



# LIBRARIES

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

## **Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954. The Geneva Conference. Volume XVI 1952/1954**

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952/1954

<https://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/G5OAT7XT7HRHX84>

As a work of the United States government, this material is in the public domain.

For information on re-use see:

<http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/Copyright>

The libraries provide public access to a wide range of material, including online exhibits, digitized collections, archival finding aids, our catalog, online articles, and a growing range of materials in many media.

When possible, we provide rights information in catalog records, finding aids, and other metadata that accompanies collections or items. However, it is always the user's obligation to evaluate copyright and rights issues in light of their own use.



Foreign  
Relations  
of the  
United  
States




1952-1954

Volume XVI

THE  
GENEVA  
CONFERENCE

Department of State  
Washington

Copyright





LEHMAN  
LIBRARY

\$20.00



Foreign Relations  
of the  
United States  
1952-1954

Volume XVI

The Geneva Conference



*Editor in Chief*

John P. Glennon

*Editors*

Allen H. Kitchens

Neal H. Petersen

United States  
Government Printing Office  
Washington: 1981

Lehman,

JX

233

A3

1952 54

v. 16

Gift.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 9167

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN  
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

---

For sale by the  
U.S. Government Book Store  
Department of State

## PREFACE

John P. Glennon supervised the preparation of this volume and compiled the portion on Korea. Allen H. Kitchens and Neal H. Petersen compiled the section on Indochina.

Fredrick Aandahl, formerly Editor in Chief, exercised general supervision over the initiation and preparation of this volume. William Z. Slany, who became General Editor in 1979, directed the final editing and release. Rita M. Baker and Vicki L. Ettleman of the Publishing Services Division performed the technical editing under the immediate supervision of Margie R. Wilber. Anne K. Pond prepared the index.

I acknowledge the assistance of the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency, in locating various documents and assisting the process of declassification. I thank those foreign governments that granted permission to publish their documents.

DAVID F. TRASK

*The Historian, Office of the Historian  
Bureau of Public Affairs*

---

### PRINCIPLES FOR THE COMPILATION AND EDITING OF "FOREIGN RELATIONS"

The principles which guide the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* are stated in Department of State Regulation 2 FAM 1350 of June 15, 1961, a revision of the order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. The text of the regulation, as further amended, is printed below:

1350 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

1351 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further ma-

terial is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

### 1352 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State. The editing of the record is guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

### 1353 *Clearance*

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, the Historical Office:

- a. Refers to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
- b. Refers to the appropriate foreign governments' requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.



# CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE . . . . .	III
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS . . . . .	VII
LIST OF PERSONS . . . . .	XI
THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON KOREA, APRIL 26-JUNE 15, 1954	
I. Introduction	
A. Note on Sources and Presentation of Material . . . . .	3
B. List of Papers Prepared for the Geneva Conference on Korea . . . . .	4
C. Schedule of the Plenary Sessions on Korea . . . . .	6
D. Schedule of Meetings of the Heads of the Sixteen Allied Delegations . . . . .	7
E. List of Participants in the Geneva Conference on Korea . . . . .	7
II. Pre-Conference Documents: Efforts To Persuade the Republic of Korea To Attend the Conference; Preparations for the Conference; Position Papers; Procedural and Administrative Matters (February 16-April 25) . . . . .	14
III. Proceedings of the Conference: Efforts To Reach an Agreed Position With the Republic of Korea; Meetings With Other Delegations; Proposals on Korea by Various Delegations; Issuance of the Declaration by the Sixteen; Conclusion of the Conference (April 26-June 15) . . . . .	143
IV. Post-Conference Documents: Views on the Results of the Conference; Consideration by the Allied Side of a Report to the United Nations (June 16-June 23) . . . . .	388
THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDOCHINA, MAY 8-JULY 21, 1954	
I. Introduction	
A. Note of Sources and Presentation of Material . . . . .	397
B. List of Papers Prepared for the Geneva Conference on Indochina . . . . .	399
C. Schedule of Plenary and Restricted Sessions on Indochina . . . . .	401
D. List of Participants in the Geneva Conference on Indochina . . . . .	403
II. Pre-Conference Documents: Efforts To Prevent Portrayal as a Five-Power Conference; Question of Associated States and Viet Minh Participation; French Conditions for Cease-Fire and Political Negotiations; United Action in Southeast Asia; Preparations for the Conference; Position Papers; Procedural and Administrative Matters (February 19-May 7) . . . . .	414
III. Proceedings of the Conference: Continued Discussions of Conference Arrangements, Procedures, and Participants; United States Positions and Tactics at the Conference; Arrangements and Discussions on Collective Defense in Southeast Asia; Consideration of United States Military Intervention in Indochina; Proposals on Indochina by the Various Delegations; Efforts To End Hostilities in Indochina and To Preserve Peace in Southeast Asia; United States Participation in the Final Stage of the Indochina Phase of the Conference; Conclusion of the Geneva Conference (May 8-July 21) . . . . .	727

	<b>Page</b>
IV. Indochina Documents Prepared by the International Secretariat of the Geneva Conference: Armistice Agreements for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; the Final Declaration on Indochina; Declarations by Cambodia, Laos, and France; Proposed Amendment by Vietnam to the Final Declaration (July 20–July 21) . . . . .	1505
V. Post-Conference Documents: Views on the Armistice Agreements; Statements by Secretary of State Dulles and Under Secretary of State Smith; Legal Analysis of the Geneva Armistice Agreement Restrictions; Arrangements Pertaining to the International Control Commission (July 22–August 11) . . . . .	1547
<b>INDEX</b> . . . . .	<b>1571</b>

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

**EDITOR'S NOTE**—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

- AFP**, Agence France Presse  
**ANZUS**, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (the ANZUS Pact nations)  
**AP**, Associated Press  
**ARMA**, Army Attaché  
**AS**, Associated States (of Indochina—Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia)  
**ASF**, Associated States Forces  
**ASIC**, Associated States of Indochina  
**BNA**, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State  
**C**, Office of the Counselor of the Department of State  
**CA**, Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State  
**CAS**, Controlled American Source  
**CATC**, Central Air Transport Corporation (Republic of China)  
**CC**, Communist China; Communist Chinese  
**CCF**, Communist Chinese Forces  
**CF**, conference file  
**CFM**, Council of Foreign Ministers  
**CG**, Commanding General  
**CHI**, Chinese  
**ChiCom**, Chinese Communist  
**Chi Commie(s)**, Chinese Communist(s)  
**CIA**, Central Intelligence Agency  
**CIGS**, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (United Kingdom)  
**C-in-C (CINC)**, Commander in Chief  
**CINCFE**, Commander in Chief, Far East  
**CINCPAC**, Commander in Chief, Pacific  
**CINCUNC**, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command  
**cir**, circular  
**cirtel**, circular telegram  
**CNAC**, China National Aviation Corporation (Republic of China)  
**CNO**, Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy  
**CodeI**, telegram series indicator for Congressional and Vice-Presidential delegation travel  
**Commie(s)**, Communist(s)  
**COMSAC**, Commanding General, Strategic Air Command  
**ConGen**, Consul General  
**CPR**, Chinese People's Republic or People's Republic of China  
**CY**, calendar year  
**DA**, Department of the Army  
**DBP**, Dien Bien Phu  
**DCM**, Deputy Chief of Mission  
**DefMin**, Defense Minister  
**Del**, Delegation; Delegate  
**Depcirtel**, Department of State circular telegram  
**Deptel**, Department of State telegram  
**DMS**, Director of the Mutual Security Agency  
**DMZ**, Demilitarized Zone  
**DNP**, Democratic Nationalist Party (Republic of Korea)  
**DOD**, Department of Defense  
**DPROK**, Democratic People's Republic of Korea  
**DRF**, Division of Research for the Far East, Department of State  
**DRV**, Democratic Republic of Vietnam

- DRW**, Division of Research for Western Europe, Department of State
- Dulte**, primarily a series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Dulles while absent from Washington; also used as a series indicator for telegrams to him from the head of the United States Delegation at an international conference
- DZ**, Demilitarized Zone
- ECA**, Economic Cooperation Administration
- ECOSOC**, United National Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
- EDC**, European Defense Community
- EE**, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
- Emb**, Embassy
- Embtel**, Embassy telegram
- EUR**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- EUR/P**, Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- FE**, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State; Far Eastern
- FE/P**, Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- FECOM (FECOM)**, Far East Command
- FEC**, French Expeditionary Corps
- FonAff**, Foreign Affairs
- FonMin**, Foreign Minister
- FonOff**, Foreign Office
- FonSec**, Foreign Secretary
- FSO**, Foreign Service Officer
- FTEO**, French forces in the Far East
- FY**, fiscal year
- FYI**, for your information
- G**, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State, Department of State
- GA**, General Assembly of the United Nations
- GARIOA**, Government Assistance and Relief in Occupied Areas
- Gento**, series indicator for telegrams from Defense representatives at the Geneva Conference to the Department of Defense
- GHQ**, General Headquarters
- GI**, paper prepared for the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference, dealing with the Indochina phase of the Conference
- GK**, paper prepared for the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference, dealing with the Korea phase of the Conference
- GKI**, paper prepared for the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference, dealing with both the Indochina and Korea phases of the Conference
- GM**, Groupe Mobile, French regimental combat team
- HC**, High Commissioner
- HCM**, Ho Chi Minh
- HICOG**, United States High Commissioner for Germany
- HICOM**, High Commissioner
- HM**, Her (His) Majesty
- HMG**, Her (His) Majesty's Government
- IAC**, Intelligence Advisory Committee
- IC**, Division of International Conferences, Department of State; Indochina
- ICC**, International Control Commission
- ICJ**, International Court of Justice (the World Court)
- IE**, Intelligence Estimate (Department of State)
- ILO**, International Labor Organization
- INS**, International News Service
- ISA**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
- JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- KMAG**, United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea
- L**, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
- L/UNA**, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State
- MAAC**, Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee
- MAAG**, Military Assistance Advisory Group

- MAC**, Military Armistice Commission, Korea
- MAG**, Military Advisory Group
- MDA**, Mutual Defense Assistance
- MDAP**, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
- MRP**, Mouvement Républicain Populaire, French political party
- MSA**, Mutual Security Act (of 1951) ; Mutual Security Agency ; Mutual Security Assistance
- msg**, message
- MSP**, Mutual Security Program
- mytel**, my telegram
- NA**, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State
- NAC**, National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems ; North Atlantic Council
- NAT(O)**, North Atlantic Treaty (Organization)
- niact**, night action, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
- NIE**, National Intelligence Estimate
- NK**, North Korea
- NNRC**, Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission
- NNSC**, Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
- Noforn**, no foreign dissemination
- NSC**, National Security Council
- OC/T (OCR/T)**, Telegraph Branch of the Office of Communications and Records, Department of State
- OIR**, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State
- OIR/DRF**, Division of Research for the Far East, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State
- OMA**, Office of Military Assistance, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
- OPI**, Office of Public Information, (Republic of Korea)
- P**, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
- PAO**, Public Affairs Officer
- PC**, political conference
- PDROK**, People's Democratic Republic of Korea
- PermRep**, Permanent Representative
- PM**, Prime Minister
- POC**, Peace Observation Commission
- PPS**, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
- PRC**, People's Republic of China
- PriMin**, Prime Minister
- PSA**, Office of Philippine and South-east Asian Affairs, Department of State
- PW**, Prisoner of War
- R**, Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State
- reftel**, reference telegram
- ROK**, Republic of Korea (South Korea)
- S**, Office of the Secretary of State, Department of State
- S/MSA**, Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs
- S/P**, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
- S/S**, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
- S/S-O**, Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
- S/S-RO**, Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
- SC**, Security Council of the United Nations
- SEA**, Southeast Asia
- SEATO**, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
- Secto**, series indicator for telegrams to the Department of State from the Secretary of State (or his delegation) in connection with international conferences
- sitrep**, situation report
- SNIE**, Special National Intelligence Estimate
- SOA**, Office of South Asian Affairs
- SYG**, Secretary-General
- Tedul**, primarily a series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Dulles while absent from Washington ; also used as series indicator for telegrams from Dulles to the head of

- the United States Delegation at an international conference
- TIAS**, Treaties and Other International Acts Series
- Tosec**, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State (or his delegation) in connection with international conferences
- U**, Office of the Under Secretary of State, Department of State
- UK**, United Kingdom
- UN**, United Nations
- UNA**, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State
- UNC**, United Nations Command
- UNCURK**, United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
- UNGA**, United Nations General Assembly
- UNO**, United Nations Organization
- UNP**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State
- UNSC**, United Nations Security Council
- UNTCOK**, United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea
- UNTS**, United Nations Treaty Series
- UP**, United Press
- URAS**, Union des Républicains d'Action Sociale, French political party
- urtel**, your telegram
- USA**, United States Army
- USAF**, United States Air Force
- USARMA**, United States Army Attaché
- USDel**, United States Delegation (Delegate)
- USIA**, United States Information Agency
- USIS**, United States Information Service
- USMC**, United States Marine Corps
- USN**, United States Navy
- USOM**, United States Operations Mission
- USRO**, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations
- UST**, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*
- USUN**, United States Mission at the United Nations
- VM**, Viet Minh
- VN**, Vietnam; Vietnamese
- WE**, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State
- WHO**, World Health Organization
- wirom**, series indicator for certain Department of State administrative telegrams

## LIST OF PERSONS

**EDITOR'S NOTE.**—The individuals identified below were principal participants in the events covered in this volume. Other officials and individuals not included in the list are identified in footnotes to the text at appropriate places. In general, individuals attending but not participating in meetings, and persons mentioned only in passing have not been identified. All titles and positions are American unless otherwise indicated. Where no dates are given, the individual held the position throughout the period covered by this volume. Spelling and alphabetization of names follow as closely as possible the style of official publications of the countries concerned.

- ACHILLES, THEODORE C.**, Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in France; Special Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- ACIKALIN, CEVAT**, Secretary General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Head of the Turkish Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- ALDRICH, WINTHROP W.**, Ambassador in the United Kingdom.
- ALEXANDER OF TUNIS, HAROLD R.L.G.**, Field Marshal, Earl, British Minister of Defense.
- ALI SASTROAMIDJOJO**, Prime Minister of Indonesia.
- ALLEN, WILLIAM D.**, Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, British Foreign Office; Member of the United Kingdom Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- BAEYENS, JACQUES**, Chief of the Press and Information Service, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Assistant French Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- BALDWIN, CHARLES F.**, Economic Coordinator, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State.
- BAO DAI**, Chief of State of Vietnam.
- BEAUMONT, JEAN MICHEL GUERIN DE**, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs after June 1954.
- BENLER, TALAT**, Member of the Turkish Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- BENTINCK, A.**, Netherlands Minister in Switzerland; Vice Chairman of the Netherlands Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- BERDING, ANDREW H.**, Assistant Director for Policy and Programs, United States Information Agency.
- BERNAU, PHYLLIS D.**, Secretary to Secretary of State Dulles.
- BEVIN, ERNEST**, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, July 1945–March 1951.
- BIDAULT, GEORGES**, French Minister for Foreign Affairs until June 18, 1954; Head of the French Delegation at the Geneva Conference until June 18, 1954.
- BLAKENEY, F. J.**, Australian Minister in the United States.
- BOHLEN, CHARLES E.**, Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
- BONBRIGHT, JAMES C. H. JR.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until April 1954; Special Assistant to the U.S. Representative to NATO and to European Regional Organizations after April 1954.
- BONNET, HENRI**, French Ambassador in the United States.

- BONSAI, PHILIP W.**, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State: Adviser, later Special Adviser, to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- BORIS, GEORGES**, French Counselor of State and member of the personal cabinet of French Prime Minister Mendès-France after June 19, 1954; Assistant French Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- BOWIE, ROBERT R.**, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State: Special Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- BREBISSON**. *See de Brebisson*.
- BRIGGS, ELLIS O.**, Ambassador in Korea.
- BRIONES, MANUEL C.**, President pro tempore of the Philippine Senate: Member of the Philippine Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- BUTTERWORTH, W. WALTON**, Deputy Chief of Mission in the United Kingdom.
- BUU KINH**, Counselor of the Assembly of the French Union: Official Observer of the State of Vietnam at the United Nations; Counselor to the State of Vietnam Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- BUU LOC**, Prince, Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam until June 16, 1954.
- CABLE, JAMES E.**, Member of the Southeast Asia Department, British Foreign Office; Member of the United Kingdom Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- CACCIA, SIR HAROLD A.**, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration in the British Foreign Office; Member of the United Kingdom Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- CALHOUN, JOHN A.**, First Secretary and Consul in the Embassy in Korea; Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- CASEY, RICHARD G.**, Australian Minister for External Affairs; Head of the Australian Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- CHANG WEN-TIEN**, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China; P.R.C. Ambassador in the Soviet Union: P.R.C. Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- CHARUN P. ISARANGKUN NA AYUTHIA**, Chief, Southeast Asia Division, Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Delegate and Secretary to the Thai Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- CHAUVEL, JEAN**, French Ambassador in Switzerland; French Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- CHEYSSON, CLAUDE**, Assistant Principal Private Secretary to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs; Expert to the French Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- CHIANG KAI-SHEK**, Generalissimo, President of the Republic of China.
- CHO CHUNG HWAN**, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea; Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time of the Geneva Conference on Korea.
- CHOU EN-LAI**, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China: Head of the P.R.C. Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- CHUONG**. *See Tran Van Chuong*.
- CHURCHILL, SIR WINSTON LEONARD SPENCER**, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.
- CLUTTERBUCK, SIR ALEXANDER**, British High Commissioner in India.
- COGNY, RENÉ**, General, Commander of the Franco-Vietnamese Land Forces in North Vietnam.
- COOPER, CHESTER L.**, Expert, later Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.



- COOPER, F. B., Secretary of the Australian Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- CORNER, F. H., Counselor of the New Zealand High Commission in the United Kingdom; Delegate of New Zealand at the Geneva Conference.
- COTY, RENÉ. President of France.
- CRITCHLEY, T. K., Member of the Australian Delegation to the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea; Australian Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- CROWE, PHILIP K., Ambassador in Ceylon.
- CUENCO, MIGUEL, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Philippine House of Representatives; Member of the Philippine Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- CUTLER, ROBERT, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Eisenhower.
- DAC KHE. *See* Nguyen Dac Khe.
- DALEY, JOHN, Brigadier General, Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- DAVIS, ARTHUR C., Vice Admiral, Director, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense; Special Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- DAY, HENRY B., Deputy Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State.
- DEAN, ARTHUR H., Deputy Chairman, for the Secretary of State, of the United States Delegation to the Negotiations at Panmunjom for the prospective political conference on Korea, September 1953–February 1954; Special Representative of the Secretary of State for discussions with Republic of Korea President Syngman Rhee, April–May 1954.
- DE BEUS, J. G., Netherlands Minister in the United States.
- DE BREBISSEAN, MICHEL, Colonel, Chief of the Special Staff of the French Secretary of State for Relations with the Associated States; Counselor to the French Delegation and Member of the French Union Military Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- DE FOLIN, JACQUES, Principal Private Secretary to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs; Expert to the French Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- DEJEAN, MAURICE, French Commissioner General for Indochina.
- DE LA CHEVALERIE, DAUFRESNE, Member of the Belgian Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY, JEAN, General, French High Commissioner and Commander in Chief, French Forces in Indochina, 1950–1951.
- DELTEL, HENRI, Brigadier General, Counselor to the French Delegation and Head of the French Union Military Delegation at the Geneva Conference; signer of the ceasefire agreements for Laos and the State of Vietnam at Geneva.
- DE MARGERIE. *See* Jacquin de Margerie.
- DE SALIS, JEAN, Professor of History at the Swiss Institute of Technology in Zurich; Swiss Delegate at the UNESCO Conference, 1954.
- DEVAKULA. *See* Prididebyabongs Devakula, Prince.
- DIEM. *See* Ngo Dinh Diem.
- DILLON, C. DOUGLAS, Ambassador in France.
- DINH. *See* Nguyen Quoc Dinh.
- DINH LUYEN. *See* Ngo Dinh Luyen.
- DIXON, SIR PIERSON JOHN, British Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

Do. *See* Tran Van Do.

DONG. *See* Pham Van Dong.

DRUMBRIGHT, EVERETT F., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

DULLES, ALLEN, Director of Central Intelligence.

DULLES, JOHN FOSTER. Secretary of State; Head of the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference, April 26–May 3, 1954.

DWAN, JOHN E., Lieutenant Colonel, Department of Defense; Expert, later Adviser, to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.

EDDY, DONALD B., Division of International Conferences, Department of State; Assistant Secretary General of the Allied Delegations at the Geneva Conference on Korea.

EDEN, ANTHONY, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Head of the British Delegation at the Geneva Conference; one of the three rotating chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Korea.

EISENHOWER, DWIGHT D., President of the United States.

ELBRICK, CHARLES BURKE, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

ELY, PAUL, General, French High Commissioner and Commander in Chief, French Forces in Indochina after June 3, 1954.

FALAIZE, PIERRE-LOUIS, Director of the Office of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Assistant French Delegate at the Geneva Conference.

FEDORENKO, N. T., Member of the Collegium of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Member of the Soviet Delegation at the Geneva Conference.

FERGUSON, ROBERT G., Colonel, Member of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense; Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.

FISCHER, MARTIN, Observer from the Federal Republic of Germany at the Geneva Conference.

FISHER, WILLIAM DALE, Member of the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State.

FOSTER, H. SCHUYLER, JR., Chief, Public Studies Division, Department of State.

FRÉDÉRIC-DUPONT, EDOUARD, Member of the French National Assembly; French Secretary of State for Relations with the Associated States in June 1954; French Delegate at the Geneva Conference.

GARCIA, CARLOS P., Vice President and Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Philippines; Head of the Philippine Delegation at the Geneva Conference.

GETZ, JOHN P., Member of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State; Expert, later Adviser, to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.

GIAP. *See* Vo Nguyen Giap.

GIBSON, WILLIAM M., First Secretary of the Embassy in France.

GLEYSTEEN, WILLIAM H. JR., Member, Policy Reports Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State; Reports Officer to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.

GOWEN, FRANKLIN C., Consul at Geneva and United States Representative for International Organizations; Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.

GROMYKO, A. A. Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Member of the Soviet Delegation at the Geneva Conference.

- GROS, ANDRÉ, Legal Adviser to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Assistant French Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- GULLION, EDMUND A., Member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.
- HAMMARSKJOLD, DAG H. A. C., Secretary-General of the United Nations.
- HARRY, R. L., Australian Permanent Delegate to the European Office of the United Nations at Geneva; Australian Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- HA VAN LAU, Member of the Military Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam at the Geneva Conference.
- HEATH, DONALD R., Ambassador in Cambodia and Vietnam, and Minister in Laos (resident in Saigon); Special Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference and Chairman of the Delegation's Indochina Working Group.
- HEENEY, ARNOLD D. P., Canadian Ambassador in the United States.
- HENNES, RICHARD V., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State.
- HENSEL, H. STRUVE, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
- HEYWOT, ATO ZAUDE GABRE, Permanent Representative of Ethiopia at the United Nations; Head of the Ethiopian Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- HINH. *See* Nguyen Van Hinh.
- HO CHI MINH, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
- HOEY, ROBERT E., Officer in Charge of Vietnam-Laos-Cambodia Affairs, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State.
- HONG, JIN KI, Vice Minister of Justice, Republic of Korea; Member of the Republic of Korea Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- HOPPENOT, HENRI, French Permanent Representative at the United Nations.
- HUAN HSIANG, Director of the Department of West European and African Affairs, People's Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Adviser to the P.R.C. Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- HUANG HUA, Counselor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China; Adviser and Spokesman for the P.R.C. Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- HULL, JOHN E., Major General; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and Commander in Chief, Far East.
- JACQUET, MARC, French Secretary of State for Relations with the Associated States, July 1953-June 1954; French Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- JACQUIN DE MARGERIE, ROLAND, Assistant Director General for Political and Economic Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Assistant French Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- JEBB, SIR HUBERT MILES GLADWYN, Ambassador of the United Kingdom in France after April 13, 1954.
- JOHNSON, U. ALEXIS, Ambassador in Czechoslovakia; Coordinator of the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference; Head of the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference, June 20-July 17; Deputy Representative and Coordinator of the Delegation, July 17-21, 1954.
- JOXE, LOUIS, French Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
- JOY, MICHAEL G. L., First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States.
- JOYCE, ROBERT P., Counselor of Embassy in France.
- KEPPEL, JOHN, Second Secretary and Consul in the Embassy in the Soviet Union; Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- KEY, DAVID MCK., Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.

- KHAMMAO.** *See* Tiao Khammao.
- KHAMPHAN PANYA,** Deputy Secretary General to the Council of the French Union in Paris; Laotian Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- KHOMAN.** *See* Thanat Khoman.
- KIM.** *See* Tran Trong Kim.
- KIMNY.** *See* Nong Kimny.
- KINDYNIS, JEAN,** Director of American and United Nations Affairs, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Member of the Greek Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- KIRKPATRICK, SIR IVONE A.,** British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- KITCHEN, JEFFREY C.,** Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State; Deputy Coordinator of, and Secretary to, the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference, July 17-21, 1954.
- KOO, V. K. WELLINGTON,** Ambassador of the Republic of China in the United States.
- KOTELAWALA, SIR JOHN L.,** Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs of Ceylon.
- KURAL, ADNAN,** Director General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Secretary General, 16 Nations Secretariat (the Allied Delegations), at the Geneva Conference on Korea.
- KUZNETSOV, V. V.,** Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Soviet Ambassador in the People's Republic of China; Member of the Soviet Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- LA CHAMBRE, GUY,** French Secretary of State for Relations with the Associated States after June 1954; French Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- LACOSTE, FRANCIS,** Assistant French Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- LALOY, JEAN L.,** Counselor to the French Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- LAMB, SIR LIONEL HENRY,** British Ambassador in Switzerland.
- LANDON, KENNETH P.,** Officer in Charge of Thai and Malayan Affairs, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State.
- LANIEL, JOSEPH,** Prime Minister of France until June 18, 1954.
- LA TOURNELLE.** *See* le Roy de la Tournelle.
- LAVRISHCHEV, A. A.,** Head of the First European Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Secretary General to the Soviet Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- LE QUANG TRIEU,** Colonel, Armed Forces Attaché at the Embassy of the State of Vietnam in the United States; Delegate of the State of Vietnam at the Geneva Conference.
- LE ROY DE LA TOURNELLE, GUY,** Director General for Political and Economic Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Assistant French Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- LE VAN KIM,** Colonel, Member of the Military Delegation of the State of Vietnam at the Geneva Conference.
- LI KE-NUNG,** Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China; P.R.C. Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- LIMB, BEN C.,** Permanent Observer of the Republic of Korea at the United Nations; Member of the Republic of Korea Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- LLOYD, JOHN SELWYN BROOKE,** Minister of State, British Foreign Office.
- LODGE, HENRY CABOT, JR.,** United States Representative at the United Nations.
- LUCE, CLARE BOOTHE,** Ambassador in Italy.

- LUNS, JOSEPH M.A.H., Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs; Head of the Netherlands Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- MACARTHUR, DOUGLAS, II, Counselor of the Department of State; Special Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- MAKINS, SIR ROGER M., British Ambassador in the United States.
- MARGERIE. *See* Jacquin de Margerie.
- MARTIN, EDWIN W., Deputy Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State; Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- MASSIGLI, RENÉ, French Ambassador in the United Kingdom.
- MATTHEWS, H. FREEMAN, Ambassador in the Netherlands.
- MATTHEWS, JACK B., Lieutenant Colonel, Member of G-3.
- MCBRIDE, ROBERT H., Officer in charge of French-Iberian Affairs, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State; Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- MCCARDLE, CARL W., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; Special Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- MCCCLINTOCK, ROBERT, Counselor of Embassy in Vietnam.
- MCCCLURKIN, ROBERT J. G., Deputy Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State.
- MCCONAUGHY, WALTER P., Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State.
- MCINTOSH, A. D., Secretary of the New Zealand Ministry of External Affairs; New Zealand Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- MEEKER, LEONARD C., Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State.
- MENÈS-FRANCE, PIERRE, Prime Minister of France and Minister for Foreign Affairs after June 19, 1954; Head of the French Delegation at the Geneva Conference, June 19-July 21, 1954.
- MENON, V. K. KRISHNA, Personal Representative of Indian Prime Minister Nehru at the Geneva Conference.
- MENZIES, ROBERT G., Prime Minister of Australia.
- MERCHANT, LIVINGSTON T., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; Special Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- MIDDLETON, GEORGE H., British Deputy High Commissioner in India.
- MILLET, PIERRE, Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States.
- MILLS, SHELDON T., Counselor of Embassy in India.
- MOHAMMAD, ALI, Prime Minister of Pakistan.
- MOHN, PAUL, Major-General; Swedish Member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea.
- MOLOTOV, V. M., Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs; Head of the Soviet Delegation at the Geneva Conference; one of the three rotating chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Korea.
- MONCKTON, G. W. R., Lieutenant Colonel, Military Adviser to the United Kingdom Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- MUNRO, LESLIE KNOX, Ambassador of New Zealand in the United States.
- MURPHY, ROBERT D., Deputy Under Secretary of State.
- NAM IL, Lieutenant General, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; Head of the D.P.R.K. Delegation at the Geneva Conference on Korea.
- NAVABRE, HENRI, General, Commander in Chief, French Forces in Indochina until June 3, 1954.

- NEHRU, JAWAHARLAL, Indian Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.
- NGO DINH DIEM, Prime Minister. Minister of National Defense and Minister of the Interior of the State of Vietnam, after June 16, 1954.
- NGO DINH LUYEN, Personal Representative of Vietnamese Chief of State Bao Dai at the Geneva Conference.
- NGUYEN DAC KHE, Minister of Democratization of the State of Vietnam; Deputy Chief of the State of Vietnam Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- NGUYEN HUU CHAU, Member of the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem; Delegate of the State of Vietnam at the Geneva Conference.
- NGUYEN HUU TRI, Governor of North Vietnam.
- NGUYEN QUOC DINH, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Vietnam until June 16, 1954; State of Vietnam Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- NGUYEN TRUNG VINH, Vice President of the Council of Ministers of the State of Vietnam; Head of the Delegation of the State of Vietnam at the Geneva Conference for part of May 1954.
- NGUYEN VAN HINH, Brigadier General; Chief of Staff of the Army of the State of Vietnam.
- NGUYEN VAN TAM, Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam, June 1952–December 1953.
- NHIEK TILOUNG, General, Cambodian Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief, Khmer National Armed Forces; Head of the Cambodian Military Delegation at the Geneva Conference; signer of the ceasefire agreement for Cambodia.
- NONG KIMNY, Cambodian Ambassador in the United States; Member of the Cambodian Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- NORODOM SIHANOUK, King of Cambodia.
- NOVIKOV, K. V., Head of the Southeast Asia Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Member of the Soviet Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- O'CONNOR, RODERIC L., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State after February 21, 1954.
- O'DANIEL, JOHN W., Lieutenant General; Chief of the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group in Indochina after April 12, 1954.
- OFFROY, RAYMOND, French Ambassador in Thailand; Assistant French Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- OUROT SOUVANNAVONG, Minister of Laos in the United States; Laotian Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- PAGE, EDWARD, JR., Counselor of Embassy in France and Deputy Director for Political Affairs in the United States Mission to NATO and the European Regional Organizations; Special Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- PAIK TU CHIN, Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea, April 1953–June 1954.
- PANDIT, MADAME SRIMATI VIJAYA LAKSHMI, Permanent Representative of India at the United Nations.
- PARODI, ALEXANDRE, Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; French Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- PAUL-BONCOUR, JEAN, Secretary General of the International Secretariat at the Geneva Conference on Indochina.
- PEARSON, LESTER B., Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs; Head of the Canadian Delegation at the Geneva Conference.

- PEASLEE, AMOS J., Ambassador in Australia.
- PHAM VAN DONG, Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Head of the Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam at the Geneva Conference.
- PHAN HUY QUAT, Minister of National Defense of the State of Vietnam until June 1954.
- PHILLIPS, JOSEPH B., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until June 30, 1954.
- PHLEGER, HERMAN, Legal Adviser, Department of State; Special Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- PHOU SANANIKONE, Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior and of Foreign Affairs of Laos; Head of the Laotian Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- PILLAI, NARAYANA RAGHAVAN, former Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.
- PLEVEN, RENÉ, French Minister of National Defense until June 1954.
- POPPER, DAVID H., Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State.
- POTE SARASIN, Ambassador of Thailand in the United States; Delegate of Thailand at the Geneva Conference.
- PRIDIBYABONGS DEVAKULA, Prince, Delegate of Thailand to the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea; Delegate of Thailand at the Geneva Conference.
- PYUN YUNG TAI, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea after April 1951; Prime Minister after June 1954; Head of the Republic of Korea Delegation at the Geneva Conference on Korea.
- QUAT. *See* Phan Huy Quat.
- RADFORD, ARTHUR W., Admiral, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- RAYNOR, G. HAYDEN, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State.
- READING, MARQUIS OF, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, British Foreign Office; Member of the British Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- REILLY, D'ARCY PATRICK, British Minister in France.
- REINHARDT, G. FREDERICK, Counselor of Embassy in France; Special Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- RHEE, SYNGMAN, President of the Republic of Korea.
- ROBERTS, SIR FRANK K., Deputy Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.
- ROBERTSON, WALTER S., Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; Deputy United States Representative at the Geneva Conference, May 8-June 20, 1954.
- ROUX, JACQUES, Director of the Asian Department of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Assistant French Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- ROWLAND, J. R., First Secretary of the Southeast Asia Section, Australian Ministry of External Affairs; Australian Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- RUMBOLD, SIR HORACE ANTHONY C., British Minister in France.
- SAM SARY, Personal Delegate of the King of Cambodia at the Geneva Conference.
- SARASIN. *See* Pote Sarasin.
- SASTROAMIDJOJO. *See* Ali Sastroamidjojo.
- SAVANG VATTHANA, Crown Prince of Laos.

- SCHUMANN, MAURICE, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1951-1954; Deputy Chairman of the French Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- SCOTT, SIR ROBERT H., British Minister in the United States; Representative of the United Kingdom on the United States-United Kingdom Joint Study Group in Washington on Collective Security Arrangements in Southeast Asia.
- SHEEHAN, E. L., Major General, Special Adviser to the Australian Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- SHUCKBURGH, CHARLES A. E., Principal Private Secretary to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until May 10, 1954; Assistant Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs after May 10, 1954; Member of the United Kingdom Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- SIHANOUK. *See* Norodom Sihanouk.
- SISAVANG VONG, King of Laos.
- SMITH, WALTER BEDELL, Under Secretary of State; Head of the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference, May 3-June 20, and July 17-21, 1954.
- SOHN WON IL, Admiral, Minister of National Defense, Republic of Korea.
- SON SANN, former Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President of the Cambodian Council of Ministers; former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Cambodian Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- SOUPHANOUVONG, Prince, Laotian resistance leader and half-brother of Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma.
- SOUVANNA PHOUMA, Prince, Prime Minister of Laos.
- SOUVANNAVONG. *See* Ourot Souvannavong.
- SPEAK, PAUL-HENRI, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs after April 1954; Head of the Belgian Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- SPENDER, SIR PERCY C., Australian Ambassador in the United States.
- STEIN, ERIC, Acting Officer in Charge of Pacific Settlement Affairs, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State.
- STELLE, CHARLES C., Member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State; Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- STEPHANOPOULOS, STEPHAN, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs; Head of the Greek Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- STURM, PAUL J., Member of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State.
- SUYDAM, HENRY, Chief of the News Division, Department of State; Press Officer of the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- TABER, ROBERT C., Lieutenant Colonel, Assistant Army Attaché at the Embassy in Saigon; Expert to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- TAHOUBDIN, JOHN G., Head of the Southeast Asia Department, British Foreign Office; Member of the United Kingdom Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- TA QUANG BUU, Vice Minister of Defense of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; D.R.V. Delegate and Head of the Military Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- TEMPLER, SIR GERALD, General, United Kingdom High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya.
- TEP PHAN, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cambodia; Head of the Cambodian Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- TEZENAS DU MONTCEL, ROBERT, Director General, Office of the French Secretary of State for Relations with the Associated States; Assistant French Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- THAK SENIVONGS NA AYUTHIA, Brigadier General, Military Attaché at the Thai Embassy in France; Delegate of Thailand at the Geneva Conference.



- THANAT KHOMAN, Deputy Permanent Delegate of Thailand at the United Nations; Delegate of Thailand at the Geneva Conference.
- THURSTON, RAY L., Deputy Director and later Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State; Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- TIAO KHAMMAO, Prince, Chief Representative of the King of Laos to the President of the French Union in Paris; Delegate of Laos at the Geneva Conference.
- TIUOLONG. *See* Nhieik Tioulong.
- TOURNELLE. *See* le Roy de la Tournelle.
- TRAN CONG TUONG, Vice Minister of Justice of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Delegate of and Translator for the D.R.V. Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- TRAN TRONG KIM, President of the National Congress of the State of Vietnam.
- TRAN VAN CHUONG, Minister of State for the State of Vietnam after June 1954; Delegate of the State of Vietnam at the Geneva Conference.
- TRAN VAN DO, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Vietnam after June 16; Head of the State of Vietnam Delegation at the Geneva Conference, June 16–July 21, 1954.
- TRAN VAN HUU, Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam, May 1950–June 1952.
- TRAN VAN KHA, Ambassador of the State of Vietnam in the United States.
- TRAN VAN TUYEN, Counselor to the Delegation of the State of Vietnam at the Geneva Conference.
- TRAPNELL, THOMAS J. H., Major General, Chief of the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group in Indochina, August 1952–February 1954.
- TREVELYAN, HUMPHREY, British Chargé in the People's Republic of China; Member of the United Kingdom Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- TRI. *See* Nguyen Huu Tri.
- TROYANOVSKY, O. A., Interpreter for the Soviet Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- TRULOCK, WALTER N., Member, Staff Operations, Executive Secretariat, Department of State; Technical Secretary to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- TWNING, NATHAN F., General, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force.
- TYLER, WILLIAM R., Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State.
- U NU, Prime Minister of Burma.
- URRUTIA, HOLGUIN FRANCISCO, Colombian Permanent Representative at the United Nations; Member of the Colombian Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- VADAKAN. *See* Vichit Vadakan.
- VALLUY, JEAN, General, French Member of the NATO Standing Group in the United States and French Representative at the Five-Power Military Conference in Washington, June 1954.
- VAN FLEET, JAMES A., General (ret.), former Commander of the United States 8th Army in Korea; appointed Special Representative of President Eisenhower to conduct a military survey in the Far East, April 1954.
- VAN HOLLEN, CHRISTOPHER, Member, Staff Operations, Executive Secretariat, Department of State; Technical Secretary to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- VAN ROIJEN, JEAN HERMAN, Netherlands Ambassador in the United States.

- VERGIN, NUREDDIN, Minister of Turkey in Portugal; Turkish Delegate at the Geneva Conference.
- VICHIT, VADAKAN, Minister of Thailand in Switzerland; Member of the Thai Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- VINH. *See* Nguyen Trung Vinh.
- VINOGRADOV, S. A., Soviet Ambassador in France; Member of the Soviet Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- VO NGUYEN GIAP, Minister of Defense and Vice Premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Commander in Chief of the People's Army of Vietnam.
- WAN WAITHAYAKON KROMMUN NARADHIP BONGSPRABANDH, Prince, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand; Head of the Thai Delegation at the Geneva Conference; one of the three rotating chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Korea.
- WANG PING-NAN, Director of the Staff Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China; Secretary General of the People's Republic of China Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- WATT, ALAN S., Australian Commissioner to the Federation of Malaya; Member of the Australian Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- WEBB, THOMAS CLIFTON, New Zealand Minister of External Affairs; Head of the New Zealand Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- WILSON, CHARLES ERWIN, Secretary of Defense.
- YAGER, JOSEPH A., Chief of the Division of Research for the Far East, Department of State; Expert, later Adviser, to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- YOU CHAN YANG, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea in the United States; Member of the R.O.K. Delegation at the Geneva Conference on Korea.
- YOUNG, KENNETH T., Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State; Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference and Chairman of the Delegation's Working Group on Korea.
- ZAFRULLAH KHAN, SIR CHAUDHRI MUHAMMAD, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister for Commonwealth Relations of Pakistan.
- ZARUBIN, G. N., Soviet Ambassador in the United States; Member of the Soviet Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
- ZULETA ANGEL, EDUARDO, Colombian Ambassador in the United States; Head of the Colombian Delegation at the Geneva Conference.

**THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON KOREA**  
**April 26–June 15, 1954**



## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. NOTES ON SOURCES AND PRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FOR THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON KOREA

#### 1. *The nature of the Conference*

Essentially the Geneva Conference on Korea was a two-sided affair with 16 Allied delegations confronting 3 Communist delegations. The Conference did not resolve the Korean question, did not reach any agreed positions, and, indeed, did not even vote on any proposals, since the Conference rules were very loose and informal and incorporated no procedures for voting. The Conference terminated with no agreement save the obvious one of continuing to disagree.

While the Conference was not open to the public, the statements and proposals made in the plenary sessions were for public consumption. Speeches were handed out to the press, as were the various proposals, for maximum publicity. The one restricted session on Korea, held on May 1, was restricted only in the number of nations attending—seven rather than nineteen; otherwise, the restricted session was as well publicized as the plenary sessions.

#### 2. *Presentation of the material*

Due to the maximum use of publicity by the delegations and the quasi-open nature of the sessions, telegraphic summaries have been used to cover the meetings, with footnote references in each case to the minutes of the various meetings. This has been done in order to avoid repetition and save space in the volume.

The documentation is set forth in strictly chronological order, with no topical break-downs. Where telegraphic summaries of meetings were transmitted some time after the events, the documents have been given an italic heading to show the time of the meetings and have been placed in the compilation at that time.

Printed below are complete lists of the plenary sessions and the meetings of the heads of the 16 Allied delegations. (See sections C and D.)

#### 3. *Unpublished sources*

The principal source of documentation in the Department of State central files is decimal file 396.1-GE. Some preliminary material is contained in file 396.1-BE (the Berlin Conference file), and some

additional papers are in the main decimal files for Korea 795.00 and 795B.00.

In addition to the decimal files, several lot files are important. The large, consolidated Conference file, lot 60 D 627, contains the best single collection of material on the Conference. Also of considerable value are three retired lot files of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, FE files, lots 55 D 480, 55 D 481, and 60 D 330.

#### 4. *Published sources*

Overshadowed as it was by the Indochina Conference, the Korean Conference has not been heavily covered in secondary and memoir literature. For overall views of the Geneva Conference with occasional brief references to Korea, one should consult the list of published sources in this volume for the Indochina phase.

Two publications are useful because they reprint most of the statements and proposals made at the Conference on Korea. The first is a British White Paper, *Documents Relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, April 27-June 15, 1954* (Cmd. 9186). The second is *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26-June 15, 1954* (Department of State publication 5609, October 1954). The latter has been used most often for citations to the text of speeches referred to in the telegraphic summaries on the meetings. In addition, some of the statements are printed in appropriate 1954 issues of the Department of State *Bulletin*.

#### 5. *Documentation on United States-People's Republic of China Contacts*

As a result of the presence of the two delegations in Geneva for the Conference, contacts took place informally and apart from the sessions, principally on the matter of nationals detained in each country who wished to return to their homes. For documentation of these contacts not printed here, see volume XIV.

### B. LIST OF PAPERS PREPARED FOR THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON KOREA

A Working Group on Korea was set up to prepare position and background papers for the United States Delegation to the Conference. The Working Group was composed mainly of Department of State officials, although the Department of Defense was represented. Below are listed the final versions of the papers prepared for the Conference. Only those five preceded by an asterisk are printed in this compilation; the remainder may be found in FE files, lot 60 D 330.

#### *Primary Papers*

- GK D-1, March 15, 1954, Organization and Procedures
- GK D-2, March 15, 1954, Conference Agenda

- \*GK D-4b, March 27, 1954, Draft US Proposal for Reunification of Korea
- \*GK D-4/1e, April 24, 1954, Basic Position Paper on Korean Reunification
- GK D-4/2a, April 5, 1954, Variant Methods of Constituting a Korean Reunification Supervisory Commission (KRSC)
- GK D-4/4, March 29, 1954, UK, Australian, and New Zealand Views on Korean Reunification
- GK D-4/5, April 21, 1954, Further Comments by the Canadian Government on the Problem of Korean Reunification
- GK D-4/6, April 8, 1954, The US Views on the Reunification of Korea
- \*GK D-4/7, April 9, 1954, Draft Initial Proposal for Reunification of Korea (Alternative A)
- GK D-4/8, April 12, 1954, Terms of Reference of the Korean Reunification Supervisory Commission
- \*GK D-4/9, April 14, 1954, General US Views on Korean Phase of Geneva Conference
- \*GK D-4/10, April 16, 1954, Draft Proposal for Reunification of Korea (Alternative B)
- GK D-4/11, April 17, 1954, Outline of Argument in Support of Initial Unification Proposal
- GK D-5a, March 25, 1954, Possible Proposals on Korea Short of Full, Free Unification
- GK D-5/1, April 30, 1954, Possible Alternate Proposals on Korea Short of Full, Free Unification
- GK D-6/e, April 9, 1954, Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Korea
- GK D-7/a, April 19, 1954, International Assurances on the Integrity and Security of a Reunified Korea
- GK D-8a, March 26, 1954, Non-Repatriated Prisoners of War
- GK D-9b, April 9, 1954, Changes in the Armistice Agreement
- GK D-10a, April 12, 1954, The ROK Position at the Geneva Conference and US Tactics in Dealing With the ROK
- GK D-11a, March 19, 1954, Probable Soviet and Chinese Communist Objectives and Tactics at Geneva With Special Reference to Korea
- GK D-12, April 9, 1954, Probable Communist Position at Geneva on Withdrawal of Foreign Troops From Korea
- GK D-13, April 26, 1954, Return of UNC Personnel Who Are Still in Communist Custody

### *Background Papers*

- GK D-30, April 9, 1954, Contributions of Combat Forces to the UN Command (December 1953)
- GK D-30/1, April 19, 1954, Soviet Policy Towards Korea
- GK D-31, April 22, 1954, North Korean Constitution

Concerning the background and position papers on Indochina and those dealing with both Korea and Indochina (GI and GKI series),

see the list under the sources dealing with the Indochina phase, page 399.

### C. SCHEDULE OF THE PLENARY SESSIONS ON KOREA

(Reprinted from *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pages 26-27.)

*April 26.* First plenary session, Prince Wan (Thailand) presiding. Statements by Mr. Dulles (U.S.A.) and the chairman. Convened 3:10 p. m., adjourned 3:40 p. m.

*April 27.* Second plenary session, Mr. Molotov (U.S.S.R.) presiding. Statements by Mr. Pyun (R.O.K.), Nam Il (D.P.R.O.K.), and Senor Zuleta (Colombia). Convened 3:05 p. m., adjourned 5:05 p. m.

*April 28.* Third plenary session, Mr. Eden (U.K.) presiding. Statements by Mr. Dulles and Chou En-lai (C.P.R.). Convened 3:05 p. m., adjourned 5:28 p. m.

*April 29.* Fourth plenary session, Prince Wan presiding. Statements by Mr. Casey (Australia) and Mr. Molotov. Convened 3:05 p. m., adjourned 4:50 p. m.

*April 30.* Fifth plenary session, Mr. Molotov presiding. Statements by Mr. Acikalin (Turkey) and Prince Wan. Convened 3:05 p. m., adjourned 3:40 p. m.

*May 1.* Restricted session, Mr. Eden presiding. Convened 3:30 p. m., adjourned 6 p. m.

*May 3.* Sixth plenary session, Mr. Eden presiding. Statements by Mr. Pyun, Nam Il, Mr. Stephanopoulos (Greece) and Chou En-lai. Convened 3:05 p. m., adjourned 6:30 p. m.

*May 4.* Seventh plenary session, Prince Wan presiding. Statements by Mr. Pearson (Canada) and Mr. Luns (the Netherlands) and Mr. Heywot (Ethiopia). Convened 3:05 p. m., adjourned 5:03 p. m.

*May 7.* Eighth plenary session, Mr. Molotov presiding. Statements by Mr. Garcia (Philippines), Mr. Webb (New Zealand), Senor Zuleta. Convened 3:05 p. m., adjourned 5:05 p. m.

*May 11.* Ninth plenary session, Mr. Eden presiding. Statements by Mr. Molotov, Mr. Spaak (Belgium), and Mr. Pyun. Convened 3:05 p. m., adjourned 7:02 p. m.

*May 13.* Tenth plenary session, Prince Wan presiding. Statements by M. Bidault and Mr. Eden. Convened 3:05 p. m., adjourned 4:10 p. m.

*May 22.* Eleventh plenary session, Mr. Molotov presiding. Statements by Chou En-lai, Nam Il, and Mr. Pyun. Convened 3:02 p. m., adjourned 6:19 p. m.

*May 28.* Twelfth plenary session, Mr. Eden presiding. Statements by Mr. Smith (U.S.A.), Senor Urrutia (Colombia), Mr. Acikalin, Prince Wan, Mr. Watt (Australia), and M. Kindynis (Greece). Convened 3:03 p. m., adjourned 5:30 p. m.

*June 5.* Thirteenth plenary session, Prince Wan presiding. Statements by Mr. Heywot, Nam Il, Chou En-lai, Mr. Garcia, Mr. Molotov, Baron Bentinck (the Netherlands), Mr. Pyun, and Mr. Smith. Convened 3:04 p. m., adjourned 7:10 p. m.



*June 11.* Fourteenth plenary session, Mr. Molotov presiding. Statements by Chou En-lai, Mr. Ronning (Canada), Mr. McIntosh (New Zealand), Nam Il, Mr. Eden, Prince Wan, and Mr. Spaak and M. Bidault. Convened 3:05 p. m., adjourned 7:20 p. m.

*June 15.* Fifteenth plenary session, Mr. Eden presiding. Statements by Nam Il, Chou En-lai, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Smith, Mr. Casey, Mr. Garcia, Mr. Spaak, Prince Wan and Lord Reading (U.K.). Convened 3:05 p. m., adjourned 8:35 p. m.

#### D. SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS OF THE HEADS OF THE SIXTEEN ALLIED DELEGATIONS

- First Meeting, April 26, 1954, 11:10 a. m.—12:55 p. m.
- Second Meeting, April 29, 1954, 11:00 a. m.—12:35 p. m.
- Third Meeting, May 1, 1954, 10:05 a. m.—10:25 a. m.
- Fourth Meeting, May 3, 1954, 11:10 a. m.—12:15 p. m.
- Fifth Meeting, May 13, 1954, 10:05 a. m.—11:40 a. m.
- Sixth Meeting, May 21, 1954, 10:40 a. m.—12:25 p. m.
- Seventh Meeting, June 4, 1954, 11:03 a. m.—12:55 p. m.
- Eighth Meeting, June 8, 1954, 11:05 a. m.—12:07 p. m.
- Ninth Meeting, June 14, 1954, 11:10 a. m.—1:03 p. m.
- Tenth Meeting, June 15, 1954, 11:07 a. m.—12:15 p. m.
- Eleventh Meeting, June 15, 1954, 4:50 p. m.—5:15 p. m.

#### E. LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON KOREA

Reprinted from *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pages 21–26. With the exception of the United States Delegation, here listed first, the delegations of the other countries are not complete and list only the principal officials who played a prominent role in the Conference. The delegation lists are filed in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 299 and CF 302.

##### *United States*

###### *United States Representatives*

Through May 2—John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State

After May 2—Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State

###### *Deputy United States Representative*

Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs,  
Department of State

###### *Special Assistants to the United States Representative*

Roderic L. O'Connor, Special Assistant to Secretary of State

Richard V. Hennes, Special Assistant to Under Secretary of State

*Coordinator*

U. Alexis Johnson, American Ambassador to Czechoslovakia

*Special Advisers*

Theodore Achilles, Minister, Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy, Paris

Robert R. Bowie, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Arthur C. Davis, Vice Admiral, U.S.N., Director, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense

Donald R. Heath, American Ambassador to Cambodia and Vietnam and American Minister to Laos

Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor, Department of State

Carl W. McCardle, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of State

Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State

Edward Page, Jr., Counselor of Embassy (USRO), American Embassy, Paris

Herman Phleger, Legal Adviser, Department of State

G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor of Embassy, American Embassy, Paris

*Advisers*

John Anspacher, Chief, Program Planning Staff, HICOG, Bonn  
Philip W. Bonsal, Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State

John A. Calhoun, American Embassy, Seoul

John Daley, Brigadier General, U.S.A., former Chief of Staff, U.N. Military Armistice Commission, Korea

Robert G. Ferguson, Colonel, U.S.A., Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense

Franklin C. Gowen, U.S. Representative for International Organizations and Consul General, Geneva

John Hamilton, Deputy Assistant Director for Policy and Programs, United States Information Agency

Louis Henkin, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State

Donald Kallet, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A., American Embassy, Saigon

John Keppel, American Embassy, Moscow

James F. King, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

Edwin W. Martin, Deputy Director, Office of Chinese Affairs,  
Department of State

Robert H. McBride, Office of Western European Affairs, Department  
of State

Charles C. Stelle, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Charles A. Sullivan, Chief, American and Far East Division,  
Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense

Ray L. Thurston, Deputy Director, Office of Eastern European  
Affairs, Department of State

Kenneth T. Young, Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs,  
Department of State

### *Experts*

Philip E. Barringer, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department  
of Defense

Robert Blake, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of  
State

Walter Drew, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of  
State

John E. Dwan, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A., Office of Foreign Military  
Affairs, Department of Defense

Vladimir De Grave, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department  
of State

John I. Getz, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs,  
Department of State

Milburn N. Huston, Colonel, U.S.A., Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of  
Staff

Robert C. Taber, Lieutenant Colonel, Army Attaché, American  
Embassy, Saigon

Joseph A. Yager, Division of Research for the Far East, Department  
of State

### *Press Officer*

Henry Suydam, Chief, News Division, Department of State

### *Assistants*

John P. McKnight, USIA, Rome

Edward Savage, USIA, Stuttgart

### *Secretary of Delegation*

Through June 9—Basil Capella, Executive Director, Bureau of  
Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State

After June 9—Henry F. Nichol, Conference Attaché, Geneva

### *Technical Secretaries*

Walter Trulock, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

Christopher Van Hollen, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

*Australia*

R. G. Casey, Minister for External Affairs  
A. S. Watt, Australian Commissioner in Malaya  
R. L. Harry, Australian Permanent Delegate to the European Office of the United Nations  
T. K. Critchley, Australian Delegate to UNCURK  
J. R. Rowland, First Secretary, South-East Section, Department of External Affairs, Canberra

*Belgium*

Paul-Henri Spaak, Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Louis Scheyven, Secretary-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs  
Vicomte de Lantsheere, Ambassador of Belgium in Berne  
Delvaux de Fenffe, Director-General of the Political Department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs  
Daufresne de la Chevalerie, Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of Cabinet  
Roger Taymans, Minister Plenipotentiary  
Baron de Gaffier d'Hestroy, Embassy Counsellor

*Canada*

Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs  
Chester Ronning, Canadian Minister to Norway and Iceland  
John W. Holmes, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

*Colombia*

Eduardo Zuleta Angel, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia in Washington  
Francisco Urrutia Holguin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Chief of the Permanent Delegation to the United Nations, New York  
Luis Gonzales Barros, Minister, Permanent Delegate of Colombia to the United Nations and Specialized Agencies in Geneva  
Jaime Polanía Puyo, Minister Plenipotentiary  
Julio Reyes Canal de Fregata, Minister Plenipotentiary

*Democratic People's Republic of Korea*

Nam Il, Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Paek Nam Un, Minister of Education  
Ki Sok Pok, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Chang Choon San, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs

*Ethiopia*

Ato Zaude Gabre Heywot, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations  
Dedjazmatch Amha Aberra, Adviser to the Ministry of Interior of the Imperial Ethiopian Government

*France*

Georges Bidault, Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Maurice Schumann, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
Marc Jacquet, Secretary of State for Relations with the Associated States  
Jean Chauvel, Ambassador at Berne  
Alexandre Parodi, Ambassador, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

*Greece*

Stéfanos Stephanopoulos, Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Jean Kindynis, Minister Plenipotentiary, Director of American and United Nations Affairs at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs  
Nicolas Hadji Vassiliou, Permanent Delegate for Greece to International Organizations in Geneva

*Luxembourg*

Joseph Bech, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Jean-Pierre Kremer, Counsellor of Legation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Georges Heisbourg, Counsellor of Legation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

*Netherlands*

J. M. A. H. Luns, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chairman of Delegation  
A. Bentinck, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Berne, Vice-Chairman of Delegation  
C. L. Patijn, Head of the International Organizations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

*New Zealand*

T. Clifton Webb, Minister of External Affairs  
A. D. McIntosh, Secretary of External Affairs  
F. H. Corner, Counsellor, New Zealand High Commission, London

*People's Republic of China*

Chou En-lai, Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Chang Wen-tien, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador of China to the Soviet Union

Wang Chia-hsiang, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs

Li Ke-nung, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs

*Philippines*

Carlos P. Garcia, Vice-President and Secretary for Foreign Affairs  
Manuel C. Briones, President Pro-Tempore of the Senate, Congress  
of the Philippines

Miguel Cuenco, Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs,  
House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines

Felino Neri, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary

*Republic of Korea*

Y. T. Pyun, Minister of Foreign Affairs

You Chan Yang, Ambassador to the United States of America

Ben C. Limb, Ambassador-At-Large, Permanent Observer to the  
United Nations

Jin Ki Hong, Vice Minister of Justice

*Thailand*

Prince Wan Waithayakon Krommun Naradhip Bongsprabandh,  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Nai Pote Sarasin, Ambassador at Washington

Luang Vichit Vadakan, Minister at Berne

Prince Pridi-debyabongs Devakula, Thai Delegate, UNCURK

*Turkey*

Cevat Acikalin, Ambassador of Turkey, Secretary-General of the  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Nureddin Vergin, Minister of Turkey in Lisbon

*Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*

V. M. Molotov, Minister for Foreign Affairs

A. A. Gromyko, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs

V. V. Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs

L. F. Ilyichev, Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs

N. T. Fedorenko, Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs

P. F. Yudin, U.S.S.R. Ambassador to the People's Republic of  
China

S. P. Suzdalev, U.S.S.R. Ambassador to the Democratic People's  
Republic of Korea

G. N. Zarubin, U.S.S.R. Ambassador to the United States of  
America

S. A. Vinogradov, U.S.S.R. Ambassador to France

F. F. Molochkov, U.S.S.R. Minister to Switzerland

*United Kingdom*

Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
The Marquess of Reading, Minister of State, Foreign Office  
Harold Caccia, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office  
W. D. Allen, Assistant Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office  
H. Trevelyan, Her Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Peking  
W. G. C. Graham, Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at Seoul  
C. A. E. Shuckburgh, Principal Private Secretary to the Secretary  
of State for Foreign Affairs

## II. PRE-CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS: EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE; PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONFERENCE; POSITION PAPERS; PROCEDURAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS (FEBRUARY 16-APRIL 25)

795.00/2-1654 : Telegram

### *The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY      BERLIN, February 16, 1954—2 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

Dulte 81. Re Tedul 46.<sup>2</sup> I do not think it wise to inform Rhee at this time of the details of our proposals. I think however, it would be wise to transmit to him a personal message from me along the following lines:

"In reference to the negotiations that we are now conducting in restricted sessions of our meeting here on the Far East, I want you to know that I have taken no position which departs from the statements I made in the plenary sessions, the pertinent parts of which have been transmitted to you."

If you concur would you authorize Embassy Seoul to pass message along this line to Rhee.<sup>3</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Dulles was in Berlin for the quadripartite meeting of Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, which lasted from Jan. 25 to Feb. 18, 1954. For documentation on the Berlin Conference, see volume VII. Although the main business of the Berlin Conference was the German question, on which no agreement was reached, other matters, such as Austria and European security were taken up. In the course of the meetings, the Foreign Ministers also discussed the Far East, and, in particular, the question of an international conference to resolve the Korean problem. It is with Korea that this telegram is concerned.

<sup>2</sup> The text of this telegram, dated Feb. 13, to Berlin, read as follows:

"Re discussions on Korean Political Conference, we wonder whether you would approve informing Rhee in general way of proposal now under negotiation. Various aspects of proposal have been leaking gradually to press, and we understand DeJean has informed Bao Dai and others re Indo-China aspects. We fear that if Rhee first hears of result your talks through press, he may react in harmful manner. Our recommendation is you authorize us to have Embassy Seoul informally advise Rhee in confidence substance Western proposal, stating it still under negotiation." (396.1-BE/2-1354)

<sup>3</sup> The reply to telegram Dulte 81 was contained in telegram Tedul 56, Feb. 17, to Berlin, which stated:

"Dulte 81. Believe inadvisable transmit personal message now in view of highly offensive letter Rhee has just sent to President and which we are trying to persuade him to withdraw. Would prefer, unless you object, await close of conference before filling him in on Far Eastern discussions." (795.00/2-1654)

The letter from President Rhee, dated Feb. 4, was withdrawn by Rhee at the request of the Department of State and was not delivered to President Eisenhower. In it, Rhee had stated that Korea saw no hope in the U.S. Government because of the unwillingness of the United States to back the efforts of the Republic of Korea to unify all of Korea, because of the weakness of the United States in the face of Communist intransigence, and because of pro-Japanese policies which the United States pursued at the expense of Korea. (Lot 66 D 204; "Rhee-Eisenhower Correspondence") For the text of the letter, see volume xv.



396.1-BE/2-1854 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

NIACT

BERLIN, February 18, 1954—3 a. m.

Dulte 88. For S/S and Phillips.<sup>1</sup> Limit distribution. Regarding Dulte 51 and 86.<sup>2</sup> Following is revised background briefing for USIA and press as to agreement for conference on Korea and Indochina. It should be treated as top secret until Secretary specifically authorizes its use<sup>3</sup> which will be for background only without attribution. Former background briefing should be cancelled.

*Verbatim text*

I. The United States is committed to do all in its power to try to bring about by peaceful means the unification of Korea as an independent nation free to manage its own affairs under a representative form of government.

To that end the US and the other 15 United Nations members which fought in Korea and the Republic of Korea have been trying to bring into being the political conference which was contemplated by the Korean armistice agreement of July 27, 1953, and which in accordance with the recommendation in that agreement would have been held within three months.<sup>4</sup>

Actually, more than six months have gone by, and no progress whatever has been made. Not a single feature has been agreed to—either place or date or participants. The US sent an important mission to Panmunjom in an effort to break the deadlock by negotiations on the spot, but after months of futile talk, the negotiations have now lapsed.<sup>5</sup>

The US therefore felt that it should make a further effort here at the four power meeting. Item one of the agenda of the four power conference made this topic relevant.

An agreement has now been reached.

<sup>1</sup> Joseph B. Phillips, Acting Director of the Office of Public Affairs, Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> Dated Feb. 8 and 17, respectively, from Berlin, neither printed. Telegram Dulte 51 contained background information for possible use in connection with developments at the Berlin Conference (396.1-BE/2-854). Telegram Dulte 86 transmitted the text of a Soviet revision of a British draft quadripartite communiqué on Korea and Indochina (396.1-BE/2-1754). The text in telegram Dulte 86 was substantially the same as that contained in the official communiqué issued on Feb. 18, the text of which is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Mar. 1, 1954, p. 317.

<sup>3</sup> Authorization was granted in an unnumbered telegram from Secretary Dulles at Berlin transmitted subsequently on Feb. 18 (396.1-BE/2-1854).

<sup>4</sup> Article IV (par. 60) of the Armistice Agreement called for a conference within 90 days to settle the questions of withdrawal of foreign troops and peaceful resolution of the Korean situation (TIAS 2782; 4 UST 234).

<sup>5</sup> The U.S. Mission was headed by Arthur H. Dean who had by this time left Panmunjom and returned to the United States. For related documentation, see volume xv.

II. The first paragraph of the agreement commits the four powers to the need for establishing by peaceful means a unified and independent Korea as an important step toward the reduction of international tensions and the re-establishment of peace elsewhere in Asia. It is useful that the Soviet Union should be thus committed to the importance of Korea being unified and independent because of the fact that it seems that Communist China is in effect incorporating North Korea into China as a colonial province.

III. The second paragraph makes provision for a conference of all the countries directly concerned in one way or another in the fighting in Korea, without distinction among them. All the countries which contributed forces to the United Nations Command in Korea pursuant to the UN Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950, would be given an opportunity to take part along with the Communist regimes in China and North Korea, and the Soviet Union.

The composition of the Korean conference will be precisely as we sought it. The agreement would exclude the participation of "neutrals"<sup>6</sup> in the projected conference. It accepts our choice of place, i.e., Geneva, which was our first suggestion.

IV. The third paragraph deals with the extension of the peace conference method to Indochina. Paragraph 3 stipulates that the conference, in addition to Korea, will further discuss the problem of restoring peace in Indochina. On September 2, 1953, Secretary Dulles, in an address before the American Legion,<sup>7</sup> said:

"We want peace in Indochina, as well as in Korea. The political conference about to be held relates in the first instance to Korea. But growing out of that conference could come, if Red China wants it, an end of aggression and restoration of peace in Indochina. The United States would welcome such a development." The Associated States and other interested states including Communist China would be invited to attend this conference in addition to France, the US, the United Kingdom and Soviet Russia.

V. The concluding paragraph of the agreement makes clear that nothing envisaged by the resolution would involve the US in diplomatic recognition of the regimes which govern Communist China and North Korea.

VI. The agreement involves an outright rejection of the Soviet thesis that the regime which governs Communist China should be

---

<sup>6</sup> At this point in the source text, the words "such as India" appeared, but they were lined out in pencil in accordance with instructions received in telegram Dulte 93, Feb. 18, from Berlin, to delete them (396.1-BE/2-1854).

<sup>7</sup> The text of Dulles' address is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Sept. 14, 1953, p. 339.

brought into world councils on a general agenda as one of the so-called "five great powers." It makes no mention of Formosa or UN membership. It treats the Communist regime as one which from the US standpoint remains unrecognized, one which is dealt with only on a *de facto* basis in relation to concrete local problems of war and peace where it is a necessary party. We maintain our refusal to give it any position of preferment, or to contribute to the enhancement of its authority and prestige. We are making an earnest effort to find a peaceful solution in Korea and Indochina. Communist China is offered every opportunity to cancel out her aggression in Korea and to cease her support of rebellion and aggression in Indochina.

VII. The agreement fully sustains the principles which have guided the US in relation to Far Eastern matters. It evidences the US desire to have peace, but not to have peace at the price of concessions of principle. We are not committed to any course at the conference. We have not traded US performance against Communist promises. The outcome gives a heartening demonstration of the unity of the three Western countries, where matters of principle affecting their essential interests are involved. The insistent Soviet demand for inclusion of Communist China in a central group of five great powers to deal with questions affecting many parts of the world was emphatically rejected.

The Foreign Ministers of the United States, France and the United Kingdom were as one in seeking opportunity for honorable settlement by peaceful negotiation of the most pressing issues outstanding in the Far East. They were also as one in their refusal to permit the inclusion of extraneous issues.

DULLES

---

795.00/2-1854 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference*

TOP SECRET  
 NIACT

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1954—11:31 a. m.

Tedul 59. As soon as agreement on Korea-Indochina resolution confirmed, we would like inform President Rhee. Would propose communicate to him through Briggs and Young<sup>1</sup> text of agreed

---

<sup>1</sup> Young was in Korea at this time as Deputy U.S. Representative at the talks at Panmunjom concerning the holding of a political conference on Korea; for documentation, see volume xv. These talks were discontinued following the decision at the Berlin Conference to hold the Geneva Conference on Korea.

resolution and points mentioned second para Dulte 87,<sup>2</sup> and would like to send Embassy Seoul for background guidance Dulte 88.<sup>3</sup> Have you any objection?

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated Feb. 18, from Berlin. The second paragraph read:

"(1) Principle of no five power conference is upheld; (2) there is no promotion of Communist China to position of authority and prestige; (3) we are negotiating with Communist China only on *de facto* basis in relation to concrete local problems of war and peace where that regime is a necessary party; (4) composition for Korea is as we sought and India is excluded; and (5) our choice of place is accepted." (396.1-BE/2-1854)

<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

---

795.00/2-1954: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

BONN, February 19, 1954—1 a. m.

2615. For Acting Secretary from Secretary. Reference Tedul 59.<sup>1</sup> Suggest informing Rhee as personal message if you desire:

"Gratified that four Foreign Ministers agreed on importance of united and independent Korea, and established conference to achieve this at a place and with a composition which has always been the common desire of our two countries."<sup>2</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 684, Feb. 19, to Seoul instructed the Embassy to communicate to President Rhee the message contained in telegram 2615, which had been sent separately to Seoul by the Department in telegram 683 (795.00/2-1954).

---

795.00/2-1954: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

SEOUL, February 19, 1954—5 p. m.

810. Repeated information Tokyo, London, Paris unnumbered. From Young. Reference Department telegram 230 to Munsan-Ni.<sup>1</sup> Ambassador Briggs and I briefly saw President early afternoon today just before his departure Chinhae. Pyun also present. We gave President copy Berlin communiqué already delivered to Pyun at noon immediately after receipt in Embassy.

We emphasized to Rhee all points in reference telegram, stressing Berlin agreement on Political Conference along lines US has sought

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Feb. 18, not printed. In it, the Department of State directed Briggs and Young to see President Rhee as soon as possible and convey to him the text and significance of the Berlin agreement to hold a Far Eastern conference at Geneva. (396.1-BE/2-1854)

and he has supported, particularly re composition, neutrals, and Geneva.

Rhee expressed appreciation prompt information. His general reaction was perhaps one of "more in sorrow than in anger", though he did not express opposition in principle to arrangements. He showed discouragement over Korea's future and fear his friends and allies were forgetting his country. We stated this was certainly not intention of President and Secretary. Regarding conference itself, he expressed dismay over additional "indefinite delay" unification Korea, concern over probable duration conference, and his long-standing conviction is useless and will fail. However, he repeated what he has said before—that he will go along with it if his American friends insist. He did not indicate specific ROK reaction to its attendance Geneva Conference.

In connection his discouraged mood, Rhee told us with some anger of alleged efforts by certain Americans and Japanese bring about trusteeship in Korea. He said this supported by newspaper articles and editorials in US. Ambassador and I told him we knew of no official backing any such project.

BRIGGS

---

795.00/2-2054 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

SEOUL, February 20, 1954—3 p. m.

813. Re Deptels 683 and 684.<sup>1</sup> While it would have been helpful had we been able convey Secretary's personal message contained Deptel 683 to President Rhee during Young's and my conversation with him yesterday, reported Embtel 810,<sup>2</sup> time for such message (which reached Seoul only this morning) would appear to have passed. Furthermore, we conveyed substance of message during presentation pursuant Deptel 679.<sup>3</sup> Rhee departed for Chinhae immediately following that conversation and is consequently not immediately available. Meantime, ROK Government spokesmen, including Foreign Minister and Director OPI, have been heaping abuse on Berlin agreement in series of statements and editorials. I, therefore, believe we should reserve authority of Secretary's name for more substantively important message should such message appear necessary in light developments.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 2 to telegram 2615, p. 18.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> Same as telegram 230 to Munsan-Ni; see footnote 1, *supra.*

<sup>4</sup> The Department of State expressed agreement in telegram 687, Feb. 20, to Seoul (795.00/2-2054).

For further comments of ROK attitude see immediately following telegram.

BRIGGS

795.00/2-2054 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL      PRIORITY      SEOUL, February 20, 1954—3 p. m.

814. Repeated information Tokyo 497, London, Paris unnumbered. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. It is readily apparent from ROK Government emanations (Embtel 809 OPI statement February 19 and *Korean Republic* editorial February 20 transmitted by TWX, and Foreign Minister Pyun's statement quoted Embtel 812)<sup>1</sup> that their immediate reaction to Berlin agreement is one of disappointment, disgruntlement and anger. *Korean Republic* editorial this morning which accuses big three of (1) acting in secret without consultation with ROK, (2) repudiating armistice agreement providing for conference between belligerents, (3) accepting Russia in nonbelligerent status despite US assurances to contrary and (4) agreeing to bring Red China to conference as sponsoring power, (*sic*) with ROK invited as afterthought is one of bitterest statements Embassy has seen printed in this government paper. One of principal criticisms by ROK is round-table nature of conference which they allege will permit majority decisions and exclude veto by one of participating sides.

At press conference this morning Foreign Minister elaborated these main points of objection and stated ROK Government will have to study situation and has not yet decided whether to attend. Embassy has been unable to find any evidence to support INS story filed February 19 quoting Foreign Ministry spokesman as stating ROK Government has decided boycott conference.

While Berlin agreement is obviously disappointment and source of resentment to ROK Government one cannot entirely escape conclusion response at least partly motivated by exasperation that conference in fact going to be held. ROK had apparently concluded political conference unlikely and was planning its policy accordingly. On balance Embassy inclined believe they will not boycott conference but possibility some such thoughtless action should not be entirely discounted.

BRIGGS

<sup>1</sup> Neither telegram 809 nor 812 is printed.

*Editorial Note*

On February 24, the Department of State extended invitations to the Korean Political Conference at Geneva to the Republic of Korea (see *infra*), Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and the Union of South Africa. In accordance with the agreement reached at Berlin, the Soviet Union was to invite North Korea and the People's Republic of China. (Press release 97, February 26; Department of State *Bulletin*, March 8, 1954, page 347)

On the same day, Secretary Dulles delivered a radio and television address to the nation reporting on the results of the Berlin Conference. The text of his remarks is printed *ibid.*, page 343.

---

396.1 BE/2-2454 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1954—7:03 p. m.

694. Rptd info: Tokyo 1927. Pass CINCUNC. Robertson handed note to Ambassador Yang today inviting ROK attend Geneva Conference. Verbatim text follows:

"Government U.S. refers to proposal agreed upon at meeting Foreign Ministers U.S., France, U.K. and Soviet Union at Berlin February 18, 1954, and announced in enclosed communiqué same date, to convene conference Geneva, Switzerland, April 26, 1954. Foreign Ministers in communiqué express belief 'that establishment, by peaceful means, of united and independent Korea important factor reducing international tension and restoring peace other parts Asia.' Purpose conference stated to reach 'peaceful settlement Korean question'.

"Recalling joint efforts Panmunjom by representatives Government U.S. and ROK arrange political conference recommended paragraph 60 Armistice Agreement and Resolution 711(VII) adopted by UNGA August 28, 1953,<sup>1</sup> this Government confident ROK in interest seeking every opportunity achieve peaceful unification Korea will desire participate conference Geneva. This Government intends consult fully with Government ROK before and during conference both procedural arrangements and substantive matters.

"View many administrative and procedural arrangements which must be settled before conference convenes, early reply appreciated."

Response fears Yang expressed re Geneva conference Robertson stressed: Results at Berlin infinitely better than dared hoped for

<sup>1</sup> The resolution welcomed the holding of the political conference recommended in paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement; the text of the resolution is printed in *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents* (Department of State publication 6446; (2 vols.) Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957), vol. II, p. 2676.

Panmunjom. Only belligerents participate. Complicating problem neutrals eliminated. Obviously must confer with aggressors but arrangements in no way constitute, and American people would not agree to, recognition Communist China. At Berlin we in effect added to Article 60 Armistice Agreement since at Geneva USSR is full participant and party any agreement. Conference inevitably between two sides. Impossible commit ROK or ourselves to proposal if do not agree. No danger agreement by U.S. to coalition government as solution unification as end result such formula Communist domination. Conferences Indo-China and Korea separate requiring different compositions but might be held simultaneously. U.S. intends participate fully in Indo-China conference just as USSR in Korea conference. Berlin genuine diplomatic triumph over Communists. Intangible important result Molotov divisive tactics was closer stronger working relations U.S., U.K. and France.

Convey foregoing when transmitting substance invitation to ROK participate Geneva since will constitute answer Pyun's questions.

DULLES

396.1-GE/2-2554 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL      PRIORITY      SEOUL, February 25, 1954—10 p. m.

834. Repeated information Tokyo 511 (pass CINCUNC), London unnumbered, Paris 6, Taipei 86, Saigon 19, Moscow 6. On receipt this afternoon of Deptel 694, February 24 I called on Foreign Minister Pyun to give him copy of official invitation to Geneva conference original of which handed Ambassador Yang in Washington yesterday. Pyun said Yang's report not yet received. After reading invitation he asked whether I had information responsive to four points raised by ROK Government (Embtel 824, February 23).<sup>1</sup>

I thereupon gave Pyun orally following information regarding which he took notes:

(1) Conference will be of participating powers under sponsorship of four countries meeting at Berlin. In context Panmunjom talks, it

<sup>1</sup> The text of this message read as follows:

"At his regular weekly press conference this morning Foreign Minister Pyun declared ROK government decision re participation in Geneva conference cannot be made until it receives satisfactory clarification on following four points:

1. Conference should be between two sides,
2. USSR should participate on Communist side,
3. Freedom of independent decision by nations participating in conference should be assured, and
4. Conference should discuss only Korean problem and not Indochina.

Pyun added he had not received adequate information on these points in his talk with Young and me." (396.1/2-2354)



will not be "two-sided" conference but as practical matter it will probably develop two-sided aspect as meeting between non-Communist side and Communist side. In that connection I emphasized participants would not include neutrals, thus meeting Korean views re composition.

(2) Status of Soviet Russia. I said Russia was sponsoring power and as such had responsibility with other sponsors for the meeting. That is, full participation, and would be party to any conference agreement. Question whether Russia "neutral" (as Communists had demanded at Panmunjom) or "belligerents" (as our side had desired) is by-passed by Russia being responsible sponsoring participant.

(3) I assured Pyun ROK could not be committed to conference proposal which ROK opposed. I pointed out this point, substantively, is by far most important point his government had raised since it involved sovereign right of any country to declare what it would or would not accept.

(4) As to scope of conference I informed Pyun, as set forth Deptel 694, that conferences on Indochina and Korea were separate with different compositions, but might take place simultaneously.

There ensued considerable discussion of foregoing, especially points one, two and four. One and two disclosed few new ideas (Foreign Minister did not like our answers) but Pyun's comments concerning simultaneous discussion of Indochina problem seem worth noting since he declared that this would give Red China "incalculable advantage, probably amounting to control of proceedings". He amplified this by stating that as soon as Korean discussions bogged down because of unacceptable Communist demands, conference would in effect adjourn consideration of Korea and take up Indochina, which would then be discussed at great length while ROK representatives and other participating countries primarily interested in settlement of Korean problem as prerequisite to settlement other matters, cooled their heels and were kept dangling. But since Red China involved in both Korean and Indochina discussion, that would give Communist China *de facto* control of proceedings. One of "less serious" results of this "capitulation" by three Western powers at Berlin was vastly to increase Red China's stature, no matter what sort of disclaimers we might make about recognition. What you have done in effect, said Pyun, is to accept five power conference on Asian (as distinct from Korean) agenda, and have given Red China controlling voice in proceedings. Your plan for "simultaneous discussion" is really agreement to "alternate discussion", which will allow Communists to sidetrack Korea while they make propaganda indefinitely, on their terms, over SEA.

Pyun then declared ROK Government would now have to consider whether in light of understanding implications of Geneva conference, his Government would find it possible to attend.

I replied that decision obviously one which must be taken by Korea in its capacity as sovereign state. Nevertheless as friend of Korea I hoped President Rhee and he would take into consideration fact that announcement of Geneva conference, in circumstances I had described, was being hailed in countries most friendly to Korea, and allied with ROK through 37 months of joint war effort, as important step on road toward Korean unification to which all of us had pledged our best efforts. I said I hoped decision of ROK Government at this important crossroads would strengthen Korea in eyes of her friends.

BRIGGS

---

396.1-GE/2-154 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, March 1, 1954—7 p. m.

842. Repeated information Tokyo 519. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. In lengthy written interview with INS President Rhee expressed himself on Geneva Conference and problems facing ROK and free world in battle against Communism. Interview preceded by presidential statement appealing to American opinion to recognize struggle for freedom and unification Korea in fact struggle for freedom America and world.

Tenor of Rhee's comments re prospects for success Geneva conference wholly pessimistic. He reiterated well-known views re ROK willingness to give US and UN chance at peaceful attainment objectives in Korea but stressed conviction Communists will never yield anything in negotiations and force only instrument they understand. Rhee expressed hope continuing Communist intransigency will finally open eyes free world to fact latter gaining nothing and losing much by continuing conferences with enemy. He attacked conditions for proposed Geneva conference strongly, particularly USSR status as inviting power rather than belligerent, alleged move in direction recognition Red China and opportunity provided for Communist stalling. He concluded Geneva merely another trap such as Panmunjom and said US-UN gained only one point at Berlin that was demanded at Panmunjom, namely, conference location; he characterized Berlin agreement as "allied-backed site for Communist-supported conference" and stated it saves Soviets enhanced prestige and escape from censure for responsibility in launching Korean war. Questioned whether he was consulted re Big Three strategy at Berlin he stated Secretary Dulles informed him he was not unmindful of Korea's

interests and cited remarks at Berlin to effect only way to peace was through political conference envisaged by armistice agreement. Rhee added he was startled therefore to learn Secretary Dulles agreed to another type conference and was hailing it as triumph for free world.

Rhee replied at length to inquiry whether ROK would wait to see conference results before taking unilateral action unify Korea. He made no attempt set new deadline but inquired how long must he wait before his allies realize conference merely stalling tactic and there will be no peaceful withdrawal Chinese Communist forces from Korea and no unification through free UN-supervised election. He concluded that if allies continue to ignore Communist strategy of delay ROK will have to resort to action of its own. He pointed out once again plight of people in north and criticized US pull-out of forces from Korea at moment when Reds bringing war matériel into Korea in violation armistice agreement, adding he does not ask US-UN forces to remain if they do not wish to but only that they give equipment and assistance in training ROK forces to carry on free world's struggle against Communism.

Rhee's interview, which combines reiteration already-known views on dealing with Communists with their specific application to Geneva conference proposal, is eloquent appeal to American opinion and contains no new clue to whether ROK will accept invitation. It is apparent Rhee is deeply disappointed and dissatisfied with Berlin agreement which he regards as unbaptized off-spring resulting from original sin, that is, 1953 armistice agreement. In this connection local press during last few days has given prominence to reports of US Congressional criticism proposed Geneva conference and it is apparent Rhee watching closely to see whether substantial American opinion might support his continuing to oppose conference.

BRIGGS

---

396.1-GE/3-154 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, March 1, 1954—8 p. m.

843. President Rhee still in Chinhae where was visited over week end by Foreign Minister Pyun following my conversation with latter described Embtel 834, February 25. At Independence Day ceremony this morning I reminded Pyun of amount of Geneva Conference prepara-

tory work which should be started as soon as possible (Deptel 702, February 27)<sup>1</sup> to which Minister replied:

"First point is whether ROK is going to attend conference. Until that is decided it would be futile for us to discuss conference matters."

Since Rhee and Pyun have apparently decided to play hard to get, suggest we not press them further for present and concentrate on outlining our own strategy and objectives without benefit ROK.

BRIGGS

---

<sup>1</sup> The text of this telegram read as follows:

"Korean political Conference at Geneva clearly affects ROK more directly than any other government. We therefore wish soonest possible consult ROK about position to be taken re unification Korea, withdrawal foreign forces and other questions likely arise at conference and also re tactics to be followed. We wish this consultation precede our tripartite discussions with British and French which we expect take place Washington.

"Please see President Rhee therefore and communicate foregoing to him. Say we would be greatly pleased if he would send Washington soonest whoever will head ROK delegation to conference and other appropriate members delegation prepared for full discussion subjects mentioned above. Earliest notification probable date their arrival Washington will aid our planning." (396.1-GE/2-2754)

---

396.1-GE/3-154: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1954—7:59 p. m.

707. Your 834 and 842.<sup>2</sup> Following background information should be used as appropriate in early conversation with Rhee on Korean Political Conference. Three Western Powers at Berlin categorically and explicitly rejected concept of "five power" conference on Asia. Original Soviet proposal on agenda Item one at Berlin Conference envisaged "five power" conference to discuss Korean as well as other unspecified Far Eastern questions and to which other powers were to be invited from time to time by "Big Five", composition depending upon particular question under consideration.

While Soviets thus attempted get at Berlin "Five Power Conference on Asian agenda", they failed completely. Instead Soviets finally agreed to conference at Geneva "for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question" rather than for a general discussion of Asian problems and to composition of conference in conformity with Armistice agreement providing for political conference of two sides including only those participating in conflict—USSR as supplier of logistics is quasi-belligerent. Moreover Soviets dropped demand Red China be one of inviting powers and agreed it be invited

---

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated to Taipei and Tokyo and pouched to Rangoon, Djakarta, Saigon, and Hong Kong.

<sup>2</sup> Dated Feb. 25 and Mar. 1, respectively, pp. 22 and 24.

as participant in Korea hostilities. USSR is not inviting power in sense it joins in extending invitation to all parties—USSR will invite only Chinese Communists and North Koreans. US inviting ROK and other participants.

As to Peiping participation in projected discussions on Indochina this agreed on basis Peiping's qualifications "as interested party" resulting from its assistance Viet Minh and not on basis of "big power". In order emphasize fact Red China at Geneva solely because its involvement Korea and Indochina, we insisted despite strenuous Soviet opposition on inclusion clear statement in Berlin resolution barring any implication recognition Red China.

While mindful of possible dangers pointed out by Pyun connection simultaneous discussion Indochina and Korean problem at Geneva, we think that by careful handling situation Pyun envisages can be avoided. You may assure Rhee U.S. does not intend allow Chinese Communist representatives gain *de facto* control of Geneva proceedings, and we wish consult fully with ROK both before and during conference on tactics to be followed as well as on substance.

SMITH

---

396.1-GE/3-154 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1954—6:55 p. m.

710. Your 843.<sup>1</sup> Not clear your 843 whether you extended specific invitation consult in Washington contained Deptel 702<sup>2</sup> or whether you desisted in view Pyun's reply after general reminder from you of need begin preparatory work soon.

If no specific invitation extended to send representatives consult in Washington believe you should do so soonest. Despite current ROK attitude re Korean Political Conference Department believes advisable extend this invitation well before consultations with other allies and conference opening so no possible misrepresentation our clear desire and intention consult early and first with ROK. If invitation already extended concur we should not press them further for time being.

Secretary desires conference be referred to as "Korean Political Conference" not as "Geneva Conference".<sup>3</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Mar. 1, p. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Dated Feb. 27; for text, see footnote 1 to telegram 843, p. 26.

<sup>3</sup> In circular telegram 328, Mar. 24, the Department informed all diplomatic posts that in view of the popular usage of the title "Geneva Conference" the use of "Korean Political Conference" was being abandoned (396.1-GE/3-2454).

396.1-GE/3-1854

*The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Soviet Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

[Moscow, March 5, 1954.]

The following are the views of my government with regard to certain matters preliminary to the convening on April 26, 1954 of the political conference in Geneva, Switzerland. These have been discussed with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France and they have expressed their complete accord with these proposals.

It appears that the only conference rooms in Geneva which are adequate for the holding of the meetings are those in the Palais des Nations. While important international agency meetings are now scheduled to be held in that building during the period in which the political conference would meet, it is considered possible to have them postponed or transferred to other sites in the event negotiations are begun promptly with the responsible officials of the United Nations.

The simplest method would be to use United Nations Secretariat personnel to provide interpretation, documentation and translation services, and to use all other available facilities of the United Nations. While the United Nations Secretariat personnel would perform common conference services, they would not have access to confidential materials or operations of the individual sides or delegations. The costs of the common conference services would need be met by the participating states, and the exact method of sharing these costs could be determined prior to the opening of the conference.

It is therefore, suggested that the United Nations delegations of the four powers jointly approach the Secretary General of the United Nations in order to enlist his cooperation in the initiation of the necessary preparations. Since the United Nations Secretariat should be given sufficient time to make the necessary physical arrangements and to prepare an adequate conference staff, it is hoped that you will be able to give a prompt reply.

---

<sup>1</sup> The source text is that transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 1088, Mar. 18, from Moscow, wherein Ambassador Bohlen stated that he handed it in the form of an *aide-mémoire* to Soviet Deputy Minister Kuznetsov on Mar. 5.

396.1-GE/3-654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

SEOUL, March 6, 1954—2 p. m.

861. Repeated information Tokyo 530. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Reference: Embtel 858, March 5.<sup>1</sup> Foreign Minister Pyun has just sent me copy of following letter dated March 3 addressed to the Secretary:

“Confidential. Seoul, 3 March 1954.

“My dear Mr. Secretary: I should like to remind you that through the visit of you and Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson,<sup>2</sup> the following understandings were reached either orally or in writing: (a) If it becomes clear that the political conference of Korea has failed to agree upon the means of unifying Korea at the end of the three-months period after its convening, the United States and the Republic of Korea will walk out and discuss measures to be taken with a view to effecting the unification; (b) in the political conference, the United States and the Republic of Korea shall be the principal participants on the side of the free world, while Communist China and North Korea play the principal role for the Communist side. As for the other United Nations having military units in the Korean war, they will naturally form consultant body and thus contribute to the position of the United States in the political conference. They will not exercise votes, however, while the United States and the Republic of Korea do; (c) the political conference shall be confined to the Korean question.

“Under these understandings, we agreed to a political conference provided for in the terms of armistice. Due to the Communist intransigence, however, no political conference has been so much as called, although six full months have elapsed since the signing of the armistice. The Panmunjom preliminary talks broke up without being able to agree upon the date or the place for the political conference. We cannot help, therefore, thinking that it is high time that we were discussing other measures to effect our common objective, the unification of Korea. But instead, the four Foreign Ministers conference has agreed upon the Geneva conference, to which we are now invited.

“We appreciate the invitation very much. We feel we ought to be willing to participate in the conference as one of the principal participants. Before we accept the invitation, however, we wish to get clarifications on the following questions:

“(1) Is the proposed Geneva conference a continuation of the Panmunjom preliminary conference?

<sup>1</sup>The text of this message read as follows:

“Saw Foreign Minister Pyun this morning with specific reference to Deptel 710, March 3. He said matter in hands of President Rhee who returns to Seoul from Chinhae March 7 or 8. I emphasized we have sought from outset to consult first with ROK with view develop common position on both substantive matters and tactics.” (396.1-GE/3-554)

<sup>2</sup>Reference is to discussions held by Robertson in June-July 1953 with President Rhee and by Dulles in August 1953 with Rhee; for documentation, see volume xv.

“(2) Is the Geneva conference to displace the UN-sponsored political conference that was to take up the question of Korean unification only?

“(3) Will our understandings listed above hold good in regard to the Geneva conference?

“(4) If the conference meets on April 26 as proposed, how long is it to be allowed to continue? When will be the deadline?

“(5) If this conference also fails at the end of a given period of time, what steps, peaceful or otherwise, will the United States take to achieve the original objective, unification of Korea?

“(6) Is the Soviet Union not to have more prestige and consequently more weight by being one of the four sponsor-nations than if it had been invited as a neutral? Sponsors of a conference, like charter members of an organization, are usually supposed to enjoy unwritten privileges over ordinary members.

“(7) Is the Communist China not to gain also in prestige or weight by assuming, as a practical matter, the circumstantial status of what may be properly called quasi-sponsor or, at least, a standing member, quite distinct from other members, except the four sponsor-nations, who will be shelved when the other subject, from the discussion of which they are respectively barred, is taken up, again as a practical matter, very much at the pleasure of the five standing members?

“(8) Why is the scope of the proposed Geneva conference to be so enlarged as to include the Indochinese problem? The localization of the Korean War has been so constantly emphasized by the United States as well as by the United Nations. We cannot afford to allow the enemy to shift from the Korean question to the Indochinese one back and forth and gain in his bargaining power.

“(9) The discussion of both the Korean and Indochinese problem in one conference necessarily implies a package deal for the Orient, and the discussion of one problem cannot be entirely free from that of the other, though, from necessity, may be carried on behind the scene. Thus either of the open discussions on two different questions will prove farcical proceedings to justify or implement the secret understandings reached among the five standing members in the course of the other discussion. Can such an arrangement be fair for the Republic of Korea?

“(10) The Communist China, the UN-condemned aggressor, was consulted in the crucial matter of arranging for the Geneva conference while this government was left in the dark. Is it compatible with the often-given pledge that this government will be consulted in advance on all important matters affecting Korea?”

[Here follows the text of the eleventh question which was excluded from this publication at the request of the Republic of Korea Government.]

“Your answers to these questions will be greatly appreciated as helpful to the formation of our decision on participation.



“With warmest regards, yours sincerely, Y. T. Pyun, Minister of Foreign Affairs.”

In his transmitting letter dated today Pyun states his communication “was written some days ago, but owing to fact it needed approval of my official superiors it has just gone out by pouch.”

BRIGGS

---

396.1-GE/3-654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

SEOUL, March 6, 1954—7 p. m.

863. Repeated information priority Tokyo 531 (pass CINCUNC). Foreign Minister Pyun's letter (Embtel 861)<sup>1</sup> is clearly designed to obtain certain additional commitments from US Government in return for ROK agreement participate in Korean political conference. It is familiar tactic this government and should, I believe, be dealt with in light history our negotiations with ROK Government during past year on armistice, political conference, economic aid, et cetera. We should also be prepared for possibility early publication of letter.

Sub-paragraph (a) is fundamentally correct although language omits certain important points in Dulles-Rhee agreement August 8.<sup>2</sup> Sub-paragraph (b) is statement of ROK position and not agreement between US and ROK. To my knowledge we made no commitment that remotely resembles this paragraph. Sub-paragraph (c) is correct insofar as it refers to our understanding of language paragraph 60 of armistice agreement.

Numbered questions in remainder of letter appear to be attempt to establish that conference at Geneva is not political conference provided for in armistice, and therefore ROK has basis for obtaining new and more far-reaching commitments than those given ROK by US last year in connection PC envisaged under article 60.

Paragraph 11 which in effect demands we commit ourselves to resume fighting if conference fails to unify Korea is obviously key commitment desired, as it has been ever since armistice negotiations were resumed in April 1953. Rhee has consistently sought by argument, intransigence and misrepresentation to involve US Government in resumption of hostilities within specified time limit, and present letter is merely continuation same tactics toward identical objective. This has been crux of difficulties in US/ROK relations for past eleven

---

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably, this is a reference to the joint statement issued at Seoul on Aug. 8, 1953 by President Rhee and Secretary Dulles, the text of which is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 17, 1953, p. 203.

months. This has been and remains point of no return in all our recent dealings with Rhee.

With further reference Pyun's numbered paragraphs, I assume answer to question one negative, and to question two affirmative. Re questions three, four and five I take it we are prepared to confirm that our commitments re Korean PC under article 60 apply generally to conference at Geneva (but not as stated by Pyun in introductory paragraphs *a*, *b* and *c*): Questions six, seven, eight and nine appear to be largely expressions of unilateral opinion to which we can probably make explicit (if to ROK perhaps unpalatable) replies; certainly I assume we do not propose to permit those cracks to go by default. Re question (10) recommend we reply categorically that US, UK and France did not consult in any way with Communist China re arrangements for Geneva conference. While we cannot state ROK was consulted in full detail in advance of Berlin communiqué, points can be made that Secretary furnished information to President Rhee re developing discussions on Asia in Berlin, that communiqué was immediately furnished Rhee by Young and me on February 19, and furthermore that Geneva terms of reference include most important points sought by ROK Government during Ambassador Dean's Panmunjom talks including absence neutrals, USSR fully responsible participant, no country bound unless it agrees, and place of meeting.

I recommend I be authorized to make early reply to Pyun on behalf of Secretary answering questions to extent Department deems desirable. In addition I think it should be pointed out (1) that as demonstrated by my talk with Rhee on February 19 and on several occasions thereafter with Pyun (Rhee having been absent from Seoul) US Government has sought to maintain closest possible liaison with ROK Government, as witness invitation for head ROK delegation to visit Washington immediately for consultation; (2) what with time passing and ROK failure collaborate, it becomes increasingly difficult follow procedure desired by US of consulting first with ROK, in advance consultation other UN allies; (3) ROK continuing criticism and re-primination is alienating Korea's friends and benefiting only Communists; and (4) ROK absence from conference would merely deprive it of voice in proceedings bearing directly on ROK future.

Point four above may be key item in our reply, since Rhee is obviously trying to blackmail us into commitments we have hitherto declined to give him, in exchange for ROK agreement to attend. To extent he remains convinced conference cannot be held without his presence, his price may remain high, conversely if he thinks conference can be held without him idea of carping on sidelines instead of donning uniform may become less attractive.

BRIGGS

396.1-GE/3-654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET

SEOUL, March 6, 1954—8 p. m.

864. Repeated information Tokyo 532, (pass CINCUNC and CAG). While following ideas were blocked out before receipt Foreign Minister Pyun's letter (Embtels 861 and 863)<sup>1</sup> and problems raised by letter are obviously first order of business, this message may be helpful in longer range consideration of our substantive position at Geneva and in approach to problem of consultation with ROK:

With public unmasking Soviet intentions re Europe at Berlin conference fresh in free world's minds believe we should seek to present an imaginative and reasonable proposal at Geneva which might similarly expose Communist intentions in Asia, and specifically in Korea. While there may be scant reason for confidence that free unified Korea likely emerge from Geneva, nevertheless if at very beginning of conference we can present proposal which has free world support and which would put clear onus on Communists for failure reach agreement, we shall at least have achieved one important objective.

Our proposal might follow general pattern of tripartite proposal for Germany at Berlin, with appropriate modification to meet Korean situation. Although there may be no more reason expect Communists will allow its application in Korea than in Germany, it would represent constructive and defensible proposal for solution Korean problem which Communists should find difficult to answer. Main elements of proposal might be: (1) Progressive withdrawal all foreign forces from Korea, to be completed by March 31, 1955, under international inspection with rights of inspecting bodies clearly specified; (2) elections throughout Korea on May 1, 1955 for representatives to National Constituent Assembly, elections to be held under international supervision with preliminary period of three months during which supervisory bodies would be empowered and enabled to determine that conditions of freedom for elections exist throughout Korea; (3) until new Korean Government established ROK Government and North Korean regime would continue exercise jurisdiction North and South of DZ and MAC would retain its authority in DZ; (4) international guarantee of powers represented at Geneva (with right for other states, such as Japan, to adhere) to maintain independence and territorial integrity of unified Korea, with or without buffer demilitarized area on both sides Yalu; (5) renunciation of special privileges in Korea for signing powers but no specific restrictions on freedom of

---

<sup>1</sup> Both dated Mar. 6, p. 29 and *supra*.

action of Korean Government with respect to security forces, external aid, et cetera; (6) provision might also be made for formal recognition by new Korean Government of instrument of guarantee and reciprocal guarantee to signing powers against aggression by Korea.

Obviously President Rhee and ROK Government may be most difficult hurdle in reaching agreement on free world side of conference on some such proposal, and I am not overly optimistic Rhee's agreement can be obtained. Nevertheless certain new elements in picture and crystallization of other developing factors may assist us in this task. First, Rhee's principal immediate objective remains ejection of Chinese Communists from Korea and plan would provide specific target date for withdrawal prior to elections. He has, moreover, made public references to possibility of eventual US-UN withdrawal and he may be more resigned to this now. Second, Rhee has in recent months come around publicly to acceptance concept of all-Korean elections, albeit to presidency under ROK constitution rather than to Constituent Assembly, and he might now be more amenable to this additional step on assumption elections, if held under conditions of freedom, would be favorable to anti-Communist elements in Korea. While prospect elections might not retain presidency for him would be difficult pill to swallow, his agreement is not wholly inconceivable if plan offered any real hope for achievement his chief objective of Korean unification and if he thought there was good chance he would be elected to presidency. Third, events since armistice have firmly convinced Rhee that Chinese Communists are in North Korea to stay and to consolidate their power and thus no agreement at PC is possible. This factor, above all else, may persuade Rhee to buy some such proposal as one above on assumption Communists will not accept it and substantial propaganda benefit could be derived from it. Rhee has never been satisfied with propaganda advantages as a substitute for material results, however, and he might seek to elicit in return our agreement to support a military effort to unify Korea if PC fails. This, I assume, we would under no circumstances agree to.

As matter of tactics in presenting ideas to ROKs, I recommend we give them unequivocal assurances we do not contemplate and will not support any proposal for trusteeship for Korea. Recent references in Japanese press to this possibility have raised Rhee's blood pressure and clear assurances on this score might help create attitude more conducive to acceptance our ideas. Idea of neutralization, another major bogey for Rhee, should also be avoided, and case can be made that plan outlined above does not constitute neutralization of Korea. Most difficult psychological block to overcome with Rhee, however, may be his

fear, based on unhappy history of manner in which great powers permitted Japan to take over Korea early in century, that despite paper guarantees great powers may condone absorption of Korea by China or Japan at later date. I believe we should seek to present convincing case that our interest in Korea and support for her is continuing one.

BRIGGS

---

795.00/3-1054 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY      CARACAS, March 10, 1954—10 a. m.<sup>1</sup>

Dulte 29. Re Rhee's inquiries on Korean Conference reported Tedul 36<sup>2</sup> believe we should make clear that while conference procedure will have to be worked out at conference itself, we understand that ROK would not be bound to any matter of substance without its consent. Same would apply of course to US. If ROK and US agree on unification of Korea, it will happen; otherwise not. That is true substance of matter which cannot be altered by voting procedure of conference.

Re relation between Korea and Indochina, believe we should undertake to push Korean matter promptly and not allow it to be bogged down with discussions re Indochina. On other hand, it would only be impertinence on part of ROK to insist that Indochina war in which it is not involved cannot be dealt with by interested nations until Korean matter settled.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Dulles was in Caracas as head of the U.S. Delegation at the Tenth Inter-American Conference; for documentation, see volume iv.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. It contained a summary of telegram 865, Mar. 8, from Seoul which stated that President Rhee was anxious to have assurances on two points: first, that Korea would be discussed and a satisfactory agreement reached on the withdrawal of the Chinese Communists and unification of Korea under democratic auspices before Indochina was taken up; second, that a voting procedure would be established allowing one country (i.e., the Republic of Korea) to exercise a veto. (396.1-GE/3-854)

---

*Editorial Note*

In telegram 896, March 16, from Seoul, Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs transmitted the text of a letter, dated March 11, from President Rhee to President Eisenhower. The text of the letter was excluded from this publication at the request of the Republic of Korea Government. For the full text of President Eisenhower's reply to Rhee's letter, see telegram 748, March 20, to Seoul, page 44. Regarding Ambassador Briggs'

delivery of the President's reply to Rhee on March 22, see telegram 926, March 22, from Seoul, page 48.

---

795.00/3-1654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

NIACT

SEOUL, March 16, 1954—midnight.

904. President Rhee's March 11 letter to President Eisenhower (Embassy's telegram 896)<sup>1</sup> is in substance elaboration of question 11 in Foreign Minister Pyun's March 3 letter to Secretary of State Dulles (Embassy's telegrams 861 and 863)<sup>2</sup> and as such represents further attempt use ROK attendance Korean Political Conference Geneva to obtain additional and important commitments from United States.

Most effective way to deal with both letters insofar as they relate to Geneva Conference would in our opinion be delivery to Rhee and Pyun by Embassy of written statement answering broad problems raised in both letters. Our statement might include points suggested Embassy's telegram 863. We should, of course, make clear United States has not, does not and will not favorably consider alternatives outlined in Rhee letter.

Rhee apparently doubts conference possible without ROK participation and seems correspondingly confident he has us over a barrel. Assuming conference can in fact be held without ROK (query, can it?) it seems important that our reply give Rhee and Pyun no support for belief former's letters to President Eisenhower will delay our preparations for Geneva. Any indication we proposing offer new concessions as price ROK attendance at conference would probably increase Rhee's appetite.

Rhee letter can likewise be interpreted as his reply to President Eisenhower's January 2 letter<sup>3</sup> since Embassy understands Rhee's

---

<sup>1</sup> See the editorial note, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> Both dated Mar. 6, pp. 29 and 31.

<sup>3</sup> For the text, see volume xv.

first reply (copy unreceived here) was not delivered to President Eisenhower (memo Robertson-Yang February 15 conversation).<sup>4</sup> In that connection I interpret fourth paragraph Rhee letter as notification Rhee now considers himself without obligation give us further notice should he contemplate unilateral action. This does not render unilateral action by Rhee more likely but fact this point included in present letter, while exchange ratification mutual defense treaty still pending, is further example of Rhee's failure to accept United States-ROK relations as two-way street. (Embassy's telegram 903, March 16).<sup>5</sup>

With specific reference Rhee's second so-called alternative, creation of 35-40 division ROK army with comparable naval and air developments would self-evidently be impossible burden on ROK economy and manpower even if project were to be underwritten by United States taxpayers. Department will recall this unrealistic proposal was advanced to Army Secretary Stevens by Prime Minister Paik last January (Embassy's telegram 705).<sup>6</sup> Insofar as Embassy aware, our reply is still pending. I also observe that although Rhee states ROK forces would be used "only for purpose of defense" that statement may be interpreted in light his definition ROK territory as extending to Yalu and Tumen rivers.

My recommendation accordingly is that I be authorized deliver statement (rather than letter) setting forth official United States Government position. Suggested statement should clearly set forth United States position in terms sympathetic to objective of unification of Korea while simultaneously leaving Rhee under no misapprehension concerning limits beyond which American Government unprepared to go in underwriting, directly or indirectly, Rhee's objective of unification by whatever means and at whatever cost.<sup>7</sup>

BRIGGS

---

<sup>4</sup> The memorandum of conversation is not printed here; but concerning the undelivered letter from President Rhee, see footnote 3, p. 14.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed here. It recommended that the Department of State postpone the exchange of ratifications of the Mutual Defense Treaty in light of Rhee's withdrawal of his assurance of no unilateral military action by the Republic of Korea (795B.5/3-1654). For documentation on this subject, see volume xv.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed here. For related documentation, see *ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> On Mar. 17, General Hull, at Admiral Radford's request, forwarded his views on President Rhee's letter. He rejected both alternatives proposed by Rhee, stating that the Geneva Conference must be held and Rhee must not be allowed to feel that he could extort promises from the United States in return for Korean participation at Geneva. (Telegram C-67435, Mar. 17, from Tokyo; 795.00/3-1054) Admiral Radford sent General Hull's telegram to Dulles on Mar. 17, and expressed general agreement except for the extent to and manner in which the United States would reject Rhee's alternative proposal. (JCS files; 091 Korea)

396.1-GE/3-1754 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL      NIACT      Moscow, March 17, 1954—7 p. m.

1086. Repeated information niact London 157, Paris 216. Following in rough translation is text of *aide-mémoire* handed to me today at 5 p. m. by Kuznetsov in answer to one I left with him on March 5:<sup>1</sup>

"In connection with *aide-mémoire* of Government of United States of America of March 5 concerning certain questions in preparation for the calling of a conference in Geneva on April 26, 1954, there are transmitted the view of Soviet Government. These views were discussed with Government of Chinese People's Republic which has stated that it shares them.

"The proposal that the conference should be held in the Building of Palais des Nations at Geneva is acceptable.

"Considering the composition of participants of the conference it appears expedient to establish that the official and working languages of the conference should be English, French, Chinese and Russian.

"Furthermore, it should be possible to adopt a procedure whereby the delegates themselves would assure the translation of documents received from other delegates and the dissemination of their own documents in one of the official languages.

"Insofar as oral translation at the sessions is concerned, it should be possible to agree that following the statement of a delegate in one of the official languages an oral interpretation should be made into another one of the official languages and at the same time there would be carried out simultaneously the translation into the remaining official languages using the system existing in the Palais des Nations suitable for simultaneous translation. The question of the order of languages in consecutive translation requires further clarification.

"It would be expedient that the representatives of one of the powers, for example French, should agree on the basis of the above-mentioned considerations, with Secretariat of UN concerning the conditions of use for the conference in Geneva of the Building of the Palais des Nations and its system of simultaneous translation.

"The proposal that the expenses for common services of the conference should be borne by the participating states and that the method of apportioning expenses should be established before the beginning of the conference is acceptable."

BOHLEN

---

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 28.



396.1-GE/3-1754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*CONFIDENTIAL  
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, March 17, 1954—7:44 p. m.

739. For Briggs from Secretary. Please deliver following to Foreign Minister Pyun.

“March 17, 1954. My dear Mr. Minister: I have your letter of March 3, 1954,<sup>1</sup> which requests certain answers to a list of questions regarding the Berlin agreement and the forthcoming Korean Political Conference to be opened at Geneva on April 26, 1954. In response to earlier questions, representatives of the United States Government have orally explained to you the nature and significance of the Berlin agreement.

The Korean Political Conference, to which the Soviet delegate reluctantly agreed at Berlin, is precisely the kind of conference which the Republic of Korea and the United States long ago agreed to seek. The participants are identical with those contemplated by President Rhee and me in our conversations of last August providing a clear-cut conference between the two sides which were involved in the fighting, uncluttered by neutrals. The objective remains the same, being now clearly defined as “a united and independent Korea.” Geneva was then mutually agreed to be an acceptable place for the conference. The program is consistent with the General Assembly Resolution of August 28, 1953. The results in our opinion are more advantageous to our position than those which Ambassador Dean, with great skill and in close consultation with President Rhee and with you, attempted unsuccessfully to obtain at Panmunjom. We remained firm at Berlin on our basic terms for a political conference. The Communists finally yielded to our position. They accepted a specific date and the location and the actual participants we had long proposed. There will be no neutrals and the Soviet Union will bear a full share of responsibility for the progress and outcome of the conference—a principle we stood for together at Panmunjom.

The U.S.S.R. is not a ‘sponsoring power’ in so far as the Republic of Korea and the nations with forces under the United Nations Command are concerned. The Soviet Government extends invitations only to the Chinese Communist and North Korean regimes. The United States Government, consistent with the General Assembly Resolution of August 28, 1953, invites the participants on our side. This procedure on invitations demonstrates the two-sided nature of the conference.

---

<sup>1</sup> See telegram 861, Mar. 6, from Seoul, p. 29.

We will go to the Korean Political Conference determined to press constantly and vigorously to achieve agreement there on our common objectives—the independence and unity of a free Korea. I believe that this Conference will provide a splendid forum for the free world to proclaim the principles of justice and freedom for a united Korea and seek to put them into effect. It will also serve usefully to unmask and challenge the wiles and designs of the Communists. In this great endeavor, it is our firm resolve to work closely with the Government of the Republic of Korea. It was in that spirit that I went to Seoul last August to consult personally with President Rhee on a political conference, as well as on the mutual defense treaty.

In the present circumstances, the United States Government, of course, wishes to consult first with the Republic of Korea. Immediately on my return from Berlin and before I went to South America, I directed that an official invitation be extended to your Government to begin consultations with us as soon as possible to enable us to arrive at a commonly agreed position concerning the Korean Political Conference. I regret that it has not yet been possible to begin these discussions. I trust that an acceptance will soon be forthcoming from your Government, as there is much preparation to be completed before April 26, and as we also wish to consult well in advance of April 26 with the other Governments which have sent forces to Korea. I can not emphasize too strongly the indispensability of the greatest possible unity and common purpose on our side before and during the Conference.

Your letter to me refers to certain oral or written understandings which you believe have been reached between representatives of our two Governments. The points contained in the first and third subparagraphs of the first paragraph of your letter apparently refer to the joint communiqué of August 8, 1953, but go beyond it in some respects. The United States adheres to its agreements expressed in the communiqué, but not to any enlargements of it.

We have no understanding—oral or written—between us regarding subparagraph (b) of the first paragraph of your letter. It is, however, my understanding that the United States and the Republic of Korea would be the principal participants on the side of the free world in the sense that any solution of the Korean problem upon which we jointly agree would, in fact, be effective from the standpoint of our side, whereas any solution with which we disagreed could not in fact be effective. Neither of our countries would, of course, be bound except by its own consent. We do not, however, believe that this differentiation which exists *de facto* should be formalized by attempting to cast other allied nations whose soldiers fought and died in Korea into the role of mere ‘consultants.’

As to your list of questions, I would answer them as follows :

1. The Korean Political Conference at Geneva cannot be a continuation of the talks at Panmunjom because those talks dealt only with arrangements, and not with substance. Substantive matters will be the principal concern of the Korean Political Conference at Geneva.

2. The Korean Political Conference at Geneva is the type of conference envisaged by the General Assembly Resolution of August 28, 1953. The Secretary General of the United Nations has declared his belief that the conference agreed on at Berlin is in full accord with that resolution. Furthermore, that resolution set forth the composition for the United Nations and authorized the United States, in whatever manner it deemed appropriate, to arrange the time and place. That we tried to do at Panmunjom, and succeeded in achieving at Berlin.

3, 4 and 5. With regard to the duration, objectives, and results of the political conference, I confirm the understandings contained in the joint communiqué of August 8, 1953, and their validity and pertinence with respect to the position of the United States at the Korean Political Conference at Geneva. It should be the common effort of our side to expedite the proceedings of the Conference. Three months should allow ample time to test and expose the intentions of the other side, as envisaged in the joint communiqué.

6 and 7. I believe that my report by radio to the American people on February 24, 1954, provides a detailed response to these questions, for the answer to both is clearly negative. (A copy of my report is enclosed.)<sup>2</sup>

There is no implication of any kind that any nation will enjoy 'unwritten privileges' over any other nation. Certainly, the responsible participation of the Soviet Union in the Conference—and our two Governments have continuously agreed on this essential requirement—is preferable to the Soviet Union's attendance as a 'neutral'. There is not the slightest basis for the assumption that 'as a practical matter' Communist China is a quasi-sponsor and that it will gain in prestige and weight by reason of its attendance at the Conference. At Berlin I brought the Soviet Union to drop its previous insistence upon acceptance of Communist China as a 'great power'. Communist China will attend the Conference neither as a great power nor as a government so far as the United States is concerned. The Berlin communiqué says explicitly that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the Korean Political Conference 'shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded'. We will deal with the Chinese Communists at Geneva—just as we did at Panmunjom—as the enemy aggressor. The fact that Communist China is involved in two aggressions certainly does not add to its prestige or position in any area outside the Communist bloc.

8 and 9. The Indochina problem is to be discussed at Geneva independently of the Korean problem and by a different group of interested nations. We do not believe that the Government of the Republic of Korea would assume to exercise a veto power over the discussion of Communist aggression in Indochina, where the Republic of Korea is

<sup>2</sup> See the editorial note, p. 21.

not a belligerent. Obviously, the nations which are involved have a right, if they wish, to discuss their own problems. The fact that both problems may be under discussion simultaneously, but independently, does not imply a 'package deal for the Orient'.

10. The Berlin agreement on the Korean Political Conference did not go beyond the main points on which President Rhee and I had found ourselves in agreement last August. Since the arrangements made at Berlin conform to our understandings in Seoul of last August and the General Assembly Resolution, and with the views of the seventeen (including Korea) meeting in Washington, I did not think it necessary to undertake additional consultations on matters already discussed and agreed upon many times in great detail between our two Governments.

During the course of the Berlin meetings, I asked that President Rhee be kept informed of my statements on behalf of the Republic of Korea and regarding Communist China. The United States representatives in Korea informed you of our shift of effort from Panmunjom to Berlin to obtain the type of conference which both our governments had been seeking. As to your statement that Communist China was consulted regarding the Korean Political Conference at Geneva, I have no knowledge of any such consultations. We have good reason to believe that the Chinese Communist regime is thoroughly dissatisfied with the outcome of the Berlin Conference.

11. The President's letter of November 4, 1953 to President Rhee deals, we believe, with and provides an answer to this question.<sup>3</sup>

I hope that these answers will be closely studied by your Government.

The opening of the Korean Political Conference is rapidly approaching. We should lose no time in consulting and fixing our common position. Therefore, it is my earnest hope that the Republic of Korea will soon accept the invitation which this Government has extended to attend the Korean Political Conference at Geneva. I also hope that the Republic of Korea will as soon as possible send to Washington whoever will be its chief representative at Geneva, in order to enable us to work closely together on procedural arrangements and substantive positions, and to continue the cooperative relationships to which both Governments have devoted their attention and their energies in the past.

Irrespective of the opinions which we may entertain as to the likelihood of the success of the Korean Political Conference, I do not

---

<sup>3</sup> In the letter under reference, President Eisenhower cautioned Rhee against unilateral military action in the following terms: "if you should decide to attack alone, I am convinced that you would expose the ROK forces to a disastrous defeat and they might well be permanently destroyed as an effective military force. . . . If you were to plan to initiate military action while the Communist forces are complying with the Armistice, my obligation as to both United States forces and other United Nations forces would be to plan how best to prevent their becoming involved and to assure their security." (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file) For the complete text of this letter, see volume xv.

believe that it would be understood or easily forgiven if the Government of Korea should refuse to take part in a conference to be held at a place and under circumstances corresponding to its own choice, designed to bring about 'the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united and independent Korea'.

With my best personal regards,  
Sincerely yours, John Foster Dulles"

DULLES

396.1-GE/3-1854 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1954—2:26 p. m.

PRIORITY

740. Soviet *Aide-Mémoire* March 17 accepting Palais de Nations as conference building in Geneva states "considering the composition of participants of the conference it appears expedient to establish that official and working languages of the conference should be English, French, Chinese and Russian." *Aide-Mémoire* states views Soviet Government on preparation for conference at Geneva were discussed with Government Chinese Peoples Republic "which has stated that it shares them." Omission any reference to consultations with North Korean regime and omission Korean as official and working language is another example Communist attempt mold conference into 5-power affair. In order forestall this and in view both sides at Panmunjom included Korean as well as Chinese and English in respect to proposals for official languages at political conference, Department believes we should propose addition Korean language.

Department wishes you to advise Rhee and/or Pyun of U.S. view essential for Korean as working language at Korean Political Conference but that we are not in position propose this provision until we know whether or not ROK will attend and therefore it most important we know this soonest. You should point out this is good example desirability preliminary consultation and planning by U.S. and ROK as U.S. suggested sometime ago and repeated Secretary's letter to Pyun. Department believes language question chance prod ROKs into response.<sup>1</sup>

DULLES

<sup>1</sup> A response to this message was transmitted in telegram 917, Mar. 19, from Seoul, which read as follows:

"Foreign Minister Pyun himself having raised question of Korean as conference language at our meeting this morning (Embtel 913) [*infra*] I telephoned him on receipt reference telegram this afternoon. Minister expressed appreciation of US offer seek acceptance Korean should ROK attend, but indicated attendance might not be decided until after receipt of reply to President Rhee's latest letter." (396.1-GE/3-1954)

396.1-GE/3-1954 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL      PRIORITY      SEOUL, March 19, 1954—10 a. m.

913. Re Deptel 739, March 17. Secretary's letter which I marked confidential delivered this morning to Foreign Minister Pyun who said he would immediately convey it to President Rhee. Only comment Pyun made while reading letter was in regard to third paragraph (re Russia not "sponsoring power" and declaring conference two-sided) with which he apparently disagrees. He also observed it might be "inconvenient" send representative to Washington, assuming Korea decides to attend, and asked why necessary consultation could not be conducted here between him and me.

BRIGGS

795.00/3-1654 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*

TOP SECRET      WASHINGTON, March 20, 1954—12:22 p. m.

748. For Briggs from the Secretary. Please deliver following to Rhee from the President.

"My dear Mr. President: I have received your letter of March 11<sup>1</sup> making alternative proposals for United States support in military action to unify your country or in enlarging and strengthening your defense forces.

My letter of November 4 which Vice President Nixon gave you when he talked with you last November expresses the position of this Government with respect to unilateral military action by your Government.<sup>2</sup> As I then wrote, if you should initiate such military action, my obligation to both United States forces and to other United Nations forces would be to plan how best to prevent their becoming involved and to assure their security. I also said that in my judgment the Republic of Korea cannot alone achieve the unification of Korea by a military decision, and unilateral action by your Government would expose your armed forces to disastrous defeat and possible destruction. I well understand your concern for the misfortune of the people in north Korea living under ruthless communist tyranny, but I believe such an attempt to unify Korea, far from freeing your compatriots in

<sup>1</sup> See the editorial note, p. 35.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, p. 42.

the north, could only result in needless misery and irrevocable loss to the people of your country.

Therefore, I cannot comply with your request for support in military action to unify your country.

Your alternative proposal for support in the strengthening of your defense forces has several aspects. The United States Government fully subscribes to your desire to assure the Republic of Korea sufficient means for preventing a surprise enemy breakthrough. We will continue to press forward with the program for training and equipping a twenty-division Republic of Korea Army.

However, the real sanction against unprovoked Communist aggression in Korea is the knowledge which is conveyed in the Sixteen-Power Joint Policy Declaration<sup>3</sup> and our Mutual Defense Treaty,<sup>4</sup> when it comes into force, that any future aggressor will meet prompt, resolute and effective resistance. I reemphasize to you our readiness and capacity to react instantly if the Communist forces renew hostilities. United States forces will quickly and in strength come to your assistance and powerfully strike the enemy.

As to your request for the immediate training and equipping of an additional 15 or 20 divisions, the United States Government has been studying this matter pursuant to previous requests from officials of your Government. The United States Government will expect to convey to your Government its final conclusion when full analysis has been made from the political, economic and military point of view. As a preliminary reaction, my advisers and I believe that full compliance with your request would dangerously overtax the human and material resources of your country. However, it may be feasible to develop a joint Republic of Korea-United States program to build a carefully trained and mobilizable reserve in the Republic of Korea. This essential aspect of your security would require additional study by both Governments to determine the prudent scale on which to develop such a reserve. As for the assignment of General Van Fleet, this matter can be considered to determine whether the psychological as well as the practical military benefits to be sought would justify requesting General Van Fleet to undertake such a task.

With reference to the Geneva Conference, it is of course for your Government to decide whether or not it will participate. I can only give you friendly advice based on my sincere and unshaken admiration for your patriotism and my desire that whatsoever differences

<sup>3</sup> Issued at Washington, July 27, 1953; for the text, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 24, 1953, p. 247. For related documentation, see volume xv.

<sup>4</sup> For related documentation, see *ibid.*

may at the moment exist between our two Governments will not alienate our peoples to the serious harm of both.

A political conference to deal with the problem of Korea was one of the armistice provisions, and it was a provision your Government accepted. It has taken us a long time, longer than the armistice agreement recommended, to get the conference set up at a place, with a composition and on terms which would not be in themselves prejudicial. We have finally succeeded. Throughout the world there are many people who sincerely believe that the opportunity thus afforded ought at least to be availed of. Very many in my own country who are dedicated friends of yours and your Government would not understand if after your protestations of desire to unify Korea, you should virtually alone of all the nations on our side refuse to attend a conference, the avowed purpose of which is peacefully to create a unified and free Korea. We can all be skeptical of whether or not the conference will in fact achieve that result. However, none of us can wisely ignore the world opinion which demands that in these matters all peaceful processes should be exhausted, however remote may be the chance for success.

We on our side will of course remain faithful to the understanding, in the agreement reached between you and Secretary Dulles, which dealt with the duration of the conference. It will be our effort jointly with you to bring the issues quickly to a head and if in fact, as we must anticipate, the Communist side is unwilling peacefully to unite Korea on acceptable terms, then we must expose that fact to all of the world.

I do not foresee that our two Governments are likely to have any serious differences with respect to tactics and negotiation at the conference. However, it is important that we should concert our positions promptly. We have been holding up discussing these matters with other participants as we think that throughout there ought to be a basic ROK-US position, but technical arrangements must be promptly settled.

With warm regard,  
Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower.”  
Original signed letter follows by pouch.

DULLES



396.1-GE/3-2554

*Memorandum of a Conversation Held on March 22, 1954 at  
11:30 a. m.*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] March 25, 1954.

[Subject:] Arrangements for the Geneva Conference

[Participants:]	The Secretary	WE—Mr. McBride
	C—Mr. MacArthur	C—Mr. Galloway
	PSA—Mr. Bonsal	IC—Mr. Eddy
	NA—Mr. Young	S/S—O—Mr. Van Hollen
	UNP—Mr. Popper	S/S—O—Mr. Trulock
	EE—Mr. Thurston	

### 1. *Secretary-General*

Mr. MacArthur said that, since the Soviets had not accepted our proposal regarding a Conference Secretariat, we propose that our side establish a secretariat of its own. The Secretary approved and said that this would help establish the two-sided nature of the Conference. It was agreed that it would be desirable for the British to provide the Secretary-General.

### 2. *Languages\**

It was agreed that there would be two advantages in having only three official languages (English, French and Russian), plus such working languages as might be required:

a. The use of Chinese and Korean as official languages would present grave technical difficulties.

b. The elimination of Chinese as an official language would remove any "Five-Power" stigma from the Indochina phase of the conference should there be no need for another language such as Annamese.

### 3. *Soviet Statement in their Aide-Mémoire*<sup>2</sup> *that they had consulted the Chinese Communists*

Mr. Thurston said that the British Embassy had informed us orally that Eden did not believe we should mention in our reply the Soviet reference to consultation with the Chinese Communists. The Secretary stated that we should include in our draft *aide-mémoire* a statement which recognized the right of the Soviets to consult whoever they pleased, but emphasizing that we do not accept any special status for the Chinese Peoples' Republic or any of the other invited powers.

<sup>1</sup>This memorandum was drafted by Walter Trulock of the Executive Secretariat.

\*Since this meeting, we have agreed with the British and French that 5 official languages should be used in the Korean phase. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>2</sup> See telegram 1086, Mar. 17, from Moscow, p. 38.

#### 4. *Seating*

In discussing the difficulties involved in having 19 countries represented at the conference table, the Secretary said that while this would be a source of confusion during the first week or ten days, he expected that the conference would "shake down" so that following the opening speeches of the foreign ministers, the smaller countries would accept roles which would place them more in position of observers.

The Secretary stressed the importance of the representatives of the Republic of Korea sitting next to us. He said that we should take a strong line on this and should oppose any purely alphabetical seating arrangement which would make it impossible for us to sit next to them.

In reference to a paper<sup>3</sup> outlining several alternatives for organizing the conference, the Secretary agreed that Mr. MacArthur might broach this problem with the British and French in order to obtain any views they might have.

In connection with three possible seating arrangements in the conference hall, the Secretary favored the alternative which would make it possible for each representative to have one adviser at the table with him with four advisers seated behind.

---

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

---

795.00/3-2254 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

SEOUL, March 22, 1954—6 p. m.

926. Repeated information priority Tokyo 565. Tokyo pass CINC-UNC. President's letter delivered this morning to President Rhee who received it with equanimity, in great contrast his attitude when last previous communication delivered (Embtel 635, January 6).<sup>1</sup> Rhee read letter slowly aloud in presence Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. After asking me to express his thanks and appreciation to President Eisenhower, Rhee talked in mild vein for 15 minutes approximately as follows:

Rhee said communication called for careful study but that it seems clear to him US now desires reduce American personnel in Korea which Rhee called "understandable". He referred to advantage from US point of view of substituting ROK for American and other UN personnel observing that he had been greatly impressed by recent *Reader's Digest* article by General Van Fleet in which latter discusses

---

<sup>1</sup> For related documentation, see volume xv.

economy of utilization Korean troops. According to this, Rhee said one American costs as much to put in the field here as 25 Koreans. This led President to rambling observation [garble] possibly of galvanizing Asians themselves to fight Communists, which necessarily is basis his recent activities seeking to bring various Asian leaders together for what he termed informal conference and discussion at Chinhae next month. President also mentioned his impending purchase of powerful radio equipment and expressed disappointment when Prime Minister said it could not be installed and functioning for six months. Shortly thereafter Rhee spoke in almost identical terms during farewell call by Air Force General Weyland<sup>2</sup> which took place after his meeting with me.

President's mood was benign but he appeared unusually vague. He gave no concrete indication of intentions concerning Geneva conference, other than to declare letter would receive his most careful attention.

BRIGGS

---

<sup>2</sup> Gen. Otto P. Weyland, who had been Commanding General of the U.S. Far East Air Forces, was leaving to become Commander of the U.S. Tactical Air Command.

---

396.1-GE/3-2354 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

SEOUL, March 23, 1954—9 p. m.

930. Repeated information Tokyo 570. Tokyo for CINCUNC. Verbatim text. Reference: Embtel 928,<sup>1</sup> Deptel 739.<sup>2</sup> Foreign Minister Pyun has requested Embassy telegram text following letter which he

---

<sup>1</sup> The Department of State file copy of this telegram is dated, apparently incorrectly, Mar. 24, 4 p. m. Presumably, telegram 928 was sent on Mar. 23 from Seoul and was received in Washington, because of the 14 hour time difference between the two capitals, at 1:08 p. m. on Mar. 23. The text read:

"President Rhee informed *New York Times* correspondent this morning Republic of Korea has decided neither accept, nor reject invitation to Geneva Conference, pending receipt additional clarification which will shortly be sought by Foreign Minister Pyun in further letter to Secretary Dulles.

"At his regular press conference today, Pyun informed press reply received from Washington to his letter regarding Geneva Conference. He stated assurance regarding 90-day time limit, after which US and Republic of Korea would jointly walk out and discuss other measures, was most satisfactory assurance given. He also specifically cited Secretary Dulles statement Republic of Korea a sovereign State cannot be bound by decision against her own interests. Pyun concluded by remarking other points not sufficiently clarified and no decision yet taken whether Republic of Korea will attend Conference." (396.1-GE/3-2454)

<sup>2</sup> Dated Mar. 17, p. 39.

has today addressed to Secretary Dulles, signed original of which being transmitted through Ambassador Yang :

*Begin Text*

My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have studied your letter of March 17, 1954 with utmost interest and attention it fully deserves. In connection, however, with answers you gave me orally through Ambassador Briggs to my earlier questions publicly raised and answers you so kindly set forth in your letter in response to batch of fresh questions couched in my letter to you dated March 3, 1954,<sup>3</sup> I should like to say that I would doubt my own loyalty owed to my own nation and to its great and beneficent ally, US, if I were to refrain from frankly reiterating views still persisting unchanged and doubts still remaining unresolved by your kindly and elaborate answers and so warning, at least, against dangers we would face unitedly, if this government should decide to participate in coming conference at Geneva, in which case, by way, I shall have pleasure of letting you know of it through your worthy and able representative Ambassador Briggs.

GA resolution sponsored by fifteen United Nations,<sup>4</sup> seeking, I believe, to preclude certain dangers and pitfalls clearly envisaged and anticipated, insisted on having Soviet Union come in as belligerent, on having it as two-sided conference, not round-table one, on insuring each participant nation freedom not to be bound by any majority-supported resolution or decision, and above all, on confining conference to Korean question.

Now it seems, Mr. Secretary, that all obstacles Communists chose to see in these crucial propositions and fought with all their demoniacal energy and truculence, have been removed at one stroke by Berlin four foreign ministers conference proposing new conference at Geneva freed from all Communist-hated restrictions. In short, we can hardly, I must confess, bring ourselves to agree with you this is type of conference we sought after.

I do not share your view Soviet Union is not sponsoring nation so far as my country is concerned. If Soviet Union is sponsoring nation only in regard to invitation of Communist participants to coming Geneva conference, while US sponsors conference for free nations concerned only, then, where do England and France come in for sponsoring? We understand recent four foreign ministers conference as body sponsored proposed Geneva conference and, therefore, any of four nations represented in Berlin conference is sponsoring nation,

---

<sup>3</sup> Text in telegram 861, Mar. 6, from Seoul, p. 29.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 711 (VII), adopted Aug. 28, 1953; text in *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. II, p. 2676.

absolutely and unconditionally, regardless of procedural matter of who issued an invitation to whom.

Your oral answer reaching me through Ambassador Briggs regarding nature of coming Geneva conference was, I remember, that technically it is not two-sided conference but it is as practical matter, for conferees will naturally be divided into Communists and non-Communist groups. This interpretation applies to UN itself, and, for that matter, to any conference or meeting where problem, when taken up, is almost invariably tending to divide members into supporters and opposers of certain proposal on it. I hope you will not be offended to be told we drew little assurance from answer you gave me.

You will agree, I believe, with me in view there is much difference between seeking not to be bound by majority decision with agreed consent of entire assembly making such decision and doing so by simple assertion of national sovereignty, which unfortunately grows odious or even offensive nowadays, so far [as] its possible effect on world opinion is concerned.

As regards proposed Geneva conference handling also Indochinese question, I should like to state unequivocally we do not mean, in slightest, "to exercise a veto power over the discussion of Communist aggression in Indochina," so long as it is carried on in perfectly independent manner, say, in separate manner, say in separate conference from that dealing with Korean problem. In my previous letter to you, I simply expressed my fear of certain dangers that might develop from same conference handling two different and, as you seem to say, disconnected problems. I need not tell you here these dangers are same dangers UN spokesmen for free cause clearly saw, though they did not all say so as clearly.

I whole-heartedly concur in your view "we should lose no time in consulting and fixing our common position". I am sorry to say I am in no position give you perfectly satisfactory reply in this connection, since this government has yet to decide on participation in Geneva conference, to which it is invited. I should like to make, however, suggestion here which I hope you will find acceptable and which also happens to represent our best effort to comply with your request under circumstances. How would you consider idea of having pre-Geneva discussions in Seoul between your Embassy here and this government or, if you prefer, between latter and whomever you will designate for occasion? Considering fact we have not all facilities of communication you have, it may be fair arrangement, after all. As to propriety of such a procedure pending our decision on matter of participation, I feel we need not question it at all, for I see only its necessity and no possible harm coming from it. I earnestly hope you will find it workable at least.

I must not pass this occasion, however, without recognizing with much satisfaction and appreciation your confirmed determination to carry out, in reference to Geneva conference, understanding of setting three-month time limit to political conference on Korea as declared in joint communiqué of August 8, 1953. I assure you in advance this heartening assurance from you, along with deep, implicit trust US Government and people have inspired in us that you will not see us betrayed in our fundamental and intrinsic interests, will yet help incline us to take favorable view of our participation in coming Geneva conference, in spite of all its forbidding aspects we seem to descry.

I beg to remain, my dear Mr. Secretary,

Yours sincerely, Y. T. Pyun.

*End text.*

BRIGGS

---

396.1-GE/3-2454 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

SEOUL, March 24, 1954—2 p. m.

931. Repeated information Tokyo 571. Tokyo for CINCUNC. While Foreign Minister Pyun's March 23 letter (Embtel 930) is couched in less assertive and distorted terms than his March 3 letter, it re-emphasizes fact ROK Government considers its bargaining position stronger so long as it has made no commitment to attend Korean PC Geneva. I interpret Pyun's last letter as [meaning?] none of considerations still regarded as unsatisfactory by ROK will necessarily be obstacle their attendance once they decide they have obtained maximum possible returns from their dilatory tactics. Consequently, I recommend we reply promptly and briefly without further attempt discuss points reiterated by Pyun.

It is also apparent ROK wishes to use its decision on attendance as bargaining level in substantive discussions and in that connection I recommend we make plain to them that there would be no useful purpose served by commencing substantive consultation until decision on attendance reached. It might even be useful begin substantive discussions with British and French in Washington to demonstrate our intention move ahead on Geneva preparations. I believe it would be helpful, however, to state in our reply that we are agreeable to having consultation, when held, take place in Seoul between Embassy and Foreign Ministry. I believe ROK desire have consultation here is probably sincere, being motivated in part by President Rhee's real need for Pyun's assistance in coming weeks, particularly in connection pro-

jected Asian anti-Communist conference, and Rhee's reported fear Ambassador Yang might be too susceptible US influence if consultation held Washington and Pyun unable be present.

BRIGGS

---

396.1-GE/3-2454 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1954—3:50 p. m.

756. Your 930 and 931.<sup>1</sup> Letter from Pyun partly garbled transmission especially first paragraph beginning "in which case by way I shall have pleasure of letting you know of it through . . ." <sup>2</sup> However to prevent delay answer please see Rhee and Pyun together taking also Secretary's letter March 17 (our 739) and President's letter March 20 (our 748) since we are not sure Rhee has seen Secretary's letter to Pyun. Inform them behalf Secretary along following lines:

Secretary's and President's letters provide best US answers to and positions on various substantive questions raised by Rhee and Pyun in their letters and in reported press interviews. (If it becomes apparent Rhee is unfamiliar Secretary's letter you may find useful opportunity go over it with him in detail.) We understand and sympathize with ROK concern but believe assurances and answers we have given in our communications make it clear nature, organization and procedures conference will protect ROK interests especially so long as US and ROK work in close concert.

Re consultations we appreciate Pyun's suggestion but do not believe useful purpose would be served by commencing substantive discussions with ROK until ROK has determined attend conference. Re locale these consultations time and other factors make it impractical consult in Seoul. US positions being currently developed in Washington and chief US participants in conference are here. Also necessary consult with other participating Governments and this can best be done here especially since time factors preclude delays which would arise from long telegraphic exchanges. In August Secretary went Seoul consult with Rhee and Pyun on conference and it therefore appropriate as well as matter practical necessity for Pyun (or whoever is to be chief ROK representative and is able speak with authority for ROK) to come Washington for consultations now.

---

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 49 and *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> The text of telegram 930 printed here is a corrected copy of the originally garbled text.

Reemphasize desire consult first with ROK. However within next few days US must begin exchanging views with other allies. Therefore hope ROK representative can come Washington soonest. At minimum we shall try keep ROK informed through Embassy Seoul and we shall be glad to have any views ROK may wish to convey through same channel. But we believe give-and-take of face-to-face discussion is essential to development agreed and effective positions on substantive and procedural questions likely arise at conference.

DULLES

396.1/3-654 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1954—3:51 p. m.

757. Your 864.<sup>2</sup> In preparation for Geneva interdepartmental Korean Working Group<sup>3</sup> discussing several basic questions on which additional views of Embassy Seoul will be appreciated. Questions involve relationship between withdrawal all foreign forces and Korean unification.

(1) What is basis underlying Embassy's proposals 1 and 2 for putting completion withdrawal prior to elections?

(2) Some difference in emphasis here on extent to which withdrawal US forces from Korea provides us with bargaining leverage vis-à-vis Chinese Communists. What is Embassy's estimate?

(3) Will ROK Government insist on Chinese Communist withdrawal from Korea as first order business conference and agreement thereon prior discussion or implementation other measures for peaceful settlement Korean question?

(4) Assuming conference agreement on unification acceptable to us impossible will ROK Government favor or insist on agreement at conference on withdrawal all foreign forces?

(5) What would be reaction Rhee and ROK Government to proposal made at Conference for agreement on total or partial withdrawal all foreign forces unrelated to unification agreement?

Realize difficulty answering questions absence consultations with ROKs but Embassy's reactions would help Korean Working Group here.

DULLES

<sup>1</sup> Also sent to Tokyo with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

<sup>2</sup> Dated Mar. 6, p. 33.

<sup>3</sup> At this time the Korean Working Group was preparing position papers for the delegation to the Geneva Conference; see the list of papers prepared, p. 4.



396.1-GE/3-2554 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

SEOUL, March 25, 1954—5 p. m.

940. Repeated information priority Tokyo 574. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Substance Deptel 756, March 25,<sup>1</sup> conveyed to President Rhee and Foreign Minister Pyun this afternoon at meeting which featured lengthy restatement by President of ROK position. This concluded by Rhee's asking me thank Secretary on his behalf and to say ROK's attitude toward Geneva attendance still undecided. As to possibility mentioned Department's telegram that Rhee perhaps unfamiliar Secretary's March 17 letter to Pyun,<sup>2</sup> it quickly became apparent that President fully informed both as to contents Secretary's letter and of Pyun's further letter March 23 (Embtel 930).

Following my presentation of contents Department's telegram Rhee asked if I would provide him and Pyun with memorandum confirming certain statements made. Memorandum based on fact [*last?*] two paragraphs Deptel 756 has accordingly been furnished.

As to pre-conference consultation, Rhee and Pyun now understand we are not prepared engage therein until ROK has decided attend conference. This useful point to clarify. It also paves way for us to begin discussions with other allies without further delay should we desire do so. As to Pyun's going to Washington (assuming affirmative ROK decision on attendance), Pyun remains reluctant and unconvinced, and he reiterated matters ought to be susceptible of handling by discussion through Embassy Seoul. (Please see Embtel 931, March 24; memorandum based on Deptel 756 will I hope be useful in this connection).

Rhee then made long, somewhat rambling, statement recapitulating his letter March 11 to President<sup>3</sup> after which he characterized President's reply as rejection of Korean views in almost every particular and hence "terribly disappointing." He noted one exception was statement US still studying Korean alternative proposal re additional ROK divisions; Rhee said that while that pending it might be difficult for him make up his mind on what to do. He declared Korea faces tragic future with no assurance of support by her allies in event of Geneva Conference failure. (What Rhee apparently means is this. He doubts whether conference will unify Korea; we have declined give him assurance of support in seeking unification by forcible means following failure of conference; he regards truncated [*garble*] possi-

---

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 53. Telegram 756 was transmitted on Mar. 24; because of the time difference, it was received in Seoul on Mar. 25.

<sup>2</sup> See telegram 739, Mar. 17, to Seoul, p. 39.

<sup>3</sup> See the editorial note, p. 35.

ble situation and hence [garble] defeat; therefore he discounts value of assurance to come to his support, that is rescue, only if attacked.)

As to "saving Asiatic perimeter" as Rhee put it, he spoke pessimistically in regard to future of "Korean free world foothold in Asia", of Japan, and of Indochina which he declares "free world is now losing". Finally Rhee referred several times to "US mistake" in not fighting Korean war to victorious conclusion. For him armistice still remains root of evil from which he continues doubt any good can grow.

At conclusion of meeting [Rhee?] stated he and Pyun would discuss situation in light of information I had conveyed to them but for present he unable say whether his government will attend Geneva Conference.

BRIGGS

---

396.1-GE/3-2454 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1954—6:59 p. m.

597. Reurtel 1125,<sup>2</sup> following is text US draft *Aide-Mémoire* submitted to French and British representatives Washington March 23 as suggested reply Soviet *Aide-Mémoire* transmitted your 1086<sup>3</sup> (March 23 draft is revision original draft submitted March 22) :

"With regard to points contained in *Aide-Mémoire* of USSR dated March 17, Governments of France, United Kingdom and United States are in agreement on the views set forth below. In this connection these governments desire to point out that the fact that the four powers agreed at Berlin on the convocation of the Conference gives them a special responsibility for its organization and creates an obligation for consultation among them. While the USSR is, of course, at liberty to consult with such other powers as it chooses, this is not to be interpreted as indicating that such other powers enjoy a status or responsibility any different from that of the other countries invited to the Conference.

"The Governments of France, the UK and the US are pleased to note that the Government of the USSR finds acceptable the proposal that the Conference be held in the Palais des Nations, that the simultaneous interpretation system of that building be used, and that expenses for common services should be borne by the participants. It is proposed

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated for information to London, Paris, Seoul, and Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> Dated Mar. 24; the text read as follows:

"British Embassy has received text of proposed reply to Soviet *aide-mémoire* on preparations for Korean political conference worked out and submitted for governmental consideration by tripartite working group Washington together with summary of discussions. In order to avoid last minute rush (which sometimes happens) if reply is to be handled on tripartite basis here, would appreciate text and any other pertinent information on subject." (396.1-GE/3-2454)

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

that these common expenses be apportioned equally among all the participants. In order to facilitate completion of the technical and related administrative arrangements prior to the Conference, the Governments of France, the UK and the US are shortly sending experts to Geneva where they will be available for liaison with appropriate Soviet officials.

"With reference to the problem of languages, the Governments of France, the UK and US consider that in the light of the four-power agreement at Berlin, the official languages should include French, English and Russian. Since it is the purpose of the proposed Conference to seek a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, Korean should also be made one of the official languages, together with Chinese, for the discussion of the Korean problem.

"It is to be regretted that the USSR does not agree to the proposals made by the three Governments for a common secretariat to be furnished by the UN for all interpretation, documentation, translation, and other Conference services. However, the proposal that each delegation assume the responsibility of translation of documents received from other delegations and the dissemination of their own documents in one of the official languages referred to above is accepted.

"With regard to oral translation, the Governments of France, the UK and the US are prepared to agree that, following the statement of a delegate in one of the official languages, and [*an?*] oral interpretation should be made in another of the official languages and at the same time a simultaneous interpretation into the remaining official languages, using the system existing in the Palais des Nations. As to the order of languages in consecutive translation, it is suggested that the official languages be used in rotation on successive days. It is suggested that the personnel required for such interpretation for the official languages be recruited from the UN Secretariat to the extent possible, the costs to be shared equally by all the participants.

"The three Governments agree that a representative of the French Government should act on behalf of all four powers in initiating the necessary arrangements with the Secretary General of the United Nations on the foregoing basis."

Foregoing text has been referred UK and French Foreign Offices for approval, after which you will receive appropriate instructions re delivery.<sup>4</sup>

Since Soviets have rejected our proposal that common conference secretariat be provided by UN, we have also raised with British and

---

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 600, Mar. 28, transmitted the following instructions from the Department to the Embassy in Moscow :

"French and British Embassies here have now informed us that their Governments have approved text US draft *aide-mémoire* transmitted to you Deptel 597 and have agreed to your delivering it to Soviets March 29.

"Please make necessary arrangements for delivery *aide-mémoire* Kuznetsov date indicated late afternoon Moscow. For your information Department plans call in representatives of Governments participating our side in Korean phase Geneva Conference on March 29 at which time they will be informed regarding contents of *aides-mémoire* already exchanged as well as present one. They will be told you are delivering latter that day." (396.1-GE/3-2854)

French representatives here question of establishment separate secretariat to serve common needs of non-communist delegations similar to secretariat three Western powers at Berlin Conference. From attitude British representative UK does not appear anxious provide SYG for such purpose. French representative advanced view that secretarial function of Korean and Indochinese aspects should be separate and different personnel should be employed. He also implied that French may insist on having French SYG for Indochina phase. We are giving consideration desirability having non-Big Three nationals act as SYG for Korean phase and have asked British and French for suggestions re such individual.

Another matter taken up with British and French was desirability consulting with representatives other UN countries and ROK soon as possible re conference preparations. It was agreed to call them in after tripartite agreement reached on above draft *Aide-Mémoire* and fill them in on progress to date.

DULLES

---

396.1-GE/3-2654 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in South Africa*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1954—5: 58 p. m.

16. FYI. South Africa is only country of the sixteen which participated UN Korean operation which has declined invitation to Korean phase Geneva Conference. It has been and remains US policy not attempt influence decision of any participants this matter. In case of South Africa, South African Ambassador<sup>1</sup> here feels very strongly his country making major mistake in refusing invitation. By participation they have built up close and friendly international relationship with the fifteen other participants which in his eyes has been important as a counter to well-known South African tendency towards isolationism. By refusing invitation he feels his government tossing away this asset and to what purpose. Presumably he has put these views his government but appears doubtful this will result in change of position. His counselor<sup>2</sup> on several occasions has hinted but not requested that perhaps a word from you to Prime Minister<sup>3</sup> on matter might be considerably more effective than his own representations. End FYI.

In light foregoing you are given discretion talk to Forsyth<sup>4</sup> and depending on his reaction again your discretion to Prime Minister

<sup>1</sup> G. P. Jooste.

<sup>2</sup> A. A. M. Hamilton.

<sup>3</sup> Daniel F. Malan was both Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs.

<sup>4</sup> D. D. Forsyth was Permanent Secretary for External Affairs.

along following line: You are speaking with knowledge but not under instructions your Government. You have noted South Africa's decision decline invitation Korean phase Geneva Conference. You note further South Africa is only Korean participant which has declined such invitation. It has been policy U.S. Government not to attempt influence decision of any participant this matter and you are not now attempting do so in case South Africa. You are wondering however whether this decision is really in interest South Africa. By participating in Korean operation South Africa not only struck a blow in defense of principles of collective security but from point of view of its own enlightened self interest developed a close international relationship with the other participants as evidenced by the frequent Washington and New York meetings of the participants. While we would hope to continue to include South Africa in such meetings almost inevitably from this point on the meetings will be closely tied to Geneva, may be held there and likely result, despite our efforts to contrary, will be that South Africa in time will lose its place in the group. You are wondering therefore if South African declination invitation will not in effect result in South Africa tossing away an asset without as far as you can see obtaining any advantage thereby.

If you decide wise talk as above it should of course be done most informally, be a one-shot operation and you should make it clear U.S. Government not attempting change South African position but that you merely wanted make these observations as a friend of South Africa and solely in interest South Africa.<sup>5</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>5</sup> On Mar. 29, Ambassador Waldemar J. Gallman reported that in the morning he had seen Forsyth, who expressed his sympathy for Gallman's position, held out no hope for a reversal of the policy, but urged him to see the Prime Minister. In the afternoon, Gallman met Malan, who stated that the South African decision not to attend the Geneva Conference was merely an extension of the policy announced before the cease fire in Korea that after the fighting ended South Africa would not participate actively in Korean matters. South Africa, having discharged its obligations under the U.N. Charter, would now leave Korean matters to those governments more directly concerned. (Telegrams 43 and 44, Mar. 29, from Capetown; 396.1-GE/3-2954)

---

396.1-GE/3-2654: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET

SEOUL, March 26, 1954—8 p. m.

946. Repeated information Tokyo 577. Limit distribution. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. Deptel 757 repeated Tokyo 2110.<sup>1</sup> Following are Embassy comments on numbered questions reference telegram

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Mar. 24, p. 54.

with emphasis on qualification noted last paragraph thereof namely, estimate of ROK position based on analysis ROK views from information heretofore available and not new consultations with government.

1. In formulating proposals (1) and (2) Embtel 864<sup>2</sup> Embassy was mindful of fact that US Government position has previously been that troop withdrawal should follow rather than precede political unification of Korea, and of security consideration which dictated that position. One important respect however in which present situation differs from that in 1948-50 is that US and its UN allies are now publicly committed to come immediately and forcefully to aid of ROK in event of further Communist aggression, a commitment which did not exist in earlier period and which in our opinion now constitutes even more important deterrent than actual presence US forces in Korea. It amply evident moreover that no chance exists for fair elections in North Korea so long as Chinese Communist forces occupy that area; to this extent President Rhee's repeated insistence on withdrawal such forces as pre-condition to unification of Korea is entirely realistic. Although withdrawal US-UN forces from South Korea prior to political unification of country would inevitably involve risks from our point of view, it is believed such risks would be substantially reduced by effective international inspection and supervision envisaged those proposals. Although we see little reason to believe Communists would seriously consider solution along these lines which would in fact permit such effective inspection and supervision, and while we believe US should not accept any proposal of this nature which did not embody such safeguards, it is believed proposal along lines that outlined reference telegram would receive wide degree of support and be effective means smoking out Communists and making clear latter's predatory motivation in this regard.

In addition these general considerations following factors were considered by Embassy in connection proposals (1) and (2) :

(a) Impression US-UN forces likely be reduced to token force by next spring anyway and desirability relate this probability to our Geneva position and extract maximum benefit therefrom;

(b) One of principal advantages which has arisen from retention US forces Korea has been their potential effect in influencing ROK Government, but Embassy inclined believe our influence in future likely be about same whether or not we have token force here;

(c) As noted above, Rhee has publicly and privately specified withdrawal Chinese Communist forces as prior requirement for holding elections Korea;

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated Mar. 6, p. 33.

(d) In addition taking initiative from Communists by incorporating withdrawal all foreign forces in package proposal for Korea, there might be advantage in demonstrating inseparability these two facets Korean settlement and thus strengthening our position in opposing possible Communist proposal for agreement on withdrawal before discussion other aspects problem;

(e) It would be effective demonstration of fact US does not have imperialistic ambitions in Asia;

(f) Presumably by time proposal implemented ROK forces would be built up to presently envisaged maximum strength and would be backed by US power in Japan, Okinawa, etc;

(g) Such relatively early withdrawal might be embarrassing to Communists if their control North Korea without military forces therein not fully established by that time (altho this seems doubtful); conceivably it might also stimulate Sino-Soviet dispute over domination North Korea.

2. Since one of principal Chinese Communist objectives appears be withdrawal US-UN forces from Asian continent this gives us certain bargaining leverage with them. This tempered however by fact they must already be aware US contemplating withdrawal in view public discussion such withdrawal in US. Even with Communist awareness our general intentions, which seems unavoidable in circumstances, believe we should exploit our agreement withdrawal to maximum in seeking satisfactory package proposal including unification under acceptable conditions. To this extent believe we should avoid public official statements re future withdrawals US forces from Korea for duration Geneva Conference on Korea (Embtel 841).<sup>3</sup>

(3) Seems likely ROK Government will initially insist on Chinese Communist withdrawal from Korea as first order business and may even wish obtain agreement thereon prior discussion other measures but believe they can be brought see advantages using withdrawal US-UN forces as part of package proposal to seek satisfactory unification Korea. This matter primarily of presentation of problem to ROK. While Rhee has stated clearly withdrawal Chinese Communist forces prior elections is essential, he has never to Embassy's knowl-

<sup>3</sup> Dated Feb. 28; the text read as follows:

"During my talk with General Hull February 24 he outlined in general terms planning which proceeding in Defense Department re redeployment US Forces Korea. In connection with eventual dissemination this information I urge that Department consider this question in relation to our substantive position on withdrawal forces from Korea at Geneva conference. While as I understand it decision on redeployment can be expected soon, I recommend strongly that information regarding that decision be held as closely as possible. I recognize that it has to be discussed with a number of other governments including that of ROK but would hope that in doing so we should take every precaution to avoid plans becoming public knowledge. It becomes increasingly apparent that major Red Chinese objective at Geneva will probably be to obtain withdrawal foreign forces from ROK. To make known publicly in advance of or during conference fact we are contemplating withdrawal bulk our forces might give Communists substantial tactical advantage at conference table." (795.00/2-2854)

edge specifically rejected idea reaching simultaneous agreement on withdrawal and unification.

(4) Believe ROK position this question may depend on assurances, or absence thereof, from US re measures to unify Korea if Geneva fails do so. On assumption US cannot satisfy Rhee on supporting attainment his objective by military means, whether by affording logistic, naval and air support or otherwise, Rhee's attitude may be determined by his analysis of likelihood embroiling US in military adventure before our forces actually withdrawn. From this viewpoint he may wish delay our withdrawal unless he concludes such withdrawal essential obtain Chinese Communist withdrawal and considers this objective overriding. In this situation period between conclusion Geneva Conference and final withdrawal US-UN forces would be period maximum risk for US and we may have to be prepared deal firmly with Rhee on this problem.

(5) This question answered partly by preceding paragraph. Rhee would probably consider withdrawal all forces from Korea without unification agreement in relation to his overriding objective Chinese Communist withdrawal and his analysis chances engaging US in unification effort by military means before our withdrawal completed, as discussed above. In other words he probably would not like such agreement but might accept it in light of developments at conference itself. Recommend it not be broached as possible ROK-UN proposal until situation at conference becomes clearer.

BRIGGS

---

FE files, lot 60 D 330, "Position Papers"

*Position Paper Prepared for the Korean Phase of the Geneva Conference*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL  
GK D-4b

[WASHINGTON,] March 27, 1954.

DRAFT UNITED STATES PROPOSAL FOR REUNIFICATION OF KOREA

PREAMBLE

The Korean people, who for centuries lived together as one nation, sharing common interests, culture and traditions, desire to be reunited

---

<sup>1</sup> A cover sheet indicated that this was a revision of an earlier version and that it would be forwarded to Secretary Dulles and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Subsequently, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs informed Dulles that document GK D-4b, which had been prepared by the Defense and State Departments in consultation, was considered acceptable from a military point of view by both the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (396.1-GE/4-754)

See telegram 1034, Apr. 19, from Seoul, p. 116, for reference to this document.



under one government, representative of the people and dedicated to the principles of freedom and independence.

In accordance with the objective of the UN, and in express recognition of the wishes of the Korea people, we make the following proposal designed to achieve peacefully and permanently through free elections in Korea the objective of a united, sovereign, and fully independent government representative of the wishes of the Korean people.

#### METHOD OF REUNIFICATION OF KOREA

The reunification of Korea should be brought about on the following basis:

1. Establishment of a Korea Reunification Supervisory Commission (KRSC);
2. Establishment of conditions for free elections;
3. Free elections throughout Korea for Constituent Body;
4. Convocation of Constituent Body;
5. Adoption of Constitution, formation of reunified government, and transfer of power from predecessor states;
6. International security for a reunified Korea;
7. Completion of withdrawal of foreign military forces from Korea;
8. Dissolution of KRSC;
9. Termination of the Armistice Agreement.

#### 1. *Establishment of a Korea Reunification Supervisory Commission (KRSC)*

The Reunification of Korea and the withdrawal of foreign forces from that area shall be supervised by an impartial commission. The Commission shall be called the Korea Reunification Supervisory Commission (KRSC), and shall be designated by the Korean Political Conference. The Republic of Korea and the PDROK shall have associate but non-voting status. Decisions by the KRSC shall require approval by a majority of its membership. The parties to this agreement shall facilitate the work of the Commission throughout Korea and comply with recommendations made by the Commission within its terms of reference.\*

The terms of reference for the Korean Reunification Supervisory Commission (KRSC) shall be as follows:

The KRSC shall be responsible for (a) assuring the existence of conditions which would make possible the holding of free elections;

---

\*It is assumed that the U.N. will be informed of and possibly will be asked to approve this proposal, and that the UNGA would consequently dissolve UNCURK. [Footnote in the source text.]

(b) supervising the implementation of the plan for the reunification of Korea set forth herein and (c) observing and certifying the withdrawal of foreign forces in accordance with the procedures outlined herein. The specific terms of reference of the KRSC shall include the following:

(1) Investigating conditions throughout North and South Korea, proposing to the parties the measures necessary to bring about conditions which would ensure free elections throughout Korea, and assuring that these measures are put into effect: these shall include freedom of movement, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of speech, press, and broadcasting, and freedom of political parties to organize and carry out their activities.

(2) Preparation of uniform electoral laws in consultation with the ROK and the PDROK.

(3) Determination, in consultation with the ROK and the PDROK, of the number of delegates to be elected and the number of election districts which shall be in direct proportion to population distribution in Korea.

(4) Supervision over the implementation of the electoral laws, registration of qualified voters, and observance of the elections at national and local levels.

(5) Observation of steps leading to the establishment of a reunified government. During the period between the end of the elections and the full assumption of control by the all-Korean Government, the KRSC will remain in operation in order to prevent action after the elections which would impair the conditions of genuine freedom under which they will have been held.

(6) Observation of the withdrawal of foreign military forces.

(7) Certification of results of elections and troop withdrawals.

The details of these terms of reference shall be worked out subsequently within this framework by the signatories to this agreement and shall come into effect at the same time as this agreement. The KRSC shall have the power to adopt measures not specifically described and which are necessary to carry out their task herein, in so far as they are consistent with this agreement.

The KRSC shall have its primary headquarters in the demilitarized zone and shall report and make recommendations at its discretion to the parties to this agreement.

## *2. Establishment of Conditions for Free Elections*

Preparatory to the holding of free elections throughout Korea for a National Constituent Assembly the KRSC shall, pursuant to its terms of reference, observe political conditions throughout Korea and shall, where it deems appropriate, propose to the parties concerned

the measures necessary to insure free elections and in particular these measures shall include the following :

- Freedom of movement throughout Korea.
- Freedom of presentation of candidates.
- Immunity of candidates.
- Freedom from arbitrary arrest or victimization.
- Freedom of association and political meetings.
- Freedom of expression for all.
- Freedom of press, radio, and free circulation of newspapers, periodicals, etc.
- Secrecy of the vote.
- Security of polling stations and ballot boxes.

### 3. *Free Elections throughout Korea for a Constituent Body*

The KRSC shall also draft electoral laws and procedures in consultation with the authorities in both South and North Korea, who shall promulgate these laws and procedures simultaneously. In particular, election procedures approved by the KRSC shall ensure that candidates reflecting varying viewpoints will be permitted to campaign freely; that the electorate will be able to express its choice of candidates freely and without duress or intimidation; and that the election procedures shall be uniform throughout Korea.

Within six months after concluding this agreement, elections shall be held throughout Korea for a National Constituent Assembly on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot. Representation of the Constituent Assembly shall be apportioned on the basis of the population of each election district. The total number of Korean nationals in the ROK and in the PDROK is deemed to be respectively, 22 million and 5 million. In the event that the KRSC shall fail to certify the election of a representative he shall not be seated in the constituent body and new local-by-elections shall be held as soon as possible under KRSC supervision. The vote of a majority of the members of the KRSC shall be required to rule that the election of any candidate is not valid. If two-thirds of the representatives should be certified and seated the Constituent Assembly shall be considered to have been established; otherwise, it shall not be considered established.

### 4. *Convocation of Constituent Assembly*

The elected representatives shall meet as a Constituent Assembly in Seoul within 30 days after the KRSC has certified the free election of two-thirds of the designated number of representatives. †

---

† The Communists have indicated in earlier proposals for joint north-south legislative sessions that Seoul is the appropriate site for reunification talks. If they now demur, Panmunjom could be suggested as an alternative site. [Footnote in the source text.]

5. *Adoption of a Constitution, Formation of a Reunified Government and Transfer of Powers from Predecessor States*

The Constituent Assembly shall draft and adopt a Constitution for a reunified government as soon as possible. Meanwhile, it may form a provisional all-Korean authority charged with assisting the Assembly in drafting the constitution and with preparing the nucleus of the future all-Korean ministries. As soon as the all-Korean Government has been formed, the Assembly will determine how the powers of the ROK Government and the Korean authorities in north Korea shall be transferred to the all-Korean Government and how the former shall be brought to an end.

These and other acts taken by the membership of the Constituent Assembly in accordance with the Constitution shall be accepted and complied with by the ROK and the PDROK.

6. *International Security for a Reunified Korea*

On the establishment of the reunified Government of Korea, the signatories to the agreement shall pledge their respect for the territorial and political integrity of Korea in conjunction with a declaration by the reunified Government of Korea to undertake not to use force against any other country except in self-defense in protection of its peace and safety. The reunited Korea shall have the authority to assume the international rights and obligations of the ROK and the PDROK and to conclude such other international agreements as it may wish.

7. *Completion of Withdrawal of Foreign Military Forces from Korea*

The withdrawal of all foreign forces shall be completed within 12 months after the completion of elections and the establishment of a reunified government. The KRSC shall observe and verify the withdrawal of all foreign forces at all times. The KRSC may submit a report to the General Assembly of the UN that foreign forces have withdrawn from Korea and Korea has been unified.

8. *Dissolution of KRSC*

Following reunification of Korea under a sovereign and independent government as outlined above and following the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the KRSC shall declare itself dissolved.

9. *Termination of the Armistice Agreement*

Immediately following the declaration by the KRSC that it is dissolved, the Armistice Agreement shall be considered terminated.

396.1-GE/3-2954 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL      NIACT

Moscow, March 29, 1954—7 p. m.

1161. Repeated information niact London 173, Paris 232, Geneva and Seoul unnumbered. I handed Kuznetsov text *aide-mémoire* given Deptel 597 5 p m (Embtel 1156).<sup>1</sup> Kuznetsov who reads and speaks English quite fluently read *aide-mémoire* and after saying he would communicate it to Molotov said he would like to make a preliminary comment on sentence which refers to status and responsibility of other powers (third sentence first paragraph dealing with Soviet consultation with other powers). He said that according to communiqué published in Berlin, Geneva Conference was a conference at which two subjects would be dealt with and at which five powers would attend with other interested countries depending on the subject. He felt therefore that sentence in question was at least debatable and not fully justified by Berlin communiqué.

I told Kuznetsov that I had nothing to add to the sentence but having been at Berlin it was perfectly clear that the four powers had assumed responsibility for calling and organizing the conference as evidenced by the fact that all other powers including Communist China had been invited and had in fact been invited by US and Soviet Governments as agreed at Berlin. I said it was difficult to see how there could be any misunderstanding on this point since Soviet Government had taken action to invite Communist China and North Korea in conformity with Berlin agreement.

Kuznetsov did not contest the point in regard to responsibility of the four powers for the invitations and organization of the conference and his subsequent remark to effect that once at Geneva China would be on an equal footing with every other participant seemed to me to indicate that he had somewhat misunderstood the sentence in question. I did not argue this point with him and he showed no further disposition to pursue the subject.

I had rather expected that he would contest inclusion of Korean as an official language but he did not and he merely asked question for clarification in order to assure himself that Chinese would be an official language under our proposal. I explained to him that for the Korean political conference the proposal was to add as official languages both Korean and Chinese, making five in all. He seemed satis-

---

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 1156, Mar. 29, informed the Department of State that Bohlen had an appointment to see Kuznetsov and would hand him the *aide-mémoire* contained in telegram 597, Mar. 25, as instructed (396.1-GE/3-2954).

fied with this point but inquired what would be done about languages in regard to Indochinese discussions. He said he assumed that organization of Indochinese phase would be discussed at Geneva. I told him I had no instructions on this point and at present *aide-mémoire* dealt only with preparations for Korean conference.

*Comment:* I am inclined to believe, as indicated above, that Kuznetsov misread sentence re consultation with other powers and was interpreting it as meaning that once conference began China and other countries would be on different status than four inviting powers. Without going into that aspect of the matter I believe I convinced him that sentence in question referred to the responsibility of the four powers for calling and organizing Korean political conference.

From Kuznetsov observation I believe that in its reply Soviet Government will stress point that once conference convenes China and all other participating countries will be on equal footing insofar as substantive work of conference is concerned. For Indochinese phase they may interpret Berlin agreement to mean that invitations for other participants to Indochinese discussions will be extended by five powers rather than four. We should therefore be prepared to deal with this point which is not definite in wording of agreement and as I recall was left somewhat unclear at Berlin.

BOHLEN

---

396.1-GE/4-354: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1954—5:15 p. m.

782. Secretary has authorized consultations with Commonwealth and France on substantive matters Korean phase Geneva Conference. Department plans hold separate meetings April 5 or 6 with UK, then Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and then France through Embassy representatives Washington probably Ambassadorial level.<sup>2</sup>

US will present as initial position on unification desirability resuming UN unification program in GA Resolution October 7, 1950<sup>3</sup> as well as previous UN resolutions hold elections North Korea as well as South for unifying country. UN resolutions carried out in South but prevented in North by Communist obstruction and aggression. Principal advantages this position at beginning consultations are: (1) backs up ROK and sacrifices of three years to preserve

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated for information to Canberra, London, Ottawa, Paris, Tokyo, and Wellington.

<sup>2</sup> See telegram 797, Apr. 8, p. 80.

<sup>3</sup> Text in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, p. 904.

ROK against Communists; (2) upholds UN resolutions on Korean unification and existing Commission which are still valid and operative; (3) is a good tactical position because gives us room for maneuver in discussion with allies, with ROK and at Conference.

Inform Pyun Monday morning<sup>4</sup> Seoul time we beginning consultations with our other allies although still desire consult first with ROK as indicated to him (Deptel 756 and Your 940).<sup>5</sup> Meetings will probably be arranged for Monday or Tuesday. Would be glad have any views Pyun may wish make on substantive questions.

DULLES

<sup>4</sup> Apr. 5.

<sup>5</sup> Dated Mar. 24 and 25, pp. 53 and 55.

396.1-GE/4-554

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Noel Hemmendinger of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 5, 1954.

Subject: ROK Participation in Planning for Korean Political Conference

Participants: Ambassador You Chan Yang, Korean Embassy  
Philip Han, Counselor, Korean Embassy  
Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE  
Noel Hemmendinger, NA

Mr. Robertson expressed regret that there was no representative of the ROK present to participate in the consultations with respect to the line to be taken at the Korean Political Conference. He said he could not understand the public position of the ROK in this matter. Mr. Dulles had won a great diplomatic battle in Berlin in getting agreement on a conference which put the aggressors in Korea on one side and the defenders of Korea on the other. This was the kind of conference, with no neutrals present, on which the ROK had insisted. The USSR was not a co-sponsor of the conference, but a sponsor of the Communist side. It issued invitations only to them.

Ambassador Yang said that his government had serious misgivings about the conference. Mr. Robertson said that it was natural for Korea to have misgivings about the future, but that the refusal to consult with its friends was adverse to Korea's interests and only helped the Communists.

Ambassador Yang referred to the desire of the Korean Government that consultations take place in Korea and said he understood from news reports that the U.S. was consulting in other capitals in Europe.

Mr. Robertson stated that this was untrue and suggested that the Korean Embassy look to him for information on matters of this character rather than to the newspapers. He pointed out that the Secretary had flown to Seoul in the past to consult with President Rhee, and that given the enormous responsibilities which the Secretary was bearing for problems the world over and the necessity to consult with many other countries, it was only reasonable to ask the ROK to consult with this Government in Washington.

Ambassador Yang said that he would telegraph his Government on this matter promptly.

---

396.1-GE/4-554 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State*

OFFICIAL USE ONLY      NIACT      Moscow, April 5, 1954—4 p. m.

1196. Repeated information niact London 183, niact Paris 243. At 2 p. m., today Kuznetsov handed me following *aide-mémoire* in reply to that of three Western powers of March 29.<sup>1</sup> Immediately following telegram, will give additional observations made by Kuznetsov on delivery.

"In connection with *aide-mémoire* of Governments of United States of America, France and England of March 29 on question of preparations for convocation Geneva conference, Soviet Government, with agreement of Government Chinese People's Republic, considers it necessary to communicate following observations:

"In *aide-mémoire* of Governments United States of America, France and England there is raised question responsibility and status of participants in conference which is being convoked at Geneva. In connection with this, it is considered necessary to call attention of above-mentioned governments to fact that decision taken by Ministers Foreign Affairs of four powers at Berlin regarding convocation Geneva conference provides that this conference shall be conference of representatives United States of America, France, England, Chinese People's Republic and USSR, which shall take part in discussion Korean question and question of re-establishment peace in Indochina which are on conference agenda, with participation other interested states for appropriate questions. From this it is clear that representatives of all five indicated powers shall take part on equal basis in examination all questions relating to conference.

"In connection with this, on basis agreement reached at Berlin conference it is expedient to establish that English, French, Chinese and

---

<sup>1</sup> Text in telegram 597, Mar. 25, to Moscow, p. 56.



Russian should be official languages during course of whole Geneva conference. At same time it seems natural to establish system whereby Korean language, together with English, French, Chinese and Russian languages, should be considered one of official languages during consideration Korean question.

"There is noted statement of agreement of Governments France, United States of America and England with proposals contained in Soviet Government's *aide-mémoire* of March 17<sup>2</sup> regarding system of written and oral translations at conference.

"Agreement is expressed with proposal of three governments that official languages should be used in daily sequence for consecutive oral translation. As concerns oral translations into official languages, it is understood that for this purpose there shall be obtained appropriate qualified interpreters by agreement among conference's participants.

"Proposal of three governments that expenditures for common services should be divided equally among all conference participants is acceptable.

"There is noted statement of three governments agreement that representative his government should reach understanding with UN Secretariat regarding conditions of using for Geneva conference, Palais des Nations Building with its system of simultaneous translation."

BOHLEN

---

<sup>2</sup> Text in telegram 1086, Mar. 17, from Moscow, p. 38.

---

396.1-GE/4-554 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State*

SECRET      NIACT

Moscow, April 5, 1954—5 p. m.

1197. Repeated information niact London 184, niact Paris 244. After reading contents *aide-mémoire* when handed me by Kuznetsov I of course noticed reference to agreement with Chinese and sentence concerning equality of Communist China at conference. I said that, as I had pointed out to him previously, Berlin agreement seemed to me, having been present, to be perfectly clear: That four powers and four powers alone assumed responsibility for invitations and organization of conference.

Kuznetsov replied that he understood this and that question of invitations and preparatory work was one thing but he considered that once conference assembled all members would be on equal basis. I answered that, speaking personally, I thought Communist China would be on same basis as other invited powers. (Since I was not aware there was any agreed tripartite position on this point (Deptel

605),<sup>1</sup> I felt it wise not to pursue subject. Had I been acting solely on behalf US Government I believe reference of Kuznetsov to fact that four powers issued the invitations might have been utilized as occasion to pin him down on Indochinese invitations).

The only other remark of interest made by Kuznetsov was that these measures of preparation were in effect to facilitate work of conference and that conference itself would have ultimate decisions as to languages and matters of this kind. I made no comment on this point for reason given above and also since I recall it was standard US doctrine that in last analysis a conference decides its own procedural and other matters. Having made point re my interpretation of Berlin agreement I told Kuznetsov I would transmit *aide-mémoire* to my government and also to British and French Ambassadors here. As to *aide-mémoire* itself, it will be noted that Russians, while agreeing to Korean as official language for Korean phase, nonetheless sought to give special status to Chinese. Since we are not prepared to deal with Indochinese phase prior to assembly at Geneva, it might be wise to treat present Soviet proposal in effect as acceptance of five official languages for this phase and merely state that problem of languages for Indochinese discussions will be considered at Geneva.

In accordance with past practice, we will merely tell press here that reply to our *aide-mémoire* of March 29 on preparations Geneva conference has been received without disclosing contents.

BOHLEN

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed; it was a repeat of telegram 4982, Mar. 26, to London wherein the Department of State had stated in strong terms that it would reject any proposal, procedural or otherwise, which would give Communist China a special place or imply a "Five Power" concept. The telegram also stated that it had been made "crystal clear" to the British Embassy that the Department did not consider procedural matters as unimportant and unconnected with the substance of the Geneva Conference. (396.1-GE/3-2254)

---

396.1-GE/4-654: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

SEOUL, April 6, 1954—1 p. m.

982. Repeated information Tokyo 593. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. Following is text of letter dated April 6 from Foreign Minister Pyun to Secretary Dulles which Pyun has requested me to telegraph to Secretary. Signed original being forwarded by pouch through Ambassador Yang.

*(Begin Text)*

My dear Mr. Secretary: There are strong indications some of Asian neutrals headed by India will get into Geneva conference to be con-

vened on April 26, 1954. Considering fact that, in UN meetings, US delegates openly invited India to any extended discussion of Asian problems other than Korean one, from which they were then seeking to exclude India, and that Indo-Chinese question contemplated to be handled simultaneously with Korean problem in proposed Geneva conference is certainly Asian problem earmarked for extended discussion, it is quite foreseeable neutrals will insist on coming in and succeed in doing so, with no opposition even from US, ostensibly for their participation in discussions of Indo-Chinese question only.

It is true this Government does not feel called to raise any objection to neutrals participation on Indo-Chinese question, if it were treated by separate conference. As it is, Indo-Chinese question will be bundled up with Korean one by being simultaneously handled in same conference. It is, therefore, clear this Government's opposition to neutral participation stands, unless simultaneous treatment of Indo-Chinese question is replaced by consecutive treatment to be given after Korean question has been dealt with with finality.

Now picture is complete, Mr. Secretary, complete, I am sorry to say, as Communists limned. Communists wanted to have it as round-table conference. And it is going to be round-table conference. Communists wanted to have Soviet Union come in as neutral. And now Soviet Union is coming in as sponsor, a thing never hoped for even by most sanguine of Communists. In addition, Communist China will be only standing member, beside four sponsor nations, thus achieving prestige and status of semi-sponsor. Communists insisted on dealing with Korean and other Asian problems. And here Indo-Chinese question is to be simultaneously handled with Korean one. Communists wanted to let in neutrals to do their errands, and now they are all coming in. Communists disliked freedom of participant nation not to be bound by majority-supported decision it does not endorse. And now principle of freedom is completely ignored.

Furthermore, Mr. Secretary, history will have it that it was Indo-Chinese car of conference hitchhiked by Korea; that political conference on Korea as stipulated in armistice and defined by UN had died at Panmunjom preliminary conference and consequently Geneva conference was one mainly on Indo-Chinese question conducted in a manner satisfactory only to Communists and at time Communists might have chosen themselves; that four sponsoring nations and one other standing member constituted composite tribunal, as it were, before which poor Korea stood as trembling defendant.

In short, Mr. Secretary, scheduled Geneva conference is very likely to prove cruel travesty of what free world wished armistice—pro-

vided political conference on Korea to be. There is every danger and even indication it will all end up in legitimizing loss of Korea and Indo-China to free world and thus virtually handing rest of Southeast Asia over to Communists. I do not believe I am speaking for interests of Korea alone, oblivious to those of free world as whole. For my part, I refuse to alienate destiny of my country from that of free community it belongs to. I likewise refuse to believe that what is fatal to my own nation could be of benefit to rest of free world.

As you already know, we will, however, go along with our allies in matter of Geneva conference, only if we are supported by assurances as to means of counter-balancing enemy build-up meanwhile and thus not endangering our security while being pulled around by conferences. To be more to point, ROK forces should be so expanded and strengthened that we can afford to attend Geneva conference and, for that matter, any conference without fearing of slipping into indefensible military position.

With best regards, My dear Mr. Secretary, I remain, yours sincerely.  
(*End text*)

BRIGGS

---

396.1-GE/4-654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

SEOUL, April 6, 1954—6 p. m.

985. Repeated information Tokyo 595. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. Reference Embtel 982.<sup>1</sup> Pyun's latest letter is basically another recital Korean misgivings, real and imagined, re Geneva Conference combined with reiteration of demand for response re expansion ROK forces as basis decision on ROK attendance Geneva. Substance of letter also summarized by Pyun at his weekly press conference this morning although without referring to fact further letter sent. His press comments concluded on note that if US assures increase in ROK military power to status matching military power in North Korea which allegedly being greatly increased daily, ROK Government would attend Geneva Conference.

While I doubt whether further attempts satisfy Pyun on his numerous grievances against Geneva would be particularly helpful, I believe we should seek give Rhee and Pyun early reply re extent to which US prepared support build-up ROK forces (Embtel 951,

---

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

March 30).<sup>2</sup> In particular, clarification of naval and air expansion to accompany 20 division program already seems somewhat overdue. I recognize that reply concerning ROK build-up far from easy since it may involve simultaneous consideration such matters as US redeployment plans, question of retaliation should Communists violate armistice, and speculation concerning Geneva Conference results. Nevertheless failure to reply probably capable being seized upon by Pyun as pretext refuse to attend on ground US withholding implementation of Rhee-Dulles agreement last August.

As for 15 to 20 additional divisions, although Rhee's disappointment when we refuse this request may be considerable, further delay in replying may only raise false hopes and thus aggravate our relations. In other words trouble over this phase perhaps unavoidable in best of circumstances.

BRIGGS

---

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. In it, Ambassador Briggs reported that in conversation on Mar. 30 President Rhee had implied that the Korean Government was not planning to boycott the Geneva Conference, but said that it was difficult to make plans in the absence of knowledge on U.S. intentions regarding his request for an additional 15 to 20 divisions and on U.S. policy should, after 90 days of the Conference, Korea still not be unified and the Chinese Communists remain in North Korea (396.1-GE/3-3054).

---

396.1-GE/4-654 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*

SECRET      PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1954—3:40 p. m.

792. Your 982 and 985.<sup>1</sup> Secretary wishes you acknowledge his receipt Pyun's letter April 6 and convey in writing to Pyun earliest opportunity following:

1. Views in April 6 letter were subject several exchange letters between Secretary and Pyun and President and Rhee. Secretary believes previous responses questions Pyun raised earlier fully presented Secretary's views on points now raised.

2. There will be no neutrals in discussion of Korean question at Geneva.

3. Korea and Indo-China questions will be treated independently. Participants Indo-China phase not even decided yet.

4. Participants in Korea Conference identical those contemplated by Rhee and Secretary in conversations last August, providing a

---

<sup>1</sup> Both dated Apr. 6, p. 72 and *supra*.

clear-cut Conference between two sides involved in fighting. Procedure on invitation demonstrates two-sided nature Conference. Soviet Union not "sponsoring power" so far as ROK and nations with forces under UNC concerned. Important to U.S. and ROK that Soviet Union be present at Conference fully sharing responsibility for progress and outcome—a principle ROK, U.S., and Allies stood for at Panmunjom.

5. Defendants at Conference are Communist aggressors and not ROK. Secretary made that clear publicly.

6. Purpose of Conference to obtain by peaceful means political unification of long suffering people whose country divided by intransigence Communist aggressor. This is the position U.S. will take at Conference.

7. Although Conference two-sided in fact, rather than round table, Secretary emphasizes strongly no nation represented our side bound by any decision it does not fully endorse. Each nation has complete freedom decision. U.S. could take no other position at this Conference and would not expect contrary of any other nation.

8. Regret in final period before Korean Conference U.S. and ROK not combining take lead in working out with Allies Conference organization, tactics and strategy. Many questions now arising on which ROK should express views with 16. On battlefield U.S. and ROK stood shoulder to shoulder in repelling aggressor, against greater odds and with larger risks than face at Conference. Now, in diplomatic field, ROK silence difficult for free world understand and compels U.S. proceed in firming up position on Korean question without chief partner. Hope not much longer without assistance from Korean friends through close partnership in seeking Korean independence and unification at Conference. Solidarity in support of ROK demonstrated by U.S. and UN whose nations gave up lives in recent bloody past deserves ROK confidence at Conference.

9. As to assurances of means counterbalance enemy buildup, President's reply Rhee's letter made clear U.S. position.<sup>2</sup> As President then stated "The real sanction against Communist aggression in Korea is the knowledge which is conveyed in the 16 power joint policy declaration and our Mutual Defense Treaty when it comes into force". President also reemphasized to Rhee our "readiness and capacity to react instantly if the Communist forces renew hostilities".

10. ROK must make its own decision as to participation in Conference. President and Secretary both indicated hope ROK would

---

<sup>2</sup> See telegram 748, Mar. 20, to Seoul, p. 44.

attend this Conference in which ROK has so much at stake. Secretary assures Pyun that U.S., whether ROK attends or not, will go Conference, determined press consistently and vigorously to achieve agreement on common objectives of U.S. and ROK—the independence and unity of a free Korea.

11. U.S. views on the ROK request for military buildup will be available by early next week.

For your information: While far from meeting ROK demands NSC decision on matter may afford ROK at least some slight modicum of satisfaction, when all factors fully explained ROK.<sup>3</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>3</sup> For material relating to the NSC decision, see volume xv.

---

396.1-GE/4-754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*

SECRET

NIACT

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1954—7:45 p. m.

796. For President Rhee from Dulles.

“My dear President Rhee: As the date for the Geneva Conference approaches, I still await word as to whether or not your Government accepts our invitation to attend. Since the location, composition and subject matter of the Conference are as we had agreed between us, and since it is our continuing purpose if you attend to look upon your Government as our principal associate, I naturally hope that you will be represented. I quite recognize the unlikelihood of a result which would satisfy our two Governments. On the other hand, it would I think be a great mistake if your Government, by its absence, gave the impression that you were responsible for the failure to bring about peacefully the unification of Korea and its freedom from foreign forces as is the purpose of the Conference.

Since the situation with reference to Communist China is becoming more tense, and since I am trying to organize a strong anti-Communist front in relation to Indochina, I believe you would find it to your advantage to be at Geneva. I believe that your Government's voice there would contribute to preventing the Chinese Communists from gaining any political advantage and would help us in our efforts to expose Communist China as the danger that we believe it is. I had hoped that we could be united in this political effort as we were united when our forces came to Korea. Our unity will not, however, achieve maximum effectiveness unless our representatives can talk together in advance and do some planning.

It is now over six weeks since you received our invitation and I

believe that we are at least entitled to the courtesy of a reply so that we will know how to make our plans.

With warm regards to you and Madame Rhee.

Sincerely yours,  
Signed John Foster Dulles."

Inform Department when delivered.

DULLES

---

396.1-GE/4-854 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

SEOUL, April 8, 1954—6 p. m.

990. Re Deptel 792 and 796.<sup>1</sup> In delivering Secretary's letter to President Rhee this afternoon in presence Prime Minister Paik and Foreign Minister Pyun, I explained that in addition statement being sent to Pyun later today in acknowledgement his letter April 6. Rhee then read Secretary's letter aloud and made following comments:

(1) With regard to our being entitled to "courtesy of reply" President pointed out that exchange of correspondence among President Eisenhower, Secretary, himself and his Foreign Minister indicated invitation under active and serious consideration by ROK Government and hence no discourtesy involved;

(2) Rhee said he is completing further letter to President Eisenhower text of which he would shortly ask me to telegraph Washington.<sup>2</sup> Rhee said letter short and indicates Korean Government prepared attend Geneva Conference if President Eisenhower, in light ROK misgivings, nevertheless still believes it desirable do so. I gather letter also takes up again Rhee desire for assurance on military build-up.

With regard to Secretary's reply to Pyun (Deptel 792) I said this in form of statement recapitulating points previously set forth, plus indication that ROK request for armed forces build-up is under active study by US Government whose views will be furnished as soon as they are available. (Point 11; I did not say reply likely "next week" since this would almost certainly have guaranteed further Korean delay pending receipt thereof). I also indicated that US Government will attend conference whether or not ROK attends (Point 10).

Although I was with President and advisors for approximately 1 hour during which Rhee covered much familiar ground, no points were developed.

<sup>1</sup> Dated Apr. 7, p. 75 and *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> *Infra*.



Because of short remaining period April 26 opening date, seems doubtful whether there will be much time for Washington consultation, even assuming ROK Geneva attendance. In this connection in addition ROK desire obtain military build-up commitment, Rhee and Pyun may believe ROK independence of action at Geneva might be limited by pre-conference consultation.

BRIGGS

---

396.1-GE/4-854 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

SEOUL, April 8, 1954—6 p. m.

991. Repeated information priority Tokyo 599 (Tokyo pass CINCUNC). Re Embtel 990, April 8. Following letter dated April 8 from President Rhee to President Eisenhower just received with request it be telegraphed to Washington.<sup>1</sup>

*Begin text.*

My dear President Eisenhower: Not knowing what to do at this darkest moment in our fight for survival of Korea, I am appealing to you once again by asking you to advise me what can be done.

Our friends are urging us to join in Geneva conference. They complain we are not cooperating with them. Have we not cooperated with US to extent of wasting over eight months, knowing as we did nothing would come out of Panmunjom or political conferences? What is result? Our enemies are today in infinitely stronger position than they ever were and UN Forces are talking about going home. We do not blame them. They see no reason why they should stay here while there is no war to fight and while their governments are trying to settle matters peacefully either one way or other.

Regarding Geneva conference, we were told Russia would not be admitted as neutral. Now we find Russia is one of sponsors of conference, sending out invitations. Again we were told positively India would not be allowed attend conference, but we hear Indian delegates are already in Geneva. I need not mention other points equally difficult to understand. [Here follow portions of President Rhee's message that were excluded from this publication at the request of the Republic of Korea Government.]

---

<sup>1</sup> For President Eisenhower's reply to the letter quoted here, see telegram 829, Apr. 16, p. 103.

Allow me to tell Your Excellency, frankly and earnestly, that UN statesmen do not seem to know what they are doing. They are playing with fire. By trying to resist Armed Forces with talks, they can never save Indochina or Korea or even their own nations. When it is too late, young men of their own countries will pay dearly for it. I am saying this with prayers in my heart. May God Almighty give you wisdom and courage that pass all understanding.

With assurances of my continued friendship and high esteem,  
 Very sincerely yours,  
*End Text.*<sup>2</sup>

BRIGGS

---

<sup>2</sup> The text of this message was forwarded to President Eisenhower under cover of a memorandum dated Apr. 8 from Secretary Dulles, who stated that a reply was under consideration by the Department of State (396.1-GE/4-854).

---

396.1-GE/4-854 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1954—6:59 p. m.

797. Afternoon April 7 Robertson presented informal paper<sup>2</sup> and discussed general US views on substance and tactics Korean phase Geneva Conference with Australia, Canadian, New Zealand and UK representatives along following lines:

1. Noting we had studied various Commonwealth proposals, Robertson stated US and Commonwealth in general agreement basic objectives seek agreement from Communists on independent, united Korea; withdrawal foreign forces from Korea with adequate safeguards and in connection with Korean unification; maintain strong united allied and UN position; emerge with moral and propaganda victory; and take only positions at Geneva which maintain position of strength for UN in Korea.

2. US proposes seek allied agreement to begin Geneva conference with proposals for resuming UN plans for Korean unification which Communists frustrated by political opposition and aggression. Such plans based on GA resolutions of November 14, 1947,<sup>3</sup> October 7, 1950, December 1, 1950,<sup>4</sup> and August 28, 1953.<sup>5</sup>

3. To preserve legitimacy, sovereignty and integrity ROK, US conceives unification as completion these resolutions by constituent act

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated to Canberra, London, Ottawa, Wellington, and Tokyo with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Text in *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. VI, p. 857.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 410 (V), establishing the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA); text in *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. II, p. 2585.

<sup>5</sup> Text *ibid.*, p. 2676.

in North Korea under UNCURK observation. This would bring area of North Korea by new constitutional act under ROK. Such arrangements would safeguard UNC security requirements in Korea. Such proposal would be combined with phased withdrawal foreign forces staged before and after elections and establishment single national government for Korea. For several legal and practical reasons situation Korea different from Germany in terms applying tripartite unification formula at Geneva automatically to Korea.

4. In discussion tactics US position Robertson emphasized (a) importance principle maintaining integrity ROK and not liquidating it constitutionally without its consent and starting *de novo* as Commonwealth proposes; (b) no agreement at Geneva valid as practical matter without joint US-ROK endorsement; (c) ROK has primary interest Korean unification and at opening stage would violently oppose Commonwealth generalized plan for elections and new government; (d) in negotiations with Communists dangerous begin conference with final fixed formula since Communists always oppose initial position; and (e) US proposal on Korea in general better to combat possible Communist proposals on Indochina.

5. US Government strongly feels undesirable, dangerous and unwise at this stage anticipate seeking extensive compromises with Communists on any ameliorating arrangements less than unification after failure reach agreement on unification.

Commonwealth representatives indicated their Governments would (a) dislike US approach either as matter of tactics or principle; (b) prefer generalized plan for all-Korea elections which would be defensible to advance at beginning conference and stand on firmly and (c) do not recognize sovereignty or authority ROK in North Korea (and neither does US), and uncertain GA Resolutions cited definitely support preserving and extending ROK integrity by new constituent act.

Robertson emphasized principle safeguarding UN resolutions and ROK integrity and need for earliest possible consultations with ROK if ROK decides go Geneva determine how far it will go towards Commonwealth viewpoint eventually at Conference.

Amembassy Seoul: Foregoing for your information only, at this stage.

US informal paper and memorandum of meeting being pouched.<sup>6</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. On Apr. 9, U. Alexis Johnson met with Jean Daridan, Minister of the French Embassy, and Pierre Millet, Counselor, setting forth for them the U.S. position generally as outlined by Robertson above (396.1-GE/4-954). Johnson, American Ambassador in Czechoslovakia, was previously Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs until late 1953, and had been recalled to Washington to coordinate work on the Geneva Conference.

FE files, lot 60 D 330, "Position Papers"

*Memorandum by Christopher Van Hollen of the Executive  
Secretariat, Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL  
GK D-4/7

[WASHINGTON,] April 9, 1954.

KOREAN PHASE

DRAFT INITIAL PROPOSAL FOR REUNIFICATION OF KOREA  
(Alternative A)

The attached paper, drafted by Mr. Drew, NA, contains the initial proposal on Korean Reunification (Alternative A) which the U.S. plans to support at Geneva. This proposal has been drafted to take account of the Secretary's desire that the initial U.S. position should support a resumption of the UN Reunification program set forth in the GA Resolution of October 12 [?], 1950 as well as in previous UN Resolutions.

The draft proposal of the minimum U.S. position (Alternative B) is contained in GK D-4b<sup>1</sup> and the basic U.S. position on the over-all question of Korean Reunification is to be found in GK D-4/1c.<sup>2</sup>

CHRISTOPHER VAN HOLLEN

[Attachment]

*Position Paper Prepared For the Korean Phase of the Geneva  
Conference*

GK D-4/7

DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR REUNIFICATION OF KOREA  
(Alternative A)

*Preamble*

The Korean people, who for 4,000 years have had a common civilization with a common language, culture, and traditions, desire to be reunited under a single government of their own choosing and to resume their traditional peaceful life. Virtually the entire world has long recognized that this is a proper and commendable aspiration, and the United Nations has repeatedly supported measures designed to realize this objective. The United Nations General Assembly adopted resolutions in 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, and 1953 which supported a

<sup>1</sup> Dated Mar. 27, p. 62. Following the drafting of Document GK D-4/10, Apr. 16, p. 106, which presented a new Alternative B, the proposal in GK D-4/b came to be known as Alternative C.

<sup>2</sup> Document GK D-4/1c is not printed. A subsequent revised version of it, Document GK D-4/1e, Apr. 24, is printed on p. 131.

free, independent, and unified Korean Government, representative of the wishes of the Korean people. The principles enunciated in these resolutions are just and equitable and constitute a broad framework upon which any political settlement for Korea should be based. The fundamental principles are as follows:

1. The Central People's Government of the [People's] Republic of China, having engaged in aggression in Korea, should cause its forces and nationals to withdraw from Korea. (UNGA Res. Feb. 1, 1951).

2. The Korean question "is primarily a matter for the Korean people itself" and it "cannot be fairly resolved without the participation of representatives of the indigenous population." (UNGA Res. Nov. 14, 1947).

3. The selection of representatives of the Korean people should be on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot; the number of representatives from each voting area or zone should be proportionate to the population; and the elections should be under the supervision of a United Nations commission of representatives of various non-Korean nations. (UNGA Res. Nov. 14, 1947).

4. The Government of the Republic of Korea was duly established in conformity with the above principles and is the only such lawful Government in Korea. (UNGA Res. Dec. 12, 1948). Subsequent elections in the Republic of Korea have been observed and endorsed by United Nations Commissions as reflecting the will of the electorate.

We therefore advance the following proposal for the reunification of Korea in accordance with the above principles enunciated by the United Nations.

#### *Method of Reunification of Korea*

1. Responsibilities of UNCURK as the Supervisory Commission.  
2. Withdrawal of United Nations forces and forces and nationals of the Central People's Government of the [People's] Republic of China from Korea.

3. Establishment of conditions for free elections.

4. Free elections for representatives to National Assembly of Republic of Korea from areas of Korea not already represented in National Assembly.

5. Action by expanded National Assembly to establish national administration for all Korea.

6. International security for a reunified Korea.

7. Residual functions of UNCURK after reunification.

8. Supersession of Armistice Agreement.

#### *1. Responsibilities of UNCURK as the Supervisory Commission.*

The present United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) was established by a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on October 7, 1950, to (i) assume the functions hitherto exercised by the United Nations Commission in [on] Korea (UNCOK); (ii) represent the United Nations

in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea; (iii) exercise such responsibilities in connection with relief and rehabilitation in Korea as may be determined by the General Assembly after receiving the recommendations of the Economic and Social Council. The functions hitherto exercised by the UNCOK under United Nations General Assembly resolutions of December 12, 1948, included the responsibility to (a) lend its good offices to bring about the unification of Korea and the integration of all Korean security forces in accordance with the principles laid down by the General Assembly in the resolution of 14 November 1947; (b) seek to facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social, and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea; (c) be available for observation and consultation in the further development of representative government based on the freely expressed will of the people; and (d) observe the actual withdrawal of the occupation forces and verify the fact of withdrawal when such has occurred. The principles for bringing about the unification of Korea embodied in the United Nations General Assembly resolution of November 14, 1947, include elections under the observation of the Commission on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot to choose representatives, which representatives would constitute a National Assembly and which may establish a National Government of Korea, the number of such representatives from each voting area or zone to be proportionate to the population.

These terms of reference for UNCURK shall be specifically revised and expanded with the consent of the United Nations General Assembly to give UNCURK responsibility for observing and verifying the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea as set forth herein and for supervising the plan for the reunification of Korea as set forth herein. The specific terms of reference of UNCURK shall include the following:

(a) Observation and certification of withdrawal of United Nations forces and forces and nationals of the Central People's Government of the [People's] Republic of China.

(b) Investigation throughout areas of Korea not already duly represented in the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea of conditions affecting the holding of free elections, freedom of movement, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of speech, press, and broadcasting, and freedom of political parties to organize and carry out their activities.

(c) Preparation of electoral laws for these areas in consultation with the Republic of Korea and the civil authorities of these areas concerned.

(d) Determination, in consultation with the Republic of Korea and the civil authorities of the area concerned, of the number of delegates to be elected and the number of election districts, which shall be in direct proportion to the population distribution in Korea.

(e) Supervision over the implementation of the electoral laws and registration of qualified voters, and observation of the elections at all administrative levels.

(f) Certification of results of elections.

(g) Observation of steps leading to the establishment of a reunified government. During the period between the end of the elections and the effective assumption of control over all of Korea by the reunified Korean Government, UNCURK will remain in operation in order to prevent action after the elections which would impair the conditions of genuine freedom under which they will have been held. The details of these terms of reference shall be worked out by the signatories within this framework and shall come into effect simultaneously with this agreement. UNCURK shall have the power to adopt measures not specifically described and which are necessary to carry out their task herein, provided that they do not otherwise conflict with this proposal.

The UNCURK shall have its primary headquarters at Pyongyang and shall report and make recommendations at its discretion to the parties to this agreement. The parties to this agreement shall facilitate the work of UNCURK and comply with recommendations made by UNCURK within its revised terms of reference as set forth above.

## *2. Withdrawal of United Nations Forces and Forces and Nationals of the Central People's Government of the [People's] Republic of China.*

The withdrawal of all forces and nationals of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic shall be carried out in pursuance of the February 1, 1951, resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, which calls for such action. This withdrawal shall take place as expeditiously as possible, and shall be completed at the latest within twelve months after the acceptance of this proposal.

The withdrawal of UN forces shall be carried out in pursuance of the October 7, 1950, resolution of the United Nations General Assembly which provides that United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for ensuring conditions of stability in Korea and for the establishment of a reunified government. This withdrawal should be completed within twelve months from the date that UNCURK notes that an effective reunified government of Korea has been established.

UNCURK shall observe and verify the withdrawal of UN forces and forces and nationals of the Central People's Government of the [People's] Republic of China, and when appropriate it may submit

reports to the General Assembly of the United Nations that all forces and nationals of the Central People's Government of the [People's] Republic of China have been withdrawn from Korea and that all United Nations forces have been withdrawn from Korea.

### 3. *Establishment of Conditions for Free Elections.*

Preparatory to the holding of free elections in areas of Korea not already duly represented in the National Assembly, UNCURK shall, pursuant to its terms of reference, observe political conditions throughout the areas concerned and shall, where it deems appropriate, propose to the parties concerned the measures necessary to insure that elections are held in a free atmosphere wherein the democratic right of freedom of speech, press and assembly would be recognized and respected. In particular these measures shall include the following :

Freedom of movement throughout the area.

Freedom of presentation of candidates.

Immunity of candidates.

Freedom from arbitrary arrest or victimization.

Freedom of association and political meetings.

Freedom of expression for all.

Freedom of press, radio, and free circulation of newspapers, periodicals, etc.

Secrecy of the vote.

Security of polling stations and ballot boxes.

### 4. *Free Elections for Representatives to National Assembly of Republic of Korea from Areas of Korea not already Represented in the National Assembly.*

In consultation with the authorities in the ROK and in the local areas concerned, UNCURK shall draft electoral laws and procedures for areas of Korea not already duly represented in the National Assembly. The civil authorities for all the areas concerned shall promulgate these laws and procedures simultaneously. In particular, election procedures approved by UNCURK shall ensure that candidates reflecting varying viewpoints will be permitted to campaign freely; that the electorate will be able to express its choice of candidates freely and without duress or intimidation; and that the election procedures shall be uniform among all the areas concerned.

Not later than 18 months after concluding this agreement or not later than six months after the withdrawal from Korea of forces and nationals of the Central People's Government of the [People's] Republic of China in the event that this is accomplished in less than twelve months, elections for representatives to the National Assembly shall be held on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot in areas of Korea not already duly represented in the National Assem-



bly.\* The number of representatives to be elected to the National Assembly from such areas shall be determined according to the size of the population of each election district. It is estimated that not more than six million persons reside in areas not already duly represented in the National Assembly. In the event that UNCURK shall fail to certify the election of a representative he shall not be seated in the National Assembly, and new local by-elections shall be held as soon as possible under UNCURK supervision. The vote of a majority of the members of UNCURK shall be required to rule that the election of any candidate is not valid.

5. *Action by Expanded National Assembly to Establish National Administration for all of Korea.*

Within thirty days after UNCURK has certified the free election of two-thirds of the number of representatives designated to be elected under its supervision, the National Assembly shall seat the newly elected representatives. After these newly elected representatives have been seated the National Assembly shall take prompt and appropriate action to provide uniform national laws for all of Korea and to render null and void all preceding sectional laws not specifically reaffirmed by the expanded National Assembly. When this action has been taken and effectively implemented a reunified Korean Government shall be considered to have been established.

6. *International Security for a Reunified Korea.*

The reunified Government shall declare its adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and at such time the parties to this agreement shall pledge their respect for the sovereignty and the independence of the reunified Korea. The reunited Korea shall have the right to conclude such international agreements as it may wish.

7. *Residual Functions of UNCURK.*

Following the establishment of a reunified Korean Government with effective control over all of Korea as outlined above, UNCURK shall note the fact and shall henceforth confine its activities to such responsibilities in connection with relief and rehabilitation as may be determined by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

8. *Supersession of Armistice Agreement.*

Notation by UNCURK that a reunified Korean Government with effective control over all of Korea has been duly established shall constitute for purposes of supersession of the Armistice Agreement, under Article 62 of that Agreement, "appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides."

---

\*This would include areas north of the 38th parallel under UNC control. [Footnote in the source text.]

396.1-GE/4-554 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1954—8:11 p. m.

642. Urtels 1196 and 1197<sup>2</sup> re substantive issue raised second paragraph Soviet *aide-mémoire*, Department's view is Soviets should be left no doubt as to views Western powers this regard. We have proposed to British and French, and British have agreed that *aide-mémoire* be dealt with in two separate exercises: (1) a short tripartite *aide-mémoire* to be delivered by you with respect to administrative and technical arrangements dealt with in the remainder of Soviet note, text of which being transmitted by separate telegram;<sup>3</sup> and (2) delivery of identic notes to Soviets by three Western Ambassadors on substantive issue. Text of U.S. note follows:

"With reference to the Soviet *aide-mémoire* of April 5, the Government of the United States points out that the characterization therein of the forthcoming Conference at Geneva as a 'conference of representatives of the United States of America, France, England, Chinese People's Republic and USSR which shall take part in discussion Korean question and question of re-establishment peace in Indochina which are on conference agenda, with participation other interested states for appropriate questions', does not correspond to the letter or the sense of the agreement reached by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Four Powers at Berlin on February 18, 1954.

The concept embodied in the *aide-mémoire* of April 5 was explicitly rejected at the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers at Berlin.

The Resolution agreed to by the four Foreign Ministers on February 18 does not contemplate a conference limited to five participants as to either the Korean or the Indochinese question. Arrangements concerning the Geneva Conference which are not dealt with equally by all of the participants will be the special responsibility of the governments of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the USSR."

U.K. have agreed identic text and Ambassador Moscow being instructed coordinate timing and delivery with you and French Ambassador. Hope French Government will issue similar instructions French Ambassador. Have informed French and U.K. that Department does not consider delivery should necessarily be joint but leave manner delivery discretion three Ambassadors Moscow. Tripartite *aide-mémoire* should not be delivered until French Ambassador instructed deliver note.

DULLES

<sup>1</sup> Repeated for information to Geneva, London, Paris, Saigon, and Seoul.

<sup>2</sup> Both dated Apr. 5, pp. 70 and 71.

<sup>3</sup> *Infra*.

396.1-GE/4-954 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1954—8 : 12 p. m.

643. Re Deptel 642 to Moscow.<sup>2</sup> (Take no action until receipt reference.) Tripartite reply to Soviet *aide-mémoire* of April 5, 1954 follows:

“The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States note from the *Aide-Mémoire* of the U.S.S.R. dated April 5 that the U.S.S.R. has now agreed on the technical and administrative arrangements for the Geneva Conference.

Although it has been agreed that English, French, Russian, Chinese and Korean should be official languages for the discussion of the Korean problem, the decision on the official languages for the discussions on the problem of restoring peace in Indochina can, of course, only be made after agreement has been reached at Geneva on all the participants for the discussions about Indochina.

With reference to the U.S.S.R.'s proposal that qualified interpreters for oral translations into official languages be obtained by agreement among the conference participants, it is assumed the U.S.S.R. will have at Geneva as soon as possible appropriate officials authorized to discuss the necessary arrangements in this regard as well as other technical and administrative details prior to the conference, with representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States who are now in Geneva.”

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated for information to Geneva, London, Paris, Saigon, and Seoul.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

396.1-GE/4-1054 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State*

SECRET      NIACT

Moscow, April 10, 1954—3 p. m.

1225. Repeated information priority London 187, priority Paris 249. Reference Deptel 642.<sup>1</sup> From beginning of exchanges with Soviet Government concerning preparations Geneva conference the desirability of not leaving Soviet Union in any doubt on these points has been repeatedly stressed by this Embassy. Furthermore, as reported, I have on every occasion emphasized these points to Kuznetsov, particularly that the four powers and the four powers alone were responsible for

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Apr. 9, p. 88.

the conference and that Communist China had no different status nor more rights than any other invited power. I am therefore in entire agreement as to desirability of a note on the subject to Soviet Government but I believe note would be more effective and of greater help at Geneva if Western interpretation as given in last paragraph was made somewhat more precise. I feel, as written, it will offer Soviet Union an opportunity for confusing the issue in hope of causing differences between three western powers. First sentence in last paragraph is not strictly accurate since portion of Soviet *aide-mémoire* of April 5 quoted in first paragraph does not state that conference at either stage should be limited to five participants. Soviet reply would probably pick up this technical discrepancy to our embarrassment. Also, the last sentence is somewhat ambiguous in reference to arrangements "which are not dealt with equally by all the participants". This might provoke an inquiry by Soviet Government as to difference between two types of arrangements contemplated.

It would appear that main point we must seek to establish clearly is that under Berlin Agreement Communist China has no different status than the other invited countries and in no way shares the responsibility of the four for any phase of conference. It seems to me there are two points of substance which must be dealt with in order to safeguard this basic position concerning role of Communist China. One deals with invitations to other participants in Indochinese discussions. While it is true Berlin decision is less precise on this point, its intent, by analogy with Korean phase, is sufficiently clear for us to assert, and at this time, that four powers and four powers alone will agree and invite in their names representatives of the other countries which will participate. For this purpose Communist China could be considered as having already been invited. The second point is the status of participating countries once the conference has convened. Here it would appear that one method of avoiding any possibility of special status for Communist China would be to adhere to principle that all participating powers will be on equal footing once conference has convened. Alternate possibility would be to assert continuing responsibility of four powers as inviting powers from organization and handling of conference business during actual sessions conference.

If we are going to attempt to clarify our position with Soviets at this juncture, and I feel we should, it would be better to meet these points head on rather than leave any obscurity in language which Soviets could seize upon for hair-splitting argument. Something along following lines might therefore be substituted for last paragraph proposed note:

"At Berlin it was agreed that four powers would take the initiative in calling conference at Geneva to discuss, in different compositions, the Korean and Indochinese questions and that for this purpose the four governments would undertake to invite other interested countries to participate. The responsibility for the issuance on invitations, the preparations and other related matters in regard to both phases of the conference rests clearly on these four governments and these four governments alone. In accordance with the Berlin decision, other countries including CPR have already been invited by the four powers to attend the discussion on Korea. The CPR has likewise been invited to attend the discussions on Indochina. Once agreement has been reached by the governments of France, US, UK and USSR as to the other countries to be invited to participate in the discussion on Indochina, invitations will in like manner be extended to them in the name of the four governments. In conformity with accepted international practice, all participating countries, inviting as well as invited, will take part in the work of the conference on a basis of equality."

An alternate for last sentence (but in my view less desirable) could be: "The US, UK, France and USSR in accordance with their position of inviting powers will continue to bear a special responsibility for the arrangements and organization of the conference even after it is convened."<sup>2</sup>

BOHLEN

---

<sup>2</sup> The Department of State transmitted the following reply in telegram 646, Apr. 10, to Moscow:

"Your 1225. Department approves substitute final paragraph suggested by you with slightly amended first clause of first sentence reading as follows:

'At Berlin it was agreed that four powers would take the initiative in calling a conference at Geneva to discuss, in different compositions, a peaceful settlement in Korea and the restoration of peace in Indochina, and that et cetera.'

"British and French here have accepted this revised text for identic notes, subject to reference to their Foreign Offices. If and when British and French Ambassadors Moscow receive approval of this text from their Foreign Offices you are authorized to deliver revised note accordance previous instructions." (396.1-GE/4-1054)

---

396.1-GE/4-1154 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

Moscow, April 11, 1954—4 p. m.

1234. Repeated information priority London 189, priority Paris 253. Have discussed this morning with British and French Ambassadors method of handling *aide-mémoire* Deptel 643<sup>1</sup> and proposed note

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Apr. 9, p. 89.

Deptels 642<sup>2</sup> and 646.<sup>3</sup> French Ambassador has had no word from Paris concerning note at all and British Ambassador has not yet received approval for revised text.

On assumption approval will be received from both Paris, London, we tentatively agreed as follows regarding delivery :

1. I should as separate operation hand to Kuznetsov *aide-mémoire*. Press would be told, as previously, that I had delivered tripartite answer to Soviet *aide-mémoire* of April 5 dealing with practical preparations and arrangements for Geneva conference.

2. Method of delivery note concerning interpretation Berlin decision depends primarily on how three governments from point of view public opinion wish to handle subject. If it is desired to make three-power demonstration, emphasizing our interpretation Berlin decisions, preferable method of delivery would be by three Ambassadors personally calling separately on Molotov. It would be difficult if not impossible to keep fact of calls by three western Ambassadors on Molotov secret and it would probably therefore be necessary to reveal to press purpose of calls. This would necessitate statements from three governments in order to insure public understanding of issue involved. On other hand if governments wish merely to keep record clear with Soviet Government without publicity, delivery by messenger as has been done in past without personal call by Ambassadors would offer best chance of keeping matter confidential. French Ambassador favors method of personal delivery since he feels demonstration of western solidarity is enhanced by personal call of Ambassadors whereas British Ambassador is in general more inclined to delivery by messenger. Provided three governments are prepared to deal with publicity on contents of note and difference with Soviet Government on interpretation Berlin agreement, I see considerable merit in personal delivery, but only on that basis. Would appreciate guidance before final decision on method delivery. British and French Ambassadors communicating along similar lines with London and Paris.<sup>4</sup>

BOHLEN

<sup>2</sup> Dated Apr. 9, p. 88.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> The Department of State sent the following reply in telegram 647, Apr. 11, to Moscow :

"Your 1234. Department would prefer personal delivery by three ambassadors and for its part would be prepared deal with question of publicity if necessary. However French and British may be reluctant make any public statement at this time. Department would not wish agreement on and delivery of note delayed by question of publicity in connection with delivery of note. Therefore if in judgment of three Ambassadors not possible make delivery without revealing purpose calls and French and or British are not now willing make public statement along lines of note you are authorized agree delivery by messenger." (396.1-GE/4-1154)

On Apr. 12 and 13, Ambassador Bohlen informed the Department that the British and French Governments preferred delivery of the notes by messenger rather than by a personal call. He also said that he had an appointment to deliver the *aide-mémoire* to Kuznetsov on the morning of Apr. 14 (telegrams 1241 and 1250 from Moscow ; 396.1-GE/4-1254, 4-1354).

795.00/4-1254

*Memorandum by the Coordinator for the Geneva Conference  
(Johnson) to the Acting Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] April 12, 1954.

Subject: Position on Korean Unification for Geneva Conference.

The ROKs have not yet indicated their intention to attend the Geneva Conference, however all indications are that they will in fact attend but are deferring any announcement in order to extract maximum concessions from us and to avoid consulting with us prior to the Conference in order to retain a free hand at the Conference.

Over the past weeks we have repeatedly reiterated to the ROKs our desire to honor our commitment to consult with them prior to consulting with anyone else concerning positions to be taken at the Conference and the difficulty of doing so until they have reached a decision on whether to attend. Last week we informed the ROK that in view of the very short time before the Conference we could no longer delay consulting with other members of the Allied side. The ROK expressed no objection and merely asked to be kept informed of the results.

We have thus far carried out preliminary consultations with U.K., the Commonwealth and France. We have made it clear in our consultation that we are not going to permit our Allies to bargain us down on our position prior to Geneva so that we have no "give" by the time we start negotiations with the Communists. We have taken the position that at least the opening Allied position at Geneva should be support of the ROK position which provides for extension of ROK sovereignty over North Korea and the holding of elections under U.N. observation for the seats in the ROK Assembly provided for North Korea under the ROK Constitution. We have attempted to support this position by, among other arguments, stating that it would be a logical completion of the U.N. plans for the unification of Korea interrupted by the outbreak of the Korean War.

The U.K. and the Commonwealth have expressed strong opposition to this position even as an opening tactical maneuver. France has not yet replied, but I expect that its position will be one of somewhat grudging support, or at least not opposition, in the hope of obtaining U.S. support for French positions with respect to Indochina.

The Commonwealth position is that a plan for all-Korean elections to a constituent Assembly should be put forward at Geneva, similar to the Allied plan put forward at Berlin for Germany. While having

<sup>1</sup> Secretary Dulles visited London and Paris, Apr. 11-14, for discussions primarily with regard to Southeast Asia; see pp. 514 ff.

a superficial plausibility, such a plan ignores the great differences between the Korean and the German situation. It in effect places the ROK and the North Korean regimes on the same basis and "starts from scratch" in Korea. Although Rhee and his supporters could be expected to win overwhelmingly any such election, the ROK could be expected violently to oppose the plan, which also ignores the basic U.S. position of the maintenance of the integrity of the ROK.

There is a position upon which I believe we could take a firm stand at Geneva which would be more consistent with basic U.N. resolutions than the present ROK position; which would be entirely consistent with our position on the maintenance of the integrity of the ROK; which I think has a reasonable prospect of obtaining support of Rhee if it is carefully and sympathetically explained to him, and upon which I believe we could obtain a very considerable degree of international support. This position would be to hold an election under international observation for the ROK Assembly throughout both North and South Korea within the framework of the present ROK Constitution, possibly accompanied by a popular election for President. Rhee has previously indicated publicly (with many qualifications) his willingness to have an all-Korea popular election for President.

We are not going to be able to accomplish much in the way of concerting our position with Pyun at Geneva. Therefore it is urgent that an appropriate individual be prepared to go to Korea to see Rhee immediately upon ROK announcing its decision to attend the Geneva Conference.

I discussed the situation with Mr. Robertson and the Secretary along the foregoing lines. As I indicated to you, the Secretary gave his approval to attempting to obtain ROK agreement and to Mr. Morton<sup>2</sup> discussing with Senator Knowland<sup>3</sup> an emissary to Rhee for the purpose.

I am following up the matter with Mr. Morton.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Thruston B. Morton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

<sup>3</sup> Senator William Knowland, Republican, of California was majority leader in the U.S. Senate.

<sup>4</sup> In a memorandum to the Secretary, Apr. 14, Johnson stated that Morton had talked with Knowland about a trip to Korea by Arthur Dean. Knowland's reaction, said the memorandum, was to suggest that General Van Fleet might be more effective, but he—Knowland—would not oppose Dean's going. Johnson indicated his belief that Dean should be sent to Seoul immediately upon Korean announcement of intention to attend the Conference. Under Secretary Smith concurred in the recommendation. On the following day, Secretary Dulles in a brief memorandum to Johnson indicated his agreement to asking Dean to go if Van Fleet also went to Korea. (795.00/4-1454)

During the following week, it was announced that General Van Fleet had been chosen by President Eisenhower as his Special Representative with the rank of Ambassador to make a military survey to the Far East. For further documentation on the missions of Dean and Van Fleet in Korea, additional to that contained in this volume, see volume xv. Concerning the report of the Van Fleet Mission, see volume xii.



Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 238 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State*

[Extract]

SECRET      NIACT

LONDON, April 13, 1954—3 p. m.

4523. Repeated information Paris niact 622. For the Acting Secretary from the Secretary. Paris for Secretary's party. Following is résumé of my final meeting with Eden this morning :

5. Korean phase Geneva Conference.<sup>1</sup>

(A) I said we had two basic thoughts: We must carry ROK with us in any proposal which we put forward at Geneva since without their acceptance proposal was meaningless.

(B) We regard Geneva as serious negotiations and while not over hopeful wish to try for settlement involving unification and independence at [of] Korea, therefore we should have some give in our position so that we can make concessions. We should not give up all our trading possibilities. While we would fully consult with other 16, US should have pretty much control of tactics. The Communists at Geneva will show a single will and if all 16 try to quarter-back operation we will get nowhere. Since US seems to have principal responsibility for trying to reach agreement and bringing ROK along we must have a tactical flexibility.

I outlined our view on opening position at Geneva based on UN Commission designed to oversee Korean elections explaining that this Commission's work had been interrupted by aggression in 1950 and that we could make a plausible and honorable case that it should carry on with the task given it by the UN. I recognized this would not be acceptable to the Communists but felt that we could stand before the bar of world opinion in putting it forward. Eden said that my presentation cast different light on situation, thus far he had only seen reports that we intended to have elections in North Korea and not in South Korea. Propagandawise this would be a very difficult position to maintain and he stressed the importance of carrying not only British but world opinion with us. He said UK had been thinking of a German type formula similar to Berlin. In light of my comments, however, he felt UK might be able to support opening position I had outlined above. He believed Communists would come forward with specious proposals and UK would like to counter with something that

---

<sup>1</sup> This was the only substantive discussion on the subject that took place during Dulles' talks in London and Paris.

seemed eminently reasonable but probably would not be accepted by Communists. He had not liked what he heretofore understood US proposal to be since he thought it tactically unsound to put forward a case which would be shot down and then produce another proposal. Now that he understood the proposition we had in mind he felt much better. He asked whether we could spell out for his people our presentation and I told him we would be glad to do so, and could probably discuss it in Paris next week.<sup>2</sup> (Alex Johnson should draw up draft of US presentation at Geneva for my consideration next Monday).<sup>3</sup>

Selwyn Lloyd<sup>4</sup> doubted that we would obtain unified Korea and asked whether we envisaged other measures which might make the armistice safer and more durable. For example, if the neutrals on UN Commission were no longer willing to remain in Korea what would we do and what would replace UN Commission. I said we would also give thought to this point.

[DULLES]

<sup>2</sup> See the record of the tripartite meeting in Paris on Apr. 22, p. 127.

<sup>3</sup> Apr. 19. The draft referred to is not printed; for Dulles' presentation of the U.S. position at the special briefing meeting on Apr. 20, see the memorandum of conversation by Brown, p. 119.

<sup>4</sup> Minister of State in the British Foreign Office.

396.1-GE/4-1454 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

Moscow, April 14, 1954—1 p. m.

1253. Repeated information niact London 198, niact Paris 263. I delivered noon today *aide-mémoire* (Embtel 1251).<sup>1</sup> Kuznetsov read text and had no questions to ask. I then told him that since the Soviet *aide-mémoire* of April 5 had in second paragraph raised questions involving the interpretation of the Berlin Accord, the three governments would have some observations to make on that subject which would be embodied in separate communications. He asked when this would be done and I told him the notes would be delivered this afternoon. He made no inquiry as to contents of notes and I volunteered none.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. In it, Bohlen informed the Department of State that he would deliver the U.S. *aide-mémoire* at noon on Apr. 14 and that the identic notes would be delivered by messenger at 4 p. m. that afternoon (396.1-GE/4-1454).

Kuznetsov did tell me that he expected to go to Geneva and inquired if I was going. I told him I was not since I had no real acquaintanceship with questions to be discussed.

BOHLEN

---

FE files, lot 60 D 330, "Position Papers"

*Position Paper Prepared for the Korean Phase of the Geneva Conference*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 14, 1954.

GK D-4/9

GENERAL UNITED STATES VIEWS ON KOREAN PHASE OF GENEVA  
CONFERENCE

PURPOSE OF CONFERENCE

1. In accordance with Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement and the Berlin Communiqué of February, the two belligerent sides are to meet to seek a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, considering that the establishment by peaceful means of a united and independent Korea would be an important factor in reducing international tension and in restoring peace in other parts of Asia. It will be a two-sided conference.

2. We are confident that all the allies are agreed our primary purpose at Geneva is to seek Korea's unification on terms that would not result in turning Korea over to the Communists and thus lose at the Conference table what we fought so long to prevent in Korea.

OBJECTIVES

1. Maintain position of strength and stability in free Korea, avoid confusion, weakening of morale, or public turmoil within the ROK, and take account ROK fear of abandonment.

2. Maintain the constitutional framework of the ROK State and the validity of past UN resolutions to the greatest extent possible.

3. Maintain a united front at the Conference among the allies, the United States and the ROK in the tactics of presentation and proceedings, and work out suitable procedures for consultations among Allies at Conference.

---

<sup>1</sup>A cover sheet indicated that this paper was used by Johnson for the oral presentation of the U.S. position at the meeting with the representatives of the 16 nations on Apr. 13 described in circular telegram 362, *infra*. It was also used by Johnson at Geneva; see telegram Secto 17, Apr. 27, from Geneva, p. 146.

4. Determine whether the Communists will insist on controlling part or all Korea, or renounce any special position in Korea in order to set up "a united Korea for free Koreans", and unmask Communist intentions.

5. Emerge from the Conference in a strong moral and political position by presenting proposals commending themselves to the world at large and which if not accepted by the Communists will make clear their responsibility for failure to reach agreement at Geneva.

#### BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

1. The Communists at Geneva will do their utmost to broaden discussions on deceptive lines, such as a general Far East security pact, lessening of tensions and recognition of the independence and security of all states. The Communists will not agree to a "united Korea for free Koreans" or any plan of unification acceptable to us on Korea.

2. Allied proposals must take into consideration the fundamental interests and position of the ROK in the future unification of Korea. The ROK is a sovereign state and not a pawn. Without the endorsement and support of the ROK, proposals or agreements at Geneva on Korea will be ineffective and invalid.

3. It is essential, from the United States point of view, to preserve the framework of legitimacy, sovereignty and integrity of the ROK State in principle. Proposals based on this principle would:

(a) preserve the integrity of the nation and people which fought, with much allied and United Nations blood and treasure, for three years against Communist aggressors;

(b) emphasize the interrupted efforts of the United Nations since 1947 in good faith to establish the independence and unity of Korea.

(c) give voice to the viewpoint of the overwhelming majority of the Korean people; and

(d) not put the ROK on a par with the North Korean regime.

4. The situation in Korea is substantially different from that in Germany so that the exact parallel of unification plans for Germany do not apply rigidly as a precedent for Korea.

#### UNITED STATES PROPOSALS

1. *Continuation of United Nations Resolutions.* We believe we should begin the Geneva Conference with proposals in the general spirit of the United Nations plans for unification of Korea which the Communists frustrated by political opposition and aggression. We have in mind specifically the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, October 7, 1950, December 1,

1950, and August 28, 1953. The principal points of these resolutions are:

(a) The United Nations has frequently attempted to assist the Korean people in re-establishing their freedom, independence and unity which are the urgent and rightful claims and that the Korean question is primarily a matter for the Korean people.

(b) National independence of Korea should be re-established and foreign forces withdrawn thereafter.

(c) Elections should be held on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot and the number of representatives from the voting districts should be proportionate to population; elections should be observed by an international commission with freedom to observe and consult throughout Korea.

(d) The ROK is the only lawful sovereign government in any part of Korea in so far as the United Nations is concerned.

(e) The United Nations has in being a commission with personnel and experience to carry out the terms of reference on Korean unification established in the General Assembly Resolution of October 7, 1950.

(f) The United Nations has in being an agency to rehabilitate all Korea once it is unified.

2. *Variant Plans.* There are two general formulas for obtaining a free and united Korea by peaceful means:

(a) to carry forward the plans contained in existing UN resolutions by completing the constituent act of elections in North Korea, within the framework of the constitutional structure of the ROK State.

(b) to start completely *de novo* by holding elections throughout Korea supervised by an international commission to set up a constituent assembly, draft and adopt a new constitution, and form a new national government. The United States favors the first formula. It would (a) avoid turmoil and disorganization in ROK, and (b) provide some negotiating flexibility.

### 3. *Elements of Unification Plan.*

(a) International Commission with authority to move throughout Korea to observe elections and advise local authorities thereon.

(b) Minimum Conditions for Free Elections.

(c) Elections in North Korea, or possibly also in South Korea, in such a way as to retain the constitutional entity of the ROK State.

(d) Establishment of an all-Korea National Assembly on basis proportional to population in South and North Korea.

(e) Assembly would have right and authority by terms of new elections to retain, amend or replace ROK constitution.

(f) Phased withdrawal of foreign forces before and after elections to be completed "X" months after all-Korean Assembly and President elected.

(g) Possible election of President simultaneous with elections for National Assembly.

396.1-GE/4-1454 : Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1954—3:43 p. m.

362. At meeting April 13 of countries that have accepted invitation participate Geneva Conference, group was given briefing on current military situation in Korea, including estimate Communist capabilities, and intelligence estimate overall Communist objectives. Unlikelihood of Communists accepting any proposals dislodging them from Korea emphasized.

Recalling bases from Geneva Conference in Armistice Agreement and Berlin Communiqué, Johnson expressed confidence allies agreed primary purpose Geneva to seek Korean unification on terms that would not result in turning over Korea to Communists, thus losing at Conference what we fought so long to prevent. He emphasized following objectives:

(1) maintain position of strength and stability in free Korea taking account ROK fear of abandonment, not causing confusion, weakening of morale or strong public opposition within ROK; (2) maintain constitutional framework ROK state and, to greatest extent possible, validity of past UN resolutions; (3) maintain united front at Conference, despite mechanical difficulties of coordinating position in fast-moving conference situation with number of participants, which would require study; (4) determine whether Communists willing surrender control over any part Korea, or if not, unmask Communist intentions; (5) emerge from Conference in strong moral and political position by presenting proposals commending themselves to world opinion and which, if rejected by Communists, will demonstrate Communist responsibility for Conference failure.

Basic considerations underlying allied position at Conference enumerated:

(1) Communists would do utmost broaden discussions on deceptive lines (e.g. general Far East security pact) and allies must keep Conference to basic issues; (2) allied proposals must take into consideration fundamental interests and position ROK in future unification since without ROK endorsement and support, proposals or agreements will be ineffective and invalid; (3) ROK is sovereign independent state, not pawn; (4) any proposals put forward must (a) preserve framework of legitimacy, sovereignty and integrity ROK State in

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the Embassies in Addis Ababa, Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Bogotá, Brussels, Canberra, London, Manila, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris, Seoul, The Hague, Tokyo, and Wellington; the Legation in Luxembourg; the U.S. Mission at the United Nations in New York; and by air pouch to Geneva and Capetown, with the following added for Capetown only:

“South Africa was not invited to meeting in order avoid embarrassment with ROK, neither country having accepted invitation to Geneva Conference. However in subsequent interview same day with South African Ambassador, Johnson covered above material.”

principle, (b) emphasize interrupted UN efforts since 1947 establish Korean independence and unity, (c) give voice to views of overwhelming majority Koreans, and (d) not equate ROK with North Korean regime. Johnson emphasized substantial differences between Korean situation and Germany so that German unification plans not rigidly applicable as precedent for Korea.

US believed proposals in general spirit UN plans for Korean unification (GA Resolutions Nov 14, 1947; Dec 12, 1948;<sup>2</sup> Oct 7, 1950; Dec 1, 1950; and Aug 28, 1953) should be submitted at outset. Principal points those resolutions were:

(1) frequent UN attempts assist Koreans in reestablishing their freedom; (2) reestablishment national independence Korea and withdrawal foreign forces thereafter; (3) elections on basis of adult suffrage by secret ballot, numbers of representatives from voting districts proportionate to population, and elections to be observed by international commission with freedom observe and consult throughout Korea; (4) ROK is only lawful sovereign government in Korea so far as UN concerned; and (5) UN has in existence Commission to carry out terms of reference Korean unification established in Oct 7, 1950 GA resolution and agency to rehabilitate unified Korea.

Johnson noted two unification plans generally suggested: (1) carry forward plan within existing UN framework; or (2) start from scratch by holding elections throughout Korea for constituent Assembly to form new government. US favored position conforming to UN resolutions. This would mean elections under international observation in those parts of Korea where UN not previously able observe elections and within framework ROK constitution. Such a plan would not necessitate destroying present ROK constitutional structure and would avoid misunderstanding, turmoil and administrative disorganization within Korea. Johnson cautioned that in considering initial allied position at Geneva important that group not now bargain proposals down between selves to point no flexibility remaining for negotiation with Communists at Geneva. In plan such as US favored, he envisaged phased withdrawal troops from both sides under international supervision but withdrawal would not be completed until after elections held and unification implemented. Important no withdrawal begin until performance at least started by other side. In answer to questions he agreed possible bargaining range within above position lay in extending elections from only North Korea to all Korea, while still preserving ROK constitution. Also pointed out that of course new all-Korean Assembly could amend ROK Constitution.

Johnson said our estimate success achieving this proposal not very high, depending naturally upon whether Communists willing see non-

---

<sup>2</sup> Text in *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948-49*, p. 290.

Communist Korea. If they are, formula can be found; if not no formula can overcome this fact.

UK representative expressed view his government would largely agree with above proposal, putting great deal stress its flexible aspects. Several mentioned importance avoiding impression North Korea would be placed under South Korea.

In answer inquiry re probable ROK attitude Johnson said US assumed ROK would want (1) complete withdrawal CCF forces; (2) extension ROK administration North Korea; (3) elections NK to fill vacant seats ROK Assembly.

Group also discussed alternative methods sharing allied costs. Several emphasized importance separating Korean from Indochinese expenses. Johnson said US continued favor plan by which US, UK and France would share 50%, and other thirteen would divide remaining 50% equally. Several expressed preference for adoption UN scale, which Johnson said unacceptable to US since would mean US pay approximately 56%. No decision.<sup>3</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> On the same day, the Department of State suggested that the Embassy in Ankara inform the Turkish Foreign Ministry of the acceptability to the 16 nations of Adnan Kural as Secretary General of the Allied side at the Geneva Conference (telegram 1150 to Ankara; 396.1-GE/4-754). Kural was a Director General in the Turkish Foreign Ministry, and the United States had taken the initiative in proposing him for the position.

---

396.1-GE/4-1554: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1954—8:37 p. m.

5451. Acting Secretary discussed with Makins, Scott<sup>2</sup> and Daridan today seating arrangements and chairmanship Geneva conference. They were informed that under no condition would US sit at table with Communist Chinese and North Koreans unless seating arrangement provided for two sides, that is Communist countries on one side and allied countries on the other. Also that we could not agree to rotation of chairmanship among 19 countries whereby North Korea and Communist China would preside as chairman.

Acting Secretary further stated that in our opinion Geneva conference was direct outgrowth Korean war and Panmunjom negotiation and therefore US should have some freedom of choice in matter

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated for information to Paris and Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador, and Robert H. Scott, Minister at the British Embassy.



of organization of conference and that unless we can agree on seating arrangement acceptable to US probable we would not attend conference except as observers.

Since UK and France objected two sided seating arrangement and Communist agreement thereto not likely US willing to agree seating plan whereby three rows of tables or ranks of chairs with desks would be arranged in semi-circular fashion. Each row would allow seating 8 delegates with one adviser each. There would be sufficient room between first row and second row and between second row and third row for from 2 to 4 advisers sitting behind each delegate. Third row to provide room for *only* 3 delegates. US proposing plan on basis UK and France would join in proposing to Soviets Communists take one block of seats arranging selves in any order they desired and allies taking remaining block and also arranging order between selves so that ROK and US adjacent. If Communists refused agree such seating order US willing agree delegations sit according to English alphabet left to right facing rows of chairs or tables so arranged US delegate immediately behind ROK. Rostrum from which delegates would speak would face delegates and be immediately in front of chairman.

Daridan stated he was in favor of this arrangement and believed his government would be inclined to agree. Makins stated that he would report to Foreign Office with observation that although he understood US making seating arrangements matter of principle he did not believe that UK should do so. Acting Secretary requested that respective Foreign Offices instruct their representatives in Geneva directly if they could agree to this plan.

With respect to chairmanship Makins agreed that rotation among 19 countries would be "fantastic". Acting Secretary stated that Spender, Australian Ambassador had suggested that a permanent chairman be Hammarskjold.<sup>3</sup> US thought this good idea. Makins and Daridan agreed proposal has merit and should be given serious consideration.

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the United Nations.

---

396.1-GE/4-1654 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1954—1 : 32 p. m.

829. Following is text of letter from President Eisenhower to President Rhee which you are requested to deliver soonest.

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated to Tokyo with instructions to pass to CINCUNC for information.

"My dear Mr. President: I have your further letter of April 8<sup>2</sup> expressing renewed misgivings in regard to the Geneva Conference and requesting increased support of the Korean armed forces.

I fully appreciate your expression of misgivings in the situation with which we are confronted. I myself am under no illusions as to the difficulties of negotiating and reaching satisfactory settlements with the Communists. Still it is my deep conviction that we should go to Geneva prepared to exhaust every possibility of obtaining the peaceful unification of Korea. That is fully in keeping with the spirit and terms of the Armistice Agreement and our own previous understanding. Therefore, I want to add my own earnest appeal to that of Secretary of State Dulles, most recently expressed in his message of April 7,<sup>3</sup> that you join with us and our other allies at Geneva in a concerted and earnest attempt to attain the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem which we all ardently desire. As we had sought all along, Soviet Russia will be at Geneva on the one side flanked by her Chinese Communist and Korean Communist allies. Neither India nor any other neutral nation will attend the Korean Conference. If the Republic of Korea participates we shall be there sixteen strong on our side with determination to strive to the best of our abilities to obtain a satisfactory settlement. In addition, I believe that Korea's presence at Geneva would be immeasurably helpful in maintaining the unity of the free world at a time when we are attempting to forge a common front to cope with Communist activities.

Once having met at Geneva, should the Communist side stall or act in bad faith, we shall be prepared, pursuant to the understanding reached between you and Secretary Dulles, to consult about what further steps we can properly take to deal with the then existing situation. But you must understand that, for the reasons set forth in my letter of March 20,<sup>4</sup> I cannot comply with your requests for United States support in military action to unify Korea.

With respect to your desire to strengthen the armed forces of the Republic of Korea, I can assure you of my sympathetic understanding. In studying these requests we have had to consider the whole strategic position of the free world, the necessity placed upon us for supplying equipment to help the forces of the French and the Associated States in their struggle against Communist aggression, and the assistance previously furnished to the Republic of Korea. We have also considered the manpower and budgetary requirements for the program of economic rehabilitation upon which we are jointly engaged, as well as the requirements for the defense of your country.

After weighing the foregoing factors, we are considering the following program for the continuing improvement of ROK forces with additional United States assistance:

1. Continued development of the ROK Army to a field army, capable in itself of sustained combat operations.
2. Continued modernization of the ROK Navy and the addition to it of antisubmarine, amphibious and auxiliary-type vessels including two destroyer escorts.

<sup>2</sup>Text in telegram 991, Apr. 8, from Seoul, p. 79.

<sup>3</sup>Text in telegram 796, Apr. 7, to Seoul, p. 77.

<sup>4</sup>Text in telegram 748, Mar. 20, to Seoul, p. 44.

3. Reorganization of the ROK Marine Corps from a brigade of scattered small units to a combat-capable division.

4. Modernization of the ROK Air Force by reequipping the existing fighter wing with jet-type aircraft, and by the establishment of an efficient tactical control organization. Training of ROK pilots for transition to jet aircraft will begin as soon as practicable.

To this end, I am asking General Van Fleet to go to Korea to consult with you and your military advisers, to study the situation thoroughly, and to develop recommendations in concert with General Hull both as to the future size and composition of the active armed forces of the Republic of Korea and the practicability of a joint United States-Republic of Korea program for Korean reserve forces.

I am confident that if the United States and the Republic of Korea work in close concert to carry out the strengthening of your defense forces and to push forward the program of economic rehabilitation, we can continue to build the position of strength in Korea which we both realize is essential to your interests, to ours, and to those of the free world as a whole.

With personal good wishes and warm regards."

When delivering foregoing message you should orally inform Rhee final action on any plans for aid to our allies rests in Congress and no such plans can be implemented until Congressional action is completed.

You should when delivering letter plainly intimate to Rhee carrying out of any plans such as those referred to in letter would of course be predicated upon continuing ROK cooperation with US, including ROK attendance at Geneva Conference.

Please confirm when letter delivered and report Rhee's reactions.

SMITH

---

FE files, lot 60 D 330, "Position Papers"

*Memorandum by Christopher Van Hollen of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL  
GK D-4/10

[WASHINGTON,] April 16, 1954.

KOREAN PHASE

DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR REUNIFICATION OF KOREA

(Alternative B)

The attached proposal for the reunification of Korea (Alternative B) provides for elections in North and South Korea for the establishment of a Korean National Government within the ROK constitutional structure.

This proposal represents a middle position between Alternative A—administrative incorporation of North Korea into the existing Republic of Korea, (GK D-4/7)<sup>1</sup> and Alternative C which provides for all-Korean elections for constituent assembly, and a new national Government (GK D-4b).<sup>2</sup>

The basic U.S. position on the over-all question of Korean reunification, together with a brief summary of the three Alternative plans, is contained in GK D-4/1d.<sup>3</sup>

CHRISTOPHER VAN HOLLEN

[Attachment]

*Position Paper Prepared for the Korean Phase of the Geneva Conference*

GK D-4/10

DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR REUNIFICATION OF KOREA

(Alternative B)

*Preamble*

The Korean people, who for 4,000 years have had a common civilization with a common language, culture, and traditions, desire to be reunited under a single government of their own choosing and to resume their traditional peaceful life. Virtually the entire world has long recognized that this is a proper and commendable aspiration, and the United Nations has repeatedly supported measures designed to realize this objective. The United Nations General Assembly adopted resolutions in 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, and 1953 which supported a free, independent, and unified Korean Government representative of the wishes of the Korean people. The principles enunciated in these resolutions are just and equitable and constitute a broad framework upon which any political settlement for Korea should be based. The fundamental principles are as follows:

1. The Korean question "is primarily a matter for the Korean people itself" and it "cannot be fairly resolved without the participation of representatives of the indigenous population." (UNGA Res. Nov. 14, 1947).

2. The selection of representatives of the Korean people should be on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot; the number of representatives from each voting area or zone should be proportionate to the population; and elections should be under the supervision of a

<sup>1</sup> Dated Apr. 9, p. 82.

<sup>2</sup> Dated Mar. 27, p. 62.

<sup>3</sup> Document GK D-4/1d is not printed. For a subsequent revised version of it. Document GK D-4/1e, Apr. 24, see p. 131.

United Nations commission of representatives of various non-Korean nations. (UNGA Res. Nov. 14, 1947).

4. The Government of the Republic of Korea was duly established in conformity with the above principles and is the only such lawful Government in Korea. (UNGA Res. Dec. 12, 1948). Subsequent elections have been held in the Republic of Korea in accordance with its constitution and observed and endorsed by United Nations commissions as reflecting the will of the electorate.

We therefore advance the following proposal for the reunification of Korea in accordance with the above principles enunciated by the United Nations and within the framework of the constitutional structure of the State of the Republic of Korea.

#### *Method of Reunification of Korea*

1. Responsibilities of UNCURK as the Supervisory Commission.
2. Establishment of conditions for free elections.
3. Free elections for a President and for representatives to National Assembly of Republic of Korea.
4. Action by expanded National Assembly to establish national administration for all Korea.
5. Phased withdrawal of Foreign Forces.
6. Residual functions of UNCURK after reunification.
7. Supersession of Armistice Agreement.
8. Rehabilitation of all Korea.

#### *1. Responsibilities of UNCURK as the Supervisory Commission.*

The present United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), established by the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of October 7, 1950 is empowered to (a) lend its good offices to bring about the unification of Korea and the integration of all Korean security forces in accordance with the principles laid down by the General Assembly in the resolution of 14 November 1947; (b) seek to facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social, and other friendly intercourses caused by the division of Korea; (c) be available for observation and consultation in the further development of representative government based on the freely expressed will of the people; and (d) observe the actual withdrawal of the occupation forces and verify the fact of withdrawal when such has occurred.

These terms of reference for UNCURK shall be specifically revised and expanded with the consent of the United Nations General Assembly to give UNCURK responsibility for observing and verifying the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea as set forth herein and for supervising the plan for the reunification of Korea as set forth herein.

The specific terms of reference of UNCURK shall include the following:

(a) Observation and certification of withdrawal of United Nations forces and forces and nationals of the Central People's Government of the Republic of China.

(b) Investigation throughout areas of Korea not already duly represented in the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea of conditions affecting the holding of free elections, freedom of movement, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of speech, press, and broadcasting, and freedom of political parties to organize and carry out their activities.

(c) Preparation of electoral laws for these areas in consultation with the Republic of Korea and the civil authorities of those areas concerned.

(d) Determination, in consultation with the Republic of Korea and the civil authorities of the areas concerned, of the number of delegates to be elected and the number of election districts, which shall be in direct proportion to the population distribution in Korea.

(e) Supervision over the implementation of the electoral laws and registration of qualified voters, and observation of the elections at all administrative levels.

(f) Certification of results of elections.

(g) Observation of steps leading to the establishment of a reunified government. During the period between the end of the elections and the effective assumption of control over all of Korea by the reunified Korean Government, UNCURK will remain in operation in order to prevent action after the elections which would impair the conditions of genuine freedom under which they will have been held. The details of those terms of reference shall be worked out by the signatories within this framework and shall come into effect simultaneously with this agreement. UNCURK shall have the power to adopt measures not specifically described and which are necessary to carry out their task herein, provided that they do not otherwise conflict with this proposal.

The UNCURK shall have its primary headquarters in the vicinity of Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone. The UNCURK shall report and make recommendations at its discretion to the parties to this agreement. The parties to this agreement shall facilitate the work of UNCURK and comply with recommendations made by UNCURK within its revised terms of reference as set forth above.

## *2. Establishment of Conditions for Free Elections.*

Preparatory to the holding of free elections in areas of Korea not already duly represented in the National Assembly, UNCURK shall, pursuant to its terms of reference, observe political conditions throughout the areas concerned and shall, where it deems appropriate, propose to the parties concerned the measures necessary to insure that elections are held in a free atmosphere wherein the democratic right of freedom

of speech, press and assembly would be recognized and respected. In particular these measures shall include the following :

- Freedom of movement within north and south Korea but not between the two areas across the demilitarized zone.
- Freedom of presentation of candidates.
- Immunity of candidates from arrest or coercion.
- Freedom of expression.
- Secrecy of the vote.
- Security of polling stations and ballot boxes.

*3. Free Elections for President and for Representatives to National Assembly of Republic of Korea.*

The UNCURK shall advise the authorities in the ROK and in North Korea regarding the establishment of conditions for free elections and assure conformity of electoral laws and procedures to the requirements of the above paragraph 2. In particular, election procedures approved by UNCURK shall ensure that candidates for President and a National Assembly of Korea, who reflect varying viewpoints, will be permitted to campaign freely; that the electorate will be able to express its choice of candidates freely and without duress or intimidation; and that the election procedures shall be uniform among all the areas concerned.

Not later than 12 months after concluding this agreement, elections for representatives to the National Assembly shall be held on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot in Korea. The number of representatives to be elected to the National Assembly shall be determined according to the size of the population of each election district. It is estimated that not more than six million persons reside in areas not already duly represented in the ROK National Assembly. In the event the UNCURK shall fail to certify the election of a representative he shall not be seated in the National Assembly, and new local by-elections shall be held as soon as possible under UNCURK supervision. The vote of a majority of the members of UNCURK shall be required to rule that the election of any candidate is not valid.

*4. Action by National Assembly of Korea to Establish Constitution and Basic Laws for all of Korea.*

Within thirty days after UNCURK has certified the free election of two-thirds of the number of representatives designated to be elected under its supervision, the National Assembly of Korea shall seat the newly elected representatives. After these newly elected representatives have been seated the National Assembly shall take prompt and appropriate action to accept or amend the Constitution of the Republic of Korea enacted on July 12, 1948. The President shall recommend to the National Assembly, for its consideration and action by

two-thirds majority of those present and voting, uniform basic laws for all Korea. When these actions have been taken and effectively implemented, a National Government of Korea shall be considered to have been established.

5. *Phased Withdrawal of Foreign Forces.*

The withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces and United Nations forces from Korea shall begin before elections in Korea, shall proceed in accordance with a prearranged schedule and shall be completed within 12 months after the date of the formation of the National Government of Korea as certified by the UNCURK. The detailed schedules for mutually phased withdrawals of both Chinese Communist and United Nations forces from Korea are contained in Annex A to this agreement.<sup>4</sup> The UNCURK shall observe the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and report to the Secretary General of the United Nations in accordance with Paragraph 2(c) of the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of October 7, 1950.

It is agreed that the United States in its capacity as the Unified Command and the Chinese People's Republic shall instruct their respective military Commanders in Korea:

a) to certify to the UNCURK within 7 days after the formation of the National Government of Korea the strength of their respective forces as of that date;

b) to accomplish a phased withdrawal of their forces from Korea through the ports of entry prescribed in the Armistice Agreement and in accordance with Annex A to this agreement;

c) to report to the UNCURK, within 7 days after the end of each phase of the agreed schedule in Annex A, that their forces have been reduced to the agreed level;

d) to certify to the UNCURK upon completion of the withdrawal of their respective forces from Korea that none of their forces remain in Korea.

6. *Residual Functions of UNCURK.*

Following the establishment of a reunified Korean Government with effective control over all of Korea as outlined above, and the verified withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea in accordance with paragraph 2(c) of the General Assembly Resolution of Oct. 7, 1950, UNCURK shall certify the fact in a report to the Secretary General of the United Nations. Thereafter, UNCURK shall confine its activities to such responsibilities in connection with observation of the independence and security of Korea as may be determined by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Its headquarters shall be moved to Seoul.

---

<sup>4</sup> The Annex referred to has not been found attached to the source text, nor to any other copy of this Position Paper in the Department of State files.



7. *Supersession of Armistice Agreement.*

Certification by UNCURK that a reunified Korean Government with effective control over all of Korea has been duly established and that all foreign forces have been withdrawn from Korea in accordance with agreement thereon shall constitute for purposes of supersession of the Armistice Agreement, under Article 62 of that Agreement, "appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides."

8. *Rehabilitation of all Korea.*

Upon such certification the United Nations Reconstruction Agency for Korea, established by the Resolution of the General Assembly of Dec. 1, 1950 shall develop and carry out a program of relief and rehabilitation of all Korea. Such a program shall be worked out in close consultation with the National Government of Korea.

---

795.00/4-1854 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET      NIACT

SEOUL, April 18, 1954—5 p. m.

1022. Repeated information Tokyo 613, Saigon 30, Taipei 97, Paris 9. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. My immediately preceding message.<sup>1</sup> Delivered President's letter at 9 this morning to President Rhee in presence Foreign Minister Pyun and Mrs. Rhee, Pyun and I having traveled from Seoul last night. After reading letter I conveyed orally two points concerning dependence on Congress for funds, and dependence of program on continued collaboration by ROK. Pyun took notes.

Rhee expressed warm satisfaction with contents President's letter insofar as it relates expansion US military aid and forthcoming assignment General Van Fleet. "Please tell President", said Rhee, "that by that alone he has assured us happy Easter in Korea". After further tribute to Van Fleet, Rhee said hoped General could come here soonest and he would like make announcement here simultaneously with Washington. Rhee asked date of announcement be soonest because of favorable effect that would have and also because of speculation and danger of leaks. (I agree sooner announcement made the better.)

President went on to say his satisfaction Van Fleet assignment should not be interpreted as implying lack of confidence in General Hull, referred to by President Eisenhower in connection Van Fleet visit, for whom Rhee said he has highest regard.

---

<sup>1</sup> In telegram 1021, Apr. 18, Ambassador Briggs reported that he had delivered President Eisenhower's letter to President Rhee in the morning and that the Republic of Korea would announce its intention to attend the Geneva Conference at 9 a. m. on Apr. 19 (396.1-GE/4-1854).

Rhee referred in that connection to his last conversation with Hull on February [April] 14 which he said had been helpful to him in formulating ROK position (see Embtel 1015, April 16).<sup>2</sup>

Turning to Geneva, Rhee said Pyun would head delegation and would leave within 48 hours. Rhee still doubts whether any good will come of conference, but he noted President Eisenhower himself had stated in letter he under no illusions about dealings with Communists. Rhee declared Pyun would do his best collaborate with Secretary Dulles and that Rhee appreciates consideration American Government has shown in connection with problems Rhee faces in seeking improve prospects Korea's future.<sup>3</sup>

With regard announcement ROK Geneva participation it was decided this would be made Seoul 9 tomorrow morning, April 19, and Rhee thereupon showed me draft statement prepared day before, of course without reference to President's letter. Draft was pessimistic, contentious and generally unhelpful, and after reading it I told Rhee effect could hardly fail be unfortunate insofar as Korea's relations with Allies concerned, and by emphasizing differences among us would certainly give comfort to Communist enemy. I urged ROK statement avoid re-hash past argumentative declarations about Russia as sponsor, conference not two-sided, etc.

---

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. In it, Ambassador Briggs said that he had talked with Hull prior to the latter's meeting with Rhee at which time Hull and Briggs agreed that Hull should mention the Geneva Conference to Rhee if a suitable opportunity arose. In view, however, of recent statements by Korean officials as well as Rhee's comments to Hull, Briggs did not feel that the Republic of Korea would decide on the question of attendance at Geneva until a reply was received to Rhee's letter of Apr. 8 to President Eisenhower. (795.00/4-1654)

In an unnumbered telegram of Apr. 14, General Hull reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on his meeting with Rhee. Hull said that he had offered Rhee his personal opinion that it would be a serious mistake for the Republic of Korea to refuse to participate in the Geneva negotiations. Hull's conclusion, after the talk, was that Rhee would agree to participate without further argument if he could find any face saving device in the form of some sort of reassurance from the United States on the matter of further aid to Korea. (Department of Defense files)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1028, Apr. 19, Ambassador Briggs sent the following message to the Department of State:

"Reference Deptel 829, repeated Tokyo 2292 and Embtel 1022, repeated Tokyo 613.

"With reference to observations made orally in accordance instructions to President Rhee and Foreign Minister Pyun yesterday in connection delivery President's letter, I considered it desirable confirm in writing statement on dependence of program of assistance on Congressional implementation. I accordingly sent Pyun following confidential letter dated April 18:

"My dear Mr. Minister: It occurs to me that it may be convenient for you to have written confirmation of an observation which, under instructions from my government, I made to President and you in presenting President Eisenhower's letter to President Rhee this morning.

"In that connection I reminded you that final action on plans for assistance to our allies, and specifically projects described in President Eisenhower's letter, rests in US Congress, so that such plans can only be implemented when Congressional action is completed.

"I am et cetera. . . ." (396.1-GE/4-1954)

After considerable discussion Rhee agreed and it was left that Pyun and Rhee's American advisor Glenn (chief editorial writer for *Korean Republic* who drafted original text at Rhee's direction) would return with me to Seoul and prepare revised ROK statement. During trip back, Glenn, Pyun and I accordingly rewrote statement to approximately 50% original length and also toned down contents. Final text, assuming Pyun introduces no more problems, follows separate telegram.

Only other subject raised by Rhee in connection with conference was situation in Indochina regarding which Rhee expressed profound concern, stating that way things now going he discouraged over prospects any settlement short of Communist victory unless French agree to complete independence at very early date to three Associated States. "French," said Rhee, "must go. Unless French leave, I shall be tempted suggest amalgamation of all anti-Communist elements in Indochina in move to get rid of French because so long as French there, problem of colonialism exists, and with colonialism, indigenous effort against Communism will be half-hearted and feeble." He declared population Indochina will not fight to help French or keep French in Indochina. (My interpretation these observations is that Pyun at Geneva is likely plunge into Indochinese question at drop of hat.) Although neither Rhee nor Pyun referred except as above to ROK attitude toward Southeast Asia problems, question of "exclusion" of Korea from possible collective declaration or action will undoubtedly remain sensitive subject. In this connection statements made yesterday to Ambassador Yang (Deptel 835)<sup>4</sup> will be helpful in future talks with ROK officials.

BRIGGS

---

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. In it, the Department of State reported on a conversation between Ambassador Yang and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Affairs Everett Drumright; for the memorandum, see volume XII. In reply to Yang's expressions of concern over Korea's exclusion from collective defense arrangements in Southeast Asia, Drumright pointed out that these were only in a preliminary stage and that Indochina was now a most critical area; he also suggested that Korea indicate more interest in collective action by expressing its intention to attend the Geneva Conference. (790.5/4-1654)

---

795.00/4-1854: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

OFFICIAL USE ONLY      NIACT      SEOUL, April 18, 1954—6 p. m.

1023. Repeated information Tokyo 614. Tokyo for CINCUNC. Re Embtels 1021 and 1022.<sup>1</sup> Text follows ROK Government statement re

---

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 1022, Apr. 18, *supra*; telegram 1021 not printed, but see footnote 1. *supra*.

Geneva conference participation, for release 9 a. m., Korean time Monday morning April 19. Foreign Minister Pyun asks Department please pass Ambassador Yang.

*Begin text.*

"This Government finally has decided to accept the invitation of United States to attend Geneva conference. Some may wish to know why we have delayed acceptance so long. Our reasons are these: (1) We have been highly dubious about achieving any results at Geneva conference; (2) we have been apprehensive lest conference provide Communists with still more time to make preparations for war; and (3) there is risk that conference will be made known all over world as great success, thus making our situation infinitely more difficult of solution.

"While we were waiting during last several weeks, we made every effort obtain definite and positive assurances from United States. We are happy to say that assurances received now are very clear and encouraging, and that they will enable us to go to Geneva with confidence and considerable hope.

"Decision to attend has been made, however, because of desire to show our spirit of cooperation with our great friend and ally, United States. We hope sincerely that should the conference fail, America will have come to realize—finally and conclusively—that further negotiation with Communists would be both futile and perilous.

"For Korea, this conference must represent final time-consuming attempt to attain unification by peaceful means. We obviously cannot continue to sit idly by while Communists exterminate or exile our people of North and make Red Chinese province out of half our country. We hope, therefore, that if and when Geneva conference has failed, United States and our other friends in free world will join with us in employing other means to drive the enemy from our land.

"We shall do our level best to cooperate with United States in seeking peaceful unification. But it is only fair to declare that we can accept no compromise. It must be unification under full democratic auspices, and it must include complete withdrawal from our soil of all Chinese Communist forces.

"The Republic of Korea will be present at Geneva as wholly sovereign nation, and as such it must reserve, at all times, right and duty of following and protecting its own interests. We trust that United States and other countries on our side will do no less, and that Communists thereby will be prevented from making gains and from dividing us among ourselves.

"If reasonable period of time has passed without conference results, we know United States will consult with us, as it has promised to do, on abandonment of discussion as way to peace with Communism and Communists. Once our friends have come to realize great improbability of expecting negotiated settlement, there may be hope for achievement of peace in Korea and elsewhere in world.

"It is in this spirit, and in expression of our friendship for United States, that we shall attend Geneva conference."

[*End text.*]

Foregoing will be issued in name of President Rhee.

BRIGGS

396.1-GE/4-1954: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1954—12:07 p. m.

839. Following for Rhee from Dulles:

"April 19, 1954. My dear Mr. President: I am gratified to have received from Ambassador Briggs the news that the Republic of Korea has decided to participate in the Conference at Geneva.<sup>2</sup> As the President and I have so often stated to you, we want to stand shoulder to shoulder with you and your Government at this Conference. Some decisions with regard to arrangements for the conference have had to be taken prior to your decision to participate. I am satisfied that you will find that these decisions fully protect the interests of your Government and are in accord with our common view of the Conference. However, many important items remain to be decided and will require decisions during the course of the Conference. I look forward to working closely with your Foreign Minister at Geneva. However, in order that you may yourself have the direct benefit of our latest thinking here, I will make arrangements for our common friend Arthur Dean to proceed immediately to Korea as my personal emissary to you. He can directly explain to you the lines of my thinking and in turn pass on to me your thoughts with respect to the Conference and the problems we will face together there. Sincerely yours, John Foster Dulles."

Inform Department by telegram when delivered and report any significant comments of President Rhee.

DULLES

<sup>1</sup> Repeated to Tokyo for CINCUNC.

<sup>2</sup> In his telegram 1026, Apr. 19, from Seoul, Ambassador Briggs forwarded the text of a note from Pyun to Dulles formally accepting the invitation to the Geneva Conference on behalf of the Korean Government. The note stated that acceptance was predicated on the assurance that, if substantial progress had not been made within 90 days of the Conference, the United States would consult with the Republic of Korea on abandonment of further negotiations with the Communists. (396.1-GE/4-1954)

396.1-GE/4-1954 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, April 19, 1954—5 p. m.

1034. Re Deptel 817.<sup>1</sup> During conversation with Foreign Minister Pyun this morning he requested information regarding probable US position on substantive questions at Geneva. I informed him I understood it to be view of US Government that most logical means of effecting unification of Korea would be to proceed with implementation of existing GA resolutions on Korea by holding UN-supervised elections in those parts of Korea in which UN not previously able observe elections. I added that I believed our thinking on troop withdrawal was that there should be phased simultaneous withdrawal begun before elections and completed within specified time thereafter. I explained however that so far as Embassy aware US had not reached agreed position with its other allies and that until it had done so it would be impossible to know exactly what US position at conference would be.

Insofar as elections concerned, Pyun said US position appeared be entirely compatible with that of ROK. Re troop withdrawal, however, he said position his government was that Chinese Communists, since they were acknowledged aggressors and also since they entered Korean conflict after UN forces, must be withdrawn from North Korea not only prior to elections but also prior to withdrawal UN forces from South. I told Pyun I believed it unrealistic to believe there existed any chance obtaining acceptance such withdrawal plan by either side, and that, whatever timing might be, I believed withdrawal would have to be simultaneous.

From viewpoint ROK cooperation at Geneva, believe it desirable initial US position on unification procedures be along lines alternative A, Document GK D-4/B April 5.<sup>2</sup> Should Communists reject this proposal as anticipated, US could move by gradual stages toward proposal for supervised elections throughout all Korea. ROK likely object vociferously at each modification but might reluctantly accept them as

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. In it, the Department of State had requested the Embassy's views on what positions the United States should take with the Republic of Korea, if and after the Koreans accepted the invitation to the Geneva Conference (396.1-GE/4-1454).

<sup>2</sup> For the text of Document GK D-4b, dated Mar. 27, see p. 62. This document called for all-Korean elections for a constituent assembly, and a new national government. Following the drafting of subsequent position papers, this proposal became known as Alternative C. See GK D-4/10, Apr. 16, p. 105.

The tenor of the comments here would appear to indicate that the reference should be to Document GK D-4/7, Apr. 9, p. 82, known as Alternative A, which called for elections in North Korea and incorporation of that area into the Republic of Korea.

For Alternative B, see Document GK D-4/10, Apr. 16, p. 105.

only possibility early unification, if convinced US has no intention backing unification by force. From past experience in negotiations with ROK appears we must resign ourselves to bitter bargaining, probably punctuated by irresponsible public outbursts whenever these seem to ROK advantage.

President Rhee's willingness entrust his political fate to *de novo* elections throughout Korea may to some extent be influenced by outcome May 20 elections,<sup>3</sup> particularly if latter produce clear-cut electoral decision either for or against his supporters.

BRIGGS

---

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the elections for the Korean National Assembly. For documentation on related developments, see volume xv.

---

396.1-GE/4-1954 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*

SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1954—8:17 p. m.

844. For Ambassador. Deptel 839.<sup>1</sup> Concerning proposal Dean go to Korea, such consultations would be conducted under your auspices and with your advice and guidance. Main purpose convey Secretary's latest thinking directly and in detail to Rhee, who will formulate ROK position from Seoul during Geneva conference. In lieu consultations here with ROK representative as we suggested to Rhee and Pyun several times, might help US at Geneva if Dean with your guidance per above could discuss with Rhee over period several days detailed background US Government's views major substantive aspects Korean issue.

As we see it problem is to persuade ROK advance proposals in reasonable form and also help us maintain sufficient flexibility and room for manoeuver while agreeing with us on certain basic principles. Dean has been working currently with Department and in meetings here on all position papers and problems and is informed regarding Southeast Asian situation and relations to it of various proposals on Korean phase conference. Also familiar with latest thinking reference Geneva our various allies. We believe that this arrangement can supplement difficult task negotiating with ROK satisfactory accord and understanding on strategy and tactics at Geneva.

Secretary has instructed Robertson and Young be in Geneva when Pyun arrives discuss with him opening presentation. Since Korean Embassy says Pyun expected there April 24, hope Dean can begin discussions with Rhee April 23 or 24.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Apr. 19, p. 115.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 299

*Memorandum by the Coordinator for the Geneva Conference  
(Johnson) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] April 20, 1954.

[Subject:] Representation—Geneva Conference

It is believed that :

1. It would not be desirable for members of the U.S. Delegation to :
  - a. Entertain or be entertained by the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans.
  - b. Appear at small social functions such as dinners or luncheons where the Chinese Communists and/or the North Koreans will be present.
2. A concerted effort will be made by "some" to bring together you and representatives of the Chinese Communist and/or the North Koreans outside of the conference room for the purpose of embarrassing you.
3. If the U.S. were to hold a reception in honor of all participants to the conference, except the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans, the USSR would not attend.

It is recommended therefore that :

1. In accordance with normal international practice the U.S. do not during the conference invite the Communist Chinese or the North Koreans to any social function.
2. In accordance with normal international practice the U.S. do not accept any invitation issued by the Communist Chinese or the North Koreans.
3. The allied governments be discreetly informed in the early states of the conference that the U.S. will not accept invitations to dinners, luncheons, or other small gatherings to which the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans are also invited.
4. The U.S. not hold a reception but limit its representational activities to dinners and luncheons.

The U.S. would of course accept invitations to receptions held by participants other than the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans, even though the latter are to be present.

*Concurrences :*

FE—Mr. Robertson EUR—Mr. Merchant L—Mr. Phleger C—  
Mr. MacArthur II

<sup>1</sup>The source text is a carbon copy, bearing no initials either of Johnson or those listed under "Concurrences" at the end of the memorandum. There is no indication on the source text that Dulles saw or commented on the memorandum.

A typewritten memorandum bearing the designation USAdmin/19, dated Apr. 27, in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 299, which was apparently distributed to members of the U.S. Delegation, incorporates the suggestions in paragraphs 1 a and b and the final 5 paragraphs of the above memorandum. The memorandum of Apr. 27 is titled "Representation—Geneva Conference" and states that all members of the delegation will be governed by the principles set forth therein.



396.1-GE/4-2054

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Elizabeth Brown of the Office  
of United Nations Political and Security Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] April 20, 1954.

Subject: Special Briefing Meeting, April 20, 1954

Participants: Australia—Ambassador Spender  
Mr. Allen, Second Secretary  
Belgium—Ambassador Silvercruys  
Mr. Muller, Second Secretary  
Canada—Ambassador Heeney  
Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary  
Colombia—Ambassador Zuleta  
Dr. Chaves, Counselor  
Ethiopia—Ambassador Deressa  
France—Mr. deJuniac, Minister  
Mr. Pelletier, Second Secretary  
Great Britain—Ambassador Makins  
Mr. Scott, Minister  
Greece—Ambassador Politis  
Mr. Cavalierato, Counselor  
Korea—Mr. Han, First Secretary  
Netherlands—Ambassador van Roijen  
Mr. van Baarda, First Secretary  
New Zealand—Ambassador Munro  
Mr. Laking, Minister  
Mr. Wade, First Secretary  
Philippines—Mr. Abello, Minister  
Thailand—Ambassador Sarasin  
Mr. Snidvongs, Second Secretary  
Luxembourg—Mr. Le Gallais, EE and MP  
South Africa—Ambassador Jooste  
Mr. Hamilton, Counselor  
Turkey—Ambassador Erkin  
Cambodia—Ambassador Nong Kimny  
Laos—Mr. Souvannavong, Minister  
Viet Nam—Ambassador Van Kha  
Mr. Tran, Second Secretary  
United States—Mr. Dulles, S  
Mr. Johnson, Geneva Coordinator  
Mr. Key, UNA  
Mr. McCardle, P  
Mr. Robertson, FE  
Mr. Young, NA  
Mr. Jones, NA  
Mr. Van Hollen, S/S  
Mr. Capella, FE  
Mr. Allen, EUR  
Mr. Henkin, UNP  
Mr. McClurkin, NA  
Mr. Fierst, UNA  
Mr. Sisco, UNA  
Miss Brown, UNP

The Secretary said that he very much appreciated this opportunity to meet to discuss the problems of the Geneva Conference in relation both to Korea and Indochina. He explained that he was planning to leave later in the day for Paris for a meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council and planned to go to Geneva April 24.

Mr. Dulles began by pointing out a number of practical problems which would have to be resolved at the outset of the Conference. These involved such matters as seating arrangements, chairmanship, languages and a mass of similar procedural problems that had not yet been settled and which he supposed would not in fact be settled until the very eve of the conference.<sup>1</sup>

The Secretary recalled that at the Berlin Conference many such problems remained unsettled until just before the session actually convened when he had spent a few minutes alone talking with Mr. Molotov and agreement was reached. He pointed out that of course it was not as difficult to reach an agreement at Berlin because only four countries were involved, and although Berlin was technically not a CFM meeting, certain CFM practices could be followed. The Geneva Conference would be much more complicated.

Mr. Dulles went on to say that the Soviet Union had manifested a certain tendency in the preliminaries to try to shape Geneva up as a five-power conference and to insist upon physical and other arrangements reflecting this position, thereby placing the other participants in a subordinate capacity; these efforts would have to be countered. He recalled that this had been one of the main disputed issues at Berlin. Just such a Soviet proposal had been stoutly opposed, and the USSR finally accepted the Western objections with the result that the

---

<sup>1</sup> Agreement had already been reached on some procedural questions. On the previous day, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Seoul of certain of the arrangements that had been made: (1) documentation on the Allied side was to be translated only into English and French; (2) documentation prepared on the Communist side would be translated by the Allied secretariat into English and French—translations into Korean would be the responsibility of the Korean Delegation; (3) costs of services provided by the U.N. for the conference as a whole, such as heat and light, would be shared equally by all 19 participants; (4) costs of services provided by the Allied secretariat for the 16 nations would be shared on a formula not yet determined. (Telegram 843, Apr. 19, to Seoul; 795.00/4-1954)

On the last mentioned point, the Allied side subsequently agreed on a cost-sharing formula for the Allied secretariat based on a proposal by Hughes Le Gallais, Luxembourg's Minister in Washington, which called for the United States to pay one-third of the costs with the remaining countries paying according to the U.N. formula. The United States had objected to use of the U.N. formula without some adjustment since this would have meant the United States would have had to pay 56 percent of Allied costs. The agreed formula apportioned the Allied costs according to the following percentages: ROK .26; Australia 4.51; Belgium 3.56; Canada 8.5; Colombia 1.06; Ethiopia .26; France 14.82; Greece .54; Luxembourg .15; Netherlands 3.22; New Zealand 1.24; Philippines 1.16; Thailand .46; Turkey 1.68; U.K. 25.25; U.S. 33.33. (795.00/4-1454; 396.1-GE/4-2354, 4-2954)

communiqué containing the invitation to the Geneva Conference was devoid of any suggestion of a five-power conference. That communiqué, the Secretary pointed out, made clear that every state invited would participate on the same level. If the USSR intended to reopen this question on the threshold of the conference, it could cause serious difficulties. Moreover, if the Berlin Agreement were to be thrown over, the general question arose as to whether it was worthwhile to reach agreements at all with the Communists. Mr. Dulles emphasized that this might become a question of considerable importance.

Subject to this qualification, however, he thought that the practical details would probably be worked out. For example, he understood that there was general acceptance of the idea that the seating arrangements would be of the auditorium variety rather than around a table which would create difficult questions as to where different participants would sit. Another difficult problem was the chairmanship. Possibly a chairman might be drawn from some neutral nation, perhaps Switzerland itself. It had also been suggested that Mr. Hammarskjöld might serve in his personal capacity as distinguished from his role as UN Secretary-General.

The Secretary said that it would be necessary to make contact between allied governmental representatives at Geneva quite early and also to arrange a meeting at a fairly high level with the Communists to settle these practical matters. It was our experience that they were never settled at a low level where the Soviet representatives were inclined to dig in on extreme technical positions.

Mr. Dulles believed that the Communists wanted the conference to proceed and did not want another Palais Rose situation at Geneva.<sup>2</sup> He commented that if they intended to have that kind of conference, it would have to be without him.

The Secretary requested suggestions or comments on the technical and procedural matters involved in the Korean phase of the conference.

Referring to the five-power conference issue, Ambassador Politis (Greece) said that he had thought that once the other participants were invited this question was over once and for all. He asked whether the US had any information that the USSR might raise this issue again. Mr. Dulles replied that the Soviet technical representative at Geneva had stated that his instructions were to work out arrangements for setting up a five-power conference.

Turning to substantive aspects of the Korean phase of the Conference, the Secretary said that he was pleased that the ROK would

---

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on the four-power exploratory talks at the Palais Rose, Mar. 5-June 21, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, volume III.

be represented at Geneva, observing that it would not be possible to have an effective conference without ROK representation. He expressed the hope that the ROK would take an active and leading part in the presentation of its case since after all it was the country primarily concerned in this matter, representing as it did the only lawful government recognized by the UN and having 75-80 percent of all the Korean people.

The Secretary stated there was one matter of substance which he knew had been considered in previous meetings and which he had discussed in London with Mr. Eden. It went very much to the fundamentals. It was the question whether this conference should be regarded as one which we would try to make succeed in achieving the unity and independence of Korea, or whether as a conference in which we more or less concede in advance that our objective is impossible of achievement and, therefore, look upon it as a conference for propaganda utterances by the two sides.

Mr. Dulles said that the US was disposed to the view that our side should make a really earnest effort to bring about the unity and independence of Korea at this conference. Of course he recognized that the chance of success was not great, and if he were making up a book, he would have to give considerable odds against a successful conference. The ROK, he noted, felt even more strongly on this point. On the other hand, the United States did not feel that the situation should be looked upon as utterly hopeless. We should at least begin the conference with the genuine desire to make it succeed.

In this connection, the Secretary noted a certain gain at Berlin in getting the Soviet Union to agree to include in the resolution constituting the invitation to the conference, the statement that the independence and unity of Korea would be a step that would increase the likelihood of peace and the relaxation of tension generally. In this way the principle of the unity and independence of Korea had already been established in the resolution which was the Charter of the Geneva Conference; in his opinion that represented a substantial advance. Mr. Dulles did not mean that the USSR would necessarily try to bring this about, but it was a step in the right direction; the conference could start out with a concept of recognition on the part of those who extended and accepted the invitation that the unity and independence of Korea is important in the relaxation of tensions and the cessation of fighting elsewhere in Asia. Mr. Dulles noted also the implicit, if not explicit relationship between the unification and independence of Korea to the end of the fighting in Indochina.

The practical significance of approaching the conference on the basis of trying to bring about unification, the Secretary indicated, was that we should not put forward our final position first. He explained that

trading with the Communists was a painful type of proposition, and that it was necessary to have some possibility for compromise or exchange if we expected to get results.

Mr. Dulles went on to say that the general position which the United States had in mind at the beginning of the conference would reflect the fact that the United Nations had already established a program for the unification and independence of Korea that would do precisely what the Berlin communiqué said should be accomplished. In 1950, the General Assembly had set up a commission to take the necessary steps to achieve unification. Because of the Chinese Communist intervention it had not been practical for the UN Commission to proceed with its task. It therefore seemed logical to suggest, now that the fighting was over and when it was incumbent upon Communist China to purge itself of wrongdoing, that the interrupted UN program should be carried forward.

That program, Mr. Dulles continued, was sound and entirely moral, and it also included certain elements about which we could bargain later if it seemed necessary or desirable to do so. It would mean holding elections in the area not yet covered by UN elections, and in that way completing the task that the United Nations began in 1948.

He appreciated that there were a number of governments, perhaps including his own, who recognized that probably a finally acceptable solution would not be achieved. However, if we were to start out by having traded down our position among ourselves to what might be our final best position, we would have nothing to trade with the Communists later. Our experience with them, Mr. Dulles said, pointed to the desirability of proceeding on a trading basis rather than putting forward a final, ideal position to which we would have to stick. If the conference were solely a propaganda exercise, of course we should begin with a generous, liberal position which the world would regard as fair. If, however, we started on that basis with a non-trading position, we must also assume that the conference could not succeed in achieving Korean unification. It might still succeed as a good propaganda demonstration, but we had to choose between the two theories. Faced with this choice, the United States considered that we should go into the conference with a position that is on the one hand entirely moral, but on the other hand, on which it might be possible to make some concessions.

Mr. Dulles went on to say that he had discussed this general position in London with Mr. Eden who had indicated that the position seemed sound to him. He repeated that we should begin the conference with

a vague and general approach and not burn our bridges behind us until we find out what moves and proposals the other side has in mind.

The Secretary cautioned that what he had said was subject to further discussions with the ROK Delegation at Geneva; there was of course no possibility of accomplishing the desired result except in terms acceptable to the ROK. The conference could not impose a settlement on the ROK which is rejected. As the subject of the conference, the views of the ROK were entitled to carry a great measure of weight.

[Here follows the remainder of the briefing which dealt with Indochina and is printed on page 535.]

---

396.1-GE/4-2954 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL      PRIORITY

PARIS, April 20, 1954—6 p. m.

3960. Repeated information priority Geneva 83, London 944. Re-Deptel 3689, April 15.<sup>1</sup> Chauvel and Lacoste, who have just returned from Geneva, sent for Achilles this morning to discuss seating arrangements. Achilles said these discussions going on in Washington and could not be duplicated here, to which they agreed but wished in any event to explain situation with help of plan of Council Chamber they had brought back. Briefly their view was that "auditorium type" arrangement would be difficult and expensive to install, would presumably result in there being only one microphone at rostrum instead of one at each place which would change character of meeting from that of conference to that of an assembly. To avoid this they favored closing fourth side of existing three-sided table.

Achilles reminded them of strength of US position as stated reference telegram that US might attend conference only as observer rather than accept seating arrangement which did not make clear distinction between Communists and other participants. They had not realized we felt so strongly (it was not clear whether French Embassy Washington had softened its report or whether Chauvel and Lacoste had merely not seen it) and indicated considerable concern. They mentioned possibility of assigning one side of square table to Communist bloc and seating remainder around other three sides.

Achilles reiterated strength of our feeling on subject and that it must be negotiated in Washington rather than here but said he would forward their views.

DILLON

---

<sup>1</sup> Same as telegram 5451. Apr. 15, to London, p. 102.

396.1-GE/4-2054 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France*CONFIDENTIAL  
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1954—6:35 p. m.

3767. For the Ambassador. Please deliver following personal message to Bidault from the Secretary :

“My dear friend: I am very disturbed to learn that you do not find it possible to agree with the proposals that have been made for the physical arrangement of our meeting place in Geneva. As you know, this has been under discussion by our representatives in Geneva and was also discussed with UK and French representatives in Washington by the Acting Secretary on April 15. The UK has agreed to our proposal in this regard, and I had not until today understood that France perceived any objection thereto.

You are of course aware of discussions that have thus far taken place at Geneva between our representatives and the Soviet representative and the determined attempt by the Soviet representative to transform the Geneva Conference into a “Big Five” conference in flagrant disregard of the understanding we reached at Berlin. I am sure that you agree we cannot permit this. In an effort to meet the problem we have suggested a seating arrangement of three rows with eight delegates and advisers in the first two rows and three delegations in the third row seated according to English alphabet left to right, with speakers rostrum facing delegates. There are numerous precedents for such arrangements in conferences of this kind.

I earnestly hope that you will reconsider your decision in the light of the foregoing so that our representatives in Geneva can be appropriately instructed.

If the Conference is to meet April 26, the physical arrangements must be decided and the work undertaken immediately. Since the Soviet representatives at Geneva have shown no disposition to discuss seriously the necessary arrangements with a view to reaching an agreement, I think it is essential that our side agree on instructions to the UN which will permit the Conference to begin on April 26. If this done the Soviets will have to bear the responsibility for any delay in the opening of the Conference arising from a failure on their part to accept reasonable physical arrangements.

I look forward to seeing you Thursday,<sup>1</sup> but I believe this matter to be so urgent it should not await my arrival. Sincerely, John Foster Dulles.”<sup>2</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Apr. 22.

<sup>2</sup> No direct reply from Bidault has been found, nor is it likely that one was sent since Dulles' message probably arrived in Paris early on Apr. 21. By the time of the meeting on Apr. 22, the French Government had agreed to the idea of auditorium seating, but without a speaker's rostrum (see the minutes of the Apr. 22 meeting, p. 127). Documentation in file 396.1-GE indicates that French acquiescence in the US-UK seating plan was transmitted from the Foreign Ministry to Geneva by telephone, so that arrangements could be begun to have the Conference room ready by Apr. 26.

396.1-GE/4-2054 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State*

OFFICIAL USE ONLY      NIACT      Moscow, April 20, 1954—9 p. m.

1286. Repeated information niact Paris 275, niact London 206. Pass Geneva. At 8 p. m. April 20 Soviet "*aide-mémoire*" (number 22 OSA) was delivered to Embassy by messenger. Translation is as follows:

"In connection with *aide-mémoire* to [of] Governments USA, France and England of April 14<sup>1</sup> regarding question of preparations for convocation Geneva Conference, Soviet Government, in agreement with Government Chinese People's Republic, considers it necessary to state following:

Decision taken by Ministers Foreign Affairs of four powers at Berlin provides that Geneva Conference shall be conference of representatives USA, France, England, Chinese People's Republic and USSR taking part in discussion Korean question and question of re-establishment peace in Indochina which are on conference agenda, with participation other interested states for appropriate questions. It therefore, appears expedient, as has already been indicated in USSR's *aide-mémoire* of April 5,<sup>2</sup> to establish that English, French, Chinese and Russian be among (*v-chisle*) the official languages during course of whole Geneva Conference. It goes without saying that, during discussion of question of re-establishment peace in Indochina, question of other official languages besides those indicated above can be examined in addition."

BOHLEN

---

<sup>1</sup>Text in telegram 643, Apr. 9, to Moscow, p. 89.

<sup>2</sup>Text in telegram 1196, Apr. 5, from Moscow, p. 70.

396.1-GE/4-2154 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State*

OFFICIAL USE ONLY      NIACT      Moscow, April 21, 1954—2 p. m.

1289. Repeated information niact London 207, Paris niact 276, Geneva niact unnumbered. Following is translation text of note received this morning in reply to our note of April 14<sup>1</sup> on interpretation Berlin agreement:

"Number 23/OSA. In connection with note of Government of USA of April 14 Government of USSR considers it necessary to state following:

*Aide-mémoire* of Ministry of Foreign Affairs USSR of April 5 in which reference is made to note of Government USA in connec-

---

<sup>1</sup> See telegrams 642, Apr. 9, to Moscow and 1225, from Moscow, Apr. 10, pp. 88 and 89.



tion with question of composition of participants of forthcoming conference in Geneva, is in full accordance with communiqué of Berlin conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of USA, England, France and USSR.

Assertion in above-mentioned note of Government USA alleging that at Berlin conference agreement was reached concerning special responsibilities of four powers in connection with calling of conference in Geneva does not have any basis since, as is known, at Berlin conference there was no other agreement on question of calling conference in Geneva except that announced in joint communiqué on Berlin conference. Above-mentioned communiqué does not envisage any limitation or concession of any special rights to individual participants in conference. Only distinction between participants conference, according this communiqué, is that representatives of USA, England, France, Chinese People's Republic and Soviet Union will participate on equal basis during consideration at conference of both Korean and Indochinese questions, whereas other states will participate on basis of equality in discussion only of that question in which they are directly interested.

Therefore, statement in note of Government US about special responsibility of four powers in relation to conference in Geneva is arbitrary interpretation of communiqué of Berlin conference and is in contradiction with spirit and letter this communiqué.

In connection with communiqué of Berlin conference, representatives of five powers mentioned above should participate on equal basis in examining all questions pertaining to conference."

British and French Embassies state similar notes received by them this morning.

BOHLEN

---

Secretary's memoranda of conversation, lot 64 D 199

*United States Minutes of a Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting*<sup>1</sup>

[Extracts]

SECRET

PARIS, April 22, 1954—4 p. m.

*Reply to Latest Soviet Note on Geneva*

M. Bidault opened the meeting by stating that there was no fixed agenda and as the host he would make the first statement. Referring initially to the tripartite reply to the Soviet Note regarding the inviting powers for the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference, M. Bidault read a U.S.-French draft of a reply (See Tab A).<sup>2</sup> He stressed the need to reply clearly to the false Soviet allegations regarding

---

<sup>1</sup> Dulles was in Paris at this time for a NATO Ministerial meeting prior to the opening of the Geneva Conference on Apr. 26. The list of participants on the source text indicates that Dulles was assisted by 9 American advisers, Eden by 5 British advisers, and Bidault by 11 French advisers.

<sup>2</sup> See the annex to this document, below.

composition of the Geneva Conference. He stressed that it had always been understood that special responsibility devolved on the four Berlin powers, and that in any event we should not open the Geneva Conference by violating the basis of the understanding on which the meeting was set up.

Mr. Eden suggested that the last sentence of the draft be put in the positive rather than the negative sense and that it should stress the fact that the Geneva Conference must be held on the basis under which it was established at Berlin. M. Bidault and the Secretary agreed with this thought.

[Here follows the portion of the document dealing with participation in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference and other matters concerning Southeast Asia, printed on page 544.]

### *Seating Arrangements*

Mr. Eden said that unfortunately there were certain procedural arrangements which must be settled today, especially the question of seating, since it was his understanding that otherwise the wiring of the hall at Geneva would not be ready on April 26th. He said he was willing to accept any arrangements that his colleagues wanted, but felt that a decision must be reached.

The Secretary said that it was his understanding, from talking with Geneva by telephone and from a telegram we had received,<sup>3</sup> that substantial agreement had been reached with the Soviets accepting the U.S.-U.K. proposal. He noted that the Soviets had proposed certain changes, including daily rotation of seats. The Secretary said we were opposed to this and favored a fixed seating plan, but would not break up the Conference on this point and would accept the Soviet position if they insisted. The Secretary said that the Soviets wished four seats in the front row and four seats behind for each delegation—an arrangement which required too many seats since the hall only seated a total of eighty-four and there were nineteen delegations.

In conclusion the Secretary said he believed that there was general agreement on seating arrangements, and he believed the outstanding problems were easily soluble. He said we understand M. Bidault's desire to have a microphone before the Chairman of each delegation in order to avoid having every speaker proceed to a rostrum. He said that while the installations might not be everything that we wanted when the Conference opened, they would be ready in a few days. Mr. Eden said that he was gratified to see that we were all in agreement and said that our representatives at Geneva should be informed accordingly.

---

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

*Chairmanship*

Mr. Eden said that he thought we should take a preliminary look at the chairmanship problem, especially if we want help from the outside. He said he favored rotation among the Big Four but realized this was impractical because the Soviets would propose rotation among the Five, including Communist China which was unacceptable. Therefore, he said we must see if there was some other rotation scheme, or if there was one man who could be selected as chairman. With regard to the suggestion that the Secretary-General of the UN be chairman, Mr. Eden stated that he considered this undesirable since the UN had taken a position opposing the aggressor in Korea, and accordingly could hardly be considered an impartial judge in hearing the Korean case.

The Secretary said that we had one other suggestion. He said he agreed with Mr. Eden's analysis of the problem, including the undesirability of having the UN Secretary-General as permanent chairman, but thought we might find a Swiss personality who could serve as chairman. The Secretary stressed that he would not be representing his Government. M. Bidault agreed that we should explore this possibility. The Secretary listed the names of four people who had been suggested by our Ambassador in Switzerland. M. Bidault agreed that three of the four would be worth examining but that Mr. Stucki, who was one of the candidates, would not be desirable from the French viewpoint because of a book which he had written regarding the Vichy regime. The Secretary and Mr. Eden agreed that Rappart, who was one of the suggested candidates, was probably too old, and too professional a personality. It was agreed that we would examine carefully the other two candidates, Burckhart and de Salis, both of whom it was thought would be excellent candidates, though it was far from certain whether either would accept.

*Other Topics*

M. Bidault said that he feared we would have to meet again on Indochina before Geneva since we were faced with many procedural difficulties and still had not settled the participation question.

Mr. Eden said that Mr. Pearson and Mr. Casey had raised with him in London the problem of how to maintain contact with the delegations of the other anti-Communist countries at Geneva. He said he was willing to repeat the formula which had been worked out at Berlin where all of the free-world delegations met together to exchange views at the expert's level every morning. He said he also thought one meeting of all the Foreign Ministers on our side should be held before the Geneva meeting opened, Sunday afternoon or Monday morning.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Apr. 25-26.

M. Bidault stated that France had made certain concessions on arrangements regarding seating, while the U.S. had made a concession regarding the elimination of a rostrum. He said we would, of course, begin with the conference on Korea which we were ready to start talking, but would have to hold parallel talks outside on Indochina on which phase, even though it is a more urgent problem, we were not ready. He concluded saying he did not believe there would be any activity on any item for two or three days after April 26, though we should, of course, get on as fast as possible.

[Here follow three paragraphs which dealt with a brief discussion of a reply to the Soviet note of March 31 concerning a European security pact; for text, see volume V.]

In concluding the meeting, M. Bidault stated that at least we had today agreed to the reply to the Soviet note rejecting the five-power concept for Geneva and had, he hoped, laid to rest that Soviet scheme. It was agreed that the press would be informed only that we had held a preliminary review of preparations for Geneva. It was also agreed that the three Foreign Ministers would meet again on Saturday, April 24 at 4:00 p. m. to continue their talks, and that the press would be so informed.<sup>5</sup>

[Annex—Tab A]

*U.S.—French Draft Reply to Soviet Note of April 21* (As revised on April 22—and delivered on April 23)

“U.S. Government refers to note of Soviet Government of April 21 concerning forthcoming conference at Geneva.

“U.S. Government rejects contention of Soviet Government that ‘Chinese People’s Republic’ should enjoy any special position with respect to conference at Geneva. This issue was fully debated at Berlin, and agreement reached between Four Powers represented at Berlin with reference to Geneva Conference clearly excludes any special position for ‘Chinese People’s Republic’. It follows that it will be special responsibility of four sponsoring governments to reach agreement as to States to which invitations will be issued for Indo-China discussions.

“Government of U.S. expects that Berlin agreement will be scrupulously observed and [is not willing] that Geneva Conference [should be predicated upon a violation of the basic agreement upon which Geneva Conference rests] <sup>6</sup> *shall take place under conditions laid down by that agreement.*” <sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> For a report on the meeting, see telegram Secto 14, Apr. 24, from Paris, p. 139.

<sup>6</sup> Brackets in the source text.

<sup>7</sup> For further documentation relating to invitations and procedural matters concerning the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference, see pp. 727 ff.

FE files, lot 60 D 330, "Position Papers"

*Memorandum by the Technical Secretary, United States Delegation  
at the Geneva Conference (Van Hollen)*

SECRET

[GENEVA,] April 24, 1954.

GK D-4/1e

KOREAN PHASE

BASIC POSITION PAPER ON KOREAN REUNIFICATION

The attached paper, revised by Mr. Young, contains the three alternative plans which would each meet the U.S. objectives of a non-Communist, independent and representative government in Korea.

A full description of each of these three alternative plans is contained in the following documents:

Plan A—Administrative Incorporation of North Korea into the Existing Republic of Korea (GK D-4/7)<sup>1</sup>

Plan B—Elections in North and South Korea for Establishment of Korean National Government within the ROK Constitutional Structure (GK D-4/10)<sup>2</sup>

Plan C—All-Korean Elections for Constituent Assembly, New Government and New National Government (GK D-4b)<sup>3</sup>

CHRISTOPHER VAN HOLLEN

[Attachment]

*Position Paper Prepared for the Korean Phase of the Geneva Conference*

GK D-4/1e

BASIC POSITION PAPER ON KOREAN REUNIFICATION

*Problem*

To develop a plan for Korean reunification and the withdrawal of foreign forces which will be in consonance with United States national policies on Korea, and which will resolve the different views of the ROK, the United States and our other allies.

*Purpose of Conference and Basic U.S. Objective*

The Geneva Conference on Korea is called pursuant to Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement and the Berlin Communiqué, whereby the two belligerent sides are to meet to seek a peaceful settlement of the Korean question considering that the establishment by peaceful means of a united and independent Korea would be an important fac-

<sup>1</sup> Dated Apr. 9, p. 82.

<sup>2</sup> Dated Apr. 16, p. 105.

<sup>3</sup> Dated Mar. 27, p. 62.

tor in reducing international tension and in restoring peace in other parts of Asia.

The general purpose of the United States at Geneva is to seek an agreement to a plan for the reunification of Korea which will establish a non-Communist, independent and representative government constituted by independently supervised elections, and which will provide for the orderly, phased withdrawal of foreign forces synchronized with that plan.

*General Principles and Considerations:*

The United States, the Republic of Korea, and their Allies should:

1. Maintain a position of strength and stability in free Korea which will lessen ROK fear of abandonment, and avoid actions which in the ROK may cause confusion, or public turmoil, leading to a weakening of public morale.

2. Affirm that the ROK is the only sovereign, lawful government in Korea; that it must not be equated with the North Korean regime; that the ROK cannot legally or morally be liquidated without its consent, which it is unlikely to give; and that the ROK has the fundamental and primary interest in the manner of unifying Korea.

3. Seek the unification within the constitutional framework of the ROK State, and in keeping with the spirit and purposes of past United Nations resolutions to the greatest extent possible, recognizing that any constitutional changes desired by the new Assembly can be worked out within the ROK constitution.

4. Maintain a united front at the Conference among the allies, the United States and the Republic of Korea (a) in the presentation and negotiation of the unification of Korea, and (b) in restricting the Korean phase of the Conference solely to Korean matters, despite Communist attempts to introduce broader issues.

5. Assume that the Korean Phase of the Geneva Conference will be a serious negotiation to bring about, if at all possible the independence and unification of Korea. Therefore, maintain some flexibility for manoeuver, while at the same time develop a full and common understanding of the basic principles regarding unification and withdrawal on which they will not compromise.

6. Acknowledge that the United States should assume leadership on the allied side in close partnership, if possible, with the Republic of Korea, in view of the heavy sacrifices and commitments made by both the US and the ROK to repel Communist aggression in Korea. Without ROK-US endorsement or support, no proposal will be effective.

7. Determine whether the Communists will (1) insist on controlling part of all Korea, or (2) renounce any special position in Korea and agree to set up "a united Korea for free Koreans"; if the former is the case, recognize that no formula can succeed, and unmask Communist aggressive intentions.

8. Although recognizing that the Communists may not agree to any proposal put forward by our side on Korea's unification, formulate our plans and proposals in such a way that their implementation would protect and preserve our interests if they were accepted by the Com-

munists and make clear our implementation of such plans will be conditioned on Communist performance.

9. Compose existing differences on various phases of plan for unifying Korea in order to arrive at a common formula that can be strongly and favorably presented and negotiated at the Conference, if the Communists have any intention of entering into real discussions rather than just propaganda.

10. Emerge from the Conference in a strong moral and political position by presenting and negotiating proposals commending themselves as fair, reasonable and workable to the world at large and which, if not accepted by the Communists, will make clear their responsibility for failure to reach agreement on Korea's unification at Geneva.

### *The Republic of Korea Position*

The Republic of Korea will probably subscribe in general to the above objectives and principles.

Specifically, the Republic of Korea will :

1. Oppose any unification plan violating ROK sovereignty and any proposals for a "neutralized Korea", a coalition government or north-south arrangements placing the North Korean regime on an equal basis with the Republic of Korea.

2. Propose first the withdrawal of all Chinese forces from Korea, extension of ROK sovereignty over North Korea, and elections held by the ROK in North Korea to fill the seats in the ROK National Assembly available for representatives from the North.

3. Argue against simultaneous elections in South Korea, but possibly acquiesce in such elections provided ROK sovereignty is preserved.

4. Reject plans for a constituent assembly, new constitution and new government as an initial position and possibly all through the Conference.

5. Accept phased withdrawal of foreign forces, if coupled with reunification.

### *Position of Other United States Allies*

Our other allies, and particularly the Commonwealth, will :

1. subscribe in general to the above principles ;

2. go along with the general US position at the beginning of the Conference, but question proposals for elections only in North Korea.

3. prefer a formula for reunification along the general lines of that proposed by the United States, France and the United Kingdom for Germany, i.e., completely fresh start in Korea to form a new government ;

4. possibly insist on such a formula as the final Allied position after others fail ;

5. object strongly to any proposal that simply provides for incorporation of North Korea into South Korea without some new constitutional act ;

6. emphasize the importance of proposals that will appear reasonable and acceptable to world opinion;
7. insist on tactical flexibility at Geneva.

### *Communist Position*

The Communists will probably :

1. Do their utmost to broaden discussions on specious, deceptive lines, such as a general Far East security pact, lessening of tensions and recognition of the independence and security of all states;
2. Oppose any plans that would remove or weaken their control and hegemony in North Korea, and not make real concession that would create a free, united Korea;
3. Propose (a) withdrawal of all armed foreign forces in Korea so that the "Koreans themselves" may bring about their own unification; (b) elaborate measures for the establishment of a provisional government over all Korea designed to give the Communists predominance and based on equal status of the north and south; and (c) national elections to take place at some indefinite time after the establishment of this provisional government and to be carried out "by the Koreans themselves" without any international supervision.

### *General United States Position*

In the light of United States policies in Korea, the ROK attitude, and the Allied position, the United States position should be based on the following two general propositions:

#### *1. Utilization of ROK Constitutional Structure*

A. It is essential, from the United States point of view, to develop proposals within the framework of legitimacy, sovereignty and integrity of the political system, and constitutional structure of the ROK State in principle. This would :

- (1) preserve the integrity of the nation and people which fought, with much allied and United Nations blood and treasure, for three years against Communist aggressors;
- (2) give voice to the viewpoint of the overwhelming majority of the Korean people; and
- (3) not put the ROK on a par with the North Korean regime.

#### *2. Continuation of United Nations Resolutions*

A. Our proposals should serve in general to resume the program for Korea's unification which the UN undertook in 1948-1950 and which the Communists frustrated by refusal to cooperate by North Korean aggression in June 1950 and by Chinese Communist intervention in November 1950. Allied plans for the unification of Korea should apply the general principles of previous United Nations plans for unification of Korea, which are contained in the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, October 7, 1950, Decem-



ber 1, 1950, and August 28, 1953. The principal points of these resolutions are :

(1) The United Nations objective is to assist the Korean people in re-establishing their freedom, independence and unity which are their urgent and rightful claims, recognizing that the Korean question is primarily a matter for the Korean people ;

(2) National independence of Korea should be re-established and foreign forces withdrawn thereafter ;

(3) Elections should be held on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot and the number of representatives from the voting districts should be proportionate to population ; elections should be observed by an international commission with freedom to observe and consult throughout Korea ;

(4) The ROK is the only lawful sovereign government in any part of Korea in so far as the United Nations is concerned ;

(5) The United Nations has in being a commission with personnel and experience to carry out the terms of reference on Korean unification established in the General Assembly Resolution of October 7, 1950 ;

(6) The United Nations has in being an agency to rehabilitate all Korea once it is unified.

#### *Specific Plans for the Unification of Korea*

1. Generally speaking, there are three possible plans which might bring about a non-Communist, independent and representative government in a united Korea, if the Communists were to cooperate in implementing any one of them. These plans are consistent with the above two propositions in different and varying degrees.

*Plan "A"—Incorporation of North Korea into the Existing Republic of Korea (GK D-4/7).*

1. The key elements of Plan "A" would include :

(a) free elections to be held only in north Korea for representation in the ROK National Assembly to complete processes carried out under UN supervision in 1948 in the area south of the 38th Parallel. That election was held to effect the unity and independence in Korea and was regarded by the electorate and the Temporary UN Commission as a "step" in reestablishing the independence in Korea. The General Assembly considered it a "further development" of representative Government in Korea.

(b) the elections should be supervised and observed in north Korea by the UNCURK in a manner similar to the work of the UN Temporary Commission of 1948 with regard to conforming north Korean electoral laws and conditions to the principles of General Assembly resolutions of 1947 and 1950-53 in order to establish at least minimum conditions for free elections during a period of 90 days before elections. UNCURK must have authority to: (1) move and observe freely ; (2) propose measures for insuring an atmosphere of free elections ; (3) set date for such elections ; (4) determine the number of representatives to be elected proportionate to the relative population in north

and south Korea; (5) certify election of valid expression of the will of the people; and (6) make recommendations and observe the orderly transfer of functions and authority from all administrative levels of north Korea where elections in accordance with the foregoing have been properly carried out, to the lawful government of a united Korea.

(c) application of ROK constitutional authority over all Korea after completion remaining constituent act, under UN resolutions, of elections in North Korea, with inherent right of expanded National Assembly to amend constitution as now provided for, if it desired;

(d) withdrawal of foreign military forces before and after convocation of expanded ROK National Assembly, observed and verified by UNCURK during stages and on completion;

(e) application by United States of US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty to entire Korean Peninsula;

(f) supersession of the armistice agreement, after UNCURK verifies completion above steps;

(g) rehabilitation of all Korea by the United Nations Reconstruction Agency for Korea.

## 2. General Comments

(a) Plan A meets the requirement for preserving the ROK constitutional system. The ROK will probably endorse it and would become the government and State for all Korea. Our Allies will only reluctantly support this Plan because it calls for elections only in north Korea. The Communists will certainly reject Plan A.

(b) Plan A is not inconsistent with past efforts of the UN to achieve Korea's unification if it is viewed as additional step to complete the program begun in 1948 in south Korea. However, the General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950 and its legislative history imply that UNCURK was to set up elections throughout Korea for a government of a united Korea, although under the conditions then prevailing the ROK would have won overwhelmingly in north and south.

(c) If the Communists really complied with the UN Commission's terms of reference to the same extent as U.S. military government and the interim South Korean authorities did in 1948, the elections in north Korea would be free and the results safeguarded. Under such conditions, the ROK would win a large majority.

### *Plan "B"—Elections in North and South Korea for Establishment of Korean National Government within the ROK Constitutional Structure*

#### 1. The key elements of Plan B are:

(a) free elections would be held throughout Korea under the ROK constitution of which Article 32 provides that elections shall be arranged by legislation passed by the Assembly and Article 4 refers to the entire territory of Korea.

(b) Pursuant to the provisions of Chapter IX, Article 98 of the Constitution of the ROK as adopted July 12, 1948, and amended July 4, 1952, the expanded National Assembly would be expected after these elections to meet in its constituent capacity to consider adoption

or amendment of the Constitution in whole or in part, so as to provide a form of constitutional government satisfactory to the entire Korean people. The Constitution may be amended by two-thirds' vote of the National Assembly. This would be consistent with UN resolutions. While preserving the framework of the existing constitution and political system, it would permit the people of a unified Korea to choose their own form of government in accordance with the existing constitution.

(c) Elections to be observed by UNCURK in the same manner as indicated in paragraph (b) of Plan A and in accordance with the 9A Resolution of October 7, 1950. Minimum conditions for free elections to be established and verified by UNCURK in Korea 90 days before election date and to include :

- (1) Freedom of presentation and movement of candidates within North and South Korea respectively, but not between both areas;
- (2) Immunity of candidates from arrest or coercion;
- (3) Freedom of expression;
- (4) Secrecy of vote;
- (5) Security of polling stations and ballot boxes.

(d) Representation in all-Korea National Assembly to be based on population ratio between North and South Korea.

(e) Convocation of all-Korea National Assembly to consider ROK Constitution and pass basic uniform laws for all Korea.

(f) Election for President for all Korea on basis universal suffrage and secret ballot in all Korea.

(g) Phased withdrawal of foreign forces before and after elections to be completed within 12 months after formation of National Government of Korea and observed and unified by the UNCURK. Withdrawal to start 90 days before election date.

(h) Application by U.S. of U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty to entire Korean Peninsula, coupled with such assurances of Korea's political independence and territorial integrity as are feasible.

(i) Supersession of the Armistice Agreement, after UNCURK has verified above measures have been carried out.

(j) Rehabilitation of all Korea.

## 2. Comments

(a) Plan "B" is more likely to obtain the approval of both the ROK and our other Allies which is not the case with Plan "A" or Plan "C". The Communists will probably oppose it.

(b) Plan B contains the essence of our two general propositions. Plan "B" reflects the spirit and the provision of General Assembly resolutions on the unification of Korea more than Plan "A" does. While Plan "B" provides for elections in both North and South Korea for a National Assembly and President, it would do so under the ROK Constitutional system.

(c) In addition to holding elections throughout Korea, the feature distinguishing Plan "B" from Plan "A" is the intention to have the

Assembly act in a constituent capacity to consider the ROK Constitution. The Assembly could also provide for presidential elections.

*Plan "C"—All-Korean Elections for Constituent Assembly New Government and New National Government*

1. The key elements of Plan "C" are:

(a) Formation of a new commission to supervise elections and bring about new all-Korean government to replace ROK and PDROK.

(b) Establishment of conditions throughout Korea for free elections.

(c) Free elections throughout Korea for a constituent assembly.

(d) Convocation of constituent assembly.

(e) Adoption of constitution, formation of reunified Government for all Korea, and transfer of power to such government from predecessor states.

(f) International assurances on the territorial integrity and political independence of a reunified Korea.

(g) Mutual phased withdrawals of foreign military forces from Korea to be completed 12 months after date of formation of new national government for Korea, and to be observed and verified by the new commission.

(h) Dissolution of the Commission and supersession of the armistice agreement.

(i) Rehabilitation of all Korea through international contributions and international agency.

2. Comments

(a) The ROK would be strongly opposed to Plan "C" because the ROK would be superseded, and it would be on a par with the North Korean regime.

(b) The Commonwealth and general opinion in many countries of the world would prefer Plan "C" to Plan "B" on the grounds that Plan "C" is more objective and impartial vis-à-vis the present Korean authorities, and gives the entire voting population in Korea a chance to make a completely new start, and thus fulfill UN resolutions. Another argument for Plan "C" is that the same general plan proposed by the three powers for Germany should be applied to Korea. Plan "C" does resemble the Eden Plan for Germany.

(c) The Communists probably would not accept such a plan unless they considered it necessary as a precedent for Indo-China.

*United States Courses of Action Regarding Specific Plans:*

To retain initiative and flexibility in an attempt to negotiate an agreement at Geneva on the unification and independence of Korea, the United States should:

1. Obtain ROK and allied endorsement to the two propositions and the general principles and considerations outlined above;

2. Seek ROK agreement to Plan "B" on the understanding that the ROK, if it desires, may present Plan "A" as its opening position at the Conference;

3. Limit ourselves, at the beginning of the Conference, to:

(a) a review of the frustrated history of Korean unification and the reasons for holding a conference on Korea, and

(b) an exposure of Communist conduct in Korea, particularly their circumvention of the Armistice Agreement;

4. Manoeuvre to have the Communists show their hand during the Conference before the United States and its allies advance any basic proposals;

5. Arrange with our allies to have the ROK lead off, with our side's general endorsement, with Plan "A", particularly with regard to elections only in North Korea;

6. Have Plan "B" introduced with full allied backing at an appropriate time after the Communist position and the initial ROK position have been hopelessly deadlocked.

7. Keep Plan "C" in reserve possibly for consideration, if it develops that the Communists show signs of desiring seriously to negotiate the peaceful settlement of the Korean question that will provide for the independence and unification of a free Korea;

8. Insist on the coupling of the withdrawal of foreign forces with acceptable plans for Korea's unification, and refrain from any consideration of second-stage plans during the discussion at the Conference of the unification and independence of Korea.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 241 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL      PRIORITY

PARIS, April 24, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 14. Repeated information Geneva 118, London 965, Moscow 320, Saigon 472, Seoul 2. At tripartite meeting this afternoon between Secretary, Eden and Bidault, it was agreed Bidault would transmit note dated 24 April to Eden, Secretary and Molotov, calling for a meeting at Geneva 11:30 a. m. 26 April, to discuss "a certain number of points touching on the organization of the conference with regard to Indochina.<sup>1</sup> It was also decided Eden would request a meeting with Molotov Monday<sup>2</sup> morning to resolve outstanding questions on Korean phase conference. Principal unresolved question now appears to be chairmanship. On chairmanship, it was agreed first position should be rotation chairmanship among US, UK, French and USSR. Any Soviet proposal for rotation among US, UK, France, USSR and Communist China will be categorically rejected and rotation among 19 also be rejected. Second position will be choice of permanent chairman from among delegations eliminating "Big Four" from consideration and rejecting North Korea or Communist China. Will accept

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Apr. 26.

anyone our side putting forward Pearson, Prince Wan, Ambassador Xueleta [*Zuleta*]. For third position, will suggest Swiss national, Jean de Salis. Are also considering possibility Swedish nationals Ekeberg. President Court of Appeals Stockholm, Richard Sandler and Bertil Ohlin. (Separate telegram<sup>3</sup> being sent Stockholm asking views on these men.) Failing agreement foregoing, suggestion will be made conference meet under provisional chairman (chosen so as exclude any possibility Communist China, North Korea) but with first order business conference selection permanent chairman presumably by majority vote.

Question composition Indochinese phase discussed, Bidault making suggestion three Associated States and three limitrophes states. Eden stated Casey would be "bothered by" inclusion Thailand and Burma and exclusion Australia. Secretary pointed out if Australia invited, probably would have to invite Indonesia and strongly reiterated fact that Communist China had been invited only as it was the source of aggression in Indochina and had in its power the control Indochinese war and not in any "Big Five" sense. Bidault stated French desire keep conference small as possible and difficulties excluding Ho from conference. Three Ministers agreed that initial position on participation would be four plus Communist China and three Associated States.

Bidault made suggestion that French, English, Russian and Chinese be considered official languages for Indochinese phase and that technical arrangements be left to experts in light of Korean phase precedents.

Eden suggested meeting of fifteen allied side prior to opening of conference and Secretary agreed to hold such a meeting at US delegation offices 11 a. m. Monday.<sup>4</sup>

DULLES

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> See telegram Secto 9, Apr. 26, from Geneva, p. 143.

396.1-GE/4-2554 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, April 25, 1954—8 p. m.

5. Repeated information Department Secto 4 Tokyo 4. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Seoul for Briggs and Dean. Secretary and Robertson met this morning with Pyun and Yang. Secretary proposed Pyun make opening statement for our side at conference on [?] which Pyun welcomed. Secretary has proposed US and ROK exchange ideas on content statement. Pyun agreed. No mention made of written "notes"

Dean discussed with Yang who has shown them to Pyun.<sup>1</sup> Pyun stated he under strict instructions from Rhee first propose unconditional withdrawal Chinese Communist forces before UN withdrawal and unification. Secretary replied such proposal could cause much trouble for our side because Communists will propose simultaneous withdrawal all foreign forces, conference would focus on question withdrawal rather than main issue independence and unity of Korea, and UN withdrawal before unification could weaken our security position in Korea if actually carried out. Secretary used tripartite position at Berlin on German unification as illustration heart of matter should be unification and freedom for Korea as was done regarding Germany in Berlin. Secretary suggested ROK statement emphasize that theme with withdrawal of forces as part larger problem. He also said no objection Pyun including in speech desirability Chinese Communist withdrawal from Korea as evidence purging themselves of aggression but connected with unification and freedom for all Korea. Pyun also raised question general elections in Korea stating he feared Communists would make such proposal in order set precedent for Indochina where they would thereby win control by peaceful means. Secretary replied we fully aware possible consequences for Indochina proposals on Korea, therefore we are proposing as initial position elections only in North Korea. Secretary made clear to Pyun this was not final position. Pyun said since he under rigid instructions from Rhee make above proposal re withdrawal he would have refer Secretary's views to Seoul.

It was agreed with Pyun that we would also refer matter to you for discussion with Rhee in hope he w'll change instructions to Pyun to emphasize primary importance seeking unification and freedom Korea rather than unconditional unilateral withdrawal Chinese Communist forces as first order precedence.

Since opening statement might have to be made Monday or Tuesday depending conference developments Secretary wishes you see Rhee soonest.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> The "notes" referred to have not been found in the Department of State files.

---

396.1-GE/4-2554 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, April 25, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 5. Repeated information London 65 Paris 111 Moscow 10 Seoul 6. This morning the Soviets proposed slight rearrangement of alpha-

betical order seating so as place Communist Chinese directly front Soviet delegation. Plan also results in slight shift so that ROKs not directly behind North Korea as under previous plan, but remain directly front US delegation. Soviets confirmed agreement to plan at meeting this evening so that question seating now considered resolved.

Eden arriving late this evening and seeking appointment with Molotov early tomorrow morning obtain agreement on chairmanship, and other outstanding issues such as rules of procedure, restricted nature meetings, meeting hours, and speaking order. If agreement on chairman within present tripartite position, that is, four-power rotation, permanent chairman selected from delegation other than Big Four or Communist delegation, or neutral Swiss or Swedish, Eden will state further tripartite consultation required. He will suggest no formal rules procedure be adopted for conference, that speaking order be by inscription with chairman and suggest that Berlin communiqué provides sufficient agenda.

DULLES



### III. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE: EFFORTS TO REACH AN AGREED POSITION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA; MEETINGS WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS; PROPOSALS ON KOREA BY VARIOUS DELEGATIONS; ISSUANCE OF THE DECLARATION BY THE SIXTEEN; CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE (APRIL 26-JUNE 15)

APRIL 26, 1954

396.1 GE/4-2654 : Telegram

*First Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, April 26, 11: 10 a. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL      PRIORITY

GENEVA, April 26, 1954—3 p. m.

Secto 9. Repeated information Seoul 7, Tokyo 5, Paris 115, London 69, Moscow 11. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Secretary held first meeting with 16 this morning primarily concerning procedural and organizational matters. Eden met with Molotov at 10: 30<sup>2</sup> and came back to report to meeting of 16 delegates. As a result of two meetings, agreements reached on following:

(1) On Chairmanship, Eden and Molotov worked out proposal of rotation among USSR, UK and Thailand. Order will be Thailand today followed by Molotov, then Eden.

(2) Speakers will be listed in order of inscription with chairman.

(3) Understood only with 16 that ROK would be first speaker for our side. Pyun not ready speak today.

(4) No rules of procedure at beginning of conference but question can be taken up later if appears some necessity for having rules, in which case General Assembly rules of procedure will be considered.

(5) Meeting would open today at 3 o'clock and meetings would be held from 3 to 7 six days a week.

(6) Agreements reached also on seating arrangements<sup>3</sup> and on procedures for interpretation. In view of difficulties locating qualified Korean interpreters language of day will be French, Russian, English and then Chinese or Korean.

(7) Understood photographers will be permitted at first plenary session for 10 minutes at opening. Agreed with Molotov and 16 no press thereafter and no observer delegations.

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/1) from which the time of the meeting is taken is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting, at which Dulles presided, adjourned at 12:55 p. m.

<sup>2</sup> No record of the Eden-Molotov meeting has been found in Department of State files.

<sup>3</sup> The minutes of the meeting indicated that the seating arrangements called for the chairman to face the delegations, which were arranged according to English alphabetical order, auditorium style, in three rows of eight, nine, and three, with a microphone for the head of each delegation.

(8) As to today's business meeting of 16, left it with Eden he would arrange with Molotov for agreement that meeting today be confined to organization.

(9) As to agenda, 11 [16?] concurred position no formal agenda required since conference being held pursuant to Berlin agreement and since Berlin communiqué calls for peaceful settlement Korean question. Eden did not discuss agenda with Molotov.

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/4-2654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

SECRET      NIACT

SEOUL, April 26, 1954—noon.

10. Sent niact Department 1064, repeated information niact Tokyo 632. Tokyo pass CINCUNC, For the Secretary and Robertson from Dean. Reference Geneva 5, repeated Department Secto 4, Tokyo 4.<sup>1</sup> Ambassadors Briggs and Dean saw President Rhee and acting Foreign Minister Cho and had satisfactory preliminary talks this morning. Your telegram 5 came during talk. Emphasized importance stressing unification first and making withdrawal Chinese Communist forces from north as condition thereto. President evidently believes if there are elections north and south, both Soviets and Chinese Communists will want to supervise. He suggested several times as alternative Pyun making very general statement but we stressed importance substance your telegram. Finally without committing himself as to content, agreed draft instructions Dr. Pyun which he will show us later today.<sup>2</sup>

BRIGGS

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Apr. 25, p. 140.

<sup>2</sup> See telegram 13, Apr. 26, from Seoul, p. 145.

---

396.1 GE/4-2654 : Telegram

*First Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, April 26, 3:10 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

GENEVA, April 26, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 10. Repeated information Seoul 8, Tokyo 6, Paris 119, London 71, Moscow 12. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense, CINCPAC and COMSAC. First session Korean political conference:

Prince Wan opened meeting at 3:10 stating he serving by agreement as temporary Chairman. He announced first order business 10 minutes

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/1) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 267. These minutes have been used to supply wording in brackets in two places in this telegram where the original was garbled.

of press photography. After photographing completed and photographers cleared room Wan [called] for proposals on chairmanship. Secretary proposed rotation between heads delegations Thailand, USSR and UK daily in that order, Thailand beginning today. Since no other proposals Wan declared proposal adopted by conference.

Wan expressed gratitude behalf his government stressing Thailand was Asian country and "conference is called upon to deal with questions relating to Asia—notably the question of Korea." After expressing greetings to Swiss people and authorities Wan stated task conference was that set by "four inviting powers" and quoted from Berlin communiqué "the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united and independent Korea would be an important factor in reducing international tension and in restoring peace in other parts of Asia." Wan also read statement of greeting from President Swiss Confederation and said reply would be made in name of conference in due course. He then said each chairman would choose his own assistants and invited Kural and Eddy to sit with him.

Prince Wan then made announcement of agreed procedures:

(a) Meetings daily at three except Sunday; recess at about 5 and aim to finish at 7;

(b) Speakers in order of inscription with list continued from day to day;

(c) Five official languages, language of the day to be in rotation beginning with French today, Russian tomorrow, English the day after and Chinese and Korean to follow;

(d) Meetings would be closed to press and public except as conference itself may determine;

(e) Each delegation [would conduct own] press relations, official communiqués only if conference decides.

Prince Wan then said that today's meeting was only organizational in nature and that general discussion would begin tomorrow. He announced that ROK has already asked to be inscribed and invited other delegations to do likewise. Meeting adjourned 3:40.

Session went off exactly as agreed and hoped for. It remains to be seen whether things will go as smoothly tomorrow when Molotov is Chairman.

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/4-2454: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

SECRET      NIACT

SEOUL, April 24 [26], 1954—8 p. m.

13. Sent Department 1068; repeated information priority Tokyo 633. Tokyo pass CINUNC. Geneva for the Secretary and Robertson

from Dean. Further reference your 5<sup>1</sup> and our 10.<sup>2</sup> President Rhee had delivered by hand this afternoon following message for Secretary Dulles to deliver to Foreign Minister Pyun :

“Dear Dr. Pyun :

“The following constitutes my latest instructions in connection with Geneva Conference :

“Our friends want us to make unification the first requirement while we want Chinese Communist withdrawal as first requirement. We will cooperate if our friends will make an agreement to effect that there will be no peace until Chinese Communists have withdrawn from Korea, and that no outside nation will interfere with unification program when we hold elections under United Nations’ observation.

“Sincerely yours, Syngman Rhee.”

Ambassadors Briggs and Dean then called on President and Acting Foreign Minister Cho and after considerable discussion President agreed on following substituted instructions for Dr. Pyun :

“You should ask Secretary Dulles to give you assurances that he will cooperate with us in bringing about unification by elections held under United Nations’ observation without outside interference which shall include Chinese withdrawal. When such assurance is received you may make unification first requirement.”

As you will observe, this draft not only represents considerably watered down version of his first demands, but it is result of trading him out of numerous other versions.

President asks you convey final draft (namely paragraph last quoted) to Pyun.

BRIGGS

<sup>1</sup> Dated Apr. 25, p. 140.

<sup>2</sup> Dated Apr. 26, p. 144.

APRIL 27, 1954

396.1 GE/4-2754 : Telegram

*First Meeting of the Deputy Representatives of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, April 27, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, April 27, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 17. Repeated information Seoul 9, Tokyo 7, London 79, Paris 127, Moscow 15. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. At first regular meeting deputy representatives of 16, Johnson outlined

<sup>1</sup> No minutes of this meeting have been found in Department of State files. The telegraphic summary printed here indicates that the meeting was held in anticipation of the Second Plenary Session on the afternoon of Apr. 27 (see *infra*).

in general terms US position on substantive questions, following document GK D-439 [D-4/9], April 14.<sup>2</sup> Johnson emphasized we should not be willing to set forth detailed proposals lest Communists pick on details and divert attention from their failure to accept fundamental principles.

Allen (UK) said his government subscribes general objectives although there might be differences in emphasis and method of achieving them. He stressed need for treating these objectives as genuine, not merely propaganda, and have proposals towards these objectives also genuine and appearing reasonable to world opinion. Proposals should be difficult for Communists to reject so that if conference fails, it will be clear failure due to Communist rejection reasonable proposals.

Watt (Australia), supported generally by Allen (UK) and La Coste (France), stressed desirability of avoiding impression that all 16 reach identical positions and speak with one voice. He said so long as objectives are common, there is virtue in degree of variety in tactics and presentation.

Sarasin (Thailand), however, questioned whether it was wise to have difference of opinion appear in public and favored common approach.

Johnson (US) supported Sarasin, noting Communists will be operating as one side and no reason why 16 should not work as one side. He said that while there would, of course, be no identity of language, it is important to avoid appearance that Communists are creating differences among us.

In reply to Philippine question, Johnson gave us impressions as to probable Communist position. He said they would probably insist on withdrawal foreign forces, and unification by joining North and South Korean assemblies, which would give Communists large majority in Assembly although North Korean population only small fraction of ROK. In regard to withdrawal of forces, Johnson said that even if Communists carry out in good faith, Chinese withdrawal would be only across the Yalu, whence they could come back at any time.

Turning to tactics for afternoon meeting, group agreed with US suggestion that if Molotov seeks to bar ROK, which is inscribed as first speaker, from speaking first, point of order would be made by Colombia, but extended floor fight would be avoided.

Johnson informed group that Secretary inscribed himself so that he could speak in event it became necessary to reply to any statements Molotov might make as chairman; otherwise he would probably withdraw his name and not enter debate today.

---

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 97.

Johnson also said he anticipates possibility Molotov might raise question of agenda. He noted that Prince Wan had stated yesterday that purpose of meeting was set forth in Berlin communiqué. US believes we should insist on Berlin communiqué as only agenda, but Communists might propose instead paragraph 60, Armistice Agreement.

Yang (ROK), when called upon by Ambassador Johnson to give ROK views, merely took occasion to express gratitude Korean people to 16 nations which came to their aid. In reply to inquiry by Allen (UK) as to what ROK intended to say in opening statement, Yang said that it would be general historical presentation stressing unity of Korean people, North and South, and United Nations action to achieve unification.

Urrutia (Colombia) said his Ambassador will also make general presentation along lines of substantive views expressed by Ambassador Johnson.

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/4-2754 : Telegram

*Second Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, April 27, 3: 05 p. m. : The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

GENEVA, April 27, 1954—midnight.

Secto 19. Repeated information Seoul 11, Tokyo 9, Paris 132, London 82, Moscow 18. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Department pass Defense, CINCPAC, COMSAC.

*Second Session Korean Political Conference.*

Molotov opened meeting 3: 05 p. m. and called on ROK representative.

Foreign Minister Pyun said he represented only legitimate Government Korea.<sup>2</sup> Recalling 4,000 years Korean unity, he expressed regret meeting northern brethren here if they belonged to some foreign country. He expressed grief North Koreans going different way against own will under intimidation alien regime. Expressed determination free Koreans and bring deliverance North Koreans. He noted millions North Korean refugees now in ROK as proof those still in north wish cleave to ROK.

He delivered lengthy review Korean events since 1945 along well known lines with emphasis on various UN activities and decisions. He

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes (US Verb Min/2), comprising 38 double-spaced pages, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 267.

<sup>2</sup> Pyun's statement is printed in *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26-June 15, 1954* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 34-39.

said to open North Korea to UN-observed elections was only way complete UN task in manner compatible with UN resolutions. He described North Korean aggression and UN action repel and punish aggressors, saying Chinese Communist attackers should withdraw from Korea entirely accordance February 1951 UN resolution. He said linking withdrawal UN forces to Chinese departure not justified by facts, and described Communist China as Soviet puppet occupying North Korea. He called on Chinese Communists to resume traditional peaceful Chinese role Korean affairs, but said if they extended their aggression they would be encircled. He added Communists repudiating armistice terms and that if ROK decides armistice terms no longer binding it will be Communists' fault. He concluded ROK had suffered greatly as result Communist attack, but could not buy peace at price of freedom. Accordingly, he recommended cooperation all concerned achieve united, independent and democratic Korea by peaceful means.

Molotov then called representative DPROK.

After statement endorsing Geneva conference, Nam Il described principal task was achieving Korean unity by converting armistice into lasting peaceful reunification Korea on democratic principles. He recalled Korea's long history as free independent nation. He paid tribute role Soviet army in 1945 liberation which he alleged was subverted by US occupation authorities. Mentioned December 1945 Moscow agreement<sup>3</sup> and read paragraph therefrom referring provisional democratic government (he avoided all reference trusteeship provisions, however), blaming US for failure to carry out agreement and for responsibilities division of Korea as well as for holding separate elections under "police pressure" and contrary Moscow agreement.

Nam then quoted from UNTCOK report passage concerning election irregularities and fact election held in only part of Korea. He alleged much progress made in North Korea in agricultural, economic and cultural fields. He contrasted North Korean adherence "peaceful unification" following August 25, 1948 elections with US control "anti-democratic" elements South Korea where no progress made. He reported DPROK had made three unification proposals which ROK failed to answer and that ROK at US instigation had attempted impose its regime North Korea. Three years war blamed on US "intervention," while he paid tribute to Communist China for help against "interventionists" who also threatened China. He continued saying 1953 armistice now opened way to peaceful unification, but said South Korea wants resume hostilities while US pouring arms into ROK with which it has concluded mutual security pact. North Korea POW question ignored but mention made 48,000 Communist

<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. II, pp. 820-821.

prisoners retained and allegedly impressed into ROK and Chiang armies. Withdrawal all foreign forces essential, he said, within six months, while there should be agreement all-Korea elections establish government representing whole country. He added measures preparing for elections required conference representatives North and South to establish all-Korea committee. He added committee should take measures facilitate contact between North and South. Finally, he made specific proposal Korean settlement text which already telegraphed Department (Secto 18<sup>4</sup>).

Molotov then called on Colombian representative (Zulueta)<sup>5</sup> who said Colombia present as logical consequence her response UN appeal help repel Communist aggression Korea. He said basic principles united, independent and democratic Korea embodied four UN resolutions, Cairo declaration of 1943,<sup>6</sup> Moscow agreement of 1945 and Article 60 armistice agreement. Colombia considers method unification clearly outlined November 1947 UNGA resolution which envisaged general election on basis secret vote adult population and set up UNTCOK, subsequent resolution added elections should be held in all Korea. Question remains, he continued, by what means free elections achieved, and concluded UN resolutions binding on this point. Purpose Geneva conference thus essentially to arrange genuinely free elections. These are possible only under auspices and with assistance UNCURK, he said. ROK is only legitimate Government Korea, he said, adding one possible means unification is extending to all Korea free expression will of people as already done that part Korea where UN commission operative. Second possibility is new all-Korea elections. Third possibility that North Korea and ROK decide without third party on formula for elections and unification. If elections based principle representation proportional to population this formula might be useful, he added, if North Korean elections really free. Fourth possibility might be joint North-South commission. This would be effective only if membership reflected difference in population North and South. Colombian representative concluded with following points: (1) solution must assure democratic and representative regime which will represent proportionally trends and groups in Korea, (2) no violation UN resolutions, and (3) supervision by UN. Said Colombia cannot accept premise that UN is one of belligerent powers.

---

<sup>4</sup> Telegram Secto 18, Apr. 27, from Geneva, not printed. The text of Nam II's proposal, along the lines set forth above, is printed in *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 39-40.

<sup>5</sup> Zulueta's statement is printed *ibid.*, pp. 41-45.

<sup>6</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 448-449.



Said Colombia represented at Geneva conference solely out of respect for UN decisions.

At end Colombian speech Molotov announced since only remaining speaker was US, which had indicated preference speak tomorrow, he would adjourn meeting unless some delegation objected. Since no response, he adjourned meeting at 5:15.

*Comment:* Meeting was conducted in extremely quiet atmosphere. Molotov presided in strictly formal fashion merely introducing speakers and making no comment on proceedings at any point. Unlike Prince Wan who summoned Turkish and US representatives to his side, Molotov was flanked by Gromyko and Troyanovsky (interpreter) and announced at outset he would be assisted by Zoldaty (USSR) and Shih Che (Communist China) who sat behind him with Zarubin throughout being consulted. All three speakers were heard passively and with no visible reaction from any other delegate.

DULLES

APRIL 28, 1954

795.00/4-2854

*Luncheon Meeting of Dulles, Eden, and Bidault, Geneva, April 28, 1 p. m.: Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Switzerland (Willis)*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, April 28, 1954.

Participants:

<i>France</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>US</i>
Mr. Bidault	Mr. Eden	Secretary Dulles
(Mrs. Bidault)	(Mrs. Eden)	Ambassador Willis

After the luncheon had progressed a few minutes, the Secretary stated that he would like to give consideration to the question of how to get the conference on Korea beyond the preliminary stage. He remarked that at the rate it was going the entire week might be taken up by speeches. Mr. Eden suggested that as he would be in the chair at the afternoon meeting and as no one other than the Secretary had indicated a desire to speak at the meeting, he might suggest a break at 4:00 approximately, when it was anticipated the translation of the Secretary's speech would be finished. During the break Mr. Eden said that possibly he might consult with the other two Presidents as to what the next step might be. Mr. Eden also tentatively suggested that it might be possible for the Bureau<sup>2</sup> to give consideration to this question.

<sup>1</sup> The meeting took place in Dulles' suite in the Hotel du Rhone.

<sup>2</sup> Eden's reference is to the group of 16 Allied nations.

It was agreed that one way to put an end to the introductory speeches would be to rule that no one who was not inscribed before noon of April 29 could speak in the preliminary phase.

The Secretary then indicated that the possibility of negotiation on Korea lay in the fact that if North Korea could be demilitarized and neutralized as a preliminary to unification, the United States would be willing to forego its rights under the treaty with the Republic of Korea to establish bases in the south and to withdraw its troops. He suggested that one way of getting things started would be for him to sound out Mr. Molotov along the above lines. Mr. Eden demurred at this suggestion and came back again to the possibility of getting discussions started in the Bureau. He admitted that that group was also probably too big for satisfactory discussion, but added that an approach there would not be as cumbersome as in the full conference.

The Secretary asked what Mr. Bidault and Mr. Eden would think of having the Five powers, plus the representatives of the two Koreas, meet together and consider ways of making progress. Both Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault indicated a favorable reaction. The Secretary then asked Mr. Eden if there would be any difficulty in excluding Australia or New Zealand, to which Mr. Eden replied that he would not anticipate any difficulty on that score. The Secretary added that it would be necessary, before adopting such procedure, to clear it with the other Sixteen. It was considered that it might be possible to do this tomorrow (Thursday April 29) and that if the suggestion made earlier that an agreement could be reached that only those inscribed before noon of the 29th would be given the floor to speak in the full conference in this initial stage, then it might be possible at an early date to have a meeting of the Seven.

The Secretary indicated that he wanted very much to make some progress on this matter before his departure. Mr. Bidault replied that he also very much hoped it would be possible to begin to confer on Indochina. The Secretary concurred in this wish.

In the course of the luncheon, the Secretary also described Mr. Molotov's visit yesterday.<sup>3</sup> The Secretary said Mr. Molotov had come and handed him a paper in Russian, which he obviously could not read.<sup>4</sup> As Mr. Molotov merely sat there the Secretary suggested that they might talk about Indochina. Mr. Molotov indicated assent, but said nothing. The Secretary raised the question as to why Mr. Molotov had come, as surely it could not have been merely to deliver the document. Mr. Eden expressed the opinion that possibly the motive had been to obtain the credit for having made a friendly gesture and hav-

<sup>3</sup> For a summary of this meeting, see telegram Dulte 15, Apr. 27, p. 579.

<sup>4</sup> The paper in question dealt with atomic energy; for documentation, see volume II.

ing taken the initiative in calling on the American Secretary. Mr. Bidault said Mr. Molotov's purpose might well have been to compare what the Secretary said and what he, Mr. Bidault, had said to Mr. Molotov.

In the course of the luncheon, Mr. Bidault was called to the telephone. He returned to the table at 20 minutes past two and said that he had just received information from his press attaché that Mr. Molotov's press conference, which was to have been held at 1:30, had been postponed for 45 minutes and had therefore kept some 400 to 500 correspondents assembled and waiting impatiently. The story was going around that Mr. Molotov was going to say to them that it was his suggestion that it was agreed that the British, Soviet and Siamese representatives should act as presidents of the conference. Although it was agreed that this appeared far-fetched, Mr. Bidault pointed out that the Communists were apparently determined to give Mr. Molotov the credit for this suggestion as the same report had appeared in *Humanite* a day or two ago.

It was generally agreed that it was important as soon as possible to find a means of getting the conference down to substantive business.

---

396.1 GE/4-2854 : Telegram

*Third Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, April 28, 3:05 p. m.:*  
*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
 PRIORITY

GENEVA, April 28, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 28. Repeated information priority Seoul 15, Tokyo 11, Paris 135, London 85, Bonn 36, Moscow 22, Vienna 11. Department pass Defense, CINCPAC, COMSAC. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Bonn and Vienna for PAO. Third session Korean political conference opened 3 p. m. today with Eden in chair assisted by Kural and Dennis Allen. Eden called on Secretary Dulles who delivered speech text of which telegraphed USIA Washington to pass State and being transmitted in wireless bulletin.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/3) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 267. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:05 p. m. and adjourned at 5:28 p. m.

<sup>2</sup> The text of Secretary Dulles' statement is printed in *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 45-53. In it, he emphasized the authority and responsibility of the United Nations in promoting Korean unification and urged that the solution be found in the U.N. General Assembly resolution of Oct. 7, 1950, which had called for supervised elections in that part of Korea, i.e. the North, where supervised elections had not yet been held.

During course Dulles speech Chinese delegation requested be inscribed and Chou En-lai delivered hour-long speech<sup>3</sup> (with interpretation) following which session broke briefly for intermission and then adjourned following intermission.

Chou opened statement by defining aim of Geneva conference as relaxation tensions and achievement peaceful solution world problems. He specifically commented on fact this first time US, UK, USSR, France and PRC as well as other interested nations have met together to solve important problems Asia. Citing long struggle Asian peoples for liberation from foreign imperialist control he charged influential circles in America with obstructing liberation movement in order enslave Asia. Thus American plans create aggressive bloc and spread war in Asia source of tension there. He followed these statements with lengthy panegyric on achievements PRC in China and declared no force can stop their march to create strong and prosperous China. Chou professed China had no aggressive intent against others and will not tolerate others aggressions.

Observing more than 20 countries recognize PRC, including great friend USSR, he stated others, US first and foremost, still refuse recognition and discriminate against PRC illegally. He stated this attitude hindered peaceful settlement questions and aggravated tension; Geneva conference should therefore lay basis for change.

He then turned to Korean question and summarized familiar Communist version origins Korean war. In this connection and again later in speech he charged US had occupied Taiwan illegally as base for attack on China. Stating US crossing 38th parallel endangered Chinese security by seeking use Japanese plan for Korean base to attack China, Chinese had no choice but come to assistance Korean people. Referring to armistice negotiations Chou charged US and ROK had continually created obstacles to agreement both sides including forcible retention over 48,000 PWs. He stated this question in no way closed and cannot escape attention Geneva conference. Attacking ROK he alleged it and US have openly violated armistice since paragraph 60 explicitly provides for consideration withdrawal forces whereas US and ROK recently concluded mutual defense pact and ROK threatened "march to North". Cited ROK threats as proof who wants peace and who wants war in Korea.

Chou stated PRC fully supports North Korean proposal Korean unification with provision for all-Korean elections without foreign intervention. Contrasted ROK statement calling for retention US forces Korea as indicating ROK required foreign support maintain

---

<sup>3</sup>The text of Chou's statement is printed in *Documents Relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, April 27-June 15, 1954* (Cmd. 9186), pp. 14-20. This publication is henceforth cited as Cmd. 9186.

itself. In expressing hope Nam Il's proposal will form basis for settlement Chou said unification matter for Korean people themselves and foreign forces must withdraw.

In his peroration Chou again charged US occupation Taiwan will not be tolerated, cited growing Jap militarism and actions US in Indochina and in attempt create SEA bloc menace peace of Asia. He then demanded that interference in internal affairs Asian countries be stopped, all foreign forces in Asia be withdrawn, all military bases be removed, all economic restrictions dropped. He concluded Dulles' speech contrary these requirements and therefore government PRC cannot agree with it and considers Asian countries should consult among themselves to solve these problems. Speech concluded with reference to US actions in Europe and in atomic energy field which threaten world peace. He expressed regret certain Asian countries (India, Burma, Indonesia) unable participate and stated conference should consider this problem.

*Comment:* Chou's speech ranged over full spectrum Asian and world problems, and, as anticipated, sought create impression five great powers meeting (with other interested states) to solve general problems Asia and world problems. Speech emphasized importance PRC attaches to diplomatic recognition but made no specific mention admission UN. Most of speech was standard CC boiler plate propaganda line in phraseology as well as content contrary to speculation Chou would adopt more sophisticated approach. Speech as whole appeared designed for propaganda appeal in Asia. Specific comments re withdrawal forces from Korea and allegations US occupation Taiwan suggest particular Chinese Communist sensitivity these points. Speech gave no indication any flexibility PRC position.

DULLES

APRIL 29, 1954

396.1 GE/4-2854 : Telegram

*Second Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, April 29, 11 a. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, April 28 [29], 1954—10 p. m.<sup>2</sup>

Secto 40. Repeated information Seoul 17, Tokyo 12, London 92, Paris 146, Moscow 26. Tokyo for CINCUNC. Department pass De-

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/2) from which the time of the meeting is taken is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting, at which Dulles presided, adjourned at 12:35 p. m.

<sup>2</sup> The file copy of this telegram is incorrectly datelined Apr. 28. It was received in the Department of State at 10:15 p. m. on Apr. 29. There was no meeting of the 16 on Apr. 28.

fense. At meeting chief delegates of 16 today, Secretary emphasized primary issue is purpose and quality of supervised elections in Korea rather than territorial scope of elections. He also raised for consideration moving from plenary sessions into smaller group for more informal negotiations or adopting restricted sessions.

After long discussion both subjects, Ministers agreed set up working committee of ROK, US, UK, Australia, Colombia, France, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey to formulate unification plan present either in smaller group or restricted session or during plenary session after completion general debate. First meeting working group morning April 30.

No final disposition re composition or nature restricted sessions or smaller group. General consensus general debate would end Saturday<sup>3</sup> for lack of speakers and restricted session could probably take place immediately after plenary session. Only Philippines and Thailand expressed intention participate general debate.

In discussing issue supervised elections in North Korea, Secretary pointed out ROK already subject to test and Communists would probably not accept. He hoped statements would be avoided imply ROK on par North Korean regime since such statements would undermine prestige and authority ROK which we should seek maintain. He said geographical scope elections not really decisive issue as are purposes and auspices such elections.

Regarding restricted or smaller meetings, Secretary suggested sign of weakness move this way too soon because Communists might assume we over-eager. We should be ready make such move when right time comes in order develop any possibility re negotiation. Secretary described bargaining possibilities in particular role which Communists accuse us wanting to play in using Korean bases for attack on China.

Eden several times pressed for termination general debate and presentation an agreed final position within next few days or 48 hours possibly followed by smaller meetings or restricted sessions to get down to business soon. He agreed with Secretary Communists would not accept principle supervised elections and thought this issue should be drawn clearly and soon on basis public position similar to tripartite position on German unification which public can understand. Other Commonwealth representatives supported Eden's viewpoint that something must be done immediately counter Communist plans and our basic and final terms should be tabled quickly so that positive issue presented to Communists on which conference can break if they reject it as expected.

---

<sup>3</sup> May 1.

Secretary several times cautioned Ministers ROK cannot be rushed into deciding on position which is matter life and death for it and when every phrase is vital concern to very existence ROK. Secretary stressed need for time for Pyun consult Rhee and ROK Cabinet.

Pyun accepted proposal working committee with ROK participation, agreed to transmit any tentative plan to Seoul for action ROK Government and reserved its position re plan. Pyun questioned need for haste and cautioned against making concessions to Communists for nothing in return.

Pyun explained to meeting he strongly feels appropriate for ROK rebut allegations of North Korean, Chinese Communist and USSR delegates. Other Ministers acknowledged necessity answer false charges, and Pyun will make such statement Saturday although several Ministers feared might start series of countercharges.

DULLES

396.1 GE/4-2954 : Telegram

*Fourth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, April 29, 3:05 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

GENEVA, April 29, 1954.

Secto 41. Repeated information Seoul 18, Tokyo 13, Paris 147, London 93, Bonn 41, Vienna 12, Oslo 1, pouched Moscow. Bonn and Vienna for PAO; Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense, CINCPAC, COMSAC. April 29 plenary session opened at 1505 with Prince Wan in chair. There were only two speakers: Casey of Australia<sup>2</sup> and Molotov, each of whom spoke about 30 minutes.

Casey said Australia approached conference in spirit restrained optimism. While fully cognizant of difficulties in reaching solution of Korean problem, solution nevertheless must be found. This is no time for recriminations about the past. Efforts should be directed toward finding solution. Basis for achieving one already present in UN Charter and UN Resolutions. Specifically, following should be elements of solution:

1. Solution must be achieved by peaceful means.
2. Principle of self-determination calls for free elections. While strong case can be made for holding such elections in North Korea only, since UN-supervised elections have already been held in South Korea, Australia hopes ROK will, if necessary, agree to elections throughout Korea as gesture of helpfulness in achieving agreement.

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes (US Verb Min/4) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 267. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:05 p. m. and adjourned at 4:50 p. m.

<sup>2</sup> Extracts from Casey's statement are printed in *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 53-58.

Government to be set up by elections should be based on principle of representation proportionate to population. Free atmosphere both before and during elections should be assured by appropriate guarantees and UN supervision. UNCURK is body already in Korea for express purpose of observing, helping and advising in conduct elections.

Needs of Korean people call for great rehabilitation efforts. Such have been made in past and no doubt will continue to be made. But only stability and security in Korea can assure real progress. To assure these is task of conference.

While North Korean proposals made by Nam Il are inadequate from Australia's point of view in a number of important points, proposal deserves careful examination. Clarification, however, should be furnished regarding following points:

1. Is membership in Joint Commission mentioned by Nam Il to be made proportionate to populations in North and South Korea? Australia thinks it should be.

2. How can free elections be assured without international supervision? Australia thinks Communist proposal that matter should be handled by Koreans themselves without interference is unrealistic in view bitterness which has grown up between two parts of country.

3. How can long delays in work of Joint Commission be avoided? How can deadlocks be broken? Will time limit be established within which Commission must complete preparatory work for holding elections?

North Korean proposal regarding withdrawal of troops deceptively simple. As Dulles pointed out, Chinese Communists would have much shorter distance to withdraw and could return in much shorter time than UN forces. While all desire early withdrawal, dangers over-hasty withdrawal have been demonstrated. Formula might be found so that withdrawal could begin at early date. Australia believes, however, that some units should stay until elections carried out. Provision could be made to assure that there would be no interference by troops in conduct of elections.

Chou En-lai, in effort to obscure facts of case, repeated charges that aggression in Korean war had been committed by South Korea and US. UN Commission observers on June 24, 1950 made field trip inspecting ROK dispositions along 38th parallel and reported that South Korean forces were not in position to launch wide-scale attack. While Commission unable to observe conditions in North Korea, subsequently captured Communist documents show that preparations for offensive had been made in North prior to attack.

Conference has two tasks before it: Solution of Korean and Indochinese problems. When war in Korea broke out, Communist aggression was already under way in Indochina although at that time of



different sort and on different scale. Hope that Korean war which provided first example in history of enforcement collective security will provide lesson for Communist World.

Molotov then took floor,<sup>3</sup> said: Geneva Conference can be said to be devoted to question of Asia. Both Korean question and that of Indochina are among most essential questions relating to Asia. Cannot help feeling conference hurt by fact that such Asiatic states as India, Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan, and other Asiatic countries not taking part in conference. At same time, shouldn't underestimate fact that for first time in recent years all great powers, France, Great Britain, US, Chinese People's Republic and Soviet Union are taking part in conference. Particular emphasis should be laid on fact that great power of Asia, Chinese People's Republic will be able to contribute.

First problem is to establish by peaceful means united and independent Korea. Stands to reason that solution of Korean problem primarily matter for Korean people themselves. No solution imposed upon Korean people by other countries can satisfy Korean people or contribute to lasting settlement Korean problem.

Korean people's struggle for independence went on for many years. Japanese imperialists seized Korea and turned peninsula into their principal stronghold for aggression against China and sought spread rule over whole of China and Southeast Asia. Under pretext of struggle against Communism they concluded anti-Comintern pact with Hitlerite Germany and schemed to divide world. Everyone remembers outcome.

Due to circumstances of military nature at end World War II Korea found itself divided into two parts. Problem of creating united, independent and democratic state not solved in immediate postwar years. ROK, however, succeeded in carrying out democratic reforms of paramount importance. This activity interrupted by war imposed from outside and brutal US military intervention under UN flag.

All countries seeking to reduce international tension are interested in peaceful solution Korean question. Cannot fail to notice, however, fact that under pressure exerted upon UN on part some states it adopted one-sided attitude and proved inability to settle Korean problem. False story of Korean events reiterated here by US representative has been repeatedly refuted and its falsity exposed by Soviet representative in UN.

When considering Korean question we cannot fail to take into account recent basic changes in political development Asiatic countries especially those taking place after World War II. For many years Asiatic countries were dominated by non-Asiatic states and other

---

<sup>3</sup> The text of Molotov's statement is printed in Cmd. 9186, pp. 24-29.

peoples were deprived of possibility of being masters of own fates. At present failure of attempts to apply old policy of colonialization becomes more and more obvious. 1917 Revolution in Russia and formation of USSR which broke with imperialist policy of Tsarism could not fail to encourage other peoples struggling for freedom and independence.

People with old-fashioned views are unable to grasp historical changes which have taken place in Asiatic countries and sometimes regard these developments in entirely false light. They are constantly on outlook for intrigues of Communists, agents of Kremlin, etc.; they attribute to Communism every movement of oppressed people toward freedom and national independence. As for views Soviet people, we make no secret of our sympathies and warm feelings for national liberation movement of peoples including those of Asia. Fundamental changes in Asia have their supreme example in China where democratic regime has been founded and economic, social, and political changes are taking place. Not to take this into account means not to reckon with events of greatest historical importance. Furthermore, who can deny that such country as India . . .<sup>4</sup> has entered historical arena. Importance of countries such as Indonesia, Burma, and others constantly being enhanced although process of establishing real independence not without struggles or difficulties in relations with some states.

No secret that firm and friendly relations have been established between USSR and CPR. Many other countries have also established relations with Chinese People's Republic. Britain is known to attach great importance to development of its relations with Chinese People's Republic. Also known that number of other countries have not established normal relations with Chinese People's Republic for sole reason that they are being prevented from doing so from without.

Open aggressive policy of US in regard to Chinese People's Republic is affecting whole situation in Asia. After establishment CPR one aggressive act after another has been taken against it. US ruling circles seized Taiwan and remnants Chiang clique masters of the island. They prevent CPR from taking legitimate place in UN, made UN pass resolution imposing embargo on trade with China, are making preparations for establishment Japanese armed forces thereby creating threat to China, charged China with aggression in Korea, are constantly threatening China's borders with invasion, etc. Under pretext of defending puppet regimes in Indochina, they have recently made plans to form military alliance in Southeast Asia although not one self-respecting Asian state proposes to participate.

---

<sup>4</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

Secretary Dulles' April 16 statement<sup>5</sup> calling loss of China mainland grave disaster and warning that loss of Southeast Asia and Pacific islands would compound this disaster shows how strong is desire follow old outworn colonial policy in some circles. His statement does not contain one word about international interest and rights of peoples of China, Southeast Asia, and Pacific islands.

Geneva Conference affords possibility of examining thoroughly those problems of Asia which have been recognized as the most urgent ones at present moment. Conference will be successful if it proceeds from principle that peoples of Asia have full right to settle their affairs themselves. Other states should assist Asian peoples by their friendly efforts.

Chou En-lai spoke about desirability of uniting efforts of Asian countries in securing peace in Asia. Soviet delegation fully in accord with that view. Delegation believes that North Korean proposals can serve as basis adoption [of adequate decision]<sup>6</sup> on Korean question.

DULLES

---

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to a statement made by Dulles on Apr. 15 in Syracuse, N.Y., on his return from London and Paris; the text is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 26, 1954, p. 623.

<sup>6</sup> The words inserted in brackets are taken from the minutes of the meeting.

---

795.00/4-2954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, April 29, 1954—8 p. m.

Dulte 27. Repeated information Brussels 7, Seoul unnumbered. For Acting Secretary from Secretary. Brussels for the Ambassador, Seoul info Ambassador and Dean. Spaak expressed to MacArthur this morning definite reservations regarding Republic of Korea proposal for elections in North Korea. He said North Koreans had countered with proposal to hold elections in all Korea. While North Korea conditions for such elections were quite unacceptable, Western European opinion would not believe Republic of Korea proposals for elections only in North Korea reasonable and he would not be able rally support for Republic of Korea proposal in Belgian Parliament. His information was that other Allied governments share this view. He felt that unity of non-Communists idea at Geneva was most essential objective of Geneva Conference from Western viewpoint, and expressed strong hope that Republic of Korea could be induced to counter with a proposal for all-Korean elections under effective supervision of United Nations. This would expose Soviet hand and make clear that failure to reach agreement on Korea was fault of Soviets. It would also pre-

serve full Allied unity and prevent Soviets from winning propaganda victory at Geneva.

I, therefore, asked Spaak to lunch with me. I explained to him in detail our problem with Rhee and the United Nations background and basis for the position put forward by Republic of Korea. I told Spaak I believe there is chance of getting Rhee to modify his position along lines of all-Korean elections under effective United Nations supervision, but that this was extremely delicate problem and would require time and most careful handling, in view of Rhee's oriental mentality and feeling that European countries were willing to sell him down river for advantages they might gain for themselves in Europe. I also explained we had sent Dean, in whom I had great confidence, to Korea to assist in handling Rhee.

DULLES

APRIL 30, 1954

795.00/4-3054

*MacArthur-Spaak Meeting, Geneva, April 30, 11:45 a. m.:  
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor (MacArthur)<sup>1</sup>*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, April 30, 1954.

I called on Mr. Spaak this morning at 11:45 pursuant to the Secretary's instructions. I said to Mr. Spaak that the Secretary had asked me to come to see him informally to lay before him a very serious problem and to seek his advice how best it might be met. I then described the problem in the following terms:

The Geneva Conference has been in session almost one full week and thus far not a single Western European country has made any statement at the Conference or attempted in any way to rebut the Soviet thesis. The Plenary sessions, I understood, were scheduled to end very soon. If some of the Western European countries do not make statements rebutting the Communist charges American Congressional and public opinion will most certainly interpret it as meaning that the Western European countries ask us to stand up and be counted with them whenever they are in difficulty and also ask us for all kinds of material and moral assistance, but at the same time they are unwilling to face up to the Soviets when purely European interests are not involved. This is not calculated to inspire confidence among the American people in the determination of Western Europe to stand together with the United States in attempting to prevent the Soviets from taking over not only Asia but also Europe. I thought there would be a direct effect on the Congressional support we could get for our

<sup>1</sup> The meeting took place in Spaak's suite in the Hotel Beau Rivage.

European policy. It would certainly reinforce all elements in America who wished to withdraw and adopt the "Fortress America" concept.

The second point which I wished to mention was the fact that Chou En-lai, because it is the first time he has spoken in any international gathering of this kind, had largely captured the headlines throughout the free world and also in Asia. If his accusations against the United Nations and general deformation of history were not rebutted, the Soviets would have the cheapest and most extensive propaganda victory in recent years. I felt we should recognize that the impact on public opinion of Geneva Conference would probably be its most important single outcome, just as had been the case of the Berlin Conference. As Mr. Spaak had said yesterday, we could not get agreements with the Soviets because they did not wish to reach reasonable agreements. To accept the Soviet and Chinese Communist declarations and statements at the conference table without rebutting them was certainly not calculated to gain the support of public opinion in the free world for what we were doing.

I said that I was not suggesting that Mr. Spaak get up and make a speech on the South Korean proposal for unification of Korea. I was fully aware of the difficulties which he would have in supporting the opening ROK proposal. What I was suggesting was that possibly himself and other Western European Foreign Ministers make statements attacking the false Soviet and Chinese charges against the United Nations and in general pointing out the total Communist distortion of history in their statements. I felt that both in terms of Western and Asiatic opinion, it was most important to develop the theme of Soviet imperialism which has manifested itself in the Eastern European satellites, East Germany, Austria, and also in North Korea and Indochina.

Mr. Spaak replied that he had not thought about the impact on American opinion of a failure of the Western European countries to stand up and speak. If it was our judgment that there would be such a reaction, it was essential that some of the Western European countries make statements. He had talked with most of his European colleagues including Mr. Eden and he had the strong impression that there was a feeling of lassitude and inutility in just a series of speeches rebutting the same old Soviet charges. There was however another point which made them instinctively shy away from making a statement. This was the fact that if they were to make a statement, it should be aimed at the problem which was the establishment of a unified, free, and independent Korea. The ROK had put forth a position which none of the Western countries liked. The North Koreans had countered with a plan calling for all-Korean elections. Actually under the present cir-

cumstances the North Korean plan which came second and could be construed as a counter proposal was really the basis for discussion. It was not in anybody's interest to have the North Korean proposal the basis of discussion and this was why it was so important to counter with a ROK proposal for all-Korean elections supervised by the UN. Mr. Spaak inquired whether Rhee would agree to such a plan by the beginning of next week. I said in my judgment there was no hope and that it would probably take at a minimum a week to bring Rhee around if indeed he could be brought around. Mr. Spaak said that under these circumstances he could make a speech along the lines which I had outlined, but it would be negative with respect to Korea, which he regretted. He said the problem now is to decide when he should speak. He is obliged to leave for Brussels tonight to meet with the other new Cabinet Ministers tomorrow<sup>2</sup> and Sunday morning, since the new Cabinet will be presenting itself to the parliament next Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday. If the Prime Minister agreed, he could possibly fly back to Geneva Monday morning, make his speech and return to Brussels Monday night. This would be a very difficult thing but he would be glad to see what could be done, and in any event he would be glad to come back next Thursday, May 6, if he could not get away on Monday. The Dutch Foreign Minister, who he said was due to arrive today, had sent him a message that he would not make any statement at Geneva unless Spaak did. The thing now to do was to get the Dutch to make a statement also, and he would be glad to approach the Dutch with us at the conference meeting this afternoon. He asked whether I would make such an approach with him. I said I would be glad to, although I thought the Secretary would wish to talk to him this afternoon and might wish to make the approach with him.

Mr. Spaak then said that he is totally unclear as to what is going to happen here at Geneva next week. Are there going to be restricted sessions on Korea? If there are, what is going to be the basis of the discussion of the Korean problem at such restricted sessions? Restricted sessions are pointless if each side simply rests on its present position, and to be very frank he said that the North Korean position, unless it was exposed for what it really was, was a much sounder position in terms of general public impression than the ROK position. He personally thought it was extremely unwise to have restricted sessions on Korea until the ROK's had some kind of a better position involving UN supervision for all-Korean elections. This however was simply his own personal thought. I said to him that if the Dutch would come along and we could get some other European countries to

---

<sup>2</sup> Saturday, May 1.

make statements rebutting the Communist charges, we could probably schedule two or three speeches for each day next week, and we might be able to consume several days. Mr. Spaak said that he thought it was better to engage in this process rather than to go into restricted sessions without adequate preparation and the best possible case. He wondered if several days next week could be taken up with procedural questions on Indochina. If this were not possible, maybe it would be preferable to recess for two to three days until we had a better position on Korea. He made clear that none of these were suggestions and that he was simply thinking out loud.

It was agreed that Secretary Dulles would see him at the meeting this afternoon to discuss:

1. When it seemed best for Spaak to speak next week (Monday or Thursday)
2. To approach the Dutch jointly to get them to make a statement
3. To exchange any further ideas which might be forthcoming on how the conference was to be handled next week.

---

790.5/4-3054 : Telegram

*Dulles-Eden Meeting, Geneva, April 30, 12:15 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY      GENEVA, April 30, 1954—8 p. m.

Dulte 33. Repeated information London 99. Eyes only for Acting Secretary. For President from Secretary. Eyes only Ambassador. Following is memorandum of conversation I had alone with Eden at his villa in Geneva at 12:15 p. m. on April 30:

I said to Mr. Eden that I was greatly disturbed over the present position and its bearing upon the cooperation of our two countries. We had, I thought, agreed to sit down with other directly interested countries to try to work out a common defense for the Southeast Asia area,<sup>1</sup> but now the British were unwilling to go ahead with the agreement which Eden and I had reached at London. On top of that was the fact that in the face of the vicious attacks by Molotov, Chou En-lai and Nam Il on the United States for what it had done in Korea, there was not a single Western European power which was prepared to get up and say a word in defense of the United Nations or United States position.<sup>2</sup> The only speakers on the non-Communist side had been South Korea, Colombia, the United States and Australia, and no one else was inscribed to speak.

---

<sup>1</sup> For documentation on this subject, see volume XII.

<sup>2</sup> See also the memorandum of conversation by Merchant on his meeting with Lester Pearson, Apr. 30, p. 626.

I said it was particularly galling to the United States to have to accept this attack on it as being an "imperialist" power. I said that the United States was eager to beat the Communists at their own game and to sponsor nationalism in the independent colonial areas, which was in accordance with our historic tradition, but that we were restrained from doing so by a desire to cooperate with Britain and France in Asia, in North Africa and in the Near and Middle East. This, however, did not seem to be paying any dividends because when the chips were down there was no cohesion between us. Here at Geneva we were presenting a pathetic spectacle of drifting without any agreed policy or purpose. The United States had presented a program which, after it had been apparently accepted, had been repudiated and there was no alternative offered.

I said as far as the Korean problem was concerned, we were being forced by our Western Allies to abandon our original position of backing the United Nations resolutions so that Western leaders could show how generous they were at South Korea's expense. I thought, however, that it was rather pathetic that we had to make our concessions to our Allies before even starting to negotiate with the Communists, where the concessions might have some negotiating value. If the effort to develop a united position with reference to Southeast Asia collapsed, we would be faced by the problem of going it alone. This would probably mean increasing the close relations with Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek, who, whatever their defects, were at least willing to stand strong against the Communists. I mentioned that there was considerable pressure for the United States to complete a mutual security treaty covering Formosa. This had been deferred and I felt that its negotiation at the time of the Geneva Conference and after my proposal for a united defense of Southeast Asia might be embarrassing. However, if there was to be no united defense for Southeast Asia and no agreed program for Geneva, then we would have to consider who there was upon whom we could depend.

I emphasized that despite what I gathered the British might have inferred from Radford's talks<sup>3</sup> the United States was not seeking either war with China or a large-scale intervention in Indochina. In fact, these were the two things we were seeking to avoid and thought could be avoided if we had a show of common strength.

I greatly feared that if I return to Washington under present conditions and had to meet with the Congressional committees and give explanations as to what had happened, the consequences would be disastrous for the close United Kingdom-United States relations which we wanted to maintain.

---

<sup>3</sup> For related documentation, see volume XIII.



Mr. Eden then handed me the memorandum,<sup>4</sup> a copy of which is annexed. He said that they had been working very hard to prevent the Colombo Conference from taking a strong anti-Western position, particularly in relation to Indochina, and he felt that they had been quite successful.

I referred to the paragraph in the United Kingdom memorandum calling for immediate and secret joint examination between the United States and the United Kingdom. I said that this might be useful, but certainly it would not be useful if that was all there was, because we had already invited other countries, such as Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand to share in creating a Southeast Asian defense; and the two first had definitely agreed and the two latter were interested. I also said I was confident we could not now rebuff them without serious consequences for the future. They would have to be brought in on some discussions, although probably not those of the intimate nature which were customary between the United States and the United Kingdom. I referred to the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty had developed progressively, the first conception being the Brussels Pact, then the addition of the United States and Canada, then the addition of Scandinavian countries, then the addition of Portugal and Italy, and most recently the addition of Greece and Turkey.<sup>5</sup> I said that surely any Southeast Asian arrangement would have to include at least Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, as well as the United States, the United Kingdom and France, and the Associated States; and I did not see why we could not get started with that nucleus and let it develop as seemed natural. Mr. Eden made no reply.

Mr. Eden then said that he felt that the Western powers had not participated in the general debate because they did not want to get tied to the South Korean election formula. I said that the issues in the general debate far transcended this rather minor technical point—that the burden of the speeches of Molotov and Chou En-lai had been that Asia was for the Asians, and that all Western influence should be eliminated, particularly that of the United States. Also, they had viciously attacked the United Nations, and made the most grotesque falsifications of history. Surely, I said, that presented issues to which the Western powers could address themselves if they believed in the United Nations and believed that the principle of solidarity extended beyond Europe. Mr. Eden said he would give thought to the possibility of his making some speech.

We then discussed the details of the Korean matter. I said I was not hopeless of the possibility of an agreement, because we had an asset to

<sup>4</sup> For the text, see volume XII.

<sup>5</sup> For documentation on NATO, see volume v.

use that we had not had in Berlin. At Berlin we could not pull out United States and United Kingdom troops because this would collapse the forward strategy of NATO. In Korea there was no general Allied strategy, and United States troops could be pulled out in exchange for a united Korea, which would have sufficient demilitarization in the North so as to constitute no threat to Vladivostok and Port Arthur. Mr. Eden suggested that we might have a restricted meeting of the Four inviting powers, plus China and North Korea and South Korea to try to get into this matter before I left. I said I would not be indisposed to have such a meeting on Saturday afternoon.<sup>6</sup>

I told Mr. Eden that I was seeing Molotov at 11 on Saturday morning on the atomic energy matter.<sup>7</sup> I was disposed not to seek a joint communiqué which would indicate that the President's plan had been rejected. I felt that to throw this in the present international situation would greatly aggravate and deteriorate affairs, and would particularly cause a deep resentment in the United States. Mr. Eden agreed to this handling of the matter.

I reminded Mr. Eden that I had had no reply from him with reference to our economic aid to Egypt.<sup>8</sup> He said he would talk to me about this before I left.

DULLES

---

<sup>6</sup> May 1.

<sup>7</sup> For related documentation, see volume II.

<sup>8</sup> For related documentation, see volume X.

---

396.1 GE/4-3054 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

SECRET

SEOUL, April 30, 1954—2 p. m.

29. Sent Department 1093, repeated information Tokyo 646. Tokyo pass CINCUNC exclusive for General Hull. Geneva for Secretary from Dean. Have read with much interest Pyun's, Nam II's, Secretary's, and Chou En-lai's speeches and résumé of Johnson's briefing of second regular meeting deputy representatives of 16.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Telegram Secto 29 from Geneva, Apr. 29, repeated to Seoul for information as telegram 14, reported on the second regular meeting of the deputy representatives of the 16. Extracts from this telegram read as follows:

"At second regular meeting deputy representatives of 16 Johnson opened with analysis North Korean proposal presented yesterday (Secto 18). He pointed up striking similarity between North Korean proposal and Soviet proposal at Berlin on Germany and analyzed reasons it unacceptable, emphasizing equating of North and South Korean Governments and fact equal representation for them gives veto to Communists in unification process.

"Yang (ROK) agreed proposal totally unacceptable and pointed out similarity to Communist proposal June 19, 1950 as well as Berlin proposal. He summarized ROK objections as: (1) It merely creates coalition government which unwork-

Would appreciate being advised as soon as conditions warrant what your current thinking is on our probable alternate proposal for achieving unification and whether we should now be trying to orient President's thinking accordingly.

At present time he heartily approves of Pyun's and Secretary's speech on unification. Despite what Secretary told Pyun, we have hesitated to discuss with President possibility of holding elections for National Assembly in South as well as in North under UN supervision.

In an informal meeting with President on Tuesday<sup>2</sup> he somewhat emotionally and tearfully pleaded for permission to allow Korean delegation to come home and quite apparently is afraid he will be asked to whittle down Pyun's present position. We were able to change subject without discussing it and emotion passed. Mention only as showing his state of mind and current state negotiations here and reluctance embark in new discussions unless we are fairly clear route we are going, the timing of troop withdrawals, etc.

With May 20 elections for National Assembly approaching and criticism by opposition party and possibly UNCURK of extent to which candidates are free to file and to run, he will probably resist any formula for the holding of elections for Assembly all over again in the South under UN supervision unless he is really convinced all-over national elections in both North and South will really facilitate workable non-Communist unification in best interests of country. Would appreciate guidance along following lines as soon as feasible :

1. Your probable timing on any new or alternate proposal.
2. When we should broach such proposal to President.
3. General lines such proposal may take.

Apart from discussion of your number 5 to Seoul<sup>3</sup> last Monday, want you to know conversations so far have been very general, and to inquire whether you have any suggestions for guidance. Present plans are to leave here next Friday<sup>4</sup> for Tokyo returning by way of Honolulu and San Francisco.

BRIGGS

---

able. (2) Provision for troop withdrawal purposely vague and unrelated unification process; simultaneous withdrawal unacceptable to ROK. (3) Did not provide for UN supervision.

"Yang raised question whether general agreement existed on UN program for unification as basis our position, to which there was no dissent. In this connection, Johnson observed that we already have plan for unification as presented by Pyun yesterday and it is primarily question of when to table it in more specific form. Meeting agreed heads delegations should meet soon to reach decision this point."  
(396.1 GE/4-2854)

<sup>2</sup> Apr. 27.

<sup>3</sup> Dated Apr. 26. p. 140.

<sup>4</sup> May 7.

396.1 GE/4-3054 : Telegram

*Fifth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, April 30, 3:05 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, April 30, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 57. Repeated information Seoul 23 Tokyo 15 London 101 Paris 158 Moscow 31 Oslo 2. Tokyo for CINCUNC. Department pass Defense, CINCPAC, COMSAC. Only speakers at short Fifth Plenary Session today over which Molotov presided were Cevat Acikalin of Turkey and Prince Wan of Thailand. In opening speech<sup>2</sup> Acikalin stressed importance UN action Korea in terms upholding principle of collective security and support UN decisions. Pointing out modern science has so shrunk world that security individual nation depends on security all nations, Acikalin said our sons who fought on battlefields of Korea serve not only common cause but also cause of own countries. While sacrifices in Korea resulted goal we set out achieve, "glorious martyred Korea" ruined by war still awaits justice. Our duty is restoration united free and independent Korea in conformity with UN resolutions to which we solemnly committed. Any other approach betrays justice and harms organization which guarantees our own security. Asserting Turkish delegation could not accept proposals by North Korean delegation which disregarded UN authority and would tend create chaotic situation likely bring about communist designs which resolute UN action has prevented, Acikalin expressed hope those who caused the ills have learned the lesson of events and will take the road we are determined to follow.

Stressing Thailand's firm support of UN as demonstrated its quick response to call for military and economic assistance ROK, Prince Wan declared Thai people understood significance UN action Korea, which turned principle collective security from abstract idealism to living reality.<sup>3</sup> Stating that task of conference was to conclude permanent peace in Korea, Wan quoted from Berlin resolution statement that establishment united independent Korea important factor in reducing international tensions and restoring peace in other parts of Asia. He cited Indochina as part of Asia in which Thailand "particularly interested as close neighbor and adjacent country."

Stressing that Thailand, particularly as Asian country strongly favored principle that "Asian people should form united independent

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/5) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 267. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:05 p. m. and adjourned at 3:40 p. m.

<sup>2</sup> The text of Acikalin's statement is printed in *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 58-59.

<sup>3</sup> Extracts from Prince Wan's statement are printed *ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

states not divided in any way or subject to colonialism or imperialism in any form, old or new", Wan pointed out Thailand has kept independence throughout colonial period because pursued open-door policy granting equal opportunities for all powers and cooperating with them. In apparent but unspoken reference Chou En-lai and Molotov's speech, Wan declared: "Thailand, no less than other Asian nations, considers that peace in Asia should be ensured, that the independence and sovereignty of Asian nations should be respected and that the national rights and freedom of the Asian peoples should be safeguarded"; but added not necessary that good Asian be exclusive Asian, but to contrary Thai national experience indicated to be good Asian as well as good European, American or African, one has to cooperate peacefully with other nations organized in world community of free nations. Peace is world-wide, one and indivisible. Thus Thailand cooperates with US, UK and French as well as Southeast Asian neighbors with view promoting peace in that part of world. In closing Wan stated key to solution Korean question could be found in adapting and applying to present situation UNGA resolution of October 7, 1950.

*Comment:* Though short both speeches today gave strong support to principle collective security and to idea solution Korean problem along lines UN resolutions. Thai speech especially effective as answer to Chou En-lai pretense speak for peoples of Asia.

Following speeches, Molotov stated general agreement next plenary session May 3 and that only speaker inscribed was ROK delegate.

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/4-3054 : Telegram

*Robertson-Johnson-Pyun Meeting, Geneva, April 30, Afternoon: The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, April 30, 1954—10 p. m.

22. Repeated information Department Secto 58. For Briggs and Dean. Robertson and Johnson saw Pyun this afternoon with regard to proposal that there be restricted meeting of 7 (US, ROK, UK, and France from our side, and USSR, Communist China and North Korea from other side) to probe Communist intentions with regard Korean settlement. We told Pyun other side had indicated willingness to have such a meeting and we were inclined to feel it would be worthwhile, particularly before the Secretary's departure, in order make maximum effort determine whether any intent by other side reach settlement acceptable to ROK and US. However, before reaching decision US desired discuss with Pyun. If, as anticipated, others of 16 agreeable, restricted meeting will probably take place afternoon May 1. We told

Pyun that at such a meeting Secretary would expect make it explicitly clear that we could not compromise on principle of elections under UN auspices, while stating we saw no reason that elections need be held other than in North Korea, that question of withdrawal foreign troops subject some scope in negotiations and possibility of demilitarized zone on both sides northern boundaries could be considered. We made it clear to Pyun that Secretary would be speaking entirely for US and would not commit ROK. This presentation would be in very general terms and designed so as to elicit Communist reactions and thus obtain some indication their intent. We indicated to Pyun the necessity for flexible position with respect scope of elections; but he made no comment except the necessity of not making "concessions" except in return for concessions from the other side.

Pyun stated he had no objection to such a meeting and that he "now" had entire confidence US not going to "sell ROK down the river". Pyun exhibited little interest in presentation Secretary would make at meeting and turned conversation to Indochina disclaiming any ROK interest, but pointing out disadvantages to US in reaching settlement too quickly in Korea, thus closing that front and releasing Chinese forces for use in Indochina.

He expressed view Communists anxious to reach settlement in Korea and professed fear Communists would accept present US-ROK unification proposal, thus forcing us into "premature" settlement in Korea before Indochina question is settled.

Pyun stated he had been approached on two occasions by number two man North Korean delegation in apparent attempt arrange meeting between Pyun and Nam Il. Pyun stated he replied that as it was hard to get out beyond the Iron Curtain, North Korean delegation should defect. Pyun stated in speech he proposes to make Monday at plenary, he will offer amnesty to North Koreans. He added he was doing this without authorization from Rhee and that if he could not "deliver" he would quit.

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/4-3054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

GENEVA, April 30, 1954—5 p. m.

20. Repeated information Department Secto 48. For Briggs and Dean. As you will have noted from meeting of 16 yesterday (Secto 40, repeated Seoul 17<sup>1</sup>) there is strong feeling basic terms our side

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Apr. 29, p. 155.

for Korean unification should shortly be presented. In spite its fake aspects, North Korean proposal leading off with call for all-Korean elections, has captured headlines. Other delegations, also giving only very grudging support or keeping silent on proposal for elections only North Korea (Plan A<sup>2</sup>). Working group of 9 met today<sup>3</sup> and engaged in only general discussion, concentrating largely on finally successful dissuasion of Philippines from putting forth plan in speech today providing for "neutral international supervision" of elections for a "constitutional convention". Philippines has now withdrawn name and plan to speak Monday along more acceptable lines. However, without making commitment at this time on exact timing and method of presentation, believe we should immediately make effort to obtain Rhee's agreement to "Plan B",<sup>4</sup> which will probably be tabled in meeting of 9 tomorrow and shortly thereafter transmitted to Rhee by Pyun.

If you have any question on desirability this timing or suggestions re handling from this end, would appreciate receiving soonest.

DULLES

<sup>2</sup> See GK D-4/7, Apr. 9, p. 82.

<sup>3</sup> A report on this meeting is contained in telegram Secto 59, Apr. 30, from Geneva, not printed (396.1 GE/4-3054).

<sup>4</sup> See GK D-4/10, Apr. 16, p. 105.

MAY 1, 1954

396.1 GE/5-154 : Telegram

*Third Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, May 1, 10:05 a. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 1, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 60. Repeated information Seoul 25, Tokyo 17, London 104, Paris 161, Moscow 33. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense. This morning Secretary held chief delegates meeting to discuss suggestion for restricted meeting this afternoon of ROK, US, UK, France our side and USSR, Communist China and North Korea other side. Secretary referred to previous discussion among 16 of restricted meeting and repeated purpose would be try put discussion of Korean unification on more realistic basis. Secretary explained we would not present any position at small meeting but would suggest possible breakdowns into several major phases. Purpose of meeting would be discuss what would be most effective consideration these phases which are as follows: (1) Elections to be under UN auspices; (2) scope and character of elections; (3) disposition foreign troops in Korea;

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/3) from which the time of the meeting is taken is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting, at which Dulles presided, adjourned at 10:25 a. m.

(4) provision to protect Korean independence, including demilitarization of border area. After further comments by Secretary, Pyun and Eden no objection was expressed to holding smaller session and meeting adjourned.

Re scope elections Secretary said he feels strongly, and hoped 16 would agree, any concessions should be made in negotiations with Communists and not in free world offers. If there is any chance serious negotiation Korean unification and independence as he still thinks there is slight possibility, our side should not bargain away everything at once. However if conference is nothing more than propaganda show then we might put our best position forward first. If there is to be serious negotiation we should keep trading points in reserve as long as there is some hope of having the conference produce formula for unified Korea. Secretary said our two main trading points are scope of elections and removal foreign forces. He feels small group is necessary to feel out whether there is any possibility negotiations produce at Geneva genuine results.

Eden agreed on usefulness of smaller meeting for negotiations. Regarding scope of elections, he said UK would not say anything more about it until we see what happens in restricted meeting.

Pyun said he agreed with all of Secretary's remarks. ROK is prepared for small compromise in return for compromises from Communists. He emphasized it was not safe to show our hand before other side.

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/5-254 : Telegram

*Restricted Session of the Seven Powers on Korea, Geneva, May 1, 3:30 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 2, 1954—11 a. m.

Secto 69. Repeated information Seoul 31, London 106, Paris 166, Tokyo 19, Moscow 37. Pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Restricted meeting held yesterday afternoon in small conference room at Palais from 3:30 p. m. to 6:00 p. m. Secretary, Pyun, Bidault, Eden, Nam Il, Chou En-lai and Molotov present, each accompanied by three or four

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (SP Verb Min/1) is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The seven powers in attendance were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Republic of Korea, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This was the only restricted session held on Korea.



assistants. General Smith, Robertson and Johnson accompanied Secretary. Secretary suggested and Molotov agreed to Eden as informal chairman on basis his turn chairman of the day. Seating was informal, non-Communist group contiguous.

At opening Secretary expressed satisfaction ability hold informal talks on assumption all were seriously seeking solution to problem faced by conference. Secretary then distributed "memorandum of principal points to be resolved in connection with the creation of a united and independent Korea"<sup>2</sup> containing following:

(1) Elections to be under UN auspices; (2) scope and character of elections; (3) disposition of foreign troops in Korea; (4) provision to protect Korean independence, including the demilitarization of border areas. The Secretary stated that these points seemed to be controversial aspects which would have to be resolved. In explanation memorandum, stated there seemed to be agreement on election some sort in some area, and it was important they be under auspices of UN. Whether the elections be only in North Korea or be nation-wide in scope was one of points of difference. We thought elections only in North Korea were required.

Then there was a question of foreign troops in Korea; that is, the UN forces in the south and the Chinese Communist forces in North Korea, and what should be done about them and the timing of their evacuation if they were to be evacuated in whole or in part.

There was then question of when Korea had achieved unity and independence, how maintenance could best be assured. In this regard might include demilitarization border areas both sides so as prevent any sudden attack and maintenance of no troops in areas having proximity to sensitive areas on either side.

Secretary then welcomed any suggestions as to whether this useful analysis, questions possibly being discussed in the order suggested, in some other order, or simultaneously in subcommittees.

Molotov stated he believed would be useful hear views North and South Korea. Nam Il then made long statement along lines his statement in plenary, rejecting any international supervision or observation of elections reiterating North Korean proposal and stressing elections throughout Korea, and withdrawal of foreign forces, stationing of any foreign troops in Korea being "foreign interference", UN and Chinese forces to be withdrawn "simultaneously" within six months. In this statement and several other times during course of meeting he asked how "renewal of war is to be prevented" if foreign troops not withdrawn.

Pyun stated preferred hear others before making statement. Molotov then made statement referring his speech at plenary and reiterating

---

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

support of North Korean proposals, stressing Korean problem should be solved by Koreans themselves. He stated all foreign troops should be withdrawn "at least three months before elections". Chou En-lai then made statement supporting North Korean proposals saying that "they could become basis for discussion in reaching agreement". Criticized Secretary's memorandum on basis did not list divergent views nor include "concrete proposals". He repeated line on Koreans solving own problems and all-Korean elections, rejecting elections under UN auspices or while foreign forces in Korea. He reiterated Nam Il's statement withdrawal of forces should be within set time limit and simultaneously.

At close Chou statement Bidault asked how volunteers could be withdrawn "when they have not been sent". Chou replied with some heat Mr. Bidault failed recall armistice was signed on our side by UNC and on other side by DPRK and Chinese People's volunteers and that if armistice valid, why would agreement for withdrawal troops not be valid?

Molotov then made reference belligerent status UN in Korea and rejected elections under auspices of UN. At this point Secretary referred to draft Soviet resolution October 2, 1950,<sup>3</sup> observing that at that time Soviet Union apparently saw no incompatibility in UN having forces in Korea and its ability observe elections in Korea. Molotov obviously caught by surprise and did not recall resolution. After Secretary passed him our copy there was prolonged huddle in Soviet delegation while resolution being translated for Molotov and discussed. During huddle by Soviets, Eden made statement that while it was inescapable UN was party to dispute in Korea, everybody recognized elections must be supervised. Mentioned precedents for UN supervision and stated there must be UN supervision "in some form or other" if results to commend themselves to world opinion.

During this period Chou reiterated belligerent status UN in Korea, stating Communist China and DPRK "had no relation to UN" and stated if DPRK proposal accepted, question "representation DPRK in UN would not arise until after establishment unified Korea". During course of meeting Chou several times reiterated "this conference has nothing to do with UN".

Molotov finally replied Secretary's query by stating October 2, 1950 Soviet resolution had "provided indispensable participation of states bordering on Korea" and asked whether it was "now a question of such a commission". In reply Secretary stated question could possibly

---

<sup>3</sup> Dulles was referring to U.N. document A/C.1/567; for documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, pp. 835 ff.

be discussed, but in meanwhile Chinese Communist regime had been declared aggressor, and therefore probably disqualified itself for such a role. Molotov replied with some heat branding UN resolution as "shameful, unjust and taken behind back of China", thereby disqualifying UN for any role in elections.

Chou then made flat statement that Korean war started by US, which also occupied Formosa and therefore US was aggressor. Passage of UN resolution had made UN lose moral authority. Eden replied UK could never accept fact disarmed South Korea had attacked North Korea or that US, which had withdrawn its troops from Korea had somehow become aggressor, and former UK Government had voted for resolution because it considered it in accordance with facts.

Pyun then asked whether commission proposed by North Koreans contemplated representation by population ratio or equally between north and south, pointing out population South Korea above 24 million, and asking Nam Il for population North Korea. By persistent questioning Pyun finally obtained clear statement from Nam Il that representation on commission would be equal between north and south and any decisions would require agreement both sides. Nam Il gave no answer on North Korean population.

Toward close of meeting Pyun made careful and reasoned statement reiterating ROK position, to which Nam Il and Chou replied and Pyun rejoined, there being considerable fencing as to who would have last word.

Secretary stated meeting had been "enlightening to US" but that he could not say he had been encouraged.

Eden expressed opinion had not gotten very far, to which Molotov replied that there had been "little effort toward getting together".

It was agreed no decision as to any further meeting would be taken until plenary Monday.<sup>4</sup> It was agreed that in pattern restricted meetings at Berlin, no statement would be made to press other than fact meeting had been held and countries attending. Secretary stated Eden would brief other 12 on confidential basis.

Meeting to brief 12 on today's meeting scheduled 10 a. m. Monday. In meantime US liaison officers will, as occasion arises, informally inform other delegations negative results of meeting.

*Comment:* No cracks apparent in solid Communist front nor slightest indication any willingness whatever modify their positions. Molotov was obviously sitting back letting Chou and Nam Il take the lead.

DULLES

---

<sup>4</sup> May 3.

MAY 2, 1954

396.1 GE/5-254 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

SECRET      NIACT

SEOUL, May 2, 1954—noon.

36. Sent niact Department 1102; repeated information Tokyo 647. For the Secretary from Dean. Re Embtel 1101, May 1.<sup>1</sup> We saw President Rhee early this morning in effort to prepare ground for substantive meeting tomorrow. Mentioned attitude some of our Allies toward necessity simultaneous elections under UN auspices in both North and South, and also interest of Geneva in press reports from here re alleged pressure on local opposition candidates. After much consideration, decided against spending real effort trying to get him to correct present alleged abuses in connection May 20 election on ground if successful we will have militated against his acceptance our Plan B which we intend outline in some detail tomorrow. He plans troop inspection away from Seoul today and believe this morning not propitious.

We also summarized developments fifth plenary (your telegram 23)<sup>2</sup> and told Rhee of plan hold restricted meeting yesterday May 1 (your telegram 22)<sup>3</sup> and that Pyun might be cabling him for instructions. He is very confident complete moral probity own party and complete sinfulness of opposition. Further believes only necessary for US and Korea to stand together. Constantly harps on fact colonialism is over in Asia and French and British are through, so why get excited over what they think. Will do level best to sell him Plan B tomorrow.

BRIGGS

---

<sup>1</sup> The text of this message read as follows :

"Re your 20 April 30. Have no question desirability and will arrange see Rhee soonest and do best obtain his approval plan 'B'. He dislikes Sunday conferences so Monday probably earliest." (396.1 GE/5-154)

<sup>2</sup> See telegram Secto 57, Apr. 30, p. 170.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed; concerning the restricted session, see telegram Secto 69, May 2, *supra*.

396.1 GE/5-254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 2, 1954—6 p. ni.

32. Repeated information priority Department Secto 72. For Briggs and Dean. Re: Secto 48 (Seoul 20)<sup>1</sup> and Secto 59 (Seoul 24).<sup>2</sup> In view

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Apr. 30, p. 172.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 173.

preliminary discussion among 16 and in working committee on counter plans, we have drafted tentative proposals along lines plan B. Text draft paper below. Have not shown to ROK or any other delegation.

Appreciate your views soonest on draft paper. Also if your discussions with Rhee on plan B warrant, suggest you inform him tentative contents draft paper for his comments and general approval if possible for developing plan with 16 and using in conference as situation develops.

Would give USDel strong hand and help us direct and control negotiating situation if US and ROK together take initiative among 16 on draft papers. Appropriate time and auspices for use such proposals in conference not yet discussed with ROK or other delegates. Draft paper contains essential principles on UN observation, elections, and troop withdrawal, but leaves room for changes on formulation of specifics if negotiations should develop at this stage, we have advantage UK and French views apparently similar to our plan B. They include specific reference UNCURK, elections within ROK constitutional structure, and permissive provision for assembly amend ROK constitution. Provision for UNCURK not unalterable if other satisfactory form UN auspices developed. But, UK and French delegates agree proposals should begin with UNCURK.

Bracketed phrases in part II A<sup>3</sup> of draft paper designed to get ROK reaction in first instance to questions scope and purpose of elections. If brackets deleted, believe proposals certain get general allied backing. USDel as yet still reserve position on these two points pending discussions with ROK.

Text draft paper follows:

Draft proposals for the establishment of a united and independent Korea.

In conformity with the United Nations resolutions of peaceful settlement of Korean question, establishment of united and independent Korea should be achieved in following manner:

### *I. Responsibilities for supervision and observation*

Establishment of united and independent Korea through holding of free elections and withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, within time schedule set forth below, should be observed and certified, in manner set forth below, by United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), established by resolution of United Nations General Assembly of October 7, 1950.

---

<sup>3</sup> Printed as parentheses in the source text which is the copy repeated to the Department.

## II. *Free elections in Korea*

*a.* Within period of blank months from adoption of these proposals, during which necessary conditions for free elections should be assured, there should be held (throughout Korea) elections for (the president and) National Assembly of unified Korea.

*b.* Representation in National Assembly should be in direct proportion to population (of citizenry of Korea).

*c.* Elections should be based on universal adult suffrage (by all citizens of Korea).

*d.* Elections should be in secret and held in conditions of genuine freedom (throughout Korea) in Korea.

*e.* Elections should be supervised and observed and results certified by United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. This Commission should insure that safeguards for free elections are observed and that elections are properly conducted.

Commission should propose, and appropriate authorities in Korea should put into effect, any changes in applicable election laws which Commission considers necessary to assure free elections in accordance with these proposals. Commission should certify that such elections are valid expression of free will of people of Korea.

*f.* Conditions of genuine freedom and applicable election laws should include following guarantees:

- Freedom of movement in Korea;
- Freedom of presentation of candidates;
- Immunity of candidates;
- Freedom from arbitrary arrest or victimization;
- Freedom of association and political meetings;
- Freedom of expression for all;
- Freedom of press, radio and free circulation of newspapers, periodicals, etc;
- Secrecy of vote;
- Security of polling stations and ballot boxes;

*g.* All authorities within Korea should cooperate fully in ensuring that elections are properly conducted under necessary safeguards and to that end should provide UNCURK with all necessary assistance and facilities and freedom to move, observe and consult in Korea.

## III. *Formation of an All-Korean Government*

*a.* Immediately after elections, National Assembly should be convened and government formed for the whole of Korea in accordance with the constitution. Government so formed would then become sole legitimate government of Korea.

*b.* Constitution of Republic of Korea should remain in force except as it may be superseded or amended by National Assembly acting in constituent session when convened following elections.

#### IV. *Withdrawal of foreign forces*

As integral part of reunification of Korea, mutually-phased withdrawal of foreign forces should be completed within twelve months after all-Korean government has assumed authority. Withdrawal will be coordinated with both sides by UNCURK. Withdrawals should begin during a 90-day period immediately prior to holding of elections on date to be announced by UNCURK. Withdrawals, observed and verified by UNCURK, will proceed in accordance with prearranged schedules and will be effected through ports of entry prescribed in armistice agreement.

#### V. *International provision for security unified Korea*

At time of formation of all-Korean government countries concerned in this agreement, and countries neighboring Korea, should pledge their respect for territorial integrity and political independence of unified Korea in conjunction with declaration by unified government of Korea to undertake to abide by purposes and principles of United Nations Charter in its international relations. Countries bordering on Korea should work out with government of unified Korea arrangements for guaranteeing security of those borders. Unified Korea should have authority to assume such existing rights and obligations and to conclude such agreements as it may wish.

#### VI. *Rehabilitation of Korea*

After formation of all-Korean government in accordance with above provisions, there should be developed and carried out international program of relief and rehabilitation for all Korea to which all countries so desiring may contribute. Such program should be developed in consultation with all-Korean government.

#### VII. *Concluding stages*

Armistice agreement should be modified as appropriate to implement the above provisions for establishing united and independent Korea. Armistice agreement should be considered superseded in accordance with paragraph 62 of that agreement when UNCURK certifies that (a) an all-Korean government has been established with effective control over all of Korea as result of free and secret elections expressing valid will of people and (b) all foreign forces have been withdrawn from Korea in accordance with an agreement thereon.

