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UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
KOREAN ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

NMWR, MP 62-9

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
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Washington: 1962


REEL
NO.
1

MILITARY ARMISTICE CONFERENCES

RECORD OF EVENTS AND

TRANSCRIPTS OF PROCEEDINGS

KAESONG MEETINGS

SESSION 1 (10 JULY 1951)

THROUGH

SESSION 26 (16 AUGUST 1951)

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND ADVANCE
APO 72

UNCA/A8-6
Serial: 266
27 July 1953

From: Secretary to the Delegate, United Nations Command (Advance)
To: Distribution List

Subj: Downgrading of classified matter; notification of

1. All classified transcripts of proceedings of meeting held between this command and the Communists in connection with the Armistice negotiations, are hereby downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED.

2. No report of downgrading is desired by this command.

/s/ J. E. SHEW
/t/ Commander, USN
Secretary

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Reports Division

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BY AUTHORITY ltr UNCA/A8-6
Ser #266 dtd 27 Jul 53 by UNC/Advance
APO 72
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

10 July 1951

28

[redacted]

Subj: Meetings on the Armistice Proposal in Korea

RECORD OF EVENTS - 10 July 1951 Proceedings

1105: Convened

1107: Exchanged credentials

1109: ADM JOY spoke

1117: ADM JOY completed speech

1118: NAM IL spoke

1129: NAM IL completed speech

1130: TUNG HUA spoke

1139: TUNG HUA completed speech

1225: Recess proposed and discussed

1230: Recessed

1601: Reconvened

1710: Recessed

1730: Reconvened

1815: Adjourned until 11 July 1951

Appendix A

Proposed agenda (United Nations)
Introduced 10 July conference.

Appendix B

Proposed agenda (Enemy)
Introduced 10 July conference.

[redacted]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

[redacted]

10 July 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings: Meetings on the Armistice Proposal in Korea.

1115K Conference convened: Opening remarks by the Senior United Nations Delegate, Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy

UNITED NATIONS: The United Nations Delegation here present represents and speaks for the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. It does so fully and solemnly conscious of the great importance to the peoples of the entire world of the discussions begun here today.

It is understood, of course, that hostilities will continue in all areas, except in those neutral zones agreed upon, until such time as there is an agreement on the terms governing the armistice and until such time as an approved Armistice Commission is prepared to function. The United Nations Command Delegation is prepared to do its part in trying to work out an Armistice Agreement with the representatives of the Communist Forces in Korea, for the cessation of hostilities in Korea, under conditions which will assure against their resumption.

This Delegation is here for that sole purpose. It will discuss military matters in Korea relating to that subject.

This Delegation will not discuss political or economic matters of any kind.

This Delegation will not discuss military matters unrelated to Korea.

Success or failure of the negotiations begun here today depends directly upon the good faith of the Delegations here present. With good faith on both sides there can be created an atmosphere of mutual confidence. In such an atmosphere there is every reason to hope for success. Such an atmosphere can exist where truth prevails.

As the Senior United Nations Command Delegate and personal representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, I desire to state with the utmost earnestness and



[redacted]

emphasis and in language so clear that it cannot be misunderstood, except by those who deliberately desire to misunderstand, that the United Nations Command Delegation will act in good faith. We must assume that the representatives of the Communist Forces in Korea here present will do likewise.

Before proceeding further with the work which brought us together, the United Nations Command Delegation proposes that we come to a full agreement to limit our discussions at this and all subsequent meetings solely to military matters related to Korea only.

Opening Remarks of
GENERAL NAM, IL Vice Chief of Staff
and Field Commander NKPA

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: The Korean people have always maintained and now still maintain that the Korean War should be brought to an end speedily and ardently support the suggestion made on June 23rd by Mr. Malik that the belligerents hold talks for Cease Fire, and that the Armed Forces on both sides withdraw from the 38th Parallel in order to end the Korean War. We deem it necessary to settle such important considerations as the withdrawal of armed forces from both sides from the 38th Parallel as the basic condition for the realization of an Armistice in Korea, and to insure again the rekindling of the flames of War in Korea, etc. In view of this, I make the following proposals in the name of the Korean People's Army:

1. On the basis of mutual agreement, both sides to issue orders simultaneously to cease all hostile military actions against each other. The Armed Forces to cease fire (and all military activities RFU), naval forces to cease fire and bombardment, (both HGU) the air force to cease bombardment and reconnaissance activities. It is obvious that a Cease Fire on both sides would not only reduce loss of life and property, but would constitute the first step towards the establishment of extinguishing the flames of war in Korea.

2. To establish the 38th Parallel as the military demarkation line, the Armed Forces of both sides to withdraw 10 kilometers from the 38th Parallel, and simultaneously complete the withdrawal within a definite time limit, leaving the evacuated area as a demilitarized zone, and the civilian administration shall be restored as it was before June 25, 1950. At the same time, to talk over the exchange of POWs, so that the POWs of various countries may return to their homes and rejoin their families at an early date.

3. The armed forces of all foreign countries should be withdrawn as early as possible. (RFU) As soon as the armed

[redacted]

[redacted] forces are withdrawn, the (RFU) people of Korea and China, (and Russia HGU) and all peace-loving people of the world, including the United States and Britain, ardently demand an early peaceful settlement of the war. I hope we can reach an agreement through these talks so as to meet the demands of the wide mass of the people.

INITIALS OF

RFU (1st LT Richard F. UNDERWOOD, USA

HGU (LT Horace G. UNDERWOOD, USN

[redacted]

REMARKS BY
GEN TENG, HUA, CG 15TH ARMY GROUP,
FOURTH FIELD ARMY.

CHINESE: The Chinese General will deliver a speech on behalf of the Chinese People's Volunteers, By the order of General Peng Te-huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, who are assisting the Korean People's Army fighting in Korea, I attend this conference together with representatives of the Korean People's Army to discuss with the representatives of General Ridgway, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Forces, problems of realizing cease fire and armistice in Korea on a just and reasonable basis. It is my belief that the settlement of these problems will be an important step toward the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The interests of the Chinese people and the Korean people are entirely the same, to end the Korean war and to settle peaceably the

Korean question and have also been the constant demand of the Chinese people and the goal for which they have been struggling incessantly. The aim of the Chinese People's Volunteers in assisting the Korean People's Army is precisely to restore peace in Korea and safeguard the security of China. Hence, when Mr. Malik, Soviet delegate to the United Nations, in accordance with the constant stand of the Soviet Government for peaceful settlement of the Korean question suggested that the belligerents in Korea hold talks for Cease Fire and Armistice that both sides withdraw their armed forces from the 38th Parallel, the suggestion immediately received the ardent support of the Chinese people and the Chinese Government, and cease fire by the belligerents in Korea and the Chinese Government, and cease fire by the belligerents in Korea and the establishment of the 38th Parallel as the military demarkation line for the both sides and the withdrawal of armed forces of all foreign countries are constant with the desire and demand of the Korean people, the Chinese people, and the peoples of the whole world. It is our belief that these three proposals made by the representatives of the Korean People's Army are the premise and the basis for ending the Korean War and settling peaceably the Korean question. The Chinese People's Volunteers sincerely support these proposals and take them as the starting point of these negotitions. Peoples of all countries bitterly hate war and desire peace ardently. I hope that we shall be able to fulfill our task of ending the war in Korea.

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: If you have anything to say, say it.

UNITED NATIONS: We desire to proceed in an orderly fashion considering one item at a time. The first item to be settled is the limitation of these discussions to military matters only. The representatives of the United Nations Command therefore propose such an agreement now. We have the agreement here and are willing to sign. It reads this way. The military representatives of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command and the Commander-in-Chief of the Communist Forces in Korea agree at this meeting and all meetings of the military representatives relative to the cessation of hostilities in Korea. Discussions will be limited to military matters only. Would you like to sign this?

NORTH KOREA: (IL NAM) This meeting was to begin arrangements to stop the fighting in Korea and I would like to know the reason for any such statement as this and the necessity for signing such a statement and those are the major premises under which we came to the meeting to begin with, limited to the military forces and I would like to know the opinion of the other party might be here.

UNITED NATIONS: We are here solely to discuss military matters related to Korea only. Do you agree?

NORTH KOREA: (IL NAM) As to the military matters and the three points I would like to know the opinion of the other party as to these proposals. We have proposed three proposals, all of them concerning military matters concerning Korea. We consider that in order to reach an agreement on these three problems we do not know what your side means. What is the content and what you include under the title of military matters, and we also want to know what is your opinion about the three proposals raised by the Korean delegate.

UNITED NATIONS: Your opening statement was not limited to military matters only. You refer to political matters which we are not empowered to discuss. It is our conception that the first

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thing to do at this first meeting is to agree on an agenda for subsequent meetings.

NORTH KOREA: (IL NAM) I would like to know more precisely what is not limited to military affairs in my opening address. I would like to know the items for discussion - - more precisely what you mean by it.

UNITED NATIONS: I will submit to you our proposed agenda for our second meeting.

NORTH KOREA (IL NAM) I would like to know one thing, what is meant by adoption? Do you have anything further on this. Adoption means to adopt and say formally we adopt the agenda.

NORTH KOREA (IL NAM) Of course military matters are always political although together we will try to limit our talks to military matters and should it be that the military matters be related to political it will be discussed later. What I said in my opening address, that means the three points I proposed are all military matters and I would like to know what you think about it.

UNITED NATIONS: We should like to have your three proposals in writing as we have given you our proposals. In other words if you do not agree with our agenda, we would like your proposed agenda in writing.

NORTH KOREA: (IL NAM) As to your proposed agenda the items are given very briefly and we would like to have more explanation about it.

CHINESE: (?) I would like you to explain more in detail the items 5 and 4 on this proposed agenda.

UNITED NATIONS: At this meeting we will not discuss the substances of any items. The first thing to do is to agree that the items should be discussed and therefore place them on the agenda. After the agenda has been agreed to discussions can start. We submit again that we must proceed in an orderly fashion. We have submitted an agenda at subsequent meeting the items thereon are for discussion in detail at a subsequent meeting to be arranged here today after an agreement upon an agenda.

NORTH KOREA: (IL NAM) I have made my proposals orally, and you have handed in your proposals for the next meeting in letters. I think the opening meeting has so far been very successful. We will hand in our

[redacted]

SEC[redacted] written proposal at a second meeting. What about making a pause until the 15th hour. That means we will have a pause for three hours and thirty-five minutes.

UNITED NATIONS: I don't see why you cannot give us your written agenda before that time. I prepose that we meet again in two hours.

NORTH KOREA: (IL NAM) We did not mean we are not going to give you our written proposal, so we will give it to you in three hours and it will take some time for us to think over your proposal. Therefore, three hours thirty-five minutes time is about right, for us.

UNITED NATIONS: You understand that our primary purpose today is to agree on the items that will be discussed tomorrow. We would like to come to some agreement before we leave here today.

NORTH KOREA: Your idea that the adoption of the agenda is quite all right. As for the agenda itself it has concrete contents and we must think over it ourselves too. And when we think over it it will take sometime. There is no sense quarreling about one hour. If we don't think over the matter of the agenda fully, it may take more time at the next meeting.

UNITED NATIONS: Very well, we will agree to meet here again at three o'clock your time and four o'clock our time.

NORTH KOREA: (IL NAM) We will not close the first meeting of this morning about cease fire.

Recessed at 1232 hours.

The conference reconvened at 1601 hours, 10 July 1951.

NORTH KOREA: (IL NAM) We have read the proposal yuu handed in about the agenda. Now will you please explain item by item?

UNITED NATIONS: The delegation from the United Nations Command have presented you in writing, its proposed list of items to be discussed at subsequent meetings. It is requested that you now present, in writing, the items, as agreed at the first meeting today.

NORTH KOREA (IL NAM) Then we can present our proposals in written letters. Proposed agenda.

(At this point written Communist agenda passed to UN delegates)

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: Before we take up any of these items on the agenda I have this to say. The representatives of the United Nations Command have not been able to conduct their business in a proper manner because of the restrictions which the communist armies have imposed on the movement of our staff and workmen. At noon today, for example, our courier was not permitted to go to the landing area without permission from a guard. The permission was long delayed. During the time in which the delegation of the United Nations Command is in the conference area we expect to move freely over prescribed routes and without any other restrictions whatever between the conference site and similarly we expect to move freely between the conference site and the Imjin River area and between the conference site and the helicopter landing area.

I am therefore taking this opportunity to inform you that, for all subsequent meetings, the United Nations Command delegation will require free access to the conference area during the period commencing one hour before the meeting is scheduled to start and ending after the meeting has adjourned and the United Nations Command party has departed from the area. This includes the ability to travel freely and safely between points, in the conference area, and to and from the conference area, along a predetermined route without prior notification. We wish preparations made for our departure at 5 o'clock your time today.

NORTH KOREA: If anything has happened, I am sorry for it, but that is just a technical matter and was due to some misunderstanding.

(PHOTOGRAPHERS ENTERED HERE) The basic problem lies in this: That we are very much concerned about the safety of the United Nations delegates and in order to guarantee the personal safety of the United Nation delegates, the traffic is strictly ordered, and we ordered strict safety for the United Nations delegates and from now on for your movements, inform us beforehand and there will be absolute safety and there won't be any such misunderstanding. This can be settled between the liaison officers.

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[redacted] photographers?

UNITED NATIONS: This matter of correspondents in the conference room should be agreed upon beforehand.

NORTH KOREA: (IL NAM) Then what kind of opinion have you about it?

UNITED NATIONS: We do not wish photographers in the conference room, but we do not object to their being in this area. Tomorrow we will have about 20 newsmen and photographers. This group will move to and from the conference site with the United Nations Command Delegates. The correspondents will not be given access to the conference room, but only to the general area of the conference.

NORTH KOREA: (IL NAM) If you don't want to have the newspapermen in the room when you hold a conference, we will consider the matter, but from our side we are not particularly against it. As for the 20 newspapermen, etc., we would like to have the thing discussed beforehand. I would like to hear your opinion about having the same number of newspapermen on both sides.

UNITED NATIONS: But with the stipulation that they will not be in the conference room. They will be restricted to the general area around here.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM IL) We agree.

UNITED NATIONS: I should like to get a more definite answer from you as to our movement into and out of this area. We want unrestricted access and movement from the meeting place to our place, our house, and the landing strip and the Imjin River. This is a daylight movement only.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM IL) We will safeguard your freedom of movement, but in order to guarantee your safety we would like to know the definite time of your coming and going. About the crossing of the Imjin River, we would like to know how many cars, how many persons and what time tomorrow you will come back. You haven't got to tell us about the number of persons right now. You can let us know later on.

UNITED NATIONS: There will be 120 people daily leaving one hour before the conference starts from the Imjin river area for the meeting

place and returning to the Imjin area as soon as the conference is over. In addition there will be couriers going back and forth from the conference site to the Imjin River area at any time of the day. We cannot give you prior notification when they will leave and when they will return. The couriers will mainly travel by helicopter.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM IL) As far as freedom of movement the principle problem has been a technical question which is better settled through our liaison officers.

The principle problem about freedom of movement has been discussed and solved, and as a technical question, for instance, how many persons and how many cars and that can be settled through the liaison officers, and here at this place we had better discuss the main problems.

UNITED NATIONS: This is too important to leave to liaison officers because it will restrict our business, unless we have an agreement.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM IL) I think the difficulty lies in language. We have never prohibited any of your movement but for your personal safety, and we don't put any restriction upon your freedom of movement, so your principle problem is solved.

UNITED NATIONS: We assume that risk. As I have said before, it is important that our couriers be allowed to travel back and forth freely during the day without the necessity of going through the red tape of obtaining clearance each time. As mentioned before, tomorrow 120 people will leave one hour before the conference starts and will return when the conference is completed. In addition, couriers will go back and forth mainly by helicopter throughout the day as necessary for us to conduct our business. Is that agreeable to you?

NORTH KOREA: (NAM IL) We talked about guaranteeing your personal safety, and we are very much concerned about it because a meeting is being held in our region, guaranteeing your safety that has a lot to do with the success of this meeting, and that is why we are so

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concerned over your safety. And if your safety this is important, and as for your freedom of movement as you mentioned there won't be any restriction, and as for the coming and going back of your helicopters, we agree with you but we want to know precisely the time, and number of persons, cars and airplanes, etc. We understood that the number of persons in the delegation would be 73 persons, but how you state 120 and we would like to know what kind of persons the remaining 47 are.

UNITED NATIONS: In general, these 120 men include additional signal men and headquarters personnel and the 20 newspaper men we referred to previously. There will be approximately 4 round-trip helicopter flights daily. We cannot give you the precise time because we do not know it very far in advance. The additional personnel does not include any additional personnel for the conference only the press and service personnel.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM IL) Are the 20 persons only newspaper men, or among them are there included cameramen too?

UNITED NATIONS: The 20 newspaper men include newspaper men, newsreel people and press correspondents and photographers.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM IL) How many newspapermen are there?

UNITED NATIONS: This is the approximate number of newspapermen there will be. One officer in charge. Two press briefing officers, nine or ten newspaper men, two still photographers, two radio broadcasters, 3 newsreel men and television cameramen. The proportion of the number of photographers and newspapermen will vary from day to day. Such details could be handled by the liaison officer.

NORTH KOREA (NAM IL) We agree fully. But it is principle that both sides should have the same number.

UNITED NATIONS: We agree. There are a few other items which will help us transact business with you, which I would like to discuss with you briefly before proceeding to the agenda items. The representatives of United Nations Command would like to suggest establishing a continuous wave frequency mutually agreed upon for the use of your delegation and the United Nations delegation in contacting each other. The United Nations delegation is pre-

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pared to utilize any frequency between 3 and 18 negacycles. It is suggested that transmission by either delegation be initiated at 5 minutes after the odd hour between 6 and 2400 daily, and that each delegation arrange to monitor whatever frequency is agreed upon at this time.

NORTH KOREA: Our communication connections up to this date has not been guaranteed. As for your proposals, we want you to give us more time to think it over. Until the matter has been fully discussed, we want you to have communications as before.

UNITED NATIONS: We agree and request that you give us an answer tomorrow.

NORTH KOREA: All right.

UNITED NATIONS: One small item more. The representatives of the United Nations Command delegation have adopted a standard system for identifying vehicles. They will be marked with white flags.

NORTH KOREA: We agree.

UNITED NATIONS: We appreciate your position and your agreement. We would now like a 15 minute recess to discuss your agenda between ourselves.

The conference recessed at 1710 hours, 10 July 1951.

The conference reconvened at 1735 hours.

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NORTH KOREA: (NAM IL) We will continue the meeting. We have thought over the proposal you presented to us about the agenda, and now about that I am going to tell you what my opinion of it is. At first I am going to talk about the principle of the Agenda. At first I would mention that your agenda proposal has not been arranged in order. For instances, under Item 2, the question of prisoners of war is presented. The problem of the prisoners of war should-n't be discussed first. When the question of the Armistice by having the 38th Parallel the line of demarkation has been met, then the question of the prisoners of war will naturally be discussed. Therefore this question cannot be discussed as an initial question, but we have got to discuss first about the Cease Fire. As to number 3, the matter hasn't been discussed at a meeting because our meeting is confined to military matters. Numbers 4 and 5 are not concrete. It hasn't been clearly shown on what demarkation line should Cease Fire be agreed. The remaining questions can be discussed when we discuss the other concrete matters, and I deem it not necessary to have it in the agenda at all.

UNITED NATIONS: Please repeat that last.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM IL) The remaining questions can be discussed when we have discussed the main problems. They are the supplementary problems to our main problems. Now comes the question of prisoners of war. When the main problems are solved, the question of the prisoners of war can be settled. Why do I think that our proposal of the agenda is proper? Your second item, I think, as to the 38th p arallel, that must be discussed first, because that is the main thing we have got to settle first, establishing of the 38th parallel as the line of demarkation and the establishment of the demilitarization zone are the basic conditions for cessation of hostilities in Korea. The next item is the withdrawal of the armed forces of foreign countries from Korea. That is the next important question, because without that it would be very difficult to have the Armistice. As to agreeing on a cease fire, that

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is the first step for a peaceful solution of the Korean question, but if you want to solve the Korean question in a peaceful way, it is impossible if there are foreign troops in our country. The next is the question of arrangements for cease fire and Armistice in Korea, and when the two questions I have proposed are solved, then we must adopt a concrete proposal for the execution of the two problems. After the end of the armistice then the question of the prisoners of war must be discussed. In our proposed agenda, the main problems we want to discuss at a meeting are included, and if all these things are properly settled, we can have the cease fire and the Korean problem can be solved peacefully. Therefore, I say that the agenda you propose is not the most adequate.

UNITED NATIONS: We appreciate your comment. We accept items 1, 4 and 5, for later discussion at the next meeting. We are not prepared to change any of the items on our agenda which we have submitted to you. In addition, we have these specific comments on your Items 2 and 3. As to Item 2, definition of the demilitarized zone. It is the position of the representatives of the United Nations Command that the proper order of business is to first establish the general topics which both sides agree to discuss, then subsequently to determine the specific agreement, the details on which agreement can be reached. Such a case is that of the demilitarized zone. The Communist delegation offered a particular demarcation line and a particular demilitarization zone as an agenda item. The delegation of the United Nations Command believes that first it should be agreed that discussions of some demarcation line and some demilitarized zone is desired by and agreeable to both parties. Once this general topic is agreed on, later meetings can approach the question as to which particular line and zone can be agreed upon. It is for this reason that the United Nations Command agenda contains items which only describe the general area of discussion, as for example, the question of arrangements pertaining to prisoners of war, Item 9. No effort

[redacted]

should be made to state in an agenda what the details of these arrangements will be. Rather, the United Nations Command agenda, Item 9, indicates only that both parties are willing to discuss arrangements pertaining to prisoners of war. Agreement to place such an item on the agenda in no way commits either delegation to any specific detail of such arrangements. The same is the case with the demilitarized zone. Both delegations wish to discuss a demilitarized zone. Exactly where this zone shall be will become a topic of later discussion. We both can agree, however, that the general question of a demilitarized zone should be one of the items to be discussed on the agenda. At a later meeting which the agreed agenda governs, the exact boundary definition of the demilitarized zone may be reached. I will now take up Item 3, the question of the withdrawal of foreign armed forces. What do you mean by foreign armed forces? What forces do you include?

NORTH KOREA: (NAM IL) Please go ahead.

UNITED NATIONS: The various Governments with armed forces in Korea operating with the United Nations Command have authorized these Armed Forces to be in Korea. Therefore, the withdrawal of these armed forces from Korea must be approved by those same governments, as well as the United Nations itself. The delegation of the United Nations Command can make arrangements only pertaining to the cessation of military action of these armed forces within Korea. Only after an Armistice has been agreed to and military action has ceased, can the matter of withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Korea be discussed with the Governments concerned. Therefore, it is our view that this matter cannot be placed upon an agenda for the military representatives to discuss.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM IL) First I am going to answer the question of the foreign troops -- what is meant by the foreign troops. By foreign troops, we mean all troops who are here under the permission of their own governments, so the foreign troops under the name of United Nations in

[redacted]

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA (Cont'd): Korea, they are all foreign troops. And now I am going to talk about using some terms in procedure of meeting.

UNITED NATIONS: You haven't finished that item yet.

(NAM IL said don't interrupt he has floor).

NORTH KOREA: About the terms. On discussing Cease Fire today, one side is the Korean People's Army and the Chinese Volunteers, and the other side is the United Nations forces, then the term "communists" is not proper here because you are not dealing with the Communists but with the Korean People's Army and the Chinese Volunteers. It is simple to define the term "foreign troops". By "Foreign troops in Korea", we mean those troops who are not Korean troops, who are not the troops composed of the Koreans. By foreign troops, we mean those troops which are not composed of Koreans.

UNITED NATIONS: Of foreign troops not composed of Koreans. That is what you mean.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM IL) Troops in Korea which are not Korean troops. There are the foreign troops.

UNITED NATIONS: I think that is all we can discuss today. I would like to call a recess until tomorrow morning.

NORTH KOREA: Before the recess we have something to discuss. That is about the activities of the pressmen. For that question I communicated with our Supreme Commander. Until I get the answer from our Supreme Commander I would like to postpone the matter. As for that I informed our Supreme Commander of the case and so until I get an answer from my Supreme Commander I would like to hold up the matter.

UNITED NATIONS: When do you expect an answer from your Supreme Commander?

NORTH KOREA: Very soon come.

UNITED NATIONS: How soon?

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: It is hard for me to answer in how many hours it will come. This is a matter which our Supreme Commander will have to decide.

UNITED NATIONS: Can you communicate with us before tomorrow and give us the decision? We propose a meeting time at ten o'clock our time and nine o'clock your time. Our Liaison Officers can come up at 7:30 our time tomorrow morning and get the answer.

NORTH KOREA: I agree as for the time of the meeting tomorrow. As for the activities of the newspapermen it is not for me to decide, it is a matter for the Supreme Commander to decide therefore I cannot give you any definite answer.

UNITED NATIONS: I am not asking for a definite answer now, I am asking for a definite answer when we send the Liaison Officer up here tomorrow morning at 7:30.

NORTH KOREA: If the Liaison Officer should come at 6:30 tomorrow morning we are not sure if we can give the answer at that time. There is one thing I would like to propose that is just for the sake of safety of the United Nations delegation we want you to give us exact time with the number of cars, persons, etc, precisely. What time tomorrow morning will you come through what route, how many cars, persons, etc. Please give that so that we can arrange before hand to safeguard your safety.

UNITED NATIONS: Are you talking about the Liaison Officers now?

NORTH KOREAN: It is about the delegation, tell us what time, the number of vehicles and number of personnel. If we know what time you will arrive here by airplane we can send our Liaison Officer to our airfield and receive you.

UNITED NATIONS: We have been discussing the question of sending the Liaison Officer up here to find out about the newspapermen.

NORTH KOREAN: For that I have given you a clear answer.

UNITED NATIONS: You were talking about the delegation. We were talking about the Liaison Officer coming up early and getting an answer about

[redacted]

the newspapermen. If it is not so clear to you I can say again.

NORTH KOREA: It is hard for me to give a definite answer. If the liaison Officer comes here at 6:30 tomorrow morning whether he will get an answer from me. It is possible that the Liaison Officer may get an definite answer about the activities of the newspapermen and it is also possible that he may not get an answer. It is because I have informed my superior of this matter and that shoul be decided by my superior and I am waiting for the answer.

UNITED NATIONS: The Liaison Officer will arrive by helicopter at 7:30 our time 6:30 your time. We hope you will be able to give him an answer when he arrives as to the activities of the newspapermen. The United Nations delegation will arrive here at 9:45 our time in helicopter, weather permitting.

NORTH KOREA: Your time?

UNITED NATIONS: Our time. 8:45 your time. The staff and workmen will travel the same route as today. They will arrive at about 9:45 our time in jeeps and trucks.

NORTH KOREA: Was that the same number of vehicles and helicopters as you had today?

UNITED NATIONS: A few more. Approximately a few more. If the newspapermen come they will come all in one truck.

NORTH KOREA: If you cannot give us a definite number right now, it is all righ But for safety sake let us know through the Liaison Officer for safety sake.

UNITED NATIONS: The newspapermen will arrive at the same time as the United Nation delegation. As I mentioned before they will not be allowed in the conference room. We will adjourn for today.

NORTH KOREA: We agree.

The Conferencethen adjourned at 1831 hours.

[redacted]

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY:

C. R. Green

C. R. GREEN
CHSCIK, USN

[redacted]

PROPOSED AGENDA
(UNITED NATIONS)

10 July 1951

1. Adoption of Agenda.

2. Location of, and authority for International Red Cross Representatives to visit, Prisoner of War Camps.

3. Limitation of discussions at this and all subsequent meetings to purely military matters related to Korea only.

4. Cessation of hostilities and of acts of armed force in Korea under conditions which will assure against resumption of hostilities and acts of armed forece in Korea.

5. Agreement on a demilitarized zone across Korea.

6. Composition, authority and functions of Military Armistice Commission.

7. Agreement on principle of inspection within Korea by Military observer teams, functioning under a Military Armistice Commission.

8. Composition and functions of these teams.

9. Arrangements pertaining to prisoners of war.

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PROPOSED AGENDA
(ENEMY)

10 July 1951

1. Adoption of agenda.

2. Establishment of the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides and establishment of a demilitarised zone, as basic conditions for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

3. Withdrawal of all armed forces of foreign countries from Korea.

4. Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease-fire and armistice in Korea.

5. Arrangements relating to prisoners-of-war following the armistice.

"B"

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Ser# 266 dtd 27 Jul 53 Hq UNC/ADJUTANT
APO 72

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

23

[redacted]

11 July 1951

Subj: Meeting on the Armistice Proposal in Korea

RECORD OF EVENTS - 11 JULY 1951 PROCEEDINGS

1001: Convened

Presentation by both sides and discussion of : free access to Kaesong area of U.N. delegation; acceptance of press and photographers at meetings; radio communications between opposing sides; communist comments on UN 10 July agenda; UN comments on Communist agenda; Communist reply containing 5 points.

Radio voice circuit between opposing delegations established.

1228: Recessed.

1359: UN reply to and comments on Communists 5 points

1400: UN answered questions previously asked by Communists

1425: UN completed answering Communist questions

1437: Discussion on meaning and possible acceptance of items listed in agenda, meaning of word "agenda", order of and relative importance of items on agenda; cease fire line; 38th Parallel as an "imaginary" and "real" line.

1543: UN read dispatch from General Ridgway concerning representatives of various News services being integral part of UN Command delegation.

1551: UN stated wished to proceed with meeting but must recess until newsmen allowed.

1555: Adjourned.

[redacted]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

[redacted]

11 July 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings; Meetings on the Armistice Proposal in Korea.

(Conference reconvened at 1000 hours, 11 July 1951).

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) What about the meetins now, time is up. Before opening the meeting I am going to give you answers to questions you asked yesterday. About your coming and going as I mentioned yesterday, we did not put any restriction on your delegation now, as it is our time we gave you a certain district.

That is just for the sake of your own personal safety and nothing more. In consideration of these facts we agree that we will allow vehicles freedom--we agree that vehicles and persons with specific marks can go freely between airplane and the meeting place. We post our liaison officer at the airdrome for your communication between Kaesong and Munsan. Therefore, if you will let the liaison officer know before hand we can guarantee your safety through our liaison officer. I made a mistake, before you leave if you will let us know before hand. When you come by motor cars by way of Panmunjom please let us know the number of cars and number of personnel and the time, then we can arrange it. We were talking about communication question yesterday as for that both sides can have a connection between wireless and wire communication. As for the communication with wire we can arrange the line between Kaesong and Panmunjom with wires then-- If you arrange the communication between Panmunjom to Munsan on your side then we can arrange communication between Kaesong and Munsan. As for your wireless we have technicians and if you can send over your technicians, and your technicians and our technicians can talk it over. If you agree you better carry it out through the Liaison officer.

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UNITED NATIONS: We would like a twenty minute recess to consider your comments.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM,IL) In principle we are not against your proposal but why not make use of this time that we should discuss for a while and then have a recess then better make use of that time.

UNITED NATIONS: I would like to take up the question of our newspapermen coming to Kaesong. The presence of newsman at this conference is considered of major importance and the reporting of such events by professional newsmen to the world at large is an accepted procedure at all important world conferences. I repeat. We desire 20 newsmen to proceed daily with our delegation. At meetings of the United Nations Security Counsel, during which major military questions are considered, participant nations such as the Soviet Union raise no objection to the presence of newsmen. The United Nations Command delegation, on instructions of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command must therefore insist that newsmen be admitted to the area of this conference without further delay. By area I do not mean the conference meeting place.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM,IL) As for the question of the newsmen I am going to answer as follows: As we are talking about military secrecies, in war time, I do not find it quite adequate to admit the newsmen at present. In the second place we have not yet agreed on the agenda as yet. That doesn't mean that later we will not allow newsmen in. It doesn't mean that we will refuse newsmen also later.

UNITED NATIONS: You understand that we do not desire the newsmen to enter this conference room at any time. The Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command is insisting, however, that about twenty of them be admitted to this area. They can be confined to the conference area so that there can be no question as to loss of your military security. The newspapermen will pick up

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No military information if they are confined to the conference area, the helicopter landing area, and the agreed upon vehicle route.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM,IL) As I mentioned already the meeting is being held at a time of war, under circumstances of warfare and as I mentioned before we have not fully discussed the items on the agenda either. Therefore I don't find it so necessary to hurry up so much to settle the question of the newsmen. Then as we said this morning, we agree to accept five persons of cameramen and newsreelmen, five of them as military personnel. Therefore I don't find it necessary to discuss about the question of the newsmen in such a hurry. So what about going to other questions and leaving the question of the newsmen until later.

UNITED NATIONS: We prefer to recess for twenty minutes to consider this matter.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM,IL) We agree.

(Conference then recessed at 1034 hours, 11 July 1951).

(Conference reconvened at 1052 hours, 11 July 1951).

NORTH KOREA: (NAM,IL) Now the time is up.

UNITED NATIONS: We do not fully understand your comments as to our freedom of movement. In order to clearly define the agreement you have stated, we request a specific agreement of the following points: (1) All properly marked vehicles can travel over the prescribed route between the conference site and the Imjin River without prior notification. (2) A properly marked vehicle can travel over the prescribed route between the conference site and the helicopter site without prior notification. The same requirement applies to the route between the conference site and the United Nations delegation house. We will, of course, have vehicles notify you when they start but the vehicles must not be detained.

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NORTH KOREA: (NAM,IL) As I mentioned already, we will guarantee your freedom of movement. The question lies only in guaranteeing the safety. As I told you clearly that persons with distinct marks can freely move from the house to meeting place, and airdrome - between house, meeting place and airdrome. As for the movement over longer distances in order to guarantee your safety, just notify our liaison officer before hand. The liaison officer is always at the airdrome and if he gets notification he will let the men under him arrange it.

UNITED NATIONS: Did you say notify at time of departure or before?

NORTH KOREA: (NAM,IL) For convenience sake our liaison officer is always at the airdrome so you just notify him when you leave. At the time of departure, for convenience sake we have stationed our liaison officer at the airdrome. That's why they have liaison officers. Is that clear to you?

UNITED NATIONS: Does the same apply to vehicular movements between the Imjin River and Kaesong?

NORTH KOREA: (NAM,IL) If you will let our liaison officer know we can notify our men to safeguard you. The question lies only in guaranteeing your safety and nothing more. For a long distance if you start without notifying us beforehand there is always danger of having something on the way. We cannot guarantee that nothing will happen on the way. At the time of departure is fine.

UNITED NATIONS: By what means is the liaison officer notified when our vehicles leave the Imjin River ?

NORTH KOREA: (NAM,IL) Our liaison officers at Panumjon. When the problem of communication is solved you can always let us know through the telephone. Have you any opinion about the communication question?

UNITED NATIONS: If you will designate a Signal Officer we will have our Signal Officer contact him for arranging details.

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NORTH KOREA: (NAM,IL) We are ready for that. Where and when to meet should be notified by the liaison officers.

UNITED NATIONS: Eleven thirty at the United Nations House, ten thirty your time.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM,IL) We agree.

UNITED NATIONS: I am still not satisfied with your answer concerning the newsmen. I wish to re-emphasize that the presence of newsmen at this conference is considered of major importance to us. I repeat we require twenty newsmen to proceed daily with our delegation from the Imjin River to the site of the conference. Do you have any further comments to make concerning the newsmen ?

NORTH KOREA: (NAM,IL) I have nothing more to say than I gave the answer already. That means that I did not give you the answer. I don't mean to say I refused the newsmen to come to the conference site area but for the time being the matter must be held in abeyance, and the question of the newsmen is not the principle problem for our discussion, so while we carry on our discussion about main problems, we will have chance to talk over the matter. So I find it better to go over to discussing the main problems from now on.

UNITED NATIONS: I wish to discuss the criticism you took up yesterday concerning our agenda. You stated that Item 2 on the United Nations Command agenda is out of proper order. This item deals with authority for the International Red Cross representatives to visit Prisoner of War camps for the purpose of relieving suffering among the prisoners. Every day that this permission is withheld means a day of unnecessary suffering for prisoners of war. The activities of the International Red Cross are equally beneficial to all prisoners regardless of nationality. This Red Cross humanitarian assistance to prisoners does not affect the military situation as does the question of exchange of prisoners of war and therefore is separated

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from the arrangements pertaining to prisoners of war on the United Nations agenda. The government of North Korea in July of 1950 announced its intention to abide by International standards of conduct in respect to prisoners of war. One of these standards is permitting visits by Red Cross representatives to prisoner of war camps as set forth in the Geneva Convention. The North Korea delegation cannot therefore properly object to considering it first on the agenda, an item completing an action which should have been taken long ago. An action which should precede any armistice. Item 3 on the United Nations Command agenda which stipulates that discussions shall be limited to military matters related to Korea only is placed on the agenda in order to emphasize that such are the limitations of the conference, so that no participant may be inclined to forget it. Since all are agreed on this point, there can be no objection to its presence on the agenda. You stated that items 4 and 5 on the United Nations Command proposed agenda were not concrete. Items 4 and 5 were made general in nature and wording rather than specific because it is the belief of the United Nations Command delegation that to do so is most conducive to orderly progress in the formulation of an agenda. It should be particularly noted that Item 4 of the United Nations Command agenda stipulates that a cessation of hostilities and acts of armed forces in Korea shall be accomplished under conditions assuring against their resumption. It is the view of the United Nations Command delegation that assurance against the resumption of hostilities is indispensible to any agreement for a cessation of hostilities. Finally it should be obvious that an agenda item covering the cessation of hostilities could hardly set forth the multitude of details relating to the stopping of hostilities and therefore must be general in wording. Item 5 of the United Nations Command agenda

was explained in yesterday's meeting. This explanation will be repeated: It is the position of the representatives of the United Nations Command that the proper order of business is to first establish the general topices which both sides agree to discuss, then subsequently to determine the specific agreements, the details on which agreement can be reached. Such a case is that of the demilitarized zone. You offered a particular demilitarized zone and a demarcation line as an agenda item. The United Nations Command delegation believes that first it should be agreed that discussion of some demarcation line and some demilitarized zone is desirable and agreeable to both parties. Once this general topic is agreed later meetings can approach the question of which particular line and zone can be agreed upon. (It is for this reason that the UNC agenda contains items which only describe the general area of discussion, as for example, the question of arrangements pertaining to prisoners of war(item9)). No effort should be made to state in an agenda what the details of those arrangements will be. (Rather the UNC agenda item 9 indicates only that both parties are willing to discuss arrangements pertaining to prisoners of war.) Agreement to place any such item on the agenda in no way commits either delegation to any specific details of such arrangements. The same is the case with a demilitarized zone. Both delegations wish to discuss a demilitarized zone. Exactly where this zone shall be, will become a topic of later discussion. We both can agree, however, that the general question of a demilitarized zone should be one of the items to be discussed on the agenda. At the later meeting when the agreed agenda governs, the exact definition of a demilitarized zone may be reached. It must be clearly understood that the United Nations Command delegation is completly uninterested in any imaginary line across Korea

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which has no military significance to the existing military situation.

CHINA: (?) Will you repeat it in English.

UNITED NATIONS: It must be clearly understood that the United Nations Command delegation is completely uninterested in any imaginary line across Korea which has no military significance and bears no relation to the existing military situation. Item 6 of the United Nations Command agenda deals with the composition, authority and functions of a Military Armistice Commission. You indicated that this was not among the main points to be considered. It appears obvious to the United Nations Command delegation that without an authoritative, fully operative Armistice Commission drawn equally from the opposing forces, no assurance can exist that hostilities will not suddenly be resumed, nor indeed that any provisions of the Armistice would be carried out. Item 7 deals with the inspection by the Military Observer Teams which must be drawn equally from both belligerent forces and are to be the eyes and ears of the military Armistice Commission. Without inspection by such teams the vital work of the Military Armistice Commission could not be accomplished and the full implementation of the Armistice could not go forward. Item 8 concerning the composition and functions of Military Observer Teams, provides a framework for establishing exactly how these important inspection teams will be manned and supported, what tasks shall be assigned them, to whom they shall report, and what shall be subject to their inspection. Unless these matters are agreed upon before a cessation of hostilities, critical delays could be encountered in putting the inspection teams into action, and misunderstandings would be numerous. It is apparent to the United Nations Command delegation that this is not a topic

which may be dismissed as non-essential or secondary, but rather it is of equal rank with any other. As previously stated by the United Nations Command delegation, the question of withdrawal of Chinese and United Nations troops from Korea is one involving the highest levels of the governments of the nations concerned, and is quite outside the purview of this conference. The United Nations Command delegation cannot consider the introduction of such an item on the agenda, since the United Nations Command delegation is not empowered to discuss matters beyond the authority of Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. With regards to Item 2 on your agenda, we are prepared to agree with you that the establishment of a demilitarized zone is required.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) Do you mind repeating it again.

(UNITED NATIONS repeats statement).

UNITED NATIONS: However, our position is that we are here to negotiate an Armistice on military terms. By the term "Armistice" we mean mutual agreement to suspend military operations under certain specified conditions.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) Would you mind repeating it again in English?

(N.N. repeats question).

UNITED NATIONS: This Armistice between military commanders in no way prejudices political and territorial settements which may be arrived at on the govermental level. Therefore, the Commander-In-Chief, United Nations Command, from his military viewpoint, is not concerned with imaginary lines on the map, which have no tactical significance, and which bear no relation to the existing military situation. Since the Armistice negotiations pertain purely to military matters, imaginary lines which are not related to terrain have no bearing on the problem. We agree only that all items should be on an agenda. These

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items will be discussed later in an effort to arrive at specific answers to the problems which confront us. We agree only that all our items should be on the agenda. We withdrew that. (Deletion requested).

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) By that you mean you want to cancel your proposal that you want to make?

UNITED NATIONS: No. Just take out that sentence. The one sentence I just said.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) We heard that the senior delegate of the other party has been speaking. There are some question in his speech which I do not quite understand so I am going to ask questions.

Firstly, I don't quite see the connection between the Red Cross representative visiting the prisoners of war and the agreement on the cease fire. Which would be better for the Prisoners of War, to be comforted by delegates of the Red Cross or to be released and go back home and be with their families as soon as possible - which would be better for them? Can there be any other questions discussed at this meeting, other than the question of the Korean War, and if not, how can we put this question in the agenda.

UNITED NATIONS: Will you please repeat that?

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) Can there be any other questions discussed at this meeting, other than the question of the Korean War, and if not - - so as for this item do we expect to discuss any other question than the question of the Korean War? I am not quite clear of the content of your item #4. (What is meant by cessation of hostilities and the cessation of military action - as the operation of hostilities and the cessation of military action - against whom? (By item #4 we mean yours). By item #5 you say there is no cause, no conditions for the resumption of the war and there is no necessity of having the armistice, What is meant by this? That is no necessity of having an armistice if there is no guarantee against the resumption of war. That is

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the wording. Next we would like to know the possible conditions, guarantees, that the armistice can be guaranteed without the withdrawal of foreign troops. What is meant by the military inspection teams? What is meant by armistice commission? Without clearing those questions it will be difficult to discuss the adoption of the agenda, — it will be difficult to discussion the agenda question - - to discuss about the adoption of the agenda. (Discussion about a truck coming into the area with a Navy Captain and three Cameramen).

UNITED NATIONS: Is that all? Has the senior delegate finished?

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) Yes.

UNITED NATIONS: From the tenor of your questions we do not believe you understand yet what we mean by an agenda. We wish to specifically define it again. An agenda is merely a list, in order, of discussions of subjects to be discussed. Is that your understanding of an agenda?

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) We know fully what an agenda means.

UNITED NATIONS: We wish to recess until one o'clock your time or two o'clock our time.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) We agree.

(Conference then recessed at 1228 hours, 11 July 1951).

(The conference reconvened 1400 hours, 11 July 1951)

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) What about the meeting. The time is up.

UNITED NATIONS: I would like to say that we plan to adjourn for the day at 1545 our time and 1445 your time to return to our line. Now I am going to take up some of the questions which the senior delegate asked us before we recessed this morning. You asked whether it would not be better for the prisoners of war to be returned to their families rather than to receive visits from Red Cross representatives. You imply that these two are alternatives, one of which must be chosen over the other. Such

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is not the case. The United Nations Command delegation is in favor of prisoners of war receiving visits from Red Cross representatives and being returned to their homes. Red Cross representatives can visit these prisoners of war tomorrow, if you agree, and can help to relieve the suffering of these prisoners of war pending the time when they can be returned to their families. On the 13th of July 1950, the Government of North Korea sent a telegram to the Secretary General of the United Nations in which it expressly stated its intentions of adhering to the principles of the Geneva Convention. One of these principles is to permit the Red Cross to visit prisoners of war camps. It is difficult for the United Nations Command delegation to understand why the delegate of the North Korean Army can take a stand contrary to that expressed by his government, and in opposition to the humanitarian purposes of the Geneva Convention. You asked what was meant by cessation of hostilities and cessation of acts of armed force. By cessation of hostilities, we mean to stop the application of all combatant forms of armed force in Korea. By cessation of acts of armed force, we mean to stop utilizing armed forces in any manner, whether by movement, reinforcement, re-equipment, positioning, or threat to change the situation existing at the time of the beginning of the armistice.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) We think you didn't quite understand the question. We know clearly what the cessation of hostilities and cessation of the acts of armed force mean, but I refer specifically to Item 4 of your proposal that you are talking about that in Korea. It says guaranteeing against the resumption of the war in Korea.

UNITED NATIONS: We will come to that.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) And what is meant by the guarantee?

UNITED NATIONS: You stated you saw no necessity of having an Armistice if

there was no guarantee against the resumption of war. An armistice put in effect without any guarantees against resumption of hostilities can permit the growth of attacking power on the part of both belligerents during the period of inaction. Thus, when the armistice ends, as it might in the absence of guarantees against resumption of hostilities, the warfare will be even more terrible and ravaging than before. You asked what are the guarantees which will safegurad an armistice without withdrawal of foreign troops. First the creation of an authoritative Armistice Commission with adequate observation teams. Second, the establishment of a demilitarized zone. Third, agreements on armistice terms between commanders of the belligerent forces including agreements to recognize the authority of the Armistice Commission. You asked what is meant by a Military Armistice Commission. It is a commission which has free and unlimited access to the whole of a specified area to insure that the terms, conditions and arrangements as agreed to by the Commanders of the belligerent forces are carried out by all armed forces involved.

The membership of the Military Armistice Commission would be subject to agreement by commanders of the belligerent forces. Normally, it would consist of equal representation on both sides.

An Armistice Commission supervises the inspection of the activities of both belligerent forces during the duration of the Armistice. It reports violations of the terms of the armistice to the commanders of the belligerent forces.

You asked what is meant by Military Observation Teams. Military Observation teams are the agencies of the Armistice Commission which perform the actual observation to determine whether the terms of the armistice are being carried out. One

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of the criticisms of the United Nations Command agenda offered by you was that the United Nations Command agenda is "not concrete". I note on your agenda and item 4 which states, "Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease fire and armistice in Korea." What do you mean by concrete arrangements?

NORTH KOREA: (NAM,IL) Before I give you the answer to the term "concrete" in item 4 of our proposal, I am going to ask one thing. That is one thing. Could you give me the answer to the question I put to you?

UNITED NATIONS: What is the question ?

NORTH KOREA: (NAM,IL) I asked what relation has the sending of representatives of the Red Cross to the Prisoner of War Camps--What relation has that with the present meeting on discussion of cease fire?

UNITED NATIONS: We will consider your question more fully and answer you later. One thing it does, it shows good faith of the representatives and insures proper treatment of prisoners.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM,IL) Now I will give an answer what is mean by the word "concrete". That is when we discuss item 2 and item 3 of our proposal and then when we take concrete measures for the realization of it, that means "concrete ". That is as to item 2 and 3.

UNITED NATIONS: Our interpreter will repeat in Korean to be sure that is correct.

(Interpreter then repeated in Korean).

UNITED NATIONS: Do you mean that items 2 and 3 must be carried out before you can discuss a concrete arrangement?

NORTH KOREA: (NAM,IL) Of course, yes sir. Items 2 and 3 must be carried out before concrete arrangements can be made. Number 2 and 3 must be agreed upon. When we are agreed upon items 2 and 3 then we will have the concrete measures. When we are agreed upon items 2 and 3 we will go into the concrete measures as mentioned in item 4.

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UNITED NATIONS: I am going to rephrase this another way to make sure we are clear as to what you mean. Do you mean that if an agreement on items 2 and 3 were made that item 4 could be discussed? Item 3 would be the details -- that is the concrete arrangements for carrying out items 2 and 3. Is that what you mean?

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) That is it.

UNITED NATIONS: In other words you do not wish to elaborate on Item 4 at this time.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) I think the word "concrete" in item 4 is clearly explained isolated. We cannot discuss it. I said before discussing item 2 and 3 -- we cannot isolate item 4 and discuss it alone.

UNITED NATIONS: Do you wish to make any further comments on any nature concerning the agenda?

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) Yes we have. As I mentioned yesterday that the proposal of the other side is not in proper order. I will talk over it again. The senior delegate of the other party asked me if I clearly understood the term "agenda". On this point I want to ask on my side. By agenda it is meant that the items that will be discussed at a meeting by ordered items which will be discussed at a meeting must be considered first when the agenda is/formed being. What are the important problems to be discussed at a meeting? Then the important problems must be discussed first. That is to say that kind of problems should be discussed and what are the central problems, then the central problems be discussed first. When you consider the proposed agenda from the other party want to discuss first the location of the prisoner of war camps and visits by the Red Cross representative. Then can we not discuss today the question of cease fire without talking about the location of the prisoner of war camps and the visiting of it by the representatives of the Red Cross. Which are more important for us at a meeting -- the question of ceasing

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[redacted] fire, and the question of armistice, or the question of visiting the prisoner of war camps by the Red Cross representatives? Judging from the nature of our meeting this is a meeting for the agreement on cease fire on both sides. If so, the basic problems about the cease fire must possés the first place. Therefore, I think that the question of Prisoner of War Camps cannot possess first place. Then that means that the agenda proposed is not in proper order. Now I am going to talk about the nature of the situation of the Prisoner of War camps and the authority of the representatives of the Red Cross. We observe the International Law as to the treatment of the prisoners of war. When I spoke this morning I didn't say anything against the declar tion of our government which our government made on 13 July 1950. The questions lies here that the dispatch of representatives of the Red Cross to the Prisoner of war camps has nothing to do with the nature of our meeting- no relation with this meeting.

When the senior delegate of the other p rty spoke this morning that the dispatch of the Red Cross representative is not a military matter-- has nothing to do with military matters-- I agreed. Then this meeting is solely concerned with military affairs and if the matter has nothing to do with military affairs, why should we bring that forward at a meeting. In your proposal as I said -- it is item 3 -- discussions will be limited at this and all subsequent meetings to purely military matters relating to Korea only. In your proposal you say so, and I put a question, "Is it necessary?" Is it necessary to have this problem on the agenda and I have not yet received any answer for that. We are bound in duty to discuss only Korean military matters at this meeting. If so, it is not necessary to have that on the agenda. That also, means that the proposed agenda is not in proper order. As for other questions

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[redacted]TED that is to say items 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 as to those items I spoke yesterday already. Then why do I think that the agenda we proposed is proper--is right. In the first place in this agenda it is suggested that the basic problems must be discussed first. It items 2 and 3 are not agreed upon other things cannot be discussed--can hardly be discussed--it is difficult to discuss other items. Without ceasing hostilities in Korea and without carrying out cease fire in Korea we cannot discuss the armistice.

UNITED NATIONS: I would like you to repeat the last.

NORTH KOREA: (NAK, IL) Without agreeing upon item 2 we connot discuss the armistice in Korea. Without agreeing upon item 2 we cannot discuss-- without agreeing upon Item 2 we cannot discuss the Armistice. We cannot discuss other questions without agreeing upon Item 2. Without having Item 2 and Item 3 agreed upon, we cannot discuss further items. Is that clear? Without having items 2 and 3 agreed upon it is difficult to discuss further items.

UNITED NATIONS: We are discussing now what to put on the agenda. Do you mean agreeing to put Items 2 and 3 on the agenda, or agreeing to their principle?

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) So of course, first we are talking about the agenda, so we want to have it in the agenda first. So before Items 2 and 3 we cannot discuss Item 4. Therefore in the agenda these items must occupy first place.

NORTH KOREA: Hello, hello. May I explain that? As those things are important things, they must occupy the first place in the agenda. If they are important. Are you clear?

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) Then what kind of opinion have you for that.

UNITED NATIONS: When I mention general, I am referring to item 5 on our agenda which is a general question -- a general item, on the demilitarized zone. You are in fact talking about one line when as

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NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) We have(sh. d)you our line. What are the possible lines for you?

UNITED NATIONS: We do not suggest any line because that is getting into the substance for discussion of that item.

NORTH KOREA NAM, IL) As for a line, we proposed a concrete line.

UNITED NATIONS: As I understand it, you do not wish to broaden the question of a demilitarized zone.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) Please say that again.

UNITED NATIONS: As I understand it you do not wish to broaden Item 2 on your agenda from what you have proposed?

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) May I ask what you imply by "broaden"?

UNITED NATIONS: To make it more general.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) Our proposal in general. I put the question about the relatior about the despatch of red cross representatives and the Armisti and for that I have not yet received any answer.

UNITED NATIONS: Referring again to your item 2 on the agenda, we cannot agree t have any specific line on the agenda as you propose.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) You do not agree?

UNITED NATIONS: We will agree to place on the agenda the establishment of some demilitarized zone. The location and limits of that zone can be discussed later when the substance of the item is taken up. I would like to reemphasize that the work of this meeting is not to determine solutions of problems, lines, ect., but to formulated an agenda--in other words, a statement of the problems to be discussed at later meetings.

NORTH KOREA: We cannot consider the 38th parallel line as an imaginary line. The 38the parallel line had existed and the war broke out right on that line. Therefore, it is the principle that the question of the cease fire must be concluded also on the 38th

[redacted]

[redacted] parallel line. Therefore, this must be on the genda.

UNITED NATI NS: You have made it very clear to me that you refuse to generalize item 2. I can take no other interpretation of your comment As for your question about the Red Cross, I have already told you that we would discuss the matter at a later meeting more fully. Before we recess, I wish to read to you a despatch I have receive from the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command:

"I desire that you inform the Communist delegates as follows: The presence of a selected number of newsmen at a conference of such major importance to the entire world is considered an inherent right by members of the United Nations. Therefore, a selected group of professional newsmen, photographers and newsreel cmer men numbering approximately 20 will accompany and be an integral part of the United Nations Command delegation to any or all future sessions beginning 12 July.

NORTH KOREA: You mean the newspapermen are an integral part of the delegatio

UNITED NATIONS: Delegation party -- the command party that comes up every day not in here. "This partyof newsmen will be controlled by our officer personnel. The United Nations Command neither asks nor desires that newsmen be admitted to the conference room." "Signed Ridgway". If by tommorrow morning you still feel that newsmen are unacceptable at the site fo the conference we request that you inform us by 0730 tomorrow by what date it will be possible to resume the conference with newsmen present at the conference site.

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) I am not quite clear. Do you mean that without the party of Newspapermen, you don't want to proceed with the meeting at all

UNITED NATIONS: We wish to proceed with the meeting, but we will recess until you inform us that the newsmen are acceptable.

[redacted]

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (NAM, IL) I understand. How can we communicate with you as to the newspapermen.

UNITED NATIONS: We have communications established now b telephone. Either you can call us by phone or our liaison officer could come up to the half-way point and meet yours. 7;30 by telephone, or the halfway point. 7:30 our time. If it is acceptable we will continue the meeting at the same time as today.

(Adjourned at 1555)

C. R. Green

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY
C. R. GREEN
CHSCLK, USN

[redacted]



NEW FOLDER BEGINS

0000046

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

15 July 1951

28

[redacted]

RESTRICTED

Subj: Meetings on the Armistice Proposal in Korea

RECORD OF EVENTS - 15 JULY 1951 PROCEEDINGS

1410K Convened. Opening remarks by Senior United Nations Delegate, proposing details of a neutral zone for the conference, removal of armed personnel from the zone and freedom of movement by the United Nations Delegation along the route to the conference site.

1424K: Communists agree in principle, ask recess.

1426K: Recess.

1444K: Reconvened. Communists ask that neutral zone details be settled by liaison officers.

1450K: UN suggests liaison officers meet after session ends today.

1455K: Communist delegate talks about agenda, including Red Cross visits to POW Camps, the place of political questions, establishing 38th Parallel as military demarkation line, and withdrawal of foreign troops.

1527K: UN explanation of Red Cross item and agreement to discuss it under general topic of "Prisoners of War" later on the agenda; opposition to establishing any parallel as military demarkation line.

1600K: Recess

FIRST SMOOTH DRAFT
TRANSCRIPT OF 15 JULY 1951 PROCEEDINGS

[redacted]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

[redacted] 15 July 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of 15 July Proceedings:
Meeting on the Armistice Proposal in Korea.

1410K Conference convened at Kaesong, Korea.

Present:

UNITED NATIONS	COMMUNISTS
DELEGATES	
Vice Admiral C. T. Joy, USN Senior Delegate	Lieutenant General Nam Il, NKPA, Senior Delegate
Major General L. C. Craigie USAF	Lieutenant General Tung Hua, CCF
Major General S. Y. Paik, ROKA	Major General Lee Sang Jo, NKPA
Major General H. I. Hodes, USA	Major General Fang Hsieh, CCF
Rear Admiral A. A. Burke, USN	Major General Chang Pyong San, NKPA

Staff Assistants

Interpreters

Stenographers

Opening remarks by the Senior United Nations Delegate,
Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy.

UNITED NATIONS: I regret that we are a few minutes late for the meeting. The delegates of the United Nations Command know your recognition of the basic principles of reciprocity of treatment for the meetings and is now prepared to proceed with the details of a neutral zone which must be determined by the delegation. The other details can be arranged by our liaison officers. It is understood that the size of each delegation's party will not exceed 150 persons. This is our proposal concerning the details of the neutral

[redacted]

[redacted]:

a. Limits: A rough circular area having a radius of approximately 5 miles centered on the traffic circle in Kaesong on the east circumference of the circle shall extend to include Pang Mon Jom.

b. Both sides have undertaken during the period of negotiations to refrain from acts of armed force within the limits of the neutral zone.

c. It is our understanding that all major combat formations are removed from the neutral zone and that only the minimum number required to perform military police functions are maintained therein. The arms carried by these troops shall be limited to those which are appropriate for this function.

