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FOREIGN
RELATIONS
OF THE
UNITED
STATES

1958-1960

VOLUME III

NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY;
ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT



DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

Washington

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**Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1958–1960**

Volume III

**National Security
Policy;
Arms Control
and Disarmament**

Editors Edward C. Keefer
David W. Mabon

General Editor David S. Patterson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 10339

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Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The series documents the facts and events that contributed to the formulation of policies and includes evidence of supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. This documentary editing proceeds in full accordance with the generally accepted standards of historical scholarship. Official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series were first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

A new statutory charter for the preparation of the series was established by Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which was signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, *et seq.*).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government, including facts that contributed to the formulation of policies and records that provided supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The statute confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.

The editors of this volume are convinced that it meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing. Although this

volume records policies and events of more than 30 years ago, the *Foreign Relations* statute allows the Department until 1996 to reach the 30-year line in the publication of the series.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of the *Foreign Relations* series for the years 1958–1960. The subseries presents in 19 volumes and 2 microfiche supplements a documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the final 3 years of the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. This volume is the last one published covering the 1958–1960 triennium.

A microfiche supplement to the volume presented here contains additional documentation on both national security policy and arms control and disarmament.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. The editors believe that in terms of access this volume was prepared in accordance with the standards and mandates of the statute, although access to some records was restricted, as noted below.

The editors have had complete access to all the retired records and papers in the Department of State. The Department's collections of NSC papers and correspondence were of the highest value. Some of these documents are available in the central (decimal) files and lot (office) files deposited at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in Washington, D.C. Certain intelligence-related files maintained in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research became available to the Department historians only after this volume was compiled. Arrangements have been made for Department historians to have access to these records for future volumes.

When this volume was compiled, all Department of State records consulted were still under the custody of the Department, and the source notes and footnotes citing Department of State files suggest that the Department is the repository. Over the last several years, however, all the Department's indexed central (or decimal) files as well as several of the decentralized office (or lot) files have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) at College Park, Maryland. The remaining Department lot files covering this

triennium are scheduled to be transferred to Archives II in the near future. The List of Sources indicates the location of the Department collections at the time this volume went to press.

The major decisions on national security and arms control questions were made by President Eisenhower, usually after recommendations from and discussion in the National Security Council (NSC) and his Committee of Principals, established in 1958 to advise him on disarmament matters. The most important Presidential records are the relevant White House files at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, to which the editors had complete access. The Eisenhower Library contains, among other important collections, the memoranda of discussion at the NSC meetings, usually prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary S. Everett Gleason, and the memoranda of conference with the President, prepared by the President's Staff Secretary, Andrew J. Goodpaster.

Records of the National Security Council located at NARA include the numbered NSC papers and related documentation. Because White House and Department of State records contain many significant Department of Defense documents, the editors sought only selected access to the Department of Defense files. The editors also perused the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the official papers of General Nathan F. Twining, General Thomas D. White, and Admiral Arleigh A. Burke.

Since 1991, the Central Intelligence Agency has provided expanding access to Department of State historians to high-level intelligence documents from those records in the custody of that Agency. Department historians' expanded access is arranged by the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to a May 1992 memorandum of understanding. Department of State and CIA historians continue to work out the procedural and scholarly aspects of this access, and the variety of documentation made available and selected for publication in the volumes has expanded.

The List of Sources (pages XIII-XVI) lists the files consulted and cited in this volume.

Principles of Document Selection for the Foreign Relations Series

In preparing each volume of the *Foreign Relations* series, the editors are guided by some general principles for the selection of documents. Each editor, in consultation with the General Editor and other senior editors, determines the particular issues and topics to be documented either in detail, in brief, or in summary. Some general decisions are also made regarding issues that cannot be documented in the volume but will be addressed in a microfiche supplement or in editorial or bibliographical notes.

The following general selection criteria are used in preparing volumes in the *Foreign Relations* series. Individual compiler-editors vary these criteria in accordance with the particular issues and the available documentation. The compiler-editors also tend to apply these selection criteria in accordance with their own interpretation of the generally accepted standards of scholarship. In selecting documentation for publication, the editors give priority to unpublished classified records, rather than previously published records (which are accounted for in appropriate bibliographical notes).

Selection Criteria (in general order of priority):

1. Major foreign affairs commitments made on behalf of the United States to other governments, including those that define or identify the principal foreign affairs interests of the United States;

2. Major foreign affairs issues, commitments, negotiations, and activities, whether or not major decisions were made, and including dissenting or alternative opinions to the process ultimately adopted;

3. The decisions, discussions, actions, and considerations of the President, as the official constitutionally responsible for the direction of foreign policy;

4. The discussions and actions of the National Security Council, the Cabinet, and special Presidential policy groups, including the policy options brought before these bodies or their individual members;

5. The policy options adopted by or considered by the Secretary of State and the most important actions taken to implement Presidential decisions or policies;

6. Diplomatic negotiations and conferences, official correspondence, and other exchanges between U.S. representatives and those of other governments that demonstrate the main lines of policy implementation on major issues;

7. Important elements of information that attended Presidential decisions and policy recommendations of the Secretary of State;

8. Major foreign affairs decisions, negotiations, and commitments undertaken on behalf of the United States by government officials and representatives in other agencies in the foreign affairs community or other branches of government made without the involvement (or even knowledge) of the White House or the Department of State;

9. The role of the Congress in the preparation and execution of particular foreign policies or foreign affairs actions;

10. Economic aspects of foreign policy;

11. The main policy lines of U.S. military and economic assistance as well as other types of assistance;

12. The political-military recommendations, decisions, and activities of the military establishment and major regional military commands

as they bear upon the formulation or execution of major U.S. foreign policies;

13. The main policy lines of intelligence activities if they constituted major aspects of U.S. foreign policy toward a nation or region or if they provided key information in the formulation of major U.S. policies;

14. Diplomatic appointments that reflect major policies or affect policy changes.

Scope and Focus of Documents Researched and Selected for Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, Volume III

Most of the research for this volume was completed in 1988, prior to a protracted declassification review. The compilation on national security policy focuses on the most significant aspects of the U.S. defense posture. Among the many issues, a major one throughout the 1958-1960 triennium was the formal, detailed annual reviews of basic national security policy, which began to reevaluate the concept of "massive retaliation" and take into account the possibilities of limited war. These reviews also considered changes in strategic doctrine because of the virtual parity in nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union had achieved with the United States. In addition, senior Eisenhower administration officials engaged in intensive discussions on the recommendations of the 1957 Gaither Report on strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems, including the vulnerability of the Strategic Air Command to a hypothetical Soviet surprise attack and measures to enhance U.S. military readiness, and the advisability of initiating a nationwide fallout shelter program. Further, they were engaged in ongoing evaluations of the Soviet Union's ballistic missile and nuclear testing programs and the relative positions of the U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. Some documents also describe briefings of the National Security Council on the disastrous effects of an all-out U.S.-Soviet nuclear war on the two nations.

The Eisenhower administration's ongoing attempt to negotiate a comprehensive agreement banning nuclear testing dominates the compilation on arms control and disarmament. Documents trace the proposals advanced by the administration's disarmament specialists calling for a testing cessation, which were usually opposed by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. The compilation also covers the Eisenhower administration's internal and public reactions to the Soviet announcement in March 1958 of a suspension in its nuclear testing program, and it provides documentation on meetings of technical experts from the Western and Soviet blocs in Geneva to try to find common ground on an effective inspection system. The U.S. objections to Soviet demands for a veto on inspections and disagreement over the required number of them to detect underground explosions in disarmament talks are covered in some detail. The compilation also documents the administration's consideration of a threshold concept banning tests

above a certain measurable seismic magnitude and efforts to maintain British and other Allied support for U.S. arms control initiatives.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time or, in the case of conferences, in the order of individual meetings. Incoming telegrams from U.S. Missions are placed according to time of receipt in the Department of State or other receiving agency, rather than the time of transmission; memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents in the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the source text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the source text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed by headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. The amount of material omitted from this print volume and from the microfiche supplement because it was unrelated to the subject of the volume, however, has not been delineated. All brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes.

The first footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. The source footnote also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates if the President or his major policy advisers read the document. Every effort has been made to determine if a document has been previously published, and this information has been included in the source footnote. Footnotes often summarize documents

or refer to others reproduced in the microfiche supplement that space limitations prevented from printing.

Editorial notes describe other pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources from the large body of records on U.S. national security and arms control policies, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

In addition to providing readers with a more complete context for the issues, these editorial devices will assist scholars who are interested in undertaking additional research to learn more about the complexities and nuances of the policymaking process on national security and arms control issues.

Declassification Review

The declassification review process for this volume was unprecedentedly lengthy, requiring 8 years to complete. It resulted in the withholding from publication of 1.4 percent of the documentation originally selected for publication by the editors; 4 documents were denied in full. Documentation withheld from the volume consists largely of certain still classified information pertaining to intelligence and nuclear weapons. The declassified documentation provides an accurate account of the major foreign policy issues and the major policies undertaken by the U.S. Government on national security and arms control policies during this period.

The Division of Historical Documents Review of the Office of Freedom of Information, Privacy, and Classification Review, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, conducted the declassification review of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 on National Security Information, which was superseded by Executive Order 12958 on April 20, 1995, and applicable laws.

Under Executive Order 12356, information that concerns one or more of the following categories, and the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, requires classification:

- 1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
- 2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;
- 3) foreign government information;
- 4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;

- 5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
- 6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
- 7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
- 8) cryptology; or
- 9) a confidential source.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security and law. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. Although the Advisory Committee does not attempt to review the contents of individual volumes in the series, it does monitor the overall process and makes recommendations on particular problems that come to its attention.

The Advisory Committee did not review this volume.

Acknowledgments

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the National Archives and Records Administration and at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, in particular David Haight, who provided invaluable help in the collection of documents for this volume.

David W. Mabon and Edward C. Keefer compiled and edited the material presented in this volume under the supervision of former Editor in Chief John P. Glennon. Dr. Mabon also provided planning and direction. Former General Editor Glenn W. LaFantasie supervised the final steps in the editing and publication process. Deb Godfrey prepared the lists of persons and abbreviations and, with Rita M. Baker, performed the technical editing. Barbara-Ann Bacon of the Publishing Services Division oversaw the production of the volume. Juniee Oneida prepared the index.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

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List of Sources

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Indexed Central Files. See under National Archives and Records Administration below.

Lot Files. A list of the lot files of the Department of State (decentralized files created by operating areas) used in or consulted for this volume and which are still in the custody of the Department follows. See also under National Archives and Records Administration below.

G/PM Files: Lot 68 D 358

Records on intelligence, national security actions, nuclear weapons, nuclear testing, et al., as maintained by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs for the years 1950–1967.

INR–NIE Files

Files retained in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research containing copies of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates for 1958–1960.

S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171

Restricted data files for 1957–1967, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Dulles Papers

Papers of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, 1953–1959, including General Memoranda of Conversation, Meetings with the President, General Telephone Conversations, and White House Telephone Conversations.

Herter Papers

Papers of Christian A. Herter, 1957–1961. Herter was Under Secretary of State, 1957–1959, and Secretary of State, 1959–1961.

McCone Papers

Papers of John A. McCone, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1958–1961.

National Security Council Staff Records

Disaster File and Executive Secretary's Subject File.

President's Daily Appointments

Records of the appointments of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953–1961.

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records

Records of the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Robert Cutler, Dillon Anderson, and Gordon Gray), 1952–1961.

XIV List of Sources

White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology

White House Office Files, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology Records

White House Office Files, Project Clean Up

Project Clean Up collection. Records of Gordon Gray, Robert Cutler, Henry R. McPhee, and Andrew J. Goodpaster, 1952–1961.

White House Office Files, Staff Secretary Records

Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary (Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher H. Russell), 1952–1961.

Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, as maintained by his Personal Secretary, Ann Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: Name Series, Dulles–Herter Series, Eisenhower Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, NSC Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, Administrative Series, and International File.

Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Twining Papers

Papers of General Nathan F. Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1957–1960.

White Papers

Papers of General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, 1957–1961.

National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

Department of State Records, Record Group 59

Indexed Central Files

Documents from the indexed central files of the Department for the years 1958–1960 are indicated by a decimal file number in the first footnote. Among the most useful of these files in the preparation of this volume were 033.1100, 320.11, 330, 396.1–GE, 396.12–GE, 611.00, 611.0012, 700.5, 700.5611, 711.5, and 711.5611.

Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688

Consolidated collection of documentation on atomic energy policy for 1944–1962, maintained principally by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy Affairs but also by other offices in the Department of State.

Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559

Collection of documentation of official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for 1959, maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560

Collection of documentation of official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for 1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

EUR/RPM Files: Lot 64 D 444

Collection of documentation on NATO and NATO countries for the years 1950–1961, as maintained by the Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs.

G/PM Files: Lot 64 D 341

Miscellaneous Top Secret subject files maintained by the Combined Policy Staff of the Office of Politico-Military Affairs for the years 1958–1961.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments for 1953–1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collection of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for 1953–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for 1957–1961.

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1

Serial and subject file of NSC documents and correspondence for 1948–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of NSC documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for 1947–1961, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous NSC files, including records of action, for 1947–1963, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385

Master set of the administrative and country files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Records, Record Group 218

Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

NSC Records, Record Group 273

Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File, and Policy Papers File.

Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.**Burke Papers**

Papers of Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, 1955–1961.

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland**Record Group 59, Conference Files: FRC 83–0068**

See Department of State Records under National Archives and Records Administration above.

XVI List of Sources

Record Group 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170

Country and general files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) for the year 1960.

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Memoirs, Autobiographies, Diaries

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List of Abbreviations

- ABM**, anti-ballistic missile system
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AFOAT, Air Force Assistant for Atomic Energy
AFOAT-1, surface and air burst nuclear test detection system
AFTAC, Air Force Technical Applications Center
AICBM, anti-intercontinental ballistic missile system
ALBM, air-launched ballistic missile
ARPA, Advanced Research Projects Agency
ASW, antisubmarine warfare
- BMEWS**, ballistic missile early warning system
BOB, Bureau of the Budget
BOMARC, surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile
BW, biological warfare
- Cahto**, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Herter when away from Washington
- CEA**, Council of Economic Advisers
CEG, Comparative Evaluation Group
CEP, circular error, probable—a measure of missile accuracy
CF, Conference Files
CFEP, Council on Foreign Economic Policy
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CONUS, Continental United States
CRAF, Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CVA, conventionally powered aircraft carrier
CVAN, nuclear powered aircraft carrier
CW, chemical warfare
- Del**, delegation
Denuc, series indicator for telegrams from the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DEW line, distant early warning air defense installations in northern Canada
DOD, Department of Defense
DOS, Department of State
Dynasoar, rocket-launched long-range space glider project
- ECM**, electronic countermeasures
ELINT, intelligence from intercepted electromagnetic signals
EURATOM, European Atomic Agency
- FAA**, Federal Aviation Administration
FY, fiscal year
- GAO**, General Accounting Office
- HE**, high explosive
- IAEA**, International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile

XVIII List of Abbreviations

- IDO**, International Disarmament Organization
IGY, International Geophysical Year
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IOC, initial operating capability
IRBM, intermediate-range ballistic missile
ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
- JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSOP, Joint Strategic Operations Plan
JSPS, Joint Strategic Planning Staff
JSTPS, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
- KT**, kiloton
- M**, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAP, Military Assistance Program
MATS, Military Air Transport Service
MRBM, medium-range ballistic missile
MSP, Mutual Security Program
MT, megaton
- NAC**, North Atlantic Council
NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Niact, night action; communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
n.m., nautical mile
NOA, new obligational authority
Nofor, no foreign dissemination
NORAD, North American Air Defense Command
NSA, National Security Agency
NSC, National Security Council
NSTPS, National Strategic Target Planning Staff
NTL, national target list
Nusup, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests
- OCB**, Operations Coordinating Board
OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OCDM, Office of Civilian Defense Mobilization
ODM, Office of Defense Mobilization
ONR, Office of Naval Research
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
- PACOM**, Pacific Command
P.L., Public Law
- Q-1**, a seismic measure of magnitude
- R&D**, research and development
reftel, reference telegram

RG, Record Group

S, Office of the Secretary of State

SAC, Strategic Air Command

SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

S/AE, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs

S&L, supply and logistics

Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State or his delegation to the Department of State

SIOP, Single Integrated Operational Plan

SLAM, supersonic low-altitude missile

SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate

SOR, Specific Operating Requirement aircraft (long-range jet powered cargo aircraft)

S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

STRAC, Strategic Army Corps

Supnu, series indicator for telegrams from the

Tocah, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Herter when away from Washington

Tosec, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State or his delegation

UK, United Kingdom

UN, United Nations

UNDC, United Nations Disarmament Commission

USA, United States Army

USAF, United States Air Force

USDel, United States Delegation

USIA, United States Information Agency

USMC, United States Marine Corps

USN, United States Navy

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VELA, project designed to improve detection of nuclear tests

VOA, Voice of America

WSEG, Weapons System Evaluation Group



List of Persons

- Adenauer, Konrad**, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Allen, George V., Director of the United States Information Agency
Amory, Robert, CIA member, Working Group on Disarmament Policy
Anderson, Robert B., Secretary of the Treasury
- Bacher, Robert F.**, Member, President's Science Advisory Committee
Bantz, Fred A., Under Secretary of the Navy
Berkner, Lloyd V., Chairman, Panel on Seismic Improvement
Bethe, Hans A., Chairman, Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Cessation; also Member, Panel of Experts
Bevan, Aneurin, British Member of Parliament and opposition Labor Party spokesman on foreign affairs
Boggs, Marion W., Director of the National Security Council Secretariat until July 1959; thereafter Deputy Executive Secretary
Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to the Philippines until October 15, 1959; thereafter Special Assistant to Secretary of State Dulles
Boster, David E., Staff Assistant to Secretary of State Dulles
Brucker, Wilber M., Secretary of the Army
Brundage, Percival F., Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1956-1958
Bulganan, Nikolai Alekandrovich, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union until March 1958
Burke, Admiral Arleigh A., Chief of Naval Operations
Byers, Lieutenant General Clovis E., Military Adviser, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
- Cabell, General Charles P.**, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Caccia, Sir Harold A., British Ambassador to the United States
Calhoun, John A., Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, from September 1958
Coolidge, Charles A., Director, Joint Disarmament Study
Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Foreign Minister
Cutler, Robert, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- De Gaulle, Charles**, Prime Minister of France, June 1958-January 1959; thereafter President of France
Dillon, C. Douglas, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until June 1958; Under Secretary for State for Economic Affairs, July 1958-June 1959; thereafter Under Secretary of State
Douglas, James II, Secretary of the Air Force until December 11, 1959; thereafter Deputy Secretary of Defense
Douglas-Home, Alexander Frederick, British Foreign Secretary from July 1960
Dryden, Hugh, Acting Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence
Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State until his resignation on April 22, 1959
Dunning, John R., Adviser to the Atomic Energy Commission
- Eaton, Frederick M.**, U.S. Representative to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva from September 1960
Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States

- Eisenhower, Major John S. D.**, Assistant Staff Secretary to the President, promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in May 1960
- Emelyanov, V.S.**, Head of Soviet (non-military) Atomic Energy Authority
- English, Spofford G.**, Chief, Chemical Branch, Research Division, Atomic Energy Commission
- Farley, Philip J.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy Affairs
- Federov, Yevgeni**, member of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva Experts Conference on Nuclear Tests, 1958; thereafter Soviet Adviser to the delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests
- Fisk, James B.**, U.S. Representative to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests; also member, President's Science Advisory Committee
- Floberg, John F.**, Member, Atomic Energy Commission
- Foster, Admiral Paul**, Member, Atomic Energy Commission; Member, Working Group on Disarmament Policy
- Foster, William C.**, U.S. Representative to the Geneva Conference of Experts on Surprise Attack
- Fox, General Alonzo P.**, Defense Member, Working Group on Disarmament Policy
- Franke, William B.**, Under Secretary of the Navy until June 7, 1959; thereafter Secretary of the Navy
- Gates, Thomas S., Jr.**, Secretary of the Navy until June 7, 1959; Deputy Secretary of Defense, June 7–December 1, 1959; thereafter Secretary of Defense
- Gleason, S. Everett**, Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council
- Glennan, T. Keith**, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- Goodby, James E.**, Atomic Energy Commission
- Goodpaster, Brigadier General Andrew J.**, Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower
- Gore, Albert**, Democratic Senator from Tennessee; member, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
- Gray, Gordon**, Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, until July 1958; thereafter Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Green, Howard C.**, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs from June 1959
- Gromyko, Andrei A.**, Soviet Foreign Minister
- Gruenther, General Alfred M.**, disarmament adviser to Secretary of State Dulles; formerly Military Adviser to President Eisenhower
- Hagerty, James C.**, Press Secretary to President Eisenhower
- Hammar skjöld, Dag**, Secretary-General of the United Nations
- Harriman, W. Averell**, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union
- Herter, Christian A.**, Under Secretary of State until April 21, 1959; thereafter Secretary of State
- Hickey, Lieutenant General Thomas F.**, Director, Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff
- Hoegh, Leo A.**, Director, Office of Civil Defense, until July 1958; thereafter Director, Office of Defense Mobilization
- Holaday, William M.**, Director of Guided Missiles, Department of Defense
- Hood, Viscount Samuel**, British Minister to the United States
- Hoover, J. Edgar**, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Humphrey, Hubert H.**, Democratic Senator from Minnesota; Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Disarmament, Committee on Foreign Relations
- Irwin, John N., II**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from September 26, 1958

- Jackson, Henry M.**, Democratic Senator from Washington; member, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
- Johnson, Lyndon B.**, Democratic Senator from Texas; Senate Majority Leader
- Keeny, Spurgeon M., Jr.**, Staff Member, White House Office of Science and Technology
- Kennedy, John F.**, Democratic Senator from Massachusetts
- Khrushchev, Nikita S.**, First Secretary of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Vice Chairman, Soviet Council of Ministers until March 1958; thereafter Chairman
- Killian, James R., Jr.**, President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, and Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology until July 1959
- Kistiakowsky, George B.**, Staff Member, White House Office of Science and Technology, until July 15, 1959; thereafter President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology and Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology
- Knight, Robert H.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, February 1958–June 1959
- Krebs, Max V.**, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State until June 1959; thereafter Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
- Latter, Albert**, physicist with the Rand Corporation
- Latter, Richard**, Member, Panel of Experts
- Lay, James S., Jr.**, Executive Secretary, National Security Council
- Le Boutillier, Philip, Jr.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics
- LeMay, General Curtis E.**, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force
- Lemnitzer, General Lyman L.**, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army until June 30, 1959; Chief of Staff until October 1, 1960; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Libby, Willard F.**, Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission, until July 1958
- Ling, Donald P.**, Member, Science Advisory Committee
- Lloyd, John Selwyn Brooke**, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until July 27, 1960; thereafter Chancellor of the Exchequer
- Lodge, Henry Cabot**, Permanent Representative to the United Nations until September 3, 1960
- Long, Franklin A.**, Professor of Chemistry, Cornell University
- Loper, General Herbert B.**, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy
- Lovett, Robert A.**, disarmament adviser to Secretary of State Dulles
- Macauley, John B.**, Deputy Director of the Office of Research and Engineering, Department of Defense
- Macmillan, Harold**, British Prime Minister
- McCloy, John J.**, disarmament adviser to Secretary of State Dulles
- McCone, John A.**, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from July 1958
- McElroy, Neil H.**, Secretary of Defense until December 1, 1959
- McGuire, E. Perkins**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics
- McRae, James W.**, Chairman, Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Requirements
- Merchant, Livingston T.**, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from October 1958; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August 1959–December 1959; thereafter Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- Moch, Jules**, French Representative to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference
- Murphy, Robert D.**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until August 1959; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August–December 1959
- Nixon, Richard M.**, Vice President of the United States
- Norstad, General Lauris**, Commander in Chief, European Command
- Ormsby Gore, William David**, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