UNCURK should submit final report to General Assembly of United Nations on completion of above stages. Thereafter, UNCURK should confine its activities to such responsibilities in connection with observation of independence and security of unified Korea as may be determined by General Assembly.

MAY 3, 1954

396.1 GE/5-354

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Technical Secretary of the United States Delegation (Van Hollen)*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 3, 1954.<sup>2</sup>

Participants:	The Secretary	Ambassador Johnson
	The Under Secretary	Mr. Phleger
	Mr. Robertson	Mr. Young

Subject: Guidance on Korea and Indochina Phases of Geneva Conference

*Korean Phase*

*Support for UN*—Ambassador Johnson asked the Secretary for guidance on the future of the Korean phase of the Conference, pointing out that all plenary speeches would probably be completed by Wednesday or Thursday<sup>3</sup> and that last Saturday's restricted session had not indicated any flexibility in the Communist position. Although it was hoped that the Allied side would be in a position to put forth a positive position—Plan B—within a short time, it did not appear that there was much likelihood or practicability of continuing the Korean phase for an extended period.

Mr. Robertson said that the Communists would probably press for the "international supervision" of elections in Korea as distinguished from elections under "UN supervision". He felt it important that we clearly specify to our Allies that we were insistent upon UN supervision, otherwise our Allies would urge us to accept "neutralist" countries as members of a supervisory commission. Ambassador Johnson agreed but pointed out that UN supervision of elections would not necessarily preclude the possibility of the USSR, India, or other similar countries serving on a supervisory commission.

The Secretary stated that we should stand firm on the proposition that the Geneva Conference should not degenerate into a repudiation of the United Nations. Although the Communists would say that the UN had intervened in the war in Korea, that such intervention was outrageous, etc., it was of utmost importance that the UN be upheld.

<sup>1</sup>The source text indicates that Van Hollen was the drafting officer for the memorandum, although he is not listed as being one of the participants.

<sup>2</sup>The meeting must have taken place in the morning of May 3. The minutes of the meeting of 16, cited in footnote 1, *infra*, indicate that Eden left to bid farewell to Dulles who was leaving Geneva around midday and did not return for the balance of the Conference.

<sup>3</sup>May 5-6.



In fact, the issue of the UN and the entire concept of collective security was a much bigger issue at the conference than Korea. Should the conference end with a repudiation of the United Nations, the results could be tragic and actually lead to the end of the UN itself. While the Allies might attempt to derogate from the position of the UN, it was important that the US urge its Allies to continue to give strong support to the UN principle.

*General U.S. Position*—The Secretary agreed that the U.S. should adhere to a general position which would provide for the holding of all-Korean elections within the framework of the ROK constitution and under UN supervision. He felt we should take this position and stand on it.

*Allied Proposal*—Pointing out that the French wanted to have each country put up a proposal in its own name with the right of other delegations to comment on or amend such proposals, Mr. Phleger said that it was important that all Allied delegations reach agreement on a single proposal and that they stand together in support of this proposal. With reference to an Allied proposal, the Secretary felt the Communists would reject any supervised elections because of the repercussions of the acceptance of such supervision in Germany. On the question of supervised elections, the Communists would have Germany in mind, while the Allies should keep Indochina in mind.

*Second Phase*—Ambassador Johnson explained that when it is apparent that the unification efforts at Geneva had failed, we would be under considerable pressure, particularly from the British, to enter into some type of "second phase" in Korea. The British have in mind (1) a possible withdrawal of troops from their present positions and the establishment of a 40-50 mile buffer zone; (2) a ROK-North Korean transportation and communication arrangement; (3) customs union. Mr. Young added that if reunification failed at Geneva, the British also were thinking in terms of some type of permanent sub-commission, composed of the so-called "Big Five" plus the ROK and North Korea, which would be set up following Geneva in order to ameliorate tension between the two sides. It was generally agreed that such attempts to establish a *modus vivendi* between the ROK and the North Koreans would prove completely unacceptable to the ROK.

Mr. Phleger suggested that rather than say that the Geneva Conference had failed or consider the establishment of a "second phase", it would be advisable to refer the entire Korean question back to the UN, with an indication that the matter had always been before the UN and was, therefore, simply being sent back to the UN for further consideration.

[Here follows the remainder of the conversation which dealt with the Indochinese phase of the Conference; for the text, see page 670.]

---

396.1 GE/5-354 : Telegram

*Fourth Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, May 3, 11:10 a. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 3, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 84. Repeated information Seoul 33, Tokyo 20, London 115, Paris 180, Moscow 39. Department pass Defense; Tokyo pass CINC-UNC. Fourth meeting chief delegates held this morning with General Smith presiding. Eden summarized Saturday's restricted meeting. He pointed out Molotov and Chou very sensitive on point of UN supervision elections; Pyun had successfully elicited Nam Il's views on North Korean proposals; and restricted meeting definitely useful showing clearly where representatives stood.

General Smith said even in light his experience negotiating with Russians he was surprised at vehemence against allies and particularly US at restricted meeting. He emphasized it would be policy US delegation meet false allegations and slander and solicited support other delegations. He also emphasized Secretary's view Communist assault on UN is serious and grave challenge to its integrity, good faith and future, and he solicited defense of UN from among delegations.

Considerable discussion followed on next steps in Korean conference. Eden pointed out question of future restricted meetings had been left open on Saturday so that matter could be reported back to heads of delegations for their consideration. Consensus of opinion: (1) Communist allegations and distortions should be countered; (2) important formulate definitive allied position soon as possible; and (3) this week's proceedings might develop with two or three plenary sessions, their [*then?*] postponement for no speakers until Friday<sup>2</sup> when allied proposals can be laid on line, completion of draft proposals by committee of nine, possibly another restricted small meeting, and possible informal discussion among certain delegations on preparations for Indochina phase.

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/4) from which the time of the meeting is taken is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting adjourned at 12:15 p. m.

<sup>2</sup> May 7.

Commonwealth delegates and Garcia (Philippines) emphasized lack concrete proposals puts allied delegations in awkward and difficult position. They urged definitive allied position soon as possible. Zuleta (Colombia) pointed out certain consultations were needed before allied proposals could be developed, and suggested committee of nine complete its work, plenary sessions be reduced, and interim be used counter Communist proposals. General Smith agreed weakness our present position is its purely negative character, pointed out time and difficulties faced in concerting among 16 governments, reported consultations proceeding in Seoul, and urged that committee of nine complete its business as rapidly as feasible. Acikalin (Turkey), while agreeing usefulness small restricted meetings to grasp root of other side's intentions, cautioned against permitting impression question of Korea is being dealt with only by great powers and China. General Smith and Eden agreed small meetings consultative only and all allied delegations should make publicly clear big powers not deciding Korean issue. Acikalin endorsed categorical refutation Communist distortions to improve our present position re public opinion.

Pyun said absolutely necessary develop common approach to Korean problem but also essential study Communist proposals item by item to formulate our definite position on which Communist terms we can accept or which not. He suggested plenary sessions could be used analyze Communist proposals. Pyun said ROK would reject North Korean proposals because they (1) set up All-Korea Commission superseding ROK and establishing coalition and (2) eliminate UN altogether by substitution international organization of their own.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/5-354

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Calhoun)*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 3, 1954.

Participants: Foreign Minister Pyun, ROK Delegation  
 Ambassador Ben Limb, ROK Delegation  
 Ambassador Johnson, United States Delegation  
 Mr. Robertson, United States Delegation  
 Mr. Young, United States Delegation  
 Mr. Calhoun, United States Delegation

Subject: ROK Intention to Submit New Proposal to Plenary Session, May 3.

Following a telephone conversation between Mr. Robertson and Foreign Minister Pyun in which Mr. Robertson sought to dissuade

Dr. Pyun from including a specific new proposal in his speech to the Plenary on May 3, the above members of the American Delegation called on Dr. Pyun at his office.

Dr. Pyun opened the discussion by referring to Secretary Dulles' statement regarding the withdrawal of forces from Korea and stressed the necessity for not tying together the withdrawal of Chinese Communist and UN forces. He cited the points he had made in his first statement on this subject and stated that he understood the Secretary supported this view. He said also that the ROK could not retreat from opposition to the proposed all-Korean Commission and must attack the North Korean proposal. He said that failure to attack it would damage the allied cause and he therefore could not keep silent.

Mr. Robertson observed that Dr. Pyun had missed the point which he was trying to make. He emphasized the importance in maintaining solidarity among the 16 allied delegations on the details of any proposals presented, pointing out that the Communists always have full solidarity on their side and we must not weaken our position by taking steps in the conference without advance notification to the other delegations. Any division among the 16 resulting from the submission of a new specific proposal would benefit only the Communists. Ambassador Johnson interjected that he thought there was a misunderstanding and that we were referring only to the six-point proposal with which Dr. Pyun intended to conclude his speech.

Dr. Pyun suggested as a possible solution that following the plenary session on May 3 he would have a press conference and state that the specific proposal in his speech was put forward by the ROK and not by the 16. He mentioned the Australian delegation statements as being another example of failure to consult among the 16 before presenting a new idea to the conference. He said that he did not wish to follow this example. He added that since his first statement the other 15 delegations had not indicated disagreement with the proposal introduced by him in general terms. He added that if we do not attack the North Korean proposal and submit additional proposals on our side, the Communists will think there is no objection to their proposal.

Ambassador Johnson emphasized that we all agreed in rejecting the Communist proposal and will support the ROK position generally. He pointed out that in the meeting of the 16 that morning Dr. Pyun had said nothing about his intention to submit a new proposal.

Following consultation with members of his own delegation, Dr. Pyun agreed to delete the specific proposal from his speech that afternoon.

396.1 GE/5-454 : Telegram

*Sixth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, May 3, 3:05 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 4, 1954—1 a. m.

Secto 85. Repeated information Tokyo 21, London 116, Paris 183, Oslo 4, Seoul 34, Moscow 40. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense, CINCPAC, COMSAC. Following is sixth plenary meeting May 3 summary :

Eden noted receipt of message from Prime Minister Ceylon transmitting extract South Asian Prime Minister's conference communiqué on Indochina.<sup>2</sup> He then called on ROK representative.

Pyun in long oratory rebutted April 27 Nam Il, April 28 Chou En-lai and April 29 Molotov speeches and reiterated unacceptability Nam Il unification proposal. Ambassador Yang gave English interpretation.

Pyun began by noting that free world concepts of peace, freedom, democracy, etc., have been perverted by Communists to become covers for own misdeeds. As example described terroristic activities of people's committees in north following liberation and noted Communists called this "democratic reform".

Pyun noted Nam Il allegation that US failed to live up to 1945 Moscow agreement, planned division of Korea and carried out separate 1948 elections with police interference. Pyun said facts were that in accordance with Moscow agreement of US-USSR, joint commission met for two years but broke down over USSR demand that nationalist elements comprising majority of population be excluded. USSR subsequently refused to permit UN Commission entry into North Korea. On eve 1948 elections in south, Communists attempted violent sabotage. Pyun concluded that Communists claim police interference only when their own terroristic activities are interfered with.

Pyun then directed attention to Nam Il's quotation from 1948 UNCOK report. Said quoted portion was communiqué which reported biased opinion only of one delegate, Mughir (Syria). According to Pyun, Mughir wanted to delay election until unity with those opposing elections, i.e., Communists, was achieved. Thus communiqué represented biased opinion of one man, not of commission as a whole.

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/6) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 267.

<sup>2</sup> The meeting of Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan took place in Colombo from Apr. 28-May 2. For the text of the communiqué, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1954* (issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs; London, Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 166-169.

In disparaging Nam Il's praise for North Korean achievements, Pyun noted that over four million North Koreans fled over 38th parallel to safety of ROK. Praised ROK land reform program. Said iron curtain precluded expose true conditions North Korea.

Regarding Nam Il's statement on POW's "forcibly retained by ROK," Pyun said ROK's regarded all Koreans, including Nam Il, as brethren and as ROK citizens. He noted that not one of thousands of Koreans abducted by North Korean regime during autumn 1950 retreat has been sent back to ROK.

Pyun then asked Nam Il whether he still believed in Communism, after Communist China has trampled on Korea's sovereignty. Communist China now has one adviser beside each nominal North Korean official, and one million Chinese Communist troops live off Korean land. North Koreans are being deported to make room for incoming Chinese peasants. Therefore, Nam Il and others should now repent and join ROK, which would "embrace them in warm brotherly love" and offer them all possible assistance.

Characterizing Chou and Molotov statements as lies and distortions, Pyun selected Chou's charge that US was obstructing Asia's desire for liberation. Pyun said that fact was imperialist is Red China, or USSR, since Red China is merely stooge of USSR. Cited destruction of nationalism in European satellites. Stated that bloc being formed by US in Asia is defensive, although he personally impatient and regretted present indecisive leadership in free world. Said better to smash python's head than try to twist its tail.

Pyun then deflated Chou's assertions that CPR represented Chinese people and that it has made progress, calling it merely satellite cringing at feet of Molotov.

Repeating appeal Communist brethren to return to ROK, Pyun called North Korea a "satellite's satellite".

Noting Molotov's urgings that Koreans evict foreigners and settle own problems themselves, Pyun said he suspected there would be Communists in North Korea for some time regardless of any agreements reached, and ROK had right to keep its own friends around. Referring Molotov's allegation Americans had intervened in Korea, ROK felt that if what US had done for ROK was intervention it is exactly what ROK desired and only complaint not quite as much as we desire. American intervention does not imply taking things away from native population, but rather assisting them.

Pyun dismissed Molotov's contention that US was aggressor in Korea and Formosa and asked whether Molotov thought UN should condemn US rather than Communist China. Pyun said USSR used Security Council veto some 50 times including veto ROK admission but complains about US opposition admission Red China to UN.

Pyun said USSR protestations of love of freedom for other nations not persuasive. He said contrary to US position USSR did not propose use of Korean language at Geneva and this shows Communist China and USSR oblivious of North Korean regime as separate entity.

In conclusion, Pyun said Nam Il proposal was unacceptable because it (1) provided for an all-Korean government on a coalition basis, means of establishing other Soviet satellites; (2) excludes UN; and (3) provides interference by international body of countries of own choice replacing UN Commission.

During above speech Nam Il impassive but slowly wrote notes, presumably changes in his speech, which he passed other members North Korean delegation for comment.

Eden then called on Nam Il,<sup>3</sup> who said he would rebut certain other statements made at conference and clarify certain points of his own proposal. Asserted that reference to certain UN resolutions adopted in absence DPROK unacceptable and without foundation.

Nam Il then quickly reiterated highlights of his April 27 proposal and launched into explanation of troop withdrawal item saying six months period originally specified, but other times could perhaps be worked out. Said US opposition to simultaneous withdrawal suggests US has intentions to use Korea as springboard for attack on China. Felt troops have a long way to go in event evacuation, Korean people do not look forward to their return.

Nam complained that Secretary Dulles said nothing about point three of his proposal. Stated participating nations must agree on measures to create improved conditions which would prevent renewal of hostilities as a basis of peaceful development of Korea. The great powers should further undertake specific obligations to guarantee independence of Korea and refrain from interference in Korean affairs.

Nam alleged US and other delegations insist elections in only North Korea, under supervision of UN and ROK, while demanding withdrawal of Chinese forces. Asserted Australian representative had admitted justice of DPROK proposal to hold all-Korean elections. Nam then drew on US and UK press stories and UN Commission reports covering period from 1948 elections through summer 1952 ROK political crisis to show that ROK is police state and that original elections invalid.

Nam also attempted historical citations including alleged September 1949 Rhee letter to Oliver and captured map in effort prove US and ROK guilty of 1950 aggression. Stated US intervened militarily in Korea before appropriate UN resolution was passed, and called atten-

---

<sup>3</sup> Extracts from Nam Il's statement are printed in *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 61-63.

tion to Rhee's demand for march to north even after armistice. Nam warned if this was tried "Korean people" would deliver crushing blow. Speech also contained veiled undercurrent of threat to renew hostilities if agreement not reached at Geneva. Nam said preceding Pyun address such slanderous, fallacious, false statement obviously not worthy of rebuttal.

Referring to request of Australian representative for clarification of DPROK proposal for all-Korean mixed commission, Nam Il said he had in mind bilateral body which would adopt decisions by mutual agreement of both sides. Organizational procedure and number of members should also be subject to mutual agreement. He said that any difficulties such as Australian representative was worrying about could be easily surmounted by Korean people themselves.

Following break Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos briefly pointed out that forces his government provided in defense of Korea were sent to fulfill obligation to uphold UN Charter and UN principle of collective security. Stephanopoulos stated that he would not support North Korean proposal.<sup>4</sup>

Chou En-lai, who had inscribed himself during Pyun's speech, began by long attack on US insistence upon use of UN resolutions as basis solving Korean question, which was largely rehash his first speech in plenary.<sup>5</sup> Relied heavily on old arguments that resolutions "illegal" and that UN disqualified itself from dealing with Korea because of its belligerency.

According to Chou, US has opposed Nam Il's demands for withdrawal of foreign forces on grounds that US forces are of a different character. He said this true, but difference is that US forces are aggressors. Picking up analogy from Nam Il speech above, he suggested that US forces should be able to withdraw full 5,000 miles that they had come to engage in hostilities in Korea. Said withdrawal must be simultaneous and within definite period.

Chou then supported point three Nam Il's proposal, as clarified, as basis for agreement at Geneva. Chou castigated Foreign Minister Pyun's statement as slanderous ravings uttered for benefit of his master, Syngman Rhee. Said shameless that Pyun's only complaint was that there was not enough US intervention.

Re prisoners of war, Chou asserted that US refusal to abide by repatriation provisions of Geneva convention was root of all difficulties. Recounted alleged US connivance at ROK June 1953 unilateral release of 27,000 prisoners of war, US obstruction of work of NNRC

---

<sup>4</sup> Stephanopoulos' statement is printed in *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 63-64.

<sup>5</sup> Chou's statement and proposal are printed *ibid.*, pp. 65-69.



and impressment of POW's in ROK and Chiang Kai-shek armies in violation armistice.

In conclusion Chou put forward proposal, which he stated had DPROK concurrence, providing that :

(1) Measures be taken to return nonrepatriated Korean and Chinese POW's impressed in June 1953 and January 1954;

(2) Commission of US, UK, France, USSR, DPROK and ROK be established to solve this problem;

(3) Joint Red Cross team, representing these nations, be sent to present location of POW's for inspection.

Eden closed meeting at 6:25 p. m. after stating that Canada and Netherlands were inscribed for tomorrow.

*Comment:* Nam Il's statement followed standard Communist line, and centered upon singling out US as aggressor, whereas Chou sought discredit UN role in Korean reunification. Nam Il's speech was first admission in nonrestricted session that commission under his plan would have equal number Communist members and would give Communist veto over its decisions.

SMITH

---

795.00/5-354 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

SECRET

SEOUL, May 3, 1954—8 p. m.

38. Sent Department 1105, repeated information Tokyo 650. For Secretary from Dean. Ambassadors Briggs and Dean saw President Rhee, Acting Foreign Minister Cho, hour and three-fourths session this morning. Reviewed Geneva's 17,<sup>1</sup> 18,<sup>2</sup> 22,<sup>3</sup> 24,<sup>4</sup> and 25.<sup>5</sup> Explained that you wanted to negotiate within sovereignty constitutional structure and authority of present ROK Government and that you wanted to do everything possible to uphold its prestige, but that it was imperative and essential that present ROK Government should stand before bar of world opinion as an unquestioned constitutional form of government in which elections were freely held in accordance with democratic processes, in which candidates could file their petitions and persons could vote without threats or intimidation. Ventured to suggest possible that President might wish to consider inviting present members of UNCURK to review procedures and methods in forthcoming May 20 elections. Explained that this was primarily domestic

<sup>1</sup> Same as telegram Secto 40, Apr. 29, from Geneva, p. 155.

<sup>2</sup> Same as telegram Secto 41, Apr. 29, from Geneva, p. 157.

<sup>3</sup> Dated Apr. 30, p. 171.

<sup>4</sup> Same as telegram Secto 59, Apr. 30, from Geneva; not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 173.

<sup>5</sup> Same as telegram Secto 60, May 1, from Geneva, *ibid.*

question for his determination on which we technically had no right to make suggestions, but since we were supporting ROK Government in every way we could, wanted to make suggestion purely on a friendly basis in order that ROK might stand in best possible light before world.

President made long and somewhat rambling dissertation on lack of confidence of Korean people in DNP and alleged interference of UNCURK in previous elections and seemed particularly grieved and critical about their report to General Assembly in fall of 1952.

Then we emphasized fundamental importance of appearance democratic elections as well as being so in fact.

Then turned to brief review of events of last few days and outlined Casey's public proposal and Cuenco's private proposal made inside group<sup>6</sup> and explained urgent necessity of ROK and ourselves putting forward a plan which would demand unanimous and enthusiastic approval all on our side. Then explained plan B in some detail and said we were confident his government would receive overwhelming approval in south. Explained simultaneous elections in north and south far more convincing evidence of democracy and in accordance UN resolutions, and that it would prove to world that his was a completely free and constitutional government. Emphasized importance that USSR should not be able to point to any division on our side or to any plan on our side which somewhat approximated Nam Il's plan to combine north and southern Assemblies in order to bring in new government.

President was very mild and pleasant throughout and said that even under plan A he envisaged as essential to have before elections not only complete withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces but even complete withdrawal of North Korean Communist army or its complete surrender. He said its complete surrender would be followed by immediate pardon for all those who renounced Communism and declared their allegiance to ROK Government and that others would be placed in custody. Further, he said that if thereafter there were elections in north alone under UN supervision he was completely prepared put up to people of both north and south in form of a plebiscite question whether they then wanted simultaneous elections in both north and south for both National Assembly and President, and that if people voted they did in plebiscite he was quite prepared to have elections for Assembly and President in both north and south under UN supervision and that he would in no sense stand in way if people wished to elect a new government or new President.

---

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the Philippine proposal summarized in telegram 20, Apr. 30, from Geneva, p. 172.

Explained that while we had visualized phased withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops together with UN troops in south starting in part before elections, we had not visualized complete withdrawal Chinese Communist forces before election or surrender or handling of North Korean Communist armies as he visualized. He insisted this was only practical way to handle it.

We explained that our plan B, except for timing of troop withdrawal, was same as he outlined above except we would eliminate necessity for plebiscite first. He replied he wasn't dictator and considered plebiscite essential.

Explained I wasn't asking for any decision on plan B but was merely discussing it with him in order to get benefit of his judgment for you.

He continued to emphasize futility further negotiations at Geneva and we explained necessity allow all our allies who had contributed troops in fighting to have their complete say and to listen to their proposals, and for our side to put forward entirely acceptable plan with his approval.

He said there was no point to unification if immediately thereafter Communists would come south, and emphasized that if Eisenhower government gave him military divisions and logistical support he needed, he would promise not to attack Communists in north if they did not attempt to come south. He evidently believes he is going to receive such complete promises military support from Van Fleet mission that prospect of total withdrawal of UN forces is unimportant.

Again urged him to give matter thorough and careful study.

As he appeared to be tired ended interview and will see tomorrow. He said he regarded discussion as most constructive and helpful. While have nothing conclusive to report, interview on whole went quite favorably with reasoned discussion and no fireworks.

With reference to criticism of current elections he is issuing statement promising to act immediately if anybody has any evidence of illegality with respect to May elections. Evidence continues to point to very complete police intimidation of opposing candidates, threats to businessmen contributing to opposition, tearing down posters, mass demonstrations to stifle opposition, etc., and news may continue bad. With reference to Department's telegrams 874, 881, and Geneva's 21,<sup>7</sup> while fully appreciating importance of world opinion to ROK Government, would like guidance on how strong we should go about making representations concerning necessity of holding free, unsuppressed, and democratic elections on May 20 and urging him to allow

---

<sup>7</sup> None printed. They dealt with the U.S. Delegation's and the Department of State's interest in urging Rhee to invite UNCURK to observe the election campaign and the elections in the Republic of Korea (396.1 GE/4-2954, 5-154, 4-3054).

UNCURK full facilities for observation. For if he follows our recommendations respect May 20 elections and they are regarded by UNCURK as democratic and satisfactory have we not to certain extent hurt ourselves in connection with urging necessity of plan B? Also, if we urge UNCURK to get really active and there is an adverse report with respect to May 20 elections haven't we accentuated publicity?

Re Geneva's 26,<sup>8</sup> Dean will delay departure subject Secretary's further instructions. Please notify office and family.

Geneva's 32<sup>9</sup> arrived after above-described meeting with President Rhee and comments on that will follow. Plan present that draft to President tomorrow.<sup>10</sup>

BRIGGS

---

<sup>8</sup> Dated May 1, repeated to the Department of State as telegram Dulte 38. In it, the Secretary expressed the hope that Dean would remain in Seoul beyond May 7, since the serious talks, which might lead to an acceptable solution and would require Dean's explaining them to Rhee, were only just beginning. (110.11 DU/5-154)

<sup>9</sup> Dated May 2, p. 178.

<sup>10</sup> On May 4, the Department of State's telegram 886 responded to telegram 1105 stating that the discussion with Rhee had been very salutary and followed exactly the right line in trying to make clear the extent to which the world would be watching the elections and the desirability of a Korean request for UNCURK observation. It left to the discretion of the Embassy in Korea the possibility of further discussions with Rhee on this subject. (795.00/5-354)

MAY 4, 1954

396.1 GE/5-454: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 4, 1954—11 a. m.

1108. Repeated priority USDel Geneva 40. For Secretary from Dean. Reference Geneva's 32,<sup>1</sup> following very preliminary comments:

1. In view our 38<sup>2</sup> you may wish define "foreign". If procedures as to NNSC under armistice agreement followed, will UNCURK really be allowed supervise withdrawal Communist troops? In interview Dean had with General Mohn last Friday, who succeeded Grafstrom on NNSC, Mohn strongly recommends NNSC's complete abolition under armistice agreement on account its complete unworkability and complete refusal Communists respect any wording except in highly uncooperative technical sense defeating intended meaning

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 2, p. 178.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

and hence enormous advantage Communists have with their inspections over US who live up to spirit in south.

2. In view our 38 should we amplify "necessary conditions?"

2. [II] B. Should there be same length of home residence required in one part of Korea as other? What will be definition of "citizens?" Will Chinese Communist immigrants into North Korea be citizens? Will Communists who are not pardoned by ROK be counted as citizens et cetera; namely will ROK decrees depriving Communists of citizenship be recognized for voting purposes?

2. [II] F. Does freedom of movement mean Communists in North Korea can freely come South during elections? Suggest adding freedom to file petitions without molestation or police intimidation of signers, affording proper police protection for meetings. How large do you envisage UNCURK forces in North at time of elections will really be before complete withdrawal Communist forces? Who will house and feed them?

4. [IV] Is not "both sides" hold over from armistice as will be only one all-Korean Government?

Will not Korean Communist forces have to be disarmed and ROK forces recognized as only legitimate army in all of Korea after organization all-Korean Government?

Mohn ridiculed to me "ports of entry" in armistice agreement and said everything came through other nondesignated ports with no way for NNSC to supervise so might as well rely on Communist good faith, since their ability to inspect our honest records in South gave them tremendous intelligence advantage and therefore we are really kidding ourselves about advantage in North of having any so-called neutral agency do checking.

Do you still plan on recommendation (C) of 7 October, 1950 about cooperation of representative bodies in view previous Communist experience this regard?

Also refer you to recommendation (D).

In II B. presume you mean "X" representatives to "Y" population and not technical system of proportional voting designed to give minorities a voice—would spell out a little more.

II E [D]. Actual voting can be in secret but if Chinese Communist troops not withdrawn voters can be intimidated at homes before voting or threatened or kept from polls or roughed up afterwards so fear may keep many from voting or may sway their vote. Difficult for temporary commission to have much effect.

II E. Who will appropriate authorities be before elections? Will law of North Korea be co-related with those of South Korea before elections?

II F. With government controlled press and radio doesn't mean much.

II G. This requires collaboration between ROK and Communist North Korean authorities with Rhee recognizing latter for this purpose before elections.

III B. What is meaning "constituent"?

IV. Will be extremely difficult to govern North for a year if Chinese Communist forces are to remain there. In this period what do you visualize relation of present North Korean forces will be?

V. Would unified Korean Government be free to adopt mutual defense pact with US and one or more treaties of alliance with USSR and her satellites now in effect with North Korean Government?

VII B. Would this require US to give up bases and right to station troops under defense pact—in other words unified government won't be free to extend bases to US as in Spain, Holland, et cetera.

BRIGGS

---

396.1 GE/5-454 : Telegram

*Seventh Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, May 4, 3:05 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 4, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 102. Repeated information Tokyo 22, London 120, Paris 199, Oslo 5, Seoul 40, Moscow 45. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department also pass Defense, CINCPAC, COMSAC.

Seventh plenary session May 4 consisted speeches by representatives Canada, Netherlands and Ethiopia.<sup>2</sup> At conclusion session Prince Wan Thailand presiding announced no further speakers were inscribed. Suggested that Wednesday and Thursday could profitably be spent in informal discussions and proposed next plenary session be held Friday, May 7. Proposal accepted.

Pearson, head Canadian delegation, delivered eloquent defense of United Nations and US, attacked Molotov and Chou speeches and dissected North Korean unification proposal. Pearson stated Canada represented at conference because she is UN member and that responsibilities of conference derive solely from decisions taken by UN on Korean question. He stated that Canada has supported and remains

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/7) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 267. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:05 p. m. and adjourned at 5:03 p. m.

<sup>2</sup> Texts of these statements may be found in *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 69-82.

bound by UN decisions and that Canada will not support any proposal which denies their validity or which would equate moral and political status of UN with aggressors in Korea.

Pearson quoted Molotov's expression of sympathy with movements for national freedom and expressed hope that any people attaining freedom would do better than Lithuania, Bulgaria or Mongolian People's Republic. Pearson also observed that right to be free does not include obligation to be Communist. He further remarked that it would be no contribution to Asian peace or prosperity, independence or dignity, if East Asian co-prosperity sphere were exchanged for Chinese East Asian co-Communist empire.

Pearson vigorously defended US against Communist charges of aggressive imperialism, citing Canadian experience with her powerful neighbor as proof of nonaggressiveness of US people.

Pearson explicitly rejected Communist charge that US began Korean hostilities and compared such charges with "those which came out of Moscow and Berlin in September 1939, to prove that peace-loving Nazi Germany had been the innocent victim of aggression by Poland".

Pearson asked if Chou's call for removal of foreign troops from Asia included Russians at Port Arthur. With respect to Chou's injection of POW issue, Pearson stated that it is difficult to understand why Chou raised this issue if he sincerely desired to press forward to a solution of the Korean problem.

Pearson expressed suspicion that North Korean reunification plan includes "words and phrases designed to camouflage a scheme which would bring to Korea the reverse of freedom and independence". He particularly attacked the proposed all-Korean commission with its built-in Communist veto. He asked several penetrating questions concerning North Korean plan: (1) Would "democratic social organizations" exclude anti-Communist or non-Communist organizations; (2) how would representatives of these organizations be chosen for this all-Korean commission?; (3) does phrase "terror groups" mean anti-Communist political parties?; (4) if no UN or other impartial international supervision, how can free elections be guaranteed in districts where bitter animosities, fears and local tyrannies make impartial Korean supervision quite impossible?; (5) "Does Nam Il really wish us to believe that representatives of North Korea feel they can work amicably and constructively on all-Korean commission with representatives of what he contemptuously calls the 'Syngman Rhee clique'?"

Pearson stated solution for unification problem must be found in principles of UN resolution providing for union of all Korean people

under government chosen by those people. United Korea, he added, will need some international guarantee against aggression and some international economic assistance to repair destruction of war.

In concluding Pearson referred to Colombo Conference resolution as "an important and constructive effort by group of free Asian states to assist in, and I hope take some responsibility for, peaceful settlement of Asian problems in their part of the world." In unspoken reference to Chou's allegation UN had lost moral authority in Asia he called attention to importance attached in Colombo resolution to role of UN.

Pearson's final word was warning that "failure here may well necessitate further collective consideration by those who, as result of such failure, will feel increasingly threatened, of further ways and means to meet that threat."

Luns, Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, followed with a deliberate defense of the US and UN. He skillfully answered many allegations made by Nam Il and Chou En-lai in their speeches of May 3. He stated that reason Netherlands Government is represented is to maintain principle of collective security and to realize UN ideals that unification in Korea must not be achieved except by will of people freely expressed in secret elections. He reiterated Netherlands Government will "not be found guilty of having failed to confer full justice to this principle." He likened general statements of Soviet Union, People's Republic of China, and DPROK to those introduced in eight years of UN debate by representatives of Communist Governments. He expressed surprise that same technique was being used in special conference for establishment of peace in Asia. Luns doubted any agreement could be reached "if everything which is in conformity with a dogmatic blueprint of Communist theory is being labeled as good, and everything which is not fitting in with this blueprint is being condemned in offending terms."

In answer to the Communist allegations that US was guilty of aggression against Korea, he stated that four years of investigation and endless discussion in UN have made it abundantly clear who was responsible for war.

Referring to Nam Il's speech on 3 May relating to character of 1948 elections in ROK, Luns expressed amusement that Communist representatives are "lecturing us with regard to democratic processes and freedom of elections." He pointed out UN investigations found character of ROK elections satisfactory and quoted resolution of temporary commission on Korea adopted by General Assembly on 12 December 1948, which he stated erased all doubts.



Regarding Nam Il's proposal of April 27 for free and democratic elections, Luns expressed view that such concept sounds democratic but in reality has nothing in common with true democracy nor with free expression of wishes of Korean people.

Referring to Chou En-lai's vigorous attack on UN of 3 May, he stated that he failed to see what common base is left to this conference for fruitful discussion leading to mutually satisfactory agreements. He made point that if it was Chou's intentions to split ranks of free world by making it appear that interests of Asian countries lie elsewhere than interests of non-Asian ones, or that countries which recognize PRC are divided on Korea, he desired to remind him of some well-established facts. He then referred to Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950 which determined North Korea as aggressor, supported by India's vote; to General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950 which reaffirmed aim of unified, independent and democratic Korea with UN forces remaining until no longer required; and the resolution introduced in Security Council November 10, 1950 calling *inter alia* for withdrawal of Chinese forces from Korea and assuring China protection its legitimate interests, supported by Norway and the UK. He added fact that this resolution was killed on November 30 by Soviet veto.

Luns also referred to fact that group of 13 Asian states, a considerable number of which had recognized People's Republic of China, and all members of UN, had appealed to the Peiping Government not to allow its forces to cross 38th parallel. He cited General Assembly resolution of December 14 which brought Ambassador Wu as Chou En-lai's representative to Lake Success to negotiate an end to conflict in Korea. He emphasized that Wu was ordered to leave by Chou En-lai on December [19,] 1950 and did not meet with UN Commission.

Luns used long Communist delay accepting principles December 3, 1952 General Assembly resolution submitted by India to offset Chou's argument that US was responsible for delaying armistice negotiations.

Luns expressed hope that this misrepresentation of facts by Communists will not continue.

Ethiopian delegate, Zawde Gabre Heywot, briefly reaffirmed his nation's loyalty to UN and to principle of seeking establish just and durable peace through collective security. Defined purpose of conference as completion task of unification of Korea by peaceful and democratic means as called for in UN resolutions. Noted that under UN sponsorship representative government had been established in South Korea and referred to ROK as only legal government in Korea. Made only general references to issues before conference. Said problem of elections was where and by what means they should be con-

ducted. In this connection, called attention to fact UN Commission already in existence. Concerning withdrawal problem, merely stated UN had no desire keep troops in Korea indefinitely.

*Comment:* Net effect day's session was strengthen picture broad Allied unity which had become somewhat blurred due to failure many friendly delegations respond promptly with strong defenses UN and US and with rebuttal Communist charges. Pearson's analysis North Korean unification plan and reassertion basic principles of UN resolutions particularly effective.

SMITH

---

795B.00/5-454 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 4, 1954—4 p. m.

1110. Repeated information priority Tokyo 654, priority Geneva 41. Tokyo pass CINCUNC exclusive for General Hull. For the Secretary from Dean. Ambassadors Briggs and Dean called on President Rhee and acting Foreign Minister Cho this morning and delivered copy of tentative draft.<sup>1</sup> In retyping we omitted brackets and left in text words formerly in brackets. In II-D we left in "throughout Korea" and struck out "in Korea". We also handed President following statement:

"Our draft for establishment of united and independent Korea, if it meets with President Rhee's approval, would give American delegation and ROK strong negotiating hand versus Communists.

"It would help US and ROK to direct and control negotiating situation at Geneva, and enable US and ROK to take initiative among 16 UN nations contributing troops in proposing sound and constructive plan. An appropriate time and auspice for use such proposals at Geneva conference has not yet been discussed with other delegations. Draft paper contains essential principles on UN observation of elections and troop withdrawal, but leaves room for changes as situation develops.

"Proposed plan is in accordance with UNGA resolution of 14 November 1947, of 12 December 1948, of 21 October 1949, and of 7 October 1950: 'that all constituent acts be taken, including holding of elections, under auspices of UN, for establishment of unified independent and democratic government on sovereign state of Korea.'

"At this stage of conference we and ROK have advantage of UK and French views which are apparently similar to our tentative plan. These views include specific reference to UNCURK, to elections within the ROK constitutional structure, and to permissive provision for newly elected National Assembly to amend ROK constitution as provided by its terms."

---

<sup>1</sup> See telegram 32, May 2, from Geneva, p. 178.

President Rhee read out loud above statement and tentative draft proposal. He asked two specific questions:

- (1) Will the Communists accept it?
- (2) If he agreed to it could he have the Secretary's assurances that we would stand on this and that we would not feel compelled to go to some other proposal in order to appear reasonable before the world in relation to the Communists?

He feels that the more intransigent position the Communists take the more we feel we should make concessions in order appear reasonable before the world and since Communists are not impressed by the concessions he wondered whom we were trying to impress. In answer to first question we said that at closed meeting Molotov and Chou En-lai had supported Nam Il's proposal of merging two Assemblies and rejecting UN supervision and at present could not see much real prospect of Communist acceptance. As to second question we said we would ask instructions. President very pleasant and agreeable throughout.

BRIGGS

---

396.1 GE/5-454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, May 4, 1954—8 p. m.

39. Repeated information Department Secto 101. For Briggs and Dean. Appreciate your 38,<sup>1</sup> 40<sup>2</sup> and 41.<sup>3</sup> With reference 40, will transmit comments soonest. With reference penultimate paragraph your 41, we do not think Communists will accept in view of unequivocal statements of Nam Il, Molotov and Chou En-lai. However it is essential that if and when conference fails that US-ROK proposals upon which it breaks enjoy full support not only of 16 nations but of free world opinion. This is not a question of conference tactics but of maintenance of unqualified US public opinion as well as other free world support for ROK in future.

With reference Rhee's second question, we are prepared to stand firm on basic principles embodied this proposal.

Plenary sessions have been suspended until Friday, May 7. Highly important that by that date ROKs, US and others of sixteen have agreed upon formal proposal embodying plan B.

Pyun saw General Smith today (at his request with no one else present). Stated he had received instructions from Rhee to effect that all-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 3, p. 191.

<sup>2</sup> Same as telegram 1108, May 4, p. 194.

<sup>3</sup> Same as telegram 1110, *supra*.

Korean elections could only be accepted if approved by plebiscite. Important Pyun receive instructions which will permit him cooperate with us in working out details proposal along lines plan B.

SMITH

MAY 5, 1954

795.00/5-554 : Telegram

*Dean-Briggs-Rhee Meeting, Seoul, May 5, Morning : The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

SECRET NIACT

SEOUL, May 5, 1954—5 p. m.

45. Sent priority Department 1115, repeated information Tokyo 657. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary and Smith from Dean. Ambassador Briggs and Dean called on President early this morning. Acting Foreign Minister Cho, Minister of Defense and Prime Minister present. Reference Geneva's 39,<sup>1</sup> explained probably intransigent attitude USSR and Chinese Communists at Geneva and apparent small possibility agreement and therefore imperative necessity free world standing together and presenting united front and united proposal which would command unquestioned free world opinion. Told him we were prepared to stand firm on basic principles set forth in plan B and urged him to authorize Pyun accept without necessity of any [troop withdrawal?] as condition to holding of elections in both North and South.

We were interrupted by necessity his going to make scheduled public appearance at children's festival and will go back at 2 p. m.

They are all sincerely troubled by provisions in plan B which presupposes simultaneous elections in North and South although Chinese Communists in North have only begun to withdraw according I and IV plan B.

Referring to supposed free elections elsewhere, where Soviet troops present, they asked if we seriously believed it would be possible to hold anything like free elections in North so long as Chinese Communist troops still in North or North Korean troops remain unsurrendered. They ridiculed idea of a civilian organization such as UNCURK, even though enhanced by numerous civilian observers, bringing about free elections and again cited experience east European countries.

They cannot understand why, since Chinese Communists are aggressors and UN forces were invited by UN and ROK, there should be any corresponding withdrawal from South as envisaged by IV

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

and President insists we are merely paving way for repetition 1949 withdrawal and 1950 aggression. Cites long experience General Hodge <sup>2</sup> in attempting to get Soviets to agree and to carry out anything even when agreed.

They are also fearful that next step after elections in North with Chinese Communist armies present would be demand for coalition government which they say Korean people would never accept. They also feel simultaneous elections somehow constitute reflection on existing ROK Government which they regard as sovereign and as so recognized by United Nations after free elections. (Plan not very clear that ROK constitution remains in effect throughout. Believe II (e) (g) bothers President as presupposes North Korean legislation and co-operation Communists.)

Urged President keep open mind and not to draft anything before we return at 2 p. m. At that time will urge necessity revised instructions to Pyun along line your 39 and that it is an essential favorable American public opinion re ROK that we stand together at Geneva. They have basic fear that plan B is merely first step in whittling-down process. President made long plea for collective security pact for entire Pacific with instantaneous striking power. Fact ROK Government was not included in Secretary's recent discussions still rankles.

Do you think possible amend plan B by making provision for Chinese Communist withdrawal much more specific before elections actually held? Such as: "Before elections are held under observation of UNCURK all Chinese forces shall have been withdrawn from Korea, or such withdrawal shall have taken place to the point where UNCURK shall certify that the remaining Communist troops constitute no threat to the holding of democratic elections free from intimidation", or some similar general provision. Believe President will also want same assurance about North Korean Communist army. Again, since ROK is sovereign and not the aggressor they can't understand why they should be stripped of protection in order to get aggressor out if they desire United Nations forces stay.

Fundamentally, they don't trust any piece of paper either the Soviets or the Chinese or North Korean Communists will sign. They further believe once paper signed, we will urge them to cooperate even though Soviets do not in order satisfy world opinion which will leave them in undefendable position.

BRIGGS

---

<sup>2</sup> Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge was Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Korea, 1945-1948.

396.1 GE/5-554 : Telegram

*Robertson-Pyun Meeting, Geneva, May 5, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

GENEVA, MAY 5, 1954—1 p. m.

42. Repeated information Department Secto 107. Seoul for Briggs and Dean. Secto 101 (Seoul 39).<sup>1</sup> Wednesday morning Robertson and Young had satisfactory meeting with Pyun, Yang and Limb on draft proposal. As result these discussions following changes made in draft proposal contained Secto 72 (Seoul 32).<sup>2</sup> Pyun emphasized these changes and proposal as a whole discussed on *ad referendum* basis as he required new instructions from Rhee in order accept draft proposal. Pyun will probably telegraph Rhee separately re proposal, referring to changes transmitted this telegram. Pyun requested US send these changes soon as possible Seoul for Rhee and suggested that Rhee might be more likely accept draft proposal if he had these changes suggested by ROK delegation.

1. In paragraph II A insert "six" before "months" and delete words "the President and". (*Comment:* Pyun urged that question of Presidential election be left to all-Korean National Assembly when convened.)

2. Add to paragraph II B "in accordance with a census observed and certified by UNCURK". (*Comment:* Pyun stressed importance having accurate census of North Korean population for purpose determining election districts.)

3. In paragraph III A insert in first sentence following "convened" words "in Seoul".

4. In paragraph V delete from first sentence words ", and countries neighboring Korea," and delete sentence beginning "the countries bordering on Korea". (*Comment:* Pyun objected to deleted phrase as possibly applying to Japan and expressed view necessary countries covered by immediately preceding language. He expressed fear provision for working out security arrangements between unified Korea and bordering countries would only lead to interference in internal affairs by China and the USSR. Pyun vehemently opposed idea of demilitarized zone along Korean border and indicated Rhee felt same way.)

As result discussions within US delegation following changes made in draft proposal before discussion with ROK delegation.

1. In preamble insert "and in recognition of right of Korean people to determine through genuinely free elections form and composition of their government," following first clause.

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 4, p. 201.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 2, p. 178.

2. In paragraph I first sentence insert "genuinely" before "free elections".

3. In paragraph I change "in manner set forth below" to "in manner provided below".

4. In paragraph II D delete "in Korea".

5. In paragraph II E replace second sentence with "this commission should insure that safeguards for conditions of genuine freedom are observed before, during and after elections and that elections are properly conducted".

6. In paragraph III A insert at end of first sentence "of ROK".

7. In paragraph III B delete "of ROK".

8. In paragraph V delete last sentence. (*Comment*: Legal adviser stated such provision unnecessary since ROK state continues and language could create difficulties.)

SMITH

795.00/5-554 : Telegram

*Dean-Briggs-Rhee Meeting, Seoul, May 5, 2 p. m.: The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

SECRET      PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 5, 1954—8 p. m.

48. Sent Department 1119, repeated information Tokyo 659, Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary and Smith from Dean. Re Embassy telegram 1115, repeated Geneva 45.<sup>1</sup> Ambassadors Briggs and Dean saw President Rhee, Prime Minister, Acting Foreign Minister Cho and Minister Defense at 2 o'clock. Again presented reasons why we felt essential modify instructions to Pyun and authorize presentation plan B. Their reasons against were (1) plan derogates from sovereignty of ROK Government, (2) no authority to have elections proposed by plan under ROK constitution, (3) announcement of such new elections for Assembly and President would cause great consternation in Korea and cause ordinary people to believe Communists gaining so much this concession was demanded by Communists, (4) in effect we are asking Rhee to resign, (5) utterly impossible to hold elections while Chinese Communist forces in Korea and Soviets constitute mass threat on border and unless ROK gets complete administrative control of North Korea before elections take place.

We again pointed out very important that American public opinion should not believe there is any lack of cooperation between ROK and US at Geneva and essential present plan commanding respect and constitution amendable.

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 5, p. 202.

After much discussion and against arguments of Prime Minister and Defense Minister, President Rhee tentatively agreed following draft:

“(1) Upon the condition that the Chinese Communist forces withdraw from Korea;

“(2) Upon the promise of the Chinese Communists and the USSR that they will not re-enter Korean territory with armed forces and again become aggressors against Korea, then the ROK is willing to undertake that pursuant to ROK constitution and its electoral laws, free and democratic election, without Communist or outside interference for the National Assembly and the President of Korea shall be held in North and South Korea under the observation of the UN”.

Term UN rather than UNCURK used because President objects to that organization and we let pass this afternoon in hopes to get an agreement on principle. Also realize USSR not declared aggressors.

After above agreed draft was typed President insisted there should be inserted after “aggressors against Korea” words to following effect “and if US stands by us”.

Pointed out that Korea already had military defense pact although Acting Foreign Minister Cho indicated they are somewhat concerned that it had not been formally ratified and published and President indicated there was certain amendments to it which they wish discuss. (See Embassy telegram 1107, May 3.<sup>2</sup>) Did not seem advisable to mention to him joint declaration of July 27, 1953 in Washington of 16 UN members contributing troops to respond in case of aggression but pointed out did not seem appropriate to refer to any agreement with US in proposed presentation of plan B at Geneva or in effect to use language which would appear to commit US beyond precise text mutual defense pact already ratified by Senate. President left matter to Ministers to decide.

Prime Minister and Defense Minister again argued publication of this draft would cause great consternation in Korea and would afford Communists much propaganda. Seemed quite obvious President was trying to extract some further promise and was tiring. So after two hours ended discussions this afternoon and arranged to see him tomorrow. Discussion friendly.

Would appreciate knowing status mutual defense pact and whether any serious discussions for its amendment under way and suggestions above language.

In going over above draft with President, President fully appreciates not in accord plan B I and IV. President is thoroughly familiar

---

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. For documentation on the mutual defense treaty, see volume xv. The treaty was signed on Oct. 1, 1953, but did not enter into force until Nov. 17, 1954. The text is printed as TIAS No. 3097 in 5 UST 2368.



so-called free elections with Soviet troops present in Europe and extremely difficult, if not impossible to sell them idea of elections in North if Chinese Communist troops present or North Korea Communist troops have not been disarmed. He considers this complete appeasement.

Reference plan B in view President's dislike of UNCURK would suggest elimination last sentence plan. After some unified and sovereign government established in Korea, why should UNCURK function further in Korea?

In IV would suggest using term "unification" rather than "reunification" and standard terminology such as "unified Korea" or "unified government of Korea" throughout rather than "all-Korean Government" which conveys idea of coalition.

In III A suggest revision so as not to indicate ROK government not presently legitimate government in Korea or that new government is necessarily formed.

BRIGGS

---

396.1 GE/5-554: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1954—3:15 p. m.

Tosec 75. Secto 72 sent Seoul 32.<sup>2</sup> Department has following suggested modifications draft paper presenting Plan "B". These take account Ambassador Dean's comments.

1. Use word "shall" instead of "will" or "should" wherever provision is mandatory.

2. Section II A should be revised to read "Within period of blank months from adoption of these proposals and following determination and announcement by UNCURK that necessary conditions for free elections exist, there shall be held throughout Korea at a date selected by UNCURK elections for the president and National Assembly of unified Korea."

3. Modify first sentence II E to read, "Elections shall be supervised and observed by UNCURK." Delete second sentence since Commission can not insure these things. Modify final sentence to read, "Results of the elections shall be considered valid expression of free will of people of Korea where Commission has so certified." This modification makes clear power of Commission to declare results invalid.

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated to Seoul as telegram 889 and to Tokyo as telegram 2429 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 2, p. 178.

4. Section II F. "Freedom of movement in Korea" is ambiguous and in pre-election period presents disadvantage of making possible Communist infiltration South Korea. Prefer elimination of phrase.

5. Rewrite II G as follows to tape down UNCURK's rights and endeavor avoid NNSC type difficulties:

"All authorities within Korea shall cooperate fully in ensuring that elections are properly conducted under necessary safeguards as determined by UNCURK. The Commission shall have the right to travel freely throughout Korea so as to make such observations and investigations as it deems necessary."

6. Section IV. Suggest substitute here and throughout paper "non-Korean forces" for "foreign forces". Phrase "will be coordinated with both sides" should read "shall be coordinated with military commanders non-Korean forces".

7. Section V. Suggest rephrasing to read as follows:

"Parties to agreement pledge their respect for territorial integrity and political independence of unified Korea. This pledge shall become effective when unified government shall have declared its intent abide by purposes and principles of UN Charter in its international relations. Unified Korea shall have authority assume such existing *international* rights and obligations and conclude such agreements as it may wish". Believe could not make provision penultimate sentence mandatory and that last sentence would permit such arrangements without placing unified government under compulsion to enter agreement Communist China. Change in first sentence avoids separate operation to secure pledge of respect for territorial integrity etc. at time unified government comes into existence.

8. Section VI. For consistency, rehabilitation proposal should be under UN auspices as long as UNCURK is proposed as supervisory commission. Communists likely seize on omission UN here to support argument against use UNCURK.

9. In order clarify manner and particulars in which Armistice Agreement shall be amended suggest following as substitute for first sentence Section VII:

"Parties to Armistice Agreement shall direct their military commanders to modify paragraphs blank of Armistice Agreement in order enable UNCURK to carry out above arrangements leading to unification Korea."

10. Suggest (b) section VII be revised read as follows: "All non-Korean forces have been withdrawn from Korea in accordance with provisions section IV this agreement."

11. Believe desirable delete last sentence section VII since this involves sovereignty new government.

12. Note that under General Assembly resolution might be argued UNCURK limited to seven representatives and seven alternates. Doubt that this constitutes adequate force for supervision.

13. Endorse Dean's suggestion Seoul's 1119 repeated Geneva 48<sup>3</sup> should use "unification" instead "reunification" in Section IV and "Government of unified Korea" instead "all-Korean Government" in Sections V and VI.

14. Foregoing comments made without reference principal substantive points Seoul's 1119 or Geneva's Secto 107 rptd Seoul 42<sup>4</sup> which just arrived. Will comment those in subsequent message.

DULLES

---

<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 5, p. 204.

---

795.00/5-554 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1954—8:32 p. m.

893. For Dean and Smith from the Secretary. Re Seoul's 1119 repeated Geneva 48 Tokyo 659.<sup>2</sup>

1. Congratulate Dean and Briggs on excellent progress in most difficult task.

2. Express to President Rhee personal appreciation Secretary for his cooperation and for time and effort he is devoting these questions.

3. Assume agreed draft Seoul's 1119 would be Rhee's instructions to Pyun and would not be incorporated in draft Plan "B" except as position stated would require certain changes in draft Plan "B".

4. Language in agreed draft paragraph 1 together subsequent discussion seems indicate Rhee might agree withdrawal US and other UN forces as well as Chinese Communist forces if both accomplished before elections. We do not believe feasible propose withdrawal Chinese Communist forces only although recognize logic and force Rhee's comments as reported Seoul's 1115<sup>3</sup> and 1119. Withdrawal both Chinese Communist and UN forces probably wipes out armistice which may not be unbearable for us in view NAC [*MAC?*] and NNSC difficulties and fact armistice is not the real sanction against renewal aggression. Withdrawal all non-Korean forces of course raises possibility Communists would stall all further implementation elections once they have secured their primary objective which is withdrawal

---

<sup>1</sup> Also sent to Geneva as telegram Tosec 81 and repeated to Tokyo as telegram 2434 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 5, p. 205.

<sup>3</sup> Same as telegram 45, May 5, from Seoul to Geneva, p. 202.

UN forces. It might help Rhee's problem somewhat if Section IV Plan "B" were changed to require withdrawal most non-Korean forces before elections take place. If necessary we might also consider possibility total withdrawal before elections which would have distinct propaganda advantage. This position not cleared by Defense. Clearance being sought. Will notify soonest.

5. No objection to substituting UN for UNCURK supervision elections and making appropriate changes in draft of Plan "B".

6. Language at beginning agreed draft paragraph 2 seems apply more specifically Chinese Communists than USSR but we have all along insisted USSR should also be one of guarantors of Korean independence and territorial integrity and draft Plan "B" meant make that clear. Perhaps Section V draft Plan "B" as amended according our suggestion should be further amended to make pledge effective at once.

7. Troubled by language re elections in agreed draft paragraph 2 since it seems imply ROK would run elections with only some minor observation UNCURK-style by UN rather than supervision. Unless Dean certain agreed draft means essential acceptance draft Plan "B" by Pyun and Yang at Geneva he should attempt secure appropriate modification conformity Plan "B".

8. Re Mutual Defense Treaty. Know of no proposal, suggestion or discussion leading to amendment except press report in Seoul's 1107.<sup>4</sup> You may tell Rhee we expect bring Treaty into effect near future by exchange ratifications Washington. It is impracticable to amend Treaty as this would require resubmission to Senate and almost certain delay until next session. Therefore urge Dean and Briggs discourage ROK making any such proposals.

DULLES

---

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, p. 206.

---

### *Editorial Note*

In the evening of May 5, Eden and Molotov met for dinner, during the course of which substantive discussions on Korea and Indochina took place. Eden gave an account of the meeting to Smith, who reported to the Department in telegram Secto 115, May 6, not printed. The telegram contained the following brief passage on Korea:

"Eden said he was not optimistic over prospects of any settlement on Korea unless Russians could prevail upon Chinese and North Koreans to abandon their wholly unreasonable attitude. He did not envisage this happening but thought continuation of *status quo* in Korea not too bad. Molotov indicated agreement." (396.1 GE/5-654)

MAY 6, 1954

396.1 GE/5-654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, May 6, 1954—1 p. m.

44. Sent Department Secto 112 priority. Department pass Defense. Re Seoul 1119 repeated Geneva 48,<sup>1</sup> and Department's 893 to Seoul, Tosec 81 to Geneva.<sup>2</sup> Am greatly disappointed will not be possible present Plan B proposal at plenary tomorrow. Pressure for presentation some plan along lines "B" mounting among other delegations, and while a few more general debate speeches are anticipated, we cannot get much further until all on allied side have proposal around which they can rally.

Do not understand Rhee's preference for UN over UNCURK. We cannot expect to have more favorable composition on any UN body than present membership UNCURK. Substitution of unspecified UN body at this stage reopens question of composition of UN commission, and to that extent goes back on past UN resolutions which we insist should be maintained. Insistence on UNCURK at this stage gives us much better bargaining position. Therefore suggest Department will wish modify instructions contained paragraph 5 Tosec 81.

Entirely concur paragraph 7 Tosec 81 on necessity UNCURK supervision rather than simply observation.

While we appreciate Rhee's point with regard to withdrawal Chinese Communist forces prior to elections, must recognize impracticable without simultaneous withdrawal UN forces and dangers inherent in completing withdrawal UN forces prior to assurance unification plans being implemented in good faith by Communists.

Full protection for ROKs under Plan B lies in (1) recognition ROK only lawful government in Korea; (2) elections under UNCURK supervision only after safeguards for conditions genuine freedom before, during and after elections assured; (3) proportional representation of North Korea in National Assembly.

Important we not get bogged down in drafting details between Geneva, Washington and Seoul, but stick to basic principles in discussions with Rhee. Communists are not going to accept any proposal containing these principles. If through any chance they do accept basic principles, negotiation of agreement would be long process in which details of drafting would be very important and in which closest consultation between Geneva, Washington and Seoul would be essential.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 5, p. 205.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 5, p. 209.

Phrases such as "formation of all-Korean Government", paragraph III proposal, should be accepted by Rhee as desirable "window-dressing", the substance of the US-UN position that ROK is only lawful government in Korea.

Will telegraph clean draft taking into account points brought out Washington and Seoul telegrams.

Yang said last night Pyun and ROK delegate had strongly urged Rhee accept proposal with amendments agreed upon with Robertson and Young.

SMITH

---

795.00/5-654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

SECRET      PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 6, 1954—2 p. m.

49. Sent priority Department 1122, repeated information Tokyo 660. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary and Smith from Dean. Re Embtel 1119 repeated Geneva 48, Tokyo 659.<sup>1</sup> While we realize UK, Commonwealth, and France have formed and expressed opinion that it is essential there should be simultaneous elections north and south and Plan B so provides, is this necessarily so? While Soviets refused to allow UNTOCK north of parallel in 1948, south cooperated completely, democratic elections were held and UN recognized ROK as only legitimate government in Korea even though it only recognized it south of parallel in UNGA 21 October 1949. Now because of wording UNGA resolution 7 October 1950, it is said correct interpretation thereof demands simultaneous elections north and south and such elections also necessary command respect free world opinion.

Whereas, really all that necessary is to have Communist forces withdrawal in order that free elections may be held in north under UN observation in connection with unification.

Understand UK-Commonwealth attitude motivated in part by unfavorable reports by former Australian member UNCURK as to extent of democracy in ROK Government. Some UNCURK members seem to take for granted complete lack of freedom of elections in Communist north but compare rather turbulent workings of new Asian democracy in south to theoretical maximum ideals of textbook Anglo-Saxon democracy and to concentrate almost entirely on criticizing admitted faults of present ROK regime.

If Communist armies remain in north and North Korea Communist regime remains in power during elections there, despite UNCURK observation, don't see how we can avoid having but one Communist

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 5. p. 205.

slate with nothing but Communist assemblymen elected in north followed by demand for coalition government. This fact and apparent harmful result does not seem to bother advocates of simultaneous elections, but they balk at accepting forthcoming May 20 elections of admittedly sovereign government as sufficient even though faulty in some respects.

As practical matter under Plan B don't see how you can operate national elections under one electoral law in north and ROK's in south. Somehow can't visualize North Korea Assembly at request of UNCURK ever adopting ROK election law. Will south therefore have to enact Communist election law in south in order to have unified electoral law?

Believe Rhee shrewd enough to know UK and Commonwealth do not think highly of his government. Casey's speech about necessity for simultaneous north and south elections in order to impress free world does not move him but rather he regards such demand as vote of lack of confidence in his government. He asks how many times ROK must be certified as sovereign and assuming ROK really is sovereign, what business UNCURK has to observe working of ROK election laws and whether UNCURK authority will be same in north and south and precisely what its authority will be.

Shall continue to use all persuasive powers to convince him necessity for simultaneous elections but thought you might be interested in his thinking and hard practicable nature of his questions.

BRIGGS

---

795B.00/5-754 : Telegram

*Dean-Briggs-Rhee Meeting, Seoul, May 6: The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET      NIACT

SEOUL, May 7, 1954—2 a. m.

1125. Repeated information Tokyo 663, information niact Geneva 52. Geneva for Smith. Tokyo for CINCUNC. For Secretary from Dean. Ambassadors Briggs and Dean saw President Rhee, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and acting Foreign Minister Cho after social visit of General Van Fleet had ended.

Told President was your plan formally to conclude ratification defense pact within next few weeks and since it had been consented to by Senate it would not be possible to make any changes therein unless whole matter was put off for year or more which would be unfortunate. President said Korean pact could be denounced by either party on one year's notice whereas Japanese treaty had longer life and he wanted same benefits without "discrimination". We said without

making any commitment would investigate but considered essential Korean defense pact be promulgated as signed and consented to.

Said considered urgently important that all free world nations should agree upon pact for unification of Korea which could be announced at Geneva tomorrow. Suggested section IV plan B be modified to provide that withdrawal of substantially all North Korean forces shall be completed or substantial progress made thereon in manner satisfactory to UNCURK during a blank day period immediately prior to holding of elections on date to be announced by UNCURK. Prime Minister did not like word "substantially" and President objected to mutually-phased withdrawal, maintaining in any event it was unconditionally essential (a) that Chinese Communist and North Korean Communist forces should be withdrawn or surrendered in north in such manner as absolutely to ensure free elections in north and did not like idea of leaving this to judgement of UNCURK, (b) insisted it was unalterable requirement that there be no cooperation or collaboration in any form between his government and Chinese or North Korean Communist Government, which presumably goes for cooperation on electoral laws, (c) declared there must be assurances by Chinese Communists and Soviets there would be no actual or threatened interference with elections in north, (d) insisted nations on UNCURK had never had ROK approval and that matter had to be administered by United Nations itself. We assured him you saw logic of his insistence that Chinese Communists be withdrawn before elections in north but that only practical way of getting Chinese Communists to withdraw was to phase coordinated withdrawals of United Nations forces in south and to require substantial withdrawals but to give UNCURK some such discretion as outlined above.

Prime Minister and Defense Minister both gagged at only requiring substantial withdrawal before free election.

Rhee insisted no strings could be attached to absolute requirement of Communist withdrawal as precedent to elections and requirement of no interference by Soviets and no requirement of collaboration by his government with Communists. He further said his offer to have elections in both north and south for assembly and presidency after free elections in north if people so demanded by plebiscite were only his personal views.

Minister of Defense then handed President statement he had written out last night in which he expressed fear that elections in north and south would bring about degeneration of morale in ROK armed services and possible disorders. Minister insisted situation would be comparable to that during US-Soviet conferences 1946 and 1947 and that requirement have election for presidency with possibility of re-



placement of chief executive would throw consternation into ranks of ROK Army. They evidently fear solid Communist bloc in north with coalition of opponents of Rhee's Liberal Party in the south.

Again urged necessity of complete unity between US and ROKs at Geneva and essential no nation on free side should present plan different from our presentation and absolute necessity of not having Geneva talks fail because of lack of unity between US and ROKs and called attention to news stories that West was paralyzed at Geneva and essential this situation be corrected.

President finally said only solution was to have General Van Fleet make such commitments as would augment ROK armed forces to such an extent that they could freely move north and annihilate Communist forces.

President was obviously extremely tired after Van Fleet welcoming ceremonies at airport and President's house this afternoon and we suggested postponement further discussions until 8:30 tomorrow morning.

At dinner later this evening explained to Minister Defense in some detail necessity of our presenting combined constructive plan which would command instant respect. He replied he had already spoken what he sincerely believed and if President and ourselves worked out program he would interpose no further objection though Prime Minister inclined to believe President's position final. However, will push on tomorrow.<sup>1</sup>

BRIGGS

---

<sup>1</sup> The following subsequent message was sent to the Department as telegram 1126, May 7, from Seoul, repeated to Geneva as telegram 53 :

"For Secretary from Dean. Geneva for Smith. Re Geneva's 44 to Seoul repeated Department Secto 112 [dated May 6, p. 211]. Reftel received after despatch our 1125. Absolutely no difference in thinking between you and ourselves and will do utmost to urge Rhee's prompt acceptance in talks this morning. Arrival other mission has to some extent complicated timetable but will iron out. Briggs" (795B.00/5-654)

MAY 7, 1954

795B.00/5-754 : Telegram

*Dean-Briggs-Rhee Meeting, Seoul, May 7, Morning: The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

SECRET      PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 7, 1954—2 p. m.

54. Sent Department 1127, repeated information Tokyo 665. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Smith from Dean. Reference your 44.<sup>1</sup> Ambassadors Dean and Briggs saw President Rhee, Prime Minister, Min-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 6. p. 211.

ister of Defense, and acting Foreign Minister Cho one hour this morning. On broad general principles outlined as forcefully as possible basic reasons why we should present united plan soonest at Geneva. President seeing General Van Fleet at 2:30 and obviously wants to see what he can get out of him before making any final commitments. Have always stayed on basic principles and have not discussed drafting changes with President. However, they have been so continually insistent on complete and total withdrawal Chinese Communist forces and surrender North Korean Army before elections can be held and complete unwillingness to leave this to determination of UNCURK. We have suggested "such substantial withdrawal" Chinese Communists as in opinion of UNCURK would permit free elections and this morning suggested "such preponderant and substantial withdrawal, et cetera", but President and Prime Minister rejected all of this as mere phraseology and insisted on unconditional withdrawal. Pointed out on basis of phased withdrawal this would require complete UN withdrawal also before elections. Again President is so positive he is going to get his entire asking price for complete build-up of Korean divisions this does not bother him in slightest and in fact he looks forward to day. He spoke with great bitterness fact he had not been allowed to move because we had locked up "ammunition and gasoline". He is basically and fundamentally unreconciled to armistice and to its inconclusive nature and spoke with great fervor on that subject.

He insists constitution does not permit him to agree to hold elections for Assembly immediately after the impending May 20 elections for National Assemblymen four-year term. He also insists he has no right to agree to hold new elections for President and claims that his idea of plebiscite in all Korea by people is correct after elections in north.

We pointed out constitution could be amended by two-thirds National Assembly and suggested he undertake to recommend to National Assembly that the constitution could be amended to permit elections desired.

Prime Minister and Defense Minister strongly objected on grounds if such elections held in south would cause consternation and confusion and insisted Communists would argue they had forced Rhee's abdication and that ROK Government though sovereign, had been placed by Geneva on par with Communists.

Reference fifth paragraph subdivision (1) your 44, until elections are held under Plan B in north and south, North Korean Communist

Government there remains in power in north and must adopt electoral laws requested by UNCURK. Rhee takes violent exception to this. Further if free elections are held President repeatedly asks me if I can guarantee present ROK Government will be returned to power and Rhee elected President.

After President had turned me down flatly, at least six times, we again urged interest US-ROK relations he cooperate with allies to present something at Geneva we regard as fundamental. He still bitter against Casey's speech and Philippines proposal and past critical reports of his government by UNCURK and every time UNCURK mentioned he objects and insists on UN.

Would it be appropriate to use some such language as "United Nations or appropriate commission thereof" in order to avoid specific use of UNCURK?

My suggestions wording Plan B were in response for request for them but unless specifically noted in cables have not discussed them with Rhee.

At conclusion my strong plea for action President asked me to put suggestions in writing and to send them over. President also asks if he did agree to what we were requesting whether I could promise in writing there would be no further demands for concessions of any kind and if he would get build-up ROK Army he desires; I of course replied had no such authority and question ROK Army entirely within province General Van Fleet.

They are extremely allergic to first sentence IV Plan B and if we do agree complete withdrawal before elections this would of course disappear.

They cannot understand why having supported them on Plan A we are now moving to Plan B in order to achieve unity at Geneva when we do not believe Communists will accept Plan B. All efforts to persuade them essential to preserve unity of free nations have fallen flat. President extremely bitter about our announcement proposed South-east Asia pact against Communists which includes European nations but excludes Korea and Nationalist China. He considers we stole his idea and then left him out and are including weak sisters and colonial powers.

Would appreciate instructions soonest and whether Defense clearance mentioned Washington 893 subdivision 4<sup>2</sup> obtained.

BRIGGS

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 5, p. 209.

396.1 GE/5-754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL      NIACT

GENEVA, May 7, 1954—9 a. m.

Secto 127. Repeated information Tokyo 25, Seoul niact 50. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Following revised draft proposal for establishment united and independent Korea :

“In conformity with UN resolutions on peaceful settlement Korean question and in recognition of Korean people determine through genuinely free elections form and composition their government, establishment of united and independent Korea shall be achieved following manner :

*I. Responsibilities supervision and observation.*

Establishment united and independent Korea through holding genuinely free elections and withdrawal all non-Korean forces from Korea within time schedule set forth below shall be observed and certified in manner provided below by UNCURK, established by resolution UNGA October 7, 1950.

*II. Free elections in Korea.*

a. Within period six months from adoption this agreement and following determination and announcement by UNCURK that necessary conditions for free elections exist, there shall be held throughout Korea at date selected by UNCURK elections for President and National Assembly of Unified Korea.

b. Representation in National Assembly shall be in direct proportion to population citizenry Korea accordance census observed and certified by UNCURK.

c. Elections shall be based on universal adult suffrage by all citizens Korea.

d. Elections shall be in secret and held conditions genuine freedom throughout Korea.

e. Elections shall be supervised and observed by UNCURK. This Commission shall ensure that elections properly conducted and safeguards for conditions genuine freedom observed before, during and after elections until government Unified Korea established. Commission shall propose, and appropriate authorities in Korea shall put into effect, any changes in applicable election laws which Commission considers necessary assure free elections accordance these proposals. Results elections shall be considered valid expression free will people of Korea where Commission has so certified.

f. Conditions genuine freedom and applicable election laws shall include following guarantees : Freedom of movement ; freedom of presentation candidates ; immunity candidates ; freedom arbitrary arrest or victimization ; freedom association and political meetings ; freedom expression for all ; freedom press, radio and free circulation newspapers, periodicals, etc. ; secrecy vote ; security polling stations and ballot boxes.

*g.* All authorities within Korea shall cooperate fully ensuring elections properly conducted under necessary safeguards, as determined by UNCURK. Commission shall have right travel freely throughout Korea so as make such observations and investigations it deems necessary and to that end all authorities Korea shall provide UNCURK all necessary assistance and facilities.

### III. *Formation Government Unified Korea.*

*a.* Immediately after elections, National Assembly shall be convened Seoul and government formed for whole of Korea accordance constitution Republic of Korea. Government so formed will then become sole legitimate Government Korea.

*b.* Constitution shall remain in force except as it may be superseded or amended by National Assembly acting constituent session when convened following elections.

### IV. *Withdrawal non-Korean Forces.*

As integral part unification Korea, concurrent withdrawal all non-Korean Forces from Korea shall be effected as follows:

*a.* Concurrent withdrawal non-Korean Forces shall be observed and verified by UNCURK all stages accordance schedules prearranged with UNCURK pursuant this agreement, and shall be carried out through ports entry prescribed armistice agreement July 27, 1953.

*b.* Concurrent withdrawals shall begin 60 days from date this agreement.

*c.* By date elections herein provided for, no more than total 150,000 non-Korean troops shall remain North Korea and South Korea respectively.

*d.* All residual non-Korean Forces shall be withdrawn from Korea within three months after UNCURK certifies Government Unified Korea has been established with effective control over all Korea.

### V. *International provision for security Unified Korea.*

Parties this agreement hereby pledge their respect for territorial integrity and political independence Unified Korea. Government Unified Korea shall undertake abide by purposes and principles UN Charter in its international relations.

### VI. *Rehabilitation Korea.*

After formation Government Unified Korea accordance above provisions, there shall be developed and carried out under auspices UN international program relief and rehabilitation all Korea to which all countries so desiring may contribute. Such program shall be developed consultation Korean Government.

### VII. *Concluding stages.*

Parties to armistice agreement shall direct their military commanders modify appropriate paragraphs that agreement order enable UNCURK carry out above arrangements leading to unification Korea. Armistice agreement shall be considered superseded accordance paragraph 62 that agreement only when UNCURK certified (*a*) Korean Government has been established with effective control over all Korea

as result free and secret elections expressing valid will of people and (b) all non-Korean Forces withdrawn from Korea accordance provisions section IV this agreement.

UNCURK shall report to General Assembly UN when implementation this agreement completed.

#### VIII. *Implementation agreement.*

There shall be annexed hereto detailed agreements for implementation above provisions which shall constitute integral part this agreement."

Paragraph IV above sent separate telegram for comment and guidance.<sup>1</sup> Would appreciate knowing soonest from Department and Seoul when we can consider text draft proposal approved for further use here.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> See telegram Secto 128, *infra*.

---

396.1 GE/5-754 : Telegram

#### *The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL      NIACT

GENEVA, May 7, 1954—10 a. m.

Secto 128. Repeated information Tokyo 26, niact Seoul 51. Tokyo pass CINCUNC; Department pass Defense. Re paragraph 4 Tosec 81 repeated Seoul 893,<sup>1</sup> submit following revision paragraph IV draft proposals for comment:

"Withdrawal of non-Korean forces. As an integral part of the unification of Korea, concurrent withdrawal of all non-Korean forces from Korea shall be effected as follows:

"A. The concurrent withdrawal of non-Korean forces shall be observed and verified by UNCURK at all stages in accordance with schedules pre-arranged with UNCURK pursuant to this agreement, and shall be carried out through the ports of entry prescribed in the Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953.

"B. Concurrent withdrawals shall begin sixty days from the date of this agreement.

"C. By the date of the elections herein provided for, not more than a total of 150,000 non-Korean troops shall remain in North Korea and South Korea, respectively.

"D. All residual non-Korean forces shall be withdrawn from Korea within three months after UNCURK certifies that government of a unified Korea has been established with effective control over all Korea."

This revision provides that bulk non-Korean forces, particularly Chinese, will be withdrawn from Korea by time elections held. This designed help Rhee's problem as Department suggests. Revision also provides that nucleus UNC Forces would remain in Korea after elec-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 5, p. 209.

tions for contingency Communists stall or circumvent implementation political plans.

Negotiating problem is whether we want to put forward in our first detailed public formulation troop withdrawal issue proposal for telescoped time span and bulk withdrawal prior to elections. Would it be better with Rhee's agreement and understanding leave paragraph on withdrawal non-Korean forces substantially as is and amend it if necessary at later stages along above lines. Communists are pressing for total simultaneous withdrawal prior to elections. Time span and scheduled phases might better be held in reserve rather than initially take position close to or same as Communists.

Admiral Davis has seen above revision and concurs subject Defense concurrence. Would appreciate comments Department and Seoul.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-754 : Telegram

*Smith-Pyun Meeting, Geneva, May 7, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT

GENEVA, May 7, 1954—9 p. m.

54. Repeated information Department Secto 137 Tokyo 27. Re Secto 127, repeated niact Seoul 50.<sup>1</sup> Went over revised draft this morning with Pyun and Yang and expressed increasingly difficult position here Geneva lacking ROK decision agree on draft proposal. Pyun and Yang said they had sent several telegrams urging President Rhee accept draft. Re elections for President in addition for National Assembly in paragraph II-A revised draft, believe we should delete elections for President. Pyun and Yang said ROK del strongly opposed as reported Secto 107.<sup>2</sup> We note from Seoul's 52<sup>3</sup> to Geneva, Defense Minister has expressed fear election for President would greatly affect morale ROK armed forces. Robertson told Pyun we fully prepared delete elections for President if ROK desires.

Only other change suggested by Pyun is in paragraph III-A where he asked insert "unified" in second sentence to read "government of unified Korea".

Explained paragraph IV on withdrawal non-Korean forces tentative. Pyun and Yang both liked revision.

Yang informed us privately Pyun sending message today to President recommending deletion presidential elections and acceptance revised draft proposal.

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 7, p. 218.

<sup>2</sup> Same as telegram 42, May 5, from Geneva, p. 204.

<sup>3</sup> Same as telegram 1125, May 7, from Seoul, p. 213.

396.1 GE/5-754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 7, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 131. For the Secretary. Inability obtain Rhee's agreement plan B facing us with increasingly difficult situation here. If Rhee's agreement not obtained shortly we must, in spite our best efforts here, anticipate probability some delegation will come forward with proposal calling for all-Korean elections under UN supervision and simultaneous phased withdrawal foreign forces which will command support from all others on allied side (and I believe, majority US public opinion) facing us with decision whether we continue stand with ROKs on plan A and bring about open break with our other allies. Allies of course recognize that without US-ROK agreement no plan can be implemented, and we will do utmost bring home to them possibilities Communist exploitation such a move on their part would create. However, pressure so strong probably cannot indefinitely continue prevent allied side from putting forward "reasonable" proposal. In any event we can expect virtually no support for breaking negotiations on our present position.

It is probable Rhee estimates by holding out agreement on plan B he can, in light of Van Fleet mission, improve bargaining position for obtaining commitment increased forces. Therefore suggest Van Fleet be instructed discuss situation with Dean and to give Dean full support his negotiations, emphasizing the urgent necessity of submitting reasonable proposal without further delay. Also suggest Hull discuss with Rhee military implications this position on troop withdrawal.

I would also appreciate your instructions tactics we should pursue here if Rhee remains adamant. That is, do we (a) join with other allies in putting forward proposal along lines plan B, facing Rhee with decision as to whether he will at that point walk out of conference, or as we would hope, refrain from public opposition to plan pending Communist reaction, or (b) do we continue stand with ROK on plan A to extent if necessary joining ROK in walkout from conference? I recommend course (a) after informing ROK we cannot stand with them on position which would not receive support from any of our allies, US public opinion, and public opinion elsewhere in free world.<sup>1</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> In telegram 897, sent niact to Seoul on May 7, the Department of State repeated the text of Secto 131 and asked for Dean's comments with particular regard to the tactics to be pursued at Geneva in the event that Rhee failed to accept Plan B (396.1 GE/5-754).



396.1 GE/5-754 : Telegram

*Eighth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, May 7, 3:05 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 7, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 138. Repeated information Tokyo 28, London 135, Paris 218, Moscow 49, Oslo 6, Seoul 55. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense, CINCPAC, COMSAC. Today's plenary session (eighth) most satisfactory presentation so far of general Allied position. Summary texts being transmitted in clear to Seoul and Department as Secto 139.<sup>2</sup> Philippine, New Zealand and Colombian representatives<sup>3</sup> spoke strongly for:

(1) Authority and integrity of UN as basic issue in view of Communist challenge UN has no authority in Korea or Asia and conference has nothing to do with UN. Consensus of today's speakers was UN members have no business at conference if Communists reject UN.

(2) Conformity of proposals on Korea with UN resolutions and particularly resolution of October 7, 1950.

(3) General proposals on Korean independence and unification including (a) supervision and observation by UN; (b) assurance of proportional representation on basis population ratio between north and south; (c) free elections and adequate safeguards for conduct of elections; (d) adequate assurance of stable conditions and unification of Korea prior to withdrawal all UN forces from Korea.

These three basic concepts and three speeches today highlight ROK Allied case at Geneva in clear, uncontrovertible, eloquent terms.

Molotov failed to give speech although apparently had prepared text in front of him. All Communist delegates left Palais immediately after session without usual mixing in lounge and without any of usual jocular exchanges with free world delegates.

Molotov announced as no speaker inscribed for Saturday,<sup>4</sup> no plenary that day. No date set for next plenary.

For Embassy Seoul: All our subsequent actions and words here should bolster this strong position which previous speeches on our side have reflected and which Secretary keynoted in his address to conference. Consider it important complete US-ROK cooperative effort concert on draft proposal so that we are prepared as soon as

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/8) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:05 p. m. and adjourned at 5:05 p. m.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> The statements of the New Zealand and Philippine representatives, Webb and Garcia, are printed in *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 82-90.

<sup>4</sup> May 8.

possible introduce it with appropriate timing and auspices for best effect. Themes of today's speeches will form excellent setting for proposal.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-754: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1954—7: 23 p. m.

Tosec 97. Re Secto 127, 128 repeated Seoul 50 and 51 Tokyo 25 and 26;<sup>2</sup> Secto 131 repeated Seoul and Tokyo by Department;<sup>3</sup> Seoul's 1127<sup>4</sup> and 1133 repeated Geneva 54 and 58 Tokyo 665 and 668.<sup>5</sup> Re revised draft proposal Secto 127 repeated Seoul 50 Department approves but makes following comments:

Para II A. Do not propose change but point out difficulties taking census and holding elections within 6 months. Assume in your thinking that 6 months period sets final deadline for elections despite UNCURK actions but that desirable slightly blur situation.

Para II G. Last sentence prefer changing after UNCURK to read "such assistance and facilities as UNCURK may request." This strengthens UNCURK's hand.

Para IV. Re force withdrawal Department approves formulation. If Rhee agrees Department also much prefers delegation's tactical suggestion Secto 128 retain previous formulation in first presentation of Plan B to conference then utilize new draft in subsequent negotiations as bargaining factor since troop withdrawal still seems to be primary Communist aim re Korea. Hope therefore Dean and Briggs can persuade Rhee agree this tactic. Defense position this question not available until receipt CINCUNC's comments expected May 8.

Re Geneva's 131 and Seoul's 1133. Defense wishes Van Fleet talk soonest with Dean and Briggs re Geneva Conference and authorizes him cooperate to fullest with them in endeavoring persuade Rhee authorize Pyun support Plan B. In persuading Rhee authorize use first para Secto 131. Pending outcome approach, Department suggests for Seoul and Geneva consideration and comment alternative course action. Dean and Briggs might tell Rhee we endeavor have one or more

<sup>1</sup> Also sent to Seoul niact as telegram 899 and repeated to Tokyo as 2455 with the instruction that it be passed to CINCUNC.

<sup>2</sup> Both dated May 7, pp. 218 and 220.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 7, p. 222.

<sup>4</sup> Printed as telegram 54, May 7, p. 215.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. It was directed to Geneva as telegram 58, May 7, to inform Smith that Dean and Briggs were seeing Rhee on the following morning in hopes of getting a general statement which would provide the United States with the desired freedom of movement. It was sent in response to telegram Secto 128, which had been repeated to Geneva as telegram 51. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 274)

our allies introduce Plan B. We convinced Communists will promptly reject. Therefore Rhee has nothing to lose if he instructs Pyun say nothing, reserving his position. US would withhold open support temporarily as some our allies have done re proposals made by Pyun and Secretary. If Communists query whether plan acceptable all 16 and especially ROK our public posture will be insist Communists give answer to reasonable proposal and if they willing accept and sign on dotted line that will be fine and we perfectly willing start preparing document for signature. However, we would try avoid this difficulty by having series supporting speakers lined up until one or more Communist side inscribed to speak.

This position clearly undesirable but believe it preferable to abandoning ROK, or having one of our allies put forward proposal which would wipe out constitutional structure ROK, or abandoning conference, which are only alternatives suggested Secto 131.

Request Geneva view possibility stalling at Geneva until middle next week to allow more time for persuasion Rhee to accept Plan B, and Seoul view usefulness this additional time.

DULLES

---

795B.00/5-754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1954—7:23 p. m.

898. Re UN Supervisory Body, Seoul's 1127, repeated Geneva 54.<sup>2</sup>

1. In discussions use UNCURK suggest you stress:

a. Composition UNCURK much more favorable ROK interests than any new body now likely be established. Believe much more difficult exclude Communist or neutralist representation in any new UN body, although probable we could assure anti-Communist majority. (If Rhee brings up possibility conference recommending addition Communists to present UNCURK membership, suggest you indicate we would not consider this unless necessary to secure Communist agreement on otherwise acceptable plan.)

b. Even if UN rather than UNCURK referred to, will be necessary explain what is in fact intended.

c. If Rhee thinking of UN supervision by secretariat personnel, rather than by representatives of governments designated by Assembly, consider such body wholly inadequate for purpose.

2. If Rhee nevertheless refuses specify UNCURK in proposal, believe we should agree refer to supervision by UN, provided Rhee understands allies would at least initially propose in discussions that

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated to Geneva as telegram Tosec 98.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 7, p. 215.

UNCURK be used. This would not require ROK indicate advance approval UNCURK.

DULLES

396.1 GE/5-754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 7, 1954—10 p. m.

57. Repeated information Department Secto 140, Tokyo 29. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Briggs and Dean. Seoul's 52 to Geneva sent Department 1125.<sup>1</sup> Suggest you inform Rhee re points B and C third paragraph reference telegram: (1) paragraph V of draft proposal would provide specific assurances from Chinese Communists and Soviets re respect for integrity and independence of Korea; (2) proposal does not contemplate direct consultation or cooperation between ROK and North Korean regime on electoral laws, or other matters connected holding free elections throughout Korea. On contrary, proposal envisages UNCURK would deal with ROK on one hand and with North Korean authorities on other re establishment conditions for elections, electoral laws, conduct of elections and withdrawal non-Korean forces. One of purposes this proposal to avoid dealings between North and South Korean authorities which might lead to type of joint arrangements envisaged in Communist proposal.

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 7, p. 213.

MAY 8, 1954

795B.00/5-854 : Telegram

*Dean-Briggs-Rhee Meeting, Seoul, May 8, Morning: The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

SEOUL, May 8, 1954—3 p. m.

1134. Repeated information Tokyo 668, niact Geneva 59. Tokyo for CINCUNC. For Secretary from Dean. Drafted following message and handed to President in two and one-half hour conference this morning at which Prime Minister and Acting Foreign Minister Cho also present.

"If the Communist aggressors will withdraw from my country, so that genuinely free elections can be held throughout Korea, under UN supervision and observation, I, Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea, pledge my complete cooperation and will recommend

to the National Assembly the adoption of such amendments to the constitution as may be necessary to have national elections for the National Assembly and the Presidency.

But there must be no repetition of the Communist aggression of 1950, after the peaceful withdrawal of the United States forces in 1949. Therefore, as President of the Republic of Korea, I plan to ask the United Nations to allow UNC forces to remain in Korea until after the elections in order to ensure that the Communist promises with respect to genuinely free elections shall this time be honored and observed, and a truly united free and independent Korea shall come into being."

Told President we considered situation exceptionally grave and that he must not consider we were merely trying please English and the French, but that we must make proposal which will command universal free world respect and command majority American public opinion, and that it was imperative administration command broad American public opinion support not only for its proposals at Geneva, but in order to get public support for appropriation for continued Korean rehabilitation and build-up ROK forces.

Emphasized phased withdrawal UN forces in south was not because we had lost interest or because we no longer desired to have American boys fight but was essential condition to obtain withdrawal Chinese Communist forces in north.

While talking to President, your 897<sup>1</sup> was handed me. Summarized provisions first paragraph to him, stated you regarded joint action along lines Plan B imperative and would be extremely difficult hold allies in line if not made.

He at first said he was not going to make any commitments until he had received all the commitments from General Van Fleet which he expected.

Pointed out our initial philosophy was to stand by and not to abandon him, but psychologically abandonment is uppermost in their minds. Believe they think we are using phased withdrawal as excuse to do what we want to do anyhow. Assured him our basic philosophy was to build-up ROK divisions as UNC forces withdrawn and was sure he and General Van Fleet would work everything out in harmony but that mission was essentially fact-finding, and decision today on Plan B was imperative and could not wait. Stated further we were allies and must act together and we would not be urging him to go forward on Plan B unless we thought it was in best interests Korean people. He stated he would not issue statement unless we guaranteed to resume

---

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, p. 222.

fighting in Korea if Communists refused to withdraw. Pointed out UN not compelled to withdraw if Communists do not and that I had been authorized state to him mutual defense pact would be promulgated and he therefore had that treaty in the event of renewed Communist aggression.

For some time he held out for guarantees by President Eisenhower Korea would be united and US should take full responsibility therefore, because he claimed it was through our original mistakes in allowing Soviet troops in north that country was divided.

Reviewed our response to aggressors, number of American lives lost, and terrific over-all American expenditure in Korea.

Contrary to Geneva's 54,<sup>2</sup> President read aloud to us telegram from Pyun in which Pyun denounced Plan B in scathing terms, termed it unmitigated surrender to Communists and urged President to stand firm on Plan A. Again pointed out disaster such procedure and stated Plan must be accepted by Communists in whole, and not in part, and doubted whether Communists would accept because our insistence UN supervision elections. President replied that argument was often used on him in connection with armistice and eventually Communists always accepted. Prime Minister and Acting Minister Cho both urged President to stand on Plan A.

Said failure endorse Plan B most disastrous US-ROK relations and Communists would regard lack of unity between us at Geneva as great victory.

Fall of Dien Bien Phu announced while we were there and President made long statement to effect we made big and resounding promises about fighting Communists but could not keep them because of American and Congressional opinion against use of American troops in Asia.

Again made strong plea to him to issue statement and he promised to discuss and call me later today. Explained possible strategy outlined Geneva's 51<sup>3</sup> and reasons therefore but he still unalterably opposed any Chinese Communist troops remaining in north before elections, demands complete surrender North Korean Communist forces, and insists ROK electoral laws must be used in elections.

With respect to above quoted statement, explained we preferred leave in words "and the Presidency" but that he could omit in his discretion.

BRIGGS

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 7, p. 221.

<sup>3</sup> Same as telegram Secto 128, May 7, p. 220.

795B.00/5-854 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 8, 1954—4 p. m.

60. Sent Department 1135, repeated information Tokyo 670. Geneva for USDel. Tokyo for CINCUNC. From Dean for Smith. Reference Geneva's 50.<sup>1</sup> Following preliminary comments for your guidance only; not discussed with Rhee except as previously noted substantively.

Assuming present ROK electoral laws were originally drawn up by UN Commission, would simplify if II E provided such laws were to govern in north. This would eliminate necessity Rhee working with North Korean Communists on new electoral unified law and hence recognizing them as an "authority".

If change made, make appropriate changes in II F and twice in G.

IV A. Since according to General Mohn, Communists are not using ports of entry in north but are using other ports of entry which NNSC not now free to inspect, he points out such provisions completely inoperative in north as far as we are concerned but provisions bind us to great detail in south with which provisions we are frequently in technical violation.

Would IV D require withdrawal US training forces, educational pilots, technicians, et cetera; and would this prevent investigatory mission such as Van Fleet current one? Realize language must be reciprocal.

II F. Understood freedom of movement from north to south was to be eliminated. In any event this provision cannot come into operation while armistice agreement remains in effect. See particularly movements in and across DMZ.

Since you don't expect Communists to accept would greatly reduce irritation here if you could use UN or appropriate agency thereof in lieu of UNCURK but in view Washington 898<sup>2</sup> suggest leave UNCURK for present.

Assume you consider impracticable make any provision for disarming North Korean Communists as long as ROK forces remain under arms but believe non-provision for this as well as provision for even residual Chinese Communist forces remaining here till after election will continue to be substantial barrier acceptance here since in their minds implies aggressor has right to remain.

Don't follow why second paragraph D applies more specifically to Chinese than UN forces.

BRIGGS

<sup>1</sup> Same as telegram Secto 127, May 7, p. 218.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 7, p. 225.

396.1 GE/5-854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 8, 1954—4 p. m.

Secto 149. Repeated information Seoul 58, Tokyo 31. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary from Smith. Following are comments on Tosec 97 [98] (to Seoul 898)<sup>1</sup> and Seoul's 54 to Geneva: <sup>2</sup>

1. Recommend against alternative course action suggested final paragraphs Tosec 97 <sup>3</sup> except as last resort. To follow such course at this time would show up allied disunity and place us in highly vulnerable position. Doubtful Communists would fail realize and exploit situation, as at Panmunjom, where Communists, ignoring our proposals, were beginning capitalize on fact ROK not supporting our position when Dean broke off talks. Believe preferable delay presentation allied proposal until agreement reached within 16 even if means stalling until some time next week.

2. Speeches Eight Plenary Session leave us in stronger position for time being with three clear-cut issues but do not believe possible stall more than few days at best. While opening Indochina phase may divert attention away from problem Korean negotiations Seoul as well as Geneva, we about run out of speakers for general debate on Korea. We reaching stage of repetition general themes or presenting proposals on basis general position thoroughly developed in general debate. Can anticipate only one or possibly two more plenary sessions general debate on Korean problem. Can count on Allied Delegates again speaking in support general principles when we in position submit proposal. Accordingly, our immediate tactic is (1) obtain firm 16-nation endorsement draft proposal, but (2) not present it to Communists at this time unless they indicate willingness accept UN role in Korea. However, plan would in any event be tabled in plenary session before adjournment conference.

3. Therefore believe should complete work not later than Tuesday <sup>4</sup> on US-ROK agreement draft proposal. We should inform Rhee we consider we must be ready present plan B proposal within next few days. His refusal to go along with it will have serious adverse effect our relations and may require re-examination (1) whether mutual defense treaty should be brought into effect and (2) extent our mili-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 7, p. 225.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 7, p. 215.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 7, p. 224.

<sup>4</sup> May 11.



tary and economic aid programs. Recommend this strong line only because convinced ROK interests fully protected by our proposal and failure present some such proposal would have extremely bad effect. Moreover, Pyun and other members ROK delegation appear convinced desirability ROK backing our proposal.

4. Hope arguments outlined Tosec 98 will convince Rhee desirability proposing UNCURK in first instance as UN body in Korea. Further point which should be considered and advanced to Rhee is fact his opposition might play into Communist hands by giving them reason propose new body perhaps including neutralist nations and even one including Communist China (see Secto 150 repeated Seoul 59, Tokyo 32 re Chinese reactions at press briefing on UN question).<sup>5</sup> We would anticipate that if serious negotiations commence here on proposal we would be prepared agree creation suitable new UN commission but from tactical viewpoint seems best insist initially on UNCURK. Rhee's objection to UNCURK does weaken our negotiating position, particularly since Communists will oppose UNCURK but may as concession later be willing accept UN commission with composition favorable Communist interests. Nevertheless, if Rhee adamant, we would reluctantly agree to phrase such as "appropriate UN commission".

5. In order stem impatience growing among some Allied Delegations we are considering meeting of working group of nine, probably Monday, to discuss draft proposal for first time, whether or not we have Rhee's approval by then. ROK Delegation would, of course, participate on *ad referendum* basis.

SMITH

---

<sup>5</sup> *Infra*.

---

396.1 GE/5-854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 8, 1954—4 p. m.

Secto 150. Repeated information Seoul 59, Tokyo 32, Hong Kong 9. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. In Chinese Communist press conference following May 7 plenary spokesman Huang Hua reacted sharply to three speeches, particularly with respect to speakers attacks on Chinese Communist denunciation UN role in Korea. Reiterating Chou En-lai's charge UN belligerent in Korea and its resolutions illegal, Huang

equated idea UN supervision Korean elections with supervision by "US occupation forces".

Referring Webb's comments on inconsistency Chou attack on UN activities Korea and Peiping demands admission UN, Huang praised UN Charter and professed desire uphold UN prestige. He quoted as saying:<sup>1</sup>

"We consider UN Charter good one leading to establishment peace and security. . . . China is one of sponsors UN. Tung Pi-wu, official PRC, was one of signatories. . . . it is precisely for purpose of upholding prestige UN that illegal resolutions adopted in past should be eliminated. . . . it was also because these illegal resolutions could not carry UN any further that Geneva Conference was arranged through other quarters. . . . after Chiang, who was kept and supported by US, was thrown out and Chinese people had chosen government of its own—PRC—it is natural that this government should secure its rightful position UN."

*Comment:* While Huang's charges against UN role in Korea follow familiar pattern, there is possibility his statement designed hint Communists will agree UN supervised elections provided Peiping admitted UN. This possibility indicated by (a) alleged support UN Charter; (b) claim Peiping regime (through Tung Pi-wu) somehow responsible for charter; (c) implication UN resolutions though illegal in past could be legal in future provided Peiping regime in UN; (d) claim that convening of Geneva Conference demonstrates UN impotent (in absence Peiping membership) deal matters such as Korea and Indochina; (e) equating UN supervision with supervision "US occupation forces," leaving door open to acceptance provided US troops withdraw and Peiping admitted UN.

While Huang statements may have simply been effort offset telling points made by speakers in plenary session, they highlight danger of Communist maneuver gain admittance UN by accepting principle UN election supervision as *quid pro quo*. Perhaps greatest deterrent Communist making such counter-proposal would be necessity abandonment principle elections held only under supervision North Korean ROK Commission with both parties represented equal footing. But whether Communists actually make counter-proposal or not continued emphasis by 16 on UN responsibility Korean settlement does involve danger Chinese Communists countering at least with strong implication they agreeable so long as Peiping is member. Countries recognizing Peiping might be receptive such appeal even though it would be case UN performance in return Communist promise.

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> The ellipses in the quoted paragraph are in the source text.

396.1 GE/5-754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1954—4:41 p. m.

Tosec 108. Re Geneva Secto 128, repeated Tokyo 26, Seoul 51.<sup>2</sup> Understand Defense transmitting through military channels concurrence revised paragraph IV Plan B with certain comments most important of which are:

1. In setting date consideration should be given time required CINCUNC accomplish orderly withdrawal personnel and equipment. CINCUNC has requested nine to eleven months.

2. Approval conditioned on understanding will be possible under agreement for US to have MAAG in Korea after establishment unified government.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Also sent priority to Seoul as telegram 903 and to Tokyo as telegram 2466 with instructions to pass it to CINCUNC.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 7, p. 220.

795B.00/5-854 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

SECRET

NIACT

SEOUL, May 8, 1954—5 p. m.

62. Sent Department 1137, repeated information Tokyo 672. Geneva for USDel. Tokyo for CINCUNC. For Smith from Dean. Acting Foreign Minister Cho called in person and handed us following authorized message dated May 8 from President Rhee for transmission our government.

“After the Communist aggressors have withdrawn from my country so that genuine free elections can be held throughout Korea under UN observation I will recommend to the National Assembly the adoption of such amendments to the constitution as may be necessary to have national elections for the National Assembly.

The withdrawal of Chinese troops should be completed and the Korean Communist Army should either leave the country or surrender to the ROK Government and the USA should pledge to act on the USA-ROK Mutual Defense Pact immediately if Communist forces invade Korea again.

There should be no repetition of the Communist aggression of 1950 which took place after the withdrawal of the USA forces in 1949.”

(With respect to foregoing statement President adds parenthetically that although no reference to elections for the presidency are to be included, when proper time comes he will personally ask National Assembly to amend constitution to include election of president, and “I may be willing run for re-election”.)

Pointed out to Cho first this wording would presumably require phased simultaneous withdrawal in south of all UN forces before

election; second, along lines Deptel 898<sup>1</sup> said would prefer use UNCURK since no Communists on present commission appointed 7 October 1950 resolutions and other side would certainly insist on Communists if Secretary General appointed today; and third, in view our conversation with President Rhee this morning, was my clear understanding if this message satisfactory to our government, President Rhee would authorize Pyun to have plan B, modified along these lines, presented at Geneva.

Cho confirmed this was his understanding of his conversations President Rhee; stated President Rhee did not wish issue instructions Pyun until sure this statement satisfactory our government.

Assume you can devise appropriate language with respect to action on Defense Pact. Sorry about inclusion surrender North Korean Communist Army but without this I am afraid can get no statement whatsoever and further believe necessary avoid rupture after plan is announced.

Sincerely hope this statement which really represents maximum effort our part and pushing President to limit can be used to put forward plan B at Geneva promptly with full approval our allies and we can iron out essential details later.

General Van Fleet has been south on inspection trip all day and will have no opportunity discuss messages with him until probably very late tonight or tomorrow morning. Fully recognize his tremendous influence but hope you won't push President too far or he apt to ask firmer commitment on ROK build-up.

Hope you appreciate the suggested statement sent Embtel 1134<sup>2</sup> drafted not only to accomplish practical result we want but so drafted that when public statement issued here will receive public approbation.

BRIGGS

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 7, p. 225.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 8, p. 226.

---

795B.00/5-854: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1954—4:41 p. m.

902. Seoul's 1137 repeated Geneva 62, Tokyo 672.<sup>2</sup> Appreciate herculean efforts put forth endeavor persuade Rhee accept Plan B

---

<sup>1</sup> Also sent to Geneva as telegram Tosec 107 and to Tokyo as telegram 2465 with instructions to pass it to CINCUNC.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*. Because of the time difference between Seoul and Washington, telegram 1137 was received in the Department of State at 8:31 a. m. on May 8.

and doubt but leave your discretion whether or not desirable press him further just now.

However re proposed statement recognize great difficulty persuading our allies adopt modification Plan "B" which would call for withdrawal or surrender North Korean Army. In addition Defense which has not yet received CINCUNC's comments is not willing accept total withdrawal all non-Korean forces before elections. Consequently do not see how we can say proposed statement is satisfactory US Government. If Delegation Geneva believes possible our allies would accept proposed statement or some suitable variation as basis introduction appropriately modified Plan B and recommends we do so Department will again query Defense re possible acceptance from military viewpoint of total withdrawal before elections. However believe consideration might also be given alternative course of action proposed Department's Tosec 97 repeated Seoul 899 and Tokyo 2455.<sup>3</sup> Desire Geneva and Seoul comments.

DULLES

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 7, p. 224.

MAY 9, 1954

795B.00/5-954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

NIACT

GENEVA, May 9, 1954—1 p. m.

Dulte 58. Eyes only for Secretary. Latest message from Seoul, particularly Dean's Department 1134, Geneva 59<sup>1</sup> and Department 1137, Geneva 62,<sup>2</sup> leave me completely mystified. I do not wish to be critical but if our people in Seoul actually drafted the statement quoted in Department 1134, it is about as bad as Rhee's counterdraft and would certainly make our position here much more difficult. Cannot imagine our representative in Seoul proposing to Rhee that he make such a statement without consultation either with Department or Geneva, let alone making a strong plea for Rhee to issue it. I appreciate all the difficulties of situation there but it seems to me there is an element of unrealism in these discussions which may require a personal word of caution from you.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 8, p. 226.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 8, p. 233.

396.1 GE/5-954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 9, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 156. Sent priority Seoul 60, repeated information priority Tokyo 38. Tokyo for CINCFE. Comments re Tosec 107, repeated Seoul 902<sup>1</sup> and Seoul's 59<sup>2</sup> and 62 to Geneva :<sup>3</sup>

1. Delegation Geneva considers entirely unlikely allies accept proposal for surrender North Korea Army to ROK and in effect automatic extension ROK sovereignty over North Korea. US would be put in ridiculous untenable position to suggest or support such proposal.

2. Paragraph 1, Secto 149, repeated Seoul 58<sup>4</sup> gives delegation's views on proposal Secto 57.<sup>5</sup> Delegation suggests question now is have we reached this last resort and when should we proceed develop plan B with other 14 and without ROK if, as seems probable, Rhee insists on impossible terms. Believe unrealistic assume ROK can be persuaded or expected remain silent. They will probably take stand along lines Rhee's views, as Pyun was about to do in plenary last Monday.<sup>6</sup> This alternative means (a) we reverse our policy of US-ROK collaboration, but we see no alternative if Rhee adheres extreme, unrealistic views and if Pyun is deceiving or completely misleading us here re plan B, and (b) Rhee will end up as appearing be cause for failure of conference, not Communists, which will be major Communist victory.

3. We urge Rhee be faced with choice of (a) presenting united front at conference which fully protects his and ROK position and which will result in Communists bearing responsibility for failure conference; or (b) isolate ROK from allies which will result in relieving Communists of onus for failure of conference. We would, of course, in fact do maximum here avoid such a situation (although we should not tell Rhee this) by attempting obtain all possible support for maintaining present situation in which issues are primarily Communist failure accept UN role and proportional voice of North Korea population, and if possible bring about break-up of conference on these issues.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 8, p. 234.

<sup>2</sup> Same as telegram 1134, May 8, from Seoul, p. 226.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 8, p. 233.

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 8, p. 230.

<sup>5</sup> The reference is apparently incorrect; it should be to telegram Tosec 97, May 7, to Geneva, p. 224.

<sup>6</sup> May 3.

396.1 GE/5-954 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1954—2 p. m.

Tosec 111. Secto 149<sup>2</sup> and 156<sup>3</sup> sent Seoul 58 and 60 and Tokyo 31 and 38.

1. Department has no objection proposed meeting working group in Geneva to discuss draft Plan B (Secto 149).

2. Unless Rhee is prepared accept Plan B shortly suggest Dean and Briggs tell him ROK appears to be faced with alternatives cited paragraph 3 Secto 156. United States Delegation on basis full and regular discussions other allied delegations is convinced of necessity presenting Plan B and is therefore moving ahead with preparations do so at appropriate time. We believe it in best interests ROK to cooperate in development and presentation plan.

3. Once this choice is presented to Rhee it may be desirable refrain from pressing him further for few days while following Delegation's suggestion of concentrating at Geneva on Communist failure accept United Nations role and obtaining common acceptance Plan B.

4. If as last resort it becomes necessary present Plan B without Rhee's support Department believes it desirable minimize so far as possible appearance of open break between ROK and US. This might be achieved by (a) having Rhee agree not openly oppose until Communist position becomes clear and (b) having some other delegation such as Philippines put plan forward and having other allies speak in support of it first.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Also sent to Seoul as telegram 904 and to Tokyo as telegram 2468 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 8, p. 230.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

795.00/5-954 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

SEOUL, May 9, 1954—midnight.

1139. Repeated information niact Geneva 64, Tokyo 673. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary from Dean. Reference Geneva 50,<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Same as telegram Secto 127, May 7, p. 218.

51,<sup>2</sup> 58,<sup>3</sup> 59; <sup>4</sup> Department 897,<sup>5</sup> 898,<sup>6</sup> 899,<sup>7</sup> 902, <sup>8</sup> 903; <sup>9</sup> CINCUNC C-67984; <sup>10</sup> Department of Defense 961278.<sup>11</sup> We have reviewed situation here in detail with Van Fleet and McNeil <sup>12</sup> and suggested Van Fleet accompany us to put seriousness situation to President Rhee and recommend his cooperation. As alternative volunteered have Van Fleet go alone if he thought that preferable. He has been most generous with time and has given thoughtful consideration to problem but on balance declined and recommended we continue.

We have also reviewed strategy and tactics of our approach to Rhee and invited Van Fleet's frank criticism. He thinks general line we are following of soliciting Rhee's complete cooperation on basis of friendship as his ally is best possible approach, and Van Fleet does not recommend threats or ultimatum.

Before you break publicly with ROKs at Geneva and support program of 16 and solicit ROK silence or risk Communist taunts on question of ROK support, all here agree we should approach Rhee again and outline distinct advantages to him for military defense standpoint in event sudden Communist attack of retaining some UN forces until after elections at same time getting him to eliminate specific demand for North Korean surrender or withdrawal.

Had pleasant lunch with President today, Sunday, but decided better not mention problems. Will see him Monday morning. Sorry haven't delivered so far, but believe auspices reasonably favorable; for example, he expressed to Van Fleet great satisfaction negotiations so far. Will comment greater detail last two paragraphs 897 and subdivision 3, Geneva 58 if necessary following conference tomorrow.

Reference Geneva's 58, having previously pursuant to cable authority and in order to sell him phased withdrawal told Rhee we would unconditionally bring mutual defense treaty into effect, plan use general tactics outlined 58, but question advisability raising issue of implementation defense treaty unless you so instruct. He does not react well to threats or ultimata or retraction of promises but does to strong, friendly pressure. Van Fleet agrees these tactics. If he were choosing, Van Fleet would stand with Rhee on plan A, rather than go with

<sup>2</sup> Same as telegram Secto 128, May 7, p. 220.

<sup>3</sup> Same as telegram Secto 149, May 8, p. 230.

<sup>4</sup> Same as telegram Secto 150, May 8, p. 231.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 1, p. 222.

<sup>6</sup> Dated May 7, p. 225.

<sup>7</sup> Same as telegram Tosec 97, May 7, p. 224.

<sup>8</sup> Dated May 8, p. 234.

<sup>9</sup> Same as telegram Tosec 108, May 8, p. 233.

<sup>10</sup> Not printed. This message and the immediately succeeding reference pertained to the work of the Van Fleet Mission in Korea; for documentation, see volume xv.

<sup>11</sup> Not printed.

<sup>12</sup> W. J. McNeil, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, was a member of the Van Fleet Mission.



Allies on plan B, because he considers friendship Rhee here more important than to stand with them. He frankly concedes he is not sufficiently familiar with over-all picture to attempt make decision. We mention this only as indicating his frank thinking. It would be helpful if Pyun and Yang would really wire what they tell you, rather than what they actually wire, including strong criticism Philippine position whom they consider under our domination.

As to UN and UNCURK, believe we can sell Rhee UNCURK for reasons you have advanced.

Statements of Judd<sup>13</sup> criticizing omission Nationalist Chinese and ROK from proposed Southeast Asian pact prominently featured here, including criticism inclusion colonial powers. Fully understood reasons for such omission, but might be helpful if we could orient Rhee to your thinking. Could we also orient him on current de-emphasis military aid to Japan, or is this still secret? His apprehensions, based on lifetime struggle for united independent Korea, are: (1) fear of abandonment based on American publicity regarding return on US divisions; (2) fear we plan to use Japan as spearhead; (3) fear UNCURK will give only nominal attention to elections in north because of pressure from remnants of unwithdrawn Chinese Communists and North Korean Communist army; (4) fear his government and Communist aggressors are being put on a parity; (5) fear solid Communist bloc in north will unite with DNP in south against him.

We have found it best to use tactics of partnership with Rhee, rather than to use "or else" tactics, and while former perhaps so far not too successful, hesitate to change at this point.

If we have to unite with 16 allies on plan B (without Rhee) and Communists then turn it down, and we have thereby antagonized Rhee, won't we be in somewhat difficult position in reference to our practical operations here?

If you disapprove present tactics would appreciate guidance. Will try improve batting average.

BRIGGS

---

<sup>13</sup> Representative Walter Judd of Minnesota, member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

MAY 10, 1954

795B.00/5-1054 : Telegram

*Dean-Briggs-Rhee Meeting, Seoul, May 10, Morning: The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

SEOUL, May 10, 1954—2 p. m.

1140. Sent niact USDel Geneva 65, repeated information Tokyo 675. Department for Secretary, Geneva for Smith from Dean. Tokyo

pass CINCUNC. Ambassadors Briggs and Dean saw President Rhee, Prime Minister and acting Foreign Minister Cho this morning.

Explained that demand for complete withdrawal Chinese Communist forces would be accompanied by demand for phased withdrawal all UN troops and if sudden Communist attack occurred such complete withdrawal might permit Communist penetration considerably south of Seoul-Inchon line whereas if number of troops suggested could remain until after elections were completed, we could probably hold approximately present line until aid brought in from Okinawa.

President said whatever the military consequences to his country or people he could not agree to one single Chinese Communist soldier remaining in Korea before elections, that we should demand Communist aggressors get out of Korea and we should not agree phased withdrawal which constitutes surrender to aggressors.

We explained alternatives faced at Geneva, cited substances paragraph 3 Geneva's 58,<sup>1</sup> but did not tell him which one we favor but did say Plan B without US and ROK support or Plan A with only US and ROK support would be tremendous victory for Communists at Geneva and that we were carefully considering necessity putting forward Plan B.

We suggested we should put forward Plan B with the other 15 nations and if ROK could not agree they should maintain silence. President said he would maintain silence provided we agreed secretly in writing that if Communists accepted our proposal rather than rejected as we expect, we would join ROK in attack on Communists. We said that was out of question. Note, if they do maintain silence and Communists were to accept what do we do then ?

As to withdrawal or surrender North Korea Communists, he visualizes moment agreement reached at Geneva to hold free elections that his army will be able to go north and take surrender North Korea Communist army. We explained why we did not think this could occur but nothing we could say would deter him from that position. Otherwise he regards elections as complete farce with Communist Government remaining in north. What, he asks, would ever induce them to surrender and how can we govern even if elections are held ?

We told him we had discussed with Generals Van Fleet and Taylor<sup>2</sup> and they concurred Plan B should be put forward with ROK approval. He again flatly refused and said we were recognizing Communist Government in north.

General Hull has offered to come over tomorrow to discuss military situation with him if that will help. We may go Tokyo confer with him.

---

<sup>1</sup> Same as telegram Secto 149, May 8, p. 230.

<sup>2</sup> Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor was Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea.

President said he had cabled to Pyun statement he gave me Saturday (Embtel 1137, repeated Geneva 62)<sup>3</sup> and Pyun was authorized to negotiate with American delegation within framework that statement and to wire his recommendations to Rhee. Gained impression President would like to get strong wire from Pyun and believe if considerable pressure placed on Pyun he might be induced to wire support Plan B which would help materially or at minimum to maintain silence when that plan put forward though consider latter not very realistic. Definitely believe Rhee wants promise ROK build-up.

Explained great regret our inability to arrive agreement and explained fear such disunity at Geneva would materially affect American public opinion, seriously jeopardize what we were trying to do in cooperation with Korea and encourage Communists.

President launched into long speech that we did not have courage to fight Communists and therefore he would have to stand alone and free world would fall. Commented only that our plans would defeat Communists and must stand together. President very firm and said his position was final and no further discussion could change him although indicated again he would like Pyun's recommendations.

Dean would like to leave in any event not later than Friday<sup>4</sup> this week and unless you instruct contrary plans to leave earlier if possible in connection urgent matters at office.<sup>5</sup>

BRIGGS

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 8, p. 233.

<sup>4</sup> May 14.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 906, May 10, to Seoul, Secretary Dulles asked Dean to stay on until Friday by which time agreement might be reached on Plan B. Dean replied in telegram 1158, May 12, from Seoul saying that he would stay on at least through Friday. (795.00/5-1054, 5-1254)

---

396.1 GE/5-1054 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*

SECRET NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 10, 1954—11:48 a. m.

Tosec 114. Department's Tosec 111 sent Seoul 904 and Tokyo 2468; <sup>1</sup> Seoul's 1139 <sup>2</sup> and 1140 <sup>3</sup> repeated Geneva 64 and 65 Tokyo 673 and 675. Department has reconsidered and does not desire discussion Plan B with working group in Geneva mentioned in paragraph 1 reference Department telegram.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 9, p. 237.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 9, *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

Increasing seriousness Indochina situation underlines undesirability open break with Rhee over presentation Plan B which we like him recognize has serious practical difficulties if Communists were to accept. Efforts persuade him agree to presentation Plan B should continue along lines already indicated. Especially desirable have Pyun recommend it from Geneva if not already done.

DULLES

---

795.00/5-1054 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 10, 1954—6 p. m.

1145. Repeated information Tokyo 679, priority Geneva 68 for USDel. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Reference Geneva 60.<sup>1</sup> While we believe Plan B best practical under all circumstances and have done level best to sell it, cannot it also be attacked as ridiculous and untenable position to suggest or support by persons hostile to our position.

Consider following questions and answers. (1) *Question.* How do we unite Korea? *Answer.* By getting Chinese Communist armies to withdraw some 60 miles across Yalu while leaving well-staffed, well-organized, well-equipped North Korean Communist army behind which will be kept in order by UNCURK clerical staff. (2) *Question.* How will elections be made genuinely free with this large Communist army in North Korea which can threaten and intimidate the populace? *Answer.* Because UNCURK says they are to be. (3) *Question.* If we have such free elections and unite North and South Korea, how do we get North Korean Communist army to disband so that the Republic of Korea can govern the unified country and so its commands will be obeyed? *Answer.* After elections UNCURK politely asks North Korean Communist army to leave or to surrender.

BRIGGS

---

<sup>1</sup> Same as telegram Secto 156, May 9, p. 236.

---

396.1 GE/5-1054 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 10, 1954—7:47 p. m.

Tedul 52. Personal from Secretary to Under Secretary. For the first time today, I have had a chance to give thought to Korean phase of Conference. The general lines of my thinking are :

---

<sup>1</sup> The file copy indicates that this telegram was drafted by Dulles. It was repeated for information to Seoul as telegram 907 and to Tokyo as telegram 2481 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

1. We should not attempt coercive pressures on Rhee to compel him to accept a plan which he with some justification feels might jeopardize the non-Communist status of the Republic of Korea. I am quite aware of the fact that there is very little chance that Plan B would be acceptable and that therefore to propose it is a good gamble. However, it is one thing to gamble with something affecting one's own country but another thing to force a gamble on the government of the country which is itself at stake.

2. Am suggesting that the present impasse might be overcome by dropping out of Plan B the provisions dealing with the withdrawal of forces and suggesting paragraph to general effect that obviously the free elections will require withdrawals of foreign forces and such disposition of domestic forces as will insure non-intimidation and that this will be dealt with at a subsequent stage.

At the Berlin Conference, the Western allies ducked the question of troop withdrawals, as proposed by Molotov, and I see no reason why the Western allies should not permit Rhee to do the same.

3. In view of our desire to develop a strong anti-Communist position, with particular relation to Indochina, and the prospect that we might still intervene there and that this might involve a clash with Communist China, I think it important that we basically follow a line which will keep the confidence of our anti-Communist allies in Asia rather than seem to be working against them with a view to winning favor of Western European countries which are not disposed to be very helpful to us in Asia.

4. Am disposed to proceed with exchange of ratifications of Korean Treaty, as I told Pyun, and as was indicated to Rhee when he agreed to send delegation to Geneva. I doubt whether we should get in position of trying to get him to try to buy same horse twice.

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/5-1054 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 10, 1954—9:19 p. m.

Tosec 124. With reference Secretary's telegram re Korea this date to Under Secretary<sup>2</sup> suggest your consideration following modifications Plan B:

Section I. Eliminate phrase "and withdrawal of all north Korean forces from Korea".

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated for information to Seoul as telegram 909 and to Tokyo as telegram 2485 with instructions to pass it to CINCUNC.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

Section IV. Eliminate.

Section VII B. Eliminate.

Section VIII. Following word "provisions" add phrase "and for withdrawal and disposition of non-Korean and Korean military forces".

Believe this might be more acceptable Rhee since it will put basic issue of free elections up to Communists thus gaining propaganda objectives without incurring risks Rhee fears. In doubtful event Communists accept principle free elections troop issue of course would then be dealt with in drafting agreement this subject.

Possible but less desirable alternative would be new paragraph under II indicating appropriate arrangement for withdrawal and disposition non-Korean and Korean military forces would have to be made subsequent reaching agreement general plan in order ensure elections genuinely free and without coercion.

Defense clearance being sought.<sup>3</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram Tosec 141, May 12, to Geneva, also sent to Seoul as telegram 917, stated that the JCS indicated no objection from the military viewpoint to the proposed modification of Plan B with regard to troop withdrawal (795.00/5-1254).

MAY 11, 1954

795.00/5-1154 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

SEOUL, May 11, 1954—11 a. m.

1155. Repeated information priority Tokyo 685, niact Geneva 72. Geneva for Smith; Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary from Dean. Head other mission<sup>1</sup> said this morning he conceived mission to be (1) to get more effective military service for less money, (2) to train and equip more Asians so as to permit withdrawal from Asia American divisions to US mainland in order permit more maneuverability, (3) to teach Asians how to use simpler weapons in order to utilize greater Asian manpower and not necessitate matching our excessively expensive standards, (4) to match our withdrawals with greater number ROK troops but with lighter weapons or equipment.

Said further in interviews with KMA&G and ROK commanders he found them copying our tables of organization and expensive equipment to last detail whereas Eighth Army was emphasizing cutbacks, and greater number of tighter divisions, with fewer men and less equipment. Further, our generally publicized statements of fighting communism to the limit in Far East and supporting ROKs were therefore

---

<sup>1</sup> Reference is to General Van Fleet.

somewhat inconsistent with our daily practices in Korea and current inquiries into possible cut of expenses and men. Therefore all this was leading to progressive lack of confidence by President Rhee in our government and its over-all policies and to a sense of Korean discouragement. Rhee told him he gets similar feeling from Formosa, Burma, Vietnam and Thai and that somehow they think they are not being treated fairly.

In reply, we said we were trying to put forward basic formula at Geneva which would preserve US-ROK allied unity and put onus for failure on Communists but that Rhee refused to consider anything as purely propaganda formula reputedly not acceptable to Communists but insisted rather on looking through formula to what active practical operating results in Korea would be if Communists actually accepted formula.

Said further that based on eastern philosophy Rhee believed something was either right or wrong and you could not confuse fundamental principles of strength and weakness and of pushing and yielding. For to Rhee Chinese Communists were aggressors and must be so labelled.

But under our plan B, part of aggressors could stay in north during elections, plus 350,000 North Korean Communist soldiers and to Rhee Communists were Communists whether Chinese or North Korean and our program for alleged free elections under UNCURK which Rhee regarded as having totally inadequate civilian manpower and without army support of communications and transportation in north together with substantial withdrawal of troops and facilities in south before elections was completely unrealistic.

Rhee says such program would force him publicly to backtrack on statements that he would never deal or cooperate with Communists, and result our program was nothing but bringing into play coalition government with Communists which we were trying to force down his throat just as General Marshall had attempted with Chiang Kai-shek and end would be the same, i.e., complete loss of Korea to the Communists.

Further Rhee asks, if we are sincere about helping Indochina, why do we not bomb factories and supply lines on Chinese mainland from advanced air bases in Korea rather than from Philippines, Okinawa or Japan and if we are going to pull our forces out of Korea we must therefore be getting ready to abandon Korea to her fate just as we did in 1949, assuming, of course, phased withdrawal means we can't come back later and use bases under mutual pact.

Rhee's questioning raises doubts in our minds whether we could use Japanese bases to drop atomic bombs on China mainland or USSR,

and whether Japan might deny or withdraw such bases use for such purpose in which doubt General Hull and Ambassador Allison<sup>2</sup> concur. If we withdraw from Korea and concentrate on Okinawa question arises whether that base might not be knocked out, and doesn't that warrant re-examining question of having unquestioned right to use advanced Korean air bases even though we don't wish to fight a war in Korea?

Inasmuch as our economic rehabilitation program has had hard work getting off the ground, and have not outlined it to Rhee in its entirety, and we are still antagonizing him by forcing Korea to buy in Japan if latter is low bidder which according to Rhee builds up a Japanese economy already relatively prosperous from Korean war, while Korea, our ally, is still struggling along in some cases from our own bombing, we have no tangible visible proof of our aid to Korea.

For all these reasons Rhee is getting increasingly allergic to talk that does not promise some immediate, definite tangible result, and he cries out against any more general talk.

To solve problem reference plan B acceptance believe there are at least two alternate solutions:

1. In order obtain Rhee's acceptance plan B, believe we should think out immediately at highest level basic principles of our over-all military security program in Far East on a unified rather than bilateral basis for Formosa, Philippines, Okinawa, Korea and Thailand with concentration on Asian ground forces backed up by atomic weapons immediately available which forces can be moved from one place to another as needed and as needed supplemented by our Navy and Air Force. Not necessary or advisable bring Japan in such open-ended program for moment. This, of course, assumes armistice ended by plan B or otherwise we are restricted as to weapons by its terms.

Work out immediately for Korea its precise relationship to the whole program and give Rhee soon as possible definite principles for building up ROK divisions and total dollar value equipment we plan for him to have on a truly realistic basis and tell him very plainly that there is not going to be any more.

Explain precisely why 20 divisions just about limit he can man and pay for and we supply with available equipment and that we and he cannot possibly man and pay for and we equip 35 divisions. Explain we will give him artillery that is interchangeable conventional weapon and atomic cannon but presently would not supply atomic ammunition. To demonstrate effectiveness of latter we would put on demonstration for him at Okinawa.

Tell him precisely what we will do over next few years in the way of economic aid on a hard realistic basis with no nonsense about it and just how it is going to be administered by the US including Japan purchases and why in both North and South Korea if plan B put into effect and Korea unified.

---

<sup>2</sup> John M. Allison, Ambassador in Japan.



Explain precisely the function of our military pact and when it will and won't work.

Or if he won't take plan B,

2. Tell him frankly that without any attempt at political settlement with the Communists we will work out independently a mutually phased timetable for withdrawal of our own troops and the Chinese Communists, reduce economic aid to ROKs to a minimum, reduce our military aid to him to the minimum, bearing in mind there may be possible Korean strikes or sabotage and active interference with our troop and equipment withdrawal. We would then denounce mutual defense pact, assuming it is promulgated.

Tell Rhee he then free to work out any political basis he pleases with the Communists which we will examine but with no commitment to aid or recognize.

Further that if the Communists unprovokedly attack him we will come to his aid in accordance mutual defense pact while in effect. But tell him in no uncertain terms we won't aid him if he attacks or provokes attack.

Tell him this is high-level long term program which will not be changed under pressure and must have his approval to whole plan and promise of cooperation.

Believe we should also tell him frankly about our Japanese program and that he has nothing to fear. Since we have explained this Japanese program to Commonwealth believe we should tell Rhee so he can be fully informed on our thinking and he can stop worrying about our rearming Japan.

Rhee can then take his choice of cooperating with us on proposed plan B or not if that's what we still want.

Rhee and ROK generals are intelligent enough to know that if we fight in Indochina, the important Chinese bombing targets are from Peiping northwestward to Anshan, Mukden, Harbin and Vladivostok for which neither Philippines nor Okinawa bases are as suitable as Korea and with Okinawa knocked out and Japan bases possibly forbidden for that purpose we must be really withdrawing from Far East if we are willing to give up Korean bases in complete withdrawal. For if Communists can't come back, can we maintain right to use bases in Korea under mutual pact?

To attempt to carry out plan B without ROK cooperation will not seem realistic to Communists and hence its announcement without ROK's blessing will not be very convincing.

Believe we must have something definite and basic to tell Rhee which will arouse his continuing interest and allay his fears of abandonment.

In this event believe there is excellent chance of getting his cooperation.

If he refuses then without question we should be prepared without wobbling to carry out alternative two above and its consequences should be carefully considered before making statement to Rhee.

Even our top military commanders and ambassadors have not been briefed on our overall thinking in Far East and hence small wonder Rhee dismayed by piecemeal briefing, newspaper accounts of withdrawal and vague rumors of cutbacks without specific information believe there is enough general information in Washington to formulate such basic principles immediately without waiting several months for detailed report of current mission and believe serious danger deterioration US-ROK relations which can set in very fast if something is not done promptly or if we announce plan B without ROK concurrence.

Whoever is authorized to brief Rhee should make sure these basic principles after being formulated at high level will be carried out without any further backing or filling or it will do no good to adopt this program.

Such a program could make American manpower much more mobile, would permit doing job with Asian ground forces supplemented by US Navy and Air Force and use the atomic cannon and other weapons as need be.

Foregoing outlined generally today at meeting in Tokyo with Generals Hull and Taylor and Ambassadors Allison, Briggs and Dean after extended discussion. Except for Briggs and Taylor, others have not seen actual text this message but they concurred in its formulation and advisability and necessity of its presentation. General idea also discussed head of other mission.

BRIGGS

---

396.1 GE/5-1154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 11, 1954—1 p. m.

63. Repeated information Department Secto 168, priority Tokyo 43. Tokyo for CINCUNC. For Briggs and Dean from USDel. Reference Geneva 68<sup>1</sup> it is incontestable that UNCURK can exercise only such powers as are delegated and permitted by mutual agreement. This would be as true of Plan A as Plan B. If Communists accept B we are not unaware of difficulties inherent in implementation as they have bad record for keeping agreements. If Communists reject B we would at least be in position before world of having made honest effort to negotiate reasonable settlement without sacrificing either ROK or

---

<sup>1</sup> Same as telegram 1145, May 10, from Seoul, p. 242.

UN. On other hand it is difficult to see how we can, with straight face, join Rhee in seeking to impose terms of a conqueror—unconditional withdrawal Chinese Communist troops, surrender North Korean Army to ROK, leaving ROK in military control of North Korea before elections and unification. Little more could be demanded if we had won military victory rather than stalemate.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-1154 : Telegram

*Ninth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, May 11, 3:05 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 11, 1954—noon.<sup>2</sup>

Secto 177. Repeated information Tokyo 48, London 151, Moscow 63, Paris 241, Oslo 7, Seoul for information 66. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense CINCPAC, COMSAC. Ninth plenary session Korean phase May 11 consisted speeches by Molotov (USSR), Spaak (Belgium) and Pyun (ROK).<sup>3</sup> At conclusion four-hour session Eden presiding announced understood Indochina meeting scheduled tomorrow and that Secretariat would inform delegates time next Korea session.

Molotov propaganda speech lasting nearly two hours flatly rejected UN role Korean unification claiming all UN activities in Korea from beginning 1947 illegal. Other two chief points were status Communist China as one of Big Five and vague statement on desirability collective security arrangement for all Asian peoples.

Molotov attack on UN role Korean unification developed from lengthy historical review Korean problem 1945 to present. Noteworthy specific charges included alleged US proposal of trusteeship for Korea for 1945 Moscow agreement, lack of competence under Article 107 of Charter to deal with Korean problem 1947-1949, and Asian nations' reluctance participate UN military intervention 1950 and non-independent status those which did.

Following historical commentary he concluded that UN, as result of illegal Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, became a belligerent in Korea and thereby deprived itself of competence to serve impartially in solving Korean problem. Asserted Geneva conference had no relation to UN and that Communist China clearly belongs on Security Council as one of Big Five, this status being shown

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/9) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:05 p. m. and adjourned at 7:02 p. m.

<sup>2</sup> The transmittal time indicated on the source text, noon, is obviously in error.

<sup>3</sup> Extracts from Molotov's speech and the text of Spaak's statement are printed in *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 91-105 and 105-109.

by its position as one of only five powers participating both phases Geneva. Made somewhat plaintive note of fact that while "torrents of speeches filled with excessive and persuasive praise of US" no word said by any non-Communist power on "seizure of Formosa". He specifically attacked October 7, 1950 UNGA resolution establishing UNCURK, saying it was intended to impose South Korean regime on North Korea. Also asserted UNCURK membership composed primarily of interventionists and colonial powers.

Recapitulated Nam II proposal and added that USSR prepared to cooperate in implementing paragraph 3 concerning peaceful development of Korea. Replying to criticism of all-Korean commission he said agreement by both sides is essential to any solution Korean problem and DPROK cannot be asked subordinate itself to South Korean regime. Then described the virtues of DPROK regime in improving welfare of people and contrasted alleged defects in South Korea. Said all-Korean Commission would preserve DPROK achievements and that plans based on extension of undemocratic and corrupt South Korean regime to North Korea are unacceptable.

Saying US attitude is key to solution of Korean problem Molotov led into attack on US hostility to Communist China and plans of US and others to form aggressive military bloc in Southeast Asia. Comparing situation with Western Europe he said all Asian States should unite to ensure collective security arrangements for all peoples of Asia.

Spaak outstanding brief address on high note reminded conference that problem before it was Korea, not world or even Asia. Rebutted Communist aspersions on UN collective security efforts in Korea and on alleged US imperialism. Noted inconsistency Chinese Communist desire for admission to UN at same time it condemned UN. Said everyone apparently agrees goal is united, free and democratic Korea and that everyone also advocates free elections. He said point at issue is whether (1) there should be no international supervision and foreign forces should be withdrawn before elections. (2) There should be no prior withdrawal foreign forces and elections should be under international supervision and under UN auspices. He supported latter. Closed with appeal for moderation and a little mutual trust among conference participants.

Pyun's speech largely rebuttal to previous Communist speeches although fundamental importance UN role in solving Korean problem emphasized throughout. Challenging professed Communist desire prevent any international intervention in Korean unification, Pyun rejoined that point 3 of Nam II proposal calls for intervention by "appropriate states" and concluded Communists wanted only foreign

intervention by nations they chose. He again attacked Nam Il proposal for All-Korean Commission as "legislatural [*legislatorial*] coalition". Chiding Chou En-lai on professed concern over security of China from Korea, Pyun asserted ROK has no aggressive intentions and went on to describe Chinese Communist imperialism in North Korea, mentioning mass deportation North Koreans and forcible marriage of Korean women to Chinese men. Rebutting Chou accusation of aggressive US intervention in China (Formosa), Pyun said that US intervention in China prevented Japanese conquest and thereby saved base of operations for Chou.

Saying that Korea "terribly eager for success" of conference, Pyun said important in case conference fails that people of world know Communists are to blame. Defined fundamental question as whether Communists would lower iron curtain in North Korea and permit free elections under UN auspices. State ROK had held four elections and May 20 elections are under "close and direct observation of UN". "Whole problem of unification would be solved" if UN could observe elections NK. Left somewhat obscure whether talking about single nation-wide elections or separate elections NK.

Reiterated earlier statement 45,000 anti-Communist Korean and Chinese mentioned by Communists are no longer POWs but citizens recovered from illegal Communist domination. Then proceeded to make long eloquent plea that Communists permit International Red Cross send representatives behind iron curtain to find, assist and repatriate civilians abducted from South Korea in 1950.

In additional comments drafted during meeting in response Molotov address Pyun defended October 7, 1950 UNGA resolution, said if aggressive USSR military bloc dissolved other blocs would disappear also, and deprecated Soviet role in defeat of Japan. Castigating uncomplimentary references by Molotov to President Rhee, Pyun repeatedly called Molotov a liar.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/5-1154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL      NIACT

GENEVA, May 11, 1954—4 p. m.

64. Repeated information Tokyo 45, Department Secto 170. Department pass Defense. Toyko for CINCUNC. For Van Fleet and Hull from Smith. Rhee's refusal agree so far on draft proposal apparently based primarily on his attitude re withdrawal non-Korean forces creating increasingly difficult situation here. Key point is his insistence Chinese Communist forces be withdrawn and North Korean forces

demobilized before elections. This position totally unrealistic since neither ROK nor United Nations in position victor in Korea. Rhee must made realize insistence on total Chinese Communist withdrawal can only mean concurrent total UN withdrawal.

It is possible that part his tactic is to use this position as bargaining lever to get commitments on further military assistance. He has not perhaps fully considered dangers to ROK in complete United Nations withdrawal before testing Communist performance on unification Korea, assuming any agreement here and implementation of agreement possible.

I would appreciate anything you may be able to do to explain frankly to President Rhee from military standpoint problems involved withdrawal all non-Korean forces before elections.

In addition point outlined above, following considerations might be advanced:

(1) Our basic objective here is to challenge Communists with constructive workable plan for achieving free unified Korea which Communists probably will never accept.

(2) We do not consider total Chinese Communist withdrawal before elections as crucial element in unification plan if we obtain acceptance principles outlined paragraph II our draft proposal. Later provisions designed to insure, among other things, safeguards against interference by foreign forces in elections.

(3) In reality we are compelled choose between total simultaneous withdrawal before elections, with danger Communists upsetting situation after United Nations withdrawal, or concurrent phased withdrawal before and after elections to protect against non-performance by Communists but with danger Communist forces might frustrate free elections.

We have accordingly sought formula along lines paragraph IV draft proposal which would require withdrawal bulk Communist forces before elections but would leave UNC in south, although reduced in size, during and after elections in event Communist failure implement unification agreement.

SMITH

795.00/5-1154: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, May 11, 1954—4 p. m.

Dulte 62. Personal for Secretary. The following represent my personal views after reading Tedul 52.<sup>1</sup> The staff here is working on a coordinated opinion. I am convinced that you are right in not wishing to attempt coercive pressures on Rhee. The talks I have had here

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 10, p. 242.

with the Koreans have made it very clear that while they are willing to admit that Plan B is a gamble, they still think it is a gamble which the Communists might accept. Ducking the question of troop withdrawals will be more difficult here than at Berlin, here we have to convince 14 other nations of the logic and correctness of our proposals, limited though they may be. All are aware that the basic objection of Communist diplomacy is to get troops out of Korea, but they will find it very difficult to rationalize Rhee's demands, and we will have to answer questions as to how the troop withdrawals might be handled. As a first thought, it seems to me we might suggest that as our own withdrawals will take considerable time and it would be undesirable unduly to postpone political action leading toward unification, the Chinese Communist troops might be withdrawn to concentration areas at the ports of entry on the Korean side of the Yalu, while United Nations troops would withdraw to concentration areas in the vicinity of our base ports. The foreign troops could, under the supervision of the international authority, be insulated from any effect on elections. The North Korean and ROK troops would, as at present, be deployed facing each other along the neutral zone, and could likewise be insulated. If the international authority were unable to carry out its functions, or were interfered with, presumably the United Nations troops would reassume their previous positions and we would again be faced with the present situation.

I am beginning to believe that our suspicion that Pyun and Yang were saying one thing to us and another to Syngman Rhee is unjustified. They are sending another message to Rhee urging acceptance of at least the basic principles of Plan B, which I think we can modify in accordance with your suggestions. I have had some trouble avoiding an early meeting of the 16, but we are scheduling it for Thursday,<sup>2</sup> and it cannot be put off longer than Thursday, with a Korean plenary probably on Friday. Eden has agreed to this and I think the others will cooperate. Spaak speaks this afternoon and is dining here tonight.<sup>3</sup>

SMITH

<sup>2</sup> May 13.

<sup>3</sup> On May 13, the Department of State sent the text of this message to Seoul in telegram 918 and to Tokyo for CINCUNC in telegram 2511 (795.00/5-1154).

795.00/5-1154: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 11, 1954—6 p. m.

1169. Repeated information Tokyo 694, USDel Geneva priority 76. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Secretary and Smith from Dean. Re De-

partment's 909.<sup>1</sup> Proposed addition to VIII draft plan B would, of course, give UNCURK supervision or right to make recommendations with respect disposition of ROK Forces in South Korea as well as Korean Communist Forces North Korea which may annoy Rhee but may be useful. Believe we have germ of good idea. For example, suppose to offset proposed surrender North Korean Army we suggest Pyun that Communists or neutrals will demand liquidation ROK Army or neutralization Korea and exceedingly dangerous their future position as government for them to demand complete withdrawal Chinese and surrender Korean Communists before elections. Instead of putting onus on Communists at Geneva such a demand might pin aggressor label on Rhee and might be very difficult for us to continue give ROK Army present generous support.

Might also tell Pyun we very disturbed about withdrawal Cho's candidacy and arrest members opposition for criticizing chief executive.

BRIGGS

---

<sup>1</sup> Same as telegram Tosec 124, May 10, p. 243.

396.1 GE/5-1154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 11, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 176. Repeated information Seoul 65, Tokyo 47. Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

1. Robertson and Young met with Pyun, Yang, Limb and Hong May 10. Robertson said seemed be complete misunderstanding Seoul re position ROK delegation here with reference proposed plan B. Robertson told Pyun we shocked and surprised, in view Pyun's and Yang's statements to us supporting plan B, receive report from Dean, Rhee had received telegram from Pyun denouncing plan as surrender to Communists and urging Rhee stand firm against it. Yang and Limb seemed taken completely by surprise. In embarrassed and ambiguous response Pyun implied he did not wish discuss matter nor contradict President and left impression no such telegram had been sent. Following subsequent private conversations with Yang we have reason believe ROK delegation and Oliver <sup>1</sup> have been urging Rhee's approval plan B. Yang told us evening May 10 ROK delegation had sent another telegram to Rhee recommending consideration proposal with ROK dele-

---

<sup>1</sup> Robert T. Oliver, an American adviser to President Rhee, was in Geneva assisting the Korean Delegation.



gations changes including deletion presidential elections which Pyun and Yang strongly desire. Yang also informed us in confidence Oliver had sent another such telegram. (Text of Oliver's first message sent Secto 123.<sup>2</sup>)

2. In conversation May 10 Robertson stressed (*a*) we had not shown or discussed plan with any other delegations because we wished collaborate and reach agreement first with ROK; (*b*) plan would represent real victory for ROK and US if our allies support it because it would put to Communists challenge to repudiate their rejection of UN and genuinely free elections; and (*c*) again stressed need for general constructive positive proposal. Pyun said ROK Government has not yet accepted proposal on simultaneous withdrawal foreign forces and simultaneous elections in North and South Korea. Pyun and Yang asked for couple days to consult by telegram with Rhee before holding meeting of 9 or 16. Told Pyun we were holding off increasing pressure on us for such meeting and did not see how we could postpone meeting of 9 beyond Wednesday.<sup>3</sup> Meeting ended with understanding that they would communicate with Rhee and we with Briggs and Dean with view clarifying whether US-ROK agreement on plan B possible. Left it with Koreans there would probably be meeting of 9 or 16 on Wednesday or Thursday.

3. Pyun has also made suggestion ROK agree accept plan B on express condition that Communists accept it *in toto* or otherwise ROK free revert to original position. Pyun indicated in above conversation he had made this suggestion to Rhee.

4. Delegation suggests that Briggs and Dean be sure Rhee understands US delegation has not shown draft proposal to any delegation but ROK, because of our long-standing practice consult first such matters with ROK.

5. Johnson and Young explained problems in US-ROK negotiations to Allen (UK) and Lacoste (France) on May 10 and 11. Today they informed us French and UK delegations respectively recognize great dangers in any break with ROK and are agreeable continuing US efforts find common ground with ROK which other allies can accept. Accordingly, both delegations have relaxed pressure for tabling counter proposal and for proceeding without ROK if necessary.

6. Agreed with UK and French representatives desirable have meeting of 16 on Thursday subject to confirmation after discussion with ROK delegation.

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> May 12.

MAY 12, 1954

396.1 GE/5-1254

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States  
Delegation (Young)*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 12, 1954.<sup>1</sup>

Participants: Dr. Pyun, ROK Delegation  
Ambassador Yang, ROK Delegation  
Ambassador Limb, ROK Delegation  
Mr. Hong, ROK Delegation  
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, US Delegation  
Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., US Delegation

After congratulating Dr. Pyun for his speech in the Plenary, May 11, Mr. Robertson said he wished to inform the ROK Delegation that it would be advisable to hold a meeting of the 16 on Thursday morning. Among other reasons, Mr. Eden had to return to London over the weekend and hoped there could be such a meeting before his departure.

Dr. Pyun indicated no objection and asked whether we intended to table our draft proposal with the 16. Mr. Robertson replied that we would not, since the United States and the Republic of Korea are not in agreement.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that Dr. Pyun should be prepared for questions from other delegations as to whether the ROK is ready with a counter proposal. Mr. Robertson suggested that Dr. Pyun make the following two general points, in view of the lack as yet of US-ROK agreement on Plan B:

(1) Reiterate, from his speech of May 11, that the issue is whether the north Koreans will agree to free and fair elections under supervision of the United Nations.

(2) Take the position that, until the Communists concede on the fundamental issue, our side should not make concessions on a detailed proposal which would be based upon UN supervision.

Mr. Robertson assured Dr. Pyun that the United States Delegation would take this same position in the meeting of the 16. The ROK Delegates expressed particular satisfaction and complete agreement with this approach. They said they would meet with certain other delegates today to develop the above position.

During the course of the discussion, Dr. Pyun proposed to make to the 16 tomorrow the six-point proposal which he had intended to present to the plenary on May 3 but had deleted at our urgent suggestion. He also said he might mention President Rhee's willingness to

<sup>1</sup> The memorandum was drafted by Young on May 14.

hold a plebiscite in the south to determine whether the people would agree to nation-wide elections in the south as well as the north. Mr. Robertson strongly urged Dr. Pyun not to mention either idea because it would create great confusion and underscore the lack of agreement among the 16. Moreover, it would be completely impractical for the Conference to wait indefinitely for a plebiscite to decide whether there should be elections. Ambassadors Yang and Limb concurred. Dr. Pyun agreed not to mention these matters in view of his complete endorsement of the above approach.

Ambassador Yang informed Mr. Young privately after the meeting that the ROK Delegation had received a telegram from President Rhee insisting on complete withdrawal of all Chinese forces and, in effect, not accepting Plan B. Because of this message and continued lack of US-ROK agreement on a proposal, Ambassador Yang said the ROK Delegation would adhere to the general approach outlined above as the only possible tactic under present circumstances.

---

396.1 GE/5-1254 : Telegram

*Smith-Eden-Bidault Meeting, Geneva, May 12, Noon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 12, 1954—5 p. m.

Secto 182. Repeated information Seoul 68, Tokyo 50. Tokyo for CINCUNC. At meeting of heads of Big Three delegations this noon, General Smith explained futility of engaging in endless attempt to work out details of plan with Rhee when any solution we proposed must be based on authority of UN, which Molotov had yesterday categorically rejected. He explained why we should not press Rhee too hard, including need for Congressional support on Indochina. He also mentioned possibility of suggesting, in restricted meeting of seven, regrouping of Chinese and UN forces prior to elections. We had reached an impasse and there would be no communist concessions. Pyun was right that North Korea had become a Chinese province. It had gone and we were not going to fight global war for it. Issue should be joined on whether or not communists would accept UN authority.

Eden said he wanted to speak next plenary in reply to Molotov and particularly to discuss question of where freedom was found in Asia. He would also like to speak on principles. It was agreed that Bidault would speak first in general terms, that Eden would then follow up with statement of principles and that Asian representative, presumably Philippines, would if possible obtain 16 agreement present specific proposal on principles. Smith suggested it be put to communists on

basis that if they accepted, there would be further discussion in restricted sessions, otherwise, there would seem to be no further point in continuing Korean discussion.

SMITH

795.00/5-1254 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

SECRET NIACT

SEOUL, May 12, 1954—1 p. m.

74. Sent Department 1160; repeated information Tokyo 688. Tokyo for CINCUNC. For Smith from Dean. Reference Geneva's 63,<sup>1</sup> 64.<sup>2</sup> We are in complete and wholehearted agreement logic, weight, force and everything else you say and have attempted make every persuasive argument we know to convince Rhee extreme folly both his position and failure to cooperate. Offered Monday to bring Hull to Seoul to convince him danger to Korean people and to his government of complete UN withdrawal if he persists in insisting complete Communist withdrawal.

His only answer is that we are appeasers and should fight and we are now reaping whirlwind harvest of armistice. Said further since we were going to get out anyhow why not get out now and leave him fight alone.

Pyun wired urging Rhee not to agree with us but to appear to give authority to Pyun.

Rhee wants either full commitments for 35 divisions and equipment and UN withdrawal so he can attack alone or by using every artifice at his command he wants to evoke situation designed to bring about unprovoked attack by Communists; in which event, we are bound come to his aid. He not only appreciates but wants danger to occur. Following my last talk, he issued statement repeating all demands and saying they are unalterable.

Delighted to have Hull see President if you think desirable. Have been awaiting Defense clearance Department's 909<sup>3</sup> before approaching him again on Plan B as further modified Subdivision 2, Department's 907.<sup>4</sup>

For your information, UNCURK has seven delegates including alternate, two observers, three in foreign administrative personnel, four Korean interpreters and 15 vehicles. Rhee constantly contrasts UNCURK civilian staff with Chinese and Korean Communist soldiers

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 11, p. 248.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 11, p. 251.

<sup>3</sup> Same as telegram Tosec 124, May 10, p. 243.

<sup>4</sup> Same as telegram Tedul 52, May 10, p. 242.

in North and asks what they will do in North without UN Army communications and support or in South with UN units in state of withdrawal.

Do not think we do not appreciate extreme seriousness situation and full force your arguments. Have kept Van Fleet and Taylor constantly posted. Again reviewed strategy and tactics Van Fleet last night and asked his advice and counsel. Had no suggestions except we must under no circumstances antagonize Rhee and would stand with Rhee at Geneva rather than other 14. He left for Formosa this morning just as your 64 arrived and has copy.

BRIGGS

MAY 13, 1954

795.00/5-1354 : Telegram

*Fifth Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, May 13, 10:05 a. m.:<sup>1</sup> The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 13, 1954—4 p. m.

Secto 194. Repeated information Seoul priority 71, Tokyo 56, London 158, Paris 251, Moscow 67. Department pass Defense; Tokyo pass CINCUNC. At fifth meeting of chief allied delegates held this morning at Palais with Kural presiding, it was agreed that, in lieu of a detailed plan, the committee of nine (US, UK, France, ROK, Thailand, Australia, Colombia, Philippines, Turkey) should meet tomorrow at 10 a. m. to begin effort to draft an agreed set of general principles upon which allied side could stand. It was obvious that all in group except ROK's and ourselves strongly felt that for propaganda reasons and because of domestic public opinions, it was highly desirable such general principles include support of all-Korean elections. Pending formulation such principles was agreed no need hold plenary sessions unless two or more allies prepared speak or unless plenary called by Commies. Also no indication other members 16 desired another restricted session unless apparent Commies ready to make some new proposal.

General Smith opened meeting by reporting that, despite complete cooperation Pyun, we were unable to reach agreement on detailed plan. Felt this not particularly regrettable, however, in view Molotov's speech yesterday<sup>2</sup> which crystallized two issues on which we could

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/5) from which the time of the meeting is taken is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting adjourned at 11:40 a. m.

<sup>2</sup> The speech was made on May 11; see telegram Secto 177, May 11, from Geneva, p. 249.

stand firm: (1) Absolute necessity uphold authority of UN; (2) requirement that free elections reflect honest will of people and that representation be directly proportionate to population. Said that while inadvisable present detailed counterproposal at this time, it would be helpful if we could present set of basic principles which had been developed by allies in plenary to date and upon which there was general agreement among allies.

In response to question from Garcia (Philippines) who pressed Pyun as to whether Rhee categorically rejected all-Korean elections and as to whether any flexibility ROK position, Pyun replied ROK position reflected by General Smith's opening remarks that allies should not explore detailed controversial points but rather wait to see whether Commies change their position re UN and free elections. Added Rhee would be ready accept all-Korean elections provided that voters so desired. Admitted such procedure would take time but pointed out all-Korean elections created constitutional problem for ROKs.

Spaak (Belgium) agreed unwise to go into details at this time but emphasized we must present a set of clear simple principles in order extricate ourselves from difficult propaganda position resulting from specific North Korean proposal. As example such principles, cited general all-Korean elections, UN supervision, withdrawal foreign forces. During discussion which followed, Eden and Commonwealth representatives, Turks and Colombia supported Spaak. Eden, after paying tribute Pyun, said that while Molotov's repudiation UN made allied task easier, we should still be in position to put up three or four point general proposal and stand on it. Said he planned to outline certain general principles in plenary speech this afternoon but would fuz question of whether elections in both North and South Korea. Lacoste added Bidault also planned to talk general principles this afternoon although did not specify what Bidault planned to say re elections.

Pearson, while supporting Spaak and Eden, went further by saying did not want to be placed in position at home of supporting only North Korean elections or withdrawal only Communist troops prior to election. Stressed importance of maintaining united front lest Communist charge that conference broke down over allied disagreement, but hinted that if general approval allied proposal not obtained might be necessary for several allied representatives to voice objections to such proposal either at Geneva or at home.

General Smith agreed need for allied unity on simple formula but urged that if agreement unattainable on general principles we should be prepared to stand on question UN authority and free elections based on representation in National Assembly proportionate to population. He also pointed out ROK Government and constitution only ones rec-

ognized by UN as legal and valid. However, no support expressed for our position we could stand on these two points in event disagreement. Instead, general consensus as stated by Watt (Australia), McIntosh (New Zealand), Zuleta (Colombia), Acikalin (Turkey) was that we must somehow reach agreement on basic principles and that such principles must contain more than broad generalities.

For Washington and Seoul.

Telegram follows<sup>3</sup> on Robertson, Young conversation with Pyun following above meeting and delegation's suggestion on set of principles to be discussed urgently with Rhee. We do not plan to table any proposal in committee of nine, without prior effort at obtaining ROK agreement on text.

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram Secto 196, May 13, *infra*.

---

396.1 GE/5-1354 : Telegram

*Robertson-Pyun Meeting, Geneva, May 13, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 13, 1954—6 p. m.

Secto 196. Repeated information Seoul 73, Tokyo 57. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Following meeting of 16 this morning, Robertson and Young met with Pyun and Republic of Korea delegation to discuss meeting of May 9. Robertson stressed:

(1) Both delegations should refrain from getting involved in details, but support general principles on which can all agree.

(2) Communists here are trying alienate United States away from its Allies by attacking only United States and not any other country.

(3) It would be playing right into Communist hands if United States put in position of agreeing only with Republic of Koreans, and not with Western Allies.

(4) United States has major problems, as well as other alliances to consider in critical areas around the world and must resist Communism wherever possible as the only country with the power and resources to lead in this effort along with other Allies.

(5) United States Government would be in difficult position with United States public opinion if we can not find common ground on basic principles with other Allies.

(6) United States delegation stressing Republic of Korea only Constitutional authority and that elections should take place under Republic of Korea Constitution.

(7) Other delegations here agree with United States on central issue United Nations supervision and drafting common set general principles, instead detailed plan which they would prefer. This is great advantage for United States, since many delegations not agree

with initial position introduced by Republic of Korea and United States delegations on elections only in North Korea and Chinese Communist withdrawal first.

(8) Molotov's second speech is such an unequivocal rejection of principle United Nations supervision that Communists undoubtedly can never repudiate it which gives United States and Republic of Korea opportunity for great political victory in free world over Communists, if we can now seize opportunity by stating general issues on which 16 insist Korean unification be based and leave Conference on that positive note when Communists reject them.

Pyun and Republic of Korea delegation concurred in desirability drafting general principles and leaving details for later development in unlikely event Communists should accept statement principles. Pyun and Yang asked United States to draft such principles and discuss with them later today which we will do.

Principles already drafted in subsequent telegram.<sup>1</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> See telegram 74, May 13, p. 264.

---

396.1 GE/5-1354 : Telegram

*Tenth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, May 13, 3:05 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 13, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 203. Repeated information Tokyo 59, London 162, Moscow 70, Paris 259, Oslo 8, Seoul 75. Tokyo for CINUNC; Department pass Defense, CINCPAC and COMSAC. Tenth plenary session Korean phase May 13 consisted of two brief speeches by Bidault and Eden,<sup>2</sup> with Prince Wan in chair. Following Eden's speech, Prince Wan announced adjournment—no session May 14 in view scheduled Indochina meeting. Next Korean session, he said, would be announced through Secretariat.

Bidault said he would not review the well-known history of the Korean problem already done well by Mr. Dulles. Communist version is contrary to facts.

Turning to Nam Il's proposal, he said proposal does not contain guarantee for establishment of unified government genuinely free and genuinely democratic. Minimum principles to be met are (1) representation must be proportional to number of citizens in both parts of

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/10) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:05 p. m. and adjourned at 4:10 p. m.

<sup>2</sup> The texts are printed in *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 109-113 and 113-117.



country and (2) elections must be held in conditions of freedom and certified by neutral observers with adequate authority. Communists have hitherto rejected these principles but it is hoped that they would reconsider and agree to place elections as well as withdrawal or movement of troops under international control. Most qualified organism to supply such control is UN.

Bidault attacked Communist accusation that UN is accomplice in aggression. This, he said, is not merely false but its repetition is dangerous to all and would threaten very existence of UN.

Bidault rejected suggestion US was aggressor in Korea and showed that facts hardly consistent with any imperialism on part US.

In apparent allusion to Indochina phase, Bidault stressed "this Geneva Conference which should be a peace conference and which we firmly continue to hope to see become truly a peace conference". Later he said "it is already much that an armistice has been signed we are the first to recognize it, we who wish to see the contagion of peace spread to all Asia".

Bidault ended on a note expressing hope that constructive efforts will yet bring Korea the unity and liberty which it deserves.

Eden also said he would avoid going into past history but stressed that UN did its duty in Korea and if US bore majority share it is measure not of US imperialism but of its loyalty to UN and deserves tribute. He also expressed regret that Communist China found it necessary to raise PW question which for UK has been settled some time ago in accordance with armistice agreement and Geneva Convention.

Alluding to charge of imperialism in Asia against UK, Eden stressed that facts are that UK has contributed to advance of national liberation, citing India, Pakistan and Burma. He referred to Asian members of UK Commonwealth which continues in close voluntary relation to UK, and asked whether real freedom was in Colombo or in Ulan Bator, in New Delhi or Pyongyang. Communists appeared unable to recognize concept of voluntary and equal association founded on cooperation and not compulsion. He also cited Colombo plan with participation other Asian countries and working hand in hand with UN and US technical assistance.

UK belief in freedom, Eden said, underlies its insistence that Korea shall have freedom—that freedom must be genuine and methods achieving it fair and practical. Nam Il's proposal could not lead to desired results since it does not recognize numerical disparity between North and South and could not lead to agreement, there being no provision even for neutral chairman or arbitration tribunal. Also, withdrawal with country divided under plan which can only lead to deadlock would result in chaos, and perhaps renewal of hostilities. Eden

noted similarity to Molotov's Berlin proposal and said in both situations elections would either not be free or would not take place at all. Communist proposal for packed commission, for elections free in name but rigged in fact.

Unacceptability of Communist proposal, Eden said, does not mean that last word has been said. He stressed general agreement on following points: (a) Desire for peaceful settlement; (b) unification; (c) after unification no foreign interference in Korean affairs; (d) appropriate guarantee for Korean integrity by other nations; (e) common desire to withdraw forces as soon as can be without again endangering peace. In light of this area of agreement, Eden suggested desirability of agreement on following basic principles: (1) Elections for all-Korean Government; (2) elections should truly reflect will of people taking into account distribution of population between North and South; (3) universal adult suffrage and secret ballot, as soon as possible under conditions of freedom; (4) elections to be under international supervision, in UK view should be under UN but members need not be chosen from among Korean belligerents but could be panel acceptable to Geneva Conference; (5) program must include withdrawal of forces as soon as international peace and security achieved, as provided for UN forces in GA resolution, October 7 in General Assembly.

Eden concluded by saying that if there could be agreement on these principles then conference could get down to terms and stages, perhaps in restricted session then reporting back to conference as a whole.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/5-1354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL      NIACT

GENEVA, May 13, 1954—9 p. m.

74. Repeated information Tokyo 58, niact Department Secto 200. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Seoul for Briggs and Dean. Re Secto 196.<sup>1</sup> Following is draft basic proposal for unification of Korea :

"1. In conformity with UN resolutions on question Korean independence, unification of Korea under single democratic and independent government for all of Korea shall be achieved by people of Korea in free elections throughout Korea to National Assembly of unified Korea. These elections shall be held under conditions of genuine freedom and in accordance with constitutional processes of ROK.

2. Representation in National Assembly shall be in direct proportion to population of all Korea, and based on secret ballot and univer-

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 13, p. 261.

sal adult suffrage free of political or other obstacles or discrimination with respect to qualifications for voting or for candidature.

3. In order fulfill above requirements effectively and assure that conditions of freedom exist before, during and after elections, commission established by UN shall observe and supervise elections, which should be held soon as possible. UN commission shall have full freedom movement and operation in all electoral areas and its recommendations and requests for facilities shall be binding on authorities concerned.

4. UN commission shall certify when government of unified Korea has been established with effective control over all Korea. Constitution of ROK shall remain in effect except as it may be amended or superseded by action of National Assembly following above elections.

5. Withdrawal from Korea of non-Korean forces shall be agreed upon, and shall be observed and verified by UN commission in order to ensure that elections and establishment of government of unified Korea are accomplished under conditions of genuine freedom.

6. Parties accepting these principles shall cooperate in carrying out this proposal, and shall pledge their respect for territorial integrity and political independence of unified Korea. Government of latter shall undertake to abide by purposes and principles of UN Charter."

Above draft being shown ROK Del this afternoon and substance will be discussed in working group of 9 Friday morning.<sup>2</sup>

Please discuss draft with Rhee, emphasizing following points:

1. As pointed out Secto 116,<sup>3</sup> Molotov's repudiation of principle UN supervision gives us opportunity for political victory in free world over Communists. It was consensus of 16 delegates at meeting today that we should now capitalize on this fact to present basic principles on which 16 insist unification must be based.

2. Draft emphasizes cardinal importance UN as basis progress for unification Korea through reference UN resolutions and requirement for supervision of elections and withdrawal forces by impartial UN body.

3. It provides that elections will be held in accordance with constitutional processes of ROK which would permit Rhee request amendment constitution for this purpose which he pointed out would be required if elections held subsequent to May 20 Assembly elections. Proposal also provides for continuation in effect of ROK constitution, another important ROK requirement.

4. It provides for representation in proportion to population throughout Korea, thus, rejecting concept of parity between North and South Korea contained North Korea proposal.

5. In accordance Tedul 52 (Seoul 907)<sup>4</sup> formulation of provision re withdrawal forces generalized to avoid difficult question whether Chinese Communists should withdraw first or whether there should be concurrent withdrawal UN and Communist forces. (We are still

<sup>2</sup> May 14.

<sup>3</sup> This reference is incorrect, since telegram Secto 116, May 6, from Geneva, dealt with Indochina. Presumably, the reference should be to telegram Secto 196, May 13, p. 261.

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 10, p. 242.

considering language this paragraph in proposal and may wish modify it. Suggest you emphasize to Rhee that this language still tentative.) In generalizing language re withdrawal forces, we are seeking sidestep present differences between Rhee and us for purposes presentation proposal to conference and in conference discussion of proposal we intend insist that agreement must be reached first on method unification, i.e., UN supervision elections and representation related to population distribution before discussing detailed agreement re withdrawal since latter meaningless if no agreement on unification. In presentation to Rhee this strategy should be stressed as basis on which we can hope overcome present differences and yet agree on more positive allied note.

SMITH

MAY 14, 1954

396.1 GE/5-1454 : Telegram

*Meeting of the Allied Working Group of Nine, Geneva, May 14, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 14, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 210. Repeated information Seoul 77, Tokyo 60. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Re Sectos 194,<sup>1</sup> 196,<sup>2</sup> 200.<sup>3</sup> Johnson opened Korean working group meeting of nine this morning with statement purpose to seek agreement on basic position which sixteen delegations can stand on and give full support too. He enumerated following points as his understanding principles to be agreed: (1) Korea to be unified state; (2) UN role in Korea must be maintained; (3) elections to be held under UN supervision; (4) representation in body elected proportionate to total population in Korea; (5) legitimacy of ROK must be maintained; (6) following unification and achievement stability in Korea non-Korean forces to be withdrawn (does not preclude commencement withdrawal earlier); (7) UN to certify unification accomplished; (8) assurances to be given for territorial integrity of unified Korea. He emphasized these should be spelled out somewhat but would be advantage in keeping statement principles short. If agreement reached in conference on principles then would have basis for negotiating detailed agreements.

Philippines (Briones) stated delegation had proposal to make which contained following points: (1) ROK and DPROK to unite under one government and constitution; (2) constitutional convention to be elected by Korean people on basis one representative per 200,000 population; (3) convention would approve and ordain new constitution;

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 13, p. 259.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 13, p. 261.

<sup>3</sup> Same as telegram 74, May 13, from Geneva, *supra*.

(4) election laws to be agreed by Geneva conference; (5) elections to be supervised by UN body; (6) subsequent elections under constitution also to be supervised by UN body; (7) non-Korean forces would remain in Korea but avoid interference in elections and withdraw after establishment of government. (This proposal similar to that suggested by Philippines earlier in conference at meeting of sixteen.)

ROK (Pyun) attacked proposal vigorously emphasizing ROK Government for all Korea, constitutional convention runs counter to principles enumerated by Johnson, particularly maintenance legitimacy ROK. He stated he would study Philippine proposal but it contrary principles his government accepted. He then criticized point four Eden's statement principles in plenary yesterday (Secto 203),<sup>4</sup> stating this would open path for Communists to suggest neutral members on commission to supervise elections. Following considerable discussion this point, during which Johnson pointed out only UN itself can make decision on body to perform functions in Korea and its present decision is for UNCURK, it was generally agreed that "UN supervision" was essential point on which we must stand, without getting into specific question whether UNCURK or not.

Meeting then turned to Philippine proposal and lively triangular exchange among US, ROK and Philippine delegates ensued, including lengthy historical lectures by Philippines. ROK supported by US pointed out proposal for constitutional convention destroyed UN resolutions and actions on Korea. Johnson stressed fact proposal counter to legitimacy ROK principle and observed latter recognized by UN and some thirty countries and nation for which we have all been fighting. He pointed up danger of playing into hands of Communists, who wished to equate North and South Korea, by any proposal which wipes out ROK. He also observed Communists have not raised this issue since North Korean proposal provides only for elections to National Assembly. Philippines then posed direct question to ROK as to whether it ready accept principle general elections throughout Korea and stated Philippines would accept concept general elections throughout Korea under effective UN supervision if ROK would. Discussion ended on this note which seemed to indicate Philippines using their proposal chiefly as rather crude tactic to push ROK into acceptance general elections thruout Korea.

At Secretary General Kural's suggestion it was agreed at conclusion two-hour meeting that US and ROK delegations would seek to draft statement principles for consideration other fourteen delegations.

SMITH

---

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 13, p. 262.

795.00/5-1454: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 14, 1954—6 p. m.

1178. Repeated information Tokyo 698, priority Geneva 81. Geneva for Smith USDel; Department for the Secretary; Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Geneva 74<sup>1</sup> received too late for appointment President today. Seeing him 11:30 tomorrow at which time plan stress points you suggest and to point out different from previous Plan B in that revision emphasizes broad general plan of elections North and South under UN supervision and leaves details of withdrawal Communist forces to subsequent drafting and offers best possible chance smoking Communists out.

Statements attributed to President in current issues *Korean Republic* and replies submitted to questions submitted by Reuters' correspondent indicate rather intransigent attitude President and continuing reversion to general theory armistice was mistake, et cetera.

Reference Geneva 68,<sup>2</sup> second and third sentences. Reasons stated somewhat cryptic and if possible would appreciate amplification.

Reference Geneva 70,<sup>3</sup> believe ROK Geneva delegation encouraging President stand firm, not to make further concessions and that US Geneva delegation concurs unwise to do so until Communists have agreed to UN supervision of elections both North and South.

Therefore think President believes we here are urging on him necessity further concessions which US Geneva delegation do not think necessary.

Reference last sentence Geneva 70 sub-division 1. What are further concessions referred to?

For your information approximately 4,000 polling places all Korea of which about 1,200 in North. In conversation Swedish General Mohn NNSC he believes UNCURK supervision either purely symbolic or would have to set up completely autonomous body several thousand men with own authority and communications system which could function North and South at least month both before and after elections. Even so in view local customs, et cetera, such supervision unlikely be effective in absence prior withdrawal Communist forces. He suggests possibility withdrawal both Chinese Communist and North Korean Communist forces to far North but we regard this as neither practical or acceptable.

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 13, p. 264.

<sup>2</sup> Same as telegram Secto 182, May 12, p. 257.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 12, not printed, it summarized the conversation described in Young's memorandum of May 12, p. 256. It was sent to the Department of State as telegram Secto 187 (396.1 GE/5-1254).

Reference our 1155.<sup>4</sup> At our suggestion Taylor, CG Eighth Army, has drafted further military comments and forwarded to Hull for transmittal Defense if approved.

For your own confidential use approximately half divisions on front North demilitarized zone are now North Korean in contrast approximately one-sixth at time armistice signed and movements continue.

Am trying keep situation here fluid as possible.

Dean will stay over until after Wilson visit which ends Seoul May 18.<sup>5</sup>

BRIGGS

---

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 11, p. 244.

<sup>5</sup> Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson visited several Asian countries in the course of his trip, which dealt basically with questions of regional defense; for documentation, see volume XII.

---

795.00/5-1454 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      NIACT      WASHINGTON, May 14, 1954—6:37 p. m.

923. Geneva's Secto 200 sent Seoul 74 Tokyo 58.<sup>2</sup> Seoul's 1178 sent Geneva 81 Tokyo 698.<sup>3</sup> Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department assumes Secto 200 represents U.S. delegation's considered judgment minimum necessary get unanimous consent of 16. Therefore hope Dean can persuade Rhee go along with it.

Possible modification which might help with President Rhee without disturbing rest of 16 too greatly would be add at end first sentence paragraph 3 of proposal, "after UN commission has determined conditions existing in Korea make possible genuinely free elections."

It could be explained to Rhee "conditions" include problem north Korean forces and UN commission thus given power defer elections until some satisfactory solution reached

Another possibility which would provide further safeguard would be modify paragraph 5 to read "Specific arrangements for withdrawal from Korea of non-Korean forces shall be agreed upon by parties accepting these principles, and withdrawal shall be observed, etc.". This would ensure ROK participation in consideration specific arrangements and might also help emphasize any discussion withdrawal must come after acceptance principles in earlier paragraphs.

---

<sup>1</sup> Also sent to Geneva priority as telegram Tosec 164 and repeated to Tokyo for information as telegram 2532.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 13, p. 264.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

Do not wish confuse issue with drafting changes. Clearly if Rhee will accept principles as given Secto 200 there need be no further changes. However changes suggested above may be useful if Rhee has difficulty with Plan in Secto 200. Geneva comment directly Seoul if considered necessary.

DULLES

396.1 GE/5-1454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 14, 1954.<sup>1</sup>

78. Repeated information Department Secto 211, Tokyo 61. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Re Secto 196,<sup>2</sup> 200.<sup>3</sup>

1. After plenary session May 13 Young discussed draft basic proposal with Pyun and ROK delegation. As they were disturbed and even angry over Eden's five points and especially his fourth point (Secto 203<sup>4</sup>), their initial reaction was critical:

(a) Pyun and other delegates objected to phrase "throughout Korea" in first paragraph draft. He said scope of elections should be left unspecified in basic principles. He repeated ROK would agree to general elections in Korea if Chinese Communists withdrew completely from Korea prior such elections;

(b) ROK delegation strongly preferred specific reference to UNCURK instead of to United Nations Commission. Their insistence on this point reflected their deep concern over the vagueness Eden's proposal for a commission composed of a "panel acceptable to Geneva conference". ROK delegation interprets Eden's phraseology possibly include neutrals such as India and Communists United Nations members such as Czechoslovakia and Poland. Pyun and ROK delegates said any such commission totally unacceptable. Young referred to Rhee's objections to UNCURK as reported by Briggs and Dean. Pyun said he would persuade President insist on UNCURK since its composition satisfactory.

(c) Pyun considered any reference to question withdrawal non-Korean forces, even such vague wording as paragraph 5 draft proposal, should be omitted. Young pointed out impracticability no reference this matter.

ROK delegation reacted negatively to draft proposal in contrast to affirmative reaction draft of plan B. Their initial criticism explained

<sup>1</sup> The file copy indicates no time of transmittal. It was, however, received in Washington at 7: 28 p. m. on May 14.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 13, p. 261.

<sup>3</sup> Same as telegram 74, May 13, from Geneva. p. 264.

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 13, p. 262.



largely by concern over Eden's remarks and also Philippine proposal for constitutional convention repeated again in meeting of 16 May 13.

2. Following meeting of working group of 9 on May 14 Pyun told us again present position ROK Government is general elections must be conditioned on prior total withdrawal Chinese Communist forces.

3. Oliver told Young May 14:

(a) Several days ago Rhee sent telegram Pyun suggesting ROK public statement Seoul and Geneva that ROK not opposing general elections but insisting on prior total Chinese Communist withdrawal. Purpose to offset impression in United States press ROK preventing agreement among allies by opposing generalizations. Pyun replied such statement inadvisable because it would create confusion in Geneva and force division among allies; and

(b) He and ROK delegation have discussed proposal for withdrawal bulk but not all foreign forces from Korea prior to elections and he thinks Rhee might be persuaded accept this along with fundamental principles on United Nations supervision and genuinely free elections. Said he would try draft telegram to Rhee on such lines.

SMITH

MAY 15, 1954

396.1 GE/5-1554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL      PRIORITY      GENEVA, May 15, 1954—3 p. m.

80. Repeated information Department Secto 216, priority Tokyo 63. Seoul for Briggs and Dean, Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

1. Re Tosec 164 repeated Seoul 923 and Tokyo 2532 <sup>1</sup> USDel concurs two suggestions strengthen text and will insert if they will help negotiations with Rhee.

2. Re Seoul's 81 to Geneva (to Department 1178 and Tokyo 698 <sup>2</sup>) second sentence Geneva's 68 <sup>3</sup> to Seoul based on paragraph three Tedul 52 <sup>4</sup> repeated information Seoul 907 and Tokyo 2481.

Third sentence Geneva's 68 (sent Washington Secto 182) refers very tentative idea Chinese Communist troops might be withdrawn to agreed areas of concentration in vicinity ports of entry near Yalu while UNC troops would move to concentration areas near our base ports. Washington views not yet formulated on this. Purpose would be insulate foreign forces from election processes to extent possible and would be under observation and verification UN Commission. This

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 14, p. 269.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 14, p. 268.

<sup>3</sup> Same as telegram Secto 182, May 12, p. 257.

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 10, p. 242.

tentative idea could be included within wording paragraph five basic proposal.<sup>5</sup>

In Secto 200 (sent Seoul 74)<sup>6</sup> or as revised in Tosec 164. Such arrangements would be developed only if Communists accepted basic principles.

3. Re Geneva's 70 (sent Washington Secto 187)<sup>7</sup> USDel considers draft basic proposal Secto 200 and plan B Secto 149<sup>8</sup> 2 different ideas. Plan B is detailed counter proposal. As long as Communists repudiate UN authority, UN supervision and genuinely free elections so categorically at Geneva, 16 have agreed inadvisable proceed with any detailed plan for peaceful unification Korea, particularly since agreement on such plan not yet possible among allies. On basic issues we can be in solid position and have strong case free world opinion as USDel has noted several telegrams. Presentation detailed counter proposal such as plan B would give Communists chance move from defensive to offensive attack and distortion of secondary issues in any detailed plan rather than fundamental issues. Basic principles on other hand do not represent specific plan or concessions bring about unification, but fundamental requirements free and orderly establishment of unification and independence Korea. If 16 could agree on them, particularly on general elections, set of positive principles thus would present to world single position all 16 and determine whether basis exists for subsequent detailed negotiations. If Communists accept principles, negotiations would be necessary on detailed implementation which would be worked out only with ROK concurrence. However 16 consider Communist rejection basic principles most likely. This would achieve political result here of great value in world wide struggle against Communist bloc.

4. By concessions Pyun seems to mean ROK changing position from proposing elections only in North Korea to accepting general elections with constitutional amendment determine will of people. He also may have in mind some modification ROK position on total withdrawal Chinese Communist forces prior elections.

5. USDel cannot overemphasize importance Rhee's agreement. It would solidify allied support in many forms for ROK and demonstrate firm unity of 16 which Communists trying to fracture.

SMITH

---

<sup>5</sup> In telegram Tosec 184, May 17, to Geneva, repeated to Seoul as telegram 928, the Department of State indicated that Defense had rejected the idea of concentration of non-Korean forces in specified areas together with insulation of ROK and North Korean forces along a neutralized zone as being militarily impractical. The Department, therefore, believed that it was inadvisable to go further with the proposal unless developments at Geneva should warrant seeking a reconsideration from Defense. (396.1 GE/5-1554)

<sup>6</sup> Dated May 13, p. 264.

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 3, p. 268.

<sup>8</sup> Dated May 8, p. 230.

795.00/5-1554 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 15, 1954—4 p. m.

1182. Repeated information Tokyo 700, Geneva 83. Geneva for Smith; Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary from Dean. Reference Geneva 73<sup>1</sup> and 74,<sup>2</sup> sent Department 196, Secto 200, Tokyo 57 and 58; also Department 923, repeated Geneva Tosec 164, Tokyo 2532.<sup>3</sup> Ambassadors Briggs and Dean called on President Rhee, Prime Minister and acting Foreign Minister at 1:30 p. m. Stressed necessity all 15 nations on our side being able unite and present broad statement of general principles and emphasized we could work out details later. Further emphasized very important both world American and Congressional opinion we stand together at Geneva in order be able fulfill our commitments elsewhere in world and carry out appropriate overall survey ROK army now under discussion. After going over Geneva 74 draft and suggested changes contained Department 923 explained, we prefer 74 text but that Secretary considered unanimous agreement on general principles very important and so were prepared agree to these changes if satisfactory to President. President read draft and riders carefully and we explained general theory and emphasized ROK one of parties. Very little discussion; President very amiable. Said would study and let us know. President occupied all morning US Armed Forces Day. Do not believe they had as yet time digest contents Pyun's report transmitted Geneva 76.<sup>4</sup> In presenting matter stressed urgent desirability of immediate agreement on principles so that they can be submitted Geneva soonest.

BRIGGS

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 13, p. 261.<sup>2</sup> Dated May 13, p. 264.<sup>3</sup> Dated May 14, p. 269.<sup>4</sup> This reference is apparently in error; no copy of a telegram 76 from Geneva to Seoul has been found in Department of State files. Possibly, the allusion is to the conversation with Pyun covered in telegram 78, May 14, from Geneva, p. 270.

396.1 GE/5-1554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 15, 1954—8 p. m.

82. Repeated information Department Secto 222, Tokyo 64. Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

1. Robertson and Young had long discussion with Pyun and Republic of Korea delegation Saturday afternoon<sup>1</sup> regarding draft basic

<sup>1</sup> May 15.

proposal (Secto 200<sup>2</sup>). Pyun gave us 14-point draft proposal for establishment United Independent Democratic Korea drafted by Republic of Korean delegation. Republic of Korean draft much more detailed than envisaged by meeting of 16 on May 13 and committee of nine May 14. Points one to nine contained in points one to four, Secto 200.

2. Question at issue is withdrawal foreign forces. Republic of Korean draft proposed Chinese Communist troops complete withdrawal one month in advance election date, phased withdrawal United Nations forces start before election, but not finish before effective control over entire Korea achieved by Unified Government of Korea, certified by United Nations.

3. Robertson told Pyun and Republic of Korean delegation essential United States and Republic of Korea, in accordance with understanding reached in committee of nine, be ready next few days if possible with common United States-Republic of Korean draft proposal general principles. Pointed out paragraphs on withdrawal would prevent agreement among 16. Told Republic of Korean delegation we would study their draft. UNCURK problem not mentioned by Republic of Koreans, nor United States during conversation.

4. Informed Republic of Korean delegation substance Seoul's 83 to Geneva, repeated information Department 1182,<sup>3</sup> Tokyo 700. Robertson again stressed urgent desirability agreement among 16 on common principles, along lines Secto 216, sent Seoul 80.<sup>4</sup>

SMITH

<sup>2</sup> Same as telegram 74, May 13, p. 264.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 15, p. 271.

MAY 16, 1954

795.00/5-1654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 16, 1954—2 p. m.

85. Repeated information Department 1185, Tokyo 702. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Smith from Dean. Sent following letter by hand to President Rhee early this morning in effort get them off dead center and not wait outcome May 20 elections or Van Fleet mission.

"In the proposed draft statement of principles I handed you yesterday you will note the words in paragraph 3 'by the United Nations (or UNCURK)'.

"In one of our earlier conversations you will recall you objected to supervision by UNCURK so I suggested to Geneva, in order to meet

your views, the use of some phrase such as 'United Nations or an appropriate committee or commission thereof.'

"As you know the existing membership of UNCURK is made up of representatives from Australia, Chile, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey, all of whom constitute members of the free world.

"If we get away from UNCURK and use another agency of the UN, the Communists or nations somewhat more friendly to them than to us may demand representation.

"So in our own interests let's stick to UNCURK.

"Nothing in this world is perfect but the draft of principles we left with you Saturday enables us to proclaim the free world solidarity against communism and you affirm your moral willingness to let the people of all Korea decide under UNCURK supervision. Further we maintain the ROK constitution and sovereignty, a cardinal article of our faith.

"Time is running out. It is important that we issue this statement of principles promptly at Geneva. We can work out the details later.

"While I have no authority to make commitments to you with respect to your army or its equipment, it seems to be quite apparent there must be no rupture in the US-ROK relations here or at Geneva if we are to get the most propitious results from the Van Fleet mission when its recommendations are announced at home so you will be in a position to repel any attack within the framework of our mutual defense pact.

"And in view of our other commitments against communism in the free world, it is essential we and you have no break with the rest of our allies at Geneva.

"As Benjamin Franklin said. 'If we don't hang together, we will all hang separately.'

"I will be glad to call any time you wish to see me."

Since drafting letter, Geneva's 80 (to Department 216)<sup>1</sup> received. Appreciate clarification. Very helpful.

Reference subdivision 5, dispatched letter in attempt to overcome Rhee's previous irritation at Eden and Philippine suggestions, and his insistence complete withdrawal prior to elections. Local military consider withdrawal toward ports somewhat dubious. Will continue press hard as we dare.

BRIGGS

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 15, p. 271.

MAY 17, 1954

795.00/5-1754 : Telegram

*Dean-Briggs-Rhee Meeting, Seoul, May 17, Morning: The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 17, 1954—8 p. m.

1191. Repeated information Tokyo 705, priority Geneva 89. Tokyo for CINCUNC. For the Secretary from Dean. Geneva for Smith.

Reference Department's 923<sup>1</sup> and Geneva's 74.<sup>2</sup> After Secretary Defense Wilson and his party left President Rhee this morning Ambassadors Briggs and Dean conferred with President and acting Foreign Minister Cho on a Presidential redraft of the proposal left with President Saturday which redraft Ambassador Dean received from President this morning. Considerable progress made but President insisting members Communist Party and its members shall have no right to vote, new immigrants from China be excluded voting, UNCURK to have no right "to interfere in the elections," objects to UNCURK making any certification with respect to when unified government has been established, and added clause in which he insists no specific mention of North Korean Government can be made which in effect provides that neither the ROK nor its western and northern Communist neighbors will invade or infiltrate the other or interfere in any way with the internal affairs of the other and in case of a military attack UN parties to the statement of principles shall at once take steps to end the aggression. In modification paragraph 5 suggested in Department's 923, President changed "non-Korean forces" to "aggressor forces".

Succeeded this morning in arguing him out of number of points and he suggested we redraft proposal and bring back this afternoon.

After combined group from National War College had called on him, Ambassadors Briggs and Dean again stayed and submitted revised draft substantially in line with draft submitted Saturday except changed his new paragraph to read "ROK and its immediate neighbors shall agree not to invade nor to infiltrate the other and not to interfere in any way with the internal affairs of the other. In case of a military attack the UN parties to these principles shall at once take adequate steps to end the aggression in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter." Struck out specific exclusion Communist Party and its members and provided right to vote should be in accordance with the appropriate electoral laws and struck out provision UNCURK could not interfere with elections and again provided supervision should be in accordance with appropriate electoral laws.

He took our draft for reading but then launched into exceptionally long criticism of our entire economic aid program, requirement Korea must buy from lowest bidder which in practice often means Japan, failure of Congress to appropriate all money promised, criticism of provisions of proposed power contract with Bechtel organization and tirade against Japan's actions in connection proposed resumption Korean-Japanese negotiations. (During 3 weeks of negotiations this is first time Rhee has raised issue of aid program.)

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 14, p. 269.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 13, p. 264.

In view urgency getting agreement on declaration of principles, we made no reply his statements but again urged him give prompt consideration draft we left this afternoon and again outlined urgency.

As we left acting Foreign Minister Cho explained President wanted Minister Defense to see revised draft before committing himself.

Will see later this evening. Hope to obtain substantial agreement your draft but it is hard uphill going all the way and won't be easy.

BRIGGS

---

306.1 GE/5-1754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 17, 1954—9 p. m.

83. Repeated information Department Secto 238 Tokyo 66. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense.

1. Afternoon May 17 Young at Robertson's request met with Pyun and ROK delegation sound them out on making revision, more acceptable to ROK, re language on withdrawal of foreign forces in basic proposal (Secto 200<sup>1</sup>). Young suggested deleting paragraph V and adding language at end paragraph I such as "and with subsequent agreement on withdrawals foreign forces and such disposition of domestic forces as will ensure non-intimidation of the electorate". Also suggested as alternate following two sentences added end paragraph I: "The holding of full elections will necessitate agreement on withdrawals of foreign forces and such disposition of domestic forces as will ensure non-intimidation of the electorate. Specific arrangements in regard to these forces shall be agreed upon as soon as all parties accept these principles." Language based on paragraph 2 of Tedul 52 repeated Seoul 907, Tokyo 2481.<sup>2</sup>

2. ROK delegation rejected suggestions as well as paragraph V language. Pyun reiterated ROKs opposed to "ambiguity" on withdrawal question. They insist on explicit provision for complete withdrawal Chinese Communist forces prior elections (see Secto 211, repeated Seoul 78 Tokyo 61<sup>3</sup>). Pyun said his instructions and ROK position so firm on this point he is not free to suggest modifications to Rhee.

3. Pyun said he has about decided at end of week or early next week ask for plenary session present 14-point proposal showed us Saturday afternoon (Secto 222 repeated Seoul 82 Tokyo 64<sup>4</sup>). He and ROK delegation believe ROK must now in plenary make explicit demand

<sup>1</sup> Same as telegram 74, May 13, from Geneva, p. 264.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 10, p. 242.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 14, p. 270.

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 15, p. 273.

on Chinese Communist withdrawal question as well as enumerate various points on UN supervision and free elections:

Young pointed out such action by Pyun would be contrary charter of 16 to committee of 9 to formulate general principles and understanding among 14 as well as committee of 9 US and ROK presently engaged in such endeavor. Pyun replied if committee of 9 agrees on set of principles such as US has submitted to ROK, his delegation would disassociate itself completely and publicly, and he would be even more inclined proceed with plenary speech giving his proposal.

4. Pyun and ROK delegation objected strongly any reference to "disposition domestic forces" and insisted that no reference be made to this idea in any draft on withdrawal question. They said it would put ROK forces on par with North Korean forces and would open door for Communists demand dissolution ROK forces.

5. Pyun has received no word from Rhee regarding draft basic proposal, and specifically on generalized language concerning withdrawal foreign forces. Obvious Pyun's reactions on this question based on unchanged instructions. Stumbling block for us with ROK delegation would accept proposal general elections if conditioned on prior withdrawal Chinese Communist forces.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/5-1754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 17, 1954—11 p. m.

84. Repeated information Department Secto 239, Tokyo 67. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Following is text ROK 14 point draft proposal for establishment united independent democratic Korea given us by Pyun Saturday. (See Secto 222 sent Seoul 82.<sup>1</sup>)

1. With view to establishing united, independent and democratic Korea, free elections shall be carried out under UN supervision in accordance with previous UN resolutions thereanent.

2. Free elections shall be held in North Korea which has not been accessible to such elections and in South Korea also, provided that majority of the people residing in South Korea wish them.

3. Elections shall be held within 6 months from adoption of this proposal.

4. Before, during and after elections, UN personnel connected with supervision of elections shall have full freedoms of movement, speech, etc. to observe and help create conditions of free atmosphere throughout entire area for election. Local authorities shall give them all possible facilities.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 15, p. 273.



5. Before, during and after elections candidates, their campaigners and their families shall enjoy full freedom of movement, speech, etc. and other human rights such as are recognized and protected in democratic countries.

6. Elections shall be conducted on the basis of secret ballot and universal adult suffrage.

7. Representation in all-Korea legislature shall be in direct proportion to population of entire Korea.

8. With view to apportioning numbers of representatives in exact proportion to populations in election areas, census shall be taken under UN supervision.

9. All Korea legislature shall be convened in Seoul immediately after elections.

10. Following questions, among others, shall be left to enactments of all Korea legislature :

- (a) Whether president of unified Korean Government should be newly elected or not ;
- (b) Concerning amendments of existing constitution of ROK ;
- (c) Concerning disbandment of military units.

11. Existing constitution of ROK shall remain effective until it is amended by all Korean legislature.

12. Communist Chinese troops shall complete withdrawal from Korea one month in advance of election date.

13. Phased withdrawal of UN forces from Korea may start before elections, but must not complete (*sic*) before effective control over entire Korea be achieved by unified government of Korea and certified by UN.

14. Integrity and independence of unified, independent and democratic Korea shall be guaranteed by UN.

SMITH

MAY 18, 1954

396.1 GE/5-1854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 18, 1954—8 p. m.

86. Repeated information Department Secto 250, Tokyo 70. Seoul for Briggs and Dean ; Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

1. Robertson and Young had long unproductive talk ROK delegation May 18. While their discussion with US most friendly on personal basis their mood has become brittle, apprehensive and even very antagonistic to UK since Eden's May 13 speech in plenary on Korea.

2. Pyun reiterated rejection any generalized language on withdrawal question and continued insist on explicit provision prior total withdrawal Chinese Communists before elections in any basic principles. He again informed us he has had no word from Rhee on draft basic proposal.

3. Conversations with ROK delegation May 17 and 18 clearly indicate Pyun has no leeway and adheres to letter Rhee's instructions last week re total prior Chinese Communist withdrawal. He appears unwilling suggest to Rhee any changes in ROK position this question. He will not accept proposition that Allies can agree on generalized provision withdrawal foreign forces leaving ROK freedom of action concur or non concur subsequent negotiations on withdrawal and other questions as we pointed out paragraph 3 Secto 216 (repeated Seoul 80, Tokyo 63).<sup>1</sup> Robertson stressed this point over and over again today with still no positive reaction from ROK delegation. Believe this argument could be used with Rhee if you agree.

4. Re Pyun's 14 points (Secto 239 repeated Seoul 84, Tokyo 67<sup>2</sup>), our impression is ROK delegation has not yet transmitted ROK draft to Seoul for Rhee. Robertson told Pyun today we prefer our shorter version which Briggs and Dean discussing with Rhee past few days. We have also studied his 14 points and made some changes which we showed him in the redraft. Chief changes were few editorial revisions paragraphs 1 and 2 conform US draft proposal, deletion paragraph 10 and substitution our paragraph 5 (Secto 200<sup>3</sup>) as two sentences for 12 and 13. Pyun and Yang objected to our wording on withdrawal for familiar reasons.

5. Robertson made strong case ROK seemed prefer clear break now with US and other Allies on general principles which Communists most likely reject rather than accept principles in 16-nation endorsement and break some indefinite future date with Communists on withdrawal question should they accept general principles. He stressed again importance US-ROK agreement and 16-nation endorsement single basic proposal on Korea. Also stressed Congressional and public opinion would react sharply if ROKs could not even agree with US and Allies on general principles which might have adverse effect on Congressional consideration appropriations for Korea.

6. Nevertheless Pyun said he saw no harm present ROK point of view inasmuch as other delegations and particularly Eden had done so on their own without concerting with ROK or 16. All ROK delegates joined in bitter attack on Eden and UK. They are obviously smarting over Eden's speech which we believe cut ground from under progress we had made in developing close collaboration and identity of view with ROK delegation here.

7. ROK delegates are contacting other delegations to support ROK thesis on Communist withdrawal. ROK delegation argues million Chinese Communists in north will allow Communists manipulate Eden's

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 15, p. 271.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Same as telegram 74, May 13, from Geneva, p. 264.

commission proposal, infiltrate South Korea, cause widespread chaos, overturn free elections for Communists and destroy ROK. (USDel is informed by other sources ROKs have approached Belgians, Canadians, and Netherlands all of whom reacting negatively ROK thesis.) ROK delegation particularly uncommunicative with us on details this matter.

8. Robertson pointed out US and ROK have responsibility report something to committee of nine before taking any unilateral action. ROK delegation agreed with us at least on that.

9. It is apparent ROK delegation is adhering standing instructions and we can expect make no further headway here on question withdrawal foreign forces unless and until Rhee can be persuaded change ROK position.

SMITH

---

795B.00/5-1854 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

SECRET      NIACT

SEOUL, May 18, 1954—10 p. m.

93. Sent Department 1202, repeated information Tokyo 710. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Smith from Dean. President at Wilson review all morning. Sent him revised text statement and pointed out extreme urgency unanimous action at Geneva.

Ambassadors Briggs and Dean saw President Rhee, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Acting Foreign Minister Cho for two hours this afternoon. Finally persuaded them to eliminate clause excluding Communist Party and its members from voting by inserting after "candidature" in subdivision 2 "in accordance with the appropriate electoral laws then in effect" and pointed out they could amend electoral law.

They strongly insist on providing for withdrawal Chinese Communist aggressors and North Korean Communist Army and not UN forces. We said must have proposal commanding unanimous agreement and commanding respect at home and not too insulting Communists. President asked if we must please Communists on our side, then why not omit them from statement and if we are sure Communists will not accept why not draft the statement the way we want it.

We pointed out subdivision 4 did not necessarily require phased withdrawal and as ROK is one of parties, they must agree to specific arrangements for withdrawal.

President again offered to agree if I would make secret arrangements to support them in fighting if North Korean army refused to disband and, I of course, refused.

Again carefully reviewed all arguments and President said they would give the statement thoughtful consideration.

Tried best sell absolute necessity for action today, but President obdurate. Said morale commonwealth forces bad which was affecting morale of Korean forces and they had better go home.

Following is the text with corrections we left with them today. Took their changes insofar as not affecting substance.

"1. In conformity with the UN resolutions on the question of Korean unification and independence, the unification of Korea under a single democratic and independent government for all of Korea shall be achieved by the people of Korea in free elections throughout Korea to the National Assembly of a unified Korea. These elections shall be held under conditions of genuine freedom and in accordance with the constitutional processes of the Republic of Korea. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea shall remain in effect except as it may be amended or superseded by the action of the National Assembly before the above elections. After the election the Constitution may be amended in accordance with its terms.

"2. The representation in the National Assembly shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population of all Korea, and shall be based on secret ballot and universal suffrage free of political or other obstacles or discrimination with respect to qualifications for voting or for candidature, in accordance with the appropriate electoral laws then in effect.

"3. In order to fulfill the above requirements effectively and to assure that conditions of freedom exist during elections, in accordance with the appropriate electoral laws then in effect, the UNCURK shall supervise and observe the elections, which shall be held as soon as possible after the UNCURK has determined that conditions existing in Korea make possible genuinely free elections. The UNCURK in accordance with the appropriate electoral laws then in effect shall have full freedom of movement and observation in all areas, with no interference of any kind, and its recommendations and requests for facilities including safe conduct shall be binding on the authorities concerned.

"4. Specific arrangements for withdrawal from Korea of non-Korean forces before the election shall be agreed upon by the parties accepting these principles, and withdrawal shall be observed and verified by the UNCURK in order to ensure that elections are accomplished under conditions of genuine freedom.

"5. The parties accepting these principles shall cooperate in carrying out these proposals, and shall pledge their respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of a unified Korea. The government of the latter shall undertake to abide by the purposes and principles of the UN charter.

"6. UNCURK shall submit its report to the United Nations when the government of a United Korea has been established with effective governmental control over all Korea.

"7. The Republic of Korea and its immediate neighbors shall agree not to invade nor to infiltrate the other, and not to interfere in any way with internal affairs of the other. In case of a military attack, the

UN parties to these principles shall at once take adequate steps to end the aggression in accordance with the principles of the UN charter."

In subdivision 4 we could probably settle for Chinese Communist aggressors and United Nations forces in lieu of "non-Korean forces" although they object violently to putting forces on a parity.

Claim we are asking them to sacrifice principles.

President considers we are somehow binding him to coalition government merely to have unity at Geneva which he considers nonsense. Says British and French will never support us and we had better get on bandwagon with Formosa and Korea and stop diplomatic maneuvering. Also fears by signing this statement he starts a new ninety day period running before he is free to walk out at Geneva.

We are not familiar precisely with what was said to him about any ninety day period at Geneva.

Message follows.

BRIGGS

---

795.00/5-1854 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

SECRET      NIACT

SEOUL, May 18, 1954—midnight.

94. Sent Department 1203, repeated information Tokyo 711. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Smith from Dean. Re: My immediately preceding message.

Since drafting foregoing message, Ambassador Dean received following letter dated May 18 from President Rhee:

"Reference is made to our discussion of this afternoon and to the proposals set forth in a secret document submitted to me, dated 18 May 1954.

"As a result of this discussion, it is agreed by the Republic of Korea Government as follows:

"To paragraph 2 of this document, following the words, 'in accordance with appropriate electoral laws' should be added the words 'then in effect' as suggested by you.

"From paragraph 3 after the words 'the UNCURK shall' the words 'supervise and' should be omitted.

"Paragraph 4 is accepted in its entirety. However, it should be understood between our two governments that to safeguard against any future misunderstanding regarding this agreement, this government will exercise its own sovereign rights without any foreign interference in bringing the North Korean Communist Forces or any other subversive elements into submission, by force if necessary before the elections. I would like to receive your agreement to this understanding.

“Paragraph 6 is entirely unnecessary and we request its deletion. To all other proposals we agree.”

Propose reply expressing gratification his acceptance, subdivision 4 and recognizing that his government is of course sovereign to extent already recognized by UN and our government, and to extent ROK chooses to exercise sovereign authority within its recognized jurisdiction, or extent to which ROK Government agrees to specific arrangement for withdrawal non-Korean forces within terms of paragraph 4 above, that is entirely within ROK's province.

We, on the other hand, are parties to the armistice agreement and are bound by its terms and cannot now be bound by a secret agreement with the ROK which would derogate from our publicly expressed obligations.

In order to be free to agree with ROK on the hoped for augmentation of the ROK army in accordance with the as yet unannounced recommendations of the Van Fleet investigatory mission and be free to introduce new equipment into Korea, we must be legally and appropriately freed from armistice provisions and to that end believe essential to achieve unity at Geneva.

In addition, we cannot agree to any terms which would bind our government beyond the terms of the publicly announced mutual defense pact.

But within these limits, we are gratified he has accepted provisions of subdivision 4 as set forth above and express our appreciation thereof and that consequent freedom to announce this statement of principles at Geneva will redound to our mutual benefit.

While we would much prefer inclusion of subdivision 6, which ROK wishes omitted, nevertheless if now omitted, could its provisions not be worked out later as pragmatic matter?

Reference Geneva's 83.<sup>1</sup> Would hold up further drafting changes there suggested pending further negotiations here. If you deem wise, suggest you advise Pyun hold up 14-point proposal pending result of negotiations here.

BRIGGS

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 17, p. 277.

MAY 19, 1954

795.00/5-1954 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

SECRET NIACT

SEOUL, May 19, 1954—3 p. m.

95. Sent Department 1204, repeated information Tokyo 712. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Smith from Dean. Acting Foreign Minister Cho called early this morning to see if we had received letter from Presi-

dent delivered last night, text of which is in Embtel 94, repeated Secretary of State 1203, Tokyo 711.<sup>1</sup> Ambassadors Briggs and Dean called on President Rhee, Prime Minister, Acting Foreign Minister Cho at 11 a. m. Ambassador Dean delivered to President Rhee following letter:

“My dear Mr. President:

“On behalf of my government permit me to say I am deeply grateful at the very distinct progress we have made in discussing the proposed joint statement of principles.

“In the statement made by you as President of the ROK and John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State of our government, on July 27, 1953, you jointly said:

“‘There are no other agreements or understandings stated or implied resulting from these consultations other than those herein contained’.

“The ‘herein’ referred to draft mutual defense treaty between our two governments. That treaty has since been consented to by our Senate and is about to be formally published and ratified between our two governments.

“When Secretary of State Dulles was testifying before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs he was asked if there were any secret agreements or understandings and he repeated the paragraph quoted above. The consent of the US Senate followed.

“We again recognize the inherent sovereignty of the ROK to deal with its own affairs in the territory now under its administrative control or hereafter recognized by our government as lawfully brought under its administrative control.

“In agreeing to the ‘specific arrangements for the withdrawal of non-Korean forces’ to which you must agree in subdivision 4 of the proposed statement of principles you will, of course, be exercising your own sovereign power, in so agreeing.

“As you know we are a signatory to the armistice agreement of July 27, 1953, and until it is lawfully superseded we must abide by its terms with which you also agreed to [*sic*] in the joint statement above referred to, to the extent therein set forth.

“We are also a signatory to the ‘declaration of the 16 nations’ relating to the armistice of July 27, 1953, in which we affirm that if there should be a renewal of armed attack against your government, challenging the principles of the UN, we will be prompt to resist.

“We believe the achievement of unity of Geneva on the basis of the statement of joint principles will enable us to command the respect of the free world and public opinion at home and will enable us promptly to carry into effect the recommendations of the Van Fleet investigation mission now in the Far East to the end that your army will be equipped to repel any attack.

“In addition you will have the mutual defense treaty. As to the elimination of subdivision 6, your government has already been re-

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

ognized by the UN in its declaration of December 12, 1948, as the only sovereign government in Korea. The extension of your administrative control in North Korea will, of course, have to be established to other governments' satisfaction and subdivision 6's inclusion is useful, but I leave that to your good judgment.

"I am very sure it will not be in your or our interest to make the further commitment you suggest in your letter of May 18, 1954, but if you will agree promptly to the ROK being a party to the joint statement of principles at Geneva it will greatly encouraged the free world and redound to the joint benefit of our respective governments and permit us jointly to go forward on the tasks envisioned by you and President Eisenhower.

"I again urge the necessity of prompt action as the opportunity for us to act at Geneva may pass from our hands.

"With renewed admiration and respect, I am, Mr. President, Faithfully yours, Arthur H. Dean. Special Ambassador to Korea".

President Rhee read letter out loud. President in substance said again had to have guarantee of US in secret letter from Ambassador Dean that if he marched north against the North Korean Communist Army after withdrawal of Chinese Communist Army we would support him, or we had to insert "North Korean Communist Army" in subdivision 4 as well as non-Korean forces.

We again explained tremendous advantage our side issuing joint statement of principles promptly and utter impossibility of having any secret agreements or understanding.

President Rhee said Secretary Dulles had assured him among our basic objectives was to bring about united and free Korea. He asked could we honestly and realistically believe we could have free elections in north if Chinese Communist Army remained or that he could ever extend his jurisdiction to north if that Army remained?

We again pointed out what the situation would be if no joint statement issued at Geneva with possible slow disintegration UN forces, grumbling American opinion at lack of unity and difficulty such fact imposed on administration in maintaining ROK Army at appropriate level capable of resisting attack.

President very amicable and reasonable aside from renewed attack on economic aid program and Japanese. He said we were really wasting our time in further discussions unless we were either prepared (a) to bring about withdrawal North Korean Communist Army or (b) back him in a military move.

We again urged him essential necessity his cooperation in order that we could continue our cooperation and continued to emphasize his position made our ability to act much more difficult.



Finally President said he would discuss further with his Cabinet officers and expressed appreciation for the good nature with which the discussions had been conducted on both sides.<sup>2</sup>

BRIGGS

---

<sup>2</sup> The following additional information was imparted in telegram 97 from Seoul to Geneva, also sent to the Department of State as telegram 1206, May 19:

"In description meeting with President Rhee this morning contained Embtel 1204 neglected to state with reference to Rhee's desire delete from paragraph three words 'supervise and', we this morning agreed to this deletion with insertion however of reference to 1950 UNGA resolution. Phrase in question now reads, 'UNCURK shall observe the elections in accordance with UNGA resolution of 7 October 1950, which shall et cetera'." (795.00/5-1954)

---

396.1 GE/5-1954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL      PRIORITY      GENEVA, May 19, 1954—7 p. m.

87. Repeated priority information Department Secto 256, Tokyo  
72. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Briggs and Dean. Re Seoul's 93 and 94.<sup>1</sup>

1. USDel deeply gratified progress your efforts and hopes confirmation Rhee's acceptance will come soon. Russians have been pressing for plenary on Korea today or Thursday<sup>2</sup> which we managed stave off. Doubt we can hold off beyond Saturday, possibly not beyond Friday. Urgent have US-ROK final agreement draft basic proposal Friday at latest. Our position on being unable present single proposal backed by 16 is becoming increasingly untenable. Unless we can do so by next plenary, situation likely deteriorate to point where we will have abandon all hope united support for single proposal. World opinion would then say we could not agree with Communists because we could not even agree among ourselves. In meantime, we will hold off further discussions with ROK delegation or others and schedule no meetings committee of 9 or 16 pending confirmation Seoul and Washington on revised text.

2. ROK delegation is so upset by Eden's speech (as noted our previous telegrams), which they interpret as sinister device obtain UN commission similar in composition to NNSC or NNRC, that they may reverse previous recommendations to Rhee. Eden has assured us several times ROK delegation completely misunderstood and misinterpreted his position and that no such inferences should be drawn from his fourth point of May 13 speech in plenary on Korea. Important Rhee understand in view our experience concerning implementation

---

<sup>1</sup> Both dated May 18, pp. 281 and 283, respectively.

<sup>2</sup> May 20.

armistice agreements, US would join with ROK in refusing accept any such commission.

3. USDel has following comments on Seoul's redraft basic proposal :

(a) Last two sentences paragraph 1 seem confuse constitutional action necessary before elections provide for them again in ROK territory and possible constitutional action after elections on amendment or supersession ROK constitution by expanded National Assembly. Suggest ending paragraph after "National Assembly" in next to last sentence, but can take paragraph as is if necessary.

(b) We regret deletion "supervise and" in paragraph 3 because undercuts Allied reiteration in plenary as well as in one restricted session on Korea genuinely free elections require UN supervision. This is what Communists have unequivocally rejected. However, last clause second sentence, paragraph 3, is supervision in effect.

(c) Insertion phrase "before the election" in paragraph 4 concerns USDel. Instead complete ambiguity in timing of withdrawals before and after elections, paragraph can be interpreted only mean 15 UN members committed make specific arrangements for withdrawal all UN forces as well as Chinese Communist forces before elections. If true, appears conflict with present US policy and JCS views favoring retention some UNC forces Korea until after elections. USDel hopes you can still change this key wording by (1) deleting phrase "before elections" and making withdrawal plural so as to not imply total withdrawal or (2) in addition (1) reinserting phrase "and establishment of government of unified Korea", as in Secto 200,<sup>3</sup> or (3) substituting "the establishment of government of unified Korea" for the words "the election" after "before". Changes would give us needed flexibility on UN forces remaining Korea after elections and not appear commit US general principle total withdrawal in advance any negotiation on arrangements.

(d) USDel agrees delete paragraph 6. Such report to UN is part commission's terms reference laid down in resolution October 7, 1950 as well as prior GA resolutions on Korean independence.

4. Re final paragraph Seoul's 93, if it would help your discussions with Rhee, inform him USDel opposes coalition of any sort with Communists in Korea. This idea of Rhee's is nonsense. In all meetings here as well as Washington prior Geneva, US Government has strongly supported sole legitimacy and sovereignty of ROK in Korea and necessity maintain constitutional structure ROK state. As we indicated in our 57 to Seoul repeated Secto 140,<sup>4</sup> and 29 to Tokyo our proposed plan B deliberately avoids collaboration between Communist puppets in North and legal sovereign Government of ROK. All safeguards for free elections and representation on basis population should ensure non-Communist results elections precluding any coalition. Same is

<sup>3</sup> Same as telegram 74, May 13, from Geneva, p. 264.

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 7, p. 226.

true basic principles. USDel confident Allied delegations here will continue support these views. As far as USDel concerned, ROK agreement basic proposal and presentation with Allied endorsement has nothing to do with any 90-day period. If Rhee signs statement question then is one of discussion in 9 and 16 to obtain their endorsement draft proposal and then its presentation for maximum advantage our side Geneva.

5. Re proposed reply described Seoul's 94 USDel concurs, subject comments paragraph 3(c) above.

SMITH

795B.00/5-1954 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, May 19, 1954—7:33 p. m.

932. Seoul's 1202, 1203 and 1204 sent Geneva 93, 94 and 95 and Tokyo 710,<sup>2</sup> 711<sup>3</sup> and 712.<sup>4</sup> Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Language para 4 proposal Seoul's 1202 clearly implies withdrawal all non-Korean forces before elections. This is not acceptable Defense. See Deptel 902 to Seoul sent Geneva Tosec 107 and Tokyo 2465.<sup>5</sup> Reluctant request Defense reconsideration since still no assurance proposal as whole will be acceptable President Rhee and since both here and in Delegation Geneva considerable doubt exists concerning desirability proposing total withdrawal before elections. Original formulation Secto 200 sent Seoul 74 and Tokyo 58<sup>6</sup> was blurred in order avoid posing this issue and do not see how can be accepted when phrase "before the election" makes it explicit. Can that phrase be dropped?

As pointed out in Seoul's reference telegrams, supplementary secret understanding proposed by Rhee is of course completely unacceptable.

Also concerned over deletion "supervise and" in para 3 of proposal since this is major substantive change. Effective UN supervision is essential ingredient which all Allied delegations have emphasized in their speeches and on which our present position rests. Addition of reference to UN resolutions as suggested Seoul's 1206 sent Geneva 97 and Tokyo 714<sup>7</sup> does not help since they call only for observation and consultation.

<sup>1</sup> Also sent priority to Geneva as telegram Tosec 213 and repeated to Tokyo as telegram 2566 for information.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 18, p. 281.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 18, p. 283.

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 19, p. 284.

<sup>5</sup> Dated May 8, p. 234.

<sup>6</sup> Dated May 13, p. 264.

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 2 to telegram 95, p. 287.

Central issue at moment appears to be question of withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces and disposition North Korean forces. Possibly undesirable raise problem re supervision in para 3 unless some satisfactory formulation can be found for question withdrawal in para 4. However leave this Seoul's discretion. If Rhee should accept proposed para 4 in Seoul's 1202 and if Delegation Geneva agrees Department will ask Defense reconsider question total withdrawal before elections. If Rhee and we can agree on some formulation re withdrawal non-Korean forces, perhaps issue re supervision can be handled through drafting discussions at Geneva with subsequent presentation this single issue to Rhee.

We recognize this still leaves issue of North Korean forces unsettled and may therefore not solve Rhee's problem as clearly stated concluding portions Seoul's 1204. Nevertheless believe this is problem which we cannot solve and which must be fuzzed over if there is to be agreement among 16 on proposal embodying basic principles for unification.

Department believes it clear 90-day period began on April 26 and knows of no oral or written statement to anybody which would imply new 90-day period starts running with introduction new plan or proposal at Conference.

DULLES

---

795.00/5-1954 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1954—7:33 p. m.

933. Seoul's 1204 sent Geneva 95 Tokyo 712.<sup>2</sup> Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department concerned about paragraph in Dean letter to Rhee which begins "We believe the achievement of unity at Geneva" and closes "to the end that your army will be equipped to repel any attack". This paragraph implies that if Rhee accepts statement basic principles for presentation at Geneva US will implement recommendations Van Fleet mission whatever they are. It also implies object buildup ROK forces is enable them repel *any* attack which goes beyond NSC policy.

You should therefore in some appropriate way correct these statements for record. Defense concurs.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated for information to Geneva priority as telegram Tosec 214 and to Tokyo as telegram 2567.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 19, p. 284.

795B.00/5-1954 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

SECRET NIACT

SEOUL, May 19, 1954—9 p. m.

99. Sent Department 1208; repeated information Tokyo 716. Geneva for Smith; Tokyo for CINCUNC. From Dean. At 5:15 this afternoon, special messenger from Prime Minister's office left with Ambassador Dean statement in exact form cabled in Embassy telegram 1202<sup>1</sup> except in subdivision 4 they changed "non-Korean forces" to "all foreign forces including North Korean Armed Forces" and instead of adding "in accordance with the resolution of the UNGA 7 October 1950" as agreed this morning in lieu of "supervise and" in subdivision 3, they added after "observe elections" words "consult regarding them".

Exact text of letter from Prime Minister to Ambassador Dean follows:

"After consultation with the President and Vice Foreign Minister, I present to you this final copy of the Republic of Korea Government statement of principles.

In paragraph 3, we accept your suggestion that "the UNCURK will observe and consult regarding the elections". I believe this will be satisfactory to all concerned. If reference to the UN resolution of 7 October 1950 is made, some other questions and discussion may unnecessarily arise.

In paragraph 4, we have inserted the five words, "including North Korean Armed Forces". We believe that this insertion is essential because the mere absence of foreign forces does not ensure free elections. The withdrawal of "foreign" forces alone does not mean anything to us unless the Communist forces also withdraw from Korea or completely surrender to the Republic of Korea Armed Forces. Under no circumstances can we change this unless there is some clause included whereby we have a guarantee that we are protected against any eventuality resulting from the non-withdrawal of the North Korean Armed Forces.

We will be pleased to sign this document in this form and have it released simultaneously.

Thank you for your cooperation."

You will note reference of "final copy" and that they cannot change unless a guarantee that they are protected against any eventuality arising from non-withdrawal of North Korean forces is added.

This seems to be stumbling block of substance which they are just unable to surmount. Unless there is some clause we can accept, am afraid this is their final answer and further negotiations futile.

Have hesitated to suggest Rhee must accept existing situation as "*fait accompli*" until West is in stronger position to move against North Korea for fear we would have explosion and charge of breaking

<sup>1</sup>Same as telegram 93, May 18, p. 281.

Cairo declaration et cetera and string of abusive public statements which would not be very palatable at home following fall of Dien Bien Phu.

We are sending separate cablegram outlining arguments which might possibly be made along these lines but frankly don't believe Rhee will buy at least at this time.

In view delicate balance negotiations, have hesitated suggest any further possibilities without prior approval and text.

Await instructions.

BRIGGS

---

795.00/5-1954 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 19, 1954—10 p. m.

1210. Repeated information Tokyo 718, Geneva 101. Priority for the Secretary and Under Secretary from Dean. With meeting this morning described in Embassy telegram 1204,<sup>1</sup> negotiations with President Rhee appear to revolve about one single apparently unsoluble topic with Rhee continuing demand commitment to support him in march north as price for agreeing to general principles favoring overall elections with prior withdrawal North Korean Communist Army.

In discussing matter with Briggs, we agree only ammunition this far unused, if it be ammunition, is to inform Rhee politely but firmly, that our government does not propose to resume Korean war for purpose unifying Korea. We could state that unification of Korea under Republic of Korea still remains our basic objective and we intend work sincerely toward that objective by every means short of war. This, of course, may mean shorter or longer period during which Korea remains un-united and, in fact, actual unification may have to await some broader settlement between Communist and non-Communist world than settlement limited to Korean Peninsula alone. While we have most profound sympathy for all Rhee's views concerning unification, fact remains to seek it once more by force of arms is not consonant with our present global and strategic responsibilities.

Such presentation, if deemed advisable, might perhaps be accompanied by suitable explanation our Asian strategy and expectations in immediate future, stressing that we shall continue to support Republic of Korea as long as that government really works with us, maintains mutual security pact as insurance against renewed Communist aggression, and seeks to rebuild Republic of Korea economy, as well as to

---

<sup>1</sup> Same as telegram 95, May 19, p. 284.

assure Republic of Korea military establishment capable of resisting armed aggression, pending arrival United States support.

At some stage of this presentation it might be necessary to describe position of Japan in Far East strategy and necessity for Republic of Korea taking steps toward settlement outstanding difficulties with Japan, though currently this issue and necessity foreign aid purchase in Japan are highly explosive ones with Rhee.

It must be clearly realized that this kind of approach to Rhee without some definite *quid pro quo* as outlined our 1155,<sup>2</sup> although perhaps overdue in our discussion with him, will in all probability not be well received at end of over three weeks of daily negotiations, even though it must be made some day. It is outlined here so that you may follow our current thinking, and as possible solution admittedly difficult situation. We really believe, however, Rhee's fear of Communist infiltration from north is so basic, we must either find some solution, or admit inability obtain agreement.

BRIGGS

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 11, p. 244.

MAY 20, 1954

795B.00/5-2054 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

SECRET      NIACT

SEOUL, May 20, 1954—noon.

104. Sent Department 1214, repeated information Tokyo 722. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Smith from Dean. Assuming Rhee would be willing to issue statement of principles satisfactory to us eliminating added words in subdivision 4 (Seoul 1208)<sup>1</sup> and assuming further Communists were to accept principles, the Chinese Communist armies were to withdraw, free elections are held and UNCURK certifies there is united government for all Korea and then North Korean Communist armies refuse to disband so that ROKs cannot effectively extend their civilian government to north, have we not then estopped ourselves from coming to his aid? For under UN Charter would seem conflict then would be internal problem and not an act of aggression or an international dispute. Or after such theoretical unification would not conflict between South and North Korea alone be a matter of domestic jurisdiction and pursuant Article 2 subdivision 7 therefore outside of UN Charter?

Am assuming, of course, we cannot give guaranty mentioned Prime Minister's letter (Embtel 1208, repeated Geneva 99) as we would in

---

<sup>1</sup> Same as telegram 99, May 19, p. 291.

effect be guarantying to rid North Korea of Communist armies. But assuming we are thinking of some such guaranty, wanted to call fore-going your attention.

BRIGGS

396.1 GE/5-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 20, 1954—3 p. m.

89. Repeated information Department [Secto] 264, Tokyo 76. For Briggs and Dean. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense.

Part I—re Seoul's 99, sent Department 1208, repeated information Tokyo 716.<sup>1</sup>

Note May 19 letter from Prime Minister to Dean proposes simultaneous release statement of principles.

Hope you can impress on President Rhee and Prime Minister on suitable occasion that such release procedure highly undesirable since would diminish impact on world opinion and would evade US-ROK responsibility coordinate with other 14 delegations at Geneva. Proper procedure following US-ROK agreement on statement would be referral to group of nine at Geneva, which would in turn report to meeting of 16, which would then coordinate presentation statement at plenary conference meeting to assure maximum effect.

Part II—re Secto 258, sent Seoul 88, repeated information Tokyo 74.<sup>2</sup>

At Saturday<sup>3</sup> Korean plenary Chou En-lai inscribed to speak first.

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 19, p. 291.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. It said that there would be a plenary session on Korea on Saturday and that the delegation hoped there would be a meeting of the group of nine on Friday. (396.1 GE/5-1954)

<sup>3</sup> May 22.

795B.00/5-1954 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1954—4:11 p. m.

934. Seoul's 1208 repeated Geneva 99 Tokyo 716;<sup>2</sup> Geneva's Secto 256 sent Seoul 87 Tokyo 72.<sup>3</sup> Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

<sup>1</sup> Also sent to Geneva niact as telegram Tosec 219 and repeated to Tokyo for information as telegram 2571.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 19, p. 291.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 19, p. 287.



1. Following suggestion may help resolve impasse over question North Korean forces and enable agreement upon principles to present to Conference.

2. Can Rhee be persuaded agree delete all reference explicit or implicit to withdrawal of forces from proposed statement principles Seoul's 1202 sent Geneva 93 Tokyo 710? <sup>4</sup>

3. It would be understood that ROK would agree speak in support proposal as thus modified but could go on to point out difficulties securing free elections so long as aggressor Chinese troops remain in North Korea and so long as North Korean Communist army remains in position influence elections despite any efforts UNCURK can put forth. Emphasis could be on difficulties securing genuinely free elections under such conditions but willingness ROK go ahead with elections which could in fact be free.

4. As an alternative to approval by Rhee of any detailed statement of principles perhaps it might be possible get Rhee send Pyun *general* instructions authorizing him agree some formulation basic principles along lines already extensively discussed between ROK and US but with complete omission question withdrawal forces on understanding Pyun could speak along lines indicated preceding paragraph and Allied delegations could say it obvious some satisfactory specific arrangements re withdrawal forces must be made in order assure genuinely free elections.

5. If Delegation Geneva considers foregoing course action may possibly meet its problem at Conference it should so notify Seoul niact so Dean and Briggs can approach Rhee along this line.

6. While it seems desirable stick to proposed statement principles already agreed with Rhee except for withdrawal provision Department would have no objection use Pyun 14 point draft contained Secto 239 sent Seoul 84 and Tokyo 67.<sup>5</sup> We do not know whether Rhee has seen it but except for South Korean plebiscite provision paragraph 2 and withdrawal provisions paragraphs 12 and 13 it seems preferable statement principles Seoul's 1202.

DULLES

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 18, p. 281.

<sup>5</sup> Dated May 17, p. 278.

795.00/5-2054 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

SEOUL, May 20, 1954—5 p. m.

1216. Repeated information Tokyo 723 and niact Geneva 105. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary from Dean. Geneva for Smith.

Discussed Embtel 1155<sup>1</sup> with General Anderson,<sup>2</sup> Commander, Fifth Air Force, who had also discussed with General Taylor. Anderson feels very important we retain air bases in Korea and quite skeptical of wisdom our agreeing to full withdrawal UN forces if that also includes Air in order to obtain only theoretical unification Korea.

At General Anderson's suggestion mentioned matter to General Partridge, Commander, Far East Air Force[s], Tokyo, and said would be most interesting to have his comments.

General Anderson has furnished us with following comments from General Partridge and authorizes us transmit Department.

"Personal Anderson from Partridge.

"This message in eight parts. Reference last night's conversation with Dean and you regarding his message to State dated 11 May, his entire dispatch not currently available and I rely on exclusive for Ridgway from Hull dated 13 May for basic provisions upon which to comment.

"Part 1. Based on acceptance of plan B. (a). Agree completely with thought US must deal with overall security program in Far East rather than on bilateral basis. (b). Agree we should tell Rhee where he stands with respect to military and economic aid. . . .

"Part 2. Dispatch mentions military and economic considerations, but program must go far beyond this point. Weight of political and psychological factors is so great that these aspects of US relationships with ROK are primary. Our overall program should be founded on a strong educational plan which as by-product will indoctrinate the young people of Korea in US ideologies.

"Part 3. With respect to rejection of plan B, any thought that we can work out a mutually phased time table involving both the withdrawal of our own troops and those of the Communists is unrealistic. Mention is made also of denouncing the Mutual Defense Pact. It would appear impractical to denounce a pact once it is made. A better course, by far, would be to reject such a pact prior to its promulgation. Since the Koreans provide the only native forces in the Far East ready and willing to fight in support of Western ideals, the latter course certainly should be adopted only as a last resort.

"Part 4. With regard to implementation of a mutual defense pact based on who makes the first attack, the proposed course of action may be a good talking point, but from the military and political point of view, it is difficult to decide upon at the critical moment. At the outset of hostilities, it is extremely difficult to determine which side is actually the aggressor. Although we probably should not tell Rhee so, I feel strongly that we have a moral obligation to support the ROK whenever it gets in trouble and until such time as it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the ROK forces are the aggressors. With respect to permitting Rhee to take his choice between cooperating with us under proposed plan B or acting otherwise, it seems highly desirable that we adopt a course of action which will insure South Korean

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 11, p. 244.

<sup>2</sup> Lt. Gen. Samuel E. Anderson.

support over a long term. In other words, we should avoid pushing Rhee to point of decision between two courses, neither of which is optimum from our point of view.

"Part 5. Agree that important Chinese bombing targets lie from Peiping northward, but feel that paragraph regarding bases for offensive operations against these targets is overdrawn. Our pacts with Korea and Japan must without fail include authority to operate from their bases. Moreover, capacity of Russians to knock out Okinawan bases is doubtful unless atomic weapons are employed in massive attacks. Such enemy action would touch off World War III in which case Air Force is prepared to carry out atomic strikes from other islands of Pacific as situation demands. (a) Much more important to military position of US in Far East than availability of Korean bases for US air operations is implication of possible use by Communists of air bases in South Korea. Presence of Communist air forces in these fields would jeopardize security of Japanese home islands. (b) Agree with statement that attempt to carry out plan B without ROK cooperation will not seem realistic or convincing and, in fact, believe this is putting the situation too mildly. I fail to see how plan B could be implemented without the fullest cooperation of the ROK's, and, furthermore, without some assistance from the Government of North Korea.

"Part 6. With respect to last paragraph above, and portion of message saying that top military commanders are not up to date on the overall thinking in the Far East, believe time has come to accept down-to-earth position on *status quo* in Korea. It is my opinion that Korea can be re-united only by force of arms, a course of action Rhee would applaud, but which would raise the most serious objections on the part of our allies as well as the people of the US. Realistically, therefore, we must accept the *status quo* and work out the best solution possible under existing circumstances. Although it will come as a blow to Rhee, I consider that the only solution is to arrange a mutual defense pact with the ROK, withdraw our military forces from Korea as rapidly as feasible, and leave there only ROK forces. These military forces should have sufficient strength to exert pressure on North Koreans and provide cushion in point of time in which US could come to the aid of South Korea before it is overrun.

"Part 7. US should not attempt to match strength in ground forces with combined North Korean and Chinese Communist armies, but should leave Rhee a ground arm of less than 20 divisions yet capable of executing delaying action against North Korean Army alone. He will not like this suggestion, but to do otherwise invites him to attack northward on his own initiative.

"Part 8. Major emphasis in US effort should be placed on economic, political and psychological stabilization of Korea and on a program of realignment of Korean sympathies toward Japan and its other neighbors outside Communist orbit in Far East rather than on military considerations. This statement is predicated on fact that the military force available to the US is of order of magnitude far exceeding anything previously visualized and that immediate prospect exists for hundred-fold amplification of even this new military power. We

should start on long-term program to cure the causes of our Far East troubles and give this cure the full weight of our effort".

All military commanders here seem to accept view no way actually to unite Korea except by force of arms and coalition government might possibly cost us use of bases in south with army commanders well satisfied about hundred per cent withdrawal ground troops as ROK army reaches strength. ROK Air Force, of course, not equal to North Korean.

BRIGGS

396.1 GE/5-1554 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, May 20, 1954—5:34 p. m.

888. For Secretary Wilson from the Secretary. Re Tokyo's 2808 repeated Geneva Tosec 170, Seoul 925.<sup>2</sup> Appreciate your valuable suggestion. Have transmitted it Geneva for information US delegation there.

So far as Korea is concerned our present problem is to secure some statement basic principles upon which ROK, US and rest of allied delegations can all agree. There seems little likelihood achieving any political settlement disturbing present *status quo* on any basis which would be acceptable to us and prevent communist domination all Korea. Nevertheless it may be useful at some point incorporate provision of nature your suggestion in order demonstrate more clearly to world opinion our effort achieve settlement.

DULLES

<sup>1</sup> Repeated for information to Geneva as telegram Tosec 220, to Seoul as telegram 935, and to Tokyo as telegram 2576. The file copy indicates that this message was drafted by McClurkin and approved for transmission by Drumright who signed for Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 15, not printed. In it, Secretary Wilson suggested inclusion in any proposal for unification of Korea of a provision for personal amnesty for all individuals; he indicated that Ambassador Allison agreed with him. (396.1 GE/5-1554)

396.1 GE/5-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL      PRIORITY      GENEVA, May 20, 1954—6 p. m.

90. Repeated information Department Secto 266, Tokyo 77. For Briggs and Dean; Tokyo pass CINCUNC; Department pass Defense.

1. Morning May 20 Pyun sent us text statement proposes make next plenary. Contains same 14 points transmitted to Seoul in our 84 re-

peated Secto 239 Tokyo 67.<sup>1</sup> Subsequently Robertson and Young met with Pyun and ROK delegation. Explained to Pyun next plenary probably Saturday and that Chou En-lai inscribed. Pyun said he desires present his 14 points as ROK proposal when next plenary held. Indicated proposal not ROK final position and they might accept changes later.

2. Again explained Pyun we regret his insistence making unilateral proposal because we are missing tremendous opportunity formulate and present single proposal all 16 can endorse. Pyun urged USDel endorse his 14 points which we said would be difficult in view his paragraph 12 and 13 on withdrawal although many points acceptable. Made strong efforts persuade Pyun delete proviso in paragraph 2 of his proposal and substitute "in accordance constitutional processes ROK". Pointed out his language not only would be ambiguous to US and free world but also appears ignore ROK constitution, ROK Government and particularly functions National Assembly. ROK delegates seemed convinced this argument but Pyun disinclined make revision presumably because his language conforms with instructions from Rhee regarding plebiscite or special vote whether new elections should be held in South Korea for unification purposes. We still have impression Pyun has not transmitted 14 points to Rhee since Pyun omits reference North Korea forces which Rhee is so emphasizing.

3. Re Seoul's 1208 to Department repeated Geneva 99, Tokyo 716<sup>2</sup> and Seoul's 1202 to Department repeated Geneva 93 Tokyo 710<sup>3</sup> USDel would point out Pyun's proposal better than 6 points Rhee has worked out; namely (a) Pyun provides for UN supervision in his first point; (b) requirement UN withdrawal prior elections but instead formulation in his paragraph 13 like US views; (c) no mention of North Korean armed forces; (d) his paragraph 14 simpler than Rhee's last paragraph.

4. We are concerned that if text Pyun's 14 points made available to Rhee, he will instruct Pyun to amend less acceptable form. Therefore, while continuing efforts here obtain minor changes, we inclined accept Pyun's 14 points as best formulation obtainable from ROK at this time. We would hold meeting 16 Friday giving Pyun opportunity present and defend his proposal to group. We estimate most of group will be willing give general support to all except Pyun's points 12 and 13. We would in meeting 16 and private conversations urge others give wide degree support as possible, focusing on points most acceptable to them and remaining silent on others. We would expect give general support by speech in following plenary.

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 17, p. 278.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 19, p. 291.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 18, p. 281.

5. Under circumstances USDel reluctantly sees no alternative for time being but proceed to Pyun's 14 points in plenary because:

(a) He is wedded to them and determined present proposal in plenary to extent he now refuses make revisions in already mimeographed statement;

(b) Except for paragraphs 12 and 13 proposal<sup>4</sup> satisfactory in principle<sup>5</sup> and even paragraphs on withdrawal have merit from negotiating point of view of ROKs putting tough position up to Communists, particularly if ROK delegation willing amend position later;

(c) Pyun's proposals represent some progress and take pressure off USDel and other 14 for making some move on Korea after long delay and as long as US and ROK have not resolved difficult problem withdrawal in 6-point proposal;

(d) Going ahead as outlined paragraph 4 does not preclude also continuing attempt formulation single proposal 16 can endorse and present at a later date. This will take more time in view problem resolving paragraph 4 of 6 points, (Tosec 213 repeated Seoul 932 and Tokyo 2566<sup>6</sup>) and need for other delegations here consult governments when and if US and ROKs table joint proposal in committee of 9 or 16. Also conceivable after Chou's speech Saturday we may have clearer picture how proceed in general situation.

SMITH

---

<sup>4</sup> At this point, the word "probably" is handwritten on the source text.

<sup>5</sup> At this point, the words "majority of Allies" are handwritten on the source text.

<sup>6</sup> Dated May 19, p. 289.

---

#### *Editorial Note*

In telegram Dulte 92, May 20, 6 p. m., from Geneva, Smith transmitted to Secretary Dulles for his eyes only an appraisal of the duration of the Geneva Conference. Most of the message dealt with Indochina; for the complete text, see page 864. The following extract, however, dealt with Korea:

"On Korea there is nothing whatever to be expected from them [the Communists]. Dean's latest message indicates that it will be impossible to produce proposals agreed to by all 16. Best we can hope to do is avoid open opposition by our side when Pyun produces his 14 points. Others of the 16 will possibly then present proposals of their own or speak in support of Eden's points. We will continue, and try to induce others to continue, to hammer as hard as possible on repudiation by all Communist delegations of authority and moral force of United Nations. World public opinion seems becoming conditioned to negative results. Unless something unexpected happens the Korea phase will drag along with an occasional plenary session while Indochina discussions go on." (396.1 GE/5-2054)

795.00/5-2054 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 20, 1954—8 p. m.

1217. Priority Geneva 106, repeated information priority Tokyo 724. Re Deptel 933, repeated Geneva Tosec 214, Tokyo 2567.<sup>1</sup> Following letter sent today to President Rhee from Dean :

“With respect to my letter to you dated May 19 I have been requested by my government to advise you of a fact, of which I am sure you are well aware ; i.e., that recommendations of Van Fleet investigation mission now in Far East will of course have to be approved by my government in Washington before they can be put into effect.

“I have been further asked to advise you that while we of course with your cooperation hope to train and equip ROK Army so that in event of an attack it can hold enemy until such time as US forces pursuant to terms of mutual defense pact can come to your aid, nevertheless use of phrase in my letter of May 19 ‘to end that your army will be equipped to repel any attack’ is *too broad*.

“I am sure you understood use of these phases in light of our general conversations but in accordance with my further instructions from Washington and in order that there may be no confusion about matter I am taking this opportunity to make matter clear.”

BRIGGS

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 19, p. 290.

795.00/5-2054 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 20, 1954—10 p. m.

1219. Priority Geneva 108, repeated information priority Tokyo 726. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. From Dean. Reference Geneva 87, repeated Department Secto 256, Tokyo 72,<sup>1</sup> Subdivision 3a. Under existing ROK constitution elections being held today to National Assembly are for 4-year term. President Rhee insists if we are going to have new north and south elections present ROK constitution must be amended before such elections to curtail term of currently successful candidates and then after elections constitution can of course be amended by its terms in order to permit Assemblymen from north and from south to choose appropriate form of government by constitutional process within framework ROK constitution. Since he was adamant about inclusion of words “before the above elections” at end of penultimate sentence in paragraph one, obtained his permission insert last sentence.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 19, p. 287.

Reference subdivision 3b we only agreed delete "supervise and" when President agreed insertion "in accordance UNGA resolution 7 October, 1950" which agreed upon change later yesterday deleted in letter from Prime Minister quoted Embtel 99, repeated Department 1208, Tokyo 716.<sup>2</sup>

No matter what we say President adamant there must not be a single Communist soldier in North Korea at time elections are held. When discussing our draft statement principles which provided for withdrawal only Chinese Communists, pointed out to him on numerous occasions his insistence such complete withdrawal would also require UN forces complete withdrawal before elections which was contrary to our wishes. His consistently repeated answer is that since UN forces were invited and Communists are aggressors and since we expect Communists to reject statement, why are we compelled to agreed phased withdrawal our forces and not just demand withdrawal Chinese Communist forces? Not only is there nothing we can say on this question which seems convince him but for some reason assuming ROK armies are built up he looks forward to withdrawal of UN forces, perhaps for reason that he will then be free to march north. It is becoming more and more difficult to carry on reasoned discussions with him on this and related issues.

Reference subdivision 4, have made arguments therein set forth many times. Reference Geneva 86<sup>3</sup> have made arguments outlined to subdivision 5 in carefully reasoned way several times with Rhee and went over whole matter yesterday pointing out extreme difficulty he would face even with build-up ROK army if he did not have continuous pipeline to US and that without it he probably would be defeated by North Koreans alone in several months. Have also repeatedly made arguments Geneva 86 subdivision 3 with same results you describe. In passing, this particular provision worries General Taylor on ground it may give Rhee veto power over withdrawal of our forces which has already been determined upon by JCS even without phased withdrawal Chinese Communists.

Fully realize utmost importance unanimous declaration at Geneva but for your information, in reviewing situation separately with Generals Taylor, Partridge and Anderson they each wonder whether advantage joint declaration at Geneva, if accepted by Communists, may not be unduly restricting our freedom military movements and whether would not be better retain such freedom and accept proposition that Korea cannot be united except by force of arms and do best we can with South Korea as presently constituted.

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 19, p. 291.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 18, p. 279.



Deem wise not to approach President until receive instructions as requested Embtel 99. We have feeling confirmed by Prime Minister's letter President is holding out for definite commitment from us which we have no authority to make.

BRIGGS

MAY 21, 1954

396.1 GE/5-2154 : Telegram

*Smith-Robertson-Pyun Meeting, Geneva, May 21, 9:45 a. m.:<sup>1</sup> The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, May 21, 1954—4 p. m.

92. Repeated information Department Secto 276, Tokyo 78. For Briggs and Dean. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense.

1. Before meeting of 16 this morning Smith and Pyun discussed and agreed on handling of meeting and Pyun's presentation his 14 points. Smith and Robertson strongly urged Pyun amend his second point along lines our paragraph 2, telegram 90 to Seoul, Secto 266, Tokyo 77.<sup>2</sup> Pyun agreed ask instructions delete language after "also" and insert "in accordance with the constitutional processes of the ROK".

2. His request to Rhee presumably encoded in USDel's 91 to Seoul.<sup>3</sup>

3. Several speakers in meeting of 16<sup>4</sup> for same reasons also urged same suggestion re second point and urged Pyun get approval from Rhee and revise point before he makes speech Saturday.<sup>5</sup> Except for points 12 and 13, US and other 14 find second point only real difficulty in Pyun's proposal. If Rhee approves Pyun's suggested change above, Allies will be able give general support all Pyun's points but 12 and 13 on which they still have reservations and need time consult home governments.

4. Accordingly urgent have favorable Rhee reply before Pyun makes speech so he can change second point. USDel would appreciate speedy processing telegram 91 to Seoul and any reply to Pyun if that could come back by State channels niact if ROK Government so desired and mentions this matter to you. Suggest might be useful in your discretion you deliver encoded text in our 91 personally to Acting Foreign Minister Cho with whatever use of above points you feel advisable recognizing delicacy referring to private communication

<sup>1</sup> A memorandum from Johnson to Smith, not printed, dated May 21, indicated that Pyun's appointment with Smith was set for approximately 9:45 a. m. (795.00/5-2154).

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 20, p. 298.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> See *infra*.

<sup>5</sup> May 22.

between Pyun and Rhee and possibility Rhee may not have full text 14 points. However in view importance this matter USDel hopes deadline noon Saturday Geneva time can be met if Rhee's response favorable.<sup>6</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>6</sup> The following message was sent niact to Geneva for Smith from Dean in telegram 16 from Tokyo, also sent to the Department of State as telegram 2882, May 22:

"Your 92 to Seoul reached us Tokyo. Pursuant suggestion your 90 did not show or discuss Pyun's 14 points with Rhee. Since Rhee has always insisted on plebiscite believe might be better rely on Pyun's direct request, but would make abundantly clear you are not accepting 12 and 13. If Pyun's statement put forward and Communists don't just reject, gives you basis further modification.

"Briggs returning Seoul Sunday. Dean leaves late Sunday afternoon for Washington." (396.1 GE/5-2254)

---

396.1 GE/5-2154 : Telegram

*Sixth Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, May 21, 10:40 a. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 21, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 277. Repeated information Tokyo 79, priority Seoul 93, London 196, Paris 314, Moscow unnumbered. Department pass Defense; Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

1. Sixth meeting of chief Allied delegations held this morning at Palais with Kural presiding, was devoted entirely to consideration substance and tactics of Republic of Korea 14-point proposal (contained to [*in*] Seoul 84, repeated information Secto 239, Tokyo 67<sup>2</sup>) which Pyun plans present plenary tomorrow and which he circulated at today's meeting. Generally cordial atmosphere prevailed. All delegations, except Philippines recognized that Republic of Korea proposal best obtainable under circumstances, in view Pyun determination to speak tomorrow. No delegation ready to give wholehearted support Pyun proposal because of language in point two, requiring South Korean referendum approving election principle (to Seoul 92, repeated information Secto 276, Tokyo 78<sup>3</sup>) and obvious difficulty all have with points 12 and 13 regarding total withdrawal only Chinese Communists troops before election. However, general consensus was that Republic of Korea proposal was far better than one presented by

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/6) from which the time of the meeting is taken is in FE files. lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting adjourned at 12:25 p. m.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 17, p. 278.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

North Koreans because Republic of Korea had agreed to principle of all-Korean election.

2. General agreement reached on Pearson (Canada) proposal that :

(a) Republic of Korea make clear that it was presenting proposal only in own name with understanding none of 16 would take exception to any points at tomorrow's plenary.

(b) Next week members of 16 could indicate general support Republic of Korea proposal while possibly recommending certain changes in detail.

(c) If Communists showed any willingness negotiate, consideration should be given next week either to (1) proposing in plenary that Republic of Korea 14-point proposal and North Korean proposal be referred to subcommittee of plenary where possibly 16-nation agreement could be reached, or (2) continuing efforts to get agreement among 16 for general proposal which would be presented in plenary without necessitating use of subcommittee.

3. Smith opened meeting by saying that the Republic of Korea felt it necessary to present some proposal at plenary on Korea tomorrow, since Chou En-lai inscribed to speak and since other delegations our side had put forward proposals. Added that Republic of Korea proposal would be presented without prejudice to formulation of set of general principles in future on which 16 could agree. Smith said that in general Republic of Korea principles seemed to recommend themselves to us and that we planned give them general support at the first plenary after Saturday's.<sup>4</sup> Although we had some reservation as to language on withdrawal of forces, we saw certain merit in proposing withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces first as negotiating tactic.

4. Pyun made a good presentation his proposal pointing out he was restricted by his instructions, but had attempted to develop his proposal within the broad general framework previously accepted by 16. During ensuing discussion, all delegations focused on point two proviso that elections could be held in South Korea "providing that the majority of the people residing in South Korea wished them" and on language in points 12 and 13 requiring total withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops prior to elections. In connection with point two, Pearson, supported by Eden, felt that some better phrase might be worked out which would not leave impression that Republic of Korea was still maintaining built-in veto over election proposal. Smith explained we had suggested alternate phrase "in accordance with constitutional processes of Republic of Korea" be used and that Pyun had agreed to ask for instructions. Pyun, after emphasizing the Con-

<sup>4</sup> Twelfth Plenary Session held May 28; see telegram Secto 337, May 28, p. 322.

stitutional problem for Republic of Korea, confirmed he had agreed to substitute wording suggested by Smith and that he had cabled Rhee for authority to use suggested language tomorrow.

5. During discussion withdrawal question Pearson, supported by Eden and Acikalin (Turkey) stressed importance of trying to modify language regarding withdrawal to prevent Communists from being in position to reject proposal flatly. Eden said frankly was unhappy with two points as presently written, since hoped would be in position to talk about phased withdrawal on both sides, thus maintaining strong propaganda position. Zuleta (Colombia) proposed that since all delegations were agreed on Pyun's points one through eleven (assuming point two amended), Pyun should propose only those points, excluding all reference to withdrawal of troops. Pyun replied that Republic of Korea agreement on all-Korean elections premised on: (1) requirement that Republic of Korea Constitution be adhered to, and (2) agreement that Chinese Communist troops be withdrawn first. Smith, while agreeing with Eden that we would have preferred language referring to phased withdrawal of forces on both sides, said fact remained that Pyun desired to speak tomorrow and could not delete present withdrawal language without specific authorization of his government. Stressed importance that withdrawal not distract us from upholding principle of United Nations authority, and free elections based on representation proportionate to population.

6. Garcia, (Philippines) maintained interrogatory attitude throughout meeting, closely questioned Pyun on details of his proposal and contended that Pyun's unilateral presentation proposal was contrary to the earlier agreement by 16, that effort be made to put forward an agreed 16-nation proposal. Recommended that Pyun postpone statement until 16 reached agreement, but obtained no support this position. (Obvious Garcia considerably rankled because we talked him out of presenting earlier Philippine proposal and also because he himself had hoped to be one to put forward an agreed 16-nations proposal.)

SMITH

---

795B.00/5-2154 : Telegram

*Dean-Briggs-Rhee Meeting, Seoul, May 21, 2:30 p. m.: The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

SEOUL, May 21, 1954—10 p. m.

1226. Repeated information Tokyo 728, niact Geneva 111. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary from Dean. Geneva for Smith.

Reference Deptels 932,<sup>1</sup> 933,<sup>2</sup> 934,<sup>3</sup> and Geneva's 84,<sup>4</sup> 87,<sup>5</sup> 89<sup>6</sup> and 90.<sup>7</sup> Ambassadors Briggs and Dean called on President Rhee, Prime Minister and Acting Foreign Minister Cho at 2:30 p. m.

We tried to get President Rhee change subdivision 4 of draft statement principles to read as follows: "Before the elections specific arrangements for withdrawal from Korea of non-Korean forces shall be agreed upon by the parties accepting these principles, and withdrawal shall be observed and verified by the UNCURK in order ensure that elections are accomplished under conditions of genuine freedom".

Thought this would accomplish purpose Deptel 932. Emphasized to President with this proposed language that before elections were held ROK as one of the parties would have to be satisfied with the specific arrangements.

President replied that he had given matter great thought and would never under any circumstances be satisfied unless we stated in so many words that (a) all the Chinese Communist armies had to be withdrawn from Korea before the elections and (b) North Korean Communist army would either have to withdraw or surrender before election. We emphasized this was not in our mutual best interests.

Reviewed again that we were missing unique opportunity at Geneva to formulate and present before the world single proposal all 16 Allies could endorse in order to command world respect, retain Allied unity, put onus on Communists, win American public opinion and congressional support for economic aid program, and Van Fleet proposals. Pointed out Communists were gleeful at division among Allies at Geneva.

Further emphasized by agreeing on principles ROK had complete details in their control and by refusing they were risking lack of unity with US which might have serious repercussions at home whereas if they accept principles break with Communists could come in course of negotiations on details and power to break lies with ROK Government.

President stressed the fact he was afraid US was losing battle against communism. had already lost China and was in process of losing not only Indochina but all Southeast Asia and that he was not prepared to accept idea that Korea must remain divided. Insisted time to fight in North Korea was now.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 19, p. 289.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 19, p. 290.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 20, p. 294.

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 17, p. 278.

<sup>5</sup> Dated May 19, p. 287.

<sup>6</sup> Dated May 20, p. 294.

<sup>7</sup> Dated May 20, p. 298.

We pointed out proposed strengthening of ROK army and proposed withdrawal UN forces would mean greater mobility and add greater strength to our military power and with military pact would enable us help them better than if we stayed and did not build up ROK army.

President insisted he would never permit elections while any Communists remained in country.

Outlined in forceful terms as we dared without making any threats disastrous consequences of President's stand and offered to add in subdivision 4 after "non-Korean forces" following words "and for the restoration of peaceful conditions in North Korea" pointing out that before elections could be held this gave him right to have voice in what conditions in North Korea must actually be before elections could be held.

President again insisted that this would postpone matters for many months, insisted conditions were deteriorating in north and again begged me to support him in march north and use personal influence to get him necessary arms and ammunition required.

We flatly declined. Told him such course would spell his defeat and even if he were victorious would take many months or years to win.

President definitely promised not to go beyond the Yalu but told him such course was utterly out of question and complete folly on his part.

Rhee was exceptionally pleasant, cordial and philosophical and when Ambassador Dean informed him he was leaving for home tomorrow, President expressed great regrets and thanked him for cordial and constructive conversations and understanding heart.

Ambassador Dean again made strong plea for cooperation now and expressed his complete confidence US ability to win war against communism and its ability to work in close harmony with staunch Allies such as Korea, but President said he had made decision and could not in good conscience accede to Ambassador Dean's request.

Ambassador Dean then urged he permit Foreign Minister Pyun to support at Geneva statement of principles without any provision on withdrawal but to outline conditions essential for free elections but President said it was essentially the same thing.

Did not mention Pyun's 14 points in view Geneva's 90.

In view President's very firm and unyielding attitude seemed clear to both of us that further discussions would be unproductive and that President was holding out for some commitment, we did not have, so at 4:30 p. m. we said cordial goodbyes to President and Mrs. Rhee and Cabinet Officers present and President expressed regret at departure. wish for early return, et cetera.

Sincerely sorry could not influence him. His stand has noticeably hardened since fall of Dien Bien Phu and he constantly wonders if USA is on winning side.

Dean leaving for Tokyo 8:30 Saturday morning.

BRIGGS

MAY 22, 1954

396.1 GE/5-2254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 22, 1954—11 a. m.

Secto 282. Priority Seoul 94; repeated information Tokyo 81. Department pass Defense. Seoul for Briggs and Dean. Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

1. Re Tosec 213 sent Seoul 932 repeated information Tokyo 2566: <sup>1</sup> We feel Defense reconsideration of question total withdrawal before elections not desirable. In view third paragraph Seoul's 108 to Geneva. repeated Department 1219 and Tokyo 726,<sup>2</sup> we are uncertain this would further help persuade Rhee amend paragraph four or assist in getting ROK deletion in paragraph four reference to North Korean forces. Also see no need consider total simultaneous withdrawal both Chinese and UN forces before Communists give any evidence intention negotiate and agree on unification proposals acceptable to US. ROK and Allies.

2. Re Tosec 219, repeated Seoul 934 Tokyo 2571: <sup>3</sup> Believe suggestion may be overtaken by events particularly after Pyun makes points 12 and 13 of his 14. Colombian representative suggested it in meeting of 16 today,<sup>4</sup> but Pyun rejected it. USDel has been examining same idea paragraph two reference telegram for some time and has mentioned it informally to certain members other delegations. Consensus has been omission in presentation plenary any reference withdrawal would probably flag problem and likely Communists would focus attack on omission to sidestep issue UN and free elections. Generalized language such as Secto 200 <sup>5</sup> would deprive Communists this advantage. Most other delegations have mentioned withdrawal in plenary speeches. However, in view probable difficulty resolving impasse with Rhee despite great efforts Seoul, see no objections trying it out on Rhee in discretion Embassy. Conceivable Korean sessions might develop in

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 19, p. 289.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 20, p. 301.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 20, p. 294.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the meeting of the 16 held on May 21; see telegram Secto 277. May 21, p. 304; there was no meeting on May 22.

<sup>5</sup> Same as telegram 74, May 13. from Geneva, p. 264.

such way desirable and possible 16 nations later present single final proposal minus withdrawal paragraph. Another possibility is later work out among 16 generalized substitute for Pyun's points 12 and 13.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-2254 : Telegram

*Eleventh Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, May 22, 3:02 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 22, 1954—midnight.

Secto 286. Repeated information Seoul 96, Tokyo 82, London 203, Paris 318, Moscow 81. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense. Eleventh Korean plenary with Molotov in chair opened with speech by Chou En-lai,<sup>2</sup> most significant aspect of which was proposal, later supported by Nam Il, that all-Korean elections be supervised by Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Chou proposed following "supplement" to Article I of Nam Il's April 27 proposals:

"In order to assist the all-Korean Commission in holding all-Korean elections in accordance with the all-Korean electoral law, in free conditions which preclude foreign intervention, a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission be formed to supervise the all-Korean elections."

In putting forward proposal, Chou acknowledged that war had "left deep scars upon relationship between North and South Korea" and consequently "necessary that neutral organization be set up to render assistance to Korean machinery in charge of holding all-Korean elections". Rejecting United Nations as supervising agency because "a belligerent". Chou said "neutral organization should be composed representatives from neutral nations to be agreed upon by Conference, that did not participate in Korean war".

After submitting foregoing proposal Chou concluded speech by drawing attention his proposal of May 3 on non-repatriation prisoners of war, again asking Conference give it serious consideration since question of prisoners of war "can not be considered closed".

In opening part of speech, Chou replied various attacks on his previous statements, particularly those relating Asian aspirations, attitude toward United Nations, and North Korean proposals. Reacting sharply to speeches by other delegations criticizing his pretensions speak for Asians, Chou denied Chinese Communists claim monopoly

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/11) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:02 p. m. and adjourned at 6:19 p. m. This message was transmitted in two sections.

<sup>2</sup> The text is printed in Cmd. 9186, pp. 54-58.



as "champions national aspirations in Asia", but at same time attacked "delegates of some Asian States" who "sang praises of United States aggression", claiming they constitute tiny fraction of minority among Asians. Said this "handful of people" typified by Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee cliques. Chou alleged overwhelming majority Asians would never agree Colonial policy United States aggressors and still less formulation military blocs using "Asians fight Asians".

Calling Nam II proposals "reasonable beyond dispute", Chou again stated they should serve as basis for reaching agreement and warned that continued insistence, or "illegal" United Nations Korean resolutions at Conference "will not be able to settle anything". Referring to criticism that Chinese Communist denunciation United Nations, Korean resolutions and request to join United Nations, self-contradictory, Chou then made definite in statement Peiping's attitude on its admission to United Nations: "The question is not that the People's Republic of China asks to join the United Nations, but that the right which the People's Republic of China should have to participate in United Nations has been deprived and hence the rightful place of People's Republic of China in United Nations should be restored". Claiming such deprivation of People's Republic of China "rights" constituted "flagrant violation United Nations Charter and seriously damaged vestige of United Nations", Chou indicated People's Republic of China absence made United Nations Korean resolution illegal and rendered United Nations incapable dealing with Korean question. He cited Colombo powers as supporting Peiping's seating in United Nations.

Turning to procedure for unifying Korea, Chou said "not impossible find common ground" and that he had not heard opposition to principle question of unification should be settled by Koreans themselves. He again called for withdrawal of all foreign forces prior elections and within "specified period of time", alleging presence United States troops Korea "not only threatens peace in Korea and security of China, but will inevitably lead interference in Korean domestic affairs".

Referring next to criticism of all-Korean Commission proposed by Nam II, Chou said same delegates "utilized principle of proportional representation to oppose principle of mutual agreement between two sides", but this nothing but "attempt impose will of one side on other" and cited Nehru May 18 statement that unity cannot be imposed by one side on another.<sup>3</sup> He said proportional representation problem for

---

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to a statement made on that date by Indian Prime Minister Nehru in the Council of States.

electoral law and no question its application to composition all-Korean Commission.

Nam Il, who had inscribed shortly before the meeting opened, followed Chou with a long discursive speech<sup>4</sup> apparently intended as general refutation of past Allied speeches, discreditment of Republic of Korea, and endorsement Chou's new proposal. Speech contained usual themes on illegality of United Nations resolutions, charges that United Nations was under complete domination of United States, and that it was impossible for United Nations to maintain an impartial position on the Korean question, since United Nations was one of the belligerents. Called for a rapid withdrawal of all foreign forces, and demanded right of Koreans to exercise all sovereign rights in internal affairs without outside influence. Alluded briefly as had Chou, to prisoners of war question, saying that over 48,000 prisoners of war, of whom 34,000 were North Korean, still held in South Korea in violation of Armistice Agreement. Contention of Canada and United Kingdom that prisoners of war question already resolved was contrary to facts.

Pointing out that United Kingdom, Australia and Colombia had already called for all-Korean elections, Nam Il said that ROKs, being subservient to United States, were afraid to give people opportunity to express their will. Then spun out series of allegations that May twenty ROK election was held under conditions of violence, police persecution, terrorism, et cetera, and cited number of press despatches to prove that both candidates and voters deprived of democratic rights. Followed this with lengthy discourse comparing political, social and economic conditions in North Korea with those in South Korea during which North Korea emerged as land of milk and honey while Rhee's realm pictured on verge of bankruptcy and starvation.

As clarification of what he contended was distortion of earlier North Korean position on proportional representation, Nam Il distinguished between all-Korean commission, which would be composed of equal number representatives North and South Korea with the subsequent all-Korean National Assembly, which would have representation based on population. Opposed proportional representation in electoral commission by saying such an arrangement completely unacceptable because would enable South Korea to impose its demands on North Korea.

In endorsing Chou's proposal for neutral nations commission for supervision of all-Korean elections, Nam Il used rationale that exist-

---

<sup>4</sup> Extracts from Nam Il's speech are printed in *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 117-123.

ing tensions between North and South Korea made *rapprochement* and unification difficult and therefore nothing should be overlooked which might make task of all-Korean commission easier. Recognizing he was on poor wicket because of earlier statements, added that it was understood that the establishment of such international supervision would not violate Communist principle that there be no intervention of "foreign states" into the internal affairs of Korea.

Pyun made relatively short statement directed primarily at refutation of Nam Il's speech and proposal of April 27 and Molotov's supporting statement of May 11. At conclusion, tabled 14-point proposal (contained in Seoul 84, repeated information Secto 239, Tokyo 67<sup>5</sup>) with last phrase in point two amended, as we had hoped, to read ". . . in accordance with the constitutional processes of the Republic of Korea."<sup>6</sup> (Pyun informed USDel that Rhee had cabled approval revised wording.)

In statement, Pyun exposed Communist 50-50 electoral commission as device designed to permit infiltration and subversion entire country and pointed out that, while Nam Il proposal contained time limit for withdrawal of foreign forces, it avoided specifying time for elections. Defended UNCURK and US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty and charged that Communist-proposed security guarantee was aimed at communication of entire country. Pyun also charged that Chinese Communists were puppets of Moscow, that there were "tens of thousands" Soviet advisers in Communist China and that ROKs would seriously consider a Soviet guarantee only if USSR ordered Chinese invaders out of North Korea. Answered Molotov's statement that Communist China, as one of 5 great powers, was entitled permanent membership on Security Council, by pointing out that Nationalists still occupied permanent seat and that Communists could not shoot way into United Nations with "guilty hands all red with its victims' blood."

After completion prepared text, Pyun made impressive refutation of Nam Il's charges about May 20 election, emphasizing that: (1) 91 percent of the registered voters turned out for election in which 2,000 candidates were contesting 203 seats; (2) the Liberal Party elected only 131 members of Assembly; (3) two of Rhee's strongest opponents (P. H. Shinicky, Chough Pyong Ok) had won in their districts despite widely-heralded charges of police intervention against them. Ended saying that the world outside the Iron Curtain was content to await

<sup>5</sup> Dated May 17, p. 278.

<sup>6</sup> The text of the 14-point proposal is printed in *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 123-124.

UNCURK's unprejudiced and factual report on election, and challenged Communists to permit similar election under UNCURK's observation in North Korea.<sup>7</sup>

No definite date for next plenary set.

SMITH

---

<sup>7</sup> UNCURK's report on the elections is contained in U.N. document A/2711, pp. 7-10. According to the report, the Liberal Party of President Rhee won 115 seats, the DNP 15, two minor parties 3 seats each, and Independents 67. The Liberal Party candidates won 55.3 percent of the total vote, the DNP 7.9 percent, and the Independents and minor parties 36.8 percent.

---

396.1 GE/5-2254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 22, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 280. We have been considering possible alternative methods, and timing, for termination of Korean phase, on assumption continuing impasse.

Method of termination: Delegation continues to believe that at appropriate time Korean phase should be terminated completely and unconditionally. In doing so Allies could make statement of referral problem to UN which in any event would inevitably be considering question, presumably at 9th GA. (Department will recall August 28 Resolution GA already calls for report by Allied side on Geneva Conference.)

Complete break off at Geneva would reflect total lack of agreement and emphasize Commie refusal to accept reasonable proposals. Together with referral to UN it would help maintain UN character of Korean action. It will also contribute to Communist uncertainty re ROK-US military plans concerning Korea. It would avoid giving false impression such as Communists tried to give free Germany that there has been reduction of tension.

Efforts in this direction might get some resistance from Allies, particularly if there has been no agreement on firm Allied proposal on Korea. It may also run into pressure for "second stage" agreements on less than unification such as UK suggested before conference, but there have been no indications as yet of any move in this direction from Allies at Geneva, although Communist statement and Nam Il plan might be interpreted as hinting to some such measures which would formalize the division of Korea.

Prince Wan has suggested to USDel establishing continuing negotiating body, perhaps seven countries (Big Four, ROK, North Korea, Chinese Communists) to resume negotiations whenever prospects improve. USDel believes this has disadvantages chiefly, it might seem to establish "Big Five" machinery (with Korea attached) as quasi-substitute for UN Security Council where Chinese Communists not admitted. ROK would probably not agree such proposal, though Allies might prefer it as softer way of ending Conference, keeping alive hope and forum for negotiation, and perhaps assisting in keeping Rhee from unilateral action.

Timing: Time of break off might be either shortly after Communists reject new Allied proposal (or if none introduced after probable Commies rejection of Eden principles of May 13.) Alternatively, Korea phase can be continued in slow tempo and minor key pending Indochina developments. Prompt termination would please ROK, remove Korean question as factor which Communists might exploit, in timing as well as substance, in connection Indochina negotiations. It would reduce strain on other delegations who have little to do in Geneva and might also sharpen propaganda effect of rejection of reasonable Allied proposal by Commies. Key Allies however will resist termination at least until Indochina phase clarifies, fearing adverse effect on Indochina. Also, from our point of view, if Indochina phase develops in manner not satisfactory to us it might be desirable to have Korean and Indochina phase end together to improve total effect.

Timing of break off should also take into account Van Fleet mission and post-Conference consultations with ROK.

Delegation tends to believe decision on timing should await clearer picture as to how Indochina is going, and developments in Korea.

Department's comments and guidance requested.

SMITH

---

*Editorial Note*

On the evening of May 22, following dinner at Molotov's residence, Smith and Molotov held a long conversation dealing with Indochina and a range of other subjects. Smith reported the meeting to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 101, May 23, from Geneva: for the complete text, see page 895. The portion of the telegram dealing with the Korean phase of the Conference follows.

"I then mentioned Korea, pointing out that discussion in plenary session today had again emphasized deep cleavage and bitterness of feeling between North and South Korea. Molotov agreed and said that this was obviously a matter which would require a great deal of time

to produce a solution. He thought that political settlement in Korea would come about possibly as a result of some years of living together. I mentioned a recent statement of Nehru's, saying that while I did not by any means subscribe to most of his statements, his recent one regarding Korea had interested me. Mr. Nehru, I understood, had said, in effect, that he did not expect a political solution for Korea to arise from Geneva conference, but that it might be that some loose association as a result of trading together would, after a period of time, reduce the tension and produce some form of agreement. The interpretation I gave this was, I now understand, a good deal different from what Nehru actually proposed. Molotov repeated that a period of "living together" and some form of commercial or other contact over a period of time might reduce the bitterness and permit some political solution. He obviously expects none here." (751G.00/5-2354)

MAY 24, 1954

396.1 GE/5-2454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 24, 1954—2 p. m.

98. Repeated information Department Secto 289, Tokyo 84. For Briggs.

1. Our position has improved on Korea as result ROK proposals. ROK Government and delegation in favorable and advantageous position vis-à-vis free world opinion and allied delegations here. However, USDel is concerned lest Rhee or ROK Government take any action reverse situation.

2. Suggest you let it be known to Rhee and ROK Government ROK proposals well received by allied delegations. They particularly appreciated change authorized by Rhee point 2. Following Pyun's speech allied delegations viewed ROK proposals generally as useful constructive contribution to conference as basis discussion although still reserved on points 12 and 13. ROK proposals made front page most US Sunday papers with favorable comment.

3. Pyun's proposals are entirely different from 6-point draft. He and ROK delegation drafted 14 points themselves. We had nothing to do with them. We repeatedly asked Pyun to withhold making them. Instead he went ahead and he rejected changes in 14 points except in point 2. Nevertheless, results better than we dared hope and we can now capitalize better situation than before.

4. Accordingly, USDel arranging for plenary Wednesday<sup>1</sup> and will make strong statement fully supporting ROK proposals and urging their most serious consideration. Urging other delegations do

<sup>1</sup> May 26. The plenary session was not held until Friday, May 28.

same and now expect short statements from Turkey, Colombia, probably UK and others.<sup>2</sup>

SMITH

<sup>2</sup> Secretary Dulles responded to this message in telegram 851 to Geneva, May 24, 7: 59 p. m., which read as follows:

"For Under Secretary from Secretary. Your Secto 289. Share your satisfaction at ROK proposals and consequent better free world opinion. We plan exchange ratifications Korean Security Treaty Wednesday morning." (396.1 GE/5-2454)

The exchange of ratification, however, did not take place on May 26, but was delayed until Nov. 17, 1954. For related documentation, see volume xv. See also telegram 1247, May 26, from Seoul, p. 319.

MAY 25, 1954

396.1 GE/5-2554

*Memorandum by Arthur H. Dean to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 25, 1954.

Reference Secto 280<sup>2</sup> without reference to effect termination of Korea phase might have on Indo-Chinese phase, following would seem to be optimum conditions for termination of Korean phase.

While we were negotiating the Armistice in 1953, JCS decided we no longer needed to maintain bases on the mainland of Asia and that we were quite prepared with or without phased withdrawal Chinese Communists to withdraw our troops in South Korea down to a corps, while at the same time strengthening ROK army so it could hold in event of attack until we could return.

But since then, the problems we face in Indo-China, location of strategic bombing targets north of the Yalu and uncertainty of availability of Japanese bases make essential re-appraisal of JCS's opinion of Korea in spring and summer of 1953.

If we are to accept that there is no practical method of getting Communists to withdraw from North Korea short of resuming hostilities, should we not again review whether our real objective is to obtain withdrawal of Chinese Communists from North Korea in consideration of phased withdrawal UN forces from South Korea or whether we are not prepared to accept *fait accompli* of divided Korea and to decide to stay or not to stay in South Korea solely in our own discretion without necessity of having to withdraw ground troops or air forces pursuant to some definitive schedule under approval of some commission comparable to NNSC.

In view of our possible entry into the Indo-Chinese situation and in view of current conditions in Japan requiring complete review of con-

<sup>1</sup> The source text indicates that the memorandum was dictated and approved in draft by Dean.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 22, p. 314.

ditions for use of Japanese bases, and inability without use of force or co-equal phased withdrawal to obtain withdrawal Chinese Communist forces from North Korea, it consequently seems better to recognize, however regrettable, that North and South Korea must remain separated. We must then strengthen ROK forces or at least increase our share of military cost of ROK army operations and enter into program of economic aid designed to alleviate continued severance of North and South Korea.

Assuming allies will agree to a clean-cut break on Korean phase and assuming further Communist rejection Pyun's proposal, we will have clean-cut method of breaking. The result will in fact give us opportunity of either (a) maintaining military *status quo* in South Korea indefinitely, or (b) withdrawing ground troops down to a corps in our discretion and maintaining all or part Fifth Air Force in our discretion, without reference to any "phased withdrawal" of our and Chinese Communist armies. Moreover, "phased withdrawal" of Chinese Communist armies does not really solve problem if augmented North Korean Communist armies remain.

If we agree with Prince Wan's proposal of establishing negotiating body of perhaps seven countries we (a) tend to by-pass the UN, (b) blur the clean-cut nature of Pyun's proposal and the Communist rejection, (c) afford the Communists a talking point with which to confuse issues and possibly persuade allies to make concessions, and (d) irritate Rhee, possibly leading to South Korean withdrawal from Geneva Conference, thus evidencing lack allied unity.

Against the foregoing we might cite (a) possible inability to get allies to agree to clean-cut break, (b) possible greater publicity value of setting up some continuing body rather than announcing clean-cut break, and (c) greater facilities for airing problem in sixteen than in UN.

After weighing the foregoing, the balance would seem to be in favor of a clean-cut break on the Korean phase and we should therefore attempt to persuade as many of our allies to agree to it as possible. (a) to make the break plausible in world opinion and (b) to get as much support as possible for maintaining the *status quo* on Korea when the matter comes up in the UN.

Further, we should endeavor to persuade the Swiss and the Swedes to withdraw from the NNSC, and give wide publicity to the futility of the NNSC, thus undercutting the Communist hints that some such allegedly neutral body, rather than the UN, might be acceptable for working out all-Korean election laws, overseeing all-Korea elections, etc. Once the NNSC has been abolished, we should also explore the legal possibility, because of Communist violations, of freeing our-



selves from the restrictions of the armistice, though we have no intention of resuming hostilities.

This series of moves—clean-cut breaking off of the negotiations, abolition of the NNSC, possibly freeing ourselves from the restrictions of the armistice, exchange ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty, implementation of the Van Fleet mission report—by demonstrating a hard position in the Korean situation may help our bargaining position vis-à-vis Indo-China.

This is my thinking before we hear from the Communists on Wednesday<sup>3</sup>—depending on what they say it may have to be revised.

I am sending copies to FE and UNA requesting they send you their comments.<sup>4</sup>

ARTHUR H. DEAN

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 1, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> No memoranda from the two bureaus mentioned have been found in the Department of State files.

MAY 26, 1954

795.00/5-2654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 26, 1954—5 p. m.

1247. Repeated information Tokyo 739, priority Geneva 127. Geneva for USDel. Tokyo for CINCUNC. Department inform Ambassador Dean. Re Embassy telegram 122 to Geneva, repeated Department 1239, Tokyo 734.<sup>1</sup> Following ceremony honoring General Anderson Commanding General Fifth Air Force this morning President Rhee asked me to remain and we had conversation re Geneva developments. In contrast attitude yesterday described reference telegram, President today pessimistic and spoke bitterly of futility of continuing talk with Communists since only way to deal with them is to employ forces. Attitude this morning duplicated during most of Ambassador Dean conversations as reported his telegrams during past few weeks. I told Rhee again of satisfaction USDel with reception Pyun's May 22 proposals (Geneva telegram 98, repeated Department 289, Tokyo 84<sup>2</sup>) whereupon Rhee, again in contrast attitude yesterday, said that as for unity, that is "only paper proposition among talkers", and as for Pyun, Rhee had been on point of recalling him from Geneva for fail-

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 25, not printed. In it, Briggs said that he had found Rhee in good spirits on May 24 and 25, expressing satisfaction with Pyun's presentation on May 22. In turn, Briggs told Rhee that the United States appreciated the emendation of point 2 and felt that, despite differences over points 12 and 13, Allied disunity had not developed and the Republic of Korea was in a relatively strong position at Geneva. (033.1100/5-2554)

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 24, p. 316.

ure include in 14-point proposal provision covering surrender or withdrawal of North Korean Communists. Rhee said that even if Chinese Communists withdraw unless there is included provision covering North Korean Communists, North Korean territory will be infiltrated with Communists, both Koreans brought in from Manchuria and Chinese disguised as Koreans, with result absolutely impossible hold fair election. Hence President said he wanted us to know he views Pyun's proposal as something Rhee has accepted "with mental reservations". However, rather than withdraw ROK delegation from Geneva, which President admitted would have rocked boat, he was taking no action for time being.

I told Rhee that withdrawal ROK delegation would have had deplorable effect particularly at time when ROK proposal apparently receiving gratifying support from our friends and furthermore at time when Communists have not yet expressed themselves regarding it. My impression from this part of conversation is that although Rhee evidently much annoyed when he first read Pyun's text he unlikely at moment go beyond possible reprimand of his Foreign Minister. (If Rhee had seen text in advance he would unquestionably have changed it to cover North Korean Communists).

President next turned to mutual defense treaty (please see Embassy telegram 95 to Geneva, 1204 to Department, 712 to Tokyo, May 19<sup>3</sup>) informing me of message from ROK Chargé d'Affaires Washington who said State Department preparations now completed for exchange ratifications and promulgation. In this connection Rhee again asked whether it would be possible modify text in two particulars. First a termination clause similar to US-Japan treaty (I assume Article IV although Rhee did not specify) and second "an aggressor clause" which would cover US assistance in ROK military action to eject Communist aggressors from north. After considerable conversation reminiscent Rhee's efforts obtain secret letter from Dean, Rhee agreed not insist now on second modification. But he declared Korea must have improved termination clause lack of which he described as discrimination.

I pointed out any modification or amendment of treaty would have to follow same Washington procedure as treaty itself including Senate approval and that delay probably until next session would be caused by attempt to modify present already approved text. Also said executive of course not in position guarantee Senate approval.

Rhee then said he desired to have statement from State Department approving desired termination provision and agreeing to recommend such provision to Senate. Rhee asked if I would give him such letter

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 284.

and if not would I request one from Secretary Dulles. Whether Rhee plans instruct Chargé d'Affaires to defer exchange ratifications until this point clarified remains to be seen.

I gave Rhee no encouragement Secretary would accept different termination clause, much less Rhee's proposed "aggressor clause".

Lastly Rhee brought up question of Ambassador Dean's last letter to him to which he said he wished reply "for the record" and that he would shortly send me reply with request it be telegraphed Washington. I find letter in question (dated May 20) not previously transmitted Washington. Text in following telegram.<sup>4</sup>

BRIGGS

---

<sup>4</sup> The text of the letter, as transmitted in telegram 1248, read as follows :

"My Dear Mr. President: In Prime Minister's letter to me dated May 19, 1954, I was sincerely sorry to note you had thought it necessary to add the five words 'withdrawal of North Korean forces' in paragraph 4 of proposed statement of general principles.

Our inability to agree on a statement of principles at Geneva will, I believe, have an exceptionally unfavorable effect on public opinion in United States and of Congressional opinion, and be extremely detrimental to the purpose of cooperative effort in working out of an economic aid program and your military forces build-up to combat the Communist menace which we both have in mind.

Faithfully yours, signed Arthur H. Dean, Special Ambassador to Korea". (795B.5/5-2654)

In telegram 1249, also dated May 26, Ambassador Briggs sent the following further message to the Department of State :

"Inform Ambassador Dean. If we wish to do so I think we can legitimately interpret President's Rhee's remarks today re defense treaty (Embtel 1247, repeated Geneva 127, repeated Tokyo 739) as basis for further postponing exchange of ratifications, at least until Rhee has received and considered Secretary's reply to request for commitment on future amendment of termination clause." (795.00/5-2654)

MAY 27, 1954

396.1 GE/5-2754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 27, 1954—8 p. m.

101. Repeated information Department Secto 320, Tokyo 90. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Re Seoul telegram 127. repeated Department 1247. Tokyo 639 [739].<sup>1</sup>

1. Re Rhee's views on Pyun, USDel has been emphasizing as much as possible with other delegations and press that 14 points are "ROK" proposals and not Pyun's proposals. Believe has advantages of avoiding increasing Rhee's antagonism and making any ROK repudiation 14 points somewhat more difficult.

2. USDel concurs your statement first part second paragraph. Several delegations including Australia and possibly UK planning give

---

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

general support ROK proposals Friday plenary<sup>2</sup> and additional delegations will do so in subsequent plenary. We are using excellent *New York Times* editorial May 24 "The Korean Proposal" with other delegations here in effort strengthen their position.

3. Re Communist attitudes assume Embassy has received summary or text violent attacks of Pyongyang and Peiping radios on Pyun personally and 14 points. Would be extraordinary for Rhee take any action re his Foreign Minister in face such crude vitriolic Communist attacks.

4. On Friday suggest you inform President Rhee General Smith is speaking on ROK proposals along substantially following lines; if you deem advisable so inform him before statement appears in public:

"USDel has studied proposals which delegate of ROK presented to us last Saturday. We find them clear moderate and reasonable. They are within framework of basic principles which vast majority of us here have publicly endorsed. It seems to USDel that these proposals represent an important and significant act of faith in UN and in genuinely free elections. These are proposals of a nation which conducts its elections under observation of a UN Commission, which has fought with enormous sacrifice and great bravery against aggression, and which has demonstrated its dedication to principles of liberty and freedom.

USDel supports proposals of ROK and recommends their acceptance".<sup>3</sup>

SMITH

<sup>2</sup> May 28.

<sup>3</sup> On May 31, Ambassador Briggs made the following comment in telegram 1269 from Seoul, repeated to Geneva as telegram 138:

"Reference: Geneva's 101, repeated Department Secto 320, Tokyo 90. In line with paragraph 4 reference telegram, I have sent President Rhee 2 letters: On May 28, informing him that General Smith would support ROK 14-point proposal and May 30 conveying text of address by General Smith at May 28 plenary. I spent May 29 with Rhee on trip to island off Inchon where he made speech warmly endorsing American aid and supporting allied unity at Geneva. Since details of ROK 14-point proposal not yet under debate at Geneva, I concluded no useful purpose served at present moment by taking up other Geneva questions with President." (396.1 GE/5-3154)

MAY 28, 1954

396.1 GE/5-2854 : Telegram

*Twelfth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, May 28, 3:03 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 28, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 337. Repeated information Tokyo 98, London 220, Moscow 95, Paris 353, Seoul 103. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/12) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:03 p. m. and adjourned at 5:30 p. m.

Defense. Twelfth Korean plenary May 28, Eden presiding, opened with speech by General Smith (see USIA Wireless File for text) <sup>2</sup> upholding role of UN in solution in Korean problem and endorsing ROK May 22 proposals.

Colombian delegate Urrutia spoke next.<sup>3</sup> He complimented ROK delegation for his "spirit of conciliation" and for his "truly remarkable spirit of understanding and cooperation", without directly endorsing ROK proposals of May 22. Urrutia in rather legalistic analysis declared North Korean reunification plan unacceptable, emphasizing that any acceptable plan must recognize authority of UN.

Turkish delegate, Acikalin, then delivered short attack on North Korean proposals and defended authority of UN in Korean problem. He concluded by characterizing ROK proposals as "an excellent working basis upon which, with aid of reason and good will, it may be possible to erect edifice whose achievement is purpose of our conference."

Prince Wan of Thailand delivered brief defense of principle of collective security as embodied in UN. He noted that both ROK and North Korean proposals admitted need for some external supervision of Korean elections and some external guarantee for Korea. Stated essential difference in two proposals lies in fact that Communists propose (1) neutral nations supervisory commission to supervise elections, and (2) guarantee by the great powers, while ROK proposes UN for both supervision of elections and guarantee. Wan stated Thailand "wholeheartedly supports 14-point proposal of ROK as basis for discussion".

Fifth speaker was Watt (Australia)<sup>4</sup> who dismissed May 24 Chou En-lai proposal for neutral nations organization to assist all-Korean commission as academic since unworkable all-Korean commission still keystone of formula. After reasserting authority of UN and principle of collective security re Korea, he offered general support to ROK 14 points as workable formula which "conference should examine carefully". Reserved detailed comment 14 points until "later stage of discussion".

Kindynis (Greece)<sup>5</sup> spoke last. Like Watt, he examined May 22 Chou proposal and ROK 14 points. Based rejection of Chou proposal on failure to recognize proper role of UN in solution Korean problem. Unequivocally endorsed ROK 14 points *in toto* as democratic and consonant with UN responsibilities in Korea and as only way to restore

---

<sup>2</sup> For the text, see *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 124-130.

<sup>3</sup> For the text, see *ibid.*, pp. 132-135.

<sup>4</sup> For Watt's statement, see *ibid.*, pp. 135-137.

<sup>5</sup> For the text of Kindynis' statement, see *ibid.* pp. 130-131.

Korea's unity and independence. Specifically endorsed ROK point 12 on withdrawal Chinese Communist forces before elections as "very natural".

Eden then said no more names on list and noted Indochina meeting tomorrow. Said next Korea meeting would be announced later.

*Comment:* Day's speeches gave further evidence of strength of opposition non-Communist delegations to Communist unification plan and support for UN authority in connection Korean problem.

SMITH

MAY 30, 1954

396.1 GE/5-3054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

NIACT

GENEVA, May 30, 1954—3 p. m.

Dulte 134. Personal for Murphy.

[Here follows the first paragraph of this message, dealing with Indochina; for text, see page 981.]

We will also within the next two days be squarely up against the final phase of Korea. There are two ways of meeting this issue.

One is to stand and break squarely on the basic issue of the United Nations, without another closed session, and probably with only one more plenary. This presents a clear-cut issue but exposes us to the charge of intransigence and unwillingness even to explore for a few points of agreement in principle.

The second way is to have a closed session and consider the North and South Korean proposals. The result of such a session might be a report to the following plenary that the two sides had been able to agree in principle:

- a. That Korea should be reunited;
- b. That there should be elections in the North and in the South;
- c. That CC and UN troops should be withdrawn;
- d. That both sides agreed that they could not agree on method, timing, supervisory authority, details of procedure, et cetera.

If this were done it would not slam the door entirely and would, I believe, automatically return the problem to the UN, at least as far as we are concerned. It would also avoid the charge of obstruction and intransigence which we are likely to get from Britain and some of the Dominions, particularly India. I recommend it, with some diffidence, as I note my most recent recommendations have not been received with great enthusiasm. But I must know at the earliest possible moment, and

certainly before Wednesday,<sup>1</sup> which line of action the Secretary considers preferable.<sup>2</sup>

[Here follows the remainder of the message, dealing with Indochina; for text, see page 981.]

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> June 2.

<sup>2</sup> On May 31, Smith sent to the Department of State his telegram Dulte 136. marked personal and eyes only for Dulles. It concerned termination of the Conference and related mainly to Indochina: for the text, see p. 992. The brief portion dealing with Korea read:

"I think we should wind up Korea during the next week or ten days, depending on your decision regarding the two alternative lines of action suggested in my Dulte 134 of May 30 to Murphy, and during this period the senior members of the sixteen will be drifting out. Some have already gone." (396.1 GE/5-3154)

MAY 31, 1954

396.1 GE/5-3154 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET

SEOUL, May 31, 1954—3 p. m.

1270. Repeated information Tokyo 753, Geneva 139. Geneva pass USDel, Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Re Deptel Tosec 298, repeated Seoul 963, information Tokyo 2651: <sup>1</sup> and Geneva's Secto 280, repeated Seoul as Deptel 964 and information Tokyo 2652.<sup>2</sup> It appears from here that time to terminate Korean phase of conference is whenever we can do so with clear cut demonstration of issues involved, maintaining unity now prevailing and placing onus for break on Communist intransigence.

Issue on which we should not hesitate to break, namely authority of UN, was defined in early allied argument. By characterizing UN as belligerent, Communists have given us exceptionally wide target. Furthermore, unity among allies on 14 points is probably now near maximum (and might disintegrate in debate, over point 12 for example).

Agreement on new detailed allied proposal before breaking off seems unnecessary unless Communists shift position drastically, and might result in obscuring fundamental issues. While some other allies may argue that break-off on Korea would imperil Indochina discus-

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 28, not printed. In it, the Department of State indicated that it had been considering the questions of timing and method in terminating the Korean phase of the Conference. Dean's memorandum of May 25 on this subject was being forwarded to Geneva. The telegram also stated that a recommendation would be presented to Dulles by June 2. The message said that at a meeting of the 16 on May 27, the Colombian representative at the Department's request had made a strong case for terminating the Conference over the issue of the Communist challenge to the U.N. role in Korea, which would help the Allied side to win a public opinion victory. (396.1 GE/5-2254)

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 22, p. 314.

sion, it is not clear to us here that it would do so. In any event, I do not see how we can tie termination of the Korean discussions with termination of Indochina discussions without impairing Korean prospects.

Prince Wan's formula would probably exacerbate rather than improve our relations with Rhee.

I think Korean termination should be complete and in terms stated at opening of Secto 280.

BRIGGS

---

795.00/5-3154 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1954—5:27 p. m.

Tosec 316. For Smith from Murphy. Re Korean portion Geneva's Dulte 134.<sup>2</sup> Also Secto 280.<sup>3</sup> Tokyo pass CINCUNC. We are giving our comments on Korean portion your Dulte 134 subject to Secretary's views. He will see this message on Tuesday<sup>4</sup> and we will let you know immediately whether he concurs.

We agree desirability early termination Korean phase conference. Longer it continues more chance there is Communists will exploit difficulties our position by attempting appeal to our allies through some formula which will attempt evade basic issue of UN role in Korean settlement. If possible we should break off discussions before this issue is blurred. Break-off should be on UN issue and should be accomplished in such way as to maximize our propaganda gains. On importance UN issue see also Tosec 298.<sup>5</sup> In whatever way break-off accomplished it seems clear under GA August 28, 1953 resolution we and others would be obligated inform UN of outcome Conference. Thus Korean issue will certainly be aired in GA. We would hope avoid it until Ninth GA but we might be faced with Korean question in resumed session Eighth GA.

Since timing and tactics for accomplishing break-off with satisfactory propaganda results depend so heavily upon developments at Geneva both from Communist side and our own I believe Delegation

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated for information to Seoul as telegram 968 and to Tokyo as telegram 2656.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 30, p. 324.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 22, p. 314.

<sup>4</sup> June 1.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 1, *supra*.



should have widest area discretion subject following general comments:

(1) Key to successful break-off from our viewpoint is maintenance unity among all 16 Allied side. Simplest and cleanest means achieving break-off while maintaining reasonable degree Allied support will probably serve our purpose best.

(2) We have no objection per se to another closed session to consider proposals for Korean unification now before Conference. However we are concerned about agreement you envisage as possibly coming out of it. Propaganda aspects would require exceedingly careful handling. As presented Dulte 134 UN issue might well be lost and general impression created that agreement reached on principles but both sides wrangling over relatively unimportant details. In addition ROK likely object this arrangement which seems imply their proposal and that of North Koreans about equally good. If (a) closed session is necessary in your judgment maintain Allied unity, (b) ROK willing to go along and (c) through handling of closed session report in subsequent plenary session importance of Communist refusal accept UN role can be reemphasized so that world will understand both that issues mentioned your subparagraph *d* on which agreement not reached are vital and also why they are vital, then we would not object to your proposal. Perhaps it would be possible to have closed session without coming to agreement on principles listed your *a* through *c*.

(3) We assume Delegation will oppose any suggestions for so-called "second stage" agreements re Korea.

(4) Prince Wan's proposal for continuing negotiating body has number of disadvantages including especially (a) probability ROK will vigorously oppose as suggested Seoul's 1270 repeated Geneva 139<sup>6</sup> (b) its composition which would be interpreted by Communists and much of world press as Big Five plus ROK and North Korea, and (c) it is not in keeping our effort emphasize UN role. However this proposal may be made by Communists especially since it is now public knowledge. In that case if ROK is willing to go along with it you may want to try to have composition of group modified (perhaps to include Thailand which first suggested it and others) but emphasize United States would only agree meet with such group if and when Communists accept UN role in Korea. Do not see how we can accept continuing group with composition suggested by Prince Wan.

MURPHY

---

<sup>6</sup> *Supra*.

795.00/5-3154 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET

SEOUL, May 31, 1954—6 p. m.

1272. Repeated information Tokyo 755, Geneva 140. Geneva for USDel; Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Reference Embtel 1247, May 26, re-

peated Geneva 127, Tokyo 739. President Rhee in accordance conversation has today sent me letter dated May 29 addressed to Ambassador Dean. Text follows.

“My Dear Mr. Ambassador :

I have received your two letters of May 20.

One of the matters you mention is the Van Fleet mission and the build-up of ROK armed forces. As you say, General Van Fleet’s investigating mission has to be approved by the US Government, but I am sure you are fully aware that the planned increase of ROK armed strength is very much in the interests of the US as well as Korea.

I would like to point out that, in the years of 1948-1950, if the US Government had granted our request to build-up ROK armed forces, the war, with all the American casualties, might have been avoided.

The State Department of the US declared, more than once, that Korea had no strategic value to the US and therefore was not included in the American defense perimeter which extended only to Japan and the Philippines. Later events proved this judgment an error. America sent its troops to help defend Korea, demonstrating that Korea had some value for America. Meanwhile, General Van Fleet quietly trained and equipped Korean manpower which now holds nearly two-thirds of the front line. I believe the authorities in America have come to realize that the ROK defense forces are of inestimable value and help in fighting the Communist aggressors and President Eisenhower has seen the wisdom of strengthening such forces.

[Here follow several paragraphs of the source text which were excluded from this publication at the request of the Republic of Korea Government.]

With regard to the proposed Geneva statement of general principles we asked you to insert in paragraph four the *words* ‘including the *North Korean* armed forces’. Our Foreign Minister, Doctor Pyun, without approval, (due to the delay in exchange of messages), presented a proposal which was made public. I could, of course, recall him and announce that he had exceeded his authority, but my further thought is to let the matter ride until such time as circumstances may force us to make our position public. I am sure our friends will agree with us that as long as any Communist armed forces remain in Korea, either Korean or Chinese, free elections will be impossible.

With personal regards. Yours sincerely, signed Syngman Rhee”.

BRIGGS

JUNE 1, 1954

396.1 GE/6-154

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States  
Delegation (Young)*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 1, 1954.

Participants: Dr. Y. T. Pyun, ROK Delegation  
Ambassador Yang, ROK Delegation  
General Walter Bedell Smith  
Mr. Walter S. Robertson  
Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr.

Dr. Pyun and Ambassador Yang came in this morning at their request and spent an hour with General Smith discussing the final phase of the Korean Conference. Since they were greatly disturbed over press reports of Prince Wan's idea for a committee of 7 to meet indefinitely in Geneva to discuss the Korean question after the conclusion of the Geneva Conference, most of the discussion revolved around this matter.

General Smith emphasized and reiterated that, firstly, the United States Delegation had absolutely no foreknowledge whatsoever that Prince Wan was going to disclose any such idea to the press without consulting with the United States or with the Sixteen, which we deplored as much as the ROK Delegation did; and secondly, that the United States Delegation does not like the idea and would not join in supporting it. Prince Wan had broached this idea informally to a member of the United States Delegation a couple of weeks ago, but General Smith said neither he nor Mr. Robertson had ever discussed it with Prince Wan. When he had first heard of the idea, General Smith said it had so many disadvantages that he was against it. And so was the State Department.

However, he had just been discussing the idea with Mr. Robertson and Mr. Young in an effort to anticipate subsequent stages of the Korean question in the United Nations after the Geneva Conference ended. General Smith pointed out that both the United States and the Republic of Korea must recognize as a real possibility that the Communists or certain other delegations may seriously propose some sort

of a standing committee, whether we like it or not. While we would try to discourage such a proposal from being put forward, General Smith said that we are now wondering among ourselves if it might not have one advantage, if it is unavoidably raised. The existence of such a committee, even if it met only a few times and recessed indefinitely, might head off any invitation from the General Assembly to the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans to sit as observers during consideration of the Korean question, if as seems likely, the General Assembly resumes debate on Korea. Such a motion might eventually create very great difficulties for the United States in view of the fact that the marginal majority opposing such invitation has been decreasing, and could reach a point where it might even turn into a majority for bringing in the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans. That could bring about a crisis in the United Nations, if the Republic of Korea declined an invitation and if the United States had to abstain or absent itself. But if there were some sort of post-conference machinery including the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans, we could argue that an invitation to them was unnecessary and inappropriate, particularly in view of the fact that they had categorically rejected and repudiated the authority of the United Nations in Korea.

If, by some chance, a proposal for such a committee were under serious discussion, General Smith stated that the United States would insist on adding Thailand, the Philippines and Australia.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that, if there were such a committee, the Republic of Korea and the United States would have the same full sovereign powers as at the Geneva Conference, and that neither could be out-voted, nor could any decisions be made binding if either the Republic of Korea or the United States opposed them. Mr. Robertson also pointed out several times to the ROK Delegates that, under the terms of the resolution of August 28, 1953 of the General Assembly, the fifteen United Nations members on our side at the Geneva Conference are obligated to report back to the United Nations. Accordingly, subsequent consideration of the Korea question by the General Assembly is practically automatic. That is an additional reason for considering the question of a post-conference committee along the lines of General Smith's suggestion.

Making clear he had no current instructions from President Rhee, Dr. Pyun completely opposed the idea of a committee of 7 as suggested by Prince Wan. Not only would it serve no useful purpose, it would be harmful in that it would give the Communists just the means they want in order to prolong indefinite talks on Korea, as, Dr. Pyun said, they were trying to do on Indonesia [*Indochina*]. All in all, he thought it was an extremely bad idea. He suspected that the "chicanery" of

other delegations, and particularly the United Kingdom, had put Prince Wan up to this idea for some ulterior purpose. He regretted that Prince Wan had made the suggestion public before consulting with the ROK or any other Delegation or in the meeting of the sixteen. Dr. Pyun said that he was glad to receive General Smith's clarification of the United States attitude toward this idea. He agreed to General Smith's suggestion to see Prince Wan as soon as possible to express the opposition of the ROK to the idea of a standing committee.

With respect to the United Nations, Dr. Pyun opposed the referral of the Korean question to the United Nations as vehemently as he did the idea of a permanent committee. His arguments were that the United Nations had nothing to do with the Geneva Conference and that it had not sponsored the Geneva Conference. Therefore, it would be wrong for the matter to be returned to the United Nations. He said he was sure his government would oppose this.

Towards the end of the conversation, Dr. Pyun stated very frankly that it was the understanding of the ROK Government that there would be no further negotiation or discussion of the Korean question after the Geneva Conference if it did not succeed in arriving at an agreed upon solution. That was the fundamental reason for his rejection of Prince Wan's idea or referral of the Korean question to the United Nations. His Government was opposed to indefinite talk, and wanted it terminated once and for all. In that connection, he suggested that the United States should be more inclined to ignore public opinion in the allied countries as well as the opinion of its allies, except the ROK.

General Smith told Dr. Pyun very frankly that the United States has allies to a far greater extent than does the Republic of Korea and that some of these allies do not appreciate or support the ROK nearly as much as the United States does. He hoped that Dr. Pyun would understand how different the position of the United States is in this respect from the Republic of Korea and what a difficult time the United States has in carrying along all its allies.

Dr. Pyun and Ambassador Yang inquired as to how long General Smith thought the Korean phase of the conference would last and how it should be terminated. General Smith replied that in the opinion of himself and the United States Delegation the conference should end fairly quickly on the question of the United Nations authority which was a clear-cut issue for our side. There might be a restricted session to put the question directly to the Communists as to whether or not they would accept the authority of the United Nations in Korea. If they continued to reject this principle, as we fully expect them to,

then there could be a final plenary session for each side to state its case, after which the conference would adjourn *sine die*. General Smith explained that this was just the view of the United States Delegation, that we were waiting for the final instructions from the Secretary of State, and that other delegations might not share this view. Dr. Pyun and Ambassador Yang both responded favorably to the suggestion for a restricted session followed by a final plenary with United Nations authority as the principal issue.

General Smith emphasized that the final phase of the Korean Conference would require the most careful planning and the closest possible cooperation between the United States and the ROK Delegations. Dr. Pyun concurred wholeheartedly. General Smith went on to say that he wanted to compliment Dr. Pyun for the effective way in which he had presented his government's point of view at this conference. General Smith told the ROK Delegates that at the beginning of the conference many of our allies had been skeptical over ROK intentions and convinced that the ROK would be completely intransigent. However, they had been considerably surprised and gratified over the 14 points which Dr. Pyun had put forward for his government. The allied delegations now have a very favorable attitude towards Dr. Pyun and his delegation, which, it is important to maintain. For that reason also, General Smith emphasized, it is essential to plan the conclusion carefully so as to leave the conference on that basis.

During the course of the conversation, General Smith also mentioned Krishna Menon's idea of agreeing to disagree, which General Smith said in his opinion contained some merit; the tendency of some of our allies and particularly the United Kingdom to prefer mediation and discussion as long as possible in an effort to reach a combination; and his anticipation in the restricted session on Indochina yesterday, before they made it, of the Communist proposal for a supervisory commission similar to the one that is working so poorly in Korea.

During the course of the conversation, Dr. Pyun expressed great alarm over the Colombian suggestion in the plenary May 22 on changing the composition of the Supervisory Commission in the United Nations. Dr. Pyun said this was an extremely dangerous idea and hoped the United States Delegation would talk the Colombians out of it. Dr. Pyun also produced a clipping from *The New York Times* of May 28 on Korea which he believed "showed how the wind was blowing in Geneva". Dr. Pyun became extremely agitated over this clipping until General Smith told him that it was quite inappropriate for him to come in to discuss with the United States Delegation one single newspaper article and that if he, as chief of the United States Delegation, spent his time on inaccurate press stories nothing would ever

get done. General Smith asked Dr. Pyun why he did not pay more attention to the very favorable *New York Times* editorial on the Korean proposals instead of getting upset over one correspondent's story. After replying that the editorial was indeed very satisfactory, Dr. Pyun put the clipping back in his pocket, as much as to say he was dropping the subject.

---

396.1 GE/6-154 : Telegram

*Smith-Eden-Bidault Meeting, Geneva, June 1, Noon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, JUNE 1, 1954—4 p. m.

Dulte 138. Eden asked for a private meeting this noon with Bidault and myself. After apologizing for passing out "the usual British bit of paper", he handed each of us the following, saying at the same time that "British would support the position of France in Indochina and would go along with Americans in Korea".

[Here follows Part I of the British paper which dealt with Indochina; for text, see page 993.]

"II. Korea.

"1. Are we agreed that the next meeting (or two) should be in restricted session, and that we should seek there

"(A) To explore the possibilities of further negotiations and

"(B) Failing that to agree upon a few general principles?

Hand over our draft.

"2. Do we agree that this move would be preparatory to the winding up of the Korean part of the conference at a subsequent plenary session?

"3. Can this idea be pursued further with Molotov and Chou En-lai (and Prince Wan)? What may be said to Chou En-lai tonight?"

[Here follows a portion of the telegram which dealt with discussion of Part I on Indochina; for text, see page 993.]

With regard to Korea, I presented the views of the Department, stating that we had in the question of UN authority a clean-cut issue that would be understood by our own public opinion and that of practically all of our associates. We would not oppose a restricted session, but at this session the first and basic question would be the acceptance or rejection of the UN authority in Korea. None of us felt the Communists, after having taken publicly a firm stand on this matter, would now recede, and that the answer would be that there was rejection on their part of UN authority. The British are extremely

unhappy that we cannot follow their suggestion of agreeing upon a few general principles, but their major concern, like ours, is what may happen later in the UN. They do not wish the issue of Communist Chinese participation to be raised in the UN at this time, since they understand our difficulties and desire to avoid a proposal on which we might be voted down. We see in Prince Wan's suggestion, probably as modified by our own ideas with regard to the inclusion of Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, a formula which might prevent the issue from arising in the UN. Eden will not discuss this with Chou En-lai tonight, as it is not of such urgency as the matter of Indochina. He understands that our final position cannot be arrived at until possibly day after tomorrow.

SMITH

---

795.00/6-154 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1954—3:28 p. m.

Tedul 145. Foregoing dictated prior to receipt by Secretary of Dulte 137.<sup>2</sup> For Undersecretary from Secretary in New York. Have just read Tosec 316.<sup>3</sup> I feel break-off should be on UN issue and that this should be our final position. The entire Korean War was fought to establish UN principle of collective security. Korea happened to be the symbol. Since we are not going to get at this time any unification of Korea, it would seem to me most unfortunate not to keep the UN symbol to the forefront. This would be a tremendous gain for the Communist side which has throughout sought to obtain a virtual western repudiation of the UN at least in its Korean role. It seems to me that if the Communists succeed in this they will have gained at Geneva a repudiation of the very principle for which so many UN members made great sacrifices. We have to our own people justified their sacrifices on the ground that it was worthwhile for Americans to fight and die to establish for the first time in history the workability of an organization for collective security. Those representations will sound hollow if in the end we should seem virtually to repudiate that organization by compromising with the Communist view that the UN must be ignored as itself a tool of aggression.

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated for information to Tokyo, Seoul, and New York, as telegrams 2658, 970, and 616, respectively.

<sup>2</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 31, p. 326.



I have at this length indicated my own reaction because it may suggest to you the most effective line of presentation which you of course will use or adapt at your discretion.

MURPHY

396.1 GE/6-154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 1, 1954—11 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

Dulte 137. Repeated priority Seoul 107. Further to Dulte 134<sup>2</sup> re Korea. There is a third possibility which would combine some of each of two outlined reference telegram.

We could have one restricted meeting to see if there is any room for compromise by Communists on UN issue. We could also propose to Communists that conference consideration of Korean question be reported to UN for its further consideration, in view inability to reach agreement here on issues of UN auspices and supervision. Communists would probably reject these proposals. We would have made an effort seek agreement. We could then go into a final plenary for each side to state its case. We could propose agreement among 16 on having conference adjourn *sine die* on UN issue as far as we are concerned.

Under this third possibility I would not propose that restricted session report any agreement in principle along lines of 4 subparagraphs Dulte 134. That might avoid possibility Communists would suggest addition of agreement in principle on measures and obligations for "insuring peace in Korea" along lines their point 3 of April 27 proposals, which would create difficulties for us particularly in Seoul. But this third possibility of combining a restricted session with a final plenary both on UN issue might satisfy many other delegations and offset any charge US intransigence.

I see no particular problem with other allied delegations except ROK on question of final phase of Korea. Anything less than complete and unconditional termination will probably create major problems for US with ROK. ROK Government will no doubt oppose any compromise formula to end conference in such a way as not to register complete disagreement and which would make possible, at least in theory, later consideration of Korean question. ROK may even be opposed to UNGA consideration, as Pyun has already expressed apprehension over *New York Times* story Friday May 28 on UN referral Korean question. ROK delegation is informally talking in terms leav-

<sup>1</sup> Received in the Department of State at 7 : 16 a. m. on June 1.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 30, p. 324.

ing Geneva when Communists reject ROK 14-point proposal. Phasing out of Korean conference will require particularly careful planning and handling on our part with ROK.

Views Embassy Seoul this problem would be helpful.<sup>3</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> The Department of State sent the following message in telegram Tosec 321 (repeated for information to Seoul as telegram 973), June 1, to Geneva:

"Dulte 137 repeated Seoul 107. Followup from Secretary on Deptel 316 repeated Seoul 968 emphasizes break be made on UN issue. Believe your proposal Dulte 137 excellent tactic consistent with concept of break on UN issue." (396.1 GE/6-154)

---

396.1 GE/6-154 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

SEOUL, June 1, 1954—midnight.

1278. Repeated information Tokyo 758, niact Geneva 144. Re Geneva's 107 (Dulte 137 to Department).<sup>1</sup> In existing circumstances I agree that anything short of "complete and unconditional termination" at Geneva will probably create major problem with ROK. That, however, has been inherent in Rhee's attitude ever since last year when we insisted on armistice, against his passionately held conviction that stalemate on battlefield would not lead to unification of his country within predictable time. All Rhee's views—toward POW exchange, toward neutrals and neutralism, toward Communist advance into Southeast Asia, toward fall of Dien Bien Phu, and now toward his exclusion (as he sees it) from forthcoming Washington military talks<sup>2</sup>—derive in substantial measure from Rhee's hatred of armistice and his belief that whatever develops from deadlock created by armistice, time is running out.

If we ever had any doubts on that score, four weeks of almost daily negotiations with Rhee while Ambassador Dean was here ought to have dissipated them.

As Rhee views it from Seoul, clean break at Geneva with no left-overs and no cold salad gathering mould in UN icebox is least unproductive result likely to follow conference deliberations. Moreover, anything that Rhee interprets as temporizing or appeasement will multiply possibility he may publicly denounce Geneva thereafter withdrawing ROK delegation.

Foregoing is not intended to imply that clean break at Geneva would solve problem of ROK post conference behavior. Fuzzy ambi-

---

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>2</sup> For related documentation, see volume XII.

guous break would, however, make Rhee more difficult to deal with in immediate future than clean one.

Deptel 968 (to Tokyo 2656, to Geneva Tosec 316)<sup>3</sup> just received. I concur with views expressed therein especially introductory paragraphs and numbered paragraphs 1, 3 and 4.

BRIGGS

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 31, p. 326.

JUNE 2, 1954

396.1 GE/6-254 : Telegram

*Smith-Bidault Meeting, Geneva, June 2, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 2, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 363. Repeated information London 236, Paris 373, Seoul 109. In conversation with Bidault this morning we outlined considerations contained Tedul 145<sup>1</sup> and stressed these represented Secretary's strong personal views. Bidault stated that if we did not adhere to these views whole principle collective security would dissolve. He then referred to Eden's proposal (Dulte 138<sup>2</sup>) that the conference agree to a few general principles on Korea. This proposal reads as follows:

"The conference reached agreement on the following principles:

"(a) Korea, within its historic boundaries, should be unified as a free, independent and democratic state.

"(b) To this end, elections should be held throughout Korea to establish a single, truly representative government for the whole of Korea.

"(c) The elections should be held in conditions of genuine freedom under international supervision.

"(d) The settlement of the Korean question should provide for the withdrawal of foreign forces.

"2. The conference has not been able to agree on the timing or methods or procedure for carrying out these principles and concludes that further discussion of the Korean question cannot usefully be pursued at the present time."

Bidault, while agreeing that fundamental issue was UN principle collective security, wondered whether reconciliation could not be made between this and Eden's principles. We took firm position that this would obscure basic issue. Bidault did not press point and concluded by stating that as US bearing main burden Korea as France was in Indochina, he would readily yield to our position. He also agreed we should endeavor arrange meeting of "16" on June 4 to be followed by

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 1, p. 334.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 1, p. 333.

restricted meeting of "7" on June 5 and final plenary session on Korea next week.

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-254 : Telegram

*Robertson-Wan Meeting, Geneva, June 2, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 2, 1954—12 p. m.

Secto 365. Repeated information Seoul 110, Tokyo 105. Tokyo for CINCUNC.

1. Re Prince Wan's idea of standing committee of seven after conference as reported in the press, Robertson and Young met with Prince Wan this morning to find out what his ideas really are. He said press stories were entirely inaccurate and misleading. He had made no such proposal and did not intend to. He is only "thinking" along following lines:

a. The 16 should meet decide on the next stages regarding Korean question;

b. He believes there should then be one or more restricted meetings of committee of seven to determine whether further negotiations are possible; whether Communists will modify their repudiation of UN competence and authority; and in order convince world opinion we have "exhausted" every possibility for trying get agreement;

c. He agrees 100 percent with Secretary's views (Tedul 145 repeated information Seoul 970 and Tokyo 2658 <sup>1</sup>) on UN issue;

d. If Communists reject UN authority in restricted sessions there will be no need for further meetings. He agreed with us there should be final plenary and conference should conclude on clear-cut issue of UN;

e. If Communists by chance modify their position on UN it might be useful to have controversial details deferred to committee of seven possibly enlarged by Thailand, Australia and Philippines. Its existence would divert debate on Korea in special session eighth GA or in ninth. If conference breaks off, he is sure India will push for resumption Korean question in GA which he believes would be "bitter and futile". If committee were set up along lines he envisages, he hopes that Korean question can stay out of GA until tenth session in fall 1955. He agreed to suggestion any such group of seven should be expanded to Asian countries participating in Geneva conference. We mentioned Thailand, Philippines and Australia. He said he had discussed his views fully in detail with Pyun and Yang yesterday afternoon and would do so again this evening at dinner. Pyun and Yang agreed to meeting of 16 and restricted session but opposed standing committee or referral Korean question back to UN.

2. Re ROK attitude Pyun and Yang came in to see General Smith Tuesday morning <sup>2</sup> highly disturbed over Prince Wan's idea as re-

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 1, p. 334.

<sup>2</sup> June 1; see the memorandum of conversation by Young, p. 329.

ported in press. Pyun said his delegation would oppose it since in his opinion such committee would serve no useful purpose, and fit into Communist plans to prolong talking on Korea indefinitely, and since his government had assumed there would be no more discussion or negotiation on Korea question after conclusion Korean conference. He also said he opposed referring Korean question to UN. Clear from his remarks he wants Korean conference terminate completely, although he pointed out he is without current instructions these matters. General Smith told him we had no foreknowledge Prince Wan's disclosure to press of his idea and informally discussed matter with Pyun along lines paragraph 3 below. Stressed to Pyun great importance most careful planning and closest cooperation between US and ROK regarding final phase Korean conference. He concurred. Smith also stressed importance ROK help wind up conference in helpful way in order conserve good-will and support ROK delegation has created among other 14 who came Geneva sure ROK would be completely intransigent and difficult. Also mentioned to him possibility closed session on Korea to put question to Communists whether or not they will accept UN authority, with final plenary to follow for closing statements on clear issue of UN. Pyun and Yang responded favorably to this suggestion.

3. Much appreciate Tedul 145 and Tosec 321.<sup>3</sup> Have proposed to UK, French, Canadian, Australian, Thai, Netherlands and Colombian delegations (1) UN issue must be clear final position, (they agree and are much impressed with Tedul 145) (2) Meeting of 16 on Friday (3) No objection to restricted meeting of committee of seven next week if other Allied delegations desire it, (4) Final plenary on UN issue if Communists intransigent and (5) Some form of report to UN by 15 UN members here. Representatives these delegations concurred. Commonwealth, Thailand (and possibly Netherlands and Belgium) favor at least one restricted session.

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 1 : see footnote 3, p. 336.

JUNE 3, 1954

396.1 GE/6-354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, June 3, 1954—3 p. m.

Dulte 143. For Secretary from Smith. Our messages cross rather often. Believe this summary will help to clarify :

a. Tedul 145.<sup>1</sup>

I did not reply directly to Tedul 145 because I accepted this as your instruction, in which, incidentally, we concur unanimously. We as-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 1, p. 334.

sumed Tosec 321<sup>2</sup> to approve the tactical line suggested in Dulte 137, and have proceeded accordingly.

We are lining up 16 and they will meet tomorrow. Most will accept the Secretary's view as indicated in Tedul 145, and others will go along, although British are still covertly shopping around with Eden's "points of agreement" covered in our Secto 363,<sup>3</sup> which I have rejected and persuaded Bidault to reject, although as stated in previous message he would like to salvage a little of it. Most of the 16 will want one restricted session on Korea for sake of appearances, and this may take place Monday.<sup>4</sup> We expect to restrict discussion to basic issue covered in your Tedul 145 and to make this the real breaking issue. The Korean plenary which follows will have to come later in the week, as some of the 16 will wish to consult their governments.

[Here follows the remainder of the message which dealt with Indochina; for text. see page 1014.]

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, p. 336.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 2, p. 337.

<sup>4</sup> June 7.

---

110.11 DU/6-354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 3, 1954—8 p. m.

Dulte 147. Repeated information Seoul 111. Molotov asked for Korean plenary tomorrow saying North Koreans wanted to speak and Indochina plenary Saturday.<sup>1</sup> After discussion with Bidault who feared Communist efforts at Indochina plenary influence Tuesday's Assembly debate, Eden proposed Molotov agree to Korean plenary Saturday, possibility Korean restricted Monday. and Indochina plenary Tuesday.

With respect to Korea, there have been two developments.

1. I understand Menon has returned to Geneva. although he has not yet asked to see me.

2. Eden says he has had hint from British left wing sources in touch with North Koreans that next meeting North Koreans will probably "touch their hat to the United Nations". It is our guess that they may present proposal somewhat along the lines of Eden's points (see Secto 363<sup>2</sup>). My opinion, Eden's points probably framed by Menon, who may have induced North Koreans present something along these lines which will have considerable appeal for some members sixteen.

---

<sup>1</sup> June 5.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 2, p. 337.

We are holding meeting of sixteen Friday morning and will make every effort influence them hold the line. At meeting sixteen we will propose restricted meeting seven for Monday at which we would squarely put up to Communists, issue of United Nations authority. If they reject, we would plan final plenary sometime next week with speeches from our side in support of United Nations principle, and authority in Korea along lines Tedul 145.<sup>3</sup> This, of course, may be subject to change in light of whatever success North Korean presentation may have in dividing and confusing sixteen.

I have told Eden that his points are entirely unacceptable to us and he seems to have accepted position set forth Tedul 145.

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 1, p. 334.

---

396.1 GE/6-254 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1954—8:32 p. m.

Tosec 341. For Under Secretary from Secretary. Secto 363 and 365.<sup>2</sup> I concur in course of action outlined in paragraph three Secto 365 and congratulate you on excellent job in steering Korean phase on right road despite numerous obstacles.

I hope that prior to termination of Korean phase Communists can be led to full rejection of Pyun fourteen point proposal and especially to clear unwillingness to accept any UN role in Korean settlement. Once foregoing aim is accomplished I would favor earliest termination Korean talks.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated to Seoul as telegram 983 and to Tokyo as telegram 2687 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

<sup>2</sup> Both dated June 2. pp. 337 and 338. respectively.

---

396.1 GE/6-354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 3, 1954—9 p. m.

113. Repeated information Department priority Secto 369. priority Tokyo 107. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Briggs.

1. Following lunch with ROK delegation which again stressed our suggestions on procedure for Korean phase in conference Pyun informed Robertson later this afternoon he had just received urgent in-

structions from Rhee not to attend any restricted session Korea. Apparently Rhee has become very much upset by published accounts of the so-called Wan proposal which would provide for continued restricted meetings to consider Korean question. Pyun and Yang agree to our proposed procedure and are cabling Rhee requesting new instructions. They suggested that we inform you of situation to get your help in obtaining Rhee's approval. We think it inadvisable inform Rhee of their suggestion to you.

2. Request you see Rhee soonest clarify purpose restricted meeting and plenary as outlined paragraphs one and three Secto 365, repeated information Seoul 110 and Tokyo 105,<sup>1</sup> as well as Tedul 145, repeated information Seoul 970 and Tokyo 2658.<sup>2</sup> In our view, purpose of restricted meeting and subsequent plenary would be to put question of UN authority directly to Communists and to conclude our participation in this conference on basis of UN issue as Secretary stated Tedul 145. Believe we should stress to Rhee this procedure is most effective way to put question to Communists and dramatize UN issue. USDel does not wish issue to become blurred or lost sight of and believes that strong moral and political victory can still be won over Communists and Allied unity maintained if all delegations united solidly behind above issue and conference procedure.

3. Revised schedule of Korean and Indochina meeting and reactions Allied delegations on Korean phase follows in subsequent telegrams.<sup>3</sup>

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 2, p. 338.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 1, p. 334.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

#### JUNE 4, 1954

396.1 GE/6-454 : Telegram

*Seventh Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, June 4, 11:03 a. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 4, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 378. Repeated information Seoul priority 114, Tokyo 109, London 244, Paris 385, Moscow unnumbered. Department pass Defense; Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

1. Seventh meeting heads 16 Allied delegations this morning June 4 at Palais with Kural presiding was devoted to consideration next steps

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/7) from which the time is taken is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting adjourned at 12:55 p. m.



Korean phase, particularly relative emphasis on elements of question to be put to Communists in restricted session.

2. Under Secretary began discussion by noting general debate has made clear that Communists reject authority UN to take collective action to resist aggression and to supervise restoration of peace and security in Korea. Said under circumstances we could only lose by allowing conference to drag on, permitting Communists to obscure basic issues, and therefore we should terminate talks on these UN issues and tell Communists we continue to desire unification under UN principles and will make further efforts to that end when they accept competence and authority UN. Under Secretary presented Secretary's views (Tedul 145<sup>2</sup>) on importance UN issue and continued avoidance of any action which would permit Communists obscure this issue or fact of Communist aggression and their obstruction UN efforts unify Korea since 1947 and aggression.

Under Secretary noted that Plenary tomorrow June 5 called at request Nam Il, who might make some spurious gesture toward UN in expectation we seeking restricted session to bring fundamental UN issue to head. Stated would be desirable have Allied speakers tomorrow.

3. Under Secretary then outlined proposed tactics for restricted session of seven at which substance of question would be asked "Are the Communists prepared to agree to unification of Korea on the basis of free elections and the condition of genuine freedom under the control and supervision of the United Nations?" This restricted meeting would be followed by another meeting of 16 and then by final Plenary late next week in event Communists said no, or spurious "yes" which in fact meant no.

General agreement all delegations on sequence restricted session followed by meeting of 16 to determine tactics for final Plenary. Also general agreement to ask Communists above question. Eden backed by other Commonwealth delegations said free elections would be key element of question put to Communists. Under Secretary, supported by Philippines (Garcia), Netherlands (Bentinck), ROK (Pyun), Turkey (Acikalin), Belgium (De La Chevalerie) and Greece (Kindynis) emphasized that UN role in Korea an essential element. Prince Wan (Thailand) saw problem as which of two linked issues should be given primary emphasis. Under Secretary stated no difficulty if both elements kept together, as in case with his proposed question to Communists. Ronning (Canada) agreed asking Communists question as originally worded but stated re UN issue, he was under instructions to stand fast against Communists only on specific issue of supervision

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 1. p. 334.

acceptable to UN rather than general principle of UN role Korea. New Zealand supported Canadians. Kural stated appeared to be general agreement and adjourned meeting.

4. Urrutia (Colombia) during above discussion raised question of form and timing of report to UN. Kural stated next meeting of 16 would be appropriate place to consider.

5. Pyun (ROK) early in meeting stated present instructions did not permit ROK participation another restricted session of seven. Said was asking Seoul for authorization attend but in event not forthcoming might cause some embarrassment. Under Secretary noted restricted meeting could always be postponed if necessary. Australia (Watt) wondered if timing of restricted meeting for Monday perhaps too tight, especially if Nam Il should present unexpected proposal tomorrow.

6. Bidault proposed, in event failure reach settlement here on Korea, 16 should issue "collective statement" on two basic elements of UN authority and free elections under UN supervision. Prince Wan agreed.

SMITH

795.00/6-454 : Telegram

*Briggs-Rhee Meeting, Seoul, June 4, Afternoon: The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

SECRET NIACT

SEOUL. June 4. 1954—midnight.

156. Repeated information Department niact 1303, Tokyo 773. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Re Geneva's 111 and 113 (repeated Department Dulte 147 and Secto 369)<sup>1</sup> also Department telegram 983 (repeated Geneva Tosec 341, to Tokyo 2687).<sup>2</sup> Saw President Rhee for one hour this afternoon with reference Geneva developments. (Reference telegrams arrived after my meeting with Rhee this morning described Embassy telegram 1297.)<sup>3</sup>

I summarized views of Secretary set forth Department telegrams 970<sup>4</sup> and 983. I said despite all roadblocks and difficulties created by Communists we now in excellent position Geneva and have reached point where we can consider early ending Korean phase, this to be accomplished through public demonstration Communist unwillingness accept UN role in Korean settlement, and also through Communist rejection ROK 14-point proposal. I said Communists have already

<sup>1</sup> Both dated June 3, pp. 340 and 341. respectively.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 3. p. 341.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 1, p. 328.

<sup>4</sup> Same as telegram Tedul 145. June 1. p. 334.

denounced UN, and if Communists now reject ROK proposal, that rejection in judgment Secretary and USDel Geneva should provide opportunity for clean break, with Allied unity intact, and should demonstrate to world opinion Korean unification impossible because of Communist intransigence.

With these elements in mind, timetable has been prepared by USDel Geneva envisaging restricted meeting Monday June 7, possibly followed by additional restricted meetings if progress appears to have been made on Monday. If Communists reject, we shall then seek final plenary session on Korean issue before end of next week.

Rhee listened but showed no enthusiasm.

I then said these matters already fully discussed between USDel on one side and Foreign Minister Pyun and Ambassador Yang on other side, and I had been instructed to see Rhee on urgent basis, to clarify purposes of forthcoming meetings and to express confidence we could count on ROK to help us conclude Korean phase of conference soon as possible, on above lines.

I said our delegation understands Pyun may require authorization from President Rhee to attend so-called restricted meetings, which authorization I was sure in light my discussion Rhee would telegraph to Pyun.

Rhee expressed satisfaction at Secretary's views and especially Secretary's intention terminate Korean phase soon as possible. Rhee then entered into lengthy declaration about futility of dealing with Communists, this his standard "I told you so" line, concluding that only way to end present "dealing with nonsense" is to end it, and that Rhee is accordingly considering ordering ROK delegation to return to Korea. Rhee said he could see no profit in "any special, or restricted, or any other kind of Geneva talks or meetings. Therefore, Rhee continued, he could not see his way clear to authorize Pyun to attend proposed June 7 meeting. Rhee declared this or any further meetings of same futile character would play directly into Communist hands by giving them heaven-sent opportunity to give impression of acceptance (or even partial acceptance) of 14 point plan, plus "some polite if insincere reference to UN" which would then be seized upon by neutralists ("like UK, now under domination of Nehru") as proof that Communists intend to cooperate.

Seems from this part of Rhee's remarks that he apprehends Communist effort, with some chance of success, may be made to smoke out UK and France in meeting June 7, who may admit pending ROK proposal is not supported *in toto* by other 15. Therefore, Rhee reiterated, it would be better for ROK to withdraw from Geneva now, if possible with US support, but in any case withdrawal which would be

“dramatic demonstration” of inability free world do business with Communists.

I then found it necessary to remind Rhee that his statements concerning dealing with Communists were not news to us and that we certainly had never been under any illusion as to difficulties facing us at Geneva in our dealing with Communists. I said it was precisely for that reason Secretary Dulles last August had agreed with Rhee on withdrawal from conference, in specified circumstances, at end of 90 days. I reminded Rhee that less than half of 90-day period has elapsed, and I said we are coming to Rhee now to tell him that in our opinion Korean phase should be terminated as promptly as possible, on terms he must recognize as favorable to us. Whether that can be accomplished within next few days, as we hope, remains to be seen. We cannot guarantee it. But surely it would be tragically unfortunate if Korea after having maintained with US and our Allies for past six weeks stalwart and impressive unity, should suddenly take unilateral action to abandon Geneva, thus destroying all we had gained at Geneva since April 26.

Unilateral ROK action of that sort I told Rhee would be impossible for my government to reconcile with Dulles-Rhee August 7 agreement.

Rhee then dropped subject of ROK withdrawal, but resumed attack on idea of ROK delegation attending any further meetings except “one final plenary called for purpose ending conference”.

After much further discussion, during which I continued to emphasize how foreign to ROK’s real interests Pyun’s boycott of restricted meetings would be, Rhee finally said he would telegraph Pyun and authorize him to attend June 7 “restricted meeting” on understanding that such meeting constitutes “regular part of Geneva conference machinery” (which I assured Rhee it was). Rhee said on that understanding he would telegraph instructions to Pyun in time for him to attend on June 7 restricted meeting.

During this conversation, also was able to set Rhee straight on Prince Wan’s views (Geneva’s 110, repeated Department Secto 365, Tokyo 105<sup>5</sup>). I said newspaper report on this project had obviously been distorted, to which Rhee replied he had nevertheless been disturbed thereby. (Press account of Wan’s proposal probably contributed to Rhee’s state of mind as reflected this afternoon’s conversation.)

While I hope as result this meeting with Rhee, Pyun may receive instructions satisfactory to us, it is clear that if Communists either at tomorrow’s plenary (Saturday) or if they on Monday come up with some soft attractive answers, and some of our Allies are beguiled thereby, we shall find Rhee harder each day to handle, and perhaps more and more difficult to keep in line.

<sup>5</sup> Dated June 2. p. 338.

My views on this remain as stated Embtel 1278, June 1. From Rhee's point of view, worst possible Geneva outcome would be any sort of standing committee arrangement, gathering UN conversational mould, while ROK perishes.

BRIGGS

---

*Smith-Menon Meeting, Geneva, June 4, Evening: Editorial Note*

For the complete report on this meeting, which dealt mainly with Indochina, see telegram Dulte 154, June 5, from Geneva, page 1038. Smith, who met with Menon at the latter's request, summarized as follows Menon's comments on Korea:

"Principal burden of his remarks, again was that in interest of reducing world tensions and to avoid complete failure of international conferences, we should not have a break here on Korea, but should announce a few points of agreement on principle and then agreement to disagree, et cetera." (110.11 DU/6-554)

JUNE 5, 1954

396.1 GE/6-554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, June 5, 1954—noon.

Dulte 152. I may be borrowing trouble but think you should know in advance my personal estimate what may develop during this afternoon's Korean plenary, asked for by Nam II. View of British and Dominions was expressed very clearly at yesterday's meeting of sixteen. This view is that the issue of free elections is paramount, and that this, and not the principle of the authority of the United Nations, should be emphasized. Eden's tentative memo on "possible points of agreement" sent you by Secto 363<sup>1</sup> omitted any reference to the UN. Both Watt (Australia) and McIntosh (New Zealand) have had very definite instructions from their governments to emphasize the "free election" principle and not the UN principle which I wish to make the clear-cut issue, and both of them had to a certain extent to "interpret" their instructions in order to give us a measure of support.

I am sure that the Chinese and North Koreans are well aware, via Menon, of this difference in emphasis and think it probable that at this afternoon's plenary Nam II may try to intensify difference by some form of proposal for "free elections under international supervision acceptable to the UN side" which, though spurious to us, could seem

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 2, p. 337.

plausible to some of our allies. As I informed you, Eden told me yesterday he had "heard that Nam Il would touch his hat to the United Nations". If this happens, it could put us in a very difficult position, as many of the sixteen will take the view that if the purposes of the UN re unifying Korea by free elections can be accomplished it would be unreasonable to frustrate them by insisting that Communists make here a public acknowledgment of UN authority which we have been unable otherwise to impose on them and which they have publicly repudiated, particularly since the UN itself has branded them as unfit for membership.

Many of our sixteen associates now take the view that the UN itself is actually a belligerent, regardless of the form and purpose of the resolution which made it so. We have two possible speakers for this afternoon, and I have a statement in reserve quoting the statements of the Swiss and Swedish members of the NNSC which can be used as a stopgap. Phleger, Robertson and I believe that we may want to delay Monday's planned restricted session on Korea until later in the week, in order to allow time for you more accurately to assess possibilities.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-554: Telegram

*Thirteenth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, June 5, 3:04 p. m.:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 5, 1954—midnight.

Secto 391. Repeated information Tokyo 114, London 250, Moscow 108, Paris 391, Seoul 115. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense. Korean plenary Saturday, June 5, opened with Prince Wan (Thailand) in chair. First speaker was delegate of Ethiopia who rejoiced that the principle of collective security had been upheld in Korea through efforts of those nations contributing forces and other assistance, and stated that with signing of armistice military objective of UN had been achieved. Went on to comment on proposals of North and South Korea delegations. Referring to North Korean proposal, stated that it intentionally denied role of UN in supervision of elections, thus undermined UN authority, did not insure proportional representation, instituted power of veto in commission, was not workable and thus was not acceptable to Ethiopian delegation. Reference South Korean proposal, stated it was reasonable, provided a basis for discussion and had support of Ethiopian delegation because provided for

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/13) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:04 p. m. and adjourned at 7:10 p. m.

all-Korean elections and UN supervision thereof. Urged all delegations to accept in principle role of UN and stressed necessity that public in all countries understand that this conference has not abandoned UN.

Nam Il then took floor and in long speech of primarily propagandistic content attacked ROK 14-point proposal and supported Chinese Communist proposal for NNSC as good basis for settlement. According to Nam, DPROK proposal re all-Korean commission good since it makes it impossible for one side to impose its will on other side. ROK proposals, on other hand, represent attempt extend authority Rhee regime to North Korea. ROK proposal that supervisory commission be under UN authority is unacceptable since UN was belligerent in Korean war. Supervision in Korea should be carried out by neutral nations, i.e., states which did not take part in Korean conflict. ROK proposal shows that ROK fears free elections since it provides for election to be held in South Korea prior to withdrawal US forces. Simultaneous withdrawal of US forces and Chinese Peoples Volunteers necessary to insure truly free election. DPROK not in principle against phased withdrawal foreign troops but considers that such withdrawal must be proportional. As already stated, DPROK delegation willing to negotiate re date by which withdrawal must be completed. ROK proposal for UN guarantee of Korea security is unacceptable and represents attempt drive conference away from proper course. Conference should not wait until unification achieved to undertake definite decision on method of guaranteeing maintenance of peace and security in Korea. As previously stated, DPROK favors guarantee by states most interested maintenance, peace and security in Far East.

Saying basic Korean law was matter for future all Korean assembly to decide and thus not within competence of Geneva conference, Nam then stated ROK proposal provided for spreading authority of ROK constitution to North Korea, and launched into long attack on allegedly anti-democratic, anti-popular nature ROK constitution, ROK failure carry out land reform, exploitation industrial workers, police terror, etc.

Chou En-lai then took floor<sup>2</sup> and referred to three proposals put forward by Nam Il which were supported by USSR and CPR. Stated these provided broad possibilities for Korean unity through free elections. Added that on 22 May CPR made supplementary proposal that elections be supervised by neutral nations commission. Chou then referred to ROK 14-point proposal also submitted 22 May which he said

---

<sup>2</sup> For the text of Chou's statement, see *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 137-141.

sought unified Korea with support of foreign armies. Said this no basis for peace and condemned attempt of US and other delegations to seek support for ROK proposal by invoking illegal resolutions UN. Contended must seek other solution and common ground could be found. Further contended peaceful settlement Korean question could be found through free elections in accordance with principles of proportional representation. Re withdrawal of foreign forces, stated only few delegations differ in principle on this point. Cited Eden's statement that common ground could be found and that conference should not despair of agreement. Claimed some delegations wanted to delay withdrawal of foreign forces, but stated there must be no delay since Korean settlement related to peace in Far East. To this end urged conference find concrete solution and not let ROK proposal stand in way.

Next section Chou speech devoted to attack on ROK and on Rhee regime. Denied assertion that ROK represents all Korean people. Charged that since it does not it fears free elections and opposes joint North-South Korean organ for all-Korean elections. Charged ROK still wants to dominate all Korea and impose its constitution while opposing withdrawal of UN, chiefly US, forces. Asserted Korean people should be enabled to settle Korean question themselves and cited *NY Times* article 28 May in support of charge that this issue being obscured by ROK and others.

Chou then continued in support of Nam Il proposal that free elections be prepared and held by commission composed by two sides. Further stated that because Korea divided for years and strained situation exists, necessary to have elections supervised by neutral nations commission saying that UN supervision untenable because UN a belligerent party which had lost its competence and moral authority to deal impartially with situation. Referred to successes of Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in supervising Korean armistice. Asserted that armistice formula for neutral (nation not participating in Korean hostilities) should be adopted. Said NNSC played positive role in armistice supervision, that it had worked out effective procedures in rotation of personnel and military equipment, has established regular inspections in North and South Korea. and has conducted specific investigations as requested by both sides. Stated that although commission has met with difficulties its contributions and achievements cannot be denied, thus no reason why neutral nations commission cannot carry out supervision Korean elections.

Further stated withdrawal all foreign forces prerequisite for holding free elections. Stated CPR and DPROK have stood for withdrawal foreign forces whereas ROK and US unwilling withdraw UN forces



simultaneously. This is proof they plan to keep troops in Korea to interfere with elections.

In concluding, Chou cited statements several UN delegates (New Zealand, Australia, and UK) who expressed common desire withdraw forces Korea as soon as would be done without endangering peace. Stated to prevent recurrence fighting in Korea nations most interested in peace in Far East should assume obligation for peaceful development Korea and saw no reason why conference could not agree on withdrawal of foreign forces and guarantee peaceful development Korea by nations most interested in peace in Far East.

Philippine representative then made eloquent speech<sup>3</sup> criticizing Communist spokesman for disregard UN authority in proposals for Korean settlement, strongly supported UN authority, validity its resolutions, etc., and expressed "heartly approval and support" for 14-point ROK proposal.

After recess Molotov took floor.<sup>4</sup> Outlined following principles on which he said agreement could be reached now in principle and submitted draft resolution, adoption of which he indicated would be favorable influence on further work of conference :

"Participants in Geneva conference have agreed on following fundamental principles in regard peaceful settlement of Korean problem :

"1. With view to unifying Korea and to establishing united, independent and democratic Korean state, free elections shall be held throughout territory Korea.

"Elections shall be held within six months after conclusion of present agreement.

"Elections shall be conducted by secret ballot and universal suffrage.

"Representation in all-Korean legislature will be in proportion to population of Korea as whole.

"2. With view to preparing and conducting free all-Korean elections and to facilitating *rapprochement* between Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Republic of Korea, all-Korean body shall be set up composed of representatives of Democratic People's Republic Korea and Republic of Korea.

"Composition and duties of this body shall be subject of further examination.

"3. All foreign forces shall be withdrawn from Korea within specified periods.

"Periods and phases for withdrawal of all foreign forces from North and South Korea prior to holding of free all-Korean elections shall be subject of further examination.

"4. An appropriate international commission shall be set up to supervise holding of free all-Korean elections.

---

<sup>3</sup> For the text of the speech, see *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 141-142.

<sup>4</sup> For the text of Molotov's statement, see *ibid.*, pp. 143-149.

"Composition of this supervisory commission shall be subject of further examination.

"5. Recognizing importance of preventing any violation of peace in Korea, it is deemed necessary for states most directly concerned in maintenance of peace in Far East to assume obligations for ensuring Korea's peaceful development, so as to facilitate settlement of problem of Korea's national unification.

"Question of which states are to assume obligations regarding ensuring of Korea's peaceful development and of nature of these obligations shall be subject of further examination."

Molotov then noted outstanding differences of views expressed so far in conference and said importance of these should not be minimized. In particular in this connection mentioned difference concerning all-Korea commission and withdrawal foreign forces. Conference, he said, should proceed to detailed and concrete examination of these differences in effort to reconcile them.

Molotov then launched violent propaganda attack on United States whose representative on May 28, he said, had tried to present United States in light of defender principles of United Nations Charter, human rights, peace and security when "facts" showed that United States had undertaken aggression contrary to principles UN Charter, and even now while settlement Korea problem still under discussion was taking action in Southeast Asia which constituted new threat to peace and security. In conclusion, Molotov in current standard Soviet propaganda language drew contrast between UN actions allegedly undermining UN authority and alleged Soviet support for principles collective security, citing in latter connection Soviet policy prior World War II, Soviet European security proposals, offer to join NATO, and support for Chinese Communist proposals regarding maintenance of security in Far East.

Netherlands delegate spoke next. Noted that conference has been under way for six weeks and that positions are still far apart on some issues. Expressed belief of his delegation that common ground does exist. Cited as example that both North and South Korean delegations propose all-Korea elections. Found it encouraging that Nam Il agrees with principle of proportional representation but emphasized that central problem is how to organize free elections.

Cited DPROK proposal that elections should be organized by all-Korea commission and said Netherlands delegation believes this impractical and unrealistic. This conference convened because North and South Korea could not solve their problem. How then can we expect these parties to agree on the organization of elections? Said in his view conference cannot afford to give election commission responsibilities it never will be able to carry out.

Further cited Chou En-lai's admission of necessity for assistance in elections supervision from outside referring to Chou proposal for neutral commission, but noted this commission would take action only after all-Korea commission had agreed on conditions for free elections. Stated it doubtful that such all-Korea commission could ever reach stage of necessary agreement.

Then referred to ROK proposal for unification. Stated that Netherlands delegation feels it presents excellent possibilities for solution and that most important part of proposal is role attributed to UN in conduct of elections. Noted that several delegates had attacked and discredited UN as aggressor. Said he would not take up these allegations since Netherlands Foreign Minister previously dealt with them.

Labelled collective security cornerstone UN and principle that commands loyalty of peace-loving nations. Referred to action in Korea as ray of hope for freedom and peace of mankind. Stated that free elections were way to goal of settlement Korea problem, agreed assistance from outside essential, and that this should be provided by UN.

In conclusion, stated that Netherlands delegation listened to USSR proposals made earlier in session and stated that Netherlands delegation will study them with care in light of statement just made.

Pyun, ROK, then took floor and spoke from notes for purpose refuting view Communist fallacy which, he said, appeared in Nam Il's statement today among many old lies and distortions. Pyun took heated issue with effort Nam Il had made to support principle of equal representation in all-Korea commission (in spite of seven to one population ratio) by drawing analogy with US and Swiss historical precedent. Pyun emphasized division of Korea not administrative one like US states or Swiss cantons, but one brought about by foreign imposition.

General Smith spoke last. Verbatim text sent USIA for Wireless File.<sup>5</sup> Although past 7 p. m., chairman permitted Chou make brief statement saying that views re NNSC quoted by General Smith had only been those of Swedish and Swiss members; that he would distribute letters from Polish and Czech members to delegations, and reserve his right to reply to other parts of General's speech.

---

<sup>5</sup> For the text, see *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 149-153. In his statement, Smith criticized the Communist proposal for an all-Korean commission to prepare for elections in Korea, since, he said, North Korea would have equal representation on such a body, despite the disparity in size between the two Koreas, and hence would have a built-in veto on proposals for genuine, free elections. He also sharply opposed the Chinese advocacy of a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to monitor the elections, stating that the NNSC agreed on for the Korean Armistice had been a dismal failure because of Communist trickery and intransigence. Finally, he emphasized that genuinely free elections in Korea could only be held under the supervision of the United Nations.

*Comment:* Communist speeches seemed designed partly for immediate internal propaganda consumption, partly (in pretending to outline rational way for conference to pursue its work toward agreement) so that contrast could later be drawn between "sincere" Communist efforts achieve agreement and anticipated desire of other delegations to terminate Korean phase. In addition, Communist speakers, especially Nam Il, seemed to imply that security guarantees for Korea should be established whether or not agreement achieved on unification.

SMITH

JUNE 6, 1954

396.1 GE/6-654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, June 6, 1954—2 p. m.

Dulte 155. Yesterday's plenary session on Korea until Molotov's speech was everything we could have asked for. Nam Il and Chou En-lai repeated with vehemence all of the charges, spurious allegations, and unacceptable proposals which they had advanced previously, and gave no indication of the slightest willingness to compromise in any direction. They also categorically rejected the ROK proposals. At the time of the five o'clock break practically all of our associates were convinced that our case had been made for us, and even the Canadian delegate told us that he had no further concern about his public opinion nor did he think there was any need to proceed further.

During the last hour of the session, however, Molotov spoke in an attitude of sweet reasonableness, presented and circulated the proposals sent you in Secto 391.<sup>1</sup> However, he concluded with a vicious attack on thesis. As we analyze these proposals, they are a combination of some of Krishna Menon's "principles" combined with a rephrasing of the unacceptable North Korean formula, together with acceptance of the idea of international supervision. This latter, which of course is spurious, as well as the all-Korean body are sugar-coated with the phrase that "composition and duties are to be examined further"

While we have not yet talked with our 15 associates, we greatly fear that Molotov's proposals may have destroyed the chance of an immediate clean break, in full association with the other 15, on the issue of the United Nations.

---

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

To those of the 15, headed by Britain and the Dominions, who wish to return home with the report of an "area of agreement on principle and relaxation of tensions" the Molotov proposal will probably make a strong appeal.

I had believed until the last hour yesterday that it would not even be necessary to hold a restricted meeting, as the issues then seemed very clearly drawn. My estimate now is that we will have to have such a meeting to examine the Molotov proposal in order to satisfy a number of the 16. It will not be possible until tomorrow afternoon to give you any accurate estimate. Our present plan is to wait until the last minute tomorrow and then call off the restricted meeting on Korea which had been announced as probable. The only one to whom I have talked about this is Bidault and he concurs, as it gives him another day to avoid an Indochina plenary. I would also prefer not to have a meeting of the 16 tomorrow, as we need time to ascertain by private contact what the various individual attitudes are, and plan our tactics. Doubt if we can avoid a meeting of the 16 Tuesday morning.<sup>2</sup>

As reported in our Secto 378,<sup>3</sup> our present differences are in emphasis. We wish to emphasize any break on the United Nations issue. All of our associates except the Commonwealth bloc will in the end support us, not because all of them agree, but because they accept our leadership. The Commonwealth bloc prefers to emphasize the issue of free elections. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have quite definite instructions in this regard.

I asked Eden to give us a little help with the Dominions, saying that actually we had the same song with two verses, and it didn't make much difference which verse we sang first, as long as we all sang the same song. He agreed, and said that both would be sung with equal loudness as far as he was concerned. But this was before Molotov.

The UN role in Korea has been vigorously rejected by the Communist bloc. The Molotov proposal ostensibly offers a negotiating basis for the views expressed by the Commonwealth bloc. Our dilemma is how to go along with the Commonwealth bloc in exploring the Molotov proposals without compromising our position that the UN role in resisting aggression and its authority and competence in establishing the peace is basic to all of the other issues involved. I would be extremely grateful for your thoughts and suggestions to reach me by Monday evening, as we may really need them on Tuesday.

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> June 8.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 4, p. 342.

JUNE 7, 1954

396.1 GE/6-754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1954—11:30 a. m.

Tedul 166. Ur Dulte 155.<sup>2</sup>

1. My feeling is resolution forwarded by Molotov should be rejected on the ground that it gives spurious sense of accomplishment although in reality it does not resolve any major issue except that of proportionate representation. This, however, is itself illusory until there is agreement as to the supervision of elections which will determine composition of all Korean legislature.

2. With respect to composition and duties of preparatory body; with respect to withdrawal of foreign forces; with respect to supervisory commission; and with respect to states assuming obligations to insure greatest peaceful Korean development, all "subject to further examination". The Berlin communiqué agreed that there should be "the establishment through peaceful means of a united and independent Korea". The Molotov resolution, using many words to create the illusion of progress, in fact does little more than repeat what was agreed to at Berlin. I feel it would be a fraud upon the peace-loving peoples of the world who are eager to see Korea peacefully united if a resolution were adopted which would inevitably lead to subsequent disillusionment if, as we assume, the communist bloc adhere to their view that the United Nations must be publicly humiliated by being excluded from any role in consummating its program first undertaken in 1947 to create an independent and united Korea.

3. The position of the 16 has too many unresolvable difficulties to allow any of us to play this dangerous game of Molotov's. President Rhee has gone as far as he is likely to go and is becoming very restive. Only an excellent piece of persuasion by Briggs induced him to authorize Pyun to attend a final restricted session (Seoul's 1303 sent Geneva 156 Tokyo 773<sup>3</sup>). He may at any point call the ROK delegation home. Our position before world opinion is certainly much better if we break off the Conference now while we are united than if we pursue a mirage of negotiation until we are divided from each other.

4. We have two good issues. I have already emphasized the prime importance of the UN issue in my own thinking. (Tedul 145.<sup>4</sup>) This

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was drafted by Dulles. It was repeated to Seoul as telegram 992 and to Tokyo as telegram 2708.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 4, p. 344.

<sup>4</sup> Dated June 1, p. 334.

is one that free world opinion will understand. The other is the issue of genuinely free elections. I see advantages if the Commonwealth will emphasize this issue if they will also speak in support of the UN. We can also cover both points with some difference of emphasis. And I hope in talking about Molotov's proposal there will be less note of welcome and more tone of regret that he gives no evidence of real willingness to yield on the fundamentals.

DULLES

JUNE 8, 1954

396.1 GE/6-854 : Telegram

*Eighth Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, June 8, 11:05 a. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 8, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 402. Repeated information Tokyo 115, London 257, Paris 401, Seoul 119, Moscow unnumbered. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

1. Eighth meeting of 16 morning, June 8 conference reflected gratifying consensus opinion and agreement on situation and tactics among all delegations.

2. Smith confidentially informed group he had explored question composition of body to supervise Korean elections informally with Molotov last night<sup>2</sup> and latter made it quite clear Communists would agree only to supervisory body consisting equally Communists and non-Communists, i.e. complete counterpart of NNSC established under armistice agreement. Smith said this only confirmed our feeling that Saturday's plenary session had clarified and sharpened issues between 16 and Communists. Communists entirely firm in rejecting our fundamental principles of free elections and UN supervision. Smith quoted at length Secretary's views (Tedul 166 information Seoul 992 and Tokyo 2708<sup>3</sup>) that these two are very strong issues on which all 16 agree even if some would emphasize one of issues more than other, and that Secretary felt also too many minor points of difference among us which might be revealed if we were dragged into exploring Molotov proposal and it is much better to stand firm and united on major issues

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/8) from which the time is taken is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting adjourned at 12:07 p. m.

<sup>2</sup> For a record of this meeting, see the memorandum of conversation by Page, p. 1059.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

as 16 now are. It would be highly desirable for other delegations to address themselves to Molotov's speech emphasizing disagreement on fundamentals and expressing regret that he gave no evidence of willingness to yield on basic issues.

3. Turning to tactics, Smith said we believe that after Saturday's session it no longer necessary to have restricted session in order to clarify and sharpen issues with Communists. Indeed restricted session would be undesirable now since it might give impression that we consider Molotov's proposal genuine and were anxious to negotiate on basis of it. Our side should now concentrate on exposing Molotov's proposal in plenary. It might be better, however, wait little while see if Communists take initiative in requesting next Korean plenary as they might do in view of Chou En-lai's statement Saturday he reserves right to make full reply to Smith's speech.

4. Other delegations (UK, Canada, ROK, Philippines, Australia, Netherlands, Thailand, Colombia, Turkey) expressed agreement points made by Smith. It was generally recognized that Molotov's speech contains no concession on fundamentals but was superficially attractive and might confuse public opinion. They agreed restricted session now unwise and desirable to have plenary to expose Molotov's proposal. They agreed it would be desirable to have few days to consult governments, and let Communists take initiative in demanding next Korean plenary, but it would be undesirable to wait too long and leave Molotov proposal before public without having additional replies to it. Pyun (ROK) preferred sponsor plenary session for our side make "clinging statement and wind it all up".

5. Garcia of Philippines suggested that at next plenary some delegations might wish to ask Communists directly question it had been intending to put to them in restricted session i.e. whether Communists would accept authority of UN.

6. UK, Netherlands, Australia, however, reserved position on desirability of restricted session in light developments at next plenary.

7. Group agreed that nothing should be done until Thursday morning.<sup>4</sup> If by then Communists had not requested plenary, Kural would make contact with them and inquire whether they desire plenary in view of Chou En-lai's expressed intention of speaking again. He would suggest plenary on Friday and if Communists refuse would insist on having one Saturday.

SMITH

---

<sup>4</sup> June 10.



JUNE 10, 1954

795.00/6-1054 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

SEOUL, June 10, 1954—9 p. m.

1326. Repeated information Tokyo 785, priority Geneva 166. Geneva for USDel; Tokyo pass CINCUNC. President Rhee has just sent me following message via Acting Foreign Minister Cho:

"Informed that at Geneva today 16 nations agreed that Communist proposal offered no encouragement and must be rejected. They also agreed time has come end Korean negotiations. US and some countries want break emphasizing UN issue while England and her sister countries want to stress free election issue."

Cho said President would appreciate it if I would convey this most urgently to Secretary Dulles and USDel Geneva emphasizing his belief Korea phase should be terminated without further delay or parley otherwise Communists will succeed in obscuring issues and dividing allies.

I reminded Cho that President had expressed approximately the same thoughts at our last talk re Geneva (Embtel 1303, June 4, repeated Geneva 156, Tokyo 773<sup>1</sup>) and that his views are accordingly already a matter of record. I said I should be glad nevertheless to telegraph again as requested by Rhee.

I also told Cho that I hoped instructions to Dr. Pyun would give latter sufficient leeway to permit him continue for at least a few days more, should that be necessary in order preserve united front UN side.

My conversation with Cho underlines views expressed Embtel 1307, June 7 (repeated Geneva 158, Tokyo 775)<sup>2</sup> that we are likely have great trouble keeping Rhee in line unless Geneva phase ends very soon. While I shall continue do my best dissuade Rhee from ordering his delegation home, unless there is something definite I can tell him prospect unpromising.<sup>3</sup>

BRIGGS

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 4, p. 344.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. It stated that at their meeting on June 4, Rhee had spoken to Briggs of withdrawal of the Korean Delegation from Geneva. Rhee had not made any threat to recall Pyun, said Briggs, but the Ambassador wished the Department of State not to overlook the possibility of early withdrawal of the Republic of Korea from the Geneva Conference. (795.00/6-754)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1327, June 11, 1 a. m., from Seoul conveyed the following message from Ambassador Briggs:

"Later conversation with Acting Foreign Minister Cho this evening [June 10] indicates that message from President Rhee to me quoted reference telegram [1326] probably originated in Geneva from Pyun and that Rhee seeking capitalize thereon to support his thesis that Geneva Korean phase should be ended soon as possible." (795.00/6-1154)

396.1 GE/6-1054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 10, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 418. Repeated information priority Seoul 120, Tokyo 123. Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

1. Korean plenary has been scheduled for Friday afternoon.<sup>1</sup> UK, New Zealand, Canada and possibly Thailand will speak for our side. Hope also for Spaak and short statement from Garcia.

2. Thereafter, USDel tentatively plans to lay following tactical recommendations before meeting of 16 Saturday June 12.<sup>2</sup> Believe good possibility general acceptance by 16. Communist tactics are the problem.

*A. Basic Considerations.*

1. Our tactics should be based on probability that unlike Berlin, the Communists will not agree to any termination formula. They will make major propaganda issue out of our "breaking up" or "wrecking" conference, while they still wish negotiate. They will maneuver to keep Korean phase conference going.

2. Continued sessions will only renew possibilities for confusing the basic issues, for creating differences among 16, and for propaganda which may have some effect on our respective public opinions. Nothing more can be achieved since Communists have shown no slightest intention to compromise on basic issues.

3. Therefore, Allies will probably have to terminate conference unilaterally, but on issues which will stand up before world opinion.

*B. Preferable Plan.*

1. We should hold no more meetings either plenary or restricted. Such meetings would invite further Communist delaying tactics such as elaboration Nam Il's point 3.

2. Representatives 3 Allied inviting powers (US, UK and France) could send joint written memorandum to Molotov informing him, as representative 4th inviting power, that they, and their 13 associates, are agreed that the 2 basic issues on which they insist, i.e., authority of UN and provision for genuinely free elections, have been repeatedly rejected by other side. Therefore, 16 are agreed that further consideration and examination Korean question by conference would serve no useful purpose as long as Communist delegations reject these two basic requirements.

---

<sup>1</sup> June 11.

<sup>2</sup> The meeting of 16 was not held until June 14.

3. The 16 could issue joint declaration drafted broad terms simultaneously with delivery letter to Molotov. Letter and joint declaration could be issued soon as necessary consultations between delegations of 16 and their governments can be completed preferably by Tuesday June 15.

Eden may wish first see Molotov in attempt obtain his agreement to no further meetings. Some of other 16 would probably support this. This would probably not be successful and in that event we should be prepared promptly to implement foregoing plan. If it is successful, the letter from the 3 on our side could be eliminated.

4. General outlines of a report to UN by 16 should be agreed to if possible at meeting of 16 June 12, and detailed drafting should be referred to working group of 15 in Washington.

### C. *Alternative Plan.*

1. As a less desirable alternative to above procedure in event some of 16 insist on another meeting, we should tell rest of 16 we would be willing have one more plenary or one more restricted meeting.

2. At close such meeting, letter to Molotov would be delivered and declaration of 16 would be issued.

3. Would appreciate Department's comments soon as possible.<sup>3</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup>The Department of State's response was conveyed in telegrams Tosec 396 and 397, June 11, to Geneva, which indicated a preference for the plan set forth in paragraph B2 but stated that there was no objection to the plan in C2 if Smith thought it desirable in order to maintain Allied unity. The Secretary concurred in this judgment. (396.1 GE/6-1054)

JUNE 11, 1954

396.1 GE/6-1154: Telegram

*Fourteenth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, June 11, 3:05 p. m.:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 11, 1954—midnight.

Secto 425. Repeated information Tokyo 128, London 269, Moscow 217, Paris 421, Seoul 123. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense. Fourteenth Korean plenary Friday June 11, Molotov presiding, opened with speech by Chou En-lai. Chou stressed desirability of noting those points on which conference has already achieved agreement and those points where agreement may be possible. Then conference should proceed to discuss points of differences so as reach agreement. He proposed that conference adopt Molotov's June 5 proposals as basis for further discussion and he went on to rehash argu-

---

<sup>1</sup>A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/14) is in FE files, lot 55 D 481. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:05 p. m. and adjourned at 7:20 p. m.

ments for all-Korean commission. Claimed US opposed to commission because US wants to impose ROK will on DPROK, which failed to do in war.

PROC cannot accept UN supervision since UN is a belligerent. It would be "inconceivable" that PROC or DPROK could agree to this.

NNSC has had its problems. These have been caused, not by Polish and Czech representatives, but because US has violated armistice on many occasions. US not only wants to prevent agreement on Korea, but wants to disband NNSC so that the US can proceed with arming ROK. Moreover, US objects to an NNSC in Indochina so as to keep war going there.

He closed by stating that peaceful settlement of Korea was closely related to peace in entire world. He claimed conference already achieved agreement on several points and no reason why conference should not continue. World opinion would not permit conference to break off.

Ronning of Canadian delegation devoted opening part his speech<sup>2</sup> to answering "challenge" of Communist delegation to authority of UN. Voicing Canada's unqualified support of UN as "preeminent international agency for making and keeping peace", he expressed belief any agreement on Korean unification must be in accordance UN principles. If conference cannot reach agreement on procedure for unifying Korea, UN will continue effort with Canadian support. Ronning then stressed danger of agreement on generalized principles when there remain serious questions as to meaning and details. Canada would like to be able to agree to Molotov's proposals, but this would be dishonest, since so many essential questions of detail are unresolved. In long run, it is more important to register actual disagreement on fundamental points than to fool people of world by indicating agreement on broad and fuzzy principles.

New Zealand delegate then spoke,<sup>3</sup> pointing out spirit of give and take was lacking in Communist delegation, especially on issues vital to cause UN members pledged to uphold. He continued in much same vein as Ronning. Although could agree with platitudinous statements of Molotov, free world has learned to examine such statements for their real meaning. It would be of little service to world if agreement was reported on these broad principles when there exists, in fact, fundamental disagreement on the basic issue of the preparation for and conduct of free elections. NNSC was an experiment in international cooperation—one that did not work, may have been disastrous and is not likely to be repeated. By abandoning their perverse attitude toward

<sup>2</sup> For the text, see *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 154-161.

<sup>3</sup> For the text of McIntosh's statement, see *ibid.*, pp. 161-165.

the UN, the PROC could open up way for a settlement of Korean problem and for wider settlement of Far Eastern problems. By deliberate design Communists have made acceptance versus denial to UN key issue both for Korean settlement and for the reconciliation of China with majority of nations.

Nam-Il followed with comparatively short speech which (a) emphasized that there was general agreement many questions of principle; (b) endorsed Molotov draft resolution of June 5; and (c) replied to General Smith's indictment of NNSC. In supporting Molotov resolution, Nam-Il reiterated Communist position on all-Korean commission, withdrawal foreign forces prior election, international supervisory commission and guarantee peaceful development Korea by interested states. Blaming US military authorities for difficulties NNSC in Korea, Nam-Il alleged North Koreans had completely cooperated while UN command violated armistice and obstructed work of commission.

Eden then spoke,<sup>4</sup> pointing out two fundamental issues before conference are authority of UN and question of free all-Korean elections. In Korea UN demonstrated its worth as organization for implementing collective security. Only by carrying out purpose and principles of UN charter can conference find solution to Korean question. Far from having lost its moral authority by its actions in Korea, UN by defending ROK against aggression, strengthened its authority.

While all say we agree must unify Korea by free elections, we do not agree on methods and procedures. This is same difference in principle which we faced in Berlin. Impartial international supervision essential for truly free elections. Supervisory commission must be so composed that it can take effective decisions and must have authority carry them out. UN is most appropriate body from which to choose impartial international commission. If all-Korean commission which gives veto to North Korean Communist minority, has main responsibility for elections result would be no elections or elections which not free. Communist proposal for NNSC supervision not only leaves unaltered all-Korean commission, but is same type which already unsatisfactory.

How does Molotov's draft resolution help since it is just on methods of application where we differ. UK stakes stand on principles UN authority and free elections. If no way found resolving differences on these two issues, must admit conference unable complete its task. As UN members we should then report back that organization. This would insure search for political settlement in Korea could be resumed at right moment.

---

<sup>4</sup> For the text, see *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 165-168.

Thai delegate in brief speech expressed view UN supervision over free elections was essential. Draft resolution of Soviet delegation is unacceptable because it is a "skeleton" rather than plan for settlement. Thai delegation cannot agree to establishment of commissions without their composition and duties being known beforehand.

Spaak then made eloquent extemporaneous speech<sup>5</sup> with much dramatic force. He noted that conference had come to "decisive" stage. Molotov's speech was of considerable importance, but was too optimistic in its claims of agreement on many issues. Agreement possible in principle, but so many matters of detail remain unsettled that there are still many important divergencies. If UN ignored in Korean settlement it would doom both concept of collective security and UN organization. Among 60 member countries in UN it would be possible find panel of impartial nations acceptable to both sides. At close of speech Spaak said he had tried to put his thoughts in writing and read following:

"In order to prepare and to organize free general elections throughout Korea, the UN shall appoint a commission, members of that commission will be selected impartially in order to enjoy the trust from both sides involved. That commission shall act in close cooperation with the representatives of the ROK and with those of the DPROK. The questions pertaining to the final constitution and other terms of reference of that body shall be the subject of a supplementary consideration."

He said if Molotov could embody such text in his proposal Geneva conference would make decisive step forward. If not, then we must face conclusion expressed by Eden today.

Bidault who had not previously indicated he was going to speak and inscribed himself late in the session spoke last.<sup>6</sup> He pointed out France could not subscribe to attacks on UN. He noted that Molotov's proposal was designed to obscure disagreement on fundamental issues. Emphasized that French delegate was moved by a spirit of reasonableness and desire to compromise in both facets of conference. He closed by stating his delegation "adheres in principle to ideas enunciated by one of our presidents, which may be summed up as follows:

"1. Korea, within her historical frontiers, should be united as a free, independent and democratic state.

2. To this end, elections should be held throughout the territory of Korea to establish a single and really representative government for the whole of the country.

3. The elections should be carried out under conditions of true freedom under international supervision.

---

<sup>5</sup> For the text, see *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 168-173.

<sup>6</sup> For the text, see *ibid.*, pp. 173-174.

4. The settlement of the Korean question should make provision for the withdrawal of foreign forces.

5. When once the unification has been carried out under number maximum conditions, the UN would be called upon to give their sanction to this settlement thus reached”.

*Comment* : Communists may seize on Bidault's closing statement as invitation to continue Korean phase. Bidault's 5 points bear close resemblance to Eden's statement of "basic principles" in May 13 Korean plenary, although 5th point seems to be Bidault's very own. USDel had no prior knowledge contents French speech.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-1154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, June 11, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 424. Repeated information priority Seoul 121, Tokyo 126. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Reference Secto 418.<sup>1</sup> Following is draft declaration by 16 which we will begin discussing tomorrow with UK and possibly some other key delegations with view introducing in meeting 16 Monday.<sup>2</sup> Would appreciate Department's comments. Department will, of course, appreciate that delegation will require some negotiating flexibility on final text in order quickly obtain agreement all 16.

Draft declaration by the 16.

“Pursuant to the resolution of August 28, 1953, of the United Nations General Assembly, and the Berlin communiqué of February 18, 1954, we, the 16 nations who contributed military forces to the United Nations Command in Korea, have been participating in the Geneva Conference for the purpose of establishing a united and independent Korea by peaceful means.

We have made a number of proposals and suggestions in accord with the past efforts of the United Nations to bring about the unification, independence and freedom of Korea; and within the framework of the following two principles which we believe to be fundamental:

1. The United Nations, under its Charter, is fully and rightfully empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security, and to contribute its good offices to seeking a peaceful adjustment in Korea.

2. There should be established a united and independent Korea through the holding of genuinely free elections under the supervision of an appropriate United Nations body, for representatives in the National Assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in Korea.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 10, p. 360.

<sup>2</sup> June 14.

We have earnestly and patiently searched for a basis of agreement which would enable us to proceed with Korean unification in accordance with these fundamental principles. We have failed.

The Communist delegations have rejected our every effort. The principal issues between us, therefore, are clear. We accept and assert the authority of the United Nations. The Communists repudiate and reject the role of the United Nations in Korea and have labelled the UN itself the tool of aggression. We desire genuinely free elections. The Communists, while asserting a corresponding desire, insist upon procedures which would make free elections, as we understand them, completely impossible. It is only too apparent that the Communist states will not accept impartial supervision of free elections. Plainly, they have shown their intention to maintain Communist control over North Korea. They have persisted in the same attitudes which have frustrated United Nations' efforts to unify Korea since 1947.

However attractive it might be to state that some agreement in principle had been reached at this point, we believe that in the long run it will be better if we squarely face the facts of our disagreement and acknowledge them than to delude ourselves with false hopes and lead the people of the world to believe that there is agreement when there is no real agreement.

In the circumstances, we have been compelled reluctantly and regretfully to conclude that, so long as the Communist delegations reject the two fundamental principles which we consider indispensable, further consideration and examination of the Korean question by the conference would serve no useful purpose. We reaffirm our continued support for the objectives of the United Nations on the establishment of a united and independent Korea."

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-1154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 11, 1954—11 p. m.

122. Repeated information Department Secto 426, Tokyo 127. Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

1. Re Seoul's 1326 to Department repeated information Geneva 166 and Tokyo 785<sup>1</sup> with respect last sentence Rhee's message to you.

Please inform him at appropriate opportunity that UK, Commonwealth and all other delegations agree we have two good issues, as Secretary stated in his Tedul 166 to Geneva, repeated Seoul 992 and Tokyo 2708.<sup>2</sup> There was general agreement on these issues at eighth meeting of 16 June 8 as we have previously reported. UK, Commonwealth and others stressed these issues today's plenary.

2. We fully appreciate likelihood of increasing difficulty with ROK if Korean phase not wound up soon. Conditional on Department's

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 10, p. 359.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 7, p. 356.



comments, suggest you inform Rhee general lines Secto 418 repeated information Seoul 120 and Tokyo 123<sup>3</sup> if you consider useful. You also might convey to Rhee that UK, Commonwealth, US and other Allies are in complete agreement on necessity for quickly bringing Korean phase to end in appropriate manner. However, we all realize here difficulties Communists will give us in trying to make "clean break". Pyun has told us he has discretion on exactly when and how terminate which he hopes will be immediately. He also has agreed a 16-nation statement at end of conference would be advisable.

3. Plan meeting of 16 on Monday discuss termination tactics in detail.

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 10, p. 360.

JUNE 12, 1954

396.1 GE/6-1254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 12, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 429. Department pass USUN as Geneva's 16; repeated Usun 16. Urrutia called on Smith by appointment pursuant to instructions and exchanged views on Korean phase at Geneva and next steps. Following points were made :

1. Smith outlined proposed tactics for termination, along lines Secto 418.<sup>1</sup> Urrutia agreed that this was reasonable and indicated he would support. He had some doubt, however, as to whether we could avoid an additional meeting if Communists asked for one but in any event he said if we have our position agreed, we could break off and issue declaration immediately following such further meeting. Urrutia stressed need for time to bring around public opinion in European and LA countries to recognize fundamental Communist responsibility for failure conference. He also expressed satisfaction with Spaak speech June 11, particularly since it emphasized we prepared to accept new UN commission not necessarily UNCURK, since latter generally discredited.

2. Smith outlined proposed declaration along lines Secto 424.<sup>2</sup> Urrutia reacted favorably. He approved particularly idea that declaration would leave talks in the penumbral state, i.e., not necessarily adjourned with implication that if Communist accepted fundamental principles they could resume. He thought this would help us with Rhee

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 10, p. 360.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 11, p. 365.

since we could argue conference not fully broken off and therefore no action of other kind should be considered. He thought also it would help us postpone consideration of Korea in UN until Ninth session. In this connection, he suggested proposed report to UN should be addressed specifically to Ninth session. If we announced this intention it would make it easier for us to resist having Korea come up earlier, e.g., if GA meets to consider Thailand appeal.

3. Urrutia raised question paragraph 62 Korean Armistice Agreement. Smith confirmed that armistice is in effect perpetual and that armistice is really more than merely a military agreement. He said however that it is not necessarily desirable to emphasize this publicly since there are advantages in keeping Communists guessing as to what our intentions in Korea are. Smith expressed personal view that Rhee's threats to march north are largely bluff.

4. Urrutia urged necessity for full consultations before Korea comes up in GA again and suggested desirability of having preliminary talks on this aspect take place here before 16 depart. He stressed particularly need for UK-US agreement on positions and timing UN consideration.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-1154 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1954—2:09 p. m.

Tosec 407. Secto 424 repeated Seoul 121 Tokyo 126.<sup>2</sup> Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Secretary read Secto 424 and thought in general furnished satisfactory basis for discussions other delegations. He confirms you should have negotiating flexibility you request.

Department has following comments on draft declaration:

1. First paragraph delete "the 16" and substitute "as", thus taking account fact South Africa also contributed forces.

2. Think numbered paragraph 1 needs strengthening and suggest rewrite as follows: "UN under its charter has duty take collective action repel aggression and restore peace and security. It likewise fully and rightfully empowered seek peaceful settlement."

3. In paragraph beginning "We have earnestly" delete last sentence "We have failed" as possibly tending place onus on us.

4. Penultimate paragraph delete "however attractive it might be to state that some agreement in principle had been reached at this point"

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated for information to Seoul as telegram 1010 and to Tokyo as telegram 2774.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 11. p. 365.

since it tends too strongly confirm Molotov line agreement in principle has been or can be reached. This will necessitate minor changes rest same paragraph.

5. Change beginning final paragraph to read "In circumstances we have been compelled reluctantly and regretfully to conclude that conference has failed reach agreement on Korea. So long as Communist delegations etc."

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/6-1254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 12, 1954—5 p. m.

Secto 431. Repeated information priority Seoul 124, priority Tokyo 130. Tokyo pass CINCUNC priority. Reference Secto 418<sup>1</sup> and Secto 424.<sup>2</sup> Following is draft of proposed letter to be addressed to Molotov and signed by Bidault, Eden and Smith. Would appreciate Department's comments soonest :

"The Korean phase of the Geneva Conference has now been in session for more than seven weeks. No progress has been made toward a solution of the Korean problem, and it is now quite clear that your government, the PRC, and the PDROK are not disposed to agree to the unification of Korea on a basis consistent with the principles of the UN and the views of the Korean people and of the free peoples of the world.

The principal issues between us are clear. We accept and assert the authority of the UN. The delegations of the USSR, PRC and PDROK repudiate and reject the authority of the UN. We desire genuinely free elections. Those delegations fear and reject free elections.

In the circumstances, the sixteen governments participating in the Korean conference pursuant to our invitation, have concluded that further meetings will serve no useful purpose. They have therefore decided to adjourn further meetings. They remain ready to make further efforts to achieve the unification of Korea by peaceful means whenever the USSR, PRC and DPROK make clear their willingness to accept the principles which we consider fundamental.

A further statement of the reasons which compelled us to this step is set forth in a declaration which is being released to the public, a copy of which is attached."<sup>3</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 10, p. 360.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 11, p. 365.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the draft declaration transmitted in telegram Secto 436. June 14. see p. 372.

396.1 GE/6-1254 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation*

SECRET PRIORITY

SEOUL, June 12, 1954—7 p. m.

170. Sent Department 1331, repeated information Tokyo 792. Geneva for USDel. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Re Geneva Secto 418<sup>1</sup> and 424<sup>2</sup> (Seoul 120 and 121, Tokyo 123 and 126). Saw Rhee briefly this afternoon. Having in mind his morning departure for probable week's visit in Chinhae, considered it desirable bring him up to date with respect to our Geneva efforts this week-end obtain agreement on draft declaration.

I told Rhee we hoped stress two principles, viz. (1) united Korea through genuinely free elections and (2) authority of UN. I said it was proposed spell out these principles with sufficient detail so world would understand issues and put blame on Communists for blocking solution. Indicated we hoped draft might also contain reaffirmation of continued UN support after conference toward establishment united and independent Korea. I did not discuss text contained Secto 424 since that might have confused issue by eliciting specific suggestions or demands from President. Moreover no matter what text is adopted he will probably think it should have been stronger. For instance he will undoubtedly object to any phraseology he interprets as apologetic or appeasing in tone.

Rhee thanked me for information and remarked albeit cheerfully that "quicker we end this Geneva thing, the better". His general attitude was one of satisfaction and barring some further delay or altercation among allies leading to weak draft, I do not believe he is at the moment contemplating withdrawing ROK delegation. However this must still be reckoned as increasing possibility should anything retard our contemplated schedule for ending Korean phase.<sup>3</sup>

BRIGGS

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 10, p. 360.<sup>2</sup> Dated June 11, p. 365.<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1011, June 12, to Seoul, the Department of State indicated that the action reported in telegram 170 constituted effective carrying out of the recommendation made in telegram 122, June 11, from Geneva to Seoul, p. 366. (396.1 GE/6-1154)

JUNE 13, 1954

795.00/6-1354 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*

SECRET NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1954—12:39 p. m.

Tosec 411. Geneva's Secto 431 repeated Seoul 124 Tokyo 130.<sup>1</sup> Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Secretary has not seen reference telegram. Department believes it constitutes good basis for discussion with other

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 12, p. 369.

delegations. Pyun may have trouble with undertaking next-to-last paragraph make further efforts if Communists accept fundamental principles but hope you can convince him.

Since Communist proposals have paid lip service to "free elections", suggest might be clearer and more pointed revise last sentence second paragraph to read "The Communist delegations fear and reject any elections conducted under conditions of genuine freedom."

DULLES

396.1 GE/6-1454 : Telegram

*Smith-Eden-Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, June 13, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, June 14, 1954—10 a. m.

Dulte 179. Repeated information London 275, Paris 426, Moscow 120. Limit distribution. I met with Eden and Chauvel Sunday evening.

[Here follows the main portion of the telegram which dealt with Indochina; for text, see page 1132.]

Eden indicated full agreement with our draft 16-nation declaration on Korea, but expressed some doubts about proposed letter from three to Molotov. He is inclined to feel, and I agree, Communists likely to insist on another plenary on Korea and that in this case best tactic might be let them talk, following which two or three Allied delegates would make brief statements, pointing out no change in Communist position. Immediately following close such session, 16-nation declaration would be issued.

SMITH

JUNE 14, 1954

396.1 GE/6-1454 : Telegram

*Ninth Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, June 14, 11:10 a. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, June 14, 1954—3 p. m.

Secto 435. Priority Canberra 11, Seoul 125, Brussels 11, Luxembourg 5, Ottawa 4, Bogota 1, Addis Ababa 1, Paris 428, Athens 10, The Hague 19, Wellington 7, Manila 10, Bangkok 23, Ankara 2, London 277, repeated information Tokyo 131. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

1. Ninth meeting of 16 held Monday morning to discuss termination tactics and text 16-nation declaration.

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/9) from which the time is taken is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting adjourned at 1:03 p. m.

## 2. Tactics agreed as follows:

During meeting UK delegation reported Molotov had just told Eden Soviet delegation requesting plenary on Korea Tuesday<sup>2</sup> afternoon. If 16 can agree in time on draft declaration, we will agree to Tuesday plenary; otherwise try postpone until Wednesday. Whether plenary held Tuesday or Wednesday, after Communist speakers, Eden as chairman will recess session brief interval. Sixteen will caucus and return to plenary. Two or three allied delegations will then make concluding statements along lines Communist speakers have added nothing new, fundamental issues remain unresolved and no need further consideration of examination by conference of Korean question. Whether or not Communists speak again at plenary, Eden and Wan as co-chairmen immediately after plenary will see Molotov to tell him 16 believe conference is ended and give him copy 16-nation declaration which would be made public simultaneously.

3. Re draft declaration, 16 set up drafting committee to meet this afternoon composed of: US, ROK, UK, Thailand, Canada. Text generally acceptable but several drafting changes suggested of no particular difficulty except re description of body supervise free elections. General Smith urged quickest possible action complete draft acceptable to all, although compromise on some particular points of view. Suggest all posts urge importance agreed text in time Tuesday plenary session in order avoid postponement plenary which US and several other delegations consider undesirable. Will transmit drafting committee's text soon as possible.

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> June 15.
 

---

396.1 GE/6-1454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL      NIACT

GENEVA, June 14, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 436. Sent Ottawa 5, Paris 429. Addis Ababa 2, Bogota 2, Athens 11, The Hague 20, Wellington 8, Manila 11, Ankara 3, repeated information Canberra 12, Brussels 12, Bangkok 24, London 278, Tokyo 132, Luxembourg 6, Seoul 26. Department pass Defense. Tokyo for CINCUNC. Reference Secto 435,<sup>1</sup> repeated information Tokyo. and sent action all other addressees.

Following is draft of declaration by 16 resulting from 3-hour meeting drafting committee this afternoon. It does not fully meet every point of view. but in our best judgment should be satisfactory to all

---

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

points of view. In view of press leaks on 16 meeting this morning disclosing this project, believe it essential that full agreement on text be reached at meeting 16 Tuesday 11 a. m. so that it may be subscribed to by all and issued immediately following Korean plenary same afternoon.

Word "appropriate" first sentence, second principle, is still under discussion and will require resolution at meeting 16 Tuesday. ROK insist on deletion "appropriate" and Commonwealth delegations wish delete "UN" in supervision of elections but will probably agree on following text if "appropriate" included. USDel agreeable to either formulation but in order maintain maximum allied unity, believe preferable "appropriate" be included. Request action addressees determine soonest whether instructions Del here sufficient to permit immediate agreement on this text and if not see Foreign Minister or other appropriate official urging that necessary instructions be transmitted in time permit maintenance foregoing schedule and thus permit termination conference under conditions most advantageous UN side.

*Text follows:*

"Pursuant to the resolution of August 28, 1953, of the United Nations General Assembly, and the Berlin communiqué of February 18, 1954, we, as nations who contributed military forces to the United Nations Command in Korea, have been participating in the Geneva Conference for the purpose of establishing a united and independent Korea by peaceful means.

We have made a number of proposals and suggestions in accord with the past efforts of the United Nations to bring about the unification, independence and freedom of Korea; and within the framework of the following two principles which we believe to be fundamental:

1. The United Nations, under its Charter, is fully and rightfully empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security, and to extend its good offices to seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea.
2. In order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea, genuinely free elections should be held under (appropriate) UN supervision, for representatives in the national assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in Korea.

We have earnestly and patiently searched for a basis of agreement which would enable us to proceed with Korean unification in accordance with these fundamental principles. We have failed.

The Communist delegations have rejected our every effort to obtain agreement. The principal issues between us, therefore, are clear. Firstly, we accept and assert the authority of the United Nations. The Communists repudiate and reject the authority and competence of the United Nations in Korea and have labelled the United Nations itself as the tool of aggression. Were we to accept this position of the Communists, it would mean the death of the principle of collective secu-

city and of the UN itself. Secondly, we desire genuinely free elections. The Communists insist upon procedures which would make genuinely free elections impossible. It is clear that the Communists will not accept impartial and effective supervision of free elections. Plainly, they have shown their intention to maintain Communist control over North Korea. They have persisted in the same attitudes which have frustrated United Nations efforts to unify Korea since 1947.

We believe, therefore, that it is better to face the fact of our disagreement and not to raise false hopes and mislead the peoples of the world into believing that there is agreement where there is none.

In the circumstances, we have been compelled reluctantly and regretfully to conclude that so long as the Communist delegations reject the two fundamental principles which we consider indispensable, further consideration and examination of the Korean question by the conference would serve no useful purpose. We reaffirm our continued support for the objectives of the United Nations in Korea.

In accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of August 28, 1953, the member states parties to this declaration will inform the United Nations concerning the proceedings at this conference."

SMITH

---

*Editorial Note*

At 8:50 p. m. on June 14, the Department of State transmitted to Geneva telegram Tedul 196, drafted by Secretary Dulles. The message dealt mainly with Indochina; for the text, see page 1146. With regard to Korea, the Secretary indicated his approval of the termination of the Conference along the lines of the last paragraph of telegram Dulte 179, June 13, and telegram Secto 435, June 14. (396.1 GE/6-1454)

JUNE 15, 1954

396.1 GE/6-1554 : Telegram

*Tenth Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva. June 15, 11:07 a. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 15, 1954—3 p. m.

Secto 443. Ottawa 6, Paris 435, Addis Ababa 3, Bogota 3, Athens 12. The Hague 21, Wellington 9, Manila 12, Luxembourg 7, Ankara 4, Canberra 13, Brussels 13, Bangkok 25. London 282, Seoul 127; repeated information Tokyo 136. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense. At meeting of 16 this morning, agreement reached on

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/10) from which the time is taken is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting adjourned at 12:15 p. m.



text 16-nation declaration. Discussion centered on draft declaration by 16 (Secto 436<sup>2</sup>) and particularly use word "appropriate". Pyun remained adamant to his insistence on its exclusion. Other participants generally urged him accept it for sake unanimity, stressing that phrase would refer to UNCURK in present circumstances though no one could bind UN as to body it might consider appropriate in future.

Finally Prince Wan suggested that since ROK finds word "appropriate" insurmountable obstacle, solution might be to omit word from declaration, but in text of report to UN which UN members will be sending, this word could be included.

Deadlock broke when Canada in prepared statement said that though they would prefer inclusion word "appropriate" as umbrella to cover those who had expressed different views on appropriate composition supervisory commission, declaration is on this subject basically contrary to Canadian position regardless of inclusion or exclusion word "appropriate". Canada prepared to accept declaration as is and would not make any public statement derogating from unanimity. It wanted its friends to know, however, that it reserved its position for the future, and whenever issue properly arose would feel free to take position that important question was impartiality and effectiveness of supervision whether or not it is strictly supervision by UN.

Smith said that we would have preferred inclusion of "appropriate" for opposite reason, i.e., there might theoretically be some kind of UN supervision we would consider inappropriate. For sake of unity, however, we are prepared accept text without this word.

McIntosh (New Zealand) who had supported Canada's position said that his government would not wish to remain sole holdout and will go along, but reserved its position for future along lines Canada.

Text draft declaration approved, therefore, without word "appropriate" and with deletion sentence "we have failed", end fifth paragraph. Subject unforeseen developments, it will be signed this afternoon and issued immediately following close plenary tonight.

Group was informed that Nam Il and Molotov inscribed and probably Chou En-lai would speak also. Smith suggested that in accordance with agreed tactics yesterday's meeting, no member of 16 should inscribe. Communists would be allowed to speak before recess, and after recess form caucus of 16, Garcia and Spaak would sum up for our side.

Smith warned, however, that Nam Il might propose establishment joint North-South Korean commission which we did not think conference should deal with. UK reported Molotov indicated Nam Il

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 14, p. 372.

would raise question of continued validity of armistice. Smith said that if this happened, he would ask to speak before recess for caucus and would on behalf UNC assert that validity of armistice is not an issue at conference, that it continues in accordance paragraph 62, and there is no need for conference to deal with question. Canada supported need for making such statement.

Pyun said that he hoped none of 16 would make statements which would in effect promise Communists we would continue abide by armistice even if Communists violate it. He warned that it might be necessary for him to speak on this subject. Smith reminded him that ROK was not party to armistice and that US would speak for UNC and for all UN members and would have declaration on armistice which would accord with our commitments under it.

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-1654 : Telegram

*Fifteenth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, June 15, 3:05 p. m.:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL      PRIORITY      GENEVA, June 16, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 451. Repeated information Seoul priority 131, Tokyo 139, London 289, Paris 440, Moscow 126. Tokyo for CINCUNC. Department pass Defense. Following is summary and [of?] final Korean plenary, June 15.

Nam Il was first speaker. In statement leading to a six-point proposal (full text sent Secto 449),<sup>2</sup> Nam Il noted that US and countries

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/15) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:05 p. m. and adjourned at 8:35 p. m. Eden presided at the meeting. This message was transmitted in three sections.

<sup>2</sup> The text of Nam Il's proposal as transmitted in telegram Secto 449, June 15, from Geneva, read:

"Nam Il Proposal. On the insurance of peaceful conditions in Korea. The States (which are) participants in the Geneva conference agree that they shall continue their efforts with a view to reaching agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question on the basis of creating a united, independent, and democratic Korean state. In the interests of insuring peaceful conditions in Korea (it is agreed)

"1. To recommend to the governments of the appropriate states that measures should be taken to withdraw from the territory of Korea all foreign armed forces as soon as possible with the observation of the principle of proportionality. The time limit for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea is subject to an agreement by the participants in the Geneva conference.

"2. To reduce, within the period not exceeding one year, the strength of the troops of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, establishing the limit of troop strength for each of the states not exceeding 100,000 men.

"3. To form, from the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, a commission to consider the question of creating conditions for gradual liquidation of the state of war, of transition of the

subject to it rejected the June 5 proposals of the USSR, and that differences of opinion existed among the delegates primarily on question of Korean elections, but that nevertheless it was necessary to reach agreement on other questions since peoples of Korea and of world demanded lessening of international tensions. He asserted that conference should reach some agreement leading to peace in Korea. He went on to charge South Korea with continuing to threaten resumption of hostilities under US orders by having increased its army from 16 to 20 divisions and planning to add an additional 15 divisions. He claimed that if the US and South Korea really want to preserve peace, conference should make provisions for transition from the armistice situation to peaceful *rapprochement* between North and South Korea, withdrawal of foreign forces, reduction of domestic forces, and end of US blockade of North Korea. To this end, he said, his delegation tabled proposal.

Chou En-lai was second speaker. He regretted that US and other delegates following its lead had rejected constructive Nam Il April 27 and Molotov June 5 proposals and obstructed any agreement on peaceful unification of Korea. Said that ROK and some US leaders trying to undermine armistice and that ROK-US mutual defense treaty not "permissible". Said remaining job was consider ways to convert present war situation in Korea to peace. Specifically endorsed today's Nam Il proposals and recommended conference go into restricted session of seven (China, USSR, UK, US, France, DPROK and ROK) to consider "peaceful development of Korea".

Molotov [said]<sup>3</sup> Soviet delegation shares UK view desirability of arriving at agreement on basic principles which would be step forward in restoration Korean unity. Urged adoption Soviet delegation's proposals. Noted that Soviet delegations proposals concurred in by

---

troops of both sides to a peacetime position, and to submit to the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to the Government of the Republic of Korea proposals for the conclusion of an appropriate agreement.

"4. To recognize as incompatible with the interests of the peaceful unification of Korea the existence of treaties between one or the other of the other part of Korea and other states insofar as such treaties involve military obligations.

"5. For the purpose of creating conditions for the *rapprochement* between North and South Korea to form an all-Korean committee to work out and to implement agreed measures for establishing and developing economic and cultural relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, trade, settlement of accounts, transport, frontier relations, freedom of movement of the population, and freedom of correspondence, cultural and scientific relations. etc.

"6. To recognize the necessity to insure by the states participants in the Geneva conference the peaceful development of Korea, and to create thereby the conditions facilitating the speediest solution of the task of the peaceful unification of Korea in a united, independent, and democratic state." (396.1 GE/6-1554)

<sup>3</sup> For the text of Molotov's statement, see *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 176-182.

DPROK and ROK and chided UN side for failing to submit constructive proposals of their own.

In referring to Canadian delegate's statement June 11, Molotov accused him of giving up attempts to reach agreement on some subjects while at the same time ignoring the USSR proposal which attempted to do just that. Continued by chiding French delegate for statement also on June 11 adhering to views of Canadian delegate while submitting five-point proposal of his own which was more or less similar to the Soviet and UK proposals. Referred to Spaak's reference that Soviet proposal mortal for UN and said Spaak forgets Geneva conference set up without help of UN and this not considered inadmissible by delegations here. Even Eden, he continued, did not refer on June 11 to his own earlier five-point proposal and was preoccupied only with the questions of elections and formation of a UN commission. Contended that authority of UN can be defended in several ways not all of which strengthen UN, and cited as example use of UN as cover for Korean aggression.

Molotov then went on to reiterate Soviet delegation's views in support of all-Korea body to set up conditions for free elections, and registered his support for proposals of DPROK which would be first step in direction Korean unification. Specifically stated support of Soviet delegation for withdrawal of foreign forces within shortest possible period, reduction troop strengths in North and South Korea, formation of all-Korea commission to consider question of bringing about conditions for transition from state of war to peace and abolition by US and others of blockade and embargo of Korea. Called on conference to recommend that existence of treaties of a military nature between North and South Korea and other countries is incompatible with interests of Korean unification mentioning US-ROK mutual defense treaty specifically as means by which US planned using Korean territory as springboard for new military adventures. Stated that Soviet delegation supports formation of all-Korea commission for development of economic and cultural relations between North and South Korea. Concluded by submitting draft declaring: For possible adoption by conference (full text sent Secto 449<sup>4</sup>).

Chairman (Eden) noting no further speakers inscribed at moment was in process of calling for short recess when Garcia (Philippines)

<sup>4</sup> The text of Molotov's proposed draft declaration, as sent to the Department of State in telegram Secto 449, read:

"The States participating in the Geneva conference have agreed that, pending the final settlement of the Korean problem on the basis of the establishment of a united, independent and democratic state, no action shall be taken which might constitute a threat to the maintenance of peace in Korea.

"The participants in the conference express their confidence that both the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea shall act in accordance with the present declaration in the interests of peace."

arose and moved for recess. See Secto 447 for account meeting 16 during recess.<sup>5</sup>

Following recess, General Smith made statement rebutting Molotov proposal, noting that existing armistice agreement is formal definitive arrangement with more force than declaration suggested by Molotov could have. (Full text follows in Secto 450.<sup>6</sup>)

Casey (Australia) made short trenchant rebuttal of today's Nam Il and Molotov proposals.<sup>7</sup> Said proposals designed to mislead public opinion from understanding that Communist obstruction reason why conference cannot reach agreement. Nam Il proposals equate aggressive North Korean regime and lawful, legitimate ROK. Molotov's proposed resolution would reduce ROK defense strength to same level as North Korea which has only one-third population and would deny ROK treaty access to its friends while asking UN believe DPROK has no such link with Peiping. Noted in particular second paragraph Molotov resolution expresses confidence DPROK and ROK would act in interests of peace and that while we confident ROK will do so we have no such confidence about DPROK. Concluded that Communist statements today offered nothing new and nothing which could serve as basis further discussions.

Garcia (Philippines) then took floor and in an impassioned statement<sup>8</sup> summarized the fundamental differences existing between Communist and non-Communist delegations, charging that Communist accusations against UN as belligerent in Korean war designed to be rejected, and concluded that after two months Communist position fundamental issues unchanged. He reaffirmed faith of Philippine delegate in UN and support for two basic principles upheld by non-Communist delegates. Maintained continued willingness to continue negotiations but asserted no purpose would be served unless Communists accept fundamental principles of free elections and control there-

<sup>5</sup> The plenary session recessed from 4:40 p. m. until 5:30 p. m. During the recess, the heads of the 16 Allied Delegations held their 11th meeting from 4:50 to 5:15 p. m. The minutes are in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824 (AD Verb Min/11). The summary of the meeting in telegram Secto 447, June 15, from Geneva, read:

"At meeting of 16 during intermission between halves of Korean plenary, Smith suggested that in view of statements made today it might be best to revert to original suggestion and have declaration read at session rather than issued after close of conference. Spaak agreed and also suggested that it would be very difficult to vote against Molotov resolution (Secto 449) and wondered whether it could not be accepted. Smith said Molotov resolution unnecessary and some parts of it undesirable but he would be willing to state that matter of continuing effective armistice taken care of by armistice itself referring to paragraph 62.

"It was agreed that following Smith statement, Casey would give arguments against Nam Il resolution (Secto 449) then Garcia and Spaak would speak and Prince Wan would read declaration." (396.1 GE/6-1554)

<sup>6</sup> Telegram Secto 450, June 15, from Geneva not printed. The text of Smith's statement is in *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, p. 182.