The area of the conference:

a. This area is defined by a circle having a radius of approximately 1/2 mile centered on the house in which the conference is held.

b. All armed personnel shall be removed from the conference area. The minimum number of unarmed guards desired to perform the necessary military police function shall be provided by your side.

Road leading to the conference area:

a. The agreed route between Pang Mon Jom to the conference area shall be opened to unrestricted use by vehicles of the United Nations Command during the hours of daylight. No notice shall be given for such use and such road shall be free of armed personnel.

Settlement of additional details:

Settlement of additional details insofar as practical any details which develop in the implementation of these provisions shall be settled by the liaison officers.

[redacted]

[redacted] The United Nations Command Delegation is prepared to resume the conference when notified by the senior delegate when the foregoing conditions obtain. This afternoon we were delayed a few minutes by your outpost sentries who did not permit passage of two jeeps in advance of the main convoy. We expectthis will not happen again. I was in one of the advance jeeps. The sentries insisted that we wait until the main convoy catch up with us.

1424K
NORTH KOREANS: In principle we agree with you on the problem presented but there are some technical questions of which we have to consider and for that we would want to have about 15 minutes recess.

1426K
UNITED NATIONS: We agree.

(Conference then recessed at 1426K hours).

1444K Conference reconvened.

NORTH KOREA: We agree with you on the problem presented about the neutral zone. As for the technical questions I think the liaison officers can arrange it. When the time and place is designated our liaison officers are ready. I think we better make an end of these questions and come over to the main problem. I am going now to say something about my opinion on the agenda. Do you have anything to say against it?

UNITED NATIONS: I suggest that the liaison officers meet after this meeting is adjourned here. We wish to recess this meeting at 1600 hours our time.

NORTH KOREA: I am going to speak about the agenda. After listening to the explanation you made at the last session on your proposed agenda, I made a study of your agenda and your explanation on it. It has been brought out in your criticism that you regard our proposed agenda as incorrect, and cannot consider our proposed agenda as appropriate.

[redacted]

We consider your agenda as inappropriate. I propose that our proposed agenda be adopted as the agenda for subsequent meetings. Why do I say your proposed agenda is inappropriate? The purpose of adopting an agenda for a conference is to determine what questions are to be discussed and what questions are not to be discussed, what questions are so important as to constitute independent items on the agenda and what questions, although related to the main subjects of the conference, are not important enough to constitute individual items on the agenda. What is more important? It should be determined which ones among these questions constitute individual items, which should be discussed first and which should be discussed second. Judging by this common interpretation, your proposed agenda is defective in that it fails to determine between what is light and what is weighty, and puts the cart before the horse. I would like to only give my views more fully on the proposed items, one by one. Regarding Item 2 on your proposed agenda I have asked you at the last session what essential relations there are between the question of location of, and authority for, International Red Cross Representatives to visit Prisoner of War Camps and the Armistice in Korea, which is the main subject of our discussions. Even if we should admit that some kind of relationship should exist between these questions and our Armistice negotiations, what reason is there for placing this

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question on the agenda as an individual item? What is more incomprehensible? We do not understand on what grounds this question is presented in your proposed agenda as the first question to be discussed during our negotiations - - - as if we could not begin discussing an Armistice in Korea without disucssing the location of Prisoner of War camps. Does not the fact of your placing such a question in the first place - - - that is the most important place in the agenda - - - prove that your proposed agenda fails to distinguish between what is light and what is weighty and puts the cart before the horse?

Next, regarding the 3rd item on your proposed agenda that is the nature ofthis conference, you have raised this point in your first speech and I have already answered you definitely and unmistakably. I said this conference of ours is an armistice conference.

[redacted]

[redacted] it is to discuss the questions of military demarkation line, withdrawal of armed forces of foreign countires, cease fire and armistice.

These are the questions to be discussed just as I have proposed in my opening statement. If it is not clear it is, of course, impossible to separate political questions from military questions. When military questions are being discussed, political questions will inevitably be involved. These questions of political character may be left out and turned over to some other conference. Is not this answer of mine sufficient? Yet you still insist on placing this question on the agenda. I do not see any necessity in doing so. I would request you to tell me which of the these inter-related questions, is not military in character. It is quite incomprehensible why a question already solved and no longer existing should be kept on the agenda and in such an important position.

Items 4 and 5 on your proposed agenda seem superficial to get to our main subjects, but I cannot point out that you have presented these questions in such a way as to confuse the major with the minor points to revert cause and effect and to submerge the main questions in abstract phrases and have isolated the question of cessation of hostilities and acts of armed force in Korea.

Item 4 relates to the cessation of hostilities and acts of armed force in Korea under conditions which will assure against resumption of hostilities and acts of armed force in Korea. Everybody knows that if the conclusion of the war in Korea simply depends on the requirement of some

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abstract assurances, the realization of cease fire and armistice in Korea would not have been so difficult and would have been achieved long ago. Everybody knows that if the problem was simple, why then is not cease fire in Korea realized? There is a reason for it. In order that armistice in Korea may be realized there must be certain fundamental conditions. If these fundamental conditions are not looked into, if they are not taken as the main questions in bringing out the conclusion of the Korean war, which should be discussed first, the conclusion of the Korean war, should be important. However, you have not presented this as an individual item and given it priority but have talked ambiguously about the so-called conditions which will insure against resumption of hostilities and acts of armed force in Korea, and have not placed it, moreover, in the leading position. This is obviously evading the main issue and will not lead to the settlement of any problem. It is true that the question of a demilitarized zone is mentioned in your Item 5, but it should still be like building a house without bricks. If the question of a demilitarized zone is separated from the question of the establishment of a military demarkation line, and our way of presenting the matter is contrary to yours, we start with the explanation that at the outbreak of the Korean war and the fact that it cannot be brought to an end, is because the 38th Parallel, the military demarkation line recognized by the whole world, was violated by one of the belligerents. Hence, in order to realize an armistice in Korea it is necessary to establish the 38th Parallel as a military demarkation line between both sides and to take the establishment of this line as a basic condition for an

[redacted] armistice in Korea. It is only when agreement is reached on this question that an armistice in Korea will be possible, then the establishment of a demilitarized zone will naturally follow and become a technical problem easy to be settled. There is another more fundamental reason why the Korean war cannot be brought to an end and peace restored in Korea. It is because the armed forces of foreign countries have been drawn into Korea, thus preventing the Korean people from settling their own affairs by themselves. In order to end the Korean war and restore peace in Korea, it is therfore necessary to damand that all armed forces of foreign countries should be withdrawn from Korea. This questions must be discussed before we can discuss cease fire in Korea. It is for this reason that we considered these two questions are of foremost importance for armistice in Korea and place them as the 2nd and 3rd Items on our agenda. This is completely in accordance with logical sequence. You opposed the inclusion in the agenda of the question of the establishment of the 38th Parallel as a military demarkation line. You believed that to do so would be to commit the error of placing particular concrete questions in the category of general questions. You assert to formulate the questions in a general way would be conducive to the progress of the conference, but we consider that the question of the 38th Parallel is the basic question for ending the Korean war Discussions of this question can only be that of the recognition or non -recognition of the 38th Parallel and not that of making a choice between the 37th and 38th or 39th Parallels. Only when there is recognition of the 38th parallel will it be possible to end the Korean war. Without

[redacted] such recognition, there is no basis for negotiating an armistice. Mr. Malik said on June 23rd the belligerents should hold talks on cease fire and armistice, with both sides withdrawing their armed forces from the 38th Parallel. This statement is the formulation of the 38th Parallel as the military demarkation line for the belligerents and should be the basis for an armistice in Korea. This is just and reasonable. We would like to ask whether or not you recognize the 38th Parallel as the military demarkation line for both sides. As to the question of withdrawal of armed forces of foreign countries we deem that it is an indispensable condition insuring the conclusion of the war and restoration of peace in Korea. I believe that we are here to negotiate an armistice for the restoration of peace in Korea and not for the cessation of hostilities, only to start them anew. If you have good faith, what reason do you have to avoid this major question which is so closely related to the armistice? You stated your command headquarters had not authorized you to discuss this important item which is indispensable to the question of armistice. Authorization or non-authorization, that is your own affair, but we must regard you as delegates with full powers of the other belligerent side to negotiate an armistice in Korea, which in fact, you are. Since this is the case, you can have no reason for only some questions on the armistice and refusing to discuss other questions of the armistice. Therefore I have to say that your refusal to discuss the question of withdrawal of armed forces of foreign countries is not justifiable. Our proposed agenda insists that the two main questions, the 38th Parallel as a military demarkation line and the withdrawal of the armed

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[redacted] forces of foreign countries, to be discussed first and then to proceed with the discussion of concrete arrangements for cease fire and armistice. Under the latter item it will be necessary to discuss questions relating to the implementation of the terms of the armistice but we feel that such questions as these do not have to be listed independently. Yet Items 6, 7, 8, on your proposed agenda are all such subordinate questions pertaining to concrete arrangements for carrying out cease fire and the armistice. Moreover, you have stipulated these items in such detail and so concretely as if these organizations alone could assure peace in Korea. In fact, without the establishment of the 38th Parallel as a military demarkation line and without the withdrawal of armed forces from foreign countries no organization whatsoever can assure that the flames of war will not flare up again in Korea nor can it assure peace in Korea. In view of the above mentioned reasons I consider that your proposed agenda is very inappropriate. Our proposed agenda is just, reasonable, and proper. This conference should adopt our proposed agenda.

1527K
UNITED NATIONS: Your proposal for the adoption of your agenda is noted but we do not believe it to be correct for the proper type of agenda for this meeting for reasons which we have carefully explained to you before. We will take up each item one at a time in an endeavor to explain to you again why we feel as we do.

You asked me on what grounds the item of the Red Cross is placed early on our agenda. I will answer that question first. Our delegation has tried to make clear that we believe the question of reporting the location of Prisoner of

[redacted] War camps and observation of these camps by the International Red Cross are matters of importance to the military commanders of both sides as well as to the Prisoners of War themselves. Both sides recognize that the welfare and health of the Prisoners of war are matters for which military commanders are responsible.

We believe that if both sides permitted visits to the Prisoner of War camps by the International Red Cross the state of mind of the families of the Prisoners of War and the Prisoners of War themselves of both sides would be immediately relieved because of the personal and material benefits resulting from such visits. We believe that such action now would permit observation by the neutral International Red Cross while the discussion of the other items is being conducted. We advanced our proposal to place this item early on the agenda for purely humanitarian reasons. We desired to alleviate the sufferings of Prisoners of War on both sides as early as possible, pending their return to their families. We also believe that the clear-cut observance of the international rules of warfare which have been agreed to and carried out by many nations at war in the past, would be an indication of good will and good faith by the delegates meeting here. We still hold this view.

The Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, has directed that I request you to pass to your Supreme Commander this important and humanitarian request: "It is requested that you report the location of the Prisoner of War camps to the International Red Cross and that you permit the representatives of the International Red Cross to visit these camps without further delay."

While we continue to maintain that this question is a military matter of high urgency, we are prepared to accept

[redacted]

your representations and discuss this problem under the general topic of "Prisoners of War"as alater item on the agenda.

UNITED NATIONS: I wish to re-emphazize that this item was placed on the agenda because we believe it to be a military matter. The reason it was placed as Item 2 on our agenda is purely for humanitarian purposes. You have stated that it is the opinion of your delegation that it is not necessary to have an item on the agenda concerning limiting the discussion at these meetings to military matters in Korea only. You assured us that since this is a meeting of delegates representing military commanders our meetings will be confined to military matters. We accept these assurances and will therefore agree to remove this item from the agenda. You stated in our earlier meetings that your Item 2 stipulating that a military demarkation line should be a particular parallel of latitude is of general nature. Certainly there are an indefinite number of lines acroos Korea extending from east to west and to select one of these, which has no military significance and is unrelated to the present military situation, is distictly not a general approach to the question. In regard to the parallel of latitude, the United Nations Command must now make the following statement: In preparing your agenda items you have repeatedly referred to a specific line in connection with the demilitarized zone. In contrast, the United Nations Command is recommending a agenda item dealing with the question of a demilitarized zone in Korea, but leaving the question of precisely where this zone shall be to discussion following the formulation of an agenda. In an effort to avoid fruitless discussion and expedite the development of an agenda, the United Nations Command Delegation offers the

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following exposition of its views with reference to any specific line crossing Korea: The military personnel of both opposing forces here assembled by virtue of their military experience know that a parallel of latitude is only a line on the map. Any degree of latitude crossing Korea has no significance from a military standpoint. The geographical lines in which military men are principally interested and which are of significance to the military situation are real lines affecting the military situation such as river lines, ridge lines, coast lines, and natural lines of communication and supply, and lines of contact between forces. Certainly no line of latitude bears any relation to the military situation existing in Korea at this time. Parallels of latitude are military non-entities in the Korean war. You stated that the Korean war began on a parallel of latitude and therefore must end on the same parallel of latitude. As military men we see absolutely no logic in that, and no precedent supporting such irrelevant reasoning. Accordingly, the United Nations Command Delegation will not discuss any particular line of latitude across Korea in connection with the development of an agenda. I will continue my remarks at our meeting tomorrow which I propose at 0900 hours your time and 1000 hours our time.

(Conference adjourned at 1600 hours)

First Smooth Draft
Transcript of:
15 July 1951 Proceedings

OFFICIAL

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, U.S.N.,
Secretary.

Certified to be a true copy:
C. K. Green
C. R. GREEN
CHSCLK, USN

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

16 July 1951

[redacted]

23

Subj: Meeting on the Armistice Proposal in Korea

RECORD OF EVENTS - 16 JULY 1951 PROCEEDINGS

1000K: Convened. Restatement by Senior UN Delegate on what an agenda is, rejection of a parallel of latitude instead of a demilitarized zone as a proper agenda item, refusal to discuss withdrawal of foreign troops, statement that the agenda is for guiding armistice discussions, not a peace conference. Senior UN Delegate again reads proposed UN agenda.

1048K: Senior Communist delegate asks recess.

1100K: Recess.

1321K: Senior UN delegate explains UN position on "concrete arrangements", including Armistice Commission and Observer Teams.

1343K: NK spokesman says he cannot fully understand.

1344K: Senior UN delegate comments on progress made. Suggests recess.

1345K: Recess.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

[redacted]

16 July 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of 16 July 1951 Proceedings:
Meeting on the Armistice Proposal in Korea.

1000K Conference convened at Kaesong, Korea.

Delegates present:

UNITED NATIONS	COMMUNISTS
Vice Adm C T Joy USN Senior Delegate	Lt Gen Nam Il,NKPA,Sen Dalegate
Maj Gen L C Craigie USAF	Lt Gen Tung Hua, CCF
Maj Gen S Y Paik, ROKA	Maj Gen Lee Sang Jo, NKPA
Maj Gen H I Hodes, USA	Maj Gen Fang Hsieh, CCF
Rear Adm A A Burke USN	Maj Gen Chang Pyong San,NKPA

Staff Assistants

Interpreters
Stenographers

Opening remarks by the Senior United Nations Delegate,
Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy.

UNITED NATIONS: Continuing my remarks of yesterday, I wish to re-emphasize that the first purpose of this conference is to agree upon a method of achieving an Armistice. We have both agreed that the first step is to adopt an agenda - to mutually agree upon the items which must be discussed. These items will include the major problems which must be solved before an Armistice can become effective. An agenda item should not be a statement of the position of one party; but should be a statement of the problem. After the agenda is adopted, both sides will have ample opportunity to state, and produce arguments in support of their respective problems.

[redacted]

[redacted]

The first point of major importance relative to the affecting of an Armistice in this case is: The establishment of a demilitarized zone across Korea.

In the light of the above, let us now review briefly our discussions thus far and attempt to determine the reason for our failure to agree on this major item of the agenda. You have proposed, as one of your principal agenda items, that a particular parallel of latitude be the main determinant of the demilitarized zone. You invited the United Nations Command delegation to state the line upon which it proposed to base the demilitarized zone. We declined, and will continue to do so until an agenda has been adopted and the item of the agenda pertaining to the demilitarized zone comes up for discussion.

In connection with the question of a demilitarized zone, you have submitted as a proposed agenda item a statement which is narrowly restrictive of the general problem. You criticized my proposed agenda item on this subject as being too general, yet you defended your own wording of this item by saying that your wording is general in nature. In effect, you propose that I accept as an agenda item, working on the subject of a demilitarized zone which excludes any view but one of your own. On the contrary, I have proposed wording of this item which would include any view on the matter, specifically including any exposition of your views you may wish to make. Why do you seek more than that from the wording of an agenda item? If the wording is such that both parties are free to discuss their respective views in all detail, why delay the progress of these meetings by futilely insisting that only your own view appear on the

[redacted]

agenda? Surely you realize that the formulation of the agenda is not the phase of negotiations in which to seek to impose your ideas on others.

In relation to the question of the demilitarized zone, you insist that it is necessary to first establish a military demarkation line. It is clear to both of us that a zone is a band of territory having width. It cannot be defined by one line. We need, in fact, two demarkation lines; the one demarkating the northern boundary of the zone; the other demarkating the southern boundary of the zone.

Where these demarkation lines shall be is a substantive issue which is to be settled during discussions after the agenda is adopted.

In spite of the fact that it is obviously essential to include an item pertaining to a demilitarized zone, we have made little progress toward agreeing on the wording of such an item. You have insisted that the item specify a parallel of latitude as the basic determinant of the zone, while the United Nations Command delegation holds that the item should be kept general in nature. You have proposed that the item dealing with the demilitarized zone be placed on the agenda as item number two. We are prepared to accept that position. In turn we ask that you accept the following wording of the item and I quote, "Establishment of a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea." Unquote.

NORTH KOREA: The item as proposed - - please read it again. The contents that item alone.

UNITED NATIONS: In turn we ask that you accept the following wording of the item: "Establishment of a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea."

[redacted]

As regards your point 3, you have continued to press the question of withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. For example, at the third meeting you insisted upon regarding the United Nations Command delegation as having full powers to discuss that question. Such is not the case. The United Nations Command delegation has repeatedly made it as plain as it can that it is not empowered to discuss the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. Such a matter is for discussion and decision at the highest level of the governments concerned. It is beyond the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command and consequently, of this delegation. Therefore, this delegation shall be completely unresponsive to any efforts on your part to place the question of withdrawing foreign troops from Korea on the agenda.

We have studied the two agendas proposed by our delegation and yours. There are many items on which general agreement is possible including the order or relative priority of topics on the agenda.

It would appear, therefore, that we have the structure of a mutually acceptable agenda if both parties will refrain from arguing for a specific wording or version and will accept a general statement sufficiently broad to encompass the arguments its delegates wish to present at meetings solely devoted to particular topics. Such a reconciled agenda will be submitted. If you approve this agenda we can rapidly get to work on the fundamental purpose of these meetings. Attention is invited to the fact that this agenda is designed to guide discussions of an Armistice, not of a peace conference. The machinery indicated in sub-titles listed uhder our "Concrete arrangements for a cease

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fire and Armistice in Korea" are temporary in nature, and are intended as a bridge to the period when a peace conference, not an armistice conference, has settled the future of Korea. I will again state, since it appears necessary that the purpose of this meeting is to develop an agenda for an Armistice conference, we military men are not here to discuss terms of peace. Such broad discussions, covering political, economic and social subjects as well as military subjects, are for some other conference to consider. The subjects properly covered by a peace conference are beyond the province of military men. You said yesterday and I quote, "These questions of political character may be left out and turned over to some other conference." Unquote. I agree with that remark, in fact the United Nations Command delegation must insist upon its application to our conference. That is why we must reject item 3 of your agenda. Our delegation is not authorized to discuss such subjects and has no intention of seeking such incongruous authority for a military delegation. Recognized rules of warfare define an armistice as follows: I quote "An armistice is not a partial or a temporary peace; it is only the suspension of military operations to the extent and under conditions agreed upon by the parties concerned." Our revised agenda is one designed to serve an armistice conference. Yours is mixed between an armistice and a peace conference. I therefore propose that my agenda be adopted since it is the only one advanced at this meeting which fits the purpose for which we are here.

I will now read our proposed agenda:

1. Adoption of agenda.

[redacted]

[redacted]

2. Establishment of a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

3. Concrete arrangements for a cease fire and armistice in Korea which will insure against a resumption of hostilities and acts of armed force in Korea pending a final peace settlement. Under Item 3, we include:

a. Military Armistice Commission, including composition, authority and functions.

b. Military observer teams, including composition, authority and functions.

4. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war. Here are copies of our proposed agenda in English.

1046K
NORTH KOREA: Have you anything more to say?

UNITED NATIONS: Not at the present time.

NORTH KOREA: We listened carefully to what you said. We want to think over the matter and we want about two hour recess, until 12 o'clock our time, 1 o'clock your time.

1058K.
UNITED NATIONS: We will have to leave here at 3 o'clock our time, 2 o'clock your time, this afternoon.

NORTH KOREA: We will study the matter.

(conference then recessed at 1100 hours, 16 July 1951)

The conference reconvened at 1300 hours, 16 July 1951.

NORTH KOREA: Preliminary, we have studied your proposed agenda. We think that your agenda this time is far better than your original agenda. By discussing further, we will agree and we think we will rapidly go over to more concrete problems. But we still think there is something not quite appropriate in your proposed agenda. I will show you my preliminary opinion about your agenda one by one, item by item. As to the second item, we cannot give up our primary standpoint--

[redacted]

[redacted]

we do not think of giving up our primary standpoint. It must be the basis for the Cease Fire talks, to make the 38th parallel line as the military demarkation line. Therefore, we insisted that this should be the second item on the agenda. But in order to reach an agreement, we are not going to have this concrete military demarkation line in the agenda, and we agree to have the general military demarkation line on the agenda as you propose. I will repeat it. But in order to reach an agreement, we are not going to have a specific--concrete--military demarkation line on the agenda but we agree to have the general demarkation line as you proposed on the agenda. And I propose to revise Item 2 of your proposed agenda as follows: I propose to revise the establishment of the military demarkation line between both sides as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea, and the establishment of a demilitarized zone. I will read it again.....the establishment of a military demarkation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea. But we will insist on definitely having the 38th parallel as the military demarkation line between both sides when we come to discuss the agenda. As to Item 3, we cannot agree to your opinion, because we cannot agree with you that you cannot discuss the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea as you are not empowered by your Commander,

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because this question is closely connected with our Coase Fire talk--this is a question which is closely connected with our cease fire talk. We think the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea is a guarantee against the resumption of hostilities in Korea. By doing so alone, our talk can play the role of a bridge for bringing forth a final peace--for the final peaceful solution of the Korean problem. I will repeat this again. By doing so alone, our talk can play the role of a bridge for the final peaceful solution--a bridge which will bring forth a final peaceful solution of the Korean problem. Clear? Therefore, this problem must be discussed at this meeting and must have an important place. I propose to have this included in Item 3 of the agenda. Item 3 of your proposed agenda is further progress as compared with your previous proposed agenda--Item 3 of your agenda. In the past you proposed the item as to the observation of the problem of Cease Fire as an independent item, but this time you presented it as a sub-item. This is a progress of the problem. In my speech yesterday, I mentioned that this problem will naturally be referred to when you come to discuss the concrete arrangements for Cease Fire and Armistice. Therefore I think in principle there isn't any great distance between the opinions of both sides. I would like to refer to Item 3 of your proposed agenda and say that there isn't any necessity of mentioning so detailed--there is no necessity of regulating so concretely this question in the agenda. I will study more about this item and present my opinion. My preliminary opinion about the agenda that you proposed are as mentioned above.

[redacted]

1321K
UNITED NATIONS: I have the following remarks to present at this time to clarify our position on what we mean by "concrete arrangements."

We meet here as military representatives to negotiate a military armistice. We seek to stop the fighting and to create conditions with respect to the military forces which will insure against resumption of the fighting. We are not empowered to alter or to create political conditions. This is reserved for peace talks which are a matter not for soldiers but for the highest levels of the governments involved. However, we are obligated to make such arrangements as we can to prevent a clash of arms or a resumption of acts of armed force until such time as peace talks make unnecessary such provisions. The proposals contained in our agenda item #3, an Armistice Commission and Observer Teams, are provisions of this sort. They are temporary measures to provide such insurance as is within the scope of military men that fighting will not be resumed during the period of the armistice. These two sub-items do not embrace all the provisions which will be necessary to insure against the resumption of fighting. Your side may desire to present additional sub-items, as may we. We feel, however, that the items listed on the United Nations Command agenda are an essential minimum to prevent the resumption of fighting. We leave the concrete details of composition, authority and functioning of these armistice preservation agencies to the later substantive discussions.

At any time when an order to cease fire is put in effect, there will inevitably be large forces of both sides occupy-

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ing positions from which they could launch attacks. Even with a demilitarized buffer zone between these forces there still remains the capability to resume hostilities suddenly and without warning. It should be clearly evident that under such conditions both a Military Armistice Commission and Military Observation Teams, or their equivalents, are vital necessities.

Before a military commander can be asked to order his troops to cease fire and to give up military advantages which he now enjoys, he must be assured that an agency has been set up which has current knowledge of the complete military situation and, furthermore, is in a position to warn either side if the other violates the terms of the armistice.

1343K
NORTH KOREA: I cannot understand what you mean by that. I cannot fully understand that. I would like to know if you mean any other commission?

1344K
UNITED NATIONS: That is an explanation of why we feel we need an Armistice Commission of which the Observer Teams are a part and functioning under the authority of the Armistice Commission. We have made considerable progress today. I propose that we recess until tomorrow to study the proposals put forth by both sides. I suggest that we meet tomorrow at 1000 hours our time and 0900 hours your time, when I will continue my remarks. Do you have anything further to bring up at this time?

NORTH KOREA: We agree to recess today so far. Having understood so far, we agree to recess today. As for the time, we propose to begin the meeting tomorrow at 1000 hours our time and 1100 hours your time.

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UNITED NATIONS: We agree.

NORTH KOREA: We agree to recess.

(The conference then recessed at 1345 hours,

16 July 1951)

1st SMOOTH DRAFT
Transcript of:
16 July 1951 Proceedings

OFFICIAL

E.C. Thomas
for H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, U.S.N.,
Secretary.

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

28

17 July 1951

Subj: Meeting on the Armistice Proposal in Korea

RECORD OF EVENTS - 17 JULY 1951 PROCEEDINGS

1059K: Reconvened.

1100K: Sparring over which side will comment first on the other's proposed agenda.

1117K: Discussion of Armistice Commission and Military Observer Teams and why UN proposes them as agenda sub-items.

1143K: Communists report several UN soldiers fired toward Pan Mun Jom from a hill northeast of the town, beginning at about 1750 hours. Ask UN to take measures to avoid repetition.

1150K: UN promisies to have liaison officer investigate, assuming report is correct.

1150K: Recess.

1359K: Reconvened. Communists submit proposed agenda, pointing out that while Item 2 omits 38th parallel it still is considered basic; insisting that Item 3 provide for withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and criticizing UN delegation for being unwilling to discuss it; declaring UN proposal for supervising ceasE fire and armistice is too specific.

1435K: UN asks if Communist opinion is formal and revised agenda is official.

1436K: Communists reply is affirmative.

1438K: Recess until 1000K hours 18 July 1951.

[redacted]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

[redacted]

17 July 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of 17 July 1951 Proceeding:
Meeting on the Armistice Proposal in Korea

Conference convened at Kaesong, Korea.

Delegates present:

UNITED NATIONS	COMMUNISTS
VADM C T Joy USN, Sr Delegate	LTGen Nam Il, NKPA, Sr Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie, USAF	LTGen Tung Hua, CCF
MGEN S Y Paik, ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo, NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes, USA	MGEN Fang Hsieh, CCF
RADM A A Burke, USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San, NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

(Conference Reconvened at 1059 hours, 17 July 1951).

1059K
NORTH KOREA: We are ready to hear your speech.

1100K
UNITED NATIONS: Yesterday you stated that your opinions of our revised agenda were informal and preliminary. Have you been able to bring your views closer to ours so that we may clearly reach an agreed agenda?

1101K
NORTH KOREA: In stating my preliminary opinion yesterday I mentioned that if we collaborated further that your proposed agenda and our proposed agenda have been much closer and if we work together further we can adopt a common agenda.
I would like to hear the opinion of the other party about my primary opinion I stated yesterday and hear your opinion and if I hear some of your opinions it will be helpful for my further study. I wish the other party would tell us his opinion about my preliminary opinion I mentioned yesterday.

1104K
UNITED NATIONS: When will you be able to present your formal opinion?

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[redacted]

1104K
NORTH KOREA: As for our formal opinion, we would like to hear your opinion first and them we can formulate our formal opinion.

1105K
UNITED NATIONS: I have formally presented a proposed agenda and explained it. I cannot agree to proceed on your preliminary and infromal opinions. We would prefer to recess until you can present your formal opinions.

1106K
NORTH KOREA: Then you mean that you have no opinion about my preliminary opinion that I presented yesterday?

1107K
UNITED NATIONS: We have made a formal proposal of an agenda and recommended its adoption.

It is our understanding that your comments on it were preliminary. We must await your official and final views on it before proceeding further.

1109K
NORTH KOREA: We presented our formal agenda already, and yesterday we mentioned our preliminary opinion about your proposed agenda. I presented my preliminary opinion yesterday because we wanted to reach a common agenda and you wanted to reach a common agenda and you wanted to arrive at a common aganda, and we presented our preliminary opinion We should hear your opinion of our preliminary opinion and by thus discussing the points arrive at an agenda.

1112K
UNITED NATIONS: We have stated our opinion many times. We still concur with them. We have proposed our agenda. We would like to have your formal opinion on our agenda, item by item, so that we can study it. You have no answer when we can expect it.

1113K
NORTH KOREA: Yesterday I presented my preliminary opinion and I clearly spoke about Item 2 and the withdrawal of foreign forces

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from Korea. I have not yet heard the opinion of the other party about it.

1114K
UNITED NATIONS: We have commented officially on your formally presented agenda. We now await your similar action to our formally presented agenda.

1117K
NORTH KOREA: Here are some questions which I don't understand about the agenda proposed by the other party. We heard about Military Armistice Commission and about Military Observer Teams and we heard your opinion about it and there are still things that are not clear. What is the difference between Military Commission and Military Observer Teams in its functions? What is the difference between both and what are their functions and what are their compositions?

1120K
UNITED NATIONS: Have you any other questions to ask at this time?

1121K
NORTH KOREA: There is one thing more. In Item 3 you say concrete arrangements for a cease fire and armistice in Korea which will insure against resumption of hostilities and pending the final peace settlement. Then you have Item 2, a and b, and by concrete arrangements you mean only these two, a and b, or something more. No further questions.

1124K
UNITED NATIONS: These matters of composition, functions, ect., are to be determined between us at later meetings after the agenda has been agreed to. The reason for having them on the agenda is to point out the need to discuss these questions. The difference between the Armistice Commission and the teams is the same as the difference between a commander and his troops. The teams are to carry out the instructions of the commission, which will be the

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supervising organ for the Armistice Commission,
the commission composed of representatives of both sides
supervising the execution of the Armistice teams,
The teams will be the eyes and ears of the Commission.
To clarify, I will add the word "including" after our Item 3,
final peace settlement including military Armistice
Commission and Military Observer teams. As we
mentioned yesterday these two sub-items do not embrace
all the propositions which will be necessary to
insure against a resumption of fighting. Your side may
decide to submit additional sub-items as may we.

1132K
NORTH KOREA: Of course, a detailed discussion about the Military Armistice Commission arethe Military Observation Teams will take place after we have adopted the agenda. As agenda always has contents, without knowing the contents of the agenda we can have difficulty in adopting the agenda. Therefore, I am going to ask one thing more about the Military Armistice Commission. You said the Military Observer Teams are the eyes and ears of the military Armistice Commission. That means they are subordinate to the Military Armistice Commission. Then to whom is the Military Armistice Commission subordinate? And of whom can it be composed?

1136K
UNITED NATIONS: The military observer teams are subordinate to the Armistice Commission.

1137K
NORTH KOREA: We understand.

1137K
UNITED NATIONS: A military Armistice Commission supervises the inspection of the activities of both belligorent forces during the duration

[redacted] of the military armistice. It reports violations of the terms of the Armistice to the commanders of the belligerent forces. The membership of the military Armistice Commission would be subject to agreement by commanders of the belligerent forces. Normally, it would consist of equal representation of both sides.

1140K
NORTH KOREA: Then you mean the military Armistice Commission is subordinate to the commanders of both parties?

1141K
UNITED NATIONS: That is correct.

1141K
NORTH KOREA: We understand. If you haven't got anything more to say we prefer to recess until I o'clock in the afternoon, our time.

1141K
UNITED NATIONS: Will you have your formal opinion ready to present at that time?

1142K
NORTH KOREA: We are going to have a recess because we want to make a further study of your agenda. Therefore we cannot say in advance whether we will be able to present our formal opinion or not by that time. But our opinion about the agenda you proposed, that we can state again.

1143K
UNITED NATIONS: Very well. We will agree to a recess until 1 o'clock your time, 2 o'clock our time.

1143K
NORTH KOREA: Before the recess, I have one things to say. According to the report of our non-armed police at PAN MUN JOM, about six or seven armed soldiers of your side appeared suddenly on a hill to the north east about 800 meters away from PAN MUN JOM, and fired about 20 shots toward PAN MUN JOM and about five minutes later, more than 20 armed soldiers increased, and fired about 30 shots towards PAN MUN JOM. Fifteen minutes later they fired over 10 shots again and at 1805 hours your soldiers left about three and about

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[redacted]ive minuted later, all disappeared. Such occurrences of such cases--such instances--is against the promise between both parties that no military hostile acts will be taken during the meeting in the neutral zone, and therefore we hope you will soon take measures against the resumption of such things later. By later, I mean from now on, They loft at 1805 our time.

1149K
UNITED NATIONS: When did they start the firing?

1149K
NORTH KOREA: About 1750 hours.

1150K
UNITED NATIONS: On the assumption that this is correct, I agree that this should not have happened. We will have our liaison officer investigate and will take necessary corrective action.

(Aside: On the basis of his report).

1151K Recess.

1359K The conference recovened.

[redacted]

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: After studying your proposed agenda, we discover that, though improved, it is quite inappropriate in some points. In order that a speedy agreement can be reached on the agenda and discussion of the substance be proceeded with, I now submit our proposed agenda and would like to explain it. In the second point of our agenda, the 38th parallel has been omitted. That is not to say, however, that we have given up our consistent stand. It is only in order to facilitate the adoption of the agenda that we have refrained from placing a specific demarkation line in the agenda, but we still maintain that to fix the 38th parallel as the military demarkation line between both sides is a basic condition for an Armistice. Therefore, when we come to discuss the substance of this item, we shall continue to speak for our position regarding the 38th parallel as the military demarkation line, because it is only when this question is solved that establishment of the demilitarized zone will obtain a basis, and thus become a technical question which will naturally follow [illegible] and can be easily settled. Next, I would like to emphasize on the third item of our proposed agenda regarding the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Korea, that is non-Korean forces from Korea. We deem that it is because foreign armed forces have been drawn into the Korean war, thus preventing the Korean people from settling their own affairs, that it has not been possible to restore peace in Korea. Therefore, we firmly believe that the question of the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea is a necessary assurance against the resumption of war in Korea.

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[redacted]

NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

As long as foreign armed forces are not withdrawn from Korea, there will be no basis for the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. In your proposed agenda, you take the organization of the so-called Armistice Commission and military observer teams for the main condition to insure against the resumption of hostilities. As to the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Korea, however, no organization, whatever its composition, authority and functions may be, can assure against the resumption of war in Korea. The withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea is the basic condition for making the resumption of war in Korea impossible. There is no other way or organization which can replace this basic condition. You say you are not empowered to discuss the question of the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Korea, but as I pointed out at previous meeting, authority or non-authority is an internal affair or yours, which cannot be utilized to evade the discussion of the most fundamental question of the assurance against the resumption of war in Korea. If you are delegates with full powers of the United Nations Command Headquarters to the Korean Armistice talks, you must have the right and are bound in duty to discuss this question, which is most closely related to the Armistice in Korea. We simply cannot understand why you delegates with full powers in these Korean Armistice talks should attempt to evade your responsibility, to evade the discussion of the most basic condition for making the resumption of war in Korea impossible.

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

You say that this conference is a conference of a military nature, that therefore the question of the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea cannot be discussed here but can be discussed only by the highest authority of the Governments concerned. It is true that this conference is a conference of a military nature. The main subject of this conference is indeed of a military nature, but the question of the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea is indisputably of a military nature. At yesterday's meeting you said at the time when a Cease Fire order is put into effect, both parties may have large forces in a position to launch an attack. That means even with a demilitarized zone, there is still the probability that hostilities may break out afresh. You proposed to assure against the resumption of war in Korea by the establishment of a so-called Military Armistice Commission and military observer teams, but it is evident that the condition which can thoroughly insure against the resumption of war in Korea is the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea. That alone can make the resumption of war in Korea a military impossibility. In order to achieve a thorough assurance against the resumption of war in Korea this conference, which is of a military nature, must discuss the question of the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea. You said further that this conference is a conference for Cease Fire, and the question of the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Korea cannot be discussed here, but can only be decided upon at the peace conference,

but as you remember, I have raised the question of the

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

withdrawal of the foreign armed forces from Korea in my very first speech. We consider this to be a military question which should be discussed and settled by the Armistice Conference. Of course, military problems cannot be separated completely from political problems. When the question of the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea is discussed, problems of a political character may also be involved. We have already said that such problems of a political character can be discussed later at another appropriate conference. Therefore, we agree with your opinion that the Armistice Conference is intended to bridge the gap until such a time as a Peace Conference is called. However, the Armistice Conference must first settle the question of the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea. It must first settle this question, which is of a military nature, before it can lay the foundation for a conference to be convened for a complete peaceful settlement of the Korean question and the other Far Eastern questions.

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

If the question if withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea is not settled in this conference a promise will be lacking for the forthcoming peace conference. It is the unanimous demand of the peoples of the whole world that all armed forces of foreign countries be withdrawn from Korea to insure completely against the breakout anew of war in Korea. We firmly hold that a discussion of this problem at this conference is our inevitable responsibilty and duty. Therefore we insist in having the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea on the agenda and accept the question as an important item of it.

Finally I would like to make a few remarks on the 4th item of our proposed agenda. We think that considerable improvement has been made in your Item 3. Yet regarding this supervising organ for cease fire and armistice, although you have reduced them from three independent items to two subordinate items, we still feel that they are too specific. We have therefore rendered them more general because these questions will naturally be discussed and settled as part of the concrete arrangements for cease fire and armistice. We have already stated that the distance between us, in principl's, is small on this point. Our concrete opinion about the supervising organ will be put forth when we get to the substance of this item. We have now submitted our revised agenda and have explained our position. We consider that our agenda is resonable and appropriate and we hope

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NORTH KOREA: (cont'd) that this agenda will be adopted and that agreement on the agenda will be reached speedily so that we can proceed to discussion of cease fire and armistice with which the peoples of the whole world are deeply concerned. I will now read our proposed agenda.

1. Adoption of agenda.
2. Fixing a military demarkation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.
3. Withdrawal of all armed forces of foreign countries from korea to insure against the resumption of hostilities and acts of armed forces in Korea.
4. Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease fire and armistice in Korea, including the compostion, authority and functions of a supervising organ for carrying out the terms of cease fire and armistice.
5. Arrangements relating to Prisoners of War.

1435K
UNITED NATIONS: Do your remarks represent your formal opinion and is your revised agenda official?

1436K
NORTH KOREA: Of course it is the official opinion.

1437K
UNITED NATIONS: We desire to recess until tomorrow to give consideration to your revised proposed agenda.

1437K
NORTH KOREA: We agree.

[redacted]

[redacted]

1437K
UNITED NATIONS: What time would you prefer tomorrow?

1438K
NORTH KOREA: 9 O'clock our time 10 O'clock your time.

1438K
UNITED NATIONS: Very well.

1438K Conference recessed for the day.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ E.C. THOMAS
H.M. BRIGGS
Captain, U.S.N.,
Secretary.

Certified to be a true copy:

C. R. Green
C. R. GREEN
CHSCLK, USN



NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

28

18 July 1951

Subj: Meeting on the Armistice Proposal in Korea

RECORD OF EVENTS---18 July 1951 Proceedings

1000K: Reconvened. UN Says agreement apparently reached on Items 1 and 5 of agenda, states views on Item 4.

1012K: NK asks if UN agrees on Item 4. UN says yes except for wording. Wording of UN Item 4 read.

1015K: approx UN says it prefers to generalize Item 2 of NK agenda, reads desired wording. Translation reveals Korean language doesn't distinguish between singular and plural, accounting for mixup over military demarcation "line" and "lines." Agreement apparently reached on Item-2.

1030K: approx UN outlines "absolutely unchangeable position" against Item 3 of NK agenda. UN cites seven particulars in which it has acceded to other party's views, proposes revised agenda be adopted. Proposed UN agenda read.

1152K: Recessed.

1331K: Reconvened. NK reiterates stand on 38th Parallel as military demarcation line, reaffirms withdrawal of foreign troops as most important question, charges UN wants to impose its opinion relative to supervising organ for armistice before question is even discussed.

1356K: Query by UN reveals that NK isn't agreeing to Item 2, is holding out for basic line of demarcation as prerequisite of demilitarized zone. Un refuses to discuss it because it is substantive, asks recess.

1435K: Recessed.

1500K: Reconvened. Un suggests two alternative wordings in Item 2, and after discussion accepts NK wording of agenda Item 2. NK repeats his version of UN's proposed wording of Item 2.

1528K: Recessed.

[redacted]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

[redacted] 18 July 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of 18 July 1951 Proceedings:
Meeting on the Armistice Proposal in Korea

Conference convened at Kaesong, Korea.

Delegates present:

UNITED NATIONS	COMMUNISTS
VADM C T Joy USN Sr. Delegate	LtGen Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LtGen Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes, USA	MGEN Fang Hsieh CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

(Conference reconvened at 1000 hours, 18 July 1951.)

1000K
UNITED NATIONS: We have carefully considered the comments and the written presentation made by your delegation at our last meeting concerning the formulation of an agenda.

We believe that the most expeditious procedure at this time would be to consider agenda items one at a time, in the order of our nearness to agreement regarding them.

I intend, therefore, that we confine ourselves to one item at a time, seeking to reach agreement on the single item under consideration before proceeding to another.

I am under the impression we are agreed on Items 1 and 5. Therefore, I shall now state the views of this delegation with respect to Item 4 on the agenda, dealing with concrete arrangements for a cease fire and armistice in Korea, the item on which our views are closest to agreement.

[redacted]

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

I refer to your proposed wording of your a enda Item 4, regarding arrangements for a cease fire and military armistice. In this wording you omitted expressing the thought that such arrangements should be those which will insure against a resumption of hostilities and acts of armed force in Korea. It is our belief that a means of insuring against a resumption of hostilities in Korea is indispensable if an armistice is to lead to peace. We agree with you that the creation of a military armistice commission and military observation teams will not alone insure against a resumption of hostilities. Not one of the provisions so far proposed by either delegation can provide complete insurance against the resumption of hostilities. The only real insurance against the resumption of hostilities is strict adherence to armistice terms by both sides. It is clear,

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (cont'd) however, that a military armistice commission and observation teams are essential to a successful military armistice. They are the principal means of keeping each side reassured that the other side is adhering to the armistice terms. Thus suspicion and distrust, often the breeding place of otherwise avoidable clashes, can be suppressed. In order to expedite the formulation of an agenda, so as to approach sooner the basic work of military armistice for which these conferences are intended, we are prepared to accept your proposed wording of the item dealing with arrangements for a cease fire and armistice.

1012K
NORTH KOREA: You mean as to Item 4, you agree with us?

UNITED NATIONS: Except the wording. That wording is: "Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority, and functions of a supervisory organization for carrying out the terms of cease fire and armistice."

(Above paragraph was then repeated)

We wish it to be completely clear that we shall insist on a single military armistice commission and its military observation teams, with unrestricted access to all of Korea, as essential parts of the arrangements for a cease fire and military armistice.

I will now take up your Item 2.

Your revised Item 2 reads as follows: "Fixing

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea."

We still prefer to generalize this agenda item, as we do in principle, all agenda items. You certainly can have no objection to wording the item in such a way that each side may present its case in its own way since the important part of the item is "the demilitarized zone." A clearer and more desirable wording would be: "Fixing a military demarcation line, or fixing lines, between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea." This wording we recommend for the final agenda. Do you agree? I would like to get this matter settled before proceeding further.

(Paragraph was then repeated in English)

1123K
NORTH KOREA: You mean to include the lines instead of one line.

UNITED NATIONS: No! Make it clear that we leave it in his wording and that we add fixing a line or fixing lines.

1124K
NORTH KOREA: You know that the demarcation line means that when we come to the discussion of that item we can discuss more lines, but in Korean it is the same, one or more lines.

UN INTERPRETER: In other words they can't distinguish between plural and singular.

NORTH KOREA: In Korean there is no difference between plural and singular.

[redacted]

[redacted]

1025K
UNITED NATIONS: It means then that you don't have any objection to the English version. It means that it can be interpreted differently in the English version by putting in "or fixing lines". Then it is the same in English as it is in Korean.

1026K
NORTH KOREA: When we come to establish a demilitarized zone it always premises two lines. One line on the other side and one on this side. See?

1027K
UNITED NATIONS: Then you agree with our wording for the English wording.

NORTH KOREA: What do you mean? Then we will have three lines when we come to establish a demilitarized zone.

UN INTERPRETER: He means do we mean such lines as the northern boundary, southern boundary and perhaps a middle line.

1028K
UNITED NATIONS: That is correct. We want you to clearly understand that we will define that zone in whatever way we see fit. I feel that we are agreed on the subject. It is just a difference in translation that caused the confusion.

1029K
UNITED NATIONS: If you mean these lines, we mean that too.

NORTH KOREA: Then we are agreed.

UNITED NATIONS: We are agreed. With regard to your Item 3 I repeat essentially what I have stressed again and again.

The United Nations Command cannot consent to

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS (Cont'd)

inclusion on the agenda of those military discussions of any topic intended to open discussion of withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.

The question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea is a question which should be discussed at the governmental level in connection with the final settlement of the Korean problem. The decision to withdraw United Nations Forces from Korea can be taken only by the United Nations and by those governments whose decisions placed them there at the request of the United Nations. The United Nations Command, as a military command, is not authorized to represent the United Nations and the several governments concerned on this question. It cannot be discussed in these present talks, which are limited strictly to military armistice questions within the purview of military commanders. It is expected that following a military armistice as a first step, questions concerning a final settlement of the Korean problem could be taken up at a governmental level.

This is our absolutely unchangeable position.

In the future, this delegation intends to do no more in respect to this subject than to repeat what I have just said.

It is our understanding that there is no disagreement between us regarding the items dealing with prisoners of war which appeared on both of our versions of an agenda.

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

We have accepted your version of the item dealing with concrete arrangements for a cease fire and military armistice in Korea. We intend to discuss under this item the question of a military armistice commission and observation teams.

In reviewing the progress of our discussions of the agenda, I note that the United Nations Command delegation has acceded to the view of your delegation in the following particulars:

a. We have accepted your proposal to remove from our agenda an item we presented regarding the International Red Cross.

b. We have accepted your proposal to remove from our agenda an item we presented regarding limiting our discussions to military topics only.

c. We have accepted your proposal to place the question of a demilitarized zone in the position of first important item on the agenda.

d. We have accepted your wording of all items on the agenda that have been agreed to.

e. We have accepted your objections to two subtitle items under our Item 3.

f. We have accepted your version of the item dealing with arrangements for a cease fire and military armistice.

g. We have conceded on points we believed important; we have made concession after concession to your views in the interests of reaching an agreed agenda.

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) In the light of the many concessions we have made, we believe you should now make a substantial contribution to the development of an agreed agenda so that we may get on with our work. For our part, we can concede nothing more. Therefore, I propose that the revised agenda be adopted. We will read our proposed agenda item by item, our proposed agenda.

1. Adoption of agenda.

2. Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as the basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

3. Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority and functions of a supervising organ for carrying out the terms of cease fire and armistice.

4. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.

1150K
NORTH KOREA: We have heard your explanation about the agenda. In discussing the agenda we made a further progress today. For the explanation of the agenda, as there is a point on which we are not agreed, we want to have a recess.

1151K
UNITED NATIONS: How long?

1151K
NORTH KOREA: Until 12 o'clock our time 1 o'clock your time.

(Conference then recessed at 1152 hours, 18 July 1951)

[redacted]

[redacted] conference reconvened at 1331 hours, 18 July 1951)

NORTH KOREA: I am sorry that we postponed the recess for another 30 minutes. We have studied your remarks and your revised agenda you presented this morning. We consider there are great differences in principle between your proposed agenda and the one you proposed yesterday. In order that agreement may be reached speedily on the agenda for our conference, and that we may proceed to the discussions of the substance, we have already made substantial concessions. But on the question of fixing a military demarcation line, that is, the 38th Parallel, between both sides, and on the question of the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea, you have either openly refused to put it on the agenda, or by your manner of presentation refused to recognize the fixing of the military demarcation line, that is, the 38th Parallel, for the basis of our negotiations. We deem that this is a difference in principle. On the question of the 38th Parallel, we have already made a substantial concession by agreeing to omit the words "38th Parallel" from our proposed agenda, and replace them by the general and abstract expression of "fixing the military demarcation line." The military demarcation line referred to is very clearly the single line of the 38th Parallel. It cannot be two lines or three lines. The fixing of the 38th Parallel as the

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

military demarcation line is considered by us as the most important point in our second proposed agenda. It is also the basis of our negotiations. Once the 38th Parallel is fixed, we can proceed to settle the problem of a demilitarized zone. Of course, it will take two lines to define the demilitarized zone, but these two lines can only be determined after the 38th Parallel is fixed. The relation between the 38th Parallel and these two lines is that between father and sons, and likewise we cannot call a father with his two sons, three brothers. We cannot put the demarcation line, which is a basic line, on the same footing as the two lines defining the demilitarized zone by calling them many lines or line. For this reason, we opposed the addition of the words "or fixing lines," after the phrase, "fixing a military demarcation line" in your agenda. Should we concur in the addition, it would completely negate our whole stand and negate the basis of our negotiations. This we absolutely cannot accept. On this question, we have already conceded a great deal. We can now concede no more. Next, ever since I made my opening statement I have enumerated the three central questions to be settled by our conference, among which the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea is the most important question. The reason

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (cont'd)

why we have so appraised them is irrefutable. The main subject of our conference is to obtain cease fire and armistice in Korea, and the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea is the necessary, indispensable, and the most reliable guarantee against the resumption of hostilities in Korea. Since we are to negotiate cease fire and armistice, we must discuss and settle this central question. Since we are entrusted with the duty to stop the Korean war, and we are agreed on the necessity of stopping the Korean war, what reasons can you have for refusing to discuss and settle the question of the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea? Could the resumption of war in Korea be insured against simply by suspending hostilities without the withdrawal of foreign armed forces? Do you mean to have hostilities suspended so that the foreign armed forces might stay and go about sight-seeing in Korea? This is inadmissible. The peoples of the whole world--of the world—desire that the war be brought to an end in Korea, and they demand that all foreign armed forces be withdrawan from Korea to assure against the resumption of war in Korea. The grounds for their desire and demand are irrefutable. You have attempted to refuse to discuss this question by means of all sorts of excuses. We have repeatedly criticized your excuses..

[redacted]

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

Your excuses are untenable. I believe in coming to sit around this table, we have a common viewpoint. That is, we have come to discuss our problems by reasoning. No excuse could be used for us to refuse to reason. If you admit this, you should not and cannot refuse to discuss and settle this central question. We insist, therefore, that the question of the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces must be placed as a major item in the agenda, as we have proposed.

On the question of a supervising organ for carrying out the terms of the armistice, we have also made substantial concessions in our proposed agenda by stating definitely that the composition, authority and function of such an organ will be discussed. We are prepared to state our concrete opinion during the discussion of the substance of the item on the agenda. We are also prepared to listen to your opinion during the discussion of the substance of the question. Yet,.in the remarks you made this morning on this question you stated so many concrete opinions as to give us an impression that you intended to impose on us your opinion before the question was even discussed. This we cannot accept. With regards to the agenda proposed by both sides, your concessions are in fact on items which should not be placed on the agenda, or as independent items. Questions of

[redacted]

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

the former kind are the visits of the International Red Cross representatives to prisoner of war camps, while the qeustion of a supervising organ is of the latter kind. On the other hand, the concessions we made on the formulation of the agenda are concessions of a substantial nature. For example, in order to reach an agreement, we agreed to leave out the words "38th Parallel" in the wording of the agenda. Again, on the question of a supervising organ, we accepted your general formulation and placed it on the agenda. We hope that you will agree to our agenda so that our conference can speedily proceed to the discussion of substantial matters.

[redacted]

1356K
UNITED NATIONS: With respect to Item 2. Do you now mean you do not agree to a general wording of Item 2 so as to permit both sides to present their own views as to where the demilitarized zone will be located? You agreed to our wording this morning.

1358K
NORTH KOREA: As I have mentioned already in the establishedment of a demilitarized zone, if we first establish a demarcation line the establishment of a demilitarized zone will follow. In establishing the demilitarized zone by starting from the basic line, of course, we will have two lines.

INTERPRETER: (HGU) By withdrawing from a demilitarized zone we will have two lines.

UNITED NATIONS: That does not answer the question.

NORTH KOREA: By establishing a demilitarized zone we will start from a demarcation line, of course, we will have these two lines. When I was talking this morning I was talking -- starting from this basic line and then having the two following lines. I did not mean to have many basic lines.

INTERPRETER: (HGU) By withdrawal from this line I do not mean to have several basic lines.

1404K
NORTH KOREA: There is one basic line for the cease fire. We have studied this item this morning. It is meant that with the differences in the translation but then we thought it over and we agreed to insert that word because that was the difference in the translation and we thought that if we put that in again it is not only the difference in meaning. According to our insistence we insist that there cannot be many -- there cannot be several basic lines.

[redacted]

INTERPRETER (HGU): They agreed because they thought it was a difference in translation but in thinking it over they feel there is a difference in meaning.

UNITED NATIONS: In other words you mean there is only one basic line in your opinion that is a specific line of parallel.

NORTH KOREA: That is our opinion, and the opinion of the other party would be cleared by discussion and we insist on the 38th Parallel line.

INTERPRETER: That is their opinion, but we may have other lines. That is why they are willing to take the 38th Parallel out. But they will insist that the 38th Parallel be their line.

UNITED NATIONS: Our proposed wording was simply to clarify the English meaning to us.

NORTH KOREA: Please explain. What do you mean by — you want to clarify in English?

1420K
UNITED NATIONS: In other words, if we want to define a demilitarized zone by two lines and not a basic line that is our business. Our wording in no way refused to permit you from presenting any views of your own. I think we are getting into language difficulty again. If you mean that we can each present our own views as to where the demarcation line should be, we are probably in agreement.

1421K
NORTH KOREA: I would like to explain more clearly what we mean by demarcation line. In order to establish a demilitarized zone we must have a basic line how far from the basic line to the north and how far

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) from the basic line to the south, etc. If we start from a basic line how far to the south and how far to the north -- from that basic line. Then as a result we will have two further lines. So we insist that in establishing a demilitarized zone we must start from a basic line. As for the opinion about this specific demarcation line. Of course there may be differences between both sides. And as for the distance from the basic line to the resulting two lines -- as for the opinion about the distance of these two lines there may also be differences between both sides. And I think the demarcation line in our agenda has been clear.

UNITED NATIONS: The United Nations Command delegation is of the opinion that a demilitarized zone can be established without starting at a central line which you call a basic line. Your method is one way of establishing a demilitarized zone. There are other ways. Therefore we contend that the item be kept general. If we both agree on the phrasing to the establishment of a demilitarized zone, then each side may arrive at the presentation later as he desires.

NORTH KOREA: I have one thing to ask. Will you please explain how we can establish a demilitarized zone without starting from a demarcation line?

1425K
UNITED NATIONS: This is too early in the discussion to state our final views as to how the zone will be

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) developed. A zone requires two lines for definition of the limits of the zone. Therefore establishing these two lines can establish a zone without a demarcation line. The lines are not necessarily parallel or symmetrical.

1427K
NORTH KOREA: There is something I do not understand. Does the senior delegate of the other party mean that in the establishment of the demilitarized zone one side can retreat further from the demarcation line -- that is, one side can concede more and one side can concede less? Is that what the senior delegate means?

1429
UNITED NATIONS: To get on with more important business and since we are discussing matters that come up, let us take the general wording of establishment of a demilitarized zone as basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

1430K
NORTH KOREA: You mean you want to leave out the words "basic demarcation line".

UNITED NATIONS: That is our proposal.

1431K
NORTH KOREA: Then without getting the answer of my question of establishing a demilitarized zone without starting at a demarcation line -- then how can you get a demilitarized zone without starting at a demarcation line? Without getting an answer for that question I cannot understand it.

[redacted]

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: To answer your question specifically is to get into a substantive discussion which we will not do at this time. If you adopt the wording proposed you are free to present the matter at the proper time and so are we. Therefore there can be no disagreement on the agenda item.

1433K
NORTH KOREA: It is our opinion it is impossible to establish a demilitarized zone without starting from a definite demarcation line. Therefore, we think it must be involved in the agenda. One thing I do not understand is that the morning you said the difference in the translation--that is the difference in the translation you said that you agree with us as to Item 2. But we do not understand it; will you please explain it again?

1435K
UNITED NATIONS: I would like a 15-minute recess to discuss this matter-to consider the matter entirely.

NORTH KOREA: Agreed.

(The conference recessed at 1440K)

[redacted]

[redacted] (Conference reconvened at 1500K hours)

UNITED NATIONS: This morning we agreed in principle on an English version of your Item 2, which met our requirements, after discussion indicated that your item in Korean meant the same as ours in English. Now you do not agree. Your wording of Item 2 restricts me to one method of approach to the problem. Both of my suggestions permit both sides freedom of discussion at the proper time. Surely you understand that. We will accept either of the following wordings:
"To establish a demilitarized zone as the basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea" or "Fixing a military demarcation line, or fixing lines, between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as the basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea."

1505K
NORTH KOREA: The point we are discussing about is "of fixing lines", and what do you mean by "lines"?