- Panofsky, Wolfgang K. H.**, Chairman, Panel on High Altitude Detection
- Pate, General Randolph M.**, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps until December 31, 1959
- Penney, William**, British nuclear physicist
- Persons, General Wilton S.** (Ret.), Assistant to President Eisenhower
- Plowden, Edwin N.**, Chairman, British Atomic Energy Authority
- Polk, Brigadier General James H.**, Director, Office of Planning, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
- Power, General Thomas S.**, Commander, Strategic Air Command
- Pugh, George E.**, Member, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Department of Defense
- Quarles, Donald A.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense until his death on May 8, 1959
- Randall, Clarence S.**, Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy
- Reinhardt, G. Frederick**, Counselor of the Department of State
- Rhea, Colonel Fred**, Defense Member, Working Group on Disarmament Policy
- Sandys, Duncan**, British Minister of Defense until October 1959; thereafter Minister of Aviation
- Saulnier, Raymond J.**, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
- Scoville, Herbert E.**, Assistant Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Director of the Office of Scientific Intelligence
- Scribner, Fred C., Jr.**, Under Secretary of the Treasury
- Segni, Antonio**, Italian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense from July 1958; Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior from February 1959; Minister of Foreign Affairs from March 1960
- Sharp, Dudley C.**, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force until January 31, 1959; Under Secretary of the Air Force, August 3–December 11, 1959; thereafter Secretary of the Air Force
- Shoup, General David M.**, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps from January 1, 1960
- Sides, Vice Admiral John H.**, Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
- Smith, Bromley**, Staff Member, National Security Council, until January 1959; thereafter Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board
- Smith, Gerard C.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
- Smith, General Walter Bedell** (Ret.), disarmament adviser
- Smith, Brigadier General Willard W.**, Deputy Director, Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff
- Spaak, Paul-Henri**, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Spiers, Ronald**, Officer in Charge of Disarmament Affairs, Department of State
- Sprague, Mansfield D.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until September 3, 1958
- Sprague, Robert**, Director, Security Resources Panel, ODM Science Advisory Committee on Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age, from September 1957
- Staats, Elmer B.**, Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget
- Stans, Maurice H.**, Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget, until March 1958; thereafter Director
- Starbird, Brigadier General Alfred D.**, Director, Division of Military Application, Atomic Energy Commission
- Stassen, Harold E.**, Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament until February 15, 1958
- Strauss, Admiral Lewis L.**, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, until June 30, 1958; Secretary of Commerce from October 24, 1958
- Symington, W. Stuart**, Democratic Senator from Missouri

- Taylor, General Maxwell D.**, Chief of Staff of the Army until July 1, 1959
- Teller, Edward**, Director, Lawrence Livermore Nuclear Weapons Laboratory
- Thomas, General Gerald C.**, Director, Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff
- Thompson, Llewellyn E.**, Ambassador to the Soviet Union
- Tsarapkin, Semen K.**, Soviet Representative to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests from 1958
- Twining, General Nathan F.**, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until September 30, 1960
- Wadsworth, James J.**, U.S. Representative to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests until August 31, 1960; Permanent Representative to the United Nations from September 8, 1960
- Washburn, Abbott**, Deputy Director, United States Information Agency
- White, General Thomas D.**, Chief of Staff of the Air Force
- Whitman, Ann C.**, Personal Secretary to President Eisenhower
- Whitney, John Hay**, Ambassador to the United Kingdom
- Wiesenand, Brigadier General James E.**, Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Wiesner, Jerome B.**, Member, President's Science Advisory Committee
- Wilcox, Francis O.**, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
- Williams, Haydn**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for NSC Affairs and Plans, International Security Affairs
- Wilson, Charles E.**, Secretary of Defense until October 8, 1957
- Wright, Michael**, British Deputy Representative to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests from 1960
- Yeagley, J. Walter**, Acting Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Department of Justice
- York, Dr. Herbert F.**, Director of Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, from December 30, 1958
- Zorin, Valerian A.**, Soviet Representative to the United Nations and to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference from 1960



NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

1. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 3, 1958.

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. Gerard C. Smith
Mr. Robert Sprague

Mr. Sprague came in at his own request to discuss the background of his proposal to the President that a study group be given the job of looking into possibilities for fruitful use of the near-term future during which the US will have a margin of strategic bombardment capability over the Soviet Union.

The Secretary congratulated Mr. Sprague on the Gaither report,¹ saying that he especially liked the analysis of our need to increase US striking power. He expressed the opinion that the US would be in bad trouble only if we lost this capacity to retaliate with great force in the event of Soviet aggression.

Mr. Sprague mentioned his extensive background in the atomic weapon field to indicate that his views were not the result of a sudden and surprising exposition to the effects of nuclear weapons.

He expressed concern about the prospect of the period starting about 12 to 20 years from now when both the US and the USSR would have complete capability for annihilating the other. He spoke of the dangers of errors that will exist then in estimating whether or not an attack is occurring. He mentioned a recent case of radar misinterpretation which had led to confusion.

During the next 2-1/2 years (more or less) the US position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union will be at its strongest. During this period we can knock out the Soviet Union's military capability without taking a similar blow

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Initialed by Herter. A note on the source text indicates Dulles saw the memorandum.

¹ The Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee on Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age (Gaither Report), dated November 7, 1957, is printed as NSC 5724 in *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. XIX, pp. 638-661. The report is named for the Panel's first Director, H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., who was succeeded by Sprague in September 1957. For information on the origins of the Gaither Panel, see *ibid.*, pp. 628-629.

from the Soviet Union. Our present capability to do this is increasing. During this period the Soviet Union could in retaliation hurt the US, but could not put us out of action.

Sometime late next year or early in 1960, the Soviets will begin to have an operational capability in ICBMs and the present US margin of superiority will begin to fade. If we are going to force the issue, the next few years will be the time.

The public impression about the Gaither report is a false one in that it suggests that the US is presently in a position of weakness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Sprague suggested that at the present the Soviets might possibly deliver one ICBM, using a one-megaton warhead as against a US capacity to deliver thousands of megatons on Soviet targets from manned bombers.

Given this state of affairs, Mr. Sprague had thought a great deal about what the US should do. He sees only three reasonable alternatives, with possibly a fourth. They are—

1. Continue the present policy. Only if the Soviet Union engages in aggression will we attack it.

2. Preventive war. The Soviet long-range striking force is on 27 bases. We could destroy this Soviet striking power, and if “clean” weapons were used we could do this without killing a great many Soviet non-combatants. Since US planes are continually flying around the world, it should be technically easier for us to mount a surprise attack than the Soviets to do the same. After striking out the Russian strategic bombardment capability, we could then dictate disarmament terms.

3. Conduct a “hot” negotiation. This, in effect, would be to threaten the Soviet Union that if it did not settle on US disarmament terms we would change our present policy against preventive war.

4. Place reliance in God to find a solution. Mr. Sprague pointed out that during the course of his work with the Gaither panel his resort to prayer had substantially increased. He wonders what device the Lord could resort to in view of past evil actions of Soviet rulers.

Given these alternatives, Mr. Sprague feels that the better opportunities for the survival of freedom lie in alternatives 2 and 3.

He feels that we should enlist the best brains in the country to advise the President as to what the US should do during the few years in which we will retain a margin of advantage. He concluded by saying that his present approach to the Secretary had been motivated by Mr. Carlton Savage having asked him to give some of the background of his thinking, as set out in his letter to the President of November 14, 1957.²

The Secretary recalled that in June 1946 he and Senator Vandenberg had speculated as to whether a resort to force would be justified if the

² Not found.

Soviets refused to accept the UN plan for internationalization of atomic energy [Baruch].³

Mr. Sprague then pointed out that technical developments in connection with thermonuclear weaponry had changed the situation since 1946 and discussed in some detail weapon effects of large-scale weapons. He pointed out that the development of large yield weapons in the 1952 and 1954 tests had been the real reason for the US deciding to get ahead with ballistic missiles. Before that time, long-range missiles did not make sense since warheads of kiloton yields did not offer an effective explosion in view of the margins of error inherent in long-range missile delivery systems.

He discussed ballistic missile guidance systems, pointing out that for the first 200 miles ballistic missiles are guided by radio. He analogized this to a gun barrel and indicated that the ratio between this atomic gun barrel and the total range of the missile was much less than the ratio between a 16" Naval gun barrel and the range of its shell fire.

Mr. Smith asked if Mr. Sprague had given thought to the alternative of some disarmament agreement negotiated without changing our present policy of using nuclear weapons only for defense and yet relying on Divine Providence. Mr. Sprague indicated that he did not have competence in the field of disarmament, but that one reason for his proposed study would be to get America's top brain power working harder on the disarmament problem.

Mr. Sprague speculated about the effect of Sputnik on American policy, indicating that he thought in the long run it would be beneficial. Americans with access to top intelligence information were not surprised at Sputnik or the missile capability which it evidenced.

The Secretary said that he had long felt that no man should arrogate the power to decide that the future of mankind would benefit by an action entailing the killing of tens of millions of people, and he believed that the President agreed with him.

He asked Mr. Sprague if he had any concrete proposals. Mr. Sprague replied that his idea for a further study of the matter was his concrete proposal for the present. He expressed the opinion in closing that making this proposal to the President completed his responsibility in connection with the Gaither panel study.

The Secretary thanked Mr. Sprague for his presentation and said he would like to think over the points Mr. Sprague had discussed.⁴

³ Brackets in the source text. In 1946, Bernard M. Baruch was U.S. Representative to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission.

⁴ Dulles met with General Alfred M. Gruenther (Ret.) on February 19 concerning a potential advisory council on disarmament; see Document 139.

2. Memorandum of Discussion at the 350th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, January 6, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Items 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security" and 2. "U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments." For Agenda Item 2, see Document 136.]

3. *Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee* (NSC Action No. 1814;¹ NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1²)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council at very great length on this agenda item (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting; another attached to this memorandum).³ In the course of his briefing, Mr. Cutler distributed to the Council a summary of the recommendations of the Gaither Panel and of the comments of the agencies assigned primary responsibility for commenting on these recommendations. (Copy of this summary is also filed in the minutes of the meeting.)⁴ Lastly, Mr. Cutler distributed a single page entitled "Comparison of Estimated US-USSR Missile Operational Capability" (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).⁵

At the conclusion of Mr. Cutler's briefing, he first called upon Dr. Killian, the President's newly-appointed Special Assistant for Science and Technology. In commenting on the Panel report, Dr. Killian said that he would direct his remarks to outlining the principal policy questions which seemed to require decision. He noted that the Gaither Panel's first concern was with the vulnerability of SAC to a Soviet surprise bomber attack. To reduce this vulnerability of SAC, the Panel had recommended a five-sided time-phased program, the elements of which Dr. Killian outlined. This seemed to Dr. Killian to raise two questions basic to national security policy:

First, is the Panel's conclusion valid, based on its estimate of the threat in relation to planned defense programs, that the U.S. air-nuclear

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on January 7.

¹ Dated November 7, 1957; see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XIX, p. 636, footnote 11.

² Dated December 16, 1957, NSC 5724/1 contains the comments and recommendations of various U.S. Government agencies on NSC 5724. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File)

³ Dated January 4; for text, see the Supplement.

⁴ Apparent reference to NSC 5724/1.

⁵ Not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

retaliatory force will be critically vulnerable to a surprise long-range missile attack in the 1959-1960 time period, when the United States may not possess a significant ICBM retaliatory force?

Second, if so, what additional precautions should we take to assure the survival of an adequate retaliatory capability in the face of a surprise missile and aircraft attack, including the provision of blast shelters?

The *third* major question was whether the prospective vulnerability of manned aircraft in the early 1960's was such as to justify the technical risks in making the *early* decisions on production schedules and bases necessary to have a significant missile retaliatory capability during that time period. With respect to the latter question, Dr. Killian pointed out that the Gaither Panel had recommended a force of 600 ICBMs by mid-1963; whereas present Defense Department plans called for only 130 as of that date. In general, added Dr. Killian, the time-phasing of the Defense programs was generally behind that recommended by the Gaither Panel.

At the conclusion of Dr. Killian's statement, Mr. Cutler called on Secretary Quarles, who pointed out initially that the recommendations of the Department of Defense for stepping up our defenses went only part way to meet the recommendations of the Gaither Panel. If one were to measure the matter in dollars, perhaps the Defense expenditures would amount to one-half the amount called for by the Gaither Panel recommendations. On the other hand, the Defense Department believed that it had picked out for acceleration the most essential areas of defense described in the Gaither Panel recommendations.

Secretary Quarles then indicated that he would comment briefly on a few of the key recommendations of the Gaither Panel in terms of what Defense was doing about them. His first reference was to the third Panel recommendation, viz.: "Accelerate the initial operational capability of the Polaris submarine ICBM system, and increase the submarine force from six to 18." With respect to this recommendation, Secretary Quarles stated that the Department of the Navy was now working on a proposal which would involve the construction of nine submarines capable of carrying Polaris missiles, rather than the three hitherto contemplated in Defense Department plans. Furthermore, the Navy plan would accelerate the completion dates for these missile-bearing submarines. But, said Secretary Quarles, this Navy Department plan was not yet firm, and if the Navy Department plan were actually adopted, sums well beyond those currently available to the Department of Defense would be required. Secretary Quarles also predicted very strong Congressional support for the construction of perhaps as many as 100 of such submarines.

Secretary Quarles next turned to recommendation 11 of the Gaither Panel: "Improve and ensure tactical warning against aircraft, including

radar modernization and lengthening of seaward extensions." Secretary Quarles pointed out that the tactical warning network constituted one of the most difficult areas of judgment facing the Department of Defense. To strive for perfection in a warning network would involve costs going far beyond anything that the Defense Department had hitherto thought wise to put into our continental defense. The currently proposed program admittedly fell far short of the ideal warning system. Similarly, with respect to recommendation 13, to "develop early warning radar system; meanwhile using interim crash program", Secretary Quarles explained that tremendous expenses would be involved in carrying out this recommendation of the Gaither Panel.

Secretary Quarles referred thereafter to recommendation 17: "Increase initial operational capability of ICBMs from 80 to 600." In point of fact, the Defense Department was planning to produce 130 ICBMs by the end of FY 1963. Secretary Quarles then explained the nature of the problem involved in meeting the Panel's recommendation for 600 ICBMs by the end of FY 1963. He indicated that we had the capability to produce 600 ICBMs within the time limit indicated. The problem was not the construction of the missiles, but building bases for them. Such ICBM bases would have to be hardened, and this was a time-consuming process. In fact, if we were to have 600 ICBMs operational by FY 1963, we would have to begin the construction of bases for them at once. By and large, the Department of Defense thought it unwise to undertake this program.

Secretary Quarles concluded his comments by references to the "Comparison of Estimated US-USSR Missile Operational Capability". Dr. Killian commented that it might prove to be very difficult to achieve our mid-1959 missile capability totalling 55 ICBMs and IRBMs, for technical reasons.

At the conclusion of Dr. Killian's remarks, Mr. Cutler proposed a Council Action which was in general acceptable to the members of the Council.

Secretary Dulles thereafter pointed out that he and his colleagues would be going up before the Congress next week, and expected to be questioned as to whether certain members of Congress could be permitted to have a sanitized version of the Gaither Panel's report. Secretary Dulles did not know the answer, and said he felt the need of guidance. Mr. Cutler replied that he thought it was the view of the Administration that no version of the Gaither Panel report was to be released, inasmuch as this was a privileged report made confidentially to the President by the members of the Gaither Panel. Such reports had never been given by any President to any Congressional committee.

Mr. Bryce Harlow interposed to state that he had only today received a formal request from Senator Lyndon Johnson to have a member of the Gaither Panel prepare a sanitized version of the Panel's report.

The President commented that he believed that before we got done with this Gaither thing we would find ourselves obliged to do things which we normally would never think of doing (releasing a classified report to the President prepared confidentially by a board of consultants appointed by the President). Mr. Cutler expressed his very deep opposition to making any concessions to the demand for versions of the Gaither report, and said that what the Congressmen and Senators were most interested in were the timetables in the Gaither report. The President replied in exasperation that he was sick to death of timetables; he had had experience with them for years, and they never proved anything useful. Mr. Cutler repeated his view that even the issuance of a sanitized version would have catastrophic results.

Changing the subject, the President turned to General Twining and said that in all the subject matter of the Gaither report he was most interested in the alert position and in the retaliatory power of the United States. He said he understood that General Twining now had 31 SAC bases. Suppose that we got down to placing one squadron of B-52 heavy bombers on each base. How much time would be required to get off 15 planes under ideal conditions, including ideal warning? General Twining replied that it would take about 20 minutes under ideal conditions.

The President addressed a second question to General Twining on the subject of alert. It had seemed to the President, he said, that the Air Force visualized a long period of time in the future in which our main reliance would still be placed on manned aircraft. Was this correct? If so, the President felt that money expended on improving the early warning system and the dispersal of SAC bases would be money well spent.

Thereafter the President indicated considerable anxiety about the necessity of proceeding to the production of certain ballistic missiles without full testing of these missiles, although he realized that Secretary McElroy believed that it was necessary to follow this course of action. In any case, the President counseled that after achieving the production of a certain number of such ballistic missiles—the number deemed absolutely necessary—we should flatten out the production curve until further testing had resulted in the perfecting of the missiles in question.

Reverting to the discussion of the release of the Gaither report to members of Congress, Mr. Gordon Gray said he hoped that the President had not completely excluded the possibility of releasing a summary of the Gaither report, because Mr. Gray felt that what was being publicly said about the contents of the Gaither report was much worse than what the Gaither report itself had stated. The President replied that he had not excluded this possibility.

Secretary Dulles said that in any case he would like to know what answer to make when this question was put to him on the Hill. As an alternative to issuing a summary or a sanitized version of the Gaither report, Secretary Anderson recommended that an oral briefing of the contents of the Gaither report be given to selected members of the appropriate Congressional committees. Secretary Anderson felt that something would have to be contrived by way of a departure from the usual privileged handling of such reports to the President.

The President, again changing the subject, expressed a certain degree of skepticism as to the wisdom of expending billions of dollars on a Shelter Program as opposed to spending the money on additional measures of active defense.

Mr. Cutler and the Vice President brought the subject back to the release of the Gaither Panel report. Mr. Cutler continued to express his violent opposition to the issuance of any written summary or sanitized version. On the other hand, the Vice President emphasized that what had been published about the contents of the Gaither report was fantastically worse than what the Gaither report actually said. Moreover, most of the recommendations of the Gaither report had appeared in Chalmers Roberts' story in *The Washington Post*. It seemed to the Vice President that making public the recommendations of the Gaither report would pose no particular problem. Our real concern is with the timetable aspect of the report. It would, he agreed, be dangerous to make the timetable public, because of its effect on our allies as well as on other nations.

*The National Security Council:*⁶

a. Noted and discussed the comments and recommendations by the respective departments and agencies on the Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee (NSC 5724), as contained in NSC 5724/1 and summarized at the meeting.

b. Noted the President's directive that the Department of Defense report to the National Security Council on the feasibility and desirability of particular military measures, additional or supplemental to those covered by the Department of Defense comments mentioned in a above, further to improve U.S. capability to deal with the Soviet threat (especially the estimated Soviet ICBM capability); the scope and timing of such reports to be presented to the Council in accordance with a schedule developed by the Department of Defense in consultation with the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology.

⁶ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 1841, approved by the President on January 9. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

c. Noted that the President would discuss separately, with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman, President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, the recommendation on strategic warning and intelligence contained in paragraph IV-B of NSC 5724.

d. Deferred, until the next Council meeting, discussion of the comments and recommendations by the respective departments and agencies on a nation-wide fallout shelter program (paragraph III-B-3 of NSC 5724) and on "Costs and Economic Consequences" (paragraph V of NSC 5724).

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology for appropriate implementation.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, JCS, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman, President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.

S. Everett Gleason

3. Editorial Note

On January 7, 1958, President Eisenhower spoke to Republican Congressional leaders on his desire for reorganization of the defense establishment, stating that just as the NSC brought together policymakers in the security field, so the JCS ought to bring together all elements of the military to resolve questions. "He said he often had to settle disputes that ought to have been settled at the Defense level." The President stated that he "felt deeply" that authority had to be centralized in the Secretary of Defense. The President also stated that he wished Congress to make this possible by passing legislation that "would have all appropriations made to the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary would have control of all appointments, promotions, etc." (Supplementary Notes on Legislative Leadership Meeting by Minnich; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)

Several documents on the President's quest for reorganization of the Department of Defense are in the Supplement. For text of P.L. 85-599, the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, approved August 6, 1958, see 72 Stat. (pt. 1) 514.

4. Memorandum of Discussion at the 351st Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, January 16, 1958.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee* (NSC Action No. 1814; NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1; NSC Action No. 1841)

Mr. Cutler said that at last week's Council meeting he had presented an over-all review of Agency comments upon the recommendations of the Gaither Panel Report. Today the procedure would be:

(1) Consideration of agency comments on measures for passive defense of the civil population.

(2) Consideration of agency comments on "Costs and Economic Consequences" of the proposed over-all programs.

(3) Consideration of the schedule prepared by the Department of Defense, in consultation with Dr. Killian and Mr. Cutler, of further reports on various military measures; and discussion of the military measures.

Mr. Cutler then briefed the Council on the first of the above three topics, and called on Governor Hoegh to explain the FCDA position. (A copy of Mr. Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)¹

Governor Hoegh stated that FCDA concurred in the Gaither Panel recommendations and favored initiation of a nation-wide fallout shelter program for a variety of reasons:

(1) Fallout shelters would add to our deterrent capability by convincing the enemy that we could survive a nuclear attack and would therefore be ready to employ nuclear retaliation if necessary. Such an increase in our deterrent capability would bolster our allies' determination to resist aggression. In the light of the \$40 billion spent annually for military protection, the spending of \$22.5 billion for sheltering the civil population should be regarded as a sound investment.

(2) Fallout shelters would be a weapon for peace because our diplomats would be strengthened at the conference table by the additional deterrent to war that such shelters would create. CIA had reported that the USSR had taken steps toward sheltering the civil population. The United States, not the USSR, should seize the initiative in achieving this increased deterrent.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on January 17.

¹ Not printed.

(3) Shelters would be a contribution to the active military defense of the United States. A shelter program would reduce casualties 35 to 45 percent and might save 50 million people; and could thus be the determining factor in sustaining the United States as a free nation.

(4) If fallout shelter is an unsound concept, then some other programs must also be unsound. For example, we must have survivors after a nuclear exchange if our stockpiles are to be used.