<sup>7</sup> For the text, see *ibid.*, pp. 183-184.

<sup>8</sup> For the text, see *ibid.*, pp. 185-186.

of by appropriate UN body. Said Philippine delegation wanted unified Korea but not at price of destruction of UN.

Spaak (Belgium), speaking fluently from notes,<sup>9</sup> expressed hope that after conciliatory UN delegation speeches Friday<sup>10</sup> and Eden's grave warning headway could be made but hopes again dashed after Communist statements in first half of session. He referred to three charges made by Molotov :

(1) That non-Communist delegates wanted to subject North Korea to South Korean enslavement ;

(2) That certain delegations wanted to end conference ; and

(3) That non-Communist delegates had not seriously considered his proposals. In refuting these charges, Spaak said :

(1) We desire democratic elections in Korea wherein Korean people can express themselves freely ;

(2) It is not our desire to end conference but cause of peace will not be gained by interminable speeches ; and

(3) We have seriously considered Molotov proposals and commented on them last session. Further asserted Communists today had made no reply to fundamental questions asked of them in last session. Reiterated previous thought that if UN considered to be aggressor this would mean destruction of UN. In referring to Nam Il statement, said this no better than his earlier statement and dealt only with withdrawal of forces.

Spaak then mentioned that one delegation will read a final statement ; that this delegation not most powerful among them which demonstrates principle equality of states. Said statement not intended to end discussions on Korea and referred to necessity of reporting back to UN on results since conference convened pursuant to UN resolution. Spaak then referred to supplementary proposal of Molotov which he thought would have good effect and to which he could give support except that, as General Smith had said, armistice agreement serves same purpose and states case better. Spaak cautioned against expressing same idea in two ways since this leads to confusion. Nevertheless, he said he was glad to note the text and its spirit and he was sure all were in agreement with it. The time had come, he continued, to separate, but in doing so all should realize that nothing was lost. When time has passed and passions have subsided parties can meet to discuss and reach agreement. He emphasized that conference work not useless and hoped all could meet again, re-examine situation, and establish conditions for unified, democratic, independent Korea.

Pyun (ROK), who inscribed during Spaak statement, briefly and cogently dissected Communist statements today on peaceful develop-

<sup>9</sup>For the text of Spaak's statement, see *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 187-190.

<sup>10</sup> June 11.

ment of Korea as scheme for infiltrating ROK and diverting attention from primary subject of conference.

Prince Wan (Thailand) after short introduction read text 16-nation declaration on behalf of 16. Full text sent Tousi 79.<sup>11</sup>

Molotov, who inscribed while Wan reading declaration, then delivered relatively long and intemperate, partly extemporaneous, attack on 16, saving severest invective for ROK which he called "rotten, semi-Fascist, etc.". Apparently speaking largely for benefit domestic Communist audiences, he denied "questions" posed by 16 had not been answered and asked whether 16 had hidden their previous proposals under their tables. Said only conclusion to be drawn from conference was that the 16 had tried to impose Rhee regime on DPROK through Geneva discussions, but failed and, therefore, obstructed any agreement and took clear initiative in ending talks. He specifically accused 16 of not studying today's 16 [6]-point proposal of Nam Il, characterized Casey's rebuttal of Nam Il as saying in effect that nothing which would strengthen peace in Korea is acceptable, and said Smith's expression of surprise at resolution proposed today by Molotov to guarantee peaceful development of Korea inappropriate in view of talk coming from "Syngman Rhee regime" and elsewhere about crusade to conquer [DPROK by] war. In conclusion, said USSR now as always on the side of democratic forces and that USSR would continue fighting for them.

Chou En-lai spoke next, stating he could not agree with position in 16-nation declaration, repeated view that conference had nothing to do with UN and besides China denied rightful place in UN. Expressed regret 16-nation declaration announced determination to end conference. Chou went on to support Molotov proposal that states participating in conference issue declaration on Korean question and regretted even such a simple expression of common desire was rejected by Smith. Stated that despite differences of opinion conference has objective reaching certain agreements on unification of Korea and for this reason made following proposal, the rejection of which, he said, could only have an unfavorable effect on future international conferences:

"The states participating in the Geneva conference agree that they will continue their efforts toward achieving an agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question on the basis of establishing a united, independent and democratic Korea.

As regards the question of the time and place for resuming appropriate negotiations, it shall be decided separately by the states concerned through negotiation."

Nam Il then spoke deploring 16-nation declaration which said that conference should be ended. He recalled initial proposal of DPROK

<sup>11</sup> For the text of the Declaration by the Sixteen, see *infra*.

and his subsequent acceptance of Chou En-lai proposal on formation neutral commission to supervise elections. Referred also to DPROK acceptance Molotov proposal re agreement by conference on major questions of principle and noted that ROK and its supporters had rejected these proposals. Said that today ROK and its followers again turned down new proposals for establishment of peace in Korea thus showing other delegates trying to disrupt conference. Concluded by supporting proposal made by Chou En-lai earlier in session.

Prince Wan then addressed brief remarks with dignity and effectiveness to Molotov's charge that the 16 were taking the initiative in breaking up conference. This, he rejected and denied saying Thailand and others of 16 will continue to work for unification of Korea on basis two fundamental principles set forth UN declaration.

Spaak then again intervened extemporaneously and stated that there appeared to be a misunderstanding. The proposals of Molotov and Chou En-lai, he said, did not contradict the declaration of the 16. None of the 16, he said, consider that their action calls into question continuation of armistice agreement or leads to resumption of hostilities. 16 appeared to differ with Molotov proposal in that they believe his idea is already in armistice agreement and that the same applies to Chou's statement. If we separate now, he continued, we do not abandon Korean problem. Therefore, it was his opinion that disagreement should not be interpreted as rejection of initial Molotov and Chou proposals and that disagreement existed simply because these ideas were already embodied in armistice agreement and in 16-nation declaration.

In a brief intervention, Molotov registered support of USSR delegation for Chou En-lai proposal.

At this point, Lord Reading (UK) spoke in support of Spaak. He regretted conference had not made more progress but as 16-nation declaration said we have done everything possible. However, he continued, if we fail here we still do not abandon hope for the future. Spaak's views, he thought, reflected those of signatories of 16-nation declaration.

Chou En-lai then asked for floor by raising PROC sign. Belgian Foreign Minister, he said, stated proposal of PROC was included in armistice agreement. This assertion was groundless. There is no provision in armistice agreement for calling on participants in Geneva conference to attempt settlement of Korean question. He said he had brought spirit of negotiation and conciliation to this, his first international conference, and if his proposal was rejected by "UNC side" he would regard fact with greatest regret and peace-loving people of world would pass own judgment.



Rising to Chou's bait Spaak again intervened stating he feared Chou had not listened carefully to what he had said. He did not say Chou's proposal was included in armistice agreement but simply that it conformed to spirit of 16-nation declaration and also with his previous statement that if Geneva Conference met with no success conference should be prepared to seek a settlement at later date. UK delegate and others, he thought, shared this sentiment.

Chou En-lai then continued the exchange with Spaak and stated that if sixteen-nation declaration and proposal of PROC shared common desire then declaration of 16 is only one-sided statement. In Geneva Conference there are 19 states represented. Why not express desire of all in common statement. If not even this much agreement could be reached, he added sadly, he regretted to have had to learn this at the first international conference. Having risen to the bait Spaak then bit with a short statement expressing readiness to accept either a vote on or affirmation by the conference of Chou En-lai's proposal.

Molotov then immediately intervened stating that the conference was about to wind up its consideration of the Korean question. It could do so by a one-sided or a joint decision. He then asked rhetorically if the conference was ready to make its decision reflect the views of all.

Eden, from the Chair, apparently realizing that the exchange had already gotten out of hand then asked somewhat unhelpfully if he could accept as the [sense of] the delegates that the proposal of PROC expressed spirit of the conference.

General Smith immediately took the floor with statement (repeated in Secto 450)<sup>12</sup> to effect that this conference could not accept responsibility for settlement of Korea question indefinitely since it is not a permanent body. He was not prepared accept Chou's proposal and 16-nation declaration made clear conditions to be made by Commies for any resumption negotiations.

Eden then seemed to recover his footing and remarked from the Chair that conference has no procedure for voting and that it acts simply on common agreement. He pointed out that conference would not be able to reach agreement on any of the various texts as part of record of conference. If that were possible he stated he would add that further progress appeared impossible and hoped that day would come when task conference had set itself could be carried to successful conclusion.

Molotov spoke next saying conference had heard statement from Chair to effect all should take note of statement of Belgian delegate in support of PROC proposal inasmuch as Chou proposals reflected

---

<sup>12</sup> For the text of Smith's statement, see *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 190-191.

views of conference and that since another statement had been made US delegation conference could also take note of it.

Chou En-lai then said he was pleased to note spirit of conciliation shown by Spaak and noted chairman asked for consent of conference for proposal of PROC delegation. He then referred to immediate opposition US delegation had stipulated and asserted this showed how US delegation has been obstructing conference and preventing it from arriving at even minimum agreement. Asked that this statement be noted as part of record of conference. Pyun then made a vigorous impromptu remark referring to 16-nation declaration and stating that if Communists wish to make a similar statement or one with the same content they are free to do so but that a joint statement is "not right". The Belgian delegation, he said, does not represent all of the 16 and specifically does not represent the ROK.

Eden from the Chair again remarked that the conference does not vote but that it was his understanding that the conference could take note of views expressed and in so doing does not implicate delegates any more than they want to be implicated.

Casey then spoke in helpful manner supporting statement of US delegate and of Chair. He reminded conference that 16 were not here in their individual capacities but as those who resisted aggression in Korea. He did not believe that second paragraph of Chou proposal could be accepted since it appeared to make 16 a "chance collection of countries". Any revival of conference should be done in UN context.

Molotov then asked for floor and said conference had heard [proposal] to effect that it should take note of statements made today. Therefore, he concluded, it was necessary to take note that Belgian delegation joins with views of PROC delegation and that former believed those views expressed sentiment of conference. Spaak replied, attempting to extricate himself from deteriorating situation, that he understood Chou proposal to mean Chou hoped discussions on Korea were not ended. Spaak said he agreed with that but would add that any further discussions must be within framework of UN. Spaak said he meant he did not oppose future discussions, for to do so would be serious and unfortunate. Chou then asked if he could interpret what had been said to mean that PROC would be excluded from future discussions on settlement of Korea question. If this were so, he added, agreement on Korea question would seem impossible.

Eden from Chair concluded lengthy session by suggesting conference could not adopt any drafts as representing collective agreement but that such drafts and statements of delegates formed part of record of conference. This he thought was only thing conference could do since there was no procedure for voting. He asked if there were any objec-

tions and there were none. He then expressed the personal hope that the day would come when "our joint task" could be carried through to successful conclusion. Meeting adjourned at 2035.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-2554

DECLARATION BY THE SIXTEEN, GENEVA, JUNE 15, 1954<sup>1</sup>

Pursuant to the Resolution of August 28, 1953, of the United Nations General Assembly, and the Berlin Communiqué of February 18, 1954, we, as nations who contributed military forces to the United Nations Command in Korea, have been participating in the Geneva Conference for the purpose of establishing a united and independent Korea by peaceful means.

We have made a number of proposals and suggestions in accord with the past efforts of the United Nations to bring about the unification, independence and freedom of Korea; and within the framework of the following two principles which we believe to be fundamental:

1. The United Nations, under its Charter, is fully and rightfully empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security, and to extend its good offices to seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea.

2. In order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea, genuinely free elections should be held under United Nations supervision, for representatives in the National Assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in Korea.

We have earnestly and patiently searched for a basis of agreement which would enable us to proceed with Korean unification in accordance with these fundamental principles.

The Communist delegations have rejected our every effort to obtain agreement. The principal issues between us, therefore, are clear. Firstly, we accept and assert the authority of the United Nations. The Communists repudiate and reject the authority and competence of the United Nations in Korea and have labelled the United Nations itself as the tool of aggression. Were we to accept this position of the Communists, it would mean the death of the principle of collective security and of the United Nations itself. Secondly, we desire genuinely free elections. The Communists insist upon procedures which would make genuinely free elections impossible. It is clear that the Communists will not accept impartial and effective supervision of free

---

<sup>1</sup> The source text, a signed original of the Declaration, was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch Secto 4, June 25, from Geneva.

elections. Plainly, they have shown their intention to maintain Communist control over North Korea. They have persisted in the same attitudes which have frustrated United Nations efforts to unify Korea since 1947.

We believe, therefore, that it is better to face the fact of our disagreement than to raise false hopes and mislead the peoples of the world into believing that there is agreement where there is none.

In the circumstances we have been compelled reluctantly and regretfully to conclude that, so long as the Communist delegations reject the two fundamental principles which we consider indispensable, further consideration and examination of the Korean question by the Conference would serve no useful purpose. We re-affirm our continued support for the objectives of the United Nations in Korea.

In accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of August 28, 1953, the member states parties to this declaration will inform the United Nations concerning the proceedings at this Conference.

GENEVA, June 15, 1954.

For Australia :

R. G. CASEY

For Belgium :

P. H. SPAAK

For Canada :

C. A. RONNING

For Colombia :

FRANCISCO URRUTIA

For Ethiopia :

Z. G. HEYWOT

For France :

JEAN CHAUVEL

For Greece :

JEAN KINDYNIS

For Luxembourg :

J. STURM

For The Netherlands :

A. BENTINCK

For New Zealand :

A. D. MCINTOSH

For The Philippines :

CARLOS P. GARCIA

For The Republic of Korea :

Y. T. PYUN

For Thailand :

WAN WAITHAYAKON

For Turkey :

M. C. ACIKALIN

For The United Kingdom :

ANTHONY EDEN

For The United States of America :

WALTER BEDELL SMITH

#### IV. POST-CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS: VIEWS ON THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE; CONSIDERATION BY THE ALLIED SIDE OF A REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS (JUNE 16-JUNE 23)

396.1 GE/6-1654 : Telegram

*Meeting of the Representatives of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, June 16, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 16, 1954—4 p. m.

Secto 454. Repeated information Canberra 15, Brussels 15, Ottawa 8, Bogota 5, Addis Ababa 5, Paris 442, Athens 14, The Hague 23, Wellington 11, Manila 14, Bangkok 27, Ankara 6, London 291, Tokyo 140, Luxembourg unnumbered, Seoul 132 and Moscow 127. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Meeting representatives 16 Allied delegations this morning June 16 considered question of report to UN and offered expression of thanks Kural for excellent services as Allied Secretary-General.

Ambassador Johnson opened discussion with suggestion that 16-nation declaration (Tousi 79<sup>2</sup>) form outline and substance report to UN and that report be brief as possible. Recommended detailed drafting be done by representatives of 15 in Washington.

Urrutia (Colombia) noted important to delay submission report to UN until late August or early September. Recommended subcommittee be established immediately Geneva to begin preliminary drafting in order give appearance work in progress. Subcommittee would subsequently pass recommendations to representatives of 15 in Washington, probably about end July. Washington representatives could then take month to refer draft to respective governments and get concurrence.

After general discussion Urrutia proposal it was agreed 6-nation (Canada, UK, Colombia, US, Thailand, France) subcommittee under chairmanship Kural should meet for several days beginning morning June 17 to consider mechanics of transmission and substance of report.

Yang (ROK) asked whether report would contain recommendations. Consensus replies given him was that recommendations inappro-

<sup>1</sup> No minutes of this meeting have been found in Department of State files.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of the Declaration, see *supra*.

priate and therefore probably could not be included, at which he indicated gratification. He also expressed ROK desire be kept informed progress of drafting and was assured that while ROK could not serve on subcommittee since it not signatory it like other 16, welcome attend Geneva drafting sessions. Following meeting US delegations assured Yang we would keep ROK fully informed subsequent steps preparation report.

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-1654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 16, 1954—noon.

Dulte 185. Personal for Secretary from Under Secretary. My personal reactions on final Korean plenary may interest you and supplement our report Secto 451.<sup>1</sup> In first place, preparatory missionary work and drafting by our own people here was superbly done. It was like herding a flock of rabbits through a hole in a fence, and there were causes for extreme exasperation, but everyone remained patient and persuasive, and it paid off. We had most unusual degree of cooperation from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand even though their basic views on some important matters differed from ours. It might be worth while if you sent a brief and very personal message to Webb and Pearson expressing appreciation. You can thank Casey personally when in Washington. He is not the world's most brilliant statesman, but he loyally stepped into the breach at last minute when some loss of control of conference by Eden in Chair and bad blunder by Spaak seemed likely to leave the US alone in declining without further instructions to associate itself with a final resolution which as we saw it would in effect have made the Geneva Conference a self-perpetuating body outside the UN but including Red China.

Until Spaak allowed himself to be baited, the session went very much as planned for most of the more than six hours, and though the final exchanges between Spaak, Pyun, and others on our side furnished the Communists a good deal of amusement and an excellent propaganda line, the real issues on which the Allies are in some disagreement never came to the surface. On the whole it was about as good as could be expected, though not as good as I had hoped from the unusual success we had during the preceding two days in holding the sixteen together on tactics and wording of final declaration.

We have operated under one great disadvantage. The Communists knew, and indeed the whole press knew almost within minutes, every-

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 16. p. 376.

thing that transpired in the meetings of the sixteen, and on the last day particularly were cocked and primed and ready for us. Considering this, I am well satisfied.<sup>2</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> Dulles sent the following reply in telegram Tedul 209, June 16, 8 p .m., to Geneva :

"From Secretary for Under Secretary. Re Dulte 185. I congratulate you on bringing Korean matter to so satisfactory a close. Please also extend my thanks to your associates on our Delegation. I shall, as you suggest, cable to Webb and Pearson and thank Casey when he is here.

"In view of fact that I shall probably have a very strenuous time with possible trips to Brussels and Montevideo during the latter part of this month and the first of July, I am hoping to get away from Saturday to Monday, returning Washington Tuesday morning. I may therefore miss your arrival which I greatly regret but which I hope you will excuse.

"As you have doubtless heard the President will want to have a group of Congressional leaders at the White House after you get back to hear your report. This may be set up for Wednesday morning [June 23]." (396.1 GE/6-1654)

---

*Eden-Chou En-lai Meeting, Geneva, June 16: Editorial Note*

Smith reported on this meeting, which took place at Chou's request, in telegram Secto 463, June 17, from Geneva; for the complete text, see page 1170. The sole paragraph of the telegram dealing with Korea read :

"Eden said that Chou was obviously shaken over conclusion Korean conference, particularly rejection his final resolution, which he interpreted as slamming door any possibility Chinese participation any further Korean discussions. Said that "he could not stand" another rebuff of his efforts at conciliation and was concerned over Indochina situation. Eden said that with respect Korean situation he had replied Chou had thrown curved ball at conference, particularly at US, by his resolution, and that the US obviously could not agree to perpetuating Geneva Conference set up. It did not mean that China would necessarily be excluded from any further consideration Korean problem." (396.1 GE/6-1754)

---

396.1 GE/6-1754 : Telegram

*Young-Pyun Meeting, Geneva, June 16: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 17, 1954—4 p. m.

Secto 464. Repeated information Seoul 133, Tokyo 146. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

1. In conversation with Young Wednesday<sup>1</sup> Pyun confirmed his answers to questions in press conference he called. ROK no longer felt

---

<sup>1</sup> June 16.



obliged to abide by Korean armistice, collapse of Geneva talks means armistice "invalidated" and ROK now feels free to take any action it wants when time comes. He also said that either Chinese Communists in North Korea should leave of their own free will or be forced to go. He turned down UN taking up Korean question, as UN has "no competence" judge it. Other delegations are disturbed and feel such remarks in public contradict 16-nation declaration.

2. In recent conversations with USDel and in meetings of 16, Pyun has expressed strong view that as far as ROK concerned, armistice should not be perpetuated, Geneva Conference is last on Korea, matter should not be referred to or taken up in UN, and report to UN by 15 should contain no recommendations. Pyun in drafting committee on declaration also objected strongly to all suggestions insert phrase "by peaceful means" in connection UN objectives Korea.

3. Pyun's remarks prompted in large part by his deep distress and consternation over Spaak's and Eden's acceptance Chou En-lai proposal closing hour final plenary. Pyun felt Spaak had "betrayed" 16 nation declaration. He explained his press remarks were no different those he had made in meetings of 16 and represented his firm convictions. Young pointed out his personal regret and disappointment such statements made public day after closing plenary characterized by good measure allied solidarity in declaration and successful efforts beat back clever Communist tactics obscure issues and prolong conference. Young pointed out Pyun's public statements would be interpreted as running counter to General Smith's statement in plenary on armistice which had successfully neutralized and turned back proposals of Molotov and Nam Il. Also pointed out to Pyun his statement was already being interpreted by press and other delegations as contradicting and undercutting declaration of 16. Pyun hoped answers to press would be helpful and not harmful.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-1754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 17, 1954—6 p. m.

Secto 466. Repeated information Ottawa 9, London 299, Tokyo 147, Bogota 6, Paris 453, Bangkok 28, Seoul 134. Re Secto 454.<sup>1</sup>

1. Drafting committee of 6 met today, June 17, and completed first working draft report to UN. Belgian, Ethiopian, Netherlands, Philip-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 16. p. 388

pine representatives also present. ROK delegate out of town. USDeI will pouch draft <sup>2</sup> to McClurkin.

2. Agreed to following procedure :

(a) No further meeting in Geneva ;

(b) Working draft will be sent 6 respective governments for comments ;

(c) Representatives of 6 will then meet in Washington finish preparation of report ;

(d) It will then be submitted to full committee of 15 and their governments for consideration and approval ;

(e) Completed report will be submitted to SYGUN at suitable time, i.e., 9th GA session.

Group felt this procedure might help keep 8th GA or special session Thailand resolution <sup>3</sup> from taking up Korean question.

3. Principal point today's discussion was armistice agreement. All representatives expressed considerable concern over Pyun's press remarks Wednesday on invalidation armistice. Owing to these remarks, Urrutia (Colombia) proposed and others supported adding General Smith's statement in 15th plenary (Secto 450 <sup>4</sup>) to report itself. They all stressed important report contains some reference to continued validity and effect of armistice agreement. Young reported briefly on Pyun's explanation and circumstances underlying his remarks (Secto 464 <sup>5</sup>) which had been made sharper in press versions than he had apparently intended. However, Young suggested and group agreed possible addition Smith's statement or short reference to armistice should be referred to delegations or governments, because it involved several important matters, before being incorporated in working draft at later stage.

4. Group also suggested ending report with hope expressed by Eden as chairman last plenary that day may soon come when task of conference can be carried through to successful conclusion. Agreed that this question, like one above, should be referred to delegations or governments of six and taken up later by Washington working group.

SMITH

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> For related documentation, see pp. 727 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed, but see footnote 6. p. 379.

<sup>5</sup> *Supra*.

---

*Smith-Molotov Meeting, Geneva, June 18, Evening: Editorial Note*

This meeting, which was held at Smith's request, was reported to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 202, June 19, from Geneva. Most of the discussion dealt with Indochina; for the complete text of

the telegram, see page 1189. Concerning Korea, Smith made the following brief comment:

“With regard to Korean phase, I had only to say that in reserving our position re final Chinese proposal had not implied to exclude Communist China from future discussions on Korean question. As matter of fact, China was belligerent there against UN and for practical reasons would have to be party to settlement.” (396.1 GE/6-1954)

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 295

*Memorandum by Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 23, 1954.

OUTLINE OF GENERAL SMITH'S REMARKS TO THE PRESIDENT AND  
BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL GROUP, 8:30 A. M.

1. General Smith spoke first of the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference, in which the US was as one of the belligerents a principal. He said that the US had maintained its principal positions:

1. The authority of the UN.
2. Good relations with the ROK.
3. Good relations with the other UN nations participating in Korea.
4. Demonstration that the failure to reach agreement was the fault of the Soviets.

He expected that the US would report to the UN, and that the existing situation would continue until some further conferences were held.

[Here follows the remainder of the document which dealt with Indochina; for text, see volume XIII.]

---

<sup>1</sup>The source text is a copy of the memorandum forwarded to Smith at the request of Cutler by Robert Bowie, Director of the Policy Planning Staff.

---

*Editorial Note*

On November 11, 1954, the 15 member nations contributing to the United Nations effort in Korea (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States) submitted their report on the Geneva Conference to the Ninth Session of the United Nations General Assembly. The text of the report is in United Nations document A/2786. It reiterated the points made in the Declaration of the Sixteen on United Nations authority and the need for free, supervised elections in Korea. noted

that the Communist delegations rejected these points, and stated that the Geneva Conference should be regarded as the political conference referred to in Article 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement and in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 711 (VII) of August 28, 1953. The report also specified that the failure of the Geneva Conference to solve the Korean question did not prejudice the armistice in Korea, which remained in effect. After debate, the Assembly adopted by a vote of 50 in favor (including the United States) to 5 opposed (Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.), with 4 abstentions (Burma, India, Indonesia, and Syria), Resolution 811 (IX), December 11, 1954, sponsored by the 15 powers, which approved the report on the Korean Political Conference.

For documentation on the report and its adoption by the United Nations General Assembly, see volume XV.

**THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDOCHINA**  
**May 8–July 21, 1954**



## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. NOTE ON SOURCES AND PRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FOR THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDOCHINA

#### 1. *The nature of the Conference*

The Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference began on May 8, the day after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, and continued until July 21. Although the line between the two sides was not as clearly drawn as it was in the Geneva Conference on Korea, the Geneva Conference on Indochina was essentially a two-sided affair. France and her allies, Cambodia, Laos, the State of Vietnam, the United Kingdom, and the United States, confronted three Communist Delegations, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet Union.

The negotiations which moved at a fairly steady rate of progress were carried out in formal plenary and restricted sessions and at many private meetings and social occasions. In addition to negotiating a settlement to the war in Indochina, the representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States engaged in considerable discussion on the question of collective security in Southeast Asia.

While the plenary sessions were not open to the public, statements and proposals made in these sessions were summarized in press briefings and in most instances the texts were made available to the press. The restricted sessions were closed entirely and only a very small amount of information on the deliberations was made available to the press.

#### 2. *Presentation of the material*

In compiling the documentation on the formal proceedings of the Geneva Conference on Indochina, telegraphic summaries were used to cover the plenary and restricted sessions, with footnote references to the verbatim or summary minutes of each session. Proposals and statements made in the sessions were handled in the same manner.

Except for the presentation of the final Conference documents, the documentation is set forth in strictly chronological order, with no topical breakdowns. Where telegraphic summaries of meetings were transmitted some time after the events, the documents were given an italic heading to show the time of the meeting and have been placed in the compilation at that time.

Because of the close interrelationship between the pre-Conference and Conference deliberations and the events in Indochina, volume XIII, Indochina, must be consulted. Additional relevant documentation is also included in volume VI, Western Europe; volume VII, Germany and Austria; and volume XII, East Asia and the Pacific.

### 3. *Unpublished sources*

The principal source of documentation in the Department of State central files is decimal file 396.1 GE (the Geneva Conference file). Some preliminary material is contained in file 396.1 BE (the Berlin Conference file), and additional papers are in the main decimal files for Indochina, 751G.00 and 751G.5.

Several Department of State lot files are important. The large, consolidated Conference file, lot 60 D 627, contains the best single collection of material on the Conference. Also of considerable value is a lot file of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, FE files, lot 60 D 330, and a lot file of the Policy Planning Staff, PPS files, lot 65 D 101.

In addition, various groups of files, in particular the papers of John Foster Dulles, in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas, contain considerable material on Indochina and the Geneva Conference.

### 4. *Published sources*

The minutes of the plenary and restricted sessions, proposals made by the delegations, and final documents adopted by the Conference on Indochina were printed in *Conférence de Genève sur L'Indochine (8 mai-21 juillet 1954)*, issued by the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères of France in 1955. Many of the proposals and statements made in the sessions were printed in two British White Papers, *Documents Relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, April 27-June 15, 1954* (Cmd. 9186, June 1954) and *Further Documents Relating to the Discussion of Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, June 16-July 21, 1954* (Cmd. 9239, August 1954).

Some materials which appear in this compilation were printed in the "Pentagon Papers"—United States Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967* (12 volumes; Washington, Government Printing Office, 1971).

A number of public pronouncements were printed in the Department of State *Bulletin* for 1954 and in the *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1960).

Two unofficial accounts of the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference are Philippe Devillers and Jean Lacouture, *End of a War: Indochina, 1954* (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1969) and Robert



F. Randle, *Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969). In addition, three works which contain considerable information on the Conference are Allan W. Cameron, *Viet-Nam Crisis: A Documentary History, Volume I, 1940-1956* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1971); Anthony Eden's memoirs, *Full Circle* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960); and Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953-1956* (Garden City, Doubleday, 1963). The Department of State assumes no responsibility for the accuracy of fact or interpretation in these unofficial publications.

#### B. LIST OF PAPERS PREPARED FOR THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDOCHINA

A Working Group on Indochina was set up to prepare position and background papers for the United States Delegation to the Geneva Conference. The Working Group was composed primarily of Department of State officials, although the Department of Defense was represented. Below are listed the final versions of the papers prepared for the Indochina phase of the Conference. In addition, papers and memoranda prepared for both the Korean and Indochinese phases of the Conference (the GKI series) are listed. Only one of these papers, GI D-7a, is printed in this volume. All of the papers, except GI D-3/1 which has not been located in the files of the Department of State, are in FE files, lot 60 D 330.

##### *Primary Papers*

- GI D-1a, March 24, Additional Aid for Indochina—Short of Combat Operations
- GI D-2, April 9, Terms of Reference for the U.S. Members of the Tripartite Working Group
- GI D-3a, March 22, Probable French position at Geneva and the Recommended U.S. Position to It
- GI D-3/1, (date undetermined) Probable French Position on Indochina at Geneva
- GI D-4a, March 24, Probable Soviet and Chinese Communist Objectives and Tactics on Indochina at Geneva
- GI D-5, March 18, U.S. Position on Possible Communist Proposals for Indochinese Settlement
- GI D-7a, March 24, U.S. Position on Participation in the Indochina Phase of the Geneva Conference
- GI D-8, March 22, Probable Position of the Associated States re Geneva
- GI D-9, March 18, Probable U.K. Position on Indochina at Geneva
- GI D-10a, March 24, U.S. Aid in Postwar Reconstruction of Indochina
- GI D-11, May 3, A Program for Cambodia and Laos

*Background and Contingency Papers*

- GI D-30a, March 25, Summary of the U.S. Aid Program in Indo-China
- GI D-31, March 29, Intelligence Estimate including the following: (a) Maximum information on the level and character of Chinese Communist aid to Vietminh; (b) Possibility of a Vietminh Air Force, including evidence of training and unusual deployment of aircraft in South China; (c) Any other form of Chinese Communist assistance of Vietminh; (d) The effect on the Vietminh war effort of cessation of aid from Communist China.
- GI D-32, April 1, Chronological History of Major Events in Indo-China since 1940
- GI D-33, April 7, History of U.S. Policy re Indochina since 1940
- GI D-34, April 12, Implementation of the July 3 Declaration, including Status of Current Franco-Viet Nam Negotiations in Paris
- GI D-36, May 3, The Problems of Implementing any Cease-Fire or Armistice in Indo-China Viewed in the Light of Our Experience in Korea

*Papers and Memoranda for Korean and Indochina Phases*

- GKI D-2, April 16, Basis of U.S. Policy Toward China
- GKI D-2/1, April 16, Formosa—A Non-Negotiable Subject
- GKI D-2/2, April 16, Mistreatment of Foreign Nationals & Interests in Communist China
- GKI D-2/3, April 16, Basis for U.S. Non-Recognition of Communist China and Opposition to Its Seating in the United Nations
- GKI D-2/4, April 13, Communist China as a Threat to Peace and Security in the Far East
- GKI D-2/5, April 16, Totalitarianism in Communist China
- GKI D-2/6, April 16, Need for Trade Restrictions Against Communist China
- GKI D-2/7, April 16, U.S. Mutual Security Arrangements in the Pacific
- GKI D-2/8, April 19, U.S. Policy and Actions with Respect to Formosa
- GKI D-2/9, April 19, Negotiating for Release of Americans Detained in Communist China
- GKI D-3, March 24, Performance vs. Promise in Communist Bloc Diplomacy
- GKI D-4, March 24, Probable Communist Position and Tactics at the Korean Political Conference at Geneva
- GKI D-4/1, April 9, Probable Soviet and Chinese Communist Objectives and Tactics at Geneva with Special Reference to Indo-China
- GKI D-5, April 6, Exploitation of Communist Bloc Weakness at Geneva
- GKI D-5/1, April 6, The Sino-Soviet Relation and Its Potential Sources of Differences
- GKI D-6a, April 17, Possible Communist Proposal for a Far East Security Pact

- GKI D-7, April 14, U.S. Propaganda Policy for the Geneva Conference
- GKI D-8, April 17, American Citizens Detained in the USSR
- GKI D-9, April 30, The "United Front" in Asian Communist Tactics
- GKI D-10, May 4, Possible Interrelation of Communist Proposals in Korea and Indochina
- GKI Memo 1, March 12. Memorandum on Preparations
- GKI Memo 2, March 25, Administrative and Technical Arrangements
- GKI Memo 2/1, March 30, Administrative and Technical Arrangements
- GKI Memo 2/2, April 26, Exchange of Communications with Soviets on Arrangements for Geneva Conference
- GKI Memo 2/3, May 6, Berlin Communiqué, Invitations to Our Side, Exchange of Notes and *Aide-Mémoire* with the Soviets
- GKI Memo 3a, April 20, List of Papers Related to Both Phases
- GKI Memo 4, April 14. Reference Documentation
- GKI Memo 5, April 26, Invitations to Geneva Conference and Berlin Communiqué

#### C. SCHEDULE OF PLENARY AND RESTRICTED SESSIONS ON INDOCHINA

The restricted sessions were less formal than the plenary sessions and thus were more conducive to substantive discussion. There were few of the lengthy formal statements which were characteristic of the plenary sessions. Principal statements were made in the restricted sessions and these are listed.

*May 8.* First plenary session, Eden presiding. Statements by Eden (United Kingdom), Bidault (France), Pham Van Dong (Democratic Republic of Vietnam), Smith (United States), Chou En-lai (People's Republic of China), Molotov (Soviet Union), Sam Sary (Cambodia), and Phoui Sananikone (Laos). Convened at 4:35 p. m., adjourned at 7:40 p. m.

*May 10.* Second plenary session, Molotov presiding. Statements by Pham Van Dong, Nguyen Quoc Dinh (State of Vietnam), Tep Phan (Cambodia), Phoui Sananikone, Eden, and Smith. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 6:40 p. m.

*May 12.* Third plenary session, Eden presiding. Statements by Tep Phan, Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Chou En-lai, Eden, Smith, Phoui Sananikone, Bidault, Pham Van Dong, Tep Phan, and Molotov. Convened at 3:05 p. m., adjourned at 5:35 p. m.

*May 14.* Fourth plenary session, Molotov presiding. Statements by Molotov, Bidault, and Tep Phan. Convened at 3:03 p. m., adjourned at 6:05 p. m.

*May 17.* First restricted session, Eden presiding. Statements by Bidault, Pham Van Dong, Smith, Molotov, and Phoui Sananikone. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 6:15 p. m.

*May 18.* Second restricted session, Molotov presiding. Statements by Phoui Sananikone, Tep Phan, Pham Van Dong, Bidault, Eden, Smith,

Chou En-lai, Nguyen Quoc Dinh, and Molotov. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 6: 15 p. m.

*May 19.* Third restricted session, Eden presiding. Statements by Smith, Bidault, Pham Van Dong, Tep Phan, Phoui Sananikone, and Chou En-lai. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 6: 30 p. m.

*May 21.* Fourth restricted session, Molotov presiding. Statements by Bidault, Pham Van Dong, Tep Phan, and Molotov. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 7: 15 p. m.

*May 24.* Fifth restricted session, Eden presiding. Statements by Bidault, Smith, Pham Van Dong, Phoui Sananikone, Nguyen Quoc Dinh, and Molotov. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 7: 10 p. m.

*May 25.* Sixth restricted session, Molotov presiding. Statements by Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Pham Van Dong, Bidault, Smith, and Molotov. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 7: 15 p. m.

*May 27.* Seventh restricted session, Eden presiding. Statements by Bidault, Chou En-lai, and Nguyen Quoc Dinh. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 5: 15 p. m.

*May 29.* Eighth restricted session, Molotov presiding. Statements by Pham Van Dong, Tep Phan, Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Smith, and Molotov. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 7 p. m.

*May 31.* Ninth restricted session, Eden presiding. Statements by Smith, Chou En-lai, Tep Phan, Gromyko (Soviet Union), and Bidault. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 7 p. m.

*June 2.* Tenth restricted session, Molotov presiding. Statements by Smith, Chou En-lai, Bidault, Eden, Pham Van Dong, and Molotov. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 6: 55 p. m.

*June 3.* Eleventh restricted session, Eden presiding. Statements by Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Bidault, Smith, Chou En-lai, and Pham Van Dong. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 7 p. m.

*June 4.* Twelfth restricted session, Molotov presiding. Statements by Tep Phan, Eden, Molotov, and Bidault. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 7 p. m.

*June 8.* Fifth plenary session, Eden presiding. Statements by Bidault, Pham Van Dong, Tep Phan, Molotov, Eden, and Smith. Convened at 3: 03 p. m., adjourned at 7: 50 p. m.

*June 9.* Sixth plenary session, Molotov presiding. Statements by Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Phoui Sananikone, Chou En-lai, and Smith. Convened at 3: 05 p. m., adjourned at 7: 15 p. m.

*June 10.* Seventh plenary session, Eden presiding. Statements by Eden, Tep Phan, Pham Van Dong, Molotov, Phoui Sananikone, Nguyen Quoc Dinh, and Smith. Convened at 3: 03 p. m., adjourned at 7 p. m.

*June 14.* Thirteenth restricted session, Molotov presiding. Statements by Molotov, Smith, Chauvel (France), Chou En-lai, and Pham Van Dong. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 7: 15 p. m.

*June 16.* Fourteenth restricted session, Eden presiding. Statements by Tep Phan, Phoui Sananikone, Chou En-lai, Pham Van Dong, Chauvel, and Molotov. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 7: 30 p. m.

*June 18.* Fifteenth restricted session, Molotov presiding. Statements by Robertson (United States), Tep Phan, Chou En-lai, Phoui Sananikone, Pham Van Dong, Chauvel, and Molotov. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 7: 20 p. m.

*June 19.* Sixteenth restricted session, Eden presiding. Statements by Chauvel, Tep Phan, Phoui Sananikone, Smith, Molotov, and Eden. Convened at 6:45 p. m., adjourned at 9 p. m.

*June 22.* Seventeenth restricted meeting, Novikov (Soviet Union) presiding. Statements by Chauvel, Li Ke-nung (People's Republic of China), Johnson (United States), Lord Reading (United Kingdom), Pham Van Dong, Sam Sary, Buu Kinh (State of Vietnam), and Novikov. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 7:20 p. m.

*June 25.* Eighteenth restricted session, Lamb (United Kingdom) presiding. Statements by Sam Sary, Chauvel, Kuznetsov (Soviet Union), and Li Ke-nung. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 6:30 p. m.

*June 29.* Nineteenth restricted session, Kuznetsov presiding. Statements by Pham Van Dong, Johnson, Chauvel, and Sam Sary. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 5:45 p. m.

*July 2.* Twentieth restricted session, Lamb presiding. Statements by Lamb, Chauvel, Kuznetsov, and Pham Van Dong. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 5:40 p. m.

*July 6.* Twenty-first restricted session, Kuznetsov presiding. Statements by Li Ke-nung, Chauvel, Sam Sary, and Kamphan Panya (Laos). Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 5 p. m.

*July 9.* Twenty-second restricted session, Lamb presiding. Statements by Johnson, Li Ke-nung, Pham Van Dong, Chauvel, Sam Sary, and Kuznetsov. Convened at 3 p. m., adjourned at 6:15 p. m.

*July 18.* Twenty-third restricted session, Molotov presiding. Statements by Molotov, Tran Van Do (State of Vietnam), and Smith. Convened at 4 p. m., adjourned at 4:45 p. m.

*July 21.* Eighth plenary session, Eden presiding. Statements by Tran Van Do, Mendès-France (France), Eden, Tep Phan, Smith, Molotov, Pham Van Dong, Chou En-lai, and Phoui Sananikone. Convened at 3:10 p. m., adjourned at 5:20 p. m.

#### D. LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDOCHINA

The delegation lists are filed in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 299 and CF 302.

##### *United States*

Headquarters—Hotel du Rhone, Geneva

##### *United States Representatives*

April 26–May 3—John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State

May 3–June 20—Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State

June 20–July 17—U. Alexis Johnson, Ambassador to Czechoslovakia

July 17–July 21—Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State

##### *Deputy United States Representative*

Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, May 8–June 20 (For the period April 26–May 8 Mr. Robertson was listed as a Special Adviser to the United States Delegation.)

*Special Assistants to the United States Representatives*

Roderic L. O'Connor, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State  
 Richard V. Hennes, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State

*Coordinator*

U. Alexis Johnson, Ambassador to Czechoslovakia (For the period July 17-21 Ambassador Johnson was listed as Deputy United States Representative and Delegation Coordinator.)

*Special Advisers*

Theodore Achilles, Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission, United States Embassy, Paris

Robert R. Bowie, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Arthur C. Davis, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy, Director, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense

Donald R. Heath, Ambassador to Cambodia and Vietnam and Minister to Laos

Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor of the Department of State

Carl W. McCardle, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of State

Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State

Edward Page, Jr., Counselor of Embassy and Deputy Director for Political Affairs in the United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Council, Paris

Herman Phleger, Legal Adviser, Department of State

George Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor of Embassy, United States Embassy, Paris

*Advisers*

John Anspacher, Chief, Program Planning Staff, United States High Commissioner for Germany, Bonn

Philip W. Bonsal, Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State (In June Mr. Bonsal became a Special Adviser to the Delegation.)

John A. Calhoun, First Secretary and Consul, United States Embassy, Seoul

John Daley, Brigadier General, U.S.A., former Chief of Staff, U.N. Military Armistice Commission, Korea

Robert G. Ferguson, Colonel, U.S.A., Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense

Franklin C. Gowen, United States Representative for International Conferences and Consul, Geneva

John Hamilton, Deputy Assistant Director for Policy and Programs, United States Information Agency

Louis Henkin, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State

Alfred leS. Jenkins, Officer in Charge, Political Affairs, Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State

John Keppel, Second Secretary and Consul, United States Embassy, Moscow

James F. King, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

Edwin W. Martin, Deputy Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State

Robert H. McBride, Officer in Charge of French-Iberian Affairs, Department of State

Charles C. Stelle, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State

Charles A. Sullivan, Chief, American and Far East Division, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense (In May Mr. Sullivan became a Special Adviser to the Delegation.)

Ray L. Thurston, Deputy Director and later Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State

Kenneth T. Young, Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State

*Experts (Research and Reference Officers)*

Philip E. Barringer, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense

Robert Blake, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State

Chester L. Cooper, Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State (In July Mr. Cooper became an Adviser to the Delegation.)

Vladimir De Grave, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State

Walter Drew, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State

John E. Dwan, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A., Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense (In June Colonel Dwan became an Adviser to the Delegation.)

John L. Getz, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State (In June Mr. Getz became an Adviser to the Delegation.)

Wilburn N. Huston, Colonel, U.S.A., Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Donald Kallet, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A., United States Embassy, Saigon

Robert C. Taber, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A., Assistant Army Attaché, United States Embassy, Saigon

Joseph A. Yager, Chief, Division of Research for the Far East, Department of State (In June Mr. Yager became an Adviser to the Delegation.)

*Press Officer*

Henry Suydam, Chief, News Division, Department of State

*Assistants to the Press Officer*

John P. McKnight, United States Information Agency, Rome

Edward Savage, United States Information Agency, Stuttgart  
(From June 23-July 17 Mr. Savage was listed as the Press Officer for the Delegation.)

*Deputy Coordinators and Secretaries of the Delegation*

April 26-June 9-Basil Capella, Executive Director, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State

June 9-July 17-Henry F. Nicol, Conference Attaché, United States Resident Delegation to International Organizations, Geneva

July 17-July 21-Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Deputy Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

*Special Assistant to the Deputy Coordinators and Secretaries of the Delegation*

Henry F. Nicol, Conference Attaché, United States Resident Delegation to International Organizations, Geneva

*Technical Secretaries*

Morris Draper, Jr., Executive Secretariat, Department of State

Walter Trulock, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

Christopher Van Hollen, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

*Reports Officers*

Robert Ekvald, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A., Department of Defense

William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Executive Secretariat, Department of State (In June Mr. Gleysteen was listed as Technical Secretary and Reports Officer to the Delegation.)

Robert Gordon, Executive Secretariat, Department of State



William P. Harris, Staff of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Bonn

*Administrative Officer*

Mason A. LaSelle, Deputy Conference Attaché, United States Resident Delegation to International Organizations, Geneva

*Deputy Administrative Officer and General Services Officer*

Max L. Shimp, Staff of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Bonn

*Documents Officer*

Mary Tsouvalas, Division of Foreign Reporting, Department of State

*Communications Officers*

Earl K. Newton, Office of Communications and Records, Department of State

William P. Richmond, Regional Communications Supervisor, United States Embassy, Paris

*Indochina Working Group*

Donald R. Heath, Chairman

Theodore Achilles

Robert Blake

Philip W. Bonsal

Chester L. Cooper

John Daley

Robert G. Ferguson

John Hamilton

Edwin W. Martin

Robert H. McBride

Charles C. Stelle

Charles A. Sullivan

Robert C. Taber

Ray L. Thurston

Joseph A. Yager

*Cambodia*

Headquarters—Hotel des Bergues, Geneva

Tep Phan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Head of the Delegation

Nong Kimny, Ambassador to the United States, Delegate

Sam Sary, Personal Delegate of the King of Cambodia

Son Sann, Former Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President of the Council of Ministers and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Delegate

Poc Thieun, Secretary General of the Office of the Cambodian Royal High Commission in Paris, Secretary of the Delegation  
 Nhiék Tioulong, General, Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of the Khmer National Armed Forces, Head of the Cambodian Military Delegation at the Conference

*Democratic Republic of Vietnam*

Headquarters—Villa “Les Cèdres,” Versoix

Pham Van Dong, Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Head of the Delegation

Phan Anh, Minister for Industry and Commerce, Delegate

Tran Cong Tuong, Vice Minister of Justice, Delegate and Translator

Hoang Van Hoan, Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China, Delegate

Ta Quang Buu, Vice Minister of Defense, Delegate and Head of the DRV Military Delegation

Nguyen Thanh Le, Liaison Officer of the Delegation

*France*

Headquarters—Villa “Le Bocage,” Geneva

Georges Bidault, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Head of the Delegation, April 26–June 18

Pierre Mendès-France, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Head of the Delegation, June 19–July 21 (During Mendès-France’s occasional absences from Geneva in June and July, Ambassador Jean Chauvel was in charge of the Delegation.)

Maurice Schumann, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Chief of the Delegation

Marc Jacquet, Secretary of State for Relations with the Associated States, July 1953–June 1954, Delegate

Edouard Frédéric-Dupont, Secretary of State for Relations with the Associated States in June, Delegate

Guy La Chambre, Secretary of State for Relations with the Associated States after June, Delegate

Jean Chauvel, Ambassador to Switzerland, Delegate

Alexandre Parodi, Ambassador and Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Delegate

Guy le Roy de la Tournelle, Minister Plenipotentiary and Director General for Political and Economic Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Assistant Delegate

Roland Jacquin de Margerie, Minister Plenipotentiary and Assistant Director for Political and Economic Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Assistant Delegate

- Georges Boris, Counselor of State and member of the personal cabinet of Prime Minister Mendès-France after June 19, Assistant Delegate
- Vincent Broustra, Minister Plenipotentiary and Director of the Conference Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Assistant Delegate
- Francis Lacoste, Minister Plenipotentiary, Assistant Delegate
- Pierre-Louis Falaize, Minister Plenipotentiary and Director of the Office of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Assistant Delegate
- André Gros, Legal Adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Assistant Delegate
- Jacques Baeyens, Minister Plenipotentiary and Chief of the Press and Information Service, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Assistant Delegate
- Jean Wolfrom, Minister Plenipotentiary, Assistant Delegate
- Jacques Roux, Minister Plenipotentiary and Director of the Asian Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Assistant Delegate
- Raymond Offroy, Ambassador to Thailand, Assistant Delegate
- Robert Tezenas du Montcel, Director General, Office of the Secretary of State for Relations with the Associated States, Assistant Delegate
- Jean L. Laloy, Counselor to the Delegation
- Henri Deltiel, Brigadier General, Counselor to the Delegation and Head of the French Union Military Delegation at the Conference
- Michel de Brebisson, Colonel, Chief of the Special Staff of the Secretary of State for Relations with the Associated States, Counselor to the Delegation and member of the French Union Military Delegation at the Conference
- Alexandre de Manziarly, Consul General in Geneva, Counselor to the Delegation
- Jacques Guillermaz, Colonel, Counselor to the Delegation and member of the French Union Military Delegation at the Conference
- Bernard Toussaint, Representative to the European Office of the United Nations, Expert to the Delegation
- Jean Benard, Deputy Director of the Information and Press Service, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Expert to the Delegation
- Jacques de Folin, Principal Private Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Expert to the Delegation
- Claude Cheysson, Assistant Principal Private Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Expert to the Delegation
- Léone Georges-Picot, Assistant Principal Private Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Expert to the Delegation

*Laos*

Headquarters—Villa "Le Lignon," Aire, Geneva

Phoui Sananikone, Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior and of Foreign Relations, Head of the Delegation

Prince Tiao Khammao, Chief Representative of the King of Laos to the President of the French Union in Paris, Delegate

Ourot Souvannavong, Minister to the United States, Delegate

Thao Lenam, First Secretary of the Laotian Delegation in Bangkok, Delegate

Khamphan Panya, Deputy Secretary General to the Council of the French Union in Paris, Delegate

*People's Republic of China*

Liaison Office of the Delegation—Hotel Beau Rivage, Geneva

Chou En-lai, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Head of the Delegation (During Chou En-lai's absence from Geneva in June and July, Li Ke-nung was in charge of the Delegation.)

Chang Wen-tien, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Delegate

Wang Chia-hsiang, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Delegate

Li Ke-nung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Delegate

Wang Ping-nan, Director of the Staff Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Secretary General of the Delegation

Lei Jen-min, Vice Minister of External Trade, Adviser to the Delegation

Huang Hua, Counselor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Adviser to and Spokesman for the Delegation

Chen Chia-kang, Director of the Department of Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Adviser to the Delegation

Ko Pai-nien, Director of the Department of American and Australian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Adviser to the Delegation

Shih Che, Member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Adviser to the Delegation

Huan Hsiang, Director of the Department of West European and African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Adviser to the Delegation

Kung Peng, Director of the Information Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Adviser to the Delegation

Lei Ying-fu, Counselor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Adviser to the Delegation

Wang Cho-ju, Chief of Protocol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Adviser to the Delegation

*State of Vietnam*

Headquarters—Bella Vista, Bellevue-Genthod

Nguyen Trung Vinh, Vice President of the Council of Ministers, Head of the Delegation for part of May

Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Minister of Foreign Affairs until June 16, Delegate (Sometime in May, precise date undetermined, Dinh assumed responsibility as Head of the Delegation.)

Tran Van Do, Minister of Foreign Affairs after June 16, Head of the Delegation, June 16–July 21

Tran Van Chuong, Minister of State for the State of Vietnam after June, Delegate

Nguyen Dac Khe, Minister of Democratization, Delegate and Deputy Chief of the Delegation after June 16

Nguyen Duy Thanh, Counselor to the Delegation

Truong Van Chinh, Counselor to the Delegation

Tran Van Tuyen, Counselor to the Delegation

Buu Kinh, Counselor of the Assembly of the French Union and the State of Vietnam's Official Observer at the United Nations in New York, Counselor to the Delegation

Doan Thuan, Counselor of Foreign Affairs, Secretary General of the Delegation

Nguyen Huu Quy, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Secretary General of the Delegation

Nguyen Huu Chau, Official in the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem, Delegate

Le Quang Trieu, Colonel, Armed Forces Attaché at the Embassy of the State of Vietnam in Washington, Delegate

Dinh Xuan Kieu, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Secretary General of the Delegation

*Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*

The lists of delegations in Department of State files do not indicate the Soviet delegates' positions at the Geneva Conference with the exception of Molotov, Soldatov, Lavrishchev, and Troyanovsky.

Headquarters—Hotel Metropole, Geneva

V. M. Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Head of the Delegation (During Molotov's absence from Geneva in June and July, V.V. Kuznetsov was in charge of the Delegation.)

A. A. Gromyko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

V. V. Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

- L. F. Ilyichev, Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- N. T. Fedorenko, Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- P. F. Yudin, Ambassador to the People's Republic of China
- S. P. Suzdalev, Ambassador to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
- G. N. Zaroubin, Ambassador to the United States
- S. A. Vinogradov, Ambassador to France
- F. F. Molochkov, Minister to Switzerland
- K. V. Novikov, Head of the Southeast Asia Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- A. A. Soldatov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Secretary General to the Delegation
- F. A. Fedenko, Counselor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- A. A. Lavrishchev, Head of the First European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Secretary General to the Delegation
- D. A. Zhukov, Head of the Protocol Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- O. A. Troyanovsky, Interpreter for the Delegation

*United Kingdom*

The lists of delegations in Department of State files do not indicate the British delegates' positions at the Geneva Conference with the exception of Eden and Monckton.

Headquarters—Villa "Les Ormeaux," Geneva

Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Head of the Delegation (During Eden's absence from Geneva in June and July, Lord Reading and Sir Lionel H. Lamb, Ambassador of the United Kingdom to Switzerland, were in charge of the Delegation.)

The Marquis of Reading (Lord Reading), Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

Harold A. Caccia, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for Administration

William Dennis Allen, Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Humphrey Trevelyan, Chargé d'Affaires at Peking

Walter G. C. Graham, Minister to the Republic of Korea

Charles A. E. Shuckburgh, Principal Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs after May

Francis A. Vallat, Deputy Legal Adviser, British Foreign Office

- John G. Tahourdin, Head of the Southeast Asia Department, British Foreign Office
- John D. Priestman, Assistant Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
- Donald James Maitland, Private Secretary to the Minister of State, British Foreign Office
- James E. Cable, Southeast Asia Department, British Foreign Office
- John M. Addis, Southeast Asia Department, British Foreign Office
- Julian L. Bullard, Far Eastern Department, British Foreign Office
- Richard A. Sykes, Northern Department, British Foreign Office
- John F. Ford, Research Department, British Foreign Office
- G. W. R. Monckton, Lieutenant Colonel, Military Adviser to the Delegation
- Anthony Rumbold, Principal Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
- C. D. W. O'Neill, Head of the News Department, British Foreign Office
- A. A. S. Stark, Assistant Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

II. PRE-CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS: EFFORTS TO PREVENT PORTRAYAL AS A FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE; QUESTION OF ASSOCIATED STATES AND VIET MINH PARTICIPATION; FRENCH CONDITIONS FOR CEASE-FIRE AND POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS; UNITED ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA; PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONFERENCE; POSITION PAPERS; PROCEDURAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS (FEBRUARY 19–MAY 7)

*Editorial Note*

From January 25 to February 18, the Foreign Ministers of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States held a Four-Power Conference at Berlin to discuss questions concerning Korea, Indochina, Germany, Austria, European security, and disarmament.

For documentation subsequent to the Berlin Conference with particular respect to the Soviet Union's proposal that a five-power conference (the four Berlin Conference powers plus the People's Republic of China) should be convened to consider restoring peace in Indochina, see pages 14 ff; for additional documentation on this subject, see volume XIII. For full documentation on the Berlin Conference, see volume VII.

Unpublished material on the Berlin Conference, including background papers on aspects of the Indochina problem, is in Department of State Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 188–216.

A Department of State publication, *Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25–February 18, 1954*, issued in March 1954, contains texts of major statements made at the Berlin Conference, texts of all proposals discussed, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' February 24 Report to the Nation on the Conference, and other related materials.



396.1 BE/2-2454

*Department of State Press Release*

No. 84

WASHINGTON, February 19, 1954.

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS AT BERLIN, FEBRUARY 18, 1954<sup>1</sup>

A meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, Mr. John Foster Dulles, M. Georges Bidault, Mr. Anthony Eden, and M. Vyacheslav Molotov, took place in Berlin between January 25 and February 18, 1954. They reached the following agreements:

## (A)

The Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting in Berlin,

*Considering* that the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united and independent Korea would be an important factor in reducing international tension and in restoring peace in other parts of Asia,

*Propose* that a conference of representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic, the Republic of Korea, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, and other countries the armed forces of which participated in the hostilities in Korea and which desire to attend shall meet in Geneva on April 26 for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question;

*Agree* that the problem of restoring peace in Indochina will also be discussed at the conference, to which representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic and other interested states will be invited.

*It is understood* that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded.

[Here follows the portion of the communiqué dealing with disarmament, Germany, Austria, and European security; for the full text of the communiqué, see volume VII.]

---

<sup>1</sup>The communiqué was sent to Washington in telegram Secto 171, Feb. 18, repeated to London as telegram 191, to Paris as telegram 219, to Bonn as telegram 1048, to Vienna as telegram 113, to CINCEUR as telegram 62, and to Moscow unnumbered. (396.1 BE/2-1854)

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

BERLIN, February 19, 1954—3 a. m.

Secto 177. For Robertson and Bonbright from McConaughy. We have frustrated Communist five-power effort and obtained agreement to conference on Korea essentially on our own terms.

I hope you can prevail on press not to portray Geneva conference erroneously as five-power gathering.

Unconditional commitment to discuss Indochina at same conference may give us trouble, although it does not compromise any basic principle and was made inescapable by pressure on Bidault. We have a difficult negotiation ahead of us.

Believe we should start now to insure participation of Thailand and Philippines in Indochina phase of conference as well as Korea phase. Early recognition of Associated States<sup>1</sup> by Philippines and if possible by other states of Southeast Asia increasingly imperative. Strong anti-Communist participation of Associated States in conference must be actively sought.

Arriving home 21st.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

396.1 GE/2-2354

*Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] February 23, 1954.

Subject: Preparations for Geneva Political Conference.

*Discussion:*

To plan efficiently for the Geneva Conference, I suggest that you designate an officer of the Department to coordinate all preparations. Perhaps Douglas MacArthur would be the appropriate man.

I would also recommend that two small task forces be set up for substantive preparations. One, on Korea, might be steered by UNP, with NA, CA and EE participating. The other, on Indo-China, could be steered by PSA, with CA, WE, EE and UNP participating.

The Division of International Conferences will provide the usual administrative support.

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Popper of UNP.

*Recommendation:*

That you approve the foregoing designations.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Approved by the Secretary. Handwritten notation on source text indicated that Secretary Dulles wanted Kenneth T. Young of NA for Korea and for MacArthur to pick someone for Indochina with Robertson's approval. Philip W. Bonsal of PSA was designated for Indochina (see the memorandum, p. 425).

---

751G.00/2-2454 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, February 24, 1954—7 p. m.

3050. Repeated information Saigon 332. Foreign Office made following comment on opening session permanent committee High Council French Union February 23:

Principal event was presentation by Bidault of developments at Berlin leading to Geneva conference and assurances given by him in presence Coty (presiding) to representatives Associated States that French position for Geneva would be prepared with concurrence Associated States and that no decision would be taken at Geneva without their approval. Representatives Associated States appeared well satisfied with Bidault's report and results obtained by him re Geneva.

Question participation Associated States at Geneva not discussed at yesterday's meeting nor is it expected this subject will be decided during balance committee session. Although French Government position this regard likely be determined in large measure by US views, Foreign Office inclined view participation Associated States undesirable since this could lead seating Viet Minh. Associated States aware this possibility and may well not press for participation for this reason.

ACHILLES

---

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Indochina"

*Memorandum by Edmund A. Gullion of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of That Staff (Bowie)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 24, 1954.

Subject: Negotiations on Far Eastern Questions at Geneva.

In this paper I explain my misgivings, some of which I know you share, about the effect of the announcement of Geneva and about the possible results of a negotiated settlement in Indochina. A suggestion for further discussion with the French is included at the end of the paper.

## I. *The Impact of the Announcement*

### 1. *In the United States*

During the Berlin Conference, public and Congressional opinion at home was occupied with the discussion of how to strengthen the effort in Indochina (the O'Daniel Mission;<sup>1</sup> Secretary Wilson's press statement, etc.). The announcement of imminent negotiations comes to many as a surprise.

The inconsistency cannot be entirely explained by saying that fighting will go on until a better bargaining position is obtained: the conference is to take place before any appreciable improvement in the French Union military position can occur.

There may be some difficult questions to answer to Congress or elsewhere with respect to the purposes of our aid to France. We decided to increase our contribution by another \$385,000,000 on the basis of French assurances that this should enable us to win a decisive victory, not merely to "improve our bargaining position".

### 2. *In France*

It will be very difficult to mobilize French opinion in full support of the war once it has been relaxed and beguiled by the prospects of a compromise peace. M. Bidault may believe, and no doubt has told us, that he cannot afford to appear unreceptive to any possibility of ending the war, but I believe the mere announcement of negotiation will set in motion forces which cannot be reversed. We and M. Bidault are both embarked upon a slippery slope.

It seems to me that the French military effort in Indochina (the Laniel-Navarre Plan)<sup>2</sup> has been seriously compromised. Its objectives have been subtly modified to the attainment of a "better bargaining position" rather than a real victory. Although the French Army is a professional one, its will for the offensive is bound to be somewhat inhibited by the prospect of negotiations.

It may have been argued that negotiations could be carried on without giving up any vital position in Indochina, and that this was necessary in order to ensure French ratification of EDC.<sup>3</sup> I fear that the opposite may be the case. With the prospect of the conference and an

---

<sup>1</sup> See "Report of U.S. Special Mission to Indochina," Feb. 5, 1954, by Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel, the Chief of Mission, in *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 (The Pentagon Papers)* (House Committee on Armed Services, committee print, 1971), Book 9, pp. 246-258.

<sup>2</sup> General Navarre's plan called for adopting a defensive strategy north of the 18th Parallel throughout the 1953-1954 campaign and for attempting to clear the zones held by the Viet Minh south of the 18th Parallel during the spring and summer of 1954. In the fall of 1954 he would launch a general offensive north of the 18th Parallel in an effort to exert sufficient pressure whereby France and the Associated States could obtain, through negotiations, a settlement of the Indochina conflict on the best possible terms.

<sup>3</sup> For documentation on the proposed establishment of a European Defense Community, see volume v.

end of the war, the French may defer all urgency in EDC. And if the war in Indochina should be settled, I believe that the French, instead of building up EDC or NATO, will go in for a period of "normalcy" and a general relaxing of effort.

We must also reckon with the effect on France of offers from India to mediate or to promote an armistice.

### 3. *In Vietnam*

It is in Indochina where the announcement of the negotiations is of critical importance. Here I think we should be prepared for trouble, including military defections and the appearance of islands of armed neutralism. Although the Vietnamese who have collaborated with the French and ourselves have for years suspected that the French would "sell them out", I fear this development has taken them by surprise. They are not likely to be impressed with the theory that negotiations in order to conciliate French parliamentary opinion can be undertaken without loss to themselves or to their territory. Regardless of the outcome of negotiations, the Vietnamese are bound to fear either

- a) the emergence of coalition governments eventually dominated by the Communists, or
- b) a partition.

Leaders and organized groups will now begin to make their arrangements in accordance with the way in which such an outcome would affect them. Those who have worked with us and the French may scurry for cover in fear of Viet Minh retribution; others may defect to the Viet Minh, and still others, perhaps the Cao Dai, may decide to play a lone and desperate game against the Vietnamese, the French, or the Americans who would urge a negotiated peace.

Most Vietnamese would prefer free elections or some accommodation with Ho Chi Minh to a partition of the country. In the latter, they would see the negation of independence, which to them has been tantamount to unification of the country. Moreover, they would fear the transformation of their country into another Korea if the UN attempted to guarantee the line against the north.

I am not sure, however, that partition would not be the French choice if public opinion forced them to sue for peace.

- a) It has an historical basis, both post-Potsdam and in the colonial era.
- b) A beachhead could be preserved in the hope that the world situation might improve, or the Communist Chinese regime might fall or something else might turn up somewhere.
- c) The principal French economic and cultural preserves would be retained. (The looming of partition is one possible explanation for the composition of the government recently installed under Prince Buoloc [*Buu Loc*] with a majority of Cochin-Chinese at a time when the new

Cabinet was expected to be one of national union, headed by men from the north.)

The effect of these prospects upon the formation of the Vietnamese Army and upon the process of incorporating in it irregulars and the troops of the armed sects is obvious. At best the Army will become increasingly passive, looking upon itself merely as a guarantee against French return; at worst, elements of it may point their guns the wrong way.

## II. *The Hypotheses of Negotiation*

In preparing our position for the negotiations, we must be fully aware of the possible pitfalls in the various hypotheses. As I see them, they are the following:

### 1. *Cessation of arms aid by both sides*

This might emerge as the minimum area of agreement, or the only proposition upon which the Chinese, the Viet Minh and the French might agree, together with whatever representatives of the Associated States the French are able to persuade to be present. It might be considered independently of territorial settlements, political arrangements, or supervised elections. Our side or the French might propose cessation of Chinese aid without promising to halt aid on our side. The Viet Minh are most unlikely to accept such a proposition unless it is accompanied by other very solid concessions in the way of political or territorial settlements. Let us assume, therefore, that arms aid would stop on both sides. All other things being equal, I am not confident that our side could win. The Viet Minh fought the war very effectively without Chinese aid for some three or four years, using mere pickup stocks. From about 1950 on, our aid to the Associated States was scores of times greater in tonnage than Chinese aid to the Viet Minh; we had more men under arms, better communications, and a great food supply base in our territory. Yet all this superiority has not been translated into offensive gains by our side. Moreover, the Viet Minh travels "light" while we travel "heavy". If our arms aid ceased, the war machine in Indochina might clank to a halt for want of gasoline, bombs, ammunition, spare parts and servicing.

I stress this point because in the various hypothetical peace settlements many persons are prone to assume that if only Chinese aid were interrupted, our problems would be solved. Even if arms aid were stopped, we should make certain that this actually meant a closed frontier. As it is, the enemy can make very effective use of the fire-power he has, because he has a secure base and a line of communications in China itself.

2. *An overall settlement, probably including stipulations with respect to cessation of aid*

a) This might take the form of a cease-fire to be followed by an interval of recuperation and consolidation, to be followed in turn by supervised elections. There might be either a provisional coalition government, or the elections might result in a coalition government. To my mind, this is the most dangerous possibility for us while it is the solution most likely to be favored *in extremis* by the Associated States, or whoever claims to speak for them. Here it must be recalled that, unfortunately, to a great number of Indochinese in both loyal and rebel zones, the French are still the principal enemy. A real understanding of the nature of the Viet Minh or of the changes that have come over the Viet Minh since 1945 has only slowly gained headway. The spirit of the Vietnamese Army is still not such as would drive it to exterminate its compatriots in the Viet Minh Army. The consequences of this psychology, the enormously heightened prestige of Ho Chi Minh as the victor and a desire to ride with the "wave of the future" would, in my opinion, promptly lead to consolidation of all of Vietnam under the Communists, with the subversion of all of South-east Asia to follow thereafter.

b) "*Buying Time*"

Obviously, our side would strive for an arrangement which would defer elections until we had been able to make effective propaganda and until arms and troops were disposed in the best possible positions. We would try to phase out any withdrawal of French troops over a long period. Yet we must not delude ourselves that time would not be working equally strongly (if not more strongly) for the enemy for the reasons already cited. Moreover, the Viet Minh are apt to make stringent stipulations about the withdrawal of French troops as the price of any settlement. The French would find it hard to resist especially since they know that the dwindling rearguard will always be in mortal danger.

3. *A Partition of Indochina*

I have already cited some of the consequences of this solution.

The first problem would be to achieve any basic line of demarcation. If this were to run, say, along the 16th Parallel, (which was the line dividing the Chinese Zone from the Franco-British Zone, post-Potsdam), it would leave above the line the key to the whole of South-east Asia in the Tonkin Delta; the most numerous and warlike part of the population; the north of Laos with its contacts with the Thai areas in the Shan States of Burma, in Yunnan and in Thailand; the upper courses of the Mekong and the principal communications links with China. If, on the other hand, an attempt was made to freeze the zones of control along lines coinciding with present military occupa-

tion, the result would be an impossible patch of enclaves, of pockets within pockets, with the advantage clearly with the Viet Minh.

There is no neat line of demarcation like the battle line in Korea. Nor does the parallel with Korea hold good in any important way. In Korea, there were 20 million South Korean south of the line and only four or five million north of it. In Indochina, the population is broken up about evenly with approximately eleven million people on either side of a ubiquitous and indeterminate bamboo curtain.

While it is true that the partition formula would offer the vague hope of later improvements in the Asian or world situation, it would be considered as the ultimate sell-out by most Vietnamese. After a period in which all of Vietnam on both sides was broken down into many warring groups with divergent interests, the whole population on both sides would settle down for a century of effort, if need be, to throw out whoever was trying to hold them apart. If this were the UN, it would doubtless mean that US troops would be involved: if US troops were involved, we could expect Chinese involvement. Clearly there is actually little to choose between this catastrophe and the catastrophe of an overall settlement in which all of Indochina might fall at one time as a unit.

It will be apparent at this point that a question arises as to the wisdom of completely identifying US policies with French policies in Asia. While for four short years they have coincided in many particulars, they are not necessarily identical. We, not the French, would probably be the principal sufferers if we are held responsible for a multilateral partition of Indochina, completely losing what credit we have remaining in Asia. It might be better, if such a catastrophic settlement must be made, that the responsibility be borne by the French alone and be undertaken in direct negotiations with Ho Chi Minh.

#### *4. Neutralization and Demilitarization*

It seems to me most unlikely that the Communists would accept such a proposal. They have never yet agreed to pull back their zone of control beyond the line occupied by Communist forces. Even if they did accept such a proposal, we could expect the Viet Minh Communists eventually to take over control. The example of a Red Indochina would have a powerful impact in Southeast Asia. Of course, neutralization would mean a fairly rapid withdrawal of French troops.

Presumably demilitarization and neutralization would have to be insured and inspected on a continuous basis by the UN or some collective body. In this case, we ought to put the Asian powers to the fore rather than ourselves.

This neutralization solution is possibly the least dangerous formula but the most unlikely to be realized.



IV [*sic*]. *A Settlement in Indochina in the Framework of a General Far Eastern Settlement*

It is conceivable that a settlement free from some of these overriding objections could be reached in Indochina if we were to offer the Chinese Communists or the Viet Minh sufficient inducements outside of Indochina. However, this course seems politically almost impossible for the United States and may lose us more than we stand to lose even in Indochina.

Which of the following would a US administration which has condemned Yalta and the loss of China be prepared to grant?

- a) recognition of Red China
- b) more trade with Red China
- c) scuttling of Formosa
- d) abandonment of EDC
- e) abstention from all arms and matériel aid in Asia
- f) abandonment of thesis of unification of Korea

Merely to cite these questions is to expose the difficulties. Moreover, even if we were to offer China trade and recognition as the price for ending the Viet Minh war, it is by no means certain that they could achieve it.

In one form or another, the present war is an expression of rebellion against white rule which has been going on for some 80 years with intermediate periods of quasi-pacification. If the Communist Chinese undertook to end the war, it would not merely have to close the frontier, but take more active measures against the Viet Minh.

This, of course, would for a time mean that the main menace of Communist China expansion had been exorcised—but it is a necessary corrective to any exaggerated hopes we may cherish.

Moreover, there is no assurance that China would keep this or any other bargain. The situation in South Asia is so fluid that “indigenous” movements would always carry on the struggle for Communism while Peiping and Moscow ostensibly disavow it.

An enlarged frame of reference for the negotiations may include still other possibilities. It is conceivable that the Soviet Union and the Communist Chinese might wish to trade unification of Korea for advantages in Southeast Asia. This might give them as a bonus a chance of splitting France and the United States. The transformation of the Korean stalemate into apparent total victory for the UN through the restoration of the integrity of Korea would be a difficult inducement for this country to resist—and it might be presented in the form of a proposal for free elections in both Korea and Indochina.

Confronted with this perhaps most dangerous of all the hypotheses, we must carefully weigh up the relative importance for us of Korea

and Indochina. In my opinion, the loss of Indochina would be much more menacing to the free world than the loss of Korea.

V. *Where do we go from here?*

1. We should arrive in this government at an understanding of the possible consequences of a negotiated peace. Such a consideration should also take up the question of whether we ought to be a party to any negotiated peace in Indochina. It may be better for us for the Conference in Geneva to end inconclusively than to put our signature to a partition or "sell-out" of our Asian allies.

2. At the earliest possible moment we should consult with the French, persuading them to take the initiative in explaining their thinking on the substantive part of the negotiations. Unless they can reveal to us some alternative more feasible than those discussed above, we should make clear to the French our firm opposition to a settlement on any such basis. We should try to persuade the French that the war should go on, using whatever inducements we can.

3. If the French are determined to negotiate, we should decide: (a) whether this should be done unilaterally; or (b) multilaterally, and with what degree of responsibility for ourselves.

My own recommendation would be that the war in Indochina should continue but that we should raise our sights with respect to needs in manpower, and in the political basis for sincere Vietnamese participation. If, in spite of everything the French should decide unilaterally to quit the war (which I for one do not believe they can or will do) I should recommend not a compromise peace on the bases listed above, but an internationalization of the war under the UN, with the participation of US forces, if necessary, recognizing that the Chinese might retaliate massively.

---

396.1 GE/2-2754 : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to All Principal Posts*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, February 27, 1954—1:49 p. m.

306. Joint State-USIA. Communist propagandists appear making some headway label Geneva Conference "Big Five Conference", unconsciously assisted by some US correspondents use of this as well as term "Five Power Conference". This damaging to US interests since elevates position Communist China, as well as inaccurate description conference which will be attended by many more than five powers on invitation four powers which met Berlin. (See Berlin communiqué

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Mosman and Poole of FE and by Fisher of USIA.

February 18 contained Wireless File same date.)<sup>2</sup> Soviet proposal for five power conference was rejected by Western powers at Berlin. In contacts with local press and US correspondents posts and USIS as appropriate requested take whatever action deemed advisable to prevent or correct labeling conference "Big Five" or "Five Power" and to encourage use of "Geneva Conference". Department requesting Embassies London and Paris secure British and French agreement adopt latter term as official usage. Inform subordinate posts.

DULLES

---

<sup>2</sup> For the pertinent portion of the Final Communiqué of the Berlin Conference, Feb. 18, see p. 415.

---

396.1 GE/2-2754

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat (Kitchen) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 27, 1954.

The Secretary has designated Douglas MacArthur to coordinate preparations for the Geneva Conference.

The Secretary has also approved a recommendation originally made by David Key that two "Task Forces" be established to begin substantive preparations. It is expected that Mr. Kenneth Young will head the group making preparations on the Korean item and Mr. Philip Bonsal the group making preparations on the Indochina item.

A meeting has been scheduled for today at 12:30 in the Secretary's office to discuss preparations and receive additional guidance from the Secretary.<sup>1</sup> In particular, the following should come under discussion:

(1) MacArthur anticipates that virtually no progress can be expected on the Korean items and the Communist will not concede anything. Therefore, he believes the question of the designation of a senior officer to advise the Secretary on Indochina (and you if you succeed the Secretary at Geneva), is of vital importance. This person must have a balance of experience and knowledge divided between the Franco-EDC complex and the Indochina-Communist military drive complex. It has been suggested that some one like Ambassador Alex Johnson would be ideal on Korea and what is needed is someone comparable to him on Indochina.

(2) The use of UN administrative and technical machinery and the cost of this operation has been discussed by Mr. Key, Mr. Popper and others in UNA. There is agreement that we should make as full use as possible of the UN machinery both because of the magnitude of the Conference and to avoid procedural squabbles between the two "sides".

---

<sup>1</sup> See memorandum by Kitchen to Smith, Mar. 1, p. 427.

The question of whether the entire UN membership, the membership participating in the Conference, or just the four host powers should pay the cost of the Conference has also been considered. In general, Mr. Key is inclined to believe that having the four hosts pay the costs (estimated at approximately \$250,000 or \$80,000 each) would be preferable to an assessment of either participants in the Conference or the UNA membership since the establishment of an assessment against Red China and North Korea is bound to have political implications.

(3) The question of participation in the Conference by small nation belligerents such as the Netherlands and Greece has also been raised. Doc Matthews has reported that the Dutch have indicated they would accept our guidance on this if we desired to reduce participation to keep the Conference more flexible. The Greeks have also inquired as to our attitude.

J. C. K.

---

396.1 GE/3-154 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 1, 1954—6:37 p. m.

2986. FYI only. Understanding here is that initiative for organization Indochina phase of Korean political conference is primarily French responsibility just as United States has such responsibility for Korean phase. On specific subject of participants in Indochina phase there is involved (a) agreement between France, US and UK with French views being given major weight and (b) discussion with USSR of tripartite position and resulting quadripartite agreement on invitations to other participants. It would be our hope that the taking of these steps could be deferred until meeting of Foreign Ministers of France, UK, USSR and US at Geneva on April 26. Invitations could then be issued for Indochina discussions to take place some weeks later. A deferment of Indochina discussions until after the end of current fighting season and conduct discussions in atmosphere of what we would hope would be active and effective preparations for decisive phase of Navarre Plan, including especially progress in creating combatworthy Vietnamese units would be highly desirable in our view. End FYI only.

Department assumes immediate pressures on French Government have been much eased as result of Berlin agreement on Indochina. Department therefore hopes French Government will agree that further discussion Indochina phase by France, UK and US on one hand and by USSR on other be held after Foreign Ministers meet for opening of Geneva Conference. Department interprets Paris 3072 repeated

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Bonsal of PSA. Repeated to London as telegram 4450, to Moscow as telegram 550, and to Saigon as telegram 1569.

Saigon 337 and London unnumbered as indicating Bidault thinking along these lines. (See numbered paragraph 2.<sup>2</sup>)

In any case, Department counts on opportunity make known its views on participants in Indochina phase prior any crystallizing of a French position and would anticipate a request from French Government for its views at such time as French Government believes it desirable proceed toward firming up of tripartite position this matter.

Discuss matter with Bidault along above lines, stating they represent Secretary's thinking and Secretary has now left for Caracas whence he will return about March 10. Comments other recipients invited.

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> Paragraph 2 of Paris telegram 3072, Feb. 25, not printed, read: "In response question by Moch (Socialist) as to whether Ho would be present Geneva, Bidault quoted as saying: 'In eyes of France, Ho Chi Minh Government does not represent state and Berlin text (of communiqué) does not make its presence obligatory. That will be discussed at Geneva where it will be question taking up Korea and IC simultaneously.'" (751.00/2-2554)

396.1 GE/3-154

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat (Kitchen) to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 1, 1954.

In addition to the points covered in this morning's Staff Summary concerning preparations for the Geneva Conference, the following emerged from Saturday's meeting<sup>1</sup> with the Secretary on this subject:

1. The Secretary's basic approach is that this Conference, particularly as it relates to Indo-China, is a holding action in order to provide time for the French to ratify the EDC and to permit a favorable military build-up and execution of the "Navarre plan". For this reason, the Secretary does not wish us to approach the French and the British with a view to settling as many procedural and substantive problems in advance as possible, but rather to merely obtain the views of those governments and indicate that we believe it best for most problems to be settled by direct conversation after the Secretary has arrived at Geneva.

2. Top priority is to be given to consulting with the Government of Korea with a view to the establishment of a mutually acceptable position or line of action on Korea<sup>2</sup> which we will then discuss with the British and French.

3. The Secretary wants all participating countries to contribute to the cost of the Conference. He does not want the Four Powers to act as "hosts".

<sup>1</sup> Feb. 27.

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on pre-Geneva Conference discussions between the United States and the Republic of Korea, see pp. 14 ff.

4. The Secretary believes that the group should "hire" the UN physical facilities and secretariat at Geneva for the administration and conduct of the Conference.

5. We do not expect that all smaller nations contributing forces to the Korean fighting will be represented at the Conference nor do we wish to encourage their participation at this time.

In connection with plans for the Conference, Mr. MacArthur indicated that he had considerable doubt as to the desirability of proceeding at this time toward the conclusion of a Mutual Security Pact with the Government of China which had been proposed earlier in the week by Mr. Robertson.<sup>3</sup> Both Livy Merchant and David Key had indicated their doubt in writing on the staff study on Friday. The Secretary instructed that this matter be turned over to Bob Bowie for submission to the National Security Council's Planning Board for consideration. He hoped to have the NSC Staff's reaction in ten days upon his return from Caracas.<sup>4</sup> Apparently his intention was that the State Department should submit the question without a recommendation. He asked that the matter be handled with extreme caution because any leak would cause controversial discussion and many difficulties would arise as a consequence. Mr. Bowie has been informed of the Secretary's instructions.

JEFFERY C. KITCHEN

---

<sup>3</sup> Robertson proposed this pact in a memorandum to the Secretary of State on Feb. 25; for the text, see volume xiv.

<sup>4</sup> For documentation on the Tenth Inter-American Conference, Caracas, Venezuela, Mar. 1-28, 1954, see volume iv.

---

396.1 GE/3-254 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State*

SECRET

PARIS, March 2, 1954—8 p. m.

3149. Repeated information Saigon 346. Department telegram 1570 to Saigon repeated Paris 2988.<sup>1</sup> All present indications here are that French position is that question should be avoided at all costs in order avoid undesirable counter-demand that representation of Associated States would have to be balanced by representation of Viet Minh, "free" Laos Government, etc. Government's position has remained

---

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 1570 to Paris, Mar. 1, read: "If you learn French endeavoring exert pressure have Associated States refrain from participating Indochina phase Korean Political Conference please report at once so Department can consider action appropriate. FYI Department strongly of opinion Associated States should be present as full participants at Geneva. End FYI." (795.00/2-2454)

unaltered that Viet Minh is in no sense a government and no steps should be countenanced which might lend encouragement to Soviet-sponsored fallacy that it is. We are under impression that this position was shared by Associated States Governments and for this reason they are not pressing at moment for participation at Geneva. (Question will undoubtedly be examined at length here after Buu Loc's arrival).

Would appreciate any background information Department could supply explaining reasoning which led to position advocating full participation of Associated States at Geneva and how it is proposed to deal with question of Viet Minh representation there as consequence. When this becomes known as US position, Embassy will be faced with necessity supporting it under attack from French authorities.

ACHILLES

396.1 GE/3-254

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Thai and Malayan Affairs (London)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] March 2, 1954.

Subject: Korean and Indochinese Conferences in April.

Participants: His Excellency, Pote Sarasin, Ambassador of Thailand  
Walter S. Robertson—FE  
Kenneth P. Landon—PSA

The Thai Ambassador called at his request and said that he had been instructed by his Government to inform the Department of State that it accepted the invitation to attend the Korean Conference in Geneva in April and that it desired to know what would be the U.S. approach to the conference in terms of policy objectives. The Ambassador was informed that the Department would pursue the well-known policy objective of achieving an independent, unified, peaceful Korea, which has always been the objective of the United Nations. The Thai Ambassador expressed some doubts as to the possible achievement of this objective and asked if the United States had in mind lesser levels of achievement with which it might be satisfied. He was informed that no lesser objectives were being considered. The Ambassador was further informed that the housekeeping arrangements as to costs and other details were being worked out.

The Ambassador then turned to the subject of Indochina and asked if the participants in the Korean Conference would automatically

deliberate on Indochina. The Ambassador was informed that the Department was waiting for the views of the French but that our tentative thinking was that there might be two separate conferences with different nations represented and that the two conferences might be held simultaneously. The Ambassador was reminded that the original statement issued regarding Indochina indicated that "interested states" would participate and presumably by "interested states" was meant not only the principal powers named such as France, the U.K., the U.S., Communist China and USSR but also the Associated States.

The Thai Ambassador said that his Government was interested because of its shared geographic boundaries with Indochina and inquired whether the Thai Government might send a representative as an observer. He was assured that this request would be given consideration.

---

396.1 GE/3-454 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

PARIS, March 4, 1954—1 p. m.

3176. Repeated information London 723, Moscow 257, Saigon 352. Reference telegram 2986, March 2 [1].<sup>1</sup> I discussed substance of reference telegram with Maurice Schumann today.

He believed that while early days of Geneva would be soon enough for ministerial discussion on Indochina problems, he thought that there should be preliminary tripartite discussions here both in view of importance of reaching agreed tripartite position and psychologically in France to make clear conference was not really "Korean" one with Indochina being treated only incidentally. He said there was no hurry since Franco-Vietnam talks<sup>2</sup> would continue through most of March. Perhaps last ten days before Geneva conference met would be sufficient time.

On question of Associated States representation, he reiterated efforts made at Berlin to frame agreement so as to include Associated States and exclude Ho, confirmed Embassy telegram 3175, March 4,<sup>3</sup> that definite position would not be taken until after consultation with

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Mar. 1, p. 426.

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on discussions at Paris between representatives of France and the State of Vietnam with a view to arriving at treaties regulating relations between the two countries, see volume XIII.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (396.1 GE/3-454)



Associated States and US and UK. He cited this as additional reason for holding preliminary discussions before Geneva. He said telegrams from De Jean indicated Vietnamese not too anxious to be represented but that he could understand our desire that they be present to avoid connotation of "five-power conference".

ACHILLES

396.1 GE/3-254 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1954—7 p. m.

3035. Your 3149 repeated Saigon 346.<sup>2</sup> Secretary's position regarding desirability inclusion Associated States in Indochina phase Geneva conference based upon following:

(1) Analogy with Korean situation. South Koreans and North Koreans were included with question "recognition" specifically reserved.

(2) Absence of Associated States would mean conference would be held without major "interested states." US has recognized Associated States along with 35 other countries, has advocated their membership in UN and has stressed defense their independence as equal sovereign members of French Union as objective US support current war effort. Department believes strongly Associated States should participate in any discussion of restoration of peace in Indochina. Effect of their absence on public opinion here and presumably also in Indochina would be highly adverse.

(3) Discussion from which Associated States were absent and which was confined to four Berlin powers plus Communist China would in effect be five power conference on Indochina. We joined with UK and French in rejecting "five power conference" concept at Berlin.

(4) While Department recognizes disadvantages presence Ho's representatives at Geneva, Department considers this more or less inevitable consequence of French acceptance of negotiations without any prior conditions.

(5) It appears essential to Department that there be present at Indochina discussions Asians speaking for people of area fighting against Communist domination. We cannot envisage discussion where Communist China would be only Asian country represented.

Department does not plan make known its position except in context discussions which it is assumed French will initiate.

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Bonsal of PSA. Repeated to Saigon as telegram 1598.

<sup>2</sup> Dated Mar. 2, p. 428.

396.1 GE/3-454 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State*

SECRET

SAIGON, March 4, 1954—5 p. m.

1597. Repeated information Paris 491, Moscow 5. As yet there is no evidence that French are exerting pressure on Associated States to refrain from participating Indochina phase Geneva Conference (Deptel 1570 repeated Paris 2988<sup>1</sup>), but I have no doubt that it is Bidault's settled policy to exclude them from conference if possible.

I saw De Jean before his departure this morning for Paris. He indicated desire of French Government that initial phase of Indochina conference be confined to discussions by the four powers. (cf. Deptel 2986 sent Paris repeated London 4450, Moscow 550, Saigon 1569.<sup>2</sup>) De Jean said that principal objective was to get Communist China to cease aiding Viet Minh, and that if this were main topic for discussion he saw no reason why three Associated States should participate. He likewise sought to argue that situation here differs from that in Korea since in Indochina Viet Minh permeate body politic, whereas in Korea there is a hard and fast line of demarcation between north and south.

Latter argument of course has nothing to do with seating of Associated States at forthcoming conference, but does indicate that De Jean feels under compulsion to justify exclusion of these governments from Geneva Conference if at all possible. Such a policy we feel is foolish and will merely serve to confirm suspicions here and elsewhere in Asia that Associated States are not in fact independent. We thoroughly concur in Department's opinion Associated States should be present as full participants at Geneva.

De Jean arrives Paris March 6 and I suggested utility of his getting in touch with Achilles.

Quat, Minister Defense, departed same airplane this morning with De Jean. He whispered to me that prospect of Geneva Conference has shaken Vietnamese people and in particular has had a disastrous effect on morale in Vietnamese armed forces.

MCCCLINTOCK

---

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, p. 428.

<sup>2</sup> Dated Mar. 1. p. 426.

---

*Editorial Note*

For the text of a note from the United States Embassy in Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, March 5, concerning preparations for the Geneva Conference, see page 28.

396.1 GE/3-554 : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Posts*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1954—6 : 56 p. m.

315. Joint State-USIA. The following supersedes Joint State-USIA Circular 306, February 27, 1954 :<sup>2</sup>

1. As Secretary's report to nation on Berlin Conference<sup>3</sup> indicated forthcoming meetings at Geneva will be seized with distinct questions political settlement in Korea and problem of restoring peace in Indochina; treatment of these problems being differentiated not only in terms of composition, but also of leadership with United States assuming principal responsibility for discussions on Korea, French on Indochina. In line with its responsibility under the Berlin agreement, United States extended invitations on February 24<sup>4</sup> to "The Korean Political Conference," scheduled to begin Geneva April 26. FYI It may be expected that at some future time, possibly in course of Korean Political Conference, invitations to conference on Indochina will be issued. End FYI.

2. Since Communist side making every effort make Geneva meetings appear identical to their proposed "Five Power Conference on the Far East," question of correct terminology important. Phase of Geneva meetings on Korea, which is only meeting to which invitations issued now, is "The Korean Political Conference." Reference to discussions on Indochina may for time being be called "Discussions at Geneva on Indochina." It should be noted that Secretary expressed wish that whenever possible official term "Korean Political Conference" be used drive home fact that forthcoming discussions at Geneva are direct result of western efforts obtain political conference on Korea.

3. In line with above, principal emphasis in public treatment of meetings at Geneva should this stage be placed on Korean Political Conference, establishing it clearly as forum we have sought to explore Communist intentions in Korea and, if possible, to reach a political settlement concerning Korea. References to proposed conference on Indochina at present should be subordinated.

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Jaeger of P. Also sent to the Consulates General at Hong Kong, Singapore, Accra, Algiers, Dakar, Lagos, Leopoldville, Lorenço Marques, Nairobi, Salisbury, and Tunis, and to the Consulate at Luanda.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 424.

<sup>3</sup> For the text of this report made on Feb. 24, see Department of State *Bulletin*. Mar. 8, 1954, pp. 343-347.

<sup>4</sup> Regarding these invitations, see Department of State press release 97, Feb. 26, 1954, printed *ibid.* p. 347; see also editorial note, p. 21.

396.1 GE/3-554

*The Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1954.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There have been several discussions between representatives of our respective Departments regarding preparation for the Geneva Conference and the organization necessary for the expeditious development of position papers and other arrangements for the Conference. This Department is interested in assisting the Department of State in every way possible in preparing for the Conference.

It is believed that Department of Defense participation can be most effective if the informal views of this Department and necessary military information are available to the Department of State during the preparation of position papers. In this way, also, interested offices in the Department of Defense will be aware of positions being developed and final processing can be handled rapidly. Further, it is believed that the Geneva Conference is of such importance to the interests and the security of the United States in the Far East area that maximum effort should be devoted by all interested agencies to the development of the United States positions for the Conference.

Accordingly, it is recommended that consideration be given to the following procedure.

(a) Establishment of a steering committee consisting of senior Department of State and Defense representatives through which all position papers developed by working groups would be processed.

(b) Establishment of two working groups consisting of working level representatives of both Departments, one working group developing positions on Korea and the second working group, positions on Indochina. Various *ad hoc* committees as may be deemed appropriate would consider specific items in each area.

(c) The papers as developed in the working groups would be processed through the steering committee. After approval by the steering committee, they would be cleared formally by the Departments of State and Defense.

If you concur in the above suggestions, the names of Defense Department representatives on the steering committee and working groups will be furnished you.<sup>1</sup>

Sincerely yours,

C. E. WILSON

---

<sup>1</sup> In a letter of Mar. 9, Acting Secretary of State Walter B. Smith informed Secretary Wilson that the Department of State was in agreement with his suggestions as to the procedures for State-Defense coordination and that the Secretary had designated MacArthur as Coordinator for the Geneva Conference, Young as Chairman of the Working Group on Korea, and Bonsal as Chairman of the Working Group on Indochina. (396.1 GE/3-554)

751G.00/3-654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

PARIS, March 6, 1954.

3240. Repeated information Saigon 362, London unnumbered. Summary highlights Laniel statement Assembly March 5 follow: <sup>1</sup>

In recalling that the Assembly's Ordre du Jour October 27 had called on Government to conclude by negotiation a general pacification in Asia, Laniel stated that "my government is the one that has publicly formulated the clearest statements on the French will to negotiate. I said it October 27, on November 12 at Tribune Council of Republic, I stated that, no more than the Americans in Korea, we did not demand an unconditional surrender of the adversary in order to speak with him and that France would be happy on the contrary to welcome a diplomatic solution of conflict. November 24 at Assembly Tribune I stated that we were ready to discuss tomorrow, in agreement with Associated States, reasonable 'cease-fire' proposals transmitted to us by adversary." In labelling Ho's responses as "propaganda gestures destined neutralize effect of statements French Government", Laniel stated that "nothing since that date has given us reason to believe that any change in true intentions of Viet Minh has taken place."

In stating that "happily the French effort looking toward negotiations was not especially oriented towards conversations with the adversary", Laniel stated that he had indicated in each of his statements that "there were reasons for motives of hope on the Chinese Communist and Soviet side as well as on American side in view of a diplomatic solution." Laniel then posed following questions "does not China have need of peace for internal consolidation? Can it not fear that concrete advantage from occidental powers in return for its contribution toward restoration of peace? Does not the search for an agreement with the occidental powers on pacification of Asia respond to wishes of Soviets in keeping with its desire for withdrawal of American troops from Korea and perhaps its apprehension regarding any independent initiative of China in FE and particularly SEA? As for great democracies, their presence at these negotiations would be not only valuable but essential, for it would multiply the chances for an agreement. Such has been the orientation of our diplomacy for some time. No occasion has been lost either at Washington or Bermuda <sup>2</sup> to have our point of view prevail progressively. It is at Berlin that our prime

<sup>1</sup> For the record of remarks by Laniel, see France, *Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationale, 1954, Debats*, pp. 713-715.

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on the Tripartite Foreign Ministers meetings at Washington, July 10-14, 1953, and the Bermuda Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, Dec. 4-8, 1953, see volume v.

objective has been attained, and under the best conditions, i.e., in full solidarity with our allies, thanks to effective action Foreign Minister”.

“Question of IC can be approached at same time as Korea at Geneva and we have the possibility, which we consider basic, of inviting the Associated States.”

Although stressing importance of Geneva in preparing for a general pacification in Asia, Laniel stated “we will not, however, have the right—when men die on the field of battle—of neglecting, if in the interval an occasion presents itself to put an end to hostilities in an honorable and effective manner. On this principle I am in perfect agreement with what has been said at this Tribune. It is not because the war has lasted seven years that we will have the right to neglect a chance to end it one day sooner.”

Although paying tribute laudable motives of Nehru in launching his cease-fire proposal, Laniel stated that Nehru’s proposal<sup>3</sup> could not be considered an offer of mediation but that it did pose a question to which it was necessary to reply. “Our reply is dictated by a main preoccupation, that of the security of our Expeditionary Corps, the French and the friends of France during the perhaps long and [apparent omission] “we consider as unacceptable any proposal, which, under color of an immediate ‘cease-fire’ would begin by putting in peril our soldiers and our friends without our having obtained sufficient guarantees to assure the development of a normal negotiation and the chances for a durable peace.” These guarantees Laniel outlined as follows: “(1) The total evacuation of Laos by troops having infiltrated there; (2) although military situation in Cambodia different, analogous precautions would be required there; (3) in northern Vietnam a sort of no man’s land would have to be created around the periphery of the Tonkin Delta and the Viet Minh units that have infiltrated the Delta would have to withdraw under strictly controlled evacuation; (4) in central Vietnam the Viet Minh units would have to withdraw to delimited zones in such manner as to guarantee security of our troops and the people; (5) in southern Vietnam, the Viet Minh forces should be disarmed or evacuated. To all these guarantees ought to be added other measures of security and control designed to assure that with suspension of fighting our adversaries cannot carry out certain activities, or proceed to reinforcement or regroupment, as was the case in Korea during the long period of conversations.”

“A suspension of fighting then will only be the result of carefully conducted negotiations for which we will be ready very shortly when

<sup>3</sup> Speaking before the Indian Parliament on Feb. 22, Prime Minister Nehru proposed a cease-fire in Indochina prior to the Geneva Conference. For the statement by the Prime Minister, see India, *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, House of the People, Part II, 6th sess.*, vol. 1, no. 6, cols. 415-416. See also telegram 3053 from Paris, Feb. 24, printed in *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, volume XIII.*

we will have carried out the necessary studies with the Associated States, negotiations which are presented at Geneva under the best conditions possible thanks to the efforts of our diplomacy. If before Geneva we receive a concrete proposal, it would be examined in the state of mind that I have just defined."

In pointing out that he had responded to question giving rise to debate, Laniel stated he would like to add that "today, these polemics ought to cease. We are unanimous in effect in wishing henceforth to settle the conflict by way of [garbled group]."

Laniel stated that "it goes without saying that our military effort ought not to be relaxed" prior to Geneva "since it is thanks to it that we have obliged the adversary to change his speech, if not his conduct, since it is thanks to it that we have adversary in a position where he cannot hope for a victory by force."

In emphasizing that it would be necessary to maintain discretion in preparing for Geneva, Laniel concluded by stating that "a peace negotiated respecting national honor, the liberty of individuals and the security of the Expeditionary Corps, is our objective. We are at the hour of hope. In the name of France, I salute all the combatants, of the Associated States and the French army, who, by their sacrifices of yesterday and tomorrow, make possible this hope."

DILLON

---

396.1 GE/3-854

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal)*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 8, 1954.

NOTES ON A MINIMUM POSITION REGARDING INDOCHINA FOR THE  
GENEVA CONFERENCE

The U.S. objective for Indochina at Geneva is presumably to avoid Communist control of the area and, as in the case of Korea, to secure the control of the entire area by indigenous non-Communist elements capable of sustaining themselves against internal subversion. Although the U.S. would be pleased with governments in Indochina firmly aligned on the side of the free world, the U.S. would presumably not reject governments of the nature of India or Indonesia the foreign policy of which would be neutralist.

---

<sup>1</sup> Bonsal in a covering memorandum to Robertson indicated that the attached paper was "designed to serve generally as a working paper in order to stimulate discussion. It will not be considered as representing Departmental views." (396.1 GE/3-854)

The principal obstacle to the achievement of this goal whether by military means or at the conference table is the existence of eight well equipped, trained and undefeated Vietminh divisions of high morale and under complete Communist control. Until and unless these divisions are defeated or disarmed and dispersed, any peace negotiation or cease fire in Viet-Nam can result only in a Communist take-over sooner or later, probably sooner. Any formula of coalition or of territorial division, any procedure of elections or plebiscite would be powerless to deter the overwhelming political and military significance of these eight divisions with their great prestige of years of successful resistance against France, Viet-Nam and the support furnished by the United States.

Our side will not obtain at the conference table a united non-Communist Viet-Nam, any more than we will obtain a united non-Communist Korea unless we make clear to the enemy that, in the event of a breakdown of negotiations, our side is not only able but willing to do what is necessary to secure the objective by force of arms.

In the case of Korea, it is almost certain that we will not obtain a satisfactory basis through negotiation for a united, free Korea. It is perhaps equally certain that the failure of negotiations will not result in a resumption of hostilities. In other words, the Communists will continue to hold North Korea as they have since 1946 while the Republic of Korea holds the South, as it has for the past few years. This *status quo* will probably continue to be guaranteed by the allies and sponsors of the respective Korean governments. Korea, like Germany, will remain a helpless symbol of the world division until a basic change in the dynamics of that division takes place.

In the case of Indochina, there is no *status quo* susceptible of being formalized in the Korean or German manner. Throughout the area, the major centers of political and economic power have remained firmly in French Union hands through seven years of war. On the other hand, the enemy controls perhaps half the population of Viet-Nam militarily and politically. A military defeat or withdrawal of French Union forces would mean sooner or later the control of the country by the indigenous Communist dominated Vietminh army and hence by Communist China. Whether this result was achieved by plebiscite, or through a temporary division of the country with the Communists holding only the North at first or through a coalition government would be of little eventual importance. This particular conflict, because of its very nature, must end with either a winner or a loser; there can be no tie as in Korea.

Therefore, the major trump card in our side's hand at Geneva would be a recognized military ability *and determination* to defeat the



enemy's regular armed forces in the field. To the extent that we and the enemy believe our side possesses that ability and determination, to that extent will successful negotiation be feasible. Conversely, to the extent that the enemy believes that our side's will to fight on to victory is waning, to that extent will negotiation be the equivalent of capitulation.

Our whole policy toward Indochina has been based upon this central objective, that of helping to create, maintain and demonstrate a Franco-Vietnamese ability and will to win this war. Our current efforts in support of the Laniel-Navarre Plan are further steps in a policy steadily followed, in spite of disappointments, since 1950 when the Chinese Communists revitalized the Vietminh and when, but for the magnificent leadership of de Lattre, Hanoi might have fallen to the enemy.

Laniel, Bidault and Pleven would probably agree with this diagnosis. Yet they are confronted in the French Assembly and within their own government with a powerful movement for peace at practically any price. Those who lead this movement argue that even the degree of military progress envisaged by Navarre is unattainable, that France can no longer bear the burden in spite of increased American help, that the Vietnamese non-Communist elements are not making and never will make the necessary effort, that these elements do not support the French Union concept and that some way must be found of ending what they term a hopeless struggle. They do not advocate any particular type of settlement nor do they face the fact that any settlement leaving the Communist army intact would be a victory for the Communists. But they will fall and fall hard for the most specious type of proposal which may be advanced by the Communists at Geneva.

It must be recognized that the agreement in Berlin in February that there should be negotiations about Indochina at Geneva has improved the position of the French Government and made it practically certain that that Government will take measures, including military measures, to improve its negotiating position for Geneva. There should be full agreement in Saigon, Paris and Washington on fullest and most energetic pursuit of the Laniel-Navarre Plan particularly at a time when the enemy may also be expected to do his utmost to improve his military position in anticipation of the Geneva negotiations.

Another element in the situation which must be recognized is the fact that, in French eyes, the decision to discuss Indochina in an international framework represents a considerable triumph for French diplomacy. When the French recall the negative or evasive stand on

this subject taken by the Secretary and by General Smith last summer,<sup>2</sup> they undoubtedly experience a sense of gratification at their own powers of persuasiveness and a hopeful confidence that those powers may still have some successful scope in directions related to the Indochina problem.

In this connection, there is no doubt that the Communists will exploit to the utmost factors which may divide the United States from its allies and pillory us in the spotlight of war-weary French public opinion as the country whose intransigence is responsible for continued bloodshed. This will be done by suggesting that Communist China's influence could be brought to bear on the side of an honorable peace in Indochina, a peace that would, in appearance at least, maintain the principle of the French Union and hence justify the French in their own eyes, if, in return, France could find a way to support such C.P.R. objectives as recognition, membership in the U.N. and perhaps even support for a formula which would eventually destroy the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa. Neither the French nor the British would be as unwilling to make concessions on these points as we are. Our intransigence on these points could conceivably give the French a basis for assuming a greater liberty of action than we would wish in dealing with the C.P.R. and the USSR in regard to Indochina.

In appraising the French pre-Geneva position, it must be borne in mind that no French Government, regardless of its private opinion, can express public scepticism regarding negotiations to end the Indochina conflict. The concept of negotiations can no more be rejected in Paris than it was in Washington with regard to Korea. A hopeful attitude must be maintained—a willingness to examine proposals made by the other side. Prime Minister Laniel's response to Nehru's suggestion of a cease-fire is a useful indication of the type of action it may be hoped the French will take in regard to proposals for negotiations. Laniel did not reject, in fact, he welcomed the idea of a cease-fire. At the same time, he laid down conditions designed to insure the security of the French expeditionary corps and of the national armies and of friendly elements in Indochina which, if accepted by the enemy, would radically change the military situation in favor of our side.

These conditions for a cease-fire were roughly as follows:

- (1) Withdrawal of Vietminh forces from Laos and Cambodia.
- (2) Establishment of a neutral zone around the Tonkin Delta and withdrawal of Vietminh forces from within the Delta.
- (3) Confinement of Vietminh troops in central Annam to designated points.

---

<sup>2</sup> Refers to talks held between Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Bidault in Washington during the Tripartite Foreign Ministers meetings, July 10-14, 1953. For documentation on these talks, see volume v.

- (4) Evacuation or surrender and disarmament of Vietminh troops in south Annam.
- (5) Other measures of control and supervision.

The Vietminh would probably only accept terms of this kind—particularly the evacuation of the Tonkin Delta and the establishment of a neutral zone around the Delta—if it thought the alternative was military defeat. The acceptance by the Vietminh of such conditions would consequently be the equivalent of an admission of military defeat.

Whether a cease-fire results from an agreement along the above lines or from the carrying out of the Navarre Plan for military decision, the next step would obviously be the establishment of a truly national government based on some sort of popular consultation. It would be neither desirable nor, in all probability, possible for the Bao Dai-Buu Loc governing formula to establish an adequate control of the entire country. A formula of national pacification and union would impose itself. Nevertheless, in order for the necessary transition to take place under the most favorable possible circumstances, it would be necessary to find some sort of interim system. This might be done on a regional basis, drawing heavily on non-Communist nationalists, on fence sitting elements and on loyal Vietnamese not too tied up or compromised in the eyes of their fellow citizens by their relations with the French.

So far as fundamentals at Geneva are concerned, the principal objective should be to convince the French to take a position based firmly on the probability of a military decision favoring our side and crowning seven years of struggle. Our own support for the French military effort must be unstinted and unquestioning. If, at any time at Geneva, there is any prospect that an offer of U.S. support, air, naval or even ground forces to supplement the Franco-Vietnamese military effort will cause the French to refuse to capitulate, we must be in a position to make or not to make such an offer as a result of a firm U.S. policy decision at the highest level. This involves a decision as to whether holding Indochina warrants a sacrifice of American lives and the risk of starting World War III. The following paragraphs from a PSA memorandum of December 18, 1953, are pertinent :

“If the interested agencies conclude that even with maximum quantitative increase in present US financial and end-item assistance the Navarre Plan is not apt to succeed within existing time limits, a recommendation should immediately be prepared for the National Security Council as to additional types of aid to be considered. This recommendation should be formulated even in the absence of any specific request from the French or the Vietnamese. (If the Navarre effort is to fail, our observers should be able to tell us about it before the French and the Vietnamese make up their minds to admit it.)

"The recommendation referred to above would presumably include the furnishing of US service and, if necessary, combat troops who would serve under French command within the general framework of the present strategic concepts. The communication to the French and Vietnamese of an affirmative decision in this respect might well prevent the reaching on their part of a decision to enter into negotiations or to abandon their present military effort in Indochina. Any further US contribution to the holding of Indochina is apt to be both more effective and less considerable the sooner it is made after a conclusion has been reached that current resources are inadequate. The longer we wait the bigger will be the commitment we will be called upon to make."<sup>3</sup>

The point here is not a recommendation that U.S. forces should or should not be engaged in Indochina but rather that a decision, positive or negative on the subject cannot be evaded—unless it is believed that it has already been taken in a negative sense as a result of the President's press conference of February 10th.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Memorandum by Bonsal to Bowie, Dec. 18, 1953, "Special Annex on Indochina" (appended to NSC 177, "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia"). (PSA files, lot 58 D 207, "Memoranda on Indochina by Bonsal")

<sup>4</sup> At his press conference on Feb. 10 President Eisenhower stated that U.S. training and administrative personnel in Indochina, including mechanics who recently had accompanied aircraft shipped there were "only maintenance troops" and would not be used in combat. He said the United States "is supporting the Vietnamese and French in their conduct of the war." The President's remarks are printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, pp. 247, 250, 253-254.

---

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Gullion"

*Memorandum by Edmund A. Gullion of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of That Staff (Bowie)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 9, 1954.

Subject: Laniel Terms for Settlement of Indochina War (Paristels 3238<sup>1</sup> and 3240<sup>2</sup>).

The terms outlined in the Assembly debate are almost sure to be unacceptable to the Viet Minh and may have been framed for that reason. This is all to the good if one accepts, as I do, the thesis that a compromise settlement on any of the bases now apparent (see my memorandum of February 25<sup>3</sup>) would be tantamount to opening up Southeast Asia to Communist control. However, if they are taken merely as the opening gambit for further bargaining, they may contain the germ of a dangerous settlement on the basis of territorial division.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Mar. 6. For text, see volume XIII.

<sup>2</sup> Dated Mar. 6, p. 435.

<sup>3</sup> Apparently a reference to a memorandum from Gullion to Bowie of S/P, Feb. 25, not printed, the subject of which was "Comments on Attached Paper ('Indochina' Paper Prepared by Study Group for NSC)." (PPS files, lot 65 D 101, box 533. "Gullion, E. A. Chron.")

More significant than the terms themselves is the apparent effort of the French to present the forthcoming conference as a general Far East conference.

Following are detailed comments:

1. The "terms" (Paristel 3240) in effect outline a solution which would be all the Navarre Plan of military operations might hope to obtain if it were prosecuted to the utmost. With reference to the enumerated guarantees sought by M. Laniel; (*a*) it is most unlikely that the Viet Minh would evacuate Laos. The position they have gained there may be said to correspond to that reached by the Chinese Communists at the end of the "long march"—i.e., an inexpugnable base to be maintained however Communist fortunes may fluctuate. Moreover, the Laos base is convenient for the exercise of pressures in other areas of Southeast Asia besides Viet Nam, and for the eventual flanking of the Tonkin Delta position; (*b*) the Viet Minh might for the present evacuate Cambodia and thus gain quite a bit of sympathy in Southeast Asia; but when any eventual flanking movement was begun they would reappear in this vulnerable area; (*c*) the Viet Minh now controls as much of the area of the Tonkin Delta and almost as many "souls" as do the French. It is hardly likely that they would evacuate upon demand; in fact, between now and April 26 the battle for control of the Delta will intensify; (*d*) the settlement proposed for Annam is very obscure but would set up a patchwork kind of arrangement which would not seem durable; (*e*) the Viet Minh is not likely to consent to evacuate Cochinchina unless they gain compensating advantages in the North.

2. Although the Viet Minh would not accept terms as at present drafted, they would not be so forbidding to them if considered as an opening gambit. They could even turn out to be dangerous for our side. These draft proposals tend more to the territorial division of Indochina than to the hypothesis of coalition governments and free elections. In other words, I see in them a possibility that the French might eventually consider withdrawal of French and loyal Vietnamese in Tonkin in exchange for Viet Minh evacuation of the Saigon Delta. This, then, is an important indicator for the French position at Geneva (for the dangers of such a territorial settlement, see my memorandum of February 25). It shows that some French are at least thinking in terms of some kind of partition.

3. It seems to me that these terms will be too harsh, not only for the Viet Minh but also for French parliamentary opinion, which has demanded that the French Government declare itself. I believe they are directed at least as much to the forthcoming talks with the Bao Dai Government at Paris as they are towards Geneva. It would be

very difficult for the French to go to Geneva with the support of the Bao Dai Government unless it had declared a position which the loyal Vietnamese could conceivably—although painfully—accept.

4. Although, as the Paris Embassy suggests, Laniel's speech may have been designed to head off premature offers of a cease-fire or a Nehru intercession, I am not sure it will have this effect. In fact, Laniel's remarks about not prolonging the war if there is a chance to "end it one day sooner" might encourage rather than discourage Nehru.

5. In my opinion the most significant aspect of Laniel's speech is the indication that France continues to think of a settlement for Indochina in terms of a general Far East settlement. (See Ambassador Dillon's comment that "It is not difficult to discern in Laniel's speech that if settlement is to be reached on Indochina at Geneva, it will be up to France's allies to make concessions to Communist China with all that that implies for the United States." <sup>4</sup>)

It seems to me that the working levels in the State Department and elsewhere can hardly prepare position papers for the Geneva Conference until their own government at the highest level determines whether bargaining is to be confined to (a) Indochina; or (b) Indochina and Korea; or (c) Korea, Indochina, the two China's, etc.

*Recommendations* are that:

(a) We request officially from the French, perhaps from General Ely, the details and background of the Laniel proposal.

(b) That further clarification be sought of the French bargaining position at Geneva.

(c) That we ask for an indication of the position of this bargaining position to the Laniel-Navarre Plan.

(d) That the relation of the Geneva Conference to an overall Far Eastern settlement be clarified in our minds as soon as possible.

(e) That the French be left in no doubt as to our thinking on this score.

(f) That our position now and at Geneva continue to be on the necessity of continuing the fight.

(g) That we be no party to a Far Eastern settlement partitioning Indochina or which is likely to hand it over to the Viet Minh.

(h) That as a final resort we plan for the employment of US force in Indochina, preferably in the framework of an internationalization of the problem.

<sup>4</sup> Ambassador Dillon's comments are contained in telegram 3238 from Paris, Mar. 6: for text, see volume XIII.

---

#### *Editorial Note*

On March 9 working groups on Korea and Indochina were established within the Department of State as part of the Department's

preparations for the Geneva Conference. One, chaired by Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, was given the responsibility for preparing position papers, etc., with respect to Korea; the other working group, chaired by Philip W. Bonsal, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, was given the responsibility for doing the same thing for Indochina.

The position papers prepared by these two working groups are filed in Northeast Asian Affairs files, lot 60 D 330.

---

751G.00/3-1054 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

PARIS, March 10, 1954—9 p. m.

3294. Repeated information Moscow 261, Saigon 374. Limit distribution. We are concerned with extent to which hopes for finding Indochina settlement at Geneva are rising in France and with growing belief that United States "concessions" to China will be necessary for such settlement. Laniel's statement in Parliament March 5 (Embassy telegram 3240 March 6<sup>1</sup>) reflects this thinking, as did yesterday's debate (Embassy telegram 3293 March 10<sup>2</sup>). We are constantly stressing in private conversations inadvisability of counting either upon willingness of Russians or Chinese seriously to negotiate or upon United States concessions to China, but so far without appreciable effect.

Of somewhat different character was Pleven's expression to Symington (Embassy telegram 3205 March 5<sup>2</sup>) of hope that United States would say at Geneva that Communist planes over Indochina would be met by United States planes. In this connection, Bohlen, when here after Berlin, told us he thought Russian worry over possibility of Indochina war spreading might conceivably predispose them to favor its termination. Warning note contained in Secretary's September 2 St. Louis speech<sup>3</sup> and declaration at time of Korean Armistice<sup>4</sup> was helpful and well received here but, between now and Geneva, we should

---

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 435.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see volume XIII.

<sup>3</sup> The text of Dulles' address before the American Legion is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, Sept. 14, 1953, p. 339.

<sup>4</sup> Representatives of the 16 nations which had participated in the U.N. Command met in Washington on July 27, 1953, and issued a declaration stating their support for the Armistice Agreement (signed that same day at Panmunjom), and indicating their belief that any breach of the Armistice would be so grave that it would probably be impossible to restrict the resultant hostilities to the confines of Korea. The Sixteen-Nation Declaration on Korea is printed in *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents* (2 volumes; Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957), vol. II, p. 2662. For related documentation, see volume xv.

seek to avoid connotations of A-bomb-rattling or premature United States conclusion Geneva can produce no Indochina settlement.

Within narrow limits which we assume will circumscribe United States freedom of action at Geneva, we fear it will be difficult to place blame for failure to reach Indochina settlement squarely upon Chinese or Russians insofar as French and presumably other European opinion is concerned. If British, as appears likely, are reluctant to go along with a rigid United States position, we may find ourselves in uncomfortable isolation. We know that intensive consideration of Indochina problem is taking place in Washington and we believe effect at Geneva upon major United States interests will depend to considerable measure upon such answers as may be found within next few weeks to questions like following:

How far are we prepared to go, in terms of United States national interest, to prevent further Communist expansion in Southeast Asia through (a) fighting or (b) negotiation involving United States concessions?

Will United States delegation have sufficient freedom for maneuver to enable it to explore possible differences of interest between Peiping and Moscow and to capitalize upon them if found?

In view of very substantial dividends which thorough tripartite preparation paid at Berlin and even more difficult situation which we will apparently face at Geneva, we strongly recommend maximum advance tripartite consultation on Indochina as suggested by Maurice Schumann (Embassy telegram 3176 March 4<sup>5</sup>).

DILLON

---

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 430.

---

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Gullion"

*Memorandum by Edmund A. Gullion of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of That Staff (Bowie)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 10, 1954.

Subject: Minimum Position for Geneva Conference (Comments on Paper by Bonsal)<sup>1</sup>

I am in complete agreement with what appear to be the principal features of this paper:

a) That we must set our face against any compromise peace at Geneva that would leave the Viet Minh army intact.

b) That, as a last resort, we should be ready to use US force to save Indochina. Yet I believe it will be difficult if not impossible to main-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Mar. 8. p. 437.



tain this position. Our paper should, therefore, take account of more detail. I have the following observations to make:

1. Although I realize that the paper is only a basis of discussion, I believe it falls short of defining the US minimum position at Geneva. The prospects of military victory upon which so much of our policy, as well as this paper is hinged, are not convincing even to most Frenchmen, much less so to the Communist conferees. I do not think that we can hope to convince the French that they are going to win after all (even though M. Bidault and M. Plevin believe it) or that the chances of our victory are so certain as to cause the Communists to accept something like the recent Laniel terms. In other words, the "major trump card in our side's hand at Geneva" which is characterized as the "recognized military ability and determination" to defeat the enemy's regular army, cannot be counted on to take tricks.

2. I am afraid that at Geneva or shortly thereafter we will have to contend with a series of proposals, either from the French or from the Communists, looking to a compromise peace; and, therefore, that our "minimum position paper" must deal more in detail with these possibilities.

3. As to the paper's major point—that we be ready if necessary to promise the use of US forces, I fear that we simply cannot make that promise. We have been progressively moving away from it during the period of the "linking" of Korea and Indochina as "two fronts on the same war"; the enunciation of the "New Look" with reliance on atom weapons; the formulation of the "disengagement" policy, and the declaration of a resolve not to become involved in the war, forced upon us by Congressional clamor over the deployment of a few technicians to Indochina.

4. If US forces were to be employed, I believe consideration should be given to whether it should be in the framework of a UN action or some collective action. Presumably, the PSA memorandum of December 18<sup>2</sup> does not exclude the collective approach but it appears to be conceived in terms of a Franco-Vietnamese-US action. If US forces *were* to be engaged, I believe that the prospects of success would be greater, and the chances of Congressional support greater if it were put on the basis of a new deal; i.e., a collective operation. This would also involve a redefinition of the status of the Associated States within the French Union.

5. As a general observation, I do not see how we can settle on a minimum position until the Administration has definitely determined that the negotiation on Indochina will not be linked with deals to be

---

<sup>2</sup> For an extract from the document under reference, see Bonsal's memorandum of Mar. 8, p. 437.

made in Korea, elsewhere in the Far East or Europe. If this determination is made, it should be included in the minimum position paper.

6. It seems to me that before a detailed position paper can be settled, we should urgently examine once more within this Government whether a military solution is feasible, what further support from France, the United States and Vietnam is required for it, and what steps should be taken to furnish that support.

---

396.1 GE/3-1054

*Memorandum by the Counselor (MacArthur)* <sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 10, 1954.

Subject: Meeting at 10:00 a. m. Thursday, March 11,<sup>2</sup> in Room 5104 New State to discuss the Indochina Phase of the Geneva Conference

I am attaching three papers to serve as guides for our discussion tomorrow morning:

Attachment A—A list of five Questions on the Indochina Problem at Geneva

Attachment B—A longer list of Questions on Indochina prepared by Mr. Bonsal

Attachment C—Possible Advance Tripartite Consultations on Indochina

I urge each of you to give as much thought as possible to the problems raised in the attached papers in order that we can obtain maximum benefit from our exchange of views.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II

Attachment A

THE PROBLEM OF INDOCHINA AT GENEVA: SOME QUESTIONS TO BE USED AS A GUIDE FOR DISCUSSION

1. What is the U.S. position regarding possible Communist proposals to:

*a.* hold a plebiscite in Indochina as the basis for the formation of a government for the whole country.

<sup>1</sup> Addressed to Merchant, Robertson, Key, Bowie, and Vice Admiral Davis.

<sup>2</sup> In a memorandum to MacArthur, Mar. 11, not printed, Trulock of S/S-O summarized decisions reached at the Mar. 11 meeting that papers would be prepared on the five questions listed in Attachment A. The first of these papers would summarize questions 1, 2, and 3, and would include a summary of the U.S. estimate of the probable Soviet and Chinese Communist intentions regarding the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference. Trulock suggested that this paper could serve as a basis for either another Assistant Secretary level meeting or for a meeting with the Secretary on this subject. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 262)

b. establish a coalition government which would include Ho Chi Minh or his followers.

c. cease fire and establish a demarcation line roughly along the 16th parallel with the area north of that line being handed over to the administration of Ho Chi Minh and his supporters.

2. What should the U.S. say and do with respect to the French if the latter are approached by the USSR and/or Communist China with a proposal to cease aid to the Viet Minh in return for French support for Chinese Communist entry into the UN or other steps to legitimize the Chinese Communist regime?

3. What should be the U.S. position in regard to the conditions for a cease fire put forward by M. Laniel on behalf of the French Government on March 5. (See Paris' unclassified telegram 3240, dated March 6.<sup>3</sup>)

As a tactical matter in our efforts to keep the French in line, if the Laniel conditions are in general acceptable to us, we might be able to hold the French to them whereas we might have great difficulty in holding them to proposals which emanated from us.

4. The U.S. may be confronted with a situation where the French would demand more active U.S. participation in Indochina in return for their rejecting Communist proposals unacceptable to us. How far should we go in giving assurances to the French in such a situation?

5. How far should the U.S. go at Geneva in committing itself to substantial contributions to the reconstruction of Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos after the end of hostilities? This might have an important effect in keeping the Associated States (and possibly also the French) in line.

#### Attachment B

#### SOME QUESTIONS ON THE INDOCHINA PHASE OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

1. Until we give the French Government our views regarding the composition and objectives of the Indochina phase of the Geneva conference, we run the risk of a crystalization of French attitudes and particularly the making of undesirable commitments by French leaders to their political followers. What is the latest date at which we should communicate our thinking to the French and British?

2. It is desirable to delay the Indochina discussions at Geneva. The Secretary envisages a discussion at Geneva among the four Berlin powers to determine the participants and the method of issuing invi-

<sup>3</sup> *Ante.* p. 435.

tations for the Indochina phase. Can we envisage a date such as June 15 for the start of the Indochina phase of discussions on the basis that agreement on invitations could be reached early in May?

3. Unless we are willing either to make concessions to the Chinese Communists in certain fields or to take a positive stand regarding U.S. participation in the struggle, we will achieve no more through negotiation at Geneva than the Communists believe the Franco-Vietnamese forces have the capacity and will to achieve militarily. To what extent do we still believe that the French and Vietnamese possess the will and the capacity to achieve decisive results in Indochina in accordance with the Laniel-Navarre principles in the event of a breakdown of negotiations?

4. It is possible that a desirable peace in Indochina could be obtained in return for concessions in other fields to the CPR and perhaps to the USSR. We are unwilling to recognize Communist China, to admit the CPR to the UN, to withdraw our support from the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa or to relax current trade embargoes against Communist China. Are there any other items desirable by the CPR or the USSR which we would be willing to consider as entering into a possible negotiating position?

5. It is probable that we could work out with the French and Vietnamese a minimum acceptable position for a negotiated cessation of the Indochina war. Such a settlement might include a cease fire along the lines recently set forth by Laniel,<sup>4</sup> general disarmament of native troops except for Vietnamese troops needed to maintain order, withdrawal of French Union troops to stated bases pending conclusion of regular Franco-Vietnamese arrangements, provision for a transitional period of political activity looking to eventual elections etc. Such a minimum acceptable position might be accepted by the enemy if the alternative were that the U.S. would consider continuation of hostilities by the Vietminh beyond a certain date as an aggression warranting "massive retaliatory action" against Communist China. Would the U.S. be willing to envisage such a position?

6. Unless the U.S. is willing to take an affirmative position as indicated above or unless the French and Vietnamese are willing and able to carry the Navarre plan to a conclusion, we will be confronted with a negotiated settlement which will leave the eight enemy divisions in Indochina undefeated and armed. This will make it highly likely that the whole area will fall to the Communists sooner or later. Do we agree that in the eventuality of this type of negotiated settlement, a

---

<sup>4</sup> See telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, p. 435.

partition which would turn Tonkin and northern Annam over to the Communists (a bitter loss of hundreds of thousands of friends) but would leave Laos, perhaps Cambodia and southern Annam and Cochin China within the French Union with French Union air and naval bases (under arrangements similar to those which we have in the Philippines) would be preferable to any other arrangement such as a plebiscite or a coalition government for the entire area?

7. A willingness on our side to contribute substantially to the reconstruction of Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos after the end of hostilities might be an important factor in stiffening the will to resist of the Vietnamese (and possibly the French) and in persuading them to adhere to an acceptable negotiating position. Can we be in a position to make definite commitments at Geneva?

#### Attachment C

#### POSSIBLE TRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS REGARDING INDOCHINA (IN ADVANCE OF GENEVA)

Both the French and the British have posed the possibility of tripartite consultations in Paris concerning the Indochina phase of the Geneva meetings. No definite ideas as to timing have been put forward, this aspect being somewhat complicated as regards the French because of the current talks with the Viet-Nameese.

If it is decided that such consultation should take place, a tripartite group might begin work in Paris about April 15 with a view to completing their work in time for the Ministers consideration when they arrive in Paris for the NATO meeting. This would be Apr. 21-22.

The advantage of such consultation is that it would enable the three ministers to concert their tactics in advance of the Geneva meeting. On the other hand, such consultation might result in stimulating the Indochinese question, when our basic purpose has been to gain as much time as possible for the military situation to develop in a favorable manner.

Should we encourage the idea of such consultation or should we maintain our present relaxed attitude and agree to such consultation only if the French push for it?

In any event, the opportunity must be found in Paris, prior to the Geneva meeting, for the Secretary to impress on M. Laniel and M. Bidault in unmistakable terms the U.S. position with regard to the Indochina phase of Geneva.

396.1 GE/3-1154

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of French-Iberian Affairs (McBride)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] March 11, 1954.

Subject: Order of Priority of Discussions at Geneva

Participants: Mr. Millet, Counselor, French Embassy  
Mr. McBride, WE

Mr. Millet called at Ambassador Bonnet's instruction to state that the Ambassador was concerned over the statements attributed to Mr. Suydam at the daily press conference today. He said that the statement carried in the UP to the effect that the French Government "understood" that the Korean phase would come before the Indochinese discussions at Geneva was not correct, and that the French Government, on the contrary, hoped the talks would take place simultaneously.

I stated that the position of the U.S. Government was, so far as I knew, governed by the Berlin communiqué from which it would certainly seem clear that in fact it was intended to start talking about Korea before getting to Indochina, which seemed definitely to be item No. 2 on the agenda. Therefore, the AP and UP stories quoting Mr. Suydam did not seem to be out of line, and Mr. Suydam's statements were in accordance with my understanding of the situation.

Mr. Millet concluded that the French Embassy here did not see it that way, and anyway the National Assembly now expected the two subjects to be discussed concurrently. Finally he said statements of this nature would cause harm to public opinion in France. I said I was sorry he felt that way, but did not see what other line we could take in response to queries. I concluded that we were in no way seeking publicity for our views, but pointed out that the Geneva meeting was a subject of great interest, and that accordingly the press would doubtless be following it continuously. I promised to convey the Ambassador's views to Mr. MacArthur as the Ambassador requested.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>The Department of State in telegram 3166 to Paris, Mar. 15, informed the Embassy about this conversation and indicated that the Berlin resolution implied that the Korean discussions would begin first at Geneva. There was no indication as to how soon after the start of the conference the Indochina phase should begin. The Department felt this question should be left open pending further development of the procedural arrangements and the U.S. position regarding Indochina. (396.1 GE/3-1254)

396.1 GE/3-1254 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy at Saigon*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, March 12, 1954—7:07 p. m.

1661. Cambodian Ambassador<sup>2</sup> called Department March 11 to inquire regarding Indochina phase Geneva Conference. He was told until Secretary had returned from Caracas, Dept could offer very little additional information.

Apparently on instructions his Government, Ambassador informed Department "informally" that Cambodia desired attend Geneva if invited and desired recognition of her "special position" which he said more similar that of Thailand than of Laos or Viet Nam. He also asked about possibility that invitation be issued by United States, stressing that this was not suggestion or expression of preference but purely request for information.

Department representative stated that while Department assumed Cambodia will be invited although no decision yet taken by Berlin powers, invitation to Associated States including Cambodia would presumably be issued by France in accordance with principles developed at Berlin and agreed quadripartitely in case Korean Political Conference.

Department representative stated assumption that Cambodian inquiry regarding conference plans addressed to U.S. also being addressed France. Ambassador gave impression Cambodia would find it difficult discuss this matter with French unless latter take initiative.

Comments of recipients would be appreciated. Above FYI only subject your later recommendation.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Bonsal and Hoey of PSA. Repeated to Paris as telegram 3139 and to Phnom Penh as telegram 48.

<sup>2</sup> Nong Kimny.

396.1 GE/3-1254 : Despatch

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

LONDON, March 12, 1954.

No. 3094

Subject: British Preparations for Geneva Conference

The following is a distillation of information obtained in a series of conversations with desk officers in the Foreign Office immediately concerned with planning for the Geneva Conference.

[Here follows Section A, dealing with Korea, which is not printed.]

B. *Indochina.*

1. In conversations with the Foreign Office, the French Embassy has explained that French willingness to continue the struggle in Indochina depends on the following factors in the order of their importance: (a) Pleven's report on his findings in Indochina, (b) the outcome of the conversations with Buu Loc in Paris, and (c) the trend of public opinion in Paris. If the military situation in Indochina is not too bad and if the probabilities are that the fighting qualities of the Vietnamese troops will soon show a marked improvement, then the French Government might be willing to brave an increasingly impatient and pessimistic public opinion and carry on at about the present scale for another year. Any indication that Buu Loc's demands are reasonable and that he is not out to jettison the French Union will, of course, be helpful. The French are increasingly concerned over the new Communist propaganda attack on United States military assistance to the French and Vietnamese forces in Indochina, as it will make it difficult for the French at Geneva to call on the Chinese to stop military assistance to the Vietminh.

2. In replying to the French, the Foreign Office has taken the position that it is primarily up to them and to the Americans to decide on what position to adopt at Geneva, although the British will, of course, wish to be consulted. In the British view, it will be difficult to keep the participation down to the Five Powers. It would be expected that the Associated States would wish to be represented and if they send delegates it would be difficult to oppose Vietminh representation. If other than the Five Powers are to be present, Australia and New Zealand will wish to have representatives there.

C. *Make-up of British Delegation to the Conference.*

1. The Foreign Secretary will, of course, attend the opening sessions of the Conference, and other sessions as needed. In his absence, the Delegation will be headed by Lord Reading. Assistant Under-Secretary Denis Allen, with the experience gained from participation in the Berlin Conference behind him, will head the working party. John Addis, the assistant to the head of the Far Eastern Department and specialist on Korean and Sino-Soviet relations, will do the spade work on Korea; he will be assisted by Julian Bullard. John Tahourdin, in charge of the South-East Asia Department, will do the spade work on Indochina.

2. On March 5th, the Foreign Office telegraphed Humphrey Trevelyan, in charge of the British diplomatic mission in Peiping, asking him unless he perceived objection to make arrangements to be present



at the Geneva Conference with the understanding that he would return to his post after the Conference was over. Having received no reply from Trevelyan, the Foreign Office assumes that he is prepared to go to Geneva and is conducting negotiations with the Chinese authorities to obtain the necessary exit and re-entry permits. It was the Foreign Office thought that Trevelyan's experience in Peiping would be of value to the British Delegation, that he himself would be helped by a change of scene . . . and that the Foreign Office representatives could benefit by an opportunity to discuss at first hand problems confronting him in Peiping.

For the Ambassador:  
ARTHUR R. RINGWALT  
*First Secretary of Embassy*

396.1 GE/3-1254

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for  
United Nations Affairs (Key) <sup>1</sup>*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] March 12, 1954.

Subject: Netherlands Acceptance of Invitation to Korean Political Conference

Participants: Mr. J. G. de Beus—Netherlands Minister  
Mr. David McK. Key—UNA  
Mr. Ward Allen—EUR  
Mr. David H. Popper—UNP

Mr. de Beus came in to present the attached note <sup>2</sup> accepting on behalf of the Netherlands Government the invitation to the Korean Political Conference. He stated that a public announcement to this effect would be made at 4:00 p. m. today in The Hague.

In response to queries from Mr. de Beus, I indicated that we would not get our consultations with other governments fully in train on the Korean question until we had responses to all of the invitations. I also indicated that we expected the French, generally speaking, to take the lead on Indochina.

Mr. de Beus told us his Ambassador had already informed FE that the Soviet Ambassador <sup>3</sup> had told the Dutch Ambassador <sup>4</sup> here that the Communists intend to suggest India, Indonesia, Burma and Thailand as "other interested states" for inclusion in the Indochina phase of the Conference. The Soviet Ambassador apparently also stated that the Communists would not initially propose that Ho Chi Minh attend

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Popper of UNP.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (396.1 GE/3-1254)

<sup>3</sup> Georgi N. Zaroubin.

<sup>4</sup> Dr. J. H. van Roijen.

but would wait for our side to propose the Associated States after which they would propose Ho Chi Minh as a bargaining counter.

DAVID MCK. KEY

---

396.1 GE/3-1354 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, March 13, 1954—1 p. m.

3344. Repeated information Saigon 387, Phnom Penh 33. Deptel 3139 (Saigon 1661, Phnom Penh 48) March 12.<sup>1</sup> In event approach made by Associated States to US re views on participation Associated States IC conference Geneva, Embassy does not believe that we should go beyond general position such as that indicated reftel to effect this a question for decision by Berlin powers at Geneva and presumably method issuance of invitation will be decided at that time.

On other hand, Embassy does not consider question participation Associated States IC conference Geneva appropriate subject for US to raise with Associated States and is of opinion that any initiative taken to express our views in this regard should be vis-à-vis French Government and in manner reflecting our full appreciation existence French Union relationship. As indicated in Embtels 3175,<sup>2</sup> 3176,<sup>3</sup> and 3209,<sup>4</sup> French have stated that their position will be determined after reaching agreement Associated States and consultation with UK and US, and that our views will play important role in determination their position.

Question participation Associated States is one French presumably desire to discuss in tripartite IC talks Paris prior April 26. As regards Cambodian fear that French may not take initiative to approach them in regard their participation Geneva, Embassy can only point out that French have said that they intend to reach agreement with Associated States this score. Presumably this question would be raised with Cambodia in connection with Franco-Cambodian negotiations expected to begin Paris end of March just as it is understood that this subject will be thoroughly explored with Vietnamese during current Franco-Vietnamese negotiations.

DILLON

---

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 453.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Dated Mar. 4, p. 430.

<sup>4</sup> In addition to reporting (in telegram 3209, Mar. 5, not printed) the French position on seating the Associated States, the Embassy in Paris said that it was unaware of any French effort to exclude the Associated States if they wished to be present and if the possible presence of a Viet Minh Government was not objectionable to the United States and the United Kingdom. (396.1 GE/3-554)

396.1 GE/3-1354 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, March 13, 1954—2 p. m.

575. Re Moscow's 1075 rptd London 153 Paris 212.<sup>2</sup> We have also become increasingly aware possibility Soviet reply may attempt to inject "Five Power" facade at outset in arranging for Geneva Conference. Delay in Soviet reply together with our belief Chinese Communists will try to grab at every scrap, symbolic, organizational, and procedural, in arranging Conference would seem to point up this strong possibility.

Embassies London and Paris are requested urgently to discuss situation with FonOffs in light Moscow's and this message and to request them to instruct their Ambassadors in Moscow to concert with Bohlen on reply along following lines if USSR raises "Five Power" idea:

"Bohlen would receive Soviet communication and state that he would transmit it to US Govt and to his British and French colleagues.

He should state however that he is authorized to say that as far as Three govts are concerned, Korean Political Conference in Geneva could not be convened on any terms differing from those agreed by four Foreign Ministers in Berlin, and Three govts are quite sure there was no misunderstanding of those terms on part of Soviet Union. He would merely observe that Soviet communication suggests basis different from that agreed at Berlin for holding Conference in Geneva, which he felt certain would be unacceptable."

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Galloway of C. Repeated to Paris as telegram 3150 and to London as telegram 4708.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1075 from Moscow, Mar. 13, not printed, the Embassy informed the Department that Soviet delay in replying to the proposals for preparation of the conference (p. 28), was probably caused by difficulties encountered with China over the Soviet failure to achieve at Berlin an acceptance of the People's Republic of China as one of the Big Five. (396.1 GE/3-1354)

396.1 GE/3-1054 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, March 13, 1954—10:31 p. m.

771. Reference your 493.<sup>2</sup> The Geneva conference on Korea and Indochina is not an international conference on the Far East. That is

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Robertson of FE.

<sup>2</sup> Dated Mar. 10, not printed. The Embassy in Taipei had reported to the Department that the Chinese Government probably would object strongly to the attendance of the People's Republic of China at "an international conference, especially one concerned with the Far East and above all one to which the Chinese Government itself is not invited." (396.1 GE/3-1054)

precisely what Secretary refused to be party to. The Korean Political Conference was called for in the Armistice Agreement<sup>3</sup> and the United Nations Resolution of August 28, 1953.<sup>4</sup> It is exactly what we endeavored unsuccessfully for six weeks to arrange at Panmunjom. It is a clear-cut conference between the two sides engaged in the fighting uncluttered by neutrals. The sole objective is to negotiate a peaceful agreement for a unified independent Korea. Geneva was agreed upon last August between Secretary and President Rhee as one of the places which would be acceptable. Recognition *de facto* or otherwise for CPR is neither involved nor implied. ROK and those nations under the United Nations Command are negotiating with the Soviet-Communist side as the enemies responsible for the aggression. Berlin Communiqué and other data sent you in our opinion made this abundantly clear. Conference on Indochina to be held simultaneously with Korean Political Conference will include USSR and CPR as quasi belligerents. Obviously no agreements could be effective which did not bind the perpetrators of the conflict. If our Chiefs of Mission are confused by communists propaganda about Geneva it is small wonder that our Asian allies are more so.<sup>5</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement, signed on July 27, 1953 at Panmunjom, contained a recommendation by the military commanders of both sides to the governments concerned that a political conference be held to settle the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc. Text printed in *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, p. 742.

<sup>4</sup> UNGA Resolution 711 (VII) welcomed the holding of the proposed political conference recommended in the Armistice Agreement; the text is printed *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 2676.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 512 from Taipei, Mar. 16, not printed, Ambassador Rankin took issue with the Department's comment that the Chief of Mission was "confused by Communists' propaganda." (396.1 GE/3-1654) The Department, in telegram 789 to Taipei, Mar. 22, not printed, informed the Embassy in Taipei that confusion had been general in high levels at home and abroad on this subject. (396.1 GE/3-1654)

---

396.1 GE/3-1354

*Memorandum by the Counselor (MacArthur)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 13, 1954.

Subject: Questions Relating to the Geneva Conference

1. *Proposed letter from Secretary to Bidault*

Our Paris Embassy is increasingly concerned with the extent to which hopes for finding an Indochina settlement at Geneva are rising in France, with the growing belief that U.S. "concessions" to China will be necessary for such a settlement. Plevin's most unfortunate briefing

of five American correspondents is indicative of the attitude of certain allegedly friendly members of the French Government. If the French Government is not now given clearly to understand the way the U.S. views the Indochina aspects of the Geneva Conference, the situation in Paris can get completely out of hand. Accordingly, it is believed that the Secretary should send a personal message to Bidault.

## 2. *Composition of the U.S. Delegation*

The composition of the U.S. Delegation is of great importance for it is manifestly impossible for the Secretary to remain at Geneva for the duration of the Conference. If the Under Secretary is to head the U.S. Delegation at Geneva after the Secretary's departure, it seems imperative that he be at Geneva with the Secretary from the opening of the Conference. It is also important that the Under Secretary have the best possible support we can give him, and it is suggested that his principal advisers throughout the Conference be Ambassador Dillon, Assistant Secretary Robertson, Ambassador Heath, and presumably Admiral Davis of the Department of Defense. It is recommended that Ambassador Johnson from Prague act as Coordinator and "Chief of Staff" of the Delegation, assisted by Mr. Young (for Korea) and Mr. Bonsal (for Indochina). The foregoing individuals would be supported by lower level advisers from the Department and the field as appropriate (Mr. Gibson of the Paris Embassy should be included in this group).

## 3. *Duration of the Secretary's stay at Geneva*

It is suggested that the Secretary might wish to stay at Geneva for a period of not more than ten days or two weeks. If the Conference develops the way we want it to, beginning with Korea, the Secretary might actually not be at Geneva when the Indochina item comes up. (It is recognized that the French will wish to have parallel discussions on Korea and Indochina from the very beginning of the Conference.) There are advantages in not having the Secretary deeply involved in the Indochina discussions at Geneva. Furthermore, it seems most important because of the hazards and problems connected with Indochina aspects of the Geneva Conference, that the Secretary be in Washington where he could lay before the U.S. Government and congressional leadership, first-hand, certain problems and alternatives which the Geneva Conference may pose. The U.S. Delegation in turn would then receive instructions on the position it should take. In this connection, it would be logical that the Secretary return to Washington if he and the Under Secretary both were at Geneva, since it could be pointed out that they both could not be absent for more than a relatively short period of time.

#### 4. *Tripartite Coordination*

Both the British and the French have asked our views on preliminary tripartite coordination regarding Indochina. On the one hand, there are disadvantages in beginning tripartite coordination very far in advance of the Geneva meeting. Too early preparation could lead to pressures from the French to get out invitations to participants in the Indochina part of the Conference so that such participants could be at Geneva on April 26. On the other hand, if the French are permitted to develop their own position with respect to Indochina, without benefit of U.S. guidance, we might find ourselves faced with a frozen French position at Geneva with which we could not live and which would in part be based on concessions which France would expect the U.S. to make to Communist China. Also, refusal to have any tripartite coordination could lead the French to adopting a fixed position and then saying we were responsible because obviously France had developed a position and we had been unwilling to cooperate with her and therefore she had been obliged to prepare a position without our advice and views.

In the light of the above dilemma, the following schedule for tripartite coordination is suggested :

*April 15-20*, tripartite working group in Paris. The U.S. Principal member would be Ambassador Dillon, with an appropriate deputy and such supporting personnel as necessary.

*April 21*, 9 a. m., Secretary and Under Secretary arrive in Paris. Afternoon, tripartite meeting with Bidault and Eden.

*April 22*, tripartite meetings of the Secretary, Bidault, and Eden.

*April 23*, NATO Council meeting.

*April 24*, Proceed to Geneva.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II

---

751G.00/3-1554 : Telegram

*The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

SAIGON, March 15, 1954—noon.

1688. Repeated information Paris 523. It seems most probable that at Geneva the Communists will confront us with a proposal for a cease-fire followed by genuinely free elections for a national assembly—possibly under UN supervision—for all of Vietnam. They must know that if such elections were held today with a slate of Ho candidates camouflaged as genuine nationalists riding on the peace wave lined

up against some sort of Bao Dai combination unfortunately linked in the popular mind with alleged French domination, they would almost certainly win, both in the controlled zones and in Viet Minh areas. In addition to this natural present advantage the Viet Minh would constitute the only strong, well organized political group, proposed by querulous, ill-organized, fiercely competitive and narrowly partisan groups.

The Communists may be expected either to open the conference with such proposal, or to use it as dramatic response to any initial Western proposal. The present Laniel-Pleven conditions for a truce and political negotiations (Paris telegram 3240 repeated Saigon 362<sup>1</sup>) will certainly not be acceptable to the Communists, who may be expected to ask the world why they should abandon diplomatically advantages which the French have not been able to force them to give up by force of arms, e.g.—withdrawal from South Vietnam and the Tonkin Delta and cessation of Chinese aid. Brushing aside such details as legalistic and unnecessary, they could pose as the truly democratic party and offer us free elections.

If we failed to accept such an offer we would open ourselves to most telling attacks as the opponent of democracy and the proponent of continued war, greatly damaging our cause and our prestige in Vietnam and before world opinion. It is thus of paramount importance either to forestall this Communist gambit if possible, or, if presented, to counter it effectively without losing the psychological initiative and preventing the development of a situation which the Communists could use to smear us with an anti-democratic label.

(1) In searching for solutions, possible course of action meriting immediate exploration is to contrive to have the Vietnamese hold national elections prior to the Geneva conference, and thus present the Communists there with the fact of a functioning elected government, either negotiating accords with the French to perfect the country's independence or already in possession of completed agreement. If such elections were possible, they would not only limit the scope of possible Communist proposals, but would also strengthen the Vietnamese-French position before world opinion and help provide a political apparatus throughout the controlled zones which would strengthen the social fabric, satisfy nationalist and democratic aspirations thus diminishing the Viet Minh appeal, and improve the basis for a political counter attack against the Viet Minh. Many difficulties lie in the way of such elections, the fact of newness and lack of strength of Buu Loc

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Mar. 6, p. 435.

Government, the inertia and confusion of Vietnamese themselves, lack of strong political leaders and the opposition of Bao Dai. In addition time is short, and the necessary organization and technical facilities will be difficult to assemble in so little time by inexperienced personnel. Still, the reward would be great, and the present political climate seems ripe for such development, with former President Huu <sup>2</sup> saying last week that there is a "general upsurge of popular feeling in favor of elections and a national assembly". (See Embtels 1638 <sup>3</sup> and 1653, <sup>4</sup> sent Paris as 506 and 515.) It will be remembered that ex-President Tam <sup>5</sup> told us while he preferred indirect elections to national assembly he saw the possibility of "safe" direct elections for such a body.

(2) Whether or not such controlled zone elections could be held prior to the conference, a Communist proposal to hold free nationwide elections might be countered with an acceptance of the principle, and a demand to hold such elections simultaneously in Vietnam and in Germany. The comparison of the two situations might be somewhat more valid if elections for a Vietnamese Government could be held first, but in any event we could make a powerful case for linking the two problems. A Communist demand for free elections throughout Vietnam would probably be similar to the recent allied position at Berlin and this could be pointed out tellingly. Having presented such a proposal for Germany, only to be rebuffed by the Communist world, we now find the same principles in their proposal for Indochina. We point out the similarity, which they have perhaps not noticed, merely because the parallel is so striking, and, now that they have accepted the principle of genuinely free elections, they surely would not desire to extend this benefit to Indochina without offering it simultaneously to Germany, thus solving two of the world's most difficult problems at a single stroke. Although the terms of reference of the Geneva conference may preclude this maneuver and the French, desirous of an end to the fighting in Indochina, may refuse to permit it (Bidault has stated his opposition to "global" solutions) we feel that such a counterproposal would stymie a Communist offer of free elections here while regaining the psychological initiative for the West, since it seems highly improbable that the Soviets would be willing to accept a united,

---

<sup>2</sup> Tran Van Huu, Prime Minister of Vietnam, May 1950-June 1952.

<sup>3</sup> Dated Mar. 10. For text, see volume XIII.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 1653 from Saigon, Mar. 12, read: "Re last paragraph Embtel 1640, repeated Paris 508. USIS has noted since decision at Berlin discuss Indochina at Geneva Conference that Saigon Vietnamese press has ceased making use of normal supply of anti-Communist editorial material and factual stories. This material accepted from USIS but not published." (396.1 GE/3-1254) For text of telegram 1640 from Saigon, Mar. 10, see volume XIII.

<sup>5</sup> Nguyen Van Tam, Prime Minister of Vietnam, June 1952-December 1953.



democratic, West oriented Germany in exchange for a probably Communist dominated Indochina.<sup>6</sup>

HEATH

---

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 1703 to Saigon, repeated to Paris as telegram 3220, Mar. 18, the Department replied that it would welcome any successful manifestations of political vitality in Vietnam including the holding of national elections prior to the Geneva Conference if this were feasible and asked if the Embassy recommended any action by the Embassy or by the Department. The Department stated that it did not believe it was possible to contemplate countering a Communist proposal to hold free nationwide elections in Vietnam with demands that such elections be held simultaneously in Vietnam and Germany. The Department felt that such a counterproposal would involve an implicit admission that the Western position with respect to Vietnam was roughly equivalent to the Soviet position regarding East Germany. (751G.00/3-1554)

---

751G.00/3-1554

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1954.

Subject: Indochina Discussions at Geneva.

Before becoming immersed in the position papers and working groups which will characterize our preparations for Geneva, I would like to set down, with a view to securing your concurrence, certain principal guidelines which, if you agree, I should like to use as defining FE's position:

(1) A substantial part of US aid to and support of France and the Associated States is predicated on French determination and ability to carry out a military plan described in Bidault's note of September 29, 1953,<sup>2</sup> to Ambassador Dillon in the following terms ". . . the strategic plan of the French Command consists essentially of retaking the offensive with a view to breaking up and destroying the regular enemy forces. Convinced that the military problem in Indochina can be settled only in conformity with such a plan, the French Government confirms that it intends to carry forward vigorously and promptly the execution thereof".

---

<sup>1</sup> Under an intradepartmental reference slip, Mar. 16, Bonsal forwarded a copy of his memorandum to MacArthur with the following comment: "The attached memorandum is designed to attempt to clarify the substantive outline of our position at Geneva with regard to Indochina. Mr. Robertson tells me that he goes along with the first seven paragraphs but has reservations regarding the 8th and 9th paragraphs." (751G.00/3-1554)

<sup>2</sup> For text, see volume XIII.

(2) There is growing evidence of a waning determination, if not ability, on the part of the French to carry through to a conclusion the plan above described. Regardless of the reasons for this changed attitude or of its justification, we are not currently in a position to draw any practical consequences from this apparent falling away from the Franco-American understandings of last September. In other words, we cannot currently alter our policy of financial and military end-item support for the French in Indochina even though the French appear to be altering the concept on which that support has been based. The maintenance and, to the extent possible, the improvement of the present military position and the avoidance of anything which might contribute to its deterioration are essential elements of our policy.

(3) Our side will not obtain at the conference table, whether in Korea or in Indochina, any more than the enemy believes our side has the ability and determination to achieve on the field of battle. At best, if we can convince the enemy that we have the ability and determination to achieve a given result, we may be able to avoid having to demonstrate them practically.

(4) We will maintain at Geneva our firm position regarding non-recognition of Communist China by the US, US refusal to admit Communist China to the UN, US support of Nationalist China and the non-lifting of the embargo on trade with Communist China.

(5) It appears unlikely that we will be in a position to bolster the French with assurances of US military intervention in Indochina in order to prevent a settlement unacceptable to us or to insure military victory for our side. We will probably not be in a position to use the threat of massive retaliatory action against China to enforce an acceptable solution in Indochina.

(6) Thus, assuming that we do get to a point of actually discussing Indochina at Geneva, we will be able to achieve a negotiating result no more favorable than is warranted by Franco-Vietnamese capacities and will power at the time. We have no fresh political or military contribution to make to a settlement.

(7) Every effort will be made by the enemy to divide France and the United States, to contrast a peace-loving, reasonable France anxious to stop the death of her sons with a warmongering United States eager to continue a slaughter in which American soldiers are not engaged.

(8) Since France, the UK and the US will be unable to present a strong, united front in the matter of China policy or of the stepping up of the military potential of our side, it is particularly important that they do present such a front with regard to a proposal for peace in Indochina to be submitted as a French initiative at Geneva with the

full support of Vietnam, the US and the UK. I conceive of agreement on such a proposal as a major task in the preparations for Geneva. A proposal of this kind should involve the acceptance of the principle that a country divided by eight years of bitter civil war needs a cessation of hostilities, a radical reduction of armed forces and a fairly lengthy period of political and economic reconstruction before it can achieve a reunited national existence. The necessary controls for the operation of such a proposal could be supplied by the UN or in some other mutually agreed manner. Some major elements in a specific proposal might be the following (submitted purely for illustrative purposes) :

(a) A cease-fire based on the conditions recently set forth by Laniel and presumably including also return of all prisoners.

(b) Arrangements for reciprocal reduction of native armed forces and armament under controlled conditions.

(c) Concentration of non-native armed forces at stated bases and their reduction in accordance with a timetable geared to the reduction of native forces. (Substantial non-native forces should remain until final establishment of representative native government in order to guarantee the lives and property of the French residents and their native supporters.)

(d) No change in *status quo* of Vietnamese Government or of Democratic Republic of Vietnam so far as international relations are concerned. This would mean in effect that the question of Vietnam's definitive membership in the French Union would not be settled until the formation of a unified national government in 1957 (see below), although present and prospective constitutional and treaty relationships between France and Vietnam would continue in force as long as the present Vietnam Government endures.

(e) Provisional arrangements for local administration including an allocation of provinces more or less on a *status quo* basis. This would amount in effect to a continuation for a couple of years of the patchwork which has characterized the eight war years. Provision for a gradual restoration of freedom of movement throughout the country would also be required although in the case of outstanding political or military leaders this would be a delicate matter and might be considerably delayed.

(f) Provisions for the prompt restoration of major roads, railroads and communications throughout the country. France and the US might announce a willingness to devote a substantial portion of the money they are now spending on fighting the war to the intensive reconstruction of Vietnam.

(g) Provisions for the political reconstruction of the country including the announcement of January 1st, 1957 (for example) as the date for nation-wide elections to a national assembly which would draw up a definitive constitution for Vietnam.

(9) The above is of course far from being even an outline of a complete proposal. I am not convinced myself of the workability of all the suggestions made. But I do think that our side can and should work

out a proposal, which, if accepted by the enemy, we could live with. It should also be one which, if refused by the enemy, would at least give us the "conference" advantage of having taken, at the opening of the discussions on Indochina, a comprehensive and reasonable attitude. Furthermore, the fact of having made a real effort to find a workable solution through negotiations should improve the position of the three governments most concerned on our side (France, Vietnam and US) with their own public opinions should it prove necessary and feasible to develop further military assets in order to seek a solution through military means.

---

396.1 GE/3-1754 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, March 17, 1954—5 p. m.

3402. Repeated information Moscow 272, London 787. In what may be beginning of Neutralist and Leftist campaign to charge that US will endeavor postpone or call off Geneva conference on any possible pretext as result reluctance make necessary concessions Communist China, Leftist and Communist press slant Secretary's reported statement to press at Washington yesterday to effect Geneva conference might possibly be delayed as result dilatory tactics on part of Soviets and Chinese Communists as follows:

Leftist *Combat* headlines its comments "Asiatic Conference Would be Postponed at Request USA" and states that it is not a question of any differences between Moscow and Peking but question of who will first pay "agreed price", i.e., will France ratify EDC before US makes concessions Peking in view ending IC war or will US make concessions in hope Parliament will ratify EDC? Secretary Dulles "in waving bogey of postponement" risks casting aside carefully drafted French timetable.

Communist *Humanité* states Secretary has confessed openly will of leaders at Washington to sabotage Geneva conference and, if possible, prevent its convocation. "This is what Secretary meant in saying that it was conceivable that Geneva conference might be delayed beyond April 26."

DILLON

---

*Editorial Note*

For the text of the Soviet reply, dated March 17, to the proposals concerning preparation for the Geneva Conference, see telegram 1086, March 17, page 38.

396.1 GE/3-1754 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department  
of State*

SECRET NIACT

Moscow, March 17, 1954—8 p. m.

1087. Repeated information niact London 158, Paris 217. Report of my conversation with Kuznetsov follows (Embtel 1085<sup>1</sup>):

Kuznetsov read and then handed me *aide-mémoire* given in my immediately preceding telegram.<sup>2</sup>

I told him I would of course, communicate it immediately to my government but, with reference to statement in first paragraph concerning consultation with Chinese Communist Government, I wished to remind him that in accordance with Berlin decision the four powers and the four powers alone were responsible for organizing the conference and that while Soviet Government of course had the right to consult with any government it wished, this could not be interpreted as indicating that CPR had any special right whatsoever as compared with other invited countries nor any role to play in the organization of the conference.

Kuznetsov said that Soviet Government of course had right to consult as it desired and considered that was useful to know the views of the parties in the conference.

I repeated that that would apply equally to any other countries invited to attend and read to him the pertinent paragraphs from the Russian text of the Berlin agreement which made it plain that the four Foreign Ministers of the four countries were proposing the Korean political conference at Geneva and hence were responsible for the arrangements, repeating that CPR was an invited country on the same basis as all others invited.

Kuznetsov did not attempt to argue the point. He did not contest my interpretation of the Berlin agreement and in fact stated that we (meaning, I presume, officials) had no right to alter an agreement reached by the four Foreign Ministers.

I believe it would be important in replying to this *aide-mémoire* the point that the Chinese Communists were consulted by Soviet Government by its own desire and not by any right should be reemphasized. It will be noted that Soviet reply raises in substance certain points not contained in my *aide-mémoire* of March 5 based on Deptel 548<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. (396.1 GE/3-1754)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1086, Mar. 17, p. 38.

<sup>3</sup> For the text of the *aide-mémoire* of Mar. 5, see p. 28. Telegram 548 to Moscow not printed. (396.1 GE/2-2754)

such as official and working languages at the conference and method of interpretation which I read to be similar to system used at Berlin ACC Building. Apart from this and reference to Chinese consultation, Soviet reply accepts most of our suggestions. Suggestion that French should speak for four powers in dealing with SYG is part of current Soviet attempt to play up to French sensibilities and is clearly designed to get away from the idea of four in order not to underline the absence of Communist China. Contents of document would appear to confirm fact that delay was due to discussions with China and reference to consultation and suggestion that Chinese would be official and working language is probably result of compromise designed to create appearance that Communist China if not fully on parity with four powers is at least not quite on same level as other invited powers.

BOHLEN

---

396.1 GE/3-1754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, March 17, 1954—7:39 p. m.

4792. Re Moscow's 1086 rptd London 157 Paris 216.<sup>2</sup> Seek concurrence FonOff that tripartite coordination of views should take place Washington to reach agreement on arrangements to be made with UN re facilities and services to be provided at Geneva for Korean Political Conference. Results of tripartite consultation could then be transmitted to Soviets at Moscow in reply to Soviet *aide-mémoire* set forth in reftel. Since UN has been pressing us almost daily re use Palais des Nations bldg, we are informally letting UNSYG know tripartite agreement has been reached with Soviets on use that building and that as agreement on related matters is reached he will be kept informed by one of the three governments.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Eddy of UNA and Thurston of EE. Repeated to Paris as telegram 3209 and to Moscow as telegram 582.

<sup>2</sup> Dated Mar. 17, p. 38.

396.1 GE/3-1954 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1954—6:45 p. m.

4850. British Embassy has approached Department re possibility Soviet may raise European questions at Geneva. They have showed us copy Foreign Office cable summarized below and requested Department's views.

*Begin summary.* Nothing to be gained by reopening Berlin discussions on Germany and Austria unless Russians prepared to modify their position. While they would seem to have no interest in resuming discussions they have given increasing attention recently to security proposals tabled by Molotov at Berlin. Already agreed composition and agenda for Geneva should preclude discussion such European items and we should "presumably" refuse consideration on these grounds.

If Soviet suggest further talks re European matters by *Four Foreign Ministers* (without Communist China) Western powers should point out views of four governments fully expressed at Berlin and no useful purpose served by further negotiation unless and until Soviet government prepared to agree to free elections in Germany and withdrawal of additional demands re Austria. We would then meet at time and place mutually agreed but not at Geneva conference, task of which already sufficient.

Another possibility is Soviet attempt at Geneva to obtain agreement to (A) Five Power conference to consider international tension or (B) reconvening Four Power conference to consider European matters. Re (B) we should not commit ourselves to hold conference unless and until we feel it can serve a useful purpose. Re (A) "Our final attitude must to some extent be dependent, so far at least as the Far East is concerned, upon whatever progress is made at Geneva over Korea and Indochina." *End summary.*

We have informed Embassy we think it unlikely European issues will be raised by Soviets at Geneva. In event they are we would agree with British position outlined above with exception (A) quoted in preceding paragraph. We have informed Embassy our position re Five Power conference was clearly set forth by Secretary at Berlin

---

<sup>1</sup>Drafted by Elbrick of EUR. Repeated to Paris as telegram 3237 and to Moscow as telegram 586.

and we are fundamentally opposed to Five Power concept regardless of developments on Far Eastern issues at Geneva.

Above for your information and use in discussions this subject with British officials.<sup>2</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>2</sup> In a memorandum dated Mar. 19, Elbrick reported to Merchant, MacArthur, and McConaughy that he had informed Adam Watson, First Secretary of the British Embassy, of the Department's views substantially as set forth in the first paragraph of the above telegram. (396.1 GE/3-1954)

---

396.1 GE/3-2254 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

LONDON, March 22, 1954—5 p. m.

4072. Repeated information Paris 552, Saigon 16. Deptel 4818 March 18<sup>1</sup> and Embtel 4053 March 20,<sup>2</sup> both repeated Paris, Saigon. Geneva Conference.

1. Embassy officer asked call this noon at Foreign Office where he given oral statement UK position as follows:

(a) We agree (i) We must do all we can prevent principle from being established at Geneva that the five powers are recognized as being in a special position as a kind of inner directing group, and (ii) before substantive talks can begin on Indochina procedural question must first be settled as to which are the "other interested states" to be invited.

(b) But we think that to insist too formally and rigidly that this procedural question is a matter for decision by the four powers might merely compel Communists press thesis it is matter for the five; moreover in practice the procedural question cannot be settled without consultation of some kind with the Chinese.

(c) Therefore, our best hope of making progress without precipitating the five-power issue lies in maintaining principle that all powers at Geneva are there on same footing, in avoiding formal establishment of any inner group whether four power or five power and in keeping all consultations outside the conference meetings as private and informal as possible and our procedures reasonably flexible.

---

<sup>1</sup> The Department in telegram 4818 to London, Mar. 18, asked for confirmation that Britain agreed that after opening of the conference, four Foreign Ministers at Geneva would take up and decide the questions of (1) participants in the Indochina phase, (2) issuance of invitations, and (3) the date on which substantive discussions could begin. (396.1 GE/3-1854)

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 4053 from London, Mar. 20, the Embassy informed the Department that the Foreign Office had offered the tentative view that the U.S. position might be too rigid and that "while we can avoid substantive talks on Indochina beginning concurrently with substantive talks on Korea, it may prove quite impossible avoid procedural talks on Indochina beginning immediately conference opens." (396.1 GE/3-2054)



2. In telegram sent Washington yesterday evening Foreign Office outlines for British Embassy its thinking on number of related points. Foreign Office believes we will have difficulty in preventing use of Chinese as official language, especially as Chinese is recognized as official language in UN. If Soviets insist on use of Chinese as official language, we might initially counter by proposing English, French and Russian as official languages and Chinese and Korean (and perhaps others) as unofficial languages. We must not however let ourselves be maneuvered into a position where conference could break down merely over relatively minor question of procedure, and in event strong opposition from Communists should be prepared give in on language question. As might be expected, Foreign Office concerned not so much over issues of prestige (including whether or not Chinese Communists gain qualified recognition as great power) as over necessity of having western position at Geneva defensible in eyes of as many nations as possible.

ALDRICH

---

396.1 GE/3-2354

*The Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1954.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Pursuant to a recommendation of the Under Secretary of State, the Department of Defense has considered the military implications of a negotiated settlement to terminate the hostilities in Indochina. The views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter were submitted to me in a memorandum dated 12 March 1954. These views, together with the views of General G. B. Erskine, USMC (Ret), Chairman of the Subcommittee of the President's Special Committee, were submitted to the Special Committee in a memorandum dated 17 March 1954.<sup>1</sup> It is understood that the Department of State is presently considering General Erskine's report.

I am fully in accord with General Erskine's recommendations and the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this matter. Accordingly, there is forwarded herewith for your information a copy of the aforementioned documents which represent the views of the Department of Defense. It is recommended that these views be carefully considered in preparation of the United States position on Indochina for the forthcoming conference at Geneva.

Sincerely yours,

C. E. WILSON

---

<sup>1</sup> Both memoranda were listed as enclosures to the source text but were not attached. Copies printed here are in PPS files, lot 65 D 101, box 532. Letter and enclosures are printed in *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*, Book 9, pp. 276-290.

[Enclosure 1]

*Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary  
of Defense (Wilson)*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 12 March 1954.

Subject: Preparation of Department of Defense Views Regarding  
Negotiations on Indochina for the Forthcoming Geneva  
Conference

1. This memorandum is in response to your memorandum dated  
5 March 1954, subject as above.

2. In their consideration of this problem, the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
have reviewed *United States Objectives And Courses of Action With  
Respect To Southeast Asia* (NSC 5405),<sup>2</sup> in the light of developments  
since that policy was approved on 16 January 1954, and they are of  
the opinion that, from the military point of view, the statement of  
policy set forth therein remains entirely valid. The Joint Chiefs of  
Staff reaffirm their views concerning the strategic importance of Indo-  
china to the security interests of the United States and the Free World  
in general, as reflected in NSC 5405. They are firmly of the belief that  
the loss of Indochina to the Communists would constitute a political  
and military setback of the most serious consequences.

3. With respect to the possible courses of action enumerated in para-  
graph 2 of your memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit the  
following views:

*a. Maintenance of the status quo.* In the absence of a very substan-  
tial improvement in the French Union military situation, which could  
best be accomplished by the aggressive prosecution of military opera-  
tions, it is highly improbable that Communist agreement could be  
obtained to a negotiated settlement which would be consistent with  
basic United States objectives in Southeast Asia. Therefore, continua-  
tion of the fighting with the objective of seeking a military victory  
appears as the only alternative to acceptance of a compromise settle-  
ment based upon one or more of the possible other courses of action  
upon which the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been specifically  
requested in your memorandum.

*b. Imposition of a cease-fire.* The acceptance of a cease-fire in ad-  
vance of a satisfactory settlement would, in all probability, lead to a  
political stalemate attended by a concurrent and irretrievable deterio-  
ration of the Franco-Vietnamese military position. (See paragraph 27  
of NSC 5405.)

*c. Establishment of a coalition government.* The acceptance of a  
settlement based upon the establishment of a coalition government in  
one or more of the Associated States would open the way for the ulti-  
mate seizure of control by the Communists under conditions which  
might preclude timely and effective external assistance in the preven-  
tion of such seizure. (See subparagraph 26b of NSC 5405.)

<sup>2</sup> For the full text of NSC 5405, Jan. 16, 1954, and related documentation, see  
volume XII.

*d. Partition of the country.* The acceptance of a partitioning of one or more of the Associated States would represent at least a partial victory for the Viet Minh, and would constitute recognition of a Communist territorial expansion achieved through force of arms. Any partition acceptable to the Communists would in all likelihood include the Tonkin Delta area which is acknowledged to be the keystone of the defense of mainland Southeast Asia, since in friendly hands it cuts off the most favorable routes for any massive southward advance towards central and southern Indochina and Thailand. (See paragraph 4 of NSC 5405.) A partitioning involving Vietnam and Laos in the vicinity of the 16th Parallel, as has been suggested (see State cable from London, No. 3802, dated 4 March 1954<sup>3</sup>), would cede to Communist control approximately half of Indochina, its people and its resources, for exploitation in the interests of further Communist aggression; specifically, it would extend the Communist dominated area to the borders of Thailand, thereby enhancing the opportunities for Communist infiltration and eventual subversion of that country. Any cession of Indochinese territory to the Communists would constitute a retrogressive step in the Containment Policy, and would invite similar Communist tactics against other countries of Southeast Asia.

*e. Self-determination through free elections.* Such factors as the prevalence of illiteracy, the lack of suitable educational media, and the absence of adequate communications in the outlying areas would render the holding of a truly representative plebiscite of doubtful feasibility. The Communists, by virtue of their superior capability in the field of propaganda, could readily pervert the issue as being a choice between national independence and French Colonial rule. Furthermore, it would be militarily infeasible to prevent wide-spread intimidation of voters by Communist partisans. While it is obviously impossible to make a dependable forecast as to the outcome of a free election, current intelligence leads the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the belief that a settlement based upon free elections would be attended by almost certain loss of the Associated States to Communist control.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that any negotiated settlement which would involve substantial concessions to the Communists on the part of the Governments of France and the Associated States, such as in *c* and *d* above, would be generally regarded by Asian peoples as a Communist victory, and would cast widespread doubt on the ability of anti-Communist forces ultimately to stem the tide of Communist control in the Far East. Any such settlement would, in all probability, lead to the loss of Indochina to the Communists and deal a damaging blow to the national will of other countries of the Far East to oppose Communism.

5. Should Indochina be lost to the Communists, and in the absence of immediate and effective counteraction on the part of the Western

---

<sup>3</sup> The Embassy in London reported in telegram 3802 to the Department, Mar. 4, that "if US and France object to an amalgamation of Vietnam and Viet Minh administrations, they can agree to a division along 16th parallel. Some such solution would tend to guarantee China's southern frontier." (396.1 GE/3-454)

Powers which would of necessity be on a much greater scale than that which could be decisive in Indochina, the conquest of the remainder of Southeast Asia would inevitably follow. Thereafter, longer term results involving the gravest threats to fundamental United States security interests in the Far East and even to the stability and security of Europe could be expected to ensue. (See paragraph 1 of NSC 5405.)

6. Orientation of Japan toward the West is the keystone of United States policy in the Far East. In the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the loss of Southeast Asia to Communism would, through economic and political pressures, drive Japan into an accommodation with the Communist Bloc. The communization of Japan would be the probable ultimate result.

7. The rice, tin, rubber, and oil of Southeast Asia and the industrial capacity of Japan are the essential elements which Red China needs to build a monolithic military structure far more formidable than that of Japan prior to World War II. If this complex of military power is permitted to develop to its full potential, it would ultimately control the entire Western and Southwestern Pacific region and would threaten South Asia and the Middle East.

8. Both the United States and France have invested heavily of their resources toward the winning of the struggle in Indochina. Since 1950 the United States has contributed in excess of 1.6 billion dollars in providing logistic support. France is reported to have expended during the period 1946-1953, the equivalent of some 4.2 billion dollars. This investment, in addition to the heavy casualties sustained by the French and Vietnamese, will have been fruitless for the anti-Communist cause, and indeed may redound in part to the immediate benefit of the enemy, if control of a portion of Indochina should now be ceded to the Communists. While the additional commitment of resources required to achieve decisive results in Indochina might be considerable, nevertheless this additional effort would be far less than that which would be required to stem the tide of Communist advance once it had gained momentum in its progress into Southeast Asia.

9. If, despite all United States efforts to the contrary, the French Government elects to accept a negotiated settlement which, in the opinion of the United States, would fail to provide reasonably adequate assurance of the future political and territorial integrity of Indochina, it is considered that the United States should decline to associate itself with such a settlement, thereby preserving freedom of action to pursue directly with the governments of the Associated States and with other allies (notable the United Kingdom) ways and means of continuing the struggle against the Viet Minh in Indochina without participation of the French. The advantages of so doing

would, from the military point of view, outweigh the advantage of maintaining political unity of action with the French in regard to Indochina.

10. It is recommended that the foregoing views be conveyed to the Department of State for consideration in connection with the formulation of a United States position on the Indochina problem for the forthcoming Geneva Conference and for any conversations with the governments of the United Kingdom, France, and, if deemed advisable, with the governments of the Associated States preliminary to the conference. In this connection attention is particularly requested to paragraphs 25 and 26 of NSC 5405; it is considered to be of the utmost importance that the French Government be urged not to abandon the aggressive prosecution of military operations until a satisfactory settlement has been achieved.

11. It is further recommended that, in order to be prepared for possible contingencies which might arise incident to the Geneva Conference, the National Security Council consider now the extent to which the United States would be willing to commit its resources in support of the Associated States in the effort to prevent the loss of Indochina to the Communists either:

a. In concert with the French; or

b. In the event the French elect to withdraw, in concert with other allies or, if necessary, unilaterally.

12. In order to assure ample opportunity for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present their views on these matters, it is requested that the Military Services be represented on the Department of Defense working team which, in coordination with the Department of State, will consider all U.S. position papers pertaining to the Geneva discussions on Indochina.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

ARTHUR RADFORD  
*Chairman*

[Enclosure 2]

*The Chairman of the Subcommittee of the President's Special Committee (Erskine) to the Special Committee of the National Security Council*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 17 March 1954.

Subject: Military Implications of the U.S. Position on Indo-China in Geneva

1. The attached analysis and recommendations concerning the U.S. position in Geneva have been developed by a Sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Department of Defense, JCS, State and CIA.

2. This paper reflects the conclusions of the Department of Defense and the JCS and has been collaborated with the State Department representatives who have reserved their position thereon.

3. In brief, this paper concludes that from the point of view of the U.S. strategic position in Asia, and indeed throughout the world, no solution to the Indo-China problem short of victory is acceptable. It recommends that this be the basis for the U.S. negotiating position prior to and at the Geneva Conference.

4. It also notes that, aside from the improvement of the present military situation in Indo-China, none of the courses of action considered provide a satisfactory solution to the Indo-China war.

5. The paper notes that the implications of this position are such as to merit consideration by the NSC and the President.

6. I recommend that the Special Committee note and approve this report and forward it with the official Department of State views to the NSC.

G. B. ERSKINE  
*General, USMC (Ret.)*

[Subenclosure]

MILITARY IMPLICATION OF U.S. NEGOTIATIONS ON INDO-CHINA  
AT GENEVA

I *Problem*

To develop a U.S. position with reference to the Geneva Conference as it relates to Indo-China, encompassing the military implications of certain alternatives which might arise in connection with that conference.

II *Major Considerations*

A. The Department of Defense and the JCS have reviewed NSC 5405 in the light of developments since that policy was approved from a military point of view and in the light of certain possible courses of action as they affect the Geneva Conference. These are:

1. Maintenance of the *status quo* in Indo-China.
2. Imposition of a cease-fire in Indo-China.
3. Establishment of a coalition government.
4. Partition of the country.
5. Self-determination through free elections.

B. The Department of Defense and the JCS have also considered

the impact of the possible future status of Indo-China on the remainder of Southeast Asia and Japan and have considered the effect which any substantial concessions to the Communists on the part of France and the Associated States would have with respect to Asian peoples as a whole and U.S. objectives in Europe.

C. Indo-China is the area in which the Communist and non-Communist worlds confront one another actively on the field of battle. The loss of this battle by whatever means would have the most serious repercussions on U.S. and free world interests, not only in Asia but in Europe and elsewhere.

D. French withdrawal or defeat in Indo-China would have most serious consequences on the French position in the world; the free world position in Asia; and in the U.S. on the domestic attitude vis-à-vis the French. It would, furthermore, constitute a *de facto* failure on the part of France to abide by its commitments in U.N. to repel aggression.

E. Unless the free world maintains its position in Indo-China, the Communists will be in a position to exploit what will be widely regarded in Asia as a Communist victory. Should Indo-China be lost to the Communists, and in the absence of immediate and effective counteraction by the free world (which would of necessity be on a much greater scale than that required to be decisive in Indo-China), the conquest of the remainder of Southeast Asia would inevitably follow. Thereafter, longer term results, probably forcing Japan into an accommodation with the Communist bloc, and threatening the stability and security of Europe, could be expected to ensue.

F. As a measure of U.S. participation in the Indo-Chinese war it is noted that the U.S. has since 1950 programmed in excess of \$2.4 billion in support of the French-Associated States operations in Indo-China. France is estimated to have expended during the period 1946-1953 the equivalent of some \$5.4 billion. This investment, in addition to the heavy casualties sustained by the French and Vietnamese, to say nothing of the great moral and political involvement of the U.S. and French, will have been fruitless for the anti-Communist cause if control of all or a portion of Indo-China should now be ceded to the Communists.

### III *Facts Bearing on the Problem*

A. NSC 5405, approved 16 January 1954, states U.S. policy with respect to Indo-China.

B. The French desire for peace in Indo-China almost at any cost represents our greatest vulnerability in the Geneva talks.

#### IV *Discussion*

For the views of the JCS see Tab A.<sup>4</sup>

#### V *Conclusions*

A. Loss of Indo-China to the Communists would constitute a political and military setback of the most serious consequences and would almost certainly lead to the ultimate Communist domination of all of Southeast Asia.

B. The U.S. policy and objectives with respect to Southeast Asia as reflected in NSC 5405 remain entirely valid in the light of developments since that policy was approved.

C. With respect to possible alternative courses of action enumerated in paragraph IIA above, the Department of Defense has reached the following conclusions:

1. *Maintenance of status quo in Indo-China.* It is highly improbable that a Communist agreement could be obtained to any negotiated settlement which would be consistent with basic U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia in the absence of a very substantial improvement in the French Union military situation. This could best be accomplished by the aggressive prosecution of military operations.

2. *Imposition of a cease-fire.* The acceptance of a cease-fire in advance of a satisfactory settlement would in all probability lead to a political stalemate attended by a concurrent and irretrievable deterioration of the Franco-Vietnamese military position.

3. *Establishment of a coalition government.* The acceptance of a settlement based upon this course of action would open the way for the ultimate seizure of control by the Communists under conditions which would almost certainly preclude timely and effective external assistance designed to prevent such seizure.

4. *Partition of the country.* The acceptance of this course of action would represent at the least a partial victory for the Viet Minh and would constitute a retrogressive step in the attainment of U.S. policy and would compromise the achievement of that policy in Southeast Asia.

5. *Self-determination through free elections.* Many factors render the holding of a truly representative plebiscite infeasible and such a course of action would, in any case, lead to the loss of the Associated States to Communist control.

#### IV [VI] *Recommendations*

A. That the U.S. and U.K. and France reach an agreement with respect to Indo-China which rejects all of the courses enumerated

---

<sup>4</sup> Printed as Enclosure 1 above.



above (except No. 1 on the assumption that the *status quo* can be altered to result in a military victory) prior to the initiation of discussions on Indo-China at Geneva. Failing this, the U.S. should actively oppose each of these solutions, should not entertain discussion of Indo-China at Geneva, or having entertained it, should ensure that no agreements are reached.

B. If, despite all U.S. efforts to the contrary, the French Government elects to accept a negotiated settlement which fails to provide reasonably adequate assurance of the future political and territorial integrity of Indo-China, the U.S. should decline to associate itself with such a settlement and should pursue, directly with the governments of the Associated States and with other Allies (notably the U.K.), ways and means of continuing the struggle against the Viet Minh in Indo-China without participation of the French.

C. The Special Committee has reviewed the findings and recommendations of the Department of Defense and considers that the implications of this position are such as to warrant their review at the highest levels and by the National Security Council, after which they should become the basis of the U.S. position with respect to Indo-China at Geneva. The Special Committee recognizes moreover that certain supplementary and alternative courses of action designed to ensure a favorable resolution of the situation in Indo-China merit consideration by the NSC. These, and the Special Committee recommendations with respect thereto, are:

1. *The political steps to be taken to ensure an agreed U.S.-U.K.-French position concerning Indo-China at Geneva.* That the NSC review the proposed political action designed to achieve this objective with particular attention to possible pressure against the French position in North Africa, and in NATO, and to the fact that discussions concerning implementation of course 2 and 3 hereunder will be contingent upon the success or failure of this course of action.

2. *Overt U.S. involvement in Indo-China.* That the NSC determine the extent of U.S. willingness, over and above the contingencies listed in NSC 5405, to commit U.S. air, naval and ultimately ground forces to the direct resolution of the war in Indo-China with or without French support and in the event of failure in course 1 above. That in this connection the NSC take cognizance of present domestic and international climate of opinion with respect to U.S. involvement and consider the initiation of such steps as may be necessary to ensure worldwide recognition of the significance of such steps in Indo-China as a part of the struggle against Communist aggression.

3. *The development of a substitute base of operations.* That the NSC consider whether this course of action is acceptable as a substitute for 1 and 2 above and recognizing that the hope of implementation thereof would be one of major expenditure and long-term potential only.

396.1 GE/3-2454

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of British  
Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 24, 1954.

Subject: Geneva Conference

Participants: Ambassador Spender, Australian Embassy  
Minister Blakeney, Australian Embassy  
Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary  
Mr. H. Raynor, Director, BNA

Ambassador Spender called this afternoon at his request accompanied by Minister Blakeney. He handed to Mr. Murphy the attached *Aide-Mémoire*<sup>1</sup> indicating that Australia considered itself an "interested State" in so far as the Indo-Chinese phase of the Conference is concerned and would desire to participate in that phase of the Conference if participation is extended beyond the Four Powers, Communist China and the Associated States.

Mr. Murphy received the *Aide-Mémoire* and indicated that the matter of the composition of the Indo-China phase of the Conference had not yet been determined; in fact might possibly not be determined until Geneva itself.

Ambassador Spender then asked a number of questions attempting to ascertain what position the United States and also the French intended to take on Indo-China at the Conference. He expressed the view that while probably agreement could not be reached with the Communist at the Conference that it was important that the Western participants develop a firm position prior to the Conference and also emerge from the Conference with a united Western position. He expressed the view that the Communist side would probably hold out for one or more of the three following concessions from the West: (a) recognition of Red China; (b) admission of Red China to the United Nations and (c) relaxation of trade barriers with Red China.

The Ambassador expressed some concern at waiting too long for the development of a French position being apprehensive that the French might desire to go to Geneva without a position and thus have full maneuverability at the Conference. The Ambassador also inquired about the military situation in Indo-China but agreed that more serious factors were the political situation in Paris and also the political problem vis-à-vis the Associated States.

Mr. Murphy indicated that although we were keeping in close touch with the French we did not yet have any indication of what their posi-

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. (396.1 GE/3-2454)

tion would be at Geneva. He indicated that we have not thus far been pressing the French too hard as we were not anxious to expedite the beginning of the Indo-China phase of the Conference. He indicated to the Ambassador that we hoped the Conference would open on Korea and exhaust that subject before beginning on Indo-China although he admitted that events might not work out in that manner. He admitted that a French desire for maneuverability at Geneva might be a contributing factor in their delay in developing a position but he thought also that there were many diverse opinions in Paris and that the government might be having real difficulty in developing a government position.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> In a staff meeting on Mar. 26 attended by the Secretary, Murphy, Robertson, Merchant, MacArthur, Bowie, and others, the Secretary reported on the conversation with Ambassador Spender. He said the Ambassador was very concerned that the Allies be organized in order to take action quickly if the situation in Indochina deteriorated. The Secretary inquired how many votes could be obtained in the United Nations if the United States proposed action on the Indochina problem. He remarked that it would have to be clear to every country in the world that the Associated States were truly independent. MacArthur suggested that it might be useful to ask Ambassador Spender to discuss the matter with the British, indicating that "the rather indifferent U.K. attitude tended to support the French desire for peace at practically any cost." MacArthur thought "it would be very useful if the Australians would ram home the hard facts of life as to what else would happen in Southeast Asia if Indochina fell." (Secretary's staff meetings, lot 63 D 75)

---

FE files, lot 60 D 330, "Position Papers"

*Position Paper Prepared for the Indochina Phase of the  
Geneva Conference*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 24, 1954.

GI D-7a

US POSITION ON PARTICIPATION IN THE INDOCHINA PHASE OF THE  
GENEVA CONFERENCE

*Background*

At Berlin, the four Foreign Ministers agreed, so far as the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference is concerned "that the problem of restoring peace in Indochina shall also be discussed at the conference to which representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the USSR, the Chinese People's Republic and other interested states will be invited." The four Foreign Ministers did not agree as to what the "other interested states" would be or as to how the invitations would be issued to the participants when agreed.

---

<sup>1</sup> A cover sheet indicated that this position paper was prepared by Bonsal of PSA and that it was revised and approved by the working group on Mar. 23.

*Timing of Four-Power Agreement on Participants*

It is considered desirable that the question of participation in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference be decided by the four Foreign Ministers at Geneva after April 26. No sentiment has apparently yet developed either on our side or in Moscow for a more rapid solution. (This may well mean that substantive discussion of the Indochina problem cannot begin at Geneva until some weeks after the date scheduled for the Korean discussions.) It is important, however, that US, UK and French agreement as to the position to be assumed be reached prior to the Geneva meeting.

*Participation in the Indochina Discussions*

Since the definition "other interested states" is extremely vague, there are several possible formulas. The following appear to be the principal ones:

*Formula A*—Restriction of conference to four inviting powers plus Chinese People's Republic.

This formula has the obvious disadvantage of a five-power discussion of the Indochina problem and hence is totally unacceptable to the U.S. However, it might conceivably be supported by the French on the basis that it is desirable to prevent Ho Chi Minh's government from being represented at Geneva. The French would then represent the interests of the Associated States and the Chinese People's Republic would represent the Viet Minh. Our position should be contrary to such a formula and in favor of one which would include the Associated States as participants at Geneva.

*Formula B*—Inclusion, in addition to the four Berlin powers plus the Chinese People's Republic, of the States of Indochina including on our side Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos and on the other side the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (we should resist inclusion of the negligible Communist-controlled nationalist movements in Cambodia and Laos).

This formula has the advantage of being in close approximation to the formula already accepted in the case of Korea since it would involve in addition to the four Berlin powers only those states directly involved in the conflict. It would have the disadvantage that outside of the four Berlin powers and Communist China, there would be no other states participating in both the Korean and the Indochina phase of the conference. This could be taken to mean a partial acceptance of the five-power concept so persistently and unsuccessfully advanced by Molotov at Berlin.

*Formula C*—Inclusion in addition to the states included under Formula B of others having land boundaries with Indochina, i.e., Thailand and Burma.

This formula would have the advantage of obviating any five-power nucleus for both phases of the conference since Thailand is already included in the Korean phase. Furthermore, the Thai interest in developments in Indochina has been frequently expressed, having almost resulted in a Thai presentation to the UN. The "land boundary" con-

cept seems to offer a good factual limitation on the "interested states" definition. I believe that we could live with the Burmese and that we might in fact reasonably hope that Burmese participation could be useful at Geneva and educational in its end results.

*Formula D*—Inclusion in addition to the states included under Formula C of a number of other states in the general area of South and Southeast Asia.

Certainly the interest of states in the general area in the restoration of peace in Indochina cannot be denied. There would be included in this formula such friendly countries as the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand (in addition to Thailand) and such neutralist countries as Indonesia and India (in addition to Burma). Pakistan might also be included. This formula would produce an unwieldy conference "cluttered" with neutralists especially India and Indonesia. It would permit countries rejected by us from the Korean phase to be present at Geneva and would undoubtedly therefore produce some of the disadvantages which we are seeking to avoid.

### *Recommendation*

On the basis of the above considerations, Formula C best serves the interests of the U.S. Under this formula, the four Berlin powers, the Chinese People's Republic, the three Associated States of Indochina, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, Thailand and Burma would participate in the Indochina phase of the conference.

---

396.1 GE/3-2554 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

SECRET

PARIS, March 25, 1954—4 p. m.

3532. Repeated information London 838 Moscow 278. Limit distribution. Bidault this morning gave me at some length his general impression of what the Soviet position would be at Geneva. He said that yesterday Vinogradov had called on him, accompanied by a counselor of Embassy and had talked for about an hour. Three quarters of an hour had been devoted to the Geneva Conference and 15 minutes had been devoted to the EDC. Vinogradov had made no attempt whatsoever to connect the two subjects. Bidault had the impression that Vinogradov was really and sincerely concerned with Geneva and that his representations regarding EDC were merely for form's sake.

On Geneva, Bidault said his personal impression was that the Soviets were really frightened of their Chinese ally. He felt that the Soviets for their own reasons sincerely desired a period of peace, and that they were deeply afraid that their Chinese friends might drag them into an adventure which they themselves did not at all desire.

For this reason, Bidault said, he felt that the Soviets were really desirous of achieving peace, or at least a cease-fire in Indochina. He felt that the Soviets at Geneva, in spite of any position they might feel they had to take publicly, would be hoping for US assistance in controlling Communist China. Bidault said that this was his strong personal impression which he had gathered at Berlin and which had now been reinforced by his conversation with Vinogradov.<sup>1</sup> He asked that his views be conveyed personally to the Secretary.

DILLON

---

<sup>1</sup> Marginal notation on source text read as follows: "French and Soviets in same position for different reasons."

---

*Editorial Note*

For the text of telegram 597, March 25, to Moscow containing the proposed reply to the Soviet *aide-mémoire* of March 17, see page 56.

---

396.1 GE/3-2254 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1954—7 p. m.

4982. Re London's tel 4072<sup>2</sup> and despatch 3094.<sup>3</sup> We have made it crystal clear to British Embassy here that we do not consider procedural matters re Geneva Conference as unimportant and unconnected with substance. On contrary our position which we have stated firmly and categorically to UK and French Embassies here is that we will not agree to any procedural arrangement which gives or implies that Communist China has some special position different from other participants. In particular we would not agree to any proposal that Communist China would be consulted by US, UK, France or USSR re composition of Indochina phase of Geneva Conference. As practical matter we would expect that Soviets on their part would in fact consult China but tripartite agreement at Berlin clearly would preclude any consultation with China by Western Big Three since in fact such consultation would give China a special status.

To sum up we would reject any proposal, procedural or otherwise, which would give Communist China a special place or imply a "Five Power" concept.

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by MacArthur of C and McConaughy of CA. Repeated to Paris as telegram 3340 and to Moscow as telegram 605.

<sup>2</sup> Dated Mar. 22, p. 470.

<sup>3</sup> Dated Mar. 12, p. 453.

In any discussions with FonOff on subject Geneva you should make clear our position as set forth above. As per tripartite agreement we are coordinating procedural, administrative and technical matters in Washington and will keep Paris and London fully informed.

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/3-2754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1954—1 : 24 p. m.

3353. For the Ambassador. I am seriously concerned by what appear to be growing expectations in France that Geneva will produce a settlement for Indochina as a result of US concessions to Communist China. Apart from our estimate that, given present military and political situation in Indochina, any settlement negotiated in immediate future could only result in ultimate complete control of all Indochina by Communists, there is no possibility whatsoever of concessions by US to Communist China in return for any promises or agreements they might indicate their willingness to enter. Long experience has taught us that exchange of US performance for Communist promises is a swindle and we will have no part in it.

I cannot believe that France with its great history and its understandable desire to continue in a role of world leadership with the US and UK could contemplate acceptance of a settlement which under existing conditions would abandon millions of loyal Vietnamese, Laotians and Cambodians to the mercies of a cruel and ruthless enemy. This would be incompatible with the high moral purpose which has characterized France's long history. To do so would result not only in the loss by France of her position in the Far East but in an abrupt decline in French prestige throughout the world with almost incalculable consequences.

I have no doubt of Bidault's comprehension of this matter and I know that his resolution is shared by many Frenchmen in and outside the government. I believe, however, that you should lose no effective opportunity to make the foregoing points forcefully with individual French leaders and particularly with those who show signs of wavering. I believe that the full text of the speech I intend to make before the overseas writers March 29<sup>2</sup> can be usefully distributed and dis-

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Merchant of EUR. Repeated to London on Mar. 31 as telegram 5079.

<sup>2</sup> Secretary Dulles' address made before the Overseas Press Club of America at New York City on Mar. 29. See editorial note, p. 487.

cretely emphasized in France. It will deal with the problem of Indochina and Communist China. We must at all costs avoid the tragedy which would spring from French misunderstanding or wishful thinking concerning the fundamental position of the United States.

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/3-2754 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

SECRET

PARIS, March 27, 1954—2 p. m.

3573. Repeated information London 852, Saigon 406. Chauvel and Lacoste advised us this morning that they were just beginning organized substantive preparation for Geneva although still without any definite Cabinet guidance. They said they would welcome any indications, however informal or preliminary, as to US thinking with respect to Indochina phase of conference as of assistance to them in formulating recommendations as to French position.

There are certain questions, partially procedural and partially substantive, on which they would particularly welcome our thinking. One was states to be included for Indochina phase. If, as they thought might be desirable west wished Thailand and Australia included, and USSR wished to have India and Indonesia, participants would be numerous. In these circumstances what would be US view concerning some sort of working sessions limited to representatives of five-powers? Chauvel said one possible way of meeting problem of Associated States-Viet Minh representation would be to follow UN procedure of having anyone of them called by chairman to participate on *ad hoc* basis rather than full participation at all sessions. He would welcome our reaction.

They have made similar approach to British.

In view of present fluid nature and early stage of French thinking, believe it would be to our advantage communicate as much preliminary US thinking as we can as soon as possible without waiting for such tripartite talks as may be agreed upon.

DILLON

---

*Editorial Note*

For the text of telegram 1161, March 29, from Moscow, reporting on delivery of the response to the Soviet note of March 17, see page 67.



*Editorial Note*

On March 29, 1954, Secretary Dulles delivered an address on "The Threat of a Red Asia" before the Overseas Press Club of America at New York City. The Secretary outlined the position of the Eisenhower Administration with respect to Indochina and reaffirmed the support of the United States for the struggle being waged there by the French Union forces. Secretary Dulles referred to recent statements made by himself and President Eisenhower "designed to impress upon potential aggressors that aggression might lead to action at places and by means of free world choosing, so that aggression would cost more than it could gain." He sought to clarify further the United States position by stating: "Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that the possibility should not be passively accepted but should be met by united action. This might involve serious risks. But these risks are far less than those that will face us a few years from now if we dare not be resolute today."

For the full text of the address, Department of State press release 165, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 12, 1954, pages 539-542.

For documentation related to Secretary Dulles' call for united action, see volumes XII and XIII.

---

110.11 DU/3-3054

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 30, 1954.

Ambassador Makins asked me at Eden's request how long I expected to be at Geneva. I said I expected to be there only for the first week. The Ambassador said he thought that Eden had hoped that he and I might be there for a fortnight, so that "we might deal with the Indochina matter". I said I was very skeptical that Indochina would come up in a serious way in the first fortnight; that I foresaw procedural difficulties in this matter and was anxious myself, as I had indicated at Berlin, to get back shortly.

JFD

---

<sup>1</sup> Memorandum directed to Merchant and MacArthur; copies sent to Robertson and Johnson.

396.1 GE/3-3054

*Draft Position Paper Prepared for the Indochina Phase of the Geneva Conference*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1954.

## U.S. POSITION WITH FRENCH

In developing a US position on Indochina to be taken with the French, we should use as a point of departure the understandings reached at Berlin where it was clearly understood that neither the US nor France would countenance a solution leading directly or indirectly to a turnover of the area to the Communists. Prevention of such a development is of course our essential objective at Geneva. Therefore, we should attempt to obtain British agreement to the position in Section I below, and then present it to the French in an effort to get tripartite agreement before the Geneva talks on Indochina start. The position in Section II, which implies a French sliding from their Berlin commitment, should remain purely a US position for later use if necessary. (It should be borne in mind throughout the paper that the term "French" refers to the elements of the Laniel cabinet who have heretofore opposed immediate negotiations with the Viet Minh. Any "French" decisions and conclusions at Geneva are probably valid only to the extent they can obtain Assembly support.)

## I. POSITION TO BE TAKEN WITH FRENCH IN FIRST INSTANCE

1. At Berlin it was understood with Bidault that we, and presumably the French also, would retain full freedom of action at Geneva and were committed to nothing. We are confident France will not take any step at Geneva which will jeopardize our Berlin understanding.

2. There is no possibility whatever of extending any concessions to Communist China (such as recognizing the regime, favoring UN admission, liberalizing trade controls or altering our Formosa policy) in exchange for promises or agreements they might indicate willingness to enter. Long experience has taught us that exchange of our performance for Communist promises is a swindle and we will have no part of it.

3. We consider it highly unlikely that Communist agreement can be obtained at Geneva to a negotiated settlement which would meet the basic conditions for the protection of the US position and interests

---

<sup>1</sup> A covering memorandum indicated that this paper was prepared by McBride of WE and that it was revised to reflect comments on an earlier draft.

in Southeast Asia (as stated in NSC 5405).<sup>2</sup> However, we likewise consider it desirable to have a positive basis for our own planning and thinking.

4. We are of course fully cognizant of the French domestic situation, the pressures to end the war in France, and the warweariness of the French people after eight years of warfare. We also realize the Vietnamese also strongly desire the end of the war.

5. We agreed to having Indochina discussed at the Korean Political Conference at Geneva for the purpose of helping the French Government to resist these domestic pressures, and in order thus to assist France to get ahead with the Navarre Plan.

6. If the French are determined to carry on the war in the absence of a settlement at Geneva, we will of course continue our policy of assisting the French war effort and even of seeking for additional means to help within the general scope of our present arrangements.

7. We believe in the worldwide interests of France that it is essential she continue the struggle to a satisfactory conclusion if no progress is made at Geneva. If France were to abandon Indochina and the millions of anti-Communist Vietnamese her whole position in the world would suffer irreparable harm.

8. Finally, France should reiterate its commitment to carry on under the Navarre Plan in the absence of a settlement emanating from the Geneva talks. From present indications we believe that the French Government will probably agree to giving us a commitment to carry on the struggle if it can be demonstrated convincingly that failure to make progress at Geneva is clearly due to Communist intransigence. If so, we can adopt at Geneva a position based on the above points, with the further understanding with France that this represents a firm position. We should not tell the French that they should consult with us prior to changing their position, if they find it necessary to shift, since this would imply we admitted the French might in fact weaken. Nevertheless, we would certainly become aware immediately of a shift in position, and, in this event, we should consider other courses with the French as follows:

## II. POSITION TO BE TAKEN BY U.S. IF FRENCH POSITION WEAKENS

### A. *If US Decides to Intervene Directly*

1. If there are no concrete results at Geneva, the US should make an offer of prompt US intervention beyond that envisaged in NSC 5405. This of course requires new NSC action, and it is understood this entire question is now under discussion in the NSC. We should com-

---

<sup>2</sup> For the text of NSC 5405, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia," Jan. 16, 1954, see volume XII.

municate this decision to the French in case of necessity, as appears most effective from a timing and tactical viewpoint. A favorable NSC decision in this sense would of course greatly strengthen our position with the French and make continuation of their own effort much more likely.

2. If the French, even upon being informed that the US has decided to participate directly in the war, say they must negotiate in disregard of US security requirements, we should then take the position as follows: (a) we are not prepared to abandon the area; (b) we will proceed in collaboration with the Associated States (if such a course is possible) and other states which might be willing to go along with us, in trying to prevent the loss of Southeast Asia to the Communists. Presumably this course of action would involve departure not only of the US but of the Associated States from Geneva. This would obviously be the most extreme course, and would presuppose that every other possibility had been tried with the French and failed.

*B. If US Decides Not to Extend Scope of Its Involvement in Indochinese War*

1. In the absence of a favorable decision of the NSC to broaden US direct participation, we should still expect the French Government to carry out its commitment of September 1953 to press forward under the Navarre Plan. We should make sure that the French have taken into account the following possible results stemming from a renegeing of their commitment:

(a) If France through one means or another countenances a Communist takeover in Indochina, it will mean far more than the end of France's position in the Far East. Rather it will be a public exhibition of France's inability to carry on any longer as a member of the three-power alliance in which she has placed such great stock.

(b) The effect of abandonment would be so severe in North Africa as to have serious repercussions not only on the French position there, but also on the nature of the relationship between France and the US in that area.

(c) If the Indochina war ends on terms not offering the minimum essential guarantees, US dollar aid to France would of course automatically cease. If, however, a satisfactory armistice were arranged, and we entered a reconstruction period, France could plan on continued dollar expenditures as a major part of our contribution to the common cause. We know the present favorable French dollar position is due to the Indochina aid program.

(d) Beyond these points, conclusion of negotiations by France resulting in Communist domination of Indochina, an area of extreme strategic interest to us, would result in consequences which we cannot envisage now in Europe as well as elsewhere.

2. If the NSC decision on US participation is negative, and we are confronted with a weakening of the French position, we are faced

with a most difficult dilemma. This is a situation which in fact may arise. Under these circumstances, we can either continue the talks or break them off. In the latter event (presupposing a US refusal to participate directly), breaking off the talks would not achieve our objectives, since we have assumed the French are determined and feel it necessary to have negotiations which would not meet US requirements. In this circumstance our interests would best be served by attempting to hold the French to ways and means of continuing the anti-Communist struggle. In this case we might have to take a position on negotiations at variance with NSC 5405 (which rules them out). The best initial approach would doubtless be to take the line that France held a heavy moral responsibility for the millions of loyal Vietnamese who have been on her side not to mention the safety of the French Expeditionary Corps. Furthermore, Laniel was committed to his proposals to the National Assembly on March 5 (see attachment A<sup>3</sup>) on which we might comment as follows:

(a) We regard the Laniel six-point program as a firm position and cannot permit erosion therefrom. While the French may wish to bargain from this position, we can note that Laniel did obtain a vote of confidence on this basis. On the other hand, we realize that we cannot go further. This is his maximum position (and our minimum) so we all must stick to it.

(b) Laniel's Point 6, which bars Viet Minh reinforcements during negotiations, should be spelled out to provide for additional controls by permitting inspection by a specified organism, preferably international. In addition there should be international control of all points covering the means of communication between Communist China and Viet Minh territory.

---

<sup>3</sup> Attachment could not be located in Department of State files. Laniel's conditions were outlined in telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, 1954, p. 485.

---

396.1 GE/3-2754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1954—2:21 p. m.

3401. Re Embtel 3573 rptd London 852 Saigon 406.<sup>2</sup> You may inform Chauvel and Lacoste along following lines on our preliminary thinking on Indochina phase Geneva Conf:

1. On procedural matters, certain questions have already been discussed with French here, and Paris presumably informed thereon. On important question participation, our thinking has not progressed

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by McBride of WE and MacArthur of C. Repeated to London as telegram 5067 and to Saigon as telegram 1814.

<sup>2</sup> Dated Mar. 27, p. 486.

beyond point that US, UK, France, USSR, Communist China, Associated States would be present. We giving further thought to this in preparation for tripartite discussion at Geneva.

On question five-power working group as proposed by Chauvel, our views were contained Deptel 3340 rptd London 4982<sup>3</sup> and we remain unalterably opposed to any proposal, procedural or otherwise, which would give Communist China a special status or imply five-power concept.

2. On substance Geneva talks, basic outline US position given in Secretary's March 29 speech.<sup>4</sup>

Furthermore, additional US views on substance problem contained Deptel 3353<sup>5</sup> (pouched London) containing message for Ambassador for use with Bidault and we presume Embassy can make effective use with Chauvel and Lacoste as well of points contained therein.

FYI believe best way to proceed re Indochina phase Geneva is to delay actual discussion procedural and organizational details until after three Ministers have had opportunity discuss substance Indochina problem. Once there is mutual understanding on substance, tactics for organizing Indochina part Geneva should be easier to decide.

At same time we do not want French and/or British to proceed alone or together to develop hard and fast positions. Rely on you therefore to keep close watch on Foreign Office, without stimulating their activities, and to give them sufficient guidance basic US position (as described first part this tel) to cause whatever work they do between now and Geneva to proceed along acceptable lines.

DULLES

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated Mar. 26, p. 484.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 12, 1954, pp. 539-542.

<sup>5</sup> Dated Mar. 27, p. 485.

---

396.1 GE/4-154 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

SECRET

PARIS, April 1, 1954—8 p. m.

3654. Repeated information London 878, Saigon 408. Embtel 3573<sup>1</sup> and Deptel 3401.<sup>2</sup> Chauvel convened Achilles and Reilly of British Embassy this afternoon to inquire as to Washington and London's views on question he had raised last week. Occasion was taken to convey substance of Deptel 3401 and to emphasize appropriate passages of Secretary's speech<sup>3</sup> and Deptel 3353.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Mar. 27, p. 486.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> See editorial note, p. 487.

<sup>4</sup> Dated Mar. 27, p. 485.

(1) On participation Chauvel stated Bidault hoped number of participants can be held to absolute minimum. Thailand and Burma could, if necessary, be included as limitrophe states without opening way for others, but French would prefer not to have Australia since this would open way for participation of Indonesia and others. British supported Australian participation but understood that neither India nor Burma wished to attend. UK also believed Associated States should be full participants and that Chauvel's suggestion of inviting them on *ad hoc* basis might reflect on their full sovereignty.

(2) British stated Hammarskjold during recent visit to London had sought invitation to send personal representative as observer. British thought this would raise considerable and needless difficulties and proposed advising him that it would be discussed at Geneva and that, in any event, he could be kept appropriately informed through Western channels. French saw legitimate UN interest in Korean phase but none in Indochina phase and disliked idea of SG having "personal" representation. Achilles doubted Washington would favor Hammarskjold proposal.

(3) Chauvel expressed hope tripartite talks at expert level could be held before Easter beginning as soon as possible after April 6. Reilly said Dennis Allen would represent UK in any such talks and would be available at any time after April 12. Achilles expressed views in Deptel 3401. Chauvel felt strongly tripartite unity would be at least as important at Geneva as it had been at Berlin and that it would be far better to have three powers ascertain in advance what differences might exist between them and endeavor to work them out in advance rather than to have them crop out at Geneva where Russians could take greater advantage of them. Reilly subsequently told Achilles that Eden was strongly of this opinion.

(4) Chauvel will be in Bern until April 6 but requested Reilly and Achilles to meet with him again on date for further discussion.

DILLON

---

396.1 GE/4-354 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

SECRET

PARIS, April 3, 1954—4 p. m.

3701. Limit distribution. Embtel 3654<sup>1</sup> and Deptel 3353.<sup>2</sup> Yesterday Achilles took occasion to go over privately with Lacoste at length US ideas given Deptel 3353.

---

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>2</sup> Dated Mar. 27, p. 485.

Lacoste stated Bidault and Foreign Office most definitely shared our concern at French public expectations of IC settlement at Geneva as result US concessions. He believed Bidault and Foreign Office fully understood US position and state of public and Congressional opinion. (He states that as result meeting reported Embtel 3654 steps had already been taken to emphasize to Cabinet members and ministries concerned that essence of US position was no concessions in exchange for Communist promises.)

Lacoste stated that despite French official realism, government must take into account fact of currently excessive French hopes for Geneva. For example Foreign Office shared our view that any IC agreement reached quickly at Geneva would lead to its ultimate loss and was fully aware of time and difficulty which have been required to reach Korean armistice, but that French public opinion was obviously expecting quick results, as IC debate in Assembly had made only too clear. Part of French Government's job between now and Geneva would be to reduce this excessive optimism, but it would be neither popular nor easy task.

He hoped Bidault and other French Ministers would publicly express thoughts along lines paragraph 2 Deptel 3353 but that US officials would not since these were things which Frenchmen could well expound patriotically but which would sound patronizing to French ears when expressed by others.

He fully shared conviction that we must avoid any misunderstanding as to each other's positions. Close tripartite unity would be essential and it was of paramount importance that failure, if there was failure, at Geneva to produce satisfactory IC settlement must be clearly attributable to Russians and Chinese despite undoubted Communist efforts to put blame on US.

DILLON

---

396.1 GE/4-154 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1954—8:09 p. m.

3475. Embtel 3654, paragraph (3).<sup>2</sup> Secretary informed Bonnet this morning of his agreement to initiating tripartite preparatory talks in Paris April 12. In response to Bonnet's expressed hope that we would be prepared to discuss substance as well as procedure Secretary was non-committal. He referred to importance of problems involved and expressed doubt our representatives would be able to go

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Bonbright of EUR. Repeated to London as telegram 5174 and to Saigon as telegram 1853.

<sup>2</sup> Dated Apr. 1, p. 492.



very far without further instructions from Washington. He indicated that Achilles would head our group supported by two officers from Department. (Names of latter will be communicated to you next week.)

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/4-354: Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

SECRET

PARIS, April 3, 1954—11 p. m.

3705. Limit distribution. Embtel 3654<sup>1</sup> and Deptel 3401.<sup>2</sup> Believe I understand Department's reluctance to hold preparatory talks on IC matters before Geneva meeting opens. At same time it seems important to find some satisfactory way of developing in advance as much tripartite common ground as possible in order to reduce Western vulnerability to Soviet divisive tactics at Geneva. Berlin was excellent example of benefits of such careful preparatory work. French, and apparently British, are most anxious that preliminary talks be held as soon as possible.

While Embassy can of course reiterate positions given in Deptel 3401 at such tripartite talks as French may call before ministers arrive late in month, believe it would be far preferable to exert maximum influence on French (and British) thinking through positive presentation of US substantive position on specific question as rapidly as Department is able to send it. Even brief visit here, preferably during week beginning April 12, by MacArthur, Robertson or Bonsal would also be desirable or, if Department considers that level too high, anyone else Department may wish to send.

I feel that we must be careful to avoid giving impression to French that we consider US and French positions to be so fundamentally opposed that we do not feel it worthwhile even to attempt tripartite coordination in advance.

DILLON

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Apr. 1, p. 492.

<sup>2</sup> Dated Mar. 31, p. 491.

---

*Editorial Note*

For the texts of telegrams 1196 and 1197, April 5, from Moscow, conveying the text of the Soviet reply to the tripartite note of March 29, and the report of Ambassador Bohlen's talk with Kuznetsov on April 5, see pages 70 and 71, respectively.

396.1 GE/4-654

*Memorandum by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich)  
to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[LONDON, April 6, 1954.]

The position of the United States Government with reference to certain matters arising out of preliminary discussions of the Indochina phase of the forthcoming conference at Geneva is as follows:

1. The United States delegation at Berlin clearly understood from the French Foreign Minister that the agreement to discuss the question of Indochina at Geneva was on the condition that France would not agree to any arrangement which would directly or indirectly result in the turnover of that area to Communist control. The United States presumes that the United Kingdom, because of its vital security interests in the area as well as its role in the free world, would solidly support this position. For the French to agree to any arrangement leading to the surrender of the area would result not only in the loss by France of her position in the Far East but in an abrupt decline in French prestige throughout the world with almost incalculable consequences.

2. The United States is seriously concerned by what appears to be growing expectations in France that Geneva will produce a settlement for Indochina as a result of United States concessions to Communist China. The basic position of the United States on Communist China has been set forth in Secretary Dulles' speech of March 29.<sup>2</sup> Especially pertinent was Secretary Dulles' statement that "We shall not, however, be disposed to give Communist China what it wants from us merely to buy its promises of future good behavior." Apart from the United States estimate that, given the present military and political situation in Indochina, any settlement negotiated in the immediate future could only result in ultimate complete control of all Indochina by the Communists, there is no possibility whatsoever of concessions by the United States to Communist China in return for any promises or agreements they might indicate their willingness to enter. Long experience has shown that the exchange of performance for Communist promises is a swindle; the United States will not participate in any such arrangement.

3. With reference to any special position for Communist China at Geneva, the United States has already made clear its position that it

<sup>1</sup> Memorandum sent to Eden in accordance with instructions contained in telegram 5090 to London, Apr. 1; for text, see volume XIII. Copy transmitted to the Department as enclosure to despatch 3357 from London, Apr. 6, not printed. (396.1 GE/4-654)

<sup>2</sup> Printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 12, 1954, pp. 539-542. See also editorial note, p. 487.

does not consider procedural matters as unimportant and unconnected with substance. It is the firm position of the United States that it will not agree to any procedural arrangement which gives or implies that Communist China has some special position different from other participants. In particular, the United States would not agree to any proposal that Communist China would be consulted by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, or the U.S.S.R. with reference to the composition of the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference; nor would it agree to the French proposal to constitute a five-power working group on Indochina. As a practical matter, the United States would expect that the Soviets, on their part, would in fact consult China, but the tripartite agreement at Berlin<sup>3</sup> clearly would preclude any consultation of China by the Western Big Three, since in fact such consultation would give China a special status. In summary, the United States remains unalterably opposed to any proposal, procedural or otherwise, which would give Communist China a special place or imply a "five power" concept.

4. On the important question of participation in the Indochina talks, the United States at present envisages that the following states would be present: the United Kingdom, France, the United States, the U.S.S.R., Communist China, and the Associated States. The United States is giving further thought to this matter in preparation for tripartite discussions at Geneva.

5. The United States believes it to be essential at this time that the three Western Powers have complete understanding on the above basic points, and the United States would hope for the strong support of the United Kingdom in discussions on these matters with the French Government.

---

<sup>3</sup> For documentation on the tripartite agreement, an informal understanding between France, the United Kingdom, and the United States with respect to the status of Chinese Communist representation at the Geneva Conference, see volume VII. For text of the pertinent portions of the Berlin Conference Final Communiqué, issued Feb. 18, see p. 415. For additional information pertinent to this matter, see telegram Dulte 87 from Berlin, Feb. 18, in volume XIII and telegram Dulte 88 from Berlin, Feb. 18, p. 15.

---

396.1 GE/4-754

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 7, 1954—3:45 p. m.

Subjects: 1. Chinese *Aide-Mémoire* Regarding Geneva Conference  
2. Consultations Regarding Security of Southeast Asia  
3. Postponement of Consideration of Proposed Sino-American Security Pact

Participants: Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador  
Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE  
Mr. McConaughy, Director, Chinese Affairs

Ambassador Koo called at Assistant Secretary Robertson's request. Amb. Koo said he was about to request an appointment with Mr. Robertson when he received the call from Mr. Robertson's office.

Mr. Robertson asked Amb. Koo to state his business first.

1. *Chinese Aide-Mémoire Regarding Geneva Conference*<sup>1</sup>

Amb. Koo said that he had been instructed by the Chinese Foreign Office to inform the Department of the substance of an *Aide-Mémoire* as to the Geneva Conference which was being delivered immediately to the American Embassy at Taipei. Amb. Koo said he anticipated that we would receive the full text shortly from our Embassy at Taipei.

Amb. Koo summarized the *Aide-Mémoire* as follows:

As to the Geneva Conference, the Chinese Government felt it desirable to indicate its attitude and expectations. At the same time the Government wished to express its appreciation for and admiration of the Secretary's excellent speech of March 29<sup>2</sup> setting forth the U.S. position with regard to the non-recognition of the Chinese Communist regime, and its non-admission to the UN.

The Chinese Government felt that the scope of the Geneva Conference should be strictly limited to the two specified items:—Korea and Indochina.

The Chinese Government would not consider itself bound by any decision affecting it which might be reached at the Conference, since the Chinese Government would not be a party to any agreements reached.

The free world side should avoid any agreements which would not be in keeping with UN principles:—there should be unconditional withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops from Korea and unconditional cessation of Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh in Indochina.

If the discussions should prove fruitless, the Conference negotiations should not be protracted indefinitely. Prolongation of the Conference would only serve Communist propaganda objectives.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Apr. 7, not printed. Transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 579 from Taipei, Apr. 8, not printed. (396.1 GE/4-854) Subsequently sent to the Department as an enclosure to a note from Ambassador Koo to Secretary Dulles, Apr. 20, not printed, requesting that consideration be given to the points presented in the memorandum. (396.1 GE/4-2054)

The Department responded to Ambassador Koo in a note dated May 15, not printed, indicating that the U. S. views with respect to the Geneva Conference were given to him by Robertson on Apr. 7 and were contained in Secretary Dulles' speech of Apr. 28 at Geneva (see footnote 2, p. 153). (396.1 GE/4-2054)

<sup>2</sup> Printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 12, 1954, pp. 539-542. See editorial note, p. 487.

As to Indochina as well as Korea, a definite time limit for the discussions should be fixed.

There should be no departure from the original UN objective of a unified, independent and democratic Korea.

The three Associated States of Indochina should be invited to the Indochina phase of the Conference, but the Viet Minh should not be allowed to participate in the Conference.

Chinese Communists action in training and supplying the Viet Minh forces constituted in itself an act of aggression and a threat to the peace. Therefore, the UN should take some collective action. Communist China was carrying out covert aggression. Covert aggression was as bad as overt aggression. Communist China is responsible for aggression in Indochina, regardless of whether the Peiping Regime has actually sent Chinese Communist armed forces to participate in the fighting.

The free world side should agree that no regime fostered and supported by the Communists will be recognized as a legitimate government. This principle is a logical outgrowth of the Secretary's speech of March 29 in which he said that the free world could not be indifferent to the grave threat which would result from the imposition by force of the Communist political system over the States of Southeast Asia.

Finally, the embargo on strategic war material to Communist China should not be abandoned or relaxed.

Mr. Robertson said that he was glad to have this exposition of the views of the Chinese Government. The *Aide-Mémoire* would be considered carefully when the full text arrived. He said that he hoped the Ambassador would make it clear to his Government that the arrangements for the Conference were ideal from the Allied standpoint. There appears to have been some misunderstanding on this score in Taipei. The Geneva Conference will not be a general conference on Far Eastern issues with Communist China playing the role of an accepted power. It is necessary for Communist China to be there, since it is impossible to settle a dispute without talking to one's opponent. It is necessary to talk to the other side in order to seek peace. It would make no sense to talk to representatives of countries having nothing to do with the fighting while ignoring the aggressors who are responsible for the breach of peace. The Korean Political Conference is set up exactly in the form which we have been striving for since last September and October. It is the sort of conference Mr. Dean had sought unsuccessfully at Panmunjom. It was clear after Mr. Dean broke off the talks at Panmunjom pending the receipt of a Chinese Communist apology that no agreement would be reached at Panmunjom, because the Chinese Communists do not make a practice of apologizing. Mr. Dulles had picked up the ball at Berlin and had seized an opportunity to get precisely the kind of conference we had

envisaged as best suited to our purposes.<sup>3</sup> The Conference would be uncluttered by neutrals; it would be a two sided Conference; the Russians would be present as a responsible participant on the Communist side along with Communist China and the North Korean Regime; the agenda was limited to the two essential questions of Korea and Indochina; all the countries who fought on the UN side were invited; it was expressly provided, in the face of strong Soviet opposition which had been maintained until 6 PM on the last day of the conference, that no diplomatic recognition was implied. Mr. Robertson said that the terms of the Resolution represented a very considerable diplomatic triumph for Mr. Dulles. He felt that the criticism of the resolution was based largely on a misreading, or actual neglect to read, the text of the resolution.

As to the composition of the Indochina phase of the Conference, the French were entitled to take the lead on the Allied side. They would take the principal initiative in setting up the Indochina phase. We certainly felt that the Associated States should be at the Indochina phase of the Conference. Under the principle which he had just enumerated, of the necessity for talking with your enemy in order to make peace, it might also be necessary for the Viet Minh to be present in some capacity. However, the composition of the Indochina phase was not yet determined, and nothing conclusive could be said on the subject.

In response to a question from the Ambassador, Mr. Robertson said that the Conference would not be a round table one and that decisions binding on all participants of course could not be taken by Conference vote.

Mr. Robertson said that Communist China would not be at the Conference as a recognized Asian power, but, in the Secretary's words, as a culprit brought before the bar of justice.

Ambassador said that he was very glad to hear the Assistant Secretary's exposition which gave him a better understanding of the nature and purpose of the Conference. He said he would transmit the substance of the explanation to the Foreign Office.

## 2. *Consultations Regarding Security of Southeast Asia*

Mr. Robertson said it was the conviction of the Department that if Vietnam should be lost to the Communists, all of the rest of Southeast Asia would eventually be lost. The actions of Communist China in supporting the Viet Minh approached very closely to outright aggression. In the face of the grave threat to all the free community of the

---

<sup>3</sup> See editorial note, p. 414.

Pacific Area, there was a need for united action to meet the threat. Consultation among the States of Southeast Asia was a necessary prelude to united action and the Secretary was in the process of discussing with the diplomatic representatives here of the various Governments what might be done to reach agreement on political action to meet the threat.

The Ambassador inquired if some sort of a joint declaration was contemplated. Mr. Robertson said that something of the sort might be considered. The Secretary had called in the Ambassadors of all the Governments particularly concerned and was reviewing the problem with them.

The Ambassador asked about possible action which might follow if a joint warning by a community of free nations were not heeded by the Communist side.

The Assistant Secretary said that agreement of course was prerequisite to any sort of action, political or otherwise, and that the current consultations were to explore the possibility of agreement as to what should be done under various circumstances.

### *3. Postponement of Consideration of Proposed Sino-American Security Pact*

Assistant Secretary Robertson said in reference to the proposal of the Chinese Government for a bilateral security pact,<sup>4</sup> that we had made a recommendation that such a pact be negotiated, and that negotiations be opened before the Geneva Conference convened.

However, there was much detailed spade work to be done before authorization to negotiate such a pact and agreement as to the provisions it should embody, could be obtained throughout all the interested quarters of the Executive Branch of the Government. Furthermore, members of both Houses of Congress had to be consulted. The Secretary felt that it was a physical impossibility to complete this process in the short time remaining before the Geneva Conference. Many of the officials who would be involved in obtaining clearance for a pact were deeply involved in preparations for Geneva.

The Ambassador asked if it would be correct to say that the matter had been placed before the Secretary; that the Secretary had not made a decision on the policy question involved, but had decided that consideration of the matter would have to be postponed in view of the lack of opportunity to examine it adequately before Geneva?

Mr. Robertson said he thought this was a reasonably accurate description of the situation.

---

<sup>4</sup> For documentation on the proposed security pact between the United States and the Republic of China, see volume xiv.

396.1 GE/4-754

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Walter Treumann of the Office of  
Northeast Asian Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1954.

Subject: Soviet *Aide-Mémoire* of April 5 regarding the Geneva  
Conference<sup>1</sup>

Participants: Mr. Joy of the British Embassy  
Mr. Millet of the French Embassy  
Mr. Young, NA  
Mr. Treumann, NA

Mr. Joy and Mr. Millet dropped in on their own initiative after today's meeting of "the sixteen." They wished to discuss the Soviet *aide-mémoire* of April 5 regarding arrangements for the Geneva Conference.

Mr. Millet outlined his government's reaction to the Soviet *aide-mémoire* as follows:

1. With regard to the second paragraph of the Soviet *aide-mémoire*, the French Government believes that the Berlin decision implied that the four powers invite all other interested governments to Geneva. Whereas the invitation itself was made by the four major powers, the participation of all governments at Geneva would be on an equal basis. There had never been the implication in the Berlin decision that "representatives of all five indicated powers shall take part on an equal basis in examination of all questions relating to the conference." Rather, it was the implication that all nineteen participating delegations at Geneva should be on an equal basis.

2. With regard to paragraph three of the Soviet *aide-mémoire*, the French Government wishes to reserve its position on languages used in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference until this question comes up. When it does, a decision should be reached at Geneva.

3. With regard to paragraph five of the Soviet *aide-mémoire*, the French Government believes that the question of interpreters should be decided at the conference itself. In the meantime, we should let Moscow know that we will use UN and our own interpreters.

Mr. Joy expressed agreement with the French interpretation of the Berlin decision, but offered no other comments concerning the Soviet *aide-mémoire* at this time. He said that the UK would offer formal comments on this matter after a draft U.S. reply is received.

Mr. Young, Mr. Millet and Mr. Joy then discussed the question of expenditures for common services by the participants. It was decided that alternative formulas would be put before the next meeting of the sixteen nations for their comments.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For text, see telegram 1196 from Moscow, Apr. 5, p. 70.

<sup>2</sup> For a memorandum of this meeting, Apr. 20 see p. 119.



396.1 GE/4-754

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of  
Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1954.

Subject: Views of the United Kingdom Foreign Office on Soviet  
*Aide-Mémoire* of April 5, 1954.<sup>1</sup>

Participants: Mr. M. G. L. Joy, First Secretary, British Embassy  
Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of North-  
east Asian Affairs

Mr. Joy called Mr. Young to inform him of the following Foreign  
Office views on the Soviet *aide-mémoire* of April 5, 1954:

1. It is hoped that the State Department will not think it is necessary to argue further about the position of the Chinese. The Soviet note is not inaccurate, even if misleading. Therefore, the Foreign Office suggests that we ignore paragraph 2 in our reply.

2. It is suggested that we simply note agreement on 5 languages for the Korean phase and settle languages for Indochina at the Conference itself.

3. Soviet *Aide-Mémoire* is vague and inconclusive on enlistment of qualified interpreters, which must be decided before Conference meets.

4. Soviet *Aide-Mémoire* does not reply to the suggestion to send an administrative officer to Geneva to discuss details. A prior condition is to send a Soviet officer.

Mr. Young told Mr. Joy that the Department of State could not accept point one above, but that it would agree in principle on the other points.

---

<sup>1</sup> For text, see telegram 1196 from Moscow, Apr. 5, p. 70.

396.1 GE/4-754

*Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 7, 1954.

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE PARIS WORKING GROUP ON  
INDOCHINA PHASE AT GENEVA

1. *Objectives and Tactics of Working Group*

a. The objective of the Working Group is to shore up the French so that they do not adopt a position at Geneva which would mean, directly or indirectly, the loss of Indochina to the Communists. Its

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Bonsal of PSA, Stelle of S/P, and McBride of WE.

role would be to conduct a holding operation pending the arrival of the Secretary in Paris on April 21 or 22. The Working Group, which will include a representative of the Department of Defense, will commence talks with the British and French on Tuesday, April 13, in Paris. A brief press statement to this effect will be released then, although the Paris press already has this information.

b. The tactics of the Working Group are to advance no general position but rather to listen to the French proposals. Our representatives should express their views along the following general lines:

## 2. *US Position To Be Presented by Working Group*

a. At Berlin it was understood with Bidault that France would not agree to any arrangement that would directly or indirectly result in the turnover of the area to the Communists, while we would retain full freedom of action to refrain from any agreement at all at Geneva. We are confident France will not take any step at Geneva which will jeopardize our Berlin understanding.<sup>2</sup> This is our point of departure.

b. Insofar as the possibility of US concessions to the Chinese Communists is concerned, the US position was made clear in the Secretary's March 29 speech,<sup>3</sup> and we should stand firmly on this position. This point should be made to the British and French, with especial reference to the following paragraph:

"The United States Delegation will go to Geneva in an effort to bring about a united and independent Korea, from which Communist China will have withdrawn its army of invasion. Also, we hope that any Indochina discussion will serve to bring the Chinese Communists to see the danger of their apparent design for the conquest of Southeast Asia, so that they will cease and desist. We shall not, however, be disposed to give Communist China what it wants from us, merely to buy its promises of future good behavior."

c. We are of course fully cognizant of the French domestic situation, the pressure to end the war in France, and the warweariness of the French people after eight years of the struggle. We agreed to having Indochina discussed at the Geneva Conference for the purpose of helping the French Government to resist these domestic pressures by exposing the real Communist position. We realize that because of these pressures the French Government must give the appearance of exploring every possibility for reaching a settlement which would safeguard France's interests, responsibilities and commitments with regard to the Indochina war.

<sup>2</sup> The informal understanding between France, the United Kingdom, and the United States with respect to Chinese Communist representation at the Geneva Conference. See footnote 3, p. 497.

<sup>3</sup> Printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 12, 1954, pp. 539-542. See editorial note, p. 487.

d. The Working Group should set forth and endeavor to secure French and British agreement to the general principles which the US believes must be firmly adhered to in any solution of the Indochina problem. The general principles which should be established are that the US, the UK, and the French have common obligations to see to it that any settlement with the Communists would not: (1) Result in or tend to result in a turning over of the politically important and strategic area of Indochina to Communist control; (2) Jeopardize the security of the French Union forces; (3) Jeopardize the freedom of the peoples of Indochina who have been loyally supporting the anti-Communist effort; (4) Endanger the prestige and status of France or her allies.

e. Having established these general principles the Working Group should explore with the French and British whatever types of settlements the French or British might propose (such as plebiscite, partition, coalition government, etc.), drawing out the French and British on how such settlements might work out in practice, testing the possible results of such settlements against the established general principles, and indicating how such settlements fell short of meeting the general principles. The Working Group should be prepared to question the French on the Laniel proposals and to raise, through questioning, the various guarantees and safeguards which would be necessary to make such a plan conform to the general principles.

f. The Working Group should be authorized to express the hope that before Geneva, or at least before substantive discussions at Geneva with regard to Indochina are begun, it will be possible to announce the conclusion of current Franco-Vietnamese negotiations since an announcement to this effect will have favorable repercussions in Vietnam and therefore in the other free-world countries most directly concerned.

### 3. *Procedural Questions*

#### a. *Participation*

(1) Emphasize strongly the quadripartite aspect of the decision agreed to at Berlin regarding participation and the US firm opposition to any five power discussion of this issue. The decision as to who will participate in the Indochina discussions in addition to the four Berlin powers and Communist China must be made by the four Berlin powers.

(2) Convey the Secretary's view as stated above again, repeating our position on participation so far is definite only for the US, UK, France, USSR, Communist China, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, and that our position on further participants is not yet firm. Australia, the Philippines and Thailand have expressed an interest in participating to us.

(3) Under any circumstances we insist on a formal invitation by the four inviting powers to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. If the French inquire whether this means inviting the Associated States even if it means also inviting Ho Chi Minh, the group should reply in the affirmative.

(4) We will find it easier to make our own decisions when the French and British have given us their definite views which the Working Group will transmit to Washington.

*b. Other Procedural Questions*

(1) Details of technical arrangements should be referred to the group already working on these questions in Geneva.

(2) Other important procedural points (seating arrangements, chairmanship, western secretary-general) can hardly be settled until the participation question is decided. These points accordingly should await determination at Geneva.

---

396.1 GE/4-854

*Memorandum of Conversation, by John I. Getz of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] April 8, 1954.

Subject: Participation in the Indochina Phase of the Geneva Conference

Participants: Nong Kimny, Ambassador of Cambodia  
 Tran Van Kha, Ambassador of Viet-Nam  
 Ourot Sovannavong, Minister of Laos  
 FE—Mr. Drumright  
 PSA—Mr. Getz

The representatives of the Associated States remained to talk with Mr. Drumright following the meeting in which they were informed, along with the Ambassador of Thailand and the Counselor of the Philippine Embassy, of the Secretary's departure for London and Paris.<sup>1</sup>

The Cambodian Ambassador took the initiative in expressing his great distress that the Associated States had not yet been invited to participate in the Geneva Conference, and pointed out that only eighteen days remained before the Conference opened. For his part,

---

<sup>1</sup>Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Drumright called in the representatives of Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and the Philippines at 12:30 p. m. to inform them that Secretary Dulles expected to leave on Apr. 10 for conversations in London and Paris "to explore further the question of united action and the steps which might be taken to assure the defense of Southeast Asia against Communism." Memorandum of conversation by Getz of PSA, Apr. 8, not printed. (396.1 GE/4-854)

he stated, he could say that it was Cambodia's firm desire to participate as a full member and not as an observer which would have unfavorable repercussions on the people of his country.

Mr. Drumright replied that two considerations were involved. In the first place, France was expected to take the initiative in this question, and we had as yet heard little from the French. It was possible that this would be discussed in Paris next week. Secondly, it appears that the question of participation can be decided finally only by the four Berlin powers in meeting together, and this would probably not occur before the actual opening of the Conference. The Ambassador acknowledged this explanation, but gave the strong impression that he was not satisfied. He referred to the Berlin communiqué and its reference to the participation of "interested states" in the Indochina talks at Geneva; he asked if any states could be more interested than Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam.

The Ambassador of Viet-Nam and the Minister of Laos volunteered nothing, but confirmed to Mr. Drumright that their Governments had not made known their position on the subject of participation in the Conference.

---

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Indochina"

*Memorandum by Charles P. Stelle of the Policy Planning Staff*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 9, 1954.

Subject: Formula for an Indochina Settlement

*Problem:* To formulate a position on an Indochina settlement which would be acceptable to the United States and which although unacceptable to the Communists would appear reasonable to world opinion, and which in the unlikely event that the Communists were willing to sacrifice their position in Indochina, would provide some face-saving elements to facilitate their capitulation.

*Elements of the formula:*

From the point of view of the United States a settlement in Indochina should provide for a disarmament of the Vietminh forces, and a cessation of all Chinese Communist assistance to the Vietminh forces. These two provisions, if carried out, would in effect provide for a French and Associated States victory in Indochina. From the point of view of the United States free elections, or the withdrawal of

---

<sup>1</sup> Directed to Bowie who forwarded the memorandum to the Secretary, stating in a memorandum for the Secretary (Apr. 9, not printed, attached to source text) that he was attaching an outline prepared as a basis for discussion of a formula for a settlement "from our point of view." A handwritten notation on Bowie's memorandum indicates that the Secretary saw it.

French forces, should occur only after the disarmament of Vietminh forces and the cessation of Chinese Communist assistance. Nevertheless from the point of view of world opinion any formula for an Indochina settlement should provide at some stage for free elections and the withdrawal of French forces. To be acceptable to world opinion the formula should also provide for full freedom of the Associated States, amnesty for the disarmed Vietminh, and international supervision of free elections. The following formula attempts to incorporate these elements in a manner which will assure that elections will be carried out only after disarmament of the Vietminh has actually occurred.

*Formula:*

1. France affirms the independence and sovereignty of the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and declares that as an instance of their sovereign equality they are completely free to elect for themselves whether to remain in or to depart from the French Union.

2. All parties to the agreement (including the U.S.S.R., Communist China, and the Vietminh), in the interest of establishing those conditions of peace and order which are the prerequisites for the full and free expression of the popular will of the peoples of the states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, agree to cease all hostile acts or support of such acts against the present governmental authorities of the three states, and to call on all individuals and groups who have hitherto been undertaking hostile action against these authorities to lay down their arms and cooperate in the establishment of peace and order, and to cooperate with the authorities of the three states in the establishment of peace and order.

3. The Governments of the Associated States agree that individuals and groups who have hitherto been conducting hostile acts against these Governments but who now lay down their arms and cooperate with these Governments will be granted amnesty for their previous acts against these Governments and will be assured of personal safety and freedom.

4. The parties to the agreements agree to invite the United Nations to constitute a Peace Commission to assist in the establishment of peace and order in the Associated States and to grant to this Commission all facilities, privileges, freedom of movement and assistance which the Commission may deem necessary to ensure:

a. That all acts of hostility against the Governments of the Associated States cease, and that all those individuals and groups who have hitherto been conducting such hostilities lay down their arms and

cooperate with the Governments of the Associated States in the establishment of peace and order ;

*b.* That all assistance of any kind to individuals or groups who fail to lay down their arms or fail to cooperate with the Governments of the Associated States cease, including the provision of supplies, military advice, or military training or assistance in areas within or outside the territories of the Associated States.

*c.* That all individuals or groups who lay down their arms and cooperate with the Governments of the Associated States in the establishment of peace and order receive adequate guarantees of personal safety and freedom.

5. At such time as the United Nations Peace Commission is able to report that all hostile acts or support of such hostile acts against the Governments of the Associated States has ceased ; that all individuals and groups who have hitherto been conducting hostile acts against these Governments have laid down their arms and are cooperating with these Governments in the establishment of peace and order, and that all such individuals have received adequate guarantees of personal safety and freedom, the Governments of the States of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia agree to invite the United Nations to send Electoral Commissions to their territories and to grant to these Commissions all facilities, privileges, freedom of movement, and assistance which the Commissions may deem necessary to ensure :

*a)* Preparation of electoral laws acceptable to the Commission including guarantees, among others, of freedom of movement, freedom of presentation of candidates, immunity of candidates, freedom from arbitrary arrest or victimization, freedom of association and political meetings, freedom of expression for all, freedom of the press, radio, and television and free circulation of newspapers, periodicals, etc., secrecy of voting, and secrecy of polling stations and ballot boxes ;

*b)* Holding of free elections ;

*c)* Effective supervision by the Commissions of such elections to insure that the elections take place in genuine freedom and in strict conformity with the provisions of electoral laws.

6. France agrees that following the holding of free elections, or at such time as the United Nations Electoral Commissions may recommend as advisable to ensure complete freedom of the elections in the three States of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, it will undertake the withdrawal of French forces from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Nothing in this agreement, however, shall be held to debar France from providing such military assistance and advice as any one of the three States may request.

7. All parties to the agreement agree to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of the three States of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and undertake to give support and assistance to

the three states, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations, and in accordance with their own constitutional processes, should there be any attack against the political independence or territorial integrity of any of these states.

---

*Editorial Note*

For information regarding a United States note and a tripartite *aide-mémoire* in response to the Soviet note of April 5, see pages 88-91.

---

396.1 GE/4-1054 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State*

SECRET

TOKYO, April 10, 1954—4 p. m.

2468. 1. In examining implications Geneva conference for Japan, important to note at outset that government has not sought representation. When Right Socialist Diet spokesman raised question early March Prime Minister stated flatly government would not attempt seek participation. This not due lack of interest but realistic appreciation that having received no invitation, any bid for participation would not be favorably received and to make such a bid would only embarrass US and result in public snub.

2. Beyond this general motivation probably lies feeling Japan stands gain little or nothing from participation since conference is not expected by most Japanese to produce any basic or lasting settlement Far Eastern problems. Conclusion of Japanese policy planners is probably that Far East likely remain fluid state for considerable period and Japanese interests therefore best served by waiting until nation strong enough to play more independent role than now possible due Japan's political and economic dependence on US.

3. In spite of above little doubt that Geneva proceedings will be followed with keen interest here in contrast Berlin conference which in their minds was concerned with problems relating to another world. There is wide recognition here that Geneva deliberations will have potentially vital significance for Japan even though no change in Far Eastern *status quo* likely result from conference. Japanese feel US statements indicate no room for compromise and Communists not likely retreat from present positions of power in North Korea and Indochina unless high price paid.

4. Few Japanese in responsible positions expect unified Korea or any other kind of Korean settlement to emerge, but most Japanese continue indulge in good deal of wishful thinking on subject. Japanese



Government and people would probably welcome idea of unified Korean "buffer state", neutralized under effective international guarantee by great powers, including Japan due general feeling it would eliminate primary source of tension in Far East between US (*sic*) and Communist world, reduce to minimum danger of clash in which Japan might become involved, and facilitate establishment normal diplomatic and economic relations between Japan and China-USSR. (Danger Communist infiltration and eventual control under such circumstances unfortunately not taken seriously; many Japanese in fact think danger greater under present circumstances, with inefficient and corrupt ROK Government providing "hothouse" for Communist growth.) Also hopefully believed unified neutralized Korea under new government might be easier for Japan to deal with than present ROK Government. In this connection it has been suggested Japan go slow on negotiation settlement with ROK until dust settles and Korean situation "stabilized".

5. Looming behind Korea and Indochina issues and of overriding importance to Japan is question of what kind of relationship between Japan and Chinese mainland can be evolved. Japanese press and official reaction to Berlin decision to hold Geneva conference characterized by strong feeling status of Peking regime greatly enhanced, that US agreed to what in essence will be five-power conference, and that ability of Chinese Communists to speak on Asian problems increased. Press also speculated that regardless of Geneva outcome, Chinese Communists now convinced of need for foreign trade to carry through their program of national development, and this offers possibilities which Japan cannot ignore.

6. In order consolidate regime's internal control and develop nation's industrial and military power, Chinese Communists might conceivably agree at Geneva to settlements of Korean and Indochinese struggles embodying major concessions to free world positions those areas. One respected Foreign Office source has expressed fear such conciliatory course of action on Communists' part, presumably resulting in major relaxation of tension in Far East, could have disastrous effect in Japan. With threat of Communist aggression apparently removed, emotional Japanese people would be strongly inclined to let down their guard and "buy" Communist peace offensive. Japan's embryonic rearmament effort might then receive setback, disposition toward neutralism would be strengthened here, and pressure increased to remove controls on China trade and establish diplomatic relations with Peking. In move toward latter step Japan might be receptive to Soviet move to seat Japan and Communist China in UN on link basis.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> For documentation on this matter. see vol. III, pp. 620 ff. and 802 ff.

7. In event Geneva conference breakdown that results in renewal of aggressive Communist Chinese or Russian action, Japan would have no choice but to abandon its hopes for normalization of relations with China and the Soviet Union. Tightening of security and economic ties with US and free world would result, and rearmament effort would presumably move forward.

8. In more likely eventuality that Geneva conference results in no change in present unsettled state in Far East probable effect in terms Japanese policy expected to be closer that described paragraph 7 than in paragraph 6. Much will depend on light in which US and Communist-bloc representatives appear at conference. If failure to achieve any real solution of major Far Eastern issues clearly due to Communist recalcitrance and it could be shown that basic aggressive aims of Communists remained unaltered, Japanese realization of need to cooperate closely with free world would be strengthened. If, however, Communists were to succeed in giving impression they had put forward reasonable proposals which US had rejected because of its refusal to recognize international existence of Peking regime, Japanese neutralism and anti-American sentiment might well receive fillip.

9. Foreign Office officials have emphasized importance of Western unity at Geneva, referring to outstanding success this respect at Berlin conference. They believe Japanese will quickly interpret any signs of discord between American, British and French allies over either Korea or Indochina as indications that a Far Eastern Munich, with grave potential complications for Japan, is in the cards.

ALLISON

---

396.1 GE/4-1054 : Telegram

*The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State*

SECRET

SAIGON, April 10, 1954—5 p. m.

1956. Repeated information Paris 639, Hanoi 354, London 32. Re Paris telegram 302 [3702] to Department repeated Saigon 415, London 890.<sup>1</sup> It probable most Vietnamese Government officials and many

<sup>1</sup>The Embassy at Paris reported in telegram 3702 to the Department, Apr. 3, that the Vietnamese Delegation in Paris had told the French Government that a definitive position concerning Associated States representation at Geneva would have to await Buu Loc's return to Paris or his instructions from Saigon. The delegation had intimated that the presence of Viet Minh representatives in any status equal to that of the Associated States, however, would have an adverse public effect in Indochina. (396.1 GE/4-354)

of more vocal leaders of anti-Communist political and religious groups would fear Viet Minh participation at Geneva as leading to loss face by Vietnamese Government and concurrent increase stature and pretensions Viet Minh Government. However, it equally probable great mass of people would experience secret satisfaction at seeing Viet Minh—especially Ho Chi Minh in person—at council table bearding French and other Western powers. Much depends in this connection on outcome at Dien Bien Phu.

There is fear on part anti-Communist Vietnam that Viet Minh would not fail capitalize on Geneva as springboard to increase tremendously their stature in eyes of Vietnamese and other Asian people. It is argued that there would be much more interest shown in Viet Minh delegates by press and photographers than in rather colorless Vietnamese delegation and that Viet Minh would steal show. Viet Minh would follow line of Red Chinese in attempting build up international position and profit to greatest extent possible opportunity develop their propaganda line through press conferences and public statements. They would present Bao Dai and Buu Loc Government in most unfavorable light possible while building up case for “legitimacy” Ho Government. Persons supporting these views believe it would be better not have Associated States represented if that would mean inclusion Viet Minh.

Buu Loc told me personally he would not head government which had to sit at conference table across from Viet Minh. His present feeling is that Vietnam should be represented but only by an observer. Cambodia would have no objection sit across from Viet Minh and Laos, while it would not object, would probably do whatever France wanted.

HEATH

---

*Editorial Note*

For the texts of telegrams 1234, from Moscow, and 647, to Moscow, both dated April 11, dealing with the mode of delivery of the tripartite note to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, see page 91 and footnote 4 thereto.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 238 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET NIACT

LONDON, April 13, 1954—3 p. m.

4523. Repeated information Paris niact 622.<sup>1</sup> For the Acting Secretary from the Secretary. Paris for Secretary's party. Following is résumé of my final meeting with Eden this morning: <sup>2</sup>

1. We agreed to communiqué already sent you in separate message.<sup>3</sup>

2. United action in Southeast Asia. I told Eden I intended to press French re real independence for Associated States, and hoped he would use influence in same direction. Also told Eden after we completed this trip we would get in touch with British to see how best we might proceed in organizing united will to resist aggression in SEA. One possibility was to establish informal working group in Washington. Eden thought this good idea and said Makins would be available.

[Here follows discussion of Trieste, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference. For the portion of discussion relating to the Korean phase, see page 95.]

6. There was brief discussion on the composition of the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference. Eden fully agreed that the Big Four would invite all participants. He also believed that very early at Geneva we would have to discuss composition of Indo-China phase. Last night at Churchill's dinner I mentioned to Eden possibility of having following participants in addition to Big Four and Communist China: Three Associated States—Thailand—Burma—Ho Chi Minh. Eden said he rather liked the idea of Thailand and Burma and thought Ho's participation essential. Re possible participation of Ho we agreed that it would be unwise for us to press the French and Associated States on this or take any initiative in raising it.

[DULLES]

<sup>1</sup> For the full text of telegram 4523, see volume vi.

<sup>2</sup> Secretary Dulles visited London, Apr. 11-13. For a statement concerning the Secretary's trip to Europe issued by the White House on Apr. 10, see telegram 3593 to Paris in volume xiii.

<sup>3</sup> For text of communiqué transmitted in telegram Secto 2 from London, Apr. 13, see *ibid.* Final text of the communiqué agreed to by Secretary Dulles and Foreign Secretary Eden was sent in telegram 4513 from London, Apr. 13, not printed (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 263); the communiqué was issued as Department of State press release 192 of Apr. 13 and was published in Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 26, 1954, p. 622.

For additional documentation pertaining to the Secretary's discussions with the Foreign Secretary and other British officials, see volumes vi and xiii.

396.1 GE/4-1354 : Telegram

*The Consul at Geneva (Gowen) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

GENEVA, April 13, 1954—6 p. m.

362. Geneva Conference. Am reliably informed certain American patriotic groups such as Committee For One Million (against admission Red China to United Nations), American Legion, Veterans Foreign Wars, DAR, Gold Star Mothers, etc are considering sending representatives here from US and posting pickets protesting against Red China in vicinity Palais Des Nations UN headquarters here during conference. This proposed demonstration would consist some twelve pickets displaying such messages as "Bar Red China from UN", "No Deal With Red China". Information clearly indicates number reputable Americans in US behind plan and ready finance it believing it would support America's position re Red China at conference and minimize prospect adding Geneva to "list of American lost conferences".

For obvious reasons Department may wish consider doing everything possible prevent or at least discourage any such plan. Pelt United Nations European Director here tells me no pickets any form whatsoever of political demonstrators will be allowed within UN premises and grounds here. Chief of Justice and Police Department Geneva Canton tells me any such demonstrations on Swiss territory would be immediately broken up by police, demonstrators would be promptly arrested and expelled from Switzerland. He added all applications for holding such demonstrations during conference or any other time would be immediately refused and no demonstrations no matter how plausible or proper will be allowed in any part of Switzerland whether sponsors are pro or con Red China or any other country government or political religious or racial groups.

GOWEN

396.1 GE/4-1354 : Telegram

*The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

SAIGON, April 13, 1954—8 p. m.

1984. Repeated information priority Paris 646, Geneva 2, Hanoi unnumbered.<sup>1</sup> Embassy has carefully studied Department's various draft position papers for Geneva conference.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Telegram summarized in a memorandum from Deputy Director of PSA Henry B. Day to U. Alexis Johnson, Apr. 13, not printed. (396.1 GE/4-1354)

<sup>2</sup> For a list of position papers prepared for the Korean and Indochina phases of the Geneva Conference, see notes on sources, pp. 3 and 397.

(1) We have certain reservations in regard to recommendation in paper on "participation in the Indochina phase of conference (GI D-7a)"<sup>3</sup> that in addition to China and the four Berlin powers the three Associated States of Indochina, Viet Minh, Thailand, and Burma be also invited. We urge that no public position be taken on possible participation of the Associated States until opportunity has been had in Paris three-power talks to consider most carefully the views of the Vietnamese Government itself.

The Vietnamese Government is deeply disturbed at prospect of facing Viet Minh delegation across the conference table.<sup>4</sup> They feel that lacking concrete evidence that Chinese Communists would be willing to consider cessation of aid to Viet Minh, the conference would be merely a Communist propaganda exercise. They conceive no advantage to Vietnamese Government in participating in such "propaganda" conference but definite loss of its position by *de facto* recognition of Viet Minh Government which would follow on Viet Minh participation. In order to prevent such *de facto* recognition of Viet Minh, which would in itself be an achievement and net gain for the Communists, Vietnamese Government is thinking in terms of sending observers to Geneva rather than formal delegation claiming a participating status. This is the view of Bao Dai and Buu Loc and I may add is shared by Ambassador DeJean.

Two obvious disadvantages to non-participation of the Associated States come immediately to mind: (1) Danger of having the Indochina phase resemble a five-power conference, and (2) possible reflection upon independence of the Associated States should France appear to be deciding their fate without their participation. The following considerations must be weighed against this, however: (1) assumption that in any event there is little chance for successful resolution of the problem which would lead to cessation of Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh and (2) real advantage to Viet Minh in prestige and status to be recognized at such a conference with no compensating advantage to Vietnamese.

Should it be decided that Vietnamese Government not participate, they could issue statement explaining reasons for non-participation. Properly worded this could serve as counter to charges that non-participation was evidence of lack of status as sovereign power. This matter can be thoroughly explored at Paris before a firm stand is taken and the fears of the Vietnamese Government should be given due weight. Invitations to Cambodia and Laos should be considered in light of decision re Vietnam.

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated Mar. 24. p. 481.

<sup>4</sup> See telegram 1956 from Saigon. Apr. 10. p. 512.

(2) With regard to position paper on US aid in post-war reconstruction of Indochina (GI D-10A)<sup>5</sup> we doubt that it would be advantageous psychologically at Geneva to indicate to the French and Vietnamese that if the war is won in 1954 the President will appropriate funds for post-war reconstruction in Indochina and that in later years we intend to urge Congress to continue aid for Indochina reconstruction.

I do not believe any such promise would have much effect at the present time in determining French willingness to continue the war here nor would it have an important present effect on Vietnamese Government. Our advice is to defer such commitments to later date when they might be effective in persuading Vietnamese Government and public opinion to better political and military performance.

HEATH

---

<sup>5</sup> "US Aid in Postwar Reconstruction of Indochina," Mar. 24, not printed. (FE files, lot 60 D 330, "Position Papers")

---

*Editorial Note*

Secretary Dulles visited Paris, April 13-14, and met with Foreign Minister Bidault and other French officials to discuss the situation in Indochina and matters related to the Geneva Conference. For documentation on their conversations, see volume XIII. The communiqué released on April 14 was issued as Department of State press release 197 of April 14 and was published in the Department of State *Bulletin*, April 26, 1954, page 622.

---

396.1 GE/4-1454 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

PARIS, April 14, 1954—7 p. m.

3897. Repeated information London 934, Moscow 301, Saigon 440. April 13 French-US preparatory meeting for IC phase Geneva.<sup>2</sup>

Informal bilateral preliminary talks were held morning April 13 with French (including Chauvel, Lacoste, Roux, Offroy, Cheysson), with next meeting, which will be tripartite meeting, to be held morning April 15.<sup>3</sup> Summary highlights April 13 meeting follow with

---

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted in two parts.

<sup>2</sup> Minutes of meeting transmitted to the Department in despatch 2654 from Paris, Apr. 20, not printed. (396.1 GE/4-2054)

<sup>3</sup> See telegrams 3919, 3921. and 3925 from Paris Apr. 16, pp. 524, 525, and 527. respectively.

particular emphasis on broad lines French position as indicated therein.

1. French raised various procedural aspects Geneva conference indicating desirability obtaining four power agreement delegate responsibility their respective representatives Geneva to resolve such matters as those concerning conference security guards and conference seating arrangements. Re latter, French indicated desirability having US sit with ROK on right facing North Korea/CPR/USSR across table in Korea phase. French expressed concern lest unresolved question conference chairmanship delay opening Korea phase. There was agreement that there are established lines for dealing such matters and present group should not inject itself.

2. Re timing IC phase Geneva conference, French agreed question participation one for resolution by four powers and expressed hope four Foreign Ministers could meet as soon as possible after arrival Geneva to reach decision. Although recognizing substantive consideration must await resolution organization problems including participation and invitations, they added it would be most helpful for French public opinion to know consideration being given IC problem at opening of Geneva conference. We expressed full agreement regarding quadripartite nature of decisions to be taken this regard and desirability raising these questions at Geneva.

3. Re participation Associated States IC phase, the general French position indicated, although qualified as representing preliminary thinking on French side only, does not favor Associated States being invited as full participants IC phase conference. French stressed that they had not yet discussed this question formally with Associated States although they recognize necessity and intend to do so as soon as possible.

On one hand, French desire keep IC conference small in size and within manageable proportions and avoid if possible it becoming propaganda forum. On other hand, French understand Vietnamese fear consequence possible consecration status Viet Minh as state arising from presence latter if invited as full conference participant and believe propaganda use made of presence Viet Minh as full participant would have harmful effect on course military campaign and Vietnamese opinion. In French view, if Associated States participate conference, difficult see how Viet Minh could possibly be excluded although presence puppet governments Laos and Cambodia could probably be resisted. French do not think that Vietnamese Government will for this reason desire participate in conference. This con-



nection, French pointed out that if Associated States invited Cambodia would certainly accept (with all that that would imply in view instability evidenced at times by Cambodians), which would probably prompt Vietnamese to participate for prestige reasons regardless presence Viet Minh.

While French do not consider full participation Associated States as invited powers desirable, they feel this problem best handled by giving three Associated States and Viet Minh Government (and perhaps puppet governments Laos and Cambodia under these circumstances, but this questionable), special status as limited conference participants deriving in essence from the immediacy of their conflict of interests. These states would neither be observers nor full participants but their representatives would be readily available at Geneva for participation as occasion required thus avoiding any discussion legal basis these governments and confrontation at conference table of belligerents. French thinking this subject, however, not yet very clear.

On the other hand, in order avoid five power connotation and as best means keeping conference as small as possible, French inclined favor limitrophe principle with four powers, CPR, Burma and Thailand constituting participating powers for IC phase.

We stated view that failure invite Associated States to conference where their fate at stake would be widely misunderstood in US and in Asia generally and would tend cast doubt on status these states. We expressed belief Associated States should receive formal invitation with decision as to acceptance or rejection up to them. We said we would be willing oppose inviting Viet Minh if reasonable formula could be found although pointing out that western powers have already accepted conference presence of CPR and North Korea without according recognition.

4. In general terms, French tentative thinking is apparently in direction finding, as first step at Geneva, some basis for a cease-fire on purely military grounds with political negotiations to follow achievement of cease-fire. French emphasized basic French preoccupation with cessation hostilities in IC and importance French public opinion pressures this regard. French indicated that they do not favor negotiations with Viet Minh nor evacuation with agreement with Viet Minh. They said that military experts were studying Laniel's March cease-fire conditions <sup>4</sup> to determine guarantees and safeguards needed so that these conditions could in effect achieve Laniel objective of guaranteeing security of French and Associated States forces and of

---

<sup>4</sup> See telegram 3240 from Paris. Mar. 6, p. 435.

friendly elements. On military situation, French hazarded prediction present military equilibrium might become somewhat more favorable to French union particularly if Associated States forces are developed as planned. French pointed out that they thought the following elements might favor negotiations for a cease-fire and for an eventual settlement: (a) Soviets may not care see IC in Chinese hands or care risk generalized war (French attach considerable importance to expressions of goodwill and of a desire to be of service which they have received from Soviet Ambassador here); (b) Chinese fear possibility US intervention; and (c) both Vietnamese and Viet Minh do not care see extension Chinese influence in Vietnam. Although admitting extreme nature difficulties involved in attempting find political settlement IC, French indicated that it was conceivable that there could be a cease-fire in IC without political settlement as in Korea.

US delegation limited itself to statement regarding necessity keep IC out of Communist hands and expression of interest in French military study of Laniel cease-fire conditions in view extreme importance of controls and guarantees.

DILLON

---

*Editorial Note*

For the text of telegram 1253, April 14, from Moscow, concerning actual delivery of the United States' and tripartite replies to the Soviet *aide-mémoire* of April 5, see page 96.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 263

*The Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs of the Department of Defense (Davis) to the Coordinator for the United States Delegation to the Geneva Conference (Johnson)*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1954.

DEAR ALEX: This Department is becoming increasingly concerned regarding the lack of a U.S. position in preparation for the Indochina phase of the Conference to be held at Geneva. I fully appreciate the difficulties which, up until this time, have made it very difficult to draft a position on Indochina. However, in view of the short time remaining until the Conference convenes at Geneva, it is essential that consideration be given to the U.S. position.

It appears to me that ample guidance is available to provide the basis for an initial draft of a U.S. Government position on Indochina

for Geneva. NSC 5405<sup>1</sup> as well as reports of the Special Committee<sup>2</sup> set forth, in positive terms, U.S. policy with respect to Indochina and Southeast Asia. At the meetings of the Indochina Working Group the need for a U.S. position on Indochina has been discussed at considerable length, but to date no progress has been made. In order to initiate action on a draft position, the Defense representatives at the working level submitted an outline of views to the State members of the Indochina Working Group. A copy of this paper is attached for your information.

In view of the foregoing I strongly recommend that immediate action be taken to draft a U.S. position paper on Indochina for the Conference at Geneva. I would be glad to discuss this matter further at your convenience or at a meeting of the Assistant Secretaries.<sup>3</sup>

Sincerely yours,      For the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) :  
A. C. DAVIS

[Attachment]

DRAFT

UNITED STATES POSITION ON INDOCHINA TO BE TAKEN AT GENEVA

*Assumptions*

1. NSC 5405, approved 16 January 1954, continues to be the policy of the United States with respect to Southeast Asia.

2. It is highly improbable that Communist agreement could be obtained to a negotiated settlement which would be consistent with basic United States objectives in Southeast Asia. (JCS memorandum, 12 March 1954).<sup>4</sup>

3. At Geneva, the French Government under continued domestic pressure will favor a negotiated settlement of the fighting in Indochina at almost any price.

<sup>1</sup> For the text of NSC 5405, Jan. 16, 1954, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia," and related documentation, see volume XII.

<sup>2</sup> President's Special Committee on Indochina of the National Security Council. For a memorandum prepared by a subcommittee of the Special Committee titled "Military Implications of the U.S. Position on Indochina in Geneva," with a covering memorandum of Mar. 17 by Gen. Graves B. Erskine, Chairman of the working group of the Special Committee, see p. 475.

<sup>3</sup> A meeting scheduled for Apr. 20 between Admiral Davis and Johnson. Merchant, Robertson, MacArthur, Bowie, and Phleger to consider this letter was cancelled at the request of the Department of Defense. It was not rescheduled. For additional documentation on Admiral Davis' letter see Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 263.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 472.

*Discussion*

The French Government has been under considerable domestic pressure to terminate the hostilities in Indochina. In order to forestall a showdown prior to Geneva, M. Laniel, in a public statement, proposed six points as conditions for a cease-fire in Indochina.<sup>5</sup> These six points would unquestionably be unacceptable to the Communists, particularly if reinforced by additional conditions to assure enforcement of the armistice terms. However, domestic pressure on the French Government to terminate hostilities is expected to increase during the course of the Geneva Conference, rather than decrease. In view of this, it would be extremely difficult for the French Government not to accept an agreement which would be less than the conditions of the Laniel proposal. It should be noted that although the above factors make it almost certain that the French Government will seek agreement at Geneva at practically any price, there has been no indication that this "price" has been considered realistically by the French Government or public.

Communist tactics at Geneva are likely to follow closely those tactics employed by Communist negotiators at Panmunjom. Communist intransigence and other tactics, short of actually breaking off negotiations, led to prolonged discussions which worked to the disadvantage of our side. As a result, the Korean Agreement in its final form produced an armistice bringing about a cease-fire but with which it has been impossible to assure Communist compliance.<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, in Korea the United Nations Command is required to live up faithfully to the terms of the armistice. It should be noted that this problem would be considerably more complex and disadvantageous to the French in Indochina.

The Department of Defense has considered the military implications of terminating the fighting in Indochina under conditions less than a military defeat of organized Viet Minh forces. It was the conclusion of the Department of Defense, as indicated in Assumption No. 2 above, that inasmuch as it is highly improbable that Communist agreement could be obtained to a negotiated settlement which would be consistent with basic United States objectives in Southeast Asia, a continuation of fighting with the objective of seeking a military victory appears as the only alternative in Indochina. (JCS memorandum, Tab A.<sup>7</sup>)

<sup>5</sup> See telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, p. 435.

<sup>6</sup> For documentation on the Panmunjom negotiations and the Korean Armistice Agreement, see volume xv.

<sup>7</sup> Dated Mar. 12, p. 472.

### *Conclusions*

If the Communists follow the same tactics they employed at Panmunjom, they will be prepared for a long and difficult negotiation. The French will find it almost impossible to withstand pressures for a weakening of their position (the Laniel proposal) and will most likely give way under these pressures. Further, the French, once engaged in a negotiation, will of necessity be required to seek every possible means of settlement.

The United States should not join with the French in any Indochina negotiations at Geneva unless there is prior French commitment not to accept terms leading directly or indirectly to the loss of Indochina. This commitment should be positive and definite, for it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to disassociate itself from the negotiations once they had begun. Thus, if the negotiations result in a settlement leading to the ultimate loss of Indochina, the United States would have participated in this loss.

### *Recommendations*

It is recommended that :

*a.* The United States adopt the position that it is highly improbable that the Communist agreement could be obtained to a negotiated settlement at Geneva which would be consistent with basic United States objectives in Southeast Asia ;

*b.* The United States position for Geneva be positive and definite that we will agree to no settlement which would in any way compromise our objectives with respect to Southeast Asia ;

*c.* The French Government be informed of the United States position (*a* and *b* above) at the earliest possible date ;

*d.* Concurrently with informing the French of the United States position, consideration should also be given to the following pressures to be brought on the French if circumstances dictate :

(1) If France through one means or another countenances a Communist takeover in Indochina, it will mean far more than the end of France's position in the Far East. Rather it will be a public exhibition of France's inability to carry on any longer as an equal member with the United States and the United Kingdom of the Big Three ;

(2) The effect of abandonment would be so severe in North Africa as to have serious repercussions not only on the French position there, but also on the nature of the relationship between France and the United States in that area ;

(3) If the Indochina war ends on terms considered unsatisfactory by the United States, our dollar aid to France would, of course, automatically cease.

(4) Beyond these points, conclusion of negotiations by France resulting in Communist domination of Indochina, an area of extreme strategic interest to the free world, would result in consequences in

Europe as well as elsewhere whose seriousness would have no apparent limitation.

*e.* If the French Government refuses to agree to the United States position, the United States Government should not participate in the Indochina discussions at Geneva;

*f.* The United States immediately determine whether in the event of (*e*) above, we should approach the Governments of the Associated States and our allies with a view to continuing the struggle in Indochina either jointly with the French, in concert with our allies, or, if necessary, unilaterally.

396.1 GE/4-1654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

PARIS, April 16, 1954—1 p. m.

3919. Repeated information Saigon 441. Following tripartite analysis participation question United States element working group Indochina phase Geneva conference recommends US adopt following position:

1. US, UK, France and USSR are inviting powers.
2. Communist China was designed [*designated*] by four powers as power to be invited at Berlin and will attend. Under no circumstances, however, will Peking be considered inviting power or take part deliberations at Geneva to discuss other participants.
3. France should invite formally Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos attend as full participants.
4. Formula restricting conference to adjoining countries should be adopted and accordingly France should convey invitations Burma and Thailand. France should convey these invitations same as United States has done in Korean phases.
5. We do not favor presence Viet Minh and presumably case against such presence will be made by French. However, if Soviets insist neither we nor French would presumably break on this point. If Soviets insist on presence Viet Minh, they should do the inviting.
6. If Soviets propose invitation to Pathet Laos and Khmer Issaraks we should strongly oppose on grounds they do not exist and have not been recognized even by Soviets.
7. Australia, Philippines and Ceylon who have expressed interest in attending should be informed (Australia and Ceylon by United Kingdom, Philippines by United States) participation limited to big four, Governments of Indochina and bordering states (of which Communist China of course one). Other inquiring states could be given same answer. From what British tell us they could probably explain this formula to satisfaction Commonwealth states.
8. Above would be conveyed by working group to French and British representatives Paris on Tuesday April 20 as United States posi-

tion which we hope is acceptable to them as tripartite one to be taken by Foreign Ministers with Russians when question discussed with them at Geneva.

In reaching above recommendations working group feels position generally acceptable British and French though former would find it easier have Commonwealth nations present. On balance therefore it is probably good compromise. We feel it highly desirable have non-Communist Asian States other than Associated States present since then even if Communist propaganda attacks legitimacy these states and disparages their presence, conference would still have seven other participants including two Asian states whose legitimacy they can hardly question. In addition there are obvious psychological and other advantages accruing our side from presence Burma and Thailand. We would not favor other participants because there is no other formula which would prevent India, Indonesia and others from applying for membership. Therefore although we realize Australia for instance would be most helpful, we inclined attempt restrict participants to eleven indicated above.

We would appreciate Department's comments above proposed position. We realize considerations Washington working party united action Southeast Asia may cause Department adopt position including ANZUS powers and Philippines as well, from viewpoint working group discussions, however above formula appears most easily acceptable on tripartite basis.

DILLON

---

751G.00/4-1654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

PARIS, April 16, 1954—1 p. m.

3921. Repeated information Saigon 443. Pass Defense and JCS. Limited distribution. Reference Embassy telegram 3897 to Department repeated Saigon 440.<sup>1</sup> In tripartite conversations April 15 French discussed further their tentative views (paragraph 4 reference telegram) re desirability approaching Indochina problem at Geneva on military plane first. As possible first move this direction and one designed limit ultimate consideration Indochina problem to Vietnam, French indicated that they considering possibility proposing that Viet Minh withdraw from Laos and Cambodia and offering in return that French Union forces withdraw entirely from Cambodia and from all of Laos except bases of Xieng Khouang and Seno provided for in

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Apr. 14, p. 517.

Franco-Laotian treaty. They emphasized that French Union forces could be moved by air within little more than hour to any point endangered in Laos in event Royal Army unable cope situation.

French preliminary thinking this connection takes line that Laniel's March conditions for cease-fire<sup>2</sup> would probably be viewed by Communist representatives at Geneva as too harsh and as representing terms of victor and therefore do not permit sufficient latitude for negotiating purposes and in exploring Communist position at Geneva. Hence, French apparently contemplating possibility attempting secure psychological initiative by first offering disengage Laos and Cambodia from Indochina military scene and then moving on to consideration possibility achieving cease-fire Vietnam.

We raised number general questions including nature controls required, effect of withdrawal French Union forces on general military situation, opportunities for Communist subversive activities resulting from such withdrawal, et cetera. We pointed out that in effect new proposal, if made, would represent change from Laniel proposals which called for withdrawal of Viet Minh from Laos and Cambodia without any French Union withdrawal. British did not seem too concerned at practical aspects and expressed thought that it might at least give French talking point initiative in negotiating process.

French said question could only be explored further on basis French military study now promised for April 20 or 21. They stated privately that they assumed proposal would be unacceptable to Communists.

It was emphasized that project was in preliminary stage only and in no sense represented French proposal as yet. Urged that be treated on secret basis for obvious reasons.

DILLON

---

<sup>2</sup> See telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, p. 435.

---

396.1 GE/4-1654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

SECRET

PARIS, April 16, 1954—2:00 p. m.

3922. Repeated information Saigon 444, London 940. Chauvel today gave French-United States-United Kingdom working group following account of attitude of Vietnamese Foreign Minister regarding Vietnam participation at Geneva Conference. Chauvel had discussed problem with him today, including explanation United States-United Kingdom position that Vietnam should participate as interested State.



Vietnam Foreign Minister said he fully expected French Government to propose such participation for Vietnam, but that if Russians then propose Viet Minh, he would expect French to object and to try to get Viet Minh considered under different status from Vietnam. If this move unsuccessful, Vietnamese Government would then expect to be consulted by French Government before acceding to proposal invite both Vietnam and Viet Minh as full participants. Chauvel commented it would obviously be impossible for French Government to break off Conference organization discussions over Viet Minh participation. Vietnam Foreign Minister will consult Bao Dai on this matter and advise Chauvel further.

DILLON

396.1 GE/4-1654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

SECRET

PARIS, April 16, 1954—5:00 p. m.

3925. Repeated information London 941, Moscow 305, Saigon 444. Embtel 3897 (London 934, Moscow 301, Saigon 440) April 14.<sup>1</sup> April 15 French-UK-US Working Group Conversations Geneva IC Conference.<sup>2</sup>

Meetings held by working group in morning and afternoon April 15 with next tripartite meeting scheduled April 20.<sup>3</sup>

1. Preliminary tripartite ministerial meeting before Geneva. French and UK both favored such meetings and thought time might be found here although Eden not scheduled arrive Paris until evening April 22 after important Cabinet meeting that morning.

2. Pre-Geneva French-UK-US-USSR contacts. French raised for consideration possibility having preliminary quadripartite meeting with view settling certain four-power organizational aspects IC conference prior April 26 and suggested tripartite working group prepare list questions for possible presentation at such a meeting. It was pointed out, however, that this matter had been largely covered in *aide-mémoires* delivered Soviets<sup>4</sup> and that it would first be necessary see Soviet reply and determine whether Soviet representatives Geneva have authority act. Group agreed would be desirable prepare list those organizational questions to be taken up by representatives four

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 517.

<sup>2</sup> Minutes of meeting transmitted to the Department in despatch 2672 from Paris, Apr. 22, not printed. (396.1 GE/4-2254)

<sup>3</sup> See telegram 4002 from Paris, Apr. 21, p. 542. The minutes of the meeting (despatch 2672, Apr. 22) indicated that the next meeting would be held on Wednesday, Apr. 21.

<sup>4</sup> For documentation on the Soviet note and the tripartite reply, see pp. 70 ff.

powers at Geneva before April 26 as well as list those other organizational questions requiring ministerial decision.

3. Participation IC phase. French reported Vietnamese Government views (separate telegram<sup>5</sup>) to effect they wish participate but on different basis Viet Minh. French also reiterated wish avoid any implication recognition Viet Minh by virtue their possible presence Geneva. We again expressed hope not only that AS be invited but that they accept. UK agreed and expressed hope that negotiations with Vietnam would have reached point that it could come Geneva as fully independent state. UK also stressed importance this connection convincing Asian opinion that AS speak for themselves.

Re number participants IC phase, French reiterated desirability finding formula that would keep conference small as possible and yet sufficiently flexible permit occasional enlargement (reflecting French view desirability according special status AS and Viet Minh). UK expressed preference for five plus three AS and Viet Minh as opposed to including limitrophe countries citing pressures which would be encountered from Commonwealth countries if participation extended beyond IC borders. French reiterated preference for five plus two limitrophe with special status being accorded AS and Viet Minh on theory this best formula keep conference small and avoid confrontation Vietnam and Viet Minh. French, nevertheless, prepared accept presence AS if Vietnam so desires in spite possibility being on equal footing with Viet Minh. In response our question how Viet Minh could be kept out, both French and UK admitted this would be extremely difficult in face anticipated Soviet arguments. French stated they would accept Viet Minh presence only on Berlin formula that presence did not involve recognition. General agreement that distinction could be drawn effectively between status Viet Minh and Soviet Governments Laos and Cambodia, French pointing out that they had no knowledge of Soviet recognition of Pathet Lao or Issarak "governments".

4. Possible military settlement IC. French again indicated desirability approach IC problem at Geneva on military plane first and stated they hoped complete study of military application Laniel March cease-fire conditions<sup>6</sup> in time for presentation next meeting tripartite group. UK and we reminded French of difficulty involved in attempting separate military and political aspects. In response our question as to French views concerning ultimate political aspects any IC settlement following possible cease-fire, French stated their thinking not

---

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 3922 from Paris, Apr. 16, *supra*.

<sup>6</sup> See telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, p. 435.

yet crystallized. We again stressed absolute necessity full consideration be given safeguards and guarantees involved in any possible consideration cease-fire.

5. Communist tactics Geneva. We gave copies item E 62<sup>7</sup> as amended to French and UK and expressed wish compare notes on anticipated Soviet tactics Geneva. French stressed necessity preparing counter arguments to possible Communist proposal withdraw all foreign troops IC and hold free elections AS. We all agreed that we must not only be prepared counter anticipated Sino-Soviet arguments but must also have positive approach ourselves and hold initiative as much as possible.

DILLON

---

<sup>7</sup> Conference position paper GKI D-4/1, "Probable Soviet and Chinese Communist Objectives and Tactics at Geneva With Special Reference to Indochina," Apr. 9, 1954, not printed. (FE files, lot 60 D 330, "Position Papers")

---

396.1 GE/4-1654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State*

SECRET

SAIGON, April 16, 1954—6 p. m.

2029. Repeated information Paris 670, Hanoi 377. In conversation with Australian Foreign Minister Casey with regard to Indochina phase of Geneva conference, he said that merely "thinking out loud" it seemed to him that there were only two pieces of "bait" which would induce Communist China to stop aiding Viet Minh. One would be American recognition of Communist China and other would be an allotment of a part of Vietnam—Northern part—to Viet Minh. He remarked humorously that there seemed to be no possibilities of first "bait" being offered due to present American feeling against China and second "bait" had every sort of objection against it.

We discussed present reluctance of Vietnamese Government to participate in Geneva conference on ground that if they participate they would have to admit a Viet Minh delegation on an equal basis which would constitute a *de facto* recognition of Viet Minh regime. Casey remarked that he could not see how peace could be obtained unless both Vietnamese Government and Viet Minh sat down together. I remarked that present feeling of Buu Loc was that Viet Minh had no intention of making peace at least for present and purpose of their having delegation at conference would be propaganda attack on allegedly non-representative and non-democratic character of Bao Dai Government.

There ensued discussion in which Alan Watt (who formerly was Australian Minister in Moscow) and Casey participated as to possibility that Communist China could be brought to conviction that in her own interest she should cease aiding Viet Minh since continued aid might result in renewal of hostilities in which China might suffer. Both Casey and Watt agreed that it was unlikely that in any publicized conference China would publicly agree to "drop" Viet Minh. Only hope was that in side line conversation she might be brought to see wisdom of taking such action—without publicity.

HEATH

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 236

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Commonwealth Affairs (Horsey)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 17, 1954.

Subject: Secretary's Trip to London and Paris and Geneva Conference

Participants: Ambassador Spender, Australia  
 Ambassador Munro, New Zealand  
 Ambassador Heeney, Canada  
 Acting Secretary Smith  
 Mr. Merchant—EUR  
 Mr. Horsey—BNA

The three Ambassadors came at the Acting Secretary's invitation. The course of the discussions in London and Paris was described in detail.<sup>1</sup>

We had felt that, because of the deterioration in Indochina, there were essentially only two alternatives for the Indochina phase of the conference: disguised capitulation by the French or disguised capitulation by the Communists. It was therefore necessary to have an additional element of strength, such as the demonstration of a united will to take whatever action was necessary.

The Secretary felt that his trip had been successful in removing misunderstandings as to our purposes and in reaching substantial agreement. Both Governments had agreed in the communiqués to discuss collective arrangements here in Washington.

All three Ambassadors emphasized the importance which public opinion attached to a convincing demonstration of French intentions

---

<sup>1</sup> See the extract of telegram 4523 from London, Apr. 13, and editorial note, pp. 514 and 517, respectively.

of granting real independence to the three Associated States. Ambassador Heeney said that this was particularly important in obtaining the support of those not directly involved. He also mentioned the importance of Indian reaction. The Acting Secretary called attention to Bidault's emphasis on *French* public opinion. The satisfactory agreement with Laos was noted. As to Vietnam, the limitations imposed by the French constitution and by the continuation in office of local French officials with a colonial mentality were recognized. As to how Vietnam would be represented at Geneva, this had not been discussed in Paris. It was not in fact known whether the Vietnam Government wished to be represented formally, since their participation might lead to the presence of Ho. The Acting Secretary said he thought it would be an advantage to get Ho to the conference table.

In reply to a question by Ambassador Spender, Mr. Merchant said there had been no discussion in Paris on any specific French proposals for terms of settlement in Indochina, beyond what had been publicly put forward by Laniel some weeks ago.<sup>2</sup> The Acting Secretary mentioned, however, that at the working level in Paris there were suggestions for a settlement along territorial lines. We did not feel that these offered a practicable solution.

On Korea, which the Acting Secretary said was after all the main purpose of the conference, there was discussion of our differences with the British on the seating arrangements.<sup>3</sup> The Acting Secretary said that consideration was being given to the Australian Ambassador's suggestion that Hammarskjold act as permanent Chairman of the Conference. Rhee had not yet agreed to attend and of course he had to be there as one of the principals. He was in the meanwhile asking increased military support. We were ourselves anxious to reduce our commitments in Korea and were proposing to offer certain forms of increased military support without, however, building Rhee up to the point where he could take independent action.

On the substance of the Korean phase, Eden had come to agree with our position, after it had been presented as a logical continuation of the UN unification process interrupted by the 1950 aggression. The various proposals for unification by some form of election were canvassed. The Acting Secretary stressed that we should not give away all of our bargaining position in preliminary negotiations between ourselves. The Communists always started from an extreme position

---

<sup>2</sup> See telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, p. 435.

<sup>3</sup> See the extract of telegram 4523 from London, Apr. 13, relating to the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference, p. 95.

and it was essential for us also to have a retreat position. The three Ambassadors expressed great appreciation to the Acting Secretary for the briefing which they had received.

---

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Meetings with the President"

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

AUGUSTA, GEORGIA, April 19, 1954.

PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

1. I first went over with the President the draft of a statement which might be issued either by him or by me. I said that Mr. Hagerty was of the opinion that it would be better if I made the statement as it would be useful to get it on to the newsreels. The President agreed. The President made a few verbal changes and he proposed what became the final paragraph.<sup>2</sup>

2. I reported on my trip to London and Paris,<sup>3</sup> with which the President was already familiar so far as the main lines were concerned. I added a little "color" with a view to giving a more vivid impression with reference to Churchill and Eden and Laniel and Bidault. I said that our trip had been useful not only in regard to Indochina, but also in regard to EDC, where the talks which MacArthur and I had had with Laniel had, I thought, played a decisive part in helping Laniel to make up his mind in announcing the date for debate in the Chamber on the EDC Treaty.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Secretary Dulles accepted an invitation from President Eisenhower to visit with him at Augusta, Georgia (telegram 3546 to Paris, Apr. 14, 110.11 DU/4-1454) by letter of Apr. 15. In his letter to the President the Secretary wrote: "I would like to have this chance to tell you of the results of my present trip and obtain your guidance before I leave for the NATO Meeting and Geneva Tuesday evening [Apr. 20]. I had useful meetings with Bidault and Laniel in Paris yesterday, which I think will help in moving forward toward some of our objectives in Indo-China and EDC." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Meetings with the President")

For documentation on the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at Paris on Apr. 23, see volume v.

<sup>2</sup> The Secretary's statement made at Augusta, Georgia on Apr. 19 following his meeting with the President was issued as a White House press release and is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 3, 1954, pp. 668-669.

James C. Hagerty wrote in his diary: "He [the Secretary] had prepared two statements: one by himself and another by the President—Asked for my advice—recommended that he as Secretary make statement for prestige purposes since he was leaving for NATO and Geneva meetings Tuesday night." (Eisenhower Library, Hagerty papers, Hagerty Diary, Apr. 19, 1954)

<sup>3</sup> See the extract of telegram 4523 from London, Apr. 13, and editorial note, pp. 514 and 517, respectively.

<sup>4</sup> For documentation on the proposed establishment of a European Defense Community, see volume v.

The President expressed some chagrin that the Senators had publicly stated that they had not been consulted. It seemed that they had forgotten.<sup>5</sup>

3. I referred to the fact that Mr. Eden had insisted upon calling off the prospective meeting of the 10 Southeast Asia countries to make a beginning on creating the collective defense. I explained that we had compromised on an arrangement which "fuzzed" the matter by combining the 10 with the 16 Korean countries.<sup>6</sup> I said that I thought this was probably largely due to pressure from Nehru.<sup>7</sup>

4. I told the President that there was still some risk that the Geneva Conference might fail because of Soviet insistence that it should be organized as a "Five Power" conference, including Red China. I said I felt that the Russians, who had vainly fought for this at Berlin, were trying to take advantage of the buildup of world hope in the Geneva Conference to repudiate their Berlin agreement and to put us in a position of either having to accept the five-power concept or be responsible for breaking up the conference. I said I regarded it as vital that the five-power concept should not be accepted. The Berlin understanding was to the contrary and was the "charter" of the Geneva Conference and I saw little use in going into a new conference with the Communists if they started out by repudiating the agreement on which the conference was based. I added that American public and Congressional opinion would be deeply resentful of our throwing away the principle which we had defended, and the acceptance of which we had won at Berlin.

The President was in entire agreement. He suggested that I should hint in my going-away statement that there was still a possibility of

---

<sup>5</sup> Senators Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Mike Mansfield of Montana, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated on Apr. 16 that President Eisenhower had not consulted with them on the preparation of his message of Apr. 15 to the Prime Ministers of the six nations signatory to the European Defense Community (Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands). (*The New York Times*, Apr. 17, 1954, p. 2) The President's message was issued as a White House press release and is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 26, 1954, pp. 619-620.

<sup>6</sup> Ambassador Makins called on Secretary Dulles on Apr. 18 and showed him a telegram from Eden which said in effect that the British would not participate in the scheduled meeting of the "Ten on Indochina" called for noon on Apr. 20 with the Secretary. Instead of calling off the meeting the Secretary proposed that representatives from the Southeast Asian nations meet with the 16 nations concerned with Korea and that he would make a report and discuss the Geneva Conference in general terms. For the full text of the memorandum of conversation of this meeting and a previous meeting between Makins and Under Secretary Smith, Apr. 18, see volume XIII. For Eden's reply, see *infra*.

<sup>7</sup> A news release from Bombay on Apr. 15 suggested that Prime Minister Nehru might take countermeasures against the collective organization for Southeast Asia at the forthcoming conference of the Colombo nations, scheduled to meet on Apr. 28. (*The New York Times*, Apr. 16, 1954, p. 2)

the conference breaking on the "five-power" issue. I indicated I would not want to deal with this on other than a very delicate basis before consulting with the British and French, who so far had stood fast with us.

The President asked what the position would be if we refused to attend and if the others went on without us. I said I felt this was unlikely to happen in relation to the initial, i.e. Korean phase, of the conference because I was confident that the ROK would follow us in this matter, and that any conference about Korea which was not participated in by both the ROK and the United States would be a farce. I said as regards the Indochina conference, that was different because France was principally concerned. However, this phase of the conference had not yet been arranged and the invitees had not been designated.

. . . . .

396.1 GE/4-1954

*The British Ambassador (Makins) to the Under Secretary of State  
(Smith)*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1954.

MY DEAR BEDELL: I put to the Foreign Secretary the suggestion which was made when I called on the Secretary of State and you that the meeting tomorrow at the State Department should be a meeting of the "Sixteen" and regarded as a general "briefing" meeting before the Geneva Conference.<sup>1</sup> The Associated States will be added in view of the Indo-China item on the Conference agenda. It could if necessary be explained that the Secretary had seen all the Ambassadors separately before he left for London and Paris and was seeing them together on account of the time factor.

I have now heard that Mr. Eden agrees to this proposal. He suggests that it might be best to lay the main emphasis on Korea, and that the Indo-China question might rest on the substance of the communiqués issued in London and Paris. In this way any implication that the meeting is to begin the work of constituting the proposed South East Asia defence arrangement would be avoided.

Yours sincerely,

ROGER MAKINS

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 6, *supra*.



396.1 GE/4-2054

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Elizabeth Brown of the Office of  
United Nations Political and Security Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1954.

Subject: Special Briefing Meeting, April 20, 1954

[Here follow the list of participants, Secretary Dulles' opening remarks, and that portion of the briefing concerned with the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference; for text, see page 119.]

Turning to Indochina, the Secretary said no decision had as yet been reached as to who would be invited to the Indochina phase of the conference. Five states were indicated by name in the Berlin communiqué, together with "other interested states". Who those other interested states were had not yet been determined and no invitations sent. He expected that the four sponsoring powers would hold early conversations in this regard. He had already had an informal exchange of views with M. Bidault; the matter had not arisen in his discussions with Mr. Eden. He assumed, however, that the Associated States would be invited if they wished to attend, and he recalled that they had been present at the Japanese Peace Conference and had signed the resulting treaty. He would think they were equally concerned in this case. It was easy to think of other states who might also be regarded as "interested".

Noting the language in the Berlin communiqué on this point, Mr. Dulles recalled that there had been some controversy at Berlin as to whether other interested "states" should be invited or other representatives of the region. As he recalled, the USSR had originally proposed "representatives", but the Western powers had insisted upon "states" on the ground that it would be more difficult to bring in Ho Chi Minh on this basis. He repeated that there was no agreement among the three Western powers, much less with the USSR, as to the composition of this phase of the conference.

Referring again to the connection which the Berlin communiqué made between a Korean settlement and peace in Asia, the Secretary said that there was also a strong inference that what happened on the Korean phase would have a bearing on what happened in Indochina. Nobody desired to give priority to Korea over Indochina from the standpoint of importance and urgency, but it was generally recognized that peaceful intentions on the part of the Communists would probably be developed positively or negatively with respect to Korea, before they could be developed on Indochina. He also thought that the

conference would probably discuss Korea first since the composition of the Indochinese phase of the conference was still undecided.

Mr. Dulles said he assumed that those present who were particularly concerned with Indochina and Southeast Asia would be interested if he also reported briefly on the talks he had just concluded regarding the creation of a defense coalition to protect Southeast Asia from possible conquest by international Communist forces.<sup>1</sup> The origin of our thinking on this proposal derived from the feeling that if we entered the Geneva Conference, and more particularly its Indochina phase, without greater cohesion and strength, the Communists could legitimately entertain the hope and expectation of being able to take over Southeast Asia piece by piece. If they thought they could do so, there was no reason why they would not proceed on that basis.

Without cohesion for defense it had seemed likely to the United States, Mr. Dulles said, that the Geneva Conference would encourage rather than discourage Communist ambitions which presumably embraced the entire area. The best hope for peaceful solution seemed to lie in creating such conditions that the Communists would realize their ambitions would encounter an obstacle so formidable as to oblige them to write off the area. He recalled that this was what happened in Greece when the Communists finally realized they could not succeed there. We knew from the Greek experience that the Communists were without scruples when it came to writing off an adventure that was not paying off.

Therefore, Mr. Dulles believed that the first thing necessary for a possible peaceful solution was to take whatever steps were necessary to make it perfectly apparent that the Communists would not be able to succeed in their presumed grandiose plans in Southeast Asia. For this reason it seemed wise to make some preliminary arrangements to this end before the conference began; otherwise what we did would not have the same impact upon the Geneva Conference.

Observing that he had had discussions along these lines with a number of those present, the Secretary said that it had seemed useful to supplement those conversations with personal discussions with Messrs. Eden and Bidault in order to ensure mutual understanding. For that purpose he had gone to London and Paris last week.<sup>2</sup> Noting the two communiqués from London and Paris covering these discussions, the Secretary stated that the essence of both was the recognition that the Communist threat in Southeast Asia constituted a danger to the vital interests of many countries in the area, and that this situa-

---

<sup>1</sup> For documentation on the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), see volume XII.

<sup>2</sup> See the extract of telegram 4523 from London, Apr. 13, and editorial note, pp. 514 and 517, respectively.

tion made it desirable to explore the possibilities of united defense measures to create a collective defense arrangement within the framework of Article 51 of the UN Charter.

The Secretary went on to say that in the Paris conversations considerable emphasis was placed upon the desirability of the independence of the Associated States, as forecast in the July 3 statement by the French Government.<sup>3</sup> All, including France, recognized that collective defense in the area would have to be defense of genuine freedom and independence and not the defense of colonialism which the French had taken the initiative in beginning to end in the area.

Mr. Dulles informed the group that no final conclusion regarding the ultimate composition of the defense system had been reached. There were certain countries so closely in the path of the present Communist threat that they obviously would be necessary and proper parties to a defense arrangement; other countries in the general neighborhood might also be useful parties. He thought, and he believed Mr. Eden shared this view, that the question of composition could not be settled hurriedly.

In this connection, Mr. Dulles recalled that the original concept of collective defense in Europe was a grouping of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and the Western continental powers. The question of adding the Scandinavian states then arose, later Portugal and Italy, and still later Greece and Turkey were added, although both of them were far away from the North Atlantic area.

This experience, Mr. Dulles indicated, showed that the problem of composition had to be solved in an evolutionary process, taking account of varying needs and the measures that states were willing to take to meet the Communist threat. The important thing was that this concept had been launched and had found a good reception among countries in the immediate area. In the Secretary's judgment, the idea had already taken hold sufficiently to make clear to the Communists before the Geneva Conference that Southeast Asia was not going to be a push-over that they could take bit by bit. They now knew that if they persisted in their present tactics they would meet united opposition.

The Secretary said that, in discussing this situation in Augusta yesterday with the President,<sup>4</sup> he had recalled the fact that past ag-

<sup>3</sup> Declaration made on July 3, 1953 by the French Government concerning the relationship between France and the Associated States. France felt the time had come to perfect the independence and sovereignty of the Associated States and invited each of the three governments to come to an agreement with France on the settlement of various questions. For the text of the declaration transmitted from Paris to the Department in telegram 52, July 3, 1953, see volume XIII. (751G.00/7-353)

<sup>4</sup> Apr. 19. For a memorandum by the Secretary of State concerning his meeting with the President, see p. 532.

gressive Communist moves had brought reaction from the free world. NATO, for example, was due perhaps more than anything else to the takeover of Czechoslovakia which brought new fears into Europe. The original concept of NATO had not, he thought, included its implementation by supplementary defense arrangements. He recalled that when it was discussed in the Senate, both he and Senator Vandenberg had thought the pledges in the treaty were sufficient.

However, after the conquest of China and the Communist aggression in Korea, the fears of the free world led to its increased strength. The US, the Secretary observed, began to create a system of collective security in the Far East through mutual security treaties with Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Japan.<sup>5</sup> If instead of collapsing in fear we were spurred to more vigorous measures of collective self-defense, Mr. Dulles considered that there was a fair chance that the ambitions entertained by the Communists would be written off, and there might be an opportunity to enlarge the area of peace in the world and to bring an end to the fighting in Indochina where so far the forces of the French Union had made a valiant contribution.

The Secretary repeated that the problem was to achieve a peace that would be secured not by surrender or retreat, but by a demonstration that peace for free men meant strength, unity, cohesion and the pooling of our strength to protect the freedom of each of us. He believed that if it became clear that the nature of the threat in Indochina would arouse such a united response, in that fact lay the best hope for all of us, not only those interested in the area, but for all free countries because otherwise the threat of aggression would become so menacing that it might plunge us into general war.

The Secretary suggested that the group should agree upon the text of a statement for the press. In his view it was of the utmost importance that there should be no discussion of any questions of strategy or tactics because this would defeat our own purposes at the conference. This group must be able to discuss such matters frankly and confidentially knowing that there would be no leaks, for if there were, it would not be possible to have such discussions in the future. Mr. Dulles suggested that the press should be told simply that there had been an exchange of views preliminary to the Geneva Conference and that he had reported to the group for information purposes on the discussions which he had carried on last week in London and Paris. He added that he would indicate that there had been present at the meeting representatives of the sixteen states participating in the Korean phase of the Conference, together with representatives of the three Associated States.

---

<sup>5</sup> For documentation on these defense pacts, see volume XII.

751G.00/4-1954

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Day) to the Coordinator of the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference (Johnson)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1954.

Subject: Philippine participation in Indo-Chinese phase of the Geneva Conference

1. In his conversation with Mr. Robertson on April 15,<sup>2</sup> Philippine Chargé, Emilio Abello, stated that if the Philippines were asked to participate in a defensive coalition to deter Communist aggression in Southeast Asia but were not invited to participate in the Indo-Chinese phase of the Geneva Conference, very strong, unfavorable reactions could be expected from Philippine political leaders. Mr. Abello anticipated that such a development would be vigorously exploited by the ultra-Nationalist element in the Philippines which is attempting to seize control of Philippine foreign policy and to drive a wedge between the Magsaysay administration and the United States.

2. The Embassy, in a telegram of April 19, stated its agreement with Abello's warning and added that no Filipino, including President Magsaysay, would understand our asking the Philippines to participate in a coalition but not in the Conference.<sup>3</sup>

3. Recent developments in the Philippines with respect to the Bases Agreement, the Trade Agreement, reparations from Japan, and demands for an "Asia for the Asians" foreign policy are all indicative of the vigorous ultra-Nationalism and a climate of opinion in which the Magsaysay administration might find it impossible to obtain the necessary political and public support for participation in any defensive coalition, if at the same time they were denied an opportunity to attend the Indo-Chinese phase of the Geneva Conference.

4. It is most likely that if the Philippine Mission, which has already left Manila to participate in the Korean discussions, is not invited to participate in the Indo-Chinese discussions, the Philippine government will be obliged to reject the proposal to participate in the coalition. It

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Bell of PSA.

Notation on source text by Drumright: "Cleared with questions indicated in margin [question marks for paragraphs 4 and 5]. It would be desirable from our point of view for Philippines to participate in Indochina discussions, but overriding external considerations may make it impossible. I believe we could explain this to Philippine Govt. EFD"

<sup>2</sup> For a summary of this conversation, see telegram 2642 to Manila, Apr. 15, 1954, printed in volume XII. (751G.00/4-1554)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 2303 from Manila, Apr. 19, Ambassador Spruance reported that "I strongly second Abello's warning. Not only would Recto's opposition exploit situation, but no Filipino, including President, would understand our asking Philippines to participate in coalition, but not including them in conference." (751G.00/4-1954)

is difficult to believe that any Southeast Asian defensive coalition without the Philippines, who are traditionally regarded as our closest collaborators in the Far East, will offer much in the way of psychological value.

5. It is recommended that the Philippines be asked to participate in the Indo-Chinese phase of the Geneva Conference.

*Note:* There has just been received in this office the attached note requesting the Philippine government be invited to attend any discussions on the restoration of peace in Indo-China which may be arranged at Geneva.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup>Not attached to source text. Note has not been located in Department of State files.

---

*Editorial Note*

Secretary of State Dulles departed from Washington on the evening of April 20 for Paris to meet with British and French officials regarding Indochina and the impending Geneva Conference. The Secretary also participated in a one-day meeting of the North Atlantic Council on April 23. He departed Paris for Geneva on the evening of April 24 at 9:20 p. m. (Paris time).

Before the Secretary's departure from Washington, he issued a statement regarding the Geneva Conference (Department of State press release 207, April 20); for text, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 3, 1954, page 669.

---

*Editorial Note*

For the texts of the Soviet replies to the United States and tripartite notes of April 14, contained in telegrams 1286 and 1289, April 20 and 21, from Moscow, see page 126.

---

396.1 GE/4-2154 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State*

SECRET

VIENTIANE, April 21, 1954—2 p. m.

30. Sent Saigon 92, Paris 20. Paris for Ambassador Heath. In separate talks on April 15 and 17 with Crown Prince and Prime Minister the following was gathered re Laotian ideas on Geneva Conference.

Though still vague in its thinking, Lao Government will probably follow French lead but only under condition French and/or great

powers guarantee all Viet Minh evacuate Laos. This holds true whether French desire talks re peace, truce or other negotiations.

Lao Government skeptical of chances of success either Korean or Indochina phases at Geneva.

Prime Minister stated he and Foreign Minister ready attend preliminary discussions and conference itself but are awaiting invitations.

McCLINTOCK

---

751G.00/4-2154 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

SECRET

PARIS, April 21, 1954—4 p. m.

3985. Repeated information Saigon 461. Heath, Bonsal and Embassy officer called on Vietnam Foreign Minister, Chargé d'Affaires in Paris, and Vice Premier Vinh last evening. They verified fact that for all practical purposes basic Franco-Vietnamese negotiations had now been concluded. Foreign Minister stated that French had accepted Vietnam's revolutionary suggestions in spite of fact they were contrary to French constitution itself. He spoke appreciatively of problems French Government faced in Parliament and public opinion in doing so. There would be two treaties, first declaring Vietnam's independence and second setting the manner of future association between two countries. Treaties will not actually be signed until the economic and financial conventions are also ready but they believed that arrangement could be made to make statement before Geneva conference that negotiations had been successfully concluded.<sup>1</sup>

Foreign Minister spoke at length of Vietnamese concerns at participating in Geneva conference if Viet Minh were also to be present. Favored Chauvel solution of compromise formula wherein states and Viet Minh could both be participants but would only take part when called and would not be called at same time. Vietnamese made it clear they intended to be present in Geneva area whether participating in conference or not.

Bao Dai arrived Paris and asked see Ambassador Heath today. It is hoped determine Vietnamese official position on participation Geneva as result that interview.

DILLON

---

<sup>1</sup> On Apr. 28, France and the State of Vietnam issued a joint declaration at Paris affirming their agreement to regulate their mutual relations on the basis of two treaties, one providing for total independence for Vietnam the other defining the terms of their association within the French Union. The treaties were not initialed until June and were never ratified. For information on French views. see telegram 3972 from Paris, Apr. 21, in volume XIII.

751G.00/4-2154 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

SECRET

PARIS, April 21, 1954—8 p. m.

4002. Repeated information Department 951, Saigon 464, Moscow 312. Tripartite working group on Indochina phase at Geneva met this afternoon with Chauvel presiding.<sup>1</sup> Colonel De Brebisson gave military briefing which adds nothing to data already submitted. French conclusions re consequences fall Dien Bien Phu already considered telegrams 3972 (Saigon 458)<sup>2</sup> and 3986 (Saigon 462)<sup>3</sup> April 21 reporting talk with Jacquet while allusions most recent Cambodian problems covered greater detail separate talk this morning Embtel 4001.<sup>4</sup> Chauvel said Navarre queried re conditions and safeguards necessary implement Laniel March 5 proposals<sup>5</sup> and Paris hoped have reply Saturday<sup>6</sup> and would give us details when available.

Chauvel also indicated Bidault was considering desirability taking initiative and making opening political declaration at Geneva stating French aim was defend independence AS against aggression. He said there was feeling this would clearly present French position and would place problem in proper framework. However, such statement would require backing up by US and UK, and Bidault would probably raise with Secretary and Eden Thursday. He said such statement might to [?] into need reestablish peace and tranquility first, following which such questions free elections Vietnam could be taken up, et cetera, Achilles requested draft any such statement when available.

Chauvel also reported Franco-Vietnamese negotiations making progress and confirmed earlier statement Embtel 4001 French inviting Cambodian and Laotian Foreign Ministers Paris quadripartite talks this Saturday with Vietnamese and French. As further thought he said French considering proposing first at Geneva that truce under Red Cross or other impartial supervisor be agreed to by both sides

<sup>1</sup> Minutes of conversations transmitted to the Department in despatch 2677 from Paris, Apr. 22, 1954. (751G.00/4-2254)

<sup>2</sup> For text, see volume XIII.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Dated Apr. 21, 1954. The Embassy at Paris reported: "French Government has asked Cambodian and Laotian Foreign Ministers come Paris meet with Vietnamese Foreign Minister (who in Paris now) and French on Saturday, April 24 in order permit French inform three Associated States on tripartite discussions and to go over entire Franco-Associated States position for Geneva. Re participation Associated States in conference, no change in Vietnamese position as indicated previously to Working Group nor is any expected prior opening Geneva conference. It is French view to have representatives three Associated States located in town near Geneva from beginning conference for purpose consultation in event French fail obtain full participation Associated States without participation Viet Minh or, failing that, on different status from latter." (751G.00/4-2154)

<sup>5</sup> Contained in telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, 1954, p. 435.

<sup>6</sup> Apr. 24.



for purpose evacuate wounded from Dien Bien Phu as first test Communist intentions.

In reply to query from Reilly (UK) on participation, Chauvel said French position remained participation beyond big four, AS, Communist China, Thailand and Burma made conference too big. Reilly said he understood this was Eden's position. Achilles stated our position undetermined beyond that [garble] expressed. Idea was projected that in order avoid "big five" question China be treated as limitrophe state like Burma and Siam if latter invited. Chauvel said nothing new on Vietnamese position beyond what was already reported. French still planned proposed Associated States as full participants though invitation of course depended on four-power agreement.

Finally French read off list unsettled procedural business item C phase as follows:

1. For settlement by four Foreign Ministers

- (a) Participants
- (b) Method of extending invitations
- (c) Chairmanship
- (d) Date of opening session on Indochina

2. For four-power settlement at lower level

- (a) Official and working languages
- (b) Seating arrangements
- (c) Distribution of costs
- (d) Other procedural points such as convening first meeting

3. For three-power settlement

- (a) Participants
- (b) Retreat position participants if Soviets reject first position
- (c) Establishment secretariat on our side.

DILLON

Secretary's memoranda of conversation, lot 64 D 199

*United States Minutes of a Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

PARIS, April 22, 1954—4 p. m.

U.S.	U.K.	France
The Secretary	Mr. Eden	M. Bidault
Ambassador Johnson	Mr. Caccia	M. Schumann
Ambassador Heath	Ambassador Jebb	General Ely
Mr. Merchant	Mr. Allen	M. Parodi
Mr. Robertson	Mr. Reilly	Ambassador Chauvel
Mr. MacArthur	Mr. Nutting	M. de Latournelle
Admiral Davis		M. de Margerie
Mr. Bowie		M. Baeyens
Mr. Achilles		M. Lacoste
Mr. McBride		M. Cheysson
		M. Folin
		M. Andronikoff (interpreter)

*Reply to Latest Soviet Note on Geneva*

M. Bidault<sup>2</sup> opened the meeting by stating that there was no fixed agenda and as the host he would make the first statement. Referring initially to the tripartite reply to the Soviet Note regarding the inviting powers for the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference, M. Bidault read a U.S.-French draft of a reply (See Tab A).<sup>3</sup> He stressed the need to reply clearly to the false Soviet allegations regarding composition of the Geneva Conference. He stressed that it had always been understood that special responsibility devolved on the four Berlin powers, and that in any event we should not open the Geneva Conference by violating the basis of the understanding on which the meeting was set up.

Mr. Eden suggested that the last sentence of the draft be put in the positive rather than the negative sense and that it should stress the fact that the Geneva Conference must be held on the basis under which

<sup>1</sup> Telegraphic summary of minutes transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 6 from Paris, Apr. 23. (PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Indochina"; copy also in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 239)

On Apr. 19 Secretary Dulles in personal messages contained in telegrams 3749 to Paris and 5508 to London suggested to Bidault and Eden the possibility of meeting at Paris on Apr. 22 to discuss preliminaries regarding Geneva. (110.11 DU/4-1954)

For the portion of these minutes pertaining to the Korean phase of the conference, see p. 127.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram Dulte 5 from Paris, Apr. 22, Secretary Dulles informed Acting Secretary Smith that for "background you should know that at tripartite meeting this afternoon Bidault appeared totally exhausted mentally and unable to preside coherently. He is obviously under great strain as a result of developments I reported in my earlier telegram to you today [French leaders considered Dien Bien Phu situation hopeless; see Dulte 2, Apr. 22, in volume XIII.] and infirmity due to this rather than other causes." (PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Indochina")

<sup>3</sup> Tab A is printed with the portion of these minutes pertaining to the Korean phase; for text, see p. 130.

it was established at Berlin. M. Bidault and the Secretary agreed with this thought.

*Participation in Indochina Phase*

M. Bidault then passed to the question of participants in the Indochina phase of the Conference, and said that we might consider as a formula the four Berlin powers plus the three Associated States and the limitrophe states of Communist China (already invited), Thailand and Burma. He said that there was a problem which did not involve the French Government but rather the Vietnamese Government in the presence of the Vietminh. He said that Vietnam was, of course, an independent Associated State within the French Union and whose Government would strongly prefer that Ho Chi Minh not be present. Therefore the French position will be to oppose the presence of the Vietminh and to propose an invitation to the three Associated States. If the first French position is rejected by the Soviets, the second French position would be to accept Vietminh presence in some restricted capacity. If the Soviets insist on the same status for Ho as for Vietnam, the French Government will consult the Bao Dai Government before taking a position. Therefore, the French position, after proposing full participation for the Associated States, if the Soviets press the point, will be to seek some formula which will give the appearance of avoiding Vietminh participation at the same level.

The Secretary commented that there was one question not bearing on the substance of this problem but on the Note we had agreed upon. He said that the sentence which stated that all participants should be equal after the Korean and Indochinese talks had got underway might block the French search for some different status for Ho, which could give the appearance that he was not on the same level as the Vietnamese Government. The Secretary noted that perhaps we could claim that the Vietminh delegates did not represent a state, while the Berlin communiqué had specified that invitations would be extended to representatives "of other interested states", but he did believe that the sentence in question might make it more difficult to create any special and subordinate status for the Vietminh.

M. Bidault stated that France does not consider the Vietminh a state though the Soviet Union, which has recognized the Ho regime, and the Communist Chinese who help it do. He noted that France considers the three governments of the Associated States which received thirty-three votes for admission to the UN and with whom France maintains diplomatic relations as the only legitimate governments of the area. He said that, by the French definition, the idea that only states should participate would exclude the Ho regime. However, he would accept the presence of Ho if it would facilitate the end of the

Indochina war, even though he could not be considered a representative of a state. He was particularly anxious to avoid the *de facto* acceptance of Ho which we had avoided at Berlin.

*French Reaffirmation of Independence of Associated States*

M. Bidault continued stating that the text of the Note which he had read seemed to reject clearly the Soviet proposal, and reaffirmed the special status of the four powers. He then said he was making a separate supplementary proposal, and read a statement regarding French reaffirmation of the independence of the three Associated States. The statement, after reaffirming the full independence of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, stated the resolve of the French Government to safeguard the freedom of the Indochinese peoples, and guaranteed that France would do everything possible so that they could exercise this independence, and live at peace. France also was resolved to safeguard the territorial integrity of the Associated States, and to prevent all attempts at disrupting the status of independence which had been freely accorded them. M. Bidault concluded that this declaration by the French Government would supplement the declaration of July 3, 1953.<sup>4</sup> He said that this had not been shown to the French Government yet, but he felt the Cabinet would approve it.

The Secretary inquired whether the statement which M. Bidault had just read would be appended to the Note to the Soviets which we had agreed upon earlier in the meeting. M. Bidault said that the statement which he had read regarding the independence of the Associated States was, of course, intended only for the French Government to make, and that this was just a rough draft, not intended to be issued right away.<sup>5</sup>

M. Bidault continued stating that insofar as the Indochinese phase of the Geneva Conference was concerned, Communist China was so far the only invited power, though she was clearly not an inviting power. He said we were sure to have a long and difficult fight on this issue with the Soviets at Geneva. He noted that the French position was in entire agreement with the U.S. stand.

Reverting to the draft note which he had read at the opening of the meeting, M. Bidault stated that the essential word in the sentence regarding the equality of all participants after the talks got underway was the word "commence". The Secretary stated that we might want to have some states as observers, so it would be preferable to omit the sentence entirely. Mr. Eden indicated that it would be better to stick as closely as possible to the terms of the Berlin agreement to avoid creating other problems, and thus he also favored deleting the sen-

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, p. 537.

<sup>5</sup> See telegram 3985 from Paris, Apr. 21, p. 541.

tence. M. Bidault agreed to omit the sentence and the text of the Note was amended accordingly.

M. Bidault stated that it was essential that there be Tripartite agreement on various problems before the opening of the Geneva Conference and accordingly he asked for a frank expression of the views of his colleagues, stating that he would later give his own frank opinions.

*Collective Defense in Southeast Asia*

The Secretary stated that last week in Paris and immediately before in London we agreed that our Governments and other interested States in the area would study a collective defense of Southeast Asia. In the view of the U.S. Government, these talks should now proceed as exploratory conversations as soon as practical without delineating initially the scope of the exact final number of participants in advance. He compared the situation with the initial talks which led to the formation of NATO, noting at first a small group of countries had been involved, that the framework had later expanded and had continued to expand ever since.

The Secretary added that some States were so obviously involved that they could be easily identified while others, such as the United States, were not so immediately threatened but realized the danger in the long run. Whether other States not immediately threatened recognized the danger as we did was not clear as yet. None of this precluded initial talks as laid out in the London and Paris communiqués. The Secretary noted that Thailand, the Philippines and Australia had confirmed their willingness to proceed with talks, while he was under the impression that New Zealand had also accepted. The Secretary said we envisaged initially talks by our political representatives possibly receiving advice from their military advisers as desirable. He was well aware of the delicacy of the task but believed it was essential regardless of the outcome at Dien Bien Phu, and of the campaign in the Tonkin Delta though the situation would, of course, be more urgent if these battles were lost.

The Secretary concluded that the knowledge by the Soviets that a common defense system was in prospect would strengthen our hand at Geneva and help convince the Soviets that they should come to a reasonable agreement. He said this was not for action within a matter of days, but that he would like to hear from the British and French Governments along the lines of last week's communiqués. The Secretary said that he reserved the right to talk later on details of the Geneva Conference. In view of the NATO meeting tomorrow<sup>6</sup> which we all had on our minds, and over which M. Bidault must preside, the

---

<sup>6</sup> Apr. 23.

Secretary suggested that we meet again on Saturday morning<sup>7</sup> to discuss the Geneva Conference.

M. Bidault stated that unfortunately he had a meeting of the Cabinet on Saturday morning, and that he was obliged to meet with the Ministers to fill them in before the opening of the Geneva talks. The Secretary suggested that in this event that they meet on Saturday afternoon.

[Here follows the remainder of this document; for text, see page 127.]

---

<sup>7</sup> Apr. 24.

PSA files, lot 58 D 207, "Bonsal Memos"

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Philippine and South-east Asian Affairs (Bonsal)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[PARIS,] April 22, 1954.

#### INDOCHINA PHASE

##### PROSPECTS FOR "UNITED ACTION" IN INDOCHINA<sup>2</sup>

The purpose of this paper is to examine the political prospects and implications of a military "united action" in Indochina which would add sufficient military assets to the present Franco-Vietnamese forces to ensure a defeat at least of the Vietminh regular divisions.

The Franco-Vietnamese effort in Indochina has to date been based upon the following factors:

(1) A military strategy<sup>3</sup> involving the destruction of the Vietminh regular divisions during the 1954-55 fighting season by a Franco-Vietnamese striking force to be built up eventually to some 20 Groupes Mobiles or regimental combat teams. About half these units would be constituted by the French expeditionary corps and the remainder would be the best elements of the Vietnamese National Army. (The proportion of Vietnamese soldiers involved would, however, be considerably in excess of 50% owing to the large numbers of Vietnamese included in French expeditionary corps units). The assumption has been that once the Vietminh regular divisions had been defeated or dispersed, the Vietnamese military and civil authorities would be able to handle the remaining rebel elements and restore peace and security throughout the country.

(2) A political strategy involving the creation of an independent Vietnamese Government with all the attributes of sovereignty and the association of that Government in a French Union conceived of as a group of sovereign states freely banded together to further their

---

<sup>1</sup> Bonsal was an adviser to the United States Delegation to the Geneva Conference and was traveling with Secretary of State Dulles on the way to Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on "United Action", see volumes XII and XIII.

<sup>3</sup> The Navarre Plan.

mutual interests. This French Union concept has probably been the major factor in keeping French parliamentary support for the war effort in Indochina above the danger point.

The impact of an application of "united action", i.e., effective US air and naval support for the Franco-Vietnamese forces would be as follows:

1) On the military plane, a recognition of the failure of the earlier strategy. In other words, a demonstration of the fact that the French expeditionary corps of 180,000 men and the Vietnamese army of perhaps 200,000 men plus massive U.S. end-item assistance are not strong enough to defeat a purely Vietnamese Vietminh army of 300,000 (of whom about 100,000 are regulars), supported by considerable but nevertheless comparatively small Chinese Communist assistance in end-items. Not only is the Navarre plan for decisive military results in jeopardy, but it also appears from recent indications that General Navarre may not even be able to maintain a stalemate. In other words, "united action" will be not only designed to achieve an early victory in this eight years war but also to avoid a very possible defeat of the Franco-Vietnamese forces.

2) On the political plane there will be three major implications:

(a) From the point of view of France, a demonstration of the fact that France is either unable or unwilling to do what is necessary to defend the French Union against aggression;

(b) That the attempt to form, in accordance with the Bao Dai formula, a strong nationalist Government and army in opposition to the Vietminh has failed;

(c) That whatever regime may be established in Vietnam depends for its existence less on its own political force and military power or on that of the French Union than on the factor of US willingness to intervene forcibly when and as necessary. The possibilities open to the Vietminh and the Chinese Communists for an infinite variety of guerrilla, terroristic, sabotage and generally subversive activities with a strong nationalistic appeal would be infinite.

*Conclusion:* Every effort must be made to convince the French and the Vietnamese that a failure to achieve success within the present framework, a failure to furnish all the means necessary to that end (including French conscripts and a major stepping up of American material aid) would be suicidal from the point of view of French interests generally, of the interests of the current Vietnamese regime and of free world interests in the Far East. The "united action" alternative, useful as it may be in improving the chances of a negotiated settlement, is a very poor second choice, if carried to the action stage. Its ultimate political success seems highly dubious both in terms of Indochina and in terms of South and Southeast Asia and the Far East generally.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 265

*Memorandum on Tripartite Talks in Paris, April 21-24, 1954*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

RÉSUMÉ OF INFORMAL US-UK-FRENCH PREPARATORY TALKS IN PARIS  
ON INDOCHINA PHASE OF GENEVA CONFERENCE

1. *Participation*

The French indicated that their preliminary thinking does not favor formal participation of the Associated States. If they participate, the French do not see how the Viet Minh could be excluded, although the presence of the Communist puppet governments of Cambodia and Laos could probably be resisted. France feels the problem could best be handled by giving the Associated States and the Viet Minh (and perhaps the Laotian and Cambodian puppet governments) a special status as limited conference participants deriving in essence from the immediacy of their conflict of interests. They would be neither full participants nor observers but their representatives would be readily available for participation as the occasion required, thus avoiding any discussion of the legal basis of these governments and confrontation across the conference table. In order to avoid the Five Power connotation and to keep the Conference as small as possible the French are inclined to favor the Big Four, Communist China, Burma and Thailand as the participating powers.

The Vietnamese Foreign Minister, now in Paris, told the French he fully expected the French to propose Vietnamese participation but to object to the expected Soviet proposal for Viet Minh participation and to try instead to get the Ho government considered under a different status from Vietnam. We and the UK stated our hope that the Associated States would not only be invited but would accept. The UK prefers keeping participation down to the Big Four, Communist China, the Associated States and the Viet Minh only, citing the anticipated pressures from Commonwealth countries and others if participation is extended beyond Indochinese borders. All agreed it would be difficult to keep out the Viet Minh, the French adding that they would accept the Viet Minh presence only under the Berlin formula that it did not involve recognition.

2. *Possible Military Settlement*

In general terms, the French position is apparently in the direction of finding, as the first step, some basis for a cease-fire on purely military grounds with political negotiations to follow. The French military

---

<sup>1</sup> Initials "UAJ" [U. Alexis Johnson] found on top right corner, first page of source text.



experts are studying Laniel's March 5 cease-fire conditions (Attached) to determine the needed guarantees and safeguards which could achieve Laniel's objective of guaranteeing the security of the French and Associated States forces and other friendly elements. The French believe, however, that Laniel's conditions would be viewed by the Communists as too harsh and would, therefore, not permit sufficient latitude for negotiating purposes. Hence, the French are thinking of securing the psychological initiative by first offering to disengage Laos and Cambodia from the military scene (i.e. by mutual withdrawal of all forces from the two countries except for the basis of Xieng Khouang and Seno which the French are permitted to garrison under the terms of the Franco-Laotian treaty. They emphasize that French Union forces could be moved by air within little more than an hour to any point endangered in Laos if the Royal Army was unable to cope with the situation.) Then consideration would be given to a possible cease-fire in Vietnam.

The British were not too concerned and thought it might at least give the French a talking point initiative in the negotiating process.

The French seemed to think there could be a cease-fire in Indochina without a political settlement, as was the case in Korea. They apparently attach considerable importance to recent expressions of goodwill and a desire to be of service from the Soviet Ambassador in Paris. They emphasize their thinking on the subject, however, is tentative only.

### 3. *Timing of Indochina Phase*

All agreed that timing (and participation) must be resolved by the Big Four Ministers. The French hope the issue will be raised as soon as possible at Geneva.

[Attachment]

#### LANIEL CONDITIONS <sup>2</sup>

In his speech of March 5, Prime Minister Laniel laid down certain conditions or guarantees which would have to precede negotiation, as follows:

1. Total evacuation of Laos by Viet Minh.
2. Total evacuation of Cambodia by Viet Minh.
3. Evacuation by Viet Minh of Tonkin Delta and creation of no-man's land around its periphery.
4. Withdrawal by Viet Minh from central Viet Nam area to certain specified and restricted areas.

<sup>2</sup> Prime Minister Laniel's conditions were outlined in telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, p. 435.

5. Disarmament or evacuation of Viet Minh forces in southern Viet Nam.

6. Other measures of security and control providing assurances that suspension of fighting would not enable Viet Minh to reinforce itself or strengthen its position during conversations.

Laniel stressed that the actual cease-fire would only be the result of negotiations incorporating these safeguards, and that a cease-fire of the kind proposed by Nehru would be unacceptable since it would not afford the minimum tolerable security guarantees for the French Expeditionary Corps and Viet Nam troops.

---

396.1 GE/4-2454 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State*

OFFICIAL USE ONLY      PRIORITY      Moscow, April 24, 1954—4 p. m.

1313. Repeated information priority Paris 282, priority Geneva 8. Embtel 1304, repeated information Paris 279, Geneva 7, April 23.<sup>1</sup>

Soviets have sent us following reply to note given them yesterday re Geneva conference.

“In connection with note Government United States of America 23 April<sup>2</sup> Government of USSR considers it necessary to state it confirms its position on question of composition Geneva conference as set forth in note April 20.<sup>3</sup>

With reference to invitations interested states to participate in discussion problem re-establishing peace in Indochina, it goes without saying that this question is matter for consideration of representatives those states whose participation on basis equality is directly provided for in Berlin communiqué”.

BOHLEN

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Annex A to the minutes of the meeting of Apr. 22, p. 130.

<sup>3</sup> Text in telegram 1289 from Moscow, Apr. 21, p. 126.

---

396.1 GE/4-2454 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

GENEVA, April 24, 1954.

Secto 1. For Phillips from McCardle. Following is Secretary Dulles' statement made on arrival at Geneva, April 24, 1954:

“We come to Geneva on a mission of peace made necessary by communist aggression in Asia. We shall be working on behalf of the Republic of Korea and the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos and

Cambodia, whose lands have been invaded and whose peoples have been ravaged by war. We think of the courageous forces of the French Union at Dien Bien Phu who, under the gallant leadership of General DeCastries, are at this very moment suffering cruelly because ambitious rulers seek to extract some profit which they can use at this Geneva conference.

"We hope to find that the aggressors come here in a mood to purge themselves of their aggression, and that it will thus be possible to achieve a durable peace which will restore to the brave Korean people their unity and independence, and enable the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to enjoy and perfect the political freedom which is now theirs.

"I take this occasion to express the friendship which is felt by the American people for the people of Switzerland and their appreciation of the manifold services which Switzerland has rendered throughout its history for the cause of peace and humanity".

DULLES

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 287

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, April 25, 1954.

Participants:	<i>UK</i>	<i>US</i>
	Mr. Eden	Secretary Dulles
	Mr. Shuckburgh	Mr. MacArthur
	Mr. Caccia	

Time: 10:15-11:00 p. m., April 25, 1954

Place: Hotel Beau Rivage, Geneva

I sent word to the British Delegation that I would be glad to see Mr. Eden upon his arrival in Geneva this evening if he thought it would be useful. At 10 p. m. I received word that Mr. Eden had just arrived and would be very glad to see me. I called upon him in his quarters at the hotel Beau Rivage immediately thereafter.

Mr. Eden opened the conversation by saying he was very glad to bring me up to date on the results of his trip to London. He had met with the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and the British Chiefs of Staff. He said he was afraid that the news which he had for me would not be exactly what I wanted to hear. However, he did have certain positive proposals to lay before me.

He then said that the British Chiefs of Staff were certain that air intervention at Dien Bien Phu would have no decisive effect on that

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Dulles and MacArthur. Conversation was summarized in telegram Dulte 5 from Geneva, Apr. 25, not printed. (751G.5/4-2554) Text of telegram Dulte 5 is printed in *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*, Book 9, pp. 388-389.

battle; therefore, since such action would be ineffective, it would be a great mistake in terms of free world opinion to undertake it since nobody could foresee where it would lead. Mr. Eden added that until it is clear what kind of action can be undertaken, it seemed better to wait and be sure where we are headed. He said that under the British proposals, which he would give me, the Communists would be kept guessing as to what we would do if Geneva failed, since they knew already we were considering the possibility of united action. He then said, the UK position resulting from his trip to London was as follows:

1. The British would give the French all possible diplomatic support at Geneva to keep them firm with a view to reaching a satisfactory settlement on Indochina.

2. If such a settlement is reached, the UK will be willing to join with the US and other interested countries of Southeast Asia in guaranteeing that settlement.

3. The UK is prepared at once to study secretly with the US the military measures which might be undertaken to defend Thailand and the rest of Southeast Asia if the French capitulate at Geneva.

Eden said that this latter US-UK exercise excluded Indochina but would deal with the remainder of the area. I asked Eden if the proposed US-UK secret study excluded all of Indochina or just Vietnam. He replied that it excluded all of Indochina. He went on to say that if the Geneva negotiations did not lead to a settlement the British would of course examine urgently with us what should be done about united action. Mr. Eden said that the British Government felt that the foregoing suggestions were not negative, but positive in character. This course of action in the British eyes was infinitely preferable to intervention in the present battle in Indochina. He repeated that under the British proposal the Communists would be kept guessing and might be led to be fairly reasonable since if they were not, and the conference failed, some other course of action might be adopted by the non-communist states with vital interests in Southeast Asia.

He said that he had two points to add in connection with the foregoing. The British had recently reassessed the situation in Malaya. They had at present 22 battalions (one third UK, one third Malaya, one third Ghurkas) and 100 thousand well armed and trained native policemen. If Indochina collapsed the British felt confident that the situation in Malaya would be in hand. He said there was no parallel between the situations in Indochina and Malaya.

I said to Eden that the British position was most disheartening. I was very skeptical that there was much in it for the French and I doubted that it would be sufficient to keep them in fight. It seemed to me that the prospects of French capitulation were increased in the light of the British position.

Mr. Eden replied "None of us in London believe that intervention in Indochina can do anything". I repeated my belief that if the French did not have some hope that they would have new allies in the Indochina war that they would be unwilling to continue on themselves.

Mr. Eden said that he had stopped at Orly on his way to Geneva (to pick up Mrs. Eden) and had a brief meeting with Bidault. He said that he had outlined for Mr. Bidault in less detail the position of the British Government and had specifically told him that it was as follows:

1. The UK will give the French all possible diplomatic support at Geneva with a view to aid them reach a satisfactory settlement on Indochina.

2. If such a settlement is reached, the UK will be willing to join with the US and others in some form of guarantee for that settlement.

3. If Geneva fails, the UK will be prepared to join with others to examine urgently the situation to see what best should be done.

I said to Eden that I had some reservations myself about immediate air intervention at Dien Bien Phu because we did not believe Dien Bien Phu could be saved by it, and also because our responsibility would be engaged without a sound and adequate political basis for carrying on military action there. In other words, it would seem to involve us very deeply on an unsound basis. However, if we could not give the French some hope for future support, I did not believe that they would be able to stand the loss of Dien Bien Phu. In this connection, I thought it a serious error to write off the loss of all of Indochina and assume that the rest of Southeast Asia could be held. It would have a vital effect on Thailand, Malaya, and Indonesia which was balanced precariously. Its long term result could lead to the loss of Japan. I said I believe the non-communist states having vital interests in the area, which certainly included Britain, should concert now to work out a joint defense and one which would at least attempt to hold the maximum part of Indochina. This would of course require assurances from the French that they would hold on and also a real guarantee from them regarding the full independence of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. I mentioned that in thinking about the problem of the defense of Southeast Asia, President Eisenhower had commented that to defend the area after the loss of Indochina with its 300 thousand native troops would make the task infinitely more difficult.

While it seemed manifestly impossible to intervene militarily in Indochina before the loss of Dien Bien Phu because of the necessary political arrangements which would have to be made, the French should feel that there was the real prospect of getting more support

after the loss of Dien Bien Phu than they had had before. If they did not have such a feeling, I feared that they would throw up their hands in despair.

Mr. Eden said there was obviously a "gap" between the US and UK views but that the British Government had gone just as far as it possibly could. He mentioned that the British Chiefs of Staff looked forward to discussing the situation in Indochina and Southeast Asia with Radford in London on Monday with a view to getting a better understanding of the differing estimates.

I asked Eden whether the British envisaged a partition in Indochina. Mr. Eden replied that this was a possible course which might save a substantial part of the area. He then produced a staff study map of Indochina prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff which Lord Alexander had given him. The map indicated by red lines that virtually all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is under, or subject to, imminent Vietminh control. He said to clear Indochina up the British believe that a strong force must be committed to the Hanoi Delta and that it would have to work gradually outwardly in concentric circles. As it advances, the area it freed of Vietminh control would have to be consolidated by loyal and effective Indochinese administrators. The British believe that this was a "tremendous project involving lots of time and considerable ground forces". I commented on a broken black line at about the seventeenth or eighteenth parallel which ran from the coast of Vietnam across to the border of Thailand. Mr. Eden indicated that this was a possible line of partition, although such a line might have to be bent a little to the south in Vietnam because of the strong control which the Vietminh had over one area on the coast through which this line ran. (Caccia subsequently confirmed that in a partition solution the UK is thinking about a partition of Vietnam and not also of Laos.)

Mr. Eden reiterated that the UK could give no commitment in advance of Geneva guaranteeing Indochina, or implying its defense. If no settlement were reached, the British would join with the allies to consider urgently what should be done. When he had explained the British position at Orly earlier in the evening, Bidault had not raised any question and had seemed resigned.

I said that I feared the French were being put in a position where they might go for what almost amounted to an unconditional surrender. Mr. Eden simply stated "We think this Indochina business is a very big operation in terms of soldiers, time, and commitments." I said that there was no reason why we could not develop the Vietnam forces so that they matched in quality and spirit the Vietminh forces which were receiving infinitely less in the way of supplies. This would

of course require real independence but that I felt was understood. To develop the Vietnam forces and a real spirit that they were fighting for their independence would take time. Mr. Eden replied that unfortunately the Vietminh forces seemed to have faith, whereas the Vietnam did not.

In conclusion, Mr. Eden said that he realized the British position was not what we would have wished, but that the position outlined was just as far as the UK Government felt it was possible to go.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 287

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, April 25, 1954.

Participants: The Rt. Hon. R. G. Casey, Australian Minister for  
External Affairs  
John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State  
Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State

Place: Geneva

Subject: Indo-China

Minister Casey called on the Secretary at 12:20 p. m. (April 25). He opened the conversation by saying that Mr. Eden, before leaving Paris for London the evening before, had conveyed to him the gist of his conversation with the Secretary late Saturday afternoon.<sup>1</sup>

The Secretary then read Casey the letter he had written M. Bidault on April 24 and Bidault's reply.<sup>2</sup> Casey asked that if Dien Bien Phu should fall, would the Secretary feel that the pressure of public opinion in France would force the French to "check in". The Secretary then summarized his talk with Laniel Saturday night just before leaving for Geneva.<sup>3</sup>

Laniel had stated that the fall of Dien Bien Phu would in all probability cause the fall of the French Government and would mark the end of French resistance. It was therefore necessary that the United States take immediate action to prevent such a catastrophe. The Secretary said he had explained to Laniel that (1) the United States

---

<sup>1</sup> For the memorandum of conversation between Secretary Dulles and Foreign Secretary Eden, Apr. 24, see volume XIII.

<sup>2</sup> The text of Secretary Dulles' letter of Apr. 24 to Foreign Minister Bidault was transmitted to the Department in telegram Dulte 1 from Geneva, Apr. 24; Bidault's reply of Apr. 24 was transmitted from Paris to the Secretary in telegram 121 to Geneva (telegram 4058 to the Department of State), Apr. 24. For the texts of both documents, see *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> For an account of the Dulles-Laniel conversation, see telegram Dulte 17 from Paris, Apr. 24, *ibid.*

could not intervene without Congressional approval, (2) that Congressional leaders would not be willing to intervene in any event except in collaboration with the British and with the independence of the Associated States guaranteed, and (3) that the procedure of obtaining Congressional approval would take weeks, thus making it necessary that the French should hold on now at any cost. He further explained that he, the Secretary, did not yet know what the attitude of the British and Commonwealth nations would be. He realized that both the Australians and British were hampered by political difficulties at home, but he emphasized to Laniel that he would do everything possible to ensure that the French could count on at least two allies. He stated further that the purpose of his quick trips to London and Paris was to create fresh assets to offset the probable loss of Dien Bien Phu.

The Secretary emphasized to Casey that everything possible should be done to support Bidault and Laniel because in the event of the fall of their Government they would probably be succeeded by a Mendes France or some neutralist which might refuse an offer of intervention even if it could be made. The Secretary said that Admiral Radford thought that the fall of Dien Bien Phu might threaten a massacre of the French population which would make it extremely difficult for the French troops to withdraw. Casey expressed his own feeling that even should Britain and Australia agree to intervene, if they should do so without UN backing it would greatly antagonize Asian opinion. The Secretary explained that we would of course expect to rely upon Vietnamese troops which could probably be wielded into an effective fighting force under training by a man like General Van Fleet.

The Secretary stated that President Eisenhower had asked Admiral Radford to ask the British why they were willing to wait until one of their greatest assets, some 300,000 Vietnamese troops, had been destroyed before deciding to take collective action. Casey replied that it was the British fear that British and American intervention in Indo-China at this time would bring in the Communist Chinese and get us all embroiled in a war with Red China.

---

033.4111/4-2554 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, April 25, 1954—midnight.

Dulte 4. Eyes only for Acting Secretary from Secretary. Please pass to the President.

“Eden advises Winston has in mind primarily discussions re certain plans and projects relating to new weapons which he would like to



talk over.<sup>1</sup> He would of course expect to review generally world situation, including Indochina, but without any expectation of taking any decisions. Under circumstances and particularly in view of negative attitude which I am reporting concurrently, I suggest that any definitive decision await my return and consultation in light of developments here as to whether a greater vitality could be given to our relationship both in Europe and in Asia. In this connection the risk of failure of your meeting popular expectations must be weighed against the background of increasing inability of Winston to lead his Cabinet and increasing inability of Cabinet to cope with Parliament. This latter consideration is, I think, paramount factor in unwillingness to face up to Indochina issues.

Faithfully yours, Foster.”

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Prime Minister Churchill visited Washington, June 25–29, 1954. For documentation on this visit, see volume vi.

---

396.1 GE/4–2554 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL      PRIORITY      GENEVA, April 25, 1954—midnight.

Secto 6. For Phillips from McCardle. Following is transcript of Secretary's background meeting with American correspondents Geneva April 25. This material should be used in same way that it was used at Berlin conference.<sup>2</sup> That is, it should be used as guidance for their information program. It can also be used for any briefing which is held in the Department, but there should be no reference that this comes from Secretary. Any such briefing in Department should be confined to the views expressed by Secretary but with no mention textually or otherwise that they come from the Secretary. Following is the Secretary's background briefing:

“Dulles: I don't expect I shall be having very many of these background conferences myself because I do not expect to stay here in Geneva very long. I hope that matters will work out so that General Bedell Smith can come to replace me toward the end of this week or the first of next week . . . .

I would not say I approach this conference in any great spirit of optimism. I joined at Berlin in the agreement to hold the conference because, as far as Korea is concerned, such a conference had been agreed upon and in my opinion it is always appropriate to accept occasions to try to bring about by peaceful means a result which seems to be a desirable result and one which is right and one which in the long run will prevail. It takes a measure of faith to believe that it will

---

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted to the Department of State in four parts.

<sup>2</sup> For the proceedings of the Berlin Conference, see volume vii.

prevail, but I have that faith and I'm willing to give a chance for the forces of righteousness, as I call them, to prevail, even though my reason may tell me that it is unlikely that it will happen.

The experience which we have had with the Soviet Union and in relations to areas where they got them, 'temporarily' under their control has been that the temporary character has always been turned into permanent, at least in so far as the present time goes and there has been no willingness on their part to relax their grip and I frankly do not see much more likelihood that they would do so in the case of Korea than in the case of Germany, although the situation is somewhat different and there is a slightly greater hope permissible, I think, in the case of Korea than in case of Germany. Certainly the importance of Korea to the scheme of affair is not comparable to the importance of Germany. There are compensations which can properly be made on the free world side in relation to Korea which were not permissible in relation to Germany, having in regard the fact the German area is part, and a very vital part, of the strategy of NATO.

Therefore, I think there is a chance which we are entitled to, and should pursue, that Korea might be peacefully united under acceptable terms. Certainly we will do the best we can to explore that fully we will not be disposed to agree to a unification on terms which would likely mean that the entire area would fall under Communist control. The terms of unification which the Soviet Union proposed for Germany were such that if the election machinery had been as they proposed it, in fact the Communists would have almost had a monopoly of voting throughout all Germany. And that, of course, was rejected and anything similar would be rejected as far as Korea is concerned. Unification, in our opinion, and I think our opinion coincides with that of the Republic of Korea, is not to be had as the price of the sacrifice of real liberty and independence. The war was not fought with its ghastly toll of misery and suffering merely to win a freedom which would be surrendered at the conference table. I have spoken of the Korean phase of the conference.

As far as the Indochina phase of the conference is concerned, the composition of that conference has not yet been determined. I don't know when that agreement will be reached. Certainly there will be serious problems involved. It took somewhat over—I think it was approximately nine months—to reach agreement about the composition of the Korean conference. Incidentally, what was finally agreed upon, both in terms of composition and in terms of place, was precisely what we had offered immediately after the armistice of last July, so that you can judge where the responsibility for the delay.

I wouldn't want to guess what the processes will be of agreeing on the composition of an Indochina conference. It could take a long time. It could take a short time. There are, of course, pressures at work there which were not present in relation to the Korean political conference because already in Korea there was an armistice, whereas the fighting goes on very intensively in Indochina. So in that respect the two situations are not comparable. Still there may be, probably will be, considerable problems involved.

One problem which is already manifesting itself in the preliminaries is the effort being made by the Soviet Union to reverse the decision of the Berlin agreement, that was that there would be no Five-Power conference and that Communist China would not be here in any capacity different from the Republic of Korea or Colombia or any other participant at the conference. At Berlin Mr. Molotov opened up that conference with a demand for a Five-Power conference. He fought for it all the way through. We opposed it all the way through and he finally gave in at the end. Now he is attempting to make this Geneva conference into something other than had been agreed upon at Berlin.

As I pointed out in Washington before I left to come here,<sup>3</sup> it is not the position of the US to start this conference out on the basis of a breach of the agreement which is the charter of the conference itself. And I see little use in trying to make new agreements at a conference where the opposing parties start out by breaking the agreement on which the conference was called.

If you have any questions I would be glad to try to answer them.

Question. Mr. Secretary, why are you going home in such a short time, whereas you stayed in Berlin four weeks?

Answer. Well, one reason I'm going home is because I did stay in Berlin for four weeks. I can't be away all the time. And I announced at Berlin when Molotov originally wanted to make this a conference of Foreign Ministers, I refused to make it a conference of Foreign Ministers and made it a conference of representatives.

I explained at the time that Molotov wanted to know why I changed the words from 'Foreign Ministers' to 'representatives' and what it meant. I said it meant that I would expect to be at this conference at the opening days and that I would expect to go back to Washington.

Q. Does that mean, sir, that you will not participate yourself in the actual discussions on Indochina when that phase of the conference is reached?

---

<sup>3</sup> A reference to the Secretary's statement made on Apr. 20 in Washington prior to his departure for Europe. Issued as Department of State press release 207 and printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 3, 1954, p. 669.

A. If I carry out my present intention of going back in a week or less, it seems to me unlikely that the Indochina phase of the conference would be organized within that time. There may of course be, as there usually are at the conferences, informal talks. I have already had some talks with Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault about that matter. I might say that as far as the attendance is concerned, I think that both Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault do not expect to be here for the duration of the conference, although that of course is for them to decide. But that is my impression.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you don't, I take it, intend to return at a later time, if the Indochina phase comes up say in June?

A. Well, that is possible. Nowadays, when you can get across to Europe over night, it should be looked upon as a possibility. I came over the week before for just two or three days and it could be that I would come back if it seemed necessary.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you expect actually to happen tomorrow? How is this conference going to start? What will be the procedures the first day, and so on? Is it anywhere near as well organized in the preliminaries as Berlin was?

A. I do not think that it is as well organized as Berlin was, although even at Berlin there were some unresolved procedural matters which I settled with Mr. Molotov just about a half hour before we actually convened. Now, the problems are somewhat more stubborn this time. There are more people here, and we have less in the way of precedents to guide us.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect to see Mr. Molotov before tomorrow's opening?

A. I have no plan for seeing Mr. Molotov.

Q. What actually happens tomorrow at three o'clock? If presumably that is the time.

A. I don't know. I expect I will be going out to the building and we will see what happens.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the compensations that might be made to China, I suppose you meant, in return for a settlement in Korea?

A. Well, what I meant there was that there are possibilities of withdrawal of forces in the case of Korea which here were not available in the case of Germany so long as Western Germany plays a part in the NATO forward strategy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what your attitude is likely to be if the opposing side requests that priority be given to a discussion of a cease-fire in Indochina instead of an immediate discussion of Korea?

A. Yes. As to what I would do?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. Well, that would be a matter which would primarily be the responsibility of those who are doing the firing, I suppose. The US is not one of those which is doing any firing in Indochina. It is quite possible our friends would want to consult with us in the matter, but I would say that if that matter would come up, the primary responsibility would devolve upon those who were carrying the burden fighting.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been frequent suggestions in the last two days that we might very soon be participating in the action in Indochina as a result of the crisis at Dien Bien Phu. Have you anything to say about Dien Bien Phu and the severity of the crisis there and our likely response to it?

A. I think it's apparent from the reports which are available in the press and which do not depart or vary a great deal from the official information I get that the plight of the defenders is increasingly difficult. They are putting up a very gallant and magnificent struggle, but the capacities of continuing air support are diminishing. Our reaction would be, as it has been for a long time, one of very great sympathy. We have taken, you might say, all steps short of actual belligerency to assist. We have drawn a line of belligerency which we have not crossed and I see no present reason to anticipate that we will cross that line.

Q. Can we afford to see Indochina fall?

A. Well, that question—can we afford to—we certainly wouldn't like to see it fall, but some things have happened that we don't like and can't practically prevent. I don't mean to suggest that I think Indochina is going to fall.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports today that French have asked us to intervene more directly and that we have told them that constitutionally, it's impossible to go farther than we have at the present time. Can you say anything about that?

A. No.

Q. Can you confirm or deny, sir, the story that was printed in *The New York Times* that you did tell the French that we would not fulfill a request from them for American planes with American crews?

A. Not other than to say that that has been the well-known and recognized policy of the administration, not to take part in active belligerency. As has been explained in Washington, there are a few technicians there working in non-combat activities, in non-combat areas. The air-lift operation that was just carried on would merely let the people off at a non-combat zone, and come back again. And it has been a policy of the United States, in accordance the limitations

on the President's authority, to avoid Executive action which might be an act of belligerence, an act of war.

Q. May I ask again question are you not confirming and not denying the *Times* story, then?

A. I have not seen the *Times* story.

Q. Well, the story, as I have reported, is that France has asked for direct, large-scale intervention in Indochina by United States aircraft, manned by American crews, but was told it was impossible for President Eisenhower to sanction such a grave move. That is the way it was written in the *Times*.<sup>4</sup>

A. I prefer not to comment on the story.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any possibility at all of your meeting the Chief of the Chinese Delegation separately before you return home?

A. Not unless our automobiles collide.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us any guidance on what prompted Mr. Eden to return to London for a Cabinet meeting before returning here?

A. No, I am afraid I cannot comment on that.

Q. Have you been informed, Mr. Secretary, of the statement Mr. Nehru made in his Parliament yesterday regarding a series of proposals made for settling the Indochina problem?<sup>5</sup>

A. I have not been officially informed of that. My own information comes from the press. There was in the local Geneva paper this morning what purported to be a text of his proposal, but I had nothing more official than that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you think should be the answer of the West to the fall of Dien Bien Phu, if it does fall?

A. I do not want to say anything that would sound as though I think Dien Bien Phu is going to fall. Of course, there are always possibilities of military reverses. We have had plenty of them in our time; and so far, a local military reverse has never changed the course of history to such an extent that the forces opposed to us have ultimately prevailed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do I take you literally that you have no anticipation of getting together with the three other principal Foreign Min-

---

<sup>4</sup> *The New York Times*, Apr. 25, 1954, p. 1. This article by C. L. Sulzberger also prompted questions from the press in Washington. The Department of State in telegram Tedul 5 to Geneva, Apr. 25, said it was "urgently waiting report your background briefing session with American correspondents in Geneva. We are under considerable pressure here to forward background briefing session to press which we are deferring pending your report of what has been given them in Geneva." (110.11 DU/4-2554)

<sup>5</sup> For Prime Minister Nehru's proposals made on Apr. 24 in New Delhi, see the memorandum by Stelle to Bowie, Apr. 30, p. 635. The proposals were transmitted to the Department of State from the Embassy in New Delhi in telegram 1596 from New Delhi, Apr. 25, printed in volume XIII.

isters that invited the nations in this conference to arrange details for tomorrow at three o'clock? You plan, just literally to go to the building at three o'clock and see what happens?

A. I expect that there will be continuing efforts to iron out the remaining difficulties. There is a working committee—Mr. Johnson is on it for US—which is working with corresponding members of the British, French, and Soviet Delegations on these mechanical details of seating arrangements and things of that sort, I have not heard the latest report. He has been working on it, I know, today, and I suppose the work will still go on tomorrow morning, will it not?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Q. Have the Chinese sought to get in at that level, Mr. Secretary?  
Secretary Dulles: No.

Q. Do you know, Mr. Secretary, who will preside tomorrow?

A. No.

Q. One other question: Can you say what our attitude is on the participation or nonparticipation of Viet Minh in the Indochina phase of the conference?

Secretary Dulles: We would be primarily guided by the French views in that respect. We have taken the position in Korea, not always with complete success but, at least, we have taken position that the Republic of Korea and the United States, which bore the great burden of the battle there, should have a primary voice in the conference decisions in relation to Korea, and I feel the same way with reference to Indochina, that the forces of the French Union, including the forces particularly of Vietnam, should have a very influential voice in matters of that sort. And while we would perhaps be consulted, we would be inclined not to try to interpose our veto, in any sense as against what they might want to do.

I have talked in Paris with Emperor Bao Dai about that matter. He feels very strongly against the admission here into the discussions of the representative of the Viet Minh. I do not think the French have finally made up their minds as to what they want, but we ourselves are rather waiting to see the ideas of those who are carrying the burden of the fighting. We are carrying a good deal of the material burden, but in the last analysis, it is the people who fight and die who have the right to the last word on these matters.

Q. Does that apply to the substantive provisions of the Indochina conference, as well, that the French and the people doing the fighting will have to decide the basic decisions and—

A. I would think that would be true up to the point at least where we felt that the issues involved had a pretty demonstrable interest to the United States itself. The United States does have pretty consider-

able interests in the Western Pacific, and there are some solutions there which we would regard as so disadvantageous that we would seek to prevent them. And if we failed in that respect, we would probably want to disassociate ourselves from it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it clear in our own minds whether the Red Chinese will participate in the rotation of the chairmanship of this conference on Korea, or not?

A. There has been no decision of any kind reached yet as to who the chairman will be or how he will be determined.

Q. But we have not taken an absolutely definite position on that, then?

A. Well, there has been no proposal of which I know that the chairmanship should rotate.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can I go back to your earlier statement about the administration's policy about not taking part in active belligerency in Indochina, and ask, if you could, to explain a little bit on that, and to explain how that would fit in with your trip a week ago to discuss united action in the Southeast Asia Pact with the French and the British. Would some policy have to be changed for that? That is, that seems to imply the active belligerency if the pact was brought into force.

A. It did. But it is one thing to create an agreed defense arrangement which would have the approval of Congress, either through a joint resolution or through a treaty; it is another thing for the Executive to go off on his own.

Q. Couldn't the Executive go to Congress in this current situation, Mr. Secretary, if the Executive desired to send military forces into Indochina to keep it from falling to the Communists?

A. He could do so, I suppose. Executives have gone to Congress before, but whether the circumstances are such, whether the President would feel prompted to do so at this particular juncture, I don't know.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel the present situation in Indochina makes urgent the need for your plan for an Asiatic NATO?

A. I do.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have we come to this conference with anything like the solid front you had in Berlin on the part of our own allies?

A. Well, I think we have a pretty well-agreed position on Korean matters. We have been meeting off and on, with considerable regularity in Washington, with the representatives of the 16 Ambassadors—15 others. We have not had a recent full exchange of views with the representative of Korea, which is, of course, vitally concerned—the most vitally concerned. But I did have, this morning, a very full and



satisfactory exchange of views with the Korean Foreign Minister, and I see no reason to anticipate any serious divergencies of views. Of course, when you have 16 people on one side, there is always a chance for variations of emphasis or the order in which you put things. You cannot have it quite as closely coordinated as when we were only three. But I don't anticipate any serious differences on Korea. The question of Indochina is somewhat different because there you are in the middle of a battle, with a constantly fluctuating situation. The governmental position in France is not as solid as one would perhaps like to see it, and there are more variables in the situation which have made it impractical to reach full agreement for the purpose of this conference. One of the reasons why I came over here to see Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault ten days ago was to try and get things in somewhat better order, at least in terms of our long-range position, which is extremely important.<sup>6</sup> If we have a solid long-range position, then your day-by-day decisions can be related to that; if you have no fundamental position of agreement, then you are driven hither and thither by the vagaries of daily interests.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how solid do you think the Soviet-China front is, especially at this conference? To what degree do you think Russia will control China?

A. I expect that whatever differences there are will not be discernable to the naked eye.

Q. Sir, is the United States position opposed to any sort of idea of any partition in Indochina?

A. Broadly speaking, it does not seem to lend itself to partition, as has been the temporary situation in Korea. As you know, there is no line there. The fighting breaks out here, there, and the other place—all over the area. It is not confined to Vietnam, but extends to Laos and Cambodia, and it is very difficult to think of the line which would in fact be an acceptable compromise.

It is conceivable, and I could take a map and draw a little bit of a place up in the mountains, and say, 'if all the Communists would go up here, I would be very happy,' and let them stay there. That might not be acceptable to them.

Q. Did you find your colleagues in Paris shared your own view about the urgency of setting up the Asiatic NATO?

A. I did not find any change last week from the position which we have developed during the preceding week. I did find in France a

---

<sup>6</sup> For information regarding Dulles' conversations with Eden and Bidault, see the extract of telegram 4523, Apr. 13, and the editorial note, pp. 514 and 517, respectively.

preoccupation with immediate, daily problems which was occupying their minds so that there was not quite as much opportunity to develop their long-range planning as would have been otherwise desirable.

Q. Is there no way in which that Asiatic pact could be applied to their day-to-day problems?

A. Well, not until it is brought into being.

Q. Generally assuming, Mr. Secretary, that the negotiation of such a pact would be a very prolonged procedure, do you share that view—a matter many months?

A. No, I do not share that view. You see, if you will check back with the statement which I made, the two communiqués that were issued in London and Paris, there is no reference made there to a pact.<sup>7</sup> Now, it might take the form of a formalized treaty, but not necessarily. You will see that I referred to the organization of what I call a 'common defense'. That does not necessarily mean that one would have to await all the processes of the negotiation of something like the Pacific NATO. That was done deliberately because of our awareness of the fact that the situation might not permit of that leisurely processing.

Q. In that form, how would Congressional participation or assent be gained, by resolution?

A. It would, presumably, be in terms of a joint resolution rather than a treaty ratified by the Senate.

Q. Could I just check one brief statement I have in my notes. I believe you said we had already taken all steps short of actual belligerency in Indochina.

A. Perhaps 'all steps' is a little bit more comprehensive than the facts warrant. But broadly speaking, we have done everything that the French have asked us to do short of acts which would involve belligerency. That is not literally true. They have once or twice asked for things which did not make sense on consideration. They have asked for planes which they did not have any airfields to handle, and things of that sort. But, within reason, we have met every request of the French short of doing what would be involved in an act of belligerency.

Q. Didn't they ask for anything which would be an act of belligerency, Mr. Secretary?

A. I would say on that, that they do not have perhaps the same experience as we have on constitutional problems, and know just where the limit of authority in the President lies. Possibly, some of the things they ask for overstep what we would think could be done by the Presi-

---

<sup>7</sup> For information on the two communiqués, see footnote 3, p. 514 and the editorial note, p. 517.

dent without committing an act of war, but it has just been in the 'twilight zone', you might say.

Reporters: Thank you, Mr. Secretary."

DULLES

---

*Editorial Note*

The Korean phase of the Geneva Conference, documented in the first portion of this volume, began on April 26 at 3:10 p. m., Geneva time, at the Palais des Nations. It concluded with the final plenary session on June 15. The Indochina phase of the Conference, after some continued discussions on arrangements, procedures, and participants, began on May 8.

---

790.5/4-2654: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      EYES ONLY      WASHINGTON, April 26, 1954—12:28 p. m.

Tedul 7.

[Here follows discussion of a possible meeting between President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill. For documentation on Prime Minister Churchill's visit to the United States in June, see volume VI.]

I will see the President this afternoon and am arranging for a Congressional briefing either this afternoon or tomorrow morning.<sup>2</sup> The President covered things pretty well with the Republican leaders this a. m.<sup>3</sup> However, reports that the French asked us to intervene actively in Indochina have already appeared in the papers and will undoubtedly leak with considerable accuracy either in Paris or here. The President will probably have to cover this matter in his press conference on Wednesday, as he will undoubtedly be questioned; so we are preparing a statement for his possible use. If you have any suggestions please wire me.<sup>4</sup>

Bonnet came again last night but he had nothing new to offer, simply to re-urge the importance of direct and immediate intervention at Dien Bien Phu, not to save the place but for the general effect on French morale in Indochina. Reports this morning indicate that the French were able to get additional ammunition in both yesterday and the day before.

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Acting Secretary of State. Secretary Dulles arrived in Geneva on Apr. 24 from Paris to attend the Geneva Conference.

<sup>2</sup> He'd that afternoon in Washington. See telegram Tedul 13, Apr. 26, p. 574.

<sup>3</sup> For a summary of the President's meeting, see telegram Tedul 16, Apr. 28, p. 599 and extracts from James Hagerty's diary, Apr. 26, in volume XIII.

<sup>4</sup> For a summary of the President's remarks on the Geneva Conference during his press conference on Thursday, Apr. 29, see editorial note, p. 604.

You will be pleased to know that on the day before the President sent his personal message<sup>5</sup> to you he spoke at New York,<sup>6</sup> and during this speech gave as glowing and touching a tribute to you as I have ever heard him accord anyone.

SMITH

---

<sup>5</sup> In this message to Secretary Dulles (telegram Tedul 5, Apr. 23, in volume XIII) President Eisenhower reassured the Secretary that he had the President's complete support for "efforts to get the French to ask for internationalization of the war, and to get the British to appreciate the seriousness of the situation at Dien Bien Phu and the probable result on the entire war of defeat at that place." The President instructed the Secretary to "make sure the British Government fully appreciates the gravity of the situation and the great danger of French collapse in that region. The British must not be able merely to shut their eyes and later plead blindness as an alibi for failing to propose a positive program." (751G.00/4-2354) For the Secretary's reply, see telegram Dulte 8, Apr. 23, in volume XIII.

<sup>6</sup> President's speech made on Apr. 22 before the American Newspaper Publishers Association at New York City is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 10, 1954, pp. 699-702.

---

751G.5/4-2654: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, April 26, 1954—2 p. m.

Dulte 7. Repeated information Paris 113, London 67. Eyes only for Acting Secretary from Secretary. Repeated information eyes only Ambassadors London and Paris. Reference: Dulte 5.<sup>1</sup> Following is conversation I have just had alone with Mr. Eden:

I asked Mr. Eden where we stood on our joint communiqué of April 13.<sup>2</sup> He said that they were not prepared to examine the possibility of a collective defense which might commit them to fight in Indochina. It was definite that they were not prepared to fight in Indochina, and they were not willing to have any conversations which assumed that as a premise. The area which they are prepared to help defend would have to exclude Indochina. I said that it seems to me that the communiqué of April 13 clearly implied at least a collective examination of the possibility of a collective defense which would include Indochina. Mr. Eden said that subsequent study had already brought them to the conclusion that this was unacceptable if it involved their fighting, but if there was a peaceful settlement at Geneva which par-

---

<sup>1</sup> Telegram Dulte 5, Apr. 25, contained summary of discussion between Secretary Dulles and Foreign Secretary Eden on Apr. 25. For text, see volume XIII.

<sup>2</sup> For a summary of Dulles' Apr. 13 meeting with Eden, see the extract of telegram 4523 from London, Apr. 13, p. 514. For the text of the communiqué, sent to the Department of State from London in telegram Secto 2, Apr. 13, see volume XIII. The communiqué was issued as Department of State press release 192 of Apr. 13 and was published in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 26, 1954, p. 622.

titioned Indochina, then they might be prepared to include the non-Communist portion in the defense area.

I said that there were at least many critical military problems arising out of Indochina which need to be explored, and I thought explored with the French. I pointed out that there are vast stores of military supplies which the US might want to recapture and that quite possibly many of the French forces would seek to pass from Indochina into Siam. All of this would bear upon the defense of the area even assuming all or part of Indochina area excluded. Mr. Eden promised to think further about this matter, and I mentioned that Radford would be discussing this today with the British Chief of Staff.<sup>3</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>3</sup> For Admiral Radford's report, contained in telegram 4725 from London, Apr. 26, see volume XIII.

---

751G.00/4-2654

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(Heath) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[GENEVA,] April 26, 1954.

At the Delegation meeting in Paris on April 24 you asked my opinion of General O'Daniel's report and recommendations (Dept. telegram to Paris 3818 of April 23).<sup>2</sup>

I. General O'Daniel in effect recommends that training of the Vietnamese Army for combat be taken away from the French, whose training concepts are insufficient and turned over to the United States. If this were done he feels sure nine Vietnamese divisions could be organized for combat by next November.

*Comment:* I naturally believe that if we went ahead full steam we could train a better Vietnamese Army faster than the French. However, since our policy continues to be to keep the French fighting in Indo-China in good spirits, we should not raise with them at this moment the controversial question of taking away their training function in Indo-China. In any case O'Daniel's ideas are merely in "concept" stage. Before we throw the idea at the French, he should have completed a real staff study of his project provided that he can prepare

---

<sup>1</sup> Handwritten notation on the source text by Roderic L. O'Connor, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, indicated that the Secretary had not seen this memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (751G.00/4-2354). Regarding General O'Daniel's report and McClinton's comments on it, see telegram 2072 from Saigon, Apr. 21, in volume XIII.

such a study without its coming to the knowledge of the French. If the latter knew he were doing it, it would have a serious effect both on U.S. relations with Navarre and on French will to continue fighting. He might be instructed to prepare his study but at the same time instructed not to take it up with the French until authorized. O'Daniel's personal relation with Navarre and the French command are not yet good and we don't wish to increase tension and provide any additional fuel to the French tendency to turn the whole defense of Indo-China over to us.

Unless we made a really remarkable effort it is to be doubted that O'Daniel could have nine Vietnamese divisions combat-ready by November. It is the opinion of Lt. Col. Taber, assistant military attaché, now detailed to the conference, that it is doubtful that U.S. training advice would have much impact on the Vietnamese battle field in less than one year. A copy of Taber's written comments to me on O'Daniel's training idea is attached.

II. O'Daniel also submits a battle plan of using these nine "combat-ready" Vietnamese divisions for a sweep from the South to the North beginning next November.

*Comment:* This is only a "concept" unsupported by a detailed study or plan. I may add that this is a very controversial concept. I believe that General Trapnell, who was Chief of MAAG until General O'Daniel arrived ten days ago and General Cogy, commanding the French forces in North Vietnam, believe efforts should be concentrated in the North as soon as possible and not follow a complete clean-up of the South and Center. General O'Daniel might be asked to prepare a detailed study of his plan.

III. O'Daniel believes that sending U.S. troops or other reinforcements would be wasteful under the present French command set-up, because of the latter's inability to handle large scale operations and its stubbornness in resisting outside advice and help. Lt. Col. Taber and I concur that it would be confusing and frustrating as well as wasteful but we both believe that limited combat support may be necessary on a short range basis in order to get the French to remain and fight long enough to give us time to train the Vietnamese national army.

IV. O'Daniel concluding statement is that General Navarre does not have the requisite ability to wage war in Indo-China on a scale that is necessary to win. I must regretfully agree with that conclusion. Navarre did quite well up until his decision to dig in at Dien Bien Phu when he underestimated enemy supply capabilities and the strength of

his own forces and position there. He has certainly, in the last few days, shown defeatism.

I suggest that it might be desirable to detail Major General Trapnell to act as a special adviser on the military situation in Indo-China. Trapnell has the best and broadest view of that situation and a sound optimism that the battle can be won without massive increase of the forces now present there plus the new Vietnamese units whose formation is already programmed. Trapnell enjoys the liking and respect of the French military.

Vice Admiral Davis is in general agreement with this memorandum except my comment on Point III. Admiral Davis observes that O'Daniel's report was sent to the JCS and is probably receiving intensive consideration there and at the White House.

DRH

[Attachment]

#### LT. COL. TABER'S COMMENTS ON O'DANIEL'S REPORT

Concur with statement "feel that Vietnamese Army must be gotten underway at once. This can be done if American methods are applied but are beyond French concept." However, do not concur with statement ". . . the first increment of nine Vietnamese divisions could be organized and employed by November." Assuming that by "organize" General O'Daniel means to activate and train Division Headquarters and build remainder of division by merely regrouping existing Vietnamese National Army battalions into regiments, I believe his time schedule unrealistic. Nine divisions would require 27 Regt. (Mobile group) Headquarters and service companies. Only 6 now exist in VNA. Schools would have to be expanded, training areas established, interpreters and leaders selected. These problems can be solved but in my opinion not in time to put nine combat-ready divisions in the field "by November", 6 months from now. It might be possible to have one or two divisions combat-ready if work could be started immediately. I doubt that U.S. training and advice would have much impact on the battlefield in less than one year. The lack of strong political leadership in Vietnam and the lack of a real will to fight make the training and advice problem much more difficult than it was in Korea with the ROK troops.

Ref. statement "This type operation gotten underway without delay I believe can save the situation and solve the problem". True only if the French Regular Army (F.T.E.O.) stays in Indo-China in present strength and continues to fight.

751G.00/4-2654 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1954—6:48 p. m.

Tedul 13. Just completed briefing session as you suggested. Following were present: Senators H. Alexander Smith, Hickenlooper, Langer, Fulbright, Gillette, Mansfield; Representatives Chiperfield, Vorys, Fulton, Smith of Wisconsin, Carnahan, Zablocki and Burleson; Clerks of Committees Francis Wilcox and Boyd Crawford.

I was actually surprised by the restrained gravity of all who participated. With no carping questions or criticisms, there appeared to be full realization of the seriousness of the situation, and among the Congressional group there was open discussion of the passage of resolution authorizing use of air and naval strength following a declaration of common intent, with, or possibly even without, British participation. All concerned waiting with great interest developments of next two days.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Acting Secretary.

396.1 GE/4-2654 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

GENEVA, April 26, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 11. Repeated information London 72, Paris 120, Moscow 28. At meeting this afternoon with Eden and Bidault called at latter's request at his villa, Bidault informed us that he had received a reply to his letter to Molotov suggesting that the three of us meet with him to consider composition of conference on Indochina. Gist of reply was that this matter should be discussed by Foreign Ministers of five powers. In final sentence, however, Molotov expressed willingness to see Bidault alone. Bidault suggested 11 morning April 27 and Molotov has agreed to call on him then. At that meeting he will seek avoid five power issue by suggesting that he deal with Molotov for procedural matters for Indochina conference in same fashion Eden represented three Western powers in arranging procedural set up for Korean Conference here today. Bidault said that he planned confine any discussion to procedural matters and would base his proposals on paper tripartitely agreed by experts.<sup>1</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



751G.5/4-2654 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, April 26, 1954—9 p. m.

Dulte 9. Repeated information London 73, Paris 122. Department eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. Paris and London eyes only Ambassador. I met for about an hour this afternoon with Eden and Bidault at latter's villa. Meeting was called at latter's request with no indication its purpose.

After some discussion procedural problems Indochina conference (reported separately<sup>2</sup>) discussion turned to Bao Dai's declaration in Paris and current attitude. Bidault told us that he understands Bao Dai named as his personal representative and observer a former member Ho Chi Minh's cabinet but that Bidault has not been able to confirm observer's arrival at his station in Evian.

Bidault then launched into rather confused discussion of problem his government faces with regard to establishing position for Indochina negotiation which he said was extremely difficult during progress of Dien Bien Phu battle. He touched lightly on whole range of possibilities including collective defense, cease-fire and partition. He mentioned further deterioration in political situation in Associated States.

Eden picked up the question of cease-fire and encouraged further discussion by Bidault this subject with cryptic remark that a month ago British had felt cease-fire due to general infiltration was dangerous but that now without having any clear view they were not so sure. I pointed out that cease-fire at Dien Bien Phu locally would be in fact surrender and that cease-fire generally would involve serious risk of native peoples' rising with resultant massacre of French. Side conversations later made it clear French believe with support of their military authorities in Indochina that general cease-fire lacking any control or safeguards would make it impossible for French Union forces to resume fighting once cease-fire established. Bidault said that the French Government had queried French High Command in Indochina and had received a reply that there would either have to be a final cease-fire or further reinforcements would have to be sent to Indochina during the conference.

As indicative of Bidault's continuing courage, he said that when he saw Molotov tomorrow he intended to stand on Laniel's statement of March 5<sup>3</sup> and attempt to draw Molotov out without ceding ground

<sup>1</sup> Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs James C. H. Bonbright in a handwritten notation on the source text indicated that he had discussed this telegram with Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Robert Murphy on Apr. 27 "who agreed [there was] no action we could usefully take at this end now."

<sup>2</sup> Telegram Secto 11, Apr. 26, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Reported in telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, p. 435.

himself and without getting involved in detailed discussions of substance on an Indochina settlement.

In my judgment, Eden has arrived with instructions actively to encourage French into almost any settlement which will result in cessation hostilities in Indochina. My guess is that behind this lies British fear that if fighting continues, we will in one way or another become involved, thereby enhancing risk Chinese intervention and possibility further expansion of war. This estimate of mine is confirmed by fact that Chauvel told MacArthur that French believe Eden's instructions are to press actively for a cease-fire.

I made clear to Bidault privately that we would have no part in settlement at Geneva of Indochina war which constituted surrender of Indochina to Communists, and that France has better chance by fighting on rather than by attempted withdrawal which would be under most difficult conditions. I intend to see Eden alone tomorrow morning to talk with extreme bluntness to him expressing my dismay that British are apparently encouraging French in direction surrender which is in conflict not only with our interest but what I conceive theirs to be.

DULLES

---

751G.00/4-2754 : Telegram

*Dulles-Eden Meeting, Geneva, April 27, Morning: The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, April 27, 1954—midnight.

Dulte 13. Repeated information London 77 Paris 127. Eyes only Acting Secretary. Eyes only Ambassadors. I saw Eden and his immediate advisors for a few minutes before his luncheon April 27. I opened by saying that I wanted to speak frankly concerning our own immediate affairs. I said I considered it great mistake to push French in direction cease-fire which I believed would be a disaster. I said I considered it of utmost importance that we both keep French in mood to fight on in Indochina. If that mood is lost surely disaster would follow with little chance of limiting its scope and indeed little chance of French extricating themselves.

Eden replied with some heat that he was not advocating a cease-fire though he admitted that he had told Bidault that he was less sure today than a month ago that a cease-fire was out of the question. He insisted that all he had been thinking of had been a cease-fire with adequate safeguards and controls. His purpose he said had been to concentrate French thinking on latter points.

I interjected that I did not think three of us were presenting a very impressive or cohesive position. I reminded him that I wanted im-

mediate *ad hoc* plans covering Southeast Asia including Indochina if Geneva failed but that British were against this. French I said had in effect no government and were at a loss as to what to do. They were drifting toward disaster. I was concerned that we were not doing all possible between us to shore up French resolution. I said there was a basic difference between us in that British seemed to think that plans for a joint defense were more apt to spread conflict than absence of any plans.

Eden said that what worried them in London apart from political aspects was that they felt military intervention would be "terrific business", a bigger affair than Korea, which could get us nowhere. They just did not believe that it was a realizable military exercise considering the military means available. Moreover Eden said it would be most unpopular in Asia let alone with British home opinion.

Eden then asked if our tripartite position was really as bad as I had painted it. He said he felt that other side was properly worried.

I agreed but said in all frankness they were more worried about United States than British.

Eden did not deny this, and said that we must see how things go here in next few days and do what we can to buck French up particularly if Dien Bien Phu falls.

I said I was deeply worried over French situation not alone in its relation with Indochina. NATO was directly affected. The fall of Laniel might result in a left-of-center government coming to power which would exist by Communist sufferance, thereby increasing Communist influence domestically in France and by contagion in Italy which country was also a source of serious concern. I said EDC would be affected, and our entire defense structure in Europe. At this point Bidault arrived and we broke off our conversation.

DULLES

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 287

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Merchant)*

SECRET

[GENEVA,] 27 April 1954.

Participants: Sir Harold Caccia  
C. A. E. Shuckburgh  
Livingston T. Merchant

Following the Secretary's talk before lunch with Mr. Eden<sup>1</sup> the three participants listed above adjourned for luncheon for the purpose of further discussing what specific steps the British and we

<sup>1</sup> Reported in telegram Dulles 13, Apr. 27, *supra*.

might jointly take to shore up the French will. I told both of them that the British abandonment of the terms of the communiqué of April 13<sup>2</sup> had cut the legs out from under the Secretary's project for an *ad hoc* coalition. I said they did not seem to appreciate that it was intended as a deterrent, which by creating restraints on the other side would reduce the risk of our being forced to intervene. They both denied that this would have been its effect. I replied that in fact the failure to create the coalition was actually increasing the risk of intervention. We argued this back and forth for a time.

With regard to the French we agreed that both our delegations should take every occasion to buck up the French and to attempt to get them to see Dien Bien Phu in proper perspective. They felt strongly, and I was inclined to agree, that the best course would be to get on with the Indochina negotiations rather than delay. They admitted that in the absence of their willingness to consider intervention there was little in the way of concrete support they could offer.

---

<sup>2</sup> For text of the communiqué issued following talks between Dulles and Eden on Apr. 13, see telegram Secto 2, Apr. 13, in volume XIII or press release 192 in Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 26, 1954, p. 622.

---

751G.5/4-2754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, April 27, 1954—noon.

Dulte 11. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. Re Tedul 9.<sup>1</sup> If you think wise, please explain to the President that I withheld delivery his message to Laniel<sup>2</sup> during my talk with Laniel last Saturday evening, because I felt that delivery approximately coincident my oral appeal would bring reaction of overpressuring France, and also make it seem that what I had said was prearranged rather than informal and spontaneous. French officials as well as public are extremely sensitive over whatever might seem to be an effort on our part to keep France fighting, while we ourselves are unwilling to join the fighting by air measures which the French believe would be limited and would save Dien-Bien-Phu. Also, it would be doubtful wisdom to

---

<sup>1</sup> In telegram Tedul 9, Apr. 26, Under Secretary Smith informed the Secretary that the President had "approved and accepted your redraft of message to Coty to be sent immediately following fall of Dien Bien Phu, both as to context and timing." (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 264) For the text of the President's letter to President Coty of France, May 7, see volume XIII or *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, p. 463.

<sup>2</sup> For the President's message to Laniel, transmitted to the Secretary in telegram Tedul 7 to Paris, Apr. 24, see volume XIII.

put either President of Republic or President of Council in a position where if he publicly urged continuance of the struggle, this could be represented as being done not spontaneously but under pressure from the United States.

As you know, I do not share French official or popular estimate of the situation, but that estimate is a fact which I know the President would want us to take into account.

DULLES

---

751G.00/4-2754 : Telegram

*Dulles-Molotov Meeting, Geneva, April 27, Noon: The Secretary of State to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

GENEVA, April 27, 1954—9 p. m.

Dulte 15. Repeated information Moscow 16. Eyes only Ambassador. Eyes Only Acting Secretary. Molotov called on me at noon April 27 at his request. He was accompanied by Zaroubin and Troyanovsky. Merchant was with me.

Molotov opened immediately by handing me single copy in Russian of eight page note which he described as Soviet reply to US note of March 19 containing our atomic energy agency proposal.<sup>2</sup> He said that it contained Soviet Union views on this proposal and also dealt with Soviet atomic proposal of December 21. It was agreed that after I had read note in translation we might usefully meet again before my departure for Washington.

When this matter concluded, Molotov made no move to raise other subjects with me (as I had rather expected he might). I inquired if he would object to my speaking on Indochina. He indicated he would be most interested.

I said that whereas neither of us were belligerents, matter was of direct concern to both. I recalled my suggestion to him at Berlin that I was fearful of chain of events starting in Indochina with far-reaching consequences which United States did not desire and assumed Soviet likewise did not desire. I said that my concern had not been diminished by events since Berlin, and that there had been created in our minds growing fear that large aggressive movement might be under way vitally affecting our interests. I said I did not myself see clearly any solution, but hoped Molotov might see a possible solution

---

<sup>1</sup> Memorandum of conversation, Apr. 27, is filed in Conference files, lot 60 D 627. CF 287.

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on atomic energy matters, see volume II.

which would avoid undesirable consequences to which I had alluded. I said that I hoped we could find ways of avoiding a growing sense of crisis and the belief that enlarged struggle was almost inevitable.

Mr. Molotov replied with great seriousness that Soviet Union had but one interest in this case which was to contribute to establishment of peace in Indochina. He felt first step was to hear both sides. Molotov said no country, including far away Soviet Union, wished enlargement Indochinese war and he stated his belief that in this respect a great deal depends on United States policy. He said it should be possible by serious attention at Geneva to find solution.

Molotov then briefly reported his talk with Bidault an hour earlier on composition conference (which talk is being reported at length in separate telegram <sup>3</sup>).

In summary, he stated his view that participants should be Big Four plus Communist China plus three Associated States plus Viet Minh and these nine delegations might agree later on adding other Asian nations with India notable possibility as country particularly interested in Indochina and in position wield conciliatory influence.

I replied that I thought it indispensable that some at least, and, perhaps, all of the Indochinese authorities he had mentioned should have opportunity to participate. I hinted that Indochinese perhaps lack sufficient experience in international affairs to be able alone to find proper solution. I concluded by saying that I would be happy to have the benefit of any idea regarding substance of an acceptable solution before I returned to Washington, and suggested that he might pursue matter at a later meeting when I had had opportunity to study note he had just given me.

After some further inconclusive discussion of subject, Molotov took his leave having failed to rise to any of the flies I had cast.

This, however, does not mean that visit had no significance. Obviously, Molotov would not have to come to see me merely to be a messenger boy to deliver Russian text note. I gather he was anxious for opportunity to see whether I had any substantive suggestions to make to him.

Compared to his appearance at Berlin, Molotov appeared tired and unwell.

At luncheon with Eden and Bidault following this talk, I gave them both gist of this conversation and Bidault reported in full his earlier talk with Molotov on composition Indochina conference.

DULLES

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram Dulles 16, Apr 27, p. 591.

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Geneva Conference"

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(MacArthur) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

[GENEVA,] April 27, 1954.

I had a long and private conversation with Chauvel after luncheon today on a personal basis. He gave me his own estimate of the French situation as follows:

The news which the French received the middle of last week that Dien Bien Phu would probably fall in a few days caused an emotionalism in Paris bordering on hysteria. The fact that Dien Bien Phu has not yet fallen has given a little time for further reflection on the part of those French officials who believe that capitulation would be a disaster for France. The problem, as these officials see it, is, in essence, that of gaining time. However, when Dien Bien Phu falls, there is apt to be a wave of emotional defeatism in the parliament and among certain members of the Cabinet which will result in sweeping the Laniel-Bidault team out of office and the formation of a new government dedicated to the proposition that its single mandate is to get out of Indochina. Mendes-France might head such a government. Such a government would also probably be unwilling or unable to push ahead with EDC.

Chauvel said that quite frankly the only hope that Bidault and Laniel see is in rapidly getting on with the Secretary's proposal for united action in Southeast Asia. He asked whether anything was being done in Washington in the way of consultations or otherwise to get on with the project. He stressed when Dien Bien Phu falls the present French Government must have something to point to to offset the loss of Dien Bien Phu. In other words "There must be something on the fire even if it isn't entirely cooked." If there is something in prospect, the present government could point to it and would be much more able to prevent the French parliament and certain leaders being swept away by an emotional wave which would lead them to decide quickly and immediately to abandon Indochina. While obviously armed intervention would be the best thing to be able to point to as evidence that France had gained support from the US, and possibly others, in Indochina, he understood that this was probably not possible because of the attitude of the UK. The next best thing to point to would be a declaration of common purpose such as was envisaged by you. This declaration, as he understood it, would proceed by setting up *ad hoc* machinery for political and military consultation looking to see what might be done with respect to the defense of Southeast Asia, including Indochina. If it were not possible to get such a decla-

ration, it would still be useful if a public announcement that representatives of the states who have vital security interests in Southeast Asia were consulting with a view to the defense of Southeast Asia. Obviously this latter device would have less appeal than the first two, but it was still something which the French Government could point to. If they had nothing to point to, he did not know what would happen. He said very frankly that neither Laniel nor Bidault knew what the effect of the fall of Dien Bien Phu would be, although the atmosphere in Paris yesterday and today was substantially better than it had been last week during our visit. This however could change with dramatic suddenness with the loss of Dien Bien Phu. When Dien Bien Phu falls, a sudden and violent reaction leading to the disappearance of the Laniel-Bidault Government must be avoided if at all possible. French leaders must weigh the advantages of getting out of Indochina against the great disadvantages in terms of France's long term interests, but to have time to reflect, they must have hope, and such hope can only come from the prospect of some form of united assistance to France in Indochina, and the US alone can supply this.

He said that Bidault and Laniel's efforts now are to exercise a calming influence on the situation in Paris. Bidault's terms of reference at Geneva which the Cabinet approved last Saturday were that outwardly at least the French should treat Geneva like any other international conference. They should stand pat in the first instance on the Laniel cease fire proposals of March 5<sup>1</sup> and should not go running helter-skelter to the Communist side with a series of new proposals. This would simply lead the Communists to believe that they were on the run and would cause them to raise their ante. In other words, they should wait for the Communists to come to them with propositions and then weight [*weigh?*] these propositions rather than leading with their chins. The Cabinet agreed to the foregoing on the basis that the U.S. was the key to the situation and that there was considerable hope that U.S. aid would be forthcoming.

Chauvel said that when the Secretary visited Paris two weeks ago the French had been apprehensive that he would ask them then to agree to certain specific courses of action which would give the appearance that France, prior to Geneva, committed itself to a course of action which made any negotiated settlement of Indochina impossible. They were therefore not only relieved but very pleased with his proposal and with the communiqué which was issued.<sup>2</sup> They felt that the communiqué would indicate to the Russians and the Chinese that

---

<sup>1</sup> See telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, p. 435.

<sup>2</sup> The communiqué released on Apr. 14 was issued as Department of State press release 197 of Apr. 14 and was published in the Department of State *Bulletin*. Apr. 26, 1954, p. 622.



courses of action were being studied, although not definitively decided upon. This was why they had agreed to the establishment of a working group of interested states in Washington. Since the Secretary's visit two weeks ago, the situation had evolved very considerably and now that the Geneva Conference had begun, the French felt that it was possible and understandable in terms of their own public opinion to proceed ahead with the establishment of some form of *ad hoc* international machinery to examine the possibility for outside action in the defense of Southeast Asia. He recognized that the British were opposed to doing anything but hoped that he could persuade them or [to] do something of some kind that could be pointed to by Bidault and Laniel even if the British would not come along. He emphasized repeatedly that it was desperately important to have something to point to before the time when Dien Bien Phu had fallen.

He said that he had recommended to Bidault and the latter had agreed that in any talks he has with Molotov dealing with a solution to Indochina, he should continue to stand pat on the Laniel proposals and wait for a Communist counter-proposal. Such a counter-proposal would be examined on its merits and would of course have full consultation with us and the British. He said that Bidault believed that if Molotov could be led to expect that if the Communists did not let up in Indochina the war would be expanded, this would be one of the best means of keeping pressure on the Communists. I gathered that Bidault is toying with the idea in some future conversation with Molotov with remarking that if Dien Bien Phu falls, a situation will arise involving additional outside support for France in Indochina with the inevitable possibility of extension of conflict. In other words, to imply that if the Communists do not wish to expand the war and have the U.S. and possibly others join France, they should not try to carry Dien Bien Phu by assault.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 287

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(MacArthur) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

[GENEVA,] April 27, 1954.

I asked Chauvel today what he thought the British position was. He said that the British are unwilling to join in united action in Southeast Asia, and what they are really hoping for is some kind of negotiated solution at Geneva. They would expect that any solution agreed to would be guaranteed by all the participating powers, which would involve guarantees not just by the UK and our side but guaran-

tees by the Soviets and Chinese Communists. In other words, when the British talk about joining in a guarantee of any possible solution reached as a result of the Geneva Conference, they are probably thinking in terms of a general guarantee involving the Communist side, rather than a guarantee which would result from united action by the non-Communist states in Southeast Asia.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 286

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States  
Delegation (Bonsal)*

SECRET

[GENEVA,] April 27, 1954.

Participants: M. Roux, Head of Far Eastern Section of French  
Foreign Office  
Ambassador Donald Heath, Special Adviser U.S.  
Delegation  
Philip W. Bonsal, Adviser U.S. Delegation

Subject: Bao Dai's Statement of April 25<sup>1</sup>

Ambassador Heath stated that the Secretary had read Bao Dai's statement of April 25 with surprise and concern. The Secretary had been under the impression that Franco-Vietnamese relations were currently characterized by harmony and mutual confidence. The statement, although somewhat enigmatic, seemed to cast a shadow on what we had hoped was a happy state of affairs.

M. Roux replied that M. Bidault and his associates had also been much surprised by Bao Dai's declaration of which they had had no previous knowledge. Roux stated that immediately after the tripartite conversations on April 24,<sup>2</sup> Bidault had called together the representatives of the three Associated States and had given them a full statement regarding the position of the French Government in relation to Geneva. This statement had included a position on (a) the independence and integrity of the Associated States, (b) their possible participation in the conference and (c) opposition to the admission of the Viet Minh. The statement also set forth the French Government's intention to maintain the closest possible contact with the representatives of the Associated States, the latter being invited to have such representatives available at Geneva. Reference was also made to the desire of the French Government to see if a cease-fire

---

<sup>1</sup> Statement released by Bao Dai's cabinet on Apr. 25 which expressed dissatisfaction with the progress of French-Vietnamese treaty negotiations. See telegram 4103 from Paris, Apr. 27, 1954, in volume XIII.

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on these talks see the memorandum, Apr. 21-24, p. 550 and telegram Dulte 15 from Paris, Apr. 24, 1954, in volume XIII.

could be arranged along the lines of the Laniel proposal which would assure the security of friendly military forces and of civilian elements.

Ambassador Heath described the conversation with Bao Dai<sup>3</sup> mentioning that the Secretary has stated his understanding that the French and Vietnamese delegates had reached agreement on the main political issues. Bao Dai confirmed this and said that he had expected that it would be possible to sign the two basic political accords (independence and association) prior to Geneva but that the French Government had preferred, for their own reasons, merely to initial these basic accords and to delay the final signing until the pending economic, cultural and military agreements had been concluded. Bao Dai stated that he had accepted this point of view although he would have preferred to have the formal signature of the political accords at this time.

M. Roux told us that the French proposal had been that a declaration covering agreement in principle should be issued at this time, that the basic accords should be initialed and made public and that work should continue on the subsidiary accords of a more technical character. (M. Roux pointed out that this whole subject is one on which the French Government may anticipate considerable parliamentary difficulties and that, although the determination of the government is firm as to principles involved, it believes that it will be in a better position to go before Parliament if it has the complete text of all the agreements in hand.) It appeared possible to M. Roux that on this matter there had been something less than perfect coordination between Bao Dai and his Foreign Minister who had been concluding the negotiation.

Ambassador Heath stated that the Secretary also inquired as to his attitude toward the Geneva Conference and Bao Dai had replied that he would, of course, accept the invitation, but if the Viet Minh were to be invited on equal status it would present a "delicate" problem to his government which did not recognize the Viet Minh as constituting a state. Bao Dai said he did not reject the idea that a peaceful solution might be found in Geneva although he appeared doubtful, and stated that, of course, Viet Nam could not accept any solution which would involve the partition of Viet Nam or the integrity of his government.

Ambassador Heath stated that the Secretary has been giving some thought to the desirability of having Ambassador Heath see Bao Dai on his behalf. The Ambassador stated that he wished M. Roux to be informed and to have an opportunity of making any comment which he might wish to make regarding his proposed interview. Roux appeared to react favorably, adding that he would discuss the matter

---

<sup>3</sup> For summary of this conversation between the Secretary and Bao Dai, see the memorandum of conversation by Ambassador Donald R. Heath, Apr. 24, 1951, in volume XIII.

with M. Bidault and let us know if the latter had any particular comments to make.

M. Roux expressed appreciation of Ambassador Heath's call and of the many occasions on which the Ambassador has contributed to the improvement of Franco-Vietnamese relations. He added that he would recommend that M. Bidault hand a copy of the statement made to the Associated States representatives to the Secretary for his information.

(*Later—same day*—news was received that Bao Dai had left Paris for Cannes and the project for Ambassador Heath to call on him was dropped.)

Mr. Bonsal raised with Roux the additional information promised last week to the working group regarding certain aspects of the Laniel proposals for a cease fire in Indochina. Roux replied that this material as received from General Navarre is now being reviewed by the civil and military authorities in Paris and that it will presumably be brought here by Colonel Brebisson within the next day or two. Roux will let us know and will call a meeting of the tripartite working group as soon as possible.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 287

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (McBride)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[GENEVA,] April 27, 1954.

Participants: Mr. Cable, United Kingdom Delegation  
Mr. McBride

Subject: Indo-China Phase of Conference—Procedural and Substantive.

Mr. Cable of the United Kingdom Delegation called at his request to discuss the Indo-China phase of the Conference. He said that on procedural arrangements for Indo-China, he agreed with us that the settlement of all other problems depended upon the firm solution first of the participation question. Accordingly, he was gratified that Bidault was meeting Molotov today, and hoped a settlement of this issue might be forthcoming. He asked if we would be satisfied to have Bidault speak for the three Western delegations if this would solve the four-power vs. five-power problem and I said so far as I knew, we would.

Mr. Cable said that the British position on participation was that the three Associated States should be invited as full participants as well, of course, as the five states mentioned in the Berlin communiqué.

He added that the British would not take the initiative in inviting Ho, but would not strenuously oppose such an invitation. I said I believed our position was about the same. We discussed the problem the French had with the Vietnamese if Ho were invited on a basis of equality, but he felt the French would not make a major issue of this point, and indeed could hardly do so. If Rhee accepted the North Koreans at the table, it seemed totally illogical for Bao Dai to make such an issue of the Viet Minh, he thought, though he admitted Rhee had much more support in his country than Bao Dai, who had none.

Beyond the nine (U.S., U.K., France, U.S.S.R., Communist China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and the Viet Minh) the British had no position, since they believed any additions such as Burma and Thailand would cause them serious trouble with the Australians and possibly elsewhere in the Commonwealth. The Australians had said again today they definitely wanted to be included if participation went beyond the nine. Therefore, the British would much prefer to have just the nine, and if it were decided to have more, then would have to support Australia. He mentioned that the U.K. also had to reply substantively at some point to the notes from Thailand and the Philippines, formally requesting an invitation. He added a similar note had been received from Cambodia but in that case the U.K. had said they would consider this request "sympathetically".

He said the best argument he could think of for including Burma and Thailand was that it might solve a chairmanship problem that would otherwise exist. With just the nine, he did not see how the chairmanship would work. Conceivably the Russians might suggest a rotation of France and Communist China, which the U.S. could not accept. If the two adjoining states were added, the present arrangement might continue, or if this were rejected for some reason, a permanent Burmese chairman might be a possibility, inasmuch as the Soviets seem generally to accept Burma as a neutral.