1506K
UNITED NATIONS: Your attitude is difficult to understand. I agree that you should define the zone in any way you see fit. You, in turn, should be agreed to let us define the demilitarized zone in any way we see fit. The neutral zone of Kaesong is oval-shaped. The demilitarized zone around this house is a circle. Here are two zones whose definition does not start from one line. Do I understand that

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (cont'd) you do not wish to accept either of our proposed wordings of Item 2?

1510
NORTH KOREA: Of course we take part in this meeting on equal footing with equal rights. Therefore, I can insist on a demand of our side, and when I have something which I don't quite understand I have the right to put a question on it. Still I don't understand the point the other party insists -- that is the insertion "of fixing lines" in this item. This morning you said that was the misunderstanding of the translation, but now we see by that means you seem to have something else in mind. You take as an example Kaesong for example of a demilitarized zone, but in the establishment of a circular demilitarized zone in Kaesong we started from a certain point that is the rotary of Kaesong. So inestablishing our demilitarized zone, too, we must have a definite starting line.

1516K
UNITED NATIONS: If by your wording of Item 2, you mean that both sides can discuss the formation of a demilitarized zone in any manner each side desires, we are in agreement. If your side desires to start with a demarcation line, that will be acceptable to us. If we desire to start some other way, that should be acceptable to you.

1518K
NORTH KOREA: Would you mind repeating it again in English?

(UN delegate repeats foregoing paragraph).

[redacted]

1519K
NORTH KOREA: In other words, you mean you agree to the condition that when we come to discuss Item 2, both sides have the freedom to freely present its opinion.

UNITED NATIONS: That is what we meant right along.

NORTH KOREA: And so without inserting "or fixing lines," the other party has the right to discuss freely on that subject.

1523K
UNITED NATIONS: To summarize, I think we have been making a mountain out of a molehill. We desire to emphasize that the important words in this agenda item are "to establish a demilitarized zone." There is more than one way to delineate the demilitarized zone. It must be clearly understood that each delegation will be at liberty to use such methods as it finds most practical to present this zone during future discussions of this agenda item. We believe that the questi n of a demarcation line is a minor point and therefore should not be included in an agenda item. I think our wording is clear and easily understood and does not confuse the issue. We see no reason why this point should be included in the agenda item. However, in order to arrive at an agreement on this agenda item, we will accept your wording. In regards to your Item 3, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, you have already had my answer. There is no need to repeat it again. The United Nations Command Delegation cannot

[redacted]

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (cont'd) And now I wish to propose a recess until tomorrow morning, and suggest 11 o'clock our time, and 10 o'clock your time to meet.

NORTH KOREA: Before the recess, I will repeat what the Senior Delegate of the other party proposed: "Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea."

UNITED NATIONS: Is that all?

NORTH KOREA: Yes, that's all.

UNITED NATIONS: That is agreeable.

NORTH KOREA: Then I agree to continue tomorrow at 10 o'clock our time, 11 o'clock your time.

(The conference adjourned at 1528K hours.)

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY

C. R. Green

C.R. GREEN, CHSCLK

[redacted]

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

[redacted]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

23

19 July 1951

Subj: Armistice Conference at Kaesong, Korea

RECORD OF EVENTS---19 July 1951

1100K: Reconvened. NK asks UNC opinion of NK agenda Item 3, is told UNC position is unchanged.

1103K: NK reiterates "unshakable stand" on withdrawal of foreign troops, says it should be on agenda.

1119K: Recessed.

1155K: Reconvened. UNC reaffirms position against Item 3, again proposes adoption of four-item agenda.

1160K: NK declares Item 3 is basic to peace, says other four items are not enough.

1208K: UNC repeats request for adoption of four items mutually agreed upon.

1210K: NK claims Item 3 needed to guarantee armistice, accuses UNC of evading foreign troops issue.

1217K: UNC says issue is for peace conference, not armistice arrangement.

1219K: NK says Item 3 must be decided as part of armistice, not peace conference.

1226K: UNC asserts four items agreed upon will permit adequate discussion.

1230K: NK asks why UNC refuses to discuss foreign troops.

1232K: UNC quotes reason.
1235K: NK calls it an excuse, asks whose decision it is, expresses doubt of UNC sincerity.

1242K: UNC says it can't possibly be any more explicit.

1244K: NK asks how armistice can be guaranteed with foreign troops in Korea.

1246K: UNC says no other items than the four agreed upon are necessary.

1248K: NK asks if UNC has good faith in guaranteeing armistice.

1249K: UNC repeats its three-point statement of 11 July.

1254K: NK says UNC proposals for guarantee are supplementary, not basic.

1259K: UNC cannot agree, says basic guarantee of armistice is adherence to armistice terms.

(A) [redacted]

[redacted]

1300K: NK still can't understand.

1301K: UNC points out that armistice must be in effect before foreign troops issue can be referred to governments concerned.

1305K: NK says it hasn't had clear answer yet.

1306K: UNC says we're talking about armistice, not final peace.

1307K: NK points out both parties are committed to talk about "all" military matters, says hostile acts of all troops is military matter, says there is no reason to shift issue to a peace conference.

1312K: UNC recalls its aim of discussing military matters relating to Korea, says foreign troops issue is political.

1313K: NK asks if foreign forces carrying out hostile acts is political question.

1314K: UNC says issue can only be discussed at government level.

1315K: NK says question is an internal one for UNC.

1319K: UNC says it's not a military question it will discuss, suggests recess.

1325K: Recessed until 1000K hours 20 July 1951.

[redacted]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

[redacted] 19 July 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of 19 July 1951 Proceedings:
Meeting on the Armistice Proposal in Korea.

Conference convened at Kaesong, Korea.

Delegates Present:

UNITED NATIONS	COMMUNISTS
VADM C T J[illegible] USN Sr. Delegate	LTGEN Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes, USA	MGEN Fang Hsieh CCF
RADM A A Burke, USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

(Conference reconvened at 1100 hours, 19 July 1951).

1100K
NORTH KOREA: What does the senior delegate think of the Item 3 of our agenda, and what is the opinion of the senior delegate of the United Nations about Item 3 on our proposed agenda, and does he agree to accept the Item 3 of our proposed agenda?

1101K:
UNITED NATIONS: The United Nations Command delegation's position on the items of the agenda is clear.

[redacted]

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (cont'd) We have nothing further to add. We can concede nothing more. Both sides have agreed on four items of the agenda. The United Nations Command delegation believes these items contain all the elements necessary for an agenda for a military armistice conference and that agreement on them would make it possible to stop the fighting in Korea.

1103K:
NORTH KOREA: I regret very much that you should still use this excuse to avoid discussion of this question. I hope that you will reconsider this question of major importance thoroughly and seriously.

I would like to explain further our viewpoint. In order to reach speedily an agreement on an agenda and enter quickly into discussions of its substance, I shall not hesitate to repeat once again our firm and unchangeable stand on the question of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. The aim of our conference is to reach an armistice in Korea on a just and reasonable basis. Furthermore, the aim of this armistice is to end the Korean war and restore peace in Korea. To achieve this aim, it is necessary that all foreign armed forces be withdrawn. It is only by doing this that the flames of war in Korea can be extinguished and resumption of war in Korea can be prevented. The appearance of foreign armed forces in Korea has

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA:
(cont'd)

been the source of the Korean war and the continuance of war in Korea. It is only by elimination of this source that the prevention of resumption of war in Korea can be definitely insured. It is therefore obvious that the delegates who are here for negotiations should discuss and settle the question of withdrawal of foreign armed forces as an assurance against the resumption of war in Korea. Repeatedly I emphasized against the resumption of hostilities and acts of armed force. Thus we cannot assure ourselves on the good faith of the party which continues to insist on such refusal. I must further point out that there is no excuse for refusal to discuss and settle the question of withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea. Since our conference is to settle the question of cease fire and armistice and since the aim of cease fire and armistice is to end war and restore peace, we must discuss this fundamental question of settlement of war in Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces in Korea. The fact that you refuse to discuss and settle the questions of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea only demonstrates that you do not have yet a sincerity for peace to bring about the conclusion of the Korean war.

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (cont'd) War is not travel and troops are not tourists. Should the cease fire be ordered and armistice achieved, yet the foreign armed forces still stay where they are, it is clear that the intention is not possible to let them enjoy the scenic beauties of Korea and I must also point out with emphasis that the attitude of any party toward the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, is a test whether it is sincerely for peace. We consider that the aim of the cease fire and armistice in Korea is the conclusion of the Korean war and restoration of peace in Korea. That is why we have maintained consistently and firmly that the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea should be placed in an important position on the agenda, as we have proposed.

It is our unshakable stand. We hope that you will give it careful consideration and alter your firm opinion so that a proposed agenda will be agreed upon and we can proceed with the substance of its items without delay.

1119K

UNITED NATIONS: We desire to recess for one-half hour.

NORTH KOREA: We agree.

(Conference then recessed at 1120 hours, 19 July 1951)

[redacted]

[redacted]

(The conference reconvened at 1155)

UNITED NATIONS: We have already explained to you that our position on your proposed Item 3 is unchangeable. Nothing you have said alters our previously stated views on this subject. I repeat again this delegation will be completely unresponsive to any efforts on your part to place your proposed Item 3 on the agenda. I again propose that we adopt the four items on which the two delegations are mutually agreed as the agenda for this military armistice conference, in order that we may proceed without further delay to substantive discussion of conditions under which we may halt bloodshed and reduce suffering in Korea. It is the position of the United Nations Command Delegation that these four items cover all the essential topics for continuing this military armistice conference to stop the fighting in Korea. If you are as sincere as you seem to indicate you will agree to the four-item agenda without further delay.

1160K
NORTH KOREA: Is that all?

1160K
UNITED NATIONS: Yes.

1160K
NORTH KOREA: As we have insisted already, the important thing for us is to discuss at this conference for cease fire and armistice - we must discuss and agree upon the conditions which will assure against the resumption of hostilities in Korea. The Senior Delegate of the other party also expressed an

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (cont'd) opinion of the same sort. Then what can be the basic conditions which assure against a resumption of the war in Korea? An armistice commission or observer teams can make up a small part of the assurance against the resumption of war in Korea, but we deem that the basic condition for the assurance against the resumption of war in Korea is the withdrawal of all armed foreign forces from Korea. The withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea is requested not only by the Korean people along, but also by all the peace-loving people of the world. Then how can we evade--then how can we, who are bound in duty to discuss cease fire and armistice, evade to discuss this question? What does the remaining of foreign armed forces in Korea offer the armistice? That I cannot understand. We cannot but take this as a thing which aims at the resumption of war. In consideration of all this, we must discuss and agree upon the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea. That is all.

1207K
UNITED NATIONS: Is that all you have to say?

1207K
NORTH KOREA Yes.

1208K
UNITED NATIONS: Your remarks have been duly noted. If you are sincere in your desire to suspend hostilities, you will accept an agenda for a military armistice which is based on the four items mutually agreed upon. I again propose that we adopt such an agenda in order that we may proceed with a discussion and stop the fighting.

[redacted]

1209K
NORTH KOREA: What do you mean by items for discussion?

U.N. INTERPRETER: Which items do you mean for discussion?

1209K
UNITED NATIONS: The four items that have been mutually agreed upon.

1210K
NORTH KOREA: We deem that these four items are not enough for guaranteeing the cease fire and armistice. It is not only our duty to have cease fire and armistice, but also we must have a guarantee for a cease fire and armistice. The basic conditions for a guarantee for the armistice is the withdrawal of foreign armed forces. If you request a real cease fire and armistice, we must also request a guarantee for them. I still do not understand why the other party evades to discuss the basic guarantee for cease fire and armistice. As I have mentioned in my previous speech, the authorization or non-authorization for the discussion of this question is an internal affair of yours. If we don't have the question of withdrawal of foreign forces on the agenda, the question of guarantee for cease fire and armistice loses its meaning. Therefore, we insist that the question of the withdrawal of foreign armed forces must be on the agenda, and it must be discussed and agreed upon here. That is all.

1217K
UNITED NATIONS: We are losing a lot of time by your insistence on discussion of your Item 3. As I have explained before, the subject of withdrawal of foreign troops is one for a peace conference and is not a

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (cont'd) proper part of an arrangement between both opposing forces to stop the fighting in Korea. Again we propose that you agree on the four-item agenda.

1218K
NORTH KOREA: Would you mind explaining it again?

(U.N. Senior Delegate repeats the foregoing paragraph)

1219K
NORTH KOREA: We do not regret that we lose time in discussion on such an important question, as this question is the basic question in our armistice talks. If we do not discuss this question, the guarantee for cease fire and armistice loses its meaning. Therefore, we think that we have no reason whatever to postpone it over to any other party -- to any other meeting, I mean. This meeting we are having is a meeting for an armistice. Therefore, here we must discuss and agree upon the withdrawl of foreign armed forces. We must discuss and have a positive decision. That is all.

1226K
UNITED NATIONS: It is our view that the four items mutually agreed upon will permit adequate discussion of provisions against resumption of hostilities in Korea. I again propose that these four agreed items be adopted as our agenda.

1229K
NORTH KOREA: Is that all?

1229K
UNITED NATIONS: That is all.

U.N.INTERPRETER: He says, "Ihave one thing to ask".

1230K
NORTH KOREA: What does the stationing of armed forces in Korea mean, and why do you evade to discuss this question?

U.N.INTERPRETER: That is cause and effect. "For what reason do you wish to keep them (foreign troops) in Korea, that

[redacted]

you insist on refusing to discuss this question?

NORTH KOREA: What does the stationing of foreign armed forces in Korea mean? Why do you refuse to discuss the question of the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Korea?

1232K
UNITED NATIONS: Our reason for not discussing your Item 3 is as follows: The question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea is a question which should be discussed at the government level in connection with the final settlement of the Korean problem. The decision to withdraw United Nations forces from Korea can be taken only by the United Nations and by those governments whose decisions placed them there at the request of the United Nations.

[redacted]

[redacted]

1235K
NORTH KOREA: We can take this for nothing less than an excuse. As I mentioned already, authority or no authority for the discussion of withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea is only an internal affair of yours. On whose decision or by whose order the foreign forces in Korea are enrolled in their hositilities in Korea?

UN INTERPRETER: By whosever request they are here or by whosever order they are here they are engaged in hostilities in Korea.

NORTH KOREA: Therefore the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea must be discussed as a guarantee for cease firing talks at this meeting.....

UN INTERPRETER: Cease fire and armistice talks at this meeting.

NORTH KOREA: If you refuse to discuss this question as the basic condition for the assurance against the resumption again of war in Korea, we cannot help doubting your sincerity. By adopting the four items in which you have proposed we have no guarantee against the resumption of war in Korea. Therefore, we must have the question of withdrawal of foreign armed forces in the agenda.

1242K
UNITED NATIONS: I do not know how I can be more positive or explicit than I have been. I repeat, the four-point agenda permits discussion of all items necessary in an armistice in Korea. I again propose that we accept it.

1244K
NORTH KOREA: Can we have a guarantee for the armistice under the conditions of having foreign armed forces in Korea?

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[redacted]

UN INTERPRETER: What guarantee can we have for the armistice in Korea if foreign troops are stationed in Korea -- under the conditions of having foreign armed troops in Korea?

1246K
UNITED NATIONS: We have already explained to you that our position on your proposed Item 3 is unchangeable. Nothing you have said alters our previous stated views on the subject. We are engaged in a very important meeting, a military armistice conference to stop the fighting in Korea. It is our opinion that the four-item agenda is a logical and sufficient agenda for a military armistice conference. No other items are necessary. We therefore continue to insist that your Item 3 not be included on the agenda. We propose the adoption of the four agreed items as the agenda.

1248K
NORTH KOREA: Is that all? Have you good faith in guaranteeing the armistice?

1249K
UNITED NATIONS: On July 11 you asked the same question about guaranteeing. You asked: "What are the guarantees that will safeguard a military armistice?" First, the creation of an authoritative armistice commission, with adequate observation teams.

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UNITED NATIONS: (cont'd) Second, the establishment of a demilitarized zone.

Third, agreement on armistice terms between commanders of belligerent forces, including the agreement of recognizing the authority of the armistice commission.

I again propose that we adopt the four-item agenda.

1254K
NORTH KOREA: You expressed your opinion that you request guarantee for the armistice in Korea. We take your proposals as the guarantee for the armistice to be supplementary and not basic. I think the aim of the stationing of foreign armed fores in Korea can be nothing else than a war. If so, can an armistice be guaranteed under the condition of having the armed forces in Korea? I cannot understand why you refuse to discuss the basic guarantee for the armistice in Korea. That means the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Korea. If you sincerely wish for a guarantee for the cease fire in Korea, I propose that the question of withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Korea be adopted on the agenda.

1259K
UNITED NATIONS: The basic guarantee of an armistice is adherence to the armistice terms. The armistice commission and military observation teams are the principal means of assuring that both sides will adhere to the armistice terms. We cannot agree to your proposal.

[redacted]

[redacted]

1300K
NORTH KOREA: I still cannot understand - - why do you insist in having the armed forces in Korea?

1301K
UNITED NATIONS: Only after an armistice has been agreed to and military action has ceased can the matter you referred to be discussed with the governments concerned.

1305K
NORTH KOREA: I have not yet received any clear answer. I ask why do you insist on -- why do you insist on not having foreign armed forces withdrawn from Korea?

1306K
UNITED NATIONS: The withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea is not appropriate for discussion because we are talking about military armistice not a final peace.

1307K
NORTH KOREA: When you opened the meeting both parties promised that we would discuss the military matters.

UN INTERPRETER: He left out one word. "All" military matters in Korea.

1308K
NORTH KOREA: If so, in Korea regardless of any troops we can discuss the acts of any troops which carry out the acts of hostilities in Korea.
The question of the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea -- that is a military question.

[redacted]

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (cont'd) The question of the withdrawal of foreign forces is closely related to the question of the armistice and is closely related to the peace armistice conference. Therefore there is no reason to shift this question over to any other conference such as a peace conference. This must be discussed and agreed upon at this meeting. Therefore I propose that our proposed agenda including the question of the withdrawal of foreign armed forces be adopted.

1312K
UNITED NATIONS: As I first said when I addressed the meeting we came here to discuss military problems related to Korea. The problem you wish to discuss is political, not military, and therefore we refuse to discuss the question. I propose the adoption of the four-item agenda. I have nothing further to say.

1313K
NORTH KOREA: Can we consider the question of foreign forces which carry out hostile acts as a political question?

1314K
UNITED NATIONS: As I have said before, this question of withdrawing all foreign troops from Korea is a question that can only be discussed at a government level, in connection with the final settlement of the problem.

[redacted]

[redacted]

1315K
NORTH KOREA: Regarding that - - I have said many times authorization or non-authorization for the discussion of the question of withdrawal of foreign armed forces is an internal affair of yours. We cannot take the question of discussion - - we cannot consider the question of the armed forces in Korea as a political question. The foreign armed forces in Korea at present carry out military actions. Therefore the discussion of their action -- that is a military question. This meeting is a meeting which discusses all the questions of military matters in Korea. We are entrusted to solve this question. Therefore in discussing this question there is no reason whatever to evade it. I propose that our agenda be adopted en toto.

1319K
UNITED NATIONS: The question of the withdrawal of armed forces is not a military question we will discuss. I have made that clear many times. I suggest we recess for lunch and during this time you seriously consider the proposals we have made. That is, adopting an agenda of the four items mutually agreed upon.
I suggest we meet again at 1:30 your time, 2:30 our time.

1322K
NORTH KOREA: In principle we agree to recess. I hope that you will reconsider the question of withdrawal of foreign forces more carefully and agree to our proposal. As for the time, what about having the recess up until 3 o'clock our time?

[redacted]

1324K
UNITED NATIONS: If you prefer, we can return tomorrow. That is too late for us. At any time you desire.

1324K
NORTH KOREA: Then we agree that we will meet again tomorrow at 9 o'clock our time and 10 o'clock your time.

1325K
UNITED NATIONS: Very well.

(The conference adjourned at 1325 hours, 19 July 1951)

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED BY:

E. G. THOMAS
Major, USMCR

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY:

C. R. GREEN
CHSCLK, USN


NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

28

21 July 1951

Subj: Record of Events, EIGHTH SESSION, 21 July 1951
Proceedings, Armistice Conference at Kaesong, Korea.

1000K: Reconvened. UNC restates opposition to NK Item 3, says items mutually agreed upon are "cornerstone for a military armistice."

1008K: NK restates its three issues: 38th Parallel, foreign troops, concrete cease fire arrangements; declares conference should adopt resolutions referring political matters "to another suitable conference or organization for settlement."

1039K: UNC states position on difference between armistice and peace, asks NK why it delays progress and prolongs bloodshed, declares: "Faith is built on acts of faith,,not words."

1056K: NK claims withdrawal of foreign troops "is demanded not only by the Korean people alone but by all the peace-loving peoples of the world," asks recess until 25 July 1951.

1100K: UNC asks half-hour recess.

1102K: Recessed.

1129K: Reconvened. UNC regrets delay which will extend period of fighting but accedes to NK proposal, standing ready to reconvene earlier and suggesting communications be kept open.

1132K: NK says it must make serious study of foreign troops issue or "there can be worse bloodshed in Korea," agrees to maintain communications.

1134K: Recessed.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

21 July 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of 21 July 1951 Proceedings:
Meeting on the Armistice Proposal at Kaesong, Korea.

Delegates Present:

United Nations	Communists
VADM C T Joy USN Sr. Delegate	GEN Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I HODES USA	MGEN Fang Hsieh CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

(Conference reconvened at 1000 hours)

UNITED NATIONS: We regret that the weather below Kaesong yesterday was so bad that we could not get through to attend the meeting.

NORTH KOREA: I would like to know what kind of opinion the Senior Delegate of the other party has about our question.

1004K
UNITED NATIONS: We have listened long and patiently to your attempts to place your proposed Item 3 on the Agenda. You have advanced many arguments and asked numerous questions in support of your item, none of which we consider valid or pertinent to the issue at hand, namely, the negotiation of a military armistice.

You have consistently held the view that we are here to negotiate a final peace settlement. We do not agree with you on that view. On the other hand, we hold that we have the cornerstone for a military armistice in the items that have been mutually agreed upon. Nothing you have said can shake our sincere conviction that

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[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

bloodshed and suffering in Korea will cease if you will be reasonable and proceed in good faith to adopt those four items as the basis for continuing discussions. Therefore, I again propose that the four items now agreed upon be adopted as the agenda.

1008K
NORTH KOREA:

After carefully studying the remarks you made the day before yesterday, I still cannot agree to your position of refusing to include the problem of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea in the agenda. Since this problem under discussion is so vitally important to the welfare of the peoples of all countries, and to the maintenance of world peace, I cannot but explain once again our point of view. I believe it is worth while to do so.

The peoples of the whole world will surely approve our sense of responsibility. You have expressed on the first day of the conference that you have good faith for cease fire and armistice. We, who are anxious to obtain peace, warmly welcome this statement. However, we expect good faith to be not so many empty words. Good faith must be demonstrated by the attitude toward the problems before us.

Now we have agreed to a cease fire and armistice in principle, yet you refuse to discuss the problem of the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces, which is inseparable from cease fire and armistice. We consider this to be incompatible with the good faith you have professed. The cease fire and armistice we are to agree upon are for the restoration of peace in Korea, and not for the resumption of war. If this is correct, what reason can you have for refusing to discuss the problem

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

of the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces, on which it is most suitable for you to show your good faith for a cease fire and armistice?

You have repeatedly emphasized in your statements that the cease fire and armistice must have reliable assurances sufficient for the prevention of the resumption of hostilities in Korea, and making our work here a bridge to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. I completely concur with you on this point. Yet, what are the conditions sufficient to insure against the resumption of war in Korea? How is it possible to make this cease fire and armistice a bridge to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question?

You said that the most reliable assurances were the three concrete measures you enumerated: A demilitarized zone, a supervisory organ, and the armistice agreement. Admittedly, these concrete measures are of certain importance to the cease fire and armistice, yet the real and most reliable guarantee against the resumption of war in Korea is the withdrawl of all foreign armed forces from Korea so as to lay the foundation for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

I cannot understand why you have repeatedly emphasized this or that assurance, while refusing to discuss this most reliable and basic assurance against the resumption of hostilities in Korea.

We have also noted another reason you have repeatedly put forth. You said the problem of the withdrawal of foreign armed forces is a political question, and should be settled by another conference. This argument is untenable.

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[redacted]

NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

Since the very first day of our conference, we have stated the three major problems our conference should discuss: Fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides, the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea, and concrete arrangements for cease fire and armistice. The reason of our raising these three problems in this way is that they are inter-related and inseparable, and that the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea in particular is a necessary conditions for guaranteeing against the resumption of war after cease fire and armistice in Korea.

Of course, as we have stated, in discussing certain ones of these problems we may encounter political questions which are related to the problem, but which cannot be settled in our conference. On such questions we should naturally adopt resolutions referring them to another suitable conference or organization for settlement.

But these related questions can be clearly defined and properly disposed of only after we have placed our major problems, including that of the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces, on the agenda and discussed them. Therefore, your refusal to place the problem of the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces on the agenda on the excuse that it is a political question or involving political questions is untenable. I must point out that no excuse whatever for refusing to discuss the problem of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea is tenable.

To stop the war in Korea and to let all foreign troops go home is not only the demand of the Korean

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) people, the Chinese people, and the peoples of the world, but also the demand of all the soldiers on the Korean battlefield. We must therefore place this problem in an important position on the agenda for discussion and proper settlement. We hope that you will reconsider seriously our viewpoint and agree to our proposed agenda. (PAUSE) That is all.

1035K
UNITED NATIONS: I should like a restatement of the paragraph in which you suggest that political matters be referred to another conference.

NORTH KOREA: Of course, as we have stated, in discussing certain ones of these problems we may encounter political questions which are related to the problem, but which cannot be settled in our conference. On such questions we should naturally adopt resolutions referring them to another suitable conference or organization for settlement.

1039K
UNITED NATIONS: Your repeated statements give evidence that you continue to fail to recognize the distinction between an armistice agreement and a peace settlement. As we have said many times before, an armistice is no more than a suspension of hostilities under conditions which have been agreed upon by the two belligerents. A peace settlement, on the other hand, is the termination of the state of war by political action. An armistice can be reached between military men; a peace settlement cannot.

We are met here to agree on an armistice, not a peace settlement.

Fundamentally, the basic guarantee for an armistice is the observance of its terms by both parties. Agree-

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UNITED NATIONS:
(Cont'd)

ment on an armistice does not of itself bring about a peace settlement, although it creates a favorable atmosphere in which a peace settlement can be concluded.

A supervisory organization should properly be included in the armistice agreement as a supplementary means of insuring against the resumption of hostilities during the duration of the armistice. The withdrawal of troops from Korea is another matter. It is a matter which is associated with a peace settlement or to be decided unilaterally by the heads of the governments concerned. It is not a topic for armistice discussions.

Why then do you delay progress in our negotiations and prolong bloodshed by talking incessantly about the withdrawal of foreign troops as a guarantee against the resumption of fighting during the armistice?

We hold that your excuses for placing your Item 3 on the agenda are untenable. I repeat, we hope that you will reconsider your stand so that we may get on with negotiation of a military armistice.

The best way to insure against the resumption of hostilities in Korea is to enforce adherance to the terms of the armistice which we are here to arrange. A military armistice commission with full and free powers of observation for violations of the terms is an absolute necessity. This central and joint agency, with adequate numbers of roving military observer teams to detect and report violations, will provide the necessary assurance that the terms are being observed. We shall welcome such observation and if you are acting in good faith, you will welcome it also.

Faith is built on acts of faith, not words. If good faith cannot be demonstrated in the observance of

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(Cont'd)

armistice terms it is not to be expected that it will be demonstrated in the observance of peace terms.

I repeat, we hope that you will reconsider your stand so that we may get on with the negotiations of a military armistice.

1056K
NORTH KOREA: Is that all?

UNITED NATIONS: Yes.

NORTH KOREA: From the first day of this armistice talk on we have been insisting that the question of withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Korea is the most important question in this talk. In my speech today, too, I clearly explained why the question of withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Korea should be on the agenda.

The question of the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Korea is demanded not only by the Korean people alone but by all the peace-loving peoples of the world. Furthermore, all the soldiers and officers on the Korean battlefield also requested this. Therefore, we think this question must be seriously and detailed discussed and it must be seriously and carefully studied.

Therefore I hope you should carefully consider our maintenance on the stand that this question, the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces, should be on the agenda and on our side we also will study carefully why you oppose it. Above all I carefully explained in detail why the question of the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea should be on the agenda, and I hope you will carefully reconsider this question. We too will make a further study of your speech. For that I propose to have recess till 10 o'clock our time 25th

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) of this month.

1100K

UNITED NATIONS: I would like a recess to consider that suggestion. We will have a half-hour recess.

1102K

NORTH KOREA: We agree.

(Conference recessed at 1102 hours)

(Reconvened at 1129 hours)

1129K

UNITED NATIONS: We note that you require a recess from the 21st to the 25th of this month to reconsider your position and study our proposals. We regret such a delay, which can only extend the period of fighting, bloodshed, and suffering. We feel such a painful delay is unnecessary since we have, in the four agreed items, an agenda which is adequate for the arrangement of an armistice.

However, we will accede to your proposal for an extended recess, although we will stand prepared to resume earlier at any time you are ready. I suggest that we keep our communications open during the recess.

Thank you for the refreshments you sent in to us during the recess.

1132K

NORTH KOREA: We do not, of course, want the continuation of the bloodshed in Korea. If we don't make a serious study of the question of the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Korea, there can be worse bloodshed in Korea. Therefore, we found it is worth while to spend time for the study of this question. I hope again that you will make a serious consideration of our statement, and we too will seriously consider your statement.

I hope that we will reach an agreement when we meet again at 10 o'clock on the 25th. I also agree to have

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

the communications during the recess. Then we will have recess until 10 o'clock the 25th our time and 11 o'clock the 25th your time.

(The conference recessed at 1134K)

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED BY:

E. C. THOMAS
Major, USMCR

Certified to be a true copy:

C. R. Green

CHSCLK C. R. GREEN, USN

[redacted]



NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

25 July 1951

Subj: RECORD OF EVENTS, Ninth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal

1100K: Reconvened. UNC gives detailed explanation of its attitude on withdrawal of foreign troops, pointing out that war broke out in Korea without their presence and that their withdrawal therefore could hardly guarantee against resumption of hostilities, calls NK position "upside-down reasoning," adds that ultimate withdrawal of foreign troops is important to overall settlement of Korean problem.

1146K: NK asks if it can present its foreign troops argument while discussing cease fire.

1148K: UNC says NK can present its views unilaterally during discussion of Item 3 but UNC will not be obligated to discuss the item, offers to give NK written copy of portion of speech making this suggestion.

1154K: Recessed.

1400K: Reconvened. NK gives rebuttal to UNC foreign troops stand, claiming Korean war is so dangerous because of presence of foreign troops, charges "a foreign country intervened in the internal affairs of Korea," declaring CCF forces came in only after foreign troops had helped penetrate deep into interior of "Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea," claims cease fire shouldn't give both sides"a breathing space and prepare for fighting anew."

NK then agrees that foreign troops question be left to another conference for settlement, proposes to add Item 5: "Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides," to be discussed by "their representatives of a higher level" within a "definite time limit" after armistice becomes effective.

1426K: UNC asks for proposal in writing.

1427K: NK says it will take time to type it again.

1427K: Recessed.

1500K: Reconvened. UNC asks if NK's new Item 5 is to be discussed by these two delegations after armistice agreement is signed and in effect.

1502K: NK explains: After agreement on four items, we discuss recommendation to governments concerned that within a definite time limit their "representatives of a higher level be convened to negotiate" withdrawal by stages of foreign troops.

1505K: UNC asks if that means new Item 5 would be discussed before armistice agreement is signed.

1506K: NK suggests recess to decide answer, then asks if, when four items are agreed upon, other party will carry through on new Item 5 in good faith.

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1511K: UNC proposes recess until 1400 next day to consider NK's proposal, asks if NK wants to recess first for 15 minutes to decide answer to UNC question.

1512K: NK says if UNC will answer its question, it will give its answer in 15 minutes.

1513K: UNC assures NK its answer will be given next day in good faith.

1514K: Recessed.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

25 July 1951

Subj: TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Ninth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

Delegates present:

United Nations	Communists
VADM C T Joy USN Sr. Delegate	GEN Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes USA	MGEN Fang Hsieh CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

1100K — Conference reconvened.

NORTH KOREA: — If you have any opinion about our agenda, please tell us.

1101K
UNITED NATIONS: — We have carefully reviewed the positions expressed by both delegations in connection with the question of whether to add to the agenda an item dealing with withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea. We have examined and re-examined the arguments you put forward, so that we could be sure we fully understood them. In this review the United Nations Command Delegation has been guided by three premises on which your delegation has indicated agreement with ours:

1. We are mutually concerned with a military armistice conference at this time, not with a final peace settlement;

2. We must confine ourselves to those subjects with which military commanders are properly engaged;

3. We are presently discussing an agenda, a general framework within which specific discussions can evolve, not a listing of pre-conceived conclusions.

With this agreed guidance before us, it became

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

apparent that not one of the arguments you have used to support your contention has been shown to be valid. You did state that a major consideration of this conference was to provide against resumption of hostilities after a cease fire had once been ordered. We agreed with that. You further stated, however, that the withdrawal of foreign troops was the basic and principal guarantee against resumption of hostilities in Korea. We cannot agree with you on that. Were this true, certainly the United Nations Command Delegation would favor the earliest withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea as quickly as possible. Consequently, we examined with great care your assertion that withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea would insure against resumption of hostilities.

In our review of the question, one fact immediately stood out like a beacon: There were no foreign forces in Korea in June of 1950, when the hostilities began. Thus, history demonstrates clearly that hostilities did occur in Korea in the absence of foreign forces. How, then, could absence of foreign forces be a guarantee against hostilities resuming in Korea? You assert that the absence of foreign forces will insure against the repetition of violent events which in fact occurred in the absence of foreign forces. This is total confusion as to cause and effect. This is upside-down reasoning.

Furthermore, we recall that for a period of time after the end of World War II, foreign troops were in Korea. No war occurred as a result of the presence of those troops; rather, their presence was an aspect of the ending of a war. However, only a short time after the foreign troops were withdrawn from Korea, the threat of

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

hostilities in Korea appeared, and was followed all too soon by actual fighting.

You have stated that the presence of foreign troops prevents the Korean people from settling their problems themselves. By what means was the settlement of these problems progressing in June of 1950, before the appearance of foreign forces in Korea? By guns, tanks, aircraft - by war, as all the world knows. By immediately withdrawing foreign forces from Korea, we would restore the condition as to presence of troops in Korea that was the case in June of 1950. Would we have a guarantee against resumption of hostilities? The absence of foreign troops served as no guarantee on June 25, 1950.

The facts show that the withdrawal of foreign troops is no guarantee against resumption of hostilities in Korea. On the contrary, over-rapid withdrawal of foreign troops could well be the direct cause of resumption of hostilities. Certainly, the eventual withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, on the orders of the governments which sent them to Korea, is to be expected. Their withdrawal must be kept in accurate phase, however, with the development of assurance that hostilities will not begin again. The sooner the governments whose troops are in Korea are convinced that a genuine military armistice has been honestly implemented, the sooner the ground work can be laid for settling the other problems of Korea, including the question of foreign forces. Thus, it is perfectly clear to the United Nations Command Delegation that your proposal to add to the agenda an item dealing with withdrawal of foreign forces is a proposal based on a totally false premise. It is a proposal

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

conceived in error and containing the seed of fresh danger and suffering for Korea.

We have pointed out to you that the question of withdrawing foreign forces from Korea is a question for determination by the governments which sent them to Korea. It is beyond the scope of a military armistice, beyond the purview of this conference. We have reminded you that a decision regarding the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea is not necessary to accomplish a military armistice. A military armistice is merely a suspension of hostilities, usually the prelude to broader settlements which could properly include politico-military topics, and resolve them.

We have emphasized that this conference must be confined to military matters essential only to the negotiation of a military armistice. Withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea is not one of these.

We have shown clearly how fallacious is your basic reason for urging that withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea be made an agenda item. We have demonstrated that far from being a guarantee against resumption of hostilities, the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea would endanger the military armistice. We have expressed our belief that as the military armistice proves itself reliable, the governments concerned will take up the matter of withdrawing their forces from Korea, along with other problems relating to Korea.

In connection with our agreed agenda Items 2, 3 and 4, both of our delegations have announced the purpose of presenting unilateral views on details not expressly mentioned in the wording of the agenda items. This

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) understanding has become a basic part of our agreement on wording of agenda items. You, for example, have made clear your intent to present views with reference to a specific parallel in connection with the agreed Item 2. We have likewise expressed an intent to present views on matters not specifically covered in the wording of the agenda items, such as the International Red Cross visits to prisoner of war camps.

It is clearly the right of either delegation to voice its views on any subject it sincerely believes to be pertinent to the question under consideration. In fact, it was to make provision for exercising this right, that the United Nations Command Delegation has advocated generalized wording of agenda items. Certainly our agreed item dealing with arrangements for an armistice provides ample opportunity for you to express any views you may entertain on such questions as withdrawal of forces from Korea. Of course, neither delegation is obliged to accept such unilaterally submitted views as correct or even pertinent.

1135K
NORTH KOREA: Would you mind repeating that last statement?

1135K
UNITED NATIONS: "Of course, neither delegation is obliged to accept such unilaterally submitted views as correct or even pertinent."

The foregoing does not minimize in any way the importance of the ultimate withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea in relation to an overall settlement of the Korean question. Its importance is recognized in the public declarations of the United Nations as well as of the individual governments having troops in the United Nations Command. However, this question is only one of those which must be considered on the governmental level

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) in effecting a permanent settlement and which cannot be discussed separately, or in advance of agreement on, and implementation of, armistice terms.

In view of this established understanding, the United Nations Command Delegation does not perceive the need for additional agenda items. As we have said the agreed agenda item dealing with arrangements for a military armistice provides you with ample opportunity to put forward your views on the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea. In the interests of making progress toward stopping bloodshed in Korea, we therefore urge that you accept the agreed items as the agenda, so that our work can go forward.

1145K
NORTH KOREA: The last part -- would you mind repeating it in English again and also in Korean?

1146K
UNITED NATIONS: "In view of this established understanding, the United Nations Command Delegation does not perceive the need for additional agenda items. As we have said, the agreed agenda item dealing with arrangements for a military armistice provides you with ample opportunity to put forward your views on the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea. In the interests of making progress toward stopping bloodshed in Korea, we therefore urge that you accept the agreed items as the agenda, so that our work can go forward."

1146K
NORTH KOREA: There is one thing we do not quite understand. We hope you will make a further explanation of it. What do you mean by saying that while we proceed with the cease fire talks, we can present our opinion about the withdrawal of foreign troops? What do you mean by that?

[redacted]

[redacted]

1148K
UNITED NATIONS: Item 3 I referred to starts off with "concrete arrangements for cease fire and armistice in Korea." We mean that you will have an opportunity during the discussion of Item 3 to present your views unilaterally on the subject of withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea. This does not mean that we are obliged to accept your views or to discuss them. Do you understand?

1149K
NORTH KOREA: That means when we come to discuss Item 3, we can present the question of withdrawal of foreign forces?

1150K
UNITED NATIONS: Not discuss it. You can present your views - unilateral views. That does not mean we are obligated to discuss the item. If you desire, the United Nations Command Delegation will give you a copy in English of the portion of my speech which makes this suggestion.

1151K
NORTH KOREA: Please let us have it -- if you could give that to us right now.

1151K
UNITED NATIONS: We will have to abstract it and it will take a little time.

1152K
NORTH KOREA: I propose to recess until 1 o'clock by our time, 2 o'clock your time.

1152K
UNITED NATIONS: We agree.

1153K
NORTH KOREA: Please give us the abstract through the liaison officer.

Recessed at 1154 hours.

Reconvened at 1400 hours.

1400K
NORTH KOREA: I have listened to your views this morning that the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Korea does not serve

[redacted]

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

to insure against the resumption of the Korean war and that, in fact, the contrary was the case. It is our opinion, however, that such a view is groundless.

What kind of a war is the Korean war today? It is a war which involves many countries. That is precisely why it is so dangerous. The occurrence of such a situation is primarily due to the fact that a foreign country intervened in the internal affairs of Korea and dispatched its armed forces to fight in Korea. The composition of our conference fully demonstrates this situation.

Judging from the surface, there were indeed no foreign forces in Korea on June 25th, 1950, but the occurrence of the incident of June 25 and subsequent developments were inseparable from the fact that large numbers of foreign armed forces arrived in Korea on June 27th which prevented the peaceful settlement of the internal problem of Korea for which we have consistently stood, and converted the war into one involving many countries.

It was only when the foreign troops participated and one side had penetrated deep into the interior of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and directly threatened the security of the Peoples Republic of China, that the Chinese People were compelled to send volunteer units to assist the Korean people to fight against intervention by foreign armed forces. In view of this, if we want a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and reliable assurances for our cease fire and armistice, it is indispensable that all foreign armed forces be withdrawn from Korea.

Ever since our first meeting we have consistently maintained that this conference should discuss and settle

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

the problem of withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea. This conference is a conference for cease fire and armistice. Its purpose is to realize cease fire and armistice in Korea through mutual agreement and on a just and reasonable basis.

Clearly we want a cease fire and armistice not in order that either of the two sides may gain a breathing space and prepare for fighting anew, but in order to pave the way for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Peace-loving peoples of the world expect us to do so, and we both sides have also pledged ourselves to make our conference accomplish this task smoothly. It is therefore incumbent to have sincerity and good faith in regard to cease fire and armistice and secure through our negotiations firm assurances against the resumption of hostile acts and the realization of cease fire and armistice in Korea.

Since it is our mutual agreement that the cease fire and armistice we seek is not for either of us to gain a breathing space for fighting again, what necessity can there be for the foreign armed forces that have come to Korea to fight to continue to stay in Korea after the cease fire and armistice? Since it is our mutual agreement that we should secure through our negotiations firm assurances against the resumption of hostilities after the realization of cease fire and armistice in Korea, what measure is there that can better assure against the resumption of hostile military acts in Korea than the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea?

Looked at from whatever angle, the problem of withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea is inseparable

rable from the problem of achieving cease fire and armistice in Korea. In accordance with these self-evident reasons we have in the past eight meetings patiently explained our position over and over again and repeatedly raised the subject of withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea on our agenda. Your reasons for refusing to include this item in the agenda are untenable. However, our position has failed to obtain your agreement through the negotiations in the eight meetings. This we can only consider to be very regrettable.

Now in order that an agreement may be reached on an armistice at an early date so that the primary wishes of the peace-loving people of the world may be realized, we agree to your view that the question of the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces be left to another conference for settlement after the realization of cease fire and armistice and not be included in the agenda of this conference.

In view of the deep-rooted relations between the question of withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea and the cease fire and armistice we seek to achieve, and the eagerness of the soldiers of the various foreign countries participating in the fighting to go back home for a peaceful life after the armistice, we consider that this conference after discussing and settling the problem of cease fire and armistice should make a definite arrangement with regard to this important question.

We therefore propose to add a fifth item to the four items on the agenda already agreed upon: "Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides," so that after our discussing and obtaining concrete

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

arrangements on the four items we may discuss under this item the question of recommending to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that within a definite time limit after the armistice agreement becomes effective a conference of their representatives of a higher level be convened to negotiate on the question of withdrawal, by stages, of all foreign armed forces from Korea.

We consider that such an item on the agenda, and the content of the recommendations we are prepared to put forward when this item is under discussion, will not only be conducive to an early realization of our desire for an armistice agreement but also enhance the hope for a peace in Korea. We believe that the delegation of the United Nations Forces will surely agree to our proposal.

1426K
UNITED NATIONS: In order that we can make no mistakes about your proposal we would like to have it in writing . . . exactly what you said.

1427K
NORTH KOREA: That we can do.

1427K
UNITED NATIONS: Can we have it now?

1427K
NORTH KOREA: It will take some time to type it again.

1427K
UNITED NATIONS: We wish a half-hour recess to discuss this.

1427K
NORTH KOREA: Agreed.

Recessed at 1427 hours.

Reconvened at 1500 hours.

1500K
UNITED NATIONS: Do we understand your actual proposed item to be: "Recommendations to the countries concerned on both sides"? Correct?

[redacted]

[redacted]

1500K
NORTH KOREA: Yes. That is the recommendation to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides.

1500E
UNITED NATIONS: We understand.

1501K
NORTH KOREA: And I explained the content of it.

1501K
UNITED NATIONS: You mean the rest, in other words, is just explanation?

1501K
NORTH KOREA: Yes

1501K
UNITED NATIONS: It is intended that your new Item 5 be discussed by our two delegations after an armistice agreement based on the four mutually agreed upon items is signed and in effect?

1502K
NORTH KOREA: Then I will explain it again. That means after having discussed the four items and reached an agreement on them, we will recommend to the governments concerned on both sides, and then we may discuss under this item the question of recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that within a definite time-limit after the armistice agreement becomes effective, a conference of their representatives of a higher level be convened to negotiate on the question of withdrawal, by stages, of all foreign armed forces from Korea.

1505K
UNITED NATIONS: In other words, you mean this is another agenda item which must be discussed before the agreement is signed?

1506K
NORTH KOREA: To have the agreement on the armistice smoothly. See? So we present the first four items first and when we have discussed the armistice items, then we will consider this item. Signing the agreement, that is only a technical question. As to whether it will come before the

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) signing or after, we want to have a 15 minute recess to consider that.

1507K
UNITED NATIONS: Want I want to get clear is this: Whether you mean if both delegations do not agree on the recommendation, you will not sign the agreement?

1508K
NORTH KOREA: Your statement is duly noted.

1508K
UNITED NATIONS: Put it another way: Is it your intention that the armistice will be in effect when the question is being considered -- when Item 5 is being considered? That is another way of putting it. Do you wish a recess?

1509K
NORTH KOREA: There is one thing I want to ask. When these four items are agreed upon, has the other party good faith to consider Item 5 then?

UN INTERPRETER: After the four items have been considered, and the armistice is signed, do you have good faith to go on to Item 5?

1510K
NORTH KOREA: And to have good result.

1510K
UNITED NATIONS: I don't understand that - "have good result."

1511K
NORTH KOREA: And we understand that it will have certain results?

UN INTERPRETER'S EXPLANATION: He means, "Carry it through to fruition."

1511K
UNITED NATIONS: I understand. In view of the importance of this question, we must recess and reconsider it, and I propose that we meet again tomorrow at 2 o'clock our time, 1 o'clock your time. Did you want to recess first for 15 minutes to give me the answer on what I was asking?

1512K
NORTH KOREA: If you could give us the answer to our question, we are

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) prepared to give you an answer to yours in 15 minutes.

1513K
UNITED NATIONS: I can assure you that whatever answer I give you tomorrow will be in good faith.

1514K
NORTH KOREA: We agree.

Recessed at 1514 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED BY:

E. C. Thomas

E. C. THOMAS,
Major, USMCR

[redacted]

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

0000160

[redacted]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

26 July 1951

Subj: RECORD OF EVENTS, Tenth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

1359K: NK asks UNC opinion of its fifth item.

1400K: UNC accepts NK proposed Item 5, reads it.

1401K: NK asks it be repeated.

1401K: UNC repeats, assures NK it will be discussed in good faith.

1405K: NK reads five-item agenda, asks if UNC recognizes agreement on it.

1408K: UNC says yes, proposes agenda be formally adopted.

1409K: NK agrees to accept it formally, wants to start discussions.

1410K: UNC says first it wants to suggest working procedure, reads enumeration of articles to the agreement.

1416K: NK asks if it's procedure for discussion or for armistice agreement.

1417K: UNC: For armistice agreement.

1418K: NK Senior Delegate asks UNS Senior Delegate to speak slower in English.

1419K: UNC proposes procedure for discussions: Once tentative agreement is reached on substance of an item, it be turned over to staff assistants to work up suggested wording, while delegates go on to next item; delegates not to discuss wording unless exchanges of written proposed drafts result in stalemate, and if staffs reach agreement delegates will adopt wording formally.

1432K: NK says its opinion on proposal will be given next day.

1435K: UNC says it's ready for NK's discussion of Item 2.

1436K: NK asks UNC opinion of Item 2.

1437K: UNC says it would prefer to give it next day.

1438K: NK proposes 15-minute recess.

1439K: Recessed.

1451K: Reconvened. NK urges 38th Parallel as military demarcation line, proposes demilitarized zone extend 10 kilometers on each side of it, remarks that present battle lines can't be used because "no stable battle lines exist before an armistice."

1502K: UNC presents proposed preamble to armistice agreement, says it intends when it gets back to camp to release agenda to press.

1510K: Recessed.

Final Smooth Draft
Transcript of
26 July 1951 Proceedings a.

[redacted]

[redacted]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

26 July 1951

Subj: TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Tenth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

Delegates Present:

United Nations	Communists
VADM C T Joy USN Sr. Delegate	GEN Nam Il Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes USA	MGEN Fang Hsich CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

Reconvened at 1359 hours.

NORTH KOREA: What opinion has the other party about our fifth item?

1400K
UNITED NATIONS: We accept your proposed Item 5, which you have stated as follows: "Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides."

In accepting this item we wish to make it clear that as in the case of other agenda items, the United Nations Command Delegation does not commit itself in advance to any specific agreement regarding this item.

1401K
NORTH KOREA: Please say that again.

1401K
UNITED NATIONS: "In accepting this item we wish to make it clear that as in the case of other agenda items, the United Nations Command Delegation does not commit itself in advance to any specific agreement regarding this item."

In response to your query of 25 July, the United Nations Command Delegation wishes to assure you that we will discuss this item fully and in good faith in an endeavor to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement.

[redacted]

0000162

[redacted]

1403K
NORTH KOREA: Your statement is duly noted and we think that you agree on the whole agenda.

1404K
UNITED NATIONS: We agree on the whole agenda as it is now -- the five items.

1405K
NORTH KOREA: Then I will read the agenda once:

"1. Adoption of agenda.

"2. Fixing of military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

"3. Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority and functions of a supervisory organ for carrying out the terms of cease fire and armistice.

"4. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.

"5. Recommendation to governments of countries concerned on both sides."

Now, does the other party recognize that we have agreed upon the agenda?

1408K
UNITED NATIONS: We recognize it, and I propose that the agenda be formally adopted.

1409K
NORTH KOREA: We agree to accept, to adopt, this agenda and we also agree to accept it formally.

I think the adoption of the agenda after several meetings is a progressive fact for the work of the armistice and I propose to go over to the discussion of the main problems.

1410K
UNITED NATIONS: Before we go over to the discussion, we would like to

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

take up certain matters relating to the drafting of the armistice agreement. We believe that if we can mutually agree on an outline procedure our work will be expedited. We suggest that we tentatively accept - as a working basis - an enumeration of articles to the agreement in consonance with the agenda. With this in view, we suggest that the armistice agreement tentatively should be organized as follows:

1414K
NORTH KOREA: Please say that again.

1414K
UNITED NATIONS: "We suggest that we tentatively accept - as a working basis - an enumeration of articles to the agreement in consonance with the agenda. With this in view, we suggest that the armistice agreement tentatively should be organized as follows:"

Preamble

Article I

Demilitarized Zone.

Article II

Concrete Arrangements for the Armistice.

Article III

Prisoner of War Matters.

Article IV

Concluding Statements.

Article V

Recommendations.

If you wish these, they are not spelled out - they are abbreviations, but if you wish them spelled out that can be easily arranged.

1416K
NORTH KOREA: One thing I don't clearly understand. Is it just procedure - is it procedure for discussion or procedure for

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) — the armistice agreement?

1417K
UNITED NATIONS: This is the procedure for the armistice agreement we both sign.

I wish to read a little further here so that we can consider it.

1418K
NORTH KOREA: If it is possible, when you speak in English, speak a little slower.

1419K
UNITED NATIONS: We will give you a copy of this. We further propose -- as a procedural matter -- that each article be taken up in turn for discussion. Necessarily the discussion of each article is related to other articles; and the drafting of any one article does not commit either side to its acceptance until such time as both sides have signed the armistice agreement.

In proceeding to the discussion of the substance of the agenda item, we propose a mechanical procedure which is designed to expedite our work program. It is as follows:

Once tentative agreement is reached between the delegations on the substance of an agenda item, either your staff assistants or our staff assistants, as agreed between the delegations, will prepare and submit in writing a proposed phrasing of the agreement. Meanwhile, the delegations will proceed to a discussion of the next substantive agenda item.

The delegations will not undertake discussion of the wordirg of the agreements unless the exchanges of proposed drafts in writing results in a stalemate. If the exchanges of proposed drafts in writing results in an

[redacted]

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) agreed wording, the delegations will then take up this agreed wording and adopt it formally, with any necessary modification. Thus a jointly-arrived-at wording of the agreement on a particular item should be largely thrashed out through exchanges in writing before the delegations address themselves to the wording.

The advantage of this procedure is that it permits the delegations to make progress on matters of substance while our staffs are working out the detailed wording of an agreement already reached in basic outline.

If you wish, I will have my staff officers remain after this meeting and consult concerning this procedure with your staff officers.

I am sure both delegations have given thought to possible methods of procedure. It is of mutual benefit to both sides to decide upon a procedure which will permit the accomplishment of our mission in the shortest possible time.

I have just made certain suggestions along this line. The United Nations Command Delegation would be happy to listen to any suggestions you may have on this subject.

1432K
NORTH KOREA: I have duly noted the proposal of the other party as to the technical questions of the procedure of the meeting. We will propose our opinion about this tomorrow morning - we will present our opinion about this tomorrow morning.

As for the particular questions for the procedure, we will present them tomorrow. Now, what about going over to the discussion of the second item?

UN INTERPRETER: "The first item has been settled. Your proposal about these technical procedure problems and procedure of the

[redacted]

0000166

UN INTERPRETER: (Cont'd) meeting -- that will not be in the way of discussing the the subsequent questions."

1435K
UNITED NATIONS: We should be pleased to hear your discussion on Item 2 of the agenda.

1436K
NORTH KOREA: Has the other party not good faith to present its opinion about the second item?

1436K
UN INTERPRETER: "Doesn't the other party have good faith to present its opinion about Item 2?"

1437K
UNITED NATIONS: We would prefer to give you our discussion of Item 2 tomorrow morning.

1438K
NORTH KOREA: Then we propose to recess for 15 minutes.

1439K
UNITED NATIONS: I agree.

Recessed at 1439 hours.

Reconvened at 1451 hours.

NORTH KOREA: We hold firmly that the 38th Parallel should be made the military demarcation line between both sides and that both sides withdraw 10 kilometers from the 38th Parallel in order to establish a demilitarized zone. The reason why we take such a stand is well known to the world.

First, to fix the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides is consistent with the historical fact recognized by the whole world. To fix the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides is the basis of the present armistice negotiations.

The outbreak of the war is precisely because of the fact that one of the belligerents violated first the demarcation line of the 38th Parallel. The reason why the

NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

war could not be stopped later is again that one of the belligerents ignored the position of the Korean people and of the Chinese people and violated once again the 38th Parallel. In order to demonstrate the good faith of both sides in the armistice and to place our armistice on a just and reasonable basis, it is necessary to fix the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides.

Third, the present battle lines cannot be taken as the military demarcation line between both sides. In fact, no stable battle lines exist before an armistice is agreed upon and implemented. Therefore, it is basically impracticable to insist on an armistice based on the current positions.

On the other hand, the 38th Parallel is the only just and reasonable military demarcation line between both sides consistent with the present military situation, since both sides occupy areas south and north of the 38th Parallel. Withdrawal from the 38th Parallel by both sides is the only realistic and practicable plan of readjustment.

Once the 38th Parallel is fixed as the military demarcation line between both sides, the establishment of the demilitarized zone is easy to arrange. We propose that, based on the principle of equality and reciprocity, the armed forces of either side withdraw 10 kilometers from the 38th Parallel so that a demilitarized zone may be established to keep apart the armed forces of the two sides. If this is done, the armed forces of either side will be in a position free from the possibility of a surprise attack by the other side.

Is the agenda agreable?

[redacted]

1502K

UNITED NATIONS: As I said before, we will present our position on the demilitarized zone tomorrow morning. Before we have a recess I would like to present to you now for your consideration our proposed preamble to the armistice agreement. I will read it off:

"Armistice

"Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Commander-in-Chief, North Korean People's Army and the Chinese Volunteer Army, on the other hand, concerning a military armistice.

"Preamble

"The undersigned Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Commanders-in-Chief, North Korean People's Army and Chinese Volunteer Army, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping further conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until such time as a final peaceful settlement of the conflict in Korea is achieved, do, individually, collectively, and mutually, agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following articles and paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea."

For your information, upon our return to our base camp today, it is the intention of the United Nations Command Delegation to release to the press the agenda upon which we have agreed.

Now we wish to recess until tomorrow morning, 9 o'clock your time, 10 o'clock our time.

1510K
NORTH KOREA: Then we agree to recess until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning our time.

Recessed at 1510 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H.M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED BY:

E.C. Thomas

E.C. THOMAS,
Major, USMCR.



NEW FOLDER BEGINS

[redacted]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

27 July 1951 28

Subj: RECORD OF EVENTS, Eleventh Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

1000K: Reconvened. NK accepts in principle tentative list of articles proposed by UNC, suggests Article I include both military demarcation line and demilitarized zone, says necessity of concluding statements will depend on what's left over after discussion of agenda Item 4. Also agrees to UNC's proposed mechanical procedure, names three staff assistants, offers to put up UNC staff officers in Kaesong. No comment yet on UNC's proposed preamble except for proper terms for NK and CCF armies.

1015K: UNC says articles will be spelled out, names its own staff officers, declines offer of facilities for them in Kaesong.

1020K: NK agrees to procedure, leaves details to liaison officers.

1021K: UNC gives opening statement on Item 2, pointing out why history has nothing to do with adopting 38th Parallel as military demarcation line, reminds NK of UNC's unquestioned air and sea control over North Korea in addition to present ground positions, submits map with UNC proposed demilitarized ground zone, proposes cessation of UNC air effort from Yalu and Tumen rivers to demilitarized ground zone, and that naval offensive be halted along both coasts from mouths of Yalu and Tumen to southern boundary of demilitarized ground zone.

1114K: NK asks recess until 1000K next day.