(5) Shelters would strengthen the morale of the people, who, as they come into possession of more accurate information on the character of nuclear war, will increasingly demand that protection be provided by governmental initiative. Popular confidence in the Government and in its leaders would be increased by such governmental initiative.

(6) Fallout shelters are an integral and essential part of a civil defense program. There is no practical alternative to shelters, no other way to afford full protection. The only way to protect a person against gamma rays is to put sufficient shielding material between the person and the rays.

(7) Fallout shelters would reassure our allies. Today there is a wide acceptance of shelters in Europe; programs are under way in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, and Turkey. Fallout shelters in the United States would be consistent with the recommendations of NATO, where the United States has been criticized for lack of a shelter program.

(8) The cost of fallout shelters, about \$125 per person (i.e., the cost of a year's auto insurance), would be a sound investment as insurance. It would be difficult to think of a way to get more for \$125.

Governor Hoegh then noted that a great many practical questions as to a shelter program had been raised. He thought that a practical program should be prepared by FCDA in collaboration with other agencies and submitted for Council consideration. In his view, a shelter program should be national in scope, dual-purpose in character, accompanied by a public information program, and reinforced by self-help features, so that a person building a shelter for himself would be generally regarded as a patriotic citizen, not an eccentric.

An expenditure of \$750 million in FY 1959 would start the program. Maximum use should be made of existing facilities (schools, tunnels, etc.) in their present state or modified as necessary. New Federal and State buildings should incorporate fallout shelters, and existing Federal buildings should be modified to provide such shelters. FHA regulations should be modified to encourage home-owners to build shelters. Fallout shelters should be incorporated in the new highway building program. Parking facilities, as well as additions to schools and hospitals, should be built underground and should double as shelters.

In conclusion, Governor Hoegh said he was convinced there was no practical alternative to a fallout shelter program. Without it there would be no hope of protecting the people; with it, the people would be protected and the United States would have an additional deterrent to

enemy attack. The first shelter in America had been a reinforced log cabin. Now our duty was clear: To provide for the common defense.

The Director, ODM,² said that a decision on the fallout shelter program would be one of the President's most difficult decisions. The ODM staff was generally in agreement with FCDA, but he (Mr. Gray) was personally not ready at this time to recommend adoption of a shelter program because he did not know precisely what program was proposed. (For example, was the program to be fully or partly Federally financed, or was it to be largely on a voluntary basis?) Mr. Gray felt that in addition to the humanitarian aspects of the problem, two major questions would have to be considered: (1) Whether the President could continue to conduct the affairs of the United States in the absence of a shelter program; (2)—a philosophical question—whether it was the duty of the Federal Government to guarantee the protection of individuals against disaster.

Mr. Gray said he was deeply concerned by the Gaither Report, which had recommended fallout shelters, with a delay in blast shelter construction. This recommendation presented great difficulties; it was tantamount to asking the Federal Government to say that protection would be provided for the countryside, but not for the cities. He was also deeply concerned by the fact that little was now known about the behavior of people in a shelter situation—whether people would live for two weeks in shelters with 10–20 square feet per occupant.

Mr. Gray said he had examined various alternatives to the recommended shelter program. For example, he had inquired into the possibility of contributing the two million tons of surplus aluminum in our stockpile to shelter construction. He had found that aluminum was an effective substitute for other materials, but that contribution of our surplus aluminum would cover only one-third of the cost and might not be a sufficient incentive. He had also thought about the possibility of a War Damage Equalization scheme to obtain revenues for shelters, but did not think such a scheme should be adopted now—but it might have to be adopted in the future.

Mr. Gray then indicated that he was not impressed by the argument that the United States should adopt a shelter policy because NATO had such a policy. It was true that the literature of the NATO Senior Planning Committee contained a shelter policy approved by the North Atlantic Council, but the principle of shelter had not actually engaged the specific attention of the heads of governments.

Mr. Gray felt that the people should be told that evacuation is not the answer to the fallout problem; that protection requires shelters. It did not

² Gordon Gray.

follow, however, that the Federal Government should undertake a full-scale program for shelter protection.

Mr. Gray believed the Gaither recommendations were not sufficiently clear and did not include a financing program. He would recommend (1) adoption of the concept of shelter; (2) frank communication to the people; (3) initiation of a research program to provide information on the kinds and types of shelters (such research to include blasting shelter prototypes with large bombs) and on siting (which the Gaither Committee did not deal with). Mr. Gray thought we should be willing to spend substantial sums on full-scale research. In the military services, funds expended for research and development on weapons systems, though substantial, were a small percentage of the cost of the operational systems. Applying this principle to shelters, we might well spend for shelter research and development one percent of the estimated cost of a completed shelter program.

Mr. Cutler then called upon the Director of Central Intelligence for a report on what the Russians are doing in the field of shelters, a question which had vexed the discussions at the lower levels.

The Director of Central Intelligence said that reports from Moscow tended to cast doubt on the validity of the conclusions in an earlier estimate. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow had been able to find few overt signs of a Soviet shelter program. CIA was still attempting to get the basic facts. However, it was clear that the Soviets, during the period of their nuclear inferiority in the late '40s and early '50s, had been extremely reluctant to inform their people of the nuclear danger. They had simply carried forward their World War II shelter programs (e.g., the Moscow subway). Mr. Dulles believed a shelter program was in existence in the USSR, but the earlier estimates may have gone too far in stating its size. The program was probably limited to new construction of public buildings, subways, and apartment houses. It might seem strange that a shelter program could be concealed, but Mr. Dulles believed concealment was possible. [2 lines of source text not declassified] The U.S. Embassy in Moscow was not in a good position to discover all the facts. Mr. Dulles estimated that one-sixth of the Soviet urban population had shelter available, but this figure was a guess and might be too high. The Russians were publicizing warning, etc., not shelter. In a month Mr. Dulles hoped to have a full analysis of the Russian program. However, the Russian program need not determine action on the U.S. program.

The President wondered whether the discussion was not getting at cross-purposes. The Gaither Committee had not recommended blast shelters for the present; yet the Director of Central Intelligence was reporting on Soviet World War II blast shelters. The United States had very impressive World War II shelters, including one in the White House, which would be no good against a one-megaton bomb exploded in the

Soviet Embassy. The reports on Russian blast shelters and the Gaither recommendations on fallout shelters were entirely different.

Mr. Allen Dulles said the Russians had no fallout shelters as such, and no blast shelters strong enough to withstand the latest nuclear weapons.

The Secretary of State said he thought it was necessary to consider not only the theoretical aspects but also the practical by-products of a shelter program. If it were possible by a wave of the hand to create shelters, we would be better off with them than without them. But in this area of judgment he believed it would be impossible to carry through the program contemplated without extremely serious consequences. Secretary Dulles asked the Council to consider the impact of a shelter program on the psychology of the American people. There were practical difficulties in the way of maintaining, at one and the same time, both an offensive and a defensive mood. We had been operating on the theory that the best war preventive was a retaliatory capability in cooperation with our allies. Secretary Dulles felt that we would be capable of preventing an atomic war against us as long as we had the capability to retaliate by devastating the Soviet Union. This was a sound policy from which we should not deviate. It was difficult to combine a strong offense and a strong defense. Burrowing into the ground would inevitably have a bad effect on our offensive mood and capability.

It had been suggested, Secretary Dulles continued, that shelters would make our diplomats bolder. He was not sure such would be the case. Even with shelters, there would be large numbers of casualties in the event of nuclear war. He thought a peace-at-any-price mood might result from the fact that large numbers of people in the urban centers would be unprotected. A shelter program would bring home to the people our lack of faith in our capability to deter war, and would make us less bold.

Secretary Dulles also thought that the effect on our allies of a Fortress America complex would be serious. A shelter program of the magnitude contemplated would have serious effects on our economic aid program, which is vital because the termination of economic aid could mean loss of the cold war. Since it was not possible to have all desirable programs, a shelter program would tend to get the people to concentrate on the United States as a Fortress America.

Moreover, the concept of shelter varied from year to year; in the last five years Secretary Dulles had heard constantly differing suggestions for civil defense. The present proposals, which were entirely different from their predecessors, might be out of date in a few years.

Secretary Dulles said the Gaither Report suggested helping our allies to build shelters. He wished to point out that our allies have no shelter programs on this scale. If we adopt greater protective measures

than our allies (who can't afford it), we will place strains on our alliances. We should try to do the best we can without a great program.

For such reasons as these, Secretary Dulles did not think we should adopt a shelter program of the magnitude suggested. However, he did not mean that we should pay no attention to shelter. Undoubtedly some form of shelter should be encouraged in new construction. In conclusion, Secretary Dulles said he was not opposed to a quiet program along the lines suggested by Mr. Gray, in order to develop a higher degree of protection.

The Secretary of Defense said he agreed with most of what the Secretary of State had said. The shelter problem was a knotty one because the opponents of such a program question whether the Government does not have to consider the welfare of the 40 million who might become casualties in the absence of shelter. Anything that can be done to improve either our offense or our defense would add to our deterrent capabilities. Secretary McElroy believed (and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in his view) that U.S. resources should be used to develop offensive capabilities and an active defense as the best deterrent. If we use our limited manpower and material resources on shelters, they will not be available for productive use, a field in which we are competing with the Russians. If necessary, the United States could build shelters without economically destroying the nation, even though shelter construction would be a large non-productive use of resources added to the already large non-productive use of resources for military purposes.

Secretary McElroy felt that public support was an important factor in the shelter program. It would be difficult to ask the people in the cities, the main source of taxes, to put up the money for a shelter program which would give no protection to the cities. This concept of no urban protection would have tremendous implications in public opinion. In his own hometown a bond issue for a modest civil defense program had recently been turned down. People would support a large shelter program only if they were given a terrific scare by the Administration.

Admiral Strauss said his notes paralleled the remarks of the Secretary of State. He felt we had insufficient information on which to base so radical a project. Aside from the financial aspects, the arguments were imponderable and could be cited on either side of the question. Take the deterrent argument, for example: If shelters, when completed, are a deterrent, then the Russians might be moved by a big shelter program to strike before the shelters are completed. A vast shelter program might lead the Europeans to think we had panicked. Like Secretary Dulles, Admiral Strauss wondered if we could simultaneously encourage an offensive and a defensive psychology. He asked whether vast shelters would be as accessible and as cheap as individual family shelters. He would recommend that certain unanswered questions on shelters be

defined, that the answers be obtained, and that the subject be considered again by the National Security Council.

Dr. Killian said he wished to make two interpretive points: (1) A program of fallout shelter does not mean ignoring the cities. Fallout shelters in a city would protect the city in case of attack outside the city (e.g., an attack on SAC bases). (2) Many persons feel that a decision not to build shelters imposes a great responsibility for improving our active defenses and assuring the safety of SAC; and that greater priority should be accorded active defense and retaliatory capability. We must be able to fend off a surprise attack. Dr. Killian agreed with the comment that more information on shelters was needed.

General Twining said that the people who are responsible for backing up governmental decisions live in the cities and would object to a lack of urban protection. Moreover, our productive power is concentrated in the cities and would be lost to us in the event of attack unless the cities were protected.

The Vice President said consideration should be given to what Congress would do with a shelter program. In his view, submission of a large shelter program to Congress would result in lobbying, a fantastic boondoggle, and a great debate. A study of the shelter problem would be desirable, but submission of a program to Congress this year would produce an unmitigated mess.

The President noted that it had been said that fallout shelters might save 50 million people, a reduction of 35% in casualties. In talking about such figures, we were talking about the complete destruction of the United States. There would be no way of living in a situation of such large casualties. In studies of the problem, lesser damage should be assumed or we would be forcing ourselves toward the conclusion that we should surrender. The President asked how much the NATO countries were doing on shelter.

Governor Hoegh said Denmark was sheltering 25% of the urban population, had spent 1 million kronen in 1957 and would spend 3 million in 1958. France planned to provide blast shelter in target areas, fallout shelter elsewhere.

The President, interrupting, asked about the dual-use concept. How could an underground garage be used for shelter if it was full of autos?

Governor Hoegh replied that there would be room for large numbers of people even before the autos were moved out.

Secretary Dulles said it was his impression that the European countries were carrying on a World War II type shelter program which was not designed to meet the nuclear threat.

The President asked how deep a city blast shelter would have to be. Such shelters seemed to him to require a stupendous engineering feat. Admiral Strauss replied that blast shelters had to be far underground.

Moreover, the problems of air, electricity, etc., were not simple. Dr. Killian agreed that shelter construction was not a simple problem.

The President said he had been impressed by General Twining's point. We were talking about saving people in the rural areas, but we might still lose if all the productive power of our cities were destroyed.

Governor Hoegh said he favored research on blast shelters, but hoped our active defense would become so strong that enemy planes could not bomb the cities.

The President said the corollary to Governor Hoegh's observation was: If we can keep enemy planes away from our cities, we can keep them out of the United States altogether. He asked whether the U.S. Government was expected to construct or help to construct a shelter in every home. If we provide incentives to individual shelter construction, it must be done without hysteria, must be accepted as routine. The President said there was a great temptation to say we are strong enough to trust to advances in active defense and put all our resources into improving active defense; but he was sympathetic to the FCDA problem.

Mr. Cutler then called on the Director of the Budget to begin the briefing on the "Costs and Economic Consequences" of the Gaither programs.

Mr. Brundage said he felt the initial estimates of receipts and expenditures should be reviewed, and had accordingly prepared certain charts.

The charts were displayed and explained by the Deputy Director of the Budget, Mr. Stans. The charts indicated that over a five-year period the United States could absorb the cost of the highest priority measures recommended in the Gaither Report and come out with a surplus. But if the cost of shelters were added, the result would be a \$19 billion deficit; and if the contingency items of the Gaither Report were added on top of shelters, the deficit would be \$36 billion over five years.

Mr. Brundage said the charts assumed continuance of existing taxes.

The President said if good times continued indefinitely, an increase in taxes might be considered, i.e., more "pay as you go" in government spending.

Mr. Scribner³ pointed out that the figures as to receipts on the Budget charts had been furnished by the Treasury Department. The forecast of receipts was based on the assumption that the economy early in 1959 would be restored to its early 1957 levels. Otherwise, receipts would decline. Mr. Scribner agreed that the United States could take on the Gaither "highest value" measures without additional taxes. He asked

³ Fred C. Scribner, Jr., Under Secretary of the Treasury.

whether the Gaither measures were included in the FY 1959 Defense budget. Mr. Cutler and Dr. Killian answered in the negative.

Mr. Scribner said he believed it was not feasible to secure the support of the people for a shelter program. If we want to obtain the support of, and collect taxes from, all the people, we can't start with protection for only part of the population. Popular demand would compel shelter construction in all areas. Shelters would result in a substantial budgetary deficit unless taxes were increased. Mr. Scribner believed we should not rely on deficit financing in order to get shelters. If there were a need to help the economy, we should cut taxes instead of increasing expenditures. Shelters should stand on their own merits as a defense program, not as an economy booster.

Dr. Saulnier, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, said he wishes to discuss three questions: First, the answer to the *fiscal* question of how much deficit depended on a series of assumptions as to GNP, aggregate personal income, Treasury receipts, and so forth. Every effort to obtain an answer to this question produces a difference of opinion as to the size of the deficit that would be incurred if a large shelter program were adopted, although there is agreement that there would be some deficit. However, this question is largely academic. If shelters are needed, fiscal considerations need not prevent their construction.

Secondly, said Dr. Saulnier, with respect to the question of *matériel*, it was clear that a shelter program of the magnitude contemplated would put a heavy but not unbearable burden on the construction industry. Materials for shelters could be obtained if a shelter program were adopted.

Thirdly, from the point of view of *anti-recession measures*, Dr. Saulnier believed shelters should never be thought of as a stimulus to the economy. The economy does not need this stimulus; it will have as much stimulus as it can stand from active defense programs. The construction industry was close to a full-employment condition, and shelters would add to its burdens. The shelter program is long-range; the economic cycle is short-range. It is therefore impossible to plan shelters as an anti-recession measure.

In conclusion and summary, Dr. Saulnier said (1) there was no need for shelters for purely economic reasons, (2) economic considerations need not block a shelter program needed for other than economic reasons.

Mr. Gray said it might be presumptuous of him, but he did not agree with the Budget and Treasury figures. He agreed with Mr. Scribner that the decision as to shelters should be taken on other than fiscal grounds. He was not recommending adoption of a shelter program, but he felt that the Council should come to a conclusion on the concept of shelter, on communication to the people, and on incorporation of shelter in new schools and Federal buildings. On the latter point, Mr. Gray noted that

the new addition to the State Department building did not include shelters.

The Secretary of State said the State Department was expendable.

Admiral Strauss said the AEC had been dispersed as a substitute for shelter.

The President asked in what respect Mr. Gray differed with the Treasury-Budget figures.

Mr. Gray replied by saying that economic recovery would cause GNP to increase faster than shown on the charts. The Treasury-Budget figures, in his view, showed a "too-late take" from taxes. The figures assumed civilian expenditures to be growing as part of GNP, while tax receipts were falling as part of GNP.

Mr. Brundage said fiscal considerations should not determine the decision on shelters.

Mr. Scribner felt the charts were optimistic as to tax receipts beyond 1959.

The President said that every time a new military program was started, the third, fourth and fifth year costs were greater than originally estimated. He felt that the fixed cost for the Department of Defense shown in the Budget charts was a very bad assumption. The factor of increase should be taken into account in the estimates.

Mr. Allen, Director of the U.S. Information Agency, said the effect abroad of a shelter program would be bad. The Europeans already think we have a war psychosis. A shelter program would lead them to think we have succumbed to war hysteria. As far as shelters strengthening our diplomats was concerned, his own attitude as a diplomat would be to apologize for a vast shelter program. During his stay in Greece, tourists from Russia had not mentioned shelters, but had talked only of peace. Nations intending to commit aggression have usually built up a combative spirit, not peace talk. Mr. Allen suggested that from a public relations point of view (which of course was not decisive), the shelter aspect of the Gaither Report should be made public and flatly rejected.

The President said he was told, during his conversations in Europe, that a great U.S. shelter program would insure neutralism in Europe.

The Vice President suggested that it be assumed that 40 million people would be killed in event of enemy attack if we had shelters, and 60 million would be killed if we did not have shelters. If 40 million were killed, the United States was finished. He did not believe we could survive such a disaster. Our major objective must be to avoid the destruction of our society. Would 40 million vs. 60 million make much difference to the USSR as to the deterrent? Since we have limited resources, we must concentrate on those measures which might deter attack rather than on

shelters, which will not stop an attack. As the President had suggested, we should study what we should do to survive.

Governor Stassen said our deterrent policy was our most important policy and the one on which prime emphasis should be placed. But we should not put all our eggs in one basket. A nuclear war might occur despite our deterrents. Then the key question would become: Do we survive and rebuild? The key to survival is protection against radiation. The demoralizing effect on rebuilding would be great when it was realized that the Government had done nothing to provide shelters. We should move forward with our allies on fallout shelters, subject to the maintenance of our deterrent power.

Mr. Cutler recalled that the shelter problem had been before the Council a number of times, and various studies had already been called for and presented to the Council. He thought that two possibilities remained: (1) to reject shelter in favor of a greatly increased retaliatory power; (2) to adopt the *concept* of fallout shelter as a modification of our civil defense policy and ask inter-departmental committees to study the development of a specific program.

Mr. Cutler felt studies were not needed on two aspects of the problem: (1) the psychological effect of a U.S. shelter program on our allies, because no one was more competent on the subject than the Secretary of State; (2) the impact on the American people, because the advice available at the Council table was superior to that of any panel.

The President said that damage on the scale reflected in the Net Evaluation studies meant the complete paralysis of the country, and there would be no reason for shelters. On the other hand, if active defense measures could bring the problem down to manageable proportions, so that some cities, some communications, etc., would survive, then shelters might add to survival. It would be silly to talk of recuperation if everything was destroyed. We could also destroy Russia, and the result would be two wounded giants doing nothing. Casualties of the magnitude being talked about would mean that civilization could not be rebuilt in a century—or even two centuries.

Mr. Cutler said he gathered there was no disposition on the part of the Council to reject the concept of shelter. As he saw it, it was the feeling of the Council that the concept of shelter should be incorporated in civil defense policy; that it was not yet clear what the Federal Government should do; and that a specific program, with the initial steps spelled out, should be brought back to the Council for consideration.

The President said the studies should include the question: What are the manageable proportions of disaster? There was no use in talking of recuperation after 100 million casualties. We must talk in reasonable figures. We are going through the dispersal exercises on the assumption that something will be left after an enemy attack.

Secretary Dulles said the study should take into account the political considerations advanced in the Council discussion; it should not be just a theoretical study. A policy premised on vast destruction and embracing measures to meet such destruction would lead to loss of allies abroad and followers at home.

The President said perhaps the NATO countries, not the United States, should take the lead in shelter programs.

Secretary Dulles remarked that perhaps the United States and the USSR should conclude a disarmament agreement under which neither would build shelters.

Mr. Cutler then reported on the tentative schedule of follow-up reports on the Gaither Recommendations (see paragraph g of the action below).

*The National Security Council.*⁴

a. Continued discussion, initiated at the last meeting, of the comments and recommendations by the respective departments and agencies on the Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee (NSC 5724), as contained in NSC 5724/1, with particular reference to a nation-wide fallout shelter program (paragraph III-B-3 and Annex B of NSC 5724), "Costs and Economic Consequences" (paragraph V of NSC 5724), and the schedule of reports called for by NSC Action No. 1841-b.

b. Agreed that, during a long future period of continued threat of Soviet bloc nuclear attack, in order to maintain the defense of the United States, to protect most effectively the civil population, to sustain the morale of the American people, and to retain the support of our allies, predominant emphasis should continue to be placed upon measures to strengthen our effective nuclear retaliatory power as a deterrent and to improve our active defenses, as compared with—but not to the exclusion of—passive defense measures such as shelter for the civil population. This agreement was based upon an over-all appraisal of how best to defend the people of the United States against nuclear attack. The cost and over-all economic consequences of a shelter program was only one, but not the determining, element in this appraisal.

c. Noted the view of the Secretary of Defense that further consideration of military measures to strengthen our effective nuclear retaliatory power as a deterrent and to improve our active defenses, as scheduled for future consideration by the Council in accordance with g below,

⁴ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 1842, approved by the President on January 21. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

might involve recommendations for further military expenditures in this Fiscal Year and subsequent Fiscal Years.

d. Agreed that the United States should not now initiate a nationwide fallout shelter program of the type recommended by the Security Resources Panel, but that existing civil defense policy for protection of the civil population, in case of nuclear attack, by emergency dispersal of urban population on attack warning (paragraph 22–d, NSC 5408)⁵ should be modified to incorporate the concept of fallout shelter for protection of the civil population against radiation hazard; on the basis that:

(1) In accordance with b above, predominant emphasis will continue to be placed upon developing and maintaining effective nuclear retaliatory power as a deterrent and upon improving active defenses.

(2) Improvements in active defenses can give reasonable promise, together with fallout shelters, of limiting estimated civilian casualties, in the event of nuclear attack on the United States, to a level which will permit the United States to survive as a nation and will in no case be greater than a similar casualty ratio in the USSR.