Passing to the question of timing, Mr. Cable said it was the U.K. opinion that time was working against us and accordingly we should proceed as fast as possible. I reiterated our feeling that the participation question obviously must be settled first. He agreed but said as soon as it was settled, invitations should probably be sent to the Associated States and others who might be involved. He said that there might not be much delay, since the Associated States had people in France now, and he understood that Ho had a delegation in the vicinity also. He asked if we visualized that, after the chairmanship, participation, seating arrangements, etc., had been settled for the Indo-China phase, talks could begin and continue simultaneously with the Korean phase. I said this was presumably being discussed at higher levels in our delegation, and I did not know the answer. He repeated that the U.K.

felt strongly the situation was deteriorating in the area, that time was on the side of our enemies, and that the sooner we could actually begin the talks, the better, especially from the point of view of maintaining the French position at a relatively satisfactory level.

Mr. Cable added that his delegation would also like to talk about questions of substance. I said that I was not qualified to go into this, but that I did know a number of things that were definitely unsatisfactory from our viewpoint. I said that I realized this was a negative position, and that we would of course be working on something more substantive which would be discussed with his Delegation by the senior members of our own delegation. I gathered that the British position is well-advanced, and from Mr. Cable's remarks, that it involves a participation [*partition*] plan for Vietnam. He said that the U.K. definitely was not opposed to partition, and indeed believed that both the Soviets and the Communist Chinese might be well satisfied with a buffer state in Tonkin. He said it was not necessarily true that the Viet Minh would continue guerrilla warfare south of an agreed line, and that indeed they might be quite satisfied to observe such a division and leave Cochin China and Annam, south of the line, in peace. He said the status of Cambodia and Laos was not involved as the Viet Minh attack was a foreign aggression in these two cases.

It was agreed that Mr. Cable and Mr. Tahourdin of the U.K. Delegation would meet again with Mr. Bonsal and myself when we might be in a position to discuss the situation more in detail.

---

396.1 GE/4-2754 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 27, 1954—6:37 p. m

Tedul 14. Reference Secto 14. April 27.<sup>2</sup> Wilson and Twining are handling Pleven's request personally and doing everything possible. At present they feel only one of the three fields is feasible. Will have fuller report for you tomorrow.

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Acting Secretary. Repeated to Paris as telegram 3850 and to Saigon as telegram 2092.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram Secto 14 from Geneva, Apr. 27, not printed, Secretary Dulles informed the Acting Secretary that he concurred with "Dillon's and Norstad's recommendations and hope immediate favorable reply can be given Pleven's request with maximum implementation undertaken as quickly as possible." (396.1 GE/4-2754) In telegram 4085 from Paris, Apr. 26, not printed, Ambassador Dillon reported that Defense Minister Pleven had that evening entered a request with General Norstad for U.S. assistance in airfield construction in Indochina and for additional U.S. transport aircraft and crews. Dillon and Norstad recommended that the requests be granted for political and psychological reasons. (751G.00/4-2654)

Bonnet visited me again this afternoon and renewed strong plea for action, suggesting possibility that joint declaration might be made without UK participation, in view of apparently strong concern of Australia and New Zealand. I told him it would be very difficult for the US to suggest such a thing but that if such suggestion came from Australia or New Zealand, or both, it would certainly deserve our careful attention.

The above should be considered against the background of Dillon's 4089, repeated niact Geneva 134.<sup>3</sup> I am sure that Dillon's estimate is correct and that this matter will be raised with you at Geneva if it has not already been brought up. I would be very grateful for your views.

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 4089 from Paris (Apr. 27, in volume XIII), Ambassador Dillon, with respect to Pleven's request for military assistance, stated he believed that the Laniel government was making every effort to hold at Dien Bien Phu for at least three weeks in the hope that the United States would be able to overcome internal political problems and to find constitutional means of providing military assistance to France in Indochina. (751G.00/4-2754)

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 287

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(MacArthur) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

[GENEVA,] April 27, 1954.

Sir Harold Caccia dropped in to see me this evening. He referred to your conversation with Mr. Eden on Sunday night<sup>1</sup> regarding the situation in Malaya and showed me a brief memorandum dealing with the Civil Security Administration. In essence he said that, aside from the 22 battalions which the British have there, they also have 25,000 constables, 40,000 special police, and 200,000 home guards. He said that as a result of the progress they have made in cleaning up the situation in Malaya, during the past few months they have been able to lift restrictions in four areas so conditions are very much as normal. He also showed me a tabulated list of the number of incidents, security police killed, and Communists killed, over the past two years. These figures indicated there had been a very substantial decrease in the number of security police killed and an increase in the number of Communists which [*sic*] had been liquidated and a reduction in the overall number of incidents. In conclusion he said that while the situa-

---

<sup>1</sup> Apr. 25. For a memorandum of this conversation between Eden and Dulles, see p. 553.

tion in Malaya was by no means cleaned up, very substantial progress had been made and should Indochina collapse, the British felt that they had the internal situation in Malaya pretty well in hand and did not believe that any large scale successful uprising could be staged.

Caccia then asked me whether we planned to respond favorably to Eden's suggestion for secret US-UK talks on the defense of Southeast Asia. The British proposal was that we exclude Indochina from this study exercise. I replied that the British proposal seemed to have virtually nothing in it to appeal to the French and seemed to be based on the assumption that Indochina was already finished. Caccia replied that the British hoped very much that the French would not give up in Indochina, but if they did, a study of the kind proposed by Eden would enable us to have some plans which could perhaps be implemented rapidly when and if the Indochina collapse came. I believe that the prime purpose of Caccia's visit was to talk about this, rather than to show me the memorandum on Malaya which to me was a flimsy pretext.

---

396.1 GE/4-2754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, April 27, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 16. Repeated information London 76, Paris 126, Saigon 5. Margerie states what French Government hopes to obtain in Indochina is not "cease-fire" but "armistice". He described difference as being that cease-fire merely meant local laying down of arms, which in case of Indochina would be tantamount to French surrender, while armistice as in case of Korea provided safeguards and political as well as military conditions. He regretted expression "cease-fire" had come to be so widely used of late and hoped it would be possible to get word "armistice" into press usage in its place.

While some suggestions as to possible partition arrangements had been made in French Government and considered, Bidault was as of now by no means prepared to accept them. He regretted publicity on favorable British disposition toward partition as doing less than no good and as having prompted Bao Dai's explosive statement.<sup>1</sup> He added incidentally that Vietnamese representative expected here had not arrived and that only communication delegation had with them was through Foreign Office.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Reference is to the Apr. 25 statement by the Bao Dai cabinet. See footnote 1. p. 584.



396.1 GE/4-2754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, April 27, 1954—8 p. m.

Dulte 16. Repeated information London 80, Paris 130. Paris and London information Ambassador. Reference Dulte 15.<sup>1</sup> Following is account of Bidault-Molotov meeting this morning given me by Bidault and supplemented by Chauvel:

Molotov was mild and friendly. Discussion was confined to procedural questions relating to Indochina phase of Conference and did not touch upon substance of possible solution regarding Indochina. Molotov said that it was not possible for the four Berlin Powers to meet to discuss Indochina phase of Geneva without presence of Chinese Communists. However, to avoid creating needless difficulties he was glad to discuss and endeavor to work out arrangements with Bidault.

Bidault said that three Western Powers believed that the composition of the Indochina phase of Geneva should be kept small and had in mind confining it to the four Berlin Powers, the three Associated States, and the three Limitrophe States (Communist China, Thailand, and Burma). Molotov replied by saying that no solution of Indochina could be made at Geneva unless the Viet Minh were represented. (Bidault and Chauvel had expected that in addition to Viet Minh, Molotov might suggest participation at Conference of recently announced Communist governments of liberation of Laos and Cambodia, but Molotov never mentioned these.) Molotov idea of composition was "Big Five", Associated States, Viet Minh, (a total of nine) and that Burma, Indonesia, and India might also well be included. He said India, in particular, had deep interest in Indochina and had already suggested possible solutions. There was brief discussion regarding who would send invitations to other participants. Molotov put forward idea the nine might invite additional participants, such as India. Bidault indicated great reserve and Molotov put forward idea that "two permanent chairmen" (i.e., United Kingdom and USSR) might issue invitations.

Bidault referred to participation of India and Indonesia and said it would raise question of participation of Australia and other countries in the area which would create difficulties and make Conference too large. Insofar as the Viet Minh was concerned, the Associated States whom he would have to consult were strongly opposed. He would, of course, also have to consult United States and United Kingdom regarding this point. (Bidault has already sent telegram to Paris

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Apr. 27, p. 579.

asking Foreign Office to contact representatives of Associated States urgently this afternoon to try to get affirmative reply regarding Viet Minh participation.) Bidault then suggested possibility of having some form of separate status for certain of the participants. Molotov confined his reply to the comment that it was obviously essential to have the Viet Minh represented if any solution were to be reached.

Molotov told Bidault his schedule "had gotten mixed up" and that he had an appointment to see me at twelve o'clock about the atomic question which did not give him as much time today as he would like to discuss Indochina. They, therefore, agreed to meet again tomorrow morning at 11 a. m. to pursue this discussion.

Bidault is trying to devise some formula which will permit Viet Minh to participate, but not on full membership basis. Eden, Bidault and I agreed to meet tomorrow morning at 10:15, prior to Bidault-Molotov meeting. Following that meeting, Eden and Bidault will lunch with me so that we can have full report and can see where we stand.

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/4-2754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, April 27, 1954—9 p. m.

Dulte 14. Repeated information Paris 128, London 78, Saigon 6. For Acting Secretary from the Secretary. Chauvel tells us French have been thinking how they might try to limit Indochina discussions of Geneva to Vietnam. The Laniel proposal of March 5<sup>1</sup> calls for a Viet Minh withdrawal from both Laos and Cambodia, but French recognize that Soviets may counter with suggestion of French withdrawal from these states. Therefore, French asked Navarre for his estimate as to whether from military viewpoint French could withdraw their forces from Laos and Cambodia without overthrow of present Laos and Cambodia regime by Communist insurrectionists. Navarre replied that if Viet Minh withdrew from Laos and Cambodia, French could also withdraw since existing Laotian and Cambodian forces are sufficient to keep situation in hand and prevent successful insurrectionary uprising.

We expressed some doubts and Chauvel replied that French Government accepted Navarre's estimate which was considered judgment of French High Command in Indochina and best estimate available.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> See telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, p. 435.

396.1 GE/4-2854

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Merchant)*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, April 28, 1954—10:15 a. m.

## Participants:

<i>France</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>US</i>
Mr. Bidault	Mr. Eden	Secretary Dulles
Mr. Chauvel	Sir Harold Caccia	Mr. Robertson
Mr. Roux		Mr. Merchant
Mr. de Margerie		

Time: 10:15 a. m., April 28, 1954

Place: Bidault's Residence, Joli Port, at Versoix

The meeting was called at Mr. Bidault's request in advance of his eleven o'clock engagement with Molotov. Mr. Bidault opened by saying that he had received no instructions from Paris nor any word of the official attitude of the Vietnamese Government on the question of participation in the Indochina conference.

Mr. Bidault said that he was increasingly concerned over the effect in Vietnam of the presence at the conference table of Vietminh representatives, and he was searching for some formula to depreciate their role. In his talk with Mr. Molotov this morning,<sup>1</sup> he intended to raise the question of a cease-fire at Dien Bien Phu in order to permit the evacuation of the French wounded. A refusal by the other side of this request he believed would harden public opinion in France and Indochina. The formula which he is considering is to have invitations issued to the US, UK, USSR, France, China, and the three Associated States, making an initial conference of eight. This conference of eight would then invite the Vietminh to appear. Presumably they would participate fully thereafter, but at least a distinction would have been drawn in the matter of precedence.

Mr. Bidault also mentioned his desire to get on with the Indochina talks.

The Secretary referred to the ground we had lost in Indochina since the Berlin Conference. He also mentioned our intelligence advice that two prominent Vietminh political figures had arrived at Geneva. Neither Mr. Bidault nor Mr. Eden had any confirmation but both were obviously interested.

Mr. Bidault made the point that he would not consider a general cease-fire, and that when the French used this term, what he had in

<sup>1</sup>For a summary of Eden's meeting with Molotov, see telegram Dulte 20. Apr. 28, p. 602.

mind was a formal armistice with all the necessary controls, safeguards, and machinery.

The three Ministers noted that no speakers had been inscribed so far except the Secretary. There was some general discussion of how to advance the work of the conference in this situation. Mr. Eden proposed that thought might be given to a restricted meeting which each member of the conference would attend with a single adviser for a frank discussion of advancing the work of the conference.

Mr. Bidault then read the tabulation of casualties in Indochina for the first three months of this year. The total figure, which was 12,600, was about equally divided between Vietnamese and non-Vietnamese French Union Forces, including Africans and the Foreign Legion. The losses constituted deaths, missings in actions, desertions, and permanently crippled. Of the Vietnamese losses, 2,022 were listed as defections.

The meeting broke up at about 10:45, and it was understood that Mr. Bidault would report the results of his conversation with Mr. Molotov to Mr. Eden and the Secretary at the latter's luncheon for the three of them today.

---

751G.00/4-2854 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, April 28, 1954—12:59 p. m.

Tedul 15. Radford and I had a long meeting with the President this morning and Radford gave a full report of his discussion with Churchill. He is obviously greatly depressed by British attitude. I discount the natural military reaction to lack of cooperation. However, the President's decision is that all requests made by Pleven will be met in so far as it is possible to do so without undue risk.<sup>2</sup> Am sending you later transcript of President's session with Congressional leaders on subject of Indochina as taken down by Cutler.<sup>3</sup> The President is trying his hand on a draft to Churchill generally in form of final appeal couched "more in sorrow than in anger". When received will transmit to you for suggestions. He does not anticipate much by way of results, nor do I, but believe it is worth trying. There is ob-

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Acting Secretary.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Pleven's requests for military assistance to France; on this matter, see telegram Tedul 14, Apr. 27, p. 588.

<sup>3</sup> For the transcript, see telegram Tedul 16, Apr. 28, p. 599.

viously a definite blind spot in London as to the trend of events in Asia.

SMITH

396.1 GE/4-2854 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, April 28, 1954—2 p. m.

Dulte 17. For General Smith from Secretary.

(1) Re your Tedul 14,<sup>1</sup> we are now working on draft cable giving our overall views on entire subject of intervention and hope to have it dispatched from here by seven o'clock tonight.<sup>2</sup> We will at that time include our specific comments on your recommendation contained Tedul 2.<sup>3</sup>

(2) Would appreciate having promptly a summary of what transpired at President's meeting with Congressional leaders last Monday on the subject of Indochina.<sup>4</sup> Would also like reaction of President and Security Council on my views as expressed Geneva Dulte 3.<sup>5</sup>

(3) Re your Tedul 10,<sup>6</sup> I have no objection and delighted you have made such progress. I will look forward to talking with him on my return.

(4) I will try and reach decision on best date for your arrival at Geneva by tomorrow. It is difficult at this point to make any judgment on how long I should stay.

DULLES

<sup>1</sup> Dated Apr. 27, p. 588.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram Dulte 21, Apr. 29, p. 605.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram Tedul 2 (Apr. 24, in volume XIII), the Acting Secretary recommended that military representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand appraise the military situation and examine possible courses of military action "aimed to hold remainder Southeast Asia." (790.5/4-2454) In telegram Dulte 25, Apr. 29, not printed, Secretary Dulles informed Acting Secretary Smith that he did "not believe at this moment in present situation we should propose constitution high level military commission of US, UK, France, Australia, New Zealand and Thailand." (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 264) For documentation on the five-power military consultations, see vol. XII, pp. 1 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Received that day in telegram Tedul 16, Apr. 28, p. 599.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram Dulte 3 (Apr. 25, in volume XIII), Secretary Dulles outlined his reasons for believing that "it is my opinion that armed intervention by executive action is not warranted." (751G.5/4-2554) A handwritten notation on the source text indicated that telegram Dulte 3 was answered in telegram Tedul 15 (Apr. 28, *supra*) and in telegram Tedul 16 (Apr. 28, p. 599).

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. Telegram Tedul 10 contained information of a personal nature between Secretary Dulles and Under Secretary Smith pertaining to an appointment to the Department of State. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 241)

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 288

*Memorandum of Conversation*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, April 28, 1954.

Participants: Prince Wan, Thailand Foreign Minister  
Ambassador Pote Sarasin  
Secretary Dulles  
Walter Robertson  
U. Alexis Johnson

Place: Geneva

Prince Wan asked to see the Secretary today following the Conference session.<sup>2</sup> He opened the conversation by expressing appreciation of the Secretary's nomination of him as one of the three rotating Presidents of the Conference. The Secretary replied that Prince Wan well knew the esteem with which he is regarded by the United States, and that the Secretary hoped it would in some very small measure make up for our inability to support Prince Wan for the Presidency of the last General Assembly.

Prince Wan referred to the prompt Thai response to the united front concept in S.E. Asia, and the Secretary expressed great appreciation of the U.S. therefor. The Secretary stated that the matter is not moving as rapidly as we had hoped because the UK was inclined to wait until it sees what happens at Geneva with respect to Indochina. France is also confronted with a very difficult situation and their Cabinet is so badly divided on this issue that there is virtually no government.

In reply to the Secretary's query as to whether Prince Wan had any information with regard to consultations in Washington with the Thai government, Prince Wan replied in the negative. The Secretary stated he thought things would develop much more rapidly after his return to Washington, which would probably be on Sunday;<sup>3</sup> that immediately upon his arrival he would consult with Congressional leaders and in general be in a better position to carry forward the concept.

Prince Wan stated that Thailand wondered whether it would not be possible to concert at least on military plans in the area, mentioning that at present Thailand has its own defense plans and the British had their plans in Malaya, but there was no coordination. He stated

---

<sup>1</sup> Copy of this memorandum of conversation in CF 264 indicates that it was drafted by U. Alexis Johnson. Summary of the conversation was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 31, Apr. 28. (396.1 GE/4-2954)

<sup>2</sup> Reference to the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference which began on Apr. 26.

<sup>3</sup> May 2.

that Thailand stood ready to conclude a pact because of public opinion in Thailand and the "many lawyers in Parliament". He felt it would be desirable to have a more formal arrangement.

In reply the Secretary pointed out that the drawing up of a formal defense pact was very time consuming. He stated that in the conversations in London, leading up to the communiqué by Mr. Eden and himself, there had been very considerable discussion of the phrase in the communiqué now reading "consider the creation of a common defense"; the word "assistance" having been deliberately left out. The situation which had to be faced in the area was such that it would probably not permit the time-consuming procedures for drawing up and ratifying a pact.

Upon Prince Wan's expressing the opinion that consultations should be undertaken, the Secretary inquired whether there was anyone in the Thai Embassy in Washington with whom at least the quasi military aspects of the situation could be discussed, agreeing that talks should start quickly. Ambassador Sarasin replied that the Chargé in Washington was available for consultations, and that on the military level, the military attachés were also available.

Prince Wan stated that in reply to press inquiries he had answered he did not believe that proceeding with the united front concept would in any way prejudice the Geneva Conference. The Secretary stated that he fully agreed and expressed appreciation for Prince Wan's having taken this stand. The Secretary stated that he would immediately telegraph Washington in regard to the undertaking of consultations there with Thai representatives.

In reply to Prince Wan's question as to whether France would keep on in Indochina, the Secretary pointed out that it is one thing to talk about quitting, but another thing actually to quit. If faced with responsibility, the present leaders in France who are urging withdrawal from Indochina would probably find that it is not easy to do so. If such persons came into power and found that the situation would in fact not permit a withdrawal, the people of France would probably be more inclined to accept the fact than they are at present. The Secretary stated that he was inclined to think that there would be no hasty French retreat from Indochina; however, if there was a change of government, it might well attempt to obtain a cease fire with no conditions, which he compared to entering into an agreement with a burglar in your house not to shoot.

In reply to Prince Wan's inquiries regarding the Indochinese phase of the Conference, the Secretary stated that no agreement had yet been reached on the composition of the Conference. He explained the French attitude toward participation of Ho Chi Minh; their attempt

to find some status for him other than a full participant in the Conference. However, the Soviets have refused a second-class membership for Ho. At the moment Bidault is trying to get in touch with Bao Dai. Bidault is also anxious to get agreement regarding evacuating the wounded from Dien Bien Phu. Molotov has told him that no such agreement can be reached until the question of composition of the Indochina phase of the Conference is decided.

---

396.1 GE/4-2854

*Memorandum for the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(Bowie)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[GENEVA.] April 28, 1954.

Subject: Consequences of the Fall of Dien Bien Phu

In response to your recent request CIA and State Department intelligence have prepared the following joint estimate of the consequences in France of the early fall of Dien Bien Phu.

1. We believe that the fall of Dien Bien Phu alone would not cause the collapse of the Laniel government or a radical change in French policy in Indochina so long as the Geneva conference offers some prospect of a settlement in Indochina. However, it would reduce the willingness of the Laniel government to continue the war. To the French public and parliamentary opinion this military defeat would represent the failure of the Navarre plan. It would strengthen the French belief that France cannot win in Indochina, and it would increase parliamentary pressure upon the French government to reach an Indochina settlement at Geneva. It would also reduce support for US policies in France, particularly if the Laniel government in its explanation of the military defeat should emphasize US refusal to provide air support for Dien Bien Phu and if the US stand at Geneva should appear intractable to the French.

2. The French people and government have concentrated their hopes upon Geneva for a settlement in Indochina. They have almost certainly abandoned hope that the threat of US involvement would force the cessation of hostilities or that a settlement might be obtained through US recognition of Communist China or Communist Chinese admission to the UN. The failure of these hopes and the fall of Dien Bien Phu might impel the Laniel government to press for US-UK approval of an Indochina settlement based upon a partition of Indochina or a cease-fire which would necessarily involve such a partition.

3. Following the fall of Dien Bien Phu, we believe that the French government would announce that it was sending additional forces from France to Indochina, but that this announcement would be designed primarily to impress the Communist states at Geneva with

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Joseph A. Yager and Chester L. Cooper, Research and Reference Officers to the U.S. Delegation.



French resolution. For the same purpose of strengthening the French hand in the Geneva negotiations, the French would continue to press the US for further support of the Indochina war, including commitment of US troops. On the other hand, we believe that the Laniel government fears the internationalization of the conflict in Indochina, because it would increase the risks of general war. However, if the Communists refused to negotiate an "honorable" settlement and demanded immediate French withdrawal from Indochina, we believe that the French government would probably accept, as a last resort, internationalization of the conflict in Indochina.

4. State and CIA feel strongly that the delegation has the best interpreters of the French political scene plus vastly greater detailed information. Hence, we express no opinion on a possible successor Prime Minister or the party line-up *if* the Laniel government falls. We see no reason to dispute Paris views that such a government would be neutralist and nationalist re European as well as Southeast Asian issues.

The above estimate was to have been discussed at today's meeting of the IAC. We have been promised further word if this discussion reveals any differing views on the part of the other intelligence agencies.

---

751G.00/4-2854 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, April 28, 1954—5:43 p. m.

Tedul 16. Following is R. Cutler's summary of principal points made by the President in his talk with Republican leaders, April 26, 1954.

"(1) The United States would not intervene with combat forces in the Indochina conflict, except as part of a grouping of interested nations formed to prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. The forming of such a grouping would provide a basis to ask Congress for the necessary authority to intervene.

"(2) The United States is doing everything to get concerted action in Southeast Asia. At first, it was thought that the U.K. would be likely to join in such concerted action, but more recent news indicates a negative position on Britain's part. Today the outlook seems pretty grim.

"(3) There does not now appear to be any great need for the United States to provide ground troops, for it should be possible adequately to train the large indigenous population for ground combat.

"(4) If there is to be intervention in Southeast Asia, such intervention should come before the French and indigenous troops are defeated. It will be a harder job to intervene later on. But it would be

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Kitchen of S/S. For another summary of this meeting, see extracts from James Hagerty's diary, Apr. 26, in volume XIII.

a 'tragic error for the United States to go in alone as a partner of France in this struggle.' The effort of the United States is to get up a regional grouping, of which it will act as a part. Our principal role would not be to use ground forces.

"(5) The United States holds to its determination to lead the free world into a unity which will make further inroads of communism impossible. As the complicated situation in Southeast Asia continues to evolve, the Executive will continue to consult with the Republican leaders of Congress. None of us should permit ourselves to be misled by day-to-day details. Nor should we try *now* to decide what will be the measure of our participation. We should keep an open mind, and decide on the basis of the facts existing at the time when decision has to be taken.

"(6) Should our allies prove unwilling to go along with us in a fair sharing of responsibility, we might have to take a fresh look at the whole situation. It does not make much sense, however, to talk about returning to a 'Fortress America' position. What has happened at Dienbienphu shows the result of trying to defend yourself in a position of isolation. The United States can never safely rest in such a posture."

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/4-2854 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva*<sup>1</sup>

[Extract]

SECRET      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, April 28, 1954—7:16 p. m.

Tosec 32. For Yager. NIE 63-54, Consequences Within Indochina of the Fall of Dien Bien Phu approved by IAC today,<sup>2</sup> has following conclusions: 1. The fall of Dien Bien Phu would have far reaching and adverse repercussions but it would not signal the immediate collapse of the French Union military and political situation in Indochina. As a consequence of the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the morale of French Union forces would receive a severe blow. A crucial factor however in the military situation thereafter would be the reliability of native units particularly the Vietnamese. There would almost certainly be increased desertions and the possibility cannot be excluded that the native components of French Union forces might disintegrate. However, we believe that such disintegration would be unlikely during the ensuing two or three months, and that for at least this period the major part of the native troops would probably remain loyal. 2. Assuming no such disintegration, the fall of Dien Bien Phu would not in itself substantially alter the relative military capabilities of

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Rothenburg and Lydman of OIR.

<sup>2</sup> For the full text of NIE 63-54, dated Apr. 30, 1954, see volume XIII.

French Union and Viet Minh forces in Indochina during the next two or three months. The French stand at Dien Bien Phu has produced certain compensatory military results. It has prevented the overrunning of Laos and has resulted in the inflicting of casualties upon the Viet Minh comparable in number to the total French force committed at Dien Bien Phu. The bulk of Viet Minh forces released by the fall of Dien Bien Phu would probably not be able to move, regroup, and re-equip in time to be employed in new major operations during the next two or three months although some lightly equipped infantry battalions might be made available more rapidly for operations in the Delta region. 3. Although the Viet Minh have a substantial capability to organize demonstrations and carry out sabotage and terrorist activities in the major cities of Indochina, we believe that French Union forces could maintain control in those cities. 4. The political consequences in Indochina of the fall of Dien Bien Phu would be considerably more adverse than the strictly military consequences and would increase the tempo of deterioration in the over-all French Union position in Indochina, particularly in Vietnam. There would probably be a serious decline in the Vietnamese will to continue the war and to support the Vietnamese military programs. However, we believe that general collapse of French and native governmental authority during the next two or three months would be prevented by the continued existence of organized French Union forces and the hope among Indochinese that the US might intervene in Indochina. 5. We believe that although the fall of Dien Bien Phu would not immediately lead to collapse of the French Union position in Indochina, it would accelerate the deterioration already evident in the French Union military and political position there. If this trend were not checked, it could bring about a collapse of the French Union position during the latter half of 1954. It should be emphasized that this estimate does not consider the repercussion of major decisions in France or Geneva and elsewhere, which could have a decisive effect on the situation in Indochina.

DRW preparing an IE on DBP repercussions in France. In general content this IE will estimate Laniel government not likely fall and if it should go out of office likely to be succeeded by Cabinet of similar orientation. You understand fourth paragraph joint OME-OIR view on this subject cabled Cooper is Agency view only and not ours. No firm date our estimate but should be available you first part next week.

396.1 GE/4-2854: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, April 28, 1954—11 p. m.

Dulte 20. Repeated information London 86, Paris 137, Saigon 8. London, Paris information Ambassador; Saigon information Chargé. For Acting Secretary from Secretary. Reference Dulte 16.<sup>1</sup> Bidault and Margerie gave following account of former's meeting with Molotov this morning:

Bidault began by saying that UK and US reaction to yesterday's discussion not unfavorable but that he had not had opportunity to consult Associated States. He then alluded to his appeal for truce for evacuation of wounded from Dien Bien Phu and expressed hope Viet Minh would show goodwill by granting it as French had done earlier on Viet Minh appeal. Molotov replied that he sympathized with wounded but that this matter could be discussed by Vietnamese and Viet Minh once both were at Geneva. Bidault said matter urgent and one for discussion between commanders in field rather than between diplomats at Geneva and he reiterated importance of Viet Minh showing goodwill. At this point, Molotov appeared to become angry and accused Bidault of attempting to introduce precondition to admission of Viet Minh Government as interested state which he considered incompatible with Berlin agreement. Bidault denied he was making precondition. Both parties reiterated their arguments at length, Molotov several times stressing importance of direct contact between Vietnamese and Viet Minh at Geneva. Bidault finally terminated acrimonious discussion with statement they were getting nowhere and he would consult further with his associates.

Molotov then hastily called press conference and gave his account of interview.

Bidault is furious. He had previously invited Molotov for dinner this evening but plans to refuse to discuss any matters of substance with him pending satisfaction on wounded and to tell Molotov there is no point in discussing business when latter immediately thereafter calls in press to receive his version.<sup>2</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Apr. 27, p. 591.

<sup>2</sup> Secretary Dulles reported to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 23, Apr. 29, that "am advised that at dinner last night Bidault and Molotov each reiterated positions given in referenced telegram [Dulte 20], that neither made any impression on other and that nothing else of substance was discussed. Atmosphere described as heavy and chilly." (396.1 GE/4-2954)

396.1 GE/4-2854 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, April 28, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 30. Repeated information Saigon 7, Paris 136. Bidault and French delegation concerned at Bao Dai's attitude and action in going off to Cannes at this point without delegating authority for decisions to any of his people in Paris, or sending any representative to Geneva. Jacquet, who was to have come here this afternoon, has been despatched to Cannes to talk with Bao Dai en route.

Margerie states French, in view of their agreement to discuss participation further with Vietnamese should Communists insist Viet Minh attend in same status, cannot now discuss participation further with Molotov without talking to Bao Dai. Jacquet is to inform him of developments and ask his views, adding that unless he has definite views to express either immediately in person, or almost immediately, through representatives in Paris, or Geneva, French will feel free to take such position on participation as they think best (i.e., Associated States and Viet Minh).

Margerie commented that Bao Dai was blithely confident that French would continue to defend his country with Americans paying for it and that if French stopped, he could look to America to take over this defense.

Bidault made suggestion Ambassador Heath talk with Bao Dai and we are endeavoring to arrange this.

DULLES

396.1 GE/4-3054 : Telegram

*Heath-Bao Dai Meeting, Cannes, April 29, 7:30 a.m.: The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, April 30, 1954—3 p. m.

Secto 47. Repeated information Paris 150, Saigon 15, London 96. Following is Ambassador Heath's report to the Secretary of his talks with Bao Dai yesterday at Cannes:

I went to Cannes yesterday on the same plane as Falaize, Bidault's Chef de Cabinet. Falaize had asked me to let him see Bao Dai before I did. However, Bao Dai sent for me shortly after my arrival at 7:30 a. m. and saw Falaize only later.

Bao Dai told me very promptly that he had independently arrived at the conclusion that it was necessary for the Vietnamese to take part in the conference and not interpose objections to Viet Minh being

present. He would send his Foreign Minister to head a delegation to Geneva. He was not afraid of encountering the Viet Minh in international conference and his delegation would know how to reply forcefully to Communist lies and impertinences. I had planned to take the noon plane back, but he asked me to stay over to see his Foreign Minister Dinh, arriving later that morning.

Unfortunately, Dinh rather complicated Bao Dai's outright acceptance of both Vietnam and Viet Minh participation by insisting there must be some precedence and differentiation in invitation to Vietnam. Accordingly he suggested procedure set forth in Secto 35, April 29,<sup>1</sup> to which Falaize readily agreed and said he would recommend by telephone to Bidault.

I thought it better not to discuss my trip on the telephone and that the Secretary's decision could await my return this morning. Bao Dai had refused to give assurances on Vietnam participation to Jacquet when the latter was there two days ago. Bao Dai was evidently awaiting word from American delegation and possibly from Bidault through Falaize, before finally making up his mind.

Bao Dai explained the declaration he made last week,<sup>2</sup> to the consternation of French official opinion, as motivated by the refusal of French President to call a meeting of High Council of French Union. Bao Dai said that under previous agreements any Associated State had the undoubted right to call a High Council meeting. Bao Dai, without criticizing Navarre, said he understood latter's recall was imminent and if it occurred, he planned to recommend General Cogny be appointed to High Command. I observed that Cogny had already spent three and one half trying years in French expeditionary force. Bao Dai had talked with Cogny a few weeks ago and Cogny had said only time he had suffered from over-fatigue was the year he had spent as head of LeLattre's military household. Bao Dai thought it would be a mistake to send General Guillaume since it would take latter months to learn how to wage war in Indochina. It would be the Navarre experience repeated over again. He praised Cogny's military ability, tact and loyalty.

In Paris I recall Admiral Radford suggesting to me that Cogny would be a good successor to Navarre.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> *Post*, p. 608.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Apr. 25 statement by the Bao Dai cabinet. See footnote 1, p. 584.

---

*Editorial Note*

At his news conference on April 29, 9:30 a. m., the President received numerous questions on the subject of Indochina. In his replies

he stated that the United States would not become involved in the war "except through the constitutional process which, of course, involved a declaration of war by Congress." He indicated that United States involvement in Indochina had been conducted within the limits of the Mutual Assistance Pact by providing technical assistance, funds, and equipment. The President said in response to whether it would be desirable to have a *modus vivendi* in Indochina that it "wouldn't be acceptable, I should think, to see the whole anticommunist defense of that area crumble and disappear." The President indicated on the other hand that the United States "certainly cannot hope at the present state of our relations in the world for a completely satisfactory answer with the Communists," and that "the most you can work out is a practical way of getting along." With reference to reports that the French had asked the United States for air intervention and whether the request had been refused at British urging, the President commented that "no British advice or counsel whatsoever has entered in any conversations between the British and ourselves as to what we should do in any specific instance, of the kind of help we should give to France." He refused to answer whether or not the French Government had asked the United States Government for air assistance and whether the United States had turned down such a request. The President said he had no objection to answering that question at an appropriate time, but that "right now we have got a conference going on in Geneva" and that the United States was trying to get a solution there. He said "I think it is a good time not to say too much about it."

For the record of the news conference of April 29, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, pages 427-438.

---

751G.00/4-2954 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, April 29, 1954—10 a. m.

Dulte 21. Eyes only Acting Secretary for President from Secretary. Developments have been so rapid and almost every hour so filled with high-level talks that evaluation has been difficult. My present estimates follow:

(1) Indochina: Delay in fall of Dien Bien Phu has resulted in some French discounting of this development. Nevertheless, it must

---

<sup>1</sup> Internal evidence indicates that this telegram was drafted on Apr. 28, but not dispatched to Washington until Apr. 29.

be assumed the French will not continue in any long-range operation unless it will definitely relieve the strain on French manpower in Indochina. Present French Government holding on because their Parliament in recess and probably no one eager to take over at this juncture. Bidault given considerable discretion because present Cabinet cannot make up its mind on any course. Therefore, we do not have anyone on French side with whom we can make any dependable agreements. After deputies return and Dien Bien Phu falls, there may well be a change of government, probably to the left, committed to liquidate Indochina. However, this is more easily said than done and it is possible that as this fact develops a French Government might be prepared to sit down with us seriously and consider some joint program which is something that so far they have evaded.

I do not know whether from military standpoint it would be deemed feasible to end the scattering and exposure of military forces for local political reasons and withdraw present forces to defensible enclaves in deltas where they would have US sea and air protection meanwhile retain enough territory and enough prestige to develop really effective indigenous army along lines suggested by O'Daniel.<sup>2</sup> This might, I suppose, take two years and would require in large part taking over training responsibility by US. Also full independence and increased economic aid would probably be required to help maintain friendly governments in areas chosen for recruitment.

I do not have any idea as to whether this is militarily feasible and Admiral Davis inclines to view that it is not. However, from political standpoint this type of program appears to offer best hope of France staying in war. If France and US agree on such a plan, there would be fair chance of Australia and New Zealand coming along. However, this estimate can be improved in next day or two after I have conferred further with Foreign Minister Casey and Prime Minister Webb. It is unlikely that the UK would initially participate and would probably use its influence to prevent participation by Australia and New Zealand. The UK situation would be difficult internally and externally, and there would probably be undesirable repercussions upon other NATO partners. Thailand could be expected to cooperate if we act promptly. Foreign Minister Wan gave further assurance today and urges quick military conversations.<sup>3</sup>

The attitude here of Molotov and Chou En-lai's statement yester-

---

<sup>2</sup> General O'Daniel's report is contained in telegram 3818 to Paris, Apr. 23, not printed. (751G.00/4-2357) For a commentary on the report, see the memorandum, p. 571.

<sup>3</sup> For a memorandum of conversation between the Secretary and Wan, Apr. 28, see p. 596.



day<sup>4</sup> lead me to rate more highly than heretofore the probability that any open US intervention would be answered by open Chinese intervention with consequence of general war in Asia.

(2) UK attitude is one of increasing weakness. British seem to feel that we are disposed to accept present risks of a Chinese war and this, coupled also with their fear that we would start using atomic weapons, has badly frightened them. I have just received a note from Eden referring to my paper read before NATO restricted council where Eden again urges necessity of consultation before any use. He says, "You know our strongly-held views on the need for consultation before any decision is taken."<sup>5</sup>

(3) General: The decline of France, the great weakness of Italy, and the considerable weakness in England create a situation where I think that if we ourselves are clear as to what should be done, we must be prepared to take the leadership in what we think is the right course, having regard to long-range US interest which includes importance of Allies. I believe that our Allies will be inclined to follow, if not immediately, then ultimately, strong and sound leadership. In saying this, I do not underestimate the immense difficulty of our finding the right course in this troubled situation. Nor do I mean to imply that I think that this is the moment for a bold or war-like course. I lack here the US political and NSC judgments needed for overall evaluation.

DULLES

---

<sup>4</sup> A reference to Chou En-lai's speech made in the Third Plenary Session of the Geneva Conference (Korean phase), Apr. 28; for a summary, see p. 153. For a speech made by Molotov in the Fourth Plenary Session of the Korean phase, Apr. 29, see p. 157.

<sup>5</sup> Eden's concern for consultation was in reference to the use of nuclear weapons. Eden's note to the Secretary was transmitted to the Department in telegram Dulite 24, Apr. 29, not printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 264) For documentation on the use of atomic weapons and nuclear energy, see volume II.

---

396.1 GE/4-2954 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, April 29, 1954—11 a. m.

Secto 32. Sent Saigon 10, repeated information Paris 139, London 88, Bangkok 2, Manila 5. Saigon's 7, repeated Paris 706, London 42, Bangkok 153, Manila 212, Department 2110.<sup>1</sup> USDel believes most important immediate measures to counteract political and military consequences of fall of Dien-Bien-Phu will be those taken by French

---

<sup>1</sup> For the text of telegram 7 from Saigon to Geneva, Apr. 25, which contained an outline of the immediate political consequences of the fall of Dien Bien Phu and possible remedies, see volume XIII.

and Vietnamese political and military authorities. USDel notes evidences of French determination to send reinforcements to Indochina and to expand airfield, et cetera. US is cooperating fully with these measures. USDel would hope that in addition present crisis would result in vigorous, effective words and deeds by Vietnamese Government on both political and military planes. USDel also believes that statements and actions by political parties and other groups giving impression of growing national unity and determination would be most helpful and would have excellent stimulating effect on developing free world concern for independence and integrity of Vietnam and belief that indispensable Vietnamese capacity and will exist and growing in face temporarily adverse circumstances.<sup>2</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>2</sup> For a report from McClintock in Saigon on the internal political situation in Vietnam, see telegram 2188 from Saigon, May 3, in volume XIII.

---

396.1 GE/4-2954 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, April 29, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 34. Repeated information Paris 141, Moscow 24. In conversation between US adviser and Laloy (French delegate) latter said it seemed clear to him that all tactics of the Soviet Union here were directed toward one principal objective, the disruption of the Franco-US alliance. It was for this reason that the Soviets have minimized procedural difficulties since they want to see this conference get under way and to make use of it for the aforementioned purpose. It was therefore essential, Laloy said, that the French and Americans find a common ground and stick to it. Laloy was asked if he meant by common ground some kind of position on an Indochinese settlement, and he replied "no, I meant a common determination by the US and French to prevent the taking over of Indochina by Ho Chi Minh."

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/4-2954 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, April 29, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 35. Repeated information [London?] 90, Saigon 11. Re Secto 30.<sup>1</sup> Bidault also sent his Chef de Cabinet, Falaize, to Cannes to see

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Apr. 28, p. 608.

Bao Dai this morning and has just received telephone message from Falaize along following lines:

Bao Dai agrees that Vietnam will be represented even if Viet Minh also present subject to following "scenario":

1. Bidault, Eden and Secretary would write him asking what reply he would make to an invitation which would be extended both to him and to Viet Minh to be represented.

2. Bao Dai would send a Minister to Geneva instructed to accept.

3. The invitations would then be sent simultaneously to the two parties.

Falaize stated that he would return to Geneva tonight with additional information he could not telephone. Bidault states Eden is agreeable to writing such letter and Secretary sees no objection.<sup>2</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> The letter to Bao Dai was signed by Eden, Bidault, and Dulles on Apr. 29 and delivered to Bao Dai in Cannes the next day. See the memorandum by Achilles, Apr. 30, p. 620.

---

751G.00/4-2954 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State*

SECRET

SAIGON, April 29, 1954—2 p. m.

2149. Repeated information Paris 723, Geneva 20, London 43. There is mounting concern in Vietnam over rumors that great Western Powers at Geneva will assent to, if not actually propose, partition of this country as acceptable settlement of conflict in Indochina.

DeJean this morning sought to portray partition idea as "made in United Kingdom" and strongly deprecated entire concept (Geneva's telegram Secto 16<sup>1</sup>). We know, of course, from Paris telegrams that certain politicians in France have likewise talked of partition.

As indicated in Embassy telegram 2087 repeated Paris 694, London 37,<sup>2</sup> such a course would mean loss of everything we are trying to maintain in Southeast Asia.

It would be most helpful in allaying current anxieties if some statement, possibly from the Secretary, could be made promptly indicating that we oppose partition of Vietnam.

McCLINTOCK

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated Apr. 27, p. 590.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (751G.00/4-2254)

790.00/4-2954 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Ceylon (Crowe) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

COLOMBO, April 29, 1954—4 p. m.

339. Repeated information Geneva priority 1. For Secretary of State. Prime Minister Ceylon <sup>1</sup> as token of personal esteem has shown me copies of official transcript yesterday's sessions South Asian Colombo conference. He told me these not shown anyone else and I therefore request greatest secrecy use and source information. Summary is as follows:

Conference <sup>2</sup> agreed discuss Indochina and hydrogen bomb as first two topics.

Nehru explained his six point proposal re Indochina <sup>3</sup> as follows:

(1) "Climate of peace". Cease-fire necessary sooner or later and the sooner the better. Military situation Indochina has now worsened but there also indications that belligerents had begun giving serious thought cessation fighting.

(2) Cease-fire. Obvious first step was cease-fire. Burma, Indonesia, Canada, and even France, as well as several other nations had agreed to this. Cease-fire should have priority Geneva agenda.

(3) Independence. France and US have agreed complete transfer of sovereignty in Indochina.

(4) Negotiations. Nehru then quoted stating he did not say to whom and in what form sovereignty should be transferred. This matter of agreement between parties concerned. He did not say French should withdraw their forces immediately and leave vacuum in Indochina. These matters to be discussed by principal parties to conflict which was substance his fourth point. He did not say settlement of issue should be completely divorced from Geneva Conference but visualized machinery for direct negotiation between French and Indochina might proceed, as it were, through Geneva Conference as "sort of subcommittee of Geneva Conference."

(5) Non-intervention. He called for non-intervention in Indochina in any form by the great powers, UK, US, USSR and China. There was no doubt that both US and China were intervening in Indochina and they have in effect not denied this. He felt that if problem could be localized by reducing all possibilities of intervention of outside powers the onus of finding a settlement could be thrown on the parties in conflict themselves.

(6) UN. He explained it was intended to bring UN into picture as there might be need for broad supervision by UN of implementation of any settlement.

<sup>1</sup> Sir John Kotelawala.

<sup>2</sup> The Colombo Conference. The meeting of Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, took place in Colombo, Ceylon Apr. 28-May 2. For the text of the final communiqué, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1954* (issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 166-169.

<sup>3</sup> Made on Apr. 25 in New Delhi.

Prime Minister Burma <sup>4</sup> stated afraid of vacuum being created in Indochina. He recommended there must be careful approach so that neither side could derive any advantage from it. He thought that conference should be quite explicit on this point and that whatever agreement was reached there should also be statement elaborating desire Asian countries to avoid giving an advantage to one side or the other.

Prime Minister Indonesia <sup>5</sup> agreed with Nehru's approach but wished get two points clear.

(1) He saw situation Indochina as being directly related to power politics of great powers and Geneva Conference was bound become forum of power politics. Recent increase in violence of fighting in Indochina was proof of power politics where each side was striving build up position of strength in Geneva through Indochina. China actively supported Ho Chi Minh. China known to be pressing demand for admission to UN. He therefore thought acceptance cease-fire by Viet Minh would be more likely if some indication given that China's demand would soon be satisfied. Conference therefore should consider cease-fire in relation admission China to UN.

(2) He was concerned over question of sovereignty and wished to know to whom independence would be given, either to Ho Chi Minh or Associated States. What guarantee would there be for independence? Ho Chi Minh has been branded as Communist but to his followers he is national leader.

Rest of session devoted discuss these points. Mohammed Ali <sup>6</sup> argued strongly that cease-fire in itself not sufficient, that if there was a choice between colonialism and communism former was less dangerous since it could be persuaded by pressure at world opinion to foster nationalism and would eventually lead to independence, that on other hand Communist occupation was a means to an end and brought danger to world peace closer to home, that conference should do nothing to prejudice or anticipate results of Geneva Conference, that he was against any "accusation of intervention", that he would accept first three points Nehru's plan, i.e., climate of peace, cease-fire, and independence but not points four and five re conference calling for direct negotiations between forces in Indochina and non-intervention agreement. Indonesian Prime Minister insisted on his view of linking admission Communist China to UN with cease-fire but Nehru, Mohammed Ali and Kotelawala opposed. (Nehru added that China's admission UN would however go long way toward relieving existing tensions.)

---

<sup>4</sup> U Nu.

<sup>5</sup> Ali Sastroamidjojo.

<sup>6</sup> Prime Minister of Pakistan.

There was unanimous approval of Prime Ministers on Nehru's first two points and it also was agreed that conference should not embarrass Geneva Conference.

Discussions continue on topics today.

CROWE

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627. CF 288

*Memorandum of Conversation*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

[GENEVA,] April 29, 1954.

Participants: Carlos P. Garcia, Vice President of the Philippines  
and Head of the Philippine Delegation  
Congressman Cuenco, Member of the Philippine Delegation  
The Secretary of State  
Philip W. Bonsal

Subject: Participation in the Indochina Phase of the Geneva Conference

Vice President Garcia called to ascertain the situation regarding participation in the Indochina phase of the conference and to state the Philippine point of view.

The Secretary described the recent exchanges of views on this subject between Bidault and Molotov<sup>2</sup> and indicated that at present the French are consulting with Bao Dai regarding the Soviet insistence that the Viet Minh participate as well as the Associated States.<sup>3</sup> He referred to the Soviet attempt at blackmail in the matter of the wounded at Dien Bien Phu.<sup>4</sup>

The Secretary stated that our position on further participation was not yet firm. He described various possible solutions of the problem. He indicated that we were fully aware of the Philippine interest in and claim to participation and said that we would of course be very glad to have the Philippines present. He added, however, that in order to get the conference under way without delay agreement might be reached on a limited participation formula (for example the four Berlin powers, Communist China and the four belligerents in Indochina) with a later expansion to be envisaged. A limited conference

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafting officer not indicated; presumably it was Bonsal.

<sup>2</sup> For summaries of these exchanges, see telegrams Secto 11, Apr. 26, Dulte 15, Apr. 27, and Dulte 16, Apr. 27, pp. 574, 579, and 591, respectively.

<sup>3</sup> See telegram Secto 35, Apr. 29, p. 608, and telegram 4137 from Paris, Apr. 29, *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> This exchange between Molotov and Bidault is reported in Dulte 20, Apr. 28, p. 602.

might deal with military aspects while the broader political aspects would be considered by an enlarged group. The Secretary described the problem involved in enlarging the group in view of the fact that not only the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand who would be welcomed by us, but the claims of Thailand and of Burma together with India, Indonesia and possibly Pakistan would have to be considered.

Mr. Garcia thanked the Secretary for his statement of the situation. He then said that the Philippine position would be one of accepting the absence of the Philippines from the Indochina phase if that phase were to be limited only to the four inviting powers, Communist China and the four belligerents in Indochina, but that the Philippines believed that if any other states were invited then the Philippines should be included.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> In a conversation on Apr. 29 between Bonsal and Felino Neri, former Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Quirino government and a member of the Philippine Delegation, held prior to the conversation between the Secretary and Garcia, Bonsal reminded Neri that the United States and the Philippines had been in agreement as to the desirability of keeping neutrals out of the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference and that so far as Bonsal was aware the same reasoning would apply in the case of the Indochina phase. Neri agreed but said that it was very important from the point of view of Philippine internal politics that, if states other than the Berlin Four, Communist China, and the belligerents were included, the Philippines also be asked to participate. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 286)

---

751G.00/4-2954 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Paris (Dillon) to the Department of State*

SECRET

PARIS, April 29, 1954—5 p. m.

4137. Repeated information Geneva 152, Saigon 484. Jacquet who returned last night from seeing Bao Dai in Cannes expects proceed Geneva later in day report results to Bidault.

They are that Bao Dai received argument that Viet Minh be present at Geneva with less objection than had been feared. Although His Majesty dwelt at length on disadvantages from standpoint Vietnam public opinion and insisted on need consult ministers before making final decision, Jacquet convinced he will come around in day or two after oriental sensibilities have been assailed. He believed Ambassador Heath's visit today should help accelerate process.

Jacquet's argument was that failure agree present plan for participation nine countries in Indochina phase Geneva might result in inclusion India, Indonesia and other undesirables. Bao Dai was impressed. Opinion of Vietnam ministers now in Cannes, including Dinh, Vinh

and Dac Khe, will influence ultimate decision but not likely in Jacquet's opinion divert Bao Dai from agreeing in due course.

Jacquet delighted final signing Franco-Vietnamese declaration<sup>1</sup> and took obvious pleasure reporting that in light present serious adversities facing both partners and in part because of theme relations between French and Vietnam Governments, at least as presented by officials both countries in France and Geneva, are unusually cordial.

DILLON

---

<sup>1</sup> France and the State of Vietnam issued a declaration on Apr. 28 undertaking to conclude two treaties, one affirming Vietnamese independence, the other defining relations between the two countries. The texts of the treaties were initialed in Paris on June 4 but were never ratified.

---

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Indochina"

*Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(Bonsal) to the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(Robertson)*

TOP SECRET

[GENEVA,] April 29, 1954.

Subject: Current Indochina Situation

Here are my views on the Indochina situation.

1) The Franco-Vietnamese military effort (which we have supported) and the Franco-Vietnamese political effort to create a stable Vietnamese Government with effective popular support are bankrupt or nearly.

2) A further application of force from the outside against the purely Vietnamese Viet Minh army, supported as it is with Communist Chinese material aid, would not produce political results with which we could live, i.e., a victory through the application of overwhelming outside force would not bring about a satisfactory Western-oriented government in control of Indochina enjoying the consideration of other Asian nations and able to maintain itself in power without an almost indefinite commitment to the area of outside force.

3) Nevertheless, our best card at Geneva is uncertainty as to whether we and other likeminded countries will in fact take measures to intervene effectively with armed force in Indochina should no acceptable solution be found at Geneva. It is essential that that uncertainty be kept alive just as long as possible.

4) Using that uncertainty as a major asset, we must support a solution at Geneva which would involve as its major features the following:



a) A cease fire in Cambodia and Laos and withdrawal of outside forces (except possibly as provided in Franco-Laotian military treaties) and the installation in these countries of peace observation machinery, perhaps under UN auspices, to see that their territorial integrity and internal security are respected.

b) A cease fire in Viet Nam, as nearly as possible along the line of the Laniel proposals. Since these do not reflect the relative military position of the two parties we may have to be flexible here. The question of controls is of course vital. We should be able rapidly to develop our thinking on this point when we receive the plans and views of the French Government which have been promised us on an urgent basis.

c) Provision for a rapid disarmament under international control of the armed forces of both sides in Viet Nam to a point where they will be within the means of Viet Nam to maintain.

d) A phased reduction of foreign forces in Viet Nam over a stated period of time (perhaps three to four years) with their eventual status to be determined in agreement with the definitive government of the country.

e) A period of transition for the restoration of political normality. During this transition period there would be in fact a political division of the country corresponding very roughly to the present military division.

f) A reconstruction program for Viet Nam to be conducted both directly by France, the US and the UK and perhaps also through the UN.

g) An announced date for the holding of national elections to form a definitive government for all Viet Nam. We might propose July 1, 1957.

The purpose of this program is to see whether we can not, under the threat of further armed intervention, create conditions under which our side could continue the struggle against Communism under relatively peaceful conditions with some chances of success.

---

751G.5/4-2954 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, April 29, 1954—7: 01 p. m.

Tedul 20. Eyes only Secretary.<sup>2</sup> Following brief of discussion this morning<sup>3</sup> will be helpful until I give you a fuller account personally:

Meeting terminated with briefing by me on developments at Geneva during which I read extracts from your most recent and informative

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Acting Secretary of State.

<sup>2</sup> Accompanying message from the Department of State contained an instruction that telegram Tedul 20 "should be handed only to the Secretary, Mr. Merchant or Mr. MacArthur and to no other persons on direction of the Acting Secretary."

<sup>3</sup> The 194th meeting of the National Security Council, Apr. 29, 1954, 10: 00 a. m. For extracts from the memorandum of discussion at the 194th meeting of the National Security Council, see volume XIII.

telegrams, which President had already seen. Radford then gave estimate of military situation and read full text of report made when he returned from London. As you are aware, he felt very depressed after his conversation with Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff.<sup>4</sup> I think he does not quite realize that the British position is not always quite as rigid as such conversations might indicate. His report precipitated a series of recommendations, most drastic of which was that we must proceed alone to retrieve the situation in Indochina in event of a French collapse. The President reiterated his previous opinion with regard to impossibility of direct intervention in the absence of a common declaration of intent joined in by most exposed and interested nations. He feels sure that neither Congressional nor public opinion would accept a last minute partnership with the French in the absence of this other association. After various conflicting views had been expressed, some of them quite vehemently, I attempted to summarize by stating substantially the following:

(1) We have underwritten the Navarre Plan on the advice of our military experts, who considered it a sound plan and one which would produce a position of strength if it were energetically and effectively implemented.

(2) It is acknowledged by the military authorities that the loss of Dien Bien Phu, from a purely military standpoint, was not by any means a mortal blow to the Navarre Plan.

(3) The French have asked for United States air intervention, not in the hope of saving Dien Bien Phu, but to raise French military and political morale in order to continue resistance in Indochina. This assurance is worth little if there should be a change in the French Government or if a further deterioration in the military situation should produce a collapse.

(4) It was impossible for me to assess whether the type of intervention requested by the French would have any real effect. However, if the United States is to take any action in the present situation it can only be in concert with other nations and if we seek a different association of nations from that originally contemplated it should be done in such a way as not unduly to offend British or Dominion opinion and should leave the door open for subsequent association by the ANZUS nations, or even by Britain, if future developments make this possible.

(5) No decision should be taken until you return from Geneva, when you will be able to give a clearer picture of the position of our allies and of the Russians and Chinese.

(6) In the intervening time it is possible only to do the following:

(a) Inform our ANZUS colleagues, possibly during an informal briefing, that we continue to be deeply concerned about the situation in Southeast Asia, that we do not share the more optimistic views of the British Chiefs of Staff, and that we are reviewing the situation. It could be hinted that we may, without

---

<sup>4</sup> For documentation on Admiral Radford's discussions, see volume XIII.

embarrassment to them, consider some other consortium of nations for the declaration of intent which we had previously proposed.

(b) Through military channels continue to urge the French to hold out, extending by implication the possibility that some formula may be found which would permit additional aid of some sort.

Just after writing this Makins came in for a private talk. His purpose was to ask what the situation was with regard to the suggested Churchill visit. We of course discussed the Asiatic situation. He stated in confidence, but quite frankly, that the British position had been taken as a result of careful consideration, and he surprised me by telling me that when consulted more than a week ago he had reported to London his estimate that when confronted with the British position the United States probably would, after some consideration, decide "to go it alone". By "going it alone" he meant act without the UK. He also gave his opinion that the British position was not as rigid as the statements of the British Chiefs of Staff and of Mr. Churchill had seemed to indicate. He was obviously very much surprised by Casey's speech reference North Korea.

Radford has just sent me the following paragraphs, which he asked be transmitted to you, as representative of JCS opinion :

"The proposal to withdraw French Union forces into delta enclaves to take up defensive positions while regrouping and being augmented by Viet Namese forces, which would be recruited and trained within the enclaves is certainly not desirable from the military standpoint. If pursuant to a negotiation with the Communists, it would probably involve a violation of any cease-fire or armistice terms that would be accepted by the Viet Minh. If undertaken as a military movement under existing conditions or as they can be envisaged following the fall of Dien Bien Phu, it would be extremely difficult to accomplish; would involve abandonment of large areas of all of the Associated States to Viet Minh exploitation; and would commit us to a defensive concept at a time when an offensive spirit would be most important to enhance the morale and support of the native populations.

"Finally the recruitment of a native army of sufficient size might be difficult or impossible if populations within enclaves were only source."

SMITH

396.1 GE/4-2954 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, April 29, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 38. Repeated information Paris 143, Moscow 25, Saigon 12. Department pass USUN. French have advised us that member of

their UN delegation was night before last invited privately to dine by Chechyotkin of Soviet delegation, who spoke along following lines:

Time had come to stop fighting in Indochina. This could be arranged within 48 hours. Soviet Russia could not appropriately propose it but French could, and would have support of British, if they would do it "free from American influence". Important thing was strictly military cease-fire. Political arrangements should be made later but "eventual settlement should be political rather than territorial".

Margerie commented that Soviet and Communist press in recent days had been savagely attacking Associated States and particularly Bao Dai Government (Molotov this afternoon referred to Associated States as "puppets"). Margerie believed Chechyotkin's approach fitted into picture and that Communist campaign here, once Viet Minh had arrived, would be to attempt to discredit Associated States in eyes of Indochina and world public opinion, and to advocate formation of new provisional government on coalition basis to be followed by elections. This would conform to pattern of North Korean proposal on Korea and would obviously fit Communist strategy for Indochina.

Margerie said French were still studying necessary military and political safeguards for any armistice. Problems would not be too difficult in south where, except for Viet Minh pockets, population was relatively loyal. It would be far more difficult in north where Viet Minh were all over the place.

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/4-2954

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(Merchant) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[GENEVA,] April 29, 1954.

This is an effort to take stock after three hectic weeks. The salient facts which to me emerge are:

1. The weakness of France, which is greater than we suspected even two weeks ago. For practical purposes she is without a government and is likely to remain in that position for several weeks and possibly much longer.

2. EDC hangs in perilous balance, but in Spaak we have a new and fresh ally who may give it enough lift to get even France to ratify. At best, this will be late June.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Handwritten notation on source text indicates that the Secretary of State saw this memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on the proposed European Defense Community, see volume v.

3. The Saar business is stuck, but Adenauer remains restrained and cooperative. We should make our joint approach with the British shortly to both the French and the Germans.<sup>3</sup>

4. The British are weaker than we thought, and they are more scared of the H-bomb. We frightened them badly and this multiplied their timidity.

5. Formation of your projected *ad hoc* coalition for united action in Southeast Asia is out the window, until this conference ends, thanks largely to the British repudiation of their agreement of April 13.<sup>4</sup>

6. Molotov's attitude in his talk with you<sup>5</sup> and his last talk with Bidault,<sup>6</sup> the Soviet reply to our March 19 note,<sup>7</sup> the apparent cohesion of the Chinese and the Russians, and lastly the arrogance of Chou En-lai's statement to the conference April 28,<sup>8</sup> all combine in my judgment to force a substantial upward revision in our past estimate of the risk of Chinese intervention if we intervene in Indochina, and also of the possibility of ultimate Soviet intervention.

7. All of the principals on the Western side are harassed and terribly tired.

8. The Communists must be terribly confused as to what our intentions actually are.

9. Our alliances have been put under greater and more sudden strain in the last few weeks than at any time since the war ended. In consequence, great effort is required to repair the situation.

From the above items, and a number of inarticulated premises, I draw the following conclusions and recommendations.

1. With respect to Indochina, I think it clear that we should not consider intervening with any of our military forces unless we have a plan which is militarily feasible, welcomed by the indigenous governments, and acceptable to the French. Assuming these conditions are met, it would thereafter, in my judgment, be necessary before acting, to have a firm commitment for its execution by a French government with a longer life expectancy than Laniel-Bidault.<sup>9</sup>

British participation, and preferably participation by other countries in the immediate area, and finally sufficiently broad bipartisan support in Congress to give assurances that we could in fact stay with what would be by its nature a long term operation, would also be necessary before we should consider taking military action. My own judgment is that these essential pre-conditions cannot be fulfilled and that

<sup>3</sup> For documentation with respect to discussions on the Saar, see volumes v and vii.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the Eden-Dulles discussions in London on Apr. 12-13 and the Apr. 13 communiqué. See the extract of telegram 4523 from London, Apr. 13, p. 514.

<sup>5</sup> For report of this meeting, see telegram Dulte 15, Apr. 27, p. 579.

<sup>6</sup> For a report of this meeting, see telegram Dulte 20, Apr. 28, p. 602.

<sup>7</sup> The Mar. 19 note from the United States to the Soviet Union pertained to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. For documentation on this subject, see volume ii.

<sup>8</sup> For Chou En-lai's statement made during the Third Plenary Session on Korea at the Geneva Conference, see telegram Secto 23, Apr. 28, p. 153.

<sup>9</sup> Handwritten notation in margin of source text: "I doubt it is realistic to expect such a govt ever to occur!"

in consequence the odds are overwhelmingly in favor of the loss of Indochina to the Communists.

2. Regardless of whether or not Indochina is lost, we should start constructing a coalition committed to hold and fight for a line preserving as much of the rest of Southeast Asia as we can recruit allies. I think the British will fight for Malaya, and I think we can get Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines in. We can probably get Thailand, and I think we should exert all possible pressure (presumably through the British) on Burma to come in. If we can't get Burma in, I think we should seriously consider an effort to persuade India to guarantee the political independence and territorial integrity of Burma and the three Associated States. We would have no link with such a guarantee, since our fighting line would be to the south.

3. Apart from extreme quiet and unobtrusive action on the steps suggested in (2) above, I think we should lie back and let the situation develop, maintaining an appearance of calm confidence and composure. I also think that you should get at least three days on Duck Island.

4. It goes without saying that we should disassociate ourselves from any part in any surrender at Geneva by the French of Indochina. If this happens, there will be strong pressure at home to abandon France and possibly Europe. We must resist this of course.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 288

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(Achilles)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[GENEVA,] April 30, 1954.

The attached letter <sup>1</sup> was signed by the Secretary, Eden and Bidault last night and taken to Cannes this morning by air by Mr. Saint Leux of the French Delegation, with instructions to give it to Bao Dai only in exchange for the latter's written agreement to accept.<sup>2</sup> The letter as signed had been rewritten at the Secretary's request to eliminate a reference in the earlier draft to an invitation to Bao Dai being issued by the "Four Powers" since the subsequent reference to "a similar invitation" being issued to the Vietminh authorities might commit us

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. Informal translation of the letter to Bao Dai read:

"In order to consult with the Government of Vietnam on the subject of invitations to be given for the conference on Indochina, we ask you to make the following arrangements.

"In view of the urgency to this question we suggest that you send to Geneva a representative of your government furnished with your instructions.

"We ask Your Majesty to accept assurance of our highest considerations."  
(Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 288)

<sup>2</sup> The U.S. Delegation informed the Department of State in telegram Secto 44, Apr. 30, not printed, that the letter had been signed and that it had been delivered to Bao Dai. (396.1 GE/4-3054)

to participate in an invitation to them. It was made clear to the French that we expected any invitation to the Vietminh to be extended by the Russians and that we would not participate in issuing it.

THEODORE C. ACHILLES

396.1 GE/4-3054 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, April 30, 1954—11 a. m.

Secto 45. Repeated information Moscow 28. Reference joint State-USIA message Tosec 31 of April 28.<sup>1</sup> To date there has been no development in Geneva of which this delegation is aware which would tend to indicate anything but complete Communist bloc unity. Chou, Nam and Molotov speeches all emphasize this factor. Today there was atmosphere of particular cordiality and almost triumphant unity among Communist delegates in lounges after Molotov's speech. While this delegation has no information on mechanics joint Sino-Soviet policy determination at Geneva, there has been nothing to date indicating any differences of opinion between Soviet Union and Communist China. Both delegations endeavoring create impression that Communist China is great power which will insist on making up her own mind on policy. It is in this context that Hsiung Hsiang-hui's [*Huang Hua's*] remark (reference telegram) should be interpreted.

Delegation feels utmost caution should be taken in any statements attributed to official US source to avoid implication there are major Sino-Soviet differences at Geneva. Allegations of Chinese independence of policy can only contribute to Asian wishful thinking that Communist China is somehow more Asian than Communist and can therefore be dealt with in more reasonable way than Soviet Union. Rather particularly in Asia we must encourage more realistic view that governments of Communist China and Soviet Union have important political and strategic reasons for working out joint policy within framework sort of senior-junior-partnership.

DULLES

<sup>1</sup> Telegram Tosec 31, Apr. 28, to Geneva, contained the following United Press report datelined Geneva, Apr. 27: "Communist Chinese delegates to far eastern conference said today they are running their own show here—they are not tied to Moscow's apron strings. Hsiung Hsiang-hui [*Huang Hua*], who has acted as spokesman for Red Chinese, was asked whether the Red Chinese delegation was consulting or would have to consult with Russia on a cease-fire in Indochina. Hsiung looked hurt. 'We do not have to consult with Soviet government on matters of policy' he said." (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 248)

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Indochina"

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, April 30, 1954—12:15 p. m.

PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH MR. EDEN

I said to Mr. Eden that I was greatly disturbed over the present position and its bearing upon the cooperation of our two countries. We had, I thought, agreed to sit down with other directly interested countries to try to work out a common defense for the southeast Asia area, but now the British were unwilling to go ahead with the agreement which Mr. Eden and I had reached at London.<sup>2</sup> On top of that was the fact that in the face of the vicious attacks by Molotov, Chou En-lai and Nam Il on the United States for what it had done in Korea,<sup>3</sup> there was not a single Western European power which was prepared to get up and say a word in defence of the UN or United States position. The only speakers on the non-Communist side had been South Korea, Colombia, the United States and Australia, and no one else was inscribed to speak.

I said it was particularly galling to the United States to have to accept this attack on it as being an "imperialist" power. I said that the United States was eager to beat the Communists at their own game and to sponsor nationalism in the independent colonial areas, which was in accordance with our historic tradition, but that we were restrained from doing so by a desire to cooperate with Britain and France in Asia, in North Africa and in the Near and Middle East. This, however, did not seem to be paying any dividends because when the chips were down there was no cohesion between us. Here at Geneva we were presenting a pathetic spectacle of drifting without any agreed policy or purpose. The United States had presented a program which, after it had been apparently accepted, had been repudiated and there was no alternative offered.

I said as far as the Korean problem was concerned, we were being forced by our western allies to abandon our original position of backing the UN resolutions so that western leaders could show how generous they were at south Korea's expense. I thought, however, that it was rather pathetic that we had to make our concessions to our

---

<sup>1</sup> Memorandum of conversation transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulles 33, Apr. 30, 1954. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 264).

<sup>2</sup> Apr. 13. For a résumé of their final meeting, see the extract of telegram 4523, p. 514.

<sup>3</sup> Reference to speeches made by Nam Il, Chou En-lai, and Molotov in the Second, Third, and Fourth Plenary Sessions of the Geneva Conference (Korean phase). Apr. 27, 28, and 29; for summaries, see pp. 148, 153, and 157, respectively.



allies before even starting to negotiate with the Communists, where the concessions might have some negotiating value. If the effort to develop a united position with reference to southeast Asia collapsed, we would be faced by the problem of going it alone. This would probably mean increasing the close relations with Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek, who, whatever their defects, were at least willing to stand strong against the Communists. I mentioned that there was considerable pressure for the United States to complete a mutual security treaty covering Formosa.<sup>4</sup> This had been deferred and I felt that its negotiation at the time of the Geneva conference and after my proposal for a united defense of southeast Asia might be embarrassing. However, if there was to be no united defense for southeast Asia and no agreed program for Geneva, then we would have to consider who there was upon whom we could depend.

I emphasized that despite what I gathered the British might have inferred from Radford's talks,<sup>5</sup> the United States was not seeking either war with China or a large scale intervention in Indo-China. In fact these were the two things we were seeking to avoid and thought could be avoided if we had a show of common strength.

I greatly feared that if I return to Washington under present conditions and had to meet with the Congressional Committees and give explanations as to what had happened, the consequences would be disastrous for the close UK-US relations which we wanted to maintain.

Mr. Eden then handed me the memorandum, a copy of which is annexed. He said that they had been working very hard to prevent the Colombo Conference from taking a strong anti-Western position, particularly in relation to Indochina, and he felt that they had been quite successful.

I referred to the paragraph in the UK memorandum calling for immediate and secret joint examination between the US and the UK. I said that this might be useful, but certainly it would not be useful if that was all there was, because we had already invited other countries such as Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand to share in creating a southeast Asian defense; and the two first had definitely agreed and the two latter were interested. I also said I was confident we could not now rebuff them without serious consequences for the future. They would have to be brought in on some discussions, although probably not those of the intimate nature which were customary between the US and the UK. I referred to the fact that the

---

<sup>4</sup> For documentation on this pact, see volume XIV.

<sup>5</sup> For information on Admiral Radford's discussions with British officials on Apr. 24 and 26, see volume XIII. See also McCordle's memorandum to Dulles, Apr. 30, p. 629.

North Atlantic Treaty had developed progressively, the first conception being the Brussels Pact, then the addition of the US and Canada, then the addition of Scandinavian countries, then the addition of Portugal and Italy, and most recently the addition of Greece and Turkey. I said that surely any southeast Asian arrangement would have to include at least Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, as well as the US, the UK and France, and the Associated States; and I did not see why we could not get started with that nucleus and let it develop as seemed natural. Mr. Eden made no reply.

Mr. Eden then said that he felt that the Western Powers had not participated in the general debate because they did not want to get tied to the South Korean election formula. I said that the issues in the general debate far transcended this rather minor technical point,—that the burden of the speeches of Molotov and Chou En-lai had been that Asia was for the Asians, and that all Western influence should be eliminated, particularly that of the US. Also, they had viciously attacked the UN, and made the most grotesque falsifications of history. Surely, I said, that presented issues to which the Western Powers could address themselves if they believed in the UN and believed that the principle of solidarity extended beyond Europe. Mr. Eden said he would give thought to the possibility of his making some speech.

We then discussed the details of the Korean matter. I said I was not hopeless of the possibility of an agreement, because we had an asset to use that we had not had in Berlin. At Berlin we could not pull out US and UK troops because this would collapse the forward strategy of NATO. In Korea there was no general allied strategy, and US troops could be pulled out in exchange for a united Korea, which would have sufficient demilitarization in the North so as to constitute no threat to Vladivostok and Port Arthur. Mr. Eden suggested that we might have a restricted meeting of the Four Inviting Powers plus China and North Korea and South Korea to try to get into this matter before I left. I said I would not be indisposed to have such a meeting on Saturday afternoon.<sup>6</sup>

I told Mr. Eden that I was seeing Molotov at 11 on Saturday morning on the atomic energy matter. I was disposed not to seek a joint communiqué which would indicate that the President's Plan had been rejected. I felt that to throw this into the present international situation would greatly aggravate and deteriorate affairs, and would particularly cause a deep resentment in the US. Mr. Eden agreed to this handling of the matter.

---

<sup>6</sup> May 1.

I reminded Mr. Eden that I had had no reply from him with reference to our economic aid to Egypt. He said he would talk to me about this before I left.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

[Annex 7]

SECRET

#### SOUTH-EAST ASIAN DEFENCE

1. Communism in Asia cannot be checked by military means alone. The problem is as much political as military; if any military combination is to be effective, it must enjoy the widest possible measure of Asian support.

2. We should aim to get the support of Burma as well as Siam as the immediate neighbours of Indo-China. But Burma will not come in unless the project commands some sympathy from other Asian countries, particularly the Asian members of the Commonwealth.

3. If we cannot win the active support of all the Asian countries of the area, it is important that we should, at the very least, secure their benevolent neutrality.

4. To secure this widely based Asian support, we must prepare the ground carefully for what is, in any case, intended to be a lasting defensive organisation, not a hastily contrived expedient to meet the present crisis.

5. This does not mean that we desire to delay. On the contrary, we have already been actively using our influence, particularly with the Asian members of the Commonwealth, with encouraging results. Pakistan and Ceylon have already promised not to oppose a South-East Asian Collective Defence on the lines we envisage, and we have succeeded in diverting Mr. Nehru from his original intention of condemning it root and branch. We have thus averted the danger that the Asian Prime Ministers at Colombo would unite in condemning our project, and have grounds for hoping for the actual support of some of them.

6. Mr. Nehru's latest statement<sup>8</sup> shows that his ideas have moved closer to our own. With persistence, we may even secure his endorsement of the kind of negotiated settlement in Indo-China that would be acceptable to us.

<sup>7</sup>The U.K. memorandum was transmitted to the Department in telegram Dulte 30, Apr. 30. (790.5/4-3054)

<sup>8</sup>Made on Apr. 25 in New Delhi; see telegram 339 from Colombo, Apr. 29, p. 610, and memorandum from Stelle to Bowie, Apr. 30, p. 635. For Prime Minister Nehru's proposals transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 1596 from New Delhi, Apr. 25, see volume XIII.

7. While we do not believe that a French collapse in Indo-China could come about as rapidly or as completely as the Americans appear to envisage, this danger reinforces the need to lay the foundations of a wider and viable defence organisation for South-East Asia.

8. We propose therefore that the United States and the United Kingdom should begin an immediate and secret joint examination of the political and military problems involved in creating a Collective Defence for South-East Asia, namely :

- (a) nature and purpose ;
- (b) membership ;
- (c) commitments.

This examination should also cover immediate joint measures to stiffen Siam.

APRIL 30, 1954.

---

396.1 GE/4-3054

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Merchant)*

SECRET

GENEVA, April 30, 1954

Participants: Mr. Pearson, Secretary of External Affairs of Canada

Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, US Delegation

Time: 1 p. m., April 30, 1954

Place: Hotel de la Paix, Geneva

I called Mr. Pearson this morning and asked if I could see him for a few minutes. He invited me to luncheon, which I accepted, at his hotel. We talked for about one hour and a half.

I opened by saying that I came to him not under instructions or in fact officially, but for the primary purpose of seeking his views on several subjects which were increasingly troubling to us. I said that I had not seen since the war our alliances so weakened, or the Russians so close to their objective of totally isolating the US from its allies. For example, I said it was to me incredible but nevertheless true that on the fifth day of the Geneva Conference during the entire course of which the US (and only inferentially the UN) had been the object of vicious attack by the Russians, Chinese, and the North Koreans, there had not been raised in the conference hall the voice of a single one of our European allies. I said no American would think of asking to be defended by his friends, but that I would have thought someone would have come to the defense of the UN and that some effort would

have been attempted to correct the perversions of history put out by the Communists. There was not, I said, in my judgment, a single American newspaperman or columnist worth his salt who would not recognize that his Sunday headline story would be built on the simple fact that every European ally had sat by silently during this past week.

Mr. Pearson expressed what I honestly believe was genuine amazement. He said the thought I had expressed as to how American press and public would react to sequence of speakers this week had never occurred to him. He said that he had intended to speak next week when he felt it would be more effective in restricted session but that in the light of the appearances which I described to him, he most decidedly would want to speak as soon as possible in plenary session. I said I had not come to ask him to speak, but to seek his advice. He insisted that he wanted to speak and would do so, although he stated that he could not address his remarks in favor of our initial proposal on Korean elections. He said however there was a good deal he could usefully say, and he said further that he thought it was important that as many as possible on our side speak in plenary session in the next few days, if only for five or ten minutes. Webb, he said, he knew would speak and he would discuss this with him. He also said that he wanted to talk to Mr. Spaak and impress on him the importance of the Europeans speaking up. I quickly interjected that Doug MacArthur and I had been talking over the situation and that when I decided to speak to him, Mr. MacArthur had decided that similarly he would speak to Mr. Spaak, and that I believed he was doing so at approximately the same time. Accordingly, I said I felt Mr. Spaak would have this general thought in mind.

I then went on to what I said I thought was a related matter but more serious; that this was the division on Far Eastern problems which the Russians were apparently succeeding so well in exploiting. I went over the history of the Secretary's effort to create a stronger and united position for Geneva by initiating plans for an *ad hoc* coalition for collective defense in Southeast Asia. I described how he felt this would create an asset at least to offset the intensified military action of the Vietminh. I said that after the Secretary's quick trip to London and Paris two weeks ago,<sup>1</sup> we had all felt that we had secured the agreement of the British and the French Governments to this proposal, but that within five days the British had walked out on it, and within two weeks the French had in fact abandoned it due to the crisis of Dien Bien Phu and the dissolution of any effective government in Paris.

---

<sup>1</sup> Apr. 11-14. For documentation on the Secretary's visit, see pp. 514 ff.

Mr. Pearson interjected that he thought Mr. Eden had been disturbed by our rushing the pace on the eve of Geneva by calling together the consultative group in Washington. He said that he felt Mr. Eden would not insist on waiting until Geneva was over to move ahead on this front but thought that if things went no better at the conference in the first few days of next week, the British would be willing to start moving ahead on the coalition idea. I said that I thought the Secretary's original purpose had been stultified, but that we should move ahead as rapidly as possible.

Mr. Pearson said that he had had several long talks with Mr. Eden and that we must realize that he is preoccupied with the Asian angle of the Commonwealth. Also, he said he would tell me in all frankness that the presentation made by Admiral Radford last Saturday in Paris to Mr. Eden<sup>2</sup> had "almost frightened him to death". He said it can be accepted that Foreign Offices are easily frightened, but that Mr. Eden had told him that Admiral Radford at his dinner Monday night with the Prime Minister<sup>3</sup> had also frightened the old gentleman who, Mr. Pearson said, is normally a man of action and not easily frightened. Mr. Pearson said the British also had gained the impression that not only were we trying to pull them into military action on a crash basis, but that we are also trying to pull the French along with us. He intimated that he felt we had prompted or encouraged the series of unrelated emergency requests for intervention made to us by the French.

We discussed the problem of Indochina inconclusively but at some length. Mr. Pearson said that coalition was obviously surrender on a time basis only, that a cease-fire without safeguards made no sense and risked slaughter, and that partition meant giving up great assets in loyal people and resources in the north and retaining behind one's lines large areas strongly held by the enemy. He asked if we had given any thought to withdrawal to the Delta areas and then building up the native forces for ultimate extension of the area of control by the local authorities. I said we had given thought to this and were continuing to do so as one possibility which would preserve the area from total surrender, but that I did not know whether or not it was still militarily feasible. I then said I had gained the impression that the British were inclined to favor partition as the least undesirable solution for a settlement. Mr. Pearson said that he didn't think so, and that Mr. Eden had expressed great doubts as to the wisdom and feasi-

---

<sup>2</sup> Apr. 24. For a memorandum of conversation between Admiral Radford and Foreign Secretary Eden, see volume XIII.

<sup>3</sup> Apr. 26. For a summary of this discussion, see *ibid.*

bility of partition. I then said that I was uncertain when Mr. Eden had told us earlier that if partition was the result of Geneva, the British would be prepared to militarily guarantee the new frontier, whether or not he was thinking in terms of a guarantee by a coalition or participation by the UK in a joint guarantee which would include the Soviets, China, and possibly the US. Mr. Pearson was emphatic that it was the former that Mr. Eden had in mind.

Mr. Pearson then said that he wondered whether *in extremis* it might be useful to get other Asians involved in the problem. He said he thought possibly there might be something in Nehru's proposals as modified by the Colombo Conference. He suggested that if we could get a Pakistani here at Geneva to speak for the five Colombo countries, we might be able to work something out. I questioned him as to what he had in mind and it was clear that he had not carried the idea further in his thinking.

We broke up at 2:30 with Mr. Pearson saying that as a result of my talk he was going to see Mr. Eden before the plenary session started. He also reiterated that he was going to speak to Prime Minister Webb.

---

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs  
(McCardle) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

[GENEVA,] April 30, 1954.

PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

Marquis Childs in confidence told me of a talk he had had with Eden. Mark urged that his name not be mentioned in any way, but this, in substance according to Childs, was what Eden told him: The British were very much disturbed and angered by Radford's coming over to London and trying to pressure the Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff to come into Indo-China with sea and air power. They knew that this wouldn't work, said Eden, because it would require land forces as large as Korea.

The British had a suspicion that Radford wanted to use this as a means of launching what Eden said was "Radford's war against China". They felt that that would be disastrous and they couldn't go along with it, but that was the reason they are staying out of the thing.

Eden said he had had the same feeling while in Paris, but he wanted to be sure of this policy as being the same as the English Government.

It was the reason he flew back and he found the Cabinet and the Government supported him. They don't believe in Bao Dai and are not willing to give any support.

---

751G.00/4-3054

*The Economic Coordinator, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Baldwin)*  
*to the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Robertson)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1954.

DEAR WALTER: I would like to pass on in this manner a report of a brief talk which I had last night with Roger Makins when we met at the Japanese Embassy. I have known Roger for some time and worked closely with him when he was in the Foreign Office and I was in the Embassy, which may account in part for the frankness with which he spoke.

At the outset of the conversation, Roger said that he was very concerned over the "serious situation" involving Indochina and the Geneva Conference. I expressed regret that his country and mine appeared farther apart than usual in their efforts to cope with the problem. He said that was most unfortunate and mentioned differences between British public opinion and American public opinion on a number of international problems, including Indochina. He then said that he did not know any quick remedy for this ailment but felt that if every effort could be made to keep the Geneva Conference in session "for as long as possible" the British public could be convinced that the United States and its allies were making a sincere effort to achieve something at the Conference but were prevented from doing so by the uncompromising and unreasonable attitude of the Communists.

As he knew that I had recently returned from Singapore, Roger asked about the effect of a Communist-dominated Indochina on the rest of Southeast Asia. I told him that it was my personal opinion that such a deplorable condition would have a fatal effect, and added that it was Malcolm MacDonald's viewpoint several months ago that if Indochina should be lost to Communism, Malaya would be near the top of the list of next victims. Roger quickly and emphatically agreed.

All of this, doubtless, is of little value but Drum and I felt that it might be of some interest to you.

I hope the going is not too rough and that you are finding it possible to have a breathing spell now and then.

Best regards,

CHUCK



PSA files, lot 58 D 207, "Bonsal Memoranda"

*Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(Bonsal)*

TOP SECRET

[GENEVA,] April 30, 1954.

GENEVA CONFERENCE, APRIL 1954  
INDOCHINA PHASE

POSSIBLE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR "RESTORING PEACE IN INDOCHINA"

The purpose of this memorandum is to examine a possible Western proposal for "restoring peace in Indochina" which might be made at the Geneva Conference either in anticipation of or as a reply to an expected Communist proposal. The Western proposal must be acceptable to the United States and appear reasonable to world opinion. Also, in the unlikely event it was seriously considered by the Communists, it should provide some face-saving elements (not of substance) to facilitate acceptance by them. The Communists will, it is expected, make a proposal of their own including such features as the withdrawal of foreign troops, the holding of "free elections" and the recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The negotiating position of the two sides at Geneva will depend upon the following major factors:

(1) The military situation and prospects, including especially the outcome of Dien Bien Phu and its effect on French and Vietnamese official, public and military opinion.

(2) Franco-Vietnamese relations including the result of current negotiations and their impact on French and Vietnamese official and public opinion.

(3) The degree to which the United States is successful in forging a "united action" concept which the Communists as well as the French and the Vietnamese believe gives promise of contributing overwhelming added military assets on our side in Indochina in the event of a breakdown at Geneva.

(4) Development of US position regarding intervention in Indochina.

(5) The extent to which the Russians and the Chinese Communists are ready to risk World War III in order to hold the Communist position in Indochina.

(6) The risks which our side is willing to take to preserve Indochina from the Communists.

The following considerations seem basic to the formulation of our position:

(1) Any settlement which leaves Ho Chi Minh's regular divisions intact and undefeated will result in a turn-over of the country sooner or later to the Communists.

(2) It is essential from the point of view of French public and official opinion that our side at Geneva make what appears to be a constructive and united attempt to end the fighting in Indochina. If such an attempt is made sincerely, and fails, the chances that the Franco-Vietnamese military effort will be continued will at least be improved.

(3) It is also essential from the point of view of French public and official opinion that nothing be done or said at Geneva to indicate that we do not understand that the French Union concept as a free association of equal, sovereign states is what justifies the heavy French contribution to our common objective of keeping Indochina from Communist control. (There appears to be no need to insist on a spelled out right of withdrawal at a time when the very existence of the new states is being assured *only* because of their membership in the French Union; the relationship between them will be an evolving one in accordance with circumstances.)

(4) In the case of *Cambodia* and of *Laos*, all that is required is a withdrawal of Vietminh invading forces in order to leave the administration of their countries to governments enjoying a satisfactory degree of popular support. Neither elections nor plebiscites are needed except as provided by the functioning constitutional machinery in the two states. We should emphasize our own sense of the "separateness" of Cambodia and Laos from Vietnam by promptly appointing a resident Ambassador in Phnom Penh and a resident Minister in Vientiane.

In view of the above summary analysis, a program for restoring peace to Indochina might be envisaged which would include:

(a) *On the military side*, (1) In *Cambodia* and *Laos*: a withdrawal of Vietminh troops and the establishment, perhaps under UN auspices of peace observation machinery which will guarantee the security and territorial integrity of these two states. (2) In *Vietnam*, a cease fire followed by progressive demobilization of indigenous forces and a phased withdrawal of foreign forces to specified areas and their gradual reduction. The current French concept of a cease fire first with all other military and political factors in an eventual settlement to be deferred until later, seems a highly dangerous one. (The question of the impact of a demobilization proposal in Indochina on the situation in Korea would require careful consideration, nevertheless, where, as in Vietnam, the opposing armed forces and zones of influences are inextricably mixed and confused, the urgency of demobilization immediately following a cease fire is very much greater than in Korea, where there is one accepted dividing line between the opposing forces.)

(b) *On the political side*, a plan for the restoration of normal conditions looking toward the holding of elections after a transitional period of perhaps three years.

(c) *On the economic side*, the undertaking of prompt and energetic measures for the restoration of war damaged roads, railroads, other utilities and for general reconstruction activities on a large scale. This program should be so designed as to have a major political impact.

The rationale for any plan which our side might propose would be that, in view of the eight years of civil war which have taken place, it is essential that a transition period of *military deflation*, *political pacification* and *economic restoration* occur before there can be envisaged the creation of a responsible representative regime for the entire area. The details of any plan would obviously have to be worked out by the French and the Vietnamese. International controls would be an essential feature. Some of the major points to be covered would be the following:

(1) *Military*

The cease fire should be based on the Laniel proposals of March 5 with provision for international controls, including control of the Chinese frontier. The nature of the international control mechanism, the extent to which it would include Communist and neutral representation would be delicate and difficult problems, especially in view of our Korean experience. Presumably provisions would be made for a return of all prisoners and for a general amnesty for all those on the Vietminh side guilty only of bearing arms in the rebellion. (See separate memorandum for an analysis of the Laniel proposals.)<sup>1</sup>

The cease-fire phase should be closely tied to a demobilization phase to be administered by the same apparatus of international controls as the cease fire. The stated purpose here would be to reduce the Vietnamese and the Vietminh armed forces to proportions related to the ability of the country to support them without outside help and to return to peaceful occupations the bulk of the 700,000 natives now under arms. (Taking into account the relative populations of Vietnam and of the United States, these 700,000 men in Vietnam would correspond to over five million in the United States.) The arms recovered might be held by the international control mechanism and be eventually disposed of for the benefit of the new national Vietnamese Government to be constituted at the end of the proposed period of transition. (The U.S. might, however, wish to reclaim some or all of the arms it has furnished under MDAP.)

This disarmament phase would not result in the complete disarmament of the Vietnamese National Army or of the Vietminh. It would be designed, however, to produce a situation readily controllable by the government which we recognize in the event of further Vietminh aggression.

Closely tied in with the disarmament phase would be the gradual withdrawal, under international control, of foreign forces (French expeditionary corps), to specified positions. A gradual reduction of their numbers might also be contemplated. Their definitive status

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

would be at first as set forth in current Franco-Vietnamese agreements although in the long run the new national Government to be formed after the proposed transition period would make a definitive arrangement on this matter. At all times, these troops should continue to be available in numbers and in positions sufficient to guarantee their own safety, that of foreign residents and that of the non-Communist Vietnamese against a renewal of aggression.

(2) *Political*

Bao Dai's Government with French Union military help controls the key cities and some other areas of Vietnam including half the population while the other half is controlled by Ho Chi Minh's Government and its indigenous forces. Ho's Government is recognized by Peking, Moscow and presumably by a number of the satellites. In view of the present equilibrium of military and political forces in the area, it is hard to conceive of an arrangement under which Ho would straightway relinquish his political control to Bao Dai. In fact, the essence of Ho's position has been one of willingness to negotiate a cease fire and a withdrawal of foreign forces with the French while at the same time he has completely ignored Bao Dai and his government.

Since the military and political situation of Bao Dai's Government is inferior, comparatively speaking, to that of Syngman Rhee's, it is probably not feasible, no matter how desirable it would be, to include, in the proposal to be made by our side (except perhaps as an initial bargaining position), a complete submission to Bao Dai's regime on the part of Ho and his supporters. In fact, the acceptance of a cease fire in the absence of complete surrender would probably presuppose the continued existence of the Ho regime during the ensuing transitional phase.

It is probable therefore that the relative positions of the two governments, complicated as they are by the absence of any frontiers between their two jurisdictions which in fact overlap and fluctuate, will have to be continued (in the absence of complete victory for our side) with all the attendant disadvantages through a transitional period. This would, however, be preferable to the immediate formation of a single government through elections or a coalition, an eventuality which most observers believe would be highly favorable to the Communists.

While neither government would be required to recognize the other during the transitional period, it is clear that some sort of an arrangement for an allocation of territory, perhaps based roughly on the cease fire disposition, would have to be worked out. As the disarmament and demobilization of native forces as described above was being carried out, it would be desirable, also under international control, to

provide for a gradual restoration of freedom of the legal movement of people and goods throughout the country.

The culmination of this period of political reconstruction would be the holding of nation-wide elections to an assembly which would draw up a definitive constitution for Vietnam. A date for such elections (July 1st, 1957) might be announced at the outset of the transitional period. The elections themselves should be under international supervision. They would result in the creation of a single government for the entire country. Even with the safeguards and delays contemplated, an appreciable number of Communists and anti-free world elements would presumably be elected although it is to be hoped they would be a manageable fraction of the total.

### (3) *Economic*

An important part of our proposal would be an economic restoration program designed to have the greatest possible popular impact. France and the U.S., as well as the Government of Vietnam, might effectively announce a willingness to devote a substantial portion of the money they are now spending on fighting the war to the intensive reconstruction of Vietnam. In those parts of the country controlled by Bao Dai's Government this program could be conducted directly by France and the U.S.; in other areas, provisions for international control and supervision could be worked out. Such a program, which would cover a period of years, perhaps as much as ten years, could if successfully devised and initiated, be a major factor in ensuring that the proposed elections returned a majority favoring a free world, Western orientation rather than one wishing membership in a Communist Chinese satellite system.

The initial purpose of this program would be to restore the roads, railroads and communications as a prerequisite to the reunification of Vietnam after the interruption of eight years of civil war.

---

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Indochina"

*Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Stelle)  
to the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bowie)*

TOP SECRET

[GENEVA,] April 30, 1954.

Subject: The Nehru Proposal on Indochina <sup>1</sup>

### *Substance of Proposal*

Nehru, speaking in the House of People on April 24, made a proposal with regard to Indochina as follows:

1. A climate of peace has to be promoted and the atmosphere of threats that prevails ought to be dissipated. To this end the govern-

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 8, p. 625.

ment of India appeals to all concerned to desist from threats and to the combatants to refrain from stepping up the tempo of the war.

2. The item of a cease-fire should be given priority on the Indochina conference agenda. The cease-fire group should consist of the actual belligerents, that is, France, the three Associated States, and the Vietminh.

3. The Conference should decide to proclaim that the essential solution to the conflict is the complete independence of Indochina and that termination of French sovereignty should be placed beyond all doubt by an unequivocal commitment by the Government of France.

4. The Conference should initiate negotiations between the parties directly and principally concerned and should give them all possible assistance. Such direct negotiations would assist in keeping the Indochina question limited to the issues which concern and involve Indochina directly. These parties would be the same as would constitute the cease-fire group.

5. A solemn agreement of non-intervention, denying aid direct or indirect with troops or war material to the combatants for purposes of war, to which the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and China shall be the primary parties, should be brought about by the Conference. The United Nations, to which the decision of the Conference shall be reported, shall be requested to formulate the convention of non-intervention in Indochina embodying the aforesaid agreement and including provisions for its enforcement under United Nations auspices. Other states should be invited by the United Nations to adhere to this convention of non-intervention.

6. Nehru stated that the United Nations should be informed of the progress of the Conference.

### *Analysis of Proposal*

a. The Indian proposal does not provide for any particular type of political settlement to follow a cease-fire. At Colombo Nehru has said that he carefully avoided saying to whom and in what form French sovereignty should be transferred, feeling that this should be left for negotiation among the parties concerned.<sup>2</sup>

b. The Indian proposal is ambiguous as to whether the "Conference" on Indochina should be conducted at Geneva or separately from the Geneva Conference. Nehru, at Colombo, has said that he was not advocating that a settlement in Indochina should be completely divorced from the Geneva Conference but that he visualized the machinery for direct negotiation between the belligerents as being a sort of subcommittee of the Geneva Conference.

<sup>2</sup> For a summary of Prime Minister Nehru's statement at the Colombo Conference, see telegram 339 from Colombo, Apr. 29, p. 610.

c. The Indian proposal pointedly excludes both the United States and Communist China as parties at interest in negotiations for an Indochina settlement. Nehru rationalizes this on the grounds that only by limiting participation to actual belligerents can the Indochina issue be separated out from other Far Eastern issues. Nehru thus arrives at a recommendation for direct negotiations between the French and the Vietminh which has been repeatedly urged by the Russians and the French Communists for some time.

d. A primary element of the Indian proposal is that there should be an immediate cease-fire. According to the proposal this cease-fire should be arranged by the actual belligerents as a matter of priority. In this respect Nehru also echoes earlier Communist recommendations. He does not, however, call for immediate withdrawal of French troops, an item which has hitherto been a constant element in Communist propaganda. The Indian proposal does not provide for any external enforcement of a cease-fire.

e. Another primary element of the Indian proposal is the advocacy of agreement by the U.S., USSR, UK and Communist China to abstain from intervention in Indochina or from rendering any help of a military nature to any of the belligerents. The proposal does provide that this agreement should be enforced by the UN.

#### *Disadvantages of the Indian Proposal*

The Indian proposal has been picked up by parts of both the British and French press and will probably have to be dealt with in some form at Geneva. From the U.S. point of view it has the following disadvantages:

a. Given the obvious eagerness of the French to reach some sort of an agreement and the disinclination of the French to reckon the costs too carefully, exclusion of the U.S. from negotiations for an Indochina settlement would undoubtedly tend to weaken the Western position in the negotiations. On the other hand, since the Vietminh are apt to be more interested in immediate complete victory than either the Russians or the Chinese exclusion of the other Communists from the negotiations would tend to harden the Communist negotiating position.

b. An immediate cease-fire, without any agreed terms for a political settlement, would redound greatly to Communist advantage. The local population would understand this to be a clear victory for the Vietminh and a signal that the Communists were about to achieve political control. Accordingly such local support as the French now have would quickly disintegrate. The French would be in no position to renew hostilities again, even in the face of utmost recalcitrance on the part of the Communists in political negotiations.

c. The absence of any provisions for enforcement of a cease-fire would also work to the advantage of the Communists. The French, being so inclined, would probably observe an agreement fairly strictly,

while the Communists would undoubtedly continue to exert forceful measures, if not against the French, at least against the local population.

d. The provisions for a cessation of all outside military assistance would clearly be disadvantageous to the U.S. and the French. The French Union forces depend completely on U.S. military assistance and would be drastically weakened by its cessation. Although the Vietminh are importantly assisted by Chinese Communist matériel, the quantity does not compare with what the U.S. is providing the French, the Vietminh are not nearly as dependent on outside assistance as are the French, and in any case, on the basis of Korean experience, there could be no expectation that Chinese Communist assistance would in fact cease, regardless of any UN enforcement machinery.

In sum the Indian proposal picks up those items of the Communist position—direct negotiation, cease-fire, and non-intervention—which have a dangerous appeal to the French public, and which in themselves would be damaging to the Western position, and neglects any of the safeguards—political settlement, and controls—which might be calculated to make the non-Communist position in Indochina tenable.

---

751G.00/4-3054 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, April 30, 1954—9 p. m.

Dulte 34. Eyes only for Acting Secretary for the President from Secretary. Bidault saw me alone after this afternoon's meeting. He spoke clearly and concisely. Eden subsequently joined us and Bidault went over more briefly in his presence what he had told me. Gist was as follows:

Our tactical position, and particularly his own, had deteriorated sharply as result of dissipation of uncertainty as to possibility of international and particularly US intervention. Moderation of recent US statements, notably French interpretation of President's press conference,<sup>1</sup> coupled with Churchill's speech<sup>2</sup> and obvious reluctance British carry through on Eden-Dulles communiqué,<sup>3</sup> removed most

<sup>1</sup> For a message to Secretary Dulles from President Eisenhower, May 1, regarding the President's press conference of Apr. 29, see p. 640.

<sup>2</sup> Prime Minister Churchill delivered a policy statement on Indochina and the Geneva Conference in the House of Commons on Apr. 27, which included the following remarks: "Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to give any undertakings about United Kingdom military action in Indo-China in advance of the results of Geneva. We have not entered into any new political or military commitments. My right hon. Friend [Eden] has, of course, made it clear to his colleagues at Geneva that if settlements are reached there Her Majesty's Government will be ready to play their full part in supporting them in order to promote a stable peace in the Far East." For the complete statement, see *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, 5th series, vol. 526, cols. 1455-1456.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 514.



of Communist uncertainty as to possible Western intentions. Premature publication of Bao Dai's willingness to attend had incidentally further removed any possibility of bargaining with Viet Minh on their participation. He felt he had little solid support at home.

As things now stood, he saw nothing to prevent a Communist victory throughout whole area. There was nothing to stop or moderate them. If this disaster happened, effects would not be limited to Indochina or even to EDC but would threaten whole NATO structure. Next French Government would give lip service to NATO but no more and might not even give that very long. He was going to Paris Tuesday<sup>4</sup> to appear before the Assembly but would refuse to answer any questions and state merely that they could either express confidence in him or remove him as Foreign Minister.

I said that as far as US was concerned, situation would not be finalized until after I returned. I was not without hope that UK could be brought with others into discussions which would at least revive Communist doubts as to Western intentions. Also, I said I was not confident that the military had completely exhausted the possibilities in the situation. They did not seem to me to be very ingenious. Something might be done short of total surrender to get the war on to a basis which would reduce expenditure of French manpower and not involve bringing in US and UK manpower, by permitting certain positions to be held and indigenous people to be trained to resume the struggle. Bidault said this thinking was not without merit.

After Bidault's departure, I told Eden I thought we should at least announce the beginning of discussions on what would be done if the conference failed to produce a satisfactory solution. He reacted rather negatively, but said he would think about it.

DULLES

---

<sup>4</sup> May 4.

---

396.1 GE/4-3054 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, April 30, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 54. Repeated information Paris 157, Saigon 18. French advise us of receipt from De Jean of his estimate on current overall situation. In De Jean's opinion it was incorrect to envisage only two alternatives of internationalization of war or negotiation of cease-fire with Ho. Re latter, he would regard anything less than Laniel's conditions as calamitous.<sup>1</sup> He inclined toward increased American participation short of direct intervention but felt it essential French retain top con-

---

<sup>1</sup> For a report on Laniel's conditions of Mar. 5, 1954, see telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, p. 435.

trol militarily, financially and politically. He would not yet admit fall Dien Bien Phu inevitable but felt that its fall would have very serious repercussions on Vietnamese military and civilian morale. He also felt that longer Geneva discussions continued, the worse would be effect on Vietnamese opinion.

DULLES

110.11 DU/5-154 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1954—9:44 a. m.

Tedul 26. Dept has received following message from President for immediate transmission to Secretary:<sup>2</sup>

"My Friday evening paper indicates that great distortion occurred in the reporting in Geneva of a statement I made at Thursday's press conference.<sup>3</sup>

"I was emphasizing the complexities and difficulties of your task at Geneva. In doing so, I pointed out that you had to steer a course between the unattainable and the unacceptable. The former I defined as a general Asian peace in which the free world could have real confidence. This I said was too much to hope for at present. The unacceptable I did not attempt to define because in it could be described an almost infinite number of hypothetical arrangements. Consequently I said that if any arrangement whatsoever was made at Geneva, it could scarcely be viewed as more than a *modus vivendi* or something of that sort. I then stated that because of the delicacy and difficulties of your task, I would not comment further on the Geneva Conference and its aims or on this government's suggestions and proposals. However, another question did allow me to state that any division or partition of Indo-China was not included in what I considered acceptable.

"*The New York Times* reported this part of my press conference accurately, so I am at a loss to understand why it should have been so completely twisted in the reports sent to Geneva.

"I am sure that you and this Administration are correct in the approach we have taken to the Indo-China problem. I have heard that New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines agree with us. They are

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Gilman of S/S.

<sup>2</sup> Secretary Dulles in turn on May 1 passed the President's message to Eden and Bidault, stating that he had received a telegram "from the President which expresses concern about the misinterpretations given to his last Thursday's press conference." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Korea—Political Conference—Geneva 1954") In an additional note to Bidault the Secretary enclosed a transcript of portions of the President's press conference dealing with Indochina and stated that "You will see that it does not in any way bear out the press interpretations which in some quarters were placed upon it." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Korea—Political Conference—Geneva 1954")

Chauvel subsequently informed the U.S. Delegation that "Bidault encouraged by . . . President's clarification of April 29 press conference given in Secretary's letter of May 1." Telegram Secto 120 from Geneva, May 6. (396.1 GE/5-654)

<sup>3</sup> Apr. 29. For summary of the President's press conference, see editorial note, p. 604.

more realistic and possibly more courageous than those who are apparently willing to accept any arrangement that allows them by suffering and for such time as may be permitted by the Chinese Reds to save a bit of face and possibly a couple of miserable trading posts in the Far East.

"With warm regards to you and all members of your party, As ever,  
D. D. E."

MURPHY

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 288

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (MacArthur)*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 1, 1954.

Participants:

<i>France</i>	<i>US</i>	<i>UK</i>
Mr. Bidault	Secretary Dulles	Mr. Eden
Mr. Chauvel	General Smith	Lord Reading
	Mr. MacArthur	Mr. Shuckburgh

Time: 12:15 p. m., May 1, 1954

Place: Bidault's Residence, Joli-Port, in Versoix

The Secretary opened the discussion by outlining his talk with Molotov this morning on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. After giving them a full account of his talk with Molotov this morning, the Secretary read to Messrs. Eden and Bidault the paper which he had read to Molotov this morning. Both Eden and Bidault asked if they could have copies, and the Secretary said that he had only his reading copy with him but would send them copies.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Bidault then said that Molotov has something on his mind. When Bidault saw Molotov yesterday, Molotov asked him when he (Bidault) was leaving. Mr. Bidault replied that he probably would be going to Paris sometime Monday<sup>2</sup> evening so that he could be there when the Assembly reconvenes on Tuesday, but would of course be returning to Geneva. Molotov had then said that Secretary Dulles was leaving on Monday and complained that this was supposed to be a Foreign Ministers meeting. Mr. Bidault said that in his judgment Molotov thinks that his only peer and equal is the Secretary, and he is probably saying to himself, "How can I stay on with inferiors when my only equal, the American Secretary of State, is leaving?" Mr. Bidault said that Molotov does have a problem of how long he remains in Geneva in the form of Chou En-lai. However, he felt Molotov's unhappiness about Secretary Dulles' leaving was because

<sup>1</sup> For related documentation, see volume II.

<sup>2</sup> May 3.

Molotov "does not like to negotiate with persons whom he considers inferior in status to himself".

Mr. Bidault then said to the Secretary that he had sent the new note to Bao Dai regarding Vietnam participation at the Geneva Conference and that the original letter which he, Eden, and the Secretary had signed had been retrieved.<sup>3</sup> He said that Bao Dai's Foreign Minister would be arriving at the Swiss frontier at about 2:30 or three o'clock this afternoon with, he understood, Bao Dai's approval for the Vietnamese to participate in the Geneva Conference even if the Vietminh is present.

Mr. Bidault then said that it was important to try to get the Indochina phase of the conference started on Monday or Tuesday. With Bao Dai's approval of Vietminh participation, either he (Bidault) would approach Molotov today, or Chauvel would see Gromyko, to inform them that the Vietnamese accepted Vietminh participation. Mr. Bidault said that it was Molotov's turn to come and see him, but he was somewhat reluctant to ask him to come to see him so quickly. The Secretary asked Bidault if he meant that he might invite Molotov to dinner tonight, and Mr. Bidault replied that he would not invite him because it was too soon after Molotov's dinner for him. If he invited Molotov tonight, Molotov would invite him back tomorrow for another meal, and he did not wish to get involved with him in too many bilateral dinners.

Mr. Bidault said that when they communicated Bao Dai's positive reply to Molotov later today, two questions would come almost at once. The first was chairmanship of the Indochina phase and the second was composition. Regarding chairmanship, Mr. Bidault hazarded that Molotov might propose an Indian chairman, and would probably have in mind Krishna Menon. After some discussion, it was agreed that India would be very unsuitable under almost any circumstances, although Mr. Bidault said that Madame Pandit would not make a bad chairman, if it was to be an Indian. However, he reiterated that India was unsuitable. Mr. Bidault said that the only chairman of the three rotating chairmen of the Conference that might be acceptable would be Eden. Mr. Eden immediately interjected saying that he really did not want to be the chairman. He had thought about suggesting the idea of having Mike Pearson<sup>4</sup> as permanent chairman for the Indochina phase but if this were done Molotov would immediately reply that this was an Asiatic conference and would then probably suggest an Asian, such as Krishna Menon. Mr. Eden said another possibility which had occurred to him was to ask the chairman of the Colombo

---

<sup>3</sup> Regarding these two notes, see the memorandum by Achilles, p. 620.

<sup>4</sup> Lester B. Pearson of Canada.

Conference (the Prime Minister of Ceylon)<sup>5</sup> to chair the meeting. Secretary Dulles said he did not see why the present three chairmen could not continue for the Indochina phase. He had worded his proposal for chairmanship carefully so that it could be construed that the three present rotating chairmen were chairmen of the conference rather than just of the Korean phase. Mr. Bidault and Mr. Eden were both enthusiastic and said this was a good idea. They had not been aware of the way the Secretary's proposal, which the conference had accepted, had been worded.

Mr. Bidault said that Molotov had suggested that "the two permanent chairmen" chair the Indochina phase. This meant the UK and the USSR. He was not happy about this idea as he did not like the thought of having the chairmen rotate on a 50-50 basis. He mentioned preferring the two-for-one basis which would result if the present chairmen were continued. Mr. Eden became somewhat confused and raised a question as to Prince Wan's continuing as one of the rotating chairmen if Thailand was not a participant. The Secretary pointed out that Eden's proposal for the chairman of the Colombo Conference to chair the Indochina phase called for an outsider whose country would not participate in the discussions. With respect to chairmanship, it was agreed that when the French see the Russians later today, they would put forward the position that the three present rotating chairmen should continue. If the Russians refused this, consideration should be given to having a single chairman, but no definite agreement on who that chairman should be was reached. The Prime Minister of Ceylon as chairman of the Colombo Conference was a possibility which should be kept in mind. It was also agreed that Prince Wan or Mike Pearson would be acceptable in the role of a single chairman.

The discussion then turned to composition of the Indochina phase of the conference, and it was agreed that Bidault would stand fast on the proposal that there be 9 participants (US, UK, France, USSR, Communist China, the three Associated States, and the Vietminh). It was agreed that this should be the initial composition of the conference, although the possibility was not excluded that this group might add additional members later. However, for the purposes of the French discussion with Molotov later today, the French should stand on the nine.

Mr. Bidault then inquired what the purpose of this afternoon's restricted meeting on Korea at 3:30 p. m. was.<sup>6</sup> The Secretary explained that he planned to table a paper containing four points which were

1. Elections to be under UN auspices
2. The scope and character of the elections

---

<sup>5</sup> Sir John Kotelawala.

<sup>6</sup> For a summary of the meeting, see telegram Secto 69, May 2, p. 174.

## 3. Disposition of foreign troops

4. Provision to protect Korean independence, including demilitarized border areas.

The Secretary indicated that he did not expect there would be substantive discussion this afternoon of these points and believed that the discussion this afternoon would cover the procedural aspect of how the conference would deal with such points. For example, should they be discussed in plenary or restricted sessions, etc.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Bidault said that he would endeavor to get Molotov's acceptance today that there should be 9 participants for the Indochina phase which had been agreed above and that the present chairmen should continue to chair the Indochina discussions. He promised to keep both the Secretary and Mr. Eden fully informed. The Secretary and Mr. Eden indicated approval of this position, and the Secretary said that while we recognized that France had primary responsibility in connection with the Indochina discussions, the US would find it very difficult to accept an Indian chairman such as Krishna Menon. Mr. Bidault reiterated that an Indian chairman would certainly not do, although if deadlock were reached on the Western proposal for the present chairmen to continue, there was merit in having an outside chairman, such as the Prime Minister of Ceylon or Prince Wan or Mike Pearson. Mr. Bidault concluded by saying that he did not exclude the possibility that Molotov might even suggest that France and Communist China alternate in the chair for the Indochina discussions or that even the Vietnamese and Vietminh alternate the chair. This was just a possibility which had occurred to him while the present discussion was going on and one that possibly might be put forward by the Soviets.

---

396.1 GE/5-154 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 1, 1954—2 p. m.

Dulte 37. After concluding my discussion this morning with Molotov on atomic energy matter, he noted as I prepared to go that my departure Monday would prevent my participation in Indochina phase of Geneva Conference. I indicated again I would be interested in any information regarding his thinking on problem. He failed again to offer anything of significance, reverting to his statement earlier in the week that it was important to seek road to peace Indochina at Geneva and that we should pay attention to the interests and the views of both sides.

DULLES

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Indochina"

*Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Stelle)  
to the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bowie)*

TOP SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 1, 1954.

Subject: U.S. Participation in an Unsatisfactory Indochina Settlement

If negotiations on Indochina reach a point where it is clear that the French are willing to enter into arrangements which are going to be unsatisfactory from the U.S. point of view, and if at that time the U.S. concludes that it does not have sufficient leverage to prevent the French from concluding such an agreement, the U.S. will have to decide whether it should at that time disassociate itself from the negotiations or continue to be a party to them. Such a decision would obviously have important U.S. domestic political implications. The following analysis, however, does not deal with domestic U.S. political aspects.

*Disadvantages of U.S. Participation*

1. U.S. participation in an unsatisfactory Indochina settlement will be taken as evidence throughout Asia and the rest of the world that the U.S. has in effect backed down in the face of the Communist threat in a critically important area. As a result there will be an unavoidable loss of U.S. prestige.

2. U.S. acquiescence to and participation in an unsatisfactory settlement will probably have particularly acute effects on U.S. prestige in the remainder of Southeast Asia—notably in Thailand. The Thais may well feel that the U.S. has marched up the hill and back again on the question of Indochina, and be tempted to believe that the U.S. would behave in similar fashion if a showdown came with respect to Thailand. Consequently the value of U.S. promises of protection and assistance may be severely depreciated in Siamese eyes.

3. U.S. readiness to participate in an unsatisfactory settlement might amount to relinquishment of the last available card that the U.S. has to play against French acceptance of such a settlement—French fear of provoking a profound breach between France and the United States.

*Advantages of U.S. Participation*

1. U.S. participation in negotiation of a settlement would keep the U.S. in a better position to play off the Associated States against the French, to stimulate the Communists to overreaching themselves, and in general to attempt to whittle down the degree of unacceptability of an Indochina settlement.

2. U.S. participation in an Indochina settlement, despite the undoubted loss of prestige involved, would place the U.S. in a better position to insert itself into the protection and shoring up of whatever remained of a Western position in Indochina and Southeast Asia after an unsatisfactory settlement. This would be particularly true in the case of a settlement involving territorial partition.

3. U.S. participation in an unsatisfactory Indochina settlement would assist in dispelling that fear of U.S. intransigence and suspicion of U.S. eagerness for drastic action against Communist China which has quite evidently contributed to present U.S. difficulties both with its Allies and with the neutralist countries.

4. U.S. participation in a settlement would lessen the possibilities of a severe breach between the U.S. on the one hand and the British and the French on the other, and would make more promising the possibilities of united action to counter the damaging effects of the settlement in Southeast Asia, as well as improve prospects for Allied cooperation in Europe.

### *Conclusion*

Unless there are good grounds for estimating that a U.S. threat to withdraw from the negotiations would in fact have the effect of preventing French acceptance of an unsatisfactory settlement, it would seem, on balance, that it would be in the U.S. interest to stay with the negotiations whatever might be the outcome.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 265

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Coordinator of the United States Delegation (Johnson)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 1, 1954.

Subject: The Indochina Phase of the Conference

#### 1. *Participation*

At Bidault's meeting with Molotov on April 27,<sup>2</sup> there appeared to be agreement that the participants—at least in the first instance—should be: The U.S., U.K., USSR, France, the Associated States, Communist China and Viet Minh. Bao Dai's acceptance of the second letter<sup>3</sup> would seem to pave the way for an invitation from the French to the 3 Associated States.

---

<sup>1</sup> Ambassador Heath also served as Chairman of the Indochina Working Group.

<sup>2</sup> For a summary of the Bidault-Molotov meeting, see telegram Dulte 16, p. 591.

<sup>3</sup> For an informal translation of the letter to Bao Dai, see footnote 1, p. 620.



*Recommendations:*

(1) That the U.S. position on participation be that the 9 Powers listed above should be the only participants.

(2) That invitations shall be extended to the Associated States by France and to the Viet Minh by the USSR.

(3) That we absolutely reject any attempt by the Soviets to include their puppet regimes in Laos and Cambodia.

(4) If the Soviets insist on the participation of India, Indonesia and Burma (or any combination thereof), we should insist on having Thailand, Philippines and Australia.

If it seems tactically wise in order to settle the question to have one state from each group included, we should accept Burma and Thailand on the limitrophe principle.

*2. Opening Date of the Indochina Phase*

While we should not be in the position of attempting to delay the Indochina Phase of the Conference, it is recommended that the Indochina discussions not begin before Monday, May 10 in order to avoid conflict with next week's Korean sessions.

*3. Chairmanship*

If the participants are limited to the 9 listed above, it is recommended that our position on chairmanship be that the chair be rotated by the U.K. and the USSR. If Thailand is included as a participant in the Indochina Phase then our position should be that the chairmanship follow the procedure of the Korean Phase, rotating among the U.K., Thailand and the USSR.

*4. Seating*

It is recommended that once the participants are finally decided upon, the French Deputy Secretary-General of the Allied Secretariat take the initiative in working out with his Soviet counterpart an auditorium-type seating plan similar to the one now in use for the Korean Phase.<sup>4</sup>

*5. Languages*

As a practical matter we see no alternative to French, English, Russian and Chinese (the Associated States will use French and the Viet Minh will use Chinese) as the official language for the Indochina Phase.

This has the disadvantage of having only the languages of the Berlin Powers plus Communist China.

<sup>4</sup> Handwritten notation by Johnson to paragraph 4: "The Secretary believes we need not be rigid on this point. With only 9 a table arrangement would be practicable. Chauvel told me tonight they were thinking of an individual desk arrangement in an ellipse. I said would be OK with us. U. A. J."

6. *Secretariat*

It is recommended that the Secretariat organization and procedures now in use for the Korean Phase be continued throughout the Conference, except for appropriate modifications in the cost-sharing formula.

We plan to resume on Monday Tripartite discussions with the British and French on the Indochina Phase of the Conference.

DRH

396.1 GE/5-154 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 1, 1954—6 p. m.

Secto 67. Repeated information London 105. British tell us that at Molotov's luncheon yesterday for Eden and Chou En-lai, host raised no question of substance but seemed interested rather in encouraging cordiality between his guests. Chou said he would like to see better relations with UK. Eden replied relations were two-way street, that Britain had recognized Communist China but that latter seemed reluctant to recognize Britain. Chou dwelt on theme that China under Peking Government was world factor which could not be ignored and was being unrightfully deprived of its position as member of UN. Eden said that this was question quite apart from subject under consideration at Geneva and he did not wish to discuss it.

DULLES

751G.00/5-254 : Telegram

*Dulles-Eden Meeting, Geneva, May 1, Evening: The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 2, 1954—8 p. m.

Dulte 42. Repeated information London 107. Limit distribution. London eyes only Ambassador. After Palais meeting yesterday, I asked Eden if British would not reconsider decision and agree now to participate in *ad hoc* group of ten, informal talks starting promptly in Washington. I told him of Bidault's press conference with selected group Americans previous evening, of which he was uninformed. I stressed that as matters stood, French literally had no alternative to disguised surrender. Eden indicated he would give matter thought, but closed conversation with remark he had congenital dislike for giving public impression of talking about something which he was not prepared to do, i.e., intervene militarily in Indochina.

After dinner I gave last night for Eden, General Smith<sup>1</sup> and I hit Eden (with Reading present) again on this subject. I made point we were seeking some form military support of French in Indochina which would reduce drain on French manpower without calling for replacement by Allied ground forces. I said I did not believe this was beyond the military wit to devise. I then said what we sought was British support and if military support was not available then at least moral support in the common endeavor to prevent loss all of Indochina. Failure of British to rally to our side would almost certainly produce consequences extending beyond that area. Between General Smith and myself, I believe we gave Eden far clearer detailed picture of our intent and purposes than he had had before. I feel that Eden was definitely impressed and during course of prolonged conversation indicated he recognized distinction between fighting in Vietnam on one hand and aggression against Laos and Cambodia on the other. He also tentatively indicated willingness join coalition which would fight external aggression in area to include Thailand and Burma (which he was hopeful being able persuade to join) as well as Malaya.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith arrived in Geneva on May 1; on May 3 he succeeded Secretary of State Dulles as head of the U.S. Delegation.

---

396.1 GE/5-154 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Australia (Peaslee) to the Department of State*

SECRET

CANBERRA, May 1, 1954—11 p. m.

251. Sent USDel Geneva unnumbered. Limit distribution. Following reports interview with Prime Minister Menzies at Canberra Embassy residence Friday evening, April 30, 1800 to 1915 hours Canberra time, at his request, related in approximate chronological sequence of statements for your appraisal.

Principal points are first, Prime Minister statement re Casey's advocacy of general Korean elections, second consideration which Prime Minister gave to himself leading the Australian delegation at Geneva, and, third Prime Minister opposition to any thought of territorial concessions in SEA.

Prime Minister's request for interview was first since our conferences April 5-11, reported Embtels 210, 213, 215, 217, 218 and despatch 343 April 13.<sup>1</sup> Conference was on eve of Prime Minister's departure

---

<sup>1</sup> Telegrams 210 (396.1 GE/4-554), 213 (396.1 GE/4-754), 215 (751G.00/4-754), 217 (751G.00/4-854), 218 (396.1 GE/4-954), and despatch 343 (751G.00/4-1354); none printed.

from Canberra for election campaign. I assumed it was for purpose of friendly explanation some Australian current press speculations re UK, Australia, and US lack of complete agreement. After preliminaries he launched into sub SEA crisis. He said government profoundly appreciated importance of Geneva conference to Australia future but that pendency of general election embarrassed it respecting any major moves in international affairs. Said the election foreclosed move which he might otherwise have taken if himself heading the Australian delegation to Geneva, in which case he would have requested "Winston" to go and would have hoped President Eisenhower might have considered it.

He then described several recent conferences with UK High Commissioner in which High Commissioner had complained about Australian press suggesting Australia not following UK, to which Prime Minister said he replied that Australia was not an authoritarian state and did not control its press but pointed he had already made a statement deploring suggestions of any rift between UK and US which he said still did not seem to satisfy High Commissioner.

Re Indochina, Prime Minister then said "of course the people have to be prepared for these things. If US and UK and Australia should invade Indochina now neither the white nor the yellow people would understand us." He referred to division of opinion in US as well as elsewhere. He said it was obviously important to get other countries associated, mentioning particularly Thailand and Burma.

I told him of UK High Commissioner's conversations with me April 11, reported despatch 343 April 13, in which High Commissioner had referred to UK thought of making some territorial concessions in Indochina. At this Prime Minister declared emphatically his "personal, unalterable opposition to anything of that kind." He referred rhetorically to the obvious desirability if it were possible of drawing line between those who really want to be Communists and those who do not, but indicated that this was not feasible geographically.

I then referred to brief Australian press statements which had just appeared suggesting possible Casey-Dulles divergence re Korean elections, saying I knew nothing except press reports and was not disturbed. Prime Minister replied knew nothing but press reports either but that press always gave only half story and that he assumed, interpolating with some emphasis "unless Casey is completely deviating from Cabinet policy," that what Casey had said was that "of course everybody would be glad to see such general elections if that would bring a solution to the problem" and that Casey had then gone on to point out obstacles and difficulties.

I referred to other press reports that Casey will return shortly to Australia and that there may be further Cabinet discussions and

asked whether Casey was needed generally in election campaign. He replied Casey not needed but if does not participate he might lose in his district.

In course of foregoing discussions Prime Minister referred to UK leadership difficulties "Winston's failing health" and "Eden's demonstrated incapacity for getting along with his US opposite numbers, including both Acheson and Dulles," according to the Prime Minister.

There was also discussion of possible future role of Prime Minister personally in international discussions after election if government returned. Prime Minister said his personal acquaintance our President only one short interview.

There are some indications of confusion in Australian press re Casey's Geneva speech.<sup>2</sup> Today's Sydney *Telegraph*, for example, sets forth as contrasting parallel columns Reuter dispatch headed "Reuter says the speech was part of a British Commonwealth bid to change tactics at the talks" and the other column headed "Rohan Rivett asks, is Australia's role simply that of a supporter and echo of Washington?"

Consul General Stebbins, Melbourne, reports recent talk with Cabinet member Kent-Hughes (which parallels similar information are [of?] other Cabinet members) in which Kent-Hughes said Dulles position on Indochina expressed exactly his own point of view, though he felt US had been somewhat late in realizing seriousness of situation.

PEASLEE

---

<sup>2</sup> Made in the Fourth Plenary Session on Korea on Apr. 29 and reported in telegram Secto 41, Apr. 29, p. 157.

---

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Chronological file"

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(Bowie) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 2, 1954.

Regardless of how things develop in Indochina, one of our primary objectives is to protect and preserve as much of the area as feasible. In particular, it is highly desirable to prevent any debacle in Vietnam from spreading to Cambodia and Laos. One device for this purpose might be the designation by the UN of a peace observation commission for Cambodia and Laos which might serve to block Vietminh invasion of those two states. Moreover, if Asians such as India, Pakistan, or Burma could be named for such a commission, this would tend to engage them, at least to this extent, in shoring up the area.

This approach would be especially useful if the French decide to give up some or all of Vietnam. But it would not seem to be prejudicial even if the defense of Vietnam can be kept going.

To take this step would presumably require action by Cambodia and Laos with the approval of the French. The events of the past few weeks may have changed the attitude of the French on such a proposal. It is hard to see how they can properly object under present conditions.

[Attachment]<sup>1</sup>

#### ACTIONS TO PREPARE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVE U.S. POLICIES IN INDOCHINA

##### *Problem*

Consideration is herewith given to those actions which the U.S.:

(a) should take to strengthen its position in Southeast Asia before resolving the question of whether it would, if necessary, be prepared to commit its forces to prevent Indochina from succumbing to communism;

(b) should not take, until this question has been resolved, at least tentatively or conditionally, and whose nature will depend on that resolution.

##### *Discussion*

The present position is obscure, since it is not known what course the French will adopt after the probable fall of Dien Bien Phu. It is unknown to what extent the French will desire and be able to continue resistance in Indochina and whether hostilities may not be terminated by a cease fire and the eventual partition of Indochina at the Geneva Conference.

The French have asked for immediate and direct U.S. air intervention to save Dien Bien Phu. This has been rejected by the U.S. on grounds that constitutional procedure prevents the U.S. from entering into a state of belligerency in the present case without congressional approval. The French were further informed that the Administration would not be able to seek such authorization until plans had been developed for Indochina's defense by united action.

The Secretary in his background press conference at Geneva April 25<sup>2</sup> stated that the U.S. is assisting the French in Indochina by all feasible means short of belligerent action. The Secretary seemed to have intended to imply that the U.S. would continue with such

---

<sup>1</sup> Prepared by Jacob D. Beam of S/P, Apr. 26, 1954.

<sup>2</sup> For the transcript of the Secretary's press conference, see telegram Secto 6, p. 559.

assistance by special measures, such as the airlift from France, over and beyond the aid agreement concluded last September.

The proposal that the U.S., U.K., Australia, New Zealand and Thailand hold secret military talks to devise measures to bolster Thailand's defense if French resistance should collapse in Indochina has been shelved for the reason that it would produce an adverse reaction on the French if it became known.<sup>3</sup> It is now proposed instead that the present Five Power Military Staff Planning Organization (U.S., U.K., France, Australia and New Zealand) meet in Bangkok, with Thai representation, to engage in planning which will include measures for a defense of Indochina also.

Nehru has indicated that he will oppose the U.S. proposal for united action for Asian defense and he has suggested instead that the countries participating in the Ceylon meeting opening April 28 put forward a plan for a cease fire in Indochina as a preliminary to a solution for the independence of all of Indochina and which would be guaranteed against outside interference.<sup>4</sup> Nehru apparently envisaged prohibiting intervention by the U.S. and Red China but seemed not to have excluded further French action, on the presumption that the French had committed themselves to Indochina's independence.

#### *Initial Measures Required*

Lacking the certainty that the French will maintain their stand in Indochina, the measures suggested in paragraph (a) of the problem statement should initially be of an immediate and contingent nature designed to do the utmost to ensure that the French will keep up their resistance. They should take the following form :

(1) The U.S. should insist with the French that the grant of sovereignty to the Associated States involves a commitment to defend the integrity of these States.

(2) Extraordinary aid short of belligerency should be continued and the British should be urged to participate.

(3) As a first step towards implementing the concept of united action, an effort should be made to obtain commitments from as many free world states in the area as feasible that they support independence for the Associated States and the maintenance of that independence against threats from any outside quarter.

(4) Voluntary contributions should be requested from the interested countries in support of the extraordinary assistance which the U.S. is furnishing the French short of belligerent action.

(5) To match any increase in effective assistance supplied by the above means, the French should be urged to send conscript levies to Indochina.

<sup>3</sup> Regarding this matter, see footnote 3, p. 595.

<sup>4</sup> Prime Minister Nehru's proposals made on Apr. 24 were transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 1596 from New Delhi, Apr. 25; see volume XIII.

(6) Common negotiating position vis-à-vis the communists should be developed which would envisage an ultimate solution safeguarding the southern frontier of Red China by the possible establishment of a neutral zone to be placed under the control of a UN peace observation committee. This would cut off further intervention by Red China and at the same time would assure world opinion that united action was aimed to protect Indochina and not to overthrow the Peking Regime.

(7) United action support should be given to Thailand for the building up of its defenses as a precautionary measure.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 333

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (McBride)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, May 2, 1954.

Participants:

<i>United States</i>	<i>Australia</i>	<i>New Zealand</i>
The Secretary	The Hon. R. G. Casey,	The Hon. T. C. Webb,
The Under Secretary	Foreign Minister	Foreign Minister
Vice Admiral Davis	Mr. A. S. Watt, Commis-	Mr. A. D. McIntosh
Asst. Secretary	sioner in Malaya	Mr. F. H. Corner
Merchant	Mr. T. K. Critchley	
Asst. Secretary	Mr. J. R. Rowland	
Robertson		
Mr. McBride		

The Secretary opened the meeting stating that he had asked his Australian and New Zealand colleagues to meet with him under the terms of reference of the ANZUS Pact which provide for such consultation when any part of the area is threatened. The Secretary said he felt the situation in Southeast Asia was such that it required consultation as called for in the ANZUS Pact. Furthermore, since all three Ministers were present in Geneva, he thought it would be useful to exchange views again, especially since the present situation requires a broad unified front.<sup>2</sup> He said he had discussed the situation with the Philippines under the terms of our pact with them and also with the French and the Associated States, and with the United Kingdom because of her interest in Malaya. He said that he had also talked with the Thais, and because of their special concern had held military conversations with them in Washington. Finally, he had talked on the general subject of the Southeast Asian situation with the Ambassadors of India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon, Japan, Na-

---

<sup>1</sup> Summary of conversation transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 73, May 3. (396.1 GE/5-354)

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on the "United Action" concept, see volumes XII and XIII.



tionalist China and the Republic of Korea. Conversations with the latter group of Ambassadors in Washington had been merely for the purpose of keeping them informed.

The Secretary continued saying that the present situation was due in large part to the lack of any strong French Government, and the French failure to put the situation on a sound basis politically in Indochina earlier. He noted that for the Western powers to appear to be engaged in Southeast Asia in helping France preserve a colonial regime would certainly not win us support from the Asian states. The Secretary said he was, however, fully aware of the problem in France where public opinion insisted that the French effort in Indochina be in support of the French Union, and pointed out it was somewhat difficult to reconcile full independence with the French Union concept. He added the French had made some progress along the lines of the British Commonwealth although their concept was not quite so liberal. He said that the Governments of the Associated States were feeble, and that Bao Dai and the King of Cambodia had hardly demonstrated qualities that would make people enthusiastic about dying for them.

The Secretary continued that some progress on achieving a united front in Southeast Asia had been made, but the situation remained unsatisfactory. He stressed that the peoples of the area were uncertain as to what issues were involved, and that it was difficult to obtain their support until the issues had been made clearer.

The Secretary then passed to the question of United States aid which he said had been enormous, and had stopped short only of acts which we felt could be considered as open belligerency. He said we could not pass to actions of this type without Congressional approval, and that it was undesirable to request such action from Congress when fundamental questions remained unanswered.

The Secretary stated that Bidault was extremely disheartened, felt that he had no remaining assets and was ready for virtual unconditional surrender. He continued that no one had yet devised any compromise that would save the situation. Partition is undesirable because it would be followed by large scale Communist infiltration south of any line that might be drawn, and furthermore the situation was unlike that in Korea because the Communists were all over the country. The solution of the problem of how to keep the south non-Communist in the event of partition had not been answered. If elections were held now the Communists would probably win, and in any event it was difficult to envisage holding elections under present circumstances, and finally, if a coalition government were established, the Communists would probably quickly take it over. Therefore our nego-

tiating position is not encouraging. In conclusion the Secretary asked his colleagues for their thoughts on the problem.

The Foreign Minister of Australia said that his thoughts were largely negative ones, but he doubted very much whether we could hold Indochina, or any of Southeast Asia, by military means without the support of the Asian countries concerned. He noted efforts had been made by the United Kingdom to make sure no damaging resolutions on the subject emerged from the Colombo Conference. Mr. Casey continued that it was absolutely essential to avoid war with Communist China since such a war would be long and terrible and the outcome was uncertain.

Mr. Casey continued recognizing the importance of United States aid to Indochina and said that the French greatly appreciated this aid and had spontaneously mentioned it to him. However, he said this was not in itself a solution. He said he saw some signs that the military situation would not develop so rapidly or so disastrously as we had feared. Dien Bien Phu might not fall, and in any event we tended to overlook the disabilities of the other side, such as the fact that the monsoon season was starting, the Communists had suffered heavy losses at Dien Bien Phu, and they would be exhausted perhaps even if it did fall.

The Australian Foreign Minister stressed no military action should be envisaged in any event during the Geneva Conference since this could be most damaging in Asian public opinion. He expressed the view that perhaps the UN should participate in the Southeast Asian problem, but did not have any specific ideas as to how this might be brought about. He mentioned Australia had already agreed to talks looking toward common action in Southeast Asia but warned the forthcoming Australian elections inhibited his Government from taking any positive action at this time. He said it would be quite wrong to commit Australia now since the Government might change in a few weeks.

He continued saying that Australia was inclined to give Geneva a chance to reach a solution during the next few weeks and that we should see if anything came out of it. He mentioned talks were going on behind closed doors, not with the other side however, regarding partition. He said he agreed with the Secretary's analysis of the disadvantages of partition. He noted furthermore that Bao Dai was opposed to partition and that the other Asian states feared it, though militarily partition at the 18th parallel might be feasible. He added possibly an alliance in the Southeast Asia area was the only answer, but stressed such a grouping should have all possible Asian participation, while we must watch very closely the colonial issue which

he knew was important in the United States, and was heavily stressed in the area.

Mr. Casey said he would see Mohammed Ali and Zafrullah Khan in Karachi on Tuesday and would talk to them along these lines as he already had with Eden. He said Ceylon might give us at least moral support, and that even in Burma the situation might not be hopeless, particularly if Ceylon should participate. He mentioned Siam had already joined in, but concluded that it would be undesirable to try to get Indonesia because that would raise the Dutch problem. He concluded if his party won the elections, Australia would take a much more positive position in this field.

The Foreign Minister of New Zealand said his delegation had been going around in circles on this problem without coming up with any answers. He said New Zealand had no enthusiasm for going into the Indochina war since it was the view of his Government the problem derived to a very large extent from French failure to grant independence to the Associated States at the proper time, as a result of which the latter were demanding much more now than they would have been satisfied with a few years ago. He said that much as we dislike Communism we were now in a difficult position because the Communists had been handed an issue on a platter by the French.

He said New Zealand could, in any event, give very little material assistance, but would not give even moral support while the Geneva Conference was in session. He said the reaction to common action outside the framework of the UN would be bad, especially with the Asians. Therefore it would be better to have the Indochina problem introduced initially into the UN. He said common action would, of course, be vetoed by the Soviets in the Security Council but that he thought the General Assembly would approve some sort of collective measures. He said that this might be the quickest way to get action anyway and such an exercise would have to be attempted before New Zealand could consider coming in.

Discussing the various alternatives Mr. Webb said it is true it would be very difficult to hold elections now and perhaps the possibility of holding a line following partition might represent the best prospect. He also noted the military situation was not too bad. Dien Bien Phu appeared to be holding out fairly firmly, and not just because the Communists were refraining from taking it for political reasons. He noted the Communists also had suffered considerably, and we should not underestimate their losses. Mr. Webb said Molotov was not keen apparently for Communist Chinese intervention in Indochina so perhaps there was some prospect for negotiations. In any event he thought negotiations should be attempted before there was any

thought of military action. He added he presumed common action in Indochina would require French consent and for reasons of pride and prestige so far France had not asked for any such assistance.

In conclusion he said that New Zealand recognized her responsibilities in the area so she would join in talks looking toward a defensive alliance of the area, but stressed it was essential to keep the South Asian countries at least neutral and if possible to try to get them on our side. He concluded with an appeal for caution.

The Under Secretary then referred to recent NSC consideration of the Indochina problem.<sup>3</sup> He agreed with the conclusions of the Foreign Minister of New Zealand that our present problem had been created to a large extent by French mistakes in the past and made the point that we had urged the French to grant independence to the Associated States at a much earlier moment.

Insofar as the military situation is concerned, he said that none of us should have any illusions about Dien Bien Phu. He said the fortress area was already so reduced that the remainder could fall at any time. He mentioned further critical positions had been lost today and the Communists can now probably take it within 24 hours. He said militarily this would not cause a collapse of the French Union effort as the French Union forces had committed much less to this effort than had the enemy. In fact he concluded the Dien Bien Phu operation had already paid dividends from the French viewpoint. However, unfortunately it has become a symbol in France and Bidault is extremely gloomy as to the effect of its fall on the morale of the French people and the National Assembly. The Under Secretary added even after the fall of Dien Bien Phu there would remain in Indochina quite strong, very well equipped, and not badly trained French Union forces.

The Under Secretary recapitulated the original plan of General Navarre and repeated that it was a sound plan which had offered a good chance of success if it were well carried out. If carried out, it would have provided a position of strength in the area, and would have resulted in effective armies of the Associated States. He noted that it provided for the establishment of 54 light battalions over each of two years. The Under Secretary added the United States contribution to this effort had been 1¼ billion dollars during the present fiscal year alone, and even this figure did not include certain additional emergency requests. The Navarre plan had kept up to schedule until three months ago and the principal disappointment had been in the quality of training. The Under Secretary stated the United States had

---

<sup>3</sup> Reference to the 194th meeting of the NSC, Apr. 29. For a summary of the discussion at that meeting, see telegram Tedul 20, p. 615.

offered to assist in this training but for reasons of sensitivity and pride the French had refused our offer though there was some possibility they would accept if we were to repeat the proposal now. He added we had been successful in the past in training forces under similar circumstances in Greece and Korea.

The Under Secretary said it had never been intended U.S. ground forces, Australian or New Zealand ground forces either for that matter, should be committed to Indochina, but pointed out that unless some new element were introduced the situation would remain very discouraging. He said if hostilities were to terminate unsatisfactorily the long border of Laos would be virtually indefensible while Thailand would urgently need assistance. He said unless strong action were taken the Communists would reach the Malayan frontier, where it would be too late to defend Malaya even if British troops were rushed to the frontier, especially in view of the Communist infiltration which has already taken place in the area. The Kra Isthmus would then be indefensible without an outside action.

Admiral Davis added most of his military information confirmed Dien Bien Phu was on its last legs, and could fall even without any large-scale Communist assault. He said after its fall the French Union forces would still have the strength to carry on militarily but it was a question whether they had the will. The Under Secretary stated the Viet Minh had put 20-25% of their assets into Dien Bien Phu, while the French Union had committed only 5-6% of its assets, and that the Communists had already lost more men than the French Union has committed in the Dien Bien Phu garrison. However, the effect in France, especially after so many years of warfare, would be greatly felt, and the officers and noncommissioned officers were French, so the effect of casualties had been felt all over the country.

The Under Secretary stated the West could not afford to commit its ground troops on the mainland of Asia, since the creation of our forces was simply too expensive to permit such a commitment. He noted the Chinese Communists had accepted an Armistice in Korea not in any sense because of losses they had suffered but because they concluded we were about to bomb their only industrial plant in Manchuria. Therefore he thought it was very desirable for us to state now that we were consulting together since it might prove a deterrent to the Communists, while if we do nothing a very grave threat will present itself in the future. Finally, he said that we do after all still have the capacity of retaliatory bombing, if the decision were taken in that sense. Admiral Davis noted from his viewpoint he also believed consultations were desirable and could certainly do no harm to anyone as no commitments were involved.

The Secretary turned to the statements made by the Australian and New Zealand Foreign Ministers with reference to the desirability of "giving Geneva a run" before taking any action. He said we agreed we could not take any military action while the Conference was in progress, but felt strongly it would be a disaster for us just to sit around. He asserted only Communist self-restraint would prevent the fall of all of Indochina now. He said neither he nor the French could see a deterrent at the present time. Accordingly, Bidault was correct when he said he had no cards to play. Furthermore Bidault's mandate, if any, is to liquidate the Indochina war, and to guarantee that no more Frenchmen are killed in Indochina after the end of the Geneva Conference. That is what the French Government and the National Assembly want, the Secretary concluded. Furthermore, he added, Bao Dai and the King of Cambodia are both playboys and have no leadership whatever to offer. They are certainly not going in any way effectively to deter the Communists.

The Secretary continued saying the choice facing the Communists was merely whether to grab Indochina all in one bite, or in little pieces and digest it as they went along. The only reason they might not take it all now is for fear of scaring the other side too much. At the present time there was not even the appearance of any alternative to eventual Communist domination of all of Indochina.

Therefore the Secretary declared he was trying to bring together a group of anti-Communist nations with interests in the area, as the knowledge such a group was consulting might cause the Communists to moderate their demands. If no action is taken until after Geneva and a disaster occurs, it will be too late. Therefore the Secretary said he would like to see military talks going on in Washington, where we have considerable information on the situation, as soon as possible.

The Secretary went on to say Eden had agreed to these talks two weeks ago when the Secretary was in London but he was not quite clear whether this agreement still stood.<sup>4</sup> However, he thought the British might come along if no intervention were involved. He said he agreed, of course, war with Communist China would be a dreadful thing, and assured the others that the United States had no intention of getting into any provocative posture with Communist China. If the Peking Government openly intervenes, then another situation would be created and we must, of course, be ready to fight at some point to preserve our fundamental values. However, the Secretary stressed that we did not intend to give the Communist Chinese any justification to attack Indochina openly.

---

<sup>4</sup> Apr. 13; see the extract of telegram 4523, Apr. 13, p. 514.

If we take no action whatever while the Geneva Conference is in progress the French, who have no will to fight, and the Associated States who have no capacity to fight, will not continue resisting and will enter into a lonely and hopeless negotiation. The Secretary agreed that the French situation was deplorable and that there was virtually no Government at the present time. For this reason above all it was urgent to have discussions among ourselves now so that we could at least make up our own minds. For example, he said, if agreement was reached on a line in Vietnam, what would we do to hold that line? At least we should examine that question among ourselves.

The Secretary added that as Mr. Casey had said the time factor was perhaps not quite so bad as it might be, and we do have the asset that the French have their troops in Indochina, and cannot evacuate them in less than several months anyway during which time the native population might turn against them. He pointed out that, since the French would in any event want to guarantee the safety of their expeditionary corps, this was a factor which might prove to be an asset on our side. He agreed that we should draw no cheer from the fact that Dien Bien Phu has not fallen as yet, as the situation there is desperate.

The Secretary added the French had made no formal request of any kind for additional United States participation except two informal requests for an air strike at Dien Bien Phu. The first had been made following General Ely's visit to Washington,<sup>5</sup> when Pleven and Bidault asked Ambassador Dillon if we could take such action, indicating they thought it might be decisive. We informed the French Government then the President considered this would be an act of war which could be taken only with Congressional consent, which he did not believe he could request at that time for various reasons, including the fact that the political situation did not appear sound to us in the Associated States nor did it to the other Asian states either. Furthermore if the states of the area did not take as grave a view of the situation as we did it would not be possible to convince the United States people of the necessity of such action.

In any event these requests were very informal, the Secretary stressed, and were not accompanied by any French suggestion for a broader United States-French relationship along lines that should be established before the creation of a wartime alliance. The French have never offered us a partnership in Indochina, and we have had nothing to do with campaign plans, training policy, etc. The Secretary added on April 22 Bidault had shown him a telegram from General Navarre

---

<sup>5</sup> For documentation on General Ely's visit to Washington, Mar. 20-25, see volume XIII.

stating a United States air strike was the only way to save Dien Bien Phu. The Secretary reiterated this was a very informal way to request such a momentous action. Accordingly he had informed Bidault at that time there was not sufficient time for Congress to act, and furthermore this request should be made in a somewhat broader framework, providing for a partnership etc.<sup>6</sup> The Secretary concluded that these are the only French requests that we have turned down except for perhaps a few minor delays in sending equipment etc. and these requests were turned down because they appeared to us to cross the line of belligerency. He said we had gone to great effort to meet other requests, and had even obtained civilian pilots for example to conduct operations which the French wanted and which we did not believe our Air Force should carry out.

Mr. Webb questioned whether the mere fact that we were discussing a common policy for the area would in fact be a deterrent and whether we would inform the Communists at Geneva that we were holding talks in Washington. He added that, of course, a point would be reached beyond which we could not go. The Secretary mentioned that at the present time no agreement existed among ourselves on what we would not tolerate from the Communists, and that accordingly at the present time they could presumably assume we would not draw the line anywhere.

The Under Secretary added it was a question of what assets we could salvage from the Indochina situation and what will emerge from the present critical problem, what is left and how we could save it. As an example, the Thais had offered to double their army. The Under Secretary did not think they could reach the 125,000 total which they had proposed, but believed an effective force of 90,000 could be built up with adequate training. Perhaps something could be done in Laos and Cambodia, he added, as well as supplying military equipment to Burma through the British mission. Finally perhaps southern Vietnam could be held and an effective force trained there, while there might also be other enclaves in Vietnam open to us. The Under Secretary pointed out until we had talked these things over among ourselves it was quite unclear where we stood. Admiral Davis added the point discussions of this type would require a long time and accordingly should get underway, noting what we were looking for now were military appreciations and not commitments.

Mr. Casey said that the Five Power Staff Agency had probably already done much of this work. The Secretary stressed again the need for some new element and made the point that the holding even of military staff talks might stiffen the French a little, and make them

---

<sup>6</sup> For a summary of the Dulles-Bidault discussion on Apr. 22, see telegram Dulte 2, Apr. 22, in volume XIII.



slightly less willing to accept surrender. The effects of French capitulation in Indochina furthermore were not limited to Asia the Secretary pointed out. The sudden descent of France into the role of a fourth-rate power would have a profound effect in North Africa, on NATO and on EDC.

The Secretary told the Australian and New Zealand Foreign Ministers it looked now as though we would start the Indochina phase here with nine powers—the four Berlin powers, the Associated States, Communist China and Viet Minh. As of the present time no tripartite position existed, and there had not even been exchanges of views. The Secretary said the French doubtless had some ideas but they had not communicated them to him, while the British had not talked to him either, and it was very questionable whether the French would accept any British play anyway. The Secretary concluded he had tried to sound out Molotov on his plans but had found out only that he was planning to sit back apparently and make our side put forth proposals.

Mr. Casey inquired whether we could not make useful propaganda of the fact the French had finally given independence to Vietnam. The Secretary stated this had not really happened yet and, while an announcement had been made, the treaties had not actually been signed. He said he understood the political treaty was now ready but the Vietnamese did not want to sign it until they had seen the draft of the economic agreement which contained certain privileges for France. Mr. Webb concluded the Vietnamese did not trust the French and accordingly we could not make much use of this. The Secretary added there was one ambiguity in the treaty and that was as to whether the Associated States could withdraw from the French Union.

Mr. Critchley of the Australian Delegation noted that the work which had been done to date by the Five Power Staff Agency was based on the assumption of an open aggression by the Chinese Communists, and accordingly its conclusions would not be useful in the present context. Therefore he said a new estimate was needed by the five powers as to what was likely to happen and what countermeasures we would take.

The Under Secretary said there was even disagreement between the appreciations of our own and the British Joint Chiefs, so it was imperative to have broader talks and evolve a common policy. He said we must decide where we would hold the line, and must prevent erosion of our position. He repeated that if for example Communist troops ever reached the Malayan frontier it would then be too late to defend that area.

The Under Secretary stressed the importance of also giving full weight to political considerations. Mr. Webb indicated his agreement that political considerations, especially colonialism as an issue, were

most important. The Under Secretary agreed noting we must have a full answer on this problem when we went to Congress to ask for additional aid for Indochina.

The Secretary concluded that the Communists had invented a type of warfare for which we had no ready antidote. They exploited any injustice in the world, and fed military power into minor dissident movements until they had become an explosive force. The problem was, that when you opposed these movements, unless you were very careful, you appeared to be supporting injustice.

Mr. Casey noted Mr. Eden's difficulties in coming along very far while the Geneva Conference was in progress, and indicated his view that perhaps working within the formula of the Five Power Staff Agency would be best from the British viewpoint. He said Australia would be glad to take part in talks on a multilateral basis, but, of course, could make no commitments until some weeks after the elections on May 29. He said Australia very much hoped that the UK would participate.

Mr. Webb asserted the New Zealand position was much the same as the Australian and agreed with the United States conclusion that we must develop a position to which we would stick. Accordingly he was willing to participate in talks on the same basis as Australia, with the general aim of stopping Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Mr. Casey added again that we should make every effort to get the Asian states on our side.

In closing the meeting the Secretary stated he thought Mr. Casey's talks in Karachi would be useful, and noted he had already talked with the Pakistan Ambassador in Washington on this subject. The Secretary made the point that East Pakistan was nearer to the danger than even India, and accordingly Pakistan might recognize the danger. The Secretary stated that since Australia and New Zealand agreed to the general idea of talks, we should explore the question with the other members of the five (UK and France) and see if they are willing also to join in talks. He asked the Australian and New Zealand delegates if they had any objections to Thailand participating in view of her obvious concern, and no objection was made.

The Secretary concluded the meeting reading the attached communiqué to which the Australian and New Zealand Foreign Ministers agreed.

[Attachment]

#### COMMUNIQUÉ

"The Foreign Ministers of Australia, New Zealand, and the Secretary of State of the United States met in Geneva on May 2, as the

Council of ANZUS to discuss the situation in South East Asia in accordance with Article Three of the Treaty.”

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 289

*The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, May 2, 1954.

DEAR ANTHONY: I am taking back to Washington for discussion with the President the Memorandum on South-East Asian Defence, which you gave me on April 30.<sup>2</sup> I think there is much in it with which we would go along. However, it does not seem to me that the eighth paragraph proposing immediate and secret joint examination between the US and the UK is in itself adequate.

Your paragraph 7 says that you do not think that a French collapse in Indochina could come about as rapidly or as completely as we appear to envisage. I hope you are right. I think, however, that our pessimistic view will almost surely prove correct if France is left at this moment with virtually no alternative to a lonely, hopeless negotiation, which will amount to unconditional surrender. I think it imperative that we inject some new element into the situation, and I believe that the least we should do would be to invite the French into at least certain phases of our talks and let this be known.

We have just had a meeting of the ANZUS Council at which Australia and New Zealand indicated a willingness to proceed with military discussions with your Government and mine and France, and with the desirability of Thailand being brought in.<sup>3</sup> This last is in accordance with the concluding paragraph of your Memorandum.

If we do nothing in the way of planning a common defense until every last detail of nature and purpose, membership and commitments is agreed upon between our two Governments acting secretly, then I fear circumstances will move against us so rapidly that what we do agree upon will have been rendered obsolete by events. Could not your Government reconsider its position as expressed in your Memorandum at least to the extent of enabling us to help provide Bidault with some element of hope, which might enable him to gather the political strength to hold off from the surrender which otherwise seems inevitable.

Faithfully yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Text of the Secretary's letter to Eden was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 45, May 3. (110.11 DU/5-354)

<sup>2</sup> Printed as an Annex to a memorandum of conversation by the Secretary of State, p. 625.

<sup>3</sup> See the memorandum of conversation, May 2, p. 654.

110.11 DU/5-454 : Telegram

*Dulles-Dinh Meeting, Geneva, May 2, Evening: The Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 4, 1954—1 a. m.

Dulte 50. Repeated information Saigon 25, Paris 182. Secretary, evening May 2nd received Vietnam Foreign Minister Dinh presented by Ambassador Heath. Dinh stated that Bao Dai had arrived at decision that Vietnam must participate in conference and would interpose no objection to Viet Minh being invited to Geneva. Vietnamese Government could not expose itself to accusation of sabotaging an international effort to find a peaceful solution of Indochina war by refusing to participate in negotiations although his government had no great hopes of their success. His government was definitely resolved to resist any proposal of partition whether at 16th, 20th or any other parallel. It would likewise refuse any proposal affecting integrity of regime, i.e., coalition government with Viet Minh. If such proposals were agreed upon by other participants, Vietnamese delegation would withdraw from conference. Secretary inquired whether that meant Vietnamese Government would prefer to have conference break up without reaching agreement, regrettable as that would be, rather than accept a proposal which would not really bring a lasting peaceful settlement. Dinh replied emphatically in affirmative. Secretary then inquired as to will of Vietnamese Government and people to continue fight if a peaceful solution were not reached in Geneva, observing that any nation determined in decision to preserve its independence would find friends and allies but would find none if there was no will to continue struggle. Dinh replied that government and people were resolved to continue fight.

Reverting to question of partition, Secretary observed that there was hardly case in history where people of country had themselves proposed or agreed to territorial partition. Partition proposals came from foreigners. He inquired whether Ho Chi Minh could logically propose partition since allegedly he was fighting for independence and territorial integrity of Viet Minh. Dinh replied that Viet Minh could not logically recommend partition.

Dinh went on to say that one Vietnamese hope was that discussions at conference would tend to induce non-Communist elements of Viet Minh to break away from Ho Chi Minh.

Dinh expressed regret at Secretary's departure and Secretary explained that he had been absent most of this year and it was necessary to renew his consultations with Congress. Dinh remarked that while American executive might have difficulties with Congress, Vietnamese Government was in even a more difficult position because there was

no Congress. It was obliged before inaugurating new measures to consult opinion of numerous political groups who were without organizational responsibility or legal standing.

SMITH

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 289

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (MacArthur)*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 2, 1954.

Participants:

<i>France</i>	<i>US</i>
Mr. Chauvel	Secretary Dulles
(Mrs. Chauvel)	General Smith
(Mr. Bidault joined	Ambassador Luce
the group later)	Mr. MacArthur
	(Mrs. Dulles)

Time: 8 p. m., May 2, 1954

Place: Secretary Dulles' dinner, Restaurant du Nord, Geneva

Mr. Chauvel outlined for the Secretary this evening the discussions which the French have had today with Mr. Dinh (Vietnamese Foreign Minister) and the conversation he had with Mr. Gromyko as follows:

In the course of the discussions with Mr. Dinh, the latter pressed very strongly for a formal letter from Mr. Bidault indicating that the French would not agree to any settlement in Vietnam involving a partition of that country. Mr. Chauvel said that Mr. Bidault had already given formal verbal assurances that France would not agree to a territorial division of Vietnam and that if now a new written assurance had to be given and carried back to Bao Dai, time would be consumed and the discussions on Indochina could not begin. Mr. Chauvel said that after some discussion (and we gathered a telephone call from Mr. Dinh to Bao Dai), it was agreed that the formal note requested by Mr. Dinh would not be a necessary precondition for the French to inform the Soviets that the Vietminh could participate in the conference. Mr. Chauvel indicated that the French had agreed that some form of letter regarding French non-acceptance of a division of Vietnam would subsequently be given to Mr. Dinh. The Secretary said that he had talked to Mr. Dinh this afternoon <sup>1</sup> and the latter had made the point that neither the Vietminh nor the Vietnam could agree to a division of their country. Whichever side first agreed to this or suggested it, would put themselves in an impossible position. The

<sup>1</sup> See telegram Dulte 50, May 4, *supra*.

Secretary made the point that this was true of Vietnam as it was in the case of Germany and North Korea where the division of the country had been imposed by occupying powers and not by the peoples of the country themselves who would not have agreed to their being divided.

Mr. Chauvel said that on the basis of the agreement with Dinh he had seen Gromyko at six o'clock this evening. He had informed Gromyko that the French and the Vietnamese Governments agreed to the participation of the Vietminh and had proposed that the invitations be sent out tomorrow morning at ten o'clock. The Soviets would invite the Vietminh and the French would invite the governments of the three Associated States to attend the conference. Mr. Gromyko replied that there might be a more formal way of inviting the Associated States and the Vietminh to participate. (Mr. Chauvel believed that he was suggesting that the invitations go out in the name of the US, UK, USSR, France, and Communist China.) Mr. Chauvel replied that there seemed to be no more need of formality with respect to the invitations to the Indochina phase of the conference than there had been at Berlin with respect to the participants of the Korean phase. Mr. Gromyko did not argue the point. After some discussion it was agreed in principle that the French would issue the invitations to the three Associated States at 10 a. m. tomorrow morning, at which time the Soviets would invite the Vietminh. Mr. Gromyko said that he would have to consult, but it was left that if he did not inform Chauvel to the contrary by 10 a. m. tomorrow the invitation would be issued on the above basis. Mr. Chauvel then said that it was important from the very beginning of the Indochina phase of the conference to separate the question of Vietnam from that of Laos and Cambodia. He had in mind that in their opening statements the representatives of Laos and Cambodia would make a statement clearly indicating that they were separate from the discussions on Vietnam. The Secretary said that he felt it was important to bring the UN to the support of this position and the thought was put forward that one possibility was to have a UN peace observation committee proposed to see that aggression did not occur against Laos and Cambodia. Mr. Chauvel said he had no clear ideas but that this was a definite possibility and one worth thinking about immediately. When asked whether the Cambodian and Laotian Governments had representatives readily available, Mr. Chauvel said that he frankly did not know. They did have representatives in Paris and one of the two governments had a high level representative at the WHO meeting at Geneva who might serve as representative, but he did not honestly know the views of the two governments as to their representation at Geneva.

He then said that in the opening statement by the French on Indochina they might make it clear that Laos and Cambodia were excluded from the area of negotiation. It was suggested to him that if the French made the opening statement in this sense, the Communist side might reply with charges that the French could not speak for the Laotians and Cambodians and at the same time the Communist side might introduce counter claims or suggestions that the problem of Vietnam could not be separated from that of Laos and Cambodia. With this possibility in mind, it would seem preferable to endeavor to arrange procedural questions so that in the first instance, the Laotians and Cambodians could speak for themselves and say that the discussions involved Vietnam and not either of the other two Associated States. Mr. Chauvel said that he felt there was merit in this idea and it should be kept in mind when the procedural arrangements regarding the order of speakers were negotiated with the Communist side.

In conclusion, Mr. Chauvel indicated a strong desire to keep in very close touch with the American Delegation, and particularly General Smith.

---

110.11 DU/4-454 : Telegram

*Smith-Eden-Bidault-Dinh Meeting, Geneva, May 3, Morning: The Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, April [May] 4, 1954—1 a. m.

Dulte 49. Repeated information Saigon 24, Paris 181. Upon Vietnamese request, Eden, Bidault and I met with Vietnam Foreign Minister Dinh morning May 3 in Bidault's office.

Dinh expressed Bao Dai's thanks for the invitation to the conference. He said Bao Dai had naturally hesitated before accepting the invitation because it involved meeting with the Viet Minh and the Communist powers. He remarked it would be necessary for him to have frequent meetings with the three of us. We replied individually that we would keep in touch with him and would undertake no important action without prior consultation with him.

Bidault said that we had a moral interest, particularly in view of the plight of the wounded at Dien-Bien-Phu, in getting the Indochina phase of the conference promptly under way and not let it bog down in procedural and organizational differences. He observed there had been agreement in Berlin that Russia would invite the Chinese and the Viet Minh while Foreign Ministers of the free countries would invite the Associated States. He suggested that the oral invitation extended at this meeting should be sufficient but Dinh replied that Bao Dai preferred written invitation. We agreed.

Dinh went on to say that his government could not justify before the people Vietnamese participation in the conference unless he were given full support against any proposal directed against the territorial integrity and political unity of Vietnam. Secondly, he made it clear that the presence of the Viet Minh should not be taken as implying recognition of the latter as constituting a state. The Viet Minh were mere insurgents. Thirdly, his government was in favor of some action being taken at the earliest moment of the conference to permit the evacuation of the wounded in Dien-Bien-Phu. Bidault and I reassured him that acceptance of the presence of Viet Minh did not constitute recognition of them. I reminded him that we did not recognize Communist China. The Viet Minh, however, constituted a fact of this war and we could not ignore this fact by refusing to confer with them in this conference. Bidault said he had tried to exclude the Viet Minh but had had to retreat from this position in the face of violent Russian intransigence. In view of the Soviet attitude it would not have been possible to have staged the conference had we insisted on barring Viet Minh attendance.

We disclosed the problem of the chairmanship of the conference and agreed that in the meeting with the Russians this afternoon the French would endeavor to get definite agreement that the chairmanship would rotate between UK, USSR and Thailand. The sharing the chairmanship would not constitute participation by Thailand in the conference. On his two days off the Thai Minister would be merely an observer. Chauvel said that in his meeting with Gromyko yesterday, the latter had concurred that the Thai Minister might be the third chairman. We agreed that if the Russians did not confirm this arrangement it would be necessary to find an outsider as a third chairman, which would be a matter of some difficulty.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-354

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Technical Secretary of the United States Delegation (Van Hollen)*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 3, 1954.

Participants:	The Secretary	Ambassador Johnson
	The Under Secretary	Mr. Phleger
	Mr. Robertson	Mr. Young

Subject: Guidance on Korea and Indochina Phases of Geneva Conference



[Here follows the initial portion of the conversation dealing with the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference; for the text, see page 182.]

*Indochina Phase*

*Participation*—Turning to the question of the Indochina Phase, the Secretary said that he understood that while our initial position was that there should be nine participants (US, UK, USSR, France, the three Associated States, Communist China, and Viet Minh), the question of additional participants should be dealt with by the conference itself at a later stage. It was particularly important, therefore, that Thailand, Australia, and the Philippines not be given a complete rebuff at the onset, and that the door be left open for their later participation. The Secretary recalled that he had assured the Philippines that, in the event the participation exceeded nine countries, he would raise the question of Philippine attendance. It was likewise agreed that the participation of Australia and Thailand might also be raised at the later stage in the Conference, particularly in view of their proposed participation in the “united action” effort in Southeast Asia.

*Chairmanship*—The Secretary commented that some consideration had been given to the possibility of asking either Prince Wan or Mr. Pearson to assume the permanent chairmanship of the Indochina phase of the Conference. Pearson had already been approached about this possibility and had indicated that, while his government probably would not be enthusiastic about his assuming such a position, they would probably go along.

The Secretary explained, however, that he had deliberately worded his resolution of April 26<sup>1</sup> recommending rotation of the chairmanship among Prince Wan, Eden, and Molotov in such a fashion that the same rotating chairmanship pattern could be retained through the entire Conference rather than through the Korean phase alone. The Secretary then read from the Communiqué of the Berlin meeting and pointed out that the words “the conference” cited in that communiqué referred to a single conference at Geneva rather than two separate conferences. Therefore, he recommended that the US adhere to the rotation of chairmanship among Prince Wan, Eden and Molotov with the understanding that if Thailand were not a participant in the Indochina phase Prince Wan could attend sessions as an observer on those days when he was not in the chair.

---

<sup>1</sup>The Secretary moved his resolution during the First Plenary Session of the Geneva Conference, Korean phase, Apr. 26. For a summary of the session minutes, see telegram Secto 10, Apr. 26, p. 144.

396.1 GE/5-354 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 3, 1954—Noon.

Secto 74. Sent Paris 171, repeated information London 111. Limit distribution. I urged Bidault last night to obtain French agreement for us to reply in next day or so to Soviet note re European security and NATO.<sup>1</sup> I pointed out that by delivering our reply to Soviets early this week we would give to world an indication of Western solidarity and strength of purpose at a time when such an indication is much needed.

Bidault indicated that there was great reluctance in Paris to send reply at this juncture. After further urging he said he would do his best to obtain French agreement so that it could be dispatched later this week. I have strong impression French are unwilling to move until after French Parliament reconvenes and possibly discusses foreign policy and till after conversations on Indochina have begun at Geneva. Therefore, suggest Dillon press the French on this later this week.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> For documentation on European security and NATO, see volume v.

396.1 GE/5-354

---

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 3, 1954.

Subject: Outline of U.S. Position and Tactics on Indochina Question at Geneva

*Presently Approved U.S. Policy*

1. Approved NSC policy applicable to the Geneva Indochina negotiations is as follows (NSC 5405, para. 25-29 approved by the President January 16, 1954) :<sup>2</sup>

25. "Employ every feasible means to influence the French government and people against any conclusion of the struggle on terms inconsistent with basic U.S. objectives. In doing so, the United States should make clear :

- a. The effect on the position of France itself in North Africa, in Europe, and as a world power.

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Charles C. Stelle, Adviser to the U.S. Delegation.

<sup>2</sup> For the full text of NSC 5405, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia," and related documentation, see volume XII.

- b. The free world stake in Indochina.
- c. The impact of the loss of Indochina.

26. Reiterate to the French :

a. That in the absence of a marked improvement in the military situation there is no basis for negotiation with any prospect for acceptable terms.

b. That a nominally non-Communist coalition regime would eventually turn the country over to Ho Chi Minh with no opportunity for the replacement of the French by the United States or the United Kingdom.

27. Flatly oppose any idea of a cease-fire as a preliminary to negotiations, because such a cease-fire would result in an irretrievable deterioration of the Franco-Vietnamese military position in Indochina.

28. If it appears necessary, insist that the French consult the Vietnamese and obtain their approval of all actions related to any response to Viet Minh offers to negotiate.

29. If the French actually enter into negotiations with the Communists, insist that the United States be consulted and seek to influence the course of the negotiations."

*The Present Situation*

2. With discussions on Indochina imminent at the Geneva Conference the essential elements of the present situation appear to be :

a. The military situation in Indochina is unfavorable. The fall of Dien Bien Phu though not in itself militarily catastrophic, will have an unsettling effect on the morale of French Union and particularly Vietnamese forces, and will expose the Delta to intensified Viet Minh activity.

b. The French Government, wobbly at best, is under heavy pressure to stop the fighting in Indochina and will spare no efforts to achieve this end. The Government may not survive the fall of Dien Bien Phu. If the present Government falls, a successor government will probably be even more willing to agree to unfavorable terms. The degree to which French concern with the French Union and France's position as a world power, the value the French place upon U.S. cooperation and assistance, French interests in North Africa and Indochina, French pride, and the technical difficulties of arranging an armistice or withdrawal may operate to inhibit the French from entering into a disastrous agreement remains to be seen. At present there are indications that certain French elements are leaning toward the idea of a coalition government as a means of stopping the fighting although as yet the French have probably reached no firm position.

c. The British are obviously firmly opposed to military participation in Indochina at this stage, and appear to be most concerned to end the fighting in order to avoid any possibility of its expansion. The British appear to be in favor of partition of Indochina as a form of settlement, although there are indications that they also would not be averse to a simple cease-fire, particularly since the British are making every effort to work out a joint position with the Asian Commonwealth powers.

d. The degree to which the Vietnamese can or will effectively oppose French inclinations cannot be accurately foretold. They are obviously concerned over the Geneva negotiations and the likelihood of French weakness in these negotiations. They have tended to look to the United States to bail them out of any situation which such French weakness might lead them to. In the absence of evidence of U.S. willingness to undertake such a rescue it is possible that they may feel that they have no choice but to fall in with French inclinations. Thus far there is no firm evidence as to what type of settlement the Vietnamese would prefer, and it is clear that there may be differences of view between the Northern Vietnamese and the Bao Dai government.

e. It appears that the Communists, although aware of the local superiority of their military and political position, are still apprehensive over the possibilities of U.S. intervention, and the possibilities of a spreading of the war. Accordingly, while sacrificing nothing of their long term interests, it is possible that they will attempt to shift from a military to a political pursuit of their objectives in Indochina, and may in fact be willing to agree to some sort of settlement in the expectation that they will in any case eventually secure control of all the area.

f. The U.S. has thus far been unsuccessful in attempts to organize an effective *ad hoc* coalition for the defense of Southeast Asia. The U.S. position also suffers from widespread foreign feeling that the U.S., in the absence of such a coalition, will not use its own forces in Indochina. There remains, however, a valuable residue of uncertainty as to U.S. intentions, particularly on the part of the Communists.

### *U.S. Tactics*

3. U.S. tactics in the first instance should be directed toward influencing the course of the negotiations to the end that no agreement will be reached which is inconsistent with basic U.S. objectives. Toward this end the U.S. should adopt the following tactics:

a. Increase as feasible Communist and Allied uncertainty as to U.S. intentions with regard to U.S. action in Indochina, and exploit whatever successes may be achieved in the organization of U.S. and Allied cooperative action in Southeast Asia.

b. Continue to make it clear to the French that we will retain full freedom of action to refrain from any agreement at Geneva.

c. Continue to set forth and endeavour to obtain French, British and Associated States agreement to the general principles which we believe must be firmly adhered to in any solution of the Indochina problem, namely that any settlement with the Communists must not (1) result in or tend to result in a turning over of the politically important and strategic area of Indochina to Communist control; (2) jeopardize the security of the French Union forces; (3) jeopardize the freedom of the peoples of Indochina who have been loyally supporting the anti-Communist effort; (4) endanger the prestige and status of France or the U.K. or ourselves.

d. Be prepared to demonstrate to our Allies, and for that matter to the Communists, the ways in which various types of settlement that

may be proposed by the Communists or by our Allies are incompatible with these general principles. To this end the Working Group is preparing detailed arguments on how such various types of proposals as (1) cease-fire, (2) partition, (3) coalition government, (4) plebiscite, or (5) immediate elections, would fail to meet our general principles and are therefore unacceptable.

*e.* Endeavour to place the French and the Associated States in the forefront of any negotiations with the Communists, toward the end that the French may experience to the fullest degree the difficulties, frustrations, and exacerbations of such negotiations.

*f.* Endeavour to stimulate the Communists to the adoption of harsh negotiating tactics and inflexible positions. The Working Group is preparing detailed suggestions of fruitful ways of playing on Communist and particularly Chinese Communist sensitivities.

*g.* Cultivate Associated States resistance to a sellout.

*h.* Wherever possible make use of possible British assistance in strengthening the resistance of the French to an unacceptable settlement.

4. The U.S. should decide whether or not it is desirable for the U.S. to put forward a proposal of its own. There can be points made for and against the U.S. putting forward a plan of its own. On the one hand the U.S. would gain something in initiative and leadership if it came forward with a concrete proposal. On the other hand a foolproof proposal which would have any chance of appearing reasonable to the French and the British is difficult to devise; the U.S. might have less freedom of action if its own proposal were made the basis for discussion; and the tactic of keeping the French in the forefront might be rendered more difficult by the U.S. making its own proposal. The Working Group is attempting to prepare a possible U.S. proposal so as to be prepared in the event it is decided to put one forward.

5. If the negotiations on Indochina reach a point where it is clear that an agreement is likely to be reached which is going to be unsatisfactory from the U.S. point of view, the U.S. will have to decide whether it should at that time disassociate itself from the negotiations or continue to be a party to them. Since such a decision would obviously have important U.S. domestic political implications, guidance from the highest level would be required. Some of the pros and cons, purely from the foreign affairs point of view, are listed below:

#### *A. Disadvantages of U.S. Participation*

1. U.S. participation in negotiations which seemed clearly to be leading toward an unsatisfactory Indochina settlement will be taken as evidence throughout Asia and the rest of the world that the U.S. has in effect backed down in the face of the Communist threat in a critically important area. As a result there will be an unavoidable loss of U.S. prestige.

2. U.S. participation in the negotiation of an unsatisfactory settlement will probably have particularly acute effects on U.S. prestige and influence in the remainder of Southeast Asia—notable in Thailand. The Thais will feel that the U.S. has marched up the hill and back again on the question of Indochina, and be tempted to believe that the U.S. would behave in similar fashion if a showdown came with respect to Thailand. Consequently the value of U.S. promises of protection and assistance may be severely depreciated in Siamese eyes.

3. U.S. readiness to participate in the negotiation of an unsatisfactory settlement might amount to relinquishment of the last available card that the U.S. has to play against French acceptance of such a settlement—French fear of provoking a profound breach between France and the United States.

#### *B. Advantages of U.S. Participation*

1. U.S. participation in negotiation of a settlement would keep the U.S. in a better position to play off the Associated States against the French, to stimulate the Communists to overreaching themselves, and in general to attempt to minimize the undesirable features of an Indochina settlement.

2. U.S. participation in the negotiation of an undesirable Indochina settlement, despite the undoubted loss of prestige involved, might place the U.S. in a better position to insert itself into the protection and shoring up of whatever remained of a Western position in Indochina and Southeast Asia after an unsatisfactory settlement. This would be particularly true in the case of a settlement involving territorial partition.

3. U.S. participation in the negotiations of an unsatisfactory Indochina settlement would assist in dispelling that fear of U.S. intransigence and suspicion of U.S. eagerness for drastic action against Communist China which has quite evidently contributed to present U.S. difficulties both with its Allies and with the neutralist countries.

4. U.S. participation in the negotiation of a settlement would lessen the possibilities of a severe breach between the U.S. on the one hand and the British and the French on the other, and would make more promising the possibilities of united action to counter the damaging effects of the settlement in Southeast Asia, as well as improve prospects for Allied cooperation in Europe.

#### *Summary*

##### *Decisions required*

1. Whether or not the U.S. should put forward its own proposals.
2. Whether or not the U.S. should disassociate itself from the negotiations if they seem likely to lead to an unsatisfactory agreement.

---

396.1 GE/5-354 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 3, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 75. Repeated information Paris 169. Chauvel tells us that violent attacks against Dien Bien Phu have suddenly stopped. French

are not certain what this means since they believe Viet Minh has capability of carrying the fortress by storm. They suspect that attacks against Dien Bien Phu are being orchestrated with Geneva negotiations with signals being called from Geneva.

DULLES

396.1 GE/5-354

*The Secretary of State to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Bidault)*<sup>1</sup>

GENEVA, May 3, 1954.

DEAR MONSIEUR BIDAULT: I leave today for Washington with regret. You will recall, however, that I said to you, Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov at Berlin that it would only be possible for me to stay in Geneva for the first days of the Conference. As it turns out, I think that I can perhaps contribute more at Washington than at Geneva to the success of the Conference. It will be difficult to achieve an Indochina peace here unless there is some alternative which can be pursued if the Communists do not make honorable proposals. The United States can, I hope and believe, make a contribution to that alternative. So far, there has been no clear decision in that respect, because the elements of the problem have been so rapidly changing. I feel confident, however, that if no honorable peace is available by agreement, you and we with others can find ways whereby we can win it by our efforts and resourcefulness; and this very fact will make more likely the possibility of an acceptable negotiated settlement.

I assure you that I return to Washington animated by a desire to contribute there to the continuing cooperation of our nations and peoples and close contact between our Governments which have been so rich in rewards both to us and to others so long as we have pursued them with fidelity.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

<sup>1</sup> The text of this letter was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 46, May 3, 1954. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 244)

396.1 GE/5-354

*The French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Bidault) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

GENEVA, May 3, 1954.

I was very greatly touched by the message which you took the trouble to transmit to me before leaving Geneva, and also by your

<sup>1</sup> The text of this letter was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 47, May 3, 1954. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 244)

communication of the contents of the telegram sent to you by President Eisenhower. The comment which he makes on the statements he made at the time of his press conference constitutes a valuable restatement of the inexact reports given in the newspapers of the continent. I need not tell you, furthermore, that I share all the sentiments you express to me on the necessity of continued and trustful cooperation between our two Governments during this Geneva conference. I know that I can count on all your personal support in that respect. Our conversations of those last few days permitted me to set forth to you with full frankness the difficulties of our position. You have seen them for yourself, and it is therefore with a full knowledge of the facts that you will be able to guide your steps in Washington along a path that is in accord with the common interests of our two countries. No French Foreign Minister has the right at this time to disregard a reasonable chance of winning acceptance of a peaceful solution of the war in Indochina; but there is the no less pressing duty of considering the measures to be taken in case the powers of the Communist bloc should not accept any of our proposals, or should themselves offer wholly unacceptable ones. I have full confidence that you will be able to bring about an understanding in Washington of the various aspects of this complex and grievous question, the developments of which, far from keeping us apart, should be an additional cause for understanding and collaboration between our two countries.

BIDAULT

---

396.1 GE/5-354

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 3, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 76. Repeated information Paris 172. Chauvel states that French delegation is working hard on proposal to be put forward at Geneva conference re Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.<sup>1</sup> He said French wished to separate out the Laos and Cambodia question from that of Vietnam so that status of Laos and Cambodia will not be compromised by infinitely more difficult problem of Vietnam. He said that as soon as French had their thoughts in reasonable shape they would wish to discuss them with General Smith<sup>2</sup> and this might be

---

<sup>1</sup>The U.S. Delegation informed the Department of State that same day in telegram Secto 81 that the French hoped to be in a position to introduce the proposal with U.S. support or at least U.S. approval at the beginning of the Indochina phase. (396.1 GE/5-354)

<sup>2</sup>Secretary Dulles departed Geneva for Washington May 3; Under Secretary Walter Bedell Smith succeeded the Secretary as head of the U.S. Delegation.



possible in next day or so. He felt it would certainly be possible to go over with us their position with respect to Laos and Cambodia not later than tomorrow.

SMITH

---

790.5/5-354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 3, 1954—8 p. m.

Dulte 48. For the Secretary. Terribly sorry to miss saying goodbye to you, but could not leave the meeting of 16.<sup>1</sup> I asked Eden to wish you safe home and give you affectionate farewell for me.

After the meeting Alan Watt, now head of Australian delegation and my former colleague in Moscow, stopped in for a private talk. He said that he and Australian delegation all deeply disturbed and distressed at position taken by Britain.

As former Minister of Defense, he was one of those who early appreciated danger inherent in SEA situation and double danger of British attitude that the "tight little island" must be considered first, was aware that in event of trouble there was only one source from which Australia and New Zealand could expect real aid and that was United States. He went on to say that the Australian delegation had been unable at any time to ascertain real British position and was never informed of events until "about five minutes too late to do anything useful". I reviewed our own position and gave him a good deal of the background, including some of Churchill's statements to Radford<sup>2</sup> which confirmed his own opinion. He concluded by saying how regrettable it was that impending election made it impossible for Australia at the moment to take a stronger line, but he felt confident that if the government won, we could count on full measure of support. He said, quite correctly, that if the government lost and the Labor Party came in, the entire defense program of Australia in which we were so greatly interested through ANZUS would break down.

After plenary session today and tomorrow, there will probably not be another until the end of the week. Spaak sent word that he would be prepared to speak Thursday or Friday, preferably Friday, so will try to have week end plenary on that date. At the meeting this morning, Eden openly and forcibly rejected every suggestion made by other

---

<sup>1</sup> Reference to the Fourth meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Korean phase. For the summary of minutes of this meeting, see p. 184.

<sup>2</sup> For a summary of this discussion, Apr. 26, see volume XIII.

participants that he speak. I am having supper alone with him tonight and will give you a report tomorrow.<sup>3</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> A report of the Smith-Eden dinner could not be found in Department of State files. Smith made reference to it, however, during a staff meeting held on May 4. For a summary of his remarks, see p. 685.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 298

*United States Delegation Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 3, 1954.

USDel/9

AN EMERGENCY PROGRAM FOR INDOCHINA

The purpose of this memorandum is to present a checklist of the various actions which might be taken by France, Vietnam and the United States (short of outright U.S. intervention) to meet the grave political and military emergency:

*By France*

(1) An announcement of an intention to continue the struggle in accordance with France's French Union obligations.

(2) Certain concrete measures of a military nature including

(a) Completion of prompt despatch of two parachute battalions already earmarked.

(b) Further reinforcements including but not limited to Groupe Mobile and armoured elements already earmarked.

(c) Speeding up of program for air force reinforcements including personnel, planes and airfields.

(d) Announcement of U.S. participation in training and supply program involving specific Vietnamese units (say three Groupes Mobiles to start). This would involve Franco-Vietnamese agreement to permit direct U.S.-Vietnamese relationship in limited aspects of military program.

(3) Rapid conclusion of political negotiations with Vietnam and Cambodia and implementation thereof at all levels.

*By Vietnam*

(1) An announcement of a determination to continue the struggle to guarantee Vietnamese independence and territorial integrity including emphasis on support being received from France in accordance with French Union obligations and from the United States and other nations in accordance with free world solidarity and security interests.

(2) Military measures designed to increase the tempo and the

---

<sup>1</sup> Name of the drafting officer was not indicated on the source text.

efficacy of the build-up of the Vietnamese National Army. Among these measures would be included the announcement of a U.S.-Vietnamese agreement for the training by the U.S. of, say, three Groupes Mobiles to be ready for active combat duty November 1, for example.

(3) A statement of political principles and intentions including an appeal for national unity based on complete independence, and, perhaps, an announcement of an intention to hold national elections as rapidly as possible after the war.

*By the United States*

(1) Reiteration of intention to support Franco-Vietnamese war effort by all possible means, including emergency airlift, planes, added technical personnel, etc., as needed.

(2) Negotiation, after consultation with French of agreement with Vietnamese Government providing for U.S. sponsored training program designed to produce by a certain date, say November 1, three or more new combat-worthy Groupes Mobiles.

(3) Direct U.S.-Vietnamese arrangements for covert operations and psychological warfare.

(4) Strong approval of new Franco-Vietnamese political arrangements.

(5) Continued energetic leadership in forging of "united action" concept into an effective instrument for use, if necessary, in attaining free world goals in Southeast Asia in the event Geneva Conference proves fruitless.

(6) Appointment of a U.S. Ambassador in Cambodia and a U.S. Minister in Laos replacing present arrangement whereby these two positions are filled by U.S. Ambassador [in] Vietnam. This measure would be politically helpful in Cambodia and Laos.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 298

*Memorandum by Joseph A. Yager of the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, May 3, 1954.

USDel/10

ARGUMENTS AGAINST PARTITION, COALITION GOVERNMENT, PLEBISCITE,  
AND IMMEDIATE ELECTIONS IN INDOCHINA

A number of types of political settlement in Indochina that may be proposed at the conference must be viewed as unacceptable in that they would probably lead to the eventual loss of the area to the Communists. This paper presents the arguments against: 1) partition, 2) coalition government, 3) plebiscite, and 4) immediate elections.

<sup>1</sup> Joseph A. Yager, Research and Reference Officer to the U.S. Delegation.

## I. PARTITION

The immediate adverse consequences of any type of partition are obvious. The area under Communist control would be expanded, anti-Communist populations would be abandoned to Communist rule, and French and US prestige would suffer. The secondary effects of partition upon areas left initially under non-Communist control are, however, equally serious. The nature of these secondary effects may be explored by considering three hypothetical cases representing different methods of partitioning Indochina :

- (a) Partition of Vietnam at the 16th parallel
- (b) Partition of Laos as well as Vietnam at the 16th parallel
- (c) Separation of all of Vietnam from Laos and Cambodia

In each case, it is assumed that French Union forces would be withdrawn shortly after partition.

*A. Partition of Vietnam at the 16th Parallel*

Partition of Vietnam at the 16th parallel would give the Communists unchallenged control over more than half of Vietnam's population, including the more energetic and virile segment of the nation's people. Economically, the Communists would gain control of Vietnam's major mineral resources, although they might encounter some minor difficulty in meeting their food deficit. Both the Chinese Communists and the Vietminh would benefit from use of the port of Haiphong.

Politically and militarily, partition would leave the Communist regime in the north at a considerable advantage relative to the non-Communist government in the south. The Communists already firmly control the bulk of the population that they would receive under the partition, and they would encounter little difficulty in consolidating their hold over their entire area. They would claim credit for the cessation of hostilities, launch a propaganda campaign for unification, and apply maximum efforts toward the overturn of the non-Communist government in the south.

In contrast to the situation in the north, the non-Communist government in south Vietnam would be hard pressed to deal with popular demoralization resulting from partition. The general public in the south would view partition as a betrayal, would be fearful of Communist military strength, and would be convinced that partition was merely the prelude to Communist control over the entire country. Even many anti-Communist politicians would believe that prudence required them to avoid identification with the non-Communist government of the south.

Communist subversive operations would find a fertile field in the south and in time the Communists would probably be able to reestab-

lish the civil war south of the 16th parallel. Eventual destruction of the government of south Vietnam from within would be likely. A possible Communist decision to hasten the fall of the southern government by external attack cannot be excluded, although it would probably be viewed as involving unnecessary risks.

### *B. Partition of Vietnam and Laos at the 16th Parallel*

Partition of Laos, as well as Vietnam, at the 16th parallel would amount to the virtual destruction of the former nation. Only about one-fifth of the land area of Laos and one-fourth of its population would remain in non-Communist hands. The area which would be left to the government of Laos by partition is a rugged and insecure region in which dissident pro-Communist Vietnamese and Laotian guerillas have been active for year. It is doubtful that any Laotian government could long rule this insignificant and insecure area.

The principal consequences of extending the partition line across Laos, however, would be the effect on Thailand. A long stretch of the Thai border would be thrown open to Communist military pressure and subversion. The danger to the Thais would be increased by the existence immediately across the border of a sizeable Vietnamese minority which already sympathizes with the Viet Minh.

The position of Cambodia would also be markedly worsened, even though Cambodia would be temporarily separated from the Communist zone by the remnant of Laos south of the 16th parallel.

The Communists would also achieve the incidental advantage of extending a buffer zone across the entire length of Communist China's border with Indochina.

### *C. Separation of Vietnam from Cambodia and Laos*

If the Communists were to gain all of Vietnam in a negotiated settlement, they would control roughly five-sixths of the entire population of Indochina. The process of extending Communist control throughout the large areas of central and southern Vietnam now held by the French Union would presumably take somewhat longer than consolidation of the northern portion alone. There would be some opposition, particularly in South Vietnam, to Communist efforts to consolidate control, based as much on regional animosities as on ideology. It is probable, however, considering the powerful military and political organization that the DRV could apply to these problems, that they could establish control over the entire country in a relatively short period of time.

The political pressures that a Communist Vietnam would apply against the smaller and weaker Laos and Cambodia would be great. There would be little prospect, barring extensive foreign assistance,

that Laos and Cambodia would be able long to withstand the pressure of a Communist Vietnam.

## II. COALITION GOVERNMENT

Little basis exists for formation of coalition governments in Laos and Cambodia. Therefore, examination of this type of settlement may be confined to Vietnam.

A coalition government in Vietnam might take one of two general forms: a) inclusion of non-Communists in the Ho government or, b) inclusion of Communists in the Bao Dai government.

The former arrangement would at best create a "democratic" facade for a thoroughly Communist regime. The insignificant role played by the so-called democratic personages in Peiping serves to illustrate the best that non-Communist ministers could hope for in the Ho government. At worst, and this result would appear the more likely, the fate of the non-Communist members of the Ho government would be similar to that of non-Communist members of the post war governments in Eastern Europe.

If coalition government took the form of bringing Communists into the Bao Dai government, complete Communist control of Vietnam would not come about immediately but would almost certainly result eventually. The number and nature of the ministries assigned to Communists in the coalition government would make little difference. By the mere fact of forming a coalition government most military and police restrictions on Communist activities would be removed. The Communists with their efficient political organization would soon overcome their relatively disorganized adversaries. A "legal" Communist takeover by means of "elections" or through a Czech-style coup would probably follow. In the unlikely event that political means proved insufficient to achieve their objectives, the Communists could at any time employ their overwhelming military and paramilitary superiority to seize power by force.

## III. PLEBISCITE

If a plebiscite were held to permit a popular choice between the Communist and non-Communist regimes in the Associated States, the Communists would probably lose in Laos and Cambodia, but would almost certainly win in Vietnam. In the two smaller states, the absence of strong indigenous Communist organizations and the popular prestige of the two royal houses would probably insure a non-Communist result. In Vietnam, however, the general acceptance of Ho Chi Minh as the standard bearer of Vietnamese nationalism, and, even more important, the extensive and efficient Communist organization would make Communist victory in a plebiscite almost certain.

If a plebiscite were held without effective outside supervision, the Communists would return virtually 100% of the vote in the areas that they now control. Since Communist areas now probably contain 60% of the population of Vietnam, the Communists could muster a majority, irrespective of the large vote that they might expect to obtain in non-Communist areas. Outside supervision might reduce the margin of Communist victory, but even in the best of circumstances could not be expected to change the final result.

#### IV. IMMEDIATE ELECTIONS

As in the case of plebiscite, immediate elections for national assemblies in each of the Associated States would probably result in non-Communist victories in Laos and Cambodia and in a Communist victory in Vietnam. The result of such an election in Vietnam is, however, somewhat less predictable than is the result of a plebiscite. Local issues and the personalities of candidates would complicate the situation, and non-Communist nationals who might vote for the Ho regime in a plebiscite would find other choices open to them in an election. Nevertheless, it appears likely that superior Communist organization would achieve at least a plurality of seats in an assembly election in Vietnam. Any government formed in these circumstances would probably contain Communist ministers, with consequences discussed above under the heading "coalition government". If a government was formed without Communist participation—which appears most unlikely—the Communists would still be in a position to exercise their formidable political and paramilitary potentials and would constitute a serious threat to the new government.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 265

*Action Summary of the Special Advisers to the United States  
Delegation of the Under Secretary of State's Staff Meeting*<sup>1</sup>

[Extract]

SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 4, 1954.

. . . . .

4. Following is a summary of the Under Secretary's remarks on our position in Indochina:

a. Our present official position is that:

1) We have underwritten the Navarre Plan and we will stick with it.

---

<sup>1</sup> Name of the drafting officer not indicated on the source text.

2) The fall of Dien Bien Phu should not deter the French or us from going ahead with the plan to put down the rebellion.

Although this is our official position, there are various alternatives which we should consider and develop our position and tactics on. A major factor is the French political reaction to the events at Dien Bien Phu.

The French ideas about a cease-fire and withdrawing into enclaves would probably result in the loss of the whole area.

We should not be in a great hurry to get on with the Indochina phase of the Conference although both the British and the French are.

The Under Secretary summarized his talk with Eden last night :

1) Eden will give General Smith on an *eyes only* basis, a paper which will state the strongest language the British can use in any announcement re military staff talks on Southeast Asia. It will be necessary for them to tie these talks in with the end of the Geneva Conference.<sup>2</sup>

2) It was agreed that the U.S. will work on Thailand the UK on Burma and we will see what we can do with the French and the Associated States in order to minimize our losses in Indochina.

The General said that he believed we could get more from the British than was indicated from his talk with Eden. He referred to his possible visit to London to see the Prime Minister. He believed that we could get out an announcement in a day or two on military staff talks in Washington.

---

<sup>2</sup> For the text of this paper, see telegram Dulte 51, May 5, p. 698.

396.1 GE/5-454

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal)*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 4, 1954.

Participants: Ambassador Pote Sarasin, Ambassador to Washington and Member of Thai Delegation

Philip W. Bonsal

Subject: General Conference Topics

The Thai Ambassador lunched with me. He raised the question of participation in the Indochina phase of the Conference. I told him



that, so far as I was aware, the initial organization would be on the basis of nine countries, i.e., the four Berlin powers, the three Associated States, the Vietminh and Communist China. I said that it was not excluded that at a later date other interested states would be invited.

The Ambassador stressed the importance of an extremely close contact between the Thai Delegation and ourselves regarding developments at the Indochina discussions. I agreed fully and said that I thought we would wish to arrange for a regular machinery for contacts of this kind. After some discussion we arrived at the very tentative personal conclusion that presumably the British would brief the Commonwealth countries (Australia and New Zealand) and the US would keep Thailand and the Philippines up to date on Indochina developments. The Ambassador will discuss this further with Prince Wan.

The Ambassador was pleased to note that conversations are about to begin in Washington in which the Thai representatives (the Chargé and the Military Attaché) will participate and at which ways and means of strengthening the Thai military position will be examined. The Ambassador said that if necessary he himself would be glad to fly back to Washington. He could be replaced here by someone from the Thai Foreign Office.

The Ambassador expressed the view that the unsatisfactory British attitude toward the concept of "united action" was not due so much to opposition to what we had in mind as to a desire to maintain an apparent independent UK and British Commonwealth position to avoid any appearance of ready acquiescence in American proposals no matter how meritorious they might be. I expressed interest in this analysis. I said that whatever the reasons, British reluctance to proceed vigorously with the "united action" concept was making the whole problem of developing a strong free world position at Geneva and in Southeast Asia more difficult. He said that he agreed but he expressed confidence that the British would eventually line up with us and that they would get considerable Commonwealth support. He asked me about the attitude of Australia and New Zealand. I said that I had no information about New Zealand but that it was my impression Australia was fully aware of the urgency of a united free world attitude in the face of the Communist design to seize all or a part of Indochina.

In speaking of Cambodia and Laos the Ambassador expressed the view that he expected the relations of those two countries to grow ever closer with Thailand.

396.1 GE/5-454 : Telegram

*Heath-Jacquet Meeting, Geneva, May 4, 1954, Afternoon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 4, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 95. Repeated information Saigon 29, Paris 193. Limit distribution. This afternoon Heath spoke with Jacquet, French Secretary of State for the Associated States just before the latter's departure to Paris to consult with his party (URAS) which, Jacquet said, was "getting out of line" and with Bao Dai and Prime Minister Buu Loc.

To the question as to how he saw the conference developing Jacquet replied "speaking not as a minister, but personally and very frankly", he saw only one "possible peaceful solution". That "solution" was national elections to be deferred as long as possible while the United States poured in money in economic aid on a scale almost equivalent to its present program of arms aid and budgetary support. He thought it would be unnecessary to have a cease-fire during this period of waiting for the elections. The Franco-Vietnamese forces were strong enough themselves to handle the situation in the south and center. In the north, the French would have to concentrate their positions perhaps in a zone 40 kilometers or so wide between Haiphong and Hanoi including both cities. He said he would not discuss Cambodia and Laos which presented a separate and lesser problem.

Partition, he said, was no solution. It would be rejected both by the Vietnam Government and the Viet Minh. France could not even suggest such a solution.

He then went on to say again, speaking "personally", that the "solution" of deferred national elections was no true solution. Within a year or two after them, the Chinese and the Viet Minh would take over Indochina by military force.

The only real solution, he felt, would be for United States to intervene militarily in limited force on the side of French and the Vietnamese. He, of course, did not know whether the United States would or could so intervene. He felt certain that American intervention confined to furnishing air and naval support would be sufficient. If we were at all considering intervening, we should do so or decide to do so within the next two months. If delayed beyond that time, our intervention would occur "on the ruins" of the French military effort in Indochina and there would be bitter feeling in France over the delay. From his personal point of view, it was regrettable that we had not judged it desirable or possible to intervene to save Dien Bien Phu where the fortifications might fall even tonight.

Jacquet said that he personally was glad that the Secretary had decided to return to the States in order to present there the grave problems of Indochina and the Conference.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/5-454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 4, 1954—5 p. m.

Secto 89. Repeated information Paris 186. Reference Secto 76, repeated Paris 172.<sup>1</sup> We told Margerie today that continued French failure to advise us of their thinking on possible armistice proposals despite their almost daily statements for last two weeks that they would communicate them to us shortly was giving rise to suspicions that French were holding out on us and might be concocting proposals with British. He was wryly amused and assured us that French had had no contact with British on subject and that they were almost as annoyed with British as we were for preventing progress toward united action and for talking about partition.

Margerie explained that sole reason they had not communicated any proposals to us was that they had so far been unable to agree upon any among themselves. He commented on mutual dislike of Bidault and Jacquet and said delegation had so far been unable to get both their agreement to anything, which augured ill for obtaining Cabinet approval. He repeated earlier indications of French thinking that they would like to propose complete evacuation by Viet Minh of Laos and Cambodia to be followed by cease-fire arrangements in different parts of Viet Nam at different times under international control with regrouping of French forces in key areas. He felt satisfactory arrangements might be made for Laos and Cambodia much more quickly and easily than for Viet Nam but one problem was to avoid impression in France that government was ducking difficult Viet Nam problem which was most acute militarily. He indicated full realization of near impossibility of preventing communists from profiting by any cease-fire or armistice arrangement but said that in a thoroughly bad situation it was necessary to seek course with least evil consequences and he repeated hope France could make proposals early in Indochina phase with US support. He was told US would much prefer to support French proposals than to oppose them but that our policy was still that anything short of prosecution of Navarre plan to victory was not good enough. He said that was "large order" but nevertheless be-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 3, p. 678.

lieved we would not be "too unhappy" over French thinking if it crystallized along its present lines. He added that if we did not like it, we would not, unless we were prepared to intervene militarily, be in too good a position to object to French making it. He reiterated that they would give us their thinking as soon as it had any status whatever and that he would urge Bidault to undertake or authorize fullest and soonest consultation with us.

SMITH

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 265

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Davis) to the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Robertson)*

TOP SECRET

[GENEVA,] 4 May 1954.

Subject: Outline of U.S. Position and Tactics on Indochina Question at Geneva.

Reference: Paper on above subject submitted by Chairman of the Indochina Working Group, dated May 3, 1954.<sup>1</sup>

1. The referenced paper gives me concern because, in general terms, it tends to suggest favorable consideration of U.S. participation in the negotiation of an undesirable Indochina settlement.

2. I continue to believe that, while we should seek to influence the course of the negotiations, as required by paragraph 29 (quoted on page 1 of the reference) of NSC 5405, the U.S. should, nevertheless, have no part in the negotiation of an undesirable Indochina settlement.

3. Our present position as stated by General Smith this morning is, of course, entirely sound. Every effort should continue to be made to brace up the French to the end that they accept the practicability of continuing the war as against the impossibility of any "settlement" that would not lead now or shortly to the loss of Indochina.

4. The question is, how to influence the course of negotiations without being tarred with a sell-out brush. It seems clear to me that we should, in addition to continuing the effort to rally French morale:

*a.* Obtain U.S. authorization on highest levels now that we take a firm position with the French that we shall not accept any unsatisfactory terms (terms leading now or shortly to the loss of Indochina); and that we shall definitely disassociate ourselves from any such negotiations.

---

<sup>1</sup>Memorandum by Heath, "Outline of U.S. Position and Tactics on Indochina Question at Geneva," May 3; see p. 672.

b. Make every effort now to obtain French agreement neither to offer nor accept any terms, or negotiated modifications of terms, that would amount to an unsatisfactory settlement.

c. Let the French know now that we shall not be a party to an unsatisfactory settlement.

5. The foregoing is based on my opinion that it would be illusory to believe that our association with unsatisfactory terms could, even at best, alter appreciably the fact that the terms were unsatisfactory; and that there could be no better way to encourage a French sell-out than to give them any impression, now or later, that any form of sell-out would have U.S. blessing or support. Conversely, the actions recommended in paragraph 4 above have a better chance of preventing agreement by the French to unsatisfactory terms than would our helping them in the crime.

6. I realize, of course, that we must await French reaction to the fluid military situation in Indochina before reaching firm conclusions as to what the French position may be. Meanwhile, however, we shall be helping to encourage the development of a French sell-out position if we imply in any way that we might go along with it.

7. In consistency with the foregoing, I strongly recommend with respect to the "Decisions Required" in the referenced paper that the U.S. by no means get entangled in the predictably unsatisfactory results of negotiations by submitting its own proposals.

8. You may regard this memorandum as political. I submit it because I regard it as political-military. In any case, it reflects the viewpoints of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.

A. C. DAVIS

---

396.1 GE/5-554 : Telegram

*President's News Conference, Washington, May 5, 10:30 a. m.:*<sup>1</sup> *The Department of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>2</sup>

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1954—5:31 p. m.

Tosec 76. Following statement was read by President at press conference today:

With the return of the Secretary of State from Geneva, there will of course be a series of conferences on foreign affairs both within the Executive Department and between the Secretary of State and bipartisan groups of the Congress. Because of these forthcoming con-

---

<sup>1</sup> For the record of the President's news conference, including the text of his statement, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, pp. 450-459.

<sup>2</sup> Drafted by Phillips of P.

ferences and the probability that the Secretary of State will himself have something to say, and because, also, of the delicate nature of the issues now pending before the Geneva Conference, I shall limit my comments on the Indo-China situation to a brief written statement.

United States foreign policy has consistently supported the principles on which was founded the United Nations. A basic expression of this policy was the Vandenberg Resolution of 1948. The United States believes in assuring the peace and integrity of nations through collective action and, in pursuance of the United Nations principle, has entered into regional security agreements with other nations. Examples are the Inter-American Agreement, the NATO Agreement, and a whole series of Pacts in the Pacific. These arrangements are invariably to assure the peaceful security of the contracting nations and to prevent likelihood of attack; they are not arrangements designed primarily for waging war.

The Geneva Conference, now nine days old, has produced no surprises. The expressed fears of some have proved unfounded.

It has not been a "five-power" conference as the Soviet Union tried to make it.

It has not involved establishing express or implied diplomatic recognition by the United States of the Chinese Communist aggressors.

The Korean phase of the Conference has been organized. Here the Communists came up with a scheme for Korean unification which was a Chinese copy of the Soviet scheme for the unification of Germany. Under their proposal no election measures could be taken without Communist consent, and there could be no impartial supervision of the election conditions or of the voting.

This scheme was rejected for Germany. Secretary Dulles tells me that it is equally unacceptable to the Republic of Korea and United Nations members which took part in the Korean War under the United Nations Command now represented at Geneva.

The Indo-China phase of the Conference is in process of being organized and the issues have not yet been clarified. In this matter a large measure of initiative rests with the Governments of France, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which are the countries most directly concerned.

Meanwhile plans are proceeding for the realization of a Southeast Asia security arrangement. This was publicly suggested by Secretary Dulles in his address of March 29th. Of course, our principal allies were advised in advance. This proposal of the Secretary of State was not a new one; it was merely reaffirmation of the principles that have consistently guided our post-war foreign policy and a reminder to

interested Asian friends that the United States was prepared to join with others in the application of these principles to the threatened area. Most of the free nations of the area and others directly concerned have shown affirmative interest, and conversations are actively proceeding.

Obviously, it was never expected that this collective security arrangement would spring into existence overnight. There are too many important problems to be resolved. But there is a general sense of urgency. The fact that such an organization is in process of formation could have an important bearing upon what happens at Geneva during the Indo-China phase of the Conference.

The countries of the area are now thinking in constructive terms, which include the indispensable concept of collective security. Progress in this matter has been considerable and I am convinced that further progress will continue to be made.

Following are questions and answers:

Q: Secretary Dulles has drawn his sharpest criticism since taking office because of what some people are contending is a major diplomatic defeat for American foreign policy at Geneva. Do you have any comment on that?

A: You can't count a battle lost that is still going on; but I would say further United States' foreign policy, like the foreign policy of all other nations, is designed in this belief: that it serves the enlightened self-interest of the country that it is supposed to reflect, that it is drawn up in favor of.

Now, we continue to work along that line. If any ally disagrees or if someone with hostile intent is able to put over some idea of his, you continue to work; you never give up working persistently and as intelligently as you know how for the best interests of the United States. So there is no such thing as acknowledging a defeat in the execution of foreign policy, as I can see it.

Q: Are you fully satisfied with Secretary Dulles' handling of the Geneva negotiations, and do you expect him to return there?

A: The need for his return or not returning will be determined by himself. After all, he is a mature man and an experienced man.

I would say this: I would never answer a question with respect to anyone, did he over a period of weeks act exactly, let's say, according to standards of perfection.

I will repeat this; Foster Dulles, in my opinion, is the greatest Secretary of State in my memory, and he has my unqualified support in what he is doing, and so far as I know, I have agreed in advance to every policy he has ever brought forward.

396.1 GE/5-554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, May 5, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 105. Repeated information priority Paris 200. Chauvel summoned Achilles and Dennis Allen this morning to state that French Parliamentary situation was serious both for government and Bidault personally and that Bidault might have to return there tonight. He would decide after talking to Falaize who was returning from Paris this afternoon. In this situation Bidault felt it important to make beginning on Indochina phase as soon as possible, preferably by routine organization meeting tomorrow with no substantive discussion before next week. He understood Cambodian and Laotian Ambassadors in Washington had reached Paris last night and assumed delegations from all three Associated States could be here tomorrow. French could not be in position of dragging feet should Russians propose meeting tomorrow. Chauvel has appointment with Gromyko for four this afternoon to discuss chairmanship and opening date.<sup>1</sup> On chairmanship, he would again propose three existing chairmen continue throughout conference but suggested that as second choice we propose Prince Wan in individual capacity as single chairman for Indochina phase. French would not agree to rotation on 50-50 basis.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Summary of Chauvel-Gromyko meeting reported in telegram Secto 109, May 5; see p. 700.

396.1 GE/5-554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, May 5, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 106. Repeated information priority Paris 201, priority London 121, Saigon 33. Re Secto 89, repeated Paris 186.<sup>1</sup> Following is outline given this morning by Chauvel to Dennis Allen and Achilles of proposal which Bidault last night sent to French Cabinet for authorization to make when substantive discussion of Indochina starts:

1. Vietnam problem is purely Vietnamese with no question of partition, only military struggle for control of government.
2. Situation different in Laos and Cambodia which are victims of external aggression.
3. Under Berlin agreement purpose of Geneva conference is to establish peace in all three countries. To this end there should be a

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 4, p. 689.



cease-fire guaranteed by adequate military and administrative controls under supervision. Cease-fire would take effect only when such guarantees had been embodied in armistice conventions, which might be different for each three states, and when control machinery had been established and was in place. Controls would be based upon Laniel's March 5 conditions.<sup>2</sup> When cease-fire occurred, regular troops would be regrouped into delimited areas and all other forces disarmed. The control machinery would be "international" and would require considerable body of personnel.

4. After peace had been re-established by the cease-fire, political and economic problems could be examined.

In discussing this draft proposal Chauvel said French assumed Russians would propose immediate cease-fire followed by political settlement based on coalition and immediate elections, which would force West into position of opposing cease-fire. French public desire for cease-fire was emotional and French Government could defend its proposal, even though it would in effect delay any cease-fire for long time if not indefinitely, on grounds that conditions demanded were essential for safety of troops themselves. The continued resistance at Dien Bien Phu long after public opinion had discounted its fall had conditioned French opinion to believe its loss would not mean loss of war. He did not exclude possibility of conference calling on opposing forces not to undertake new military operations during negotiations. He assumed very lengthy negotiations would be necessary to reach any armistice agreement and felt that during this period Communist uncertainty as to united action or US intervention might be increased.

Allen inquired whether at some stage in proceedings working out of armistice details might be left to combatants themselves as suggested in Colombo communiqué.<sup>3</sup> Chauvel did not like this idea but said it might be considered. In response to question as to whether he envisaged conference turning into indefinite Panmunjom Chauvel said it might turn armistice negotiations over to working group and adjourn to reconvene when warranted.

In response to Achilles inquiry as to whether "international" meant "UN" supervision, Chauvel stated French had no firm position on this but subsequent discussion indicated French continue to oppose use of UN machinery as establishing precedent which would be used against them in North Africa and elsewhere and that British definitely share

---

<sup>2</sup> Laniel's conditions proposed on Mar. 5 are contained in telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6; see p. 435.

<sup>3</sup> Communiqué issued by Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan following their meeting at Colombo, Apr. 28-May 2. Text printed in *Documents on International Affairs, 1954*, pp. 166-169. For a report by the Ambassador in Ceylon (Crowe) on discussions at this conference, see telegram 339 from Colombo, Apr. 29, p. 610.

their point of view. Allen suggested something like peace observation commission would be preferable to UN auspices. Achilles stressed importance of insisting on UN auspices.

Chauvel said studies by French military had confirmed their impression that withdrawal of French Union Forces from Cambodia and Laos except for two bases in latter would be of definite military advantage rather than disadvantage.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, May 5, 1954—5 p. m.

Secto 110. Repeated information Paris 203, London 123, Saigon 34. Department pass CIA and Defense. Re Secto 106 repeated Paris 201, repeated London 121, repeated Saigon 33.<sup>1</sup> Tentative French proposal contained reference telegram was orally outlined to Achilles and Allen by Chauvel. We are asking French for written text proposal as approved by Cabinet and warning them time required obtain US Government decision on whether support their proposal after text received. Believe outline in reference telegram provides basis urgent preliminary consideration Washington. Request instructions soonest.

Meanwhile, preliminary USDel comments follow :

1. Unless or until we have firm support in the United States for some other solution we are not in a position in Geneva to prevent the French from making such a proposal, which is far below a successful prosecution of the Navarre plan.

2. Draft proposal, if accepted by French Cabinet, would provide somewhat better French initial position than might have been feared.

3. Distinction drawn between Vietnamese situation one hand and that Laos and Cambodia on other, is valid and should be useful negotiating point.

4. Key element of draft proposal is that cease-fire should take effect only when "adequate military and administrative controls under supervision" have been embodied in armistice conventions, and when control machinery has been established and is in place. It is perhaps encouraging that proposal is predicated on a long if not indefinite delay in negotiating the armistice conditions and that French believe they can justify this to French opinion on grounds that the conditions are essential for safety of French troops themselves. On the other hand, we must realize that pressure will be very great for hasty conclusion of an agreement.

5. French statement they are not excluding "possibility of conference calling on opposing forces not to undertake new military opera-

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

tions during negotiations" makes it clear that once discussions of armistice have begun there will be real danger of military operations slacking off into what may be in effect *de facto* cease-fire prior to agreement on control conditions.

6. If the French in effect take the Laniel statement<sup>2</sup> as their starting point this is probably the best initial French position that could be expected, given the present French mood.

7. Allen's suggestion that working out of armistice details might be left to combatants themselves is obvious echo of Nehru proposals<sup>3</sup> and would seem dangerous in that it might weaken US capacity to influence negotiations.

8. In view firm position we taking in Korean negotiations on UN supervision it would seem advisable for us urge French accept UN auspices for control machinery if it is decided we should support French proposal.

9. We doubt whether French would in fact remain firm in negotiations for satisfactory controls, and believe they would slide rapidly toward almost inevitable Communist counter proposal of immediate cease-fire without controls. Important element in blocking French capitulation will be, as French have suggested, the degree to which we on our part can strengthen the French hand by increasing Communist uncertainty as to possibility of US intervention and by achieving success in organization some form South East Asian coalition.

Our soldiers have never told us the minimum we can accept. If we knew this I am confident I can persuade the British to go along with us.

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> Made on Mar. 5 and reported to the Department of State in telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, p. 435.

<sup>3</sup> Made on Apr. 25 in New Delhi; outlined in a memorandum dated Apr. 30, p. 635.

---

396.1 GE/5-554 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, May 5, 1954—6 p. m.

4212. Repeated information Geneva 172, Saigon 496. In the course of yesterday's Assembly discussions on Indochina which led last night to the government's request for a vote of confidence, Laniel made the following statement *inter alia*:

"It will depend tomorrow on the Viet Minh, which is invited to the Geneva conference, to realize the hopes we have placed in it (for a counterproposition leading to a cease-fire). But one must not expect from us a pure and simple capitulation. To accept a cease-fire today, at the demand of Ho Chi Minh, would simply mean to lay down our arms. Parliament never gave us (the government) such a mandate. If it had it would be up to another government than mine to carry it out. Instructions have been given accordingly to the French delegation at Geneva."

In the light of the above I do not think it appropriate for me to make formal representations to Laniel or Maurice Schumann as suggested Deptel 3944 repeated Geneva Tosec 69.<sup>1</sup> I am seeing the latter this evening, however, on another subject and will take occasion to touch on this subject.

DILLON

---

<sup>1</sup>In telegram 3944 to Paris, May 4 (396.1 GE/5-354), Acting Secretary Robert Murphy informed Ambassador Dillon that he strongly supported Under Secretary Smith's suggestion made in telegram Secto.78 "that at your discretion you talk to Laniel or Maurice Schumann along lines Secretary's letter (Dulte 46)." For telegram Dulte 46, May 3, containing the Secretary's letter to Bidault, see p. 677. In telegram Secto 78, May 3 (396.1 GE/5-354) the Under Secretary reported that he would be discussing with Bidault or Chauvel a concern raised by Dejean with McClintock (see telegram 2181 from Saigon, May 3, in volume XIII) that certain Ministers of the French Government would advise a policy of asking for an immediate cease-fire in Indochina in order to save Dien Bien Phu. The Under Secretary said he was "confident that Bidault would not take such action, certainly not without informing us, except under specific orders from Cabinet and that he would be most reluctant to do so even then."

---

790.5/5-554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 5, 1954—7 p. m.

Dulte 51. London eyes only Ambassador. Repeated information London 122. Eden has just given me the memorandum which follows:

"In his statement in the House of Commons on April 27, the Prime Minister said:

'Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to give any undertakings about United Kingdom military action in Indochina in advance of the results of Geneva. Her Majesty's Government have not entered into any new political or military commitments. My Right Honorable friend has, of course, made it clear to his colleagues at Geneva that if settlements are reached at Geneva, Her Majesty's Government will be ready to play their full part in supporting them in order to promote a stable peace in the Far East.'

"I am ready to recommend that Her Majesty's Government should take part at once with the United States, France, Australia and New Zealand in an examination by the Five Power staff agency of the Indochina and South East Asia situation, both now and subsequent to the Geneva conference, in the light of this statement, including the implications of any Geneva settlement. In addition to military questions, there will certainly be political and economic problems which will require urgent examination. For this purpose we suggest that political and economic experts should be attached to the agency as appropriate.

"This study would be of direct interest to a number of other countries, notably the powers represented at the Colombo conference and Siam. It would be understood that these countries would be informed of the intention to initiate the study, kept suitably advised of the progress of the work and, where appropriate and by agreement, invited to take part.

"A joint public announcement of our intentions would be issued. It would, of course, be essential that this should be carefully considered and agreed upon.

"The present terms of reference of the Five Power staff agency would require amendment in order to make clear the circumstances to which the study is to apply."

This represents a number of redrafts since I received his proposed draft note late yesterday evening. We have had lengthy and I believe frank discussions, and I am sure the British understand our position as we understand theirs. The note represents a considerable compromise on their part and includes suggestions made not only by me but by Phleger and Admiral Davis. We believe here that if accepted it will have a good effect on the conference and on the public opinion of both countries, and should produce a coordinated military view, which is now lacking. Eden has suggested informally that the Five Power agency be strengthened by the assignment of some senior and experienced officers. He went so far as to imply that General Templar, who will shortly become CIGS, might take part in the examinations and plans which are proposed. Our recommendation is that you concur in this proposal.<sup>1</sup> If so, please give me your views as to the form of joint public announcement which would be acceptable. This will not be taken up with the French until both London and Washington have concurred.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Secretary Dulles in telegram Tedul 32, May 6, informed Under Secretary Smith that "Dulte 51 represents good progress. Shall discuss NSC meeting this morning and cable thereafter." (396.1 GE/5-654) For a report on action taken on this matter by the National Security Council, see telegram Tedul 36, May 6, p. 705.

---

396.1 GE/5-554 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 5, 1954—8 p. m.

4220. Sent Geneva 176, Saigon 498. During meeting with Maurice Schumann devoted primarily to Saar, I raised subject of Secto 78<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, p. 698.

and Schumann said that the thoughts expressed in the Secretary's letter to Bidault were excellent. The only difficulty with letter was that it had not been made public and so did not have any effect on the Chinese. Schumann was depressed regarding the prospects for a negotiated settlement at Geneva. He said that Bidault had been deprived of all his cards and that therefore he, Schumann, did not have much hope that Viet Minh or Chinese would accept a reasonable settlement. While he did not say so directly, it was clear that he fears that the French Government may eventually be forced to accept pretty much any settlement put forward by the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists.

DILLON

---

396.1 GE/5-554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 5, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 109. Repeated information Paris 202. Reference: Secto 105, repeated Paris 200.<sup>1</sup> Chauvel states Gromyko raised objection to present three chairmen or Wan alone or any outsider or to letting nine choose.

He proposed rotation among five or among four (leaving out France as participant in fighting), both of which Chauvel of course rejected. Chauvel stated rotation of UK and USSR unacceptable to French.

Although he might easily have done so Gromyko made no mention of including India or additional participants.

Molotov dining with Eden tonight and they will discuss it further, with Eden again pressing for either rotation of three or Wan alone.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 5, p. 694.

---

396.1 GE/5-654 : Telegram

*Achilles-Allen-Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, May 6, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 6, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 124. Repeated information Paris 212, London 131. At this morning's Chauvel-Allen-Achilles meeting, Chauvel asked reactions

to French proposal (Secto 106, May 5, repeated information Paris 201, London 121, Saigon 33<sup>1</sup>) :

Allen stated British thinking in general agreement French proposal along right lines and hoped it would be presented at outset of Indochina discussions as clear cut proposal which would capture headlines. British feared that if Bidault spoke only in general terms, Communist bloc would present concise proposal which would take headlines and leave West in position of trying to formulate counter-proposal. Chauvel recognized importance of French obtaining initiative insofar as public concerned and said he would urge Bidault to table short and specific proposal.

In his response to question as to United States attitude, Achilles said this depended on Washington, since current instructions were that anything short of complete victory unacceptable. We would need precise French proposal soonest. Delegation liked French insistence armistice be concluded only under satisfactory safeguards, which implied time for strengthening Western position in Southeast Asia, but frankly feared pressures in France for earlier agreement to unsatisfactory armistice. Chauvel recognized this danger, but felt immediate future most critical time and that if we survived (1) tomorrow's confidence vote, (2) commit attempt to extend possible Dien Bien Phu truce into general cease-fire, and (3) fall of Dien Bien Phu, we would have several months during rainy season when pressure of French opinion would be less than in recent weeks, or at present time.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 5, p. 694.

751G.00 /5-654 :Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 6, 1954—11 a. m.

Secto 111. Repeated information Saigon 35, Paris 204, London 124. Reference Saigon telegram 2202 repeated Geneva 44, Paris 752.<sup>1</sup> I concur with Saigon that the Secretary might at his next press conference, in reply to a question regarding possible partition of Vietnam, say that the United States advocates a solution firmly based upon the independence, unity and the territorial and political integrity of Vietnam.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. (751G.00/5-454)

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 289

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States  
Delegation (Bonsal)*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 6, 1954.

Subject: Indochina Phase of Conference

Participants: M. Jacques Roux, Chief of Far East Section of  
French Foreign Office and Member of French  
Delegation  
Philip W. Bonsal

I lunched with M. Roux today. Our discussion of (a) Chinese Communist participation in the invitation to the Vietminh and (b) the chairmanship of the Indochina phase of the conference have been covered in a separate memorandum.<sup>1</sup>

M. Roux said that although the conference would open with only the nine participants which had been agreed upon, it seemed to him certain that the other side, following the line taken by Molotov and by Chou En-lai in their recent speeches, would propose that other Asian powers be included, particularly India, Indonesia and Burma. We might take either one of three positions:

1) reject the Soviet proposal and urge that the conference be kept to nine;

2) accept the Soviet suggestions on condition that Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand be also included, or

3) propose that the other states of the general Southeast Asian or South Asian region be invited to the conference as (a) observers of the Indochina phase, i.e., the discussions to see whether an armistice is possible as a prelude to restoration of peace in Indochina and later (b) as guarantors and controllers of the armistice and of whatever political arrangements including elections may eventually be agreed upon.

I did not comment other than to say that our conception of the two phases of the Geneva Conference had been that the two sides in the conflict would be represented and that neutrals would not be included. M. Roux said that the British are apparently very anxious to get the Indians in.

I referred to the oral explanation of the possible French position with regard to an armistice in Indochina given by Ambassador Chauvel to Mr. Achilles and Mr. Allen yesterday.<sup>2</sup> M. Roux said that the French Delegation is rather uncertain in this matter at present stating that it has not yet received definitive instructions from Paris,

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this memorandum could not be found in Department of State files.

<sup>2</sup> See telegram Secto 106, May 5, p. 694.



i.e., M. Bidault has not been told what the attitude of the cabinet may be. M. Roux recalled the divergence of views within the cabinet (Pleven, Jacquet, Reynaud, Faure, etc.). *He also told me that General Navarre currently favors a cease-fire as soon as possible.*

I said that from the point of view of our Delegation, it was most important that we receive a full statement of the position which the French Delegation plans to take on substantive matters regarding Indochina so that we could refer this position to Washington and seek instructions as to the attitude which our Delegation should take in regard to it.

He understood this and said that he would do his best to see that we receive such a paper just as soon as possible.

I took occasion to say that obviously it was of the greatest importance that the politico-military position of our side be made to appear as strong as possible if we were to have any prospect of success at the conference. I said that for example, the enemy must be left in no doubt that we are actively engaged in preparations for next year's campaign, i.e., that replacements, reinforcements and additional equipment, etc., are being forwarded in accordance with our preparations, if possible, even beyond the previously estimated requirements of the Navarre Plan. He agreed fully and pointed to the fact that reinforcements and replacements will be sent out to Indochina.

Turning to the international aspects of reinforcement of the position of our side, Roux wondered whether the five-power staff agency which had been established some time ago might not serve as a nucleus for the formation of the defensive coalition which we had in mind. Its terms of reference would have to be expanded and its membership possibly increased. I said that I was not in a position to speak with authority but that I understood in part from the press that this idea was being actively explored.

---

396.1 GE/5-654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 6, 1954—5 p. m.

Secto 116. Repeated information Paris 208, Saigon 36. French delegation, under instructions to do everything possible to obtain truce for removal of wounded from Dien Bien Phu, yesterday approached Secretary General of Chinese delegation<sup>1</sup> informally with request

---

<sup>1</sup> Wang Ping-nan.

that he facilitate contact between Viet Minh and French commanders on spot to arrange such truce. Chinese said merely that he would look into possibility. French felt that while this might mean nothing, it contrasted with Molotov's extreme negative attitude (Dulte 20, April 28 repeated London 86, Paris 137, Saigon 8<sup>2</sup>).

Chinese Secretary General sent for French this morning and stated that after discussing request with Viet Minh and Russians, Chou En-lai felt that this issue could best be discussed between French and Vietnamese and Viet Minh delegations here, at any time anyone wished.

French were struck by similarity of this reply to that given by Molotov (Dulte 20) and believe it meant Russians clearly calling tune. Much more serious from their point of view is possibility that Communists intend to propose immediate cease-fire at Dien Bien Phu to be expanded to rest of Indochina. They feel this would strike French public opinion at its most sensitive nerve and now suspect this Communist design may be reason Viet Minh had not already overwhelmed Dien Bien Phu.

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 602.

---

396.1 GE/5-654

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 6, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 120. Repeated information Paris 211. Chauvel states Bidault encouraged by sequence of President's clarification of April 29 press conference given in Secretary's letter of May 1,<sup>1</sup> Secretary's statement on departure from Geneva<sup>2</sup> and President's press conference yesterday,<sup>3</sup> which Bidault regards as beginning to re-establish Western position.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Contained in telegram Tedul 26, May 1, p. 640.

<sup>2</sup> In his statement the Secretary of State made the following remarks concerning the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference: "It is my hope and expectation that the Indochina phase of the Conference will quickly be organized. I hope that it may lead to peace which will be compatible with the independence and freedom of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In my opinion, the Southeast Asia area, of which Indochina is a part, is an area where the principle of collective security should be applied as it has been applied successfully in other areas of the world, notably Western Europe. I shall continue to seek to promote that result. I believe that peace in Indochina will be more readily obtained if it can be fitted into a framework of collective security." (USDel/5,PR/4, May 3, 1954 (396.1 GE/5-354))

<sup>3</sup> Extracts in telegram Tosec 76, May 5, p. 691.

790.5/5-554 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1954—8:22 p. m.

Tedul 36. For Under Secretary from Secretary. Following is Record of Action reached at NSC meeting this morning<sup>2</sup> re Eden proposal set forth in Dulte 51:<sup>3</sup>

"Agreed that the United States should be willing, in response to a British proposal, to participate in an examination by the existing Five-Power staff agency (US, UK, France, Australia and New Zealand) of the situation in Southeast Asia (including Indochina); provided that:

(1) The purpose of such examination is to explore means by which these participating governments may assist the countries of Southeast Asia in a cooperative effort to defend themselves.

(2) It is made clear that such an examination is supplementary to continued efforts by the United States to organize a regional grouping pursuant to NSC Action No. 1086-b<sup>4</sup> or 1104-b,<sup>5</sup> and is neither a substitute for nor the nucleus of such a grouping."

<sup>1</sup> Contents of telegram dictated by Secretary Dulles; telegram drafted by MacArthur of C.

<sup>2</sup> The 195th meeting of the National Security Council, May 6, 1954, 10 a. m. For the memorandum of discussion, see volume XIII.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 5, p. 698.

<sup>4</sup> NSC Action No. 1086-b, Apr. 6, 1954 read:

"Agreed that the United States should direct its efforts prior to the Geneva Conference toward:

"(1) Organizing a regional grouping, including initially the U.S., the U.K., France, the Associated States, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines, for the defense of Southeast Asia against Communist efforts by any means to gain control of the countries in this area.

"(2) Gaining British support for U.S. objectives in the Far East, in order to strengthen U.S. policies in the area.

"(3) Pressing the French to accelerate the program for the independence of the Associated States."

For discussion of NSC Action No. 1086, see memorandum of discussion at the 192d meeting of the National Security Council, Apr. 6, 1954, in volume XIII.

<sup>5</sup> NSC Action No. 1104-b, Apr. 29, 1954 read:

"Agreed that, despite the current unwillingness of the British Government to participate at this time and without awaiting developments at the Geneva Conference, the United States should continue its efforts, undertaken pursuant to NSC Action No. 1086-b-(1), to organize a regional grouping, including initially the U.S., France, the Associated States, and other nations with interests in the area, for the defense of Southeast Asia against Communist efforts by any means to gain control of the countries in this area; final recommendation on the above to await return and report of the Secretary of State.

"*Note:* The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate action."

For discussion of NSC Action No. 1104, see memorandum of discussion at the 194th meeting of the National Security Council, Apr. 29, 1954, in volume XIII.

For the information of the U.S. Delegation the Department of State transmitted NSC Action No. 1104-b in telegram Tedul 38, May 7, 1954. (396.1 GE/5-754)

Above is for your information and you should not discuss it with Eden pending further instructions and guidance which will be sent tomorrow. In meantime would appreciate your reaction by urgent wire, if possible, by tomorrow morning.

DULLES

---

790.5/5-554 : Telegram

*The Department of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, May 6, 1954—9:35 p. m.

Tedul 37. Secretary held hour and half briefing of 25 leading members Congress yesterday.<sup>2</sup> Generally friendly, constructive atmosphere, no direct criticism, although considerable discussion on future plans and weakness of British and French.

Secretary described set-up of Conference and briefly went over Korean developments. Explained difficulty with Allies on all-Korean elections and trouble finding someone to speak up in defense of US against Communist vilification. Congressmen showed interest in this and asked about positions our various Allies.

Turning to Indochina, Secretary traced developments in our thinking and plans since inception massive aid program last fall. Three prerequisites demanded from French had then seemed to be met: understanding A.S. become independent, effective program for rapid training of natives, aggressive military plan. Prerequisites would lead to our desired objectives. Navarre Plan still sound, but French will for offensive action and even ability govern themselves disintegrated. Following development united action concept and as French military situation deteriorated, we began think of US military intervention. In April 3 meeting with Congressmen agreed objectives of earlier prerequisites must be met to increased degree and other interested nations must join in before such intervention could be authorized.<sup>3</sup> Secretary described London-Paris trip and Eden's renegeing on communiqué.<sup>4</sup> Some adverse Congressional comment on latter and Secretary said thought Nehru had pressured British.

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Matthews of S/S.

<sup>2</sup> For the record of the Secretary's briefing, held at the Department of State, May 5, 1954, 5:30 p. m., see volume XIII.

<sup>3</sup> For a summary of meeting, see memorandum for the file of the Secretary of State, Apr. 5, *ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> For information on the Secretary's visit to London and Paris on Apr. 11-14, 1954, see pp. 514 and 517. Text of Dulles-Eden communiqué was sent to the Department of State from London in telegram Secto 2, Apr. 13, printed in volume XIII.

Secretary described two informal French requests for US air intervention on April 4 and 22 and his replies thereto.<sup>5</sup> Described French mood of extreme urgency and British Cabinet confirmation of reversal of agreement in communiqué of April 13. British terrified by H-bomb, pressured by Nehru, contrasted their giving up India with French call for help to keep Indochina, and gave higher rating to risk of Chinese intervention and global war if West intervened. Secretary read from memo of conversation in which he had chastised Eden for British stand.<sup>6</sup> Number adverse Congressional comments on British position, especially Judd.<sup>7</sup>

Secretary said had reached three conclusions. US should not intervene militarily until and unless prerequisites agreed on at April 4 meeting<sup>8</sup> were fulfilled. Conditions must exist for successful conclusion of war and such was not now case. Participation other allies academic since French had not fulfilled prerequisites. Considerable opposition to internationalization of war in France anyway. This was Administration position on intervention. No Congressional comments on this.<sup>9</sup>

Secondly, US must push rapidly for development of SEA community, probably without Vietnam but hopefully with Laos and Cambodia. British might come in and they might want Burma and India too. We were agreeable to Burma. This community might offer fair chance "insulate" rest SEA against possible loss of Vietnam.

Third conclusion was we should not write off British and French in spite of their weakness in Asia. Lack of 100 per cent cooperation one of welcome disadvantages of democratic system.

Dulte 51<sup>10</sup> then received and Secretary read pertinent parts. Considerable discussion ensued on Eden's idea of "five white powers" consultation and conclusions 2 and 3 above. Judd strongly against Eden "plan", wanted Asians in even without UK and France. Know-

<sup>5</sup> For documentation on the French requests and the Secretary's replies, see volume XIII.

<sup>6</sup> For conversations between Dulles and Eden on these matters, see telegram Dulte 13, Apr. 27, and memorandum of conversation by the Secretary of State, Apr. 30, pp. 576 and 622, respectively.

<sup>7</sup> Representative Walter Judd of Minnesota.

<sup>8</sup> For a summary of the Apr. 4 meeting, see editorial note, in volume XIII.

<sup>9</sup> In Tedul 34, May 6, Secretary Dulles informed Under Secretary Smith that "As a result of my meeting with Congressional leaders and of intensive efforts by press to get interpretations from participants, a number of garbled stories are coming out, notably AP story that US has written off Vietnam. If you deem it useful, you may point out to your colleagues that all of these stories represent a garbled version of a confidential meeting and that they are not to be relied upon. The US position is as stated by President Eisenhower yesterday and as I will state in my speech tomorrow." (110.11 DU/5-654) For texts of the President's press conference, May 5, and the Secretary's speech, May 7, see pp. 691 and 720, respectively.

<sup>10</sup> Dated May 5, p. 698.

land<sup>11</sup> agreed on importance of Asians, as did several others. Knowland said we should have commitments from UK, Australia, New Zealand and others to help us if needed in Korea or Japan, et cetera, if we were to have collective security pact with them for SEA, which he personally favored. Secretary said Burma, Thailand, Philippines plus A.S. would help and that he told Eden he wanted Formosa in if British brought in India. McCormack and Smith<sup>12</sup> supported Secretary on conclusion three and several others did too.

Secretary described effect of Indochina developments on French government and EDC. Russell<sup>13</sup> paid fine tribute to Secretary for briefings and cooperation with Congress and others expressed appreciation.

DULLES

---

<sup>11</sup> Senator William Knowland of California.

<sup>12</sup> Representative John McCormack of Massachusetts and Senator Alexander Smith of New Jersey.

<sup>13</sup> Senator Richard Russell of Georgia.

---

396.1 GE/5-654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 6, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 126. Repeated information Paris 213. Re Secto 109 repeated Paris 202,<sup>1</sup> Eden tells me that at dinner last night his discussion with Molotov of Chairmanship covered same ground as ref tel, with Molotov willing to agree only to rotation among nine or five or four (without France) or two. Eden rejected all of these (although he and we see no objection to UK-USSR).

At this morning's Chauvel-Allen-Achilles meeting additional possibilities discussed: (1) France-USSR, (2) UK-USSR-France or (3) UK-USSR-one Associated States, probably Laos. UK and US prepared accept any of these with French preferring (2) and putting all three to Bidault in addition to further consideration of UK-USSR.

Molotov appeared in no hurry begin Indochina discussions but he and Eden discussed possibility of having organizational meeting tomorrow with Korean Plenary postponed until Saturday.

Later this afternoon Eden informed me Bidault was consulting Paris but probably would not be ready for IC organizational meeting tomorrow. (Lacoste confirms this, but adds that there is possibility Paris will instruct them attempt to call IC meeting tomorrow afternoon).

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 5, p. 700.

I told Eden we would be agreeable IC meeting either day, or if French still not ready, early next week. I suggested no Korean Plenary Saturday,<sup>2</sup> but agreed possibility meeting sixteen that day.

Colombia and Philippines inscribed for Korean Plenary tomorrow. If New Zealand does not speak tomorrow, will probably speak Monday. Probable Spaak will also speak Monday.<sup>3</sup> Eden says he is ready speak any time, but I suggested wait see whether we would be in position introduce Plan B proposal<sup>4</sup> early next week, tying in his speech with that.

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> May 8.

<sup>3</sup> May 10.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to a plan for elections in Korea prior to unification of the country.

---

396.1 GE/5-754 : Telegram

*Achilles-Allen-Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, May 7, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 7, 1954—4 p. m.

Secto 134. Repeated information Paris 216, London 133. Re Secto 124 May 6 repeated Paris 212 and London 131.<sup>1</sup> At this morning's Chauvel meeting, he reported Bidault had withdrawn objections to UK-USSR alternating in chair. It was agreed Eden should informally advise Molotov to that effect and at same time seek latter's agreement to Eden chairing the first meeting. In view French difficulties in getting Cabinet approval of their position, they are anxious that no Indochina meeting be held before Monday at earliest and Eden will suggest this to Molotov on grounds Bidault may have to return to Paris for weekend and that Laotian and Cambodian heads of delegations arriving only Sunday. While three delegates would like to postpone beginning of substantive Indochina discussion as long as possible, it was recognized that in view of fighting at Dien Bien Phu and elsewhere it would not look well to have first meeting adjourn after merely brief procedural discussion. Furthermore, French felt that at first meeting they must say something about truce for evacuation of wounded which would presumably touch off substantive discussion from Communist side.

French wish to speak first and their request to that effect to Eden as chairman considered already filed. French hope to be able to table their specific proposal then. They reported Vietnamese not certain whether they would prefer to speak before or after Viet Minh and sub-

---

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 700.

sequent batting order accordingly left open with expectation US and UK will not speak until after at least one Communist speech.

Secretariat for Indochina phase was discussed, with French proposing their present Deputy, Paul-Boncour, head secretariat for Indochina phase. Allen and Achilles recognized French interest but hoped present secretariat could be kept intact (since it appears technically feasible to separate expenses incurred for each phase). We understood Paul-Boncour much less capable than Kural. Allen proposed secretariat be kept intact with Kural as Secretary General but delegating responsibility to his Deputy, Paul-Boncour, for Indochina phase. This would be discussed further but we would like to have Kural retain substantive charge of secretariat for Indochina phase with minimum substantive delegation of responsibility to Paul-Boncour.

It was agreed it would be desirable to have meeting of heads of six delegates late Sunday.

SMITH

790.5/5-754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 7, 1954—1 p. m.

Dulte 53. Re Teduls 36 and 37.<sup>1</sup> Following background information is pertinent.

First sentence in second paragraph of initial British draft read as follows: "I am ready to recommend that HMG should take part at once with the US, France, Australia and New Zealand in a study to be undertaken by the Five-Power staff agency of the implications of such support for an Indochina settlement."

This sentence in latest draft now reads: "I am ready to recommend that HMG should take part at once with the US, France, Australia and New Zealand in a preliminary examination by the Five-Power staff agency of the Indochina and Southeast Asia situation, both now and as it may be after the Geneva Conference, in the light of this statement."<sup>2</sup>

It is possible that British desire initially was to change our own proposal, which was intended primarily to start machinery on military

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 6, pp. 705 and 706, respectively.

<sup>2</sup> Unsigned memorandum for the record, May 7, indicated that the President thought the U.S. reply to Eden's proposal should make clear (1) that the Five-Power Staff Agency, alone or with other nations, was not a satisfactory substitute for a political coalition of Southeast Asian countries, (2) that a Staff Agency examination was acceptable to see how these nations could give military aid to the Southeast Asian countries in their collective defense effort, and (3) that the United States would not agree to a "white man's party" to determine the problems of the Southeast Asian nations. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "1951-1959, Indochina")



levels for general consideration of Southeast Asia and Indochina situation and to improve bargaining position at Geneva, into a proposition amounting primarily to our committing ourselves in advance to association with and support of any Indochina settlement at Geneva no matter how unacceptable to us. This British position probably based on view that British political situation requires that in advance of Geneva settlement or failure, no step be taken indicating possibility of failure and British planning on that basis.

Feel it is clear from comparison of two versions quoted above that British have yielded considerably with respect to their initial position. In this connection, the shift in British position resulted not only from our persuasion and British fear of rift with US but also from pressure by Australians and New Zealanders.

Although current British press stories have apparently been based on original British effort to commit us in advance to support of any Geneva settlement, it is possible British public opinion might now be shifting somewhat because of President's recent statement.

We think best method of sounding present state of British thinking is to reply to Eden's proposal on basis of provisions contained in subparagraphs 1 and 2 of Tedul 36 as representing US understanding and basis its acceptance of proposal. In light of foregoing do not see why this might not be acceptable to British provided provision subparagraph 1 is not wholly exclusive.

This reply should, of course, be made informally and orally in the hope that it would produce further favorable development in British position before anything is committed to paper on either side.

What I want to emphasize is that the British propose staff examinations by an already constituted agency as a matter of common prudence. They realize the necessity of this, yet they are caught on the horns of a dilemma, resulting on the one hand from the widespread feeling in Britain that in some way or other the Geneva Conference is going to produce agreements which will solve all of the problems of Asia, and on the other the inevitability of criticism that staff examinations and long-range planning should have been under way long ago. They see developments very much as indicated, the second and third conclusions mentioned in Tedul 37. Eden said "at the proper time you will bring in Thailand and we can probably bring in Burma, although this will take some doing." They will of course be very sensitive as to the form of any public statement, for the reasons I have just mentioned. I would like as much latitude as possible in discussing this with Eden, as unfortunately it has leaked in all directions and in many distorted forms. As a matter of fact, press speculation has reached the point now that almost any public announcement might be

a letdown. It might be just as well to proceed quietly and unostentatiously with the action contemplated and avoid any public statement.

SMITH

---

110.11 DU/5-854 : Telegram

*Smith-Bidault Meeting, Geneva, May 7, Afternoon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, May 8, 1954—11 a. m.

Dulte 54. Repeated information Paris 220. Had long talk yesterday afternoon with Bidault. He was dog-tired but thoroughly lucid and wanted to cry on somebody's shoulder. Told him that Dien-Bien-Phu, while tragic loss,<sup>1</sup> was not military disaster and need not be psychological one. Question now was what could be saved in Indochina and what any of us could do to help.

Bidault said it was hard to forecast psychological reaction in France. He had asked his government to give him instructions to be firm but his draft proposals were being made vaguer and he was seriously disturbed by word Jacquet had brought back (Secto 133, repeated Paris 215<sup>2</sup>). He would be talking with Laniel by phone and if he did not get the instructions he wanted, he would be much tempted to go to Paris to try to get them by personal persuasion. He felt it would be easier to get a firm position from government on Saturday than on Monday<sup>3</sup> but was not sure whether his trip to Paris at this time would produce instructions he wanted or be straw that would break government's back. Man in street in France was beginning to count hours until cease-fire could be arranged.

I asked him how nearly alone he was in his fight. He said others felt the same way but he was almost only one to speak out. He had been accused in press at least three times of having imposed his will on Cabinet and was not sure he could do it fourth time. He would under no circumstances surrender but he might lose his hide. Pressure would be very strong to agree to a cease-fire and then see what could be done. Even if he could get government to reject this approach, pressures would develop for worse solutions.

I agreed present moment was critical but thought that if he could persuade the government not to capitulate immediately, things would shortly get better. I hoped he would be able to propose something we could support. He interjected that if French position was something we could not support, he would not himself present it. I reiterated that

---

<sup>1</sup> At 10:30 a. m., Paris time, May 7, the central position of Dien Bien Phu fell.

<sup>2</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>3</sup> May 8 and 10.

if he could steer his government through this immediate period, future would be much better. He remarked on difficulty of trying to fight Indochina and EDC battles at same time. Obtaining support for continuing fight in Indochina required appeals to elementary patriotism, whereas support for EDC required rejection of simple patriotism. EDC required support of Socialists who were in entirely wrong camp on Indochina.

I reiterated fall of Dien-Bien-Phu should not mean loss of all of Vietnam let alone southeast Asia. US was seeking additional ways to help and possibilities of more active support. I told him that you were making good progress since your return and that US was more determined than ever to organize some form of collective security in southeast Asia. We were convinced that some form of southeast Asian NATO was necessary but that would take time. Could French provide it? Bidault said he would gladly give us time but was not sure his colleagues would give it to him. Proposals for partition could not be entertained. He thought we would probably have to accept military conditions under which Vietnamese would not be in control of all Vietnam territory but we could not tolerate establishment of Communist state in any part of Vietnam.

I remarked that tragic as was loss of Dien-Bien-Phu, its loss had at least deprived Communists of powerful lever upon French opinion. Bidault said he would do his best to obtain firm instructions.

I told Eden of foregoing talk and he is considering what British can do to encourage Bidault and strengthen his position.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/5-754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 7, 1954—3 p. m.

Secto 133. Repeated information Paris 215. Reference: Secto 132.<sup>1</sup> In giving us proposal contained reference telegram last night Lacoste stated that while Cabinet approval not yet obtained, delegation had been advised from Paris that as result of preliminary consideration first four numbered paragraphs could be considered firm and only minor changes expected in remainder. This morning however he and Chauvel advised Allen and Achilles that despite yesterday's vote, situation inside Cabinet was explosive and that Jacquet, who returned from Paris last night, had told Bidault that French delegation could not possibly reject Communist proposal for immediate unconditional cease-fire without causing immediate disintegration of Cabinet and

<sup>1</sup> *Infra.*

fall of Laniel. He also said if Bidault made specific proposal including statement that cease-fire could occur only after armistice terms agreed, he would risk being disavowed by other members of Cabinet and precipitating crisis. Bidault is very much disturbed and is considering returning to Paris tonight for personal discussion with his Cabinet colleagues. Am not certain of extent to which Jacquet was speaking personally or reflecting Cabinet view.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 7, 1954—4 p. m.

Secto 132. Repeated information Paris 214, London 132, Saigon 37. Re Secto 106 from Geneva, 5 May.<sup>1</sup> Following is informal translation of paper given us last night containing French proposals as sent Paris by Bidault. In giving it to us, Lacoste stated that delegation had considered adding proposal based on "Eden plan" for Germany with respect to future elections but was currently inclined not to do so on grounds it would be merely needless complication. Chauvel discussed paper with Vietnamese representatives last night and reports their agreement to it.

"(1) It should be pointed out first that what is presently called 'the Indochina problem' is essentially a problem of internal order. Thus neither the existence of the state of Vietnam nor its territorial integrity are at stake. What is involved, during the hostilities in progress, is the allegiance of the population of that state to this or that regime.

"(2) It is only recently, and somewhat as a side issue, that a new element has been introduced into the Indochinese question, the fact of the invasion of the other two states of the peninsula, that is to say Laos and Cambodia, by armed forces foreign to those two states.

"(3) As a result, however, of that extension of hostilities to Laos and Cambodia, the establishment of peace in Indochina envisaged by the Berlin communiqué should include the termination of hostilities in the territory as a whole of each of the three states.

"(4) This being the goal—re-establishment of peace in one country, Vietnam, ravaged by a war whose primary characteristic is that of being a civil war, and in two countries, Laos and Cambodia, victims of an external aggression, a foreign aggression, there remains to be settled the conditions under which peace should be re-established.

"The cease-fire which must necessarily mark the beginning of the first step of the return to peace cannot in itself suffice to insure peace. It must be accompanied by the immediate and effective putting into operation of provisions of both a military and administrative nature destined on the one hand to insure the security of the troops on the

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 694.

spot and the population, and on the other hand to guarantee each of the two parties in conflict against an abusive utilization of the cessation of combat by the other party.

"(5) It follows that the cease-fire can take place only following the signature of armistice conventions in which would be included clauses whose purpose has just been defined and whose coming into effect should coincide with the cease-fire.

"With the aim of avoiding the risks of hostilities breaking out again accidentally or otherwise, partially or generally, other stipulations should be written into the armistice conventions having the effect of regrouping in separate noncommunicating and strictly delimited zones the military forces of both parties.

"(6) Finally, the armistice conventions should establish an international control which would become effective at the same time as the conventions themselves. The particular situation in Vietnam, in Laos and Cambodia being different in each of these states, separate conventions should be concluded for each of them.

"(7) Once hostilities are terminated by the entry into force of these different conventions, the political and economic problems whose settlement would be necessary to insure a stable character to the peace, can be examined."

SMITH

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 286

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Thurston)*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 7, 1954.

Subject: Turkish Views on Korean and Indochinese Questions

Participants: Ambassador Acikalin, Turkish Delegation  
 Mr. Benler, Turkish Delegation  
 General Smith, US Delegation  
 Ray L. Thurston, US Delegation

[Here follows the first portion of the conversation dealing with the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference.]

After a preliminary remark to the effect that Turkey was not a participant in the Indochinese discussions, Acikalin asked General Smith how things were going on that side. General Smith emphasized that the problem at this stage was primarily one for the French and the Associated States. The US has not yet formulated a definite position, but it was our thought that we might be able to save Laos and Cambodia in any event. In his remarks the Turkish delegate took a very pessimistic line on Indochina and with fervent gestures to a map of the Far East on the wall asked how he could contain the Communist march on Southeast Asia once a Communist state obtained control of a part of Indochina. He was critical of the French on the colonial

aspect and talked about the importance of the free Asian nations having a role to play. He referred to the color consciousness of the Asians as a factor we had to take into account.

RAY L. THURSTON

751G.00/5-754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1954—6:02 p. m.

3979. Please forward following message immediately to Bao Dai :

"Your Majesty: On behalf of the American people I should like to express to you and the people of Viet-Nam our admiration for the gallant men of the Vietnamese forces who, together with their comrades of the French Union, for two months so heroically defended Dien Bien Phu against insuperable odds. It is sad indeed that the fortress and its brave defenders have fallen to the enemy, but we can be heartened in the knowledge that their sacrifice has not been in vain. Not only have they taken a terrible toll of the enemy, but, I think more important, their heroic resistance to the evil forces of Communist aggression has given inspiration to all who support the cause of human freedom. Those brave men made their sacrifice in order that individual freedom and national independence for the people of Viet-Nam should not be lost to Communist enslavement. We of the Free World are determined to remain faithful to the causes for which they have so nobly fought. With expressions of my personal regard, Dwight D. Eisenhower."

Saigon, deliver courtesy copy to Government of Viet-Nam and arrange appropriate local publicity. This message and message to Pres Coty<sup>2</sup> released by White House this afternoon.

DULLES

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Poole of FE. Repeated to Saigon as telegram 2216, to Hanoi as telegram 617, to Geneva as telegram 95.

<sup>2</sup> The text of the President's letter to French President Coty, May 7, 1954, was as follows:

"My Dear President Coty: The entire free world has been inspired by the heroism and stamina displayed by the gallant garrison at Dien Bien Phu. Their devotion and the quality of their resistance have been so great that that battle will forever stand as a symbol of the free world's determination to resist dictatorial aggression and to sustain its right of self-determination and its dedication to the dignity of the human being. France has in the past suffered temporary defeats, but always she has triumphed in the end to continue as one of the world's leaders in all things that tend to bring greater richness to the lives of men. Those who fought and died and suffered at Dien Bien Phu should know that no sacrifice of theirs has been in vain; that the free world will remain faithful to the causes for which they have so nobly fought.

"With expressions of my personal regard, Dwight D. Eisenhower"

Text from the *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, p. 463. For President Coty's reply, released May 13, see *ibid.*, p. 463n.

396.1 GE/5-754

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Getz)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, May 7, 1954.

Participants: Ambassador Heath  
 Mr. McBride  
 Mr. Getz  
 Mr. Dac Khe—Minister of National Democratization  
 Member of Vietnamese Delegation  
 Mr. Buu Kinh—Adviser to the Vietnamese Delegation

Subject: Vietnamese Views on the Indochina Phase of the Conference.

Mr. Dac Khe entertained the above members of the US delegation at dinner.

Dac Khe opened the conversation by expressing to Ambassador Heath the very strong Vietnamese view that they did not want this conference; they expected and wanted the conference to be a failure; but they would do nothing to "sabotage" the gathering.

Dac Khe and Buu Kinh, apparently as a result of the story in the *Herald Tribune* this morning,<sup>2</sup> expressed some anxiety over the possibility of the US "writing off" Viet-Nam and concentrating on saving Cambodia and Laos from the Communists. They were assured that this was not the intention of the US.

The main point upon which Dac Khe dwelt for most of the evening was that the Vietnamese delegation firmly believes that a military solution to the Indochinese problem cannot be separated from a political settlement. He is afraid that the French are so taken up with the serious military problem that they might accept a cease fire without political guarantees. He returned time and time again to this subject, and stated that this was the firm view of Bao Dai.

The Vietnamese "plan" would be:

1. The French proposal must include the negotiations of an armistice as part of a complete military-political program.

2. The Laniel program<sup>3</sup> was acceptable as a basis provided it was expanded providing for UN inspection teams along the Chinese border. The Viet-Minh forces would disband [*disband?*] and lay down and surrender their arms to the Vietnamese Government under an amnesty declaration which would be guaranteed and supervised by a

<sup>1</sup> Summary of conversation transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 144, May 8. (396.1 GE/5-854)

<sup>2</sup> A reference to press reports of the Secretary's meeting with Congressional leaders on May 6. See telegram Tedul 37, p. 706.

<sup>3</sup> Laniel's proposals made on Mar. 5. See telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, p. 435.

United Nations Commission. Sometime after the armistice had been concluded national elections would occur under United Nations supervision. If the elections so resulted a coalition Government might then occur, but not before. He said that he had discussed in general terms this Vietnamese "plan" with the French but had not mentioned the United Nations supervision which he feared was unacceptable to the French.

When asked by Ambassador Heath as to Vietnamese [views?] on UN action, both Buu Kinh and Dac Khe [stated?] the belief that this would be desirable, but that it should be under the Security Council rather than the General Assembly. In the Security Council, they said, they could count on the veto of the US or Nationalist China to block any undesirable Russian proposals, and would not risk the possibility of Indian leadership in General Assembly with probable unfavorable results. Mr. McBride pointed out that because of this veto power the Security Council had become a rather sterile organization, and that the necessary majority in the Assembly for any desirable proposal could probably be attained with very little risk. The prestige would be much greater in this forum. The Vietnamese, however, persisted in believing the Security Council offered the greater insurance.

The discussion then turned to tactics in the conference. Dac Khe stated that the Vietnamese delegation was of the opinion that they should let the Viet-Minh representatives speak first; in this way, the Vietnamese, twenty-four hours afterwards could both rebut and attack in their first speech. This would also permit them to let the Viet-Minh take the blame for initiating name-calling and the abuse, to which they would have no hesitation in responding. Dac Khe agreed that it might be best to let either the Cambodians or the Lao lead off for our side.

Ambassador Heath stressed the importance of having good English translations of their speeches ready to hand out to the press immediately after they speak, and said that members of the US delegation would be pleased to assist in this work. Dac Khe said that he had translators, but hoped that we would be able to check their work.

---

396.1 GE/5-754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 7, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 136. Repeated information Paris 217, London 134, Moscow 51. Following agreement between Bidault and Molotov regarding issuance invitations to Indochina phase Geneva Conference, US, UK and French delegation heads joined in invitations to Vietnamese,



Cambodian and Laotian representatives. Soviets, presumably taking as pretext fact invitations our side had not been issued by single state was case in Korean phase, issued invitation to Viet Minh in name of USSR and Chinese People's Republic (as reported by Tass). This obviously violation of Four-Power Berlin Agreement.

We have discussed matter with French and British delegations making suggestion that French delegation as Berlin power on our side chiefly interested in Indochina, should make statement for the record to the effect that form of invitation to Viet Minh violated Four-Power accord. There would be no question of contesting right of Viet Minh to be present or of demanding that correct invitation be forwarded.

French and British have now indicated their unwillingness to make such a statement on matter which they apparently regard as purely procedural. They believe that while Soviet violation exists, our side has not accepted or agreed to such violation and in any case they do not see utility of raising issue at this point. They apparently wish avoid any risk of debate or loss of time on this issue which their public opinions would regard as very minor in context major Indochina problems.

We believe we should not let this incident pass unnoticed although we do not believe that critical importance should be attached to it. We would not wish to be put in position that because we have not raised issue in case of invitation to Viet Minh, we are obliged to accept Five-Power principle in event additional invitations are issued. Furthermore, passing mention this violation of agreement by USSR would serve again highlight Secretary's success in completely blocking manifold Soviet attempts to secure acceptance Five-Power principle at Geneva.

US delegation believes matter could be handled either (a) through brief statement for the record at opening meeting on Indochina or (b) through statement by General Smith at press conference. Choice of methods would seem to depend in part on extent to which issue has been played in American press. (We have seen only editorial mention *New York Times* May 4.) We would wish to avoid strong reaction by USSR which would be designed put US in position of having raised purely procedural issue on which we would have little support from our friends and which would delay cessation of fighting in Indochina generally.

If statement on this point is made by US delegation at plenary meeting, it would follow a general expression of the US delegation's satisfaction that the Indochina phase of the conference has now opened and of the delegation's determination to work with other delegations

for the restoration of peace in Indochina under conditions that will guarantee the integrity and freedom of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Proposed text on invitation issue follows:

"The United States delegation takes this opportunity to recall that at Berlin, the US joined with France, the UK and the USSR in agreeing to organize a conference at Geneva to consider the problems of Korea and of Indochina. Subsequently, the same four powers reached agreement as to the composition of the Indochina phase of the conference, an agreement reflected in the presence here today of the nine delegations in this hall. As in the case of the Korean phase, there are only four inviting powers, the UK, France, the US and the USSR. Therefore, if, as has been stated in press reports, the invitation issued to the so-called Democratic Republic of Vietnam appears in the name of both the USSR and the Communist Chinese regime, that invitation is, in its form although not in substance, at variance with the clear understanding of the Foreign Ministers present at Berlin last February. Assuming the press reports to be accurate the US delegation can only regret that the Indochina phase of this conference should be initiated by a procedural evasion on the part of the USSR of previously reached agreements."

Please instruct urgently.<sup>1</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Text as stated by Under Secretary Smith during the First Plenary Session on Indochina, May 8, and reported in telegram Secto 153, May 8, on p. 736.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 265

*Radio and Television Address to the Nation by the Secretary of State, Delivered in Washington, May 7, 1954, 9:30 p. m.*<sup>1</sup>

[Extracts]

### THE ISSUES AT GENEVA

I welcome this opportunity to talk with you about the Conference now going on in Geneva and the related aspects of our foreign policy.

First of all, I join with you in paying tribute to the gallant defenders of Dien Bien Phu. May it be given us to play a worthy part to defend the values for which they gave their lives.

. . . . .

### THE PROBLEM OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

Let me turn now to the problem of Southeast Asia. In that great peninsula and the islands to the south live nearly 200 million people in seven states—Burma; the three states of Indochina—Laos, Cam-

---

<sup>1</sup> Issued as Department of State press release 233 and printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 17, 1954, p. 739.

bodia and Vietnam; Thailand; Malaya; and Indonesia. Communist conquest of this area would seriously imperil the free world position in the Western Pacific. It would, among other things, endanger the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, with all of which the United States has mutual security treaties. It would deprive Japan of important foreign markets and sources of food and raw materials.

In Vietnam, one of the three Indochinese states, war has been going on since 1946. When it began, Indochina was a French colony just liberated from Japanese occupation. The war started primarily as a war for independence. What started as a civil war has now been taken over by international Communism for its own purposes. Ho Chi Minh, the Communist leader in Vietnam, was trained in Moscow and got his first revolutionary experience in China.

In the name of nationalism, the Communists aim to deprive the people of Vietnam of their independence by subjecting them to the new imperialism of the Soviet bloc.

What is going on in Indochina is a perfect example of the Soviet Communist strategy for colonial and dependent areas which was laid down by Lenin and Stalin many years ago and which the Communists have practiced to take over much of Asia.

The Indochina area was vulnerable. The Governments of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia had not yet received full political independence. Their peoples were not adequately organized to fight against the Communist-led rebels, and they did not feel that they had a stake in the struggle which justified great sacrifice.

President Eisenhower became familiar with the problem when he was the Supreme Commander of NATO in Europe. He had seen the strain and the drain which the Indochina war put upon France. He was aware of the growing discontent in France resulting from the long war where the French were assuming the principal burden of the fight and where human and material costs were mounting.

I recall in December 1952 when General Eisenhower, as President-elect, was returning from his Korean trip on the cruiser *Helena*, we discussed gravely the problem of Indochina.

We realized that if Vietnam fell into hostile hands, and if the neighboring countries remained weak and divided, then the Communists could move on into all of Southeast Asia. For these reasons, the Eisenhower Administration from the outset gave particular attention to the problem of Southeast Asia.

Our efforts took two complementary lines. We sought to strengthen the resistance to Communism in Indochina. We sought also to build in Southeast Asia a broader community of defense.

## INDOCHINA MEASURES

In Indochina itself, the following steps seemed to us important :

1. The French should give greater reality to their intention to grant full independence to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. This would take away from the Communists their false claim to be leading the fight for independence.

2. There should be greater reliance upon the national armies who would be fighting in their own homeland. This, we believed, could be done if the peoples felt that they had a good cause for which to fight and if better facilities for training and equipment were provided for them.

3. There should be greater free-world assistance. France was carrying on a struggle which was over-burdening her economic resources.

Much progress was made in each of these respects. The French Declaration of July 3, 1953, pledged full independence to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Already, a treaty of independence has been concluded with Laos, and Emperor Bao Dai told me, in Paris, two weeks ago, that he felt that Vietnam was assured of its independence.

On the military side, a two-year plan was worked out by General Navarre. It was designed to speed the training of native forces.

The cost of this operation would be considerable. The United States, which was already paying part of the cost of the war, agreed to bear the greater part of the total cost. We are now paying at the rate of about \$800,000,000 a year, plus a very large provision of military equipment.

Despite the gains on these fronts, there has been a growing belief by the French people that France was over-extended, in view of its responsibilities in Asia, in Africa and in Europe. As a result, when I met in Berlin last January and February with the Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the French Government asked that the projected conference on Korea be expanded to discuss also the problem of peace in Indochina.

Shortly after the Berlin Conference adjourned, the Communists, as was to be expected from them, began to expend their military assets, human and material, in a desperate effort to win some victory which they would exploit for political purposes. They concentrated on a mass assault against one of the French outposts—that of Dien Bien Phu. That assault was pushed with a callous disregard of human life.

Now, Dien Bien Phu has fallen. Its defense, of 57 days and nights, will go down in history as one of the most heroic of all time. The defenders, composed of French and native forces, inflicted staggering losses on the enemy. The French soldiers showed that they have not lost either the will or the skill to fight even under the most adverse

conditions. It shows that Vietnam produces soldiers who have the qualities to enable them to defend their country.

An epic battle has ended. But great causes have, before now, been won out of lost battles.

The Chinese Communists have been supplying the forces of Vietnam rebels with munitions, trucks, anti-aircraft guns, radar, and technical equipment and technical advisers. They have, however, stopped short of open intervention. In this respect, they may have been deterred by the warnings which the United States has given that such intervention would lead to grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina.

#### COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

Throughout this period the United States has also followed the second course of trying to develop strength in Southeast Asia through collective measures.

Back in 1951, I negotiated treaties with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. These recognized that this area was one of vital importance to the United States. These treaties also recognized that they were only initial steps toward the development of a more comprehensive system of collective security in the area.

This we have constantly sought. However, it has proved difficult to achieve this result. There were differences of race and culture and differences in the development of national self-government. The countries which had won or were winning their independence from Western colonialism and Japanese imperialism were often more concerned with past dangers from which they were extricating themselves than with the threat of new peril. The memories of the past blind them to the present perils of Communist imperialism. They were not disposed to make the sacrifices inherent in any collective security system.

However, this situation began to change and by the spring of this year it seemed that there could be a broader program of collective defense.

On March 29, 1954, after consultations with Congressional leaders of both parties, and after having advised our principal allies, I stated: "The imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that that possibility should not be passively accepted, but should be met by united action."<sup>2</sup>

This declaration was nothing new, although the circumstances of the moment gave the words a new significance.

<sup>2</sup> For summary of the Secretary's address of Mar. 29, 1954, see editorial note, p. 604.

President Eisenhower speaking almost a year earlier, in his address of April 16, 1953, had said that "aggression in Korea and in Southeast Asia are threats to the whole free community to be met by united action."<sup>3</sup>

After having explained our purposes to the American people, we promptly conferred with the representatives of nine free nations having immediate interest in the area, namely Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, France and the United Kingdom. We informed others whose interests could be affected.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and of France asked me to visit their capitals to develop further our concept. After conferences at London on April 12 and 13 with Sir Winston Churchill and Mr. Eden, we issued a joint U.S.-U.K. communiqué which, after reciting the danger to the entire area of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific caused by Communist warfare in Indochina, concluded: "Accordingly we are ready to take part, with the other countries principally concerned, in an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defense within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations to assure the peace, security and freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific."<sup>4</sup>

A similar agreement was reached in Paris with Prime Minister Laniel and Foreign Minister Bidault.<sup>5</sup>

The progress thus made was that which the United States had sought. We had never sought any sudden spectacular act such as an ultimatum to Red China. Our goal was to develop a basic unity of constructive purpose. We advanced toward that goal. I feel confident that unity of purpose persists, and that such a tragic event as the fall of Dien Bien Phu will harden, not weaken, our purpose to stay united.

The United States and other countries immediately concerned are giving careful consideration to the establishment of a collective defense. Conversations are taking place among them. We must agree as to who will take part in the united defense effort and what their commitments will be.

It must be recognized that difficulties have been encountered, but this was expected. The complexity of the problem is great. As I have pointed out, the complications were such that it was not possible even to get started until recent months. Under all the circumstances, I be-

---

<sup>3</sup> For text of the President's address, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 601.

<sup>4</sup> For text of Dulles-Eden communiqué, Apr. 13, see *ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1954, p. 622.

<sup>5</sup> For text of Dulles-Bidault communiqué, Apr. 14, see *ibid.*

lieve that good progress is being made. I feel confident that the outcome will be such that Communist aggression will not be able to gain in Southeast Asia the results it seeks.

This may involve serious commitments by us all. But free peoples will never remain free unless they are willing to fight for their vital interests. Furthermore, vital interests can no longer be protected merely by local defense. The key to successful defense and to the deterring of attack is association for mutual defense. That is what the United States seeks in Southeast Asia.

The question remains as to what we should do about the current hostilities in Vietnam.

In Korea we showed that we were prepared under proper conditions to resort to military action, if necessary, to protect our vital interests and the principles upon which stable peace must rest.

In Korea, we, along with others, joined in the defense of an independent government, which was already resisting an armed assault. We did so at the request of the Republic of Korea and under a United Nations mandate. The Korean people were inspired by a deep sense of patriotism and eager to develop a power of their own. The issues were clarified before the world by decisions of the United Nations. Under these circumstances, we and our allies fought until the enemy sued for an armistice.

In Indochina, the situation is far more complex. The present conditions there do not provide a suitable basis for the United States to participate with its armed forces.

The situation may perhaps be clarified as a result of the Geneva Conference. The French have stated their desire for an armistice on honorable terms and under proper safeguards. If they can conclude a settlement on terms which do not endanger the freedom of the peoples of Vietnam, this would be a real contribution to the cause of peace in Southeast Asia. But we would be gravely concerned if an armistice or cease-fire were reached at Geneva which would provide a road to a Communist takeover and further aggression. If this occurs, or if hostilities continue, then the need will be even more urgent to create the conditions for united action in defense of the area.

In making commitments which might involve the use of armed force, the Congress is a full partner. Only the Congress can declare war. President Eisenhower has repeatedly emphasized that he would not take military action in Indochina without the support of Congress. Furthermore, he has made clear that he would not seek that unless, in his opinion, there would be an adequate collective effort based on genuine mutuality of purpose in defending vital interests.

A great effort is being made by Communist propaganda to portray it as something evil if Asia joins with the nations of the Americas and Europe to get assistance which will help the peoples of Asia to secure their liberty. These Communist nations have, in this connection, adopted the slogan "Asia for the Asians".

The Japanese war lords adopted a similar slogan when they sought to subject Asia to their despotic rule. The similar theme of "Europe for the Europeans" was adopted by Mr. Molotov at the Berlin Conference when he proposed that the Europeans should seek security by arrangements which would send the United States back home.

Great despotic powers have always known that they could impose their will and gain their conquests if the free nations stand apart and none helps the other.

It should be observed that the Soviet Communist aggression in Europe took place only against countries which had no collective security arrangements. Since the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty, there has been no successful aggression in Europe.

Of course, it is of the utmost importance that the United States participation in creating collective security in Asia should be on a basis which recognizes fully the aspirations and cultures of the Asian peoples. We have a material and industrial strength which they lack and which is an essential ingredient of security. Also they have cultural and spiritual values of their own which make them our equals by every moral standard.

The United States, as the first colony of modern history to win independence for itself, instinctively shares the aspirations for liberty of all dependent and colonial peoples. We want to help, not hinder, the spread of liberty.

We do not seek to perpetuate Western colonialism and we find even more intolerable the new imperialist colonialism of Communism.

That is the spirit that animates us. If we remain true to that spirit, we can face the future with confidence that we shall be in harmony with those moral forces which ultimately prevail.



III. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE: CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS OF CONFERENCE ARRANGEMENTS, PROCEDURES, AND PARTICIPANTS; UNITED STATES POSITIONS AND TACTICS AT THE CONFERENCE; ARRANGEMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS ON COLLECTIVE DEFENSE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA; CONSIDERATION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA; PROPOSALS ON INDOCHINA BY THE VARIOUS DELEGATIONS; EFFORTS TO END HOSTILITIES IN INDOCHINA AND TO PRESERVE PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA; UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE FINAL STAGE OF THE INDOCHINA PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE; CONCLUSION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE (MAY 8—JULY 21, 1954)

MAY 8, 1954

751G.00/5-854 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State*

SECRET

SAIGON, May 8, 1954—10 a. m.

2277. Sent Geneva 66, Paris 786, London 50. We have given preliminary consideration to Bidault's proposed position at Geneva as set out Secto 106, repeated Paris 201, London 121, Saigon 33<sup>1</sup> and to valid comment of US delegation as indicated Secto 110, repeated Paris 203, London 123, Saigon 34.<sup>2</sup> Department and USDel Geneva will have already seen De Jean's preliminary reactions as described my telegram 2276 today.<sup>3</sup>

De Jean put his finger on essential point which is what guarantees will exist for fulfillment in good faith of terms of any cease-fire and armistice agreement which might ensue from Geneva conference. Obviously from oversimplified French view it would be splendid if US would take up this burden.

I am strongly opposed to such a concept. Situation in Indochinese war has reached point that very soon both French and Vietnamese, who presumably are our friendly clients, will seek to blame US for whatever disaster may befall them. Furthermore, so far as Asiatic

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 5, p. 694.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 5, p. 696.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 8; see volume XIII.

opinion generally is concerned, there will be a tendency to blame US for acts of commission and non-commission.

If this analysis is valid, it seems to me that we should with utmost insistence demand that United Nations be brought into picture. If Geneva conference arrives at an agreed cease-fire and armistice, conference should then request United Nations Security Council to assume responsibility for providing guarantees of armistice conditions and for supervision execution thereof. I do not see how Russians would be in a position to veto such a fair proposal and furthermore, from their policy point of view, they might find it advantageous to permit Security Council to assume jurisdiction here. Under President's recent pronouncement that no military action will be taken in this theatre without following constitutional processes,<sup>4</sup> again it seems to me that recourse to United Nations would afford President much greater liberty of potential action since Senate has already consented to treaty which is United Nations Charter, and police action under Chapter 7 of Charter could in fact be contemplated in event Security Council's supervision of armistice were flouted by Communists here. If Soviet veto aborted Security Council action we might still be able to work out some arrangement for collective self-defense under Article 51.

Foregoing is largely devoted to juridical aspects of problem. We should not blind ourselves to practical fact that if a cease-fire and armistice brings an ostensible end to military conflict in Indochina, it will have little effect on that clandestine but even more dangerous conflict which will continue; namely that cold war whereby Viet Minh can easily infiltrate all of this peninsula and eventually by legitimate democratic means take over this area.

McCLINTOCK

---

<sup>4</sup> For summary of the President's news conference, Apr. 29, see editorial note, p. 604.

---

751G.00/5-854 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1954—11:28 a. m.

PRIORITY

Tedul 42. For Smith from Secretary. Assume you have text my last night address.<sup>2</sup> The reference to "proper conditions" under which US went into Korea was designed to suggest by analogy the conditions which US would want to settle before becoming belligerent in Indochina. We assume that French will have gotten the point and realize that we are ready to talk with them about internationalizing the war

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 7, p. 720.

if they come to conclusion that this is preferable to the harsh terms which no doubt Communists will seek to extract. Also, FYI, it might not be indispensable that the UK participates at the outset.

DULLES

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 311

*Memorandum by Richard V. Hennes to the Head of the United States Delegation (Smith)*

[GENEVA,] May 8, 1954.

Attached is a statement prepared by Ambassador Heath for your use in the event the Communists raise the question of the presence at the Conference of the "ghost regimes" in Cambodia and Laos. Ambassador Heath has the original, which he will bring to the session.

RVH

[Attachment]

At Berlin we agreed that "the problem of restoring peace in Indochina" would be discussed at this conference "to which representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic, and other interested states will be invited."

At Geneva the four inviting powers have agreed that in addition to the participation specified at Berlin there should be representatives at this conference of the Governments of Laos, Cambodia, and Viet Nam, and of the Vietminh.

The United States cannot agree that non-existent so-called governments or states, such as the so-called Pathet Lao or Free Cambodians can in any way be considered as qualifying for invitations to this conference under the Berlin Agreement.

The United States proposes that any idea of inviting these non-existent so-called governments be rejected. If there is opposition to this United States proposal, the United States suggests this meeting be adjourned to allow for further discussions on this point between the four inviting powers.

---

396.1 GE/5-854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, May 8, 1954—noon.

Secto 142. Repeated information niact Paris 221, niact Saigon 40. Re Dulte 54, Paris 220.<sup>1</sup> Chauvel states Bidault last night obtained

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 8, p. 712.

from Laniel firm instructions he sought and is accordingly anxious to have initial Indochina meeting today in effort to fix French opinion as quickly as possible. Translation of proposal he expects to table (Secto 143, repeated Paris 222, Saigon 41) being separately telegraphed niact.<sup>2</sup>

We have made clear United States not in position to express any substantive views today and French fully understand and do not mind.

Head of Laotian delegation is here and Cambodian Ambassador Washington has agreed take their seat. On Vietnamese side, Dac Khe is here and he is reluctant to attend in absence senior members his delegation but French trust they can persuade him to do so.

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> *Infra.*

---

396.1 GE/5-854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, May 8, 1954—noon.

Secto 143. Repeated information niact Paris 222, niact Saigon 41. Following is informal translation of proposal French will table at opening plenary session Indochina phase today: <sup>1</sup>

I. Vietnam.

(1) Grouping of the regular units of both parties in delimited zones to be determined by the conference.

(2) Disarmament of other combatants with exception of police forces which are recognized as necessary for maintenance of order.

(3) Immediate freeing of prisoners of war and civilian internees.

(4) Control of the carrying out of these clauses by International Commissions.

---

<sup>1</sup> In telegram Secto 152, May 8, the U.S. Delegation informed the Department of State that the French proposal as tabled at the plenary session contained the following modifications from text sent in telegram Secto 143:

"In section I, paragraph 1: 'All regular units to be assembled in assembly areas to be defined by the conference on the basis of proposals by the commanders-in-chief.'

"Section I, paragraph 2: 'All elements not belonging either to the army or to the police forces to be disarmed.'

"Section II, paragraph 2: 'All elements which do not belong either to the army or to the police forces to be disarmed.'

"Section II, paragraph 3 becomes paragraph 4. Paragraph 3 now reads: 'All prisoners of war and civil internees to be released immediately.'" (396.1 GE/5-854)

(5) Cessation of hostilities immediate upon signature of the agreement.

The regrouping of troops and the disarmament measures called for above will begin at the latest X days after the signature of the agreement.

## II. Cambodia and Laos.

(1) Evacuation of all regular and irregular forces of the Viet Minh which have invaded the country.

(2) Disarmament by governmental authorities of elements which belong neither to the Army nor to the forces charged with maintenance of order.

(3) Control of the carrying out of these clauses by International Commissions.

III. The guarantee of the agreements is assured by the member states of the Geneva conference. Any violation will call for immediate consultation among them with a view to taking individually or collectively appropriate measures.

SMITH

---

751G.00/5-854 : Telegram

### *The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1954—12:32 p. m.

Tedul 43. Eyes only Smith from Secretary.

1. At special meeting this morning NSC<sup>2</sup> considered French proposals contained in Secto 132<sup>3</sup> which was read to meeting.

2. After discussion NSC took following decision:<sup>4</sup>

“The United States will not associate itself with any proposal from any source directed toward a cease-fire in advance of an acceptable armistice agreement, including international controls. The United States could concur in the initiation of negotiations for such an armistice agreement. During the course of such negotiations, the French and the Associated States should continue to oppose the forces of the Viet Minh with all the means at their disposal. In the meantime, as a means of strengthening the hands of the French and the Associated States during the course of such negotiations, the United States will continue its program of aid and its efforts to organize and promptly activate a Southeast Asian regional grouping for the purpose of preventing further expansion of Communist power in Southeast Asia.”

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Bowie of S/P.

<sup>2</sup> The 196th meeting of the National Security Council, May 8. For a memorandum of discussion of the meeting, see volume XIII.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 7, p. 714.

<sup>4</sup> NSC Action No. 1110-a, May 8, 1954.

3. Referring your Dulte 54<sup>5</sup> I would stress that position set out in para 2 was considered as minimum one from which U.S. shld not recede. NSC felt any cease-fire without acceptable armistice agreement wld be such disaster as to require us to dissociate ourselves from it.

4. NSC decision was based on assumption that armistice would be approved by Associated States as well as France. In event of split between them NSC would want to reconsider U.S. position.

5. Secto 143<sup>6</sup> not received until after NSC meeting. Comments will follow.

DULLES

---

<sup>5</sup> Dated May 8, p. 712.

<sup>6</sup> *Supra.*

---

396.1 GE/5-854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 8, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 144. Repeated information Paris 223, Saigon 42. Dac Khe and Buu Kinh outlined views Vietnamese delegation with which they said Bao Dai in general agreement to Ambassador Heath as follows:

1. Vietnam had never wanted Geneva conference. They hoped it would fail though they would not sabotage it.

2. They were somewhat concerned over US headlines (New York *Herald Tribune* May 7) we were "writing off" Vietnam. Ambassador Heath assured them this not US intention.

3. Vietnamese feel most strongly military solution Indochina must be tied to political solution and accordingly they fear French desire end war will lead them accept cease-fire without political guarantees.

4. Vietnamese would support French proposal for armistice provided it was part of a military political program; Laniel plan acceptable basis but should be expanded include UN inspection teams along Chinese border; Viet Minh should lay down arms under amnesty guaranteed by UN. Some time after armistice national elections would occur followed then (and only then) in coalition government if election results so dictated.

5. Vietnamese plan discussed generally with French but without references UN which Vietnamese fear unacceptable to French.

6. Vietnamese believe Security Council safest UN form introduce their problems since the US or Chinese Nationalist veto could block unacceptable Soviet proposal. They seemed concerned re undesirable Indian leadership UNGA.

7. On conference tactics, Dac Khe says Vietnamese desire speak after Viet Minh in order follows 24 hours later with speech which would both rebut and attack while leaving responsibility Viet Minh for throwing first stone.

8. It was agreed US and Vietnamese delegations should maintain close contact.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, May 8, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 145. Repeated information niact Paris 224, niact Saigon 43. For his opening speech on Indochina Bidault originally planned something essence as follows: (British found text too strong for them fully to support but we considered it good).

“French Government, recognizing aspirations of people of three Associated States for independence and liberty, and noting their desire to be preserved from scourge of war, to practice toleration and to live in peace with other peoples as good neighbors, is firmly decided to follow policy which it is pursuing, of which essential is to assure these peoples their full national sovereignty as well as benefits of fundamental freedoms of peoples and individuals in exercise of their democratic liberty. To this end French Government is determined to take all appropriate measures to preserve against any danger of external aggression the territorial integrity of these states and to counter (prevenir) all attempts from whatever quarter to undermine their free institutions.”

However, this morning French delegation submitted following to Bidault which is obviously weaker and less satisfactory from our viewpoint:

“Recognizing the aspirations of the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos for national independence and liberty the French Government declares its decision to extend, for its part, to the sovereign states of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos the benefits of the undertaking to which it has subscribed in the term of the San Francisco Charter for the purpose of assuring the nations members of the UN of the respect for their national sovereignty and the benefits of fundamental liberties of peoples and of individuals and the functioning of democratic institutions.”

We are told Bidault is now studying two texts and will probably deliver speech hitting note somewhere between the two.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 8, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 147. Repeated information London 137, Hong Kong 8, Moscow 52. In conversation with Thurston May 7 Trevelyan (UK delegate) stated that as result his observations last eight months as UK Chargé Peking and here at Geneva believes following represent "minimum present requirements" Peking regime re Korea and Indochina:

1. Continuation *status quo* in Korea except for withdrawal UN and Chinese troops;

2. Peking requires establishment small Communist buffer state in northern Indochina (a) because it would lose face if present Ho Chi Minh Embassy in Peking were closed; (b) for military protection its southern borders; and (c) to keep control of river system in Yunan-Indochinese border region on which the tin mining industry of Yunan depends for transportation.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-854 : Telegram

*First Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 8, 4:35 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 8, 1954—midnight.

Secto 154. Repeated information Paris priority 227, Saigon priority 46, London 141, Tokyo 36, Moscow 56, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Department pass Defense. First session Indochina phase held 4:30-7:45 p. m. today. Following opening speech by Bidault at conclusion which he tabled proposal contained Secto 143, repeated Paris 222, Saigon 41, Moscow 54, London 139, Tokyo 34,<sup>2</sup> (minor modifications contained Secto 152, repeated Paris 225, Saigon 44, Moscow 55, London 140, Tokyo 35<sup>3</sup>). Viet Minh immediately proposed invitation Pathet Lao and Khmer Issarak. Remainder of meeting devoted sharp procedural wrangle this point. I rejected invitations to these nonexistent governments and also noted improper invitation conveyed to Viet Minh in name Communist China as well as USSR (text my statement contained Secto 153, repeated

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/1) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 276. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 4:35 p. m. and adjourned at 7:40 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 13-30. The speeches of Bidault, Pham Van Dong, Smith, Molotov, Sam Sary, and Phoui Sananikone are printed in Cmd. 9186, pp. 107-116. The proposal made by the French Delegation during the meeting, Indochina Document IC/1, May 8, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279A.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 8, p. 730.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 8, not printed; for text of modifications, see footnote 1, *ibid.*



Paris 226, Saigon 45, London 138, Moscow 53, Tokyo 33 <sup>4</sup>). Next meeting tentatively scheduled Monday 3:00 p. m.

Eden opened session announcing chairmanship arrangements (he and Molotov alternating), official languages (English, French, Russian, Chinese). Bidault gave effective presentation French position in which he attacked Communists bitterly, particularly over failure grant evacuation wounded Dien Bien Phu. He stressed particularly independence already granted Associated States and fraudulent nature Viet Minh allegations of fighting for freedom Indochina. He then gave general outline French reasoning on what was required in Indochina and concluded by tabling proposal.

Viet Minh Vice President Pham Van Dong followed, (he spoke in Vietnamese) and devoted virtually entire speech plea for invitations to Pathet Lao and Khmer Issarak along strictly Communist lines (they represent struggle of those peoples for independence from foreign imperialism, etc.). He ended with formal motion invite these two.

I then made statement contained Secto 153 following which Chou En-lai immediately spoke holding conference had right discuss its own composition and calling for adoption Viet Minh motion. Molotov followed with harangue dedicated both Viet Minh proposal and my remarks re inviting powers. On former he alleged these regimes controlled much of territory of two countries and were leading war of national liberation. He spent most of time inviting powers problem, reading paragraph from Berlin communiqué re Indochina. He interpreted this meant one of five "named powers" had any special status, and accordingly said it was perfectly proper for Communist China join with Soviets in inviting Viet Minh. He concluded saying all of nine powers present today had right propose additional states, and he thus hoped Viet Minh proposal to extend two more invitations would be accepted. In closing he referred to my suggestion that 4 Berlin powers meet to settle question and countered with proposal additional invitations be considered by five powers named Berlin communiqué.

Bidault and Eden supported US position. Bidault appealed to conference to avoid sterile procedural arguments while Eden characterized Viet Minh proposal as something quite new which four Berlin powers should discuss.

Cambodian delegate (Sam Sary) asked for floor saying he had not intended speak so soon but felt he must reject Viet Minh proposal. In effective rebuttal he said Cambodia at peace until invaded April 3, 1954 so any so-called government must have been created for purpose

---

<sup>4</sup> *Infra.*

of Geneva conference. He stressed complete control Royal Cambodian Government except for minor shifting pockets of invaders. He said remaining dissidents were mostly foreign invaders and asking them represent Cambodia was like asking Pole to represent Soviet Union. Finally he pointed out "Khmer Issarak" were nationalist rebels who rallied to King, and people using that name now were foreign Communist invaders.

Chou En-lai intervened again calling for acceptance Soviet proposal for five-power talks on Viet Minh proposal. Viet Minh followed with additional peroration denying Pathet Lao and Khmer Issarak were ghosts and calling also for acceptance Soviet proposal for five-power talks on invitation problem.

Eden noted he had two mutually irreconcilable proposals before him, US for four-power and Soviet for five-power talks. Accordingly he proposed simple adjournment, although Laotian had previously asked for recognition. Laotian (Phoui Sananikone) insisted on recognition and spoke on nonexistence Pathet Lao which dissolved itself in October 1949. He noted its "chief" was discredited member Royal family who had joined Viet Minh and to invite his regime would be to admit any dissident individual or group anywhere could claim recognition as a government.

SMITH

---

396.1 GB/5-854 : Telegram

*First Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 8, 4: 35 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

GENEVA, May 8, 1954.

Secto 153. Repeated information Paris 226, Saigon 45, London 138, Tokyo 33, Phnom Penh and Vientiane unnumbered. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Following is statement by US representative in first Indochina plenary session :

"The United States delegation takes this opportunity to recall that at Berlin, the US joined with France, the UK and the USSR in agreeing to organize a conference at Geneva to consider the problems of Korea and of Indochina. Subsequently, the same four powers reached agreement as to the composition of the Indochina phase of the conference, an agreement reflected in the presence here today of the nine delegations in this hall. As in the case of the Korean phase, there are only four inviting powers, the UK, France, the US and the USSR. Therefore, if, as has been stated in press reports, the invitation issued to the so-called democratic republic of Vietnam appears in the name

of both the USSR and the Communist Chinese regime, that invitation is, in its form at variance with the clear understanding of the Foreign Ministers present at Berlin last February. Assuming the press reports to be accurate the US delegation can only regret that the Indochina phase of this conference should be initiated by a procedural evasion of previously reached agreements.

At Berlin we agreed that 'the problem of restoring peace in Indochina' would be discussed at this conference 'to which representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic, and other interested states will be invited'.

At Geneva the four inviting powers have agreed that in addition to the participation specified at Berlin there should be representatives at this conference of the governments of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, and of the Viet Minh.

The United States cannot agree to the suggestion which has just been made that non-existent so-called governments or states, such as the so-called Pathet Lao or free Cambodians, can in any way be considered as qualifying for invitations to this conference under the Berlin agreement.

The United States proposes that any idea of inviting these non-existent so-called governments be rejected. If there is opposition to this United States proposal, the United States suggests this meeting be adjourned to allow for further discussions on this point between the four inviting powers."

Summary of meeting follows.<sup>1</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Summary of the First Plenary Session on Indochina contained in telegram Secto 154, *supra*.

MAY 9, 1954

751G.00/5-954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, May 9, 1954—noon.

Dulte 56. Personal for Secretary. Reference your Tedul 42.<sup>1</sup> I put the point covered in the reference paragraph of your speech to the French in a broad and unmistakable hint in my private talk with Bidault last Friday.<sup>2</sup> He got the point and it had, I think, a great deal to do with stiffening his position.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 8, p. 728.

<sup>2</sup> Reported in telegram Dulte 54, May 8, p. 712.

396.1 GE/5-954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, May 9, 1954—noon.

Dulte 57. The Communist maneuver of yesterday, reported in Secto 154,<sup>1</sup> could put us in a very difficult position if we allow the problem to boil down to whether the Big Four, as proposed by me, or the "Big Five", as proposed by Molotov, consider the participation of Pathet Lao and Khmer. Should this occur, and thus delay or possibly prevent serious discussions leading to the end of bloodshed in Indochina, it will intensify and broaden the already critical attitude of segments of European and Asiatic political and public opinion, which consider our attitude on Communist China to be obstructive and intransigent. I should think that in France it would ultimately have a particularly bad effect, as it will seem to the French that we are protracting a procedural wrangle to maintain our position while French lives are being lost. This would give the Communists and anti-EDC protagonists a particularly powerful weapon.

We cannot possibly acquiesce in Molotov's proposal, as to do so would really make this a Big Five conference in every sense and would immeasurably increase the position of Communist China.

I doubt that either Eden or I can persuade Molotov to drop his "Big Five" proposal and go along with us. He stands to gain too much even at the risk of broadening the war in Indochina and Asia.

The best way out to us seems to continue the debate in the plenary sessions, letting the issue "Big Four versus Big Five" fade out, and trying to concentrate the procedural issue on admission of the two phantom governments. At the same time we and our associates would continue to press discussion of the real question; i.e., ending the war in Indochina on a satisfactory basis of security in SEA. The advantage is that for the next few days at least it puts us in the superior position. The disadvantages are that the Chinese will assert themselves more and more, taking advantage of French weakness, lukewarm attitude of Britain, and support of Soviet Union. There is possibility of them emerging from this phase recognized as a really dominant factor, but this is likely to happen anyway.

We are trying today and tomorrow to develop British and French positions and will report. Meanwhile, grateful for any suggestions on

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 8, p. 734.

above. I have just read Reston's story in Friday *Times*<sup>2</sup> and in view of his statements this message seems *ex post facto*.<sup>3</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> In *The New York Times* of May 7, James Reston reported that the "United States, Britain, and France are now in substantial agreement on a compromise plan for a 'protected armistice' in Indo-China." He said it was "understood that the Laniel Government in Paris has told Washington that it is prepared to fight on in Indo-China unless the Communists agree to evacuate Laos and Cambodia and withdraw to certain 'fixed areas' in the third independent state of Vietnam." Reston reported that the "Eisenhower Administration, determined to block the Communist conquest of the whole peninsula, but unwilling to intervene at this time in the war with United States military power, is prepared to go along with Paris in its attempt to negotiate this compromise in Geneva." He indicated that Secretary of State Dulles was reported to have discussed the compromise arrangement with members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and that the Secretary "also outlined to them his own plans for the negotiation of an 'extended' Southeast Asia security arrangement that would be designed to guarantee the terms of any honorable armistice that could be arranged." (*New York Times*, May 7, 1954, p. 1)

<sup>3</sup> In a follow-up message (telegram Dulte 60, May 9), Under Secretary Smith reported that the "British and French concurred in tactics recommended. . . . British believe that Communists will drop two phantom governments after another day or two of discussion in plenary as they dropped East Germans at Berlin. French commented that all six non-Communist delegations were resolute against their admission and that continuation of Communist obstructionism during next two or three days would help Bidault in Paris, assuming Western delegations continue to press for substantive discussions and keep onus of obstructionism on Communists. French hoped that first day or two of substantive discussion would bring short statements from US and UK, giving general support for broad lines of French proposal, but with Associated States doing most of talking." (110.11 DU/5-954)

Secretary of State Dulles replied in telegram Tedul 45, May 9, that he agreed "best course is to keep discussion of additional participants in plenary and to stress sham character of Pathet Lao and Khmer regimes and relationship these regimes to basic Communist techniques for subversion and takeover. Above course seems best way to avoid getting bogged down in procedural discussion of Four versus Five with bad effects you describe." (396.1 GE/5-954)

---

396.1 GE/5-954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, May 9, 1954—noon.

Secto 155. Repeated information priority Paris 228, priority London 142, priority Saigon 47, priority Tokyo 37. Tokyo for CINCFE. Reference: Tosec 104.<sup>1</sup> Following are USDel comments French proposal as tabled at conference (Secto 143<sup>2</sup> as revised by Secto 152<sup>3</sup>):

---

<sup>1</sup> In telegram Tosec 104, May 8, the Department urgently requested the U.S. Delegation's comments on telegram Secto 143, May 8. (396.1 GE/5-854)

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 8, p. 730.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 8, not printed; for text of modifications, see footnote 1, *ibid.*

1. Proposal contains major elements contained in previous French drafts (Secto 106<sup>4</sup> and Secto 132<sup>5</sup>) and comments already submitted (Secto 110<sup>6</sup>) remain valid.

2. Proposal continues differentiate between Vietnam one hand and Laos and Cambodia other, calling for evacuation of all regular and irregular Viet Minh forces from Laos and Cambodia, and disarming "all elements which do not belong either army or police forces" which on face of it would call for elimination all rebel forces of any character in Laos and Cambodia. We continue believe separation out of Laos and Cambodia issues is justified by facts of situation and is valid point.

3. Proposal contains important point hostilities should cease only after an agreement is reached which provides for (a) definition of assembly areas for regular units; (b) disarming of "elements not belonging either to the army or to police forces"; (c) release of POWs and civil internees, and (d) supervision under international commissions. Proposal thus has characteristics of armistice rather than simple cease-fire. But since assembly of troops and disarming of forces, according to proposal, will unavoidably follow rather than precede cessation of hostilities there is a major loophole here which could in effect make a simple cease-fire out of a paper armistice agreement.

4. Proposal contains new point, which has, however, been talked about by the French before, namely, that agreements "shall be guaranteed by the states participating in Geneva conference". It is unclear whether this refers, as presumably it does, only to states participating in Indochina phase of conference. This part of proposal obviously requires clarification and careful consideration since it might amount, on our part, to undertaking some obligation for underwriting a settlement which at best will be highly unstable. The responsibilities of the "guarantors" are, however, probably purposely left vague, consisting as they do of "immediate consultation" for the "purpose of taking appropriate measures either individually or collectively". It is probable that French set considerable store on an underwriting of settlement, particularly by the United States, and that United States response to this part of proposal will have an important bearing on how firm French will feel they can be in negotiating other conditions of an armistice.

It is possible that French view this provision as possible prelude to eventual UN membership and guarantees for the Associated States or that they are thinking of a link with possible collective action in Southeast Asia. This section, taken literally, could paradoxically require consultation between ourselves and the Communists in the event

<sup>4</sup>Dated May 5, p. 694.

<sup>5</sup>Dated May 7, p. 714.

<sup>6</sup>Dated May 5, p. 696.

of Communist violation. The Communists might also, of course, attempt to steer such a provision in the direction of a Communist sponsored all Asian security pact.

5. Another new point is suggestion that assembly areas in Vietnam should be defined by the conference "on the basis of proposals by the Commanders-in-Chief". This could be merely an indication of the obvious requirement for military staff work, or it could be an entering wedge for on-the-spot technical conversations between the combatants which might, under certain circumstances, substitute for formal agreements, and thus might circumvent the conference proceedings.

6. On the whole French proposal is amorphous, and as compared with earlier French drafts somewhat more sketchy and loose. We fully realize danger that under pressures which French will experience they will move rapidly in direction of making so little insistence on nature of supervision or controls they will in fact agree to a simple cease-fire. The French proposal is purely an outline, and a vague one at that. The French will be under severe temptation make no efforts to fill it in satisfactorily.

7. If at this point United States does not support French in negotiations there can be little doubt that French would rapidly agree to a cease-fire, and that in process there would be severe damage, not only to United States interests in Indochina, but also to our relations with French. If we do support French proposal we certainly run a major risk of becoming deeply involved in an unsatisfactory settlement, but we might be able strengthen French hand sufficiently so they will pursue negotiation of "an acceptable armistice agreement, including international controls" (NSC language) and come out with maximum salvage from Indochina situation, and without a radical dislocation of their relations with United States and of their world position.

8. We will probably be in better position win British and Australians and New Zealanders over to more active role in defense of Southeast Asia if at this stage we support French in these negotiations than if we keep hands off.

9. On balance, well realizing difficulties of situation and risks involved, we recommend that at this stage we give general support present French proposal in the negotiations, that we try strengthen French position by what we do here at Geneva and particularly by what we do at home, while continuing make it clear to French that our support is premised upon French not agreeing to cessation of hostilities without an acceptable armistice agreement.

110.11 DU/5-954 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1954—3:06 p. m.

Tedul 46. For Under Secretary from Secretary. Re Dulte 56.<sup>2</sup> Following is memo of my conversation with Bonnet May 8:<sup>3</sup>

"I called on Ambassador Bonnet at his residence, he being indisposed. We spoke of my speech the night before which he commended. I said I assumed that the parallel with Korea had been noted by him and he said that it had. I said that this was as far as I thought it wise to go publicly in indicating what had on many previous occasions been made clear, namely that the United States was prepared to sit down and talk with the French about what the French called "internationalizing" the war and working out a real partnership basis. I said that as far as the immediate present was concerned, I assumed that the French Government would still not want this. However, they might change their mind after the full harshness of probable Communist terms was revealed. Then this might seem to them an alternative worth exploring. I wanted the French to know that such explorations would be acceptable to the United States."

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4002 and to Saigon as telegram 2233.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 9, p. 737.

<sup>3</sup> For the text of memorandum of conversation, see volume XIII.

396.1 GE/5-954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

GENÈVA, May 9, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 157. Repeated information Paris 229, London 143. At his meeting this morning, Chauvel inquired as to outcome of NSC meeting yesterday.<sup>1</sup> Achilles stated we could not associate ourselves with any arrangement for cease-fire in advance of adequate and controlled armistice, but that we could support initiation of negotiations for such an armistice agreement. He added that French proposal<sup>2</sup> as tabled had been received in Washington only after NSC meeting, and that it was, therefore, not dealt with specifically, but that we assumed we would be in position to support general lines of French proposal as minimum. We might have to disassociate ourselves, should that proposal be weakened in negotiations.

---

<sup>1</sup> For report of decision taken by the National Security Council at its 196th meeting, May 8, see telegram Tedul 43, May 8, p. 731.

<sup>2</sup> Contained in telegram Secto 143, May 8, p. 730.



In discussion of French proposal it became clear that French have not thought through much of it. In discussion of paragraph I (1), questioning brought out their tentative thinking that framework for regrouping would be established by conference, that commanders in field would then be asked to work out details, which would in turn be submitted for approval by conference. There was no answer to Allen's remark that Eden did not wish to spend next two years in Geneva.

With respect to I (4), French had no definite idea as to composition of control commission other than that they need not necessarily be same nationalities as guarantors in paragraph III. Chauvel indicated less opposition than previously to United Nations responsibility for control and selection of control commissions.

There was considerable discussion of paragraph III on guarantees. In answer to British question as to nature of obligations contemplated, Chauvel stated only specific obligation was consultation, although they wish this provision to involve each of the nine in some political responsibility. Allen remarked that consultation with Communists might take time but Chauvel said that any government could act immediately, particularly those with forces in field. We stressed desirability of providing framework for action by six,<sup>3</sup> with possible addition of other governments prepared to participate in united action. Allen felt proposal as phrased might be helpful in associating Colombo powers<sup>4</sup> with some form of united action, whereas they would be reluctant to join in framework limited explicitly to non-Communist powers. We stressed importance of avoiding any possibility of Communists or neutralists, delaying or paralyzing collective action. French felt that reference to "individual or collective measures" avoided this possibility, since any single nation or group of nations could act. They stated their intent was to facilitate united action. British said proposal would help them, as would any agreement reached here, to secure both UN and Commonwealth support for united action. Achilles reiterated US would not participate in negotiating, let alone guaranteeing, any unsatisfactory settlement. Allen stated that the less satisfactory any settlement reached here might be the greater and more urgent would be the need for united action. Objective was to check the rot in as much of Indochina as possible and prevent its spreading elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Question of "guarantees" will obviously require careful consideration as to how we might utilize it to facilitate development of united action and prevent its complicating picture.

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

<sup>4</sup> Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan.

396.1 GE/5-954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 9, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 158. Repeated information Paris 230, London 144, Saigon 49. Ambassador Heath saw Dac Khe of Vietnamese delegation this morning for discussion of positions taken at yesterday's plenary. Dac Khe expressed understanding and approval of US, France and UK positions on matter of inviting powers and on status of Lao and Khmer "ghost" governments. He expressed concern at French armistice proposal on following grounds:

(1) Vietnamese position (as set forth in Secto 144 repeated Paris 223, Saigon 42)<sup>1</sup> is that military arrangements should be concluded at same time rather than independently of political settlement. Dac Khe fears that purely military armistice would result merely in highly illusory and dangerous cease-fire.

(2) Vietnamese criticize French armistice proposal which they consider vague and unsatisfactory from their standpoint on two counts:

(a) Franco-Vietnamese forces are apparently to be given same treatment in matter of withdrawal and regrouping as those of rebel Viet Minh. (We note that Laniel proposals referred only to Viet Minh troops<sup>2</sup>).

(b) French plan fails to make any provision for internationally supervised zone along Chinese border. Vietnamese consider establishment such zone imperative if any political or military arrangements are to have chance of stability.

It is to be noted, that French proposal which Dac Khe considers weaker than requirement his country's safety is probably stronger than proposal which this or a successor French Government will in long run adhere to under present circumstances, i.e., in absence injection new positive elements on our side.

The present tactical plans of Vietnamese delegation in the next two or three plenary sessions are as follows:

(a) Delivery of short speech against the admission to the conference of delegations of phantom "free governments" Cambodia and Laos.

(b) Immediately or twenty-four hours after the conclusion of Viet Minh delegation's opening address (which was interrupted by debate on the candidacies free Laos and Cambodia "governments") to address the conference or rather the Viet Minh delegation, urging the latter, now that Vietnam's independence has been obtained, to end the war, free themselves from foreign Communist direction and elements, and rally to the legal government. The delegation does not plan in its

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 8, p. 732.

<sup>2</sup> Made on Mar. 5, reported in telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, p. 435.

first address to spell out all of the details of its plan for eventual elections after an armistice will have brought peace to the country.

Vietnamese are anxious to know whether we will support their view that military armistice and political program must be in single agreement. Department instructions requested.<sup>3</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> See telegram Tedul 49, p. 747.

---

790.5/5-754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1954—8:57 p. m.

Tedul 48. For Under Secretary from Secretary. Re Dulte 51<sup>2</sup> and 53<sup>3</sup> Tedul 36<sup>4</sup> and 37.<sup>5</sup> Eden's proposal reflects considerable progress in providing UK and French participation in some visible form of collective planning prior to conclusion Geneva Conference. But even as modified (Dulte 53) it contains major defects from our point of view. The most serious is that the five powers represented on the Staff Agency are all non-Asian. If this becomes nucleus of military, political and economic planning, this will be resented by Asian public opinion as recalling colonial past, despite provision for possible participation by invitation of certain Asian countries. Communist propaganda machine can be expected to concentrate on absence any Asian charter membership. Incidentally we note absence specific mention Philippines in Eden draft which exclusion would not be acceptable to us.

US admittedly faced by dilemma resulting from (1) our desire quickly to establish common front with Western powers directly concerned with problem defense Southeast Asia for earliest possible establishment collective defense for that area and (2) our desire which UK apparently does not share to avoid planning during Geneva Conference which would imply Associated States have been written off. To counter with argument that France would represent and speak for Associated States would merely underline in Asia existing skepticism as to their independence.

In the light of this dilemma, our objective must be to handle the discussions for a regional grouping in such a way as (1) to move forward rapidly to creation of minimum coalition, if Indochina should be lost, and (2) in so doing to avoid creating impression that Associated States are already written off and (3) to leave question of

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State and MacArthur. Repeated to London as telegram 5969, eyes only for the Ambassador.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 5, p. 698.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 7, p. 710.

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 6, p. 705.

<sup>5</sup> Dated May 6, p. 706.

actual inclusion or exclusion of some or all of Associated States to be decided in light of outcome at Geneva.

In practical application we would propose to pursue two parallel lines concurrently.

The first would be five-power staff talks concerned exclusively with development military plans (hence our unwillingness to attach political and economic experts to such agency) which plans would be regarded as for benefit of all countries directly threatened by developments in Southeast Asia.

The second line would be the continued effort at political level to construct a collective defense grouping of the Western and Asian countries. As latter assumes definite form, five-power military group would contribute results of its work to entire group.

At its special meeting on May 8 NSC<sup>6</sup> again considered this question and reached decision (superseding that contained Tedul 36) "Agreed that the United States should be willing to participate in an examination by the US, UK, France, Australia and New Zealand of the military situation in Southeast Asia (including Indochina); provided that: (1) the purpose of such examination is to explore, through secret and existing military channels in Washington, means by which these participating governments may assist the countries of Southeast Asia in a cooperative effort to defend themselves. (2) It is made clear that such an examination is supplementary to continued efforts by the US to organize a regional grouping pursuant to NSC Action No. 1086-b or 1104-b and is neither a substitute for nor the nucleus of such a grouping."<sup>7</sup>

FYI. Reference in quoted NSC decision to "secret and existing military channels" reflected desire results of work would be secret but not intended preclude public knowledge such planning was under way. End FYI.

Form of public announcement, if any, of five-power military planning activity is of course crucial, particularly from point of view Asian public opinion. Hence we are most anxious to see soonest suggested draft of such announcement. It may prove better, as suggested your Dulte 53, to avoid any formal public statement. Radford favors Washington because the talks here could be less ostentatious and avoid the degree of speculation inevitable in converting to high-level five-power military talks at Singapore.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> The 196th meeting of the National Security Council, May 8; for the memorandum of discussion, see volume XIII.

<sup>7</sup> Regarding these two NSC Actions, see footnotes 4 and 5, p. 705. Regarding the five-power examination of the situation in Southeast Asia, see volume XII.

<sup>8</sup> For additional information on Radford's views, see Merchant's memorandum of a conversation held on May 9, printed in the regional compilation in volume XII.

Meanwhile, we intend to continue consultations here with Ambassadors of those countries with whom I originally talked. I saw Munro of New Zealand May 8<sup>o</sup> and expect separately to see representatives of Australia, Thailand and Philippines May 10. Since only competent representatives Associated States are now in Geneva, you should talk to them having in mind that present talks are primarily to keep the idea alive pending outcome of exchanges of views with UK including your talks with Eden.

DULLES

---

<sup>o</sup> For the memorandum of conversation between the Secretary and Ambassador Munro, May 8, see volume XIII.

---

396.1 GE/5-954 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1954—8:57 p. m.

Tedul 49. For Under Secretary from Secretary. You are authorized to support in general terms French initiative looking toward an armistice agreement incorporating effective and adequate safeguards and under international supervision. You should throw in additional language reiterating established NSC policy concerning objective of assuring independence and freedom of Associated States. In so far as relates to a guarantee you should make clear that the US must reserve its position until it is known more clearly what would be the nature of the settlement to be guaranteed and the obligations of the guarantors.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State.

MAY 10, 1954

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 285

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 10, 1954.

At the meeting of the Six<sup>2</sup> this morning the following was generally agreed:

a) In the event that Molotov opens the meeting by reading the communication he has received from Chou En-lai regarding the candi-

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Bonsal.

<sup>2</sup> The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

dacies of the Laotian and Cambodian resistance "governments", the six delegations on our side will express their opposition in the following order: Cambodia, Laos, France, UK, Viet-Nam and the US. (The purpose of having the US speak last is because of the understanding that you will address yourself not only to the proposal regarding the ghost governments but also will wish to express your general support of Bidault's proposals.)

b) The Vietnamese Delegation, for the purpose of getting the jump on the Vietminh, is sending a letter to the Chairman (Molotov) asking that the Conference take the position that it is necessary that the problem of the evacuation of the wounded from Dien Bien Phu be considered without delay and before the examination of the problems regarding the armistice and the restoration of peace in Indochina. The Vietnamese Delegate will not insist on immediate discussion of the proposal but he wishes it to be made known to the Conference.

c) In the event that proceedings are such that the Vietminh Delegate concludes his substantive speech, it is the present plan for the Cambodian Delegate who has a speech ready, to be the first to speak in reply. The Vietnamese Delegate wishes to reflect and to prepare his answer.

d) The further possibility is that Molotov will immediately recognize the Vietminh Delegate and ask him to proceed with his substantive speech. If this occurs you should arise on a point of order pointing out that the Conference still has before it the Vietminh proposal to admit delegations from Free Cambodia and Pathet Lao on which you desire to make some brief remarks.

Attached are (a) the text in French and English of Chou En-lai's communication to Molotov and (b) French text of the letter the Vietnamese representative is sending to Molotov on the wounded.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 286)

110.11 DU/5-1854 : Telegram

*Luns-Smith Meeting, Geneva, May 10: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 13, 1954—3 p. m.

Dulte 65. Repeated information The Hague 12, Djakarta 2, Canberra 8. Luns called on me at his request May 10 to discuss united action in Southeast Asia. I told him that we regarded Dutch as one of our staunchest allies in Europe and referred to early Dutch ratification of EDC and many evidences close-working cooperation between our two countries. I said that it was regrettable to have to tell one of our closest European allies that it was not possible to invite their participation in alliance in Asia for reasons which were apparent to him.

Luns said that he understood this completely. He said that Dutch have large investments and interests in Southeast Asia which they were prepared to defend. He said that they would not let New Guinea go and that Australians were in complete agreement on this point. He added that Dutch were sending additional forces to area, replacing territorials with Marines and adding cruiser and possibly two destroyers to their naval forces there. He said that these units would be available if needed. All he asked is that Dutch be kept informed of developments. I assured him that we would do this.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-1054 : Telegram

*Second Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 10, 3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, May 10, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 163. Repeated information Paris niact 235, Saigon 54, London 147, Tokyo 41, Moscow niact 59, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Second plenary session Indochina phase opened 3 p. m. today with Molotov in chair. Following offer release Dien Bien Phu wounded (Secto 164<sup>2</sup>), Viet Minh launched two-hour long Communist-line recital Indochina events leading to present situation. Theme was standard Viet Minh invective against French colonialists and American interventionists, but made frequent reference desire establish friendly relations with France, "on basis equality and mutual interests".

Presuming to speak for Pathet Lao and Khmer, gave account of events Laos and Cambodia and eventually associated them with proposals at end of speech.

US intervention first noted 1947 with reference American diplomat visiting Bao Dai in Hong Kong and France and recommending American assistance. Intensive US intervention beginning 1950 scored in vicious attack. Accused US of using French as tool with intention of later ousting them and using Indochina as a base for conquest Southeast Asia.

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/2) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 276. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 6:40 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 31-57. The speeches of Pham Van Dong, Phoui Sananikone, and Eden, and the proposals made by Vietnamese and Cambodian Delegations are printed in Cmd. 9186, pp. 116-123. The proposals made by Vietnam and Cambodia, Indochina Documents IC/4 and IC/5, May 10, are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279A.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 10, p. 757.

Claimed Viet Minh victories, success of peace movement in France, and prospects peace opened by Geneva Conference caused anxious Americans plan common action. Ridiculed idea Indochinese peoples could be threat to security to US. Concluded US interventionists and French war advocates principal obstacles peace in Indochina. After expressing readiness Viet Minh delegation unite its efforts with other delegations proposals (Secto 162<sup>3</sup>) were tabled. Ended with accusation that French proposal submitted first session could not be taken seriously since it did not take account facts of situation, including military developments, and disregarded political matters.

Cambodian delegate then took floor beginning with denial Viet Minh claim to assist Cambodians in relieving themselves of French yoke. Pointing out that real Khmer Issarak were patriots who rallied to Royal Government once independence acquired, he claimed that actually none exist at present. Listed atrocities and invasion by Viet Minh and mentioned official complaint to United Nations. He pointed out difference situation in Cambodia and Laos from Vietnam; latter had both political and military problems while Cambodia and Laos only military. Ended with submission four-point proposal:

1. Evacuation from Cambodia all regular and irregular Viet Minh;
2. Disarmament of elements not in army or police;
3. Liberation or exchange prisoners of war and civil internees;
4. Control of first three measures by international commissions chosen by conference if possible from states not party to war.

Lao delegate followed with account developments democratic institutions his country since Second World War. Progress interrupted by Viet Minh invasions. Placed special emphasis on Viet Minh taking Lao children out of country to be educated as future Communist leaders. His proposal consisted of:

1. Withdrawal Viet Minh forces;
2. Prisoners of war to be returned;
3. Civilians to be repatriated;
4. Control by observers appointed by conference.

UK next with Eden making gracious gesture US. Said picture painted of US by Viet Minh could not be recognized by those who knew country and people. US strength used for independence and welfare all people; no one in world has been enslaved by US. Followed with short statement of support for French proposal and advocated study and elaboration of its provisions.

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 10, p. 753.



My statement (Secto 161 <sup>4</sup>) ended general debate but was followed by further exchange on Dien Bien Phu wounded. Session adjourned without date for next meeting. (Korea plenary tomorrow).

SMITH

---

<sup>4</sup> *Infra.*

---

396.1 GE/5-1054 : Telegram

*Second Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 10, 3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

NIACT

GENEVA, May 10, 1954.

Secto 161. Repeated information Paris niact 233, Saigon niact 52, London niact 145, Tokyo niact 39, Moscow 58, Phnom Penh and Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Following is statement by United States representative today in second Indochina plenary session :

“The United States delegation warmly welcomes the proposals made and accepted this afternoon for the evacuation of the long suffering wounded of Dien Bien Phu and hopes sincerely that this evacuation will be effected without delay.

“Regrettably, for the subsequent two hours of our session we listened to a remarkable distortion of the events of the past few years in Indochina. The Viet Minh spokesman is well trained in the Communist technique of distorting history and calling black white. The world has learned to evaluate such spurious allegations. The charges made against the United States by the Viet Minh representative are substantially identical with those made by other Communist representatives during the opening phase of the Korean discussion. They have been already amply and adequately refuted, and I see no reason to divert this Conference from its important task by according them further attention at this time. I cannot refrain, however, from commenting on his remarkable effrontery in describing the brutal Viet Minh aggression against Cambodia and Laos as a movement of ‘liberation’. At present, I will merely say that after his statement, it is extremely difficult to believe that the Viet Minh representative has come to this Conference with any intention of negotiating a just and durable peace.

“The United States has come here with sincere hopes that the work of this Conference at Geneva will result in the restoration of peace in Indochina and in the opportunity for Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to enjoy their independence under conditions of a real and lasting peace.

"The United States has watched with sympathy the development of the peoples of Indochina toward independence. The United States and many other countries have recognized the three States of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. We have followed with great interest the negotiations which have been undertaken by France and the Associated States to perfect the independence of the Associated States.

"The United States has shown in many ways its sympathy for the effort of the Associated States to safeguard their independence. We have provided material aid to France and the Associated States to assist them in this effort and have given them support to enable them to resist open and covert invasion from without their borders. We will continue to do so, for the simple reason that it is the wish of the American people to assist any nation that is determined to defend its liberty and independence.

"The United States maintains that the first principle of any settlement in Indochina must be to assure the independence and freedom of the States of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

"The United States also maintains that any settlement in Indochina must give assurance of real and lasting peace. To this end, the United States believes that any settlement must be preceded by an armistice agreement which incorporates effective and adequate safeguards.

"The United States maintains that such an armistice agreement can be effective only under international supervision. The United States, therefore, believes that any settlement must include provisions for effective international supervision and assurance of powers and privileges on the part of the international supervising authority equal to enable it to carry out its various responsibilities.

"The United States welcomes the French initiative and believes the French representative has made a helpful contribution toward the restoration of peace in Indochina. The French proposals are consistent with the general principles to which any satisfactory settlement must conform. In our opinion, they should be accompanied by a program for the resolution of political problems. We look forward to hearing the views of the government of Vietnam on such a program.

"The United States notes the French proposal that 'agreements shall be guaranteed by the States participating in the Geneva Conference'. The United States has already demonstrated its devotion to the principle of collective security and its willingness to help in the development of collective security arrangements in Southeast Asia, as elsewhere. Until it is possible to see more clearly, the exact nature of the agreement to be guaranteed and to determine the obligations of the guarantors, we will, of course, not be able to express any judgment on this section of the proposal.

"The United States delegation suggests that the Conference adopt the French proposal as a basis of discussion and hopes that we will move forward constructively and rapidly in bringing about a restoration of peace in Indochina.

"The American delegation has listened with sympathy to the factual recital of the representatives of Cambodia and Laos and will study with interest their proposals for the restoration of peace in Cambodia and Laos."

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-1054 : Telegram

*Second Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 10, 3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

NIACT

GENEVA, May 10, 1954.

Secto 162. Repeated information Saigon niact 53, Paris niact 234, London 146, Tokyo 40, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Viet Minh tabled following proposal for restoration peace Indochina at second plenary session :

"In order to achieve the re-establishment of peace in Indochina the following shall be deemed necessary :

"1. Recognition by France of the sovereignty and independence of Vietnam throughout the territory of Vietnam and also of the sovereignty and independence of Khmer and Pathet Lao.

"2. Conclusion of an agreement on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of Vietnam, Khmer and Pathet Lao within the time-limits to be agreed upon between the belligerents. Pending the withdrawal of troops the dislocation of French troops in Vietnam shall be agreed upon, particular attention being paid to limit to the minimum the number of their dislocation points. Provision shall be made that the French troops should not interfere in the affairs of local administration in the areas of their dislocation.

"3. Holding of free general elections in Vietnam, Khmer and Lao. Convening of advisory conferences of the representatives of the governments of both sides in Vietnam, Khmer and Pathet Lao, in each of the States separately and under conditions securing freedom of activity for patriotic parties, groups and social organizations in the preparation and the holding of free general elections to establish a unified government in each country; while interference from outside should not be permitted. Local commissions will be set up to supervise the preparation for and the carrying out of the elections.

"Prior to the establishment of unified governments in each of the above-mentioned States, the governments of both sides will respec-

tively carry out their administrative functions in the districts which will be under their administration after the settlement had been carried out in accordance with the agreement on the termination of hostilities.

"4. The statement by the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the readiness of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to examine the question of the entry of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam into the French Union in conformity with the principle of free will and on the conditions of this entry. Corresponding statements should be made by the Governments of Khmer and Pathet Lao.

"5. The recognition by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, as well as by Khmer and Pathet Lao of the economic and cultural interests of France existing in these countries.

"After the establishment of unified governments in Vietnam, Khmer, Pathet Lao the economic and cultural relations of these States with France should be subject to the settlement in conformity with the principles of equality and mutual interest. Pending the establishment of the unified governments in the three States, the economic and cultural relations of Indochina with France will temporarily remain without a change, such as they exist now. However, in the areas where communications and trade ties have been broken off, they can be re-established on the basis of understanding between both sides.

"The citizens of both sides will enjoy the privileged status to be determined later, in matters pertaining to domicile, movement and business activities on the territory of the other side.

"6. The belligerent sides undertake not to prosecute persons who collaborated with the other side during the war.

"7. Carrying out mutual exchange of prisoners of war.

"8. Implementation of measures referred to in paragraphs 1-7, should be preceded by the cessation of hostilities in Indochina and by the conclusion to this end of appropriate agreements between France and each of the three States which should provide for :

"a. Complete and simultaneous cease-fire throughout the whole of the Indochina territory by all armed forces of the belligerent sides: ground, naval and air. Both sides in each of the three States of Indochina for the purpose of strengthening the armistice will carry out a necessary settlement of territories and of the areas occupied by them, and it should also be provided that both sides should not hinder each other during the passage, for the purpose of the above-mentioned settlement, by the troops of the other side over the territory occupied by the other side;

"b. Complete termination of transportation into Indochina from abroad of new ground, naval and air units or personnel, or any kind of arms and ammunition;

“c. To set up control over the implementation of the terms of agreement on the cessation of hostilities and to establish for this purpose in each of the three States mixed commissions composed of the representatives of the belligerent sides.”

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-1254

*Smith-Molotov Meeting, Geneva, May 10, 7:30 p. m.: Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Keppel)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, May 10, 1954.

Participants: W. B. Smith, Under Secretary of State  
Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister  
Troyanovski, Soviet Delegation  
J. Keppel, US Delegation

Place: Molotov's Villa, Geneva

General Smith arrived at Molotov's villa for a courtesy call at 1930 and was greeted by Molotov, Gromyko, and Kuznetsov. Molotov then led General Smith into a small sitting room and, with Troyanovski and Keppel being the only others present, opened the conversation with a few remarks about Geneva.

When the conversation turned to the subject of the Conference, General Smith remarked that while he did not have Mr. Molotov's experience in international conferences, it seemed to him that the present conference was "the worst" he could remember. Molotov exhibited mild surprise at this and General Smith amplified his remark by pointing to the extreme seriousness and explosive possibilities in the Indochinese situation. He indicated that while the US had come to the Geneva Conference hoping that progress could be made on the Korean issue, at least there was no fighting in Korea. The Indochinese situation, on the other hand, he said, was fraught with dangers.

Molotov agreed that the Indochinese situation was much "hotter" than the Korean question. During this part of the conversation he gave every appearance of understanding what General Smith was talking about and adopted a similarly serious manner. Molotov then said that it was too bad that Secretary Dulles had had to go home so early. He said that there had been all sorts of rumors in the press as to the reasons for the Secretary's departure but added that, of course, one shouldn't necessarily believe all such stories. General Smith agreed and explained the Secretary's departure in terms of preventing certain

<sup>1</sup> Summary of the conversation transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 165, May 11, not printed. (396.1 GE/5-1154)

extremists in both parties from disrupting bi-partisan support for US foreign policy. Molotov then indicated the hope that since General Smith was a military man rapid progress could be made at the Conference.

Returning to the Indochinese question General Smith said that the situation was made complex by the absence of clearly defined lines. Molotov agreed that this was so and asked what kind of a solution General Smith had in mind. The latter said that this was something about which he had thought a great deal but has as yet no final ideas. Molotov indicated his belief that something could be worked out. He said that despite the excitable nature of Pham Van Dong's speech he thought that the proposal which it contained represented a real attempt to find a solution. In particular, he said, it sought to solve the question of Indochinese-French relations, "up to and including participation in the French Union."

Molotov then asked General Smith how long he thought that they should all stay at the Conference. The General replied that he thought they should stay as long as there were any chance of making progress toward a solution of the Indochinese problem. He indicated that a certain number of speeches of a general character had to be made before one could get down to business and Molotov indicated his understanding and implied that these were of no real significance. General Smith then said that things were after all not too bad so long as they "were talking," a remark to which Molotov subscribed.

Toward the end of the conversation General Smith said that Eden had mentioned his anxiousness to have both Vietnamese and French wounded evacuated from Dien Bien Phu. The General said he had agreed with Eden to take the matter up when he saw Mr. Molotov that afternoon. To evacuate both the Vietnamese and the French, instead of just evacuating the French as Pham Van Dong had apparently proposed would, the General said, be one step that could be taken to relax the tension somewhat. Molotov said that it was inconceivable to him that Dong had not had this in mind when he made his proposal. He said that he had discussed the matter with Chou En-lai after the session and that it had been Chou's understanding that Dong's proposal had contemplated the evacuation of both French and Vietnamese seriously wounded. A member of his own delegation, Molotov added, had also discussed the matter with the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Molotov and General Smith agreed that the press on both sides should be kept from building this question up into an issue owing to a misunderstanding of Dong's proposal.

After a few remarks of a courtesy nature General Smith took his leave. The conversation throughout was translated by Troyanovski.

396.1 GE/5-1054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, May 10, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 160. Repeated information Paris 230, Saigon 91. Initial French reaction is that while Viet Minh proposals are clever, they may not under present circumstances have as much effect on French opinion as they were obviously calculated to have. French press officer held press conference before this afternoon's session ended with view to having comments in correspondents' hands simultaneously with text of Viet Minh proposals. Points made included that if expeditionary force left, freedom would be finished in Vietnam, that proposal like other Communist proposals in past envisaged arrangement between two competing governments of which Communist one always won out, that proposal would mean three Communist republics in French Union, that Poland and other satellites were a good object lesson as to Communist promises re individual liberties, national economies and cultural matters.

USDel has avoided comment on proposals.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-1054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, May 10, 1954—midnight.

Secto 164. Repeated information Paris niact 236, Saigon niact 55, London 148, Tokyo 42, Moscow 60, Hanoi, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. At beginning second Indochina plenary Viet Minh opened with offer return Dien Bien Phu wounded of which following is English text distributed at meeting:

"The delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the instruction of its government considers it necessary to make the following declaration:

'The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, in conformity with its humanitarian policy, which has always been pursued by it during the war, particularly in regard to the wounded and prisoners of war, is prepared to authorize the evacuation of the seriously wounded of the French Expeditionary Corps who were taken prisoner in Dien Bien Phu.

If the French Government is disposed to evacuate these wounded, the representatives of both Commands will undertake on-the-spot practical measures necessary for carrying out this evacuation.'"

Vietnamese delegation immediately asked Chairman Molotov what had happened to his letter asking conference take up this question, and regretted letter had not been brought to attention of conference before this time. Molotov replied letter just received and being translated.

Bidault replied proposals by Viet Minh and Vietnam corresponded to wish of his government. Hoped Commands in field could take measures he had asked for since beginning of conference, saying better late than never.

Just before end session, Vietnamese intervened to call attention that written text Viet Minh proposal provided only for evacuation French wounded, and asked that Vietnamese be included. Bidault supported intervention, claiming it contrary to international law for commander to make distinction between troops of opposing side. Molotov ended session with hope all present would take note.

In courtesy call on Molotov after session, I raised question interpretation Viet Minh proposal and urged that Vietnamese wounded, as well as members French Expeditionary Force, be evacuated. Molotov said that while he had not discussed matter directly with Viet Minh representative, he was sure that Viet Minh proposal was intended to cover seriously wounded of both French and Vietnamese forces. He said that after session he had discussed matter with Chou En-lai and that this was Chou's understanding. He added that member of Soviet delegation had also discussed matter with Viet Minh delegation.

Molotov expressed hope possibility of misunderstanding would not be blown up by press in view expected clarification, and said he had so informed his press office. I did the same. Molotov and I agreed effort should be made keep press on both sides from building up issue if in fact no difference of interpretation exists on matter.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/5-1054

*Memorandum by Chester L. Cooper and Joseph A. Yager to the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[GENEVA,] 10 May 1954.

Subject: Joint State-CIA Estimate on Communist Intentions Regarding Indochinese Phase of Conference

In response to your request, State Department Intelligence and the

---

<sup>1</sup> In addition to this memorandum, Cooper and Yager drafted and circulated another intelligence paper entitled "Intelligence Notes—II." (396.1 GE/5-1054)



Office of National Estimates, CIA, prepared a joint estimate on Communist intentions regarding the Indochinese phase of the Geneva conference. There follows a text of the estimate which was received here this morning. You will observe that this estimate appears to use the term "cease-fire" to refer to both an armistice and a simple cessation of hostilities.

*Intentions with Respect to Cease-Fire*

1. On the basis of present indications, it appears probable that the Communists will propose or assent at Geneva to a cease-fire in Indochina, without prior guarantees for the withdrawal of French forces. The Communists may, however, insist on French initiative in calling for a truce, in order to underline a Communist military "victory" in Indochina.

2. The Communists may estimate that under a cease-fire negotiated between Ho and the French and possibly even the Associated States, Communist prospects would be favorable. They may estimate a cease-fire would forestall US military intervention, would enable the Communists to maintain and possibly increase their military strength, and would enhance Communist political capabilities. Moreover, the Communists estimate the French would find it difficult to resume the war once hostilities ceased. On the other hand, a cease-fire would confront the Communists with the risk of a possible build-up of French Union forces through massive US aid. Furthermore, the Communists could not be certain a cease-fire period would not be utilized by the US to create anti-Communist alliance in Southeast Asia for "united action" in the event of renewed hostilities in Indochina. If a cease-fire contained safeguards against military build-up, the Communists would benefit, since such safeguards would be difficult to enforce against the Viet Minh. Finally, they would hope by proposing or agreeing to an unconditional cease-fire they could further their political warfare objectives in Europe and Asia.

3. These advantages to the Communists of a cease-fire would in general apply also to a cease-fire based on territorial division. While the Communists have rejected the Laniel formula of March 5 on the grounds that it would require Communist withdrawal from areas now held, the Communists have not categorically rejected partition as a formula for a cease-fire (as distinct from political settlement). A cease-fire involving partition would place the Communists in a favorable political position in both halves, and need not greatly prejudice Communist espousal of Vietnamese "nationalism".

*Intentions with Respect to Political Settlement*

4. While indications of possible Communist terms for political settlement are at best vague, it is possible to ascribe some order of probability to various possible Communist demands. In any event, it is possible a cease-fire would be followed by long drawn out and inconclusive political negotiations.

5. Partition of Vietnam as a political solution appears to be made unlikely by the logic of the Communist position, not only on Indochina but also on Korea and Germany, and by popular resentment that would be aroused in Vietnam by proposals for permanent partition of the country. Insofar as private Communist hints concerning partition may reflect Communist policy, they must probably be taken as referring not to political settlement but to terms for a cease-fire.

6. Coalition government of some type, with or without elections, is a more probable Communist proposal. However, it should be noted that the Communists have taken great pains during recent weeks to build up the DRV as a regime recognized not only by the people it governs, but also by French-held areas, and even by France itself. The Communist view of the relative status of the DRV and the Government of Vietnam are not analogous to the Communist view of the status of two Korean or two German governments, since the latter never governed *all* their respective countries. Therefore, if the Communists advance a coalition formula for Indochina it may differ somewhat from the German or Korean formulas. For example, Communists may offer merely to broaden the present DRV regime, possibly through new elections, to include members or supporters of the present government of Vietnam. Conversely, the Communists will almost certainly reject any formula providing merely for Communist participation in the present Bao Dai government.

7. Although the ultimate Communist objective is control of all Indochina, their immediate concern is victory in Vietnam. Communists have given little indication of their position with regard to Laos and Cambodia, although it appears probable that Communist demands for these countries, centering on claims of two Communist "regimes", will be advanced at Geneva, but only as a tactic to delay or even prevent agreement or as a likely bargaining counter. In any event, moreover, the Communists are unlikely to relinquish control over northern Laos.

396.1 GE/5-1054

*The Head of the United States Delegation (Smith) to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden)*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 10, 1954.

MY DEAR ANTHONY: The following summarizes the message<sup>2</sup> which I had from Washington this morning and which we have just discussed:<sup>3</sup>

"We are pleased at the progress reflected in Eden's proposal toward some visible form of UK and French participation in collective planning before the end of the Geneva Conference. From our point of view, there are, however, still major defects, most serious of which is that all five powers on the staff agency are non-Asian. Asian opinion would resent non-Asian staff agency becoming the nucleus of military, political and economic planning. Communist propaganda would seize on absence of Asian charter membership. Particularly unacceptable from US point of view would be absence of Philippines. We want to (1) move forward rapidly to create a coalition in case of loss of Indochina, (2) avoid any impression that Associated States have been written off, and (3) leave for decision in the light of Geneva outcome the question of inclusion or exclusion of some or all of Associated States.

"We propose that to secure these objectives we move forward concurrently on two parallel lines: (1) The first line should be staff talks by the five powers, to be exclusively concerned with the development of military plans (and so without the attachment of political or economic experts), with such military plans being regarded as developed for the benefit of all countries directly threatened in Southeast Asia; (2) The second line would be a continued effort to construct, at the political level, a collective grouping of Asian and Western countries for defense. As this grouping assumes definite form, the results of the work of the five power military group would be contributed to the entire group.

"The way public announcement is made, if at all, of five power military planning activity is crucial from point of view of Asian opinion. We are eager to see draft of possible announcement. It might, in fact, be better to avoid a formal statement. We are inclined prefer Wash-

<sup>1</sup> Under Secretary Smith's letter was delivered to Eden on the morning of May 11 by Reinhardt of the U.S. Delegation. Shuckburgh informed Reinhardt that Eden would have some comment on the letter later in the day and added, as his personal view, that "the only thing which seemed to be troubling Eden was whether or not we were moving a little too quickly with respect to the Ten." (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 308)

Shuckburgh's reference to "the Ten" was probably to the issue of whether the five-power staff talks between Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States should be expanded to include additional nations such as Thailand, the Philippines, and some of the Colombo Powers (India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia, and Burma).

For Eden's reply to Smith, May 11, see p. 774.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram Tedul 48, May 9, p. 745.

<sup>3</sup> Contents of telegram Tedul 48 presented orally to Eden on May 10; for a report of this discussion and other related comments, see telegram Dulte 66, May 13, p. 791.

ington for the talks since they could be held less ostentatiously and would avoid speculations resulting from conversion to a high level of the Singapore military talks.”

I am rather pleased with this, and if you agree I will report to Washington that you are undertaking to present it to London. Also, that you consider, as do I, that it might be as well to avoid any formal public statement. If, however, it becomes necessary to make such a statement in Washington, a coordinated Washington-London statement should be issued. I would therefore be grateful if you would send me the text of the one which we agreed on this Noon.

Faithfully,

BEDELL

MAY 11, 1954

396.1 GE/5-1154

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Taber of the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, May 11, 1954.

Participants: Ambassador Heath	Colonel Monckton, Military
Mr. Bonsal	Advisor to the British
General Daley	Delegation
Colonel Ferguson	Colonel de Brebisson,
Lt. Colonel Taber	French Del.
	Major Debarnot, French
	Del.
	Major Seze, French Del.

Subject: French Military Briefing—Indo China

*Summary*

French object to use of word “armistice” as it combines both military and political considerations. It is also psychologically bad as word associated with the long negotiations at Panmunjom.

French want agreements for cessation of hostilities in Indo China to be guaranteed by the great powers now at Geneva. On-the-spot inspections for compliance with agreements should be accomplished by a neutral commission.

After cessation of hostilities opposing regular forces would move to previously designated zones. Maintenance of forces would be allowed but reinforcement or tactical movement prohibited. Ports, air-

<sup>1</sup> Hennes in a note to Under Secretary Smith, May 12, stated that “although you saw this briefly at staff meeting this morning, you may wish to examine it in greater detail. The map of the proposed re-grouping zones, not yet approved by the French Government, is on the last page.” (396.1 GE/5-1154)

fields and frontier entry points would be controlled by neutral commission.

French would retain north part of Tonkin Delta including Hanoi and Haiphong. Viet Minh would be given Southern part of delta except Catholic areas of Phat Diem and Bui Chu which would be neutralized. A ten kilometer demilitarized zone would separate French Union and Viet Minh areas in Tonkin Delta.

Viet Minh would hold area from south edge of delta south to Song Giang (river). French would hold area from Song Giang to Faifo (inclusive). Viet Minh from Faifo (exclusive) to Qui Nhon (exclusive). French would continue to hold plateau, area taken during operation Atlante and the coastal area south to Phan Thiet (inclusive). There would be four small Viet Minh zones in South Viet Nam.

#### *Detailed Record*

At Colonel de Brebisson's invitation above-named persons attended a briefing on preliminary plans for the implementation of the military phase of possible French agreement with the Viet Minh. Colonel de Brebisson started the briefing saying that the French Government wanted to avoid the use of the term "armistice". He said there were two reasons for this—one, juridical, and the other, psychological. Juridically, an armistice contains both military and political considerations and must be agreed to by a government, not a commander-in-chief. Therefore, it takes longer to negotiate. Psychologically, the French feel that people's minds are still influenced by the Panmunjom negotiations and there is a tendency among the French to feel that an armistice would take several years to negotiate. In reply to a question as to what the French call their plan, he said it had no name but it could well be called a "cessation of hostilities" or "suspension of hostilities." He added that a simple cease-fire would be dangerous and must be avoided. The French believe that a "cessation of hostilities" guaranteed by the great powers can be worked out at Geneva. This agreement would include the acceptance of regrouping zones for regular armed forces and the delimitation of these zones. The details could then be worked out in the field. The French suggested a neutral commission, with advisors from opposing forces attached, to supervise the implementation of this agreement in Indo China.

Colonel de Brebisson said the French continue to consider Cambodia and Laos as separate problems which will be relatively easy to solve. The French will insist on the withdrawal of Viet Minh invaders in Laos and Cambodia. The Viet Minh could logically ask that all French military be withdrawn. During recent negotiations with Laos, the Laotians requested that a French mission remain with the Lao Army and, in addition, that the French maintain four bases with gar-

risons. The French had little interest in maintaining bases in Laos but finally agreed to keep Xieng Khouang and Seno. In view of the accords which they have signed, the French will insist on keeping those bases if the Laotians still want them to do so. In Cambodia, the French have no bases and no garrisons but they do have a small mission with the Royal Khmer Army. The French are prepared to listen carefully to Laotian and Cambodian suggestions for the cessation of hostilities and will give their views consideration.

Considering the question of control measures, de Brebisson said there would be no question of identification of Viet Minh units in Cambodia and Laos as General Navarre's headquarters had excellent order of battle information on these areas. However, the length and character of the frontier would complicate the control problem. The well-known hostility of the Cambodians and Laotians to the Vietnamese would facilitate the detection of Vietnamese border crossings since the population can be expected to report to neutral observers all known Vietnamese frontier crossers. Preliminary studies of control measures have indicated that a neutral group of three or four hundred people would be needed to observe and control the frontier. The Laotians and Cambodians have been given a general briefing of the French plan for their countries but have not yet been given the details. De Brebisson said they would be given complete information soon, as obviously the French must have their consent to any proposal.

The control problem in Viet Nam is much more complicated because the troops of opposing forces are well mixed throughout the country. The establishment of regrouping zones would require giving up, to the Viet Minh, certain areas now controlled administratively by the Vietnamese Government. Also, there is the question of turning over areas in which the population has been friendly to the French and thus exposing these people to Viet Minh terrorist counter-measures. These people could be moved to Vietnamese controlled zones if they wished, but that would raise additional problems. Certain zones, particularly Catholic areas, should be neutralized and possibly administered by the neutral commission.

At this point Major Debarnot, Deputy G-2 in General Navarre's headquarters, presented the military plan in some detail. As background he explained that there are two types of terrain in Indo China, first, mountain and hill country—generally covered with heavy vegetation, and second, rice paddy. The Viet Minh are expert at moving undetected in both of these types of terrain. Also, there are vast areas with low population density and, conversely, other areas which are extremely over-populated. Either condition facilitates undetected Viet Minh movement and infiltration. Another important consideration is the feeling of the population, which varies throughout Indo China.

Major Debarnot then gave a brief summary of the military situation in Indo China. This summary is omitted from this memorandum as it presented no new information.

Debarnot then stated that the military proposal that he was about to present was tailor-made for the unusual military situation in Indo China and that it had different solutions for different areas. He also stressed the fact that this proposal was based on a "preliminary" study. The guiding principles for this study were as follows:

(1) the proposal must guarantee the security and existence of French Union Forces during any cessation of hostilities;

(2) there must be adequate guarantees to prevent the Viet Minh from reinforcing during the truce or making troop movements to improve positions;

(3) the French must avoid any conditions which would in practice be more restrictive to French Union Forces than to the Viet Minh. As an example, certain movement restrictions might be very easy to enforce on French Union troops but difficult or impossible to enforce on Viet Minh;

(4) conditions must allow French Union Forces to be maintained in such a way that they would be able to fight to defend themselves or to recommence hostilities in case of a breakdown of negotiations.

As previously stated, the French expect that the general conditions for a cessation of hostilities would be agreed at Geneva and the following minimum conditions are desired for this initial agreement:

(1) cessation of hostilities must be complete in all areas and be accompanied by suitable inspections by a neutral commission.

(2) agreement should be made that opposing forces would give adequate warning in the event of unilateral re-opening of hostilities.

(3) the Viet Minh must be prohibited from reinforcing or creating new units.

(4) there must be neutral control of ports, airfields and frontier entry points.

(5) movement of rations and maintenance supplies and the rotation of troops must be allowed.

(6) training should be authorized.

(7) the French Expeditionary Force should have the right of replacement by individual or unit from areas outside Indo China.

(8) in the case of French Union losses from attrition which are not immediately replaced, the French should be given credit for these losses in order to allow replacement at a later time.

(9) free movement in respective zones and on agreed inter-zone lines of communication must be guaranteed.

(10) the French must be guaranteed free use of air transport for supply, liaison and movement of replacements.

Major Debarnot next discussed the zones of relocation for opposing regular forces, pointing out that these zones were proposed by General Navarre's staff and have not yet been approved by the French Government. Movements for regrouping of troops must be gradual

and there must be agreement at Geneva on phasing of these movements.

The following zones were delimited: (See sketch, Incl. 1)<sup>2</sup>

North Viet Nam—Delta: The French will retain the area delimited by the following points—RN-1 from Mon Cay to Hon Gay, RN-18 to Sept Pagodes, along river to Dap Cau, Da Phuc, Lap Thrach, Viet Tri, Son Tay, Xuan Mai, Phu Xuyen, Hung Yen, along the Canal des Bambous to Ninh Giang and down the Song Thai Binh to the sea. A demilitarized zone, 10 kilometers wide, extending outside of this line will separate the present forces.

The Viet Minh would be required to regroup their regular forces in Thai Binh province. The area Phat Dien, Ninh Binh, Phu Ly, Nam Dinh, Quat Lam would be neutralized, probably under the control of a neutral commission. In northwest Tonkin certain areas between the Red and Black Rivers and the Red and Clair Rivers would be set aside for French Union maquis. In center Viet Nam, the Viet Minh would continue to hold the area from the south edge of the Tonkin Delta to the Song Giang River. The French would retain control of the area from the Song Giang south to, and including, Faifo. The Viet Minh would regroup in the area they presently hold between Faifo and RN-19, excluding Qui Nhon, and west to the eastern limit of Kontum Province. The French would relocate in the plateau, the area recently captured by operation Atlante and along the coast to Phan Thiet. In South Viet Nam there would be four Viet Minh zones—the western half of the Ca Mau peninsula, the Plain des Jones, “War Zone D” area northeast of Saigon, and along the Annam-Cochin Chinese border, excluding Phan Thiet. Many of the above delimitations were quite vague. Major Debarnot explained this by saying that they were recently transmitted from General Navarre’s headquarters by cable and that the cable had some omissions and garbles.

Viet Minh regionals would be considered as regular troops and would be moved to Viet Minh controlled zones. The Viet Minh guerrillas or “Troupe Populaire” would be disarmed, although Debarnot added that he thought this would probably be impossible.

De Brebisson stressed the fact that this is a military plan, not political, and it would be part of the larger overall Indo China solution. General Navarre considers it a minimum position that he could accept militarily in Indo China and it is one that would leave the French Union Forces in a position to resume combat under relatively favorable conditions if that were required. The plan has not yet been discussed with the Vietnamese. It is admittedly a far from perfect solution but the French state they have been unable, after much study, to come up with anything better and they believe that it fits the situa-

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



tion as it actually exists in Indo China. They believe it is imperative that opposing forces regroup after cessation of hostilities and not remain scattered throughout Indo China as at present. A cessation of hostilities, with troops remaining in present dispersed positions, would expose French Union Forces to the possibility of a massacre such as they experienced in Tonkin on the night of 19 December 1946. De Brebisson stated he believed that the problem in Viet Nam was primarily a political one. He said he would not be surprised if the Viet Minh would ask for a capital, probably Hanoi.

In reply to a question as to what the French military plan to do if negotiations break down at Geneva, Debarnot stated it is obvious there is only one thing they could do—continue fighting. He said General Navarre has asked for reinforcements and realizes that he may have to abandon certain areas of Indo China in order to hold the more important ones. French air power in Indo China is his greatest asset and it will be much more effective, now that the Dien Bien Phu operation is over, as targets will be much nearer the departure airfields. The history of the war in Indo China has been one in which French Union Forces have repeatedly been given missions and objectives requiring an effort far greater than their capabilities. Debarnot likened the war to a poker game where each side is continually raising the ante on logistical support. This year the Viet Minh had more artillery than before and next year they may have tanks and airpower. De Brebisson ended the briefing by saying that the French were open to suggestions and would appreciate any comments we might have on their proposal.

Members of the American delegation said they would study the proposal. No commitments were made.

---

396.1 GE/5-1154

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath)*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 11, 1954.

Participants: Cambodian Delegation: Tep Phan, Foreign Minister; Nong Kimny, Cambodian Ambassador to Washington; Sam Sary and Sonn San, members of the Cambodian Delegation.

Under Secretary of State, Walter Bedell Smith  
Ambassador to Cambodia, Donald R. Heath

Subject: The Cambodian Program for the Conference

The Under Secretary received the Cambodian Delegation and gave them our view of the conference to date, congratulated Sary on his

political speech in the initial session against the candidacy of the "free Cambodian Government" proposed by the Vietminh Delegation, and he expressed the intention of the American Delegation to support Cambodian efforts to obtain an equitable peace settlement. He suggested that it would be well, in view of adverse communist propaganda, for the Cambodian Delegation to neglect no occasion during the conference to proclaim the full independence of Cambodia. Tep Phan agreed heartily with this suggestion.

Tep Phan then outlined Cambodia's program for the conference. Cambodia intended to press for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cambodia, that is, the withdrawal of the Vietminh aggressors and the French battalions which the Cambodian Government had called in to help fight against the invaders. There should be a United Nations commission to oversee the withdrawal and the disarmament of the Vietminh aggressors and an international guarantee against reinvasion. Cambodia warmly sympathized with Secretary Dulles' proposal for a mutual defense pact for Southeast Asia.

Sonn San and Tep Phan then said that the entire Cambodian population was ready to take up arms against the aggressors but were in no position to obtain armament. Tep Phan had been ordered by the king to purchase 5,000 rifles in Paris so the Cambodian army could be expanded. Several months ago they had passed an order for 500 military rifles to the French but had been unable to get delivery. The only real source of armament was the United States and they inquired whether, in view of recent developments the United States could not now give direct arms aid to Cambodia instead of through the French as heretofore. The Under Secretary stated the Cambodian army had already received a considerable quantity of arms and equipment from the United States through the French but he agreed that the present situation necessitated some alteration of arrangements and he thought some changes in line with the Foreign Minister's request should and could be made.

---

396.1 GE/5-1154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 11, 1954—3 p. m.

Secto 169. Repeated information priority London 149, New Delhi 13, Karachi 1, Colombo 1, Paris 257, Tokyo 44. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Following information given informally to delegation by James Cable, British Indochina Desk Officer (we

---

<sup>1</sup> For a complete text of the memorandum of this conversation, see Department of State file 396.1 GE/5-1154.

shall contact more senior UK representatives to ascertain whether these views represent top-level UK thinking).

British policy on Indochina now concentrating on involving nations represented at Colombo conference in supervision and guarantee of Geneva Indochina settlement. India, Pakistan, and Ceylon have been kept completely informed all aspects conference and have been encouraged to submit policy recommendations. Nehru has indicated India would favorably consider contribution of troops for supervision and guaranteeing of peace in Indochina. UK has envisaged major troop contributions by India and Pakistan with Indonesia, Burma, and Ceylon providing only token troops.

Nehru appears to be thinking of guarantee for Indochina along lines of Asian Locarno: Colombo countries would join countries participating in Indochina phase Geneva conference in pledge to use force against any country violating agreement.

UK delegation hopes to introduce proposal along these lines as soon as Commonwealth approval received, feels early introduction would pay important propaganda dividends and might strengthen French determination to maintain strong position. As far as UK delegation knows Nehru has not indicated Communist China admission to UN would be *quid pro quo* Indian participation.

UK delegation is very tentatively exploring possibilities one of Commonwealth Prime Ministers would call Southeast Asia defense conference. UK prefers to avoid participation in Southeast Asia defense pact in which Colombo countries not represented, and feels these countries must be present at earliest stages negotiations which could follow Geneva conference. Nehru, worried about losing initiative for "Indian leadership in Asia," feels he must go along with some such proposal. He has raised possibility that Asian Locarno for Indochina might be extended into similar guarantee for all Southeast Asia. UK now has strong indications from all Colombo countries except Indonesia that they are concerned about possibility Communist expansion in Southeast Asia.

Please protect source.

SMITH

---

751G.00/5-1154 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State*

SECRET

SAIGON, May 11, 1954—5 p. m.

2333. Sent Geneva 84, repeated information Paris 813. I trust USDel Geneva will keep a weather eye out for possibility that, in framing military provisions of an armistice, Communists will write in a clause forbidding either side to improve its military posture, as for example by construction of air bases or training indigenous troops

by foreign means. Unless we are careful they could effectively spike any NSC program for training of, and operational planning in, Vietnamese National Army.

McCLINTOCK

396.1 GE/5-1154: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 11, 1954—6 p. m.

Secto 174. Repeated information Paris 239, London 150, Saigon 56, Tokyo 46, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Moscow 62. Pass Defense Department; Tokyo pass CINCFE. Preliminary analysis Viet Minh proposal (Secto 162)<sup>1</sup> confirms that it is totally unacceptable and its adoption would amount turnover Indochina to Communists.

Following are delegations comments:

(1) Most obviously unacceptable element is clear indication Viet Minh (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) would determine question association with French Union (paragraph 4) and presumably handle other pertinent problems as well. For example, during discussion free elections it is specified Viet Minh will in meantime speak for country. From this it seems logically and obviously Viet Minh would organize elections, win them and quickly or gradually convert Vietnam into Communist state.

(2) References to French Union may be serious and not purely for propaganda. Conceivably Communists might envisage Communist states in French Union. In any event tactic of not unfriendly references to French Union is interesting.

(3) Insofar as Cambodia and Laos are concerned, it is apparent Communists have dropped invitations to Geneva for Khmer Issaraks and Pathet Lao as issue, and Viet Minh now simply speak in name all three peoples (though Cambodian and Laotian representatives challenged this sharply yesterday). Viet Minh objective for these countries is certainly same as for Vietnam though because central governments now have fuller control over these two countries process would probably be somewhat slower.

(4) References in paragraphs 1 and 8 to unified governments three states Indochina obviously intended refer Viet Minh, Pathet Lao and Khmer Issarak and not any of three presently constituted governments.

(5) Viet Minh launch appeal Asian nationalism by calling for elections which categorically reject any foreign intervention (paragraph 3), and thus follow pattern Communist elections proposals laid down by North Koreans.

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 10, p. 753.

(6) Paragraph 8 of Viet Minh proposal which is to precede paragraphs 1-7 is in effect a cease-fire though it is ostensibly linked with certain other considerations. Proposal is furthermore tantamount rejection Bidault's plan tabled Saturday.

(7) Viet Minh program doubtless for French consumption has certain elements reminiscent some of Bidault's proposal. For example:

(a) Point two Viet Minh proposal calls for evacuation foreign troops all three states Indochina but also for agreement re stationing French troops in Vietnam, implying at least for foreseeable future there would not be demand for total withdrawal. On this point paragraph 8 (a) calls for "readjustment" territories which troops of two parties occupy. While actual meaning is doubtless deliberately vague, suggestion recalls paragraph I (1) Bidault proposal (Secto 143)<sup>2</sup> calling for grouping regular units delimited zones. Viet Minh proposal appears even more detailed on surface providing each party shall give free access troops other party cross its territory to reach its assigned zones.

(b) Paragraph 8 (c) Viet Minh proposal provides for establishment control assure execution cease-fire recalling paragraphs Bidault proposal providing for control mechanisms with major difference Bidault called for international controls while Viet Minh appeal to nationalism Indochinese people by calling for participation only of belligerents thus eliminating all non-Asians except French.

(c) Paragraph 7 of Viet Minh proposal provides for exchange of prisoners of war recalling paragraph (3) Bidault proposal which also calls however, for exchange of civilian internees.

(d) Bidault, of course, calls for signature armistice agreement before end hostilities, while Viet Minh proposal states general political measures (paragraphs 1 through 7) "should be preceded by cessation of hostilities in Indochina and the conclusion to that end of accords between French and each of the three countries". These agreements should cover cease-fire, regrouping of troops, ban on admission of new troops (patterned after Korean armistice) and establishment of controls. While it is quite uncertain even these minimal arrangements are to be carried out before cease-fire occurs, Viets can presumably allege they like French are not calling for immediate cease-fire with no conditions.

(8) Addition elements recalling some of Bidault's points Viet Minh proposal contains other sections presumably designed appeal French. For example:

a. First, of course, are references French Union (paragraph 4). There is obviously no assurance whatever that the "single" government of Vietnam which is called for (nor the governments in the other two countries either for that matter) will join the French Union. However, fact concept is not rejected and indeed implication is free Vietnam may well "freely consent" joint union may furnish fuel for neutralists and others in France.

b. Provisions paragraph 5 recognizing special economic and cultural interests France in Indochina and proposing special reciprocal

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 8, p. 730.

rights for ressortissants two parties are also unquestionably aimed at winning favor France even though references economic and cultural interests are reminiscent Soviet accords with Poland and Czechoslovakia.

(9) In summarizing acceptance Viet Minh proposal would seem to us result in rapid turnover Indochina to Communists. In our opinion, however, it has enough propositions designed appeal French opinion in its present state and which seem reasonable on surface perhaps to cause difficulties for French Government especially in light present Assembly situation.<sup>3</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> The U.S. Delegation reported in telegram Secto 175, May 11, that de Margerie of the French Delegation had outlined the tactics the French expected to follow on the Viet Minh proposal along the following lines: "While it is totally unacceptable, they cannot afford to turn it down cold but must rather go through the motions of trying to find something acceptable in it. They must expose it point by point beginning with immediate recognition of Viet Minh and establishing proposal means nothing but turnover. From French point of view, proposals put political cart before military horse and they will accordingly say such political questions should only be taken up after armistice, with satisfactory guarantees, has been concluded." (396.1 GE/5-1154)

---

396.1 GE/5-1154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, May 11, 1954—6 p. m.

Dulte 63. For Secretary from Smith. French have flash press report statement attributed to you that Southeast Asia can be held without Indochina or words to that effect.<sup>1</sup> Bidault is in complete tailspin. Sure

---

<sup>1</sup> A telegram from the French Embassy in Washington (En Clair No. 380, May 12) contained the following report: "Dulles said [in his news conference yesterday] the United States wanted a South East Asian alliance against Communism which would pledge member nations to fight if openly challenged by Communist aggression. While he hoped such an alliance would cover all Indo-China he firmly asserted that the loss of some or all of that country would not necessarily bring the loss of all South East Asia. In conversations with friendly nations the United States was trying to create a situation in which South East Asia would not go down like a row of dominoes if Indo-China fell." (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 311)

In his news conference the Secretary of State stated in response to questions that the "purpose of this collective security arrangement which we are trying to create is to save Southeast Asia, to save all of Southeast Asia if it can be saved; if not, to save essential parts of it." He said that the "situation in that area, as we found it, was that it was subject to the so-called 'domino theory.' You mean that if one went, another would go?) We are trying to change it so that would not be the case. That is the whole theory of collective security. . . . And what we are trying to do is create a situation in Southeast Asia where the domino situation will not apply. And while I see it has been said that I felt that Southeast Asia could be secured even without perhaps Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, I do not want for a minute to underestimate the importance of those countries nor do I want for a minute to give the impression that we believe that they are going to be lost or that we have given up trying to prevent their being lost." (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 24, 1954, p. 782)

this taken out of context from more comprehensive statement. Give me urgently anything I can say to him which will help counteract.<sup>2</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup>The Department of State transmitted to the U.S. Delegation in telegram Tosec 125, May 11, the verbatim text of some of the pertinent questions and answers from the Secretary's press conference. (396.1 GE/5-1154)

---

751G.00/5-1154: Telegram

*The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

SAIGON, May 11, 1954—7 p. m.

2342. Sent Geneva niact 86; repeated information Paris 815, London 55, Tokyo 96. De Jean tells me, re Secto 164 repeated Paris 236, Saigon 55, London 148, Tokyo 43 [42],<sup>1</sup> that General Navarre has sought by direct radio message to Giap and by parachute letter dropped on Red Cross tent at Dien Bien Phu to indicate his immediate readiness to evacuate wounded.<sup>2</sup> De Jean has likewise telegraphed French delegation Geneva so to inform Viet Minh delegation.

Although French do not have many helicopters in area, they are getting together such machines as are available and plan to land with first party professor of faculty of medicine, Hanoi University, who personally knows General Giap and speaks Vietnamese. French helicopters will commence immediate evacuation most seriously wounded irrespective of whether French or Vietnamese. Less urgent cases will have to await C-47 evacuation after reconstruction of airstrip.

McCLINTOCK

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 10, p. 757.

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on the wounded at Dien Bien Phu, see volume XIII.

---

396.1 GE/5-1154

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, May 11, 1954.

Participants: M. Paul-Henri Spaak, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
and Leader of the Belgium Delegation  
Philip W. Bonsal

Subject: M. Spaak's views on Indochina

After General Smith's dinner, I had a lengthy conversation with M. Spaak whom I had known in the early days of the Marshall Plan.

---

<sup>1</sup> Summary of conversation transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 195, May 13. (396. GE/5-1354)

M. Spaak believes the US should take the leadership in a policy for Southeast Asia similar to that which has given such good results in Europe. His thought is that we should establish a line on our side of which the governments and peoples will give adequate support to the concepts of free world orientation and collective security. We should make it quite clear to the Communists that if they step over that line they will risk a generalized war. With regard to Indochina, about which M. Spaak states he has no "expert" knowledge, it is his belief that we should leave the French and Vietnamese and the Vietminh to work out the best possible solution reflecting their relative potentialities and that we should not involve ourselves directly in the situation. I observed that we had already made a very considerable investment of prestige, material and funds in Indochina.

M. Spaak is most discouraged about the French situation although he expressed great admiration for M. Bidault personally. He states that the French Government must force the EDC matter to an issue in the Assembly without any further delay. He states that if Europe is not "created" in the near future, the whole structure of security which has been erected during the past few years will be in danger of falling to the ground. It is his thought that the other EDC partners should issue a pressing appeal to the French Government to move forward.

In the course of our walk from the Hotel du Rhone to the Hotel Beau Rivage we met General Bethouard who is in Geneva for two or three days. He expressed the gloomiest views regarding the French cabinet situation. He castigated the attitude of the Gaullists in most severe terms.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 308

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) to the  
Head of the United States Delegation (Smith)*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 11, 1954.

MY DEAR BEDELL: Thank you for your letter of May 10<sup>2</sup> giving me a summary of the messages which you had received from Washington yesterday and which we discussed at noon.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Text of letter transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 67, May 13. (790.5/5-1354)

For a summary of Eden's reply and other related comments, see telegram Dulte 66, May 13, p. 791.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 761.

<sup>3</sup> May 10. For a report of this discussion, see telegram Dulte 66, May 13, p. 791.



I enclose a copy of the text for the joint statement which we agreed would be suitable for use if it is found necessary to make a public statement.<sup>4</sup> Meantime you may care to know that in reply to questions in the House yesterday, the Minister of State used the phrases which you and I agreed upon,<sup>5</sup> and my feeling is that no further public statement is now necessary.

As regards the substance, I think you agreed with me that we should make a start with the Five Power Staff talks and should not commit ourselves, or appear to commit ourselves, at this stage to the exact composition of the wider group which we hope would eventually discuss South East Asia security arrangements.

My strong view remains that it would be fatal at this stage to begin discussions with a ten power group. To do this before the results of the Conference are known would destroy any prospect of bringing along the Asian powers who really matter.

What I do think will be useful is that we should inform and consult the Colombo Powers, Siam and the Philippines, and possibly others, about the progress of the work of the Five Power Staffs, in the hope that by the time we can see what prospects of Geneva are, they will be willing to take an interest in security arrangements of a wider character. We on our side shall also keep the Colombo Powers fully informed of the developments at Geneva and will do our best to bring them along.

This is, I am convinced, the best way of trying to bring Asian opinion along with us. As you personally are well aware, that has been one of my principal anxieties from the beginning. I do not understand how your Chiefs of Staff can have obtained a different idea of my purpose.

There is one further point. We discussed the question where the Five Power Staff Agency should have its first meeting. I had originally thought that Singapore would be the most suitable, but you thought it should start in Washington. I have now heard from our people in Singapore that they rather doubt whether Singapore is in fact suitable from the point of view of Asian opinion, and they throw doubt on Washington for this same reason. I wonder whether an alternative would be to have the first meeting in London?

I am available at any time in case you would like to discuss this further.

Yours ever,

ANTHONY

<sup>4</sup> Attachment 1 below.

<sup>5</sup> Attachment 2 below.

## [Attachment 1]

## DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT FOR ISSUE BY THE FIVE POWERS

Pending wider discussions of measures to support a stable peace in South East Asia, the Governments of Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States have agreed that their military representatives should undertake an examination of the situation in South East Asia.

This examination will be undertaken by existing staff agencies formed some time ago for the study without commitment of problems of common concern.

The problems to be reviewed will be of interest to a number of other countries, notably the Powers represented at the Colombo Conference, Siam, the Philippines, etc. These countries have been informed of the intention to initiate this study and, during the progress of the work, will be consulted and kept informed.

## [Attachment 2]

*Mr. Warbey*

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement on the proposed staff talks with the United States, France and other countries concerning Indo-China?

*Mr. Selwyn Lloyd*

The existing military agencies have been examining and will, of course, continue to examine jointly the various contingencies with which we may be faced. The Five Power Staff Agency is one such organisation. I must emphasise that any examinations undertaken are without commitment.

**MAY 12, 1954**

396.1 GE/5-1254: Telegram

*Smith-Bidault-Eden Meeting, Geneva, May 12, Noon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 12, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 183. Repeated information Paris 244, Saigon 59, London 152. At Eden's urgent request we met with him and Bidault this noon to discuss tactics on Indochina. If French and we agreed, he proposed

to raise following questions<sup>1</sup> this afternoon after Cambodians and Vietnamese had spoken :

Is it agreed that first start is to get fighting stopped in orderly manner? It is assumed that arrangements dealing with wounded are in hand at Dien Bien Phu. If there is agreement on above question, following other questions require urgent answer :

1. Is it agreed that all troops on both sides shall be concentrated in determined area?
2. Is it accepted that Laos and Cambodia are in special category and that Viet Minh forces will be withdrawn from them?
3. Who is to work out areas of concentration for Vietnam? Is it to be commanders-in-chief?
4. Is it agreed that when all troops have been concentrated into determined areas, any irregulars shall be disarmed?
5. Are we in favor of international supervision? If so, in what form? UK would prefer UN. UN does not necessarily mean combatants or any of those here represented. There could be an agreed panel of countries.

There was agreement that his raising these questions presented no difficulty with French or ourselves. Bidault did not wish himself to question Viet Minh directly but felt Eden's questions and Communist answers would help him later to analyze Viet Minh proposals. On international supervision, Smith felt we should stick on principle that it be UN and that collectively we would have enough influence to insure acceptable composition. Eden felt composition in Korea had been mistake since two Communist nations blocked everything. He suggested four not from either side, such as Swedes, Swiss, Latin American and Asian, probably Indian. Smith said Indian soldier, such as General Thimmaya might be acceptable but Indian politician would be wholly unacceptable. Bidault also objected to any Indian but felt Thimmaya might be acceptable. Eden pushed hard for India as great power of Asia or at least one great power in Asia and held its policy gradually moving our way. It was nevertheless agreed that we should not at this time go beyond principle of UN supervision and fight out battle of composition later.

Eden asked whether we should continue regular meetings on Indochina or go into restricted sessions. Bidault felt restricted sessions might be agreeable later but felt principles should be further clarified in general meetings. Smith agreed.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> In telegram Secto 185, May 12, the U.S. Delegation reported Bidault stated that Eden's questions may have saved the Laniel government. Bidault indicated that the threat of dissolution would have considerable effect on former Gaullists. He said he was also holding in reserve his own threat of resignation which, carrying 100 MRP votes with it, he believed would be effective in avoiding undesirable instructions. (396.1 GE/5-1254)

396.1 GE/5-1254 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 12, 1954—2:09 p. m.

Tosec 138. For the Under Secretary from the Secretary.

*Begin verbatim text.*

The following basic instructions, which have been approved by the President, and which are in confirmation of those already given you orally, will guide you, as head of the United States Delegation, in your participation in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference.<sup>2</sup>

1. The presence of a United States representative during the discussion at the Geneva Conference of "the problem of restoring peace in Indochina" rests on the Berlin Agreement of February 18, 1954. Under that agreement the US, UK, France, and USSR agreed that the four of them plus other interested states should be invited to a conference at Geneva on April 26 "for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question" and agreed further, that "the problem of restoring peace in Indochina" would also be discussed at Geneva by the four powers represented at Berlin, and Communist China and other interested states.

2. You will not deal with the delegates of the Chinese Communist regime, or any other regime not now diplomatically recognized by the United States, on any terms which imply political recognition or which concede to that regime any status other than that of a regime with which it is necessary to deal on a *de facto* basis in order to end aggression, or the threat of aggression, and to obtain peace.

3. The position of the United States in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference is that of an interested nation which, however, is neither a belligerent nor a principal in the negotiation.

4. The United States is participating in the Indochina phase of the Conference in order thereby to assist in arriving at decisions which will help the nations of that area peacefully to enjoy territorial integrity and political independence under stable and free governments with the opportunity to expand their economies, to realize their legitimate national aspirations, and to develop security through individual and collective defense against aggression, from within or without. This implies that these people should not be amalgamated into the Communist bloc of imperialistic dictatorship.

5. The United States is not prepared to give its express or implied approval to any cease-fire, armistice, or other settlement which would have the effect of subverting the existing lawful governments of the

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4042, to Saigon as telegram 2265, and to London as telegram 6028.

In telegram Tedul 47, May 9, the Secretary sent to Under Secretary Smith a draft of the instructions and said he would try to obtain Congressional approval. The Secretary indicated that he had not yet submitted the instructions to the President or to the Department of Defense. (396.1 GE/5-954) On May 10 the draft instructions were sent to the Department of Defense. (396.1 GE/5-1054)

<sup>2</sup> In telegram Tosec 137, May 12, the Secretary informed Under Secretary Smith that he had read the text of the instructions to the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees and had received no objections from them. (396.1 GE/5-1254)

three aforementioned states or of permanently impairing their territorial integrity or of placing in jeopardy the forces of the French Union in Indochina, or which otherwise contravened the principles stated in (4) above.

6. You should, insofar as is compatible with these instructions, cooperate with the Delegation of France and with the delegations of other friendly participants in this phase of the Conference.

7. If in your judgment continued participation in the Indochina phase of the Conference appears likely to involve the United States in a result inconsistent with its policy, as stated above, you should immediately so inform your Government, recommending either withdrawal or the limitation of the US role to that of an observer. If the situation develops such that, in your opinion, either of such actions is essential under the circumstances and time is lacking for consultation with Washington, you may act in your discretion.

8. You are authorized to inform other delegations at Geneva of these instructions.

*End verbatim text.*

DULLES

396.1 GE/5-1254

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath)*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 12, 1954.

Participants: Nguyen Quoc Dinh, head of the Vietnamese Delegation

Nguyen Dac Khe, a member of the Vietnamese Delegation

Donald R. Heath, Ambassador to Cambodia

Subject: The Vietnamese Conference Plan Tactics

Dinh told me yesterday that the Vietnamese Delegation was against Bidault's armistice proposal; the Delegation is against any armistice as they feared it would inevitably work toward the Communists' advantage. Nevertheless, the Delegation would not in the Plenary Session at this time raise any general opposition to Bidault's armistice plan, realizing that it is politically necessary for the latter to present some proposal for eventual cease-fire to the French parliament. The Vietnamese tactics were to discuss the proposal with the French, to point out its weak points and stall for time. They believe that if Bidault finds parliamentary backing he would prefer to keep up the fight rather than negotiate a necessarily unsatisfactory armistice.

Dinh inquired whether there was [were] any developments of [on] the Secretary's consultation with the President, Congress and our military authorities. I replied that we had no news of the results of the

Secretary's discussions. Dinh reminded me that he had told the Secretary, to the latter's evident approval, that rather than accept an unsatisfactory solution the Vietnamese Delegation would walk out of the conference.

396.1 GE/5-1254 : Telegram

*Third Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 12, 3:05 p. m.:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

OFFICIAL USE ONLY      PRIORITY      GENEVA, May 12, 1954—midnight.

Secto 193. Repeated information London 157, Moscow 66, Tokyo 55, priority Paris 250, Saigon 63, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Eden chaired third plenary session Indochina phase today. Although Vietnam inscribed to speak first, Eden permitted Cambodian delegate to open debate by reading text of telegram he had received regarding killing of Cambodian Government official and several other persons by Viet Minh on May 10.

Vietnam representative then reviewed events since World War II, blaming Communists in Viet Minh for betraying national aspirations Vietnamese people and turning movement into a tool of foreign ideology, and praising Bao Dai for progress made in winning recognition Vietnamese sovereignty. He then read text of April 28 joint Vietnamese-French declaration and also full texts of treaty of independence and treaty of association between Vietnam and French. (Translations sent Department in Saigon's 2145, April 28.<sup>2</sup>)

Recognition of Vietnam sovereignty deprived Viet Minh of its *raison d'être*. Vietnamese representative then made following points:

(1) Governments of Laos and Cambodia have full sovereignty, which state of Vietnam respects. Fate of "free Laos" and "free Cambodia" movements wholly within competence above-mentioned governments. Vietnam delegations, in view rejection by Cambodia and Laos Governments of proposal that these two movements be admitted to conference, has adopted same point of view. Reestablishment of peace in these countries will be accomplished simply by withdrawal all invading Viet Minh forces.

(2) Viet Minh proposals purposeless. Viet Minh has no right to negotiate in name of Vietnamese nation, since this exclusive right

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/3) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 276. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:05 p. m. and adjourned at 5:35 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 58-79. The speeches of Chou En-lai and Eden and the proposal made by the Vietnamese Delegation are printed in Cmd. 9186, pp. 123-127. The speech by Eden and the proposal made by the Vietnamese Delegation, Indochina Documents IC/6 and IC/9, May 12, are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279A.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (751G.00/4-2854)

State of Vietnam. France and Vietnam have already reached full agreement on question independence and participation in French Union.

(3) Viet Minh proposals do not constitute serious basis for discussion. Absence of all international control over elections is unacceptable.

Vietnam delegation then made proposals regarding (1) military settlement, and (2) political settlement (Secto 190<sup>3</sup>).

Chou En-lai then took floor and ran gamut of Communist propaganda charges regarding French colonialism and US imperialism. Chou used harsh tone and succeeded in being unusually insulting to US, France and Bidault personally. Said stepped-up US intervention created danger extension Indochinese war and posed "ever-increasing threat to peace of Asia and world." Chou called French military efforts "colonial war," while terming Indochinese resistance "just war". "Any attempt to ignore or underrate strength of Indochinese peoples or to deny existence of Democratic Republic of Vietnam and resistance Governments of Khmer and Pathet Lao is doomed to failure". French ruling circles "either are unwilling to stop Indochina war, which has been condemned by French people as 'dirty war', or deliberately put forward terms unacceptable to opposite side to obstruct termination of war." Chou said "activities of United States for forming aggressive blocs in Asia are inseparable from its objectives of preparing global war and establishing domination over whole world. Certain elements in ruling circles of US have of late concocted endless fictions about intervention of People's Republic of China in Indochinese war". US organization of blocs in Asia "having nothing in common with safeguarding of collective security" and "are being carried on behind backs of Asian peoples and of most Asian states. To organize certain Asian states into bloc against other Asian states can only create and aggravate trouble and division in Asia".

Referring to his April 28 statement regarding consolidation of Asian states for safeguarding of peace and security in Asia,<sup>4</sup> Chou said only by mutual respect for each other's independence and sovereignty and by developing normal relations could Asian states "avert unprecedented calamity arising out of attempts of new colonialists to use Asians to fight Asians."

Chou then cited desire for peaceful settlement of Indochinese war on part Chinese people and in India, Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan and Europe. According to him not all American statesmen in favor "of

<sup>3</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>4</sup> Made in Third Plenary Session on Korea, reported in telegram Secto 28, Apr. 28, p. 158.

embarking upon military adventure in Indochina or Southeast Asia." Chou then paid brief tribute to "peace policy" of USSR.

Chou endorsed Viet Minh statement and proposals as "truly expressing will of Indochinese peoples to fight for peace, independence, unity and democracy as well as their legitimate demands." These proposals, he said, "have already opened way for peaceful settlement of Indochinese question." He then castigated Bidault for maintaining in his May 8 statement<sup>5</sup> "attitude of a colonial ruler, ignoring existence Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and refusing participation representatives Khmer and Pathet Lao at conference." Bidault also, according Chou, "left aside political basis for restoration of peace in Indochina and acted like victor laying unilateral terms for cessation of hostilities and demanding their acceptance by peoples of Indochina."

In milder conclusion to speech Chou again endorsed Viet Minh proposals "as basis for conference to discuss termination of war and restoration of peace in Indochina."

Eden then asked questions contained in Secto 183,<sup>6</sup> adding phrase "with, I suppose, reference to conference back here" at end of number three.

Smith then made statement, text of which contained Secto 191.<sup>7</sup>

Bidault took floor, expressed sympathy over events mentioned in telegram read by Cambodian delegate, stated conference should tackle at earliest possible date problem of restoration of peace in Laos and Cambodia, castigated Chou for presumption in telling him about state of French public opinion and endorsed Eden's questions as useful contribution.

Viet Minh representative made speech trying to show that Indochina is single theatre of operations and explaining intermixture of Cambodians, Laotians and Vietnamese in resistance movement.

Cambodian delegate endorsed Vietnamese statement and criticized Chou for confusing Viet Minh movement with Khmer Issarak movement and again denouncing so-called Khmer Government as invention of Viet Minh and People's Republic of China. He then replied to Eden questions saying Cambodian delegation wants Cambodia to be considered in special category, is in favor of immediate withdrawal of Viet Minh forces and irregulars under Viet Minh control, and favors international supervision of armistice.

Molotov then took floor and in clumsy statement tried to discredit telegram read by Cambodian delegate at beginning of session, saying

---

<sup>5</sup> Made in the First Plenary Session on Indochina, reported in telegram Secto 154, May 8, p. 734.

<sup>6</sup> Dated May 12, p. 776.

<sup>7</sup> Dated May 12, p. 784.



it was of uncertain origin, had not been distributed, if incident had occurred illustrated lack of Cambodian Government control, etc. Lively interchange between Bidault, Viet Minh representative, Cambodian representative and Molotov ensued, during course of which Molotov attempted ironic joke which drew laughter from Communist side and dignified but stinging rebuke from Bidault that death of human beings was not laughing matter, upon which Communist side fell dead silent.

After getting session under control again Eden set next Indochina plenary for May 14.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-1254 : Telegram

*Third Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 12, 3:05 p. m.:*  
*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 12, 1954.

Secto 190. Repeated information London 154, Tokyo 52, priority Paris 247, Saigon 61, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered, Moscow 64. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Following is text Vietnamese proposals tabled Third Indochina Plenary:

The conference of Berlin recommended the restoration of peace in Indochina. This restoration implies:

- A military settlement, in order to end the hostilities, and,
- A political settlement, in order to establish peace on a real and durable basis.

#### A. *Military Settlement*

(1) The delegation of the state of Vietnam declares itself ready to examine any working paper to this effect submitted to the conference. These documents must present a serious and positive effort, susceptible of leading in good faith to a satisfactory military settlement.

(2) They must include guarantees sufficient to assure a real and durable peace, to prevent any possibility of a new aggression.

(3) They must not lead to a partition, direct or indirect, definitive or provisional, in fact or in law, of the national territory.

(4) They must provide for an international control of the execution of the conditions for cessation of hostilities.

#### B. *Political Settlement*

Concerning the relations between the state of Vietnam and France:

The relations will be settled on the base of the joint Franco-Vietnamese declaration of April 28, 1954, which foresees the signature of two fundamental treaties: The first of these treaties recognizes

the total independence of the state of Vietnam and its full and entire sovereignty; the second establishes a Franco-Vietnamese association in the French Union, based on equality.

Concerning the internal political settlement in Vietnam:

(1) Because of the territorial and political unity of Vietnam, recognition of the principle that the only state qualified legally to represent Vietnam is the state personified by His Majesty Bao Dai, Chief of State. This state is the only one invested with the powers flowing from the internal and external sovereignty of Vietnam.

(2) Recognition of the principle of a single army in the entire territory. This army is the National Army, placed under the direction and the responsibility of the state of Vietnam.

Settlement of the status of the Viet Minh soldiers in the framework of the legal army of the state of Vietnam, in conformity with the above principle, and by modalities to be determined.

International control of the application of the above settlement:

(3) In the framework and under the competence of the state of Vietnam, free elections throughout its territory, as soon as a determination is made by the Security Council that the authority of the state is established throughout its territory and that conditions of freedom are found to exist. In order to assure the liberty and sincerity of these elections, an international control functioning under the auspices of the United Nations.

(4) Representative government formed under the aegis of His Majesty Bao Dai, Chief of State of Vietnam, following and according to the results of the elections.

(5) Engagement by the state of Vietnam to refrain from any action against persons having collaborated with the Viet Minh during the hostilities.

(6) International guarantee of the political and territorial integrity of the state of Vietnam.

(7) Assistance by friendly nations to develop the national wealth and to raise the standard of living of the country.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/5-1254: Telegram

*Third Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 12, 3:05 p. m.:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 12, 1954.

Secto 191. Repeated information London 155, Tokyo 53, priority Paris 248, Saigon 62, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnn, Moscow 65. Tokyo

for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Following is text my statement today Third Indochina Plenary:

The United States delegation has listened with interest to the impressive observations of the chief of the Vietnamese delegation. We will give close study to the proposal he has made and in a future session will give the United States views on it. The United States and more than 30 other nations recognize the government which he represents here as the legal government of free and independent Vietnam.

I wish to make it clear, Mr. Chairman, that the position of the United States is, and has been, that while the Viet Minh is necessarily present as an armed aggressor engaged in hostilities against the Governments of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, this in no way implies recognition of the Viet Minh as a government.

The United States delegation "agrees with the delegate of Vietnam that a correct, practical and democratic way of restoring peace in Vietnam would be for the aggressive belligerents on the other side to make their peace with the legal government and once tranquillity is thereby restored, to accept the will of the people as expressed at the polls in national elections, the freedom and honesty of which would be assured by international supervision under United Nations' auspices".

We welcome the very pertinent questions put forward by Mr. Eden and will await replies with the greatest interest.

In particular, we consider it essential that the program for the orderly cessation of hostilities be under effective international supervision under the auspices of the United Nations.

I believe Mr. Eden's advice to this conference to be very sound. Therefore, I will not take your time to refer to the all too familiar distorted version of past and present events presented to us this afternoon by the delegate from Communist China. I don't think they'll change the considered opinion of anyone in this room, or anywhere else for that matter.

SMITH

---

751G.00/5-1254: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 12, 1954—6:12 p. m.

Tedul 60. Paris for Ambassador, Geneva for Under Secretary, Saigon eyes only and info only McClintock, from Secretary. Ambassador Bonnet called on me today at his request.<sup>2</sup> He referred to our talk

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by MacArthur. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4048 and to Saigon as telegram 2269.

<sup>2</sup> For text of memorandum of conversation, May 12, see volume XIII.

May 8 when I told him US was prepared to sit down to talk with French about "internationalizing" war in Indochina (Tedul 46<sup>3</sup>). He said French Govt believes time has now come to have such discussions and wants to know US attitude and position in event Geneva does not lead to cessation hostilities and military situation Indochina makes it imperative for French to ask for outside assistance. French Govt cannot wait until outcome of Geneva to know US attitude since by then military situation may have so deteriorated that Indochina would be lost. French Govt knows US intervention must be within framework of collective action but doubts that Australia can move before May 29 elections and recognizes that UK "because of preoccupations re both Hongkong and Nehru" may not be willing to join. It is therefore very important to know precisely what US is willing to do and when it might be able to act.

I told Bonnet we were prepared to begin discussions with French but doubted desirability of doing so until after vote of confidence by French Assembly tomorrow. I added that problems involved in US participation had been under continuous examination by us including highest level this govt and I felt we could usefully begin talks at very early date after vote of confidence. Bonnet agreed and said he obviously was not in position to discuss substance today.

Question then arose as to where discussions should be held. I said we would wish to keep in close touch with Laniel and tentatively thought Paris might be best place. Bonnet said he would put this question to Paris indicating there were probably advantages in having them in Paris and also advantages in having them in Washington. He would seek French views on this.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 9, p. 742.

---

396.1 GE/5-1254 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 12, 1954—6:50 p. m.

Tosec 143. Secretary saw Spender May 10<sup>2</sup> briefing him along lines conversation with Munro May 8 (Tosec 121).<sup>3</sup> Spender additionally raised question possible UN action. Secretary said he thought there should be some UN action but action should not be dependent UN

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Raynor of EUR/BNA. Repeated to Canberra as telegram 209, to Wellington as telegram 158, to USUN as telegram 554, and to Paris and London by pouch.

<sup>2</sup> Text of memorandum of conversation is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 328.

<sup>3</sup> For text of memorandum of conversation, May 8, see volume XIII; for telegram Tosec 121, May 10, see volume XII.

because procedural slowness and probable difficulty obtaining two-thirds favorable vote. Secretary mentioned by way of illustration possible appropriate action by UN could be sending peace observation commissions Laos and Cambodia where it is clearer than in case Viet Nam external aggression involved. Spender raised personal basis possibility Cambodia, Laos or Thailand submitting question to Security Council but with action to be deferred pending outcome Geneva Conference. Secretary replied that while suggestion might have merit would not desire encourage such step pending clearer indication as to which direction French will take. He expressed apprehension that such step taken against wishes French might mitigate against possibility French maintaining firm position.

DULLES

MAY 13, 1954

751J.00/5-1354 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Vientiane (Rives) to the Department of State*

SECRET

VIENTIANE, May 13, 1954—10 a. m.

34. Sent Saigon priority 103, priority Geneva unnumbered, repeated information Paris 23. Crown Prince informed me today that Laotian Government has sent instructions Laotian delegation Geneva to oppose invitation so-called Pathet Lao members on both political and military grounds. Laotian Government sees no reason recognition Pathet Lao in view danger to Laos comes from outside and fears usual infiltration into power if even *de facto* recognition given. Militarily, Laos Government foresees continual ability Communist Laotians call for help of Viet Minh or China once their existence admitted.

Chargé requested [forward?] Laotian Government plea that US stand firm in opposition to invitation Pathet Lao participate conference.<sup>1</sup>

RIVES

---

<sup>1</sup>The U.S. Delegation replied in telegram Secto 204, May 14, as follows: "You may assure Crown Prince US firm in opposition invitation Pathet Lao and Khmer resistance groups." (396.1 GE/5-1454)

396.1 GE/5-854 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1954—4:17 p. m.

Tosec 152. For your background information and for your use as check list in connection with proposals already made by French

---

<sup>1</sup>Drafted by Fisher of EUR/WE and Sturm of FE/PSA. Repeated to Saigon as telegram 2284, to Paris as telegram 4066.

(Secto 143 as modified by Secto 152<sup>2</sup>) and any compromises which French may appear to favor hereafter, following principles seem to us basic to any acceptable settlement in Indochina :

1. The establishment of international control machinery in place and ready to function prior to an actual cease-fire.
2. Representatives of the international control commission should be guaranteed unrestricted movement in, and free access to all of Indochina.
3. Such a commission should have sufficient military personnel and logistic support to discharge its responsibilities in connection with the armistice terms.
4. Provision for UN assumption of responsibility for supervision of the international control commission. (Some other form of effective international control might well be a satisfactory substitute for UN supervision.)
5. Measures to provide for the security of troops and populations, and guarantees against abuses of the cease-fire by either party.
6. Provisions for the humane and orderly liberation of POW's and internees.
7. Evacuation of Viet Minh forces from Laos and Cambodia.
8. Provision for examination of political and economic problems following an armistice agreement.
9. No provisions in armistice of a political nature, such as for early elections, or for troop withdrawals that would clearly lead to a Communist take-over.

French proposal appears to us to depart from above criteria at following points:

1. Hostilities are to cease immediately on signature of agreement and no time is allowed for installation of control commission.
2. Proposal omits statement re measures to protect Franco-Vietnamese military forces and civilian populations of Associated States, which statement was contained in Secto 132,<sup>3</sup> and only measure this nature proposed concerns regrouping of forces.
3. No provision is made for examination of economic and political problems following a cease-fire.

French proposal needs much spelling out in detail if significance is to be judged accurately. If French should proceed to attempt to reconcile their proposal with that made by Communists in effort negotiate compromise, careful attention must be paid to adherence or non-adherence to principles set forth above as well as to proposed details of implementation in order to determine point at which a French proposal would cross the line of what is not acceptable to US, thereby requiring a decision in the light of the NSC action of May 8.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Both dated May 8, see telegram Secto 143, May 8, p. 730.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 7, p. 714.

<sup>4</sup> For a report on decisions taken by the NSC on May 8, see telegram Tedul 43, May 8, p. 731.

You are authorized to discuss contents this message as you may deem appropriate with French and other friendly delegations.

DULLES

---

110.11 DU/5-1854 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1954—5:08 p. m.

Tedul 65. Personal for Under Secretary from Secretary. I hear the finest reports of the way you have taken hold of the Geneva task. Certainly it is a tough one. But you should know that the President and I are delighted with the way you are tackling it. At the moment of dictating this, we await anxiously the results of the vote in Paris.<sup>2</sup> Best regards. Foster.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State.

<sup>2</sup> The French National Assembly discussion of the question of debate on Indochina culminated in a vote of confidence late on the evening of May 13. The Laniel government survived by a vote of 289 to 287. For the record of the discussions, see France, *Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationale, 1954, Débats*, pp. 2336-2345 and 2368-2383.

---

396.1 GE/5-1854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 13, 1954—6 p. m.

Secto 197. Repeated information Paris 254, London 159, Saigon 64, Moscow 68. Pass to Defense. Vietnamese proposal tabled yesterday (text transmitted Secto 190)<sup>1</sup> covers both military and political aspects problem. In effect Vietnamese delegation proposes Viet Minh dissolve their government and army under terms political amnesty supervised and guaranteed by "international control". Later Viet Minh soldiers of this army would be taken into Vietnamese National Army and there would be internationally supervised elections at some unspecified future date (as soon as security council determines Bao Dai Government is established throughout Vietnam and that conditions of freedom exist). This might be ideal solution from standpoint but hardly acceptable to Viet Minh who make same proposal in reverse. Both Vietnamese and Viet Minh proposals are obviously victor's solution.

Vietnamese proposal, especially with regard incorporating Viet Minh soldiers after they disarm and disband into Vietnamese Na-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 12, p. 783.

tional Army, will be quite unacceptable to other side. Vietnamese are certainly aware this aspect problem and their proposition clearly reflects basically differing French and Vietnamese objectives this conference. Whereas termination hostilities with more or less satisfactory guarantees is general French objective, Vietnamese, who have less substantial military assets, are primarily concerned avoid loss segments their territory to Viet Minh or any settlement which endangers their position as legal and effective government of Vietnam.

Following are comments on some of specific provisos :

1. Paragraph 3, Section A on military settlement categorically rejects partition in accordance with known Vietnamese position. From wording it is clear Vietnamese wish avoid not only partition by drawing a line across their country but also by permanent or semi-permanent establishment of zones, enclaves etc.

2. International controls and guarantees of execution military settlement are envisaged (paragraph 4, Section A) but it is not made clear how they will work.

3. Section B on political settlement contains philosophy Bao Dai Government is sole legal representative Vietnam. This is expressed even more strongly than Pham Van Dong's allegation regarding right Viet Minh speak for country. Stemming from this, Vietnamese view settlement is that Viet Minh Army should be merged into Vietnamese National Army, position sure to be unacceptable to Viet Minh. It is noted Vietnamese proposal further call international control of integration Viet Minh Army into National Army Vietnam, which would doubtless be difficult and highly complex problem to execute.

4. While Viet Minh proposal called for elections to be organized by "democratic republic of Vietnam", Vietnamese of course insist Bao Dai Government should organize them.

5. About only point resemblance between Viet Minh and Vietnamese proposals is recommendation clemency for all persons collaborating with other side during hostilities (paragraph 5, Section B).

SMITH

---

320.2 AB/5-1354 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1954—6:58 p. m.

761. I believe that steps might now be taken to bring UN into Southeast Asia picture by instituting UN Observation in Indochina area. I think Thai presentation would be more effective than Cambodia or Laos initiative, since it would come from experienced representatives of an indisputably independent UN Member.