1115K: Recessed.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

27 July 1951

Subj: TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Eleventh Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

Delegates Present:

United Nations	Communists
VADM C T Joy USN Sr. Delegate	GEN Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes USA	MGEN Fan Hsieh CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

Conference reconvened at 1000 hours.

1000K:
NORTH KOREA: We are going to say something about the technical questions which the other party proposed yesterday. In your statement yesterday you proposed a tentative list of articles to the armistice agreement drafted in consonance with the order and content of the agenda. After having studied your statement, we consider that the organization and structure of the agenda agreement and the captions in it which you propose can be accepted in principle.

Under Article I, however, you mentioned only demilitarized zone. It is our opinion that it will be more appropriate if it is changed into military demarcation line and demilitarized zone. In this way it will be consistent with the phreaseology and the content of the agenda agreed upon by both sides, and can be understood clearly by all. We believe that you will undoubtedly accept such an amendment we propose.

With regards to the question if it is necessary to list concluding statements as an independent article,

[redacted]

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

it will have to be determined after we have discussed the fourth item of the agenda.

This is a tentative program. If you agree to the two points I have just raised, we may use the revised article as a working basis to proceed with our work of drafting the armistice agreement.

Next, we are also willing to try your proposed mechanical procedure. When better procedures are found out in the course of the work, we will propose it immediately and expedite our work -- we will propose it immediately so as to expedite our work. In the meantime, we shall introduce any new method we discover in order to expedite the fulfillment of our program -- our working program.

We have appointed Colonel Chang Chun San, Lt Colonel Chai Cheng Wen and Captain Chu Mun Sun as our staff assistants to work with your staff assistants on drafting the proposed phrasing of the agreements in reaching the substance of the agenda. I hope you will also appoint your staff assistants so that they may consult with our staff assistants on the details of working procedure after this meeting.

I have already ordered our three staff assistants, Chang, Chai, Chu, to provide your staff assistants with living and working facilities. If you deem it beneficial to our work to have your staff assistants living in Kaesong, they will surely be welcome.

We appreciate the drafted preamble to the agreement you have presented to us. As you stated that it was furnished to us for information only, there is no need for us to make any comment yet. But I should like to take

[redacted]

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) this opportunity to point out that you have in this draft called our forces the North Korean People's Army and Chinese Volunteer Army, which are not their proper names, and are therefore inappropriate. The proper names of our armed forces are the People's Army of the Democratic Peoples of the Republic of Korea and the Chinese People's Volunteers.

1015K
UNITED NATIONS: Is that all?

1015K
NORTH KOREA: That is all.

1015K
UNITED NATIONS: As we pointed out yesterday, we said if you wished the titles of these articles spelled out, we would do so. If you agree, we will spell out Article I to read, "Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea."

We will do the same with the other articles, wording them exactly as they are on the agreed agenda. We also agree to your proposal about Article IV, which we will leave until after Item IV has been decided upon.

We appoint Colonel Kinney and Colonel Murray as staff assistants. An additional officer will be appointed from time to time.

UN INTERPRETER: (To UN Senior Delegate): Sir, they agreed to your first statements about the articles.

1019K:
UNITED NATIONS: At present, no living or working facilities are needed in addition to those now available. Thank you, however, for your offer. During the first recess of this meeting, Colonel Kinney and Colonel Murray will meet with your staff

[redacted]

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) officers.

1019K:
NORTH KOREA: Is that all?

1020K:
UNITED NATIONS: That's all. I want to refer to your speech of yesterday.

1020K:
NORTH KOREA: Then we agree to your statement. The details will be settled by the liaison officers of both sides during the recess.

1021K:
UNITED NATIONS: We agree to that.

In your opening statement yesterday on agenda Item 2 you proposed that the 38th Parallel be accepted as a military demarcation line and that both sides withdraw an equal distance from this line. Among the reasons advanced by you was that this selection would be consistent with historical fact. That is, hostilities started at the 38th, therefore, ipso facto, they should end on the 38th.

It is true, as you say, that the war began on the 38th Parallel. This fact, by itself, constitutes no basis whatever for the contention that this line should be selected as the military demarcation line under current conditions. Following the start of hostilities and before the United Nations were able to implement fully their resolution to assist the Republic of Korea, their military forces withdrew to the Naktong river, where the military situation stabilized. Had an armistice been concluded a year ago today, it is difficult to believe that you would have agreed to a military demarcation line along the 38th Parallel.

Subsequent to the 15th of September 1950 your forces withdrew to the region of the Yalu river. Had an armistice been concluded at that time, you could not reasonably have

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UNITED NATIONS:
(Cont'd)

expected us to agree to accept the 38th Parallel as a cease fire line.

From the standpoint of history then and of military realism, it is obvious that not since the outbreak of the war, on 25 June 1950, has there been any valid basis for considering the 38th Parallel as a military demarcation line.

A military demarcation line, or line to limit the advance of opposing forces during an armistice, bears no relation to past history. Such a line, moreover, does not involve the question of good faith; neither is it concerned with long-term territorial readjustments of a political nature. Finally, no demarcation line is essential for the establishment of a demilitarized zone. Your position in this regard is therefore untenable.

In summary, none of the several arguments you advanced in support of your proposal that the 38th Parallel be accepted as a military demarcation line has any validity whatever. On the contrary they imply a lack of understanding of the true nature of such a line.

You have agreed that a demilitarized zone shall be established across Korea. Within this zone all armed forces are to be excluded. We contend that the delineation of this zone must be based on practical military considerations as they exist at present and that it be entirely uninfluenced by consideration of any ultimate settlement at governmental level of political and territorial problems. On the other hand, every element pertaining to the military effectiveness of both opposing forces, must be thoroughly and impartially considered.

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UNITED NATIONS:
(Cont'd)

Therefore, an imaginery goographical line such as a parallel of latitude has no validity whatsoever in developing a military armistice.

In approaching the problem of a demilitarized zone, the United Nations Command Delegation desires to call attention to certain military realities.

Under the terms of any armistice agreement which we may arrive at there will be in fact, three zones of military significance.

First, the air zone. The United Nations Command maintains air superiority over all of Korea.

Second, the sea zone. The United Nations Command controls the entire sea area around Korea.

Third, the ground zone. The United Nations Command controls everything south of a line running roughly from Chodo-ri on the East coast of Korea in a westerly direction through the high ground south of Pyonggang; thence southwesterly through Pan Mun Jom to Haechang-ni and along the northern banks of the Han river to its mouth.

The effect of air and naval power, as well as ground force effectiveness, <u>all three considered together</u>, influence materially the location of the ground demilitarized zone. In other words, the ground demilitarized zone must be kept in proper focus in its relation to the other military zones carved out by air and naval power, the impact of which you are fully cognizant.

Due consideration must be given, therefore, to the effects the air and naval forces have on ground operations. The United Nations Command Air Force and Naval Air have restricted the freedom of movement of your forces and have inflicted heavy casualties on your ground troops.

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

The attacks of the United Nations Command Air Forces in your rear areas have compelled you to employ large numbers of troops and guns in rear area AA defenses, troops and guns otherwise available for employment on the ground battle line. Your capabilities for concentrating troops and supplies in the battle area have been materially reduced. Your capabilities for providing air surveillance and close air support to your ground troops are practically nil.

Again, with respect to naval power you fully appreciate the realities. At the present time you are landlocked. The United Nations Command has free access to the seas contiguous to the entire area of Korea while your use of sea lines of communication is restricted. Your roads and rail lines along both coasts are subject to effective naval gunfire. The United Nations Command retains the capability of conducting amphibious operations, requiring you to deploy sizeable forces along the coasts against the threat of these landings. Your ports, military installations, lines of communications, and supply depots near the coasts are subject to naval bombardment at will. In contrast South Korea is free from a naval blockade, and from attacks by naval forces.

The military realities of the situation are clearly shown geographically on this map. Your attention is directed toward the large areas which the United Nations Command controls by its air power and naval power. It includes all of North Korea, from the present line of contact to the Yalu and Tumen rivers. You have nothing comparable in South Korea.

In considering the ground situation alone our

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

respective capabilities may lend themselves to a more nearly equal comparison. However, here again we must be realistic and consider thoroughly and impartially every element pertaining to the military effectiveness of the opposing forces in their present positions.

It must be clear by this time that the line you have frequently proposed to use in determining the demilitarized zone is entirely unrelated to the overall military situation as it exists in Korea at this time. It is not even related to the present line of ground contact. It fails completely in reflecting the effectiveness of air and naval forces. It is far less related to the overall military situation in Korea than would be the case of a line of demarcation running generally through Pyongyang and Wonsan. In other words, the advantages given up by you in a withdrawal of your ground forces to the north of a line running generally through Pyongyang and Wonsan would in no way equal the advantages you would gain by the United Nations Command withdrawing its air and naval power from North Korea.

The ground forces, yours and ours, are in general contact at this time along a specific line, known to you and to us so well that it is not necessary to go into detail as to its location. Considering only ground forces a cease fire arrangement with all forces remaining in place would appear reasonable. This, however, would stop only a part of the hostile action. Our navy would still be free to blockade and bombard along both coasts of North Korea. Our air forces would still be able to reconnoiter and inflict military damage over all of North Korea. If, then, we are to agree on a

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

military armistice whereby our ground, air and naval forces cease operations against your forces we contend that the location of the demilitarized zone, in all fairness, must be appropriately influenced by all of those factors.

These factors, in our opinion, and I am sure in yours, are matters worthy of the most serious consideration. These factors all influence the location of the ground demilitarized zone. All of these factors must be considered in any discussion concerning the military advantages which each side may have to concede in order to arrive at an equitable and effective military armistice.

In general, then, you must be aware that a cease fire on the ground, in the air and along the coasts on the part of the United Nations Command forces is a concession far greater than a cease fire by all the North Korean and Chinese forces in Korea under present conditions. It is at a minimum, equivalent to a major withdrawal to the North of North Korean and Chinese ground forces.

The depth of the demilitarized zone should be sufficient to prevent the occurrence of minor but disturbing incidents between individuals of both sides during the period of the armistice. This is a simple precautionary measure that each commander has the right to expect. To accomplish this without unduly complicating the administrative arrangements within the zone, we propose that, in general, the demilitarized zone be approximately 20 miles in depth.

As we indicated many times during the preliminary

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) conferences, there are several methods by which the zone can be delineated. Inasmuch as this zone represents a temporary military expedient to insure against misunderstandings which might delay progress toward final settlement of the Korean problem, we consider that it should be delineated by easily recognized ground or terrain features.

In consideration of the foregoing remarks, we now propose the following:

1. Cessation of all ground action, and the establishment of a demilitarized zone from which all military forces will be withdrawn. The ground demilitarized zone proposed is outlined on the map which I presently will hand you.

2. Cessation of our air effort in the area extending southward from the Yalu and Tumen rivers to the southern boundary of the demilitarized ground zone to be agreed upon.

3. Cessation of our naval bombardment and blockade along the coasts of Korea from the mouth of the Yalu on the west coast and the mouth of the Tumen river on the east coast, southward to the southern boundary of the demilitarized ground zone to be agreed upon.

This map at a scale of 1:250,000 outlines in general the zone but does not define it in the detail that will be required later for administrative purposes.

1114K
NORTH KOREA: We propose to recess until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

1115K
UNITED NATIONS: Very well.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Recessed at 1115 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

E. C. Thomas

E. C. THOMAS
Major, USMCR

[redacted]


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General Staff
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Sariwŏn
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

28 July 1951

Subj: RECORD OF EVENTS, Twelfth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

1003K: Reconvened. NK calls UNC proposal of demilitarized zone "Incredible statement," charges UNC's military demarcation line and tenor of remarks is "an attempt to intimidate," asks if UNC position was so solid why it did not hold Pyongyang-Wonsan line, claims UNC air and naval power have succeeded only in "wanton bombardment" of "innocent civilians", points out that battle lines on ground are "concentrated expression of the military effectiveness of your land, air and sea forces" and therefore UNC air and sea power should not be used as argument to roll back present battle line, says 38th Parallel reflects "relative war power of both sides," declares battle lines are changin all the time south and north of 38th and present line can't be taken as reflecting military realities, winds up by asking if UNC comes to conference for peace or as an "excuse for extending the war."

1047K: Recessed.

1330K: Reconvened. NK says he left out something in morning speech: UNC's present positions on ground are barely and temporarily maintained" only by relying on "indiscriminate and inhuman bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces in violation of the international law" other wise ground forces "would long since have withdrawn to no one knows where".

1333K: UNC scorches NK for "discourteous," "rude and graceless remarks," says if UNC were intent on extending the war" we should not need to come to an armistice conference in search of an excuse", charges that if NK continues its rudeness UNC will be "compelled to conclude you have no serious or sincere purpose at this conference," reiterates its stand that true military demarcation line must not only consider present ground battle line but give full credit for UNC's undisputed control of sea and air, points out that military campaigns have been successful without ground forces advancing and cites capitulation of Japanese islands as example, claims present battle line represents most stable line since breakout from Naktong River line, points out that 38th Parrallel is an attempt to reap polictical and territorial advantage from military armistice.

1415K: NK recalls "your yesterday's intimidating and insulting statement," says courtesy "must start from your side, and it does not apply to us," claims UNC views of today, are still the same old tune of yesterday," accuses UNC of "preparing an excuse for extending the war," claims that NK has "attitude of equanimity," says he'll answer UNC's other points "when I deem it necessary."

1430K: Recessed.

1500K: Reconvened. UNC reviews effect of its air and sea campaign.

1512K: NK says UNC statement "forgot to mention the indiscriminate bombing of peaceful cities and villages and their inhabitants."

1517K: UNC finds "nothing in NK's arguments, refutes assertion that UNC wants to stop campaign on ground and not in air or on sea.

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1524K: NK says its stand on 38th Parallel is "righteous and immovable".

1528K: UNC says its stand "is based on the military situation and the military realities."

1530K: NK says present contact line is not a fixed line and can change during negotiations, hence can't be used as line of demarcation.

1535K: UNC points out there's no more reason for using 38th Parallel than for 39th, reminds NK that UNC proposes to use line shown on UNC map, not present battle line.

1540K: NK proposes recess until 1100K next day.

1542K: Recessed.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

28 July 1951

Subj: TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Twelfth Session. Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

Delegates present:

United Nations	Communists
VADM C T Joy USN Sr, Delegate	GEN Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes USA	MGEN Fang Hsieh CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

Conference reconvened at 1003 hours.

NORTH KOREA: Have you anything more to say?

1004K
UNITED NATIONS: Not at this time.

1004K
NORTH KOREA: Now we will speak.

Yesterday I heard with surprise your incredible statement and had a glance at that map of yours on which were three lines which anybody with red, blue and black Pencils could have drawn. One of the three lines was apparently advocated by you to be fixed as the military demarcation line. At the time I already felt that such lines drawn at random were not worthy of attention, and when I had heard the arguments you raised in support of these lines, I was even more convinced that they were not worthy of attention, because your arguments were naive and illogical.

What did you say actually in support of the lines you had drawn? You maintained that the fixing of this military demarcation line and the delineation of the demilitarized zone must start from the consideration of

NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

the existing military realities and be free from the influence of any political or territorial considerations.

Now among the so-called military considerations, you advocated the doctrine of military effectiveness. You contended that you held air and naval superiority, and that therefore, the demarcation line drawn across the land must enable the area occupied by your ground forces to be pushed forward a great step into our area, so as to reflect the present military situation.

We consider that this theory of yours is based on a one sided, simple and incorrect military point of view We consider that in fixing a military demarcation line, due attention should indeed be paid to the military realities on the battlefront. Yet, the armistice we seek for is the first step toward the peaceful settlement of the Korean question and not intended for the resumption of fighting.

Therefore, in fixing this military demarcation line, apart from giving due consideration to the military realities on the battlefield, we must also give consideration to the creation of favorable conditions for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Judging by this criterion the entire tenor of your statement was to boast about the so-called military power and effectiveness on your side, in an attempt to intimidate. You should be aware that such a gesture can intimidate nobody, but what is more important such a gesture can only have a harmful effect on the armistice negotiations as the first step toward the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

You asserted that the advantages we would gain by

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

the cessation of the air and naval attacks by the United Nations Forces would be greater than the advantage given up by us in the withdrawal of our ground forces to the line running through Pyongyang and Wonsan. I would like to know, since the situation is so preponderantly favorable on your side, why did you not hold your ground in the Pyongyang-Wonsan line you had once reached, instead of withdrawing all the way to the south of the Han River under cover and support of your naval and air forces? May I advise you sincerely that as these naive remarks serve no good purpose for our negotiations while they can intimidate nobody, the less there are of such remarks, the better it would be.

With regard to the military realities on the present battlefront, naturally we cannot ignore the comparison of military power of both sides, which is primarily constituted by the effectiveness of the various arms of the forces employed by them.

Yet it would be a gross mistake to think that this constitutes all the factors of the war power of the two sides. Have you never lent a thought to the following question? Can it be explained purely by the so-called effectiveness of the various arms of the forces that, in spite of the wanton bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces, your battle lines rolled back from the Han river to the vicinity of the 38th Parallel? No.

The factors constiuting war power are in fact much more complicated than the superficial effectiveness of the various arms of the forces you have reapeatedly stressed, and should include the manpower, morale, political conditions, etc. Of course, I have not

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

sufficient time to discuss military theories at present. I will only make a few remarks about your ridiculous theory about the three zones--land, air, and sea.

It is mentioned in any military manual worthy of its name that military power is thesum total of the power of all arms of theforces; the position occuptied by your ground forces fro the time being is imseparable from the support of your air and naval forces. In other werds, your battle lines on the ground are the concentrated expression of the military effectiveness of your land, air, and sea forces.

I must further point out that the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment by your naval and air forces in the past year have only destroyed and a large number of peaceful towns and villages, and killed and wounded innocent civilians of our country, without being able to overawe the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. In fact, we are steadily overcoming th difficulties brought to our civilians by your wanton bombing and bombardment, and are making great strides forward. This is a fact known well to all; yet you are still boasting that there are three isolated battle zones, that you have established a separate royal domain in the air and on the sea. You maintain that once all hostilities cease, you will be at a disadvantage, hence you propose that the military demaraction line must lie deep in our side so that it will be no loss to you. Such logic of yours can only deceive those who neurotic or muddle-headed.

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

Therefor, the military demarcation line which you have proposed on the basis of such a fallacious theory is completely groundless and, hence, unworthy of consideration and cannot be considered.

On the other hand, our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides reflects, from the viewpoint of military considerations, the relative war power of both sides at the present stage.

From the viewpoint that our negotiations should be the first step toward the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, our proposal is also once which is recognized by the whole world and one which is just, reasonable, realistic and practicable.

What are the characteristics of the battlefront at the present stage? Since this year, the situation of the battle front has been changing all the time. In January, the troops of our side advanced to the Suwon, Wonju, Pyongchang region south of the 38th Parallel, and since then, the battle line of contact between both sides has been shifting south and north of the 38th Parallel all the time. You are aware, as I am also aware, that the present positions occupied by both sides are similarly changing all the time.

This kind of situation will continue until agreement is reached through our negotiations and is implemented. Therefore, the present situation of the battlefront cannot be taken as reflecting the military realities of the battlefront. Thus, all attempts to take the present military situation as the basis for the military demarcation line cannot reflect the military realities and

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

consequently, also cannot be a subject for consideration. This is the necessary conclusion drawn from one of the characteristics of the Korean battlefront.

Secondly, another characteristic of the battlefront is that the battle lines are changing all the time while on th whole remaining within the sphere of the region of the 38th Parallel. Obviously, any clear-headed military observer or military commander has to admit this powerful fact. From this characteristic, we cannot avoid the following conclusion, that is, at the present stage, the 38th Parallel approximately reflects the situation of both sides on the battlefront. Therefore, proceeding purely from the military viewpoint alone, we deem that the 38th Parallel, as a military demarcation line between both, sides, is just, reasonable, realistic and practicable.

Therefore, we specifically propose the following principles for the second item of the agenda:

1. Fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides.

2. Withdrawal of the armed forces of both sides 10 Kilometers from the 38th Parallel.

3. Taking the area 20 Kilometers in depth from which the armed forces are withdrawn as the demilitarized zone.

After giving my deliberated criticism of your statement yesterday, I would like to put to you a qestion: Seeing that you made such a completely absurd and arrogant statement, for what actually have you come here? Have you come here to negotiate for peace, or just to look for an excuse for extending the war?

I formally request you to give us your answer to this question.

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1045K
UNITED NATIONS: We wish to have a recess until 1330 our time-1:30 our time-1230 your time, to consider your remarks.

1046K
NORTH KOREA: We agree.

Recessed at 1047 hours

Reconvened at 1330 hours.

1330K
NORTH KOREA: I left out something in my translation this morning. I am going to corret it now. In fact, I left out the following statement in my English version:

In fact, it is only by relying on indiscriminate and inhuman bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces in violation of the international law that the present positions of your ground forces are barely and temporarily maintained. Without such cover and support of indiscriminate bombing and bombardment, the ground forces would long since have withdrawn to no one knows where.

1332K
UNITED NATIONS Is that all you have to say?

1332K
NORTH KOREA That is all.

1333K
UNITED NATIONS You closed your statement this morning with a rhetorical question to inappropriate, so irrelevant and so dis courteous as to be unworthy of a reply. But you com pounded this rude and graceless act by a formal request for a formal reply. It is for that reason only that I dignify your question with an answer. In making that reply I need only cite the presence of the United Nations Command Delegation in this armistice conference as evidence of our sincere intent to seek an honorable and equitable basis for

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

the termination of hostilities. If it were, as you imply, our objective to prolong hostilities, we should not need to come to an armistice conference in search of an excuse.

I wish to comment briefly on the tone of your remarks this morning. In your statement this morning you expressed yourself in rude terms applied to the United Nations Command Delegation, including many discourteous adjectives. In your discourtesy, you have resorted to bluster direct at this delegation.

All here are presumed to be military men. Those Peoples whose military organization are respected throughcut the world are proud of the reputation for courtesy and for objective mental attitudes toward serious questions unfailingly demonstrated by the personnel of their armed services. Military men are expected to be sufficiently mature to realize that bluster and bombast phrased in intemperate language do not and cannot affect the facts of any military situation. No amount of such vituperation as was indulged in by you this morning will sway the concentration of the United Nations Command Delegation on the serious problmes before this conference. No amount of discourtesy will tempt the United Nations Command Delegation to utilize similar tactics.

You should understand, however, that rudeness such as you have displayed will lead to only one end if continued. That is, the United Nations Command Delegation will be compelled to conclude you have no serious or sincere purpose at this conference, and the prospect of peace in Korea will be greatly dimmed. With all the earnestness at my command, I urge you to consider most seriously where your recent attitude may lead. I hope

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

to note in your further remarks, tangible evidence that this conference will resume the high level of traditional courtesy between military man, when until this morning it had enjoyed, so that progress in an a tmosphere of logic and reason may go rapidly forward.

I shall now proceed to more important business

You state that the United Nations Command Delegation statement of yesterday was intended to intimidate you. We regret that you have either missed entirely the points brought out through reasoning and sound logic, or deli, berately twisted them to suit your purpose. O„r proposal of yesterday was based on military realities which is in agreement with your statement of the morning that due attention should be given to these realities. We are here to negotiate a <u>military</u> armistice based on those <u>military</u> realities.

This requires the selection of a demilitarized zone based on the military factors of terrain and of the considerable potentials of United Nations Command sea power and air power. But we have proposed to withdraw our sea power and air power. We must be compensated for these two great concession on our part by the factor of terrain. It is mandatory for us to have an adequate defensive position on the ground. It involves that reasonable margin of military security which no military commander in line of duty can forego.

At the same time, a defensive position is accorded your forces in the form of hill masses and axial routes of communications and supply. Indeed, there are no concessions which we have asked you to make which will compensate for the withdrawal of the striking potential of

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

our air and naval forces.

You have stated that the present position of ground forces reflects the concentrated United Nations Command naval and air capabilities and effectiveness. You therefore contend that the progress of the war is indicated by the position of the ground battle line.

It is a fact well known to all, and in no way implies boasting, that the United Nations Command naval and air power have been able to reduce your industrial capacity, disrupt your means of transportation and communication and wage a war of attrition without needlessly wasting its manpower. These effects have occurred regardless of the position of the ground battle line.

As has been evident to both belligerents, the United Nations Command has been interested primarily in prosecuting the campaign on an overall basis rather than in holding ground positions alone. Our method of waging warfare has been one of maneuver in order to take full advantage of our naval and air capabilities.

In many instances in history, campaigns have been successful without the ground forces advancing. Even in the last war Japanese power was ultimately defeated by air, naval and ground action without ground troops setting foot on the Japanese islands. For this reason, movement of the ground battle line through a country waging war is not necessarily an indication of the progress of the war.

You have stated that the 39th Parallel represents the composite fluid battle line of the war.

Your attention is directed to the fact that since the outbreak of hostilities the battle line has never been on the 38th Parallel no has it been any military sense

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

associated with the 38th Parallel. The battle line has adjusted itself to the military realities of terrain and military potentials at any given moment.

The present battle position represents the most stable line of the war since the breakout from the Naktong river line. It has varied little since the middle of June and these minor adjustments have been caused only by patrol and reconnaissance activities.

We have repeatedly pointed out to you that any demilitarized zone which is set up by an armistice to constitue a buffer between opposing forces must be based solely on practical military considerations, and that neither historical nor political matters are properly to be considered in determining where a demilitarized zone should be located.

The demilitarized zone proposed by us complies with this criteria. The parallel of latitude suggested by you is based solely on historical and political considerations and not at all on practical military considerations. It, therefore, violates the foregoing criteria in every respect It is an attempt to obtain, by means of a military decision made here, the answer to a political and territorial questions which must, and properly should, remain for ultimate settlement at governmental level. We are not here attempting to determine, nor are we concerned with, final political boundaries. The 38th Parallel has no significance, whatsoever in the consideration of the question of the location of the demilitarized zone.

The delegates of both sides are agreed that the establishment of a demilitarized zone is an essential step in the preparation for an armistice.

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

The delegates are now engaged in the task of delineating, on the ground, the location of such a zone.

Inasmuch as we are considering a purely military Armistice, we have contended from the start that the location of this zone must be influenced only by practical military factors.

Let me again rapidly review the military realities which I outlined in detail yesterday and which I desire to emphatically state again.

There are three zones of military significanes: the ground, the air and the sea zones. All three, considered together, must from the basis for the location of the demilitarized zone which will exist during the period of the armistice.

If we were to consider only the ground elements it would be logical to call for a cease fire along the present line of contact. But we are not confronted only with the ground situation.

Indeed the military situation at this present time, when both our ground forces are almost inactive, but the United Nations Command air and sea forces are continuing to attack, is illustrative of the military realities of the Korean war.

We will continue to contend that these air and naval factors must receive full consideration in any general cease fire arrangement. This limited ground area which you relinquish we know and, in all fairness we feel you appreciate, has no equalizing capability in compensating for the enormous advantages which we relinquish by the application of the cease fire conditions to our air and naval forces.

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) We again submit our proposal outlined to you on the map we furnished yesterday.

That is all.

1415K
NORTH KOREA: You seem to have forgotten your yesterday's intimidating and insulting statement. I only criticized you unclear and unilateral statement. The courtesy of the Army men which you are talking about must start from your side, and it does not apply to us. We expect that you have more earnestness and fair attitude and statement for a smooth procedure of proceedings of the Armistice talks.

And in your statement this afternoon, you stated that I stated that in your statement you tried to intimidate us. I never made any such statement and your statement can never intimidate us. I only said that your statement could intimidate a neurotic person.

I have already made the necessary comments on your statement yesterday and pointed out the ridiculous nature of the various fallacious doctrines you had presented.

I have also given our correct viewpoint and stand on the present armistice negotiations. Yet the views you presented today are still the same old tune of yesterday. This is extremely regrettable.

You mentioned yesterday the effect of your naval and air forces in ground operations. We have pointed out that your naval and air forces have no other might than that of wantom bombing and bombardment, killing peaceful civilians and destroying peaceful towns and villages.

This is clearly demonstrated by facts. If you are so powerful as you claim, why did you retreat all the way to Taegu last year and again this summer retreat all the way to the south of the Han River? Even during our negotiations

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) we still hear continuously the frantic rearing of your guns, but such bombardment has no other effect than killing peaceful civilians and destroying peaceful villages.

Since the tenor of your statement today is still the same as that of yesterday, I must remind you once again that the less there are of such remarks, the better it would be.

Yesterday, you put forth the talk that a cease fire on the ground without cease fire in the air and on the sea would appear reasonable, and today you have virtually repeated it again. Thus there can be no other explanaation than that your are preparing an excuse for extending the war and one cannot but question your sincerity for peace.

We are here at this meeting not to vaunt our own military strength or clamor about war, but to negotiate for the cessation of the war, and hence to build a bridge to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. In accordance with this policy, our delegates have, ever since the first day of this conference, held that attiude of equanimity and maintained the principle of fairness and justice in dealing with all problems.

Our propocal that the 38th Parallel be fixed as the military demarcation lire further testifies to our attitude and standpoint. We have not done so far anything else but for stopping the war and realizing the desires and demand of the peoples of the world for peace.

If you have the desire and good faith to stop the war in Korea, you should refrain from repeating such fallacious statements as you have presented, and consider.

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) seriously and accept our correct proposal on the second item of the agenda

With regard to the other points you have raised today, I will make known my views when I deem it necesary.

1430K
UNITED NATIONS: We wish a 30-minute recess to consider your remarks.

1430K
NORTH KOREA: We agree.

Recessed at 1430 hours.

Reconvened at 1500 hours.

UNITED NATIONS: With reference to your attempt to minimize the independent effects of our air and naval operations which re quite separate from the ground campaign, I desire to make the following statements:

1501K
NORTH KOREA: Please say that again.

1501K
UNITED NATIONS: "With reference to your attempt to minimize the indepent effects of our air and naval operations which are quite separate from the ground campaign, I desire to make the following statments".

My remarks are factual and are not said in a spirit of boasting.

Air power: Through the use of its fighters, bomber, and reconnaissance aircraft, the United Nations air forces have gained and maintained air superiority allowing it to:

a. Interdict your rail and road networks and harass ground troops, thereby greatly reducing freedom of movement.

b. Reduce your capability of concentrating troops and supplies in the battle area.

c. Neutralize airfields and destroy other important installations so necessary to conduct warfare.

d. Destroy vital military industries.

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

e. Disrupt telephone and radio communication networks which are used for military purposes.

f. Greatly restrict your ability to conduct air surveillance and provide air support to ground troops.

You have been able to operate effectively only inter ceptor aircraft, which in generalhave been confined to the extreme northwest corner of Korea. You have found it necessary to operate from bases outside of Korea and within the small area which can be reached from those non-Korean bases.

Naval Powers: With respect to naval power, the realities are as follows:

At the present time you are landlocked. The United Nations Command has free access to the seas, contiguous to the entire area of Korea.

The United Nations Command Naval blockade denies you the use of the sea for military logistic support and movement of troops.

Your internal lines of military ground communication along the coasts are subject to continuous naval gun-fire and air bombardment.

The United Nations Command has the capability of conductin amphibious operations. As a result, you must deploy your forces along the coast against the threat of such landing.

You military installations and supply depots are subject to naval bombardment.

In contrast to the above, South Korea is free from a Naval blockade, and from a tta cks by Naval forces.

Have I made myself clear and do you want to make any remarks at this time?

[redacted]

[redacted]

1512K
NORTH KOREA: I have already explained in detail about the activities of your air and naval forces, Therefore I am not going to repeat my explanations any more.

There is one thing I want to point out-one important point is missing in your statement about the activities of your air and naval forces, That is to say, you forgot to mention the indiscriminate bombing of peaceful cities and villages and their inhabitants. The whole world Knows about the activities of your naval and air forces in violation of international law. That must be added to the list of activities of your naval and air forces--of the activities of your naval and air forces in Korea.

That is all.

1516K
UNITED NATIONS: Do you have anything further to propose at this time?

1516K
NORTH KOREA: Nothing more.

1517K
UNITED NATIONS: After again considering your remarks of this afternoon, we find nothing valid in your arguments. We find only one point we have not previously commented on; that is, your assertion that the United Nations Command Delegation advocates a cease fire on the ground without a cease fire on the sea and in the air.

Let this be quite clear. The United Nations Command Delegation has not, does not, and will not propose a cease fire on the ground without a cease fire on the sea and in the air. We do, however, insist that the effects of the general military situation of our withdrawal of the United Nations Command air and sea power be given the full consideration due it in fixing the location of the demili-

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[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

tarized zone.

We hold to our views because we beleive them to be correct and sound. Our views are based on the military situation. We maintain-and will continue to maintain-that a military armistice must be based on military realities--on all the military factors. The 38th Parallel has no military significance and therefore does not enter the question.

In summary, we find that your previously expressed views on the location of the demilitarized zone are not sound and we find that you have offered no new thoughts this afternoon on that subject.

Have you anything to propose, or have I made myself clear?

1524K
NORTH KOREA:

We have made clear our opinion about the 38th Parallel from the first day of the negotiations on. In today's meeting, too, I have explained and insisted in detail twice that we willhave the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line. Our stand is righteous and immovable-therefore I hope you will express your opinion in considering our stand.

The proposal you presented-as for the proposal you presented for the establishing of a buffer zone-I have given it accurate analysis and criticism

That is all.

1528K
UNITED NATIONS;

I too hope that you will consider very carefully our stand, which is logical and sound. Our stand is based on the military situation and the military realities. As we are military ment and this is a military armistice, everything we have presented regarding the zone we have proposed is

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) logical and sound. Have you anything further to propose?

1530K
NORTH KOREA: I have already said several times there is nne thing more I want to say-I want to say again that the present contact line is not a fixed line. That is to say, the line is not a fixed line and it can be changed during the negotiations- it can be changed also during the negotiations.

UN INTERPRETER: " It can change,"not "it can be changed."

1533K
NORTH KOREA: I think a ny military leader has to admit-recognize this logical theory of mine. Then if so, then how can one insist upon starting from this line which is not fixed and is changeable? This is a proposal which is not in accordance with the present conditions.

That is all.

1535K
UNITED NATIONS: Any lines drawn on a map can be fixed if the people who are drawing them agree to their being fixed. These is no more reason for fixing a zone on the 38th Parallel than fixing it on the 39th Parallel. The zone we propose has fixed lines just as the zone you proposed has fixed lines. But there is more logic in our zone than there is inyour zone, because our zone is based on military realities while yours is not.

You apparently do not understand our proposal. We do not propose to use the present line of ground contacts as the boundary of the demilitarized zone, nor as the line of demarcation. We propose the lines shown you on the maps we presented, which are a fair representation of the relative combat power of our two forces.

I hope I have made myself clear.

[redacted]

[redacted]

1540K
NORTH KOREA: For several times I have mentioned about the correct ness of our proposal and I do not find it necessary to say anything more about it. As for your proposal, I have heard it explained several times and we know precisely what its contents is.

If the other party has not further opinion to Present, I propose to recess until 10 o'clock our time and 11 o'clock your time tomorrow.

1542K
UNITED NATIONS: We agree.

Recessed at 1542 hours.

OFFICAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN,
Secretary

[redacted]



NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

[redacted]

29 July 1951

Subj: RECORD OF EVENTS, Thirteenth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

1103K: Reconvened. NK asserts:

1. UNC's "military considerations" used for its line of demarcation are "exaggeration of your own military strength," makes it "difficult to believe that you have come to this armistice conference for the genuine conclusion of the Korean war."

2. UNC has "resorted to a most illogical logic" in trying to justify "pushing the military demarcation line into our present positions."

3. Major role played by UNC air and sea power has been "indiscriminate and inhuman bombing and bombardment of the civilians and cities and villages, in violation of international law," claims his forces have been "steadily overcoming" effects of bombings on military targets.

4. Present battle line proves NK ground force is "at least equivalent in valor to the total of your three forces, if not greater" and that without cover and support UNC forces "would long have been withdrawn to no one knows where."

5. US "fought Japan for nearly three years without being able to defeat them" but "decisive role" was played mainly by "ground forces of China and the Soviet Union."

6. When "Korean civil war" began US thought its air and sea power alone could "interfere successfully" but that the theory went "bankrupt" and US sent its ground forces.

7. In last seven months each side has crossed 38th Parallel twice, NK and CCF forces staying nearly five months south of it and UNC remaining little more than two months north of it; penetration south of parallel was "far greater" than that north of it.

8. Stand for 38th Parallel is "firm and unshakable."

1203K: UNC replies, saying:

1. We agree your army has fought bravely.

2. Astounded at "indiscriminate bombing" charge, UN air has hit targets of either "real or apparent military significance"; unfortunate that innocent noncombatants suffer but can't be helped if soldiers disguise as civilians and tanks hide under haystacks.

3. NK arguments for 38th Parallel wander into political and territorial problems.

4. Demilitarized zone is buffer to prevent recurrence of incidents, and its boundaries and line of demarcation should be along easily recognized terrain features to permit troops to more easily recognize limitations of zone, cannot be done with straight line.

5. UNC proposed zone reflects present picture, not that of last year or next year, is based on military realities.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

1225K: NK asks which of his points aren't related to armistice conference.

1229K: UNC says there are so many his speech will have to be studied, will give answer later.

1230K: NK says UNC claims of naval and air superiority are "fantastic," asks what "military relation" the conference house has that it was bombed, says Communist press did not propagandize UNC bombings "but made the people of the whole world know about it," offers to give data on civilian casualties.

1241K: UNC says discussion should be confined to location of zone.

1242K: NK says he proposes to talk about 38th Parallel.

1243K: UNC says it would like to hear "any logical military reason for supporting any definite parallel of latitude."

1249K: Recessed.

1504K: Reconvened. UNC makes following points:

1. Principles on which demilitarized zone should be established are: Geography in relation to existing overall military situation, outlined by easily recognized terrain features, suitable defensive positions for each side close to zone.

2. NK would gain many military advantages from armistice which would be "distinct losses" to UNC.

3. If armistice is put into effect, it will give NK chance to improve its position against possible resumption of war far out of proportion to benefits UNC would obtain.

4. UNC is in defensible position now, does not intend to relinquish it.

5. NK proposed line fulfills none of requirements UNC believes essential, is political one dating back to 1945 but violated in 1950, in future should not be discussed by military commanders.

1538K: NK wants to discuss line of demarcation first, then demilitarized zone.

1540K: UNC says it has given NK a line - "the black line between the north and south boundaries of the demilitarized zone."

1545K: NK: In other words, "the black line on the map you gave us."

1546K: UNC: "That is correct."

1546K: NK says UNC line drawn "for your own military benefit and not for the negotiations of the armistice in Korea," declares he can't accept, adds his stand is "absolutely immovable."

1553K: UNC says its proposal embodies traditional provisions for armistice reached at a stage when "neither side enjoys an overwhelming military advantage," hopes NK will "drop further references to non-military lines."

1605K: NK says UNC apparently is "not aware of my statement," offers to "let you have a manuscript" of it.

[redacted].

1607K: UNC: "We thoroughly understand your manuscript and don't need it."

1607K: Recessed.

[redacted]

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

29 July 1951

Subj: TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Thirteenth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

Delegates Present:

United Nations	Communists
VADM C T Joy USN Sr. Delegate	GEN Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes USA	MGEN Fang Hsieh CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

Conference reconvened at 1103 hours.

NORTH KOREA: If you have any opinion about our stand, please tell us.

1104K
UNITED NATIONS: I have nothing to say at this time except to propose we adopt our demilitarized zone as a basis for continuing discussions.

1105K
NORTH KOREA: I will make my statement. I have again made a careful study of the statement you made yesterday afternoon. I have to say frankly that it has caused us great disappointment. Your arguments show no improvement at all on what you said the day before yesterday. You say that your proposal is logical and tenable. Yet, I cannot but point out that the arguments you employ in support of your proposal are entirely illogical and therefore untenable.

I would like to make some comment on the fundamental viewpoint you take with regards to the question of fixing a military demarcation line to establish a demilitarized zone. You have repeatedly stressed that only military considerations, pure and simple, should be considered in

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

solving this question. These military considerations of yours are in fact an exaggeration of your own military strength and an attempt to secure through illogical reasoning an advantageous position which does not actually exist.

Such considerations of yours make it difficult to believe that you have come to this armistice conference for the genuine conclusion of the Korean war, and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. As you have asserted, to exaggerate one's own military strength in an attempt to secure a more advantageous military position surely cannot but give people the impression that this is to prepare to fight again.

Our position on this question is different from yours. We consider that this armistice conference itself is the first step of the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, while fixing the military demarcation line is the basic condition of an armistice. In view of the foregoing, to fix the military demarcation line it is not only necessary to take into consideration the present situation on the battlefront, but also to make sure that the decision made on this should be reasonable and equitable to both sides, and beneficial to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

This position of ours can be made public to the world and is supported by all the peace-loving peoples of the world.

But what is more incomprehensible are the so-called military considerations you have raised. Your considerations are directed toward attaining one result, that is pushing the military demarcation line into our present positions. In seeking to achieve this apparent aim, you

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

have resorted to a most illogical logic to support your viewpoint. You made the arbitrary assertion that you hold the superiority on the sea and in the air, that since the armistice has to be an armistice of the air, sea, and ground forces, this will be unfavorable to the superiority of your air and naval forces, and that therefore the front line on the ground should be pushed back into our side, and fixed as the military demarcation line so as to compensate for the advantages given up by your air and naval forces.

Indeed, I cannot believe that you yourselves really believe in this theory because it is -- excuse my saying it -- too illogical. In my statement yesterday I already made a thorough criticism on this theory of yours, which I am not going to repeat here.

But then, you seem to be concerned over whether I understood what you meant and enumerated once again the six military roles played by your air force and of the power wielded by your navy.

I appreciate your concern. But allow me to tell you sincerely that among the roles played by your naval and air forces, you have forgotten to mention the most important role, which has been and is still being played in Korea by your naval and air forces -- that is the indiscriminate and inhuman bombing and bombardment of the civilians and cities and villages, in violation of international law, a brutal action which should be regarded as the shame of twentieth century mankind.

This is a most important fact. We believe any soldier with a sense of honor should not take brutality as strength, much less pride themselves on it.

[redacted]

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

Of course, you will ask, "Do our naval and air operations really have no effect at all on your military action?" With the same sincerity, I would like to point out that they produce a certain amount of effect, but what is more important is that we have been steadily overcoming those effects, and are victoriously accomplishing our tasks in battle.

You claim that you possess three forces -- air, naval and ground -- while we possess only a ground force. Even if to a certain extent this is true, would not the fact that our army by itself is setting at naught your air and naval forces prove that our army is at least equivalent in valor to the total of your three forces, if not greater? What does this mean? I said yesterday that in fact it is only by relying on indiscriminate and inhuman bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces in violation of international law that the present positions of your ground forces are barely and temporarily maintained. Without such cover and support of indiscriminate bombing and bombardment, your ground forces would long have been withdrawn to no one knows where.

You stated that the situation of the ground forces of both sides approximately reflects the relative strength of the ground forces of both sides, but in fact, it is only under the support and cover of your air and naval forces that your ground forces barely and temporarily maintain their present positions.

On the other hand, our ground forces have advanced from the Yalu river all the way to the region of the 38th Parallel, by overcoming the difficulties to a certain extent that the wanton bombing and bombardment of your air

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

and naval forces have been able to bring to our military actions. Hence, if the effectiveness of all of the armed forces is not taken into consideration, the existing situation of the ground forces certainly cannot be considered as reflecting the relative combat power of the ground forces of both sides.

Military power is, of course, the sum total of the effectiveness of all the arms of the forces. The ground forces, however, play a decisive role. Considered from the viewpoint of winning the war, the air and naval forces can only support the arms of the forces and they in themselves alone cannot settle the battle. That is, in fact, no novel viewpoint. Anyone with some military knowledge knows this truth. For example, not long ago this was expressed by a person who is acquainted with military affairs to a certain extent. He said that in his view, it is wholly untenable to think of waging wars with any special marvelous weapon without employing ground forces. War can and may very likely start from the air or the sea, but once it has started it will very quickly pass into land operations. Without ground operations, air bases cannot be occupied and maintained. No matter what gains have been made by the activities of the air or naval forces, they must be guarded by land forces.

This should be self-evident truth.

But you refuse to recognize the decisive role of the ground forces and contend that the air and naval forces can wage war extensively and independently and even win victories. In doing this you have unknowingly committed a grave mistake. You said that in the last war Japan was

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

defeated as a result of blows inflicted by your naval and air forces. You have forgotten that it was the Korean's People's Liberation struggle and as a result of the Chinese People's War of eight years and the resistance by the Soviet Union, in addition to the operations of the other wartime allies, which defeated the forces of Japanese imperialism, and that the decisive role was played by operations conducted mainly by the ground forces of China and the Soviet Union.

Your naval and air forces fought Japan for nearly three years without being able to defeat them. It was only with the participation by the Soviet Army that a crushing blow was dealt and Japan was finally defeated. Can these historical facts be negated lightly? Your own example refutes your own theory.

When war broke out in Korea on June 25, 1950, the United States government imagined that it could interfere with the Korean civil war successfully by dispatching air and naval forces alone, but such a calculation and course of action went bankrupt a few days later and it was in view of those conditions that the United States government decided to dispatch its ground forces to fight in Korea, hence we have the situation today. By this fact I think I have fully refuted your reasons that the air and naval forces can win victories independently and the naval and ground forces can be taken into consideration separately.

We consider the lines you have drawn to be unworthy of attention as the arguments supporting them are untenable. There is no necessity to give consideration to the lines themselves. You said yesterday that the present

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

battle line was the most stable line since the battle of Naktong river. This is still more groundless. Leaving aside the cause of the war last year, for the time being, we can see that since this year alone the ground battle lines have never been stabilized during the seven months. The contact line between the two sides has shifted four times along the 38th Parallel. We pushed twice south and you pushed twice north of the 38th Parallel. Isn't this proof enough that the ground battle lines are very unstable?

What is more worthy of notice - during the last seven months our troops stayed nearly five months south of the 38th Parallel and the period during which your troops twice stayed north of the 38th Parallel amounted to a little more than two months. The positions held by you at present are only less than two months old. How then can they be called stable? When our troops advanced south of the 38th Parallel the first time this year and reached the Han river area, they stayed there three and one-half months. That is nearly double the length of time your troops have stayed at the present positions. If the Han river lines once occupied by us are not said to be stable, what reasons can you bring forth to prove that the positions held by you for less than two months are stable? How then can the lines be considered stable? The present battle line is only a temporary military situation. They are not in consonance with the temporary military situation.

I mentioned already yesterday that the present battle line is constantly changing. Before an agreement is reached and our armistice negotiations are implemented, the present military situation should not and cannot be taken

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

as the primary military consideration in fixing a military demarcation line. For the past seven months the battle line has been changing constantly but throughout these changes, there is a definite tendency -- that is the movement of both sides did not in the main get beyond the region of the 38th Parallel although the length of time and the width and depth of penetration of our troops south of the 38th Parallel were far greater than the penetration of your troops north of the 38th Parallel.

We contend, therefore, that even from the exclusive viewpoint of military reality the 38th Parallel reflects approximately the relative military strength of both sides at the present stage and should be made the military demarcation line between both sides.

We have already mentioned in the foregoing that in fixing a military demarcation line we should take into account the present military realities. But the armistice which we seek for is one which leads to an overall settlement of the Korean question and is in itself the first step in the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Therefore, at the same time, as we are taking into account the military realities in fixing a military demarcation line, we must also take in account the fact that our decision must be beneficial to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question and must not be harmful or obstructive to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Seen from this aspect, our stand of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides is clearly recognized by the whole world as just, equitable, reasonable, realistic and workable.

Our position is really consistant with logic, and is

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

therefore firm and unshakeable. I sincerely hope you will consider seriously and accept our proposal.

That is all.

1203K
UNITED NATIONS:

First I would like to say that we agree that your army has fought bravely. We have never contended otherwise. You are again twisting our remarks to suit your convenience or for reasons which are incomprehensible. Why do you persist in such unworthy tactics which have no bearing on the issue at hand?

C

Needless to say, the United Nations Command Delegation was astounded to hear you make the charge yesterday and today that our air force had been guilty of indiscriminate bombings. While that charge has long been a favorite of the propagandists writing in the Communist press and broadcasting over the Communist radios, I know that as military men the members of your delegation are fully aware of the fact that the targets attacked by United Nations Command aircraft have had either real or apparent military significance.

One of the many unfortunate elements of modern warfare is that innocent noncombatants often suffer. But this is just as true of a bullet from the rifle in the hands of an infantryman or a shell from the barrel of a cannon as it is of a bomb from an airplane.

If soldiers disguise themselves in civilian clothing, and military trucks are hidden in civilian homes, and tanks are camouflaged in haystacks on farms, it is inevitable that innocent civilians will suffer in the attacks which these legitimate targets naturally receive. And the bombing of the factories which support your military effort

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

and the roads and railroads which constitute your lines of communications may also cause the deaths of some innocent persons.

But as military men, you know that this does not change the fact that these are legitimate targets. It is difficult to understand why you continue to dwell on this subject when you, as military men, realize that aerial bombardment and ship bombardment against military targets constitute a legitimate method of conducting warfare.

We too have made a studied analysis of yesterday's proceedings, the 12th meeting of our respective delegations, and I have listened carefully to you this morning, The agenda item under consideration was the establishment of a demilitarized zone. This analysis indicates that by far the greater portion of this discussion concerns itself with many topics completely unrelated to the subject. We find mention of political problems, and discussion of a general purpose of our meeting, territorial problems, much concerning imaginary lines which have no relation to the overall military situation and many topics unrelated to the basic problem.

Let us today attempt to confine our discussions to the establishment of a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

What is the purpose of a demilitarized zone? It is to set up a buffer between two opposing armed forces to prevent the recurrence of incidents which might lead to resumption of hostilities. To accomplish this purpose, it is essential that the boundaries of the zone itself, as well as the line of demarcation dividing this zone, be along easily recognized terrain features such as rivers,

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) ridge lines, roads, villages and towns, insofar as practicable. This permits the troops, who must rigidly govern their movements when in proximity to the zone, to more easily recognize the limitations of that zone. This cannot be accomplished by the use of a strait line based solely on a degree of latitude.

The zone the United Nations Command Delegation has proposed reflects our view of the current overall military situation. It does not reflect the picture of last year or next year. It is the picture now, July,1951. The zone proposed by us, and outlined on the map presented to you at a recent meeting, is based on the military realities as they exist today.

We therefore propose that the remainder of the discussion today be confined to matters pertaining to the location of this zone on the ground to meet the practical requirements of both commanders. Are we fully agreed on the purpose to be served by the demilitarized zone?

That is all for the present.

1222K
NORTH KOREA: I don't understand your last statement. Would you mind repeating it?

1223K
UNITED NATIONS: "We therefore propose that the remainder of the discussion today be confined to matters of locating this zone on the ground to meet the practical requirements of both commanders. Are we fully agreed on the purpose to be served by the demilitarized zone?"

Are we agreed on the purpose to be served by this demilitarized zone? Why do we have a demilitarized zone? What is the purpose of it?

[redacted]

1225K
NORTH KOREA: I have some questions to put to you. What do you mean by saying I have twisted your opinion?

1226K
UNITED NATIONS: I did not say I twisted your opinion. I said that you are twisting our remarks.

1226K
NORTH KOREA: What do you mean by it?

1227K
UNITED NATIONS: Tell him he is taking the wrong interpretation of what we say.

1227K
NORTH KOREA: Would you mind saying that again?

1227K
UNITED NATIONS: You have definitely contended that we have said something about your army not fighting bravely. We agree that your army has fought bravely. We have never contended otherwise.

1229K
NORTH KOREA: One thing more. In my statement, what points are not related to the armistice conference?

1229K
UNITED NATIONS: There are so many points not related to the armistice conference that I will have to study your speech carefully. I have to consider further your remarks on the subject.

1229K
NORTH KOREA: When can I have the answer?

1229K
UNITED NATIONS: I will let you know the answer later.

1230K
NORTH KOREA: Then I will speak. Firstly, I am going to speak about your statement that we twisted your remarks. I have never tried to twist your statement, and I have never twisted your statement.

I never said that you did say that our ground forces were not brave, and, of course, I cannot say so, as I know

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

that our ground forces are bravely fighting and will bravely fight, therefore I cannot make such an erroneous statement.

Next, about air forces -- the day before yesterday and yesterday too, you stated many things about your air forces. Speaking as a compensation for superiority of your air and naval forces, you were talking about pushing the military demarcation line into our area. And you thought that would be enough, for the Pyongyang-Wonsan line would satisfy us.

When you make such fantastic statements, we cannot but make a careful analysis of the effects of your air and naval forces. They have spent their main force in attacking our peaceful cities and villages and killing their inhabitants.

You said that you played a big role in destroying the military equipment, transportation, communications and factories. Then I want to ask you one thing. This house, this building where we are having this conference -- what kind of military relation has this so that it was bombed?

You said that I repeated the propaganda that is said in the papers.

UN INTERPRETER: You mean propaganda in Communist papers.

1237K
NORTH KOREA: Propaganda in Communist papers. The Communist papers did not make any propaganda of this, but made the people of the whole world know about it. If you don't know the concrete data of casualties inflicted on the peaceful towns and cities and their inhabitants by your indiscriminate bombing, we can present you this data. That is all.

[redacted]

[redacted]

1239K
UNITED NATIONS: I have nothing to add at this time. Have you any proposals?

1240K
NORTH KOREA: For the time being, we have nothing more to say.

1241K
UNITED NATIONS: I should like to repeat that the remarks of this discussion should be confined to the location of this zone on the ground to meet the practical requirements of both commanders.

1241K
NORTH KOREA: Is there nothing more to say?

1241K
UNITED NATIONS: I have nothing more to say.

1242K
NORTH KOREA: In your statement, you do not mention the demarcation line but the demilitarized zone, but in establishing the demilitarized zone we must start from the demarcation line. Therefore, I propose to talk about our proposal about the 38th Parallel. That is all.

1243K
UNITED NATIONS: You must realize that a statement that "the use of the 38th Parallel as the demarcation line is necessary to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question" is purely a political reason for selecting the 38th Parallel. It is not a military reason. The United Nations Command Delegation would like to hear any logical military reasons for supporting any definite parallel or latitude across Korea.

1244K
NORTH KOREA: Is that all?

1244K
UNITED NATIONS: That is all.

1245K
NORTH KOREA: In my several statements and especially in my today's statement, I militarily explained why the 38th Parallel should be the demarcation line. If you find it necessary,

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) we can give you the manuscript of my speech through our staff officer.

1246K
UNITED NATIONS: I propose a recess for lunch, to eat. What time would you like to meet again?

1246K
NORTH KOREA: Until half-past two our time.

1246K
UNITED NATIONS: Would you prefer to recess until tomorrow morning?

1246K
NORTH KOREA: If it suits you, we are not against meeting tomorrow morning.

UN INTERPRETER: "If you need the time, we will meet tomorrow morning".

1247K
UNITED NATIONS: We do not need the time. We will meet again at 3:30.

1247K
NORTH KOREA: We agree

UN INTERPRETER: 2:30 your time, 3:30 our time.

1248K
UNITED NATIONS: I suggest we make it two o'clock your time, 3 o'clock our time.

1249K
NORTH KOREA: We agree.

Recessed at 1249 hours.

Reconvened at 1504 hours.

1504K
NORTH KOREA: Do you have anything to say?

1505K
UNITED NATIONS: You have indicated this morning and stated yesterday that our proposals in respect to the establishment of a demilitarized zone have played the same theme and that, as we emphasized our proposals by repetition, you could note no change in the tune.

It is satisfying to note that you have been unable to detect a change in our stand. It indicates that the translators have been able to accurately represent our

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[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS:
(Cont'd)

position. We do not intend to change our position on basic principles, which we have no hesitancy in defending. Our proposal on the demilitarized zone has been and continues to be based on military realities and therefore tied to facts. You have so far offered no evidence to disprove these realities. Our proposals can only change when the facts on which they are based change. Under the current military situation which we face today as we consider a military armistice, these facts are relatively constant and have been since early June.

We have based our proposals and our arguments in reference to your proposals on sound realistic military facts so I must now, in all fairness, advise you that you cannot anticipate any change of theme or tune.

Our position on the principles that must be considered in establishing a demilitarized zone have been clearly and logically stated. Briefly these principles are:

a. The zone must be located geographically in relation to the existing overall military situation.

b. The zone must be outlined by easily recognized terrain features.

c. Suitable defensive positions must be available on both sides and in close proximity to the zone.

It is our contention that a demilitarized zone satisfactory to both opposing forces can be established on these principles.

In your remarks this morning you implied that the present ground battle positions represented fairly the combined strengths of all arms and you therefore gain no advantage in the application of cease fire to our air and naval

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

forces.

The advantages you gain in case of a cease fire are not those that necessarily reflect in the current situation.

They are simply the military advantages which incur to you as a result of an armistice and which are in turn distinct losses to the United Nations forces.

Your superiority is in numbers of ground forces. Our superiority is in the air and at sea.

The benefit that your ground forces gain in a cease fire is represented primarily in the logistic fields. You can repair at liberty the damage to your transportation and if through some unfortunate incident the war should be resumed it would take many weeks for our air and naval forces to again place you in a logistic situation such as presently faces your commanders and staff.

At this point in our discussion I would like to review again some of the advantages which will accrue to you as a result of a cease fire. You will be able to repair, unmolested, your railroads, your roads and your bridges. You will be free to utilize these for the transportation of supplies essential to the health and well being of your troops. Your power lines, industries, ports and shipping would operate again. The loss of expensive and valuable equipment will be ended.

An armistice would bring about from its inception an end to the destruction of your facilities and create opportunities for restoration and rehabilitation. By virtue of these factors you would be in a greatly improved position militarily should unfortunate events lead to a resumption of hostilities. No corresponding improvement

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

could accrue to us since our communications and facilities are not now subject to attack.

Do you contend that the points I have just mentioned have no military significance and that they are not essential considerations affecting the location of the demilitarized zone for the duration of the armistice?

We have attempted to point out the military necessity of a defensible position for occupancy during an armistice. This position may or may not be occupied but it should be available for the security of the forces in case one side should unfortunately decide to break the armistice. Every military commander expects no less than this and his forces are entitled to that much consideration.