(3) Measures to carry out this concept must be undertaken in ways that will obtain the support and cooperation of the American people, without (a) creating public overconfidence in shelter or a public passive defense psychology, (b) causing Congressional and public reaction prejudicial to higher priority national security programs, (c) losing the support of our allies or causing them to adopt neutralism, or (d) presenting the posture of the United States as that of a nation preoccupied with preparations for war.

(4) Implementation of this concept will be deferred pending Council consideration of the report requested under e below.

e. Requested an Interdepartmental Committee, consisting of representatives of the Federal Civil Defense Administration (Chairman), the Department of Defense, the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Atomic Energy Commission—consulting as appropriate with representatives of the Departments of State and the Treasury, the Special Assistants to the President for Science and Technology and for Public Works Planning—to develop recommendations as to appropriate measures to carry out the concept in d above; including in each case the magnitude, nature, timing, cost, means of financing, and assignment of responsibility. Such recommendations are to be submitted to the Council by March 15, 1958, and should indicate whether these measures should include:

(1) Research and development program on fallout shelters—and to a lesser extent on blast shelters—including prototype testing and site-planning of various sizes and types.

⁵ For text of NSC 5408, "Continental Defense," dated February 11, 1954, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. II, pp. 609–633.

(2) Incorporation of fallout shelter in all new Federal construction and by remodelling existing Federal facilities.

(3) Urging states and municipalities to incorporate fallout shelter in their new construction and by remodelling their existing facilities.

(4) Urging private industry to incorporate fallout shelter for employees in any new construction and by remodelling its existing facilities.

(5) Multi-purpose use of shelters.

(6) Wide dissemination of information and instruction on means and methods by which, and the extent to which, private citizens may provide in their homes fallout protection for themselves and their families.

(7) An over-all public information program.

f. Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence would prepare a revised estimate on Soviet Civil Defense and Shelter Programs for submission to the Council before March 15, 1958.

g. Noted the following tentative schedule of reports developed by the Department of Defense in consultation with the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1841-b.

To be submitted approximately January 30, 1958:

(1) Report on whether decisions should be made now:

(a) To produce additional first-generation ICBMs beyond the 130 currently programmed, to be operational prior to the end of FY 1963;

(b) To build additional launching sites required to make operational any additional first-generation ICBMs so produced; and

(c) To harden such additional launching sites.

(2) Report on whether to order now production of more than 3 Polaris submarine missile systems; and on possible further acceleration of production.

(3) Report on whether to install interim defense against ballistic missiles attack at SAC bases, utilizing modified available anti-aircraft missiles.

To be submitted approximately March 15, 1958:

(4) Presentation of Department of Defense plan for national-level study relative to capabilities of forces for limited military operations.

To be submitted approximately April 1, 1958:

(5) Report on whether to accelerate early warning radar system for ICBM attack by advancing the operational dates (a) of long-range tracking radar at the Thule Station from December, 1960, and (b) of the stations in Alaska and Scotland from December, 1960, for the warning radar, and from December, 1961, for the tracking radar. (This report will be submitted prior to April 1, 1958, if the Department of Defense needs authority for such acceleration at an earlier date.)

(6) Report on:

- (a) Whether to accelerate the improvement of SAC reaction time against an enemy bomber attack and against an enemy ICBM attack;
- (b) Whether to accelerate the dispersal of SAC aircraft to SAC bases; and
- (c) Whether to disperse SAC aircraft to non-SAC military bases and to commercial airfields in ZI;

indicating SAC alert and dispersal status as of the reporting date and at the end of FY 1958, 1959, 1960, and 1961.

(7) Report on whether to improve defense of SAC bases by:

- (a) Accelerating the installation of anti-aircraft missile defenses at the 29 bases now planned;
- (b) Installing such anti-aircraft missile defenses at more than the 29 bases; and
- (c) Accelerating research and development on area defense against ICBMs to enable prompt decision on installation of such a system.

(8) Report on whether to increase the number of operational IRBMs beyond the 8 squadrons (120 missiles) now planned to be operational by the end of CY 1960 (taking account of the likelihood of availability of additional overseas launching sites).

(9) Report on status of measures to increase emphasis on the program to improve anti-submarine effort.

To be submitted approximately August 21, 1958, as a supplement to the Annual Status Report as of June 30, 1958:

(10) Report on the status of efforts to improve and insure tactical warning against aircraft, including radar modernization and lengthening of seaward extensions.

(11) Report on status of research and development on how to deal with enemy "blinding" of our radar by electronic countermeasures and enemy low-level attack below our radar coverage; and, on the basis of such research, a report on the feasibility of installing improved radar by the period CY 1961-1963.

(12) Report on JCS recommendation on the Continental Air Defense Operational Plan to determine the manner of providing further strengthening of our active defenses, including defense against submarine-launched missiles.

Note: The above actions, together with NSC Action No. 1941, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to all holders of NSC 5724 and NSC 5724/1; and referred for appropriate implementation as follows:

d and e: To the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, in collaboration with the Secretaries of State, Defense and the Treasury, the Director, ODM, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, AEC, and the

Special Assistants to the President for Science and Technology and for Public Works Planning.

f: To the Director of Central Intelligence.

g: To the Secretary of Defense.

2. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*

The Director of Central Intelligence displayed a chart containing a tabulation of Soviet missile tests during 1955, 1956 and 1957. He said that, on the basis of the best obtainable intelligence, there had been a substantial dropping off in Soviet missile testing recently. For example, there had been no ICBM test since early September; no test of an IRBM in the 950-mile range since August, and few tests in the 150-mile range. Why had this decline in testing occurred? Did the Soviets feel they had "over-alerted" the United States? Or were they holding tests which defeat our detection methods?

The President said it would be logical to expect that testing would increase if the first tests were successful.

Mr. Dulles said one would have expected more testing of the longer-range missiles.

The President said that, shooting from the hip, he would be inclined to think the Soviets were having some missile trouble. In his experience, the higher the stage of development of a weapon, the more frequent was the testing.

General Twining said General Norstad was of the opinion that the Soviets were having trouble with their missiles.

Governor Stassen asked whether any seasonal factor would account for the decline in Soviet testing. Mr. Dulles replied that the seasonal factor was minimal.

Admiral Strauss said perhaps the Soviets were content with previous tests. In August 1951 and August 1953 there were no Soviet atomic tests because the Soviets were content with their 1951 device as a trigger.

The President said it was incredible that a military organization should be content with an existing weapon. Mr. Dulles did not think the Soviets could be content with a limited number of 950-mile range tests.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to a tabulation of Soviet missiles tests during 1955, 1956 and 1957.

Marion W. Boggs
Director
NSC Secretariat

5. Memorandum of Discussion at the 352d Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, January 22, 1958.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military Operations* (NSC Action No. 1814; NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1; NSC Action Nos. 1841 and 1842)

General Cutler read to the Council the Gaither Panel recommendation on the subject, as follows:

"Augment our and allied forces for *limited military operations*, and provide greater mobility, to enable us to deter or promptly suppress small wars which must not be allowed to grow into big ones. The Panel suggests that a study be undertaken, at the national rather than at a service level, to develop current doctrine on when and how nuclear weapons can contribute to limited operations."

General Cutler went on to point out that in its comments on the above recommendation, the Department of Defense had agreed that the *capabilities* of forces for limited operations should be augmented and the readiness of such forces increased, in relation to our over-all posture to meet the requirements of a general war. But Defense wished to defer implementation of this recommendation pending completion of a national-level study, a plan for which would be recommended by Defense to the Council about March 15, 1958. Secretary Dulles had expressed concern over the delay in the submission of this plan to the Council. He had also questioned the advisability of postponing action to augment the capabilities of our forces for limited operations, until after the completion of the proposed Defense Department study on this subject. Accordingly, these two questions were before the Council today. General Cutler then called upon the Secretary of State.

Secretary Dulles said that in the first place, the comments of the Department of Defense on the recommendation of the Gaither Panel were not wholly responsive to the Panel's recommendation. While we did not necessarily have to follow the Gaither Panel recommendation, that recommendation actually called for the augmenting of our *forces* for limited military operations. The Department of Defense comment, on the other hand, merely stated that we should augment the *capabilities* and the readiness of such forces. Thus there existed a discrepancy.

Secondly, continued Secretary Dulles, the Gaither Report had recommended a study of this problem at a level higher than the level of the

military services. He believed that the State Department should be brought into this study at its inception, because the kind of forces referred to in the Panel recommendation were those that the State Department was particularly interested in and on whose composition the State Department had pronounced views. Secretary Dulles went on to say, in explanation, that in the course of carrying out our foreign policy over the last five years, the State Department had sometimes felt a need for the United States to have non-nuclear-equipped forces which could, if necessary, put on a demonstration of U.S. interests in various parts of the world. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had responded well when called upon to mount such demonstrations in the past. There had been and would be occasions when aircraft carriers, air power, and even potential landing forces had been very useful in this context. Perhaps such forces should even now be deployed in the general area of Indonesia, because we do not know what will happen there. Such forces had recently proved very valuable in the Eastern Mediterranean when they had been called upon to demonstrate U.S. support of King Hussein of Jordan. Such examples illustrate in general how limited forces can be of assistance to U.S. foreign policy. Accordingly, political and foreign policy considerations should be meshed into the study by the State Department from the very beginning.

Secretary Quarles replied that Secretary Dulles' suggestion gave rise to complicated questions, and that the problem of forces for limited war was far from achieving agreement as to the implications. The Defense Department had thought it best for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to formulate a plan for the study of the problem and to submit this plan to the National Security Council through the NSC Planning Board, where the State Department member and other members of the Planning Board would have an opportunity to analyze and comment upon the JCS plan. Would such a procedure meet the point raised by Secretary Dulles? As to the other matter raised by the Secretary of State—namely, the time of submission of the JCS plan (March 15, 1958)—it was the view of the Defense Department that the problem of forces for limited war was so difficult and serious that consideration of the plan deserved the amount of time allocated. Perhaps the due date of the JCS plan could be advanced if the President so desired. Secretary Quarles then asked if General Twining could present his views on this general subject.

General Twining pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been concerned for a very long time with the problem of U.S. forces for limited military operations. Indeed, our basic national security policy called upon the Defense Department to maintain such forces. It was true that we did not have a "platoon system" of forces set apart for the specific purpose of undertaking limited military operations. Such a separate force might be very desirable, but it would surely be very expensive, and

the Joint Chiefs of Staff were now stretched to the absolute budgetary limit. In spite of this, we were capable of sending military forces today from the pool of regular military forces to any part of the world where they were needed, and to do this very rapidly.

With respect to the proposed study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Twining pointed out that in the wake of the leak of the Gaither Report the Joint Chiefs of Staff were very worried about a possible leak of our U.S. war plans. If outsiders like those on the Gaither Panel were brought into the JCS study, a leak of our war plans might actually prove fatal to our national security.

Secretary Dulles quickly pointed out that he was not suggesting that any persons outside of the Government be brought in on the formulation of the Defense Department study. He was only asking for the inclusion of State Department views on the problem of forces for limited war from the outset of the study. If these State Department views were not included, the result would be purely a military study of the problem, and we would have to go on to do another study of the problem of limited war in its political and foreign policy aspects.

General Cutler asked Secretary Dulles whether the procedure just proposed by Secretary Quarles did not meet Secretary Dulles' argument. Secretary Dulles replied that he didn't think that it quite did, because as he saw it, under Secretary Quarles' proposal the State Department did not have a chance to express its own views until the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already crystallized. Secretary Quarles then suggested the holding of a preliminary conference between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after which the Joint Chiefs would get down to work. Secretary Quarles pointed out that what the Joint Chiefs would present to the National Security Council on March 15 was only a plan for the study of forces for limited military operations, and not the study itself.

The President commented that in any event the JCS plan would have to go to the NSC Planning Board before it was considered by the National Security Council. The President and General Cutler both agreed on the desirability of the conference between the Joint Chiefs and State, suggested by Secretary Quarles, before actual work on the study was commenced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Allen Dulles inquired whether covert operations would be included in such a study. The President replied facetiously that he, of course, had no knowledge of covert operations.

Secretary Dulles then stated that he had one more question. He felt that the Defense Department comment on the original Gaither Panel recommendation seemed to prejudge in a negative sense the validity of the Panel's recommendation. This might prove to be correct, but the matter should not be prejudged. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles recommended

that the terms of reference of the JCS study should be broad enough to permit at least the consideration of the Gaither Panel recommendation in favor of augmenting our forces for limited operations as opposed to merely augmenting the capabilities and readiness of such forces.

The President said he was inclined to believe that in general the important thing was to augment the capabilities of our forces for limited war rather than increasing the size of such forces. He did not believe that the Gaither Panel recommendation was well set forth in calling for an augmentation of U.S. forces for limited military operations. However, the President expressed agreement with Secretary Dulles that the terms of reference of the JCS study should be broad enough to include consideration of whether to augment the size of our forces for limited operations. The President pointed out that we had been earnestly arguing for the augmentation of the capabilities of the military forces of the Republic of Korea, while at the same time we were seeking to cut down the force levels of the ROK armed forces.

*The National Security Council:*¹

a. Discussed the subject, and procedures for further Council action thereon, in the light of comments by the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Noted that the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would confer with the Department of State in the preparation of a plan for a coordinated study by the Departments of State and Defense pursuant to NSC Action No. 1842-g-(4); and would make the terms of reference for the study sufficiently broad to include consideration of the entire range of U.S. and allied capabilities for limited military operations.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation, and to the Secretary of State and the Chairman, JCS, for information.

[Here follow Agenda Items 2. "Long-Range U.S. Policy Toward the Middle East," 3. "Priorities for Ballistic Missile and Satellite Programs," 4. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," 5. "U.S.

¹ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 1844, approved by the President on January 24. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

Policy Toward Finland,” and 6. “U.S. Policy Toward Ethiopia.” For Agenda Item 3, see the Supplement.]²

S. Everett Gleason

² The brief discussion of Agenda Item 3 led to adoption of NSC Action No. 1846, approved by the President on January 24, establishing the following programs as having the highest developmental authority, with operational capability to be as approved by the President: Atlas and Titan ICBMs, Thor–Jupiter IRBMs, Polaris FBMs, an anti-missile missile defense system “including active defense and related early warning for defense of the United States proper,” the Vanguard and Jupiter C satellite programs, and other satellite programs “determined by the Secretary of Defense to have objectives having key political, scientific, psychological or military import.” (*Ibid.*) See the Supplement. On March 10, Eisenhower discussed the relative merits of Atlas, Titan, Thor, and Jupiter missiles with Dr. Killian and others. (Memorandum by Goodpaster, March 11; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)

6. Editorial Note

At the 353d meeting of the National Security Council on January 30, 1958, William M. Holaday, Director of Guided Missiles in the Department of Defense, gave the Council its third annual briefing on ballistic missile programs:

“At the conclusion of the presentation, Mr. Cutler noted that Mr. Holaday had displayed charts showing the following figures: 393 IRBMs, 173 Polaris missiles, and 272 ICBMs. Mr. Cutler asked whether these figures were larger than the figures previously reported because of the inclusion in the larger figure of training and test missiles. Mr. Holaday answered in the affirmative.

“Mr. Cutler said the purpose of his question was to point out that the operational capability figures approved by the President last week were smaller than the figures displayed by Mr. Holaday because the operational capability figures did not include training and test vehicles.

“Secretary McElroy noted that production of missiles had begun in advance of acquiring the research and development knowledge which, ideally, should be available in advance of production. He believed the decision to start production was correct, but wished to point out that this decision would probably entail increased expense because of design changes in the course of production. He was being pressed to move even faster, especially on Polaris, which was an attractive deterrent weapons system. The first firing of a complete Polaris would not take place until October 1959, but three Polaris submarines with missiles had already been ordered. One Senator had suggested that 100 submarines should be ordered. As we go farther down the research and development road we may have to take further gambles, but the present gamble is as big as the

Department of Defense can recommend now. If test firings were successful, Secretary McElroy hoped to recommend expansions of the missiles program.

"Dr. Killian inquired about the prospects for liquid Titan propellants other than refrigerated liquids. Mr. Holaday said present progress was slow because the technicians were leaning toward solid propellants. Some liquids looked promising, but research on these liquids would have to be pushed if progress was to be made." (Memorandum of discussion by Boggs, January 31; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

Notes dated January 30 for Holaday's presentation and Cutler's introductory remarks, attached to the memorandum, are in the Supplement.

After the discussion, the NSC noted the briefing in NSC Action No. 1850, approved by the President on January 31. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

7. Editorial Note

In the course of a conversation on February 4, 1958, among the President and several scientific advisers, the following exchange occurred:

"Dr. Kistiakowsky went on to give a technical net evaluation of our relative position respecting the Soviets. As to the ICBM, he thought they were probably about one year ahead of us in propulsion, one year behind us in warhead development, and somewhat behind us in guidance, but with a much simpler operational concept based on a mobile rail-based system. He added that because of more powerful propulsion, they could have simply designed their weapon to carry the heavier, older-style warhead. In the medium range missile of 100-600-mile range, they are probably about three years ahead of us, having initiated troop training in 1953 and 1954. Their weapons are highly mobile, using track-laying and road vehicles. In guidance they are probably behind us, with a one-mile CEP for small weapons and a five-mile CEP for large. Their IRBM is a 1000-mile missile, which is probably a 600-mile missile with a lighter warhead.

"The President said that in evaluating material of this kind it is necessary to consider relative probabilities. Until an enemy has enough operational capability to destroy most of our bases simultaneously and thus prevent retaliation by us our deterrent remains effective. We would make a mistake to credit him with total capabilities. Dr. York pointed out that an enemy who planned to make an attack could select a time for his

attack and delay until he is ready.” (Memorandum by Goodpaster, February 6; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries) The full text of the memorandum is in the Supplement.

8. Memorandum of Discussion at the 355th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, February 13, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Item 1. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.” Vice President Nixon presided at the meeting.]

2. *U.S. Policy on Continental Defense* (NSC 5408; NSC 5606;¹ NSC Actions Nos. 1574, 1781, 1814, 1815, 1841 and 1842;² Executive Order No. 10173; NSC 5802³)

General Cutler briefed the Council in detail on the history of U.S. Continental Defense policy, noting that in 1954, because of the lack of emphasis previously placed on programs for Continental Defense, the Council concluded that it would be advisable to raise to a high level of importance and urgency—in relation to other national security programs—certain military and non-military programs directly related to Continental Defense. For this purpose, a Continental Defense policy statement embracing over 30 selected programs was recommended to and approved by the President in February, 1954, as NSC 5408. General Cutler observed that in the years which have followed, the basic purpose of elevating these selected Continental Defense programs is currently reflected in our Basic Policy statement (NSC 5707/8).

General Cutler indicated that during the last four years some of these Continental Defense programs—especially those of a military

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason and J. Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative on Internal Security, on February 14.

¹ NSC 5606, entitled “Continental Defense” dated June 5, 1956. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5606 Series) Discussion of NSC 5606 at the NSC meeting on June 15, 1956, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XIX, pp. 317–333.

² NSC Action No. 1574 was approved by the President on July 9, 1956; see *ibid.*, p. 332, footnote 18. NSC Action No. 1781 was approved by the President on September 16, 1957. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) NSC Action No. 1815 was approved by the President on November 12, 1957; see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XIX, p. 676, footnote 5.

³ NSC 5802, entitled “Continental Defense,” dated February 3. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Continental Defense)

nature—have been either completed, diminished, modified, or altered in priority by reason of scientific and technological advances. Thus, the Southern Canadian Early Warning Line and the DEW Line have been established and are in operation. In addition, other Continental Defense programs are in a continuing state of implementation. As a consequence of the foregoing, it has been conceded for some time that although NSC 5408 has remained the official policy statement, many parts of it are out of date and require revision.

General Cutler noted that the Council's recent consideration of the Gaither Report and of progress in advanced weapons systems related to Continental Defense make the present time suitable to present to the Council an up-to-date statement of Continental Defense policy to replace NSC 5408. He noted that when NSC 5408 was considered in 1954, then existing circumstances made it appropriate to present the issues in the form of a group of programs rather than in the form of policy guidance. Now, however, circumstances permit the presentation of the less detailed and non-programmatic statement (NSC 5802) scheduled on today's agenda. In the latter connection, General Cutler noted that the President had recently indicated it was high time the Council issued such revised non-programmatic statement of policy.

General Cutler called attention to the scope of NSC 5802 and to the fact, as stated in paragraph 1-a, that there are many policies relating to Continental Defense (for example, our overseas base complex) which are not included in the statement. He then invited attention to paragraph 1-b, which specifically notes that although NSC 5802 does not include programs, the omission from NSC 5802 of any program which had been included in NSC 5408 does not of itself cancel or change that program. Under paragraph 1-b each responsible agency is required to determine whether a specific program is currently valid under NSC 5802 or should be cancelled or changed.

General Cutler indicated that, following the introductory and general policy statements appearing in paragraphs 1 through 5 of NSC 5802, the statement covers strategic and tactical warning (paragraphs 6 and 7), military policies (paragraphs 8 through 12), internal security and port security policies (paragraphs 13 through 19), and other non-military policies (paragraphs 20 through 27). General Cutler then invited attention to paragraph 4 of the statement, which outlines the time-phasing and urgency of the new Continental Defense policy proposed in NSC 5802, which time-phasing takes into account the recent National Intelligence Estimate on "The Soviet ICBM Program".⁴

⁴ SNIE 11-10-57, dated December 17, 1957. (*Ibid.*, INR-NIE Files) A footnote to paragraph 4 of NSC 5802 notes the estimates in SNIE 11-10-57 that the Soviet Union would have operational 10 ICBMs sometime during mid-1958 to mid-1959, 100 by mid-1959 to mid-1960, and 500 by mid-1962 at latest.

General Cutler mentioned that the compilation of this draft policy statement involved great difficulties and complications with a few resulting divergencies of view as reflected in the paper. He then proceeded to take up each of these divergencies.

After reading paragraph 8 of the draft statement,⁵ General Cutler indicated that the Science and Technology Observer at the Planning Board, with the concurrence of the State, ODM and FCDA Planning Board representatives, recommended that there be included in paragraph 8 a requirement for a high percentage kill capability against enemy aircraft or missiles approaching or operating over the North American Continent before they reach vital targets.

Dr. Killian said this point had been suggested for inclusion in the policy paper in order to raise for Council consideration the question as to whether the programs envisaged in NSC 5802 would actually achieve the objective called for in paragraph 3 of NSC 5802—namely, that the United States be prepared at all times to counter an attack on the North American continent in such a way as to deter Soviet attack, or, if an attack occurs, to insure our survival as a free nation. He said that from a technical standpoint, the air defense system we presently have and the one we have programmed will probably not achieve the aforementioned objective, and that it will probably give us a kill capability of less than 50%. It was the view of the technological experts who examined this matter that our defenses against aircraft and missiles should have a greater capacity if we are to meet the objective referred to above. It was Dr. Killian's thought that the Council should be cognizant of this technological judgment before taking final action on NSC 5802.

Secretary McElroy thought Dr. Killian's point was a valid one and, indeed, a key one. He said, however, that the Defense Department questioned whether it would be desirable to include in a paper of this kind the "high percentage" phrase. While the Secretary would agree with the percentage figures as to kill capability cited by Dr. Killian and would certainly agree that within reasonable limits every effort should be made to improve our capability, it was the belief of the Department of Defense that the phrase in issue should be eliminated from the paper. This is particularly so at this time, inasmuch as Defense is not ready to implement such a requirement even if it is included in the paper.