---

<sup>1</sup>Drafted by Popper and Stein of UNA/UNP. Repeated to USUN as telegram 555, to Paris as telegram 4068, to London as telegram 6061, to Bangkok as telegram 2234, and to Saigon as telegram 2291.



Therefore suggest you approach Prince Wan and ask him whether he would agree to revive Thai plan of June, 1953, for use of Peace Observation Commission in Indochina area to observe and report on threats to Thai security. Sarasin is familiar with Thai plan.<sup>2</sup>

If Thais would ask for POC, we would hope to push matter through SC to Soviet veto and then urgently convene GA. Assembly would be asked designate POC Subcommittee perhaps composed of Pakistan, India, Uruguay, New Zealand and Sweden. We would expect Associated States to associate themselves with Thai request at early stage and authorize Subcommittee to enter their territory. POC Subcommittee terms of reference would indicate that Subcommittee could carry out observation in general area of Indochina and send observers to any state in area on its request.

If Wan agrees, you should consult French, British and Associated States representatives.

DULLES

---

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on this plan, see volume XIII.

---

790.5/5-1354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, May 13, 1954—8 p. m.

Dulte 66. S/S-R pass Defense. I made an oral presentation to Eden of your Tedul 48<sup>1</sup> and followed it by an informal written summary.<sup>2</sup> British accept Washington viewpoint that we should move forward concurrently on two parallel lines, and are prepared at once to make a start with the five power staff discussions, which they understand will be exclusively concerned with the development of military plans. They believe we should not commit ourselves, nor appear to commit ourselves, at this stage to the exact composition of the wider group which we would hope to eventually discuss Southeast Asia security arrangements; in other words, the second of the two parallel lines of action proposed by your Tedul 48. They think it would be useful to inform and consult the Colombo powers, Thailand and the Philippines, and possibly others, about the work of the five power staff. They doubt that Singapore is suitable, but also question Washington as the location, and suggested as an alternative that the first meeting might be in London.

We concur with all but the final suggestion. Washington is without question the most suitable place. However, I think the suggestion made

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 9. p. 745.

<sup>2</sup> Letter to Eden from Smith, May 10, p. 761.

to me by the Australian and New Zealand representatives, who have been our strong supporters in this entire matter, is worth considering; that is, that while Washington is the appropriate location for staff discussions, it might be valuable to have the first meeting at Pearl Harbor. To us this has an added significance, because it is the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief Pacific.

The British now take the view that a joint statement is not necessary and, in fact, not particularly desirable. As I mentioned before, so much has already been said that any agreed public statement might be an anti-climax. The Australian and New Zealand representatives here, on the other hand, have felt that some sort of announcement would be necessary. Eden and I together worked out the following, which the British could accept and which looks reasonably satisfactory to us in case a statement becomes necessary:

"Pending wider discussions of measures to support a stable peace in Southeast Asia, the Governments of Australia, France, New Zealand, the UK and the US have agreed that their military representatives should undertake an examination of the situation in Southeast Asia.

"This examination will be undertaken by existing staff agencies formed some time ago for the study without commitment to problems of common concern.

"The problems to be reviewed will be of interest to a number of other countries, notably the powers represented at the Colombo conference, Siam, the Philippines, etc. These countries have been informed of the intention to initiate this study and, during the progress of the work, will be consulted and kept informed."

I assume that Washington will now take the initiative in getting these staff talks under way, but I would like to be informed at the earliest possible moment so that I can tell Eden. It is a purely technical exercise which must be done as a matter of prudence, and will be the beginning, I believe, of something of much greater importance.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/5-1354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 13, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 199. Repeated information London 160, Paris 256, Saigon 65, Moscow 69. Following Korean Plenary Meeting today Eden raised with Bidault and myself "what we do next" respect to Indochina. He suggested he see Molotov and/or Chou En-lai to tell them they were "playing a dangerous role" in abusing United States and to a lesser extent France at every meeting. Things cannot continue on present basis. Bidault offered no objection as long as it was understood it

would not interfere with his plan for full analysis of Viet Minh proposal and comparison with French proposal at plenary tomorrow. I offered no objection and during course of discussion Bidault and I agreed that Eden would first bring matter up with Chou En-lai when Eden calls upon him tomorrow and, as co-chairman, tell Molotov what he has said to Chou En-lai.

Eden stated in addition foregoing he proposes raise with Chou En-lai and Molotov on his own responsibility and *ad referendum* to our side question of how to handle replies to questions he put in plenary yesterday, making mention possibility discussion in restricted subcommittee meeting which would include all participants Indochina phase or in restricted meeting principal delegates.

During course conversation Bidault stated Molotov believed he could "make France explode" but that he was mistaken. Bidault also expressed hope press conferences Indochina questions be avoided as much as possible as they "make things very difficult for people here".

I told Eden and Bidault that in my call on Molotov I had expressed the view Indochina question highly inflammatory requiring careful and adroit handling to prevent unhappy results and that Molotov had agreed situation was "complex".

Before agreeing any restricted meeting<sup>1</sup> on replies to Eden's questions, I intend insist that those on our side get together to concert our views.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> At the close of the Fourth Plenary Session on May 14 Molotov stated that the next meeting, scheduled for Monday, May 17, would be held in restricted session with participants limited to delegation chiefs and three advisers each. See telegram Secto 212, May 14, p. 795.

Anthony Eden in his memoirs, *Full Circle*, p. 133, wrote on this matter as follows: "As is usual at international conferences, much of the real work was done in informal talks which took place daily, away from the conference table. The course of the negotiations was frequently influenced, as a rule adversely, by diplomatic events far away from Geneva. It quickly became clear to me that we should make little progress if we continued to discuss Indo-China in plenary sessions, which merely provided a stage for the striking of attitudes by both sides. On May 13, I accordingly suggested to Bedell Smith and Bidault that we should continue our talks in restricted sessions, consisting of the heads of all nine delegations with only two or three advisers apiece. No account of the proceedings would be given to the press. This proposal was agreed upon, and on the following day Molotov and Chou En-lai also accepted it."

---

396.1 GE/5-1354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, May 13, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 201. Repeated information Paris 257, Saigon 66, London 161. Department pass Defense. Re Secto 183, May 12.<sup>1</sup> My answer to Eden's

---

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 776.

questions 1 and 3 will be that if the concentration of all regular troops in determined areas is a preliminary step to provide for the unification of all Vietnam under its recognized government, then my answer is yes. If these concentrations are a preliminary to the partition of Vietnam we could not associate ourselves with this proposal. Since our final decision is dependent upon the ultimate results of these concentrations, we must reserve our reply. With regard to question 4, I will say that we agree that all irregulars shall be disarmed, but this must be accomplished under competent international authority and supervision. That competent authority is the United Nations.

As for question 5, I will state that we are in favor of competent international supervision. The only competent organization capable of exercising such supervision is the United Nations.

Regarding question 2, I will heartily agree that Laos and Cambodia are in a special category and urge priority consideration of a settlement for these two states on the grounds that we should be able to move forward rapidly on the relatively simple questions involved in bringing hostilities to an end in Laos and Cambodia.

SMITH

MAY 14, 1954

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 285

*Meeting of the Six on Indochina, Geneva, May 14, Morning: Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 14, 1954.

The following summarizes the results of the meeting of the Six on Indochina this morning:

1) Bidault will analyze the Vietminh proposals. He will support Viet-Nam's contention that Bao Dai's government is the only legal government of Viet-Nam. He does not propose to deal with the Vietnamese proposals (Vietnamese representative not too happy about this). Bidault's speech will also contain replies to the questions posed by Eden. He will advocate the separating out of Laos and Cambodia.

2) There was discussion as to whether it might be advisable today to propose that the delegations meet in a restricted form, i.e., the heads of delegations with two or three experts apiece in order to see whether better progress could not be made in that way. It is my understanding that Bidault will allude to this possibility.

3) There was also some discussion as to the desirability of setting up special working committees to deal with the questions of Laos and

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Bonsal.

Cambodia. It was agreed that such a suggestion should only be made in the proposed restricted groups since that [*sic*] to raise this possibility now would probably produce a revival of the debate on the so-called resistance governments in Laos and Cambodia.

4) Several delegations expressed the view that plenary sessions should continue until Molotov has spoken particularly with respect to the Eden questions.

---

396.1 GE/5-1454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 14, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 206. Repeated information Saigon 70, Paris 263, Hanoi 2. Delegation has been operating on assumption that situation in Indochina would not deteriorate radically during coming weeks and hence that time [was?] available required in order that efforts to reach common allied position defense Indochina and remainder southeast Asia might crystallize. Also indications here Communist bloc playing for time. In light of certain telegrams reaching delegation today indicating rapidly deteriorating political and military situation and persistent rumors Vietnamese-Viet Minh contacts we wonder if our assumption continues valid.

In view above, request Washington provide best coordinated military and political estimate on situation in Indochina we are likely to be facing (1) two weeks and (2) one month from now.<sup>1</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> For the reply to this request, see telegram Tosec 225, May 20, p. 870.

---

396.1 GE/5-1454 : Telegram

*Fourth Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 14, 3:03 p. m. :<sup>1</sup>  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GENEVA, May 14, 1954—midnight.

Secto 212. Repeated information Paris 266, London 163, Saigon 74, Moscow 71, Tokyo 62, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, unnumbered. Tokyo

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/4) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 276. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:03 p. m. and adjourned at 6:05 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 80-100. The speeches of Molotov and Bidault and the proposal made by the Soviet Delegation are printed in Cmd. 9186, pp. 127-136. The speeches of Bidault and Molotov, Indochina Documents IC/10 and IC/13, May 14 and 15, and the proposal made by the Soviet Delegation, IC/12, May 15, are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279A.

pass CINCFE. Department pass Defense, CINCPAC, COMSAC. Molotov chaired fourth plenary Indochina today and opened with 90 minute speech which on one hand attacked French colonial policies Indochina and on other was adroitly calculated to appeal to French public opinion. Asserted Bao Dai government established by French "occupation authorities" as compared with broad basis "Viet Minh regime," and castigated "failure" of what has come to be known as "dirty" war which French are waging against Vietnamese people. Again attacked recent activities of Secretary Dulles leading toward establishment of defense community in Southeast Asia on grounds defense of US, France and UK not involved here, but rather extension of war to Southeast Asia.

Molotov endorsed substance Viet Minh proposals introduced at second plenary session May 10 (Secto 162),<sup>2</sup> stating they were based upon justice and honor, should satisfy needs of both Indochinese and French people. He then criticized French proposals (Secto 143 as modified Secto 152)<sup>3</sup> for failure to deal with "political elements."

Molotov then noted criticism of Viet Minh proposal for not including international supervision of cessation hostilities and "since reaching agreement this question great importance" proposed addition that supervision of agreement be entrusted to "commissions composed representative neutral countries" stating "no insurmountable difficulties should arise in determination composition neutral nations supervisory commission". Asserted France had choice between continuation of colonial war or negotiation.

Molotov observed that USSR would in future state its attitude toward all British proposals but considered that they also failed to cover all military and the political aspects of Indochinese war.

Bidault characterized Molotov statement as a propaganda diatribe which would not divert him from serious purpose of the conference. Turning to specific Viet Minh proposals (Secto 162) he noted they covered wide variety of subjects and therefore confused. Leaving aside such matters as fell outside purview of Geneva conference, Bidault supported position of Laos and Cambodia in their denial to Viet Minh of right to speak for those nations. He stated that any decision by Associated States to re-establish an Indochinese community should be taken by them in conformity with their own desires. France has recognized independence of Laos and Cambodia; problems mentioned in points 1, 3, 4 and 5 of Viet Minh proposal are therefore resolved for those nations and there remains only the invasion of their territories by Viet Minh foreign forces. Bidault noted that Viet Minh

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 10, p. 753.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 8, p. 730.

proposal evaded this problem except perhaps implicitly in point 2, referring to withdrawal of foreign forces.

In Bidault's view, withdrawal of foreign forces would call for specific control measures such as are mentioned in points 2, 6, 7 and 8 of Viet Minh proposal. Although problems of Laos and Cambodia are independent of one another, they cannot be confused with those of Vietnam, which are quite different. For that reason French proposal separated out Vietnamese provisions from those pertaining other two nations or of general character. In order to deal with Laos and Cambodia promptly, Bidault stated that France, on advice of interested governments should be prepared to recall its own forces if invading forces also withdrawn.

As regards Vietnam, Bidault pointed out that existence and recognition of Bao Dai government by 35 nations demonstrated redundancy of point 1 of Viet Minh proposal and superfluity of point 4.

As to point 2, Bidault observed that movement of French troops is determined by operational requirements during hostilities; once peace is established France would not propose to maintain troops in Vietnam against wish of legal government of country. Since it would be up to that government to make or modify provisions of agreement, France would not make re-establishment of peace in Indochina dependent on any commitments whatever concerning this question.

Bidault stated that conclusion of agreements concerning economic and cultural interests of France in Vietnam would never be a condition to concluding hostilities (point 5). He vigorously attacked point 3 as designed to assure total domination of Viet Minh over Vietnam even before elections. In his view, no political agreement should precede or hold up military settlement. Bidault cited Vietnamese proposals as an interesting basis of discussion in this connection.

He stated that points 6 and 7 would not be objected to by France. Having agreed upon principles, however, he would reserve right of examining implementing provisions, although clear POWs and civilian internees<sup>4</sup> should be immediately freed on cessation of hostilities.

Bidault inquired whether first line of point 8 of Viet Minh proposal meant that agreement on measures referred to in points 1 to 7 should precede cessation of hostilities. In the French view, solution of political problem should not be pre-condition to terminating hostilities. Moreover, no agreements between France and Laos or Cambodia necessary since France not at war with either.

Re subparagraph (a), point 8, concerning complete and simultaneous cease-fire, Bidault again considered that Cambodian and Laotian

---

<sup>4</sup> Handwritten marginal notation to "civilian internees" as follows: "not mentioned in VM proposals".

situations should be distinguished from Vietnamese, which involved a gradual process moving from one region to another. This should be studied by military commands. He felt that subparagraph (b) should be carefully clarified along lines of first section of French proposals, envisaging concentration areas and readjustment between such areas.

Bidault stated that Viet Minh proposals did not cover disarmament of irregular forces belonging neither to armed forces nor to police, and referred on this point to French proposal (Section I, paragraph 2).

Bidault considered provisions of point 8 (c) to be less desirable than French proposals which clearly envisaged international commissions as essential to correct implementation of agreement. He observed that guarantee of these agreements would be assured by Geneva participants and stated that UK, US, Vietnamese and Laotian delegations had already agreed to principle of international control.

Bidault, in conclusion, gave following answers to British questions (Secto 183<sup>a</sup>) :

(1) Agree that forces in Vietnam should be concentrated in determined areas;

(2) Yes;

(3) Geneva conference should delineate areas of concentration in consultation with commanders-in-chief who would be responsible for working out details;

(4) Yes, when means of disarmament have been established taking into account conditions of regrouping of regular forces;

(5) France proposed international control and is ready to examine all suggestions for composition of control commissions. He noted that mixed commissions could have subordinate bodies under their control for full implementation of their tasks.

Following recess, Molotov called on Cambodian representative, Tep Phan, who again entered a formal denial of right of Viet Minh to speak in the name of Cambodian people. He observed that Cambodia had made its own independence with France and that reference to this subject in the Viet Minh proposal was harmful. If Viet Minh desired to enter into friendly relations with Cambodian people, it should cease its attacks against the country. Like Bidault, Tep Phan addressed himself to specific details of Viet Minh proposal, making these comments :

(1) Superfluous;

(2) Since French forces have already withdrawn from Cambodia, only Viet Minh and Royal Khmer forces remain. Absurd to consider latter as foreign forces;

(3) Cambodian Government has already been organized with general elections throughout country which could be repeated as soon as

<sup>a</sup> Dated May 12, p. 776.



Viet Minh forces withdrawn. Second half of point 3 inapplicable to Cambodia;

(4) Cambodia does not desire an intermediary in establishing its own form of association with France;

(5) To be handled by Royal Khmer Government;

(6) and (7)—Cambodia has never contemplated prosecution of those collaborating with the French. It is prepared to exchange Viet Minh POWs if Viet Minh forces withdraw;

(8) Cambodia demands simple retreat by Viet Minh aggressor.

Since Cambodian solution is simple, Tep Phan proposed that conference adopt his suggestions without delay.

Molotov noted that no additional speakers were inscribed and stated that delegations had agreed between themselves that no meeting should be held Saturday, 15 May. He stated next meeting on Monday, 17 May, would be held in restricted session with participation limited to delegation chiefs and three advisors each—it being understood that each delegation would supply its own interpreters. Meeting adjourned at 1805.

SMITH

790.5/5-1454 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1954—3:34 p. m.

Tedul 67. Dulte 66<sup>2</sup> indicates British accept view we should move forward concurrently on two parallel lines, and they prepared to proceed immediately at least along line of military staff discussion. Assume you will be reporting more fully on British views re other parallel line of procedure.

Problem of location of talks appears to us to be closely related to problem of public impression we desire create by having talks. We strongly believe talks should be held with no publicity whatsoever. We glad British now concur that no public statement of any kind necessary and we strongly believe talks should not be initiated in manner which attracts attention and gives impression of convocation of a special conference.

As indicated above, appearance of convocation of special conference undesirable. We therefore are opposed to London or Pearl Harbor. (Spender tells me Casey prefers Washington.) Our position remains firm that talks should be Washington where highly qualified representatives already located and talks could be gotten under way here immediately without any fanfare.

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by MacArthur of C and Fisher of WE.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 13, p. 791.

We believe prior opening five power talks Washington it desirable inform confidentially Thailand and Philippines and perhaps others regarding background these talks and their objective which is to explore means by which five powers can assist countries of SEA in cooperative effort to defend themselves. UK could similarly inform Colombo powers. Subsequently we could decide in light of progress made particularly in getting on with SEA regional arrangements, extent to which participation in military talks by other Asian countries, notably Thailand and Philippines, is desirable.

FYI, our feeling is that if talks were held in London even only to start with this would suggest that UK view non-participation Indochina war had prevailed and that Indochina tacitly written off in current military planning. At this stage, this likely have particularly damaging effect French political situation.

DULLES

---

751G.00/5-1354 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1954—4:29 p. m.

Tosec 158. Deteriorating political and military situation Vietnam reflected in such telegrams as Saigon's 2372<sup>2</sup> indicates need for urgent consideration of possible countermeasures.

Appears from here that first step this connection is to urge Bao Dai to return at once to Vietnam. If Bao Dai proves unresponsive to Heath's approach you should discuss with Bidault re possible further steps that could be taken.

We are of course aware however of uncertainty as to what role Bao Dai could or would play under existing circumstances. Nevertheless Bao Dai's return to Vietnam is the one remedial measure we might put into effect most quickly. If Bidault and USDel concur, and if Bao Dai does not respond affirmatively to first suggestion, might be put up to Bao Dai that unless he is willing accept our recommendation, French and US policy with regard to him and his regime will have to be reexamined.

I believe moreover that we must at once undertake fullest discussions with French at Geneva as well as Paris and Saigon concerning

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4074, to Saigon as telegram 2300, and to Hanoi as telegram 630.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2372 from Saigon, May 13, McClintock reported that Defense Minister Phan Huy Quat had stated, citing recent desertions, that the internal situation had so deteriorated that all semblance of government might disappear within ten days. The Chargé further indicated that according to certain French authorities, unless Bao Dai returned and faced up to his responsibilities within ten days to three weeks there would no longer be a state of Vietnam. (751G.00/5-1354)

further steps which might be taken toward rectifying political situation Vietnam and toward preventing apparent disintegration of governmental authority from further compromising Franco-Vietnamese military posture.

DULLES

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 289

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States  
Delegation (Bonsal)*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 14, 1954.

Participants: Pote Sarasin, Ambassador to Washington and Member of Thai Delegation  
The Under Secretary  
Philip W. Bonsal

Subject: Security Arrangements in Southeast Asia and U.S. Military Assistance for Thailand

Ambassador Sarasin stated that he was interested in getting information on his own behalf and that of Prince Wan regarding progress being made on (a) the development of collective security arrangements in Southeast Asia and (b) measures for strengthening the Thai armed forces. He said he had been informed of the call which the Thai Chargé paid on the Secretary on May 10th in Washington at which time it was the Chargé's impression that progress on the united action concept, at least so far as immediate implementation is concerned, is held up by British unwillingness to go along at this time.<sup>1</sup>

The Ambassador indicated a full awareness of the requirements of the Thai armed forces in the matter of equipment and training. He said that a certain amount of small arms had recently been received. He said that the Thai Prime Minister is anxious to increase the Thai army from its present strength of between 50 and 60,000 to a total of 150,000. The manpower is readily available but there is the problem of training cadres. There is also a financial problem. The Thai budget currently amounts to \$250 million of which the armed forces absorb over \$100 million. The Thai financial situation is very tight. This was confirmed by the International Bank recently when it refused to make a loan requested by Thailand because of concern over Thailand's public finances. The Ambassador concluded with an appeal for a statement of the extent to which US assistance might be counted on in developing Thailand's armed forces and improving Thailand's defense position.

---

<sup>1</sup> For memorandum of conversation between Secretary Dulles and Minister Thuathep Devakul, May 10, see volume XII.

The Under Secretary replied that while his information regarding progress on military assistance to Thailand was not entirely current, he could state that our JCS have been asked to examine and make recommendations with regard to a program which would include assistance in increasing the Thai army to 90,000; constructing the Saraburi Highway and certain other matters including an air base. The Under Secretary stated that his views had been requested and that he was making favorable recommendations. He said that he thought that ways and means would be found whereby existing resources might be made available to help the Thai Government.

The Under Secretary added that he had most strongly recommended the establishment in Thailand of an air base with fighter planes in the event that the Thai Government should request the installation of such a base. He stressed the top secret nature of this matter and the important part which such a base could play in free world defense of Southeast Asia against aggression.

The Under Secretary stated that, provided the necessary resources could be made available, the concept of assistance to be rendered the Thai Government in military matters would be broad and flexible. It would include financial support in view of the state of the Thai budget and assistance in the construction of housing and presumably in the provision of certain types of infrastructure (roads and air fields). The Under Secretary emphasized also the important assistance which we could render in training Thai officers and noncommissioned officers. He recalled the experience which the US Marine Corps has acquired in the peculiar problems of jungle warfare with modern weapons.

The Under Secretary then took occasion to reiterate the Secretary's appreciation of the strong stand taken by the Thai Government immediately after the Secretary had launched his united action concept. He said that this attitude had greatly strengthened the Secretary's hand. He added that he thought it important that the Burmese Government should now be encouraged to move away from its position of neutrality. He said that there were definite signs of a change. He expressed the hope that Thailand could be of assistance in accelerating this movement.

The Ambassador replied that Mr. Eden has requested Prince Wan to try to exert some influence with the Burmese. This matter is a delicate one because of some traditional factors in Thai-Burmese relations and also because of certain recent incidents, including the bombing of Thai territory by the Burmese air force. However, the Thai Government is taking a conciliatory and constructive attitude and hopes that it can be useful.

The Ambassador took occasion to express his satisfaction at the recent strengthening of the Cambodian Government as reflected by the fact that certain dissident elements have rallied to the King. He cited these developments as illustrative of the dynamic effect of real independence. The Ambassador stated that he was in full agreement that the situation in Laos and Cambodia should be disassociated from the situation in Viet-Nam in any settlement of the Indochina war.

The Ambassador then asked the Under Secretary whether the US would proceed with the united action concept even if the UK should drag its feet or even refuse to go along in any useful manner. To this the Under Secretary replied that in his opinion the situation with which we are confronted in Southeast Asia makes it essential that we and other likeminded countries proceed as rapidly and as energetically as possible.

The Ambassador then reverted to his theme as to the importance of keeping India out of any defense arrangements in the area. He said that collective arrangements which included India would insure united inaction rather than united action. The Ambassador indicated that the Indians had been trying to influence the Thai authorities away from the united action concept. He said, however, that Pakistan would be a useful participant in any arrangement.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 286

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Martin)*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 14, 1954.

Participants: Mr. Kenneth Young, U.S. Delegation  
 Mr. John Calhoun, U.S. Delegation  
 Mr. Edwin Martin, U.S. Delegation  
 Mr. Humphrey Trevelyan, British Delegation

Subject: Views of Mr. Humphrey Trevelyan, British Chargé at Peiping, on various subjects relating to Communist China.

During the course of a small dinner given by Mr. H. Trevelyan, British Chargé at Peiping, for three members of the U.S. Delegation, he expressed his views on several topics of interest relating to the Peiping regime and the Geneva Conference. A summary of his views follows:

1. *British Recognition of Communist China*

Mr. Trevelyan said that he felt strongly that there had been "no loss and some gain" by the maintenance of the British diplomatic mission

in Peiping even though the Peiping regime had failed to recognize the British Government. He cited U.S. press reports that the British diplomatic representatives were laughed at in the streets as being not in accord with the facts. He had never felt any sense of being slighted or mocked at by Chinese in Peiping, because of his unrecognized status. On the other hand, he had personally made a very careful study of treatment of British firms as compared to the treatment of firms of other Western countries which have formal diplomatic relations with the Peiping regime and had been unable to find any evidence that British firms were less favorably treated. Mr. Trevelyan evidently felt that the Western countries which had established formal diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communist regime had not been able to protect their interest in China any more effectively than had the so-called British negotiation mission.

Mr. Trevelyan said that he had discussed with members of the Chinese Communist Delegation here the question of Peiping's failure to recognize the UK. The principal justification offered by the Communist representatives for this policy is that the UK had failed to support Peiping's seating in the UN; therefore the British were "not sincere" in their recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. Trevelyan indicated that the Communists had also mentioned such matters as the handing over of CNAC and CATC planes "to Chennault" in connection with Peiping's non-recognition of the UK, but the impression conveyed is that the British position on Peiping's entry into the UN is the main consideration.

## 2. *Peiping Foreign Policy*

Mr. Trevelyan is convinced that, except for Indochina, the Chinese Communist regime is not interested in pushing forward externally for the time being but wishes to concentrate on internal developments (this is in line with views expressed by Ford of the British Delegation—see memo of conversation May 12<sup>1</sup>). He expressed the belief that Peiping's tough talk and intransigent attitude both at the Geneva Conference and in their propaganda output is explained by the fact that the Chinese Communists are speaking primarily to an Asian audience and care little about the impression they make in the U.S. and Western Europe. Trevelyan does not believe that the Communists are disposed to bargain for admission to the UN but will continue to demand it as a right and are willing to wait indefinitely for admission rather than make concessions.

## 3. *Internal Politics*

In Trevelyan's view, the CCP's comment emphasis on "collective leadership" while reaching high into the party, even up to the Central

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. (396.1 GE/5-1154)

Committee, does not affect the very highest strata. He feels that Mao Tse-tung's personal prestige and authority is stronger now than ever. He cited several recent events to support this thesis.

#### 4. *Economic Conditions*

Trevelyan indicates that in conversation with Chinese Communist officials here, they have expressed great confidence in their ability to handle their economic problems. Trevelyan himself believes that the Communist regime has shown considerable flexibility in its economic policies in the sense of being able to reverse itself when a given policy proves to be ineffective or counter-productive. The Chinese Communists here have admitted to Trevelyan that there was no increase of food production in 1953, but they hope for a 6% increase in 1954. They explain the grain rationing program, which was formally introduced on January 1 though experimentally tried out as early as November 1953, in terms of the need for assuring an adequate supply of food grains to the rapidly growing urban population, particularly the industrial workers. Cadres have been sent out to explain to the peasants the need for the grain control program in these terms. Trevelyan, incidentally, quoted his local Chinese Communist contacts as saying the population of the city of Peiping is now approximately 3,000,000 and that of Shanghai is 7,000,000. Total population of the mainland is in excess of 500 million and increases at the rate of 8 to 10 million per year. This enormous annual increment to the Chinese population does not seem to worry the Communist regime, according to Trevelyan.

#### 5. *General Observations on Peiping and Environs*

Trevelyan said no restrictions have been placed on his driving around the country side from Peiping. He has never been stopped on such excursions and does not know of any mileage limit imposed by the authorities. Frequently he walks in the Western hills and has never been molested. It is necessary, however, to get a permit to travel by train. He has experienced no difficulty thus far in getting a permit. In trips through villages in the environs of Peiping, Trevelyan has been impressed with the generally well-dressed and well-fed appearance of the inhabitants.

#### 6. *Impressions of Chinese Communist Delegation Members*

Mr. Trevelyan says that on the whole his relations with the various members of the Chinese Communist Delegation have been pleasant and friendly. He apparently gets along best with Huan Hsiang, Ch'iao Kuan-hua and Kung Peng. On May 11 he was invited by Lei Jen-min, Vice Minister of Foreign Trade, to dinner. The guests included the four mentioned above and Huang Hua. (This is apparently the oc-

casation on which Sino-British trade relations were discussed—see Secto 189<sup>2</sup>). . . .

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (396.1 GE/5-1254)

110.11 DU/5-1454 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, May 14, 1954—8:43 p. m.

775. For Under Secretary from Secretary. If you deem appropriate, please deliver following personal message to Bidault from me:

“Dear Georges: Am delighted that you are carrying on. I know this is good for France and for the friendship which has so long well served our two countries. I think I can appreciate the heavy burdens which you are compelled to carry. I have confidence that you will do so in a manner which will enhance the prestige of your country.<sup>2</sup> I hope we can increasingly find ways for cooperation to mutual advantage at this critical moment. Foster”<sup>3</sup>

DULLES

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State.

<sup>2</sup> The U.S. Delegation informed the Secretary of State in telegram Secto 244, May 18, that the fourth sentence had been changed to read “The way you are doing it has done much to enhance the prestige of your country.” (396.1 GE/5-1854)

<sup>3</sup> Bidault’s reply, transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 87, May 19, was as follows: “Thanks for your friendly message. I know you are not unaware of either our difficulties or our efforts. I have confidence in this understanding and in our friendship to strengthen the close relations between our two countries essential for the good of all.” (110.11 DU/5-1954)

396.1 GE/5-1454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY      GENEVA, May 14, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 209. Repeated information priority Paris 265, Saigon 72. We communicated substance of Saigon’s 109 sent Department 2391 Paris 841<sup>1</sup> to French this morning and offered to assist them in any way we could. They did not receive similar information directly until just before meeting this afternoon when they received it in instructions to Bidault to take it up at today’s session.

<sup>1</sup> In telegram 2391 from Saigon, May 14, not printed, McClintock reported that the Viet Minh had placed conditions on the evacuation of wounded from Dien Bien Phu. Dejean indicated to the Chargé that “this was but a diabolical ruse to delay evacuation of French Union wounded as long as possible in order to prevent French air attack of RC-41 while Giap moves his divisions toward delta. Wounded of Dien Bien Phu are in fact being used as hostages.” (751G.00/5-1454)



Bidault consulted Eden and me during recess in considerable distress. His information convinced him that Viet Minh would be able to move bulk of their forces from Dien Bien Phu to delta within two weeks necessary to fly out wounded unless their movement along RC-41 was effectively blocked. Viet Minh proposal would only be admissible if it were possible to have international control of RC-41 to insure it was not used for troop movements. This seemed wholly impractical. In circumstances Bidault felt that to raise it in public meeting today would do no good for wounded who were probably doomed in any event.

At later talk after meeting he and I decided best tactic would be for him to write head of Viet Minh delegation as one belligerent to another and to both chairmen protesting this diabolic blackmail. I agreed to raise supporting letters to both chairmen. Letters are being phrased to provide out for Communists if there is any possibility of their backing out. We will try to avoid publicity pending further developments.

SMITH

MAY 15, 1954

751G.5/5-1554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 15, 1954—10 a. m.

Dulte 70. Limit distribution. I took occasion to tell Bidault last night that we should be under no illusions about troop withdrawal in Indochina, that it would be very difficult to prevent any lines fixed from developing into *de facto* partition which was something US could not accept. If we saw things heading that way, we would have to disassociate ourselves from this particular proposal.

Bidault replied that would be very serious. He said that military regrouping would postpone any political settlement and that neither Vietnamese nor Viet Minh would accept partition. He realized that if there were any clean-cut split on a given parallel, it would inevitably become partition and for that reason he felt jumbled and irregular lines like frontiers of Israel far safer. I said I agreed with this line of thought.

I also told him that we were making progress with British and I felt much more optimistic than two weeks ago. I also said we could do a great deal for the long pull, including training, provided it was not necessary for us to intervene directly in present fighting.

SMITH

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 289

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy United States Representative (Robertson)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 15, 1954.

Participants: Prince Wan, Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Ambassador Sarasin, Thai Ambassador to the United States  
Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State  
Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State

Subject: Revival of Thai Plan of June 1953 for UN Peace Observation Commission in Indochina

General Smith opened the conversation by summarizing Department's telegram to Geneva number 761.<sup>2</sup> He reviewed the circumstances of last June when due to French opposition we had to reverse our position and request the Thais not to present a plan at that time. He stated that if they would now revive the petition, we would make a firm commitment to push it through the Security Council to a Soviet veto and then urgently convene the General Assembly.

Prince Wan said that he agreed in principle and that he felt his Government would agree in principle but there might be some question as to timing. He stated he strongly felt that although the 16 powers participating in the Geneva Conference represented the UN in a sense, the UN as an institution had not been brought into consideration of the Indochina question. He went on to say that neither Bidault's nor Eden's proposals for guarantee of the agreements that might be reached seemed to be within the framework of the UN, and that he had told Bidault that in his opinion the UN rather than the participants in the Conference should be the guarantor. As to timing, however, he questioned whether they had as good a case now as they had in June 1953 and that it might be advisable to wait until there was an invasion of Laos before reviving the request. The Cambodian complaint, he said, was already before the UN and at the moment they (the Thais) did not feel that there existed a threat to Thailand. However, if our intelligence had information to the contrary he would be glad to have it.

General Smith said that in his opinion the situation was more threatening now than it was last June, that there was mounting tension throughout the area, that no one knew when the attack would come or where and it was highly desirable to have the POC on the

<sup>1</sup>This discussion and one held on May 14 between Smith and Sarasin were summarized in telegram Secto 230 to the Department of State, May 16. (396.1 GE/5-1654)

<sup>2</sup>Dated May 13, p. 790.

ground before the event, if possible, rather than afterwards. Time was of the essence as it would necessarily take time to get action by the Assembly. General Smith pointed out that the Russian tactic here at Geneva is to bypass the UN and he agreed with Prince Wan that the UN should be brought back into the situation as involving one of its primary responsibilities to preserve the peace. He said he thought Thailand was the best country to ask for POC since it was an experienced and independent UN member. Prince Wan seemed impressed by these observations and said Ambassador Sarasin was leaving for Bangkok Sunday night and would discuss the matter with the Prime Minister. Prince Wan added that the composition of the POC had not been particularly considered last June, but in view of the experience in Korea was it not probable that Russia would attempt to load the commission with Communists or Communist sympathizers. General Smith replied that he thought we had strength enough in the UN to prevent the success of such a move and that we had in mind such countries as Pakistan, India, Uruguay, New Zealand and Sweden. General Smith asked Prince Wan's approval to discuss the proposal with the British and the French and Prince Wan agreed.

General Smith then referred to the conversation he had on yesterday with Ambassador Sarasin<sup>3</sup> with reference to measures for strengthening Thai armed forces and asked Prince Wan about the offer of bases in Thailand for the free world attributed to the Thai Chief of Staff. Wan said he had no official knowledge of such an offer but realized the desirability of defensive air base facilities. General Smith stated that if Thailand is willing to grant such bases, it might be desirable to negotiate agreements now for a fighter wing base which he thought would greatly increase the strength of Thailand's position. Prince Wan said he would consult with his Government.

---

<sup>3</sup> For a memorandum of conversation of this discussion, May 14, see p. 801.

---

396.1 GE/5-1554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL      PRIORITY      GENEVA, May 15, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 215. Repeated information Paris 268, Saigon 75. Re: Paragraph 3, Secto 209.<sup>1</sup> Following is unofficial translation letter delivered about midnight last night to Eden and Molotov (as Co-Chairmen Indochina Conference) by Bidault:

“Mr. Chairman: On May 10 the Geneva Conference, basing its action on a letter of Mr. Nguyen Quoc Dinh and on a declaration of

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 14, p. 806.

Mr. Pham Van Dong on the same day, gave its agreement in principle to the evacuation of the wounded from the former fortress of Dien Bien Phu.<sup>2</sup>

"The French Commander-In-Chief immediately got in touch with General Vo Nguyen Giap in order to arrange the practical steps in this evacuation.

"During the meeting which was held at Dien Bien Phu on May 14 it was noted that the first group of wounded designated by General Vo Nguyen Giap, that is to say 450 men, included no Vietnamese.

"It was made clear, however, in the declaration published on this subject by the Viet Minh delegation on the evening of May 10 that the Viet Minh command would not make any discrimination among the wounded based on considerations of race or nationality. Furthermore a new demand which raised an extremely serious problem was made by the representatives of General Vo Nguyen Giap. This in effect would have subjected the evacuation of the wounded to the condition that during the entire duration of this operation, which in view of the state of the terrain would have required about a fortnight, Provincial route number 41 should not be the object of any military action. No parallel can be established between the operation of evacuating the wounded from Dien Bien Phu, which has no military consequences, and the neutralization of the only major route existing in the area. This prolonged neutralization would in effect permit major troop movements of such a nature as to modify profoundly the military situation in North Vietnam.

"I would therefore be most grateful if you would communicate the foregoing on a basis of extreme urgency to Mr. Pham Van Dong so that he may intervene with the Viet Minh command in order that the measures which shall be taken to evacuate the wounded may conform to the letter and spirit of the decision of the Conference.

"Please accept, Mr. Chairman, the assurances of my very high consideration."

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> Discussion of the wounded during the Second Plenary Session on Indochina in the verbatim minutes of the session in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 276.

---

396.1 GE/5-1554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GENEVA, May 15, 1954—3 p. m.

Secto 219. Repeated information Saigon 77, Paris 272. Reference Secto 209, repeated Paris 265, Saigon 72,<sup>1</sup> and Secto 215 repeated Paris 268 and Saigon 75.<sup>2</sup> Following is text of letter from Smith to Molotov as "Co-Chairman, Geneva Conference on Indochina" transmitted this morning. Letter to Eden is identical except for substitution of "Mr. Molotov" for "you" in first and last sentences paragraph 2, and "Mr. Molotov" for "Mr. Eden" in last paragraph :

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 14, p. 806.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 15, *supra*.

“Excellency: It is with surprise that the US delegation has learned that the Viet Minh Military Command apparently is attempting to establish extraordinary conditions for the removal of the wounded from Dien Bien Phu. Most of these brave men have suffered under intolerable conditions for many weeks. I had shared the general hope that following the discussion of this matter at the plenary session on Indochina last Monday there would be no further obstacles to the prompt evacuation of all the wounded of General De Castries’ command at Dien Bien Phu.

“When I spoke with you after our session on May 10th I raised the question of the interpretation of the Viet Minh statement. I said that I assumed it covered all of the wounded at Dien Bien Phu regardless of whether they were members of the French Expeditionary Corps or of the Vietnamese National Army, and also regardless of whether they were French or Vietnamese or belonged to other nationalities. It was my understanding that you had reached the same conclusion and that Mr. Chou En-lai likewise had made the same interpretation.

“I am informed that there are no Vietnamese among the first group designated for release. I thought it had been made clear that there should be no racial or national discrimination.

“Apart from the foregoing, I have also been informed that Viet Minh Command’s representatives are apparently attempting to establish irrelevant conditions for the release of the wounded which would have the effect of giving marked military advantages to their side.

“I earnestly hope that you may find it possible immediately to bring the foregoing to the attention of the Viet Minh representatives here to the end that arrangements made by the Viet Minh Command for the evacuation of the wounded be in full accord with the letter and the spirit of the decisions made by our conference.

“I am transmitting a similar letter to Mr. Eden as Co-Chairman of our conference. (Signed) Walter B. Smith.”<sup>3</sup>

No public release of letter will be made until French decide whether and when release their letter.

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> In a letter to Smith, May 15, Molotov replied as follows: “I have received your letter of May 15 concerning the evacuation of the seriously wounded from Dien Bien Phu. Somewhat earlier I had received a letter on this same question from the Head of the French Delegation which I have today answered. I am sending you a copy of my reply to M. Bidault in which the questions which interest you are dealt with.” (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 303) See telegram Secto 224, May 15, p. 817.

---

396.1 GE/5-1554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 15, 1954—3 p. m.

Secto 217. Repeated information Paris 270, London 164, Saigon 76.  
Re Secto 183, May 12, repeated Paris 244, Saigon 59, London 152<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 776.

and Secto 201, May 13, repeated Paris 257, Saigon 66 and London 161.<sup>2</sup> Eden, Bidault and I have discussed tactics for Monday's<sup>3</sup> restricted session on Indochina which will be devoted principally to answers to Eden's questions.

During discussion Eden stated Chou En-lai had yesterday told him Viet Minh proposal indicated their agreement on Eden's first question. I warned against anything that could become *de facto* partition and suggested we concentrate first on separating out Laotian and Cambodian questions. Bidault agreed and thought Commie case weak on this point. On Vietnam, he maintained we must do everything possible to avoid simple line across country which would cost us North Vietnam. He thought Commies would continue firm on having political settlement before military one and that this left no alternative but to continue "casting iron dice" (shooting). Political settlement at this time would mean loss of whole country and French had not fought eight years for that.

In response to my question as to who would be responsible authority outside delimited areas, Bidault mentioned possibility international supervision, principles of which he observed Molotov had not rejected. I pointed out Soviet concept of effective supervision very different from ours and advised them of second letter of Swiss and Swedes asking to be relieved of their obligations on Korean commission since Commie members prevented them accomplishing task. I asked whether we were agreed there should be UN supervision. Bidault said it should be UN but he would not exclude some other set-up if satisfactory alternative could be found. Eden said we must avoid Korean set-up of two and two. We agreed to discuss this further in light of results Monday when Commies might show more of their hand in restricted session and that we would make every effort to draw them out on all points in Eden's questionnaire.

Eden anticipated battle over separating Laos and Cambodia with Commies again proposing admission of ghost governments. Bidault felt their case on this ridiculous and that more they pushed more they would hurt themselves with French opinion. I suggested that Commie intransigence on this would show they did not want settlement. Bidault felt there would be difficulties with Vietnamese over delimiting areas and that we should first seek agreement that military settlement must come before political. I remarked it would be impossible to have political settlement while fighting continued and Eden said Western

---

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 793.

<sup>3</sup> May 17.

insistence on this would put Commies in position of being ones who are preventing cessation of hostilities.

We agreed first item should be Dien Bien Phu wounded, second separation Laotian and Cambodian cases from Vietnam and third principle that military settlement must precede political one. Eden will be in chair. We are coordinating this afternoon first with British and French and subsequently with Associated States.

SMITH

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 285

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 15, 1954.

Subject: Restricted meeting on Indochina to be held Monday, May 17th.

After discussion of such details as the room, provision of interpreters, number of experts (3) and etc., following tentative procedure was agreed to at a tripartite meeting called this afternoon by Ambassador Chauvel:

1) Eden as chairman will call on Bidault to discuss the question of the wounded at Dien Bien Phu. Bidault will rehearse his own letter to Molotov and Molotov's reply and will then ask the Vietminh Delegation for their views on how to proceed to expedite this matter. (Bidault is favorably impressed by the Molotov letter which strikes him as favorable in substance, i.e., no discrimination between French and Vietnamese and generally conciliatory and courteous in tone.) Bidault may also ask whether there is any news about the nurse, the only French woman in the Dien Bien Phu garrison.

2) Eden will then bring up the matter of his five questions<sup>2</sup> and will ask Bidault if he has any further comment he would like to make.

3) Bidault will then ask if there is agreement on the separation of the problems of Laos and Cambodia from the problem of Viet-Nam. If agreement on this principle can be obtained, Bidault will suggest the appointment of separate working committees containing representatives of all nine delegations to endeavor to give form and content to practical solutions for Laos and Cambodia respectively. Perhaps the

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Bonsal.

<sup>2</sup> Contained in telegram Secto 183, May 12, p. 776.

first task of these committees will be to agree on their terms of reference and to submit those terms to the Conference for approval.

4) After the question of Laos and Cambodia has been disposed of, Bidault would endeavor to secure agreement on the principle that the cessation of hostilities with appropriate controls and guarantees need not wait upon the reaching of political agreements. This is a problem upon which agreement will be most difficult not only with the other side but also with our own side. The Vietnamese are strongly opposed to any agreement for cessation of hostilities which is not simultaneous with a political agreement recognizing their own status as the sole legal government of Viet-Nam.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 321

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Davis) to the Deputy United States Representative (Robertson)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[GENEVA,] May 15, 1954.

Subject: Indochina Guarantees

I think the following quotations are of considerable importance in connection with the guarantee feature of the French Indochina proposals.

General Smith's statement regarding the French proposals includes the following paragraph: <sup>1</sup>

"The United States notes the French proposal that 'agreements shall be guaranteed by the States participating in the Geneva Conference.' The United States has already demonstrated its devotion to the principle of collective security and its willingness to help in the development of collective security arrangements in Southeast Asia, as elsewhere. Until it is possible to see more clearly the exact nature of the agreement to be guaranteed and to determine the obligations of the guarantors, we will, of course, not be able to express any judgment on this section of the proposal."

Bidault's statement of yesterday contains the following paragraph: <sup>2</sup>

"The French Delegation considers that the institution of an international control is an indispensable guarantee to a correct application of the agreements. It should like to mention further that under

---

<sup>1</sup> Made during the Second Plenary Session on Indochina. For Smith's statement, see telegram Secto 161, May 10, p. 751.

<sup>2</sup> Made during the Fourth Plenary Session on Indochina. See telegram Secto 212, May 14, p. 795.



Chapter Three of the French proposals of the eight[h] of May, the guarantee for the agreements would be, and should, by the state members to this Conference. It notes that *the delegation of the United States, of Viet-Nam, Laos, of Cambodia have already assented to the principle of international supervision and to the guarantee to be given to those agreements.*"

The underlined <sup>3</sup> portion of Bidault's remarks constitutes a flat statement that the U.S. has assented to the guarantee to be given to the proposed agreements. The discrepancy between this and General Smiths' statement is, in my opinion, so strong that it should not remain unchallenged. Otherwise we shall be tacitly committed to a form of guarantee to which I am sure we cannot agree.<sup>4</sup>

A. C. DAVIS

---

<sup>3</sup> Printed here as italics.

<sup>4</sup> Handwritten notation on the source text and a chit attached to the source text indicate that Robertson and Johnson agreed with Admiral Davis.

---

751G.00/5-1654 : Telegram

*Eden-Smith Meeting, Geneva, May 15, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY

GENEVA, May 16, 1954—4 p. m.

Dulte 72. Repeated information Paris 279. Eyes only for the Secretary. Eyes only Ambassador. Eden came to see me yesterday evening obviously quite irritated and bringing with him a copy of the Paris edition of the *Herald Tribune* for Saturday, May 15, which headlined Ned Russell's article "US-France To Discuss Terms For Intervention In Indochina Conflict". His irritation seemed to be less because we were moving positively than because the British had not been informed, particularly at a time when the Prime Minister and others are continually being forced to answer Parliamentary questions with regard to five-power discussions and relations with and position of the United States. I read him extracts from Deptel 4023 to Paris, repeated Geneva Tedul 54, and Paris to Department 4383, repeated Geneva 237.<sup>1</sup> He left in a more amiable frame of mind. I would suggest, however, that in matters of this kind we keep the British informed as far as possible in advance. It will assist them in meeting political situations and will encourage them to move further in our

---

<sup>1</sup> For telegrams 4023 to Paris and 4383 from Paris, May 11 and 14, pertaining to U.S. policy on intervention in Indochina, see volume XIII.

direction if they believe we are giving them a considerable measure of confidence. There will be disagreements and we will be obliged at times to tell them that we are going ahead whether they agree or not, but I think they would infinitely prefer this than to be surprised with a press story.<sup>2</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup>The Department of State in telegram Tedul 75, May 17, instructed Under Secretary Smith that as the result of newspaper stories "we are informing British and ANZUS Ambassadors in general terms regarding our talks with French." The Department asked Smith to report "urgently any specific points in Tedul 54 [telegram 4023 to Paris, May 11] which you did not cover with Eden." (751G.00/5-1654) Smith's reply is contained in telegram Dulte 80, May 17, not printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 245)

Under Secretary Smith reported to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 76, May 17, that Eden had recommended to Churchill that he treat lightly in Parliament press reports of French-U.S. talks on U.S. intervention in Indochina. Eden "suggested Prime Minister say that talks had not yet begun, that there had been slight slip-up in British not being informed such talks were in contemplation but that they had now been informed, that Eden was satisfied, and that he was sure they would continue to be kept informed." Smith recommended that "we must continue to keep them informed and Eden would prefer that it be done here while he is here." (751G.00/5-1754)

---

396.1 GE/5-1554: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 15, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 223. Repeated information Saigon 79, Paris 273. Reference Saigon telegram to Geneva 96, repeated information Department 2372.<sup>1</sup> Heath, Achilles and Bonsal discussed with Chauvel, Roux and Cheysson of the French delegation today, the deteriorating political situation in Vietnam and the advisability of Bao Dai's returning to take over the reins of government. The French said that their reports noted political deterioration, but thought the answer was for Prime Minister Buu Loc to return forthwith to Saigon. They were inclined to doubt that Bao Dai's return would immediately change the situation for the better. In any case, they felt it very important, from their point of view, that Bao Dai stay in the neighborhood of delegation in Geneva as otherwise the Vietnamese delegation would hold up decisions and discussions at every point while they awaited instructions from Bao Dai. The Vietnam delegation has firm instructions to take no position without prior authorization from Bao Dai.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> For summary of telegram 2372 from Saigon, May 13, see footnote 2, p. 800.

396.1 GE/5-1554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 15, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 224. Repeated information Paris 274 Saigon 80. Reference Sectos 215, 219.<sup>1</sup> I have received from Molotov acknowledgment of my letter<sup>2</sup> and copy of his reply to Bidault which reads:

"I have today received your letter of May 14 regarding the evacuation of wounded from Dien Bien Phu.

"In accordance with your wish, I have brought the content of your letter to the attention of the head of the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Pham Van Dong.

"I also am aware of the statements which you mention of the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam of May 10 to the effect that its Commander would carry out no discrimination among the wounded on considerations of race or nationality.

"As you remember, at the Geneva Conference, May 10, a statement by the head of the delegation of the DRV was heard concerning its readiness to undertake without delay measures directed toward the evacuation of the seriously wounded taken prisoner at Dien Bien Phu. At the same time, the wish was expressed that representatives of both commands undertake practical steps on the spot to carry out this evacuation, and all participants in the Conference took cognizance of this.

"In accordance with this it is reasonable to think that all practical questions concerning the evacuation of wounded from Dien Bien Phu should be settled by agreement among the commands of both sides on the spot.

"It is possible that you, Mr. Minister, will find it expedient to establish direct contact with the delegation of the DRV which is in Geneva to clarify those questions, the settlement of which might assist in the establishment of a system of evacuation which would be satisfactory to both sides."

Bidault was struck by its courteous tone, its reference to nondiscrimination, its reiteration that practical questions be dealt with on the spot, and suggestion that French discuss it with Viet Minh here. He has not decided what to do next.<sup>3</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Both dated May 15, pp. 809 and 810 respectively.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 15. See footnote 3, p. 811.

<sup>3</sup> Bidault's comments on the Molotov reply are contained in a memorandum from Achilles to Johnson, May 15, in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 303.

396.1 GE/5-1554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 15, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 225. Repeated information Paris 275, Saigon 81, London 167, Moscow 72, Phnom Penh and Vientiane unnumbered. Department pass Defense. Following are comments Molotov and Bidault speeches fourth Indochina plenary yesterday:

(1) Molotov gave four-point program which he said was summary Viet Minh proposal. Comparison shows USSR four points (with one additional sentence which Molotov added) cover in briefer form first seven points Viet Minh proposal, as well as most of Viet Minh point eight (which provided for cessation hostilities as condition precedent for other seven and which vaguely outlined controls for cease-fire). Soviets do not repeat Viet Minh reference to "settlement of territories and of areas occupied" given in second sentence point eight Viet Minh plan, which presumably covers regrouping concept also found in French plan.

Supplement to Viet Minh proposal importance of which Molotov stressed was in fact, substitution for Viet Minh plan for mixed commissions comprising belligerents only (paragraph eight C). USSR proposed "setting up of a neutral nations supervisory commission shall be provided for in the agreement".

Portion Molotov speech covering various proposals already submitted and Soviet comments thereon was characterized by ostensibly conciliatory approach. He did not refer to Vietnamese plan (Secto 193<sup>1</sup>) at all, but stated drawback of French proposal was it did not deal with political problem which was inseparable from military stressing impossibility any purely military settlement. French, of course, had indicated Vietnamese should take lead on proposing political settlements, but Vietnamese recommendations would doubtless be completely unacceptable to Soviets. He said no cessation hostilities should be just "shrewdly-arranged respite". On guarantees question, Molotov agreed idea nine States participating conference would be guarantors, but rejected French concept individual guarantees and spoke only of "collective measures" to implement guarantees. He expressed hope other delegations would also comment on French plan which he said was "an important proposal". Thus Soviets gave some appearance conciliatory approach to French plan.

Molotov also said Soviet delegation would reply to Eden's five points at later date.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 12, p. 780.

(2) Bidault's speech was point-by-point refutation Viet Minh proposal. He first isolated problems Laos and Cambodia and then refuted in detail Viet Minh proposals as applied to Vietnam (Secto 212<sup>2</sup>). For first time in plenary session, Bidault indicating French willingness withdraw troops from Laos and Cambodia under certain conditions.

Bidault statement did not disavow any of points previously made in French proposal submitted first plenary session. He did stress political settlement should follow military arrangement and that discussion former should not delay latter. This may cause some difficulties with Vietnamese who, of course, emphasize inter-relationship two problems. Bidault did admit tie existed between two, but said political settlement would be consequence, not precondition of military settlement.

In replying to Eden questions, on point number five, Bidault reiterated France had originally proposed international controls and said France "was prepared to examine all proposals which might be made concerning the composition of commissions and the methods of control". He added, if principle international control accepted, appropriate mixed groups could be established by common agreement and operating under international authority. This is slight though probably not significant modification French position as tabled first plenary session.

In general, Bidault gave impression that although talking to Viet Minh proposal his objective was refutation and France rejected Viet Minh plan as basis for discussion.

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 14, p. 795.

**MAY 16, 1954**

396.1 GE/5-1654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 16, 1954—9 a. m.

Secto 228. Repeated information London 171. Limit distribution. Eden spoke to me briefly regarding talk he had time his call on Chou En-lai morning May 14. Allen gave Johnson detailed account Saturday and let him read UK's summary conversation made following meeting during which no notes were taken.

Allen stated Chou very reserved and formal, unbending only slightly toward end of meeting. Eden opened by stating he wished first as co-chairman Indochina phase discuss how conference could get down to negotiations, particularly on Indochina and suggested

possibility restricted sessions next week. Chou responded with formal style statement that if everyone wanted peace, solution could be found that would be "honorable, fair and reasonable by both sides". Chou stated had studied Eden's questions on Indochina as well as Eden's points on Korea and would discuss restricted Indochina sessions with USSR and Viet Minh. Stated China supports North Korea and Viet Minh views and complained French had not answered Viet Minh political proposal, leaving political questions to Vietnam.

Eden then stated that as Foreign Secretary he wanted to do what he could to decrease tension between "five great powers", and a settlement was necessary to achieve this. Chou responded by referring to preamble recent Chinese Communist agreement with India on Tibet which set forth principles Chinese Communist foreign policy, that is, mutual non-aggression and peaceful co-existence. Chou then stated China wished to obtain recognition as a great power but "was not making this a condition for any settlement".

Eden then referred to dangers if Ho Chi Minh persisted in asking too much. He might feel that he could get it, and he "might even be able to get it", however wider considerations should be borne in mind or position could become dangerous. Chou responded by terming "Bao Dai's" proposals as unrealistic and his claims to absolute authority throughout Indochina as "absurd" as position taken by Chiang Kai-shek during the Civil War in China. He added that far eastern experts like Dennis Allen and Trevelyan who were present, would be fully familiar with the situation that had existed in China.

Eden suggested it would be better to discuss military armistice upon which Chou asked for explanation Eden's first question. Eden replied that if the fighting were to be stopped it would be necessary that the forces both sides be disengaged, and this would require some redeployment on their part. Chou said he could see that this might well be first point for discussion and would study situation.

Chou then made statement with regard to necessity both countries working for improvement of relations, implication being China would do little toward normalizing relations with UK until there was change in UK attitudes toward Communist China.

Eden then mentioned conversations between Trevelyan and Huan Hsiang, upon which Chou indicated he was closely following their conversations and giving detailed instructions to Huan Hsiang.<sup>1</sup> Eden then stated it is important both countries also "bring other countries along too", to which Chou replied that it was in main British who could do this.

---

<sup>1</sup> Reference to discussions on Sino-British relations between members of the Chinese and British Delegations at Geneva. For an outline of these discussions, see p. 803.

Allen characterized conversation as not offering much hope any change Chinese Communist attitudes or policies.

Eden told me that while term UN was never mentioned in conversation, implication he drew from Chou's remarks and general approach was that Chou was asking obliquely whether if Chinese behaved they would be admitted to UN. Eden said he made it very clear this was not a question to be handled by "deals", and that he was not making a proposal of any kind.

He also told me that just before leaving he had said he must add a word of caution about pushing the US too far—that we were "slow starters" but that when we did start we went all the way. This is not reflected in the memorandum.

SMITH

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 331

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 16, 1954.

Subject: French request concerning your visit to Bao Dai.

Ambassador Chauvel this morning showed a member of the U.S. Delegation a telegram from French Commissioner General Dejean in Saigon.

The telegram was concerned principally with the very bad reaction to the Secretary's press conference remarks on May 11 to the effect that Indochina was not indispensable to the defense of Southeast Asia.<sup>2</sup> Dejean felt that this statement had destroyed the last French-Vietnamese trump at Geneva: the threat of U.S. intervention in Indochina. This feeling was strengthened by the fact that Secretary Wilson, General Van Fleet, and General Hull were not planning to visit Indochina during their tours of the area. However, Dejean understands that Secretary Wilson now intends to stop in Indochina.

With a view toward lessening the reaction to the Secretary's remarks, Ambassador Chauvel (speaking, I understand for Bidault) asked if you could tell Bao Dai that the U.S. position on Indochina has not changed, that we still consider it the key to defense of Southeast Asia, and that we are not planning to let it go to the Communists.

Ambassador Chauvel also said that M. Bidault agreed that Bao Dai should not go back to Viet-Nam for a week or ten days, since his absence would paralyze the Vietnamese Delegation. M. Bidault does feel

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Getz.

<sup>2</sup> For summary of the Secretary's press conference, see footnote 1, p. 772.

that Vietnamese Prime Minister Buu Loc should return to Saigon immediately.

---

396.1 GE/5-1654 : Telegram

*The Chargé in India (Flanagan) to the Department of State*

NEW DELHI, May 16, 1954.

Unnumbered. Sent Department Geneva and IPSNY unnumbered. Geneva for McCardle. USINFO. Nehru told House of People May 15th that if his Indochina ceasefire suggestion <sup>1</sup> had been thought of in more urgent terms, much suffering would have been avoided. Said satisfactory settlement procedural difficulties at opening conference good omen. Said countries of Asia intimately concerned with both Korea and Indochina. Said it not illegitimate desire of India that business of others carrying on warfare for their own purposes in Asia should cease.

Said imposition of settlement by either side impossible. Cited military stalemate in Korea. Said statesmen at Geneva actuated by strong desire for peace. Saw growing commonness in their approach.

Said he had no desire participate Geneva. Said he would hesitate very much to assume further burdens any kind. But said India cannot avoid fact that if situation arises which might require some kind of initiative on our part or association in any particular decision "We cannot run away. We cannot shed responsibilities that go with a great country."

Suggested that Geneva conference report to United Nations which could facilitate implementation Geneva decisions.

FLANAGAN

---

<sup>1</sup> Made on Apr. 24. For an outline of Nehru's proposal, see p. 635.

---

396.1 GE/5-1654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 16, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 227. Repeated information Bangkok 4, Paris 277, London 170, Saigon 82. Discussed with Prince Wan and Sarasin contents of Department's telegram to Geneva 761.<sup>1</sup> Prince Wan said that he agreed in principle and that he would submit suggestion to his government. He felt his government would also agree in principle but there might be some reservation as to timing, that Cambodia's complaint was already before UN and that it might be advisable to wait until there had been

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 13, p. 790.



an actual invasion of Laos before submitting to UN as reaction might be that there was no good reason for request.

I stressed that in my opinion there was better case to be made now than last June, that there was mounting tension throughout area, and no one knew what would happen or when. It was particularly important to get action started promptly on account of time factor involved in getting action through Assembly and POC on ground. Prince Wan seemed to be impressed and stated that he would communicate with his government immediately.

With Prince Wan's approval, I discussed subject with Bidault and Eden stating we thought time had come to bring in UN, preferably through revival of Thai appeal and that conditions were so different now that I strongly hoped French would find advantages now outweighed disadvantages. I believed "colonial" complications could now be avoided. I told them Wan agreed in principle but was not sure about timing and that we believed effective action could be gotten without too much delay in General Assembly after Soviet veto in Security Council. Eden referred to Cambodian appeal but I expressed belief Thailand more suitable as experienced independent UN member.

Bidault said it would be difficult to reply quickly but he would try to give answer early next week.

Thai appeal to UN also subsequently discussed with Chauvel and Allen. Chauvel stated he saw no objection in principle but questioned only timing and peg on which to hang appeal. He thought next week or two might provide peg either through further invasion of Laos or Cambodia, Communist refusal to agree to Viet-Minh evacuation of Laos and Cambodia or further insistence on representation phantom governments.

Allen indicated generally favorable view although both he and Chauvel raised question whether such action would prejudice conference efforts separate problems Laos and Cambodia from Vietnam.

SMITH

---

751G.5/5-1654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 16, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 229. Repeated information Paris 278, Saigon 83. Following is Heath's account of his talk with Bao Dai at Paris Friday:<sup>1</sup>

"Bao Dai had planned to drive his family down to Cannes Friday morning but postponed his departure until afternoon to see me. I told him I had thought it a good thing to get his present views on conference. Bao Dai said that although he had seen a great many people

<sup>1</sup> May 14.

during his stay in Paris he had been unable to obtain any clear view of what were intentions of French Government regarding Vietnam and Indochina, or how French attitude towards Indochina would develop. When he left Saigon he had not intended to remain long, but in this situation of complete uncertainty of French intention and actions which might gravely affect Vietnam, he thought it necessary to remain where he could consult with French Government and also keep in close touch with his own delegation to Geneva Conference. He believed or rather hoped that French were "so committed" (*engagé*) in this war that they could not withdraw their forces from Indochina, but he was far from sure of this.

"I then said that reports had reached us indicating a marked deterioration in political situation of Vietnam and that view had been expressed in Vietnam, with an echo in Washington that it was necessary for him to return to Vietnam now in order to take hold of things. Bao Dai said that there was some deterioration in Vietnam of which he was fully aware but it did not, he thought, present any immediate dangers and was in part caused by uncertainty regarding French intentions. He thought it better for him for moment to stay nearby in France. He indicated that he had thought to return to Saigon either with firm assurances that French would resist any Communist pressure for a phony peace settlement or that French had decided to give up and in which latter case he would return and head a national movement of resistance to Viet Minh. He was inclined to doubt that French would like him to return and issue an appeal for resistance to Viet Minh at very moment when French were still negotiating an armistice with latter at Geneva.

"He said that he had been disturbed by first press reports of Secretary's press conference of May 11.<sup>2</sup> I reassured him that in first press reports transmitted phrases taken out of their context and summarized complete statement for him.

"Bao Dai then said that he was deeply grateful for America's support and conscious that we had political problems at home in connection with this support. He wanted to say he would welcome any suggestions on our part as to what he might do or say that would be helpful in furthering our policy toward Vietnam. I said I would report this to Washington, mentioned that the Under Secretary would be glad of chance to meet him and talk things over with him, and inquired whether he intended to come, as I had heard, to near-by Evian. He said he would come to Evian and asked when Under Secretary would be free to see him there. I replied that Under Secretary would be somewhat freer of conference duties on Sunday and if Bao Dai were planning to go to Evian then, Under Secretary would drive over to see him. Bao Dai said that he would be in Evian on Sunday next."<sup>3</sup>

This has been cleared with French and I will make a short visit today. British also informed.

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> For summary of the Secretary's press conference, see footnote 1, p. 772.

<sup>3</sup> May 16.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 331

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*

TOP SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 16, 1954.

1. Bidault, through Chauvel, says he sees no objections to your calling on Bao Dai.

2. I do not believe in view of Bidault's objection, (see attached memo)<sup>1</sup> we should attempt to persuade Bao Dai to return to Vietnam at this precise juncture.

3. As Bidault suggests, you might mention alarming reports of political deterioration and suggest urgently that Prime Minister Buu Loc return forthwith.

3. [*sic*] You might also ask Bao Dai's views on the alleged conflict between the Defense Minister Quat and Vietnam Chief of Staff, General Hinh.

4. You might smoke him out as to his plans for the conference. Evidently the Vietnam Delegation intends to stall for time without openly opposing the French, hoping the conference will break up without reaching a "solution" acceptable to the Communists, the French and ourselves and that the French will, therefore, have to keep on with the fight, with increased assistance, perhaps intervention from the U.S. If a conference solution is reached acceptable to the Communists and the French, he is considering the idea of keeping up the fight with the Vietnamese army alone provided we will come through with arms and financing. (The chances of any successful Vietnamese resistance unsupported will be very dubious to say the least.)

5. Another thing he hopes to do is to use the conference as a platform to help persuade the non-communists elements of the Vietminh supposedly in the majority, to break away and rally to the Bao Dai Government. (His chances of success in such an enterprise at this time seems to me to be very dubious.)

6. Without "protesting too much" you may wish to correct any misapprehension which may have arisen in Bao Dai's mind as a result of press conferences and statements over the past week, stressing to him the efforts being made by the President and by the Secretary to create further military and political assets on our side.

7. Finally you might refer with appreciation to Bao Dai's statement to me that he would be glad to receive any suggestions we might make as to what he might do or say that would aid the U.S. Government in its policy of helping Indochina.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 16, p. 821.

After saying that you might inquire as to the plans and prospects for building a stronger and more efficient government and army capable of arousing unified national support. This is a first meeting so should not, I feel, start taking him sternly to task for his deficiencies as a ruler. He is still the best trump we have. But in discussing his willingness to do or say anything which would help us help him we can get across our thought that marked improvement in the performance of his Government and himself is necessary.

MAY 17, 1954

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 285

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 17, 1954.

A meeting of the Six was held this morning:

1) Ambassador Chauvel explained that there would be no press conferences after the meetings and that only jointly agreed communiqués would be issued.

2) With regard to the Dien Bien Phu wounded, Bidault will review the situation in the light of latest developments including possibility that negotiations between the high commands in the field have been broken off. Bidault will also ask for news of prisoners.

3) Bidault will then take up the Eden questions and endeavor to ascertain whether agreement can be reached on (a) separate and rapid consideration of the problems of Cambodia and Laos, and (b) priority over political problems for a cessation of hostilities with appropriate guarantees and international supervision.

4) In the event that agreement is reached on the question of Laos and Cambodia, Bidault will suggest the constitution of a special committee to deal with the problems and to report back to the Conference (the Cambodians are insistent that separate committees be appointed for Cambodia and for Laos but are willing to defer taking their stand on this point until the principle of separate treatment for the two countries is accepted by the other side).

5) If the priority of working out a satisfactory cessation of hostilities is accepted, Bidault would plan to suggest (probably not today) that the military commands in the field, i.e., the Franco-Vietnamese command and the Vietminh command be asked to designate officers who would come to Geneva and would here endeavor to work out a detailed proposal for the regrouping of forces for submission to the Conference.

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Bonsal.

6) There was some discussion of a Vietnamese proposal that there should be requested a cessation by both sides of military operations of any importance during the current negotiations. It was agreed that this proposal presents many difficulties and should not be made without a great deal of careful further study.

---

396.1 GE/5-1754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 17, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 232. Repeated information London 172, Paris 280, Moscow 73, Saigon 84. S/S-R pass Defense and CIA. Reference Secto 212,<sup>1</sup> we believe Molotov's speech most significant Communist pronouncement thus far in conference. Whatever may lie behind speech in terms Moscow-Peking relations, speech itself represents Moscow decision take open initiative re Indochina question along following lines:

1. After presenting what they may feel is strong case from Communist viewpoint re "just" character Ho Chi Minh was against legitimate authorities Indochina, Soviets have through Molotov issued warning against intervention in Indochina or continuing US efforts to organize collective security front SEA. Speech includes significant statement that "establishing new American military bases in this region . . . cannot be regarded indifferently by those states, the security of which is affected by plans to create the above-mentioned bloc" (reference is to "new military bloc" in SEA). No doubt one purpose this threat is to provoke US reaction to enable Communists better to determine our intentions.

2. Latter part Molotov's speech in marked contrast with foregoing and obviously intended represent constructive negotiating attitude re French proposal for guarantee by Geneva powers and British concept role for SOA Colombo powers.<sup>2</sup>

3. By threatening as to consequences of US intervention through "united action" and simultaneously holding out hopes regarding possible modification of Communist demands re Indochina Molotov is treating French and British to familiar Soviet carrot and whip technique. Message intended is that if they will disassociate themselves from US strength and leadership, they will find Soviets not unreasonable regarding their interests in Indochinese settlement. Worth noting that Molotov makes "full termination of movement into Indo-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 14, p. 795.

<sup>2</sup> SOA-South Asia. Powers included India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma.

china from outside of fresh troops and all types of arms and ammunition" a condition precedent to any settlement.

4. That Communists intend to play present military advantage in Indochina to full is clearly indicated in Molotov's statement to conference that "termination of hostilities in Indochina (cannot be transformed into shrewdly-arranged respite for one side which would like to use it to prepare for extension of war . . .". By coupling foregoing with statement that Geneva conference "must secure early cessation of hostilities and at same time reach such an agreement as will . . . satisfy legitimate demands of peoples of Indochina," Molotov also makes clear that Communist price for settlement is political turnover to Ho Chi Minh, however fancy may be the window-dressing in terms of French "honor" or prestige.

5. Boiled down practical aspects Molotov's speech looks like warning to west that if it wishes Indochinese settlement it had better set aside thoughts their direct military intervention Indochina or regional collective security moves SEA. Molotov by linking such threats with apparent parallel disposition toward negotiations hopes to exploit development negotiations so that latter may act as brake against US efforts organize collective security SEA. By combining this diplomatic tactic with full exploitation military possibilities Indochina Communists believe they can thwart our defensive efforts since it will be most difficult for us to build collective security enterprise around atmosphere of defeat.

6. Great danger for us is that if present situation continues to deteriorate Soviets, though still adhering to fundamental policy of avoiding risk global war, may now be so encouraged by what they believe to be weakness our local position SEA that they will take or permit steps necessitating counteraction on our part at later more unfavorable time from our viewpoint.

7. Communists may estimate that given present British and French attitudes and our present concentration on what at best will be long drawn-out effort to set up SEA collective security system, they now have excellent opportunity gain control Indochina and perhaps other SEA areas without undue risk.

It follows from foregoing that our willingness take concrete steps retrieve Indochinese position itself, expressed primarily through deeds rather than words, would have salutary effect in bringing Communists to their senses. Appreciate that strong US position might be viewed in some non-Communist Asian quarters as having "colonial" or "imperialistic" implication. This could be counterbalanced in part by our assuming favorable position re participation Colombo Government in machinery for Indochinese settlement.

396.1 GE/5-1754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 17, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 234. Repeated information priority Paris 281, Saigon 85. With Heath saw Bao Dai at Evian yesterday.<sup>1</sup>

I expressed our view regarding the advisability of associating the UN with the Indochina conflict, and told him of my talks with Bidault and Prince Wan. He seemed in accord with the idea, but made no definite expression of approval, apparently desiring to discuss the matter with his ministers and also to ascertain that this proposal would not cross wires with the French.

Bao Dai agreed with me that Bidault was making a courageous stand to prevent a Communist take-over of Indochina, but Bao Dai pointed out that the chances of survival of the present government, with a majority of only two in the vote of confidence, were not brilliant. In these days of critical uncertainty whether France was going to stand by Vietnam in the fight or walk out, he felt it was necessary to remain near Geneva and Paris. He had been disappointed with the reaction to the fall of Dien Bien Phu. He had thought that in France, a great military nation, or at least a nation with a great military tradition, the reaction would be one of increased determination and effort to turn the tide. That reaction had not appeared and the chief concern seemed to be to place the blame on some one.

He still hoped, however, that France would see that her true interest was in fighting loyally alongside the Vietnamese Army in the great task of preventing a Communist take-over of all Indochina.

He was alarmed over the French proposals for termination of hostilities and was determined that if the French insisted on an armistice that it should not bind the Vietnamese Army, which was willing to fight on to the end, even if the struggle looked like a suicidal one. He was confident of the loyalty of the army and he had recently received a large number of telegrams, including one from Bishop Le Huu Thi, assuring him the senders were ready to fight on whatever the French did. In this situation, he intended in the next few days to ask the Lanier Government whether the French were determined to make peace and withdraw or whether they would fight on with the Vietnamese Army. He did not want to do anything to increase French political difficulties at this time, but he was sure that the government would understand the necessity of his putting the question bluntly and without delay.

---

<sup>1</sup> May 16.

To my inquiry as to reports political deterioration in Vietnam, he replied that there was some deterioration but no political disintegration. This deterioration was in part due to uncertainty as to the French attitude. It was natural that many individuals and groups should seek to find new positions in case the French withdrew. Such political difficulties were confined to the south. The north was united and determined to resist, because it was close to the war and knew the danger of communism. The difficulties of the south were also caused in part by intrigues of low level French officials and interests who were backing certain Vietnamese individuals and groups. He had no complaints to make of high level French conduct and policy.

To my inquiry as to reported friction between Defense Minister Quat and General Hinh, Bao Dai replied that friction between military commanders and defense ministers occurred in many countries. The situation I had referred to was not serious and this friction would disappear before the great defense task confronting Vietnam.

Bidault had expressed concern over the absence of Prime Minister Buu Loc from Vietnam in the moment of political deterioration. Bao Dai avoided answering my question whether he intended sending Buu Loc back at this juncture.

He went on to say that among the fence-sitters who in these last days had expressed allegiance to him, he had received a message from Ngo Dinh Diem, a leading Catholic lay figure and "fence-sitter" offering to return to Vietnam and serve Bao Dai to whom in the past he has been hostile.

Bao Dai said he had therefore appointed Ngo Dinh Diem's brother Luyen, as his personal observer at the conference and if I wished to communicate with or receive information from Bao Dai I need only to call on the latter.

Bao Dai said that a former minister of his, present in Geneva, had received a request for an interview from Phan Anh, Dong's principal assistant at the conference. Bao Dai told him by all means to see Anh. Bao Dai said it was possible that Anh and others in the Viet Minh delegation really wanted to get in touch with him and possibly rally to his side, but on the other hand he had to be on guard lest this were a Viet Minh maneuver. He could not understand why the Viet Minh delegation included such non-Communists as Anh and Buu. Bao Dai had gone to school with both of them and both had formerly held Cabinet posts under him.

Bao Dai expressed no opinion as to Navarre's competency, merely saying that he had been most correct in his relations with the Vietnamese Government and had obviously done his best to build up the



Vietnamese National Army. Bao Dai did, however, criticize the manner of using the Vietnamese National Army by the French High Command. He said that the Vietnamese training schools would "manufacture" a battalion which would forthwith be swallowed up in the French Expeditionary Force. Often times the Vietnamese Minister did not know where a given Vietnamese battalion was. He said that there should be found means of maintaining some degree of separateness and control for the Vietnamese units and the Vietnamese National Army must be given more responsibilities.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-1754 : Telegram

*First Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 17, 3 p. m.:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, May 17, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 240. Repeated information Paris 288, London 177, Saigon 86, Tokyo 68, Moscow 74. Department pass Defense, Tokyo pass CINCFE. At first restricted Indochina meeting today after discussion of Dien Bien Phu wounded,<sup>2</sup> Bidault as first speaker stated that although he had answered Eden's five questions,<sup>3</sup> he thought they should be clarified and supplemented. He proposed (1) that if there were agreement with the French position that Laos and Cambodia should be dealt with separately, there should be appointed an *ad hoc* committee for this purpose, and (2) that if there were agreement with respect to Vietnam on relative priority of the military over the political aspect of the problem and necessity for immediate cessation of hostilities, that the commanders-in-chief should send representatives to Geneva to study technical aspects of termination of hostilities and put forward their recommendations to conference.

Molotov said there were two proposals before conference, one French<sup>4</sup> and the other Viet Minh.<sup>5</sup> He said that Soviet delegation attached great importance to both military and political aspects of question, believing them closely linked but since military aspect was dealt with in both draft proposals whereas only one dealt with politi-

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/1) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 278. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 6:15 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 101-105.

<sup>2</sup> Discussion described in telegram Secto 241, May 17, *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> Reported in telegram Secto 183, May 12, p. 776.

<sup>4</sup> Reported in telegram Secto 143, as modified by Secto 152, May 8, p. 730.

<sup>5</sup> Reported in telegram Secto 162, May 10, p. 753.

cal, he would suggest that military questions be taken up first. After that one could go on to consider political matters. He suggested that conference (1) consider point by point the proposals in French and Viet Minh drafts, (2) since there were military provisions in both drafts, begin by considering those military provisions, and (3) while doing this, also consider the relevant questions advanced by Eden and at same time recall proposal made by Soviet delegation.

Laotian delegate then spoke of Eden's questions, all of which he answered in the affirmative and stressed importance of treating Laos and Cambodia separately by working sub-committee and achieving cease-fire as soon as possible.

Eden opined that there was not too much dissimilarity between Bidault's second question and Molotov's proposal. What was outstanding was question of how to deal with Laos and Cambodia. General Smith then suggested that Molotov amend his proposal so as to accept Bidault's wish for establishment of working sub-committee to deal with Laos and Cambodia and made statement supporting separate and early consideration of problem of these countries pointing out relative simplicity and ease with which Geneva conference could make solid step toward restoring peace to Indochina by its resolution.

After Chou had supported Molotov's proposal on procedure Molotov suggested that if conference accepted his proposal to use French and Viet Minh drafts as basis for discussion, this could be with understanding that substantive discussion would begin with question as to whether Laos and Cambodia should be dealt with separately. Vietnam delegate supported separate treatment for Laos and Cambodia and reminded conference that his delegation had also tabled proposal on Vietnam which it would expect to have considered as well.<sup>6</sup>

Viet Minh delegate in lengthy and somewhat confused statement eventually supported Molotov's proposal on procedure but ended with somewhat querulous assertion that they saw no real reason for considering Khmer and Pathet Lao first. After further clarification resulting in clear understanding that Molotov proposal on procedure did not exclude consideration of substantive proposals already tabled in addition to French and Viet Minh, his proposal was accepted.

It was agreed to postpone substantive discussion to next meeting, tomorrow afternoon at 3:00 p. m. text of routine communiqué to be issued by delegations individually was agreed on. Eden reminded delegations they were not to exceed its terms.

SMITH

---

<sup>6</sup> Reported in telegram Secto 190, May 12, p. 783.

396.1 GE/5-1754: Telegram

*First Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 17, 3 p. m.:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, May 17, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 241. Repeated information Paris 289, London 178, Saigon 87, Tokyo 69, Moscow 75. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. At restricted meeting Indochina conference this afternoon, Bidault raised question evacuation DBP wounded. After referring letters exchanged between delegations here, he stated his information now indicates (a) no Vietnamese wounded scheduled for evacuation thus violating principle of nondiscrimination, and (b) that Viet Minh Command has raised unacceptable conditions not mentioned Geneva, i.e., requirement that route 41 be not bombed during evacuation. Bidault said French Government ready evacuate Viet Minh wounded by air to any point designated by Viet Minh Command in number equal to wounded our side evacuated from Dien Bien Phu.

DRV delegate reiterated acceptance principle nondiscrimination but stated number Vietnamese wounded very low because "French command concentrated at Dien Bien Phu best troops of Expeditionary Corps," adding that original garrison had consisted of only 1/8th Vietnamese and many of these surrendered wholesale abandoning French during fight. He said there had been agreement in field that wounded would be free in three groups with 753 in first two groups and number of third group to be decided later by DRV, that evacuations would be at rate of 80-100 per day and that French were to suspend air action over certain ones during period of evacuation. He pointed out that while Franco-Vietnamese wounded evacuated by air, Viet Minh must have use roads. He said Cogny in radio broadcast midnight May 13 had agreed suspend air activity over an area 10 kilometers around Dien Bien Phu and on route 41 between Sonla and Dien Bien Phu.

Molotov supported DRV statement adding that contact between interested delegations in Geneva might be maintained while details worked out in field.

USDel received message monitored over DRV radio to effect only French, Africans and Foreign Legion would be evacuated and suggested possibility of misunderstanding. He also stated rate of 80-100 wounded per day suggested by DRV seemed very low.

Bidault indicated alleged agreement described by DRV delegate was not between soldiers but between doctors. He stressed principles

---

<sup>1</sup>A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/1) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 278.

of nondiscrimination and of avoidance of injecting strategic considerations into humanitarian matter.

CPR delegate supported DRV. Vietnamese delegate took sharp issue with DRV allegations re small number and/or conduct of Vietnamese troops at DBP.

Eden recorded agreement on nondiscrimination principle, on desirability that evacuation proceed rapidly and that contacts in field be supplemented by contacts in Geneva.

At intermission Chauvel told us Bidault did not feel discussion had been productive.

Later in meeting Bidault reverted this topic asking DRV delegate designate representative with whom French might pursue problem. Molotov then rather pointedly and looking at Dong expressed understanding of Soviet delegate that both parties would do everything to facilitate contacts both in field and in Geneva to which Dong nodded agreement.

SMITH

---

*Editorial Note*

On May 17 Prime Minister Winston Churchill made the following statement in Parliament on the proposed security pact for Southeast Asia.

"I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman and other hon. Members for postponing these Questions until now.

"The Geneva Conference is now entering on its fourth week. The immediate object of the discussions about Indo-China is to bring the fighting to an end on terms acceptable to both sides. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary is doing all in his power to help in finding an agreed basis for this, and I am sure the House would not wish that anything should be said which might make his task more difficult. Moreover, the situation is in constant flux. As those who have put these Questions on the Paper have no doubt seen for themselves, it has undergone changes even since last Thursday. I certainly feel sympathy with the desire of many Members of the House to discuss more fully than is possible at Question time the whole foreign situation in all its bearings, but I cannot yet fix a suitable occasion. It certainly would be a great advantage—I think we should all agree to this—if the Foreign Secretary himself were present to give his own account of the events which have taken place and set his own proportion upon them.

"All I will therefore say today is that until the outcome of the Conference is known, final decisions cannot be taken regarding the establishment of a collective defence in South-East Asia and the Western Pacific. Meanwhile it will be clear from the statements already made

that Her Majesty's Government have not embarked on any negotiation involving commitments.

"These problems of future policy to which I have just referred are, of course, quite distinct from the question of the examinations undertaken without commitment by existing military agencies, to which my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State referred in reply to a Question on 10th of May. They are equally distinct from the conversations which, as reported in the Press, have been in progress during the past few days between the United States and French Governments about the situation in Indo-China.

"In our consideration of all these matters, we are maintaining the closest touch with the Governments of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, and also with the Government of Burma. All these Governments are being kept fully informed from day to day of the development of events at the Geneva Conference, since we fully realise that they will be closely affected by its outcome and may feel willing to make a contribution towards it. There is, of course, also very intimate consultation with the Governments of Canada, Australia and New Zealand through their Delegations at Geneva as well as through the usual channels of Commonwealth consultation.

"It should not, however, be thought that the terms of this statement cast any doubt upon our readiness to examine, when the outcome of the Geneva Conference is clearer, the possibility of establishing a system of collective security and defence in South-East Asia and the Western Pacific within the framework of the United Nations. We shall certainly do so. But our immediate task is to do everything we can to reach an agreed settlement at Geneva for the restoration of peace in Indo-China. Her Majesty's Government are resolved to do their utmost to achieve this aim and to exercise their influence to ensure that any acceptable settlement shall be backed by effective international guarantees." (*Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th Series*, volume 527, columns 1692-1693)

---

790.5/5-1754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 17, 1954—4 p. m.

Dulte 77. Repeated information Paris priority 283. Eyes only Ambassador. Reference: Tedul 67.<sup>1</sup> In reply to question whether subject Southeast Asia collective security measures should continue to be dealt with here between Eden and General Smith or in future be handled between Washington and London, Caccia said that from British point of view as long as Eden was here it would be better to carry on busi-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 14, p. 799.

ness in Geneva.<sup>2</sup> Other questions apart, Caccia felt that only outstanding problem regarding proposed military staff talks was development of terms of reference. He felt that Eden was now prepared to go along with Washington as site.

However with respect to subject in general, a new obstacle has been created by published reports of US-French talks on US participation in Indochina war. Before this report was published on Saturday Eden had been ready to agree to going ahead immediately with military staff talks but now felt he had to await outcome of US-French talks. Problem for him was that if French were to ask for US intervention on terms proposed it would not be possible for him to pretend that five-power military staff talks were "without commitment", for the US and France would in fact be planning on basis of very specific commitments. Caccia said that as far as British were concerned it remained essential that proposed five-power military talks be without commitment and that Eden be able so to report to Parliament.<sup>3</sup>

When it was pointed out to him that some time might elapse before French Government reached decision whether to request US intervention, Caccia seemed to reflect that this aspect had not been considered by Eden and he said that the latter would no doubt wish to give further thought to this aspect.

Caccia said Eden was disturbed by press reports indicating Department had put specific question re adherence to Southeast Asia pact to certain Colombo states including India and Burma and had got flat turndown. Eden was also concerned whether this reflected decision on our part not to follow agreed division of labor whereby British would deal with Colombo states and US with Thailand, Philippines, etc., on this subject. We are assuring British that there is no such intention on our part and that talks between Murphy and Ambassadors of Colombo states were of much more general character than that attributed to them by press.

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup>The Department of State in telegram Tedul 86, May 18, instructed Under Secretary Smith that "so long as Eden remains Geneva substantive negotiation with British regarding Southeast Asia collective security measures should be dealt with by you. Will of course be impossible avoid consultation from time to time with Makins here. On such talks we will keep you informed and in order to avoid any possibility crossed wires will look to you to report in detail developments on this subject at Geneva." (396.1 GE/5-1854) Under Secretary Smith replied in telegram Dulte 88, May 19, that "I shall of course report immediately any developments here on SEA collective security measures and will not take any steps without your instructions. I would hope that Makins could be kept currently informed by you of any developments here so that we may avoid any crossed wires." (396.1 GE/5-1954)

<sup>3</sup>The U.S. Delegation reported in telegram Dulte 78, May 17, that "Eden had made up his mind to go ahead with five-power military staff talks. He only wanted to await the result of questions in Parliament this afternoon on the basis of which he would then determine whether to take decision himself or whether it would be necessary to refer to Cabinet." (396.1 GE/5-1754)

396.1 GE/5-1754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1954—7:51 p. m.

Tosec 190. Limit distribution. Merchant today separately saw New Zealand, Australian and British Ambassadors at their request. Informed them he thought general agreement just about reached on holding five-power military staff talks which we desire held Washington without fanfare. Also indicated we intend continue parallel talks with broader group interested states, bilaterally if necessary, on question development regional security arrangements.

Also reviewed with each of them in general terms talks which have taken place with French.

Ambassadors in the main listened although Munro and Spender by referring to Webb's and Casey's statements gave impression they feel political talks should go forward as matter of urgency. Munro and Makins both also queried what French were doing on matter independence. Munro inquired if we had received any approach similar to French from Associated States. He also probed into question of what type of UN action US had in mind.

Makins indicated Eden keeping India, Pakistan and Ceylon informed closely re Geneva developments. He expressed the view that all three might come in with respect to a settlement provided settlement were guaranteed multilaterally by both sides. Makins added that in so far as he knew there had been no discussion or suggestion that Eden had in mind that these States would come into a collective security arrangement as members.<sup>2</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Raynor of EUR/BNA.

<sup>2</sup> Memoranda of conversation, May 17, are filed in 751G.00/5-1754.

790.5/5-1754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 17, 1954—10 p. m.

Dulte 79. Repeated information Paris 286, London 176. Paris eyes only Ambassador. London eyes only Ambassador. Re Dulte 77, repeated Paris 283.<sup>1</sup> Caccia has just informed us that Eden has gotten off telegram to London recommending approval of immediate start of five-power military staff talks. He has asked for reply by tomorrow and believes it will be favorable. His only reservation will be that

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 17, p. 835.

committee which is to start its work in Washington should have power to move to meeting place other than Washington if later developments would indicate such move desirable.

Re Dulte 76, (repeated Paris 282, London 173) Caccia reported subject had gone well in Parliament this afternoon.<sup>2</sup>

SMITH

<sup>2</sup> For summary of telegram Dulte 76, May 17, see footnote 2, p. 816.

MAY 18, 1954

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 285

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*

SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 18, 1954.

At this morning's meeting of Six it was agreed :

1. that Laotian and Cambodian delegates would carry the ball, with US, UK and France generally supporting their statements either directly after them or after Communist speeches in between.
2. that general line would be that while the Vietnamese problem was both military and political, the Cambodian and Laotian problems were purely military and simpler than the Vietnamese military problem.
3. that they would deny the existence of the phantom govts and maintain that if Vietminh forces left, problem would be solved.
4. Cambodia would be prepared to suggest international control over withdrawal of Vietminh forces and to prevent their reentry.
5. that nothing would be said about elections except as a retreat position, in which case both Laos and Cambodia would refer to their constitutional provisions concerning periodic elections.
6. when Communists raise question of withdrawal of French forces, Cambodians and Laotians will suggest they withdraw except as provided by respective treaties or to the extent the two countries request them to remain.
7. that if Communists attempted to pass to other questions without agreement being reached on separating Laotian-Cambodian questions, determined effort would be made to resist it. (West could call for Plenary session on this point. There would be no point in appointing sub-committees until agreement had been reached in principle.)

Eden would like to sum up discussion but Chauvel suggested he might do so better tomorrow when he is in chair.

Chauvel commented that at yesterday's meeting Molotov appeared to be seeking formula for separation Laotian-Cambodian cases, whereas Chou seemed cool and Dong opposed.

It was pointed out that Molotov might try to force discussion point by point on French and Vietminh proposals.



396.1 GE/5-1854 : Telegram

*Second Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 18, 3 p. m.:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, May 18, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 251. Repeated information Paris 294, London 184, Saigon 90, Tokyo 71, Moscow 76. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Re Secto 240 repeated Paris 288 London 177 Saigon 86 Tokyo 68 Moscow 74.<sup>2</sup> Restricted Indochina meeting May 18.

Molotov in chair referred to yesterday's agreement to take up today question of separate consideration for Laotian and Cambodian problems.

Laotian delegate referred to widespread support of government since dissident movement had declared itself satisfied and made peace with government in 1949. Laotian problem was simple one of Viet Minh invasion of small areas near frontier and withdrawal of invading forces was sole requirement. Elections scheduled for 1955 would enable population freely to express political preferences.

Cambodian said their problem was simple one of foreign invasion aided by handful of rebels. Invaders were aliens by race, religion and ideology. French troops had already been withdrawn.

Viet Minh delegate held war and peace indivisible in Indochina and problem could only be settled as a whole. People of all three countries were fighting against foreign intervention. Leaders of Khmer and Pathet Lao controlled vast territories, enjoyed support of population and represented will of millions of people. There were same military and political problems throughout Indochina and only solution would be simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina followed by political settlement which would provide unification. He flatly rejected separation of their problems.

Bidault spoke briefly to Dong's remarks and recalled Ho had sought to dissolve Indochina federation and achieve independence for each of three countries. Dong's attempt to speak for all three conformed neither to reality nor previous Viet Minh position.

Solution for Laotian and Cambodian problems lay in obtaining controlled withdrawal of Viet Minh forces. Viet Minh refusal to separate problems would delay work of conference.

Dong replied that by "unification" he meant unification of each country and that he had no desire to reestablish Indochina federation.

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/2) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 278. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 6:15 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 106-112.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 17, p. 831.

He spoke for governments of Khmer and Pathet Lao only because they had been excluded from conference.

Eden stated British Government considered Laotian and Cambodian problems basically different from that of Vietnam. British information was that both countries had only recently been invaded, that the areas occupied were small and adjacent to Vietnam border, that there were no pockets of resistance, that the peoples were fundamentally different, that in 1947 Laos and Cambodia had obtained democratic constitutions and had since held free elections. Dissident movements in both countries had dissolved themselves or surrendered. USSR, China and Viet Minh had not recognized phantom governments. UK would take serious view of any further aggression by any one against other country.

Smith cited practical reasons as well as those of logic and justice for separating problems and held failure to reach agreements on Laos and Cambodia would bode ill for success of conference. He cited recent dates they had been invaded, ethnic and religious differences, and popular support of Laotian and Cambodian Governments reflected through democratic processes. We could countenance no solution which would give recognition to small dissident groups which with outside assistance were threatening frontier areas.

Chou reiterated that war was between colonialism and forces seeking liberation and independence in all three countries. Foreign intervention began with French violation of its agreement with Ho Chi Minh. Problem Indochina must be settled as a whole by simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina.

Vietnamese delegate asked for agreement on separation of problems as test of sincerity in seeking restoration of peace.

Molotov stated conference was hearing only one side regarding conditions Cambodia and Laos. He recalled earlier proposal that representatives resistance governments be invited and said not too late to do so. He stated DRV representative in closest contact with conditions Pathet Lao and Khmer. Information made available by DRV demonstrates struggle for national independence carried on not only by people Vietnam but also in other two countries. CPR statement bears this out. France carries on colonial war throughout Indochina. Molotov rejected thesis external factors governing events in Cambodia and Laos. Such countries as CPR and India have refuted this thesis. Nehru speaks of independence struggle throughout Indochina. Other Asian countries do the same. Molotov also alluded to Secretary's May 7 statement which referred to Indochina as a whole and to alleged failure French to give real independence to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

According to Molotov, Secretary made no distinction between three states or between struggles for national independence going on in each. Molotov stated greater part Vietnamese territory under control DRV. Similarly in other two countries resistance governments control parts of territory. Soviet delegate therefore rejects separate approach for Cambodia and Laos. Such approach would also be contrary to Berlin communiqué which speaks of restoring peace in Indochina as a whole.

Cambodian delegate then briefly refuted DRV statements with particular reference to Son Ngoc Minh. Cambodian delegate stated this man represents nothing in Cambodia where unknown. He accused Viet Minh of imperialism and repeated thesis re absence indigenous Cambodian independence movement fighting royal government.

USDel then suggested adjournment in view lateness hour although indicating would wish to speak further this subject. There was some discussion as to whether Korea or Indochina should be conference topic tomorrow. Molotov indicated speakers inscribed for Korea. However USDel with strong support UKDel took view undesirable to top Indochina this stage and agreement finally reached for next Indochina restricted meeting tomorrow 3 p. m.

One sentence communiqué was agreed to as follows: "At restricted meeting of the 9 delegations on May 18, the consideration of the problem of restoring peace in Indochina was continued".

US and USSR delegates reiterated agreement to effect delegation press officers should not go beyond terms of communiqué in informing press regarding proceedings the restricted session.

SMITH

---

790.5/5-1854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 18, 1954—5 p. m.

Dulte 84. Repeated information Paris 293, London 182. Paris and London eyes only Ambassadors. Re Dulte 83.<sup>1</sup> Eden handed me following copy draft terms of reference for Five-Power military staff talks which he is submitting to London. I believe they are generally acceptable and would appreciate Department's views as soon as possible.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Smith reported in telegram Dulte 83, May 18, not printed, that Eden stated he had received authorization from London to go ahead with the five-power military talks. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 245)

<sup>2</sup> Department's and Joint Chiefs of Staff's views are contained in telegram Tedul 93, May 20, p. 858.

*Begin verbatim text.*

1. Venue—start in Washington, with the right to move elsewhere later, e.g. Singapore, if found advantageous.

2. Terms of reference—the Five-Power Staff Agency representatives will undertake military planning studies in order to recommend possible courses of action to enable an effective line of resistance to further Communist aggression or infiltration in Southeast Asia to be established. They would examine all possible courses of action in the light of the current situation and of the known capabilities of the anti-Communist countries concerned in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific.

3. Informing participating and non-participating powers.

(a) Participating powers.

Australia and New Zealand to be informed in Geneva by UK.  
France to be informed by US-UK in Geneva.

(b) Non-participating powers.

US Government to inform Siam and Philippines.  
HMG to inform Colombo powers and Canada.

Non-participating powers to be informed that the object of the exercise is “to examine without commitment the various contingencies with which we may be faced, including practical means of help for those nations of SEA who may call for it”. This was the wording used in the House of Commons, and we would prefer it to the wording proposed by Washington, which was “to explore means by which the Five Powers can assist the countries of Southeast Asia in a cooperative effort to defend themselves”.

*Comment:* I see no objection to British taking this line with Colombo powers, but believe we should feel free to inform Thailand and Philippines as we deem best. *End comment.*

4. Start of meetings—first meeting to be called by US military authorities in Washington through normal military channels.

5. Publicity—no public announcement at the beginning of the talks, and no information to be given to the press as the talks proceed. Questions to be answered on the lines already taken in the House of Commons (see above) if there is a leakage.

*End verbatim text.*<sup>3</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> The Secretary's Special Assistant, Roderic L. O'Connor, in a memorandum to MacArthur, May 19, indicated that the Secretary had read telegram Dulte 84 and had noticed that the concept of a cooperative effort had been left out of the proposed British text and felt strongly that this concept should be included in the statement. O'Connor said that the Secretary was also disturbed by the idea of an agreement with Eden on division of functions with the British talking exclusively to the Colombo powers. The Secretary wondered if “we had made any specific agreement with Eden which would exclude us from dealing directly with the Colombo powers if we so desired. I told him that I did not think there had been any very specific agreement at all but that I would check.” (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 289)

751G.00/5-1854

*Memorandum of Conversation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 18, 1954.

Participants: Ngo Dinh Luyen, Bao Dai's Personal Representative  
The Under Secretary  
Philip W. Bonsal

Subject: Alleged views of Bao Dai on Current Military and Political Situation in Vietnam

Mr. Ngo Dinh Luyen called at his request in his capacity as Bao Dai's personal representative in Geneva. He delivered a letter<sup>2</sup> from His Majesty to the Under Secretary and also showed his credentials.

Mr. Ngo Dinh Luyen set forth the following views alleged to be those of Bao Dai:

1) Some six years ago when Bao Dai returned to Viet-Nam with the French, he did so, not because the political solution then adopted seemed to him ideal, but because he wished to avoid a situation in which the fight in Viet-Nam would be purely one between colonialism on the one hand and Communism on the other. Bao Dai wished to make a place in the struggle for true Vietnamese Nationalism and to insure that Vietnamese national interests would win out in the end over those of both the Communists and the colonialists.

2) Bao Dai has been thwarted throughout by the French, and has been unable to follow truly national policies which would rally the people behind his government and army. According to Ngo Dinh Luyen, even the most recent treaties signed with the French are regarded by Bao Dai as merely further "pieces of paper" which can in practice be nullified by French actions and restrictions. As a result, the mass of the people in Viet-Nam consider that the Vietminh represent the "good cause".

3) On the military side, the French for a long time refused to create a Vietnamese National Army and when they did so, they did not provide this army with the necessary artillery, armored elements or aviation so that it could function as an autonomous force. The Vietnamese national army at the present time is merely a source of light

<sup>1</sup> Name of drafting officer not indicated; presumably it was Bonsal.

Summary of this conversation transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 261, May 20. The telegram contained the following comment: "Heath and Bonsal believe Luyen may be overstating Bao Dai's views, but that latter may indeed be considering Ngo Dinh Diem if assured US support. Recommend Paris contact Diem discreetly, now residing . . . [in Paris], in effort develop his views and degree to which Bao Dai-Diem reconciliation has progressed.

"As regards Luyen's claim that many members of Bao Dai's Government were imposed on him by the French, Heath doubts that Bao Dai said it and remarks that if he did say it, it is not true. If, however, Bao Dai considering getting rid of this government, this claim might be an excuse for such action to present to Vietnamese public opinion." (396.1 GE/5-2054)

<sup>2</sup> For text, see telegram Secto 265, May 20, p. 863.

infantry reinforcements which are fed into the battle as required by the French Command and are more often than not destroyed before they achieve any real combatworthiness. As a result Vietnamese military morale is low in contrast to the very high morale of the Vietminh armed forces.

4) Bao Dai recognizes that the presence of the French army is essential in Viet-Nam under present circumstances. Nevertheless, he believes that the presence of that army prevents the development of the national spirit which alone can truly vitalize the Vietnamese National Army. He believes that further French reinforcements, necessary as they may be to meet an immediate military emergency, will further destroy the military morale of the Vietnamese people and therefore further diminish the efficiency of the Vietnamese National Army.

After having set forth the above alleged factors in the situation at some length, Ngo Dinh Luyen stated that His Majesty was thinking seriously of adopting a new political program which would in effect rally behind him the true nationalist elements in Viet-Nam. Bao Dai is fully conscious of the need of insuring continued French support. He also realizes that the attitude of the US and of the UK toward the French must be a most prudent one and that we would not wish to bring any real pressure to bear on the French. Bao Dai wonders therefore whether he could count on our support for any radical political initiative which he might himself take and which would rally his people behind him although it might to some extent alienate the French. (It seems quite evident that to the extent that Ngo Dinh Luyen reflects Bao Dai's views, the latter is trying to find out whether the US is disposed to replace France in Indochina to an extent which would virtually free Bao Dai from the need for taking into account French views about the military and political requirements of the situation in Viet-Nam.)

General Smith commented briefly that in his opinion the French at the highest levels were sincere with regard to the independence of Viet-Nam. The General recognized that possibly some lower level officials, particularly in Indochina, might still harbor illusions based on a possible return to a vanished past. But he said he thought that the Vietnamese might well have confidence in Laniel and Bidault, adding that we should do everything possible to strengthen the hand of these courageous French political leaders. He advised that Bao Dai reserve his judgment as to the significance of the new treaties.

With regard to the Vietnamese army, General Smith agreed with much that Ngo Dinh Luyen had said. He recognized that the French had first delayed the fundamental decision to have a national army and had then failed to carry out that decision as energetically and rapidly as was desirable. He said that US influence had been constantly exerted in favor of the creation of a truly autonomous Vietnamese national

army. He described our experience in Korea. He said that, of course, seventeen months are ideally required before combatworthy troops can be created and that more time is needed to create the necessary cadres at all levels. General Smith told Ngo Dinh Luyen that he believed the French attitude regarding participation in the training of Vietnamese troops by the US was being currently modified.

General Smith concluded by saying that he had listened with attention to Mr. Ngo Dinh Luyen's exposition and that if later he had any specific suggestions of comments to make for transmittal to His Majesty, he would arrange to do so.

Ngo Dinh Luyen indicated to Mr. Bonsal that Bao Dai is contemplating the early dismissal of Buu Loc as Prime Minister. He gave the strong impression that, if Bao Dai were in fact free to choose, he would now call Ngo Dinh Diem to power. He intimated, however, that the French would oppose his brother's nomination because of Ngo Dinh Diem's well known independent policy and that Bao Dai believed this opposition would, under present circumstances be decisive.

Ngo Dinh Luyen took occasion to say that many members of the Bao Dai Cabinet have been imposed upon His Majesty by the French and are not persons in which His Majesty can have confidence. Thus, for example, Bao Dai does not feel able to communicate with General Smith through members of his government but is obliged to seek a personal, unofficial representative such as Ngo Dinh Luyen.

Ngo Dinh Luyen later set forth for Mr. Bonsal's benefit another idea with which His Majesty is toying. It is the neutralization of Vietnam with guarantees by the powers participating at the Geneva Conference. This would apparently involve a complete break with the French Union.

Mr. Ngo Dinh Luyen made the somewhat startling statement that one of the ways in which the French control Bao Dai's movements is by limiting his transfers of piastres into foreign exchange. Ngo Dinh Luyen said that Bao Dai could hardly afford to stay at hotels and was obliged to spend much time at his own villa at Cannes, where he has now gone. On the other hand, he stated that Buu Loc had recently been authorized to transfer ten million francs for travel expenses.

Mr. Bonsal endeavored to stress to Ngo Dinh Luyen that, in the present emergency, the proper course of action was not one of recrimination and consequent destruction of existing assets but rather one of united action in order to surmount the immediate crisis successfully. Unless that were done there would be nothing left to save. Mr. Bonsal stressed the hope that the elements which had remained apart from the situation would rally to the support of the government. (Ngo

Dinh Luyen has been away from his country for five years and his brother, Ngo Dinh Diem for about three.)

(The analysis of the above in which Ambassador Heath and Mr. Bonsal concur is that Ngo, while he is probably what he represents himself to be, has perhaps overstated Bao Dai's views on the situation. On the other hand, Bao Dai is probably seeking to reconcile to himself every possible element of strength. He is undoubtedly carrying on a political flirtation with Ngo Dinh Diem who does have a certain amount of support particularly in Vietnamese Catholic circles. He might well play the Ngo Dinh Diem card if he could be sure we would support him; otherwise not. Ngo Dinh Diem is a visionary, doctrinaire individual with a high reputation for integrity and patriotism. He might well refuse to take office except on terms which would alienate much French support and facilitate the task of those Frenchmen seeking an apparently honorable exit from the Indochina scene. On the other hand he would strengthen the Vietnamese government in local eyes if he were to take office. *It is recommended* that direct contact with Ngo Dinh Diem be established—he is now in Paris.)

---

751G.00/5-1854

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 18, 1954.

Subject: Indochina; Southeast Asia

Participants: Sir Roger Makins, Ambassador, British Embassy  
Mr. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, EUR  
Mr. Raynor, Director, BNA

Ambassador Makins called this afternoon at his request. Sir Roger said he wished to raise a few questions with respect to our discussions with the French for the purpose of clarification. His first question pertained to the level of continued French military effort and said he understood from Mr. Merchant that our condition was that the French should maintain the present level of their effort. From French sources the British had obtained the idea that we had indicated that the French must increase their effort proportionately to the effort made by others. Mr. Merchant replied that we had made no effort to arrive at any mathematical formula on this question but that the principle which we had put to the French was to the effect that any outside assistance from the United States or others must be additive to the general situation and not substitutive for the present French effort. The only basis Mr. Merchant could possibly have for the French mis-



understanding our position on this matter was the fact that we did continue to feel that the size of the native forces should be augmented.

Sir Roger's second point was to the effect that the French in Geneva had given British officials the impression that the current talks had devolved from U.S. rather than from French initiative as Mr. Merchant earlier told Sir Roger. Mr. Merchant reaffirmed that the present talks commenced as a result of French initiative in Paris last Tuesday or Wednesday. He said, of course, the French had known for some time we were willing to discuss this matter with them.

Sir Roger then inquired as to our present views with respect to possible UN action on a peace observation commission. Mr. Merchant indicated that we had not arrived at any final position but our present inclination was leaning in favor of this action being initiated by the Thais inasmuch as they were members of the UN and seriously considered taking this type of action late last summer.

Sir Roger then inquired if, on the question of conditions, it was correct to assume that the ball was now in the hands of the French in the sense that we were awaiting replies from them. Mr. Merchant said this was correct although he would not describe the matter as one of conditions. He said rather what we had put forward to the French was essential elements.

Sir Roger then said that he had been informed that Mr. Eden would be advising General Smith today that the British are agreeable to the holding of five-power military staff talks immediately in Washington with fairly broad terms of reference but without commitments. Mr. Merchant raised the question as to whether the French had been consulted on this matter and Sir Roger said he did not know. He did say that he thought Mr. Eden would advise the Colombo powers with regard to the holding of the five-power talks as soon as agreement is formally reached. He inquired what reactions we had as a result of our talks with the Colombo powers. Mr. Merchant replied he understood Mr. Murphy had only general talks with them.

Mr. Merchant then referred to Churchill's statement in Commons. Sir Roger said that the statement in his opinion had been very very carefully worded in an effort to keep the door open for possible group discussion of South Asian collective security arrangements at a time when the situation at Geneva became clearer. In Sir Roger's view the language clearly indicated that Churchill had not meant to imply that these talks must await the actual conclusion of the Geneva talks. Sir Roger added, however, that he thought it would be unwise to press Churchill on this at least for the next few days.

MAY 19, 1954

751G.00/5-1954

*Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(Bonsal) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*

TOP SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 19, 1954.

Subject: Further call of Bao Dai's personal representative, Mr. Ngo Dinh Luyen.

Mr. Ngo Dinh Luyen called on me this morning to say he had reported to Bao Dai on his interview with you yesterday.

According to Ngo Dinh Luyen, Bao Dai is most anxious to change the Vietnamese Government. He would bring in Ngo Dinh Diem as Prime Minister and replace most if not all present ministers. A new policy of independence based upon the creation of a real Vietnamese national army would be the program of the new government with which Bao Dai hopes to revitalize the Vietnamese struggle against Communism.

Bao Dai would like to know, however, to what extent he can count on US support. He would like to know whether, if the present Franco-Vietnamese military effort is insufficient to hold the Delta, the US would plan to intervene directly. He is also concerned lest the French Government, under the pressure of French political and public opinion, should decide to abandon the struggle. In that case, would the US intervene directly?

I replied that I saw no signs of a weakening of French determination to continue the fight. On the contrary, recent indications show a firming up of French determination. I said that I would convey Bao Dai's questions to you.

Bao Dai is also worried as to what the attitude of the Vietnamese Government should be in the event that the Geneva Conference shows signs of moving toward a situation which would in effect involve the abandonment of Viet-Nam to the Communists. Should the Vietnamese Delegation pull out? What is our advice?

Bao Dai is also interested in having US military assistance (MDAP) delivered directly to the Vietnamese national army or at least specifically earmarked for that army instead of being delivered as at present through the French. Bao Dai does not want to make a revolutionary change in present arrangements but would like to see our assistance specifically identified with Viet-Nam rather than with France. He would like your views on this point too.

In the event a new government under Ngo Dinh Diem takes over, its first act would be the creation of a new Vietnamese army. In this army, Bao Dai would hope to consolidate the present elements of the

Vietnamese army plus Vietnamese soldiers now serving with the French Expeditionary Corps plus all types of irregular and religious troops. He anticipates French opposition because according to him over half the French Union forces in Viet-Nam are Vietnamese and therefore those forces would be much weakened by Bao Dai's plan. Also, Bao Dai believes the French fear that a strong Vietnamese national army might make possible direct negotiations and agreement between Viet-Nam and the Vietminh. His Majesty, however, desires to create a fighting offensive-minded army. (I commented that such a plan while it might eventually help create a strong Vietnamese national army would in the mean time probably weaken the military potential of our side. In reply Ngo Dinh Luyen stated that it would be His Majesty's idea to proceed somewhat gradually.)

### *Recommendation*

I recommend that for the present you authorize me to tell Ngo Dinh Luyen that I have communicated the above to you,<sup>1</sup> that you are not prepared at once to reply to the questions raised by Bao Dai but that you have them under serious consideration.<sup>2</sup> I might add that it is your view that under present critical circumstances all positive elements on our side must be united and that consequently all important decisions should so far as possible represent agreement between all concerned.

<sup>1</sup> In a note of May 25 attached to the source text, Hennes informed Bonsal that "Regarding your attached memorandum, General Smith has approved your telling Ngo Dinh Luyen that you have communicated his report to General Smith. There is no reply, but General Smith may want to talk to Ngo Dinh Luyen at a later date."

<sup>2</sup> In a handwritten marginal notation, Walter S. Robertson wrote "I suggest elimination of this instruction" in reference to the following part of the sentence: "that you are not prepared at once to reply to the questions raised by Bao Dai but that you have them under serious consideration".

396.1 GE/5-1954 : Telegram

*Smith-Eden-Bidault Meeting, Geneva, May 19, Morning : The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 19, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 253. Repeated information Paris 296, London 185, Saigon 91. Discussed tactics for next few days with Bidault and Eden this morning. Since it appears undesirable to risk Korean plenary before Saturday<sup>1</sup> at earliest and since today's restricted Indochina meeting should exhaust discussion on separation Laos and Cambodia, I proposed plenary on Indochina tomorrow in order that six could make public

<sup>1</sup> May 22.

their position on separation. Eden would have preferred plenary on Korea tomorrow to hear Molotov and Pearson, who would like to speak before returning to Ottawa Friday,<sup>2</sup> but I explained we at long last may be near agreement on proposal by sixteen and that I could not accept responsibility should premature Korean plenary spoil this. Bidault referred to Molotov's apparent desire to stay off Indochina for 24 hours and felt that French opinion would require him to see whether this produced any more favorable Soviet attitude, although he personally was not optimistic. Case for separation of Laotian and Cambodian questions was sound logically but had little popular appeal. From his point of view tomorrow would be too soon to make public position of six. French opinion would feel inadequate effort had been made in restricted sessions before resorting to invective and would believe conference already failing. For this impression to be given so soon might well bring down French Government.

He proposed that today's meeting be held as scheduled, that there be no meeting tomorrow on either subject, that on Friday there be another restricted meeting on Indochina and that if Friday's meeting produced no progress, he would be ready for plenary on Indochina at any time. This was agreed and Eden subsequently obtained Molotov's concurrence.

It was expected that today's meeting would largely repeat yesterday's discussion, with Bidault expecting to say that while France insisted on separate consideration of Laos and Cambodia, it did not insist such discussion precede discussion on Vietnam. It would be necessary to see outcome of today's meeting before planning tactics for Friday.

I proposed that at some early date the six should make public an agreed statement on separation of Laos and Cambodia. Eden was unenthusiastic. Bidault felt statement should not be made until we had made further efforts in restricted session and that statement should not be limited solely to Laos and Cambodia. He thought early next week would be soon enough.

Incidentally he and Eden are scheduled to be in Paris on Saturday for celebration of entente cordiale but do not know yet whether they will go.

I raised question of Thai appeal,<sup>3</sup> mentioning desirability of having observation commission proceed first to Thailand and then Laos and Cambodia. Eden agreed it would be useful to have such commission there at least for fact-finding but wondered about juridical basis and

---

<sup>2</sup> May 21.

<sup>3</sup> For status of the Thai appeal, see telegram Tosec 203, May 19, *infra*.

timing. Bidault was bothered by length of time necessary to go through Security Council procedure to Assembly decision and possibility of Assembly speeches touching Morocco, et cetera. He hoped quicker and simpler procedure could be found and Chauvel was confident it could be done. He has asked UN Section Quai d'Orsay to suggest procedure and expects to have it during day. Eden again said he would need London's decision on political question of this magnitude. He agrees appointment of commission would be useful but fears its effect on course of conference here and public repercussions in Britain.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-1854 : Telegram

*The Department of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1954—12:36 p. m.

Tosec 203. Now that French, Cambodian, and Lao agreement obtained to principle of Thai appeal, (Secto 248 repeated Paris 290 Bangkok 6 London 180 Saigon 89<sup>2</sup>) we hope prompt reply will be forthcoming from Thai and British so that early action can be initiated in New York. Trust French agreement envisages prompt action. Geneva confirm.

Request Donovan discuss matter with Prime Minister.

In your further conversations following comments on points set forth Secto 227 (repeated Bangkok 4 Paris 277 London 170 Saigon 82 USUN by pouch)<sup>3</sup> may be helpful:

1. Re Wan's concern as to lack of current reason for request to UN, we doubt there could be serious question that sufficient reason presently exists. Vietminh invasion troops still on Lao and Cambodian territories. Threat to these states and Thailand increasing as result military developments. There can be no question condition international tension now exists which is sole prerequisite for POC observation under Uniting for Peace Resolution. Moreover if Vietminh should press Laos invasion it would be important have POC on spot in advance. Principal function POC to report on situations international tension prior to actual invasion.

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Stein of UNA/UNP. Sent to Bangkok as telegram 2277; repeated to USUN as telegram 565, to Paris as telegram 4140, to London as telegram 6175, and to Saigon as telegram 2343.

<sup>2</sup> The U.S. Delegation reported in telegram Secto 248, May 18, as follows: "Chauvel states French Government last night agreed to principle of Thai appeal [telegram Secto 227, May 16, p. 822]. Cambodia had previously expressed agreement and Laotians indicated they would agree provided French did." (396.1 GE/5-1854)

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 16, p. 822.

2. Re Wan's and Eden's comment on Cambodian appeal to UN this appeal addressed to Secretary General did not request UN action.<sup>4</sup> However it did reserve Cambodia's right request action under Charter Article 35. If Wan and others definitely prefer, Thailand, Cambodia and possibly also Laos could file joint request or simultaneous requests for Security Council action.

3. Re desirability separate problems Laos and Cambodia from Vietnam. When POC subcommission established request for observation could be made by Thailand, Laos and Cambodia only, deferring Vietnam request pending development Geneva negotiations. Thus at least initially situation in Vietnam would not be before UN for action. This would assist rather than hamper efforts separate Lao-Cambodian problem from Vietnam at Geneva as French desire.

If question of relationship POC to possible armistice machinery raised, you might point out:

(a) POC would operate at least in part for benefit Thailand which obviously not within area of armistice.

(b) Presence of POC in Laos and Cambodia would supplement armistice supervisory machinery since POC would report to UN on developments affecting tension in area including Communist attempts at subversion of armistice. Such reports could serve as basis for UN action. POC particularly useful if supervision of armistice should be entrusted to mixed commission or other non-UN body.

(c) Pending negotiations for and implementation of armistice, presence of POC might have some effect in discouraging Communist infiltration and subversion.

DULLES

---

<sup>4</sup>The U.S. Delegation reported in telegram Dulte 89, May 20, that "Eden is backtracking on UN and says decision must be by Cabinet and may take some time. Am sure we should go ahead full speed without them and that they will come along." (110.11 DU/5-2054)

---

110.11 DU/5-1954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 19, 1954—1 p. m.

Dulte 85. Re Dulte 83.<sup>1</sup> Following is summary of some recent British messages from capitals Colombo powers which Eden has made available to me and which he is also sending to Makins.

*Begin verbatim text:*

1. Ceylon: Ceylon Government are prepared to consider associating themselves with support for an Indochina settlement reached by all

---

<sup>1</sup>Telegram Dulte 83, May 18, not printed, reported that Eden had received authorization from London to go ahead with the five-power military talks. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 245)

parties concerned in the dispute, subject to scrutiny of terms of the settlement.

2. Pakistan: Pakistan Government are also ready to examine possibility of Pakistan's helping to guarantee any settlement of Indochina problem reached at Geneva, and supported by all powers participating in Geneva conference.

3. India:

(a) Responsible Indian officials have informally indicated that India might not only participate in a neutral supervisory commission in Indochina, but also send troops to help implement an agreed settlement.

(b) Indians are paying considerable attention to Burmese attitude towards Indochina problem and, primarily for this reason, are beginning to worry about dangers of Communist control in Indochina. Responsible Indian officials favor retention of French Forces in Indochina until local troops can be trained to take their place.

(c) A leading article in *Hindustan Times* welcomed Mr. Eden's five questions on Indochina at Geneva and declared that Colombo countries would do their utmost to see that this initiative succeeded.

4. Burma:

(a) Burmese attitude towards Indochina and general menace of international communism is rapidly becoming realistic, but Her Majesty's Ambassador considers any overemphasis on collective security for Southeast Asia as a purely military or strategic plan will tend to scare Burmese and hinder this desirable development.

(b) Acting Foreign Minister has informed us that Burmese Government will participate in a neutral supervisory commission in Indochina if invited, though Burma could not provide more than token forces.

*End verbatim text.*

SMITH

---

751G.00/5-1954: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 19, 1954—2 p. m.

Dulte 86. Repeated information Paris 295. Eyes only Ambassador Paris. Chauvel states privately Bidault somewhat concerned by fact he cannot be in on impending French-US talks in Paris and thinking of suggesting they be held here between him and me. Reminded Chauvel that military aspect of talks and other reasons made it desirable to have them in Paris and will talk with Bidault at early

opportunity to see how seriously he takes this. Ely-Trapnell talks I should not take place here. My own feeling is that talks should be held in Paris, with Bidault kept fully and currently informed through me, allowing him time to express his views before decisions are reached.<sup>2</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> For documentation on the talks held between Generals Ely and Trapnell, see volume XIII.

<sup>2</sup> The Department of State in telegram Tedul 97, May 20, replied as follows: "Concur your views Dulte 86 re location talks and your informing Bidault." (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 242)

---

396.1 GE/5-1954 : Telegram

*Third Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 19, 3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, May 19, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 259. Rptd info Paris 299, London 188, Saigon 93, Tokyo 75, Moscow 78. Dept pass Defense; Tokyo pass CINCFE. Re Secto 251 repeated Paris 294 London 184 Saigon 90 Tokyo 71 Moscow 76.<sup>2</sup> Restricted Indochina meeting May 19.

Eden in chair, US del first speaker. Referred to incorrect use by Molotov of Secretary's May 7 statement<sup>3</sup> pointing out that while Secretary drew distinction between sovereignty and independence of three Indochina states we do distinguish between these three sovereign states and so-called resistance governments Pathet Lao and Khmer and we also note difference in extent and source of aggression affecting three states themselves. US del described briefly fictitious character so-called resistance governments in both Khmer and Pathet Lao stating that in case of latter large numbers regular and irregular Viet Minh troops followed by Viet Minh political cadres have invaded country. US del pointed out that Viet Minh radio itself broadcast instructions for conduct Viet Minh "volunteers" in Laos during first invasion year ago. US del concluded with urgent appeal early consideration of proposal advanced by Laos, Cambodia and France, i.e., withdrawal Viet Minh troops from Laos and Cambodia.

Bidault then spoke briefly with regard Molotov's remarks yesterday denying Molotov's interpretation of Berlin communiqué.<sup>4</sup> He stated

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/3) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 278. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 6:30 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 113-121.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 18, p. 839.

<sup>3</sup> Reference to Secretary Dulles' address of May 7, p. 720.

<sup>4</sup> Made during the Second Restricted Session; see telegram Secto 251, May 18, p. 839.



war in Vietnam has recently overflowed into Laos and Cambodia as result invasion of those countries by foreign forces. Said latter two countries should be dealt with separately because simpler and can be handled more rapidly. Bidault stressed French not proposing priority for Laos and Cambodia over Vietnam but rather separate parallel and simultaneous procedures with Laos and Cambodia situation entrusted to subcommittee of conference. Viet Minh representative then made lengthy florid propaganda statement more suitable to plenary than to work session. He traced alleged national liberation movements in both countries from earliest days of French conquest last century. He then described condition surrounding "second French conquest" after 1954. He stated that in Cambodia resistance government controls large area not only along Vietnam border but in other parts of country and that same situation prevails Pathet Lao.

DRV del attempted to demonstrate undemocratic and fraudulent nature Cambodian and Laotian constitutions and elections. He referred to Franco-Laotian treaty of independence quoting obligation of Kingdom of Laos to join its resources with those of members of French Union for defense purposes, emphasizing coordinating function of French Government as proof hollow nature independence granted by France.

DRV del claimed that reality national liberation movements of three countries IC is why French authorities with expeditionary corps and so-called national armies amounting to over 1/2 million men had been unable conquer these movements. He attacked so-called national governments as former servants of French colonialism now in fact serving same interests and US interventionists after having collaborated with Japanese Fascism.

DRV del concluded problems of Vietnam, Pathet Lao and Khmer cannot be disassociated. DRV then proposed discussion proceed on basis point 8, and particularly point 8A, Viet Minh proposals<sup>5</sup> and points 1 and 5 French proposals.<sup>6</sup> (Point 8 Viet Minh proposals refers complete and simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina and points 1 and 5 French proposals are included in French section dealing only with Vietnam.)

Following the recess first Cambodian and Laotian dels in turn refuted convincingly and in detail the assertion of Dong. Both insisted on independent and national character of their governments and on the synthetic nature of so-called liberation governments. Both stressed

---

<sup>5</sup> Contained in telegram Secto 162, May 10, p. 753.

<sup>6</sup> Contained in telegram Secto 143, May 8, p. 730.

point that all that was required to re-establish peace in Cambodia and Laos was the withdrawal of the foreign Viet Minh invader.

Chou En-lai then spoke in support of Viet Minh. He agreed that there were three separate nations and three states but in all three a colonial war was raging caused by same source. It must be stopped throughout the three countries as asked for by Berlin communiqué. He could not agree with French del that decision to treat two separately would aid progress of conference. He tried to prove existence and importance of national liberation movements in each of three countries and concluded with assertion that if peace were to be restored in Indochina, it would have to be by simultaneous cease-fire throughout whole area.

Eden suggested no meeting tomorrow to see if private contacts could contribute to overcoming difficulty blocking progress.

Molotov said he was not asking decision but wished to express desire of Soviet del at next meeting to conduct point by point discussion of military aspects French and Viet Minh drafts.

Eden closed meeting with statement that all agreed there was no agreement what would be done at next meeting, Friday May 21.

*Comment:* Meeting made no progress whatever. Communists showed no signs of any willingness compromise. Viet Minh and Chinese Communist statements were propaganda harangues rather than type of discussion expected in restricted session. Communists appear confident and in no hurry get down to business. Difficult assess significance Dong's suggestion (supported by Molotov) to consider jointly military portion Viet Minh proposal (which is applicable whole area) and that portion French proposal dealing only with Vietnam and appeal this may have for French. *End comment.*

SMITH

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 242

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1954—4 p. m.

Tedul 88. For Under Secretary from Secretary. A news ticker report from London indicates British sources have informed the press there re agreement on five-power talks. In view of firm UK agreement set forth in Dulte 84<sup>2</sup> that there would be no publicity whatsoever and

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by O'Connor of S.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 18, p. 841.

no announcement to the press I find this development most disheartening. Unless you perceive objection, please mention this to Eden and tell him ticker report on information given out in London arrived at precise time that President was going over his proposal which specifically stated nothing would be said to press.

DULLES

MAY 20, 1954

396.1 GE/5-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 20, 1954—9 a. m.

Secto 260. Repeated information Saigon 94, Paris 300. Heath comments on Saigon's 2419, May 17,<sup>1</sup> to Department that the thought of deposing Bao Dai and establishing a regency council is not a new one and has been advanced by some Vietnamese and has received some consideration by the French. Heath observes that a regency might conceivably be a future solution but is very strongly of the opinion that it should not be talked about with the French or anybody else at this time. Principal Vietnamese support for such proposals in the past has come from certain southern Vietnamese who propose regent be the Empress who is a southerner. It's unlikely that the Empress or the Crown Prince would connive at deposing Bao Dai. A government headed by Tri and Premier Quat as proposed in reference telegram would be very unpalatable to the southern Vietnamese and Tri would be very unhappy heading a government in which Tam, whom he dislikes and distrusts, held the extremely important portfolio of the interior. The French would certainly not agree to such a proposal at the present time and without their consent, in view of the French armed forces in Saigon, the coup could hardly be pulled off. Bao Dai states that Ngo Dinh Diem has agreed to rally to him and this is confirmed by Diem's brother, whom Bao Dai has appointed as secret personal observer for the conference and a channel of secret communication, if need should arise, between himself and the American delegation.

In short, Heath feels we must, at least for the time being, bear with the Bao Dai solution.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> For text, see volume XIII.

790.5/5-1854 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1954—10:32 a. m.

Tedul 93. Under Secretary from Secretary rptd info and eyes only Ambs. JCS have submitted following comments on draft terms of reference for five-power military talks:

"1. The recommendations of the JCS on State Dulte 84 May 18, 1954<sup>2</sup> on above subject are as follows:

"a. Re para 1, meetings should be held and completed in Washington. JCS do not concur in British recommendation 'to move elsewhere later'.

"b. Re para 2, terms of reference should read as follows: 'Military representatives of participating powers (i.e., no reference to be made to a five-power staff agency) will meet in Washington and will undertake military planning studies, objective of which will be to examine, without commitment, security matters of mutual interest and to explore means by which military assistance could be rendered to countries of SEA which might request it.'

"c. Re subpara 3(A), US and UK should inform France, Australia, and New Zealand, simultaneously and jointly, in Geneva.

"d. Re subpara 3(B) US Govt should inform Japan, Republic of Korea, Nationalist Govt Republic of China, Thailand, and Philippines. UK may inform Colombo powers and Canada.

"e. Re unnumbered subpara following subpara 3(B), nonparticipating powers should be informed that purpose of exercise is 'to undertake military planning studies, objective of which will be to examine, without commitment, security matters of mutual interest and to explore means by which military assistance could be rendered to countries of SEA which might request it.'

"f. Re para 4, as to start of meetings, upon notification from Geneva of acceptance by France, Australia, and New Zealand, US military authorities would initiate call for first meeting.

"g. Re para 5, there should be no public announcement at beginning of talks and no information should be given to press as talks proceed. With reference to possibility of a leakage, in that eventuality appropriate quotations from terms of reference should be used in answering questions.

"2. Copy of this memorandum has been provided directly to Department of State in view of urgency this matter. For JCS: s/Arthur Radford, Chairman, JCS."

I discussed above with Admiral Radford this morning and send following comments (on numbered paras in JCS memo) for your guidance in further talks with Eden:

1.a. I explained to Radford that in our opinion any decision to move elsewhere would have to be concurred in unanimously by all

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4169 and to London as telegram 6209.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 841.

participants and is not subject to majority vote. This is our interpretation which you might confirm with Eden.

1.b. JCS attaches particular importance to this para dealing with terms of reference and we hope very much you can get Eden to accept.

1.c. Assume you can work out arrangements to inform France, Australia, and New Zealand simultaneously or jointly in Geneva of terms of reference when they have been agreed by US and UK.

1.d. We of course reserve right to inform other countries in general terms re exercise and would expect in fact to inform countries mentioned in JCS memo and possibly others.

1.e. Is designed to bring information to others in line with terms of reference proposed in 1b above.

1.f. Self-explanatory.

1.g. Has been somewhat overtaken by events as result of yesterday's leak in London.<sup>3</sup>

There is one point which has not been covered in Eden's memo which is, informing Associated States. We are going on assumption this is oversight since notification of these States we regard as essential. Suggest you seek Eden's agreement to their being informed. Assume this would be done by French and possibly yourself also as representative of host govt.

DULLES

---

<sup>3</sup> See telegram Tedul 88, May 19, p. 856.

---

396.1 GE/5-2054

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal)*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 20, 1954.

Participants: Ngo Dinh Luyen, Bao Dai's Personal Representative  
Philip W. Bonsal

Subject: Bao Dai's concern over the outcome of the Geneva Conference and his desire for direct US assistance for Viet-Nam

Mr. Ngo Dinh Luyen called at his request. After telling me that Bao Dai has almost decided to change his government, Mr. Ngo Dinh Luyen said that Bao Dai is somewhat worried about recent declarations by the President and the Secretary. Specifically, he would like to know whether the US is disposed to give assistance to Viet-Nam and in what form.

Bao Dai wonders whether help for the Vietnamese army could be immediate in view of the present situation. Although Bao Dai hopes that the Vietnamese army will be able to hold back the enemy, he would

like to know whether we have decided to give direct assistance if such assistance should be necessary. Bao Dai considers that the French military effort is becoming daily more insufficient.

According to Ngo Dinh Luyen, Bao Dai is very worried about the consequences of a take-over in the Delta by the Vietminh. The Delta is the great reservoir of recruits for the Vietnamese National Army and its loss would be a tremendous blow. Bao Dai would envisage direct US intervention if the French were to abandon the Delta.

I said that I saw no signs of a policy of abandonment of the Delta on the part of the French. In fact I had been much encouraged by the reaction to the admittedly serious military situation on the part of Bidault and of the French Government in general. Ngo Dinh Luyen replied that Bao Dai fears that French public opinion may force the French Government to adopt a policy of appeasement.

According to Ngo Dinh Luyen, Bao Dai thinks that the Geneva Conference will probably result in a Communist victory. He is considering the attitude which the Vietnamese Government should adopt in that eventuality. He is weighing in his mind the apparent divisions of opinion between Western powers. He is trying to determine the attitude which the Vietnamese Government should adopt in the event that the Conference in Geneva takes a position contrary to the basic position of the Vietnamese Government.

Ngo Dinh Luyen mentioned a telegram which Bao Dai had received from Governor Tri in which the situation in North Viet-Nam is described as "tragique".

In describing the new policy which Bao Dai would like to adopt, Ngo Dinh Luyen stated that His Majesty is anxious to take an entirely new political stand and at the same time create a real Vietnamese National Army. He has, however, not finally decided to proceed actively at this time and would only do so with US support. Ngo Dinh Luyen asked whether that support would be forthcoming. In reply Bonsal made the customary statement regarding our unwillingness to interfere in internal Vietnamese affairs.

Ngo Dinh Luyen then said that Bao Dai's thinking was along the lines of bringing Ngo Dinh Diem in as Prime Minister and making a complete change in the cabinet. Ngo Dinh Luyen took occasion to say that the French have always dominated His Majesty and that French influence has had the result that many of the men whom His Majesty has called in to serve the governments have, as a consequence of that service, seen their influence and prestige in Viet-Nam seriously diminished. Ngo Dinh Luyen stated that Bao Dai would welcome political suggestions from us.

Ngo Dinh Luyen stated that he had conveyed to Bao Dai the remarks made by General Smith to Ngo Dinh Luyen concerning the time which it takes to form truly combat worthy troops (17 months) as well as the longer period required to train really effective officers at field and general levels.<sup>1</sup> His Majesty's comment is that there are Vietnamese soldiers in the French Expeditionary Corps, in the national army and in various irregular paramilitary, and suppletif forces. It is His Majesty's intention to group all these forces in a new Vietnamese army. Bao Dai is aware that the French will oppose this move for two reasons. First, because they want to keep all French Union forces under their own control and over half of those forces are Vietnamese. (This is probably an exaggeration; the accurate proportion is perhaps 40%.) The second reason is that, according to His Majesty, the French fear a possible agreement between Viet-Nam and the Vietminh, an agreement which would be possible if the preponderance of forces on the Franco-Vietnamese side were to become that of the Vietnamese National Army controlled by the Vietnamese Government.

Bao Dai's general idea is to create a nucleus of combat-worthy troops which would largely be those taken from the present French Expeditionary Corps. His concept is that the army would be a highly mobile, aggressive, offensive-minded force. Ngo Dinh Luyen concluded this exposition of Bao Dai's alleged views by an appeal that we should understand His Majesty's position.

Bonsal asked whether the rather drastic measures proposed, while they might eventually result in the creation of a Vietnamese National Army along the lines envisaged by His Majesty, would not at least at first disorganize and weaken the major fighting units upon which the continuation of successful resistance to the Vietminh depends. In reply Ngo Dinh Luyen stated that of course His Majesty would envisage proceeding gradually and avoiding any such situation as that contemplated in Bonsal's question.

Bao Dai is anxious to obtain direct US assistance for the Vietnamese army. Ngo Dinh Luyen here was referring to MDAP assistance. Bao Dai's thought is that such assistance should come direct to the Vietnamese army instead of through the French authorities as at present or that, if this should prove impractical, there should at least be a specific earmarking of certain items of US assistance as being destined for the Vietnamese National Army. If such an arrangement could be made it should be supplemented by some sort of control machinery to see that earmarked items actually did get to the Vietnamese army.

---

<sup>1</sup> See memorandum of Smith-Ngo Dinh Luyen conversation, May 18, p. 843.

Luyen stressed that Bao Dai did not wish to introduce any revolutionary changes which might adversely affect the present combat situation even though theoretically such changes might be desirable.

In conclusion Bonsal told Ngo Dinh Luyen that he would convey the above to General Smith and would advise Ngo Dinh Luyen in the event the General wished to make any specific replies or comments at this time.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 257 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 20, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 263. Dept pass USUN. Substance Tosec 203<sup>1</sup> and Usun 745<sup>2</sup> to Dept discussed with Chauvel this morning:

1. He agrees quick action desirable and believes whatever Washington decides re timing should be controlling.

2. He concurs with Lodge Thailand case should go first to Security Council. He believes it should then go to Interim Committee rather than Assembly in interests of speed and avoiding possible complications in Assembly.

3. He believes appeal should be made at this time exclusively by Thailand. He concurs in Lodge's thinking and adds that for Asiatic state not participating in Indochina Conference to appeal to UN on grounds of tension in nearby areas would reinforce allied position at Conference and suggest externally successful settlement on Indochina unlikely at Geneva. For Laos and Cambodia to be associated with it at this time would carry connotation they and France had prematurely given up hope for successful conclusion at Geneva. He stated incidentally latest military information was that Vietminh were moving slowly towards Delta and not towards Laos.

He will consult Bidault on foregoing but is confident of his agreement.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 19, p. 851.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 745, May 19, from New York, not printed, contained USUN's comments on the question of Thailand's initiating a request for United Nations POC action for Indochina. (751G.00/5-1954)



396.1 GE/5-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 20, 1954—5 p. m.

Secto 265. Repeated information Paris 306, Saigon 97. Secto 261, repeated Paris 302, Saigon 95.<sup>1</sup> Following is translation letter to Under Secretary from Bao Dai presented by Ngo Dinh Luyen :

"Up to the present I have had neither the occasion nor the opportunity to break through the thick curtain of silence with which I have been constantly surrounded.

"The concurrence (*connivance*) of the cease-fire plans presented by France and the Viet Minh, both directed against the interests of Vietnam and the peace of the world, removes any scruple I might have had about making direct contact with peace-loving nations which are friendly to Vietnam.

"Mr. Ngo Dinh Luyen, in whom I place my entire confidence, is empowered by this letter to give and to receive in my name all information, all explanations, all proposals with regard to a concerted action looking toward, with a non-Communist Vietnam, consolidation of world peace, by diplomatic or any other means.

"I wish ardently that nations devoted to peace and liberty hear through my feeble voice this last call of the Vietnamese people for the solidarity of free peoples."

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Telegram Secto 261, May 20, contained report of conversation between Under Secretary Smith and Ngo Dinh Luyen on May 18. For memorandum of conversation, see p. 843.

396.1 GE/5-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 20, 1954—6 p. m.

Secto 267. Repeated information Paris 307, London 191, Saigon 98. Eden advised Bidault and me of his talks this morning with Chou along following lines :

Eden had argued case for separation of Laos and Cambodia. Chou had agreed that military and political aspects must be dealt with separately with priority for cease-fire. Cease-fire should take effect in all three States on same date. Political settlements might be different for three. Eden's advisers who had accompanied him felt that Chou wanted an early agreement for cease-fire. Chou had repeatedly stated that if no progress could be made on one line, another should be tried.

Bidault observed that situation with respect to cessation of hostilities was different in three countries. It could be brought about immediately in Cambodia and Laos where it was simply a problem of external forces, while some regrouping of forces would be essential

in Vietnam. Any extension of this regrouping concept to Laos and Cambodia (as distinct from withdrawal) would complicate their situation by establishing pockets. He did not wish to free conference, but if we abandoned principle of separation, even temporarily, we would not know when or on what level we would be able to take it up again. Laos and Cambodia had said this morning they would not go along if we abandoned separation.

I said I believed Communists desire to produce troop concentrations which they could point to as areas controlled by resistance movements. It would be difficult to determine whether such concentrations were natives or invaders and much would depend on composition and effectiveness of supervisory commission, which was matter of supreme importance. We must maintain our position regarding separate consideration Laos and Cambodia, but might explore Communist ideas regarding mechanism of an armistice.

Eden had said West denied so-called resistance movements in Laos and Cambodia had any existence whatever. Chou had said they might be minorities, but they existed and could not be swept out of countries.

French believed Viet Minh proposal (Secto 259, repeated information Paris 299, London 188, Saigon 93<sup>1</sup>) to discuss their point 8(a) and French points one and five, indicated possibility Communists might still agree to separation. I said we would fully reserve our position on separation, but having done so, would agree look at these specific points.

Eden subsequently told me that he had warned Chou again that Indochina situation was dangerous and might lead to unpredictable and serious results. Chou had said he was counting on Britain to prevent this happening. Eden had warned him not to do so, since even though Britain desired moderation, in event of showdown, she would stand with United States.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 19, p. 854.

---

396.1 GE/5-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 20, 1954—6 p. m.

Dulte 92. Eyes only for Secretary. Your Tedul 79.<sup>1</sup> It is difficult to estimate duration Geneva. Communists have not given an inch and

---

<sup>1</sup> In telegram Tedul 79, May 18, the Secretary asked Under Secretary Smith if he had "any estimate as to duration Geneva or at least duration of your tour of duty there?" (396.1 GE/5-1854)

I do not believe they will make any concessions. They have a big fish on the hook and intend to play it out. They must feel sure that one way or another they will get at maximum a major part or possibly all of Indochina, and at minimum a partition which would produce a Communist state comprising considerable part Vietnam with a slice of Laos and possibly even part of Cambodia. Believe they have decided to risk chance of our intervention, estimating that even if this occurs the result will be another, and for us a more expensive, Korea. They probably count on restraining influence of our allies to prevent us from extending war or striking directly at Communist China or even at the direct source of all the trouble. They must anticipate that the present French Government cannot long survive, and certainly cannot survive a complete impasse here, so it is to their interest to prolong this conference without making concessions. Churchill's statement that no commitments will be made till after Geneva should convince them that time is on their side. On Korea there is nothing whatever to be expected from them. Dean's latest message indicates that it will be impossible to produce proposals agreed to by all 16. Best we can hope to do is avoid open opposition by our side when Pyun produces his 14 points. Others of the 16 will possibly then present proposals of their own or speak in support of Eden's points. We will continue, and try to induce others to continue, to hammer as hard as possible on repudiation by all Communist delegations of authority and moral force of United Nations. World public opinion seems becoming conditioned to negative results. Unless something unexpected happens the Korea phase will drag along with an occasional plenary session while Indochina discussions go on.

How long the Indochina phase will continue depends on length of time French are able to sustain the pressure and British believe, either honestly or for political effect, that they can continue to play the role of mediator. Best hope seems to me to be injection of the United Nations factor. I suppose I must stay here as long as Molotov, Eden and Bidault remain, and apparently they have no immediate intention of leaving. Molotov obviously attaches real importance to this meeting. We will certainly go on for another two weeks at very minimum, and probably longer. Our only strength lies in what you are doing in Washington. Were it not for that, I would suggest that you give serious consideration to coming here when we approach the break-off. If Molotov and Eden leave, I will ask you to replace me. If the conference really gets into an Indochina settlement we could have another Panmunjom.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 242 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1954—6:26 p. m.

Tedul 95. Defense informs us that Gen Valluy called on Admiral Radford this morning saying French were much upset over news report from London published yesterday about forthcoming five power military talks.<sup>2</sup> General Valluy said French were completely uninformed about such talks.<sup>3</sup> Radford replied that we had had a preliminary exchange of views with UK but no final decisions had been reached and that obviously as soon as matter was a little more concrete it would of course be discussed with French.

General Valluy also commented that French would be unable to reach any final decision about possible five power military talks until after Ely's return to Paris from Indochina sometime next week.<sup>4</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by MacArthur. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4187 and to London as telegram 6223.

<sup>2</sup> See telegram Tedul 88, May 19, p. 856.

<sup>3</sup> The U.S. Delegation in telegram Dulte 94, May 21, informed the Department of State with reference to Tedul 95 that the delegation "assume[d] Defense has advised General Valluy French were advised here on May 15 of impending talks. Bidault may not have advised Paris or Paris not advised Valluy." (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 245)

<sup>4</sup> The Department of State in telegram Tedul 104, May 21, informed the U.S. Delegation that "Valluy informed Radford this morning that French agree to five-power military talks and indicated that Valluy will probably be French representative." (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 242)

---

396.1 GE/5-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 20, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 268. Repeated information Bangkok 8, Paris 309, Saigon 99, USUN/NY 1. Robertson, Phleger and Bonsal today discussed with Prince Wan question Thailand initiating United Nations POC action. Robertson gave Prince Wan gist of second paragraph Tosec 203<sup>1</sup> and read him Lodge's comments contained New York's 745 to Department, repeated information to Geneva as 2.<sup>2</sup> Robertson also made clear to Prince Wan that French Government now in full agreement this proposal.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 19, p. 851.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 862.

Prince Wan expressed agreement with procedure outlined reference telegram from Lodge. He is instructing Khoman to begin drawing up necessary communications and statements and to get in touch with Phleger and Henkin regarding them. He agrees that Security Council phase should involve Thailand along with support from Cambodia and Laos being introduced only at time of General Assembly consideration. If Department or USUN have further specific suggestions on drafting or procedure, please telegraph them here.

With regard to timing, Wan still has reservations. He would evidently prefer to await some specific military move upon which Thailand action would be based. We will continue to urge gravity of present situation upon him, desirability of having POC in place before grave emergency arises and evident intent of Viet Minh to dominate Cambodia and Laos at this time with obvious threat to Thailand.

Prince Wan particularly impressed by argument that United Nations has been excluded from Indochina situation and that Thailand initiative would be partial remedy.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/5-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 20, 1954—7 p. m.

Dulte 93. Repeated information Paris 208. Eyes only Ambassador. Reference Dulte 86, repeated information Paris 295.<sup>1</sup> While not happy about situation, Bidault agrees that for time being talks should continue in Paris on understanding he will be kept closely informed here. He was worried at receiving no news from Paris of talks in last few days, but felt better when I told him we had heard of none and were sure there had been none. He was concerned about intrigue there, while expressing complete confidence in integrity of Laniel and Maurice Schumann, he appears to feel that his political antennae are more sensitive than theirs. He mentioned one mechanical problem in that Margerie was only one in Quai d'Orsay at working level whom he trusted to backstop these conversations satisfactorily, but felt he could not spare him from Geneva. He believes that it should be fairly clear by end of next week whether there is any chance of doing any serious negotiating here and if prospect is then negative, he hopes to turn over to Schumann and return to Paris.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 19, p. 853.

790.5/5-2054 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1954—7:20 p. m.

Tedul 98. Limit distribution. We consider it necessary that we and British work as closely as possible and have as full an understanding as possible of each other's viewpoints and objectives with regard to Southeast Asian problems. This particularly important in view recent trend drifting apart from each other and resulting adverse effect Western unity. We hope that British now understand what we are doing in the talks with French at Paris. We are not so sure we have a full understanding of what Eden has in mind with regard to the Colombo powers. We do fully concur that he should, in the first instance, work with these powers and with Canada and have concurred specifically with his point on this in the terms of reference for the five power military staff talks. We do however believe that this point should not preclude us from talking with the representatives of these states here in Washington or at their capitals it being understood that we would take pains not to work at cross purposes with the British and would keep Eden fully informed.

We note (Dulte 66<sup>2</sup>) that British concur in our concept of parallel lines of development, one with regard to military staff talks and other with regard collective grouping in Southeast Asia. We would like fullest information obtainable regarding Eden's views on the latter. You should express our great concern that if we were to await final outcome of Geneva before doing anything further with respect to Southeast Asia we would be playing into hands Communists who can stall at Geneva while pressing military situation in Indochina to point where Associated States may be beyond saving and it would be too late enlist active cooperation other states in area or draw anything like an effective or satisfactory line to be held at all costs. Consequently we believe that prior outcome Geneva we must, in addition to having military talks, get UN POC into area soonest, clarify possibilities of military participation of US and others within Indochina itself and continue preparations for collective efforts even though precise stand to be taken by collective group cannot yet be determined in light uncertainties (1) military-political developments within Viet Nam (2) French position (3) prospects for armistice at Geneva. We also hope that our talks with French in Paris may help to bolster

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Fisher of EUR/WE. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4188 and to London as telegram 6227.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 13, p. 791.

French at Geneva and to give Communists cause for concern that might help achievement more acceptable armistice.

We plan talk to Makins here soonest along foregoing lines.

DULLES

110.11 DU/5-2054 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 20, 1954—7:50 p. m.

Tedul 99. Personal for Under Secretary from Secretary. Have just read full text of Churchill's statement May 17, relevant portion of which is quoted in today's *New York Times*.<sup>2</sup> It is noteworthy that Churchill's statement involves a substantial repudiation Dulles-Eden joint statement of April 13 which had previously personally been approved by Churchill.<sup>3</sup> Last paragraph of Churchill's present statement is a paraphrase of our April 13 statement with following essential changes:

1. April 13 statement was one of present readiness to examine. Churchill's statement expresses readiness to examine "when the outcome of the Geneva Conference is clear."

2. April 13 statement speaks of readiness to examine "with the other countries principally concerned". This important statement is omitted.

3. April 13 statement spoke of "establishing a collective defense". Churchill's statement says "establishing a system of collective security and defense". The word "system" was proposed by Eden at the dinner with Churchill and after discussion it was omitted from our agreement because the urgency of the situation was such that the need was for "defense" and not for a "system" which would be a matter of long negotiation and ratification.

Officially-inspired statements from London represent this statement of Churchill's as an amplification and confirmation of April 13 agreement and say that US Government has not asked the British Cabinet to go beyond what Churchill pledged last Monday.<sup>4</sup>

I wonder whether the British want us or expect us to remain silent and uncommunicative to the press here while they misrepresent our position and attempt to conceal their repudiation of our April 13 agreement. I do not want to make your task more difficult but I do feel a certain righteous—I hope—indignation. What would you think of

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State.

<sup>2</sup> For text of Churchill's statement made in Parliament, May 17, see editorial note, p. 834.

<sup>3</sup> See extract of telegram 4523, from London, Apr. 13, p. 514.

<sup>4</sup> For British decisions on collective security in Southeast Asia and on holding five-power military talks, see telegrams Dulte 72, 77, 79, and 84, pp. 815, 835, 837, and 841, respectively.

asking Aldrich to inquire of the Foreign Office as to what interpretation US should put on Prime Minister's statement having regard to Dulles-Eden agreement of April 13?

DULLES

396.1 GE/5-1454 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, May 20, 1954—7:50 p. m.

Tosec 225. As requested Secto 206 repeated Saigon 70, Paris 263, Hanoi 2,<sup>2</sup> there follows text NIE 63-3-54: Probable Military and Political Developments in Indochina over the Next Thirty Days, which was approved by Intelligence Advisory Committee today.

*Begin text:*

*The Problem*

To estimate the probable military and political developments in Indochina over the next 30 days.

*Assumptions*

1. That no cease-fire agreement is reached at the Geneva Conference during the period of this estimate.

2. French policy with respect to Indochina will not undergo a radical change for the worse during the next thirty days.

*The Estimate*

*I. Military Developments*

1. The fall of Dien Bien Phu has not precipitated a collapse of the French and Vietnamese military position in Indochina, but it has had a significant impact upon the attitudes toward the war of all participants. From the Viet Minh viewpoint, the fall of Dien Bien Phu has created a climate of victory which offers possibilities for further advances. We believe that the Viet Minh will raise their present level of operations, seeking to reduce further the French and Vietnamese will to continue the war, to improve the Communist basis for bargaining at Geneva, to prevent major redeployments of French Union forces, to prepare for major campaigns and to exploit any opportunities for early victory. From the French Union viewpoint, the defeat at Dien Bien Phu has underscored the fact that the war cannot be won by French efforts alone. Accordingly, the main French effort appears at present to be directed toward maintaining and in any case preventing a collapse of the French Union military position before a cease-fire is negotiated at Geneva or the conflict is internationalized.

**A. Military Developments Within the Next Two Weeks**

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Trueheart of R. Repeated to Saigon as telegram 2365, to Paris as telegram 4190, and to Hanoi as telegram 650.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 14, p. 795.



2. Without redeployment of major units, the Viet Minh will have during the next two weeks the capability to increase the present level of their military operations throughout Indochina. In the Delta, the Viet Minh over the next two weeks will probably continue to mount attacks against French strong points and to cut temporarily the lines of communications between Hanoi and Haiphong. In addition, they will probably continue to augment their capabilities for sabotage and terrorist activities in Hanoi and Haiphong. However, while the scale of these activities will increase, they will probably not exercise these capabilities for sabotage and terrorism to the full during the next two weeks except in the event of large-scale military operations in the Delta. Outside the Delta, the Viet Minh will probably launch attacks in Central Vietnam, conduct raiding operations in Laos, and increase guerrilla operations in Cambodia.

3. We consider that, despite the defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the French Union forces still retain the will to defend key points. In the Delta, the French almost certainly will possess for at least the next two weeks the capability to hold major positions. They have redeployed one mobile group from Laos to the Delta, and they apparently intend to regroup forces already within the Delta even though this may require the abandonment of some outlying Delta strong points. Outside the Delta region, the French will probably have the capability to hold most positions during the next two weeks although they may abandon certain positions in order to concentrate their troops in critical areas elsewhere.

#### B. Military Developments Within the Next 30 Days

4. If major units now at Dien Bien Phu are redeployed as rapidly as possible, the Viet Minh can within the next 30 days attain a capability for launching a heavy assault against French positions in the Delta. Preparations are now being made for moving the bulk of the Viet Minh units from Dien Bien Phu toward their bases in the Delta area, and there are indications that redeployment has begun. We believe that approximately one division will remain initially in the vicinity of Dien Bien Phu. The major portion of the forces at Dien Bien Phu with their heavy equipment could not assemble in the Delta area before 7-15 June, although it is believed that their lightly equipped units could complete the movement by 31 May. However, the gradual increase in intensity of rains during the month of June, combined with French aerial attacks on Route 41, may slow down the movement.

5. In addition to the force at Dien Bien Phu, the concentration of 17 battalions at Thai Nguyen, a point approximately 35 miles north of Hanoi, may be used to augment the Viet Minh capability for major attacks against the Delta. This group, 13 of which are regional battalions, appears to be undergoing advanced training. It is unlikely that these troops will be independently committed in major attacks on Delta strong points during the next 30 days. However, they might be used to attack French static defense units or to fill out a major attacking force made up of units now at Dien Bien Phu.

6. If military considerations alone dictate, we estimate that the Viet Minh will not launch an all-out assault against the Delta during the next 30 days. The major factors militating against such an assault

are: the requirements for reorganization and recuperation of Dien Bien Phu main striking force, the limited period of time to prepare for major assaults against fortified positions, the possibilities of delay in movement of artillery units into position, the onset of the rainy season with resultant supply difficulties, and the flooding of areas within the Delta which restrict routes for troop movements and areas of maneuver. The most important deterrent, however, is the French strength in manpower, firepower, and airpower. However, the Viet Minh might undertake an assault on the Delta because of political requirements in relation to Geneva, or on the basis of their estimate that French Union forces had become demoralized and that Viet Minh capabilities for assault combined with sabotage, terrorism, and insurrection might prove decisive in the Delta. Barring a serious deterioration of the will to fight of the French Union forces as a result of political developments in Indochina or elsewhere, we believe that the French would be able to counter or blunt such an assault within the next 30 days.

7. On the other hand, we anticipate that, short of mounting an all-out assault on the Delta, the Viet Minh during the next 30 days will increase their present level of operations and will attack French strong points in the Delta and elsewhere. Although we consider it likely that the French will suffer some reverses from attacks on this scale, we believe that they will be able to retain possession of most of their key strong points throughout Indochina, and will be able to keep open the lines of communications between Hanoi and Haiphong except for frequent but temporary interruptions.

8. It is possible that defections by Vietnamese units will occur during the next 30 days and will thus reduce the capabilities of French Union forces. Some Vietnamese from militia units are believed to have defected recently to the Viet Minh with their arms. On the other hand, since the fall of Dien Bien Phu, French and Vietnamese units have been engaged with no indication of impaired morale or will to fight. We estimate that, unless the Vietnamese become convinced that the French intend to sell out in Indochina or unless the Viet Minh achieve substantial military successes, the fighting capabilities of the French Union forces during the next 30 days will not deteriorate so severely as to preclude their employment as an effective military force. There is always the possibility however that some spectacular Viet Minh success in the Delta would convince the native population and Vietnamese troops there that victory in the Delta was imminent, in which case an extremely rapid deterioration of the situation in North Vietnam would ensue.

## II. *Political Developments*

10. Barring the unlikely event of a large-scale Viet Minh invasion, or of a *coup d'état*, Laos and Cambodia will probably retain their present uncertain political stability during the next 30 days. The Laotian Government will almost certainly remain in power if the French continue to provide it with support. The Cambodian Government will probably retain control and will continue its efforts to solicit direct US aid.

11. Political stability in Vietnam will probably continue to deteriorate during this period. In the absence of both Bao Dai and Buu

Loc, factionalism has become extreme, and the Vietnamese central government is virtually paralyzed. It is possible that the Vietnam central government will disintegrate during the next 30 days. It is also possible that a coup may be attempted by General Hinh, who has obvious dictatorial ambitions. If the Vietnam central government should disintegrate, the French could almost certainly maintain civil control temporarily in the regions they occupy by working through Vietnamese regional governors and local officials. A large part of the Vietnamese troops in the French Union forces probably would continue at least temporarily to be responsive to the French High Command. Thus disintegration of the Vietnam central government, while it would complicate negotiations at Geneva, would almost certainly not cause an immediate collapse of French control in Indochina unless it were accompanied or preceded by a collapse of the French military position.

*End text.*

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/5-2054

*Bidault-Eden-Smith Meeting, Geneva, May 20, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 20, 1954—midnight.

Secto 271. Repeated information Paris 311, London 193, Saigon 101. Bidault, Eden and I this evening discussed tactics for tomorrow.

French outlined their thinking on discussion of Viet Minh Point 8 (a) and their Points 1 and 5.<sup>1</sup> Viet Minh proposal provided for cease-fire based on agreements concluded between French and each of three countries, with cease-fire simultaneous throughout Indochina and regrouping in all three countries. This obviously impossible for French since Associated States were its allies and armistice could only be between France and Associated States on one hand and Viet Minh on other. Nevertheless this provision might be utilized to set up two or three committees to study conditions for cessation of hostilities in three countries. This would have advantages of maintaining position on separation, permitting us to go ahead on Laos and Cambodia, exploring possibilities of general cessation of hostilities and, if Communists refused, putting them in unfavorable light. It would have disadvantage when coupled with Points 1 and 5 of French plan<sup>2</sup> of facilitating Viet Minh thesis re regrouping in Laos and Cambodia, of being distasteful to Associated States and, in event of cessation of hostilities, would make it more difficult to clean up South in event of armistice violations. It was unlikely Communists would agree to cease-

---

<sup>1</sup> For Viet Minh proposal, see telegram Secto 162, May 10, p. 753.

<sup>2</sup> For French proposal, see telegram Secto 143, May 8, p. 730.

fire in Laos and Cambodia on basis of troop withdrawal but West might propose progressive withdrawal.

Bidault was not optimistic about Associated States reaction to this gambit nor did he believe Communists would buy it. However, he felt he must push detailed analysis of Viet Minh proposal clear to bottom before drawing positive conclusions. He had no intention of accepting single military and political treatment for three countries.

I pointed out that Viet Minh proposal contained elements (8 b) such as prohibition on movement of troops or arms into Indochina which would destroy our position. We would comply while they would not. Any such agreement would be fatal unless there were really effective supervisory machinery. Bidault recognized impossibility of controlling Chinese frontier and Mekong.

It was agreed we would propose setting up three committees, one for each country, or two with Laos and Cambodia lumped in one. This would be discussed by 6 tomorrow and decision then made between two or three. I stressed importance of making very clear to Associated States that we were in no way receding from our stand on separation. If Associated States were in full agreement, France would propose setting up committees, otherwise either US or UK would do so. If Communists refused this, we would be prepared on Monday to begin discussion of military provisions of French and Viet Minh proposals with respect to Vietnam, reserving our position on others.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/5-2154 : Telegram

*Smith-Eden Meeting, Geneva, May 20, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 21, 1954—3 p. m.

Secto 275. Repeated information Paris 313, London 195, Saigon 103, Moscow 79. Limit distribution. Eden told me at dinner last night Molotov made "personal" observation could get ahead with work on Indochina by examining certain proposals (within framework of French and Viet Minh proposals<sup>1</sup>) for cessation of hostilities, which would in any event inevitably apply to all three Associated States. Molotov specifically mentioned the question of supervisory machinery and the segregation of opposing forces. Molotov suggested after this has been done, conference could examine application to each country of the general proposals. Over and above foregoing, political issues with respect to each country could be dealt with separately. Molotov said

---

<sup>1</sup> See footnotes 1 and 2, *supra*.

he did not know what Chinese would say to such proposition and was putting it forward only as his own personal idea.

Eden stated he made no commitment. He reported conversation to Bidault after returning from dinner last night. Neither Eden nor I yet have any information on Bidault's reactions.

Eden said that Molotov was in very relaxed mood. At opening of their conversation had referred to various press rumors on US-UK differences, stating he did not believe them. Eden said he replied that Molotov was right. Molotov then went on to state we should not imagine the Soviet Union does not have its differences with its allies and stated it would be wrong to believe that Soviet Union controls China.

Eden stated he had impression Molotov really wanted to "get moving" on Indochina. Said much easier to deal with him than Chou En-lai who was personally stiff and unresponsive, usually giving a cold exposition of China's position in response to Eden's attempts at fruitful discussion. Eden stated throughout evening Molotov refrained from any criticism US and again adverted to Secretary's departure from Geneva with some puzzlement. Eden said he referred to Secretary's statements at Berlin that he would be unable to spend any length of time in Geneva. Eden agreed with my observation that Molotov was probably worried over what the Secretary is doing back in Washington, and that this was a good thing.

SMITH

MAY 21, 1954

396.1 GE/5-2154 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT WASHINGTON, May 21, 1954—2:44 p. m.

Tosec 228. Urtel Secto 273.<sup>2</sup> Below is Thai draft letter to SC President containing Department modifications as given to Sarasin last June. No memo of transmission required for SC proceeding.

*Verbatim text:*

"I have the honor, under instructions from my Government and in conformity with Articles 34 and 35, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, to bring to the attention of the Security Council a situation which, in the view of my Government, represents not only a threat to the security of Thailand but is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security of the region.

Large-scale fighting has taken place in the immediate vicinity of Thai territory; there has been a clear possibility of direct incursions

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Stein of UNA/UNP. Repeated to USUN as telegram 574.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (396.1 GE/5-2154)

of foreign troops into its territory. This possibility continues to exist [despite the temporary recession of the direct threat of military incursions.]<sup>3</sup>

I have the honor to bring this situation of international tension to the attention of the Security Council to the end that the Security Council may provide for observation in the area under the Peace Observation Commission.

The Royal Thai Government makes this appeal to the Security Council not only as a firm supporter of the United Nations but as a power firmly determined to play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia.

Finally, I have the honor to request that you call a meeting of the Security Council to consider this matter and, as representative of Thailand, I may be invited, in conformity with Rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, to participate in the Council discussion of the question.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration."

Suggest bracketed portion of last sentence second paragraph be omitted.

Next following telegram contains text of draft resolution.

We are pouching you Thai text of Thai statement in SC and Department redraft thereof prepared last June. Believe this will need considerable reworking to bring it up to date. We are reviewing this text and will send you our comments.

Also pouching set of drafts outlining problems expected arise in SC and GA proceeding. These are working papers only and contain no firm positions.

DULLES

---

<sup>3</sup> Brackets in the source text.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 250 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL      NIACT      WASHINGTON, May 21, 1954—3 p. m.

Tosec 229. Urtel Secto 273.<sup>2</sup> Following is text draft resolution agreed between Thailand and Department last June :

*Verbatim text :*

"The Security Council, recalling General Assembly Resolution 337 (V) (uniting for peace), part A, section B establishing a peace observation commission which could observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension, the continuance

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated to USUN as telegram 575.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (396.1 GE/5-2154)

of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, finds that there exists in the general area of [and adjacent to]<sup>3</sup> Thailand [and Laos]<sup>3</sup> a condition of international tension the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security, requests the Peace Observation Commission to establish a subcommission composed of hiatus members, with its seat at the United Nations Headquarters, with authority:

(a) To despatch such observers as it may deem necessary to any part of the above area on the request of any state or states concerned, but only to the territory of states consenting thereto;

(b) To visit if it deems necessary, any area in which observation requested under sub-paragraph (a) is being conducted;

(c) To consider such data as may be submitted to it by its members or observers and to make such reports as it deems necessary to the Peace Observation Commission and the Security Council for the information of member states."

Suggests as minimum desirable changes:

(1) Omission bracketed words second paragraph. Words "and adjacent to" would foreclose possibility using POC in Vietnam if words "and Laos" are also omitted.

(2) Re paragraph three, Department has in mind subcommission of five (India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden and Uruguay) and believes it would be preferable name these states in resolution since if composition left to POC, there would be additional delay and greater risk appointment less desirable members.

DULLES

---

<sup>3</sup> Brackets in the source text.

---

396.1 GE/5-2154 : Telegram

*Fourth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 21, 3 p. m. :  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, May 21, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 279. Repeated information Paris 316, Tokyo 80, London 199, Moscow 80, Saigon 104. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Re Secto 259, repeated Paris 299, London 188, Saigon 93, Tokyo 75, Moscow 78.<sup>2</sup> Restricted Indochina meeting May 21, 3-7:15 p. m.

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/4) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 278. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 7:15 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 122-130.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 19, p. 854.

Molotov in chair referred to "wish" expressed May 19 by Soviet delegation that discussion of paragraph 1 of French proposal and paragraph 8-a/of DRV proposal be initiated.<sup>3</sup>

Bidault recalled that French proposal dealt only with Vietnam while DRV proposal covered all three countries. He accepted principle of examination of all current proposals including Vietnamese, Cambodian and others. He noted that DRV and USSR have apparently accepted the principle that priority be given to military questions, but that they object to separate treatment of Cambodia and Laos on one hand and Vietnam on other. While French delegate agrees object of present exercise is peace in all three states, French delegate never had in mind priority for one over other and agrees must be guarantees and controls international character to cover cease-fire in all three states. Nevertheless fact that conditions in Laos and Cambodia are different from those in Vietnam must be taken into account.

DRV delegate stated that differences in three states were of degree but not of kind and rejected idea of disassociating Cambodia and Laos from Vietnam.

Cambodian delegate reiterated view that Cambodia was special case to be considered separately and on priority basis. Suggested however possibility discussion of Vietnam and then of Cambodia and Laos in alternate sessions. Laotian delegate spoke to same effect.

Chou En-lai spoke in favor of Molotov's proposal on basis objective was working out of cease-fire throughout Indochina.

US delegate, making clear that he was not commenting on substance of proposals pointed out French proposals deal only with Vietnam which is principal problem. If way can be found of solving it we will have less trouble with others. He suggested application to Vietnam of French and Viet Minh paragraphs be discussed. US delegate maintained the view that Laos and Cambodia present a different and simpler problem from Vietnam.

Eden agreed with US and Cambodian proposal suggesting discuss application Vietnam one day and then next day application to Cambodia and Laos. He reserved position regarding details of proposals (as had US delegate).

Molotov then recalled that though some delegations had wished to start discussion political problems, compromise had been reached on suggestion of French delegate that military problems be discussed first. French and Viet Minh proposals accepted as basis for discussion. He said paragraph 5 of French proposal to be discussed in addition to one so as to match paragraph 8-a of Viet Minh proposal. Molotov

---

<sup>3</sup> For the Viet Minh and French proposals, see telegrams Secto 143, May 8, and Secto 162, May 10, pp. 730 and 753, respectively.



suggested that these paragraphs be discussed from the point of view first of finding what provisions would be applicable to all of Indochina. Conference would proceed to discuss questions peculiar to different parts of the area.

DRV delegate supported Soviets proposal stating that before going into problems of Vietnam, Khmer and Pathet-Lao it would be well to establish certain general principles applicable to whole area.

Bidault said he did not think any general rules could be worked out which would be applicable to these special and particular situations. He felt that if special character was not established no results would be achieved.

US delegate then said that although US delegation believes relatively simple problem of Laos and Cambodia should be handled separately, US delegation willing to discuss application French and Viet Minh paragraphs to Vietnam in order to ascertain whether such discussion can give us some general principles applicable elsewhere. US delegate supported Cambodian proposal of alternate meetings.

After recess Eden made two points: (1) if we were to discuss two texts and proposals they contained, we should also discuss separately their application to each of three states, and (2) all delegations should also be free to discuss related proposals such as those dealing with international control.

Molotov stated his understanding we would discuss general principles applicable to all three cases and then their application to each separately. He agreed to discussion of any closely related proposals. He then suggested discussion turn to substance.

Bidault thought there would be confusion and waste of time unless there were agreement as to questions which would be discussed as relating to all three. He suggested committee be established to draw up such list.

Molotov saw no need for committee and suggested we begin by discussing two questions: (1) simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina, and (2) zones for regrouping forces. This would not preclude discussion of other elements such as international supervision and non-introduction of foreign troops or arms.

Dong concurred with Molotov's first point, amplified second by saying there must be readjustment in each of three countries of areas held by opposing forces, and proposed discussion also to cover non-interference with movements of troops into zones. Proposal for cessation of introduction of foreign troops and arms spoke for itself. He supported Soviet proposal for neutral commissions and guarantee of agreements by members of conference acting of course collectively.

Bidault cited reference in point 8 to agreements between France and each of three countries. He said France had agreements with each but they were allies rather than enemies and would be on same side any armistice agreement. Point 8 (a) ignored distinction between civil war in Vietnam and external invasion in Cambodia and Laos and was not acceptable as basis for discussion. He reiterated proposal committee draw up list of questions for discussion. He also suggested the conference summon representatives of Commanders-in-Chief to Geneva to assist in separate discussion of problems of three countries.

Smith cited problem of who would determine whether hostile forces in Laos and Cambodia were Viet Minh invaders or indigenous and agreed with Bidault we should have list of basic questions before proceeding to substantive discussion.

Chou thought committee would be pointless if conference itself could not agree on agenda. First point for discussion should be general principles for simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina. He granted application would be different in three countries. He supported Soviet proposal on neutral commission and guarantees. Viet Minh proposal re cessation of all entry of foreign troops and arms was essential to any effective cease-fire.

Bidault suggested two chairmen might be asked to establish list of questions.

Molotov said we had decided on May 17 to consider Viet Minh point 8 (a) and French points 1 and 5 and any other related questions. He saw five principal ones: first simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina. After decision in principle, this would require detailed consideration including fixing of time limits for carrying it out. Second was establishment of zones in each of three states. Third was non-introduction of foreign troops or arms. Fourth was supervision over terms of agreement. Fifth is need for guarantees. Other questions might emerge from discussion.

Bidault said Molotov had listed five questions and he himself eight. Bidault could agree to discussion of any of them provided it was on basis of dealing with fundamental principles rather than national application.

Eden suggested Molotov's five questions plus Bidault's three others be taken up at next session. He thought it well to consider getting representatives of two commands here since that would take some time.

Molotov reaffirmed that his five questions were not exclusive and that anyone could add others. His referred only to military aspects and political problems could be discussed later.

Cambodian delegate reiterated that in Cambodia there could be no question of regrouping troops in internal zones, only withdrawal of invaders.

DRV saw no need for representatives of two commands and said any delegation could call anyone it wanted.

Next meeting will be restricted one on May 24.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-2154

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath)*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 21, 1954.

Participants: M. Marc Jacquet, French State Secretary for the Associated States.

Donald R. Heath, Ambassador to Vietnam and Cambodia

During the conference intermission today I spoke with Jacquet. He said:

1. The political situation in Paris was very shaky.
2. Reports of political deterioration in Vietnam were very disquieting.

3. He was also disturbed by the friction between Generals Cogny and Navarre. The latter had lost much of his former moral authority over his command.

4. To my question whether he had heard rumors of the reconciliation between Bao Dai and Ngo Dinh Diem, he said that last December he would have favored Bao Dai's appointing Ngo Dinh Diem as Prime Minister, now he is not so sure it would be a good idea to change Buu Loc.

5. He had heard rumors of contacts between members of the Vietnamese and Vietminh Delegations which he found alarming. If there was a conciliation of the two factions it would be the Bao Dai crowd which would lose out. In that connection he recalled that Bao Dai, during a recent conversation had made a cryptic remark which had disturbed him. Bao Dai had said "we should approach this situation as we did in 1945". Bao Dai would not explain this statement and Jacquet recalled that in 1945 Bao Dai had abdicated and accepted a job as Political Counselor to Ho Chi Minh.

*Comment:* It was rather interesting to hear Jacquet worry about contacts between the Vietminh and Vietnam Delegations. According to a memorandum <sup>1</sup> from Chester L. Cooper, "M. Marc Jacquet, with-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

out Bidault's knowledge, has designated staff members Michel Audiat and Tezenas du Montcel for secret contacts with the Vietminh in Geneva. Bao Dai is aware of this arrangement".

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 250 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1954—6 p. m.

Tosec 231. Re Secto 263<sup>2</sup> Department agrees appeal at this time should be made exclusively by Thailand. Believe important you press for definitive French and United Kingdom agreement in order furnish basis press Thailand for immediate action.

Department has serious doubts regarding use interim committee for establishment POC subcommission and prefers use GA for following reasons.

We consider it most desirable obtain greatest possible Asian support: India would interpret bypassing GA over which Mrs. Pandit would preside by reviving moribund body as slap at Indian Government; India and other Asians would react badly to deliberate choice forum which Soviets consider illegal and have hitherto boycotted, and Asians might not support establishment subcommission or agree serve on it. Reports by subcommission so established might not carry same weight as body created under unchallenged auspices. If Soviets should not take seats in interim committee, we would gain little if anything by reactivating it.

Use interim committee would give Communists pretext for challenging legality POC operation; if POC set in motion by GA, Soviets could not convincingly oppose it. USSR did not oppose POC section of uniting for peace resolution and is member of full POC. USSR would not of course be appointed to POC subcommission.

Might also be fairly serious procedural complications. While terms of reference interim committee could be interpreted mean it can meet while GA recessed, practice has been for committee not to meet unless regular session GA has adjourned. Thus committee did not meet in 1951 or in 1953. GA is now in recess. There might thus be procedural wrangle at outset when interim committee is being organized.

While its terms of reference prohibit interim committee from itself taking any substantive action other than establishing subcommission, committee can recommend additional action to GA and can convene special GA session. Particularly if piqued, Asians likely press for

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated to New York as telegram 577, to London as telegram 6247, to Paris as telegram 4202, to Saigon as telegram 2375, and to Bangkok as telegram 2307.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 20, p. 862.

additional action and immediate GA session. Would be difficult prevent this and net result would be two debates on Indochina.

DULLES

MAY 22, 1954

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 327

*The Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Achilles) to W. Dennis Allen of the British Delegation*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 22, 1954.

DEAR DENNIS: With reference to our conversation of this morning, I am quoting below the draft letter to the President of the Security Council which the Thai government proposed to send last June. The only change which Washington believes need be made at this time is deletion of the bracketed portion at the end of the second paragraph.

"I have the honor, under instructions from my Government and in conformity with Articles 34 and 35, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, to bring to the attention of the Security Council a situation which, in the view of my Government, represents not only a threat to the security of Thailand but is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security of the region.

"Large-scale fighting has taken place in the immediate vicinity of Thai territory; there has been a clear possibility of direct incursions of foreign troops into its territory. This possibility continues to exist [despite the temporary recession of the direct threat of military incursions].<sup>1</sup>

"I have the honor to bring this situation of international tension to the attention of the Security Council to the end that the Security Council may provide for observation in the area under the Peace Observation Commission.

"The Royal Thai Government makes this appeal to the Security Council not only as a firm supporter of the United Nations but as a power firmly determined to play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia.

"Finally, I have the honor to request that you call a meeting of the Security Council to consider this matter and, as representative of Thailand, I may be invited, in conformity with rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, to participate in the Council discussion of the question.

"Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration."

The following is the text of the draft resolution which the Thai government intended to propose last June. Washington believes that it is still suitable with deletion of the bracketed words in the second paragraph. The Department also has in mind a subcommission of five—India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden and Uruguay—and believes it would be desirable to name these states in the resolution.

<sup>1</sup> Brackets in the source text.

"The Security Council,

"Recalling General Assembly Resolution 337(V) (uniting for peace), part A, section B establishing a peace observation commission which could observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,

"Finds that there exists in the general area of [and adjacent to] Thailand [and Laos]<sup>2</sup> a condition of international tension the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security,

"Requests the Peace Observation Commission to establish a sub-commission composed of . . . members, with its seat at the United Nations Headquarters, with authority:

(a) To despatch such observers as it may deem necessary to any part of the above area on the request of any state or states concerned, but only to the territory of states consenting thereto;

(b) To visit if it deems necessary, any area in which observation requested under sub-paragraph (a), is being conducted;

(c) To consider such data as may be submitted to it by its members or observers and to make such reports as it deems necessary to the Peace Observation Commission and the Security Council for the information of member states."

Sincerely,

THEODORE ACHILLES

<sup>2</sup> Brackets in the source text.

396.1 GE/5-2254: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, May 22, 1954—11 a. m.

Dulte 96. Eyes only Secretary. I think it very likely that we will be confronted with the proposal that India participate in this conference, and in view of future possibilities it is a proposal which it will be difficult for us to resist. However, this will raise very serious questions. For instance, we should not accept India without alternatively proposing the Philippines and Thailand who have already indicated their willingness to join the Southeast Asian Pact. Our thinking at the moment is that if and when a proposal for Indian participation is made, we might accept but propose also the inclusion of these two other nations who are on our side. There is a chance that this would open up a whole Pandora's box. The question is one on which I urgently need your guidance because Menon's visit here may bring up the matter.<sup>1</sup>

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> For the Secretary's reply, see telegram Tedul 108, May 22, p. 889.

790.5/5-1854 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1954—11:08 a. m.

Tedul 106. Limit distribution. In May 20 meeting with Webb and Munro Secretary outlined JCS recommendations (Tedul 93<sup>2</sup>) re UK terms reference (Dulte 84<sup>3</sup>) proposed five power military talks. Secretary said US believes talks should take place Washington and not transfer elsewhere later without full agreement of five. Webb expressed hope representation at talks would be high level in view importance New Zealand and world opinion. Secretary thought Defense tentatively had in mind two or three star general but indicated no decision yet taken. Subsequently it appeared New Zealand thinking of General Gentry, Chief of General Staff.

Secretary revealed background our recent discussions with UK re Southeast Asia action beginning with April 13 communiqué issued following London visit. He explained his concern that Eden had agreed to establishment working group Washington but subsequently backed out just prior scheduled meeting, which then had to be changed to meeting of 16-power Korean group plus Associated States representatives.<sup>4</sup> Secretary stated Churchill's May 17 Commons statement was further repudiation original April 13 joint communiqué.<sup>5</sup> Churchill modified statement on readiness examine possibility establishing collective defense by inserting additional phrase "when the outcome of the Geneva Conference is clear". Churchill statement also omitted UK readiness make such examination "with other countries principally concerned". Churchill changed April 13 statement "establishing a collective defense" to "establishing a system of collective security and defense". Secretary felt establishment of "system" might unduly delay necessary and immediate measures, noting that NATO Treaty had taken over year to work out.

Secretary outlined reasons which led US in April to take initiative in creating *ad hoc* coalition to offset then impending fall Dien Bien Phu. He admitted UK change of position had not been helpful to US-UK relations.

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Horsey of EUR/BNA and Draper of S/S. Repeated to London as telegram 6275, to Paris as telegram 4222, to Wellington as telegram 166, and repeated from Wellington to Canberra as telegram 217. Memorandum of conversation, May 20, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 328.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 20, p. 858.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 18, p. 841.

<sup>4</sup> For the Secretary's briefing on Apr. 20, see the memorandum of conversation, p. 535.

<sup>5</sup> For text of Churchill's May 17 statement, see editorial note, p. 834.

Turning to recent conversations with French re "internationalizing" Indochina war, Secretary said French had never until recently asked us sit down discuss situation even though they have known we were prepared do so. French apparently not willing limit their complete freedom of action in spite our swift and extensive responses virtually to all specific aid requests except one, an air strike at Dien Bien Phu. Secretary said we made clear then we could not commit belligerent act unless based on sound principles fundamental to which was idea of collective action.

Secretary enumerated, in response recent French approach, what we told them would be necessary basic conditions for such internationalization i.e., France and Associated States request direct US military participation with similar invitation to Australia, New Zealand, UK, Thailand and Philippines; matter presented to UN in some form promptly; Associated States guaranteed complete independence by France; France not to withdraw its forces even with addition other forces supplementary to those of France and Associated States; agreement on command structure and raising-training native troops.

Secretary emphasized, in spite press leaks, these discussions in very preliminary stage and would probably remain suspended until General Ely return to Paris. He felt certain French had not yet reached firm decision.

Full memorandum follows.

Webb also made courtesy call on President May 20.

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/5-2254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL      NIACT

GENEVA, May 22, 1954—noon.

Dulte 95. Eyes only for the Secretary. Your Tedul 99.<sup>1</sup> Last night I dictated a message to you sharing your indignation regarding British statements and agreeing that Aldrich should act in accordance with your suggestion. However, after sleeping on the matter, and because I hope and expect that Eden will insure British support of the peace observation plan while in London over this week end, I think now we should withhold any protest until after this is done. I agree these things are hard to swallow, but you know how pettish both Eden and Churchill can be at times, and if we stir them up at this moment they may again back-pedal on support of the Thailand proposal,

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 20, p. 869.



which I now believe they are prepared to accept. Also, cannot forget that British are equally concerned and upset by President's statement regarding possible Southeast Asian pact "without Britain".<sup>2</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> At his news conference on May 19, the President, in response to a question whether "we could build an effective pact back there [in Southeast Asia] without Great Britain's support", answered: "Well, after all, you must remember that Australia and New Zealand are the countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations that are directly involved. I should say that with the proper Asiatic nations, which of course I lay down as a *sine qua non*, and Australia and New Zealand, we might possibly work out something that would be maybe not as satisfactory or as broad as you would like it, but could be workable." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, p. 497.)

---

790.5/5-2254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, May 22, 1954—1 p. m.

Dulte 97. Eyes only Secretary. Re Teduls 93<sup>1</sup> and 88.<sup>2</sup> Eden left early this morning for Paris and London before I had time to analyze or to speak to him regarding our JCS recommendations on the British text re five-power staff talks.

Since I received these comments in Tedul 93, you have probably seen Avis Gento 32 of 21 May<sup>3</sup> reporting summary given him by Colonel Monckton, British military adviser. You will note that the British propose these talks be conducted at Chief of Staff level, Australia and New Zealand concurring. They intend to send to Washington the Army Chief of Staff, General Harding, with advisers of major general rank from the other three services. This automatically lifts talks above level of "five-power staff agency".

You will also note the comprehensive items for discussion proposed by British delegation here to British Chiefs of Staff, which I assume will be adopted.

Under these circumstances, I am extremely reluctant to open up again the whole matter with Eden on the basis of our JCS comments, some of which I think are no longer pertinent, and most of which I think should be settled by these senior staff officers themselves when they first meet in Washington.

Department's assumption that omission of informing Associated States from Eden's memo is an oversight, is correct. He understands

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 20, p. 858.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 19, p. 856.

<sup>3</sup> Not found in Department of State files. In a note (attached to the source text) Kitchen informed the Secretary that "we have made arrangements to obtain the reference Defense message (Avis Gento 32 of 21 May) from Defense as quickly as possible."

they will be informed. He also understands that the information which will be given by the several participants to their Asiatic protégés as to terms of reference will vary. His wording is that which he proposes to use to those nations that will be informed by Britain, and I told him that we would probably modify it to a certain extent in speaking to the countries whom we are to inform.

I have pushed this matter pretty hard with Eden because I believe that these talks were desirable to lay some of the dust which has been raised about disunity, and also because I believe that serious military technical discussions are imperative.

So far as joint participation in staff conversations are concerned, the first objective has already been accomplished by the press. The scope and effectiveness of the second will depend very largely on the ability of the soldiers to get down to serious business, and as we have quite enough points of friction here, I would hope to be relieved of the necessity of going again to Eden on this matter unless a real major issue arises.

Monckton informed us that Eden is very concerned about the leak to the British press of details regarding the five-power talks and that a thorough investigation is being made both at London and at Geneva to determine the source.<sup>4</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>4</sup>Memorandum of conversation, May 21, between Colonel Monckton, Colonel Ferguson, and Colonel Taber, not printed. (396.1 GE/5-2154)

---

790.5/5-2254 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, May 22, 1954—1 : 51 p. m.

Tedul 107. Eyes only for Under Secretary from Secretary. Re Dulte 97.<sup>2</sup> You may advise Eden acceptance his proposal Dulte 84<sup>3</sup> on following understandings which we believe acceptable and understood by other participants:

1. Any decision to move from Washington would involve unanimous concurrence rather than majority vote;

2. We will ourselves prefer to call the group "military representatives of the participating powers" but since it is understood that no official announcement will be made this matter is presumably academic.

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State; cleared by Admiral Radford.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 18, p. 841.

3. We understand that the terms of reference should be interpreted so that the second phrase dealing with examination of "all possible courses of action in the light of the current situation" etc. is without limitation, and in particular is not restricted by the prior sentence dealing with "an effective line of resistance".

4. We see no objection to UK informing Australia and New Zealand because of commonwealth relationship. We would also expect to keep them informed in view of our ANZUS relationship and in fact we did inform Webb fully of the then status of the matter during his recent visit here.

5. The US would expect to inform others in accordance with its standing policies in such matters, possibly varying the precise formulation of the terms of reference according to the circumstances of the case. Also, we assume that Associated States will be informed in the first instance presumably by France.

We suggest that a letter of memorandum be handed to Eden to the foregoing effect at the time you explain the above points orally.

For your information US and British Chiefs have exchanged despatches on the subject of level of representation. British Chiefs originally proposed Chief of Staff level or two star level. US Chiefs replied that they preferred two star level. British Chiefs yesterday requested reconsideration of this matter and US Chiefs replied that they still preferred the two star level and were not willing to raise it to the Chief of Staff level but would go along with British and French senior representation from Washington which would mean that the British could designate four star General Whiteley<sup>4</sup> and French could designate three star General Valluy. That is acceptable to the French. US Chiefs intend to maintain their direct representation in these meetings on two star level, even if British accept this last proposal. We feel here that this particular matter is one which can be adjusted between the Chiefs themselves. End FYI.

DULLES

---

<sup>4</sup> Gen. Sir John F. M. Whiteley, Chairman, British Joint Services Mission in Washington, and British Representative on the NATO Standing Group.

---

790.5/5-2254 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, May 22, 1954—2:15 p. m.

Tedul 108. Ur Dulte 96.<sup>2</sup> My preliminary thinking is that we should not resist participation South Asian countries. If they effectively as-

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 22, p. 884.

sume responsibilities in Indochina, Thailand and Burma, that would either constitute a useful deterrent influence against communist takeover or if it did not accomplish this it would be educational, particularly to India and we might thereby gain. If India is to be there, believe also Pakistan and Ceylon should participate, also of course Thailand, Philippines, and presumably Burma.<sup>3</sup>

Before you take definitive position I want to think further about this matter and clear it higher level.

DULLES

---

<sup>3</sup> Smith in telegram Dulte 102, May 24, replied that "In my Dulte 96 am not sure I made it clear that proposal may be that India participate in this Geneva conference on Indochina. If this proposal is made, we have a perfectly valid case for admission to the conference of the Philippines and Thailand, probably also for Pakistan, and as you say, presumably Burma. If it is brought up, will take no position until I hear further from you." (396.1 GE/5-2454)

---

396.1 GE/5-2254

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath)*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 22, 1954.

Participants: Buu Kinh, Vietnamese Delegation  
Donald R. Heath, Ambassador to Vietnam and Cambodia.

Buu Kinh called by appointment to say that the Vietnamese Delegation was somewhat worried over the developments of the last restricted session. They had understood that the French Delegation and the British and American Delegations as well, would insist on a separate treatment for Laos and Cambodia on the one hand and Vietnam on the other. However, the French and British Delegations had apparently swung around to Molotov's program of discussing general principles adaptable to all three states. This was not the Vietnamese position nor that of Cambodia and Laos, and they thought it a potentially dangerous procedure to adopt. He was particularly worried over the very first proposal advanced by Molotov and the cease-fire must be simultaneous in the three countries. The Vietnamese position was that peace might be obtained more quickly in Cambodia and Laos in which case cease-fire should not be held up there while awaiting conclusion of armistice arrangements with Vietnam which might take a long time and indeed might never occur except on terms which would pave the way for a Communist takeover.

On the other hand, Vietnam did not want at this stage to be too vociferous and intransigent in opposing such commitment proposals as were accepted by the French since it did not wish to embarrass the position of the French Delegation and the French Government. Vietnam had a great deal of confidence in Bidault and hoped that his position, policy and support by French parliamentary opinion could be strengthened during the week or so.

I said I was thoroughly inclined to believe that we should not accept without reservations the proposition that the cease-fire should be simultaneous in the three countries but I had not yet discussed the matter with the head of our delegation. I observed he must have noted that we in effect had not only asked separate treatment for those countries but even priority of settlement because of the simplicity of their problems. I added we had very great confidence in Mr. Bidault but realized the latter's position was presently difficult and that, therefore, we all should at this stage try to co-ordinate our action with that of the French.

I said it was my understanding that Mr. Bidault, in accepting the Russian proposal to discuss fundamental points had made a distinct reservation as to the necessity of separate treatment of the Cambodian and Laotian situations.

I then went on to say that as he doubtless knew, we were actively exploring various possibilities of strengthening the military and political assets of France and the Associated States in the Indochina conflict and we felt that progress is being made. We were, for example, actively promoting the formation of the Southeast Asia Mutual Defense Pact.

I then inquired as to rumors of contacts between the Vietnamese and Vietminh Delegations. Buu Kinh, with air appearance of candor said that no contacts, to his knowledge, had occurred and he doubted any would or could occur because of the close supervision over the Vietminh Delegation exercised by its own and Soviet and Chinese security agents. He said that Phan Anh as long ago as 1946 at the Fontainebleau conference had told his friend Dinh, now head of the Vietnamese Delegation here, that he had made a mistake in going over to Ho Chi Minh since the latter by then had revealed himself as a Communist. Anh had said then, however, that he was "embarked" and could not change his course. He had advised Dinh to steer Vietnamese nationalists towards association with the United States.

396.1 GE/5-2054 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1954—3:48 p. m.

Tedul 110. Eyes only Ambassadors. Reference Secto 261<sup>2</sup> and 265.<sup>3</sup> In view of role which US may be called upon to play in Indochina, we have given much thought to Bao Dai's offer to maintain contact with you. I believe this offer should be discreetly exploited. Moreover, because of delicacy and importance of contact, I believe it should be pursued directly between you and Bao Dai.

FYI I am aware of disabilities ascribed to Bao Dai and believe him to be an ally of uncertain value for the long push. If we are to take active part in Indochina war, we must work toward rapid establishment of authentic Vietnamese nationalist government. Our present thinking envisions as an important first step the creation of a provisional National Assembly having initially broad consultative, but more importantly constituent, powers. Besides symbolizing national independence, such assembly would furnish necessary safety valve and continuing source of new leadership. It would of course function haltingly at first and cause some trouble, but these hazards would have to be accepted and would be lessened by method of establishment suggested below.

During period in which assembly was being established and coming to some measure of maturity and a more nearly representative government being set up, it would be necessary that Bao Dai continue to contribute whatever he represents of governmental legitimacy and unity. If there were no substantial change from performance he has been giving since 1949, we believe he could be largely neutralized if responsible Vietnamese, backed by France and US, found this to be necessary.

On other hand, it is possible Bao Dai is both sincere and accurate in his contention that French have prevented him from playing more effective part as Chief of State. Despite his known deficiencies, it may be that Bao Dai is a patriotic Vietnamese, and that under other auspices his patriotism might find more satisfactory expression. In any event, we do not seem to have on this side of the lines an immediately available substitute whose advent to power would not occasion more or less grave disturbance in some part of territory of Vietnam under nominal control of National Government.

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA and Gullion of S/P. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4225 and to Saigon as telegram 2385.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram Secto 261, May 20, contained a report of a conversation between Under Secretary Smith and Ngo Dinh Luyen on May 18. For memorandum of conversation, see p. 843.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 20, p. 863.

Accordingly, it would seem advisable not to attempt find substitute for Bao Dai, but to avail ourselves of what he has to offer, meanwhile remaining alert to minimize his power to do harm if he should evince tendency to revert to his old habits or to adopt new ones contrary to our interests.

As we now conceive it, the provisional legislative body mentioned above (whose initial membership could come from among local councillors elected in January 1953, representatives chosen by religious and political groups, and other persons selected as far as possible from elements which have stood aloof from politics since beginning of present hostilities) would have to grow into its job. At outset, it should have right to approve the government then existing or new one chosen by Bao Dai in consultation with French and ourselves, or it might elect an executive committee from its own membership from which part or all of the cabinet would be chosen. Assembly could thereafter have right to question ministers and probably vote budget, but its primary attention should be directed toward writing constitution, aided by French and American constitutional experts.

While we should under no circumstances commit ourselves irrevocably to Bao Dai nor indicate a fixed opinion in favor of any particular governmental reform, we must seek what good we can derive from his cooperation at least for the time being. Thus far the worst in his character seems to have been indulged, with results which are all too apparent. If he should now prove to have better stuff in him, we shall have gained useful ally. End FYI.

I hope you will take earliest occasion to renew personal contact with Bao Dai. Because of his oriental reticence, perhaps it would be advisable for you to talk with him only in presence of an interpreter of his choice. In this interview you should draw him out as far as possible on following lines (FYI portion this message may be useful to you in formulating questions, and was included for that purpose, but you will of course avoid indicating trend of our thought to Bao Dai) :

1. What can be done quickly to rectify political situation in non-Communist Vietnam?
2. What kind of "concerted action" does he have in mind?
3. What kind of working relationship does he see between himself and US?
4. What would be French reaction to such a working relationship, and how does he envisage operation of a Franco-US-Vietnamese partnership?

This conversation should of course be purely exploratory. Its purpose is to afford us a better current appreciation of one who may of necessity play important part in Vietnam for some time to come. You should assure Bao Dai you are ready to communicate with him di-

rectly whenever he wishes. After interview, I would like you to make full report including your personal estimate of Bao Dai and of his probable utility in developing situation.

I know that you understand clearly the delicacy vis-à-vis Bidault and the French generally of our seeming to intervene in this regard. I leave tactics to your good judgment.

Request Delegation, Paris and Saigon comment on FYI section this message.

DULLES

---

751G.00/5-2254

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal)*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 22, 1954.

Participants: Tezenas du Montcel, Minister of the Associated States  
Philip W. Bonsal

Subject: Visit to General Smith of Bao Dai's Personal Representative, Ngo Dinh Luyen

Pursuant to General Smith's approval of the recommendation contained in my memorandum of May 21,<sup>1</sup> I asked Tezenas du Montcel to come to see me. He did so on Saturday evening, May 22.

Emphasizing the highly sensitive and confidential nature of what I was about to tell him, I gave Tezenas du Montcel a broad outline of the approach made to General Smith by Ngo Dinh Luyen in the capacity of Bao Dai's personal representative. I indicated that the major purpose of the approach seemed to be in order to find out to what extent Bao Dai could count on American support in the event that present French support should appear to weaken for any reason. I told Tezenas du Montcel that General Smith had stressed in the most emphatic terms to Ngo Dinh Luyen his conviction regarding French resolution and determination under present circumstances. I added that no reply had as yet been given to Ngo Dinh Luyen with regard to the questions which he had asked. I said also that we are somewhat puzzled as to whether Ngo Dinh Luyen is in fact accurately stating the views of His Majesty. He may be serving more as a mouth-piece of his brother, Ngo Dinh Diem.

Tezenas du Montcel expressed great appreciation of General Smith's action in seeing that the French were informed of this move. He assured me of his realization of the very sensitive nature of this informa-

---

<sup>1</sup> A memorandum dated May 21 from Bonsal to Under Secretary Smith has not been found in Department of State files.



tion. He said that it was his impression there was no love lost between Bao Dai and Ngo Dinh Diem and that in the past when Bao Dai had spoken of the possibility of giving Ngo Dinh Diem the post of Prime Minister, it had been with the idea of breaking Ngo Dinh Diem's back ("pour lui casser les reins").

In conclusion Bonsal said that we had merely listened to Ngo Dinh Luyen and had given him no answers regarding our policies in certain contingencies. Bonsal said that we would not give such answers in the absence of coordination with the French.

---

751G.00/5-2354 : Telegram

*Smith-Molotov Meeting, Geneva, May 22, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 23, 1954—5 p. m.

Dulte 101. Repeated information Moscow 82. Moscow eyes only Ambassador. S/S limit distribution. At Molotov's invitation, Robertson, Phleger, Johnson, Reinhardt, and I dined last night at his house. We were cordially received and the atmosphere during dinner was reminiscent of the days toward the end of the honeymoon period. After dinner Robertson and I were steered into a room with Molotov, Gromyko, Zarubin, and Troyanovsky. The others were, by clearly calculated arrangement, conducted into another room, where they could hear only snatches of our conversation. Molotov was completely relaxed, quite friendly, and objective.

He began the conversation with a few remarks about the conference and led immediately into Indochina, asking me for my view of the situation as it existed in the separate states. I replied that as I had stated in the closed sessions of our conference, we believed the situation in Vietnam to be quite different from that which existed in Laos and Cambodia. In Vietnam we recognized that the forces of Ho Chi Minh were well organized, disciplined, formidable, and controlled a considerable portion of the territory of the country. Here, it was our feeling that where two completely hostile ideologies were in serious conflict there would have to be some sort of separation in the form of

---

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted in three sections. Memorandum of conversation of this meeting, May 23, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 289.

In Tedul 119, May 24, the Secretary of State replied that he was "Much interested your Dulte 101 and am transmitting textually to President." (751G.00/5-2354) In a memorandum to the President, May 24, transmitting the telegram, the Secretary commented that "Molotov's attitude, as described, conforms generally with that which I found in Berlin, and which appeared from the two talks I had with Molotov at Geneva. However, in this case, there is a good deal more detailed discussion of China and Indochina than has heretofore taken place between us." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "1951-1959, Korea-Political Conference, Geneva, 1954")

an armistice and a withdrawal of the regular contingents to specified areas with probably prolonged discussions leading toward a political settlement, all under supervision of some genuinely neutral authority. With respect to Cambodia and Laos, the situation was entirely different. Our information was good and we were convinced that the statements made by the representatives of the Cambodian and Laotian Governments were substantially correct. I had, I stated, on our staff, officers who had visited all parts of both Laos and Cambodia and who were able from personal observation to confirm the fact that in both states the dissident elements were not indigenous and controlled very little, if any, of the country. Molotov replied that he agreed generally with regard to Vietnam, and he also agreed that there was a great difference in the problem of Vietnam as against that of Cambodia and Laos. However, he said, from what information he had, which was not very complete, he had arrived at the impression that the governments of the two countries actually controlled only about half of their territory, and that all of their troubles were not by any means due to external causes. I replied that apparently our information was different, and how did he suggest the question be resolved? He said that this was difficult, and repeated that he was inclined to the view that the governments of both states were weak and really controlled only about half of their respective territories. I said that there was one way of finding out and that was to have an inspection made by a genuinely neutral committee who could determine the real facts. Molotov said it would hardly be possible to do this during the period of our conference, but that the matter must of course be resolved. He then repeated that he did not challenge the fact that the problems were considerably different. There was a good deal of discussion of this subject, during all of which Molotov took the same apparently detached and objective position. It is our view that he visualizes the solution lying in some form of a cease-fire operation which would ultimately divide Vietnam, but he did not object when I remarked that the conditions in Cambodia and Laos were not such as to justify even considering slicing off pieces of their territory to provide for the concentration of dissident elements. He said that we were not making much progress in the conference and he thought it might be advisable to have the parties most concerned, namely, the French, Vietnamese and Viet Minh, meet and see if they could not come to some solution among themselves which they could present to the conference. I said I did not know how the French would react to this; that I could not recommend it to the French, but that I would not oppose it. Our position here with regard to Indochina was different from Korea. We wanted to be helpful. We were not a belligerent, although we were assisting France and the Associated States with money and equipment. Our interest was great

as France was our ally, and Britain, another ally, was in Malaya. Also we had a treaty with the Philippines, where we had a special interest. Molotov said he understood this, but there were reports that US did not want fighting to stop. I said thing we wanted most was an honorable cessation of hostilities, on just terms, but we would not associate ourselves with any capitulation to what we believed to be aggression.

I then mentioned Korea, pointing out that discussion in plenary session today had again emphasized deep cleavage and bitterness of feeling between North and South Korea. Molotov agreed and said that this was obviously a matter which would require a great deal of time to produce a solution. He thought that political settlement in Korea would come about possibly as a result of some years of living together. I mentioned a recent statement of Nehru's, saying that while I did not by any means subscribe to most of his statements, his recent one regarding Korea had interested me. Mr. Nehru, I understood, had said, in effect, that he did not expect a political solution for Korea to arise from Geneva conference, but that it might be that some loose association as a result of trading together would, after a period of time, reduce the tension and produce some form of agreement. The interpretation I gave this was, I now understand, a good deal different from what Nehru actually proposed. Molotov repeated that a period of "living together" and some form of commercial or other contact over a period of time might reduce the bitterness and permit some political solution. He obviously expects none here.

The conversation then passed to the subject of our general relationship, and via that, to China. I said that I believed, with regard to the Soviet Union, as I expected Mr. Molotov to believe with regard to the United States, that we genuinely desired peace. We had come, I hoped correctly, to think in the United States that although we went through periods of public name-calling, we could, in the last analysis, sit down at the conference table with the Soviet Union and work out some form of solution for our major problems. We did not have this same feeling about some of their associates; we had sensed a lack of restraint and an intransigence which caused us grave concern. Molotov looked up immediately at me and said China. I said yes, China. Well, he said, you must remember that China is still a very young country, and you must also remember that China is always going to be China, she is never going to be European. The Soviet Union, he went on, had worked out a relationship with Communist China. I should also remember that we had done a good many things to irritate Communist China and cause them difficulties. I replied that the Soviet Union and Communist China had one point in common, they had a common political ideology which made it easier for them to arrive at common

understandings. We did not share that common ideology with Communist China. Molotov said that, in effect, we weren't the only ones that are worried, the Soviet Union would like to devote all of its time and resources to improving its internal situation, but from time to time events took place which made it necessary for them to realize that they would have to devote their attention and resources to matters outside their borders. He said China was only five years old and she also needed time to devote her attention and resources to her internal problems. I said that President Eisenhower believed in world trade but the Chinese made any contact impossible. He said there was a great deal in our attitude which gave the Soviets ground for serious thought. Here he groped for a word to imply hostility or aggressiveness without being discourteous. I supplied the word and said we sensed the same attitude in the Soviet Union. The question which concerned us both was war or peace, and if there was any doubt in his mind as to the pacific intentions of the United States, I would demonstrate to him that they were unfounded. We had intervened in Korea as a result of deep-rooted moral principles. When we reversed the situation and the Chinese Communists intervened, we could have dealt with Communist China without difficulty had we been willing to go into general mobilization and use all of the resources at our disposal. We had not done so, and had taken thousands of casualties rather than commit the full prestige of the United States and possibly that of the Soviet Union in an issue which would have involved broadening the conflict and possibly brought on global war. I would remind him of the first official conversation that I had when I arrived in Moscow, and suggested that when he returned he get out a memo of that conversation and re-read it. He said he recalled it. I then said that he would also recall that I told him at that time that there was a line beyond which compromise could not go; that we were willing to reach honorable compromise, but compromise was a two-way street and we would not abandon our principles. He replied in a perfectly friendly way that he understood, and again he said that China was a very young country. He also said, and this is very interesting, that it will become known some day that in the Korean matter the Soviet Union had acted as a restraining influence. He repeated that we had done some things to irritate Communist China. Robertson said that the Chinese Communists had done many things to irritate US, one illustration of which was the matter of American citizens and air force personnel, none guilty of any crimes, now imprisoned, and also those unable to get exit visas.<sup>2</sup> Some of these people had died in prison, and they have been mistreated. Molotov obviously was completely informed in the matter.

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on this issue, see volume XIV.

He at once replied that there were some Chinese students in the United States who had been unable to leave. Robertson said that this was correct, but they were neither imprisoned nor ill treated, and that under proper arrangements they could be permitted to go. Molotov said he saw no reason why a matter of this kind could not be very readily adjusted. I said that although the number involved was few, incidents like this made it almost impossible even to consider moving close toward an understanding. The American people reacted very strongly to what they considered unjust or inhumane treatment—that they would take hundreds of casualties, but that they would never abandon efforts to obtain the release of one single prisoner. Molotov again said that this should be easily resolved. He went on to say that the Soviet Union, along with US, had for a long time done all it could do to uphold Chiang Kai-shek, and had only abandoned him when further support became completely impracticable. Neither Robertson nor I felt there was any purpose in replying to this comment.

Robertson remarked at this point that he had heard much said here about Colonialism. This was no longer an issue. Britain had given complete freedom to India, Pakistan, Burma, et cetera, and Holland to Indonesia. Our record re the Philippines was well known. We were perfectly willing and should be able to live at peace with people of a different political ideology, but it ought to be recognized that our differences were not Colonialism but ideological. Molotov replied that this was so.

The thing that impressed me most last night was the difference in Molotov's attitude now from what it was when Stalin was alive. He went further, was much more frank, made no charges, by implication or otherwise, no recriminations, and it was as though he were looking at the whole situation through a magnifying glass and analyzing its various aspects. There is apparent much greater self-confidence and authority. It is interesting that Molotov, having toasted every one of his guests, then proposed a toast to the heads of our respective states, "the President of the United States, General Eisenhower, and the President of the Supreme Soviet, Marshal Voroshilov". This is the first time I ever heard such a toast given by a top Communist official which placed the President of the Supreme Soviet in the position of head of the state. Molotov also commented again on your departure from Geneva and asked again how long I would be here. I said my movements depended on his decisions. We had gone to Panmunjom expecting to stay three weeks, and had stayed 27 months. If we did not complicate the problems of Laos and Cambodia, it should not take too long.

MAY 23, 1954

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 308

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 23, 1954—2 p. m.

Dulte 100. Eyes only Secretary. Your Tedul 107.<sup>1</sup> I will advise Eden in accordance with your instructions and provide him with a confirming memorandum.<sup>2</sup> Will omit paragraph four, since Australia and New Zealand have been informed and are participating and our relationship to ANZUS is well understood.

With regard to final paragraph of Tedul 107, it is completely impossible for me to understand the reasoning which prompts the decision by our Joint Chiefs of Staff that they should downgrade the rank of our representation on these five power staff conferences. Regardless of the actual outcome, the simple fact that very senior military officers of the five powers were meeting in Washington would convince the Russians and Chinese, who inevitably would know about it, that, regardless of protestations or statements to the contrary, we really intended serious business. I really regret this decision more than I can say.<sup>3</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 22, p. 888.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram Dulte 117, May 26, Smith reported that "Eden has forwarded my memorandum to London and is confident it will be well received. He hopes talks will start as quickly as possible and so do I. Can we not get on with them?" (790.5/5-2554)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram Tedul 112, May 24, the Secretary of State informed Under Secretary Smith that he had "discussed final paragraph [of telegram Dulte 100] with Radford and Chiefs will reconsider. Their motivation has been primarily political, feeling that British wanted high ranking to obviate carrying on broader political talks." (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 242)

MAY 24, 1954

396.1 GE/5-2454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 24, 1954—11 a. m.

Dulte 103. Repeated information Paris 320, Saigon 105. Re Geneva Tedul 110, repeated Paris 4225, Saigon 2385.<sup>1</sup> I agree fully that it would now be very useful, later possibly imperative for me to have personal contacts with Bao Dai. That said, I do not believe we should make any move in that direction without prior discussion and approval of Bidault. While the latter raised no objection some eight days ago when I told him of my intention to pay a courtesy call on Bao

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 22, p. 892.

Dai and made no comment when, through Ambassador Chauvel, Heath reported on my meeting.<sup>2</sup> I am sure that Bidault was uneasy that this meeting would be used by the opposition to increase the difficulties of himself and the Laniel government. There was in fact some unhelpful French press speculation over what transpired at my meeting with Bao Dai.

Before making any arrangements for a next meeting, therefore, I would like to discuss the matter with Bidault in such a manner as not to allow him to impose a veto on my eventually seeing Bao Dai but agreeing if he raises objections to the political effect of such a meeting (which would be sure to be known) to defer any contact for some days to come. Bao Dai himself evidently feels that our meeting at this precise time would be unwise in view of probable French reaction and this is one of the reasons that he appointed Luyen as channel of communications. (See telegram Secto 265 repeated Paris 306, Saigon 97.<sup>3</sup>)

The four-point outline suggested in reference telegram would be a good agenda for our first meeting.

As regards the program outlined in the first five paragraphs of reference telegram everyone including Bao Dai would agree as to the necessity of strengthening Vietnamese government in face present emergency. Bao Dai might also if we insisted agree to the creation of a provisional assembly having initially broad consultative powers and would probably agree that it have constituent powers as well.

The Buu Loc government has in fact promised the creation of a consultative assembly. Bao Dai's own immediate solution has been strengthening the efficiency and autonomy of the army and the creation of war cabinet with real authority.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Held on May 16; for summary of discussion, see telegram Secto 234, May 17, p. 829.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 20, p. 863.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 2541 from Saigon, May 26, McClintock stated that "with all deference" he wanted to correct this sentence. He commented that "Bao Dai has not strengthened efficiency and autonomy of Vietnamese National Army. On contrary, as Embassy's telegrams have pointed out, morale of army is at new low ebb and its efficiency is gravely impaired by open rivalry between Minister of Defense Quat and Chief of Staff Hinh. Furthermore, Geneva conference has had deleterious effect on fighting spirit in all ranks. There has been no creation of a war cabinet with real authority. This cabinet had one meeting and has since lapsed into oblivion. Its composition is Buu Loc as Prime Minister, Quat as Minister of Defense, and Hinh as Chief of Staff. Since Buu Loc is in France and neither Quat nor Hinh will ratify suggestions of other, war cabinet is an absolute nullity." (751G.5/5-2654)

In commenting on McClintock's telegram Under Secretary Smith said "there seems to be some difference of view between drafting officer Ambassador Heath and Chargé d'Affaires McClintock, a condition which probably exists in other missions elsewhere in the world. However, it would have been more accurate if our Dulte 103 had stated 'Bao Dai's own proposed solution is, et cetera'. Personally, Bao Dai did not impress me as a man to lead forlorn hopes." (Telegram Dulte 118; 396.1 GE/5-2654)

I believe he would go along with the creation of the assembly and the lines mentioned in reference telegram seem to be wise and practical.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-2454 : Telegram

*Smith-Bidault Meeting, Geneva, May 24, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 24, 1954—10 p. m.

Dulte 107. Repeated information Paris 322. Eyes only Secretary; Paris eyes only Ambassador. Re Paris 4499 to Department.<sup>1</sup> In accordance with Dillon's suggestion I had long talks with Bidault this morning. Only Margerie and Achilles were present. Day in country and good night's sleep had put him back in good condition.

I told him of Saturday night's talk with Molotov,<sup>2</sup> including my conclusions that Russians expected no progress on Korea but thought they had hooked big fish on Indochina which ought involve Europe as well, that they considered time on their side although their worries over developments elsewhere might impel them to accept a less favorable settlement than they had hoped. I thought next two or three days might shed further light.

Bidault felt we should go right ahead with Franco-US talks as to what would be done should conference fail and that public knowledge such talks were going on was helpful. "Lightning should not strike during conference but occasional rumbles of distant thunder were useful and the quicker the better." We should go ahead as rapidly as possible and get the British to come along. His talks with Eden on Saturday and British press comment, particularly Saturday's *Economist* and yesterday's *Observer*, convinced him Eden was making rapid progress in right direction. This was important from Paris viewpoint because Gaullists were particularly responsive to British thinking.

He said his troubles in Assembly were primarily due to bitterness over EDC and that this week and especially tomorrow would be unusually dangerous. It was becoming apparent to opponents that MRP and Socialist Congresses would probably result in majority for EDC unless government were overthrown.

<sup>1</sup> In telegram 4499 from Paris (May 22, in volume XIII) Ambassador Dillon reported that "Bidault also made several remarks about how ill-informed he had been in Geneva on these negotiations [regarding intervention in Indochina]. He said that Margerie had talked with Achilles but that he himself had never talked with the Under Secretary on this subject. I have the impression that he would very much like to have the Under Secretary talk with him about this early next week." (751G.00/5-2254)

<sup>2</sup> The French informed the press about the Smith-Molotov talk of May 22; for Under Secretary Smith's reaction, see telegram Dulte 122, May 26. p. 936.



Bidault expressed great confidence in Ely and was eager to hear his impressions, particularly as to seriousness of situation in delta. There must be change in commander in chief. In view of French superiority in men and weapons, something was obviously wrong when French suffered defeat after defeat. Asking if I might speak bluntly, I said any second rate general should be able to win Indochina war, if there were proper political atmosphere. Present political climate of Indochina made it very hard to produce native forces with real will to fight. Did he believe I could help with Bao Dai and was it true that he did not want Bao Dai back in Indochina?

He expressed surprise and said Bao Dai at Cannes was completely useless. Either he should stay in Evian and run his delegation or, better still, get back to Indochina and run his country. He would be glad to have us try to get him to do one or other.

He said he did not understand very clearly what was contemplated on POC and thought that if Security Council veto was followed by interim committee action, there would be less chance of unfortunate speeches by Asiatic, Latin American and Arab delegates. However, he appeared agreeable to leaving decision between the two to the experts.

Reverting to Franco-US talks, I believed it important they be held in Paris but that he and I should be kept closely informed and that decisions not be taken until we had had chance to express our views. He expressed pleasure and we agreed to keep in close personal contact about it.

He was worried by report from Bonnet that US intervention would be limited essentially to naval and air support, that there was strong feeling in Congress against use of ground forces and that joint resolution might be passed prohibiting their use on continent of Asia. Bonnet felt US military might be less interested in saving Associated States than in A-bombing China. I told him Congressional resolution authorizing naval and air support would be major accomplishment.<sup>3</sup> Navy included marines, now a major military force, but still one which benefitted from traditional feeling that they could be used in remote places without constituting an act of war. US would be unwise to commit major ground forces in Indochina and if there were real war, it would not be fought in Asia.

He said if he were not in Paris on Wednesday, he would be glad to speak on Korea and to take line that to speak of UN as belligerent was in effect to tear up charter.

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> For a draft Congressional resolution authorizing the President "to employ Naval and Air forces of the United States to assist friendly governments of Asia", see annex to memorandum of conversation with the President, May 19, in volume XIII.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 286

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States  
Delegation (Martin)*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 24, 1954.

Participants: Amb. Acikalin, President of Turkish Delegation  
Mr. Vergin, Turkish Delegation  
General W. B. Smith, United States Representative  
Mr. Martin, U.S. Delegation

Amb. Acikalin called at his own request on General Smith at 11:15 this morning. Dr. Acikalin opened the conversation by asking as to our thinking on tactics. General Smith replied that a restricted meeting on Indochina was scheduled for today and there would probably be another one tomorrow, but he planned to ask for a Plenary on Korea for Wednesday.<sup>1</sup> General Smith said he would speak on Wednesday and noted that Amb. Acikalin was also planning to speak. General Smith emphasized his hope that as many as possible of the Allied Delegations would inscribe for the next Korean Plenary; even if all were unable to speak at the one session, the inscriptions could be carried over to the next.

General Smith then referred to his conversation with Mr. Molotov during the dinner given for him by the latter on May 22.<sup>2</sup> General Smith commented that he had been struck by Mr. Molotov's demeanor during this dinner as contrasted with that which he had customarily displayed on similar occasions when Stalin was alive. Mr. Molotov now was far more relaxed, self-possessed and confident than he had been in those days. General Smith also commented on the fact that Molotov had offered a toast to General Eisenhower, President of the United States, and to Marshal Voroshilov, "President of the Soviet Union", (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet). When Stalin was alive Mr. Molotov's toast had invariably been to Stalin, while the Soviet chief of state was entirely overlooked. General Smith then reviewed in some detail his conversation with Mr. Molotov, and indicated that he did not intend to discuss it with anyone else except Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault.

Commenting later on General Smith's reference to Molotov's toast, Amb. Acikalin said that the post-Stalin regime had been very clever in making Voroshilov President. He said that Voroshilov, who represented the power of the Soviet Army, was one man Stalin had never been able to suppress.

---

<sup>1</sup> May 26.

<sup>2</sup> For a report of this conversation, see telegram Dulte 101. May 23. p. 895.

Amb. Acikalin asked General Smith whether he thought the Communists would eventually agree to elections in Korea under UN supervision. General Smith replied that at one time he thought this might be possible; but since Molotov had made a speech flatly rejecting the idea, he now felt certain that the Communists would not agree. General Smith pointed out that the Soviet Union was perfectly capable of pulling the rug out from under a satellite, but once it had publicly gone on record on a matter of this sort, its prestige was committed and it would not reverse itself.

Amb. Acikalin then outlined briefly what he planned to say at the next Korean Plenary. He said he would stress two points:

(1) The distortions and untruths in the Communists' allegations concerning the UN and US roles in Korea; and

(2) the necessity of upholding the role of the UN in any Korean settlement. The Ambassador said he would again reject the North Korean proposals and would support Dr. Pyun's proposals as a good basis for discussion. In this connection, Amb. Acikalin said he felt Dr. Pyun's argument that the Chinese Communist forces should not be put in the same category as the UN forces was a valid one. General Smith agreed and expressed approval of the line Ambassador Acikalin proposed to take in his speech.

Amb. Acikalin asked General Smith whether he thought that the Soviet Union wanted any settlement at this time. General Smith replied that he did not know: he had so often [been] deceived by the Soviets in the past. If he were to make an estimate, however, he would say that the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to a settlement which would give them some advantages. The Soviets undoubtedly have a maximum and minimum position in Indochina and will, of course, strive to obtain the maximum. It is too early to tell whether a settlement is possible in Indochina, but the Communist position should be more clearly developed within the next few days. As to Korea, the Communists appeared not to expect any settlement, and it seems probable that we will have the *status quo* for an indefinite period.

Amb. Acikalin's final question related to the progress being made on united action in Southeast Asia. He was particularly interested in whether the objective was to provide for some joint action in the future, after a settlement on Indochina, or whether more immediate action was contemplated. General Smith indicated that discussions on this subject were proceeding through diplomatic channels and that military staff talks would shortly commence in Washington. As to the timing of any joint action, General Smith said that presumably alternative plans would be discussed during the military staff talks. General Smith stressed that the major difference with the British on the ques-

tion of united action had been one of timing; but the British were beginning to change their minds on the necessity of awaiting the outcome of the Geneva Conference, as the Communist position was already becoming clearer. On the other hand, General Smith acknowledged that the U.S. may have tried to hurry things up a little too much, and the British have a point in feeling that too precipitate action might alienate such countries as Burma which otherwise might be brought along to some form of participation. Amb. Acikalin commented that the British attitude on timing was probably also affected by the need for dealing with British political opposition groups.

On leaving Amb. Acikalin expressed appreciation for the information which General Smith had given him. General Smith said that he hoped they would be able to see him soon again.

---

396.1 GE/5-2454

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 24, 1954.

Subject: Meeting of the Six

1. Agreed to accept the French list of questions as a basis of discussion.<sup>1</sup>

2. Agreed that France would speak first, Cambodia second, Laos third and we fourth.

3. It is possible the French may seek to revise the order of questions and move the question "international control of the execution of agreements" from fourth place to second.

4. The French Delegation is unwilling at this stage to take the position that international control should be exercised only by the United Nations. Cheyssou [*Cheysson*], of their Delegation, however, raised the point, if the control commission was not under the United Nations, under whose authority would it be?

5. The suggestion was made that the Six discuss in an early meeting just what real neutrals might usefully serve on the control commission. Ambassador Chauvel made the point that any effective international control would have to have several countries since the smaller countries could not provide sufficiently large contingents of control troops.

---

<sup>1</sup> See report of the Fourth Restricted Session in telegram Secto 279, May 21, p. 877.

396.1 GE/5-2554 : Telegram

*Fifth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 24, 3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, May 25, 1954—1 a. m.

Secto 292. Repeated information Paris 323, London 205, Tokyo 85, Moscow 83, Saigon 106, Phnom Penh 3, and Vientiane 2. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Fifth restricted session met under presidency Eden today.

Eden said it had been left last meeting conference would discuss Molotov five points and additional ones submitted by Bidault. He then read list seven-point proposal made by Bidault and asked if discussion this list would be satisfactory basis continue meetings. Points were: (1) cessation of hostilities; (2) measures concerning regular troops; (3) measures concerning irregular forces; (4) questions concerning introduction into three states further foreign troops and matériel; (5) liberation prisoners war and civilian internees; (6) international supervision execution of agreements; (7) guarantees of agreements.

Molotov said there was no great difference between his list and French and two lists were satisfactory basis discussion, but he noted inseparability political and military solution and concluded after brief discussion military problem we should pass on to political.

Bidault said what conference had agreed was priority military over political solution. He noted mixing of two in case Laos and Cambodia would cause delays settlements there since no political problem existed and solution would be forced await political settlement Vietnam.

Smith pointed out first task was to end shooting and then settle political questions later. He added only problem in Laos and Cambodia was withdrawal invading forces and implementation settlement this simple problem should not await arrangement more complex Vietnamese problem.

Bidault then gave detailed comments his own seven points as follows:

(1) on cessation hostilities, he said French had laid down principle May 8 fighting should cease under adequate security guarantees. He said France wanted war in all Indochina stopped, but we should not insist principle simultaneity cease-fire all three countries since it would be unfair to continue fighting in any state where agreement terminate

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/5) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 278. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 7:10 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 131-142. This telegram was transmitted in two sections.

it existed. He said France continued insist on Article 5 (section I) May 8 proposal.<sup>2</sup>

(2) Bidault said he defined "regular troops" as being all those permanently organized, noting Viet Minh had many so-called irregulars who were just as well-organized as so-called regulars. He said in Cambodia and Laos problem was simply evacuating Viet Minh, while for Vietnam France proposed delimited zones for regular forces both sides with demilitarized zones between probably required to avoid danger contact between opposing forces. He agreed there appeared little difference between French and Viet Minh proposals this point. He said Viet Minh point re passage of troops through opposing zones might be acceptable if under adequate controls and not used to permit strengthening forces or areas either side.

(3) Bidault said forces both sides not required for army or internal security should be disbanded. He said this was important since Cambodian and Laotian armies and Franco-Vietnamese troops in Vietnam would be imperiled if grouped in delimited zones and irregulars free to harass them.

(4) On introduction new forces, Bidault stated we should return to this problem when vital question of nature controls determined.

(5) France has asked immediate freeing of prisoners of war and civilian internees since May 8. This operation should be subject same controls as remainder agreement.

(6) Bidault said French had asked for effective international controls since beginning. He said France open to suggestion on structure and membership control committee. He added we could not go further into detail on nature control entity until we know details of agreements which committee would supervise. He said France suggested (for Vietnam only) mixed committee two opposing military staffs to operate under international control group.

(7) On guarantees, Bidault said France had proposed conference guarantee agreement and nine parties should consult immediately in case violation and proceed to appropriate individual or collective measures.

In conclusion, Bidault said France would not accept solution any individual point but only "package deal" on all.

Chou En-lai said he had no objection general discussion these questions but reminded conference of Molotov's point political was inseparable from military. He reserved right reply Bidault later.

Cambodian representative made point conference should not insist on simultaneity cessation hostilities all three countries since this unfair those with simpler problems. He noted Viet Minh withdrawal would solve Cambodian problem.

---

<sup>2</sup> Article 5, Part I, of proposals submitted by the French Delegation at the First Plenary Session on Indochina, May 8, read as follows: "Hostilities to cease as soon as the agreement is signed. The assembly of troops and disarmament of forces as above provided to begin not later than x days (the number to be fixed by the Conference) after the signature of the agreement." (US Verb Min/1, May 8, 1954, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 276)

Viet Minh representative expressed following views on seven points :

(1) Cease-fire must be complete, simultaneous and as soon as possible throughout whole area ;

(2) Regular troops of both belligerent sides must be assembled into zones established in accordance with principles agreed to by conference but worked out in Indochina separately in each state ;

(3) Problem of irregulars does not arise since when agreement reached each side would have responsibility of seeing that cease-fire observed in areas where it has authority ;

(4) Essential there be complete cessation introduction into Indochina of new forces or additional military equipment, munitions, etc. Cease-fire must lead to real peace and not be respite to permit preparation for expanding war ;

(5) Control would be effected (a) by joint commissions made up of representatives of belligerents having knowledge local conditions, and (b) by international control commission composed of neutral countries. If agreement in principle can be reached here should be possible work out composition, functions and relations between types of committees ;

(6) Democratic Republic Vietnam agrees that agreements be guaranteed by states members of Geneva conference on basis guarantees will have strictly multilateral and collective character ;

(7) There seems to be general agreement regarding release of prisoners of war.

Democratic Republic Vietnam proposed that following discussion of principles and agreement thereon conference could then proceed to apply same to individual countries. Dong suggested beginning with Vietnam as most important theater of war and then proceed to Khmer and Pathet Lao. He concluded with statement advocating examination of political questions by conference and stating sooner conference occupies itself with these questions the better.

US delegate spoke favorably of restrained way in which Democratic Republic Vietnam had spoken and also regarding Molotov's clear, concise analysis of military questions before conference at last meeting. US delegate stressed importance of cessation hostilities and suggested conference vigorously explore whether progress could be made toward that end. US delegate said Dong statement encouraged optimism this respect.

Laotian delegate expressed general agreement with proposed list of questions. He emphasized importance of effective international control and fact withdrawal of foreign troops would automatically bring about cessation of hostilities in Laos.

Vietnamese delegate agreed with great desirability of cease-fire, but stated that Franco-Vietnamese declaration of April 28 and two treaties agreed to between France and Vietnam had important bearing since as result independence has been achieved by Vietnam. This

problem of independence dominates events in Indochina. Vietnam has negotiated independence from France and must defend that independence against all foreign dangers. Vietnam delegate urged this question be debated.

Eden expressed hope there would be general agreement with US delegate's suggestion leading to fruitful further discussion military aspects beginning with cessation hostilities. He expressed hope discussion general principles be brief and that conference get down to application. He agreed with Democratic Republic Vietnam suggestion that application in Vietnam be first topic after general principles.

Molotov, after speaking of desirability of effective cease-fire leading to durable peace, urged direct contacts be established either in field or at Geneva between parties directly concerned. Molotov then reminded conference of agreement take French and Viet Minh proposals as basis for discussions and pointed out these deal with both military and political matters. Molotov urged political problems be taken up without delay and urged that following tomorrow's meeting on military problems that next meeting be devoted to political problems. He apparently contemplated alternate meetings on military and political problems.

Bidault stated that he could not accept proceeding to political problems until some real progress had been made on military problems. He said that to link two questions now would cause confusion and might lead to failure of conference.

Chou En-lai agreed with Soviet proposal to take up political matters day after tomorrow and also with proposal that parties directly concerned, whom he defined as France and Democratic Republic Vietnam, should make direct contact.

US delegate supported Bidault's point of view regarding delay in taking up political problems until military questions further advanced. He also stated parties at interest include not only France and Democratic Republic Vietnam but also Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.

Viet Minh delegate advocated rotating discussion political and military problems. He accepted Soviet proposal for contacts between directly interested parties and referred to precedent already established on Dien-Bien-Phu wounded.

Bidault stated that while contacts in Geneva had been relatively satisfactory, it would be necessary to have all interested parties and not only these. He denied any agreement to take up military and political problems together and said it was wholly impractical and undesirable to go on to political problems without having at least



provided for stopping bloodshed. He proposed that at tomorrow's restricted session decision might be taken regarding next session.

Molotov then made very strong brief statement to effect that agreement already reached to take up French and Viet Minh proposals made necessary discussion both military and political problems.

Eden said no one denied political problem would eventually have to be discussed, but questioned helpfulness their injection at this stage. Suggested conference reflect on this point and discuss further tomorrow.

US delegate said that rather than challenge Molotov's recollection of agreements earlier reached he proposed adjournment.

However, Cambodian delegate said that he would hope military problem would be cleared up first since Cambodia has no political problem, Cambodia independent sovereign country represented only by Cambodian Government.

*Comment:* Appeared Communists concerned at trend toward discussion military matters before political question and were attempting recover ground lost in this regard. Molotov appeared particularly concerned and his specific suggestion meeting following tomorrow discuss political questions discourages hope Communists might, while reserving their position, permit substantive discussion on military matters proceed without simultaneously injecting political issues. Conclusion is that Communists still playing for time on premise time is on their side in Indochina.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/5-2454: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1954—6:50 p. m.

Tosec 252. For Suydam. Public opinion polling results based on interviews May nineteen through twenty-two.

Sixty-nine percent say if other countries join us, US should "take part in Indochina fighting to keep Communists from taking over all of Indochina". Twenty-three percent say No, remainder no opinion. Those approving were asked should US take part in fighting even if other countries not willing. Yes twenty-one percent, No forty-four percent, No opinion four percent, total sixty-nine percent.

NATO approved by eighty-five percent, and fifty-nine percent approve "US signing agreement for defense Southeast Asia, along with such countries as Philippines, Siam, Australia".

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Foster of P/PS.

Indochina truce as soon as possible desired by forty-six percent, while forty percent want fighting there kept up until Communists defeated.

Our government's handling Indochina problem approved by fifty-four percent, disapproved by sixteen percent, no opinion thirty-three percent. Dulles' handling Geneva conference approved by forty-two percent, disapproved seventeen percent, no opinion forty-one percent. On general way Dulles carrying out job, fifty-seven percent approve, ten percent disapprove, thirty-three percent no opinion compared approval fifty-six in March, sixty-one late April.

DULLES

396.1 GE/5-2154 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1954—7:49 p. m.

Tosec 254. Reference Secto 279 May 21.<sup>2</sup> We are disturbed by persistent Communist bloc attempts during restricted Indochina meeting May 21 to gain acceptance of principle that all three Associated States, to some degree at least, should be given simultaneous consideration and similar treatment.

We note with approval your statements tending to stress essential difference between Vietnam on the one hand and Laos and Cambodia on the other. In this connection we refer to Tosec 152<sup>3</sup> which states as seventh principle basic to any acceptable settlement "evacuation of Vietminh forces from Laos and Cambodia".

We are apprehensive that if Molotov and DRV delegation obtain acceptance of proposition that any single provision or group of provisions is applicable to Indochina as a whole, way will in effect have been opened for internationally recognized implantation of Vietminh elements in Laos and Cambodia.

You should continue vigorously to reject DRV contention that "differences in three States are of degree but not of kind". Our contention is that distinction is precisely one of kind and that failure to insist upon this difference will tend to extend a kind of recognition to shadow Khmer and Pathet-Lao. We must decline to be brought into discussion of Molotov's point 2, "zones for regrouping forces", as this provision might apply to Laos and Cambodia. Our position with regard to these latter two countries is that they are victims of foreign

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4235 and to Saigon as telegram 2393.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 877.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 13, p. 787.

aggression and there can be no question of establishing zones in them for regroupment of enemy forces.

DULLES

396.1 GE/5-2454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 24, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 291. Repeated information Paris 321, London 204, New Delhi 16. Allen (UK delegate) said in talk he had with Menon last night Menon appeared to have been very taken aback by vehemence of Chou En-lai's attack on UN during his conversation with Menon that afternoon. From Menon's account, appears Chou had largely repeated same attack on UN as in his speeches in Korean plenary sessions. Chou also stressed Chinese Communist views on linking political agreements with cease-fire which Menon said contrary Indian views.

Allen said Menon as "fiery" as ever and was vaguely talking about "standstill agreement with modifications" in Indochina, but seemed clear on desirability UN role in supervising any Indochina settlement. He said thought India would accept active role "if invited by both sides" and mentioned team composed of India and Norway.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-2554 : Telegram

*Smith-Menon Meeting, Geneva, May 24, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 25, 1954—11 a. m.

Dulte 108. Repeated New Delhi 17. Eyes only Ambassador. I spent three hours with Krishna Menon last night. He did most of the talking and I made very few comments. He said he was giving his own ideas and did not speak with any authority from his government. I knew, of course, that he would not have spoken as he did without Nehru's authority.

Summary of his remarks as follows :

(a) The conference should reach some agreement on Korea, if only agreement in principle that Korea should be reunited and an agreement to disagree. On procedure, therefore, even an agreement to disagree was a small step forward and not a step backward. After "two years or twenty years" of loose association and some trade and cultural exchanges, they could learn how to get along together. I asked him whether he was suggesting an international body to mediate between the United Nations and the Communists on Korea. He said no, the United Nations, while a belligerent, was also the "umbrella held over the world". In this dual capacity it could mediate with itself

(meaning that the non-participating nations of the UN could mediate between the 16 participants on the one side, and the Communists on the other).

(b) Agreement could be reached on Indochina. He estimated Chou En-lai as a man "with whom one could do business", and Molotov as "quite different and much improved".

(c) There should not be a partition in Indochina, but after a standstill the opposing forces should be gradually gathered into "pockets".

(d) It is unrealistic to think that all military problems can be settled without some corresponding political settlements. For instance, Cambodia and Laos had been invaded, but there were indigenous elements associated with the invaders. All belligerents should stand still and ground their arms while a neutral authority sorted out the invaders. Presumably the indigenous elements remaining in opposition would have little significance in an election. Also, without some political understanding, in which all three states participated, Cambodia and Laos would have no assurance against repetition of trouble.

(e) I asked (because I knew) what his ideas were about a supervisory authority. He said that to be effective it would have to be accepted by all five major participants. India, if agreed to by all and requested to do so, would probably accept the responsibility along with some European nation. He thought Norway was the only one left that might accept and be acceptable to everyone. I mentioned several others, such as Sweden, et cetera, and he said they would probably not accept or would not be acceptable to the Communist side because of close association with NATO. A Latin American country would not do because considered part of the "American Bloc". Canada, though otherwise very good, was probably out for the same reason. Thailand, though Asiatic, was considered generally aligned with the American bloc. Burma might be acceptable, but had local troubles. However, Burma might be able to provide some "token representation". The United Nations as a direct supervisory authority would, he thought, be rejected by Communist China.

(f) The only way an agreement can be reached on a supervisory authority is by private discussions among heads of the five delegations themselves. If India's services were desired, it would have to be a governmental decision; therefore India should not become a bone of contention.

He will be here until Wednesday, will probably talk with Eden again, and may ask to see me once more before he goes to New York.

SMITH

MAY 25, 1954

396.1 GE/5-2554 : Telegram

*Smith-Buu Loc Meeting, Geneva, May 25, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 25, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 298. Repeated information Paris 328, Saigon 109. Prince Buu Loc called on me this morning prior to his return to Paris today and

then to Saigon. He asked me for my views on the conference and the situation in Indochina. I told him I would speak with the frankness of a soldier to say that with two to one numerical superiority and great superiority in armament the Franco-Vietnamese forces should be able, even under second class general, to defeat the Viet Minh provided there was a political situation and a political leadership behind the lines which would inspire the loyalty of the Vietnamese forces and their determination to win. We were prepared to increase our assistance, particularly in form of a training mission and we thought the record showed our methods of mass production achieved results whether in producing automobiles or training troops. Buu Loc said that he was sure that Bao Dai was more than ever determined not to give up the fight but did not want to return to Vietnam without bringing back the treaties establishing Vietnam's independence from France fully signed and sealed. When Bao Dai left Saigon in early April he thought this would be accomplished in two or three weeks. Actually the French were refusing to sign these treaties on the pretense that signature must await conclusion of the subordinate financial and cultural agreements, but, actually, Buu Loc thought because the French did not want to commit themselves irrevocably until they saw how the Geneva conference would turn out. He asked our assistance in bringing strongly to French attention the advantage and indeed necessity in signing these accords without further delay. I told him we favored such action and would do what we could to bring it about. Buu Loc said that it was necessary that the Vietnamese Army have more autonomy and national identity. I told him that we sympathized with that idea and that was the idea of General O'Daniel who wished to form Vietnamese divisions. Buu Loc then went on to say that with military autonomy and with assurance of our continued military assistance, Vietnam would keep up the fight even if the French should agree to an armistice or even withdrawal their military forces in Vietnam. Buu Loc felt that Vietnamese National Army supported by US could hold the southeastern quarter of the Tonkin delta. His government was convinced that it must not yield the northern delta to the Communists which would probably thereafter take over southern Vietnam.

He said he was returning promptly to Saigon and had only stayed these last few days because various delegations of Vietnamese nationalists were arriving in Paris and Geneva and had asked him to stay over and brief them. He said he was urging Bao Dai to leave the further negotiations with the French in the hands of the Vietnamese Foreign Minister and Minister Dac Khe and let Buu Loc take the

other Ministers now engaged in such negotiations back to Saigon to govern and reorganize the country.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-2554

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*<sup>1</sup>

SFCRET

[GENEVA,] May 25, 1954.

There was a meeting of the Six this morning.

1) Ambassador Chauvel suggested that the program for this afternoon should be continued discussion of the seven questions on which Bidault and Dong gave their views yesterday. He hoped that the discussion could be point by point, making clear however that what was involved was agreement on all seven. We expressed general agreement.

2) Chauvel made clear that the French would most strongly resist Molotov's proposal to pass on to political questions at this time. He asked for support from other delegations. We expressed general agreement.

3) Dennis Allen, on instructions from Eden tabled two proposals (attached)<sup>2</sup> dealing with respectively cessation of hostilities and international supervision. Eden's purpose is to secure on these points agreement on certain principles and on certain immediate action. In this way he hopes to cut ground out from under Molotov by showing real progress being made on military questions and hence no reason to pass on to political problems at this time. All of the other delegations reserved their position on the Allen papers although the possibility of a meeting in Geneva of representatives of the two commands in order to work out regrouping arrangements for Viet-Nam alone seemed generally acceptable.

4) Allen took position Dong's proposal yesterday indicated Viet-minh acceptance of principle Viet-Nam to be treated separately from Cambodia and Laos. This argument was not convincing to Cambodian and Laotian representatives who continue to insist on both separation and priority for their relatively simple problems.

Attached is a draft statement<sup>3</sup> for your use today which covers the first four of the seven French questions: cessation of hostilities, regular troops, irregular troops and the supervisory authority.

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Bonsal.

<sup>2</sup> Attachments 2 and 3 below.

<sup>3</sup> Attachment 1 below.

[Attachment 1—Draft]

*Talking Paper for May 25 Indochina Session on "Cessation of Hostilities"*<sup>4</sup>

1. We agreed yesterday that this afternoon we would talk about cessation of hostilities in Vietnam. I believe that we can achieve a cessation of hostilities in Vietnam if agreement can be reached on four points:

- a. Withdrawal of Vietminh forces from Laos and Cambodia.
- b. Withdrawal into specified areas of regular forces in Vietnam.
- c. Disarmament and disbanding of irregular forces.
- d. Establishment of adequate safeguards and creation of an international supervisory commission whose composition and terms of reference would permit it to function effectively.

2. On the first point I will merely repeat again what has been said so many times. Hostilities in Laos and Cambodia can be stopped by arranging for the withdrawal from those two countries of the invading Vietminh forces. I hope this arrangement can be made immediately.

3. On the second point Mr. Bidault has made a proposal for assembling all regular units in assembly areas. If such a regrouping were based on the assumption that this is a preliminary step to provide for the unification of all Vietnam under its recognized government, I would support Mr. Bidault's proposal. If on the other hand, these concentrations, in our judgment, appeared to be a preliminary to the partition of Vietnam, the United States could not associate itself with such a proposal. I will thus have to examine specific proposals which may be advanced before my delegation can take a definitive position on this question.

4. With reference to the third point the United States believes that agreements for the cessation of hostilities should include provisions for the disarmament of all irregular forces. From the statements made yesterday it appears that there is a general consensus on this point.

5. Finally it seems to us of the utmost importance that there should be effective safeguards to provide for the security of armed forces and the civil populations and to ensure against abuses of the cease-fire by either party. The United States maintains these safeguards must be exercised under competent international supervision and that the competent authority is the United Nations. To be effective it seems

---

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 25. Drafted by Stelle.

clear to me that adequate UN control machinery must be in place and ready to function before there is an actual cease-fire.

If progress here indicates that an effective agreement for the cessation of hostilities may be realizable in the near future, we should take up with corresponding urgency the establishment of adequate control machinery.

Representatives of the control commission must have guarantees of unrestricted movement in and free access to all parts of the area in which peace is restored. Such a commission would also have to have sufficient personnel and logistic support to be able to discharge its responsibilities.

6. If we could reach agreement here on the four points I have outlined it would be possible to put an end to the fighting in Indochina.

[Attachment 2]

BRITISH PROPOSAL MADE AT MEETING OF SIX DELEGATIONS MAY 25  
BUT NOT ACCEPTED BY OTHER DELEGATIONS

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

A. *Agreed Principles.*

1. To take place simultaneously throughout all three States as soon as the necessary military agreements are concluded.

2. To be effective for all armed forces of both sides.

3. To take effect by means of :

(a) immediate standstill of all forces ;

(b) immediate subsequent regrouping of forces into areas determined by prior agreement ; and

(c) unhindered passage for the purposes of (b) of forces of one party through areas allotted to the other.

B. *Immediate Action.*

1. The areas in 3(b) above to be worked out for Vietnam.

2. Representatives of the two commands to meet in Geneva for this purpose.

3. These representatives to report their findings and recommendations to the Conference as soon as possible.

4. The Conference meanwhile to proceed with examination of other military matters, beginning with arrangements for international supervision.



## [Attachment 3]

BRITISH PROPOSAL MADE AT MEETING OF SIX DELEGATIONS MAY 25  
BUT NOT ACCEPTED BY OTHER DELEGATIONS

## SUPERVISION

A. *General Principles*

1. Commissions shall be set up in each of the three States.
2. These shall be composed of representatives of neutral countries not members of the present Conference to be chosen by agreement at the Conference.
3. In Vietnam mixed groups consisting of representatives of the two Commands shall also be set up to function under the authority of the Neutral Commission.

B. *Immediate Action*

1. Representatives of the two Commands, meeting in Geneva, to prepare plans for the constitution and operation of the proposed mixed groups in Vietnam.
2. The Conference to examine the constitution and membership of the proposed Neutral Commissions.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 286

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States  
Delegation (Young)*

[Extract]

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 25, 1954.

Subject: Questions Relating to Southeast Asia and Korea

Participants: Prince Wan, Thailand Delegation  
Walter S. Robertson, U.S. Delegation  
Kenneth T. Young, Jr., U.S. Delegation

Prince Wan informed Mr. Robertson that the Government of Thailand had decided to proceed with an appeal to the United Nations regarding aggression in Cambodia and Laos and had instructed its representative in New York to discuss the Thai communication to the United Nations with Ambassador Lodge before filing it. Mr. Robertson expressed his gratification that the Thai Government had taken this action and hoped that it would be carried out as quickly as possible. Prince Wan also informed Mr. Robertson, who agreed, that it would be better to hold off discussion on certain military matters until Ambassador Sarasin had returned to Geneva, which now would be

Saturday.<sup>1</sup> He explained that Ambassador Sarasin would have the benefit of the views of the Prime Minister.

---

<sup>1</sup> May 29.

396.1 GE/5-2654 : Telegram

*Sixth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 25, 3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 26, 1954—1 a. m.

Secto 302. Rptd priority information Paris 329, Tokyo 86, London 206, Moscow 86, priority Saigon 110, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. The sixth restricted session met May 25 with Molotov as chairman.

Molotov indicated there was no need to remind conferees where session had terminated on previous day. He then asked for speakers.

Molotov thanked French delegation for translation of Bidault's statement of yesterday. He had received text of Bidault's statement only upon entering Palais and might reply at next session.

Molotov indicated this session should deal matters upon which there was common view taking up later other matters on which there was no agreement.

Vietnamese representative recalled meeting supposed to examine general principles. However, in doing so it must recognize different situation in three states, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. First problem to be recognized was cessation of hostilities. In considering this problem a different situation exists in Vietnam than in other two states. Negotiations must be based on independence which Vietnam has acquired. If peace restored it must be done within terms of Berlin communiqué. Peace should be restored anywhere possible.

Re measures for regular troops Vietnam held problem in Laos and Cambodia relatively simple. These are sovereign states which he was certain no one at the conference would contest. Conference need only agree on withdrawal of invading troops. Problem of concentration of regular troops existed only in Vietnam. He recalled plan he had previously put forth and made following points:

a. Vietnam would not agree to any plan which would result in its partition.

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/6) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 278. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 7:15 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 143-153. Under Secretary Smith's speech, Indochina Document IC/14, May 26, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279A.

*b.* Vietnamese National Army set up under a legal government and there should be no agreement which would result in restrictions on Vietnamese troops.

*c.* Concentration of troops should take into account security.

*d.* It would be necessary to take measures to prevent any further aggression.

Irregular troops must be disarmed if minimum security precautions were to be met. He proposed procedure be worked out for handling this.

All delegations in agreement on release of POWs and internees. Cease-fire must be on international basis and internationally guaranteed. Such action required if Vietnam to be assured against further aggression. Withdrawal of foreign troops must be taken up after agreement reached on all other issues.

All points inter-dependent and there must be agreement on all before conference can succeed.

Eden submitted a proposal which he hoped would enable the conferees to deal with certain points and then move on to other points. He stated that his proposal related principally to international supervision. Text read :

"In order to facilitate early cessation of hostilities it is necessary to determine areas within which the forces of both sides shall be regrouped.

To this end it is proposed that :

1. Representatives of two commands should meet immediately in Geneva.
2. Their first task should be to work out regrouping areas for Vietnam.
3. They should report their findings and recommendations to conference as soon as possible.
4. Conference meanwhile should proceed with examination of other military matters, beginning with arrangements for international supervision."

DRV representative stated cessation of hostilities means complete cessation to include not only ground action but air and sea action as well. After cessation of hostilities his government would not tolerate French aircraft in the air over territory nor would they permit the French engage in warfare against their fishermen.

He stated that separation of the problem of cessation of hostilities would mean that the conference is moving away from the stated intention of general cessation of hostilities. Separate cessation of hostilities would result in a concentration of forces in areas where hostilities

continued would lead to general hostilities. Then made the following points:

a. Must be recognition of the principles of readjusting areas under control each state.

b. Readjustment would mean exchange of territory taking into account actual areas controlled including population and strategic interests.

c. Each side would get territory in one piece to include complete control of the area both economic and administrative.

d. Line of demarcation should be established following the topographical line of territory to make transportation and communications possible within each state.

e. When the demarcation lines are determined each side would withdraw its troops into its own area including all air and sea forces, military facilities and police forces.

f. Territory under administration of one side would continue under the control of that side until its troops were withdrawn, immediately after which administration would be transferred to control of the other side.

In conclusion, stated that agreement must be worked out on a cease-fire and once principle is agreed to by Geneva Conference, the commanders of both sides should meet and make recommendations to the conferees on the terms of the armistice. Conferees could then agree on final terms of settlement. Pointed out that any arrangement for cease-fire must include arrangements for Khmer and Pathet Lao.

Bidault referred to proposals made for regrouping of forces, pointing out that procedures should be examined as the first step in that direction. Referred to proposals previously made for examination by the High Command on the spot stating that conference convened in Geneva and the High Command should prepare and submit recommendations to the conferees for consideration. He mentioned that representatives of High Command might appear in Geneva for consultation.

Bidault proposed that the conference speed up consideration of the problem of Laos and Cambodia pointing out that the conference must not submerge a simple problem only to consider a more complex problem.

General Smith then made the following statement:<sup>2</sup> "When we left yesterday, I was under the impression that we would talk about a cessation of hostilities in all of Indochina, with specific reference to Vietnam.

"If I understand the proposal of the Viet Minh representative, he referred to partition of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. I do not believe we should seriously consider this proposal. I believe that we can

<sup>2</sup> Correction in Under Secretary Smith's statement transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 304. *infra*.

achieve a cessation of hostilities if agreement can be reached on three points:

- “(1) Withdrawal into specified areas of regular forces in Vietnam;
- “(2) Disarmament and disbanding of irregular forces;
- “(3) Establishment of adequate safeguards and creation of an international supervisory commission whose composition and terms of reference would permit it to function effectively.

“On the first point, Mr. Bidault has made a proposal for assembling all regular units in assembly areas. I can wholeheartedly support Bidault's proposal.

“In the meanwhile, Mr. Eden has submitted a proposal which is preliminary to achieving a cessation of hostilities. I believe that we should proceed with an examination of it immediately.

“With reference to the second point, the US believes that agreements for cessation of hostilities should include provisions for the disarmament of all irregular forces. It was my understanding yesterday that there was agreement on this point.

“Finally, it seems to us to be essential that there be effective safeguards to provide for the security of armed forces and the civil population, and to insure against abuses of the cessation of hostilities agreement by either party. It seems unlikely that men who have been fighting for months will ground arms and keep the peace unless they are under competent international supervision. From our point of view, the most competent authority in existence for such purpose is the United Nations.

“I have addressed myself exclusively to the problem of Vietnam because it was my understanding that was our agreement. However, I shall repeat what I have said before that hostilities in Laos and Cambodia can be stopped by arranging for the withdrawal from those two countries of the invading Viet Minh forces. I would hope that this arrangement can be made without delay. I will not say anything further on this point at this time.”

Molotov concluded by stating that Eden's proposal would be circulated to permit quick consideration. He then stated that he hoped that he would be expressing a common view if he proposed recess.

Following recess, Molotov proposed certain amendments to Eden's draft text: In preamble, addition of words “and simultaneous” between “early” and “cessation”; in paragraph 1, addition of the phrase “in order that this would contribute also to the establishment of contacts between interested parties on the spot”; and paragraph 2, to read “their task should be to work out the regrouping areas for the two sides and first of all for Vietnam”. He had no amendments for paragraph 3 but thought that paragraph 4 was hardly necessary because

it dealt with matters which related to conference as a whole and not to immediate problem.

Bidault supported Eden's proposal but Cambodian delegate asked whether it applied to all Indochinese states or just to Vietnam. Eden replied that preamble intended to be general but that paragraph 2 was for Vietnam. To this, Cambodian entered reservation in order "not to mix up those things which should be kept distinct". Furthermore, he could not accept any of the Soviet amendments.

General Smith thought that British delegate's proposal extremely well-drafted and got by two opposing positions now occupied without doing violence to either and offered possibility of progress. On other hand, he thought that amendment to paragraph 1 proposed by chairman was sensible and reasonable. Facilitating their contacts in the field would help work at Geneva and US delegation could accept this. The other suggestions he would find too difficult to accept and believe so would other delegations. He would explain his reasons to his colleagues. US delegation had made its position very clear regarding situation it believed existed in Laos and Cambodia. Yet in effort to be helpful and contribute to work of the conference, the delegation had gone along with examination of various proposals but making it very apparent that it was not abandoning its position. British proposal would make it possible to make progress without surrendering this point. He suggested conference accept Molotov's amendment to paragraph 1 and eliminate the others, namely to preamble and paragraph 2, returning to original draft. This would permit conference to proceed without further obstacle or damage to US position.

Bidault then stressed that British proposal must be applicable only to Vietnam, that it was only there that a regrouping of military forces was required. He was agreeable to establishment of contacts at Geneva and in the field.

Vietnam delegate expressed view that first sentence of British proposal prejudged situation in Cambodia and Laos. He supported Bidault's statement and requested specification that first sentence where reference was made to regrouping of forces only applied to Vietnam. He could not agree to Soviet addition of "simultaneous". Cessation of hostilities should occur wherever possible without delay. Soviet amendment to paragraph 2 by generalizing concept prejudged by its terms result of any regrouping. As a final remark, he stressed concern with which Vietnam nation views possibility that conference may produce partition of national territory. This was contrary to wishes of Vietnam people and he was duly bound to request conference to give its assurances that regrouping of forces would not result in partition.

Eden supported General Smith's analysis of meaning of his text and proposed amendments. He had simply tried to put down greatest common measure of agreement without prejudging any issues. He had not tried to deal with that of Laos and Cambodia but simply with great task of work regarding Vietnam which sooner or later conference had to deal with. He expressed hope that agreement could be reached on Molotov's amendment to first paragraph and that his other amendments would not be pressed.

Molotov offered to withdraw his amendments excepting that to paragraph 1 but added that in order to avoid controversial issues he coupled this with proposal that text be restricted to paragraph 1. If necessary, paragraph 3 could remain as new paragraph 2, although its content was obvious.

Bidault replying first to Vietnam statement, assured him that conference had not been convened to tear apart unity of Vietnamese nation. He then expressed view that suppression paragraphs 2 and 4 from Eden proposal would render document null and void. He proposed that if whole text with Soviet amendment to paragraph 1 could not be accepted, that time be taken to ponder the problem. It might be advisable to devote tomorrow to full examination of all proposals made so far in order to understand complete situation where there was agreement and where not.

Cambodian delegate then announced it was his duty to state that he could not accept UK proposal since in some points it applied to Cambodia. It was his understanding that today was to be devoted to Vietnam. He appreciated Eden's efforts at conciliation but was obliged to make firm reservations regarding any decisions which might be taken affecting his country.

A final effort by General Smith to obtain agreement to Eden's proposal with Soviet amendment to paragraph 1 only impelled Molotov to accept Bidault's suggestion that tomorrow be devoted to clarification of delegation's views on this and other proposals.

Following agreement of routine communiqué, next restricted meeting Indochina phase agreed for Friday, May 27.<sup>3</sup>

*Comment:* It is clear from foregoing that separate treatment Laos and Cambodia remains fundamental issue on which Communists despite procedural dialectics are not yet prepared to compromise. DRV proposal is clear bid for partition. All delegations excepting Laos and Cambodia have agreed to contact between representatives High Commands both in Geneva and in field.

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> Date of next restricted meeting, Indochina phase, given incorrectly; it should read Thursday, May 27. (Corrected in telegram Secto 304, *infra*.)

396.1 GE/5-2654 : Telegram

*Sixth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 25, 3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 26, 1954—11 a. m.

Secto 304. Repeated information priority Paris 331, priority Saigon 111, Tokyo 88, London 207, Moscow 87, Phnom Penh, Vientiane. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Reference Secto 302,<sup>1</sup> repeated foregoing addressees. Correct first quoted statement by General Smith to read as follows:

"When we left yesterday I was under the impression that we would talk today about a cessation of hostilities in all of Indochina, with specific reference to examining the problem of Vietnam.

"If I understand the proposal of the Viet Minh representative, he is now proposing to partition Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. I do not believe we should seriously consider this proposal. I believe, however, that we can achieve a cessation of hostilities if agreement can be reached on three general points: These are (1) withdrawal into specified areas of regular forces in Vietnam; (2) disarmament and disbanding of irregular forces; (3) establishment of adequate safeguards and creation of an international supervisory commission whose composition and terms of reference would permit it to function effectively.

"On the first point, M. Bidault has made a proposal for assembling all regular units in Assembly areas. If such a regrouping is a preliminary step to provide for the ultimate unification of all Vietnam under its recognized government, I can support M. Bidault's proposal. However, we will want to examine the specific suggestions which may be advanced.

"In the meanwhile, Mr. Eden has submitted proposal which is an inevitable preliminary to achieving a cessation of hostilities. I believe that we should accept it and proceed with it immediately.

"With reference to the second point, the US believes that agreements for cessation of hostilities should include provisions for the disarmament of all irregular forces. From the statements made yesterday, it appears that there is a general consensus of opinion on this point.

"Finally, it seems to us to be essential that there be effective safeguards to provide for the security of armed forces and the civil population, and to insure against abuses of the cessation of hostilities agreement by either party. It seems unlikely that men who have been fighting for months will ground arms and keep the peace unless they are under competent international supervision. From our point of view the most competent authority in existence for such purpose is the United Nations. To be effective, it seems clear to me that adequate UN control machinery must be in place and ready to function at the time of actual cessation of hostilities.

"I have addressed myself exclusively to the problem of Vietnam because it was my understanding that was our agreement. However I

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*



shall repeat what I have said before that the situations of Laos and Cambodia present a special case, and hostilities in Laos and Cambodia can be stopped by arranging for the withdrawal from those two countries of the invading Viet Minh forces. I would hope that this arrangement can be made without delay. I will not say anything further on this point at this time."

The foregoing text being circulated to other delegations.

Additional correction: Date of next restricted meeting Indochina phase given incorrectly Secto 302. Should read Thursday May 27.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-2454 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, May 25, 1954—4: 53 p. m.

Tedul 121. Reference Dultes 103<sup>2</sup> and 107.<sup>3</sup> Your talk with Bidault effectively clears way for developing direct personal contact between you and Bao Dai.<sup>4</sup> Reports your further conversations with Bao Dai will assist us in decisions which may have to be taken quickly.

Despite rapid course of events in Vietnam, we fear that Bao Dai and Buu Loc government lack sense urgency and believe we should do all possible to encourage them to initiate prompt and radical action.

As indicated, FYI portion Tedul 110<sup>5</sup> was intended serve only as background and not as subject specific discussion.

DULLES

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4244 and to Saigon as telegram 2403.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 24, p. 900.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 24, p. 902.

<sup>4</sup> Smith reported in telegram Dulte 115, May 26, that "through intermediary appointed by Bao Dai I have suggested a conversation with Bao Dai but have indicated this might take place after French Assembly debate on Indochina now scheduled for June 1st." (396.1 GE/5-2654)

<sup>5</sup> Dated May 22, p. 892.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 242 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, May 25, 1954—6: 51 p. m.

Tedul 123. Limit distribution. Hope your talk with Eden resulted in British agreement go along on Thai initiative in SC,<sup>2</sup> since we are eager begin proceedings without delay.

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Popper of UNA/UNP. Repeated to USUN as telegram 588.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding the Thai decision to make an appeal to the United Nations, see the memorandum of conversation, p. 919.

We would expect Khoman would be able to send Thai letter raising this matter in SC before end of week, and that SC meetings could be scheduled, say, for Wednesday, Thursday and Friday next week (June 2, 3 and 4). If SC action could be completed that quickly, and assuming Soviet veto, we would expect General Assembly might meet on or shortly after June 15th.

Would appreciate it if you could ask Eden to request Dixon in New York to cooperate to extent possible in arranging for SC proceedings.

We will want to approach Indians as soon as we know Eden has consented.

DULLES

---

751G.00/5-2554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 25, 1954—8 p. m.

Dulte 111. Eyes only Secretary. Eden showed me today in confidence a Cabinet message from Burma which stated that Burma was willing if called upon to participate as a member of a supervisory commission in Indochina, although they could contribute little in the way of troops. It went on to state that Burma was also prepared, in the event the Geneva conference failed, to join a Southeast Asian security pact.

SMITH

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 246 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 25, 1954.

Dulte 112. Eden has just informed me officially that although the British Government has serious misgivings about the timing of the Thai appeal to the UN, they will nevertheless go along with us if we decide that it must be done at this time. Eden gave me a memorandum of the following questions for consideration. I answered most of these informally and apparently to his general satisfaction in accordance with previous correspondence with the Department, but we agreed that Dixon, Lodge and the French representative should get together in New York and arrive at a coordinated position with respect to the considerations raised in the British memorandum.

1. I told him that our thought was that the appeal should go to the Security Council and then to the Interim Committee but I did not think we would have any objection were it to go direct to a special

session of the General Assembly, although I thought the French might object.

2(a) I had no ideas with regard to the problem of Chinese representation.

(b) We felt that the appeal should be direct from Thailand to the United Nations and that the Associated States should not be brought into the picture until later.

3(a) Draft resolution was being worked out by Thailand. Subsequently, subcommission would visit the other areas which might invite them.

(b) Lodge, Pearson and associates could work out the proposed composition of the subcommittee. That proposed in the British memorandum was not far away from our own ideas.

4. Could not answer it here.

5. It would probably be difficult to control debates in the General Assembly and the French are worried about various issues of colonialism being dragged in, particularly Morocco and Tunisia.

6. We believe the effect would be good here, providing the appeal was divorced entirely from the Geneva Conference and was direct from Thailand to the United Nations.

7. The Peace Observation Commission is probably our best chance of getting anything like genuinely neutral supervision later in the Associated States.

8. We believe that Thai appeal to UN should proceed as rapidly as possible and be completely divorced from the Geneva Conference at this time.

Following is text of British memorandum :

“Questions for consideration with respect to the proposed appeal by Thailand to the United Nations.

1. Should the appeal go direct to a special session of the General Assembly or should it go first to the Security Council and then to the General Assembly in accordance with the United Action for Peace procedure?

2.(a) How should the problem of Chinese representation be handled?

(b) What, if any, governments or authorities would be invited to participate in the debates in the Security Council and the General Assembly? Possible claims to appear by Laos, Cambodia, Viet-Nam and Viet-Minh, should be considered.

3.(a) What should be the exact terms of the draft resolution? For example, consideration should be given to phrase “the general area of Thailand”? What areas should the sub-commission visit?

(b) Would the proposed composition of the sub-commission—India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden and Uruguay—be satisfactory or feasible? If not, what should be its composition?

4. What votes in support of the draft resolution would there be in the Security Council and the General Assembly? Would there be a sufficient majority in the latter?

5. Would it be possible to control the debates especially in the General Assembly?

6. What would be the effect of the debates on the position in Indo-China and on the Geneva Conference?

7. What would be the relations between the functions of the sub-commission and any agreement on Indo-China that may emerge from the Geneva Conference?

8. What would be the timing of proceedings in the United Nations, especially in relation to the Geneva Conference?"

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/5-2554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 25, 1954—9 p. m.

Dulte 113. Limit distribution. In conversation with Eden this morning, he showed me in great confidence, message from High Commissioner in India,<sup>1</sup> the text of which is given below, which is illuminating and shows some of the considerations which are conditioning United Kingdom thinking regarding our maneuvers with respect to Southeast Asia :

"1. Indians realise that if Geneva Conference fails, dangerous situation will arise throughout Southeast Asia and the Far East, carrying with it whole series of alarming possibilities. These are seen as ranging in order of gravity from large scale Western intervention in Indochina (involving another 'Korean' campaign with every risk that this time the conflict could not be localised) to abandonment of Indochina, but formation under Western auspices of a collective defense organization designed to safeguard neighboring territories. In Indian eyes, former at best, would be a tragedy, not least for the people of Indochina themselves; at worst, it would be suicidal as opening way for general war. Latter might enable peace to be preserved for a while, but in Indian estimation, further clash would only be a matter of time. And either course would involve renewed Western domination in a large part of Southeast Asia which would not only offend Asian nationalist sentiment everywhere, but would, in Indian view, be a futile and self-defeating policy. They are convinced, indeed, that peace can never be established on any lasting basis, unless Western powers keep their hands off Asia and leave Asian countries on a basis of full independence to settle their affairs amongst themselves.

"2. But while such considerations may be at back of their minds, Indians have not yet brought themselves to think seriously of possibility of failure of Geneva Conference. It is all-important to them

---

<sup>1</sup> Sir Alexander Clutterbuck.

that it should succeed, and they view progress to date, though slow, as not unsatisfactory. They feel that there is now good hope of a cease-fire. Once that stage is reached, the rest should, in their view, be much easier, even though negotiations for a political settlement are bound to be prolonged.

"3. In the above circumstances, any new deal between the United States and Siam on the lines indicated in your telegram would be regarded here as quite disastrous. It would be looked on as a new attempt by the United States to sabotage the Geneva Conference and one which almost certainly would have that result. All hopes built on present negotiations would be shattered and it would be felt that last opportunity for peaceful settlement has been wantonly thrown away. American stock, already very low here, would sink to rock-bottom and political reactions would be very serious.

"4. Apart from impact on Geneva Conference, proposal would be bound to cause indignation from India's own standpoint. With United States/Pakistan deal on one side, and United States/Siamese deal on the other, India would feel herself being contained by United States and her associates; distrust and suspicion of United States motives would be magnified, and there would be serious risk of anti-American feeling taking an anti-Western form.

"5. From the angle of this post, therefore, I must hope that advantage will be taken of any opportunity that arises to impress on Americans extreme unwisdom of pursuing any such proposal while Geneva Conference is in session. If Conference fails, whole situation will no doubt have to be considered *de novo*, and this might be part of the defensive measures that may then become necessary. But if trouble here is to be avoided, it is essential that current negotiations should be given every chance before there is any airing of measures which, from Indian standpoint, are bound to appear provocative to the other side."

SMITH

MAY 26, 1954

110.11 DU/5-2654 : Telegram

*Smith-Eden-Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, May 26, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 26, 1954—8 p. m.

Dulte 121. Repeated information Paris 338, Saigon 118, London 211. This morning Eden and Chauvel, in Bidault's absence, and I discussed tactics for next few days, particularly with respect to Laos and Cambodia and question international control.

Eden wondered at what point we are going to stand on Cambodia and Laos. Their problem was separate but complementary to that in Vietnam and he saw no reason why simultaneous cease-fire was in itself objectionable. He thought an acceptable formula would:

(1) Cease-fire, (2) withdrawal of troops into areas near frontier and (3) withdrawal of all foreign forces within six months. He rec-

ognized danger of this was that foreign troops were not now concentrated and that we could have no confidence they would be gotten out of country in absence of effective supervision.

Chauvel said France did not consider the proposal of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina to be one which we could oppose in principle. Moreover, it was likely to happen anyhow. The identity of regular Viet Minh battalions in Cambodia and Laos has been definitely established, and they are known to be elements of regular Viet Minh divisions. Chauvel believed these forces must be regrouped on Vietnamese territory and not on Laotian or Cambodian territory. French also had heard rumors Communists might be less difficult on Laos and Cambodia than on Vietnam. Cease-fire could be simultaneous in all three but certainly restoration of peace would not.

I agreed with Chauvel's views but said I would need further instructions. We must assume bad faith on Communist side and must insure that Communists did not profit by armistice period to strengthen and extend their position. It would be difficult to oppose proposal for simultaneous cease-fire but composition and effectiveness of supervisory control was basic problem. Chauvel said Viet Minh had yesterday agreed to give French written copy of their proposal but were still stalling hour by hour and it might be somewhat different when finally received. It would be desirable if West could make counterproposal at next meeting.

On question of controls, Eden said Krishna Menon had indicated India would participate in military supervision of regrouping. Presumably India neither would nor should act alone. Norway and probably Burma might be acceptable and might agree.

I said I had just been talking to Menon and raised question under what authority India would be acting if a participant. Would it be UN or under terms of reference from Geneva conference, perhaps referred to UN? Contingent of Indian army acting under international command was one thing, while Indian contingent acting under direct control of Nehru and Indian Government quite another. (Some influential US opinion would consider latter would mean turnover of Indochina to Communists.) Menon had said India did not rent out its army. I said neither did we but we had on occasion placed ours under international control where interests of world required. Eden did not think Menon would object to UN auspices but doubted Chinese would accept it. Menon had said that the UN might be brought into picture by conference here agreeing on composition of international authority and informally approaching agreed-upon nations to ascertain whether they would be willing to serve. These nations might thereupon reply that they would so serve providing they were asked to do so by UN.

This would automatically induce some element of UN supervision. Chauvel said French had no definite views and asked whether group of India, Norway and Burma would be agreeable to us. I said we had strong views on what should be established for fully effective supervision and that suggested grouping would not be fully satisfactory to us but might be best we could get. There was some advantage in making Asians police their own back yard. Also somebody would have to provide a considerable military force.

Chauvel asked whether some continuing agency set up by this conference could provide suitable auspices. I said that would be dangerous in diluting and confusing authority of UN. Chauvel suggested we give Communists burden of making first proposal. Eden felt when conference adjourned it would probably have to leave some *ad hoc* body in existence anyway. I stated that Menon seemed to want some connection with UN and seemed to be searching for formula "such as under general UN guidance."

It was agreed that tripartite working group would meet this afternoon on problems of troop withdrawal from Laos and Cambodia and international control, including alternatives as to composition, and that we would meet again tomorrow morning. It was also agreed Lodge, Hoppenot and Dixon would be asked to work together in New York on devising quickest and most effective UN procedures for handling Thailand appeal.

I objected strongly to continuing leaks on restricted sessions and recalled Molotov had said we might as well be in open sessions. French maintained embarrassed silence. Eden wished to think it over. We have got to do something about present disorderly and distorted leakage.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/5-2654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 26, 1954—5 p. m.

Secto 309. Repeated information Paris 336, Saigon 115. In immediately forthcoming Indochina sessions we will undoubtedly be discussing question of international supervision. I need guidance urgently on following points: <sup>1</sup>

1. Do we stick to the position we have so far taken that international controls should be under UN auspices? If so, what and how direct should relations to UN be?

---

<sup>1</sup> Department of State reply contained in telegram Tosec 288, May 28, p. 966.

2. If we accept control not under UN auspices for Vietnam should we insist on UN supervision of Laos and Cambodia?

3. If we stick to UN controls what will be our maximum and our minimum positions with regard to the composition of a control commission?

4. If we agree to supervision not by the UN what would be our maximum and our minimum positions with regard to the composition of the control body?

5. What should be our suggestions as to the authority to which a non-UN commission should report?

6. What should be our suggestions on financing such commission? Our estimate here is that the French will not propose, but might go along with a proposal for control machinery under the UN. The Laotians will go along with the French. The Cambodians will be adamant for UN control. The Vietnamese will want UN machinery but may possibly agree to other international supervision. The English will probably push for non-UN controls. The Communists will, of course, oppose UN control.

SMITH

---

790.5/5-2654 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      NIACT      WASHINGTON, May 26, 1954—6:07 p. m.

Tedul 126. Re Dulte 117.<sup>2</sup> UK military have informed our JCS of receipt of message from Eden yesterday indicating he had accepted interpretations set forth in your memo;<sup>3</sup> that USDel Geneva had been informed; and that it was now agreed talks could proceed as soon as possible.

Our JCS would like to issue invitations Thursday<sup>4</sup> for five-power talks to begin Washington about June 2 and would appreciate urgent confirmation way is now clear.<sup>5</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by MacArthur.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram Dulte 117, May 26, Smith reported that "Eden has forwarded my memorandum to London and is confident it will be well received. He hopes talks will start as quickly as possible and so do I. Can we not get on with them?" (790.5/5-2554)

<sup>3</sup> See telegrams Tedul 107, May 22, and Dulte 100, May 23, pp. 888 and 900, respectively.

<sup>4</sup> May 27.

<sup>5</sup> The JCS issued the invitation on May 27 for talks to begin June 3, and designated Adm. Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, as Senior U.S. Representative to the talks.



110.11 DU/5-2454 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>SECRET      PRIORITY  
NO DISTRIBUTION

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1954—7:39 p. m.

Tedul 127. Eyes only for Under Secretary from Secretary. Re Dulte 105.<sup>2</sup> If your answer reflects merely personal preference I can well understand it. However, we want to be sure that you feel that the substitution mentioned would not be misinterpreted by other friendly Foreign Ministers who are there as a slight to them and also that you feel that it would not be interpreted as U.S. writing off the conference or effort to sabotage conference. We do not want to be blamed for causing conference failure. We assume that if you do plan return as suggested, you would get here June 7th or 8th, and the maximum advance notice should be given so as to avoid impression that your departure is related to some particular event. On receipt of your reply<sup>3</sup> I will take matter up with the President.

Incidentally, I find at all quarters agreement on brilliant job you are doing.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram Tedul 111, May 24, Secretary Dulles informed Under Secretary Smith that he had planned for some time to make a trip of the Middle West and West beginning on June 9 and that he "would hope very much you could be back by then as would be reluctant to leave Department for several days at this juncture without you." (110.11 DU/5-2454) In reply, Smith, in telegram Dulte 105, May 24, informed the Secretary that "nothing would make me happier. I see no reason why this could not be done." (110.11 DU/5-2454)

<sup>3</sup> See Dulte 123, May 27, p. 940.

751G.00/5-2654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 26, 1954—8 p. m.

Dulte 120. Repeated information Paris 337, Saigon 117. Eyes only Ambassadors. Re Dulte 109, repeated Paris 325, Saigon 107.<sup>1</sup> My Dulte 109 should have said "I would like to reinforce last four numbered paragraphs of Dillon's message<sup>2</sup> on independence Associated States".

---

<sup>1</sup> In telegram Dulte 109, May 25, Under Secretary Smith reported that he "would like to reinforce the last paragraph of Dillon's message on independence Associated States. I believe that it is of the utmost importance to have prompt signature of the two basic treaties. Aside from the fact that we are in a false position here until these are signed, it is probable that when they are signed Bao Dai will return promptly and, to the extent his energy and ability permit, will try to assume national leadership." (751G.00/5-2554)

<sup>2</sup> For telegram 4514 from Paris, May 24, see volume XIII.

Am convinced that we should not continue to press at this time for statement granting Associated [States] right of withdrawal from French Union, as this would not produce sufficiently favorable effects in Vietnam to counterbalance undoubtedly adverse effects including diminished support French Assembly and public opinion for immediately required military measures in Indochina.

Urgent thing now is to get the two basic treaty documents signed.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/5-2654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 26, 1954—8 p. m.

Dulte 122. Eyes only Secretary; Paris 339 eyes only Ambassador. Reference Dulte 107 repeated Paris 322.<sup>1</sup> Following my confidential talk with Bidault on Monday, he and Margerie, with incredible stupidity, gave Baeyens generalized account of what I had told them in complete secrecy about my dinner with Molotov, including Molotov's groping for word and my supplying it.

Baeyens, who tells everything, repeated this to AFP correspondent who used it. Fortunately his remarks on substance were only banalities which did no particular harm, but that one touch made it obvious to Molotov that I had personally described our conversation to Bidault. Word comes back from Russians through US correspondent that Molotov is greatly annoyed, and I think the incident has probably destroyed our small base of contact.

This demonstrates practical impossibility of speaking to French with anything like real frankness about such matters, and I will unfortunately have to act accordingly in future. I have so advised Bidault.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup>Dated May 24, p. 902.

---

396.1 GE/5-2654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 26, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 313. Repeated information Paris 340, Saigon 119. Re Sectos 261<sup>1</sup> and 265.<sup>2</sup> Member USDel today told Ngo Dinh Luyen, Bao Dai's personal emissary, that General Smith has no comment for present

---

<sup>1</sup>Telegram Secto 261, May 20, contained a report of a conversation between Under Secretary Smith and Ngo Dinh Luyen on May 18. For memorandum of conversation, see p. 843.

<sup>2</sup>Dated May 20, p. 863.

regarding various questions as to US action in certain contingencies (question referred mainly to US intervention if French pull out, to US direct assistance for Vietnamese Army and US views on political developments in Vietnam including particularly Bao Dai's alleged project of replacing Buu Loc with Ngo Dinh Diem).

Ngo Dinh Luyen was told Under Secretary appreciates contact established and that in addition Under Secretary believes, if Bao Dai concurs, that further meeting between Bao Dai and Under Secretary might be useful in event Bao Dai plans to be in Geneva neighborhood. Date of such meeting tentatively suggested as late next week after forthcoming French Assembly debate.

We have endeavored impress Ngo Dinh Luyen with USDel view that (a) nothing should be done to weaken French determination to react vigorously in present military emergency in Tonkin and (b) major importance that all positive elements on free world side (including Bao Dai) should be united and move forward in most coordinated fashion possible.

Ngo Dinh Luyen tells us decision as to Ngo Dinh Diem's departure for Saigon not yet firm.

SMITH

---

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Indochina": Telegram

*The Head of the United States Delegation (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET      PERSONAL AND PRIVATE      [GENEVA,] 26 May 1954.

DEAR FOSTER: Dag Hammarskjold came to see me this evening on pretext of courtesy call. He is leaving tonight for New York and will confer with Cabot Lodge and Dixon on Friday<sup>1</sup> regarding the Thailand proposal. He had just been with Eden, who told him the British position which I have already given you. Dag Hammarskjold does not think the Thai proposal will weaken the U.N. if properly handled, but he is worried about tactics, not only in the Security Council but in the General Assembly, with Mrs. Pandit in the chair. He said with some hesitancy, that he found it difficult to discuss things seriously with Cabot Lodge, who did not seem to be well informed on details and who seemed unwilling to transcend U.S. internal political factors. Dag Hammarskjold said he confined himself strictly to proper channels, to avoid arousing resentment, but on this matter, the timing and impact of which is of so much importance, he would hope after his Friday conference to have a private talk directly with you in order to decide on strategy. He could come to Washington Monday afternoon, quite quietly. I told him I would pass this on to you through

<sup>1</sup> May 28.

private channels and that if you were willing you could get word to him by phone Friday afternoon, or Saturday morning. I am inclined to think this would be useful and we transmit it through Allen Dulles' channel as I do not want anyone here to know about it.<sup>2</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> Allen W. Dulles informed the Department of State at 6:22 p. m. on May 26 that he had received the above message from Smith and that Smith wanted the Secretary to see it that night. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Telephone conversations) A notation on the source text by O'Connor indicates that the Secretary saw the letter. Concerning the Dulles-Hammarskjold meeting, June 2, see p. 1012.

MAY 27, 1954

751G.00/5-2754

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 27, 1954.

Subject: Meeting of the Six Delegations May 27.

1) At this morning's meeting the French Delegation submitted an entirely new paper<sup>2</sup> regarding establishment of contact between military commands for the determination of regrouping zones in Viet-Nam. Under general principles, the paper reproduces the language of the Viet Minh proposal for exchanges of territory based on a variety of political, demographic, and economic principles. French military and political experts (Major Debarnot and Cheysson) spoke briefly in favor of the proposal. The Vietnamese Delegate took strong issue with the proposed acceptance of the Viet Minh language which he said would merely lead to partition; (in this he was conservative; acceptance of the Viet Minh principles would very probably give to the Viet Minh a firm springboard from which they could rapidly absorb the entire country). It was finally agreed that if the French make their proposal, they will include only strictly military considerations plus a positive statement against any arrangements leading to partition.

2) This current French proposal takes as a point of departure Eden's May 25 proposal.

3) The British paper<sup>3</sup> providing for the regrouping in Viet-Nam of Viet Minh troops in Laos and Cambodia was read but was not given thorough consideration. It appears that the problem of the simultaneity of the cessation of hostilities is recognized to be a practical rather than a theoretical one.

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Bonsal.

<sup>2</sup> Attachment 1 below.

<sup>3</sup> Attachment 2 below.

4) The Cambodian Delegation strongly restated the well known Cambodian position regarding the necessity for a withdrawal of all Viet Minh forces from Cambodia.

## [Attachment 1]

CONFIDENTIAL

FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE MILITARY  
PROBLEM OF VIETNAM

(Further proposals will be put forward in the immediate future for Laos and Cambodia and it is understood that nothing agreed for any one area will prevent the entry into force of a cease-fire in all areas simultaneously.)

1. Representatives of Commanders-in-Chief of the two parties will meet at Geneva on \_\_\_\_\_.

2. They will examine, in the first place, the demarcation of the zones of regrouping in Vietnam.

3. They will present their recommendations and observations to the Conference.

4. It will be their task to propose the basis upon which the regroupment will be carried out, taking into account the following two principles: (a) the regroupment must not lead to a dismemberment of Vietnam, and (b) the regroupment has for its objective the reestablishment of peace and security in Vietnam.

5. If it should be considered necessary, they will be able to request the Conference to define such points as they consider useful.

6. During this time the Conference will continue to study other problems relative to the peace in Indochina.

## [Attachment 2]

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSAL OF THE U.K. DELEGATION

In order to facilitate the early and simultaneous cessation of hostilities [~~it is necessary to determine the areas within which the forces of both sides shall be regrouped.~~

~~To this end~~<sup>4</sup> it is proposed that:

1. Representatives of the two commands should meet immediately in Geneva in order that this should also contribute to the establishment of contacts between the two parties on the spot.

2. Their first task should be to work out the regrouping areas for Vietnam [~~the two sides and first of all for Vietnam~~].<sup>4</sup>

3. They should report their findings and recommendations to the conference as soon as possible.

<sup>4</sup> Brackets in the source text.

4. The conference meanwhile should proceed with examination of other military matters, beginning with arrangements for international supervision.

---

396.1 GE/5-2754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 27, 1954—10 a. m.

Dulte 123. Eyes only Secretary. Reference Tedul 127.<sup>1</sup> I would like to reserve final recommendation till Monday or Tuesday of next week. Believe it very likely that following ten days will be the critical period. As your own departure caused some comment here, and as Molotov, Eden and Bidault apparently intend to stay on through next ten days or so, my own view and that of Phleger, to whom I have talked privately, is that I should also remain. I don't imply that Murphy and others could not do quite as good or even a better job.

The probability is that general interpretation, no matter what was said, would be that we had written off the conference and were pulling out by degrees, or even that we were sabotaging at critical moment.

If you were leaving the US, it would, of course, be different. On the other hand, I do not think you should cancel out this very important trip. If you feel you cannot maintain adequate direction by phone, et cetera, and that I should be there, possibly I could come home for period of your trip with understanding that I was returning in few days, leaving Robertson to carry on. Trouble is that Phleger, whose judgment is very valuable, will be leaving at same time. I have reasonable excuse for short trip home as I was scheduled to receive honorary degree at New York University June 9.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 26, p. 935.

---

110.11 DU/5-2754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1954—10:22 a. m.

Tedul 131. Re Dulte 124.<sup>2</sup>

1. Our military authorities are today inviting representatives of other four powers to meet Washington June 3.

2. This invitation is for moment secret because Australians last

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by MacArthur. Repeated to London as telegram 6374, to Paris as telegram 4276, to Canberra as telegram 224, and to Wellington from Canberra as telegram 174.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram Tedul 124, May 27, Smith said he urgently confirmed "my own view way has been cleared for several days for beginning Five-Power talks. Eden has same view and confirms despatch instructions to UK military Washington mentioned first paragraph reference telegram." (110.11 DU/5-2754)

night made strong *démarche* urging that there be public announcement re meeting. In view leaks and speculation, State and Defense agree public announcement would be useful.

3. We therefore have agreed to following text proposed to us by Australians (which we modified in two minor respects) :

*Begin text.* The Govts of Australia, France, New Zealand, the UK, and the US have agreed that talks will begin in Washington on June 3, between military representatives of their Chiefs of Staff.

Discussions will survey the military situation in the Far East arising out of developments in Indochina. Talks will be without commitment to any of the govts whose military representatives are participating. These discussions should be of value not only to these five govts, but to other govts in the region in any further conversations, military or political, which may take place later on a wider basis.

*End text.*

4. Coordination and timing of press release will be difficult unless it is done at Geneva where you, Bidault, Eden, and Australian and New Zealand representatives can work out details. Simultaneous release would be made in five capitals.

5. Accordingly you are authorized (a) to agree to any minor changes in above text; and (b) to agree on release time. (We would suggest 4 pm Washington time Friday May 28.)

6. Please keep us informed niact re text and release date agreed for issuance here.

7. In past UK and French have consistently leaked virtually everything to press and jumped gun on ironclad agreements on release time of joint announcements, to disadvantage of US press and our embarrassment. Know you will impress on them there should be no gun-jumping.

DULLES

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 250 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1954—11 a. m.

Tosec 271. Our comments on questions raised by Eden Dulte 112.<sup>2</sup>

1. Thai should raise matter first in SC through letter to SC president along lines given in Tosec 228, Usun 574<sup>3</sup> with Wan's modification given in Secto 293 passed USUN.<sup>4</sup> Possible title of item: "Request of the Government of Thailand for UN observations." In event of veto matter should go to GA. Reasons for our strong preference for GA over interim committee given in Tosec 231, repeated

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent to New York as telegram 593.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 25, p. 928.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 21, p. 875.

<sup>4</sup> May 25, not printed. (396.1 GE/5-2554)

Usun 577 and termed persuasive in Usun 759 [579].<sup>5</sup> Three alternative methods of convening GA discussed in working paper sent Ross May 20. We lean toward emergency session under "uniting for peace" resolution since under rule 10 of GA rules it would be most difficult add other items (i.e., Korea, Morocco) to agenda.

2. (A) We believe Chinese representation problem must be dealt with in SC and GA under moratorium agreement that is, any proposals to be ruled out of order or deferred.

(B) Expect Thailand only to be invited to SC table. Would hope associated states would not request participation in SC. However, they could express support for Thai move in written communication to SC.

3. (A) Terms draft resolution given in Secto [*Tosec*] 229, repeated Usun 575.<sup>6</sup> When POC subcommission established Thailand would and associated states could request observation.

(B) Subcommission membership of India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, Uruguay satisfactory and we hope feasible. Key question will be India's willingness serve. Hope UK will strongly urge Indians to agree serve.

4. Would expect nine votes in SC and more than necessary two-thirds majority in GA.

5. We would hope to control debate in GA through strenuous advance consultation to discourage submission any other agenda item and to support presiding officers in focusing discussion.

6, 7, 8. Agree with Smith's comments.

Our purpose at this time is limited to obtaining in smoothest and quickest way, establishment of UN observation. Statements in SC should therefore stress incontestable existence of international tension and need for ascertaining facts and should as far as possible avoid detailed accounts of military and political situation.

DULLES

<sup>5</sup> Usun 577 dated May 21, p. 882; Usun 579 not printed.

<sup>6</sup> Dated May 21, p. 876.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

*Memorandum of Discussion at the 199th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 27, 1954*<sup>1</sup>

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 199th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States;

<sup>1</sup> Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on May 28.



the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 1 through 6); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Items 5 and 8); Assistants Attorney General Barnes and Rankin; Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., Department of State (for Item 2); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Mr. Robert Amory, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency; the White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

. . . . .

10. *Southeast Asia* (NSC 5405; NSC Actions Nos. 1086-*b* and -*c*, 1104-*b*, 1110 and 1112)<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Cutler then asked the Secretary of State if he would report any recent developments regarding the Geneva Conference.

Secretary Dulles replied that he had nothing of significance to report from Paris or Geneva. Everything was awaiting the return of General Ely from Indochina, which had just occurred. General Trapnell had reached Paris at about the same time, but had not yet seen General Ely.<sup>3</sup>

Dr. Flemming inquired of Secretary Dulles the significance of Mr. Eden's proposal at Geneva for a cease-fire. Secretary Dulles replied that acceptance of the Eden proposal would bring about a *de facto* partition of all three of the Associated States. Beyond that, the Communists would certainly infiltrate the areas assigned to the other side, with the result that sooner or later they would obtain complete control of all three States.

Secretary Dulles went on to express his great concern over the deterioration of the Bao Dai regime, and mentioned the possible need for "drastic action" if Bao Dai did not regain control of his government.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of NSC 5405, Jan. 16, 1954, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia," and related documentation, see volume XII.

For texts of NSC Action Nos. 1086-*b*, Apr. 6, 1954, and 1104-*b*, Apr. 29, 1954, see footnotes 4 and 5, p. 705. For discussions in the NSC and actions taken on NSC 1086 and 1104, see memoranda of conversations, in volume XIII.

For NSC Action Nos. 1110 and 1112, see memorandum of discussion at the 196th meeting of the NSC, May 8. *ibid.* For the text of 1110-*a*, see telegram Tedul 43, May 8, p. 731.

<sup>3</sup> For an account of General Trapnell's meeting with General Ely the morning of May 27, see telegram 4566 from Paris, May 27, in volume XIII.

The National Security Council:

Noted oral remarks by the Secretary of State on developments in France and at the Geneva Conference with respect to Indochina.<sup>4</sup>

11. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*

Mr. [Allen] Dulles commented on intelligence reports which suggested the presence of a certain number of Soviet advisers with the Vietminh as early as April 29. He then went on to point out that the redeployment of the Vietminh forces from Dien Bien Phu toward the Delta had proceeded more rapidly than originally anticipated, so that the bulk of these forces was now likely to arrive early in June. Whether or not they would attack the French position in the Delta wasn't yet clear. Meanwhile, the French were reinforcing the Delta with troops from other parts of Indochina. Plans for further reinforcement from the Metropole or North Africa would await the report of General Ely. The French were also studying plans to reduce the size of their defense perimeter in the Delta.

Mr. Dulles' final point was to emphasize the near chaotic situation in Saigon, which was actually more unstable than at Hanoi or Haiphong. A significant development was that the Saigon press had now taken a very strong anti-American position.

S. EVERETT GLEASON

<sup>4</sup>This sentence constitutes NSC Action No. 1142.

110.11 DU/5-2754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 27, 1954—3 p. m.

Dulte 125. Repeated information Paris 341. Bidault gave me following account of his trip to Paris yesterday:

He had gone for only one purpose—to get mad and raise hell. It had worked and French Government had decided to act in national interest of France; that is to say, it would stand fast at Geneva and send reinforcements to Indochina. Reynaud was, nevertheless, continuing to demand capitulation and Bidault might have to go to Paris again tomorrow. Laniel was firm but Bidault himself had to do most of the talking. His opponents were having fine time insulting him but he was confident their actions were costing them thousands of votes with public opinion. I hope he is right.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-2754 : Telegram

*Seventh Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 27, 3 p. m.:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 27 [28], 1954—noon.

Secto 325. Repeated information priority Paris 343, priority Saigon 120, Tokyo 93, London 213, Moscow 89, Phnom Penh and Vientiane unnumbered. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Seventh restricted meeting met May 27 with Eden as chairman.

Eden recalled his proposal last meeting and Molotov amendments and then referred new French proposal (see Secto 327<sup>2</sup>) asked Bidault to comment thereon.

Bidault commented on number of proposals before meeting and desirability concentrating attention on arranging meeting of representatives of commands in Geneva for purpose establishing regrouping zones in Vietnam. He pointed out eight out of nine delegations had agreed in principle and ninth had not expressed opposition to this concept. In tabling proposal dealing with Vietnam he stated French delegation would present in very near future proposals re Laos and Cambodia. He supported principle of simultaneous cease-fire provided this did not result in delaying cessation of hostilities in any given territory. He expressed view conditions in each of three states should be taken up on merits.

In commenting on proposal Bidault said principle of regrouping zones in Vietnam seems generally agreed as well as idea that representatives of commands meet in Geneva. There would also be required exchange of views with commands in field. Bidault urged haste stating time saved Geneva saves blood Indochina and time wasted Geneva wastes blood there.

Bidault suggested June first as date for meeting of representatives of commands in Geneva and asked delegates express themselves re date.

Chou En-lai then presented six-point proposal (see Secto 326<sup>3</sup>) on basic principles pertaining to cessation of hostilities. He reiterated need for simultaneous cease-fire. He stated he shared belief that situation different in three states but regrouping needed in all three. He expressed agreement to contact both at Geneva and in field between commands of two sides in order determine zones for regrouping and other matters. He said Bidault's suggestion of demilitarized zones

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/7) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 278. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 5:15 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 154-158.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 27, p. 948.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 27, *infra*.

warranted further consideration and might be topic for discussion directly between parties. He expressed himself strongly on need for preventing introduction further troops and military matériel into Indochina after cessation of hostilities. He said Korean armistice procedures offered precedent and took occasion to stress importance he attached to stopping introduction into Indochina by US of military personnel and weapons. On question of supervision of armistice Chou En-lai endorsed DRV proposal of joint committees of belligerents and in addition Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission along lines followed in Korea. He spoke in most laudatory terms of performance of NNSC in Korea adding that failure by US forces to abide by provisions of armistice including those concerning prisoners of war had created difficulties. He painted picture of smoothly functioning armistice supervision by NNSC in Korea. With regard to international guarantees Chou En-lai said he shared view of French and Soviet delegations (to which he stated no objection had been taken) that all Geneva states join in guarantee. In case of violation, there should be consultation leading to collective rather than to individual measures. He anticipated no difficulties regarding prisoners of war and civil internees.

Chou En-lai envisaged agreement on principles followed by discussion regarding concrete application.

Vietnamese delegate then delivered earnest statement of Vietnamese views on imperative necessity of avoiding immediate or eventual partition through establishment of proposed regrouping zones. He stated DRV proposal would lead to this end due broad nature of economic, political, demographic and other considerations introduced by DRV in proposal as factors in determining zones. He recalled that conference designed not only ascertain and recognize facts but also achieve respect for justice and law. He recalled UN Charter provision re conditions for peaceful settlement of international disputes and also Stimson doctrine as applied Manchukuo. He recalled Stimson doctrine of non-recognition of results of acts of force had been approved by League of Nations members including some states represented at conference. He said partition would only lead to further war and presented proposal reading "The regroupment zones will be so established as not to impair the territorial and political unity of Vietnam."

During recess Bidault, Eden and Smith agreed that Eden should seek Molotov's agreement to adoption of either French proposal or of Eden's proposal of May 25 with preamble and paragraph one amended to read, "In order to facilitate the early and simultaneous cessation of hostilities it is proposed that: 1. Representatives of the two commands should meet immediately in Geneva in order that this should

also contribute to the establishment of contacts between the two parties on the spot." with paragraphs two, three and four as originally presented (Secto 320 [302] <sup>4</sup>).

Molotov declined to accept either in absence of some indication there would be regrouping in Laos and Cambodia as well. Western three refused to concede on this and proposed that, rather than continuing discussion this afternoon, "drafting committee" should meet tomorrow at 11:00 to consider Eden, Bidault and Chou proposals and attempt to come up with common one. This was agreed. Phleger, Allen and Chauvel will represent Western three on drafting committee.

*Comment:* In private meeting of three at recess Bidault took strong stand, which I supported, against suggestions by Eden which would have had effect of so far by-passing issue as to permit Communists interpret as capitulation to their point of view. We much prefer French draft and will press for something along these lines in drafting committee.

It was clear Communists are in no hurry, and thus far entirely unwilling make any concession which would even temporarily bridge gap so as permit work start on Vietnam. Apart from events in Indochina they may well also be influenced by scheduling of Indochina debate for next Tuesday in French Assembly.

It was a day of complete frustration and we encountered absolute intransigence on Communist side.

SMITH

---

<sup>4</sup>Telegram Secto 302, dated May 26, p. 920.

---

396.1 GE/5-2754 : Telegram

*Seventh Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 27, 3 p. m.:*  
*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 27, 1954—midnight.

Secto 326. Repeated information priority Paris 344, priority Saigon 121, Tokyo 94, London 214, Moscow 90. Department pass Defense; Tokyo pass CINCFE. Saigon pass Phnom Penh and Vientiane. Following is text Chinese Communist proposal presented at seventh restricted meeting:

"The participants of the Geneva Conference have agreed upon the following basic principles pertaining to the cessation of hostilities in Indochina:

"1. A complete cease-fire by all the armed forces of the two belligerent parties—ground, naval and air forces—is to be simultaneously carried out throughout the territory of Indochina.

"2. The two parties are to begin negotiations on appropriate readjustments of the area of their occupied zones, the passage of troops of the two parties during the readjustments and other related questions that may arise.

"3. The introduction into Indochina from outside of all kinds of fresh troops and military personnel as well as all types of arms and ammunition is to cease simultaneously with the cessation of hostilities throughout the territory of Indochina.

"4. Joint committee composed of representatives of the commands of the two parties are to supervise the implementation of the terms of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities.

"International supervision by a neutral nations commission over the implementation of the aforesaid agreement is also to be carried out.

"The question as to the composition of the neutral nations commission is to be examined separately.

"5. The states participating in the Geneva conference undertake guarantee the implementation of the agreement.

"The question as to the nature of the obligations to be undertaken by the states concerned is to be examined separately.

"6. War prisoners and interned civilians are to be released by the two parties."

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/5-2754 : Telegram

*Seventh Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 27, 3 p. m.:*  
*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL  
 PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 27, 1954—midnight.

Secto 327. Repeated information priority Paris 345, priority Saigon 122, Tokyo 95, London 215, Moscow 91, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Following is text of proposal presented at seventh restricted meeting by French delegation for settlement of military problem of Vietnam:

"(Further proposals will be put forward in the immediate future for Laos and Cambodia and it is understood that nothing agreed for any one area will prevent the entry into force of a cease-fire in all areas simultaneously).

1. Representatives of commanders-in-chief of the two parties will meet at Geneva on blank.

2. They will examine, in the first place, the delimitation of the zones of regrouping in Vietnam.

3. They will present their recommendations and observations to the conference.

4. It will be their task to propose the basis upon which the regroupment will be carried out, taking into account the following two principles:

(a) The regroupment must not lead to a dismemberment of Vietnam, and

(b) The regroupment has for its objective the re-establishment of peace and security in Vietnam.

5. If it should be considered necessary, they will be able to request the conference to define such points as they consider useful.

6. During this time, the conference will continue to study other problems relative to the peace in Indochina."

SMITH

---

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Meetings with the President

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President*

[Extract]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 27, 1954.

PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

. . . . .

When these [travel] plans were made, I had expected that General Bedell Smith would be back. With reference to his possible return and replacement by Murphy, I am inclined to feel that to pull him out at this time, particularly with Eden, Bidault and Molotov staying on, might be interpreted as an effort on our part to sabotage the conference, especially as around June 9 or 10 may be the critical time.

My disposition, therefore, is to have Bedell stay and plan to make my trip with the understanding that the Army can set up communications for me with Washington, and I can, of course, come back on short notice.

Does this have your approval? <sup>1</sup>

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> A handwritten notation by President Eisenhower on the source text indicated that the President approved the Secretary's decision to leave Under Secretary Smith at Geneva.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 242: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation* <sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1954—5:58 p. m.

Tedul 135. No distribution. Eyes only Under Secretary from Secretary. Your Tedul 127.<sup>2</sup> Subject matter discussed with President who

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 26, p. 935.

agrees you should not by your departure risk misinterpretation. I shall, therefore, plan Western trip on assumption communications will be adequate. If not will interrupt and return canceling out my speaking.

I assume by time Phleger gets through his case, Geneva will probably be over but if not and you need him, I will ask him to return to Geneva.

DULLES

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 242 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, May 27, 1954—6:51 p. m.

Tedul 136. Re Tedul 131.<sup>2</sup> Assume you will inform Prince Wan and Garcia soonest re decision on five-power talks; Associated States will also be informed at Geneva; UK will inform India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia. We will also inform other appropriate Asian countries here prior to announcement. See no objection your informing ROK representative Geneva if you desire.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by MacArthur.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 27, p. 940.

---

396.1 GE/5-2754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Extracts]

CONFIDENTIAL      PRIORITY      GENEVA, May 27, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 319. For McCardle from Suydam. Following is extensive selected verbatim Under Secretary's press briefing U.S. correspondents morning 27th. Full text will be pouched.

Question: Have Cambodian or Laotian delegations indicated to us they might walk out of conference if principle of partition should be applied to their two states?

Answer: They have not so indicated to us because we do not accept principle of partition. Our position is that Laos and Cambodia have been invaded. Way to stop trouble in Laos and Cambodia is for invaders to withdraw.

Q: You said Viet Minh proposal seemed to go lot further than we were willing to go. Could you give us any sort of general guidance on how far we are prepared to go?

---

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted to the Department of State in three sections.



A: You know basic position of U.S. It is that Laos and Cambodia are separate distinct problems from Viet Nam, that Laos and Cambodia have been invaded and that settlement of their respective problems is completely simple; all that is necessary is for invader to withdraw. It is recognized, however, that in Viet Nam we have powerful, indeed formidable, opposition, well-organized and national. That is, national in sense that they are Vietnamese; whereas dissident elements in Laos and Cambodia, in accordance with our info, are not Laotian or Cambodian but are also Vietnamese. So that there the problem is quite different.

Q: Do we recognize any difference between Cambodia, where apparently there are no areas which are really under control of Viet Minh, and Laos, where there are very definitely areas which have been more or less constantly under Viet Minh control, in north?

A: Not in principle, because forces which control those areas are identified battalions of Viet Minh Army, identified even with respect to divisions to which they belong. So in principle there is no difference.

Q: When Indochina discussions opened it evidently was strategy of six powers to isolate and deal first with Laotian and Cambodian questions, but now over last two days six delegations have moved around to position of evidently trying to deal with Viet Nam first. Wonder if you could give some explanation or reason for change in strategy.

A: We have not changed our views, have made our position completely clear. It is, as I have outlined to you, with regards to Laos and Cambodia. We propose to deal with them first because they are most susceptible of quick solution. Since other side would not accept that approach, while completely reserving and maintaining our position with respect to Laos and Cambodia, we have, in interest of possible progress, been willing examine other one, because from purely practical point of view, if solution could be reached with regard Viet Nam, it would be very simple to apply principles which have governed that solution to much less difficult problems of Laos and Cambodia. We do not believe cessation of hostilities in Laos and Cambodia should wait on solution of problem in Viet Nam.

Q: Thing that seems to have Cambodians and Laotians worried is, for example, if you accept internatl supervision or some political formulas in case of Viet Nam you might be walking into trap where those formulas would be made to apply to Laos and Cambodia as *quid pro quo* of winding up Viet Nam war.

A: If we are blind enough to walk into trap, then they have reason enough to worry. Don't think we are.

Q: Are all our allies in same position of completely separating Laos and Cambodia at present?

A: At present, and in general, yes. There are certain differences of opinion as to tactical approach, slight differences of view as to real practicalities of situation as against position in principle. There is no basic difference.

Q: You have emphasized our position in respect to principle of partition of Cambodia and Laos. Does that also apply to principle of partition in respect to Viet Nam?

A: Our present official position is yes. However, we do have recognized and very practical difference there. You just cannot ignore fact that Ho Chi Minh has well-organized, disciplined formidable military force which controls considerable proportion of country. You cannot just wish that out of existence. Actually, what we are doing here is rather groping for possible solutions which do not violate our principles, but which might produce objective we are seeking, that is, termination of hostilities on honorable basis.

Q: What is your reading as to whether Communist side, on basis of last few days' sessions, appear to be trying to come to settlement or are they planning for deadlock? What is general tone at this point?

A: I would answer if I could. I really don't know yet. In dealing with Communists, you know, it takes infinite time. There is unending argument about minutiae of phraseology of proposal, or paragraph, or sentence. We have not gone far enough yet to be able to determine whether we are going to encounter complete intransigence or whether we are going to encounter slight move toward compromise coupled with proposals we cannot accept, or whether we are really going to find some way out. Think next coming week may well tell story.

Q: Do you see any indications here that Communist bloc at present in light of governmental situation in France, is trying through its strategy to link Indochina with EDC?

A: That has worried me great deal; but, again, because I don't know I haven't been able form considered opinion as to what their strategy or intentions are. I can very well answer. Obviously, there is or could possibly be very important connection.

Q: Have we any reason to believe there is difference in approach among three Communist delegations on Indochina negotiation?

A: Can't say I have. Would also be very reluctant to say Molotov, without consultation, is able speak authoritatively for all three. Have seen huddles during recess and delays obviously for tactical purpose of permitting time for discussion among themselves, even on very simple things.

Q: How does this look to you in terms of time? Does it look like all summer job? You mentioned in a week you might be able tell whether you could see any quick ending or another Panmunjom.

A: If one can approach military solution, or if there seems to be military solution in sight, discussions might go on for long time. But discussions would certainly not go on at foreign minister level. Can't estimate at this time.

Q: What kind of military solution would that be?

A: First object is to stop killing. Granted you can't arrive at solution which would stop killing everywhere without considering some political questions along with military solution, because to certain extent there are corollary military political considerations.

Q: What can you tell us about state of Anglo-American relations?

A: They are good, I think. As matter of fact, you know there was terrific amount of "dust" raised about Anglo-American differences. There were not real differences either as to policies or as to objectives; such differences as existed were differences of opinion with regard to tactics and timing.

We are in very close indeed constant contact with British delegation. Relationships are extremely good. I am not prepared to say in fact I am inclined to believe that in some respects their views on timing were right, while in some respects our views were right. Won't go into any further detail on that. In any event, there are no serious or substantial differences.

Remember that this conference is in effect still groping. We have our respective basic positions. That does not mean there cannot be or would not be certain amount of compromise, not only between our own, and that of our allies, but between our combined positions on one side, and that of Communists on other, if it will produce end product we want. Nothing rigid about this. As I have said several times, we are really groping to see if there does lie in middle of all this "spate of oratory" germ of solution. It will take little while to do that.

Q: Think we get impression that British probably more inclined to look favorably on some kind deal involving partition than we are. That would seem to be rather fundamental difference.

A: I don't say that British are not opposed to it in principle either. Don't think their views have crystallized any more than our own have. We have our respective principles.

Thank you, gentlemen. Hope will be seeing you little more often.

SMITH

---

110.11 DU/5-2754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, May 27, 1954—10 p. m.

Dulte 126. Repeated information priority Paris 342, London 212, Canberra 9, Wellington 5. Tedul 131.<sup>1</sup> Discussed with representatives

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 27, p. 940.

of other four governments. While recognizing desirability of avoiding extravagant speculation which might arise for example when Australian and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff depart for Washington, there was agreement it would otherwise be desirable avoid public statement and particularly joint announcement five capitals. FYI: Watt had received same instructions from Canberra as had Spender and had replied as above. End FYI.

Eden will have to refer to London in view of questions which last sentence of text may raise as to whether UK has agreed to wider conversations and if so, on what basis. It was recognized that Bidault had most serious problem and that his views, which we will not be able to obtain until morning, should be given major weight.

Subject to change as result of London's or Bidault's views in morning, consensus was that there should not be simultaneous announcement in five capitals but that each should talk from text given in reference telegram as and when necessary to prevent or counteract press speculation. I think best thing possible would be to say nothing and just let things happen.

SMITH

MAY 28, 1954

396.1 GE/5-2854 : Telegram

*Smith-Eden Meeting, Geneva, May 28, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 28, 1954—3 p. m.

Secto 328. Department pass USUN New York 2. Reference Tosec 271.<sup>1</sup> In conversation this morning I showed Eden copy Tosec 271. Eden said report had just been received of meeting between Dixon, Hoppenot and Lodge. Eden particularly referred to Hoppenot's suggestion that Security Council might put Thai appeal on its agenda but postpone debate until Geneva Conference was over. Eden stated he was informing Dixon that he thought this was not a bad suggestion and was well worth further consideration.

With reference last sentence paragraph 2B, Tosec 271, Eden stated he understood our view was Associated States would keep out of matter entirely until POC established when Cambodia and Laos might invite POC extend observation their areas. I confirmed this was strong view of USDel here, and we would so recommend to Department.

Eden stated he was seeing Krishna Menon again tomorrow morning and would discuss with him question Indian role on POC. I told Eden

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 27, p. 941.

in conversation I had with Menon last night he had initially taken strong position against Indian participation, but at end had softened his attitude.

Eden said UK was not so sanguine of two-thirds majority in GA at present moment, being particularly doubtful attitude Arab bloc which in addition to traditional attitudes toward "French colonialism" might wish to repay USSR for its veto on Palestine case.

SMITH

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 281

*United States Minutes of the First Meeting of the Drafting  
Committee on Indochina*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 28, 1954—11 a. m.

IC/DC/1

Participants:

*United Kingdom*

Lord Reading

Mr. Allen

Mr. Tahourdin

Mr. Vallat

*U.S.S.R.*

Mr. Gromyko

Mr. Novikov

Mr. Troyanovsky

*Vietnam*

Mr. Dac Khe

Mr. Thanh

Mr. Buu Kinh

*Cambodia*

Amb. Nong Kimny

Mr. Sam Sary

Mr. Son Sann

*Communist China*

Chang Wen-tien

Li Ke-nung

Pu Shou-chang

Ch'en Chia-k'ang

*United States*

Mr. Phleger

Amb. Heath

Mr. Stelle

*France*

Amb. Chauvel

M. Roux

M. Cheyssou

M. Andronikov

*Laos*

Mr. Sananikone

Mr. Panya

*Viet Minh*

Mr. Phan-Anh

Mr. Hoan

Mr. Quat

Lord Reading stated that he had had discussions with Mr. Gromyko as to the question of Chairmanship. Since this committee was formed in yesterday's restricted session, they had thought it should be treated

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Stelle. Minutes indicate that meeting convened at 11 a. m. and adjourned at 1 p. m. Summary of minutes was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 333, May 28. (396.1 GE/5-2854)

as a carry-over from that session when Mr. Eden was in the Chair rather than a committee which would be attached to the next session of the Ministers when Mr. Molotov would be in the Chair. Mr. Gromyko and he had thought, therefore, that it might be appropriate to have him in the Chair. He wondered whether this was generally agreeable to the other delegations.

Chauvel stated that the French delegation was in full accord with this idea. If meetings similar to this one should be held, the same arrangement might be carried out. The other delegations signified their agreement.

Reading stated that he thought the purpose of the meeting as set by the Ministers was to consider three drafts—the UK draft of the day before yesterday, and the French and Chinese Communists' drafts which had been tabled at yesterday's sitting. He thought it would be remembered that Mr. Molotov had proposed certain amendments to the UK draft, that these amendments had been discussed, but that in the end it had proved impossible to reach agreement. Lord Reading distributed drafts of a UK proposal which follows:<sup>2</sup>

“In order to facilitate the early cessation of hostilities it is necessary to determine the areas within which the forces of both sides shall be regrouped. To this end it is proposed that :

*a.* Representatives of the two commands should meet immediately in Geneva.

*b.* Their first task should be to work out regrouping areas for Vietnam.

*c.* They should report their findings and recommendations to the Conference as soon as possible.

*d.* The Conference meanwhile should proceed with examination of other military matters, beginning with arrangements for international supervision.”

He stated that the UK itself would like to make one amendment. He would like to delete in the preamble the phrase “It is necessary to determine the areas within which the forces of both sides shall be regrouped. To this end”.

This amendment would leave the effective part of the proposal unchanged. Reading stated he did not want to take advantage of being in the Chair to talk too much, but he would like to make one suggestion on the procedure of this meeting. During the last few days at the restricted meetings we have been making a vigorous effort to arrive at a point where action at last could be taken. It would be a relief and incentive to all of us if we felt we were making genuine progress

---

<sup>2</sup> The British proposal was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 332, May 28. (396.1 GE/5-2854)

towards a settlement. It would also be a satisfaction to the whole world which was watching these proceedings.

He stated that we have been searching for common ground but to him two points seemed agreed upon. The first was the necessity for direct contacts between the commanders either in Geneva or on the spot, or perhaps preferably both. The second was the extreme desirability for a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina. He wondered whether it was not possible and urgent to get representatives of the commanders together to begin work on the terms and methods of cessation of hostilities while the conference proceeded with other matters. The conference could then at any time enlarge the terms of reference upon which the military representatives could work. The important thing to do was to get them started on something, and we might get them working on something more later on. He thought it well to recall that the commanders or their representatives could only present proposals to the conference. Only the conference itself could approve or disapprove those proposals. He thought the UK proposal did not conflict in any way with the proposal which had been tabled by Mr. Chou En-lai even though the ideas contained in the Chinese proposal were perhaps expressed in different language. He thought that the first two of the Chinese proposals might be referred to the military representatives and that others might be taken up perhaps later on. He was sorry that he had talked at such great length, but he had thought that it might be useful to give expression to the sense of urgency which he was sure all delegations share. He hoped that the other delegations would express their opinions.

Chauvel gave thanks from the French delegation to the Chairman for a clear and lucid exposition of the task of the committee. He thought the committee was not meant at this level to replace the conference and to repeat its work but rather to facilitate the work of the conference. He thought that if the committee could find points of common agreement it could achieve positive results. He thought the task of the committee should be approached in a positive way and that to this end it should limit the scope of the matters with which it dealt. He thought the committee should address itself to specific matters.

The last meetings of the Ministers have been concerned with the question of bringing together representatives of the commanders-in-chief. He thought the question should be put as to whether the conference wants these representatives to meet and to undertake certain tasks for the conference. He thought it was not very difficult for the committee to arrive at useful results. There were quite a few points of common agreement although the angles from which those points were approached were not necessarily the same. He thought that in the

various proposals some were addressed to immediate tasks whereas some—such as, for example, some of those of the Chinese Communists' proposal—were larger in scope and addressed to principles. Even in the Chinese Communists' proposal, however, there were certain immediate tasks which were in common with those of the other proposals. He did agree that proceeding toward finding items of common agreement should be the purpose of this meeting. Finally, of the three proposals he thought that Point *a*, of the UK proposal, covered the same ground as the first point of the French proposal; Point *b* of the UK proposal was similar in purpose to the second point of the French proposal; Point *c* of the UK proposal could be equated with the third point of the French proposal and Point *d* of the UK proposal with the sixth point of the French proposal.

Chauvel stated that the Chinese proposal was much broader in scope and covered very much the whole ground of the discussions of the conference. However, Paragraph 2 of the Chinese Communists' proposal did cover points which were referred to in the British and French drafts. If his memory was correct he believed that Chou En-lai had noted the desirability of contact between the commanders in Geneva. The same statement had been made in one form or another by many other delegations. He thought, therefore, that without difficulty this could be extracted as a point of common agreement. He might further say that he had had the feeling that the proposal which the French had made on the 27th of May was not far removed from Mr. Dong's proposal and that it did not conflict with what the Viet Minh representative had put forward.

The Cambodian, Ambassador Nong Kimny, took note of the amendment which the UK had made to the proposal which it had itself distributed. He stated that the head of the Cambodian delegation had the other day mentioned that the British proposal might raise certain misunderstandings. The head of the Cambodian delegation had at the same time addressed to Mr. Eden questions as to whether the UK proposal applied to all three countries or whether it applied only to Vietnam. Eden had replied, he believed, that the preamble applied to all three countries and the rest to Vietnam. The Ambassador thought he should again address these questions to Lord Reading. He believed that to start with the UK draft might again give rise to a series of amendments and objections. He thought it might be better to start with the French plan, particularly since Paragraph 4 of the French plan removed some of the difficulties which were raised by the proposal of the UK delegation. He would like to propose that the committee begin by considering point by point the French proposal in which



case it might then attack directly the question of achieving contact between the two commands.

Lord Reading stated that the UK proposals were general and intended to apply to all three states. Only the specific Paragraph *b* was directed to Vietnam since this was a question of the greatest urgency. He thought it was for the meeting to decide which proposal it should consider. He himself had no personal objection to considering the French draft.

Gromyko referred first of all to the proposal tabled by the Chinese delegation. He understood that there had been some agreement among the Ministers that these proposals should be considered tomorrow at the next meeting of the Ministers. He thought that at this meeting the committee should begin work at the point where the Ministers had stopped which was, as he saw it, in reconciling the various texts of Eden's proposal for achieving contacts between the commanders of the two sides. He believed that to save time discussions should be started with the last draft presented by the representative of the UK which as he understood it had been formulated taking into consideration the various opinions expressed around the table. From the observations of the UK representative he understood that this draft had been also formulated in such a way as to represent the ideas proposed by the French delegate. He would like to speak first about the preamble. He thought it would be desirable to insert the phrase "and simultaneously" between the words "the earliest" and the phrase "cessation of hostilities". He thought that proceeding from the fact that there had been at one time no objections from other delegations to the insertion of such a phrase he did not see why such a very general statement should be unacceptable to any delegation. He thought that if all delegations concurred, the committee could agree on the preamble in its new form.

As to Paragraph *a* of the UK proposal he would suggest the addition of the phrase "and also to establish contact on the spot". He proceeded from the fact that this addition had also been discussed in various meetings and had not evoked disapproval. He believed that Mr. Bidault had spoken of the desirability of contacts on the spot.

At this point Lord Reading raised the question as to whether the Russian amendment might read more smoothly if it read "and contact also be established on the spot". Gromyko acquiesced in Reading's revision.

Gromyko proposed that Paragraph *b* of the UK text be amended to read "their task should be to work out regrouping areas for the two sides" or alternatively it should be amended to read, "their task should be to work out regrouping areas for the two sides beginning

with Vietnam". Gromyko accepted Paragraph *c*. He stated that he still held the view that there was no need at all for Paragraph *d*. He justified his feeling that there was no need at all for Paragraph *d* by stating that the Ministers had agreed that the re-establishment of peace should begin with a discussion on how to bring about a cessation of hostilities. There had been already considerable discussion on this point and this committee was addressing itself to these matters. The conference had still to talk political matters.

The question of when they should discuss these was something which the Ministers themselves should decide. There was no reason for the committee to commit them in that respect. In his own view, Gromyko said, if the French and the DRV delegations were agreeable he thought it might be well to give a date when the contacts between the commanders should be established and to amend the British draft on that respect. Gromyko concluded by advocating that it was advisable to take up the last UK draft read, to take into consideration the amendments he had proposed, and to prepare a text for consideration by the Ministers.

Phleger raised a point of inquiry as to whether the USSR had accepted the UK deletion in the preamble of the British draft. Lord Reading thought the USSR had accepted that amendment and read the text including the Russian amendments and deletion of the phrase the UK had recommended to be deleted. Gromyko said he had had in mind the Russian text which had been distributed and that the text as he had it in mind would read "in order to facilitate the earliest and simultaneous cessation of hostilities it is necessary to determine the areas within which the forces of both sides shall be regrouped". (This made it evident that Gromyko did not accept the UK deletion.)

Reading asked whether Gromyko would have objection to the amended form which he stated was intended only to simplify the proposal. Gromyko said that simplification was good within certain limits but it was not useful when the limits were surpassed. He therefore thought that it was more useful to use the fuller formula of the original UK text.

Sananikone, the Laotian representative, stated his pleasure that after two weeks the conference was about to reach a constructive stage. As to which paper the committee should consider the Laotian thought that it was preferable to extract common points of agreement. He thought that all were agreed on the desirability of the meeting of the commanders. He questioned why that point should not be presented to the conference for a decision. He had one question, however, to address to Lord Reading. He had understood Reading to say that all except Paragraph *b* of the UK proposal applied to all of Indochina. If this

were so, he wanted to know what commanders were referred to in Paragraph *a*. If the reference were to the Laos commander and the Viet Minh commander, he thought it should be again made clear that there was in Laos no question of any regrouping but merely a question of simple withdrawal of Viet Minh forces.

Dac Khe thought that progress could be made by leaving the level of the abstract and progressing to the concrete. He thought that progress had been made by beginning a concrete examination of the problems of Vietnam leaving aside for the moment those of Cambodia and Laos, which would be settled later on their merits. He pointed out that the French proposal clearly refers to Vietnam and only Vietnam. Moreover Paragraph 4 of that proposal contained elements which he thought it was necessary for the commanders to have for guidance in their work. He therefore proposed that the committee take the French draft as a basis for discussion.

Lord Reading stated that he fully realized the reasons advanced by the representatives of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, but he wondered whether in view of the fact that the British proposal was so similar to the French, and since it had been already commented upon by the USSR whether it would not be useful for the committee to come back to the UK text and to deal with Gromyko's amendments as well as certain other amendments which he himself was prepared to make, and amendments which others might care to make. He thought the question needed considering, but he wondered if we could not return for the moment to the British text.

Chauvel commented that he had no pride of authorship, that he did think that the French proposal, particularly with the points which were made in Paragraphs 4 and 5, had some advantage and that there was also an advantage in the fact that the French proposal had no preamble. His mind, however, was open to any text. As regards the UK text, he endorsed the deletion in the preamble which the UK had recommended. He thought that whatever text the committee considered it was running the risk of making no progress unless it realized that principles were one thing and implementation another. He thought it was important to begin with the problems of Vietnam which was the most important theatre of operations. If it were attempted at the same time to deal with the problems of Laos and Cambodia, this might temper whatever draft was arrived at and complicate it. He thought the committee should limit its objective and start with Vietnam. It could immediately thereafter address itself to work on Laos and Cambodia if the conference should so decide. Chauvel commented that if we were dealing with Vietnam alone the notion of a simultaneous cease-fire had no application or meaning. He was concerned that the committee

should reach a practical conclusion. If the conference wanted military people to meet and to take up the problems of Vietnam, we should say so simply. If at a later date the conference wanted the same military people to take up the problems of Laos and Cambodia, it could say so at that time. With regard to the question of simultaneous cease-fire the French delegation admits this as a practical possibility, and as a matter of fact, the first part of the French proposal contained mention of the possibility. Chauvel thought that it would be an improvement if the UK proposal could be clearly headed "Proposal for Vietnam".

As to the question of timing which had been raised by Mr. Gromyko, Chauvel would like to inform the committee that military representatives of the Franco-Vietnamese High Command would be arriving in Geneva Monday.

Phleger stated that his understanding of the terms of reference of the committee was that the committee was to examine the various proposals and the discussions concerning those proposals which had been put forward in the last few days and to extract from them those points on which there was agreement. It was not the task of the committee to make suggestions on matters on which there had been no meeting of the minds. From examination of the proposals and the discussions of the last few days it seemed to him that there were only two clear points on which there was general agreement. First there was general agreement that representatives of the Franco-Vietnamese commanders should meet in Geneva. Second there was agreement that these military representatives should explore means and methods of working out regrouping areas for Vietnam. If there were general agreement on these two points it should be possible to find a way to express this agreement clearly and simply.

Phleger said it was equally clear from an examination of the discussions and proposals that there was not a meeting of the minds on two subjects: (a) There was no agreement that the three countries should be treated in the same manner. (b) There was no general agreement that there must be a simultaneous cessation of hostilities. There might eventually be agreement to that effect but as yet there existed no such agreement. It therefore seemed to him that all language which referred to agreement on simultaneous cessation of hostilities should be excluded from proposals drafted by the committee. Application of the test as to areas of agreement lead him to the view that as amended by the UK the UK proposal was one which clearly stated points on which there was general agreement. It is clear that the task of the military commanders applied solely to Vietnam. The amendments suggested by the USSR on the other hand introduced matters on which there had not been agreement and therefore he did not think that the amendments proposed by the Russian representative should

be acceptable. Phleger stated that in a desire to be helpful he made the suggestion that the UK proposal be restricted to Paragraphs *a*, *b* and *c*, that the preamble be dropped and that in line with the views of the Russian representative Paragraph *d* be omitted also. He thought it would be useful if the names of the commanders referred to were inserted. The proposal would therefore read :

1. "Representatives of the Franco-Vietnamese and Vietminh commands should meet immediately in Geneva.
2. "Their first task should be to work out regrouping areas for Vietnam.
3. "They should report their findings and recommendations to the conference as soon as possible."

Lord Reading stated that several delegations had requested to speak, that there was a plenary on Korea this afternoon, that since it was one o'clock already he did not believe agreement could be reached on the various proposals at this meeting. He recommended an adjournment and asked whether it would be agreeable to the others to meet again at 1030 Saturday morning. The other delegations indicated readiness to meet on Saturday morning. Lord Reading stated that there was just one point he would like to make in closing the meeting—the military representatives would be here Monday, and he thought it would be absolutely a tragedy if we did not have something for them to do.

---

110.11 DU/5-2854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, May 28, 1954—3 p. m.

Dulte 131. For the Secretary from the Under Secretary. Limit distribution. If we succeed obtaining agreement on beginning military staff talks on Indochina, we will shortly thereafter be facing up to question of supervisory organization. What would you think of asking Colombo Conference countries (Pakistan, India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia) to undertake role, they to invite participation of European neutral which I would assume would be Norway ?

It seems to me this would have certain definite advantages. It would place responsibility on Asians for "policing their own back yard", the participation of a European state being justified by European interest in Indochina. It would be difficult for India to refuse association with Pakistan if placed in this context, and such association might contribute to reduction tension between the two. Indian and Pakistan Armies should be able to get along in such a role, they having common traditions and training under UK.

Whatever countries are invited, necessary they be able supply considerable numbers of troops which will be required. I would think it would take strength of about two divisions and in Asia only India and Pakistan will be able qualify.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-2854 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1954—3:21 p. m.

Tosec 285. For Under Secretary from Secretary. Advices from New York indicate that British and French are both opposing Thai request for UN observation commission. I had understood from you that the French had definitely agreed to support this and that while the British were reluctant to go along and wanted to work out procedural understanding with us, they were in last analysis prepared to support step. Last fall the Thais were ready to go ahead and papers were all drawn. Then at last minute we advised them to give in to pressure from the French. Now again they are ready to go and have sent representative especially to New York for purpose and matter has received wide publicity. In my opinion US will appear as totally bankrupt, incompetent and undependable if we now repeat the performance of last year and tell the Thais we will not support them. It will be particularly ignominious since I publicly stated at press conference that we would support UN application. I feel so strongly on this matter that I would be disposed to push ahead even though we know British and French would oppose us openly. I would rather accept that consequence bad as it is than the alternative.

There is mounting tide of Congressional criticism due to failure to bring Indochina matter before UN. This was indicated at yesterday's Foreign Affairs hearing on Indochina authorization of funds. It is difficult to overstate the importance which we attach to proceeding in the UN. Failure may jeopardize our chance to get funds for area and also our larger objectives. The Thai proposal takes matter to UN in form least likely to compromise or embarrass Geneva discussions.

I would be willing to limit present decision to Security Council application, leaving open the question of what if anything should be done if Soviet vetoes in Security Council. It is probable that by that time fate of Geneva will be known.

DULLES

<sup>1</sup>Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to USUN as telegram 599, to Paris as telegram 4300, to London as telegram 6420, and to Bangkok as telegram 2366.

396.1 GE/5-2854 : Telegram

*Smith-Eden-Bidault Meeting, Geneva, May 28, Afternoon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, May 28, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 336. Limited distribution. This afternoon Eden proposed the following:

“In order to facilitate the early and simultaneous cessation of hostilities it is proposed that:

(a) Representatives of the two commands should meet immediately in Geneva and contacts should also be established on the spot.

(b) They should study the dispositions of forces to be made upon the cessation of hostilities, beginning with the question of regrouping areas in Vietnam.

(c) They should report their findings and recommendations to the conference as soon as possible.”

Eden discussed this with me and Bidault as [representing?] the maximum that he believed the Communists would accept. He proposes to discuss this tomorrow with Molotov firstly with the words “and simultaneous” omitted, but if necessary agreeing to inclusion of these words. If Molotov agrees and the French, ourselves, and the Laotians, Cambodians, Vietnamese agree then he would present it at tomorrow’s Indochina session.

In Phleger’s opinion this proposal confirms the Russian position that all three states should be considered in the same category, Vietnam State being different only in the priority given it. He, therefore, believes that we should not consent to the inclusion of the word “simultaneous” and that the instruction to the military people should be limited at this time to the study of the question of regrouping areas in Vietnam. He believes the resolution treating all three states as being in the same situation would give the military authority to propose a plan that could give the Viet Minh areas in Laos and Cambodia. He does not think our assent should be used to secure assent of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. However, if all except ourselves agree he believes that we could go along without expressing concurrence.

I do not share his apprehensions.

I have made clear constantly that US considers Laos and Cambodia in a different situation than Vietnam and I do not view this proposed resolution as departing from this principle. I assume that the military representatives of the French and Associated States in their talks will under no circumstances agree to anything other than the withdrawal

of Viet Minh forces from Laos and Cambodia. If all others agree I will state that our position re separate problems of Laos and Cambodia remains unchanged, and that I will reserve my opinion until I see the recommended solution of the military experts, but will not oppose the effort to arrive at one.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-2654 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1954—4:09 p. m.

PRIORITY

Tosec 288. Following are replies to numbered questions in Secto 309:<sup>2</sup>

1. Since sticking to UN as only control machinery would raise in acute form problem of Chinese representation, answer is no.

2. Our position is that Laos and Cambodia constitute problem separate from Vietnam. We would favor POC observation in those countries as substitute for armistice supervision. While this would not be equivalent to UN supervision of an armistice, it would provide UN observation of any major breaches in armistice involving those countries.

3. In light of (1) above, this question does not arise.

4. Our minimum position should be to oppose any commission composition of which would place a veto in Communist hands (Cf. NNSC in Korea). Our optimum position would be an international control commission composed of: Thailand, India, Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan, all nations which have consistently been spokesmen for Asian integrity and generally occupy range of territory nearby or contiguous to danger zone. (We prefer not to include Indonesia but if this were done we would insist on addition of Philippines.)

5. We consider that personnel of this commission would act as representatives of their respective govts and would engage responsibility of those govts to which they would report.

This procedure would we hope involve Asian nations responsibly in an undertaking affecting their own security and contributing to their understanding of (a) Communist imperialist threat to South and Southeast Asia, and (b) burdens of maintaining independence in face of such menace.

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA and Gullion of S/P. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4302 and to Saigon as telegram 2440.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 26, p. 933.



6. Salaries of a control commission could be paid by their govts and logistic support could be financed by opposing sides. However size and nature of supervisory body would largely control type of financing, which might in end prove to be extremely costly. For this reason we would have to reserve our position on this until later stage in negotiations.

DULLES

---

751G.00/5-2854 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1954—4: 18 p. m.

Tedul 137. Eyes only for the Under Secretary from the Secretary. It seems to me that there is a growing possibility that the DVR cease fire proposal might develop into form of *de facto* partition which Eden might be expected to encourage and which French might find impossible to refuse but which Associated States would oppose.

If this situation should arise we would face necessity for very difficult decision and I hope it would be possible for you to inform me before taking irrevocable position so that I could consult with the President. This would of course have bearing on paragraph 5 of your President-approved instructions (Tosec 138).<sup>2</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Merchant of EUR.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 12, p. 778.

---

396.1 GE/5-2854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 28, 1954—5 p. m.

Secto 329. Repeated information Paris 347, Moscow 92. French tell us that nothing of interest or substance transpired at Bidault's dinner for Molotov last night and that neither principal made any effort to raise serious subject. Russians arrived at 8:40 and left at 10:30. Molotov was described as genial and mellow and conversation as vague and general. Laloy remarked that Molotov was in same relaxed mood that he had first observed at Berlin. French thought that Molotov had given slight indication growing impatience at length of Geneva sojourn.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-2854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 28, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 331. Repeated information Paris 349, Saigon 123. Re Deptel 4272 to Paris repeated Geneva Tosec 269 and Saigon 2418,<sup>1</sup> and Paris 4565 to Department repeated Saigon 549 Geneva 304.<sup>2</sup> Bidault has received full report from Parodi of our proposals. Margerie states Bidault personally thinks they are good and that much of this program can be carried out. There is of course considerable difference between what Bidault may advocate and what Cabinet may agree to but Department's suggestions have at least been very well received.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> In telegram 4272 to Paris, May 26, the Department of State outlined the U.S. views on the independence of the Associated States for use by the Embassy in Paris in discussions with the French. The United States could not "wait for an abolition of all deep-rooted causes and extra-territorial privileges"; the United States must make it "clear that the Treaty of Independence between France and Vietnam represents full and unqualified commitment on part of France which will be carried out in practice." In order to achieve this purpose, the United States, France, and other countries, associated in a regional grouping for collective defense, could join "in a formal pledge of fulfillment of full independence and sovereignty provided by Article I of Treaty of Independence." In addition, France and Vietnam should sign the draft treaties immediately and France should undertake to indicate that the French Union was composed of equal and sovereign states, to declare that France would withdraw its expeditionary force from the Indochinese states at an earliest practicable date after an end of hostilities, to provide military aid to the Associated States, and to facilitate Associated States participation in measures required for the defense of their territory. As a final suggestion, and one the Department felt was fundamental, France and the United States should encourage the establishment "at earliest date possible of representative and authentic nationalist governments." (751G.00/5-2454)

For the full text of telegram 4272, see volume XIII.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 4565 from Paris, May 27, not printed, contained a report that the contents of telegram 4272 had been passed to the French. (751G.00/5-2754)

396.1 GE/5-2854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 28, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 335. Repeated information Paris 352. Department pass Usun 3. Following yesterday's discussion between Lodge, Dixon and Hoppenot on Thai appeal,<sup>1</sup> French express increased worries over (1)

---

<sup>1</sup> Henry Cabot Lodge, Henri Hoppenot, and Sir Pierson Dixon, Permanent Representatives of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, respectively, to the United Nations, met in New York City on May 27 to discuss the matter of proceeding in the U.N. Security Council on the Thai appeal. Lodge reported to the Department of State in telegram 777 from New York, May 27, that the British and French Representatives were "reluctant to go along with the proposed Thai initiative" and that they were "concerned about the timing of discussions here in relation to the discussions in Geneva." Lodge said he "felt discussions here

Pandora's box possibilities and (2) possible coincidence of introduction of appeal in Security Council with some favorable development here such as opening of talks between representatives of commanders in chief. Nevertheless, we are told Bidault has today instructed Hoppenot that (1) French Government is committed in principle to supporting introduction of appeal and (2) that recommendations as to most appropriate and least embarrassing timing should be made *ad referendum* by him, Lodge and Dixon.

SMITH

would be helpful" and recommended that since the United States had encouraged Thailand for a second time to make an appeal, "we ought to inform Khoman that he proceed with the letter asking for a SC meeting." (751G.00/5-2754)

The three Permanent Representatives met again on May 28 to discuss the text of the Thai appeal. They agreed that some modifications should be made to the text but they disagreed again on the timing for submission of the appeal. Hoppenot and Dixon felt submission should be delayed; Lodge said the appeal should be submitted on May 29. After consultation with the Department of State, Lodge informed Dixon and Hoppenot that Secretary of State Dulles wanted the appeal to be filed as soon as possible; the Secretary indicated to Lodge that in order to meet the French and British views on timing it would not seem essential for the Security Council to meet right away. The French and British accepted the U.S. views. For the text of the memorandum of conversation between Lodge, Dixon, and Hoppenot, May 28, see volume XIII.

The Government of Thailand submitted its appeal in the form of a letter to the U.N. Security Council on May 29, drawing the Security Council's attention to the Indochina situation, which Thailand contended threatened Thai security, and requesting that the Security Council provide observation of this situation under the auspices of the U.N. Peace Observation Commission. The letter of appeal was circulated as U.N. doc. S/3220.

## MAY 29, 1954

396.1 GE/5-2954 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1954—1 : 39 p. m.

Tosec 302. Reference Tosec 288<sup>2</sup> and Dulte 131.<sup>3</sup> While the line of reasoning adopted is similar in both referenced telegrams, I believe, as indicated in Tosec 288, that our initial position with reference to a supervisory organization should provide for the inclusion of Thailand. If Indonesia were included we should insist also on the Philippines.

I see no objection to agreeing that the Asian members of a control commission might invite a non-Asian state to join them. However I believe it might be offensive to the Asian members of a control commission if it were stipulated that they must include in their membership a non-Asian state, particularly a European nation. This would suggest to them that we have no confidence in their reliability unless buttressed

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 28, p. 966.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 28, p. 963.

by non-Asian support. Accordingly, I feel that for the time being we should neither make nor support a recommendation that a non-Asian state be included in a military control commission for Indochina.

MURPHY

396.1 GE/5-2854 : Telegram

*Eighth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 29, 3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 28 [29], 1954—midnight.

Secto 349. Repeated information Paris 365, London 229, Moscow 99, Tokyo 100, Saigon 132, Phnom Penh Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Eighth restricted session, Saturday, May 29, Molotov presiding.

Eden stated informal talks yesterday had, he hoped, produced agreement on text which was merely attempt to express generally accepted view without anyone accepting at this stage undertakings they found impossible (text telegraphed separately<sup>2</sup>). If agreed, date for meeting of representatives of commanders should be fixed.

Bidault held it important to begin concrete discussions between representatives of commanders and that Eden text permitted such discussions to start. French did not object, it being understood talks would begin on regrouping in Vietnam. France reserved its point of view on other problems, notably on difference between Laotian and Cambodian problems, and that of Vietnam. Other questions dealt with in general discussion such as controls and guarantees must also be solved before any agreement could be considered valid. Military experts would work merely on behalf of conference and their findings could not commit it without its explicit approval. Representatives of French and Vietnam Commands would be available here as of June 1.

Dong in long prepared statement said regrouping essential but must not interfere with essential unity of country. Two armed forces must first be separated but peace could only be based on recognition of national rights and independence of people of Vietnam. Essence of military problem was cease-fire. Essence of political problem was independence and territorial unity. Establishment of zones was only transitory and provisional measure looking toward national unity to be attained through free elections. Progress toward peace and unity was disconcerting to US interventionists but their obstinacy deceived

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/8) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 278. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 7 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 159-167. The communiqué issued by the Conference is printed in Cmd. 9186, p. 136.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram Secto 336, dated May 28, p. 965.

no one, particularly in Indochina. Bao Dai's army and administration were falling apart. Viet Minh proposals were greeted with unanimous enthusiasm by Indochinese in France as well as Indochina. He thought Chinese proposals should be accepted as synthesis of views so far expressed and conference then pass on to other questions. British proposal contained essential element of direct contact between military and was acceptable. It would take some time to get Viet Minh representatives here. Local contacts between commanders would be even more important than those in Geneva. (He distributed statement on completion of evacuation of 858 wounded of 21 nationalities from Dien Bien Phu with what he stated was agreed report on evacuation by field representatives of two parties.)

Molotov remarked sharply that Viet Minh statement covered several points not dealt with in Eden proposal. They could be dealt with later. Eden proposal was subject of discussion at present. No objections had been raised to it. If it was agreed, conference could pass on to other work.

Bidault said that although Viet Minh statement on evacuation of wounded contained many misstatements, he would not enter into polemics other than to say evacuation of wounded had not been completed. French Government for its part was prepared unilaterally to liberate a large number of wounded Viet Minh.

Chou in single sentence favored adoption of Eden proposal.

Cambodian delegate stated understanding Eden proposal concerned Vietnam only. Cambodia had no objection to simultaneous cease-fire provided arrangements were made for withdrawal of foreign invaders from Cambodia. Since no Cambodian representative would participate in discussions, he reserved right to contest any prejudicial recommendations. Regrouping could not apply to Cambodia. If his reservations were accepted by all other delegations, UK proposal was acceptable as starting point for military experts, who should be instructed to consider regrouping in Vietnam only.

Laos accepted Eden proposal on understanding regrouping could be applied only to Vietnam.

Vietnam representative agreed representatives of two Commands should meet here soonest but their work would be purely technical. It must be guided by general principles, one of which as included in French proposal was that regrouping should not be detrimental to Vietnamese political and territorial unity. Press had been nearly unanimous in regarding Viet Minh proposals as [calling for?] partition. Even if it were called provisional, same had been true of division of Korea. He asked that statement of this principle be added to Eden proposal.

Smith made statement given in Secto 343<sup>3</sup> and Secto 344.<sup>4</sup>

Molotov stated Soviet delegation considered Eden proposal acceptable and would in due course express its views on matters covered therein. Speaking again as chairman, he wished to sum up discussion. Meeting was discussing question of whether Eden proposal was acceptable. Account must be taken of the reservations already made and others which might be made by other delegations. He believed all were proceeding on assumption UK draft did not exhaust questions upon which it touched but that on other hand it was acceptable in its present form as all had spoken favorably of it as step forward. If it were acceptable to all, date should be fixed and he suggested June 1 as French had earlier proposed.

Dinh said that as representative of most interested party, he must return once more to question of safeguarding Vietnamese political and territorial unity. Without assurance on this point, it would be difficult for him to accept Eden proposal which neither provided for nor excluded partition.

Molotov expressed desire to help. He suggested it was common view of all that we should proceed from principle of Vietnamese unity and that this matter could not provoke any discussion.

Dong expressed agreement.

Molotov again inquired as to date.

Dong recalled his reservation as to delay in arrival of his military representative and suggested continuing and expanding contact already established between his delegation and French.

Bidault suggested that if Viet Minh representatives were not here by June 1 talks could start with whomever they had on hand. Chou referred to mechanical difficulties of transport and suggested meeting recess. Smith believed any mechanical difficulties could be easily overcome and asked estimate of time necessary.

Following recess during which Communist delegates met, Viet Minh delegation, after smilingly turning down US delegation offer of plane of "aggressor state" to bring Viet Minh military representative to Geneva, repeated Viet Minh "taking necessary dispositions" and finally said would advise prior June 1 date when Viet Minh military representative would arrive Geneva.

Molotov then embarked on lengthy commentary of principles set forth in CPR proposal of May 27 (Secto 326<sup>5</sup>). He said all delegates seemed to agree regarding simultaneous cease-fire applicable all armed forces in Indochina and that direct negotiations between parties con-

<sup>3</sup> *Infra*.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram Secto 344, May 29, the U.S. Delegation reported that the last sentence of text of telegram Secto 343, *infra*, should read "US delegation of course reserves its right, *as do others*, to decide for itself." (396.1 GE/5-2954)

<sup>5</sup> Dated May 27, p. 947.

cerned both in Geneva and on spot should lead to implementation this principle. Question of adjustment of territories, grouping of troops and passage of troops across areas held by each side and other matters could also be discussed by military representatives in Geneva and on spot.

Molotov strongly endorsed CPR position regarding importance of stopping entry of troops and war matériels into Indochina. This problem leads to problem of controls and supervision. Molotov stated that supervision by an international commission had been proposed by the French delegation and others and that the Soviet delegation had proposed supervision by commission of neutral countries. After an agreement in principle on this point, question of composition could be taken up. Molotov also endorsed Viet Minh proposal supported by CPR regarding principle of control by commission made up of representatives of two Commands. He discussed this as an indisputable proposal to which no one had objected. Molotov then referred to French proposal that agreements be guaranteed by Geneva conference states and said Soviet delegation had expressed agreement. He continued that no other delegation had expressed objection. Following agreement in principle on guarantee Molotov envisaged discussion of character of commitments to be entered into as suggested by CPR. Molotov said that USSR believes in consultation which would then provide approach collective action. Molotov believed no difficulty would be encountered regarding prisoners of war and civil internees.

Molotov suggested it would be well to record agreement regarding principles involved in CPR proposals. Their adoption would facilitate discussion of other matters on which agreement not yet reached.

US delegate stated he could not accept all of "interesting summary" made by Molotov, adding that there are objections to CPR proposals. He added that some of CPR proposals already taken care of in UK proposal adopted. He stated nothing more important than questions of supervision. He suggested that at next meeting conference devote its attention to such matters as type, quality and composition of supervisory authority, stating that if this matter could be disposed of practically all others might fall into line; if not, problem very difficult indeed.

Molotov then read draft communiqué (see Secto 347 \*).

US delegate stated that while there was agreement on communiqué various delegations have made reservations or statements establishing their positions regarding UK proposal. US delegate stated he reserved right to make US position clear and to make statement to press along

---

\* Dated May 29, p. 975.

lines brief statement he had previously made (see Secto 343 and Secto 344).

Cambodian delegate made statement endorsing US delegate's statement and stating that Cambodian delegate would make Cambodian reservation available to press.

Soviet delegate said that if each delegation could give its point of view regarding communiqué, nature and purpose of communiqué might be vitiated. He suggested perhaps conference had better resume plenary sessions.

US delegate stated this special case and suggested perhaps a sentence could be added to communiqué to effect various delegates reserved position on certain matters of principle.

Eden, who during this discussion had been showing signs great impatience and irritation then said perhaps terms of UK proposal might be altogether omitted from communiqué (see below).

Chou En-lai said communiqué had better be left as read and asked whether US delegate proposal would not empower every delegation to make its views known through a press conference.

US delegate expressed appreciation for Chou En-lai observation. Stressed that US delegation has observed press ethics in matter of restricted sessions. He pointed out however this peculiar situation in which US delegation authorized not to accept and not to oppose UK proposal but rather to record certain principles. He stressed he did not intend, in dealing with press, to go beyond framework of brief remarks he had made.

Molotov then suggested that agreement be reached to adopt communiqué without additions, to take note of observations made by delegates regarding their reservations and not to restrict delegations in their dealings with press on this topic. This was generally agreed.

*Comment:* It was clear that while there had been prior coordination between Molotov and Chinese, Viet Minh had not been given their instructions prior to meeting and were somewhat slow in responding to Molotov's clear directions that they agree to meeting of Commanders in Geneva if possible by June 1.

Although I had discussed with Eden at intermission fact that we would have to make our position clear on various reservations of principle we had taken, when I raised subject in meeting both Eden and Reading gave a startling public exhibition of impatience and pique which included an irate aside by Reading, audible throughout room to effect UK should withdraw its proposal. In contrast Molotov remained calm and finally accepted that it would be understood each delegation would be able to make clear positions it had taken with regard to resolution.



396.1 GE/5-2954 : Telegram

*Eighth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 29, 3 p. m. : The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL      NIACT

GENEVA, May 29, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 343. Repeated information London 223, Paris 358, Saigon 128. Following is text of statement made by Smith in restricted session Saturday May 29 on Eden proposal. We will release it to press if text of Eden proposal is incorporated in communiqué or if it leaks textually. Department may wish to do same.

"I would like to make clear the position of my delegation on proposal submitted by Mr. Eden.

"I have frequently made it clear that US wants killing to stop throughout Indochina as soon as possible.

"I have also made it clear that US maintains problems of Laos and Cambodia are of a distinctly different nature from problems of Vietnam. It is my view that forces which are now carrying on hostilities against Governments of Laos and Cambodia are foreign forces. US believes it essential that any settlement for Laos and Cambodia must provide for complete withdrawal of these forces from both countries.

"However I do not view proposal made by UK as departing from principle that Laos and Cambodia are in a different situation than Vietnam. Moreover, I would assume that no recommendation made to this conference by any military representatives will involve any violation of this principle and that they will provide for withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Laos and Cambodia. Having made known these views and assumptions, and upon understanding that this proposal is acceptable to all of the other delegations participating in this conference, USDel will not oppose convening of the military representatives as proposed by UK and would hope that they will produce acceptable solutions. US delegation, of course, reserves its right as do others, to decide for itself whether any of the solutions ultimately proposed by the military experts are consistent with our firm positions on Laos and Cambodia as well as Vietnam which I have already stated to the conference."

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-2954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

GENEVA, May 29, 1954.

Secto 347. Repeated information Paris 363, Moscow 98, London 227, Saigon 131, Tokyo 99, Phnom Penh and Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Department pass Defense. The nine delegations met in a restricted meeting on May 29, and continued their discussion of the problem of the reestablishment of peace in Indochina. The meeting

adopted a proposal presented by the delegation of the United Kingdom, which reads as follows :

“In order to facilitate the early and simultaneous cessation of hostilities it is proposed that :

“(a) Representatives of the two commands should meet immediately in Geneva and contacts should also be established on the spot.

“(b) They should study the disposition of forces to be made upon the cessation of hostilities, beginning with the question of regrouping areas in Vietnam.

“(c) They should report their findings and recommendations to the conference as soon as possible.”

It was agreed that the date of the first meeting of the representatives of the two commands in Geneva shall be fixed before June 1.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-2854 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      NIACT      WASHINGTON, May 29, 1954—3:37 p. m.

Tosec 307. Reference Sectos 332,<sup>2</sup> 333<sup>3</sup> and 336.<sup>4</sup> We realize from Secto 336 that you are fully alive to the dangers of associating Laos and Cambodia with Viet Nam in any cease fire and troop regroupment. We agree with Phleger's analysis of the position and believe that great attention must be paid to the wording of any agreed proposal on this subject.

As we have stressed in a series of messages, especially Tosec 254<sup>5</sup> and Tosec 288,<sup>6</sup> we firmly maintain the position that the three Associated States are not to be treated as a bloc in proposed military arrangement.

As to paragraph (b) of UK draft (Secto 332 and 336) we believe that our position could be fairly represented by a redraft along the following lines :

“The first task should be to work out regrouping areas within Vietnam, for Vietminh forces operating in all three Associated States, and for Franco-Vietnamese forces operating in Vietnam”

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of PSA and Gullion of S/P.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram Secto 332, May 28, contained the U.K. proposal presented to the Drafting Committee on Indochina. (396.1 GE/5-2854) For minutes of the meeting of this committee, May 28, and the text of the British proposal, see p. 955.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram Secto 333, May 28, contained the summary minutes of the first meeting of the Drafting Committee on Indochina. (396.1 GE/5-2854) For minutes of this meeting, May 28, see p. 955.

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 28, p. 965.

<sup>5</sup> Dated May 24, p. 912.

<sup>6</sup> Dated May 28, p. 966.

With reference to the Eden version in Secto 336, we oppose the words of the preamble "and simultaneous" unless it is made clear thereafter that regrouping would be effected only within Vietnam.

As you know (Tedul 137)<sup>7</sup> we fear that zonal "regrouping" may tend to *de facto* partition which would raise serious questions for us. Also, the feasibility of maintaining the integrity of enclaves and isolated sectors is problematical. Without effective policing and guarantees, which an Asian commission may be unable to supply, we fear a possible general merging under Communist pressure, unless Western powers are willing and ready to intervene on detailed and regional questions.

We should like as soon as practicable receive whatever series of maps or other topographical descriptions of the zones projected under the various propositions may be obtainable from French or other sources.

MURPHY

---

<sup>7</sup> Dated May 28, p. 967.

---

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers

*Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 29, 1954.

PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

I received the following eyes only message for you from Bedell sent Geneva Saturday, May 29.

"Please give this privately to Foster preferably by phone as soon as convenient after he arrives in New York on Tuesday. Bedell is convinced that Eden and Bidault are willing to accept Foster's leadership and judgment on matter of Thai Resolution but they would like to be sure that decisions are his, personally, and taken after he has personally considered their respective problems. Eden's position vis-à-vis India particularly difficult now as result of Allen's statement to Pillai re British support. This statement was made before Eden had informed Krishna Menon, which he did this morning, with bad reaction."

**MAY 30, 1954**

741.13/5-3054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 30, 1954—4 a. m.

Unnumbered. Eyes only Secretary. Absolutely no distribution. Following personal message from the Under Secretary is to be delivered to Secretary Dulles and to no one else.

Dear Foster: The conclusion of our closed session today was so revealing that I must give you my personal impressions to supplement Secto 349.<sup>1</sup> Although, during the recess, I told Eden that when Molotov suggested, as a communiqué, the plain text of the United Kingdom proposal, I would be obliged to say that the United States must also make plain its reservations on matters of unagreed principle; and although at that time he indicated complete agreement, his subsequent performance and that of Lord Reading, was absolutely shocking to me.

I stated the United States position in the most restrained terms. Eden and Reading, although informed in advance as I have said, staged a demonstration of petulance and annoyance, the like of which I have never seen before at an international conference. Their attempt to distort and deceive was so obvious that even Molotov could not swallow it, and his final proposal was, by comparison, reasonable and moderate.

I have done everything I possibly can here to retain an Anglo-American equilibrium. I smiled pleasantly today when Eden told me that my statement at yesterday's plenary session, which the London *Times* reported as "a clear and restrained defense of the United Nations and the principle of collective security," was "frightful." I shall continue to do so. . . . I felt, in view of the impending visit, that I should give you this personal estimate. You may not agree with it, but here it is, for what it is worth. Signed Beetle.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 29, p. 970.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 286

*Smith-Robertson-Sarasin Meeting, Geneva, May 30, 10:20 a. m.: Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy United States Representative (Robertson)*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 30, 1954.

Participants: Ambassador Sarasin, Thai Delegation  
 Walter Bedell Smith, U.S. Delegation  
 Walter S. Robertson, U.S. Delegation

Ambassador Sarasin, just back from a week's visit to Bangkok, came in to report the result of his conversations there with the Prime Minister and other government officials. He stated that decision had been made to proceed with the appeal to the United Nations without delay. The Thais felt that while the threat was not overt, it had actually increased since last June. He hoped we would give our unqualified support, and General Smith assured him that we would. He said he

---

<sup>1</sup> Summary of discussion was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 139, June 1. (790.5/6-154) For text, see volume XII.

doubted what the attitude of India would be. Prince Wan was seeing Krishna Menon today and they hoped that India could be induced to accept a place on the Peace Observation Commission. If India accepted, Burma might be persuaded to accept too.

General Smith related his conversation with Menon regarding Thailand's appeal to the Security Council. Menon's first reaction was that it was just "American propaganda" and the appeal should not be made until the Geneva Conference had been given full opportunity to reach agreement. After General Smith emphasized the necessity of bringing the United Nations into the Indochina picture and the important role that India should play in such a situation, possibly as a member both of the Peace Observation Commission and of the International Control Commission to enforce the armistice, Menon's attitude seemed to be somewhat modified.

Ambassador Sarasin reported that Thailand's relations with Burma were very much improved, citing the evacuation of the KMT as being very helpful in improving relations. He related conversations which a representative of the Thai Government had with the Acting Foreign Minister of Burma on a recent visit to Rangoon. The Minister stated that Burma was opposed to communism but must appear to be neutral on account of its proximity to communist power. For this reason Burma could not afford to accept assistance from the western countries. If bad came to worse, however, Burma would throw in its lot against the communists.

With reference to the proposal to establish a fighter wing base in Thailand, Ambassador Sarasin reported the Prime Minister said it would be very difficult to explain a Spanish base agreement to his people at this time. He said, however, that his Government agreed in principle and that the base would be acceptable if established in any one of the three following conditions: (1) as a result of United Nations resolutions; (2) as the result of a decision by a collective security organization; (3) in connection with a mutual defense pact with the United States. While Thailand did not want to grant us a base along the lines of the Spanish agreement, it would welcome being furnished with a group of jet fighters for the training of its own pilots and to receive through MAAG the necessary assistance to enable them to establish a base of their own which would be available to us in case of need. The Thais' main concern at the present was to build up its own military forces through MAAG. At present their military organization seemed to be bogged down in procedures and the Thais were confused about what America would or would not do. General Gillmore<sup>2</sup> stated that there was a 50% deficiency in non-commissioned and com-

---

<sup>2</sup> Maj. Gen. William M. Gillmore, U.S.A., Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand.

missioned officers, that the Air Force while lacking in equipment was making progress, and that the Navy was "all right" for present purposes. He said, however, that Thailand's economic situation had deteriorated so seriously that they would need economic assistance to help relieve the strain of building up its military strength. He cited, for instance, that although they had been furnished with planes it was necessary to use its slender foreign exchange balances to buy spare parts and fuel.

With some initial hesitation but with complete frankness, Ambassador Sarasin stated that General Gillmore, while evidently an able and efficient officer, was very blunt in his relations with the Thai Prime Minister and military officers and that some friction had developed. General Smith suggested that General Donovan might act as mediator to smooth things over. Ambassador Sarasin replied that it appeared the two did not get along very well. General Gillmore considered General Donovan a World War I officer and General Donovan considered General Gillmore to be a young man not mature in experience.

General Smith suggested that in view of the Thais' confusion about what we were willing and able to do and our lack of knowledge of what the Thais themselves were willing to undertake, the best way to resolve the confusion would be for the Thai Chief of Staff and appropriate officers to come to Washington for a frank discussion with our Chiefs of Staff. He said that he would have to obtain authority from Washington for such a procedure, but he felt it could be done if the suggestion appealed to the Thais. Ambassador Sarasin thought it would be an excellent idea and would so report to his Government. General Smith emphasized that if the Thais came they should have clearly in mind beforehand what they are prepared to do and what economic assistance would be needed to carry out their desired program.

Ambassador Sarasin stated his Prime Minister was extremely upset by the five-power talks to take place in Washington on June 3. The Prime Minister felt that if Thailand, the first country to respond to Secretary Dulles' appeal for a SEA collective security pact, was left out of the discussions now to take place, it would seem as if Washington was just taking Thailand for granted. The Prime Minister said it would be impossible to explain Thailand's omission to the Thai people and he earnestly hoped Thailand could be included. General Smith explained that the five-power talks were a continuation of talks which had been going on between the five powers over a period of several years, that they did not represent a discussion by members of a collective security organization, and that none of the countries participating had yet made a definite decision to become parties to such a pact. He said that Great Britain, as has been generally publicized, was unwilling to join a SEA pact before the Geneva Conference had

shown whether or not it was able to reach a satisfactory agreement, and that the Australians had been unwilling to take a position before the Australian elections. New Zealand, which at one time was very cold to the idea, was now showing indication of falling in line. In order to get going, it was necessary to fall back on an already existing agency. The purpose of the talks was to obtain the best military evaluation by the five powers of the situation in Indochina. General Smith hoped that such an evaluation would prove to all the participants the need for the pact. He stated that other interested governments would be kept informed as to the discussions and that at the appropriate time it was hoped to have a conference to include them all.

General Smith said it was necessary to get high level military talks started not only to determine an over-all strategic concept but also to impress the communists with allied unity. Ambassador Sarasin was persistent in his unhappiness about the situation. General Smith patiently emphasized that it would be impossible to get the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand to participate if other nations were included at this stage, that these were the facts and it would be helpful if he could use his good offices in making them clear to his Prime Minister.

---

396.1 GE/5-3054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, May 30, 1954—3 p. m.

Dulte 134. Personal for Murphy. Probably the major part of this conference will be wound up by the end of next week. Eden is leaving within a few days. I believe Molotov will leave as soon as the military experts get started to work under the general terms of the British proposal of yesterday. In any event, things are likely to move very fast. Please emphasize to all concerned that Departmental instructions received after the event, as was Tosec 307,<sup>1</sup> are of very little help.

[Here follows the portion of this message relating to the Korean phase of the Conference; for the text, see page 324.]

Next, and equally important, is the vital matter of the Indochina control authority, particularly its composition. Discussions on this will begin on Monday. The Communists will probably propose a counterpart of the NNSC, possibly offering India as a fifth. The British will probably propose India in association with a European country (Norway is India's choice). The Communists would not accept Thailand or the Philippines, and India would not accept association with them. The realistic element in the problem is the necessity for troops—about 30,000 of them. I hope you will continue to take this fact into

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 29, p. 976.

consideration, as well as the fact that the period referred to in Tosec 302<sup>2</sup> as "for time being" is likely to be very short unless I am to be continually exposed to pressures from several Foreign Ministers who are becoming very impatient, and irate.

Therefore, while I am glad to know what our initial position should be, I also need most urgently to know, if it can now be estimated, what our final position may be on this important question. I am still of the opinion that the Colombo powers, in association with a neutral European nation of their selection, would be the best solution. I did not, in my previous message on this subject, imply that the US should propose it.

The other important matter which will come up in few days is the question of international guarantees, either by the nations represented at this conference, or by some other body such as the UN. I very much need to know the Secretary's views about this, and I hope you will get them to me at the earliest.<sup>3</sup> The Communists will insist on consultation and collective action which builds in a veto. We might accept consultation, but should maintain the principle that action shall be taken "jointly or severally" on receipt of a plea from the supervisory authority.

SMITH

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 29, p. 969.

<sup>3</sup> The Department's reply is in telegram Tedul 144, May 31, p. 989.

**MAY 31, 1954**

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 285

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 31, 1954.

Subject: Meeting of the Six regarding this afternoon's restricted session on Indochina.

1) In reply to Chauvel's question, I stated that your remarks Saturday<sup>2</sup> regarding supervision and controls did not indicate that you were ready to submit definite proposals on this subject. I added that we were not taking the initiative in submitting proposals on this or other questions, leaving this to the countries more directly interested. The Cambodian Delegate pointed out that on this question the Viet-minh and the Communist Chinese have advanced rather definite proposals whereas our side is still talking general principles. Chauvel made it clear that Bidault is not yet ready to talk about the composition of the international supervisory authority but that he might ad-

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Bonsal.

<sup>2</sup> May 29.



vance some ideas regarding the tasks of that authority ((a) keeping the belligerent armies apart and (b) supervising frontiers and ports of entry).

2) It was brought out that the other side will probably wish to talk about point 3 of the Chinese Communist proposal relating to the introduction of fresh troops and weapons. We should take the position, as was implicitly stated in your remarks last Saturday, that this issue can only be taken up after agreement has been reached regarding the supervisory authority.

3) It was tentatively agreed that this afternoon Eden would begin with a general statement regarding the position of the Conference in the light of Saturday's developments, that you would then talk briefly expanding the remarks you made on Saturday (draft being prepared) and possibly recounting our experience with NNSC in Korea thus refuting the rosy picture painted by Chou En-lai. Bidault might then make a few remarks regarding the tasks of the supervisory machinery in Indochina.

4) It seemed generally agreed that our side does not have very much to say today and that we need to develop a coordinated position on the supervisory authority. Therefore it was tentatively agreed that we would try to avoid a meeting on Indochina tomorrow holding the next one on Wednesday, June 2nd.

5) The Cambodian Delegate expressed the hope that at the meeting following the one this afternoon the cases of Cambodia and Laos could be taken up again. He made the point that until Vietminh troops were evacuated from Cambodia, Cambodia could agree to no restrictions on Cambodia's right to introduce reinforcements and weapons.

6) The Vietnamese representative expressed regret that the Conference agreement regarding the unity of Viet-Nam had not been incorporated in the communiqué. He may raise this issue. We could probably support a public statement on this subject if other delegations approve (we should not, however, carry the torch on this one).

---

396.1 GE/5-3154 : Telegram

*Ninth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, May 31, 3 p. m. :  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 31, 1954—midnight.

Secto 356. Repeated information Paris 369, London 232, Saigon 137, Tokyo 103, Moscow 101, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/9) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 278. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 7 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 168-175.

for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Ninth restricted session, Monday, May 31, Eden presiding :

Eden stated conference had Chinese proposal of May 27 (Secto 326<sup>2</sup>) before it. First two paragraphs covered by military negotiations agreed last session. Most important remaining provisions refer to supervision on which US delegate spoke last meeting.

Gromyko who led Soviet delegation in Molotov's absence pointed out CPR proposal dealt other matters which must be discussed also.

US delegate agreed stating CPR paper contained two most important points: Supervision and guarantees. US delegate, after stressing fact restricted meetings make it possible for delegates to speak plainly without worrying about public effect, spoke of great importance of supervisory machinery to be available as soon as fighting stops. He said this could at first be of an interim, local character but function must be taken over at earliest possible moment by international supervision.

US delegate then referred to Korean experience with NNSC "which we hopefully called neutral" and to Chou En-lai's remarks concerning Korean experience. He said UN side had acted in good faith toward Commission and Communists had not. He read from letters of May 4 and 7 from Swedish and Swiss members of Commission to prove his point by impartial testimony. He concluded that armistice supervision by Neutral Nations Commission will not be effective unless:

- (a) Commission composed of truly neutral nations
- (b) Agreed system for checking reinforcements not dependent primarily on good faith opposing forces, and
- (c) Personnel of NNSC unrestricted geographically in activities.

Chou En-lai took strong issue with Smith's statement. After criticizing Swiss and Swedes for lack of complete impartiality, he turned to report of Repatriation Commission in which there was majority report agreed by Indians, Poles and Czechs and minority report submitted by Swedes and Swiss. Chou En-lai said, however, NNSC had been basically successful and he referred to supervision over rotation of military personnel and replacement of arms and munitions. There has been no incident reported basically detrimental to armistice such as recurrence of hostilities. He denied reports that there have been armistice violations by North Koreans or Chinese volunteers. He referred to charge made on October 12, 1953, by senior delegate of UN Command to effect North Koreans and Chinese had shipped aircraft into North Korea. A thorough inspection on ground by NNSC re-

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 27, p. 947.

vealed this was without foundation. On other hand, UN Command's requests to investigate North Korean Army to determine if POWs captured from ROK Army were serving there had been denied as beyond terms of armistice agreement. If this were not so, Communist side might well request right to investigate on UN side and even on Taiwan to find 48,000 prisoners held by force. Such request if made by Communists would also be denied as exceeding armistice agreement.

As to matter introduction fresh troops or matériel, Chou En-lai alleged NNSC inspection teams stationed at entry ports have full facilities. Those teams receive from North Korean-Chinese volunteer side reports in advance and may make inspections at any time including spot checks. He mentioned particularly possibility of making inspection of trains on which no advance report had been submitted. He referred also to fact that UN side had insisted on inspection teams located at two ports of entry which Communist side not using for rotations or replacements.

Chou En-lai "acknowledged fact" NNSC has met difficulties created by UN side. He referred to statements by Czech and Polish members April 15 and April 30. He mentioned four items.

(1) 14,000 prisoners of war shipped out of Korea at Inchon in violation Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission agreement. NNSC not allowed make inspection this movement. This was violation of agreement.

(2) In ten months UN side has brought in over 7,500 combat aircraft allegedly as replacements but NNSC inspection has reported in addition 186 aircraft shipped in illegally resulting in increase of combat strength in violation of agreement.

(3) There have been violations in matters of spare parts and other items which UN side has not allowed NNSC to inspect. This also increases combat strength and constitutes violation.

(4) UN side only allows inspection of ships reported but refuses to permit inspection of ships not reported.

Chou En-lai concluded that Neutral Nations Commission should be able reflect views both sides and take care interests both belligerents while supervising terms of armistice impartially. He also favored joint commissions of representatives of two sides charged with implementation of armistice agreement.

US delegate repeated that Czechs and Poles on NNSC not neutral and added view Communists cannot be neutral.

After recess, DRV representative took issue with US delegate's view regarding neutrality of Communists. He then announced designation by Viet Minh High Command of Ta Quang Buu (member of Viet Minh delegation here and currently Vice Minister of Defense) as offi-

cial delegate to meetings of representatives of two High Commands. He will have several military advisers. Colonel Ha Van Lau of Viet Minh delegation will be prepared meet with Brebisson and others on French side on June 1 to prepare opening meeting representatives two High Commands.

Bidault accepted proposal for meeting and later indicated Franco-Vietnamese representative at military representatives meetings is to be General Deltiel assisted by high French and Vietnamese officers including Colonel Brebisson.

Cambodian delegate supported US delegate's position regarding desirability appointing true neutrals to supervising authority and impossibility of Communist neutrality. He also reiterated that Chinese Communist proposals could refer only to Vietnam not to Cambodia. He stated he would submit a proposal dealing with Cambodia.

Gromyko then rehearsed Communist Chinese proposal (Secto 326) along very much the same lines followed by Molotov on May 29 (Secto 349<sup>3</sup>). He advocated recording agreements which had already been reached on these principles, namely,

- (1) That cessation of hostilities should be simultaneous;
- (2) That parties have now agreed to enter into military contacts to make appropriate readjustments of territories held by them;
- (3) That it is indispensable to control introduction into Indochina of fresh troops and matériel;
- (4) Need for international supervision and for proposed joint committee of belligerents to help supervise armistice;
- (5) Desirability of guarantees by Geneva powers with provision for consultation and collective action; and
- (6) Release of prisoners of war and civilian internees.

In speaking of supervision, Gromyko referred to alleged general approval of concept of joint commissions representing two commands. He also said there was general agreement regarding a neutral nations commission. He agreed with US delegate's view that this matter of neutral nations commission required full discussion. He suggested a neutral nations commission composed of India, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Pakistan, stating that such a commission could supervise the implementation of the terms of the cessation of hostilities. He said it would have every reason to insure an impartial approach and every facility for carrying out its task. It would have the "necessary international authority".

Gromyko took issue with US delegate's statement regarding impossibility Communist nation being true neutral. He said this position

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 29, p. 970.

might be turned in opposite direction but that he refused to reach any such gloomy conclusion. He said ideology is one thing and cooperation and the maintenance of peace is another thing.

Gromyko concluded by expressing hope conference could adopt a resolution setting forth agreements on principle which he had outlined in general support of CPR proposal.

Bidault said his understanding of agreements reached was not as broad as Gromyko's. He considered international control as fundamental preliminary to any regrouping of forces and agreement on guarantees. International control must be effective, equitable and respected. He indicated he would be prepared later to give views.

With regard to Cambodia and Laos, Bidault said main task of control commission would be to insure withdrawal of invading troops. In Vietnam, task would be considerably more complex including internal organization, inspection of regrouping areas and of lines separating zones and disarmament of irregulars. He indicated acceptance of concept of joint commissions representing belligerents as adjuncts to international commission. He stressed, however, responsibility of control would rest with international commission which would have supreme authority to see to implementation of agreements. He said conference must define :

- (a) Functions of international commission ;
- (b) Composition to be drawn from countries truly neutral ; and
- (c) Permanent authority to which commission would report.

As to composition, Bidault refrained from entering controversy as to whether Communist countries can be neutral but he said Gromyko's proposed commission bore a great resemblance to composition already accepted in Korea. Bidault noted with approval views of US delegate on results there. He suggested conference would be justified in seeking some new approach and said that he might later have some proposals.

Cambodian delegate then took strong issue with Gromyko's statement on paragraph 2 of China's proposal dealing with regrouping zones. He stressed that military conversations will deal only with Vietnam. He recalled that Molotov, as chairman at last meeting, had taken note of Cambodian and other reservations but that today Gromyko had referred only to communiqué. Cambodian delegate asked that Cambodian reservation be included in today's communiqué. Eden turned down this request with statement situation was as left at last meeting, namely, that conference took note of reservations and delegates were free to make these reservations public.

Agreement was then reached on communiqué (Secto 355<sup>4</sup>). It was agreed, on Eden proposal, that a day for contacts and reflection would be useful. The next restricted meeting will be June 2.

Original draft of communiqué spoke of "military representatives of France and the DRV". As a result of point made by Vietnamese representative and proposal of Soviet delegate language finally adopted was "military representatives of the two sides".

(*Comment*: Although this may be somewhat ambiguous, record of discussion makes clear that military representatives included on the one hand French High Command including French and Vietnamese officers and on the other hand representatives of DRV High Command.)

(*Comment*: Chou En-lai was obviously caught unprepared by Smith's statement on NNSC and after period of silence during which there were no speakers finally spoke extemporaneously and with more animation than he has thus far shown while aides scurried out to obtain material brought in piece-meal while he was speaking.

SMITH

---

<sup>4</sup>The text of the communiqué, transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 355, May 31, was as follows: "The nine delegations continued in restricted session their discussion of the problem of restoring peace in Indochina. The conference was informed that a preliminary meeting would be held on June 1 between military representatives of the two sides in order to make arrangements for the meetings of the representatives of the two commands. The next meeting of the conference will be held on June 2." (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 258)

---

751G.00/5-3154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, May 31, 1954—4 p. m.

Dulte 135. Repeated information Paris 367, Saigon 135. Re Tosec 269 (repeated Paris 4272 and Saigon 2418)<sup>1</sup> and Paris 4565 to Department (repeated Geneva 304 and Saigon 549).<sup>2</sup> Am advised Bidault wishes to discuss with me in near future question of clarifying independence. Am told he is in general agreement with line of thinking Tosec 269 but has some ideas of his own on how to proceed.

My own views remain those expressed in Dulte 120.<sup>3</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1 to telegram Secto 331, p. 968.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 26. p. 935.

396.1 GE/5-3054 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1954—6: 14 p. m.

Tedul 144. For Smith from Murphy. Re Dulte 134.<sup>2</sup> Your urgent need for guidance fully appreciated as well as your capacity to absorb pressures of "irate Foreign Ministers"!

Secretary will not be available until Tuesday<sup>3</sup> morning in New York arriving Washington about nine p. m. EDT.

You have been given our thinking on Korea in Tosec 316<sup>4</sup> subject Secretary's approval.

On Indo-China we are giving Secretary outline our thoughts for his consideration as follows (and no doubt he will communicate to you his views as soon as possible).

*I. Outlook for Conference.*

Conference is rapidly approaching new stage with summoning of military experts to Geneva and forthcoming departure of Molotov and Eden. Therefore, important at this time we review our total position. Military experts cannot, of course, commit us to accept their recommendations or any territorial settlement in Viet Nam which threaten to deteriorate to disadvantage of anti-Communist security position. As you indicated in your remarks May 29 (Secto 343<sup>5</sup>) we should continue reserve right to decide for ourselves whether any of solutions ultimately proposed are "consistent with our firm position on Laos and Cambodia, as well as Viet Nam". (Underscoring mine.)

If evolution of military campaign should threaten maintenance of key positions in Tonkin Delta, this might confront United States with grave decisions (key areas may be those outlined in paragraph (4) of Dillon's 4605, repeated Geneva 560 May 30<sup>6</sup>). It is no less true that loss these key positions through negotiated settlement would be unacceptable to United States.

On basis latest messages from Paris, present French Government seems disposed to hold in the Delta. Our actions in Geneva and elsewhere are calculated strengthen its ability and will to resist. If French Government or its successor should weaken and seek end fighting on worse terms, prejudicial to free world security and integrity of Viet

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Gullion of S/P, Tyler of WE, Popper of UNP, and Sturm of PSA. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4334, to Saigon as telegram 2463, and to London as telegram 6474.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 30, p. 981.

<sup>3</sup> June 1.

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 31, p. 326.

<sup>5</sup> Dated May 29, p. 975.

<sup>6</sup> For text, see volume XIII.

Nam, we might have seriously to consider extent if any to which we could associate ourselves with such a settlement.

Dubious attitude of British as reflected by Eden would not prevent us from making this independent assessment.

## II. *Composition of Control Authority.*

We are opposed to any "counterpart of the NNSC". Our preferred solution is control commission organized as suggested our Tosec 302.<sup>7</sup> You are authorized, however, support commission which included Norway or another friendly European nation provided Asian powers who might be expected make up control commission should indicate no insuperable objection. If, as counterpart to friendly European nation, Soviets should propose European satellite, this would be unacceptable and we would prefer stand for purely Asian membership.

## III. *International Guarantees.*

In my view necessary sanctions against violation should preferably be supplied through UN. It is increasingly clear here that if US must eventually intervene, public and congressional opinion would much more readily support action within UN framework. Moreover, this solution would commend itself to Asian nations, particularly Associated States.

Asian nations acting alone without UN would have neither will nor ability prevent or penalize violations; in fact, they may even be unwilling assume field supervision functions without some relationship to UN.

Action by signatory powers alone would have relatively narrow base. Moreover, on practically every issue action would be inhibited by sharp divisions between Communist and free world components. If intervention were then undertaken "jointly or severally" by free nations it might have aspect of an action by interested powers unbacked by disinterested support of third parties.

In UN there exist established procedures for intervention which could be rapidly utilized, whereas these would have to be devised and spelled out for intervention by signatory powers, doubtless over opposition of Communists.

Despite SC veto, UN charter and procedures provide effective means for individual or collective defense against armed aggression.

For above reasons, UN responsibility from outset is preferable but we could accept solution in which: 1) signatories pledge responsibility for no breach in armistice by participants their side; 2) signa-

---

<sup>7</sup> Dated May 29, p. 969.



tories agree as part of armistice that if control commission reports breach in armistice, any signatory may refer matter immediately to UN.

MURPHY

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 810

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1954.

DEAR FOSTER: During your absence as brief as it has been, it seems to have become increasingly clear that the basic decision which confronts you regarding Geneva is whether you want the United States to be *particeps* to an agreement on Indochina which, in the light of the Geneva conversations, cannot be happy from the American point of view. Nothing has happened so far which provides encouragement for belief that a satisfactory understanding would eventuate. I doubt you have expected that. The United States is not a belligerent in the Indochina hostilities and barring overt Red Chinese participation, perhaps will not enter at this late hour. In view of the British obvious determination to see some form, almost any, of settlement, and what appears an unmistakable trend in Paris on the political side to achieve a settlement, we have the concomitant of a French effort to nudge us into some form of military participation. I think you have said that if the latter effort is designed to strengthen the position at Geneva, there will be no objection; but if it will lead to compromising the conditions laid down by the United States for participation, that was to be avoided. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, it is suggested that giving instructions to Bedell without a clear-cut conviction whether in the end we wish to be parties to an agreement of settlement for Indochina, whether termed "honorable" or not, is an exceedingly difficult undertaking. The arguments for and against are fairly clear. Our tactical position would be best protected if the United States would not be *particeps*. I hope that we can have the benefit of your guidance on this basic consideration after your return.

We have elaborated some thoughts on both Korea and Indo-China which are enclosed in the forms of a copy of our Tosec 316<sup>1</sup> and a staff memorandum on Indo-China, Tedul 144.<sup>2</sup>

I hope the short break you had was beneficial.

All the best.

Yours,

ROBERT MURPHY

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 31, p. 326.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

396.1 GE/5-3154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, May 31, 1954—9 p. m.

Dulte 136. Personal and eyes only for Secretary.

Dear Foster: There is one consideration in connection with your Western trip that worries me a great deal. This trip might, I fear, coincide with what one might call the windup of the "Foreign Minister" phase of the Conference. I think Eden will leave Thursday, for reasons which I told you privately. Molotov is making a quick trip to Moscow this weekend, and my guess is that he will leave around the end of next week, or the first of the following week if by then the military representatives are on the spot and working. Bidault, who trusts few of his associates, will probably divide his time between here and Paris, as he has a large stake in the military recommendations.

I think we should wind up Korea during the next week or ten days, depending on your decision regarding the two alternative lines of action suggested in my Dulte 134 of May 30<sup>1</sup> to Murphy, and during this period the senior members of the sixteen will be drifting out. Some have already gone.

The trouble is that this will be just the time I need to be in close touch with you. I have the feeling that things are going to happen very fast during the next ten days. Unless arrangements can be made for me to receive your personal advice and instructions very promptly, it might be better for me to come home as you originally suggested, either letting Murphy replace me or, possibly even better, leaving Robertson and Johnson to carry on here. After a month here, I have a certain feeling of the realities of the situation that I find reflected only in your personal messages and in the conversations we had before your departure. I am quite certain, for example, that we will see a division of Vietnam, no matter what it is called, and that we will be lucky to save half of it, as we will be lucky if we do not lose a considerable northern slice of Laos. We will be equally lucky if all concerned would accept supervision in Indochina by the Colombo powers, possibly with the association of a neutral European State. Norway, by the way, was not my suggestion. but Menon's, and I agree that we should not propose it as the French don't take to it. I am reasonably sure that neither the Communists, nor India would take Thailand or the Philippines, as they consider them our stooges, but I think we should try for them, at least as a gesture, if the Colombo powers or other Asian States are proposed by others. Menon has been busy trying to sell the idea of India and Norway to the Russians and Chinese,

---

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 981.

I do not know with what success. Incidentally, today the Russians made the first bid: India, Pakistan, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

If I could have your own personal thoughts on these matters, it would be of great help to me. Signed Bedell.

SMITH

JUNE 1, 1954

396.1 GE/6-154: Telegram

*Smith-Eden-Bidault Meeting, June 1, 1954, Noon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

NIACT

GENEVA, June 1, 1954—4 p. m.

Dulte 138. Eden asked for a private meeting this noon with Bidault and myself. After apologizing for passing out "the usual British bit of paper", he handed each of us the following, saying at the same time that "British would support the position of France in Indochina and would go along with Americans in Korea".

"I. *Indochina.*

"1. How do the French and Americans see the future development of the conference? Is it or is it not urgent to get an agreement? What are the chances of getting the main lines of an agreement worked out by the end of next week?

"2. Will the French have ready for tomorrow's meeting their own detailed proposals on international control under M. Bidault's headings:

"(a) Form and functions.

"(b) Composition.

"(c) Ultimate authority.

"3. In particular, can we make a counterproposal on composition? Can we propose the five Colombo powers?

"4. Have the French also begun to work out their ideas on the guarantee, the introduction of new material and personnel and the other remaining questions covered by the Chinese proposals?

"5. What may we say to Chou En-lai tonight? May we sound him about the Colombo powers?

[Here follows Part II which dealt with Korea; for text, see page 333.]

After some discussion we agreed with regard to point one—Indochina—it is urgent to clear the thing up with the main lines of agreement worked out by the end of next week in order that the major issues will not be fuzzed up by a mass of supplementary proposals.

With regard to points 2 and 3, it was agreed that the Soviet proposal made yesterday was completely unacceptable. We agreed as a tactical procedure that the US would make the first counterproposal

as suggested by Tosec 288.<sup>1</sup> Neither the US nor British should propose the Colombo powers, but France might do so on the basis of a compromise, and we would then see how it might develop. My own view is that this is the best solution we are likely to get, and it has marked advantages from many points of view.

With regard to point 4, the decision will depend on what develops in connection with the cease-fire and the ultimate authority for supervision, and we will not touch on that matter.

With regard to point 5, it was decided that Eden would say tonight to Chou En-lai simply that the Soviet proposal was completely unacceptable; that the Americans had very strong views which were supported by France and British and they would probably make a counterproposal.

[Here follows a portion of the telegram which dealt with discussion of Part II on Korea: for text, see page 333.]

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 28, p. 966.

---

396.1 GE/5-3054: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1954—3:37 p. m.

Tedul 146. For Under Secretary from Secretary in New York. Reference: Dulte 134<sup>2</sup> and Tedul 144.<sup>3</sup>

1. In these matters we must bear in mind the basic Presidential instructions, of which Congressional committees were informed, from which we should not depart without previously informing these committees.

2. It seems unlikely that the basic settlement will be one with which we would want to be formally identified or attempt to guarantee. Certainly this cannot be known at this juncture. Therefore discussion of control commission is awkward without knowing what it is that will be controlled or US responsibility in relation thereto. Under these circumstances it seems that in any suggestions or arguments we make, real composition of control commission must be carefully safeguarded so as to avoid other parties feeling that because they have deferred to our views regarding composition of control commission we are committed to some basic decision or solution.

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to London as telegram 6483, to Paris as telegram 4338, and to Saigon as telegram 2467.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 30, p. 981.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 31, p. 989.

3. In view of the misconduct of Poland and Czechoslovakia on NNSC we should under no circumstances give any acquiescence to their playing a like role in relation to Indochina. Furthermore, I do not see why Indonesia should play supervisory role merely because of the accident that it happened to attend a single meeting at Colombo which was called for a different purpose. It has nothing to contribute but its own fears. By every test of stability and ability to contribute, Thailand [out?] ranks Indonesia. So also does the Philippines. It seems to me that the key role in supervision might be assumed by India and Pakistan as the only two Asian nations of the area which are perhaps generally acceptable and which can make any contribution. These two might pick up their own associates.

4. My view in general is that on this matter we should make suggestions which indicate our best judgment but that we should not take any "final" position in the sense of, stating that one setup is acceptable and another setup unacceptable. Our necessary reservation with reference to the ultimate solution forbids, it seems to me, action on our part other than contribution of friendly advice at this juncture.

MURPHY

JUNE 2, 1954

396.1 GE/6-254: Telegram

*Tenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 2, 3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 2, 1954—midnight.

Secto 364. Repeated information Paris 374, London 237, Saigon 139, Tokyo 104, Moscow 103, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Tenth restricted session, Wednesday, June 2, Molotov presiding:

US delegate made statement replying statements May 31 by Chou En-lai regarding NNSC in Korea and by Gromyko regarding composition proposed NNSC for Indochina. Statement based on quotations from May 4 letter to Military Armistice Commission signed by Swedish and Swiss members commenting on Polish-Czech report dated April 29. Quoted portions dealt with wholehearted support of NNSC by UNC, with absence any evidence indicating UNC has increased combat strength, concluding with full quotation final two

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/10) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 278. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 6:55 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 176-186. The speech by Bidault is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 283, and the speech by Pham Van Dong, Indochina Document IC/16. June 3, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279A.

paragraphs in which Swedish and Swiss members record refutations allegations of Poles and Czechs and full compliance of armistice agreement by UNC.

US delegate stated Gromyko proposal on composition unacceptable since it would result in arrangement exactly like Korea. With reference India and Pakistan, US delegate stated this might be helpful suggestion meriting serious consideration. He concluded: "It seems to us that India and Pakistan, in association with other genuinely neutral states, might provide the basis for a satisfactory and really effective supervisory commission".

Chou En-lai made feeble reply referring again to reports of Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission where India sided with views of Poles and Czechs rather than with those of Swedes and Swiss as proving, on basis India's unquestioned neutrality, that Poles and Czechs neutral rather than Swiss and Swedes.

Chou En-lai also stated he would distribute Polish-Czech communications dated April 15 and 30 and May 8 and 20. He concluded that rejection of Communists as neutrals unacceptable since on this basis there would be no neutrals because world divided between ideologies. He defined neutrals as countries not having participated in Indochina war and willing contribute peace there.

Chou En-lai supported Gromyko proposal as to composition Indochina NNSC (India, Pakistan, Poland, Czechoslovakia) pointing out that Poland and Czechoslovakia have diplomatic relations with DRV while India and Pakistan have them with France. (Chou En-lai defined two belligerents as DRV on one hand and on other France and her Associated States.)

Chou En-lai concluded by quoting paragraph 37 of Korean Armistice Agreement in which neutral nations defined as nations whose combat forces have not participated in Korean hostilities. He asserted this definition applicable to Indochina.

Bidault took issue with assertion of Soviet and CPR delegates regarding extent and number of points on which agreement reached. He said his delegation not bound by formal agreement on simultaneous cease-fire although believes this would be desirable if achievable in all three countries. However, if cease-fire can be achieved in one country at once, so much the better.

Principle of regrouping is acceptable to French delegation and to other eight delegations only so far as Vietnam is concerned. Military representatives currently studying regrouping in Vietnam. Results of these studies will be brought before the conference which will then have to examine consequences of proposals, methods of implementation, movement of troops, administration of zones, etc. Bidault stressed that

questions of Laos and Cambodia remained entirely open and must be taken up as soon as possible by conference.

Bidault said he thought there was general agreement on principle of release prisoners of war and civilian internees and that this agreement could be recorded.

Turning to controls and guarantees, Bidault said that it would be an exaggeration to say there is any general agreement. Nine delegations have gone no further than to state there should be international neutral control in all three countries of Indochina. Little has been said regarding functions, structure, composition and supreme authority.