As military men, we would be less than prudent if we agreed to rest the security of our forces on the faith that hostilities, though halted, would never begin again. We sincerely hope that any armistice agreed to here will be a lasting one but an armistice by itself does not guarantee our hopes and wishes. Rather it provides only conditions under which later discussions may bring about a permanent solution. Consequently, the demilitarized zone should be so located tactically as to tend to readjust the balance of military advantage. The one we have proposed follows this prescription and does not in any way enhance our present situation with respect to yours when hostilities cease.

The United Nations Command is in a defensible position at present. It does not intend to jeopardize the security of its forces by relinquishing such a position. It is related to present military conditions and reasonable security of forces during the period of armistice.

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

In view of these considerations we believe all requirements have been met in our proposal of 27 July. Furthermore we believe we have proven conclusively that the demilitarized zone we outlined to you is based on a fair and just analysis of the overall military situation as it exists in Korea.

The line and zone you have proposed fulfills none of the requirements we believe essential. Its only significance is a political one dating back to 1945 but violated in 1950. If it is discussed again at any time in the future it should not be by military commanders. We here are not concerned with a political sub-division of Korea. That is a matter for discussion by the heads of states. Furthermore, there are no reasonably sound defensible positions near the 38th Parallel and there is no reason why there should be due to the nature of the line. It would be practically impossible to draw any degree of latitude across Korea which would even generally coincide with a defensible ground position.

We hope that you will now agree to cease inappropriate discussions of a political nature so that we may proceed without further delay to get on with the basic consideration "a demilitarized zone."

That is all for the present.

1535K
NORTH KOREA: I would like to have an answer to my question I put this morning.

1536K
UNITED NATIONS: Please repeat the question.

1536K
NORTH KOREA: In your statement you stated that in my statement there are many points which are not related to military affairs. I would like to know concretely what they are.

[redacted]

[redacted]

1537K
UNITED NATIONS: Your question has been duly noted and we will give you an appropriate answer when your speech has been duly transcribed.

1538K
NORTH KOREA: There is another question. I think in discussing the item on our agenda - I think that we are confronted with a question - that is the fixing of the demarcation line. Then if so, isn't it, in principle, that we should discuss the demarcation line and then go over to the discussion of the demilitarized zone.

1540K
UNITED NATIONS: We informed you clearly, emphatically and repeatedly during our earlier discussions while formulating this agenda item that we would present the demilitarized zone as as saw fit during these substantive discussions. To this you agreed.

However, since you desire a demarcation line we have given you one. It is the black line between the north and south boundaries of the demilitarized zone. It is in general equidistant between the two demilitarized zone boundaries.

As I stated, at some length and in considerable detail, the demilitarized zone proposed by the United Nations Command Delegation is based on consderation of all the factors effecting the present military situation in Korea. Moreover, the boundaries of the zone, as well as the demarcation line, have been selected so as to be easily distinguishable, involving salient terrain features such as ridges and rivers, in order to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding.

That is all.

[redacted]

1545K
NORTH KOREA: In other words, you mean that the black line on the map you gave us -- that is the demarcation line?

1546K
UNITED NATIONS: That is correct.

1546K
NORTH KOREA: Several times I mentioned that the demarcation line you presented was drawn in a position with no basis whatever. That line was drawn for your own military benefit and not for the negotiations of the armistice in Korea.-- for a fair and reasonable solution of the armistice in Korea. According to your opinion the line between Pyong-yang and Wonsan would be more favorable for your side and the Naktong river line would be more favorable for our side, but this is not fair and not reasonable.

Therefore in consideration of all these, I mentioned several time that the reasonable and fair line is the 38th Parallel. Therefore I explained in detail why the 38th line is the reasonable and fair line and why it must be the demarcation line. I hope that you will seriously consider our stand which I have expressed already and also in my today's statement, that the 38th Parallel should be the demarcation line.

We cannot accept the line you propose as the demarcation line at all, -- we absolutely cannot accept. Our stand is absolutely immovable.

That is all.

1553K
UNITED NATIONS: The single factor which would contribute most to the creation of what you call "favorable conditions for the peaceful settlement of the morean question" is a cessation of hostilities. Though you state you are deeply concerned with creating such favorable conditions, you are delaying

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

the most favorable condition by insisting on an unreal and unmilitary solution to the question of a demilitarized zone. If you sincerely seek the earliest cessation of hostilities, which is the most favorable condition for a peaceful settlement in Korea, you will drop your illogical contentions regarding the 38th Parallel, a line irrevalent to the question of military armistice, and accept our reasonable proposal for a demilitarized zone based on the present military situation.

Our proposal embodies the traditional provisions for an armistice reached by nations at a stage of hostilities in which neither side enjoys an overwhelming military advantage. Is it clear?

We are greatly disappointed in the remarks you have made thus far, inasmuch as you have made no move toward an area of possible agreement. We have told you why before, and we tell you again, your proposal of the 38th Parallel as the basis of a demilitarized zone is unsound, unrelated to the military situation, and unacceptable. The sooner you accept the fact that agreements reached at this conference are going to be confined to the military realities of the present situation, including the location of the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone, the sooner we will be able to make progress.

We are firmly convinced of the justice and equity of the demilitarized zone we have proposed. We leave that thought with you in the hope you will give it thorough consideration, and accordingly will drop further references to non-military lines.

That is all.

If you have no further comments I propose to recess

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) until tomorrow.

1605K
NORTH KOREA: You said many times that the 38th Parallel has no bearing on the military situation and I made the statement several times that if you are not aware of my statement I can let you have a manuscript of my statement. I hope you will seriously consider our stand and accept our stand.

I think we had better meet here tomorrow again at 10 o'clock our time, 11 o'clock your time.

1607K
UNITED NATIONS: We thoroughly understand your manuscript and don't need it. We agree to meet tomorrow morning at ten o'clock your time.

Recessed at 1607 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H.M. BRIGGS,
Captain, U.S.N.,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED BY:

E.C. Thomas

E.C. THOMAS,
Major, USMCR.



NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

30 July 1951

Subj: RECORD OF EVENTS, Fourteenth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

1059K: Reconvened. UNC tells NK which of his arguments are irrelevant to the subject, says UNC will continue military action until armistice, declares NK arguments for 38th Parallel are unrealistic, advocates democratic line that is tactically sound.

1143K: NK says hostilities will continue until armistice agreement is signed, asks what UNC would do for demarcation line if front line were to change before armistice is agreed upon, claims he's not convinced UNC should get credit for its air and sea efforts in determining ground line, reiterates "wanton bombing" charge, says demarcation line should be fixed before zone is discussed, asserts UNC interest in defensible positions "reflects lack of faith in prospects of peace," states UNC regards itself as conquerors and that "no one has recognized you as conquerors."

1250K: UNC says NK obsession with 38th is motivated by political and not military considerations, charges NK apparently seeks to lay groundwork for "eventual sub-division of Korea," points out administrative difficulties for each side of using line which bisects towns, crosses rivers, etc.

1318K: NK says UNC has twisted NK statement into desire to divide Korea in two.

1324K: UNC cites two NK statements which are "somewhat encouraging," relative to peaceful settlement and fixing military demarcation line, says UNC proposed line is not "pushing into your positions" but "pulling out of your positions," points out that "the line derives from the zone, not vice versa."

1358K: NK maintains 38th is military line, not political, says his stand "is unshakeable."

1408K: Recessed.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

30 July 1951

Subj: TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Fourteenth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

Delegates present:

United Nations	Communists
VADM C T Joy USN Sr. Delegate	GEN Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes USA	MGEN Fang Hsieh CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

Conference reconvened at 1059 hours.

1059K
NORTH KOREA: I would like to have the answer to my question I put yesterday.

1100K
UNITED NATIONS: Yesterday you asked the following question:

"In my statement what points are not related to the armistice conference? I would like to know concretely what they are."

Prior to answering your question I would like to repeat my statement that apparently raised the question in your mind. My statement was as follows:

"We have made a studied analysis of yesterday's proceedings, the 12th meeting of our respective delegations.

"The agenda item under consideration was the establishment of a demilitarized zone. This analysis indicates that by far the greater portion of this discussion concerned itself with many topics completely unrelated to the subject."

I pointed out to you yesterday that your remarks

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UNITED NATIONS:
(Cont'd)

regarding such matters as military bombardment were obvious reprints from newspapers, propaganda lines of long standing and thoroughly discredited character. Moreover, you chose to imply that the United Nations Command had come to this conference for the purpose of extending the war. In addition, you referred to "political conditions" as a military factor. These were some of the clearly irrelevant matters to which I had reference.

The reference to the proceedings of the 12th meeting was made for the purpose and with the hope that we could keep the future records clean from such irrelevant remarks so that we could more quickly take up the business of the day.

I trust your question is answered.

I wish to make another statement at this time.

You have made remarks about gunfire continuing even while the armistice conference is being held. You have also asserted that the United Nations Command Delegation is attempting to exaggerate its own strength with a view to securing a more advantageous military position, and that this gives the impression that the United Nations Command is preparing to fight again. This assertion on your part seems to imply that you may have held the idea fighting was to stop when the armistice discussions began.

Certainly it was made clear to you before, and I do so again -- the United Nations Command intends to continue military operations with all arms until, through actual performance, you have shown the world you do desire the peace about which you continually talk. We have faith only in performance, not in words. We will not rest the

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

security of our forces on an undemonstrated and unimplemented assertion of good faith. When you have shown by deeds here at this conference, and in the execution of armistice agreements, that you sincerely desire peace, we will then and only then begin to relax our readiness for combat.

And now I wish to take up some of the main business at hand.

Ever since this conference began, you have maintained the consistent stand that the 38th Parallel should be the military demarcation line separating both sides. You have reiterated this statement over and over.

We have examined all of your statements most carefully to ascertain what reasons you could advance for maintaining this position. Although you have repeatedly stated your position, you have not given any sound reason therefore. Let us examine the reasons which you have given in support of your contention. You stated that the 38th Parallel as a military demarcation line reflects the military consideration of the relative war power of both sides at the present stage. We have refuted this argument time and time again. We have stated that even the ground lines are not on the 38th Parallel. They, in general, are north of the 38th Parallel. We have also brought out repeatedly that there are other factors whose effect will not be fully reflected in the ground positions under cease fire conditions. It is apparent, therefore, that your statement that the 38th Parallel reflects the relative war power of both sides will not survive an impartial analysis.

You state also that the armistice we seek is the

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UNITED NATIONS:
(Cont'd)

first step toward a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and is not intended for the resumption of fighting. With this statement of yours we heartily agree. The sentiment expressed is correct but has nothing whatever to do with the 38th Parallel. The 38th Parallel was once the boundary between North Korea and the Republic of Korea. It is a historical fact that war occurred when this was a boundary. There is nothing magic in this line that prevents war. One factor that caused the present war was the fact that the 38th Parallel was an illogical and unsound boundary. There were no military factors which prevented war from beginning on the 38th Parallel on the 25th of June of last year. There are no military factors which have arisen since then that would make this line any better now than it was then.

You've also made the statement that the battle lines have frequently shifted north and south of that parallel. You've pointed out that four times since the beginning of this year the battle lines have passed this position. This statement is correct. The battle lines have gone either north or south but they have never stopped there. Therefore, your conclusion that, because the battle lines have gone north and south of the 38th Parallel, the 38th Parallel should then be used as a military demarcation line, is not sound. A demilitarized zone should be based on reasoning far better than that the battle has crossed its position several times. A much better method is to choose a general area in which the battle lines were comparatively stable. The only sound method is to choose a zone which represents the military situation that will

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

exist for the duration of an armistice. Therefore, we contend that simply because the battle line shifted across a parallel but never stopped there is no good reason for choosing that line as a military line of demarcation.

You have also made the statement that, if the 38th Parallel were to become the demarcation line, it would be reasonable and equitable to both sides. You have not brought forth any arguments to support that view. There are no arguments which can support that view. Such a line would require our ground lines to give up their strong defense positions. This is certainly not reasonable and certainly not equitable. There are no military advantages which you can offer to compensate for this. This is entirely different from the demilitarized zone which we propose which is reasonable and just to both sides. We have not only pointed out this fact to you many times but we have also given you full explanations why this is so.

We are aware of your motives to have the 38th Parallel as a demarcation line. We realize that you do want that. We cannot understand, however, that there is any justice or fairness or reasonableness in your positions.

We believe that if you examine our proposed demilitarized zone carefully and that if you will also study the reasonable advantage for adopting such a zone, you will find that it is just, reasonable and advantageous to you.

In summary, we have agreed the opposing forces should each have a definite position which is tactically

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) sound from the point of view of terrain and lines of communication.

The line that you propose is only an imaginary line that happens to cross Korea. It leaves the United Nations Command no suitable defensive position. It is not readily and easily recognized from terrain features. The result from the point of view of communication, roads, and railroads, does not lend itself to administrative arrangements after an armistice is agreed.

The zone that we propose provides both sides with suitable defensive positions. There is an adequate communications net to provide both sides logistical support. Adequate defense for base areas can be attained. The lines are so drawn as to be readily identified by towns, crossroads, streams and other land marks. This will be a definite advantage to both sides from an administrative point of view once an armistice is signed.

The zone we propose is advantageous to both sides defensively. In contrast, the one you propose is disadvantageous to the United Nations Command. Therefore, we again propose that you accept our zone.

That is all for the present.

1143K
NORTH KOREA: I cannot consider your answer to my question I put yesterday to be satisfactory to me. Your answer to my question, that I had no good faith to the armistice conference -- that is not appropriate. Time and again, and especially yesterday, I have explained in detail that you did not have good faith to the armistice conference. I am not going to repeat it again. As to your statment that I brought forth the same propaganda of the Communists -- as to that I also gave a clear explanation

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

yesterday. Therefore, I am not going to repeat it. As to the continuation of the hostilities during the negotiations, you say that I held that the hostilities should cease during the negotiations. That is an absolutely incorrect statement. I thought that the hostilities would continue during the negotiations and I will continue to think so. Until the signing of the agreement on the armistice, the hostilities will continue on both sides. This is all I have to say concerning the answer to my question.

I have something I would like to ask. You said in your statement that you insist on having the demarcation line you present because that is the most defensible line for you. If so, if the front line should change, what sort of line would you have?

1150K
UNITED NATIONS: Repeat that question.

1150K
NORTH KOREA: If so, should the front line change, what line would you adopt as the military demarcation line? Even after the change of the line, would you still insist on having the same line, or would you adopt some other line?

1151K
UNITED NATIONS: Do you mean the battle line?

1151K
NORTH KOREA: You gave a black line in establishing the demilitarized zone. If the demarcation line which I mean, should change, what line will you have? Is that clear to you?

1152K
UNITED NATIONS: No.

1153K
NORTH KOREA: I will repeat it from the beginning. I said that, the present line on which you insist is the most favorable line for your defense, if this line changes, what line

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[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) are you going to choose? Even after a change, would you insist on the same line you insist on at present? Is that clear?

1155K
UNITED NATIONS: Just a minute. I think we understand.* Is that all?

1156K
NORTH KOREA: That is all.

1156K
UNITED NATIONS: We will give you an answer to that later.

1156K
NORTH KOREA: I will go over to the study of the main problem. I have studied the statement you made yesterday afternoon. I have also made an overall study of all the statements you made since the 27th on the question of fixing a military demarcation line. I cannot but point out that the statements you made on this question are full of self-contradictions that evade the essentials by clinging to trifles and put the cart before the horse.

You presented on the 27th the fundamentally fallacious theory that since your naval and air forces hold a superiority, you must be given a compensation on the ground in the arrangements for an overall armistice. Based on such a theory, you made your concrete proposal concerning the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone.

In my statements on two consecutive days, the 28th and 29th, I have completely refuted your theory and thereby negated your fallacious proposal based on the fallacious theory. Yet you continue to hold to your fallacious proposal without replying directly and convincingly to our criticisms. You merely stated lightly that our arguments were political and unrelated to the

* Translation of written version appears on Page 23.

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

question under discussion, in order to cover up the fallaciousness of your theory.

I asked you twice yesterday which of our arguments were unrelated to the question under discussion. You have given your reply today, but your reply is entirely sophistic, and does not really answer my question at all. You only persisted in your fallacious proposal. I consider this a self-contradictory attitude. You failed to show that the basis of your argument is correct and not fallacious.

How, then, can you convince people that your conclusion is correct and not erroneous? I formally requested you to give concrete answers to the arguments I raised on the 28th and 29th. I think you should do so. Military men with a sense of logic should not refuse to do open and above-board reasoning. It is only by honest reasoning that this conference can yield good results.

I would like to repeat the main points of my criticism of your proposal. The crux of the fundamental mistake made by you in your theory lies in your contention that you maintain naval and air superiority, and that this must be compensated for when the military demarcation line is being fixed, that is, the military demarcation line should be pushed far into our positions. The crux of your fundamental mistake is this.

But, in fact, the main capability of your naval and air forces is the indiscriminate and wanton bombing and bombardment of the civilian population in Korea, and effects on our military actions are very limited. It is precisely due to this indiscriminate and wanton bombing and bombardment by your naval and air forces that your

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

ground troops barely and temporarily hold their present positions. Without the support of your naval and air forces your ground troops would have long ago withdrawn from the Korean peninsula.

We therefore maintain that your demand that compensation be made for the superiority enjoyed by your naval and air forces in the armistice terms is completely groundless. The present line of contact between both sides does not reflect the present military realities on the present battleline, hence they cannot be taken as the primary consideration in fixing the present military demarcation line.

Yesterday I cited many concrete instances to prove this point. I do not think it necessary to say anything more before you present your concrete opinions. We maintain that even from exclusive military considerations, the 38th Parallel we propose is the line more closely reflecting the military realities on the battleline at the present stage. These are the main points of our criticism of your proposal.

Next I must point out that after propounding on the 27th and the 28th a great deal of erroneous military theory and evading an answer to our criticism, you suddenly proposed that we proceed directly into the concrete discussion of the delineation of the demilitarized zone. We deem that such tactics are putting the cart before the horse, are illogical and unacceptable. Ever since we began to discuss the formulation of the agenda, we have spent a great deal of time on the item of fixing the demarcation line and the establishment of the demilitarized zone. We have at least agreed in principle to

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

the wording of Item 2 on the agenda. It is felt that we must fix the demarcation line before there can be a basis for the establishment of a demilitarized zone. This is a clear point. You now know the exact wording of the agenda item and you propose to proceed directly to the delineation of the demilitarized zone. This is not consistent with the script of our agreement.

If the belligerents cannot find a common line to observe as the military demarcation line and a basis of a demilitarized zone then a demilitarized zone can have no significance. On the other hand, if there is such a military demarcation line the question of establishment of a demilitarized zone will then become a technical question which can easily be negotiated and settled. It is our stand that the military demarcation line must be fixed before there is any basis for the discussion of the demilitarized zone. The fixing of a demarcation line is significant not only for the establishment of a demilitarized zone.

What is a military demarcation line? It is the line which is recognized by both belligerents as the line which separates the two sides -- it is also the line which should reflect the military realities of the battlefront and relative strength of both sides at the present stage and can pave the way for a peaceful settlement. This is the basis upon which the war between the two sides may be stopped. As to the delineation of the demilitarized zone, the purpose is naturally to separate the armed forces of both sides.

Since we have not yet reached an agreement on a military demarcation line, it is impossible to proceed

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

into the actual discussion of a demilitarized zone. But since you have already put forth three principles for the delineation of a demilitarized zone, I shall also make, in passing, some general comments on those principles which you consider necessary.

You state that the demilitarized zone must reflect the overall military situation. Naturally this is a question which should be settled when the military demarcation line is fixed. You state that this zone must be outlined by recognizable terrain features. We contend that this is unnecessary and a superfluous point. How do you know that there are no recognizable terrain features in the region 10 kilometers to the south and north of the 38th Parallel? Since modern naval and air forces can operate on the basis of lines of longitude and latitude, how then can they not have sufficient recognizable features?

You state that there must be defensive positions for both sides in close proximity to this zone. How could you prove that the area around 10 kilometers from the 38th Parallel is not defensible?

It is our opinion that our armistice is to be the first step of the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The combat defensive positions of the armed forces of both sides should not be our first consideration. The fact that you put so much emphasis on defensive positions reflects your lack of faith in prospects of peace.

As to the concrete arrangements for a demilitarized zone, I shall state my opinion when we come to discussing this part of the problem.

I find that in your statement yesterday there is only

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

one point which is related to the fixing of a military demarcation line. You assert that the military demarcation line you had drawn reflects the overall military situation. The real intention is just as you stated -- The United Nations Command is in defensive positions at present and it does not intend to jeopardize the security of its forces by relinquishing such positions. Yet you want to maintain and expand the present positions, pushing the demilitarized zone entirely into our positions.

We consider the military demarcation line you have drawn as completely unjustified and cannot be considered. I have fully refuted your argument in my statements on the 28th and the 29th.

I now further point out that your argument is a camouflage. The substance behind your theory is the presumption that you regard yourselves as conquerors. Your fallacious theory and proposals serve only your wishful thinking -- you are, in fact, not conquerors. No one recognizes you are conquerors, neither the Korean people, nor the Chinese people, nor British people, nor the American people have recognized you as conquerors. No one has recognized you as conquerors. As long as you do not abandon such a presumptuous attitude of a would-be conqueror and take a sober attitude of fairness and reason, our negotiations cannot make any progress.

Our position is exactly the opposite of yours. Our proposal that the 38th Parallel be fixed as the military demarcation line reflects the military realities on the battlefront at the present stage. It is reasonable and equitable to both sides, and is at the same time beneficial to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

It is the basis of the present armistice negotiations.

Firstly, the 38th Parallel reflects the military realities of the battlefront at the present stage. In the past seven months of this year the contact line of both sides moved four times across the 38th Parallel. Our side twice entered areas south of the 38th Parallel, while your side twice reached north of the 38th Parallel. It is, however, worthwhile pointing out that in the past seven months our side remained south of the 38th Parallel for nearly five months, while your side remained north of the 38th Parallel for only a little more than two months.

During the past seven months the battle line has been changing constantly but throughout these changes there is a definite tendency -- that is, the movements of both sides did not in the main get beyond the region around the 38th Parallel, although the length of time and width and depth of penetration by our side south of the 38th Parallel were greater than those of the penetration of your side north of the 38th Parallel. We contend, therefore, that even from the exclusive viewpoint of military realities, the 38th Parallel reflects approximately the relative strength of both sides at the present stage and should be made the military demarcation line between both sides.

Secondly, the fixing of the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line is reasonable and equitable to both sides. At present the 38th Parallel is a common line for both sides. Our side occupies a sector south of the 38th Parallel, while your side occupies a sector north of the 38th Parallel. Our proposal that each side withdraw respectively from the other side of the 38th Parallel is

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NORTH KOREA:
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entirely equitable and reasonable. It is completely different from your proposal of unilaterally pushing the military demarcation line into our positions.

Thirdly, our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line not only reflects the military realities in the present stage, but is at the same time beneficial to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. All your considerations are based on war; therefore, you have repeatedly emphasized defensible positions.

But the greatest assurance for the security of the forces of both sides is peace. Our way of thinking is contrary to yours. We always think in terms of peace. It is only by fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line that our armistice may become a bridge to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

You have repeatedly accused us of raising political questions. I would like to ask whether the question of peace is a political question. If not for peace, why should we want an armistice? In view of these reasons, we have consistently proposed that the 38th Parallel be fixed as the military demarcation line, ever since we began to discuss the formulation of the agenda. This position of ours is unshakeable and cannot be shaken.

That is all.

1250K
UNITED NATIONS: The more you talk, the more you offer fallacious arguments attempting to support the 38th Parallel as a military demarcation line, the more we are convinced you are not concerned with a demarcation line for a demilitarized zone. The only explanation why you cling to an obviously unmilitary solution to a military problem, is that your

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

motivation is political -- you seek to lay the groundwork for eventual sub-division of Korea. You will not succeed. You are delaying the progress of this conference by injecting political considerations into it. You are succeeding in that, and in its result -- the extention of the period of bloodshed and suffering in Korea.

To get back to the main business at hand, it might clarify thought on the subject of a military demarcation line to assume that a demilitarized zone and a demarcation line have been established, and then to examine the demarcation line as to its functions and characteristics. In this way we may be able to determine what is a <u>suitable</u> demarcation line.

Assuming that a zone and line are established, what purpose does the demarcation line serve? Only one. It provides a line of limit of responsibility for administration to the north and the south sectors of the demilitarized zone during the period of an armistice. The demarcation line can do no more than this. It is not intended to do more than this.

What are the desirable characteristics of a line which limits an area for administrative purposes? First, it must be easily recognized visually, so that the population in each sector of the zone, and the administrative personnel, may readily know the limit of their sector, so that misunderstandings between the two sectors may be avoided.

Second, the demarcation line should avoid awkward divisions of features of the zone such as towns and villages. For example, we do not wish a line drawn for administrative purposes to bisect a town. We would <u>want</u>

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) the town entirely in one or another of the administrative sectors of the zone. Likewise, the demarcation line should follow rivers and ridge lines, so that administrative responsibility is conveniently divided.

It is obvious that no straight line of latitude could possibly fit the requirements just stated. First, a line of latitude is not recognizable on the ground. It cuts through towns, and across rivers. It runs across, rather than along, ridge lines. It is completely unsuitable for the purpose of this conference. The principal reason a line of latitude does not fit our requirement is the simple reason that no line of latitude was drawn with administrative purposes in mind.

The demarcation line we have proposed, however, was drawn with no other thought but administrative purposes in mind. For that reason it is far superior as a line of demarcation to any arbitrarily selected parallel of latitude. You may be able to offer improvements of the line we suggest by adjusting it here and there, but you cannot offer improvements by insisting on a basically unsuitable line. Let us get on with the problem of refining the suitable demarcation line proposed by the United Nations Command Delegation, so that it will become an improved and mutually acceptable solution.

1318K
NORTH KOREA: You have twisted on purpose our statement and you stated that we wanted to have the territorial demarcation line to divide Korea into two. We cannot take this but for a statement which had a certain other aim. We said that the 38th Parallel should be a military demarcation line and we seriously let you know that we say that the 38th Parallel line should be a military demarcation line and not any

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

territorial demarcation line. The statement which you just made is not in proper order.

We must first discuss and agree on the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone and then we should proceed to discuss the administration in that zone. Therefore we insist that we must first fix the military demarcation line. Therefore I further maintain that the 38th Parallel should be the military demarcation line as we propose.

That is all.

1324K
UNITED NATIONS:

You have made two statements which are somewhat encouraging. Those are taken from your talk of yesterday morning. I quote: "This armistice conference itself is the first step of the peaceful settlement of the Korean question;" and: "Fixing the military demarcation line is the basic condition of an armistice."

In the latter statement I am especially glad that you use the phrase "military demarcation line." That word <u>military</u> used by you to describe the type of demarcation line is encouraging to the United Nations Command Delegation. It is encouraging because even though you continue to <u>talk</u> of a line that has had only political significance you at the same time may be <u>thinking</u> in terms of military significance. The problem of agreeing on a purely military line or lines will be more expeditiously handled if one side does not continue to talk on political matters while the other restricts its comments to military matters.

You also stated, "Make sure that the decision made on this (the military demarcation line) should be <u>reasonable</u> and <u>equitable</u> to both sides." With that statement

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) we are in full agreement. In other words, there are enough agreed principles connected with the military demarcation line to give us a mutual point of departure.

You allege that our intent is to establish the military demarcation line within your present military positions. On this point you have failed to credit all factors. Withdrawal of all air and naval operations on our part is not "pushing into your positions" -- on the contrary, it is "pulling out of your positions." Also, we did not suggest "pushing" into the Onjin peninsula or, in fact, anywhere at any great distance from the present ground front lines.

Do you not consider that to expect us to withdraw 10 kilometers south of the 38th Parallel under the present military situation in Korea might be considered "pushing" to a slight degree, especially when we are more than 50 kilometers north of that line in some places?

The distance involved isn't our chief interest, however - departure from a military defensible line is of vital concern to us from a purely defensive point of view. You state that such a stand is illogical. It is difficult to believe you really mean that.

In the meeting of 29 July you stated in effect that fixing a military demarcation line must be beneficial to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, and must not be harmful or destructive to the settlement of the Korean question. Do you mean to imply that the demarcation line which is to be utilized for establishing the demilitarized zone is to have some future significance in the settlement of the Korean question?

Each delegation has agreed that we are meeting here to

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

discuss military matters only. Both delegations have agreed to discuss an agenda item that reads, "Fixing of military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea."

It should be clear from the agenda item that the demarcation line that we are discussing is connected only with a demilitarized zone. This line and the demilitarized zone are military matters connected with the military armistice only; they have no bearing on anything beyond the armistice. It is not intended that they be related to what may be agreed upon during a future settlement at a later conference.

Again you say: "We consider the lines you have drawn to be unworthy of attention as the arguments supporting them are untenable. There is no necessity to give consideration to the lines themselves."

We don't wish to believe that you seriously mean you won't consider lines that are based on purely military realities when you state that the armistice is to be based on military considerations. Surely you do not again intend to tell us that you consider the 38th Parallel a military line or that it has any present military significance because both sides have crossed it several times. If you have any line or zone related to the present military situation we would be happy to hear it. It would assure us that there is a chance of progressing in the important armistice discussions.

Do you have any comments to make?

1345K
NORTH KOREA: I have made my stand already.

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1540K

UNITED NATIONS: In the discussion leading up to the agreement on the wording of that agenda item I made the statement that, "The United Nations Delegation is of the opinion that a demilitarized zone can be established without starting at a central line which you call a basic line. Your method is one way of establishing a demilitarized zone. There are other ways. Therefore we contend that the item should be kept general."

And in the statement accepting your phrasing of this item of the agenda I specifically stated that, "We desire to emphasize that the important words in this agenda item are - 'to establish a demilitarized zone'. There is more than one way to delineate the demilitarized zone. It must be clearly understood that each delegation will be at liberty to use such methods as it finds most practical to present this zone during future discussions of this agenda item."

The United Nations Command Delegation is now following exactly the procedure which it has consistently advised you that it felt should be followed in the substantive discussions of this item. You have the right to approach this problem as you desire. We have a similar right. The map which we presented to you at the eleventh session, held on 27 July 1951, contained the boundaries of the demilitarized zone proposed by my delegation, which boundaries follow easily recognizable terrain features. It also contained a demarcation line which likewise follows such terrain features.

We appreciate the eventual necessity for a demarcation line. As we shall explain at more length when the next item of the agenda is reached, we propose that, except as

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

qualified by any other terms of the armistice, the commander of each of the opposing forces will administer that area of the demilitarized zone located on his side of the demarcation line and will be the final authority on matters relating to the civil administration of such area and all persons therein. We believe, however, that the line derives from the zone, not vice versa.

If you will consider this matter objectively, and disregard the political implications which alone cause you to urge that a parallel of latitude is a military line, I am sure that we will very quickly reach agreement on the boundaries of a demilitarized zone which will satisfy the military requirements for such a zone and will, at the same time, be satisfactory to both sides.

This delegation has been striving earnestly and sincerely to persuade you to enter discussion of a reasonable solution of the problem before us. To our many efforts to bring our two points of view into an area wherein agreement is possible, you have so far responded only with irrelevant repetition of the irrelevant words "38th Parallel."

Once again I assure you that your insistence on a political line will only serve to delay the ending of hostilities in Korea. I urge you, therefore, to give our proposed zone the serious consideration which you state you have not yet seen fit to give it.

I propose a recess until 1100 our time tomorrow, 1000 your time.

1358K
NORTH KOREA: I don't know for what reason, but anyway you deliberately repeat that the 38th Parallel we proposed is a political line. I have time and again clearly explained why the

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[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

38th Parallel is a military line. I believe if you want to expedite this armistice conference, you will accept the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line. I hope you will consider again my proposal of accepting the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line, and accept my proposal.

This stand of ours -- that is, the stand to have the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line — is unshakeable.

We agree to your proposal to meet at 1000 hours our time, 1100 hours your time tomorrow morning.

1406K
UNITED NATIONS: I would like our liaison officers to get in writing that question you asked me. We couldn't understand it very well.

Recessed at 1408 hours.

NOTE: Following is translation of GEN Nam Il's question referred to above and on Page 8:

"Because the demarcation line you advocate is the most advantageous defense line for you, you advocate this line as the military demarcation line. If the present front line changes, what line will you adopt as the military demarcation line? Will you still claim the same line even if the present front line changes?"

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED BY:

E. C. Thomas

E. C. THOMAS
Major, USMCR

Final Smooth Draft
Transcript of
30 July 1951 Proceedings

REGRADED Unclassified
BY AUTHORITY OF Ltr UNCA/A8-6
Ser #266 of 22 Jul 53 Hq UNC/Adjutant
AFO 72
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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

31 July 1951

Subj: RECORD OF EVENTS, Fifteenth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

1101K: Reconvened. UNC answers NK query about what would happen if front lines change before armistice is signed, says it would advocate same proposed UNC line unless major change takes place in military situation, points out that adequate defense is guard against war, reiterates difference between military armistice and peace settlement.

1124K: NK asks who is "aggressor," side which "tries to guard their fatherland" or side which "intrudes into a foreign country."

1127K: UNC says question "will never be answered," calls it "deliberate stall on your part."

1132K: NK asks why UNC seeks favorable defense line in foreign country if it wants peace.

1135K: UNC repeats statement that it wants adequate defensive position for each side to insure against "accidental incidents."

1142K: NK says UNC hasn't explained why 38th Parallel isn't adequate defense line.

1143K: UNC says NK hasn't explained why it's a good defense line.

1144K: NK says it isn't looking for good defense line, thinks 38th is best line for "bridge toward peaceful settlement," declares UNC stand proves it has "no good faith to a real armistice negotiation."

1148K: UNC points out very fact the battle has crossed 38th many times proves it's not a good defensive line.

1150K: NK asks if UNC is there to talk armistice or get a good defense line.

1153K: UNC cites Hague Regulation, Article 36, defining what an armistice is.

1159K: NK says its 38th Parallel stand is "in conformity with the spirit of of our conference," is "unchangeable."

1201K: UNC declares 38th Parallel "is no bridge to peace," has already proven "to be a bridge to war;" UNC accuses NK of saying "over and over again phrases which have little or no bearing on the subject," that 38th Parallel is "totally unacceptable."

1213K: NK says UNC proposal is "fantastic," reiterates its five reasons for 38th Parallel.

1230K: UNC proposes recess unless NK has any proposals "other than the already discredited proposal of a zone based on the 38th Parallel."

1232K: NK says its stand is "unshakeable," agrees to recess.

1233K: Recessed

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

31 July 1951

Subj: TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Fifteenth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

Delegates Present:

United Nations	Communists
VADM C T Joy USN Sr. Delegate	GEN Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L.C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes USA	MGEN Hsieh Fang CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

Reconvened at 1101 hours.

NORTH KOREA: I would like to have your answer to my yesterday's question.

1102K
UNITED NATIONS: Your question was:

"Because the demarcation line you advocate is the most advantageous defense line for you, you advocate this line as the military demarcation line. If the present front line changes, what line will you adopt as the military demarcation line? Will you still claim the same line even if the present front line changes?"

The answer is yes, unless there is a major change in the military situation. The proposed demilitarized zone and its related military demarcation line are based on the military conditions as they exist now. We do not expect to propose a different zone if the armistice is consummated within a reasonable length of time.

However, if the armistice agreement is excessively delayed and if this delay is accompanied by an appreciable change it may be desirable to consider another zone more appropriately based on the military situation that exists at the time negotiations are consummated. You may consider

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) that a military demarcation line located within the general area of the demilitarized zone which we have outlined to you will remain suitable for the purpose of the conference under the present situation.

1110K
NORTH KOREA: Please repeat that again.

1110K
UNITED NATIONS: "You may consider that a military demarcation line located within the general area of the demilitarized zone which we have outlined to you will remain suitable for the purpose of the conference under the present situation."

I have another statement to make.

In your statements yesterday you asserted that all of our considerations are based on war while you think in terms of peace. In this we recognize the propaganda line of your newspapers and radios. I presume that you have reference to our insistance on an adequate defensive position for both sides during the period of armistice.

Are the terms defense and war synonymous with you? They are not with us. We hold that an adequate defense is an essential surety of peace, removing from the minds of would-be aggressors the temptations -- irresistable to them -- of the lack of an adequate defense. Certainly then, an adequate defense is a guard against war and an insurance for peace. No one ever initiated a war while on the defensive.

Your demilitarized zone based on the 38th Parallel does not provide us with a reasonable defensive position. Your insistence on the 38th Parallel makes it appear that you are making every conceivable effort to deprive us of an adequate defensive position in its vicinity. The real reason that you are making these efforts is known only to you or to

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) your superiors.

Furthermore, we do not subscribe to mere lip service concerning "peace". We are becoming realists. We seek to establish the foundations of peace through adequate arrangements. Here, a fundamental of these arrangements is the establishment of a demilitarized zone which will provide an adequate defensive position for each side. This action would insure against accidental incidents. Your proposed demarcation line does not provide a zone with adequate defensive positions and hence does not provide one important ingredient for a stable military armistice.

You have asked whether peace is a political question. My answer is yes, peace is a political question. What we are endeavoring to do here is to reach a military armistice agreement. A military armistice is clearly defined as a suspension of hostilities. An armistice is not in itself a peace settlement. It is a concrete step toward peace. The establishment of a peace or permanent cessation of hostilities involves the resolution of political factors at a higher level than this conference. By agreeing to an armistice we will be laying the foundations for a peace settlement.

In speaking of defensive positions, therefore, we are speaking in terms of defense, not offense, of peace, not war. We are thinking in terms of affording security to the forces of both sides should unfortunate circumstances lead to the resumption of hostilities during the armistice.

That's all.

1124K:
NORTH KOREA: There is something I would like to ask. You said that the occupied area at present is most favorable for defense. You

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) said that in order to block aggression you have to have such a defense line. Whom do you mean, "aggressor?" Is the side which tries to guard their fatherland against foreign aggression the aggressor, or is the side which intrudes into a foreign country and occupies the territory -- is that "aggressor?" Which side do you mean is aggressor? I request an answer.

1127K
UNITED NATIONS: Your question has been noted. It will never be answered. It is a deliberate stall on your part.

1128K
NORTH KOREA: That is not right. You say that you wanted to keep this line in order to block the aggression, and whom do you mean by "the aggressor?"

1129K
UNITED NATIONS: I will read it again. You have misquoted our remarks.

"We hold that an adequate defense is an essential surety of peace, removing from the minds of would-be aggressors the temptations -- irresistable to them -- of the lack of an adequate defense."

It has no implications unless you take it as such.

1131K
NORTH KOREA: I have one thing more to ask.

1131K
UNITED NATIONS: I will clarify it some more. An aggressor would be anybody who first attempts to pierce the defense line of either side properly established by mutual agreement.

1132K
NORTH KOREA: There is one thing more. You are trying to find a favorable defense line by means of the armistice conference. If you really want peace, for what reason to you want to have a favorable defense line in a foreign country? What can it mean that you want to find a defense line in a foreign country?

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[redacted]

1135K
UNITED NATIONS: I will read again what I said.

"Here, a fundamental of these arrangements is the establishment of a demilitarized zone which will provide an adequate defensive position for each side. This action would insure against accidental incidents."

It would insure against accidental incidents during the armistice. That is the sole reason we are trying to find a favorable defense line.

1137K
NORTH KOREA: Is that all?

1138K
UNITED NATIONS: That is all.

1138K
NORTH KOREA: Your answer does not cover our question.

1139K
UNITED NATIONS: I consider it does.

1140K
NORTH KOREA: How can we know that -- how can we interpret that you cannot accept the 38th Parallel as the demarcation line because it is not favorable for your defense? That is all.

1141K
UNITED NATIONS: We have answered that for two days. Our stand has been clearly and logically presented to you. If you still do not understand what we have said, I suggest you review the record of proceedings.

1142K
NORTH KOREA: You havn't explained for what reason the 38th Parallel is not favorable for you as a military defense line.

1143K
UNITED NATIONS: You havn't explained why it is a good defense line.

1144K
NORTH KOREA: I am not looking for a defense line in our armistice talks.

We take it that the basic object of the armistice negotiations is to stop the bloodshed as soon as possible, and to find a bridge for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Therefore, we tried to find out the de-

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

marcation line which is fair for both sides and what kind of demarcation line can satisfy such a stand. We think we can take the 38th Parallel for this.

You only look for a demarcation line which is favorable for your defense, in opposition of our right stand. This proves nothing else than that you have no good faith to a real armistice negotiation. That is all.

1148K
UNITED NATIONS: The very fact that you have so often stated that the battle in Korea has crossed the area of the 38th Parallel many times is conclusive evidence there is no good defense position in that area. Neither side has ever been able to hold a defensive position within the zone of the 38th Parallel you propose. In fact, everything you have said supports our contention that the 38th Parallel is not a good defensive zone.

1150K
NORTH KOREA: Regarding my statement, what do you think is the objective of the armistice talks? Is it to find armistice to stop the bloodshed and build a bridge to peace, or is it to find you a good defense line?

1153K
UNITED NATIONS: Your question shows clearly that you do not know the definition of an armistice in the field. It is defined by the Hague Regulation, Article 36, as a suspension of military operations by mutual agreement between the belligerent parties. An armistice is not, in itself, a peace settlement as you seem to believe. It is, however, a concrete step toward peace.

1155K
NORTH KOREA: Of course, an agreement on an armistice is not an agreement on peace. That is what everybody knows. There is nothing new in what you have said. But in your own



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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) statement, too, you said our peace talks should be a bridge to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. We agreed to it and we, too, maintain it. But as a result of your pursuit of a defense line, you deliberately deny the righteousness of the 38th Parallel as the defense line.

1158K
UN INTERPRETER: Please repeat it in Korean.

1159K
NORTH KOREA: But what you try to find is a defense line in Korea and is nothing less than a deliberate denial of the character of the 38th Parallel as a reasonable and righteous one. For all these reasons, we consider all your proposals to be not proper.

On the contrary, our stand is fair and reasonable and it is in conformity with the spirit of our conference. Therefore we will maintain our stand to the last and it is unchangeable. That is all.

1201K
UNITED NATIONS: The 38th Parallel is no bridge to peace. It has already proven to be a bridge to war.

1202K
NORTH KOREA: Please say that again.

1202K
UNITED NATIONS: "The 38th Parallel is no bridge to peace. It has already proven to be a bridge to war."

It is where war began in June 1950. It invites war because it offers no strong defense positions and therefore invites aggression.

We are prepared to go ahead in an attempt to arrive at an armistice agreement, but yuur insistence in discussing the 38th Parallel as a political matter is only delaying us.

1204K
NORTH KOREA: You said in your statement right now that the 38th Parallel

[redacted]

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) cannot be a bridge to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question but a bridge to a war.

1204K
UNITED NATIONS: Invitation to a war.

1205K
NORTH KOREA: I will repeat what I heard from the translation. You said the 38th Parallel cannot be a bridge to a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem -- the bridge to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question is war. Please say it again.

1207K
UNITED NATIONS: "The 38th Parallel is not a bridge to peace. It has already been proven to be an invitation to war. It is where war began in 1950. It invites war because it offers no strong defensive position and therefore invites aggression. "

I want to make some concluding remarks unless you have something to say at this time.

1209K
NORTH KOREA: I have nothing at the present but I would like to hear your concluding remarks.

1210K
UNITED NATIONS: For the past four days you have reiterated time and again the same proposal you introduced in detail while we were engaged in the preliminaries of formulating the terminology of the agenda.

During this period you have presented nothing new or constructive nor have you given us any indication that you have either the authority or the desire to examine into the substantive arguments which we have presented. You say over and over again phrases which have little or no bearing on the subject which the world has been led to believe is being carefully considered here at Kaesong.

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UNITED NATIONS:
(Cont'd)

Your statements are mere repetition of a preconceived plan to return to the conditions which existed on 25 June 1950. The United Nations Command Delegation, on the other hand, has stated its position, has elaborated it and has answered numerous questions about it. We now ask that you give serious consideration to the views and proposals which we have presented. We also suggest that you re-examine your own position carefully.

I want it clearly understood that a demilitarized zone based on the 38th Parallel is totally unacceptable to the United Nations Command.

I want it clearly understood, what I have just said. If you have nothing new to offer, I propose a recess until the same time tomorrow morning.

1213K
NORTH KOREA:

We cannot accept the proposals you presented because they are too fantastic. Once more I am going to say about the fairness and reasonableness of the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line:

1. The areas occupied by your side and our side on the south and north of the 38th Parallel are approximately the same. Therefore the withdrawal would not bring forth any loss.

2. The area we have south of the 38th Parallel has military value but in spite of it we want to give it up, to show that we have good faith to peace, but you are not going to give up the region you have north of the 38th Parallel. What reason do you have?

3. You said the area you possess north of the 38th Parallel is favorable for your defense, but if we should accept the demilitarized zone you want to establish, it is

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

unfavorable for our defense. Therefore your proposal is favorable only for you. On the contrary,our proposal is equal for both sides. Therefore our proposal is fair.

4. Experiences since 1945 have proven the easiness of recognizing the 38th Parallel. Therefore the reason for your refusal is untenable.

5. During the last seven months the warfare has been shifting to and fro four times along the 38th Parallel. This means that the 38th Parallel relatively reflects the military strength of your and our sides. You have occupied the regions for no more than two months. When the conditions are so shifting how can you say that the lines are fixed? But if the demarcation line is established upon the agreement of both sides and if both sides stick to it, the line has a military value. A military demarcation line which is not agreed upon by both sides - if it is established absurdly, it has no value at all.

Through the above mentioned reasons your criticism that the 38th Parallel is not proper as a military demarcation line is fully and positively refuted. Therefore, we hope that you will consider again our opinion so that the negotiations can speedily reach an agreement and the armistice will be speedily carried out. That is all.

1230K
UNITED NATIONS: I want to say again -- I want it clearly understood -- that a demilitarized zone based on the 38th Parallel is totally unacceptable to the United Nations Command for the reasons we have given time and time again.

If you have any proposal to make other than the already discredited proposal of a zone based on the 38th Parallel, we will be glad to consider it. If not, I again

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) propose we recess until tomorrow.

1232K
NORTH KOREA: There is no other line than the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line which we can present. I propose again that you consider our proposal carefully and accept it. Our stand is a stand which is unshakeable.

I agree to recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow our time, 11 o'clock your time.

Recessed at 1233 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H.M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED BY:

E.C. Thomas

E.C. THOMAS,
Major, USMCR

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

28

1 August 1951

Subj: RECORD OF EVENTS, Sixteenth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

1100K: Reconvened. UNC takes up five NK points on demilitarized zone and line of demarcation and refutes them, declares NK apparently came to conference "under the misapprehension that the acceptance of the 38th Parallel ..... was a foregone conclusion and ... would be a mere formality requiring no supporting logical arguments," points out difficulty apparently stems from different interpretations of word "armistice."

1214K: NK asks if UNC refuses to continue discussions if NK insists on 38th.

1216K: UNC repeats that 38th is "totally unacceptable," if NK will stop talking about it "I am sure we can get together."

1220K: NK asks if UNC isn't denying its announced aim of "establishing a bridge to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question."

1225K: UNC declares it does not propose to "build our bridge on unstable foundations."

1232K: NK asks why UNC talks about defensive line.

1235K: UNC asks why NK is so fearful of UNC entering armistice with strong defensive line, points out such a line is an obstacle "only to those who contemplate offensive action."

1242K: NK asserts "you have no good faith," says it isn't afraid of strong defensive positions for UNC, replies to earlier reference by UNC on start of war by saying it broke out "by the manipulation of those who tried to trample upon the independence and freedom of a different nation," claims possible defensive lines are better 10 kilometers south of 38th than 10 kilometers north of it.

1315K: UNC says it has "listened patiently," has heard "no new or constructive ideas," suggests a recess "if you have nothing new to offer."

1323K: NK says UNC stand is "unfair and unreasonable," agrees to recess.

1325K: Recessed.

Final Smooth Draft
Transcript of
1 August 1951 Proceedings. a.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

1 August 1951

Subj: TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Sixteenth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

Delegates Present:

United Nations	Communists
VADM C T Joy USN Sr. Delegate	GEN Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes USA	MGEN Hsieh Fang CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

Reconvened at 1100 hours.

NORTH KOREA: If you have anything to say about our proposal, please tell us.

1101K
UNITED NATIONS: Yesterday you stated that you desired to again bring out the fairness and reasonableness of the 38th Parallel as a military line of demarcation. In your review five major points were emphasized. These same arguments have been repeatedly advanced by you. I was unable to detect even a semblance of a new idea. I have looked for reason and found only vague declarations. I have looked for military logic and I have found nothing more than political thinking.

Permit me to review your points one by one:

FIRST: "The areas occupied by your side and our side on the south and north of the 38th Parallel are approximately the same. Therefore the withdrawal would not bring forth any loss."

We have repeatedly told you that we are interested in the security of our forces during the period of an armistice. We are not interested in real estate as

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

such, either north or south of the line you propose. But just for your information and to keep the record straight, the United Nations Command holds more than twice the amount of real estate north of the 38th Parallel than you hold south of that line. I repeat, however, that we are not interested in territory as such. As this is a military armistice conference, we are interested only in military realities.

SECOND: "The area we have south of the 38th Parallel has military value, but in spite of it we want to give it up -- this is because that it tells we have good faith to peace, but you are not going to give up the region you have north of the 38th Parallel. What reason does it have?"

The answer to this question is exactly the same as to the first question.

THIRD: You indicated your belief that the demilitarized zone proposed by the United Nations Command was unfavorable to defense by you. You also stated that your counter-proposal was fair to both sides.

Although I disagree with both of your conclusions, I am glad that you made those statements as they reveal that you are finally recognizing one of the requirements for the establishment of a demilitarized zone.

The military demarcation line which you propose is not a military demarcation line at all. Its only significance is a political one dating from 1945, but violated in 1950. You know full well that no suitable defense positions exist for many miles south of your proposed line. On the other hand, that line does provide you with excellent capabilities for the offensive. You would have

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

numerous major converging avenues of approach into the vital communications center of Seoul. Those approaches are difficult to defend from positions immediately south of the 38th Parallel.

The boundaries of the demilitarized zone proposed by the United Nations Command would, on the contrary, provide both sides with adequate defense positions. As military men we know that you are well acquainted with the virtues of those points, but if you desire we will outline those positions to you on a map. The broad outline contained on the map which the United Nations Command Delegation presented to you on 27 July is, of course, subject to the adjustments which such a detailed study might reveal to be necessary. There would be no difficulty in reaching agreement on such adjustments.

The 38th Parallel, with its complete lack of a defense line on the south, might encourage a resumption of hostilities. The demilitarized zone proposed by the United Nations Command, with its strong defense lines to the north as well as to the south, would discourage any such unfortunate event. If you do in good faith desire to see the projected suspension of hostilities become the bridge to a permanent cessation of hostilities, you will agree to the demilitarized zone proposed by the United Nations Command, with such adjustments as may be warranted.

FOURTH: "Experiences since 1945 have proven the easiness of recognizing the 38th Parallel."

If you are speaking of ease of recognizing it on a map, I agree. If you mean it is easily recognizable on the ground, I must disagree. Surely you recall the many claims and counter-claims of violation of this former boundary.

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

Someone was wrong in each case. Someone was unable to recognize the 38th Parallel. The 38th Parallel does not follow any easily discernible features of terrain such as rivers, roads, ridges or towns. It is an imaginary line used only for geographic reference; it has no meaning on the ground as a line of military demarcation. Your contention that the 38th Parallel is easily recognized is wholly erroneous. Any parallel of latitude in Korea is, therefore, unacceptable as a military demarcation line.

As to your fifth point you stated:

"During the last seven months the warfare has been shifting to and fro four times across the 38th Parallel. This means that the 38th Parallel relatively reflects the military strength of your and our sides. You have occupied the regions for no more than two months. When the conditions are so shifting, how can you say the lines you possess are fixed?"

We have never contended that the line of contact is fixed. We have merely stated that at present it is relatively stable. We recognize that a change in conditions may affect the stability of a line of contact.

We have stated that we do not expect to propose a different zone if the armistice is consummated within a reasonable length of time. However, if the armistice agreement is excessively delayed, and if this delay is accompanied by an appreciable change, it may be desirable to consider another zone more appropriately based on the military situation that exists at the time negotiations are consummated.

We are not interested in the past history of this conflict. We are talking about the realities of the



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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

present. However, as you seem to have a fascination for the statistic of how many times and for how long the 38th Parallel has been crossed, let me cite another and more pertinent one. The last time it was crossed, the crossing was made in a northerly direction and the line of contact is now on the average of 20 kilometers north of it. We are concerned with present trends and realities rather than past history.

In examining your arguments, I have searched diligently for some semblance of pertinent logic. I have found none. I have found varying degrees of heat but little light.

My analysis of your statements has convinced me that you came to this conference laboring under the misapprehension that the acceptance of the 38th Parallel as a military line of demarcation was a foregone conclusion and that these discussions would be a mere formality requiring no supporting logical arguments.

Perhaps you feel that the passage of time will provide a change in our position which will result in a settlement on your terms. Let me assure you that this will not be the case.

In one of your arguments you stated that the zone proposed by the United Nations Command did not provide you with an adequate defensive position. Are you willing to discuss this problem, as military men, and join us in an examination of the map?

It has become evident to the United Nations Command Delegation that before the two opposing delegations can discuss effectively with one another the many aspects of a military armistice, they must mutually agree on the

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

definition of the word "armistice." Before they can hope to reach agreement on any controversial item incident to the armistice, it is essential that they come to a real agreement on that same definition. It has become obvious that we can make no progress in our discussion until we both define the word "armistice" in exactly the same terms.

We have tried to define the word for you in military terms but, except for one brief statement you made on 31 July, you have given us no indication that you are interested in any definition other than your own conveniently vague and general one. You speak of the armistice only as "the first step toward peace." We have, from the very beginning of our discussions, not only accepted but actually propounded the fact that an armistice must precede peace. Subject to the good faith of both parties, a military armistice should, in this case, lead up to a final peace.

As long as we define this most fundamental word differently, it is difficult to see how we can meet and discuss it on a common ground. It is almost as if our two delegations, attempting to arrive at a designated meeting place, were heading north and south respectively and, when they arrived in the general vicinity of the agreed-upon site, discovered that they not only were on different roads but that there was a river separating the roads. (We will give you a copy of this in English). Under such circumstances it would be difficult to have much of a meeting or to arrive at any joint agreements. I am afraid we now find ourselves pretty much in that same situation.

What do we do about this situation in which we find

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UNITED NATIONS:
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ourselves? Obviously, if we are to talk effectively and with any expectation of success in this armistice conference, we must agree on the definition of the word "armistice." I repeat the definition from the Hague Regulations which I gave you yesterday: "A suspension of military operations by mutual agreement between the belligerent parties." After I read this definition to you on 31 July you stated, "Of course an agreement on an armistice is not an agreement on peace. That is what everybody knows. There is nothing new in what you have said." If our interpretation of your statement is correct, it would appear that there is now a slightly improved chance of our getting together.

It appears to the United Nations Command Delegation that one of our difficulties has been the fact that we have been talking about different types of armistices. The United Nations Command Delegation has been discussing a military armistice as defined by the Hague Regulation. Such a military armistice establishes a demilitarized zone from which troops are withdrawn. This enables discussion of peace to proceed. Such an armistice envisages that both sides retain, in general, their present military capabilities. It also provides for the security of forces during the period of the armistice.

To date you have not talked about the same type of armistice. You have, on the contrary, taken the view that we should have a "magic" sort of armistice which would accomplish the solution of all the difficult problems of Korea. It is quite true that such an armistice marked the end of World War I in 1918 when the losing side was hopelessly beaten and sued for peace through the medium of an

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UNITED NATIONS:
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armistice. But it does not fit the situation in Korea today.

In this conference at Kaesong the best we can hope to achieve is one of the traditional types of armistice agreements reached by nations at a stage of hostilities in which neither side has an overwhelming advantage. Under such conditions, then, it is, of course, absolutely essential for the commander of the United Nations Command troops to provide for the security of his forces during the armistice. He has no agressive motive in doing so. It is his duty to think of and provide for the security of his forces until final agreements are mutually reached by the negotiators. These agreements will permit the security provisions to be relaxed and troops to leave their defensive positions in the vicinity of the demilitarized zone.

Perhaps what I have just said will make clearer to you the point which I have been emphasizing for several days, to wit: We will have nothing to do with the positions which you offer us south of the line which is itself 10 kilometers south of the 38th Parallel of latitude. If you have not already done so, I suggest you draw the line on a map and look at it. This extremely unsatisfactory solution which you offer, and which you classify as military, could not have been conceived by a man with sound military experience. We cannot understand why you can seriously suggest that the only fair solution to this problem before us is for the United Nations Command forces to withdraw to positions more than 65 kilometers south of those they now hold on the eastern portion of the front and, on the western third of the front, take up positions on the Ongjin peninsula that are practically indefensible. We have absolutely no interest

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) in any such proposal.

We insist and will continue to insist on a demilitarized zone which has suitable defensive positions to its immediate south. We have such positions now and see no reason why we should give them up.

The problems of communications and logistic support which would inevitably arise in connection with positions just south of the 38th are unnecessarily difficult and we see no reason for voluntarily taking them when these problems would be of less magnitude if we retain our present positions.

We have tried to make it clear to you in this speech why we must retain suitable defensive positions and why we cannot accept the 38th Parallel as a military line of demarcation. I assume that both delegations are now in agreement on the definition of a military armistice in the field. When you cease discussion of the wholly unacceptable line of demarcation you have proposed, I am confident we can agree on a demilitarized zone and a resulting military line of demarcation.

The United Nations Command Delegation is willing to attempt to get together with you on such a basis. We await your reaction.

I again wish to emphasize that a zone based on the 38th Parallel is totally unacceptable to the United Nations Command.

That's all.

1214K
NORTH KOREA: I have some points to ask. Firstly, you mean if we insist on the 38th Parallel, no problems can be discussed any more in this armistice conference? You said that if we insist on the 38th Parallel you cannot discuss the problems --

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) that you are not going to discuss any more with us, if we insist on the 38th Parallel?

1216K
UNITED NATIONS: I did not say that at all. I said that the 38th Parallel as a basis for a demilitarized zone was totally unacceptable to the United Nations Command.

I will repeat it: "When you cease talks of the wholly unacceptable line of demarcation you have proposed, I am confident we can agree on a demilitarized zone, and a resulting line of demarcation.

1218K
NORTH KOREA: Then you mean if we insist on it, you cannot discuss with us any more? Is that what you mean?