Secretary McElroy then called on Deputy Secretary Quarles for further comment. The latter indicated that the Defense Department experienced considerable difficulty in trying to determine the degree of increase intended by the phrase in issue. He stated that in the event of a small raid on the continental United States, we would expect to inflict a relatively high percentage of kill; whereas if the raid were a large one, we

⁵ Entitled "Active Defense Against Aircraft and Missiles."

would not expect to have such a high kill capability. He noted further that the phrase in issue could be so construed as to require a doubling of our air defense costs. He stated that the Defense Department would, of course, like to see a better air defense capability than we presently have, and went on to point out that war games which were conducted in the past reflect that under our present defense programs we have what is regarded as a solid deterrent position.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not know the precise meaning of this phrase. He thought that the language "high percentage" could be so construed that if it were fully implemented the Defense Department would be put in the position where it did not have money left to do anything else in other important defense areas.

The Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, indicated that his Bureau was encouraged to see the Defense Department supporting the Budget Bureau's position. He indicated that it was the Budget view that if the phrase in issue were included in the policy statement, it would almost imply a crash program for air defense against aircraft and missiles. The Budget Bureau was opposed to such a crash program.

Secretary McElroy thought that the problem under discussion was but one of a number of questions which would have to be faced by the country. He said that this kind of problem is becoming more complex. Today we must defend against aircraft, missiles and satellites; tomorrow who knows what we will have to defend against. He mentioned that in time we may have aircraft that will travel three times the speed of today's planes, and we may have to prepare defenses against planes of such speed. He observed that the speed with which weapons technology is moving raises and will continue to raise a variety of questions. Consequently, on a matter such as that at issue, we must ask what are the most important things that we should do, and to what extent should we do them. It was his thought that we couldn't do everything, and that we must do that which is determined to be most essential.

The Vice President, who presided at the meeting in the President's absence, said it seemed to him that in many of our policy papers of this general type, we seem to express the pious hope of achieving maximum objectives which are beyond our reach. It seemed to him that the real question was to determine how the language suggested by Dr. Killian, if included in the statement, would really affect or change what we do. He thought that all concerned realize the importance of Continental Defense. The real question was whether our Continental Defense policy on air defense against aircraft and missiles should be changed—should we expend more in this area than we presently plan?

In response to the Vice President's inquiry, Secretary McElroy expressed the thought that the inclusion of the language concerning "high percentage" would change what the Department of Defense is

endeavoring to do in this and related programs, because statements contained in NSC policies are used as the basis of military planning. Should the phrase in issue be included, the military planning in this area would be different than that now envisaged. The Vice President inquired as to whether the Defense Department feared that the inclusion of such language would take something from or otherwise divert from other important areas in which the Defense Department is working. To this, Secretary McElroy responded that there may be interference with things the Defense Department may be recommending in the future, and that such things might deserve higher priority than the priority suggested by the inclusion of the "high percentage" phrase in paragraph 8. Secretary McElroy indicated that despite this concern, the Defense Department would of course like to achieve the high capability envisaged by the phrase in issue and would strive to that end even if the particular phrase were not included in NSC 5802.

The Vice President inquired of Dr. Killian whether, in the opinion of his people, the Defense Department needs to be "revved up" in this area of Continental Defense. He asked whether Dr. Killian thought the President should indicate to the Defense Department that it should place greater emphasis on the aspect of active air defense covered in paragraph 8.

Dr. Killian expressed the view that this aspect of our Continental Defense program must be looked at in the context of other important military programs. He thought, however, that our present Continental Defense program constitutes more of a psychological than an actual deterrent and, accordingly, in approving a statement of policy on this point, the Council should bear this fact in mind. Dr. Killian continued, however, that he could not strongly advocate diverting funds to the Continental Defense program from other important programs underway.

General Cutler observed that the stated objectives of Continental Defense have always been higher than the programs to implement same, and it was his view that the purpose of Dr. Killian's raising and suggesting the language under discussion was to call attention to our technological capabilities and limitations in this area of the over-all Continental Defense program.

The Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization indicated that he favored the inclusion of the "high percentage" phrase. He joined with Dr. Killian in the latter's concern lest anyone feel we have a greater capability in the air defense area than we actually possess. He thought the real question to be considered did not involve diverting funds from other military programs to the one under discussion; rather, the bigger question to be considered was whether we want to raise the budget ceiling for Continental Defense purposes.

Secretary McElroy indicated, in response to the last point mentioned by Mr. Gray, that this immediately raised questions as to whether

any such increase in funds should be used for the programs under consideration here, or for other relatively more important programs.

General Cutler noted that since this Administration assumed office it has increased greatly expenditures on Continental Defense.

It was the Vice President's thought that the discussion on this issue indicated quite clearly that everyone is aware of the problem. As a consequence, the contested language might be eliminated from the final statement of policy on the subject, with the understanding that those concerned do desire and will strive to achieve improved air defense capabilities.

General Cutler indicated that the contested language would be eliminated from the paper as finally submitted to the President for approval; but, at the time of such submission, the President would be informed as to the pro's and con's of the Council discussion on paragraph.

As a closing note on the Council discussion of this phase of the subject, Dr. Killian noted that the problem related inevitably to the shelter program and to our general defensive capabilities. As a consequence, he thought the question of our air defense capabilities would inevitably arise when the shelter program is again considered by the Council.

General Cutler next referred to paragraph 8-b of NSC 5802, which called for the development of "an anti-ICBM weapons system operational capability as a matter of the highest national priority".

Secretary McElroy, in response to General Cutler's request, commented that the Defense Department believed the phrase "operational capability" should be omitted from the policy statement on the subject because, at this time, the problem of defending against an ICBM attack involves too many unknowns. It was the Secretary's thought that it would be premature to include in a policy statement at this time language calling for such operational capability.

Dr. Killian agreed with Secretary McElroy's point, and, in the absence of objection from other Council participants, General Cutler indicated that the phrase "operational capability" would be omitted from the revised statement of policy on the subject.

General Cutler then read paragraph 9 of NSC 5802, noting that the ODM Member of the Planning Board favored the inclusion of language which called for "hardening" as well as other protection of essential facilities.

Mr. Gray, based on his understanding that the subject would be taken up on February 27 when the Council considers the Gaither Report again, indicated that he would not push for the inclusion in this paper of the language recommended by his representative on the Planning Board. He accordingly agreed to deletion of the contested language in the draft statement of policy on Continental Defense, with the proviso that such

deletion would not prejudice its being raised when the Council considers further the Gaither Report. In the latter connection, Secretary Quarles indicated that the Defense Department would be ready to report to the Council, on February 27, on those aspects of the Gaither Report to which Mr. Gray had referred.

[Here follows discussion of port security, the potential for clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the United States, the protection and dispersal of Federal facilities, measures for the continuity of industry under attack, and stockpiling for civilian survival, all included in the Supplement.]

(Note: The above summary of the Council discussion on U.S. Policy on Continental Defense was recorded by Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative on Internal Security.)

*The National Security Council:*⁶

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5802; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, as presented at the meeting.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5802, subject to the following amendments:

(1) *Page 5, paragraph 8:* Delete the bracketed phrase and the footnote thereto.⁷

(2) *Page 6, subparagraph 8-b, 4th line:* Delete the words "operational capability".

(3) *Page 6, paragraph 9:* Delete the bracketed words and the footnote thereto.

(4) *Page 11, subparagraph 20-b:* Delete the bracketed sentence and the footnote thereto.

(5) *Page 12, paragraph 21:* Revise to read as follows:

"21. Except as otherwise determined by proper authority, new Federal facilities and major expansion of existing Federal facilities, important to national security, should not be located in target areas. The location of new or expanded military installations, excluding the Pentagon and other similar administrative headquarters, shall be within the sole discretion of the Secretary of Defense."

(6) *Pages 12-13, subparagraph 22-b:* Delete the bracketed subparagraph (2) and the footnote thereto; eliminating the numeral "(1)".

(7) *Page 13, paragraph 23:* Revise the second sentence to read as follows (deleting the footnote thereto): "Where total availabilities appear inadequate, measures should be developed to meet minimum requirements with the least disruption of the economy, the least cost to the Government, and maximum encouragement of private participation."

⁶ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 1862, approved by the President on February 19. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

⁷ That is, the language calling for a high percentage kill capability.

c. Agreed that the statement of policy in NSC 5802, as finally adopted and approved, is intended to supersede NSC 5408; but is not intended, of itself, to cancel or change any program set forth in NSC 5408, each of which programs should be reviewed by the responsible departments and agencies in accordance with paragraph 1-b of NSC 5802.⁸

d. Recommended that the responsible agencies should use, on a continuing basis, available passive devices for the detection of fissionable material, pursuant to paragraph 14 of NSC 5802.

e. Noted that the Department of State would undertake to examine and report at the next Council meeting, on whether, if there were substantial evidence that any shipment entering the United States under diplomatic immunity contained radioactive material, the Department should advise the diplomatic representatives of the country concerned that the shipment would be opened by U.S. officials, in the presence of representatives of such country, to determine the nature of the radioactive material.

f. Requested the Departments of the Treasury and Justice, in view of the decision in *Parker v. Lester*:⁹

(1) To draft an Executive Order, to supersede Executive Order No. 10173, which will enable Federal authorities to take the most effective action possible in the circumstances to deny access to U.S. merchant vessels, ports, and waterfront facilities on the part of individuals considered inimical to the security of the United States.

(2) To draft proposed legislation, which would enable Federal authorities to take more effective action in this area, for consideration for submission at this session of the Congress.

g. Requested the Department of the Treasury to prepare for Presidential approval the programs to implement all aspects of paragraph 19 of NSC 5802; such draft to include (1) instructions taking into account the new Executive Order referred to in f-(1) above and (2) appropriate provisions along the lines of those stated in NSC Action No. 1781 (which related U.S. policy toward Poland to the port security provisions of NSC 5408).

Note: NSC 5802, as amended and adopted, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5802/1¹⁰ for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Govern-

⁸ Paragraph 1-b called for agencies to review Continental Defense programs "in the light of this policy statement to determine whether such programs are currently valid or should be cancelled or changed."

⁹ In this 1955 decision, a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that certain procedures in Executive Order 10173 violated minimum requirements of due process.

¹⁰ For text of NSC 5802/1, "Continental Defense," dated February 19, see the Supplement. NSC 5802/1 contains certain pages as revised by NSC Action No. 1911, May 15, and another as revised by NSC Action No. 2249, June 29, 1960. (Both in Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Regarding NSC Action No. 2249, see Document 105.

ment (together with the action in c above, as approved by the President); and referred to the departments and agencies indicated in the table on "Primary Responsibilities for Implementation" (with the exception of the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency) for report, in a special annex to their respective annual status reports, on progress in implementing the appropriate paragraphs of NSC 5802/1.

The action in d and f above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General for appropriate implementation.

The action in e above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate implementation.

The action in g above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury for appropriate implementation.

[Here follow Agenda Items 2. "NSC 123," and 3. "U.S. Policy Toward Turkey."]

S. Everett Gleason

9. Memorandum of Discussion at the 356th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, February 27, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Item 1. "U.S. Economic Defense Policy."]

2. *Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee* (NSC Action No. 1814; NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1841 and 1842)

General Cutler, in his briefing on this item, pointed out that the Department of Defense was to present a report on certain military recommendations included in the so-called "Gaither Report" for which there had not been sufficient time for discussion before the Council at its January 6 meeting.¹

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on February 28.

¹ For text, see the Supplement.

The first item to be reported on was whether to produce additional first-generation ICBMs beyond the 130 currently programmed to be operational prior to the end of 1963; whether to build additional launching sites required for an operational capability of such additional ICBMs; and whether to harden such additional launching sites.

The second item, continued General Cutler, was whether to order now production of more than three Polaris submarine missiles systems and whether possibly further to accelerate Polaris production.

The third matter was whether to utilize modified existing anti-aircraft missiles (Talos) as interim defense against ICBM attack at SAC bases, pending the development of an initial operational capability of the more effective Nike-Zeus anti-missile missiles.

The fourth matter was whether to harden SAC bases by providing blast shelters for a large part of SAC planes, weapons, personnel, and supplies.

The report on the first three of the aforementioned matters was presented by Mr. William Holaday, Director of Guided Missiles, Department of Defense. (A copy of Mr. Holaday's report on these three items is included in the minutes of the meeting.)² In the course of his report, Mr. Holaday made use of charts which indicated force objectives and estimated fund requirements.

At the conclusion of Mr. Holaday's report, the President inquired whether the Talos missile was better than the Nike-Zeus anti-missile missiles. Mr. Holaday replied in the negative, but pointed out that at this time the Talos program was further advanced than the Nike-Zeus. Accordingly, we must decide whether the Soviet threat in the years just ahead justifies going on with Talos or moving into Nike-Zeus.

Thereafter, General Cutler called on Dr. Killian for any comments that he desired to make on Mr. Holaday's report.

Dr. Killian stated that with respect to the first and second items (ICBM and Polaris), he would say that we are reaching a point where it is necessary to undertake an over-all review of our U.S. ballistic missiles programs, particularly in view of the possibility of achieving a solid proppant ICBM (the so-called "Minute Man").

As to the Titan program, Dr. Killian commented that it looked promising and appeared to be subject to greater improvement in the future than did the Atlas, the prospects for improving which were not so considerable. Accordingly, it might be better to put our money on Titan rather than on Atlas. This question should be part of the general review which he was recommending. On the other hand, Dr. Killian warned that

² Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File)

we should not jump to the conclusion that a solid propellant ICBM was near at hand and stake too much on that assumption.

With respect to the Polaris missile, Dr. Killian pointed out the extreme complexities we were encountering in developing navigation and guidance systems. He also pointed out the very high cost per missile of the nuclear submarine program. (A copy of Dr. Killian's comments is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)³

When Dr. Killian had completed his comments on Mr. Holaday's report, the President inquired whether what they had been listening to did not emphasize the need for a centralized research on fuels because these fuels were used all across the board. The President said he would put such centralized research under the Secretary of Defense. In response, Dr. Killian pointed out that research on solid propellant fuels differs in important respects from research on liquid propellant fuels.

Secretary Dulles indicated that he had some observations to make. He then pointed out that in any over-all review of our U.S. missiles programs such as had been suggested, it would be of great importance to take political considerations into account, particularly in the matter of deploying our missiles on the territories of our allies. We must not assume that we can station intermediate-range missiles anywhere we want on the territories of our allies. Nor would we be sanguine on the point of how dependable our missile bases overseas will turn out to be in practice. To make his point clear, Secretary Dulles indicated that we had required a year to complete our negotiations with the United Kingdom (our strongest ally) on stationing IRBMs in the United Kingdom. In short, Secretary Dulles said he felt that we could not stake the security of the United States on missiles deployed and based on foreign soil. We must depend in the first instance on ballistic missiles deployed on U.S. soil or in U.S. submarines.

The President said he had one comment to make on all this discussion—namely, that we were not going to carry out all these plans and still maintain a free economy in the United States.

At this point General Cutler asked Secretary McElroy when he estimated that the over-all review of the U.S. missiles program would be completed. Would it be by April 1? Secretary McElroy replied that the President would have made a decision on a number of moot points by April 1, but not on all.

General Cutler then called on Secretary Quarles for the fourth in the series of Defense Department reports—namely, on whether to harden SAC bases. Secretary Quarles made his report, and noted that the review of this matter in the Defense Department had confirmed the earlier position of the Defense Department that it did not concur in the recommen-

³ Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

dition of the Gaither Panel relative to providing blast shelter at SAC bases. (A copy of Secretary Quarles' report is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)⁴

Asked by General Cutler to comment, Dr. Killian expressed the opinion that Secretary Quarles' reasoning against hardening SAC bases appeared persuasive, though Dr. Killian hoped that this opinion would not be interpreted to exclude the possibility of a limited and selected hardening of SAC bases as opposed to a total hardening program for SAC bases. Secretary Quarles replied that the possibility of a special and limited hardening of selected SAC bases could very well be kept in the picture.

Dr. Killian then added that he had a question to put to Secretary Quarles. What were the actual pounds per square inch (PSI) levels in use for protecting SAC headquarters and other Air Force command headquarters? He believed that the level was 30 PSI and he feared that this would leave such headquarters vulnerable. Secretary Quarles admitted that a direct or near hit by a megaton bomb would destroy SAC headquarters. It was terribly costly even to provide a 30-PSI level of protection. If we attempted to provide protection at the level of 100 PSI, the costs would go out of sight.

The President asked what additional protection could be afforded installations by layered reinforced concrete, noting that we had been unable to destroy the German submarine pens even with direct hits by the bloc-busters of World War II. Secretary Quarles replied to the President by indicating that over-pressure of 2 PSI would destroy aircraft on the runways. An over-pressure of 10 PSI would destroy a reinforced steel building.

The Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization stated his agreement with the views of the Department of Defense that it was not wise to adopt now a program of hardening all SAC bases; but Mr. Gray expressed the hope that we could follow out Dr. Killian's suggestion for a limited hardening program for certain selected SAC bases.

*The National Security Council:*⁵

a. Noted and discussed an oral report by the Department of Defense:

(1) On the status of its studies pursuant to NSC Action No. 1842-g-(1), -(2) and -(3).

(2) Confirming, after further review, its comment in NSC 5724/1 that it does not concur in and would not propose to carry out Recommen-

⁴ Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

⁵ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 1866, approved by the President on March 3. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

dation III-A-2-d of the Security Resources Panel Report (NSC 5724), relative to providing blast shelters at SAC bases.

b. Noted the comment by the Secretary of State that the development of U.S. ballistic missiles programs should take account of foreign political conditions which could involve a risk to U.S. security through undue dependence upon deployment of such missiles in areas not under secure U.S. control.

c. Noted that the Secretary of Defense would:

(1) Report to the Council, prior to April 15, as to his recommendations regarding the measures referred to in NSC Action No. 1842-g-(1), -(2) and -(3).

(2) Keep under review the feasibility and desirability of providing blast shelters for a limited number of selected SAC bases.

Note: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

[Here follow Agenda Items 3. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," and 4. "Shipments Entering the United States Under Diplomatic Immunity" (included in the Supplement).]

S. Everett Gleason

10. Memorandum of Discussion at the 358th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, March 13, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Items 1. "Recommended Revisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directives," 2. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," and 3. "Possible U.S. Actions in Support of Pro-Western Nations in the Middle East."]

4. *U.S. Overseas Military Bases* (Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 14 and February 14 and 24, 1958)¹

General Cutler briefed the Council in considerable detail on the contents of the Nash Report, which he described as a remarkably fine, comprehensive and detailed study, and one which should be most useful to appropriate operating personnel as a source of information and guidance. On the other hand, there were only a few significant issues which the Planning Board had thought should be brought to the Council's attention and on which the Planning Board had made recommendations. (A copy of General Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and a copy is likewise attached to this memorandum.)²

When General Cutler had finished his briefing, he read the main thesis of the Nash Report, summarizing Mr. Nash's statement on the present and future need for the base system,³ the comments of the Planning Board, and their recommendation that the National Security Council accept the Planning Board statement as to the validity of the thesis on the present and future need of an overseas base system. He read the Planning Board's recommendation as follows:

"The tremendous changes in weapons technology will not, in the immediate future, alter the need for substantially our present overseas base system. Most probably for at least five years, this system will remain essential (a) to maintain and disperse our deterrent to general war; (b) to maintain tactical forces to deter and cope with local aggression; and (c) to support foreign policy objectives. In fact, a small net expansion for our base system may be required, at least initially, to accommodate new weapons and to meet new Soviet offensive techniques."

Pointing out the proposed changes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—to wit, that the term "in the immediate future" in the second line should be changed to read "for the foreseeable future" and that the term "tactical forces" in line 7 and the word "small" in line 9 should be omitted—General Cutler inquired of General Taylor whether he felt strongly about the desirability of incorporating the changes proposed by the Joint

¹ The January 14 memorandum transmitted the study by Frank C. Nash, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, entitled "United States Overseas Bases: Report to the President," dated December 1957. (Department of State, EUR/RPM Files: Lot 64 D 444, Nash Report) For information on the report, see *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, vol. XIX, pp. 709–710. The February 14 memorandum transmitted the recommendations of the Planning Board on the Nash Report. The February 24 memorandum transmitted the views of the JCS on the recommendations of the Planning Board. (Both in Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records) The February 14 memorandum and enclosure are in the Supplement.

² For text, see the Supplement.

³ This thesis was that the base system was a key to U.S. national survival and that over the following 10 years, despite changes in weapons technology, its general scope and pattern were not likely to change. Base needs might even increase, at least initially, to accommodate new weapons, meet new Soviet offensive techniques, and disperse forces.

Chiefs. General Taylor⁴ replied that he personally did not. The President intervened in the discussion that followed, to state that after all, the members of the National Security Council were not prophesying columnists whose views were valid as to the length of time that we would need our present overseas base system. He therefore suggested that the above recommendation be revised to indicate that the situation was going to change progressively and rapidly over the next ten years, and that we should conduct a review of our base system each year.

General Cutler turned to the next issue selected by the Planning Board, namely, the issue of stationing IRBMs around the Sino-Soviet periphery. He read the Planning Board recommendation on this issue as follows:

“In view of the prospective Soviet ICBM capability and the resulting increase in the vulnerability of the continental United States, our continued ability to deter general war will be better ensured by the positioning of IRBM’s in selected areas around the Sino-Soviet periphery. Such positioning must be carefully planned to avoid pressing the Sino-Soviet bloc to the point that may incline it to miscalculate our objectives and conclude that our intentions have become aggressive, thereby making it feel obligated to react violently. [The implications of positioning IRBM’s around the Sino-Soviet periphery outside the NATO area are of such import that a decision to do so should be made through NSC procedures, only in light of the over-all advantages and disadvantages.]”⁵

“*ODM–Treasury–Budget proposal.”

After General Cutler had explained why the ODM, Treasury and Budget members of the Planning Board had felt it desirable to include the bracketed last sentence of the above recommendation, and why the majority of the Planning Board had objected to its inclusion, the President expressed his hearty agreement with the ODM–Treasury–Budget proposed addition. He took issue with the majority view that this was solely a military matter, and said that it seemed plain to him that the decision involved more than military matters. Secretary Herter agreed with the President on the strong political element involved in a decision to station IRBMs in bases on the Sino-Soviet periphery outside of NATO. Accordingly, the ODM–Treasury–Budget language was included.

On the third issue—namely, a Western Mediterranean Pact—General Cutler read the Planning Board recommendation as follows:

“Consideration is being given by the Departments of State and Defense to the feasibility and desirability of a Western Mediterranean defense arrangement embracing Spain, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya.”

⁴ General Maxwell D. Taylor was representing Chairman of the JCS General Twining.

⁵ Brackets in the source text.

The Council adopted the Planning Board language without discussion or change.

On the fourth issue—a chain of bases in Central Africa—General Cutler read the Planning Board recommendation as follows:

“The United States should not, at this time, establish a line of ‘back bases’ across the waist of Africa; but should, in accordance with NSC 5719/1,⁶ keep the area under periodic survey to determine any changes in our strategic requirements.”