Bidault limited his remarks to Vietnam stating he would later give his views regarding Laos and Cambodia. He said function of international commission would be control of all clauses of armistice agreement and particularly :

- (1) Those dealing with regrouping including movement of troops;
- (2) Supervision of demarcation lines separating regrouping zones and, if necessary, of demilitarized sectors and territorial waters;
- (3) Execution of provision concerning prisoners of war and civilian internees and other problems.

Bidault noted that problem of prevention introduction fresh arms and troops following cessation of hostilities would arise only in case Vietnam since in other two countries cessation of hostilities would result achievement final peace. He expressed surprise Chou En-lai had referred only to introduction American personnel and troops and that both Chou En-lai and DRV had failed refer material assistance other side received at Dien Bien Phu and elsewhere from Communist China, USSR, Czechoslovakia, etc. He said French delegation could not accept control which was not complete and equitable.

Bidault envisaged central control commission choosing own headquarters and able set up necessary number of local commissions (also of international character) at locations related to tasks. Number of these local commissions would be scattered over territory at frontier points, ports and elsewhere. Central commission would also set up *ad hoc* international subcommissions for special tasks such as supervising release of prisoners of war and local manufacture of arms. Bidault stressed need for adequate modern transportation and communication facilities so that groups can be mobile and efficient. International commission would be able in its discretion to create and use joint bodies representative of two belligerents which, however, would function under the authority, responsibility and direction of international commission for performance certain special duties. Bidault again stressed importance that kernel of international organization be on ground at time of cessation of hostilities.

Bidault suggested that at all levels of international control decisions be taken by majority. Conference need not otherwise set up rules of procedure determination of which could be left to international commission.

Regarding composition of international commission, Bidault agreed with US delegate's appraisal of Korean experience. He said that commission which merely balanced opposite tendencies would be impotent which not equivalent of neutral. With regard to thesis that Communist countries cannot be neutral, Bidault read following quotation from statement by Mao Tse-tung in "new democracy" in 1940:

"At a time when rivalry between the Socialist states of Soviet Russia and the imperialist states of England and America is becoming still more acute, China must take sides. Such is the inevitable tendency. Can China be neutral and avoid taking a side? That is a day dream. The whole world will find itself included in these two battle lines. In the world, from now on, the word 'neutrality' is only good for deceiving the peoples."

Bidault concluded with statement French delegation prepared examine any proposal on composition which would meet requirements of objectivity and disinterestedness.

Eden spoke after recess. Referring to Bidault's proposal he stated some parts dealing with structure and functions of the neutral commission are inevitably technical in character. After consideration has been given to proposal it should be referred to a technical committee to work out details. Technical committee would then report back to restricted session.

Eden then referred to paragraph 4 of Chinese proposal, which suggested that joint committee be established consisting of representatives of two commands. Eden stated joint committee could render help to international commission provided the committee is subject to command of neutral commission.

Referring to composition of neutral commission, Eden stated it must be composed of truly neutral countries, not involved in Indochina conflict, and must not be deadlocked by two opposing views. It must act independently and impartially. Eden stated he could not agree that Korean Armistice Agreement provides acceptable precedent for Indochina neutral commission, and that two European countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia, would not be acceptable.

Viet Minh representative stated question of cease-fire must be considered as a whole. He then listed matters to be studied—implementation plans on zones and transfer of troops; prohibition of introduction of forces and equipment into Indochina; and organization for controlling cease-fire, including joint committee to supervise readjust-



ment of zones and transfer of troops; and neutral commission to work with joint committee. Neutral commission would supervise non-introduction of troops and equipment into Indochina. He stated joint committee and neutral commission must work impartially. Dong mentioned responsibility for implementation of cease-fire would be up to joint commission which would be equivalent to armistice commission and would have representatives of two commands. Stated if two sides want peace, and presumably that is why they are at Geneva, it is up to conference to see that details of agreement will work.

Dong stated violations of armistice would be referred to joint committee which would take steps to refer matter to proper side for action to comply with armistice. Believes solution is simple and logical. If both sides—French and Viet Minh—really want peace, they should take action to obtain it with help of friendly countries.

Referring to relationship between joint committee and neutral commission, Dong stated their relationship would be one of coordination, not subordination. He then indicated Viet Minh agreement with Soviet proposal for neutral commission consisting of Poland, Czechoslovakia, India and Pakistan.

Dong stated international control for Indochina should not be under the United Nations and charged UN not really representative since one of great powers not represented there.

Molotov stated Eden's recommendation for technical committee would best be considered after basic issues have been clarified by the conference. At that time, a technical committee could work out detailed arrangements.

Molotov referred to various proposals—Chinese, French and statements by other delegates—mentioning that there are a number of areas of basic agreement. The conference should record areas upon which there is agreement and then move on to areas of disagreement. Molotov noted only proposal for neutral commission for Indochina had been made by the Soviet delegation. There have been critical remarks on the Soviet proposal but not counterproposals. He stated criticism followed two lines—practical consideration and considerations on matter of principle. On former, he referred only to NNSC operations in Korea; on latter, he referred to statements by General Smith earlier in session. He stated position taken by US delegation might mean US has no desire for reaching agreement, does not want settlement of problem, and such position will hamper settlement. Stated much could be said about this matter and he might do so on another occasion. Further stated Soviet Union's view on whether Communist nations neutral obvious and no comment necessary.

Referred to Soviet proposal for neutral commission which he stated recalls Korean neutral nations supervisory commission. Recognized NNSC had deficiencies and both sides at conference had criticized operation of NNSC. He stated regardless how much Swedish and Swiss members NNSC criticize Polish and Czech members, comments of latter much more solid than Swedish and Swiss comments. He then referred to comments by Chou En-lai on documents refuting statements of Swedish and Swiss members NNSC. He stated all four countries acknowledge US violations to Korean armistice and referred to statements of NNSC dated September 11, 16 and December 22, 1953, respectively. Referred to specific violations reported by Polish and Czech representatives NNSC, including 177 military aircraft, 465 guns and Howitzers, 1365 machine guns. Stated Polish and Czech representatives NNSC also drew attention that during October 1953-February 1954 UN Command used up tremendous number of shells including 130 million cartridges and 1,100,000 shells. This he indicated during period in which there were no hostilities.

Molotov stated in spite of weaknesses in NNSC, Soviet delegation, in interest of getting ahead with work, desired to make neutral commission in Indochina a workable organization. Molotov stated in considering matter of a neutral commission it would be inappropriate to draw upon references as to whether neutrality possible between Communism and imperialism as a question of principle. He stated question of neutral commission should be approached in the same manner as in Korea.

Molotov then repeated Soviet proposal for neutral commission for Indochina to be composed of India, Pakistan, Czechoslovakia and Poland. He stated Korean NNSC composed of four European countries whereas Soviet proposal for Indochina calls for two Asian and two European. Stated neutral commission should not be composed of countries having diplomatic relations with only one side, but two having relations with one side and two with other side. This would lead to better understanding and more secure armistice.

Cambodian representative challenged statement made earlier in session regarding non-introduction of arms and equipment into Indochina. Stated reference had been made to all of Indochina including introduction of arms and equipment into three states. Stated Cambodia would never agree and referred specifically to French proposal which had referred only to Vietnam.

Cambodian representative stated would again like to ask when case of Cambodia would be taken up by conference. If conference is to succeed, would be necessary to carry out coordinated and parallel examination of problem in Indochina.

In concluding meeting, Molotov read following communiqué, which was approved:

“At the restricted meeting on June 2, the nine delegations continued their discussion of the re-establishment of peace in Indochina. The next restricted meeting on this subject is to be held on June 3.”

*Comment:* At the tenth session, lines were clearly drawn on two points:

(a) Composition of neutral nations commission. Communist side supported Soviet proposal for commission including India, Pakistan, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Our side rejected Czechoslovakia and Poland and favored Asian neutrals as basis.

(b) Status of international commission in relation to supervision of armistice. On this point, Bidault clearly upheld authority and responsibility of international commission while DRV gave major responsibility to joint bodies made up of belligerents with international commission merely in a vague coordinating, auxiliary role. Molotov has not yet indicated whether DRV has Soviet support on this point although Chou En-lai appears to have given his approval to DRV general concept at May 31 meeting.

In course of Molotov's remarks addressed to US delegation contention Communist state cannot be neutral, Troyanovsky, translating for Molotov, gave impression Molotov indicated countries not Communist must be imperialist. This was caught by Gromyko and correction rapidly made to general effect that question was neutrality between “Communism and imperialism”.

SMITH

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 242: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      NIACT      WASHINGTON, June 2, 1954—5:33 p. m.

4356. Eyes only Under Secretary and Ambassador from Secretary. Reur 4596.<sup>2</sup> We are gratified at progress made but believe you should warn Laniel that no statement implying anything like final agreement

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to Geneva as telegram Tedul 149.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 4596 from Paris, May 29, Ambassador Dillon reported on a discussion with Laniel concerning the status of the U.S.-France negotiations. Laniel expressed great satisfaction at the fact that “we had now reached accord in principle on political side” and said that “our political agreement made it urgent that we start military conversations immediately to complete the negotiations regarding training, command structure, and war plans.” Ambassador Dillon said he “made it clear to him that we had now answered all questions posed by French Government but that, except for important military phase of negotiations, we were awaiting further action from the French side.” The Ambassador recommended strongly that the United States agree to a proposal made by Laniel “that Franco-US military negotiations be held in Washington next week.” (751G.00/5-2954) For the full text of telegram 4596, see volume XIII.

should be made to his Cabinet or in Parliament or otherwise now or at any time without careful prior agreement between our Governments as to precise form of words. You will bear in mind that the U.S. conditions required among other unfulfilled conditions assurances of action and participation by other governments and also that political and military conditions cannot be divorced for, as I earlier pointed out, the military situation might deteriorate to a point where a collective defense of Indochina would be impractical. Any premature or inaccurate statements which now attain publicity would cause Congressional and public reactions which might necessitate a denial or explanation here which would leave the situation worse than if nothing had been said by Laniel.

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/6-254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL  
PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 2, 1954—6 p. m.

Secto 360. For McCardle from Suydam. Following is substantial verbatim Under Secretary's briefing US press morning June 2:

We have tried, as executive sessions on Indochina went on, to give certain amount of guidance, which I hope has been helpful. On one occasion, as in reserving our general position with regard special problems Laos, Cambodia in connection with proposal for military staff talks, I gave you practically verbatim statement. Those of you who read statement will note we did not interpret UK proposal as deviating any way from principle which we on our side all accept, that is special situation which exists in Laos, Cambodia. No difference opinion on our side about that.

As Korean phase approaches conclusion, very clear Allied side is able to rest its case on one very important principle and one clear-cut issue. We stand before world on that issue and that principle. Issue is authority and moral force of UN as exponent collective security.

This has been categorically rejected by all Communist participants: it has been strongly upheld by all other participants. It is issue we cannot see fuzzed up or abandoned, from which we have no intention retreating. It looks as though two opposing points view were not reconcilable at this time.

With regard Indochina phase, as I told you before, our position in conference itself is little bit different from what it is in Korean side

---

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted to the Department of State in two sections.

of conference. We are not belligerents although we have given assistance to our allies in Indochina. In conference itself, our position is rather one of trying to give friendly advice when suitable and of upholding there, as well as in Korea, certain principles to which we adhere.

Indochina phase is seeking solution for problems of supervision and guarantees. Has been pretty generally reported what first definite proposal was, with regard to composition of supervisory commission. Without going into details in regard that proposal, would like mention performance neutral nations supervisory commission in Korea which, as you know, consists of Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

Senior Swedish representative, General Mohn, who has recently returned to Sweden, officer of great character, ability and integrity, has characterized that performance as complete farce, and so it is.

Swiss and Swedes have had complete access to UN side for most thorough inspections. They have made separate report in which they completely disassociated themselves from report submitted by Poles and Czechs. Swiss and Swedes refute and deny point by point allegations made by two Communist members. We have done everything we could to help make that supervisory commission effective. It had built-in veto at beginning, and that veto has been consistently exercised during entire scope its operation. US, under no circumstances, would even consider adopting similar formula anywhere else in world where really neutral supervision by international authority was necessary for solution.

Have interesting paper <sup>2</sup> on my desk which was prepared by staff of coordinating committee just before I left Washington. C. D. Jackson, who at that time was intimately concerned with work of committee, assisted in reviewing paper. Title is "War by Cease-fire". Some day will make it available to you. It starts out with quotation from Chou En-lai, which is extremely significant. It points up very definitely crux of this whole problem of what Chou En-lai calls "coalition government" as corollary of an armistice, a cease-fire, for political reasons. We cannot lend ourselves to any theory like that, and won't.

Question: When military men sit down here and start drawing up papers, are they working on basis of general line across Indochina or are they working on basis of trying to define pockets and areas of controls?

Answer: Can only tell you what French theory is. Can guess how Viet Minh will approach it. My guess is Viet Minh will try draw line right across, further down the better. I know French do not accept

---

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

theory like that. They propose outlining certain areas. That is what you call at Leavenworth "drawing goose eggs on map", that is, assembly areas for regular troops. Of course, that will leave certain other areas which are in effect demilitarized, where irregular forces would presumably lay down arms. That is why question of supervisory authority assumes such transcendent importance. In first place, where men have been fighting for almost eight years, you cannot expect when whistle blows they will in good faith lay down their arms, sit there, and look at each other. You know what will happen unless there is some really competent neutral, effective supervisory authority on spot. That means on spot with troops.

Q: Could thing equally break down on issue of whether you draw continuous line, or whether you try to do it by areas?

A: Again, from my point view, we are not in position here of either forcing viewpoint or of obstructing or preventing agreement. It might be agreement with which we could not associate ourselves.

Q: Would it not take great deal more troops and logistic facilities to supervise French plan?

A: Indeed it would, because other is simply partition.

Q: This morning BBC announced consideration was being given to French plan under which Britain, Russia, Sweden and Switzerland would be members of neutral commission.

A: I hadn't even heard of it.

Q: Have we any suggestions ourselves as to what composition of neutral commission should be?

A: No, we have no suggestions.

Q: Do we have general suggestions in terms what categories of countries, how to divide them up far as areas of world might be concerned, as Asians, Europeans, and that sort of thing?

A: We have two views in matter. First I have already given you, and that is that country in Soviet orbit cannot be neutral. Second one is that insofar as possible, we would like see Asiatic nations police their own back yard. There are, of course, European interests there and very strong ones, but we have in mind no specific proposals as to what consortium of nations would or would not be acceptable, except we completely reject idea there should be two so-called neutral nations and two so-called Communist neutral nations. We do not think second thing exists.

Q: What would our attitude be, say, towards Colombo powers taking on job, with India carrying most of load far as providing troops?

A: I don't know. I do not have instructions from Department on it.

Q: Will you give us our position as of now in regard Laos, Cambodia?

A: Our position as of now in regard Laos, Cambodia is that they are invaded by foreign troops, that foreign troops should be withdrawn, and that when foreign troops are withdrawn there is no problem either in Laos, Cambodia. Sooner foreign troops are withdrawn, sooner fighting stops. There are in both states regular Viet Minh battalions identifiable by division. They should be withdrawn.

Q: Is there agreement among the six on that position?

A: Yes.

Q: What do you understand about that agreement, as announced in communiqué Saturday night? What do you understand position is going to be under provision for military talks in Indochina as well as here?

A: Ultimate decisions will have to be made here. There would, of course, have to be certain field reconnaissance and field contacts, but our view is that decision is to be made here, not by two sides in Indochina sitting down and defining areas, because there are political considerations involved.

You mentioned two possible alternatives, one which might be quite acceptable to soldier in field, and that is just drawing line, pretty easy thing to do. This would be completely unacceptable, I would say, from political point of view.

Q: Does this statement in regard to our position re Laos, Cambodia mean we would probably disassociate ourselves from any agreement which would give Viet Minh northern Laos, which they now effectively control?

A: Yes. At present time our position is we cannot associate ourselves with any formula which partitions or dismembers Vietnam.

Q: I was talking about Laos, north Laos.

A: You said "which they effectively control". I don't understand they effectively control it at all.

Q: French themselves say that 25% is controlled by Viet Minh.

A: We have couple of bright young soldiers here who have been all over it. One has visited every Cambodian battalion but one. That terrain, he reports, is just as wild and jungle-like as Bataan peninsula used to be in early days when I took parties over it to keep trails open. Battalion or part of battalion can take position anywhere in that northern territory of Laos and claim it controls everything within 500-mile radius. It can probably maintain that claim until two battalions go and chase it out. Then it moves couple hundred miles away, sits down and makes same claim. So there you are. It is extremely rugged terrain.

Q: But even as far as Vietnam is concerned, we would not associate ourselves with any formula which resulted in dismemberment or partition of country, is that it?

A: Permanent dismemberment or partition. Molotov has categorically stated that views of entire conference are that there will not be dismemberment or partition.

Q: Is operative word there "permanent"? You said "permanent partition or dismemberment". In other words, if there is temporary line drawn we could associate ourselves with two-zone system.

A: Even that I would hesitate to subscribe to because once you draw line, divide country and provide what you might call demilitarized zone in between, you have in effect partitioned it. It would depend largely on political formula whether that were permanent partition or not. But what we witnessed in Korea is not in any way encouraging to thought that there could be reasonably prompt, political formula which would resolve it and prevent it from being dismembered or partitioned.

Q: What's your interpretation of Molotov's categorical assertion on this point? Does it mean they want whole country?

A: That's right.

Q: Is there any news about American prisoners in China? You told us last week it seemed to be reasonable thing to engage in direct contracts with Chinese if necessary.

A: If we can do it on proper basis, yes, but we haven't found out anything yet.

Q: What would be proper basis?

A: Basis of complete disassociation of any recognition. Don't know whether that can be done or not.

Q: If we were opposed to principle of partition and we are opposed to any form of coalition settlement, how do we see solution of that problem?

A: Actually, we are just now shooting at cease-fire side of it. We do not believe you can have any kind of political settlement, any reasonable political settlement, until military operations have ceased until peace and tranquility have been restored, if that is possible.

Q: But that in itself will involve some sort of *de facto* revision of forces which could be beginning of partition, even unintentionally. Most of our partitions started off that way in other countries.

A: Can only repeat what I said before, that if you drew line across country that would indeed be beginning, in our view, of partitioning. If, however, you withdrew regular troops into series of enclaves or pockets of various sorts, depending on locations, and kept them there and disarmed irregulars in demilitarized areas in between, and did it



under effective international supervision, this would not necessarily involve partition.

Q: When Molotov made his categorical rejection of idea of partition could you draw from that the meaning that in military talks Communists will accept principle of grouping by areas rather than trying draw continuous line?

A: Can only give you Molotov's words.

Q: It strikes me as being rather important, categorical statement like that.

A: It strikes me as being very important. Can draw my own conclusions and I leave you to draw yours, but I can't interpret his words because he didn't interpret them. He just simply says we are all in agreement that there should not be dismemberment.

Q: In view military situation in Indochina today, do you think West can afford to keep these negotiations going for indefinite time here?

A: Sometimes I have mental picture of myself wandering up and down corridors of hotel Du Rhone with long white beard. It is very hard to say.

Q: Last week you said you were still groping for some solution. Do you see any more daylight today than you did last week?

A: Only in sense that it does look as though finally we get some of military people down to drawing goose eggs on map then we can see what is going to come out of it.

Q: What's our attitude towards Siamese proposal on Korea to set up semi-permanent commission to continue exploring problem?

A: I didn't know there had been any such proposal officially made.

Q: Well, Prince Wan has been promoting idea and *New York Times* had it Monday.

A: Well, actually until I get it from Prince Wan or get it officially I won't comment.

Q: Do we favor any possible semi-permanent machinery to continue exploring problem?

A: I don't know because if and when such proposal were officially made would have to go back to Department and find out.

Q: You said any neutral supervision in Indochina would have to be with troops. Do you have any idea how many troops would be necessary?

A: Have my own ideas which probably not entirely accurate because to make estimate of that sort you have to go over terrain and map very carefully and make military plan. I should think it would be somewhat on order of about three times as many as were needed in Korea. In Korea it was 5,000. Should think it would take two or three

times that many in Indochina, considering nature of terrain and long frontiers involved.

Q: You are talking about Vietnam itself?

A: No, I am talking about whole area because you have got border problems, even though Viet Minh regular troops are withdrawn, you have got some irregular troops. Remember frontier between Laos and Vietnam is extremely long frontier and very rugged. There are Vietnamese living on Laotian side of frontier and there are Laotians living on Vietnamese side, so you really have problem of border observation, as well as problem of administering cessation of hostilities inside one country.

Q: Would there be American troops among this approximate 15,000?

A: Hell, no.

Q: Korean plenaries will presumably continue more or less as they have been going. There is no move to break that side off, is there?

A: It's pretty hard to forecast tactics on matter of that kind, but we do have really basic and fundamental issue which it does not appear we are likely to be able to resolve here. When you have real basic and fundamental issue, one might as well stand on that rather than have it fuzzed up by lot of possibly supplementary suggestions and speculations. That is way I feel about it.

Q: Have there been any indications from Communist side here, since conference started, that it would try to persuade West to drop American conception of Asiatic Pact in return for guarantee system?

A: No.

Q: Will Thailand move in UN have an effect on conference?

A: Don't think it should. I think that it is just move of common prudence.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 2, 1954—9 p. m.

Dulte 141. I hope to see Bao Dai within the next few days and when I do, I will put to him the four questions listed in Geneva Tedul 110<sup>1</sup> and urge on him the formation of an appointive provisional national assembly initially having broad consultative powers but also constituent powers.

I will, I believe, get answers to the questions and probably approval, in principle, of a consultative-constituent assembly. I doubt, how-

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 22, p. 892.

ever, that I will be successful in getting Bao Dai to return promptly to Vietnam. He will wish to continue in close contact with his delegation here. Furthermore, his decisions regarding degree to which he will directly engage his person and his fortunes in fate of Vietnam at this time will, in my judgment, not be made until current Franco-American discussions reach conclusion. Even if Bao Dai does return, it, of course, highly problematical whether he is capable of exerting real leadership or of setting an inspiring personal example or of driving through fundamental reforms in his government.

To the extent that the trend of Bao Dai's recent thinking has been accurately reported by Ngo Dinh Luyen (Secto 313<sup>2</sup>), it seems likely that Bao Dai will endeavor to draw me out on the degree to which he can count on direct US assistance particularly in the event that French will and capacity to carry on the struggle in Indochina should markedly decrease. With any assurance, of unconditional backing from us or perhaps merely encouragement, Bao Dai might conceivably within a week or so withdraw his delegation from Geneva although he would, of course, consult with Bidault first. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Dinh told Heath May 31 that tactics of the Vietnamese delegation for next few days were to go through the motions of negotiating a cessation of hostilities in order not to embarrass Bidault whose private preference, Dinh felt, would be for a firm stand for continuing the fight against the Viet Minh if his government and French Parliamentary and public opinion would allow it. Dac Khe, deputy chief of the Vietnamese delegation, said he was thinking of recommending to Bao Dai the withdrawal of the Vietnamese delegation after a few days and asked Heath what he thought of such an idea. Heath replied that it would be unthinkable to break up the conference at this stage.

Bao Dai will, therefore, probably ask me for my advice as to the course of action he should take and the support he would receive from us in the event the French here appear disposed to agree on a cessation of hostilities on a basis which will practically result in a turnover of Vietnam to the Communists.

I should like to take the position with Bao Dai that these are not profitable topics for exploration and discussion at this time. I shall inform him in general terms of the present state of our efforts to create an effective organization for united action and of the discussions we are having with the French regarding possible US intervention in Indochina (in this I shall be confirming widespread press reports). On the other hand, we could not consider participating in the conflict without prior Congressional approval, assurances of con-

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 26, p. 936.

tinued French participation and some form of UN association and assurances of cooperation from other countries in the area. I would wish to take the line that any important action now taken by either France, by Vietnam or by the US as the three active partners in the enterprise to save Vietnam from Communist control should be carefully coordinated with other partners in order to make sure that any single action will in fact result in net addition to strength of the partnership as a whole.

I shall say that particularly in France there are dangerously strong forces of defeatism which will seize upon any pretext or excuse to diminish or even abandon the French contribution. I shall say to Bao Dai that in my judgment for the present and probably for many months to come that contribution is vital and irreplaceable.

I shall tell Bao Dai that I have been encouraged by the French plans for reinforcing the expeditionary corps and at the general willingness of the French to envisage a more direct US participation in the training and perhaps also the supplying of the Vietnamese national army. I shall state that I would hope his relations with the French would be constantly characterized by the mutual confidence and consultation which has existed in the past.

I shall add, however, that if the present relatively favorable situation should change, I should hope immediately to have consultations with Bao Dai in order to concert with him such measures as might seem appropriate. I would expect him to take no decisions, based upon a French withdrawal from the struggle, until he had given me and other representatives of our government a full opportunity to discuss the situation with him and to see what measures might be requisite.

Urgent guidance requested.<sup>3</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> Department's reply contained in telegram Tedul 159, June 5, p. 1044.

---

396.1 GE/6-254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 2, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 361. Repeated information Moscow 102.

1. Dennis Allen (UK) informed Johnson today regarding Eden's discussion with Chou En-lai at private dinner last night. While Chinese were friendly and congenial, they left immediately after dinner

and nothing of particular significance resulted from meeting. Four points of interest came up during conversation :

(a) Eden raised question of Chinese Communist treatment of Trevelyan in Peking after he returns there. Eden asked that he be accorded the usual courtesies and privileges and be allowed to see appropriate Chinese Communist officials. Huan Hsiang Head of European and African Department in the Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry, said he would see that these things were done and looked at Chou En-lai who concurred. Allen commented this would be helpful but UK will wait and see if Chinese Communists actually carry it out.

(b) There was no discussion of diplomatic relations or exchange of Ambassadors or of UN representation for Chinese Communists. However, Chou remarked cryptically during evening "what makes you think we want a seat in the UN?" Allen commented perhaps sense of obscure remark was to effect Chinese Communists should be in UN by right and that its seat is not negotiable in relation to anything else.

(c) On the question of embargo, Eden inquired of Chou regarding Chinese Communist construction projects, particularly Huai River development. He asked if Chinese Communists could get all the machinery and equipment they needed for these projects and remarked that the embargo probably was limiting this development. Chou responded only to effect that they needed equipment and machinery from wherever they could get it but admitted economic restrictions were giving them difficulties.

(d) Regarding Indochina Eden emphasized again to Chou that it was a dangerous situation and that UK and other delegations on our side really did not know whether the Chinese Communists and particularly the Viet Minh really wanted a settlement. He wanted to make it clear to Chou that it even looked as if the Communists did not have real intention to seek genuine settlement here. However, these remarks drew no useful response from Chou since he replied Vietnam delegation was not helpful.

(e) Eden told Chou he hoped he understood UK and other delegations believed control, authority and supervision is particularly important aspect Indochina problem. Eden said Soviet proposal for Poles and Czechs on commission is totally unacceptable to UK. Also UK does not believe Poles and Czechs, as European countries and as Communist countries, have any competence or knowledge deal with Indochina, and UK not only cannot understand why they should be suggested but is convinced such proposal is not helpful or acceptable. Chou replied that there are four European nations supervising the armistice in Korea which has "worked out well" whereas on Indochina Soviet Union proposed two Asian countries both of which have close relations with UK and one of which has a "treaty" with US. Chou thought this should be much more satisfactory from UK point of view than Korean setup. He insisted that it was essential to have some countries which would "reflect the interests of the Viet Minh and in which the Viet Minh would have confidence."

2. Molotov came to see Eden briefly this morning ostensibly to find out from him his co-chairman about any developments re Indochina

and what would be taken up at restricted session this afternoon. Eden stressed the importance of adequate control, authority and supervision and said session today should continue discussion of that problem to work something out. Molotov replied that that was an important consideration but there are also other items in the Chinese Communist's proposal particularly the matter of the introduction of arms into Indochina. Eden acknowledged that was also factor. Eden then told Molotov that Soviet proposal made in his absence regarding Poland and Czechoslovakia was totally unacceptable to the UK. He took same lines as Chou En-lai and stressed necessity for having Poland and Czechoslovakia to reflect point of view of the Viet Minh. He said that there had to be countries on the commission acceptable to the Viet Minh.

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-554 : Telegram

*Dulles-Hammarskjold Meeting, June 2, 1954: The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1954—9 : 56 a. m.

Tosec 354. Following is summary of conversation between Secretary-General Hammarskjold and Secretary June second :

"After exchange of courtesies, etc., Mr. Hammarskjold mentioned pending Thai application. He said he was afraid result of this might be to reduce chance of success at Geneva. He said while Thai application did not necessarily involve any agreement about Indochina matter being discussed at UN, the Russians probably would feel called upon to cover the entire territory, and that this might precipitate chain of events which might end up with certain duplication of Geneva talks.

I said that 'success' at Geneva seemed to me to involve something more than merely getting an agreement but involved getting the right kind of agreement. That, I thought, would be impossible unless French had some alternative to complete surrender and US was trying to provide that. One of preconditions to any contingent US action would be some participation in area by UN. Also it was important from standpoint of getting MSA appropriations. We had followed the course which seemed to us least likely to involve Geneva. I did not see how the Russians could very well make this reason for breaking off at Geneva if only reason why UN talks covered Indochina was because Russians themselves brought that element in.

Hammarskjold then spoke of possible UN Assembly action following prospective Soviet veto in SC. He said he doubted whether we could get two-thirds vote, or certainly not more than bare two-thirds vote, if matter came up while Geneva was still offering some hope. I

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Popper of UNA/UNP. Repeated to USUN as telegram 622.

said I thought we could decide on what to do about Assembly after SC dealt with matter, and we did not need to make any firm decision at this time."

DULLES

JUNE 3, 1954

396.1 GE/6-354 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1954—12:39 p. m.

Tosec 334. In future conversations re Thai SC appeal for UN observation, may be helpful for you to know British have been making strenuous efforts in New York to ensure that Thai request is for UN observation limited to Thailand alone. British have pressed USUN use influence with Thai Del to restrict opening Thai SC statement accordingly. USUN has refused, stating our position clear from outset POC subcommission must be given authority observe in other states in general area if those states so request, though we would expect Laos and Cambodia would not at this time make such a request. Khoman told USUN yesterday he could not accept restriction POC subcommission authority to Thailand alone; said public opinion his country would not consider it provided adequate protection for Thailand.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Popper of UNA/UNP. Repeated to London as telegram 6520 and to Bangkok as telegram 2405.

751G.00/6-354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 3, 1954—3 p. m.

Dulte 142. Repeated information Paris 376. Paris limit distribution. I told Eden this morning that with the deteriorating military situation Indochina and the Vietnam-French military talks now going on here I was seriously concerned that if within the next week or two the Communists offered France a cease-fire the French would be in a weak position to resist and might have to accept without any agreement on effective international control machinery or with machinery which would be purely nominal. Eden said he fully shared my fears in this regard.

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, June 3, 1954—3 p. m.

Dulte 143. For Secretary from Smith. Our messages cross rather often. Believe this summary will help to clarify :

[Here follows the portion of this message pertaining to the Korean phase of the Conference; for the text, see page 339.]

B. Tedul 146<sup>1</sup> and Dulte 138.<sup>2</sup>

Your recent instructions have given us a clear line of procedure for next few days. Gromyko's proposal of supervisory authority consisting of India, Pakistan, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and our rejection, supported by our associates, of Poland and Czechoslovakia or any other Communist states in the Soviet orbit, leave us at an impasse which Eden thought last night might be a breaking issue. At the closed session on Indochina this afternoon the French will probably make some counter-proposals. I do not yet know what these may be but if it becomes necessary I will throw in Thailand and the Philippines; otherwise, will make no statement.

I believe the Communists are convinced that once military talks reach point of producing some sort of cease-fire formula acceptable to France, that then nothing can stop the cease-fire and that when this occurs the composition of a supervisory authority will become almost academic and they will get about what they want. Meanwhile, the continuing deterioration of the military situation in the Delta will exert increasing pressure on the French to accept almost any face-saving cease-fire formula.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 1, p. 994.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 1, p. 993.

396.1 GE/6-354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 3, 1954—3 p. m.

Secto 367. Repeated information Paris 377, Saigon 140, London 238, Tokyo 16, Moscow 104. Department pass Defense; Tokyo pass CINCFE; Saigon pass Phnom Penh and Vientiane. Cambodian Foreign Minister tells us he plans introduce in an early session following proposal. Unofficial translation follows :

“Cambodian proposal for the settlement of the Cambodian problem :

“1. A cessation of hostilities will be proclaimed in Cambodia, if possible simultaneously with a cessation of hostilities in Laos and



Vietnam. In the event of an agreement on a simultaneous cessation of hostilities, the three plans relative to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam will be placed in force simultaneously.

"2-a. All the regular and irregular Viet Minh forces will be as of the date of the cessation of hostilities, evacuated outside the territory of Cambodia and regrouped in Vietnamese territory within the regrouping zones assigned to the Viet Minh Command in accordance with the agreement between the French, Vietnamese and Viet Minh Command.

"For this purpose, the Cambodian and Viet Minh Commands will meet on the spot in order to fix the details of the evacuation.

"2-b. All of the armed elements which do not depend [?] either from the army or from police forces will be, as of the date of cessation of hostilities, disarmed and disbanded. Foreign elements, non-nationals, will go back to their countries of origin.

"3. After agreement between the Cambodian and Viet Minh Commands, there will be carried out a release or an exchange of prisoners of war and civilian internees.

"4. A system of control by the UN or a system of international control functioning under the auspices of the UN will be established to watch over the execution of the above-mentioned agreements. This system of international control must be organized and ready to function as of the date of the cessation of hostilities."

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-354 : Telegram

*Eleventh Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 3, 3 p. m.:*  
*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 3, 1954—midnight.

Secto 370. Repeated information Paris 380, London 241, Saigon 141, Tokyo 108, Moscow 105, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Eleventh restricted session, Thursday, June 3, Eden presiding:

Vietnamese delegate spoke on question international controls. He limited discussion to Vietnam stating Laos and Cambodia separate problems involving two independent sovereign states victims foreign invasion. He referred Bidault's proposal yesterday emphasizing particularly need for vigorous control over 1,000 kilometers of frontier separating China from Vietnam.

Regarding composition of international control commission, he agreed with French and US delegates regarding need for impartial-

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/11) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 278. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 7 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 187-195. This message was transmitted to the Department of State in three sections.

ity. He rejected concept that nonbelligerent states, in present world conditions, meet test of neutrality. He described absolute and exclusive nature of Communist ideology, contrasting it with conditions in non-Communist countries. There are differences between non-Communist states but not in and among Communist states. He referred both to internal regimes of Communist states and to voting record of those states in UN and other international organizations.

Vietnamese delegate rejected Soviet proposal that Czechoslovakia and Poland be included in neutral nations commission for Indochina. He referred to Chinese delegate's contention that Soviet proposal equitable because two of proposed countries have recognized Viet Minh (Czechoslovakia and Poland) and two others have not. Vietnamese delegate pointed out, however, that while all four states proposed have normal relations with France, none has recognized Vietnam. Thus, Soviet proposal totally unacceptable for Vietnam which is completely ignored in Soviet proposal. He recalled 35 free states have recognized Vietnam, concluding that it is duty Vietnamese delegation protest vigorously against Soviet proposal.

Vietnamese delegate then referred to complex character Franco-Vietnamese side in struggle in which Vietnam and Vietnamese National Army play effective, increasingly important role. He stated that garrison of Yen Phuh, which has victoriously resisted Viet Minh for past three weeks, almost wholly Vietnamese. He added 80 percent of garrisons fighting Viet Minh in North Vietnam are Vietnamese.

Vietnamese delegate then turned to Korea pointing out that here UN carrying out action against aggressors from North by virtue Security Council decision based on Security Council responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Enemy in Korea consists of both North Korean Army and Chinese People's Volunteers. This is reflected in preamble and terms of armistice agreement alluding to dual character of Sino-Korean Command. Vietnamese delegate stated impossible to ignore state of Vietnam in considering make-up of anti-Communist side in Vietnam.

Vietnamese delegate stressed that state of Vietnam had freely agreed participate this conference and could not have been compelled to do so. He emphasized that conference could do nothing without agreement of Vietnam.

With reference to Eden proposal suggesting that conference include in control commission Asian states, Vietnamese delegate expressed favorable view but made two reservations:

First, pointing out that Indochina war is currently matter of worldwide interest and concern, he asked whether composition of international control commission should be confined exclusively to Asian states; although recognizing their great interest therein; and,

Second, since control of cessation of hostilities and all related agreements has technical character, he stated controls should be entrusted to states having sufficient stability and experience needed for task in question.

After summarizing views on neutrality and technical competence, Vietnamese delegate made proposal that control of execution of terms of Indochina agreement be handled through UN which meets conditions of neutrality. It is an organism of collective nature which already exists. It has no special sympathy for any state or group of states. It has on occasion synthesized policies of all member nations as in case of approval of declaration of rights of man in 1948. Although Communist states did not vote for this declaration, they did not vote against. He described two-thirds majority requirement in General Assembly as guarantee for all members. He also stressed technical competence of UN to which all main powers of world belong.

In closing, Vietnamese delegate cautioned against danger of neglecting UN where maintenance of peace involved. He stated that creation of *ad hoc* bodies endangers organization which aroused so much hope in world.

M. Bidault then spoke. He said Vietnamese proposal deserved careful consideration. He said undeniable UN founded by 50 countries in order advance rule of law and specific conditions necessary for maintenance of peace. He said UN had had successes, failures, and half successes. He recalled recent Colombo meeting where several Asian countries invited parties to Indochina conflict to have recourse to good offices and, eventually, to services of UN. The goodwill and impartiality of these Asian countries are beyond question. Therefore, Vietnamese proposal should be studied with great care.

Bidault stated that there are two aspects to be examined:

First, should conference ask UN to suggest composition of international commission or does conference prefer provide for this itself?

Second, what will be final authority supervising work of international commission—will it be UN as proposed, or will there be some other organism to which international commission would report?

Bidault asked that conference reflect on these two questions and be prepared with replies in near future.

French delegate then turned to Viet Minh explanation of functions of control mechanism made at tenth restricted meeting yesterday, which he described as unsatisfactory and surprising to French delegation. French delegate, following Molotov's statement of May 14 (Secto 212<sup>2</sup>) and CPR statement of May 27 (Secto 325<sup>3</sup>) had believed there

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 14, p. 795.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 28, p. 945.

was agreement in principle regarding international control. Bidault quoted from Molotov's speech of May 14 (not from proposal) as follows:

"It would be possible to come to an agreement that supervision of implementation of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities should be entrusted to commissions composed of representatives of neutral countries."

Bidault recalled great satisfaction with which this agreement in principle had been received throughout world.

Bidault stated DRV proposal of yesterday very far from agreed concept. Dong proposes that control of armistice would rest solely on hands of joint commissions made up of representatives of two commands which would be termed an armistice commission and would *alone* be designated to fill this role. DRV gives to neutral commission merely secondary role including international aspects such as entry of matériel and personnel from outside. Viet Minh representative assigns entire enforcement of agreement to parties to struggle. Bidault stated this absolutely unworkable.

Bidault pointed out also that Viet Minh proposal dealt with all Indochina while French delegate can conceive of joint commissions of belligerents only for Vietnam. Bidault stated he reserved right to return to problem of Cambodia and Laos on another day, which he hoped would be soon.

Bidault, continuing analysis of Viet Minh proposal, stated that such important matters as regrouping of forces would escape neutral commission entirely being confined to joint commission whose role would be limited to supervision of ports and, with Viet Minh permission, to land frontiers. But neutral commission entirely eliminated from control of essential clauses of cessation of hostilities agreement.

Bidault referred to experience with joint commissions made up of belligerents eight years ago as demonstrating inefficiency and serious danger involved in this type of arrangement. Bidault admitted utility of joint bodies made up of people having practical knowledge of country but stated such bodies cannot act as judges in disputes of which their members are parties. In case of a violation, it would be presumably impossible to get agreement of joint body even as to fact of violation and thus control would break down. Joint commissions would be useless in cases of violations and, added Bidault, "I am afraid this is the goal sought". Under Viet Minh proposal such important clauses as those referring to regrouping, transfer of troops, supervision of limits of zones, liberation of prisoners would escape from any real control. Result would be an interminable quarrel, without an arbiter, without

an end, and without hope. French delegation warns conference against this result.

Following recess, General Smith recalled US preference for UN as supervisory authority and stated Vietnam had given convincing speech to this end. He recalled US view Czechoslovakia and Poland could not be considered for NNSC and suggested India, Pakistan, Sweden and Switzerland might well have been proposed by our side. However, suggested not appropriate bandy names of countries in such a meeting. Therefore, if others agreed two chairmen arrange for discussion actual composition in more private manner. He also pointed fundamental importance resolving evident differences supervisory authority highlighted by Dong's and Bidault's presentations.

Chou started by saying that with respect to Eden's proposal for the formation of technical committee he agreed with Molotov that we should exchange views and determine first principles before tackling question technical committees. He wished to set forth CPR delegation views on principal controversial questions. Most disputed dealt with question joint committees. On May 27 he had said that in order to supervise armistice there should be two kinds of organizations; (1) joint committee as proposed by DRV which should be actual armistice commission made up of representatives of two belligerents; (2) neutral nation supervisory committee as proposed by Molotov on basis of Bidault proposal that this commission would be composed of neutral nations invited by the conference. Question of terms of reference could best be determined by using those of Korean armistice agreement. He stressed that these two kinds of organizations would be mutually related but neither was to be superior to the other and NNSC was by no means to be over the joint committees. Function of joint committees to supervise fulfillment by two parties of armistice provisions. Function of NNSC to supervise and inspect violations of armistice agreement. Such violations could take place inside or outside Indochina. He found example of competence of both parties to carry out armistice in their implementation of recent agreement for evacuation of seriously wounded of Dien Bien Phu although he suggested that measure of sincerity had not been equal on both sides. Disputes or violations of armistice agreement which two sides could not reconcile would be taken up by NNSC which would be established for that purpose. Its functions would be two-fold: (1) to supervise demilitarized areas separating two sides in Indochina; and (2) to supervise throughout Indochina and along common frontiers with other countries introduction whether on land, sea, or air of fresh troops, arms and ammunition. With respect to first function joint commissions would see to execution armistice agreement and NNSC would also

supervise. Thus within Indochina there would be two kinds of organizations working together. Along frontiers NNSC would be directly responsible and this would be its more important function. Prohibition of introduction of fresh troops and material most essential to consolidation of peace in Indochina. CPR delegate cannot agree that NNSC would have different function in different states. Cambodian delegate had said that clause re non-introduction not applicable to his country but this would mean that the US could establish military bases in Indochina and thus threaten peace. CPR delegation for this reason could never accept this suggestion.

CPR view was that NNSC should be responsible to international guarantee of nine nations parties to conference. If NNSC should find impossible to deal with certain incidents they would be reported to nine nations who should seek agreement for collective measures to deal with problem. He still felt that neutral nations should be as defined in Article 37 of Korean armistice agreement. Bidault's citation of Mao yesterday only proved that if ideological measure used there could be no neutrals. Only realistic approach was to define neutrals as those who had not participated in war. Vietnam delegation had proposed that UN supervise armistice. CPR must oppose. UN had nothing to do with Geneva conference and although some people were trying to drag UN into Indochina war for their own purpose only result could be new difficulties and obstacles in way of armistice in Indochina.

DRV delegate stressed necessity to agree on principles before proceeding to the details. Problem of restoration of peace in Indochina war not difficult to achieve if two principal parties wanted it. In that case questions of control and implementation of cease-fire would present no difficulties. French and DRV had right and responsibility exercise such control. His delegation wanted peace and if it signed an agreement intended to implement it. Why renounce responsibility for benefit of international body, he asked and he denied any difference in views between his and Soviet delegation on subject of control as alleged by Bidault. He stressed that control should be exercised over all three states of Indochina without exception; otherwise if Vietnam only were controlled shipment of troops and equipment could be made to adjoining state. This would constitute threat to security and serious menace of aggression against peace. He strongly reconfirmed his opposition to any and all proposals tending to give UN authority for execution of armistice saying everyone knew who hid behind that organization and asking was it really organization of United Nations, was it impartial and neutral?

Then Cambodian delegate unsuccessfully sought recognition and Bidault suggested that further debate of this important subject be

deferred to next meeting in order to avoid any temptation to polemics.

This was agreed and Eden found no objection to his proposal that Indochina restricted meeting be held tomorrow, Friday, June 4, and that there be Korean plenary on Saturday,<sup>4</sup> Monday<sup>5</sup> restricted session probably on Korea, and Tuesday<sup>6</sup> plenary session on Indochina.

*Comment:* Clear Communist concept supervision closely follows Korean pattern. Chou today appeared give somewhat wider role to NNSC than Dong's presentation yesterday by according it supervision of demilitarized areas along with joint commission and task of taking up disputes which two sides could not resolve. However difficult reconcile latter point with Chou's statement supporting Dong's position that NNSC was not "over" joint committee. No sign whatever of any break in rigidity Communist position on composition.

SMITH

---

<sup>4</sup> June 5.

<sup>5</sup> June 7.

<sup>6</sup> June 8.

---

110.11 DU/6-354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 3, 1954—4 p. m.

Dulte 146. For Murphy. Just before leaving here, Achilles gave me the following memorandum,<sup>1</sup> which represents his personal thoughts on some of the matters we are dealing with. I thought it good enough to bring to your attention, and suggest you ask the Secretary to read it at his convenience.

*“Memorandum*

It is essential to prevent the loss of Southeast Asia to communism. We are currently losing ground militarily and politically on the spot and there is danger of losing more politically here. On the other hand, every inch we lose makes it harder to keep from losing more. On the other, there is no sense in saying we will not yield another inch unless we damn well mean it. What we have got to find is a practical and realistic means of holding every inch we can.

We cannot stop the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia by either war or appeasement. We can do so only by deterring it. In Ernest Bevin's words (the genesis of the Atlantic Pact): 'What we need is such a mobilization of moral and material force as will inspire confidence and energy within and respect elsewhere.' To deter you have got to be willing to fight if necessary, but a US military victory in Indochina might cost us the rest of Southeast Asia psychologically. The difficulties in Asia, like the distances from home, are far greater than in Europe and the community of interest between possible part-

---

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this memorandum, dated May 31, 1954, is located in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 321.

ners far less. In deterring something, the greater the force and determination available, the less is the likelihood of having to use it. The converse is equally true, and the present mess in SEA is such that the risk of having to use it is great.

The narrow ledge between war and appeasement seems a little wider than it did a month ago, due primarily to the lessening of allied disunity. Despite American pressures toward war and British pressures toward appeasement, the enormity of the issues involved and the need of each for the other have tended to keep both on the path. Bidault has almost single-handedly kept the French Government from selling out and has secured approval for the sending of substantial reinforcements but he is not yet out of the woods.

The dilemma between war and appeasement is only one of several. A second is between the need to build a sound long-term defense in Southeast Asia and the need for immediate military action. A third is between wishful thinking that we might get by with use of US sea and air power and the painful certainty that, once involved, we could not achieve victory or even a Korean type stalemate without at least as large a commitment of ground forces as we had in Korea. A fourth is between the need for solid Asian support and the present Asian attitude of antipathy toward the west and apathy toward communism.

We could easily fumble into a disaster either way. While the right answer is hard to see, certain elements seem reasonably clear:

(1) We must mean whatever we say, and the Russians must know we mean it.

(2) If we decide to intervene directly we must be prepared militarily and psychologically to take on at least another Korean war and quite possibly World War 3.

(3) If we decide to let part or all of Vietnam go we must seek a new line as far north and east as possible which we are prepared to hold militarily, politically, and economically, at the cost of war if necessary.

(4) We cannot count on much help from France or anyone else.

(5) Nothing we do to stop communism in Asia will succeed unless it has the wide support of Asian opinion, not just that of our friends out there. We have got to bring Asian opinion along as far and as fast as we can. This cuts directly across (2) but not necessarily (3). It will take more patience and suppleness than we usually show.

(6) Any real barrier to communism in Asia is going to take time to build and we are going to lose some ground, whatever we do, before we get it built.

(7) If we have to intervene militarily to save the immediate situation we should, while being prepared for the worst, make every effort to keep our intervention limited to a minimum and not get sucked into a major effort to drive the Chinese and Viet Minh back into China. That slope is just as slippery as the one of appeasement.

(8) If there is any prospect of a settlement here that we could live with it is because of Russian respect for the A-bomb and fear



of our intentions. While we must be careful to avoid bluffing, the current military talks may well help to increase their uncertainty."

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-354

*Memorandum by Chester L. Cooper and Joseph A. Yager of the United States Delegation to the Special Adviser (Heath)*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 3, 1954.

Subject: National Intelligence Estimate on Laos and Cambodia <sup>1</sup>

On June 1, the Intelligence Advisory Committee approved the attached National Intelligence Estimate of the effects of certain possible developments on the military security and political stability of Laos and Cambodia through the end of this year. The principal conclusions of this estimate are:

1. Communist political influence in Laos and Cambodia is probably minimal outside those areas firmly occupied by Viet Minh forces. Those forces, moreover, are not now an imminent threat to the legal governments, because of the military support provided by the French.

2. Laos and Cambodia are vulnerable to Communist pressures, chiefly because of their military weakness. Additional sources of weakness are unpredictable leadership, the rivalry of cliques, and, in Cambodia, the existence of armed, non-Communist dissidence.

3. If, as a result of a negotiated agreement with the Communists covering all of Indochina, French and Viet Minh regular units were actually withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia (leaving Viet Minh irregular forces still operating in those countries), native forces could probably preserve for some time approximately the present degree of security and stability in Laos, provided French cadres and the present scale and nature of French material aid remained available to the native armies. However, such an agreement with the Communists would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to implement and police, and in these circumstances the native armies could probably not for long successfully resist the Viet Minh without increased outside support.

4. If Laos and Cambodia were partitioned, the will of the non-Communist remnants to maintain their independence would greatly decrease. Under such circumstances, probably nothing but military occupation of those countries by non-Communist forces would assure their continued freedom from Communist control.

<sup>1</sup> For a National Intelligence Estimate on Communist Capabilities in Indochina, June 1, see NIE 10-3-54, in volume XIII.

## Attachment

## EFFECTS OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE MILITARY SECURITY AND POLITICAL STABILITY OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA THROUGH 1954

## I. PRESENT SITUATION IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA

A. *Military Security*

1. Viet Minh forces are operating in Laos and Cambodia, but do not currently present an imminent threat to the existence of the native governments. However, this is so only because the security of Laos and Cambodia is supported by French regular forces and extensive French assistance to native forces. (See page 7 for force strengths [*post*, page 1028].)

*Laos*

2. Viet Minh regular troops in Laos are organic to regular Viet Minh divisions and are Vietnamese invaders, not Laotians. Viet Minh regional forces, scattered throughout Laos, are pre-dominantly Vietnamese, but include Laotians as well. These regional troops have effectively conducted guerrilla-type operations at company level and are considered equal in effectiveness to companies of the Laotian National Army. They could be easily organized into larger units, with a consequent increase in their capabilities. There are no known armed non-Communist dissident forces in Laos.

3. The defense of Laos has depended primarily on French Expeditionary Forces. For military reasons, the French may at any time reduce or increase the present strength of regular units in that country. If such strength is reduced substantially below 10,000, Laos would be seriously exposed to Viet Minh attack or subversion.

4. The Laotian National Army, numbering 14,500, is organized into six infantry battalions, seven light infantry battalions, and one parachute battalion. The combat effectiveness of the Army as a whole is only fair. It is inadequately trained and lacks experienced native officers and NCO's. The Laotian National Guard is poorly trained and equipped.

5. The Laotian military establishment depends almost entirely on outside support. France (and, indirectly, the US) furnishes all equipment and almost all the necessary funds. The French train, advise, and tactically direct the Laotian forces. All French expeditionary and Laotian National Army troops in the country are under French operational command. Approximately 300 French officers and NCO's serve in the Laotian National Army, and French officers occupy most field grade positions.

*Cambodia*

6. Two Viet Minh regular battalions, organic to a Viet Minh division, are now in northeast Cambodia. These troops are Vietnamese invaders who entered Cambodia in March 1954. In addition, small units of Viet Minh regulars, regional troops, and militia are scattered throughout Cambodia. The combat effectiveness of these regional and militia forces is generally only fair, but those east of the Mekong river will probably be raised to a high standard of organization and training before the end of 1954.

7. There are also in Cambodia several hundred armed non-Communist dissidents, who are followers of the Nationalist leader, Son Ngoc Thanh.

8. The Cambodian Royal Army, numbering 14,000, is organized into ten regular infantry, one parachute, and three light infantry battalions. Cambodian armed forces are heavily dependent on the French for finance, equipment, training, and advice, though less so than is the case in Laos. However, the Cambodian government exercises much greater command responsibilities than does the Laotian government. French officers and NCO's, who formerly served in the Royal Army, are at present in the process of being withdrawn. The Cambodian King has full administrative control over all royal forces, and operational command west of the Mekong river.

9. The Cambodian Royal Army is reasonably well equipped and trained, but has a number of deficiencies, chief among which are a lack of adequate numbers of trained officers and NCO's, a low standard of discipline and responsibility in the officer corps, and an almost paralytic defensive-mindedness. In time, the effectiveness of the Royal Army may be increased as a result of the efforts of General Nhiek Tioulong, recently appointed by the King as Defense Minister, Chief of Staff, and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

*B. Political Stability*

10. The political situation in both Laos and Cambodia is uncertain, but at present is relatively quiet. In Cambodia, the royal institution is held in high regard by the people, who have traditionally accepted monarchical authority, and the King is personally popular. Moreover, Cambodia enjoys a high degree of cultural, ethnic, and religious homogeneity. In Laos, the population is largely apolitical. In neither country is there any appreciable economic or social unrest. In both countries, a tradition of governing elite subordinate to the throne attracts most educated Laotians and Cambodians to government service.

11. Communism has thus far made little progress in either Laos or Cambodia. The Viet Minh is unpopular in both countries because its

members are Vietnamese, who are heartily disliked by both the Laotians and the Cambodians. Communist sponsored "free governments" and "independence forces" in Laos and Cambodia are viewed as parts of the Viet Minh and thus far have evoked little support in those countries. Communist political influence is believed to be minimal outside those areas firmly occupied by Viet Minh forces. The "Nationalist" appeal of the Communists, which has been relatively successful in Vietnam, has been blunted in Laos by the general political inertness of the country, and in Cambodia by the vigorous nationalist efforts of the King.

12. The Cambodian government derives considerable domestic support from the fact that it is anti-French. The Laotian government, on the other hand, is outwardly pro-French, but this policy does not adversely affect the government's domestic strength.

13. However, both Laos and Cambodia are vulnerable to Communist pressures, chiefly because of their military weakness. Moreover, in times of crisis their political leadership is often unpredictable, especially in Cambodia. There has been a widespread tendency in both countries to regard the war against the Viet Minh as being "someone else's business". In addition, the Communists may be able at any time to take advantage of the fact that in Laos, and especially in Cambodia, there are rival cliques presently contending for political power.

#### *Non-Communist Dissidence*

14. A source of weakness in Cambodia is the existence of non-Communist dissidence. The principal dissident is Son Ngoc Thanh, who is believed to be essentially an independent nationalist. A premier of Cambodia under the Japanese during World War II, Thanh is believed to have a latent political following throughout the country, particularly among students, intellectual groups, and younger army officers who see in him the embodiment of Cambodian independence aspirations. Thanh's political influence has been sapped in recent months by the nationalist efforts of the King, but is still far greater than the small size of his present armed following would suggest. Cambodia's political stability would be greatly enhanced if he should rally to the government, but his future behavior cannot be predicted and it is conceivable that he might join forces with the Viet Minh. In addition to Thanh, there are a number of former dissident leaders who have rallied to the King, but who continue to enjoy warlord-like "autonomous" powers in certain regions of Cambodia. These people are essentially opportunists, whose future loyalty cannot be assured.

15. There are no significant non-Communist dissident groups in Laos. However, Prince Petsarath, now resident in Thailand, is a pre-

tender to the Laotian throne and has at times been reported to be planning a *coup d'état*.

## II. THE EFFECT OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA

16. The future security and stability of Laos and Cambodia will almost certainly be determined by outside developments. The fate of these kingdoms will be largely fixed, not by their own efforts, but by a number of interacting factors, chief among which are probably: (a) the trend of developments in Vietnam; (b) the scale and nature of outside assistance given the governments of Laos and Cambodia, and (c) the nature and strength of Viet Minh military and political pressures against those countries.

### *Developments in Vietnam*

17. Developments in Vietnam will have an immediate effect on Laos and Cambodia. A strong non-Communist position in Vietnam would tend to assure military security and political stability. However, if key areas of Vietnam fell to the Communists, pressure on Laos and Cambodia would be greatly increased. The military capabilities of these countries are so slight that they would almost certainly request outside aid to defend themselves. If such aid were not immediately supplied, Laos would be quickly overrun, or its government would seek accommodation with the Communists. Cambodia might hold out longer, but in the end it too would be forced to surrender or accommodate. If a negotiated settlement placed the Communists in a position which would enable them eventually, but not immediately, to dominate Vietnam, the immediate danger to Laos and Cambodia would be less and the Laotian and Cambodian governments could probably maintain control for some time.

### *French Withdrawal*

18. If, as a result of a negotiated agreement with the Communists covering all of Indochina, French and Viet Minh regular units were actually withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia (leaving Viet Minh irregular forces still operating in those countries), native forces could probably preserve for some time approximately the present degree of security and stability in Cambodia and a certain minimum security and stability in Laos, provided French cadres and the present scale and nature of French material aid remained available to the native armies. However, such an agreement with the Communists would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to implement and police, and in these circumstances the native armies could probably not for long successfully resist the Viet Minh without increased outside support.

*Outside Assistance*

19. Under the adverse alternatives discussed in the two preceding paragraphs, outside support on a scale larger than the French could provide would be required to assure a satisfactory level of security and stability in close countries. If such additional support were not quickly forthcoming, the resistance of Laos and Cambodia to Communism would collapse.

20. If outside support took the form of a security system involving multinational guarantees for the security of Laos and Cambodia and could be implemented in time, that would probably permit Laos and Cambodia to maintain their security, despite rising pressures from the Communists in Vietnam and a probably growing degree of internal Communist unrest in both countries, we believe that the requirements of such a security system will be: (a) adequate MDAP-type aid; (b) effective protective forces appropriately located in the area; and (c) assurance of assistance in the event of internal subversion as well as external attack. The success of the above measures, in the long run, would also require the maintenance and development of a political and psychological atmosphere which would motivate any indigenous peoples against Communism.

*Partition*

21. If Laos and Cambodia were partitioned, the will of the non-Communist remnants to maintain their independence would greatly decrease, and their ability to do so would be weakened because of the new establishment in those countries of strong and legalized Communist positions. Under such circumstances probably nothing but military occupation of those countries would assure their continued freedom from Communist control.

## FORCE STRENGTHS

	LAOS		
	<i>Regulars</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Total</i>
Viet Minh	10,300	8,500	18, 800
French Expeditionary Corps	18,000 (5,000 Laotian)	2,000 (attchd Laotian militia)	20, 000
Laotian Nat'l Forces	14,500 (Nat'l Army)	6,500 (Nat'l Guard & semi- milit)	21, 000

## CAMBODIA

	<i>Regulars</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Total</i>
Viet Minh	2,200	6,500	8,700
French Expeditionary Corps	5,000	1,000	6,000
	(3,000 infantry, 2,000 service)	(attchd Cam- bodian militia)	
Cambodian Royal Forces	14,000	19,000 (Nat'l Guard 4,000; semi- milit 15,000)	33,000

JUNE 4, 1954

396.1 GE/6-454

*Memorandum from the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, June 4, 1954.

Subject: Meeting of the Six on Indochina this Morning.

1. The British and French representatives advanced the thought that Chou En-lai's address yesterday represented a slight concession from the Vietminh representatives' proposal, in that Chou En-lai recognized that the Neutral Commission could also take cognizance of violations of the armistice agreement although it would have no authority or superiority over the mixed commissions. This view was not shared by other Delegations. Ambassador Chauvel suggested, however, that perhaps Molotov is having trouble coordinating his people.

2. This afternoon, both Eden and Bidault may seek clarifications of certain statements made by Chou En-lai and Dong yesterday with particular reference to discrepancies between them.

3. The Cambodians may make some brief statements rejecting Chou En-lai's proposal that the international mechanism control the nonintroduction of troops and war material into Cambodia after the cessation of hostilities. However, the Cambodian Delegation has a fairly long speech almost prepared which it may deliver this afternoon or may wait for the plenary. (We should get the plenary organized as soon as possible.)

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Heath and Bonsal.

4. The meeting was given some interesting information regarding Krishna Menon's calls on the representatives of the Associated States (telegram being drafted).<sup>2</sup> Menon, who only called on the Associated States Delegations after the Cambodian Delegate had expressed to the press his great surprise at the absence of such visits, showed great ignorance of the political situation of the three countries. He wants an international control of the introduction of troops and arms into all three countries and an immediate cease-fire. His idea of a court of last resort in the event of serious violations of the cessation of hostilities arrangements in Indochina would be the Four Great Powers who would presumably consult together and take appropriate measures; the alternative would be World War. Menon indicated that India was ready to participate in the enforcement of an armistice in Indochina. The Cambodian Ambassador added that his Delegation's enthusiasm for having India in the Control Commission had been "greatly tempered" by Menon's call. Menon suggested to the Laotian Delegation that they consent to Vietminh troops remaining in a small area in Laos. The Vietnamese Delegate said that the Foreign Minister had a two hour talk with Menon of which he did not have a full report but the Vietnamese Foreign Minister had taken Indian policy to date to task as favoring the Vietminh rather than the legitimate government of Vietnam. Vietnamese Delegate said that before accepting India in any capacity in Indochinese affairs, he would like to feel India was neutral and not merely neutralist.

---

<sup>2</sup> Summary of Menon's discussions with the Associated States representatives is in telegram Secto 390, June 5, p. 1045.

---

396.1 GE/6-454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 4, 1954—noon.

Secto 371. Department pass USUN; repeated information Paris 381, London 242, Bangkok 16, Usun 11. Reference Tosec 334<sup>1</sup> and Secto 366.<sup>2</sup> It seems to me that we must choose a careful path between resolution which would limit POC to Thailand and one which specifically provides for observation elsewhere in the area or directly implies that such observation will take place. As I said in Secto 366 Eden wants to avoid resolution specifically extending scope of POC beyond Thai-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 3, p. 1013.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram Secto 366, June 3, not printed, the U.S. Delegation reported that "Eden today said UK felt Security Council consideration Thai appeal should 'not be pressed urgently' and no resolution should be tabled which would have effect extending scope POC beyond Thailand." (396.1 GE/6-354)



land but will support resolution which does not prohibit at a later stage, without further SC or GA action, the extension of this observation to Cambodia or Laos when those governments request it. It should not be difficult to find form of words to achieve this result. If the present subparagraph (a) of the draft resolution (Tosec 229<sup>3</sup>) carries too strong an implication to insure promised British support, perhaps it can be more generalized.

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 21, p. 876.

---

396.1 GE/6-454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 4, 1954—3 p. m.

Secto 374. Repeated information Saigon 142, Paris 384. Dac Khe told Heath yesterday that he had protested to French delegation that French Officers, who have now started talks in Geneva with representatives of Viet Minh command, are defeatists. Vietnamese Government has Colonel Kim sitting in on these talks and Vietnamese delegation has added Tran Van Tuyen, both of whom have been instructed watch for any signs of "defeatist concessions" by their French colleagues.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-454 : Telegram

*Twelfth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 4, 3 p. m. :  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 4, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 379. Repeated information Paris 387, London 245, Saigon 144, Tokyo 110, Moscow 107, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Twelfth restricted session, Friday June 4, Molotov presiding:

Cambodian delegate reiterated views re special character Cambodian problem. He referred to CPR position yesterday that international control including control over introduction war material and troops be extended to Cambodia. After referring to complete independence and sovereignty of Cambodia and to absence French troops there and to foreign (Viet Minh) invasion of which Cambodia victim and after

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/12) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 278. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 7 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 196-204.

referring to fact Viet Minh has foreign armament (including shells with Chinese characters) and after stressing pacific nature Cambodian Government and people, Cambodian delegate stated that when peace is restored Cambodia will need to import war materials and also foreign military technicians and instructors for legitimate purposes Cambodian organization for defense. He said international control over this legitimate activity would be dangerous intervention in Cambodian domestic concerns. He added, however, Cambodia would give commitment not permit introduction foreign troops into Cambodia and also to inform control commission re Cambodian importations of arms. He said international control in Cambodia over introduction arms and troops made as much sense as would similar control in Thailand and in China.

Cambodian delegate believes composition of international control commission for Cambodia should be different from that for Vietnam because of Cambodia's special situation. He reiterated proposal he had made on May 16 and 17 that selection of members international commission basis proposals by Geneva Conference and added that in case of Cambodia it should be Cambodia herself that would make proposal. International control in Cambodia would be designed purely to protect Cambodia against fresh invasion following evacuation of Viet Minh troops.

Cambodian delegate proposes seven states (India, Pakistan, Burma, Philippines, Japan, Canada and Italy), asking conference select three of these for international control commission in Cambodia.

Mr. Eden reiterated that he had always agreed Cambodia and Laos were special cases which should be taken up by conference at an early date, and he referred to views earlier expressed on this subject by UK delegate. Dismissing Cambodian intervention, he then turned to general subject of international supervision. He mentioned statements yesterday by French, US and CPR delegates.

Eden said first important point regards functions and relations between proposed joint committees of belligerents and proposed international supervisory commission. He stated DRV-CPR view to effect joint committees have primary responsibility for carrying out cease-fire provisions but added he may not clearly have understood Chou En-lai's remarks re this topic. He said further clarification would be helpful. He stated his own view to effect joint committees in Vietnam could be helpful but that since obviously differences will arise between two sides, there must be an authority, namely, the impartial international committee of control, to resolve these differences and to assure correct execution all clauses of cessation of hostilities agreement. Mere coordination between two bodies clearly insufficient. Even interna-

tional body will not be able function satisfactorily if made up on same bilateral basis as joint committees. Membership of international commission must not reflect points of view of two sides but be truly impartial and endowed with necessary authority for task.

Re composition, Eden referred to agreement that this should be pursued in private discussion. He repeated need for clarification re authority and status of the international committee. Thereafter, conference should take up structure and functions thereof. He stated Bidault's June 2 proposals would be most useful.

Eden said next question would be decision on authority to which international committee will be responsible. He expressed interest in CPR proposal that responsibility could be to Geneva Conference nations who have task of guaranteeing agreements. Eden suggested guaranteeing powers might see fit set up permanent control organism made up of members. This required further consideration.

Summarizing, he stated following questions:

1. What should be the function and responsibility of joint committees, of impartial international commission and of guarantor powers?
2. What should be the relations between these three bodies?

Molotov then spoke re composition of international commission. He referred to Soviet proposal (India, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Pakistan) and to objections on basis Communist ideology of Poland and Czechoslovakia. He stated these objections untenable. Capitalistic countries on this basis could not be neutral either. He discussed organization of such bodies as UN, Security Council, ECOSOC and International Court of Justice. He stated charter of ICJ clearly calls for makeup on basis differing juridical systems which reflect existing dominant political, economic systems.

Molotov rejected proposal to introduce UN into Indochina matter. He stated UN unfit if only because absence China whose people denied their legal right of membership. He also pointed out majority members Indochina phase Geneva Conference not UN members.

Re composition of international commission, Molotov stated there should be included countries having diplomatic and political relations with both of the parties to the dispute which means Poland and Czechoslovakia "or others" cannot be omitted.

On subject of relation between joint committees and international commission, Molotov stated relationship should be one of coordination, that they should work in agreement but not be subordinate one to the other. He referred to precedent in Korea where no such subordination exists in case of joint bodies representing belligerents. He described role of international commission as one of helping

parties to carry out terms of their agreement. With reference to matter of appeal by NNSC in event unable settle disputes, Molotov referred to statement made by CPR in which Eden had expressed interest to effect that guarantor states mentioned in original French proposal would receive for consideration disputes which neither NNSC nor, in first instance, joint committees had been unable to settle. The guarantor states would then agree on necessary collective measures.

Molotov stated that NNSC must cover all three countries of Indochina. Otherwise there might occur in Laos and Cambodia a concentration of military personnel and arms or even establishment of foreign bases which would threaten permanence of cessation of hostilities in Indochina. He reminded conference that France and French troops have relations with all three states. He added that original French proposal spoke of international control for all three states, only difference being nature of responsibility in each.

Molotov denied there was any difference in the proposals of Soviet delegation and DRV in matter of NNSC. He expressed full Soviet endorsement of observations made by DRV and by CPR on this question.

Molotov also drew attention to second paragraph of Chinese proposal (Secto 326<sup>2</sup>) providing that parties concerned should begin negotiations upon appropriate readjustments of their occupied zones and other related problems. He stated contacts have been established between commands in Geneva but noted that none had yet been established in field in spite of fact that conference "resolution" of May 31<sup>3</sup> clearly provides for special contacts. He expressed hope these would be established in near future. Molotov expressed agreement with suggestion made yesterday re private exchanges of views on international control commission problems.

After intermission, Bidault spoke at some length on need for effective impartial permanent control authority over armistice agreement which could take immediate action whenever necessary.<sup>4</sup> Otherwise every agreement would be in danger. If no difficulties arose in implementation agreement, no need for such impartial arbiter. However, all agreed that violations likely and that disputes would arise mixed commission. Therefore, must be dispassionate and responsible control authority which would be removed from heated disputes and able move quickly. French could not abandon this concept.

Bidault continued he would speak of Laos and Cambodia later, and was concerning himself today only with situation Vietnam. He re-

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 27, p. 947.

<sup>3</sup> Reference to the communiqué agreed to during the Ninth Restricted Session on May 31: see telegram Secto 356, May 31, p. 983.

<sup>4</sup> French proposal on "Structure of Supervision in Viet-Nam" is *infra*.

marked Chou yesterday had considered it necessary establish two joint bodies—mixed commissions which knew well geographic areas and which would participate in implementation armistice agreement and at same time international commission. He again stressed need of neutral supervision and pointed out areas disagreement which might arise in mixed commissions such as those concerning regroupment troops, exchange prisoners, increase war potential. He considered solution these problems extremely difficult and without precedent that first condition for adequate control over these problems was need for real neutral observers who would have authority and who could act quickly for, if breaches of the armistice were permitted endure, disaster would result. He advocated efficient system of supervision control which would be fixed yet mobile, large enough to be effective, and with modern means of transportation, communication, etc. He said each time dispute arose which could not be settled by mixed commissions it must be referred international commission which would have last word and full authority. If there were no such controls there could be no guarantees for effective armistice.

Bidault continued mixed commissions should actively participate implementation of armistice agreement. Their duties, following directive of international commission, could be widened. But they were always subordinate to international commission. When violations in armistice terms fell within competence international commission, international commission would take action. When secondary violations within competence mixed commissions arose, they would attempt to settle them, but if they were unable they must be referred back international commissions.

Bidault then turned to question composition international commission but made no proposal. He noted various proposals on Indochina armistice had been tabled, including one by Eden today and suggested they be considered seriously and talked over in subsequent restricted meeting. He said he would circulate views French delegation on results thus far Indochinese debate.

General Smith had three brief observations:

(1) Was impossible reach meeting minds on interpretation actual neutrals on one hand and effective impartiality of non-belligerents on other. He suggested new approach in accordance with Eden's statement today on impartial international controls. He proposed discard word "neutral" and insert "impartial" and then perhaps delegates might find impartial nations for participation in international commission;

(2) He associated himself completely with British and French views re relationship between mixed commissions and impartial international commission. There must be supreme authority by latter and reasonable subordination by former;

(3) He agreed that Chou's basic principles might in long run be framework for agreement on condition that agreement be reached separately on three points, namely, (1) composition international commissions; (2) relationship between commission and mixed commissions; and (3) nature of obligations of guarantor states. Without this, Chou's basic principles remained skeleton without substance.

SMITH

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 283

*Twelfth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 4, 3 p. m.:  
Proposal Made by the French Delegation*

MOST SECRET

[GENEVA,] June 4, 1954.

#### STRUCTURE OF SUPERVISION IN VIET-NAM

Supervision in Viet-nam shall be organized in the following manner:

1. An "International Supervisory Commission" shall be set up composed of representatives of neutral countries.

2. Joint commissions shall likewise be set up composed of representatives of the Commands.

3. The "International Supervisory Commission" shall be responsible for the execution, by the parties, of the clauses of the armistice agreements.

For this purpose, it shall establish a complete system of supervision, inspection and investigation, comprising a central commission, local commissions distributed over the whole of the territory, and *ad hoc* mobile commissions which can be utilized in any part of the country. These commissions shall carry out all necessary investigations both documentary and on the spot, either on their own account, or at the request of either of the parties, according to the decisions of the central commission. Any complaint shall be followed by an investigation.

Throughout the whole of the territory, the international commissions shall be given every facility by the civil and military authorities to enable them to carry through their mission.

The international commissions, at every level, shall take their decisions by a majority vote in accordance with a procedure to be determined.

4. The joint commissions shall take part in the execution of the armistice terms, particularly of those which imply regular contact between the parties or which require a thorough knowledge of local conditions.

The joint commissions shall act under the authority of the "International Supervisory Commission", which shall assign to them special duties taking account of the foregoing considerations. They shall report to the international commissions, in proper form to be established by the latter, on the performance of such duties.

Any difference of opinion arising within the joint commissions shall be submitted to the "International Supervisory Commission" which shall settle the dispute directly with the parties.

5. The "International Supervisory Commission" shall be installed as soon as hostilities cease. It shall begin work immediately and define at once the spheres of action and the working conditions of the joint commissions. Measures consequent on the cessation of hostilities (re-groupings, transfers of units, release of prisoners etc.) shall be carried out under its supervision with the assistance of the joint commissions.

---

396.1 GE/6-454 : Telegram

*Twelfth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 4, 3 p. m.:*  
*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY      GENEVA, June 4, 1954—10 a. m. [*p. m.*]

Secto 381. Repeated information Paris 388, London 246, Saigon 145, Tokyo 112. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Indochina restricted session Friday June 4, continued discussion international controls armistice agreement.<sup>1</sup> There was no apparent progress toward meeting of minds.

On composition international commission, our side upheld thesis true neutrality or impartiality while Molotov stated essential commission contain countries having diplomatic, political relations each side and that countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia could not be rejected. General agreement this subject might be pursued in private conversations.

On relations between joint committees of belligerents and international control commission, Eden, Bidault and Smith reiterated strong stand that international commission must have authority and full facilities and joint committees be definitely subordinate. Molotov equally firm that task of international commission one of coordination and assisting belligerents to implement armistice agreement.

Eden expressed interest in Chou En-lai's proposal that nine Geneva powers act as court of appeal in case international control commission unable settle disputes. Eden stated this worthy further study. Molotov

---

<sup>1</sup> For the French proposal made at the Twelfth Restricted Session on "Structure of Supervision in Viet-Nam", see *supra*.

said nine guarantors might receive unresolved disputes from international commission and agree on collective measures.

Cambodian Del reiterated special nature Cambodian case and proposed special international control commission for Cambodia made up of three nations to be selected by conference from India, Pakistan, Burma, Philippines, Japan, Canada and Italy.

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-454 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1954—7:40 p. m.

Tosec 352. Department has received no reports tending confirm any information set forth in UP press story datelined London June 2 and desires any comments which would help evaluate authenticity significance.<sup>2</sup> Information in press item which is attributed to informed and authoritative sources is summarized below :

Molotov quick visit Moscow from Geneva was result conversation Menon with Molotov in which former conveyed India's stand that support of Viet Minh position on Laos and Cambodia would jeopardize friendship USSR among independent nations Southeast Asia. USSR may modify its support of Viet Minh refusal withdraw from Laos, Cambodia. This could produce rift between USSR and Communist China. UK and India closely cooperating on this issue which Eden discussed with Chou at dinner June 1. Prime Minister Burma said to have influenced Nehru inform USSR dangers overly ambitious USSR policy in Southeast Asia. SEA governments reported satisfied sincerity Eden's efforts reach settlement Geneva and his awareness importance of sympathies people Laos, Cambodia with Buddhist peoples Burma and Ceylon. Molotov reportedly cooperative but Chou firmly insisting not possible treat Cambodia, Laos separately from Vietnam.

DULLES

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Day of FE/PSA. Repeated to New Delhi as telegram 1402, to London as telegram 6574, and to Moscow as telegram 769.

<sup>2</sup> The delegation reply is in telegram Dulte 154, June 5, *infra*.

110.11 DU/6-554 : Telegram

*Smith-Menon Meeting, Geneva, June 4, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 5, 1954—3 p. m.

Dulte 154. Reference Tosec 352.<sup>1</sup> Can best comment on Tosec 352 by giving you substance of conversation I had last night with Menon,

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*.



who asked to see me. Principal burden of his remarks, again was that in interest of reducing world tensions and to avoid complete failure of international conferences, we should not have a break here on Korea, but should announce a few points of agreement on principle and then agreement to disagree, et cetera.

He had just talked at length with Chou En-lai, and in response to my question, he said Chinese recognized special problems of Laos and Cambodia, but could not agree to their special treatment. Possibly having been filled in on the substance of yesterday afternoon's debate, Menon gave as a specific example, that the Chinese could not agree to "neutral" supervision in Vietnam and no supervision, or different supervision in Laos and Cambodia. He repeated same arguments given by Molotov and Chou En-lai at yesterday's closed session. France and United States would build up military strength in Laos and Cambodia for aggression toward Vietnam, et cetera. (Of course, to us this is a subsidiary problem to that of the regroupment of Viet Minh forces outside Laos and Cambodia.)

There was no indication yesterday of a softening of the Communist position as previously described regarding Laos and Cambodia, and I intend to talk privately with Molotov on this matter when he comes to dinner Monday, and may be able thereafter to give a better estimate. My own impression has been that the Communist position hardened somewhat after Molotov returned.

SMITH

JUNE 5, 1954

396.1 GE/6-654 : Telegram

*Smith-Bidault Meeting, Geneva, June 5, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 6, 1954—2 p. m.

Dulte 156. Repeated information Paris 393. Paris eyes only Ambassador. Reference: (1) Deptel 4023 repeated Geneva Tedul 54<sup>1</sup> (2) Deptel 4272 repeated Geneva Tosec 269<sup>2</sup> (3) Deptel 4286 repeated Geneva Tedul 133.<sup>3</sup> Bidault made following comments yesterday morning on US conditions for internationalization Indochinese conflict:

1. Reference 1 paragraph 2b: He foresaw no difficulties regarding request to other nations but wondered whether this problem might be

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 11; see volume XIII.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 26; see *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 4286 to Paris, May 27, not printed, contained suggestions for meeting the French requirement that an agreement for joint action must allow France some flexibility in regard to the withdrawal of its forces from Indochina in the event of a substantial increase in the strength of the Vietnamese National Army. (751G.00/5-2254)

simplified, although he did not amplify. I feel sure French would like to be informed soonest of progress negotiations with other interested nations.

2. Reference 1 paragraph 2c: Bidault feels Thailand resolution provisionally takes care this problem. He reminded me of difficulties which might arise regarding similar action on part of Laos and Cambodia. I pointed out that we able move fast in Korea because of POC on spot and stated most desirous establish counterpart in Thailand which at later date could extend activities to whole region. He was noncommittal.

3. Reference 2 paragraph 2: Bidault questioned advisability President unilaterally making formal pledge re fulfillment full independence and sovereignty Vietnam. He believed isolated American guarantee ran risk of being interpreted as "vassalization" of Associated States by US; that guarantee should be directed toward territorial integrity, defense and security of Associated States rather than independence "as is usual in case of this kind" and that such a guarantee might be better within framework of any Southeast Asia organizations agreement.

4. Reference 2 paragraph 3c: Bidault suggested change words "after end of hostility" to "after reestablishment peace and within period to be determined in agreement with Government Vietnam."

5. Reference 3 paragraph 2: He suggested paragraph read "throughout duration collective action present French effort will be maintained account being taken of France's international obligations, requirements for metropolitan defense and its obligations toward countries in French Union and its protectorates." Bidault stated that such language would be most helpful in EDC debates since many EDC enemies claim France could not maintain forces both metropolitan France and Asia. I pointed out that some conditions in new draft were inherent, such as requirements for national defense. Said I would report his proposal to Department.

6. Reference 1 paragraph 7: Bidault stated that French Government could only consider submission of request for assistance to Parliament upon complete failure Geneva conference, otherwise government would fall. I replied understood Laniel was prepared lay agreement before Parliament and Cabinet after decision taken honorable armistice not possible Geneva. I pointed out this parliamentary approval essential because of long term basis our commitments and need to rely on fulfillment of conditions by any successor French Government. I continued he and Laniel should judge timing and my government would not press French to take any action which might bring on government crisis.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 320

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath)*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 5, 1954.

Participants: Frederic-Dupont, New French Minister for the Associated States.

Donald R. Heath, Ambassador to Vietnam and Cambodia.

At yesterday's session Mr. Frederic-Dupont, appointed the day before to be French Minister for the Associated States, with whom I became acquainted during his visit with a French Parliamentary Commission to Indochina two years ago, said he would like to talk with me. I saw him this morning. He is leaving for Paris this afternoon, returning here Monday and will be at the Monday conference session whether it deals with Korea or Indochina.

He said that while he had been interested in Indochina affairs for some years he had had no time since his appointment to brief himself on his new job. He had seen General Ely but only for three minutes and had come forthwith to Geneva. He started off by saying that he would speak with entire frankness although his ideas on the Indochina problem were not yet firm. He was a Frenchman but in these days of Communist menace he was not alone a Frenchman but a citizen of the free world. He believed thoroughly in the EDC and had had some slight success in converting colleagues to the necessity of prompt French ratification of the EDC treaty. He was firmly of the belief that any attempt to get along with Communists on the basis of peaceful negotiations would be a fatal futility unless such negotiations were backed up by force. Therefore should the free world decide that continuation of French war effort and sacrifices in Indochina was necessary he would go along repugnant though that course would be to present French public opinion.

On the other hand from long acquaintance with the Indochina situation he was afraid that whether at Geneva or on the field of battle some decision might be taken, as it so often had in the past in Indochina, to try for some small victory tomorrow without taking account of the possibility, that such decision might lead to a grave defeat at some future date.

It was conceivable, he said, that the Communists might back down and agree to French conditions as to the necessity of adequate neutral international control of an armistice, which would be a temporary victory for France but would be followed by Communist insistence

<sup>1</sup> Summary of conversation transmitted to the Department in telegram Secto 389, June 5. (396.1 GE/6-554)

on free elections, which by reason of its democratic tradition, France could not successfully oppose and which would result in a real victory for communism in Vietnam and a profound humiliation for France, the United States and the free world.

The military situation was not good. The French had lost the fine corps of their Expeditionary Force at Dien Bien Phu. The Vietnamese national army was very shaky and the Vietminh were flushed with victory, fanatically disciplined and devoted. The French troops, of course, would fight with unimpaired morale since they were professional soldiers but it was not sure they could hold the Tonkin delta or even Hanoi.

The foregoing was evidently a prelude to his "provisional" opinion that the only solution was partition of Vietnam at the Col de Nuages just north of Hue which was, he argued, a defensible military line which would conserve the traditional capital of Hue, the center and the south which was much richer than Tonkin. He asked whether the United States attached great military importance to the holding of the Tonkin delta.

I replied that I understood our general military opinion considered the holding of Tonkin to be important to the point of being vital. I remarked that the abandonment of Tonkin would give the Vietminh—and the Chinese Communists—complete control of the Vietnamese population there. They could turn them rapidly into first class soldiers. I remarked that the Vietnamese government had taken a firm stand against partition of Vietnam and then went on to say that our military in Indochina and in Washington did not take a gloomy view of the French military position as a result of the loss of Dien Bien Phu. We very definitely thought something could be done about it. I said he undoubtedly knew we were exploring with the French and other countries the possibilities of strengthening the Franco-Vietnamese position. He said that he was not informed of any conversations with the French government so I forbore giving him any details, merely stating we were actively exploring with, I thought, prospects of success, the possibilities of adding to French-Vietnamese political and military assets. I also remarked that our experts were very dubious, to say the least, of the possibility of concluding any sure armistice in view of the difficulties of the terrain and certain Communist evasion and bad faith.

He observed that French public opinion had been greatly disheartened that neither France nor Great Britain had come to the aid of the French to save Dien Bien Phu. I said that there had been a last-minute approach to that end but it could hardly be expected that United States or other countries would react immediately and affirmatively

to the unexpected idea of immediate military intervention. Until a few weeks ago there had been no question of the United States intervening militarily in Indochina except possibly as a result of an overt Chinese Communist invasion. Neither France nor any other country had wanted American military forces to engage in that struggle. Frederic-Dupont said the only thing he could say was that he hoped the United States would make up its mind quickly what they were willing to do towards saving Indochina. I remarked here that I personally thought that prompt ratification of EDC would tend to take off Communist heat on Indochina. Faced with a militarily United Western Europe the Soviets might feel less inclined to back Communist military ventures in South East Asia.

He then returned to his theme of partition. He doubted that the dominant families in Cochin China would object to that solution if the central and southern Vietnam could be guaranteed by France, the United States and other powers. He was, of course, entirely insistent that there be no partition of Laos or Cambodia. France public opinion would favor supporting the monarchs of those two countries but was highly disinclined to support Bao Dai, who was staying on in France instead of putting himself at the head of his army. The average Frenchmen who could not afford to leave the boulevards for his vacation was rather jealous of Bao Dai staying comfortably at Cannes, while Frenchmen were dying for him in Indochina. He heard that Bao Dai was now planning to take the "cure" at Evian. This would have a really disastrous effect on French public opinion. In the French officers corps there was hardly a family that did not have a relative who had been taken prisoner or killed at Dien Bien Phu. Nearly a third of the officers and non-commissioned officers corps of France was serving in Indochina and suffering heavy continuing casualties.

I said that in his single talk with Bao Dai, some two weeks ago, the head of our delegation, General Smith, had raised the question of Bao Dai returning to Vietnam but that Bao Dai said he could not return until the independence treaty had been signed and until he could see what the outcome would be in Geneva; until he was clear whether France would continue supporting him in keeping up the fight against the Vietminh. I said that as far as I knew there had been no insistence by the French government that Bao Dai return to Vietnam at this moment. I had heard from the Vietnamese Foreign Minister that Bao Dai was coming shortly to Annecy. The Foreign Minister had asked General Smith whether he had any message for Bao Dai. I had replied that we had no communication to make but General Smith hoped before long he might have another talk with Bao Dai. Frederic-Dupont said he favored the idea of such a talk in the hope that we

would urge on Bao Dai the necessity of returning. He said he would write us a letter urging that General Smith talk with Bao Dai and persuade the latter to go back to his fatherland. He had very little hope of Bao Dai really doing anything very important although he was extremely intelligent, a very charming and rather frank person but he had been spoiled. Frederic-Dupont saw no clear signs of other leadership in Vietnam. He would like to find a Syngman Rhee. I observed that there probably was latent leadership in Vietnam. If France continued its military and financial support of Vietnam and we continued ours, together we might be able to insist successfully that Bao Dai comport himself as a Chief of a state in peril. At least we could make the try. Frederic-Dupont said he appreciated the talk and hoped it would be followed by others. He expects to see Ely and Salan over the weekend and Reynaud. He remarked it had been definitely determined that Salan should go as Ely's deputy but that Cogny would retain his command in the north. He asked our opinion of Cogny. I said we had a very high one. I forebore any comment on Salan.

---

396.1 GE/6-254 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1954—12:42 p. m.

Tedul 159. For Under Secretary from Secretary. Re Dulte 141.<sup>2</sup> I am in general accord subject to the following considerations:

1. In view of dubious future role of Bao Dai as indicated your second paragraph, doubt he should be made the recipient of any express or implied pledges from US.

2. Doubt that US should be so completely identified with France and Vietnam that our own independence of action and freedom to disassociate ourselves would seem to be impaired. I refer in this connection to last sentence of fifth paragraph about "coordination".

3. I have some concern that your proposed statements with reference to necessity Vietnam cooperation with French might be interpreted as asking Vietnam to take pressure off French for clarification of their independence and completion independence treaty.

4. We do not yet have any firm position as to what action we would take in relation to local authorities if French agreed to sell-out unacceptable to them. It would under these circumstances be most unlikely that we would openly intervene there, but we might want to encourage local resistance and help maintain some sort of a non-communist gov-

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4428 and to Saigon as telegram 2507.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 2, p. 1008.

ernment, even if it were a government wholly or partially in exile. However, as you suggest, it is not at all clear that Bao Dai would be the best person for us to rely upon under these circumstances. This accentuates the desirability of avoiding any statement which he might regard as personal pledge to him.

5. I hope you can use conversation to draw him out, particularly on the two points of:

- a. what French can do to carry conviction in Indochina that the people are fighting for their own independence, and
- b. how a more effective native government can be established.

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/6-554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 5, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 390. Repeated information Paris 390, Saigon 147, London 249, New Delhi 23. Following account Menon's visits to heads delegations Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos based on reports latter.

Very shortly after he had expressed surprise to press that Menon visited Viet Minh delegation and not delegations of legal governments of Associated States, Cambodian delegate was approached by Menon and interview took place June 2. Menon showed complete ignorance political conditions and status Cambodian independence. He was interested in establishment international control of introduction further troops and munitions into all three countries of Indochina following cessation of hostilities. Cambodian delegate said this unacceptable in special case of Cambodia. As for guarantee of an Indochina agreement that may be concluded, Cambodian delegate states Menon appears to favor four great powers as court of last appeal to resolve difficulties. He states that if they unable reach agreement reactions to be taken in case of serious violations of agreement, alternative will be world war. Cambodian delegate indicated Menon favorable to Indian participation in control of armistice.

Laotian delegate reported Menon contemplating possibility Viet Minh troops might be permitted remain in frontier area of Laos. Laotian delegate stated this unacceptable.

Vietnamese delegate indicated Menon completely ignorant elementary facts re Vietnam and added view Menon position favors Communists. Vietnam delegate says Indians must prove they are neutral and not merely neutralists.

On the whole, Associated States enthusiasm for India and for Menon extremely moderate. They were startled and alarmed at his ignorance of facts of life with which they are confronted.

SMITH

JUNE 6, 1954

396.1 GE/6-554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of Defense*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 5, 1954—3 p. m.

[Received June 6, 1954.]

Army Message Gento 50. Action Defense; repeated action USAR-MAAs London, Paris, Saigon and Department State. From Defense representative Geneva. For Hensel from Sullivan. Following is summary French-VN military talks with Viet Minh 4 June reported to Defense representative by member French delegation:

1. At four hour session Viet Minh referred to statement of Pham Van Dong at 25 May restricted session of delegations as basis upon which military talks should proceed, and suggested military representatives reach agreement thereon.

2. French representative took position that Dong proposal not acceptable basis for discussion since it dealt with political and economic subjects and only incidentally strategic ones. French representative maintained discussion should deal with concrete proposals and not with principles of nature those in Dong's statement. Referred again to Laniel proposal of 5 March as concrete suggestion and basis for further discussion. Invited Viet Minh to table concrete proposal of their own.

3. Viet Minh representative said situation had changed since 5 March; said French had suffered many reverses and many casualties, condemned Laniel proposal as "provocation", and said world opinion also condemned it. French representative responded that Viet Minh had also suffered heavily and that a battle lost is not a war lost as history of French nation testifies.

4. Viet Minh representative contended he could not discuss specific details without agreement on principles first.

5. *Comment:* No indications of progress in this meeting. French delegation contact expressed opinion that Viet Minh tactic of agreement on Dong principles would be dangerous since Communists could claim that French refusal to agree later to specific proposals allegedly in consonance with the principles demonstrated French bad faith. French still contend they will not fall into trap of beginning detailed talks in Indochina before agreement reached here on framework for



talks in the field. French delegation contact noted that Viet Minh group consisted of only one military officer and is of opinion that Viet Minh may not be serious about reaching military agreements in Geneva, preferring that talks take place in field.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 320

*The Coordinator of the United States Delegation (Johnson) to the  
Head of the Delegation (Smith)*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 6, 1954.

GENERAL SMITH: I have been thinking over your letter to the Secretary on Indo-China.<sup>1</sup>

I most emphatically agree with your sentence that it would take strong, direct and rapid action by the U.S. to reverse the adverse trend. Unless we take such action a result such as you set forth is the best we can hope for.

The major factor is the defeatism and lack of will to fight among the Vietnamese who are now in the down slope. Our intervention on even a limited scale might reverse the trend. However, I feel that there is a better than even chance that our intervention would eventually result in full scale hostilities with at least Communist China. If a formula could be found that would give the Vietnamese the psychological lift of our intervention without our actually being required to intervene it would be ideal. However, I fear it is an impossible ideal.

The only other possibility of reversing the trend is for a Vietnamese to appear able and willing to sound a loud clear trumpet call to turn his people around and start them up the slope. However, I see no such person or the probability of such a person appearing.

However, I do not agree that our intervention would have an "enormous adverse effect" on Asiatic public opinion because of direct association with militant colonialism. There would probably be some initially adverse reactions, but I believe they could be overcome by a clear declaration on our part of our policy with regard to Vietnamese independence. Adverse Asian reaction would rather arise from fear that we were precipitating World War III. If we succeeded in winning in Indo-China without bringing on World War III our position in Asia would be enormously enhanced. However, if World War III did result, Asia would blame us and turn against us.

U. A. JOHNSON

---

<sup>1</sup> For text of Under Secretary Smith's letter to Secretary Dulles, see telegram Dulte 157, June 7, p. 1054.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 320

*The Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the  
Head of the Delegation (Smith)*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 6, 1954.

MY DEAR GENERAL: In addition to your vast military experience and insight you have for years now successfully dealt at first hand and at high level with international affairs.

Since the attached confidential letter<sup>1</sup> represents your considered judgment of the present situation and its possible solution, you as the boss of this delegation must, of course, send it.

I would hope, however, that you will modify it to the extent of admitting a possible alternative, a possible if not too likely loophole for a better way out of this mess.

That loophole consists of several big "ifs"—*if* military, congressional and public opinion can be rallied to the idea of American military intervention in Indochina, *if* we can persuade the Philippines and Thailand to at least token co-intervention, *if* Bidault's ideas prevail and the French Assembly agrees to keep up the fight, *if* with or without Bao Dai we can install a Vietnamese regime of honesty and will (perhaps under Ngo Dinh Diem) and *if* EDC is ratified presenting Russia with a militarily United Western Europe with German divisions at its back-door, perhaps China might persuade herself or be persuaded by Russia not to intervene overtly in Indochina even if the battle turned against the Vietminh, which indeed it could.

Before embarking on intervention with its risk of bringing not only China but the entire Communist world into war we should offer a peaceful alternative to world opinion. That alternative would be: a massive genuinely neutral, preferably United Nations, international control commission—disposing of say, two divisions—with its elements stationed in the Vietminh as well as the Vietnam zones, able to move at will within them and along the Chinese frontier, able to enforce disarmament of all irregular troops, able to prevent entry of fresh troops and matériel and, in preparation of UN supervised elections, able to ensure that political parties, press and radio of both sides could campaign freely in the territories of the other. National elections might be held, say, within one year after hostilities—and terrorism—had ceased. We would run the risk that elections would go against the Vietnam Government. I don't think that risk would ever develop because the Communists would not really accept such a spelled-out control.

---

<sup>1</sup> Reference to letter from Under Secretary Smith to Secretary Dulles. For text of letter, see telegram Dulles 157, June 7, p. 1054.

If the foregoing seems to you too unlikely an alternative I nevertheless venture to suggest two changes in your letter:

1. I personally believe the Communists would accept a partition line further north than the Col de Nuages which latter would give them a good 60 percent of the population and the territory. I believe they would accept northern Vietnam which would still give them Hanoi, the cultural capital, the hardiest breed of Vietnamese and nearly one-half of the Vietnam's population.

2. I personally would modify the phrase "the enormous adverse effect" partition would have on Asiatic opinion. I suggest that Formosa, Thailand, Philippines and even Burma would understand our intervention is not colonialist and that we might develop understanding in Ceylon, Pakistan and Turkey.

DRH

JUNE 7, 1954

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 290

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, June 7, 1954.

Participants: M. Roland de Margerie, French Delegation  
Donald R. Heath, US Delegation  
Edward Page, US Delegation

In conversation this morning the following points were brought out by de Margerie:

1. While Bidault in the last session had taken a strong stand that the mixed commission must be subordinate to the authority of the international commission, de Margerie is not sure that he would maintain this line for the following reasons: If France desired, after a cease fire, to bring U.S. matériel or U.S. personnel into UN for training of troops a too precise supervisory structure might make this impossible. He had therefore recommended to Bidault that any final plan—he was under no illusions, that any armistice could be drawn which could not be evaded by the Communists—should be "short and vague". He cited the incident of Abbe Sieyes saying to Napoleon that "a constitution must be short and clear" only to be interrupted by the latter stating "yes I agree that a constitution must be short and obscure".

2. He thought Chou En-lai had made a slight concession in agreeing that the international commission would have authority over the demilitarized zones between or along the periphery of the regroupment areas. There would probably be at least five demilitarized zones which would give the international commission considerable authority.

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Heath and Page.

3. Bidault was now in favor of an Indochina plenary tomorrow for it would give him an opportunity to make a detailed statement on the French position prior to his statement in Parliament on Wednesday<sup>2</sup> which would be of a more general nature. Bidault's line in Tuesday's plenary would probably be to review the serious practical concise French proposals and the fact they had been met by vague impractical and unacceptable proposals from the Communists.

4. Bidault would let General Smith know whether he thought it advisable for the General to speak tomorrow. De Margerie thought it possible that Bidault might desire the General to reiterate the U.S. position of the composition of the international commission.

<sup>2</sup> June 9.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 319

*Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(Bonsal) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 7, 1954.

Subject: Indochina

I called on Ambassador Chauvel at 12:30 today at the latter's request.

Regarding the current military conversations, Chauvel said that absolutely no progress had been made. The Vietminh have insisted on trying to reach agreement regarding the general principles contained in their May 25 proposal whereas the French have wished to start from Laniel's proposals of March 5. Late Saturday, the French suggested that a good way to begin might be to establish the present military positions of the opposing sides. The French plan this afternoon to present their situation and see if this elicits anything specific from the other side. They are not optimistic because of the generally delaying tactics of the other side including insistence on speaking Vietnamese, citing from Communist newspapers, etc., etc.

On the matter of controls, Bidault has had a talk with Chou En-lai and Chauvel himself has seen Wang Ping-nam three times. The CPR position is firmly to the effect that the control commission must have two members having relations with the Vietminh. The fact that France's relations with India are less than cordial does not alter the Chinese Communists' position that India is one of our side's neutrals. Bidault is seeing Chou En-lai this evening and something may develop although so far the CPR position is one of firmly supporting the Soviet proposal on composition.

Bidault saw Molotov this morning with completely negative results. Chauvel described Molotov as having behaved like a "smiling

log". Molotov suggested that perhaps one reason the military discussions were not making greater progress was because "someone is expected" i.e., the Vietminh Delegation is not yet complete. Molotov insisted on the Soviet proposal regarding composition and particularly the inclusion of states having diplomatic relations with the Vietminh.

Krishna Menon saw Bidault for an hour and a half yesterday. He also insisted that the control commission should include someone having relations with the Vietminh.

It is the French impression that Molotov's attitude since his return from Moscow has hardened to some extent. The French note that since Molotov's return from Moscow he has had no direct contact with Eden. The French also regret that Eden has been away this weekend and therefore no contacts have been possible during these critical three days.

Bidault will be prepared to make a speech tomorrow generally summarizing the French proposals and the various arguments which have been advanced in the course of the restricted sessions. Bidault is according to Chauvel satisfied that the plenary here will precede the speech he will make to the Assembly and that thus he can use the speech he made here in reporting to the Assembly.

Ambassador Chauvel stated at both the beginning and the end of his conversation with me that the French are very much concerned and annoyed at the lack of any progress. They are in the dark as to the enemy's military intentions, and are fully aware of the fact that between June 15 and June 20 General Giap will be ready to resume the offensive.

---

Conference files, lot 80 D 627, CF 316

*Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(Bonsal) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 7, 1954.

Subject: Implication of Probable Vietminh Offensive in Tonkin  
Delta

The following factors seem pertinent to an appraisal of the Indochina situation:

1. Present French military dispositions and intentions, even if successfully carried out, present the Vietminh with an opportunity in the

<sup>1</sup> This memorandum was sent to Under Secretary Smith through Robertson and Heath. In a note attached to the source text Heath informed Smith and Robertson that "I agree that the analysis of the present situation is very good but I am not clear whether the action recommended in the final two paragraphs is practical." In a handwritten notation by Robertson on Heath's note, Robertson said "I don't agree that we should attempt a 'bluff'. It might be called."

next few weeks to achieve an important increase in territory held by them in the Tonkin Delta. The loss of such places as Nam Dinh, Thai Binh and the two Catholic bishoprics would represent a serious further drop in prestige for the Franco-Vietnamese cause and will further depreciate the negotiating position of our side at Geneva.

2. The above represents the best we may hope for in the military-political situation over the next few weeks if the Vietminh resumes the offensive. If the French are again, as they have so often been in the past months, "surprised" at increased Vietminh power and are unable to meet that power, we may be faced with the loss of Hanoi and perhaps with a large scale military disaster if the French are unable to withdraw their forces to Haiphong.

3. A deteriorating military situation, whether it takes the form set forth in (1) or (2) above, coupled with French public and parliamentary anxiety for a cease fire, will make it increasingly difficult for the French negotiators to stand firm on the negotiating points which are vital if any part of Vietnam is to have a chance of being kept from Communist control. (These points are (a) regrouping zones which would permit if necessary a resumption of hostilities under conditions reasonably favorable for our side particularly if direct US intervention were contemplated, (b) a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission which would have the will and the means to control the execution of the armistice terms, and (c) a UN or other guarantee in such form that the free world guarantors could not be hamstrung by the Communist guarantors.)

4. In the present military-political situation, there seems to be absolutely no indication of any significant improvement in Vietnamese political morale. Bao Dai has proved himself to be an even more inert and repulsive figure than we had earlier thought. So far as North Vietnam is concerned, Governor Tri is our only hope and his morale is pretty low at this time.

5. Our conversations with the French regarding conditions for possible US intervention are presumably progressing favorably. We can probably assume that, if the Geneva Conference is unsuccessful from the French point of view, the French will invite US intervention and that the other conditions for such intervention will prove workable. On the other hand, the possibility that the French will in fact agree to the breaking off of the Geneva discussions will diminish with the deterioration of the military situation in Indochina and the increased peril of the expeditionary corps. As the military situation gets worse, the trend toward peace at any price and away from the enlarging of the conflict will probably become accentuated. In any event, it would be most difficult to find, in the face of a rapidly deteriorating military situation in Indochina, the formula for a break at Geneva which would satisfy the requirements of both the French Assembly and the US Congress in the event that such a break were followed by a request to the Assembly and to the Congress for authorization for a US intervention in the war.

Our most recent information indicates that the bulk of the Vietminh forces will be ready for further offensive action on June 15. If such an

offensive does begin, the following courses of action appear to be open to us :

(a) If we and the French were really and irrevocably determined on US intervention in order to prevent a Vietminh victory, we would simply, in view of the enemy's pursuit of his aggression, and in concert with the French take the necessary steps to withdraw from the Geneva Conference and we would submit the whole problem to our respective legislatures and to the UN and to our allies. It is quite obvious, however, that France is not in a position to take speedy effective action nor is it certain that the US could act speedily.

(b) Another possible course of action would be for the US, acting unilaterally following the resumption of the Vietminh offensive, to withdraw from the conference and to recover complete freedom of action. This might involve branding the Vietminh offensive as involving an overt Chinese Communist aggression. (You will recall that the Secretary early in April said that the Chinese were very close to such overt aggression.) We would then proceed as provided in NSC 5405<sup>2</sup> in the event of an overt Chinese aggression. This would be unsatisfactory because our military-political relations with the French would be uncoordinated, and because there is considerable doubt that our other allies would follow us.

(c) A third alternative would be for the US simply to withdraw from the conference and to disassociate itself from any deal which the French may be forced to make. Such a course would be extremely damaging to our prestige and would spell the end of the policy of collective security which we have endeavored to build. It would accelerate the turning over of Indochina to the Communists more than any other action we could take. We do not have a substitute partner in Indochina if the French bow out.

The consideration of these factors and of these alternatives leads me to pose the following questions: Is there anything which can be done within the current week (the critical date of June 15 is next Tuesday) to induce the enemy to abandon his apparent offensive intentions? Can it be made clear to Molotov and to Chou En-lai that if Giap intensifies his military action in the delta, we would be forced to withdraw from the Geneva Conference and to concert military measures to meet a changing military situation? Can we get the agreement of the French and British delegates?

Molotov and Chou En-lai would be informed perhaps by Eden acting for the French and ourselves that our readiness to negotiate for the restoration of peace in Indochina was predicated upon the situation as it existed when the conference opened. If that situation is to be changed we desire to recover full freedom of action to take necessary counter-measures. By means of this *démarche*, we would endeavor to impress in the most serious and convincing fashion upon Molotov and Chou En-

---

<sup>2</sup> For NSC 5405, "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to South-east Asia," Jan. 16, 1954, see volume XII.

lai the extreme danger to world peace of a further offensive in the Tonkin Delta. At the same time, we could authorize Eden or whoever represents us to express a realistic understanding of the situation in Vietnam and a willingness to accept an agreement for the cessation of hostilities and for a transitional period leading to general elections throughout Vietnam which would give the Vietminh leaders an opportunity through peaceful means to contest control of the country with non-Communist leadership. We should of course stress the firmness of our position regarding Laos and Cambodia. Molotov should be made to feel that on the military actions of Giap over the next ten days, the whole issue of peace or war may depend.

The drawback to any approach to Molotov and Chou En-lai along the lines proposed above is of course the possibility that they might believe we were bluffing. This is a risk which we would have to take. We have to take it because, in the last analysis, we ourselves don't know whether we are bluffing or not, i.e., we can not be sure at this stage of the reaction of the American public to a further serious deterioration of the Franco-Vietnamese position in the Tonkin Delta followed by a Presidential appeal to Congress for the necessary authority to intervene militarily. Furthermore, we are uncertain regarding the reaction in France to further Vietminh military successes under either of the hypotheses set forth in numbered paragraphs 1 and 2 above. But the uncertainties in the situation should be made to work so far as possible to our advantage by being, from the enemy's point of view, as great as possible.

---

396.1 GE/6-754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 7, 1954—2 p. m.

Dulte 157. Personal for Secretary.<sup>1</sup>

Dear Foster: If you have not done so, please read our Secto 389 reporting Heath's first conversation with Frederic-DuPont.<sup>2</sup> As I told you privately, I have felt for some time that a solution somewhat like that visualized by DuPont is likely to be the best we will be able to get, and that we well may get something worse. The Viet Minh are obviously not in a hurry to settle military questions. Bidault said Saturday

---

<sup>1</sup> For comments on the letter to the Secretary, see letters to Smith from Johnson and Heath, both dated June 6, pp. 1047 and 1048, respectively.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram Secto 389, June 5, not printed, contained a summary of a conversation between Heath and Frederic-DuPont. (396.1 GE/6-554) For a memorandum of this conversation, June 5, see p. 1041.



that so far they had absolutely refused to discuss cease-fire details, and had confined themselves to political polemics and rather truculent references to their victories and their growing military strength. I am afraid there is truth in the latter.

I realize that a solution like that mentioned by DuPont would not please our soldiers and would not be popular generally at home, and I know how much importance Radford has attached to the delta, but I know also that China has been after the Red River valley and the delta for years, and it seems to me that they now intend to have it, or at least the greater part. The Communists probably estimate that if Hanoi is surrounded the French cannot supply the defenders by air and feed the population too, and that the occasional supply column they might drive through would not be enough. I believe also that the Chinese Communists have considered and are willing to risk the chance of what we might do in Indochina. They probably would welcome the introduction of some US ground forces there because of the opportunity this would give them directly to intervene for the ostensible purpose of repelling US aggression and because of the initially adverse effect our participation would have on Asiatic public opinion for many reasons well-known to you. I believe it already has involved in the minds of Australia and New Zealand some of the thoughts of "supporting colonialism" judging by the apprehensive reaction of their representatives here to our military talks in Paris.

I realize we cannot associate ourselves with or guarantee anything that bears the appearance or carries the name of partition, or of division of the country, and of course if such a solution is reached by the military committee it will not be called "partition." If a solution is not reached, and that rather promptly, I fear that a deteriorating situation in Indochina may provide it. Even now it would, I believe, require powerful, direct and rapid action by the United States to reverse the adverse trend. Laos and Cambodia can probably be saved, although in the former there will most likely be a rather large political and military "no man's land" in the north and along the frontier. My thought is that here we should in the matter of Indochina continue only to play the role of helpful friend as indicated in your Tedul 146,<sup>3</sup> standing firm on the separate status of Laos and Cambodia but not opposing or obstructing any reasonable military compromise the French may be able to get, recognizing at the same time that it will be one that we don't like, and probably will not be able publicly to associate ourselves with. Signed Bedell.

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 1, p. 994.

396.1 GE/6-754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 7, 1954—5:28 p. m.

Tedul 169. I have your Dulte 157.<sup>2</sup> I share the views there expressed, emphasizing however your remark that we should seek to avoid formal identification with open partition or the creation of two states where one now exists.

Referring to your Secto 389<sup>3</sup> I feel that Heath has somewhat overstated the case, perhaps deliberately for morale reasons. Our military authorities do in fact take a rather gloomy view of military situation and the "explorations" designed to strengthen military and political position are pretty much at a standstill not by our election but because the French themselves have never yet really decided on whether they want the war to be "internationalized" on the conditions which long ago we laid down at Paris. Therefore Dupont's advice to us to make up our mind "quickly" is rather irrelevant. We made up our mind sometime ago with the qualification however that we reserve the right to review the situation if by the time the French acted the situation had deteriorated beyond salvage. The latter seems to be happening.

I have long felt and still feel that the French are not treating our proposal seriously but toying with it just enough to use it as a talking point at Geneva.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, *supra*.

396.1 GE/6-754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 7, 1954—6:27 p. m.

Tedul 171. Eyes only Ambassadors. Re Secto 389.<sup>2</sup> Defense Dept reports<sup>3</sup> that five-power military conference at its plenary session of June 4, under chairmanship General Valluy, amended and approved [Five-Power] Conference Study No. I: "Intelligence Survey of Military Situation in SEA Area."

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA; cleared in substance by Admiral Radford. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4448 and to Saigon as telegram 2527.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1054.

<sup>3</sup> In a memorandum dated June 5, entitled, "Five-Power Military Conference of June 1954; Summary of the Proceedings of 4 June." (751G.00/6-554)

In connection with review of intelligence survey, Gen Valluy presented his own evaluation military situation Tonkin Delta as follows:

1. If Tonkin is lost, military line will not be reestablished anywhere.  
2. Anyone can find on map a line with tactical characteristics which theoretically should permit reestablishment, such as Laos bottleneck or eighteenth parallel, but Valluy said he could affirm there would be no forces to man this line.

3. Valluy said he was not speaking of French forces in this connection but meant to indicate that there were no southern Vietnamese who could oppose northern Vietnamese.

4. Ho Chi Minh's objective is Tonkin, to be attained either by negotiation at Geneva or by assault on Hanoi.

5. Ho Chi Minh wishes to entangle us in negotiations by admitting now, for first time, that there is a Communist northern state and a non-Communist southern state and saying that both might be incorporated in French Union.

6. What Ho Chi Minh seeks is Tonkin and its political capital Hanoi from which he was driven in 1946. He wishes obtain Tonkin either by negotiation (Valluy admitted "among military men" that Ho Chi Minh finds across negotiating table receptive French ears) or by military action. To prepare for such action, he is drawing out negotiations to gain time for his battle corps to be in position and ready, if action is called for.

7. In course of negotiating toward a ceasefire (which is demanded by French public opinion) concept of partition appears, as Ho Chi Minh wants occupy all Tonkin. If conditions are too hard and talks are broken off he will strive to obtain Tonkin by force. In such a military action his chances of success are good.

8. It has been said at this Conference that if Tonkin is lost we will fight in south. However French will not fight nor will Vietnam. To man line in south, conferees will have to provide own men. Moreover it will be an artificial line for defense of which Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand can do nothing.

9. Decisive point in military conference is this: if other conferees do not underwrite today's battle for Tonkin, tomorrow they will fight without French in Saigon and Bangkok. Valluy said he could affirm that if Tonkin were lost, no Vietnamese would fight against other Vietnamese, and sooner or later (probably sooner) whole of Vietnam will become Communist.

10. Valluy said he did not mean to dramatize but only to be realistic among soldiers. Truth cannot be disguised. Each of allies has share of responsibility and if battle for Tonkin is lost, allies will have to fight alone on actual main line of resistance much farther away.

Admiral Carney remarked that Gen Valluy's appraisal was of interest and important to all conferees and suggested it might be put in writing and appended to intelligence survey as representing unilateral views of one representative. End Defense Dept summary.

Foregoing for your own info only. Valluy was speaking in confidence and as an individual. Your comments requested.

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/6-454 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1954—7:34 p. m.

Tosec 368. Secretary believes it is of overriding importance to push on with action on Thailand appeal, and to avoid getting bogged down in argumentation about geographical scope of sub-commission activities. Nevertheless, it seems clear UK and French will not agree to move along in SC until we have reached understanding on this question. Secto 366<sup>2</sup> and Secto 371<sup>3</sup> indicate language included Tosec 229<sup>4</sup> and in Thai speech to SC June 3 should meet Eden's desire that resolution not specifically extend scope of POC beyond Thailand, while allowing actual observation to be extended later without further SC or GA action. However, French delegation in NY has firmly contended sub-commission must be restricted to Thailand alone while British were most concerned that there be no immediate request by Laos and Cambodia for observation.

Since we now desire quick action, suggest you meet with Eden, Prince Wan and Bidault to work out agreement which will permit delegations in NY to press matter in SC. Hope we could get their agreement next meeting of SC should be held preferably Friday and certainly not later than Monday or Tuesday, June 14 or 15. Possibly they would agree on text contained Tosec 229. If not, we would be interested to know what constructive suggestion they have. Soon as agreement on resolution reached we would want to have it introduced in SC, although we would hope next meeting could be scheduled even if text of resolution not yet firm. In this event next meeting would be limited to speech-making.

Foregoing discussed with Thai Ambassador here today. He most eager avoid delay in SC and feels strongly we should not give up our bargaining position by yielding on scope of UN observation at least at this time. He is notifying Prince Wan you may discuss matter with him.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Popper of UNA/UNP. Repeated to USUN as telegram 626, to London as telegram 6632, to Paris as telegram 4454, and to Bangkok as telegram 2438.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 3, not printed, but see footnote 2 to telegram Secto 371, p. 1030.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 4, p. 1030.

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 21, p. 876.

396.1 GE/6-754

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Page)*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 7, 1954.

Participants: Mr. Molotov, Mr. Kuznetsov, Mr. Troyanovsky, General Smith, Assistant Secretary Robertson, and Mr. Page.

After an exchange of amenities, General Smith inquired whether it might not be useful to explore possible compromise solutions to the question regarding the composition of the Indochinese Supervisory Commission. He stated categorically and in no uncertain terms that his government could not accept the Soviet proposal that the Commission be composed of India, Pakistan, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Our experience with the NNSC in Korea proved that such a composition was absolutely unworkable.

He did not wish to get into an argument over "neutrals" as compared with "impartials"—he was primarily interested in finding nations to serve on the Commission which would make it operate efficiently and which would not bog down its activities. He had suggested that a group of impartial nations in association with India and Pakistan could be formed. Such a solution was not so favorable to the West as one might think, as it is clear that India, one of the few Asian powers which could provide supervisory military personnel, is not on our side but, in international matters, seemed more often more on the Soviet side.

The Colombo powers were rather impartial nations with direct interest in Southeast Asian affairs. Another possibility might be to let the Vietminh and Vietnam each choose a member for the Commission and that three European members, neutral and impartial such as Norway, for example, be asked to serve on the Commission.

Mr. Molotov replied that although the Czech and Polish membership could be re-examined, he could not agree to any membership not on a 50-50 basis, that is 50% Communist and 50% non-Communist. Furthermore, at least two of the members of the Commission must have diplomatic relations with the Vietminh. He was absolutely adamant on this question. At one point he even sarcastically suggested that NATO be given armistice supervisory powers in Indochina. He maintained that one must take into consideration the will of the Vietnam people, at least 50% of whom support Ho Chi Minh, that the French were too late in giving limited independence to Indochina and that this

---

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 160, June 9. (751G.00/6-954)

should be taken into account. He then strongly attacked Bao Dai "now vacationing in Cannes" whom he said was supported by the United States. General Smith said that  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the Vietnamese people supported Bao Dai,  $\frac{1}{3}$  supported Ho Chi Minh and " $\frac{2}{3}$ " were on the fence. Molotov replied that even if this didn't add up correctly it did not correspond to Soviet estimates. In any event he could not recede from the Soviet position that the composition of the Commission be on the 50-50 basis.

At about this time, Kuznetsov interjected that he had read reports that President Eisenhower had said that the US might intervene in Indochina with naval, air and marine forces. General Smith replied that such action was the last thing the US Government desired to take. Also, in designating areas for troop assembly, a hundred square miles of jungle was not worth making a crisis over that might involve serious results. The Vietminh were entitled to just consideration, but if their appetites were too great and if they over-reached themselves a crisis could ensue which, he inferred, might well lead to US armed intervention. It was the duty of the US and the USSR to reduce friction in the area, not to increase it, and that was why he was now seeking a compromise solution of the question of the composition of the Supervisory Commission which was of the utmost importance. Unless a reasonable solution of this question were found there were grave risks inherent in the situation in Southeast Asia and Mr. Molotov realized the consequences of this.

Mr. Molotov seemed completely unimpressed. He merely remarked that perhaps the Vietminh deserve more than we were willing to give them, that perhaps they were entitled to more than 50% of the spoils of war—even up to 75%. (General Smith strongly contested this claim.) In any event, he could not yield on the principle that the Commission be half Communist and half non-Communist.

Throughout the entire conversation Mr. Molotov was relaxed, yet absolutely unmovable, courteous, friendly, in excellent humor. (It was my [Page]<sup>2</sup> opinion that he was even more relaxed than during the Berlin Conference.)

General Smith terminated the conversation by remarking that if agreement at Geneva could not be reached on such a matter as the composition of the Supervisory Commission, how could agreement be reached on anything. It would be questioned whether there was any real value in holding international conferences with the Soviet Bloc.

It was agreed that no comments whatsoever would be made to the press on this evening's meeting.

---

<sup>2</sup> Brackets in the source text.

JUNE 8, 1954

396.1 GE/6-854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 8, 1954—9 a. m.

Secto 397. Repeated information Paris 395, London 253, Saigon 149. In conversation yesterday with Heath and Page,<sup>1</sup> De Margerie stated he not sure Bidault would maintain strong stand that joint committees of belligerents must be subordinate to authority of proposed international commission for control of Indochina armistice. Taking Communist evasion and noncompliance for granted, it is De Margerie's view that too precise supervisory structure might make it impossible for France, after a cease-fire, to bring United States matériel or United States personnel into Indochina for training of troops. De Margerie also thought that Chou En-lai had made slight concession in agreeing that international commission should have authority over demilitarized zones between or along periphery or regroupment areas. Since there would probably be at least five demilitarized zones this would give international commission considerable authority.

Chauvel in conversation with Bonsal made following points:

1. French very much concerned and annoyed at lack of any progress either in military talks or with reference composition and set up of proposed international control commission. French aware that between June 15 and June 20 Giap will be ready to resume offensive. French however in dark as to enemy intentions.

2. No progress at all has been made in military conversations here. Viet Minh wish to discuss principles contained in their May 25 proposal. French are anxious to get to concrete discussion actual regrouping areas. French suggested Saturday that exchange of views as to present military positions of opposing sides might be helpful in furnishing base from which discussion of regrouping zones could take off. French were planning make information on their position available to Viet Minh representatives yesterday.

3. Bidault has talked to Chou En-lai and Chauvel has seen Wang Ping-nan, Secretary General of Chinese Communist delegation, three times on matter of composition of international control commission. CPR position is firmly to effect control commission must have two members having relations with Viet Minh. India, in spite of India's current dispute with France over France's Indian possessions and in spite of India's unsympathetic attitude toward France's North African problems, is considered by CPR to be one of our side's neutrals. Bidault saw Chou En-lai yesterday evening and something may have developed further.

4. Bidault-Molotov talk yesterday morning was absolutely negative although Molotov was amiable like a "smiling log" in Chauvel's phrase.

---

<sup>1</sup> See memorandum of conversation, p. 1049.

Molotov insisted on earlier Soviet position regarding composition of control commission. He suggested possible delays in military conversations arose from fact Viet Minh delegation incomplete. French have impression Molotov's attitude since his return from Moscow June 1st has hardened. They noted that since his return he has had no direct contact with Eden. (Fuller account of conversation follows.<sup>2</sup>)

5. Krishna Menon saw Bidault for one and one-half hours yesterday. He too, insisted generally on Soviet view regarding composition of control commission, i.e., inclusion of country or countries having diplomatic relations with Viet Minh.

6. Bidault plans to make speech generally reiterating French proposals and argument as set forth during restricted sessions. He plans leave Geneva after plenary tomorrow in order to take part in Assembly debate. He is pleased that he will have opportunity of speaking plenary here before commenting before Assembly on progress of conference.

SMITH

<sup>2</sup> See telegram Secto 399, June 8, p. 1065.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 251 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1954—noon.

Tosec 371. Following is Canberra's 290, June 6, 10 pm.

"Limit Distribution. Suggest Department pass Geneva, London, Paris. Casey plans leave Sydney Monday night June 7 via Singapore, Bangkok thence New Delhi arriving Pan American 1:15 am June 10 thence Karachi, Geneva, later London, Washington.

Prime Minister at American Embassy Sunday June 6 said he had just received cable from Spender clarifying Secretary's views respecting possible *de facto* partition. Cabinet discussions Friday fourth covered:

(1) Australia does not underestimate seriousness events. Not dragging feet. Realizes importance making constructive suggestions.

(2) Feels US has not defined precisely enough (a) political or (b) military objectives of intervention. Believes staff talks will supply better basis for appraisal. Asks whether we contemplate (a) intervening and hold Viet Minh from further advance which would involve long garrison task or (b) complete defeat Viet Minh which would require massive campaign land forces, (c) bombing Chinese bases and what Cabinet believes would be general war with China.

Australia reports indicate Viet Minh and Vietnamese dislike French and possibly any vote would go to Ho Chi Minh not French. Would be fatal for US merely to support French Power.

<sup>1</sup> Repeated to London as telegram 6635 and to Paris as telegram 4455.



(3) Since immediate intervention at this stage could not be UN it presents two acute problems for Australia: (a) would be committing Australia to military operations outside UN, (b) also outside British Commonwealth, because Cabinet believes neither UK nor Canada nor South Africa nor any other member British Commonwealth disposed participate in intervention except Australia and New Zealand.

(4) Australia wants to aim at (a) putting block in way of Communist aggression in SEA and (b) reconciliation of UK and American policy, avoiding departure from unity.

Casey gathered impression UK, though thinking 'French have gone too far to be rescued', might have different view regarding defense of Thailand.

Therefore in effort to get UK and US views together, following should be considered: (a) Laos and Cambodia are different races from Vietnam. Viet Minh have no rights in Laos and Cambodia. Southern part of Vietnam contains export rice bowl and its protection of tremendous significance to British position in Malaya and to Japan as rice importer. Minds should be directed to having group of nations agree to give guarantee to territorial integrity Laos, Cambodia and Southern section of Vietnam for two reasons:

(a). Strategic importance in struggle against Communism.

(b). Guarantee of territorial integrity would not interfere with local self-government and might attract cooperation of India and Burma.

While disagreeing with Nehru, Prime Minister said no doubt of Nehru's importance in Asia. Nehru would violently challenge military intervention in Hanoi area as military colonialism and invasion. With Nehru's influence in Burma and Indonesia we might find we had hostile forces all round us, quite unlike situation in Korea.

Cabinet thinks Nehru should be asked to participate in territorial guarantee. Prime Minister personally pessimistic but says Casey does not despair of achieving that.

'Summing up' Prime Minister said:

(1). Australia would regard military intervention in Hanoi area now as precipitate and likely to involve very large forces and over-all war with China with question also of Russian repercussions. Hence, if Australia understands 'American proposal' they think it requires more frank exchange before Australia would think the proposal right.

(2). On other hand Australia thinks UK view may be much too restricted and if French left to themselves and completely evacuate Vietnam with result that Communists over-run down to southern extremities, this would expose Malaya to new form of attack. Cabinet also thinks UK underestimates significance of loss of export rice bowl area.

(3). Australia therefore will say to Nehru and Eden: 'While should not risk hasty intervention and rapid evacuation, we must face up to threat. A line must be drawn and guaranteed. Perhaps

French, with material assistance from US can hold their own position in Hanoi area.'

Prime Minister said if UK would join in any sort of territorial guarantee there would be no problem for Australia, but if it became question of entering war in which UK would be neutral, that, 'would of course involve the end of the British Commonwealth' and would be very difficult step, particularly for his administration which has consistently emphasized Commonwealth unity. He discounted necessity of such choice and said Casey 'would have a good go at Nehru and Eden'.

Prime Minister said several Cabinet members had raised question of his going personally to Geneva and that Prime Minister had replied that he could not do that immediately without its appearing as complete disavowal of Casey who had done good job, but he told Cabinet members he will hold himself in readiness in case situation develops so that he could be of assistance in London, Washington or elsewhere. He contemplates leaving for New Zealand tomorrow for vacation two weeks if events permit that long.

Will cable Bangkok, New Delhi and Karachi Casey's ETA those cities.

Signed Peaslee".

DULLES

751G.00/6-854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of Defense*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 8, 1954—12:50 p. m.

Army Message Gento 52. From Defense representative for Hensel from Sullivan, information USARMAs Paris, London and Saigon; repeated action Department State. Following is summary French-Vietnam military talks with Viet Minh 7 June reported to Defense representative by member French delegation:

1. French representative proposed both sides reach agreement on areas in which each has military superiority as basis for proceeding to discuss regrouping of forces. To this end suggested each side specify areas in which it claims superiority, and that disputed areas be subject to negotiation. As initial gesture, French then described area of delta (apparently that conforming to present dispositions) as one over which it claims military superiority of French Union forces. Invited Viet Minh similarly to specify areas of its own.

2. Viet Minh representative refused to accept area delimited by French representative stating Viet Minh held many localities within delta, and alleging in addition that sympathies population are with Viet Minh. French representative replied military representatives not concerned with sympathies population, only facts of military situation. Said Viet Minh should present areas it claimed in specific terms so talks could move forward.

3. Viet Minh representative agreed with French suggestion but did not say when he would make proposal re areas claimed by Viet Minh.

4. *Comment*: French delegation contact says military representative sees no use talking daily if Viet Minh refuse to state specific areas they claim. Impression is that French military representative would prefer, under such conditions, to meet only when Viet Minh have something concrete to offer.

---

396.1 GE/6-854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 8, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 398. Repeated information London 254, Paris 397, Bangkok 18, Usun 12. Reference Tosec 368.<sup>1</sup> Eden is not returning until just prior to Indochina plenary this afternoon, and Bidault is leaving for Paris immediately following the plenary. I believe I can obtain Bidault's agreement instruct Hoppenot to agree to language which will not specifically restrict POC operations to Thailand, and will make attempt do so before Bidault's departure today. However, in view of Eden's and Bidault's schedules, there will be no opportunity work out and agree on specific language prior to Friday.<sup>2</sup>

As I have previously said, I see grave dangers in negotiating this subject here and had hoped that further negotiations and drafting could be centered in New York and Washington.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 7, p. 1058.

<sup>2</sup> June 11.

---

396.1 GE/6-854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 8, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 399. Repeated information Moscow 109, Paris 398, London 255. Reference numbered paragraph 4 Secto 397 (repeated London 253, Paris 395, Saigon 149).<sup>1</sup> Following is more complete account Bidault's conversation with Molotov on Monday, June 7, made available to us by Bidault.

Bidault met with Molotov for about an hour. Discussion centered on composition and role of international control authority for Indochina settlement. Molotov was adamant on Soviet position that control

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 8, p. 1061.

commission must represent the two sides of the conflict and that members must have diplomatic relations with one or the other party. He insisted that India and Pakistan be considered as on the French side despite their problems with France which he described as secondary. If other Asiatic states were preferred that was acceptable but a unilateral proposal was not. He could not agree to an arrangement in which India had the decisive vote.

Molotov contended that Bidault wished to contribute too many functions to the international control commission which in his view should have as its primary role the improvement of relations between the two parties.

To Bidault's complaints re the lack of progress military conversations Molotov replied with charge that French had made no concrete proposals. His parting shot was that there had been very little discussion so far of political questions and that these must be kept in mind as much as military ones.

In short the meeting was completely unproductive. We are informed Bidault feels Molotov taking tougher line since his return from Moscow.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-854 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State*

SECRET

LONDON, June 8, 1954—3 p. m.

5588. Repeated information Geneva 132 for Under Secretary. Limit distribution. At meeting in Kirkpatrick's office today to which I brought Merchant and Butterworth and at which Sir Frank Roberts was present the following of immediate interest transpired.

Kirkpatrick indicated that Eden had reported to cabinet over weekend that due to vacillating tactics of the French the Communists had been so encouraged that he was now convinced that an agreement at Geneva was now most unlikely. Eden therefore believes attempt should be made to bring conference to close within the next week or 10 days but in a manner which will consolidate and increase the progress already made in convincing the Asiatic members of the Commonwealth in particular and the rest of the world in general that Communist intransigency was responsible for the failure at Geneva. In this connection Kirkpatrick said that Eden felt that considerable progress had been made with respect to Burmese opinions and intentions during the past few weeks and that Eden was not unhopeful of an attitude of semi-benevolent neutrality on the part of India with participation by Burma in a Southeast Asian arrangement. Kirkpatrick also went on to say

that in prevailing circumstances Eden was now disposed to move more rapidly in formation of collective defense for Southeast Asia. The inference was that he would be prepared actively to start on this immediately following failure of conference.

ALDRICH

---

*Editorial Note*

At his news conference on June 8, Secretary of State Dulles, in reply to a question of his assessment of the Geneva Conference talks concerning Indochina to date, said :

“The primary responsibility in those negotiations is being carried, of course, by the French delegation in association with the delegations of the three Associated States of Indochina, Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia.

“The United States is playing primarily the role of a friend which gives advice when it is asked for, and of course we have a very deep hope that the result will be one which will maintain the genuine independence of the entire area and bring about a cessation of the fighting.

“Whether that result is obtainable or not is of course problematic. It seems that the Communist forces in Indochina are intensifying their activities. They have done so ever since the proposal for peace in Indochina, which was taken at the Berlin Conference. There has been, I think, a deliberate dragging out of the negotiations at Geneva while the Communist military effort has been stepped up in Indochina itself. The fact that under these circumstances the Communists are dragging their feet on peace and intensifying their efforts for war is a commentary upon the general attitude of the Communists and gives a lie, I think, to their greatly professed love for peace.”

Asked what, in his view, was the best way to meet a situation where the Communists were intensifying war and dragging their feet on peace, the Secretary said :

“The United States has made a number of suggestions which all fit into a common and consistent pattern.

“The first suggestion of that order was, as I have recalled to you, the proposal that the President made over a year ago in his April 16 address when he proposed that there should be united action in relation to Indochina. That suggestion was not adopted, although, as I mentioned here, I think, in my last press conference, it was followed up in private negotiations by the United States Government.

“I renewed the same suggestion in my March 29, 1954, speech, and the position of the United States with respect to that matter still stands, subject, of course, to the possibility that a time may come when that particular suggestion is no longer a practical one. But it has been a practical one ever since President Eisenhower first made it, and I believe it is still a practical one.”

Asked whether the alternative, should the plan for united action not become practical, might imply the United States dealing with this situation singlehandedly or unilaterally, Dulles replied:

"No. The United States has no intention of dealing with the Indochina situation unilaterally, certainly not unless the whole nature of the aggression should change. . . . if there should be a resumption by Communist China of open armed aggression in that area or in any other area of the Far East that might create a new situation."

Asked how long he felt the United States and other nations should continue to sit at Geneva in a sincere effort to negotiate while the Communists dragged their feet at Geneva and intensified the war in Indochina, Secretary Dulles said:

"As I pointed out earlier, the primary responsibility in that respect has to be assumed by the countries that are carrying the principal burden of the fighting in the area, which on our side are France and Viet-Nam. They are recognized by us as having a primacy in this matter. It would be their decision in this respect which would be controlling. I would not want to attempt to establish what I thought should be their policy in this matter."

The Secretary of State was asked what the objectives of united action would be—would it mean intervention, the holding of a special line in Indochina, or some other objective? The Secretary replied:

"It would obviously have an objective. The objective would be to retain in friendly hands as much as possible of the Southeast Asian peninsular and island area. Now the practicability varies from time to time. What was practical a year ago is less practical today. The situation has, I am afraid, been deteriorating."

The Secretary was asked what progress had been made toward general acceptance of the united action idea. He replied:

"I would say that progress has been made only in this sense, that two of the conditions precedent have been advanced. Namely, considerable further progress, I think, has been made in clarifying the prospective status of the states of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia as regards their complete independence. And, also, the fact that on the application of Thailand the Security Council voted 10 to 1 to put that on its agenda, and to begin to get into the matter. That, again, is a movement on one of the fronts which we have felt to be indispensable in relation to united action. In those two respects some progress has been made."

The Secretary was asked about the progress of the Washington military staff talks and about parallel talks with Asian countries. He replied:

"We have had a series of talks the first of which I think took place here in Washington with the representatives of the Government of

Thailand with reference to their military position and steps which might be taken to strengthen it. Then Secretary Wilson, when he was in Manila a few days ago, had a series of talks, himself and his military advisers, with the representatives of the Philippine General Staff.

"The talks that are going on here in Washington with the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand are the same type of talks designed to gather together military information, to assess military possibilities so that if and when it is necessary to take political decisions there will be available at hand the military elements of the problem. I expect a further visit to this country of the Philippine Chief of Staff and possibly a similar visit from Thailand. We are trying to keep in as close touch as we can with the military position, as I say, because that has to be taken into account in reaching political decisions."

Asked about reports that the Administration might ask Congress to adopt some sort of resolution on the Indochina situation, Secretary Dulles replied:

"There is no present plan for going to Congress for any authority in this matter. As is well known, the general scheme which the United States has had for this area and which I have already described here, would, if it were implemented, probably require congressional action. But there has so far not been a sufficiently general acceptance of the program to make it, as a matter of practical politics, a question of going to Congress."

For the Secretary's complete remarks on the Korean and Indochina phases of the Geneva Conference, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 21, 1954, pages 947-949.

---

396.1 GE/6-854: Telegram

*Fifth Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 8, 1954, 3:03 p. m.:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL      PRIORITY      GENEVA, June 8, 1954—midnight.

Secto 405. Repeated information Paris 404, London 260, Tokyo 118, Moscow 111, Phnom Penh, Vientiane. Department pass Defense, Tokyo pass CINCFE. Fifth Indochina plenary session Tuesday June 8 with Eden presiding opened with long well-balanced speech by Bidault reviewing progress so far in effort define points of agreement and problems still at issue. Bidault pointed out as result adoption French

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/5) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 277. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:03 p. m. and adjourned at 7:50 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 205-236. The speeches of Bidault, Molotov, and Eden, and the proposal made by the Cambodian Delegation are printed in Cmd. 9186, pp. 137-153. The speeches of Eden, Bidault, Tep Phan, Pham Van Dong, and Molotov, Indochina Documents IC/17, IC/18, IC/20, IC/21, and IC/22, respectively, and the Cambodian proposal, IC/19, of June 8-9, are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279A.

proposal May 17<sup>2</sup> give priority military aspects cease-fire, progress of conference was "not negligible". But desire French delegation take up cases Laos and Cambodia first, because simpler, frustrated by Communist insistence "peace indivisible" and in order facilitate progress conference French had agreed to discuss Vietnam first. Bidault emphasized, however, that although some progress made discussions Vietnam, cases of Laos and Cambodia still pending.

Bidault then took up six points which he said would bring out those matters on which there was agreement and those on which divergent views had been expressed :

1. Principle of cessation of hostilities. All delegates agreed this principle which French delegate had proposed May 8. However, Communists wanted simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina and some delegates had expressed reservation on this.

2. Regroupment of regular units. After various proposals had been made Eden text was adopted on May 29.<sup>3</sup> French had observed at that time that regrouping applied only to Vietnam and that principle of unity of Vietnam could not be questioned. All delegates had agreed principle unity of Vietnam. Concrete results Eden proposal manifested in meeting at Geneva on June 2 of representatives High Commands both sides<sup>4</sup> and preparations going forward for on-the-spot meetings in Indochina. French delegate hoped these military discussions could proceed rapidly so that conference could examine concrete recommendations on map.

3. Irregular forces. Pointing out one-third Viet Minh forces in this category, Bidault stressed conference could not leave large part forces one party free; conference should study this problem when talks on zones had progressed sufficiently. Bidault felt Dong statement May 25<sup>5</sup> did not rule out possibility agreement this point.

4. Entry of troops and material into Vietnam after cessation of hostilities. Clauses in armistice agreement relating this subject should apply equally to both parties. Should also cover local war production. Without strict control of Vietnam's land and sea frontiers accord on supervision would be illusory and fraudulent. Agreement on this principle seems possible.

5. Prisoners of war and civilian internees. There is unanimous agreement on immediate liberation of POWs and civilian internees following cessation of hostilities.

6. Controls and guarantee. Bidault stressed following aspects this problem :

(a) Responsibilities International Neutral Control Commission should extend to all clauses of armistice.

<sup>2</sup> See telegrams Secto 240 and 241, May 17, pp. 831 and 833, respectively.

<sup>3</sup> See telegram Secto 349, May 29, p. 970.

<sup>4</sup> Reference to meeting between French and Vietnamese military representatives at Geneva.

<sup>5</sup> See telegram Secto 302, May 26, p. 920.



(b) Joint Commissions of two sides must be subordinated to International Commission; questions on which Joint Commissions cannot agree should be submitted to International Commission for decision by majority vote. Communist delegates insistence that essential responsibility for certain aspects of armistice be confined to Joint Commissions, which would not be subordinated to International Commission, represents serious divergence in views which must be surmounted.

(c) Composition of International Commission should be determined by criteria of objectivity, impartiality and effectiveness, any countries meeting these criteria satisfactory to French. An International Commission composed four neutrals chosen reflect equally views two sides would be impotent. Such content would guarantee no one.

(d) There must be authority to which International Commission reports. This organ would in turn look to guarantors of armistice, namely members Geneva conference. Bidault emphasized guarantee must not be paralyzed by any veto.

Bidault summed up "appreciable results" of conference as follows: (1) method of work chosen; (2) principle total cessation hostilities accepted, simultaneously throughout Indochina if possible; (3) principle regroupment zones Vietnam adopted and referred competent persons for study; (4) principle of setting up International Control Commission accepted.

Bidault cautioned however, that serious differences existed on essential points which cannot be exceeded without infringing essential principles. He specified three subjects which had not yet been examined or on which conclusions not yet reached: (1) Laos and Cambodia; (2) regroupment zones; and (3) methods of control.

Next speaker was Pham Van Dong who said he would like to compare various proposals made during conference. Claiming Vietnam proposals realistic, fair, rational, he attacked proposals other delegates as unilateral, incomplete, and negative. Describing Bidault's proposals as *completely military*, Dong stressed interdependence political and military problems, said even Bidault military proposals failed reflect real situation Indochina and thus not likely lead to agreement. Dong then attacked sarcastically proposals made by "Bao Dai delegate", singling out particularly proposals on incorporation Viet Minh Forces into Vietnamese Army and elections under UN supervision for government under aegis Bao Dai. He also attacked theses that there should be no control on introduction of arms into Cambodia and Laos.

Saying that "first result" of conference was acceptance resolution pertaining to contacts by representatives of High Commands in Geneva and Indochina, Dong accused French of offering nothing in military meetings which could lead to agreement and of stalling start of on-the-spot talks in Indochina. Dong ridiculed recent initialling of

Vietnam independence treaty in Paris, saying it was simply fulfilling condition laid down by US for intervention in Indochina.

Dong then made several proposals, suggested conference discuss in "realistic fashion" proposals tabled by Chou En-lai. Invited French delegate expedite on-the-spot contacts of military representatives in Indochina. Invited conference to embark immediately on discussion of political questions such as recognition of Vietnam, general elections, and relations Indochina with France, including association of Vietnam with French Union.

Third speaker was Tep Phan, Cambodian delegate, who again drew attention to fact that Cambodia was victim of Viet Minh aggression and reiterated Cambodian demand for complete evacuation Viet Minh Forces. He then made four-point proposal. (See Secto 367.<sup>6</sup>)

Turning to task of International Control Commission, Tep Phan said its tasks different in Cambodia than Vietnam and outlined its control functions in Cambodia as follows: (1) evacuation of Viet Minh regular and irregular forces; (2) disarming of all armed elements not in the army or police forces; (3) liberation and exchange of POW's and civilian internees; (4) external activities endangering peace and security of Cambodia.

Phan emphasized his government could not accept any control over the entry of troops and war material into Cambodia, pointing out that unlike Vietnam there would be no armistice in Cambodia since all Viet Minh troops would be withdrawn. He assured Communist delegates Cambodian Army being trained for defense frontiers only and said his government prepared under certain conditions limit size of army in order not to pose threat to neighboring countries.

Cambodian delegate then discussed briefly questions composition International Control Commission, pointing out Korean experience demonstrated uselessness of Commission with composition suggested by Soviet delegate. He referred again to Cambodian proposal on composition of June 4<sup>7</sup> and suggested if no agreement could be reached on Commission of neutral countries control of armistice should be entrusted to UN.

Following recess, Molotov made long speech which included attacks on US, France and Associated States. Beginning with comments on insincerity some participant this conference which supposed to be concerned with restoration peace in Indochina, he then claimed US scheming on Southeast Asia military pact with colonial powers; pointed to military talks in Washington; accused US of ordering Thailand UN appeal in order prepare for UN intervention which really US.

<sup>6</sup> Dated June 3, p. 1014.

<sup>7</sup> See telegram Secto 379, June 4, p. 1031.

Molotov then stated that Indochina cease-fire must be enduring and therefore necessary take up political problems. Although priority military question agreed at beginning conference, it was now time to sum up and begin on political matters. He noted result of discussion of various proposals was some movement toward reconciliation, such as agreement simultaneous cease-fire, in spite some reservation, regroupment regular forces, and meeting of military representatives.

Also establish agreement in principle to Viet Minh proposal non-introduction foreign troops and arms after cease-fire. No doubt raised necessity Joint Commissions or international supervision. Guarantee of settlement by conference powers suggested by France received favorably by Soviet delegate. In discussing guarantees, Molotov, did not mention "collective".

Molotov also marked areas disagreement such as function and composition International Supervisory Commission, and noted "crude attempts discredit NNSC in Korea". Maintained Communist position of more important role for joint committees which should be responsible for all on-the-spot measures to ensure the cessation of hostilities.

Leading up to further comment on political questions, he praised national liberation movements in three states. Acknowledged differences in three such as three quarters of Vietnam in hands of movement while in Laos one-half of country not under control of "official agencies of the government". Cambodia "less" but developing. Ridiculed claims of Associated States to independence, pointing out no Asian power believes this true; that is why they have not recognized. Eight years of attempts to re-establish colonial regime has resulted in 100,000 French killed, wounded and cost of 2,000 billion francs and heavy defeats in spite US aid. War was not in national interest of France, but if French Government wished to end it there was now possibility peace with honor on both sides.

Molotov disliked dwelling on military matters and said restoration peace required settlement two basic political questions: (1) relationships between France and Indochina states, and (2) internal political matters. Since Viet Minh had made generous offer, including readiness to examine French Union membership, and French had claimed willingness to recognize independence of three states, should not be too difficult to reach agreement.

Then returned to attack Associated States Government quoting from US House Committee reports to prove Associated States lack independence. Commented Dien-Bien-Phu defended by foreigners who had nothing to do with France or Vietnam. Noted futile attempts to prove foreign elements with Viet Minh. Further proof lack of popular support for Bao Dai was failure to mobilization.

He devoted considerable comment to subject national elections in Vietnam and asked for French position. Ridiculed performance of Vietnamese in municipal elections and quoted western sources to effect Viet Minh would win if national elections held. Elections must be held in Vietnam under conditions freedom of activity for patriotic parties, groups and organs. However, elections should be preceded by withdrawal foreign troops, which requires military settlement at Geneva. He then enumerated three main political problems as: (1) establish Franco-Indochina relations on basis equality and freedom; (2) free elections in all three states for democratic government; (3) on-the-spot contacts in Indochina for contribution to political as well as military settlement.

Molotov concluded with repetition of call for free elections after foreign troops withdrawal, direct contact in Indochina, and then proposed parallel consideration by conference of political and military matters by means alternate meetings.

Eden then made strongest and most forceful statement thus far made by UK in conference (Secto 404) <sup>8</sup> during which he suggested five Colombo powers for Supervisory Commission.

Bidault returned with vigorous but dignified reproach to tone and line of Communist speeches this session. Disappointed by insistence on political question, since cessation hostilities was obviously beginning of any solutions. He referred to speech on Korea by Soviet delegate in Security Council Malik in June 1951 and quoted him as follows:

“The Soviet peoples believe that the first measure should be to introduce discussions between belligerents for the purpose of bringing about a cease-fire and an armistice, involving the withdrawal of the forces behind an agreed line”.

Said Viet Minh should not worry over lack of contacts Indochina since instructions had been given to French authorities to carry this out. Hoped duality these contacts Indochina and Geneva would not cause delays. Said that answer to Dong's remark that some people wanted international war was that simplest means preventing this was to end war. Made special reference to Molotov's attacks and noted lack of urbanity usually found in this eminent and experienced diplomat, and regretted that one of conference chairmen had resorted to partisan attack.

Dinh commented that truce on insults should be first order of business. Eden then called on US delegate.

---

<sup>8</sup> Dated June 8, p. 1077.

Under Secretary offered forgo his statement in view late hour if other remaining inscribed delegates willing do same. Molotov said he would like speak one minute. Under Secretary refused yield to Molotov and then made statement Secto 403.<sup>9</sup>

Molotov, obviously reacting to effective comments by Bidault, denied his speech insulting and said he was only recalling "certain bitter harsh facts".

Bidault replied facts must be respected but question is how facts are narrated.

Eden closed meeting by suggesting that remaining two inscribed speakers could speak at tomorrow's plenary. Meeting adjourned at 7:50.

*Comment:* Bidault last statement superb job of offsetting Molotov's obvious appeal to French opinion and turning tables on Communists by placing onus on them for failing achieve cease-fire because of intransigence and introduction extraneous issues as opposed reasonableness and conciliatory approach of French.

SMITH

---

<sup>9</sup> *Infra.*

---

396.1 GE/6-854 : Telegram

*Fifth Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 8, 3:03 p. m.:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

GENEVA, June 8, 1954.

Secto 403. Repeated information Paris 402, London 258, Saigon 151, Tokyo 116, Moscow, Vientiane, Phnom Penh unnumbered. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Following is text Undersecretary's statement at fifth Indochina plenary Tuesday, June 8: "At our previous meetings the United States delegation has stated from time to time its firm position with regard to the special nature of the problem existing in Laos and Cambodia. This position is as described this afternoon by M. Bidault as well as Mr. Eden and I will not enlarge on the subject except to say that the US associates itself with France and that the US delegation continues to maintain that peace would automatically be restored to Laos and Cambodia if the invading Viet Minh forces would withdraw.

Our object is to secure a real and lasting peace in Indochina. To do this we must be sure that there are adequate safeguards for any settlement which this conference may reach. My delegation has repeatedly, in our restricted session, stated the view that one essential element for

safeguarding a settlement is the creation of an International Supervisory Commission whose composition and terms of reference would permit it to function effectively.

The composition of an International Supervisory Commission is a question of such importance that I have suggested that it be taken up in private conversations among the members of this conference. I still believe that we might move forward more rapidly if this point could be settled in private discussions. I think it will be helpful, however, again to make clear the principle upon which I feel certain we must proceed in arriving at the membership of an effective International Commission.

In one word that principle is impartiality. An impartial commission, as Mr. Eden pointed out, if endowed with adequate authority, can safeguard a settlement. A partial, or divided commission, will obstruct or prevent achievement of the real and lasting peace which must be our common objective. We must therefore search for impartial membership on a Supervisory Commission.

Mr. Molotov has suggested a four country commission to consist of India, Pakistan, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Two of these states, Poland and Czechoslovakia, are the same two Communist countries that have exercised their power of veto to frustrate the effective operation of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea. Last Saturday, in our meeting on Korea, it was necessary for me to point out the unhappy experience which we have had [with?] this Korean commission. I described how the truly impartial members of this commission, Sweden and Switzerland, have been forced repeatedly to protest against the continued arbitrary refusals of the Communist countries to permit the carrying out of the obligations of the commission. My statements have been made a matter of public record in our Korean meeting. I will not repeat them here because the facts have been clearly demonstrated.

Mr. Molotov's proposal is that a Supervisory Commission should be established under arrangements exactly like those in Korea, where the Communist States, by exerting a veto over the activities of the commission have completely blocked effective performance of the obligations of the commission. This is obviously an unsatisfactory and unacceptable proposal. We must not repeat a mistake which has not only served to obstruct the carrying out of an international agreement, but has also placed two truly impartial nations in the intolerable situation of being innocent parties to such obstruction.

Mr. Molotov did propose, however, that India and Pakistan should be requested to serve as two of the members of a Supervisory Commis-

sion. As I have already said in our restricted sessions, I believe this is indeed a helpful proposal and one that merits serious considerations. It has seemed to me for a long time that India and Pakistan, in association with other actually impartial states, might provide a basis for a satisfactory and really effective International Supervisory Commission. It is for that reason that I welcome with satisfaction the proposal that the delegate of the United Kingdom has just made, and for that reason believe it should be given our very careful consideration.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-854 : Telegram

*Fifth Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 8, 3:03 p. m. :  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

GENEVA, June 8, 1954.

Secto 404. Repeated information Paris 403, Saigon 152, London 259, Moscow 110, Tokyo 117 Phnom Penh Vientiane un. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Following is text Eden statement fifth Indochina plenary Tuesday, June 8:

Gentlemen, next speaker to have his name down is your chairman who would ask your indulgence if he makes few observations at this point.

More than three weeks have gone by since we last discussed Indochina in plenary session and I think that public opinion everywhere will expect to hear what we have achieved during that time. My colleagues will no doubt agree we have made some progress, even if this has been slow but differences on main problems before us are still formidable and unless we can resolve them we shall have failed in our task.

An important step forward was our agreement on May 29. The representatives of the two military commands in Vietnam should discuss the terms of a cessation of hostilities in that country. These talks have now begun here in Geneva. It is to be hoped that these military exchanges will soon bear fruit in shape of agreed recommendations to conference but these talks concern only Vietnam. The conference has yet to come to grips with separate and distinct problems of Laos and Cambodia.

I think we can all agree that cessation of hostilities should be simultaneous throughout Indochina. It is arrangements, not timing, that need to be different in Laos and Cambodia. In Vietnam arrangements to be worked out must inevitably be complicated, in Laos and Cam-

bodia we have to deal with formidable but entirely distinct problem of Viet Minh invasion. I cannot regard these aggressive acts, some of which have taken place since this conference was announced at Berlin, as acts of peace. Nor are they merely symptoms of internal troubles. Therefore, no one should be surprised that they cause deep concern far beyond confines of states concerned.

If foreign troops are withdrawn from those two countries, peoples of Laos and Cambodia can be left to work out their own destiny safeguarded by international supervision from interference from beyond their borders. In this connection I note that the representative of Cambodia has told us today that Cambodia has no intention of allowing military bases to be established on her territory which might threaten peace of Indochina and Cambodia is willing, under appropriate conditions, to limit her own forces to those needed for defense of her territory.

Now I come to another crucial issue, international supervision. We are all agreed this must form an essential part of arrangements arrived at for the restoration of peace in Indochina. This all-important problem, which is common to all three states of Indochina is now central issue before conference.

It has, I think, been accepted that in Vietnam there shall be joint committees of two belligerents in addition to international supervision. These joint committees could probably render some useful service, provided that it was clearly understood that their functions were mainly technical and clearly subordinate to authority of an international supervisory commission.

After eight years of bitter fighting, even with the best will in the world, we must expect there will be differences between two sides comprising the joint committees. It's therefore essential to provide for an international supervisory commission endowed with power to resolve these differences and to insure the proper execution of all provisions of the agreement for cessation of hostilities.

Here I should like to make a suggestion, which is, I submit, practical. Over a month ago Prime Ministers of Ceylon, Burma, India, Indonesia and Pakistan met at Colombo and discussed among other things problems of Indochina. Communiqué they issued after their discussion has, I think been of real value to our deliberations here. I should like to suggest that Asian powers represented at Colombo Conference are admirably qualified to assume responsibilities of supervising whatever arrangements are reached by this conference. These five countries meet essential requirements of impartiality. They have recog-



nized neither Viet Minh nor Associated States. We are bound to agree that, as Asian countries, they have particular concern in restoration of peace in Indochina and possess first-hand knowledge of kind of problems confronting us there. Moreover, they are probably close enough to be able to provide and organize without undue difficulty the large staff of qualified observers which will be needed.

Finally, there could be no danger of a deadlock on an international supervisory commission consisting of a panel of these five powers acting by majority of vote. This danger would, however, clearly arise if supervisory commission were to consist of an even number of states—half Communist and half non-Communist—as has been suggested by Mr. Molotov.

When we have solved problems of the authority and composition of proposed international supervisory commission, it will be necessary to study in detail its functions and structure. We shall also have to examine more fully question of guarantee by members of this conference of arrangements reached. Any such guarantees must be so designed as to insure that no one power has a veto over action considered necessary to secure observance of our agreements.

To sum up, therefore, the following are immediate tasks: first, it is necessary for military representatives of the two commands to submit agreed recommendations to conference for its consideration. Meanwhile, we have two urgent tasks, first, to reach agreements on composition and powers of the special problems of Laos and Cambodia. Until we have done these things, conference cannot be held to have made any decisive contribution to reestablishment of peace in Indochina.

SMITH

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 316

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Sullivan) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 8, 1954.

Subject: USARMA Saigon Estimate of Indochina Situation

1. In OARMA CM 295-54 (attached) <sup>1</sup> USARMA Saigon comments upon a Department of the Army estimate of the situation contending the following:

a. Disagrees with Department of the Army that "French will be able to hold Delta throughout rainy season and that no major VM

---

<sup>1</sup> Not attached to source text.

assault is likely" stating his view continues VM will attack on or after 20 June and will dislodge French Union forces from most of the Delta.

b. States VM will attack for following reasons :

(1) No other logical reason rapid redeployment VM battle corps from Dien Bien Phu.

(2) VM riding victory wave will seek to capitalize on same.

(3) French Union forces in midst major reorganization under new inexperienced (in Indochina) CINC are at low point defensively, moralewise and organizationally but "will gather strength from this summer onward".

(4) VM has altered codes, an SOP before former attacks.

(5) Aid to VM negotiators at Geneva.

c. Believes Delta cannot be held for following :

(1) Hanoi vulnerable to encirclement and cannot be maintained thereafter.

(2) Hanoi airfield subject to arty interdiction after VM have penetrated 15 miles.

(3) Loss of Hanoi would lead to loss western Delta.

(4) VM can take Phu Ly (SW quadrant) area with troops already deployed there by sustained attack.

(5) Will use mass infiltration and strangulation technique rather than mass assault, which French failed to counter at Dien Bien Phu.

2. *Comment*: While above statements are largely correct, the following should also be taken into consideration.

a. While some French sources themselves have reiterated identical statements as above, it is considered that French have a higher combat capability than indicated above. French will have following advantages :

(1) Shortened lines creating internal lines for communications and maneuver and greater mobile reserves than heretofore.

(2) Superior firepower. VM will have no arty field day as afforded by concentrated target and superior observation at Dien Bien Phu.

(3) Ability to maneuver. VM have never taken a battalion-sized position until Dien Bien Phu and then probably because French freedom of movement was so restricted as to limit effectiveness of counterattacks.

Admittedly, much depends upon the French attitude psychologically in entering this battle. If led to believe their position is hopeless strategically, they will be less effective. If encouraged and supported by their own command and allies, French Union forces can hold a substantial portion of the Delta and inflict intolerable casualties on the Viet Minh.

C. A. SULLIVAN  
*Defense Representative*

396.1 GE/6-854 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>SECRET  
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1954—7:54 p. m.

Tosec 378. Reference Secto 398<sup>2</sup> and Tosec 368.<sup>3</sup> Latter somewhat over-emphasized my views.

Appreciate heavy burden which would be laid on you if you had to negotiate specific language of draft resolution on UN observation for Thailand with Eden and Bidault, in addition your other activities. Therefore, suggest you limit your efforts to seeking agreement Eden and Bidault to principle of not absolutely restricting POC operations to Thailand and have them instruct their UN delegations accordingly. Precise language of resolution would then be worked out in detail in New York. If this goes beyond what you can conveniently undertake, let me know and then forget it.

We are still eager to obtain agreement on earliest resumption of SC proceedings.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State and by Popper of UNA/UNP. Repeated to London as telegram 6658, to Paris as telegram 4468, to Bangkok as telegram 2452, and to USUN as telegram 630.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 8, p. 1065.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 7, p. 1058.

396.1 GE/6-654 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1954—9:19 p. m.

Tedul 175. Re Dulte 156.<sup>2</sup> Numbered paragraph 1 reftel. We would be interested any specific ideas Bidault might propose with view simplifying request to other nations, so long they meet basic condition that US will not intervene alone. Until we have full agreement, at least in principle, with French on conditions US military participation there would be no actual negotiations with other interested nations. So far we have kept them generally informed concerning current discussions in Paris and have obtained their tentative views. We would seek firm views once French authoritatively tell us they want to internationalize the Indochina War. Meanwhile, UK views are well known

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Tyler and Fisher of EUR/WE. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4470.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 6, p. 1039.

and soundings indicate almost certainly New Zealand and probably Australia would not participate without UK. Our soundings indicate Thailand and Philippines would most likely come along.

Numbered paragraph 3. We agree undesirable President should make formal pledge unilaterally and refer you paragraph 2 Deptel 4272, repeated Geneva Tosec 269,<sup>3</sup> which stressed joint character any such pledge. President would necessarily deal with independence question in any request to Congress for authorization use US forces for combat in Indochina.

Numbered paragraph 4. While we would agree substitution words "after re-establishment peace" for "after end of hostilities" we feel our phrasing for rest sentence definitely preferable to that proposed by Bidault. His text carries overtone France retaining right decide timing first and then getting Vietnamese Government to agree after, which precisely type implication we consider it necessary avoid if independence of Viet Nam to be crystal clear.

Numbered paragraph 5. We feel Bidault's proposed text for paragraph 2 of Deptel 4286, repeated Geneva Tedul 133,<sup>4</sup> conflicts with assurance sought by our text. While Bidault's language might be helpful for EDC debate it provides loopholes for abusive interpretation justifying later claims right withdrawal on one or other of counts listed. When occasion offers suggest you point out to Bidault that we could not commit forces and US prestige in situation when there would be any question concerning premature French withdrawal their forces.

Numbered paragraph 6. After full agreement reached on all conditions and French Government has reached decision it wishes request US intervention, US must have opportunity at that time make its own decision whether prevailing circumstances warrant implementation of formal steps leading to US military participation. We cannot grant French an indefinite option on us without regard to intervening deterioration. Only after these decisions taken would we expect Laniel submit agreement and request for internationalization to Parliament for endorsement and ratification; also he must not prejudice our liberty of decision by approaching Parliament in such way that we would appear be morally committed intervene prior to our decision.<sup>5</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 26; for text, see volume XIII.

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 27, not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1039.

<sup>5</sup> Under Secretary Smith informed the Department of State in telegram Dulte 166, June 10, that he would "be unable discuss referenced telegram [Tedul 175] with French until early next week since understand Bidault will probably not return until then. Department may wish instruct Embassy Paris take questions up with Bidault or De Margerie who with Bidault in Paris." (396.1 GE/6-1054)

JUNE 9, 1954

751G.00/6-954 : Telegram

*Smith-Eden Meeting, Geneva, June 9, Morning: The United States  
Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

NIACT

GENEVA, June 9, 1954—10 p. m.

Dulte 164. Eyes only Secretary. I had a long talk with Eden this morning. He said that we are clearly coming to end here on Indochina. Three major issues have emerged on which we cannot compromise and on which Communists show no intention of receding. These are (1) separate treatment of Laos and Cambodia, which are clearly victims of Viet Minh aggression; (2) status and powers of impartial international supervisory authority; and (3) composition of international supervisory authority.

He is convinced that we can get no further on these issues and should break within next few days. While he feels no useful negotiating purpose would be served, he is inclined to think that for public opinion it would be desirable that he privately see Molotov once more before a break in order to make clear to Molotov firmness our position and obtain Communist position. He is hopeful of forcing Molotov into public rejection Colombo powers for supervisory organization. This will have very beneficial effects in south and southeast Asia. I pointed out, and he agreed, that French situation is such that we would probably have to leave the French and Viet Minh military officers here talking about zones in Vietnam.

Immediately following break he feels Cambodia and Laos should put their cases to the UN entirely divorced from Thailand request. (I gathered that he was thinking of something more than just a POC.) He thinks it highly important that they move rapidly after the conference is wound up, but equally important until that time there be no hints or press leaks whatever that such action is contemplated. He feels that if properly handled and appeals are spontaneous on their part, with no implication of US-UK initiative or prodding, they will receive general Asian support. I pointed out, and he agreed, that France might oppose but we should go ahead anyway. In meanwhile he feels very strongly we must not now complicate matter by insisting on broadening Thailand appeal to Laos and Cambodia. He rightly points out that language in Security Council draft resolution is largely academic, as it will in any event be vetoed. Resolution can be written any way that appears desirable at the time matter comes before General Assembly. He said he would send instructions to Dixon

to try to work out with Lodge some language that would meet his point, while not necessarily precluding POC operations outside Thailand. I am sending separate telegram repeated to USUN replying to your Tosec 378<sup>1</sup> giving only latter part this paragraph.

Eden said he had not yet put to cabinet his ideas with regard to UN appeal by Cambodia and Laos, and therefore asked that the matter be treated with strictest secrecy.

Eden also said he was considering recommendation reduce strength of Commonwealth division in Korea by about half or one brigade in order to reinforce Malaya. If things eased up in Egypt, he was also hopeful that forces could be spared from there for Malaya. I told him that in view of more critical situation in southeast Asia and our ability within the armistice to train and equip ROK forces as replacements, I thought we would have no objection.

Clear that Eden now considers negotiations here have failed. Believe he is prepared to move ahead quickly in southeast Asia coalition which would guarantee Cambodia and most of Laos under umbrella of some UN action with respect to those two countries. He expects active cooperation from Burma, and hopes for benevolent neutrality from India. He apparently does not feel much can be salvaged in Vietnam.

As you know, Bidault is not here and we will not know where French stand until Assembly debate completed, if then. If French continue negotiations, point will probably arrive shortly when deteriorating military situation will force them accept simple cease-fire in attempt temporarily salvage something. Therefore one question we may shortly face is what we and UK do if France insists on continuing negotiations somewhat longer. It is one thing to withdraw if France negotiates an agreement with which we cannot publicly associate ourselves, and another to withdraw prior to that time.

Eden's tactics recommend themselves very strongly to me.

Chauvel spoke to me after the above was dictated. In Bidault's absence he and others have been considering recommending to Bidault that France and three Associated States together make appeal to UN. He had reports from Valluy, part of which he read to me. He is obviously convinced that things will go badly in Delta. I made no comment except to suggest that Laos and Cambodia commanded a certain sympathy in Asia and Middle East which France plus Vietnam did not. I asked him categorically if France wanted to internationalize on conditions we had tabled some time ago, saying neither you nor I knew

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 8, p. 1081.

where France stood. He replied that he did not know: that "Bidault still hoped to get something here".

I would appreciate your thoughts and guidance.<sup>2</sup>

With respect Korea, Eden indicated he would probably speak next plenary (which we plan for Friday or Saturday). He would not be adverse to making this last session on Korea. However, not all of sixteen are yet prepared to do this. I do not know whether we will be able get them lined up. If not, one more plenary may be necessary.

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> See telegrams 1 and 07, both dated June 10, pp. 1117 and 1119, respectively, for comments by Acting Secretary Murphy to Secretary Dulles on telegram Dulte 164 and for Murphy's reply to Smith.

---

396.1 GE/6-954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 9, 1954—11 a. m.

Dulte 161. Repeated information Saigon 155, Paris 406. Eyes only Ambassadors. Re Tedul 171.<sup>1</sup> My personal message to you (Dulte 157<sup>2</sup>) is a fair general commentary on General Valluy's estimate of South-east Asia situation, and I think it might be of some use to our Chiefs of Staff if you made it available to them together with the following specific comments on the numbered paragraphs of Valluy's estimate:

1. I would modify his statement that if Tonkin is lost military line will not be reestablished anywhere to read "probably, will not be re-established." The unqualified "not", and "anywhere" prejudices history and takes in too much territory.

2. I agree with two as a correct evaluation of the present situation, but to the concluding phrase "there would be no forces to man this line" I would add "unless other nations furnished them".

3. Heath would agree that at present, there are "no southern Vietnamese who could oppose northern Vietnamese". I am unable to estimate.

4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. I agree thoroughly with this evaluation, except that we could, if we would, create ability of Thailand, Laos and Cambodia to assist.

9. Heath would agree with nine but would qualify statement that no Vietnamese would fight against other Vietnamese by saying that they would not fight effectively or long unless backed up by strong foreign forces. I am unable to estimate.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 7, p. 1056.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 7, p. 1054.

396.1 GE/6-954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 9, 1954—3 p. m.

Dulte 162. Personal for Secretary from Under Secretary.

1. Your Tedul 169.<sup>1</sup> I agree with what you say about French, and you are right in thinking that Heath overstated our confidence deliberately for morale reasons. However, there is this to be said for French. I think they are as confused about our real intentions as we are about theirs. We make strong statements, and then qualify them, and I am sure French believe that air and naval support alone will not prevent ultimate loss of Delta with its almost inevitable consequences of a rapidly deteriorating political and military situation.

2. Bidault was unable to keep an appointment he requested with me before leaving for Paris yesterday because of protracted plenary session, but De Margerie told us that Bidault was alarmed by report from General Valluy of his talk with Radford that latter would give no assurance that American marines would be furnished in case "internationalization" of the Indochina conflict were agreed upon but had suggested that ROK divisions be sent instead. De Margerie stated emphatically that a substitution of Korean troops for American marines would be utterly unsatisfactory as destroying belief and confidence that Americans would really participate in defense of Indochina.

3. Bidault was also concerned by Valluy's report that Radford had said no firm decision had yet been taken on sending American training mission. De Margerie said that it was certainly possible within, say, two weeks there might be a cease-fire and it would thereafter be impossible for an American training mission to enter Vietnam. Bidault hoped for an accelerated decision on this point. The date of June 15 keeps coming up, although the French avoid any definite explanation.

4. Bidault was worried that there was no clear understanding as to American counter-action in case of a sudden and unprotected mass attack by Chinese aircraft. De Margerie pointed out that the French had absolutely no anti-aircraft or other defense against such an occurrence. He said, however, that French were somewhat less urgent on this point in view of American intelligence reports to Valluy that there was no evidence that from South China or Hainan airfields such air attack could be mounted in the immediate future.

5. Bidault had also noted that understanding had not yet been reached as to the organization of the command and the division of duties.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 7, p. 1056.



6. I conveyed your feelings, as given me in Tedul 169, rather strongly to French, representing them as my own and that of Department, but of course the reply, at least by implication, is always to suggest considerations given in first paragraph of this message.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-954 : Telegram

*Sixth Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 9, 3:05 p. m. : The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 9, 1954—midnight.

Secto 413. Repeated information Paris 410, Saigon 157, London 263, Tokyo 131, Moscow 113, Phnom Penh, Vientiane. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Sixth Indochina Plenary session, Wednesday, June 9, with Molotov presiding: Dinh (Vietnam) opened session with statement subdued in tone and ironic at Molotov's expense. He said he would not reply to Viet Minh's insults of their brethren but took issue with Molotov's false statement. He thanked Molotov for interest in independence of his country and referred well-known Soviet liberation of other small nations as evidence their action toward Eastern European countries since Yalta. He told Molotov that while Vietnam army has not yet had time to develop fully, soldiers fighting for their country should not be insulted. Dinh reminded conference of firm stand his delegation took which led to unanimous agreement by conference there should not [be] partition of Vietnam and rejected Viet Minh proposals as in fact proposing partition which would give them power to perpetuate themselves in their area.

Dinh came out strongly for international supervision of elections, as well as international supervision of implementation of armistice, which he said should be by UN. He rejected Soviet concept of Commission of India, Pakistan, Czechoslovakia, Poland pointing out that none of them had recognized Vietnam. UN would be impartial and neutral and most appropriate for armistice supervision. He recalled Soviet proposal December 24, 1948 for SC armistice commission in Indonesia. He also rejected Viet Minh concept that joint commission was effective, citing Vietnam experience in 1946 to show joint commission never worked in practice.

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/6) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 277. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:05 p. m. and adjourned at 7:15 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 237-264. The speeches by Phoui Sananikone and Chou En-lai are printed in Cmd. 9186, pp. 153-165. The speeches of Phoui Sananikone, Nguyen Quoc Dinh, and Chou En-lai. Indochina Documents IC/23, IC/24, and IC/25, respectively, June 9-10, are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279A.

Phoui Sananikone (Laos) followed with résumé his government's position, stressed difference between situation Laos, Cambodia on one hand and Vietnam on other and repeated withdrawal of foreign invading forces would in fact result in cessation of hostilities. He said his Government's position is based on three points: (1) Laos is independent; (2) it has a democracy, united national government; and (3) there is no civil strife but only invasion of Viet Minh forces. He referred to tyranny and atrocities by invaders who pretend to champion liberty.

Turning to issues under discussion in relation to Vietnam, he said supervision must be effective and impartial which requires international neutral organ. Laos would prefer that it be UN which is most appropriate. If agreement cannot be reached on UN supervision they are prepared to examine other possibilities, e.g., Asian countries such as Pakistan, Thailand, India, Ceylon and Philippines.

Following recess, Chou En-lai spoke, opening with statement that while some progress made this had been considerably short of expectations. He proceeded to summarize his delegation's views, starting with quotation of his May 27 6-point proposal (Secto 326<sup>2</sup>), and elaborating on each point. He emphasized the following with reference numbered paragraphs of proposal:

(1) Cease-fire must be simultaneous in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, even if procedurally at conference countries might be considered successively.

(2) Disposition of forces following cease-fire should apply to entire territory of Indochina, although since situation not entirely alike measures for settlement probably not same. He rejected idea that Communist forces in Cambodia and Laos should be evacuated, insisting they were local forces and therefore could not be removed from country. Chou En-lai also called for contacts between commanders in Indochina as well as in Geneva.

(3) It was essential to stop completely introduction of military personnel and material, which must include arms and personnel of United States. So far as supervision is concerned, Korean armistice agreement may be used for reference. Prohibition on such reinforcement must apply to all three Indochina states. As in Korean armistice agreement, supervision should be divided between joint commission and neutral nations supervisory commission with terms of reference like case in Korean armistice. Reference to composition of commission, he rejected argument that Communist states like Poland and Czechoslovakia cannot be neutral and said if Communist countries cannot, neither can capitalistic states, and it would be impossible to find any neutrals. Definition of neutrals he said should be that contained in Korean armistice agreement. If Communist states are barred from neutral nations' body, it will be impossible to reach agreement on composition.

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 27, p. 947.

As to relationship between neutral nations supervisory commission and joint commission, neither should be subordinate to other, but both should have parallel and supplementary functions as in Korean armistice agreement.

Commission must operate by unanimity rule and not by majority. He rejected Smith criticism of NNSC into UN, saying it has been very effective, examining entry of over 2 million military personnel and over 7,000 US aircraft. Commission he said should not be prejudiced in favoring either side and must reflect views of both sides. He admitted there were disagreements in NNSC, but maintained this safeguarded Korean armistice agreement. If Poles and Czechoslovaks barred investigation of false US charges that PWs retained by Communists, Swiss and Swedish prevent investigation of US forcible retention and transfer to Taiwan of thousands of Chinese PWs. Indeed he said NNRC, which worked by majority, disregarded Poles and Czechoslovak views and has resulted in deadlock on forcible US retention of Communist PWs which still unresolved. NNSC on other hand has not taken action contrary to views of either parties and has therefore succeeded.

(4) Neutral nations supervisory commission should be responsible to countries providing international guarantees for peace in Indochina.

(5) UN supervision which has been proposed is unacceptable. Conference has nothing to do with UN and recent efforts to place Indochina question on UN agenda to step up intervention in Indochinese war makes it still less appropriate for UN to assume responsibility for supervising Indochinese armistice. Guarantees instead should be by participating states of conference who should agree to carry on consultation and adopt collective instead of individual measures in event of violation.

(6) View of experience re Dien Bien Phu personnel, agreement on exchange of PWs and interned civilians should present no problem. After cease-fire throughout Indochina, PW question should be submitted for discussion in Geneva and in Indochina.

Chou En-lai concluded with attack on US efforts to extend war in Indochina, and prevent Geneva Conference from reaching agreement. He also attacked "war faction in France" which was seeking American intervention and enlarged aid and has adopted dilatory tactics at conference. Chou En-lai also charged us with intensifying activities to organize SEA bloc, thereby continuing to locate tensions in Far East and to threaten peace and security of Asia throughout the world. Recent treaties between French Government and Bao Dai running contrary to true independence for Vietnamese people also not conducive to early restoration of peace.

Finally, Chou En-lai said that military issues and political issues are interrelated and cannot be completely separated. On this point, he said Korean experience has shown that these issues must be treated together since political conference pursuant to Article 6 proof Korean

armistice agreement never took place and Geneva Conference has produced no results so far and these political and military questions should be considered by conference along parallel lines and in rotation as suggested by Molotov.

Meeting concluded with Smith statement contained in Secto 412.<sup>3</sup> It was agreed to meet again in plenary Thursday, June 10.

*Comment:* Chou En-lai statement revealed no hint of concession and contained flat statements that it would be impossible to obtain agreement except on Communist terms, particularly re composition of neutral nations supervisory commission, its relation to mixed changes and unanimity provision in its operation. Believed it will harden UK and French positions.

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> *Infra.*

396.1 GE/6-954: Telegram

*Sixth Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 9, 3:05 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

NIACT

GENEVA, June 9, 1954.

Secto 412. Repeated information Paris 409, London 262, Saigon 156, Tokyo 120, Moscow unnumbered. Department pass Defense. Under Secretary's statement at sixth Indochina plenary Wednesday, June 9:

"Mr. Chairman, Fellow Delegates, as I listened yesterday to Mr. Molotov's statement, and to that of Mr. Chou En-lai today, I felt a disappointment—shared, I am sure, by other delegations—at their unconstructive character. I had hoped for some definite response to our efforts toward compromise on basic issues. Since this has not been forthcoming and since we have had only a reiteration of accepted formulas which have been given us on a number of previous occasions, I feel that it is necessary now for me to comment on the charges reiterated on several occasions by Mr. Molotov and more intemperately repeated by Mr. Dong and Mr. Chou En-lai of aggressive designs and imperialistic intentions and deliberate deceptions and obstructions on the part of the US and of our friends and allies.

These charges are part of a familiar pattern. I'm quite sure that Mr. Molotov, and probably Mr. Chou En-lai, do not themselves actually believe that they will be taken seriously, except possibly in those countries where the instrumentalities of government are devoted to the suppression of the distribution of accurate and unbiased information.

I would assume, therefore, that Mr. Molotov was not actually speaking to us, but rather the regimented audience in Europe and

Asia which accepts the Cominform line. I believe, therefore, that it is sufficient for me, in reply, to say that the record of my country during and since the second world war is well known to the whole free world. We are quite willing to have our present and our future intentions judged from this record and I am sure that the confidence of our associates will not be diminished, and that of less fortunate people, if they were permitted to examine the record, would be restored.

We sometimes overlook the fact that we know a great deal, also, about the record of the Soviet Union during this same period and, in judging the present and future intentions of the Communist states and in assessing the validity of their proposals, I suggest we can learn more from reviewing this record than from such statements as those which our Communist colleagues have permitted themselves to make. For example, when Mr. Molotov and Mr. Chou En-lai speak of the national liberation movements of the peoples of Asia, I am at once moved to recall what Mr. Molotov and the government he has so long represented have actually done to affect the national aspirations of various smaller nations.

I would therefore remind you all of the mutual assistance treaties which the Soviet Union made in 1939 with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. On October 31, 1939, Mr. Molotov, as reported in the Soviet press, said of these treaties that they in no way imply any interference on the part of the Soviet Union in the affairs of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania . . . on the contrary all of these pacts of mutual assistance strictly stipulate the inviolability of the sovereignty of the signatory states and the principle of noninterference in each other's affairs . . . we stand for the scrupulous and punctilious observance of the pacts on the basis of complete reciprocity, and we declare that all the nonsensical talk about the Sovietization of the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs.

The fate which overtook Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania very soon after this verbally admirable statement by our eminent colleague is well known to all of us.

Have any of my colleagues forgotten the pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany dated August 23, 1939. Probably at one time Mr. Molotov considered this pact a diplomatic achievement, but I'm sure he must later have shared with the rest of us the bitter conviction that it paved the way first for the Nazi victories of the early years of World War II and then for the Nazi assault on the Soviet Union which cost the grave, long-suffering and wholly admirable Russian people so many millions of lives and such wide-spread destruction.

I have examined this pact and particularly the secret annex thereto, which has since been revealed, and I remain deeply impressed by the following words from the second numbered paragraph of this annex to which Mr. Molotov appended his signature on August 23, 1939.

They read as follows:

'The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and that such state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments. In any event, both governments will resolve this question by means of friendly agreement.'

No attempts to justify this international immorality on the ground of exigencies existing at the time can possibly be acceptable and read in the light of this paragraph, the history of Eastern Europe between 1939 when Poland was destroyed and 1948 when Czechoslovakia lost her proud place as a free nation becomes unmistakably clear. The national aspirations of small, weak countries are to be subject to what is called the 'interests' of large aggressive powers with designs of world domination. What took place in Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania and Czechoslovakia constitutes in each case a chapter in the Soviet record.

It now begins to appear that one of the next chapters in this record may reveal an intention to subordinate the national aspirations of the people of Indochina to what has been termed the 'interest of both parties' as they may be represented by the treaty relationship between the Soviet Union and Communist China.

I should like at this point to bring to your attention another interesting quotation which will be familiar to Mr. Chou En-lai: 'Truce is the military counterpart of the political tactic of coalition govt. It is the means to an end, not the ultimate objective'. In the words our colleague, the Foreign Minister of Communist China, gave to the familiar military truce a meaning entirely new in the history of war. That meaning was spelled out in a war of aggression in Korea and the same concept hangs over the battlefields of Indochina and it will be understood that it is for this reason, among others, that the majority of us have insisted on definite understandings regarding some of the vital issues that we are considering in our effort to bring peace in Southeast Asia.

Our objective and our hope are peace and security. Mr. Molotov himself will recall that at our first formal conference in Moscow in 1946 I stated that the vital question in the mind of the entire free world was, 'how much further is the Soviet Union going to go'.

I said also at that time that if the aggressive expansionism, which the Soviet Union had already demonstrated, were to continue, the free

world, purely in self-defense, would if necessary draw closer together.

The repressive effect of Soviet armed might was not so soon felt in South or Southeast Asia as it was in Eastern Europe. Consequently, therefore, we saw, since the end of the last war, the peoples of this area make giant strides in attaining independence and the control of their own destinies. Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines have taken their place in the family of free nations. These developments have been viewed with the greatest satisfaction by the people of my country.

Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam have more recently joined the other free South and Southeast Asian nations in the achievement of independence, and it is our sincere hope that they will attain peace and security based on a true respect for the national aspirations of their peoples. Those national aspirations should not be subordinated as has occurred in the case of the unfortunate nations mentioned at the beginning of this statement, to the interests of a large aggressive power or powers.

The Soviet Union today is the great Asian imperial power, holding vast colonial territories in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The solicitude I have heard expressed by Mr. Molotov of the people of Southeast Asia apparently does not extend toward the Armenians, the Kazakhs, Mongols, and I think it might be worth the while of all my colleagues to recall the circumstances under which the former small independent state of Tanatuva disappeared completely from the map.

I might say also to Mr. Pham Van Dong that accusations against the use of aggressive intentions and imperialist designs come rather strangely from his lips when we recall that the troops of the Viet Minh have invaded the peaceful countries of Cambodia and Laos, and have spread death and destruction there.

But, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, I intensely dislike these charges and countercharges. I have, so far, refrained from replying myself because of the really serious and important business facing this conference.

Having now recorded my testimony with regard to the matter of imperialism, I should like to return to consideration of the specific proposals before us. At this moment we are still confronted with three important issues which have been debated at length at a number of meetings and without result. The first of these is, as I and others of my colleagues said yesterday afternoon, the special nature of the problem existing in Laos and Cambodia.

I believe that both Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault unanswerably demonstrated the necessity of separate treatment for those two countries

where peace would automatically be restored by the withdrawal of the invading Viet Minh force.

The second issue is that of the powers of the international supervisory commission for Vietnam. This commission must, obviously have the authority and facilities to settle any problems or differences which cannot be adjusted by the joint commissions of the belligerents, and, logically, therefore, its decisions must be binding on those joint commissions.

The third vital issue is the composition of the international supervisory commission. As I and others of us said before, a commission containing states unable to meet the test of impartiality e.g. that is, a commission, the counterpart of that set up in Korea, on which Communist state members have been able by veto to prevent effective supervision, is obviously an unsatisfactory and an unacceptable proposal. Yesterday the representative of the UK proposed the Colombo powers. I welcomed that proposal. This afternoon the representative of Vietnam proposed the UN. That would be acceptable.

Both are reasonable proposals. The proposal of the Soviet Union from my point of view, and I think from that of the majority of my colleagues, is not reasonable.

I am obliged to state that the Soviet, the Chinese Communists, and the Viet Minh Delegations have, so far, shown no signs of willingness to resolve these issues on any reasonable basis which could be acceptable to this conference, or which would inspire and insure the return of peace to Indochina. I hope that I am wrong, but the negative results of our last meeting seems to support this conclusion.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman."

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-954: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 9, 1954—5 p. m.

Secto 408. From Suydam for McCardle. There follow pertinent excerpts Under Secretary's briefing of American press this morning (full text pouch mail): "the Secretary had quite a press conference (yesterday) and we have just gotten the pertinent points of it here. I presume that it has been or is being made available to you.

. . . (he said), among other things, that the attitude of the Communists at Geneva and in stepping up the war in Indochina, as he put it, 'gives the lie to their greatly professed love of peace'.

---

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted in two sections. Ellipses in this document are in the source text.



As an example of their professed efforts to diminish international tensions, I think it is worth while that you take another good close look at what Mr. Molotov said yesterday. It really represented him at his cleverest. He didn't address himself to substance at all. It was very apparent, as soon as he had gotten into his speech, that his purpose was to undermine as much as possible the position of M. Bidault in the debates which were scheduled to start today. He took a blast at French foreign policy and at French military policy, and he had a few words to say about M. Bidault's philosophy. He was pretty brutal about the losses of Dien Bien Phu, and he enlarged in considerable detail on the cost of the war to France. Then he really cast all amenities to the wind, and so did his colleagues, because they then began to refer to the Vietnamese Government, which as you recall has been officially recognized by a great many nations, as the Bao Dai Government and the representative of the Bao Dai Government—a clever buildup. . . .

In my opinion, Mr. Molotov's attitude has stiffened considerably since his return from Moscow. Whether the Moscow visit itself contributed to that, I do not know. A certain indication of a willingness to cooperate, and possibly play the part of the slightly left-of-center middleman—as between the two extreme positions which some people might say are represented by Communist China and the US—has vanished.

There is a great deal more evidence of rigidity and aggressiveness. . . .

Our attitude in connection with the Indochina phase of the discussion has been that of a friendly collaborator; we do not attempt, and have not attempted, to exert any particular leadership, giving advice where we thought it was desirable and supporting reasonable suggestions as they were made.

The Communist position in demanding international—or, as they call it, 'neutral'—supervision of the ceasefire in Indochina, the counter part of the so-called Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea, we have had to reject. We have also had to maintain and reaffirm and re-reaffirm our position with regard to the special character of the problems existing in Laos and Cambodia. Mr. Eden made a very strong statement on it yesterday himself, recording unmistakably the British policy, which is identical with our own. He proposed a counter-suggestion to that of Mr. Molotov, that impartial international supervision might be provided by the Colombo powers, reminding the conference that the prime ministers at Colombo had passed resolutions and issued a communiqué which had been of some help, and at least by implication had suggested a very great interest. I thought,

and I think others did, that that suggestion is worth very serious consideration.

Question: General, are you aware that the Chinese Delegation's spokesman rejected it last night at the press conference?

Answer: No, I am not; but if so, it seems to me to indicate an even greater degree of intransigence than I had anticipated.

Q: He seemed to think, General, that Pakistan was not neutral, having a military agreement with the US. Nevertheless, he continued to accept the two of them as part of the Molotov formula.

A: I see. We sometimes think that India is not too entirely neutral in our direction. But some sort of a consortium of nations based on an India-Pakistan axis has always recommended itself to me as a possibility. I know that the Secretary feels that, insofar as possible, our Asiatic friends should exercise policy functions in their own backyard. . . .

Q: Then, you endorsed Mr. Eden's proposal . . . ?

A: I welcomed Mr. Eden's proposal without endorsing it and, said that it deserved very serious consideration; and I also said that I had thought for some time, as I previously stated in our restricted conference, that some sort of a consortium of nations, of impartial nations, might be found using as the base the India-Pakistan suggestion of Mr. Molotov.

Q: What is your feeling, General, about having one Communist country also on the commission?

A: If the commission were otherwise well organized and if it did not operate on a basis, the good old Communist basis of unanimity, such that refusal of one member might nullify or veto every action of the group, I should think it might be acceptable . . . in other words, if there is not a built-in veto. We have had a lot of experience with that.

Q: General, about this seeming stiffening of Mr. Molotov's attitude since his return from Moscow . . . it seemed to me that Mr. Molotov didn't say anything yesterday in the way of a position relative to Laos and Cambodia, any other thing that they didn't say in their first speech here. What, in the interim, indicated a lessening or softening of their position?

A: This is just my personal impression.

Q: Well, didn't Molotov at the beginning, General, indicate a willingness to consider the military aspect of the problem?

A: Yes.

Q: Separately, or give it priority?

A: Yes.

Q: Whereas yesterday he backed away from it?

A: Yes. He said first that he would consider the military aspects of the problem. Then at various times during the closed sessions he indicated very clearly that he recognized the special considerations applying to Laos and Cambodia. He specifically stated on at least one occasion that there was no thought whatever of partitioning anywhere in the area. Now he has, at least by implication, backed away from the really vital question of solving the military problems. And his associates have now proposed, as I recall it, alternating military and political sessions.

Q: General Smith, since we have in our role of friendly advisers only taken two positions, but have taken them quite definitely, in regard to the separation of Laos and Cambodia from Vietnam, and in regard to the need to have a truly impartial non-veto international commission—

A: Non-built-in veto, yes.

Q: —and since the Russians now in their [garbled group] what appears to be a very thoroughly thought out statement of policy, have definitely turned down those two typings[?] on which we have stood, is there any possibility of an agreement in which we can participate?

A: Not unless they modify their position. Ours is a reasonable and moderate one, we think. The bargaining stage on Indochina I do not believe is over. On the other hand, events in Indochina themselves are certainly going to influence, have more influence on, what agreement is reached than debates around the conference table at Geneva. . . .

Q: General, in view of Mr. Molotov's new aggressiveness, do you think there is any chance of (your) being more articulate in these plenary sessions? Yesterday he attacked our efforts to build up a Southeast Asia security organization. Are we going to keep still to the end of the conference on issues of that sort?

A: Well, occasionally the spirit moves me to speak. I did yesterday. . . .

Q: General, is there any chance of this conference breaking up pretty shortly?

A: I do not think these things should be prolonged indefinitely when it becomes apparent that there is no equitable solution in sight. Take the Korea phase, for example. The Secretary said yesterday that the talks about Korea are pretty close to the end of their useful life. My own view is that when we reach a point where it becomes clear that the mission of the conference is not likely to be accomplished, or the mission of one phase of the conference is not likely to be accomplished, that phase should not be permitted to drag on in order to permit the Commies to use the conference as a platform for propaganda, and to obfuscate the major issues. We have two very important and very

clear-cut issues with respect to Korea. The first is the status and the authority of the UN in its role of repelling aggression and in uniting Korea; and the second is the possibility of arriving at a formula which would produce actually free, uncoerced, and honest elections both in the North and in the South. And since the formula which the Commies insist on is quite incapable of producing anything but completely rigged and coerced elections in areas in which they control, and since they have gone even further and said that the franchise in North Korea at least would be exercised by everybody on the spot, regardless of nationality, which would include all the Chinese and any Russians that happened to be there, and various other odds and ends, it does not seem to be a solution which is susceptible of producing any results, and certainly not one that we could accept. Therefore, I should dislike very much to see that phase of the conference degenerate into a propaganda medium for our Commie associates.

Q: What is the outlook, General, on the Korean situation? What is likely to happen? You said the other day you were ready to rest our case at the bar of world opinion. Do the other delegates here share your opinion?

A: I think that most of them do, yes. Of course, Mr. Chou En-lai has reserved the right to reply to some of the things that I said. He may want another plenary session. We would certainly want one because we have Mr. Molotov's proposal which, if read just by itself by people who still held the illusion that 'neutral' means the same to us as it does to the Commies, might have some effect . . . (but) if you read his speech, which accompanied the presentation of that proposal, you will note that he was absolutely adamant in insisting that that composition must be the same as that of the neutral nations supervisory commission of Korea . . . the Swiss and the Swedes have had a complete snootful of it, and I don't blame them.

Q: What about Indochina, after you get thru this series of plenary sessions? Do you think you will go back into restricted sessions again on this?

A: I do not know. Mr. Molotov asked to go into open sessions because, he said, the closed sessions were not actually closed, and because the information always leaked out, and, since it leaked out from various sources and in various distorted forms, it was far better if we had our discussions in open sessions. . . .

Q: General Smith, do you have any idea of how these conversations on Indochina could ever be broken off? . . .

A: All I can say about that is that we started the one seeming step toward progress that was made, which was the beginning of what you might call talks by military experts on both sides. As far as I can

ascertain, nothing has been accomplished. The Commie side has refused to discuss actual details and has restricted itself more or less to political polemics. In other words, it seems that we are just as far from getting down on the map the staff officers idea of concentration areas for the regular troops involved as we were at the beginning. That has a certain ominous significance to me. I would not like to enlarge on why, however.

Q: Then, can one take it to be our feeling now that it is going to be extremely difficult to break up the conference on any pretext?

A: Well, whether the Indochina phase would really break up or not is problematical. You must remember at Panmunjom we went there for three weeks and we stayed there twenty-seven months . . . that doesn't mean that I will be here twenty-seven months.

I have had some interesting minor items in some of our press summaries, and, without intending to be critical, there are certain errors of fact . . . for example, these constant reiterations about a split here between the British and the US delegates are not justified. I read one comment, I believe, that when the closed session on Korea was called off that the US del was highly irritated; well, that is not a fact. The US del was thoroughly satisfied. We saw no reason for a closed session on Korea after the speeches made at the previous plenary. . . .

(As) to the possibility that the Korean phase might last a long time further, as a result of Mr. Molotov's new proposals: . . . they do not say one single thing that has not been proposed before, although they say it differently, and they sugar-coat the unpalatable morsel by the phrase 'composition to be examined later' . . . I do not think that the majority of the other fifteen are ready to chop it right off (here). As a matter of fact, I personally now want to see some others speak to the point of Mr. Molotov's proposal. I have spoken my piece, and I dare say that others will.

Q: Has there been a change in our position from the beginning of this conference, when it was my definite impression that we wanted to get a clear-cut decision here as to whether the Russians and the Red Chinese were going to talk business, and, if not to cut the thing short and go home, and take what measures had to be taken to stop Commie expansion in Southeast Asia? Was that a mistaken impression, or do we wish to get a clear-cut decision and stop muddling the mind of the public?

A: We always want a clear-cut decision, and we always want it quickly. That is a national characteristic, and I must say that I share it to the full; but it isn't always possible to get it as quickly or as cleanly cut as we ourselves would like because we work with a group of allies, each of whom has its own public opinion to consider, and

many of whom are more convinced than we that there are possibilities in somewhat prolonged negotiation. We should take that into consideration. We cannot always do what we like ourselves, neither can our allies. We have to arrive both tactically and in matters of policy at a sort of a compromise; that's almost inevitable, both as to timing and as to procedure.

Q: And as to principle?

A: Well, I do not think there is any great difference in principle. I have not encountered that. Such differences in opinion as I have encountered here have related primarily to timing and to procedure, and I would like to say this to you, completely off the record, please, as my own estimate now after several weeks here: If I had to total up the score, I would say events have demonstrated that in some cases we have been right, and in some cases some of our associates have been right, and I think that they would admit that as quickly as I am prepared to admit the other."

SMITH

751G.00/6-954 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1954—5 : 52 p. m.

Tedul 178. Eyes only for Ambassadors. Ambassador Bonnet came to see Secretary Dulles Wednesday afternoon and raised question of participation of US Marines Indochina. He said he had received telegram from Maurice Schumann expressing excitement and dismay at information from Valluy that Radford had said there was no question of utilization Marines Indochina. Ambassador said this conflicted with what French Govt had hitherto understood to be intentions US Govt this respect. He further stated suggestion made by Radford to Valluy that three Korean divisions might be used in Indochina was unacceptable.

Secretary said US position had been clear from start and that we were not willing to make commitment ahead of time which French could use for internal political maneuvering or negotiating at Geneva and which would represent a kind of permanent option on US intervention if it suited their purpose. A month ago, French had been explicitly informed conditions which must be met and fulfilled by them before President took decision whether to go to Congress and ask for authority use American armed forces in relation Indochina. Among

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Tyler of EUR/WE. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4476, to Saigon as telegram 2551, and to London as telegram 6684.

these conditions was need for French and Associated States to request US and certain other interested countries to come in. We were still in dark as to what French intentions really were.

Secretary said he felt French desire obtain firm commitment from us on which they could draw was understandable, but equally understandable in circumstances is our determination not to give them such blank check. Secretary confirmed US position as stated by Dillon (4766 from Paris<sup>2</sup>) that use of Marines would not be excluded provided an agreed operational plan required their presence. He said it was useless and illusory to attempt to obtain from us at this time a commitment more specific on this point than that which we had already given.

With regard to what we would do in event act of open aggression by Chinese, Secretary read relevant extracts (last four paragraphs of section Roman four) from his Los Angeles speech which is being separately transmitted.<sup>3</sup>

Bonnet expressed surprise that we considered that French Govt had not made up its mind with regard to internationalization of Indochina war and said he considered request had already been made by French. Secretary pointed out that our offer on basis certain specific conditions had been made a month ago in context of situation at that time, which confirmed and made precise much earlier representations. Since then things had changed rapidly and would doubtless continue to change. For this reason delay was regrettable, and further delay would not improve situation with regard to any role we might consider playing.<sup>4</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 9; for text, see volume XIII.

<sup>3</sup> For the text of the speech delivered by the Secretary of State at Los Angeles on June 11, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 28, 1954, pp. 971-973.

<sup>4</sup> Under Secretary Smith replied in telegram Dulte 165, June 10, as follows: "I pointed out to Bidault several days ago and again yesterday to Chauvel that before any US forces could be engaged in Indochina a resolution authorizing the President to take such action must be passed by Congress; that before such a resolution could be passed certain conditions must be fulfilled, such as, for example, association of other states in intervention, request for assistance by France, et cetera. I explained that should such a resolution be passed participation of Marines would not be excluded since Marines were part of Navy." (751G.00/6-1054)

---

396.1 GE/6-954: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of Defense*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, June 9, 1954—7 p. m.

Army Message Gento 53. Action Department of Defense and State Department; information USARMA's Paris, London and Saigon.

---

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted in two sections. Section two could not be located.

From US Defense representative Geneva. For Hensel from Sullivan. Following is summary French-VN military talks with Viet Minh 8 June reported to Defense representative by member French del:

1. Viet Minh representative was not prepared to specify areas in North Vietnam over which Viet Minh claim military superiority, as requested by French at previous days session, and urged French representative to give such information for all of Vietnam.

2. French representative acceded and described limits of all areas in Vietnam over which French claim their forces hold military superiority (French del contact reported that areas so described by French representative presented "optimistic" picture from their point of view and included territory which, in some cases, is "rotten" with Viet Minh infiltration. We will attempt to secure detailed information tomorrow on areas described).

3. Bulk of session devoted to lengthy exchanges of opposing views on validity French claims, each side using different criteria to determine what constitutes military supremacy over an area. Viet Minh representative stated he would present Viet Minh claims but did not say when.

4. French representative proposed text of joint telegram of instructions to be sent by both sides to their military commanders in Indochina, directing commanders to appoint liaison officers to make contact with view to meeting of delegations in the field. Meeting place for liaison officers suggested as one of the three places used in exchange of wounded POWs. French representative further proposed text of joint communiqué to be issued by military representatives Geneva, announcing this action. Viet Minh stated they would consider proposal and reply next meeting.

5. *Comments:*

(a) French del contact states French representative does not plan to engage in further dispute with Viet Minh over validity French area claims until Viet Minh describe areas over which they claim military superiority.

(b) Further stated French representative proposal for joint telegram to commanders designed to counter expected Viet Minh charge that French have not lived up to 29 May agreement to establish contact "on the spot". Viet Minh charge to this effect in fact was made by Dong (Viet Minh del) in 8 June Indochina Plenary (French del contact has said that military delegation is being assembled in Indochina, prepared to establish contact with Viet Minh when orders received to do so.) Bidault stated in reply to Dong that necessary instructions have been issued. Presumably this referred to preparatory arrangements only since authorization to meet with Viet Minh representatives in field apparently not issued.



(c) French del contact says his delegation feels orders for representatives opposing sides to meet in field must be in form of joint instructions arising from agreement reached at Geneva. Otherwise, attempts by commanders in field to make contacts under separate orders from their governments could create impression that new French Union Commander, General Ely, has been sent Indochina in role of supplicant for armistice.

---

751G.00/6-954 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1954—7:56 p. m.

Tedul 180. Eyes only for the Under Secretary from the Secretary.

1. In relation to Dulte 162<sup>2</sup> you should explain that in our opinion the French confusion is due to the fact that they have allowed themselves to be confused by other than official statements of the U.S. Government position. This position was clearly set out, notably in Deptel 4023 to Paris, repeated Geneva Tedul 54,<sup>3</sup> and we have since clearly adhered to it subject to our clarification expressed in Deptel 4117 to Paris, repeated Geneva Tedul 78<sup>4</sup> to the effect that we could not allow the French to have a continuing option on the situation, and we have to take into account that with the passage of time and the increasing deterioration of the situation, what was possible at the time of our original proposal could become impossible.

As far as military talks are concerned, these do not involve political decisions which will be taken by the President. There could be military divergencies about the part which the different elements of the armed forces would play in the event that there was intervention. This sort of thing is normal among allies. Of course, if on the basis of collective action, we should get into the war, we would be in it all the way, and would do whatever seemed necessary to win the war. The question of what disposition of various forces would best serve this purpose is something that could only be determined at the time and in light of the situation as it developed, including the reaction if any, of the Chinese

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to Paris eyes only for the Ambassador as telegram 4487.

In telegram Tedul 188, June 11, Acting Secretary of State Murphy informed Smith that Tedul 180 had been "personally dictated by Secretary and sent just before his departure. He had in mind our posture if we had to disengage." (110.11 DU/6-1154)

The Secretary of State was absent from the Department from June 9-12 to deliver speeches in several western U.S. cities.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 9, p. 1086.

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 11; for text, see volume XIII.

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 17; for text, see *ibid.*

Communists who may themselves have a determining influence in this matter. On high authority we have told the French that if we participate we would expect our participation to be principally in the form of air and sea power but that this would not exclude the possibility of some land (marines) participation within the framework of agreed over-all military strategy. We cannot do more than that at this time and so indicated to Bonnet (Tedul 178<sup>5</sup>).

2. There is another important problem about which we must be thinking. This is how we shall avoid commitment to a settlement which would be quite contrary to our principles. Assume that the Soviet will want the eventual settlement to be "guaranteed" in some way by the principal powers, including the United States. This guarantee would presumably be designed to preclude any efforts on the part of the U.S. at the liberation of the peoples who were subject to captivity. This, on a small scale, would be what we have refused on many occasions to do in relation to Europe, where we have said we would never make a statement which would give the stamp of approval to the captivity of Eastern European peoples. We believe that a "guarantee" which committed the United States to sustain Communist domination of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, or at least many of them would be unacceptable as cutting across our basic principles for dealing with the Communist world. We believe also it would be deeply resented by the American people and the Congress.

It occurs to us that one step to attenuate what might seem to be an abrupt position which could be interpreted as designed to sabotage the conference would be for you to show our basic instructions to you to Eden and Bidault so that they cannot claim to be taken by surprise if we subsequently adopt a program of disengagement from the result.<sup>6</sup> There might similarly be utility in showing them to Molotov. Before you show them to anyone (if you have not already done so), we would wish consider advisability modifications in light developments. Would appreciate your comments on this.

One thing we fear is that the Soviets might put up a proposal which would salvage a little something for the French, at least in form and

<sup>5</sup> Dated June 9, p. 1100.

<sup>6</sup> In telegram Tedul 177, June 9, Secretary Dulles asked Under Secretary Smith if he had "shown or read your formal instructions (Tosec 138) to any of your colleagues?" (110.11 DU/6-954) Smith replied in Dulte 168, June 10, that "formal instructions (Tosec 138) communicated to British and French colleagues." (110.11 DU/6-1054) In an additional reply, Dulte 177, June 13, Smith reported that his instructions "were discussed with Eden and Bidault in general terms which would not preclude their modification if desired. From my position they seem satisfactory and I have no changes to suggest." (110.11 DU/6-1354) For telegram Tosec 138, May 12, see p. 778.

make this contingent upon a guarantee by the U.S. If this guarantee was refused then our refusal would be cited by the Communists as an excuse for denying the French even the minimum of face-saving otherwise provided. If we fall into this trap, which is not easy to avoid, then that could be used to create strong anti-American feeling in France with very serious repercussions on our NATO alliance and EDC.

We are giving these matters our careful consideration and suggest that you do the same and let us know if you have any inspiration. I would particularly like your comments on the various possibilities you may see for disengaging ourselves from any unsatisfactory settlement.

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/6-954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 9, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 410. Repeated information London 261, Paris 408, Bangkok 20, USUN New York 14. Department pass USUN New York. I spoke to Eden this morning along lines Tosec 378.<sup>1</sup> He feels very strongly we must not complicate present situation in Geneva by insisting upon broadening Thailand appeal to Laos and Cambodia. He points out language Security Council draft resolution largely academic, as it will in any event be vetoed. Resolution can be written any way that appears desirable at time matter comes before General Assembly.

He will send instructions Dixon to try to work out with Lodge some language that would meet his point while not necessarily precluding POC operations outside Thailand.

Have not yet been able to see Prince Wan.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 8, p. 1081.

JUNE 10, 1954

396.1 GE/6-1054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of Defense*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 10, 1954—1 a. m.

Army Message Gento 54. Action Defense; repeated information USARMAs Paris, Saigon, London and Department State. From Defense representative Geneva. To Office Secretary of Defense, Wash-

ington for Hensel, State Department from Sullivan. Following is summary French-VN military talks with Viet Minh 9 June reported to Defense representative by member French delegation :

1. Viet Minh representative presented description areas in North Vietnam over which Viet Minh claim military superiority. French representative noted he had presented his position regarding areas throughout all Vietnam and insisted Viet Minh do same before discussions proceed to reconciliation conflicting positions. Viet Minh representative agreed.

2. Re Delta area, Viet Minh representative acknowledged French Union forces control only Hanoi and Haiphong proper, that all other parts Delta in contested status.

3. *Comment*: French del contact promised copy map showing areas claimed by both sides as soon as drawn up.

---

396.1 GE/6-1154 : Telegram

*Smith-Dinh Meeting, Geneva, June 10, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 11, 1954—noon.

Secto 422. Repeated information Saigon 161, Paris 417. Vietnam Foreign Minister Dinh called yesterday morning to deliver a "message" from Bao Dai. The "message" was that Bao Dai felt that definite military measures should be undertaken without delay, for the accelerated formation and expansion on an autonomous basis of the Vietnamese National Army. His dilemma was that if he undertook such measures now he would be accused of war-mongering and of thwarting the efforts at Geneva to find a peaceful solution of the Vietnamese conflict. It would be difficult to launch such measures until he knew what the outcome of the Geneva Conference would be.

I replied that I saw no dilemma to hinder Bao Dai's taking such action while the Geneva Conference was still in progress. I fully agreed that the Vietnam National Army must have its own identity and felt sure that the French would agree to it but that was something that Bao Dai, as Commander-in-Chief of Vietnamese Forces, should take up personally with Pleven and perhaps Laniel. It would be well for him also to talk with Bidault. I remarked that O'Daniel had a plan for training four light divisions as a starter and when they were formed they could take the place in the lines of the Vietnamese battalions now integrated into the French Command. The latter could then

be withdrawn and later be formed into divisions. I realized their lack of higher officers. They would have to use French staff officers at this stage and, of course, the National Army would be under the French High Command. Dinh said Bao Dai had instructed Buu Loc to take this matter up with Pleven but Buu Loc had had to return to Saigon before doing so.

I went on to say as a general proposition that when military crises occurred, the Commander-in-Chief should be on the ground. As I understood it, Bao Dai was Commander-in-Chief of the National Army just as our President, by constitutional right, was CIC of American armed forces.

Dinh said he understood no final decision had been taken on General O'Daniel's plan for a training mission and program for the Vietnam National Army. I agreed that final decision had not been taken but suggested that Bao Dai should take that matter up in his talk with Pleven. I said the fact that the independence treaty with France had only been initialed but not formally signed by the latter placed Vietnam and ourselves in a difficult situation. We felt the treaty should be signed and that Bao Dai should insist on the advantage to France and Vietnam of having the convention signed without further delay.

I said that I would be glad to talk again with Bao Dai if the latter so desired, and Dinh said he would urge him to come to the Geneva area.

Dinh raised the question of possibility of an early cease-fire which might be accompanied by a prohibition on arrivals of fresh troops and matériel. Such a provision would prevent the sending of an American training mission and equipment which the Vietnamese Army would require. I replied that a cease-fire on such lines might present certain but not insuperable difficulties. If a cease-fire were agreed upon it might be somewhat on the lines of the Korean arrangement which provided for the gradual withdrawal of foreign troops but allowed for their replacement by newly formed native divisions which would be entitled to bring in the necessary equipment.

After our talk, Heath asked Dinh the reason for the delay in concluding the negotiations for the supplementary financial, economic and cultural accords in Paris. Dinh replied that there had been some "foot dragging" on both sides but the delay was mainly due to the inexperience of the Vietnamese negotiators. Dinh said that if he and Dac Khe were not tied down in Geneva they could return to Paris and he thought, conclude the supplementary agreements within a week.

396.1 GE/6-1054

*Prince Wan-Robertson-Bonsal Meeting, Geneva, June 10, 10:30 a. m.: Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, June 10, 1954.

Participants: Prince Wan, Leader of Thailand Delegation  
Walter S. Robertson  
Philip W. Bonsal

Subject: (a) Status of Thai application to UN;  
(b) Plans for Korean Conference.

Mr. Robertson called on Prince Wan at 10:30 a. m. in order to discuss the status of the Thai application to the UN and particularly the date of the next Security Council meeting and the wording of the resolution to be presented. Mr. Robertson described to Prince Wan our recent talks with Chauvel and with Eden (see Sectos 398 and 410<sup>2</sup>).

Prince Wan expressed agreement that the meeting of the Security Council should not be delayed beyond Monday or Tuesday (June 15 or 16) and that the wording of the resolution should not be such as to preclude the proposed Peace Observation Commission from entering countries other than Thailand should this prove desirable at a later date and should the countries in question, (particularly Laos and Cambodia) extend an invitation to the Commission. Prince Wan was also in full agreement that Laos and Cambodia should, for the present, take no action with regard to or even notice of the Thai application to the UN. This would not, however, preclude Laos from following the example of Cambodia in placing before the UN the facts regarding the invasion of which Laos is currently the victim.

With reference to Korea, Mr. Robertson urged Prince Wan to make a statement at tomorrow's plenary. Although Prince Wan had been planning to make his statement at the next plenary after the one on June 11th, he agreed to take Mr. Robertson's suggestion. Prince Wan expressed agreement with Mr. Robertson regarding the importance of terminating the Korean phase of the conference without delay and of making clear that the termination results from an inability to agree on the UN issue and on the issue of truly free elections.

<sup>1</sup>The U.S. Delegation informed the Department of this discussion in telegram Secto 417, June 10, indicating that Prince Wan "fully agrees on desirability early Security Council meeting (not later than June 15 or 16) as well as view that wording of resolution should not preclude proposed POC from entering countries other than Thailand." (396.1 GE/6-1054)

<sup>2</sup>Telegram Secto 398, dated June 8, p. 1065; telegram Secto 410, dated June 9, p. 1105.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 285

*Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(Bonsal) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 10, 1954.

Subject: Meeting of the Six this morning.

1. M. Chauvel informed us that no one has so far indicated a desire to speak at the plenary this afternoon. Mr. Eden is ready with some remarks commenting on Chou En-lai's speech to the general effect that it represents in fact a step backward from points of agreement previously reached. The Cambodians are ready to make a few remarks on their particular problem. It was generally agreed of course that Mr. Molotov, Mr. Chou En-lai and Mr. Dong would probably have something to say although they have not yet indicated their intention to do so.

2. With regard to future plans, M. Chauvel indicated the desirability of proposing that the conference return to restricted sessions for the purpose of continuing the discussions of unagreed points relative to military matters and also of giving special attention to the problems of Cambodia and Laos. Mr. Eden will take this idea under advisement and may propose it this afternoon.

3. It was brought out that the Six are in full agreement that we should reject, at the present stage of our discussion of the conditions for a cessation of hostilities, any proposal for an early discussion of political questions.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 312

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(Reinhardt) to the Coordinator of the Delegation (Johnson)*<sup>1</sup>

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GENEVA, June 10, 1954.

Subject: Kingsbury Smith-Zhukov Conversation

Kingsbury Smith (INS) dined last night with Zhukov of *Pravda*. Smith gave me the following fill-in on their conversation:

1. *Soviet attitude.* When asked why Molotov had returned from Moscow with an apparently tougher line, Zhukov said that this was because the French were obviously stalling and trying to sabotage the Conference. For example, in the military talks, the only proposal which the French had put forward was the old Laniel proposal of

---

<sup>1</sup> Summary of discussion transmitted to the Department in telegram Secto 423, June 11. (396.1 GE/6-1154)

Heath in a note to Under Secretary Smith, attached to the source text, indicated that "you will find of interest the attached report."

March 5. This was obviously ridiculous because the situation had changed materially since that time.

2. *Viet Minh proposal.* Zhukov said that as a counterproposal, the Viet Minh would shortly put forward a plan to the military committee which would entail their retaining all of the Red River Delta except the Hanoi-Haiphong area. This proposal would be followed by one for the balance of Viet Nam. He gave the impression that the proposal which he described as generous would call in effect for a withdrawal of the French to the coastal regions where they would retain a sort of Hong Kong type of foothold. When Kingsbury Smith commented that this seemed to imply that the Viet Minh would retain all of the interior, Zhukov said that this could not be avoided under any circumstances.

3. *Communist veto or unanimity principle.* When asked whether the Communist side would freeze on the issue of retaining the veto power in any international control organization, or whether some kind of compromise might be possible, Zhukov said he thought that the unanimity rule might not have to apply in all cases. Certainly it would in such a matter as intervention by the guarantor states but he felt that the Conference by defining the various contingencies could establish same in which a two-thirds or even a simple majority vote might be acceptable.

4. *General Smith's stay.* Zhukov inquired more than once whether General Smith was going home shortly and seemed to show concern on this score. Kingsbury Smith replied that he of course did not know but would assume that the General would not stay on indefinitely in Geneva if no progress were made at the Conference. Zhukov said it was important to keep the Conference going. Molotov was confident that agreement could be reached at the Conference but it would take time. Zhukov said that no progress was likely until after the French governmental crisis had been brought to an end nor were serious negotiations possible until Bidault became convinced that the US was not going to intervene in Indochina.

5. *General Smith dinner for Molotov.* Zhukov asked whether General Smith had liked his dinner with Molotov and stressed its length. Kingsbury Smith replied that he didn't know and commented to me that it was quite evident that Zhukov would have been very interested to get a reply to this question.

6. *European conference.* When asked whether there was anything behind the rumors that the Soviet government would like to call another conference on European questions in the near future, Zhukov replied that they felt such a conference would not be useful until the current Asiatic problems had been settled.



7. *Trade relations.* Zhukov stated that one should attach great importance to the forthcoming visit of Chinese trade delegates to the United Kingdom. He said his government felt it was a shame that the US did not send businessmen to the Soviet Union.

---

751G.00/6-1054 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

SAIGON, June 10, 1954—2 p. m.

2714. Repeated information Paris 967, Geneva 214. Paris for Ambassador. Geneva for Under Secretary. General Valluy's appreciation of the situation as set out Department telegram 2527, sent Geneva Tedul 171, repeated Paris 4448<sup>1</sup> is exceedingly good—in fact almost too good. Although there are one or two points to which we might take exception from purely military aspect, I desire to confine my comment to political connotations of Valluy's statement. I have impression that under instructions he made this very concise evaluation less with military considerations in mind than with political objectives in view. I think that Valluy was looking as much at the French Parliament as he was at the Tonkin delta when he made his speech. General Ely has twice in my presence stated that his keenest desire is for United States to enter this war. Only yesterday his Chief of Staff, Colonel Brohan, repeated this comment. My belief is that purpose of Valluy statement was either to bring us and, if possible, other five powers into conflict here or, failing that, to prepare excuse before history for an impending armistice which French would then request of Viet Minh.

McCLINTOCK

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 7, p. 1056.

---

396.1 GE/6-1054 : Telegram

*Seventh Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 10, 3:03 p. m.:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 10, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 420. Repeated information Paris 416, Saigon 160, London 267, Tokyo 125, Phnom Penh 7, Vientiane 4, Moscow 115. Tokyo pass

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/7) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 277. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:03 p. m. and adjourned at 7 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 265-290. The speeches of Eden and Molotov and an extract of Smith's speech are printed in Cmd. 9186, pp. 165-168. The speeches of Tep Phan, Eden, Pham Van Dong, and Molotov, Indochina Documents IC/26, IC/27, IC/28, and IC/29, respectively, June 10-12, are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279A.

CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Seventh Indochina plenary Thursday, June 10, which Eden chaired opened with statement by Eden, as head UK delegation, in which he continued strong line taken in June 9 plenary. For text see Secto 419.<sup>2</sup>

Cambodian delegate was next speaker. In effort set record straight after distortions re Cambodia made by Communist delegates, Cambodian delegate reaffirmed his previous statements re separate nature of Cambodian problem, independence and sovereignty of Cambodia, and fact problem was solely one of armed invasion by Viet Minh. He attributed failure of Colombo powers to recognize Cambodia to their lack of knowledge of situation and expressed hope they would recognize Cambodia as soon as they become acquainted with treaties recently concluded with France. Saying that political problem as regards Cambodia does not exist and that nothing stands in way of conference examining military problem there, he proposed that conference devote its next meeting to Cambodian question, examining four-point proposal he introduced June 8. Endorsed Eden's remarks re Cambodia.

Dong, Viet Minh delegate, followed with very long, intemperate, discursive tirade attacking Cambodia, Laos and "Bao Dai regime", French colonialism and foreign imperialism in familiar Communist language. Dong concluded with statement in support of proposal made at earlier session by Molotov and seconded by Chou that French and Viet Minh should begin separate discussions of political questions simultaneously with the military talks now in progress.

After recess Cambodian delegate replied briefly to inaccurate statements made by Pham Van Dong re Cambodia and reserved right reply in more detail later.

Next speaker was Molotov, who in medium-length speech including little, if any, substance, accused both France and US of being responsible for delay in achieving peace in Indochina, said only Viet Minh was for free elections in Vietnam, etc. In repeating previous charges that governments of Associated States were not independent Molotov again referred to "numerous" official US statements urging France to grant them greater degree of independence. Molotov also replied briefly and rather weakly to statements United States delegate made June 9 re Soviet policy toward smaller nations, asked for US statement of policy toward efforts achieve peaceful settlement in Indochina and once more emphasized inter-connection political and military elements in Indochinese solution. He stated that conference would be performing its duty if it prevented any attempts to enlarge war in Indochina. Molotov concluded speech with cloudy remark (probably intended as rebuke to Eden) that if Eden's statement of today had

---

<sup>2</sup> *Infra.*

contributed to efforts restore peace in Indochina, it would have been contribution to work of conference.

The Laotian delegate spoke next and in short, dignified and effective statement said that much had been said about the situation that exists in Laos. He asserted that Laos is an independent country and has nothing more to desire in this connection. He referred to Dong's allegation that Laotian independence exists only on paper and that country is dominated by French. Since Dong has his own ideas about this question, the Laotian delegate suggested that the conference set up a commission to go to Laos to determine whose version of Laotian independence is correct and proposed that Dong go along and learn more about a country he does not know.

The Vietnamese delegate then took the floor and deplored that differences of opinion had to be aired between children of same nation while an atrocious war was in progress. He then spoke briefly to refute Molotov's earlier statement that only the Viet Minh propose free general elections in Vietnam. He said this was in error for the Vietnamese delegate also proposed free elections with the significant difference that such elections should be accompanied by international supervision whereas the Viet Minh proposal included no such supervision. He concluded by making reference to the treaty initialed between France and Vietnam, stating that Vietnamese were proud of it and that it served the people well.

General Smith then made following statement :

"I must correct my friend Mr. Molotov in the interest of accuracy. The United States delegation at this conference has repeatedly stated that it accepts and recognizes the independence and sovereignty of the states of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. The US maintains a senior diplomatic representative with these independent states, who is here presently. The US delegation has also stated repeatedly that to enable Laos and Cambodia completely to enjoy their sovereignty and independence in peace, it is only necessary for the invading forces of Viet Minh to withdraw from their territories. Admittedly, the problem of restoration of peace in the state of Vietnam presents greater problems, but they are not involved with matters of the sovereignty and independence of that state, which as I said, we fully recognize.

"With regard to our different opinions on matters of history, I leave the judgment to our colleagues. The policy of the US with regard to the establishment of peace in Indochina, about which Mr. Molotov asks is, on basic issues identical with that outlined at the beginning of our session by the representative of the United Kingdom, with which statement the US delegation associates itself completely."

Prior to adjournment, Eden noted that there will be a Korea plenary tomorrow and that the two chairmen would arrange for the next session on Indochina.

*Comments:*

Eden's remarks to effect that in crossing Laotian and Cambodian borders Viet Minh forces had crossed frontier between Chinese and Indian cultures is of interest as possibly reflecting Nehru's views.

Communist speeches today probably intended for effect on French political situation as well as strictly stalling purposes. Member French delegation interpreted them as attempt put French delegation in position of having to defend Bao Dai (who is very unpopular with certain sections French population) publicly and thus leaving Communists free to charge that failure of conference to make progress is due to French Government's support of "rotten Bao Dai regime".

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-1054 : Telegram

*Seventh Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 10, 3:03 p. m.:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

GENEVA, June 10, 1954.

Secto 419. Department pass Defense; Tokyo for CINCFE. Repeated information Paris 415, Moscow 11, Saigon 159, London 266, Tokyo 124, Phnom Penh 6, Vientiane 3. Following is verbatim text Eden statement made in Indochina plenary 10 June.<sup>1</sup>

"The last 2 days of public discussion have certainly clarified our differences. I fear that they have also deepened them. I say this with infinite regret, but it is our stern duty to face realities. As a result of the progress we have admittedly made on questions of procedure, our work now seems to me to fall into 3 main chapters. Let us see where we are in each.

We are agreed that the cessation of hostilities should be simultaneous, and we have also accepted that its examination should begin with Vietnam. Representatives of the 2 commands are now meeting. We are all glad of this. We hope that we may now learn the outcome of their discussions.

Next comes the issue of supervision. We are all agreed that some form of international supervision is necessary. We are not agreed as to how to make it effective and impartial.

Let us first consider the membership of the international commission. I have stated the proposals of HMG on this. We do not think any the worse [of] them because they have been ignored by certain delegations. We stand by them. I repeat that I have proposed this group of 5 Asian powers because they are truly impartial. I am convinced that a group of 4 powers, 2 supporting the views of either side, can only

<sup>1</sup> In telegram Dulte 170, June 11, the U.S. Delegation informed the Department of State that "Eden is planning to see Molotov tomorrow regard to Indochina. I understand he plans reiterate position he took speech at plenary yesterday and attempt obtain from Molotov some indication of where Molotov thinks conference goes from here." (110.11 DU/6-1154)

lead to deadlock. My reason for refusing to accept such a proposal is not ideological. It is simply that it wouldn't work.

As to the working of such a commission as we propose, it will clearly be the desire of the impartial powers, if they be chosen, to try to reach agreement among themselves on every issue that comes before them. But if they fail to do so, they must have the right to decide by a majority. There can be no power of veto. May I remind our critics on this point that to insist on unanimity is to declare that you have no confidence in impartiality. The international commission must, therefore, be truly impartial, and must have the power to decide by majority. We, for our part, are firmly convinced that the representation of India and Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia would form a just and impartial commission.

Now what of the relations of this international commission with the mixed committees representative of the 2 commands? There is no dispute that the latter could do useful work in Vietnam. On the other hand, it has been admitted that even with the best will in the world, the 2 sides cannot be expected after 8 years of war to agree on every point. The warning of the representative of the State of Vietnam about the experiences of 1946 should not be forgotten by the conference.

No one, therefore, attempts to deny that there will be differences, and they may well be frequent. How are they to be resolved? This is surely where the international commission will have its part to play. No doubt it will always seek to reconcile these differences. But it will not always succeed. In the event of failure, the international commission must have the authority to decide. There is no other way.

The conference has a clear choice, and we should face it. Either we can set up a commission which is as impartial as we can make it, and give it the necessary authority and the power to take its decisions by a majority if need be, each of us trusting in its good faith, or we can at each phase interpose a veto, as some delegations proposed. According to them, this veto might first be used in the mixed committees themselves. It could next be used in the international commission. It might even be used once again if in the last resort a question was referred to representatives of this conference. This issue of effective and impartial international supervision seems to me to be crucial. I am sorry to have to record that after the debate of the last 2 days we are in my judgment further apart than ever upon it.

I come now to the third of the main issues which I wish to discuss—the future of Laos and Cambodia. There is no dispute that it is our duty to examine measures to restore peace in Laos and Cambodia, as in Vietnam; there is dispute as to what those measures should be. Reference has been made here to the existence of resistance armies in Laos and Cambodia, and to the fact that there are 2 belligerent sides in all 3 states—Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. This does not accord with the information which we have from our representatives on the spot. I think it my duty to give this in all good faith to the conference.

Laos was first invaded by regular Viet Minh forces in April 1953. These forces came from northern Vietnam. They advanced to within 12 miles of the capital before they were defeated and driven back to the frontier area in northeastern Laos, where they have since remained.

In December, 1953, a further invasion took place. Regular Viet Minh troops advanced from the Vietnam border into central Laos. They were again driven back. But there are still many Viet Minh troops in the border areas of Laos. These are regular battalions belonging to Viet Minh divisions with their headquarters in Vietnam. Some of them have heavy weapons, including artillery and anti-aircraft guns. These regular Viet Minh units cannot be described as resistance movements.

On April 17, the Laotian Government formally notified HMG and other friendly governments of the violation of their frontiers by the Viet Minh. On December 25, the Laotian Prime Minister appealed to world opinion against renewed aggression by regular units of the Viet Minh corps of battle.

Cambodia was invaded in April 1954. This was on the eve of this conference, and several weeks after we had agreed in Berlin to meet here to discuss the restoration of peace in Indochina. Once again the invaders were regular Viet Minh troops who crossed the border from Vietnam. They did not come to fight the French. These foreign invaders have in fact merely terrorized and battered on the people of Cambodia. They hold no centre of any importance. On April 23 of this year, a formal protest by the Cambodian Government against Viet Minh invasion was delivered to the Secretary General of the United Nations.

The Laotian and Cambodian delegates have already told us the history of the resistance movements in their countries. No one denies that there have been such movements in the past. But with unimportant exceptions, the former members of these movements have now rallied to the support of the legitimate governments of Laos and Cambodia. Armed resistance now derives overwhelmingly from the Viet Minh. It is only since this conference was announced that even Communist spokesmen have pretended anything else.

Viet Minh aggression is not the only factor that distinguishes the problems of Laos and Cambodia from those of Vietnam. In race, religion, language and culture, the peoples of these 2 countries are fundamentally different from those of Vietnam. The Viet Minh invaders not only crossed a political boundary, they crossed the frontier that divides the 2 great cultures of Asia—the Indian and the Chinese. The Viet Minh delegate attempted to excuse this action by saying that there were Vietnamese minorities in Laos and Cambodia. That is true, but it no more justifies Viet Minh invasion of Laos and Cambodia than it justified Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia. It is also true that in recent years, the 3 different peoples of Indochina were united under French rule. That is no reason why they should now be united against their wishes under the rule of the Viet Minh.

To sum up, I repeat that there are now 3 chapters to our work. Military talks between representatives of the 2 commands are proceeding. As I have said, we await a report upon these. In respect, however, to the arrangements for supervision, and the future of Laos and Cambodia, the divergencies are at present wide and deep. Unless we can narrow them now without further delay, we shall have failed in our task. We have exhausted every expedient of procedure which we could devise to assist us in our work. We all know now what the differences are.

We have no choice but to resolve them or to admit our failure. For our part, the United Kingdom delegation is still willing to attempt to resolve them, here or in restricted session, or by any other method which our colleagues may prefer. But if the positions remain as they are today, then it is our clear duty to say so [to] the world, and to admit that we have failed.”

SMITH

110.11 DU/6-1054 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

SAN FRANCISCO, June 10, 1954—6 p. m.

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

1. The following my comments on Under Secretary's Dulte 164 repeated as Number 2 from Department.<sup>1</sup>

1. I agree that Geneva is getting us nowhere on Indochina except backwards. The pendency of negotiations leads to delaying vital decisions on our side while the Communists pursue actively and vigorously their program of action in Indochina. I had hoped that we too might have had a program of action while Geneva was going on, but this the British rejected. The sooner the British get into a mood where we can seriously talk with them about collective action the better off we shall be. I agree with the issues he names but I could not agree that they are necessarily the only public issues on which we would break. For example, I feel that there has been a general lack of good faith and a use of Geneva as a cover to promote Communist aggression.

2. I have no particular opinion about Eden seeing Molotov again. Also I am quite sure that this action in that respect will not be influenced by either your opinion or mine. I concede that there is some advantage in getting a better understanding by India and Burma provided this is not at the expense of alienating Korea, Formosa, the Philippines and Thailand. I know that the British look upon the former as their particular friends and the latter as our friends. But apart from this difference, the latter group are willing and able to fight and that is an element which I fear is conspicuously lacking in the former group.

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 9, p. 1083. The Secretary's comments were repeated to Under Secretary Smith in Geneva as telegram Tedul 185, June 11. (790.5/6-1154)

In telegram Tedul 183, June 10, Acting Secretary of State Murphy informed Smith that he had "forwarded your Dulte 164 to the Secretary and he is thinking about it. I doubt that any substantive comments can be forthcoming before his return Saturday [June 12] when we will know outcome French confidence vote, but we will of course send you comments just as soon as we can." (751G.00/6-954)

3. I hesitate to make a firm decision now about Cambodia and Laos until we know what will be the policy toward Vietnam. A program for Laos and Cambodia, excluding Vietnam, will almost surely be interpreted in Vietnam and elsewhere as its total abandonment, and until we see no alternative to such abandonment, I would not want to promote it by UN action on behalf of Cambodia and Laos alone.

4. With reference to the Thai application, I agree that it should not expressly include neighboring ARMAs, but also I agree that it should not expressly exclude POC operations outside of Thailand.

5. With reference to Commonwealth withdrawal from Korea, this is partly a military problem, but even more a political and psychological problem. We are going to have a hard time restraining Rhee from open military action following the termination of the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference. Until we have lived through the immediate crisis which I think will follow the termination of Korean talks in Geneva I would prefer to avoid adding any elements which he can seize on as a further excuse for independent action.

6. I do not agree that nothing can be salvaged from Vietnam. That very largely depends upon the UK itself. I feel confident that the Communists are prepared to stop wherever we are prepared to stand. However, that stand must be a united one to be effective, and the one element so far conspicuously lacking in that unity is the UK.

7. On the question of what we and UK do if France insists on continuing negotiations after we believe they have collapsed, I believe answer would be to reduce our delegations in stature. I believe, for example, you should then return, perhaps leaving Robertson in charge, and that there should be corresponding action by UK. If this happened and then we began the united-front talks which we had planned for early April, that in my opinion would prevent French continuance at Geneva from thwarting all our plans.

8. As regards internationalization, it should be made clear to the French that our offer does not indefinitely lie on the table to be picked up by them one minute before midnight. As we instructed Dillon to tell Laniel, our offer was made in the light of conditions at the time, and conditions could so deteriorate that no point intervention could be successful. The French cannot permit Geneva to be dragged out indefinitely while the situation in Indochina deteriorates and then at same time at sometime in July expect our position to be precisely as it was in April. I believe we should begin to think of putting a time limit on our intervention offer.



110.11 DU/6-1054 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Seattle*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1054—7:18 p. m.

07. For the Secretary from Murphy. Re our telephone conversation this afternoon.<sup>2</sup> The evolution in Eden's thinking (assuming it is supported by British Cabinet) as set forth in Dulte 164<sup>3</sup> could be very significant and radically change our tactical possibilities both in Geneva and indeed with respect to Southeast Asia. I think generally we would agree with Eden's analysis and with Bedell's comments thereon. In his comments Bedell has pointed out some very knotty questions. One is what we and the U.K. (on the assumption that the U.K. will go along with Eden's views) should do if France insists on continuing the negotiations when the U.K. and ourselves feel that the time to break has come. If we act with the British, other Europeans may go along with us and although the French can be expected to react strongly, at least the full brunt of the blame will not rest uniquely on the U.S.

I do not think that we should send any reply to Dulte 164 until after your return on Saturday when we should know the outcome of the French Assembly's vote of confidence. If the Laniel Government falls, we will obviously be faced with a different situation. But in any event Dulte 164 raises such important basic issues that I do not think we should rush a reply until we have assessed carefully the possibilities and the corresponding tactics. This I believe we will only be able really to do following your return and in light of the French Assembly vote.

In the meantime, we shall try our best to have some thoughts to go over with you on Saturday.

MURPHY

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by MacArthur.<sup>2</sup> Memorandum of telephone conversation between Secretary Dulles and Murphy, June 10, 12:15 p. m., not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers)<sup>3</sup> Dated June 9, p. 1083.

JUNE 11, 1954

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 303

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(Page) to the Coordinator of the Delegation (Johnson)*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 11, 1954.

I saw Laloy this morning. He stated that he had not yet seen Mr. Bidault who had just returned and who was going back to Paris this evening. Bidault will attend the Korean Plenary this afternoon and I

suggested that it might be a good idea if he and the General could get together for a few minutes during the intermission.

It seems that the French delegation took a very dim view of yesterday's Plenary and believed it represented even a further hardening of Communist position. What seems to distress them the most is the Communist proposal, made by Dong and strongly supported by Molotov, that bilateral political talks be carried on between the French and the Vietminhese parallel with the military talks. He felt that this proposal might also be an attempt to influence French public opinion, for if turned down by Bidault, segments of French foreign opinion would say that Bidault was not taking every opportunity to arrive at a peace in Indochina and was still backing up Bao Dai. So far as Laloy was aware, the French would continue to adhere to their position that a cease-fire must be agreed upon before political discussions were initiated. He had no other views on the Indochinese phase of the Conference or of the termination of the Conference saying that so much depended upon action in Paris tomorrow. He was inclined to think that the French Government would fall, but that a new government could be formed without Laniel and Pleven, "the two enemies of the people," possibly headed by Faure.

---

751G.00/6-1154 : Telegram

*The Chargé in India (Mills) to the Department of State*

SECRET

NEW DELHI, June 11, 1954—3 p. m.

1804. Repeated information Geneva 27, London 340. Acting UK HICOM Middleton gave me following strictly confidential report on Nehru-Casey meetings yesterday June 10. Casey reportedly told Nehru that Australia had a special relationship with US through ANZUS which was very important to his country because of geographic situation but in no sense made Australia a satellite of US. Nehru indicated understanding. Casey then said Hanoi could only hold out for few weeks, fate of Vietnam as a whole in jeopardy, and essential that Laos and Cambodia be treated separately from Vietnam. Nehru indicated no objection to this proposition. Casey then brought up proposal that Colombo conference countries serve on supervisory commission. Nehru became evasive and stated he could not comment on this because no invitation had been extended. Casey reportedly gained impression current Nehru policy unclear but apparently intent on "dis-aligning" India from any halfway agreement to take responsibility in Indochina. Sudden departure of Krishna Menon from Geneva may mean Indians

realize Geneva about to fold up and Menon and India wish to avoid any connection with this development.

Pillai, as well as Nehru, appears to Middleton to be rapidly back-tracking. On arrival of Casey at airport June 10, Pillai told Middleton he hoped latter had not reported to London on his purely personal and preliminary views re Colombo countries as cease-fire supervisors. He had indicated many days ago that idea was an interesting one, although in subsequent discussion he had questioned having Pakistan on such a commission since its neutrality could be considered doubtful. Apparently this attitude towards Pakistan had also been raised by Menon in Geneva. Later yesterday, June 10, Middleton found Pillai had clammed up completely.

*Comment:* Middleton asked me to use his comments with care since it is embarrassing when he receives cables telling him he has talked too freely with American Embassy.

I saw Middleton today after he had met with Casey and Canadian and Australian HICOM's, and his comments probably represent consensus their views. Nehru's evasive comment on Colombo countries as supervisors obviously was begging the question as special correspondents at Geneva in stories published in New Delhi press yesterday and today have shifted abruptly from eulogies of Eden to attacking him as having given way to US pressures. Middleton considers this abrupt change probably result of "guidance" by Krishna Menon. If Indochina discussions at Geneva now end in failure, it more than likely that blame will be attributed to West by Indian press.

MILLS

---

396.1 GE/6-1154: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 11, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 425. Repeated information Paris 420, Saigon 163. A delegation of North Vietnamese nationalists, after a three days pow-wow with Bao Dai, have been here in Geneva for two days and are returning next week to Vietnam. The group consists of Le Toan, Pham Huu Chuong, Tran Trungdung, Nguyen Thuc, Nguyen Tienny, Le Quang Luat. Foreign Minister Dinh had me to dinner with them last night.

The apparent leader of the group was Le Toan but the most active and voluble was Dr. Chuong.

In talking with them last night I told them I thought the elements necessary to improve the cause of Vietnam would be formal signature of the independence treaty, more autonomy or separate identity for

the Vietnamese national army (on which the group was insistent) and leadership.

Chuong, accompanied by Hy, called on Heath this morning. Chuong said that Bao Dai had finally agreed to set up in the immediate future, a new government of national unity and under "honest and dedicated" prime minister whose name, however, Chuong did not divulge. He will perhaps be Ngo Dinh Diem. Chuong said that Bao Dai was less interested in signing the treaties than in obtaining agreement from the French that the Vietnamese command would enjoy a definite consultative voice in French military planning and decisions. Chuong said a written proposal for such an arrangement had been tentatively presented by the Vietnamese military but had been rejected by the French high command. Chuong said Bao Dai would not return to Vietnam until he had such an agreement. Heath replied that we could not comment on the proposal until we saw a copy of it but he was of the opinion that the French would not reject any reasonable proposal. If Bao Dai felt strongly about it why did not he go immediately to Paris and take it up with Plevin? Heath went on to say that he understood consultative arrangements between the Vietnamese and French staffs were already in existence adding that formal arrangements were less important than having Vietnamese defense teams with the necessary will and the military knowledge to insure a hearing by the French high command. He added that after Bao Dai's presentation of his request to Plevin he saw every reason why Bao Dai should return promptly his Vietnam.

Chuong then outlined a project of his group which was the formation of an underground guerrilla force which would infiltrate present Viet Minh territory and operate a stay-behind resistance in any new territory acquired by the Viet Minh. He asked whether American arms and equipment would be available to such a group. He was told no reply could be made in advance of a definite Vietnamese Government request and convincing plan for such operations.

Heath said he had, of course, no criticism to make of the present government or any suggestions about government changes but it was clear that immediate effective and determined governmental performance was vitally necessary in Vietnam. Certainly one element in the hesitancy of friendly nations towards extending assistance to Vietnam was their doubt that there existed an effective cohesive movement determined to fight for the territorial integrity of that country. There was no time to be lost in proving to world opinion that such a movement did exist in Vietnam.

110.11 DU/6-1154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 11, 1954—10 p. m.

Dulte 172. Repeated information Saigon 162, Paris 419. Re Tedul 159<sup>1</sup> and Secto 422.<sup>2</sup> In view of the deteriorating situation in Indochina and Frederic-Du Pont's statement, with which I agree, that Bao Dai's staying on in France intensifies highly adverse French opinion of him (Secto 389, June 5<sup>3</sup>), I believe if Bao Dai does not come to Annecy or Evian in the immediate future where I can talk with him personally, that Heath might see him in Cannes.<sup>4</sup>

While I would raise the question of a consultative-constituent assembly suggested in Tedul 110, May 22<sup>5</sup> and would draw him out, as suggested in Tedul 159, as to what the French could do to establish conviction in the Vietnamese people to fight for independence and how a more effective government can be established, my main theme would be to impress on him the necessity of his immediate return to his country to see that necessary political and military reform measures were undertaken with maximum determination.

I would expect him to press for assurance that America would back his government with arms and financial aid whether or not the French stayed in. In this case I would remind him of the important aid which Vietnam had received and is receiving and our continuing efforts to promote united action in the area, but I would definitely refuse to give him any assurance that his government will be backed by US.<sup>6</sup> I would remind him, however, of what you said when his Foreign Minister called on you, "that any nation determined to fight on to preserve its independence would find friends and allies but would find none if there was no will to continue the struggle". (Dulte 50, May 4<sup>7</sup>).

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 5, p. 1044.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 11, p. 1106.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram Secto 389, not printed, transmitted a report on a meeting of Heath and Frederic-Dupont. For a memorandum of that conversation, see p. 1041.

<sup>4</sup> The Department of State instructed the U.S. Delegation in telegram Tedul 190, June 12 as follows: "During present French governmental crisis, and pending a decision as to what we may be able to do in Indochina, I think it just as well that you should not seek an interview with Bao Dai. If he should ask to see you, however, we shall consider together at that time what you could most appropriately say to him." (110.11 DU/6-1154)

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 892.

<sup>6</sup> At his news conference of June 10, President Eisenhower indicated that he did not intend to request special authority to take action in Indochina from Congress before it recessed for the summer. For the record of the news conference, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, pp. 545-554.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, p. 666.

JUNE 12, 1954

110.11 DU/6-1354 : Telegram

*Smith-Eden Meeting, Geneva, June 12, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 13, 1954—noon.

Dulte 176. Repeated information Moscow 119, London 273, Paris 425. Limit distribution. Eden came to see me immediately following his talk with Molotov yesterday morning on Indochina. Eden said Molotov agreed with his analysis of the three fundamental issues facing the conference: That is; (1) separate treatment of Laos and Cambodia, (2) functions and powers impartial supervisory organization, (3) composition impartial supervisory organization.

With respect to the first, in reply to Eden's statement that the Vietminh invaders must withdraw, Molotov suggested that "we go on thinking about it". Molotov then went on to suggest that some "neutral formula" be found under which military staff talks on Laos and Cambodia could be gotten under way. Although neither Molotov nor British mentioned or discussed any specific form of words, Eden gained impression that Molotov had in mind a proposal to general effect that "military talks be held between the staffs in order to deal with disposition of forces in Laos and Cambodia with view to preparing a cessation of hostilities". Eden pointed out very doubtful such a formula would accomplish anything, as Laos and Cambodia would immediately demand formula be interpreted as calling for withdrawal of Vietminh forces, and Vietminh would make opposite interpretation. Eden said he thought it important any formula arrived at make specific that military staff discussions would be with regard withdrawal Vietminh forces but could obtain no commitment from Molotov along this line. Eden stated he was not sure whether Molotov's apparent attempt to find formula get separate staff talks going Laos and Cambodia was a face-saving gesture to cover Vietminh withdrawal or stalling device, but was inclined toward latter view. However, felt he must pass on to us, as well as France, Laos and Cambodia. He was to see them yesterday afternoon. Both of us felt they would also reject. In this event, he plans again see Molotov, probably today (he said he hoped for last time) and pass rejection on to him.

On political side Molotov stated they wanted elections in all three of the Associated States. Eden said he recalled that Laotians had expressed willingness hold elections under UN supervision following

<sup>1</sup> For a further report on this meeting, see telegram Dulte 178, June 13, p. 1130.

withdrawal Vietminh forces, but apparently not much discussion on this point.

Respect composition and operation supervisory commission, Molotov said that he was not necessarily opposed to having majority decisions some questions, but remained firm on 50-50 composition. He rejected Eden's suggestion of each side adding one to the five Colombo powers. Molotov suggested conference might begin examination categories of questions upon which majority vote and unanimous vote of supervisory organization would be required. Eden rejected pointing out impracticability and lack of real distinction between majority and unanimous vote with 50-50 composition. Eden said Molotov mentioned published reports India would refuse to serve with Pakistan. (Eden said to us with some bitterness this reflected Menon's activities.)

Molotov asked Eden for another Indochina plenary Monday suggesting might return to restricted sessions after that. Eden demurred, pointing out futility of sessions under present conditions, but Molotov was insistent. I said if session held would plan to make statement. We discussed without conclusion having Laos and Cambodia at Monday's session<sup>2</sup> indicate that as they had been unable to obtain any results at conference, were bringing their case before UN.

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> June 14.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 252 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1954—1 p. m.

Tosec 406. It seems clear from Canberra's 290 rptd Tosec 371,<sup>2</sup> other messages from Peaslee and talks here with Spencer that Australians are convinced of the need for developing collective arrangements for Southeast Asia area. With recent development in Eden's position, it should be easier for Australia and New Zealand to assist in carrying project forward and I am sure Casey's return to Geneva will give you opportunity to enlist his aid. I understand he plans return home via Washington and in your discretion tell him I am delighted he plans stop in Washington and will look forward to opportunity of good discussions with him. Suggest to him that he let me know his plans as soon as they are firm.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated to Canberra as telegram 246.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 8. p. 1062.

396.1 GE/6-1254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 12, 1954—1 p. m.

Dulte 173. Repeated information Paris 422, Moscow 118, London 271. Limit distribution. Last evening Bidault informed me French officer had contacted alone Viet Minh officer who said Viet Minh would demand Tonkin, and would be disposed to be "generous" in the south. He continued he did not like present military situation in delta where Viet Minh much stronger and thinking aloud wondered whether it might not be wiser to give up entire area through negotiation than lose it militarily once it had been determined French could not hold out. Thus it might be possible evacuate French and Vietnamese forces. Said in any event he would consult French military authority.

I outlined to him Zhukov's remarks to Kingsbury-Smith (reference Secto 423, repeated information Paris 418, Moscow 116, London 268),<sup>1</sup> saying that Zhukov was sometimes rather reliable but that I doubted Viet Minh would offer Hanoi and Haiphong, although this might be their final selling price for most of interior.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Telegram Secto 423, June 11, not printed, transmitted a summary of the Zhukov-Kingsbury Smith conversation to the Department. (396.1 GE/6-1154) For a memorandum of the conversation, dated June 10, see p. 1109.

751G.00/6-1254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 12, 1954—2 p. m.

Dulte 174. Pass Defense. Reference Tosec 392.<sup>1</sup> I note with concern decision to withhold US commitment regarding US training Vietnamese troops. I fully appreciate desirability concluding complete agreement with French on overall operational plan for US participation in Indochina conflict. However, irrespective of such agreement, I sincerely hope and strongly recommend that decision regarding US training mission will be reconsidered for following reasons:

(a) Negotiations at Geneva on Indochina reaching a stage where any indication of US support has effect of strengthening the French position. Decision on training Vietnamese troops would have particularly desirable effect, since it is positive action which can readily be taken during course of conference.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 10; see volume XIII.



(b) French military discussions with Viet Minh at Geneva have made no appreciable progress. French military representatives have indicated on several occasions to Defense representatives at Geneva necessity of action by the US. Commitment of training mission would even without commitment US intervention, lend support to French military in their negotiations at Geneva.

(c) As I have pointed out, if there is a settlement at Geneva under present conditions it will probably result in partition of Indochina, no matter what it is called. This would result in loss of part of Vietnam. How much of Vietnam is actually lost may depend on our decisions in connection with helping to create and train a Vietnamese national defense force. Action would have to be taken, even if this undesirable type of settlement should be made, to strengthen Vietnamese forces to defend remainder of area. In my view US training mission under these conditions would still be desirable.

(d) Thursday night at Vietnamese dinner I had discussion with group of nationalist Vietnamese leaders who were formerly associated with the Viet Minh. They are sure to attempt to persuade Vietnamese to continue the struggle and have indicated their willingness to lend all possible support. As conditions they have mentioned specifically conclusion of a treaty and establishment of a national Vietnamese army. They further indicated that, as undesirable as it would be, partition would be better than a coalition government with the Viet Minh which would inevitably lead to Communist control of all of Vietnam. I have no way of estimating the determination and strength of these Vietnamese leaders; however, believe it an encouraging sign. US action on training Vietnamese forces would assist in bolstering resistance among Vietnamese as well as French to unsatisfactory settlement.

(e) Inasmuch as we have long discussed possibility of training of Vietnamese forces, prior to any discussion of intervention, consider that it would logically be handled separately from question of US military participation in Indochina conflict.

If the decision not to train Vietnamese forces apart from an overall operational plan stands, I strongly recommend that every effort be made to expedite conclusion of final agreement with French if situation in Indochina is not to deteriorate to a point where the entire area is in danger of falling to the Communists.

Since drafting the above message I have seen Dillon's 4812<sup>2</sup> in which I fully concur.

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 4812 from Paris, June 11, Ambassador Dillon recommended that if the United States was no longer interested in helping with the training of the Vietnamese army except in the framework of united military action in Indochina, the United States should promptly inform the French in order to avoid future misunderstanding. (751G.00/6-1154) For the full text of telegram 4812, see volume XIII.

110.11 DU/6-1254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 12, 1954—4 p. m.

Dulte 175. Repeated information Paris 423. Gromyko told me yesterday Communists could not accept Colombo Powers for Indo-chinese Supervisory Commission. He asked what was "minimum" US position. I reaffirmed that US could not accept "50-50" composition, that Laos and Cambodia must be treated separately, and that we could not associate ourselves with any form of capitulation on principle in Indochina.

SMITH

---

*Editorial Note*

On June 12, the government of Joseph Laniel was defeated in the National Assembly on the issue of Indochina by a vote of 306 to 293. The government resigned the following day. In despatch 3373 from Paris, June 30, the Embassy transmitted a detailed analysis of the debates leading to the fall of the Laniel government. (751G.00/6-3054)

On June 17, Pierre Mendès-France was elected Premier of France by the National Assembly. The vote was 419 to 47 with a large number of abstentions. In his statement of policy delivered prior to the vote, Mendès-France undertook to resign if he were unable to obtain a cease-fire in Indochina on reasonable terms by July 20.

Mendès-France formally took office on June 18. He also assumed the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs.

JUNE 13, 1954

Conference files, lot 60 D 627. CF 322

*Memorandum by Richard V. Hennes to the Head of the United States Delegation (Smith)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[GENEVA,] June 13, 1954.

GENERAL SMITH: The London *Times* article directly charges the Secretary with accusing Mr. Eden of going back on his agreement prior to the Geneva Conference. The fact that this article was sent to you in one copy and that another copy was then given our messenger delivering the text of the Secretary's speech, indicates a considerable degree of British concern. Although about one-third of the article is devoted to the Secretary's reference to Stimson,<sup>1</sup> which was the burden

<sup>1</sup> Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State, 1929-1933.

of Mr. Eden's complaint, it seems likely that Eden's real concern is at his being publicly charged with breaking faith.

The Stimson argument has been going on for years. Most reputable diplomatic historians in the US and UK have concluded that neither the US nor Great Britain was willing to stop the Japanese in Manchuria in 1931-32. This conclusion is closer to the British position than to the one expressed by the Secretary. The latter has had some currency in journalistic circles in the US.

With regard to the section impugning Eden's reliability, which was changed by the Secretary at your request, I would guess that the British had intercepted somewhere along the line the original text and were positive of the meaning and therefore reacted to it rather than to the modified language. A comparison of the two versions is attached.

I suggest that you might tell Mr. Eden that we too have a public opinion problem, that considerable segments of our population are firmly convinced that we were duped into two world wars by evil foreigners, and that collective security may be made more acceptable to these isolationist elements if it is presented with a made-in-America tag. By depicting the foreigner as reluctant and, in particular, by "twisting the lion's tail," we have a far better chance of bringing our isolationists along in a united action.

You might wish to refer to your personal knowledge of mid-Western sentiment if you use this rationalization.

RVH

[Attachment]

### *Original Text*

The British and French governments said that they were ready to take part with the other countries principally concerned in an examination of the possibilities of establishing a collective defense. But the British government subsequently concluded that any such examination should await the results of the Geneva conference. The French also were still hesitant on "internationalization".

### *Delivered Text*

I went to Europe in this mission and it seemed that there was agreement on our proposal. But when we moved to translate that proposal into reality, some of the parties held back because they had concluded that any steps to create a united defense should await the results of the Geneva conference.

### *Original Text*

The morale of the French and national forces is strained under the impact of mounting enemy power on their front and political vacillation at their rear.

*Delivered Text*

The French and national forces feel the strain of mounting enemy power on their front and of political uncertainty at their rear.

---

790.5/6-1354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 13, 1954—2 p. m.

Dulte 178. During Eden's visit yesterday I read to him suitably expurgated extracts your Tedul 185,<sup>1</sup> emphasizing particularly the importance of collective action and the time already lost without serious talks. I said this represented the strong view of the President and yourself, and that while I realized sensitive position of Britain re own public opinion India and Burma, et cetera, I was sure that in this matter we had been right from beginning. Eden repeated that Churchill "would not send troops to Vietnam". I said that if French could hold Hanoi-Haiphong area, or Haiphong and an enclave along coast, we should decide where to draw line on which we take our stand in south of Vietnam and elsewhere in SEA. If the military talks in Washington were making any progress they should at least have the alternatives ready for consideration and decision at the time of the PMs visit.

I then spoke of the political and psychological factors re withdrawal part of UK forces from Korea and critical nature of period after Geneva. Eden said there was nothing imminent on this and they intended to leave it for discussion in Washington.

New subject. I have just had long talk with Casey and conveyed message your Tosec 406.<sup>2</sup> He plans to return via Washington and will let you know. He is convinced of necessity of collective guarantees on Cambodia, Laos, and what can be saved of Vietnam. Also convinced that there must be, as he put it "teeth in those" guarantees. He had expressed these views strongly to Nehru, saying that he hoped that same group Asiatic and European nations that gave the guarantees would provide the teeth, and that India and Pakistan would associate themselves with such a group. Nehru did not reject this, and had apparently discussed it later and at length with Pillai and Mrs. Pandit, who were present at dinner that evening where discussion continued. Casey felt that when he left, Nehru was favorable, but that the influence of Menon, with whom he talked last night, would continue to be bad.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 1 from the Secretary of State to the Department of State, June 10, repeated to Geneva as Tedul 185, June 11, p. 1117.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 12, p. 1125.

751G.00/6-1354 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

PARIS, June 13, 1954—2 p. m.

4832. Sent Geneva 389 repeated information Department 4832. We took up with De Margerie June 12 contents Tedul 175 to Geneva.<sup>1</sup> He had no specific comments on particular points raised but he had following general observations to make :

1. He could not help but feel that there was a growing "discrepancy" between the context of these secret negotiations of conditions for U.S. intervention in Indochina and recent public statement by highest American officials which the French could only interpret as meaning that there was less and less disposition in Washington to intervene militarily. It was becoming increasingly obscure as to what and when the U.S. intended or was prepared to do. The points raised in Tedul 175 he considered reflected this constantly increasing tendency on our part toward more caution, more conditions and more qualifications.

2. Margerie expressed opinion that Admiral Radford's suggestion to Valluy about possible use ROK units in Indochina was most disturbing and again reflected U.S. intention to withhold direct American military intervention.<sup>2</sup> He considered any such plan as extremely dangerous, not only because it might break uneasy Korean truce arrangements but would provide tailor-made excuse for open Chinese intervention in Indochina, should Peking so decide. He added that the formula that "Asians should fight Asians" was an extremely dangerous one and concluded by saying that any threat or plan to use ROK units in Indochina was a "false deterrent" and the formula for extension of the war with the loss of any Asian support.

3. Margerie stated that Lippman's analysis which appeared in Paris *Herald Tribune* June 11 entitled "The Best of a Bad Job" had found wide acceptance in France.

4. Bidault, Margerie thought, would almost certainly remain on as Foreign Minister, no matter who succeeded Laniel. Washington must realize, however, that Bidault would return to Geneva with virtually no cards whatsoever in his hands to obtain a cease-fire and an honorable armistice arrangement with the Communist side. The logic of this situation is that Bidault will now be compelled to go much further with the Vietminh than he has ever been prepared to go. In short all along the only real deterrent to the Russians, Chinese and Vietminh has been the fear of possible, probable and serious U.S. intervention. If this card is now virtually withdrawn from the play, as it now appears to be, or its presence and validity discounted by the opposition, there is very little left for the French to do except to bargain for the best terms obtainable which are now almost certain to be extremely bad for France and the West.

5. Margerie stated that Bidault had all along been in favor of the U.S. taking over training responsibilities for the Vietnamese National Army but could not understand why nothing apparently was being

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 8, p. 1081.

<sup>2</sup> See telegram Tedul 178, June 9, p. 1100.

done about this since General Ely had indicated some weeks ago his acquiescence. Margerie said that unless we got our training personnel in soon a cease-fire arrangement would probably freeze the situation in such a way that it would be impossible for us to introduce additional personnel at a later date.

Margerie commented that we should consider the foregoing comments to be his own and not necessarily reflecting precisely the views of Bidault or how his chief would express them at this time.

As set forth in Embtel 4780 June 9,<sup>3</sup> in his speech before the National Assembly on Wednesday, Bidault nowhere mentioned the U.S. or its role in Indochina or at Geneva, and we got the impression from Margerie that Bidault's feeling toward the U.S. is becoming increasingly bitter, primarily for the reasons outlined in paragraph 1.

DILLON

---

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

---

396.1 GE/6-1454 : Telegram

*Smith-Eden-Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, June 13, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

NIAC

GENEVA, June 14, 1954—10 a. m.

Dulte 179. Repeated information London 275, Paris 426, Moscow 120. Limit distribution. I met with Eden and Chauvel Sunday evening.

Eden reported he had informed Laotian and Cambodian delegations Molotov's suggestion for military talks with those countries (Dulte 176<sup>1</sup>) and that both had replied could not consider agreeing such talks unless it was clear they would be about withdrawal of Viet Minh troops. Cambodia had no objections to a plenary or restricted session on Laos and Cambodia, provided it was clearly understood they would not modify their attitude.

Eden also reported that Laotians have asked his advice on whether they should appeal to UN and Cambodians had indicated if they failed to get satisfaction at this conference they could take their case elsewhere. Eden said he considered it necessary give both delegations clear indication his views. He proposed tell both of them that having failed secure at Geneva withdrawal of Viet Minh forces, if they thought it right take their case to UN on ground their territories had been invaded, they could count on UK approval and support. However, ground would need preparing here, possibly by asking for early meet-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 13, p. 1124.

ing on Laos and Cambodia to discuss Mr. Molotov's suggestion, and if at meeting it became apparent no further progress toward settlement, Laos and Cambodia delegations might if they wish announce at meeting or soon thereafter intention take case to UN.

Eden indicated he was thinking in terms Laos and Cambodia bringing their case to UN as aggression, moving first to Security Council and then immediately to General Assembly under Part A Uniting for Peace Resolution, stating that "If we mean to draw a line, this is the way we might do it".

Eden also stressed view that if conference drags on and Viet Minh take advantage situation switch troops for major invasion of Laos and Cambodia, we would bear heavy responsibility if we had discouraged them from proceeding to UN. He also said he strongly felt we were losing by staying on any longer; the time had come to recess the conference while French-Viet Minh military talks continued. If anything developed from those talks which should be reported to conference, it could be reconvened.

Chauvel professed ignorance of Bidault's thinking, repeating French view on getting POC into Cambodia and Laos through Thai appeal. He made obscure statement to effect that in "underground military talks" with Viet Minh which are going on simultaneously with military staff talks, Viet Minh had said there was no chance getting anything on Vietnam if French position on Laos and Cambodia maintained. He said in these talks French had feeling that the Chinese were pushing Viet Minh move into Laos and Cambodia and that Viet Minh were not in control that situation. Stated he felt question Laos and Cambodia appeal to UN only one of timing and that effort should first be made get military talks going on satisfactory basis for Laos and Cambodia, and if this failed those two countries should go ahead with appeal to UN.

I said that I did not see why appeal by Laos and Cambodia under Part A Uniting for Peace Resolution should interfere with action on Thai appeal—they could both go along together. However Thai appeal should be pressed as both would take about same time. I raised question of what effect separate appeal by Laos would have on writing off Vietnam. Eden and Chauvel both thought that there was basic difference between situation in Laos and Cambodia and that in Vietnam both with respect to actual conditions on the spot and with respect to conference, that appeal by Laos and Cambodia would not have harmful effects on Vietnam; that is, Laos and Cambodia were clearly victims external aggression and with respect to conference military talks were going on re Vietnam, whereas no basis for military talks on Laos and Cambodia had been found.

I fully agreed that things should be wound up here as quickly as possible so that we can get ahead on serious talks on collective action as only real means of improving situation. I said important decisions must be made, and this cannot be done while unprofitable debate is going on here. Only if the Communists believe we are going to do something is there likely to be improvement in present situation, and the sooner we got ahead on this, the better.

Eden said that if the Cambodian and Laotian delegations agreed, he would see Molotov Monday morning and suggest an early meeting on Laos and Cambodia, while warning Molotov that there is no change in the basic position on our side.

Eden said in deference to French views, he would not yet inform Laos and Cambodia they could count on UK approval and support, but would otherwise talk to them along lines set forth second paragraph this message.

During course conversation Chauvel said it was obvious that "official" military staff talks will not and cannot get anywhere; (in characteristic Chauvel fashion) he has hopes that the very secret "underground" military talks which are going on simultaneously might get some place (Dulte 173<sup>2</sup>). He is anxious that at least official military talks continue to provide cover for secret talks. Chauvel said he was going to phone Bidault and urge he return to Geneva Monday.

[Here follows a paragraph which dealt with Korea; for text, see page 371.]

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 12, p. 1126.

#### JUNE 14, 1954

396.1 GE/6-1454 : Telegram

*Heath-Dac Khe-Bonsal Meeting, Geneva, June 14, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 14, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 437. Repeated information Paris 430, Saigon 164. Dac Khe, Vietnam Minister of Democratization and Deputy Chief of Geneva delegation, talked to Ambassador Heath and Bonsal this morning.

In Dac Khe's view, there was a course of action which could save Vietnam from complete takeover by the Communists. That would be for Bao Dai to return immediately to Vietnam to be with his troops and to back up a new government presided by Ngo Dinh Diem, in a campaign of official austerity, honesty of pitiless severity against past



and present governmental grafters. That was the first step. The next step must, in Dac Khe's view, be a program of real agrarian reform and social betterment for the peasant  $\frac{9}{10}$ ths of the population. The American economic aid program should be revised to serve exclusively needs of the agricultural population. A third step, which Dac Khe personally favored, was creation of a consultative assembly of limited legislative powers but inclusion the right to legislate on the budget.

A major reason that Viet Minh had made progress was general disbelief in the various Bao Dai governments to date. If elections were held at present, Viet Minh would win it. If really free supervised elections were held six months from now, neither the Viet Minh nor Bao Dai would gain a majority. But this situation could be changed substantially for the better in a matter of days or weeks. The new regime should arrest and send to Poulo Condor, the grafters, of which the government has already a list, preferably shooting the 4 or 5 most guilty.

There would be time successfully to initiate these reform measures Dac Khe thought. In spite of French desires for a cease-fire, it would be almost impossible for the French to arrive at a negotiated cease-fire in the immediate future in view of Viet Minh intransigence and Vietnamese resistance to such a move.

Bao Dai's stock had fallen in Vietnam since 1949, Dac Khe said, but so had Ho Chi Minh's. Bao Dai had retained, however, a residual prestige which could be improved.

Dac Khe said that while Bao Dai lacked character, he, nevertheless, could be persuaded to undertake the decisive action necessary, but only the United States seconded by France could "persuade" Bao Dai to go into action.

There had to be plain talk of a firmness that neither France nor the United States had yet used with Bao Dai. It would be a most disagreeable interview for both sides because the past failings of Bao Dai and his governments would have to be frankly reviewed. Dac Khe suggested that Bao Dai would accept Heath's criticism and recommendations because of his belief in the latter's friendship.

Heath and Bonsal listened to all this without comment. When Dac Khe said, however, that Bao Dai would probably insist on assurance of American backing if he took the action requested, Heath remarked that some weeks ago when Bao Dai said he would insist on autonomy for Vietnam national army, Dac Khe had said to him that was a request to be made from the field of battle and not from Cannes or Paris. Heath asked why the same observation would not apply for a request for foreign backing; viz., if Bao Dai and his regime showed improved

performance and action on the ground, then would be the time to ask their friends for support. Dac Khe agreed.

Returning to Diem, Dac Khe said he would be an excellent man to lead off in exterminating corruption but would not be good in rallying the peasants. Diem was essentially a mandarin of the ideal type described by Confucius. Diem's criticism of Bao Dai's regimes was that there were too many mandarins of the bad type. Diem was an honest mystic of an age that had passed. Diem did not believe in agrarian reform except of an administrative mandarin type. He did not believe in a popular assembly. Both these measures, particularly the first, in Dac Khe's opinion, were absolutely necessary. The latter personally favored calling a selected peasant congress to determine the general lines of an agrarian reform. A strong government could guide the deliberations of such a congress and not let it get out of hand as did the "national congress" of last October.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-1454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 14, 1954—10 a. m.

Dulte 180. Eyes only and personal for Secretary from Under Secretary. From his own statements and from other evidence Eden intends to pack up and depart Thursday at latest, taking most of his delegation with him. He will probably leave one or two officers as observers. Bidault will be here from time to time but will probably leave Chauvel in charge while military talks are going on. As indicated in my Dulte 179,<sup>1</sup> French pin their hopes on what Chauvel referred to as the "underground" conversations, which are presumably proceeding under cover of the military talks, and think that while these are going on Vietnam will not make all-out attack on Hanoi. I would think that Molotov will leave about the time Eden does, if we have by then brought things to a head, and I believe we also should depart about the last of this week, leaving a State officer, a military officer, and a stenographer, as observation and reporting group.

Think it is vital to get breaking off issues brought out and Foreign Ministers to go if we are to begin serious talks on collective action, particularly while Churchill is in US and also while Casey is there. I hope five power staff talks have produced some realistic, coordinated estimates which might form the basis of collective action discussions.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 14, p. 1132.

If things go here as we hope, and if general timing is as indicated above, request your approval to proceed accordingly.<sup>2</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> In a memorandum by the Secretary of State of a meeting with the President, June 14, Dulles wrote that he had "reported briefly on the Indochina situation and on conditions in Geneva, and I read to the President Dulte 180 reporting Smith's prospective return coincidentally with Eden's return. The President agreed on such return." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Meetings with the President)

In telegram Tedul 200, June 14, the Department informed the Under Secretary that "On assumption situation develops along lines in Dulte 180 we are giving thought to who should remain behind after you leave Geneva. We agree your view that a State officer, military officer and stenographer would be suitable and are thinking of Bonsal." (396.1 GE/6-1454)

---

396.1 GE/6-1454 : Telegram

*Thirteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 14, 3 p. m.:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 14, 1954—midnight.

Secto 440. Repeated information Paris 432, London 280, Saigon 166, Tokyo 134, Moscow 122, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Thirteenth restricted session, Monday, June 14. Molotov presiding.

Molotov reviewed proposals which have been made during past weeks re joint committee of belligerents and international supervisory commission in connection with implementation agreement on cessation of hostilities in Indochina. He recalled paragraph eight of DRV May 10 proposal and paragraph four of French proposal of May 8, as well as Soviet proposal May 14. Latter proposal included provision for a supervisory commission composed of neutral countries. On May 31, USSR proposed composition to include India, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Pakistan.

Molotov repeated already stated views on Communist side to effect joint commissions of belligerents should work parallel to and not be subordinate to international commission. He recalled Soviet discussion on this matter June 8. He stressed thesis that implementation of armistice agreements is primarily duty of two sides in war. He stated that if either side is determined not to carry out the agreement, no international commission could insure its being carried out.

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/13) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 278. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 7:15 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 291-299. The proposal made by the Soviet Delegation, Indochina Document IC/30, June 14, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279A.

A brief summary of the meeting was transmitted to the Department in telegram Secto 439, June 14. (396.1 GE/6-1454)

On matter of method by which international commission may reach decisions, Molotov for first time advanced that since international commission would be dealing with questions of varying importance, unanimity rule need not be applied to all matters. In certain cases a majority vote would be sufficient with chairman having deciding vote (at end of meeting Molotov stated India should be chairman).

Molotov then submitted detailed proposal transmitted separately via pouch (see Secto 442<sup>2</sup>). Molotov concluded that Soviet delegation believes these proposals take into consideration remarks made by other delegations during discussion this subject and should therefore, facilitate agreement.

USDel (verbatim text transmitted in Secto 441<sup>3</sup>), after referring to importance of two questions brought up by Molotov, namely, authority of international supervisory commission and composition thereof, turned to question of special situation in Laos and Cambodia. He stressed previously stated views regarding independence, constitutional character of these governments and fact that two countries victims of foreign invasion. He concluded with proposal that next restricted session be devoted to problem of restoring peace in Laos and Cambodia.

USDel expressed regret that Molotov continued insist on parallel nature of international supervisory commission and mixed commissions. He made point that submission by former belligerents to authority of a truly impartial international agency would be an essential text of good faith of parties. He also stressed necessity for international commission to be able, in fact, to reach decisions. He again rejected Soviet proposal of India, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Pakistan. He repeated his general acceptance of either Colombo powers or UN selected commission.

French delegation (Chauvel) stated he unable make comparison Molotov's June 8 discussion with present proposal. He criticized most recent Soviet proposal stating that distribution of functions between joint commission and international commission seemed to involve duplication and overlapping. He referred to French June 4 proposals with particular emphasis on fact international commission to be complex, large-scale affair with ample facilities. He questioned whether Molotov's proposal met this point. He added that relationship between international commission and joint commissions as proposed by Molotov, i.e., parallel relationship, appeared to him unsatisfactory. He noted that in Molotov's proposal joint commissions not obliged to recognize or accept decisions of international commission but can refer

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 14, p. 1143.

<sup>3</sup> *Infra.*

those decisions back to international commission. There is, of course, further reference to guarantor powers who would act as sort of super arbiters. This generally unsatisfactory since basis of true control should be body with real power. He referred to old French saying that Roland's mare was most beautiful horse in world, but unfortunately, was dead.

Chauvel then referred to composition of international commission. He characterized Molotov proposal as in effect providing that international commission would have equivalent composition to joint commission since members would represent parties. He said that it should be possible to find a commission made up of true neutrals. He added that Bidault had agreed to the UK proposal re the Colombo powers and French delegation maintains open mind re any proposal involving truce impartiality.

Chauvel expressed himself as being puzzled at Molotov's proposal as to procedure in reaching decisions by the international commission. He said distinction between subjects which can be decided by majority and those to be decided by unanimity not clear. He suggested a list of subjects might be drawn up to make this issue more precise. He expressed fear that requirement of unanimity is provided in those cases which are most important and which therefore are very ones requiring most rapid decision.

Chauvel agreed fully with US delegations position re Laos and Cambodia. He said French Government also through its representatives and agents in those countries could endorse facts and conclusions advanced by Laotian and Cambodian delegations. He added that French delegation has not opposed international control in Laos and Cambodia but has merely said that since military situation there different from that in Vietnam, international control would be applied to different subject matter. Chauvel endorsed US delegation suggestion for early meeting on Laos and Cambodia.

Following recess Chou En-lai, after commenting on the artificial deadlock created by certain delegations made detailed statement in support of Molotov's proposal. He ended by referring to question of Khmer and Pathet-Lao and saying that his delegation was prepared to put forward views on this subject at future meetings.

Dong then stated that for his delegation joint commission was the armistice commission. He referred to previous comments which had cited precedent of 1946 as proof inability such mixed commission to function properly and asserted that state of mind of those who signed 1946 agreements well known to him since he had participated in Fontainebleau meeting. In interim, eight years had passed and many things had happened. Armies had gotten to know each other and at Geneva

conference Viet Minh had made proposals which were generally recognized as reasonable. This had had influence on members of French Expeditionary Corps and from those officers and men taken at Dien Bien Phu Viet Minh knew of their deep desire for peace. These were no longer the men of 1946, and as far as his side was concerned, their desire for peace was indubitable. The Viet Minh army and people would respond as a single man when the order was given for them to respect the armistice. All this led to inevitable conclusion that one could trust the people who would compose joint commission. He was in complete accord with the Soviet proposal.

On subject of Khmer and Pathet-Lao he insisted that basic fact of situation was existence of liberation movement in each country. His delegation was ready to discuss problem on this basis.

He then recalled that on June 10, he had said that three fundamental issues divided the conference: (1) membership of supervisory commission; (2) its authority; and (3) fate of Laos and Cambodia. Despite Molotov's efforts today to deal with technical aspects of commission's function he nevertheless felt that principal differences remain unresolved. Military discussions now in progress was solid achievement and one must await results. He supported US suggestion that day be devoted to Laos and Cambodia but if no progress were made he doubted whether any good purpose served by conference continuing to debate unresolved questions. He suggested that conference might suspend its meetings until military committee could report on its work. He was not asking for an immediate reply from his colleagues but thought they might think it over.

Cambodian delegation pointed out Soviet proposal dealt only with Vietnam. Because of special position of Cambodia he was in full accord with US proposal that next session study Cambodian problem.

Molotov wished to make two supplementary observations re his today's proposal. He thought chairmanship of commission could be settled in usual way and that first named member of commission could be chairman and could have the deciding vote on questions where majority rule accepted. This formula would give India chairmanship. Up to now no objections had been raised re this country. He reiterated that any subordination of joint commission to international supervisory commission would be incorrect since this would imply that joint commission should act on orders of international commission. Presumably such orders could only be enforced by force of arms and would mean that international military forces would have to be introduced into Indochina. Such introduction would be contrary to objective of establishing peace in Indochina. Therefore he insisted to want subordination meant not to want peace. Although he did not consider

information on Laos and Cambodia provided by UK and US reflected sufficient objectivity and his delegation's views were well known he nevertheless had no objection to consideration of this subject at subsequent meeting but would hope such consideration would not preclude consideration of important questions discussed today.

Next restricted meeting Wednesday, June 16.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-1454 : Telegram

*Thirteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 14, 3 p. m.:*  
*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 14, 1954—midnight.

Secto 441. Repeated information Paris 433, Saigon 167, London 281, Tokyo 135, Moscow 123, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Following is verbatim text General Smith's statement made in Indochina restricted session Monday 14 June:

"Mr. Molotov outlined very clearly some of the fundamental questions on which we have not been able to agree. I listened to him with great attention and will examine his proposals with care. I must say, however, that I heard nothing said which truly disposes of the fundamental issues before us. We are still in disagreement as we were before regarding the mandate of the international supervisory commission, regarding the relation between the proposed joint commissions and the international commission, and with regard to the composition of the international commission. We have already stated that agreement on these points is essential if our conference is to succeed.

I should like later to comment on the two most important issues listed by Mr. Molotov with regard to the international supervisory commission and the joint commissions. I should like at this time to remind my colleagues that there is a third question before us, the special situation in Laos and Cambodia.

On the question of Laos and Cambodia, it is my opinion that the statements at our meetings by the delegations of those countries have been clear, accurate and altogether in accordance with the facts. The information given by the delegate of the UK confirms that already available to the US delegation. I would like to point out that the US has been represented by diplomatic missions in Cambodia and Laos as well as in Vietnam since 1950. The US delegation at this conference includes several members who have been and still are assigned to these missions. Other members of this delegation have visited Cambodia and Laos one or more times during the past year or two. They have traveled widely in these two countries; they have talked to people in the cities and in the villages; they have seen with their own eyes the situation as it has developed and they are thoroughly familiar with this situation. American representatives were in these two countries during their last elections in 1951 and were deeply impressed by the

conduct of these elections and by the demonstration of the rapid development of effective democratic institutions in the short period since the constitutions of the two countries came into effect.

I must, therefore, reiterate as a fact what has already been said here, that whatever armed opposition to the legal governments of Cambodia and Laos exists is provided by the military forces of the Viet Minh and the Communist political cadres under the protection of its army.

I accept as a fact and repeat as such the statement of the Cambodian delegate on June 8 that the common denominator of the three wars in Indochina is the presence in each country of Viet Minh troops.

It should be apparent to us all that the problems of Cambodia and Laos could be solved in a single day if the Viet Minh were willing to withdraw its invading regular and irregular troops. A political problem does not exist, as we know both from experience and from the statements by the delegates of Cambodia and Laos before this conference.

The delegation of Cambodia submitted a proposal to our meeting of June 8. This proposal is reasonable and logical in concept and it should be simple in execution.

The delegation of Laos submitted a proposal on May 10 which seemed to us to fit every requirement of the situation. In the opinion of the US delegation, these proposals could be rejected only by those having no interest in the restoration of peace to the two countries. It seems to me that if we have any hope that our conference may make any positive contribution to the restoration of peace in Indochina, we might devote our next restricted session to the problem of how to restore peace to Laos and Cambodia.

As to the next fundamental question clearly at issue between us, that of the authority of an international supervisory commission, it seems to us that there is very little to add to the clear and persuasive statements already made on this subject by Mr. Eden and M. Bidault. As far as this delegate is concerned, these statements demonstrated to us that the international supervisory authority must have competence and power to settle any problems or differences which may arise in the joint commissions of the belligerents and that the decisions of the supervisory authority must be binding on the joint commissions. It is, therefore, with great regret that I heard Mr. Molotov reject any possible subordination and insist on parallel action of the two bodies.

There is, however, one important point that I think the Communist delegates should carefully consider. The Communist delegates have said that observance of an armistice depends upon the good faith of the belligerent parties; that cessation hostilities will not be permanent if the two contending parties are not prepared to cooperate in carrying out the agreement. This is a perfectly valid argument. Good faith on both sides is an essential element of a successful armistice. I accept it. But reasonable men will recognize that the passions aroused by eight years of bitter warfare do not easily or rapidly subside; that given the best of will on both sides there will be differences which cannot, as has already been said, be readily adjusted, and that it is absolutely necessary that there be impartial authority with the power to arbitrate the differences which will arise. Good faith in entering into an armistice must, therefore, be expressed by willingness volun-



tarily to submit to the authority of an impartial international agency in the carrying out of an armistice. It is the willingness to submit questions to impartial authority, as well as the intent to stop shooting, which will demonstrate whether or not the contending parties have that good faith which the Communist delegates rightly say is an indispensable ingredient of a peaceful settlement.

The third vital matter on which we are in disagreement is that the composition of the international supervisory commission is closely related to the question of its necessary authority and most of us are convinced that the commission must have authority over the joint commissions and since its decisions must be binding on them, it is obvious that the commission must have both the capacity to arrive at decisions and the impartial character which will win for it the confidence of all the parties to the agreement including all the participants of this conference. If the commission is so divided that it cannot reach decisions, it will be impotent in settling differences. If the commission is not recognized to be impartial its decisions will not readily be accepted by the parties to the agreement.

It seems essential to us, therefore, that the commission be an impartial one, and that it be so constituted that it can reach decisions. I regret that Mr. Molotov reaffirmed his previous proposal of a four-country commission of Poland, Czechoslovakia, India and Pakistan. This proposal does not seem to meet either these two criteria for the simple reason as stated by Mr. Eden that it just would not work.

It did not seem to me, as I listened to Mr. Molotov, that the attempt which he made to differentiate between certain matters which could be settled through a majority vote with the chairman casting the deciding vote and other matters which would require unanimity for decision would do anything more than further to complicate an already complex problem.

I have said before that I welcomed the proposal of the UK for a commission composed of the Colombo powers. I have also said that I believed the proposal of the representative of Vietnam that the duties of the commission be entrusted to the United Nations was also a reasonable suggestion. Either of these proposals would provide a commission which could be impartial and which had the capacity for making decisions. I should again like to point out to our Communist colleagues that the good faith which they have stated is important in carrying out an armistice should extend to providing reasonable prospects for success of such an armistice. An impartial and workable supervisory commission is a final essential element of such a successful settlement."

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-1454 : Telegram

*Thirteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 14, 3 p. m. :  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 14, 1954—midnight.

Secto 442. Repeated information Paris, London, Moscow, Saigon, Tokyo unnumbered. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE.

Saigon pass Phnom Penh and Vientiane. Following is text of Soviet proposal presented at Restricted Session on Indochina, Monday, June 14:

*I. Mixed Commission (Military Armistice Commission)*

*Composition*

1. The Mixed Commission (Military Armistice Commission) shall consist of an equal number of representatives of the Commands of both sides. The senior members of the Mixed Commission shall hold the rank of General. The Mixed Commission shall create mixed inspection teams (the number to be agreed by both sides) with an equal number of members from both sides.

*Functions and powers*

2. It shall be the duty of the Mixed Commission to exercise control over the implementation of the terms of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, the principal of which shall be:

- a. Control over the strict fulfillment of the plan for the establishment of zones and regrouping of the armed forces of the sides;
- b. Control over ensuring a simultaneous, general and complete ceasefire.
- c. Settlement by negotiations of all questions connected with violations of the terms of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities.

3. The Mixed Commission and the Neutral Nations Commission shall act in parallel and one Commission shall not be subordinated to the other. To ensure effective implementation of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities both Commissions shall act in conformity with the assignment of functions and in cooperation on the basis of the powers provided for in the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities.

*II. Neutral Nations Observation Commission*

*Composition*

4. The Neutral Nations Commission for the Observation (nablyudenie) of Carrying out the Terms of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indochina shall be formed of the representatives of the following nations. . . .

The term "neutral nations", as used here, shall refer to those states the armed forces of which did not participate in hostilities in Indochina.

The Commission shall consist of an equal number of representatives appointed by each of the above-mentioned neutral nations.

It shall create inspection teams composed of an equal number of officers appointed by the neutral nations.

*Functions and powers*

5. The task of the Neutral Nations Commission shall be to carry out surveillance (nadzor), observation, inspection and investigation connected with the implementation of the terms of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities. The principal of these shall be:

- a. Observation of the carrying out by both sides of the provisions establishing the military demarcation line and the demili-

tarized zones on the basis of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities;

b. Observation of the regrouping of troops carried out in setting up the zones;

c. Observation of the repatriation by both sides of the prisoners-of-war and civil internees;

d. Investigation and establishment of the facts of violations of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in the demilitarized zones at the request of the Mixed Commission or one of its sides as well as submitting proposals regarding their elimination.

e. Observation at specified naval or air ports and points on land of the cessation of introduction into Indochina from outside of new contingents of armed forces and military personnel, as well as of all types of armaments, ammunition and military equipment.

f. Recommendations concerning possible amendments and addenda to the provisions of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities to provide the most effective carrying out of the Agreement.

The Neutral Nations Commission shall carry out its functions by means of the respective inspection teams stationed at the points specified in the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities.

*General provisions*

6. Neutral Nations Commission for the Observation of the Carrying out of the Terms of the Cessation of Hostilities shall adopt decisions by agreement among the members of the Commission. The Commission shall inform the Mixed Commission of its decisions and the Mixed Commission shall adopt in this connection appropriate measures or refer the question back to the Neutral Nations Commission for re-examination. If an examination of this sort does not yield positive results the Neutral Nations Commission shall immediately inform the Mixed Commission and the States-guarantors of the fact.

In case differences of opinion arise in the Neutral Nations Commission during the consideration of one or another problem regarding the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, the Commission as a whole or its separate members shall pass on to the Mixed Commission, as well as to the States-guarantors information pertaining to the problem under consideration including information concerning the attitudes of the State-members of the Commission.

If the sides in the Mixed Commission are unable to settle differences on subject under consideration the States-guarantors shall take appropriate measures to prevent violations of the agreement of the threat of such violation.

7. Be it resolved that the questions on which decisions can be taken if there exists no difference of opinion in the Commission shall be the following:

a. Questions connected with violation of provisions of the agreement or the arising of a threat of such violation which could lead to the re-opening of hostilities (including violation of land

and sea borders as well as of air space by the armed forces of the sides;

b. Questions concerning amendments and addenda to the provisions of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities.

8. Questions which can be decided by simple majority shall be the following:

a. Questions connected with the carrying out by the Commission of its functions of ensuring that fresh armed forces (land, air and naval) armaments of all kinds (assembled or dismantled), ammunition as well as various types of military equipment are not introduced into Indochina from outside;

b. Questions connected with the investigation of statements by the Mixed Commission or by one of the sides regarding violations of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities;

c. Other questions within the terms of reference of the Neutral Nations Commission.

If in the examination of the above-mentioned questions votes are equally divided, the vote of the Chairman shall be decisive.

9. The Neutral Nations Commission shall immediately carry out investigation beyond the limits of points established in the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in agreement with the Commander of the side in question.

10. The Neutral Nations Commission shall determine the rules for its operation in accordance with the present decision.

### *III. International Guarantees*

11. The carrying out of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities shall be guaranteed by the States-participants in the Geneva Conference.

12. In the event that the Mixed Commission and Neutral Nations Observation Commission are not able to take appropriate measures to prevent violation or the threat of violation of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indochina and in the event of the appearance because of this of a threat of reopening of hostilities the States which are parties to the agreement on guarantees shall convene a conference for consultation with the aim of taking collective action to ensure the implementation of the agreement.<sup>1</sup>

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-1454 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1954—8:50 p. m.

Tedul 196. Re Dulte 179<sup>2</sup> and 180.<sup>3</sup>

1. It is our view that final adjournment of Conference is in our best interest provided this can be done without creating an impression in

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 14, p. 1132.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 14, p. 1136.

France at this critical moment that France has been deserted by US and UK and therefore has no choice but capitulation on Indochina to Communists at Geneva and possibly accommodation with the Soviets in Europe. Because of this, if the French want to keep the Conference at least nominally alive, we would go along with the idea of recess and the maintenance of the small observation group as you propose in Geneva. We trust that the developments at Geneva will have been such as to satisfy the British insistence that they did not want to discuss collective action until either Geneva was over or at least the results of Geneva were known. I would assume that the departure of Eden would be evidence that there was no adequate reason for further delaying collective talks on SEA defense.

2. Re paragraph 1 above we assume any recess would only relate to the Indochina phase of Conference and the Korean phase would be closed out as indicated last para Dulte 179 and Secto 435.<sup>4</sup>

3. We believe that you should leave Geneva no later than Eden.

4. Assume that you will as soon as appropriate opportunity offers talk with Bidault as well as Eden about these matters.

DULLES

---

<sup>4</sup> Dated June 14, p. 371.

---

751G.00/6-1254 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, June 14, 1954—8:55 p. m.

Tedul 197. Re Dulte 174.<sup>2</sup> Department is giving this thorough consideration with Defense. My personal opinion is that we should try to carry situation along with avoidance of either formal refusal now train Vietnamese and also without anything like a massive commitment of some two to three thousand MAAG personnel which under present conditions could not but carry strong political overtones and might raise Congressional complications.

With reference to your last paragraph suggestion on "expedite conclusion of final agreement with French" this is quite impossible so long as French have not made up their mind whether or not they want to internationalize war and now are further from internationalizing it than ever before. They want, and in effect have, an option on our intervention but they do not want to exercise it and the date of expiry of our option is fast running out.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 12, p. 1126.

396.1 GE/6-1454 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1954—8:55 p. m.

Tedul 198. It seems clear that apart from official French-Viet Minh military talks, there are parallel conversations going on both between individuals from each side (Dulte 173<sup>2</sup>), and other probably important talks mentioned Dulte 179<sup>3</sup> which, in spite fact they are called "underground military talks", may have considerable substantive political significance.

We would not wish be in position where this subterranean negotiation between French and Viet Minh might have result our being suddenly faced with terms proposed settlement which we would not feel able accept and from which we might have to dissociate ourselves.

We therefore attach great importance to ascertaining scope and character current Franco-Viet Minh talks other than official military discussions, and we would like leave it to you find out by whatever means you consider appropriate as much as possible about them. We would of course hope to be kept informed by French on continuing basis.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Tyler of EUR/WE. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4580 and to Saigon as telegram 2601.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 12, p. 1126.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 14, p. 1132.

JUNE 15, 1954

396.1 GE/6-1554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 15, 1954—10 a. m.

Dulte 181. Eyes only Secretary from Under Secretary. Reference Tedul 200.<sup>1</sup> I had also intended recommending Bonsal and Colonel Dwan. Please do what you can to insure that military officer is Dwan<sup>2</sup> . . . .

---

<sup>1</sup> Summarized in footnote 2, p. 1137.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram Tedul 201, June 15, the Secretary informed Under Secretary Smith that "Admiral Davis agrees that if small observer group is left at Geneva, Colonel Dwan will remain with Bonsal."

In the same telegram the Secretary said he doubted "desirability of your remaining since US has been the country which from the beginning has taken the dimmest view of Geneva Conference and I would not like to see us the last to leave. I hope you can get some rest before your return here where you will be subjected to much Congressional questioning but I hope your rest could be dissociated from Geneva Conference—perhaps based on your physically moving elsewhere." (396.1 GE/6-1554)

Believe Korean phase will close out today generally as we planned. Recess would only relate to Indochina phase, as assumed in Tedul 196.<sup>3</sup>

I would remain several days after Eden, if he follows his present plan, but would attend no meetings. Have already discussed these matters with him and in general way with Bidault before his departure. Do not know if Bidault intends to return.

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 14, p. 1146.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 322

*Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal)  
to the Special Adviser to the Delegation (Heath)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[GENEVA,] June 15, 1954.

I saw Jacques Roux at lunch today.

1. Roux believes that Mr. Molotov's proposal yesterday, in addition to the rather vague "concession" regarding a majority vote on the NNSC, indicates the possibility of a further concession regarding composition. Roux believes that the Communists would be willing to eliminate either Poland or Czechoslovakia, probably Czechoslovakia, and accept instead a European neutral such as Norway. Roux himself would like if possible to get Canada as the fourth member in place of Czechoslovakia.

2. Roux believes that the Vietminh are definitely seeking partition at this time, at least on a military basis. He supports this view by citing the original Vietminh proposal for exchanges of territory and by referring to the fact that Molotov's proposal yesterday refers to *the* demarcation line rather than to several demarcation lines as would be the case if several zones were contemplated.

3. Roux wonders whether it is not time to refer the questions regarding the whole subject of controls to a committee of delegates of the principals to the conference who could perhaps reach certain agreements to be referred back to the conference. I said that I did not think that until we had made more progress on the matter of fundamental principles to which we adhere in regard to this matter that it would be particularly useful to have those principles discussed at a lower level. I said that I

---

<sup>1</sup> In a note from Heath to Smith, June 16, attached to the source text, Heath wrote: "Mr. Robertson suggested that you read this because it may provide clues on future Soviet conference tactics. He particularly recommends you read the final paragraph."

thought such a proposal would merely play into the evident Communist desire to prolong the conference without reaching decisions.

4. Mr. Roux wondered whether the time had not come to convey to the Communists and specifically to Mr. Molotov a "discreet warning" that our side is only disposed to continue talking at Geneva on the basis that the situation in the field does not change. Such a warning would be unspecific, i.e., it would not involve any spelling out of how, where or when our side would react to further Vietminh aggressive moves. I said that I thought this idea was worth looking into. I added that we should certainly not be put into a position of conferring at Geneva and doing nothing else while the Communists improve their position in the field.

5. Roux had nothing to say regarding current military conversations or regarding any other possible Franco-Vietminh contacts. He said, however, that he was convinced on the basis of information derived by the Vietnamese Delegation from Vietnamese fence-sitters who have been in contact with the Vietminh that the latter are indeed anxious for a cessation of hostilities (on their own terms) and that they fear the development of Chinese control over their actions, present and future. (This analysis does not seem particularly sound to me—at any rate I doubt whether Vietminh actions and dispositions are determined in accordance with this sort of consideration.) Roux indicated that while present Vietminh troop dispositions both north and south of the delta indicate the possibility of military plan to cut the Hanoi-Haiphong line there is no certainty that such is their intention at this time.

6. I gathered later from Maurice Ferro who is off to Paris this afternoon that the Communist journalists at the Maison de la Presse are spreading the report that after the Secretary's speeches of last week, there is absolutely no prospect of any imminent US armed intervention in Indochina and that the Communists therefore have to worry only about the French expeditionary corps resistance to their further advance. It is being said that until after the November elections the US will not move in Indochina regardless of what happens there.

---

751G.00/6-1654 : Telegram

*Heath-Offroy Meeting, Geneva, June 15, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 16, 1954—noon.

Dulte 184. Repeated information Paris 441. Eyes only Ambassador. Heath last night saw Offroy, French Ambassador Thailand, whom



Bidault had appointed to "watch over" the talks in Geneva between representatives of the Viet Minh and Franco-Vietnamese Commands. Offroy expressed a personal preference that the terms of reference of these talks be expanded to include discussion of such political problems as would undoubtedly arise in any practical plan for cessation of hostilities.

He went on to say, speaking personally, he thought a mistake had been made in not drawing the Viet Minh out on their proposal of May 25.<sup>1</sup> Discussion of that proposal would lead, he thought, to the Viet Minh unveiling their real proposal, which was one of partition.

He rather hesitantly advanced the idea that partition might be the only practical solution unless "internationalization" of the war occurred promptly. He personally thought that neither a new government nor the Assembly at this time would consider taking up the "option" of American interventions, as outlined in the Secretary's Los Angeles speech of June 11.<sup>2</sup> The Assembly would want to hear first a final Viet Minh proposal. In its present mood the Assembly would accept such a proposal if it were at all reasonable. If, however, the Viet Minh took an extreme, intransigent stand then American intervention might be requested.

There was another circumstance, Offroy thought in which the Assembly and government might ask American aid. If the Viet Minh attacked Hanoi and it seemed the latter would fall there would be two possible reactions in France. One would be insistence on a cease-fire on almost any conditions. The other reaction of public opinion might be one of anger and determination to carry on the fight, asking American intervention. He, Offroy, would not venture to predict which of these alternative reactions would occur. He was afraid if the latter occurred that the US would decline intervene on a last-minute call for help on the grounds that it would then be too late to save Hanoi. Heath made no comment on this observation.

Offroy objected to Eden's proposal that the conference adjourn pending a report from the military representatives of the two commands. He thought it extremely important that at least a skeleton conference sit while those talks were still in progress in order to hear reports on developments in those conversations and to provide guidance for the military representatives. He assumed that such conference

---

<sup>1</sup> Made at the Sixth Restricted Session, May 25. See telegram Secto 302, May 26, p. 920.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of the speech delivered by the Secretary at Los Angeles on June 11, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 28, 1954, pp. 971-973.

delegates as remained in Geneva would not meet daily but would reconvene instantly as occasion required.

In conclusion, Offroy reiterated he had expressed personal views and asked his name not be divulged in connection therewith.

SMITH

751G.00/6-1554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 15, 1954—10 p. m.

Dulte 183. Eyes only Secretary from Under Secretary. Your Tedul 197.<sup>1</sup> Fully concur in your personal opinion that we should at this time try to carry situation along, avoiding either formal refusal to train Vietnamese or massive commitment of additional personnel to MAAG. Depending on development of SEA situation, could we not if appropriate moment occurs, proceed with beginning of O'Daniel plan<sup>2</sup> in small way, say the start of one Vietnamese division, without material increase in MAAG? Realize that decision on timing, and extent of action, would depend on what happens to Vietnam Government as well as the field.

My Dulte 174<sup>3</sup> was written after my last hurried talk with Bidault, during which I got impression that principal sticking point on final agreement with French would be our insistence on unqualified assurance that "France will not itself withdraw from the battle until it is won". Bidault indicated that this implied too much to the French people. I asked Bidault at that time to see Dillon as soon as he could, get clearly in mind present state of military discussions, and give his definite and minimum position. Since then, of course, I have asked Chauvel categorically if French do or do not want to internationalize, and as I told you he replied that "he did not know", and that "Bidault still expected to get something here".

Your conclusion regarding present French position re internationalization is certainly correct. It might change, however, and it may be that we should not close the door too soon, even though it could be opened again. British attitude after Geneva will have important bearing on our overall plans for the area. Incidentally, Casey has given me a copy of Chiefs of Staff report as result of five-power conference.<sup>4</sup> He is very disappointed, as is Eden, at mediocre results; i.e.,

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 14, p. 1147.

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on General O'Daniel's proposals, see volume XIII.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 12, p. 1126.

<sup>4</sup> For extracts of the "Report of the Five-Power Military Conference of June 3-11, 1954," June 11, see volume XII.

a jump from the delta to the Kra peninsula with no consideration of intermediate positions or alternatives.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-1554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 15, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 448. Repeated information Paris 437, Saigon 169, London 286. Limit distribution. Molotov asked to see Eden this morning re Soviet proposals yesterday regarding Indochina.

*Re composition:* Molotov suggested possible addition Indonesia to four countries already proposed by Communists. He said Indonesia was Colombo power and had indicated interest in problem by sending representative Geneva to discuss matters with Soviet and other delegations. Eden said Burma better addition since it was limitrophe country. Molotov agreed Burma interested party but said if limitrophe country added someone might propose Thailand which was unacceptable. Eden had impression Molotov's opposition to Burma not absolute.

*Re supervision:* Molotov stressed importance mixed commission not subordinate to international commission. Did not see how this could work in practice unless international commission would bring in large army and he was opposed to that.

Eden replied that there must be provision for resolving cases where mixed committee unable reach agreement. This could be done only by international commission on the spot with authority to arbitrate, give rulings, and reach decisions by majority vote on all subjects with which authorized to deal.

Molotov replied his latest proposal provided for majority vote on number questions and only reserved for unanimous decision questions liable lead to reopening of hostilities or related to amendments to the agreement. Eden asked how international commission would decide whether a question was one for decision by majority or unanimous vote. Molotov said only serious cases would require unanimity. He did not deny that difficulties would arise over determination of what constituted serious cases and finally suggested this question might be discussed further. Eden agreed and added it would be less difficult to settle questions re supervision if the military talks on Vietnam had reached conclusion and we knew what sort of military agreement was to be supervised. Molotov agreed it would be great advance if military agreement reached and that this might also facilitate discussion supervisory arrangements.

In answer Eden's question, Molotov said no military contacts made yesterday since French colonel in Paris.

Molotov told Eden he would "suggest something" tomorrow re Laos and Cambodia. Eden got word to Chinese today that UK absolutely firm on Laos and Cambodia.

*New subject:* Chauvel wishes establish nine-nation group to work on technical aspects control in order avoid appearance French being left alone to deal with Viet Minh. Chinese made similar suggestion to French Deputy Secretary-General this morning.

SMITH

JUNE 16, 1954

396.1 GE/6-1654 : Telegram

*Smith-Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, June 16, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 16, 1954—6 p. m.

Dulte 187. Repeated information Paris 443. Paris eyes only Ambassador. Reference Tedul 198 repeated information Paris 4850 Saigon 2601.<sup>1</sup> Chauvel informed me this morning that in Franco-Viet Minh "underground military talks" (conducted by Colonel de Brebisson on French side) Viet Minh had demanded all of Tonkin and entire delta area including Hanoi (to become Headquarters Viet Minh Army) and Haiphong be turned over to Viet Minh. French without agreeing had implied that if anything like this settlement were made, French would demand free hand in south, indicating area south of line starting approximately 18 parallel on Laotian border and running southeast approximately to Badon (this line marked somewhat indefinitely on map in Chauvel's office), French had also indicated necessity for enclave and port in delta area, implying temporary tenure for troop withdrawal. Chauvel indicated Ely felt he could not defend delta area and better have French forces therein by negotiations than lose them in battle. French raised question evacuation their troops, French citizens, and Vietnam Catholics from Tonkin area but had received no reply from Viet Minh. Chauvel also stated French had made clear that Laos and Cambodia were not involved in this proposed settlement. No mention was made regrouping Viet Minh forces south this line. Last conversation three days ago and nothing has developed since. Chauvel continued that Vietnamese had no knowledge this proposal and if acceptable to French it would be most difficult to sell it to them, which

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 14, p. 1148.

might be necessary within next few days. He implied that Ambassador Heath might be of real service this connection.

I informed Chauvel of Zhukov-Kingsbury Smith conversation (Secto 423 repeated Paris 418<sup>2</sup>) emphasizing advisability French retaining foothold in north preferably Haiphong-Hanoi area, but at least Haiphong. This, with possibly, small compensating enclave for Viet Minh south of line, would avoid appearance of outright partition. Chauvel was somewhat dubious whether this would be possible but thought that maybe foothold on delta coast at Hon Gay, where there are important French coal interests, might be retained. I told Chauvel that we did not wish be suddenly placed in position where these secret negotiations might have result of our being abruptly confronted with agreement or proposed settlement which we would not feel able accept and from which we might have to disassociate ourselves, and stressed need our being informed on continuing basis of conversations. Suggested Colonel Dwan be liaison officer this respect. Chauvel agreed entirely.

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> For a memorandum of conversation of this discussion, see p. 1109. Summary of conversation transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 423, June 11. (396.1 GE/6-1154)

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 285

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 16, 1954.

Subject: Meeting of the Six this morning.

1. Bidault is returning to Geneva this afternoon at about 5:00 and remaining through tomorrow morning. He will not be present at this afternoon's session. He will, however, wish to see Mr. Molotov and the heads of the five friendly delegations.

2. Chauvel stated French most anxious to avoid giving the impression that the windup of the Korean phase is a precedent for a similar windup of the Indochina phase. He recognized, however, that the heads of some of the delegations might have to return home. After referring to recent discussions regarding the control problem and particularly to Eden's proposal of June 2nd regarding reference of the French proposal of that date to a technical committee and after referring to Molotov's proposal of June 14, Chauvel said that perhaps the time had come to refer this whole matter to a committee made up

of representatives of the nine delegations who would study it. Chauvel tabled a paper on this subject (translation attached).<sup>1</sup> Chauvel said that he was thinking of presenting this proposal this afternoon. The Cambodian Delegation took a strong position against the introduction of any proposal that would tend to relate to the particular case of Laos and Cambodia. He furthermore criticized Chauvel's proposal as putting Laos and Cambodia in the same class as Vietnam. I stated that I would have to refer the matter back to the head of my delegation but that it seemed to me there was considerable question as to timing and that we were perhaps not ready for the committee at this stage. The Vietnamese delegate also stated that he thought Chauvel's proposal would be premature. He added that reference should be made in the terms of reference of the proposed committee to the "authority" from which the control organism would depend (i.e., the guarantors). (Later Offroy made it very clear that what the French wish to avoid is any departure from the conference of the leading figures without leaving representatives of the nine delegations apparently engaged in useful work. Offroy referred to the Eden proposal of a recess pending a report from the military conversations and said that the French wished to avoid any complete recess.)

3. With regard to the specific matter of Laos and Cambodia which is to be discussed this afternoon, it was agreed that the Cambodians and Laotians in that order would present their cases. The Cambodians have already made a specific proposal (June 8), the Laotians will make a similar one this afternoon. The French do not plan to make their statement in support of the Laotians and Cambodians until after hearing from the Communists. (The British representative indicated that Molotov had told Eden that the Soviets would have some suggestions to make.) I indicated that we would speak but I did not state at what point. (Chauvel at one point suggested the possibility of military talks on Laos and Cambodia but did not develop his thinking.)

4. It was suggested that it would be good tactics to avoid strong statements on our side until after we had heard from the Communists.

5. The Cambodians will again stress their willingness to make commitments regarding the nonintroduction of foreign troops into Cambodia and the restriction of the Cambodian military establishment to what is required for Cambodian defense.

6. Ambassador Offroy told me that he saw no objection to the mention in your remarks of specific Vietminh units which have invaded Laos and Cambodia.

---

<sup>1</sup> Not attached to the source text.

396.1 GE/6-1754 : Telegram

*Fourteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 16, 3 p. m. :  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 17, 1954—1 a. m.

Secto 461. Repeated information Paris 448, London 296, Saigon 174, Tokyo 145, Moscow 132, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Fourteenth restricted session, Wednesday, June 16.

Eden presiding.

Cambodian delegate referred to his June 8 proposal (Secto 367)<sup>2</sup> and recalled essential principle of evacuation Viet Minh troops from Cambodia. He rehearsed fact of invasion by regular troops in April 1954. In describing functions of international commission in Cambodia he said first task would be concerned with evacuation regular and irregular Viet Minh troops, second with its exchange and release of prisoners of war and civilian internees, and third with the prevention of all foreign activities prejudicial to peace in Cambodia.

Cambodian delegate made point he had accepted simultaneity of cessation of hostilities in all three states and also meeting of military representatives in Geneva and on the spot. He also stressed Cambodian readiness to make commitment that Cambodia will not admit foreign troops or permit foreign bases on her territory or make increases in her military establishment beyond requirements of efficient national defense.

Cambodian delegate again denied existence of so-called resistance movement. He reiterated independence of Cambodia and repeated earlier statements re loyalty to King, elections and constitutional processes. He stressed Cambodia's lack of desire to intervene in affairs of neighbors.

Cambodian delegate concluded with following statements: "Let Cambodia not be reproached tomorrow for seeking to defend itself by no matter what means when justice has been refused her and everything has been done to prevent her from living in a state of neutrality, freedom and peace at home."

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/14) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 278. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 7:30 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 300-310. The speech by Tep Phan, Indochina Document IC/32, June 16, and proposals made by Laos, the Viet Minh, and the People's Republic of China, Indochina Documents IC/31, IC/33, and IC/35, respectively, June 16-17, are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279A. A proposal made by the French Delegation, June 16, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 283.

A brief summary of the meeting was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 462, June 17. (396.1 GE/6-1754)

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 3, p. 1014.

The Laotian delegate took generally similar line. He stressed national unity of Laotian people, democratic conditions and complete independence. He referred to presence of Viet Minh invaders known to all objective observers. He submitted a six-point proposal involving (1) evacuation Viet Minh regular and irregular troops; (2) concentration of French Union troops at bases established in Franco-Laotian agreements; (3) disarmament of remaining irregular troops with departure of Vietnamese citizens and granting of all civic rights to Laotians; (4) freeing of prisoners of war and civil internees; (5) a system of international control to be applied also to supervising the frontiers; and (6) a meeting of representatives of the military commands at Geneva, these representatives to create, if they so desire, special military committees to coordinate troop movements on the spot. (Text transmitted in Secto 457.<sup>3</sup>)

Chou En-lai then referred to his proposal of May 27 (Secto 326<sup>4</sup>) and to agreement of May 31 based on Eden proposal (Secto 347<sup>5</sup>). He recalled that he had stated on several occasions that conditions not same in each of three countries of Indochina; there are differences between all three although they cannot be disassociated in clear-cut manner. He then expressed following views:

First, in accordance with May 29 agreement, there must be early and simultaneous cessation of hostilities throughout Indochina. Examination of situation in Laos and Cambodia must necessarily proceed on this principle.

Second, [garbled group] in the agreement of May 29, representatives of the two commands should now examine the situation in Laos and Cambodia so far as the disposition of forces at the time of the cessation of hostilities is concerned.<sup>6</sup> Chou En-lai pointed out that the representatives of the two commands have been meeting with regard to Vietnam since June 2 and that they should now study both in Geneva and on the spot the disposition of forces in Laos and Cambodia. This study must take into account (a) that opposing native forces in Laos and Cambodia include the armies under resistance governments in the two countries, and (b) that all foreign forces must be withdrawn in accordance with the DRV proposal of May 10.

Third, from date of cessation of hostilities there must be prevention of introduction into Indochina from outside of all kinds of military personnel and material. This principle must apply to Laos and Cambodia also. Chou En-lai stated he had noted with understanding Cam-

<sup>3</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 27, p. 947.

<sup>5</sup> Dated May 29, p. 975.

<sup>6</sup> The actual text of Chou En-lai's remarks, taken from the verbatim minutes of the session, was as follows: "Second, the agreement on May 29 provides that representatives of the two commands should study the disposition of forces to be made upon the cessation of hostilities, beginning with the question of regrouping areas in Vietnam. Now we should examine the problem of bringing about an armistice in Laos and Cambodia on the basis of this principle, as already agreed upon."



bodian's statement of June 8 recalling Cambodian requirements of arms for defense. This would apply also to Laos. This question requires further consideration. At same time Chou En-lai made clear that if peace is to be restored in Indochina, no foreign country must be permitted to establish bases in the territory of any of the three countries of Indochina after the armistice.

Fourth, the principle of international supervision applicable to Laos and Cambodia seems to be generally accepted. However, special conditions there are to be taken into account in applying international supervision.

Fifth, there seems to be no problem involved in the release and exchange of prisoners of war and civil internees.

Sixth, there should be no persecution of persons having collaborated with either party during the war.

Chou En-lai then submitted proposal transmitted as Secto 458.<sup>7</sup>

DRV delegate then spoke at some length on necessity recognizing importance national liberation movements Laos and Cambodia; he maintained movements, based on past history and glories these countries, had been active for many years subsequent to French conquest and colonization. Even after France had entrenched itself in Indochina people continued fight for independence. After defeat Japanese occupation Viet Minh, Khmer, and Pathet-Lao Republic formed. French tried to break down these resistance movements with arms and then endeavored entice them with pseudo-independence and democratic reforms. Aim US interventionists was to take over from French colonialists. DRV representatives respected and saluted these liberation movements and wished to do everything possible to help them. He refuted "tendentious" assertions that there were external influences (Viet Minh) in Laos and Cambodia. When imperialism and colonialism exists resistance comes from within and could not be imposed artificially from without. He then added that he supported Chinese resolution and expressed hope that negotiations in Geneva and on spot would take place.

DRV delegate then referred to his May 10 proposals and said question restoring peace Vietnam necessitated discussion political and military issues. Military discussions have shown some progress here at Geneva and time had come to take up political matters. For this reason, he submitted proposal transmitted as Secto 459.<sup>8</sup>

French delegate (Chauvel) expressed pleasure that DRV delegate had not objected to Chinese proposals. He would later comment on DRV proposals but wished now limit his remarks to Laos and Cambodia. Communists appeared concerned re bases these countries. Proposals made by Laotian and Cambodian delegates should give assur-

---

<sup>7</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1162.

<sup>8</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1163.

ances on this score. When Viet Minh troops withdrawn no foreign troops would remain Laos and Cambodia. The Cambodians had said that if there were no danger of aggression there would be no appeal for foreign troops. What more guarantees do Communists desire? Re Laos, France had agreement with military commitments. When Viet Minh troops withdrawn French troops would be reduced to very minimum needed to maintain security and would be subject international control. France ready accept these controls. If proposals Laos and Cambodia accepted adequate guarantees would exist in military fields.

Re statements made by Communist side concerning resistance movement, French delegate felt that Laos and Cambodia statement had given satisfactory answer. If hostilities cease, free elections would be held these countries with neutral commission to supervise them. Khmer and Pathet-Lao people would have same civic rights and could take their place in society. French delegate associated acceptance Laos and Cambodia proposals which he believed would bring peace and security to area. He continued that he had listened with care and read with interest Chinese proposal which contained many useful elements. He would comment on them at later date. He surprised to hear today DRV proposal, it being his understanding that subject Laos and Cambodia would be discussed this meeting. He felt tabling this proposal was endeavor to mix up everything. He was not critical of proposal itself but wished to take things up in methodical order.

US delegate, though inscribed to speak, stated thought it better to limit remarks to few words in view lateness hour. He said he listened with interest to Chinese statement which seemed to him restrained and reasonable. He could not say same thing regarding DRV statement which was not reasonable or restrained. He proposed that conference return to subject Laos and Cambodia. In closing, he remarked that at first glance there appeared to be certain points in Chinese proposal which might be agreed to and others which seemed to him similar to points proposed by Laotian and Cambodian delegates.

Soviet delegate pointed out that conference in considering restoration peace in Indochina gave immediate attention cease-fire Vietnam which was main theater operations. However, entire area had many similar characteristics and he could not agree that situation Vietnam different from Laos and Cambodia although latter two had certain peculiarities which must be taken into account. All three states struggling for freedom and independence. He believed re-establishment peace all three Associated States could not but be related to desire those people for peace, liberty, and freedom. In examining question restoration peace Laos and Cambodia certain difficulties had arisen. Conference had heard representatives from only one of the belligerents

and had not heard from the resistance movements. Soviet delegate considered Cambodian proposal of June 8 as one-sided and cited paragraph two as example. Same thing could be said of today's Laotian proposal. He believed Chinese proposal covered all main questions and took into account desires of representatives Laos and Cambodia. It might form basis for decision this conference. DRV proposals took into account measures, if not taken, would mean no cease-fire Laos and Cambodia. If accepted cease-fire could be agreed upon. He therefore supported DRV proposal.

Soviet delegate then referred to his proposal June 14 regarding composition, functions neutral commission and mixed commissions. He continued that he would like to meet desires other delegates and therefore suggested that international neutral commission be composed of five, not four members, and that Indonesia, for example, be added. India would have chairmanship and other members would be Poland, Czechoslovakia, Pakistan. Another variant might be a more restricted international commission composed of India (chairmanship), Poland, and Indonesia or "some other Asiatic power". He thought agreement might be reached on one these proposals. He again endorsed his June 14 proposal adding Soviet delegate considered entirely unacceptable suggestion that mixed commission be subordinate to international commission.

Vietnam delegate stated he felt Laos and Cambodia proposals most reasonable on which he would speak at later date. He noted conference had agreed deal first with military questions Vietnam and he felt that much confusion would be caused by discussing military and political questions at same time. More reasonable complete military talks then enter political field. He still supported his May 13 proposals and when political discussions were initiated he would make his views known thereon. He maintained DRV statements regarding independence Vietnam had no basis whatsoever and pointed out he had communicated to conference treaties of independence recently initiated Paris. He again maintained that elections Vietnam should be under supervision United Nations.

UK delegate started to close meeting stating discussion had been important and many proposals tabled. He suggested that this might be studied carefully and views exchanged. French delegate interjected with statement he wished to submit still another proposal on procedures re controls (see Secto 460).<sup>9</sup> UK closed meeting with suggestion that all proposals be studied carefully and delegates meet Friday, June 18, to discuss them.

SMITH

---

<sup>9</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1164.

396.1 GE/6-1654 : Telegram

*Fourteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 16, 3 p. m. :  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 16, 1954—midnight.

Secto 457. Repeated information Paris 444, Saigon 170, London 292, Tokyo 141, Moscow 128, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Following is text of Laotian proposal presented at restricted session on Indochina Wednesday, June 16:

"1. On the date of the cessation of hostilities, the regular and irregular VietMinh troops will be withdrawn from Laotian territories.

2. The French Union forces will return to the bases specifically provided in the agreements existing between the Kingdom of Laos and the French Republic. Those forces which are not considered by Laos as necessary for its security will leave country.

3. Remaining irregular elements will be disarmed. The Vietnamese components thereof will return to Vietnamese territory.

The Laotian nationals, after having presented themselves to the regular Laotian authorities, will recover without reservations the rights enjoyed by all Laotian citizens and particularly the right to be voters and candidates to the National assembly. They will enjoy the legislative provisions already applied to the members of the former Lao-Issari movement which contemplate particularly their right to join or to be reincorporated into the civil service or into the national army.

4. The two parties will proceed to the total liberation of prisoners of war and civil internees.

5. An international control will be established to supervise the execution of the different points of the above agreement and especially of the troop movements contemplated in Articles 1 and 2.

It will also be applied to the supervision of the integrity of the frontiers.

6. Representatives of the military commands will meet at once in Geneva in order to study the conditions of execution of points one and two. They will be able to propose the creation of *ad hoc* military committees whose purpose will be to coordinate on-the-spot troop movements in any given region. They will as soon as possible submit the result of their labors to the conference."

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-1754 : Telegram

*Fourteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 16, 3 p. m. :  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 17, 1954—1 a. m.

Secto 458. Repeated information Paris 445, London 293, Tokyo 142, Saigon 171, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered, Moscow 129. De-

partment pass Defense; Tokyo pass CINCFE. The following is text of proposal submitted by Chou En-lai at restricted meeting on Indochina, Wednesday, June 16:

"The countries participating in the Geneva conference are agreed on the following:

"1. The cessation of hostilities will be declared simultaneously in Laos and Cambodia at the same time as in Vietnam.

"2. Representatives of the commands of the two belligerent parties will begin direct negotiations at Geneva and on the spot on the subject of the cessation of hostilities in Laos and Cambodia.

"3. After the cessation of hostilities there will not be introduced from abroad into Laos and Cambodia new troops and military personnel, army, navy and air, as well as all kinds of arms and munitions. The question of the quantity and the category of arms necessary for self defense which may be brought in will be the object of separate negotiations.

"4. The competence of the International Control Commission will extend over Laos and Cambodia, taking into account the special situations of these two countries.

"5. After agreement between the commands, prisoners of war and civil internees will be liberated or exchanged.

"6. Persons having collaborated with the opposing party during the war must not be the object of prosecution."

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-1754 : Telegram

*Fourteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 16, 3 p. m. :  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 17, 1954—1 a. m.

Secto 459. Repeated information Paris 446, London 294, Tokyo 143, Saigon 172, Moscow 130, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Following is text of proposal submitted by Pham Van Dong at restricted Indochina meeting Wednesday, June 16:

"The participants of the Geneva Conference are agreed on the following:

1. In the interests of establishing a stable peace in Indochina political questions must be settled on a basis of respect for the principle of complete and real sovereignty and national independence of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

2. In order to restore the unity of Vietnam and to create a single government in Vietnam there must be carried out in the shortest possible time after the cessation of hostilities free general elections by secret ballot throughout the territory of Vietnam.

In order to create appropriate conditions which will assure the organization of the above-mentioned elections, the following must be recognized as necessary:

a. Withdrawal from the territory of Vietnam of all foreign troops before the organization of the elections;

b. The international supervision of the organization of the free general elections in Vietnam by the international supervisory commission composed of . . .

3. An undertaking by the belligerent parties not to prosecute the persons who collaborated with the opposing party during the war.

4. Establishment of economic and cultural relations between France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on a basis of equality and of mutual interests.

5. Undertaking by each of the three states of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to respect the independence, the unity and internal regime of the other states.

6. Other political questions concerning Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia must be settled at a later time in the interests of consolidating peace and the guarantee of democratic rights and national interests of the peoples of Indochina."

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-1754 : Telegram

*Fourteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 16, 3 p. m. :  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 17, 1954—1 a. m.

Sectó 460. Repeated information Paris 447, London 295, Tokyo 144, Saigon 173, Moscow 131, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Following is translation of proposal French delegate mentioned at restricted Indochina meeting Wednesday, June 16, and which will be distributed to 9 delegations June 17 for discussion June 18.<sup>1</sup>

"A committee, composed of representatives of the 9 delegations of the conference, will gather as soon as possible in order to study, on the base of the proposals which have been made by the various delegates, the technical conditions (modalities) of the control over agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, in Cambodia and in Laos.

The committee will submit its recommendations to the conference as soon as possible—and in case of differences the points of divergence—on the various aspects of the problem for each of the three countries. It will study particularly questions relative to the structure, organization and the competence of the control commissions."

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> This proposal, Indochina Document IC/34, June 17, together with a communication from the French Delegation pertaining to the proposal, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279A.

396.1 GE/6-1754 : Telegram

*Fourteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 16, 3 p. m. :  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 17, 1954—1 p. m.

Dulte 190. Repeated information Paris 450. Paris limit distribution. Yesterday at recess Molotov asked me what I thought of the Chinese proposals on Laos and Cambodia. I said they seemed reasonable but they did not provide for withdrawal of Viet Minh troops. If this were provided for, and satisfactory control commission agreed upon, they would deserve careful consideration. Molotov said he would propose adding a fifth state, possibly Indonesia, to his original slate of India, Pakistan, Poland and Czechoslovakia, with India as chairman. I said Indonesia was new country and still a little unstable.

I would suggest Philippines or Thailand, both democratic countries. Molotov said they were "a little too democratic", but that Burma might be considered. I said that Burma had long frontier with her powerful neighbor, China, and would be very sensitive to pressure. Molotov said that on more restricted basis it might be possible to consider India as chairman, with either Poland or Czechoslovakia and "an Asian state" making third. This he did in fact propose at end of session.

I said that I would not speak against the Chinese proposals at this time and that if China's principal preoccupation, as I had heard, was that United States not establish military bases in Laos or Cambodia, there should be no concern about that, as the United States had no desire or intention to do so as long as these two states were adequately equipped to defend themselves and their security guaranteed.

This conversation should be considered with that of Eden and Chou En-lai reported in my following Secto 463.<sup>1</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1170.

396.1 GE/6-1654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 16, 1954—3 p. m.

Dulte 186. Eyes only Secretary from Under Secretary. Eden departs tomorrow, taking most of his personal staff. Lord Reading, Minister of State, remains in charge, supported by good professional FSO, Colonel Monckton and about half of present technical and communications staff. Eden does not wish further to downgrade British representation while Molotov remains and in deference to the French. He estimates Reading will stay on for week or ten days.

Chauvel will remain in charge for French, who wish to retain nine power representation during military-technical negotiations on sub-ministerial level. Colonel Brabizon [*Brebisson*] is carrying on "underground" military talks. Chauvel expects decision may be arrived at within week or ten days. (See my Dulte 187 which follows.<sup>1</sup>)

Subject your approval,<sup>2</sup> I will leave on Saturday,<sup>3</sup> with Robertson, Phleger, and major part of our delegation. However, I believe we should not down-grade our representation too far during the next ten days or two weeks. I recommend :

a. That Ambassador Johnson remain in charge here as long as Reading and Molotov stay.

b. That Johnson be supported by Bonsal, Colonel Dwan, and minimum clerical and code personnel.

c. That Bonsal and Dwan remain after Johnson leaves, until end of military-technical staff talks.

As indicated in my Dulte 187, French expect difficult period when Viet Nameese are brought into picture and confronted with solution of "truncated" Viet Nam. I have made it clear to Chauvel that we must be kept informed on very secret basis, and that we cannot be confronted with sudden decision. French also know that we probably will not publicly associate ourselves with or publicly support such decision. Chauvel has promised that Brabizon [*Brebisson*] will keep Colonel Dwan informed.

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 16, p. 1154.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram Tedul 204 to Geneva, June 16, drafted by the Secretary of State, the Secretary said "Agree" with reference to Dulte 186. (396.1 GE/6-1654)

<sup>3</sup> June 19.

751G.00/6-1654 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY  
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1954—8 p. m.

Tedul 208. For Under Secretary and Ambassador. Bonnet has just left after reading a long message from Bidault, the substance of which was that the French no longer felt that US was committed to intervention on the conditions stated in our May 11 basic cable to Paris<sup>2</sup> and that this left them in a very difficult negotiating position at Geneva.

I said that it was quite true that the French could not have a continuing option to call US into war at some future undetermined date

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4624.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 4023 to Paris, May 11; see volume XIII.



and under conditions which could not now be foreseen. On the other hand if and when there was a French Government which had the confidence of the Assembly and if it should then decide that it could not conclude an honorable armistice and that it was thus necessary to continue the struggle, the US would be prepared promptly to respond and that response would probably be along the lines of our May 11 telegram unless in the meantime the situation had further deteriorated to a point where the making of a stand in Indochina had become impracticable or so burdensome as to be out of proportion to the results obtainable.

I said that I regretted not being able to make a response that would be more satisfactory to Bidault but that I could not conceive that it would be expected that the US would give a third power the option to put it into war at times and under conditions wholly of the other's choosing.

I suggest that Under Secretary or Ambassador (whoever sees Bidault first) should summarize foregoing to Bidault as am not confident that Bonnet who was in highly emotional state will adequately report.<sup>3</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>3</sup> For a memorandum of the conversation between Secretary Dulles and Ambassador Bonnet, June 16, see volume XIII.

---

110.11 DU/6-1754 : Telegram

*Smith-Bidault Meeting, Geneva, June 16, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 17, 1954—1 p. m.

Dulte 192. Eyes only Secretary from Under Secretary. At dinner last night Bidault, much the worse for wear, showed me a strong and unpleasant telegram he had sent to Bonnet for delivery to you and referred to in your Tedul 208.<sup>1</sup> I said that as I was his guest I would refrain from discussing unpleasant things till I saw him today. My guess is that Bonnet did not deliver this in original form, but in any event you should know and make allowances for fact that much of the basis of Bidault's pique is his disappointment in not being included in invitation to Churchill and Eden. He said one French paper had proclaimed this as "the end of France as a great power." Bidault is very tense and fatigued. He ate nothing at dinner and was in bad shape at the end. I am seeing him at noon today and will convey substance of Tedul 208. Congratulate you on your restraint. A lot of it is going to be needed during next few weeks.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

751G.00/6-1654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of Defense*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 16, 1954.

Army Message Gento 58. Action Defense, information USARMA Paris, USARMA Saigon, USARMA London, State Department. From Defense representative for Hensel from Sullivan. Following is summary French-Vietnamese military talks with Viet Minh 14 June reported to Defense representative by member French delegation :

1. Maps exchanged 11 June by both sides (see Gento 57<sup>1</sup>) compared and found to be widely divergent regarding areas over which each claims military superiority. Substantially Viet Minh position is that French hold only population centers. (Maps being reproduced by French delegation, copies promised US delegation when available.) No discussion thus far of possible regroupment areas.

2. Principal topic of discussion was preparation of paper setting forth summary of results of all meetings to date. Viet Minh representative tabled his version which French representative found unacceptable. Chief point of disagreement was Viet Minh assertion that French had put forward Laniel proposal of 5 March<sup>2</sup> on take it or leave it basis, and that Viet Minh had rejected it. French representative stated his reference to Laniel proposal intended merely as starting point for military discussions, that he expressed willingness to modify it, and that therefore, it was not subject to acceptance or rejection. Another point of disagreement in Viet Minh draft was statement of French position regarding Dong proposals of 25 May, advanced by Viet Minh representative at 4 June meeting. French representative found Viet Minh expression of reasons for French disagreement with Dong proposals inaccurate. French representative is redrafting paper and will present his version to Viet Minh 15 June. Presumably next meeting will be devoted to further discussion of maps and draft summary of progress to date.

*Comment :*

(a) French delegation contact, in response to direct question, flatly stated there were no military talks with Viet Minh going on in Geneva other than those herein reported ;

(b) Further informed Defense representatives that instructions were issued to General Ely to have a liaison officer at Dinh Cau 14 June during POW exchange available to make contact with Viet Minh liaison officer and discuss time and place for meeting of representatives military commanders in field. Viet Minh were informed in advance. French delegation has no information yet whether contact was made.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> For outline of the Laniel proposal, see telegram 3240 from Paris. Mar. 6. p. 485.

JUNE 17, 1954

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 322

*Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(Keppel) to the Coordinator of the Delegation (Johnson)*

SECRET

[GENEVA,] June 17, 1954.

Subject: Recent Resumption of "Negotiating" Attitude by Communists

In evaluating the meaning of the conciliatory gestures which the Communist side made yesterday in the Indochina discussions, I think that we should not overlook the influence which Eden's sudden change of stance and the announcement of the forthcoming Churchill-Eisenhower conversations may have had on the Communists and, in particular, on the Soviets.

I personally am inclined to believe that the harshness of the position which Molotov took in the Indochinese discussions after his return from Moscow was probably primarily intended for its effect on the French political crisis and reflected real fear that EDC might after all go through if action were not taken fast. (As indicated in our memorandum of June 11 to General Smith,<sup>1</sup> his harsh line probably also reflected an estimate that we were not likely to intervene to save the Delta.) The manner in which Molotov went about contributing to the fall of the Laniel Government had, I believe, a wholly unexpected violent effect on Eden which must have been interpreted by the Soviets as implying that the progress which had been made toward getting the UK into a neutral role had been jeopardized. The announcement of the forthcoming Churchill-Eisenhower talks coming on top of Eden's change of position must have seemed to the Soviets like an alarming indication that the U.S. and British might agree on a practical policy to defend at least Laos and Cambodia if not also southern Vietnam.

In the light of this and in view of the fact that the Communists did not yesterday commit themselves publicly to anything of real significance, I think that we should be clear in our own minds that their performance might have been intended primarily as a tactical maneuver to forestall the serious consequences which might come out of the Churchill-Eisenhower talks. (The Communist performance probably also reflected a desire to repair damage done recently to their relations with Nehru.) It is, of course, probable that the Communists would accept a neutralized Laos and Cambodia if they got a relatively free hand in Vietnam and if by the neutralization of Laos and Cambodia our efforts to organize collective defense in Southeast Asia could be blocked.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

396.1 GE/6-1754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, June 17, 1954—1 p. m.

Dulte 189. Eyes only Secretary from Under Secretary. Because of possibilities mentioned in last paragraph Dulte 186,<sup>1</sup> Robertson, Phleger and I believe and recommend that it would be desirable for Heath also to remain Geneva for a while after we leave. This for morale effect on Laotian and Cambodian delegations, as well as on Vietnamese. These little people are likely to feel that they are being deserted in what for them is crisis if Heath leaves now. Actual length of his stay would depend on situation as estimated by Johnson and decided by you. Do not think it would be more than ten days. Request your approval.

Also urgently request your opinion whether I should stop en route for call or lunch with Churchill. He has sent me three invitations for weekends, two by personal phone calls, and he phoned again last night implying that he thought Eden had interfered. I took this as a joke, but Eden said it was not, and urged me to stop in London. I would prefer not to do so, both on considerations of personal convenience which can be disregarded, and also British press, and I do not want to be quoted there before having made whatever report is required at home. Associates here think I should do so.

Just had report Eden probably will not leave today.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 16, p. 1165.

396.1 GE/6-1754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 17, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 463. Repeated information London 297, Saigon 175, priority Paris 451. Limit distribution. Chou En-lai asked to see Eden yesterday making reference to Caccia's call on Chinese in which Caccia had reiterated firmness of position on Laos and Cambodia (unnumbered paragraph 7, Secto 448<sup>1</sup>).

Eden said that Chou was obviously shaken over conclusion Korean conference, particularly rejection his final resolution, which he interpreted as slamming door any possibility Chinese participation any further Korean discussions. Said that "he could not stand" another rebuff of his efforts at conciliation and was concerned over Indochina

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 15, p. 1153.

situation. Eden said that with respect Korean situation he had replied Chou had thrown curved ball at conference, particularly at US, by his resolution, and that the US obviously could not agree to perpetuating Geneva Conference set up. It did not mean that China would necessarily be excluded from any further consideration Korean problem.

Chou indicated he understood UK position respect Laos and Cambodia and its relation to the British position in Malaya. Said Chinese did not desire anything in Laos and Cambodia and were willing recognize "Kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos". Major Chinese worry is that US is attempting establish bases in Laos and Cambodia. China willing see Laos and Cambodia maintain relationship with France. Eden said Chou's major worry seemed to be US intentions that area and conviction we were attempting establish bases for assault on China. Chou said that he was willing see Laos and Cambodia independent states "in same manner as India and Burma".

Eden urged Chou to say to French directly whatever he had to say on Indochina, as French had major responsibility there.

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-1754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1954—3 : 52 p. m.

Tedul 211. From Secretary. Re Secto 460.<sup>2</sup> I seriously doubt wisdom of US participation as member of Committee of Nine, which is really not a committee at all since nine is total membership of Conference. This it seems to me would put our Delegation in position of having to participate in making of decisions which ought not be made so far as US is concerned, except after consultation with Dept and perhaps even on those terms we would not want to share in making these decisions.

I have frequently pointed out, notably in last press conference, that US continuing presence Geneva would be subject to recognizing primacy of French and Associated States and only with view to being helpful in quasi-advisory or observer capacity.

Could not membership of Committee be reduced by elimination for example of US, UK, and Soviet Union, and perhaps Communist China, with understanding that such a subcommittee would report back, at which time definitive US position could be made known. Presumably US Del would be kept informed by French and Associated

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4636 and to Saigon as telegram 2636.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1164.

States but we would avoid official participation in day by day Committee discussions which would mold decisions from which we might find it awkward subsequently to disassociate ourselves.

DULLES

396.1 GE/6-1654 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 17, 1954—3:54 p. m.

Tedul 212. From your Dulte 187<sup>2</sup> it is evident that "underground military talks", even more than conference proceedings, are pointing toward *de facto* partition under conditions such that Communist take-over of all Vietnam looms ahead clearly.

Chauvel's mention of difficulty of "selling" Vietminh proposal to Vietnamese and his doubt that Hanoi-Haiphong area can be held indicate to us that French may end by accepting any Vietminh proposition which offers hope of extricating Expeditionary Corps. In this connection we note failure of Vietminh thus far to react to French question regarding evacuation French troops and citizens and Vietnamese Catholics.

There can of course be no question of US participation in any attempt to "sell" a partition to non-Communist Vietnamese.

DULLES

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 16, p. 1154.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 286

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal)*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 17, 1954.

Participants: Prince Wan, Leader of Thailand Delegation  
The Under Secretary  
Philip W. Bonsal

Subject: Thailand application to the Security Council.

Prince Wan called on General Smith at 4:00 p. m. He stated that he is satisfied with the present draft of the resolution which will be submitted to the Security Council in connection with Thailand's application. The Security Council meets tomorrow, June 18. It is probable that there will be no vote until Tuesday, June 22.

Prince Wan stated that he was leaving for Bern on June 23 and planned to leave Switzerland on June 26. He will proceed either to

Bangkok or to New York depending on whether there is to be a special session of the General Assembly.

Prince Wan speculated on whether Malik, the representative of Lebanon on the Security Council, would vote affirmatively on the Thai resolution. He recalled that last year Malik had expressed himself generally as being in favor of the Thai policy in this regard. (Later this evening, Prince Wan telephoned to say that he had been informed by Ambassador Sarasin that Malik will vote for the Thai resolution.)<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Following the submission of the Thai appeal on May 29, the Security Council considered this question at its 672d, 673d, and 674th meetings, June 3, 16, and 18, respectively. On June 18 the draft resolution was put to the vote at the request of the U.S. Representative. It received 9 votes in favor, 1 against (Soviet Union), and 1 abstention (Lebanon). Since the vote against was that of a permanent member, the draft resolution was not adopted.

On July 7 the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Thailand sent a letter to the Secretary-General stating that since the Security Council had rejected the request for observers, his government was now obliged to have recourse to the General Assembly. He requested that an item entitled "Request of Thailand for observation under the Peace Observation Commission" be placed on the agenda of the eighth session of the General Assembly. On Aug. 20 the Thai Foreign Minister informed the Secretary-General that he had been instructed by his government not to press for a resumed session of the General Assembly. No further request was received to place the question on the agenda of the ninth regular session.

For information on the submission of the Thai appeal to the United Nations Security Council, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Ninth Year*, 672d, 673d, and 674th Meetings; United Nations, *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1954*, pp. 60-61; and U.S. Department of State, *US Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1954*, pp. 54-56. Voluminous unpublished material exists on the Thai appeal in the following files of the Department of State: 320.2 AB; 330; 396.1 GE; 751G.00; and in the IO files—master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

396.1 GE/6-1754: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 17, 1954—5 p. m.

Dulte 193. Repeated information London 298, Paris 452, Saigon 176. London, Paris and Saigon eyes only Ambassadors. Reference Secto 463, repeated information London 297, Paris 451, Saigon 175.<sup>1</sup> Dennis Allen (UK) gave Johnson this morning additional details on conversation with Chou En-lai. Chou stated that in case Cambodia resistance forces were small and all that was necessary was a political settlement by the present royal government with them "which could easily be obtained." In case of Laos, the resistance forces were larger, and it would be necessary recognize this fact by formation of regrouping areas along the border with Vietnam and China. The task in both states was twofold: The removal of foreign forces and dealing with

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1170.

the problem of domestic resistance movements. The military staff should get down to this task.

In reply to Eden's query as to whether it would not be difficult obtain Viet Minh admission Viet Minh forces were in Laos and Cambodia, Chou stated it would "not be difficult" to get Viet Minh to agree to withdrawal their forces from those two states in context with withdrawal all foreign forces. Chou made no direct reply to Eden's reference to French-Laotian treaty on French bases in Laos. Eden expressed personal view that Chou wants settlement, but has some doubt with regard to degree of control he exercises over Viet Minh.

In long talk with Bidault this morning (first direct contact between Chinese and French) Chou substantially repeated what he told Eden yesterday (in conversation with Bidault, Chou referred to Viet Minh forces in Laos and Cambodia as "volunteers"). Bidault had also seen Molotov this morning and reported that both Molotov and Chou are obviously greatly concerned over any break-up Indochina conference in pattern of Korean conference as well as of lowering level conference below level of Foreign Ministers. Bidault said they clearly want to keep the conference going. Bidault and I agree (Eden did not comment) that it was important we do nothing dispel Chou's worries over US bases in Laos and Cambodia.

I also expressed personal opinion that important Laos and Cambodia move ahead as quickly and as vigorously as possible with appeal to UN. Eden and Bidault agreed, Eden adding that important Vietnam not get mixed up with Laos and Cambodia cases UN.

Chauvel showed me handwritten note from Ely, in his political capacity, urging against attempting hold any enclave in delta and recommending straight partition formula. I could not resist expressing contempt for such an easy "sellout" of last remaining foothold in north and said we could under no circumstances publicly associate ourselves with such a solution

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-1754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      NIACT      WASHINGTON, June 17, 1954—7:44 p. m.

Tedul 215. For Under Secretary and Ambassador from Secretary. Reference Sectos 458, 459, 461, 463 and Dulte 190.<sup>2</sup> Chou

<sup>1</sup>Drafted by the Secretary of State, Sturm of FE/PSA, and Gullion of S/P. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4649.

<sup>2</sup>All dated June 17, pp. 1162, 1163, 1157, 1170, and 1165, respectively.



En-lai's proposal concerning Laos and Cambodia (Secto 458) seems to us discouraging in that it marks little advance over his proposal of May 27 (Secto 326<sup>3</sup>), except that it acknowledges our insistence on separate identities of three Associated States. Following particulars seem open to serious objection.

1. New proposals would still have the enemy represented by a phony Khmer and Pathet Lao command and appear designed in effect to perpetuate Vietminh presence in Laos and Cambodia.

2. Secto 458 fails to make any provision for withdrawal of Vietminh forces from Laos and Cambodia. Its wording would tend to provide sanction for Vietminh troops now in the two countries to remain there in support of any Khmer or Pathet Lao troops which could be mustered. Moreover no foreign troops could be admitted to Laos and Cambodia to defend the countries, as part of united action in the area, or train their armies, nor could the latter be provided with the means to fight.

3. Paragraph 4 in later proposal admits the concept of an international control commission and makes no mention of the joint committee of military representatives which all Communist proposals regarding a cessation of hostilities have hitherto described as bearing the real responsibility for implementing any armistice.

4. Broadly speaking, think important that neither we nor other friendly delegations give any impression of agreement which would exclude possibility bringing Laos and Cambodia into some collective security system in Southeast Asia or if this should be done making the military arrangements implicit in any such relationship.

I was interested in reaction you were able to draw from Molotov on composition of control Commission. I doubt we can get Thailand or Philippines, let alone both, on it. Our position of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia seems the one we should stick on.

DULLES

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 27, p. 947.

JUNE 18, 1954

396.1 GE/6-1854

*Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal) to the Deputy United States Representative (Robertson)*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 18, 1954.

Subject: Meeting of the Six this morning.

1. Chauvel reported on Bidault's talk yesterday with Chou En-lai. Chou En-lai apparently agrees to recognize the Royal Governments in both countries and, with regard to Cambodia, to recognize that the handling of the Khmer movement is a question of internal politics only. With regard to Laos, Chou still insists on regrouping zones in

northern Laos, along the Chinese and Vietnamese frontiers, for the Pathet Lao. Chou's position is that the Vietminh in the countries are "volunteers", the withdrawal of which could be worked out by military staff conversations.

2. The Cambodians and Laotians will talk this afternoon with reference to the formal Chinese Communist proposal. They will ask for certain clarifications regarding the parties concerned and the terms of reference of the military talks. If these clarifications seem satisfactory, they will then make a definite proposal for military conversations. The Cambodians insist that these conversations take place in Cambodia and not at Geneva. The Cambodians and Laotians will speak separately with the idea that perhaps this afternoon we can reach agreement on military conversations for both Laos and Cambodia. (With regard to the military conversations, the Cambodian position is that because of the fluid military situation in Cambodia and because of the danger that the Vietminh might send some alleged Khmer resitants to Geneva they prefer conversations on the spot. The Laotians expressed themselves strongly against any regrouping zones in Laos.) The military conversations could result in recommendations which would be reported back to the Conference so that these recommendations could be correlated and coordinated with the other work of the Conference including the military settlement in Vietnam.

3. Chauvel spoke about the future work of the Conference and the desirability of providing for continuity after the departure of Eden and General Smith. He said the Chinese Communists believe they lost a good deal of face because of the method by which the Korean phase was terminated. Chauvel indicated that he probably would not discuss his proposal for a nine-delegation committee this afternoon although he left this open.

4. Chauvel may present a French proposal for the conditions of international control in Laos and Cambodia.

---

751G.00/6-1854 : Telegram

*Johnson-Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, June 18, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 18, 1954—3 p. m.

Dulte 195. Repeated information Paris 455, Saigon 177. Paris eyes only Ambassador; Saigon eyes only Ambassador. Johnson saw Chauvel this morning and discussed with him conference situation in light Tedul 211.<sup>1</sup> Johnson stated seemed to us that such fundamental

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1171.

questions as composition, voting procedures and authority of international control commission should be dealt with in conference rather than by committee. If conference reached decision on fundamental principles, working out of details could be done by committee of experts of principally interested parties in same pattern as present Franco-Viet Minh military conversations.

Chauvel said this would be agreeable except that question of authority, which he termed "relationship between international commission and joint committees" could be dealt with by technical committee, thus implying France not prepared to maintain principle of subordination joint committees to international commission. As French have already circulated proposal contained Secto 460<sup>2</sup> through secretariat, it was agreed we would make suggestion along foregoing lines at today's restricted meeting. Chauvel said they did not yet have any further indication as to what attitude Chinese would take on French proposal entirely clear from conversation with Chauvel that his main interest is in keeping some conference activity of nine going and that if regardless of level representation we prepared continue some conference meetings would probably meet French point of view. Appears French proposal made on assumption that there would be complete recess of conference with departure of Smith and Eden.

Chauvel made reference to his conversation with Smith yesterday (Dulte 193—last paragraph),<sup>3</sup> making inquiry as to exactly what we had in mind. Johnson in reply read to him paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 basic instructions (Tosec 138)<sup>4</sup> stating that French willingness surrender even minimum enclave in north of Haiphong would so clearly contravene the principles which the US considered essential as to require our public dissociation with such a solution.

In reply to Chauvel's questions, Johnson made it clear we were speaking only of public disassociation from such a settlement. The US had in the past and of course would continue working with and supporting France in every possible way and wherever we could. Chauvel indicated full understanding our position. He said they had come to conclusion that what he termed any "leopard spot" solution was entirely impracticable and unenforceable. From standpoint of future it would be much better to retain a reasonably defensible line in Vietnam behind which there would be no enclaves of Viet Minh and do all possible behind that line to build up effective Vietnamese Government and defense. They had no intention of "any immediate surrender

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1164.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1173.

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 12, p. 778.

of Haiphong" which in any event must remain under their control for a considerable period for purely military reasons to effect evacuation of French Union Forces from the north. However, if, as appeared likely, choice was giving Viet Minh an enclave in south in exchange for French enclave in Haiphong, they thought it preferable to give up Haiphong. He said no French parliament would approve conditions which the US had laid down for its intervention, and French had no choice but made the best deal they could, obtaining as strong position as possible in south. Chauvel understood fully we would probably not be able to publicly associate ourselves with such a solution, but he hoped that when it came time to put it to the Vietnamese the US would consider it possible very discreetly to let the Vietnamese know that we considered it best that could be obtained under the circumstances and our public disassociation would not operate so as to encourage Vietnamese opposition. Johnson replied he did not see how it would be possible for us to do this, and in any event he would of course have to see what the solution was. Chauvel said that such a solution as partition should come as no surprise to the Vietnamese as Buu Loc had sometime ago indicated to DeJean there had been conversations between Vietnamese and Viet Minh in which Viet Minh had made it clear that only two alternatives were coalition government or partition. Chauvel said Ngo Dinh and Diem are very unrealistic, unreasonable, and would probably prove to be "difficulte".

Chauvel said the line French had in mind had been made available to US defense representatives at some five-power talks, but was vague about time and place. He referred to it as "line of the chalk cliffs", which he said was defensible position running from the sea across Vietnam and Laos to the Mekong. Understand this is a line roughly 19 parallel running from vicinity of Dong Hoi to Thakhek. Replying to query, Chauvel said French Union Forces removed from the north would be deployed along that line.

Chauvel said all indications were Mendes-France would succeed in forming government next day or two and would probably himself assume Foreign Minister post. Said he had been in touch with Mendes-France and had sent emissary to Paris this morning to brief him on situation in Geneva. Chauvel said was anxious to show complete continuity of French effort here in Geneva and hoped there could be another restricted meeting tomorrow. Chauvel said, "Under-ground military talks" last night had been completely unproductive, Viet Minh obviously taking strong line in view of French Government situation.

751G.00/6-1754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, June 18, 1954—1:04 p. m.

Tedul 217. Dulte 193.<sup>2</sup> It has for a long time been our basic policy to see the UN more actively concern itself with the situation in Indochina as a whole and also in relation to Thailand. It seems that if Laos and Cambodia act alone, particularly under Chapter VII this might be construed as a writing off of Vietnam and care would be required in this connection. We note, however, that 157 from Phnom Penh<sup>3</sup> indicates intention only to seek peace observation commission not Chapter VII action.

In view of the critical nature of the situation we are not disposed to attempt to use pressure to prevent what any one of these governments thinks may be necessary to its own survival. This would be to assume excessive responsibility. We can, however, exert care lest the action of one should unfortunately injure the other.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to USUN as telegram 653, to Bangkok as telegram 2528, to Saigon as telegram 2649, to Phnom Penh (from Saigon) as telegram 78, to London as telegram 6938, and to Paris as telegram 4668.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1173.

<sup>3</sup> June 17, not printed; the message contained a report on a Cambodian request for a peace observation commission. (751G.00/6-1754)

396.1 GE/6-1854 : Telegram

*Fifteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 18, 3 p. m.:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 18, 1954—midnight.

Secto 472. Repeated information Paris 459, London 304, Saigon 180, Tokyo 150, Moscow 135, Phnom Penh and Vientiane unnumbered. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Fifteenth restricted session, Friday, June 18, Molotov presiding.

In General Smith's absence, Robertson made statement (Secto 470<sup>2</sup>) supporting proposals made June 8 by Cambodian delegate (Secto 367<sup>3</sup>) and June 16 by Laotian delegate (Secto 457<sup>4</sup>). He

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/15) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 7:20 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 311-322. The speech by Tep Phan, Indochina Document IC/37, June 18, and the proposals by Cambodia and Laos, Indochina Documents IC/36 and IC/38, respectively, June 18, are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279A.

<sup>2</sup> *Infra*.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 3, p. 1014.

<sup>4</sup> Dated June 16, p. 1162.

stated Chinese Communists proposal (Secto 458<sup>5</sup>) seemed to make provision for local Communists to remain in Laos and Cambodia and was lacking in precision and definiteness. He stated US delegate therefore unable accept Chinese Communist proposal. He spoke of large number positively identified Viet Minh units in Laos and Cambodia.

Cambodia delegate then commented on Chou En-lai's June 16 proposal. He said he was not opposed to simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina if it could be rapidly reached. Otherwise cease-fire in Cambodia might precede other cease-fire since it can be accomplished by withdrawal of all regular and irregular foreign forces. Cambodian delegate reiterated commitment that after such withdrawal, Cambodia would admit no more foreign troops. He stressed, however, Cambodia cannot accept re-grouping zones for existing foreign troops i.e. Viet Minh in Cambodia.

With regard to negotiations by the representatives of belligerents, Cambodian delegate said purpose, location and participants must be settled. As to purpose, he said military representatives must deal primarily with elimination of foreign forces including period of time, facilities to be given Viet Minh command to fulfill commitments and road and river routes to be used. Military representatives must have precise terms of reference.

With regard participants, Cambodian delegate said there would be representatives of Royal Cambodian Command on one hand and Viet Minh Command on the other.

As to location, Cambodian delegate recalled Viet Minh proposal that discussions for Vietnam be on spot and said this would be appropriate in case of Cambodia. He pointed out extremely fluid military situation in Cambodia with highly mobile Viet Minh invaders. He therefore did not consider meeting of military representatives in Geneva practical or useful. He reiterated paragraphs 2 (a) and (b) and 3 of Cambodia proposal of June 8 (Secto 367) as spelling out terms of reference of military representatives.

Turning to paragraph 3 of Chinese Communist proposal re non-introduction from abroad of new troops and military personnel, Cambodian delegate expressed appreciation. Chou En-lai's understanding that new country requires to organize its defense structure. He said however, in addition to arms and munitions, new army needs experts and instructors.

With regard to 4th paragraph of Chinese Communists proposal on international control Cambodian delegate indicated acceptance of such control either by true neutrals or by UN, stating that it must be on spot and ready to function at time of cessation hostilities in order to

---

<sup>5</sup> Dated June 17. p. 1162.

control (1) withdrawal of foreign forces, (2) freeing of prisoners of war and civilian internees, and (3) any external activity capable of troubling peace and security of Cambodia. Cambodian delegate expressed view there would be no difficulty with 5th and 6th paragraph of Chou's proposal dealing with liberation and exchange of prisoners of war and civilian internees and with non-persecution of persons having collaborated with opposing party.

Cambodian delegate took strong issue with Viet Minh statement supporting so-called resistance government. He added Chou En-lai's proposal not far off some points from Cambodian position and expressed satisfaction at spirit of conciliation shown by Chinese.

Cambodian delegate then submitted specific proposal (Secto 471<sup>6</sup>) covering meeting of military representatives to achieve purposes outlined above.

Chou En-lai then spoke. He stated Mr. Robertson's statement was obviously different from General Smith's statement other day. He expressed understanding of duty Robertson has to perform i.e. the creation of controversy and of instigating controversy. For himself, he would put emphasis on conciliation and attempt to reach agreement in principle. He added, however, that as Robertson well knew, if Robertson insisted on challenging him, he would meet challenge and there would be endless discussion in this conference "we are not strangers to each other".

Chou En-lai then took up situation in Laos and Cambodia stating that in both countries there were resistance forces led by resistance governments and that there were also foreign troops some of which have been withdrawn. Agreement should be reached for complete withdrawal of foreign troops in Laos and Cambodia as well as in Vietnam.

Chou En-lai reiterated need for meeting of military representatives. Re international supervision he said that UN cannot be considered. He added international control should extend to Laos and Cambodia taking into account special conditions there. He urged early effort both within and without conference to agree on composition of neutral committee, stating that after agreement on composition decision can be reached on other points re control. He expressed himself favorably re French proposal for a committee of [nine] delegates to discuss this point (Secto 460<sup>7</sup>). He considered this proposal an alternative to discussion within the conference itself.

Chou En-lai reiterated stand be simultaneity of cessation of hostilities.

---

<sup>6</sup> Dated June 18, p. 1186.

<sup>7</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1164.

Chou En-lai then turned DRV proposal of June 16 re political considerations (Secto 459<sup>8</sup>) and expressed full support. He stated true peace can be consolidated only when political problems are solved. He proposed that conference set date for discussion of political problems on basis DRV 6-point proposal June 16.

Laos delegate then stated Chinese Communists proposal of June 16 seemed to him to present acceptable basis for development discussion. He recalled his reservations on simultaneity of cessation hostilities but he said none of Chinese Communists points presented insuperable problem but that some required precision.

Laos delegate then made proposal (Secto 459) for meeting of representatives of the two commands in Geneva and on spot to study withdrawal of Viet Minh troops from Laos and of French Union troops to peace time bases in Laos. The representatives are to submit recommendations to conference as soon as possible. Meanwhile conference can continue to examine other problems relating to peace in Laos and especially to international control.

After the recess Mr. Robertson asked for the floor and made the following statement :

“I categorically reject Mr. Chou En-lai’s insinuations.

There is nothing contradictory in the statement I have just made with the position taken by General Smith at our last meeting. General Smith stated that Mr. Chou En-lai’s proposal deserved our respectful attention. The US delegation has carefully considered the proposal and I have stated the conclusions reached. We have listened with careful attention to the statements made by the Cambodian and Laotian delegates. They pointed out, as I did, the lack of precision and definiteness in some aspects of the Chinese proposal and its failure to provide for the withdrawal of the Viet Minh forces. For these reasons the US delegation believes that the Laotian and Cambodian proposals provide a more desirable basis for negotiation”.

Pham Van Dong (Viet Minh) spoke next and supported Chinese proposal of 16 June (Secto 458) which, he said, should be used as basis for further debate and which springs from principles presented in Chinese proposal of 27 May (Secto 326<sup>9</sup>). His delegation, he said, supports these principles and Chinese proposal concerning Laos and Cambodia.

He then made following remarks :

1. Principle of simultaneous cease-fire in three states should be accepted.

2. Disposition of forces of both sides after cease-fire should pertain to local forces including forces of resistance movements in Laos and Cambodia which, he said, exist in fact.

<sup>8</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1163.

<sup>9</sup> Dated May 27, p. 947.



3. With respect to withdrawal of foreign forces he said there have been Viet Minh volunteers in Laos and Cambodia and that these have been withdrawn but that if today there are such forces they will be withdrawn.

4. No foreign country should establish military bases in Indochina.

5. Representatives of military commands should engage in negotiations in Geneva and on the spot re cease-fire in Laos and Cambodia.

Dong then devoted some time to discussion of resistance movements in Laos and Cambodia, stressed that they were organized in companies and battalions, and that the existence of these forces must be recognized by all parties. He attacked Laotian and Cambodian delegates for denying existence of such forces and hoped these delegates would yield to reason. Concluded by charging that information about Viet Minh units mentioned by Robertson in opening statement was as fallacious as allegation that Chinese units participated in battle of Dien Bien Phu which, he said, has been denied by French High Command.

Chauvel (France) spoke next and referred to Chinese statement and proposal 16 June as reasonable and moderate, and as containing elements which could be acceptable although terminology appeared subject differing interpretation. He then commented on following points of Chinese proposal (Secto 458) :

1. Re paragraph 3: Clarification necessary since, while text does not prohibit certain categories of armament necessary to defense, its purpose appears to be otherwise.

2. Re paragraph 4: While French delegate agrees international control should be applied to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, it is not clear whether one or three commissions intended.

3. Re paragraph 2: This main difficulty Chinese proposal believe all agree negotiation between representatives commands of belligerent parties necessary, but who are those commands? This not clear since in statement introducing proposal Chou En-lai drew distinction in speaking of disposition of forces between local troops and foreign troops.

Chauvel remarked that Chinese text offers prospect for making progress and added parenthetically, in obvious reference to French delegate, conference should resolve these questions since composition some delegates might soon be changed.

Taking up question withdrawal foreign forces Chauvel emphasized need for clear definition identity of belligerent commands. For example, in Cambodia since no French forces are there, who would establish contact in the field. Suggested Command of Royal Cambodian Forces would have to discuss problem with Viet Minh since latter would be command that had to receive troops withdrawn. Similarly in Laos there is French-Laotian command and on other hand

Viet Minh Command which would be responsible for receiving foreign troops withdrawn. At this point Chauvel injected comment that French High Command could confirm US information re Viet Minh units in Laos and Cambodia.

In concluding Chauvel referred to three drafts now before conference—Chinese proposal 16 June, and Cambodia and Laos proposals of today. Suggested that if these looked at side by side they would not be conflicting although Laotian and Cambodian drafts reduced in scope and more precise. He then suggested that all delegates work on three proposals overnight and attempt to formulate by tomorrow version acceptable to all.

Molotov then took floor as Soviet delegate and noted that during debate last few days certain *rapprochement* of views has appeared on Laotian and Cambodian questions as would be seen from reaction to Chinese proposal 16 June. He believed all had impression Chinese draft constituted step forward and contained number of positive proposals on which position several delegates could be brought closer together. Re to common ground that now appeared to exist re Laos and Cambodia Molotov noted today's statement by US delegate which caused him to ask if US delegate felt there was danger in possibility of agreement being found. He stated we should work to overcome difficulties and not fear that agreement constituted danger to anyone. Pursuing this point further he noted that comparisons were made between statements of US delegate at last and at today's meeting. He noted that US delegate now appeared to have different attitude re Chinese proposal, and that Robertson appeared so interested in refuting existence these differences that no comment seemed necessary. However, he asserted, such differences exist. US delegate, he continued, at last meeting characterized Chinese proposal as "reasonable and moderate," and today its views are of different nature. He noted particularly that representatives of countries directly concerned, particularly Laos, thought Chinese proposals could be acceptable basis for discussion but "Robertson won't hear of that". Fact that Cambodian delegate did not refuse to consider Chinese proposal he said, further gives reason to believe three proposals not so irreconcilable as to make impossible chance of bringing them together.

Molotov then devoted some time to supporting assertion that national liberation movements exist in Laos and Cambodia.

In concluding Molotov referred to adoption by conference on 29 May of resolution <sup>10</sup> that military talks begin between two commands in Vietnam and suggested similar decision re Laos and Cambodia be adopted. He recognized that clarification would be needed as to who

---

<sup>10</sup> Text of the resolution reported to the Department of State in telegram Secto 347, May 29. p. 795.

would conduct such military talks but that this would not be difficult to settle.

Eden spoke last briefly in support of Chauvel's suggestion that all delegates consider three texts (Chinese, Laos, and Cambodian), in effort to reconcile them between now and next meeting as practical basis to go on.

Molotov stated he saw no objection to this suggestion since it appeared to be reformulation of French delegate's proposal. Molotov then adjourned meeting to be reconvened 19 June.

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-1854 : Telegram

*Fifteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 18, 3 p. m. :  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 18, 1954—midnight.

Secto 470. Repeated information Paris 457, London 302, Saigon 178, Tokyo 148, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered, Moscow 133. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Following is text of statement by Robertson at fifteenth Indochina restricted session Friday June 18:

"Proposals on how to settle the problems of Cambodia and Laos have been put forward by the representatives of Cambodia and Laos on June 8 and June 16, and by the Chinese Communist delegation on June 16. The US delegation has given these proposals careful consideration.

The proposals of the Cambodian and Laotian delegations are clear, simple and forthright. They both provide for what is obviously the essential element of a just settlement—the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from the two countries.

The Chinese Communist proposal, on the other hand, is not clear on the question of the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Laos and Cambodia and further seems to contemplate that local Communist forces not in those countries, but that some provision should be made for them in any settlement. For these and for the reason that other provisions lack precision and definiteness, we are unable to accept the Chinese Communist proposal.

I do not believe that we will ever find a more appropriate time for good faith to be manifested than during our talks this afternoon. The head of the Viet Minh delegation, as well as the leader of the Soviet delegation, has expressed his confidence that this good faith exists. If we are to accept these protestations, if we wish the world to give any credence to these assertions, we must have a concrete demonstration before we can make progress toward an agreement in which that element plays a part. I can think of no better demonstration than for the Viet Minh to admit the presence of its regular and irregular mili-

tary units in Cambodia and Laos and to agree to their prompt withdrawal.

It is not possible in fact to deny that these troops are in Cambodia and Laos. A number of these units have been positively identified. Among them, according to recent information, are troops of the Viet Minh 325th Division which normally operates in Central Vietnam and the 304th Division which had previously operated in the area south of the Red River Delta. These units include the 436th Battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment either in Cambodia or withdrawn from Cambodia to Laos, three battalions of the 66th Infantry Regiment in Laos, one battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment in Laos, and two battalions of the 18th Infantry Regiment in Laos. Previous unit identifications include what was probably the entire 308th Infantry Division which invaded northern Laos in January and February this year, but was later withdrawn to take part in the battle at Dien Bien Phu. The units I have just named do not complete the list of invading units, but they should be sufficient to indicate the magnitude of this aggression.

Mr. Pham Van Dong, in his speech of May 12, admitted the presence in Cambodia and Laos of armed Vietnamese, but claimed that they were residents of those two countries who had taken up arms against the legal governments in support of what he is pleased to call the Pathet Lao and Khmer 'resistance governments'. This admission represents some progress, but what he failed to admit was that these armed Vietnamese are under the orders of and totally allied with the Viet Minh forces across the border in Vietnam.

It is now time to return to reality for an honest discussion of what may be done to end the hostilities in Cambodia and Laos. Fortunately, the path to be followed has been clearly marked in the proposals of the Cambodian and the Laos delegations. The US delegation does not see any justification for further delay in working out a simple and effective solution based on these proposals."

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-1854 : Telegram

*Fifteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 18, 3 p. m. :  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 18, 1954—midnight.

Secto 471. Repeated information Paris 458, London 303, Saigon 179, Tokyo 14, Moscow 134, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Following are translations of texts of Cambodian and Laotian proposals submitted at fifteenth restricted Indochina meeting Friday, June 18 :

A. *Cambodian*

"The representatives of the Cambodian and Viet Minh commands will meet on the spot, that is to say in Cambodia, with the mission :

- "1. Of studying the methods of evacuation of foreign forces, regular and irregular.

"2. Of studying the methods of liberation or exchange of prisoners of war and civil internees.

"3. To submit, in the shortest possible time, their recommendations to the decision of the conference."

### B. *Laotian*

"Toward a cessation of hostilities in Laos:

"1. The representatives of the two commands will meet as soon as possible at Geneva and contacts will be established immediately on the spot.

"2. The representatives of the two commands will study the problems relative to the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Laotian territory and of those of the French Union to their peacetime bases.

"3. They will submit their recommendations to the conference as soon as possible."

SMITH

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 320 : Telegram

### *The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, June 18, 1954—6 p. m.

Dulte 197. Eyes only Secretary from Under Secretary. Ambassador Dillon has telephoned suggesting that on my return I touch down Paris and see Mendes-France at airport on condition that he is invested, which Dillon expects today or tomorrow.<sup>1</sup> Dillon says that Mendes-France urgently desires to see me. Because of French reaction to Churchill visit<sup>2</sup> and for other reasons, I will do this, unless I hear from you to contrary.<sup>3</sup> Plan to leave here Sunday afternoon.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Memoranda from Johnson to Smith, June 18 and 19, concerning Ambassador Dillon's call and a possible meeting between Under Secretary Smith and Premier Mendès-France are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 320.

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on Prime Minister Churchill's visit to Washington, June 25-29, see volume VI.

<sup>3</sup> The Department's reply was contained in telegram Tedul 218, June 18, *infra*.

---

110.12 SM/6-1854 : Telegram

### *The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1954—4:42 p. m.

Tedul 218. Eyes only for Under Secretary and Ambassador from Secretary. Ur Dulte 197.<sup>2</sup> This poses difficult problem. On one hand

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4671.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

we do not want to discourage Mendes France initial effort at what may be policy of cooperation with US nor do we wish to do anything to make more unhappy French feeling arising out of Churchill-Eden visit. On the other hand we here are in process rethinking our entire position regarding Indochina in light developments at Geneva and Paris. We need your contribution and hence no firm position will be reached until your return.

On balance we believe advisable you accept Mendes France invitation although we would prefer you to take extra time which would be involved in calling briefly on him rather than having him come to airport to see you which carries a certain emergency and feverish character which is inappropriate to our desire to make a calm fresh start covering whole gamut of our problems with French including EDC.

It seems that if you call on him you could better regulate time and character of visit and explain it as a courtesy call—an explanation which hardly fits into a hurried airport meeting.

If you do see Mendes France hope you will find it practicable principally to gather his intentions without any explicit or implicit commitment of our own.<sup>3</sup>

As far as substance is concerned believe President's letter to Coty gives guidance and that it will be well to keep within 4 corners of that letter.<sup>4</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>3</sup> Under Secretary Smith replied in telegram Dulles 198, June 19, that he agreed "completely with procedure you suggest [in Tedul 218] re Mendes-France and will keep plane departure flexible enough to act accordingly. Will also remain within substance of President's letter." (396.1 GE/6-1954) The Department of State replied in Tedul 223, June 19, that "If Mendes-France still desires see you despite absence Assembly approval his Cabinet and if Dillon concurs, we believe it would still be appropriate for you pay courtesy call in Paris on Mendes-France en route home." (396.1 GE/6-1954)

Smith met for an hour and a quarter with Mendès-France on June 20 at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris. In telegram 4944 from Paris, June 20, Ambassador Dillon reported that the Under Secretary and the Premier discussed various matters pertaining to Indochina and to the Geneva Conference, in particular negotiations at Geneva between France and the Viet Minh. The Under Secretary emphasized the importance of the French Delegation in Geneva keeping in touch with the U.S. Delegation regarding any negotiations with the Viet Minh "so that we would not be suddenly faced with a solution from which we would have to publicly disassociate ourselves." With reference to an agreement with the Viet Minh, Mendès-France indicated that he expected to have considerable difficulty with the Vietnamese. He said the Vietnamese representatives would "place great weight on any advice they might get from the United States and he hoped that the United States would be able to help France by discreetly letting the Vietnamese representatives know that they would be wise to accept the French agreement with the Viet Minh as the best agreement obtainable." Ambassador Dillon reported that the Under Secretary did not commit himself in any way on this subject. (751G.00/6-2054) For the full text of telegram 4944, see volume XIII.

<sup>4</sup> President Eisenhower's letter to President Coty, June 16, and the reply by President Coty, June 23, are printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, pp. 583-584.

396.1 GE/6-1854 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, June 18, 1954—8:43 p. m.

Tedul 221. Under Secretary from Secretary. Limit distribution. In view of events subsequent to Tosec 138 May 12<sup>2</sup> and prospective return yourself with others of Delegation, believe basic instructions should be regarded as withdrawn and replaced by direction to those who will continue on at Geneva to take no substantive positions except pursuant to specific instructions which may be given from time to time. If you concur, please advise Johnson accordingly.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 778.

396.1 GE/6-1954 : Telegram

*Smith-Molotov Meeting, Geneva, June 18, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 19, 1954—midnight.

Dulte 202. Repeated information Moscow 138. Moscow eyes only Ambassador. I saw Molotov at his villa yesterday evening at my request to inform him of my departure, and because I felt time had come to sound a note of warning. Talk lasted more than hour and a half. Molotov asked what I thought would be best thing to do with conference, to adjourn it temporarily or to keep it going. I replied as far as we concerned should be kept going while there was hope of reaching reasonable settlement, but that there was no use referring to "committees" matters of major policy which must be decided by conference as a whole. Before my departure I felt it would be desirable to exchange views, in order that mistakes of the past should not be repeated as the result of misunderstanding of our respective positions. With regard to Korean phase, I had only to say that in reserving our position re final Chinese proposal had not implied to exclude Communist China from future discussions on Korean question. As matter of fact, China was belligerent there against UN and for practical reasons would have to be party to settlement.

Regarding Indochinese phase Molotov said he had impression US avoided reaching solution and cited in this regard Robertson objection in yesterday's restricted session to acceptance Chou's proposal on Laos and Cambodia. I said that while proposal might be satisfactory in

---

<sup>1</sup> Message transmitted in two sections.

some respects it made no mention of Viet Minh withdrawal or of adequate supervision. So long as regular Viet Minh forces remained in Laos and Cambodia we could not help but view situation in very serious light. Molotov cited Pham Van Dong's remarks regarding withdrawal Viet Minh "volunteers" and emphasized importance of beginning direct negotiations regarding Laos and Cambodia of type now taking place regarding Vietnam. I regretted that I was not at all convinced that Pham Van Dong really meant what he said. His statements sounded well enough, but his written proposals did not bear them out.

I said I wanted to make our position on Laos and Cambodia entirely clear. In addition to regular Viet Minh forces in these countries, which I enumerated, there were some dissident elements in Laos and a much smaller number in Cambodia. If regular Viet Minh forces were withdrawn, elections could be held, with guarantees that individuals would not be discriminated against as regards their electoral rights for having supported either side. Dissidents would be able to vote for any candidates they choose, Communists included. However, while Viet Minh forces remained in these countries, there could be no peace nor could free elections be held.

In private conversations with Mr. Eden and others, Communist delegates, in particular Chou En-lai, had taken an apparently reasonable view on Laos and Cambodia, but that here again, when we came to the point of trying to get open agreement on specific points we were unable to do so. I specifically mentioned Chou En-lai's statements to Eden in which he said that China would have no objections to recognizing the Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia or to these states having forces and arms sufficient to maintain security, or their remaining in French Union so long as they were not used as military bases by the United States.<sup>2</sup> We could not disagree with any of this, although if we kept out the Chinese would have to keep out, and these small states would have to be allowed to join with their neighbors in whatever regional security arrangements would best protect their integrity without constituting a threat to any one else. Chou En-lai might be anxious about possibility of US bases in Laos and Cambodia. We wanted on our part to be sure that these countries were not handed over to the Chinese. Molotov said that while he did not know about what attitude Chinese might have on other questions in future, he could assure me that Chinese attitude on this particular question was not at all unreasonable, and that there was nothing in it which would give rise to conflicts. He added, however, that if we continued to take a one-sided view and insist on one-sided solutions, he must "in all frankness say that this would not succeed". There were, he said, some differences of view

---

<sup>2</sup> Conversation reported in telegram Secto 463, June 17, p. 1170.



between us on Laos and Cambodia, especially in regard to our refusal to recognize resistance movements; point he wanted to make, however, was that basis for reaching agreement was present and that agreement could be reached so long as neither side "adopted one-sided views or put forward extreme pretensions". This, he said, could only lead to other side's doing same.

Resistance movements existed, in Laos and Cambodia, Molotov asserted. About 50 percent of the territory of Laos was not under the control of official government. It was true that much smaller resistance movement existed in Cambodia. He said that in fact conditions in all three Indochinese countries were different—large resistance movement controlling three-quarters of territory in Vietnam, substantial movement in Laos controlling, as he had indicated, about half territory, and much smaller movement in Cambodia. I said, with regard to two latter countries, solution was simple. Withdraw invading Viet Minh forces and let dissident elements elect Communist representatives to general assemblies if they wished. But the elections must be actually "free". Regarding Vietnam, I said we recognized relative strength of the Viet Minh but they were demanding too much. It seems Viet Minh demanded all Delta, including both Hanoi and Haiphong. The French were our allies, and we took grave view of this extreme pressure. Molotov said that if French were to have something in south and something in north, and probably in center as well, this would add up to three-fourths of country or better, which was wholly unreasonable. He said there was old Russian proverb that if you try to chase two rabbits at once you are apt to miss both of them, and added that in this case wanting something in north and in south was like chasing two rabbits. If French were to give way to Viet Minh in north, they would gain territory probably greater in extent in south in recompense. I said appearance of "partition" was repugnant to us, and that as far as proverb about rabbits went, I felt that Viet Minh were chasing two rabbits in wanting both Hanoi and Haiphong. Viet Minh demands for all the Delta, or efforts take it all by force prior to reaching political solution through elections, was serious matter in view of my government. Molotov disagreed, stating that present French position in area was due only to Viet Minh restraint, and that two cities did not even have normal communications between each other. In regard to US aversion to partition, he said that this problem could easily be solved by holding elections at once, which would decide "one way or the other".

He repeated that important thing in reaching agreement on any of these questions relating to Indochina was to be realistic about actual facts, and to avoid putting out one-sided views or extreme pretensions.

If French were encouraged to disregard actual situation and to ask for too much, he said, one could only expect conflict to continue. (He made it clear that he considered US as party likely to do the encouraging.) I replied that US was not one of principals to Indochinese dispute and did not cast deciding vote, to which Molotov remarked "maybe so, but you have veto, that word I hear you use so often" and went on to say that among other delegations present at conference there seemed to be real willingness to reach agreement. Agreement had in fact he added very nearly been reached, although he hoped I would realize this was not information for publication. (This remark, obviously, referred to private French-Viet Minh military conversations which I have mentioned.) I said I must emphasize my government held serious views on issues involved in Indochina situation, more serious, perhaps, than did some of other governments represented at conference. I hoped he would give consideration to this, and assist in overcoming some of the deep-rooted suspicions of Asiatic participants, which became apparent every time we tried to reconcile formal proposals.

*Comment:* Throughout conversation Molotov maintained friendly and mild tone evident in all informal conversations. He is completely sure of himself and of his position. What he had to say regarding Delta, Laos and Cambodia confirms Communist intentions to play all the cards they hold. His avoidance of endorsing Chou's remarks to Eden concerning Laos and Cambodia indicated that simple withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from these countries was not acceptable and that some form of *de facto* partition was intended in Laos, at least. His remarks seemed to indicate that Communists have eye on as much as half of country. This conversation, together with the inflexible position which Molotov took during his last conversation with me regarding the composition of a neutral nation or supervisory commission for Indochina, as well as his speech on Tuesday, June 8, and all subsequent speeches on the Communist side, which took firm positions on points the Communists know to be unacceptable to Eden, Bidault and me, are highly significant. The recent emphasis by all three Communist spokesmen that France should carry on direct political as well as direct military negotiations with Viet Minh show their interest in having a convenient way of holding out for greater gains in their direct negotiations with the French as well as within the framework of the conference.

Molotov in effect told France in his June 8 speech that her position and that of the government she was supporting in Indochina were hopeless and that she had best face up to facts and capitulate in direct negotiations with the Viet Minh. His speech, of course, was in large part intended to assist in the destruction of the French Government

for the implications that that would have on the European as well as on the Asiatic scene. Nevertheless, his harsh and even insulting language seemed to reflect the confident, nearly triumphant mood in which he has been lately. It would be misleading to ascribe the harder line which Molotov brought back with him from Moscow entirely to Soviet tactical considerations in regard to the French Government crisis. While the Soviets may think that the blocking of EDC through the destruction of the French Government would reduce future threats to them in Europe, the fact remains that the Indochina conflict potentially involves a much more immediate threat of general war.

It is probable that initial Soviet tactics were to forestall US intervention in the Delta by some kind of a compromise formula involving Hanoi and Haiphong if it appeared that such intervention were imminent. The recent raising of the ante in the negotiations here by the Communist side probably reflects an estimate on their part that our intervention is improbable and that they are safe to go ahead there, keeping, of course, a sharp eye out for indications of change in our attitude.

While the Communist position on Laos and Cambodia remains more flexible than their position in regard to the Delta, they will get all they can in Laos now. In the whole area the determining factor for the Communists will continue to be their estimate of the likelihood of US or joint intervention and nothing short of a conviction on their part that this intervention will take place will stop them from going ahead with their plans for taking all of it eventually, through military conquest, French capitulation, or infiltration.

Realize much of above is repetitious, but it will serve as final summary.

SMITH

JUNE 19, 1954

751G.00/6-1954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of Defense*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 19, 1954.

Army Message Gento 62. To Department of State and OSD for action, repeated information USARMA Paris, USARMA Saigon, USARMA London. For Hensel from Sullivan Defense. Following is summary French-Vietnam military talks with Viet Minh 17 June reported to Defense representative by member French delegation :

1. Both sides reached agreement on draft summary of discussions to date. No decision yet when or if summary will be presented to delegates.

2. Discussions continued on areas over which each side claims controls.

3. *Comment:*

a. French delegate contact said talks "marking time" with French-Vietnam side awaiting instructions in light change in governments both countries.

b. Viet Minh in Indochina have not contacted French liaison officer re military talks in field. French delegate representatives now believe Viet Minh hoped to trap French into making public a unilateral request for armistice talks in field thus making French appear to be supplicants, but since that propaganda gambit failed Viet Minh now less anxious to make contact.

c. In view preoccupation to date military committee with delineation of areas controlled by opposing forces, Defense representative queried French representative whether decision by French to suspend transfer of southern zone Delta to Vietnamese (OARMA Saigon MC 275-54) was designed to minimize Viet Minh claim thereto. French delegate contact not aware of change in plan, but insisted that areas Viet Minh claim to control do not appear related to areas where Vietnamese as distinguished from French colonial units are located.

---

751G.00/6-1954: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of Defense*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 19, 1954.

Army Message Gento 64. To State & OSD for action; info USARMA Paris, USARMA Saigon, USARMA London. For Hensel from Sullivan. Following is summary French-Vietnam military talks with Viet Minh 18 June reported to Defense representative by member French delegation:

1. Meeting lasted 20 minutes and was devoted to signing joint summary of meetings to date. Talks still marking time while French and Vietnam representatives "await instructions" from their new governments.

2. *Comment:* (a) French delegate contact appeared to expect principal delegates can reach agreement soon on military talks in Laos and Cambodia. French delegate is discussing this question with Laos and Cambodian delegates in effort to reach common position. French delegate contact said Cambodians prefer not to have French representative on their side in military talks, but he believes they will agree to accept a French officer as advisor to Cambodian chiefs of delegation. (b) Next meeting 21 June.

751G.00/6-1954 : Telegram

*Johnson-Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, June 19, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 19, 1954—2 p. m.

Dulte 200. Repeated information Paris 462, Saigon 182. Paris and Saigon limit distribution. Chauvel asked to see Johnson this morning saying that he wished to tell him what French Del had in mind for today's meeting.

Chauvel opened by saying most confidentially he was very anxious to "tie things up" as thoroughly as possible before Mendès-France came into office. Said French press reported Mendès-France was coming to Geneva Wednesday and Chauvel was trying prevent him as probably nobody here to talk to except Dong.

Chauvel then gave Johnson copy of the following French proposal on Laos (together with identical one on Cambodia except for change in name). Said he had discussed this last evening with Eden, also discussing it this morning with Chinese, Soviets, Laos and Cambodia.

"With a view to facilitating the rapid and simultaneous cessation of hostilities in Indochina, the following is proposed :

(a) The representatives of the two commands will meet immediately at Geneva and contacts will likewise be established on the spot;

(b) They will study at the outset the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops in Laos, taking into consideration the observations and proposals by the various Dels at the conference;

(c) They will transmit as soon as possible to the conference their conclusions and their recommendations."

He said that in discussions with Chinese and Viet Minh French had made it clear that insofar as Cambodian side was concerned Cambodian Command would carry on discussion but French officer might be on staff (Cambodia has not yet agreed to this) and on other side Command must be Viet Minh although if Viet Minh representative insisted on having Khmer Issarek member on staff, of course it could not be prevented. In case of Laos Command, on our side would be French while on other side it must be Viet Minh as in case of Cambodia but if Viet Minh had rather have Laos member of staff could not be prevented. However, in each case must be clearly understood principal representative would be Viet Minh.

Johnson expressed concern Commands not specifically named stating we considered it as minimum essential that Viet Minh Command be named and we would have to state our views on this. Chauvel stated that, just as in case of Eden's proposal on Vietnamese conversations, he assumed that as mentioned in paragraph (b) of proposal each Del

would make various observations on the proposal which would be taken into account. Johnson said after stating our observations we would take same position we took re Eden's proposal on Vietnam, that is, we had grave reservations but if others agreed we would not obstruct.

With respect Laos, Chauvel stated they were studying possibility of having international supervisory command acting as a fact-finding group with respect to widely divergent claims on areas held by insurgents and government.

With regard French proposal 9-nation committee (Secto 560 [460])<sup>1</sup> Chauvel said French were considering general proposal to effect that if occasion arose, conference could establish appropriate technical committees. No reference will be made to size or composition of committees. Johnson said we would, of course, have no objection to this as a general proposition, it being understood that any such committees would be in the pattern of Franco-Viet Minh military talks that is normally composed of the principally interested parties.

Chauvel said they were anxious that meeting this afternoon not be repetition of previous time-wasting discussions; therefore, hoped not have meeting until general informal agreement reached on text proposals Cambodia and Laos. If agreement not reached this morning, would ask meeting be postponed to 5 p. m. or so in order give additional time informal discussion. Eden has obtained Molotov's agreement to this.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1164.

396.1 GE/6-1954

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath)*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 19, 1954.

Participants: General Smith, Under Secretary of State  
 Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State  
 Mr. Heath, Ambassador to Cambodia and Vietnam  
 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Vietnamese Foreign Minister and  
 Chief of Delegation to Geneva Conference

At noon today the Under Secretary, accompanied by Assistant Secretary Robertson and Ambassador Heath, called on Dinh at the latter's residence. The Under Secretary explained it would be necessary for him to return to the States tomorrow but he would leave Ambassadors Johnson and Heath to represent the United States who would maintain association with and support of the Vietnamese and the

other two delegations from Indochina. The Under Secretary said that it was possible that Secretary Dulles might have to make a trip abroad towards the end of the month, in which case, the Under Secretary could not return promptly to Geneva since it was necessary that either the Secretary or himself always be present in Washington. The Under Secretary said that after two weeks or so either the Secretary, himself or possibly Deputy Under Secretary Murphy might return to Geneva.

The Under Secretary said he wished to take this occasion to assure Foreign Minister Dinh of his great pleasure in having been associated with him at this conference. The support which the American Delegation had so far given to the Vietnamese Delegation would be continued to the extent possible. Dinh replied that he himself had planned to call on the Under Secretary to take leave of him since along with the rest of his government, he had offered his resignation to Bao Dai. He would continue on provisionally in charge of the delegation until the new Prime Minister, Ngo Dinh Diem, named his successor. He planned to return to university life. The Under Secretary hoped that the new government would continue to avail itself of the services of Mr. Dinh and other capable men and expressed the hope they would be associated again in international gatherings.

Dinh replied that he and his delegation were exceedingly grateful for the unfailing support of the American Delegation and the Under Secretary's assurance that support would be extended in the future. He recalled in conversation a few days ago the Under Secretary had stated that if there were national determination in Vietnam the assistance of other nations could be provided. Mr. Dinh felt that the new government would reveal and develop the national determination of Vietnam. He went on to say that the conduct of the Vietnamese Delegation at this conference had been difficult. For while the government of Vietnam had principle on its side it did not have force behind it. The Under Secretary stated that unfortunately this conference had demonstrated as had so often been demonstrated in the past that, in negotiating with the Communists there was no chance of success unless the other parties had force and determination behind them—the only factors which the Communists respected. Dinh said that as a professor of diplomatic history who had carefully studied Soviet-American relations he thought that all American representatives were of the same mind as the Under Secretary that force and determination were the only things the Communists respected. The Under Secretary recalled Stalin's remark to Hopkins and Averell Harriman who in a war-time negotiation had raised the question of the attitude of the Pope evoking Stalin's contemptuous question, "how many divisions does he have".

Dinh said that he would not hide the fact that there was disquietude in Vietnam over the advent of Mendes France to the French premiership. He thought it was highly imprudent for Mendes France to announce that he was going to negotiate a peace by July 20 or resign.<sup>1</sup> That statement put Mendes France in the weak position of a supplicant to the Communist states. Dinh, however, went on to say that perhaps the line of Mendes France might work out all right in the end provided he did not capitulate [to] the Communists. There were still leaders and forces in France against capitulation to the Communists in Indochina and if Mendes France showed that honest effort to negotiate honest agreement had failed, then those forces would be encouraged to insist France take a stronger line.

The Under Secretary said he expected to see Mendes France tomorrow afternoon. While he would be very circumspect in what he said he felt that he would be able to make him understand that the people of the United States would never associate themselves with an abject surrender or capitulation to Communist demands in Indochina. Dinh thanked him for that assurance and said he hoped that Mr. Eden would give similar warning to Mendes France.

In conclusion Dinh said that in spite of the situation he thought there were still forces in France and Vietnam, which with the help of other free nations would enable us to get "around the cape" in this difficult passage in which the free world found itself. He hoped before long he would be able to make a trip to the States and visit some American universities. The Under Secretary and Mr. Robertson said they would be personally delighted to welcome him if he visited the States.

---

<sup>1</sup> See the editorial note, p. 1128.

---

396.1 GE/6-1954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 19, 1954—noon.

Dulte 199. Re Tedul 221<sup>1</sup> and 222.<sup>2</sup> I suggest that instead of withdrawing basic instructions they be amended as of this date to effect that those who continue at Geneva shall take no substantive positions except pursuant to specific instructions which may be given from time to time. Suggest this has advantage of showing continuity of policy approved by President at same time giving additional protection that

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 18, p. 1189.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram Tedul 222, June 18, read: "Supplementing Tedul 221, five-power staff report suggesting Thakhek-Donghoi line, coupled with rapid Delta deterioration, is leading us to reexamine possible *de facto* partition Vietnam." (396.1 GE/6-1854)



no substantive position will hereafter be taken except pursuant to specific instructions. Believe your supplement to Tedul 221 does not affect suggestion made above.<sup>3</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> Acting Secretary Murphy in telegram Tedul 224, June 19, replied to Under Secretary Smith (with reference to telegram Dulte 199) as follows: "As Secretary will not be available until June 22 your message will be brought to his attention then. Decision in Tedul 221 taken by him personally." (396.1 GE/6-1954) Ambassador Johnson, Head of the Delegation upon Smith's departure for the United States on June 20, replied in Secto 486, June 20, with reference to Tedul 221 and Dulte 199 that "after discussion with Under Secretary, I propose unless otherwise instructed support as desirable substantive positions thus far taken by USDEL with respect to composition and functions international control commissions. It is likely next few meetings will be devoted this subject." (396.1 GE/6-2054)

---

751G.00/6-1954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 19, 1954—2 p. m.

Dulte 201. Personal for Secretary from Under Secretary. Your Tedul 217.<sup>1</sup> Believe policy outlined in last paragraph is correct. In connection probable appeal by Laos and Cambodia, however, believe following possibilities deserve attention:

The attitude and sympathies of several Southeast Asian nations, particularly India and Burma, very different toward Laos and Cambodia than toward Vietnam plus French. If Laotian-Cambodian appeal came to issue in General Assembly would guess from what I have heard here from Menon and others that least India might do would be take position of benevolent neutrality, whereas Pakistan, Burma, and probably Indonesia would be inclined to support. Middle Eastern states would also probably be disposed to support, whereas on Thailand (possibly) and on an association of Vietnam and France (probably) they might be disposed to pay their debt to Russia by actively opposing.

Judging by the way things are developing here, I cannot help but be pessimistic about Vietnam solution, and in this connection see my following report of conversation last night with Molotov.

Feel sure that without exerting pressure on either government to act, and with exercise of care lest action of one group should injure the other, we can still have two strings to our bow, and I foresee that this may be advantageous to us.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 18, p. 1179.

396.1 GE/6-2054 : Telegram

*Sixteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 19, 6:45 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 20, 1954—2 a. m.

Secto 480. Repeated information Paris 466, London 307, Saigon 185, Tokyo 153, Moscow 139, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Sixteenth restricted session, Saturday, June 19, Eden presiding.