1219K
UNITED NATIONS: What I mean is: If you stop talking about the 38th Parallel, I am sure we can get together.

1220K
NORTH KOREA: That means if we insist on the 38th Parallel, it will not go? There is one thing more to ask. Since the beginning of this conference you said these armistice talks have agreement of stopping the bloodshed in Korea and establishing a bridge to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, and aren't you denying it now?

1222K
UNITED NATIONS: (To UN Interpreter) Have him repeat his question.

1223K
NORTH KOREA: You said that this armistice conference has the aim of stopping the bloodshed in Korea and establishing a bridge to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Do you acknowledge it or do you deny it?

1225K
UNITED NATIONS: I will read what I said: "You speak of the armistice only as the first step toward peace. We have from the very beginning of our discussions not only accepted but also propounded the fact that an armistice must precede peace.

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) Subject to the good faith of both parties, a military armistice should, in this case we are discussing, lead up to a final peace."

I will clarify it some more. We, too, seek to so arrange an armistice that it will serve as a bridge to peace. We do not, however, propose to build our bridge on unstable foundations. Strong defensive positions for both sides are essential if an armistice is to be reliably stable. Your proposed zone offers no strong defensive positions. Our proposed zone offers such positions for both sides.

That is all.

1232K
NORTH KOREA: Then I understand that you also agree that our armistice will serve as a bridge to a future peace. Then while you are aiming at having a bridge to a peace, why do you talk about a defense line, and why, especially, are you seeking for a defensive line in Korea?

1235K
UNITED NATIONS: We have noted your question. We will answer it later. I wish, however, to say this: The purpose of the United Nations Command is self-evident from the fact its delegation is here at this conference, seeking to arrange an armistice.

Why are you so fearful that the United Nations Command may enter an armistice while holding strong defensive positions? To whom is a strongly held defensive position an obstacle? Only to those who contemplate offensive action. Therefore, since you state your intentions are peaceful, why do you object to defensive positions.

Let this be clear: We of the United Nations Command Delegation earnestly seek an equitable armistice. We do

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) not deny your right to propose the 38th Parallel as a basis for the demilitarized zone. We do say that the 38th Parallel is totally unacceptable to the United Nations Command as the basis for the demilitarized zone. We do say that so long as you insist on an unmilitary solution, so long will the progress of this conference be delayed.

That should answer all your questions. That is all.

1242K
NORTH KOREA: It is not a direct answer to our question. Having heard your statement several times, I can draw only one conclusion. That is, you have no good faith to have the armistice conference. If you have the stand of stopping the bloodshed and establishing a bridge to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, why do you insist upon having a firm defensive line in Korea?

The fact that the United Nations forces are trying to find a firm defensive line in Korea, that alone cannot lead to the solution of the problem. There is no reason for the United Nations forces to have a strong defensive line in Korea, and nobody will allow such a thing. We are not afraid of your trying to find a strong defensive line. But that is against the principle. Therefore, we cannot recognize it.

I have stated time and again that your proposal for the establishment of a demilitarized zone is not fair and has no sound basis. On the contrary, our stand is a veritable stand for the armistice talk, and it is also a fair and reasonable stand.

You spoke as if we are deterring the progress of the meeting by insisting upon the stand, but that isn't so. It is you who deters the progress of our meeting. You just try to drag on time by maintaining an unfair and unreason-

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NORTH KOREA:
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able stand.

Therefore, I consider that the correct way is for you to change your stand and accept our proposal of having the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line. Yesterday you said that the 38th Parallel is no bridge to peace. You said it was a bridge to war. When you said yesterday that the 38th Parallel was no bridge to peace you, for explanation, took the instance that, when the war broke out in Korea in June 1950, it was because the 38th Parallel did not have a proper defensive line.

I cannot but evaluate these statements of yours as wrong and curious. That the war broke out on the 25th of June 1950 was not because there was no defensive line as you insist. There was a most serious and fundamental reason in it. This fact is all too clearly known to the peoples of the whole world. I want to tell you clearly that the war broke out in Korea in June 1950 not because there was no sufficient defensive line, as you maintain, but it broke out by the manipulation and motive of those who tried to trample upon the independence and freedom of a different nation. It did not break out due to the military and geographical factors of the 38th Parallel itself.

In what history of what nation do you find any instance of an aggressive war against the independence and freedom of a weak nation breaking out because there was no defensive line? Any military person who can judge matters cannot make such a groundless statement. If you ask me to give a more detailed explanation of why the war broke out in Korea, I can explain it more concretely, basing it upon more complete data.

Starting from this wrong standpoint, you arrive at a

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

fantastic theory that should we make the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line in our peace conference, there will be no factor for a defense. For what reasons and basing upon what concrete factors do you say that there will be no conditions for drawing a defensive line in an area 10 kilometers south of the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line? There are relatively long rivers, there are mountains, there are heights, and there are well developed roads, too.

Anyone who has good faith to these negotiations for cease fire and armistice and who has no scheme of utilizing the time of armistice can find more sufficient and better defensive lines 10 kilometers south of the 38th Parallel than 10 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel. Isn't this a fact? It is understood and a clear fact for which we don't have to open the map and wait for an explanation.

In spite of that you make the conjecture that our stand of making the 38th Parallel the demarcation line to be a move to get rid of your defensive line. As we mentioned yesterday, we are not aiming at resumption of war after the armistice but we think this armistice will be the first step to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question in the future, and this armistice is a premise to it.

Why are you so ardently looking for a favorable defense line? We who firmly believe that the armistice will be the first step to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question and we who strive for it can hardly understand this. You ardently look for your favorable defensiv line in the region north of the 38th Parallel. For what

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

purpose do you look for a favorable defensive line in the region north of the 38th Parallel?

I seriously want to tell you that you cannot find any favorable defense line in the region north of the 38th Parallel, and should a line be drawn wantonly on a map on a desk, it will be useless. We arrive at the following points as a necessary conclusion to my statements:

Firstly, as I said yesterday, to establish the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line for both sides is a most fair and reasonable thing which allows no doubt. Therefore, it is the first step tc the peaceful settlement of the Korean question to establish the demilitarized zone for both sides starting from the 38th Parallel, and by doing so alone we can have a full guarantee after the armistice.

I hope you will consider more seriously the five points I presented yesterday as the explanation of my stand that the 38th Parallel is the most adequate military demarcation line.

I hope that you do not spend any further time trying to find an unrealistic unilateral and unfair military demarcation line and I hope that by establishing a demilitarized zone based upon the 38th Parallel as the demarcation line you will speedily carry out the work of our cease fire and armistice negotiations for which the peoples of Korea and peoples of China, as well as the peoples of the United States of America, and also the peoples of the whole world, wish. That is all.

1315K
UNITED NATIONS: We have listened patiently to your last remarks. They present no new or constructive ideas. They indicate no desire or sincere attempt on your part to reach mutual agreement

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) with us.

1317K
NORTH KOREA: Please say that again. I don't understand.

1318K
UNITED NATIONS: They indicate no desire or sincere attempt on your part to reach a mutual agreement with us. They only dress up the previous remarks in different language. We have refuted these same remarks by sound and logical reasoning. I suggest that you study the records of the proceedings, which will prove what I say.

We will not retreat from our expressed principle that the demilitarized zone must be based on general ground area representing the overall military situation which will result from the armistice. I again wish to emphasize that a zone based on the 38th Parallel is totally unacceptable to the United Nations Command. If yo have nothing new to offer, I propose a recess until 1100 tomorrow, 1000 your time.

1323K
NORTH KOREA: We cannot change our stand at all. You said that we repea our stand with the same content all the time. We will always maintain our stand. Our stand is fair and reasonable in principle. Your stand you propose has no basis an it is an unfair and unreasonable stand.

I hope that you will consider more seriously, and accept, our proposal that the 38th Parallel be made the military demarcation line. We agree to your proposal for recess until 10 o'clock our time, 11 o'clock your time tomorrow.

Recessed at 1325 hours.

AUTHENTICATED BY:

E. C. Thomas

E. C. THOMAS,
Major, USMCR

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary.

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

2 August 1951

Subj: RECORD OF EVENTS, Seventeenth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

1100K: Reconvened. NK asks if UNC has anything more to add to its opinion of NK's question of day before.

1105K: UNC says review of NK's five major points "only strengthens the opinion of them that I gave you yesterday."

1107K: NK gives lengthy discourse on UNC's proposal for demilitarized zone, using same arguments as before.

1128K: UNC says it's duty of "prudent commander to provide for the security of his forces," asks why NK fears having UNC in defensive position during armistice.

1134K: NK says it isn't afraid, claims fact that UNC wants it "deep in the area north of the 38th Parallel" is unfair and unreasonable.

1138K: UNC asks for reply in writing.

1139K: NK repeats, asks why, since UNC agrees that armistice is first step toward peace, it wants strong defense line.

1141K: UNC explains again that armistice does not end a war, that UNC doesn't intend to violate an armistice but does not intend to be "caught in an indefensible position if such an armistice is violated by the other side," asks NK if it thinks security of his forces is duty of each commander in time of armistice.

1147K: NK answers by saying solution of question is adoption of 38th Parallel.

1149K: UNC says NK dodges question, declares it will put question in writing.

1151K: NK says it understands question and has "clearly answered it," asks why, if UNC claims already to be 20 kilometers north of 38th, it feels its proposal is "based upon realities," wonders if UNC proposal hasn't "something else in mind."

1155K: UNC says answer is simple: No. UNC asks again if NK doesn't agree that security of his forces is duty of each commander in time of armistice.

1159K: NK says it answered that.

1159K: UNC says it has answer: NK won't answer.

1201K: NK says answer will be found in the record.

1202K: UNC asks why NK dodges question, says it only requires simple yes or no.

1203K: NK says UNC doesn't have to tell it how to answer, claims answer has been given already.

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1210K: UNC asks for NK's definition, in writing, of military armistice.

1212K: NK says it can give answer in writing through liaison officer.

1213K: Each side asks if other has anything more to say, gets negative answer, reaffirms its own position.

1224K: NK proposes recess until next day.

1226K: Recessed.

[redacted]

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

2 August 1951

Subj: TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Seventeenth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

Delegates Present:

United Nations	Communists
VADM C T Joy USN Sr. Delegate	GEN Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes USA	MGEN Hsieh Fang CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

Reconvened at 1100 hours.

NORTH KOREA: We would like to hear if the other party has anything to say.

1101K
UNITED NATIONS: I have nothing to say that hasn't been said before.

1102K
NORTH KOREA: I'll make a statement. Before I make a statement I might say, do you take what you said to my question yesterday as an answer, or have you anything else to say?

1104K
UNITED NATIONS: Repeat that question.

1104K
NORTH KOREA: It is regrettable to have to repeat what I said. Yesterday you said you would study it first and then give us an answer.

1105K
UNITED NATIONS: A review of your five major points only strengthens the opinion of them that I gave you yesterday. I have nothing more to add except to suggest that you study the record of yesterday's proceedings with care.

1107K
NORTH KOREA: That isn't the answer to my question. If you want, we

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

will give you our question in writing.

I have made a study of the series of statements you made since we began the discussion of the second item of the agenda, including the lengthy statement you made yesterday lasting 70 minutes. I have carefully summed up and compared your various statements. But the result of the analysis fails to show that there are new or worthy ideas in it.

In your earlier statements you emphasized the so-called superiority held by your air and naval forces and the compensation you must be given for it in the drawing of the military demarcation line on the ground. This fallacious theory has been completely refuted by us.

As a result, your statements on the last two days were injected with another central argument. This central argument is no other than that you must be provided with a defensible line, and that this defensible line you require must be established north of the 38th Parallel, penetrating far into our area. We have pointed out time and again that in negotiating an armistice and seeking a permanent cessation of hostilities, you must have sincerity and faith for peace. The fact that you continually emphasized a defensible line only serves to prove that you lack sincerity and good faith for peace.

Further, the fact that you want a so-called defensible line to be established deep in our area north of the 38th Parallel cannot but invite suspicion of your real intentions, and make it impossible for your proposal to be agreed upon and accepted. I must point out again that your tactics of endeavoring to compel others to accept your proposal under the excuse of defense is

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

a very much discredited one. We consider that either in the case of a suspension of hostilities or that of a permanent cessation of hostilities, neither of us should assume the attitude of a victor and try to compel the other side to accept an unfair and unreasonable proposal. And yet, the proposal you have continuously insisted upon and refused to abandon is exactly of that character - both unfair and unreasonable.

On the contrary, we have consistently maintained that the armistice must be negotiated upon a fair and reasonable basis, and starting from this basis we have submitted our fair, reasonable and workable proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line.

We could also have submitted an unreasonable proposal, just as you did, a proposal, for instance, to draw the military demarcation line far south of the 38th Parallel. However, we have not done so. On the one hand, we consider that this would be an indication of lack of good faith in the negotiations. On the other hand, this is impracticable anyway.

I believe strongly that in any case, our armistice negotiations must be carried out on an equitable and reasonable basis. Otherwise, it would be impossible to stop the war, still less to achieve peace. That is why we proposed as an agenda item fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line so as to establish a demilitarized zone, when the formulation of the agenda was under discussion. Later we accepted your wording of the agenda Item 2 in order that the agenda might speedily be agreed upon, and the aim of cease fire and armistice

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

be realized at an early date. We stated clearly at that time we would still insist on the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line during the discussion of the substance of that item.

But ever since July 29th, you have evaded the topic of the military demarcation line and proceeded arbitrarily into the detailed discussion of the delineation of the demilitarized zone. We consider that such a method of putting the cart before the horse is illogical and unacceptable. In accordance with the wording of the agenda item, we submitted the proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line with both sides withdrawing their forces 10 kilometers from the 38th Parallel, and making the area 20 kilometers in depth from which the forces are withdrawn the demilitarized zone.

I have set out clearly and in detail the fairness and reasonableness of our proposal. However, you have not given it due attention and careful study, so that up to now you still express yourselves unready to accept our proposal. We consider that this attitude of yours will only protract the negotiations and prolong the bloody conflict. No matter how you have argued, you have offered nothing new.

The sole idea is to establish a defensible line deep in our area. How could you expect us to consider and accept such an unfair and unreasonable proposal? If you accept our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line, I am certain that we would get a basis for establishing a demilitarized zone. That is to say, we would have solved the fundamental

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) question of the armistice negotiations so that all the remaining questions will naturally become easy to be solved.

I hope you will carefully make a further study of our proposal and accept it. We deem that this is the most essential attitude to bring about early success to our negotiations. That is all.

1128K
UNITED NATIONS: Your remarks have been duly noted.

You accuse us of ulterior motives because we insist on a suitable defensive line for the United Nations Command during the armistice. A defensive line is a necessary precaution. It is the duty of every prudent commander to provide for the security of his forces.

Your continued questions and concern about defensive lines make us seriously question your own motives and good faith.

1130K
NORTH KOREA: Please say that again.

1131K
UNITED NATIONS: "Your continued questions and concern about defensive lines make us seriously question your own motives and good faith."

Now, I want to ask you a question. Why do you fear a defensive position held by the United Nations Command during the armistice in the general area proposed to you?

1133K
NORTH KOREA: Any more questions?

1133K
UNITED NATIONS: That is all.

1134K
NORTH KOREA: We are not afraid of the defensive line you propose, and we don't think of being afraid of it. Firstly, what is

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

your wrong stand? It is the fact that you tried to find a defensive line; that is it. The fact that you seek for a strong defensive line -- that alone is wrong; the fact that you looked for it deep in the area north of the 38th Parallel. The so-called military demarcation line you propose is an unfair and an unreasonable line. Not only that, it is a fabrication of a line without any basis.

Therefore we oppose and logically we analyze that it is not right time and again. Therefore your proposal is not acceptable -- therefore your proposal is impracticable. Are you satisfied?

1138K
UNITED NATIONS: I would like to have your answer in writing. I am not sure I understand it.

1139K
NORTH KOREA: You say that you don't quite understand my question I put yesterday, so I am going to repeat it now. Why do you seek a strong defensive line since you agree that the cease fire and armistice is the first step to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question? Why must you have in Korea, in our country, strong defensive lines?

1140K (Pause of one minute).

1141K
UNITED NATIONS: After all the logical explanation I have given you for a week on this subject your question hardly deserves an answer. However, here is my answer:

An armistice does not end a war. It merely suspends hostilities for a definite or indefinite period. An armistice for a definite period may come to an end without being superceded by a full peace. There is no

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) inherent guarantee that an armistice will not be violated. The United Nations Command does not intend to violate any armistice to which it agrees. However, the United Nations Command does not intend to be caught in an indefensible position if such an armistice is violated by the other side. The United Nations Command considers a good defense position is added insurance against a resumption of hostilities and therefore a bridge to peace. By your question you have made it appear more necessary than ever before for the United Nations Command to provide for its security by retaining its defensive positions during the armistice and prior to an accomplished peace.

Now I want to ask you a question. Do you or do you not agree that the security of his forces is the duty of each commander in time of armistice?

1146K (Pause of one minute).

1147K
NORTH KOREA: To this question I am going to answer this way: The immediate solution of this question is to make the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line and the armed forces of both sides withdraw 10 kilometers north and south of the 38th Parallel.

1149K
UNITED NATIONS: That is not a complete answer -- that dodges the question. I will give you the question in writing so that you can study it further.

1150K (Pause of one minute).

1151K
NORTH KOREA: We do not need it in writing. We have understood your question and I have clearly answered it.

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1153K (Pause of two minutes).

1155K
NORTH KOREA: I have a question to put. You said you proposed to have the military demarcation line deep in the area north of the 38th Parallel in consideration of the realities. You said in your statement yesterday that you reached about 20 kilometers into the area north of the 38th Parallel. In consideration of all these realities, is your proposal based upon realities?

(Short pause).

Hasn't your proposal something else in mind?

1155K
UNITED NATIONS: The answer is simple. It is no.

(Short pause).

I want to ask you a question you can answer "yes" or "no".

1156K
NORTH KOREA: You haven't given a full answer to my question.

1156K
UNITED NATIONS: The answer to your question is no. Now I expect a simple answer like that from you for this question. Do you or do you not agree that the security of his forces is the duty of each commander in the time of an armistice?

(Pause of two minutes).

1159K
NORTH KOREA: I answered to that question.

1159K
UNITED NATIONS: We have the information we need. You won't answer it.

(Pause of one minute).

1201K
NORTH KOREA: That is what you think. Anyway, I gave you the answer.

If you will look over the record you will find it.

1202K
UNITED NATIONS: Why do you dodge the question? It only requires a

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) simple "yes" or "no".

1203K
NORTH KOREA: You do not have to tell me how to answer. I know how to answer. I have given you the answer already.

(Pause of five minutes)

1208K
NORTH KOREA: Have you anything more to say?

1208K
UNITED NATIONS: No.

1208K
NORTH KOREA: Are you waiting for our statement?

1209K
UNITED NATIONS: I am waiting to hear what else you have to say.

1209K
NORTH KOREA: For the time being we haven't got any more statements to make.

1210K
UNITED NATIONS: I would like to have in writing and in military terms your definition of a military armistice.

1211K
NORTH KOREA: What else have you?

1212K
UNITED NATIONS: That is all.

1212K
NORTH KOREA: We can give it to you in writing. We can give it to you through our liaison officer.

(Short pause).

1213K
NORTH KOREA: Have you anything else to say?

1213K
UNITED NATIONS: I have nothing else to say.

(Pause of one and a half minutes).

1215K
NORTH KOREA: For the time being we too have nothing else to say.

We would like to know if you have any more statements to make today or not.

1216K
UNITED NATIONS: I haven't any more statements to make today.

[redacted]

1216K
NORTH KOREA: We have no other statements to make either. The only thing I want to say is that we hope you will consider again our statement on making the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line and we hope you will accept it.

Your stand that you are going to establish a defense line by drawing a military demarcation line in the region north of the 38th Parallel cannot be accepted.

That is all.

1220K (Pause of three minutes).

1224K
NORTH KOREA: If you have no more statements to make, we propose to recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow, our time.

1224K
UNITED NATIONS: Let me assure you again of the firmness of our position. The United Nations Command will make no concessions with respect to the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line. I desire to make more emphatic my previous statement that any demilitarized zone based on the 38th Parallel is absolutely and totally unacceptable to the United Nations Command.

We agree to recess until 10 o'clock, your time, tomorrow.

Here is that question I asked you before. I will leave this with you.

Recessed at 1226 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED BY:

E. C. Thomas

E. C. THOMAS
Major, USMCR

Final Smooth Draft
Transcript of
2 August 1951 Proceedings

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

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

3 August 1951

Subj: RECORD OF EVENTS, Eighteenth Session, Conference
At Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

1100K: Reconvened. UNC refutes, one by one, NK's arguments and accusations on UNC's position on demilitarized zone.

1120K: NK takes nearly two hours to expound doctrine of 38th Parallel and reply to UNC's arguments, ends by asking three specific questions.

1314K: UNC requests questions in writing, asks 20-minute recess.

1315K: Recessed.

1334K: Reconvened. UNC asks NK if its stand on the 38th Parallel means it will not sign armistice unless 38th is part of it, reiterates UNC position against 38th.

1348K: NK avoids answering question, insists on 38th.

1350K: Recessed.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

3 August 1951

Subj: TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Eighteenth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

Delegates Present:

United Nations	Communists
VADM C T Joy USN Sr. Delegate	GEN Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes USA	MGEN Hsieh Fang CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

Reconvened at 1100 hours.

NORTH KOREA: We will hear if the other party has any statement to make.

1102K
UNITED NATIONS: In general every point you made in yesterday's meeting has been answered a number of times. Either you haven't studied the answers which are based on pure common sense and logic or you require further explanation. Assuming the latter to be the case, that is, you don't yet understand what we have been telling you, I will briefly review several of them for you.

1. You assert that it is unfair for the United Nations Command to expect to be compensated in any way for the cessation of air and navy effectiveness. If the shoe was on the other foot would you still feel that way? We have explained many times, and I'm sure that you recognize the logic of our position. A military armistice should maintain the approximate balance of military advantages existing at the time of the cease fire. Neither side should be expected to surrender military advantages without the other military factors being adjusted

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UNITED NATIONS:
'(Cont'd)

accordingly. Our arguments have been directed toward maintaining this balance. For example, suspension of air and naval operations, which increases your capabilities for attack on the ground, must be accompanied by a corresponding improvement in our ground positions.

2. You accuse us of seeking a defensible line, north of the 38th Parallel, and deep in North Korea. If you will place the battle line on the map we gave you, it will be easy to see that we don't seek the defensible line there. We have one that we gained by hard fighting. However, I can assure you that we were not influenced in any way by the 38th Parallel in advancing to the positions we now occupy. We have been fighting our opponent where we find him. Now that we have these positions, do you believe it unreal, unfair or suspicious for us to want to secure them for the duration of an armistice? If you do, I advise that you quickly become realists. We will not relinquish them to you to satisfy political desires to subdivide Korea.

3. You infer that we lack sincerity and good faith for peace. We rest our case in that regard on the record, and on the fact we have been at this conference for 24 days, patiently attempting to reason with your preconceived ideas, in an effort to find a way to halt hostilities.

4. You accuse us of assuming the attitude of victors. If you will read the record you will find that we have presented only military realities. We have asked you to give up territory in exchange for military advantages which you acquire as a result of the cessation of United Nations Command air and naval action.

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

Why do you continue to ignore military realities? Why not permit both sides to get on with the vital issues of a military armistice in the field?

5. You stated we evaded the topic of a military demarcation line and went directly to a discussion of the demilitarized zone. There was no evasion on our part. We did not get the cart before the horse. One may start with a demilitarized zone and thereby arrive at a military line of demarcation. Or one can reverse the process and start with a military demarcation line and arrive at a demilitarized zone. The result is the same in either case. It is about the same as whether the egg or the chicken came first. What you really meant was that we are wrong because we refuse to accept your proposed military demarcation line. By this time it should be perfectly clear to you that the 38th Parallel is totally unacceptable to the United Nations Command as a military demarcation line.

6. Lastly you stated the military line of demarcation we proposed was a fabrication, that it had no basis and that it was illogical. It is difficult to believe that you still do not understand the military realities from which our demilitarized zone and the military demarcation line are derived. However, if you still do not, I suggest you go back to the records of 27 July and several subsequent days, where you will find these realities supported in detail.

That is all.

1120K
NORTH KOREA: I will speak.

I have made a careful study of all the statements

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

you made since July 27th. I cannot but point out with regret that you have continuously been raising questions not directly related to the subject of our discussions, to argue for your fundamental stand, which is unreasonable. On the other hand, you have not given any answer to the just and reasonable refutations we made against your fundamental stand.

I contend that the responsibility for the slow progress of our conference rests entirely on your side. It is our opinion that in order to reach speedily an agreement through our discussions, we must bring the focus of our discussions back to our central topic, that is, the fundamental question of fixing the military demarcation line.

In the recent five days, you have repeatedly emphasized the necessity of establishing the so-called "military defensible lines," in order to argue for your absurd proposal of fixing the military demarcation line north of the 38th Parallel above the present battle lines, and within our present positions. You have continuously tried to explain the necessity of establishing military defensible lines by what you claim to be purely military reasons. But this cannot cover up the real motives why you have maintained such a stand.

In your statement of July 31st, you stated frankly: "We hold that adequate defense is necessary to remove from the minds of aggressors, temptations irresistible to them because of lack of defense." I asked you at the time as to whom you meant by aggressor, but you dodged my question. Actually, your answer was not needed, for your statement itself exposed fully the real motive of your insistence on establishing defensible positions

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

north of the 38th Parallel.

Abstractly speaking, it is natural for an army to want to defend itself, but the actual question is why you want to establish defensible lines north of the 38th Parallel above the present battle lines, and within our positions. We think that there can be no other explanation than that this is a concrete manifestation of your consistent fantastic slander that we are the aggressors. You should know that such slander of yours is the basic reason why war could not be stopped. This absurd basic viewpoint of yours, and the proposal of an absurd military demarcation line based on such an absurd viewpoint, are absolutely unacceptable to us. I must tell you, please do not attempt to find indications in our statements that this absurd proposal of yours may be accepted.

When you raised this question of aggressors, I asked you whether aggressors are those who defend their fatherland, or those who intrude into the territory of a foreign country. You stated that my question was noted, but would never be answered. Actually, no direct answer was needed from you. Your insistence on establishing defensible positions north of the 38th Parallel has already made clear your answer. I must tell you that it is precisely because of this, that your proposal with regard to the military demarcation line is absolutely and totally unacceptable.

Since you are unable to defend your absurd statements about the aggressors, you have for the past few days been attempting to argue for your proposal of establishing a military demarcation line to the north of the 38th Parallel by an abstract military viewpoint.

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

Yesterday, you raised further the question of the security for the armed forces in connection with the so-called necessity of defensible positions. I have already concretely answered your question yesterday. Yet you have not only failed to make a careful study of my answer, but even authorized your press officers to announce to the press that I did not answer your question. I contend that this was not true, and that such tactics were not appropriate.

I shall now repeat my answer for your study. We hold that the best way of insuring the security of the forces of both sides is to fix the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line and to withdraw the forces of both sides 10 kilometers respectively from the 38th Parallel, so as to establish a demilitarized zone. You maintain that I have not answered your question directly, but I contend that your question need not be answered directly. If you are willing to think it over a little more, you will surely find that I have not only answered your question in principle, but also answered it concretely.

Similarly, we have also answered both in principle and concretely the question of defensible positions. Speaking of principle, we have never advocated the view that a commander should place his forces in a position where they may be attacked any time by the other side. The necessity of defense in general terms is not to be questioned.

What we do oppose is that you want to establish defensible lines north of the 38th Parallel, above the present battle line, and within our positions. Is not

NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

our attitude sufficiently clear? The establishment of defensible positions is the internal affairs for the commanders of the forces of both sides, and should not be made a major and decisive consideration in fixing the military demarcation line, much less as an excuse to cover up your absurd proposal of fixing the military demarcation line north of the 38th Parallel, above the present battle lines, and within our positions.

I must further point out with emphasis, for the last several days you have dodged the discussion of the fundamental question of fixing the military demarcation line under the pretext of elaborating on such general questions as necessity of defensible positions and security of troops. We consider that the security of troops and the necessity of defensible positions cannot be the major considerations in fixing the military demarcation line, still less can they testify to the correctness of your proposal that the military demarcation line be fixed north of the 38th Parallel, above the present battle line, and within our positions.

If your logic should be followed, our discussion could be drawn out endlessly. We, on our part, might also propose under such pretexes to fix the military demarcation line to the south of the Han river. However, we have not done so because this would be as arbitrary as your proposal. Furthermore, to do this would protract our negotiations, just as your tactics are protracting our negotiations.

Obviously, it is absolutely impossible for you to justify your proposal that the military demarcation line be fixed north of the 38th Parallel, above the present

NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

battle line and within our positions, under such pretexes as the security of troops and necessity of defensible positions. Your proposal is absurd, because its basis is absurd. As you cannot prove the soundness of the basis of your proposal, you should not continue to insist on your proposal.

What is the basis of your proposal? It is, in fact, backed by one sole argument -- that is, you have dogmatically presented the indiscriminate and wanton bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces as an independent military superiority, and asserted that it must be compensated for in fixing of the military demarcation line in the overall armistice arrangement. In other words, you want a military demarcation line to be fixed north of the 38th Parallel, above the present battle line, and within our positions.

I have, in my statements of the 28th and 29th of July, twice completely refuted this absurd idea of yours. But you have only lightly made an empty remark that my just and reasonable refutation was unrelated to the subject under discussion, without giving me any answer. I have expressed several times the wish that you indicate which parts of my statements were not related to the main subject under discussion. But very regrettably, you have not said anything to the point, in spite of my repeated question.

Actually, it is you who have, for the past few days, been emphasizing general questions which are really unrelated to our subject, such as defensible positions and security of troops, to dodge the point. But the main subject is not to be dodged.

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NORTH KOREA:
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We have pointed out that the contention that the superiority held by your air and naval forces must be compensated for is absurd, illogical and untenable. The main part played by your air and naval forces in Korea is to carry out indiscriminate and inhuman bombing and bombardment in violation of international law. This kind of brutal action cannot be regarded as military effectiveness as such. It has produced a certain degree of effect on our military actions; but what is more pertinent, your ground forces would have withdrawn to no one knows where, but for the certain degree of effect imposed on us by the indiscriminate and wanton bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces. It is only due to such kind of support given by your air and naval forces that your ground forces have barely, temporarily and most unstably held their present positions. To use military terms, the so-called superiority of your air and naval forces is already embodied and reflected in the positions barely, temporarily and most unstably held by your ground forces.

Since this is the case, upon what grounds can you propose that the military demarcation line be fixed north of the 38th Parallel, above the present battle line and within our positions? I think you should not dodge this question. You must give me a direct and formal answer to this question because it is one of the central questions of fixing the military demarcation line. I shall wait for your answer.

On the other hand, our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line, with both sides withdrawing their armed forces 10 kilometers from

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

the 38th Parallel so as to establish a demilitarized zone, does reflect the military realities of the battle front at the present stage; it is reasonable and fair to both sides and is favorable to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

Our proposal that the 38th Parallel be fixed as the military demarcation line reflects the military realities of the battlefront at the present stage. The military realities of the battlefront at the present stage present two main and clear-cut characteristics. The first characteristic is that the entire battleline is constantly changing. Since this year, the contact line between both sides has shifted four times across the 38th Parallel, with our side pushing twice south of the 38th Parallel and your side pushing twice north of the 38th Parallel. This fact clearly demonstrates the instability of the present battle line.

You said that the present battle line is most stable or relatively stable. Yet in fact you have entered your present positions a little more than two months ago. If the Han river line we had been holding for three and one-half months did not prove to be stable, or relatively stable, how can the positions held by you at present be called relatively stable or even most stable? Therefore, the contention that the present battle line is stable and should be taken as the prototype of the military demarcation line is untenable, let alone the fact that the military demarcation line you propose is even above the present battle line and within our positions north of the 38th Parallel.

The other characteristic of the realities on the

NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

battlefront at the present stage is that, during the past seven months, the advances and retreats of both sides, in general, do not outstep the area around the 38th Parallel, although the duration, width and depth of our penetration south of the 38th Parallel have been far greater than the duration, width and depth of your penetration north of the 38th Parallel. Therefore, we consider that, even by taking into account the military realities alone, the 38th Parallel does approximately reflect the relative military strength between the two sides at the present stage, and should be taken as the military demarcation line between both sides.

You said that you are not interested in the history of the war and that it is only the present situation which interests you. But it appears strange to me that, although you state you are so deeply interested in the present situation, yet you propose to have the military demarcation line fixed north of the 38th Parallel, above the present battle line and within our positions, a proposal conceived in gross violation of the present military situation. Are you not conscious of a self-contradition in your attitude? As a matter of fact, the military realities deduced from the past seven months' history of war are far more realistic than the present military situation in which you say you are interested, but actually you are not.

You said again: "Although the battle line has been vaccilating across the 38th Parallel, yet it has never stayed on the 38th Parallel. How then can the 38th Parallel be taken as the military demarcation line?" This sounds reasonable but is indeed sophistry. It is

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

sophistry because our military demarcation line is a line to mark the cessation of hostilities to be agreed upon and mutually observed by both sides, it has never been suggested that the line iteslf would have a magic power to stop the war automatically. What is important in this connection is that this line must appropriately reflect the military realities on the battlefront at the present stage, that it must be reasonable and fair to both sides and at the same time favorable to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, and that, by these virtues, it is agreed upon and mutually observed by both sides.

Our proposal that the 38th Parallel be fixed as the military demarcation line is reasonable and fair to both sides. First of all, it is necessary to point out that the 38th Parallel is occupied today by both sides and not by your side alone. In length, the part we occupy is about the same as that occupied by you. In area, there is again no great difference between the sector we occupy south of the 38th Parallel and the sector yuu occupy nortl of the 38th Parallel. Therefore, our proposal that each side withdraw from the other side of the 38th Parallel is in general both fair and reasonable.

Your assertion that the present battle line lies on the average 20 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel is not in accordance with facts. You have forgotten that about half of the 38th Parallel is occupied by our forces. You claim that, since you have penetrated more than 50 kilometers into the north from the eastern section of the 38th Parallel, you would be suffering a loss by a withdrawal, and hence such a proposal cannot be considered

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

as fair. But actually, according to the adjustment we propose, the forces of both sides are to be withdrawn from positions on the other side of the 38th Parallel. This is completely fair to both sides. Yet you say that this is not fair. How could you possibly maintain that it is fair for you to demand that our forces umilaterally and completely withdraw 30 to 60 kilometers in big strides east of the Imjin river and withdraw from a vast area west of the Imjin river?

You assert also that you are not interested in territory, that you cannot give up the present strong defensib? positions north of the 38th Parallel, that there are positions north of the 38th Parallel capable of offensive and avenues of approach converging on Seoul, and that the south, especially the Onjin peninsula, is indefensible.

You could indeed expand this theory and maintain that the position of the whole northern Korea is favorable for offensive against southern Korea and hence the military demarcation line must be pushed up to the Yalu river in order to control those favorable defensible positions. Of course, you have been very moderate in not contending this. But does not your theory give people exactly such an impression? Does not your proposal that the military demarcation line be fixed north of the 38th Parallel above the pres nt battle line and within our positions confirm exactly such an impression?

You have contended that even if we withdraw to the Pyongyang - Wonsan line it would still be insufficient to compensate for the advantage we gain through the cessation of your naval and air attack. Does not such an absurd contention further strengthen such impression? We

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

have already stated that defensible positions should not and cannot be regarded as major and decisive considerations in fixing the military demarcation line and that there is even less reason to refuse to fix the military demarcation line on a fair and reasonable basis with the excuse of maintaining or expanding the present positions.

Once the military demarcation line is fixed, you have complete freedom to establish within your positions what you may consider as suitable defensive positions. In fact, there are plenty of hills, valleys and rivers in the region bordering the area 10 kilometers from the 38th Parallel among which defensible positions may be established during the period of armistice. This would be your own affair with which we have no desire to interfere.

Our proposal that the 38th Parallel be fixed as the military demarcation line reflects the military realities of the battlefront at the present stage and is beneficial to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. In the past 17 sessions, I have almost ceaselessly expounded this stand of ours. If a military demarcation line can be fixed which reflects the military realities on the battlefront at the present stage and is at the same time beneficial to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, why should we not accept such a military demarcation line?

We maintain that fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line is beneficial to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. We maintain this because fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation is recognized by the whole world as the basis for stopping the war. Is that not the most important first step in

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

the peaceful settlement of the Korean question? Of course this is only a military demarcation line; this is but the first step of the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. But this fact does not reduce by any means the utmost importance of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line.

You assert that the 38th Parallel is a territorial demarcation line, that it is a political question. I contend that this is a deliberate misinterpretation on your part. The 38th Parallel has never been recognized in history as a territorial demarcation line. As you well know, the 38th Parallel was originally fixed as a demarcation line of a military nature by the United States and the Soviet Union during the war against Japan in order to share the task of fighting against Japan. Later, after the Soviet Army had long withdrawn, when the United States armed forces finally withdrew from Korea under the constant demand of the Korean people, again no one recognized the 38th Parallel as a territorial demarcation line.

We have absolutely no intention to divide Korea by proposing the 38th Parallel as a territorial demarcation line. On the contrary, on this question, we have consistently held that the domestic affairs of Korea should be settled by the Korean people themselves by peaceful and democratic means.

But this aim cannot be achieved with foreign troops remaining in a specific area in Korea. Our stand is that the governments of the countries concerned should decide by consultation after armistice on the withdrawal by stages of all foreign armed forces from Korea so as to create favorable conditions for the Korean people them-

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

selves to settle their own problems. Does this not make it fully clear that the aim of our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line is to make it a line of military demarcation to be observed by both sides during the armistice?

Fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line and establishing a demilitarized zone on this basis, so that the war may be brought to an end --- this constitutes a most important part of the whole process of the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, although it does not constitute the entire process. In this respect, our armistice negotiations are at the same time the important beginning of the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Have we diverged from the current interpretation of a military armistice by saying this? We deem that we have not.

On the contrary, we contend that only our interpretation is the comprehensive interpretation. For can we say that our military armistice is not for peace but for fighting again? Can we say that, since our military armistice provides only for the suspension, and not the final cessation of the conflict, we should therefore not discuss the question of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line, a step which is favorable to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question?

Ever since we began to discuss the military demarcation line, you have continuously accused that our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line is entirely based upon political considerations and has not taken into account the military realities on the battlefront. This accusation is groundless. You say tha

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

peace is a political question and does not come within the purview of our discussion. But in fact, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question is a process of which our armistice negotiations are a most important part. Your refusal to pave the way for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question in connection with fixing of the military demarcation line, on the excuse that peace is a political question, is erroneous and untenable.

In view of the above-mentioned reasons, we firmly insist upon fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line and establishing a demilitarized zone on its basis, as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea. Our stand is unchangeable and unshakable, because our stand is entirely reasonable, logical and sound, while your view is totally and absolutely unacceptable, because it is unreasonable, illogical and untenable.

Now, in order that our discussion should not stray from the main issue, and that agreement might be reached speedily on it, I wish to put to you the following questions, to which you are requested to give serious consideration and direct answers:

1. As we have already refuted your absurd contention that the superiority held by your air and naval forces must be compensated for when the military demarcation line is being fixed in the concrete arrangement of the armistice, on what ground do you still insist on fixing the military demarcation line north of the 38th Parallel above the present battleline and within our positions?

2. As we have already proved that you cannot employ

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

the excuses of the so-called necessity of defensible positions and assurance of security for troops to support your proposal of fixing the military demarcation line north of the 38th Parallel above the present battle-line and within our positions, what reason do you have for refusing to abandon this unreasonable proposal of yours?

3. As we have already refuted your various ground-less accusations regarding our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line, what reason do you have for opposing this proposal of ours which reflects the military realities on the battlefront at the present stage, and is reasonable and fair to both sides and at the same time favorable to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question?

1314K
UNITED NATIONS: I wish to have the questions presented to us in writing.

1314K
NORTH KOREA: Just the questions alone?

1315K
UNITED NATIONS: The questions alone.

1315K
NORTH KOREA: We can do it.

1315K
UNITED NATIONS: We would like a 20-minute recess.

1315K
NORTH KOREA: We agree.

Recessed at 1315 hours.

Reconvened at 1334 hours.

UNITED NATIONS: I have some points I wish to bring out.

You continue to insist on the 38th Parallel as a military demarcation line as a basis for the demilitarized zone, in spite of the many logical reasons we have given to show you that it is not satisfactory. Our reasoning

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

proves conclusively that the 38th Parallel is not suitable as a military demarcation line. The United Nations Command Delegation has pointed out again and again that a military demarcation line based on the 38th Parallel has no military factors supporting it.

Does your insistence mean that you will refuse to accept a military armistice unless the demilitarized zone is based on the 38th Parallel as a military demarcation line?

Does your stand mean that you will not agree to a military armistice unless the United Nations Command gives up its present defensive positions?

Does your stand mean that you will not sign a military armistice agreement unless you can gain great military advantages as a result of the military armistice?

Will you continue to insist that hostilities will not cease unless the United Nations Command accepts your proposals with which you entered the conference?

Did you come to this conference to negotiate an equitable cease fire or did you anticipate that your preconceived proposals would be accepted regardless of their unreasonableness and obvious unfairness?

There are certain basic conditions which must be met in any military armistice. No satisfactory military armistice can be achieved unless those conditions are met.

We have repeated these conditions over and over again. We have explained them in the utmost detail. We have explained them in various ways. There should be no need to explain them again. All the reasons are in the records.

I want to assure you again that those conditions must be met in any acceptable military armistice. The 38th

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) Parallel as a military demarcation line and as a basis for a demilitarized zone does not meet any of the conditions for an acceptable military armistice. I again remind you that the 38th Parallel as a military demarcation line is totally unacceptable as a basis of negotiations for the United Nations Command.

The United Nations Command stands absolutely firm on this issue and will make no concessions which will result in the 38th Parallel becoming the military demarcation line for a demilitarized zone.

If you have nothing new to offer, I propose a recess until the same time tomorrow.

1348K
NORTH KOREA: We never refused the armistice talks, and we never tried to do so. We only refuted your proposal as unrealistic, unfair and unreasonable, and we keep on insisting on our fair and reasonable stand. The presentation of the question itself proves that you have no good faith to the armistice negotiations. We hope that you will accept our proposal that the 38th Parallel be made the military demarcation line. We agree to your proposal of recess till 10 o'clock by our time, and 11 o'clock by your time tomorrow.

1350K
UNITED NATIONS: Before closing, I wish to re-emphasize again that the 38th Parallel as a basis for the demilitarized zone is totally unacceptable to the United Nations Command.

Recessed at 1350 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H.M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED BY:
E.C. Thomas
E.C. THOMAS,
Major, USMCR.

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

4 August 1951

Subj: RECORD OF EVENTS, Nineteenth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

1100K: Reconvened. UNC answers NK's three questions of previous day, restates its opposition to 38th Parallel, invites NK to discuss UNC proposal with a map.

1149K: NK says military demarcation line is question to be settled first, finds it "too early to discuss the technical questions."

1152K: UNC asks if NK has any other proposal besides 38th Parallel to submit.

1155K: NK says no.

1157K: Recessed.

1401K: Reconvened. UNC proposes recess until next day, notes that a company of armed troops passed within few hundred yards of UNC Delegation house at Kaesong during day, in violation of neutral zone.

1405K: NK declares its stand on 38th is "unshakable," says it will investigate report of violation of neutral zone, agrees to recess.

1406K: Recessed.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

4 August 1951

Subj: TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Nineteenth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

Delegates Present:

United Nations	Communists
VADM C T Joy USN Sr. Delegate	GEN Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes USA	MGEN Hsieh Fang CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

Reconvened at 1100 hours.

UNITED NATIONS: From your statements of yesterday it is evident that you still prefer the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line. Your statement reaffirming this preference concluded with three questions to which direct answers were requested. In order to understand these questions the United Nations Command Delegation found that it had to separate the rhetoric from the query. Stripped of their rhetoric the questions were: First, on what grounds to you still insist on your proposed military demarcation line? Second, what reason do you have for refusing to abandon your proposed demarcation line? Third, what reason do you have for opposing our proposed demarcation line?

The answers to each of these three questions can be found in the record of proceedings of this conference, expressed many times in clear concise language. I urge that these records be studied again but with an open mind. I know you will reach the conclusion, that will eventually be reached by neutral analysts, that our arguments have been based on sound military logic and that the proposals are

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) just and reasonable.

On one point it appears that the United Nations Command Delegation has not made itself clear. You allege that the United Nations Command seeks defense positions north of the present line of contact and deep into your present positions. We have never sought such positions and this will be clearly indicated to you later in this statement.

I desire to proceed directly to a further clarification of the factors which effect and govern our search for a solution to our mutual problem. The answers to the three questions mentioned earlier will be restated during this exposition.

What are the advantages of an armistice?

An armistice will suspend hostilities. It will stop the killing and bloodshed. It will create a favorable atmosphere for future peace negotiations. If the armistice is properly observed it can lead to the peaceful settlement of the problems which led to the war. These are advantages that will accrue to both sides from an armistice.

There are in addition certain advantages which would accrue to you alone. The bombardment by air and naval forces will cease. There will be no blockade, no interdiction of supply routes and communications, no destruction of military facilities and war potential.

Unmolested, you will be able to repair your railroads, roads and bridges. Your industries, ports and shipping can be made to operate again. By virtue of these factors you would be in a greatly improved military position should hostilities ever unfortunately begin again.

These are the immediate and finite advantages that

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) you can gain through an armistice. None of these advantages would accrue to the United Nations Command as a result of an armistice.

Let us review again the arguments which have been presented on the establishment of a military demarcation line and a demilitarized zone.

An analysis of your statements on the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone gives evidence that you have accepted the principles that the demilitarized zone should be based upon military considerations and that its location should be related to the present overall military situation.

Comparison of a zone based on the 38th Parallel with the one proposed by the United Nations Command Delegation demonstrates clearly the unsuitability of the 38th Parallel zone from the standpoint of its military characteristics. The primary military requisite of a demilitarized zone for an armistice is that a suitable defensive position be available to each side. Such a position requires defensible terrain which is served by adequate communications. Obviously, a combination of such natural features as these could not be expected to coincide with an artificial line such as a parallel of latitude.

That a zone based on the 38th Parallel does not in fact provide suitable defensive positions for both sides is made evident by the fact that during all the fluctuations of the war neither side has ever held defensive positions on or near the parallel. This fact can be readily understood if one makes a careful military study of the terrain.

On the other hand, the present situation of the ground forces gives evidence of the defensibility of the positions

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) in that area which are involved in the United Nations Command proposal. A study of the terrain will also confirm that evidence.

Now as to the location of the zone.

A comparison of a zone based upon the 38th Parallel with the one proposed by the United Nations Command Delegation shows the unsuitability of the 38th Parallel zone as an expression of the current military situation.

The argument that hostilities began on the 38th Parallel is, of course, irrelevant. So also is the argument that each side currently holds areas to the north and south of the parallel. An exchange of real estate is not one of the purposes of armistice negotiations.

A zone based on the 38th Parallel would require the United Nations Command to withdraw the center and right of the line presently held by its ground forces a great distance. In addition, the United Nations Command air and naval forces would withdraw their effectiveness from the entire area of Korea under your control. An incidental result of the United Nations Command withdrawal on the ground would be that it would be forced to abandon the only suitable defensive position anywhere near the current line of contact.

What does your side concede in return? You offer certain land areas to the westward of the battle positions. You give up no control of the air, no control of the sea, and no terrain of military value. Instead you gain freedom from air attacks, freedom from naval attack, and advance your ground forces considerable distances along the line of contact. How can you advance such a solution on the grounds that it reflects the current military situation?

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

In justification of this faulty solution you state that the battle position has moved back and forth across the 38th Parallel several times during the fighting.

This reasoning is completely fallacious. We are concerned with the current overall military situation, not that of several months ago. You seek to nullify by means of this flimsy argument the real military advantages the United Nations Command has gained during several months of fighting.

By contrast with your unrealistic proposal, the United Nations Command proposed zone is so located as to reflect the current overall military situation. It offers the withdrawal of the United Nations air and naval capabilities from all parts of Korea under your control in exchange for a slight withdrawal by your ground forces. You gain freedom from air and naval attack at the small cost of a limited withdrawal along the ground front. The United Nations Command sacrifices the advantages of continuous air and naval attack in return for a reasonably secure defensive position for its forces.

I sincerely hope that our position is now clear to you. As you have been shown, the United Nations Command does not seek a defensive position north of the present line of contact. We have never suggested a defensive position deep within your present lines. Except for the necessary guards along the southern boundary of the demilitarized zone we do not expect nor is it necessary to move any forces forward from their present positions.

You have restricted your proposal to one specific and inflexible line. In our proposal we have outlined a general area. We have stated that we expect this area to be subject

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) to discussion and to possible resulting adjustments.

If you care to examine a map with us, the United Nations Command Delegation will point this out in detail. It would be useful for us to peruse together a map showing the present battle line and to talk about the zone the United Nations Command Delegation has proposed. In that way we could be certain that the United Nations Command Delegation's proposal is perfectly clear to you. We could discuss possible adjustments. Surely you agree it is desirable that there be no misunderstandings, some of which may be due to the language barrier. A map speaks the same language to both delegations.

Are you willing to discuss this on a map?

1143K
NORTH KOREA: Is that all?

1143K
UNITED NATIONS: Do you wish to answer my question?

1143K
NORTH KOREA: When you are through with your statement, I will give you my answer.

1143K
UNITED NATIONS: In other words, you say no.

1143K
NORTH KOREA: I will answer.

1144K
UNITED NATIONS: All right. I misunderstood.

1144K
NORTH KOREA: I will give my answer to your question that if both sides could study on your proposal on the map.

UN INTERPRETER: "I will answer your question about there being some benefit if we study your proposal on a map."

1149K
NORTH KOREA: I have already, time and again, criticized your proposal as unrealistic, unreasonable and unfair. So I clearly explained that we can absolutely not accept the proposal you make.

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) What is the necessity of discussing such an unfair, unreasonable and unrealistic proposal on the map? It is nothing but a technical question to discuss this problem on the map. We must first discuss the principal question, that is, the question of establishing the military demarcation line. As for the technical questions, they can be discussed in any manner. Therefore, I find it too early to discuss the technical question while the main problem of principle is not yet settled. Are you satisfied with my answer?

1151K
UNITED NATIONS: Would you state what you consider the main problem to be -- the principal problem?

1151K
NORTH KOREA: The main problem of principle is the problem of establishing the military demarcation line.

1152K
UNITED NATIONS: We understand your answer. I desire at this time to ask a direct question. Have you any proposal other than your proposal based on the 38th Parallel that you can submit to this delegation?

1154K
NORTH KOREA: Have you any further questions?

1154K
UNITED NATIONS: No. No further questions.

1155K
NORTH KOREA: We have no other proposal than the most reasonable proposal, to make the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line.

1156K
UNITED NATIONS: I propose we have a recess for lunch and meet again at two o'clock our time, one o'clock your time.

1156K
NORTH KOREA: We agree.

Recessed at 1157 hours.

Reconvened at 1401 hours.

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NORTH KOREA: If you have anything to say, please tell us.

1402K
UNITED NATIONS: We have carefully considered your response to our question this morning. We regret that you have refused to join us in discussing with the aid of a map, a military demarcation line based on the present battle line and overall military situation.

Since you have nothing new to offer, I propose a recess until tomorrow at the same time. But before I leave, I want to make this unmistakably clear. The United Nations Command will never accept any proposal for a demilitarized zone that is based on the 38th Parallel.

I wish to note for the record a violation of the Kaesong neutral zone. At 1345 a company of armed troops passed within a few hundred yards of the house assigned the United Nations Command Delegation. This violates the zone in two respects. First, no armed personnel were to be within one-half mile of the conference site. Second, troops within the area five miles from the Kaesong traffic circle were to be limited to those necessary for military police functions.

That is all.

1405K
NORTH KOREA: Our stand that the 38th Parallel be made the military demarcation line is unshakable and we will keep on insisting on it. As I have critized time and again, we absolutely cannot accept your proposal as to the military demarcation line.

As for your statement about violation of the neutral zone, we will make an investigation of it and we will let you know about it later.

[redacted]

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

We agree to recess until tomorrow ten o'clock by our time and 11 o'clock your time.

Recessed at 1406 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H.M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED BY:

E.C. Thomas

E.C. THOMAS,
Major, USMCR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

28

10 August 1951

Subj: RECORD OF EVENTS, Twentieth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

1330K: Reconvened. NK said it is regrettable conference was adjourned for 5½ days. NK asks if UNC has given up its previous proposal concerning military demarcation line and asks if UNC is prepared to accept 38th Parallel.

1333K: UNC restates its position on military demarcation line and opposition to 38th Parallel.

1355K: NK asks who provoked aggressive war.

1404K: UNC says aggressor has been established by vast majority of nations.

1406K: NK again presents, in length, 38th Parallel proposal, admits power of UN air and naval bombardment, states UN ground troops would have been driven out of Korea without air and naval support and states Korean and Chinese air and naval forces are "constantly growing".

1440K: UNC states it will not be responsive to further 38th Parallel discussion.

1445K: Pause -- neither side talked.

1655K: Talk resumed. UNC says talk on agenda item 2 is deadlocked and asks NK how they propose to break deadlock.

1705K: NK says acceptance of 38th Parallel will break deadlock.

1712K: UNC proposes agenda item 2 be dropped temporarily and conference proceed to item 3.

1715K: NK says conference must settle item 2 before discussion can start on other items.

1726K: UNC proposes recess until 1100 11 August 1950.

1740K: NK restates position on 38th Parallel is "absolutely unshakable" and agrees to recess.

1743K: Recessed.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

10 August 1951

Subj: TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Twentieth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

Delegates Present:

United Nations	Communists
VADM C T Joy USN Sr. Delegate	GEN Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes USA	MGEN Hsieh Fang CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

Reconvened at 1330 hours.

NORTH KOREA: It is very regrettable that our conference has been adjourned for 5½ days on account of a question unrelated to the main topic under discussion. The conference is now resumed. I would like to know if you have given up your previous proposal concerning the military demarcation line and are prepared to accept our fair and reasonable proposal. I am waiting for your answer.

1332K
UNITED NATIONS: Is that all you have to say?

1332K
NORTH KOREA: At present that is all. I am waiting for your answer to to this question.

1333K
UNITED NATIONS: For days these meetings have made no progress. I will briefly review the sequence of events which have resulted in lack of progress. When the question of location of a demilitarized zone was taken up by the delegations, you proposed a zone based on the 38th Parallel. You offered no valid military reasons for that proposal. You did not because you cannot cause the 38th Parallel to reflect the present military situation. You asserted that the 38th

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

Parallel would be a bridge to peace, despite the fact that it has proven to be an invitation to war. You did not show that there are defensible positions for either side adjacent to the zone you proposed. You did not because you cannot.

At no time in the Korean War has either side been able to hold defensible positions near that zone. In attempting to support your proposed 38th Parallel zone, you denied the total effect of the air and naval forces of the United Nations Command. Yet, you irrationally and erroneously claimed that but for these same United Nations Command air and sea forces, your ground forces would have driven ours from Korea. By your own illogical statements, you revealed your true motive in seeking the 38th Parallel zone.

We are left no recourse but to believe that your current objective is a face-saving return to the 38th Parallel from which this unprovoked war of agression began. You confirmed that your only purpose is the political division of Korea.

In our turn, the United Nations Command Delegation presented a proposed demilitarized zone. This zone is based on a fair assessment of the present overall military situation. It provides defensible positions for both sides. It recognizes the changed military capabilities of both forces resulting from any period of armistice. It has no political connotation whatever. It adheres strictly to military realities.

You refused to consider seriously the equitable zone proposed by the United Nations Command Delegation. You refused to discuss this zone with the aid of a map so that

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

at least a clear understanding of it could be assured. You rejected the offer of the United Nations Command Delegation to discuss possible adjustments of the proposed zone. You stated you have absolutely no proposal to offer other than that the 38th Parallel be fixed as the military line of demarcation. Your attitude has been inflexible, and without any reasons so far stated to justify that attitude.

It seems clear to us that you seek to gain, through negotiation of a military armistice, a political division of Korea. The fundamental incompatibility of your political objectives with the strictly military nature of a military armistice renders your case for the 38th Parallel zone illogical, unrealistic, and totally unacceptable to us. It can only raise doubts in the minds of the peoples of the world who have access to the truth and who recognize it when presented, that you have any honest intention of seeking an honorable end to hostilities.

Whenever you are willing to discuss strictly military matters connected with a military armistice, we are of the opinion that an equitable arrangement can be worked out.

As long as you continue to cling to your discredited 38th Parallel zone with its impossible conditions this conference cannot make progress. For that reason, the United Nations Command Dolegation now informs you that it is through discussing the 38th Parallel. It is through considering your flimsy arguments related to the 38th Parallel.

We are always willing at any time to discuss a demarcation line and a demilitarized zone based on the battle

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) line and current military realities. We will not discuss further the 38th Parallel as a military demarcation line. We trust this is quite clear.

That is all.

1355K
NORTH KOREA: I have one thing to ask which I don't understand in your statement. In your statement as a reason for your opposition against our fair and reasonable stand that the 38th Parallel should be made the military demarcation line, you said that we said we want to go back to the 38th Parallel where the aggressive war broke out. What is meant by the "aggressive war" which you say, and who do you mean provoked the aggressive war?

1359K
UNITED NATIONS: I will reread the statement. "We are left no recourse but to believe that your current objective is a face-saving return to the 38th Parallel, from which this unprovoked war of aggression began." That statement does not say anything about who provoked the war. My statement had no implications unless you take it as such.

1401K
NORTH KOREA: It is not quite reasonable to say that the aggressive war was broken out, and say that nobody provoked the aggressive war. The fact itself that the aggressive war broke out means that there was an aggressor. Therefore, I request a clear explanation of your statement.

1404K
UNITED NATIONS: Aggression in Korea and the identity of the aggressor has been established by the vast majority of the nations of the world in councils assembled and after thorough investigation of the facts. It is not the purpose of this conference to determine who was the aggressor. That has already been determined.

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1405K
NORTH KOREA: As for this question, you tried to dodge a full-sided answer.

1405K
UNITED NATIONS: I am not trying to dodge the answer. I told you the purpose of this conference was not to determine who was an aggressor in any war.