General Cutler then noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed the addition at the end of the above recommendation of the following language: “and develop political accommodation that would promote assurance of early success if base rights are needed in the future.”

After a brief discussion, Secretary Herter said that he could perceive no objection to the added language, but that he would like to know what particular African countries were involved in a possible new base chain, so that the State Department could commence to prepare the ground.

General Cutler then referred to the fifth issue, on “Alternative Bases in the Far East”, reading the Planning Board recommendation as follows:

“Because of weaknesses in our present Far East defense perimeter and the increased threat inherent in Soviet missile achievements, the Department of Defense should continue to study the desirability and feasibility of alternatives to our present bases in the area as a means of increasing dispersal and establishing bases in the most politically reliable areas.”

[Here follows discussion of the creation of a stockpile in Australia, the Organization of American States, and criminal jurisdiction over U.S. forces stationed abroad, included in the Supplement.]

As he was leaving, the President adverted once again to the discussion of the U.S. base structure overseas. He spoke with earnestness to the effect that the whole matter should be the subject of soul-searching in order to determine the *net* value and advantage of each of these bases to the United States. He was not, he insisted, asking for any new study, but instead asking each responsible official to keep this matter constantly in mind. There was grave question, he said, in his own mind as to the *net* value of many of our overseas bases, although there were, of course, exceptions such as Okinawa and the Bonins.

[Here follows discussion of the sharing of defense responsibilities with Canada, included in the Supplement.]

⁶ Entitled “Africa South of the Sahara,” dated August 23, 1957. For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XVIII, pp. 75–87.

*The National Security Council:*⁷

a. Noted and discussed the report by the NSC Planning Board (transmitted by the reference memorandum of February 14, 1958) on main issues of the Report to the President on the subject prepared by the late Mr. Frank C. Nash and transmitted by the reference memorandum of January 14, 1958; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of February 24, 1958.

b. Adopted the recommendations contained in the Planning Board report enclosed with the reference memorandum of February 14, 1958, subject to the following revisions:

(1) *Recommendation 1, page 2:* Revise to read as follows:

“Progressively the situation, as affected by tremendous developments in weapons technology and other factors, is going to change rapidly over the next ten years the need for our present overseas base system. Accordingly, while an overseas base system will most probably remain essential (a) to maintain and disperse our deterrent to general war, (b) to maintain forces to deter and cope with local aggression, and (c) to support foreign policy objectives; each year the then-existing base system should be reviewed. In fact, a small net expansion of our base system may be required, at least initially, to accommodate new weapons and to meet Soviet offensive techniques.”

(2) *Recommendation 2, page 4:* Include the bracketed sentence, deleting the brackets and the footnote thereto.

(3) *Recommendation 4, page 6:* Add at the end of the sentence the following words: “and develop political accommodation that would promote assurance of early success if base rights are needed in the future.”

(4) *Recommendation 6, page 8:* Delete the bracketed word and the footnote thereto; and substitute in its place the words “in the foreseeable future”.⁸

(5) *Recommendation 8, page 12:* Delete the phrase “, where feasible,” in the first sentence; and include the second sentence, deleting the brackets and the footnote thereto.⁹

(6) *Recommendation 9, page 14:* Substitute for both the majority and the ODM proposals the following: “The Departments of State and Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization should study and report

⁷ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 1876, approved by the President on March 15. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

⁸ As modified, the recommendation provided that in the foreseeable future the United States should not transfer mothballed merchant ships to or establish grain stockpiles in Australia, but that studies should be made under pertinent provisions of NSC 5802/1 for taking both measures “outside the continental United States.”

⁹ As modified, this recommendation called for the United States to obtain in all countries where its forces were stationed criminal jurisdiction arrangements at least as favorable as those in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, and that in countries where this was not feasible, forces should be stationed only if the Secretaries of State and Defense determined that overriding national interests demanded their presence.

to the National Security Council on the need for and possible scope of a statement of policy on U.S. relations with Canada.”

c. Noted the statement by the President that earnest and continuous scrutiny should be given by all appropriate officials as to whether each U.S. overseas base throughout the world continues to represent a net advantage to U.S. security.

d. Recommended that the President authorize the responsible agencies to circulate the Nash report, together with the recommendations adopted pursuant to b above, and the statement by the President in c above, to key operating personnel in this country and overseas, for information and such action as each agency deems appropriate consistent with approved national security policy. Distribution of the full Report, because of its sensitivity, should be limited to key operating personnel, and only appropriate extracts from the Report should be circulated to personnel having particular responsibility for specific subjects.

Note: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to all interested departments and agencies for appropriate action in accordance with d above.

S. Everett Gleason

11. Paper by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler)

Washington, March 16, 1958.

MASSIVE EXCHANGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

It is necessary, in planning for the use of nuclear weapons on a massive scale, to give greater weight than before to *other* than purely military considerations.

(1) When nuclear weapons originally became available, the “military requirements” therefor were “all the nuclear weapons that could be

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Secret. A marginal note by Cutler reads: “5:30-7 discussed with P[resident] March 20 with Herter, Goodpaster, Sprague, Killian, Strauss, Cutler. Strongly approved by him. RC”.

produced and as rapidly as possible." Since that time, "military requirements" for nuclear weapons and the number of targets to be destroyed have increased as increased numbers of nuclear weapons became available. (Greatly improved hard intelligence-gathering in the last few years has contributed to this increase in targets.)

(2) Assume that current planning calls for the destruction of some 0000 military targets in enemy territory. The accomplishment of this objective will require the detonation of nuclear weapons involving *several million kilotons*.

(3) A recent exercise¹ indicated that, in fifteen hours of preliminary exchange between the aggressor and the U.S., nuclear weapons involving *7 million kilotons*² (over half of it in the first three hours) would be detonated; with the U.S. going on to win with still *further* detonations against the enemy. Thus, this exercise contemplated nuclear explosions in North America, Europe, Asia, and North Africa, occurring within a half-day, which were *350,000* times as great in magnitude as the nuclear explosion at Hiroshima (which resulted in over 130,000 casualties—64,000 killed, 72,000 injured).

(4) The effect of any such exchange is quite incalculable. No one knows what the concentrated explosion of 7,000,000 KT's (7,000 MT's) involving nuclear material would do [to] the weather, to crop cycles, to human reproduction, to the population of *all* areas of the world (whether or not directly exposed to the detonation). It is possible that life on the planet might be extinguished.

(5) Assume that 0000 military targets are reasonable and appropriate in the case of an attack launching *preventive* war. Would such a large number of military targets be reasonable or appropriate in the case of a U.S. *retaliatory* strike following a major nuclear attack on the U.S.? In this contingency, it is believed that our remaining air strike and missile capability: *first*—would not be capable of effectively attacking as many as 0000 targets; *second*—would not be capable of readily discriminating between those enemy military targets which (because their military aircraft or missiles had already been launched) were no longer of value, and those enemy military targets still valid for attack. In the *third* place, for a *retaliatory* action by the U.S., perhaps 000 hostile targets (1/10 the number above-indicated) would quite as adequately support the concept of deterrence. That is, the enemy would be equally deterred from attacking the U.S., if the enemy knew we would, in retaliation, destroy their 000 population centers instead of only some of their 0000 military installations.

¹ Not further identified.

² This phrase was double-underscored on the source text.

The foregoing commentary suggests military re-examination of hostile targets in the event of *retaliatory* action and a need for strict civilian control over the objectives upon which "military requirements" for nuclear weapons and forces are based. "Military requirements" for nuclear weapons and forces should not exceed the possible and most effective use of weapons and forces made available—at vast expense—to meet such "requirements."

(6) It is apparent that there are considerations, other than military, which must control the massive production and use of nuclear weapons and delivery forces.

12. Memorandum of Discussion at the 359th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, March 20, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Items 1. "Measures To Carry Out the Concept of Shelter," 2. "Soviet Defense and Air-Raid Shelter Construction," (both included in the Supplement), and 3. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security."]

4. *Estimate of the World Situation* (NIE 100-58)¹

General Cutler briefed the Council on the relationship between the new estimate of the world situation and the problem of revising our basic national security policy, on which task the NSC Planning Board was already engaged. (A copy of General Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)²

After pointing out the difficulty of preparing such an estimate, which required the contributions of the entire intelligence community,

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on March 21.

¹ Entitled "Estimate of the World Situation," dated February 26, 1958. (Department of State, INR-NIE Files) For text, see the Supplement.

² Dated March 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File)

Mr. Allen Dulles read a summary of what he considered the most significant changes between the present estimate and the "Estimate of the World Situation" made last year. In the meantime, General Cutler had distributed a statement entitled "Important Points in the Estimate of the World Situation (NIE 100-58)", which had been selected by the NSC Planning Board. (A copy of this statement is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)³

When Mr. Allen Dulles had finished his summary, General Cutler explained that the statement he had just distributed represented an independent effort by the Planning Board to focus the Council's attention on four or five major points in this very disturbing estimate of the world situation. There was not any difference, essentially, between what Mr. Dulles had just said than the points which the Planning Board had singled out. It was the hope of the Planning Board, through this device, to obtain some expression of opinion from the Council by way of guidance in the current review of our basic national security policy.

General Cutler then summarized briefly the material in the written Planning Board statement contained under the heading "Soviet Strength and Intentions" and under the heading "The State of Mutual Deterrence and Deterioration in the Western Position". General Cutler said it was the latter development which he personally found to be the most disturbing in the entire estimate.⁴ The estimate's conclusions under this heading made many of the Planning Board wonder what new long-range change, if any, we could find as a means of dealing with the situation. Should the United States, asked General Cutler, in the face of the estimate's conclusions on mutual deterrence and the deterioration of the Western position, continue our existing national strategy? Or should the United States proceed to exert greater pressures on the Soviet Union? Or, finally, should we seek an accommodation with the Soviets by offering them concessions? General Cutler said he thought it would be valuable if the Secretary of State would comment on the first two points—to-wit, "Soviet Strength and Intentions" and "The State of Mutual Deterrence and Deterioration in the Western Position". The other points in the written statements had been sufficiently covered by Mr. Allen Dulles, in particular the serious problem created by the capability of the USSR to direct

³ Undated. For text, see the Supplement.

⁴ Under this heading, the Planning Board statement summarized portions of NIE 100-58 that concluded that the United States and the Soviet Union would soon achieve a state of mutual deterrence, under which each would try to avoid a general nuclear conflict. In this circumstance, potentially disruptive forces within NATO were stimulated and some friendly nations feared that the United States would no longer be willing to threaten nuclear retaliation in their interests. The Soviets would grow bolder and there would be a general weakening of "Free World" alliances accompanied by lowered confidence in U.S. leadership and military power. Respect for Soviet achievements, meanwhile, would grow.

its economic strength in support of any internal-external policy which it believed would help it achieve world leadership.

In response to General Cutler's invitation, Secretary Dulles said that he did have one or two observations to make on this estimate. In the first place, the estimate paid far too much attention to our U.S. problems than it did to the problems which confronted the Soviet Union. Doubtless if the Soviets had written a similar estimate, they would have emphasized their own problems more than the problems which faced the United States.

Secondly, said Secretary Dulles, there was another fact which must be constantly borne in mind. It was true that the USSR had now achieved greater influence in the world than it possessed eight or ten years ago. This is primarily due to the fact that the behavior of the Soviet Union was better now than it had been then. In its attempts to control the destinies of other countries, it is much more sophisticated and subtle. The Soviet Union no longer dares try to reduce other countries to its control by direct and forceful action, but feels obliged to use more subtle approaches. Not only can we not prevent this improvement in the behavior of the Soviet Union, it was a question whether we wanted to prevent this improvement. Doubtless the ultimate intentions of the Soviets were still bad, but their behavior, at least, was better, and ultimately the Soviets may become more civilized.

There was yet another serious problem, said Secretary Dulles, which had not been stressed in this intelligence estimate but which he had been aware of and most recently in his trip to the Far East. In scanning English-language publications in Far Eastern cities, the basic fact had struck him that nothing in the way of news comes out of the USSR except what the Soviets want to have come out. On the other hand, hardly any news comes out of the United States that we really want to come out. Nothing more contributes to increasing the influence of the USSR and lessening the influence of the United States than this fact. Bellacose statements by U.S. Congressmen and all kinds of sensational stuff which essentially misrepresents the United States is headline news in these newspapers and journals. It was a question as to how long we could stand this contrast with the news emanating from the Soviet Union. Secretary Dulles confessed that he did not know how to deal effectively with this problem.

When Secretary Dulles had completed his remarks, General Cutler expressed himself as being comforted by the first two observations which Secretary Dulles had made; but he asked Secretary Dulles then to speak of the problem of mutual deterrence and the potentially disruptive forces which the state of mutual deterrence has stimulated within the Western alliance. What are we going to do about the fear of our allies that

the United States will not use its nuclear retaliatory capability to protect these allies from Soviet aggression?

Secretary Dulles said he could not understand what so concerned General Cutler, inasmuch as we proposed, of course, to protect our allies by invoking our retaliatory capability in the event that their vital interests are threatened. Furthermore, continued Secretary Dulles, he did not share the view that our allies were losing faith in our will to make use of our nuclear retaliatory capability in the event of Soviet attack.

General Cutler said that the issue still seemed somewhat doubtful to him. Secretary Dulles replied that if it did, General Cutler must be aware that our allies would soon have their own nuclear weapons. Moreover, mutual deterrence would not only apply to large wars but, to some degree at least, it would also apply to little wars. Did General Cutler object to this situation? What was wrong with mutual deterrence? Did General Cutler advocate war?

General Cutler replied that he was simply suggesting that once the Russians fully realized the existence of the state of mutual deterrence, they would nibble their way into the fabric of the Free World by small aggressions. Secretary Dulles disagreed with General Cutler's view, and thought the Soviets were no more likely to take such risks than was the United States. In strong support of Secretary Dulles' view, the President cited our ties to Formosa and the effect of the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine. General Cutler, however, stuck to his point of view in the argument, and added that of course we did not have conventional forces available to meet the conventional forces which the Soviet bloc could use against us in limited war.

Mr. Allen Dulles thought that Soviet aggression through recourse to limited wars presented the United States with much less of a problem than was presented by developments such as those in Indonesia, which the Soviets could effectively exploit to weaken the Free World. Secretary Dulles commented that in the three situations which most greatly concern the United States today—namely, Indonesia, North Africa, and the Middle East—the directing forces were not Communist, but primarily forces favorable personally to a Sukarno, a Nasser, or the like. Developments in these areas had not been initiated by Soviet plots.

General Cutler replied that, in short, the Soviets were not obliged to do the work themselves; it was being done for them. The President took vigorous exception to this interpretation by General Cutler, and in turn, Secretary Dulles insisted that the Soviets would not dare today to repeat again what they had done in Czechoslovakia. If they did so, the facade of respectability which they had so assiduously built up would collapse. Mr. Allen Dulles expressed disagreement with this view of the Secretary of State. He said he felt that the Secretary's argument might apply to what the Soviets would not dare to do in Berlin, but he felt obliged to

point out that the Communist take-over of Czechoslovakia had not involved any Soviet troops. Secretary Dulles agreed that this was so, but insisted that in general the Communist take-over of Czechoslovakia had been the result of heavy Soviet pressure and of fear of Soviet power. The President expressed hearty agreement with this diagnosis, and said that he could speak from personal experience that fear of Soviet Communism was what had induced the democratic leaders of Czechoslovakia to cave in before the demands of local Communists.

Against Secretary Dulles' argument that the Soviets would now no longer dare to repeat what they had done in Czechoslovakia for fear of losing face in the world, Mr. Allen Dulles cited the case of Hungary. Secretary Dulles replied that this was somewhat different, because in the case of Hungary the Soviets were not seizing territory which they had never controlled, but were rather holding on to something that they had previously had under their control.

Secretary McElroy intervened to state that his really great concern related to the question as to whether in a democracy like the United States we could successfully engage in real economic competition with the USSR, expend the necessary resources to do this, and still be assured of popular and Congressional support. Secretary McElroy felt that this kind of all-out contest with the Soviet Union was much more likely in the future than was general war. The President commented that he couldn't agree more, but there would be very few votes in Congress in support of such competition. Secretary McElroy agreed, and said he wondered whether we were not approaching a time when we will have to do a little packaging of such a program, as we had done in the Marshall Plan, rather than meeting Soviet economic competition in a piecemeal fashion. The President replied that until recently we had thought that we were making real progress with the Congress in this field because the Democrats had always been strong supporters of the foreign aid program; but they were now turning against it, and the Republicans were the majority supporters of the program. It was pointed out that the South, as it became more heavily industrialized, was turning against foreign aid programs.

Secretary Anderson counseled that the Government should study very carefully certain selected economic projects around the world which gave promise of extraordinary value. As an example he cited study of projects of possible alternative routes to carry Middle Eastern oil to Europe, since the present routes were controlled by forces hostile to the West. Another instance was Africa, where Secretary Anderson believed that development might prove wholly theoretical except in so far as Africa can distribute its exports. It would be profitable for us to study how best this distribution could be made.

*The National Security Council:*⁵

a. Noted a National Intelligence Estimate on the subject (NIE 100–58) as summarized at the meeting by the Director of Central Intelligence.

b. Discussed important points in the subject estimate, on the basis of a statement of such points submitted by the NSC Planning Board and distributed at the meeting.

[Here follows Agenda Item 5. "Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military Operations," included in the Supplement.]

S. Everett Gleason

⁵ The following paragraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1880, approved by the President on March 21. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

13. Editorial Note

At its 360th meeting on March 27, 1958, the National Security Council discussed NSC 5807, "Measures To Carry Out the Concept of Shelter," dated March 14. Prior to the meeting, on March 24 and 26, Lay transmitted the views of the Planning Board and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, respectively. After discussion, the Council directed that a research and development program go forward, along with a limited program of prototype construction. These measures are described at some length in NSC 5807/1, dated April 2.

At its meeting on July 14, the NSC considered several reports prepared in accordance with its action at the March 27 meeting. The reports are identified and summarized in a memorandum from Bromley Smith to Secretary Dulles, July 10. The NSC also briefly considered the question of shelter at its meetings on December 11 and 18. NSC 5807/2, dated December 24, summarizes NSC consideration of shelter during 1958.

The memoranda of discussion of these four NSC meetings are in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. All the other documents cited are in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5807 Series. With the exception of the memoranda of discussion of the NSC meetings held on December 11 and 18, all the documents cited are in the Supplement.

14. Editorial Note

During a conversation on April 1, 1958, President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles discussed national security policy as follows:

"3. I discussed with the President the question of our national strategic concept. I expressed the view that this too much invoked massive nuclear attack in the event of any clash anywhere of U.S. with Soviet forces. I expressed the opinion that this question should be reviewed. I pointed out that there were, I thought, increasing possibilities of effective defense through tactical nuclear weapons and other means short of wholesale obliteration of the Soviet Union, and that I thought these should be developed more rapidly. I pointed out that there was a certain vicious circle in that so long as the strategic concept contemplated this, our arsenal of weapons had to be adapted primarily to that purpose and so long as our arsenal of weapons was adequate only for that kind of a response, we were compelled to rely on that kind of response. I referred to the passage in my *Foreign Affairs* article of October 1957 which I recalled the President had approved, although I said obviously this approval of the article did not in any way commit the President on this specific point.

"I said, of course, our deterrent power might be somewhat weakened if it were known that we contemplated anything less than massive retaliation and therefore the matter had to be handled with the greatest care.

"The President said he, too, was under the impression that our strategic concept did not adequately take account of the possibilities of limited war.

"I suggested that this should be studied at a high level. I said I thought it a waste of time to have this studied by the regular members of the NSC Planning Board. The President agreed and said he would ask General Goodpaster to set up a group composed of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman and members of the JCS, Admiral Strauss and myself, with perhaps the participation of General Cutler, to study this matter directly and to make a report to him for his decision." (Memorandum of conversation by Dulles; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Memoranda of Conversation with the President. The *Foreign Affairs* article is entitled "Challenge and Response in United States Policy," pages 25-43.)

Dulles also discussed limited war with Goodpaster on April 3. (Memorandum by Greene; Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military Issues 1958-1959)

15. Note by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler)

Washington, April 2, 1958.

GUIDANCE FROM PRESIDENT ON CONDUCT OF COUNCIL MEETINGS

The President expressed a strong preference that future Council Meetings should focus *less* on discussion of papers and *more* on discussion of issues.

From this latter type of discussion, guidance would flow to the Planning Board, which had enough authority correctly to draft the necessary papers on the basis of the discussion of issues.

He said that, in the first term, there was necessity to review all existing policy papers; but that, now we had completed that work, he hoped the Council could discuss provocative issues which required high-level thought.

He pointed out that the Cabinet, from time to time, had half-hour executive sessions preceding the Cabinet Meeting which were devoted entirely to oral discussion of important topics. He thought Cabinet Members found these sessions most helpful in their work.

I replied that it was necessary for the NSC to operate largely on written-out papers, because NSC papers were the basis of planning and of budgetary expenditures throughout the Government. However, I thought such papers could be used as a springboard for discussing at Council Meetings the *basic issues* which they covered rather than concentrating attention on the papers themselves. The President approved such a procedure.

The President also indicated that OCB progress reports, special reports, and intelligence briefings were not in the category he had been talking about.

Mr. Lay pointed out that minor changes in existing policies could be, and were being, handled through the Planning Board and a Council-vote-slip procedure, instead of using up Council time for their consideration. The President approved such a procedure.

R.C.¹

16. Memorandum of Discussion at the 361st Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, April 3, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Items 1. "Monitoring a Long Range Rocket Agreement," 2. "Technical Feasibility of Cessation of Nuclear Tests," and 3. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security." For Agenda Items 1 and 2, see Document 148.]

4. *Launching of SAC Alert Forces ("Fail Safe")*

General Cutler introduced the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command, General Power, who, after a few introductory remarks, indicated that Colonel Wisman of his staff would brief the Council on the launching of the SAC alert forces ("Fail Safe").¹

The President seemed extremely pleased with this discussion of the procedure for launching SAC alert forces, and noted that this was something we had been talking about for years and had wondered why we couldn't have it. The President then inquired whether our SAC alert force plans went up from their bases in the direction of the Soviet Union singly or in groups. General Power replied that all went singly. The President added that, in short, no Soviet submarine would be likely to detect a whole flock of U.S. planes flying toward their targets and sound the alarm.

The President inquired of General Power whether he had sufficient alert force planes to provide for a new alert force promptly after the first alert force was in the air. General Power assured the President that this was the case.

Secretary Dulles inquired about the communications system which would enable the recall of the SAC alert planes from their targets in the Soviet Union if the alarm proved to be false. Could the communications system be upset by such things as sun-spots? General Power reassured Secretary Dulles that in the early tests he had been 95% successful in testing whether the crews carried out their orders.

Secretary Dulles next inquired as to the conditions of the nuclear weapons carried in the SAC alert planes. Were the warheads ready and

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on April 4.