Chauvel recalled that it had been agreed yesterday that an attempt would be made, on basis Laotian, Cambodian (Secto 471<sup>2</sup>) and Communist Chinese (Secto 458<sup>3</sup>) proposals to present to conference a new text. He added that as result of exchanges of views between delegations, subject text was now available which he hoped had general agreement of all delegations and would permit military talks with respect to situation in Laos and Cambodia to begin without delay. Chauvel then read following text:

“With a view to facilitating simultaneous and rapid cessation of hostilities in Indochina, it is proposed that:

(a) The representatives of commands of two sides shall meet immediately in Geneva or on spot;

(b) They shall study questions relating to cessation of hostilities, on territories of Cambodia and Laos, beginning with question concerning withdrawal of all foreign armed forces, due regard being had to observations and proposals presented by various delegations at conference;

(c) They shall report as soon as possible to conference their conclusions and recommendations.”

Molotov stated Chauvel proposal was not same as that submitted earlier to Soviet delegation in that in paragraph *b* after “foreign armed forces” Soviet text contains “and foreign military personnel”. Soviet delegation clearly under impression this had been agreed.

Chauvel admitted error due to fact text had been shopped around all day. Said he had no objection inclusion Molotov’s words which he thought covered by observations he made yesterday to general effect that any French troops or military personnel in Laos or Cambodia are there on basis agreements with sovereign governments concerned and that French rely on their judgment in matter.

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/16) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 6:45 p. m. and adjourned at 9 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 323-327. The French proposal, Indochina Document IC/39, June 21, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279A.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 18, p. 1186.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1162.

Chou En-lai expressed agreement to French proposal with additional Molotov amendment.

Cambodian delegate then rehearsed position his delegation. He accepted French proposal so far as purpose of military talks is concerned on understanding principal purpose withdrawal foreign troops from Cambodia. He agreed to location of talks. With regard to parties to talks, he said they should be Cambodia on one hand and Viet Minh on other. He described complete military independence of Cambodian Government. He said that he could not compromise on fact that parties to military talks would be Cambodia and Viet Minh, adding that if any delegations had idea of getting in other representatives, Cambodian delegate thinks it would not be useful to adopt present text. He referred again, in connection with Molotov amendment, to Cambodia's need to bring in instructors and experts for young Cambodian Army and spoke of understanding attitude of Chou En-lai. He stated his delegation would be ready to negotiate on conditions for introduction this type military personnel.

Laotian delegate agreed with French text. Regarding simultaneous cease-fire, he expressed hope this could be achieved but that cessation hostilities in Laos as soon as possible would not thereby be prejudiced. He stated withdrawal of foreign troops from Laos would be decisive step toward durable peace. He recalled French Union bonds and presence in Laos of French troops in numbers and at places provided by treaty and also provision of French experts to train National Army in accordance with freely negotiated conventions. These arrangements are necessary for security of Laos.

US delegate made statement set forth in Secto 479.<sup>4</sup>

Eden stated that it should be clearly understood that any recommendations by military representatives would be brought before conference which would accept, reject or amend them as provided in paragraph (c) of French proposal.

Molotov confirmed understanding his amendment accepted. He said that obviously there were divergent views on many subjects but that purpose was to find something acceptable to all. He said that questions such as those of French officers serving in National Armies of Laos and Cambodia should be clarified in forthcoming military talks, not before. He reminded conference that Chou En-lai had submitted proposals covering matters not already covered by current French proposal on which discussion not completed. He stated Soviet belief that these matters upon which he did not enlarge would also be included in military talks.

---

<sup>4</sup> *Infra.*

US delegate asked Molotov to be patient with him as only received French proposal ten minutes ago. He wished to know if Molotov differentiated between officers and non-commissioned of French forces and other foreign troops in Laos and Cambodia. He stated on this point he associated himself with views of Laos and Cambodia. He added that in view of Eden's statement regarding reference of military recommendations to conference he would not oppose French proposal but wished all to take note of what he had said.

DRV delegate then spoke generally favorably of Laotian statement although it calls for certain reservations. He said Cambodian remarks ignored certain realities, rejected certain essential points (not specified) of Chinese Communist resolution, appeared not inspired by spirit of conciliation and understanding and, through reservations reduced French proposal to something very unilateral and unrealistic. He said US delegate unilateral and unrealistic. He concluded approving French proposal with Soviet amendment and insisting upon wording of paragraph *b* thereof (he seemed to imply that military representatives could consider other questions relating to cessation of hostilities in Laos and Cambodia beyond withdrawal of foreign armed forces, etc.)

Chauvel pointed out his modest proposal did not pretend to settle all outstanding problems. He stated military representatives would not infringe upon sovereign authority of conference which remains supreme in settling divergencies and making decisions on report of military representatives.

Eden stated that conference would note observations made as being included in those covered by paragraph *b* of French proposal as modified. He asked whether French proposal could now be considered as accepted by conference as terms of reference for meeting of representatives of commands of both sides.

US delegate stated that he accepted French text as originally proposed, i.e., without Molotov amendment, and that he did not reject the amended text subject to reservations he had formulated.

After a brief recess, Eden submitted text of communiqué in which he included agreed text of French proposal, statement conference would continue in session and request that representatives of commands dealing with Laos and Cambodia submit interim or final report within 21 days. It was also agreed that next meeting be held June 22. (Secto 478 contains full text of communiqué as finally approved.<sup>5</sup>) Eden said first task of conference next week would be to consider question of international supervision or control.

---

<sup>5</sup> Dated June 19, p. 1204.

*Comment:*

(1) US delegate questioned French, Laotian and Cambodian delegates regarding mechanism for establishing military contacts. They have no ideas.

(2) US delegate questioned Chauvel regarding fact French proposal does not specify that representatives of commands of two sides are Laos and Viet Minh and Cambodia and Viet Minh. Chauvel stated that he had oral agreement on this point from Soviet and Communist Chinese delegates who stated they had secured similar agreement from Viet Minh. We are worried about this point. We are convinced, however, that Cambodians and Laotians will refuse to meet with overt representatives of resistance movement.

(3) Chauvel's tactics apparently aimed at keeping Mendes-France from coming to Geneva in order to talk to Dong and possibly Chou En-lai and others regarding unsettled problems. Agreement on military talks for Laos and Cambodia apparently regarded by Chauvel as a step forward which will make Mendes-France less anxious to hasten here.

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-1954: Telegram

*Sixteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 19, 6:45 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 19, 1954—midnight.

Secto 479. Paris priority 465, London 306, Tokyo 152, Saigon 184, Moscow 137. Department pass Defense; Tokyo pass CINCFE; Saigon pass Phnom Penh and Vientiane. Following is text Under Secretary's statement 16th Indochina restricted session, Saturday, June 19:

"I refer to the last phrase of paragraph (b) of the French proposal to the effect that due regard is to be had 'to the observations and proposals presented by the various delegations at the Conference'. The position of my delegation on the question of Laos and Cambodia is perfectly clear, and has been repeatedly stated to this Conference. The problems of Laos and Cambodia, as has been so ably demonstrated by the representatives of those two countries, arise primarily in our view from an invasion of their territory by Viet Minh forces. It seems to us their problems can be simply resolved by the withdrawal from their territories of these Viet Minh forces. If military staff talks are to be held, it is clear that they should be held between the Cambodian and the Viet Minh commands in the case of Cambodia, and the Franco-Laotian and Viet Minh commands in the case of Laos, and that they should be devoted primarily to the question of the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Cambodia and Laos.

"The United States delegation has certain misgivings regarding the formula proposed as to whether it clearly provides for staff talks which will follow the principles which I have just stated. It has the gravest doubts regarding the Molotov amendment. I sincerely hope my associates realize what they are being asked to agree to. The small Cambodian and Laotian forces have a few French officers and non-commissioned officers. If they are deprived of these, their capacity for self defense is materially reduced. The United States delegation considers that in the same way as any other sovereign state, the States of Laos and Cambodia should be free to request and obtain technical assistance and advice, and certainly from the French Union of which they are members.

"I am not prepared to say, however, that the formula necessarily conflicts with these principles. I would assume that the military representatives will, in fact, produce recommendations which will provide for the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Laos and Cambodia. On this assumption and upon the understanding that these proposals are acceptable to all of the other delegations participating in this Conference, the United States will not oppose convening of the military representatives as originally proposed by France. My delegation, of course, reserves its right to decide for itself whether the solutions ultimately proposed by the military representatives are consistent with the positions which we have previously taken and which have been set forth by the delegates of Laos and Cambodia. These we support."

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/6-1954 : Telegram

*Sixteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 19, 6:45 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 19, 1954.

Secto 478. Paris priority 464, London 305, Moscow 136, Tokyo 151. Saigon priority 183, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. For press backstop.

Following text communiqué 16th restricted Indochina meeting Saturday June 19:

"The nine delegations continued in restricted session their examination of the problem of restoring peace in Indochina.

Agreement was reached upon the following text relating to the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia and Laos:

With a view to facilitating the simultaneous and rapid cessation of hostilities in Indochina, it is proposed that:

(a) The representatives of the commands of the two sides shall meet immediately in Geneva or on the spot.

(b) They shall study the questions relating to the cessation of hostilities, on the territories of Cambodia and Laos, beginning with the question concerning the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and of foreign military personnel, due regard being had to

the observations and proposals presented by the various delegations at the conference.

(e) They shall report as soon as possible to the conference their conclusions and recommendations.

It was further agreed that the conference would continue in session. The representatives of the commands dealing with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, were asked to submit an interim final report to the conference within 21 days.

The next meeting of the conference will be held June 22."

SMITH

JUNE 20, 1954

396.1 GE/6-2054

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath)*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 20, 1954.

Participants: Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State  
Donald R. Heath, Ambassador to Cambodia and Vietnam  
H. E. Tep Phann, Foreign Minister and Chief of Cambodian Delegation  
H. E. Son Sann, Former President of the National Assembly, Former Minister  
H. E. Sam Sary, Former Minister

The Under Secretary made a good-bye call on the Cambodian Foreign Minister this morning.<sup>1</sup> Tep Phann explained the purposes of his reservation to Molotov's amendment to the French proposal whereby not only foreign armed forces should leave Cambodian and Laotian territory in the event of an armistice but all foreign military personnel as well. He said Cambodia not only desired to keep French military instructors and advisers to build up its army to defense strength but would like to get other foreign military advisers, particularly American instructors. Cambodia was aware of the remarkable record of the Americans in building up the South Korean army. The Under Secretary said it was a record of which we were proud. In a space of three years we had provided South Korean Government with 20 first-class divisions equal and in some cases perhaps even superior to the American divisions stationed in Korea.

The Under Secretary mentioned an unconfirmed report received this morning that India was preparing to recognize Laos and Cambodia,

<sup>1</sup> Under Secretary Smith departed Geneva for Paris and Washington on the afternoon of June 20. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson became Head of the U.S. Delegation.

which he hoped would prove true. Tep Phann said they had talked with Krishna Menon when the latter was in Geneva and found him extremely uninformed about Cambodia and the development of its complete independence. He had no knowledge of India's intention regarding recognition. He had also talked with Vice President Garcia of the Philippine Delegation but found him also uninformed on Cambodia and dubious of the reality of Cambodian independence. The Under Secretary said that he was shortly calling on Garcia and would urge that the Philippines accord recognition to Cambodia and the other associated states.

The Under Secretary then referred to a long talk he had with Molotov two days ago. He had gathered from that talk that the Communists were inclined to accept Cambodian conditions and not ask for either temporary or permanent division of its territory. In case of Laos, however, the Under Secretary feared that the Communists were going to press for a sizeable slice of Laotian soil. He suggested that Cambodia should support Laos against such demands. The Cambodian Foreign Minister did not reply directly to this suggestion and pointed out there was some difference in the situation of Cambodia and Laos since the Cambodians exercised the high military command whereas the command in Laos was still in French hands. He went on to say that he was very skeptical of any results from the staff talks fearing that instead of the Vietminh command presenting itself for these talks the Vietminh would put forward representatives of the phony "free Cambodian" government. Tep Phann said that in this case the Cambodian government would refuse to start staff talks. The Under Secretary said he approved that stand but it would probably be impossible to keep the Vietminh command from adding a "free Cambodian" to the staff talks of the delegation on the pretext that he was a military officer.

The Under Secretary said that the more conciliatory attitude of the Communist delegations towards Cambodia's proposals gave him some concern. Obviously the Communist tactic was to work toward a solution of the problem of Cambodia to prevent that country from making an appeal to the United Nations an eventuality which the Communists feared. Also the Communists feared to put forward too harsh terms to Cambodia and Laos because of the sympathy for these two countries entertained in India and in Burma. The Communists were not disposed to irritate India because although militarily weak, India enjoyed great moral stature and influence in Asia.

At the end of the interview Son Sann put forward a request that the United States furnish a training mission and arms to build up the Cambodian defense force. The Under Secretary said he felt the United States would be disposed to consider such a request.



JUNE 21, 1954

396.1 GE/6-2154

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States  
Delegation (Bonsal)*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 21, 1954.

Participants: Mr. Tep Phan, Cambodian Foreign Minister  
Mr. Sam Sary, Member of Cambodian Delegation  
Mr. Son Sann, Member of Cambodian Delegation  
Mr. Philip W. Bonsal, U.S. Delegation

Subject: Military Conversations between Cambodia and Vietminh

I called on the Cambodian Delegation this morning in place of Ambassador Heath who had had to leave for Paris.

Mr. Tep Phan told me that Mr. Chou En-lai had called him in yesterday and had expressed the wish of the Chinese Government to be helpful in getting the Cambodians into contact with the Vietminh for the purpose of proceeding with the military talks to which the conference agreed at its June 19 session. Mr. Tep Phan is awaiting instructions from his government regarding the personnel of the Cambodian representation, the point at which a meeting might take place and other details. It appears that Chou En-lai has invited the Cambodians to have dinner with him tonight. Mr. Tep Phan understands there is a possibility that some Vietminh representatives may also be there. He asked me for my advice as to whether he should go. I replied that this was a decision which he would of course wish to take himself. I said that personally it seemed to me that there must obviously be official contacts between the Vietminh and Cambodia but that it seemed asking a great deal, under the circumstances, to ask the Cambodians to mingle socially with the Vietminh who are active, unprovoked, invaders of Cambodia and killers of Cambodian people.

Mr. Tep Phan is worried about the future attitudes of the Communists with regard to his country. We agreed that the resolution accepted on June 19 was susceptible of two interpretations. It might be a general document which would permit the Communists to reassert various unacceptable points of view regarding the so-called resistance movements and their right to occupy certain areas in Cambodia. On the other hand, the terms were sufficiently general so that the other side could abandon their intentions regarding resistance movements without any further spelling out of this matter. If they do indeed intend to abandon that position it is obvious that it would be easier for them to do so without a specific admission of intent. We agreed that the position on this should very rapidly be clarified.

Mr. Tep Phan told me that he expected to divide his time between Geneva and Paris. He said that he was most anxious to secure certain arms for the Cambodian army and that he was rather discouraged at the difficulties he had encountered. He said for instance that there was an order for 500 rifles to be supplied from the Saint Etienne factory which had been pending for six or seven months and which Mr. Tep Phan hopes to activate in the course of his next trip to France.

Mr. Tep Phan asked me about the possibility of getting arms from the US. I said that I was not up to date with regard to the details of such conversations as there have been on this matter. I said that I was aware of the fact that General O'Daniel and Mr. McClintock had been in Phnom Penh recently and had had some discussions with the Cambodian authorities. I said in this connection that if in fact the relatively favorable dispositions, which some people believe the Communists have now adopted with regard to Cambodia, are to find expression, it would seem advisable to make the path for such expression relatively smooth. I repeated that we should very shortly ascertain their real intentions.

Mr. Tep Phan agreed to keep the US Delegation closely informed of all developments.

---

396.1 GE/6-2154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 21, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 488. Repeated information Paris 473, Saigon 189. Roux of French delegation has indicated to us that French thinking as to organization future work of conference involves delegating [*delegation*] to a committee of the conference of task of making recommendations re "technical aspects" of supervision and control of armistice. Reading informs us French delegation is preparing paper endeavoring to make distinction between technical aspects which would be province of committee and political aspects which conference would continue to work on.

I have stated to Reading and plan to inform Chauvel this afternoon that, although US delegation will give careful study to any suggestion made, it continues to be our view that certain fundamental matters of principle must be agreed to before profitable discussions at technical level and [*can*] take place. These fundamental matters, in addition to that of composition, include the authority, structure and

capacity of the International Commission in relation to the mixed commissions. (See in this connection Tedul 211<sup>1</sup> and Dulte 195.<sup>2</sup>)

As soon as French paper is available, we will telegraph text with recommendations. French objective of course is to keep conference as alive as possible and to give impression of continued progress or at least of activity. If they can get agreement of six non-Communist delegations, they would plan present proposal described above at tomorrow's conference session.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1171.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 18, p. 1176.

---

396.1 GE/6-2154 : Telegram

*Johnson-Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, June 21, Afternoon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 21, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 498. Repeated information Paris 479, Saigon 193. Limit distribution. I saw Chauvel this afternoon following his return from Paris. He felt General Smith's talk with Mendes-France had been most useful. He said he had had long private conversation with Mendes-France, and he was very encouraged at his attitude on Indochina, although Mendes-France's ignorance of actual situation was still very great.

With respect Mendes-France-Chou meeting, Chauvel said Mendes-France had proposed meeting on outskirts Paris, and Chou had refused meeting any place in France but stated he still wished very much see Mendes-France, would postpone his departure two days if necessary, and would meet any place in Switzerland. Mendes-France has proposed meeting at Bern on Wednesday, but as of this evening Chou's reply not yet received.<sup>1</sup>

Under instructions Mendes-France, Chauvel attempting arrange secret meeting this evening with Pham Van Dong in which he will say on behalf Mendes-France that there are limits beyond which France cannot go in settlement, and any settlement must be such that US will not feel obligated "reject it". Chauvel will urge Viet Minh move ahead in "underground military talks", in which Chauvel says there has been no progress whatever during past week.

---

<sup>1</sup> In telegram 4999 June 22, from Paris, Ambassador Dillon reported: "Mendes-France has just telephoned Ambassador to say he was leaving 11 tonight for Bern to see Chou En-lai. He also said vague approaches had been made to him to see leader of Viet Minh delegation while there but he had declined offer. Said he would give Ambassador report when he returned." (651.93/6-2254)

Chauvel said Chou's conversation with Cambodians and Laotians (Secto 495<sup>2</sup>) bore out his "most optimistic interpretation" of Chou's conversation with Eden and Bidault.

He said he had renewed his request that DeJean come to Geneva as quickly as possible to assist him, and hoped this would be approved shortly.

He said Mendes-France was anxious that conference reconvene on foreign minister level as soon as possible. Chauvel had pointed out to him that this was dependent upon progress military staff talks. In meanwhile, Chauvel believed conference meetings need not be held more than 2 or 3 times a week.

He discussed with me tactics for tomorrow's meeting, which will be subject separate message.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 21, p. 1211.

---

396.1 GE/6-2154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, June 21, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 496. Repeated information Paris 478, Saigon 192. Re Secto 488 repeated Paris 473, Saigon 189.<sup>1</sup> Chauvel has just given me following proposal which he may submit at meeting tomorrow and at same time withdraw proposal contained Secto 460: <sup>2</sup>

"The conference may constitute, each time that the need is felt, an 'ad hoc commission' of which the composition will be fixed according to the subject under consideration. The ad hoc commissions will take up their studies within the framework of directives given by the conference, and on the basis of the proposals and statements of the delegations. They will submit, in the shortest time possible, their recommendations to the conference, and in case of divergency, the explanation of the contradictory views."

I intend, in the absence of contrary instruction from the Department to go along with the above proposal at the meeting tomorrow. It appears to me consistent with working method conference has already adopted and with my understanding of first paragraph Tedul 211.<sup>3</sup> He is primarily interested in giving impression of conference activity.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 21, p. 1208.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1164.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1171.

751G.00/6-2154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, June 21, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 497. Chauvel today gave me the following French proposal on Cambodia and Laos which he said represented an attempt to eliminate from the Chinese proposal those points which erroneously indicated agreement had been reached where none had, and to turn it into a formal agenda on Cambodia and Laos, although frankly I am not entirely clear what he has in mind. It is possible he will bring this forward at meeting of six tomorrow morning, and I would appreciate any comments the Department may have. I will reserve my position pending instructions.<sup>1</sup>

“Following the Conference debates on Cambodia and Laos, and taking into account the observations made and the proposals presented to the Conference, the latter will study the following problems:

1. Cessation of hostilities in Cambodia and Laos. Simultaneous with the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam.
2. Examination of the recommendations transmitted by the representatives of the commanders in chief on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodia and Laos (cf., resolutions of June 19).
3. Prohibitions on the introduction, after the cessation of hostilities, of new troops as well as arms and munitions into Cambodia and Laos, with reservations concerning the needs of the national armies in order to assure the defense of the two countries.
4. International control system in Cambodia and Laos.
5. Liberation of prisoners of war and civil internees.
6. Protection of persons having collaborated with the opposing side during the war.”

JOHNSON

<sup>1</sup>The Department of State in telegram Tosec 454, June 21, informed the U.S. Delegation that the points raised in telegrams Secto 496, June 21, *supra*, and Secto 497 “will be discussed with Secretary who returns tomorrow and appropriate instructions forwarded. Believe you should reserve your position on both proposals meanwhile.” (751G.00/6-2154)

In telegram Tosec 460, June 22, the Department instructed the U.S. Delegation, with reference to Secto 497, that “it would appear that Chauvel is now attempting to substitute Chou En-lai’s six-point proposal with minor modifications for proposal adopted by Conference after long debate at restricted session June 19. We must insist on retention of text of proposal as previously adopted.” (751G.00/6-2154)

751G.00/6-2154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 21, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 495. Repeated information Paris 477, London 315, Tokyo 154, Saigon 101, Moscow 141, Vientiane and Phnom Penh unnumbered.

Department pass Defense. Tokyo for CINCFE. Lao Foreign Minister Phoui Sanankone [*Sananikone*] and Orot Souphanouvong [*Souvanavong*] called on Bonsal today to report conversation with Chou En-lai at noon. Chou apparently turned on all his charm and made visible impression. Chou indicated understanding attitude toward (1) possibility that cease-fire could take place in Laos before Vietnam; (2) maintenance French bases and French military training mission under Franco-Lao military accord; and (3) withdrawal Viet Minh troops. Concerning latter, he claimed few left in Laos. He gave Phoui impression that Viet Minh could be totally withdrawn from even Sam Neua province. Chou said Prince Souphanouvong had no ambitions for Laos throne, only interested in "peace, independence and democracy". He discussed with Phoui possibility of meeting between Souphanouvong and Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. Although Phoui stated interview would have to be on basis submission of former and not involve recognition of Pathet Lao group, he was evidently interested in further exploration this possibility and appreciative of Chou's willingness to facilitate matter.

Lao and Cambodian delegates have accepted Chou's invitation to dine with him this evening; Pham Van Dong is also to be a guest. After Phoui left [Bonsal's?] office, Orot described Chou as "snake charmer" and indicated some concern that Phoui's sincere approach might be abused. Also stated that Chou several times mentioned his opposition to establishment US bases in Laos.

JOHNSON

---

751.13/6-2254 : Telegram

*Dillon-Mendès-France Meeting, Paris, June 21, 10 p. m.: The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

PARIS, June 22, 1954—10 a. m.

4980. Repeated information priority London 1205, Geneva 433. London, Geneva, eyes only Ambassadors. Limit distribution. Mendes-France asked me to come to see him last night and I saw him at his apartment at 10 p. m. He said that he wished to bring me up-to-date regarding his proposed meeting with Chou En-lai. He said that the French delegation had informed the Chinese that Mendes would not come to Geneva but that he would like to see Chou and proposed a meeting in France somewhere between Paris and Geneva. Chou replied that while he had no objection to leaving Geneva in order to meet Mendes he could not of course under any circumstances enter French territory as France did not recognize Communist China. He therefore renewed his proposal that the meeting take place at Geneva. After some further negotiation the following arrangement was ac-

cepted in principle by Chou. Mendes told me that all the delegation chiefs including Bedell Smith, Eden and Molotov had at one time or another visited Bern to pay their respects to the President of Switzerland and to thank him for having made available the facilities of Geneva. Bidault had not been able to make this visit because of the crisis although he had desired to do so. Accordingly Mendes tentatively planning to go to Bern on Wednesday and make his visit to the Swiss President. Later Wednesday he will meet Chou at the French Embassy in Bern. Chauvel left for Geneva last night and is seeing the head of the Chinese delegation this morning to firm up this arrangement.

Mendes then said he had been quite embarrassed by a UP press leak Monday from Washington indicating that he might meet Chou. This had brought him a series of telephone calls from French press as well as from members of his own Cabinet who were uninformed. He said he had refused to comment to the French press or to his Cabinet and had had to postpone the Cabinet meeting scheduled for this morning to this afternoon so that he would be [in] a position to give factual information to his Ministers. He also said that he had scheduled a second meeting with Diem for early this afternoon at which he had intended to tell Diem of his plan to meet with Chou. Mendes said that unfortunately now Diem would probably read about the meeting in the press. Mendes then said that it was his desire to keep the US fully and currently informed of his actions through me, and he expressed the hope that in the future the Department of State would show more discretion in preserving his confidences.<sup>1</sup>

DILLON

---

<sup>1</sup> In reply to Mendès-France's implication that the Department of State had been responsible for the leak of his proposed meeting with Chou En-lai, the Department in telegram 4752 to Paris, June 22, informed Ambassador Dillon that a careful check throughout the Department "revealed no Dept source any press leak on this subject. Matter taken up on confidential basis with UP who informs that first story this subject was from Geneva June 21 attributed to 'high diplomatic French source', which stated Mendès-France trying arrange secret meeting with Chou. No stories Washington dateline this subject. You should further explain to Mendès-France that this is by no means first time Dept has been accused of French leaks and we hope that in future instances his first step will be to ascertain facts." (751.13/6-2254)

JUNE 22, 1954

751G.00/6-2254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 22, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 499. Repeated information Paris 481, London 317, Tokyo 155, Saigon 194, Moscow 142, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Re

Secto 495, repeated Paris 477, London 315, Moscow 141, Tokyo 154, Saigon 19 [101].<sup>1</sup> As indicated reference telegram Chou En-lai last night entertained Cambodian, Laotian and Viet Minh delegates at dinner. Accounts given us by Laotians and Cambodians indicate dinner was excellent with numerous toasts to peace and friendship followed by movies and by conversations.

Cambodians were favorably impressed at Dong's attitude toward Cambodia. He accepted principle of withdrawal of Viet Minh "volunteers". He said aspirations of minorities in resistance movements should, however, be taken into account. He expressed satisfaction at Cambodian intention of granting general amnesty following cessation of hostilities. He admitted great popularity of King Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia. He expressed satisfaction with agreements for transfers of power from France to Cambodia which Cambodians showed him and with which he apparently unfamiliar. He expressed understanding of Cambodian requirements for self-defense while claiming his main worry was possibility of American bases in Cambodia.

Conversation with Laotian delegate followed generally similar course. Chou En-lai evinced sympathetic interest in Laotian territorial integrity and independence. According to Ourot, "he almost promised us the protection of 600-million Chinese". Dong stated he accepted Franco-Laotian military agreements including continued existence of French Union bases on Laotian territory. He expressed concern at the possibility of American bases and of agreements between Laos and the US for defense. Dong accepted principle of withdrawal of Viet Minh volunteers and pointed to fact most of them had already departed and that operations are at low ebb (Laotian reports confirm this).

With regard to resistance movements in Laos, Dong's attitude was different from that followed with regard to Cambodia. He suggested meeting between Souvanna Phouma (Prime Minister) and his brother Prince Souphanouvong, the resistance leader. Dong said he would like to talk further with Laotian delegate on this subject. (*Comment*: It is quite evident that Dong regards Laotian resistance movement as more valuable asset than Cambodian resistance movement.)

According to our informants, there was no mention at this meeting of possible establishment of relations between Communist Chinese and Laos and Cambodia.

*Comment*: It seems clear that Viet Minh with Communist Chinese support will endeavor to secure at price of conciliatory friendly attitude they are adopting toward Laos and Cambodia involving with-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 21, p. 1211.



drawal of Viet Minh and cessation of hostilities in those countries, a commitment or understanding which would in effect neutralize these two countries or at least prevent them from participating in Southeast Asian defense organization. Since participation depends not only on their willingness to participate but also on US willingness to make specific commitments for defense of Laos and Cambodia, US delegation would appreciate urgently instructions as to attitude we should advise Laotians and Cambodians to adopt. We are suggesting, of course, that they, while protesting their peaceful intentions and their complete sovereignty and independence make no commitments which would prejudice their ability to enter into collective security arrangements with other countries.

JOHNSON

396.1 GE/6-2254 : Telegram

*Seventeenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 22, 3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 22, 1954—midnight.

Secto 504. Moscow 144 repeated information Paris 486, Saigon 199, London 319, Tokyo 158, Phnom Penh, Vientiane. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Seventeenth Indochina restricted session on Tuesday June 22, with Novikov (USSR) presiding. Chauvel opened by raising question international control for Cambodia and Laos. Referred to list of questions prepared for discussion (Secto 497<sup>2</sup>) but decided withhold them pending implementation decision June 19 on military talks.

Denying Communist allegations that French believed international control should apply only Vietnam, Chauvel stated international supervision in Cambodia and Laos should apply to:

1. Evacuation of foreign troops;
2. Liberation prisoners of war and civil internees;
3. Guarantee of territorial integrity and concentration of remaining French troops (in Laos) to agreed bases;
4. Control over entry of arms necessary for national armies to assure defense.

Structure of international control would resemble that for Vietnam. Central commissions situated in country capitals and units in countryside and frontier areas with necessary material support and ability

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/17) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 7:20 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 328-338. Message transmitted in two sections.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 21, p. 1211.

make investigations on request or on own initiative. Commissions could ask for creation joint commissions. Should be on spot to function from moment cessation hostilities.

Chauvel emphasized majority decision by commission. It would report to guarantors (conference powers) failure to obey decisions or anything threatening renewal hostilities.

Composition should be similar but not necessarily same as for Vietnam. Entire problem in practical aspects can be studied as whole for three states, but differences in function and structure should be noted. After certain fundamental issues agreed, French delegation would submit proposal for discussion. Raised question of turning over technical aspects for expert study, but conference should continue consideration special problems Cambodia and Laos.

Next China (Li Ko-neng) noted various views on international control, expressed belief sincere negotiation could resolve differences. He recalled various Communist statements this subject and particularly Molotov June 14 proposal (Secto 442<sup>3</sup>), which he suggested as basis discussion. He supported proposal and amendment of June 16 (Secto 461<sup>4</sup>) providing for five or three-power commission, including Indonesia, with India as chairman. Acknowledged special conditions Cambodia and Laos. Then emphasized that since two parties primarily responsible for successful cease-fire the joint commissions should be chiefly responsible for control. Hoped for rapid accomplishment of definition terms of reference and relations between joint and international commissions.

USDel followed with statement Secto 503.<sup>5</sup>

UK (Lord Reading) took floor to express hope and belief that Chinese were right, that differences could be settled, but noted several awkward problems. Although conciliatory and almost apologetic in words and manner, he then effectively attacked Molotov proposal. Referring frequently his agreement with USDel criticism, he pointed out ineffectiveness of subordination international commission to joint bodies. Frankly had to ask Soviet delegation for real reason behind this unworkable scheme.

Reading again supported Colombo powers and then turned to question majority or unanimous decisions by international commission. Said Molotov proposal would invite breakdown at critical moments while arguing whether any given incident required joint or unanimous decision.

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 14, p. 1143.

<sup>4</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1157.

<sup>5</sup> *Infra*.

He hoped drafters Soviet proposal would not object to amendments other delegations thought necessary. He ended with reference to Chou En-lai statement that decisions difficult without exact knowledge of what is to be supervised. Hoped therefore positions could be kept flexible pending submission reports by military representatives.

Dong (VM) spoke after recess and referred to study commission proposed by French delegate on subject of control. Dong proposed conference should adopt following principles to assist committee:

1. Correct interpretation of armistice rests with belligerent parties.
2. Joint commission should not be subordinate to "neutral armistice supervisory commission" (Dong reiterated familiar arguments that neutral commission should have no right to impose decisions on joint commission, that it is not possible to give neutral commission power of decision without providing it with coercive means to implement its decisions, and that differences should be referred to conference powers.)
3. Soviet proposal of June 14 re powers, functions and rules of procedure for a neutral commission should be used as basis for discussion and linked to question of composition neutral commission as suggested by Soviet delegate on June 16.

Cambodian delegate (Sam Sary) then took floor and stated that his delegate shared views expressed by Chauvel, but believed joint commission for Cambodia should be different from those for Vietnam and Laos although composition could be same and commissions could cooperate with each other. In referring to Communist Chinese suggestion that Soviet proposal be used as basis for discussion, Cambodian delegate said he did not reject everything in Soviet proposal although it applied only to Vietnam. He stated that since conference has recognized separate problem of Cambodia and Laos, conference should apply same approach to problem of control in Laos and Cambodia as distinguished from Vietnam. In concluding Cambodian delegate said the same remarks apply to the statement made earlier by Dong regarding question of composition of commission.

Vietnam delegate (Buu Kinh) referred to earlier expression views of his delegate June 9 on question of control, said line of reasoning guided by adherence to two principles: Impartiality and efficiency of control commission. These he reaffirmed while noting that the Soviet proposal lacked them. He then emphasized that role of joint commission should be limited to execution and implementation, and that one side cannot be both judge and party at interest, situation which would be inherent if joint commission were dominant over neutral commission. Concluded by saying that control body must be independent of both sides and that United Nations Organization best pos-

sible one to guarantee impartiality, efficiency and technical ability to carry out task.

Chauvel (France) then spoke extemporaneously noting that conference had before it "abundant crop of proposals", referred to valid questions posed today by US delegate and noted statement of UK delegate which, he said, conformed to his own views that difficulties arise from role of unanimity as his three years experience in United Nations Security Council testified. Referring to Cambodian intervention Chauvel said he saw no conflict between his and Cambodian views, stating that there was definite advantage in having central control commission for each country adding that he did not contemplate joint control system as in case of Vietnam, but rather liaison parties to supervise certain practical matters on a temporary basis (Chauvel remarks at this point were rather vague).

In course of further somewhat diffuse remarks Chauvel made following points: Some safeguards to insure carrying out of armistice terms necessary since unlikely two belligerent parties will work together following hostilities in spirit of complete cooperation; joint control commission should be charged with implementation of agreement as distinguished from role of mediation and control which must be provided by higher and neutral body when difficulties arise; speaking of relations between joint and neutral commissions question of which is subordinate not helpful since it is not necessary to set up tribunals but rather bodies suited for specific tasks they have to perform; conference should discuss what subjects would be suitable for each of these two commissions; i.e., in Vietnam question of regrouping of forces would be one for joint commission whereas control of entry of arms and equipment would be matter for neutral commission.

In concluding Chauvel suggested that conference set up committee of experts from each delegation to examine and compare various proposals on control put forward to date, and advise conference of results of this examination. Committee would not necessarily exist for duration of conference but would report every 2 or 3 days concerning questions raised from one meeting to another.

Laotian delegate (Ourot Souvainavong [*Souphanouvong*]) then somewhat confusingly proposed that the two chairmen, following traditional procedure, meet to reach decision on French suggestion concerning committee of experts.

Lord Reading (UK) asked for the floor and stated that although he was willing to discuss anything with his co-chairman he felt that in the past such discussions pertained to procedural rather than substantive subjects, and expressed the view that there were too many

differences of opinion to hope that two chairmen could reach solution. (None of delegates subsequently referred to Chauvel's suggestion.)

Novikov (USSR) speaking as Soviet delegate, contributed nothing new by touching on following points: Soviet, PRC and DRV Democrats consider United Nations unacceptable in control function; Colombo powers "truly neutral" but are not only neutral states in world; Soviet delegate has shown spirit of conciliation by proposing commission composed of 4 countries, then by suggesting chairman have decisive vote on number of questions, and then by proposing commission be reduced to 3 countries or raised to 5; if two sides in Indochina want to maintain peace it will be maintained, and no commission can thwart resolve of one side to resume hostilities; decisions of neutral commission should not be imposed on joint commission; no one has answered question how to make joint commission submit to decisions of neutral commission; USDel has gone so far as to propose that international commission have organs on territories of both sides thereby infringing sovereignty "both Vietnam and DRV", and raising question US motives; one commission should be set up for all Indochina rather than one for each of three countries.

In concluding Novikov remarked that Kuznetsov (Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister) would arrive Geneva tomorrow, will study all proposals and may wish make statement.

Since no more speakers inscribed Novikov read usual communiqué asking delegates when next meeting should be set. After short round of discussion it was decided to set June 24 as date of next meeting with understanding that after consultation of co-chairmen meeting might be postponed.

JOHNSON

---

396.1 GE/6-2254: Telegram

*Seventeenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 22, 3 p. m.:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 22, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 503. Repeated information Paris 48, Saigon 198, London 318, Tokyo 157, Moscow 143, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Department pass Defense; Tokyo pass CINCFE. Following is text my statement in 17th Indochina restricted session Tuesday, June 22:

Both the delegates of France and the People's Republic of China have spoken of the task now confronting this conference with respect to the question of international control. Mr. Chauvel has I believe given us a most useful analysis of the task we face in this regard.

As Mr. Li has noted, on June 14 Mr. Molotov made a rather extensive statement on the subject of International and Joint Commission control over the provisions of an armistice agreement in the three states and submitted a proposal on this question. He later developed his ideas on that same day and on June 16. I would like in a spirit of helpfulness to address myself to some of the questions raised by this proposal and its explanation, and to refer to some of the principles which my delegation feels must be accepted with regard to each of the three states if this control is to be effective.

I regret I must first note the small degree of progress which seems to have been achieved. Mr. Molotov did accept that certain categories of decisions by the International Supervisory body could be taken by majority vote. I regret that he stopped there and thereby placed such limits on the capacity of the Commission to take executive and rapid decisions. If unanimity were to be applied, and I quote from Mr. Molotov's proposal, to "questions connected with violation of provisions of the agreement or the arising of a threat of such violation which could lead to the re-opening of hostilities", it is obvious that on matters of the gravest importance the Commission could be paralyzed just at the time when rapid and effective decisions were most needed.

However, this progress is slight when we consider the major questions which are still unresolved. I refer particularly to the questions of composition of the International Supervisory Commission, the authority of this Commission, and the relation of Joint Commissions to the International Commission.

The position of my delegation has been made clear several times on the question of composition of the International Commission. I can only reiterate that I consider either the United Nations as mentioned by several delegations or the Colombo powers as proposed by Mr. Eden as meeting the criterion of impartiality upon which this Commission must be founded. The views of the USDel are well known on the question of the inclusion of countries of the Communist bloc. These views are amply supported by the records, the neutral nations Supervisory Commission in Korea which there is no need for me to repeat at this time.

I turn to the question of the authority of the International Commissions. The provisions of Mr. Molotov's proposal which are concerned with the functions and powers of the International Supervisory Commission, particularly when read in conjunction with the remainder of his proposal, would give us a Commission which the USDel feels not only lacked the real power of decision but which also lacked any substantive field in which to operate. I understand that the term in the Russian language used by Mr. Molotov in describing the Commission is correctly translated into English as "observation" rather than "supervisory". Indeed, "observation" describes more accurately the functions proposed by Mr. Molotov for this Commission, and it is on this principle that we find our greatest divergence of view.

A further weakness in the functions assigned to the International Commission by the Soviet proposal is in the proposal's failure to spell

out clearly that the Commission should have free access to the entire country in which it is operating and that this access should not be conditional upon an invitation by one or both of the opposing sides. This access should be facilitated, as M. Chauvel has pointed out, by providing the Commission with adequate means of transportation and communication as well as with sufficient personnel to carry out any missions which it considers appropriate to its functions.

The Soviet and other Communist delegations desire the acceptance of a powerless and unworkable body which would have no authority in relation to the two belligerent sides or to the Joint Commissions made up of representatives of these two sides. We, to the contrary, insist on a truly impartial International Commission in a position of authority over the parties to the armistice and over any Joint Commissions which it might be necessary to create.

I noted with interest Mr. Molotov's statement on June 14 that to insist on subordination of the Joint Commissions to the International Commission would mean that we do not want to re-establish peace in Indochina. I find that statement somewhat difficult to understand as it seems to me that the premise bears no relation to the conclusion. It is the belief of our delegation that the best means of maintaining a cessation of hostilities would be to give the necessary powers to the International Commission, including full authority over the Joint Commissions.

In summary, the United States delegation desires to see the creation of an impartial and effective International Supervisory Commission, endowed with real authority to supervise and control the provisions of the agreements with respect to each of the three states and provided with the personnel and material means which will permit it to carry out its mandate.

I have, Mr. Chairman, put forward this analysis in the hope that by pointing up what seems to our delegation the fundamental principles in this regard which still must be resolved, we can expedite the resolution of these problems.

JOHNSON

---

396.1 GE/6-2154 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation* <sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1954—7:26 p. m.

Tosec 461. Proposal reported Secto 496 <sup>2</sup> is consistent with working methods adopted by conference but as indicated in Tedul 211 <sup>3</sup> we do not wish participate in work of committees which may take decisions from which it might be awkward for us later to dissociate ourselves.

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 21, p. 1210.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1171.

Suggest you reiterate to Chauvel that we would not be prepared accept membership in any "ad hoc commissions" which in our view should be constituted only of principals.

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/6-2254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 22, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 501. Rptd information Paris 483, Saigon 196. Paris eyes only Ambassador, Saigon eyes only. Department limit distribution. Chauvel told me this afternoon that Chou En-lai-Mendes-France meeting had been arranged for tomorrow at Bern "under cover" courtesy visit by Mendes-France to Bern. However, announcement will probably be made this evening that he will also see Chou En-lai.

There was opportunity only to obtain brief account Chauvel's meeting with Dong today. Chauvel said that Dong stated agreement on Vietnam could be reached within ten days in "underground military talks", and Chauvel added it would take another five days "to sell" the Vietnamese.<sup>1</sup> I asked him what this portended as far as Hanoi-Haiphong perimeter was concerned and received vague answer to effect was making attempt to hold on to that area "for time being" on grounds of military necessity and that with passage of time lots of things could happen.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>1</sup> In telegram Secto 506, June 23, the U.S. Delegation instructed the Department of State to "Correct second sentence paragraph Secto 501 to read as follows: 'Chauvel said that Dong stated agreement on Vietnam could be reached within ten days in "underground military talks" (which Chauvel expects to be resumed Thursday) and Dong expected it would take another five days "to sell" the Vietnamese.'" (396.1 GE/6-2354)

---

751G.00/6-2254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 22, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 502. Repeated information Paris 484, Saigon 197. Learning Heath was in Paris yesterday, the Vietnamese Defense Minister, Quat, asked to see him. Quat said there had been some "feelers" for him to remain in Ngo Dinh Diem's cabinet. Before making up his mind, he wanted to be certain of Ngo Dinh Diem's policy. He said that too many



of Ngo Dinh Diem's supporters were neutralists of the Indian school; that neutralism was no answer to the Communist attempts to take over Vietnam.

Quat said he expected to see General Ely today. He was greatly alarmed over the French plan of drawing in their lines to encompass what they called the "useful delta" which meant a rather narrow parallelogram from Hanoi to Haiphong. When this idea had originally been broached the French said they would ask the Vietnamese National Army to defend the provinces to the west of the parallelogram, notably the two Catholic provinces of Phat Diem and Bui Chu. Quat had accepted this proposition provided the French would agree to give artillery and aviation support and group mobile in case of a large-scale Viet Minh attack. The French agreed. Now, however, the French said they could furnish neither artillery, aviation or group mobile and the Vietnamese Army lacking such support could not hope to withstand a determined Viet Minh attack. Quat said it was of the utmost importance that an attempt be made to hold these western and southern delta provinces since they were the source of manpower for the national army. He could not hope to build up the national army to the desired strength during 1954 without recruits from the north delta. With all due regard to the southern Vietnamese the best and most willing recruits were only to be found in the north.

Quat went on to say that while one must not underestimate the gravity of the military situation of the Franco-Vietnamese forces, one should not forget the Viet Minh were having their difficulties also and were desirous of peace in which they could consolidate their positions. He asserted that Viet Minh had had very great recruiting difficulties at the time they were increasing their attack on Dien Bien Phu and from the regions around Nim Dinh and Nam Dinh the Viet Minh had gotten only 15 and 20 percent of the recruits they had planned to conscript.

JOHNSON

JUNE 23, 1954

*Editorial Note*

At 8:30 a. m. on June 23, in Washington, Under Secretary Smith conducted a briefing on the Geneva Conference for the President and a bipartisan Congressional delegation of 13 Senators and 17 Representatives, including the Congressional leadership of both parties. He said the United States position toward the Indochina phase of the Conference was different from that toward the Korean phase. The

United States was not a principal or a belligerent and therefore had to remain aloof and be somewhat restrained. He said that Secretary of State Dulles "a long time ago had told Bidault that if Indochina were put on the Geneva agenda, violent communist fighting would break out in Indochina. This had happened." Smith said that the United Kingdom "had been anxious to play a major role at Geneva as a peace maker, carrying the Asian members of the Commonwealth along, but not involving commitment of British forces."

Under Secretary Smith indicated that "during the Geneva Conference, the decline in morale and effectiyeness of the Vietnamese army and the fall of the Laniel Government in France had compelled the US to re-evaluate its position." He said that the "original US position was that enemy forces should be evacuated from Laos and Cambodia, because they had been invaded and should be treated differently from Vietnam, which was in a state of civil war; that whatever fair settlement was arrived at for Vietnam, we wanted an impartial and effective International Supervisory Commission, and not one with two built-in Communist vetoes. These positions became the central issues of the Indochina phase. On the latter issue, when the British finally proposed the International Advisory Commission, to be composed of the Colombo Powers and the Soviets rejected this proposal, the Soviets incurred Asian ill-will."

Smith summarized the developments at Geneva and indicated that throughout the United States had "continued to hold to its basic views, but as the US is not a principal or a belligerent, it has not the power to determine the decision."

Smith predicted a "continuance of French political weakness, a continuance of UK desire to avoid conflict in the Far East, a continuance of the Communist firmness of position, and a belief that the Communists would probably move to the following position, which the French, UK, and Associated States would accept:

"1. A partition of Vietnam, or some intermediate step looking toward partition.

"2. Communist control of about one-half to one-third of Laos.

"3. No Communist control in Cambodia.

"4. An ineffective International Supervisory Commission.

"5. The arrangement to be subject to revision in the future at such time as the Communists might decide."

For the complete text of Smith's remarks and those of the Secretary of State who was also in attendance, see memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler), June 23, volume XIII.

396.1 GE/6-2354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 23, 1954—10 a. m.

Secto 505. Repeated information Paris 487, Saigon 200. Dac Khe, Deputy Chief of Vietnam delegation, told Heath that he saw both Ngo Dinh Diem and Bao Dai in Paris over the week end. He had urged Ngo Dinh Diem to appoint a new chief of the delegation with least possible delay to which Diem agreed.

He found Bao Dai "very anxious" over the situation and the possibility of the loss of the northern Delta as a result of French-Viet Minh agreement. Dac Khe said he told His Majesty the only way to ensure that French not surrender north would be for Bao Dai to return forthwith to Vietnam and to take up residence in Hanoi. Bao Dai made no reply to this suggestion.

Dac Khe was extremely worried over the Chinese "concession" to Laos and Cambodia looking towards the "neutralization" of the two countries. Dac Khe said that China was a large cat which was suggesting that the two mice, Laos and Cambodia, be neutralized. But who would ensure the neutrality of the cat?

Dac Khe feared that an agreement acceptable to Laos and Cambodia would be reached shortly which would prevent those countries from carrying their case to the United Nations and this would greatly handicap chances of an eventual appeal of Vietnam to the UN.

Khe felt sure that Vietnam must eventually withdraw from conference. The question was when?

JOHNSON

396.1 GE/6-2254 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1954—11:20 a. m.

Tosec 464. Limit distribution. Ref Secto 501.<sup>2</sup> Chauvel's evasiveness re "underground military talks" is contrary our understanding with him and Mendes-France that we were to be kept fully informed.

Suggest Johnson take earliest appropriate occasion remind Chauvel this understanding and to add that our continued presence at Geneva can be useful only to the degree that we are in fact kept fully informed.

Ambassador Dillon should make similar representations Mendes-France.

DULLES

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA. Sent to Paris as telegram 4756 and repeated to Saigon as telegram 2698.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 22, p. 1222.

751G.00/6-2254 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1954—2: 22 p. m.

Tosec 465. Secto 499.<sup>2</sup> While of course unable now make specific commitment for defense Laos and Cambodia believe you could usefully say to representatives those countries Geneva we most favorably impressed with consistency and firmness position they maintained at conference to date.

Our view continues be Laos and Cambodia victims of foreign aggression and withdrawal Vietminh troops from those countries is only problem regarding them which concerns Geneva Conference.

Continue encourage Laotians and Cambodians to proclaim their peaceful intentions but warn them against making any commitments to Communist bloc which might compromise their present defenses or hinder their participation in defense arrangements which may be made hereafter.

Laotians should be warned particularly against striking any bargain with Prince Souphanouvong which might lead to coalition.<sup>3</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4761, to London as telegram 7041, to Tokyo as telegram 2844, to Moscow as telegram 797, to Phnom Penh as telegram 80, to Vientiane as telegram 31, and to Saigon as telegram 2699.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 22, p. 1213.

<sup>3</sup> The U.S. Delegation in telegram Secto 524, June 25, reported that "we expressed to [Ourot] Souvannavong [Laotian Minister to Washington] the observations suggested in Tosec 465, June 23. To our particular warning against striking any bargain with Prince Souphanouvong which might lead to coalition, the Minister said he was afraid the Laotian Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, was not well briefed [on] Communism and dangers of entering into coalition arrangements with Communists." (396.1 GE/6-2554)

---

*Editorial Note*

In a memorandum to the Secretary of State, June 23, Under Secretary Smith indicated that "the question of our present or eventual disassociation from Geneva Conference decisions and the reduction of our participation to a quasi-advisory or observer capacity" raised some very important policy considerations. He felt that any settlement reached at Geneva would "establish a new balance between Communist power of aggression and free world power of resistance." He said it was "the objective of U.S. foreign policy to make that equilibrium as favorable as possible to our side, to minimize the possibility of further defeats in this area, and to localize the present one as far as possible." Smith thought that any settlement coming out of the Conference

would "reflect the inability of our side, notably France, Viet Nam, and the U.S., to reach an acceptable basis for continuing the fight to hold the Tonkin Delta against a Communist advance" and asked if the United States would "guarantee that settlement, or do we disassociate ourselves from it?" He felt that the United States had no other choice than to accept reluctantly "the general results of the military defeat which is the dominant theme of the present phase of the Conference" and that "it should be our endeavor . . . not only to obtain through diplomatic united action as good a settlement as possible, but also to see to it, by participation in the guaranteeing of the settlement, that the other side is not tempted by the weakness and disunity of the opposition to violate the settlement reached." (396.1 GE/6-2354)

For the complete text of the memorandum, see volume XIII.

---

751G.00/6-2354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 23, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 510. Repeated information Paris 489, Saigon 202, Phnom Penh 8. Re Secto 499.<sup>1</sup> Tep Phann, Cambodian Foreign Minister, Sam Sary and Son Sann, members of the Cambodian delegation, talked with Heath today.

They expect to see Pham Van Dong shortly, probably today and anticipate the latter will meet their demands for withdrawal of Viet Minh troops from Cambodia but on condition that (1) Cambodia solemnly engage not to permit foreign bases on its soil; (2) nor any foreign military personnel for training or other purposes and (3) accept a severely limited arms import program for Cambodian defense forces, in short the "neutralization" of Cambodia. Tep Phann said that his inclination was to refuse these conditions and hold out for unconditional withdrawal of Viet Minh forces. He and other members of the delegation had no illusions as to the value of a Viet Minh or a Chinese Communist guarantee of Cambodia's neutral status and/or of a Communist convention of non-aggression. He felt certain if Cambodia accepted such an arrangement the Viet Minh would promptly start new efforts of subversion and infiltration, probably followed before very long by another invasion overt or covert.

Before taking such a stand, Cambodia would need to be assured of continuing adequate American arms aid and a training mission, French or American. They would want to know what were the pros-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 22, p. 1213.

pects of forming a Southeast Asian Mutual Defense Pact and whether it might involve Cambodia's providing a military base.

Heath said that the delegation was without instructions to discuss the matter or to give the assurances and information requested. He reminded Tep Phann, however, that during the past three years the bulk of the arms and equipment of the Cambodian army had been furnished gratis by the United States and deliveries were still going on. He remarked that as far as he knew no detailed new request for American arms aid had been presented by the Cambodian Government and suggested that it would be very difficult to decide now just what kind of military program and equipment Cambodia would need until one could see how the conference was going. The delegation would, however, immediately report the Cambodian delegations request to Washington. Meanwhile, he personally recommended the Cambodian delegation should refrain from making any precise engagements which would tie their hands. He remarked the sudden Communist change of conciliatory attitude toward Cambodian position had, *inter alia*, very likely been motivated by Communist desire to forestall Cambodian appeal to the United Nations under Chapter 7 of the Charter and also to prevent Cambodian participation in a possible Southeast SEA defense pact.

*Comment.* I believe that if we were to give some general assurance to Cambodia and its delegation here that the United States would provide arms aid directly and would consider providing a training mission, providing the French do not offer one, Cambodia might, at least for a time, hold fast to its demands for unconditional withdrawal of Viet Minh forces. If the Communists refused unconditional acceptance of Cambodia's position, Cambodia might then decide to appeal to the Security Council.

Please instruct urgently.<sup>2</sup>

JOHNSON

---

<sup>2</sup> The Department of State replied in telegram Tosec 479, June 25, p. 1246.

---

396.1 GE/6-2354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 23, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 511. Limit distribution. With reference my Secto 512<sup>1</sup> it seems to me situation is clearly moving rapidly toward Franco-Viet Minh agreement on respective zones of occupation under cease-fire, with almost complete lack of agreement on supervision. When agree-

---

<sup>1</sup> *Infra.*

ment on zones reached, French pressures for effecting cease-fire are likely be so strong as to force virtual French capitulation to Communist views on supervision.

Must recognize Communist proposals on supervision very closely parallel those in effect in Korea, and French likely take view that they cannot prolong fighting obtain better terms than UNC agreed to in Korea in spite of differing situations. I am concerned over this situation and believe we should do all possible during this interregnum to forestall it, as well as not give French any grounds for accusing us of having prevented progress.

I therefore believe that we should generally be flexible on technical and procedural suggestions of French while reiterating and maintaining our position on basic substantive principles.

I think it very important that French have ready for use at an appropriate time a fully developed draft agreement on control so they are not at last minute maneuvered into position of being forced to work from a detailed Communist draft. I plan to discuss this with Chauvel tomorrow and attempt make arrangements for Colonel Dwan establish close liaison with French experts so as obtain clearer insight into French thinking and give us opportunity make suggestions.

Would appreciate any suggestions Department may have concerning other lines of action we might take.<sup>2</sup>

JOHNSON

---

<sup>2</sup> The Department of State in telegram Tosec 485, June 25, repeated to Paris as telegram 4828, replied as follows: "Agree with your analysis and reaffirm belief control commission should be provided by UN or alternatively by Colombo Powers. You should reiterate this to Chauvel and on every appropriate occasion warn him against any agreement which would place Communist satellite state on control commission. Agree French should have draft agreement prepared preferably along lines consistent with our position. However we should not participate in preparing draft." (396.1 GE/6-2354)

---

396.1 GE/6-2354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 23, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 512. Reference Tosec 460.<sup>1</sup> At yesterday's restricted meeting Chauvel alluded to paper transmitted Secto 497,<sup>2</sup> but stated he would withhold this "pending implementation June 19 decision on military talks". Have no reason believe Chauvel attempting substitute this paper for June 19 conference decision. My understanding is Chauvel

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1211.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 21, *ibid.*

merely attempting draw up a form of agenda to provide framework for conference discussion while paying some lip service to Chinese proposal. It does not seem to me his paper endeavors to register any conference agreement on topics mentioned as did Chinese Communist proposal June 16 which we will of course continue oppose. I see no objection going along with Chauvel on this, and would appreciate Department's approval.

Yesterday's meeting Chauvel also alluded to his proposal for "*ad hoc* commissions" (Secto 496<sup>3</sup>) but did not table any proposal (reference Tosec 461<sup>4</sup>). However he did orally suggest the possibility of committee of nine, the sole purpose of which would be assemble "abundant crop of proposals" before conference on matters of control together with observations made by various delegations this subject and present sort of summary working documents, which would facilitate further discussions.

In view Chauvel absence at Bern today, have not been able discuss matter further with him, but Bonsal saw Roux this morning and reiterated our reluctance approve establishment of subcommittees in absence clear terms of reference reflecting agreement on principles achieved at conference itself. Bonsal suggested task Chauvel had in mind might better be performed by one delegation and presented as working document to conference. Roux said would discuss with Chauvel having small group representatives of few principally interested delegations perform task. Roux stressed French thought is not create any form permanent subcommittee, but rather assign group experts task which would be accomplished between regular meeting of conference by *ad hoc* experts, which would then be dissolved.

From my previous conversations with him, I believe Chauvel's motivation to be: (1) He has available junior staff member highly competent control matters who cannot directly participate regular restricted sessions but who could represent French delegation at lower level committee; (2) Chauvel himself is unfamiliar with large amount of material which various delegations have submitted and genuinely believes an agreed analysis presentation of material would be helpful; (3) Chauvel believes appointment *ad hoc* commission perform more or less specific task would give impression of activity and progress which not produced by repetitious discussions at restricted sessions.

I see little utility but no particular objection to such *ad hoc* committee if insisted upon by France. While as practical matter smaller group of "principally interested delegations" would probably be able work more effectively, if we did not participate danger that elements

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 21, p. 1210.

<sup>4</sup> Dated June 22, p. 1221.



of control which we consider important might be dropped in committee report. Therefore am inclined believe on balance preferable we participate if clearly understood committee job collating and recording only, and not decision-making.

Please instruct.<sup>5</sup>

I am not clear on whether Chauvel will continue push for "committee of experts" on more substantive aspects control, but in view his anxiety get his junior staff expert work on this subject believe it likely he would do so. I strongly feel referral to committee in absence of agreement on essential principles very dangerous and will continue oppose.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>5</sup>The Department of State replied in telegram Tosec 478, June 24, p. 1238.

---

751G.00/6-2354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 23, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 513. Repeated information Paris 590, Saigon 203, Phnom Penh 9. Following Heath's conversation with Cambodian Foreign Minister reported Secto 510,<sup>1</sup> Heath received letter from Foreign Minister of which following is rough translation :<sup>2</sup>

"Following our talk this morning, I have the honor again to express to you the concern of my government for the present and future security of Cambodia, a concern which is justified by the insufficiency of means at its disposal up to this time to provide for that security. Although lacking necessary means at present to oppose the pressure of the common enemy, Cambodia is resolved to participate in any system for the defense of world freedom.

Thus Cambodia would be tempted to refuse the proposals of the People's Republic of China and the Viet Minh concerning prevention of the introduction of military personnel, or of arms, of the establishment of foreign bases, etc., and to devote itself to maintaining the principles for its complete sovereignty after the withdrawal of the invading troops. However, if Cambodia were not able to hope to receive assistance in personnel, armament, etc., in other words, if the conditions asked of us for the withdrawal of Viet Minh troops were in fact to be fulfilled, this refusal on our part to accept those conditions would lack any reasonable basis and would allow it to be believed that Cambodia does not wish the restoration of peace and does not even think of taking advantage of its refusal, if only during the transitory period, in order to organize itself internally and possibly to reshape its policy.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 23, p. 1227.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of the letter, in French, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 302.

In these conditions, I ask Your Excellency kindly to contemplate the possibility of letting me know to what extent Cambodia might hope for future assistance from the United States of America for the defense of its security. This would permit me to define the position of my delegation at the time of forthcoming bilateral conversations with the Viet Minh.

As soon as I have precise assurances from the Government of the United States of America, my delegation will firmly defend its position without fear of letting escape the chances of peace temporary or illusory though it may be, offered by the Communist delegations."

JOHNSON

751G.00/6-2354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 23, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 514. Repeated information Saigon 204, Paris 491, Vientiane 5. Laotian delegation met with Pham Van Dong, Viet Minh delegate, alone this afternoon in garden of Chinese delegation's villa.

Dong was very "amiable". He seemed to agree that Viet Minh forces should be withdrawn and disposed to admit that French keep treaty military bases. He also admitted to continuation of French cadres and training missions but said French military personnel must be reduced to minimum figures which would be agreed upon in talks between representatives of the Franco-Vietnamese and Viet Minh commands scheduled to begin in Geneva about June 26. Dong asked very insistently whether there was any military pact with the United States. The Laotians answered negatively not considering the Military Assistance Agreement of 1950 (pentalateral) to fall in that category. Laotian delegate agreed to ask Laotian Premier, Souvanna Phouma, to meet with his half brother (Souphanavong, leader of the Free Lao Movement) in the immediate future. Dong then suggested, without insistence, that Laotian Government might give some government jobs to members of the "Free Lao Movement" thus creating a government of "national union". In the next elections, the latter could present their candidacies for the Laotian Assembly. Then Dong mentioned vaguely that some sort of a "temporary arrangement" might be made for administration of those regions where the Free Lao Movement Military Forces were located. This suggestion worries the Laotian delegation.

After the talk with Dong, Ourot Souvannavong, Laotian Minister to Washington, had a talk with Tran Cong Tuong, member and translator on Viet Minh delegation. They had attended school together in Saigon. Tuong referred to the execution of a former fellow-schoolmate saying that the latter had been a non-Communist nationalist member

of Viet Minh and no obstacle could stop the Communist domination of movement. Tuong also said that he was certain the Laotian Government would find that the Laotian Resistance Movement was much stronger and better implanted than was believed in Vientiane.

Ourot Souvannavong agreed to our suggestion that it would be well for the Laotian delegation to make no major commitments to the Viet Minh until they saw where the latter's proposals were leading. He said he would keep the American delegation fully and promptly informed of developments.

JOHNSON

JUNE 24, 1954

751G.00/6-2454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 24, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 517. Repeated information Paris 493, London 321, Saigon 206. Following account of Mendes-France-Chou En-lai interview yesterday at Bern was given Bonsal by Roux who was present. Chauvel who returned to Paris with Mendes-France, plans to furnish written summary to US and British Ambassadors Paris this morning.

Mendes-France had with him Chauvel, Roux, Col. Guillerma and an interpreter. Chou En-lai was accompanied by Li Ko Nung [*Li Ke-nung*] (Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs), by Director of European Affairs and two others plus an interpreter. Conversation cordial in tone. There was no mention at any time of Franco-Chinese relations or of recognition by France of Chinese Communist Government. Chou En-lai carefully avoided giving impression he considered new French policy in making and he referred several times to earlier interviews with Bidault.

Chou En-lai stated military aspects must be disposed of before other aspects can be taken up. A cessation of hostilities is primary goal. Chou En-lai hopes Ministers can return to Geneva as soon as possible to pass on recommendations of military representatives for all three countries.

With regard to Laos and Cambodia, although Chou En-lai stated there would have to be regrouping areas for national resistance forces, he said this could be handled by international commissions and that in any case governing thought should be that of reestablishing unity of Laos and Cambodia. If those countries truly support their present royal governments, that is their affair. A suitable place in national life must however be found for resistance elements.

Chou En-lai referred to dinner he had given for delegates of Laos, Cambodia and Viet Minh, stating that they had all spoken French.

He spoke sympathetically of French Union. He added that there could be no American bases in Laos and Cambodia but was not violent on this point. There was no specific discussion of present French Union bases. Chou En-lai said that Chinese attitude on these matters would not be altered by threats to which Chinese would not yield. At same time he emphasized reasonable nature of Chinese position.

With regard to Vietnam, Chou En-lai stated that just as Laos and Cambodia had established contact with Viet Minh, there should be similar contacts between Vietnam and Viet Minh Government. He suggested that French authorities could persuade Vietnamese Government to engage in these contacts. He criticized Bao Dai's position on this subject as having been too intransigent.

Mendes-France then said that in order to be able to influence Vietnamese, French must know what Viet Minh have in mind in connection with military settlement. He said he was seeing General Ely June 24 and would see that French military delegates have precise instructions. Chou En-lai rejoined that he was glad to hear this and that he would try to see that Viet Minh also have instructions. He repeated that within period of three weeks provided by conference resolution, there must be progress which will permit Ministers to return to Geneva.

Chou En-lai made no reply to Mendes-France remarks that Viet Minh claims in military field seemed excessive.

With re to military regrouping of zones, there was no specific exchange of ideas. There was no mention of status of Tonkin for example.

With re to problem of international control, Chou En-lai took position that this could not really be settled until after agreed military dispositions become apparent. It will then become clear just what the task of control will be.

Roux informed us that Mendes-France is seeing Ngo Dinh Diem this morning and will presumably report to him on conversations. French here are doing likewise with Laotian, Cambodian and Vietnamese delegates.

JOHNSON

---

396.1 GE/6-2454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 24, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 516. Repeated information Paris 492, Saigon 205, Phnom Penh unnumbered. Re Sectos 510<sup>1</sup> and 513,<sup>2</sup> June 23. Suggest Heath

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 1227

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 1231

might be authorized orally to state to Cambodian Foreign Minister that the US is at present disposed to increase the deliveries of equipment for Cambodian regular forces which have been provided under terms of the Pentalateral Convention of 1950. It is also at present disposed to provide some military equipment for local defense units (auto defense). The kind and amount of military equipment to be provided would be discussed in the first instance by Cambodian defense authorities with the Chief of Military Assistance Advisory Group established under the authority of the Pentalateral Convention. Whether US military equipment would be furnished directly to Cambodian forces or as at present through the French High Command in accordance with terms of the convention would be decided later. In this connection it has been the view of the MAAG that the development of the Cambodian defense forces to date has not yet provided a logistic branch sufficient to meet the requirements of American legislation and regulations re reception, transportation, maintenance and inspection of military equipment furnished.

It is noted that France has heretofore also provided both equipment and budgetary support for the Royal Khmer Army and is presumably prepared to continue such assistance. As regards military advisory, technical and training personnel it is noted France is also contributing such personnel and it is our understanding is prepared to continue to do so.

It is noted, however, that the Cambodian delegation, in the restricted session of the Geneva Conference on June 19 stated, "the Cambodian delegation would be ready, as proposed by the Chinese delegation, to engage in special negotiations on the question of the introduction of certain personnel into our territory"; and on June 4 stated, "it might also be agreed, in connection with the control of the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces, that the relevant control authority would see to it that what is imported into Cambodia in the way of equipment, cadres, etc., would be elements strictly necessary for the Cambodian National Army for its own defense."

We note these statements with some concern as possibly indicating that the size, character and equipment and the members [*numbers*] of foreign technical and training personnel for the Cambodian Armed Forces would be negotiated with member states of the Geneva Conference and determined by such negotiations.

In conclusion the Foreign Minister might be informed, in compliance with Tosec 465, June 23,<sup>3</sup> that in the past we have been most favorably impressed with consistency and firmness of position maintained at conference, that withdrawal Viet Minh troops in Cambodia

---

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 1226.

is only problem regarding them which concerns the Geneva Conference and we feel we must warn the Cambodian delegation against making any commitments to Communist bloc which might compromise present defense or hinder participation in future defense arrangements.

JOHNSON

396.1 GE/6-2454

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Day)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] June 24, 1954.

Subject: Geneva Conference

Participants: His Excellency Nong Kimny, Ambassador of Cambodia

Mr. Everett Drumright, FE

Mr. Henry B. Day, PSA

Nong Kimny had just returned by air from Geneva via Paris. He called to resume contact with the Department. He expressed appreciation of the support which the U.S. Delegation had given the Cambodian Delegation at Geneva.

Mr. Drumright exchanged current items of information with the Ambassador mentioning in particular the talks which Chou and Pham Van Dong had been having with the Lao and Cambodian delegates. These had taken place after Nong Kimny left Geneva. Mr. Drumright referred to the possibility that the Communists might agree to withdrawal of Viet Minh troops from Cambodia provided Cambodia agreed not to permit foreign bases on its soil or any foreign military personnel and to receive only very limited supplies of arms. Mr. Drumright informed the Ambassador that the Department had just received a message concerning a note from the Cambodian Foreign Minister to Mr. Heath at Geneva which (a) pointed out that it would be unreasonable for Cambodia to refuse to accept conditions which the Communists asked if Cambodia could not expect to receive assistance in personnel and armament and therefore the conditions were in fact to be fulfilled and (b) asked to what extent Cambodia might hope for help from the U.S. in maintaining its security. The Ambassador said this note was fully consistent with the position Cambodia had taken from the beginning.

The Ambassador said that when he left Geneva at the end of the Korean phase he thought the Indochina phase would also come to a

quick close. It was only then that the Communists adopted a more conciliatory tone and made overtures to Laos and Cambodia.

The Ambassador said he wished to make clear that his Government was determined to resist Communist encroachment but that Cambodia's resources were insufficient to enable it to withstand Communist pressures alone. His Government attaches great importance to action on regional defense and favors conclusion on agreement or pact as soon as possible. The second matter he wished to say was that his Government considers it important to learn the results of the Churchill-Eden visit.<sup>1</sup> He had the impression that the UK Government desires to postpone action on regional defense and fears that the British may wish to postpone action indefinitely. The Cambodian Government would not mind postponement for two or three weeks if that is the duration of the life of the Geneva Conference but is strongly opposed to letting the matter die. The Ambassador recognized that the British might want some sort of Locarno-type pact. Whatever resulted it would be essential to have some sort of collective guarantee. With regard to action in the UN, the Ambassador said that the way had already been paved and that he was fully prepared to take further action in the UN.

The Ambassador referred to Menon's visit to Geneva. Menon's ideas seemed vague and cloudy. Until just before Menon had left Geneva he had called on all of the delegations at the conference except those of the countries principally concerned, namely, Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia. The Cambodian Delegation issued a communiqué pointing this out after which Menon announced that he would call on the delegations of the Associated States before leaving Geneva. Menon did call on Tep Phann, the Cambodian Foreign Minister, but nothing came of it. The possibility of recognition did not come up.

Nong Kimny expressed the belief that military talks between the Cambodian and Viet Minh Commands should take place in Cambodia, that the Cambodians would not discuss anything with the so-called free Khmers. He understood that there were two representatives of this movement behind the scenes at Geneva. The Ambassador was surprised that Defense Minister Tioulong had planned to go to Geneva for military talks.

With regard to the plans of the King of Cambodia, the Ambassador thinks that the present time is not good for such a long trip as the King proposes. He himself was to have accompanied the King on the trip but persuaded his Government that it was more important to return to duty in Washington. The King has a definite commitment to visit Thailand but may give up for the present his plan to visit other countries.

---

<sup>1</sup> For documentation on Prime Minister Churchill's visit, June 25-29, 1954, see volume vi.

396.1 GE/6-2354 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1954—7:33 p. m.

Tosec 478. Reference Secto 512.<sup>2</sup> Our position remains that in Tosec 461.<sup>3</sup>

The imminence of a settlement between Mendes-France and the Communists, which in some form will probably be brought before a revived conference for its approval, emphasizes the importance of adhering to these instructions. Otherwise we may be involved in committee work leading to the making of decisions which we might be obliged publicly to disavow.

We should avoid being drawn into the French effort to give conference semblance of vitality by means of a series of committee operations.

FYI Our thinking at present is that our role at Geneva should soon be restricted to that of observer, and now that Lord Reading has departed, you should leave in a few days. Bonsal could continue as chief observer in accord with terms of Tedul 211.<sup>4</sup> Let us have your views.<sup>5</sup>

DUILLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 23, p. 1229.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 22, p. 1221.

<sup>4</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1171.

<sup>5</sup> The delegation's reply was contained in telegram Secto 528, June 25, p. 1249.

751G.00/6-2454 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

PARIS, June 24, 1954—9 p. m.

5037. Repeated information Saigon 630, Geneva priority 444. Limit distribution. Re Deptel 4756.<sup>1</sup> As a result of conversations with Chauvel and Parodi this afternoon I feel that Department is unduly concerned regarding Chauvel's supposed evasiveness on underground military talks. After he had told me about Mendes talk with Chou, he said that he was going to Geneva to try and reactivate the military talks and he volunteered to keep Johnson fully informed.

In answer to direct question he said there had been no further secret military talks since the departure from Geneva of the Undersecretary. Regarding details of the military settlement I asked Chauvel what the French thinking was and he replied that it was now clear that the French could have a clean-cut division of the country. They would try

---

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 4756 to Paris, also sent to Geneva as telegram Tosec 464, June 23, p. 1225.



their best to maintain an enclave some sort in the north. The difficulty in this lies in the fact that they do not wish under any circumstances to allow the Viet Minh a similar enclave in the south. Chauvel said he had been discussing this very matter with Ely today and their first preoccupation is that the territory which they will retain in the south must be absolutely clear of Viet Minh troops and influence. They will try their best in addition to obtain some sort of enclave in the Delta but they are not sure whether or not they will be successful. *Comment*: From talking with Chauvel I get clear impression that French will not break off negotiations over the question of an enclave in the north. In other words, if Viet Minh delegation continues to hold absolutely firm for a division of the country the French will eventually accept.

Chauvel said that he realized US wish that everything be done to avoid a situation that looked like partition. He said that this would be done by indicating clearly that settlement was merely an armistice and that Vietnam would continue to be considered as one country and would eventually be reunited under one government after free elections had taken place at some indeterminate time in the future.

I emphasized to Chauvel necessity of keeping in close touch with Johnson and he was in full agreement. I think his lack of clarity in his last talk with Johnson was simply due to the fact that he had no new information and was not himself certain at that time as to what the French position would be.

DILLON

---

751G.00/6-2454 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

PARIS, June 24, 1954—10 p. m.

5035. Repeated information Geneva 443. Limit distribution. Since Mendes was tied up in National Assembly today, he asked me to see Parodi and Chauvel regarding his talk with Chou. Chauvel did all the talking and described the meeting as follows:

He said that Mendes opened the meeting telling Chou that he had been glad to agree to Chou's idea of a meeting and that he was interested to hear anything Chou had to say. Chou then spoke very fully and most of the time at the meeting, which lasted a little over two hours, was taken up by Chou's statements and the necessary translations.

Chou in general followed the same line as he previously had taken with Eden and Bidault, with certain important exceptions, which Chauvel considered to represent a considerable advance over Chou's previous position.

Chou started by talking about Laos and Cambodia. He said that the immediate problem was to obtain the withdrawal of all foreign forces including Viet Minh from the entire territory of both countries. He said that then the governments of the two countries should arrange political settlements within their own countries based on the will of the majority of the people. Chou said that while there should be no persecution of minorities, he had no objection to the two countries retaining their monarchical form of government if they so desired. The one thing upon which he insisted was that there should be no US bases in either Laos and [or] Cambodia. He stated that he saw no objection to Laos and Cambodia remaining with the French Union, provided they so desired.

The talk then turned to Vietnam where Chauvel considered important advances in Chou's position were revealed. Chou said that he recognized that there were now two governments in the territory of Vietnam, the Viet Minh Government and the Vietnamese Government. According to Chauvel, this was the first time that Chou had recognized the valid existence of the Vietnamese Government.

Chou then said that the settlement in Vietnam should be reached in two stages. First, an armistice which should be reached as soon as possible, and second, peace, which would obviously take longer to achieve. Chauvel said that Chou clearly accepted, and for the first time, the French thesis that there should be two phases; first military and second political to the eventual settlement of Vietnam. Regarding military settlement, Chou said that there should be regroupment of troops in large zones in order to stop the fighting. Chou said that he was ready to discuss the division of zones if Mendes so desired. Mendes answered that he was not yet prepared for such a detailed discussion and said he preferred that it be handled by the delegations at Geneva. Therefore, there was no discussion in detail regarding the make-up of the eventual zones.

Regarding the final political settlement, Chou said this should be reached by direct negotiations between the two governments in Vietnam, i.e., the Vietnamese Government and the Viet Minh Government. Chou further said that France might be able to help in these negotiations. He added that he saw no reason why the eventually united state of Vietnam should not remain within the French Union.

Mendes at this point said that since the war had been going on for 8 years and passions were high, it would take a long time before elections could be held as the people must be given a full opportunity to cool off and calm down. Chou made no objection to this statement by Mendes and did not press for early elections.

Mendes then told Chou that negotiations with the Viet Minh for reasons not very clear to the French had been at a practical standstill for the past week or ten days and he suggested that a word from Chou to the leader of the Viet Minh delegation might be helpful in speeding things up which seemed to be Chou's desire as well as Mendes'. Chou agreed to intervene with the Viet Minh and ask them to speed up negotiations.

The conversation never touched on any subject other than Indochina. According to Chauvel, no other item of Far Eastern policy was touched upon, nor was Europe nor the UN or possible recognition of China by France ever mentioned.

Chauvel is returning to Geneva tonight and will see the head of the Viet Minh delegation tomorrow in an attempt to get the military talks under way again.

DILLON

JUNE 25, 1954

396.1 GE/6-2554 : Telegram

*Johnson-Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, June 25, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 25, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 522. Repeated information Paris 501, Saigon 211. Department—limit distribution. Paris and Saigon eyes only Ambassador and Chargé. I saw Chauvel this morning following his return from Paris. He said Dong, whom he was also going to see this morning, was very insistent on seeing Mendes-France. He also said that in talks at Bern, Chou had suggested meeting "soon" between Mendes-France and Dong. He was going to tell Dong that meeting between Dong and Mendes-France at this time would be unwise, as among other things it would make things more difficult with US and Vietnam. He was going to urge Dong that they get ahead in conversations either at his level or with Colonel Brebisson.

Following are other points I gathered from conversation :

(1) Dong has been very insistent that US, as well as Vietnamese, not be informed of secret Franco-Viet Minh conversations. (Dong's idea apparently is that full Franco-Viet Minh agreement will be sprung on US and Vietnam, who will take about a week to decide to acquiesce.) Chauvel has told Dong we are not being informed, but said he will of course in fact continue keep us informed. Therefore requested information this regard be closely held US Government.

(2) Chauvel is using US as lever in conversations with Dong by insisting that France must be able obtain US acquiescence to arrangements.

(3) French position will be: (a) attempt obtain some supervised neutralization of Bishoprics in north which will protect the anti-Communist population against the Viet Minh; (b) agree to give up Hanoi in exchange for complete Viet Minh evacuation of the south; (c) retain an enclave around Haiphong (French continue lay great stress on not permitting any Viet Minh enclave in south and necessity for exchanging something in north to achieve this).

In accordance with Tosec 478<sup>1</sup> (on which I will comment later today<sup>2</sup>) made clear to Chauvel we will not participate work of committees in absence of agreement on principles. He expressed great disappointment, saying there would be no point committee if we did not participate.

Chauvel promised set up orderly arrangement so we kept fully and currently informed secret talks through Brebisson or Cheysson and Colonel Dwan.

In response to my question as to whether French had done any work on draft agreement on control, he replied in negative and accepted my offer for Colonel Dwan make available to French experts our experience in Korea on this subject.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 24, p. 1238.

<sup>2</sup> See telegram Secto 528, June 25, p. 1249.

---

396.1 GE/6-2554 : Telegram

*Eighteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 25, 3 p. m. :  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 25, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 529. Repeated information Paris 506, Saigon 217, London 327, Tokyo 161, Moscow 147, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Eighteenth Indochina Restricted Session on Friday, June 25, with Lamb (UK) presiding.

Cambodian delegate (Sam Sary) spoke first briefly and reiterated Cambodian position that control commission for Cambodia and Laos should be different from that for Vietnam even though its composition could be same. He stressed that his position was based on practical considerations since if there were but one commission for all of Indochina with its headquarters, for example, in Hanoi, contacts with its subcommittees would be difficult.

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/18) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 6:30 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 339-346.

Chauvel (France) spoke next on the subject of relations between the joint and neutral commissions. Rather than speaking on whether joint commission should be subordinate to neutral commission, he thought it would be possible to consider these two bodies as operating side by side but in different fields, and that conference should try to decide upon what kinds of activity each should perform. He referred to Dong's (Viet Minh) statement that effective implementation of armistice agreement depended upon the two sides, this being the case, certain provisions of armistice would apply to each side separately, and certain other provisions, i.e., regrouping of forces, would require joint action. In its tasks the two sides must be helped by some control system, he said.

The task of the control body, he continued, should be to supervise implementation of agreement, either on its own initiative or on request of two sides, to make recommendation when differences occur regarding implementation, and thus to play mediatory role. Control body, he explained, should be link between implementation of armistice provisions and guarantee of agreement itself.

Chauvel then asked rhetorical question, would it be possible define different tasks for each commission? The control commission, he suggested, should act in cases of disagreement between two sides or violation armistice provisions by one side. He made analogy herewith contract between two parties which often has arbitration clause, and when both parties sign they accept principles and consequences of arbitration.

Chauvel next referred to what some delegates referred to as compulsory character of decisions of neutral body. Some delegates, he said, contend implementation armistice agreement would depend goodwill both sides. Even if this were so, he said, there might be disagreements on interpretation. Here decision of neutral body would be necessary. French delegation does not believe it necessary for neutral body to have forces at its disposal. If one side refuses decisions of neutral body then this is case for guarantor powers.

Pursuing this point further, Chauvel said it would be useful to determine what kinds of situations would be decided by neutral body. He thought in ordinary cases neutral body could make recommendations by a majority vote but that in serious cases, such as those threatening peace and security, then neutral commission could refer matter to guarantor powers. Such report could be made unanimously or with majority and minority reports. If one side refused to implement commission's recommendation, "one would not appeal to the police", but report of such refusal would be sent to guarantor powers. These re-

marks, Chauvel stressed, were just illustrative in effort to find areas within which joint and neutral commissions would function.

In conclusion, Chauvel stated that, since both commissions would have different tasks they should function in different locations, details of which could be specially examined. He referred to Cambodian delegate's idea that there should be separate commission for Cambodia and said that in his view there should be central body in each of three countries, but that tasks would apply to whole area, and that there might be a coordinating body.

Kuznetsov (USSR) then asked for the floor and referred to the large number of proposals on questions of functions and composition control commission emphasizing that the conference has expressed many points of view. He charged some delegates with being unwilling to help find common point of view, with putting obstacles in the way of a solution, and with distorting Soviet proposals. He referred to Soviet proposals as thoughtful, detailed, and helpful and wanted to make certain remarks in light of attacks on them made by other delegates.

Principle behind Soviet proposal, he said, was to facilitate establishment contact between both belligerent sides regarding all questions including supervision implementation of armistice. Soviet delegate, he contended, thinks both sides should be "full masters of their internal affairs", and that other states should not interfere in these affairs but should help two sides and render assistance only when necessary. This why Soviet delegate proposed that mixed commission not be subordinate to international commission.

Some delegates, he continued, either misunderstood or distorted Soviet proposal and assumed Soviet delegate meant that two commissions should have same functions. On contrary, Soviet delegate believes commissions should work along parallel lines on basis cooperation, but should not perform same tasks. Conference should determine principles concerning what tasks would be performed by each commission. Soviet proposals, he insisted, conformed to principle laid down by conference to effect that two sides be permitted to work out conditions of cessation hostilities.

Kuznetsov then cited the successful operation military armistice commission in Korea as proof that mixed commission not subordinate to neutral commission was practical, and accused US delegate of attempting to make Korean example look bad. The NNSC does not issue orders to MAC but cooperation exists and hostilities have been stopped for a year, he said.

He then referred to proposal of French delegate at last meeting that *ad hoc* commission be set up composed of experts to examine various proposals and prepare recommendations for conference. Soviet dele-

gate, he said, agrees with this in principle, and is ready to examine a program of work for this committee. However, he said, conference should think overall proposals and recommendations before it and divide them according to their importance and according to those on which conference agrees and on which conference disagrees. If conference submitted all questions to subcommittee, he thought, this could be considered as constituting an unnecessary delay. Procedure other than that suggested by French delegate should, therefore, be considered.

Kuznetsov then made suggestion that heads of delegations meet in more restricted sessions with a few experts and interpreters, taking Soviet proposal on control as basis for discussion. He did not want to insist on immediate reply, but thought this would be step forward to facilitate recommendations to Ministers "who should return to Geneva".

In concluding, Kuznetsov referred to today's statement by Chauvel, said it deserved attention, and asked Chauvel if he could have written texts. Chauvel nodded affirmatively.

After recess, Li Ke-nung spoke on armistice control system. He declared French proposal for comparing various proposals on this subject "was helpful". He supported, however, proposal by Kuznetsov for more restricted meeting to determine what work should be referred to committee of experts. Li also supported fully Kuznetsov's statements on control system.

Li then launched into discussion of various issues involved in control system taking as his text Molotov's proposals of June 14 and 16. He made following principal points:

1. Conference has in effect agreed with points 1 and 4 of Molotov's proposal of June 14, since all delegations agree that there should be two types of commissions—joint and international—that joint commission should be composed of equal representatives from two commands and that international commission should be composed of representatives of neutral powers. In latter connection, he referred to proposal that Colombo powers constitute international commission and agreed that these powers are neutral. He pointed out that three of five powers proposed for commission by Soviets were Colombo powers.

2. Concerning powers and functions of commissions, Li stated that Bidault statement of June 2 agreed in principle with point 5 of Molotov's proposal of June 14 concerning the functions of the neutral nations commission. Li noted Chauvel's statement of June 22 to effect that one commission need not be "subordinate" to other, that there should be division of functions, and that functions of two commissions should be spelled out. Li pointed out that Molotov's proposal of June 14 has many points of agreement in this respect with views expressed by Bidault.

3. Concerning voting on international commission, Li asserted Molotov's proposal of June 14 took into account views of some delegations that voting should be by majority vote. Li argued, however, that on issues vital to one side or other decision should not be one-sided but must be unanimous. He stated that points 7 and 8 of Molotov's proposal provided basis for agreement on voting.

4. Concerning international guarantees, Li stated all delegations agreed guarantees desirable and that conference powers should be guarantors. He claimed conference should be able to agree on Molotov's points 11 and 12. Proposal by chairman that next meeting be Tuesday June 29 accepted.

JOHNSON

396.1 GE/6-2554 : Telegram

*Eighteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 25, 3 p. m. :  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 25, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 526. Repeated information Paris 503, Saigon 214. At recess today's restricted session, Chauvel expressed extreme disappointment over Kuznetsov's turn-down of Chauvel's proposal for small meetings of experts from certain delegations to study various proposals on armistice measures and controls and Chauvel's other suggestion that *ad hoc* committees be formed from time to time to study specific armistice problems. Chauvel disagreed with Kuznetsov's proposal that the 9 delegation chiefs meet to discuss control measures with fewer experts present than at recent sessions: A sort of a restricted session.

Chauvel thought at next session he would present a detailed paper on functions and powers of the control measures in answer to the Russian proposal of June 14 which is the only detailed paper on the subject to date.

JOHNSON

751G.00/6-2554 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1954—5:56 p. m.

Tosec 479. Reference Secto 510<sup>2</sup> and 513.<sup>3</sup> Preliminary oral reply should be made to Cambodian Foreign Minister along lines stated below. He may be informed that formal reply to his letter will

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA and Gullion of S/P. Repeated to Paris as telegram 4810, to Saigon as telegram 2721, and to Phnom Penh as telegram 81.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 23, p. 1227.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 23, p. 1231.



be made promptly when Washington has had opportunity for full consideration.

1. We hope Cambodians will continue to press for withdrawal of Vietminh forces from Cambodia.

2. Our view is Cambodians should insist during negotiations that Cambodia is member of French Union and accordingly French military personnel are not to be considered foreign. Suggest they continue reaffirm their right as sovereign government to employ anyone they wish.

3. We would be willing furnish military training mission if French did not do so.

4. We would be willing continue furnish arms and equipment on request Cambodian Government.

5. You should also inform Cambodians that we are impressed and heartened by their clear understanding of the Communist motives and their rejection of them. Such steadfastness is the quality which must characterize any effective collective resistance to the further spread of Communist aggression. With reference to their queries about the SEA pact you should say that we are convinced of its utility in the present situation and are doing our best to bring it into being by obtaining the necessary support in the free world. We cannot yet say what precise form it would take, what facilities it would require, or what its scope would be, but we would hope that Cambodia would be a part of it.

You should also refer to Cambodian statements mentioned in Secto 516<sup>4</sup> and indicate that we would expect that no restrictions would be accepted which made it difficult or impossible for us to aid Cambodia in future.

We shall comment later on Secto 516, which should not enter into your discussion with Cambodians at this time, except as above noted.

DULLES

---

<sup>4</sup> Dated June 24, p. 1234.

---

396.1 GE/6-2554 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1954—6 : 20 p. m.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Tosec 480. Tedul 221<sup>2</sup> and 222,<sup>3</sup> Dulte 199.<sup>4</sup> Basic instructions transmitted Tosec 138<sup>5</sup> were intended provide guidance for fully operative USDel. As such they were approved by President and Congressional

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 18, p. 1189.

<sup>3</sup> For text of message, see footnote 2, p. 1198.

<sup>4</sup> Dated June 19, *ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Dated May 12, p. 778.

Committees at a time when it appeared settlement Indochina conflict acceptable to US might conceivably be reached.

Since delegation has now been reduced in size and concept its role revised to include only advisory or observer functions (Tedul 211<sup>6</sup>) it appears to us desirable alter its terms of reference accordingly and so to advise Congressional Committees. Additionally, developments at Geneva and in Indochina since date basic instructions have made possibility acceptable settlement appear so remote that we prefer now to revert to *ad hoc* basis in order render positions we shall take fully responsive to realities as we see them not only at Geneva but also in US and Indochina.

In consequence basic instructions are now withdrawn. Matters of substance should be referred Department with request for instructions each instance.

DULLES

---

<sup>6</sup> Dated June 17, p. 1171.

---

396.1 GE/6-2554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 25, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 527. Repeated information Saigon 216, Paris 505, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Chauvel saw Dong this morning. According to Chauvel, Dong was very "agreeable" and anxious to reach agreement with the least possible delay. Chauvel spoke of the necessity of retaining Haiphong enclave and the question of protection for the inhabitants of the Bishoprics of Phat Diem and Bui Chu as well as leaving line as far north as possible. Dong replied that these should not present too much difficulty.

Chauvel told Dong he did not himself wish to deal with purely military questions. Those should be left to French and Viet Minh military representatives. Chauvel explained that he was not personally familiar with Indochina nor was he a military expert and accordingly thought that his conversations with Dong should be only on political and larger questions. Dong agreed.

Dong was insistent on an early interview with Mendes-France, but when Chauvel explained that it would be "extremely imprudent" for Mendes-France to see Dong, either secretly or openly, at this time, Dong said that he would defer to Chauvel's judgment. Chauvel told Dong that when their talks reached agreement and the ministers returned to Geneva, Dong could then see Mendes-France.

Dong said that the Laotians were not difficult to deal with but the Cambodians most decidedly were. Dong asked whether France had any

objection to Viet Minh negotiations with the Cambodians alone in Geneva with no French representative present. Chauvel assured him there was no objection (however, there will be a Frenchman on Cambodian staff of talks in Cambodia). Dong told Chauvel that the French military representative in the Franco-Laotian-Viet Minh talks was "difficult".

Kuznetzov, whom Chauvel had not previously known, called on Chauvel this morning. Chauvel said Kuznetzov was very friendly and hoped Chauvel would dine with him soon. In their talk Kuznetzov seemed "flexible" on question controls, but Chauvel agreed there was no evidence flexibility in Kuznetzov's speech in today's restricted session which merely repeated rigidly the old Soviet position on the powers and functions of the control commissions.

Chauvel expects to see Kuznetzov and will suggest that Sir Leo Lamb, acting British delegate and co-chairman, also talk with him and endeavor to get the Soviets to abate their terms on controls. Chauvel stated that the French still insist on effective control of armistice terms.

JOHNSON

---

396.1 GE/6-2554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 25, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 528. Limit distribution. Reference last paragraph Tosec 478.<sup>1</sup> My understanding is that original thought was conference would go into complete recess pending results military talks, or displacement Geneva by developments elsewhere, and under this condition observation and reporting group only would be left under Bonsal (Dulte 180<sup>2</sup> and Tedul 196<sup>3</sup>). In meanwhile, I would remain here as long as Lord Reading and Molotov stayed (Dulte 186<sup>4</sup> and Tedul 204<sup>5</sup>). Subsequently, in discussions here leading up to statement in June 19 communiqué that "conference would continue in session" together with chairman's (Eden) statement just before adoption communiqué that "first task of conference would be consider question international supervision or control" (Secto 480<sup>6</sup>) and our acquiescence thereto, it seems to me we have agreed to continuation conference at lower level pending results military talks.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 24, p. 1238.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 14, p. 1136.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 14, p. 1146.

<sup>4</sup> Dated June 16, p. 1165.

<sup>5</sup> For text of message. see footnote 2 to telegram Dulte 186, p. 1166.

<sup>6</sup> Dated June 20, p. 1200.

With UK represented by Ambassador (Lamb) and USSR by Deputy Foreign Minister (Kuznetsov), reduction our representative below ambassador level together with Bonsal being restricted to role of observer will be interpreted by all as first step toward complete disassociation, and by French in particular as contrary to understanding as of June 19.

Therefore, seems to me that question is whether events since June 19 have been such as cause us reconsider our acquiescence in continuation conference and thus withdraw to role observer.

In this connection from my conversation with Chauvel this morning (Secto 522<sup>7</sup>), as well as previous conversations, I believe that he and Mendes-France estimate that we will in the end acquiesce in type of "regrouping areas" in Vietnam he has outlined to us. If our considered decision is that we will not do so, should they not be told this now and told that in absence of any change of policy on their part we are immediately disassociating ourselves?

This would be said by Dillon directly to Mendes-France and by me to Chauvel.

I am unable to assess what effect would be on French and believe Department may want to obtain Dillon's view on this. On one hand, it may stiffen France, which might attempt somewhat correct its policy when faced with break with US. On other hand, in view of pledges he has made, Mendes-France might feel there would be no use even trying obtain US acquiescence and, therefore, capitulate even further.

Insofar as Associated States are concerned, any disassociation would have to be carefully handled so as not leave them with any even temporary impression we are abandoning them to French policy with which they would have no choice but to acquiesce. Unless we are able immediately to assure them we are prepared enter into truly significant politico-military-economic relationships with them, I do not see how this could be done.

My own frank view is that while I appreciate but cannot assess other considerations, our continued participation on a critical and reserved basis would serve, at this precise stage, to act as restraining influence upon French and bolstering influence upon Associated States and thereby assist in salvaging as much as possible from a most unhappy situation. If we, with or without our allies, are prepared to take immediate and concrete action to prevent an unacceptable settlement, I see much merit in immediate disassociation. If we are not, then I think we should not at least for time being, withdraw our influence from the conference unless we estimate withdrawal or threat thereof will in itself produce favorable change in French policy.

Alternatively, I could withdraw leaving Bonsal as US representa-

---

<sup>7</sup> Dated June 25, p. 1241.

tive who would continue participate in meetings. There is no middle position between observer role and participant. If observer role chosen, it must be made clear to all other participants as there constantly arise situations in which silence can only be interpreted as assent.<sup>8</sup>

JOHNSON

---

<sup>8</sup> See footnote 4, p. 1271.

JUNE 26, 1954

396.1 GE/6-2654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 26, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 530. Repeated information Paris 508, London 328, Hong Kong 30, Moscow 148. Course past few days several knowledgeable American correspondents talked with Savage (press officer) re increasingly independent role taken by Chou En-lai during conference. Correspondents, include such well-versed observers Communist affairs as Ed Stevens (*Christian Science Monitor*), Ed Korry (UP), and Joe Fromm (*US News & World Report*).

They cite evidence of Chinese Communist efforts strike independent role as follows: Chou made first conciliatory gestures toward Laos and Cambodia, not Molotov; Chou acted as host recent Geneva dinner attended by Laos, Cambodia and Viet Minh representatives; during later stages conference, Chinese Communists appear taken over active leadership Viet Minh cause although several Viet Minh leaders spent considerable time Moscow on way Geneva; no Soviet representation seen at June 23 Mendes-France-Chou Bern parley; finally current all-Asian discussion between Chou and Nehru.

Consensus these correspondents Chou been making obvious efforts forge own foreign policy in Far East and establish at Geneva strong international position for Communist China. They believe these efforts viewed with significant discomfiture by Soviets.

I do not entirely share these views but pass them on as of possible interest.

JOHNSON

396.1 GE/6-2654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 26, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 531. Repeated information Paris 509, Saigon 218, Phnom Penh 12. Re Tosec 479, repeated Paris 4810, Saigon 2721, Phnom Penh

81.<sup>1</sup> Preliminary oral reply conveyed today by Ambassador Heath to Cambodian Foreign Minister in accordance with Tosec 479. He expressed general satisfaction and agreement. With reference to longer term, he indicated Cambodian attitude regarding French Union would depend largely on French attitude. "If they continue to treat us like children, we will not stay in the Union."

Heath endeavored to make point that Cambodia as injured party insisting on withdrawal Viet Minh troops, should not put itself in position of making concessions to Viet Minh such as agreements regarding future Cambodian defense dispositions.

Ambassador Heath recalled that Cambodian delegation has unilaterally indicated its nonaggressive intentions, its determination to take appropriate steps, including foreign military personnel and matériel, to build up Cambodian national army to point required for self-defense and has indicated that it would be willing to report to International Commission regarding such measures. The evaluation of those measures in view of conditions for durable armistice would be province of International Commission.

Foreign Minister advised us that Cambodian mission for bilateral military conversations will depart Saigon June 27 and will consist of Tiou Long, two regular Cambodian officers and Dap Chuon, Puth Chay and Chantarangsei, latter three being leaders of former resistance bands who have rallied to Royal Government. Foreign Minister stated that he did not envisage presence of any French officer at conversations even in observer status although he recognized there would have to be some sort of liaison so that withdrawal of Viet Minh troops from Cambodia could be coordinated with whatever dispositions are made for the regrouping of Viet Minh troops in Vietnam.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 25, p. 1246.

---

396.1 GE/6-2654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, June 26, 1954—5 p. m.

Secto 534. Department pass Saigon if desired; repeated information Paris 511. Following is Ambassador Heath's account of his farewell call on Chauvel today:

"Chauvel asked me to say in Washington that from his own recent consultations with Mendes-France, he was certain that it was not the latter's intention to 'evacuate' Indochina but to make a viable settlement which France would support. While Dong had not definitely accepted the idea of the Haiphong enclave and some sort of protective

arrangement over the bishoprics of Phat Diem and Bui Chu, he had expressed no hostility to the idea nor had he suggested any counter territorial concession for the Viet Minh in the south. With a foot-hold in the north and holding the south and part of the center, the Vietnamese would have the foundation on which to build a solid durable state with the possibility of regaining complete control of national territory from Viet Minh provided it developed the necessary political dynamism and capacity. The latter was the great question mark. Certainly the regime had so far failed to show energetic capacity and it was the general impression in Paris that Ngo Dinh Diem did not have the necessary qualities to unite his country. The latter's speech on arrival in Saigon had not impressed the French Government.

"It would be the task of France cooperatively aided by the United States to try to build a solid state structure in the new Vietnam. Chauvel went on to say that he had not been favorably impressed by the Ministry of Associated States and did not think its personnel had the necessary drive and imagination to undertake successfully such a task. In any case it would be a mistake to send an ex-colonial official to Vietnam. La Chambre, the new Minister of Associated States, seemed to be a very good and intelligent chap but entirely new to the problem.

"Chauvel thought it was of the utmost importance that Ely be seconded immediately by an outstanding diplomatic counselor. He had urged on Mendes-France and hoped I would urge on La Chambre, if I saw him, the advantage of sending Georges-Picot, now at UN, at once to Indochina. The latter knew Indochina and was excellent at dealing with Asiatic peoples. Chauvel's other candidate for the job, Baudet, former French Ambassador to Yugoslavia, was no longer available since Mendes-France had taken him to be his Director of Cabinet. When I told Chauvel that I expected to see Bao Dai before leaving for Washington, he shrugged his shoulders over the political shortcomings of His Majesty but made no suggestions as to what might be said to the latter. He said he would appreciate, however, if I would pass on anything important Bao Dai said to me through Dillon in Paris.

"Chauvel said it was altogether possible in eight or ten days that, in their secret talks, the French would arrive at tentative agreement with the Viet Minh. He hoped that this agreement would be one that the United States might accept. It would be, however, difficult to sell to the Vietnamese who might unrealistically and irresponsibly oppose it. He had hoped that I would stay on at Geneva to help explain to the Associated States delegations, if a reasonable solution were found, that they should accept it and go on from there to build up their national strength. I made no comment on this or his other statements beyond observing that from my acquaintance the situation, the military position of France in Indochina was not as weak as was thought in many quarters.

"Chauvel said he regretted that the new government was opposed to DeJean coming to Geneva as advisor which Bidault had opposed, except possibly towards the end of the conference."

JUNE 27, 1954

396.1 GE/6-2754: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 27, 1954—4 p. m.

Secto 536. Repeated information Saigon 221, Paris 513. From Heath. Ex-Premier, Tran Van Huu, has been in Geneva the last three days. He is planning to remain in Europe for at least a month and, I would guess, much longer if situation Vietnam seems insecure.

After talking with Huu, his position as a southern Vietnam separatist seemed quite clear. The possibility of partition of Vietnam and specifically possible entire loss of Tonkin appeared not unduly to afflict him.

He is as consistently anti-Bao Dai as ever and said it would be impossible to build up a viable state if latter continued as monarch. While recognizing his honesty he is dubious about Ngo Dinh Diem's chances of success. He insists that without delay a National Assembly must be formed according to suggestion he had made two years ago, which was that 45 percent of members be elected and 55 percent be designated by Chief of State. He insists that elections could be held now. He justifies having majority of members appointed by pointing out that under Confucianist tradition which still prevails in Vietnam, best elements would be unwilling to campaign for office. That, he asserts was shown in municipal and communal elections of last year. Prominent men in villages generally refused to run for office, and it was younger and less responsible elements who campaigned. He claimed that later when villages were attacked or infiltrated by Viet Minh newly-elected counselors usually gave in or ran away.

JOHNSON

JUNE 28, 1954

*Editorial Note*

On June 28, at the conclusion of their meetings in Washington, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill of the United Kingdom issued a statement touching on a number of subjects of mutual and world interest. The portion of this statement which related to Southeast Asia read:

"We discussed Southeast Asia and, in particular, examined the situation which would arise from the conclusion of an agreement on Indochina. We also considered the situation which would follow from failure to reach such an agreement.



"We will press forward with plans for collective defense to meet either eventuality.

"We are both convinced that if at Geneva the French Government is confronted with demands which prevent an acceptable agreement regarding Indochina, the international situation will be seriously aggravated."

For the full text of this statement and the documentation on the visit of Prime Minister Churchill to the United States, see volume VI. The text of the statement is also printed in *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, volume I, pages 1705-1706, from which the above extract is taken.

---

396.1 GE/6-2854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 28, 1954—4 p. m.

Secto 538. Repeated information Paris 515, Saigon 222, London 329. Limit distribution. Paris for eyes only Ambassador; Saigon eyes only Chargé; London eyes only Ambassador. Chauvel this morning told me he had had further discussions with Kuznetsov when returning his call Saturday and also with Chinese Communists re control problem but nothing concrete had developed. Chauvel has impression Soviets are maintaining lead in matter of international control while Chinese Communists maintaining initiative re military conversations. Chauvel is asking Offroy (French Ambassador in Thailand and former diplomatic counselor in Saigon) to work on USSR June 14 proposal (Secto 442<sup>1</sup>) with view to preparing commentary which Chauvel may make at tomorrow's restricted meeting. (In this connection I again noted Colonel Dwan's knowledge of Korean armistice details and pitfalls could be made available to Offroy if desires.)

I took occasion to stress point made into Section [*Tosec*] 485<sup>2</sup> re our views on inclusion Communist satellite state on control commission. Lamb (UK representative who was present for part of my talk with Chauvel) seemed support this point of view. We were generally agreed re Colombo powers but I have impression Chauvel estimates at least one Communist power may in end have to be accepted by France. Fact French, as one of belligerents, willing to submit to control of purely Asian group whereas other side demanded inclusion one or more European satellites of USSR evidence French good faith and gives good talking point on this issue. I urged "impartial" be used in

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 14, p. 1143.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 25; see footnote 2 to telegram Secto 511, p. 1229.

referring control commission rather than Communist terminology of "neutral".

Chauvel is currently considering informally setting up without reference to conference a group of three (France, UK and USSR) at expert level to consider and compare current proposals on control as well as negotiate *ad referendum* on this subject. Chauvel said Lamb somewhat reticent on this proposal and Chauvel is asking Paris to instruct French Embassy in London to urge it on Foreign Office. Chauvel very concerned existing wide differences on control and is trying to push toward agreement on details at least to point of refining issues for quick decision by ministers when they reconvene to consider reports of military conversations.

Chauvel reports military talks with Viet Minh on Saturday were unsatisfactory. Viet Minh allegedly worried about change in French Government and wishes assurance Chauvel, Brebisson and others fully qualified to speak for new government. Chauvel says he has reported this to Paris and expects following Cabinet meeting this afternoon, "it will be taken care of" but result, according to Chauvel is loss of two days in military talks. Further complicating factor is absence authorized representatives of new Vietnamese Government.

Re recently opened military discussions between belligerents in field, Chauvel stated that until talks here have made further progress he unable to see what can be achieved in field other than establishment of contact and necessary facilities.

JOHNSON

---

751G.5 MSP/6-1254 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1954—7 p. m.

4853. Re Deptel 4852 repeated Geneva Tosec 489 and Saigon 2746.<sup>2</sup> In concert with your U.K. colleague you should when further instructed by Department make parallel communication following reply to French *aide-mémoire* set forth reftel. This reply has been cleared by Eden and we expect Churchill's concurrence tomorrow morning.

( In drafting this reply below we had in mind that it should tend stiffen French position so that they would not accept terms which we would be unwilling respect. (FYI U.K. sending a similar message Jebb but is informing him that he may orally add that HMG would be willing if French Government desires to give diplomatic support to

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated to London as telegram 7147, to Saigon as telegram 2748, and to Geneva as telegram Tosec 490.

French Government in order secure an agreement on lines set forth joint instruction below. This we are unwilling to do as we informed British. End FYI.)

*Begin verbatim text.* The U.S. Government/HMG have taken note of the French Government's communication. They appreciate being informed of this expression of the French Government's position in the current negotiations for an armistice agreement on Indo-China. The U.S. Government/HMG would be willing to respect an agreement which:

1. Preserves the integrity and independence of Laos and Cambodia and assures the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces therefrom;
2. Preserves at least the southern half of Vietnam, and if possible an enclave in the delta; in this connection we would be unwilling to see the line of division of responsibility drawn further south than a line running generally west from Donghoi;
3. Does not impose on Laos, Cambodia or retained Vietnam any restrictions materially impairing their capacity to maintain stable non-Communist regimes; and especially restrictions impairing their right to maintain adequate forces for internal security, to import arms and to employ foreign advisers;
4. Does not contain political provisions which would risk loss of the retained area to Communist control;
5. Does not exclude the possibility of the ultimate unification of Vietnam by peaceful means;
6. Provides for the peaceful and humane transfer, under international supervision, of those people desiring to be moved from one zone to another of Vietnam;
7. Provides effective machinery for international supervision of the agreement. *End text.*

DULLES

751G.00/6-2854 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1954—7:10 p. m.

4852. Following is translation *aide-mémoire* delivered by Bonnet to Secretary and Eden June 26. Text coordinated US-UK reply contained next following message.<sup>2</sup>

"The coming weeks will be of decisive importance insofar as Indochina is concerned. Following his conversation with Mr. Chou En-lai, the head of the French Government has instructed M. Chauvel to approach M. Pham Van Dong with a view to carrying on with him directly negotiations to ascertain whether a basis can be found, in his opinion, for a territorial settlement in Vietnam or not.

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by McBride of EUR/WE. Repeated to London as telegram 7146, to Saigon as telegram 2746, and to Geneva as telegram Tosec 489.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

"The objective of the French Government is to arrive at a regrouping which will assure the State of Vietnam a territory as solid as possible, and without the *de facto* division which will result being too cut up. That is the reason why the French Government will insist on maintaining Haiphong as long as possible and on obtaining the neutralization of the bishoprics of Bui Chu and Phat Diem.

"It is difficult to predict the result of this negotiation in which the French authorities must face two sorts of difficulties: on the one hand it will be most difficult to obtain concessions from the Viet Minh in the north; and on the other hand the negotiations risk causing, if the agreement is concluded, dangerous reactions by the Vietnamese Government whose citizens are serving at the present time under the orders of the French command, comprising a major proportion thereof.

"The French Prime Minister feels that the allied American and British Governments should be as well informed as possible of these possibilities. M. Mendes-France wishes especially to call the attention of these two Governments to the following aspects of the situation:

"(1) If the Viet Minh appears disposed to negotiate, it is for a series of reasons among which figure without doubt the fear of a spreading of the conflict, a spreading which nothing at the present time would lead us to expect, but which the general world situation does not permit us to exclude. Although the fear of such an extension of the conflict may have a determining influence on the decisions of our adversaries, the French Government realizes that precise declarations on this subject are not possible at this time. But it considers it would be very useful if the final communiqué of the Anglo-American talks in Washington could state in some fashion or other that, if it is not possible to reach a reasonable settlement at the Geneva Conference, a serious aggravation of international relations would result.<sup>3</sup>

"(2) The problem which is posed with regard to Vietnam is different. It is to be feared that any solution providing for an indefinite period a division of the country will cause a violent and unreasoning reaction on the part of the Vietnamese patriots. While this reaction may be in a large measure inevitable, every effort should nevertheless be made to canalize this reaction in a direction in conformity with the interests of Vietnam, France and their allies.

"To this end it appears highly desirable to the Prime Minister of France to obtain the assurance of the United States Government that nothing will be done by the latter which might even implicitly encourage such a reaction. Under present circumstances such action could lead to no result but to ruin any hope of seeing Vietnam consolidate herself in such a fashion as to create in the face of the Viet Minh an authentically national and independent force. It is for this reason that the French Government strongly hopes it can count on the United States at the proper moment to intervene with the Vietnamese to counsel upon them wisdom and self-control and to dissuade them from refusing an agreement

<sup>3</sup> See the editorial note, p. 1254.

which, if it is reached, is dictated not by the spirit of abandoning them, but on the contrary by the desire to save in Indochina all that can possibly be saved, and to give the Vietnamese state, under peaceful conditions, opportunities which have not always been possible heretofore because of the war."

DULLES

JUNE 29, 1954

396.1 GE/6-2954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 29, 1954—noon.

Secto 540. Repeated information Paris 516, London 331, Saigon 223. Tosec 489<sup>1</sup> and 490.<sup>2</sup> USDel notes that numbered paragraph 3 in US-UK communication states that agreement must not impose on "retained Vietnam" restrictions on importation of arms.<sup>3</sup> It has been generally understood at conference that one of functions of International Control Commission would be prevention of importation of reinforcing troops and arms after cessation of hostilities and during period of international control. Only contemplated exception has been in case of Cambodia and Laos where modest importations for self-defense purposes have been envisaged. French delegation has made point at different times of need to supervise closely frontier between Vietnam and China in order to prevent strengthening Viet Minh forces. So far as "retained Vietnam" is concerned, it seems doubtful that French will be able to obtain any provisions for unrestricted arms importation which would not be equally applicable in case of Viet Minh area. Would appreciate clarification.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>1</sup> Telegram Tosec 489 to Geneva sent as telegram 4852 to Paris, June 28, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram Tosec 490 to Geneva sent as telegram 4853 to Paris, June 28, p. 1256.

<sup>3</sup> The Department of State in telegram Tosec 500, June 30, referring to telegram Secto 540, informed the U.S. Delegation that "Numbered paragraph three of US-UK communication is intended refer to maintenance of defenses adequate to preserve internal security in Associated States. We have in mind difficulty you mention re Vietminh area." (396.1 GE/6-2954)

---

396.1 GE/6-2954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 29, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 541. Repeated information Paris 517, London 332, Saigon 224, Moscow 149. Roux reports that at Kuznetsov dinner for Chauvel last night, Russians appeared anxious be "helpful" on control problems,

but no concrete suggestions or discussion developed. He said Russians appear genuinely puzzled by attitude US and USDel here, stating they not know what US wanted. (Roux said this was good thing.)

French gained impression while Soviet insistent on inclusion Poland or Czechoslovakia and India under 3-nation composition, would be willing substitute for Indonesia non-Asian country more "neutral" on France's side.

JOHNSON

---

*Editorial Note*

On June 29 President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill of the United Kingdom issued the following declaration on common principles of Anglo-American policy:

"As we terminate our conversations on subjects of mutual and world interest, we again declare that:

"(1) In intimate comradeship, we will continue our united efforts to secure world peace based upon the principles of the Atlantic Charter, which we reaffirm.

"(2) We, together and individually, continue to hold out the hand of friendship to any and all nations, which by solemn pledge and confirming deeds show themselves desirous of participating in a just and fair peace.

"(3) We uphold the principle of self-government and will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire and are capable of sustaining an independent existence. We welcome the processes of development, where still needed, that lead toward that goal. As regards formerly sovereign states now in bondage, we will not be a party to any arrangement or treaty which would confirm or prolong their unwilling subordination. In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure they are conducted fairly.

"(4) We believe that the cause of world peace would be advanced by general and drastic reduction under effective safeguards of world armaments of all classes and kinds. It will be our persevering resolve to promote conditions in which the prodigious nuclear forces now in human hands can be used to enrich and not to destroy mankind.

"(5) We will continue our support of the United Nations and of existing international organizations that have been established in the spirit of the Charter for common protection and security. We urge the establishment and maintenance of such associations of appropriate nations as will best, in their respective regions, preserve the peace and the independence of the peoples living there. When desired by the peoples of the affected countries we are ready to render appropriate and feasible assistance to such associations.

“(6) We shall, with our friends, develop and maintain the spiritual, economic and military strength necessary to pursue these purposes effectively. In pursuit of this purpose we will seek every means of promoting the fuller and freer interchange among us of goods and services which will benefit all participants.”

The text of this declaration is printed in *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, volume I, page 1707, from which the above text is taken. For documentation on Prime Minister Churchill's visit to the United States, see volume VI.

---

396.1 GE/6-2954 : Telegram

*Nineteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 29, 1954, 3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 29, 1954—midnight.

Secto 545. Repeated information Paris 520, London 334, Saigon 227, Tokyo 164, Moscow 151, Vientiane, Phnom Penh unnumbered. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Nineteenth Indochina Restricted Session Tuesday, June 29, with Kuznetsov in Chair.

Qam [*Pham*] Van Dong (Viet Minh) opened with reference Soviet suggestion first meeting that after certain agreement on principles armistice control question could be referred to committee. Dong then, without contributing any new ideas, proceeding to comparison Soviet June 14 proposal and French (Chauvel) statement June 25 to show wide area agreement. He stated “object” of control was terms armistice agreement. Noted that military talks making progress but political questions barely started; although he did not pursue this question he seemed to indicate necessity embodying political terms in agreement.

Basing claims on French statements of June 2 and June 25 and Soviet June 14 proposal; Dong concluded no disagreement in principle on:

- (1) Regroupment,
- (2) Establishment demarcation lines,
- (3) Establishment demilitarized zones,
- (4) Liberation prisoners and civil internees, and
- (5) Prohibition on introduction arms and troops after armistice.

Dong noted detail of Soviet proposal and stated it was good basis for discussion, although certain precisions and additions necessary. For

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/19) are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279. The minutes indicate that the session convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 5:45 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 347-355.

example, question of duration of control not yet considered. Certain aspects such as regroupment of forces and exchange of prisoners would require control only until accomplishment, but with other aspects, such as prohibition of introduction of arms, control would not terminate automatically. How long this control to be maintained, for example, until final peace treaty or new agreement, should be considered.

Dong described guiding principles of control as efficiency and impartiality but there were other aspects. Communist delegates had stressed necessity for respecting sovereignty of three states. This question most important in connection control. Efficiency of control mechanism must not impair sovereignty of states or rights of people. Control bodies with compulsory authority might become foreign administrations detracting from this sovereignty.

Dong again referred indivisibility of peace in Indochina. This must apply to control of armistice since violation in one state could seriously affect other two.

On question organization of control, Dong claimed following areas agreement Soviet and French proposals:

1. All recognized necessity joint and international commissions operating parallel manner and in different fields. Although Chauvel statement June 25 and Soviet proposal close, agreement still remains on functions and relationship. Basically, responsibility of carrying out agreement up to both sides, this must be recognized. Sides will settle differences between themselves. Therefore, joint committees should be responsible for control and implementation. In case of differences would refer problem to international commission but this unlikely since both sides have equal interest in success of agreement.

Functions of international commission on other hand would comprise supervision and particularly of non-introduction [of new troops and equipment into Indochina, to] <sup>2</sup> note violations and communicate to both sides, and to make suggestions to amendments to agreement.

2. Between joint and international commissions, Dong stated, no question of subordination, rather coordination and different tasks. He noted Soviet proposal this effect and Chauvel statement June 25 that commissions would begin "juxtaposition".

3. On question of unanimous or majority decisions by international commission, he reiterated Communist insistence that decisions not be of unilateral (i.e., majority) character. He again quoted Chauvel statement June 25 to show that in serious cases international commission might submit majority and minority reports to guarantor states but they would not have force of unanimous reports.

4. With reference control for Cambodia [and Laos] he noted all agreed necessary. Reserved position on Cambodian proposal for separate commissions for each of three states. He thought Chauvel's suggestion three control bodies with additional coordinating body not too far from Communist position.

---

<sup>2</sup> These and following words in brackets supplied from the verbatim record of the Nineteenth Restricted Session.



Dong finally stated belief conference now has basic factors with which to reach agreement in principle on control, and questions could now be referred to committee as proposed by Soviet delegate.

US delegate then made statement Secto 542.<sup>3</sup>

Chauvel followed with preliminary comment on Dong's statement. He asked for copy for more thorough study and noted several problems or deficiencies in Dong's speech :

1. To avoid confusion, term "control" should probably not be used with reference to the joint commission but rather terms such as "execution" and "implementation". "Control" is more relevant to international aspects of problem.

2. Dong's analysis omitted reference to mediation or arbitration by international control body. Even though that body may have only few occasions to act, it must have power to make compulsory recommendations.

3. Dong said that control machinery must respect national sovereignty. This is very well in normal peace time but we are dealing with abnormal situation.

Concerning Johnson's statement on Korean experience, Chauvel agreed conference must benefit by this and other experience, but observed all experiences not absolutely comparable. Chauvel then made somewhat cryptic remark about guarantees of settlement, saying this is complicated problem on which some data may still be lacking. He suggested this problem might well be reserved for return of heads of delegations.

In closing, Chauvel remarked French delegation now engaged on work on entire control question and welcomes suggestions from other delegates.

After recess, Cambodian delegate, Sam Sary, spoke briefly. He endorsed French proposal for establishment of committee of experts and agreed with Soviet recommendation that conference provide experts with a list of questions. He saw no need, however, for more restricted conference sessions to formulate such questions, as Soviets had proposed.

Cambodian delegate then made following points concerning supervision of armistice :

1. Each Indochinese state should have separate international control commission. He agreed with French suggestion that coordination between three commissions could be achieved by special body, but hoped that such body would act solely in liaison capacity and have no authority over country commissions. Liaison body could, he suggested, work through secretariats of three country commissions.

---

<sup>3</sup> *Infra.*

2. In Cambodia, joint commission representing belligerent sides would be needed only for a short period of withdrawal of foreign troops.

3. International control commission should be set up under aegis of UN and composed of really neutral states. It is hard for Cambodia to believe Poland and Czechoslovakia [are neutral], since they have [recognized] DRV and not Cambodia.

Conference agreed next restricted session would be July 2.

JOHNSON

396.1 GE/6-2954 : Telegram

*Nineteenth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, June 29, 1954,  
3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 29, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 542. Repeated information Paris 18, London 333, Moscow 150, Saigon 225, Tokyo 163, Vientiane, Phnom Penh unnumbered. Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Following is text my statement, 19th Indochina restricted session, Tuesday, June 29, 1954:

I listened with interest to Mr. Pham Van Dong's statement and I have carefully studied further the Soviet proposal of June 14. With some minor differences this proposal seems very similar to the control Korean organization under Korean armistice agreement.

Also at our last meeting the delegate of the Soviet Union again made reference to the military armistice commission and the neutral nations supervisory commission in Korea and spoke of them in flattering terms. He described the work of these commissions in a manner apparently designed to have us believe that the supervisory commission now operating in Korea could be used as an example for this conference in our efforts to work out an effective control system for a cease-fire in Indochina.

I wish that I could agree with the Soviet representative's statement that, and I use his words, "the Korean example is a good one". The fact is that the NNSC system of control in Korea does not work. This can be demonstrated very simply: There is no effective supervision in North Korea. This is not just the conclusion of the US but, as the US delegation has frequently pointed out, that of the representatives in Korea of Sweden and Switzerland, two countries whose complete impartiality and objectivity is accepted by the majority of the delegates at this table.

I mention this because I think it important that we learn the lessons which can be drawn from the Korean experience and to profit by them.

What lessons can we learn from the Korean experience?

First of all it is absolutely essential that all members of a supervisory commission be truly impartial.

Another lesson of our experience with control machinery in Korea is that the supervisory commission must be able to make its decisions by majority vote. The fact that the neutral nations supervisory com-

mission in Korea consists of four members, two of whom are not impartial, obviously is responsible for the state of deadlock of the commission there; but even if an odd number of nations were to compose the commission, such as five or three, the probability of deadlock, especially on important issues, would be no less great if one member could veto the decisions of the rest. The solution is not to suggest that the supervisory commission operate according to majority vote on some issues and by unanimity on others, since the "other issues" are obviously the important ones and those on which deadlock would be most harmful to the maintenance of peace.

A third lesson of the experience with control in Korea is that the two belligerent sides, represented in the military armistice commission, have not been able to work out their differences between themselves. I will not dwell here on why this has been so. Irrespective of why the military armistice commission in Korea has been unable to correct the situation of inadequate supervision, we must recognize that some provision must be made to resolve differences between the two parties when they occur. In Korea the neutral nations supervisory commission has not performed and cannot perform this function. The lesson we have learned is that both sides must invest in an impartial body the authority to render decisions when agreement between the sides cannot be reached. As Ambassador Chauvel so effectively pointed out last Friday, both sides can demonstrate their good faith in a real sense by accepting the mediatory role of a truly impartial body.

As the US delegation has frequently stated, it believes that if the entirely reasonable proposal that the UN carry out this role is not accepted, the five countries of India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon should be acceptable to all parties genuinely interested in restoring and maintaining peace in Indochina.

JOHNSON

396.1 GE/6-2954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, June 29, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 544. Repeated information Paris 519, Saigon 226. Paris and Saigon eyes only. Department limit distribution. Chauvel told me this afternoon that no progress whatever in military talks with Viet Minh and does not expect any progress for several days. He felt they were trying little war of nerves on French and advised Paris he felt it important that French "stand firm".

UK have received report from UN and Swiss Security officers Molotov is due return Geneva July 8.

At recess, Kuznetsov referred to press reports I was being withdrawn from Geneva, saying he thought it "important" I not leave. I jocularly told him not to necessarily believe everything he reads in the press, but noted I had been absent from Prague since March.

JOHNSON

JUNE 30, 1954

396.1 GE/6-3054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL      PRIORITY      GENEVA, June 30, 1954—11 a. m.

Secto 547. Repeated information Moscow 152. Kuznetsov has invited me and several members USDel to lunch tomorrow and I have accepted.<sup>1</sup> I intend avoid substantive discussion insofar as possible, listening to whatever he has to say, and as necessary reiterating our substantive positions. However if Department desires I make any specific points, would appreciate instructions.<sup>2</sup>

JOHNSON

---

<sup>1</sup> For an account of the Johnson-Kuznetsov meeting, July 1, see telegram Secto 550, July 1, p. 1268.

<sup>2</sup> The Department of State in telegram Tosec 501, June 30, replied as follows: "Suggest that as appropriate you stress with Kuznetsov our position on international control commission: i.e., UN or Colombo powers." (396.1 GE/6-3054)

JULY 1, 1954

396.1 GE/7-154 : Telegram

*Johnson-Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, July 1, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY      GENEVA, July 1, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 549. Repeated information Paris 2, London 2, Saigon 1. Limit distribution. Paris eyes only Ambassador. London eyes only Ambassador. Saigon eyes only McClintock. Chauvel called me this morning to tell me that he is going to Bern for 24 hours. His talks with Dong remain at standstill. He wishes to avoid impression of eagerness or anxiety on French side. He will return in time for restricted session tomorrow. He will then request meeting with Dong either tomorrow night or Saturday morning for ostensible purpose of discussing international control. At that meeting he plans to tell Dong that military demarcation line somewhat north of Dong Hoi (he referred to US-UK *aide-mémoire* quoted Tosec 490)<sup>1</sup> would have international acceptance in sense that France's friends at conference would respect it, implication being that this line, as military demarcation line, would avoid risk of international intervention to which Viet Minh are sensitive although, in Chauvel's view, less so than their Soviet and Chinese Communist backers. He intends make clear there is no room for bargaining on that line.

---

<sup>1</sup> Telegram Tosec 490 to Geneva sent as telegram 4853 to Paris, June 28, p. 1256.

Chauvel does not expect Viet Minh to move very promptly. Although they may come to decision regarding military demarcation line early next week, probability is that they will await return of Ministers.

In reply to my question, Chauvel stated there had been no discussion as yet with Dong regarding evacuation of civilian population desiring to leave areas which will be under Viet Minh control following armistice. I stressed importance of this.

Chauvel stated that rapidity with which French High Command had withdrawn from southern part of delta had given impression of weakness which had not been helpful to him in his negotiations with Dong. He stated that no reply had yet been received from Dong re proposed neutralization of Catholic bishoprics or conditions under which French would remain in Haiphong although he stated Dong had made no objection on latter point. Chauvel hopes to make retention of Haiphong at least as "permanent" as military demarcation line.

Chauvel stated that as soon as agreement on demarcation line is reached, actual drafting of armistice agreement should be relatively simple. I cautioned him on basis of our Korean experience re difficulty and complexity of translating agreements in principle with Communists into workable documents.

I re-emphasized to Chauvel our position re composition of international supervisory commission with particular reference to rejection of Communist membership. He stated that Viet Minh had agreed to freedom of movement in their border areas for international control teams supervising non-importation of reinforcing troops and arms.

Chauvel stated he had impression there might be division of views within Viet Minh delegation with Dong following Communist line of consolidating gains already achieved and avoiding risk of international intervention and extension of conflict while other elements following purely nationalist line wish to exploit further existing military and political situation which they believe highly favorable to them even at risk of provoking international intervention.

Chauvel also told me that at his suggestion DeJean is proceeding to Cannes within a day or two to visit Bao Dai generally to inform him re present state of negotiations with Viet Minh and do whatever may be possible to have Bao Dai take a realistic view of the situation and use his influence accordingly. Chauvel states new Prime Minister, Ngo Dinh Diem, highly unfamiliar with facts of life in Vietnam and generally "unrealistic" in his approach to situation.

Chauvel expressed concern at weakness of British delegate indicating that Lamb only comes to Geneva for meetings and that next member of British delegation, Tahourdin, although able cannot perform

“go-between” role with Soviets which Chauvel thinks important. Massigili has discussed the matter with Reading but had not received definite reply.

Chauvel said Offroy had been discussing control matters with Novikov but apparently no positive results yet reached.

French delegation being strengthened by LaTournelle who is arriving this afternoon.

JOHNSON

---

396.1 GE/7-154 : Telegram

*Johnson-Kuznetsov Meeting, Geneva, July 1, Afternoon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 1, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 550. Repeated information Paris 4, Saigon 2, Moscow 1. Paris eyes only Ambassador; Saigon eyes only McClintock; Moscow eyes only Ambassador. Department limit distribution. Following lunch today, Kuznetsov initiated discussion and set forth at length Soviet views regarding composition and authority international commission. (Novikov and Larischev were also present but took no part in substantive conversation. Bonsal, Getz and Yager accompanied me.) Conversation was completely friendly and frank in tone.

On composition, he expressed incomprehension at US opposition to such Communist powers as Poland and Czechoslovakia. He said commission must include powers acceptable to Viet Minh and made clear Soviets will continue insist on inclusion Communist element. He said Colombo powers did not meet this definition although Viet Minh willing to accept some of them. He particularly pushed Molotov's three-power proposal (India, Poland or Czechoslovakia and Indonesia “or some other Asiatic state”), as a reasonable compromise.

I replied as forcefully as possible stressing firmness our position on composition and making clear that I was not only expressing views US Government but strong personal convictions based upon my intimate experience with Korean armistice. I pointed out that disregarding controversial question of ideology, evident close coordination between Chinese and North Koreans on one hand Poles and Czechs on other, the latter in no case ever finding even most minor flaw in Chinese and North Korean performance while Swedes and Swiss had not hesitated call their shots against UNC when they felt it justified. I pointed out conclusions on unworkability Korean system not only that of US but of Swedes and Swiss. I also pointed out composition must not only be acceptable Viet Minh side and stressed reasonableness of Colombo powers, none of which could be characterized as partisans of

France or expected act as such, none of which had recognized either Vietnam or Viet Minh and all of which were Asiatic states.

On subject role of international commission, Kuznetsov stated Chauvel had made considerable step forward in direction meeting Viet Minh requirements in that he had abandoned thesis joint commissions composed of belligerents should be "subordinate" to international commission. According to him, sticking point now is insistence that decisions of international commission should be mandatory so far as belligerents concerned.

Kuznetsov stated this unacceptable and proposed that international commission make "recommendations", either by unanimous or majority vote depending on cases, and that, if these unacceptable to either side, matter be referred to guarantors. I stressed impracticability as would introduce delay and controversy precisely in cases where urgent clear-cut decisions and action vital if cessation hostilities to be preserved and revival of war to be avoided. I added, for purpose of debate, that since Kuznetsov had said French had made considerable step forward in narrowing gap on this point, it was now up to other side to take similar step. I expressed hope that good faith with which parties approach armistice would reduce controversy and violations to minimum but stressed importance that, as evidence of such good faith, parties should beforehand agree to abide by decisions or, if Kuznetsov preferred the term, recommendations of international commission.

I also pointed out impracticability attempting separate those issues upon which majority and unanimous votes would be required. No matter how carefully prior definition carried out commission would probably be tied up in hopeless procedural wrangle on which category any given case fell just at time decisions most urgently needed. Also stressed that category of cases for which Soviets envisaged unanimous decisions was just the category in which it would be most important commission be able act quickly without being blocked by requirement for unanimous decision. Important point was not perfection of decision from standpoint both sides but ability quickly reach decision when most needed. In reply, Kuznetsov said this would mean that views of only part of commission would be imposed on one side and this unacceptable. He said neither side should be subject to "commands" of commission.

I avoided discussion of role of guarantor states.

Kuznetsov alleged we had rejected Molotov's June 14 proposal without adequate analysis and study on purely political grounds. I denied this and said that our interest was solely in direction of assisting in finding practical and effective system international supervision.

I feel conversation should be of some usefulness in additionally impressing Soviets with firmness our positions as well, I hope in some

small degree, with their logical basis. However, I am under no illusions as to effectiveness our logic in shaking their Communist convictions (and instructions). As was to be expected, on his part Kuznetsov showed no slightest sign of ability or willingness to shift from any present Soviet positions.

JOHNSON

751G.00/6-3054 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1954—5:35 p. m.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

8. Re Embtel 5117.<sup>2</sup>

1. Partition line taken from Five Power Conference report and Dong-Hoi used as point of reference to avoid confusion between two systems, French and English, of parallels. Actual line thought of forms triangular promontory with apex at about 20th parallel (French system).

2. Implication paragraph on timing elections due to use of expression "final settlement and troop withdrawal" is that Mendes-France thinking of withdrawing entire French Expeditionary Corps from all of Viet Nam within next six months. "Withdrawal", on other hand, could mean deployment into agreed regroupment areas. Does Mendes seek agreement allowing reassembly in retained Viet Nam those Expeditionary Troops withdrawn from Tonkin and indefinite maintenance in retained Viet Nam of French forces now stationed there or are French prepared agree withdraw from all Viet Nam all French forces within matter of months? This requires full and urgent clarification.

3. Dillon with Mendes and Johnson with Chauvel should urgently seek such clarification.

DULLES

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Fisher of EUR/WE. Repeated to Saigon as telegram 15 and to Geneva as telegram Tosec 506.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 5117 from Paris, June 30, Ambassador Dillon reported on a discussion between British Ambassador to France Sir Gladwyn Jebb and Premier Mendès-France on June 30. Ambassador Jebb indicated Mendès-France had confirmed that negotiations with the Viet Minh at Geneva were stalled. He said Mendès-France was perplexed by a reference in a British note to a "line running generally west from Dong Hoi" as possible partition line for while Dong Hoi is approximately at 17.5 degrees French had been holding out for 18th parallel in face Viet Minh wanting 13th." On the question of elections, Ambassador Jebb quoted Mendès-France "as stating that the Viet Minh wanted them to be held in six months but that the French were taking the position that they should be delayed for a year after final settlement and withdrawal of troops had been achieved. This, as presently envisaged, would mean a year and half to two years from now." (751G.00/6-3054)



396.1 GE/7-154 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1954—5:50 p. m.

Tosec 507. Eyes only Johnson. Reference Tosecs 478,<sup>2</sup> 480<sup>3</sup> and 495.<sup>4</sup> In withdrawing basic instructions, and in instructing you not take part in work of any *ad hoc* commission, we did not mean to imply you should cease exert all possible influence on French to resist communist bloc efforts impose Indochina agreement from which we might feel obliged dissociate ourselves.

In particular, we desire you continue urge French delegation stand firm on question international control commission (UN or Colombo powers) and other conditions listed numbered paragraphs Tosec 490.<sup>5</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 24. p. 1238.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 25. p. 1247.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram Tosec 495. June 30, the Department of State informed Johnson that "in light French *aide-mémoire* (Tosec 489), joint United States-United Kingdom reply thereto which now approved, and decision set up United States-United Kingdom study group (Deptel 1154 to Geneva [not printed]), approve your continuing as head USDel on present basis until further notice." (Conference files, lot 60 D 627. CF 253)

<sup>5</sup> Tosec 490 to Geneva sent as telegram 4853 to Paris, June 28. p. 1256.

JULY 2, 1954

396.1 GE/7-254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, July 2, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 552. Repeated information Paris 05, Saigon 03. Tran Van Do has called on US Delegation to state he is personal representative of Ngo Dinh Diem and is taking charge Vietnamese Delegation here.<sup>1</sup> His status will be regularized when Diem forms his cabinet. Do is generally critical of previous Vietnamese political and military efforts and of French attitude toward those efforts. He is aware that before present Government can expect to enlist greater measure of outside support, it must prove that it has internal strength and support. He is also aware of extremely short time at Diem's disposal. Do informed

---

<sup>1</sup> The Embassy in Saigon reported in telegram 79, July 6, that "Tran Van Do has been named Foreign Minister new Vietnamese Government." Embassy reported that Do's "views on political scene in Vietnam have usually been interesting but always pessimistic. He has been fence sitter and regarded as intellectual and talker rather than doer." Embassy said he was "believed to have been friend for considerable time of brother of President Diem, Ngo Dinh Luyen, and to share his views." (751G.02/7-654)

US that Vietminh here has refused any contact with Vietnamese Delegation (Do is known only to members US Delegation here as plausible fence-sitter; any information available to Paris and Saigon re his present status would be appreciated).

JOHNSON

396.1 GE/7-254 : Telegram

*Twentieth Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, July 2, 3 p. m.:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, July 2, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 554. Repeated information Paris 7, London 5, Saigon 5, Tokyo 2, Moscow 2, Vientiane, Phnom Penh unnumbered. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Twentieth Indochina restricted session, Friday, July 2 Lamb (UK) chairman.

Lamb observed that as result of last four meetings conference has clear idea of remaining tasks. Hoped today further progress would be made especially concerning relations between joint commission and international supervisory commission but need much goodwill in order reach satisfactory conclusion.

Chauvel (France) followed saying he too believed we are on path where agreement may be foreseen but he not yet ready offer more precise definitions or specific solutions. Most can be now said is we seeking distinguish problems of joint aspect of control and neutral aspect of control. This broaches delicate problem of way decisions to be taken in important cases.

Chauvel stated he has in back of mind possible way to solve voting problem but not ready set it forth. Said would not make positive contribution to debate today.

Kuznetsov (USSR) then made following comment on control.

1. Relationship between joint and international commissions.

Said on June 14, Soviets attempted define duties both commissions and relationship between them. Relation would not be that of subordination but each would carry on autonomously. Certain delegates have resisted this idea. French apparently do not insist upon subordination concept and other delegations also now appear not to do so. This testifies to certain *rapprochement*. We should then be able agree on draft on principle that two commissions work side by side

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/20) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279. The minutes indicate that the session convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 5:40 p.m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 356-361.

without one being subordinate. There is also not serious difference of opinion concerning definition of functions and duties of these bodies and we should be able reach agreement.

2. Procedure for implementation of recommendations of international supervisory commission.

Some have expressed opinion armed forces will be needed to implement recommendations. We against this since would mean in effect occupation Vietnam, violation of sovereignty, and could restart war. Now apparently none of delegations proposes international commission have armed forces. No need stress binding nature of recommendations. Asked delegations, especially French, re-examine this question.

3. Decisions of the international supervisory commission.

French have proposed that supervisory commissions in addition to making recommendations, should make reports which if not unanimous could be made in form of majority and minority reports. Soviets proposed decisions be made not by majority vote, but by agreement of all members. Seems French position remains same as before but desirable receive from French clarifications this point.

4. Composition of international supervisory commission.

Kuznetsov dwelled on June 29 US statement which he claimed attempted discredit NNSC and "reiterated outworn, long-since refuted arguments". Many documents distributed among delegates. If difficulties exist in NNSC that explained by fact US not only has not assisted commission but puts obstacles in way. Important thing is American command must stop obstructionist policy concerning NNSC. US considers as impartial only those countries which act as US desires.

In summary, Kuznetsov saw *rapprochement* concerning questions.

(1) Inter-relationship of two commissions; (2) lack of need of armed forces at disposal supervisory commission. On other hand, we are far apart on composition neutral supervisory commission and on method of resolving disagreements arising in commissions.

Chauvel then spoke again pointing out that Kuznetsov stated conference could today take "decision". We cannot take decisions as such. This is question of terminology. Cannot now say anything final on important question procedure of neutral control commission. We need to know what is to be controlled, need terms of reference and how body will act. Suppose neutral body would have to take decisions and would have to do something in case of disagreement. Could we not conceive this aspect from angle of law which is compulsory itself or if sides delegate to body powers of arbitration presume they will accept that arbitration. Goodwill is best guarantee for implementation of armistice

agreement and must function with respect both bodies. Perfect machinery may become clogged. Question of what to do in case serious disagreement is not simple matter. At this point we do not seek specific formula so much as correct description on case. Not ready now make proposal but may be at next meeting.

During his intervention Chauvel, in obvious reference to Kuznetsov's attempt to indicate closeness of agreement between French and Soviet positions on relation of international and joint commissions, made statement to effect he could not necessarily be bound by impromptu remarks during course of debate.

After the recess, Lamb (UK) spoke briefly, and said that fact UK delegate had not intervened does not mean UK delegate subscribes to view that question of subordination in relation between mixed and international commissions is not a serious one. UK delegation reserves its position on this. What UK delegate wants, he said, is system that works best. UK delegate has not changed its view that international commission must have mandatory power in order to expedite decision. He concluded by saying UK delegation is studying various proposals and has not adopted any particular viewpoint.

Buu King [*Kinh*] (Vietnam) spoke next noting that after weeks on debate differences are still profound. His delegation, he said, considered principles of efficiency and impartiality fundamental to system of control. He then referred to comments of other delegates that control system should be compatible with principle of national independence, and pointed out that it is not same for country to accept limitation of its sovereignty for benefit of another state as it is to do so in interests of peace. He referred to cases in international law where sovereignty is limited in interests of peace, and cited 26 September 1953 Vishinsky speech in UNGA in which latter said international control should be applied to control of atomic energy.

Turning to subjects of composition and functions of neutral commission and its relation to joint commission, he asked if Soviet proposal would result in selection truly impartial countries. He subscribed to Eden's speech in Commons 21 June 1954 in which Eden said neutral commission composed of two Communist and two neutral would not work. He then asked whether neutral commission as proposed by Soviet delegation would be efficient and concluded that if unanimity rule were applied to important questions commission could be paralyzed by one state. As far as giving joint commission control responsibility, he said his delegation warned against this in light of sad memories of 1946. To assume mutual good faith is an illusion and a danger. After eight years of fighting difficult to imagine both sides will cease to dis-

trust each other. Therefore, his delegation, he said, cannot accept parallel relation between commissions, and supports UK view on this point. In conclusion, he stated that only an international body can perform control function, and that a UN agency would be the best.

There being no further speakers, session adjourned at 1740, and will resume on 6 July.

JOHNSON

---

396.1 GE/7-154 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1954—4:09 p. m.

Tosec 511. Reference Sectos 517,<sup>2</sup> 544<sup>3</sup> and 549.<sup>4</sup> Have you any further specific information re thinking of various delegations about possible resumption of conference at ministerial level?<sup>5</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA. Repeated to Paris as telegram 29, to London as telegram 37, and to Saigon as telegram 26.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 24, p. 1233.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 29, p. 1265.

<sup>4</sup> Dated July 1, p. 1266.

<sup>5</sup> The U.S. Delegation's reply is contained in telegram Secto 556, July 3, p. 1280.

---

751G.00/7-254 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1954—7:34 p. m.

39. ReDeptel 4852, June 28; Saigon 2746; Geneva 489.<sup>2</sup> It seems to me that new Vietnamese Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem, who has reputation of uncompromising nationalist, is quite in the dark about developments critically affecting country he is trying to lead. We fear that if results of French negotiations with Communists are revealed to him as a *fait accompli*, the very reaction French wish to avoid will result.

You should therefore indicate our concern to the French and ascertain their own intentions with respect to consulting him or minimizing his resentment and their views with respect to plans and prospects for maintaining order in South Vietnam.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Gullion of S/P and by Sturm of FE. Repeated to Saigon as telegram 31 and to Geneva as telegram 9.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 28, p. 1257.

751G.00/7-254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 2, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 553. Repeated information Paris 6, Saigon 4. Department limit distribution. Paris eyes only Ambassador; Saigon eyes only Chargé. Reference Tosec 506, sent Paris 8, repeated Saigon 15.<sup>1</sup> Have discussed subject second paragraph reference telegram with Chauvel who stated current negotiations with Viet Minh are concerned with question regrouping forces of both belligerents in Vietnam and that from French point of view this involves movement troops both sides in accordance demarcation line and other arrangements. Question of withdrawal from Indochina of French Union troops not within scope of present military or "underground" conversations and not contemplated.

With respect newspaper accounts unmolested French military withdrawal (Tosec 503),<sup>2</sup> Chauvel states categorically there was no Franco-Viet Minh agreement or understanding on this subject. French movements reflect decisions taken last May 14 at National Defense Council in Paris for purpose insuring safety expeditionary corps by concentrating forces in positions where they will be able successfully resist enemy attack. He states withdrawal caught Viet Minh by surprise and probably for this reason movement accomplished largely without molestation.

Colonel Brebisson gave Bonsal same information that Chauvel gave me.

Chauvel stated UK delegate Lamb has now received instructions from Foreign Office to arrange for member his delegation work informally with members French and Soviet delegations in order to attempt make progress on matters of control. Lamb confirmed this.

In reply to my query Chauvel assured me French view basic control principles same as ours and that he would inform me of any substantive changes therein.

Chauvel reiterated his intention of discussing demarcation line with Dong this evening or tomorrow morning along lines set forth Secto 549.<sup>3</sup> Chauvel stated Viet Minh had been asking for line running northwest from Tuy Hoa (about 13th parallel) to Pleiku and thence west to Cambodian border.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 1, p. 1270.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 1, p. 1266.

JULY 3, 1954

396.1 GE/7-354 : Telegram

*Bonsal-Do Meeting, Geneva, July 3, Morning: The United States  
Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 3, 1954—4 p. m.

Secto 555. Repeated information Paris 8, Saigon 6. Tran Van Do (Secto 552<sup>1</sup>) called on Bonsal this morning. He expressed view French negotiating with Viet Minh without adequately informing or consulting Vietnamese Government. He is endeavoring to see Chauvel but latter has been "too busy" to give him early appointment.

Do said withdrawal from south delta serious blow to new Vietnamese Government. Do claims that new French Minister of Associated States had assured Diem before latter's departure for Saigon that no important decisions would be taken by French without at least advance notification to Diem. Although making allowances for need for secrecy in operation of this nature, Do believes commitment was not kept.

Do inquired as to possibility of expression of US moral and material support for new Vietnamese Government. Bonsal replied since this government had not yet even been formed and since little is known regarding its intentions, capacities and possibilities, it would presumably be difficult for US Government to consider any specific action in regard to it at this time. Do was also told that discussions of this subject should take place in Saigon and Washington rather than Geneva. He was reminded that US had in past wholeheartedly in moral and material fashion supported French and Vietnamese efforts to defeat Communists in Vietnam. Do's reaction was cordial and understanding.

Do stated his belief that French have decided to give up Tonkin without further fight and to endeavor to hold Cochinchina where majority of their material interests are located. He expressed view they count on international guarantee to help achieve this end. He continues to view French actions and intentions as though colonial era still alive. Bonsal reiterated well known US attitude regarding complete independence of Associated States.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 2, p. 1271.

751G.00/7-354 : Telegram

*Bonsal-Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, July 3, Afternoon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 3, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 557. Repeated information Paris 10, Saigon 8. Limit distribution. Paris eyes only Ambassador. Saigon eyes only Chargé. In Johnson's absence, Chauvel this afternoon, informed Bonsal regarding his talk with Kuznetsov last night and with Dong this morning.

Chauvel raised with Kuznetsov pending questions on control. He found Kuznetsov adamant on necessity of inclusion Communist power and rejection thesis Communists can not be neutral. Kuznetsov added that Colombo powers are after all sworn to influence of London which in turn is influenced by Washington. Upshot of talk on this point was that matter of composition might be set aside for present and left for Ministers to settle when they return. Concerning acceptance by parties of decisions or recommendations of international commission, Chauvel stressed importance of establishing "rule of law" accepted beforehand by both sides. Chauvel had impression Kuznetsov not unmoved by his arguments this point, although he gave no indication of change in Soviet position.

On military questions, Chauvel made clear to Kuznetsov that these are held up because Viet Minh have made unacceptable proposal of demarcation line along thirteenth parallel (about Tuy Hoa). On other hand, Chauvel stated French have proposed line acceptable not only to French, but one which French have reason to believe would be acceptable to conference as a whole, and thus would avert risk of internationalization of conflict. Kuznetsov replied that difficulty arises from fact that three provinces south of Faifo have been held for many years by Viet Minh (area in question would appear to run from just south of Faifo and include provinces of Quang Ngai, Qui Nhon and perhaps all or part of Song Cau; Department will recall in this connection, recent violent Viet Minh attack against French forces withdrawing from Anke which is in this general area). Kuznetsov suggested French and Viet Minh might examine area between fourteenth and eighteenth parallel and exchange views as to specific areas of particular interest to each party. Chauvel stated this could not be considered and repeated position regarding line French have already offered.

Chauvel's talk with Dong took place this morning at residence of Chinese Communist delegation. There was an exchange of views about control and particularly regarding prior agreement to accept decisions or recommendations of international commission. Dong stated that he



would consider this further. He is aware that French, British and Soviet delegations are working on specific proposals (Secto 553<sup>1</sup>).

Chauvel reports that he spoke most firmly to Dong regarding military discussions. He said French have accepted Viet Minh proposal that Viet Minh receive Tonkin area, including Capital, but that further Viet Minh proposal for demarcation line is unacceptable. Chauvel reiterated in strongest terms fact that French proposal for demarcation line just north of Dong Hoi would be acceptable to conference and would thus eliminate danger of extension of war. (Chauvel stated to Bonsal that of course French would have to hold Haiphong and adjacent zones for considerable period.)

Dong raised question of Viet Minh troops and sympathizers in area south of Faifo. Chauvel stated he assumed regular troops would be evacuated and others would return to their villages. He said that presumably there would be no objection to any persons desiring to do so removing to Viet Minh controlled territory. (Bonsal expressed interest and emphasized United States view this subject as set forth paragraphs of *aide-mémoire* contained Department telegram 4853.)<sup>2</sup>

Dong endeavored to raise question of eventual political settlement, but Chauvel stated that in present discussions must be limited to military matters and reaching of armistice. He stressed purpose of present conversation is to make arrangements for removal from Tonkin of 300,000 Franco-Vietnamese troops. He said that French have no aggressive military intentions, although obviously it is essential for French to reinforce their position both by regrouping their forces in delta and by measures agreed on in Paris in order to insure so far as possible, security of their troops. (He told Bonsal he did not believe either French or Viet Minh would take aggressive military action under present circumstances.)

Alluding to political matters, Chauvel took occasion to point out to Dong that elections have not yet been held in Communist China and that Dong would probably agree on need for considerable period of pacification and reconstruction before elections would be held. Dong made no comment.

Chauvel read Bonsal passages from letter he had received from Mendes-France indicating that French negotiators should avoid appearance of overeagerness to reach settlement. Deadline date of July 20 which Mendes-France has set himself<sup>3</sup> is not so pressing as to induce French to accept Viet Minh proposal of thirteenth parallel.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 2, p. 1276.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 28, p. 1256.

<sup>3</sup> French Premier Mendès-France made the announcement in the National Assembly on June 17; see the editorial note, p. 1128.

In view Department telegram 9,<sup>4</sup> Bonsal drew Chauvel's attention to presence here of new Vietnamese representative Tran Van Do and to latter's interest in seeing Chauvel. (Chauvel apparently not fully informed by his subordinates on this score.)

JOHNSON

---

<sup>4</sup> Department of State telegram 9 to Geneva, July 2, sent as telegram 39 to Paris, p. 1275.

---

396.1 GE/7-354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 3, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 556. Repeated information Paris 9, London 6, Saigon 7. Tosec 511.<sup>1</sup> Thinking here appears to be generally that, if military representatives come up with substantive reports within 21-day period, Ministers will meet soon thereafter. Report that Molotov will return about July 8 fairly wide-spread. Chauvel today read Bonsal passage from letter he had received from Mendes-France to effect latter anticipated meeting in Geneva at ministerial level about July 12 or later with final showdown about July 19 (expiration of period Mendes-France has given himself to secure solution).

Chauvel himself believes that Ministers will have to take final decisions re demarcation line and re outstanding points of difference re control. He thus apparently envisages meeting of Ministers here before reaching of final decisions on agreement and notably before disposition of some of points contained in US-UK *aide-mémoire*.

Press has asked us whether Secretary or Under Secretary planning return.<sup>2</sup>

JOHNSON

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 2, p. 1275.

<sup>2</sup> On this question, see telegram 101 to London, July 7, p. 1294.

**JULY 4, 1954**

PSA files, lot 58 D 207, "Vietnam Correspondence"

*Ambassador Donald R. Heath to the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal)*

PERSONAL AND SECRET

PARIS, July 4, 1954.

DEAR PHIL: It was good to hear your voice this morning. I had intended phoning you as soon as I had reached the Embassy, but you beat me to it.

As I indicated over the phone, I have little or nothing definite to report as a result of my brief Washington consultation. I am nevertheless glad I took the trip.

I was in Washington only a little over forty-eight hours. The first man I saw was of course Henry Day, who was kindness itself, but who is not intimately concerned with the Indo-Chinese situation. The one person in your outfit who is concerned and is very intimately concerned is Paul Sturm, who sees the Secretary and Robertson and his small committee at least once a day. Sturm is tired and about as baffled as everyone else at the Department at this precise juncture. I also saw Charlie Stelle and Ed Gullion. The latter made the statement, and I think it is correct, that all the people below the Secretary and Under Secretary are unanimous that we should intervene or rather make up our mind to intervene now with or without the French. The place and manner of intervention varies. Bob Bowie got off a memorandum to the Secretary on June 25 (written by Stelle)<sup>1</sup> in which he remarked that in case of a settlement along the Dong Hoi line that we send in some troops in southern Viet Nam as well as train the Viet Nameese Army.

My first talk was with Walter Robertson who expressed his usual sentiments against the British attempts to promote a settlement in Indo-China at any price and referred to Eden's influence over B.<sup>2</sup> Walter was rather despairing about the possibility of doing anything in the situation. I may say that I urged that you be put in charge of the delegation. The next day Walter had an attack of ulcers and didn't return to the Department before I left.

I had a long talk with Doug MacArthur but inconclusive. As I recall it, his conclusion was that the administration was going to be blamed for whatever happened there whether we disassociated ourselves or joined in to get the best solution possible.

I also had a long talk with Bob Murphy and urged on him as indeed I did on everybody that we use all the influence and pressure we could on Mendes-France to insist the French bargain for at least a foothold in the Northern delta. Both he and the Secretary doubted that we could do anything to persuade Mendes-France to which my answer was that we could at least try. I also felt that the Communist Chinese wanted a ceasefire as badly as the French and would be disposed to force the Viet Minh to accept at least provisionally the Haiphong enclave. Bob said that the Secretary's conditional offer of American intervention on the lines of his Los Angeles speech must still remain

---

<sup>1</sup> "United States Policy on Indochina," June 25, printed in volume XIII.

<sup>2</sup> Reference to "B" is presumably to Walter Bedell Smith.

open for a time because while the French have no intention of accepting it they would blame us if we withdrew it. When I saw the Secretary, he criticized the British for efforts to conclude peace at any price, referred to his offer of our intervention on terms which he said were thoroughly reasonable, expressed his disbelief that we were being kept really informed of the secret negotiations and expressed doubt that Mendes-France could be persuaded to adopt a strong line. I saw the President who said he had been thinking back whether there was anything that he might have done to have persuaded the French to internationalize the Indo-Chinese War. He said he had been endeavoring to persuade the French to do so since 1950. He wondered if he had talked to more people whether he might not have succeeded. He remarked that Bidault had been the one person who had seen the necessity of such action. Bidault had become converted to this idea at the Bermuda Conference.

I finally had a talk with Radford a short while before leaving Washington. Radford told me that one afternoon last spring the Government was almost decided to intervene with aviation to save Dien Bien Phu. Radford said he was convinced that throwing in our aviation would have saved Dien Bien Phu and our whole position in Southeast Asia would have been much stronger. His idea is that after intervening to save that fortress we could have withdrawn our aviation. He said unfortunately, however, the attitude of Washington toward our intervention was "conventional".

All in all at least on the high levels the attitude was one of pessimism and not knowing what to do. Much sympathy was expressed to me over my task on my return to Saigon. There was no expression of hope or belief that I might do something. To all and sundry I said we will just do the best we can down there and we hope we could find someone or some group with whom we could build something solid. I insisted to everybody the necessity of keeping a foothold in the North remarking the French would have to keep Haiphong at least for a time in order to evacuate their forces.

Over the phone I indicated to [*sic*] my last talk with Bao Dai was "unsatisfactory". That is the understatement of the week. He has no intention of going back there. I am sure that he is not a well man but that is no excuse for his cowardliness at this crucial moment in his country's history. Nevertheless, I don't think we should talk about his defection and eventual replacement now. We need to keep up at least a facade of Government until we find someone to take over.

Affectionate best to Margaret and yourself from us both,

DON

JULY 5, 1954

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 308

*Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Dwan)  
to the Head of the Delegation (Johnson)*

TOP SECRET

[GENEVA,] July 5, 1954.

Subject: Report of Five Power Military Conference, June 1954.<sup>1</sup>

Following is a summary of the conclusions of the Five Power Military Conference for your information:

*The Present Situation*

1. The retention of the Tonkin Delta is of the greatest importance to the defense of Southeast Asia as a whole. At the present time, the military situation in the Delta is critical. The Viet Minh are in a position to launch a strong offensive at any time from mid-June and by September will be able to undertake a fully coordinated offensive. Between now and September they will undoubtedly exert heavy pressure and, if by then, no reinforcements have been received a severe Franco-Vietnamese reverse is probable. This may well lead to a serious defection of Vietnamese troops.

*Forces Required to Stabilize the Situation in the Delta*

2. The stabilization of the situation and establishment of a secure base in the Delta would require outside assistance on the order of three well trained and equipped divisions and about three hundred aircraft. Owing to the limited capacity of the airfields in Indochina these aircraft would have to be provided initially by a carrier task force, supported by appropriate naval units and from air forces based outside Indochina. Minesweepers may also be required.

3. The movement and concentration of these forces will take time and a decision to reinforce the Delta must be made immediately if adequate forces are to be ready to meet the large scale Viet Minh offensive expected in September 1954.

4. The Delta will remain vulnerable until the whole of Tonkin has been secured and the Viet Minh Regular Army in Indochina has been destroyed. There can be, therefore, no guarantee that further reinforcements will not be required later. The size will depend on a number of factors including the extent of the recovery of morale throughout Indochina, the growth in size and effectiveness of the Vietnamese forces; the extent to which French Union Forces, now necessarily dispersed on police duties throughout the country, can be concentrated; and the reaction of Communist China.

---

<sup>1</sup> For documentation on the five-power talks, see volume XII.

5. The arrival of reinforcements from the Free Nations, other than France, would be an important factor in the restoration of Vietnamese confidence. In the opinion of the French General Staff the psychological impact of those reinforcements would be enhanced if they were drawn from the Western Powers.

*Situation Should the Delta be Lost*

6. Should the Delta fall to the Viet Minh, consideration must be given to the holding of a line of recovery further south. Due to the nature of the terrain and the forces which might be available to hold it such a position is not readily to be found. The line Thakhek-Dong Hoi offers the best possibilities although it is subject to a number of limitations. It would require a force of the order of four divisions with supporting air forces to hold it, together with the forces necessary to secure complete control of southern Indochina. Provision too, would have to be made for ensuring the security of the flank resting on the Thai border. The maintenance of this force would require development of the existing logistic facilities.

7. Under present conditions the French Union Forces in Southern Indochina are fully occupied with internal security duties and could make no contribution to the holding of this position. Therefore, unless adequate forces were extricated from the Delta, the success of this operation would depend on the timely arrival of the necessary reinforcements from outside Indochina.

*War With China*

8. The danger of Chinese Communist intervention will increase with the approach of Allied forces, other than Vietnamese forces, to the Chinese border. From the start provision must be made to meet such intervention.

9. Should war with China be precipitated by Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, air attack should be launched immediately aimed at military targets. In the selection of these targets political considerations cannot be ignored. To achieve a maximum and lasting effect nuclear as well as conventional weapons should be used from the outset. A blockade against China should also be established.

10. It is unlikely that the land forces immediately available would be sufficient to hold the Chinese advance but a recovery line in Indochina and defensive positions in Thailand and in Burma should be considered as a means of inflicting the maximum delay on the enemy and winning the support of those peoples. The lack of natural defensive positions and the inadequacy of forces likely to be available would limit what could be achieved.

11. The final stop-line should be a defensive position on the Kra Isthmus, the essential communications being controlled by air and naval forces based on the Philippines, Malaya and Ceylon. Intermediate operations should not be allowed to prejudice the ability to hold this final position.

#### *Global War*

12. Any war with China involves some risk of war with Russia although no agreement was reached at this Conference as to whether the risk was probable or merely problematical. This is an important factor to be considered when deciding to commit forces to a war with China since such a committal must not be allowed to destroy the balance necessary for the implementation of allied global strategy.

13. In the event of Global War, the overall strategy of the Allies should be generally defensive in Southeast Asia utilizing the offensive capabilities of naval and air forces as practicable. Elsewhere in the Far East the possibilities for offensive action should be exploited.

#### *Measures to improve Internal Security in Southeast Asia*

14. The maintenance of internal security in Southeast Asia depends largely on our ability to enlist the determined support of the leaders and people of the free Southeast Asian countries in the fight against Communism. This is a political problem but if it can be solved there are certain military measures which can be taken to increase their stability and develop their strength.

15. From the military viewpoint, a vital factor in the maintenance of internal security is the existence of strong, reliable, well trained and well equipped forces including police. Therefore, the Allies should be prepared to aid in developing these forces and their ability to operate. Such action would contribute not only to internal security but also to the general defense of Southeast Asia. These measures should not be considered in isolation, but with political and economic factors, which, applied together, will contribute greatly to welfare and stability.

#### *Military problems of a Cease-fire in Indochina*

16. Both the local situation in Indochina and previous experience of truce or armistice between free and Communist nations was taken into account. The conditions which would be the soundest and which would prevent a cease-fire in Indochina developing quickly into a more serious situation were set down only from the military point of view.

17. Any cease-fire agreement should provide for the retention by the French Union Forces of the Hanoi-Haiphong area, the communications between those two places and at least the area south of the line Thakhek-Dong Hoi.

18. There must be a guarantee by nations other than those directly involved that they will intervene if the agreement is broken and neutral observers with freedom of movement must be provided to detect and establish violations where they occur.

*General Conclusions*

19. Throughout the studies the Principal Military Representatives have been much impressed by the fact that the military measures required to enable resistance to further Communist aggression or infiltration in Southeast Asia to be effective call for firm solidarity between the Five Powers represented at this Conference. The Principal Military Representatives would also call special attention to the critical nature of the present situation in Tonkin and the urgency of decisions on the immediate problems that it presents.

JULY 6, 1954

751G.00/7-654 : Telegram

*Johnson-Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, July 6, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 6, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 560. Repeated information Paris 12, Saigon 10. Limit distribution. Paris eyes only Ambassador. Saigon eyes only Ambassador. This morning Chauvel expressed to me serious concern re reports he had had from Bonnet of two statements by Secretary and one by Under Secretary to effect US not being adequately informed. He asserted with much emphasis that he had and would continue keep me fully and frankly informed. My own belief is that Chauvel has not deliberately withheld information.

Chauvel had seen Dong this morning. On question of demarcation lines, Dong again referred to status of populations sympathizing with Viet Minh who would be left south of demarcation line proposed by French. He said this question would be easier for him if he could get some general political assurances regarding eventual status these people. Chauvel said Dong indicated that with such assurances he might be able to accept Dong Hoi line.

In reply to Dong Chauvel stated that such assurances would have to be very general. They might refer to such matters as eventual unity, territorial integrity, democratic conditions, etc.

Chauvel told Dong that any attempt to go further into detail on political matters would result in prolonged discussion and delay in achieving the armistice which all desire.



Chauvel suggested to Dong that it might be advantageous to have the agreement on the armistice purely one between the commands of each side and not between governments. This would obviate immediate problem of securing consent of Vietnamese Government. Agreement would, of course, have to include certain questions not purely military. The agreement could then be submitted to the conference. Perhaps conference might then make a general statement of political principles which would be included in a final declaration by conference. Dong agreed with this general approach. He referred to his own statement of May 12 in which he had advocated that agreements regarding cessation of hostilities should be bilateral.

Chauvel stated that in his talk with Dong he referred to fact military conversations not moving well. He wondered whether it might not be possible to supplement them with some conversations between civilians on certain subjects not purely military. Dong agreed and Chauvel designated Offroy while Dong indicated that Tran Cong Tuong (Vice Minister of Justice in Viet Minh Cabinet and member Viet Minh delegation here—he was also in Fountainebleau Conference in 1946) would be his representative.

Chauvel told me French delegation is working on draft of paper on control system which will be submitted to British and Russian delegations and of which he will give us a copy as soon as completed. Although his position remains that parties should agree accept decisions or recommendations of international commission, he is somewhat skeptical on how system will work in practice on major questions. He stated that decisions could be by majority or unanimous vote, but that in case of majority decisions on major questions implementation would obviously be difficult. He pointed out that eventual recourse to guaranteeing powers, i.e., conference powers will obviously not work in event serious disagreement. He stated that it will be necessary in this case "for us to work out something among ourselves".

Chauvel told us that he is leaving for Paris tomorrow to see Mendes-France in order to get his instructions. He indicated that Mendes-France has been in touch with London regarding future plans for conference. He has impression from Massigli that Reading or Caccia will be returning here shortly and that Eden is expected about 12th, (Lamb subsequently told me he has no information on Eden's plans and knows nothing about Reading or Caccia returning in advance of Eden).

Mendes-France himself may come here between 10th and 12th, probably not before Eden. The Chinese Communist representative apparently indicated to Chauvel that Chou En-lai's return is expected, but gave no details. Molotov is apparently still due about 8th, although Soviets have not directly said anything on this.

I again raised matter Haiphong enclave by asking Chauvel if any recent Viet Minh reaction on this. Chauvel said that Dong had given no definite indication regarding maintenance French enclave there. Chauvel said French would in any event obviously have to remain there for some time to come. In reply my further question, he said that French military do not attach great importance to retention of Haiphong from military point of view.

I also again raised with Chauvel question of anti-Communist civilian population in zones evacuated by French under any agreement. Chauvel said he expected Offroy to take this up with Dong's representative. Such matters as amnesty for alleged political offenses could also be discussed. Chauvel stated that problem of forcible repatriation of prisoners had not risen and that he did not expect that it would.

I asked Chauvel regarding liaison with Vietnamese. He replied he was handling this through members of his staff and was avoiding direct contact with Vietnamese in order not to have to answer their questions.

JOHNSON

---

396.1 GE/7-654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 6, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 559. Repeated information Paris 11, Saigon 9. Dac Khe, Minister of Democratization in Buu Loc Cabinet and member Vietnamese delegation here has expressed following views to Bonsal :

(1) Continued duration Geneva Conference is sapping will to fight and morale of Franco-Vietnamese forces. Prolongation of conference will be increasingly damaging.

(2) Mendes-France and other French leaders are not keeping Vietnamese informed of their plans and of their negotiations with Viet Minh. If presented with unacceptable terms for ending of conflict, Vietnamese will walk out of conference. (Dac Khe did not define terms he would consider unacceptable; he is aware of probability French willing give up entire Tonkin delta.)

(3) Dac Khe is hopeful but not confident that Diem, for whom he has admiration and respect, will be able to rally Vietnamese people. However, he insists on essentiality of true independence, i.e., rapid conclusion of current negotiations and establishment without delay of truly autonomous Vietnamese Army. In common with many other Vietnamese, Dac Khe holds that while development Vietnamese National Army and related forces has been satisfactory from quantitative standpoint, fact French High Command has regarded Vietnamese

Armed Forces merely as source of manpower to be used piecemeal as required and has not permitted that army to operate as integrated fighting force (coordinated of course by Unified Command) has had disastrous effect on morale of Vietnamese forces.

(4) Dac Khe is critical of Bao Dai's behavior and admits Bao Dai is physically and morally depressed. Nevertheless he holds that it would be major error to press for Bao Dai's resignation at this time. Resignation would result in removal symbol of unity and tradition which is still valuable asset.

(5) Dac Khe expressed confidence inhabitants of recently evacuated provinces (he himself is native of Phuly though absent many years) and particularly Catholics would give Viet Minh much trouble. He believed guerrilla networks were in existence.

(6) Dac Khe anxious and perplexed regarding US attitude toward Vietnam. He hopes new government will justify continued US support. He believes US backing major asset and one which Communists truly respect and therefore one whose strength or weakness will have important bearing on terms of settlement if one is reached here or on possibility of continuing struggle if no settlement is reached.

JOHNSON

---

396.1 GE/7-654 : Telegram

*Twenty-first Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, July 6, 3 p. m. :  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, July 6, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 561. Repeated information Paris 13, London 7, Saigon 11, Tokyo 3, Moscow 3, Vientiane, Phnom Penh unnumbered. Department pass Defense; Tokyo pass CINCFE. Twenty-first Indochina restricted session, Tuesday, July 6, Kuznetsov presiding.

Li Ko-nung opened meeting with review of Communist position on armistice supervision. He read his support of the Soviet and DRV statements on this question and also noted that the French statements deserve attention. He stated that views of various delegates were drawing closer but that some gaps still needed to be bridged. In alleged effort to further negotiations, Li made following principal points:

1. Although some delegates have not expressed their views, agreement apparently reached on principle that Joint and Neutral Com-

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/21) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279. The minutes indicate that the session convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 5 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 362-367. The comments by Sam Sary on the introduction of military supplies and personnel, Indochina Document IC/40, July 6, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279A.

missions will work side by side and that one will not be subordinate to other.

2. On functions and powers of two commissions, Soviet proposal of June 14 and French statement of June 25 are similar and should provide basis for agreed position.

3. It is not necessary in terms of reference of Neutral Commission to stress compulsory nature of Commission's recommendations. If sides have good faith, they will pay serious attention to recommendations of Neutral Commission. Compulsory recommendations will not provide any additional protection for armistice, but merely lead to interference in internal affairs of states of Indochina.

4. On voting procedure of Neutral Commission, French statement of June 25 distinguished between method of handling important questions and that for other questions. Discussion on this problem should continue on basis of Soviet proposal for [of] June 14.

5. On composition of Neutral Commission, constructive Soviet proposals can provide basis for agreement. Proposal that UN supervise armistice deliberately obstructs progress of conference.

6. On armistice supervision in Laos and Cambodia, Li argued since problems of peace in these countries are component parts of total Indochina problems, unified Neutral Commission should be established for all Indochina. Differing conditions in the three states of Indochina could be taken into account in administering armistice.

7. Statement by US delegate on June 29 distorted Korean armistice experience and demonstrated unconstructive attitude.

8. More restricted session, as proposed by Soviet delegate, to consider various proposals on armistice supervision and to refer to experts points agreed in principle should be adopted.

Chauvel spoke next. He stated French delegate is continuing work on comprehensive draft of control problem. He therefore preferred not to go into various issues involved but to wait until work finished.

He then turned to new subject and observed that point 3 in Chinese Communist's proposal of June 16 had not yet been discussed. He asked Chinese Communist delegate what was meant by statement that "The question of the amount and the type of arms that may be introduced into Laos and Cambodia for requirements of self defense shall be the subject of separate negotiations."

Sam Sary (Cambodia) followed with reminder that Cambodian delegate had several times restated opposition to Van in introduction arms and military personnel following cease-fire. Made points that after armistice Cambodia will not reduce its right and freedom to strengthen army for legitimate defense of kingdom; that if fear existed that arms would transit Cambodia for Vietnam international control could be set upon Cambodia-Vietnam border; that it ridiculous to believe country of 5 million, even armed to teeth, could menace countries of several tens or hundreds of millions population. Repeated willingness Cambodia, under certain conditions, make commitment

introduction arms and personnel would remain compatible with defense needs.

Sam Sary pointed out Chinese Communist proposal of June 16 recognized need for import of arms following armistice but failed mention requirements foreign experts and instructors. He noted other Asian countries, independent longer than Cambodia, still required assistance its personnel in military establishments. Since Cambodia needed both arms and personnel two questions should not be separated.

If separate negotiations this subject, as proposed by Chinese Communists did take place, following principles should govern: Cambodian sovereignty must be recognized and Cambodia must be able organize defense without interferences; insofar as security Cambodia not imperiled, Cambodia would give assurances defensive character its defense organization and would not menace neighbors.

Cambodia ready participate in such negotiations but must know how organized, when, between what parties, and whether results to be incorporated in general armistice agreement or in separate convention. Ended by inviting views other delegates, particularly Chinese Communists.

Laotian delegate, Kam Phan Panya, endorsed statement of Cambodian delegate and drew attention to certain points particularly applicable to Laos. He stated that Laos has vast area along difficult borders and young army. As a result Laos has requested and received French assistance. Under Laotian-French agreements, French Union troops would be stationed in Laos even in peacetimes for defensive purposes. Maintenance of these bases is for the time being essential to defense of Laos. Assistance of French officers and technicians necessary to raise Laotian army to proper level of defensive efficiency. Any lack in proportion between the size of the French training mission and task of such mission could easily be detected.

He pointed out that sparse population and geography were such that Laos could not be threat to neighbors. In closing, he stated technical military data on Laos, including relations with French, would be placed before military subcommittee.

Next restricted session scheduled for Friday, July 9.

JOHNSON

---

396.1 GE/7-654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 6, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 563. Repeated information Paris 14, London 8, Saigon 12. I had long talk today with Lamb (UKDel) and have impression he is

not being kept very well informed by London. My principal purpose in seeing him was to attempt assure UK would stiffen and support French in trilateral discussions with Soviets on control organization. I referred to paragraph 7 US-UK note to French (Tosec 490<sup>1</sup>) and told him I had feeling when such discussions undertaken French might be inclined be somewhat too "flexible" on some aspects mechanics control organization in face of complete inflexibility on Communist side. I thought this particularly dangerous in absence any agreement on composition. In absence any indication Communists prepared to agree satisfactory composition, particularly important there not at this time be any weakening our position on basic principles control.

Lamb indicated general agreement.

Bonsal will see Tahourdin (UKDel, who will work directly with French) and Offroy tomorrow on same subject.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>1</sup> Telegram Tosec 490 to Geneva sent as telegram 4853 to Paris, June 28, p. 1256.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 323

*Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Dwan)  
to the Head of the Delegation (Johnson)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[GENEVA,] July 6, 1954.

Subject: Talking Point on Joint Commission

In the many exchanges at the Conference on the subject of the joint and international commissions everyone talks about the joint commission as if it could have inherent authority in its own right. I think there is a point to be made about the character of the joint commission, regardless of whether it is parallel to the international commission or whether it accepts decisions of the latter, that might help clarify and support our position.

The joint commission will consist of representatives of the military commanders of both sides. The representatives can only reflect the wishes of the two autonomous commanders. Bringing the representatives together in a commission does not produce a body capable of performing a command function. Only the two commanders, separately, have authority over their respective armed forces. They do not invest in the joint commission, composed of their representatives, command authority over the forces of both sides, as to do so would be to give representatives command authority over the commanders themselves.

Thus the real function of the joint commission can be no more than a coordinating or liaison role. Only the commanders of both sides can

actually carry out the terms of an armistice agreement. To assume that this job can be performed by the joint commission is not realistic. The joint commission can at best only coordinate the implementation of the agreement by the two commanders.

It seems to me to be important that this fact is made clear, because it refutes the idea that the joint commission can reach "decisions" and therefore "control" (as the Soviet proposal states) the implementation of the agreement. The joint commission cannot possibly have powers of control, since representatives do not give orders to their principals.

Therefore, it is not a question of choosing which of the two commissions should have control authority. The question is whether there is to be an international body with control authority, or whether there is to be none and no control at all. If this point can be convincingly established it might be easier to argue the necessity for an international control body.

A realistic description of the various elements in a cease-fire situation might be:

Commanders of both sides—	implement terms of agreement
Joint commission	—coordinates implementation
International commission	—supervises and controls implementation

It might be useful to make this point in conversations with the French and others, and include it in our critique of the Soviet 14 June proposal.

J. E. D.

JULY 7, 1954

396.1 GE/7-754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 7, 1954—10 a. m.

Secto 564. Re Secto 561.<sup>1</sup> At next session July 9, I plan to make short statement on question of introduction of arms and military personnel into Laos and Cambodia after cessation of hostilities. Unless instructed to contrary, I will reiterate points made by Under Secretary at session of June 19, and support positions taken by Cambodian and Laotian delegates on July 8.<sup>2</sup>

JOHNSON

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 6, p. 1289.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram Tosec 520, July 7, the Department of State replied that it concurred with Ambassador Johnson's decision. (396.1 GE/7-754)

751G.00/7-754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1954—10:14 a. m.

101. Eyes only Aldrich and Dillon from Secretary. Please deliver following personal message to Eden :

“Dear Anthony: We have an inquiry from Mendes-France as to whether or not Bedell or I will return to Geneva and if so when. He apparently contemplates a reunion at the ministerial level July 12. I understand he is making a similar inquiry of you.

It is my present feeling that it would be better if neither Bedell nor I went back. As you know, it would not be feasible for us to be parties to a settlement which fell below the seven point paper which we drew up together in Washington and gave the French through our Ambassadors. Our position in that respect is perhaps a little different from your own. In any event, I fear that the French, whether or not Bedell or I are there, will take a solution considerably worse than this and in that event our high-level presence at Geneva might prove an embarrassment to all concerned. In view, however, of our joint efforts for this area, I wanted to let you know of our present thinking and I would welcome quickly knowing how you yourself visualize this matter working out. Sincerely yours, Foster.”

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to Paris as telegram 68.

396.1 GE/7-754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 7, 1954—6 p. m.

Secto 568. Repeated information Paris 16, London 10, Saigon 13. Secto 563 repeated Paris 14, London 8, Saigon 12.<sup>1</sup> Following summarizes results Bonsal conversations today with Tahourdin (UKDel) and Offroy (French Del) principally regarding subject of international control. Bonsal stressed US views on composition, authority, voting, and scope and mobility of commission.

Tahourdin stated that proposed tripartite conversations (France, UK, USSR as envisaged in Secto 549<sup>2</sup> and Secto 560<sup>3</sup>) have not as yet been initiated. French have made no specific approach to UKDel as yet. UKDel here has no authority to make any change in previously assumed positions regarding control organization.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 6, p. 1291.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 1, p. 1266.

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 6, p. 1286.



Lamb dined with Kuznetsov last night. Later discussed question of voting procedure of commission from "practical" point of view indicating that in fact parties would not implement decision handed down by other than unanimous vote on matters of real importance and that hence question of whether voting be unanimous or by majority largely academic. Lamb had impression Kuznetsov earnestly seeking agreement this point. Conversation resulted in no progress. Tahourdin volunteered personal view that solution of question of Chinese position international commission might be reached if our side would accept one Communist insisting at same time on inclusion, in addition to selected Colombo powers, "one proper neutral" presumably from Western Europe. He said that we should of course maintain insistence on vote by majority on all matters and on prior acceptance by parties of authority of commission.

Offroy informed Bonsal that French Del paper regarding control mechanism has been completed and approved by Foreign Office legal adviser Gros. Chauvel intends to take it to Paris this afternoon for Mendes-France approval. Offroy stated that he would get us copy of paper as soon as possible and that plan was to submit it as basis for discussion to UK and USSR delegations. He emphasized paper does not reflect final position and he added it does not go into matter of composition which Offroy regards as question to be decided by Ministers. It provides for acceptance by parties of majority decisions of commission on less important questions while at same time providing that in case of important violations or threats to peace, commission must reach unanimous agreement or refer majority and minority opinions to guarantors, i.e., Geneva powers.

Offroy had talk recently with Novikov who expressed adamant position on inclusion at least one Communist power on control commission and on necessity for unanimous decision on really important cases.

Offroy's personal philosophy on this matter on international control is that control cannot hope, under circumstances, to be effective in itself. Nor does he envisage that whatever guarantee arrangement Geneva powers may be able to set up will produce practical action. It is his thought, however, that presence of international commission some of whose members will be in position to make trustworthy reports on developments plus probability that majority of guaranteeing powers will approve these reports will be of greatest importance in mobilizing free world public opinion for whatever action may be necessary to stop further Communist advances in Southeast Asia. He cites Korean precedent.

Offroy contemplates a settlement which would leave Laos, Cambodia and part of Vietnam on this side of the "bamboo curtain". At same time, interested powers (US, UK, France, Australia, New Zea-

land, Thailand, Philippines and possibly others) would set up SEA defense pact. This pact would become operative in event violation of Geneva arrangements for Indochina. Offroy does not contemplate that "combined Vietnam", Laos and Cambodia would participate directly in pact although they would be guarantors of Geneva arrangements.

Offroy's view of military situation in Tonkin delta colors his thinking on this whole subject. He believes that in absence of truce or of very substantial reinforcements in the order of three divisions, French will be obliged, in addition to current withdrawal from south delta which was militarily essential, to evacuate Hanoi before end of September and retreat to Haiphong redoubt. He is convinced defeat at Dien Bien Phu radically altered balance of military strength in North Vietnam and that Franco-Vietnamese attempt to hold more than Haiphong redoubt this fall against assault of which enemy fully capable would result in major disaster because enemy would cut lifeline between Hanoi and Haiphong.

As Department is aware Offroy has spent two years in Saigon as Diplomatic Adviser to High Commissioner and was recently named Ambassador to Thailand. He was in Indochina in May and had many contacts with French military leaders. He states that his views reflect current French military thinking. He is unfamiliar with and skeptical of capacities new Vietnamese political leaders.

Offroy convinced Ministers must settle demarcation line in Vietnam, status of Laos and Cambodia, composition and powers of international control commission and other topics although possibly agreements will be reached through private bilateral or trilateral conversations rather than at conference table. Durability of any basic agreements reached will depend on degree to which US and other free world powers effectively guarantee such agreements through willingness to take action in event of violations.

JOHNSON

---

396.1 GE/7-754: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 7, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 569. Repeated information Paris 17. Reference last sentence paragraph 5 Secto 568,<sup>1</sup> Offroy's statement to Bonsal on voting procedure international commission contained French draft paper.

As Department aware, I have repeatedly set forth to Chauvel (as well as in restricted sessions) our views on this and other questions concerning control, and Bonsal repeated them to Offroy this afternoon.

---

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

French will give us opportunity see paper before presenting it to Soviets. In view paragraph 7 US-UK note to French (Tosec 490<sup>2</sup>) I would appreciate Department's instructions as to whether it desires I make further representations to Chauvel on this point, which is intimately tied up with policy US may adopt with regard to guaranteeing any agreement which may be reached.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>2</sup> Telegram Tosec 490 to Geneva sent as telegram 4853 to Paris, June 28, p. 1256.

---

751G.00/7-754

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Day)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1954.

Subject: Comments of Lao Minister on Return from Geneva Conference

Participants: The Honorable Ourot R. Souvannavong, Minister of Laos

PSA—Messrs. Day and Hoey

The Minister of Laos, who has been on the Lao Delegation at Geneva, said he had left Geneva on July 1. He said he might be called to Vientiane for consultations soon. The Lao Defense Minister took his place on the delegation.

He said that before he left Geneva military talks had begun between Lao and Viet Minh representatives at Geneva. Each side had held to its position and in the absence of any agreement there have been two postponements of further meetings. The Lao representative insisted that the only question for discussion was withdrawal of the Viet Minh from Laos. The Viet Minh side insisted on the principle of regroupment with a zone for Pathet Lao forces. No specific demarcation lines were discussed.

There have been some informal talks between the Lao Delegation and the Viet Minh Delegation aside from the military talks. His delegation first met Dong and two other Viet Minh delegates at the dinner which Chou gave for the Cambodian, Lao and Viet Minh. The atmosphere at this dinner was friendly with Chou assuming an extremely cordial attitude. Chou inquired whether there were any proposals for the US to establish military bases in Laos. He was informed that there were none but that Laos had treaty arrangements with France under which French troops were stationed in Laos for training and defense. Chou seemed to accept this as entirely agreeable. In direct conversations between the Lao and Viet Minh delegates, the Viet Minh urged

that two or three representatives of Pathet Lao be included in the government to prepare for elections. The Lao pointed out that there would be elections next year in the normal course of events at which time any person wishing to be a candidate could present himself. At one time Chou wanted to help arrange a meeting between the dissident Prince Souphanavong and his half-brother Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Prime Minister. Nothing came of this. The Lao Government has had no information for some time of any activity on the part of Souphanavong or any so-called Pathet Lao forces.

Regarding the recent incident involving military trainees near Vientiane Ourot said that Prince Petsarath, who has been in exile in Thailand, had been given permission to re-enter Laos to visit his family. However, he actually came to recruit forces for Souphanavong. He expected to move these from the Vientiane area to another part of Laos by way of Thailand. The plan failed.

Ourot said that he was with his Prime Minister when Menon called on him. He was impressed by Menon's lack of information regarding Laos.

Ourot said there was a Pathet Lao representative among the Communist delegates. One of the Lao Delegation recognized the individual. Ourot found three Viet Minh representatives who were former friends of his in student days. Ourot found them all well indoctrinated. One in particular made Ourot appreciate this by referring to Communism as an evincible force that would crush all obstacles. Ourot has the impression that the Communist delegates at Geneva all acted as victors. Their attitude of triumph was of course most noticeable after the battle of Dien Bien Phu.

---

396.1 GE/7-854 : Telegram

*Bonsal-Do Meeting, Geneva, July 7, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 8, 1954—noon.

Secto 571. Repeated information Paris 20, Saigon 14. Bonsal and Dwan dined last night with Tran Van Do, new Vietnamese Foreign Minister, at latter's invitation. Also present were Ngo Dinh Luyen (brother of Prime Minister) who is here on brief visit Nguyen Huu Chau, a family connection of Ngo Dinh Diem's, newly-arrived member of Vietnamese delegation here; Le Quang Trieu, Vietnamese Military Attaché, Washington, and Dac Khe, member of former Vietnamese Government.

Vietnamese, with Ngo Dinh Luyen doing most of talking, made many bitter intemperate statements regarding French of which following fair sample:

1. French refused to allow Vietnamese to defend recently-evacuated areas of south delta and particularly bishoprics. "If French don't want to fight any more themselves, they might at least make it possible for us to fight." (There was no attempt to make any analysis of capacities of Vietnamese forces which would have opposed Viet Minh in this area.) Marshal de Lattre's action in dissolving Catholic militia three years ago was severely criticized.

2. French failed to notify Vietnamese beforehand of their intentions in delta or to explore with Vietnamese possible alternative courses of action.

3. French have consistently failed and still fail to understand that creation of effective Vietnamese fighting force depends upon autonomy of that force under own leadership and its use as integrated whole rather than as mere manpower reserve for French High Command. Necessity for Unified Command recognized.

4. French are not keeping Vietnamese informed of current negotiations. Ngo Dinh Luyen has not seen Mendes-France for many days and interviews with Guy La Chambre have proved unilluminating.

5. There is reason to believe French plan to revive "Republic of Cochinchina" and thus to retain for themselves richest part of Vietnam leaving remainder to Communists [. No?] evidence whatever was given on this score.

6. French still refuse official signature of treaties of independence and association and completion of negotiations on supplementary conventions (economic, cultural, military, et cetera).

In reply to all this, Bonsal could only suggest importance of establishing and maintaining closest contact between Vietnamese delegation here and other friendly delegations including particularly French delegation. He expressed skepticism regarding some of points made above. He pointed out that for eight years French and Vietnamese have been fighting Communists in Vietnam and that for past four years US material and moral support to both French and Vietnamese in this struggle has been substantial. He added expression of hope for future and belief that fact Vietnamese Government now being taken over by new men who had not previously been involved in struggle might produce important new political assets and revitalize forces fighting against Communist domination.

General effect of conversation was depressing. None of Vietnamese give impression of ability to exercise leadership or to conceive of or to carry out practical enterprises. Dac Khe suggestion regarding importance of maintaining covert relationships with friendly elements in Catholic bishoprics and even of arranging to parachute arms and supplies to them was closest Vietnamese came to focusing on realities of present situation.

Luyen reported Bao Dai's state of health precarious.

Chau told us that in South Vietnam relations between Vietnamese and Viet Minh troops, at points where French are absent, are relatively good. Viet Minh do not tend to attack posts manned only by Vietnamese.

Dac Khe stated recent AP story attributed to Vietnamese sources here regarding military demarcation line at sixteenth parallel with enclaves for Franco-Vietnamese to north and for Viet Minh to south of line had in reality come from Viet Minh.

JOHNSON

JULY 8, 1954

396.1 GE/7-854 : Telegram

*Johnson-Offroy Meeting, Geneva, July 8, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 8, 1954—6 p. m.

Secto 574. Repeated information Paris 23, Saigon 15. Offroy called on Bonsal and me this morning. He described his talk with Tuong Viet Minh delegate (see 6th paragraph Secto 560).<sup>1</sup> With reference Dong's position on Viet Minh sympathizers south of Dong Hoi line (paragraph 2, Secto 560) French position is that while cease-fire agreement to be signed by the two commands could include provisions for free movement of populations from one regrouping area to the other, as well as arrangements for repatriation of prisoners, etc., this agreement should not include any specific reference to a date for the withdrawal of "foreign troops" from Vietnam or to a date for elections. At most, French would agree that in final declaration of Geneva Conference some general statement be made re territorial integrity of Vietnam, provisions for eventual unity and desirability of democratic processes. Tuong has not yet replied to this statement of position. I urged on Offroy importance including in cease-fire agreement arrangements for movement anti-Communist civilian population from evacuated zones so that responsibility for implementation would be clearly fixed and subject to supervision of international commission.

Offroy furnished us with copy of working paper prepared by French Del with regard to system of controls. He said besides ourselves copies were only being given UK and USSR for their comments. Translation contained Secto 575.<sup>2</sup> Offroy reiterated views contained Secto 568<sup>3</sup> re

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 6, p. 1286.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 8, p. 1305.

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 7, p. 1294.

this matter, stated was only "working paper" and French did not consider it binding on them.

While fully understanding our views, he clearly contemplates that agreement with Communists on composition will only be reached if Soviet satellite included. He contemplates that the others would be one or more Asian "neutrals" such as India and a Western country such as Canada or Belgium. He also is convinced that Communists will insist on "veto" on major questions. I expressed concern that French paper does not provide for majority decision in all cases, stating that if contrary to our views French contemplate acquiescing in inclusion Soviet satellite, majority principle is of even greater importance. In reply he stated that with strong possibility that an Asian "neutral" such as India would have decisive vote under majority rule in any Commission, he felt it of equal importance that Western Power on the Commission friendly to our side also be able to exercise a veto on major matters.

We discussed with Offroy present state of Franco-Vietnamese relations and desirability, in our view, that French should take steps to establish close relations with new Vietnamese Del. Bonsal described in general terms his talk with Vietnamese yesterday. (Secto 571<sup>4</sup>). Offroy expressed some reluctance in view his inability answer questions re current French conversations with Viet Minh plus his rather pessimistic view of possibility of having current Vietnamese Government officials take realistic and helpful view of situation. He suggested perhaps USDel should undertake this task. It is his view that if Vietnamese could be assured that part of Vietnam which will remain under their control after armistice agreement will receive wholehearted support in political, economic and military fields from France and US and other free world powers, their attitude might be improved. We replied that we did not believe it practical at this stage for USDel to be source of information re situation in which French have leadership and are playing major role. Offroy stated he would consider matter further. We hope we made some impression on him.

I raised with Offroy what French contemplated course of events with regard conference would be on Saturday when report of military representatives is due to be made, but he had no views on subject. He said that when he returns, Chauvel might have some views and would communicate with me. He expects Mendes-France on Sunday.<sup>5</sup> He asked whether we have heard if anyone would be coming from the US.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>4</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>5</sup> July 11.

396.1 GE/7-854

*The British Minister (Scott) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1954.

DEAR GENERAL SMITH: This is the text of the telegram from the Foreign Office which I showed you yesterday:—

“The French Ambassador told me today that the French Prime Minister hoped that I would get to Geneva by July 12 at latest. He added that the French Prime Minister would like to see me personally before the Conference reopens.

Meanwhile the Soviet Ambassador has informed me that Molotov is already on his way, that he hopes to have two or three days' holiday after arrival in Geneva, but would be ready for the Conference to re-open after that.

When I discussed plans with Bedell Smith in Washington he said that he might pass through London on his way to Geneva. From the newspapers I have seen rumours that he may not after all be returning to Geneva. I sincerely hope that this is not so and I shall be glad if you will tell him that we shall greatly look forward to seeing him on his way to Geneva if he can manage that. You should also say that I have it in mind to stop in Paris on my way to Geneva on Monday, July 12 in response to the French Prime Minister's suggestion for a conversation between us two.

It will be helpful to me to know as soon as possible what Bedell Smith decides.”

Yours sincerely,

R. H. SCOTT

396.1 GE/7-854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, July 8, 1954—5 p. m.

Secto 573. Repeated information Paris 22, Bonn 6. 2 members US Delegation had lunch today with Dr. Martin Fischer, Senior West German Observer for Geneva Conference. Fischer had just returned from Bonn where he had reported to Chancellor, Foreign Minister, and other officials in Conference. He stated officials in Bonn are very interested in Conference, particularly as it may indirectly influence prospects for EDC. He referred to, but did not endorse, press speculation that French may trade EDC for favorable Indochina settlement. In this context, he reported that a few days ago, when he, Chancellor, and Foreign Minister appeared before Foreign Affairs Committee of Bundestag, member of Committee asked why victorious Viet Minh troops had not pressed their advantage and driven French out of



Tonkin. Foreign Minister replied that he also would like answer to this question.

JOHNSON

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 323

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal)*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 8, 1954.

Participants: Phoui Sananikone, Laotian Foreign Minister  
Philip W. Bonsal

Subject: Problems of Laos at the Geneva Conference

Mr. Phoui came in at his request. He stated that recent reports from Vientiane as well as a conversation which he had had two or three days ago in Paris with the Crown Prince made him fear that perhaps the position of the Laotian Delegation in Geneva had been misunderstood. He was afraid that there had been reports to the effect that the Laotian Delegation here was disposed to compromise with the Communists and to accept claims for Laotian territory through the medium of regrouping zones.

Mr. Phoui then rehearsed the attitude of his delegation and pointed out that he had assumed from the first the position that peace in Laos would be restored after the foreign invaders withdrew and that the so-called resistance forces constituted a purely internal problem which could be solved through Laotian political mechanisms. He recalled that he had turned down a Vietminh proposal that the Laotian Government should be enlarged to include some of these resistance elements. He commented that even if the government were to make an agreement of this nature, the freely elected Laotian Assembly would probably refuse its approval.

I told Mr. Phoui that I had been aware of the strong position which he and his delegation had taken and that I thought it was in every way the correct one and one which should be maintained.

Mr. Phoui went on to tell me that the Crown Prince is very much worried about rumors to the effect that the French are abandoning the fight in Tonkin. The Crown Prince fears that a similar abandonment may take place in the case of Laos. Mr. Phoui asked me for my views on this possibility and also asked as to the possibility that Laos would find someone else, presumably the US, to protect her in the event the French abandoned her. I said that while the situation in Tonkin is militarily critical and difficult, I did not believe that one could argue by analogy with Tonkin in order to reach conclusions about Laos. I

said that it seemed to me most improbable that the French would, so long as the Laotian Government desired to continue the relationship, go back on their treaty obligations to defend Laos. I added that I was without authority to give him any indication as to what our attitude would be in this most unlikely event. I pointed, however, to our general policy of support for Laos and for other free nations when threatened with aggression.

Mr. Phoui stated that there is currently a point of difference between the French and the Laotian military representatives here. In considering the matter of separation of opposing native forces in Laos, the French view is that it might be desirable to concentrate all these forces in one area. On the other hand Mr. Phoui believes that it would be well to leave them in the half dozen provinces where they are since, if they are concentrated, they might be able to exercise a dominating influence in a given province with the result that that province might be permanently lost to the central administration. On the other hand, according to Mr. Phoui, if these forces are left dispersed as they are at present they will be unable, after the departure of their Vietminh supporters, to exercise any important influence. Mr. Phoui asked me for my view. In reply, I said that I could not express an opinion on the subject other than to reiterate to him my confidence in his judgment on this and other matters.

---

751G.00/7-854 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

LONDON, July 8, 1954—6 p. m.

124. Eyes only Secretary. Re Deptel 101.<sup>1</sup> I saw Eden this afternoon. He will answer your message soonest.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile he asked me to say he is going to Geneva Monday,<sup>3</sup> and will meet Mendes-France. Mendes-France wished him to come Paris over week-end but he is unable to do this. Eden will support French at Geneva in attempt to get most favorable possible settlement. He has no information or idea how matter may work out because Russians have not disclosed their hand and he is sure they will not do so until meetings take place in Geneva.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 7, p. 1294.

<sup>2</sup> On July 8, Ambassador Makins transmitted to Secretary Dulles a message from Foreign Secretary Eden in which Eden indicated that he hoped "very much that you or Bedell will be able to return to Geneva early next week." The Foreign Secretary said that "one cannot yet be sure how things will work out because the Communists will certainly not show their hand until the final stages of the negotiations have been reached." (611.93/7-854)

<sup>3</sup> July 12.

Weakness of French position is of course fact that election would undoubtedly result in all Viet Minh going Communist and therefore division of country in all probability best solution. It is impossible to foresee how this trump card may be played by Communists. Eden does not think it would be fair to you to expect you to attend Geneva Conference this juncture but thinks it would be very helpful to him and the French if Bedell could be there and hopes that if Bedell comes he will stop in London on way.

*Comment:* I am sure Eden is extremely anxious to have Bedell present because of Bedell's intimate knowledge of personalities involved at Geneva and of manner in which situation has developed.

ALDRICH

396.1 GE/7-854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 8, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 575. Repeated information Paris 25, Saigon 17. Department pass Defense. With reference Secto 574<sup>2</sup> following is translation of text of working paper on control in Vietnam prepared by French delegation under date July 7. Similar paper will be prepared for Laos and Cambodia.

“1. The sides assume responsibility for the implementation of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities.

2. The control of this implementation is to be assured by an international commission.

3. In order to facilitate, in accordance with the conditions set forth below, the implementation of those clauses which imply joint action by the two sides, there is set up a joint commission in Vietnam.

4. The joint commission is to be composed of an equal number of representatives of the commanders of the two sides.

5. The heads of the delegations on the joint commission will have the rank of general.

The joint commission will create joint groups the number of which will be agreed between the sides. The joint groups are to be composed of an equal number of officers of the two sides. The stationing of these groups on the demarcation lines between the regrouping zones is to be fixed by the sides, taking into account the authority of the joint commission.

6. The joint commission is to assure the implementation of the following provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities:

(a) The cease-fire, which is to be simultaneous and general in Vietnam for the whole of the regular and irregular armed forces of the two sides.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram transmitted to the Department of State in two sections.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 8, p. 1300.

- (b) The regrouping of the armed forces of the two sides.
- (c) Respect for the lines of demarcation between the regrouping zones and demilitarized sectors.

The commission is to help the sides in the implementation of the said clauses; it is to insure liaison between the sides for the preparation and for the placing in effect of plans for the application of these clauses; it is to endeavor to resolve the difficulties which may arise between the sides in the implementation of these clauses.

7. There is created an international commission charged with the control of the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam. It is to be composed of representatives of the following states: (Blank) it is to be presided over by the representative of (blank) it will have its headquarters at (blank).

8. The international commission is to create fixed and mobile inspection teams consisting of a number of officers designated by each of the states mentioned above.

The fixed teams are to be stationed at the following points: . . . These points may be later modified at the request of the joint commission or at the request of one of the sides or at the request of the international commission itself by means of an agreement between the international commission and the command of the side concerned.

The action zones of the mobile teams will be the areas neighboring on the land and sea frontiers of Vietnam, the lines of demarcation between the regrouping zones, and the demilitarized zones. Within the limits of these zones, the teams will have the right of free movement and will receive from the local civil and military authorities all the facilities they may need to accomplish their missions (such as the furnishing of personnel, the making available of the necessary documents for control purposes, the summoning of witnesses necessary for investigations, the protection of the security and of the freedom of movement of the inspection teams, etc.). They will have at their disposal modern means of transport, observation and communication which may be useful to them outside of the action zones defined above.

Mobile teams will be able, in agreement with the command of the side concerned, to engage in other movements within the framework of the missions entrusted to them by this agreement.

9. The international commission is charged with supervising the implementation by the sides of the provisions of the agreement. For this purpose, it is to carry out missions of control, observation, inspection and investigation related to the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities and it must especially:

- (a) Control the movement of the armed forces of the two sides carried out within the framework of the regrouping plan.

- (b) Watch over the demarcation lines between the regrouping zones as well as the demilitarized zones.

- (c) Control the operations involved in the freeing of prisoners of war and civilian internees.

- (d) In the ports and airports as well as on all the frontiers of Vietnam, watch over the application of the clauses of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities having to do with the introduc-

tion into the country of armed forces of military personnel, and of all types of armament, munitions and war matériel.

10. The International Commission is to proceed through the inspection teams which have been mentioned above, and as rapidly as possible, either on its own initiative or at the request of the Joint Commission or at the request of one of the sides, to carry out investigations which may be necessary, on the basis of documents and on the ground.

11. The inspection teams are to transmit to the International Commission the results of their control, of their investigations, and of their observations; in addition, they are to make whatever special reports they may deem necessary or which the Commission may ask them for. In case of disagreement within the team, the conclusions of each of the members are to be transmitted to the Commission.

12. If an inspection team has not been able to settle an incident or if it believes that there has been a serious violation or a threat of such a violation, the International Commission is to be informed; it is to study the reports and the conclusions of the inspection teams and to inform the sides regarding the measures which must be taken in order to settle the incident or to make the violation cease or to do away with the threat of violation.

13. When the Joint Commission does not succeed in reaching an agreement regarding the interpretation of a provision or the evaluation of a fact, the International Commission arbitrates the disagreement. Its conclusions are to be sent directly to the sides and are to be communicated to the Joint Commission.

14. The recommendations and the arbitral decisions of the International Commission are to be adopted or rendered by a majority vote, subject to the provisions of Article 15 below. In case of a tie vote, the vote of the chairman is decisive. The International Commission may formulate recommendations regarding amendments and additions which it would be desirable to make to the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam in order to insure a more efficacious application of the said agreement. These recommendations are to be adopted by unanimous vote.

15. When questions are involved which relate to violations or to threats of violations which may result in a resumption of hostilities i.e.:

(a) The refusal by the armed forces of one side to proceed with the movements provided in the regrouping.

(b) The violation by the armed forces of one side of the regrouping zones or of the territorial waters or of the air space of the other side.

(c) Blank

The decisions of the International Commission must be adopted by unanimous vote. If unanimity is not achieved, the majority conclusions are to be communicated to the sides which must take them into consideration.

16. If one of the sides refuses to apply a recommendation or an arbitral decision of the International Commission, the latter informs the guarantors.

If the International Commission has not succeeded in reaching a unanimous conclusion in the cases provided for in Article 15, it will transmit to the guarantors a majority report and one or several minority reports.

The International Commission is to inform the guarantors of any obstacle which may arise to the carrying out of its activities.

17. The International Control Commission is to be on the spot from the moment of the cessation of hostilities in Indochina in order to be able to carry out the tasks provided in Article 9.

18. The International Control Commission in Vietnam is to act in close cooperation with the International Control Commissions in Cambodia and in Laos. An organism of coordination of the activities of the three Commissions is to be created through an agreement between them.

19. The International Control Commission for Vietnam may, after consulting with the International Control Commissions for Cambodia and Laos, formulate recommendations regarding the gradual reduction of its activities, taking into account developments in Vietnam. These recommendations are to be adopted by unanimity."

Comments USDel follow.<sup>3</sup>

JOHNSON

---

<sup>3</sup> Comments on French paper contained in telegram Secto 577. July 9, p. 1311.

396.1 GE/7-854: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 8, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 576. Repeated information Paris 24, Saigon 16. Latournelle of French delegation today told Bonsal that he is informed that some weeks ago, Burmese Prime Minister<sup>1</sup> sent note to Nehru expressing grave concern at Chinese Communist activities on Burmese border and at Chinese Communist-supported Viet Minh invasions of Laos and Cambodia. Nehru passed this communication on to Chou En-lai at Geneva presumably through Menon with indication that Nehru shared Burmese concern.

According to Latournelle, Chou En-lai's anxiety to allay this concern for present through personal discussions New Delhi and Rangoon was a major reason his visit these capitals.

---

<sup>1</sup> U Nu.

Latournelle believes on basis of above Communists will eventually accept for present firm positions of Laotian and Cambodian governments regarding withdrawal Viet Minh invaders and absence of "regrouping zones" for alleged Laotian and Cambodian resistance forces.

JOHNSON

---

751G.00/7-854 : Telegram

*The Department of State to the Embassy in France*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1954—7:08 p. m.

84. Our willingness make public statement we will respect agreement Indochina predicated assumption Associated States and in particular Viet Nam would agree terms settlement.

We believe Mendes-France should be under no illusion that observance seven points (Deptel 4853<sup>2</sup>) would of itself suffice without agreement Associated States and request you make sure he understands this.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Tyler of EUR/WE. Repeated to Geneva as Tosec 525, to Saigon as telegram 84, and to London as telegram 149.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 28. p. 1256.

---

611.51/7-854 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, July 8, 1954—7:24 p. m.

85. For Dillon, Aldrich and Johnson. I think it is probably true that if we had put together all of the bits of information given at various times and at various political and military levels at Paris, Geneva, Washington, Saigon and Hanoi, the result would have been a reasonably clear picture of French military intentions as now revealed. I have never harbored any thought of any willful concealment. Also I have always conceded that the French were clearly within their rights in making their own plans. I have repeatedly said at press conferences that we recognize that the French had the primary position in Indochina and that our role was that of a friendly observer who wanted to help if and when our help was wanted.

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to London as telegram 151 and to Geneva as telegram Tosec 526.

I do feel that there is a certain lack of any intimacy which is perhaps due to the fact that we have not in the past worked closely with the personalities of the present Government who have been plunged into an immense and engrossing task. In this respect they have our sympathy and I hope that you will try to remove any impression of carping criticism on our part.

We are quite prepared to agree that France has been overextended in relation to Indochina and we are not quarrelling with present French policy designed to limit its commitments more nearly within the bounds of its strength.

Our present intentions to leave representation at Geneva at the present level of Ambassador Johnson is primarily because we do not want to be the cause of any avoidable embarrassment by what might be a spectacular disassociation of the United States from France. Whatever France may be determined to do, we accept as within its prerogatives. We only regret that we cannot agree to associate ourselves in advance with an end result which we cannot foresee. Equally, we do not want to be in a position of seeming to obstruct an end result which from the French national standpoint seems imperative to its parliament and people.

Since starting to dictate this, I have received through Bonnet a message from Mendes-France strongly urging that either Bedell Smith or I should come back. This apparently based on my today's press conference statement that neither of us had any present plans for returning.

I told Bonnet the substance of the preceding paragraphs to the effect that while we would be only too happy to contribute to a united front, we could not do so without knowing on what position that front was based. If there were a position which France was able to define and state that she would not accept anything else, then we would be able to judge whether or not that afforded the foundation for a united front. At the moment, it seems to me that there is less danger of doing irreparable injury to Franco-American relations if we avoid getting into a position at Geneva which might require a disassociation under spectacular conditions which would be deeply resented by the French as an effort on our part to block at the last minute a peace which they ardently desire.

We have not yet taken any irrevocable decision and even if no one from here comes over for the 12th, we would be standing by here under circumstances such that if developments at Geneva seem to indicate that our presence there would serve a really constructive purpose one or the other of us could get to Geneva overnight.



Unless you perceive objection, I would like you to explain orally my position to Mendes-France, making clear that we are motivated by our estimate that in the end our presence at Geneva, even though initially it seemed an asset, might subsequently prove a liability to Franco-American relations.

DULLES

*Code Room:—Please note*

*For London only*

Please show Eden portion of this cable which follows first two paragraphs. Portion begins "We are quite prepared, etc."<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> A letter of July 9 from British Ambassador Makins to the Secretary of State read: "I have now had a further telegram from Anthony Eden saying that he is glad that your decision that neither you nor Bedell Smith should go to Geneva for the present is not final." Makins' letter indicated that Eden felt it was important that in the difficult "concluding stages of the negotiations we should go out of our way to show an united front to the Communists, and he very much hopes that it will be possible for either you or Bedell Smith to go to Geneva soon." (Presidential correspondence, lot 66 D 204)

JULY 9, 1954

396.1 GE/7-954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 9, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 577. Department pass Defense; repeated information Paris 26, Saigon 18. In commenting on working paper prepared by French delegation on control of cessation of hostilities in Vietnam (Secto 575<sup>1</sup>), Department will wish to bear in mind general development of French thinking on this subject during past few weeks. Joint Commissions of belligerents are no longer envisaged as they were in original French proposals of June 2 and 4 as merely working instruments of International Commission. Importance of contemplated role of Joint Commissions has greatly increased. Concept of subordination has been totally abandoned although French continue to maintain obligatory nature of certain types of decisions and recommendations of International Commission. Any thought that International Commission would have physical means of acting as an enforcing agency has been abandoned. Soviet view on need for unanimous decisions on important questions has been accepted by French.

It should also be noted that until terms of agreement for cessation of hostilities are known, it is difficult to comment on significance of cer-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 8, p. 1305.

tain points in French working paper. For example, what will be demarcation line or lines? Are demilitarized sectors envisaged other than those separating two sides?

Following comments are on numbered articles of French working paper:

Articles 1-3: Division of responsibility considered appropriate (two sides have responsibility for implementation of agreement; International Commission for control; and Joint Commission for facilitating joint implementation).

Articles 4 and 5: No comment.

Article 6: Except for word "assure" in first sentence, paragraph assigns to Joint Commission proper role of "help" to two sides, "liaison" between them, and "endeavor to resolve" difficulties. This in keeping with character of Joint Commission as we visualize it, since it would be body of representatives with function of coordinating implementation by two sides. However, word "assure" (French *assurer*) may have connotation of control, and thus tend to blur division of responsibility between Joint and International Commissions.

Article 6(B): We believe special provision should be made for either evacuating or disarming irregular forces of one side located in re-grouping area to be assigned other side.

Article 7: No comment.

Article 8: Re second paragraph: Appears undesirable that points at which fixed teams are stationed could be modified "at the request of one of the sides" even with agreement between International Commission and command of side concerned. Since locations of fixed teams are initially to be decided by agreement between both sides, both sides should agree to changes. Also not clear which side would be "side concerned" (French: *la partie interessee*). It could be side on whose territory point is located, or other side, since latter would be "concerned" if a team were moved from important check point to insignificant point.

Re fourth paragraph: Since mobile teams can move in areas outside of action zones defined in third paragraph only in agreement with command of side concerned, mobile teams could be blocked from inspecting, for example, airfields and local arms manufacturing plants that might be situated outside action zones.

Wording of paragraph has effect of excluding from sphere within which mobile teams can inspect on their own initiative these two significant activities which, if uncontrolled, could permit Viet Minh to increase their military capability. We believe, therefore, definition of action zones should be reconsidered. Also we believe two sides should be specifically charged with furnishing to international teams transport, observation and communication facilities as well as logistic support without precluding introduction such facilities by members International Commission.

Article 9: Omitted from subjects to be controlled are local arms and ammunition manufacturing plants which, if not subjected to control,

could increase Viet Minh military capability. Re sub-paragraph (D), not clear whether airports outside action zones mentioned in Article 8 would be subject to control. We note no control envisaged on recruitment or development further native forces.

Article 10: This article places no geographical limitations on movement of inspection teams of International Commission on its own initiative. However, paragraph 3, Article 8, requires mobile teams to have agreement of command of side concerned to move outside action zones. Presumably Article 8 would govern since purpose of making distinction between action zones and other areas would be defeated if, under Article 10, inspection teams could move freely merely on initiative of International Commission. This apparent conflict, if not corrected, could produce different interpretations in International Commission, and seriously hamper effective control.

Article 11: No comment.

Article 12: The authority of inspection teams to "settle an incident" is nowhere spelled out. The obligation of the sides to carry out recommendations of the International Commission is not as clearly stated as would be desirable.

Article 13: No comment.

Article 14: Re second paragraph: Not clear whether recommendations of International Commission on amendments and additions to agreement would be binding on the sides. If this is intention, consider this provision undesirable. Two sides should not be obliged to accept amendments. Amendments should be made upon agreement of both sides in same manner as for basic agreement itself. If intention is that recommendations should not be binding, paragraph should so specify.

Article 15: Consider all questions, particularly serious ones specified in sub-paragraphs (A) and (B), should be decided by majority vote. Veto protects transgressor and impedes corrective action.

Article 16: The merits of this paragraph cannot be judged until the conference has made further progress in matter of role, obligations and commitments of guarantors.

Articles 17-19: No comment.

We are informally discussing foregoing comments with Offroy, French delegate, and will report further.

JOHNSON

---

751G.00/7-954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of Defense*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 9, 1954—2 p. m.

Defense Message Gento 76. Sent OSD Washington DC, repeated information USARMA Saigon, State Department. For Sullivan from Dwan. Discussion with members Vietnam delegation 7 July reported in Secto 571,<sup>1</sup> produced remarks which throw some light on general

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 8, p. 1298.

outlook of leaders of new government on military problem now confronting Vietnam. Awareness of this outlook should be useful in future US contacts with Vietnamese officials on military subjects.

Outlook of Vietnamese representatives here appears colored above all by their extreme bitterness toward French and by intense desire for "real independence" of Vietnam. These factors, both with high emotional content, appear to obscure their grasp of some of facts of military situation, and are likely to influence their judgment about what will be best military policy for Vietnam.

For example, Dac Khe, with apparent concurrence of his colleagues, flatly disagreed with French assertion that recent withdrawal French Union forces from southern part of delta was dictated by military necessity, and said French motives were political, looking toward extrication French Expeditionary Corps from delta and purchase of cease-fire at any price. Irrespective of whether or not withdrawal was dictated by military necessity as French claim, it is significant to note that Dac Khe and Ngo Dinh Luyen said their point borne out by fact Vietnamese Government pleaded with French to leave Vietnamese forces for defense southern delta under Vietnamese command even if French Expeditionary Corps were withdrawn; or alternatively to leave arms with people to permit them to defend area. French refused. From this Vietnamese concluded sacrifice of southern provinces not necessary, implying that since will of Vietnamese forces and people to fight on existed it was simply matter of leaving arms with them. Apparently not considered were factors such as capability of Vietnamese alone to resist attack, necessity for combat and logistic support provided by French, necessity for integrated defense plan for all delta, and effect on whole defense position of weakness of one part.

Nguyen Huu Chau said with feeling that if French did not have resolve to carry on war they should not stand in way of Vietnamese doing so on their own with autonomous army under Vietnamese command. Although this reflects admirable spirit, it comes at somewhat belated stage when talk of going separate ways clearly unrealistic in light of present crisis faced by French Union forces even when operating in concert.

If above is fair sample of thinking of new government leaders, it reflects a rather primitive concept of military facts of life which, if not modified, is likely to make continued Vietnamese collaboration with French in carrying out common military efforts even more strained.

Above comments submitted for such use as they may be in contacts between US and Vietnamese officials on military subjects.

396.1 GE/7-954 : Telegram

*Twenty-second Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, July 9, 3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, July 9, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 580. Repeated information Paris 30, London 12, Saigon 21, Tokyo 5, Moscow 6, Vientiane, Phnom Penh unnumbered. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Twenty-second Indochina restricted session Friday, July 9, Lamb (UK) presiding.

US delegate spoke first. Text in Secto 579.<sup>2</sup>

Li Ko-nung (PRC) spoke next referring to comments of French, Cambodian and Laos delegates 6 July on subject nonintroduction of troops and arms into Laos and Cambodia after cessation hostilities. Referring to question that above delegates raised concerning requirements for self-defense, Li said he would like to make three points in response :

1. Problem of what was necessary for self-defense should be considered separately, and quantity of military personnel, arms and ammunition introduced should be limited to requirements of self-defense. In this connection Li was pleased to note that Laos and Cambodian delegates on 6 July reaffirmed their assurances that arms to be introduced would be limited to requirements of self-defense.

2. Question of limitation on introduction military personnel and arms should be discussed together with question of prohibition of foreign bases. On this point Li noted 8 June statement of Cambodian delegate that it would not allow foreign bases to be established in Cambodia and concluded that neither Laos or Cambodia have views contrary to his on this question.

3. Referring to question of need for foreign experts and technicians in Laos and Cambodia, Li said relation of these countries to French Union required that this subject be studied and that it should be discussed along with question of withdrawal of foreign forces.

Referring to meetings between military representatives pursuant to conference agreement on 19 June, Li said question of military arms and equipment necessary for self-defense of Laos and Cambodia should be discussed by representatives of two commands who, after reaching certain measure of agreement, could submit recommendations to conference. He expressed hope military representatives would proceed on basis three above principles.

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/22) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279. The minutes indicate that the session convened at 3 p. m. and adjourned at 6:15 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 368-375. The observations made by Pham Van Dong on the question of supervision, Indochina Document IC/41, July 10, are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279A. This message was transmitted to the Department of State in two sections.

<sup>2</sup> *Infra*.

Dong (Viet Minh) then took floor to speak on general question of control, noting that statements of Soviet, PRC, and French delegates at last session showed area of agreement on which conference could agree.

Dong said views of delegates quite close on following subjects:

1. All recognized need for two categories of control (joint and neutral commissions).
2. All agreed that relation between these organs should not be on basis subordination but rather coordination.
3. All more or less agreed that since neutral commission would have no forces its decisions could not be imposed on the parties, and if one party protested, problem should be referred to guarantor powers.
4. All agreed decisions of neutral commission should be taken by unanimous vote on important questions such as renewal of hostilities and amendment of agreement, and that certain others could be taken by majority vote.
5. All agree that organization of control should cover all of Indochina, although special situations in Laos and Cambodia would be taken into account.

On question of organization of control, Dong made following comments:

1. Regarding the objects of control, following military questions should be included: simultaneous and complete cease-fire; demarcation line between regroupment zones; separation of belligerent forces and transfer of belligerent troops to regroupment areas; withdrawal of foreign forces; prohibition of introduction of arms and military personnel; prohibition of foreign military bases, and exchange of POWs and civilian internees. All these, he said, are measures which should be implemented at same time as cease-fire.

2. Regarding the function of control body, Dong pointed out that implementation of agreement depended on action of two sides, that to be effective, control of implementation should be grounded on knowledge of prevailing conditions, and that supervision should be in the hands of those who are competent, that is, representatives of two sides in joint commission. Subjects enumerated in previous paragraph fall within competence joint commission, except for prohibition of introduction arms and military personnel and prohibition of foreign military bases. These latter two are within competence of neutral body. Distribution of tasks between two commissions can be determined by differing nature of roles. Joint commission implements, negotiates disputes, recommends to sides. In cases of disagreement, question is referred to neutral commission for advice and examination. Neutral commission supervises implementation of agreement, particularly concerning prohibition on introduction troops and establishment foreign bases; it makes inquiries, and recommends to sides. If one side contests ruling, issue goes to guarantor states. In short, joint commission supervises implementation of agreement and negotiates differences; neutral commission supervises and conciliates, while supreme arbiters are guarantor powers.

All above remarks concerning organization of control, Dong said, are valid for all of Indochina. Joint commissions should be set up in each of three states with one general neutral commission which would have sub-commissions in each state. Special conditions, particularly in Cambodia, should be taken into account, notably regarding withdrawal of foreign troops and nonintroduction arms and military personnel from outside. Nevertheless basic principle of control for all three states of Indochina is not altered.

In concluding, Dong said considerable progress made by conference on question of supervision, and that "objects of control" being dealt with by military experts. He hoped military talks would soon reach satisfactory result and that committees could report in reasonable time.

Chauvel (France), speaking from notes, noted statements of Laotian and Cambodian delegates at last meeting in which they expressed concern over need for maintaining means of defense. He said French Government fully aware of this need, and recognized that if French troops have been in these two countries it was because national elements were not able to meet task. Real problem, he said, was necessity to give these states capability of exercising their sovereignty. In this connection he noted that ideas of US delegate expressed in Ambassador Johnson's opening statement coincided with concession French Government on this point.

Turning to statement of PRC delegate, Chauvel said he was not sure he agreed with PRC view that question of introduction arms and military personnel into Laos and Cambodia should be discussed by military experts since he felt this was not issue merely to be worked out by Laos and Cambodia with Viet Minh but was matter of interest all delegates in conference.

Chauvel then referred to Dong's statement, and warned conference against temptation, now that Ministers are about to meet, of reaching general agreements on various subjects when detailed issues are yet unresolved. It would be confusing, he said, to say we agreed in areas where in fact there is no agreement. He went on to note that Dong incorrectly said all delegations agreed that there should be single armistice agreement for all Indochina. French delegation, he asserted, never said that. Rather it said just the contrary and he believed conference shared its view. On 19 June, he said, conference appeared to favor not one single commission but three to deal with problems in three states. Similarly a single text of an agreement cannot apply to all three countries. French delegation, he said, favors three agreements, one for each country.

Sam Sary (Cambodia) spoke next and said statement of PRC delegate concerning nonintroduction arms into Laos and Cambodia not far

from his own lines of thinking, particularly remark on defensive goals such arms should have. He went on to make following points:

1. Re foreign bases in Cambodia, statement of Cambodian delegate on 8 June that it did not intend to authorize foreign bases intended to apply only if Cambodia not threatened. However, if Cambodian security were imperiled, Cambodia intends, he said, to keep its legitimate right to defend itself by all means.

2. Re foreign instructors and technicians, he referred to present situation in which there are French instructors whom Cambodia continues to wish to avail itself of. However, he said, negotiation on this subject should properly be carried out in framework of conference, not with invader (meaning Viet Minh) who would be interested in limiting means of defense of its victim.

3. Re limitation on introduction arms and military personnel, principle of limitation, he said, applies only to quantity and should not be detrimental to sufficient defense of independence of country. Cambodia must be able to choose origin and quality of equipment and military personnel needed to maintain its sovereign independence.

In concluding, Sam Sary said his delegation fully shared reservations expressed today by French delegate on question control in Laos and Cambodia.

Although no delegates indicated intention to speak further, and in spite of general feeling that meeting should adjourn, Kuznetsov suggested session take short break and resume to discuss question of next meeting in light of early arrival Foreign Ministers.

After break Kuznetsov expressed support of Soviet delegation for Chinese proposals re introduction of arms after cease-fire. Said as is known, in point order of conference decisions June 29, work of conference should begin with question of withdrawal of foreign forces and military personnel. It is obvious this agreement meant provide cessation hostilities and thus provide that no foreign troops or foreign arms be admitted into the two countries. Taking into consideration peculiarities of situation in Laos and Cambodia, Chinese proposals provided for certain arms be admitted from outside but amount should be discussed separately. It will be difficult decide this question but Chinese suggestion deserves special mention. Majority delegates appear agree amount of arms should be limited to amount necessary for self-defense. It also necessary provide that introduction arms not create situation menacing neighboring countries. Many participants this conference expressed this idea and not without foundation, for there are not a few examples where territory of sovereign states used to create great stores of armaments menacing neighbors. Countries allowing this in fact lose their sovereignty. We consider that anybody undertaking this discussion should proceed on principle that introduction of armament be limited to self-defense.



During past three weeks delegates have tried hard reach *rapprochement* on question of control and supervision over cessation of hostilities. In particular, France has made no small effort in this respect. We have made step forward and have basis from which can move further. Important we not place artificial obstacles in way. We are now at stage where can pass from speech making to definition of certain formulas.

Lamb then stated co-chairman and he felt they could not very well fix date of next meeting since several delegations will be represented by Ministers.

Usual communiqué issued leaving date for next meeting open.

JOHNSON

---

396.1 GE/7-954 : Telegram

*Twenty-second Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, July 9, 3 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, July 9, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 579. Repeated information Saigon 20, Paris 29, London 11, Tokyo 4, Moscow 5, Phnom Penh and Vientiane unnumbered. Department pass Defense. Tokyo for CINCFE. Following is text my statement at 22nd restricted Indochina session Friday, July 9:

“Mr. Chairman, in continuation of our discussion at the last meeting, I desire briefly to comment on the statements made at that meeting by the Dels of Cambodia and Laos on the important subject of the defense of their countries.

As the US and other Dels have stated on several occasions, the problem of restoring peace in Laos and Cambodia is solely one of ending a foreign invasion. It seems to the US delegate unthinkable that these sovereign states should be forced to divest themselves of their right of self-defense as the price of obtaining the withdrawal of foreign aggressive forces. I cannot seriously believe that anyone could regard Cambodia and Laos as potential threats to the peace and security of their neighbors. All possible doubt on this score has long since been removed by the declarations made before this conference.

The proposal made by Mr. Chou En-lai on June 16 appears to have paid at least some lip service to the right of Laos and Cambodia to import arms for their self-defense. However, as the Del of Cambodia pointed out at our last session, that proposal does not seem to have recognized the right of Laos and Cambodia to seek foreign technical assistance and to employ foreign military advisers whenever necessary to the proper development of their defense forces. As General Smith said on June 19, ‘The small Cambodian and Laotian forces have a few French officers and noncommissioned officers. If they are deprived of these, their capacity for self-defense is materially reduced. The USDel considers that in the same way as any other sovereign state, the states

of Laos and Cambodia should be free to request and to obtain technical assistance and advice.'

The position of the Chinese Communist Del on the military facilities established in Laos under agreements between the governments of Laos and France also requires clarification. The purely defensive nature of these facilities has been made clear by the Dels of Laos and France. Moreover, since both Laos and France are members of the French Union these facilities are clearly not 'foreign' bases in the sense that that term has been used by several Dels.

The Chinese Communist Del has proposed that separate negotiations be held on the question of the amount and type of arms that may be introduced into Laos and Cambodia for self-defense after the cessation of hostilities. At our last session, a number of questions were raised concerning this proposal. The Del of Cambodia, supported by the Del of Laos, also set forth certain principles which should be recognized if the proposed separate negotiations are in fact undertaken. These principles are entirely reasonable and indeed essential from the point of view of the future security of these small countries, which are even now being forced to defend themselves against attacks originating outside their borders. As the head of the Cambodian Del made clear on an earlier occasion, the representatives of these two countries would be gravely derelict in their duty to their peoples were they to deliver them with hands and feet tied, defenseless to foreign aggressors. Indeed, after all the statements we have heard on the necessity for respecting national rights and sovereignty, I find it strange that we find ourselves in the position of discussing limitations on the most fundamental aspects of the sovereignty of these two countries.

I hope that the responses to the questions raised at our last meeting will lead to a concrete recognition of the sovereign rights and the defensive requirements of Laos and Cambodia."

JOHNSON

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 323

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal)*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 9, 1954.

Participants: Major Mathieu, Member Franco-Laotian Delegation  
for Military Talks with Vietminh  
Philip W. Bonsal

Subject: Cessation of Hostilities in Laos

I saw Major Mathieu briefly during the interval at today's restricted session. He expressed general optimism regarding the outlook for the military talks with the Vietminh on the situation in Laos. From the military point of view, the problem would probably be solved by having the so-called Laotian resistants, once the Vietminh invaders have withdrawn, integrated into the Royal Laotian army. In Major

Mathieu's opinion, this can be done without great danger since there are only some 1500 men involved.

From the political point of view, the problem is more complicated. The Laotian Government's position is that it is willing to grant complete amnesty to those who have borne arms against the government and to permit these people the full exercise of their political rights as Laotian citizens at the next elections. According to Major Mathieu, however, something more is required to meet the need of the Vietminh for some sort of face-saving device which will permit them to climb down from their former exaggerated position with regard to the Pathet Lao.

Major Mathieu stated that what is now being considered is the possibility of constituting a committee some of whose members would be Ministers of the Laotian Government and others representatives of the Pathet Lao. The mission of this committee would be to study the political situation and to make recommendations for over-all political pacification of the country. In view of the well-known Laotian temperament, Major Mathieu believes that such a committee would promote harmony in a framework of security for the present government.

I said that I was glad that there was no question of a coalition government or of giving the Pathet Lao elements any authority in any area of Laos. I referred briefly to the well-known talent of Communists for infiltration and subversion. I said that off hand it seemed to me that if the committee which Major Mathieu discussed is to be constituted, it would be better if the representatives on the Laotian side could be well below the rank of Ministers. There would thus be avoided any appearance that the Laotian Government was treating the Pathet Lao movement as an equal. I said that perhaps the Laotian governmental side might be made up of some members of the Laotian National Assembly and that it should be understood that the function of the committee would be merely to make some recommendations which would be submitted to the Laotian Government for its consideration but which would have no binding character whatever. Major Mathieu said he thought well of this idea.

---

751G.00/7-954 : Telegram

*Johnson-Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, July 9, Afternoon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 9, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 578. Repeated information Paris 28, Saigon 19. Limit distribution. Paris eyes only Ambassador. Saigon eyes only Ambassador.

I called on Chauvel following restricted meeting today. He has just returned from Paris. His impression is that Mendes-France position unchanged and that he does not intend make further concessions to secure agreement with Communists. Mendes-France anticipates active week of discussions followed possibly by last minute agreement on evening July 19. Mendes-France arrives here tomorrow afternoon. He will see Molotov tomorrow evening.

Chauvel dined last night with Communist Chinese. Li Ko-nung and Chang Wen-tien, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to USSR who has just returned here, were present. Atmosphere was "very cordial". Chauvel informed Chinese that military discussions with Viet Minh not going well and that latter had made both for Vietnam and for Laos unacceptable proposals wholly out of harmony with what Chauvel had understood Chou En-lai's position to be. Chinese expressed surprise but did not go into details of situation. He told Chauvel that Chou En-lai would probably return here early next week saying it takes three to four days to fly here from Peking depending on weather. Vice Minister stated Chou En-lai had had "very good meeting" with Ho Chi Minh and results "would be helpful to French". Vice Minister has spent last two weeks in Moscow and Chauvel believes Communist Chinese and Soviet positions regarding problem have been coordinated, with Chinese views on Asian problems being given major weight.

There was an "underground" meeting between French Colonel Brebisson and Viet Minh military representative yesterday. At this meeting Viet Minh made two proposals (1) A demarcation line about 40 kilometers north of Tuyhoa line and (2) "neutralization" of delta in order to permit total evacuation of French Expeditionary Corps in three months period. French representative stated both these proposals wholly unacceptable and not even worthy of discussion. He refused to set date for next meeting.

Chauvel saw Molotov this morning. Molotov expressed interest in being informed of progress of conference. Chauvel gave him general review touching particularly on question of demarcation line, attitude of extreme intransigence being adopted by Viet Minh in military talks and problem of international controls. Molotov expressed interest but claimed unfamiliarity with details. Chauvel suggested desirability of contact between French military representatives and members of Soviet delegation in order that Soviet delegation might be fully informed of difficulties being encountered and of attitudes adopted by Viet Minh. Later in day Soviet delegation got in touch with French delegation and these contacts will be set up. Molotov stated that he had seen

Chauvel's working paper (Secto 575<sup>1</sup>) and that while there were points requiring clarification and further study he thought it was a useful contribution.

Chauvel has impression both Russians and Chinese give Viet Minh fairly free hand to see how far they can go but that when they find Viet Minh demands have gone beyond limit which French can be expected to accept, they intervene. Chauvel made point to Molotov that any agreement reached must be acceptable not only to Franco-Vietnamese side and to Viet Minh but also to other conference members. He is hopeful that, as he says occurred previously, Chinese-Russian moderating influence will now be brought to bear on Viet Minh. Chauvel expressed confidence that if he were negotiating only with Russians and Chinese, he could almost certainly achieve a settlement in line with provisions of US-UK *aide-mémoire*.

Chauvel told me that he is having his staff prepare drafts of an armistice agreement and related documents so as to be ready in case ministers reach agreements on major matters. He stated that information we had furnished regarding Korean armistice was most useful to them and was much appreciated.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 8, p. 1305.

JULY 10, 1954

751G.00/7-1054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 10, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 581. In keeping with Tosec 526,<sup>1</sup> I assume that Department desires I maintain a generally passive attitude in conference meeting and in relations with other delegations, acting in role of "friendly observer who wants to help if and when our help is wanted".

US-UK note to France (Tosec 490<sup>2</sup>) should provide sufficient guidance on US policy for most questions which will arise.

Real negotiating will take place at ministerial level outside of conference, and I will endeavor do maximum keep Department promptly informed thereon.

It is not clear to what extent there may be conference meetings, but as it is likely that developments will be rapid during course of next week, probable that urgent questions will arise as to attitudes we will take as long as we participate when matters presented to conference.

---

<sup>1</sup> Telegram Tosec 526 to Geneva was sent as telegram 85 to Paris, July 8, p. 1309.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram Tosec 490 to Geneva was sent as telegram 4853 to Paris, June 28, p. 1256.

While any conference action which involves a commitment by the US would clearly require a reservation of US position pending instructions, uniformly to adopt such an attitude with respect other questions will be regarded by French and others as an obstructive and delaying tactic. I have in mind possibility of procedural and substantive issues on which Ministers here have reached agreement and where action might not be entirely to our liking but would not involve commitments by US. As example, something along lines French proposal on controls (Secto 575) <sup>3</sup> might be presented for conference agreement as basis for drafting detailed agreement by committee experts. In such a situation I would not in conference oppose position taken by France but would merely state, where appropriate, US has some doubts on adequacy or clarity of document but will not obstruct action agreed upon by other participants in conference.

When consistent with the positions set forth in US-UK note to French (Tosec 490), I would propose briefly support in conference substantive positions taken by French or others on our side when it would appear appropriate and useful.

I would appreciate the Department's comments and instructions.

In event some one or all of Associated States take position of open opposition to France in conference session, possibly even to extent of walking out, I would appreciate Department's thinking regarding US attitude.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 8, p. 1305.

---

396.1 GE/7-754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation* <sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1954—5:42 p. m.

Tosec 529. Reference Secto 569.<sup>2</sup> Amb Johnson should reiterate to Chauvel and Amb Dillon or Ambassador Johnson to Mendes our views on international control which are closely tied to attitude we shall adopt re any Geneva agreement.

In this connection it should be stressed our attitude will depend not only on adherence to seven points of US-UK note, but also on acceptance or non-acceptance of any agreement by Associated States (ref Deptel 84 to Paris <sup>3</sup>). For this reason it is indispensable that French face up to problem of advising Vietnamese of Geneva develop-

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA and Gullion of S/P. Repeated to Paris as telegram 124, to Saigon as telegram 121, and to London as telegram 190.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 7, p. 1296.

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 8, p. 1309.

ments and prospects in order avoid dangerous reactions mentioned Deptel 39<sup>4</sup> to Paris.

Saigon's 85<sup>5</sup> indicates Ngo Dinh Diem is still uninformed re French intentions and has not accepted implications military situation. We are struck by his statement that "ceasefire must not lead to partition which could only lead to preparation for more deadly war", and his appeal that southern provinces of delta be restored.

Ambassador Dillon should again stress to Mendes (or in his absence to de Beaumont) acuteness this problem as it appears to us, and advise him that unless French themselves take initiative in preparing Diem for a Geneva agreement in line with US-UK seven points, we fear strongly adverse Vietnamese reactions may compromise possibility of establishing any line in Vietnam.

FYI For our part, we believe we must place our own relations with Diem on basis both more realistic and confidential if we are to play useful role in Vietnam at this time or in future. We would wish, of course, not to embarrass French thereby and would hope that their own consultations with Diem might have provided background against which review of our relations with Vietnam and statement of our policy in present circumstances would be appropriate. We believe such a step would contribute and in fact be indispensable to purposes set forth in French *Aide-Mémoire* of June 26 (Deptel 4852 to Paris<sup>6</sup>). We propose Diem be given information based on our reply to *Aide-Mémoire* (Deptel 4853 to Paris<sup>7</sup>), although neither *Aide-Mémoire* nor our reply should be mentioned to him. End FYI.

French should be informed by Embassy Paris and British by Embassy London that we are conveying this information in general terms to Diem, primarily in effort relieve pressures which appear dangerous to us and prejudicial to establishment of any free world strength in Vietnam.

Ambassador Heath should see Diem soonest and convey to him oral message from Secretary in following sense: <sup>8</sup>

"As you assume your high office I want you to know that thoughts of American people, President Eisenhower and myself are with you and with your country in its difficult ordeal.

"Your wisdom, strength and record of devotion to cause of genuine independence are well known to us and we are confident that they will be put to service of Vietnam.

<sup>4</sup> Dated July 2, p. 1275.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

<sup>6</sup> Dated June 28, p. 1257.

<sup>7</sup> Dated June 28, p. 1256.

<sup>8</sup> Ambassador Heath conveyed the Secretary's message to Diem on July 12. For Heath's report, see telegram 150, July 12, from Saigon, p. 1339.

"We know that struggle in Indochina is one for liberty against despotism and that you represent the spirit of resistance to a menace which threatens entire free world.

"US has, as you know, taken up arms against this Communist imperialism as one of the United Nations in Korea. We have also contributed of our resources and those skills we possess in other threatened areas, not least in Vietnam. US remains prepared support countries everywhere seeking maintain their freedom against godless Communist menace.

"During past year as new plans of French Union High Command developed, we sought to assure ourselves that those plans offered prospect of military success and would accompany and foster early completion of independence, and development of national armies, in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

"Unfortunately this program was not fulfilled and military situation in Vietnam deteriorated.

"Meanwhile US had acquiesced in suggestion of its associates in free world that fullest trial should be made at Geneva of resources of negotiation. Communists during this period in no wise abated their aggression in Vietnam. Other negotiations with Viet Minh and Chinese Communists, to which US is not a party, have also taken place.

"If as a result of such negotiations or of military operations there should now result any cease-fire line tending to divide Vietnam, we would be unwilling to consider it as final. We would lend our best efforts to assist patriotic Vietnamese in building up strength in that part of Vietnam remaining outside Communist occupation. At the same time, it must be recognized that the necessary conditions for intervention by our own forces in North Vietnam have not been realized and are unlikely to be in the future.

"As you know, President Eisenhower and I have recently concluded a series of conferences with British Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden. At these conferences we made clear our strong opposition to any settlement which might be made on terms leading to permanent division of your country. We and British agreed, and so informed French, that although temporary division of country might be required to effect regrouping of opposing military forces, we could not exclude prospect of ultimate peaceful reunification. In any such regrouping, we informed French, we felt strongly provision must be made for humane movements of populations.

"We believed French might be encouraged to resist possible agreements of more undesirable character if they were advised what kind of provisional agreement we and British might be prepared to respect, even though we were not prepared accept it as desirable or final. Accordingly we and British informed French we would 'respect' an agreement which :

"1. Preserves at least the southern half of Vietnam :

"2. Does not impose on free Vietnam any restrictions materially impairing its capacity to maintain a stable non-Communist regime, and especially does not impose restrictions impairing its right to maintain adequate forces for internal security, to import arms and to employ foreign advisers :



- “3. Does not contain political provisions which would risk loss of the retained area to Communist control;
- “4. Does not exclude the possibility of the ultimate reunification of Vietnam by peaceful means;
- “5. Provides for peaceful and humane transfer, under international supervision, of those people desiring to be moved from one zone to another of Vietnam; and
- “6. Provides effective machinery for international supervision of the agreement.

“While we recognize that settlement along these lines imposes hardships on Vietnam, we fear that deteriorating military situation and separate negotiations in progress with Viet Minh and Chinese Communists could lead to something still worse. It is our hope that views we have expressed to French may bear fruit in form of stronger resolve on their part.

“Finally permit me say how much I sympathize with sufferings of Vietnam and its people. I am glad that one who had dedicated his life and prayers to its service is now at hand to give comfort and guidance.”

DULLES

396.1 GE/7-1054: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 10, 1954—6 p. m.

Secto 583. Repeated information Paris 31, Saigon 22. Pass Defense. Bonsal and Dwan talked to Offroy (French delegate) today and presented comments on French delegation working paper on control of cessation of hostilities in Vietnam along lines Secto 577.<sup>1</sup> Offroy said he had written basic paper but that it had been somewhat modified in course of staffing. He took notes on comments and seemed particularly persuaded by several points, although overall effect remains to be seen. He has also had comments from UK and Soviet delegates.

Offroy acknowledged that word “assure” in first sentence Article 6 has connotation of enforcement, although he did not say whether he would suggest amendment. Re Article 6(B) Offroy fully agreed special provision should be made for either evacuating or disarming irregular forces as a practical matter. He also appeared to be persuaded by suggestion that locations of fixed teams covered in Article 8 should be subject to relocation only if both sides agreed. Re fourth paragraph of Article 8, he said intention of wording here not to restrict right of mobile teams to proceed to necessary points of inspection, including airports, but merely to require as practical matter that their movement to such points be coordinated with command of side in which they operated. He said French Union side would want to

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 9, p. 1311.

regulate movement of mobile teams in its own area outside of action zones in reciprocal fashion. Re Article 9, he seemed to agree that some provision might be made for control of local arms and ammunition manufacturing plants.

Concerning two fundamental questions of binding authority of [garbled group] international commission (Article 12) and voting procedure (Article 15), Offroy said his original draft specifically stated that decisions of international commission would be binding on the sides but that this was modified so draft now makes decisions of international commission binding only implicitly. Here he cited wording Article 12. Reason for modification, he said, was that since this was particularly critical issue, Soviets might find it more difficult to accept if point were emphasized by being flatly stated. We pointed out that if Soviets were not prepared to accept this point it would be well to find it out before cease-fire, and emphasized strongly we felt this point should be positively stated. Concerning majority vote on minor subjects and unanimous vote on major ones, Offroy said French delegation believes Soviets will never accept principle of majority vote on all issues. Furthermore, French believe that veto provision will safeguard their interests as well in the event international commission is so composed that Asian state, perhaps India, unsympathetic with French role in Indochina, is placed in role on commission of swinging balance. Furthermore as practical matter international commission itself cannot take any effective action to stop a serious violation of agreement if one side willfully intends to break it, and that various questions must in any case be dealt with by states willing to guarantee conditions after cessation of hostilities; regarding Article 14 Offroy said not intention of French draft that recommendations of international commission concerning amendments to agreement should be binding on sides, and seemed to agree that clarification of wording would be desirable. Re Article 16, Bonsal explained we reserved comment on this Article since question of guarantees still not sufficiently developed by conference.

In response to question about what French envisage would be "demilitarized section" referred to in Article 6(C), Offroy said French initially had in mind Catholic bishoprics of Bui Chiu and Phat Diem in southern part of delta (from which forces of two sides would withdraw leaving police functions to Catholic militia) and zones separating troops of both sides along demarcation line and around one or more enclaves. Since withdrawals in delta, Offroy believes it is now less likely Viet Minh will accept demilitarization of bishoprics, but French will try get agreement on this.

396.1 GE/7-1054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 10, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 584. Repeated information Paris 33. Department limit distribution. Paris eyes only Ambassador. Chauvel today called in Bonsal to ask latest developments regarding United States representation at Conference next week. Bonsal replied that he was familiar with message regarding Secretary's position transmitted yesterday by Joyce to Mendes (Tosec 526) <sup>1</sup> and with press accounts to effect that further representations had been made by Bonnet. Bonsal stated he had no information as to Secretary's reaction to these further representations.

Chauvel then stated with great earnestness that he believed it would be "most dangerous" if United States delegation not headed by either Secretary or General Smith. He recalled that his whole effort over past three weeks in dealing with Viet Minh, Soviets and Communist Chinese had been predicated on possibility of attaining at least military settlement which would have international sanction. He said that chance of reasonable settlement along lines United States-United Kingdom *aide-mémoire* <sup>2</sup> depends entirely on judgment of Communists as to United States attitude. If Communists believe United States dissociating itself from negotiation, they will push their demands much further. Chauvel recalled that Molotov raised question of United States representation with Chauvel at their conversation yesterday and stated, when Chauvel indicated he had no information on subject, "we will have to go ahead anyhow". Chauvel concluded with earnest reiteration of importance that either Secretary or Smith be here. He attaches greatest value even to "silent presence" of Secretary or Smith in order to achieve settlement short of loss entire area in fairly near future.

Chauvel reported that de Jean had found Bao Dai quite amenable to military settlement along lines Dong Hoi demarcation line. Bao Dai most interested in possibility of French and United States military and economic assistance to reduced Vietnam which would result from military settlement.

Chauvel reported that Brebisson today briefed two Soviet officers regarding military negotiations with Viet Minh. This was in accordance with suggestion Chauvel had made to Molotov (Secto 578 <sup>3</sup>). Brebisson had impression Soviet officers wholly unfamiliar with situation. Chauvel hopeful that result will be helpful in sense of Soviet-Chinese Communist influence to restrain exaggerated Viet Minh demands.

JOHNSON

<sup>1</sup> Telegram Tosec 526 to Geneva was sent as telegram 85 to Paris, July 8, p. 1309.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see telegram 4853 to Paris. June 28, p. 1256.

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 9, p. 1321.

611.51/7-1054 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      NIACT      WASHINGTON, July 10, 1954—10:25 p. m.

127. For Ambassador from Secretary. Limit distribution. Following is personal message from Secretary Dulles to Mendes-France which is to be delivered by Ambassador Dillon to Mendes-France in person as promptly as possible as instructed by separate cable.<sup>2</sup>

*Begin text:* My dear Mr. President: President Eisenhower (who has been kept closely informed) and I have been greatly moved by your earnest request that I or General Bedell Smith should return next week to Geneva for what may be the conclusion of the Indochina phase of the Conference. I can assure you that our attitude in this respect is dictated by a desire to find the course which will best preserve the traditional friendship and cooperation of our countries and which will promote the goals of justice and human welfare and dignity to which our two nations have been traditionally dedicated. We also attach great value to preserving the united front of France, Great Britain and the United States which has during this postwar period so importantly served all three of us in our dealings with the Communists.

What now concerns us is that we are very doubtful as to whether there is a united front in relation to Indochina, and we do not believe that the mere fact that the high representatives of the three nations physically reappear together at Geneva will serve as a substitute for a clear agreement on a joint position which includes agreement as to what will happen if that position is not accepted by the Communists. We fear that unless there is the reality of such a united front, the events at Geneva will expose differences under conditions which will only serve to accentuate them with consequent strain upon the relations between our two countries greater than if the US does not reappear at Geneva in the person of General Smith or myself.

Beginning early last April the US worked intensively with the French Government and with that of Great Britain in an effort to create a common position of strength. This did not prove possible. The reasons were understandable, and derived from fundamental causes which still subsist and influence the possibility of achieving at the present time a genuine "united front".

During the talks of Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden with President Eisenhower and me, an effort was made to find a common position which might be acceptable to the two of us and, we hoped, to the French Government. This was expressed in the seven-point memorandum of which you are aware. I believe that this represented a constructive contribution. However, I do not yet feel that there is a united position in the sense that the three of us would be prepared to stand firmly on this as a minimum acceptable solution

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to London as telegram 195 and to Geneva as telegram 21.

For a discussion between the Secretary of State and the President concerning this message to Mendès-France, see volume XIII.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 128 to Paris, July 10, *infra*.

and to see the negotiations break off and the warfare resume if this position was not accepted by the Communist side. We doubt very much that the Communists will in fact accept this seven-point position unless they realize that the alternative is some common action upon which we have all agreed. So far, there is no such alternative.

Under these circumstances, we greatly fear that the seven points which constitute a minimum as far as the US is concerned will constitute merely an optimum solution so far as your Government and perhaps the UK are concerned, and that an armistice might be concluded on terms substantially less favorable than those we could respect.

We gather that there is already considerable French thinking in terms of the acceptability of departures from certain of the seven points. For example:

Allowing Communist forces to remain in Northern Laos; accepting a Vietnam line of military demarcation considerably south of Dong-hoi; neutralizing and demilitarizing Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam so as to impair their capacity to maintain stable, non-Communist regimes; accepting elections so early and so ill-prepared and ill-supervised as to risk the loss of the entire area to Communism; accepting international supervision by a body which cannot be effective because it includes a Communist state which has veto power.

These are but illustrations of a whittling-away process, each stroke of which may in itself seem unessential, but which cumulatively could produce a result quite different from that envisaged by the seven points. Also, of course, there is the danger that the same unacceptable result might come about through the Communist habit of using words in a double sense and destroying the significance of good principles with multiplying implementations.

We do not for a moment question the right of the French Government to exercise its own judgment in all of these respects. Indeed, we recognize that the issues for France are so vital that the French Government has a duty to exercise its own judgment. I have from the beginning recognized the preponderant interest of your Government as representing the nation which has borne for so many years the burden of a cruel and costly war. However, my Government equally has the duty not to endorse a solution which would seem to us to impair seriously certain principles which the US believes must, as far as it is concerned, be kept unimpaired, if our own struggle against Communism is to be successfully pursued. At the same time, we do not wish to put ourselves in the position where we would seem to be passing moral judgment upon French action or disassociating ourselves from the settlement at a moment and under circumstances which might be unnecessarily dramatic.

It is also to be considered that if our conduct creates a certain uncertainty in the minds of the Communists, this might strengthen your hand more than our presence at Geneva in a form which would expose probably to the world, and certainly to the Communists themselves, differences which the Communists would exploit to the discomfiture of all three of us.

Under all these circumstances, it seems to us that the interests of both of our countries are best served by continuing for the time being

the present type of US representation at Geneva. This consists of able and responsible persons who are in close contact with the President and me.

If circumstances should alter so that it appeared that our common interests would be better served if higher ranking officials became our representatives, then we would be alert to act accordingly.

It is because I am fully aware of the serious and solemn nature of the moment that I have gone into the matter at this considerable length. It is possible that by the first of the week, the Communist position will be sufficiently disclosed so that some of the answers to the foregoing queries can be foreseen. This might clarify in one sense or another the thinking of us all.

In this connection, let me emphasize that it is our ardent hope that circumstances might become such that consistently with the foregoing either General Bedell Smith or I can personally come to Geneva and stand beside you. *End text.*

DULLES

---

611.51/7-1054 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

NIACT

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1954—10:33 p. m.

128. For Ambassador from Secretary. Limit distribution. In separate telegram I am sending you a message from me to Mendes-France,<sup>2</sup> which you should deliver to him in person in Geneva at the earliest possible moment. I think that in this connection you should not limit yourself merely to delivering the message, but that you should discuss the subject matter with him so as to be sure he gets the real flavor and import of what we are trying to explain. In this connection, please express the profound personal sympathy which the President and I have for the position of Mendes-France and our admiration for the courageous way in which he is tackling almost insurmountable problems. Also, emphasize that if we seem to differ from him as to whether Ambassador Johnson or General Smith or I am at Geneva, this is a difference of tactic which ought not to be exaggerated.

After having seen and delivered the message to Mendes-France as above, please then give a copy to Eden.

Because of your distinctive relationship to Mendes-France as Ambassador to France, we leave it to your discretion as to whether or not Johnson accompanies you. However, when you see Eden, you should have Johnson with you.

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to Geneva as telegram 22 and to London as telegram 196.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 127 to Paris, July 10, *supra*.

In this connection, please give Eden the following:

*Begin text:* Dear Anthony: Beedle and I greatly appreciate your messages. We are at the moment unable to decide in favor of either of us coming to Geneva for reasons which are set out in the lengthy exposition to Mendes-France, which I am making, and of which you will be getting at once a copy. I hope that even if you do not agree wholeheartedly with our reasoning, you will understand our point of view. It is a tough decision for us, either way. With warm regards, Foster. *End text.*

DULLES

JULY 11, 1954

Eisenhower Library, Hagerty papers

*Hagerty Diary, Sunday, July 11, 1954*

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

I dropped down to see the President at ten o'clock after church to see if there was anything further he wanted me to do. He had nothing in particular that he wanted me to do with reference to the change of plans, but we did have an opportunity to talk about the international situation and the upcoming Geneva Conference. He told me that he had been giving considerable thought to our discussion of several days ago and had reached the point in thinking it over where he thought it was necessary to have Foster Dulles fly to Paris to confer with Mendes-France and Eden on the entire situation. He told me at that time that Dulles would announce on Monday that he was leaving for Paris Monday evening<sup>1</sup> and that if Dulles did reach an agreement, we could support with the French and British, Dulles would also have Bedell Smith go back to Geneva. "All in all it is going to be a tough situation, but I think you are dead right in urging us to have a high level American representative at Geneva. Otherwise, the stories from

---

<sup>1</sup> The log of the President's daily appointments for Monday, July 12, indicates that he held an off-the-record meeting with Secretary Dulles at 9:40 a. m. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower records, Daily Appointments) Thereafter, Dulles called MacArthur from the White House instructing him to make arrangements through the United States Delegation at Geneva for the Secretary to meet with Premier Mendès-France in Paris on the evening of July 13. Mendès-France was not to be led to believe that Dulles would be going on to Geneva. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file) MacArthur immediately called Ambassador Johnson at Geneva. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Korea-Geneva 1954") At 12:55 p. m. Dulles received a call from Johnson indicating that Mendès-France would be pleased to meet with Dulles in Paris the following evening. The Secretary so informed the President. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Telephone Conversations)

For President Eisenhower's recollection of these events, see *Mandate for Change*, pp. 369-370. For the statement issued by Secretary Dulles prior to his departure for Paris on the evening of July 12, see the editorial note, p. 1342.

Geneva will be entirely colored by Red propoganda and also by propoganda of our allies, particularly the French, who will then blame us for everything that goes wrong.”

---

396.1 GE/7-1154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 11, 1954—noon.

Secto 586. Repeated information Paris 6, Saigon 23. In course of conversation yesterday, Bonsal asked Chauvel how he envisaged negotiation of political settlement following achievement of cessation of hostilities. Chauvel replied that French delegation would insist on maintaining separation between military and political problems. In the declaration which conference may issue at time of agreement on cessation of hostilities, Chauvel envisages only general references to political principles (territorial integrity, unity, democratic processes, et cetera). Question of negotiating political settlement would be entrusted by conference to parties with request that they report back to conference at a later date. He did not make clear who parties would be or what role French would expect to play in negotiation between Democratic Republic of Vietnam on one hand and on other State of Vietnam, an independent member of French Union. We will explore this matter further and would appreciate any views Department may wish to express.

JOHNSON

---

396.1 GE/7-1154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 11, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 589. Repeated information Paris 39, Saigon 24, London 16. Reference first paragraph Tosec 529, repeated information Paris 124, Saigon 121, London 190.<sup>1</sup> I today reiterated to Chauvel great importance we attach to effective international control and its full equality, along with other six points in United States-United Kingdom note. I stated that I was concerned at considerable gap developing between French and United States thinking on this subject. I said that I had fully reported development French thinking this regard and reasons underlying it, but had no indication it had, or would, cause any changes in views United States Government on essential principles.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 10, p. 1324.



Chauvel said he fully understood United States views, but that French were increasingly of opinion that too rigid and too effective controls would operate to their disadvantage by limiting their freedom of action. I said I could understand this point, but that question would be which side would make most use of freedom of action.

Chauvel said that at Mendes-France dinner with Molotov last night, discussion centered entirely around "lines", Molotov pointing out strength of Viet Minh in three provinces south of Faifo and French bringing up importance to them of road communications into Laos which apparently led Molotov to suggest possibility of what Chauvel termed "tiger stripe" arrangement, which was rejected by French.

Mendes-France suggested to Molotov that there not be any conference meetings for next two or three days pending results of private talks to be held during that period. Molotov said he was agreeable, but would consult with others.

Mendes-France is seeing Dong this afternoon and is lunching with Eden tomorrow.

JOHNSON

---

751G.00/7-1154 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

PARIS, July 11, 1954—9 p. m.

133. Repeated information Geneva 20, Saigon 12, London 34. Limit distribution. For Secretary from Ambassador Dillon. During conversation with Mendes at Geneva, I informed him of contents of Deptel 84<sup>1</sup> and of our feeling that Vietnam Government should be kept more fully informed by French. I told him that we felt time had now come for Vietnam to be informed of general lines of seven point program. Mendes said he would consider informing Vietnamese after discussing matter with his advisors during afternoon. He said he had originally felt it preferable not to inform them until he could assure them that US was prepared to guarantee them against further aggression or subversion.

He then spoke at length of necessity for a clear-cut US guarantee that would protect Associated States in the event that the Communists did not honor the spirit of any agreement that might be reached at Geneva. Without such a guarantee he said that a settlement would not be worth the paper it was written on. Mendes asked me to inquire as to whether if a settlement within seven point framework was obtained, Secretary would then be willing to come to Geneva to close conference and to work out necessary guarantees to protect Associated States.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 8, p. 1309.

He then discussed in some detail the situation which would arise if no settlement was reached at Geneva. He said the sending of conscripts to Indochina would then be debated on July 22 and 23. If the National Assembly approved, the first division would leave on July 25 and the second division about 10 days later. It would take a month to reach Indochina and three more weeks to get troops ready for action. Therefore the first division of conscripts would not be ready in Indochina until about September 15.

This schedule for reinforcements would be known to Viet Minh and the result would undoubtedly be a massive Viet Minh assault during August prior to arrival of new troops.

Mendes said he doubted if French alone could successfully resist such an assault. He said that French Government would officially inform US of these facts at end of July if no cease-fire reached.

I reminded him of US requirements for action on our part, and he said he could not foretell how French Parliament might react. They might react strongly and request US help to continue the war or they might have what he termed a "nervous breakdown" and push for capitulation at any price to save expeditionary corps.

If no cease-fire, Mendes will resign, but in view of the above, I feel it is possible that if no cease-fire is reached the French Government which will succeed Mendes may appeal for US armed help, and may meet all US terms. Not possible to estimate timing of such an appeal but it could occur during August when US Congress no longer in session.

DILLON

---

751G.00/7-1154 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

PARIS, July 11, 1954—9 p. m.

134. Repeated information Geneva 21, London 35. Limit distribution. For Secretary from Ambassador. I delivered Secretary's message Department telegram 127<sup>1</sup> to Mendes in Geneva after lunch Sunday. At same time, I gave him personal message contained in first paragraph Department telegram 128.<sup>2</sup> In view Eden's absence (Secto 585<sup>3</sup>), I did not see him. Johnson will deliver message to Eden tomorrow, if Aldrich has not already done so.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 10, p. 1330.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 10, p. 1332.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram Secto 585, July 11, contained a report from Geneva that Eden was not due to arrive until the following day. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 260)

Mendes was very touched by personal message in Department telegram 128 and twice asked me to be sure and thank Secretary on his behalf for this thought.

Regarding Department telegram 127, Mendes expressed extreme disappointment and gave concern at United States decision not to be represented at Ministerial level. He divided his remarks into two categories, first, the effect of our decision on Conference itself, and second, the overall effect of our decision on world affairs.

Regarding first category, Mendes stated that our absence made French bargaining position far weaker. He stated that if Secretary was present, France would not accept anything at Conference that was unacceptable to United States. As he put it in his own words, presence of Secretary would give United States in effect a veto power on decisions of Conference. He felt it particularly important that we have someone at Geneva who could take strong personal position with Molotov, if and when necessary, and without having to refer to Washington for instructions. Mendes also feels that United States absence at Ministerial level will lead Communists to increase their pressure and be more demanding in order to deepen the obvious rift between the Western powers. He said France had not as yet departed from the Seven Point United States-United Kingdom position and he did not make any commitment to hold to these points during coming week, except for statement regarding United States veto power if Secretary present.

On the overall effect of our decision, Mendes pointed out that this will be first time since the war that United States not represented at equal level with other powers in an important conference. He said he felt certain that Europe would interpret United States absence as first step in return to a policy of isolationism. This he felt, would have catastrophic effects not only in Far East, but also in Europe and would be great cold war victory for Communism. According to Mendes, we would in effect be saying "do your best, you have our sympathy, but result is no real concern to us".

I tried hard to dissuade Mendes from this viewpoint, but without much success. His statement regarding United States veto power if Secretary present, led me to point out that there must also be an agreed alternative if Conference failed. Mendes promptly replied that only alternative to cease-fire at Geneva would be internationalization of war with United States military forces coming promptly to assistance of French. This aspect of our talk being covered more fully in separate telegram, being repeated to Saigon.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 133, *supra*.

Finally, Mendes asked if there was anything he could do specifically to create a situation that would make it possible for Secretary to come to Geneva. He asked me to pass this question on to Washington. In this connection, he specifically questioned sixth paragraph of Secretary's letter, and said he knew of no French thinking along such lines, except possibly on subject of international supervision. He wondered where United States had got the ideas expressed in this paragraph.

While I was talking with Mendes, Johnson talked with Chauvel and showed him a copy of Secretary's letter. Chauvel showed Johnson a cable from Bonnet which indicated that Bonnet may have given Secretary the impression that French were considering retreating from Seven Point program.

Chauvel and Johnson joined us at end of our talk, and Johnson and I suggested that if Mendes developed any concrete ideas which would help meet United States fears, it would be helpful if he put them into a reply to Secretary's letter. While Mendes was non-committal as to a formal reply, I rather expect he will make one. In closing, Mendes said he would keep in close touch with Johnson. During talk, Mendes made it clear that while presence of Under Secretary at Geneva would be most helpful, he very much hoped that Secretary himself could come.

DILLON

JULY 12, 1954

611.51H/7-1254 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1954—1: 18 p. m.

Tosec 532. Cambodian Ambassador called on Secretary July 10 stating he would depart twelfth to return Geneva. Before leaving he wished assure U.S. his government would continue maintain firm position against Communist efforts demilitarize or neutralize Cambodia. Assurances U.S. support would be most useful his government. A written reply to his Foreign Minister's letter to Heath June 23 would strengthen Cambodian resolve.

Secretary replied time did not permit written response prior Ambassador's departure. However he hoped progress made in U.S.-U.K. bilateral talks now going on would permit formal reply during course Geneva Conference. We are continuing work toward collective security and hoped Cambodia would be party to such arrangement. We hoped Cambodia would preserve right inherent in Cambodian independence.

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Hoey of FE/PSA. Repeated to Saigon as telegram 138, to Paris as telegram 134, and to Phnom Penh as telegram 5.

make whatever arrangements it saw fit for outside military and economic aid. This is prerogative independent country.

Ambassador asked view U.S. as to possible Cambodian request for UN action should Geneva Conference fail. Secretary replied this hypothetical question but as matter principle U.S. would not oppose such move. However manner and timing such act should be carefully studied and we would be glad consult if circumstances led toward such development.

Ambassador asked about control organization. Secretary replied this is most difficult problem. Hard to see how membership Communist power on control organization could do anything but assist Communist cause. One thing Communists understand is military strength. That is why we are working toward collective security. Cambodia should be in position militarily oppose internal Communist efforts since such likely.

Ambassador thanked Secretary for helpful advice and concluded his government would continue stand firm against Communist effort subvert Cambodia. Secretary assured Ambassador firm U.S. support and suggested close liaison U.S. delegation Geneva.

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/7-1254 : Telegram

*The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State*

SECRET

SAIGON, July 12, 1954—5 p. m.

150. Repeated information Paris 62, Geneva 29, Hanoi unnumbered. I conveyed to Diem this morning oral message from Secretary transmitted in Department's 121, July 10, sent Geneva Tosec 529.<sup>1</sup> He was appreciative of message but obviously disappointed it did not provide for France keeping up fight and American intervention in case Viet Minh refused his minimum requirements of retention of Hanoi-Haiphong parallelogram plus return to Vietnamese administration of south delta provinces, particularly bishoprics of Phat Diem and Bui Chu. Nevertheless, he was heartened to note that America and Britain were opposed to any restrictions on Vietnam's maintaining adequate forces for internal security, to import arms and to employ foreign advisers. He was however somewhat worried about phrase "adequate for internal security." In normal circumstances Vietnam could get along with a relatively small army to maintain internal order. Under present circumstances of Communist infiltration and threat, Vietnam would need a much larger, stronger army than she now possesses.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 10, p. 1324.

He asked me urgently to have Secretary's message repeated by US Geneva delegation to Foreign Minister Do.<sup>2</sup> He said he could of course telegraph latter but he very much feared French had "broken" Vietnamese code. As regards scheme of trading "regroupment zones" for Viet Minh in south in return for Viet Minh agreement to allow Vietnamese Government to retain Hanoi and southern provinces in Tonkin delta, he said that on reconsideration only southern regroupment zones they could afford militarily, economically, and politically to leave to Viet Minh would be Plane des Jones and southwest corner of Vietnam around Ha Tien (cf. Embtel 115<sup>3</sup>). He had telegraphed his Foreign Minister in Geneva and urged him to be "persuasive" in convincing Mendes-France of necessity of retention of Hanoi and south Tonkin delta provinces.

In conclusion Diem said that his government was gravely handicapped by opposition of Binh Xuyen, Cao Daists, and Hoa Haos, but he believed he would be able to overcome or nullify this opposition. His government was in terribly difficult situation but he was convinced he would succeed.

HEATH

---

<sup>2</sup>The Department of State in telegram Tosec 533, July 12, instructed the U.S. Delegation to "convey orally to Foreign Minister Do gist Secretary's message to Prime Minister Diem." (396.1 GE/7-1254) The instruction was carried out on July 13; see telegram Secto 596, July 13, p. 1347.

<sup>3</sup>Telegram 115 from Saigon, July 9, not printed. (601.51G11/7-954)

---

396.1 GE/7-1254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 12, 1954.

Secto 591. Repeated information Paris 40, Saigon 25. Saigon pass Phnom Penh 1. Department pass Defense. Following points were made by member Cambodian military mission and delegate Son Sann in separate conversations with members USDel today:

1. Scheduled third meeting today of Cambodia-Viet Minh military cancelled by Viet Minh. Latter have not only declined to name alternative date, but in previous two meetings have refused to discuss seriously question of withdrawal Viet Minh troops. As result unproductive second meeting July 10, Cambodian delegation convinced Viet Minh avoiding agreement for moment and that some unspecified political contact may be necessary before progress can be made. In response to direct Cambodian demand for withdrawal invading forces. Viet Minh insist linking this question with demand that French cadres and

experts with Cambodian Army be removed. Cambodians have replied that sovereign state has right to ask for and select origin of necessary advisers. Viet Minh continually seeking inject political questions which General Tioulong refuses to discuss.

2. Son Sann, who is leaving Geneva for Phnom Penh on July fourteenth, confirmed status military talks, and stated Cambodia had made all possible concessions to Viet Minh; it is now latter's move.

3. Son Sann raised question letter from Tep Phan (Secto 513<sup>1</sup>) asking US commitment for future assistance. Acknowledging preliminary oral reply to [of] Ambassador Heath (Secto 531<sup>2</sup>), and expressing appreciation that this a delicate subject, he stated Cambodian delegation would like written response. Department's views this matter requested.

4. Son Sann states Nong Kimny rejoining delegation thirteenth or fourteenth.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 23, p. 1231.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 26, p. 1251.

---

396.1 GE/7-1254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 12, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 592. Repeated information Paris 41, Saigon 26. Although we have not yet had full briefing from French, we gather following items regarding Mendes-France activities today:

(1) Mendes-France saw Dong yesterday and will see him again this afternoon. Yesterday's talk devoted to what Folin, Mendes-France's Chef de Cabinet, described as "exchange of charm" plus firm insistence by Mendes-France on Dong Hoi line. Although Dong attitude on this negative, he did not close door.

(2) Mendes-France told me that Menon had called on him. He had discussed various possibilities regarding demarcation lines. Mendes-France had insisted on necessity of eighteenth parallel.

(3) Mendes-France saw Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Van Do this afternoon.

USDel is giving dinner for Vietnamese delegation this evening and will report their reaction. I plan to discuss situation with Do along lines Secretary's message to Diem contained Tosec 529.<sup>1</sup>

JOHNSON

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 10, p. 1324.

396.1 GE/7-1254: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 12, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 593. Repeated information Paris 42, Saigon 27. Saigon pass Vientiane 1. Department pass Defense. USDel member talked today with Kamphan Panya of Lao delegation. Kamphan says that French-Lao military talks with Viet Minh are at impasse over Viet Minh insistence Lao Government recognize and negotiate with Pathet Lao authorities, while Lao representatives refuse discuss this political question.

Kamphan feels that Viet Minh are in no hurry reach agreement at this point, but fears that some package deal between French and Communists may develop at last moment which may fall considerably short of firm Lao position taken to present. He asked what US position would be if Mendes-France presented Lao with arrangement of this sort, since Laos alone would not be in position resist. He was told US has and will continue to support Lao position at conference, but we consider unlikely French would take such step without consultation with Laos and US. Kamphan said Laos hopes to be covered and participate in eventual Southeast Asia security pact, and that traditional ties with Thailand lead country to seek friendships to West rather than East.

Returning to military aspects, Kamphan said French have suggested that Lao accept Viet Minh proposal Pathet Lao regroupment areas within Laos. Viet Minh have insisted that Vietnamese from Laos be permitted to remain in country, while expressing willingness to withdraw "volunteers" from outside.

Kamphan says Lao Government is divided on position to be taken in negotiations. Some support present position delegation that rebel ethnic Lao with Viet Minh may be reintegrated in national life; other members believe that "reconciliation" Pathet Lao and Royal Government is necessary. He indicated latter faction motivated by fear that stronger position will not be backed up by France and US.

JOHNSON

---

*Editorial Note*

In connection with Secretary of State Dulles' trip to Paris for meetings with Premier Mendès-France and Foreign Secretary Eden on July 13 and 14, the Department of State released the following press release (380) on July 12:

"I am leaving by plane for Paris, where I shall confer tomorrow afternoon and evening with the French Prime Minister, Mr. Mendès-



France, and with Mr. Eden, the British Foreign Secretary. This trip follows an exchange of views which took place at Geneva yesterday between the U.S. Ambassador to France, Mr. Dillon, and the French Prime Minister, and an invitation which I received this morning from the French Prime Minister. With President Eisenhower's warm approval I have gladly accepted this invitation.

"This trip will demonstrate anew the deep concern which the United States takes in developments in both Indochina and in Europe and our earnest desire to assure such coordinated action by France, Great Britain, and the United States as will best promote the attainment of those goals which we share together with free nations generally.

"As regards Indochina, while our long-term interests are identical, there is superimposed upon France and the Associated States a special set of primary interests due to the cruel and costly war now in its eighth year which the Communists have waged against France and Viet-Nam and latterly against Laos and Cambodia. The United States is not itself a belligerent in Indochina, and it is not clear that the interests which we hold in common with France and Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia will necessarily be best served by identical action in all respects. Therefore, my trip to Paris is without prejudice to the previously expressed position that neither I nor Under Secretary Smith have at the present time any plans for going to Geneva, where the United States is presently maintaining contact with developments through Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson and his associates.

"My trip does show, I hope, that I wish to leave no stone unturned in seeking to find the course which will best serve the traditional friendship and cooperation of France and the United States and which will promote the goals of human justice, welfare, and dignity to which our nations have always been dedicated.

"We also attach great value to preserving the united front of France, Great Britain, and the United States which during this postwar period has so importantly served all three of us in our dealings with the Communists."

---

396.1 GE/7-1354 : Telegram

*Johnson-Do Meeting, Geneva, July 12, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 13, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 594. Repeated information Paris 43, Saigon 28. USDel at dinner last night entertained Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Van Do and his brother Tran Van Chuong, Minister of State, who also carries title Ambassador-at-large. According to Chuong, latter title is provisional to permit his visit Washington pending formalities obtaining agreement his formal assignment Ambassador to US. His intended departure for US tomorrow postponed when he learned of Secretary's trip, and he hopes to see Secretary in Paris today.

Tran Van Do is progressing toward acceptance necessity of settlement considerably short hopes and desires his government. We had

factual discussion of problems involved in assigning zones, in which I emphasized such arrangement considered by us as temporary pending eventual reunification of country and also interest of US to continue economic and military support of Vietnam. He stressed, with strong and emotional support from Chuong, necessity retaining Hanoi-Haiphong enclave which is not only cradle of Vietnamese race but produces only Vietnamese willing actively to fight for independence.

Long discussion, principally by Chuong, took place on failure French to grant real independence to Vietnam.

Chuong claimed that even formal signature treaties independence and association insufficient without economic, cultural and other conventions. Unless this effected, neither French military effort nor US aid will give Vietnam Government needed popular support. In spite of repeated attempts to draw out both Do and Chuong on immediate problems of redressing political and military situation in Vietnam and program of new government for next few weeks, they insisted on returning to question of total independence. Customary indictment French record in Indochina, particularly since 1945, climaxed by Chuong statement that he would prefer living in days of undisguised colonialism to false independence of last few years.

In spite of tendency to indulge in overdrawn and strongly biased polemics, Chuong is engaging man with pleasant manner.

Do is seeing Pham Van Dong this morning; in my absence Bonsal will see Do this afternoon convey Secretary's message to Ngo Dinh Diem (Tosec 533<sup>1</sup>) and sound him out on results contact with Dong.

Chuong and Do say Bao Dai really ill with kidney complaint and will take cure at Vittel.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1340.

JULY 13, 1954

396.1 GE/7-1354 : Telegram

*Johnson-Menon Meeting, Geneva, July 13, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 13, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 595. Repeated information Paris 44, New Delhi 1. Krishna Menon asked to call on me this morning. He opened by asking how I felt the conference was going, to which I replied "badly". I said that I was personally discouraged at the lack of any progress. At various times senior Communist representative had indicated to French and others what appeared to be a certain amount of reasonableness and

any action. When the technicians got together there had not been the slightest shift in Communist positions and no progress whatever had been made during the period following departure of ministers.

He said he understood French were insisting on a line in vicinity of 18th Parallel and the Communists were talking about a line in vicinity of 14th Parallel. I said I heard that the Communists had even mentioned something along 13th Parallel.

In reply to his question, I said that I was entirely satisfied that there was no room for compromise in French position on 18th Parallel. It was not bargaining position on part of French and they had our full support. He said if "all other things were settled" it should be possible to arrive at some compromise formula, to which I replied that this was not the type of situation which was susceptible to further compromise. The French position made military sense and I was satisfied they were not going to get themselves into position of splitting Parallels. He said that although we probably did not realize it, India had in past brought strong pressure upon Communists and that if he could be of help in future, he was willing to try; there being a vague implication that India might support present French position. He said he supposed "neutralization" of some of area between 18th and 14th Parallels might theoretically be desirable, but did not feel it would be practicable. In any event if this were done India would probably have to do the major part of it and had no desire take on such a job. I agreed that "neutral" administration of any considerable area of the country was impracticable.

In reply to his query as to what I thought were other major questions, I said Laos, Cambodia and control organization. He said there would be no problem about getting "every Viet Minh soldier" out of Laos and Cambodia, but some method must be found of "saving the Communists face" on resistance movements. I said this seemed ridiculous as every one knew that indigenous resistance movements were very small and unimportant, and it seemed to me just as logical to insist on recognizing the Ukrainian national movement in the Soviet Union as so-called resistance movements in Laos and Cambodia. He said Laos already expressed willingness to hold elections and felt something like this might take care of it. I pointed out that both Laos and Cambodia have in past, and I presumed would in the future, hold elections. He avoided discussion of control organization.

He talked at some length on Viet Minh, who while undoubtedly Communist, were also nationalists and seriously desired maintain relationship with French. He said that they would not be puppets of Moscow or the Chinese and that in normal course of events they would

constitute a more or less "neutral" group such as India, although they would be oriented towards Communists while India is oriented toward west.

In course of some discussion of Chinese Communist attitudes, I took advantage of opportunity to outline my discussion with Chinese Communists with regard to Americans in China, lack of results thus far, and my discouragement with regard thereto in spite of gestures we had made. He said he thought Nehru may have said something about this to Chou En-lai, but did not follow up subject further.

He said he hoped see me when I returned from Paris<sup>1</sup> and left for an appointment with Molotov.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>1</sup> The U.S. Delegation reported to the Department of State in telegram 41 from Geneva, July 13, that Ambassador Johnson had "left Geneva for Paris 14:38 today on special plane with Mendes-France and Eden." (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 299)

---

396.1 GE/7-1354 : Telegram

*Bonsal-Boris Meeting, July 13, Afternoon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 13, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 598. Repeated information Paris 48. Limit distribution. Eyes only for Dillon and Johnson. Boris, who is Mendes-France special assistant, this afternoon referred to French draft of proposed declaration to be issued by conference as part of its final proceedings (unofficial translation contained Secto 597<sup>1</sup>). Boris stated this draft had been or was being made available today to all conference delegates for their comments and suggestions. French consider it working document at this stage. Boris expressed regret at delay in getting us copy.

Boris summarized briefly Mendes-France's recent conversation with Dong. He said that Dong had agreed that date of elections could not be fixed at this time but that it should be result of negotiations between State of Vietnam and Democratic Republic of Vietnam at later date. Boris described this as important achievement "since it is to our interest to delay elections as long as possible".

On matter of demarcation line, Boris stated that Dong today made a concession in sense of moving line up from 13th to 14th parallel. Concession which presumably will be described in detail by Mendes-France to Secretary is regarded as wholly insufficient and Dong has

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 13, p. 1355.

been so informed. Mendes-France has reiterated importance of 18th parallel (Dong Hoi).

Boris intimated that current French thinking is to effect there should be no enclaves on either side of demarcation line. A proposal to preserve Haiphong and coal mines was examined by French military experts and rejected.

Boris stated that Chou En-lai in his recent talk with Mendes-France indicated desire to be helpful but spoke in very general terms. On 2 occasions during conversation, Chou En-lai attacked US attitude and influence. According to Boris, Mendes-France cut him off short both times, stressing Franco-American solidarity.

BONSAL

---

396.1 GE/7-1354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 13, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 596. Repeated information Paris 46, Saigon 29. Tosec 533.<sup>1</sup> I conveyed substance Secretary's message to Diem to Tran Van Do. He expressed appreciation. I also informed French here that I had done so in general terms. Boris informs me Chauvel had long talk with Do today and French now feel Do up to date regarding negotiations between French and Viet Minh.

In reply to question on results his talks this morning with Pham Van Dong, Do stated little accomplished from viewpoint progress or determining exactly what Viet Minh envisage as terms of agreement. He described at some length atmosphere of talk which he said was on basis of equals and in serious vein. He believes Viet Minh worried over genuine nationalist character Ngo Dinh Diem Government and its potential popular appeal. He also thinks Viet Minh extremely worried by thought of US intervention and concerned that Diem backed by US.

Do agreed with thought that assets our side this juncture include Vietnamese political leadership, Vietnamese military potential and French Union Expeditionary Corps and that misunderstandings and bickerings must be avoided at this serious juncture if our side is to get best results out of these assets and to induce maximum possible free world support and confidence. He talked moderately and with understanding of probability of settlement which would be difficult but unavoidable. I had distinct impression that he is beginning to face situation with considerable realism and courage.

BONSAL

---

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 2, p. 1340.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 324

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Head of the United States  
Delegation (Johnson)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

PARIS, July 13, 1954—8:30 p. m.

Participants:

The Secretary	Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden
Ambassador Dillon	Sir Harold Caccia
Mr. MacArthur	Sir Gladwyn Jebb
Mr. Phleger	Sir Anthony Rumbold
Ambassador Johnson	
Prime Minister Mendes-France	
M. Latournelle	
M. Parodi	
M. de Folin	

Following dinner Mendes-France explained to Eden and the Secretary present state of negotiations with respect to regroupment areas in Vietnam. He had a map showing the various proposals and counter-proposals in detail and the areas occupied by the French and the Vietminh respectively. He said the original French proposal from which they had not deviated was for a line along a defensive ridge somewhat north of Donghoi in the vicinity of the 18th parallel (all parallels in accordance US system). He said this line was somewhat north of the Donghoi Thakhek line set forth in the seven points of the US-UK memorandum.<sup>2</sup> He said the original Vietminh proposal was for somewhat "S" shaped line in the vicinity of the 13th parallel. They had then moved to a line in the vicinity of the 14th parallel.

Yesterday after they had heard the Secretary was meeting with Mendes-France and Eden in Paris, Dong had made a proposal to Mendes roughly along the 16th parallel, the line being just to the south of the French air and naval base at Tourane. Mendes ascribed this relatively major shift in the Vietminh position as attributable to Vietminh knowledge of the Secretary's meeting with himself and Eden. Mendes stated that French had flatly rejected this proposal and could never agree to Vietminh control of the naval and air base at Tourane, the important center of Hue and the vital road to Laos. He said that with

<sup>1</sup> This meeting took place at the Hotel Matignon, Paris, at 8:30 p. m.

For background information on the circumstances of the Secretary's trip to Paris and his discussions with Mendès-France and Eden see the entry from James Hagerly's diary, July 11, p. 1333.

The meeting described here was preceded by a conversation between Secretary Dulles and Premier Mendès-France from 7:30 to 8:30 at the residence of Ambassador Dillon. For a text of this discussion, which dealt largely with European matters, see volume VI.

<sup>2</sup> Text of the memorandum was contained in telegram 4853 to Paris, June 28, p. 1256.

respect to the road to Laos Molotov had suggested that the French could have the right of access to Laos along the road, apparently something along the lines of the corridor to Berlin. Mendes said that the road was narrow, mountainous, with many culverts and bridges and that French must have full control of the area both sides of the road, as Communist performance on any corridor arrangement could not be anticipated and stray individuals could blow bridges and culverts making the road unuseable.

He indicated that the French would be prepared to drop their line some small distance south, possibly to the Donghoi Thakhek line or slightly south thereof.

The French map had an enclave drawn around the Haiphong area but there was no discussion of this.

With respect to Laos, Mendes-France stated that Communists now admitted to the existence of Vietminh forces which would be withdrawn, but had insisted upon some temporary regroupment areas for the indigenous resistance forces pending their integration into Laotian forces. He said the Communists recognized the unity of Laos under its present government. He stated that the indigenous resistance forces were unimportant, totalling about 25 hundred men and that the Laotians were confident they could handle this problem. However, on the military level the Vietminh had come forth with a regroupment proposal for a line running the entire length of Laos connecting up with their original ("S" shaped) 13th parallel line in Vietnam. He said that the French military experts had shown Vietminh proposal to the Soviet military experts and the latter had characterized it as absurd. Mendes appeared to feel there was no serious problem with respect to Laos, except that of the two French bases which he said consisted of small air strips, some stores of ammunition garrisons totalling about 2000 French Union forces. He said the bases were entirely without military interest to the French and from the French standpoint they had no desire to maintain them. However, Laotians placed high value on them and had asked they be retained and he thought the Laotians would be able to work out something on this with the Vietminh.

Mendes said that Communists had recognized and seemed willing to agree to French military instructors and technical assistance to the armed forces of Laos and Cambodia as opposed to French garrisons being stationed there. He said the Communists were entirely unwilling to see any US military personnel stationed there in any capacity whatever and were extremely sensitive on the subject of US bases in those countries. The Secretary disclaimed any intention or desire for the US to establish military bases of any kind in those countries and stressed the importance of being able to assist those countries to maintain ade-

quate defense forces and contribute to their economic development. In view of the traditional Communist charge that US bases were being established wherever we have had even an economic aid program, and the US legislative requirement that US personnel have some role in the administration of US economic aid, he expressed the fear that what the Communists were really attempting to do was to keep all US personnel, both civilian and military, out of these areas. He made it clear that the US would be willing to assist these countries but we were not willing or able to simply turn money over to them to spend as they saw fit.

Mendes-France and Eden both indicated that their understanding was that the Communists were opposing US military bases in the traditional sense of the term. The Secretary expressed the strong view that it was of vital importance not to agree to any terms which would inhibit the ability of Laos and Cambodia and retained Vietnam to obtain economic and military assistance from the free world.

There was no specific discussion of Cambodia. Mendes-France apparently did not take much interest in Cambodia. He said they had 99.5% full independence and they apparently wanted to stay in the French Union and that was all right with him.

In response to the Secretary's questions concerning the Communist position on political settlement, Mendes stated that Dong had first insisted on elections within six months after the cessation of hostilities and had also insisted that French troops must be evacuated before the holding of elections. Mendes-France stated that he had pointed out the inconsistency of this position and that Dong had now agreed that the question of the date for elections should be left for determination by the two governments in Vietnam. He said Dong was preparing a draft of some sort of general declaration in this regard. He said that the Communists were entirely willing to see Vietnam remain in the French Union and the Secretary pointed out that Communists would probably be very glad to see three Communist members in the French Union. Mendes replied that there was no danger of three, only of one, i.e. Vietnam and that he was well aware of this possibility and was considering handling it by some statement to the effect that the conditions for membership of a united Vietnam in the French Union would be determined by subsequent agreement.

There was a brief discussion about the International Control Commission for Indochina being discussed at Geneva. Mendes-France said he might eventually have to accept a Communist member on such a commission but he would not agree to the Communists having veto power.



Following presentation by Mendes, the Secretary went into a detailed, careful and reasoned exposition of his viewpoint on US representation at Geneva. He said that it was clear that the main Soviet Communist objective was Europe and that if they could disrupt allied unity with respect to Europe, preventing ratification of EDC and reconciliation between France and Germany, the major objective would be accomplished. For the USSR, the Far East was essentially a secondary objective, but they would exploit the situation in the Far East to the maximum so as to prevent allied unity, particularly so as to cause a split between the US and France. The US and France were united by deep ties of common interest and sentiment and he desired to do everything possible to maintain those ties and prevent disunity developing. His interest was in doing whatever was best to achieve this objective.

With respect to Geneva he was very concerned over the situation if there was high level representation there. There were two major possibilities.

1. The Communists would make proposals conditional upon US association and guarantee in such a form that they knew could not be accepted by the US. The Communists probably knew very well just how far the US was able to go. If, as would be necessary, the US refused to associate itself with and did not approve such guarantees, in the eyes of French public opinion US would be responsible for failure of France to achieve peace in Indochina. This would place an intolerable strain upon US-French relations.

2. On the other hand, the French might well come to the point that they would say they did not feel they could resist making a poor settlement with the Communists unless the US would join with them in the fight on brief notice if they turned down the Communist terms. The US several months ago had stated the conditions under which it would join in action to defend Indochina on the basis of united action. Since then, the military situation had deteriorated very substantially, and the conditions under which we were then willing to join in collective action were no longer the same. If the French, as a condition for not making a bad agreement at Geneva, should ask us to give them a commitment to join with them in Indochina in a matter of days, this we would not be able to do. Neither the Secretary nor the President could make such a commitment. Whereas three months ago he was confident that Congressional approval for military action in Indochina could have been obtained under the conditions set forth to the French, he was not confident that this now could be done. If there were high level representation at Geneva, this problem would be much more acute, and therefore after long and careful thought and full discussion with the President, the conclusion had been reached that the long-term interests of US-French relations would be best served by neither the Secretary nor the Under Secretary returning to Geneva.

Mendes-France replied that as the US was in any event represented at Geneva, the problems mentioned by the Secretary were not avoided. The US could still be faced with the same dilemmas. He felt very strongly that the Communists feared that the Secretary would come to Geneva and that his failure to come would be interpreted by the Communists as indicating a rift in allied relationships which could be exploited by them. The Secretary's presence would without question assure that the Communists would agree to much more reasonable terms than if he were absent. Eden strongly supported Mendes-France. Eden said that he felt it would be possible to obtain a settlement within the framework of the seven points but that it would be a very tough negotiation, the balance might well be on a knife-edge. The Secretary's or Under Secretary's presence could well be the factor which would tip the balance in favor of our side.

The Secretary then explained carefully against the background of US public opinion and political situation the difficulties of the US Government associating itself with any agreement which would appear to guarantee to the Communists the fruits of their aggression. He said that Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, were clearly not going to be happy with any settlement the French would be able to reach and were already asking for our help. Mendes replied that these countries were strongly divided and that while asking for our help they were also all talking with Dong in Geneva. The Secretary earnestly explained that we wanted to help any way we could, that the US did not want to see the war continue in Indochina. While if the war did continue it could well turn into a situation that would engulf all of our countries in war, from a military standpoint we felt that commitment of a major part of our own and our allies' military force to combat the "third team" of the Communists, would be a colossal military error. Whereas three months ago it appeared the situation might have been retrieved with the addition of some naval and air power together with a small commitment of ground forces, that time had now passed. We full well realize the realities of the situation which the French face. We will not reproach them for what they find it necessary to do. We recognize their primary responsibility. However, the US Government could not be in a position of seeming to approve the sale of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam into Communist captivity. The memories of Yalta in the United States were very fresh. The US Government cannot be associated with a settlement which would be portrayed in the US as a second Yalta. The very fact that the US had agreed even to the holding of the Geneva Conference had been unreasonably portrayed as a major diplomatic defeat for the US and the fact that the President and the Secretary even agreed to the Conference has been a political liability.

Mr. Eden expressed the view that the important thing was to get the best possible settlement, then make it clear that if the Communists broke it, everybody would be lined up against them. He hoped that not only the US, UK, and France would be able to take such a position together, but that it would be possible to obtain wide agreement thereon in South Asia. This would be a very important gain. The Secretary again expressed the view that if the Communists maneuver the situation so that it appears that the US is the only obstacle to a settlement, it would so strain relations between the allies that EDC would be killed and the Communists would accomplish their major objective in Europe. He did not want to expose himself to that risk. He said that he was prepared to say publicly and in writing that he was 100% behind the present French demands in Indochina, and wondered if this might help the French. Mendes-France again reiterated that the risks for the US are exactly the same whether high-level representation is present or not at Geneva and without the Secretary's presence the efficacy of US support of France is not the same.

Mendes-France then referred to the seven points, stating that he will do all he can to obtain a settlement within their framework, that if the Secretary were there he could help in this regard. If he is not there, he, Mendes-France, is satisfied the result would not be as good and his absence would weaken the French. The Secretary replied that the real question is what we do if Geneva fails. Perhaps the French negotiating position would be strengthened if it could portray to the Communists the US as the "wicked partner" in the background. Eden reacted very strongly to this, saying that he under no circumstances would be prepared to portray the US to the Communists as the "bogeyman", the UK, US, and France are allies and he simply would not place himself in such a position. The Secretary suggested that this aspect might be implicit rather than explicit, to which Eden replied that Communists take advantage of every possible opportunity to try to get the British to say that the US is what is preventing peace, that the US is the only country that does not want peace. He absolutely refuses to be trapped into any such statement because he knows it is not true.

Mendes-France then stated that if France desired to obtain peace at any price, it would be much easier to do if the US were not there. However, this was most emphatically not the French position. France will do its best to get a settlement within the framework of the seven points, but if the US is not there at a high level, this will be much more difficult. There are definite limits beyond which France will not go. If there is no agreement by July 20, the war will continue, with intensification. The Communists well know that France will send reinforcements. The

danger of the enlargement of the war will be great. However, reinforcements cannot arrive there until September. Therefore, he is convinced that if there is no settlement by July 20 the Vietminh will immediately launch a big offensive. It will be impossible to hold Hanoi. Haiphong can be held only if there is naval and air support. There might be a question of whether the US could help if that situation arises. He wants to do all possible to obtain such a settlement by obtaining a cease-fire and obtaining it on the best possible terms. The best terms can be assured if the Secretary is there.

Mendes-France said that if there were big differences between the US and France, he could understand the US not being there, but this was not the case. The Secretary replied that the French might have to give in to very onerous Communist terms and he would fully understand that it might well be necessary for France to make peace terms which the US could not approve. He would not want to place himself in the position of having publicly to denounce the terms. He would not want France to say that it will stand on the seven points only if the US will fight as an alternative. Mendes-France replied that he would not ask this "for the time being" and said that if France does not stick to the substance of the seven points whether the Secretary is in Geneva or Washington, he would probably have to disavow the settlement, and he understood this fact. He was not prepared to say that on some points of detail the present French position might not compromise but he had no thought of compromise of any of the points on which, in the Secretary's letter to him of July 11th,<sup>3</sup> the Secretary indicated he understood the French positions were shifting. He said with great earnestness that if a US Minister comes to Geneva and France signs something which the US feels it necessary to disavow, he would take the responsibility. He then solemnly said that in his official capacity "I ask you to come and help us." The Secretary stated that he fully appreciated the weight of the Prime Minister's request, he would defer his reply.

There was then some discussion of the type of statement the US could make with regard to any settlement at Geneva within the framework of the seven points, in which Mendes-France said that all France asked was that the US make a unilateral statement that it will take action if the Communists break any settlement that is reached. Mendes-France suggested something along the lines that the US would "view with grave concern any action from any country which will endanger the maintenance of peace in Indochina". The Secretary said that a unilateral declaration something along these lines would present no problem.

---

<sup>3</sup>Text of this message was in telegram 127 to Paris, July 10, p. 1330.

At the close (approximately 12:30 a. m.) the Secretary expressed his great appreciation for such a frank talk, which he felt was long overdue, and it was agreed that another meeting would be held July 14 at 11:30 a. m. at the Quai d'Orsay.

---

396.1 GE/7-1354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

NIACT

GENEVA, July 13, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 597. Sent Paris niact 47. Following is unofficial translation of draft declaration prepared by French delegation and circulated informally today and yesterday to other delegations for their comments and suggestions (Secto 598<sup>1</sup>). Declaration would be issued by conference as part of its final proceedings.

"The conference takes note of the agreements which end the hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and which organize the international control of the implementation of the provisions of these agreements.

"The conference is happy to see peace reestablished in Cambodia and Laos, which countries having recovered their territorial integrity henceforth will be able to assume, without hinderance, in full independence and sovereignty, their role in the peaceful community of nations.

"The conference notes the statements made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos concerning their intention to proceed to free general elections with a secret ballot and to adopt measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community. The conference also takes note of the statements of these governments by which they undertake to limit their armed forces strictly to the level required by the needs of the defense of their territory.

"The conference declares that the agreement concerning Vietnam has as its essential goal the settlement of military questions in order to put an end to hostilities but does not prejudge the solution of other problems related to the definitive restoration of peace in Vietnam.

"The conference declares that a settlement of these problems must be made on the basis of respect for the principles of independence of the unity and of the territorial integrity of Vietnam. This settlement will have to permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental liberties guaranteed by democratic institutions formed following free elections by secret ballot which will take place under international control, when, in the opinion of the competent representative authorities, the restoration of peace in the country has made sufficient progress and all the necessary conditions will be present in order to permit free expression of the national will. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities which are meant to assure the protection of persons and of possessions will have to be applied in the most strict

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 13, p. 1346.

manner and particularly to permit each person, in Vietnam, to decide freely the zone in which he wishes to live.

"In their relations with Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, each member of the Geneva conference undertakes to respect the independence, the unity, and the integrity of the states concerned and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

"The conference takes note of the statements by the Government of the French Republic on its resolve to conform to the decisions of the representative authorities in the three states concerning the presence of its troops in the territory of these states.

"The members of the conference agree to consult among themselves on any question which is submitted to them by the International Control Commissions in order to study the measures which might appear necessary to assure respect for the agreements on cessation of hostilities in Indochina."

BONSAL

---

396.1 GE/7-1354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 13, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 599. Repeated information priority Paris 49. French delegate today furnished me with draft of clause to be included in agreement on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam covering guarantees for individuals and communities against political reprisals, the right of choice for civilian populations and the protection of foreign property and persons. This draft has not yet been cleared by Foreign Office legal expert Gros but it has been shown to Viet Minh though text not supplied them. Viet Minh reaction was that some such clause might be included in agreement on cessation of hostilities but suggestion was made that there also be included a clause desired by the Viet Minh and providing for free exchange of goods between proposed regrouping zones. (According to French delegate, this clause would be of economic importance to Viet Minh.)

Unofficial translation follows:

"The two sides conscious of the need for sparing the populations concerned further trials, will each of them take the necessary measures so that, in the areas where the regroupings contemplated by this agreement will take place,

(A) There will be assured the protection and the safety of French and foreign nationals (ressortissants) residing in these areas as well as of Vietnamese who have collaborated with the other parties and in order that these different categories of citizens may be effectively guaranteed against any reprisals, any arbitrary political and administrative action and any discriminatory measures.

(B) That a right of choice be recognized, during a certain period, to all Vietnamese desiring to fix their domicile in another region of Vietnam and that their transfer there be freely assured.

(C) That all facilities be granted to Frenchmen and to foreigners desiring to break up their present establishment or temporarily to quit the region of Vietnam where they reside."

French delegate would welcome our comments on above working text.

BONSAI

396.1 GE/7-1354 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 13, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 600. Repeated information Paris 50. Attention Ambassador Johnson. Offroy and Cheysson, French delegate, this evening gave me French working paper re international control in Laos and Cambodia to supplement paper recently furnished us on Vietnam (Secto 575<sup>1</sup>) unofficial translation and comments will be furnished shortly.

Offroy also supplied us with outline of agreements for cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. These agreements are to be between military commands of Viet Minh on one hand in all three countries, and on other hand Franco-Vietnamese command, Cambodian command and Franco-Laotian command respectively. (There is apparently hope that this will make things easier for Vietnamese Government). The outline of the agreement for the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam may be translated as follows:

*"First; the cease-fire:*

Disengagement of Franco-Vietnamese and Viet Minh units and minor regroupings to follow the cease-fire.

This is to be signed as soon as completed, to be published at once, and to be placed in effect (under the control of the joint commission.)

*Second; supplementary provisions:*

*A. Military provisions.*

Definition of regrouping zones and of demilitarized sectors.

Regrouping of the armed forces of the two sides in accordance with a precise plan of transfers.

Nonreinforcing of the potential of the opposing forces liberation of prisoners and civilian internees.

Air and sea communications. (Circulation)

*B. Political and administrative provisions.*

Administration of the regrouping zones

Conditions (modalities) of the transfer of zones

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 8, p. 1305.

Guarantee for individuals and communities against political reprisal

Right of option for civilian populations

Movement of populations which wish to take refuge with the adverse side

Protection of property and persons

C. *Provisions re the control of the agreements.* (See working paper of July 7.)”

Working paper of July 7 is that contained in Secto 575.

It will be noted that this outline apparently provides for cease-fire prior to availability on spot of international control mechanism. With regard to administration of territories to be transferred, Cheysson tells me French have accepted Viet Minh proposal of May 25 to effect that “a territory depending from one party, which is transferred to the other party following the plan of delimitation of zones, shall continue to be administered by the first party until the day when all of its troops which are to be transferred shall have left the territory in order to free the zone for the other party.”

Outline for Cambodia and Laos is similar except that provisions are made for the evacuation of foreign troops rather than regrouping and for the movement of populations which desire to seek refuge in Vietnam. In the case of Laos, French Union forces are to withdraw to specified installations. In addition it is contemplated that the Laotian and Cambodian Governments will make declarations re the importation of war material needed for self-defense purposes and re French instructors and technicians.

It is my understanding that neither of these outlines have as yet been distributed to other delegations, although I am not certain on this point.

USDel will make comments as soon as possible following further discussion with French Del. Meanwhile would welcome urgent comments from recipients this message.

BONSAL

JULY 14, 1954

396.1 GE/7-1454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 14, 1954—11 a. m.

Secto 601. Repeated information Paris 52, priority Saigon 31. Re Secto 599, repeated information Paris 49, Saigon 30<sup>1</sup> concerning Viet Minh proposal that agreement on cessation of hostilities include clause

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 13, p. 1356.



providing for free exchange of goods between regrouping zones, delegation agrees with French judgment that this clause would be of economic importance to Viet Minh. Also, delegation believes clause would probably work to political advantage of Viet Minh through facilitating Communist infiltration and subversion in non-Communist zones.

Request comments Saigon and guidance Department concerning attitude delegation should adopt toward Viet Minh proposal.<sup>2</sup>

BONSAL

---

<sup>2</sup> The Department's reply was contained in telegram Tosec 550, July 16, p. 1393.

The Embassy at Saigon responded in telegram 194 to the Department (repeated to Geneva as telegram 38), July 15, that it concurred in the "delegation's estimate as expressed latter telegram [Secto 601]. However, in a country such as this where corruption and contraband are almost of a professional standard, we believe that too much importance should not be attached to wording of the agreement since ways in any event will be found by Viet Minh and interested persons on Vietnamese side to evade the engagement." (396.1 GE/7-1554) For additional comments on this question, see telegram 218 from Saigon, July 17, p. 1423.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 324

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Head of the United States  
Delegation (Johnson)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

PARIS, July 14, 1954.

Participants:

The Secretary	M. Mendes-France
Ambassador Dillon	M. Parodi
Mr. MacArthur	M. Guerin de Beaumont
Mr. Phleger	M. Latournelle
Mr. McCardle	M. de Margerie
Ambassador Johnson	M. Folin
Mr. Eden	
Sir Harold Caccia	
Sir Gladwyn Jebb	
Sir Anthony Rumbold	

The meeting was very informal, with at times discussions going on between the Secretary and Mendes-France, the Secretary and Eden, and all three.

The Secretary first discussed with Mendes-France a letter to be addressed by Mendes-France to the Secretary confirming the discussions and undertakings that had been reached. Mendes-France agreed

---

<sup>1</sup> This meeting took place at the Quai d'Orsay from 11:30 a. m. to 1:30 p. m.

with the conclusion of a draft presented by the Secretary but indicated that he desired more fully to include the French position.<sup>2</sup>

There was also a discussion of a joint French-US position paper of which the Secretary showed Mendes-France a draft.<sup>3</sup> The discussion of this paper centered principally around respective positions with regard to bringing the matter of Indochina to the UN if there was no agreement at Geneva, and French intentions and policies concerning the independence of the Associated States. During this discussion the Secretary pointed out the dilemma with which France faced any US efforts to be of assistance. On the one hand, the French claimed that Indochina was an internal affair which could not be brought before the UN, and on the other hand, wanted assistance from the outside. The US could not be in the position of assisting a French colonial war in Indochina. Mendes-France replied that the Indochina affair was at the beginning a colonial war, but outside influences were more and more coming into the situation and it was no longer an entirely internal affair. However, with respect to bringing the matter to the UN, France had to consider the situation if trouble broke out in another French territory and the precedent that would be established if the matter of Indochina were brought to the UN.

With respect to the American draft of the position paper, to the effect that France reaffirms its intention to reaffirm genuine independence to the Associated States and would not forcibly prevent any of the States from withdrawing from the French Union, Mendes stated that France had many times expressed its intention with respect to the independence of the Associated States, and in addition there was no problem with respect to Laos and Cambodia with which treaties were completed and in effect.

With respect to forcibly preventing their withdrawal, he pointed out the constitution of the French Union did not make any positive provision for secession therefrom, and it was therefore beyond his constitutional power to make any such statement.

Mr. Eden stated that he thought the question of Vietnamese independence was very fundamental in the present situation and the Vietnamese had said to him that unless the question of their independence was resolved, there would be no hope of holding any part of retained Vietnam. The Secretary also expressed the view that there was no chance of holding Vietnam unless they were granted real independence. Mendes-France said the question is what is to be done if there is a cease-fire. Neither the separate authorities in the north nor in the south would have the right to speak in the name of all the country.

<sup>2</sup> The U.S. draft has not been located; for the text of the letter from Mendès-France to Dulles, July 14, see p. 1365.

<sup>3</sup> The U.S. draft has not been located; for the final approved text of the U.S.-France position paper, July 14, see p. 1363.

Only a future unified government would be able to do that. However, he fully recognized the importance of developing a strong nationalist government in the south of Vietnam even if in the beginning this gives rise to difficulties for France.

Mendes said he fully realized the urgency of doing something in this regard both in the civilian and military fields and that France must take political and psychological measures which will give the Vietnamese in the retained portion of Vietnam prestige and popularity and they would also need outside aid. It was extremely important that Vietnamese in this area be able to present themselves as representing a truly national movement.

It was decided that a working group would redraft the proposed letter and the joint position paper.

There was then discussion regarding whether General Smith's health would permit his presiding at Geneva.<sup>4</sup> However, Mendes expressed the view that the important thing was not the exact date General Smith was able to arrive, but that they be able now to say that he was coming. The Secretary said that if General Smith was not able to come, it might be possible for him to return for a two or three-day period, but he explained that the situation in Congress with national and foreign aid and other legislation of importance to the area made it imperative that he be in Washington and also that he fully explain to Congressional leaders the results of the conversations held here.

Mendes said that the cease-fire act "has to be done by Tuesday".<sup>5</sup> That is when the date upon which the cease-fire was to go into effect must be published. After that the Conference can go on as long as it likes with regard to technical matters. If he deviates in any way from his determination that this be done by Tuesday, it will mean that the French will be involved in another Panmunjom. The Secretary pointed out that "technical matters" could be of very great importance.

The discussion was recessed until 3 p. m.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> See the editorial note, p. 1381.

<sup>5</sup> July 20.

<sup>6</sup> Following this meeting, Secretary Dulles called President Eisenhower to inform him that agreements had been reached which would require Under Secretary Smith to return to Geneva. The President gave his approval. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)

---

751G.00/7-1454

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

SECRET

PARIS, July 14, 1954.

During the course of the discussions at the Embassy this afternoon, Ambassador Johnson suggested to Secretary Dulles that he felt that

Mr. Mendes-France and Mr. Eden might not fully comprehend the position of the US with reference to "guaranteeing" a settlement which would turn over much of Vietnam to the Communists. Thereupon, Secretary Dulles drew Mr. Mendes-France and Mr. Eden aside with him and said he wished to make it crystal clear that the US could never join in any guarantee to the Communists of the fruits of their aggression. The US did accept it as a fact that certain people became the victims of Communist aggression, and it was not prepared itself to go to war or to encourage others to go to war to rectify the situation. However, this was not the same as to say the US would become an ally of the Communists if there were a breach of the agreement by non-Communists.

It would be compatible with the foregoing that the US should make a unilateral declaration to the effect that in accordance with its obligations under the UN Charter, it would not resort to force to upset an agreement if it were arrived at, and it would seek to bring others to act correspondingly. Also the US could agree with others to react with force to Communist aggression in violation of the agreement. This, however, would have to be conditional upon Senate ratification of the treaty and/or Congressional approval of belligerency.

Mr. Mendes-France and Mr. Eden expressed their understanding of the US position. Mr. Eden stated that he hoped that the UK and others, including many South Asian countries, would be able to associate themselves with a declaration by the US against the use of force to overturn the Geneva agreements.

Ambassador Johnson and Mr. MacArthur were present during the above conversation.

[Annex]

PARIS TALKS, JULY 13-14, 1954

COMMUNIQUÉ

We have had intimate and frank discussions. These have resulted in a clear understanding of our respective positions in relation to Indochina.

The United States Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, explained fully the attitude of his Government toward the Indochinese phase of the Geneva Conference and the limitations which that government desired to observe as not itself having a primary responsibility in the Indochina war.

The French Premier and Foreign Minister, M. Pierre Mendes-France, expressed the view with which Mr. Anthony Eden, the Secre-

tary of State for Foreign Affairs for the United Kingdom, associated himself, that it would nevertheless serve the interests of France and of the Associated States, and of the peace and freedom of the area, if the United States, without departing from the principles which Mr. Dulles expressed, were once again to be represented at Geneva at the ministerial level.

Accordingly, President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles are requesting the United States Under Secretary of State, General Walter Bedell Smith, to return to Geneva at an early date.

---

751G.00/7-1454

*France-United States Position Paper*<sup>1</sup>

CLASSIFIED

1. France and the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are recognized to be those which, on the non-Communist side, are primarily interested in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference.

The United States is interested primarily as a friendly nation which desires to assist, where desired, in arriving at a just settlement, but it will not seek, or be expected, to impose its views in any way upon those primarily interested.

2. The attached seven points constitute a result which France believes to be obtainable by negotiation at Geneva and which would be acceptable to France and, France believes, to the Associated States. The United States, while recognizing the right of those primarily interested to accept different terms, will itself be prepared to respect terms conforming to the attached. The United States will not be asked or expected by France to respect terms which in its opinion differ materially from the attached, and it may publicly disassociate itself from such differing terms.

3. If the settlement is one which the United States is prepared to "respect" its position will be expressed unilaterally or in association only with non-Communist states in terms which apply to the situation the principles of non-use of forces which are embodied in Article 2(4) and (6) of the Charter of the United Nations.

4. The United States is prepared to seek, with other interested nations, a collective defense association designed to preserve, against

---

<sup>1</sup> This paper was approved by Secretary Dulles and Premier Mendès-France at Paris on July 14. The text was transmitted to Washington in telegram 179 from Paris, July 14. (751G.00/7-1454)

direct and indirect aggression, the integrity of the non-Communist areas of Southeast Asia following any settlement.

5. If there is no settlement, the United States and French governments will consult together on the measures to be taken. This will not preclude the United States, if it so desires, bringing the matter before the United Nations as involving a threat to peace as dealt with by Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

6. France reaffirms the principle of independence for the Associated States in equal and voluntary association as members of the French Union.

JULY 14, 1954.

MENDES-FRANCE

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

Annex

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE FRANCE-UNITED STATES POSITION PAPER

An agreement which :

1. preserves the integrity and independence of Laos and Cambodia and assures the withdrawal of Vietminh forces therefrom ;

2. in connection with the line of military demarcation, preserves at least the southern half of Vietnam and if possible an enclave in the Delta ; in this connection we would be unwilling to see the line of division of responsibility drawn further south than a line running generally west from Dong Hoi ;

3. does not impose on Laos, Cambodia or retained Vietnam any restrictions materially impairing their capacity to maintain stable non-Communist regimes ; and especially restrictions impairing their right to maintain adequate forces for internal security, to import arms and to employ foreign advisers ;

4. does not contain political provisions which would risk loss of the retained area to Communist control ;

5. does not exclude the possibility of the ultimate unification of the Vietnam by peaceful means ;

6. provides for the peaceful and humane transfer, under international supervision, of those people desiring to be moved from one zone to another of Vietnam ; and

7. provides effective machinery for international supervision of the agreement.

JULY 14, 1954.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

MENDES-FRANCE

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 324

*The French Prime Minister (Mendès-France) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[PARIS,] July 14, 1954.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Following our frank and friendly conversation of last evening,<sup>2</sup> I believe I understand fully the position of the United States with regard to the negotiations at Geneva concerning Indochina.

If I interpret your views correctly, you recognize fully the primary right of France, the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, to decide the conditions for the settlement of a war in which they are the only belligerents on the non-Communist side. You wish to aid us through your good offices in obtaining a just and honorable settlement which will take into account the needs of the interested peoples. However, you are not prepared to participate with the Communist countries in any settlement which might appear to retain for them the benefits of aggression or the domination of non-willing peoples. In any case, if a settlement should be arrived at between the parties holding the primary responsibility, you would agree to indicate that you would comply with the principles which are contained in Article 2 (4) and (6) of the United Nations Charter and you would consider any violation of the settlement by the Communist regimes as being of grave concern.

It being your belief that the continuation of the war would involve a serious risk of an extension of the conflict, both as concerns the combat areas and the belligerent countries, the question of the participation of the United States would be guided by the terms defined in the fourth paragraph of the letter addressed on July [*June*] 16, 1954, by President Eisenhower to President Coty.<sup>3</sup>

You have indicated to me that you would fear, in the present state of negotiations, that the sending by the United States to Geneva of representatives chosen at a high level and bearing instructions from President Eisenhower to adhere to the principles noted above, could cause a situation capable of giving rise in France, under the most regrettable circumstances, to a feeling that our two countries are divided and that it might risk affecting seriously their good relations which are so important to the whole free world.

<sup>1</sup> Unofficial translation of French text. Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 179 from Paris, July 14. (751G.00/7-1454)

<sup>2</sup> For memorandum of conversation, July 13, see p. 1348.

<sup>3</sup> The text of President Eisenhower's letter to French President Coty, June 16, is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, pp. 583-584. The text of the fourth paragraph of the President's letter is printed in volume XIII.

I have noted your hesitation to come to Geneva in the fear of having eventually to disassociate yourself from an agreement, or certain of its terms, which you might not be able to respect. This appears to me to be understandable, but in my opinion it does not respond to the situation. In effect, I have every reason to think that your absence would be precisely interpreted as demonstrating, before the fact, that you disapproved of the conference and of everything which might be accomplished. Not only would those who are against us find therein the confirmation of the ill will which they attribute to your government concerning the re-establishment of peace in Indochina; but many others would read in it a sure sign of a division of the western powers. Finally, the negotiations would thus be deprived of the element of balance indispensable to the seeking of a solution as recommended in the memorandum of June 30.<sup>4</sup>

I consider thus that such an absence would produce an effect diametrically opposed to the intentions which you have expressed and which I have cited above. In a situation as difficult as this only the unity of the western diplomatic front, supported by the immense potential which we have in common, can bring about the very military and strategic unity which we should seek eventually to establish in that part of the world.

It is in this spirit that the French Government envisages, aside from the assurances which the conference itself could furnish, the establishment of a collective guarantee by virtue of which the signatories would declare themselves prepared to intervene if, in Indochina, one of the three states was a victim of aggression.

I am fully conscious of the position of the government of the United States and I have noted with care the consequences which it might imply; but for the reasons which I have just enumerated, I have the profound conviction that the common interests of our two countries and of the three Associated States would be effectively defended only if you yourself, or the Under-Secretary should represent in person your government at Geneva.

If the situation should nevertheless evolve in a manner which would confirm your fears, I engage myself, on behalf of France, to make known publicly the conditions under which you have acceded to my request.

I do not wish to end this letter without telling you how much I have appreciated during the meeting, certainly fruitful for the future of Franco-American relations, the way in which you have been able to join firmness and sureness of your political views to a broad understanding of the positions of your friends.

<sup>4</sup>Text of the U.S.-U.K. communication is in telegram 4853 to Paris. June 28.  
The text was delivered to the French on June 30.



Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 324

*The Secretary of State to the French Prime Minister  
(Mendès-France)*<sup>1</sup>

PARIS, July 14, 1954.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your letter of July 14<sup>2</sup> with reference to participation by the United States in the final stages of the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference.

In the light of what you say and after consultation with President Eisenhower, I am glad to be able to inform you that the President is asking the Under Secretary of State, General Walter Bedell Smith, to prepare to return at his earliest convenience to Geneva to share in the work of the Conference on the basis of the understanding which we have arrived at.

I greatly appreciate the opportunity which we have had to confer together, and I believe that it has added a new chapter to the honorable and precious tradition of Franco-American cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Text transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 179 from Paris. July 14. (751G.00/7-1454) Copies of the Dulles-Mendès-France correspondence were provided to Foreign Secretary Eden who acknowledged receipt by letter of July 14. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 324)

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

---

396.1 GE/7-1454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 14, 1954—noon.

Secto 603. Repeated information priority Paris 54. Limit distribution. Eyes only Dillon and Johnson. Cheysson of French delegation told me this morning that when Dong was given draft declaration (Secto 597<sup>1</sup>) prepared by French delegate, his first reaction was to insist that the conference should also take note of the fact that Democratic Republic of Vietnam has stated its intention of examining the question of membership in the French Union and of engaging in discussions with the French with a view to resuming economic and cultural relations (Viet Minh May 10th proposals<sup>2</sup>). French rejoined that this would hardly appear to be suitable question for inclusion in final declaration designed to record some measure of conference approval or acceptance of definite items. Cheysson added that if Dong

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 13, p. 1355.

<sup>2</sup> For the report of the Second Plenary Session on Indochina, May 10, see telegram Secto 162, May 10, p. 753.

insists, some satisfactory language of a general character might be found to cover this point, "but of course we do not want them in the French Union".

BONSAL

---

396.1 GE/7-1454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 14, 1954—noon.

Secto 604. Repeated information priority Paris 55. Limit distribution. Eyes only Dillon and Johnson. With reference Secto 598,<sup>1</sup> Cheysson of French delegation today gave me somewhat more detailed account of yesterday's meetings between Mendes-France and Chou En-lai and between Mendes-France and Dong.

Although I am sure Mendes-France himself has already given Secretary this information, am transmitting Cheysson's account and his comments as of possible interest.

Yesterday morning Chou En-lai told Mendes-France that present difference of demarcation line must be settled and that it was up to both sides to make concessions with Viet Minh making the major concession. Mendes-France repeated that French position on Dong Hoi line was firm.

Later Mendes-France received Dong and they had lengthy discussion of line. Finally Dong stated he was ready to go as far as 16th parallel (this runs just south of Tourane). Mendes-France stated this was unacceptable and that French position remained at or about the 18th parallel. Mendes-France stated that it was essential for Franco-Vietnamese to maintain positions at Tourane and Hue and also to maintain control of the road running from Quang Tri to Savannakhet in Laos. This latter objective would involve retention of considerable area north of road.

Dong rejoined that it would be possible to find a settlement giving Franco-Vietnamese side Tourane and making some special arrangements (neutralization?) for Hue and the road. Mendes-France refused to consider these ideas and reiterated position that line must be in Dong Hoi area.

Cheysson is struck by fact that Dong made important although insufficient concession a week before probable end of conference and by the further fact that Communists, in making this concession, gave up the strong position they had hitherto adopted regarding the necessity for the Viet Minh to maintain and control the three provinces

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 13, p. 1346.

south of Faifo which they have ruled uninterruptedly since 1946. Cheysson believes further concessions may be expected from Communists.

BONSAL

---

396.1 GE/7-1454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 14, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 605. Repeated information Paris 56, Saigon 33. Pass Defense. Following is unofficial translation text of French delegation working paper<sup>2</sup> on control in Cambodia and Laos similar to one on Vietnam reported in Secto 575:<sup>3</sup>

"1. Responsibility for implementation of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities is assumed by the sides.

"2. An International Commission is charged with control of the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in (Cambodia) (Laos); it is composed of representatives of the following States: (blank). It is presided over by the representative of (blank). It has its headquarters at (blank).

"3. The International Commission will create inspection teams, fixed and mobile, composed of an equal number of officers designated by each of the above States.

The fixed teams will be stationed at the following points: (blank); these points can later be modified by agreement between the Government of (Cambodia) (Laos) and the International Commission.

The action zones of the mobile teams will be the areas bordering on the land frontiers (and sea frontiers of Cambodia) (of Laos); within the limit of their zones of action they will have the right of free movement and will receive from the local civil and military authorities all the facilities they may need to accomplish their missions (furnishing of personnel, making available of the necessary documents for control purposes, the summoning of witnesses for investigations, protection of the security and of the freedom of movement of the inspection teams, etc.). They will have at their disposal modern means of transport, observation and communication which may be useful to them.

"4. The International Commission is charged with supervising the implementation by the sides of the provisions of the agreement. For this purpose, it is to carry out missions of control, observation, in-

---

<sup>1</sup> Telegram transmitted to the Department of State in two sections.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 8.

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 8, p. 1305.

spection and investigation related to the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities and it must especially :

(a) Control the withdrawal of foreign forces according to the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities.

(b) See that the frontiers of (Cambodia) (Laos) are respected.

(c) Control the operations involved in the freeing of prisoners of war and civilian internees.

(d) In ports and airports, as well as on all frontiers of (Cambodia) (Laos), watch over the implementation of the clauses of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities having to do with the introduction into the country of armed forces, of military personnel and of all types of armament, munitions and war matériel.

(e) (For Laos only) watch over the implementation of the clauses of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities having to do with the reliefs (releves) of personnel, and the supply of the security forces of the French Union maintained in Laos.

Joint groups are created to facilitate the implementation of the clauses having to do with the withdrawal of foreign forces. They will assist the sides in the implementation of said clauses, and assure liaison between them in order to put the withdrawal plans into effect, in compliance with the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. They will follow these troops in their movements and will be dissolved following completion of the implementation of the withdrawal plans.

"6. [*sic*] The joint groups are composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commands of the interested sides.

"7. The International Commission is to proceed, through the inspection teams which have been mentioned above, and as rapidly as possible, either on its own initiative or at the request of a joint group or of one of the sides, to carry out investigations which may be necessary on the basis of documents and on the ground.

"8. The inspection teams are to transmit to the International Commission the results of their control, of their investigations, and of their observations; in addition, they are to make whatever special reports they may deem necessary or which the Commission may ask them for. In case of disagreement within the teams, the conclusions of each of the members are to be transmitted to the Commission.

"9. If an inspection team has not been able to settle an incident or if it believes that there has been a violation or threat of a serious violation, the International Commission is to be informed. It is to study the reports and the conclusions of the inspection teams and to inform the sides regarding the measures which must be taken in order to settle the incident, to make the violation cease or to do away with the threat of violation.

"10. The recommendations of the International Commission are to be adopted by majority vote, subject to the provisions of Article 11. In case of a tie vote, that of the chairman is decisive.

The International Commission may formulate recommendations regarding amendments and additions which it would be desirable to make to the provisions of the agreement for the cessation of hostilities in (Cambodia) (Laos) in order to insure a more efficacious application of said agreement. These recommendations are to be adopted by unanimous vote.

"11. When questions are involved which relate to violations or to threats of violations which may result in resumption of hostilities, i.e.:

(a) The refusal by foreign armed forces to proceed with the movements provided for in the withdrawal plan.

(b) The violation or threat of violation by foreign armed forces of the integrity of the country.

(c) (Blank).

The decisions of the International Commission must be adopted by unanimous vote. If unanimity is not achieved, the majority conclusions are to be communicated to the sides which must take them into consideration.

"12. If one of the sides refuses to apply recommendation or an arbitral decision of the International Commission, the latter informs the guarantors.

If the International Commission has not succeeded in reaching unanimous conclusion in the cases provided for in Article 11, it will transmit to the guarantors a majority report and one or several minority reports.

The International Commission is to inform the guarantors of any obstacle which may arise to the carrying out of its activities.

"13. The International Control Commission is to be on the spot from the moment of the cessation of hostilities in Indochina in order to be able to carry out the tasks provided for in Article 4.

"14. The International Control Commission in (Cambodia) (Laos) is to act in close cooperation with the International Control Commissions in Vietnam and (Laos) (Cambodia). An organism of coordination of the activities of the three Commissions is to be created through an agreement between them.

"15. The International Control Commission in (Cambodia) (Laos) may, after consulting with the International Control Commissions for Vietnam and for (Laos) (Cambodia), formulate recommendations regarding the gradual reduction of its activities, taking into account developments in (Cambodia) (Laos). These recommendations are to be adopted by unanimity."

BONSAL

396.1 GE/7-1454: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 14, 1954—4 p. m.

Secto 606. Repeated information priority Paris 57. Re Secto 600, repeated information Paris 50.<sup>1</sup> Unofficial translation follows of outlines of cease-fire agreements for Cambodia and Laos supplied yesterday by French delegation:

*“Agreement concerning cease-fire in Cambodia.**First, cease-fire:*

Disengagement of Cambodian and Viet Minh Armed Forces and minor regroupment following cease-fire.

This is to be signed as soon as completed, to be published at once, and to be put into effect (with the cooperation of joint groups).

*Second, supplementary provision:**A. Military provisions.*

Plan for evacuation of foreign forces and liberation of prisoners and civilian internees.

*B. Other provisions.*

Guarantees for individuals and communities against reprisals and protection of property and persons.

Right of option for foreign civil populations.

Movement of populations which wish to take refuge in Vietnam.

*Third, provisions regarding control of agreements:*

(See working paper July 8<sup>2</sup>)

*Declaration of Cambodian Government:*

Relative to importations of necessary foreign matériel by Cambodian Army in order to assure defense of Kingdom.

And relative to French instructors and technicians maintained at the disposition of the Cambodian Army.

*Agreement concerning cease-fire in Laos.**First, cease-fire:*

Disengagement of Franco-Lao and Viet Minh units and minor regroupment following cease-fire.

This is to be signed as soon as completed, to be published at once and to be put into effect (with the cooperation of joint groups).

*Second, supplementary provisions:**A. Military provisions.*

Plan for evacuation of Viet Minh forces.

Withdrawal (reilin) of French forces into limited military installations.

System of relief (releve) and supply of French forces stationed in the military installations.

Liberation of prisoners and civilian internees.

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 13, p. 1357.

<sup>2</sup> Transmitted in telegram Secto 605, July 14, *supra*.

**B. Other provisions.**

Guarantees for individuals and communities against reprisals.

Protection of property and persons.

Right of option of foreign civilian populations.

Movement of populations which wish to take refuge in Vietnam.

*Third, provisions regarding control of agreements :*

(See working paper of July 8)

*Declaration of Laotian Government :*

(Same as declaration of Cambodian Government.)”

Working paper July 8 transmitted Secto 605.

BONSAL

396.1 GE/7-1454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 14, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 607. Repeated information priority Paris 58, Saigon 34. Offroy, French delegate, states that Do has received strong telegram from Diem urging that Hanoi, Haiphong and the Bishoprics be retained for Vietnam in current negotiations regarding military regroupings. In consequence, Offroy tells us Do is planning to issue rather strong public statement designed to give impression of serious divergences between France and Vietnam. Offroy states Do believes this approach would be good tactics although not entirely realistic. Offroy fears result may be to exacerbate anti-French sentiment in Vietnam and perhaps cause difficulties there, although he recognizes possibility that appearance of serious difficulties between France and Vietnam may help negotiating position vis-à-vis Viet Minh.

BONSAL

396.1 GE/7-1454 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 14, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 608. Repeated information Paris 59. Limit distribution. Eyes only Dillon. Offroy informs us that in course of conversation between members of French Delegation and Wang Ping-nan, Secretary General of Chinese Communist Delegation, latter referred to discussions between Dong and Mendes-France re demarcation line (Secto 604<sup>1</sup>). Wang Ping-nan stated that French should make some further con-

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 14, p. 1368.

cession and implied that Viet Minh would be prepared to meet this with even greater concession. French representatives reiterated firm position re Dong Hoi line.

BONSAI.

---

PSA files, lot 58 D 207, "Vietnam Correspondence"

*The Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsai) to  
Ambassador Donald R. Heath*

PERSONAL AND SECRET

GENEVA, July 14, 1954.

DEAR DON: Many thanks for your good letter of July 4<sup>1</sup> which I received on July 13. In spite of the delay it was most useful and I am truly grateful to you for taking the time to write for I know how rushed you must have been.

You are certainly faced with a difficult task. Nevertheless on the basis of the past record I am sure you will get out of the situation all that can be gotten in the interest of the United States.

I noted your statement about the feeling in the Department regarding U.S. intervention. Whatever may be the merits of this course of action, those who favor it are, it seems to me, in the somewhat sterile position of favoring something which is just not going to happen. My own belief is that the threat of American intervention has been and perhaps still is of some value to those who are negotiating for an end of this long war—a war which of course it would have been desirable to have won. But I have throughout been strongly of the opinion that actual intervention by U.S. forces against the Vietminh would not produce durable or desirable results. Therefore, when you refer to "all the people below the Secretary and Under Secretary" as being unanimous on this matter, please count me out.

There is some question as to whether the settlement which we finally reach will leave much scope for Mike O'Daniel and his activities. Certainly the pressure will be off and I suspect that the French attitude on the matter will stiffen although of course the Vietnamese will be anxious for our help.

I was also interested to note that in your talk with Bob Murphy you urged that we try for an enclave at Hanoi, whereas on your return to Saigon you seemed to feel that a Hanoi-Haiphong enclave must be sought. I hope that this change of view reflects your view that the military situation in the north is really better than it was when you talked with Bob Murphy. We will probably end up with a few months tenure of Haiphong but that is about all. On the other hand we may well get a solid area south of the 18th parallel. What can we then do?

---

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 1280.



Cheysson is most anxious that we should be thinking along lines of French and American economic and military support for "retained Vietnam".

I think that under the circumstances we have been kept fairly well informed regarding Mendes-France's negotiations. I also hope and believe that we have now reached a point where Diem in Saigon and Do in Geneva are also being taken into the confidence of the French. It seems to me furthermore that Mendes-France has taken a firm and resolute stand at least within the framework of our seven points and that to the extent that he can count on our support and on our association with the results he achieves, he will get the very best deal justified by the facts with which we are confronted.

I agree with what you say about Bao Dai and have been trying my best to follow this line in spite of my real feelings on the subject.

You are much missed on the Delegation here not only for your company but also because of the fact that we are kept pretty busy and would like to have someone to share the work with.

Margaret joins me in love to Louise and in very best to you both in the job which you have so brilliantly and wholeheartedly performed over the past four years. If all concerned had been as devoted and single-minded as the two of you our enterprise would not now be going through the wringer. But there will be something left from which to build.

Yours as ever,

PHILIP W. BONSAI

JULY 15, 1954

*Editorial Note*

Upon the return of the Secretary of State from Paris the Department of State released the following press release (387) on July 15:

"I return from consultations at Paris with the new French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, M. Pierre Mendès-France. These talks were also participated in by Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary.

"These talks have brought about an understanding concerning Indochina much more complete than has heretofore existed. It enabled us to demonstrate anew the solidarity of the Western powers in the face of Communist hostility and intrigue.

"The United States has been concerned to find a way whereby it could help France, Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia find acceptable settlements without in any way prejudicing basic principles to which the United States must adhere if it is to be true to itself, and if the captive and endangered peoples of the world are to feel that the United States really believes in liberty.

"I had the opportunity in Paris fully to explain the United States position in this respect to M. Mendès-France, whom I had known before but whom I had not met since he assumed his new offices.

"The conclusion was that we would ask the Under Secretary of State, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, to return to Geneva at an early date to renew his participation in the Indochina phase of the Conference. But this is on the understanding, to which both the French and British Ministers expressly agreed, that renewed participation by the United States at the ministerial level will be without departing from the U.S. principles which I had described.

"I believe that we have found a formula for constructive allied unity which will have a beneficial effect on the Geneva Conference. And it carries no danger that the United States will abandon its principles."

---

396.1 GE/7-1554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, July 15, 1954—11 a. m.

Secto 617. Repeated information Paris 65, Saigon 38. At working level meeting today representatives of French, US and UK Dels called by French Del (Laloy) there was discussion of Soviet counterproposal to French draft declaration to be issued by conference. Soviet text is contained in Secto 615.<sup>1</sup>

Meeting opened with some discussion of original French text. Aside from some unimportant matters of drafting, there was general acceptance of French text except that USDel reserved position on final paragraph concerning agreement of members of conference to consult among themselves.

Turning to Soviet counterproposal, Laloy stated there were 3 main objections:

1. It applies political criteria for Vietnam also to Laos and Cambodia which do not have political problems,
2. It establishes date for elections, and
3. It introduces for all 3 countries prohibition on alliances and foreign bases.

Following are comments developed on specific numbered paragraphs of Soviet counterproposals:

1. It was agreed that instead of "approve" effort would be made to restore "takes note" from original French text. USDel firm on this point—French and British acquiesced.

2. This is new provision to which French do not object provided word "recognition" is replaced by "respect". French point is that independence has already been recognized.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 15, p. 1384.

3. French Del will ask explanation of clause added by Soviets to 6th paragraph of original French text.

4. There was objection to lumping together of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Evacuation of foreign troops is to take place in Laos and Cambodia at once subject to agreed reservations in case of French military personnel whereas in Vietnam position is that presence of French troops will be in accordance with decisions of representative authority.

5. In addition to lumping together of 3 countries, French hold that case of Vietnam will be covered in military agreement between commands and that there is no need for repetition in conference declaration. In case of Laos and Cambodia, these countries are making unilateral declarations which should be noted by conference in terms used by 2 countries.

6. This introduces new concepts of "military alliances" and "foreign bases". General subject matter to be covered in Laos and Cambodia by their unilateral declarations. In case of Vietnam, difficult to see how "foreign base" could be established in light of prohibition of introduction reinforcing troops and arms.

7. Again this provision joins together 3 countries and calls for political negotiations with Laos and Cambodia where there are no political problems.

8. British stated no fundamental objection to having international commission to supervise elections consisting representatives of same states supervising military aspect. French have already told Soviets they consider fixing of date for elections entirely unacceptable. They did not like concept of consultation between "northern and southern zones of Vietnam".

9. It appears unnecessary and perhaps dangerous to spell out freedoms to be guaranteed in Laos and Cambodia. This is derogatory to established governments of those countries. Conference should limit itself to taking note of unilateral statements by Governments of Laos and Cambodia re dates of elections and should not attempt itself to fix dates.

10. This item should be in military agreement rather than in conference declaration. Final sentence appears ambiguous and should be eliminated.

11. No comment.

12. In this paragraph regarding consultation, Soviets have added word "collective". It was agreed that this should be omitted and US representative reiterated US reservation of position.

Laloy expressed view that conference guarantee would be of no really effective importance since serious differences would have to be settled in some other manner.

Laloy will get Mendes-France's views on Soviet proposals and on working level comments this evening and will then prepare a further French draft based on original French draft incorporating whatever may be acceptable from Soviet draft. He will distribute this new draft as soon as possible to US and UKDels.

It was agreed that effort should be made so that Ministers could have before them urgently a text showing agreed and disagreed working level draft.

There was some inconclusive discussion of method of financing international supervisory commission. It was emphasized that adequate financing most important to proper functioning. Department's view this point would be appreciated.

JOHNSON

396.1 GE/7-1554 : Telegram

*Johnson-Kimny Meeting, Geneva, July 15, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, July 15, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 616. Repeated information Paris 64, Saigon 37, Phnom Penh 3. Nong Kimny called on me this morning. He described call yesterday by Chou En-lai, accompanied by two aides and interpreter and Cambodian Foreign Minister arranged at Chou's request. Chou stated his recent interviews with Nehru, U Nu and Ho Chi Minh permitted him to assert that all three want peace in Indochina and that this also is wish of all countries of South and Southeast Asia. Unanimous desire is that three Associated States be united and have cordial relationship with Colombo powers, such as Burma, India and Indonesia. Chou stated that India was willing to participate in International Control Commission. Chou recalled the two declarations which had been issued on occasion of his visits to New Delhi and Rangoon, reiterating the five points contained in the Chinese-Indian Treaty regarding Tibet.<sup>2</sup>

Chou then asked Cambodian Foreign Minister regarding prospects of Conference. Foreign Minister replied that in two meetings he had had with Dong, latter had insisted on injecting political problem into military aspect and that if this continued, Foreign Minister is dubious as to prospects. He reported that Dong had asked that certain provincial officials appointed by resistance movement be retained, and that resistance youth movements be preserved. These demands are contrary to Cambodian constitutional processes. Chou is reported to have laughed at these claims, and to have stated that these are internal matters which Cambodian Government should handle unilaterally.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram transmitted in two sections.

<sup>2</sup> The "Communiqué on Talks between Mr. Nehru and Mr. Chou En-lai, 28 June 1954" and the "Joint Statement by the Prime Ministers of China and Burma. Mr. Chou En-lai and U Nu, 29 June 1954" are printed in *Documents on International Affairs, 1954*, pp. 313-314. The Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet, signed on Apr. 29, 1954, is in 70 UNTS 229.

Chou then referred to the two documents he had received the day before (July 13) from French delegation, namely draft of Conference declaration (Secto 597<sup>3</sup>), and working paper regarding controls in Cambodia and Laos (Secto 605<sup>4</sup>) with important draft declaration, Chou stated that in this document, France recognizes independence and sovereignty of Cambodia without discriminating against elements having cooperated with either party and contemplates the evacuation of all foreign forces. Also Chou interpreted document as meaning that there would be no military foreign bases in the three States of Indochina and that no military alliances would be permitted between the three States and other States. (Nong Kimny stated he was unable to find any basis for these assertions in French draft declaration; it is, however, included in Soviet draft just received.) Referring particularly to Cambodia, Chou stated his understanding intent was that countries would gain complete independence and that all elements belonging to resistance movement could return to national community. This would leave only military problem for solution.

Cambodian Foreign Minister replied that after cessation of hostilities, all elements of the population who had formerly worked with Viet Minh would be able to return to national community without deprivation of constitutional civic rights. (In reply to my question, Nong Kimny stated amnesty was not designed to apply to crimes against persons and property.) Foreign Minister then asked Chou for his thinking regarding introduction of arms and military personnel in Cambodia after cessation of hostilities. Chou stated that this matter was to be subject in case of both Cambodia and Laos to separate negotiations, but did not elaborate on this theme, taking refuge in statement that he had not thoroughly studied French draft document which, however, he had received favorably as representing French desire to reach agreement. In reply to Foreign Minister's insistence on impossibility of accepting limitation on introduction of arms and military personnel into Cambodia, Chou replied that he would make further study of question and hoped Cambodian and Laotian representatives would submit their ideas. He expressed interest in knowing quantity of foreign troops, military personnel and arms which Cambodian and Laotian Governments consider necessary for defense of their countries.

Cambodians reiterated point that arms limitation incompatible with sovereignty and pointed out that defense establishment in Laos and Cambodia would depend on armament of Cambodia's neighbors.

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 13, p. 1355.

<sup>4</sup> Dated July 14, p. 1369.

Chou then referred to his June 16 proposal and stated belief that perhaps principles therein had been badly stated or badly understood. He referred particularly to paragraph 3 of that proposal which reads:

"3. After the cessation of hostilities, the introduction in Laos and Cambodia from outside of fresh troops and military personnel of ground, naval or air forces and of all types of arms and ammunition shall be prohibited.

"The question of the amount and the type of arms that may be introduced for the requirements of self-defense shall be the subject of separate negotiations."

Chou stated that he wished to make clear that the provisions regarding nonintroduction of arms and military personnel refers only to armistice period and not to permanent situation which will prevail after armistice has given way to definitive peace. Nong Kimny expressed view that this represents important development in Chinese thinking but added that Chou continues to link armistice in Cambodia with armistice in Laos and Vietnam and apparently contemplates that there will be one armistice for all three countries with simultaneous termination. Since Cambodians believe their problem extremely simple and recognize Vietnam problem extremely complex, it appears evident to them that if Chou's view prevails they may be bound by armistice terms long after peace could be definitively restored to their country.

Chou established differentiation between situation in Vietnam where neither party is to bring in arms and troops and that in Cambodia and Laos where limited introduction of arms and munition will be contemplated. Chou did not mention military personnel.

Later in day (July 14) Cambodians met with French. French told them they contemplate three basic documents in connection with cessation of hostilities:

- 1) Draft declaration copies of which have already been submitted to all delegations;
- 2) Three separate agreements on cessation of hostilities;
- 3) Unilateral statements by governments concerned including in case of Cambodia and Laos statement of intent regarding elections and regarding arms and equipment needed for self-defense.

Nong Kimny thought well of my suggestion to amend statement on elections by adding phrase "in accordance with constitutional processes" since Cambodians did not wish to assume obligation of holding special elections. (Normal elections scheduled in 1955.) Cambodians also raised point with French that it would have been desirable instead of submitting draft declaration and draft control document to all delegations if agreements could not have been reached between six friendly delegations before handing these papers to Communists.

French replied that they recognized justice of observation but that from practical point of view it was necessary to discuss these papers simultaneously with both friendly and unfriendly elements if practical conclusions are to be reached within available time periods.

I took occasion in this connection to express the view that French position regarding general terms of settlement in Indochina was as firm and courageous as we could expect in view of realities of present situation. I stated Secretary had been much heartened by his talks with Mendes-France. I added that it seemed to me that Cambodian unilateral declaration envisaged in French draft need be no more than repetition of what Cambodians have already stated at conference regard to elections and to Cambodian defense plans.

JOHNSON

---

*Editorial Note*

At the 206th meeting of the National Security Council, July 15, in Washington, the Council devoted a substantial amount of time to a report by the Secretary of State on his talks in Paris with Premier Mendès-France and Foreign Secretary Eden and to the decision that Under Secretary Smith would return to the Geneva Conference as Head of the United States Delegation.

For a memorandum of discussion of this meeting, see volume XIII.

---

396.1 GE/7-1554 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL      NIACT      WASHINGTON, July 15, 1954—4:50 p. m.

Tosec 544. For Ambassador Johnson from Secretary. Please deliver following message from Secretary to Mendes-France.

"My dear Mr. President: Ambassador Johnson has just transmitted to me your kind message.<sup>2</sup> I share your feeling that our meeting was well worthwhile. Certainly from my standpoint I feel a sense of respect and admiration for the forthright position which you have taken on the vital issues that confront us. Uncertainty is the worst plague and you have done much to dissipate it.

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State.

<sup>2</sup> This reference to a "kind message" from Premier Mendès-France is apparently a reference to a handwritten paragraph at the end of Mendès-France's letter to Secretary Dulles of July 14, p. 1365. This paragraph was translated and then transmitted to Secretary Dulles on July 15 in telegram Secto 614, July 15. It read as follows: "I do not wish to end this letter without telling you how much I have appreciated during the meeting, certainly fruitful for the future of France-American relations, the way in which you have been able to join the firmness and the sureness of your political views to a broad understanding of the positions of your friends." (396.1 GE/7-1554)

I am glad to tell you that General Bedell Smith will be able to leave tomorrow and he plans to get away sometime tomorrow afternoon arriving in Geneva around Saturday noon.

Immediately upon my arrival in Washington a few hours ago I went from the airport to the White House and reported fully to the President, to General Bedell Smith and the other members of the National Security Council. The President was highly gratified with my report. General Bedell Smith will go to Geneva fully informed not only on the basis of documentation but on the basis of my personal report.

As you face fateful decisions at Geneva, you can feel that the many friends of France will be supporting you with their best wishes and with their prayers, and I am glad that we have found a way whereby, I hope without violation of our principles or serious risk of future misunderstanding, we can evidence at Geneva our moral and political support.

Mrs. Dulles asked me to thank you for the beautiful roses which you sent and which greeted her on her return.

With sincere good wishes, I am  
Sincerely yours, Foster Dulles"

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/7-1554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of Defense*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, July 15, 1954—7 p. m.

Defense Message Gento 81. For Sullivan from Dwan. Following are principal provisions of French Delegation draft agreement on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, copy of which shown me today by member of French Delegation who promised to give US Delegation copy as soon as finalized :

Article I: Cease-fire.

This article provides for complete separation of opposing forces to be completed within 380 days from date of cease-fire and for division of final zones of regroupment along line in vicinity Porte d'Annam (18th parallel). Disengagement of forces to consist of initial separation and is to proceed to final positioning of opposing forces.

Article II: Principles for Execution of Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities.

This article prescribes that the cease-fire, separation, and regroupment of forces will take place simultaneously for both sides. It includes details such as that forces both sides will be withdrawn from demilitarized zones; that civilians who desire may leave regroupment zones; that persons may cross demarcation line only with authorization of Joint Commission; that civil administration and relief is responsibility of commanders of zones concerned; that sides must remove mines and



provide safe conditions for supervisory organs etc. It further makes distinction between regular and irregular forces, defining former as organized formations which on Viet Minh side include both regular and regional forces, and defines irregular forces as partisans.

#### Article III: Separation of Combatants.

This article provides for inclusion of a specific time for cease-fire and calls for execution of separation of forces as soon as possible thereafter. It provides for (but for the moment leaves blank) the number of days during which regroupment of forces into *initial assembly areas* must be completed and prescribes that Joint Commission is to fix local conditions therefor. It further provides for (but for moment leaves blank) number of days thereafter during which movement into *primary regroupment zones* must be completed and leaves to Joint Commission responsibility for fixing details for this movement. Following are *primary regroupment zones* designated for each side:

##### *North Vietnam.*

French Union Forces to be regrouped into following areas in three stages:

- (1) Area delimited by present battle line in delta (details to be fixed by Joint Commission, both sides to agree to undertake no offensive action during fixing of detailed line);
- (2) Enclave extending inland just beyond Haiduong;
- (3) Enclave around Haiphong.

##### *Central Vietnam.*

Viet Minh Forces located between Col des Nuages (above Tourane) and Porte d'Annam to be evacuated north of Porte d'Annam; Viet Minh Forces located in quadrangle Col des Nuages, west to Laos border, south to junction borders of Annam, Cochinchina and Cambodia, east to Phan-Ri, to be regrouped in Quang-Ngai and Binh-Dinh Provinces, with five-kilometre demilitarized zone to be established around this regroupment area; Viet Minh Forces in Central Vietnam south of quadrangle described above to be regrouped in South Vietnam.

##### *South Vietnam.*

Viet Minh Forces east of Saigon River to be regrouped in Xuyen-Moc and Ham-Tan Provinces. Viet Minh Forces west of Saigon River to be regrouped vicinity Long-My and in Ca Mau Peninsula.

#### Article IV: Withdrawals and Transfers.

This article describes simultaneous phased movements of opposing forces from regroupment areas. (1) When French Union Forces withdraw to Haiduong enclave, Viet Minh evacuate Long-My and Ca Mau regroupment areas in South Vietnam. (2) When French Union Forces withdraw to Haiphong enclave, Viet Minh evacuate Xuyen-Moc, Ham-Tan regroupment area. When French Union Forces withdraw from Haiphong enclave, Viet Minh evacuate regroupment area in Cen-

tral Vietnam. This article also prescribes that embarkation port in Central Vietnam is at Qui Nhon, and in South Vietnam at Can Tho, Ham-Tan, or Phan Thiet. It further prescribes that first simultaneous withdrawal phase is to be completed within three months, second within one additional month and third within eight months 15 days additional (total 380 days after cease-fire).

Article V :

This article prohibits the introduction into Vietnam of re-enforcing military personnel, and weapons, and contains wording similar to Korean Armistice Agreement (paragraphs 13(C) and (D)). It further prescribes 11 ports of entry on each side through which all military personnel and arms must enter and leave under supervision of International Commission.

Article VI, prisoners of war; and Article VII, further details, were not available in draft.

Provisions for control machinery also to be included.

Member of French Delegation said French would present to Viet Minh draft of agreement including first four articles described above. Balance of draft, including article on re-enforcement of military personnel and arms, would not be presented and French would wait for Viet Minh initiative on this subject. Member French Delegation also said similar draft agreement on Laos currently under preparation.

---

396.1 GE/7-1554 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, July 15, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 615. Sent Paris 63, Saigon 35. Following is unofficial translation made by UK del of Soviet counterproposal to French draft declaration (Secto 597<sup>1</sup>) to be issued by conference :

“1. The participants of the Geneva conference on the question of re-establishing peace in Indochina approve the bilateral agreements which put an end to hostilities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and which establish an international control and supervision over the implementation of the said decisions.

2. The conference takes note with satisfaction of the statement made by the French Government to the effect that, when settling all problems connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, it proceeds from the recognition of the complete sovereignty and independence, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

3. In its relations with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, each participant of the Geneva conference, regardless of its political, military,

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 13, p. 1355.

diplomatic or other relations with the said states, at the time of the signature of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities, undertakes to recognize and respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and integrity of the said states and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

4. The conference takes note of the agreement of the parties that all foreign troops and foreign military personnel will be withdrawn from the territories of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia within time limits to be determined by agreement between the parties.

5. The conference takes note of the agreement, reached between the parties, that the transfer from abroad into Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, of new military units and military personnel, of all kinds of arms and ammunition will not be permitted and that the import of arms into Laos and Cambodia will be limited in relation to the established defense requirements of these countries.

6. The conference takes note of the agreement reached by the parties, that after the cessation of hostilities, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia must not enter any military alliances whatsoever, and that the establishment of foreign bases on the territories of the said states must not be permitted.

7. The conference notes that the agreements regarding Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have as their goal the settlement of military questions in order to put an end to hostilities in Indochina. As far as political problems are concerned, these will be settled within the shortest possible time by means of direct negotiations between the interested parties in accordance with the provisions contained in the present declaration.

8. The conference declares that, in respect of Vietnam, the settlement of political problems effected on the basis of respect for the principles of the independence, unity and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free elections by secret ballot. These elections will be conducted under the control of an International Commission composed of representatives of the member states of the commission for control and supervision mentioned in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, when the agreed opinion, reached by consultation between the competent representative authorities of the northern and southern zones of Vietnam, is that the re-establishment of peace in the country shall have made sufficient progress and when all the conditions necessary for a free expression of the national will shall have been created, but not later than June 1955.

9. The conference takes note of the declaration by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their intention to hold general free elections by secret ballot, and to take all measures to enable all citizens to take their place in the national community. These elections should take place before June 1955. In order to conduct general free elections, the Governments of Cambodia and Laos must ensure individual rights and democratic freedoms for the whole population of these states, in particular, freedom of speech and press, freedom of meetings and organizations, freedom of residence and of movement.

10. The competent representative authorities of the northern and southern zones of Vietnam as well as the authorities of Laos and Cam-

bodia must not permit individual or collective collaboration in any way with one or the other side during the war. These persons and the members of their families should be afforded individual freedom and freedom of political activity and right to elect and be elected.

11. The provisions contained in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, aimed at protecting persons' property, must be very strictly implemented, and should in particular afford any person in Vietnam the right to choose the zone in which he wishes to reside.

12. The members of the conference agree to hold consultations among themselves on any question referred to them by the International Commission on control and supervision, in order to consider collective measures which may prove to be necessary in order to ensure observance of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Indochina.

13. The members of the Geneva conference express their confidence that, as a result of the implementation of the provisions contained in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, which ensure the re-establishment of peace in Indochina, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia will freely develop in conditions of independence and sovereignty along the road of improving their economy and raising the standard of living of their people, and will make their useful contribution to the common cause of consolidating peace and cooperation among peoples."

JOHNSON

---

396.1 GE/7-1654 : Telegram

*Bonsal-Chau Meeting, Geneva, July 15: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 16, 1954—11 a. m.

Secto 618. Repeated information Paris 66, Saigon 39. Tran Van Do yesterday sent Nguyen Hu Chau to call on Bonsal to express on behalf of Diem great concern over possibility of losing entire Tonkin delta in conference settlement. Chau read full text of point 2 of US-UK seven point reply to French *aide-mémoire*.<sup>1</sup> (Full text of seven points had been given to Vietnamese by British; we had only furnished them with abbreviated oral version contained in Secretary's message to Diem,<sup>2</sup> and put special emphasis on "if possible an enclave in the delta".) He expanded on both political and military necessity retaining Hanoi-Haiphong area as well as Bui Chu and Phat Diem, saying that new government would lose its *raison d'être* as champion of unity and independence if that area should be given up. At least, he said, Bui Chu and Phat Diem should somehow be neutralized and "subtracted" from Viet Minh pressure and influence.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see telegram 4853 to Paris, June 28, p. 1256.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see telegram Tosec 529, July 10, p. 1324.

Chau, who is lawyer by profession, laid great stress on legal arguments, implying that protectorate treaty of 1884 was last valid treaty between Vietnam and France, and that this would somehow preserve his government's claim to Tonkin even if French should sign it away at Geneva. His intention was apparently, through Bao Dai's status as heir of the Nguyens and Chief of State, to establish legitimacy of his government and its claim to all of Vietnam.

Chau alluded to possibility that if Tonkin were lost, Bao Dai might feel obliged to retire from the scene. Chau implied, not too convincingly, that this would be fraught with undesirable consequences and hence was an additional reason for trying to hold Hanoi, Haiphong and the bishoprics.

Bonsal replied that it was his understanding Franco-Vietnamese relations subject agreements of 1949 rather than treaty of 1884 and that Bao Dai's constitutional status currently that of Chief of State and not hereditary sovereign Emperor. He stressed view that current discussion of demarcation line involves only military arrangements and that goal continues to be, whenever favorable conditions can be brought about, the unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam. He stressed in this connection vital necessity of closest possible contacts between French and Vietnamese delegations.

In more general conversation Chau commented on following subjects:

1. Some Vietnamese and French would like to see reestablishment Cochin Chinese Republic; in this connection he noted Tran Van Huu back in Geneva after very active period in Paris. He implied French official backing for intrigues this direction.

2. He complained of French and Viet Minh neglect of Vietnamese Army officers at military talks in Indochina.

3. Chau seemed particularly proud that Ngo Dinh Diem government has obtained "full powers" from Bao Dai. Contact here with Viet Minh delegation and coming replacement of Tran Van Kha in Washington given for examples of action by new government without Bao Dai approval. Also noted plateau areas formerly ruled directly by Bao Dai through Imperial Cabinet now placed under Central Government. Chau was critical of Bao Dai's entourage.

JOHNSON

396.1 GE/7-1654 : Telegram

*Bonsal-Offroy Meeting, Geneva, July 15: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 16, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 620. Repeated information Paris 68, Saigon 40. Offroy of French delegation yesterday expressed following views to Bonsal

regarding status of discussions on international controls of agreements for cessation of hostilities in Vietnam (Secto 575<sup>1</sup>) and in Cambodia and Laos (Secto 605<sup>2</sup>). He stated following four major questions remained pending with Communists:

1. Compositions: Communists insist on inclusion Communist member. Further discussions will have to take place at ministerial level following General Smith's arrival.

2. Freedom of action of international inspection teams: Soviets contend that complete freedom of action for these teams would infringe on sovereignty of states concerned.

3. Rules of procedure and mandatory character of decisions of International Commission: Soviets continue to insist on unanimity rule in event of major violations and on recommendatory rather than mandatory character of Commission's decisions and recommendations.

4. Organization: Soviets want one main commission with subcommissions for Laos and Cambodia. Our side conceives of three commissions with similar composition plus coordinating mechanism.

Offroy envisages meeting at early date of friendly delegations to express views on draft texts already submitted by French. This would be followed very shortly by discussion with other side on restricted basis. Offroy envisages not more than three or four powers taking part in this discussion aimed at securing definition of agreed and disagreed items.

To date, French have distributed papers on controls (Sectos 575 and 605) to all nine delegations; draft declaration for conference (Secto 597<sup>3</sup>) also to all nine (Soviet counterproposal contained Secto 615<sup>4</sup> has been distributed to all delegations); administrative human rights provision of cessation of hostilities agreements to six friendly delegations and draft military clauses of these agreements distributed probably only to US.

JOHNSON

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 8, p. 1305.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 14, p. 1369.

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 13, p. 1355.

<sup>4</sup> Dated July 15, p. 1384.

JULY 16, 1954

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 306

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation  
(Bonsal) to the Head of the Delegation (Johnson)*

[GENEVA,] July 16, 1954.

Re: Message from Dennis Allen

Dennis Allen telephoned at 10:35 a. m. to say that he had just had a call from la Tournelle who stated that at last night's Mendes-

France-Molotov dinner<sup>1</sup> it was suggested that a meeting might be held this afternoon between the two Chairmen (Eden and Molotov) and the French to review the documents which have so far been produced and to see where the Conference stands.

Eden has asked Allen to let you know of this suggestion and to find out your views. Eden believes that the meeting in practice might be useful. If the question of U.S. participation in such a meeting is raised, Allen believes that the Russians will probably insist on the presence of the Chinese communists, and we would thus have a five-power gathering.

I told Allen that we would let him have your views as soon as possible.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> See telegram Secto 626, July 16, p. 1394.

<sup>2</sup> Handwritten notations on the source text indicated that Ambassador Johnson had "no objection" to holding the meeting between the two Chairmen and the French and that Johnson agreed with Dennis Allen's belief that the Russians would probably insist on a Chinese Communist presence which would mean a five-power gathering. An additional handwritten notation indicates that Allen was advised of the Ambassador's notations.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 301

*The Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1954.

MY DEAR GENERAL SMITH: The following basic instructions,<sup>2</sup> which have been approved by the President, will guide you as head of the United States Delegation in your participation in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference for which you are leaving today.<sup>3</sup>

1. I append hereto as Annex A a Six Point France-United States Position Paper, dated July 14, 1954.<sup>4</sup> Attached thereto is a Seven Point Memorandum setting out the terms which the French Government states it believes are obtainable at Geneva by negotiation, and which would be acceptable to France, and France believes, to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.<sup>5</sup>

2. The United States recognizes that these four nations have a direct and primary interest as belligerents which entitles them to negotiate a settlement without any coercion or pressure from the United States. As stated in the Position Paper, the United States will not seek "to

---

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this letter is also filed in 396.1 GE/7-1654.

<sup>2</sup> Under Secretary Smith's original instructions were contained in telegram Tosec 138, May 12, p. 778.

<sup>3</sup> Under Secretary Smith departed for Geneva on the afternoon of July 16.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 1363.

<sup>5</sup> Attached to the position paper. p. 1364.

impose its views in any way upon those primarily interested", i.e., France and Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

3. Therefore, your role at the Conference will be that of the representative of a nation friendly to the non-Communist states primarily interested, which desires to assist, where desired, in arriving at a just settlement. You will not, however, go beyond this role.

4. If there is a cease-fire, armistice or political settlement which conforms substantially to the Seven Points referred to in the annexed Position Paper, and which is agreed to by the states primarily interested, you are authorized to make a declaration of the attitude of the United States in the form of the annexed declaration, marked Annex B. This will be a unilateral declaration, unless certain of the non-Communist states desire to associate themselves with it, in which case this is acceptable. The United States will not, however, become cosignatory with the Communists in any declaration.

5. You will note that the Position Paper states that if the terms of settlement differ materially from those set out in the Seven Points, the United States will not be asked or expected by France to respect those terms and "it may publicly disassociate itself from such differing terms."

6. In the event that you are in doubt as to whether the settlement conforms substantially to, or differs materially from, the Seven Points referred to in the Position Paper, you will seek instructions before either refusing to make the declaration contemplated by the above paragraph numbered 4 or publicly disassociating the United States as contemplated by the above paragraph numbered 5. Of course, before taking any important action which could have serious repercussions upon our international relations, you will naturally communicate with me.

7. You will avoid participation in the negotiations in any way which would imply, or give the Communists a plausible case for contending, that the United States was so responsible for the result that it is in honor bound to guarantee that result to the Communists. We apprehend that the Communists might offer to make certain concessions if the United States would then guarantee the settlement so far as they were concerned. You should, so far as possible, avoid getting yourself into a position which would lend itself to such a Communist maneuver. Accordingly, the non-Communist belligerents, rather than the United States, should be the active negotiators, and such ideas as we have should be put forward to the French or Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, as may be appropriate, and through them to the Conference if they find it desirable to adopt such ideas as their own.



8. Also, since the United States is not prepared at the present time to give any commitment that it will intervene in the war if the Geneva Conference fails—the United States position in this respect is set out in President Eisenhower's letter of June 16, 1954, to President Coty<sup>6</sup>—you should avoid as far as possible exerting any pressures or giving advice to the French of such a character that, if there is no cease-fire, the French can plausibly contend that it is because of our advice to, or pressure upon, them, and that therefore we are morally obligated to intervene at once in a military way.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

#### Annex B<sup>7</sup>

The Government of the United States being resolved to devote its efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations

Takes note of the Agreements concluded at Geneva on \_\_\_\_\_ (date) \_\_\_\_\_ between the \_\_\_\_\_ military commands

Declares with regard to aforesaid Agreements that

(i) it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with Art. 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force; and

(ii) it will seek that other states which are not members of the United Nations shall similarly refrain from the use of force, in accordance with the Art. 2(6) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with insuring that states which are not members of the United Nations shall act in accordance with the principles of the Charter so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security;<sup>8</sup> and

(iii) it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of these agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

<sup>6</sup>The text of President Eisenhower's letter to French President Coty, June 16, is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, pp. 583–584. The pertinent portion of the letter, the fourth paragraph, is printed in volume XIII.

<sup>7</sup>The copy of this draft in the Dulles papers at the Eisenhower Library bears the handwritten initials of President Eisenhower indicating approval.

<sup>8</sup>The following marginal notation appeared opposite paragraph (ii): "Deletion recommended by Secretary. Tosec 560." Telegram Tosec 560, July 17, read as follows: "Upon reflection and in view of reactions here, believe that Subparagraph 2 of US Declaration Annex B should, if at all possible, be eliminated as subject to misconstruction. Suggest you inform Phleger." (396.1 GE/7-1754)

396.1 GE/7-1654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 16, 1954—4 p. m.

Secto 622. Repeated information Paris 70, Saigon 42. Following is unofficial translation of draft given us by French which is latest refinement of text of clauses to be included in cessation hostilities agreement to cover certain political and administrative requirements:

"Article 1. Each regrouping zone is placed under the administration of the side which is carrying out the regroupment of its forces within it.

"Article 2. The administration of the zones which cease to come under one authority in order to pass to the authority of another is transferred on the day the regroupment is finished. The passing of responsibilities is carried out in conformity with the provision of article (blank) (military on the passing of command).

"Article 3. Vietnamese Nationals as well as French and foreigners residing in any part of the territory of Vietnam will be able, during a period of six months following the going into effect of this agreement, to transfer freely their domicile to any other part of the territory. The competent authorities of the two sides will take all necessary measures in order to facilitate the transfer of persons and property.

"Article 4. No one will be the object of measures of reprisal because of his previous political activities in favor of one of the sides.

"Article 5. The security of French and foreign Nationals as well as the safety of their property will be assured throughout the territory of Vietnam by the responsible authorities who must take all necessary measures to this effect. No legislative, administrative or judicial measure may be taken against these persons and their property in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner."

JOHNSON

396.1 GE/7-1354 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1954—5:33 p. m.

Tosec 549. Secto 600.<sup>2</sup> With respect USDel comment that French outline agreement for Vietnam provides for cease-fire before international control mechanism is installed and ready to act, Department refers to numbered paragraph 17 French working paper (Secto 575<sup>3</sup>) which says "International Control Commission is to be on the spot from the moment of the cessation of hostilities in Indochina." Similar provision made for Laos and Cambodia in working paper transmitted

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA. Repeated to Paris as telegram 205 and to Saigon as telegram 203.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 13, 1957.

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 8, p. 1305.

Secto 605.<sup>4</sup> This point should be clarified. Further comment on Sectos 600 and 606<sup>5</sup> will have to await spelling out of conditions under the several headings.<sup>6</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>4</sup> Dated July 14, p. 1369.

<sup>5</sup> Dated July 14, p. 1372.

<sup>6</sup> The U.S. Delegation reported in telegram Secto 651, July 18, that "With regard to refrel [Tosec 549], USDel can only point out that if agreement for cease-fire in Indochina is reached in next couple of days and if date for cease-fire is set, as would appear inevitable, fairly soon, cease-fire will take place in absence of functioning international control commission on spot. This result seems to us as undesirable as it is inevitable. It reflects long standing conference deadlock on major principles of control arrangements." (396.1 GE/7-1854)

---

396.1 GE/7-1454: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1954—5:33 p. m.

Tosec 550. Secto 601.<sup>2</sup> Vietminh proposal touches on only one phase of possible economic relations between Communist and non-Communist zones Vietnam. As this suggestion raises problem East-West trade, USDel should attempt discover contemplated duration such arrangement if made; nature goods to be exchanged; currency or currencies to be used; control mechanisms to be set up. These problems will necessarily assume importance and affect our attitude toward Geneva agreement if inter-zone trade provision written into it.

Since as Saigon 194<sup>3</sup> states means will be found carry on trade between zones in any case Department interested know why Vietminh may be concerned to regularize it.

While there is reason to fear that formal economic exchange between two zones would work to political advantage Vietminh, some concession this character may be necessary to gain Vietminh acceptance of principle of exchange of populations. It seems likely also such exchanges goods would work to economic advantage Vietminh. However developments past few months in Indochina may have altered circumstances on which this judgment is based. Embassy Saigon should be able furnish timely comment this respect.

Department's initial judgment of French draft submitted Secto 599<sup>4</sup> is it does not adequately cover point six of US-UK reply to French *aide-mémoire* of June 26. That item specifies that provision

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA. Repeated to Paris as telegram 204 and to Saigon as telegram 204.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 14, p. 1358.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1359.

<sup>4</sup> Dated July 13, p. 1356.

shall be made for the "peaceful humane transfer, under international supervision, of those people desiring to be moved from one zone to another of Vietnam." Numbered paragraph (b) does not in our view adequately spell out this provision, and paragraphs (a) and (c) lay too much stress on rights of French and foreign nationals.

DULLES

---

396.1 GE/7-1654 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1954—6 : 37 p. m.

Tosec 553. For Under Secretary from Secretary. There is rising concern which found utterance at my hearing today with Foreign Relations Committee that vast amounts of war matériel from US will fall into hostile hands. I hope that you will have the opportunity to emphasize to French importance of cease-fire terms which will permit safeguarding or at least destroying this matériel.

Hearing as a whole went well and there was no expressed criticism of your return to Geneva.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State.

---

396.1 GE/7-1654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 16, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 626. Repeated information Paris 72, Saigon 44. Saw Chauvel this afternoon. He told me that Mendes-France and Molotov had dinner last night, and Soviets had launched into substantive discussion even before cocktails were served and continued throughout dinner, and Mendes-France and Molotov had discussion following dinner with only interpreters present which lasted more than 3 hours until almost 1 a. m. Discussion covered whole range of outstanding questions at least once; according to Chauvel some of them "twenty times". Chauvel said Mendes had stuck firmly to French positions and with very minor exceptions of elections mentioned below, Molotov had, while being very pleasant, not budged an inch. On elections Molotov finally made suggestion that conference agree on date by which two governments of Vietnam would have decided date for elections. Mendes rejected this. Chauvel's assessment was that Communists expected to find Mendes

“soft”, are somewhat confused at his firmness, and are still testing him.<sup>1</sup>

There have been no other major developments. I called Chauvel's particular attention to paragraph 3 of position paper on Indochina agreed at Paris and noted that French were still using term “guaranteeing powers” in draft armistice, and asked how he perceived the situation in this regard. He said that he conceived guarantee to be more than that embodied in French draft of conference declaration (Secto 597<sup>2</sup>). I pointed out that position paper made it clear that US will express its position unilaterally or in association only with non-Communist states, and was not quite sure how French concept of conference declaration fitted therewith. I said I had particularly instructed Bonsal reserve our position on last paragraph of French draft providing for consultation among conference powers on reports of violations by supervisory commission. Although I had no instructions on subject, I did not believe US would be willing assume continuing obligation consult with all conference powers including Communist China and Viet Minh. Chauvel said that in light of paragraph 3 of position paper, French draft provided only for conference “noting” armistice agreement.

Chauvel said French were concerned over reports continued contacts between Tran Van Do and Dong. They did not know exactly what was happening, they know very little about Do, but they had impression he was unsophisticated and might be “taken into camp” by Dong. They felt after zones between defined and two governments each clearly responsible for own territories, such contacts would probably be desirable and necessary, but in present situation might be dangerous and could even result in surprise move bringing about something in nature of coalition government. Chauvel said De Jean was going to see Bao Dai to determine what Bao Dai knew about the matter and whether he had approved.

In reply to my question on what French conceived to be major outstanding issues, Chauvel listed: (1) military demarcation line in Vietnam, (2) regrouping in Vietnam, particularly in delta area, where Chauvel said Viet Minh would be required to move out two divisions from areas that they now occupied so as permit separation from French-Vietnamese forces. In Laos he said major question was reten-

---

<sup>1</sup> With respect to this meeting the U.S. Delegation reported to the Department of State in telegram Secto 621, July 16, as follows: “Latournelle today told us that in course of dinner meeting with Molotov last night, Mendes-France gave complete statement of French positions on Indochina settlement. Molotov listened attentively and courteously but gave no indication of any yielding from previously assumed Communist positions. According to Latournelle. Molotov behaved like a ‘feather bed’”. (396.1 GE/7-1654)

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 13. p. 1355.

tion small number French troops there (consideration was being given to "changing their flag" from French to Laos), and also political questions in Laos. He said there were no major issues on Cambodia.

Chauvel also mentioned international control and asked whether I had any new instructions on subject. I said I had not and subject had not been discussed at Paris in any detail.

UK informed me today that meeting was proposed this afternoon between Mendes, Eden and Molotov to go over present stage of work of conference and make catalogue of work to be done. They asked whether I wished to be present, pointing out if US were present Soviets would probably insist on presence of Chinese, thus turning meeting into "five-power affair". I replied that I had no objection to their going ahead on three-power basis.<sup>3</sup>

JOHNSON

---

<sup>3</sup> See telegram Secto 632, July 17, p. 1408.

---

396.1 GE/7-1654 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1954—7:38 p. m.

Tosec 555. Secto 597.<sup>2</sup> US position is still that it will not negotiate and sign with Communist bloc any multilateral declaration on Geneva conference or on any agreement issuing therefrom.

With respect French draft we note with concern political content particularly commitment to hold elections in Vietnam at time to be chosen by "competent representative authorities".

Final paragraph draft appears contemplate perpetuation of conference through imposing on participant states obligation to act as referee on matters submitted by International Control Commissions. This seems be off-hand manner of charging such states with obligation to "guarantee" Geneva settlement which US not prepared accept.

Following comments apply to numbered paragraphs Soviet counter-proposal Secto 615<sup>3</sup> and Working Group comments Secto 617:<sup>4</sup>

- 1) Agree with USDel comment.
- 2) Agree with Working Group amendment. Soviet recognition of territorial integrity of Vietnam indicates they have no doubt as to who would win any elections held as early as June 1955.
- 3) It would be interesting know exactly what this paragraph signifies to Soviets. Is this paragraph and its French counterpart in-

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA. Repeated to Paris as telegram 211 and to Saigon as telegram 208.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 13, p. 1355.

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 15, p. 1384.

<sup>4</sup> Dated July 15, p. 1376.

tended to include formal diplomatic recognition all around? How are Vietnam and the Vietminh regimes to be accommodated within this formula?

4) Who are the "parties": military commands? In the Working Group comment on this paragraph what is meant by "representative authority"?

5) Again who are the "parties"? Will Russians openly acknowledge that paragraph applies to Vietminh also?

6) This paragraph is of great interest to US because of prospective Southeast Asia security pact. In its present form it is accordingly wholly unacceptable to us. Do Russians mean it to be applicable to Vietminh also?

7) What is meant by second sentence? Who are "the interested parties"?

8) Agree with French comment. We note that under this proposal elections would have taken place before expiration 380 days French propose as period for separating opposing forces (Gento 81<sup>5</sup>).

9) We consider this paragraph irrelevant and objectionable.

10) As received this paragraph says authorities must not "permit" individual or collective collaboration. We assume this should read "punish", and agree with French comment.

11) Would implementation of this paragraph on movement of persons be left to chance?

12) Department's comment on similar French proposal applies. Laloy's remark on this subject is not clear.

It strikes us that Soviets in this draft have done masterly job of masking existence of Vietminh.

We agree with Laloy's three numbered objections stated at beginning of message.

Question of financing will be taken under advisement.

DULLES

---

\* Dated July 15, p. 1382.

---

396.1 GE/7-1654: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1954—8:14 p. m.

Tosec 557. Secto 618.<sup>2</sup> US-UK seven points<sup>3</sup> given Prime Minister Diem in Secretary's message<sup>4</sup> were edited to eliminate references to Laos and Cambodia and state in general terms territorial conditions as they affect Vietnam. Mention of enclave in northern delta purposely eliminated since condition was softened by phrase "if possible" and

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA and Gullion of S/P. Repeated to Saigon as telegram 210 and to Paris as telegram 216.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 16, p. 1386.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see telegram 4853 to Paris. June 28, p. 1256.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see telegram Tosec 529, July 10, p. 1324.

developments since adoption of seven points indicated unlikelihood that any such enclave could in fact be retained for more than transitional period.

Ambassador Johnson should take appropriate occasion state to Tran Van Do and Ambassador Heath to Prime Minister Diem, that Department fully recognizes justice of Vietnamese Government's claim to sovereignty over all national territory and views loss of northern areas, which it cannot accept as final, as dictated by harsh military necessity. They should also indicate that in our discussions with French and British we specifically stressed great importance of maintaining enclave and that this was implied in our phrase "at least" in point two.

We would welcome any estimate USDel and Saigon can furnish on basis present information with respect Vietnamese intentions, if military agreement does not provide northern enclave. Specifically are they likely to pull out of Geneva? If so will Diem resign or undertake independent action in Vietnam?

It has never yet been made clear how or through what agency Vietnamese people will or will not be associated with agreement between military commands which provides for division of country.<sup>5</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>5</sup> The U.S. Delegation reported in telegram Secto 643, July 18, that "with reference final paragraph reference telegram [Tosec 557], demarcation line will be established through agreement on cessation of hostilities signed by Franco-Vietnamese and Vietminh military commands. Members of conference including Vietnamese Government will presumably 'take note' of agreement (with exception, of course, of US). No other 'association' of Vietnamese people with this purely military division of country is contemplated so far as we are aware." (396.1 GE/7-1854)

---

396.1 GE/7-1654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 16, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 627. Repeated information Paris 73, Saigon 45. After background statement by Laloy for benefit of Associated States representatives who although they had received original French draft declaration to be issued by conference (Secto 597<sup>1</sup>) had only today shortly before meeting received Soviet counterproposal (Secto 615<sup>2</sup>) and new French draft (Secto 628<sup>3</sup>). Laloy also explained reasoning behind new French draft along general lines of conclusions reached at tri-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 13, p. 1355.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 15, p. 1384.

<sup>3</sup> *Infra*.



partite working level meeting yesterday (Secto 617<sup>4</sup>). He gave following as guiding principles in new French text :

1. Separation of Vietnam from Cambodia and Laos;
2. Non-repetition in declaration of matters already handled in proposed military agreements;
3. Maintenance of position regarding not fixing date for elections in Vietnam;
4. Modification of article regarding withdrawal of French troops so that these are now to be withdrawn on request of governments concerned;
5. Acceptance of Soviet idea contained in paragraph 3 of Soviet counterproposal (Secto 615), but
6. By maintaining in brackets portion of Soviet proposal (reproduced in paragraph 9 of new French proposal) to leave this phrase open for further clarification.

Cambodian Ambassador Nong Kimny took issue with paragraph 3 of new draft. He wished to get across idea that Cambodia (as well as Laos) had held periodic elections and would continue to do so. This was finally redrafted so that it now reads "all citizens . . . will be able to take their place in the national community by taking part in the next general elections which, in accordance with the constitutions of each of these countries, will take place by secret ballot respecting fundamental liberties".

With regard to Article 4, Cambodians presented a proposed Cambodian declaration to the effect that for duration of armistice period in Vietnam, Cambodian Armed Forces would be no larger than those sufficient for defense of Cambodia and would not constitute a threat to anyone. He proposed that a definite time period for duration of Vietnamese armistice might be fixed in Cambodian declaration. This proposal was somewhat brusquely disapproved by other delegations including French and Vietnamese who pointed out that it was essential that no time period be set in any way for duration of pre-electoral period in Vietnam. Nong Kimny withdrew his draft and said he would think the matter over.

Sam Sary remarked that proposed declaration in fact gives Cambodia no assurances or guarantees for her security in the future. He entered a general reservation based on fact Cambodian delegation had only received text less than hour before meeting.

After meeting Sam Sary told Bonsal that Cambodia most reluctant to make any commitment with respect to territorial integrity of Vietnam because Cambodia considers boundary between Cambodia and Vietnam was set arbitrarily by President of France and that it leaves

---

<sup>4</sup> Dated July 15, p. 1376.

outside of Cambodia large number of people of Cambodian racial origin. For this reason Cambodia makes a general reservation.

Vietnamese representative (Chau) emphasized need for leaving imprecise duration of pre-electoral period in Vietnam.

UK (Allen) and US (Bonsal) expressed view new text represented considerable progress. US position on not participating in consultation with other conference members regarding questions transmitted to them by international control commissions was reiterated.

After meeting, Bonsal endeavored to make clear to Cambodian delegates that it would not be possible practically to guarantee Cambodian security through any mechanism composed of conference members and subject to Communist veto. He stated that Cambodian security would have to be insured through other means which he was confident US and other interested countries looked forward to discussing with Cambodian Government once satisfactory cessation of hostilities achieved. Such cessation to be satisfactory must not bind hands of Cambodian Government or prevent it from cooperating with other non-Communist states in defense matters.

JOHNSON

---

396.1 GE/7-1654 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 16, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 628. Repeated information Paris 74, Saigon 46. Following is unofficial translation of French redraft of proposed conference declaration prepared following discussion of Soviet draft Secto 615<sup>1</sup> and Secto 617:<sup>2</sup>

"1. The conference takes note of the agreements which terminate hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam and which organize international control and supervision of the implementation of the provisions of these agreements.

2. The conference is pleased to see peace re-established in Cambodia and Laos, which countries, following the placing in effect of the provisions contemplated in this declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities, will be able thereafter to take up, without obstacle, in full independence and sovereignty, their role in the peaceful community of nations.

3. The conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos with reference to their intent of adopt-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 15, p. 1384.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 15, p. 1376.

ing measures which will permit all citizens to take their place in the national community and, especially, re their intentions to proceed to general elections with secret ballot which will take place in accordance with the constitution of each of these countries, with respect for fundamental liberties.<sup>3</sup>

4. The conference also takes note of the declarations of these governments according to which (text to be drafted on the basis of the declarations of the Governments of Laos and of Cambodia re their defense needs).

5. The conference notes that the agreement concerning Vietnam has as its essential goal the settlement of military questions in order to put an end to hostilities, but does not prejudice the solution of other problems related to the definitive restoration of peace in Vietnam. It expresses the conviction that, following the placing in effect of the provisions contemplated in this declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, Vietnam will be able to take up without obstacle, in full independence and sovereignty its role in the peaceful community of nations.

6. The conference declares that the settlement of political problems in Vietnam must be carried out on the basis of respect for the principles of the independence, the unity, and the territorial integrity of Vietnam. This settlement must permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental liberties guaranteed by democratic institutions formed following free elections by secret ballot which will take place under the control of an international commission, composed of representatives of the states' members of the International Control Commission set up by the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, when, in the opinion of the competent representative authorities in each zone, the restoration of peace in the country has made sufficient progress and all the necessary conditions are present in order to permit the free expression of the national will.

7. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities meant to assure the protection of persons and property must be applied in the strictest fashion and particularly must permit everyone in Vietnam to decide freely as to the zone where he wishes to live.

8. The conference notes the declaration of the Government of the French Republic according to which that government is prepared to withdraw its troops from the territories of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam at the request of the governments concerned.

9. The conference takes note of the declarations of the French Government according to which the settlement of all the problems related

---

<sup>3</sup> In telegram Secto 629, July 17, the U.S. Delegation transmitted to the Department of State a new redraft paragraph 3 that the delegation had received from the French. The text of paragraph 3 now read as follows :

"The conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos with reference to their intent of adopting measures which will permit all citizens to take their place in the national community, especially by participating in the next general elections which, in accordance with the constitution of each of these countries, will take place with secret ballot and with respect for fundamental liberties." (396.1 GE/7-1754)

to the restoration and to the strengthening of peace in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam is based upon respect for the independence, the sovereignty, the unity and the territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

In its relations with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, each of the members of the Geneva conference (without prejudice to its political, military, diplomatic or other relations with the states concerned at the time of the signature of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities) undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the said states and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

10. The members of the conference agree to consult together on any question which may be transmitted to them by the International Control Commissions, in order to study the measures which may appear necessary to insure observance of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Indochina.”

Immediately following telegram describes discussion of this draft at working level meeting today attended by France, US, UK and three Associated States.<sup>4</sup>

JOHNSON

---

<sup>4</sup> Telegram Secto 627, July 16, *supra*.

JULY 17, 1954

751G.00/7-1754

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*

SECRET

[GENEVA,] July 17, 1954.

Laloy of the French Delegation tells me that there will be a meeting this afternoon between the French Delegation (Latournelle, Gros, Laloy and Cheysson) and the Viet Minh Delegation in order to go over both the draft military agreements and the draft declaration. The idea is to see whether questions to be settled by Ministers can be separated from those which can be considered purely technical.

In reply to my question, Laloy told me that the Vietnam Delegation will not be represented at this meeting. While the Vietnam Delegation has participated in the military conversations, it is Laloy's view that these are <sup>1</sup> at a higher level and that there is no reason for Vietnamese participation. (I think this is a mistake.)

---

<sup>1</sup> On a copy of this document in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 306, the words "these are" have been stricken and the following words inserted: "today's meeting is".

396.1 GE/7-1654 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1954—1:07 p. m.

Tosec 558. We agree French redraft of proposed conference declaration transmitted Secto 628<sup>2</sup> marks some advance, subject to comments made Tosec 555.<sup>3</sup>

We are however still perturbed by numbered paragraph six which says elections are to be held in Vietnam when "in opinion of competent representative authorities in each zone" such action is feasible. Assuming "competent representative authorities" to mean governments of respective zones, we foresee almost certain disagreement between them with result that elections in Vietminh zone might take place few months hence while being delayed much longer time in non-Communist zone. We fear any disagreement between zones on this issue would tend be resolved in favor Vietminh with corresponding prejudice to interests of free world. How does working group propose such situation should be dealt with?

With reference to numbered paragraph 8, would proposed French declaration state or imply French troops would be withdrawn only "at request of governments concerned" and not before or otherwise?

We agree with Bonsal's remarks to Cambodian delegates, but we do not wish them to be left with impression US will be willing discuss question of Cambodian security only if and when satisfactory cease-fire is achieved throughout Indochina.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup>Drafted by Sturm of FE/PSA. Repeated to Paris as telegram 222 and to Saigon as telegram 217.

<sup>2</sup>Dated July 16, p. 1400.

<sup>3</sup>Dated July 16, p. 1396.

751G.00/7-1754

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal) to the Deputy United States Representative and Coordinator of the Delegation (Johnson)*

SECRET

[GENEVA,] July 17, 1954.

Subject: Final Conference Declaration

Paragraph 10 of the current French draft declaration<sup>1</sup> for issuance by the Conference reads as follows:

"10. The members of the Conference agree to consult together on any question which may be transmitted to them by the international

---

<sup>1</sup>For full text, see telegram Secto 628, July 16, p. 1400.

control commissions, in order to study the measures which may appear necessary to insure observance of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Indochina.”

We have consistently taken the position that we would not consult with the Communist powers regarding matters related to Indochina after the close of the present Conference. Therefore we should either suggest that this paragraph be omitted or that it merely provide that the international commission will report to the Geneva Conference powers on such matters related to the implementation of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities as the international commission has not been able to handle.

The following wording might be appropriate in the event the latter alternative is accepted :

“10. The International Control Commission (or Commissions) will inform the members of the Conference regarding the progress of its (their) work and particularly regarding questions which appear to involve a threat to the successful implementation of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities. In the event that unanimity is not achieved in the preparation of such reports, any member or members of the Commission may communicate directly with the members of the Geneva Conference.”

---

396.1 GE/7-1754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 17, 1954—3 p. m.

Secto 630. Repeated information Paris 76, Saigon 48. Caccia gave Johnson brief account of Mendes-France, Eden, Molotov meeting last night. More complete account will be received and transmitted later today.<sup>1</sup> The three met for approximately three hours, from 6 until 9 p. m.

It was agreed the following eight documents are working papers before some or all conference members: French draft cease-fire agreement on Vietnam, French draft cease-fire agreement on Laos, French draft cease-fire agreement on Cambodia, Viet Minh draft cease-fire agreement on Vietnam (not yet received by US delegation), French draft control organization for Vietnam, French draft control organization for Laos and Cambodia, declaration by Cambodia on military and political matters and similar declaration by Laos (neither country has yet presented drafts), and French-Russian drafts and counter-drafts on final declaration of conference.

---

<sup>1</sup> Telegram Secto 632, July 17, p. 1408.

Discussion then turned to substantive issues, with Mendes listing: (1) line in Vietnam, (2) elections in Vietnam, (3) international control organization as major issues requiring ministerial decision. Molotov added (1) time required for completion regrouping; that is, French proposal for 380 days vs. Communist proposal for maximum for six months; (2) prevention of entry of arms, ammunition and foreign forces to all three states; (3) foreign bases in all three states; (4) nonentry of three states into military alliances. Eden added regroupment in Laos.

There was vigorous but inconclusive discussion on three French points, neither side moving from previously stated positions.

The Laotian delegation informs us that they had talk with Viet Minh this morning with completely negative results. The Viet Minh demand about half the country for regroupment zone for Pathet Lao and at same time that there be formed for entire country government of national unification in which Pathet Lao would be represented. These demands were rejected by Laotian delegation.

Latournelle tells us that at Mendes-France dinner for Molotov July 15, Molotov on two occasions referred to US as "war-like power".<sup>2</sup> Mendes-France denied this stating that he would not have gone to Paris to see Secretary unless he was convinced sincerity US desire for restoration of peace in Indochina on terms which Mendes-France believes acceptable and honorable.

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> This meeting was reported in telegram Secto 626, July 16, p. 1394.

396.1 GE/7-1854: Telegram

*Smith-Eden-Mendès-France Meeting, Geneva, July 17, Afternoon:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 18, 1954—11 a. m.

Secto 638. From the Under Secretary. Limit distribution. I met with Eden and Mendes-France at the latter's residence yesterday afternoon. Previous to Eden's arrival I had a few minutes with Mendes-France alone and gave him full background regarding my role here and regarding impossibility that US should sign any conference document with Communist powers. I read him extracts from my letter of instructions. I made clear that these applied also to current French draft of declaration to be issued by conference. I also emphasized extreme importance of evacuating military equipment in order that it should not fall into Communist hands. I said that if there were any difficulties of local evacuation from advanced posts, heavy

equipment should rather be destroyed on spot than abandoned to enemy. He said instructions to this effect already issued, and all equipment would be needed in south. However he would send urgent message emphasizing this. He understood my own role here and was grateful for your personal message, which I had made a little florid.

When Eden arrived, the three of us began with extensive discussion of status of international control. Minor issue of number of commissions (one or three) and coordinating mechanism if three commissions appears on way to solution with Viet Minh acceptance of three commission principle.

So far as voting is concerned, it appeared to us all that we would have to accept majority voting on minor or routine questions and unanimity for major matters. We speculated as to possibility of securing acceptance of majority vote to determine which are minor and which major matters. There was general agreement that built-in veto, in view probable composition of commission (see below) might work more to our advantage if solid "neutral" on our side was included in commission.

Chauvel stated that two French working papers on controls (Sectos 575<sup>1</sup> and 605<sup>2</sup>) had been circulated to other members of conference but that no counter-proposals had yet been received from Communists. Molotov had indicated to Eden that he saw no particular problem with French papers on this subject. Those papers, however, do not cover matter of composition.

On composition we agreed that Communists would not drop demand that at least one Communist power be included. We tentatively therefore agreed that best position might be Colombo powers plus one Communist power plus one Western neutral (Belgium or Canada were mentioned, although it was recognized Canada would probably be unacceptable because of Commonwealth ties).

On question of freedom of movement for international commission it was general view that commission would not in fact receive necessary facilities for thorough timely inspections throughout Viet Minh zones and that therefore to insist on theoretical freedom of movement would probably favor other side more than ourselves.