1406K
NORTH KOREA: I don't mean that the object of this meeting is to decide who the aggressor is, but as you mention the aggressor war in your statement, I want to have you clarify it. If we take your answer as the full-sided answer to my question, I would understand it as follows. I consider to be the aggressor the side which all freedom loving and peace-loving people of the world know to be the aggressor.

And now I further express my opinion -- I would like to continue to give our view with regard to the question of the military demarcation line on which no agreement has so far been reached, as a result of your insistence on your unreasonable proposal. After I have repeatedly refuted clearly and completely the theoretical basis of your proposal, I cannot understand how you can still insist upon your absurd and arrogant proposal. The correctness and reasonableness of my arguments should have long ago been perceived by anybody with an open mind, but I shall not be adverse to restating them once again in the hope that you will give up your absurd and arrogant proposal, and accept our fair and reasonable proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line.

You have repeatedly vaunted the effectiveness of the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces, and insisted upon getting a compensation

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NORTH KOREA:
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for it on the ground in the armistice agreement, attempting thereby to push your troops a great distance to the north of the 38th Parallel, and into our positions, and demand that our troops withdraw from a large area of territory. I have pointed out again and again that the indiscriminate and inhuman bombing and bombardment of innocent inhabitants and peaceful cities by your air and naval forces in violation of International Law should be regarded as a shame by any self-respecting military men.

Furthermore, exaggeration of the military effectiveness of certain complementary armed services in isolation of the war as a whole, and the contention that these services are sufficient to decide the outcome of the war and play an independent part should not be the logic of anyone who is militarily minded. As a matter of fact, it is only under the support of the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces, in violation of International Law, that your ground forces have barely and temporarily maintained the present situation on the battlefield. If there were no cover and support of such indiscriminate bombing and bombardment, your ground forces would have long ago been driven out of the Korean Peninsul

What is more, your naval and air forces certainly do not dominate unchallenged the Korean sea and the Korean air. The naval and air forces of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers are constantly growing and have dealt considerable blows to your naval and air forces. The serious losses of your naval and air forces admitted by yourselves are a clear proof of this point. Your apparent belief, which appears persistently in your statements, that we have no naval and air forces at all

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NORTH KOREA:
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is therefore completely at variance with facts.

You say that should your air and naval forces stop fighting, various advantages would accrue to us, and therefore you must be compensated. Has it occurred to you that according to your logic, should our army, acknowledged as mighty and superior by the whole world, stop fighting so that your troops will escape the fate of annihilation, are we not entitled to an even greater compensation and to propose a demarcation line and demilitarized zone to the neighborhood of the Naktong river? But you can rest assured that we shall not make such an illogical proposal because such a proposal would be as absurd as yours, and as incompatible with the spirit of settling problems in our armistice negotiations.

Again, you have repeatedly emphasized the so-called necessity of defensible positions, and assurance of the security of troops, and insisted upon the establishment of your defensive positions north of the 38th Parallel, above the present battleline, and within our positions. Regarding this, I have repeatedly pointed out that the establishment of defensible positions should not in any case be taken as the main and decisive questions in fixing the military demarcation line, and that it is even less justified to seek to fix the military demarcation line north of the 38th Parallel, above the present battleline and within our positions under the excuse of establishing defensive positions.

I have also pointed out again and again that the best measure to guarantee the security of troops of both sides is to fix the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line, and withdraw the armed forces of both sides 10

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NORTH KOREA:
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kilometers from the 38th Parallel respectively, so as to establish a demilitarized zone. You say that you are not looking for defensible positions north of the present line of contact, and that you merely demand the stationing of certain guards along a certain boundary of your proposed demarcation zone. Has it never occurred to you that according to your logic, we could also demand the stationing of guards south of the Han river? We did not, and we shall not do so, for that would be as naive as your demand and just as incapable of deceiving anyone, and would indefinitely protract our armistice negotiations.

On the other hand, our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line, with both sides withdrawing their armed forces 10 kilometers from the 38th Parallel so as to establish a demilitarized zone, does reflect the military realities of the battlefront at the present stage. It is fair and reasonable to both sides, and is favorable to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

I have repeatedly pointed out that the characteristics and trend of the Korean battlefront demonstrates clearly that our proposal reflects the military realities of the battlefront at the present stage. You say you are not interested in history, that the characteristics and trend of the Korean battlefront are all of no significance, but even your highest military men could not but repeatedly admit that the greatest military achievement you could attain would be to maintain your positions on the 38th Parallel.

Our proposal that the 38th Parallel be fixed as the military demarcation line is fair and reasonable to both

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

sides, because the 38th Parallel is occupied today by both sides, and both sides occupy sectors similar in area on the two sides of the 38th Parallel. The withdrawal by both sides 10 kilometers from the 38th Parallel so as to establish a demilitarized zone is consistent with the principle of equality and reciprocity, and does not involve any loss to either side.

Furthermore, our proposal that the 38th Parallel be fixed as the demarcation line is favorable to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, because this is recognized by the whole world as the basis of ending the Korean war. Without such a basis, not only would we be unable to settle the question of delineation of a demilitarized zone, or to discuss other questions of armistice, but we would also be unable to pave the way for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. I sincerely request that you seriously consider and accept our proposal.

You say that you would not discuss any more about fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line. I would like to know what you mean by this information? Doe it mean that you mean to deprive us of our sacred right to insist upon our stand in discussion of fixing the military demarcation line? We think that it is our right, which we cannot be deprived of, to insist on, as a fair an reasonable demarcation line, on having the 38th Parallel a the demarcation line, and you have no reason whatever to deprive us of this right.

That is all, and we are waiting for your answer to the question.

144OK
UNITED NATIONS: We do not deprive you of the right to say what you please.

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) I will read again what we say - what we mean. We are always willing at any time to discuss a demarcation line and a demilitarized zone based on the battle line and current military realities. We will not be responsive in any way to any further efforts on your part to engage us in discussion of the 38th Parallel as a military line of demarcation.

That is all.

1445K
NORTH KOREA: At present we have nothing more to say.

1445K
UNITED NATIONS: Neither do we.

1 (Pause of two hours and ten minutes).

1655K
UNITED NATIONS: Would you like to say something?

1655K
NORTH KOREA: At present I have nothing to say.

1655K
UNITED NATIONS: We continue to make no progress. So far you have failed to offer any proposal for the location of a demilitarized zone based solely on current military realities. We are left no recourse but to believe that your objective is only a face-saving one. You wish only to return to the conditions of 25 June 1950.

We have proposed to you the general location of a reasonable demilitarized zone. It has been arrived at after long and careful study. It is in the general area of the battle line. It is based on a fair assessment of the current <u>overall</u> military situation.

Your attitude is inflexible and unreasonable. We have offered to discuss adjustments to this demilitarized zone. We continue to remain flexible to reasonable, logical and pertinent discussion within the military field but

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) on no other grounds.

We are always willing to discuss a demarcation line and a demilitarized zone based on the battle line and current military realities. For the second time I trust this is clear. We will not discuss further the 38th Parallel a a military demarcation line. It appears that we are temporarily deadlocked on Item 2. How do you propose this deadlock be broken?

That is all.

1706K
NORTH KOREA: We oppose any scheme which fixes the military demarcation line north of the 38th Parallel. We oppose the scheme of fixing the military demarcation line at the present battle line, that is, the scheme of armistice at present position but in particular what we cannot possibly tolerate is the absurd proposal that you made that the military demarcation line be fixed north of the 38th Parallel above the present battle line and within our positions. We have repeatedly demonstrated that this proposal of yours is based on an argument which is illogical and contrary to the prin ciple of logic and reasonableness but you have not given any answer to our refutations.

I hope that you will seriously reconsider the fair and reasonable proposal we made that the 38th Parallel be fixed as the military demarcation line. The solution of the deadlock in our discussions on the second item is to have the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line.

1708K
UNITED NATIONS: I thought I made it clear that we will not, repeat,not, discuss further any line of demarcation or demilitarized zone based on the 38th Parallel. You have not made a proposal yet as to how the deadlock may be broken.

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1709K
NORTH KOREA: I repeatedly stated that is is reasonable, fair, and in conformity with the present military realities to make the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line. In spite of it, you said today that you are not going to discuss any more about the 38th Parallel and I think it is not right. We make it clear that we will always insist on having the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line and we make it also clear that it must be accepted. And this stand of ours is unshakable.

1712K
UNITED NATIONS: Since you have no proposal to offer there may be some merit in dropping agenda item 2 temporarily. By so doing we may find areas of mutual agreement in which some of our mutual problems could be quickly settled. In addition, by discussing other items, it is possible that agenda item 2 may be received later in a different light. By so doing we may save time in arriving at an overall military armistice agreement. I therefore propose we proceed to discussion of item 3 of the agenda. That is all.

1715K
NORTH KOREA: It is indeed very regrettable that we have not been able to reach an agreement on agenda item 2 although many days have been taken for its discussion. This, however, does not mean that item 2 cannot, or should not, continue to be discussed. I consider that in order to solve the other questions in our agenda we must first and foremost solve the most crucial question in the agenda, that is, the question of fixing the military demarcation line so as to establish a demilitarized zone.

Speaking in general, the agenda items of a conferenc are arranged in the order of the importance of questions

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NORTH KOREA:
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to be dealt with. Once an agenda is formulated, the agreeing parties should proceed with the discussion of items in accordance with the agenda order. The order should not be altered unless demanded by special important reasons. Our agreed agenda has been arranged correctly, according to the importance of the questions we are to settle. We consider that the question of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line so as to establish a demilitarized zone is the prerequisist question in stopping the Korean war, that is to say, the basic condition of the armistice.

Once this fundamental question is solved, the various questions of concrete arrangements included in the following items are not difficult to settle, that is, the questions of supervisory organs and war prisoners. Conversely, if the fundamental question of fixing the military demarcation line is not solved, all these questions of concrete arrangements will be impossible to discuss, that is, the question of the supervisory organs and prisoners of war. And even if discussed, it will be as baseless as castles in the air and a waste of time.

In view of the above mentioned reasons, we would rather spend more time and energy on the continued discussion of this item. If you have good faith, I believe it should be possible to solve this question speedily. On the contrary, if you should continue to maintain your former attitude in discussing the questions, it would not be certain whether our work will make speedy progress, even if the order of the agenda items were reversed.

We hope you will reconsider your stand and continue to discuss item 2 with us in good faith. And if we solve

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NORTH KOREA:
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this question, the other questions can also be solved and the desire and the demand of the peoples of the world for peace can also be realized.

That is all.

1726K
UNITED NATIONS:

You have failed to offer any proposal for the location of demilitarized zone based solely on the overall military situation. You have refused to discuss the adjustment of the demilitarized zone we proposed. This you have refused even though you know in general it is a fair representation of the overall military situation.

You have refused to proceed by temporarily passing to the discussion of item 3. It should have been perfectly clear that such action might have had the advantage of saving time and permitting some progress to be registered by this conference.

In view of your unreasonable and so far inflexible stand it appears that nothing is to be gained by continuing the conference today. I propose that we recess until 1100 hours our time tomorrow.

It is hoped that by so doing you will reconsider your position on the points I have mentioned above. It is further hoped that you will return tomorrow with one or more proposals designed to further, rather than hinder, these negotiations.

We are always willing at any time to discuss a demarcation line and a demilitarized zone based on the battle line and current military realities. We will not be responsive in any way to any further efforts on your part to engage us in discussion of the 38th Parallel as a military line of demarcation.

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

My reply to your last message concerning the alleged United Nations Command air violations of 7 August, will be formally presented to your senior liaison officer today.

He will also be given the formal report of the United Nations Command investigation into the alleged 7 August incident of the patrols at PAN MUN JOM.

We wish to thank you for the use of your transportation from the airfield today.

1740K
NORTH KOREA:

I have something which I must inform you. The information you gave us is completely absurd and arrogant and is in complete violation of the principle of equality and reciprocity between the two parties at the conference. We absolutely cannot agree to such an unreasonable information given by your side. I must also state again that our proposal of making the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line is absolutely unshakable. Tomorrow I shall continue to state our views in connection with this fair, reasonable and just proposal of ours.

We agree to your proposal to recess till 11 o'clock by your time and 10 o'clock by our time tomorrow.

Recessed at 1743 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H.M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED BY:

R.M. Monson
R.M. MONSON,
Major, USMCR.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

11 August 1951

Subj: RECORD OF EVENTS, Twenty-first Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

1102K: Reconvened. NK proposes neutralization question be referred to liaison officers of both sides.

1108K: UNC asks for neutralization question proposal in writing.

1109K: UNC says violation of neutral zone indicates the value of NK pledged word and is reason why UNC insists on military line of demarcation related to battle line to provide security for UNC forces.

1118K: NK accuses UNC of violating neutral zones and refers to liaison officer discussion again. Then NK's discussion of the "main question" in which: NK asserts 38th Parallel as "fair" military demarcation line; says UNC has "malicious political intentions" in placing line north of the 38th Parallel; says UNC is trying to save face; restates that UNC air and naval forces have kept UNC ground forces from being driven out of Korea; says UNC is confused as to where military demarcation line should be; and maintains UNC demarcation line north of the 38th Parallel, above present battle line and deep in Communist positions cannot be considered.

1206K: UNC says it is willing to let world judge which force is "superior". UNC maintains armistice will allow strengthening of Communist troop force and positions - therefore, UNC should have defensible positions for demarcation line. UNC asks NK to show on map its conception of demilitarized zone.

1224K: NK says 38th Parallel appears clearly on map and withdrawal of ten kilometers is proposed demilitarized zone.

1228K: Recessed. NK delivers note UNC requested pertaining to liaison officers discussing neutralization question. Translated copy of note included in this record.

1430K: Reconvened.

1435K: UNC says it will study meeting of liaison officers and give reply 12 August 1951.

1436K: NK says UNC has confused the military demarcation line, the southern boundary of demilitarized zone and present battle line. NK claims UNC wants too much compensation for silencing of air and naval forces in armistice.

1450K: UNC says NK has maintained "arrogant" attitude during conference, and has refused to view maps of UNC proposed demarcation line. UNC says NK refuses to negotiate item 2 and proposes again the conference move on to agenda items 3 and 4. UNC says it is firmly opposed to NK effort to negotiate a political division of Korea. UNC proposes recess until 1100 12 August 1951.

1523K: NK agrees to recess.

1526K: Recessed.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

11 August 1951

Subj: TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Twenty-first Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

Delegates present:

United Nations	Communists
VADM C T Joy USN Sr. Delegate	GEN Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes USA	MGEN Hsieh Fang CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

Reconvened at 1102 hours.

NORTH KOREA: I have one thing to propose before we go over to the discussion of the main problem. On July 15th our two delegations agreed in principle on the question of neutralization. We also agreed at that time that the details of the formulation of these principles could be referred to liaison officers of both sides for consultation and settlement. Though the liaison officers did meet and consult with each other after the meeting of July 15, they did not carry out any detailed discussion nor did they make any decision in regard to details of neutralization.

Now in order to set up detailed provisions on the basis of the principle of neutralization to be observed henceforth by both sides in this regard, I propose that the liaison officers of both sides meet again to discuss this question and to agree upon a draft of detailed provisions of neutralization. This draft may then be rectified by our two delegations as an agreement to be observed by both sides.

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

On the condition that you agree to convene such a meeting I now appoint Colonel Chang Chun San and Lieutenant Colonel Tsai Cheng Wen as the liaison officers of our side to attend the meeting.

I hope you will also appoint liaison officers of your side so that they will meet after today's meeting to discuss the details of neutralization.

That's all.

1108K
UNITED NATIONS: Give me your proposal in writing. We will consider it and let you have our answer later.

1108K
NORTH KOREA: We will give it to you.

We will be glad to hear your opinion about our stand as to the military demarcation line.

1109K
UNITED NATIONS: As I told you yesterday we refuse to discuss your illogical and ridiculous proposal for a demilitarized zone based on the 38th Parallel. I have a statement to make.

You stated yesterday: "It is very regrettable that our conference has been adjourned for 5½ days on account of a question unrelated to the main topic under discussion." I would like to comment briefly on your statement.

The question which caused the recess was closely related to item 2. The success of an armistice depends upon the integrity of the belligerents, upon their willingness to live up to their assurances and their appreciation of the vital importance of doing so.

You clearly demonstrated to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command that you considered your guaran-

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) tees regarding the neutrality of the Kaesong area of little significance. The United Nations Command has been informed several times, since these violations occurred, that the flagrant violation of the guarantees which you made on 14 July was trivial and of no importance.

Is this, then, an indication of the value you place on your pledged word? If the breaking is considered such a trivial matter, how can you expect us to rely on it with reference to the security of our forces during an armistice? You cannot expect us to accept your guarantees that you will not attack. We must rely on strong physical defensible positions since you have made known to the world the small value you place on a guarantee. Perhaps you now begin to understand why we insist upon a military line of demarcation which is related to the battle line and which permits the United Nations Command Commander to provide for the security of his forces.

That is all.

1118K
NORTH KOREA: You seem to try to prolong the time of meeting by bringing forth questions which are settled already. I am going to refute it in brief. Of course the question you mentioned is not a big question. You repeatedly violated our agreement on the neutral area. But such questions as these could be settled by discussions of both sides. We try to settle these through our liaison officers. You recessed for five days on the pretext of questions which could be settled through liaison officers and that shows that you have no good faith to the

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NORTH KOREA:
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conference. Henceforth, I want to leave this matter for settlement through the liaison officers on both sides.

Now I want to go over to the main question.

After I have listened to your statement yesterday, and compared it with the statements you made in other sessions, I find that the attitude with which you treat the views of our side are totally different. On our side, we have never taken the rude attitude of refuting in a general and abstract way the views of your side without careful and thorough study and analysis. It is our opinion that the correct attitude in discussing and settling questions is to study and analyze carefully and thoroughly the statements of the other side and to review the statements of one's own side.

Therefore, with regards to your statement yesterday that your side is through with discussing our proposal of the 38th Parallel, I cannot but consider it as a rude and improper declaration that you are not willing to reach a settlement. If your side really has a serious intention to negotiate an armistice and to reach a settlement, you should give up such an attitude. In accordance with our consistent attitude of analyzing and studying the statements of the other side, I have again studied your statement of yesterday.

As a result, I cannot but say that our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line is fair and reasonable and that it should be discussed and accepted. On the contrary, your proposal is unacceptable. Contrary to what you have been stating, our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

military demarcation line is first and foremost drawn up and formulated on the basis of real military realities.

The characteristics and trend of the development of the war in the past seven months during this year, and the present situation in which both sides occupy sectors similar in area south and north of the 38th Parallel, reflect the military realities of the battle-front at the present stage. Therefore, to fix the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides is the most logical and workable proposal.

But you are not willing to give a concrete answer in your refutation of our proposal, which has been proven to be correct by both reason and facts, but you merely insist that the sole purpose of our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line is the political division of Korea. Such a statement itself is a demonstration of your deliberate ignorance of our repeatedly expressed views. We have clearly stated on 3 August that our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line is merely to make it the military demarcation line to be observed by both sides during the armistice.

From its name alone, one should be able to understand that it is not to be a political demarcation line. But what is more, we have further stated that the domestic problems in Korea, including the problem of its unification, should be settled by the Korean people themselves by peaceful and democratic means after the realization of an armistice agreement in Korea and the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Korea.

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NORTH KOREA:
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Your persistent opposition to our statements and explanations cannot but raise the question in our mind that since you have no reason for your opposition, you are using such statements which are contrary to facts to cover up your inability to find an argument, and to cover up the real motive of your insistence on pushing the military demarcation line wholly to the north of the 38th Parallel. I have pointed out that your insistence on placing the military demarcation line to the north of the 38th Parallel and within our positions proves that it is you who have malicious political intentions. All that I would like to say is that such intention of yours can in no way be realized.

You said again yesterday that we proposed to make the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line in order to save face, but the plain truth is that we insist upon this proposal simply because it reflects the military realities of the battlefront at the present stage, and is reasonable and fair to both sides, and at the same time favorable to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

We insist upon the truth and intend to do nothing else. This allegation of yours is a fabrication and is inappropriate. We do not wish to hear again such discourteous remarks. As a matter of fact, the people who really wanted to save face with respect to the military situation are those who seek to attain by means of absurd theories what they have not won, and the people who wanted to save face with respect to the political situation are those who have crossed the ocean to intervene in the domestic affairs of another country, not

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

those who fight the foreign interventionists heroically and selflessly. It is clear enough, and requires no further explanation.

Our proposal to make the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line is completely fair and reasonable and reflects the military realities and paves the way for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. This proposal of our definitely will not be shaken by your distortions.

Yesterday, you also said that we deny completely the total effect of your air and naval forces. As a matter of fact, we have never denied it. On the contrary, we have given it due appraisal. What we are against is your attempt to secure compensation on the ground by exaggerating the effectiveness of your air and naval forces, and thus to place the military demarcation line on the north of the 38th Parallel and within our positions.

We say that if it were not for the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces, your army would have long ago been driven out of the Korean peninsula by our mighty and superior ground forces. That is our fairly high appraisal of the effectiveness of your air and naval forces. Moreover, ever since 27 July, we have repeatedly explained by logic and by facts this self-evident situation. Yet, you have never given any concrete reply to our explanation and instead still insisted upon the independence and superiority of your air and naval forces, and upon the compensation you must get for it when drawing the military demarcation line on the ground. This is not a commend-

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NORTH KOREA:
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able attitude.

Could you explain how your proposal can still stand when the premise upon which your proposal has been conceived and raised has already been refuted and is no longer existent? It is indeed entirely unjustifiable that up until now you should still cling to your proposal. To insist upon doing what is itself entirely unjustifiable, is this not for the purpose of attaining some malignant political desire?

If you really have the intention to reach a settlement, please answer concretely to my criticism of your proposal. What is more incomprehensible and intolerable is that, while reluctant to abandon your proposal, you dare not make known the substance of your proposal.

From your statements we really cannot see that your proposal is a proposal of the so-called armistice at the current battle line. Sometimes you claim that your proposed military demarcation line and demilitarized zone are based on the present battle line. Sometimes you say that your proposed demilitarized zone is located in the general area of the battle line. You also deliberately confuse the military demarcation line with the battle line.

If your proposal were in reality, as you claim it to be, the military demarcation line you proposed should have been the present battle line itself. Yet the military demarcation line you draw on the map is deep within our area north of the 38th Parallel. I do not understand why you have not been willing to clarify this point frankly.

You say your proposed demilitarized zone may be

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

adjusted. This we have noted. Then why have I not been responsive? For what actually is the nature of your so-called adjustment? Actually, such adjustments are only for you to occupy an area slightly less than 12,000 square kilometers which we would give up if we withdrew from the present battle line in accordance with your proposal.

Do you suppose it possible for us to take an interest in such adjustments? If you allege that I have not understood you correctly, will you point out the exact mistake?

You have indeed stated more than once that you are always willing to discuss your demilitarized zone on the basis of the present battle line and the military situation or military realities, as you sometimes call them.

But to my knowledge your proposed demilitarized zone is the area between the lines drawn on your map and those three lines are north of the 38th Parallel, above the present battle line, and within our positions. Consequently, such a statement on your part is just empty words without any actual meaning.

For the above reasons, we contend that the arguments supporting your proposal are untenable and, therefore, your proposal is unreasonable, unfair and indeed absurd. Hence it cannot be considered.

Finally, I wish to state again that a demilitarized zone based on the 38th Parallel is fair and reasonable. As soon as we determine the principle of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line, the details of the demilitarized zone will not be difficult

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

to negotiate when it comes to the discussion of a demilitarized zone.

1206K
UNITED NATIONS:

Yesterday you stated: "Has it occurred to you, that according to your logic, should our army, acknowledged as mighty and superior by the whole world, stop fighting so that your troops will escape the fate of annihilation, are we not entitled to an even greater compensation and to propose a demarcation line and demilitarized zone to the neighborhood of the Naktong river?" Again today you mention your mighty and superior ground forces.

We do not now, nor have we ever disputed the great numerical preponderance of your ground forces. However, in view of your progress northward since February, we ridicule your use of the word "superior". We are quite willing to let the world judge that point.

We also recognize as self-evident, the fact that the capabilities of these already numerically greater ground forces, available to you, will begin to increase the day an armistice goes into effect. These same capabilities will continue to materially increase each week the armistice is in effect. It is during this period when the air and naval forces must remain inactive that your ground troops could be rested and re-equipped without interference. They could be positioned at your leisure.

We know well that once these ground forces are fully reconditioned they have the capability, which presently is restricted, of launching and sustaining an attack that could be disastrous to any force not in a naturally strong and well defensive position. We know that you

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) recognize that fact also.

It is exactly for the reasons you have stated that this delegation has consistently pointed out that the United Nations Command requires adequate natural defense positions with sufficient depth to ensure that they cannot be quickly overrun by a numerically greater ground force. We realize that it would take several weeks of full time operation for our air and naval forces to again create the situation in your rear areas that presently prohibit the full utilization of your numerically greater ground forces.

It is precisely for these stated reasons that the United Nations Command Delegation has consistently held that the military realities which govern the present situation justify improvement in the defensive position of our ground forces as a just compensation for the withdrawal of our strong air and naval forces.

You have criticized our proposed demilitarized zone. We would welcome an exposition of <u>your conception</u> of a demilitarized zone <u>based on the present battle line and the overall military situation</u>. Will you provide us a map showing such a zone?

1224K
NORTH KOREA: Is that all?

1224K
UNITED NATIONS: That is all.

1224K
NORTH KOREA: We have repeatedly explained the military demarcation line and also the demilitarized zone. We clearly explained that the 38th Parallel should be fixed as the military demarcation line and troops of both sides should withdraw ten kilometers on each side and establish

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) a zone of twenty kilometers as the demilitarized zone.

The 38th Parallel appears clearly on the map. The withdrawal of ten kilometers north and south of the 38th Parallel, that is so clear that one does not have to look it up on a map.

1227K
UNITED NATIONS: Is that all you have to say?

1227K
NORTH KOREA: That is all.

1227K
UNITED NATIONS: I propose a recess for lunch, returning at 1430 our time, 1330 your time.

1228K
NORTH KOREA: We agree.

Here is the proposal in writing which you requested: (U.N. translation of proposal written in Korean.)

"On 15 July we (both sides) came to an agreement on the principle of neutralization, and we decided to leave the settlement of details of this principle to a meeting of the liaison officers of both sides. Although the liaison officers of both sides met after the meeting of 15 July, they were unable to get to any detailed discussion or to reach any agreement concerning neutralization.

"Now, in order to select the detailed regulations for neutralization based on this principle of neutralization and have both sides adopt them, I propose that the liaison officers of both sides continue this former meeting, discuss this problem and decide on the details of neutralization, and then after submitting them to the delegations of both sides and obtaining their agreement that they be taken as the agreement to be observed equally by both sides.

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

"If you agree to call such a meeting, we will appoint Colonel Chang Chun San and Lieutenant Colonel Tsai Cheng Wen as liaison officers for our side to the above meeting. We ask that you appoint your liaison officer and we hope that you will let them have a meeting immediately after today's meeting and let them confer on concrete regulations for neutralization."

Recessed at 1228 hours.

Reconvened at 1430 hours.

1435K
NORTH KOREA: Have you anything to say?

1435K
UNITED NATIONS: In respect to your suggestion regarding a meeting of our liaison officers, we will study the matter and give you a reply tomorrow.

Have you anything to say?

1436K
NORTH KOREA: In my statement this morning, I have again made clear the content of our proposal and pointed out that your proposal is unacceptable.

You have deliberately maintained, in order to confuse people, that the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone you proposed are based on the present battle line and that they are located in the general area of the battle line. You have also deliberately confused the military demarcation line, the southern boundary of the demilitarized zone and the present battle line.

This is sufficient proof that your proposal is incapable of being made public. With regard to these questions, you did not make any definite explanation

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

after my statement. This is further sufficient proof that you do not dare to explain clearly your proposal and make it public to the world, as we do.

In order to support your proposal of pushing the military demarcation line to the north of the 38th Parallel, deep into our positions, you have persistently emphasized the so-called superiority of your naval and air forces and that, therefore, you must be compensated on the ground.

Yet, today you have presented a new and strange argument that since our army is already superior at present, it will be more so after armistice and, therefore, you should be again compensated for reasons of security. In using these self-contradictory arguments in support of your proposal, do you not feel ridiculous?

You said that because your air and naval forces were strong you should be compensated and now you admit that your army is weak, but again you claim that you should be compensated. Just imagine, you need compensation no matter whether you are strong or weak. Is that not completely without reason, and wholly nonsense?

It has been proved that your proposal is untenable and that our proposal is based on reason. Therefore, whatever novel and ridiculous arguments you should fabricate, they would never bolster up your proposal.

I can tell you frankly that as long as you do not abandon your unreasonable proposal, it will not be possible for our conference to make any progress.

As for our proposal, its reasons are irrefutable, therefore it is unshakeable. We insist on our proposal of making the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line.

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145OK
UNITED NATIONS: Yesterday you used the word "arrogant" in connection with a proposal the United Nations Command Delegation now has before this conference. The United Nations Command Delegation has been in search of an expression which conveys the haughty intransigence, the arbitrary inflexibility, and the unreasoning stubbornness of your attitude. Arrogance is indeed the word for it.

From the first day of these conferences your arguments have reflected the very essence of arrogance. You stated, in your opening remarks, that <u>your</u> view in regard to a military line of demarcation <u>had</u> to be accepted. You have made that same statement over and over again. Once more yesterday, you stated that <u>your</u> solution to the question of a demarcation line "must be accepted." Your attitude has been that of an arrogant dictator, not that of a negotiator seeking in good faith an end of hostilities.

By your obdurate and unreasoning refusal to negotiate you have brought these meetings to a standstill. You have slammed every door leading to possible progress. By trying to deceive the world into believing that you have defeated the United Nations Command, you have delayed and stalled these meetings. You refuse to negotiate except on your own terms, thus seeking to falsely portray yourself as a victor dictating to the vanquished.

When the United Nations Command Delegation presented its original proposal regarding a demarcation line, you rejected it summarily. You stated you would not give it serious consideration. You contemptuously

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UNITED NATIONS:
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knocked aside the map we offered for your consideration.

When the United Nations Command Delegation proposed that possible adjustments of the demarcation line based on the battle line be considered, you flatly rejected this proposal. You implied there was no need to study the physical location of a demilitarized line, since you had already provided a solution you unilaterally considered suitable.

When the United Nations Command Delegation urged you to join it in studying the proposed demilitarized zone from a map, you refused. The United Nations Command Delegation pointed out that to study the proposed demilitarized zone on a map would at least clear up any possible misunderstanding concerning the proposal. You rejected even that.

Yesterday you placed a conclusive cap on your record of arrogance. You stated and I quote: "We oppose the scheme of fixing the military demarcation line at the present battle line," unquote. You thus revealed clearly the fact that you engaged in these conferences only to present demands, not to negotiate solutions. You seek to gain a political division of Korea by mere repetition of your arrogant demands. You offer no logic because you have none. You merely state, restate, and state again your peremptory demands.

All the world realizes that a military armistice is a device to halt the fighting until the issues which caused the fighting to start are settled. All the world knows, therefore, that military armistices are and ought to be a reflection of the overall military situation at the time the armistice is put in effect. Yet you, in

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UNITED NATIONS:
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your absurd arrogance, oppose a military demarcation line conforming with present military realities.

The United Nations Command Delegation has thus been unable to negotiate the question of a demarcation line with you who refuse to negotiate. As a result, the United Nations Command Delegation yesterday proposed to shift discussion to item 3 of our agreed agenda, dealing with Concrete Arrangements for the Cessation of Hostilities. The United Nations Command Delegation explained to you its hope that by putting aside temporarily the question of a demarcation line and delving into the details of stopping hostilities, a later return to the matter of a demarcation line might find a favorable atmosphere. Using a previously prepared statement you rejected this also. In addition to rejecting the proposal to discuss concrete arrangements for ceasing hostilities, you gratuitously rejected discussion of item 4, dealing with relieving the suffering of prisoners of war. I ask you to reconsider these decisions.

In adhering to your futile fixation on an effort to divide Korea by cloaking political maneuvers under the guise of a military armistice, you have blocked every earnest effort of the United Nations Command Delegation to make progress toward a cessation of bloodshed and suffering. Your cold calculations take no account of such matters as the pitiful suffering of the Korean people.

Ruthlessly, arrogantly and with the assumed air of a victor, you baldly assert that your demands must be met. The record of these proceedings has become your unanswerable accuser. You did not come here to stop the

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

fighting. You did not come here to negotiate an armistice. You came here to state your price - your political price - for which you are willing to sell the people of Korea a temporary respite from pain. You have tried to camouflage your purpose in words cleverly designed to trap the unwary. You are failing. Your arrogance and your bad faith stain through every attempted deception. The immutable facts hold you guilty of having delayed, and of continuing to delay, the end of hostilities in Korea. I do not envy you the place to which truth assigns you.

Today we have again made no progress. I trust the proceedings have provided you an opportunity to reflect on the unreasonableness of your inflexible position, and of your refusal to give serious consideration to any but your own ideas. I trust they have impressed upon you the firmness of the rejection by the United Nations Command Delegation of your effort to negotiate a political division of Korea. I hope they have brought to your mind those who die in the continuing warfare, victims of your refusal to discuss a military solution to a military problem. I hope they have raised in you a desire for the end of bloodshed which would attend a cessation of hostilities. If so, the way is open for you. I leave these thoughts with you.

I propose a recess until 1100 hours our time tomorrow.

1523K
NORTH KOREA: There is nothing new in your statement. Your statement does not frighten us and cannot change our stand. As our proposal of making the 38th Parallel the military

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

demarcation line and our proposal of establishing a demilitarized zone is fair, reasonable and proper, we will continue to insist upon it.

We agree to your proposal of recessing until tomorrow, 1000 our time, and 1100 your time.

Recessed at 1526 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED BY:

R. M. Monson
R. M. MONSON
Major, USMCR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

12 August 1951

Subj: RECORD OF EVENTS, Twenty-second Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

1101K: Reconvened. NK says 38th Parallel "reflects the military realities, is reasonable and fair to both sides." NK asserts UNC has never made careful study of reasons for 38th Parallel as military demarcation line. NK says NK Delegation has a prepared map marking out the relation between present battle line and line proposed by UNC and claims UNC has no adjustment to make "since adjustment would still place military demarcation line and demilitarized zone within our (Communist)positions." NK refuses to move on to agenda items 3 and 4, claims UNC is assuming the air of a victor in negotiations and says UNC voiced willingness to discuss demilitarized zone is a scheme to deceive the world. NK presents five questions it wants UNC to answer to more clearly understand UNC's stand.

1208K: UNC asks if bottom line on NK map is NK concept of present battle line or line of contact.

1208K: NK answers it is contact of both sides at present.

1209K: UNC requests questions in writing.

1210K: NK agrees. (Questions are Enclosure No. 1).

1210K: UNC concurs to NK proposal of 11 August 1951 for meeting of respective liaison officers to determine whether there is need for more detailed provisions for the neutralized zone. (Extracts of three documents referred to in liaison discussion are enclosures No.'s 2, 3 and 4).

1226K: UNC again suggests conference drop agenda item 2 temporarily and move on to items 3 or 4 or both. UNC proposes a recess until 1100 hours 13 August 1951.

1236K: NK refuses to move from discussion of item 2, says stand on 38th Parallel is "unchangeable" and agrees to recess.

1238K: Recessed.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

28

12 August 1951

Subj: TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Twenty-second Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

Delegates Present:

United Nations	Communists
VADM C T Joy USN Sr. Delegate	GEN Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes USA	MGEN Hsieh Fang CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

Reconvened at 1101 hours.

NORTH KOREA: I want to make a statement. Yesterday you made a lengthy statement of an extremely absurd nature with a threatening tone, attempting to shift the responsibility for the stand-still of the conference onto our shoulders. I replied in brief then that these remarks of yours were no surprise to me and could not change our position, because our proposal was fair and reasonable. I said in my statement yesterday that our consistent attitude has been to study and analyze carefully and soberly the statement of the other side and at the same time to review our own statements in the hope of finding thereby a way to the solution.

Therefore, in spite of the fact that your statement yesterday was totally absurd and without reason, I have, nevertheless, made a careful and sober study and analysis of it. I cannot but point out that the charges you brought against us are completely groundless and that your threatening can have no effect on us.

It is true that since the beginning of the conference, we have consistently held that the 38th Parallel should be

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NORTH KOREA:
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fixed as the military demarcation line so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basis of armistice in Korea. Since then, we have consistently upheld this proposal because it reflects the military realities and is reasonable and fair to both sides, and also is favorable to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Because it is the truth and because the arguments you have advanced against it are untenable, there is naturally no necessity for us to give up or alter our proposal. You should know that truth is not afraid of repetition, and needs repetition.

Ever since we raised this proposal, you have never made a careful study of our reasons for raising it. You have refused to discuss this reasonable proposal of ours with the simple assertion that the 38th Parallel is a political demarcation line. You, yourselves, know that this assertion which you use as a pretext for refusing to discuss our proposal of the 38th Parallel has been thoroughly refuted by us, and yet up to yesterday you still clung to this empty assertion, refusing to discuss this reasonable proposal of ours. This unreasonable attitude of yours reached its highest peak when the day before yesterday you declared, "The United Nations Command Delegation is through discussing your proposal on the 38th Parallel."

This is the real reason why our conference has come to a standstill, and the responsibility for this rests entirely with your side. Our attitude is that of reasoning. Our proposal is reasonable, and our aim and hope is to attain the realization of armistice in Korea through debate and negotiation. The entire record of our proceedings thus far, proves this point. Unscrupulously distorting our statements

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

to suit your purposes, you tried to substantiate your accusation that we only raise demands, but refuse to give solutions. Such a declaration is contrary to facts and it cannot succeed.

Now let us examine your proposal once more. Based on a completely untenable argument, you have made the proposal of fixing the military demarcation line north of the 38th Parallel far above the present battle line and within our positions. We have more than once pointed out that the basis of your proposal is untenable. However, you have never dared to answer this irrefutable and correct criticism by us, but instead clung stubbornly to your absurd and arrogant proposal. On what basis could you say that your proposal is reasonable?

We have indeed used consistently the terms "absurd and arrogant" to describe your proposal. We feel that it is entirely proper to do so because that proposal of yours is actually an absurd and arrogant one.

Perhaps you have forgotten what kind of a proposal you yourselves have drawn on the map. I have made specially a copy of the map and marked out the relation between the present battle line and the line you have proposed. You can see for yourselves whether your proposal is not absurd and arrogant. The just public opinion of all the world demands that you make public your proposal. If you have confidence, you should make it public without any hesitation, so that the peoples of the world can be the judge as to whether it is arrogant or not.

Since your proposal of a military demarcation line and a demilitarized zone is so intolerably absurd and arrogant, our attitude can only be one of pointing out the ab-

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

surdity and arrogance of the basis of your proposal. It is impossible to enter into its concrete discussion, because it is, viewed objectively, not worthy of concrete consideration. Still less could there be any necessity to study the map, for what is there to be studied; since the three lines you have drawn are all within our positions anyway, there could again be no necessity to discuss the adjustments you mentioned, for what is there to adjust?

Any adjustment would still place the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone within our positions. Since we both agree that to fix a military demarcation line in order to establish a demilitarized zone is the basic condition of the realization of armistice in Korea, and since no agreement can yet be reached on the question of fixing a military demarcation line, due to your stubborn insistence on this absurd and arrogant proposal, there is no reason for putting aside the second item of the agenda to discuss other items below it. It would be meaningless to do so. Just as in the case of building a house, can you set up pillars and beams before you lay a foundation? This is obviously impossible.

Our conference has been brought to a standstill as you have mentioned, precisely because you have insisted on your absurd and arrogant proposal and refused to discuss our fair and reasonable proposal. Is this not crystal clear?

You say that we assume the air of a victor, but in fact it is you who are assuming the air of a victor. I would like to ask you, is there a precedent in history when compensation was demanded on the ground for the air and naval forces because they were said to have independent

NORTH KOREA:
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superiority, to push the military demarcation line deep into the positions of the other side, and demand the other side to withdraw from an area of more than 12,000 square kilometers. Is this not the proposal of a victor? Can such a proposal be that of the vanquished?

To demand the other party to accept your proposal of a demilitarized zone which involves the withdrawal from an area of more than 12,000 square kilometers, and to refuse to discuss the proposal of a demilitarized zone which may be adjusted on the basis of the 38th Parallel, which is held in common by both sides, is this not the attitude of an outright would-be victor? So long as you do not abandon your arrogant proposal, you will not be able to escape the accusation by the peoples of the world. Though you are no victor, you assume the air of a victor. Precisely by doing so, you have blocked every road leading to the progress of this conference.

You put on an air of false benevolence and pity, and declaim about bloodshed on the battlefield and suffering of the Korean people, alleging that the armistice conference cannot make any progress because we insist on our fair and reasonable proposal. You say that as if you were great humanitarians. In fact, it is simply because you cling to your arrogant and absurd proposal of a military demarcation line that the armistice conference can make no progress, thus prolonging the bloodshed and suffering of the masses of soldiers and of the Korean people. Every day you are carrying out indiscriminate bombing and bombardment in Korea. Who can believe that you will shed tears over this?

I must point out with emphasis once again that so long

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NORTH KOREA:
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as you do not completely abondon your absurd and arrogant proposal of the military demarcation line, it will be impossible for our armistice conference to make any progress.

At the meeting the day before yesterday, you described your proposed demilitarized zone as located "in the general area of the battle line." I have already pointed out that your proposal is in effect demanding us to withdraw our front line from its present position more than 12,000 square kilometers. I pointed out also that in no sense can it be said that your proposed demilitarized zone is located in the general area of the present battle line. Yet you persist in saying so. I can see no other purpose for your doing so other than that of deceiving the peoples of the world. You dare not make known your proposal to the peoples of the world because it is too absurd and too arrogant.

During the meeting the day before yesterday, you stated four times that you were willing at any time to discuss the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone based on the present battle line and current military realities.

Your communique on 10 August declared your "completo willingness to discuss a demilitarized zone located generally in the area of the present battle line." At the same time you also said that you were willing at any time to discuss adjustments of your proposed demilitarized zone but, as a matter of fact, your proposed military demarcation line and demilitarized zone have no relation whatever with the present battle line.

Why,then, do you insist on making these statements? I cannot but consider that it is designed to deceive the

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

peoples of the world, as if your proposal were indeed taking the present battle line as the military demarcation line and, in addition, could be subject to adjustments so as to produce the impression that your proposal was reasonable and flexible.

Yet, in effect, is it not true that your proposal consists of three lines drawn within our positions and hence your so-called adjustments are simply generosity at our expense and your proposal is devoid of any flexibility?

Even more intolerable is the fact that you deliberately assert that we refuse to discuss your proposal of the demilitarized zone which you claim is "based on the general area of the present battle line," so as further to deceive the peoples of the world.

Actually, we have never refused to discuss any of your views or proposals, no matter how absurd of fallacious they were. In fact, we have been discussing every day for all these days your proposal of a military demarcation line, discussing its absurdity and its arrogance. But discussing is one thing and acceptance is another. What you demand is not that we discuss your proposal but that we accept your proposal. But you know that we shall not accept this proposal of yours because it is unreasonable and unfair and is absurd and arrogant.

To assert dogmatically that a proposal of a military demarcation line which is unrelated to the present battle line is a proposal based on the present battle line, to assert dogmatically that a completely inflexible proposal of a demilitarized zone is flexible, and to assert that our refusal to accept your proposal is a refusal to discuss your proposal, all this is a scheme to deceive the world;

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

it is a scheme unworthy of any military man.

At yesterday's meeting I twice put several questions to you. In neither case did I receive a satisfactory answer from you, but I think it is necessary to put again these questions to you in order to make completely clear your stand:

Question 1. In the map you handed to us on 27 July, the military demarcation line is clearly marked as being far above the present battle line, and from 18 to 50 kilometers deep within our positions. Why did you say, in your communique of 10 August, that your proposal took the battle line area as the possible location of the military demarcation line?

Question 2. Clearly, the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone you proposed are located a considerable distance away from the present battle line within our positions. Why did you say that your proposal of a military demarcation line and demilitarized zone was based on the present battle line?

Question 3. What, actually, is your understanding of the relationship between the military demarcation line, the southern boundary of the demilitarized zone, and the present battle line? Why do you frequently confuse the three as the same?

Question 4. You mentioned that you are always at any time willing to discuss a proposal of a military demarcation line and a demilitarized zone based on the present battle line and current military reality. Is this proposal of a military demarcation line and a demilitarized zone the same as the one you have drawn on the map? If not what is this proposal?

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

Question 5. What are really your so-called adjustments Sometimes it was an adjustment to your proposal, and sometimes you say that it was not. What is the object of what you are saying so? It is our opinion that you have a duty to answer clearly and definitely these questions.

Finally, I wish to emphasize again that so long as you insist on your unreasonable and absurd and arrogant proposal of a military demarcation line and a demilitarized zone, no matter how beautifully you clothe it in words, it will be impossible for our conference to make any progress and the responsibility for it rests entirely with your side.

That is all.

1206K
UNITED NATIONS: I request a repetition of your Question 5.

1206K
NORTH KOREA: What are really the adjustment you mean? Sometimes you said it was an adjustment to your proposal and sometimes you said it was not. Where lies the object of your doing so?

1208K
UNITED NATIONS: I want to ask you a question. Is the bottom line on your map your concept of the present battle line or line of contact?

1208K
NORTH KOREA: The line of contact of both sides at present.

1209K
UNITED NATIONS: It is difficult to tell from your statements of yesterday and today which questions are concrete and require an answer and which are not. Whenever you desire any point of our position clarified, we request that you give us the question in writing. We will then consider it. I suggest that all the five questions you have asked today be submitted in writing so we can answer them correctly.

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121OK

NORTH KOREA: Good. We will hand it to you.

(Questions referred to are attached as Enclosure No. 1).

121OK
UNITED NATIONS: Now I wish to take up the question about the meeting of the liaison officers. We will give you an English copy of this statement. In respect to the statement regarding a meeting of the liaison officers, which you provided in writing yesterday, we do not agree with your expression of the problem.

On 12 July, General Ridgway stipulated certain general conditions the acceptance of which was a necessary prerequisite to the return of the United Nations Command delegation to KAESONG.

On 14 July, Generals KIM and PENG accepted these conditions.

On 15 July, the senior delegate of the United Nations Command expressed the United Nations Command proposal on a neutral zone in greater detail. Your senior delegate immediately agreed in principle but desired a recess for consideration of technical questions. After the recess your senior delegate gave his full agreement and expressed the view that the technical details could be handled by the liaison officers.

The liaison officers met on 15 July. During their meeting there was no modification and only one amplification of the terms and provisions which had previously been agreed to by the respective commanders in chief or their delegates to the armistice conference. This amplification had to do with the identification of arms suitable for military police duties as "small arms." "At this meeting your liaison officers expressed their understanding of the provisions which

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

had been agreed upon by the delegates and gave no indication of a desire to establish additional provisions."

Subject to your understanding that the agreements referred to above are basic and unalterable, the United Nations Command delegation concurs in your proposal of yesterday morning that the liaison officers of the two delegations meet to determine whether there is need for more detailed provisions. In this respect I have instructed my liaison officer to bring up the question of reporting and investigating alleged violations of the neutral zone. Past experience has indicated that charges have been made completely unsupported by evidence. Further investigations of alleged violations by the United Nations Command will be made only when the charge itself is supported by factual and conclusive information based on a proper and thorough investigation by the reporting agency.

It is understood that such recommendations as the liaison officers desire to make will be referred to the delegations for their consideration.

I will have my liaison officer transmit to your liaison officer a copy of this statement. Attached will be a complete extract of the three basic documents I have referred to in this statement.

(Documents referred to are attached as Enclosure Nos 2,3,4).

My liaison officers are Colonels Kinney and Murray. They will meet with yours after the meeting is over today.

1225K
NORTH KOREA: There is one thing I want to ask. You mean to refuse the meeting of the liaison officers of both sides to discuss the technical questions pertaining to the agreements reached by the commanders of both sides?

[redacted]

[redacted]

1225K
UNITED NATIONS: We will give this to you in writing. I am afraid you do not understand it, the way it has been said.

1226K
NORTH KOREA: Then we will let our liaison officers meet, and if you give us a copy in writing we will have it.

1226K
UNITED NATIONS: Today is our 12th meeting on agenda item 2. There can be no progress on this agenda item until you abandon your inflexible and unrealistic stand on your proposed demilitarized zone. We have made it quite clear that we will neither discuss nor be responsive to your original proposal. We will however, discuss any proposal designed to further the progress of these meetings.

You again objected to our proposal of a demilitarized zone based on our analysis of the overall military situation. We, therefore, suggest that you place your concept of a demilitarized zone based on the battle line on a map for purposes of discussion.

If you are not ready for the aforementioned reasonable procedure, it is suggested that we drop item 2 temporarily. We can then go to either item 3 or 4 or both. By so doing we would expedite the armistice arrangements.

It is obvious that to take positive action on at least one of these two suggestions is the only possible solution to our present problem.

I await your answer.

We will study your map and your five questions in detail.

I propose we recess until 1100 hours our time tomorrow.

1236K
NORTH KOREA: As I mentioned already, the basic problem of our conference is the second item. So, as I have mentioned already, it is

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

impossible to go over to discussion and agreement of the other questions without discussing and reaching agreement on item 2. Our stand that the 38th Parallel be made the military demarcation line is unchangeable.

You asked to have our questions in writing. We will let you have them through our liaison officers.

We agree to your proposal of recessing till tomorrow morning, 1100 hours your time and 1000 hours our time.

Recessed at 1238 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H.M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED BY:

R.M. MOESON,
Major, USMCR.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

U.N. translation of Communist questions submitted in Korean on 12 August 1951:

"In yesterday's meeting I twice presented several questions to you, and both times I failed to receive satisfactory answers. However, in order to know your stand clearly, I feel the necessity of again asking several questions of you.

"No. 1. Although the lines drawn on the map you gave to us are obviously in front of the present battle line and in a position 18 to 50 kilometer inside our lines, for what reason did you, in your communique of 10 August state that your proposal made the battle line area the possible position of the military demarcation line?

"No. 2. Despite the fact that your proposal concerning the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone is very far from the present battle line inside our positions, why do you say that your proposal concerning the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone are based on the present battle line?

"No. 3. How do you understand the relationship between the three things - the military demarcation line, the southern boundary of the demilitarized zone and the present battle line, and what do you think the relationship should be? Why do you confuse the three so extremely?

"No. 4. Is the proposal concerning the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone based on the present battle line and the current military situation which you have said you are prepared to discuss mean the proposal you drew on the map? If not, is it another one? If it is another proposal, what is it?

"No. 5. Exactly what are the so-called adjustments which you speak of? Sometimes you say they are adjustments of the proposal you made and sometimes you speak as though they are not. What is really your object in doing it this way?

"We think that you have the responsibility of answering these several questions clearly."

[redacted]

Enclosure (1)



[redacted]

Extract from general conditions stipulated by General Ridgway on 12 July 1951:

"The assurances which I require are simple and few. They include as primary pre-requisites the establishment of an agreed conference area, of suitable extent, completely free of armed personnel of either side. Each delegation must have complete reciprocity of treatment to include complete and equal freedom of movement to, from and within the agreed conference area, and complete and equal freedom at all times in the selection of the personnel in its delegation party to include representatives of the press.

"I therefore now propose that a circular area with its center at approximately the center of Kaesong, and with a five-mile radius, be agreed upon as a neutral zone. The eastern limit of the neutral zone shall be the present point of contact of our forces at Pan Mun Jom. I propose that we both agree to refrain from hostile acts of any kind within this zone during the entire period of our conferences. I propose that we agree that the area of the conference site and the road leading thereto used by personnel of both delegations parties be completely free of armed personnel.

"I further propose that we both agree that the total personnel of each delegation within the neutral area at any time be limited to a maximum of 150. I propose that we agree that the composition of each delegation party within the foregoing limit be subject solely to the determination of its commander. It is understood that personnel to be admitted to the actual conference chamber shall be limited to those agreed upon by your representatives and mine."

[redacted]

Enclosure (2)

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[redacted]

Reply accepting conditions stipulated in enclosure (2):

"General Ridgway:

"We have received the proposition dated 13 July and have agreed to make Kaesong the neutral zone as you have proposed. By adjusting some of the misunderstandings, we agree to continue with the armistice negotiations. We propose to have the delegates from both sides settle such problems as the establishment of liaison officials and liaison machinery at this next conference. We believe that the problem of the presence of news reporters which is now hindering the continuance of armistice negotiations has no bearing to the establishment of a neutral zone.

"The liaison officials of 8 July had no authorization to discuss the establishment of a neutral zone. Furthermore the problem of the presence of news reporters is only a minor one and this cannot be the sole reason for the discontinuance of the conference. We believe that it was improper to have news reporters of many nations present at the conference while the agenda had not been decided upon.

"We support the basic principle of carrying on negotiations by mutual agreement. We feel that it was improper to have correspondents report only one side of the news while the conference had not reached the negotiation stage. However, we accept your proposal to send twenty reporters with your delegation and have already issued the necessary instructions to that effect."

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Extract from Transcript of Proceedings of 15 July 1951:

UNITED NATIONS:

"I regret that we are a few minutes late for the meeting. The delegates of the United Nations Command notes your recognition of the basic principles of reciprocity of treatment for these meetings and is now prepared to proceed with the details of the neutral zone which must be determined by the delegations. The other details can be arranged by our liaison officer. It is understood that the size of each delegation's party will not exceed 150 persons.

"This is our proposal concerning the details of the neutral zone:

a. Limits: A rough circular area having a radius of approximately 5 miles centered on the traffic circle in Kaesong. The east circumference of the circle shall extend to include Pan Mun Jom.

b. Both sides have undertaken during the period of negotiations to refrain from acts of armed force within the limits of the neutral zone.

c. It is our understanding that all major combat formations are removed from the neutral zone and that only the minimum number of troops required to perform military police functions are maintained therein. The arms carried by these troops shall be limited to those which are appropriate for this function.

"The area of the conference:

a. This area is defined by a circle having a radius of approximately 1/2 mile centered on the house in which the conference is held.

b. All armed personnel shall be removed from the conference area. The minimum number of unarmed guards desired to perform the necessary military police function within this area shall be provided by your side.

"Road leading to the conference area:

a. The agreed route between Pan Mun Jom and the conference area shall be opened to unrestricted use by vehicles of the United Nations Command during the hours of daylight. No notice shall be given for such use and such road shall be free of armed personnel.

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"Settlement of additional details:

Insofar as practical any details which develop in the implementation of these provisions shall be settled by the liaison officers. The United Nations Command Delegation is prepared to resume the conference when notified by the senior delegate that the foregoing conditions obtain. This afternoon we were delayed a few minutes by your outpost sentries who did not permit the passage of two jeeps in advance of the main convoy. We expect this will not happen again. I was in one of the advance jeeps. The sentries insisted that we wait until the main convoy catch up with us."

[redacted]

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Enclosure (5) Photo reproduction of map submitted by Communist Delegation and referred to on Page 3, Appendix to Conf No.25 of Transcript of Proceedings for 12 August 1951.





NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

13 August 1951

Subj: RECORD OF EVENTS, Twenty-third Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

1103K: Reconvened. NK asks for answers to its five questions of previous day.

1104K: UNC gives answers, points out that only 30 of the 234 kilometers comprising present battle line are below 38th Parallel, reiterates logic of its desire to discuss a line based on present military realities, invites NK to propose adjustments in UNC proposed line.

1145K: NK asks if UNC doesn't see that present battle line is result of "cooperative action of your ground, air, and naval forces," asks if UNC has a further proposal than the one drawn on its map.

1152K: UNC offers to read its answer again.

1153K: NK asks if UNC's answer to NK question No. 4 is the same as proposed on UNC's map.

1156K: UNC says it will give NK copy of its answer in English.

1158K: NK says "we haven't received any direct answer" to question No. 4.

1200K: UNC agrees to study question again, answer question in clearer light.

1203K: NK reiterates its stand for 38th Parallel, labels UNC proposal "arrogant and absurd," claims UNC's refusal to discuss 38th is "placing one more great obstacle on the road leading to our agreement," wants UNC to "abandon completely" its proposal so "the sanguinary conflict in Korea can be halted."

1211K: UNC hands NK a map showing each side's concept of present line of contact, noting that two lines do not coincide; UNC notes lack of progress on Item 2, again suggests skipping to Items 3 or 4.

1220K: NK says it's already given "clear answer" on going to other items, criticizes UNC "because you stick to your very unreasonable proposal and refuse to discuss our fair and reasonable proposal."

1224K: Recessed.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

13 August 1951

Subj: TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Twenty-third Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

Delegates Present:

United Nations	Communists
VADM C T Joy USN Sr. Delegate	GEN Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes USA	MGEN Hsieh Fang CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

Reconvened at 1103 hours.

NORTH KOREA: I am ready to hear your answers to the five questions I presented yesterday in writing.

1104K
UNITED NATIONS: Your first question indicated your desire to know why it was stated in a 10 August communique that the United Nations Command proposal was based on the battle line area when obviously the military demarcation line in the proposal was actually inside your lines. The statement in the communique is correct. The communique did not say the possible military demarcation line coincided with the battle line. It said the possible military demarcation line is in the area of the battle line. This distinction is clear enough. Your statement that it is within your lines is also correct.

Your second question asked for almost the identical information. It stated that though we propose a military demarcation line and a demilitarized zone north of the battle line and inside your territory, we continue to state it is based on the present battle line.

In the third question you seek further clarification

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UNITED NATIONS:
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on what you term to be our confused use of the terms, "military demarcation line," "southern boundary of the demilitarized zone," and "the battle line."

The second and third questions are so closely related that it would require considerable repetition to answer each one separately. Rather than take the time of the delegates with such unnecessary repetition, I will answer the two questions in one response.

In your second and third questions you have quoted only portions of our statements. Whenever you use the phrase, "based on the battle line area" or "based on the present battle line" you have failed to quote the entire phrase. This phrase properly reads as follows: "Based on the present battle positions and the overall military situation" or "Based on the current battle positions and present military realities."

It has been our constant effort to make certain that the military realities of the overall military situation are properly reflected in the location of the demilitarized zone that may eventually be delineated by agreement at the conference. The records are replete with sound, logical and factual arguments which develop fully the relationship between current military realities and the demilitarized zone. These arguments take cognizance of air and naval operations which are independent of the position of the ground battle line.