¹ The "Fail Safe" concept is described in Air Force Chief of Staff General White's March 10 memorandum, in which he also stated that he had ordered institution of the procedure on March 1. (Attachment to JCS 1899/398; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 381 U.S. (5-23-46) Section 94) See the Supplement.

in place. Secretary Quarles explained that there was no danger of an unforeseen nuclear explosion in the weapons now being carried in the tests of the SAC alert procedure. Not wholly satisfied, Secretary Dulles pointed out that when these SAC alert planes take off they do not know whether it is “the real thing” or not. Would not Soviet intelligence pick up the flight of these SAC alert planes, and would they not in turn be uncertain whether these flights portended a real attack on the Soviet Union or not? Being thus uncertain, the Soviets might start their deliveries of nuclear weapons against the United States even though no actual attack by the United States on the Soviet Union was intended. General Power said that he was well aware of this risk, that a great deal of attention had been paid to it; but that, of course, there was no absolutely sure way to prevent a miscalculation.

The President then said he wished to take up with General Power certain ideas that he, the President, had with respect to the instructions which were to be provided to the crews of the SAC alert forces. The President’s views were subsequently set forth by General Cutler in a memorandum to Secretary Quarles dated April 3, 1958.²

*The National Security Council:*³

Noted and discussed an oral presentation on the subject by the Commander-in-Chief and members of the staff of the Strategic Air Command.

[Here follow Agenda Items 5. “U.S. Policy Toward Libya,” and 6. “Preparations for a Possible Summit Meeting.”]

S. Everett Gleason

² Not printed. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs) See Document 25 and footnote 2 thereto.

³ The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1891, approved by the President on April 7. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

17. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Cutler) to President Eisenhower

Washington, April 7, 1958.

Mr. President:

The views which you expressed last week on how you wished Council Meetings conducted, I have set down in the attached memorandum for myself and my successors as Special Assistant.

During the time I shall continue as Special Assistant, these views will guide me. Nevertheless, I earnestly believe:

(1) As a general rule, the most fruitful discussion at top-level results when it is addressed to a carefully-prepared paper, circulated and studied in advance, which forms the basis of consequent written-out decision.

(2) As a general rule, discussion of an issue—not so based and directed and recorded—tends not to be responsible, or to move the ball forward.

(3) At top level, there is urgent, continuing need for painstakingly careful written-out policy papers, to guide future action in all areas of our enormous governmental structure.

These beliefs are consistent with the generation and carrying on of vigorous discussion in the Council Meetings (against a documented background) along the lines you have outlined. It has been my lack of skill not to evoke as sharply as you wish the *issue*, rather than the text which expresses the issue. I certainly shall try to do better.

Right now, the Planning Board is at its tenth meeting in review of Basic Policy. To me, nothing done at my level is more useful than this annual exercise (killing as it may be to R.C.). All the resources, all the strong views, all the passionate advocacies, of the Executive Branch agencies meet and clash in this broad spectrum.

As President you see only the end-result, often with many divergent and unresolved views. But I hope you will appreciate the value derived from this great annual struggle to reappraise, reexamine, keep up to date (as circumstances change) our Basic Policy. The *text* of the paper is only the result: the text has a great value, of course, for those who must use and rely on it. But far greater value inheres in the tremendous inter-agency intellectual effort that goes into the preparation of the integrated text.

Bobby

18. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, April 7, 1958.

Meeting in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 7 April 1958.

PRESENT

Secretaries McElroy, Quarles, Brucker, Gates, Douglas, Sprague, Dulles; Generals Taylor, Pate, White; Admiral Burke; Mr. Gerard Smith; Admiral Strauss; General Cutler; General Goodpaster

Mr. McElroy said he had brought the group together at the President's request to consider a matter which Secretary Dulles had raised with the President a few days before—pertaining to the strategic concept under which we are now working.

At his request, Mr. Dulles presented the problem. He recalled that in December 1950 he had advanced the doctrine of "massive retaliation"¹ somewhat as an offset to a speech by former President Hoover supporting a "fortress America" Doctrine.² Mr. Dulles thereafter supported the use of a capacity for massive retaliation as a deterrent, avoiding the necessity for sufficient local strength everywhere to hold back the Soviets. Now he thought new conditions are emerging which do not invalidate the massive retaliation concept, but put limitations on it and require it to be supplemented by other measures.

Since 1950, the Soviets have themselves gained great destructive power. The capacity for massive attack is no longer a deterrent which we alone have. The prospect is now one of mutual suicide if these weapons are used.

As a result, our allies are beginning to show doubt as to whether we would in fact use our H-weapons if we were not ourselves attacked. In fact, we cannot ourselves be sure that we would do so because the situation may be quite unclear during the critical period. As present leaders drop out in major allied countries, new governments seem bound to be even more skeptical.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Nuclear Exchange. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on April 9. Another memorandum of this conversation by Smith is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military Issues 1958–1959.

¹ In an address delivered before the American Association for the United Nations in New York on December 29, 1950, Dulles outlined a strategic doctrine that pointed out the difficulties of area defense and emphasized deterrence through the capacity for counterattack. Dulles had also stressed, however, that "total reliance should not be placed on any single form of warfare or any relatively untried type of weapon." The term "massive retaliation" was not used in this address. For text, see *The New York Times*, December 30, 1950.

² "Our National Policies in This Crisis," a radio address delivered by Hoover on December 20, 1950. Text is *ibid.*, December 21, 1958.

Accordingly the question must be asked, "Have there been developments in the nuclear field that make possible an area defense based upon tactical weapons?" The idea is one of local defense against local attack, possibly through the use of atomic artillery against key passes, for example into [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. There is the further question whether, if our concept is simply that of general war, we build weapons only for that, thus leaving us unable to take other kinds of action, and making us prisoners of a frozen concept.

In summary, he added these comments about the concept of massive retaliatory attack: This was inevitable when conceived in 1950; it is deteriorating as an effective deterrent; it is giving rise to increasing doubts on the part of our allies; it may be subject to alteration through the development of new weapons. While he could not speak as to the military points, it is State's considered opinion that although we can hold our alliance together for another year or so, we cannot expect to do so beyond that time on the basis of our present concept. Accordingly, we should be trying to find an alternative possessing greater credibility.

Mr. McElroy then spoke, indicating that in his opinion the question has been appropriately raised. He said it is one which Defense has been studying. There is some possibility that thermonuclear weapons are coming to be like chemical warfare—neither side will think their use worthwhile. He said he felt that our weapons position, as Secretary Dulles had indicated, is substantially governed by the strategic concept, under which we have concentrated on producing large weapons in recent years. Secretary Dulles commented that he is not proposing that we give up the capacity for massive retaliation. Mr. McElroy said a central question is whether we could conceive of tactical weapons being used without provoking the use of the "big ones." Many people think this could not be done.

General Twining pointed out that the Chiefs are aware of the problems, and are trying to avoid getting into a rigid position. Initially, and he thought wisely, there was a concentration on the large weapons. But now we are building a great many small ones. He added that we could not stop an attack [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] for example, with small weapons alone.

Secretary McElroy acknowledged that we have not spelled out just how we would use tactical weapons, for example, if the Chinese were to renew the attack in Korea. The question is whether there is something between conventional and massive nuclear attack. He thought it is worth putting some time against this question, for we may come out with something new.

Admiral Burke commented that we now have the capacity for massive retaliation. We need to develop the capacity for smaller operations. Our need is, not rigidity, but an ability to move effectively into big, inter-

mediate or small operations. Mr. Dulles recalled that Churchill had said that it was our retaliatory power that saved Europe over the postwar years. Mr. Dulles did not think that this would remain true for another decade.

General Taylor said there should be a clear realization as to how limited we are in the field of small weapons. There are major possibilities in this field, however. He referred to the possibility of having tactical atomic weapons of size ranging from ten tons TNT equivalent to 100 tons in 1960 or 1961. Mr. Dulles said he felt there was a proven need for more graduated weapons.

Secretary Quarles then spoke, indicating that he thought the massive retaliation concept is inescapable. We cannot rely on area defense, since the enemy could use the same kind of weapons against us. He thought that the defense has not gained relative to the offense through the development of nuclear weapons. Secretary Dulles commented that perhaps the study will bring out something different from what we are doing now. If it does not, perhaps we should not be making tactical weapons at all. Mr. McElroy said that these observations do not imply that the study should not be made—he thought that it clearly should.

General White pointed out that we are building a great number of small weapons at the present time. Secretary Dulles said there was, however, a lack of tactical doctrine. He felt it was extremely important to have such a doctrine, because the decision to “press the button” for all-out war is an awesome thing, and the possibility that such a decision would not be taken must be recognized.

Secretary Gates said there is also a question to be considered: if the deterrent fails to deter, then what should our retaliatory force be designed to do. General Twining said we must keep ourselves flexible in this regard. Logically, great industrial and communications centers are probably the correct targets; however, military men have to plan with the realization that they might be prohibited from attacking such targets. If they are held to attack military targets only, they must have much greater numbers of weapons and vehicles.

In the concluding remarks, Mr. Dulles said that the matter involves considerations of such high policy that he saw little point in having the problem studied by staff level people. Mr. Quarles commented that there is much in the background of our thinking in this matter that bears on the points raised in the discussion. Mr. Dulles said that background is not enough; we must have something we can present to our allies.

A. J. Goodpaster³
Brigadier General, USA

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

19. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, April 7, 1958.

DEAR FOSTER: Following the conference in Neil's office this morning, I am sending you two papers (reflecting my own personal views) germane to the subject under discussion:

(1) Memorandum entitled "Some Elements for a Realistic National Military Strategy in a Time of Maximum Tension and Distrust" (Top Secret and For Your Information Only), April 7, 1958.¹ This memorandum represents my first attempt to write down these views.

(2) Memorandum entitled "Massive Exchange of Nuclear Weapons" (Copy No. 2 of 7 Copies, Secret and Eyes Only), March 16, 1958.² I have reviewed this memorandum with a very few friends at my level or higher in Government, and with them discussed it one day with the President. Subsequently, the President directed the NSC Net Evaluation Subcommittee to conduct the 1958 Net Evaluation upon a targeting plan directed to non-military targets with a view to paralyzing the enemy nation.

I am furnishing similar material to Secretary McElroy.

Sincerely yours,

Robert Cutler³

Attachment 1⁴

SOME ELEMENTS FOR A REALISTIC NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY IN A TIME OF MAXIMUM TENSION AND DISTRUST

1. General war is obsolete, because of its incalculable destructiveness, as a method to obtain national objectives.

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Nuclear Policy. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Goodpaster. The source text is attached to a brief summary, also by Cutler, of the meeting described in Document 18. See the Supplement.

¹ Printed below as Attachment 1. Also attached was an undated "Summary of Conclusions" (printed below as Attachment 2), and a draft memorandum dated April 7 and entitled "Some Elements of a National Military Strategy in a Time of Maximum Tension, Distrust and Destructive Capability." The draft memorandum is in the Supplement.

² Document 11.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

⁴ Top Secret; For Your Information Only. Drafted by Cutler.

2. The U.S. will not launch “preventive” war.

3. The original purpose of our maintaining a massive nuclear capability to wage general war, through immediate retaliation, is to deter a hostile power from aggression against the U.S., U.S. forces, and the allies to whose defense the U.S. is committed. (Doubt is growing in many areas whether U.S. nuclear retaliatory power would be used *except* against attack on the U.S. and U.S. forces.)

4. Because U.S. nuclear capability is intended for retaliation, not initial attack, the U.S. targeting plan should be based on paralyzing the Soviet nation through destruction of several hundred population centers and not on knocking out her war-making capabilities (already launched in large part) at several thousand military targets.

5. When both sides have the nuclear capability substantially to destroy each other, whichever strikes first, the primary use of U.S. resources for defense should be to have ready and invulnerable that capability in sufficient strength; but the U.S. should not devote resources to building up superfluous deterrent capability at the expense of other necessary capabilities and national needs.

6. Strategic nuclear capability is not effectively usable against, or in reply to, minor aggression.

7. By eliminating from the strategic deterrent capability vulnerable elements and elements intended to blunt a once-launched enemy attack, rather than intended to deter its launching, resources could become available to the U.S. effectively to deal in future times with minor aggression and with Communist economic and political penetration overseas.

8. In dealing with limited aggression, the U.S. objective should be to *stabilize* the situation rather than, by pressing for outright victory, to provoke a hostile response which may through counteractions lead on to general war.

9. The building up of U.S. strategic deterrent forces and overseas bases beyond the objective stated in 4 above is as dangerous a provocation to hostile action as not maintaining enough.

10. A large-scale program at high priority by either side can appear a ground for retaliation. Gradual, long-term programs are preferable in this period of tension.

Attachment 2⁵

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

*All-out war is obsolete as an instrument for the attainment of national objectives. The purpose of a capability for all-out war is to deter its use by an enemy, but once a stalemate of such capabilities has been achieved, to perpetuate it at minimum loss of other capabilities.

*Strategic strength is not usable strength for stable deterrence of, or reply to, minor aggression.

*The U.S. should determine, establish, and maintain the *minimum invulnerable* strategic forces adequate to deter initiation of all-out war by a *rational* opponent.

*The force determination just mentioned should be on the basis of the softest target system that will do the job of deterrence, viz., at present, population.

*With savings realized from the resulting moderation of U.S. strategic striking objectives (elimination of the "blunting" mission), our "graduated deterrence" capability to cope with limited aggression can and should be improved.

*A graduated deterrence capability, based on possession of a spectrum of nuclear weapons down to the lowest yields, and/or improved conventional weapons, will become increasingly essential for dealing with limited aggression in the ICBM/FBM era.

*The phasing-out of vulnerable in favor of invulnerable retaliatory systems will contribute significantly to the flexibility of our strategic position.

Supplementary conclusions are the following:

*The response to limited aggression must be limited as to objectives, and generally as to means. Action policy at both diplomatic and military levels must be restrained by the principle of not trying to "win too much." The goal of winning should be replaced by the goal of *stabilizing the situation*, with minor advantage to be expected in perhaps not more than 50 percent of cases.

*It is essential to keep our opponent rational by avoiding a superfluity of strategic "deterrence". Too much, like too little, constitutes provocation. The maintenance of excessive strategic deterrence power

(a) exacts a price in over-all readiness (in that expenditures for all-out preventive or "blunting" war readiness are subtracted from those that support limited-war readiness);

⁵ Confidential.

- (b) stimulates any paranoid tendencies of the enemy leadership;
- (c) gives any such tendencies the basis of popular support they need by inflaming otherwise groundless fears of preventive-war action on our part;
- (d) affects our position adversely in the eyes of neutrals.

*Our declaratory policy (interpreted as what we tell the enemy leadership in general through non-public channels) should adhere closely to action policy. Our public information policy should promote the relaxing of tensions by emphasizing the fact that we have nothing to gain from aggression.

*Restricted communications, as imposed by the Iron Curtain, provide a refuge for paranoia that can threaten the long-term stability of deterrence. Therefore penetration or elimination of the Iron Curtain is a major national policy objective.

*The initiation of a large-scale “crash” defensive program by either side can appear to be a warlike act, detrimental to the stability of deterrence. The institution of a gradual, inexpensive minimal-shelter program, slanted toward new construction, appears to be a preferable approach to defense.

*In our research and development program, increased emphasis on long-term projects and basic research appears desirable. Shorter-term military development should be oriented toward improving the invulnerability and diversification of strategic forces, and toward urgent build-up of the graduated-deterrence capability.

*Profitable areas of agreement with the Russians do not appear to include disarmament, as long as mutual good faith cannot be assumed. Several other areas in which agreements might be reached (particularly where inspection is not required) should be explored. Limitation of high-yield weapon tests may be one of these.

*There appears to be no peaceable means by which the major powers currently possessing H-bombs can indefinitely prevent other nations from becoming possessors, as long as the major powers refuse to compromise any of their own sovereignty. All members of the “suicide club” acquire shorter life expectancies as the membership increases.

*When advanced retaliatory systems are introduced, characterized by effective invulnerability, the strategy of automatic massive retaliation in response to all-out attack can profitably be replaced by a cat-and-mouse strategy of graduated retaliation-coercion.

20. Editorial Note

During his briefing on significant world developments affecting U.S. security at the 362d National Security Council meeting on April 14, 1958, Allen Dulles reported on the Soviet ballistic missile program:

"The Director of Central Intelligence reminded the Council that early in January of this year he had provided a full briefing on the Soviet ballistic missiles program. He would continue today with a summary of information on this subject received subsequently and mentioned from time to time in his intelligence briefing.

"The Soviet testing under its ballistic missiles program reached its climax last August. There were 21 test operations on the Kapustin Yar range. Since January the number of such tests had fallen from 21 to about 10 a month. This might be explained by the possibility that the Soviet 950-mile missile was merely a step-up of their 750-mile missile. That is, they may be using the 750-mile missile as the basic weapon, but carrying a smaller warhead to permit a range of 950 miles.

"Tests along the Tyura Tam-Klyuchi range occurred on January 30, March 29, and April 4 1958. There was also an unsuccessful attempt to test-launch an ICBM on March 12.

"Mr. Dulles noted the completion of a new detection system in the United States, and also pointed out that the Soviet Union has meanwhile taken steps to cut down on the amount of communications involved in the test firing. This unfortunate development may have resulted from extensive publicity in the United States giving the Soviets a clue to the manner in which we were receiving intelligence on these tests.

"The Soviet earth satellite presumably burned up last night somewhere over the British West Indies. Mr. Dulles predicted that launchings of new satellites by the Soviet Union were to be expected in the near future.

"General Cutler asked Mr. Dulles whether there was any available intelligence on the statement from Denmark that the Soviets had abandoned their nuclear testing because of a catastrophic accident which had greatly spread radioactive fallout in the USSR and elsewhere. Mr. Dulles replied that there was no information whatsoever on this subject, and that the Danish report seemed unlikely on the face of it." (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, April 15; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

For the January briefing mentioned by Dulles, see Document 4.

21. Memorandum of Discussion at the 363d Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, April 24, 1958.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee* (NSC Action No. 1814; NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1841, 1842 and 1866)

General Cutler explained that the Defense Department Report on the subject would consist of two parts, the first to be presented by Mr. Holaday, the Director of Guided Missiles, and the second by Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles. The first part would cover Defense recommendations as to whether:

(1) To decide now to produce first-generation ICBMs in addition to the 130 hitherto programmed, and to be operational prior to the end of FY 1963; to build additional launching sites for any such additional ICBMs; and to harden such additional launching sites.

(2) To order now production of more than 3 Polaris submarine missile systems.

(3) To increase the number of IRBMs beyond the 120 missiles planned to be operational in Calendar Year 1960.

(4) To install interim defense against ballistic missile attack at SAC bases, utilizing modified available anti-aircraft missiles.

General Cutler then called upon Mr. Holaday, who read his report on the above subjects to the National Security Council. (A copy of Mr. Holaday's report and his chart is filed in the minutes of the meeting. A second copy is attached to this memorandum.)¹

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on April 25. On May 8, the Council heard as Agenda Item 6 a presentation by Drs. Killian and Kistiakowsky comparing U.S. and Soviet ballistic missile development. (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, May 9; *ibid.*) See the Supplement.

¹ Regarding ICBMs, Holaday's presentation did not recommend an increase "at this time," but stated that if work on solid fuel propellant for Titan was successful, the Department of Defense would ask for four additional squadrons for fiscal year 1960 (over the authorized four squadrons totaling 40 missiles). Defense was asking for two more Polaris submarines with missiles in its FY 1959 augmentation request, and if the program continued to show promise in the test phase, would ask for three more (for a total of eight) in its FY 1960 budget request. Holaday stated that the JCS had recommended that operational IRBMs be increased to 240 by FY 1963, but the Department of Defense recommended "that the total number of squadrons be held for planning purposes to 12 squadrons (180 missiles)." Lastly, Holaday's report called for accelerating the development of modified Nike-Zeus anti-aircraft missiles for use as defense against ICBMs, while dropping the Talos program for this purpose entirely. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) See the Supplement. JCS recommendations regarding the Talos system are in memoranda to the Secretary of Defense dated February 5 and April 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 381 U.S. (5–23–46) Section 96)

Upon the conclusion of Mr. Holaday's presentation, General Cutler called on Secretary McElroy to comment first. Secretary McElroy said that as all of us could see from Mr. Holaday's charts and report, we had a very diversified system for the delivery of modern weapons, and we should not overlook the existence of SAC, with both its heavy and medium bombers, even though these had not been referred to. In view of the evident variety of ways in which modern weapons could be delivered, the time had come—or indeed it might even be past—when the Joint Chiefs of Staff should attempt to determine the right "mix" among all these delivery capabilities. Indeed, Secretary McElroy said, he had already given the Joint Chiefs of Staff this problem and they in turn had given it to the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group. As a result, we could expect guidance on the appropriate mix to be ready some time next July. This military judgment would be extremely important for us to obtain, although Secretary McElroy emphasized his belief that the current programs which Mr. Holaday had described were not excessive in size or cost.

The President was next to comment. He first referred to the recommendation in Mr. Holaday's report that the number of IRBMs be increased from 8 to 12 squadrons and from 120 to 180 missiles as an initial operating capability in 1963. The President pointed out that by 1960 we were going to be in a position to know a lot more than we now do about the effectiveness of Thor and Jupiter. This would certainly be true of the first generation of Thor and Jupiter missiles, and it would probably be true of the second generation of these missiles. Accordingly, some time about 1960 we may have to say that we are going to scrap some of these missiles. The President therefore said he was inclined to question the value of the recommended increase to 180 of first-generation IRBMs.

The President said his next question concerned the allocation of a total of \$454 million for the Titan missiles. The President said it seemed to him, in the light of these figures, that every time we fire off a Titan missile we are shooting away \$15 million. If this was indeed the case, he hoped there would be no misses and no near-misses! What exactly was the unit price of a Titan missile?

In the same connection, the President noted that Mr. Holaday had stated that the Titan missiles would be deployed at Denver, Colorado. This greatly troubled the President because, he said, the municipal authorities of Denver were constantly on his neck because of the abnormally large number of military installations in a city which was growing rapidly and which was facing severe congestion as a civilian air center. The Denver authorities clearly wanted no more military installations, and the President wondered if it was judged really necessary to put the ICBM installations so close to Denver. Why jam up a big city when other locations might be perfectly suitable?

Secretary Quarles explained that while the site of the ICBM deployment was described as Denver, the actual installation would be at a distance of perhaps 45 miles north and east of the city proper. The President replied that this seemed curious, inasmuch as the servicing of the ICBMs was to be done by the Martin Company, which was located to the south of the city. He again explained that he could not understand why it was necessary to put these installations so close to a large city. Indeed, he had been told that there were more Federal employees living in Denver than anywhere else in the United States except Washington itself. Secretary Quarles replied by stating that the Defense Department thought that it was meeting the President's point by putting these installations 45 miles away from the city, but the matter certainly could be re-examined if the President wished.

General Cutler reminded Secretary Quarles to answer the President's question about the unit price of a Titan missile. Secretary Quarles replied that the sum of \$454 million mentioned by Mr. Holaday was not a fair figure against which to compute the unit price for these Titan squadrons. A Titan missile, as it rolls off the line, costs somewhere between \$1 million and \$2 million. However, the costs of basing these missiles are very great, amounting to \$5 million per emplaced missile if the base were hardened. The \$454 million figure also took account of years of active development still lying ahead of the Titan missiles. The President sought assurance that the figure of \$454 million represented all the money allocated for research and development of the Titan missile. There were no sums for this purpose placed elsewhere in the budget.