I then made clear that US could not agree any proposal requiring all conference members consult on reports supervisory commissions. I added that we did not wish in any way to perpetuate conference. I suggested, however, we would have no objection if, in armistice document rather than in conference declaration, statement were made that

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 8, p. 1305.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 14, p. 1369.



the international commission would report on its work and particularly on difficulties encountered to members of conference. Mendes-France and Chauvel both stated they feared this would result in a control commission having no "top" although they recognize futility of a guarantee system in which Communists participate. Chauvel pursued subject of trying to get something into conference declaration on this subject of which all members could "take note" and which would bind none to consultations.

Turning to subject of demarcation line Eden expressed hunch that final settlement would be near eighteenth parallel. He wondered whether it might not be possible to trade some nonessential area between seventeenth and eighteenth parallels for position on elections which we could all accept. French have three successive positions on lines between seventeenth and eighteenth parallels which they intend present as necessary in negotiations. Mendes-France stated that our interests require delay of at least two years before elections. Soviet thinking on election date seems to be any time in 1955. Mendes-France stated that on this point therefore French and Soviets are only about six months apart, since French could accept date mid-1956.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/7-1754

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal) to the Deputy United States Representative and Coordinator of the Delegation (Johnson)*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 17, 1954.

De Latournelle telephoned me at 5:20 this afternoon to say that he and Gros and Cheysson would like to call on me to discuss the proposed French draft declaration to be issued by the Conference. It was suggested that Mr. Phleger might also be present at this meeting.

After consulting with you, I telephoned de Latournelle at 5:55 and stated that in view of the conversation which General Smith had had with M. Mendes-France this afternoon and in view also of the third point of the joint French-US position paper prepared in Paris on July 15, there did not seem to be any useful purpose served by further US working level participation in the discussion of this declaration. I suggested that if there was anything unclear in the situation it should probably be discussed directly by General Smith and M. Mendes-France.

De Latournelle stated that he would report our conversation to Mendes-France.

396.1 GE/7-1754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 17, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 632. Repeated information Paris 79, Saigon 50. Following account of Mendes-France-Eden-Molotov meeting last night is based on report of this meeting to Foreign Office made available to Johnson by Caccia. This telegram expands upon and supersedes preliminary account transmitted in first three paragraphs Secto 630 (repeated information Paris 76, Saigon 48).<sup>1</sup>

At Eden's suggestion, French enumerated documents before conference:

(a) Armistice agreements to be signed by local commanders-in-chief. French have prepared drafts for Vietnam and Laos and Cambodians draft for Cambodia. Viet Minh delegation preparing counter draft for Vietnam.

(b) Control arrangements. French have circulated papers for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

(c) Political arrangements. After having seen military documents, certain delegations might make unilateral statements. For example, Laos and Cambodia are preparing statements on their willingness to limit their armed forces. Conference as whole would then agree upon common statement taking note of military agreements and unilateral declarations. French have circulated draft of such statement. Soviets have prepared counter draft and French second redraft.

French explained that if conference did not have time to agree on all details of armistice, it might approve only parts providing for cessation of hostilities and first stage of regroupment. Remaining aspects of agreements could be covered by statement of general principles for guidance of experts who would work out details after conference had dispersed.

It was agreed that British, French, and Soviet experts would meet July 17 to consider various drafts.

At Eden's suggestion, Mendes-France summarized main outstanding problems as (a) demarcation line for Vietnam, (b) elections, and (c) control arrangements. Concerning demarcation line, he said French had proposed line near 18th parallel whereas Viet Minh proposed 16th parallel. On elections in Vietnam, he said question was whether to fix firm date now (Soviets had proposed June 1955) or whether, as French proposed, to settle now only manner in which date would be set. Elections in Laos and Cambodia already provided for in constitutions for August and September 1955, respectively. On control, he said main questions were: Whether there should be one commission

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 17, p. 1404.

or three, composition, voting, execution of commissions' recommendations, and freedom of movement for inspection teams.

Molotov added to outstanding issues: (d) time required for regrouping (French have proposed 380 days and Soviets 6 months); and (e) prevention of importation of new arms and military personnel subject to certain exceptions for Laos and Cambodia, prohibition of foreign military bases, and prohibition of military alliances by three states.

Eden added (f) question of regroupment areas for resistance forces in Laos.

Discussion then turned to substantive issues:

(a) *Elections in Vietnam*. Molotov said conference should fix date for elections. He conceded more flexible formula might be found than firm date of June 1955 previously proposed by Soviets and suggested agreement merely that elections be held during 1955 with precise date to be fixed by Vietnamese and Viet Minh authorities.

Mendes-France argued that it would be imprudent to fix date as early as the end of 1955. He suggested two ways of providing necessary flexibility in arrangements: Date for elections might be fixed after completion of regrouping; or exact date might be fixed now and international control commission be given authority to advance date if necessary.

Eden supported Mendes-France on need for flexibility and suggested that two parts of Vietnam fix date after completion of regrouping. Mendes-France agreed to consider this suggestion, but Molotov continued to urge elections during 1955.

(b) *Demarcation line*. Molotov argued that in moving from 13th to 16th parallel, Viet Minh had made substantial concession which called for proper response from French. Mendes-France disagreed, arguing that Viet Minh would be giving up much less in Annam than they would be getting in Tonkin. He said that Pham Van Dong had admitted that line on 16th parallel would require special arrangements for Tourane, Hue, on route No. 9 leading into Laos. Mendes-France stated that necessity for such special arrangements showed how unnatural demarcation line at 16th parallel would be. He said that there was no chance of persuading French Government to accept line which excluded either Hue or route No. 9. Eden supported Mendes-France.

Molotov suggested that discussion move to question of control arrangements. Mendes-France replied might be better to postpone such discussion. He observed that questions of elections and demarcation line had been discussed together and might be linked in sense that conceivably one party might yield on one question and another party on other.

396.1 GE/7-1754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1954—7:37 p. m.

Tosec 562. 1. Final report US-UK study group on SEA defense being cabled.<sup>2</sup> Rob Scott requests you make copies available Eden to which we fully agree.

2. Scott asking UK govt to concentrate on two immediate questions:

*a.* US position that working group of representatives US, UK, France, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand should be formed immediately to prepare recommendations on terms of collective security treaty.

*b.* US position that declaration of intent should be issued quickly whether or not there is a settlement at Geneva.

3. We hope Eden will not continue emphasize efforts toward persuading Colombo Powers at expense moving ahead rapidly on collective defense arrangement.

4. We will, of course, continue our consultations with Australia, New Zealand, Philippines and Thailand.

5. FYI study group agree copies report should not be given other countries but there was informal understanding Australia, New Zealand and Canada could receive copies, which is being followed up here.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Galloway of C.

<sup>2</sup> *Infra.* For background information on the establishment of the Joint U.S.-U.K. Study Group on Southeast Asia, see volume XIII.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 254 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1954—8 p. m.

Tosec 563.

[REPORT OF THE JOINT U.S.-U.K. STUDY GROUP ON SOUTHEAST ASIA]

## ITEM I

*Terms of Reference:*

“Assuming France-Associated States and Vietminh reach agreements on Indo-China, which the US and UK are willing to respect—

(*a*) The precise terms on which the UK and US might be willing to be associated with such agreements; and

(b) The basis on which the free Asian and other interested non-Communist states might be brought into association with the agreements.”

1. There was discussion of the methods of association with such agreements. The UK members preferred a multilateral declaration to be signed by all the countries taking part in the Indo-China phase of the Geneva conference and as many other interested South and South-east Asian states as possible. The US members stated that provided the agreements met US specifications, the US, at the conclusion of the Geneva conference, would be prepared to make a unilateral statement of US policy to the effect that the US would respect the agreements in the sense of applying thereto the non-force principles of Article 2 (4) and (6) of the UN Charter. The US would gladly welcome non-Communist co-signers. The US members were not prepared to envisage negotiating the terms of such a unilateral statement of US policy either directly with the Communists at Geneva or indirectly through discussion of the terms with the Indians or other countries.

2. The US members defined an agreement which the US could respect as being one which (a) in its view substantially fulfilled the seven points communicated to the French by the UK and US<sup>1</sup> and subsequently accepted by France (July 14, 1954);<sup>2</sup> and (b) the Associated States accepted.

3. The UK members pointed out that the UK would wish to make a declaration in a form which as many as possible of other interested states might feel able to use. Some of these countries might not be members of the UN, or not represented there. The UK might therefore wish to avoid too many detailed references to provisions of the Charter, and refer only to the general principles of the UN, in order to secure as wide agreement as possible on the substance and terms of a declaration in respect of an Indo-China settlement.

4. On the assumption that agreements are reached on Indo-China which the US and UK members are willing to respect, the UK members stated that the free Asian and other non-Communist states should be encouraged to bring themselves into association with the agreements on the same basis as the US and the UK. The UK members considered that the first step in securing the support of these powers for a collective defense system would be to induce them to associate themselves with an Indo-China settlement. This would not only help to make that settlement durable and effective, it would also be valuable in the event of violation and in the event of an appeal to the UN.

---

<sup>1</sup> The seven points were contained in telegram 4853 to Paris, June 28, p. 1256.

<sup>2</sup> The French acceptance was contained in the U.S.-France Position Paper, July 14, 1954, p. 1363.

5. The US members agreed that it would be valuable to have free Asian and other interested non-Communist states associate themselves with whatever declarations the US and the UK might make. The US members stated, however, that the value was not so great that the US would be disposed to exert political pressure on other non-Communist countries to associate themselves with the declaration which the US might make.

6. Agreed recommendations on Item I.

The Study Group agreed that provided agreements are reached which the two governments can respect :—

*a.* The US and UK should each issue a declaration of policy in respect of the agreements.

*b.* The terms of the US and UK declarations should be as similar as possible.

*c.* These declarations should conform to the purposes and principles of the UN and should contain a statement that the issuing government would not use force to disturb the agreements.

*d.* It would be desirable for as many interested non-Communist countries as possible to issue similar or identical declarations.

ITEM II

*Terms of Reference :*

“Assuming an Indo-China agreement, the terms of a collective security pact regarding Southeast and possibly South Asia, designed—

*a.* To deter and if necessary to combat Communist aggression by making it clear that it would be met by prompt and united action and would involve grave consequences ;

*b.* To provide machinery for effective cooperation in defense of the area against aggression and for assisting the lawful governments to resist Communist infiltration and subversion ;

*c.* To commit the members to take, in accordance with their constitutional processes, such action as is deemed necessary, including the use of armed force, in the event of Communist aggression covered by the pact ;

*d.* To protect Laos, Cambodia, and that part of Vietnam remaining free after any agreement, whether or not they are free to participate under the terms of the agreement.”

7. [*a.*] The Study Group agreed that drafting a collective security treaty should be a matter for negotiation between all the founder members.

*b.* The US members submitted an informal draft text of a collective security treaty for Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, as an indication of US thinking.

(Annex A<sup>3</sup>). The US members stated that they had also made this draft available to certain of the other potential founding members of a collective security arrangement.

c. The UK members made some preliminary comments on the American draft. The UK comments are given in Annex B.<sup>4</sup> The UK members considered that it was premature to submit a text until clear agreement had been reached between the two governments on the nature and purposes of the proposed treaty, and on the timing and negotiations with other powers. They were therefore unable to associate themselves with the US members in submitting a text at this stage.

#### 8. Main features of a collective security treaty.

The Study Group agreed on the main features of the proposed treaty. These features are indicated in the following recommendations, which, however, do not attempt to use language suitable for inclusion in the treaty.

a. Purpose. The purpose of the treaty is to block the expansion of Communist influence in the general area of South and Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. The group recognized that this might take several forms: Overt aggression; infiltration and subversion coupled with Communist assistance to armed rebellions or Communist interference in civil wars; or Communist infiltration and subversion without resort to violence. The group agreed that provision should be made in the treaty against all these contingencies.

#### b. Membership.

(1) The initial membership of the collective security treaty should include UK, US, Australia, New Zealand, France, Thailand and the Philippines and other Southeast Asian states (Burma and Indonesia) if they are willing. The initial membership could also include other states which, on the basis of informal consultations, indicated their desire to participate.<sup>5</sup>

(2) Cambodia, Laos, and non-Communist Vietnam should be participants if the arrangements at Geneva should permit this.

(3) After entry into force of the treaty, invitations to other states to accede to the treaty, or to associate themselves with it, could be issued upon unanimous agreement of the parties to the treaty.

#### c. Nature of the commitment.

Each party should agree:

(1) To assist the lawful governments to maintain and develop their capacity to resist armed attack and Communist infiltration and subversion, through help in the military, police, intelligence, information, economic, technical, and other relevant fields.

<sup>3</sup> Annex A, a draft treaty text dated July 9, is printed in volume XII.

<sup>4</sup> Annex B is printed *ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> For clarification of paragraph 8.b. (1), see telegram Tosec 566, July 18, p. 1431.

(2) To consult together in order to agree on the measures which should be taken whenever in the opinion of one of the parties the territorial integrity, political independence or security of one of the parties, or the peace of the area, is endangered.

(3) In the event of overt Communist aggression in the area of the treaty, to take in accordance with its constitutional processes such action as it deems necessary including the use of armed force.<sup>6</sup>

*d. Geographical scope of the commitment.*

(1) The commitment in paragraph *c*(3) above should cover:

(a) Local territory of parties to the treaty in the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southwestern Pacific;

(b) Laos and Cambodia and non-Communist Vietnam whether or not they are parties to the treaty;

(2) Provision should be made to allow countries not participating in the treaty to be covered, by agreement, by the commitment in paragraph *c*(3) above.

(3) The treaty should permit later enlargement of its geographical scope.

*e. Organization.*

The treaty should contain no more than a simple and generalized description of a council; precise organization should be left to discussion with other participating countries and to development by the council. Among the subjects the council should consider would be:

(1) Establishment of such permanent machinery as might be needed;

(2) Interim arrangements pending the completion of (1) above;

(3) Arrangements for the association of countries not parties to the treaty with work of the organization.

*f. Duration.*

The treaty should be of indefinite duration with the provision that any party may cease to be a party one year after notice of denunciation.

9. Considerations affecting timing.

*a.* The group agreed that any agreements reached at Geneva would register a considerable gain for the Communist bloc in Southeast Asia. In the wake of such agreements there would be left an unstable situation in those areas of Indochina remaining free. At the same time those agreements would increase the tendency of the other non-Communist states in the area to accommodate themselves to the prospect of further Communist encroachment. These considerations underlined the necessity for urgent conclusion of collective security arrangements. The group also recognized the importance of securing the backing of the Colombo powers in halting the expansion of Communist influence.

<sup>6</sup> For clarification of paragraph 8.c.(3), see telegram Tosec 566, July 18, p. 1431.



The attitude of these powers toward the collective security arrangement would be important. It would be desirable that these powers should at least acquiesce in the establishment of such an arrangement.

b. The UK members believed that strong efforts to secure the participation of the Colombo powers in the collective security arrangement or at least their acquiescence in its formation should be made prior to the negotiation of the treaty. In the long run the general aim of blocking Communist expansion in the area will be governed by the support that can be obtained from the peoples and governments of the area. The UK, therefore, considered that immediate negotiations of a collective security arrangement prior to consultation with the Colombo powers would prejudice the eventual attitude of the latter thus endangering the ultimate object of the treaty.

c. The US members believed that explorations with the Colombo powers should not delay the formation of a security arrangement for the area. The US members recognized the possibility that speedy establishment by other countries of a collective security arrangement might engender temporary opposition on the part of some of the Colombo powers; they believed, however, that in the long run the immediate creation of a strong defense against Communist expansion in Southeast Asia would lead to eventual cooperation by South Asian countries. The US members believed that the political emergency created by a Communist victory at Geneva should be met by immediate action to serve notice that Communist expansion in Asia had reached its limit. The US members believed that delay in the formation of a collective security agreement would probably result in a deterioration in the area of South and Southeast Asia which in the end could well render impossible the conclusion of any effective security arrangement, additional to the US security arrangements with others in the area. The US members believed, therefore, that the collective security arrangement should be negotiated forthwith, with those nations now ready to proceed in the establishment of an effective collective defense system in the general area of the South and Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

#### 10. Declaration of intention.

a. The US members considered that even if there were agreements at Geneva, the urgency of the situation was such, and the probable length of time before a treaty could be signed and ratified was such, that it would be important to have the founding countries issue a statement of intent to conclude a treaty, and immediately to establish *ad hoc* machinery pending the ratification of such a treaty. The US submitted a draft declaration (Annex C) <sup>7</sup> as an indication of US thinking.

---

<sup>7</sup> Annex C is printed in volume XII.

The US members stated that copies of this draft had been made available to other potential signatories of such a declaration.

b. The UK members doubted whether it would be necessary, in the event of a settlement in Indo-China, to issue a declaration of intent, but did not exclude this possibility.

### ITEM III

#### *Terms of Reference:*

“Assuming no agreement on Indochina—

a. The form of collective defense pact for the purposes outlined in paragraph 2, which would be suitable to the situations;

b. The action to be taken in respect of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.”

11. The group agreed that the main features of a collective security treaty which would be suitable in the event of no agreement on Indochina should be similar to those proposed by the group in the event of a settlement.

#### 12. Timing.

The group agreed that in the event of a failure of the negotiations at Geneva the establishment of a collective security treaty would become more urgent.

a. The UK members considered that a strenuous effort should be made to enlist the support of the Colombo powers and that this consideration should be kept in mind in deciding how to proceed with the negotiation of the treaty.

b. The US members believed that the situation would require negotiation of a treaty with the utmost dispatch by those nations ready to participate in such a treaty.

#### 13. Declaration of intention.

The group agreed that in the event of failure of the negotiations at Geneva:

a. It would be desirable that each of the 2 governments should issue a declaration of intent to conclude with other interested countries a collective security treaty.

b. It would be desirable that as many other potential members of the treaty as possible should issue similar declarations, and that they should be consulted urgently to this end.

The US members believed that the issue of a declaration would, in the event under consideration, be not only desirable but imperative and that the declaration should provide for the immediate formation of *ad hoc* machinery by the potential founding members of a security treaty.

The UK members considered that the text of the declaration of intent should be simple and general and drafted with the Colombo powers in mind.

14. In the event of no agreement being reached at Geneva the study group recognized that decisions of high policy on the action to be taken in respect of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam would be required. Among others, consideration should be given to the following:

(a) Invitations to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to join the security treaty.

(b) Appeals to the Security Council by Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

(c) The opening of military discussions with the French.

(d) Further measures to ensure the political stability and defense of Thailand.

#### ITEM IV

##### *Terms of Reference:*

"The procedure for bringing other interested nations promptly into these negotiations".

15. The group noted that consultations have already been undertaken with representatives of Australia, and the Colombo powers.

16. The group recommended that the problem of further consultations concerning a declaration in respect of an Indo-China settlement should be dealt with by the representatives of the two governments at the Geneva conference. (The respective views of the UK and US members are covered under Item I of this report).

17. a. As regards consultation with other powers on the projected Collective Security treaty, the US members believed that a working group with representatives of the UK, US, Australia, New Zealand, France, Thailand, and the Philippines should be established in Washington immediately to prepare agreed recommendations on the terms of a Collective Security pact regarding Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, and to prepare agreed recommendations on the terms of a declaration of intent. Consultations should be undertaken with the Cambodians, Laotians and Vietnamese as appropriate.

b. The United Kingdom members believed that such a working group should not be set up until the views of the two governments on this report were known and that in any case the establishment of the group should be preceded by individual soundings of the views of all potential participants in the treaty. Meanwhile consultation with other powers should be in general terms on an individual and not collective basis.

396.1 GE/7-1754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 17, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 633. Rptd info Paris 80, Saigon 51. Nguyen Huu Chau of Vietnamese delegation handed USDel copy of note<sup>1</sup> which was given to French delegation today. He said French requested contents be kept secret for moment, and that French not aware copy given to this delegation. Following is unofficial translation :

“Just as the French High Command in Indochina evacuated, without fighting and in spite of the strongest protests by President Ngo Dinh Diem, zones vital for the defense and the existence of a free Vietnam, the delegation of the Vietnamese National Government learned only by the papers and by the messages which were sent to it yesterday, July 16, that the French delegation appears already to have accepted abandoning to the Viet Minh all of that part situated north of the eighteenth parallel and that the delegation of the Viet Minh might claim an even more advantageous demarcation line.

The National Government of Vietnam has also been left in complete ignorance of the proposals on the fate of Vietnam made by the French Government to the American and British Governments, particularly at the meeting in Paris.

The delegation of the State of Vietnam must express its surprise at this situation.

This delegation finds it hard to understand that peace in Vietnam is being negotiated without previously consulting with its qualified representatives.

The *de facto* partition which seems to have been adopted from the outset by the delegations of France and of the Viet Minh—at discussions bearing only on the materialization of the partition—does not take any account of the unanimous will for national unity of the Vietnamese people.

On the other hand the regroupment of non-national armed forces in the zones resulting from the partition implies their consolidation outside of any danger of combat and thus reinforces the threat that they constitute to the free expression of the will of the people.

Therefore not only does such a cease-fire not lead to a durable peace, since, ignoring the will for national unity, it provokes the people to ‘unify’ the country, but by the consolidation of the armed forces now facing each other, it violates in advance the liberty of the future elections.

The delegation of the State of Vietnam, which more than any other wishes the return of peace, is pleased with the efforts put forth by the other delegations in favor of this object. However, it greatly fears that the cease-fire, such as it seems to be accepted by certain delegations, far from leading to peace, makes peace improbable and precarious.

Aware of these very grave dangers and certain that it is expressing the profound aspirations of all true Vietnamese, including most of the

---

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this note is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 323.

Viet Minh fighters themselves, and in full accord with the Chief and the Government of the State of Vietnam, the Vietnamese delegation asks not only a cease-fire but the disarmament of all the belligerent forces in Vietnam.

The Vietnamese delegation asks that the entire territory of Vietnam be placed provisionally under the control of the United Nations pending the complete re-establishment of security, of order and of peace in their minds and in their hearts which will permit the Vietnamese people to decide their destiny by free elections.

His Majesty Bao Dai, Chief of State of Vietnam, thus shows once more that he places the independence and the unity of his country above any other consideration, and the National Government of Vietnam would prefer this provisional control by the United Nations over a truly unified and independent Vietnam to its maintenance in power in a country dismembered and condemned to slavery.

The Vietnamese delegation reserves its right to develop its proposal at a later time."

SMITH

396.1 GE/7-1754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 17, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 634. Repeated information Paris 81, Saigon 52. French delegation has given us draft of declaration to be made by Laos delegation for our comments. They pointed out language second paragraph taken from USSR-Norwegian treaty, and fourth paragraph from UN charter. Unofficial translation follows:

"The Government of Laos wishes to establish relations with all its neighbors pacifically founded on mutual respect, non-interference, and non-aggression. It considers that the defense of its territory is best assured by its association in the French Union.

The Government of Laos is resolved never to take part in a policy having aggressive goals and will never permit Laotian territory to be used in the service of such a policy.

The Laotian Government will never take part in an agreement with other states if this agreement carries with it for Laos the obligation of establishing bases for the military forces of foreign powers on Laotian territory, as long as Laos is not attacked or exposed to the threat of an attack.

The Government of Laos is resolved to settle its international differences by pacific means, in such a manner that peace and international security, as well as justice, will not be endangered.

The Government of Laos will refrain from recourse to threats or the employment of force either against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any state or in any other manner."

SMITH

396.1 GE/7-1754: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 17, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 635. Repeated information Paris 82, Saigon 53, Phnom Penh 4. Nong Kimny tells us Cambodian Foreign Minister this morning called on Chou En-lai, returning latter's call described Secto 616.<sup>1</sup> He found Chou less conciliatory than on occasion previous conversation. Chou urged that Cambodian government take steps to incorporate resistance elements into Cambodian army, police or civil service. He also spoke with great seriousness and emphasis regarding proposed Southeast Asian pact. He said that if Cambodia were to join such a pact or to permit foreign bases on her territory or to accept American military instructors, the consequences would be very serious and would aggravate the situation with unfortuante consequences for Cambodian independence and territorial integrity. He said that it would be all right for the Cambodians to have French or even British instructors. He made clear that his remarks regarding the Southeast Asian pact, foreign bases and American instructors apply to all three states of Indochina.

According to Nong Kimny, Cambodian Foreign Minister reiterated Cambodian position that Cambodia must retain her freedom of action to insure her own defense.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 15, p. 1378.

396.1 GE/7-1754: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 17, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 636. Repeated information Paris 83. Eden today gave Mendes-France and me following account his talks with Chou En-lai this morning. Chou was most anxious about reports reaching him re recent Paris talks and particularly re US plan to create Southeast Asia pact including Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Chou reiterated his position to effect that he was prepared to join in a guarantee of the freedom and independence of all three Indochinese states but that if these states were to become members of Southeast Asian pact, everything would be changed.

Eden told us that he replied that he knew of no proposal for the Indochinese states to join a Southeast Asian pact but that he would confirm this with General Smith. He told Chou that of course we are

interested in the defense organization of Southeast Asia and he pointed to current Soviet-Communist-Chinese pact as indicating right of nations to join for self-defense. Chou rejoined that this pact was concerned only with Japan, adding that he does not mind ANZUS which also is directed against Japan. He spoke at length on danger of foreign bases in Indochina. Eden told us he said this was nonsense.

I stated to Eden and Mendes-France that it seemed to me that question of whether or not Indochinese states are to be members of Southeast Asian defense pact depends on the outcome of current conference. I added that if we failed here we would have to go ahead and face a different and serious situation.

Later at Eden's villa, I urged upon him the great importance of our being prepared without delay, regardless of how conference comes out, to issue statement of intent to form Southeast Asian defense organism. I said that I hoped that US, UK, Australia, New Zealand, possibly France as well as the Philippines and Thailand could be members initially. Eden stated that he would give serious thought to this matter but added that of course he would have to advise Commonwealth members in South Asia before any action was taken. He promised me a reply on this subject before long.

Turning to general situation here, Eden and I agreed that Communist position, and particularly Molotov's has hardened very considerably in last three or four days. It is evident that Mendes-France has been a great disappointment to the Communists both as regards the relatively firm position he has taken on Indochina and his attitude toward EDC. They may therefore wish to force him out of the government by making settlement here impossible.

SMITH

396.1 GE/7-1754 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 17, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 637. Repeated information Paris 84, Saigon 54. Immediately following close of meeting between Molotov, Eden, Mendes-France this evening at Eden's villa, Caccia gave Johnson detailed account of their meeting of which following is summary.

Molotov opened by referring to four major unsettled questions he had mentioned at meeting last night (Secto 630<sup>1</sup>) saying that he had been unable to find anything in French documents on question of arms, ammunition and troops into Vietnam. It was pointed out to him

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 17, p. 1404.

that French draft armistice agreement on Vietnam dealt with this subject and that proposed French conference declaration covered matter insofar as Laos and Cambodia concerned. Molotov said he would study matter further. Molotov then said he could not find anything with respect to foreign military bases and non-entry of these countries into military alliances. Mendes referred to proposed unilateral declarations by Laos and Cambodia and note to be taken thereof in conference declaration, to which Molotov replied that this was fine, but Russian counter-draft had proposed each power in conference undertake obligation in this regard and French proposal was "not quite the same thing".

There was then discussion of time required for regrouping, in which Mendes pointed out this was military problem; French military estimated 305 days would be required under ideal conditions and that 21½ months had been added for "acts of God" and as a margin of error. He said that there was not only question of military personnel and matériel, but also of civilian population. Molotov appeared to be somewhat surprised at the mention of civilian population and suggested that perhaps that could be handled in some other way. After fairly extensive discussion, it was agreed French and Viet Minh military experts would discuss matter further, Molotov agreeing to urge Viet Minh military meet with French who for some time have been unable to make contact on military level.

Mendes then turned discussion to supervision, during course of which Molotov said the French proposal for three separate commissions for each of Associated States acceptable if there was coordinating committee. During course this discussion, Eden supported Colombo power group and finally suggested that if not acceptable, non-Communist state and one other state be added to Colombo group, pointing out French have conceded issue of unanimity and this would meet Communist point having at least one Communist state. Molotov replied by referring to his previous three-nation proposal, saying he had no other proposal to make and would inform Viet Minh of British suggestion.

On voting, Mendes referred to French paper and Molotov stated, subject to certain drafting amendments, positions not far apart. It was agreed French and Viet Minh civilian experts would meet to discuss drafting changes. Freedom of movement for commission was also raised by Mendes, to which Caccia understood Molotov to reply that this was no problem. However, status of this apparently left vague.

Ministers then asked for report from experts (Tahourdin, Levrishew and Laloy were meeting in separate room on last French draft of conference declaration). However, it appeared that no progress had been made. Soviets, while accepting last French re-draft



as basis for discussion (Secto 628<sup>2</sup>) attempting to re-introduce all items dropped from Soviet counterproposal (Secto 615<sup>3</sup>).

Molotov then suggested a conference meeting be held tomorrow and long discussion ensued with Mendes and Eden attempting prevent meeting and making counter-suggestions of short meeting starting at 5:00 instead of 3:00, etc., but Molotov remained adamant on full meeting. During course of discussion, Molotov indicated Chinese and Viet Minh feel they have perhaps been left out of negotiations a little and have something to say. There was also vague reference by him to General Smith's return and desirability he be "brought back into picture". Matter was left with Molotov to consult with Chinese and Viet Minh on meeting at later hour than 3:00, and UK and France suggested meeting be very restricted with only 2 or 3 present from each delegation. Apparently, Eden and Mendes feel meeting cannot be refused if Communists continue to insist.

Caccia reported that on entering meeting with Molotov, Mendes had requested Eden not to raise question of line and elections, as in talk with Chou which Mendes had just had it appeared some resolution can be found these problems. However, neither Eden nor Caccia had opportunity obtain more full account from Mendes.

French had told Caccia they are immediately replying to Vietnamese note (Secto 633<sup>4</sup>) denying Vietnamese have not been kept fully informed.

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 16, p. 1400.

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 15, p. 1384.

<sup>4</sup> Dated July 17, p. 1418.

---

751G.00/7-1754: Telegram

*The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State*

SECRET

SAIGON, July 17, 1954—midnight.

218. Repeated information Paris 85, Geneva 46. Reference: Secto 601, repeated Paris 52, Saigon 31, July 14.<sup>1</sup> Free exchange of goods between regrouping zones would certainly be of importance to Viet Minh. Practically all of surplus economic areas will be in free zone. Even if Viet Minh get control of coal mines and cement mill north Vietnam, in addition to cotton mills, Viet Minh would still have trouble making their zone self-sustaining due to problems of supply of machinery and raw materials and transportation and marketing difficulties. All of surplus rice and rubber areas would be in free zone.

---

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 1358.

Most of mineral resources would be in Viet Minh zone, but are relatively undeveloped. Viet Minh zone would be deficient in rice.

In summary, after certain amount of reconstruction free zone could be made self-sustaining over longer period of time and with more difficulty.

Free exchange of goods between zones would enormously complicate problem of giving US economic aid to free Vietnam. Free exchange would in effect mean we giving economic aid Viet Minh as pointed out in our telegram 194, sent Geneva 38, Paris 74.<sup>2</sup> Difficulties preventing smuggling between zones, which goes on even under war conditions, would be increased under armistice. However, this should not prevent free world from attempting to put economic pressure on Viet Minh and Communist China.

USOM concurs.

HEATH

---

<sup>2</sup> Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1359.

JULY 18, 1954

396.1 GE/7-1854: Telegram

*Working Level Meeting of Six Delegations, Geneva, July 18, Morning:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 18, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 648. Repeated information Paris 90, Saigon 59. There was working level meeting of friendly delegations this morning in order to consider questions related to conference restricted session this afternoon. Phleger and Bonsal attended for USDel. The French chairman (Roux) said he understood Molotov's main purpose in calling meeting was to study proposed declaration. Text of declaration with agreed and unagreed portions resulting from meeting between UK, USSR and French working level representatives yesterday evening was taken up. These portions covered in Secto 647.<sup>1</sup>

Vietnamese representative Ngo Dinh Luyen (brother of Prime Minister) stated his delegation not in position to express views on declaration which referred to agreement on cessation of hostilities with terms of which Vietnamese Government unfamiliar since it had not participated in negotiation of agreement.

USDel reiterated US reservation on paragraph dealing with consultations and stated that full position of USDel with regard to declaration and to guarantees of results of conference would be made known by chief of USDel.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 18, p. 1438.

It was agreed that in paragraph of proposed declaration sentence would be added to effect "line of demarcation provided in agreement on cessation of hostilities must in no way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary".

There was also some discussion of proposed unilateral declaration to be made by Laotian and Cambodian delegations. Laotian text is contained in Secto 634.<sup>2</sup> Laotian del reserved comment. Cambodian del to whom similar draft had just been submitted stated that his government had previously envisaged unilateral declaration on three subjects:

- (1) Absence of reprisals against resistance movements;
- (2) Intention to hold elections in accordance with Cambodian constitution; and
- (3) Military intentions and limitations. He said that he would prefer to have statement on elections included in unilateral declaration rather than in conference declaration. He wished to avoid impression that holding of elections was something which had been imposed on Cambodia by Communists in course of reaching settlement.

Reverting to conference declaration Cambodian representative (Sam Sary) also stated that his government would have to make reservation regarding articles 6 and 9 in which respect for territorial integrity is mentioned since his government did not wish to disbar itself from negotiations with Vietnamese Government regarding boundary between Vietnam and Cambodia, boundary which Cambodia does not recognize since it was established by unilateral action of French President.

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 17, p. 1419.

---

396.1 GE/7-1854: Telegram

*Smith-Kimny Meeting, Geneva, July 18, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, July 18, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 650. Repeated information Paris 91, Saigon 60, Phnom Penh 5. Cambodian Foreign Minister and Cambodian Ambassador to Washington called on me this morning for discussion of conference prospects. We agreed as to strength and justice of Cambodian position and as to probability Cambodia would come out of conference with assurances Viet Minh invaders would be withdrawn.

Re problems of Cambodia's defense in future, I stated that if Cambodians could create conditions under which they would be able to

import arms and continue to employ French military instructors and technicians, it seemed to me that Cambodia might then, if necessary to secure agreement at conference, make declaration to effect Cambodia does not intend foreign bases on her territory and does not intend to enter military alliances under present circumstances. I stated in this connection that US and other like-minded countries intend to go ahead rapidly and effectively with creation of Southeast Asia pact. If Cambodia could join this pact, so much the better. But if Cambodia were for any reason unable to have a formal relation with the pact, I assured the Cambodian Foreign Minister that, in our view, any aggression overt or covert against Cambodian territory would bring pact into operation even though Cambodia not a member.

I took position that French Union membership afforded Cambodia adequate desirable means of securing through France necessary arms some of which would be American as well as necessary instructors and technicians some of which might well be American trained.

Nong Kimny took careful notes on conversation. Foreign Minister limited himself to statement that Cambodia relies heavily on US for eventual protection against aggression and that Cambodia desires to emerge from current conference with maximum freedom of action re measures Cambodia may take to assure defense.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/7-1854 : Telegram

*Smith-Do-Chuong Meeting, Geneva, July 18, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 18, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 652. Repeated information Paris 93, Saigon 62. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Van Do and Tran Van Chuong called on me this morning. Burden of conversation for Vietnamese was carried by Chuong. Latter referred to meeting with Secretary in Paris and memorandum which he presented at that time.

I expressed our sympathy for present difficulties Vietnam, but emphasized that any division of country was forced by harsh military necessity and that US could only consider such arrangement to be of temporary nature. I said US would not guarantee or recognize a partition and would not associate itself with statement accepting partition as such. However, US would not use force to upset an armistice agreement. I reiterated that no more could be gained at conference table than on battlefield.

In discussion of post-armistice need for Vietnam to maintain and strengthen army, Chuong brought up need for continuing US aid. I

said, in view probable Communist insistence no foreign arms or instructors, it would appear necessary emphasize non-foreign character French Union assistance Chuong objected to US aid being channeled through French, to which I replied that aid could go through French directly to Vietnamese Army. I recalled that I had told Bao Dai to insist to French that Vietnam be permitted reorganize and form autonomous army, but he had not done this.

Chuong noted that Ngo Dinh Diem's request to General Ely for arms for Catholic militia in bishoprics for self defense had been met by French military withdrawal from those provinces. I replied that as military man I understood necessity of French decision in face of Viet Minh strength. It was too bad that better organized autonomous Vietnamese Army had not previously been created; this fault of neither Vietnam nor US, but it was too late to accomplish this in north.

Chuong asked US reaction to situation brought out in his note to effect that Vietnam, after accepting principle military regrouping zones, now being faced with partition. I repeated US does not accept partition, only temporary division through armistice agreement. To Chuong's question about need for military and political build-up of south during division period, I replied it was imperative if there to be any hope for success in eventual elections. Previous to elections south should be cleaned of Viet Minh and strengthened, while during this same period population of north would have had taste of living under Communist rule. After two years, there was hope that elections would turn out favorably.

Chuong asked if Vietnam could count on US aid; I countered by asking if Vietnam would remain in French Union, to which Chuong replied that necessary conditions were full independence and right to leave if they wished. I again made point that Communist insistence on no foreign military assistance might require such aid to go through medium of French Union.

Chuong then went through customary exercise of blaming presence French for strength of Communists. He said Vietnam would use this conference to gain real independence from France.

When I asked if this might not mean departure French troops, he said that was wish of Vietnamese Government; without French, they could successfully appeal to Nationalists and fight Communists. I replied that in such circumstances Communists would walk through the country.

I ended by noting that US would not obstruct conference by insisting on US right to give direct military assistance and training, and that

US certainly not prepared to fight for this principle if Vietnamese refused French channel.

SMITH

396.1 GE/7-1854 : Telegram

*The Head of the United States Delegation (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, July 18, 1954—1 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

Secto 639. For the Secretary from the Under Secretary. Following despatch given us in advance by Topping of Associated Press apparently represents official Chinese Communist position and was given Topping in order that we would become aware of it.<sup>2</sup> It begins:

"The Communist bloc has demanded that the United States guarantee the partition peace plan for Indochina and join in an agreement to neutralize the whole country, a responsible Chinese Communist informant said today.

The informant, who reflects the views of Red China Premier Chou En-lai, said the Communists are hopeful of a cease-fire agreement by next Tuesday's deadline if the Western powers agree to 'bar all foreign military bases from Indochina and keep the three member states out of any military bloc.'

The informant said the Communists are pressing for the stamp of American approval on the armistice agreement—already okayed in principle by Britain and France—which would divide Vietnam between Communist leader Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh and Bao Dai's pro-Western regime.

'We believe that the US as a member of the conference should and is obligated to subscribe to and guarantee any settlement. Morally there is no reason for the US to avoid this obligation.'

But the informant did not rule out the chance of an Indochina cease-fire even if the US refuses to okay the armistice agreement.

The Eisenhower administration has told France and Britain that they can go ahead with their plan for an Indochina settlement based on partition of Vietnam. But Washington has made it clear that it is not ready to associate itself formally with the plan which would sanction putting millions of Vietnamese under Red rule.

The Communist informant said the 'crucial issue' now in the Geneva peace negotiations revolves around whether the Western powers will agree effectively to neutralize Indochina.

'Refusal to join in such a guarantee,' the informant said, 'could seriously deter a final settlement. On other important points in the negotiations we are in agreement or close to it. We are hopeful and we believe that there is time to reach a settlement by July 20.'

<sup>1</sup> Because of the time difference between Geneva and Washington, telegram Secto 639 was received at 9:58 a. m., Washington time, and the reply to Geneva, *infra*, was sent at 12:26 p. m., Washington time.

<sup>2</sup> For background on Topping's talk with the Chinese, see telegram Secto 661, July 19, p. 1448.

French Premier Pierre Mendes-France has promised to resign with his Cabinet if he fails to end the bloody eight-year-old war by next Tuesday. Fall of the French Government probably would doom the Geneva negotiations. The informant declared that American efforts to organize a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) is 'a threat to any possible Indochina agreement.'

'Success or failure of the Geneva Conference may depend on the attitude of the American delegation in this regard,' he added."

The above seems to me extremely significant, particularly in view of the fact that in my discussion with Eden last night he expressed pessimism, which he said was now shared for the first time by Krishna Menon. Latter had begun to feel, as I do, that Molotov wishes to force Mendes-France's resignation. Eden remarked that Molotov had now become the most difficult and intransigent member of Communist delegation. You will note obvious intention to place on shoulders of US responsibility for failure of Geneva Conference and fall of French Government if this occurs.

Molotov is insisting on a meeting this afternoon which French and British are trying to make highly restricted as they are apprehensive of what may occur. If such a meeting is held and if demands are made for US association in any agreement, I will simply say that in the event a reasonable settlement is arrived at which US could "respect", US will probably issue a unilateral statement of its own position. If question of participation Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam in security pact is raised, I will reply that this depends on outcome of conference.

Eden has already told Molotov that security pact is inevitable, that he himself favored it some time ago and that he would not withdraw from that position, but he made the mistake of saying that no consideration had been given to inclusion of Laos and Cambodia.

This final gambit is going to be extremely difficult to play and I do not now see the moves clearly. However, my opinion as expressed to you before leaving, i.e., that Molotov will gain more by bringing down Mendes Government than by a settlement, has grown stronger.

SMITH

396.1 GE/7-1754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      NIACT      WASHINGTON, July 18, 1954—12:26 p. m.

Tosec 565. From Secretary for Under Secretary. Does Secto 637<sup>2</sup> fourth paragraph mean that Eden has given away position which

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 17, p. 1421.

Mendes-France took in Paris, namely that he was willing to have Communist state on Control Commission without veto, or unanimity if no Communist state a member, but he would not take both a Communist state and unanimity rule?

Your Secto 639<sup>3</sup> received. It may be useful for you to bear in mind that Executive has no Constitutional power to give "guarantee". This can only be done by treaty, ratification of which would surely be rejected. Executive can only reaffirm in relation to Indochina its general undertakings expressed in UN Charter.

Am fearful Eden will try to push Mendes-France into agreement far short of 7 Points which will confront us with dilemma of either agreeing to "respect" it or repudiation which might involve our responsibility for breakup. This precisely result which I apprehended and fully discussed with Mendes-France Paris and I must count on him to strive to protect both our countries against consequences of this Communist maneuver which Eden might unwittingly abet.

DULLES

---

<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

---

396.1 GE/7-1854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 18, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 640. Repeated information Paris 86, Saigon 55. Tosec 550, repeated Paris 204, Saigon 204.<sup>1</sup> USDel will remain alert to various points raised in reference telegram concerning economic relations between Communist and non-Communist zones Vietnam. USDel doubts, however, whether detailed economic arrangements will be incorporated in agreement for cessation of hostilities and assumes that these arrangements will be subject of later negotiation between authorities of two zones at which time the US representatives in Saigon and perhaps also in Paris will have an opportunity of making our detailed views known.

Regarding final paragraph of reference telegram on subject humane transfer of populations, USDel assumes these comments made prior to receipt of Secto 622<sup>2</sup> which gives latest French draft on this general subject.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 16, p. 1393.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 16, p. 1392.



396.1 GE/7-1854 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1954—1:41 p. m.

Tosec 566. At conclusion final study-group meeting UK showed us memorandum representing their understanding situation re membership countries as follows:<sup>2</sup>

*"For UK Record*

It was understood that the wording of Para 8b(1) covered the possibility of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon becoming initial members. The US Representative said that they would not in practice interpret it to cover the inclusion of Formosa, Korea or Japan as initial members. He indicated that the US Government had no intention of opening informal consultations with Formosa, Korea or Japan in order to bring them in as initial members, but would not, however, preclude their eventual participation under the provisions of the treaty governing the accession of additional parties."

With respect to area to be covered by pact we made following notation which we gave the British:

"The US Representative made clear to the UK Representatives that in the US view, commitments under Para 8c(3) did not apply to Hong Kong."

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Tyler of EUR/WE and Duvall of OC/T. Repeated to Saigon as telegram 220, to London as telegram 367, and to Paris as telegram 226.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of the report of the U.S.-U.K. Study Group on Southeast Asia, see telegram Tosec 563, July 17, p. 1410.

---

396.1 GE/7-1854 : Telegram

*Twenty-third Restricted Session on Indochina, Geneva, July 18, 4 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 18, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 654. Repeated information Paris 94, London 19, Saigon 63, Tokyo 6, Moscow 7. Department pass Defense; Tokyo pass CINCFE; Saigon pass Vientiane and Phnom Penh. Twenty-third Indochina restricted session Sunday, July 18, Molotov presiding. This session called at urgent request Soviets; French and British had requested that participants be confined to chiefs of del plus one adviser. This latter relaxed to permit two advisers.

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this session (IC Restricted/23) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 279. The minutes indicate that the session convened at 4 p. m. and adjourned at 4:45 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 376-377. This message was transmitted in two sections.

Molotov spoke first, noting that last meeting of Foreign Ministers held on June 19, just one month ago. He believed that today's session presented good opportunity to gauge importance of period which had passed since last meeting and work performed by deputies. He believed that results achieved through private meetings and discussions had been not inconsiderable. Of course, not all of the questions had been resolved nor everything done which had to be done, but one should recognize the value of what had been achieved.

Molotov said first of all he wished to note that as far as the most complicated problem was concerned, that of peace in Indochina, a basis for reestablishment of peace had been achieved as a result private negotiations which had opened possibility of agreement on that question. He believed all participants would attach appropriate significance to this accomplishment. He felt it was also important to recognize the work done with reference to establishment of peace in Laos and Cambodia. In this connection, it is perhaps true that everything had not been done that could be done, but it appeared conference was on way to agreement concerning Laos and Cambodia.

Molotov said that all this shows recent private talks have had success and he expressed belief that such success would continue.

Describing situation as it appeared to him, Molotov noted that drafts for agreements on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and Laos had been presented to conference. Two drafts would be available today. The same was also true for Cambodia. He hoped parties concerned would display goodwill necessary to agree on unresolved points in these drafts.

Molotov noted also [there] were two drafts of Geneva conference declaration dealing with important political matters.

Two drafts have also been presented concerning the question of international control pertaining to implementation of the agreements. Question of control commission has long been discussed and Molotov felt that final agreement on this subject would not require great deal of time.

Molotov concluded by saying that he had made these observations in order to give general picture of the conference at present and that his remarks were naturally not complete. He believed that today's meeting could make progress re the questions under discussion and would contribute to solution of problems facing conference.

After long pause Tran Van Do (Vietnam) spoke next, saying he had learned this morning that today's meeting was to review final declaration of Geneva conference. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, he wished to state firmly that Vietnam del could not associate itself with

any discussion of this declaration. Vietnam position based on following points:

1. Vietnam does not agree to conditions advanced for cessation of hostilities.

2. Vietnam delegation has not as yet advanced proposals on behalf of Vietnam Government for solution of problem based on principles of peace, independence and unity.

With regard point number one, Do referred to French draft of July 16 of conference declaration (Secto 628 repeated Paris 74, Saigon 46<sup>3</sup>). This draft spoke of division of Vietnam into zones. For example, article 6 said settlement must permit Vietnamese people enjoy fundamental liberties guaranteed by democratic institutions formed following free elections supervised by international commission. Elections would take place when in opinion of competent representative authorities in each zone restoration of peace in country has made sufficient progress, et cetera. Article 7 speaks of a settlement which would give Vietnamese people right decide freely as to zone where residence desired.

Vietnamese representative next referred to Soviet draft of July 15 (Secto 615, repeated Paris 63, Saigon 35<sup>4</sup>). Article 8 of Soviet draft speaks of "consultation between competent representative authorities of northern and southern zones of Vietnam". Article 10 states that representative authorities in northern and southern zones of Vietnam, as well as authorities of Laos and Cambodia, will not permit persecution of persons who have collaborated with other side.

In view Vietnamese delegation, this indicates that Vietnam will be divided into north and south zones. Everyone is talking of the division of Vietnam and mention is even made of parallels at which division will be accomplished. Delegation of Vietnam can only protest the idea of partition. Based on point number one cited earlier in statement of Vietnamese representative, Vietnamese delegation flatly rejects both drafts submitted to conference.

Vietnamese representative then stated that Vietnamese delegation has not had opportunity, on behalf of new Vietnamese Government, to express own views. It reserves its right to submit a draft declaration and to elaborate on it at a plenary meeting in near future. Vietnamese delegation therefore requests a plenary meeting for this purpose.

Do noted further that there was no mention of State of Vietnam in either French or Soviet drafts. Vietnamese delegation cannot accept

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 16, p. 1400.

<sup>4</sup> Dated July 15, p. 1384.

declaration or agreement where Vietnam, which invited to conference as existing state, not even mentioned.

After pause following Molotov's request for other speakers, General [Smith] made following statement:

"If no one else desires to speak, I think it would be helpful if I made clear position of US in these last critical days of conference. I do this because I have recently seen the advance drafts submitted to the conference and have had a chance to review them.

"The position of the United States with respect to this conference has consistently been that it is willing to assist, where desired, in arriving at a just and honorable settlement which will contribute to the establishment and maintenance of peace in the area. The United States is not a belligerent in this conflict and it has not and will not seek to impose its views in any way upon the belligerents, who are the parties primarily interested.

"If the agreements arrived at here are of a character which my government is able to respect, the United States is prepared to declare unilaterally that, in accordance with its obligations under the United Nations Charter, and particularly Article II(4), it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, and would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern."

Since no other representatives requested floor following General Smith's statement, Molotov suggested intermission. After intermission had lasted for 45 minutes, it was informally agreed that meeting should be adjourned without returning to conference room. No communiqué issued.

*Comment:* Today's restricted session strangest performance to date. Apparent Molotov had not set stage even with Communist colleagues for any particularly important announcement despite his insistence that meeting be called. Molotov had said to Mendes-France just before meeting that he thought would be well underline progress made and to show how close conference was to reaching agreement.

During recess, Chou En-lai said he had no desire make any statement. He seemed as much in dark as everyone else as to why Soviets had called meeting.

SMITH

361.1 GE/7-1854: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 18, 1954—6 p. m.

Secto 644. Limit distribution. Eden has just given us following draft message to Colombo powers, Australia and New Zealand (re

Tosec 562<sup>1</sup>) which he is today transmitting to capitals concerned for delivery as soon as London approval received. He expects this will be forthcoming tomorrow. I told Eden I thought we would want to make similar communication to Philippines and Thailand, that it would be somewhat different because they had already agreed in principle to this move, but that we should synchronize our approaches. He undertook to have London inform Washington directly of UK Government approval.

Further comment follows in separate message.<sup>2</sup>

Language in brackets [*parentheses*] is original UK text<sup>3</sup> which Eden agreed to amend at my suggestion.

*Begin text:*

*Draft message to Colombo powers, Australia and New Zealand*

"We are now in the critical concluding phase of the Geneva conference. We are all working very hard for an agreement, to which I attach the greatest possible importance. I still hope one may be reached.

"If it is, I trust that we may count upon all of the Colombo powers as well as upon other countries, to endorse it and to associate themselves with it in some way. This would very greatly strengthen peace in Asia. I shall communicate with you again as soon as possible about this once we have got agreement.

"The chances of agreement are still in my opinion no better than even. In these circumstances we are bound in prudence to consider the action to be taken in the interests of peace if we fail. A very grave situation would at once arise and it would be of crucial importance that common action on the widest possible basis should be taken urgently in order to stabilize it.

"In my view the best action would be an early announcement that countries of the Commonwealth and of South and Southeast Asia, together with the United States and France had all agreed to work together to ensure their common defense.

"As you know, we have long been in favor of creating a broadly based defensive organization for Southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific. Such a system is needed whether or not agreement is reached here. But if agreement is not reached then the need will become far more urgent and joint planning should begin at once.

"HMG have accordingly decided in that event to join with the United States Government, and with such other interested governments as are willing to take part, in making an early declaration of their intention to establish such an organization (begin such joint discussion). They greatly hope that the government of \_\_\_\_\_ will also be ready to make such a statement. You will see that no place is mentioned and we would like your views upon this. A draft showing the

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 17, p. 1410.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram Secto 649, July 18, p. 1439.

<sup>3</sup> The original text of the message from Foreign Secretary Eden to the governments of the five Colombo Powers, Australia, and New Zealand, July 18, is filed in 751G.00/7-1854.

form such a statement might take is contained in my immediately following telegram.

"We shall be glad to have your very early views on this proposal. A similar invitation is being addressed to the governments of \_\_\_\_\_.

*"Draft declaration"*<sup>4</sup>

"The government of \_\_\_\_\_ desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in Southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific and convinced that the situation calls for them to be prepared for the exercise in this area of the inherent right of collective self-defense, recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, have decided to set up immediately in \_\_\_\_\_ an interim council or committee (working committee) to prepare early recommendations for the conclusion (on the question) of a collective defense agreement for Southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific."

*End text.*<sup>5</sup>

SMITH

<sup>4</sup> Annex B to Foreign Secretary Eden's draft. Titled "Draft Declaration of Intention on Collective Defence."

<sup>5</sup> Annex A to the draft was as follows: "Possible points for inclusion in a Declaration of Support for an agreement on Indo-China. 1. Note (or approve or welcome or support) Geneva settlement. 2. Desire to contribute to consolidation of peace in the area. 3. Undertake to treat violation of Indo-China settlement as a threat to international peace and security. 4. Resolve to apply principles of United Nations in support of the settlement (e.g. Article 2(4) of Charter)." (751G.00/7-1854)

396.1 GE/7-1854: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 18, 1954—7:16 p. m.

Tosec 568. From Secretary for Undersecretary. President asking principal radio and television networks to reserve time for Wednesday nite<sup>2</sup> which President will use if Geneva Conference fails so that he can explain gravity of resulting situation.<sup>3</sup> You may in your discretion inform your French colleague.

DULLES

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State and Browne of OC/T.

<sup>2</sup> July 21.

<sup>3</sup> For background information on the President's decision to ask for principal radio and television network time, see a memorandum of a conversation with the President by the Secretary of State, July 19, in volume XIII.

In the memorandum the Secretary wrote as follows: "After leaving the President [on July 18] I despatched to General Smith a cable [Tosec 568] informing him of the President's intentions and authorizing him to inform Mendes-France which he did [see telegram Secto 665, July 19, p. 1455]. Subsequently on Monday morning [July 19] I telephoned to General Smith to ascertain his views as to whether or not some announcement or 'leak' should be made from here as to the President's possible speech. General Smith was of the opinion that matters were going better from the standpoint of prospective settlement and that what had already been done was sufficient. I informed the President and he concurred." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, meetings with the President)

396.1 GE/7-1854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 18, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 645. Caccia has told us of conversation he had with Li K'Nung [*Ko-nung*] this morning. Later [*latter*] made strong statement to effect that Indochinese states must not be allowed to become members of any alliances and that acts of conference must not permit this. Caccia said he replied by saying that if an agreement were reached which UK liked and if agreement provided that military alliances were not acceptable then UK would not spend spare time trying to force Indochinese states into Southeast Asian pact.

On subject of Laos, Caccia told Li that Viet Minh were still demanding half of country. This was out of all reason and would jeopardize conference. Li said his Prime Minister thought a single regroupment area along NE frontier was best solution. It would, of course, remain under Laotian sovereignty and would be preferable to series of smaller areas.

Re election dates Li said it was important to make clear to people of Vietnam that conference was not fooling. This could only be done by setting specific date. When Caccia pointed out to him that India and Burma had taken from two to three years to hold elections and that Communist China apparently had problems in this connection, Li said that two or three years is a definite date and much preferable to an indefinite formula.

SMITH

396.1 GE/7-1854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 18, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 646. Repeated information Paris 88, Saigon 57. Tosec 558 repeated information Paris 222, Saigon 217.<sup>1</sup> The term elections as used in French draft declaration is assumed to involve nation-wide elections resulting from agreement between representative authorities of two zones that conditions were adequate for such elections. Current controversy with Communists centers around date for such nation-wide elections.

So far as we know, French troops would not be withdrawn except at request of governments concerned although French are making no commitments re number of troops which military situation might

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 17, p. 1403.

require be maintained. This would presumably be subject of further negotiation within French Union.

USDel does not believe Cambodians were left by Bonsal with impression we would discuss Cambodian security only if and when satisfactory cease-fire was achieved throughout Indochina. USDel will however bear this point in mind.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/7-1854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 18, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 647. Repeated information Paris 89, Saigon 58. Following French-UK-Soviet working group meeting yesterday, French del circulated new draft of proposed conference declaration showing in brackets following points on which French-UK and Soviet positions still differ. References are to numbered paragraphs of previous French draft transmitted in Secto 628 repeated Paris 74, Saigon 46.<sup>1</sup>

Second paragraph. Soviets want paragraph to refer to Vietnam as well as to Laos and Cambodia.

Third paragraph. French and British want to refer explicitly to regular elections called for by constitutions of Laos and Cambodia in August and September 1955 respectively. Soviets want elections in these two countries "within one year after the signature of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities".

Fourth paragraph. Soviets want to substitute following for French draft:

"The conference takes note of the understanding reached between the parties upon the fact that the introduction of new troops, military personnel, and all arms and munitions into Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia will be prohibited and upon the fact that the importation of arms into Laos and Cambodia will be limited to the defined needs of the defense of these countries.

"The conference takes note of the agreement reached by the parties, that after the cessation of hostilities, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia must not enter any military alliances whatsoever, and that the establishment of foreign bases on the territories of the said states must not be permitted."

Fifth paragraph. Soviets want to delete following from first sentence: "But does not prejudge the solution of other problems related to the definitive restoration of peace in Vietnam."

Sixth paragraph. Soviets want elections in Vietnam not later than June 1955. French and British do not want conference to set deadline.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 16, p. 1400.



Eighth paragraph. Soviets want "parties" to negotiate time for withdrawal foreign troops and military personnel. French and British stand on French draft.

Ninth paragraph. Bracketed passage omitted, apparently by mutual agreement.

Tenth paragraph. French and British want members of conference to study "collective or individual" measures. Soviets want "collective" only.

In addition to above points of difference, French and British have not agreed to Soviet effort to include tenth paragraph Soviet draft declaration (Secto 615 repeated Paris 65 [63], Saigon 35<sup>2</sup>).

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 15, p. 1384.

396.1 GE/7-1854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 18, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 649. Limit distribution. I think UK message to Colombo powers, Australia and New Zealand (Secto 644<sup>1</sup>) is satisfactory step forward particularly since Eden is talking in terms of making declaration of intention as early as Thursday, July 22 in event of failure Geneva negotiations. Message itself may have salutary effect on work of conference when Communist delegates become aware of UK approach to Colombo powers.

Should, however, conference produce settlement Eden is hoping for more time and would like a delay of two or three weeks before making declaration of intention. His thought is that first thing following a settlement is to get Colombo powers to declare their support thereof and with this in mind is suggesting to them a form of words along the lines of proposed US unilateral declaration. It is clear that in this eventuality we will need to keep pushing Eden for earliest possible action.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 18, p. 1434.

396.1 GE/7-1854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 18, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 655. Repeated information Paris 95, Saigon 64. At recess after today's meeting Tran Van Do and Tran Van Chuong immediately

approached Johnson stating they wished US clearly understand reasons they felt compelled make their statement at today's meeting (Secto 654<sup>1</sup>) and why they were asking for a plenary session. They said they desired at such a plenary session put forward position contained their note to French (Secto 633<sup>2</sup>) and asked Johnson's opinion on position. Johnson replied that did not feel it was practicable proposal, to which they responded they fully realized that it was not practicable and would be rejected by other side, but they felt they must make moral position their government clear to world and to Vietnamese people. If other side rejected it, position of their government would have been improved. Upon rejection by other side they would be prepared accept settlement along lines now being discussed.

Johnson pointed out that time was short and it was late for such proposal to which they replied that Mendes could of course ask for and obtain additional time from French Assembly. Johnson expressed strong doubt and urged they speak directly with French. After repeated strong urgings they finally approached Mendes, who listened sympathetically and at length. He suggested and they promised to consider formulation their proposal in writing and circulation to other delegations. He categorically stated he could not even if he so desired ask Assembly for any extension time he has given self.

Johnson told Mendes he was concerned over reaction to Vietnamese statement and reminded Mendes of US position on Vietnamese concurrence with any agreement. Mendes stated he was very conscious of this and was asking De Jean immediately go to Cannes to see Bao Dai.

Chauvel said that from De Jean's previous talk with Bao Dai it appeared Bao Dai had no knowledge of Do's conversations with Dong and in general had given delegation here free hand.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 18, p. 1431.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 17, p. 1418.

396.1 GE/7-1854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 18, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 656. Repeated information Paris 76, Saigon 65. Tonight after restricted session, at Tran Van Do's request, Bonsal and Getz met with him and Ngo Dinh Luyen at Vietnamese villa.

Principal Vietnamese concern was explanation statement made at today's meeting (Secto 654<sup>1</sup>) and proposal contained Secto 633.<sup>2</sup> Do

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 18, p. 1431.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 17, p. 1418.

emphasized they did not wish to sabotage Mendes-France or possibility of conference agreement. Vietnamese delegation feels that in present state of military inferiority they must carry fight to Viet Minh on political grounds. To do this, they have chosen strong stand against partition, which will contrast with Viet Minh willingness to reach agreement on this basis. This stand, they believe, will evoke extremely favorable response of Vietnamese people, and permit Diem Government to attract popular support in post-armistice period.

This new "position" of Vietnamese delegation intended as primarily psychological move which will not prevent their acceptance agreement based on US-UK seven points, which they consider minimum. They intend speak with all friendly delegations tomorrow morning, beginning with French to make sure there is complete understanding.

Bonsal expressed understanding their difficult position but stressed hard realities with which we are faced along lines Under Secretary's talk with Do this morning (Secto 652<sup>3</sup>). Conversation ended on friendly note with Do explaining delegation could not return to Vietnam without having made this stand.<sup>4</sup>

SMITH

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 18, p. 1426.

<sup>4</sup> The U.S. Delegation transmitted an additional report on this conversation in telegram Secto 658, July 19. It read as follows: "During conversation with Tran Van Do (Secto 656), Bonsal asked Do purpose Tran Van Huu's visit to Geneva last week. Do said Huu had seen Pham Van Dong to sound out possibilities of coalition government. When Bonsal expressed surprise, Do said Huu would do anything to get into power. Do said he realized impossibility coalition government from experience in 1946. Even one Viet Minh in coalition would lead to disaster." (396.1 GE/7-1954)

396.1 GE/7-1854: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 18, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 657. Repeated information Paris 97, Saigon 66. Department pass Defense. Following is translation (done by British) of text working paper on control in Vietnam prepared by Soviet delegation. Paper dated July 9 although only received today. Soviet paper follows closely French paper July 7 (Secto 575, repeated Paris 25, Saigon 17<sup>2</sup>). Most important changes from French text appear in paragraph three of numbered paragraph eight, numbered paragraph nine (*d*), numbered paragraphs 15 and 18.

"1. The responsibility for implementing the agreement on the cessation of hostilities is placed on the parties.

<sup>1</sup> Message transmitted in two sections.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 8, p. 1305.

"2. Control and supervision over this implementation is ensured by the international commission.

"3. In order to facilitate, under conditions shown below, the implementation of provisions concerning joint actions by the two parties a joint commission will be set up in Vietnam.

"4. The joint commission is composed of an equal number of representatives of the commands of the two parties.

"5. The presidents of the delegations of the joint commission will hold the rank of general. The joint commission will set up joint groups, the number of which will be determined by mutual agreement between the parties. The joint groups will be composed of an equal number of officers from both parties. Their activity on the demarcation lines between the zones of regroupment will be determined by the parties whilst taking into account the powers of the joint commission.

"6. The joint commission will ensure the implementation of the following provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities:

*a.* A simultaneous and general cease-fire in Vietnam for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.

*b.* A regroupment of the armed forces of the two parties.

*c.* Observance of the demarcation lines between the zones of regroupment and the demilitarized sectors.

It will help the parties to implement the said provisions, will ensure liaison between them for the purpose of the working out and putting into effect of plans for the application of these provisions, and it will endeavor to solve controversial questions which may arise between the parties during the implementation of these provisions.

"7. An international commission will be set up for control and supervision over the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Indochina. It will be composed of an equal number of representatives of the following states: (blank)

It will be read by the chairman (blank)

Its location will be (blank)

"8. The international commission will set up permanent and mobile inspection brigades, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned states. The permanent brigades will be located at the following points (blank). These points of location may, at a later date, be altered at the request of the joint commission, or of one of the parties, or of the international commission itself by agreement between the international commission and the command of the party concerned.

The field of action of the mobile brigades will be the demilitarized zones. Within the limits of these zones they will have the right to move freely and to receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may be in need of for the fulfillment of their tasks (supply of personnel, placing at their disposal documents necessary for control, summoning witnesses necessary for investigation, ensuring the security and freedom of movement of the inspection brigades, etc. . . .) they will have at their disposal the necessary modern means of transport, supervision and communication. Outside the zones and points of activity shown above, the mobile brigades may, by agreement with the command of the party concerned, make trips within the limits of the tasks given them by the present agreement.

"9. The task of supervising the implementation by the parties of the provisions of the agreement will be placed on the international commission. For this purpose it will fulfill the tasks of control, supervision, inspection and investigation connected with the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, namely, it must,

a) Control the movement of the armed forces of the two parties, effected within the framework of the regroupment plan.

b) Supervise the demarcation lines between the zones of regroupment, and also the demilitarized zones.

c) Control the operations of releasing prisoners of war and civilian internees.

d) To watch over the implementation of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, concerning the ban on the introduction into the country from abroad, of armed forces, military personnel and of all kinds of arms, ammunition, military equipment, in the zones and points shown in Article 8.

"10. The international commission shall, through the medium of the mobile brigades mentioned above, and as soon as possible, either at its own initiative, or at the request of the joint commission, or of one of the parties, have recourse to necessary investigations by documents and on the spot.

"11. The inspection brigades will submit to the international committee the results of their control, their investigation and their observations, furthermore they will draw up special reports which they may consider necessary or which may be requested from them by the commission. In the case of a disagreement within the brigades, the conclusions of each member will be submitted to the commission.

"12. If any one inspection brigade is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or a threat of a serious violation the international commission will be informed; the latter will study the reports and the conclusions of the inspection brigades and will inform the parties of the measures which should be taken for the settlement of the incidents, ending of the violations or doing away with the threat of violation.

"13. When the joint commission is unable to reach an agreement on the interpretation to be given to some provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the international commission will study the controversial question. Its conclusions will be sent directly to the parties and will be notified to the joint commission.

"14. Recommendations will be adopted or passed by the international commission by majority vote, reservation being made for the provisions contained in Article 15. If there is a split of votes the chairman's vote will be decisive.

The international commission may pass recommendations concerning amendments and additions which it may be necessary to make to the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, in order to ensure a more effective implementation of that agreement. These recommendations will be adopted unanimously.

"15. When dealing with questions concerning violations of the

agreement, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, namely :

- (a) Refusal by the armed forces of one party to effect the movements provided for in the regroupment plan ;
- (b) Violation by the armed forces of one of the parties of the regroupment zones, territorial waters, or air space of the other party ;

The decisions of the international commission must be unanimous.

"16. If one of the parties refuses to put into effect a recommendation passed by the international commission, the commission or one of the parties address themselves to the guarantors. If the international commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in Article 15, it will submit a majority report and one or more minority reports to the guarantors. The international commission will address itself to the guarantors in all cases where its activity is being hindered.

"17. The international control commission will be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indochina in order that it should be able to fulfill the tasks provided for in Article 9.

"18. The international commission for control and supervision in Vietnam will act in close connection with the international control commissions in Cambodia and Laos. A body for coordinating the activities of the three commissions will be set up by agreement among them, in the form of a coordination international commission for control and supervision in Indochina.

"19. The coordination international commission for control and supervision in Indochina will adopt decisions concerning a progressive decrease in the activities of the international commissions for control and supervision in Laos and Cambodia, taking into account the evolution in Vietnam. These decisions will be adopted unanimously."

SMITH

JULY 19, 1954

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 306

*Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Dwan)*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

[GENEVA, July 19, 1954.]

COMMENTS ON VIETMINH DRAFT ARMISTICE AGREEMENT FOR VIETNAM <sup>2</sup>

1. Vietminh draft is based on French draft, follows its organization, and in many cases borrows whole paragraphs.

2. It establishes a single military demarcation line but does not say where.

3. It requires transfer of all forces of both sides to their respective sides of the line within 180 days. (French draft provides for 380 days.)

<sup>1</sup> The handwritten initials of U. Alexis Johnson appear on the source text.

<sup>2</sup> Summary of the Viet Minh draft agreement is attached ; it was transmitted to the Departments of Defense and State in telegram Gento 84, July 19. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 307)

4. It omits any reference to intermediate regroupment zones as French draft covers so completely, and calls instead for withdrawal in two stages—air and naval forces and two-thirds of the ground forces during first three months, balance in last three months. Draft leaves up to the representatives of the two commands on the spot to work out further details.

5. It provides that turnover of civil authority between each side begins at the outset of the withdrawal and transfer of troops, specifically requiring that such transfer of civil administration of Hanoi be completed within 60 days and of Haiphong within 180 days.

6. It permits transfer of civilians from one zone to the other.

7. It prohibits introduction into Vietnam of reinforcing military personnel (although permitting individual and small unit rotation), except during 180 day period of evacuation.

8. It prohibits introduction of reinforcing arms and ammunition (but permits piece for piece replacement only during period between completion of transfer of forces and withdrawal of foreign forces).

9. Neutral control commission to observe and inspect reliefs and replacements at specific ports of entry.

10. It prohibits creation of new military bases and reinforcement of existing bases, and reestablishment of old bases.

Draft is exceedingly vague on details and phasing of regroupment of forces, leaving details to two commanders to work out. It appears constructed so as to permit the spirit of the agreement to be violated through imprecision of the letter.

It calls for transfer of forces in a time period less than that French say is needed to evacuate Delta in orderly fashion.

[Attachment]

SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS OF VIETMINH DRAFT ARMISTICE  
PROPOSAL FOR VIETNAM

*Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zones*

1. Provides for *provisional* military demarcation line and 10-kilometer demilitarized zone.

2. Location of line to be indicated on attached map.<sup>3</sup>

3. Forces of both sides to be regrouped on either side of the line within 180 days after armistice comes into effect.

*Principles for Implementation of Armistice Agreement*

1. Establishes principle of simultaneous ceasefire throughout all Indochina as of (blank) hour and date.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

2. Requires conference to establish a schedule for the meeting in Indochina of representatives of the two opposing commands who will handle operations connected with the cessation of hostilities.

3. Pending general elections for unification of Vietnam, civil administration in each regroupment zone to be conducted by the side regrouping therein. (*Comment*: question of elections not mentioned in French draft.)

4. Transfer of civil administration from one party to the other to begin at the outset of the withdrawals and to be completed when the withdrawal is completed. Specifically, transfer of civil administration of Hanoi to Vietminh must be completed within at least 60 days from date armistice comes into effect; that for Haiphong within 180 days. (*Comment*: French draft provides that civil administration remain in hands of one side until all its forces are withdrawn from zone concerned.)

5. Prohibits reprisals against persons and organizations having collaborated with other side during hostilities and guarantee of their democratic liberties.

6. Between time armistice enters into effect and completion of transfers of troops, civilians desiring to move from the zone of one side to the zone of the other will be authorized and assisted to do so by the authorities of zone in which they are now living.

7. Withdrawals of forces and equipment to be made by sector or province in the following order: all combat aircraft, naval units, and two-thirds of the ground forces to be evacuated in the first three months; the balance of forces and supplies to be totally evacuated in the last three months.

8. The Joint Commission and the neutral control commission to observe measures guaranteeing security of the forces during withdrawals and transfers.

9. A meeting of the representatives of the two high commands in Indochina will determine specific conditions for withdrawals and transfers according to the above principles.

*Prohibition of the Introduction of New Troops, Military Personnel, Arms and New Ammunition, and the Question of Military Bases*

1. All reinforcing troops and additional military personnel prohibited from entering Vietnam after the ceasefire.

2. Arrival of individual military personnel into Vietnam for temporary duty and return to Vietnam of individual military personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Vietnam to be authorized under the following conditions: relief of units and personnel not authorized during evacuation period of 180 days; term "relief" means replacement of units or personnel by other units of the same echelon or of other personnel arriving in Vietnam for mili-



tary service there; relief units not to be larger than battalion size or equivalent naval and air units; relief to be man for man and no more than 1000 men to be admitted within any one month; units and personnel to enter and leave Vietnam only at points set forth below; neutral control commission, through its inspection teams, to observe and inspect reliefs at locations mentioned below.

3. Introduction of reinforcing armaments and ammunition and other war materials into Vietnam is prohibited, such as combat aircraft, naval units, artillery, recoilless weapons, armored vehicles, etc.; piece for piece replacement permitted between completion of transfer of forces to withdrawal of all foreign forces; neutral control commission, through its inspection teams, to observe and inspect these replacements.

4. From proclamation of ceasefire, creation of new military bases (naval and air) and construction work on existing military bases and restoration of bases will be prohibited.

5. Points of entry and exit for relief personnel and equipment (to be defined later).

#### *POW and Civilian Internees*

1. Vietnamese nationals, French and other nationalities, to be liberated within period of (blank) days from effective date of armistice.

2. Term "civilian internees" to include those arrested and detained for having contributed to armed or political struggle between the sides.

#### *Additional Provisions*

1. Commanders of both sides to accord protection and assistance to Joint Commission and the neutral nations control commission.

2. Expenses of the commissions to be shared, etc.

---

396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

#### *The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—11 a. m.

Secto 659. Eyes only for the Secretary from the Under Secretary. Reference your Tosec 565.<sup>1</sup>

Paragraph 1. No. I gave the background of thinking on this in my Secto 638.<sup>2</sup>

Paragraph 2. I am fully aware limitations of executive power and authority in this matter and have and will continue to use constitutional argument as necessary. As I reported in my Secto 638, I made

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 18, p. 1429.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 18, p. 1405.

it clear that United States cannot join in any guarantee and will not even join any proposal declaring conference members will in future consult.

I have reason to be well satisfied with what we have been able thus far to accomplish with Eden and Mendes-France, and am particularly gratified at progress have been able to make with Eden on SEATO. See my Sectos 644<sup>3</sup> and 649.<sup>4</sup> In the event of failure conference Eden is prepared make immediate declaration, and even if conference succeeds is prepared to go ahead very quickly along lines for which we have long been working.

In the latter case he asked for two to three weeks to work on Colombo powers in order to get at least benevolent neutrality.

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 18, p. 1434.

<sup>4</sup> Dated July 18, p. 1439.

396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 660. Limit distribution. Dennis Allen has just informed us that London has cleared Eden's messages to Colombo powers, Australia and New Zealand (Sectos 644<sup>1</sup> and 649<sup>2</sup>) including suggestion for statements along lines of proposed United States unilateral declaration in event of Geneva settlement and instructed that messages be delivered immediately.

We will be discussing with British today program of action to be taken in event agreement reached at conference.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 18, p. 1434.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 18, p. 1439.

396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 661. Re Secto 639. Topping has supplied in confidence following background information concerning his story on views of Chinese Communist delegation.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Substance of Topping's talk with Yager of the delegation is also in a memorandum from Yager to Johnson in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 303.

<sup>2</sup> Topping's story was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 639, July 18, p. 1428.

He stated his informant was Huang Hua, whom he has known for many years. Interview was at Huang's initiative, was called on short notice, and was conducted in extremely serious manner without propaganda harangues.

Topping said he had reported Huang's statement fully in his story but had obtained number of "visual impressions" during interview. When Huang spoke of possibility American bases in Indochina or anti-Communist pact in Southeast Asia, he became very agitated, his hands shook, and his usually excellent English broke down, forcing him to work through interpreter. Huang also spoke seriously and with apparent sincerity concerning his belief that I have returned to Geneva to prevent settlement. Topping believes Chinese Communists convinced Americans made deal with French during Paris talks on basis of which Mendes-France has raised price of settlement.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/7-1854 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 18 [19], 1954—1 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

Secto 662. Repeated information Paris priority 99, Saigon priority 68. Working level elements French delegation indicate that if agreements between commands are reached tomorrow and conference accepts or "respects" these agreements, date for cease fire will probably be set at fifteen days from July 20. This period has been suggested by French High Command, Saigon.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Although note on source text indicates that this message was delayed in transmission, it is more likely that it was dated July 19 and not July 18. It was not received in the Department of State until July 21.

---

396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 663. Repeated information Paris 100, Saigon 69. Laotian Foreign Minister called on Johnson this morning to describe interview with Chou En-lai yesterday at which Chou En-lai presented unofficial and extravagant demands. These include:

- (1) Regrouping of Laotian resistants in provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua and in portions of provinces of Luang Prabang and Xien Khouang as far south as Ban Ban;

(2) The administration of these provinces to be placed under the supervision of joint committees composed of representatives of Royal Government and of the resistance movement with a supervisory joint committee at Vientiane; this situation would prevail until general elections scheduled for August 1955 at which time government of "national unity" would presumably emerge;

(3) Complete elimination of French Union bases in Laos even though provided in Franco-Laotian treaty.

Most recent Viet Minh proposals (latest day before yesterday) have been based on concept of large regrouping zones administered by Pathet Lao resisters whose nominations would be rubber-stamped by Royal Government.

Laotian Foreign Minister has told us that both Chinese and Viet Minh proposals are wholly unacceptable and that his government will not adhere to any agreement on cessation of hostilities which Franco-Laotian Command may sign with Viet Minh accepting such conditions. Foreign Minister holds that Laotian proposals which include regrouping zones within which resistance elements are to have freedom of movement together with facilities for resisters to recover civic rights and to re-enter administration are ample and Royal Government can go no further. Foreign Minister asked us what help US could give his government if it refused to accept cessation of hostilities agreement.

USDel is urging and facilitating contacts between Laotian and UK delegations on this subject and is also arranging to discuss it with French delegation without delay.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/7-1954: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—3 p. m.

Secto 664. Repeated information Paris 101, Saigon 70. Department pass Defense. With reference to French delegation working paper on control in Vietnam (Secto 575<sup>1</sup>), French and Viet Minh have agreed on first 17 of 19 paragraphs with following changes:

Paragraph two: Insert "observation and" before "control".

Paragraph seven: First sentence: Insert "neutral" before "International Commission" throughout text; insert "observation and" before "control".

Second sentence: Insert "an equal number of" before "representatives".

Paragraph eight: First sentence: Insert "equal" before "number".

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 8, p. 1305.

Paragraph nine: First sentence: Change "supervising" to "observing".

Paragraph thirteen: First sentence: Substitute "is to be informed of" for "arbitrates".

Second sentence: Substitute "recommendations" for "conclusions".

Paragraph fourteen: First sentence: Delete "and the arbitral decisions"; delete "or rendered".

Paragraph fifteen: Sub-paragraph (c): Delete; delete last sentence.

Paragraph sixteen: First sentence: Delete "or an arbitral decision"; substitute "the interested sides or the commission itself is to inform the members of the Geneva Conference" for "the latter informs the guarantors".

Second sentence: Substitute "members of the conference" for "guarantors".

Third sentence: Substitute "members of the conference" for "guarantors".

French are proposing following new paragraphs eighteen and nineteen to Viet Minh today:

"Eighteen. The International Control Commission in Vietnam will act in close cooperation with the International Control Commissions in Cambodia and Laos.

A body made up of a representative of each member state of the neutral International Commission is created to coordinate the activities of the three commissions each time that the implementation of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, in Laos, and Vietnam makes it necessary.

Nineteen. The neutral International Control Commission in (Cambodia) (Laos) (Vietnam) can, in agreement with the coordinating body, and taking account of the development of the situation in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, formulate recommendations concerning the progressive reduction of its activities. These recommendations will be adopted unanimously."

Soviet draft on control in Vietnam (Secto 657<sup>2</sup>), presumably is superseded by new French-Viet Minh draft.

Communists appear to have conceded two important points.

Soviet version (Article 8) restricts actions zones within which mobile teams can function without agreement of side concerned to "demilitarized zones" and make no mention of "areas neighboring land and sea frontiers of Vietnam" as does French draft. It also retains reference to "guarantors" in paragraph sixteen rather than "members of conference" as in French draft. Therefore, on these points French-Viet Minh version more acceptable than Soviet draft. Although agreed

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 18, p. 1441.

French-Viet Minh draft reflects desirable change in paragraph sixteen, it weakens role of International Commission by omitting reference to arbitral function and providing only that commission can inform and make recommendations to the sides. (Paragraphs thirteen and fourteen.)

French also will attempt today to get Viet Minh agreement on designation of following twofour [24] points at which fixed teams are to be stationed: Lai Chau, Lao Kai, Ha Giang, Cao Bang, Langson, Tien Yen, Cam Pha, Hongay, Haiphong, Nam Dinh, Hanoi, Vinh, Dong Hoi, Hue, Tourane, Nha Trang, Phan Thiet, Cap St. Jacques, Saigon, Can Tho, Dalat, Ban Me Thout, Pleiku, Kontum.

SMITH

396.1 GE/7-1954: Telegram

*Smith-Mendès-France Meeting, Geneva, July 19, Afternoon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 669. For the Secretary from the Under Secretary. I had long talk with Mendes-France this afternoon, as I told you. He urgently asked that we expand our proposed unilateral declaration so as take note not only of agreements between military commands, but also take note of paragraphs one to nine proposed conference declaration. (See Sectos 628<sup>1</sup> and 647<sup>2</sup>). I made it clear that we could under no circumstances associate ourselves with conference declaration even though it is anticipated it will be only conference document and not signed agreement, nor could we note or otherwise imply any acquiescence in or approval of paragraph 10 which provides for consultation among conference members on questions transmitted to them by international control commissions.

Text of declaration not yet agreed between French and Communists, but I am transmitting immediately by following telegram French estimate probable final text.<sup>3</sup> I am also transmitting texts of unilateral statements to which Laos and Cambodia have agreed which are referred to in paragraph 4 draft declaration<sup>4</sup> and draft French unilateral declaration referred to in paragraph 8.<sup>5</sup>

French position is this conference declaration is integral part of agreements reached at conference and they will be sorely disappointed if we simply disassociate ourselves from declaration without even

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 16, p. 1400.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 18, p. 1438.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram Secto 667, July 19, p. 1460.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram Secto 668, July 19, p. 1456.

<sup>5</sup> Telegram Secto 670, July 19, p. 1462.

taking note in same manner as with respect to cease-fire agreements. I recommend that I be authorized to amend our proposed declaration (Annex B my instructions <sup>6</sup>) by inserting a brief addition taking note of paragraphs one to nine of conference declaration if its final content does not too greatly differ from that which French have indicated they prepared to accept. I would like some latitude on this, and am sure I know what would be acceptable to you. I will, of course, have to state in conference that the US is unable to join in a multilateral declaration (since the one planned would include the Communists) but it is making a declaration of its own position, et cetera. This may come to a head tomorrow afternoon or evening, and while it would be possible to make our declaration later it is infinitely preferable to do it at the time of settlement. Otherwise we will have to disassociate ourselves with a lengthy and detailed conference declaration without anything of our own to offer except the very brief declaration we already have prepared.<sup>7</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>6</sup> Dated July 16, p. 1391.

<sup>7</sup> French Ambassador Bonnet telephoned the Secretary of State at 8:32 a. m. on July 20 and reported that he had had a telephone conversation with Mendès-France that morning. Mendès-France had reported that there would be some "little" changes in the wording of the final declaration but that the general meaning would not be changed. Mendès-France wanted to show the solidarity of the three Western Powers and told Bonnet that he would appreciate it if Smith had as broad instructions as possible to take note of the final act of the conference. Mendès-France mentioned point 9. The Secretary of State said it was not a question of what was in the final act, but rather a "question of making it with the Communists." Secretary Dulles told Ambassador Bonnet that he was studying the second part of point 9 and that instructions would be sent to Smith. Bonnet asked to be notified. At 8:47 a. m. the Secretary informed the Ambassador that Smith was being told he could make a unilateral declaration on behalf of the United States, which would include acceptance of article 9. Ambassador Bonnet said he was delighted. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Telephone Conversations)

For the instructions to Under Secretary Smith, which were contained in telegrams Tosec 578 and Tosec 586, July 20 and 21, see footnote 4, p. 1472.

---

396.1 GE/7-1854 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, July 19, 1954—6:28 p. m.

Tosec 572. For General Smith from Secretary. Makins came in this afternoon and gave me copy of message <sup>2</sup> (which is practically identical to that contained in your Secto 644 <sup>3</sup>) from Eden to Govts five Colombo powers plus Australia and New Zealand. Message contained Annex A—possible points for inclusion in Declaration of Support on

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Bonbright of EUR.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 18, p. 1434.

an agreement for Indochina; and Annex B—draft declaration of intention on Collective defense.<sup>4</sup>

I observed that Eden's message might leave impression that if agreement which we could respect was reached we might join in multi-lateral statement with Communists. Makins said he was sure this was not contemplated.

Re point 3 of Annex A which reads: "Undertake to treat violation of Indochina settlement as threat to international peace and security" I pointed out difference between this wording and that contained in Annex B of your instructions under which we "would view *any renewal of the aggression* in violation of these agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security". I explained that while we did not expect that any non-Communist state would violate the agreements, we were unwilling to enter into an engagement which might place us in position of having to side with Communists against a non-Communist state. Makins readily saw point and said he would report it to his Govt. He pointed out that Eden's wording was not "sacrosanct" and had been conveyed to other Commonwealth Govts in order to elicit views.

Re Annex B I suggested that final clause concerning "conclusion of a collective defense agreement, etc." be changed to "establishment of a collective defense, etc.". (I had in mind that with this change it would be easier for us to move expeditiously in establishment of *ad hoc* machinery before details of agreement were finally worked out which might take some time.) Makins thought this change would be an improvement.

I suggest you convey substance of above to Eden at your earliest opportunity.

DULLES

---

<sup>4</sup> For text of Annex B, see telegram Secto 644, July 18, p. 1434; for text of Annex A, see footnote 5, p. 1436.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 307

*The United States Delegation to the Department of Defense*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, July 19, 1954.

Defense Message Gento 85. For: Sullivan from Dwan. Rptd info: USARMA Saigon. Defense pass State. Ref: Gento 81.<sup>1</sup> French Del has circulated additional paragraph under Article 5, Draft Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, which reads as follows:

"While present agreement is in effect, no military bases of a foreign state shall be established in the regroupment zones of the two sides;

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 15, p. 1382.



the latter will see to it that their zones are not used for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy.”

This addition appears to be to advantage of French Union side since it appears aimed directly at possibility of Vietminh using their regroupment zones as bases for further aggression. Prohibition of establishment of foreign bases in regroupment areas not to French Union disadvantage since Delta to be evacuated.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/7-1954: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL      NIACT

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 665. For Secretary from Under Secretary. Reference: Tosec 568.<sup>2</sup> In event failure Geneva conference I believe it would be useful if President included in his radio and TV speech reference to approach British and ourselves have made to prospective members of southeast Asia collective security organization (Secto 660<sup>3</sup> and previous).

If you agree suggest you send us text of pertinent language so that I may inform Eden before speech delivered.

I told Mendes-France today of the President's intention. He expressed interest and I invited his suggestions for anything he thought might be usefully included in the speech. He promised to let me know.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Handwritten notation on the source text indicates that the Secretary of State saw this telegram.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 18, p. 1436.

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 19, p. 1448.

---

396.1 GE/7-1954: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 666. For the Secretary from the Under Secretary. The outlines of international control now clearly emerge. Composition will probably be Poland, India, and Canada or Belgium. The French prefer Belgium and so do I. Both Poland and Canada or Belgium will have veto on important questions. Commission will have full freedom of movement in demilitarized zones which will separate forces at each stage of regrouping and in all frontier and seacoast areas.

Taking everything into consideration, I strongly feel this is satisfactory and much better than we were able to obtain in Korea. French

feel, and Eden and I agree, that with such composition built-in veto will work to our advantage. This setup is best French or anybody else could get, and I feel it is within spirit of point 7.<sup>1</sup>

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Point 7 of the U.S.-U.K. communication to the French, contained in telegram 4853 to Paris, June 28, p. 1256, read: "7. Provides effective machinery for international supervision of the agreement."

396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 668. Repeated information Paris 102, Saigon 71. French delegate has given us copy of draft of unilateral declaration of Governments of Laos and Cambodia which these governments have accepted. Draft also given Viet Minh and Chinese Communists but their reaction not yet received. Unofficial translation follows:

"The Government of (Laos, Cambodia) is resolved never to take part in an aggressive policy and never to permit the territory of (Laos, Cambodia) to be used in the service of such a policy.

"The Government of (Laos, Cambodia) will never join in any agreement with other states if this agreement carried with it for (Laos, Cambodia) the obligation of establishing bases for military forces of foreign powers on the territory of (Laos, Cambodia) as long as (Laos, Cambodia) is not attacked or exposed to threat of attack.

"The Government of (Laos, Cambodia) is resolved to settle its international differences by pacific means in such a manner that peace and international security as well as justice will not be endangered. During the period between the date of cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and that of definitive settlement of the political problems in that country, the Government of (Laos, Cambodia) will not solicit foreign aid in matériel or personnel or instructors other than within the limits defined above and in the framework of a strictly defensive policy which it intends to apply in the future as it has always done in the past."

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 677. Repeated information Paris 108, Saigon 77. Following is UK translation of July 17 USSR "Working document concerning

---

<sup>1</sup> Message transmitted in two sections.

the joint and international commissions in Cambodia and Laos".  
Russian text delivered USDel offices July 18.

*Verbatim text:*

Restricted. July 17, 1954. Translation (UK). USSR delegation.

*Working document concerning the joint and the international commissions in Cambodia and Laos.*

1. Responsibility for the execution of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities is placed on the parties.

2. An international commission shall be entrusted with control and supervision over the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in (Laos Cambodia). It shall be composed of representatives of the following states: \_\_\_\_\_

It shall be presided over by the representative of \_\_\_\_\_

Its location shall be \_\_\_\_\_

3. The international commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned states. The fixed teams shall be located at the following points \_\_\_\_\_

These points of location may, at a later date, be altered by agreement between the government of (Laos Cambodia) and the international commission. Beyond the points shown above mobile teams may, by agreement with the command of the party concerned, carry out movements within the limits of the tasks given them by the present agreement. They shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfilment of their tasks (provision of personnel, placing at their disposal documents needed for supervision, summoning witnesses necessary for the holding of enquiries, ensuring the security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams, etc.). They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, supervision and communication as they may require.

4. The international commission shall be responsible for supervising the proper execution by the parties of the provisions of the agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfil the tasks of control, supervision, inspection and investigation connected with the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, namely it shall:

(a) Control the withdrawal of foreign armed forces in accordance with the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities.

(b) Control the operations of releasing prisoners of war and civilian internees.

(c) Supervise at the points mentioned in Article 3, the implementation of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, concerning the ban on the introduction into (Laos Cambodia) from abroad, of armed forces, military personnel and of all kinds of arms, munitions, and war material.

5. A joint committee and joint teams shall be set up in order to facilitate the implementation of the provisions concerning the withdrawal of foreign armed forces and foreign military personnel. The

joint committee shall ensure the implementation of the following provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities :

(a) A simultaneous and general cease-fire in (Laos Cambodia) for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.

(b) A regroupment of the armed forces of the two parties. It shall help the parties to implement the said provisions, shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the application of these provisions and shall endeavour to solve such disputed questions as may arise between the two parties in the course of implementing these provisions. They shall follow these troops and foreign personnel during their movement and shall be disbanded once the execution of the withdrawal plan has been completed.

6. The joint committee and joint teams shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the commands of the interested parties.

7. The international commission shall, through the medium of the inspection teams mentioned above, and as soon as possible either on its own initiative, or at the request of the joint committee, or of one of the parties, undertake the necessary investigations, both documentary and on the ground.

8. The inspection teams shall submit to the international commission the results of their supervision, their investigation and their observations, furthermore they shall draw up such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the conclusions of each member shall be submitted to the commission.

9. If any one inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or a threat of a serious violation the international commission shall be informed, the latter shall study the reports and the conclusions of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures which should be taken for the settlement of the incidents, ending of the violations or doing away with the threat of violation.

10. The recommendations of the international commission shall be adopted by majority vote, subject to the provisions contained in Article 11. If the votes are divided the Chairman's vote shall be decisive. The international commission may formulate recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in (Laos Cambodia) in order to ensure a more effective implementation of that agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

11. When dealing with questions concerning violations of the agreement, or threats of violations, which may lead to a resumption of hostilities, namely :

(a) Refusal by the foreign armed forces to effect the movements provided for in the withdrawal plan ;

(b) Violation or threat of violation by foreign armed forces of the integrity of the country ; the decisions of the international commission must be unanimous.

12. If one of the parties refuses to put into effect any recommendation of the international commission, the commission or one of the parties shall address themselves to the guarantors. If the international commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in Article 11, it shall submit a majority report and one or more minority reports to the guarantors. The international commission shall address itself to the guarantors in all cases where its activity is being hindered.

13. The international commission for control and supervision shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indochina in order that it should be able to fulfil the tasks provided for in Article 4.

14. The international commission for control and supervision in (Laos Cambodia) shall act in close cooperation with the international control commissions in Vietnam (and Laos Cambodia). A body for coordinating the activities of the three commissions shall be set up by an agreement among them, in the form of an international coordinating commission for control and supervision in Indochina.

19. [15.] The international coordinating commission for control and supervision in Indochina shall adopt decisions concerning a progressive decrease in the activities of the international commissions for control and supervision in Laos and Cambodia, taking into account the evolution in Vietnam. These decisions shall be adopted unanimously.

SMITH

396.1 GE/7-1954: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, July 19, 1954—7:42 p. m.

Tosec 576. For Under Secretary from Secretary. Your Sectos 666, 667, 668, 669.<sup>2</sup> As requested 669 you may expand proposed unilateral declaration so as to take note of paragraphs 1 to 8 of the proposed Conference Declaration with understanding that US obligations "with regard to aforesaid agreements and paragraphs of Declaration" are limited to those expressed Subparagraphs 1 and 3 of Annex B of your instructions.<sup>3</sup>

The foregoing is on the assumption that the Declaration in its final form does not materially differ from Secto 667. As to non-materiality of differences, would like you to obtain Phleger's legal judgment.

Have no objection to including first portion of paragraph 9 of proposed Conference Declaration but am concerned as to effect of including second portion of paragraph 9 as this seems to imply a multi-

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State.

<sup>2</sup> All dated July 19, p. 1455, *infra*, pp. 1456 and 1452, respectively.

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 16, p. 1391.

lateral engagement with Communists which would be inconsistent with our basic approach and which subsequently might enable Communist China to charge us with alleged violations of agreement to which it might claim both governments became parties.

While we don't want to take responsibility of imposing our views on the French, I feel particularly concerned about provisions of paragraph 6 which gives the Control Commission constituted as per Secto 666 authority also to control the general elections. The ink is hardly dry on the Declaration of President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill of June 29<sup>4</sup> to the effect that "In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the UN to insure that they are conducted fairly." It is rather humiliating to see that Declaration now so quickly go down the drain with our apparent acquiescence.

With reference to 668 believe something like this is acceptable if obtainable. Believe that this would not necessitate these states dealing only with or through France as suggested your 650 and 652.<sup>5</sup> We hope that this possibility of direct assistance for genuinely defensive and internal security purposes and not involving any US bases can be preserved as it may very well be that as a result of surrender in Tonkin Delta French will become so highly unpopular that their effort to maintain authority in other areas would in fact lead to these other areas surely falling under Communist domination.<sup>6</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>4</sup> See editorial note, p. 1260, for the text of this declaration.

<sup>5</sup> Both dated July 18, pp. 1425 and 1426, respectively.

<sup>6</sup> For the Vietnamese Government's views on the Tonkin Delta issue, see telegram 248 from Saigon, July 19, in volume XIII.

---

396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 667. Repeated information Paris 103, Saigon 72. Following is best French estimate text of conference declaration which they expect will be adopted.

"1. The conference takes note of the agreements which terminate hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam and which organize international control and supervision of the implementation of the provisions of these agreements.

2. The conference is pleased to see peace re-established in Cambodia and Laos, which countries, following the placing in effect of the provisions contemplated in this declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities, will be able thereafter to take up, in full inde-

pendence and sovereignty, their role in the peaceful community of nations. (*Note:* French will accept wording here to general effect peace will also be restored in Vietnam following but not preceding placing in effect of provisions of declaration.)

3. The conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos with reference to their intent of adopting measures which will permit all citizens to take their place in the national community, especially by participating in the next general elections which, in accordance with the constitutions of each of these countries, will take place in September 1955 for Cambodia and in August 1955 for Laos with secret ballot and with respect for fundamental liberties.

4. The conference also takes note of the declarations of these governments according to which (text to be drafted on the basis of the declarations of the Governments of Laos and of Cambodia regarding their defense needs). (See Secto 668 for current draft.<sup>1</sup>)

5. The conference notes that the agreement concerning Vietnam has as its essential goal the settlement of military questions in order to put an end to hostilities and that the military demarcation line does not constitute a definitive territorial or political boundary. It expresses the conviction that the placing in effect of the provisions contemplated in this declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities has created the necessary premises for realizing in the near future a political settlement in Vietnam.

6. The conference declares that the settlement of political problems in Vietnam must be effectuated on the basis of respect for the principles of the independence, of the unity, and the territorial integrity of Vietnam. This settlement will involve free general elections, with secret ballot, which will take place in the course of the year 1956, under the control of an international commission composed of the representatives of the states members of the international control commission, it being requisite that all conditions must be present to assure the respect of fundamental liberties and of free expression of the national will.

7. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities meant to assure the protection of persons and property must be applied in the strictest fashion and particularly must permit everyone in Vietnam to decide freely as to the zone where he wishes to live.

8. The conference notes the declaration of the Government of the French Republic according to which that government is prepared to withdraw its troops from the territories of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in agreement with the governments concerned.

9. The conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government according to which the settlement of all the problems related to the restoration and to the strengthening of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam will be based upon respect for the independence, the sovereignty, the unity and the territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

In its relations with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam each member of the Geneva conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the said states and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 19, p. 1456.

10. The members of the conference agree to consult together on any question which may be transmitted to them by the international control commissions, in order to study the measures (USSR: Collective) (French-UK: . . . or individual) which might appear necessary to insure observance of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Indochina."

*Note:* In addition French would agree to following desired by Soviets. "The competent representative authorities of the northern and southern zones of Vietnam as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia must not permit individual or collective persecution of persons, or members of their families, who had collaborated in any way with one or the other side during the war". (This omits last sentence of Article 10 of Soviet draft transmitted in Secto 615.<sup>2</sup>)

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 15, p. 1384.

---

396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 670. Repeated information Paris 104, Saigon 73. USDel has just received from French Del following draft of articles related to proposed conference declaration (Sectos 628,<sup>1</sup> 647<sup>2</sup> and 648<sup>3</sup>):

"Draft of unilateral French declaration re withdrawal of French troops (reference: Article 8 of draft declaration): The Government of the French Republic declares that it is prepared to withdraw French troops from the territories of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam in agreement with the governments of these states."

*Comment:* Previous French draft stated that withdrawal would be at request of governments concerned.

"Draft of unilateral French declaration (reference: Article 9 of draft final declaration): In the settlement of all problems relating to the restoration and the reinforcement of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, the Government of the French Republic will base itself upon respect for the independence and the sovereignty, the unity and the territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam."

*Comment:* This appears to involve only minor drafting change as compared with previous text of this portion of Article 9.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 16, p. 1400.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 18, p. 1438.

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 18, p. 1424.



396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 671. Repeated information Paris 105, Saigon 74. French Delegation has told us that they intend to maintain position re text of final conference declaration set forth in Secto 628<sup>1</sup> with following possible changes (see also Secto 647<sup>2</sup> in which current Soviet positions are set forth). References are to be numbered paragraphs of French text transmitted Secto 628.

2. French anticipate no difficulty in satisfactory wording here which will give away nothing of previously assumed position.

3. French will insist on maintaining reference to "constitution of each of these countries" and that elections be fixed in August or September 1955 and will reject Soviet proposal of elections within one year.

4. French will endeavor to secure Communist agreement to text of declaration made by Governments of Laos and Cambodia and which Laotian and Cambodian delegations have already accepted. This article will then refer to those declarations. French will not accept Soviet proposal cited Secto 647.

5. French will insist on inclusion of language to the effect that military line of demarcation does not constitute definitive territorial or political boundary.

6. French plan to propose following alternative wording for this article: "The conference declares that the settlement of political problems in Vietnam must be effectuated on the basis of respect for the principles of the independence of the unity, and the territorial integrity of Vietnam. This settlement will involve free general elections, with secret ballot, which will take place in the course of the year 1956, under the control of an international commission composed of the representatives of the states members of the international commission, it being requisite that all conditions must be present to assure the respect of fundamental liberties and of free expression of the national will".

8. The French Government will insist upon maintenance of French drafting on this point, i.e., that French troops will be withdrawn from the territories of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam only in agreement with the governments concerned.

With regard to additional paragraph which Soviet Delegation desires to have included and which is the same as paragraph 10 of the Soviet proposal transmitted in Secto 615,<sup>3</sup> French will accept first sentence reading: "The competent representative authorities of the northern and southern zones of Vietnam as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia must not permit individual or collective persecu-

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 16, p. 1400.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 18, p. 1438.

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 15, p. 1384.

tion of persons, or members of their families, who had collaborated in any way with one or the other side during the war." But will reject second sentence: "These persons and the members of their families should be afforded individual freedom and freedom of political activity and right to elect and be elected."

SMITH

396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 673. Repeated information Paris 106, Saigon 75. Vietnamese Del handed us late this afternoon their new proposal. It is elaboration of idea in note to French (Secto 633<sup>1</sup>) and conference was advised of its preparation in yesterday's restricted session. Unofficial translation follows:

"French, Soviet, and Viet Minh drafts all admit the principles of a partition of Vietnam in two zones, all of North Vietnam being abandoned to the Viet Minh.

Although this partition is only provisional in theory, it would not fail to produce in Vietnam the same effects as in Germany, Austria, and Korea.

It would not bring the peace which is sought for, deeply wounding the national sentiment of the Vietnamese people, it would provoke trouble throughout the country, trouble which would not fail to threaten a peace so dearly acquired.

Before discussing the conditions of a *de facto* partition with disastrous consequences for the people of Vietnam and for the peace of the world, the Del of the state of Vietnam renews its proposal for a cease-fire without a demarcation line, without partition, even provisionally.

The Vietnamese Del therefore proposes:

1. A cease-fire on present positions.
2. Regroupment of troops in two zones which would be as small as possible.
3. Disarmament of irregular troops.
4. After a period to be fixed, disarmament of Viet Minh troops and simultaneous withdrawal of foreign troops.
5. Control by the United Nations:
  - A. Of the cease-fire
  - B. Of the regroupment
  - C. Of the disarmament and the withdrawal
  - D. Of the administration of the entire country
  - E. Of the general elections, when the United Nations believes that order and security will have been everywhere truly restored.

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 17, p. 1418.

This proposal made on the formal instructions of His Majesty Bao Dai, and of the President Ngo Dinh Diem, shows that the chief of state of Vietnam once more places the independence and the unity of his country above any other consideration, and that the national government of Vietnam would prefer this provisional UN control over a truly independent and united Vietnam to its maintenance in power in a country dismembered and condemned to slavery.

Vietnamese Del renews its request that a conference session be devoted to the study of its proposal for a cease-fire without partition.

In adding this proposal to those of other members of the conference, the Del of the state of Vietnam means to bring a positive contribution to the search for a real and durable peace which conforms to the aspirations of the Vietnamese people.

Geneva, July 19, 1954."

Comments follow.

SMITH

396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 674. Limit distribution. Re Secto 660.<sup>1</sup> Eden and I have discussed program of action to be taken in event of acceptable settlement. We have agreed to submit the following formula to London and Washington for approval. I feel this text reflects gratifying progress in UK thinking. "*Action in re to Southeast Asia pact in the event of acceptable agreement on Indochina at Geneva on or about July 20.*"

1. Every effort should be made to persuade countries of Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific to associate themselves in some way with the Geneva agreement, in accordance with the suggestion made to them on July 19.<sup>2</sup>

2. Whether or not such declarations of association are made by all the countries concerned, invitations should be addressed not later than August 7 to the Governments of France, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines and Siam, to appoint representatives to meet with representatives of the Governments of the US and UK in (blank) not later than September 1 in order to prepare recommendations on the conclusion of a collective defense agreement for Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

3. The invitations to the five commonwealth countries, Burma, and Indonesia would be sent by the UK Government, to the Philippines and Siam by the US Government, and to France jointly by the two governments."

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 19, p. 1448.

<sup>2</sup> See telegrams Secto 664, July 18, p. 1434, Secto 649, July 18, p. 1439, and Tosec 572, July 19, p. 1453.

396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 675. Repeated information Paris 107, Saigon 76. At Mendes-France-Eden meeting with Chou this afternoon, Chou very considerably modified demands with regard to Laos set forth Secto 663.<sup>1</sup> He agreed to retention of French bases in Laos, provided French turn base at Xieng Khouang over to Laotians and establish substitute base in southern part of Laos. French state this entirely agreeable to them as they for some time have considered moving base elsewhere.

Chou also dropped his demand for any joint administration. He proposed regrouping points for Pathet Lao forces be established in northeast provinces. French more optimistic over possibility agreement on Laos.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 19, p. 1449.

396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 676. Repeated information Moscow 8. For the Secretary from the Under Secretary. As I mentioned on the telephone today, Mendes-France told me that during his first dinner with him, Molotov had made two very brief references to Europe, simply saying that it was necessary to "strengthen peace in Europe too", and when Indochina settlement was complete might be possible to exploit the atmosphere that would exist for "bringing peace in Europe".

Mendes said that he had replied when the Indochina affair was settled he would be pleased to hear what Molotov had to say and report to his government. However, he was not prepared to discuss Europe now, as he was concentrating on the Indochina problem, and he was young and uninformed on many aspects of the European problems, and was therefore in no position to discuss them. Mendes said that although he had expected there would be effort to link Indochina with Europe, since then Molotov had never mentioned Europe and subject had not come up in any way during negotiations here.

However, yesterday during private luncheon between Joxe (French Ambassador to Moscow) and Vinogradov (Soviet Ambassador in Paris), latter had said that before leaving Geneva Molotov would be glad to have a good talk with Mendes concerning European affairs.

When Joxe had replied that Mendes was concentrating completely on Indochina problem, Vinogradov said that talk could take place after the signature of Indochinese agreements.

Mendes said that it was clear enough that Molotov will invite him discuss European problem, and it is his intention to listen and report to his government. He promised that US will be kept informed. He intimated that today's AFP reports on the 4-power meeting on Europe in Stockholm in the fall were inspired by Communist sources. Mendes said that if such a talk with Molotov took place he was very anxious to have the gesture of western unity on Europe before leaving Geneva and suggested that there might be a meeting between Eden, himself and myself in connection with his conversation with Molotov if one was held so as to make clear that he was not dealing bilaterally with Molotov on Europe.

SMITH

396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 678. Repeated information Paris 109, Saigon 78. Re Secto 668 repeated Paris 102, Saigon 71.<sup>1</sup> Cambodian delegation has circulated new draft of unilateral declaration of Cambodian Government which corresponds exactly to French draft transmitted by reference telegram, but adds passage, which reads in unofficial translation as follows:

"The Government of Cambodia, faithful to democratic and liberal principles and respectful of the fundamental law of the country granted and promulgated by His Majesty The King on May 6, 1947, by virtue of which it has already held two free legislative elections, makes clear its intention to take measures to integrate all citizens without any discrimination into the national community, granting them in particular all civic, political rights and all individual liberties provided by the constitution.

It affirms its intention to organize, in conformity to this constitution, new general elections, after the re-establishment of peace and security in Cambodia."

Reaction other delegations above draft not yet known.<sup>2</sup>

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 19, p. 1456.

<sup>2</sup> For Soviet amendments to this draft, see memorandum from Bonsal to Johnson, July 20, p. 1468.

396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, July 19, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 679. Repeated information Paris 110, Saigon 79. French delegation has circulated new draft unilateral declaration proposed to be made by Laotian delegation. Reactions other delegations not yet known.<sup>1</sup> Unofficial translation follows:

“The Royal Government of Laos :

Anxious to assure the harmony and unanimity of the populations of the Kingdom;

Declares it is resolved to take the necessary measures in order to integrate all citizens without any discrimination in the national community and to guarantee to them the enjoyment of the rights and liberties provided for in the constitution of the Kingdom which has been in effect since 1947;

Makes clear that all Laotian citizens will be able to participate freely as voters and as candidates in the general elections with secret ballot anticipated in Laos in conformity with the dispositions of the constitution and of the existing electoral law;

Indicates additionally, that it will promulgate the appropriate measures to organize in the provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua during the period from the cessation of hostilities to the general elections, a special representation attached to the Royal administration of these provinces to benefit the Lao nationals who fought in the ranks of the People's Army of Vietnam.”

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> For Soviet amendments to this draft, see memorandum from Bonsal to Johnson, July 20, *infra*.

JULY 20, 1954

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 306

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal) to the Deputy United States Representative and Coordinator of the Delegation (Johnson)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, July 20, 1954.

Subject: Soviet amendments to French draft of unilateral declaration to be made by the Lao delegation.

The Soviet amendments to the French draft on a Lao declaration (see attached Secto 679<sup>2</sup>) are the following:

1. In the third paragraph, the phrase “which has been in effect since 1947” (referring to the constitution) is eliminated.

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Getz of the delegation.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

2. In the fourth paragraph, the phrase "in conformity with the dispositions of the constitution and of the existing electoral law" (referring to elections) is eliminated.

3. In the last paragraph, the phrase "who fought in the ranks of the People's Army of Vietnam" is changed to read "who fought against the Royal Government during the hostilities."

*Comment:* The first two changes seem to forecast a possible attempt to change the provisions of the constitution and the electoral law which refer to civil rights and elections. By eliminating specific reference to the constitution which has been in effect since 1947, one could even imagine the intention of the Pathet Lao to demand a new or completely revised constitution. Elimination of reference to the electoral law would leave the actual date of the elections open.

The change in the last paragraph seems only to be a reluctance to admit the presence of the Viet Minh army in Laos.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 306

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal) to the Deputy United States Representative and Coordinator of the Delegation (Johnson)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, July 20, 1954.

Subject: Soviet Amendments to Cambodian Declaration

We have just received the amendments proposed by the Soviet delegation in the unilateral declaration to be made by the Government of Cambodia. These amendments appear to be addressed to the French draft of early yesterday (Secto 668<sup>2</sup>) and ignore the language added to the French draft by the Cambodians last night (Secto 678<sup>3</sup>).

The Soviets propose the following changes:

1. Cambodia is to declare its intention not to enter into military alliances, as well as not to permit the establishment of foreign bases on its territory.

2. The following language qualifying the commitment not to permit foreign bases is omitted: "as long as Cambodia is not attacked or exposed to threat of attack."

3. The Soviet draft would permit Cambodia to solicit foreign aid in matériel, in personnel or in instructors "only for the needs of self-defense and within the limits fixed by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities." The French and Cambodian drafts permit Cambodia to

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Yager of the delegation.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 19, p. 1456.

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 19, p. 1467.

solicit such aid "within the limits defined above [i.e., in the declaration itself] <sup>4</sup> and in the framework of a strictly defensive policy which it [Cambodia] intends to apply in the future as it has always done in the past."

<sup>4</sup> Both sets of brackets in the source text.

396.1 GE/7-1954: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1954—9:39 a. m.

Tosec 579. From Secretary for Under Secretary. Re Secto 674.<sup>2</sup> Please inform Eden US Govt accepts formula set forth in reftel. You may also tell him that while we would prefer slight change in language in paragraph 2 of reftel, substituting "establishment of a collective defense etc." for "conclusion of a collective defense agreement" (our reasons for this are set forth as penultimate paragraph of Tosec 572<sup>3</sup>), this is not sufficiently important to delay reaching agreement now.<sup>4</sup>

In your discretion you may tell Eden we think Baguio (Philippines) would be very suitable for the meeting, both because it is in area and is Asian.<sup>5</sup>

DULLES

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by MacArthur.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 19, p. 1465.

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 19, p. 1453.

<sup>4</sup> The U.S. Delegation reported in telegram Secto 688, July 20: "Eden agrees to substitution of phrase 'establishment of a collective defense' in paragraph two of formula set forth in Secto 674." (396.1 GE/7-2054)

The Department of State in telegram Tosec 592, July 21, informed the U.S. Delegation that it had "been in consultation with British Embassy on question approaching French re further action SEA collective defense. Could you let us know to what extent you or Eden informed Mendes-France in Geneva about agreed US-UK formula, Secto 674 as amended by Tosec 579, so we can determine what if anything needs to be done with French." (396.1 GE/7-1954) Under Secretary Smith replied in telegram Secto 723, July 22, that he "did not discuss specific US-UK formula with Mendes-France but last night at dinner I discussed subject in general terms and impressed on him urgency of our moving forward. Am uninformed whether Eden took occasion to mention formula to him but believe unlikely." (396.1 GE/7-2254)

<sup>5</sup> Under Secretary Smith reported in telegram Secto 688, July 20, that "day before yesterday I suggested to him Baguio as suitable place for meeting and have repeated suggestion today. He has not yet commented." (396.1 GE/7-2054)

In telegram Secto 713, July 21, the U.S. Delegation reported as follows: "Caccia said today that the UK thought the suggestion of Baguio as a meeting place was a good idea but a decision now would be premature. They thought that the place of meeting should not be named in the invitations but should be selected after it is finally known what nations have accepted, as this might well be taken into consideration in the final selection of the meeting place." (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 261)



396.1 GE/7-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, July 20, 1954—noon.

Secto 680. For Secretary from Under Secretary. The Russians are pressing for a signed declaration and have also proposed the following opening paragraph :

“The members of the Geneva Conference, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France, of the State of Vietnam, of the United States of America, of Cambodia, of the USSR, of the United Kingdom, of the People’s Republic of China, of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and of Laos have examined the question of the restoration of peace in Indochina and have reached agreement on the following points . . . .”

Eden, as co-chairman, is meeting with Molotov this morning in an effort to induce him to drop both proposals and accept the simple heading “Declaration by the Conference” and the procedure that after its presentation each delegate will state his position. I will not know the outcome until about noon, local time, and I will telephone you as soon thereafter as possible. The final session may begin at 4 or 5 p. m.

Whatever happens, I would state approximately the following (Phleger and I are still polishing it up and it is possible that last-minute developments may dictate some slight alteration).

Begins :

“As I stated on July 18, my government is not prepared to join in a declaration by the conference such as is submitted. However, the United States will make a unilateral declaration of its position in these matters in the following form :

*Declaration*

“The Government of the United States being resolved to devote its efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

Takes note

Of the agreements concluded at Geneva on July 20, 1954 between the (a) Franco-Laotian Command and the Command of the People’s Army of Vietnam; (b) The Royal Khmer Army Command and the Command of the People’s Army of Vietnam; (c) France-Vietnamese Command and the Command of the People’s Army of Vietnam and of paragraphs one to blank of the declaration thereon considered by the Geneva Conference declares with regard to the aforesaid agreements and paragraphs that (i) it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force; and (ii) it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of them with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

"In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning free elections in Vietnam, my government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954, as follows: 'In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly'".<sup>1</sup>

Unless you have serious objection, I am strongly of opinion, and Phleger and Johnson concur, that our declaration should include taking note of paragraph 9. (See Tosec 576<sup>2</sup> and Secto 667<sup>3</sup>). We share your concern regarding second half this paragraph, but believe that pointedly to refuse simply to take note of part of this paragraph will cause Communists and some others to believe we actually intended to disregard it and probably would result in Communists insisting that we include it. This could have serious effects. French yesterday, and again today, strongly urged us to include it, pointing out that it is substantially UN Charter language, and that our singling it out for omission carries with it strong implications that we intend to violate it. I had same reaction from UK this morning.<sup>4</sup>

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> This statement was taken from a declaration made by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill in Washington on June 29. For the text of the declaration, see editorial note, p. 1260.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 19, p. 1459.

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 19, p. 1460.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram Tosec 578, July 20, the Secretary of State instructed Under Secretary Smith to "make declaration as indicated, assuming Conference declaration does not materially vary from Secto 667 and include taking note paragraph 9. This on assumption that declaration is 'unilateral', thus avoiding 9 becoming contractual with Communists." (396.1 GE/7-1954)

After discussing the matter with the President, the Secretary of State instructed Smith in telegram Tosec 586, July 21: "You are authorized to make unilateral declaration as per Secto 680 with the slight verbal modifications indicated by telephone. We would like, if possible to add following: 'We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations and will enable the people of that area to determine their own future.'" (396.1 GE/7-2054)

The telephone communication referred to above was made on July 21 by the Secretary to the U.S. Delegation and is contained in a memorandum from Hennes to Smith, July 21. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 306)

396.1 GE/7-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, July 20, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 681. Repeated information priority Paris 111, Saigon 80. Chauvel told Johnson this morning that Laotian problem seemed on way to settlement along lines of temporary regrouping for short period resistance forces in areas close to where they are now located. Upon

entering such regroupment areas, members resistance forces would be given choice of laying down arms and returning to civilian life or proceeding to two regroupment areas located in two northeast provinces, there being one regroupment center in each province. Resistance forces would have no territorial authority in either province, right of full administration being retained by Royal Government, but resistance forces would appoint representative deal in their behalf with Royal authorities pending their integration into Royal Army.

Chauvel stated all but two or three small points text of armistice in Vietnam agreed.

French say Cambodians have been very difficult to work with, refusing accept French or other assistance in preparing armistice draft and having produced very unworkable document. This confirmed by members USDel. Late last night Cambodians finally accepted French assistance, and workable draft was produced early hours this morning. As of this morning they were waiting to get together with Viet Minh.

At meeting between Dong and Mendes-France late last night Mendes-France accepted June, 1956, as latest date elections would be held in Vietnam.

Chinese have offered, and Dong has confirmed, demarcation line 10 kilometers north of RC 9. French have not accepted and are trying obtain something better. Chinese and Viet Minh have also offered 245 days for completion regroupment, but French have not accepted and are also trying to improve.

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/7-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 20, 1954—5 p. m.

Secto 683. For Secretary from Under Secretary. Makin's report to Eden accurately covered ground your Tosec 572.<sup>1</sup> Latter assured me there was no misunderstanding re impossibility US joining in any multilateral statement with Communists.

Eden messages to Colombo powers, Australia and New Zealand were all delivered yesterday.

Re point three of his Annex A,<sup>2</sup> Eden prepared to take our language if article "the" omitted and text thus amended to read "would view any renewal of aggression" etc. He observed, however, that what was sought in this instance was not agreement on part of seven powers to text of joint declaration but to stimulate them to produce and issue

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July.19, p. 1453.

<sup>2</sup> For text of Annex A, see footnote 5, p. 1436.

individual declarations associating them in some way with a Geneva settlement and containing suggested points, but in their own language. These points had been advanced as "the kind of points that might be included in anything that were said." In agreement with us, no indication was given that points taken from US draft declaration. It was Eden's thought that each country would produce its own form of language and these would probably differ considerably. Most Colombo powers would presumably wish to avoid using term "aggression" in this context.

Re Annex B,<sup>3</sup> Eden said he thought phrase "establishment of a collective defense" was better than his original and agreed to advance and support it, if and when this proposed document discussed with powers concerned. We agreed it was better not to make special *démarche* for this purpose but to await recipients initial reactions.

SMITH

---

<sup>3</sup> For text of Annex B, see telegram Secto 644, July 18, p. 1434.

---

396.1 GE/7-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, July 20, 1954—5 p. m.

Secto 684. Regarding Secto 667.<sup>2</sup> Following is French draft text of conference declaration as furnished by Ambassador Chauvel at 12:45 today and is under discussion at Eden, Mendes, Molotov meeting this afternoon. Hold this text to provide basis for telephone call to Secretary when report is received of changes resulting from that meeting.

"1. The conference takes note of the agreements which terminate hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam and which organize international control and supervision of the implementation of the provisions of these agreements.

"2. The conference congratulates itself on the termination of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam; and expresses the conviction that the placing in effect of the provisions contemplated in this declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to assume hereafter their role in the peaceful community of nations in full independence and sovereignty.

"3. The conference takes note of the declarations made by the governments of Cambodia and Laos with reference to their intent of adopting measures which will permit all citizens to take their place in the national community, especially by participating in the next general elections which, in accordance with the constitutions of each of

---

<sup>1</sup> Message transmitted in three sections.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 19, p. 1460.

these countries, will take place in the course of the year 1955 with secret ballot and with respect for fundamental liberties.

"4. The conference takes note of the articles in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam prohibiting the entering into Vietnam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all arms and munitions. It also takes note of the declarations made by the governments of Cambodia and Laos concerning their determination not to request foreign aid and materials, personnel or instructors except in the interest of the defense of their territory and within the limits fixed by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities.

"5. The conference takes note of the articles in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam according to which no military base depending from a foreign state can be established in the regrouping zones of the two sides, it being the duty of the latter to see to it that the zones attributed to them do not become a part of any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. It also takes note of the declarations of the governments of Laos and Cambodia in accordance with which these governments will not join in any agreement with other states if this agreement involves the obligation to participate in a military alliance which is not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or with the principles of the agreements on cessation of hostilities in Indochina or to establish basis for the military forces of foreign powers on Laotian or Cambodian territory.

"6. The conference notes that the agreements concerning Vietnam has as its essential goal the settlement of military questions in order to put an end to hostilities and that the military demarcation line cannot in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. It expresses the conviction that the placing in effect of the provisions contemplated in this declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary premises for realizing in the near future a political settlement in Vietnam.

"7. The conference declares that, so far as Vietnam is concerned, the settlement of the political problems, to be effectuated on the basis of respect for the principles of the independence, of the unity and of the territorial integrity, must permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental liberties guaranteed by democratic institutions formed as a result of free general elections with secret ballot. In order that the restoration of peace may have made sufficient progress and that all the conditions be present which are necessary to permit the free expression of the national will, the general elections will take place on July 20, 1956, under the control of an international commission composed of representatives of the states which are members of the commission for control and observation contemplated in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations on this subject may take place between the competent representative authorities of the two zones beginning July 20, 1955.

"8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities meant to assure the protection of persons and property must be applied in the strictest fashion and particularly must permit everyone in Vietnam to decide freely as to the zone where he wishes to live.

"9. The conference takes note of the agreement which has been made to take note (constater) of the fact that, in accordance with the declaration of the Government of the French Republic, the latter will withdraw its troops from the territories of Cambodia, of Laos and of Vietnam at the request of the governments concerned and within the periods which will be fixed in agreement with those governments, except for those cases where, in accordance with provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities, a certain quantity of French troops may be left in agreed points and for agreed periods.

"10. The conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government according to which, for the settlement of all the problems related to the restoration and strengthening of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam the French Government will base itself upon respect for the independence and the sovereignty, the unity and territorial integrity of the governments of Cambodia, of Laos and of Vietnam."

In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, [each] of the members of the Geneva conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty and the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the said states and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

"11. The members of the conference agree to consult together on any question which may be transmitted to them by the International Control Commissions, in order to study the measures (USSR: Collective) (FR-UK: . . . or individual) which might appear necessary to insure observance of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Indochina."

*Note*—following additional sentence agreed but precise place it will be inserted in body declaration not known :

"The competent representative authorities of the northern and southern zones of Vietnam as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia must not permit individual or collective persecution of persons, or members of their families, who had collaborated in any way with one or the other side during the war."

SMITH

---

396.1 GE/7-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, July 20, 1954—5 p. m.

Secto 685. Repeated information Paris 113, Saigon 82. State pass Defense. Following is unofficial translation of "draft declaration of the Cambodian delegation on the final act" which will apparently be

added to list of conference documents transmitted Secto 682 repeated information Paris 112 Saigon 81.<sup>1</sup>

"Paragraphs 6 and 9 of the final act<sup>2</sup> stipulate respect for the territorial integrity of Vietnam. The delegation of Cambodia asks the conference to consider that this clause does not imply the abandonment of the rights and legitimate interests which Cambodia might wish to assert with respect to certain regions of South Vietnam, and subject to which Cambodia has formulated specific reservations, particularly at the time of the signature of the Franco-Khmer Treaty of 8 November 1949 on the relations between Cambodia and FR, and at the time of the vote on the FR law joining Cochin China to Vietnam.

Faithful to the ideal of peace and to the international principle of non-intervention, Cambodia does not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of the state of Vietnam, and associates itself completely with the principle of respect for its integrity, subject to a reservation concerning the adjustment and regularization of the delimitation of the frontiers between that state and Cambodia, frontiers until now fixed by unilateral act of France.

In support of this declaration, the Delegation of Cambodia is addressing to all members of the conference a 'memorandum on the Cambodian territories of South Vietnam'.<sup>3</sup>

19 July 1954"

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 20, not printed. (396.1 GE/7-2054)

<sup>2</sup> See telegram Secto 684, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 302)

396.1 GE/7-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, July 20, 1954—6 p. m.

Secto 686. Repeated information priority Saigon 114, Paris 83. Following is unofficial translation of text of note received from Vietnamese delegation this afternoon :

"In case of rejection of the proposal for a cease-fire without partition, and in order not to slow down the search for another peaceful solution, the delegation of the State of Vietnam solemnly draws the attention of the other delegations to the following points :

"The armistice agreement, considered as an act of a purely military nature, affecting only the French High Command and the Viet Minh High Command, and only being signed by the two commanders-in-chief and by their representatives, will lead nevertheless to consequences which compromise the future of the State of Vietnam from other points of view.

"In effect, it leads to the abandonment of territory, of populations, of civilian public services.

"The delegation of powers that the French High Command holds from the Chief of State of Vietnam, insofar as Vietnamese troops are

concerned, does not imply that the State of Vietnam must endure such grave consequences.

“(a) On the line of demarcation: The delegation of the State of Vietnam regrets that it is not able to subscribe to a solution of partition, that is to say, the abandoning to the Viet Minh of all the north of Vietnam, of the most populous part of Vietnam, an abandonment which takes from Vietnam, in the military as well as in the political field, the possibility of resisting Communist expansion.

“The State of Vietnam cannot abandon the Catholic populations which have shown their will to remove themselves and to be removed from the Communist regime. That is why our delegation asks:

“(b) For the protection of the populations that everything possible be undertaken in order that the population may be effectively protected against what would be for them a political and moral annihilation, and that their transfer into a non-Communist zone, if they show this desire, be assured under the most effective conditions.

“(c) On the right of the State of Vietnam to assure its own defense.

“The prohibition against any importation of new arms into Vietnam after the armistice would only work in favor of the Viet Minh for whom no control could, in practice, prevent from continuing to receive arms across the very long Chinese frontier.

“To the contrary, such a prohibition would condemn the State of Vietnam to be able for its defense to count only on the maintenance in Vietnam of an expeditionary corps which the French Government has stated that it intends to repatriate as soon as possible.

“For these reasons, the State of Vietnam cannot accept to see taken from it not only a vital part of its territory and of its population but, beyond that, the right of a sovereign and independent state to organize its defense in the manner that it believes the most in conformity with its national interests.”

SMITH

---

*Editorial Note*

At 6:20 p. m., Washington time, July 20, Secretary Dulles and Under Secretary Smith held the following telephone conversation:

“Nothing is happening, said the Gen. Vietnam looks pretty good—the line is the 17th parallel. The wording prohibits their joining any alliance. Both are worried about that, and being able to aid these countries. The thing is until the documents which are referred to are available, we cannot decide what to do. They are on their way, said Smith. Smith said they can have an army of their own. We don’t have to commit ourselves tonight. Then Smith said he didn’t believe there



would be a meeting tonight, but if there is, he would read a prepared statement. He read it to the Sec. and the Sec. thought it good. He will hold off on a plenary session until the afternoon so we can get word over there. Tonight they will probably sign a military armistice—for Vietnam and probably Laos, but probably not Cambodia. Phleger got on and he is worried about the cross-references. He said the General's statement is good. They agreed the countries must be able to develop a security force of their own.

"It was left that when we got the documents, we would communicate with them tomorrow." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Telephone Conversations)

At 6:43 p. m., Washington time, July 20, Secretary Dulles and Senator H. Alexander Smith held a telephone conversation in which the "Sec. said the situation is at present that we believe the belligerents will be signing a cease-fire within 15 minutes. Political declarations etc. contain cross-references and we can't understand what they mean because we haven't had adequate word. We will decide in the morning—we won't sign but it is a question of whether or not we totally disassociate ourselves of it or take notice. We have impressed this on the French. S. [Smith] will just say the US position won't be formulated until tomorrow." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Telephone Conversations)

There is some confusion as to exactly when the armistice agreements were signed. The United States Delegation reported in telegram Secto 699, July 21, page 1487, that the agreements for Vietnam and Laos were signed at 3:30 a. m., Geneva time, July 21. The delegation reported in telegram Secto 703, July 21, not printed, that these agreements were signed at 2400 hours (midnight), July 20. (751G.00/7-2154) The final approved texts of the agreements for Vietnam and Laos indicate that they were signed at 2400 hours, July 20. Although the delegation reported in telegram Secto 704, July 21, not printed, that the agreement for Cambodia was signed at 11 a. m., Geneva time, July 21, the final approved text of the agreement only indicates that it was signed on July 20. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 261)

---

396.1 GE/7-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 20, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 689. USDel has had request from French delegate (Gros, legal adviser) for views regarding sharing of expense of international control commissions in Indochina. French delegate states British delegate has indicated willingness to share in expenses of international commissions under whatever reasonable formula may be devised.

USDel replied to Gros that we had no instructions on subject but believe doubtful US would participate both because of our general attitude toward Indochina settlement and because of Korean precedent where expenses of international commission were borne by belligerents. (Secto 617<sup>1</sup> and Tosec 555<sup>2</sup>). Gros rejoined that of course in case of Indochina, this might result in receipt of inadequate contributions which would hamper effectiveness of control.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 15, p. 1376.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 16, p. 1396.

---

751G.00/7-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 20, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 690. Final agreed text conference declaration compares as follows with text contained Secto 684.<sup>1</sup>

Articles 1 through 4—No change.

Article 5—In second sentence instead of “or with the principles of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Indochina” final text reads “or with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities”.

Article 6—Insert word “provisional” before “military demarcation line”.

Article 7—First sentence—no change.

We do not yet have final agreed text of remainder of this article although we understand no change in election date of July 20, 1956 is contemplated.

Article 8—No change.

New Article 9 contains text given in note appearing as final paragraph of reftel. Instead of “persecution of persons” insert “reprisals against persons”.

New Article 10 (Article 9 in Secto 684). This article now reads “the conference takes note of the declaration of the government of the French Republic in accordance with which the latter is prepared to withdraw its troops from the territories of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam at the request of the governments concerned within the periods which will be fixed by agreement by the parties, except for the cases where, through agreement between the two parties, a certain quantity of French troops may be left in agreed points and for agreed periods.”

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 20, p. 1474.

New Article 11—Same as first paragraph of Article 10 of Secto 684 except that instead of “the independence and the sovereignty, the unity and territorial integrity of the Governments of Cambodia, of Laos and of Vietnam” insert, “the independence and the sovereignty, the unity and the territorial integrity of Cambodia, of Laos and of Vietnam”.

New Article 12—Same as second paragraph of Article 10 in Secto 684.

Article 13—This article now reads: “the members of the conference agree to consult together on any question which will be transmitted to them by the international control commissions, in order to study the measures which might appear necessary to insure observance of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, in Laos and in Vietnam.”

SMITH

---

751G.00/7-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, July 20, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 691. Re Secto 690.<sup>1</sup> Following prelude added final agreed text conference declaration :

“Final declaration dated July 20, 1954, of the Geneva Conference on the problem of the restoration of peace in Indochina, in which participated the representatives of Cambodia, the State of Vietnam, the United States of America, France, Laos, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the People’s Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.”

Remainder paragraph 7 reads :

“In order that the restoration of peace may have made sufficient progress and that there may be present all the necessary conditions to permit the free expression of the national will, general elections will take place in July 1956, under the control of an international commission composed of representatives of the states which are members of the international commission for supervision and control provided for in the accord on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will take place on this subject between competent representative authorities of the two zones after July 20, 1955.”

Correction translation paragraph 2, “hereafter” should read “thereafter”.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

751G.00/7-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, July 20, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 692. Following declarations of French Government have been agreed to by all parties :

“Declaration of the Government of the French Republic (reference: Article 10 of the final act <sup>1</sup>).

“The Government of the French Republic declares that it is prepared to withdraw its troops from the territories of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam at the request of the governments concerned and in periods which will be fixed in agreement with those governments, with the exception of those cases where, by agreement of the two parties, a certain number of French troops may be left at fixed points and for fixed periods.”

“Declaration of the Government of the French Republic (reference: Article 11 of the final act).

“In the settling of all the problems related to the restoration and the strengthening of peace in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, the Government of the French Republic will base itself upon respect for the independence and the sovereignty, the unity and the territorial integrity of Cambodia, of Laos and of Vietnam.”

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> For text of the draft final declaration (or act), see telegrams Secto 684 and Secto 690, July 20, pp. 1474 and 1480, respectively.

396.1 GE/7-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, July 20, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 693. Following is unofficial translation of declaration to be made by Government of Laos which has been agreed to by all parties (reference: Article 3 of the final declaration <sup>1</sup>) :

“The Royal Government of Laos,

“Anxious to insure the harmony and the unanimity of the populations of the Kingdom,

“Declares itself resolved to take the necessary dispositions in order to integrate all citizens without any discrimination into the national community and to guarantee to them the enjoyment of the rights and liberties provided for by the Constitution of the Kingdom.

---

<sup>1</sup> For text of the draft final declaration (or act), see telegrams Secto 684 and Secto 690, July 20, pp. 1474 and 1480, respectively.

“Makes clear that all Laotian citizens will be able to participate freely as voters and as candidates in the general elections with secret ballot.

“Indicates additionally that it will promulgate the appropriate measures to organize in the provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, during the period from the cessation of hostilities to the general elections, a special representation attached to the Royal administration of these provinces, for the benefit of the Lao Nationals who were not on the side of the Royal forces during the hostilities”.

SMITH

396.1 GE/7-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, July 20, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 694. Following is unofficial translation final agreed draft declaration of Royal Government of Laos:

“(Reference: Articles 4 and 5 of the final draft <sup>1</sup>):

“The Royal Government of Laos is resolved never to take part in an aggressive policy and never to permit the territory of Laos to be used in the service of such a policy.

“The Royal Government of Laos will never join in any agreement with other states if this agreement carries with it for the Government of Laos the obligation to enter into a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities or to establish bases for the military forces of foreign powers on Laotian territory.

“The Royal Government of Laos is resolved to settle its international differences by pacific means in such a manner that peace and international security as well as justice will not be endangered.

“During the period between the date of cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and that of definitive settlement of the political problems in that country, the Royal Government of Laos will only solicit foreign aid in matériel, in personnel, or in instructors in the interest of the defense of the country and within the limits fixed by the agreement on the cessation of hostilities.”

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> For text of the draft final declaration (or act), see telegrams Secto 684 and Secto 690, July 20, pp. 1474 and 1480, respectively.

396.1 GE/7-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET      NIACT

GENEVA, July 20, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 695. Following are texts of two declarations to be issued by Government of Cambodia. These texts have been agreed between French and Viet Minh and are currently being discussed with Cambodians:

The first declaration reads:

*"Declaration of Royal Government of Cambodia*

(Reference: Article 3 of the final declarations <sup>1</sup>)

The Royal Government of Cambodia:

Anxious to assure the harmony and unanimity of the populations of the Kingdom, declares it is resolved to take the necessary measures in order to integrate all citizens without any discrimination in the national community and to guarantee to them the enjoyment of the rights and liberties provided for in the constitution of the Kingdom.

Makes clear that all Cambodian citizens will be able to participate freely as voters and as candidates in general elections with secret ballot."

The second declaration reads:

*"Declaration to be made by Cambodian Government*

(Reference: Articles 4 and 5 of the final declaration)

The Royal Government of Cambodia is resolved never to take part in an aggressive policy and will never permit the territory of Cambodia to be used in the service of such a policy.

The Royal Government of Cambodia will never join in any agreement with other states, if this agreement involves for the Royal Government of Cambodia the obligation to enter into a military alliance which is not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities or to establish bases for the military forces of foreign powers on Cambodian territory.

The Royal Government of Cambodia is resolved to settle its international differences by pacific means in such a way that peace and international security as well as justice will not be endangered.

During the period between the date of cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and that of the definitive settlement of the political problems in that country, the Royal Government of Cambodia will not request foreign assistance in material, in personnel or in instructors other than in the interest of the defense of the country and within the limits fixed in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities."

SMITH

<sup>1</sup>For text of the draft final declaration (or act), see telegrams Secto 684 and Secto 690, July 20, pp. 1474 and 1480, respectively.

751G.00/7-2054 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, July 20, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 696. Re Sectos 684 and 690.<sup>1</sup> Following has been submitted by del of state of Vietnam for insertion between Article 11 and present Article 12 of declaration :

“The conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the state of Vietnam undertaking :

“—To make and support every effort to re-establish a real and lasting peace in Vietnam ;

“—Not to use force to resist the procedures for carrying the cease-fire into effect, although it deems them to be inconsistent with the will of the nation ;

“—To pursue the achievement of the aspirations of the Vietnam people with all the means conferred upon it by the national independence and sovereignty solemnly recognized by France.”

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> Both dated July 20, pp. 1474 and 1480, respectively.

JULY 21, 1954

396.1 GE/7-2154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT

GENEVA, July 21, 1954—1 a. m.

Secto 698. Repeated information Saigon niact 85, Paris 115, Hanoi niact 1, Tokyo 7, London 20, Moscow 9, Vientiane 2, Phnom Penh 7. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Following is clear text final conference declaration as translated by British delegation and issued by six nation secretariat : <sup>1</sup>

“Final declaration, dated the 20th July, 1954, of the Geneva conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indochina, in which the representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, France, Laos, the People’s Republic of China, the state of Vietnam, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America took part.

1. The conference takes note of the agreements ending hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam and organizing international control and the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements.

2. The conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam ; the conference expresses its convic-

<sup>1</sup> For the approved text of the Final Declaration, Indochina Document IC/43 Rev. 2, July 21, see p. 1540. The Final Declaration was also printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 2, 1954, p. 164.

tion that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam henceforth to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.

3. The conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community in particular by participating in the next general elections, which, in conformity with the constitution of each of these countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms.

4. The conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam prohibiting the introduction into Vietnam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. The conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of their territorial defense and to the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities.

5. The conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam to the effect that no military base at the disposition of a foreign state may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Laos and Cambodia to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other states if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Indochina or the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign powers.

6. The conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Vietnam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Vietnam.

7. The conference declares that, so far as Vietnam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order that the restoration of peace may have made sufficient progress and that there may be present all the necessary conditions to permit the free expression of the national will, general elections will take place in July 1956, under the control



of an international commission composed of representatives of the states which are members of the international commission for supervision and control provided for in the accord on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will take place on this subject between competent representative authorities of the two zones after July 20, 1955.

8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Vietnam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.

9. The competent representative authorities of the northern and southern zones of Vietnam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such person's families.

10. The conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, at the request of the governments concerned and within a period which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except in the cases, where by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.

11. The conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems connected with reestablishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, the French Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, each member of the Geneva conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned States, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

13. The members of the conference agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission, in order to study such measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam are respected."

SMITH

---

751G.00/7-2154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

NIACT

GENEVA, July 21, 1954.

Secto 699. Armistice agreements Vietnam and Laos to be signed at 3 : 30 a. m. Geneva time.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For the Armistice Agreements for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, Indochina Documents IC/42 Rev. 2 of July 20, IC/51 Rev. 1 of July 20, and IC/52 of July 21, see pp. 1505, 1521, and 1531, respectively. The Indochina Documents indicate that the agreements for Vietnam and Laos were signed at 2400 hours (midnight), July 20, and that the agreement for Cambodia was signed on July 20 (no specific time given).

US delegation releasing following statement at that time :

Statement by the United States representative

“The United States delegation is very pleased with the important progress that has been made tonight toward ending the bloodshed in Indochina. As soon as we have had an opportunity to examine the final texts of the agreements reached by the belligerents, the United States delegation will express its views with regard to them. Meanwhile, we share the fervent hopes of millions throughout the world that an important step has been taken toward a lasting peace in Southeast Asia, which will establish the right of the peoples of that area to determine their own future.”

SMITH

751G.00/7-2154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

NIACT

GENEVA, July 21, 1954.

Secto 705. For immediate action of Secretary. Following is revised text of declaration by Royal Government of Cambodia (reference: Articles 4 and 5 of final declaration) which has been agreed to by all parties: <sup>1</sup>

“The Royal Government of Cambodia is resolved never to take part in an aggressive policy and never to permit the territory of Cambodia to be utilized in the service of such a policy.

The Royal Government of Cambodia will not join in any agreement with other states, if this agreement carries for Cambodia the obligation to enter into a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or with the principles of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities, or, as long as its security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian territory for the military forces of foreign powers.

The Royal Government of Cambodia is resolved to settle its international disputes by peaceful means, in such a manner as not to endanger peace, international security and justice.

During the period which will elapse between the date of the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and that of the final settlement of political problems in this country, The Royal Government of Cambodia will not solicit foreign aid in war material, personnel or instructors except for the purpose of the effective defense of the territory.”

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> Final text, Indochina Document IC/46 Rev. 2, July 21, p. 1544.

751G.00/7-2154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

NIACT

GENEVA, July 21, 1954.

Secto 707. Repeated information Saigon niact 90, Vientiane 6, Phnom Penh 11, Hanoi 5, Paris 120, London 25, Moscow 14, Tokyo 11. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Following is revised text declarations by Laos as translated and issued by 6-nation secretariat.

*Declaration by the Royal Government of Laos*<sup>1</sup>

(Reference : Article 3 of the final declaration)

The Royal Government of Laos,

In the desire to ensure harmony and agreement among the Peoples of the Kingdom,

Declares itself resolved to take the necessary measures to integrate all citizens, without discrimination, into the National Community and to guarantee them the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms for which the constitution of the Kingdom provides;

Affirms that all Laotian citizens may freely participate as electors or candidates in general elections by secret ballot;

Announces, furthermore, that it will promulgate measures to provide for special representation in the Royal Administration of the provinces of Phang Saly and Sam Neua during the interval between the cessation of hostilities and the general elections of the interests of Laotian Nationals who did not support the Royal Forces during hostilities.

*Declaration of the Royal Government of Laos*<sup>2</sup>

(Articles 4 and 5 of the final declaration)

The Royal Government of Laos is resolved never to pursue a policy of aggression and will never permit the territory of Laos to be used in furtherance of such a policy.

The Royal Government of Laos will never join in any agreement with other states if this agreement includes the obligation for the Royal Government of Laos to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities or, unless its security is threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Laotian territory for military forces of foreign powers.

The Royal Government of Laos is resolved to settle its international disputes by peaceful means so that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.

During the period between the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and the final settlement of that country's political problems, the Royal Government of Laos will not request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors, except for the purpose of its effec-

<sup>1</sup> Final text, Indochina Document IC/45 Rev. 1, July 21, p. 1542.

<sup>2</sup> Final text, Indochina Document IC/47 Rev. 1, July 21, p. 1543.

tive territorial defense and to the extent defined by the agreement on the cessation of hostilities.

SMITH

---

*Editorial Note*

At 7 a. m. on July 21 the Secretary of State received a telephone call from Under Secretary Smith summarized as follows:

"S. [Smith] said one of the Foreign Ministers there will make a statement that a cease-fire has been arranged. The protest against negotiations will be done in the political field. It is the best obtainable by negotiation. They discussed some of the terms, but they will probably come in by cable, and I won't set down what may be inaccuracies unless someone wants them. There are practically no restrictions on Cambodia's maintaining an adequate security arrangement. There is international control or supervision of the transfer of some of the people. Re what the Sec. was worried about, the French assured S. it will be given priority—even over personnel. They discussed S.'s statement, and the Sec. suggested putting in something re self-determination as independent and sovereign states. S. agreed and referred the Sec. to the statement made last night. The prohibition of arms and alliances is not forever. They agreed S. would make his declaration. It would be extremely bad if we did not when Mendes has done all he has. S. said today they are going to demonstrate Western solidarity by dining and meeting together. This would be done preparatory to Mendes' talking with Molotov. S. and the Sec. have their fingers crossed on this. S. assured the Sec. there were no under-the-table deals. S. said he thought his declaration would have been made by the time the Pres. has his press conference. S. read his statement." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Telephone conversations)

For the text of President Eisenhower's statement made at his press conference on July 21, see editorial note, page 1503.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 306

*Memorandum by Richard V. Hennes to the Head of the United States Delegation (Smith)*<sup>1</sup>

[GENEVA,] July 21, 1954.

GENERAL SMITH: The Secretary is recommending to the President that he give the following statement at his press conference.<sup>2</sup> He will proceed with this unless you advise to the contrary:

"As evidence of our resolve to assist Cambodia and Laos to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community

<sup>1</sup> Smith's handwritten initials appear on the source text.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of the President's statement made at his press conference on July 21, see editorial note, p. 1503.

of free nations, we are requesting the *agrément* of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to our appointment of Chiefs of Diplomatic Mission, to be resident in Phnom Penh and Vientiane. We already have a Chief of Mission at Saigon, the capital of Viet-Nam, who will of course be maintained."

It will be assumed in making this statement that the contacts have by that time been made and that the Foreign Ministers of Cambodia and Laos are agreeable.

RVH

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 308

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Phleger)*<sup>1</sup>

[GENEVA,] July 21, 1954.

With respect to the seven points attached to the instructions,<sup>2</sup> the various proposed agreements and declarations compare as follows:

1. If the Vietnamese Government does not agree to the arrangement, the provision of the instruction regarding agreement by the states primarily interested is not met.

2. Point 1. Appears to be met.

Point 2. Military demarkation line should be assessed on basis that it was best obtainable by negotiation.

Point 3. This is met as to Cambodia. Laos is probably restricted to French instructors and military supplies acceptable to International Commission. Prohibited from foreign bases save where security threatened and military alliances save UN type.

Vietnam prohibited importation arms, personnel, bases and alliances. Very similar to Korean Armistice.

Point 4. There are political provisions which *risk* loss of retained area to Communist control, but the principal one is that requiring elections in two years, which is the means for complying with Point 5.

Point 5. This is met.

Point 6. This is met, though not as completely as might be desired.

Point 7. The international supervision of the Agreements and of the Elections is by India, Canada and Poland which must act unanimously in important matters. It has no enforcement authority and its powers in connection with the election are not spelled out.

---

<sup>1</sup> Smith's handwritten initials appear on the source text.

<sup>2</sup> Reference to the memorandum of points attached to the U.S.-French Position Paper, July 14, p. 1363. This memorandum was also attached to the Secretary's instructions to Under Secretary Smith, July 16, p. 1389.

396.1 GE/7-2154

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Reinhardt) to the Deputy United States Representative and Coordinator of the Delegation (Johnson)*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, July 21, 1954.

Subj: Possible Communist Attack Against U.S. Position at Final Plenary Session

We have heard rumors to the effect that, at the final plenary session this afternoon, Molotov or Chou may take the opportunity to denounce the United States' position of non-association with the Indo-Chinese settlement. According to these rumors, the Communists might use the occasion for a full-scale attack against United States policy.

If the Communists engage in polemics against us at the plenary, it would probably be with the aim of eliciting a counter-attack from our side, which could then be used by their propaganda in an attempt to demonstrate that we were opposed to a peaceful settlement in South-east Asia.

On balance, however, we believe it is unlikely that the Communists will choose to upset the picture of "sweetness and light" which they will wish to achieve at the final plenary by launching a violent attack against the United States.

We have considered what response should be made by the United States if such an attack materializes. In our view, it would be best to refrain from responding in kind to a Communist denunciation and to re-state, in restrained and dignified fashion, our position of non-association based on the fact that the United States is not a belligerent.

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Stoessel of the delegation.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 306

*Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 21, 1954.

The Vietnamese Foreign Minister [Do] has just told me that he will be present at the plenary session this afternoon. He will state that his government is glad that a cease fire has been arranged. He will protest at the manner in which the negotiations have been conducted and at the fact that his government has not been kept informed. He will state that his government does not plan to use force in order to overthrow the cease fire but that it reserves its freedom of action in the political field.

396.1 GE/7-1954 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

NIACT

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1954—12:15 p. m.

Tosec 587. For Under Secretary from Secretary.

1. Re Eden's formula for moving ahead on collective defense in SEA (Secto 674<sup>2</sup> as amended by Tosec 579<sup>3</sup>) we have assumed that Eden would not extend formal invitations to any of Colombo Powers unless such powers had previously indicated informally that they would accept invitation. Is this assumption correct? In our view it would be counter-productive to send a formal invitation and to have such invitation formally rejected. Furthermore, it would greatly complicate our ability to deal with fact that neither ROK nor Formosa will be invited.

2. Also we had not envisaged that US-UK invitations would be made public but rather that after invitations are extended, those governments accepting would make simultaneous and identical announcements in capitals in the form of a declaration of agreement to appoint Reps to meet together to prepare recommendations on establishment of SEA collective defense. This would make clear their common purpose and fact that their decision was on basis of common initiative and agreement and not something that US and UK had pushed others into.

3. Now that Geneva Conference has produced agreements, assume Eden will proceed immediately with further consultation Colombo Powers to determine their attitude toward establishment collective defense SEA. As he knows, Philippines and Thailand are ready to proceed. We will concert with British Embassy here immediately to initiate necessary further consultation with French.

4. Hope consultations with Colombo Powers will produce early indication attitudes those powers so that if they are willing to participate, invitations can be extended and announcements made (paragraph two above) as far as possible in advance August 7 deadline. In our view, timing is still the important element particularly in view of the fact that public reaction to Geneva Conference is as we expected portraying Indochina agreement as great victory for Communists.

5. Please discuss above with Eden.

DULLES

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by MacArthur.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 19, p. 1465.

<sup>3</sup> Dated July 20, p. 1470.

751G.00/7-2154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 21, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 708. Repeated information Paris 123, Saigon 91. Following is unofficial translation of note from French to Vietnamese delegation which was given us by French this morning; Vietnamese have asked that it be made a conference document, which French are now considering:<sup>1</sup>

The Government of the French Republic has undertaken to with-bring a full and complete satisfaction to the aspirations of the Viet-namese people, confirms that it will settle its relations with Vietnam in conformity with the principles of Public International Law through bilateral agreements on the basis of respect for the independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam.

The Government of the French Republic has undertaken to with-draw its troops from the territory of Vietnam at the request of the Government of the State of Vietnam, and the final act of the Geneva Conference has solemnly verified this.

The Government of the French Republic agrees to submit any possible disagreement on the transfers of authority and of services or on the execution of the above treaties to arbitration, the arbiter being in each case designated by agreement between the two governments. In case of disagreement in this choice, each government will designate one arbiter, and the two arbiters thus named will choose the third arbiter."

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> This document did not become a conference document.

751G.00/7-2154 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT

GENEVA, July 21, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 709. Repeated information Paris 124, Saigon 93, Hanoi 6, Tokyo 12, London 26, Moscow 15, Vientiane 7, Phnom Penh 12. Fol-lowing are revisions to declaration sent Secto 698:<sup>1</sup>

Date was changed to 21st of July.

On paragraph 4 last sentence should read: "The conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of the effective defense of their territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos."

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 21, p. 1485.



Last sentence of paragraph 5 should read as follows: "The conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other states if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign powers."

No other deletions or additions.<sup>2</sup> Please note, however, that due to translation differences secretariat documents as issued will differ in wording and use of phrasing although not in substance from US delegation translations contained in, for example, Sectos 692, 693, 694 and 695.<sup>3</sup>

Further, last two sentences of paragraph 7 should read as follows: "In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtained for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the member states of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 April 1955 onwards."

SMITH

---

<sup>2</sup> In telegram Secto 726, July 22, the U.S. Delegation sent the following additional revisions: "Six-nation Secretariat advises that translation recheck revised text declaration sent Sectos 698 and 709: First sentence paragraph 6 insert 'is a provisional line and' between 'line' and 'should'." (751G.00/7-2254)

<sup>3</sup> All dated July 20, pp. 1482, 1483, and 1484.

---

751G.00/7-2154 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL      PRIORITY      WASHINGTON, July 21, 1954—1 : 34 p. m.

253. For Ambassador from Secretary. If you think appropriate please orally say to Mendes-France that while many aspects of the Indochina settlement obviously reflect a sense of compulsion rather than of choice, I feel that it is at least a good augury for France that

---

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by the Secretary of State.

he has demonstrated a capacity to take decisions and carry them out. You may tell him that I hope he feels that our presence through General Smith at the Geneva Conference was helpful to his cause, and that so far as I am concerned, I greatly value the opportunity we had at Paris for an exchange of views, and believe that exchange will be helpful for the future.<sup>2</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 364 from Paris, July 27, Ambassador Dillon replied that he had passed the Secretary's message to Mendès-France the day before. With respect to the presence of Under Secretary Smith at the Geneva Conference Ambassador Dillon reported that Mendès-France "felt the return of Bedell Smith to Geneva had been an event of the greatest importance and he thought it was probably impossible for us to realize how important Bedell Smith's presence had been to achieving a successful result at Geneva." (751G.00/7-2754) For the remainder of Ambassador Dillon's reply, see volume XIII.

---

396.1 GE/7-2154

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Head of the United States Delegation (Smith)*

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, July 21, 1954.

Subject: Unilateral U.S. Declaration at Geneva Conference.

Participants: Mr. V. M. Molotov, Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
USSR

Mr. V. V. Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister for Foreign  
Affairs, USSR

Mr. O. A. Troyanovsky, Interpreter  
U-General Smith

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson

I called on Molotov at his villa shortly before the plenary meeting this afternoon and told him I wished to inform him of exactly what the United States was going to say at the meeting this afternoon.

Troyanovsky interpreted to Mr. Molotov the full text of the U.S. Delegation declaration. I said that this declaration should be satisfactory, and pointed out that the last paragraph of the declaration with respect to the renewal of aggression was stronger than that in the proposed Conference declaration.

Mr. Molotov pointedly referred to the fact that the U.S. would not be associated with the other members of the Conference and was taking a unilateral position. He said it was unfortunate that the U.S. was disassociating itself from all the others. I replied that some of the others were not recognized by the U.S. and that the Conference agreements contained some things we disliked very much. However, I said, the United States had consistently tried to be helpful, particularly in

discussions with the Cambodian representatives the previous night. This drew a quizzical expression from Molotov. (Both the Chinese and the Russians believe we tried to induce the Cambodians to hold out.)

Without mentioning it by name, Molotov referred to SEATO as a renewed threat. I replied that it would not be a threat to anyone, but would be purely, and I hoped strongly, defensive. In response to his question I said that it was not now contemplated that the Associated States be invited or pressed to join SEATO.

WBS

---

396.1 GE/7-2154: Telegram

*Eighth Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, July 21, 3:10 p. m.:  
The United States Delegation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

GENEVA, July 21, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 721. Repeated information Paris 130, Saigon 99, London 29, Tokyo 15, Moscow 18, Hanoi 9, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Department pass Defense. Eighth and final plenary session Indochina conference with Eden in chair opened Wednesday, July 21 at 1500 hours and lasted until 1725. First ten minutes spent taking press photographs.

Eden announced that before opening formal proceedings, he wished to call on representative state of Vietnam. Tran Van Do stated his delegation tabled proposal for armistice without partition, involving disarmament all forces, limited regroupment zones, temporary UN administration of country, and final settlement through free elections. He protested rejection this proposal without examination. He requested conference accept at least demilitarization and neutralization of Catholic bishoprics in south Tonkin delta. He protested fact that armistice for Vietnam had been negotiated by French command, although authority of that command over Vietnamese troops had been delegated from Chief of State of Vietnam. He also protested abandonment of territory still under Vietnamese control and stated that as result Vietnam was deprived of sovereign right to organize its defense without reliance on foreign troops. Finally, he protested inclusion of date for elections in armistice agreement since such provision obviously political in nature. He reserved Vietnam's right to full freedom of action to safeguard unity, independence and territorial integrity.

---

<sup>1</sup> A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/8) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 277. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:10 p. m. (after 10 minutes for press photographs) and adjourned at 5:20 p. m. The minutes are also printed in *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 378-392. Extracts of the minutes are printed in Cmd. 9239, pp. 5-9. This message was transmitted in two sections.

Mendes-France responded to Do's statement. He said French delegation did not wish to return to points raised by Vietnamese delegation, but believed French command had acted within its mandate. He further stated French Government has always shared concern of Vietnamese delegation for Catholic bishoprics and expressed hope that recent declaration by Ho Chi Minh concerning Viet Minh intention respect freedom of conscience will be observed.

Eden remarked conference will wish to take note of statements of Vietnam and France.

Eden then proceeded to list agreed documents which were before conference (Secto 682<sup>2</sup>). He stated agreements on cessation of hostilities were not to be made public pending agreement between parties. He explained agreements should not be published until all cease-fires had been effected.

After completing list of documents Eden requested each delegation declare its position on final conference declaration.<sup>3</sup> Responses varied:

France—approved terms of declaration.

Laos—had no observations to make.

Democratic Republic of Vietnam—nodded agreement.

Chinese Communists—agreed.

UK—associated themselves.

USSR—agreed.

Cambodia—protested Eden's failure to list Cambodian declaration reservations concerning Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier (transmitted Secto 685<sup>4</sup>) and read text.

(Eden explained that he had only at that instant received Cambodian declaration and expressed opinion that past controversies between Cambodia and Vietnam were not part of task of conference. Dong agreed with Eden and registered "most express reservation" concerning Cambodian statement. Eden declared conference could take note of statements of Cambodia and Democratic Republic of Vietnam.)

US—statement transmitted Secto 711.<sup>5</sup>

Vietnam—asked following language be inserted after Article 10 in final conference declaration: "Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the State of Vietnam undertaking:

"To make and support every effort to re-establish a real and lasting peace in Vietnam; not to use force to resist the procedures for carrying the cease-fire into effect, in spite of the objections and reservations

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 20, not printed. (396.1 GE/7-2054) For the three armistice agreements, the final declaration, and all of the final declarations made by Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and France, see pp. 1505 ff.

<sup>3</sup> For the final conference declaration, Indochina Document IC/43 Rev. 2, July 21, see p. 1540.

<sup>4</sup> Dated July 20, p. 1476.

<sup>5</sup> *Infra*.

that the state of Vietnam has expressed, especially in its final statement."

Eden responded final declaration already drafted and proposed conference take note of Vietnamese statement.

Eden then stated two more pieces of business to be settled:

(1) He suggested that two chairmen send telegrams to governments of India, Poland and Canada, asking them to undertake the armistice supervisory duties proposed by conference. No objection.

(2) He suggested chairmen prepare proposal on allocation of costs on International Commission. Again no objection.

At this point, session appeared to be at point of adjournment. Eden made brief statement concerning conference achievements and expressed his appreciation for cooperation all delegations, hospitality of Swiss Government, and assistance of United Nations. US delegate thanked chairmen for their performance. Molotov replied to US delegate, stressing outstanding role of Eden in conference.

Vietnamese delegate again asked conference include his insertion in final declaration. Eden again replied final declaration could not be amended, but conference could note Vietnamese statement.

Eden then started to declare session closed, but Molotov triggered series of concluding statements by asking to speak, explaining he had believed such statements were to be made.

Molotov's speech consisted largely of standard Communist themes. Only points of interest were:

- (1) Reference to unsolved problem of Korean re-unification;
- (2) Cryptic reference to position taken by US on final declaration "fact which we know";
- (3) Assertion that artificial obstacles to international role Communist China created by aggressive circles now being swept away.

Pham Van Dong followed with equally platitudinous and somewhat emotional pronouncement on accomplishments of conference. He made special reference to DRV policy of freedom of worship in Bui Chu and Phat Diem. He emphasized DRV desire for cultural and economic links with France and ended with appeal to Vietnamese of south, stating "victory is ours, independence is in our hands".

Chou En-lai followed with statement similar in tone to those of Dong and Molotov and containing no points of particular interest. Laos and Cambodia then delivered brief statements on accomplishments of conference. Mendes-France gave final statement, in which he emphasized that success of conference was due to spirit of compromise and that same spirit would be needed in carrying out agreements.

SMITH

751G.00/7-2154 : Telegram

*Eighth Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, July 21, 3:10 p. m.:*  
*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

NIACT

GENEVA, July 21, 1954.

Secto 711. Repeated information Saigon niact 94, Vientiane 8, Phnom Penh 13, Hanoi niact 7, Paris 125, Tokyo 13, London 27, Moscow 16. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Department for press backstop. Text follows of statement made by General Smith at concluding Indochina plenary, July 21.<sup>1</sup> Release made here 1630 Geneva time. Request Department release immediately. Other addressees may also release as deemed appropriate.

"As I stated on July 18,<sup>2</sup> my government is not prepared to join in a declaration by the conference such as is submitted. However, the United States makes this unilateral declaration of its position in these matters:

*Declaration*

The Government of the United States being resolved to devote its efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations takes note of the agreements concluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954 between the (a) Franco-Laotian command and the command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (b) the Royal Khmer Army Command and the command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (c) Franco-Vietnamese command and the command of the Peoples Army of Vietnam and of paragraphs 1 to 12 inclusive of the declaration presented to the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954 declares with regard to the aforesaid agreements and paragraphs that (i) it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force; and (ii) it will view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning free elections in Vietnam, my government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954,<sup>3</sup> as follows:

'In the case of nations, now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly.'

<sup>1</sup> Smith's statement and the unilateral U.S. declaration are also printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 2, 1954, pp. 162-163 and in Cmd. 9239, pp. 6-7.

<sup>2</sup> Smith's statement made in the Twenty-third Restricted Session on Indochina, July 18, was contained in telegram Secto 654, July 18, p. 1431.

<sup>3</sup> A reference to the joint statement issued by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill in Washington on June 29; see editorial note, p. 1260.

With respect to the statement made by the representative of the State of Vietnam, the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing in its declaration just made is intended to or does indicate any departure from this traditional position.

We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam to play their part in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples of that area to determine their own future."

SMITH

396.1 GE/7-2154 : Telegram

*Eighth Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, July 21, 3:10 p. m.:  
The United States Delegation to the United States Information  
Agency*

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 21, 1954—11 p. m.

Tousi 15. For Berding/Phillips. Geneva Guide Final. But for Molotov's sudden awakening at 4:10 this after, conference chairman Eden might have closed the Geneva Conference without a final round Communist harangue. Matter of fact, plenary session was actually closed in Eden's words when Soviet Foreign Minister suddenly asked whether closing statements were in order. Probably weren't but he started off anyway.

Naturally, he set the theme for his two Asian colleagues, striking chords of "peaceful co-existence", "relaxation of tensions", and the "success" achieved at Geneva by the "forces of peace". Molotov's tone considered moderate, especially towards US, but this did not last long. Pham Van Dong picked up the theme but not the tone, and once having touched in his own words on the "Communist success" (and thus the conference success, of course) at Geneva, he launched into the type of aggressive attack that has come to be expected of him. Certainly it was in bad taste under the circumstances.

Aside from these three speeches, final session of conference, as you know from news file, devoted largely to presentation of final declaration plus special statements from almost everyone of Allied delegations. Some of these made for home consumption, especially when they reflected note of protest, demand or reservation. This does not, of course, apply to US declaration, principles of which are well-known and can be dealt with accordingly. Certainly Smith's forthright statement can be considered a sound and positive, rather than negative, approach to problems of guaranteeing peace and security in South-east Asia, and protecting fundamental rights of man in which free

world believes. US declaration was actually much stronger and had much more substance for non-Communist states than conference declaration by other members. Our statement was the only one which really carried the weight of a guarantee against further aggression. This should be a recurring point in our commentary on the whole conference.

Treatment: Of other separate declarations, only one with which we need deal especially, aside from noting (as did the conference, in most cases), is short Vietnam resolution prepared for insertion into the final declaration. Not accepted as an insertion, but since it states worthy pledge on behalf of Vietnam to bend all efforts to re-establish real peace in that country, and to refrain from using force to oppose any implementation of cease-fire agreements, US supports it. Because of the language, it requires careful handling, with emphasis on the pledge, and not on irony of its phraseology. US considers this a statement of valid intent to achieve true and lasting peace, and we wish the Vietnam[ese] well.

Communist wind-ups were notable, and even vulnerable, for at least one specific strain which ran through them all. At every turn they combined the "forces of peace": Viet Minh, Communist China and the Soviet Union, with France. In their lexicon, France is on their side, because it helped to make peace and peace is their private property. Not only weakness of this argument but the affrontery of it should be obvious. We suspect French themselves will rebut this premise, and we should pick up everything in next few days, probably from Mendes in Paris, which helps knock down that inadmissible although not new by any means, Communist reasoning.

Notable also was Asian Communist appeals, either in Dong's language or in Chou's more moderate approach, for what would amount to an Asian security pact. Their principal objective is just such a pact as Molotov has proposed for Europe, with US isolated. We have our answer to that, which presumably is being worked into our output as situation permits.

Also note heavy reliance on cultural and economic cooperation theme, to which our national strategy for this area might have some other than straight military answers. It has been obvious throughout conference that Chou is most concerned over US activities in Asia, so the more active we are, on all fronts, and especially in the next two years where elections will be held, the more anxious we can make him. Our statement is part of the strategy referred to; it stands out of the welter of language in Geneva today as a real, valid, and applicable principle, and should be treated as such.



*Editorial Note*

At his news conference on July 21, President Eisenhower made the following statement:

"I am glad, of course, that agreement has been reached at Geneva to stop the bloodshed in Indochina.

"The United States has not been a belligerent in the war. The primary responsibility for the settlement in Indochina rested with those nations which participated in the fighting. Our role at Geneva has been at all times to try to be helpful where desired and to aid France and Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam to obtain a just and honorable settlement which will take into account the needs of the interested people. Accordingly, the United States has not itself been party to or bound by the decisions taken by the Conference, but it is our hope that it will lead to the establishment of peace consistent with the rights and the needs of the countries concerned. The agreement contains features which we do not like, but a great deal depends on how they work in practice.

"The United States is issuing at Geneva a statement to the effect that it is not prepared to join in the Conference declaration, but, as loyal members of the United Nations, we also say that, in compliance with the obligations and principles contained in article 2 of the United Nations Charter, the United States will not use force to disturb the settlement. We also say that any renewal of Communist aggression would be viewed by us as a matter of grave concern.

"As evidence of our resolve to assist Cambodia and Laos to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of free nations, we are requesting the agreement of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to our appointment of an Ambassador or Minister to be resident at their respective capitals (Phnom Penh and Vientiane). We already have a Chief of Mission at Saigon, the capital of Viet-Nam, and this Embassy will, of course, be maintained.

"The United States is actively pursuing discussions with other free nations with a view to the rapid organization of a collective defense in Southeast Asia in order to prevent further direct or indirect Communist aggression in that general area."

The text of this statement is also printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, August 2, 1954, page 163, and in the *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, page 642.

---

751G.00/7-2154: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1954—7:45 p. m.

Tosec 597. For Phleger from Cowles. Secretary has asked for our legal opinion as to what extent Geneva agreement may impose inhibi-

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by O'Connor of S.

tions and restrictions on the Associated States. He has asked particularly how we can (a) protect Laos, Cambodia and retained Vietnam through SEATO against external aggression and assist them to prevent internal subversion and (b) bring them into some form of military or economic association with SEATO.

Secretary thinks that what we can do in these respects will depend to a considerable extent on the legal interpretations which France, UK and Associated States place on the agreements reached at Geneva, in light of their discussions and negotiations of these agreements. I would very much like to have your comments on these points either by cable or in person if you plan be back by end of week.<sup>2</sup>

DULLES

---

<sup>2</sup>The reply to the Secretary's request was contained in two memoranda—one, dated July 22, prepared by Meeker of L/UNA; the other, dated July 27, also prepared by Meeker, was sent by Phleger of L to the Secretary of State. The memorandum of July 22, which contains a handwritten notation on the source text that the Secretary of State saw it, is filed in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 329. For the memorandum from Phleger to the Secretary, which also contains a handwritten notation on the source text that the Secretary saw it, see p. 1552.

---

751G.00/7-2154: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 21, 1954—8 p. m.

Secto 718. Repeated information Paris 128, Saigon 97. Offroy of French del tells us that following conclusion of conference today he is pursuing negotiations with Viet Minh del regarding protection of French economic interests in North Vietnam and regarding conditions under which Frenchmen will be allowed to continue to reside there. According to Offroy French do not propose for present to have any sort of official representation in North Vietnam after evacuation French Expeditionary Corps and have rejected Viet Minh proposal for Viet Minh representation in Paris.

SMITH

IV. INDOCHINA DOCUMENTS PREPARED BY THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE: ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS FOR VIETNAM, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA; THE FINAL DECLARATION ON INDOCHINA; DECLARATIONS BY CAMBODIA, LAOS, AND FRANCE; PROPOSED AMENDMENT BY VIETNAM TO THE FINAL DECLARATION (JULY 20-JULY 21)

396.1 GE/7-2154

*Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, 20 July 1954.

IC/42 Rev. 2

CHAPTER I

PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

*Article 1*

A provisional military demarcation line shall be fixed, on either side of which the forces of the two parties shall be regrouped after their withdrawal, the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam to the north of the line and the forces of the French Union to the south.

The provisional military demarcation line is fixed as shown on the map attached (see Map No. 1<sup>2</sup>).

It is also agreed that a demilitarized zone shall be established on either side of the demarcation line, to a width of not more than 5 kms. from it, to act as a buffer zone and avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities.

*Article 2*

The period within which the movement of all the forces of either party into its regrouping zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall be completed shall not exceed three hundred (300) days from the date of the present Agreement's entry into force.

*Article 3*

When the provisional military demarcation line coincides with a waterway, the waters of such waterway shall be open to civil naviga-

<sup>1</sup> This document was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 700, July 21. (751G.00/7-2154) Revisions issued by the International Secretariat were transmitted to the Department in telegram Secto 703, July 21. (751G.00/7-2154)

The following printed notation appeared on the source text: "The two parties have agreed that this text shall not be published until further notice."

This agreement was also printed in *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, pp. 750-767; Cmd. 9239, pp. 27-40; and *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 427-442.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

tion by both parties wherever one bank is controlled by one party and the other bank by the other party. The Joint Commission shall establish rules of navigation for the stretch of waterway in question. The merchant shipping and other civilian craft of each party shall have unrestricted access to the land under its military control.

*Article 4*

The provisional military demarcation line between the two final regrouping zones is extended into the territorial waters by a line perpendicular to the general line of the coast.

All coastal islands north of this boundary shall be evacuated by the armed forces of the French Union, and all islands south of it shall be evacuated by the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam.

*Article 5*

To avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities, all military forces, supplies and equipment shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within twenty-five (25) days of the present Agreement's entry into force.

*Article 6*

No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the provisional military demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission.

*Article 7*

No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the demilitarized zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Joint Commission.

*Article 8*

Civil administration and relief in the demilitarized zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall be the responsibility of the Commanders-in-Chief of the two parties in their respective zones. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the demilitarized zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed at any one time a figure to be determined by the Trung Gia Military Commission or by the Joint Commission. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be determined by the Joint Commission. No one else shall carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission.

*Article 9*

Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as limiting the complete freedom of movement, into, out of or within the demilitarized zone, of the Joint Commission, its joint groups, the International Commission to be set up as indicated below, its inspection teams and any other persons, supplies or equipment specifically authorized to enter the demilitarized zone by the Joint Commission. Freedom of movement shall be permitted across the territory under the military control of either side over any road or waterway which has to be taken between points within the demilitarized zone when such points are not connected by roads or waterways lying completely within the demilitarized zone.

## CHAPTER II

PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURE GOVERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE  
PRESENT AGREEMENT*Article 10*

The Commanders of the Forces on each side, on the one side the Commander-in-Chief of the French Union forces in Indo-China and on the other side the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army of Viet-Nam, shall order and enforce the complete cessation of all hostilities in Viet-Nam by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval and air forces.

*Article 11*

In accordance with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indo-China, the cessation of hostilities shall be simultaneous throughout all parts of Viet-Nam, in all areas of hostilities and for all the forces of the two parties.

Taking into account the time effectively required to transmit the cease-fire order down to the lowest échelons of the combatant forces on both sides, the two parties are agreed that the cease-fire shall take effect completely and simultaneously for the different sectors of the country as follows:

Northern Viet-Nam at 8:00 a. m. (local time) on 27 July 1954  
Central Viet-Nam at 8:00 a. m. (local time) on 1 August 1954  
Southern Viet-Nam at 8:00 a. m. (local time) on 11 August 1954

It is agreed that Peking mean time shall be taken as local time.

From such time as the cease-fire becomes effective in Northern Viet-Nam, both parties undertake not to engage in any large-scale offensive action in any part of the Indo-Chinese theatre of operations and not to commit the air forces based on Northern Viet-Nam outside that

sector. The two parties also undertake to inform each other of their plans for movement from one regrouping zone to another within twenty-five (25) days of the present Agreement's entry into force.

#### *Article 12*

All the operations and movements entailed in the cessation of hostilities and regrouping must proceed in a safe and orderly fashion :

(a) Within a certain number of days after the cease-fire Agreement shall have become effective, the number to be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission, each party shall be responsible for removing and neutralizing mines (including river- and sea-mines), booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous substances placed by it. In the event of its being impossible to complete the work of removal and neutralization in time, the party concerned shall mark the spot by placing visible signs there. All demolitions, mine fields, wire entanglements and other hazards to the free movement of the personnel of the Joint Commission and its joint groups, known to be present after the withdrawal of the military forces, shall be reported to the Joint Commission by the Commanders of the opposing forces ;

(b) From the time of the cease-fire until regrouping is completed on either side of the demarcation line :

(1) The forces of either party shall be provisionally withdrawn from the provisional assembly areas assigned to the other party.

(2) When one party's forces withdraw by a route (road, rail, waterway, sea route) which passes through the territory of the other party (see Article 24), the latter party's forces must provisionally withdraw three kilometres on each side of such route, but in such a manner as to avoid interfering with the movements of the civil population.

#### *Article 13*

From the time of the cease-fire until the completion of the movements from one regrouping zone into the other, civil and military transport aircraft shall follow air-corridors between the provisional assembly areas assigned to the French Union forces north of the demarcation line on the one hand and the Laotian frontier and the regrouping zone assigned to the French Union forces on the other hand.

The position of the air-corridors, their width, the safety route for single-engined military aircraft transferred to the south and the search and rescue procedure for aircraft in distress shall be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission.

#### *Article 14*

Political and administrative measures in the two regrouping zones, on either side of the provisional military demarcation line :

(a) Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of Viet-Nam, the conduct of civil administration in each re-

grouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present Agreement;

(b) Any territory controlled by one party which is transferred to the other party by the regrouping plan shall continue to be administered by the former party until such date as all the troops who are to be transferred have completely left that territory so as to free the zone assigned to the party in question. From then on, such territory shall be regarded as transferred to the other party, who shall assume responsibility for it.

Steps shall be taken to ensure that there is no break in the transfer of responsibilities. For this purpose, adequate notice shall be given by the withdrawing party to the other party, which shall make the necessary arrangements, in particular by sending administrative and police detachments to prepare for the assumption of administrative responsibility. The length of such notice shall be determined by the Trung Gia Military Commission. The transfer shall be effected in successive stages for the various territorial sectors.

The transfer of the civil administration of Hanoi and Haiphong to the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam shall be completed within the respective time-limits laid down in Article 15 for military movements.

(c) Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their democratic liberties.

(d) From the date of entry into force of the present Agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district.

#### *Article 15*

The disengagement of the combatants, and the withdrawals and transfers of military forces, equipment and supplies shall take place in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The withdrawals and transfers of the military forces, equipment and supplies of the two parties shall be completed within three hundred (300) days, as laid down in Article 2 of the present Agreement;

(b) Within either territory successive withdrawals shall be made by sectors, portions of sectors or provinces. Transfers from one regrouping zone to another shall be made in successive monthly instalments proportionate to the number of troops to be transferred;

(c) The two parties shall undertake to carry out all troop withdrawals and transfers in accordance with the aims of the present Agreement, shall permit no hostile act and shall take no step whatsoever which might hamper such withdrawals and transfers. They shall assist one another as far as this is possible;

(d) The two parties shall permit no destruction or sabotage of any public property and no injury to the life and property of the civil

population. They shall permit no interference in local civil administration;

(e) The Joint Commission and the International Commission shall ensure that steps are taken to safeguard the forces in the course of withdrawal and transfer;

(f) The Trung Gia Military Commission, and later the Joint Commission, shall determine by common agreement the exact procedure for the disengagement of the combatants and for troop withdrawals and transfers, on the basis of the principles mentioned above and within the framework laid down below :

1. The disengagement of the combatants, including the concentration of the armed forces of all kinds and also each party's movements into the provisional assembly areas assigned to it and the other party's provisional withdrawal from it, shall be completed within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days after the date when the cease-fire becomes effective.

The general delineation of the provisional assembly areas is set out in the maps annexed to the present Agreement.

In order to avoid any incidents, no troops shall be stationed less than 1,500 metres from the lines delimiting the provisional assembly areas.

During the period until the transfers are concluded, all the coastal islands west of the following lines shall be included in the Haiphong perimeter :

- meridian of the southern point of Kebao Island
- northern coast of Ile Rousse (excluding the island), extended as far as the meridian of Campha-Mines
- meridian of Campha-Mines.

2. The withdrawals and transfers shall be effected in the following order and within the following periods (from the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement) :

*Forces of the French Union*

Hanoi perimeter	— 80 days
Haiduong perimeter	—100 days
Haiphong perimeter	—300 days

*Forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam*

Ham Tan and Xuyenmoc provisional assembly area	— 80 days
Central Viet-Nam provisional assembly area—first installment	— 80 days
Plaine des Jones provisional assembly area	—100 days
Central Viet-Nam provisional assembly area—second installment	—100 days
Point Camau provisional assembly area	—200 days
Central Viet-Nam provisional assembly area—last installment	—300 days



## CHAPTER III

BAN ON THE INTRODUCTION OF FRESH TROOPS, MILITARY PERSONNEL,  
ARMS AND MUNITIONS, MILITARY BASES*Article 16*

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited.

It is understood, however, that the rotation of units and groups of personnel, the arrival in Viet-Nam of individual personnel on a temporary duty basis and the return to Viet-Nam of individual personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Viet-Nam shall be permitted under the conditions laid down below :

(a) Rotation of units (defined in paragraph (c) of this Article) and groups of personnel shall not be permitted for French Union troops stationed north of the provisional military demarcation line laid down in Article 1 of the present Agreement, during the withdrawal period provided for in Article 2.

However, under the heading of individual personnel not more than fifty (50) men, including officers, shall during any one month be permitted to enter that part of the country north of the provisional military demarcation line on a temporary duty basis or to return there after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Viet-Nam.

(b) "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or groups of personnel by other units of the same échelon or by personnel who are arriving in Viet-Nam territory to do their overseas service there;

(c) The units rotated shall never be larger than a battalion—or the corresponding échelon for air and naval forces.

(d) Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis, provided, however, that in any one quarter neither party shall introduce more than fifteen thousand five hundred (15,500) members of its armed forces into Viet-Nam under the rotation policy.

(e) Rotation units (defined in paragraph (c) of this Article) and groups of personnel, and the individual personnel mentioned in this Article, shall enter and leave Viet-Nam only through the entry points enumerated in Article 20 below.

(f) Each party shall notify the Joint Commission and the International Commission at least two days in advance of any arrivals or departures of units, groups of personnel and individual personnel in or from Viet-Nam. Reports on the arrivals or departures of units, groups of personnel and individual personnel in or from Viet-Nam shall be submitted daily to the Joint Commission and the International Commission.

All the above-mentioned notifications and reports shall indicate the places and dates of arrival or departure and the number of persons arriving or departing.

(g) The International Commission, through its Inspection Teams, shall supervise and inspect the rotation of units and groups of personnel and the arrival and departure of individual personnel as

authorized above, at the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below.

*Article 17*

(a) With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons and armoured vehicles, is prohibited.

(b) It is understood, however, that war material, arms and munitions which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cessation of hostilities may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same type and with similar characteristics. Such replacements of war material, arms and munitions shall not be permitted for French Union troops stationed north of the provisional military demarcation line laid down in Article 1 of the present Agreement, during the withdrawal period provided for in Article 2.

Naval craft may perform transport operations between the regrouping zones.

(c) The war material, arms and munitions for replacement purposes provided for in paragraph (b) of this Article, shall be introduced into Viet-Nam only through the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below. War material, arms and munitions to be replaced shall be shipped from Viet-Nam only through the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below.

(d) Apart from the replacements permitted within the limits laid down in paragraph (b) of this Article, the introduction of war material, arms and munitions of all types in the form of unassembled parts for subsequent assembly is prohibited.

(e) Each party shall notify the Joint Commission and the International Commission at least two days in advance of any arrivals or departures which may take place of war material, arms and munitions of all types.

In order to justify the requests for the introduction into Viet-Nam of arms, munitions and other war material (as defined in paragraph (a) of this Article) for replacement purposes, a report concerning each incoming shipment shall be submitted to the Joint Commission and the International Commission. Such reports shall indicate the use made of the items so replaced.

(f) The International Commission, through its Inspection Teams, shall supervise and inspect the replacements permitted in the circumstances laid down in this Article, at the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below.

*Article 18*

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout Viet-Nam territory.

*Article 19*

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the re-grouping zone of either party; the two parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy.

*Article 20*

The points of entry into Viet-Nam for rotation personnel and replacements of material are fixed as follows:

- Zones to the north of the provisional military demarcation line: Laokey, Langson, Tien-Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen;
- Zone to the south of the provisional military demarcation line: Tourane, Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Tanchau.

## CHAPTER IV

## PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES

*Article 21*

The liberation and repatriation of all prisoners of war and civilian internees detained by each of the two parties at the coming into force of the present Agreement shall be carried out under the following conditions:

(a) All prisoners of war and civilian internees of Viet-Nam, French and other nationalities captured since the beginning of hostilities in Viet-Nam during military operations or in any other circumstances of war and in any part of the territory of Viet-Nam shall be liberated within a period of thirty (30) days after the date when the cease-fire becomes effective in each theatre.

(b) The term "civilian internees" is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.

(c) All prisoners of war and civilian internees held by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to their country of origin, place of habitual residence or the zone of their choice.

## CHAPTER V

## MISCELLANEOUS

*Article 22*

The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall ensure that persons under their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of the present Agreement are suitably punished.

*Article 23*

In cases in which the place of burial is known and the existence of graves has been established, the Commander of the Forces of either party shall, within a specific period after the entry into force of the Armistice Agreement, permit the graves service personnel of the other party to enter the part of Viet-Nam territory under their military control for the purpose of finding and removing the bodies of deceased military personnel of that party, including the bodies of deceased prisoners of war. The Joint Commission shall determine the procedures and the time limit for the performance of this task. The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall communicate to each other all information in their possession as to the place of burial of military personnel of the other party.

*Article 24*

The present Agreement shall apply to all the armed forces of either party. The armed forces of each party shall respect the demilitarized zone and the territory under the military control of the other party, and shall commit no act and undertake no operation against the other party and shall not engage in blockade of any kind in Viet-Nam.

For the purposes of the present Article, the word "territory" includes territorial waters and air space.

*Article 25*

The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and co-operation to the Joint Commission and its joint groups and to the International Commission and its inspection teams in the performance of the functions and tasks assigned to them by the present Agreement.

*Article 26*

The costs involved in the operations of the Joint Commission and joint groups and of the International Commission and its Inspection Teams shall be shared equally between the two parties.

*Article 27*

The signatories of the present Agreement and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for ensuring the observance and

enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall, within their respective commands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the present Agreement by all elements and military personnel under their command.

The procedures laid down in the present Agreement shall, whenever necessary, be studied by the Commanders of the two parties and, if necessary, defined more specifically by the Joint Commission.

## CHAPTER VI

### JOINT COMMISSION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIET-NAM

28. Responsibility for the execution of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.

29. An International Commission shall ensure the control and supervision of this execution.

30. In order to facilitate, under the conditions shown below, the execution of provisions concerning joint actions by the two parties a Joint Commission shall be set up in Viet-Nam.

31. The Joint Commission shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commanders of the two parties.

32. The Presidents of the delegations to the Joint Commission shall hold the rank of General.

The Joint Commission shall set up joint groups the number of which shall be determined by mutual agreement between the parties. The joint groups shall be composed of an equal number of officers from both parties. Their location on the demarcation line between the re-grouping zones shall be determined by the parties whilst taking into account the powers of the Joint Commission.

33. The Joint Commission shall ensure the execution of the following provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities:

(a) A simultaneous and general cease-fire in Viet-Nam for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.

(b) A re-groupment of the armed forces of the two parties.

(c) Observance of the demarcation lines between the re-grouping zones and of the demilitarized sectors.

Within the limits of its competence it shall help the parties to execute the said provisions, shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the application of these provisions, and shall endeavour to solve such disputed questions as may arise between the parties in the course of executing these provisions.

34. An International Commission shall be set up for the control and supervision over the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam. It shall be composed of representatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland.

It shall be presided over by the Representative of India.

35. The International Commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned States. The fixed teams shall be located at the following points: Laokay, Langson, Tien-Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen, Tourane, Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Tranchau. These points of location may, at a later date, be altered at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one of the parties, or of the International Commission itself, by agreement between the International Commission and the command of the party concerned. The zones of action of the mobile teams shall be the regions bordering the land and sea frontiers of Viet-Nam, the demarcation lines between the re-grouping zones and the demilitarized zones. Within the limits of these zones they shall have the right to move freely and shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfilment of their tasks (provision of personnel, placing at their disposal documents needed for supervision, summoning witnesses necessary for holding enquiries, ensuring the security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams etc. . . .).<sup>3</sup> They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, observation and communication as they may require. Beyond the zones of action as defined above, the mobile teams may, by agreement with the command of the party concerned, carry out other movements within the limits of the tasks given them by the present agreement.

36. The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the proper execution by the parties of the provisions of the agreement. For this purpose, it shall fulfil the tasks of control, observation, inspection and investigation connected with the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and it shall in particular:

(a) Control the movement of the armed forces of the two parties, effected within the framework of the regroupment plan.

(b) Supervise the demarcation lines between the regrouping areas, and also the demilitarized zones.

(c) Control the operations of releasing prisoners of war and civilian internees.

(d) Supervise at ports and airfields as well as along all frontiers of Viet-Nam the execution of the provisions of the agreement on the

---

<sup>3</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

cessation of hostilities, regulating the introduction into the country of armed forces, military personnel and of all kinds of arms, munitions and war material.

37. The International Commission shall, through the medium of the inspection teams mentioned above, and as soon as possible either on its own initiative, or at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one of the parties, undertake the necessary investigations both documentary and on the ground.

38. The inspection teams shall submit to the International Commission the results of their supervision, their investigation and their observations, furthermore they shall draw up such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the Commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the conclusions of each member shall be submitted to the Commission.

39. If any one inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or a threat of a serious violation the International Commission shall be informed; the latter shall study the reports and the conclusions of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures which should be taken for the settlement of the incident, ending of the violation or removal of the threat of violation.

40. When the Joint Commission is unable to reach an agreement on the interpretation to be given to some provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

41. The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by majority vote, subject to the provisions contained in article 42. If the votes are divided the chairman's vote shall be decisive.

The International Commission may formulate recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam, in order to ensure a more effective execution of that agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

42. When dealing with questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, namely:

(a) Refusal by the armed forces of one party to effect the movements provided for in the regroupment plan;

(b) Violation by the armed forces of one of the parties of the regrouping zones, territorial waters, or air space of the other party; the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.

43. If one of the parties refuses to put into effect a recommendation of the International Commission, the parties concerned or the Com-

mission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.

If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in article 42, it shall submit a majority report and one or more minority reports to the members of the Conference.

The International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference in all cases where its activity is being hindered.

44. The International Commission shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in order that it should be able to fulfil the tasks provided for in article 36.

45. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam shall act in close co-operation with the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos.

The Secretaries-General of these three Commissions shall be responsible for co-ordinating their work and for relations between them.

46. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam may, after consultation with the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos, and having regard to the development of the situation in Cambodia and Laos, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be adopted unanimously.

47. All the provisions of the present Agreement, save the second sub-paragraph of Article 11, shall enter into force at 2400 hours (Geneva time) on 22 July 1954.

Done in Geneva at 2400 hours on the 20th of July 1954 in French and in Viet-Nameese, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Commander-in-Chief of  
the People's Army of Viet-  
Nam

For the Commander-in-Chief of  
the French Union forces in  
Indo-China

TA-QUANG-BUU

Brigadier-General DELTIEL

*Vice-Minister of National De-  
fence of the Democratic Re-  
public of Viet-Nam*

#### Annex

### ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN VIET-NAM

#### I. DELINEATION OF THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE (Article 1 of the Agreement, refer- ence map: Indo-China 1/100,000)<sup>4</sup>

(a) The provisional military demarcation line is fixed as follows,  
reading from east to west:

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.



the mouth of the Song Ben Hat (Cua Tung River) and the course of that river (known as the Rao Thanh in the mountains) to the village of Bo Ho Su, then the parallel of Bo Ho Su to the Laos-Viet-Nam frontier.

(b) The demilitarized zone shall be delimited by Trung Gia Military Commission in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam.

II. GENERAL DELINEATION OF THE PROVISIONAL ASSEMBLY AREAS  
(Article 15 of the Agreement; reference maps: Indo-China 1/400,000)<sup>5</sup>

(a) *North Viet-Nam*

*Delineation of the boundary of the provisional assembly area of the French Union forces*

1. The perimeter of Hanoi is delimited by the arc of a circle with a radius of 15 kilometres, having as its centre the right bank abutment of Doumer Bridge and running westwards from the Red River to the Rapids Canal in the north-east.

In this particular case no forces of the French Union shall be stationed less than 2 kilometres from this perimeter, on the inside thereof.

2. The perimeter of Haiphong shall be delimited by the Song-Van-Uc as far as Kim Thanh and a line running from the Song-Van-Uc three kilometres north-east of Kim Thanh to cut Road No. 18 two kilometres east of Mao-Khé. Thence a line running three kilometres north of Road 18 to Cho-Troi and a straight line from Cho-Troi to the Mong-Duong ferry.

3. *A corridor contained between:*

*In the south*, the Red River from Thanh-Tri to Bang-Nho, thence a line joining the latter point to Do-My (south-west of Kesat), Gia-Loc and Tien Kieu;

*In the north*, a line running along the Rapids Canal at a distance of 1,500 metres to the north of the Canal, passing three kilometres north of Pha-Lai and Seven Pagodas and thence parallel to Road No. 18 to its point of intersection with the perimeter of Haiphong.

*Note:* Throughout the period of evacuation of the perimeter of Hanoi, the river forces of the French Union shall enjoy complete freedom of movement on the Song-Van-Uc. And the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam shall withdraw three kilometres south of the south bank of Song-Van-Uc.

*Boundary between the perimeter of Hanoi and the perimeter of Haiduong*

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

A straight line running from the Rapids Canal three kilometres west of Chi-ne and ending at Do-My (eight kilometres south-west of Kesat).

(b) *Central Viet-Nam*

*Delineation of the boundary of the provisional assembly area of the forces of the Viet-Nam People's Army south of the Col des Nuages parallel.*

The perimeter of the Central Viet-Nam area shall consist of the administrative boundaries of the provinces of Quang-Ngai and Binh-Dinh as they were defined before the hostilities.

(c) *South Viet-Nam*

Three provisional assembly areas shall be provided for the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam.

The boundaries of these areas are as follows :

1. *Xuyen-Moc, Ham-Tan Area*

*Western boundary:* The course of the Song-Ray extended northwards as far as Road No. 1 to a point thereon eight kilometres east of the intersection of Road No. 1 and Road No. 3.

*Northern boundary:* Road No. 1 from the above-mentioned intersection to the intersection with Route Communale No. 9 situated 27 kilometres west-south-west of Phanthiet and from that intersection a straight line to Kim Thanh on the coast.

2. *Plaine des Joncs Area*

*Northern boundary:* The Viet-Nam-Cambodia frontier.

*Western boundary:* A straight line from Tong-Binh to Binh-Thanh.

*Southern boundary:* Course of the Fleuve Antérieur (Mekong) to ten kilometres south-east of Cao Lanh. From that point, a straight line as far as Ap-My-Dien, and from Ap-My-Dien a line parallel to and three kilometres east and then south of the Tong Doc-Loc Canal, this line reaches My-Hanh-Dong and thence Hung-Thanh-My.

*Eastern boundary:* A straight line from Hung-Thanh-My running northwards to the Cambodian frontier south of Doi-Bao-Voi.

3. *Point Camau Area*

*Northern boundary:* The Song-Cai-lon from its mouth to its junction with the Rach-Nuoc-Trong, thence the Rach-Nuoc-Trong to the bend five kilometres north-east of Ap-Xeo-La. Thereafter a line to the Ngan-Dua Canal and following that Canal as far as Vinh-Hung. Finally, from Vinh-Hung a north-south line to the sea.

396.1 GE/7-2154

*Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos*<sup>1</sup>

GENEVA, 20 July 1954.

IC/51 Rev. 1

## CHAPTER I

CEASE-FIRE AND EVACUATION OF FOREIGN ARMED FORCES AND FOREIGN  
MILITARY PERSONNEL*Article 1*

The Commanders of the armed forces of the parties in Laos shall order and enforce the complete cessation of all hostilities in Laos by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval and air forces.

*Article 2*

In accordance with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indo-China the cessation of hostilities shall be simultaneous throughout the territory of Laos in all combat areas and for all forces of the two parties.

In order to prevent any mistake or misunderstanding and to ensure that both the cessation of hostilities and the disengagement and movements of the opposing forces are in fact simultaneous,

(a) Taking into account the time effectively required to transmit the cease-fire order down to the lowest échelons of the combatant forces on both sides, the two parties are agreed that the complete and simultaneous cease-fire throughout the territory of Laos shall become effective at 8 hours (local time) on August 6, 1954. It is agreed that Peking meantime shall be taken as local time.

(b) The Joint Commission for Laos shall draw up a schedule for the other operations resulting from the cessation of hostilities.

*Article 3*

All operations and movements entailed by the cessation of hostilities and re-grouping must proceed in a safe and orderly fashion:

(a) Within a number of days to be determined on the spot by the Joint Commission in Laos each party shall be responsible for removing

<sup>1</sup> This document was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 702, July 21. (396.1 GE/7-2154) Revisions issued by the International Secretariat were transmitted in telegram Secto 703, July 21. (751G.00/7-2154) Additional revisions to this document were issued by the International Secretariat in a note by the Secretariat of July 24. (396.1 GE/7-2454)

This agreement was also printed in *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, pp. 775-785; Cmd. 9239, pp. 18-26; and *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 443-452.

The revisions made to this agreement were entered on the two source texts by typewriter and by hand. As far as can be determined there is no final copy of IC/51 Rev. 1 in Department of State files; there is no indication that a final, revised copy of IC/51 was ever issued by the International Secretariat at Geneva.

and neutralizing mines, booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous substance placed by it. In the event of its being impossible to complete the work of removal and neutralization in time, the party concerned shall mark the spot by placing visible signs there.

(b) As regards the security of troops on the move following the lines of communication in accordance with the schedule previously drawn up by the Joint Armistice Commission in Laos, and the safety of the assembly areas, detailed measures shall be adopted in each case by the Joint Armistice Commission in Laos. In particular, while the forces of one party are withdrawing by a line of communication passing through the territory of the other party (road or waterways) the forces of the latter party shall provisionally withdraw two kilometres on either side of such line of communication, but in such a manner as to avoid interfering with the movements of the civil population.

#### *Article 4*

The withdrawals and transfers of military forces, supplies and equipment shall be effected in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The withdrawals and transfers of the military forces, supplies and equipment of the two parties shall be completed within a period of 120 days from the day on which the present Agreement enters into force.

The two parties undertake to communicate their transfer plans to each other, for information, within 25 days of the entry into force of the present Agreement.

(b) The withdrawals of the Viet-Nameese People's Volunteers from Laos to Viet-Nam shall be effected by provinces. The position of those volunteers who were settled in Laos before the hostilities shall form the subject of a special convention.

(c) The routes for the withdrawal of the forces of the French Union and Viet-Nameese People's Volunteers in Laos from Laotian territory shall be fixed on the spot by the Joint Commission.

(d) The two parties shall guarantee that the withdrawals and transfers of all forces will be effected in accordance with the purposes of this Agreement, and that they will not permit any hostile action or take action of any kind whatever which might hinder such withdrawals or transfers. The parties shall assist each other as far as possible.

(e) While the withdrawals and transfers of the forces are proceeding, the two parties shall not permit any destruction or sabotage of any public property or any attack on the life or property of the local civilian population. They shall not permit any interference with the local civil administration.

(f) The Joint Commission and the International Commission shall supervise the implementation of measures to ensure the safety of the forces during withdrawal and transfer.

(g) The Joint Commission in Laos shall determine the detailed procedures for the withdrawals and transfers of the forces in accordance with the above-mentioned principles.

*Article 5*

During the days immediately preceding the cease-fire each party undertakes not to engage in any large-scale operation between the time when the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities is signed at Geneva and the time when the cease-fire comes into effect.

## CHAPTER II

PROHIBITION OF THE INTRODUCTION OF FRESH TROOPS, MILITARY  
PERSONNEL, ARMAMENTS AND MUNITIONS*Article 6*

With effect from the proclamation of the cease-fire the introduction into Laos of any reinforcements of troops or military personnel from outside Laotian territory is prohibited.

Nevertheless, the French High Command may leave a specified number of French military personnel required for the training of the Laotian National Army in the territory of Laos; the strength of such personnel shall not exceed one thousand five hundred (1,500) officers and non-commissioned officers.

*Article 7*

Upon the entry into force of the present Agreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout the territory of Laos.

*Article 8*

The High Command of the French forces shall maintain in the territory of Laos the personnel required for the maintenance of the two French military establishments, the first at Seno and the second in the Mekong valley, either in the province of Vientiane or downstream from Vientiane.

The effectives maintained in these military establishments shall not exceed a total of three thousand five hundred (3,500) men.

*Article 9*

Upon the entry into force of the present Agreement and in accordance with the declaration made at the Geneva Conference by the Royal Government of Laos on 20 July 1954, the introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and military equipment of all kinds is prohibited, with the exception of a specified quantity of armaments in categories specified as necessary for the defence of Laos.

*Article 10*

The new armaments and military personnel permitted to enter Laos in accordance with the terms of Article 9 above shall enter Laos at

the following points only: Luang-Prabang, Xieng-Khouang, Vientiane, Seno, Paksé, Savannakhet and Tchépone.

### CHAPTER III

#### DISENGAGEMENT OF THE FORCES—ASSEMBLY AREAS—CONCENTRATION AREAS

##### *Article 11*

The disengagement of the armed forces of both sides, including concentration of the armed forces, movements to rejoin the provisional assembly areas allotted to one party and provisional withdrawal movements by the other party, shall be completed within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days after the cease-fire.

##### *Article 12*

The Joint Commission in Laos shall fix the site and boundaries:

—of the five (5) provisional assembly areas for the reception of the Vietnamese People's Volunteer Forces,

—of the five (5) provisional assembly areas for the reception of the French forces in Laos,

—of the twelve (12) provisional assembly areas, one to each province, for the reception of the fighting units of "Pathet Lao".

—The forces of the Laotian National Army shall remain *in situ* during the entire duration of the operations of disengagement and transfer of foreign forces and fighting units of "Pathet Lao".

##### *Article 13*

The foreign forces shall be transferred outside Laotian territory as follows:

###### *(1) French Forces:*

The French forces will be moved out of Laos by road (along routes laid down by the Joint Commission in Laos) and also by air and inland waterway;

###### *(2) Vietnamese People's Volunteer Forces:*

These forces will be moved out of Laos by land, along routes and in accordance with a schedule to be determined by the Joint Commission in Laos in accordance with the principle of simultaneous withdrawal of foreign forces.

##### *Article 14*

Pending a political settlement, the fighting units of "Pathet Lao", concentrated in the provisional assembly areas, shall move into the Provinces of Phongsaly and Sam-Neua except for any military personnel who wish to be demobilised where they are. They will be free to move between these two provinces in a corridor along the frontier between Laos and Viet-Nam bounded on the south by the Line Sop Kin, Na Mi, Sop Sang, Muong Son.

Concentration shall be completed within one-hundred-and-twenty (120) days from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement.

*Article 15*

Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations for their activities during the hostilities and also undertakes to guarantee their democratic freedoms.

CHAPTER IV

PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES

*Article 16*

The liberation and repatriation of all prisoners of war and civilian internees detained by each of the two parties at the coming into force of the present Agreement shall be carried out under the following conditions:

(a) All prisoners of war and civilian internees of Laotian and other nationalities captured since the beginning of hostilities in Laos, during military operations or in any other circumstances of war and in any part of the territory of Laos, shall be liberated within a period of thirty (30) days after the date when the cease-fire comes into effect.

(b) The term "civilian internees" is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed strife between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason or kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.

(c) All foreign prisoners of war captured by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to the destination of their choice.

CHAPTER V

MISCELLANEOUS

*Article 17*

The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall ensure that persons under their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of the present Agreement are suitably punished.

*Article 18*

In cases in which the place of burial is known and the existence of graves has been established, the Commander of the forces of either party shall, within a specified period after the entry into force of the present Agreement, permit the graves service of the other party to enter that part of Laotian territory under his military control for the purpose of finding and removing the bodies of deceased military personnel of that party, including the bodies of deceased prisoners of war.

The Joint Commission shall fix the procedures by which this task is carried out and the time limits within which it must be completed. The Commanders of the forces of each party shall communicate to the other all information in his possession as to the place of burial of military personnel of the other party.

#### *Article 19*

The present Agreement shall apply to all the armed forces of either party. The armed forces of each party shall respect the territory under the military control of the other party, and engage in no hostile act against the other party.

For the purpose of the present article the word "territory" includes territorial waters and air space.

#### *Article 20*

The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and co-operation to the Joint Commission and its joint organs and to the International Commission

If an inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that assigned to them by the present Agreement.

#### *Article 21*

The costs involved in the operation of the Joint Commission and its joint groups and of the International Commission and its inspection teams shall be shared equally between the two parties.

#### *Article 22*

The signatories of the present Agreement and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for the observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall, within their respective commands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the present Agreement by all military personnel under their command.

#### *Article 23*

The procedures laid down in the present Agreement shall, whenever necessary, be examined by the Commanders of the two parties and, if necessary, defined more specifically by the Joint Commission.

## CHAPTER VI

### JOINT COMMISSION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN LAOS

#### *Article 24*

Responsibility for the execution of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.



*Article 25*

An International Commission shall be entrusted with control and supervision over the application of the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos. It shall be composed of representatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland. It shall be presided over by the representative of India. Its headquarters shall be at Vientiane.

*Article 26*

The International Commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned States.

The fixed teams shall be located at the following points: Paksé, Seno, Tchépone, Vientiane, Xieng-Khonang, Phongsaly, Sophao (province of Sam Neua). These points of location may, at a later date, be altered by agreement between the Government of Laos and the International Commission.

The zones of action of the mobile teams shall be the regions bordering the land frontiers of Laos. Within the limits of their zones of action they shall have the right to move freely and shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfilment of their tasks (provision of personnel, access to documents needed for supervision, summoning of witnesses needed for holding enquiries, security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams etc. . . .<sup>2</sup>). They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, observation and communication as they may require.

Outside the zones of action defined above, the mobile teams may, with the agreement of the Command of the party concerned, move about as required by the tasks assigned to them by the present Agreement.

*Article 27*

The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the execution by the parties of the provisions of the present Agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfil the functions of control, observation, inspection and investigation connected with the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and shall in particular:

(a) Control the withdrawal of foreign forces in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities and see that frontiers are respected;

(b) Control the release of prisoners of war and civilian internees;

---

<sup>2</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

(c) Supervise, at ports and airfields and along all the frontiers of Laos, the implementation of the provisions regulating the introduction into Laos of military personnel and war materials;

(d) Supervise the implementation of the clauses of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities relating to rotation of personnel and to supplies for French Union security forces maintained in Laos.

#### *Article 28*

A Joint Commission shall be set up to facilitate the implementation of the clauses relating to the withdrawal of foreign forces.

The Joint Commission shall form joint groups, the number of which shall be decided by mutual agreement between the parties.

The Joint Commission shall facilitate the implementation of the clauses of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities relating to the simultaneous and general case-fire in Laos for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.

It shall assist the parties in the implementation of the said clauses; it shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the implementation of the said clauses; it shall endeavour to settle any disputes between the parties arising out of the implementation of these clauses. The joint groups shall follow the forces in their movements and shall be disbanded once the withdrawal plans had been carried out.

#### *Article 29*

The Joint Commission and the joint groups shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the commands of the parties concerned.

#### *Article 30*

The International Commission shall, through the medium of the inspection teams mentioned above, and as soon as possible, either on its own initiative, or at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one of the parties, undertake the necessary investigations both documentary and on the ground.

#### *Article 31*

The inspection teams shall submit to the International Commission the results of their supervision, investigations and observations; furthermore, they shall draw up such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the Commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the findings of each member shall be transmitted to the Commission.

*Article 32*

If an inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or a threat of a serious violation the International Commission shall be informed; the latter shall examine the reports and the findings of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures which should be taken for the settlement of the incident, ending of the violation or removal of the threat of violation.

*Article 33*

When the Joint Commission is unable to reach an agreement on the interpretation of a provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

*Article 34*

The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by majority vote, subject to the provisions contained in Article 35. If the votes are equally divided, the chairman's vote shall be decisive.

The International Commission may make recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos, in order to ensure more effective execution of the said Agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

*Article 35*

On questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, and in particular,

- (a) refusal by foreign armed forces to effect the movements provided for in the withdrawal plan,
- (b) violation or threat of violation of the country's integrity, by foreign armed forces,

the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.

*Article 36*

If one of the parties refuses to put a recommendation of the International Commission into effect, the parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.

If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in Article 35, it shall transmit a majority report and one or more minority reports to the members of the Conference.

The International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference of all cases in which its work is being hindered.

*Article 37*

The International Commission shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in order that it may be able to fulfil the tasks prescribed in Article 27.

*Article 38*

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos shall act in close co-operation with the International Commissions in Viet-Nam and Cambodia.

The Secretaries-General of these three Commissions shall be responsible for co-ordinating their work and for relations between them.

*Article 39*

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos may, after consultation with the International Commissions in Cambodia and Viet-Nam, and having regard to the development of the situation in Cambodia and Viet-Nam, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be adopted unanimously.

CHAPTER VII

*Article 40*

All the provisions of the present Agreement, save paragraph (a) of Article 2, shall enter into force at 24 hours (Geneva time) on July 22, 1954.

*Article 41*

Done at Geneva (Switzerland) on July 20, 1954, at 24 hours, in the French language.

For the Commander-in-Chief of the French Union  
in Indo-China:

DELTIEL,  
*Général de Brigade*

For the Commander-in-Chief of the fighting units of  
"Pathet-Lao" and for the Commander-in-Chief of  
the People's Army of Viet-Nam:

TA-QUANG-BUU  
*Vice-Minister of National Defense  
of the Democratic Republic of  
Viet-Nam*

396.1 GE/7-2154

*Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, 21 July 1954.

IC/52

## CHAPTER I

## PRINCIPLES AND CONDITIONS GOVERNING EXECUTION OF THE CEASE-FIRE

*Article 1*

As from twenty-third July 1954 at 0800 hours (Pekin mean time) complete cessation of all hostilities throughout Cambodia shall be ordered and enforced by the Commanders of the Armed Forces of the two parties for all troops and personnel of the land, naval and air forces under their control.

*Article 2*

In conformity with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indo-China, there shall be a simultaneous cessation of hostilities throughout Cambodia, in all the combat areas and for all the forces of the two parties.

To obviate any mistake or misunderstanding and to ensure that both the ending of hostilities and all other operations arising from cessation of hostilities are in fact simultaneous,

(a) due allowance being made for the time actually required for transmission of the cease-fire order down to the lowest échelons of the combatant forces of both sides, the two parties are agreed that the complete and simultaneous cease-fire throughout the territory of Cambodia shall become effective at 8 hours (local time) on 7 August 1954. It is agreed that Peking mean time shall be taken as local time.

(b) each side shall comply strictly with the time-table jointly agreed upon between the parties for the execution of all operations connected with the cessation of hostilities.

*Article 3*

All operations and movements connected with the execution of the cessation of hostilities must be carried out in a safe and orderly fashion.

---

<sup>1</sup>This document was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 715, July 21. (751G.00/7-2154)

This agreement was also printed in *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, pp. 767-775; Cmd. 9239, pp. 11-18; and *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 453-460.

The following printed notation appeared on the source text: "The two parties have agreed that this text shall not be published until further notice."

Revisions made on the source text were made in accordance with a note issued by the International Secretariat, July 24, 1954. (396.1 GE/7-2454)

(a) Within a number of days to be determined by the Commanders of both sides, after the cease-fire has been achieved, each party shall be responsible for removing and neutralizing mines, booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous devices placed by it. Should it be impossible to complete removal and neutralization before departure, the party concerned will mark the spot by placing visible signs. Sites thus cleared of mines and any other obstacles to the free movement of the personnel of the International Commission and the Joint Commission shall be notified to the latter by the local military Commanders.

(b) Any incidents that may arise between the forces of the two sides and may result from mistakes or misunderstandings shall be settled on the spot so as to restrict their scope.

(c) During the days immediately preceding the cease-fire each party undertakes not to engage in any large-scale operation between the time when the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities is signed at Geneva and the time when the cease-fire comes into effect.

## CHAPTER II

### PROCEDURE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FOREIGN ARMED FORCES AND FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM THE TERRITORY OF CAMBODIA

#### *Article 4*

1. The withdrawal outside the territory of Cambodia shall apply to:

(a) the armed forces and military combatant personnel of the French Union;

(b) the combatant formations of all types which have entered the territory of Cambodia from other countries or regions of the peninsula;

(c) all the foreign elements (or Cambodians not natives of Cambodia) in the military formations of any kind or holding supervisory functions in all political or military, administrative, economic, financial or social bodies, having worked in liaison with the Viet-Nam military units.

2. The withdrawals of the forces and elements referred to in the foregoing paragraphs and their military supplies and materials must be completed within 90 days reckoning from the entry into force of the present Agreement.

3. The two parties shall guarantee that the withdrawals of all the forces will be effected in accordance with the purposes of the Agreement, and that they will not permit any hostile action or take any action likely to create difficulties for such withdrawals. They shall assist one another as far as possible.

4. While the withdrawals are proceeding, the two parties shall not permit any destruction or sabotage of public property or any attack on the life or property of the civilian population. They shall not permit any interference with the local civil administration.

5. The Joint Commission and the International Supervisory Commission shall supervise the execution of measures to ensure the safety of the forces during withdrawal.

6. The Joint Commission in Cambodia shall determine the detailed procedures for the withdrawals of the forces on the basis of the above-mentioned principles.

### CHAPTER III

#### OTHER QUESTIONS

##### A. *The Khmer armed forces, natives of Cambodia.*

*Article 5.* The two parties shall undertake that within thirty days after the cease-fire order has been proclaimed, the Khmer Resistance Forces shall be demobilized on the spot; simultaneously, the troops of the Royal Khmer Army shall abstain from taking any hostile action against the Khmer Resistance Forces.

*Article 6.* The situation of these nationals shall be decided in the light of the Declaration made by the Delegation of Cambodia at the Geneva Conference, reading as follows:

“The Royal Government of Cambodia,

In the desire to ensure harmony and agreement among the peoples of the Kingdom,

Declares itself resolved to take the necessary measures to integrate all citizens, without discrimination, into the national community and to guarantee them the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms for which the Constitution of the Kingdom provides;

Affirms that all Cambodian citizens may freely participate as electors or candidates in general elections by secret ballot.”

No reprisals shall be taken against the said nationals or their families, each national being entitled to the enjoyment, without any discrimination as compared with other nationals, of all constitutional guarantees concerning the protection of person and property and democratic freedoms.

Applicants therefor may be accepted for service in the Regular Army or local police formations if they satisfy the conditions required for current recruitment of the Army and Police Corps.

The same procedure shall apply to those persons who have returned to civilian life and who may apply for civilian employment on the same terms as other nationals.

*B. Ban on the Introduction of Fresh Troops, Military Personnel, Armaments and Munitions. Military Bases.*

*Article 7.* In accordance with the Declaration made by the Delegation of Cambodia at 2400 hours on 20 July 1954 at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers:

"The Royal Government of Cambodia will not join in any agreement with other States, if this agreement carries for Cambodia the obligation to enter into a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or, as long as its security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian territory for the military forces of foreign powers.

"During the period which will elapse between the date of the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and that of the final settlement of political problems in this country, the Royal Government of Cambodia will not solicit foreign aid in war material, personnel or instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of the territory."

*C. Civilian Internees and Prisoners of War.—Burial.*

*Article 8.* The liberation and repatriation of all civilian internees and prisoners of war detained by each of the two parties at the coming into force of the present Agreement shall be carried out under the following conditions:

(a) All prisoners of war and civilian internees of whatever nationality, captured since the beginning of hostilities in Cambodia during military operations or in any other circumstances of war and in any part of the territory of Cambodia shall be liberated after the entry into force of the present Armistice Agreement.

(b) The term "civilian internees" is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason or kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.

(c) All foreign prisoners of war captured by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to the destination of their choice.

*Article 9.* After the entry into force of the present Agreement, if the place of burial is known and the existence of graves has been established, the Cambodian commander shall, within a specified period, authorize the exhumation and removal of the bodies of deceased military personnel of the other party, including the bodies of prisoners of war or personnel deceased and buried on Cambodian territory.

The Joint Commission shall fix the procedures by which this task is to be carried out and the time limit within which it must be completed.



## CHAPTER IV

JOINT COMMISSION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION  
AND CONTROL IN CAMBODIA*Article 10*

Responsibility for the execution of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.

*Article 11*

An International Commission shall be responsible for control and supervision of the application of the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia. It shall be composed of representatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland. It shall be presided over by the representative of India. Its headquarters shall be at Phnom-Penh.

*Article 12*

The International Commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned States.

The fixed teams shall be located at the following points: Phnom-Penh, Kompong-Cham, Kratié, Svay-Rieng, Kampot. These points of location may be altered at a later date by agreement between the Government of Cambodia and the International Commission.

The zones of action of the mobile teams shall be the regions bordering on the land and sea frontiers of Cambodia. The mobile teams shall have the right to move freely within the limits of their zones of action, and they shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfilment of their tasks (provision of personnel, access to documents needed for supervision, summoning of witnesses needed for enquiries, security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams, etc.). They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, observation and communication as they may require.

Outside the zones of action defined above, the mobile teams may, with the agreement of the Cambodian command, move about as required by the tasks assigned to them under the present Agreement.

*Article 13*

The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the execution by the parties of the provisions of the present Agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfil the functions of control, observa-

tion, inspection and investigation connected with the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and shall in particular:

(a) control the withdrawal of foreign forces in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities and see that frontiers are respected;

(b) control the release of prisoners of war and civilian internees;

(c) supervise, at ports and airfields and along all the frontiers of Cambodia, the application of the Cambodian declaration concerning the introduction into Cambodia of military personnel and war materials on grounds of foreign assistance.

#### *Article 14*

A Joint Commission shall be set up to facilitate the implementation of the clauses relating to the withdrawal of foreign forces.

The Joint Commission may form joint groups the number of which shall be decided by mutual agreement between the parties.

The Joint Commission shall facilitate the implementation of the clauses of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities relating to the simultaneous and general cease-fire in Cambodia for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.

It shall assist the parties in the implementation of the said clauses; it shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the implementation of the said clauses; it shall endeavour to settle any disputes between the parties arising out of the implementation of these clauses. The Joint Commission may send joint groups to follow the forces in their movements; such groups shall be disbanded once the withdrawal plans have been carried out.

#### *Article 15*

The Joint Commission shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commands of the parties concerned.

#### *Article 16*

The International Commission shall, through the medium of the inspection teams mentioned above and as soon as possible, either on its own initiative or at the request of the Joint Commission or of one of the parties, undertake the necessary investigations both documentary and on the ground.

#### *Article 17*

The inspection teams shall transmit to the International Commission the results of their supervision, investigations and observations;

furthermore, they shall draw up such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the Commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the findings of each member shall be transmitted to the Commission.

*Article 18*

If an inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or threat of a serious violation, the International Commission shall be informed; the Commission shall examine the reports and findings of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures to be taken for the settlement of the incident, ending of the violation or removal of the threat of violation.

*Article 19*

When the Joint Commission is unable to reach agreement on the interpretation of a provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

*Article 20*

The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by a majority vote, subject to the provisions of article 21. If the votes are equally divided, the Chairman's vote shall be decisive.

The International Commission may make recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, in order to ensure more effective execution of the said Agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

*Article 21*

On questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, and in particular,

(a) refusal by foreign armed forces to effect the movements provided for in the withdrawal plan,

(b) violation or threat of violation of the country's integrity by foreign armed forces,

the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.

*Article 22*

If one of the parties refuses to put a recommendation of the International Commission into effect, the parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.

If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in article 21, it shall transmit a majority report and one or more minority reports to members of the Conference.

The International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference of all cases in which its work is being hindered.

*Article 23*

The International Commission shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in order that it may be able to perform the tasks prescribed in article 13.

*Article 24*

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia shall act in close cooperation with the International Commissions in Viet-Nam and Laos.

The Secretaries-General of these three Commissions shall be responsible for coordinating their work and for relations between them.

*Article 25*

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia may, after consultation with the International Commissions in Viet-Nam and in Laos, and having regard to the development of the situation in Viet-Nam and in Laos, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be adopted unanimously.

## CHAPTER V

### IMPLEMENTATION

*Article 26*

The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall ensure that persons under their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of the present Agreement are suitably punished.

*Article 27*

The present Agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall apply to all the armed forces of either party.

*Article 28*

The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and co-operation to the Joint Commission and to the International Commission and its inspection teams in the performance of their functions.

*Article 29*

The Joint Commission, composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commands of the two parties, shall assist the parties in the implementation of all the clauses of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities, ensure liaison between the two parties, draw up plans for the implementation of the Agreement, and endeavour to settle any dispute arising out of the implementation of the said clauses and plans.

*Article 30*

The costs involved in the operation of the Joint Commission shall be shared equally between the two parties.

*Article 31*

The signatories of the present Agreement on the cessation of hostilities and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for the observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall, within their respective commands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the present Agreement by all personnel under their command.

*Article 32*

The procedures laid down in the present Agreement shall, whenever necessary be examined by the Commands of the two parties, and if necessary, defined more specifically by the Joint Commission.

*Article 33*

All the provisions of the present Agreement shall enter into force at 00 hours (Geneva time) on 23 July 1954.

Done at Geneva on 20 July 1954.

For the Commander-in-Chief of  
the Units of the Khmer Resistance  
Forces and for the Commander-in-  
Chief of the Viet-Name-  
se Military Units

For the Commander-in-Chief of  
the Khmer National Armed  
Forces

TA-QUANG-BUU

*Vice-Minister of National Defence  
of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam*

General NHIEK TIOULONG

396.1 GE/7-2154

*The Final Declaration on Indochina*<sup>1</sup>

GENEVA, 21 July 1954.

IC/43 Rev. 2

*Final Declaration*, dated the 21st July, 1954, of the Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China, in which the representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, France, Laos, the People's Republic of China, the State of Viet-Nam, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America took part.

1. The Conference takes note of the agreements ending hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam and organizing international control and the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements.

2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam; the Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam henceforth to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.

3. The Conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community, in particular by participating in the next general elections, which, in conformity with the constitution of each of these countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms.

4. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam prohibiting the introduction into Viet-Nam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of their territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.

---

<sup>1</sup> This document was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 698, July 21, p. 1485. Revisions issued by the International Secretariat were transmitted to the Department in telegram Secto 709, July 21, p. 1494.

This declaration was also printed in *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, pp. 785-787; the Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 2, 1954, p. 164; Cmd. 9239, pp. 9-11; and *Conférence de Genève*, pp. 467-468.

5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam to the effect that no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign Powers.

6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Viet-Nam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Viet-Nam.

7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Viet-Nameese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards.

8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.

9. The competent representative authorities of the Northern and Southern zones of Viet-Nam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such persons' families.

10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the French Republic to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, at the request of the governments concerned and within periods which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except in the cases where, by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.

11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, the French Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam.

12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission, in order to study such measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam are respected.

---

396.1 GE/7-2154

*Declaration by the Royal Government of Laos (Reference: Article 3 of the Final Declaration)*<sup>1</sup>

GENEVA, 21 July 1954.

IC/45 Rev. 1

The Royal Government of Laos,

In the desire to ensure harmony and agreement among the peoples of the Kingdom,

Declares itself resolved to take the necessary measures to integrate all citizens, without discrimination, into the national community and

---

<sup>1</sup>This declaration was also printed in Cmd. 9239, p. 41 and in *Conférence de Genève*, p. 461.



to guarantee them the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms for which the Constitution of the Kingdom provides;

Affirms that all Laotian citizens may freely participate as electors or candidates in general elections by secret ballot;

Announces, furthermore, that it will promulgate measures to provide for special representation in the Royal Administration of the provinces of Phang Saly and Sam Neua during the interval between the cessation of hostilities and the general elections of the interests of Laotian nationals who did not support the Royal forces during hostilities.

---

396.1 GE/7-2154

*Declaration by the Royal Government of Cambodia (Reference: Article 3 of the Final Declaration)*<sup>1</sup>

GENEVA, 21 July 1954.

IC/44 Rev. 1

The Royal Government of Cambodia,

In the desire to ensure harmony and agreement among the peoples of the Kingdom,

Declares itself resolved to take the necessary measures to integrate all citizens, without discrimination, into the national community and to guarantee them the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms for which the Constitution of the Kingdom provides;

Affirms that all Cambodian citizens may freely participate as electors or candidates in general elections by secret ballot.

---

<sup>1</sup> This declaration was also printed in Cmd. 9239, p. 40 and in *Conférence de Genève*, p. 462.

---

396.1 GE/7-2154

*Declaration by the Royal Government of Laos (Reference: Articles 4 and 5 of the Final Declaration)*<sup>1</sup>

GENEVA, 21 July 1954.

IC/47 Rev. 1

The Royal Government of Laos is resolved never to pursue a policy of aggression and will never permit the territory of Laos to be used in furtherance of such a policy.

---

<sup>1</sup> This declaration was also printed in Cmd. 9239, pp. 41-42 and in *Conférence de Genève*, p. 463.

The Royal Government of Laos will never join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation for the Royal Government of Laos to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities or, unless its security is threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Laotian territory for military forces of foreign powers.

The Royal Government of Laos is resolved to settle its international disputes by peaceful means so that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.

During the period between the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and the final settlement of that country's political problems, the Royal Government of Laos will not request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors, except for the purpose of its effective territorial defence and to the extent defined by the agreement on the cessation of hostilities.

---

396.1 GE/7-2154

*Declaration by the Royal Government of Cambodia (Reference: Articles 4 and 5 of the Final Declaration)*<sup>1</sup>

GENEVA, 21 July 1954.

IC/46 Rev. 2

The Royal Government of Cambodia is resolved never to take part in an aggressive policy and never to permit the territory of Cambodia to be utilised in the service of such a policy.

The Royal Government of Cambodia will not join in any agreement with other states, if this agreement carries for Cambodia the obligation to enter into a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or, as long as its security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian territory for the military forces of foreign powers.

The Royal Government of Cambodia is resolved to settle its international disputes by peaceful means, in such a manner as not to endanger peace, international security and justice.

During the period which will elapse between the date of the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and that of the final settlement of political problems in this country, the Royal Government of Cambodia will not solicit foreign aid in war material, personnel or instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of the territory.

---

<sup>1</sup> This declaration was also printed in Cmd. 9239, p. 41 and in *Conférence de Genève*, p. 464.

396.1 GE/7-2154

*Declaration by the Government of the French Republic (Reference: Article 10 of the Final Declaration)*<sup>1</sup>

GENEVA, 21 July 1954.

IC/48 Rev. 1

The Government of the French Republic declares that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, at the request of the Governments concerned and within a period which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties, except in the cases, where by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.

---

<sup>1</sup>This declaration was also printed in Cmd. 9239, p. 42 and in *Conférence de Genève*, p. 466.

396.1 GE/7-2154

*Declaration by the Government of the French Republic (Reference: Article 11 of the Final Declaration)*<sup>1</sup>

GENEVA, 21 July 1954.

IC/49 Rev. 1

For the settlement of all the problems connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, the French Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, the unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam.

---

<sup>1</sup>This declaration was also printed in Cmd. 9239, p. 42 and in *Conférence de Genève*, p. 465.

396.1 GE/7-2154

*Draft Submitted by the Delegation of the State of Vietnam (Amendment for Insertion Between Article 11 and Present Article 12 of the Final Declaration)*<sup>1</sup>

GENEVA, 20 July 1954.

IC/50

The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the State of Viet-Nam undertaking:

—to make and support every effort to re-establish a real and lasting peace in Viet-Nam;

---

<sup>1</sup>For the action taken by the Conference on this draft proposed amendment, see *infra*.

—not to use force to resist the procedures for carrying the cease-fire into effect, although it deems them to be inconsistent with the will of the nation;

—to pursue the achievement of the aspirations of the Viet-Nam people with all the means conferred upon it by the national independence and sovereignty solemnly recognized by France.

---

396.1 GE/7-2154

*Proposal for Insertion in the Final Act, Submitted by the Delegation of the State of Vietnam*<sup>1</sup>

GENEVA, 21 July 1954.

IC/53

The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the State of Viet-Nam to the effect that it undertakes:

To make and to support every effort for the restoration of peace in Viet-Nam;

Not to use force to oppose the agreed procedure for execution of the cease-fire, despite the objections and reservations it has expressed, in particular in its final statement.

---

<sup>1</sup> For text of the Vietnamese proposal, see *supra*.

V. POST-CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS: VIEWS ON THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS; STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES AND UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE SMITH; LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE GENEVA ARMISTICE AGREEMENT RESTRICTIONS; ARRANGEMENTS PERTAINING TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION (JULY 22–AUGUST 11)

396.1 GE/7-2254 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, July 22, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 725. Repeated information London 32, USUN New York 1. Caccia, UK delegate, said he wished inform Department that Prince Wan had agreed with him early in July that, if an armistice agreement was reached in Geneva, Thai appeal would not be pressed for hearing at a special session of the assembly but would wait for the next regular session which convenes in September.

Caccia said UK agreed with this view and now that an agreement had been reached in Geneva, was advising Dixon in New York of UK view and asking he meet Ambassador Lodge and Hoppenot, French delegate, to discuss matter, and with their agreement, take matter up with Wan. It is further UK view that when next regular session of the assembly convenes that matter should then be reviewed in light of conditions as it would appear at that time. If Geneva settlement is working well, then Thai appeal should not be presented but held in further abeyance.

SMITH

396.1 GE/7-2254 : Telegram

*The Consul at Geneva (Gowen) to the Department of State*

PRIORITY

GENEVA, July 22, 1954.

129. Mytel 127.<sup>1</sup> Under Secretary and party left for London 1530 hours Geneva time.

GOWEN

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 22, not printed.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 261 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

GENEVA, July 22, 1954.

Secto 728. Repeated information Saigon 102. Tran Van Van, former Minister of National Economy and claiming to be Geneva observer of Vietnamese Front of National Safety (Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Binh Xuyen, and Catholics) left copies of prise de position with USDel this morning.<sup>1</sup>

Van supports position Vietnamese delegation at conference, but criticizes it for not walking out at last minute. He attacks French Colonialists and Viet Minh for collusion and sell-out to Vietnam, accusing former of wishing to hold on to richest part of country, states that the Front will take up the fight for independence and unity.

Statement being pouched Department and Saigon.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

751G.00/7-2354 : Telegram

*The Consul at Geneva (Gowen) to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 23, 1954—11 a. m.

135. For the Under Secretary and pass Defense. Following is substance remarks made by General Deltiel representative of CG French Union forces in military negotiations with Viet Minh to Dwan 22 July at airport prior departure of General Smith.

Deltiel said Mendes-France asked him to make known to General Smith Deltiel's view about armistice agreements from military point of view but crowded schedule had prevented his doing it personally. He asked his remarks be passed on General Smith.

Deltiel said signature Vietnam and Laos agreements "extremely painful" for him as military man since they represented a partial capitulation. He felt however that terms of agreements were very best that could have been obtained under circumstances. Task now remaining is to strengthen military position in retained Vietnam. This will be complicated by uncooperative attitude Vietnam Government, divided loyalties of indigenous groups specifically Cao Daists and lack of dynamic Vietnam leadership [" "] like that of Syngman Rhee". Deltiel made especially bitter references to Bao Dai for staying away while country in crisis.

As for military demarcation line Deltiel said vicinity 18th parallel and Chalk Hills region only natural defensive position with narrow coastal strip on east and almost impenetrable mountains with few

passes. He held firm in negotiations on this line. Decision to drop to 17th parallel that of Mendes-France. Song Ben Hat River site of present line far less desirable from military point of view.

Three hundred day period for movement into regroupment zones more than adequate for orderly evacuation of delta. Deltiel seemed quite satisfied on this point, saying initial French position consciously high for bargaining purposes. However he expressed serious anxiety over difficulties of disengagement and separation of forces in delta during initial phase. French Union forces must withdraw lines to smaller perimeter at same time Viet Minh now within battle position pass through to outside. Meanwhile possibility further defection Vietnamese National forces is possible, and trouble with population under Viet Minh incitement also a danger.

Some forces withdrawn from delta will be disembarked at Tourane to reinforce demarcation line and northern part regroupment zone, and others at more southern ports.

In response to question whether he thought "Pathet Lao" forces who chose neither to withdraw with Viet Minh nor to be disarmed on the spot would create problem in provinces of Phang Saly and Sam Neua after movement there, Deltiel said he thought they could be handled once disassociated from Viet Minh and provided Viet Minh actually withdrew as required. On this point, as on all provisions agreements, he said, much depends on whether international commission can bring about compliance with terms.

GOWEN

---

751G.00/7-2354 : Telegram

*The Consul at Geneva (Gowen) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, July 23, 1954—3 p. m.

138. Repeated information Saigon 103. Chou En-lai gave dinner last night for all Indo-Chinese delegations. Tran Van Do had "previous engagement" but sent Ngo Dinh Luyen to represent him. Nong Kimny refused to attend. Tioulong, although present, expressed his great disgust with affair.

GOWEN

---

751G.00/7-2354 : Telegram

*The Consul at Geneva (Gowen) to the Department of State*

SECRET

GENEVA, July 23, 1954—5 p. m.

142. Repeated information Paris 134, Saigon 104. Tran Van Van called on Bonsal today. Although he represents himself as delegate of

Cao Dai Pope and of Commander of Binh Xuyen his closest connection appears to be Col. Trinh Minh The, former dissident Cao Daist. Van was also observer at Geneva Conference on behalf of National Salvation Front said to be composed of Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Binh Xuyen and Catholics.

Van is bitterly anti-French. He believes nothing politically constructive can be done in Vietnam in presence of French whom he credits with worst intentions. Nevertheless he recognizes early departure French Expeditionary Corps would leave a vacuum which Vietnam Army could not fill at present. He is most anxious for all forms of US aid.

Van states that although movements he represents are not all that might be desired, being in fact somewhat corrupt, still their armed forces are valid assets and should form basis of Maquis if needed. He is contemptuous of Catholic forces in south and of Leroy. He describes Tam and Huu as more French than the French.

Van describes Diem, Do and their associates as well meaning bourgeois devoid of the Nationalistic revolutionary fervor required by present situation. Van would like to proceed to US in order to propagate his ideas and inform American people about the situation in Vietnam. He will get in touch with Gibson Paris Embassy about his plans. Saigon's recommendations as to how he should be handled would be appreciated.

Before embarking upon his future activities Van will spend another week here followed by a month at Vichy taking the cure.

GOWEN

---

*Editorial Note*

At a news conference on July 23 the Secretary of State made the following statement:

"The Geneva negotiations reflected the military developments in Indochina. After nearly 8 years of war the forces of the French Union had lost control of nearly one-half of Viet-Nam, their hold on the balance was precarious, and the French people did not desire to prolong the war.

"These basic facts inevitably dominated the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference and led to settlements which, as President Eisenhower said, contain many features which we do not like [see editorial note, page 1503].

"Since this was so, and since the United States itself was neither a belligerent in Indochina nor subject to compulsions which applied to others, we did not become a party to the Conference results. We merely noted them and said that, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, we would not seek by force to overthrow the settlement. We went on to affirm our dedication to the principle of self-determination of



peoples and our hope that the agreements would permit Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam to be really sovereign and independent nations.

"The important thing from now on is not to mourn the past but to seize the future opportunity to prevent the loss in northern Viet-Nam from leading to the extension of communism throughout Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. In this effort all of the free nations concerned should profit by the lessons of the past.

"One lesson is that resistance to communism needs popular support, and this in turn means that the people should feel that they are defending their own national institutions. One of the good aspects of the Geneva Conference is that it advances the truly independent status of Cambodia, Laos, and southern Viet-Nam. Prime Minister Mendès-France said yesterday that instructions had been given to the French representatives in Viet-Nam to complete by July 30 precise projects for the transfers of authority which will give reality to the independence which France had promised. This independence is already a fact in Laos and Cambodia, and it was demonstrated at Geneva, notably by the Government of Cambodia. The evolution from colonialism to national independence is thus about to be completed in Indochina, and the free governments of this area should from now on be able to enlist the loyalty of their people to maintain their independence as against Communist colonialism.

"A second lesson which should be learned is that arrangements for collective defense need to be made in advance of aggression, not after it is under way. The United States for over a year advocated united action in the area, but this proved not to be practical under the conditions which existed. We believe, however, that now it will be practical to bring about collective arrangements to promote the security of the free peoples of Southeast Asia. Prompt steps will be taken in this direction. In this connection we should bear in mind that the problem is not merely one of deterring open armed aggression but of preventing Communist subversion which, taking advantage of economic dislocations and social injustice, might weaken and finally overthrow the non-Communist governments.

"If the free nations which have a stake in this area will now work together to avail of present opportunities in the light of past experience, then the loss of the present may lead to a gain for the future."

The Secretary's statement was released as Department of State press release 400, July 23, and is also printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, August 2, 1954, pages 163-164.

---

396.1 GE/7-2354

*Statement by the Under Secretary of State (Smith)*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, July 23, 1954.

While the agreements reached at the Geneva Conference contain features which the United States does not like, I am nevertheless con-

---

<sup>1</sup>Smith made this statement upon arrival in Washington from the Geneva Conference.

vinced that the results are the best that could be expected in the circumstances.

The position of the United States was stated officially in the unilateral U.S. Declaration made at Geneva, and clearly outlined in the President's statement of July 21.<sup>2</sup> I am also convinced that the decision regarding our representation during the closing, critical hours at Geneva was wise and effective, both as to timing and tactics. Also, I might point out that, when we analyze and discuss the results of Geneva it will be well to remember that diplomacy is rarely able to gain at the conference table what cannot be gained or held on the battlefield.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see editorial note, p. 1503.

396.1 GE/7-2754

*Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Phleger) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 27, 1954.

Subject: Geneva Armistice Agreement Restrictions on Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam

This memorandum is designed to give an analysis<sup>2</sup> of the restrictions placed on Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in the Armistice Agreements and Declarations made at the recent Geneva Conference.<sup>3</sup> This analysis is based on the instruments executed at the Conference, and must necessarily be regarded as tentative because much depends on the views which will be taken of those instruments by France and the Associated States, by other Conference members, and by the international commissions to be established under the Armistice Agreements. The memorandum will consider, in turn, a number of different respects in which restrictions are imposed, and under each heading will deal with the status of Cambodia, then of Laos, and then of Vietnam.

1. *Membership in collective security arrangement*

(a) Cambodia would be permitted to participate as a member of a Southeast Asia collective security arrangement. Article 7 of the Armistice Agreement with Cambodia provides, in part:

"In accordance with the Declaration made by the Delegation of Cambodia at 2400 hours on 20 July 1954 at the Geneva Conference of

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Meeker of L/UNA and approved by Phleger. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that the Secretary of State saw it.

A copy of this memorandum in a slightly different form is filed in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 329.

<sup>2</sup> Meeker drafted a briefer analysis of the armistice agreement restrictions, dated July 22, and it is filed in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 329. A handwritten notation on the July 22 document indicates that the Secretary of State also saw this document.

<sup>3</sup> For all of the armistice agreements and final declarations, see pp. 1505 ff.

Foreign Ministers: "The Royal Government of Cambodia will not join in any agreement with other States, if this agreement carries for Cambodia the obligation to enter into a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or with the principles of the Agreements on the cessation of hostilities, . . ."

Assuming that a Southeast Asia collective security arrangement would constitute a "military alliance" within the meaning of Article 7, such an arrangement would not be precluded by the provisions just quoted. A Southeast Asia collective security agreement would be "in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations". Similarly, such an arrangement would be compatible "with the principles of the Agreements on the cessation of hostilities". There is nothing in the Armistice Agreement with Cambodia which would make Cambodia's membership in the arrangement inconsistent, nor would it seem that such membership would be inconsistent with the "principles" of the Armistice Agreements relating to Laos and Vietnam; it is possible that the Conference text of Article 7 in the Cambodian Agreement contains a typographical error in giving "Agreements" as plural.

The international commission provided for in the Armistice Agreement with Cambodia—composed of Canada, India, and Poland—might be called upon to express its view whether a Southeast Asia collective security arrangement conformed to the principles of the United Nations and of the Indochina Armistice Agreements. Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Cambodian Agreement contain the following provisions:

*"Article 19.*

"When the Joint Commission is unable to reach agreement on the interpretation of a provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

*"Article 20.*

"The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by a majority vote, subject to the provisions of article 21. If the votes are equally divided, the Chairman's vote shall be decisive.

"The International Commission may make recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, in order to ensure more effective execution of the said Agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

*"Article 21.*

"On questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, and in particular,

(a) refusal by foreign armed forces to effect the movements provided for in the withdrawal plan,

(b) violation or threat of violation of the country's integrity by foreign armed forces,

the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous."

It is not clear whether the cases enumerated in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article 21 are exclusive, since they are introduced by the words "and in particular". In the Armistice Agreement with Vietnam, the expression "namely" is used instead of these words. It may or may not have been intended that the cases referred to in (a) and (b) would be exclusive for all three Armistice Agreements. In any event, it would seem that a recommendation of the international commission concerning Cambodian membership in a Southeast Asia collective security arrangement should be considered subject to majority voting rather than unanimity under Article 21 of the Armistice Agreement.

Consideration by the international commission of problems under the Armistice Agreement could only result in recommendations by the commission. The Parties to the Armistice Agreement have not bound themselves to accept any such recommendations. Article 22 of the Agreement provides, in part :

"If one of the Parties refuses to put a recommendation of the International Commission into effect, the Parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.

"If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in Article 21, it shall transmit a majority report and one or more minority reports to members of the Conference."

(b) Laos would be permitted to participate as a member of a Southeast Asia collective security arrangement. The Armistice Agreement with Laos contains no provision prohibiting such membership, and no provision comparable to Article 7 of the Cambodian Agreement. Laos, however, made a Declaration on July 21, 1954, containing the following statement :

"The Royal Government of Laos will never join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation for the Royal Government of Laos to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or with the principles of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities . . ."

Membership by Laos in a Southeast Asia collective security arrangement would not be inconsistent with this Declaration.

This Declaration is noted in paragraph 5 of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference. However, since the terms of the Declaration are not incorporated in the Armistice Agreement with Laos, it would seem that the international commission established under the Agree-

ment would not be called upon to express a view as to whether or not Laotian membership in a collective security arrangement was in conformity with the principles of the United Nations and of the Laotian Armistice Agreement.

(c) The zone of Vietnam south of the demarcation line would, apparently, be precluded from membership in a Southeast Asia collective security arrangement. Article 19 of the Armistice Agreement with Vietnam provides, in part:

“The two Parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy.”

An argument might be made that the projected Southeast Asia collective security arrangement would not be a “military alliance” since it would be entirely defensive in character and would not commit the Parties to come to the assistance of any Party which became involved in an armed conflict regardless of the origin of that conflict. However, as a practical matter, such a narrow and now perhaps obsolete definition of the term “military alliance” would be difficult to sustain. It seems not unlikely that the Parties to the Armistice Agreement covering Vietnam understood the term as including a defensive treaty like the proposed Southeast Asia collective security arrangement.

## 2. *Other coverage by collective security arrangement*

(a) If Cambodia were not itself a Party to a Southeast Asia collective security arrangement, Cambodia could, consistently with its Armistice Agreement, be protected by the undertakings of Parties to such an arrangement to defend Cambodia against attack. This follows *a fortiori* from the conclusion that Cambodia could be a member of a Southeast Asia collective security arrangement. There is nothing in the Cambodian Armistice Agreement to prohibit defensive treaty guaranties by other powers in favor of Cambodia. It seems clear that Cambodia could at any time request or consent to the protection afforded by such guaranties.

(b) Laos, similarly, could be protected by a collective security arrangement to which it was not a Party.

(c) While the two zones of Vietnam are precluded by Article 19 of the Vietnamese Agreement from adhering “to any military alliance”, either zone, presumably, could be protected against attack by a defensive security treaty concluded among other powers. The Armistice Agreement covering Vietnam contains no provision prohibiting such protection of the two zones. Because of the provisions in Article 19 quoted above, it is problematical whether retained Vietnam could re-

quest or consent to the extension of SEATO protection prior to actual military attack. Its giving of consent or making a request in advance might be considered as a degree of participation which constituted *adherence to a military alliance*.

### 3. Bases

(a) Article 7 of the Armistice Agreement with Cambodia, in incorporating the Cambodian Declaration at the Geneva Conference, contains the following provision:

“The Royal Government of Cambodia will not join in any agreement with other States, if this agreement carries for Cambodia . . . , as long as its security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian territory for the military forces of foreign powers’ ”.

Under this provision, the United States, in implementing the proposed Southeast Asia collective security arrangement, would not be able to have military bases in Cambodia in the absence of a threat to Cambodia's security. The international commission provided for in Article 11 of the Cambodian Agreement might be called upon to express its view as to whether such a threat existed. Probably a recommendation on this score by the international commission would be through majority vote.

It is not clear whether the reference to “foreign powers” in Article 7 includes France. Inferentially, from various indications scattered through the Indochina Armistice Agreements, the term “foreign” would not seem to apply to France. However, in connection with the matter of bases, this issue may be academic because of the provision (Article 4(1) (a)) for the withdrawal of French military forces from Cambodia and the implication that new French combatant units may not be introduced (except perhaps in the event of a threat to Cambodia's security within the meaning of Article 7). Article 4(1) (a) will be discussed below.

(b) The Laotian Declaration referred to in paragraph 5 of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference contains a provision on foreign military bases which has the same wording as the corresponding portion of Article 7 in the Armistice Agreement with Cambodia. This Declaration by Laos may not have the force of an international commitment, since it is cast as a statement of policy and is not incorporated in the Laotian Armistice Agreement.

Article 7 of the Laotian Agreement provides:

“Upon the entry into force of the present Agreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout the territory of Laos.”

Article 8 limits France to the maintenance of two bases in Laos. The first paragraph of that Article reads :

“The High Command of the French forces shall maintain in the territory of Laos the personnel required for the maintenance of the two French military establishments, the first at Seno and the second in the Mekong valley, either in the province of Vientiane or downstream from Vientiane.”

While Article 7 does not in terms prohibit the use of any existing Laotian bases by foreign forces such as United States forces, the restrictions placed by Article 6 of the Laotian Agreement on the introduction of military personnel into Laos may render this issue academic in the absence of a threat to Laotian security such as is mentioned in the Laotian Declaration. In the event of such a threat, perhaps both French and foreign military bases could be established on Laotian territory despite the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. The international commission might be called into play here since effectuation of the Laotian Declaration would involve departure from the Armistice terms.

(c) Article 19 of the Armistice Agreement covering Vietnam provides, in part :

“With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zone of either Party;”

This provision would apparently preclude the United States from having a military base in retained Vietnam. It would not seem to preclude France from maintaining military bases in the zone south of the demarcation line. Article 18, however, provides :

“With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout Viet-Nam territory.”

#### 4. *Local forces*

There are no provisions in the Armistice Agreements covering Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam prohibiting or limiting the numbers or types of local armed forces which Cambodia, Laos, and retained Vietnam may keep or create.

#### 5. *French forces*

(a) Paragraph (1) of Article 4 of the Armistice Agreement with Cambodia provides, in part :

“The withdrawal outside the territory of Cambodia shall apply to :  
(a) the armed forces and military combatant personnel of the French Union”.

It might be inferred from this provision that, when the relatively small number of French forces now in Cambodia have been withdrawn, other such French personnel could not be introduced—except, presumably, to man bases which might be established under Article 7 in the event of a threat to Cambodia's security. In any event, it could be argued that Article 4(1)(a) means simply that *French fighting units* must be withdrawn during the withdrawal period; and that despatch of a French military advisory mission would not be prohibited by the Cambodian Agreement.

(b) The Armistice Agreement with Laos appears to place a numerical ceiling on the number of French military personnel who may be in Laos. Article 6 provides:

“With effect from the proclamation of the cease-fire the introduction into Laos of any reinforcements of troops or military personnel from outside Laotian territory is prohibited.

“Nevertheless, the French High Command may leave a specified number of French military personnel required for the training of the Laotian National Army in the territory of Laos; the strength of such personnel shall not exceed one thousand five hundred (1,500) officers and non-commissioned officers.”

Article 8 provides:

“The High Command of the French forces shall maintain in the territory of Laos the personnel required for the maintenance of the two French military establishments, the first at Seno and the second in the Mekong valley, either in the province of Vientiane or downstream from Vientiane.

“The effectives maintained in these military establishments shall not exceed a total of three thousand five hundred (3,500) men.”

It is possible that French forces over and above these 5,000 could be brought into Laos to man bases established in the event of a threat to Laotian security, if French forces were considered to be *foreign* forces for purposes of the Laotian Declaration provision relating to bases.

(c) Additional French military personnel may not be introduced into the Southern zone of Vietnam except through rotation as provided in the Armistice Agreement and through the French withdrawals from the Northern zone. Article 16 of the Vietnamese Armistice Agreement begins with the following general statement:

“With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited.”

The Article then goes on to make provision for rotation.



(d) At the Geneva Conference France made the following Declaration, which is referred to in paragraph 10 of the Final Declaration of the Conference:

“The Government of the French Republic declares that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, at the request of the Governments concerned and within a period which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties, except in the cases where, by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.”

This statement of policy constitutes an additional element to be considered in assessing the position of France in regard to the stationing of troops in Indochina.

#### 6. *Foreign forces*

(a) Article 7 of the Armistice Agreement with Cambodia incorporates the following provision contained in a Declaration by the Government of Cambodia:

“During the period which will elapse between the date of the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and that of the final settlement of political problems in this country, the Royal Government of Cambodia will not solicit foreign aid in war material, personnel or instructors except for the purpose of the effective defense of the territory.”

The international commission might be called upon to express its view as to whether foreign aid in the form of a military advisory mission or other military personnel were “for the purpose of the effective defense of the territory”. Presumably, if foreign military bases were established on Cambodian territory in the event of a threat to Cambodia’s security (Article 7), such bases could be manned by foreign forces.

(b) Laos appears to be prohibited from the introduction of any additional military personnel from outside the country, except for specified numbers of French personnel. These restrictions are contained in Articles 6 and 8 of the Armistice Agreement with Laos, quoted above.

At the Geneva Conference Laos made a Declaration containing the following statement (referred to in paragraph 4 of the Final Declaration):

“During the period between the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and the final settlement of that country’s political problems, the Royal Government of Laos will not request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors, except for the purpose of its effective territorial defense and to the extent defined by the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities.”

Under the terms of this Declaration, the ability of Laos to secure foreign aid in the form of a military mission or other military personnel would seem to be limited to what is allowed by Articles 6 and 8 of the Laotian Armistice Agreement.

In an earlier paragraph of this same Declaration (noted in paragraph 5 of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference), Laos stated that it would "never join in an agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation for the Royal Government of Laos . . . , unless its security is threatened, . . . to establish bases on Laotian territory for military forces of foreign powers." By implication, this statement envisages the possibility of foreign forces being introduced into Laos, despite the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, in the event that Laotian security is threatened. The international commission might be called into play if foreign military forces were introduced into Laos to man bases established in the event of a threat to Laotian security, since such introduction would involve departure from the Armistice terms.

(c) Article 16 of the Vietnamese Armistice Agreement prohibits the introduction "of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel". This would apparently preclude the assignment of new United States Air Force technicians or military advisory group personnel, except in rotation for such technicians or personnel who were being replaced. It is understood that approximately 100 Air Force mechanics remain in Vietnam, and that the United States military advisory mission to the three Indochinese countries (now concentrated in Vietnam) comprises approximately 200 members of the U.S. armed forces.

#### 7. *Armaments from abroad*

(a) Cambodia has agreed, in Article 7 of its Armistice Agreement, not to solicit foreign aid in war material, pending a final political settlement in Vietnam, "except for the purpose of the effective defense of the territory". Presumably, this provision covers receipt as well as solicitation. The international commission may have a role in determining what imports of armaments are "for the purpose of the effective defense of the territory".

(b) Laos has agreed as follows in Article 9 of its Armistice Agreement:

"Upon the entry into force of the present Agreement and in accordance with the declaration made at the Geneva Conference by the Royal Government of Laos on 20 July 1954, the introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and military equipment of all kinds is prohibited, with the exception of a specified quantity of armaments in categories specified as necessary for the defence of Laos."

There is no indication elsewhere in the Agreement how the quantity and categories referred to are to be specified. Presumably, this is to be done by agreement in the joint commission. If agreement is not reached there, the matter might then be referred to the international commission.

Laos has also stated (in its Declaration noted in paragraph 4 of the Geneva Conference Final Declaration) that the Royal Government of Laos will not request foreign aid "except for the purpose of its effective territorial defense and to the extent defined by the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities". This provision indicates that it remains subordinate to the effect of Article 9 in the Armistice Agreement. However, if a foreign military base were established on Laotian territory as contemplated by paragraph 2 of the Laotian Declaration (mentioned in paragraph 5 of the Geneva Conference Final Declaration), the forces maintaining such a base would presumably be entitled to import arms and equipment for their use.

(c) Article 17 of the Armistice Agreement covering Vietnam begins with the following provision :

"With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordinance, jet engines and jet weapons and armored vehicles, is prohibited."

Subsequent paragraphs of this Article make provision for a piece-for-piece replacement of material destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cessation of hostilities.

#### 8. *Locally produced armaments*

Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam are not limited as to the armaments they possess or produce within their territories. The Armistice Agreements covering these countries place no restrictions on economic aid which may be given to them. In fact, it would be possible under the Armistice Agreements to supply Cambodia, Laos and retained Vietnam with machinery and plants to manufacture all kinds of products including war materials.

#### 9. *Traffic and commerce between the zones of Vietnam*

Traffic of persons and commerce of goods between the Northern and Southern zones of Vietnam is not precluded by the Geneva instruments. Paragraphs 6 and 8 of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference state that "the military demarcation line should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary", and "the provisions of the Agreements on the cessation of hostilities

intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely in which zone he will live." Article 13 (d) of the Vietnamese Armistice Agreement states :

"From the date of entry into force of the present Agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one Party who wish to go and live in the zone controlled by the other Party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district."

Articles 3 and 6 of the Agreement provide for control by the Joint Commission at the demarcation line and in its immediate area. Article 3 provides :

"When the provisional military demarcation line coincides with a waterway, the waters of such waterway shall be open to civil navigation by both parties wherever one bank is controlled by one party and the other bank by the other party. The Joint Commission shall establish rules of navigation for the stretch of waterway in question. The merchant shipping and other civilian craft of each party shall have unrestricted access to the land under its military control."

Article 6 provides :

"No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the provisional military demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission."

The Agreement contains no provisions restricting traffic by air or sea between the two zones.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 315

*Documents Pertaining to the Arrangements for the International Control Commission, July 22-August 11, 1954*<sup>1</sup>

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSIONS IN INDOCHINA

1. Text of a Statement on Canadian Membership in the International Commissions for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia released at 5 E.D.T., July 28, 1954

2. Message from Mr. Eden and M. Molotov to the Governments of Canada and India, dated July 21

3. Message from Mr. Nehru to Mr. Eden, as co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, dated July 24

---

<sup>1</sup> For further documentation on the arrangements and activities of the International Control Commission, see volume XIII.

4. Text of the Canadian Government's reply to the Invitation to serve on the International Supervisory Commission for Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam
5. Message from Mr. Nehru to Mr. Eden
6. Reply, dated July 22, of the Government of India to the Message from Mr. Eden and M. Molotov

[Attachment 1]

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT ON CANADIAN MEMBERSHIP IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS FOR VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA RELEASED AT 5 E.D.T., JULY 28, 1954.

The Canadian Government has today transmitted to Mr. Anthony Eden co-chairman, with Mr. Molotov, of the Geneva Conference on Indochina, its acceptance of the invitation forwarded by him on July 21 to designate representatives to form with India and Poland, the International Supervisory Commissions for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Officials are being sent to New Delhi this week to take part in preliminary organizational discussions, prior to the actual establishment of the Commissions in Indochina. The Canadian representatives on the Commissions will be named shortly.

The Government has decided to accept this invitation only after detailed study of the Cease-fire and Armistice Agreements which are to be supervised by the International Commissions, and with full knowledge and appreciation of the responsibilities and difficulties that will go with membership. There are no illusions about the magnitude and complexity of the task.

Canada is geographically remote from Indochina and her collective security responsibilities in Southeast Asia are limited to those that arise from membership in the United Nations. We know from experience, however, that just as local conflicts can become general war so conditions of security and stability in any part of the world serve the cause of peace everywhere. If, therefore, by participating in the work of these Indochinese Commissions, Canada can assist in establishing such security and stability in Southeast Asia we will be serving our own country as well as the cause of peace.

While it is a matter of regret to us that the settlement in Indochina and the supervision of that settlement are not directly under the aegis of the United Nations, the Government is satisfied that Canadian participation will be fully in harmony with our responsibilities as a member of the world organization.

It should be emphasized that acceptance of membership on these Commissions does not mean that we have been called upon to guarantee or enforce the Indochina cease-fire. Nor does it involve any new military or collective security commitments for Canada.

The actual execution of the Cease-fire Agreements is the responsibility of the two sides directly concerned, functioning through joint commissions established by the Armistice Agreements. The International Commissions themselves have no enforcement obligation or responsibility. Their function will be solely supervisory, judicial and mediatory. Under Indian chairmanship, the Commissions will be responsible for supervising the proper execution of the provisions of the Agreements by the parties directly concerned; will assist these parties with the interpretation of those provisions; will be available to settle disputes; and in cases where disputes cannot be settled, will report the matter to the members of the Geneva Conference. India, Poland and Canada are also expected to assume responsibility at a later stage for supervising elections.

In carrying out their tasks the International Supervisory Commissions should be able to function more effectively than the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea which because of equal Communist and non-Communist representation, very often had effective action blocked, and which could report only to the two military commands.

The Indochina Commissions will each consist of three members—Indian, Polish and Canadian—and in most cases will be able to take decisions by majority vote. In those special and designated cases where unanimity is required by the Cease-fire Agreements but cannot be obtained, the Commissions will submit majority and minority reports to the Geneva Conference powers. It will then be the responsibility of those powers to deal with the matter.

In addition to providing representatives for each of the three Supervisory Commissions, India, Poland and Canada will supply a number of military officers for the fixed and mobile inspection teams which will supervise the execution of the Cease-fire Agreements in the field, under the direction of the Supervisory Commissioners.

A study of the information available has led us to the conclusion that the Commissions have a reasonable chance of operating effectively and of making a constructive contribution to the successful implementation of the Cease-fire Agreements, and hence to peace in Southeast Asia. If our expectations unfortunately prove ill-founded, and the Commissions are frustrated by obstruction, then of course no useful purpose would be served by continuing their existence.

The exchange of views which we have had with those powers with whom we are especially closely associated in efforts to maintain peace and strengthen security has confirmed our conviction that we ought to accept this onerous but honorable assignment.

Finally we have been conscious of the serious consequences which might follow if we were to decline the invitation, since this could delay and complicate the implementation of the Cease-fire Agreements with unhappy and possibly even serious results. We have no illusions that the task we are undertaking will be either easy or of short duration, but we take satisfaction from the fact that in performing it Canada will be playing a worthy and responsible part in an effort to strengthen peace.

[Attachment 2]

MESSAGE FROM MR. EDEN AND M. MOLOTOV TO GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA  
AND INDIA, DATED JULY 21

We have the honour to address you as co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China which concluded its work on July 20, 1954. The Conference took note of agreements ending hostilities in Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, and organising international control and the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements. In particular, it was agreed that an International Commission should be set up in each of the three countries for control and supervision of the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China. It was further proposed that these Commissions should be composed of an equal number of representatives of Canada, India and Poland, presided over by the representative of India.

2. On behalf of the Conference we accordingly have the honour to invite the Canadian/Indian Governments in consultation with the Governments of Canada/India/Poland, to designate representatives to form the International Supervisory Commissions for Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia as envisaged in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities and on supervision in those three countries.

3. It is hoped that the three International Supervisory Commissions can be established on the spot as soon as possible from the date on which the ceasefire comes into force.

4. The text of the final declaration adopted by the Conference and of all other agreements and declarations concerning the cessation of hostilities and the organisation of supervision in the three countries of Indo-China will be transmitted to you as soon as possible.

5. We have the honour to request an early reply, which we shall at once transmit to the members of the Conference.

[Attachment 3]

REPLY, DATED JULY 22, OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE MESSAGE  
FROM MR. EDEN AND M. MOLOTOV

The Government of India have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the communication forwarded by the United Kingdom High Commission conveying a message from Mr. Eden and M. Molotov as co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference. In this message it is stated that the Conference agreed that an International Commission should be set up in each of the three countries, namely, Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, for control and supervision of the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China. It was further proposed that these Commissions should be composed of an equal number of representatives of Canada, India and Poland, presided over by the representative of India. The Government of India are anxious to help, in every way possible to them, the cause of a peaceful settlement in Indo-China and are prepared to consider favourably assuming responsibilities as suggested, in regard to the control and supervision of the execution of the agreement arrived at Geneva. They would like to have, however, the texts of the agreements as well as of the declarations made in regard to the cessation of hostilities and the organisation of supervision, to enable them to find out the exact nature of the functions of the Supervisory Commissions and the responsibilities which the Government of India will have to undertake in regard to them. They will be grateful, therefore, if these texts are supplied to them at an early date, together with such other particulars as may be considered necessary.

[Attachment 4]

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT'S REPLY TO  
THE INVITATION TO SERVE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY  
COMMISSION FOR LAOS, CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM

I have the honour to acknowledge your message of July 21 which you and Mr. Molotov sent in your capacity as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, containing the invitation to the Canadian Government to designate, in consultation with the Governments of India and Poland, representatives to form the International Supervisory Commissions for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as envisaged in the Agreements on the cessation of hostilities, and on supervision in those three countries.

Conscious of the grave responsibilities which the task will impose,—but in the hope that it can be discharged in such a way as to contribute to the establishment of peace and security in Indo-China, the Cana-



dian Government accepts this invitation. The Canadian Government has been in touch with the Government of India concerning preliminary arrangements and intends to send representatives to New Delhi in the immediate future to consult with Indian and Polish officials on the setting up of the International Supervisory Commissions provided for in the Agreements drawn up by the Geneva Conference.

The Canadian Government would be grateful if you would transmit the text of this reply to the members of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, whose continuing interest and support will be required if the Commissions are effectively to carry out their functions and if the Agreements on the cessation of hostilities are to be successfully implemented.

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1954.

[Attachment 5]

INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY COMMISSIONS MESSAGE FROM MR. NEHRU  
TO MR. EDEN

The Government of India have the honour to inform the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China that at the invitation of the Government of India a preliminary conference of the three states constituting the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Indo-China was convened and met in New Delhi from the 1st of August to the 6th of August, 1954. A final communiqué<sup>2</sup> of the Conference which embodies the principal decisions arrived and is being sent by air mail.

2. The Government of India are glad that the three Commissions will be installed and begin their work in Phnom Penh (Cambodia), Vientiane (Laos), and Hanoi (Vietnam) on the 11th of August, 1954.

3. The three Armistice Agreements and the issues arising therefrom were, as far as they are applicable to the work of the International Commissions, fully discussed. The Government of India are happy to state that the discussions were frank and cordial and the decisions were unanimous.

WASHINGTON, August 11th, 1954.

[Attachment 6]

REPLY, DATED JULY 22, OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE MESSAGE  
FROM MR. EDEN AND M. MOLOTOV

The Government of India have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the communication forwarded by the United Kingdom High Com-

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

mission conveying a message from Mr. Eden and M. Molotov as co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference. In this message it is stated that the Conference agreed that an International Commission should be set up in each of the three countries, namely, Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, for control and supervision of the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China. It was further proposed that these Commissions should be composed of an equal number of representatives of Canada, India and Poland, presided over by the representative of India. The Government of India are anxious to help, in every way possible to them, the cause of a peaceful settlement in Indo-China and are prepared to consider favourably assuming responsibilities as suggested, in regard to the control and supervision of the execution of the agreement arrived at Geneva. They would like to have, however, the texts of the agreements as well as of the declarations made in regard to the cessation of hostilities and the organisation of supervision, to enable them to find out the exact nature of the functions of the Supervisory Commissions and the responsibilities which the Government of India will have to undertake in regard to them. They will be grateful, therefore, if these texts are supplied to them at an early date, together with such other particulars as may be considered necessary.

## INDEX



# INDEX

- Abello, Emile, 119, 539  
 Aberra, Dedjazmatch Amha, 11  
 Achilles, Theodore C. :  
   Geneva Conference on Indochina, 404,  
   407, 417, 428-431, 492-494, 543,  
   544, 620-621, 694-696, 709-710  
   Geneva Conference on Korea, 8, 124  
 Indochina, cessation of hostilities,  
   700-701, 742-743, 902  
   Southeast Asia, 1021-1023  
   U.N. Peace Observation Commission  
     for Indochina, proposed, 883-884  
     Vietnam, 816  
 Acikalin, Cevat, 12, 170, 185, 261, 306,  
   323, 343, 387, 715-716, 904-906  
 Addis, John M., 413, 454  
 Aldrich, Winthrop W., 470-471, 496-497,  
   1066-1067, 1304-1305  
 Ali Sastroamidjojo, 611  
 Allen, Ward, 455  
 Allen, William D. :  
   Geneva Conference on Indochina :  
     Participation in, 412, 454, 544,  
     955, 1010-1011; preparations for,  
     493, 694-696, 709-710; progress of  
     negotiations, 819-821; review of  
     conference documents, 1388-1389  
   Geneva Conference on Korea, 13, 119,  
   147, 153  
   Indochina, cessation of hostilities,  
     700-701, 743, 913, 916, 1173, 1400  
   Korean unification, U.S. Alternate  
     Plan B, 255  
   U.N. Peace Observation Commission  
     for Indochina, proposed, 823  
 Allison, John M., 246, 248, 510-512  
 Anderson, Lt. Gen. Samuel E., 296, 302  
 Andronikov, C., 544, 955  
 Anspacher, John, 8, 404  
 ANZUS pact meeting on Southeast  
   Asia, 654-665  
 Associated States. *See* French Asso-  
   ciated States.  
 Atomic weapons, 245-246, 607, 619  
 Audiat, Michel, 882  
 Australia (*see also Australian subhead-  
 ings under other subjects*), 538  
 Baeyens, Jacques, 409, 544, 936  
 Baldwin, Charles F., 630  
 Bao Dai :  
   France, treaty negotiations with,  
     584*n*, 585  
   Geneva Conference on Indochina, 565,  
   603-604, 608-609, 613-614, 859-  
   863  
 Bao Dai—Continued  
   Indochina, situation in, 660, 829-831  
   Vietnam, State of : Government, 1008-  
     1010, 1043-1044, 1134-1136, 1282,  
     1288-1289; political situation,  
     823-824, 881, 901*n*, 903, 1052; U.S.  
     aid to, 859-860, 1106  
 Barringer, Philip E., 9, 405  
 Beam, Jacob D., 652*n*  
 Beaumont, Jean Michel Guerin de, 1359  
 Bech, Joseph, 11  
 Benard, Jean, 409  
 Benler, Talat, 715  
 Bentinck, A., 11, 16, 343, 386  
 Berlin Agreement. *See under* Geneva  
   Conference on Korea.  
 Bidault, Georges :  
   Cambodian official, assassination by  
     Viet Minh, 782, 783  
   French Associated States, independ-  
     ence of, 968  
   Geneva Conference on Indochina :  
     Composition of, 427*n*, 493, 620-621  
     French position : Associated States  
       approval of, 417; formulation  
       of, 575-576; presentation at  
       opening session, 733, 735  
     Participation in, 408, 677-678, 1155  
     Preparations for, 544-548, 574, 591-  
     594, 641-644, 669-670  
   Restricted sessions, need for, 792-  
     793  
   Soviet position, 483-484  
   Tactics, 776-777, 849-851, 873-874  
   Geneva Conference on Korea, 11, 38,  
   127-130, 139-140, 333, 415  
 Indochina :  
   Cessation of hostilities : British five  
     questions, 777, 783, 819, 831,  
     993-994; British proposal, 922,  
     925, 965-966, 996; French pro-  
     posals, 873-874, 878-879, 907-  
     908, 1069-1071; international  
     control problems, 987, 993-994,  
     997-998, 1017-1019, 1034-1035,  
     1061-1062, 1065-1066; Laos and  
     Cambodia, 831, 839, 854-855,  
     863-864, 878, 987, 996-997, 1174-  
     1176; military negotiations  
     with Viet Minh, 831, 945, 970,  
     986, 1126; political and military  
     aspects, order of conference  
     discussion, 910-911; prisoners  
     of war problem, 997; Soviet  
     five-point proposal, 880; Viet  
     Minh proposal, 796-798, 819,  
     873-874, 879, 922

- Bidault, Georges—Continued  
 Indochina—Continued  
 Internationalization of war in, 1039-1040, 1086  
 Situation in, 517, 867, 944  
 U.S. military intervention in, 638-639, 902-903, 1167  
 Korean unification, 151-155, 174, 176, 257-258, 262-263, 337-338, 344, 364-365  
 Laniel government, 806n, 902  
 U.N. Peace Observation Commission for Indochina, proposed, 823  
 Vietnam: Dien Bien Phu, 602, 712-713, 758, 807, 809-810, 833, 834, 971; partition question, 807  
 Blake, Robert, 9, 405, 407  
 Blakeney, F. J., 480  
 Bohlen, Charles E., 28, 67-68, 71-72, 89-91, 96-97, 445, 467-468, 552  
 Bonnet, Henri, 589, 742, 785-786, 903, 1100, 1101, 1166-1167, 1453n  
 Bonsal, Philip W.:  
 Geneva Conference on Indochina: Advisory role, 404, 407, 417n, 434n, 425, 445, 459, 503n, 1137n, 1166, 1238; composition, 541, 612, 613n; preparations for, 463-466, 686-687, 702-703; progress, 1149-1150, 1374-1375; tactics, 1109, 1175-1176; U.S. role, 1053, 1329; Vietnamese concerns on outcome, 859-862, 1347  
 Geneva Conference on Korea, 8, 47, 437-442  
 Indochina:  
 Cessation of hostilities: Cambodia and Laos, 1207-1208, 1211-1212, 1303-1304, 1357, 1358; draft agreements, 1402; French military talks with Viet Minh, 1250, 1320-1321; international control problems, 1061-1062, 1278-1280, 1294-1296, 1357, 1387-1388; Vietnamese statement, 1440-1441, 1492  
 French draft declarations, 1346-1347, 1355, 1367-1368, 1400, 1402-1404, 1407, 1469-1470  
 Situation in, 614-615, 762, 816, 1051-1054, 1308-1309  
 United action, proposed, 548-549  
 U.S. intervention, 1052, 1053, 1374  
 Western proposal for restoration of peace, draft, 631-635  
 Southeast Asia, defense, 773-774, 801-803  
 U.N. Peace Observation Commission, proposed, 866-867, 1108, 1172-1173  
 Vietnam: Cessation of hostilities negotiations, 1277, 1356-1359, 1368-1369, 1373-1374, 1386-1387; situation in, 843-846, 848-849, 894-895,
- Bonsal, Philip W.—Continued  
 Vietnam—Continued  
 1134-1136, 1288-1289, 1298-1300, 1327-1328, 1334, 1549-1550  
 Vietnam, State of, treaty negotiations with France, 584-586  
 Boris, Georges, 409, 1346-1347  
 Bowie, Robert R., 8, 404, 507n, 544, 598-599, 651-654, 1281  
 Briggs, Ellis O.:  
 Geneva Conference on Korea: Berlin Agreement, 18-20; Draft Declaration by Sixteen, 370; final phase and termination of, 325-326, 336-337, 344-347, 359; ROK participation, 22-26, 29-32, 36-37, 44, 48-49, 52-53, 55-56, 74-75, 78-79, 111-113; U.S.-ROK pre-conference discussions, 29n, 33-35, 59-62, 116-117, 144, 146  
 Korea, Republic of: Mutual defense agreement with United States, 320-321; U.S. military aid question, 74-75  
 Korean unification: ROK 14-point proposal, 319-320; U.S. Alternate Plan B for, 191-194, 200-203, 205-207, 213-215, 226-228, 239-242, 248; U.S.-ROK general principles, draft, 268-269, 273, 275-277, 281-283, 306-309  
 Briones, Manuel C., 12, 266-267  
 Broustra, Vincent, 409  
 Brown, Elizabeth, 119-124, 535-538  
 Bullard, Julian L., 413, 454  
 Burleson, Omar, 574  
 Burma, 928, 979  
 Buu Kinh, 411, 717-718, 732-733, 890-891, 955, 1217-1218, 1274-1275  
 Buu Loc, Prince of Vietnam, 513, 845, 914-916  
 Cable, James E., 413, 586-588, 768  
 Caccia, Sir Harold A., 13, 412, 544, 553, 577-578, 589-590, 593, 835-836, 1348, 1359, 1404-1405, 1408, 1421-1423, 1437, 1470n, 1547  
 Cairo Declaration, 1943, 150  
 Calhoun, John A., 8, 119, 185-186, 404, 803  
 Cambodia:  
 Cessation of hostilities negotiations. *See* Indochina: Cessation of hostilities: Laos and Cambodia  
 Independence question. *See* French Associated States.  
 National Intelligence Estimate on, 872, 1023-1029  
 U.S. aid question, 768, 1206, 1208, 1227-1228, 1231-1232, 1234-1236, 1246-1247, 1341  
 U.S. Ambassador to, proposed, 681, 1490-1491, 1503  
 Viet Minh assassination of Cambodian official, 780, 782-783

- Capella, Basil, 9, 119, 406  
 Carnahan, A. S. J., 574  
 Carney, Adm. Robert B., 10, 119, 934*n*, 1057  
 Casey, Richard G., 10, 157-159, 213, 217, 379, 384, 386, 389, 390*n*, 529-530, 557-558, 649, 651, 654, 656-657, 662-664, 1120-1121, 1130  
 Chang Wen-tien, 11, 410, 955, 1322  
 Chantarangsei, 1252  
 Chauvel, Jean:  
   Geneva Conference on Indochina: Continuity after departure of Foreign Ministers, 1176, 1178; participating role in, 408, 544, 1166; preparations for, 486, 492-493, 517, 526-527, 542-543, 581-584, 593, 640*n*, 641, 667-669, 694-696, 709-710, 729-730; restricted sessions, 1109; resumption at Foreign Minister level, 1209-1210, 1280, 1329  
   Geneva Conference on Korea, 11, 124, 371, 386  
   Indochina: Cessation of hostilities negotiations, 576, 700-701, 713-714, 742-743, 916, 931-933, 955, 956-958, 961-962, 1394-1396, 1473-1474; international control problems, 931-933, 982-983, 1050-1051, 1061-1062; 1138-1139, 1154-1156, 1176-1177, 1215-1216, 1218, 1229-1231, 1243-1244, 1246, 1249, 1255-1256, 1263, 1272-1274, 1278-1280, 1288, 1290, 1317, 1334-1335, 1406, 1407; Laos and Cambodia, 592, 961-962, 1139, 1159-1160, 1183-1184, 1195-1196, 1200, 1202, 1215-1216, 1218, 1248-1249, 1290, 1317, 1473-1474; situation in, 1239-1241; U.S. military intervention in, 853-854  
   Southeast Asia, 821-822  
   U.N. Peace Observation Commission for Indochina, proposed, 823, 851*n*, 862, 1084, 1132-1134  
   Vietnam: Cessation of hostilities negotiations, 957-958, 1050, 1154-1155, 1174, 1175, 1177-1178, 1222, 1238-1239, 1241-1242, 1248-1249, 1252-1253, 1265-1268, 1276, 1286-1288, 1321-1323, 1334, 1473-1474; military situation, 676-677; political situation, 818-819  
 Chaves, José Maria, 119  
 Chechotkin, Igor, 618  
 Chen Chia-kang, 410, 955  
 Cheysson, Claude, 409, 517, 544, 816, 906, 955, 1367-1369  
 Chiao Kuan-huc, 805  
 Childs, Marquis, 629  
 China, People's Republic of:  
   Recognition question, 16, 17, 154, 160-161, 464, 488, 529  
 China, People's Republic of—Con.  
   Relations with Japan, 511-512; North Korea, 16, 154; Soviet Union, 897-899; United Kingdom, 648, 803-806, 1011, 1111  
   Treaty with India regarding Tibet, 1378  
   U.N. membership question, 232, 464, 488, 611  
 China, Republic of, 154, 155, 160, 428, 501, 623  
 Chipperfield, Robert B., 574  
 Cho Chung Hwan, 144, 146, 233-234, 359  
 Chou En-lai:  
   British relations with Communist China, 648-649, 1011  
   Chinese Communist aggression in Asia, 310-311  
   Geneva Conference on Indochina: Charges against France and United States, 781-782; composition of conference, 735, 736; restricted sessions, 793*n*, 819-821; role at conference, 410, 1251, 1499, 1549  
   Geneva Conference on Korea, 11, 174, 176, 177, 190-191, 390, 1170-1171, 1176  
   Indochina:  
   Cessation of hostilities negotiations: French military meetings with Viet Minh, 971-974; international control problems, 913, 946, 984, 996, 1011, 1019-1020, 1050, 1061, 1088-1090, 1139; Laos and Cambodia, 840, 856, 863-864, 878, 1158-1159, 1163, 1170-1171, 1173-1176, 1181-1182, 1201, 1208, 1211-1212, 1308-1309, 1378-1380, 1449-1450, 1466; order of discussion of political and military aspects, 908, 910; six-point proposal, 945, 946, 1088-1089, 1174-1175; Soviet proposal, 832; Viet Minh proposal, 782  
   Meeting with Ho Chi Minh, 1322  
   Meeting with Mendès-France, 1209, 1212-1213, 1222, 1233-1234, 1239-1241, 1347  
   Korean unification, 310-312, 349-351, 353, 361-362, 377, 381-384  
   Southeast Asia defense pact, 1420-1421  
   Vietnam, partition of, 1368  
 Chough Pyong Ok, 313  
 Churchill, Sir Winston Leonard Spencer, 558-559, 594, 616, 617, 628, 638*n*, 651, 698, 834-835, 869-870, 1169-1170, 1254-1255, 1260-1261  
 Clutterbuck, Sir Alexander, 930-931  
 Cogy, Gen. René, 604, 881, 1044  
 Colombo Conference, 198, 610, 612, 623, 625, 695

- Congress, U.S., 390, 393, 574, 706-708, 1069, 1223-1224
- Cooper, Chester L., 405, 407, 758-760, 881-882, 1023
- Corner, F. H., 11, 654
- Cowles, Willard B., 1503-1504
- Crawford, Boyd, 574
- Critchley, T. K., 10, 654, 663
- Crowe, Philip K., 610-612
- Cuenco, Miguel, 12, 612
- Cutler, Robert, 599-600, 943
- Daley, Brig. Gen. John, 8, 404, 407, 762
- Daridan, Jean, 81*n*, 102-103
- Davis, Vice Adm. Arthur C., 8, 404, 459, 520-521, 544, 606, 654, 659, 662, 690-691, 814-815, 1148*n*
- Day, Henry B., 539-540, 1236-1237, 1281, 1297-1298
- Dean, Arthur H. :  
 Geneva Conference on Korea, 94*n*, 117, 144-146, 178, 317-319  
 Korea : Panmunjom mission, 15*n* ;  
 Van Fleet mission, 244-245, 301  
 Korean unification : U.S. alternate plans for, 168-169, 191-196, 200-203, 205-207, 212-217, 226-229, 233-234, 237-241, 244-248, 253-254, 258-259 ; U.S.-ROK draft principles, 273-277, 281-286, 291-298, 301-303, 306-309, 321*n*
- Debarnot, Maj., 762, 764-766, 767
- de Beus, J. G., 455-456
- de Brebisson, Col. Michel, 409, 542, 762-767, 1166, 1276, 1322
- de Folin, Jacques, 409, 544, 1348
- De Grave, Vladimir, 9, 405
- Dejean, Maurice, 14*n*, 432, 609, 639-640, 727, 773, 806*n*, 1210, 1253
- de la Chevalerie, Daufresne, 10, 343
- Deltiel, Brig. Gen. Henri, 409, 986, 1518, 1530, 1548-1549
- de Manziarly, Alexandre, 409
- de Margerie. *See* Jacquin de Margerie.
- Deressa, 119
- de Salis, Jean, 129, 140
- Dien Bien Phu. *See under* Vietnam.
- Dillon, C. Douglas :  
 Geneva Conference on Indochina : Adviser to, proposed, 459 ; French expectations, 435-437, 445-446 ; French fears of failure of, 699-700, 1335-1336 ; participation question, 456, 486, 524-527, 541, 613-614 ; postponement rumor, 466 ; preparations, 486, 492-495, 517-520, 527-529, 542-543 ; Soviet position, 483-484 ; U.S. role, 1336-1338, 1496*n*  
 Indochina : Cease-fire question, 697-698 ; French request for military aid, 589*n* ; Mendès-France meeting with Chou En-lai, 1209*n*, 1212-1213, 1239-1241 ; Mendès-France meeting with Smith, 1188*n* ; U.S.-French military talks, 1001*n* ; U.S. military intervention in, 902*n*, 1131-1132 ; withdrawal of forces question, 525-526  
 Vietnam, 541, 1127*n*, 1239, 1270*n*  
 Dinh Xuan Kieu, 411  
 Dixon, Sir Pierson, 928, 933, 937, 954-955, 968-969  
 Doan Thuan, 411  
 Donovan, William J., 980  
 Dop Chuon, 1252  
 Draper, Morris, Jr., 406  
 Drew, Walter, 9, 82-87, 405  
 Drumright, Everett F., 113*n*, 506-507, 539*n*, 1236-1237  
 Dulles, Allen, 944, 977  
 Dulles, John Foster :  
 Address before American Legion, 16  
 British relations with Communist China, 648, 1011  
 Communist threat in Asia, address, 487  
 Geneva Conference on Indochina :  
 Australian interest in, 481*n*, 557-558  
 Basic instructions for U.S. participation, 778-779, 1189, 1247-1248, 1271, 1389-1391  
 Communist bloc unity, 621  
 Conclusion of, news conference statement, 1550-1551  
 Departure prior to opening, 459, 487, 641, 644, 666, 677  
 Duration, 864*n*  
 Final Declaration on Indochina, 1396-1397, 1403, 1453*n*, 1459-1460, 1472*n*  
 Foreign Minister level, suspension and resumption of negotiations at, 1117-1118, 1137*n*, 1146-1147, 1148*n*, 1238, 1275, 1294, 1309-1311, 1330-1333, 1351-1355, 1367, 1381-1382  
 French-U.S. position and meeting with Mendès-France, 1333, 1348-1355, 1359-1361, 1363-1364, 1375-1376  
 Lack of progress, 1067, 1068, 1117-1118, 1282  
 Mendès-France role, 1495-1496  
 NSC consideration of French proposal for, 731-732  
 Participation question, 579-580, 603, 608-609, 612-613, 620-621, 641-644, 666-667, 670-671, 739, 889-890  
 Preparations for, 485-486, 491-492, 494-495, 514, 544-548, 553-558, 574-576, 579-580, 591-594, 641-644, 667-669  
 Press briefing, 15-17, 559-569



Dulles, John Foster—Continued  
 Geneva Conference on Indochina—  
 Continued  
 Radio-TV address to nation, 720-  
 726  
 Soviet position, 608, 644  
 Special briefing, 535-538  
 Trip to Paris, 540  
 U.S. representative to, 403  
 U.S. role at, 994-995, 1103-1105  
 Western solidarity at, need for, 672  
 Geneva Conference on Korea :  
 Arrival statement, 552-553  
 Berlin Agreement, 18, 415  
 Communist attacks against United  
 States, question of rebuttal,  
 165-168  
 Communist bloc unity, 621  
 Congratulations to Smith at con-  
 clusion, 390*n*  
 Declaration of Sixteen, 368-370  
 Duration, 864*n*  
 European problems, Soviet interest  
 in, 469-470  
 Final phase and termination, 334-  
 335, 336*n*, 341, 370-371, 374  
 Five-power concept, 424-425, 484-  
 485  
 Head of U.S. Delegation, 7, 459  
 Official languages, 43  
 Preparations for, 14, 29, 35, 47-48,  
 53-54, 56-58, 68-69, 75-77, 88-  
 89, 95-96, 117, 124-125, 128-130,  
 139-144, 151-155, 157, 468, 532-  
 534  
 Press briefing, 15-17, 559-569  
 Restricted session, 173-177  
 ROK participation question, 21-22,  
 39-43, 77-78, 115  
 South African refusal of invitation,  
 58-59  
 Special briefing, 119-124  
 U.S. Delegation guidance meeting,  
 182-185  
 Indochina :  
 Cessation of hostilities negotia-  
 tions: Agreements, signature  
 of, 1478-1479; British position,  
 576-577; French position, 590,  
 1256-1259; French proposal,  
 747; international control prob-  
 lems, 966-967, 1171-1172, 1175,  
 1221-1222, 1392-1393, 1429-  
 1430; Laos and Cambodia, 592,  
 912-913, 1038, 1174-1175, 1226.  
 1246-1247, 1338-1339; Soviet  
 position, 617-618; U.S. basic  
 principles, 787-789; U.S. guar-  
 antees, 1361-1362, 1403; U.S.  
 position in support of agree-  
 ment, 1309, 1324-1327; Viet  
 Minh proposal, 967  
 Internationalization of war, 728-  
 729, 742, 785-786, 886, 1056,  
 1067-1068, 1147

Dulles, John Foster—Continued  
 Indochina—Continued  
 Situation in: Briefing of Congres-  
 sional leaders on, 706-708; five-  
 power military talks, 842*n*, 856-  
 857, 858-859, 866, 885, 888-889,  
 900*n*, 934, 940-941, 950, 1068-  
 1069; joint military commis-  
 sion, proposed, 595*n*; message  
 to President Eisenhower, 605-  
 607; NSC meeting on, 943;  
 U.S.-French meetings, 1187-  
 1188, 1342-1343; U.S.-French  
 military conversations, 1001-  
 1002; U.S.-Soviet discussion,  
 895*n*  
 U.S. military aid question, 588*n*,  
 639-640  
 U.S. military intervention, question  
 of, 557-559, 570-571, 595*n*, 638-  
 639, 648-649, 1081-1082, 1100-  
 1101, 1166-1167  
 U.S. public opinion poll, 911-912  
 Korea, Van Fleet mission, 94*n*, 290  
 Korean unification: Elections under  
 international supervision, 156;  
 ROK proposal, 317*n*, ROK and  
 North Korean proposals, compari-  
 son of, 162; Soviet principles of  
 agreement for, 356, 357; U.N. res-  
 olution, 171; UNCURK super-  
 vision, proposed, 225-226; U.S.  
 Alternate Plan B, 172-173, 178-  
 181, 207-210, 224-225, 237, 241-  
 244; U.S.-ROK draft basic prin-  
 ciples for, 269-270, 289-290, 294-  
 295; withdrawal of forces ques-  
 tion, 54, 233-235  
 Presidential commendation, 693  
 Southeast Asia, defense of, 596-598,  
 622-625, 654-656, 660-665, 704*n*,  
 705-706, 720-726, 745-747, 798-  
 800, 868-870, 885, 1125, 1410, 1431,  
 1453-1454, 1470, 1493, 1551  
 Trip to London and Paris, 517, 532,  
 1187-1188  
 Trip to Paris for meeting with  
 Mendès-France, 1342-1343  
 U.N. Peace Observation Commission  
 for Indochina, proposed, 786-787,  
 790-791, 851-852, 875-877, 882-  
 883, 927-928, 938, 941-942, 964,  
 966, 1012-1013, 1058, 1081, 1179  
 Vietnam: Cessation of hostilities ne-  
 gotiations, 1148, 1172, 1225, 1275,  
 1393-1394; Dien Bien Phu, 602,  
 607-608, 676-677; partition ques-  
 tion, 1270; situation in, 578-579,  
 800-801, 892-894, 927, 1044-1045,  
 1394  
 Vietnam, State of, 1147, 1324-1325  
 Visit of Churchill to United States,  
 558-559  
 Dwan, Lt. Col. John E., 9, 405, 1148*n*.  
 1149, 1166, 1242, 1283-1286, 1292-

- Dwan, Lt. Col. John E.—Continued  
1293, 1313-1314, 1382-1384, 1444-1445, 1454-1455
- Eddy, Donald B., 47, 145
- Eden, Anthony:  
British relations with Communist China, 648  
Colombo Conference, 623  
Geneva Conference on Indochina:  
Agreed documents, 1498; chairmanship question, 642, 708-709, 735; Foreign Minister phase, suspension and resumption, 1136, 1165, 1170, 1304-1305, 1311*n*; head of British Delegation, 412, 454; lack of progress, 1114-1117, 1124-1125; participation question, 620-621, 735; preparations for, 514, 544-548, 553-557, 575-576, 593-594, 641-644, 669-670; restricted session, need for, 792-793, 819-821; tactics for, 776-777, 849-851, 873-875; termination, 1083-1085  
Geneva Conference on Korea: Basic principles for, 260, 264, 337; Chinese Communist participation in future Korean discussions, 390; Declaration of Sixteen, 371, 387; final phase and termination of, 333-334, 340, 343, 383-385, 389, 1083-1085; head of British Delegation, 13, 454; outcome, 210; preparations for, 47, 95-96, 123, 128-130, 139-140, 142, 151-155, 415; restricted session, 174-177, 184; U.S. request for support in rebuttal of Communist charges, 165-168  
Indochina:  
Cessation of hostilities negotiations: Agreements. discussions on, 1404-1409; British position, 575-577, 777, 782, 879, 910, 911, 921, 925, 965-966, 970-974, 1404-1409; international control problems, 931-933, 993-994, 998, 1011-1012, 1013, 1032-1033, 1078-1079, 1114-1115, 1153-1154, 1406-1407, 1421-1423, 1565; Laos and Cambodia, 832, 840, 863-864, 1115-1116, 1132-1134, 1170-1171, 1173-1174, 1185, 1201-1202  
Five-power staff study, 791-792, 836*n*  
U.S. military intervention in, 570-571, 629-630, 638-639, 648-649, 750, 815-816, 1128-1129  
U.S.-French position, 1348-1355, 1359-1361  
Korean unification: Basic principles, need for, 264; international supervision of elections, 156, 174, 176-177, 264, 270-271, 279, 280,
- Eden, Anthony—Continued  
Korean unification—Continued  
287, 343, 363; North Korean proposal, 263-264; ROK 14-point proposal, 306; U.S. Alternate Plan B, 257-258  
Malaya, 1084  
Nuclear weapons, 607  
Relationship with Dulles, 651  
Southeast Asia, defense of, 622-625, 698-699, 774-776, 1066-1067, 1420-1421, 1429, 1470*n*, 1473-1474  
U.N. Peace Observation Commission for Indochina, proposed, 823, 834, 852*n*, 954-955, 1030-1031, 1083-1084, 1105  
Vietnam, 1404-1405, 1407-1409
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.:  
Declaration on common principles of Anglo-American policy, 1260-1261  
Geneva Conference on Indochina, 640-641, 949*n*, 1137*n*, 1169, 1333-1334, 1436, 1455, 1503  
Geneva Conference on Korea, 45-46, 103-105, 532-534, 691-692, 1503  
Indochina, 442*n*, 570*n*, 594-595, 599-600, 604-605, 616, 1123*n*, 1282  
Korea, 42*n*, 44-45  
Southeast Asia, defense, 555, 692-693, 710*n*, 887, 1254-1255  
Vietnam, fall of Dien Bien Phu, 578*n*, 716
- Ekvald, Lt. Col. Robert, 406  
Elbrick, Charles Burke, 470*n*  
Ely, Gen. Paul, 544, 854, 943, 1044, 1103, 1111, 1168  
Erkin, Feridun C., 119  
Erskine, Gen. G. B., 475-479  
European Defense Community, 418-419, 427, 532, 533, 618, 774, 1043
- Falaize, Pierre-Louis, 409, 603, 604, 608-609  
Fedenko, F. A., 412  
Fedorenko, N. T., 12, 412  
Ferguson, Col. Robert G., 8, 404, 407, 762  
Ferro, Maurice, 1150  
Fierst, Herbert A., 119  
Fischer, Martin, 1302-1303  
Flanagan, Thomas E., 822  
Flemming, Arthur S., 943  
Ford, John F., 413  
Forsyth, D. D., 58, 59*n*  
France (*see also French subheadings under other subjects*):  
Laniel government, 581, 582, 598-599, 618, 619, 661, 694, 712-714, 777*n*, 789*n*, 806, 829, 902, 1040, 1120, 1128  
Mendès-France government, 1128, 1178, 1198  
Treaty negotiations with State of Vietnam. *See* Vietnam, State of:  
Treaties with France.

- France—Continued  
 U.S. aid to Indochina. *See under* Indochina : Situation in.
- Frédéric-Dupont, Edouard, 408, 1041-1044
- French Associated States, independence question (*see also* Cambodia ; Laos ; Vietnam, State of), 113, 416, 447, 508, 514, 530-531, 537, 546-547, 657, 658, 753, 780, 935-936, 968, 988, 1093
- Fromm, Joe, 1251
- Fulbright, J. W., 574
- Fulton, James G., 574
- Gallman, Waldemar J., 59n
- Garcia, Carlos P., 12, 185, 223, 260, 306, 343, 358, 379-380, 386, 612-613
- Geneva Conference on Indochina, May 8-July 21, 1954 (*see also* Geneva Conference on Korea) :  
 British position, 576-577, 583-584, 834-835  
 British-U.S. relationship at, 953  
 Cambodian program for, 767-768, 1425-1426  
 Cease-fire during, question of, 827  
 Chairmanship question, 642-644, 647, 669-671, 700, 708-710, 735  
 Chou En-lai role at, 410, 1251, 1499, 1549  
 Communiqués on restricted sessions, 988n, 1001, 1204-1205  
 Communist delegations, 891, 952  
 Communist intentions, joint State Department-CIA estimate, 758-760  
 Communist position, 483-484, 528, 608, 827-828, 1119-1120, 1192-1193, 1344-1346, 1421, 1429, 1492  
 Composition (*see also* Participants ; Participation questions, *infra*), 426-427, 454-456, 482, 486, 497, 505-506, 514, 528, 535, 560-561, 579-580, 586-587, 591-593, 597-598, 612-613, 620-621, 643, 644, 646-647, 663, 669-670, 686-687, 889-890  
 Conclusion, 1496n, 1499, 1501-1502, 1547, 1549-1551  
 Declarations :  
 Final Declaration on Indochina :  
 Final text, 1540-1542 ; French drafts, 1346-1347, 1355-1356, 1367-1368, 1398-1400, 1400-1402, 1407, 1438-1439, 1460-1462, 1474-1476 ; translated text, 1485-1487 ; U.S. comments on, 1403-1404, 1462-1463, 1474, 1476, 1480-1481, 1485, 1494-1495, Vietnamese draft amendment, 1498-1499, 1545-1546 ; Western reaction to, 1498-1499  
 Soviet counterproposal, 1376-1388, 1396-1397
- Geneva Conference on Indochina—Con.  
 Declarations—Continued  
 Unilateral declarations : Cambodia, 1456, 1467, 1469-1470, 1476-1477, 1484, 1488, 1543, 1544 ; \*Laos, 1419, 1456, 1468, 1469, 1482-1483, 1489-1490, 1542-1544 ; Republic of France, 1482, 1545 ; U.S., 1309, 1361-1362, 1391, 1395, 1411-1412, 1452-1453, 1459-1460, 1471-1472, 1500-1501  
 U.S. message to Vietnamese Prime Minister on status of U.S. relations with Vietnam, 1324-1327  
 Vietnamese statement of disassociation with, 1432-1434, 1439-1441, 1492
- Dulles' nonparticipation, 487, 641-642, 677-678, 689
- Duration, 864-865, 952, 967, 1007, 1066, 1109-1110
- Eisenhower's proposed radio-TV address in event of failure, 1436, 1455
- European problems, Soviet interest in discussion of, 1110, 1466-1467
- Expenses, sharing of, 427-428
- Foreign Minister phase, preparations for suspension : Composition of conference after departure of Foreign Ministers, question of, 1146-1149, 1165, 1166, 1170, 1226-1227, 1238, 1271 ; continuation of conference, question of, 1174, 1176-1178, 1196-1198, 1202, 1205, 1249-1250, 1251n, 1265 ; departure of Foreign Ministers, 875, 981, 992-993, 1136-1137, 1170 ; departure of Smith, 935, 940, 949-950, 992-993, 1053, 1136-1137, 1146-1147, 1148-1149, 1205-1206
- French Foreign Ministers : Bidault nonparticipation, 641-642 ; Mendès-France decision-making role, 1495-1496
- French preconference position, 417, 432, 435, 437, 444-446, 485-486, 493-494, 496, 575-576, 581-584, 689-690
- Headquarters of delegations, 403, 407, 408, 410, 411, 412
- Invitations question, 449-450, 455-456, 668, 718-720, 734-737, 770
- Lack of progress and question of breakup, 1067-1068, 1083-1084, 1118, 1119, 1149-1150, 1151-1152, 1155, 1156, 1344-1346, 1436, 1465
- Laotian position, 540-541, 750, 1303-1304
- Meeting schedules, 401-402
- Meetings :  
 Drafting Committee on Indochina, 955-963

- Geneva Conference on Indochina—Con.  
Meetings—Continued  
Meetings of the Six: *May 10*, 747-749; *May 14*, 794-795; *May 17*, 826-828; *May 18*, 838; *May 24*, 906; *May 25*, 916; *May 27*, 938-940; *June 4*, 1029-1030; *June 10*, 1109; *June 18*, 1175-1176; *July 18*, 1424-1425
- Plenary sessions: First, 734-737; Second, 749-755; Third, 780-785; Fourth, 795-799, 818-819; Fifth, 1069-1079; Sixth, 1087-1094; Seventh, 1111-1117; Eighth, 1497-1502
- Restricted sessions: First, 831-834; Second, 839-841; Third, 854-856; Fourth, 877-881; Fifth, 907-911; Sixth, 920-927; Seventh, 945-949; Eighth, 970-975; Ninth, 983-988; Tenth, 995-1001; Eleventh, 1015-1021; Twelfth, 1031-1038; Thirteenth, 1137-1146; Fourteenth, 1157-1165; Fifteenth, 1179-1187; Sixteenth, 1200-1205; Seventeenth, 1215-1221; Eighteenth, 1242-1246; Nineteenth, 1261-1265; Twentieth, 1272-1275; Twenty-first, 1289-1291; Twenty-second, 1315-1320; Twenty-third, 1431-1434
- Schedule of plenary and restricted sessions, 401-403
- U.S. meetings with delegates:  
Cambodia: *July 12*, 1340-1341; *July 15*, 1378-1381; *July 18*, 1425-1426
- France (*see also* United Kingdom and France, *infra*): *May 24*, 902-903; *June 5*, 1039-1040; *June 15*, 1150-1152; *June 16*, 1154-1155, 1167; *June 18*, 1176-1178; *June 19*, 1195-1196; *June 21*, 1209-1210; *June 25*, 1241-1242; *July 1*, 1266-1268; *July 3*, 1278-1280; *July 6*, 1286-1288; *July 8*, 1300-1301; *July 9*, 1321-1323; *July 15*, 1387-1388; *July 19*, 1452-1453
- India: *May 24*, 913-914; *June 4*, 1038-1039; *July 13*, 1344-1346
- Laos: *July 8*, 1303-1304; *July 12*, 1342
- Netherlands: *May 10*, 748-749
- Soviet Union: *May 10*, 755-756; *May 22*, 895-899; *June 18*, 1189-1193; *July 1*, 1268-1270; *July 13*, 1346-1347; *July 21*, 1496-1497
- Thailand: *May 30*, 978-981; *June 10*, 1108
- Geneva Conference on Indochina—Con.  
Meetings—Continued  
U.S. meetings with delegates—Con.  
United Kingdom: *May 15*, 815-816; *May 20*, 874-875; *May 28*, 954-955; *June 9*, 1083-1085; *June 12*, 1124-1125
- United Kingdom and France: *May 12*, 776-777; *May 19*, 849-851; *May 20*, 873-874; *May 26*, 931-933; *May 28*, 965-966; *June 1*, 993-994; *June 13*, 1132-1134; *July 17*, 1405-1407
- Vietnam, State of: *May 25*, 914-916; *June 10*, 1106-1107; *June 14*, 1134-1136; *July 3*, 1277; *July 7*, 1298-1300; *July 12*, 1343-1344; *July 15*, 1386-1387; *July 18*, 1426-1428, 1440-1441
- Nature of conference, 397
- NSC discussions, 943-944, 1381
- Official languages, 471, 647, 735
- Opening date, 569, 587-588, 647, 686, 694, 709-710
- Outcome of, French concern, 699-700
- Participants, list of, 403-413
- Participation questions (*see also* Composition, *supra*; U.S. advisory role, *infra*): Associated States, 16, 416, 417, 428-432, 453-456, 506-507, 518-519, 542-543, 545-546, 550, 663, 730, 737; Australia, 480-481, 663, 670-671; Communist China (*see* Geneva Conference on Korea: Chinese Communist participation); Pathet Lao and Free Cambodian groups, 428-429, 729, 734-739, 770, 787, 1298; Philippines, 539-540, 670-671, 884, 889-890; Thailand, 430, 670-671, 884, 889-890; Viet Minh, 512-513, 518-519, 584, 585, 663, 668, 734-737; Vietnam, 526-529, 531, 541, 545-546, 550, 565, 586-587, 603-604, 608-609, 613-614, 620-621, 642, 668-670
- Preparations:  
ANZUS pact meeting, 663
- French consultations with: Associated States, 417, 435, 437, 542, 584; Soviet representatives, 527-528, 574, 591-592
- Paris Working Group, 503-506, 527-529, 542-548
- Press background briefing, 15, 16-17
- State Department briefings, 535-538, 670-671
- State Department Working Group, 399, 444-445

- Geneva Conference on Indochina—Con.  
Preparations—Continued
- U.S. preconference meetings with representatives: Australia, 480-481, 529-530, 557-558, 649, 650; France, 491-495, 517-520, 694-696, 702-703; Thailand, 686-687; Turkey, 715; United Kingdom and France, 130, 139-140, 430-431, 446, 451, 494-495, 518, 527-528, 540, 550-552, 575-576, 593-594, 641-644, 709-710; United Kingdom—France—Vietnam, 669-670; Vietnam, 717-718
  - Western position, question of, 672, 704
  - Press leaks, 933, 936
  - Restricted sessions, question of, 792-793, 799, 820, 1109
  - Review of, 1374-1375, 1431-1432, 1434, 1447-1448, 1551-1552
  - Seating arrangements, 647
  - Secretariat, 648, 709-710
  - Tactics for, 747-749, 776-777, 779-780, 794-795, 811-814, 826-827, 838, 849-850, 873-874, 906, 1029-1030, 1109
  - U.S. advisory role, 445-446, 448-451, 458-459, 482, 504-506, 524-525, 774, 784-785, 896-897, 994-995, 1002-1004, 1055, 1067, 1323-1324, 1405-1406
  - U.S. basic instructions, 778-779, 1389-1391; withdrawal of, 1189, 1198, 1247-1248
  - U.S.-British statement of position in event of failure of, 1254-1255
  - U.S. guidelines, 463-466
  - U.S. minimum position, 437-442, 446-448, 496-497
  - U.S. participation in unsatisfactory settlement, question of, 523, 645-646, 675-676, 991, 1103-1105
  - U.S. position: Clarification, 1365-1367, 1434, 1503; outline, 672-676, 690-691
  - U.S. position papers:
    - Defense Department contribution to, 471-479, 520-524
    - Papers: Arguments against partition, coalition government, plebiscite, and immediate elections in Indochina, 681-685; draft position paper, 488-491; negotiations on Indochina, 417-424; U.S. aid in postwar reconstruction of Indochina, 517; U.S. participation in conference, 481-483, 516
    - U.S. press briefings, 950-953, 1002-1008
- Geneva Conference on Indochina—Con.  
Vietnamese concerns re holding of conference, 419-420, 432, 732-733, 859-862
- Vietnamese conditions for participation, 669-670
  - Vietnamese consideration of withdrawal, 1225
  - Vietnamese contacts with Viet Minh delegation, 881-882
  - West German interest in, 1302-1303
  - Geneva Conference on Korea, Apr. 26-June 15, 1954 (see also Geneva Conference on Indochina):
    - Allied delegations:
      - Declaration. See Declaration by the Sixteen, *infra*.
      - Meetings. See *infra*.
      - Proposal for meetings of, 151, 152
      - U.S. military briefing, 100-102
    - Allied Secretary General, 102n, 388
    - Allied Working Group of Nine, 156, 231, 259, 266-267
    - ANZUS meeting, 530-532
    - Arrival statement by Dulles, 552-553
    - Berlin Agreement as basis for, 14n, 15-17, 18n, 19-21, 24-25, 39, 42, 50-51, 126-127, 243, 414, 415, 439, 444, 467, 481, 488, 496, 694, 778
    - British-U.S. relationship at, 651, 679-680, 1099
    - Chairmanship question, 102-103, 120, 121, 129, 139-143, 145, 531
    - Chinese Communist participation (five-power concept), 16-17, 18n, 20, 23, 26-27, 30, 41, 67-68, 70-74, 89-91, 98, 120-121, 126-128, 130, 414, 416, 424-425, 457, 467, 469-470, 484-485, 496-497, 503, 533-534, 561, 663, 734-739
    - Communist bloc unity, 621
    - Communist charges against United States and United Nations, 154-155, 619; Allied reaction to, 157, 162-163, 184-185, 200, 210, 250-251; Allied rebuttals, 187-189, 197-199, 263-264; Chinese Communist reaction to Allied rebuttals, 231-232
    - Communist contacts with U.S. Delegation, 4, 118
    - Coordinator, 416, 425
    - Declaration by the Sixteen:
      - Approval, 374-375
      - Draft texts, 361, 365-366, 368-369, 372-374
      - Final text, 385-386
      - Positions on: Belgian, 379n, 382, 383; British, 371; Canadian, 375; Chinese Communist, 381, 383, 384; Colombian, 367; New Zealand, 375; North Korean, 381-382; Soviet, 381; Thai, 375

## Geneva Conference on Korea—Con.

Declaration by the Sixteen—Con.

Presentation at final plenary session, 379*n*, 381, 382

Demonstration by anti-Communist patriotic groups, 515

Dulles, duration of stay, 459, 559, 561–562, 691–692

Duration, 19, 30, 41, 46, 52, 283, 290, 300, 569, 864–865

European questions. Soviet interest in discussion of, 469–470

Expenses, sharing of, 427–428

Facilities, 28, 47, 56–58, 428, 468

Five-power concept. *See* Chinese Communist participation, *supra*.

Indian interest in, 347, 913–914

Indochina problem, separate discussion of, 23, 27, 29, 30, 35, 41–42, 51, 72–74, 416, 431, 433, 452, 535–536

Interpreters, 38, 57, 71, 120, 121, 502, 503

Introductory speeches, agreement to cutoff, 95–96, 152

Inventions: Acceptance of, 429, 455; Union of South African refusal of, 58–59, 100*n*; U.S. issuance of, 21–22, 433

Japan, implications of conference for, 510–512

Lack of progress, 315–316, 864–865, 897

## Meetings:

Allied Working Group of Nine, 266–267

Deputy Representatives of Sixteen Allied Delegations: First, 146–148; Second, 168*n*–169*n*

Heads of Sixteen Allied Delegations: First, 143–144; Second, 155–157; Third, 173–174; Fourth, 184–185; Fifth, 259–261; Sixth, 304–306; Seventh, 342–344; Eighth, 357–358; Ninth, 371–372; Tenth, 374–376; Eleventh, 371–372

Plenary sessions: First, 144–145; Second, 148–151; Third, 153–155; Fourth, 157–161; Fifth, 170–171; Sixth, 187–191; Seventh, 196–200; Eighth, 223–224; Ninth, 249–251; Tenth, 262–264; Eleventh, 310–314; Twelfth, 322–324; Thirteenth, 348–354; Fourteenth, 361–365; Fifteenth, June 15, 376–385

Postconference discussions, June 16–18, 388–393

Restricted seven-power session, May 1, 156, 168, 171–177, 185, 344, 643–644

Schedules of plenary sessions and meetings of Heads of Sixteen Allied Delegations, 6–7

## Geneva Conference on Korea—Con.

Meetings—Continued

United Kingdom—Soviet Union, May 5, 210

U.S. Delegation, May 3, 182–184

U.S. meetings with delegates of: Belgium, Apr. 30, 162–165; France, June 2, 337–338; Soviet Union, May 22, 315–316; Thailand, June 2, 338–339; United Kingdom, Apr. 30, 165–168; United Kingdom and France, Apr. 28, 151–153; May 12, 257–258; June 1, 333–334; June 13, 371

U.S.—ROK meetings:

Geneva with Foreign Minister Pyun and others: Apr. 30, 171–172; May 3, 185–186; May 5, 204–205; May 7, 221; May 12, 256–257; May 13, 261–262; May 21, 303–304; June 1, 329–333

Seoul with President Rhee: May 5, 202–203, 205–207; May 6, 213–215; May 7, 215–217; May 8, 226–228; May 10, 239–241; May 17, 275–277; May 21, 306–309; June 4, 344–347

U.S. comments on consultations, 185, 427

Nature of, 3, 26–27, 429–430

No-voting procedure, 383–385

Official languages, 38, 43, 57, 67, 71, 72, 126, 139–140, 502, 503

Organizational and procedural matters, agreement on, 143–145

Opening statements, 148–150, 153*n*, 154–155

Outcome of, report to President and Congressional leaders, 390, 393

Participants, list of, 7–13

Participation:

British Delegation, 454–455

Chinese Communist Delegation, 805–806

Neutrals, exclusion of, 16, 18*n*, 23, 72–75, 79, 104

Number of delegations, 416, 426, 428, 455–456, 493

ROK participation: Concerns, 14, 17–27, 29–32, 35, 48–53, 69–70, 78–80; conditions for attendance, 22–23, 29–31, 35–36, 44; decision to attend, 111–115; invitation, 21–22; question of nonparticipation, 32, 36; U.S. comments on efforts re ROK attendance, 26–27, 36–37, 39–43, 45–46, 55–56, 69–70, 75–79, 103–105, 115, 121–122, 531

Thai participation, 416, 429–430

U.S. participation, 459, 532–534

## Geneva Conference on Korea—Con.

## Position papers:

Basic U.S. Position on Korean Unification and Summary of Three Alternative Plans, 131-139

Draft U.S. Proposal for Reunification of Korea, 62-66; Alternate Plan A, 82-87; Alternate Plan B, 105-111; Alternate Plan C, 63-65

General U.S. Views on Korean Phase of Geneva Conference, 97-99

Post-Conference Standing Committee of Seven on Korea, proposed, 338-339

Postponement question, 466

## Preparations:

Defense Department cooperation in preparation of position for, 434

Preconference Allied consultations, 68-69, 80-81, 129, 184, 185, 427, 460

ROK-U.S. preconference discussions, 26*n*, 27, 29*n*, 40, 42, 51-54, 55, 58, 69, 76, 93, 94, 116-117, 140-141, 144, 146

Seven-power substantive discussions, proposed, 152

Soviet *aide-mémoire* and tripartite replies, 38, 56-58, 67-68, 70-72, 88-92, 96-97, 126-130, 467-468, 502, 503, 544-545, 552

State Department briefing, 47-48

State Department task forces, 416-417, 425

State Department Working Group, 444-445

Timing of opening of conference, 493

Press conferences, 15-17, 119-124, 559-569

Press coverage, ROK reaction to, 332-333

Purpose and objectives, 97-99, 122-124, 157-161

Report to the United Nations, 183, 330, 331, 339, 344, 368, 388-389, 391-394

Republic of China *aide-mémoire*, 498-500

ROK withdrawal, question of, 169

Seating arrangements, 102-103, 120, 121, 124, 125, 128, 141-143, 531

Site, 16, 18

Soviet role, 16, 20, 23, 30, 41, 50, 73, 76, 79, 98, 905

## Termination:

Allied draft letter to Mo'otov from U.S.-French-British Delegates, 360, 369-371

Allied preparation for final phase and breakoff on U.N. issue, 314-315, 317-319, 324-327, 333-344.

## Geneva Conference on Korea—Con.

## Termination—Continued

## Allied preparation—Continued

360-361, 367-368, 371-372, 379-380, 382, 383, 389-390, 1108, 1149

British points of agreement proposal, 340-341

Indian proposal to announce points of disagreement, 347

Last plenary session, 379*n*, 1085

North Korean position on U.N. issue, 340

ROK position, 329-333, 339, 341-342, 359

U.S. approval, 374

U.S. message to Rhee, 366-367

U.S. press conference remarks on, 1097-1100

Title of conference, 27, 433

U.N. observer question, 493

UNGA resolution calling for conference, 41, 42, 50, 458*n*

U.S. briefing of Southeast Asia countries and Sixteen Allied Delegations on, 533*n*, 534

Georges-Picot, Leone, 409, 1253

Getz, John P., 9, 405, 506-507, 711-718, 1268, 1440

Gibson, William M., 459

Gillette, Guy M., 574

Gillmore, Maj. Gen. William M., 979, 980

Gleason, S. Everett, 942-944

Gleysteen, William H., Jr., 406

Gonzales Barros, Luis, 10

Gordon, Robert, 406

Gowen, Franklin C., 8, 405, 515, 1547, 1548-1549

Graham, Walter G. C., 13, 412

Gromyko, A. A., 12, 151, 411, 700, 895, 955, 959-960, 984, 986-987, 1128

Gros, André, 409

Guillaume, Gen. Augustin, 604

Guillemetz, Col. Jacques, 409

Gullion, Edmund, 417-424, 442-444, 446-448, 1281

Ha Van Lau, Col., 986

Hagerty, James C., 532*n*, 1333-1334

Hamilton, A. A. M., 58, 119

Hamilton, John, 8, 405, 407

Hammarskjold, Dag H. A. C., 103, 129, 493, 531, 937-938, 1012-1013

Han, Philip, 69, 119

Harris, William P., 407

Harry, R. L., 10

Heath, Donald R.:

## Geneva Conference on Indochina:

Advisory role at, 404, 407, 646*n*, 1196-1198

Meetings of the Six on Indochina, 747-749, 826-827, 838, 906, 916, 938-939, 982-983, 1029-1030, 1155-1156

- Heath, Donald R.—Continued  
 Geneva Conference on Indochina—  
 Continued  
 Participation question, 512–513, 541,  
 603–604, 729  
 Preparations for, 460–463, 529–530,  
 544, 646–648, 672–676, 717–718  
 Restricted sessions, tactics for, 813–  
 814  
 U.S. position papers, 515–517  
 Vietnam: Position, 1009; tactics,  
 779–780
- Geneva Conference on Korea, 8, 459
- Indochina: Cessation of hostilities  
 negotiations, 688–689, 744–745,  
 890–891, 1049–1051, 1205–1206,  
 1227–1228, 1251–1252, 1423–1424;  
 situation, 762, 829, 1041–1044,  
 1051*n*, 1150–1152, 1225, 1280–1282;  
 U.S. military intervention in,  
 1048–1049, 1149*n*
- Southeast Asia, defense of, 821–822
- Vietnam: Cessation of hostilities  
 agreement, 1339–1340; demarca-  
 tion line, 1049; situation in, 818–  
 819, 823–826, 843*n*, 857, 881–882,  
 1122, 1134–1136, 1222–1223, 1252–  
 1254
- Vietnam, State of, 571–573, 584–586,  
 1107
- Heaney, Arnold D. P., 119, 530–532
- Heisbourg, Georges, 11
- Hemmendinger, Noel, 69–70
- Henkin, Louis, 8, 119, 405
- Hennes, Richard V., 7, 404, 729, 849,  
 1128–1130, 1490–1491
- Heywot, Ato Zaude Gabre, 11, 16, 199–  
 200, 386
- Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 574
- Ho Chi Minh, 427*n*, 430, 455–456, 597–  
 598, 1322
- Hoang Van Hoan, 408, 955
- Hodge, Lt. Gen. John R., 203
- Hoey, Robert E., 10, 1297
- Hong, Jin Ki, 12, 254–255, 256
- Hoppenot, Henri, 933, 954–955, 968–969
- Horse, Outerbridge, 530–532
- Huan Hsiang, 410, 805, 820
- Huang Hua, 231–232, 410, 621*n*, 805, 1449
- Hull, Maj. Gen. John E., 37*n*, 61, 105,  
 111, 112, 246, 248
- Huston, Col. Milburn N., 9, 406
- Ilyichev, L. F., 12, 412
- India (*see also* *Indian subheadings under other subjects*), 1378
- Indochina (*see also* *French Associated States*):  
 Alternative U.S. policies in, implemen-  
 tation of, 652–654  
 Arms aid to, effectiveness of cessation  
 of, 420  
 Cease-fire demand, French opposition  
 to, 697–698, 703, 712, 713
- Indochina—Continued  
 Cessation of hostilities negotiations  
 (*see also under* Vietnam):  
 Agreements:  
 Chinese Communist position on,  
 1428–1429  
 Comparison of agreements with  
 U.S.-French position on Indo-  
 china, 1491  
 Date of signature, 1487–1488  
 Document review by British, So-  
 viet, and French Delegations,  
 1388–1389  
 French outline for, 1372–1373  
 French plan for, 1380  
 Progress on, 1473–1474  
 Restrictive effect of, U.S. legal  
 opinion on, 1503–1504, 1552–  
 1562  
 Signature, 1478–1479  
 Texts: Cambodia, 1531–1539;  
 Laos, 1521–1530; Vietnam,  
 1505–1520  
 Working paper, 1404–1405, 1408–  
 1409
- Armistice terminology, French posi-  
 tions on, 543–544, 590, 593–594,  
 763
- British five questions on: Com-  
 ments on, 777, 782, 785, 819,  
 820; U.S., British and French  
 discussion of answers to, 811–  
 813; U.S. replies, 793–794
- British preconference position, 576–  
 577, 834–835
- British talking paper, 917–919
- Canadian views, 628–629
- Chinese Communist six-point pro-  
 posal, 460–463, 945–948, 957–  
 960
- Economic rehabilitation, 615, 635
- Free exchange of goods between re-  
 grouping zones, 1423–1424
- French economic and cultural inter-  
 ests in, 754
- French opening position, 729–733,  
 735, 737
- French outline proposal, 694–697,  
 700–703
- French six-point proposal, 436, 440–  
 444, 447, 449–450, 461, 464–465,  
 491, 519, 525–528, 531, 550–552,  
 575–577, 582–583, 586, 631–635,  
 689–690
- French seven-point proposal, 714–  
 715, 731–733, 739–742, 744–745,  
 750, 752–753, 779, 829, 907–910
- French and Viet Minh proposals as  
 basis for discussion, 831–832,  
 863, 873–875, 878–880, 890–891
- Indian position, 822, 913, 914, 930–  
 931, 1030
- Indian six-point proposal at Co-  
 lombio Conference, 436, 440–441,  
 444, 564, 610–612, 625, 629, 635–  
 638, 653



## Indochina—Continued

## Cessation of hostilities negotiations—Continued

International control problems, positions on: Australian, 1120, 1121; British, 769, 777, 916-919, 923, 931-933, 993-994, 998, 1013, 1014, 1029, 1032, 1033, 1037, 1074, 1078-1079, 1095, 1096, 1153-1154, 1249, 1255-1256, 1272, 1274, 1276, 1291-1292, 1294-1295, 1405-1407, 1421-1423, 1455-1456; Chinese Communist, 946, 984-985, 996, 1001, 1019, 1020, 1289-1290; French, 694-696, 715, 743, 762-763, 764, 777, 931, 982-983, 987, 993-994, 997-998, 1001, 1013, 1014, 1017-1019, 1029, 1034-1037, 1050-1051, 1061-1062, 1065, 1066, 1070-1071, 1149-1150, 1154-1156, 1161, 1164, 1208-1210, 1255-1256, 1259, 1263, 1267, 1268, 1272-1274, 1276, 1278-1280, 1287, 1290-1292, 1294-1295, 1305-1308, 1317, 1369-1371, 1387-1388, 1394-1395, 1405-1407, 1421-1423, 1455-1456; Indian, 913; Soviet, 973, 986-987, 999-1001, 1033-1034, 1059-1060, 1110, 1128, 1153-1154, 1161-1165, 1249, 1255-1256, 1260, 1266n, 1268, 1272-1273, 1276, 1278-1280, 1291-1292, 1295, 1421-1423; U.S., 509, 615, 696-697, 743, 777, 794, 923, 931-934, 963-964, 966-967, 969-970, 973, 981-982, 983, 984, 985, 990, 992, 994-995, 996, 1001, 1004, 1006-1008, 1013, 1014, 1019, 1031-1032, 1035-1038, 1048, 1050-1051, 1059-1062, 1075-1077, 1094-1096, 1110, 1128, 1137-1138, 1143, 1146, 1149-1150, 1156, 1171-1172, 1175-1177, 1199n, 1221-1222, 1242, 1246, 1259, 1264, 1268, 1292-1295, 1311-1313, 1327-1328, 1334-1335, 1392-1393, 1405-1407, 1429-1430, 1455-1456; Viet Minh, 998-999, 1001, 1020, 1261-1265, 1278-1280, 1316-1317; Vietnamese, 1015-1017, 1087, 1156, 1161, 1274-1275

International guarantees, positions on: Australian, 1130; British, 583-584, 768-769, 1429-1430; Chinese Communist, 946, 1139; French, 814-815, 821-822, 1070-1071, 1138-1139, 1149, 1394-1395; Indian, 1130; Soviet, 1137-1138, 1140, 1143-1147; U.S., 727-728, 740-741, 743, 762,

## Indochina—Continued

## Cessation of hostilities negotiations—Continued

International guarantees—Con.  
982, 990, 1138, 1141-1143, 1149; Viet Minh, 1139-1140

Laos and Cambodia:  
Chinese Communist concern, 1170-1171, 1173-1176, 1211-1215, 1233-1234, 1240-1241, 1378-1381, 1466

French compromise proposal, 1195-1196, 1202-1206, 1211

International control problems, positions on: British, 1216-1219; Cambodian, 768, 782, 982, 986, 1014, 1015, 1029, 1031-1032, 1072, 1156, 1217, 1242, 1263-1264, 1290, 1291, 1318, 1535-1536; Chinese Communist, 1216, 1245-1246; French, 1215-1216, 1218, 1243-1244, 1369-1371; Laotian, 150, 1088, 1218, 1291, 1526-1530; Soviet, 1219, 1244-1245, 1456-1459; U.S., 1219-1221; Viet Minh, 1217; Vietnam, 1217-1218

International guarantees, 1399, 1400, 1403

Need for discussion of problems, 1132, 1134, 1175, 1176

Neutralization question, 1169, 1225, 1339

Partition problem, 950-952, 1023, 1043, 1437

Prohibition of introduction of fresh forces and military personnel, 754, 973, 983, 998, 1000, 1070, 1107, 1290-1291, 1293, 1315, 1317, 1320, 1446-1447, 1523-1524, 1534

Proposals, 750, 1014-1015, 1186-1187

Regroupment of forces after cease-fire, agreement, 1524-1525

Repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, 150, 1014-1015

Separate treatment of, positions on: British, 777, 812, 813, 832, 840, 849-850, 863, 878, 925, 1077-1078; Cambodian, 839, 841, 855-856, 878, 924-925, 1000, 1112, 1140, 1157, 1180-1181; Chinese Communist, 840, 856, 863-864, 878, 1038, 1158, 1159, 1162-1163, 1181-1182; French, 678-679, 696, 714, 715, 763, 812, 813, 826, 831, 839, 849-850, 854-855, 863, 864, 878, 922, 961-962, 1039, 1070; Laotian, 832, 839, 855-856, 1088, 1113, 1158,

## Indochina—Continued

Cessation of hostilities negotiations—  
Continued

## Laos and Cambodia—Continued

Separate treatment of, positions  
on—Continued

1162, 1182-1183, 1449-1450;  
Soviet, 832, 840-841, 895-896,  
1038, 1096-1097, 1140-1141,  
1160-1161, 1165, 1184; U.S.,  
683-684, 696, 740, 793-794,  
812, 813, 840, 849-850, 854,  
864, 878, 879, 895-896, 912-  
913, 922, 924, 925, 951, 962,  
975-977, 1038-1039, 1075,  
1093-1094, 1118, 1138, 1141-  
1142, 1160, 1165, 1179-1180,  
1182, 1185-1187; Viet Minh,  
839-840, 855, 878, 1140, 1159-  
1160, 1163-1164, 1182-1183;  
Vietnamese, 832, 840, 890-  
891, 920, 924, 1161, 1214-1215

Viet Minh military talks with,  
1248-1249, 1251-1252, 1297-  
1298, 1303-1304, 1340-1341,  
1405

Withdrawal of foreign forces  
from:

Agreement provisions for:  
Cambodia, 1532-1533;  
Laos, 1521-1523

Positions on: Cambodian, 150,  
768, 983, 1014-1015, 1227-  
1228; French, 349, 592,  
987; Laotian, 150; Soviet,  
1189-1192; U.S., 615, 1005,  
1189-1192, 1246-1247, 1437-  
1438; Viet Minh, 753

Prisoners of war and civilian inter-  
nees, exchange of, 150, 754, 921-  
922, 997, 1014-1015, 1070, 1447,  
1525, 1534

Simultaneous cease-fire in Indo-  
china, question of, 754, 923, 924,  
931, 932, 957, 962, 965-966, 996-  
997

Soviet position, 617-618, 818

Summary of areas of agreement  
and disagreement, 1069-1074

U.S. basic principles for, 787-789

U.S. formula, 507-510

U.S. hypothesis of negotiations,  
420-421

U.S. military position:

Defense Department draft posi-  
tion paper, 520-524

Defense Department views, 471-  
479

U.S. proposal for Western position,  
614-615, 631-635

Viet Minh proposal, 753-758, 770-  
772, 780-782, 796-799, 819, 1231-  
1232

Withdrawal and regroupment of  
armed forces into enclaves, 628,

## Indochina—Continued

Cessation of hostilities negotiations—  
Continued

## Withdrawal—Continued

686, 762, 763, 765-766, 777, 938-  
940, 955, 957-962, 987, 1233-  
1234, 1239, 1241, 1373, 1421-  
1423

Communist aid to, need of cessation  
of, 16, 17, 507-508, 530, 656, 657,  
660, 1308-1309

Communist charges of U.S. aggression  
in, 749-750, 751, 1090-1093

Dulles briefing of Congressional lead-  
ers, 706, 708

Dulles radio-TV address, 722-723

Emergency program for, 680-681

Five-power military talks. *See under*  
Southeast Asia.

French military briefing, 762-767

French military effort, 454, 578-579,  
597, 617

French military plan (Navarre plan),  
418, 439, 441, 450, 463-464, 489,  
490, 616, 658-659, 685-686

Geneva Conference. *See* Geneva Con-  
ference on Indochina.

International Control Commission  
(*see also* Cessation of hostilities  
negotiations: International con-  
trol problems, *supra*):

Allocation of costs, 1479-1480, 1499

Commencement of work, 1499, 1567

Documents on arrangements for,  
1562-1568

Geneva Conference, discussion of  
composition, 768-769, 777, 852-  
853, 928, 932, 963-964, 966-967,  
969-970, 981-982, 992, 1004,  
1033-1034, 1036, 1037, 1050-  
1051, 1059-1060, 1072, 1075-  
1077, 1087, 1088, 1094-1096,  
1120-1121, 1128, 1153-1154,  
1161, 1165, 1175, 1255-1256,  
1260, 1378

Internationalization of war in, posi-  
tions on: British, 1128-1130;

Chinese Communist, 1089;

French, 785-786, 886, 1056, 1086-

1087, 1131-1132, 1147, 1151; U.S.,

728-729, 742, 785-786, 886, 1039-

1040, 1067-1068, 1118, 1131, 1136

Military forces in, effect of Geneva  
agreement on, 1556-1561

Neutralization question, 422, 763,  
1169, 1225, 1339

Situation in (*see also under* Viet-  
nam):

ANZUS discussion, 657-659

Congressional resolution, question  
of, 1069

Indian concerns regarding, 1030,  
1045-1046

Military casualties for 1954 (first  
quarter), 594

## Indochina—Continued

- Situation in—Continued  
 NSC discussions, 615-617, 731-732, 942-944  
 ROK views on, 56, 113  
 U.N. consideration of, question of (*see also* United Nations Peace Observation Commission for Indochina, proposed), 657, 718, 732, 1132-1133  
 U.S. aid to, question of (*see also* U.S. military intervention, *infra*), 418, 438, 441-442, 447, 451, 475, 477, 517, 588, 655, 658, 688  
 U.S. estimates on, 795, 870-873, 1079-1080  
 U.S. evaluation of, 614-615, 634-635, 1280-1282  
 U.S. military intervention, positions on: Australian, 557-558; British, 553-555, 556, 570-571, 577-578, 581, 583, 595-596, 599, 616, 617, 623-630, 638*n*, 648-649, 673; Chinese Communist, 674; French, 638-640, 652-654, 836, 853-854, 902-903, 1042-1043, 1100-1101, 1131-1132, 1166-1167; U.S., 243, 489-490, 548-549, 555-558, 563-564, 566, 568-570, 574, 577-578, 589, 595, 599-600, 604-605, 616, 619-620, 623, 649, 652-654, 659-662, 815-816, 836, 1042-1043, 1047, 1049, 1052-1054, 1060, 1081-1082, 1103-1104, 1123*n*, 1150, 1152, 1374  
 U.S. military personnel in, 155, 442, 1556-1557  
 U.S. policy, 672-673  
 U.S. public opinion polls, 911-912  
 U.S. British-French Commission, proposed, 595*n*  
 U.S.-French discussions, 517, 853-854, 867, 1001-1002, 1041, 1044, 1296  
 U.S.-French position:  
 Paper on, 1359-1361, 1363-1364  
 U.S.-French-British meeting, 1342-1343, 1361-1366, 1375-1376, 1381  
 Viet Minh offensive in Tonkin Delta, evaluation, 1051-1054, 1056-1057, 1085, 1111, 1283-1284  
 Vietnamese concerns, 673, 674, 1225, 1298-1300  
 Intelligence Advisory Committee, U.S., 870-871  
 International Control Commission. *See under* Indochina.
- Jackson, C. D., 1003  
 Jacquet, Marc, 11, 408, 603, 613-614, 688-689, 713-714, 881-882
- Jacquin de Margerie, Roland, 408, 590, 602, 603, 618, 689-690, 772*n*, 968, 1049-1050, 1061, 1086, 1131-1132
- Japan:  
 Effect of situation in Southeast Asia on, 474  
 Implications of Geneva Conference for, 510-512  
 Mutual Security Treaty with United States, 297, 538  
 U.S. bases in, 245-246, 317-318  
 U.S. military aid to, 239
- Jebb, Sir Hubert Miles Gladwyn, 544, 1270*n*, 1348
- Jenkins, Alfred deS., 405  
 Johnson, U. Alexis:  
 Cambodia, U.S. aid to, 1228, 1234-1236  
 Geneva Conference on Indochina:  
 Chou En-lai role at, 1251  
 Coordinator and U.S. Representative to, 403-404  
 Head of U.S. Delegation, 1166, 1238, 1249-1251  
 Lack of progress, 1344-1346  
 Participation question, 544, 670  
 Restricted sessions: Statements, 1219-1221, 1264-1265, 1319-1320; summaries, 1215-1219, 1242-1246, 1261-1264, 1272-1275, 1289-1291, 1315-1319  
 Resumption at Foreign Minister level, 1209-1210, 1249-1251, 1280  
 Review of documents, 1389*n*  
 Seating arrangements, 647*n*  
 U.S. advisory role, 1323-1324  
 U.S. unilateral declaration, 1496  
 Vietnamese declaration of position, 1439-1440, 1548  
 West German interest in, 1302-1303
- Geneva Conference on Korea: Advisory role, 425; coordinator of, 8, 459; preparations for, 81*n*, 93-94, 100-102, 118, 119; restricted session, 171-172; report to United Nations on, 388; U.S. guidance meeting, 182-183
- Indochina:  
 Cessation of hostilities negotiations: International control problems, 1176-1177, 1199*n*, 1208-1210, 1246, 1255-1256, 1259-1260, 1266, 1268-1270, 1276, 1287, 1291-1292, 1296-1297, 1300-1301, 1311-1313, 1334-1335, 1395; Laos and Cambodia, 1195-1196, 1211, 1213-1215, 1232-1233, 1293, 1340-1341, 1342, 1378-1381, 1449-1450  
 French draft declaration, 1376-1378, 1398-1400  
 Situation in, 1233-1234

- Johnson, U. Alexis—Continued  
 Indochina—Continued  
   U.S. military intervention, question of, 1047  
   U.S.-French position, 1348-1355, 1359-1361  
 Korean unification, 146-148, 168*n*, 169*n*, 185, 186, 266-267  
 Southeast Asia, defense, 596-598  
 Vietnam, cessation of hostilities negotiations, 1222, 1228-1231, 1241-1242, 1248-1249, 1265-1267, 1271-1272, 1276, 1286-1287, 1301, 1321-1323, 1341, 1343-1344, 1392, 1394-1396  
 Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S., 472-478, 858-859  
 Jones, William G., 119  
 Jooste, G. P., 58, 119  
 Joxe, Louis, 1466-1467  
 Joy, Michael G. L., 502, 503  
 Judd, Walter, 329, 707
- Kallet, Lt. Col. Donald, 8, 406  
 Kent-Hughes, Wilfred Selwyn, 651  
 Keppel, John, 8, 405, 755, 1169  
 Key, David McK., 119, 426, 455-456  
 Khamphan Panya, 410, 955, 1291, 1342  
 Ki Sok Pok, 10  
 Kindynis, Jean, 11, 323-324, 343, 386  
 King, James F., 8, 405  
 Kirkpatrick, Sir Ivone A., 1066  
 Kitchen, Jeffrey C., 406, 425-428  
 Knowland, William, 94*n*, 707-708  
 Ko Pai-nien, 410  
 Koo, V. K. Wellington, 498-501  
 Korea (*see also* Geneva Conference on Korea):  
   Collective military action in, 725  
   Communist aggression in, 158-159, 188  
   Declaration by the Sixteen. *See under* Geneva Conference on Korea.  
   Neutralization question, 34  
   Panmunjom talks, 15, 17*n*, 21, 22, 29, 39, 41, 73, 230, 1009  
   Sixteen-Power Joint Policy Declaration, 1953, 45  
   Territorial integrity, 33, 35  
   United Nations Command, 16  
   United Nations Commission for Reunification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). *See* United Nations Commission, etc.  
   United Nations Reconstruction Agency for Korea, 111  
   United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, 149, 150, 187  
   U.S. military intervention in, Soviet comment on, 159  
 Korea, People's Republic of, nonrecognition of, 16  
 Korea, Republic of:  
   Communist prisoners of war in, 149-
- Korea, Republic of—Continued  
   Communist prisoners of war in—Con. 150, 154, 172, 188, 190-191, 310, 312  
   Elections in, 191-192, 193-194, 301, 312-314  
   Mutual defense agreement with United States: Communist opposition to, 154, 377, 378; exchange of ratifications, question of, 37*n*, 206, 210, 213-214, 243, 285, 317*n*, 319-321; importance of, 228, 233, 234, 238; ROK proposal for modification of, 328  
   North Korean refugees in, 148, 188  
   Unilateral military action, question of, 25, 42*n*  
   U.S. aid, 31-32, 36, 37, 45, 48-49, 74-75, 104-105, 111, 149, 215, 276, 286, 318  
   Van Fleet mission, 45, 48-49, 94*n*, 105, 111, 222, 227, 234, 244-245, 285, 290, 301, 319, 328
- Korean Armistice Agreement, *July 1953*:  
   Basis for Geneva Conference, 15, 150, 458*n*; Chinese Communist remarks, 1089, 1090; continuity of, 368, 376, 392, 394, 445*n*; restrictive nature of, 318-319; ROK concern about, 56, 390-391; termination after unification of Korea, proposed, 63, 66, 83, 87, 107, 111, 181, 219  
 Korean political conference. *See* Geneva Conference on Korea.  
 Korean Reunification Supervisory Commission (KRSC), 63-64, 66  
 Korean unification negotiations:  
   All-Korea free elections:  
     Alternate Plans: (A), 83, 86-87; (B), 107-109, 218-219; (C), 63-65  
     Positions on: Australian, 157-158, 649-651; British, 93-94, 343, 347; Chinese Communist, 154-155; Colombian, 150; North Korean, 150, 347-348; ROK, 116, 201-203  
     U.S.-ROK discussions, 168-169, 192-193  
   ROK proposal, 301-303  
   ROK and North Korean proposals, 161-164  
   Simultaneous election question, 192-193, 212-213, 217  
   Working Committee draft paper, 180  
 Allied position, 33-35, 93-96, 99, 133-134, 156-157, 183-185, 223-224  
 Allied principles, 259-262, 266-271  
 Alternate solutions to unification, 178, 183, 314-315  
 Amnesty proposal, 298

- Korean unification negotiations—Continued
- Chinese Communist proposal and reactions to, 377, 380-384
  - Chinese Communist reaction to Conference rejection of proposal, 390, 392-393, 1170-1171, 1176
  - Constitutional convention, proposed, 267
  - French five-point proposal, 364-365
  - Government of unified Korea, plan for, 63, 66, 180-181, 219
  - Indian interest in, 913
  - International Permanent Standing Committee, proposed, 329-331
  - International security guarantees question, 63, 66, 83, 87, 181, 219, 349, 351, 352, 354
  - International supervision question, positions on: Australian, 323; Belgian, 250, 343, 384; British, 176, 264, 287; Canadian, 343-344; Chinese Communist, 156, 176, 177, 232, 310; Ethiopian, 348-359; French, 337; Greek, 323-324, 343; Netherlands, 343, 352, 353; New Zealand, 344; North Korean, 175, 177, 312-313, 352; Philippine, 343, 351; ROK, 149, 175, 177, 270-271, 279, 280, 287, 332, 343, 353; Soviet, 175-177, 354; Turkish, 343, 905; U.S., 143*n*, 153*n*, 156, 175-177, 182-183, 265, 334, 335, 336*n*, 337, 905, 1002
  - Japanese position, 510-511
  - Moscow Agreement, 1945, 149, 150, 187
  - National Assembly for unified Korea, proposed, 63, 64, 65-66, 83, 87, 107, 109-110, 264-265, 312
  - North Korean proposals, 149-150, 376-377
    - Allied opposition, 163*n*-169*n*
    - Positions on: Australian, 379; Belgian, 380; British, 263-264; Canadian, 197-198; Chinese Communist, 311-312, 377; Colombian, 323; French, 262-263; Greek, 190; Netherlands, 199; ROK, 185, 187-189, 250-251; Soviet, 250, 377-378, 381; Thai, 323; Turkish, 323; U.S., 200
  - ROK positions on, 19, 29, 30, 93, 133, 319-320
  - ROK proposal (14-point), 278-281, 298-300, 303-306, 309, 313, 316-317, 321-324
  - Soviet and North Korean proposals, discussion of, 377-380
  - Soviet position, 159-161
  - Soviet proposals, 351-352, 354-356, 379-383
- Korean unification negotiations—Con.
- Thai formula for continuing negotiating body, 315, 318, 326-327, 329-331, 334
  - U.N. resolutions on, importance of, 68-69, 83, 84, 98-99, 106-107, 134-135, 148-151, 170-171, 196-200, 223
  - U.N. supervisory role:
    - Allied stand on importance of, 149, 153*n*, 156, 182-183, 190, 225-226, 250-251, 265, 268, 334-335, 336*n*, 337, 343-344, 348-354, 362-364, 905, 1002
    - Communist rejection, 249-250, 355, 361-362, 363
  - U.S. alternative plans:
    - Alternate Plan A, 82-87, 173, 222, 228
    - Alternate Plan B, 105-111, 172-173, 178-181, 200-212, 215-231, 234, 237-249, 251-260
    - Alternate Plan C, 62-66
    - Alternate plan summary, 131-139
    - U.S. planned discussion at Geneva Conference, 100-102
  - U.S. position, 34, 44-45, 437-442, 446-448, 622-627, 670-680
  - U.S. press briefing, 15, 16
  - U.S. responsibilities, 14*n*, 35-36, 228
  - U.S.—ROK statement of basic principles:
    - Discussion, need for, 213-217, 265-266
    - Draft proposal, 264-265, 271-278
    - Draft proposal, revised text, 281-285, 287-290, 292-295, 321*n*
  - Withdrawal of foreign forces:
    - Alternate solution of buffer zone, British proposal for, 183
    - Korean Working Group consideration of, 54, 181
    - Positions on: Australian, 158; Chinese Communist, 176, 177; French, 176; North Korean, 150; ROK, 25, 34, 62, 116, 141, 144, 146, 149, 176, 192-193, 214-216, 226-228, 233-234, 281, 285, 286, 289, 328-329; U.S., 33, 34, 59-62, 176, 192-193, 233-236, 265, 289, 295-298, 302, 309-310
  - U.S. estimate of time for withdrawal of U.N. forces, 233
  - U.S. proposals, 63-64, 66, 83, 85-86, 99, 107, 110, 219-221
  - Working Group of Nine on unification, 156-157, 231
- Korry, Ed, 1251
- Kotelawala, Sir John L., 610, 611, 642-643
- Kremer, Jean-Pierre, 11
- Kung Peng, 410, 805

- Kural, Adnan, 102*n*, 145, 153, 267, 388, 710
- Kuznetsov, V. V., 12, 67-68, 411, 467-468, 1059-1060, 1219, 1244-1245, 1249, 1265, 1266, 1268-1270, 1272-1273, 1278, 1295, 1318-1319
- La Chambre, Guy, 408, 1253
- Lacoste, Francis, 124, 147, 255, 409, 486, 493-494, 517, 544, 713
- Laking, G. R., 119
- Laloy, Jean L., 409, 608, 1119-1120, 1376-1377, 1398-1399, 1420
- Lamb, Sir Lionel Henry, 412, 1242, 1249, 1255, 1256, 1272, 1274, 1276, 1291-1292, 1295
- Landon, Kenneth P., 429-430
- Langer, William, 574
- Laniel, Joseph, 435-437, 557-558, 697-698, 1001*n*
- Laos:
- Cessation of hostilities negotiations. *See* Indochina: Cessation of hostilities negotiations: Laos and Cambodia.
  - Chinese Communist-supported Viet Minh invasions, Burmese concern, 1308-1309
  - Free Lao position in government of, 1232
  - National Intelligence Estimate on, 872, 1024-1029
  - U.S. bases in, Chinese Communist opposition, 1211-1212, 1240-1241
  - U.S. Chief of Mission to, proposed appointment, 681, 1490-1491, 1503
- LaSelle, Mason A., 407
- Lavrishchev, A. A., 412, 1268
- Le Gallais, Hughes, 119, 120*n*
- Le Huu Thi, 829
- Le Quang Luat, 1121
- Le Quang Trieu, Col., 411, 1298-1300
- le Roy de la Tournelle, Guy, 408, 544, 1268, 1308, 1309
- Le Toan, 1121
- Le Van Kim, Col., 1031
- Lei Jen-min, 410, 805
- Lei Ying-fu, 410
- Li Ke-nung, 12, 410, 955, 1216, 1233, 1245-1246, 1289-1290, 1315, 1322, 1437
- Limb, Ben C., 12, 185, 204, 254-257
- Lloyd, John Selwyn, 96, 776
- Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., 862, 866-867, 928, 929, 933, 937, 954-955, 968-969, 968*n*-969*n*
- Luang Vichit Vadakan, 12
- Luce, Clare Boothe, 667
- Luns, Joseph M. A. H., 11, 198, 199, 745-749
- MacArthur, Douglas II, 8, 47-48, 162-165, 404, 416, 426, 434*n*, 448, 458-460, 481*n*, 581-584, 589-590, 641-644, 667-669, 1281
- MacDonald, Malcolm, 630
- Maitland, Donald James, 413
- Makins, Sir Roger, 102-103, 119, 533*n*, 534, 617, 630, 837, 846-847, 1311*n*
- Malan, Daniel F., 59*n*
- Malaya, 554, 589-590, 630, 1084
- Malik, Charles, 1173
- Mansfield, Mike, 533*n*, 574
- Mao Tse-tung (quoted), 998
- Martin, Edwin W., 9, 405, 407, 803-806, 904-906
- Mathieu, Maj., 1320-1321
- Matthews, H. Freeman, 426
- McBride, Robert H., 9, 47, 405, 407, 452, 488*n*, 503*n*, 544, 586-588, 654-664, 717-718
- McCardle, Carl W., 8, 404, 119, 559, 629-630, 1359
- McClintock, Robert, 432, 540-541, 609, 727-728, 769-770, 773, 800*n*, 806*n*, 901*n*, 1111
- McClurkin, Robert J. G., 119
- McConaughy, Walter P., 416, 497-501
- McCormack, John, 708
- McIntosh, A. D., 11, 261, 347, 362-363, 375, 386, 654
- McKnight, John P., 9, 406
- McNeil, W. J., 238
- Mendès-France, Pierre:
- French Premier and Foreign Minister, 1128, 1178
  - Geneva Conference on Indochina: French draft declaration on Indochina, 1452-1453; role at, 408, 1495-1496; U.S. position on participation at French Minister level, 1310, 1336-1338, 1351-1355, 1365-1366
- Indochina:
- Cessation of hostilities negotiations: Alternatives, 1335-1336, 1455; French position, 1341, 1346, 1347, 1381*n*, 1394-1395, 1404-1409, 1421-1423; French military talks with Viet Minh, 1348-1351
  - U.S.-French position paper, 1359-1361, 1363-1364
- Meeting with Chou En-lai, 1209, 1210, 1212-1213, 1222, 1233-1234, 1239-1241, 1347
- Meeting with Dulles and Eden, 1342-1343, 1351-1355
- Meeting with Smith, 1187-1188
- Soviet interest in discussion of European problems, 1466-1467
- Vietnam: Cessation of hostilities negotiations, Vietnamese statement, 1440, 1499; demarcation line, 1270*n*, 1341, 1346, 1368-1369, 1407
- Menon, V. K. Krishna:
- Geneva Conference on Indochina, 642, 644, 884, 913-914, 1120-1121, 1344-1346, 1429

- Menon, V. K. Krishna—Continued  
 Geneva Conference on Korea, 340, 347, 913-914  
 Indochina: Cessation of hostilities negotiations, Laos and Cambodia, 1030, 1038-1039, 1045-1046, 1237, 1298; international control, 913, 1051, 1062; situation, 1130, 1341  
 Menzies, Robert G., 649-651  
 Merchant, Livingston T., 8, 404, 530-532, 544, 577-578, 579, 593-594, 619-620, 626-628, 654, 837, 846-847  
 Middleton, George H., 1120, 1121  
 Millet, Pierre, 81*n*, 452, 502  
 Mills, Sheldon T., 1120-1121  
 Mohammad Ali, 611  
 Mohn, Maj. Gen. Paul, 194-195, 229, 268, 1008  
 Molochkov, F. F., 12, 412  
 Molotov, V. M. :  
 Cambodian official, assassination of by Viet Minh, 782-783  
 Communist China, Soviet and U.S. relations with, 897-899  
 Geneva Conference on Indochina: Bidault and Dulles departure prior to opening, 641-642, 875; closing statement, 1499, 1501-1502; duration, 967; European problems, interest in discussion of, 1466-1467; head of Soviet Delegation, 411; negotiating position, 644, 827-828, 895*n*, 899, 904, 1112-1113, 1169; preparations for, 574, 579-580, 591-592, 644, 708, 735, 755-757; restricted sessions, 793*n*; review of progress, 1431-1432, 1434; summary of areas of agreement and disagreement, 1072-1075; suspension and resumption at Foreign Minister level, 1136, 1189-1193, 1265, 1280; U.S. unilateral declaration, 1496-1497  
 Geneva Conference on Korea, 12, 151-153, 159-161, 174-177, 249-250, 315-316, 351-352, 392-393, 415  
 Indochina, cessation of hostilities negotiations: International control problem, 972-973, 999-1000, 1011-1012, 1033-1034, 1050-1051, 1059-1060, 1061-1062, 1065-1066, 1137-1138, 1153-1154, 1161, 1165, 1323-1324, 1421-1423, 1565; problems of Laos and Cambodia, 840-841, 1154, 1160-1161, 1184-1185, 1200, 1201  
 Korean unification, 377-378, 381, 384  
 Southeast Asia defense, 799, 827-828  
 Vietnam: Cessation of hostilities negotiations, 756, 818, 831-832, 874-875, 878-879, 895-899, 907, 910, 911, 923-924, 925, 971, 972, 1034, 1066, 1112-1113, 1404-1405, 1408-  
 Molotov, V. M.—Continued  
 Vietnam—Continued  
 1409, 1421-1423; Dien Bien Phu, 602, 811*n*, 817, 833  
 Monckton, Lt. Col. G. W. R., 413, 762, 887, 888, 1165  
 Morton, Thruston B., 94*n*  
 Moscow Agreement, 1945, 149, 150, 187  
 Muller, Charles, 119  
 Munro, Leslie Knox, 119, 530-532, 837, 885  
 Murphy, Robert D., 326-327, 416-417, 480-481, 698*n*, 969-970, 976-977, 989-991, 1103*n*, 1117*n*, 1119, 1199*n*, 1281-1282  
 Nam II, Lt. Gen., 10, 149-150, 174, 175, 177, 189-190, 312-313, 349, 363, 376-377, 381-382  
 National Intelligence Estimates, 870-872, 1023-1029  
 National Security Council, U.S. :  
 Meetings: *Apr.* 29, 615-617; *May* 27, 942-944; *July* 15, 1381  
 NSC Actions on Indochina and Southeast Asia, 705-707, 731-732  
 NSC 5405, continuing validity of, 472, 478, 672-673  
 U.S. aid to Indochina, question of consideration of, 475, 479  
 Navarre, Gen. Henri, 418*n*, 572-573, 592, 685-686, 703, 766, 773, 830, 881  
 Navarre plan. *See* French military plan under Indochina.  
 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 316, 436*n*, 564, 610-612, 635-636, 769, 822, 897, 1120-1121, 1130, 1567  
 Neri, Felino, 12, 613*n*  
 Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, 996  
 Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) :  
 Performance in Korea, positions on: Chinese Communist, 350, 353, 362, 1089; New Zealand, 362; North Korean, 349, 363; U.S., 318-319, 353*n*, 1003  
 Supervisory commission for Indochina, proposed, positions on: British, 998; Chinese Communist, 946, 984-985, 996, 1019-1021; French, 762-764, 998; Soviet, 973, 986-987, 999-1000, 1033-1034; U.S., 896, 984, 985, 988, 990, 995-996, 1001, 1019, 1021; Viet Minh, 998-999; Vietnamese, 1016  
 Supervisory role in Korean unification, proposed, 310, 312-313, 353  
 New Zealand, 538  
 Newton, Earl K., 407  
 Ngo Dinh Diem, 830, 843*n*, 845, 846, 848, 857, 860, 881, 894-895, 1136, 1275, 1339-1340  
 Ngo Dinh Luyen, 843-846, 848-849, 859-862, 1298-1300, 1424, 1440, 1549

- Nguyen Dac Khe, 411, 717-718, 744-745, 779-780, 955, 961, 1009, 1031, 1134-1136, 1225, 1288-1289, 1298-1300
- Nguyen Duy Thanh, 411
- Nguyen Hau Chau, 411, 1298-1300, 1386-1387, 1400, 1418-1419
- Nguyen Huu Quy, 411
- Nguyen Huu Tri, 857, 860, 1052
- Nguyen Quoc Dinh, 411, 604, 666-667, 669-670, 779-780, 971-972, 1009, 1015-1017, 1074, 1087, 1106, 1107, 1113, 1161, 1196-1198
- Nguyen Thanh Le, 408, 955
- Nguyen Thuc, 1121
- Nguyen Tienny, 1121
- Nguyen Trung Vinh, 411, 541
- Nguyen Van Hinh, Brig. Gen., 825, 830, 873, 901*n*
- Nguyen Van Tam, 462
- Nhieck Tioulong, Gen., 408, 1025, 1237, 1252, 1539, 1549
- Nichol, Henry F., 9, 406
- Nixon, Richard M., 44
- Nong Kimny, 119, 407, 453, 506-507, 767, 955, 958-959, 1236-1237, 1341, 1378-1381, 1399, 1420, 1425-1426, 1549
- Norodom Sihanouk, King of Cambodia, 1214
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 537-538, 672
- Novikov, K. V., 412, 955, 1268, 1295
- Nutting, Sir Anthony, 544
- O'Connor, Roderic L., 7, 404, 842*n*
- O'Daniel, Lt. Gen. John W., 418*n*, 571-573, 606, 1106-1107, 1374
- Offroy, Raymond, 409, 517, 1150-1152, 1156, 1287, 1294-1296, 1300-1301, 1327-1328, 1373, 1387-1388, 1504
- Ohlin, Bertil, 140
- Oliver, Robert T., 254, 271
- O'Neill, C. D. W., 413
- Ourot Souvannavong, 119, 410, 506-507, 1211-1212, 1214, 1218, 1232-1233, 1297-1298
- Paek Nam Un, 10
- Page, Edward, Jr., 8, 404, 1049, 1059, 1119-1120
- Pandit, Mme. Srimati Vijaya Lakshmi, 1130
- Parodi, Alexandre, 11, 408, 544, 1238, 1239, 1348, 1359
- Partridge, Gen., 296-298, 302
- Patyn, C. L., 11
- Paul-Boncour, Jean, 710
- Pearson, Lester B., 10, 140, 196-198, 304, 306, 389, 390*n*, 626-629, 642-644, 671, 929
- Peaslee, Amos J., 649-651, 1062-1064
- Pelletier, Pierre, 119
- Petsarath, Prince of Laos, 1026-1027, 1298
- Pham Huu Chong, 1121-1122
- Pham Van Dong:
  - Geneva Conference on Indochina, 408, 735, 1499
  - Indochina: Cessation of hostilities negotiations, 879, 909-910, 998-999, 1020, 1071-1072, 1112, 1139-1140, 1217, 1261-1263, 1278-1279, 1316-1317; French draft declaration, 1367-1368; Laos and Cambodia, 839-840, 855, 878, 1159, 1163-1164, 1182-1183, 1214, 1217, 1232-1233, 1248-1249
  - Vietnam: Demarcation line, 1286-1288, 1341, 1368-1369; French military discussions with Viet Minh, 970-972, 1241, 1248-1249
- Phan Anh, 408, 830, 891, 955
- Phan Huy Quat, 432, 800*n*, 825, 830, 857, 901*n*, 955, 1222-1223
- Philippines, 536
- Phleger, Herman, 8, 182-183, 404, 670, 866-867, 955, 960, 962-963, 965, 1166, 1348, 1491, 1552-1562
- Phoui Sananikone, 410, 736, 955, 960, 1088, 1113, 1158, 1162, 1182, 1187, 1201, 1211-1212, 1303-1304, 1449-1450
- Pillai, Narayana Ragnavan, 1121, 1130
- Pleven, René, 445, 588*n*
- Poc Thieun, 408
- Polania Puyo, Jaime, 10
- Politis, Athanase G., 119, 120
- Popper, David H., 47, 455
- Pote Sarasin, 12, 119, 147, 429-430, 596, 597, 686-687, 801-803, 808, 978-980
- Prididebyabongs Devakula, Prince of Thailand, 12
- Priestman, John D., 413
- Pu Shou-chang, 955
- Puth Chay, 1252
- Pyun Yung Tai:
  - Geneva Conference on Korea: Final phase, 329-333, 341-342, 358; postconference standing committee, 338-339; preparations, 55, 72-74, 116-117, 140-141, 148-149, 157, 185; restricted meetings, 171-172, 174-177, 344; report to United Nations, 390-391; ROK delegate to, 12; ROK participation in, 20, 22-24, 26, 29-31, 49-52, 115*n*; signature on Declaration of the Sixteen, 387
  - Korea: Communist proposals, 380-381; U.N. role, 187-189, 250-251, 343
  - Korean Armistice Agreement, 376
  - Korean unification: All-Korean elections, 201-202, 260, 353; ROK 14-point proposal, 185, 186, 298, 300, 303-304, 305, 306, 313-314; ROK-U.S. basic principles, 261-262, 267, 270-271, 277-278, 279-281;



- Pyun Yung Tai—Continued  
 Korean unification—Continued  
 U.S. Alternate Plan B, 204-205,  
 221, 228, 254-255, 256-257
- Radford, Adm. Arthur W., 37*n*, 472-  
 475, 594-595, 616, 617, 858-859, 1086,  
 1100, 1131, 1282
- Rankin, Karl L., 458*n*
- Raynor, G. Hayden, 480-481, 846-847
- Reading, Marquis of, 13, 382, 412, 454,  
 641, 955-963, 974, 1165, 1208, 1216-  
 1219, 1238
- Reilly, D'Arcy Patrick, 492-493, 543, 544
- Reinhardt, G. Frederick, 8, 404, 1109-  
 1110, 1492
- Reston, James, 739*n*
- Reyes Canal, de Fregata Julio, 10
- Reynaud, Paul, 944
- Rhee, Syngman:  
 Geneva Conference on Korea, 14, 17-  
 19, 24-25, 35-36, 48-49, 55-56, 78-  
 80, 111-115, 144, 146, 169, 193, 283,  
 344-347, 359  
 Indochina, situation in, 113  
 Korea, Republic of: Mutual Defense  
 Agreement with United States,  
 320-321, 328; UNCURK supervi-  
 sion of elections, 191-194; U.S.  
 aid to, 75*n*, 276; Van Fleet mis-  
 sion, 48-49, 227, 328  
 Korean unification, 60, 191-194, 201-  
 203, 205-207, 213-217, 226-228,  
 233, 239-241, 258-259, 273, 275-  
 277, 281-284, 286, 301-303, 306-  
 309, 319-320, 328-329  
 Vietnam, Dien Bien Phu, 228  
 Richmond, William P., 407  
 Ringwalt, Arthur R., 453-455  
 Rives, Lloyd M., 787  
 Robertson, Walter S.:  
 Communist China, 898-899  
 Geneva Conference on Indochina, 403,  
 429-430, 463*n*, 498-501, 544, 557-  
 558, 593, 670, 1166, 1196, 1198  
 Geneva Conference on Korea: Deputy  
 U.S. Representative to, 7, 459;  
 final phase of conference, 328,  
 330, 338-339; preparations, 21-22,  
 29, 69-70, 80-81, 119, 140-141, 182-  
 183; restricted meetings, 171-  
 172; U.S.-ROK basic principles,  
 186, 261-262  
 Indochina, 1179-1180, 1182, 1185-1187  
 Korean unification, 185, 186, 204-205,  
 254-255, 256-257, 273-274, 279-  
 281, 303-304  
 Southeast Asia, defense, 596, 654  
 U.N. Peace Observation Commission  
 for Indochina, proposed, 808-809,  
 849*n*, 866-867, 919-920, 978, 1108
- Ronning, Chester A., 10, 343-344, 362,  
 386
- Roux, Jacques, 409, 517, 584-586, 593,  
 702-703, 816, 955, 1149-1150, 1208,  
 1233-1234, 1259-1260, 1424
- Rowland, J. R., 10, 654
- Rumbold, Sir Horace Anthony C., 413,  
 1348, 1359
- Russell, Ned, 815
- Russell, Richard, 708
- Salan, Gen. Raoul, 1044
- Saltonstall, Leverett, 533*n*
- Sam Sary, 407, 735-736, 1217, 1227-1228,  
 1242, 1263-1264, 1290-1291, 1317-  
 1318, 1399-1400, 1425
- Sandler, Richard, 140
- Savage, Edward, 9, 406, 1251
- Scheyven, Louis, 10
- Schumann, Maurice, 11, 408, 430-431,  
 544, 699-700, 1100
- Scott, Sir Robert H., 102, 119, 1302
- Selwyn Lloyd. *See* Lloyd, John Selwyn.
- Shih Che, 151, 410
- Shimp, Max L., 407
- Shinicky, P. H., 313
- Shuckburgh, Charles A. E., 13, 412, 553,  
 577-578, 641, 761*n*
- Silvercrucys, Baron Robert, 119
- Sisco, Joseph J., 119
- Smith, H. Alexander, 574, 708, 1479
- Smith, Kingsbury, 1109-1110
- Smith, Lawrence H., 574
- Smith, Walter Bedell:  
 Communist China, Soviet and U.S.  
 relationships with, 897-899  
 French Associated States, independ-  
 ence question, 968, 988, 1113  
 Geneva Conference on Indochina:  
 Agreements, 1490, 1551-1552  
 Basic instructions, 1198-1199  
 Briefing of President and Congres-  
 sional leaders, 1223-1224  
 Communist charges of U.S. aggres-  
 sion in Indochina, 1090-1093  
 Communist delegations, 1094-1097  
 Communist position, 1192-1193  
 Departure at conclusion, 1547  
 Duration, 967, 981  
 European problems, Soviet interest  
 in discussion of, 1466-1467  
 Final Declaration on Indochina:  
 Cambodian and Laotian draft  
 unilateral declarations, 1476-  
 1477, 1488-1490; final agreed  
 text, 1480-1481, 1485, 1490,  
 1494-1495; French draft de-  
 clarations, 1460, 1462-1463,  
 1477, 1476; French unilateral  
 declaration, 1482; Soviet pro-  
 posal, 1471; U.S. unilateral  
 declaration, 1452-1453, 1471-  
 1472, 1482, 1496-1497  
 Foreign Minister phase, suspension  
 and resumption of, 992-993,  
 1136-1137, 1148-1149, 1165-

## Smith, Walter Bedell—Continued

## Geneva Conference on Indochina—Continued

Foreign Minister phase—Continued  
1166, 1170, 1189-1193, 1196-1198, 1226-1227, 1361, 1363, 1367, 1376, 1381-1382

Head of U.S. Delegation, 403, 649*n*, 678*n*, 789, 1496*n*

Indian interest in, 913-914

Lack of progress, 864-865, 1124-1125

Nature of conference, 755-757

Participation questions, 426-427, 431, 453, 530, 666-667, 670, 708-709, 734, 737-739, 884, 890*n*

Preparations for, 434*n*, 530-532, 641, 667, 669-670, 678-679, 685-686, 694, 700, 704, 708-710, 718-720, 730-733

Plenary sessions: Statements at, 736-739, 752-753, 1075-1077, 1090-1094, 1113, 1500-1501; summaries, 734-737, 749-755, 780-785, 795-799, 818-819, 1069-1075, 1087-1090, 1111-1117, 1497-1499, 1501-1502; tactics for, 776-777; unproductiveness of, 792-793

Progress, 1447-1448

Restricted sessions: Communiqué on sixteenth session, 1204-1205; press leak, 936; statements at sessions, 1138, 1141-1143, 1203-1204, 1434; summaries of, 831-834, 839-841, 854-856, 877-881, 907-911, 920-927, 945-949, 970-976, 983-988, 995-1001, 1015-1021, 1031-1038, 1137-1141, 1157-1165, 1179-1185, 1200-1203, 1431-1434; tactics for, 811-813, 849-851, 873-875

Return to Washington in absence of Dulles, question of, 935, 940, 949-950

Termination of, question of, 1083, 1085

U.S. press briefing, 950-953, 1002-1008, 1094-1100

Working level meeting of the Six, 1424-1425

## Geneva Conference on Korea:

Agreement on principles, proposals for, 337-338, 365

Alternate head of U.S. Delegation, 7, 459

Berlin Agreement, 17-18

Briefing of President and Congressional leaders, 393

Chinese Communist participation in future Korean discussions, 392-393

## Smith, Walter Bedell—Continued

## Geneva Conference on Korea—Continued

Communist charges against United States and United Nations, 184, 200, 231-232

## Declaration of the Sixteen:

Proposal, 361

Text, 365-366, 371-376, 379*n*, 383, 387

Duration, 300, 864-865

Indian interest in, 913-914

Indochina phase, separate from Korean phase, 433

Lack of progress, 315-316

Meetings of Sixteen Allied Delegations, summaries, 371-372, 374-376

Nature and objectives, 26-27, 457-458, 904-906

Plenary sessions, summaries, 250-251, 310-314, 376-385, 389-390

Postconference meeting of representatives of Sixteen Allied Delegations, summary, 388-389

Postconference standing committee on Korea, proposed, 338-339

Preparations for, 27, 102-103, 182, 185, 434*n*, 457, 530-532

Press briefing, 1002-1008

Report to the United Nations, 391-392

ROK participation question, 105

Termination of, 314-315, 324-325, 329-334, 339-344, 347-355, 357-358, 360-361, 366-369, 1083-1085

## Indochina:

Cease-fire, French position, 698*n*

Cessation of hostilities:

Agreements: Chinese Communist position, 1420-1421, 1428-1429, 1448-1449; Laos and Cambodia, 1466, 1472-1473, 1478-1479, 1487-1488; substantive discussions, 1405-1407, 1420-1423, 1437-1438; working paper, approval of, 1404-1405, 1408-1409

British five questions, 776-777, 793-794

French and Viet Minh proposals, discussion of, 873-875

French proposals, 689-690, 696-697, 714-715, 737, 739-743, 752-753

French talks on military matters with Viet Minh, 973-975, 1031, 1126, 1127, 1154-1155

International control and guarantee problems, 913, 931-934, 973, 982, 984-985, 993-994, 1010-1014, 1019, 1030, 1035-1036, 1153-1154, 1406-1407

## Smith, Walter Bedell—Continued

## Indochina—Continued

## Cessation of hostilities—Con.

International Control Commission, composition, 768-769, 852-853, 928, 963-964, 973, 981-982, 992, 995-996, 1014, 1036, 1059-1060, 1065-1066, 1075-1077, 1128, 1153-1154, 1165, 1455-1456, 1479-1480

Laos and Cambodia, 767-768, 840, 854, 863-864, 879, 965-966, 1014-1015, 1038-1039, 1095, 1160, 1162, 1170-1171, 1173-1174, 1202-1205, 1419, 1425-1426, 1456, 1466, 1467, 1472-1473, 1478-1479, 1482-1483, 1484, 1487

Political and military aspects, order of discussion, 907, 909, 910

Simultaneous cease-fire question, 965-966

Soviet constructive negotiating posture, 827-828

Summary of Chinese Communist, French, Laotian, and Viet Minh proposals, 1162-1165

U.S. position in event of unsatisfactory settlement, 1105*n*

U.S. statement at restricted session on, 922-924, 926-927

Viet Minh proposal, 757, 770-772

Vietnamese proposals, 789-790

Five-power military talks. *See under* Southeast Asia, *infra.*

French-U.S. position, 1187, 1188*n*

Internationalization of war in, 1039-1040, 1086-1087, 1152

Situation, deterioration of, 574, 595*n*, 615-617, 795, 829-831, 867, 895-899, 901-902, 944, 1045-1046, 1054-1055, 1085

U.S. military intervention in, 569-570, 594-595, 649, 815-816, 853-854, 902-903, 1082*n*, 1101*n*, 1130, 1167

Korea, Van Fleet mission, 94*n*

Korean Armistice Agreement, 379

Korean unification, 201-202, 211-212, 218-224, 226, 230-231, 235, 236, 248-249, 251-253, 257-261, 265-267, 271-272, 287-289, 294, 303-306, 309-314, 316-317, 321-324, 371-372, 374-385

## Southeast Asia :

Defense of, 589, 654, 658-659, 662-664, 679-680, 686, 698-699, 710-712, 715, 748-749, 761-762, 772-773, 801-803, 835-836, 886-887, 930, 1021, 1420, 1421, 1434-1435, 1439, 1448, 1465, 1470*n*, 1473-1474

## Smith, Walter Bedell—Continued

## Southeast Asia—Continued

Five-power military talks, 791-792, 837-838, 841-842, 887-888, 900, 934*n*, 940*n*, 953-954

U.N. Peace Observation Commission for Indochina, proposed, 808-809, 822-823, 862, 928-930, 937-938, 954-955, 968-969, 978-979, 1030-1031, 1065, 1105, 1132-1134, 1172-1173, 1547

Vietnam: Cessation of hostilities negotiations, 1430, 1441, 1449-1452, 1464, 1478-1479, 1485, 1487-1489, 1494, 1504; Dien Bien Phu, 600-601, 703-704, 712-714, 806-807, 810-811, 817, 833; partition question, 701, 807, 992, 1055, 1407-1409, 1426-1428; situation in, 843-846, 857, 914-916, 927*n*, 936-937, 1008-1010, 1121-1122, 1123

## Vietnam, State of :

Armed forces: French (O'Daniel) plan for training of, 1106-1107; U.S. training of, proposed, 1107, 1126-1127, 1152

Treaties with France, question of signature of, 915, 935-936

U.S. military assistance question, 849*n*, 915

Snidvongs, 119

Soldatov, A. A., 412

Son Ngoc Minh, 841

Son Ngoc Thanh, 1025, 1026

Son Sann, 407, 767, 768, 955, 1205-1206, 1207, 1340-1341

Souphanouvong, Prince of Laos, 1214, 1227-1228, 1298

South Africa. *See* Union of South Africa.

## Southeast Asia :

## Collective defense arrangement :

ANZUS meeting on, 654-664

Australian interest in, 649-651, 656-657, 662-664, 1125

Belgian views on, 773-774

British Commonwealth proposal for defense conference, 769

British formula, 1470

British message to Colombo powers and Australia and New Zealand, requesting support for, 1431, 1434-1436, 1439, 1448, 1453-1454, 1473-1474, 1493

British position, 533, 553-555, 570-571, 583, 590, 622-628, 743, 834-836, 847, 869-870, 885-887, 930-931, 1066-1067, 1084

British and U.S. declaration of intent, 1465; proposal for, 581-583, 1421, 1429, 1448; British position, 583, 590, 665, 679-680, 686-687; U.S. position, 616-617, 653-655, 674, 681, 1410

Burmese interest in, 928

## Southeast Asia—Continued

- Collective defense arrangement—Con.  
 Cambodian interest in, 1237, 1247  
 China, Republic of, interest in 500–501  
 Chinese Communist opposition to, 250, 1420–1421, 1437  
 French views, 581–583, 713, 1295–1296  
 Meeting of the Ten on, 533  
 Netherlands interest in, 748–749  
 New Zealand interest in, 657–658, 663, 664  
 Participation question, 239, 1420–1421, 1431, 1437, 1552–1555  
 Press statements: Churchill, 834–835, 869–870; Dulles, 1551; Eisenhower, 692–693, 1503  
 Report of joint U.S.–British study group on, terms of reference for, 1410–1417  
 ROK interest in, 113n  
 Soviet position, 796, 827–828  
 Thal interest in, 687, 801–803  
 Turkish interest in, 905–906  
 U.S. efforts at organization of arrangement, 536–538, 600, 704n, 705n, 707–708, 720–726, 739  
 U.S. policy (*NSC 5405*), 472, 476–477  
 Vietnamese concern, 824  
 Five-power military talks:  
 British proposal for, 761–762, 791–792  
 British-U.S. agreement on holding of, 934  
 Joint statement, 774–776  
 Positions on: British, 836–838, 847, 852n, 856–857; French, 866; Thai, 980–981; U.S., 837–838, 847, 980–981  
 Preparations for, 687, 705–706, 798–800, 841–842, 887–900, 934, 940–941, 950  
 Press conference remarks, 1068–1069  
 Report, 1283–1286  
 Results, 1152–1153  
 U.S.–Australia–New Zealand discussion, 885  
 Five-power staff studies on Communist aggression in, 662–664  
 Implications of loss of Indochina to, 474, 477, 478, 772–773, 1021–1023  
 U.S. concern on Communist aggression in, 487, 1092, 1093  
 Souvanna Phouma, Prince of Laos, 1212, 1214, 1226n, 1298, 1303  
 Soviet Union (*see also Soviet subheadings under other subjects*), 1091–1092  
 Spaak, Paul-Henri, 10, 161–165, 250, 260, 364, 379n, 380, 382, 383, 386, 389, 773–774  
 Spender, Sir Percy C., 103, 119, 480–481, 530–532, 786–787, 837  
 Spruance, Raymond A., 539n  
 Stark, A. A. S., 413  
 Stelle, Charles C., 9, 405, 407, 503n, 507–510, 635–638, 645–646, 672n, 955, 1281  
 Stephanopoulos, Stephan, 11, 190  
 Stevens, Ed, 1251  
 Stimson, Henry L., 1128–1129  
 Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 405  
 Sturm, Paul J., 386, 1281  
 Sullivan, Charles A., 9, 405, 407, 1046–1047, 1064–1065, 1079–1080, 1101–1103, 1105–1106, 1168, 1193–1194  
 Sulzberger, C. L., 564  
 Suydam, Henry, 9, 406, 452, 950, 1002, 1094  
 Suzdalev, S. P., 12, 412  
 Sykes, Richard A., 413  
 Ta Quang Buu, 408, 985–986, 1518, 1530, 1539  
 Taber, Lt. Col. Robert C., 9, 406, 407, 573, 762–767  
 Tahourdin, John G., 413, 454, 955, 1294, 1295  
 Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 240, 248, 269, 302  
 Taymans, Roger, 10  
 Templer, Gen. Sir Gerald, 699  
 Tep Phan, 407, 767–768, 798–799, 1072, 1112, 1157, 1180–1181, 1186–1187, 1201, 1205–1208, 1227–1228, 1231–1232, 1251–1252, 1420  
 Tezenas du Montcel, Robert, 409, 882, 894–895  
 Thailand, 596–597, 662, 801–803, 979–980  
 Thanat Khoman, 1013  
 Thurston, Ray L., 9, 47, 405, 407, 715–716, 734  
 Tiao Khammao, Prince of Laos, 410  
 Topping, 1428, 1448–1449  
 Toussaint, Bernard, 409  
 Tran Cong Tuong, 408, 1232–1233, 1287  
 Tran Trungdung, 1121  
 Tran Van Chuong, 411, 1343, 1426–1428, 1439–1440  
 Tran Van Do, 411, 1271–1272, 1277, 1298–1300, 1341, 1343–1344, 1426–1428, 1432–1434, 1439–1441, 1492, 1497, 1549  
 Tran Van Huu, 462, 1254, 1441n  
 Tran Van Kha, 119, 506  
 Tran Van Tuyen, 411, 1031  
 Tran Van Van, 1548, 1549–1550  
 Trapnell, Maj. Gen. Thomas, J. H., 573, 854, 943  
 Treumann, Walter, 502  
 Trevelyan, Humphrey, 13, 412, 454–455, 734, 803–806, 1011  
 Trinh Minh The, 1550  
 Troyanovsky, O. A., 151, 412, 579, 755, 756, 895, 955, 1001, 1059, 1496

- Trulock, Walter N., 9, 47-48, 406, 448n  
 Truong Van Chinh, 411  
 Tsouvalas, Mary, 407
- U Nu, 611
- Union of South Africa, 21, 58-59, 100n
- United Kingdom (*see also British sub-headings under other subjects*), 648, 803-806, 977-978, 1011, 1111, 1260-1261
- United Nations, membership for Communist China, question of, 232, 464, 488, 611
- United Nations Commission for Reunification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK):  
 Dissolution plan after unification of Korea completed, 63n  
 Supervision of elections in Republic of Korea: Proposal, 191-194; report, 314; supervisory body in Korean unification plan, 83-85, 87, 107-111, 150, 179-181, 192, 193n, 194, 195, 218, 225-226, 229, 230, 231, 291
- United Nations General Assembly:  
 Adoption of Report of Geneva Conference on Korea, 393-394; Resolution on Geneva Conference on Korea, 41, 42, 50, 458n; Resolutions on Korean unification, 68-69, 83, 84, 98-99, 106-107, 134-135, 148-151, 196-199, 223; Uniting for Peace Resolution, 1132-1133
- United Nations Peace Observation Commission for Indochina, proposed:  
 British efforts to limit appeal to Thailand, 1013, 1030-1031, 1066  
 British position, 823, 847, 850-851, 927-931, 964, 968n-969n  
 Cambodian and Laotian appeal, question of, 1174, 1179  
 French position, 669, 695-696, 823, 850-851, 862, 903, 928, 929, 933, 964, 968-969  
 Indian participation question, 955, 979  
 Thai appeal, 875-877, 883-884, 969n; Dulles-Hammarskjold meeting on, 1012-1013; French and British agreement to appeal, 977, 1081, 1083-1084, 1105, 1133; suspension of appeal to U.N. General Assembly, 1547; U.N. Security Council action, 1173n; U.S. interest in, 508-509, 651-652, 668, 790-791, 847, 850-852, 868, 882-883, 927-931, 941-942, 954-955, 966; U.S.-Australian discussion, 786-787; U.S.-Thai discussions, 875-877, 883-884, 969n; U.S.-Vietnamese discussion, 829-830
- United Nations Reconstruction Agency for Korea, 111
- United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, 149, 150, 187
- Urrutia Holguin, Francisco, 10, 148, 323, 344, 367-368, 386, 388, 392
- Vallat, Francis A., 412, 955
- Valluy, Gen. Jean, 860, 1056-1058, 1111
- Van Baarda, C. Th. R., 119
- Van Fleet, Gen. James A., 45, 48-49, 94n, 105, 111, 222, 224, 238-239, 240, 248, 249
- Van Fleet mission. *See under* Korea, Republic of.
- Van Hollen, Christopher, 10, 47, 82, 105-106, 119, 131, 182-183, 406, 670-671
- van Roijen, Jean Herman, 119
- Vassiliou, Nicolas Hadji, 11
- Vergin, Nurredin, 12
- Viet Minh. *See under other subjects.*
- Vietnam:  
 Cessation of hostilities negotiations (*see also under* Indochina):  
 Agreement: Final text, 1505-1520; French draft, 1382-1384, 1392; French note to Vietnamese Delegation on agreement, 1494; nonestablishment of foreign military bases in regroupment zones, 1454-1455; Viet Minh draft, 1444-1447  
 Cease-fire, Vietnamese acceptance of, 1492  
 Collaborators, nonprosecution of, 754, 784  
 Economic relations between zones, 1358-1359, 1430  
 Elections, all-Vietnam: Date question, 615, 684-685, 1394-1395, 1437, 1473; French views, 509; simultaneous elections in Germany and Vietnam, 462-463, 714; U.S. estimate of Communist position, 448, 460-463; U.S. military view, 473, 478; withdrawal of foreign troops prior to, 688, 753, 754, 1074  
 French *aide-memoire*, 1256-1259  
 International control and supervision: Agreement provision, 1515-1518; French draft agreement, 1228-1231; French proposal, 1036-1037; French working paper, 1450-1452; U.S. position on drafting of agreement, 1229n; Vietnamese proposal, 783, 784  
 International guarantees: French draft agreement, 1356-1358; Soviet working paper, 1441-1444; Vietnamese proposal, 783, 784  
 Lack of progress, Vietnamese concern, 1343-1344, 1347  
 Limitation of negotiations to Vietnam, question of, 592

## Vietnam—Continued

Cessation of hostilities negotiations—  
Continued

Military regroupment zones: Agreement provision, 1519-1520; British paper, 938-940; Chinese Communist concerns, 1233-1234, 1239, 1241; French paper, 938, 939; positions: British, 955, 957, 959, 960; Cambodian, 959-960; French, 958, 961, 962, 1395-1396; Laotian, 960; Soviet, 959-960; U.S., 960, 962-963; Viet Minh, 923; Vietnamese, 1373

## Military talks:

French meetings with Vietnamese and Viet Minh:

Agreement on, 975-976, 988*n*

Meetings: *June 4*, 1046-1047, 1050; *June 7*, 1064-1065; *June 8*, 1101-1103, 1105-1106; *June 14*, 1168; *June 17-18*, 1193-1194

French secret meetings with Viet Minh, 1120, 1127, 1134, 1148, 1154-1155, 1222, 1225, 1241-1242, 1275-1277, 1329, 1548-1549

Positions on: British, 921, 946-947, 957, 963, 970, 974, 1077; Cambodian, 925, 958-959, 971; Chinese Communist, 945-946, 971, 1233-1234, 1239-1241; French, 826, 922, 924-925, 938-939, 941, 946-949, 957-958, 960-962, 970, 972, 986, 1050, 1061, 1066, 1126, 1134, 1151, 1154-1155, 1222, 1238-1239, 1241-1242, 1256, 1265, 1276, 1329, 1548-1549; Indian, 1341; Laotian, 960, 971; Soviet, 896, 923, 959, 971, 972, 1034, 1066, 1329; U.S., 923-925, 946-957, 962, 973-975, 1046-1047, 1050, 1098-1099, 1126, 1148, 1225; Viet Minh, 970-972, 985-986, 988; Vietnamese, 924, 946, 961, 971-972, 1031, 1275, 1277

Prisoners of war and civilian internees, agreement provision, 1513

Prohibition of importation of new troops and supplies, agreement provision, 1511-1513

Vietnamese concerns on negotiations, 1339-1340; declaration of position on partition, 1464-1465, 1477-1478; protest of conduct of negotiations, 1497, 1498, 1548

## Vietnam—Continued

Coalition government question, 419, 421, 449, 472, 478, 628, 655, 682-683, 684, 1126, 1127, 1441*n*

## Dien Bien Phu:

Cessation of hostilities during Geneva Conference, question of, 676-677

Evacuation of wounded from, 602, 669-670, 703-704, 748, 749, 756-758, 773, 806-807, 809-811, 817, 826, 833-834, 971

Fall of, 228, 397, 598-601, 605-608, 712-714, 716, 1042, 1043

## Partition question:

Agreement provision for, 1505-1507  
Demarcation line, 1286-1288, 1341, 1368-1369, 1518-1519

Positions on: Australian, 656; British, 1405-1407; Canadian, 628-629; Chinese Communist, 1368, 1373-1374; French, 419-420, 590, 609, 688, 1042-1043, 1149, 1151, 1154-1155, 1166, 1177-1178, 1266-1267, 1270*n*, 1278, 1279, 1280, 1286, 1298-1300, 1348-1349, 1368, 1395, 1405-1407, 1473, 1548, 1549; Indian, 914; New Zealand, 657; Soviet, 1191; U.S., 421-422, 473, 556, 682-683, 1003, 1004, 1049, 1154-1155, 1266-1267, 1397-1398, 1405-1407; Viet Minh, 922, 1110, 1286-1300, 1348-1349, 1368, 1444-1445, 1548, 1549; Vietnamese, 419, 585, 609, 666, 783, 920, 922, 971-972, 983, 1087, 1266-1267, 1298-1300, 1386-1387, 1418-1419, 1426-1428, 1464-1465

## Situation in:

French position, 816, 821-822, 881-882, 944

National Intelligence Estimate on, 872-873, 1027

U.S. concern, 800-801, 816, 823-826, 881-882, 914-916, 1122-1123, 1127, 1393-1394

Vietnamese views, 800*n*, 823-824, 830, 843-846, 901*n*, 914-916, 927, 936-937, 1222-1223, 1254, 1313-1314, 1549-1550

Vietnam, Democratic Republic of: Association with French Union, proposed, 754, 1367-1368; capital at Hanoi, 767; French concern on protection of interests, 1504; nonrecognition by State of Vietnam, 669-670

## Vietnam, State of:

Aid from friendly nations, need for, 784

## Armed forces:

French (O'Daniel) plan for training, 1106-1107

- Vietnam, State of—Continued  
 Armed forces—Continued  
 French training and absorption into  
 French forces, problem of, 830-831  
 U.S. aid in training National Army, 571-573, 769-770, 848-849, 859-861, 915, 1010, 1086, 1126-1127, 1131-1132, 1147, 1152  
 Elections, 461-462  
 Government: Bao Dai, 1008-1010, 1043-1044, 1134-1136, 1282, 1288-1289; new Foreign Minister, 1271-1272; provisional national assembly, 892-894, 901, 902, 1134-1136; regency proposal, 857; Vietnamese view of legal status of, 784; Vietnamese-planned government reforms, 848-849, 859-862, 1121-1122, 1134-1136  
 Treaties with France: French signature, question of, 915, 935-936, 968*n*, 1107, 1121; French-Vietnamese declaration, 614, 780, 782; negotiations, 430, 541, 584-586, 663  
 U.S. plan to continue Chief of Mission at Saigon, 1503  
 U.S. position on aid to, 1135-1136  
 Vinogradov, S. A., 12, 412, 483, 1466-1467  
 Vo Nguyen Giap, Gen., 810, 1051, 1053, 1054, 1061  
 Voroshilov, Marshal Kliment Yefremovich, 899, 904  
 Vorys, John M., 574  
 Wade, R. H., 119  
 Wan Waithayakon Krommun Naradhip Bongsprabandh, Prince of Thailand: Geneva Conference on Indochina, 597-598, 643-644; Geneva Conference on Korea, 12, 140, 144-145, 381, 382, 387; Korean unification, 170-171, 315, 323, 364; Southeast Asia, 596-597; U.N. Peace Observation Commission for Indo-
- Wan Waithayakon Krommun Naradhip Bongsprabandh—Continued  
 china, proposed, 808-809, 822-823, 866-867, 919-920, 1108, 1172-1173, 1547  
 Wang Chia-hsiang, 11, 410  
 Wang Cho-ju, 411  
 Wang Ping-nan, 410, 703-704, 1050, 1061, 1374-1375  
 Warbey, William Noble, 776  
 Watt, Alan S., 10, 147, 261, 323, 344, 347, 530, 654, 679-680  
 Webb, Thomas Clifton, 11, 223, 389, 390*n*, 654, 657-658, 662-664, 885, 886  
 Weyland, Gen. Otto P., 49  
 Wilcox, Francis, 574  
 Willis, Frances E., 151  
 Wilson, Charles E., 269*n*, 276, 298*n*, 434, 471, 1069  
 Wolfrom, Jean, 409  
 Yager, Joseph A., 9, 406, 407, 681-685, 758-760, 1023, 1268  
 You Chan Yang, 12, 21, 69-70, 113*n*, 140-141, 148, 168*n*-169*n*, 204, 221, 254-257, 329, 331, 332, 338-339, 342, 388-389  
 Young, Kenneth T.: Communist China, 803; Geneva Conference on Indochina, 405, 670; Geneva Conference on Korea, 9, 18-19, 47, 119, 182-183, 185, 261-262, 329, 338, 390-392, 417*n*, 425, 434*n*, 445, 459, 502, 503; Korea, Panmunjom talks, 17*n*; Korean unification, 131-139, 204, 254-255, 256-257, 270-271, 273-274, 277-281; U.N. Peace Observation Commission for Indochina, proposed, 919-920  
 Yudin, P. F., 12, 412  
 Zablocki, Clement J., 574  
 Zaroubin, G. N., 12, 412, 455-456, 579, 895  
 Zhukov, D. A., 412, 1109-1110  
 Zuleta Angel, Eduardo, 10, 119, 140, 150-151, 185, 223, 261, 306









COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES



0045664277

Lehman Library

JX

233

.A3

1952-54

v.16

copy 2