All three questions are related to the present ground battle positions. Therefore, let us examine the current military situation as it concerns the present line of ground contact. We find it extends for 234 kilometers across Korea. It crosses the 38th Parallel

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UNITED NATIONS:
(Cont'd)

near Nulmon-ni. The greater portion of this line, 204 kilometers to be exact, lies north of the 38th Parallel. Only 30 kilometers of the line of ground contact lies south of the 38th Parallel. The greater portion of the current line of ground contact and, therefore, the present battle positions lie actually well north of the 38th Parallel. In fact, at several places it is more than 50 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel.

We have never attempted to disguise the fact that the military demarcation line of our proposed demilitarized zone lies north of the present ground battle positions. In fact, most of our basic arguments, which appear again and again in the records of this conference, show clearly why it is logical that this military demarcation line be to the north of the present ground battle positions.

On 11 August I presented to you in considerable detail the reasoning used by the United Nations Command Delegation in arriving at a demilitarized zone north of the present battle positions. As you will recall, our argument was related to the increasing capabilities of your numerically greater ground forces resulting from the cessation of air and naval activities during a period of armistice. We used this fact to indicate the heightened requirement placed on the United Nations Command for adequate security of its ground forces.

We concluded these arguments with the following statement; "It is precisely for these stated reasons that the United Nations Command Delegation has consistently held that the military realities which govern the present situation justify improvement in the defen-

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

sive positions of our ground forces as a proper adjustment for the withdrawal of our air and naval forces."

In simple terms, we took the present ground battle positions as the starting point. We then adjusted the demilitarized zone and its resulting military demarcation line northward to ensure adequate depth to our defensive positions. It is only a fair and proper adjustment to balance the advantages gained by you during the armistice, due to the withdrawal of the United Nations Command air and naval forces.

I trust that the preceding remarks have clarified for you the relationship between the present ground battle line, the military demarcation line, and the southern boundary of the demilitarized zone.

The proposed zone submitted on 27 July was given to you for the purpose of providing a clear and concise understanding of our concept of a demilitarized zone reflecting the current military realities. We have repeatedly stated that we were willing to discuss this proposal jointly on a map with a view to making such adjustments as would be acceptable to both parties.

Your fourth question asked whether the proposed military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone we desired to discuss on a map, was the zone we had already proposed or another proposal which we had not as yet submitted.

The United Nations Command Delegation stands ready to discuss any demilitarized zone based upon the current battle line and the overall military situation. The proposal we have offered represents our best evaluation of the several factors which logically enter into deter-

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

mination of the location of the military demarcation line. We concede that adjustments might be made so that the resulting line and zone would be satisfactory to your side as well as ours. We would listen attentively to any views you may care to present on a demarcation line based on the battle line and existing military situation. Have you any adjustments to propose?

Your question number 5 is in two parts.

a. The first part reads, "After all, what are the so-called adjustments which you speak of?"

We will be receptive to proposed adjustments including changing the proposed demarcation line, changing the boundaries of the demilitarized zone, and altering the width of the zone. We are prepared to consider any proposed adjustments whatsoever which are based on military logic.

b. The second part of your 5th question reads, "What is really your object?"

If I understand your question correctly, the answer is simple and clear-cut. First, it is to channel the discussion into the general battle area. Second, it is to restrict discussion to military realities. Third, it is to show that we have a mind open to logical, reasonable, realistic and purely military views and discussion. We are prepared to consider any proposed adjustments whatsoever which are based on military logic.

I trust that what I have said answers your questions submitted to the United Nations Command Delegation yesterday.

That is all.

[redacted]

[redacted]

1145K
NORTH KOREA: I have duly noted your answer. There are some points which I don't understand, so I have something further to ask. Don't you see that the present battle line you maintain is the result of the cooperative action of your ground, air, and naval forces?

1145K
UNITED NATIONS: Is that all? Your question has been noted. Give it to us in writing so that we can duly consider it.

1147K
NORTH KOREA: Our yesterday's question No. 4 says, "The proposal you discussed repeatedly refers to the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone based upon the present battle line and the present military situation."

Does it mean that that is the proposal that you have drawn on your map, or, if not, is it anything else? If it is something else than that, then what kind of proposal is it? That is our question and we would like to have a further explanation of it.

1152K
UNITED NATIONS: I don't know how we can answer it any clearer than we did but I will read it again.

1153K
NORTH KOREA: I will say what I want to know.

Is it the proposal you have shown on your map or is it something else? I want to hear a clear answer on that, and I have not heard it. If there anything else, and if it is something else, what is that proposal?

I will read it word by word.

Question 4: "You mentioned that you are at any time always willing to discuss a military demarcation line and demilitarized zone. Is this proposal of a military demarcation line and a demilitarized zone the same as the one you have drawn on the map? If not,

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) what is this proposal?"

1156K
UNITED NATIONS: We will give you a copy of this in English. I suggest that you study our answers this morning. I believe they will answer your questions. (Pause) We understand your question.

1158K
NORTH KOREA: Of course we have duly noted your answer.

As for question No. 4, we haven't received any direct answer. Though we should study your statement in writing, still we would not be able to find any direct answer.

1200K
UNITED NATIONS: We will study your question again and see if we can present it to you in a clearer light, since you evidently do not understand our answer.

1201K
NORTH KOREA: Do you really understand what I request, or shall I repeat my question again?

1201K
UNITED NATIONS: We understand.

1202K
NORTH KOREA: Have you anything more to say?

1202K
UNITED NATIONS: No.

1203K
NORTH KOREA: Since the first day of the conference we have raised and upheld the proposal of making the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line because this proposal reflects the military realities and is reasonable and fair to both sides and at the same time favorable to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

On the other hand, you have raised and clung to the arrogant and absurd proposal based upon untenable arguments so that the road leading to attainment of an

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

agreement by our negotiations is blocked. Moreover, you have declared during the past few days that you would refuse to discuss our correct proposal, thus placing one more great obstacle on the road leading to our agreement.

I have repeatedly pointed out yesterday and the day before that your proposal is not only arrogant and absurd, but also full of self-contradiction. Therefore I raised five questions to which I requested you to give clear and concrete answers directly. However, up to now, you have not given me a satisfactory answer.

I must point out that our proposal of making the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line is unshakeable, because it is fair, reasonable and unshakeable and therefore should be discussed and accepted.

As long as you do not abandon completely your arrogant and absurd proposal, it will not be possible for our conference to make any progress.

I hope you will seriously reconsider your position so that an agreement may be reached in our conference and the sanguinary conflict in Korea may be halted.

1210K
UNITED NATIONS: Is that all you have to say?

1210K
NORTH KOREA: That is all. I would like to hear anything you have to say.

1211K
UNITED NATIONS: Yesterday you handed us a map on which you outlined your concept of the present line of ground contact.

Today I will hand to you a map showing our concept of the present line of ground contact. For purposes of comparison I have also reproduced on this same map your concept of the line of contact given us yesterday.

You will note that the two lines do not coincide.

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UNITED NATIONS:
(Cont'd)

We wish to call attention to the differences of opinion of the location of the line of contact particularly in the center, and on the flanks. However, in spite of this difference of opinion the two delegations do have a reasonably limited zone of contact for consideration.

We will give this map to your liaison officer.

Again we have asked you for a proposal for a demilitarized zone based on the ground battle line and the overall military situation. So far you have been unresponsive to this request.

We have suggested discussion of adjustments of our zone. We have given you examples of points that might be discussed in connection with our proposed zone. You have remained silent on this score also.

We are making little, if any, progress on Item 2. I again suggest that we proceed to either Items 3 or 4 with a view of returning to Item 2 later.

Again I repeat we are always willing at any time to discuss a demarcation line and a demilitarized zone based on the battle line and current military realities.

We will not be responsive in any way to your unrealistic and totally unacceptable proposal.

If you have no further proposal, I suggest that we recess until tomorrow at the same time.

1220K
NORTH KOREA:

As to the question of leaving Item 2 for the time being and going over to the 3rd or 4th Item, I have given you a clear answer and I have no further answer.

Having heard your answer to my five questions which we presented yesterday, I understand the true nature of

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

your proposal - - I clearly understand the true nature of your proposal. This is the basic reason why we could not make any progress, after more than ten days discussion of Item 2. That is because you stick to your very unreasonable proposal and refuse to discuss our fair and reasonable proposal. In order to change such a standstill, you should change your very unreasonable proposal and should seriously consider our proposal.

If you have any new proposal, we are willing to hear it and discuss it.

We agree to your proposal of recess.

Recessed at 1224 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED BY:

E. C. Thomas

E. C. THOMAS
Major, USMCR

[redacted]

000407

CONFIDENTIAL

22

PYÖNGYANG (Heijo)

KYONGSONG (Keijo)

INCH'ON (Jinsen)

Haeju (Kaishū)

Wönsan (Gensan)

Kaesŏng

Ch'unggang-ni

Kyomip'o

Chinnamp'o

Sariwŏn

Songhwa

Haeju



NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

14 August 1951.

Subj: RECORD OF EVENTS, Twenty-fourth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

1101K: Reconvened. NK talks about 38th Parallel for 79 minutes, reiterating all his previous arguments, charges UNC's refusal to accept it as being responsible for conference deadlock.

1220K: UNC replies for 68 minutes, citing chapter and verse to prove NK blocks conference by refusing to consider UNC's proposals, charges: "By negotiations you seek to regain what you have lost through resort to arms."

1334K: NK cites UNC's "shameless attitude to dare to call us the aggressor," claims NK will "patiently and sincerely try" to negotiate armistice.

1334K: UNC points out that 24th session has produced no progress, proposes recess until next day.

1344K: NK agrees to recess.

1345K: Recess.

[redacted]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

14 August 1951.

Subj: TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Twenty-fourth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

Delegates Present:

United Nations	Communists
VADM C T Joy USN Sr. Delegate	GEN Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes USA	MGEN Hsieh Fang CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

Reconvened at 1101 hours.

NORTH KOREA: I want to make a statement.

Yesterday I heard your reply to my five questions and pointed out immediately that your reply further confirmed our consistent view. That means the reason why this conference cannot make progress is because your side has insisted upon your arrogant and absurd proposal and refused to discuss our fair and reasonable proposal of making the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line.

Therefore, the entire responsibility for the standstill of the conference rests wholly with your side. If you really have the sincerity to stop the sanguinary conflict in Korea and break the present deadlock in our discussions, you should first of all completely abandon your arrogant and absurd proposal and earnestly and seriously consider and accept our fair and reasonable proposal of making the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line.

I have made a careful and sober study of your reply to my five questions. I cannot but say I am surprised

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

at the fact that after I have so thoroughly refuted the basis of your proposal you yet cling so perversely to your arrogant and absurd proposal.

Regarding the theoretical basis of your proposal, I have made enough comments. However, for the sake of reaching an agreement through mutual debate, I shall set out once more with patience the total absurdity and utter arrogance of the arguments supporting your proposal. You claim that your arguments are sound, logical and realistic. In fact, the characteristics of the arguments supporting your proposal are exactly to the contrary. They are unsoumd, illogical and arrogant.

On what grounds can you say that the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment of your air and naval forces are a military superiority? On what grounds can you say that this so-called superiority of air and naval forces is an independent factor, capable of deciding the outcome of a war? On what grounds can you say that this so-called independent superiority of air and naval forces must be compensated for on the ground in the armistice?

Your aircraft and warships are indeed brutal, but the numerous killings of peaceful civilians and the numerous ruins of peaceful cities and villages, all under the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment of your air and naval forces, are loud protests against you. This indiscriminate bombing and bombardment is no military superiority at all.

The conscience of 20th century mankind does not permit recognition of your indiscriminate bombing and bombardment as a military superiority. Every self-respecting man is ashamed of recognizing, and would be even more

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

ashamed of boasting of, indiscriminate bombing and bombardment as superiority of air and naval forces. Yet you claim barbarism to be bravery, brutality to be strength, and an indiscriminate bombing and bombardment as a military superiority.

Let us assume it to be a military superiority. Still how can you say it is an independent factor which can decide the outcome of a war? In order to expose your error, I have cited the words of the United States Secretary of Defense Marshall to prove that the argument you presented at this conference is not only illogical, but even contradictory to the view of General Marshall.

I have done this to make you understand that the air and naval forces are only complementary arms which cannot decide the outcome of a war, and that it is the army alone which can decide the outcome of a war. The main role of the air and naval forces is to cover and support the fighting of the ground forces. This point has, in fact, long been accepted as correct by the candid military theoreticians of the world.

You have emphasized the independent position of the air and naval forces, not for any theoretical purpose, but for a practical purpose, that is to slice off a piece of territory of more than 12,000 square kilometers from within our positions, as a compensation for the cessation of hostile acts by your air and naval forces.

We have repeatedly pointed out that without the support of the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces, your ground forces would have long ago been driven out of the Korean peninsula by our powerful and battle-skilled ground forces.

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

It is only with this kind of support by your air and naval forces that your ground forces are barely, temporarily and unstably maintaining their present positions against the pressure of our powerful and battle-skilled army. In other words, the present positions held barely and temporarily by your ground forces are in themselves a concentrated reflection embodying the importance of the superiority of your air and naval forces in indiscriminate bombing and bombardment.

Thus, there can neither be the question of the independent superiority of air and naval forces, nor the question of its compensation on the ground in the armistice. This is so evident that even a Reuters correspondent cannot but ridicule your absurd demand by saying that it is without precedent in history that air and naval superiority should be compensated for on the ground.

It is possible that you yourselves are not aware of the complete unreasonableness of your demand. Yet you insist upon such a demand. I can therefore draw only one conclusion; that is, that you have knowingly fabricated a theory in which you yourselves do not believe to disguise your predatory demand on our territory.

I tell you in all sobriety, there was indeed a time when a kingdom in the east could be seized simply by the setting of a few cannons on the sea coast, and now you intend to attain a similar aim by a slightly modified method, but it must be realized that those days are gone forever.

As you are unable to prove the correctness of the theory that the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces are an independent power capable of deciding the outcome of a war, and hence should be com-

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

pensated for on the ground in the armistice, on what grounds can you suggest that the military demarcation line and even the southern boundary of the demilitarized zone should be pushed into our positions?

Your arguments are unsound, illogical and arrogant. Yet you assert that they are sound, logical and realistic. You are indeed masters in confusing black and white, in reversing right and wrong.

Again you say that it is only by pushing the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone completely into our positions that adequate depth to your defensive positions can be ensured, and that the mightiness of our ground forces, though you only admit their numerical superiority, compels us to strengthen your present defensive position to guarantee the security of your ground forces.

Your argument I have refuted more than once, but I have never heard your reply. I am not going to repeat all my reasonings at present. I will only put to you one question.

You say that because your air and naval forces are strong, therefore they must be compensated for in the armistice by pushing the military demarcation line into our positions. That is to say,you need compensation because your air and naval forces are strong. Yet you say again, because our ground forces are numerically greater, the security of your troops cannot be guaranteed without defensive positions in adequate depth within our positions This is to say you also need compensation because your army is weak.

In other words, whether you are strong or weak, you

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

must receive compensation in either case. Do you not find such a logic ridiculous? It is not only ridiculous, it is downright dogmatism.

Since both the so-called main arguments supporting your proposal are untenable, on what grounds can you still insist on this proposal? In fact, so long as you still insist on this proposal, it is an indication that you are insisting on being dogmatic and refusing to settle the question through reasoning and negotiation.

But in order to cover up the absurdity and arrogance of your concrete proposal, in order to deceive the good people of the whole world, you asserted that the military demarcation line you proposed was located in the general area of the present battle line, that your proposal could be adjusted at any time, and that you are willing to discuss any military demarcation line based on the present battle line under the military situation.

Those who do not know the facts may indeed be deceived, but your attempt has failed. You asserted that the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone you proposed were deep in our positions, but were still within the general area of the present battle line.

According to such reasoning of yours, if we were to propose a military demarcation line south of the Han river. it would also be in the general area of the present battle line. But we are not those who would do such a dishonest thing.

Actually, the purpose of your deliberate emphasis that the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone you propose are within the area of the present battle line, is to deceive the people of the world, including the

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

American people and the masses of soldiers on the battle front. Does not the fact that your various communiques failed to disclose that your proposed demarcation line and demilitarized zone are deep within our positions clearly demonstrate this point?

You asserted that your military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone could be adjusted at any time, and even invited us to propose adjustments to your absurd proposal. Do you really think that we are so interested in this absurd proposal of yours? Your proposed military demarcation line and the southern boundary of your propose demilitarized zone are all within our positions. What do you think would be the meaning of proposing adjustments to your proposal? It could have no other meaning than recognizing first that it basically right to have the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone within our positions as they are in your proposal.

An adjustment is a slight alteration. If the demilitarized zone were to be carved out of our positions, admustments could only mean whether there would be greater or smaller carving.

I can frankly tell you that this proposal of yours is completely absurd, arrogant and intolerable.

The question today is not for me to propose any adjustment. It is for you to abandon wholly your absurd and arrogant proposal.

You asserted that you were ready always at any time to discuss any proposal of a military demarcation line based on the present battle line and the present military situation. You have repeatedly and openly emphasized this point as if your mind were actually "open to logical,

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

reasonable, realistic and purely military views and discussion". That is to say that only you have come here really to negotiate.

But what is the fact? Your mind has not been open at all to fair and reasonable military views and discussions. You have not come here to negotiate with us. You have come here to ask us to surrender.

Ever since our discussion of the second item of the agenda, we have been discussing the military realities of the present battle front, so as to fix a fair and reasonable military line. Our discussion has fully proved that what you mean by the military realities you maintain should be the basis of the military demarcation line, is none other than your utterly absurd theory that your so-called superiority in naval and air forces should be compensated on the ground during the armistice, and the resulting arrogant proposal that the military demarcation line must be pushed into our positions.

On the other hand, you have refused to consider our objective evaluation of the military realities. Thus, no matter how you repeat that you are willing to consider any proposal of the military demarcation line which is based on the present battle line and the military realities, the only proposal you are willing to consider is your absurd and arrogant proposal with certain adjustments of pushing the military demarcation line into our positions.

Your reply yesterday to my five questions once more verified this judgment of mine. You asserted dogmatically that the absurd and arrogant military demarcation line you proposed was within the present battle line area and stated openly that you were willing to consider adjustments of

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

this proposal and were ready always at any time to discuss any proposal of a military demarcation line based on the present battle line and the military realities.

The purpose of your doing so is to give people the impression that you have come here to negotiate and not to dictate, but what actually is the practical meaning of such abstract words of yours? It is simply that we must accept completely your plan of a demilitarized zone which requires that our front line be withdrawn for more than 12,000 square kilometers. Of course, your plan can be adjusted, but what is meant by adjustments is that you may consent to ask for less and not insist on that much.

The only kind of negotiating which you are willing to carry out is that of negotiating how much territory we should give you for nothing. I would like to ask if this kind of negotiating is not asking us to surrender to you, what is it? But you must know that you did not win the war. You are not victors. We want peace but we have not come here to surrender to you.

If you really admit this and if you really have good faith in the negotiation of an armistice, you should then honestly and completely abandon your absurd and arrogant proposal of the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone and at the same time seriously consider our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line, which is really based on military realities.

I must first of all repudiate your unreasonable attitude of refusing to discuss our proposal by such abusive statements as that the 38th Parallel is a political demarcation line, that its purpose is to subdivide Korea.

During the past month I have patiently and repeatedly ex-

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NO[redacted]KOREA:
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plained that the 38th Parallel which we propose to be the military demarcation line is merely a military demarcation line which separates the armed forces of both sides during the armistice; it is not a political demarcation line which divides Korea.

You know that we have always advocated democratic unification of Korea but in spite of our repeated declaration you are still making such completely groundless slander that we attempt to divide Korea through the armistice. The practical purpose of your saying so is to attempt to find an excuse for refusing to discuss our fair and reasonable proposal of a military demarcation line by using such an irresponsible, malicious and abusive statement.

Not long ago you even stated arrogantly that you would not be responsive to our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line. Such an attitude is completely irresponsible. If you really have good faith in the negotiation of an armistice you should first abandon such an attitude.

As I repeatedly explained, the reason why we have proposed making the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line is because first of all this proposal is based on the present battle line and the military realities. If your statement that you are willing to discuss any proposal of a military demarcation line based on the present battle line and the military realities, is not merely empty words, you should first abandon the rude and arrogant attitude of ignoring our proposal, and consider earnestly and seriously and accept our proposal of making the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line.

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

We stand firmly for making the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line because it reflects the military realities and is hence fair and reasonable. We oppose resolutely your proposal of pushing the military demarcation line completely into our positions because it is absurd, arrogant and intolerable.

If you have sincerity for negotiating an armistice, if you are willing to break the present deadlock in the discussion, you should take back your absurd and arrogant proposal. So long as you cling to this proposal of yours and refuse to discuss our proposal, it will be impossible to break the deadlock in the conference and the responsibility for bringing the deadlock and its unfavorable consequences rests solely with your side.

That is all.

1220K
UNITED NATIONS: Yesterday and again today you made a statement which will rank high among distortions. It will surely rank without peer, however, among assertions totally without foundation. You cannot fail to realize that the record of these conferences leaves no shadow of a doubt as to your responsibility for blocking progress toward an armistice. Even the most casual examination of the record reveals at least that much about your performance here. Therefore, it was a huge distortion that you uttered when you falsely, and for propaganda purposes, charged the United Nations Command with delaying progress toward an armistice.

However, the United Nations Command admits it has delayed the progress of your proposal for a political division of Korea. The United Nations Command admits it has delayed the progress of your proposal to put our

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

forces in an indefensible position. The United Nations Command admits it has delayed the progress of your proposal to ignore the military facts of our air and naval effectiveness.

In turn the United Nations Command Delegation notes the following concerning the delaying actions of your delegation. You have proposed a political division of Korea as a demarcation line. You have refused to propose a demarcation line based on the battle line and current military realities. You have refused to propose adjustments in the solution offered by the United Nations Command Delegation so as to render this basically equitable proposal acceptable to both sides in detail. You have refused to discuss Items 3 or 4 of the agenda, though you yourself state the conference is deadlocked on Item 2. These are facts, and you know them to be facts.

The suggestion for armistice talks in Korea was made on 23 June. For nearly a month prior to that time the military situation had given indications of the stability which has characterized it since that date. In responding to the invitation to initiate military armistice talks, the United Nations Command anticipated that both delegations would confine their proposals to military matters and that the armistice would be based upon the current military situation. The United Nations Command Delegation has adhered to that course. It has become clear, however, that your aims and your objectives with respect to these talks are very different from ours.

The proposals you brought with you to the first session of the conference bore little relationship to

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

the military situation or to military realities. You proposed that the United Nations Command withdraw its air and naval attacks from that portion of Korea under your control. You had no corresponding military capability to withdraw.

You proposed that the United Nations Command troops withdraw an average distance of 36.6 kilometers from the positions they held. At the same time you proposed that your forces be permitted to advance an average of 16.6 kilometers from the line of contact.

To try to justify this you offered the United Nations Command certain land areas of no military value to the westward of the battle position in exchange for the United Nations Command surrendering highly defensible terrain within the battle zone. In further attempts to mask the facts, you sought to negotiate on the basis of a military situation which had not existed for many weeks.

As a final affront to reality you proposed the establishment of a demilitarized zone in an area which was notable for only one feature, the fact that it would require the United Nations Command to vacate the only satisfactory defensive position available to it north of the Han river.

Your proposals disregarded entirely the realities of the military situation. They were so ambitious, so arrogant and so aggressive as to be almost ludicrous. Yet, you have adhered to these initial demands without deviation for 23 conference sessions. In your supporting arguments you proclaim that your proposals are logical. They are logical, if your purpose is the

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

political division of Korea.

The position to which you adhere so rigidly is political, not military. The essence of the supporting arguments is political, not military. Your plans to conquer and destroy the Republic of Korea by force of arms have been thwarted on the field of battle by the resolute action of many nations. Consequently, you have found it expedient to shift your efforts from military action to the conference table. Your basic design remains unchanged; you have merely altered some of the details to meet the existing circumstances.

Having failed to conquer Korea by force of arms, you have decided to be satisfied for the present with a lesser objective. Your interim objective is the restoration of the unnatural partition of Korea. You seek to do this as part of a military armistice, by reestablishing the pre-war political boundary under the guise of a military demarcation line. By negotiations you seek to regain what you have lost through resort to arms.

The United Nations Command will not acquiesce in your program to restore the pre-war boundary. It will not accede to your proposal by means of which you seek to push the military demarcation line far south of the current line of contact and deep into our positions. The United Nations Command will not give up in armistice negotiations the military advantages which accrued to it as a result of military action. It is prepared now, as it was when it entered these negotiations, to discuss and agree upon an armistice based on the current military situation and military realities.

Already this morning you have stated your illogical

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

and preconceived views concerning the questions you asked us yesterday. You arrogantly stated your views without even waiting and considering our replies. However, I will give you our answers to your questions.

I will now answer the initial question which you asked yesterday. It was: "Do you not see that the battle line (the line of contact between both sides) which you have at present is the result of the combined actions of your land, sea and air forces?"

The answer is no. We do not see it that way.

The present location of the front line of the United Nations Command ground forces is, as we have previously stated, the result of the action of our ground forces combined, however, with only a portion of our air and naval operations.

The remainder of our air and naval effort has been devoted to military tasks which have only an indirect or long delayed effect on the position of the ground battle line. I refer particularly to the aerial bombardment directed against vital military industries, against training areas and training establishments in the rear areas and against communications and transportation centers and lines.

One important purpose of these attacks in your extreme rear areas, quite apart from the effect on your military industries, is to disrupt your national economy. This is accomplished by the destruction of your industrial capacity and your communications and transportation systems, thereby reducing your ability to effectively wage war.

You have stated several times your apparent conviction that the location of the present battle line is the

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

result of the combined actions of all the United Nations ground, air and naval forces. Based on this conviction, you refuse to consider or discuss a military demarcation line which would require you to withdraw some of your forces north of their present positions.

You choose to ignore completely a fundamental military concept concerning a most important objective of military forces in the field of battle. That objective is the destruction of the opposing military forces. The acquisition of real estate is secondary to this objective. You are well aware of the many times we have given up ground in the course of battle only to regain it again after destroying the force which constituted your assaulting echelons.

We have fought, and we continue to fight, a war in which attrition of the opposing force is our primary objective. You are a military man and I am sure you understand this tactical concept. You are also in a position to appreciate its effectiveness. Recently we have taken a strong defensive posture in order to give full play to our capability for independent air and naval action.

Today the location of the battle positions is largely of the United Nations' choosing. You face this position with large bodies of troops which you must supply over long lines of communications. Your rail and highway systems are continuously under United Nations air attack and the United Nations naval forces deny you the use of the sea and interdict your land routes along the coasts. Your personnel, supplies and equipment are subject to destruction enroute to your

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UNITED NATIONS:
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front lines. You must maintain elaborate anti-aircraft defenses at your supply centers and you are forced to immobilize large bodies of troops in your rear areas because of the ever-present threat of amphibious landings or air-borne assaults by the United Nations forces.

All these results of our independent air and naval capability are costly to you in terms of men and material destroyed or employed in areas far from the battle line. All of this is going on while the battle line is relatively stable.

Yet, you maintain over and over again that the location of the battle line represents the sum total of the results of our combined ground, air and naval action. Surely, it must now be evident that the position of the battle line does not reflect the total effect of our air and naval strength.

We are prosecuting a war behind your front lines which is not duplicated behind our lines. As soon as the armistice becomes effective you will acquire a degree of freedom of movement now denied to you.

During the period of the armistice the forces on your side of the demilitarized zone will become capable of more formidable action than they could now take. Recognizing your increased capability, the United Nations Command must, during the period of the armistice, ensure that its ground positions are adequate to balance the advantage you gain by the withdrawal of our air and naval forces. As you well know, these advantages would take several weeks or even months to nullify once your rear areas have been rehabilitated.

All the things I have mentioned are clearly evident

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[redacted]n whose lives have been devoted to military matters. Your insistence on ignoring these facts is absurd. It is a feeble and unworthy attempt to seize on any conceivable pretext for escaping from military realities into tortured and devious reasoning. By this method you have attempted to justify an extremely artificial and unrealistic proposal.

Yesterday you requested clarification of our answer to your fourth question contained in the records of the previous day.

The question as repeated by you was as follows:

"In Question 4, you mentioned that you are at any time always willing to discuss a military demarcation line and demilitarized zone. Is this proposal of a military demarcation line and a demilitarized zone the same as the one you have drawn on the map? If not, what is this proposal?"

This was our understanding of the original question and our response was intended to give you a clear answer to that question. However, in view of your inability or unwillingness to understand our answer, I will attempt to put it in as clear a language as I can command.

We have made two proposals. Our first proposal was presented to you on a map. It was a specific demilitarized zone and a specific demarcation line which represented our best judgment of the present military realities. In our second proposal, we proposed that you recommend adjustments in the zone we originally presented. We are prepared to consider any such adjustments which are based on military logic.

This was clearly indicated in our answer yesterday to the first part of your question No. 5. At that time

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

we stated we would be receptive to discussion of proposed adjustments including changing the location of our proposed demarcation line. We also stated we would be receptive to discussion of a change in the boundaries of our demilitarized zone. We further stated we would be receptive to discussion of altering the width of our demilitarized zone. How far these discussions would be pursued would depend upon the military logic on which they are based. We have left the road to discussion and agreement wide open.

I trust I have fully answered your question No. 4.

Have you now any adjustments to propose for discussion?

1328K
NORTH KOREA:

I think my reasonable, realistic and fair statement which I made at the beginning of my statement this morning sufficiently refutes the statement you just made.

You have even gone so far as to assume such a shameless attitude to dare call us the aggressor and you have gone so far as to try to evade the responsibility for bringing agony and bloodshed to the Korean people through your aggressive war against the Korean people.

Furthermore, you try the machination of shifting the blame on the shoulders of the Korean people who fight for independence and freedom of their country. I won't go any further into this because it is too well known to the peace loving people of the world and its crime is clearly brand-marked. If you want to have concrete data which will make you more clearly understand who is the instigator of the Korean war and who was behind it, I am always ready to comply with your request.

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NORTH KOREA:
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No slander, distortion, or discourteous attitude and statement of yours can ever make us change our righteous stand. In spite of your insincere and unreasonable and unfair attitude we will patiently and sincerely try our best for the success of the armistice conference.

I hope you will give up your unilateral, arrogant and unreasonable insistence which blocks the progress of our armistice talks and seriously consider our just, fair and realistic opinion, and seriously consider and study our just, fair and realistic stand.

1334K
UNITED NATIONS:

The 24th session of this conference has produced no progress. Again we have by every means at our command offered to consider any proposal other than the discredited 38th Parallel zone originally proposed by you which we have refused to discuss further.

You have accused us of delays, yet it is you who have refused to consider seriously our zone, or to propose any adjustments to this zone after we indicated that we would accept for discussion any adjustments within the general battle area that conform to the realities of the present military situation.

I suggest that you consider proposing an adjustment to the United Nations Command demilitarized zone. It is only by bringing this discussion into the general battle area that we can hope for progress. I propose we recess until the same time tomorrow to permit you to prepare your proposal.

1344K
NORTH KOREA:

I hope when you go back you seriously consider your stand again and when we resume our meeting again tomorrow morn-

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

ing I hope you will give up your absurd stand.

I agree to recess.

Recessed at 1345 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED BY:

E. C. Thomas

E. C. THOMAS,
Major, USMCR.

[redacted]


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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

15 August 1951

Subj: RECORD OF EVENTS, Twenty-fifth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal

1101K: Reconvened. NK again opposes UNC proposal for demilitarized zone, devoting most of its argument to UNC's claim for credit for air and naval superiority.

1153K: UNC replies, pointing out that NK's claims that UNC air and naval activities have little military effect and that same forces prevent NK from achieving victory are contradictory, restates necessity of being compensated for halting air and naval activity during armistice.

1217K: NK claims it has "fully refuted your statement.....I think."

1230K: UNC recommends new procedure to break deadlock over Item 2: Each delegation appoint one delegate, two assistants and interpreters to act as joint sub-committee to meet informally on Item 2 and recommend to both delegations.

1241K: NK asks for UNC proposal in writing.

1244K: Recessed.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

15 August 1951

Subj: TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Twenty-fifth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

United Nations	Communists
VADM C T Joy USN Sr. Delegate	GEN Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes USA	MGEN Hsieh Fang CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

Reconvened at 1101 hours.

NORTH KOREA: I will make a statement.

In your statements of the past several days, you have made clear one point; that is, you still insist upon your arrogant proposal of pushing the military demarcation line and the entire demilitarized zone to the north of the 38th Parallel and into our positions by resorting to the absurd theory of the so-called air and naval superiority.

In your statement yesterday, you declared that you had made two proposals. In the first proposal you presented clearly a specific demarcation line and demilitarized zone. In the second proposal you suggested that we recommend adjustments to your proposed demilitarized zone. Everybody can see that these so-called two proposals are in fact one thing; that is, insisting that the military demarcation line and the entire demilitarized zone must be pushed into our positions.

In order to support your arrogant proposal, you once again raised the discredited platitude of compensation on the ground for the so-called air and naval

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NORTH KOREA:
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superiority. In your statement yesterday, you even denied the fact that the present battle line barely maintained by you reflects the total effect of your air and naval and ground forces, and asserted that the present location of your front line is the result of the action of your ground forces, combined with only a portion of your air and naval operations, while the remainder of your air and naval effectiveness lies in the disruption of our industrial production and communications and transportation systems, and in the diverting of our manpower and equipment to anti-aircraft and anti-landing tasks.

It is true that the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces exercise a definite amount of effect on our military action, but it is by constantly overcoming this effect that we are victoriously accomplishing our combat tasks.

Should there be no need for us to overcome the definite amount of effect on our military action caused by the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment of your air and naval forces, the combat power of our troops fighting at the front would no doubt have been greatly enhanced, while the combat power of your troops fighting at the front would no doubt have been greatly weakened, so that there would have been a change in the ground battle line in our favor and to your disadvantage.

Does not this point prove that the so-called effectiveness of your air and naval forces is already embodied in the situation at the front? Consequently, I have said that it is only with the support of the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces that

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NORTH KOREA:
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you have barely and temporarily maintained the present position of your ground forces. The present position of your ground forces is a concentrated reflection embodying the so-called military effectiveness of your air and naval forces.

Apart from this, what independent military effectiveness do your air and naval forces possess?

You separate the two different forms of activity of your air force, separating the strategic from the tactical bombing, in order to prove that only a portion of your air force is needed for supporting the action of your ground forces, while the remainder of your air force is engaged in strategic bombing of our rear. You attempted thereby to prove that the ground battle line reflects the military effectiveness of only a portion of your air force, while the remainder of your air force has its independence without any relation to the front line, and therefore must be compensated for on the ground when the armistice is realized.

Such an argument, if it is not meant to fool yourselves deliberately, must be designed to deceive the people who lack common sense.

You pretend that you really believe it, and exclaim, "Just look! The purpose of the so-called strategic bombing perpetuated by our air force is to disrupt your national economy."

And what is national economy? It is the factories, the mines, the cities and the villages. What relation is there between these things and the front line? Let me ask you, do you really believe that there is no relation between them?

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NORTH KOREA:
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If they were indeed unrelated to the action of the ground forces which decide the outcome of the way, it would mean that the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment of our area by your air and naval forces are a thousand times more Fascistic than the operations of the hordes of Hitler, because even Hitler admitted frankly that the only military raison d'etre for such so-called strategic bombing of the other side is that it weakens the combat power of the enemy's ground forces and thereby enhances the combat power of one's own ground forces. No! Such strategic bombing directly affects the action of ground forces and its composite military consequence is represented only by the effect on the ground forces.

I would like to tell you frankly that with the direct support of your tactical aerial bombing alone, your ground forces would have been completely unable to hold their present positions. It is owing to your strategic air effort of indiscriminate bombing of our rear, rather than your tactical air effort of direct support to the front line, that your ground forces are able to maintain barely and temporarily their present positions. That is to say, the military effectiveness of both your tactical and strategic air efforts is already embodied in the present positions occupied by your ground forces.

As with your air force, so is the case with your navy. You would perhaps ask, "Can it be that our air and naval forces have no other effectiveness than that embodied in the present battle line?"

Yes, there is. It is the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces of our peaceful civilians and cities and villages. It

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NORTH KOREA:
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constitutes the largest part of the work done by your air and naval forces in Korea.

But this effectiveness of your air and naval forces is no military effectiveness at all. It is the effectiveness of 100 per cent atrocity. Your air and naval forces have committed monstrous crimes in our country.

Yet you are so impudent as to demand compensation for it. The so-called military logic and so-called military realities, derived from such an absurd theory of compensation on the ground for the superiority of air and naval forces, are also inevitably and basically absurd. The proposal of the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone based on such an absurd theory is also inevitably absurd and presumptuous.

Actually, your so-called military logic, military theory, and military realities are but for the purpose of covering up your political objective of conquering the whole of Korea. You have attempted to use as an excuse for refusing to discuss our proposal, the slanderous and abusive statement that the 38th Parallel which we propose as the military demarcation line is a political demarcation line, and that our objective is to subdivide Korea. Thus, you make the excuse for refusing our proposal.

I have repeatedly pointed out that the 38th Parallel has never been, and shall never be, a political demarcation line. No single line could obstruct forever the democratic unification of Korea. It is only owing to foreign intervention and manipulation directed at dominating Korea and menacing China that the democratic unification of Korea has been temporarily obstructed, and the war of June 25, 1950, was instigated.

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

On June 27, 1950, a large number of foreign armed forces came to Korea, attempting to accomplish the objective of dominating Korea and menacing China through direct intervention of armed forces. The fighting in Korea became thereby a war against foreign aggression. But the courageous resistance of the Korean people and the Chinese people has shattered long ago your objective of dominating the whole of Korea.

Your proposal of pushing the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone north of the 38th Parallel and deep into our positions is precisely an attempt to achieve under the cover of your absurd so-called military logic, military theory and military realities, the political objective which you could not gain by armed force.

You asserted that the location of the ground positions at present was of your own choosing, but for a time your former commander-in-chief openly declared that the ground position you choose were along the Yalu river. Though you possess that superiority of air and naval forces of which you have been continually boasting, such a presumptuous objective of yours has been completely shattered.

You have now realized that no matter how strong your boasted air and naval superiority is, you will never be able to achieve your objective of conquering by armed force the whole of Korea. But now, you are attempting to lay the foundation of carrying through your political objective through negotiations, under cover of an absurd military theory. I must tell you in the strongest terms, such an attempt of yours is doomed to failure.

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

You asserted that you were willing at any time to discuss a proposal based on the present battle line and the military situation. Yet you refused to discuss the proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line, which we have made on the basis of an objective evaluation of military realities. You asserted that your proposal was based on the present battle line as the starting position, and pushing the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone northward to insure adequate depth for your defensive positions. Can you call such a proposal as being based on the present battle line and the military situation?

You asserted that our proposal was a proposal of exchange of land area and that you were not interested in any exchange of land area. But the exchange of land area which we propose is an adjustment to the present battle line on the basis of the present military realities. It is unlike your proposal which is completely divorced from the present battle line and the military situation, by openly proposing plunder of territory.

Furthermore, our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line is also favorable to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. This is recognized by all the world as the basis of the armistice negotiations.

In your statement yesterday you mentioned that the suggestion for armistice talks was made on June 23rd. I am sure you remember also that the suggestion of armistice talks made on June 23rd takes also the 38th Parallel as the basis.

Although I have repeatedly refuted the theoretical

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

basis of your proposal and proved that our proposal is consistent with the present military realities and favorable to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, you still insist upon your absurd and arrogant proposal and refuse to discuss our fair and reasonable proposal, so that the conference has made no progress since July 26th. I must point out again that we absolutely cannot consider, still less accept, any proposal of pushing the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone completely to the north of the 38th Parallel and within our positions.

In order to break the deadlock and to proceed to the discussion of the other items on the agenda, I propose that you abandon completely your absurd and arrogant proposal and reconsider and accept our fair and reasonable proposal of making the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line.

1153K
UNITED NATIONS: You have stated many times, and I quote, "It is only by the support of your air and naval forces that your ground forces are barely, temporarily, and unstably maintaining their positions."

You assert that were it not for the United Nations Command air and naval forces, your ground forces would push the United Nations Command ground forces completely out of Korea. You have indicated further that "wanton bombardment" by United Nations Command air and naval forces has had little military significance. Now let us look at those assertions reasonably.

First, let us assume on a hypothetical basis that your statements are correct. Let us accept hypothetically

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

that were it not for the United Nations Command air and naval forces, your ground forces could drive the United Nations Command ground forces far back, perhaps destroy them totally.

What is it that the United Nations Command air and naval forces do which has prevented you from carrying out this hypothesis? You say in one breath that the United Nations Command air and naval forces have little military effect. In the next breath you assert that it is these same United Nations Command air and naval forces which prevent you from defeating the United Nations Command ground forces. In the name of reason, you must recognize how completely your one assertion invalidates the other.

The fact is, the cumulative effect of the United Nations Command air and naval forces, employed over a period of time, prohibits you from bringing your full ground strength to bear on the battle line. The United Nations Command air and naval forces prevent you from fully utilizing your ground strength in the ground battle area. They do this by operating for a significant period of time against your rear areas and your lines of communications.

A pertinent fact about the effectiveness of the United Nations Command air and naval forces is that to attain their full military result against your forces, they must operate over a period of time against your rear areas. They require considerable time to execute a full program of blowing out bridges, destroying military supply dumps, disrupting centers of communications and interdicting your lines of re-supply and reinforcement.

[redacted]

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

Now, during the period of armistice, what could happen in this regard? First, the United Nations Command air and naval forces will cease their operations during armistice. Thus you are provided a period of time in which you could rehabilitate and build up the striking potential of your ground forces without physical interference. With this additional strength, you should be able to overrun quickly the United Nations Command ground forces which you say but barely, temporarily, and unstably hold their present positions against your present strength.

Moreover, you say the United Nations Command ground forces hold their present positions but barely and unstably only by the support of the United Nations Command air and naval forces. If during armistice you should suddenly attack, an eventuality every prudent commander must anticipate, the United Nations Command air and naval forces would re-enter the battle. However, they could not expect for some time to influence it decisively. Attacked by your increased ground strength, is it not clear that the United Nations Command ground forces would be in critical danger? You yourself have said so. Is it not reasonable, then, that the United Nations Command ground forces should attain, in armistice, a strong defensive position?

It is perfectly clear that one of the already agreed conditions of armistice, the cessation of operations by United Nations Command air and naval forces, provides you a material military advantage. Your own words prove it. Yet you oppose conceding to the United Nations Command the only equivalent advantage you can concede. That is,

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd)

an improved defensive position on the ground.

It is not that the United Nations Command insists that its battle positions must be moved forward. Rather, in return for the obviously huge advantage conceded to you in the withdrawal of United Nations Command air and naval forces, the United Nations Command only asks that you withdraw your ground forces a short distance. Thus only can the balance of military advantage be kept even.

Yet you refuse this patently fair and equitable exchange of advantages. You seek to gain a military advantage through negotiation, though you pay much lip service to such words as fair, equitable and reasonable.

We again urge that you join us in a study of the demilitarized zone we have proposed, with a view to adjusting this basically equitable solution to make it acceptable in detail to both sides. Unless you seek to gain through negotiation what you cannot gain by battle, you will join us in such a study without further delay.

I suggest a recess for lunch, to meet again at 2 o'clock our time, 2 o'clock your time.

1217K
NORTH KOREA:

Your statement has been duly noted. The content of your statement is just the same as before. The gist of your statement is nothing else than that you need compensation because your air and naval forces are superior. At the same time, you need compensation because your ground forces are weak.

Your statement is nothing else than the insistence of your wrong and absurd stand. As long as you don't give up your wrong and absurd proposal and not accept our proposal of making the 38th Parallel the military

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NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd)

demarcation line, the conference can make no progress.

My statement today has fully refuted your statement.....I think.

In your statement you distorted my statement when you cited it. In my statement I never said that your air and naval forces didn't give us any effect. I said it this way: "Of course, it is true that the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces exercises a definite amount of effect on our military action."

Hoping that you will give up your wrong and absurd proposal, and seriously consider and accept our fair and reasonable proposal, I propose to recess until 11 o'clock by our time, 12 o'clock your time tomorrow.

1230K
UNITED NATIONS: I want to make a statement before we leave.

We have hung in deadlock on Item 2 of our agenda for many days. We show no prospect of progress along present lines of procedure. I, therefore, recommend a new effort to break this deadlock.

One of our prime difficulties is the formality of each delegation regarding the points at issue. This is necessary in order to preserve order in these meetings involving 10 delegates and their various assistants. Nevertheless, our present manner of exchanging views is tedious and somewhat stilted.

We suggest that each delegation appoint one delegate to membership in a joint sub-committee of the delegations. We suggest that these two delegates meet informally, to exchange views on Item 2 of our agenda. We suggest that the two delegations jointly charge this sub-committee to

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UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) make recommendations to the two delegations as to ways and means of emerging from the present deadlock.

We suggest two assistants, including interpreters, be appointed for each side.

It is our thought that neither delegation be bound by implication or contract to honor the recommendations of the joint sub-committee. Such recommendations would of course require ratification by the delegations. It is our thought that this sub-committee meet around, rather than across a table, and seek objectively to work out a solution to our present problem.

I am prepared to nominate my delegate and staff assistants. If you desire to think this over for a period, you can let us know tomorrow when we meet again.

If you agree in principle, but not in the details, we will consider such proposal as you may offer.

We suggest either 11 o'clock or 1 o'clock tomorrow afternoon our time. That is, 10 o'clock your time, or 12 o'clock your time, and not 11 o'clock your time.

1241K
NORTH KOREA: Your proposal has been duly noted, but we would like to have it in writing.

As for the recess, it is better we meet again tomorrow at 12 o'clock by our time, and 1 o'clock by your time.

Recessed 1244 hours.

OFFICIAL:

AUTHENTICATED BY:

E. C. Thomas

E. C. THOMAS
Major, USMCR

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary

[redacted]



NEW FOLDER BEGINS



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

16 August 1951

Subj: RECORD OF EVENTS, Twenty-sixth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

1304K: Reconvened. NK reiterates stand for 38th Parallel, repeats its arguments against UNC proposal, agrees to UNC suggestion for sub-committee to discuss item 2; suggests one delegate and three assistants for each side, that plenary session be in recess until sub-committee comes up with recommendation or raises question requiring decision of entire delegation.

1342K: UNC asks for NK statement on sub-committee in writing, gets it, discovers NK proposal is for two delegates on sub-committee, plus unlimited number of staff assistants.

1345K: NK says interpreters are to be included as assistants.

1347K: UNC asks 30-minute recess to discuss it.

1348K: Recessed.

1418K: Reconvened. UNC agrees to NK's specifications on sub-committee, saying its understanding is each sub-committee be composed of two delegates, one staff officer, one Korean interpreter.

1419K: NK says that's right.

1419K: UNC suggests that assistants be increased as mutually agreed upon by both sides.

1421K: NK agrees.

1421K: UNC explains its understanding of NK's stipulation regarding plenary session recessing during sub-committee meetings.

1422K: NK says it's correct.

1422K: UNC proposes first sub-committee meeting be held next day, nominates General Hodes as one delegate, Colonel Mudgett as staff officer, says it will name other delegate later.

1425K: NK nominates Generals Lee Sang Jo and Hsieh Fang as delegates, Chu Ko Wan as staff officer, Major Sul Chung Sik as interpreter.

1426K: UNC asks if Chinese interpreter will be needed, is told no, names Lieutenant Underwood as its Korean interpreter.

1427K: NK thinks sub-committee should meet at 1100K next day.

1428K: UNC agrees.

1428K: NK says it will decide on site for meeting, inform UNC through liaison officer.

1429K: UNC says its sub-committee will come to Kaesong and NK can tell them then.

1430K: Recessed.

Final Smooth Draft
Transcript of
16 August 1951 Proceedings. a.

[redacted]

000448

[redacted]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

16 August 1951.

Subj: TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Twenty-sixth Session, Conference at Kaesong, Korea, on the Armistice Proposal.

Delegates Present:

United Nations	Communists
VADM C T Joy USN Sr. Delegate	GEN Nam Il NKPA Sr. Delegate
MGEN L C Craigie USAF	LTGEN Tung Hua CCF
MGEN S Y Paik ROKA	MGEN Lee Sang Jo NKPA
MGEN H I Hodes USA	MGEN Hsieh Fang CCF
RADM A A Burke USN	MGEN Chang Pyong San NKPA

Staff Assistants
Interpreters
Stenographers

Reconvened at 1304 hours.

NORTH KOREA: If you have anything to say, we would like to hear it.

1304K:
UNITED NATIONS: Have you an answer to the proposal we gave you at the end of the session yesterday?

1305K
NORTH KOREA: If you have anything to say, we will also give you our answer. That means if you have anything to say, please say it beforehand.

1306K
UNITED NATIONS: I want to hear your answer.

1306K
NORTH KOREA: I will make a statement.

Since the 27th of July, I have spent much time in refuting your absurd and fallacious theory that the superiority of air and naval forces must be compensated for on the ground during the armistice. I think it is worthwhile that I have done so, since this absurd and fallacious theory is the only important basis of your proposal. I have thoroughly refuted this theory and this would be tantamount to thorough refutation of your proposal and declaration of its bankruptcy and, consequently, it can no longer be a basis for discussion.

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

Yesterday you repeated again some of the arguments why this superiority of naval and air forces must be compensated for on the ground during the armistice. I already pointed out at the time that there was nothing new in your statement. Its gist is that you should be compensated since your naval and air forces are strong and that you should also be compensated since your ground forces are weak. These arguments are mutually contradictory, and are unjustifiable.

You have also used the excuse that adequate depth must be insured to your defensive positions to guarantee the security for your forces in order to argue for your proposal of pushing the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone into our positions. With regard to this argument of yours, our basic viewpoint is that the need for defense should not in any case be made the primary and decisive factor in the determination of the military demarcation line.

As to the need for defense, it is a matter concerning both sides. You state that the military demarcation line must be pushed into our positions because of your need for defense. We could likewise maintain that the military demarcation line should be pushed into your positions because of our need for defense. You know that by arguing in this way, we shall never get anywhere.

The arguments which you used to support your proposal are absolutely untenable. Nevertheless, you are still insisting on your proposal. From this, we can only conclude that what you are seeking by your proposal is not the military objective of cessation of hostilities on the basis of the present battle line and military realities, but some

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

other ulterior objective. It is well known that the original purpose of your waging the war is to conquer the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. On this, the United Nations, under the domination of the United States of America, in fact passed a resolution on the 7th of November last year, but your improper attempt has failed.

Though it has failed, you are still assuming the air of a victor and demanding that the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone be pushed entirely into our positions. This we cannot possibly tolerate and you absolutely will not be able to succeed on this point. You have persistently stated that your proposal is not unchangeable, that you are willing to consider any proposal of adjustment we may make, and that you are willing to consider any proposal of a military demarcation line and demilitarized zone based on the present battle line and military realities. But I have repeatedly pointed out that your proposal is completely unreasonable and therefore it is impossible to make any proposal of adjustment. Any adjustment would be adjusting the military demarcation line within our positions. What sense could there be in doing so?

On the other hand, if you are really willing to consider any proposal based on the present battle line and military realities, you should abandon completely your original absurd and arrogant proposal because that proposal is not at all based on the present battle line and military realities. Your original proposal is ao unreasonable that you dare not make public its detailed content. You have had to describe it, in fact cover it up, with abstract terms.

[redacted]

NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

We think that for the important objective of ending the sanguinary conflict in Korea and breaking the present deadlock in our discussions, it is not too high a price to abandon a proposal, which in fact should not have been proposed. You have constantly used irrelevant pretexts to refuse to discuss our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line. We contend that this is not a correct attitude at all. Though we cannot accept your proposal, we have always discussed your proposal in all seriousness. We have been discussing why it cannot reflect the military realities and why it is unacceptable, but you have stated openly on irrelevant pretexts that you will not be responsive to our proposal.

You state without any justification that the 38th Parallel, which we propose as the military demarcation line, is a political demarcation line. Actually the 38th Parallel we have proposed represents a reasonable adjustment of the present battle line on the basis of our objective evaluation of the military realities. You state that our proposal requires your forces to withdraw 36.6 kilometers, on the average, from the present battle line, and hence it is unfair, but you forget that this is only the adjustment on your part east of the Imjin river which our proposal demands, while west of the Imjin river our forces are prepared to make a similar great concession. Our proposal is the most reasonable proposal which reasonably adjusts the present battle line on the basis of the 38th Parallel. It is completely unjustifiable for you to assume the attitude of not heeding our proposal, in refusing to discuss it under the groundless pretext that it is a political demarcation line.

We consider that the second crucial point for breaking

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NORTH KOREA:
(Cont'd)

the present deadlock is for you to abandon the attitude of refusing to discuss our proposal and to adopt the attitude of considering seriously our proposal. I am of the opinion that otherwise no change in the formality of the conference will provide any solution. You have continuously stated that you are prepared always at any time to adjust your proposal of the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone, and hence your proposal is not inflexible, while our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel is completely inflexible.

I have pointed out that your proposal of the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone is to push both the line and the zone entirely into our positions. Its inflexibility is therefore essentially inflexible, for any change would still leave them within our positions. This means that it is your proposal which is really rigid and inflexible.

As to our proposal, just as I have explained before, though it proposes a single line, the 38th Parallel, as the military demarcation line, necessary and reasonable adjustments to the proposed demilitarized zone based upon it, can surely be made according to terrain features and the requirements of either side. Thus, in order to break the deadlock in our discussions, I contend that you should first of all abandon your completely unreasonable and unfair proposal, and consider seriously our fair and reasonable proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the basis of the demilitarized zone. We contend that only in this way can an agreement be reached through the form of a sub-committee discussion.

Finally, I agree in principle to your proposal of forming a sub-committee to discuss the second item on the agenda.

[redacted]



[redacted]

NORTH KOREA: (Cont'd) I merely propose the following amendment and supplementation.

First: The sub-committee shall be composed of one delegate and three assistants from each side, and the appointment of the assistants shall not be limited -- and the appointment of the assistants by both sides shall not be limited by both sides.

Second: Hence when there is a decision ad hoc by both sides, the plenary session will be recessed, during the period when the sub-committee meets, until the sub-committee makes a recommendation or raises a question which requires discussion and decision by the plenary session.

As to the number of delegates, I have a correction to make: That the sub-committee should be composed of two delegates and two assistants from each side. As for the assistants, both sides can recommend any assistants they like without any limitation.

1342K
UNITED NATIONS: We would like to have this part of your statement in writing (Copy appended as Enclosure (1)).

In here you do not say an unlimited number of assistants as you said before. You say two delegates and two assistants -- is that right?

1344K
NORTH KOREA: It is all right without the limitation.

UN INTERPRETER: They don't mind omitting the words "without limitation".

1345K
UNITED NATIONS: That does not include interpreters?

1345K
NORTH KOREA: Of course the interpreter is included in the assistants.

1346K
UNITED NATIONS: In addition, or included?

1346K
NORTH KOREA: It is included in the assistants.

1347K
UNITED NATIONS: We wish a 30-minute recess to discuss this.

[redacted]

[redacted]

1347K
NORTH KOREA: We agree.

Recessed at 1348 hours.

Reconvened at 1418 hours.

UNITED NATIONS: We have considered your proposal and we agree in principle. to it. I understand the sub-committee will consist of two delegates, one staff officer and one Korean interpreter. Is that correct?

1419K
NORTH KOREA: That is right.

1419K
UNITED NATIONS: I think it should be left this way. Regarding the assistants, assistants may be increased as mutually deemed necessary by the sub-committee — mutually agreed upon by the sub-committee.

1420K
NORTH KOREA: You mean by agreement of both sides?

1420K
UNITED NATIONS: By both sides. Is that agreed?

1421K
NORTH KOREA: We agree.

1421K
UNITED NATIONS: We understand your second paragraph to mean .... your paragraph "b" to mean, the plenary session will be recessed during the period of the sub-committee meetings unless the delegations mutually agree that the plenary session should be resumed or unless the sub-committee recommends that the two delegations meet. Is that understanding correct?

1422K
NORTH KOREA: Yes.

1422K
UNITED NATIONS: We propose the first meeting of the sub-committee tomorrow morning at whatever time you suggest. I nominate General Hodes as one of the delegates of our side and reserve the right to appoint the other delegate as I deem necessary.

[redacted]

[redacted]

UNITED NATIONS: (Cont'd) Colonel Mudgett will be the staff officer. We would like to hear your nominations.

1424K
NORTH KOREA: When will we know who will be the other one?

1424K
UNITED NATIONS: Tomorrow morning. We havn't decided yet. When the sub-committee meets.

1425K
NORTH KOREA: The delegates of the sub-committee from our side will be Major General Lee Sang Jo and General Hsieh Fang. English interpreter, Major Sul Chung Sik and the staff officer, Chu Ko Wan.

1426K
UNITED NATIONS: You have only one Korean interpreter ... Korean-English interpreter.

1426K
NORTH KOREA: Only one.

1426K
UNITED NATIONS: Will it be necessary for us to translate into Chinese?

1427K
NORTH KOREA: If you translate only into Korean that will be enough.

1427K
UNITED NATIONS: Lieutenant Underwood will be our interpreter.

1427K
NORTH KOREA: I think it is better to have the sub-committee meet at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning our time.

1428K
UNITED NATIONS: That is agreed.

1428K
NORTH KOREA: As for the site for the meeting, we will decide on it first and let you know through our liaison officer.

1429K
UNITED NATIONS: Our sub-committee will come here and you can tell them then.

1429K
NORTH KOREA: When you come here again we will let you know through our liaison officer.

1430K
UNITED NATIONS: I propose a recess then for the remainder of the day.

[redacted]

[redacted]

1430K
NORTH KOREA: We agree to the sub-committee meeting tomorrow.

Recessed at 1430 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H.M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED BY:

E.C. Thomas

E.C. THOMAS,
Major, USMCR.

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE (1)

Communist delegation's translation into English of its proposal on sub-committee referred to on page 6.

Finally, I agree in principle to your proposal of forming a sub-committee to discuss the second item on the agenda. I merely propose the following amendment and supplementation:-

a. The sub-committee shall be composed of two delegates and two assistants from each side.

b. Except when there is a decision ad hoc by both sides, the plenary session will be recessed, during the period when the sub-committed meets, until the sub-committee makes a recommendation or raises a question which requires discussion and decision by the plenary session.


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