The President continued by asking Secretary Quarles to try to make a better case for convincing of the desirability of increasing the IOC of the IRBMs from 120 to 180, particularly in view of the heightened possibilities which could be envisaged for the second-generation IRBMs. The President warned that we could not let our defense programs pyramid simply because we had once established these programs.

Secretary Quarles replied that the figure 180 represented a compromise between the recommendation of the Gaither Report (which called for 16 squadrons) and the original Defense Department proposal for 8 squadrons. The figure of 180 now recommended was also designed to meet the proposed NATO deployment of IRBMs. For this purpose, the program for 180 was minimal.

The President said that perhaps his question was prompted by stupidity. Nevertheless, the Defense Department had been working for years on these missiles, and it therefore seemed to the President that the development period for the second generation of missiles would not be as long as it had taken to design the first-generation missiles. What was it proposed to call the second-generation Thors and Jupiters? Were they to be called Super-Thor and Super-Jupiter? Secretary Quarles answered

that in so far as we can improve the liquid propulsion systems, we would call them Jupiter II and Thor II.

The President's next question related to the matter of achieving a storable liquid fuel. Secretary Quarles replied that this kind of fuel was not suitable for IRBMs but might prove to be suitable for ICBMs.

Asked to comment by General Cutler, Dr. Killian stated his belief that the question of second-generation missiles, raised by the President, was indeed the key question. Moreover, the over-all study of the appropriate mix in delivery systems, mentioned by Secretary McElroy, was absolutely essential in order to enable us to make the necessary detailed decisions. Until we get this over-all study, we are obliged to resort to ad hoc decisions such as had been done in the case of deploying IRBMs in the NATO area.

The President then commented that we are now beginning to think of aircraft as becoming obsolescent, and so it is also with first-generation ballistic missiles. Despite this, we are going ahead full steam on the production both of aircraft and first-generation ballistic missiles. Perhaps the rate of obsolescence of the airplane will actually be the slower of the two. Accordingly, it would seem that we must anticipate some very hard thinking if in four or five years' time we are to avoid presenting a bill to the public for these military programs which will create unheard-of inflation in the United States.

General Cutler pointed out that, as he understood it, we had not yet had a single completely successful test flight of an IRBM or of an ICBM. Dr. Killian and the President concurred.

General Cutler then asked the Secretary of State if he had any comments to make. Secretary Dulles said he had one general thought to express. Turning to the President, he pointed out that the President had often in such discussions as this quoted George Washington on the desirability that the United States possess a respectable military posture. In Secretary Dulles' view, the United States should not attempt to be the greatest military power in the world, although most discussions in the Council seemed to suggest that we should have the most and the best of everything. Was there no group in the Government which ever thought of the right kind of ceiling on our military capabilities? This ceiling would be imposed when we had determined that we had achieved all that was necessary for a respectable military posture. In the field of military capabilities enough was enough. If we didn't realize this fact, the time would come when all our national production would be centered on our military establishment. There should be a group designated to study what it will take in terms of military capabilities to make the Russians respect the military posture of the United States.

The President replied that this, of course, was one of the great preoccupations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Dulles replied that he was

not at all sure that this was so. It was the business of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend military capabilities which would provide the utmost national security. He did not blame them for this. It was right and it was their job. But there was, as he had pointed out, another side of the problem. The President agreed, and stated that of course too much, as well as too little, could destroy our national defense. Too much could reduce the United States to being a garrison state or ruin the free economy of the nation. Secretary Dulles added that all he wanted to state was that his words had constituted his judgment as to past discussions of the U.S. military posture in the National Security Council.

Dr. Killian then inquired whether the Defense Department had been giving any thought recently to the possibility of using the Polaris missile on aircraft-carriers or on cruisers. The President said that he had seen some suggestions on this point, and quoted the possibility of 24 missiles per carrier. Mr. Holaday indicated that this matter was being studied right now by the Navy Department, and that the study seemed to be of good quality. Dr. Killian added that if the Polaris missiles could be used on carriers or cruisers, this would really cut the cost of getting the Polaris missiles on station.

Dr. Killian then said he had a second question with respect to the solid propellant research programs in the Defense Department. How far had we gone in the direction of creating a centralized program for research and development on solid propellants? Mr. Holaday said that the Defense Department was now engaged very diligently on working out an accelerated research program on solid propellants. General Cutler stated that he knew this to be a fact, but that the accelerated program which Mr. Holaday had mentioned was not centralized but was divided among the military services. Mr. Holaday said that the Defense Department was going to produce a centralized program within a matter of days. Secretary Quarles interrupted to point out that a portion of this forthcoming program would be put under the aegis of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and part would be under the aegis of the separate services, although to be integrated at the Department of Defense level. This development was in process now, and would be made definite within a few days.

The President commented that he still had more faith in the delivery capabilities of the aircraft than he had in all these missiles at the present time. Secretary McElroy replied that so had he as of the present time.

The President then made inquiries of Mr. Holaday about the Mace aerodynamic missile, which was explained to be a second-generation Matador. In the same connection the President inquired as to why it was necessary to have both Mace and Regulus aerodynamic missiles. Mr. Holaday explained that the Regulus missile was ship-launched. The President then asked whether this meant that the Regulus could not be

launched from bases on land. Mr. Holaday replied in the affirmative, but explained that this would be a more expensive system of land-based aerodynamic missiles than would the Mace system. The President continued, however, that the Regulus ought to be simplified, in his opinion, so that it could be used on land, and the Mace program discarded.

Secretary Quarles intervened to point out that the Mace missile had a very special guidance system which made it particularly effective for tactical use. Mace could scan its own terrain. Regulus, on the other hand, was adapted to radio control and was not so desirable a missile for shifting land operations. These facts accounted for the two separate systems, which Secretary Quarles said he thought justifiable. The President did not sound wholly convinced.

General Cutler then attempted to sum up the consensus of the Council, suggesting that the Defense Department take a fresh look at the plan for deploying ICBMs at Denver and that the President had expressed disapproval of the recommendation for increasing the initial operating capability (IOC) of the IRBMs. On the latter point the President said that General Cutler was mistaken and that he was going along with the Defense recommendations for increasing the number of IRBMs to 180, even though this did not constitute the austerity program that the President would like to have seen. General Cutler pressed the President to withhold approval of the increase in IRBMs at least until one completely successful test flight had occurred. Secretary Quarles expressed opposition to this proposal, particularly if we intended to follow through on our plans and commitments to deploy IRBMs to NATO.

Secretary Dulles asked Secretary Quarles whether it was not true that we were experiencing great difficulties with the IRBMs. Secretary Quarles replied that we were experiencing such difficulties, but he remained confident that we were still on the schedule originally worked out, although the technical problem of the liquid propellant was not yet licked. Thus the Thor flight yesterday had been quite successful.

General Cutler then inquired whether the proposed increase in IRBMs would not require additional funding. Secretary Quarles replied in the negative, and said that the IRBMs were included in a funding plan under the FY 1959 appropriations.

General Cutler indicated that the second portion of the Defense Department report would now be heard. Secretary Quarles would report to the Council on the following matters stemming from the original Gaither Panel Report (copy of Secretary Quarles' report filed in the minutes of the meeting):²

² Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File)

- (1) Whether to accelerate the early warning radar system for ICBM attack.
- (2) Whether to accelerate improvement of SAC reaction time and SAC dispersal.
- (3) Whether to improve SAC anti-aircraft defenses.
- (4) A report on measures to improve the anti-submarine effort.

With respect to the first item, Secretary Quarles explained that the Defense Department originally had envisaged a radar early warning system against ICBM attack comprising three stations to be located at Thule, Alaska, and Scotland. These installations would be equipped with both early warning and tracking radars. The Defense Department had now in the FY 1958 budget funds for the completion of the Thule installations, as well as for preliminary work on the other two sites. It was expected that the Thule station would be in operation in mid-Calendar Year 1960. This had involved a heavily accelerated program and some \$400 million additional expenditure.

The President questioned the accuracy of this figure, but General Cutler supported it and explained that the original Gaither estimate of costs on this item had been very low. Dr. Killian said he anticipated that the ultimate costs would be far above \$400 million. Secretary Quarles estimated that if all three stations were completed, the cost would be above \$1 billion. For this reason the Defense Department was now reconsidering the matter and had decided that only site surveys would for the time being be carried out in Scotland and in Alaska. We would go ahead at an accelerated rate on the Thule installation, which in point of fact would have 75% of the coverage which all three stations would have if they were completed.

Secretary Anderson asked about the funding for this program. Secretary Quarles replied that the Thule station was already funded, but that if we were to go on to install the other two stations, large additional funding would certainly be required. The President asked Secretary Anderson how he was feeling (laughter).

At this point Dr. Killian spoke up to state that the antiballistic system programs required review, particularly from the technical point of view. Secretary Quarles stated that the program was being reviewed, and Dr. Killian went on to say that there were many unknowns in this field at the present time, and that we might well meet insoluble problems. He stated his agreement, however, that we should go ahead with the Thule installation.

Secretary Quarles then came to his second question—namely, whether to accelerate improvement of SAC reaction time and SAC dispersal. He pointed out what was being done in this field, but indicated that at present the Defense Department was not much encouraged over the possibilities of dispersing SAC to non-SAC military bases and to

commercial airfields in the zone of the interior. As to SAC alert planes, Secretary Quarles gave the following figures as to the number of SAC planes which would be on 15-minute alert over the next few years: 150 planes at the end of this fiscal year (July 1, 1958); 355 planes at the end of the next fiscal year; 425 planes at the end of Fiscal Year 1960; 480 planes at the end of the Fiscal Year 1961. General Cutler commented that this amounted to about a third of the force, to which Secretary Quarles agreed.

With respect to his third question, viz., whether to improve SAC anti-aircraft defenses by various measures, Secretary Quarles expressed the opinion that Mr. Holaday had dealt adequately with this subject and that he had nothing to add.³

On the fourth and last matter—namely, measures to improve the anti-submarine effort—Secretary Quarles indicated that additional funds amounting to \$112 million are included in the FY 1959 budget amendment now before Congress. In total, the FY 1959 budget had been increased about \$262 million over the amount planned for anti-submarine work at the time the Gaither Report was submitted.

The concluding comment was made by Dr. Killian, who pointed out that because of the time-span required to complete the measures to provide adequate protection to SAC bases, and because of the evident Soviet ICBM capability, we were here clearly facing a situation where the alert status of SAC is of the most critical importance, particularly in this interim period before we ourselves have achieved an adequate ballistic missiles capability.

*The National Security Council.*⁴

a. Noted and discussed reports by the Department of Defense, as presented at the meeting by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Guided Missiles:

(1) Pursuant to NSC Action No. 1866-c-(1), as to its recommendations regarding the measures referred to in NSC Action No. 1842-g-(1), -(2), and -(3).

(2) Pursuant to NSC Action No. 1842-g-(5), -(6), -(7), -(8), -(9).

b. Noted the President's approval of the recommendation by the Secretary of Defense that the initial operational capability of intermediate range ballistic missiles by early Calendar Year 1961 be increased from 8 squadrons (120 missiles) to 12 squadrons (180 missiles), with the understanding that additional new obligational authority will not be required during Fiscal Years 1958 or 1959 for this purpose.

³ Apparent reference to the discussion of missile defense in Holaday's presentation.

⁴ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 1898, approved by the President on April 25. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

c. Noted the President's request that the Department of Defense review the need and desirability of the proposed location at which Titan squadrons are to be deployed.

Note: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation.

[Here follow Agenda Items 2. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," 3. "U.S. Employees Overseas," and 4. "U.S. Policy Toward Africa South of the Sahara Prior to Calendar Year 1960."]

S. Everett Gleason

22. Paper by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler)

Washington, May 1, 1958.

MAJOR FACTORS INFLUENCING REVIEW OF BASIC POLICY

First. The realization that both sides are capable of delivering massive nuclear devastation (regardless of which side strikes first) increasingly deters each side from initiating, or taking actions which directly risk, general nuclear war.

Second. During this time of nuclear parity and mutual deterrence: (a) there is growing doubt in the Free World whether the United States will use its massive nuclear capability, except in retaliation to direct attack on the United States or its forces, leading to a growth of neutralism and a weakening of Free World alliances; (b) the USSR will be more bold—especially toward less developed and uncommitted nations—in economic penetration, in political action, and perhaps in probing through means of limited military aggression.

Third. Weakness or instability in less developed or uncommitted nations, and their primary aim for "modernization", renders them vulnerable to expanding Sino-Soviet political and economic penetration.

Fourth. Changes in top Kremlin personnel do not indicate a deterioration or disintegration in the Soviet regime's policy or determination to achieve world domination for Communism.

Fifth. A U.S. massive nuclear retaliatory capability, invulnerable and sufficient to deter general nuclear war, and to prevail in such a war if it comes.

Sixth. A U.S. flexible and selective capability (including nuclear) to deter or suppress limited military aggression; realizing that the chances of keeping a conflict limited—whenever major areas or causes are involved—are at best not promising.

Seventh. Advances in Soviet military technology and scientific skill.

Eighth. The false images presented by Communism to the world of U.S. intentions and objectives, and of the USSR as the advocate of "peace and disarmament".

Ninth. The adverse effect of the U.S. economic recession upon a healthy, expanding U.S. economy, which is essential to the security of the United States and the Free World.

Tenth. The ability of the Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes to direct their economic strength in support of internal and external policies which seek world domination.

Eleventh. The American people lack appreciation of the extent of the crisis facing the United States.

23. Memorandum of Discussion at the 364th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, May 1, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting, and Agenda Item 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security."]

2. *Basic National Security Policy* (NSC 5707/8;¹ NIE 100-58; NSC 5810²)

General Cutler briefed the Council in very considerable detail on the highlights of NSC 5810. The first part of his briefing consisted of a

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on May 2.

¹ Entitled "Basic National Security Policy," dated June 3, 1957; for text, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. XIX, pp. 507-524.

² Dated April 15, 1958. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5810 Series)

statement of the many factors which had influenced the Planning Board in its review of basic policy. He then read the eleven major factors which had influenced the review.³ Thereafter he indicated where the new guidance and new emphasis in NSC 5810 reflected the impact of these factors. To this end he read pages 2 and 3, the Outline of U.S. National Strategy, which he described as the skeleton of the policy guidance as a whole.

General Cutler's briefing then concerned itself with the principal new emphasis in NSC 5810. Having concluded this section of his briefing, he turned to two very significant paragraphs in the new statement, which repeated and continued in effect the text of last year's statement. The first, paragraph 14,⁴ dealt with limited military aggression. The second, paragraph 41,⁵ dealt with Communist China and Taiwan. General Cutler pointed out that while the Planning Board had not formally recommended a revision of either of these two paragraphs, he himself personally said he would report his own views, shared by some members of the Planning Board, on these two paragraphs. Thereafter he read his own suggested revision of paragraph 14.⁶ He indicated that his alternative draft for paragraph 14 would make two major changes in the existing policy guidance. First—that, in this period of relative nuclear parity, limited aggression may *not* always be confined to less developed areas. Second—that, in this period of relative nuclear parity, it may not be in the U.S. interest to deal with every limited aggression by applying whatever degree of military force was necessary to suppress it. In general, he described the purpose of his proposed changes as designed to ensure that the United States would have a flexible capability so that it could determine the application of force best serving U.S. interests under the circumstances existing in each case of limited military aggression. (A copy of General Cutler's briefing note,⁷ together with a statement of the "Major Factors Influencing the Review of Basic Policy" and General Cutler's "Alternative Version of Paragraph 14", are filed in the minutes of the meeting and also appended to this memorandum.)

After reading his alternative paragraph 14 and indicating the reasoning behind this suggested alternative, General Cutler first called on Secretary McElroy for comment.

Secretary McElroy observed that of course paragraph 14, on limited war, presented a subject of very great gravity. The subject had all the implications suggested by General Cutler's remarks with respect to our

³ See Document 22.

⁴ The text of paragraph 14 of NSC 5810 is similar in substance and virtually identical in wording to the text of paragraph 15 of NSC 5707/8.

⁵ The text of paragraph 41 of NSC 5810 is identical to paragraph 41 of NSC 5707/8.

⁶ The text of Cutler's revised paragraph 14 is attached but not printed.

⁷ For text, see the Supplement.

alliances. General Twining and he had just returned from the meeting of the Military Committee and the Defense Ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance. On no less than three occasions during this meeting, the Defense Minister of Turkey had enlarged on his apprehensions as to the firmness of our intentions and those of the NATO Alliance in general to resist a Soviet attack on one member of the Alliance as an attack on all.

Moreover, continued Secretary McElroy, these were not the only implications of General Cutler's revision of paragraph 14. There were grave potential budget implications. We are already launched on very extensive expenditure programs in the Department of Defense at the present time. While we need not necessarily stay on the same road along which these programs are taking us, the changes proposed by General Cutler as to increased capabilities for limited war could cost a great deal more money if they were not balanced by reductions in our expenditures to maintain our nuclear deterrent capability for massive retaliation.

In concluding his remarks, Secretary McElroy expressed the opinion that the subject of paragraph 14 was of the very greatest importance. Some of the Council Members, and at least people in the Department of Defense, had not actually had adequate time to discuss and consider the problem of limited war as set forth in General Cutler's paragraph 14. While he was very much in favor of raising this problem for discussion in the National Security Council, he was opposed to any hasty decision as to how to meet the problem.

At Secretary McElroy's suggestion, General Cutler called on Secretary Quarles to add his thoughts on this subject. Secretary Quarles observed that the differences in the version of paragraph 14 contained in NSC 5810 and the alternative paragraph proposed by General Cutler, were rather subtle. Perhaps the single most important point underlying General Cutler's paragraph and reasoning could be expressed in some such way as this: Nuclear weapons will stalemate themselves and leave us and the Russians to fight wars with conventional weapons only. This was, of course, an overstatement. We can not exclude the use of nuclear weapons. We must, on the contrary, rely upon them. In the circumstances, therefore, the danger of speaking about a limited war involving the United States and the USSR is precisely that it would encourage this kind of erroneous thinking. It would be extremely dangerous, for example, to allow a concept to get out that if we were attacked in Berlin we would not apply all the necessary military force required to repel the attack. Any other concept than this, as to our reaction to an attack on Berlin, would have the effect of inviting a Soviet attack. Accordingly, Secretary Quarles felt that the whole problem set forth in paragraph 14 deserved further thought before any decision was made.

General Cutler then called on General Twining, who briefly stated that the basic problem emphasized by General Cutler's alternative para-

graph 14 was not new to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was old, and in essence it could be described by the question, do we de-emphasize our deterrent forces and increase our forces for limited war? He said he would like to have General Taylor address himself first to the problem, and thereafter to have the Council hear from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and finally again from General Twining himself.⁸

General Cutler then called on General Taylor, who said he would present the views not only of himself but of the Chief of Naval Operations and of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In reading his report, General Taylor noted the serious reverses which the United States in the last year had encountered in Indonesia, in the Middle East, and elsewhere. In the meanwhile, he pointed out, the Soviets had achieved virtual nuclear parity with the United States. This new and grave situation pointed up the need of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for new guidance. General Taylor's report called for greater flexibility in our military capabilities so that we were not faced with the alternatives of reacting to Soviet aggression by a massive nuclear strike or simply by retreating in the face of the aggression. General Taylor's report insisted that there should be no reduction in the strength of our nuclear deterrent capability, but at the same time it called for more adequate capabilities to resist limited aggression. The report also stressed the fact that limited war would not be confined, as in the current basic national security policy, to underdeveloped areas, but could occur in developed countries such as those making up the NATO Alliance in Europe. The United States should be able to face up to a Soviet military aggression even without the use of any nuclear weapons whatsoever, as well, of course, as having available a wide range of nuclear weapons with yields down to very small amounts of TNT equivalent.

General Taylor's report indicated the belief of its three sponsors that the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability was essentially a shield, whereas our active military capabilities must be those designed for the conduct of limited war. General Taylor believed that this issue was well posed in General Cutler's alternative draft of paragraph 14, adoption of which by the National Security Council could go far to provide the required new guidance on U.S. military strategy. General Taylor called for the immediate adoption of the alternative paragraph 14, on grounds that the matter had been thoroughly studied and that nothing more would be gained from further reports on this subject emanating from the Joint Chiefs of

⁸ The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs on NSC 5810 are in a memorandum with attachments from General Twining to Secretary McElroy, dated April 25. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) Another view is in a memorandum from W.J. McNeil, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to McElroy, also dated April 25. (*Ibid.*, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up) Both are in the Supplement.

Staff. (A copy of General Taylor's report is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)⁹

In accordance with General Twining's proposal, General Taylor was followed by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General White, who likewise read a prepared written statement. He argued the Air Force position that NSC 5810 as written constituted a satisfactory statement of basic policy, although he said that the Air Force would recommend further discussion of the limited war problem if warranted after the study of this subject called for earlier by the National Security Council.

General White added his belief that U.S. military capabilities, both for general and for limited war, were now reasonably adequate. There were, of course, many other problems remaining. We must nourish the conviction that these military capabilities do exist. Otherwise we could inadvertently give currency to a belief that the U.S. response to local aggression would be ineffective.

Continuing, General White's report pointed out three areas which particularly required close scrutiny—guidance as to nuclear weapons use; general priorities for force composition; and the problem of local war. As to the first, NSC 5810 made a clear-cut statement that "we would place *main* but not sole reliance on nuclear weapons", and that these are considered "as conventional weapons from a *military* point of view". This was a realistic and essential doctrine.

The Air Force also believed that it found adequate guidance in NSC 5810 with respect to broad guidance on priorities for force composition. As stated in paragraph 14, these priorities were the development and maintenance of safeguarded and effective nuclear retaliatory power and the development and maintenance of adequate military programs for continental defense.

As for the problem of local aggression, this was described accurately in paragraph 14 as set forth in NSC 5810 (as opposed to General Cutler's alternative). We were to maintain forces "*within* the total U.S. military force", to deter, defeat, or hold local aggression—and the "prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary . . . is considered the best means to keep hostilities from broadening into general war." NATO, according to present guidance, was properly excluded from the context of local aggression. (A copy of General White's written statement is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)¹⁰

⁹ Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File) Taylor summarized his presentation in *The Uncertain Trumpet*, pp. 60–64.

¹⁰ Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File)

It then became the turn of General Twining to complete the presentation of the military points of view. Turning to the President, General Twining pointed out that the Council had now heard the compelling arguments, pro and con, with respect to the wording of the basic security policy. His own approach, he said, would be a little different from that of Generals Taylor and White. He believed that we would have to assume, in the first instance, that in due course the basic philosophy of NSC 5810 would become known to the world at large. Accordingly, we would have to concern ourselves with three significant implications. First, what would be the impact of the philosophy of NSC 5810 on our Free World allies? Secondly, how would the Soviets interpret this document? Thirdly, what would the document do to our own national will to face the problems of the future with strength and resolution?

As to the matter of the confidence and will of our allies, General Twining described the meeting last month of the Military Committee and the Defense Ministers of NATO. The Turkish representatives had made four long reports in opposition to the definitions proposed for the terms "incursions, infiltrations, and hostile local actions." The Turks were obviously very concerned that we would accept a local war in the NATO area without the united, common NATO response to which we were committed. Other nations beside the Turks had some apprehensions. In short, adoption of General Cutler's proposed alternative paragraph 14 would have an extremely adverse effect on the NATO Alliance.

As to the second point—what the Soviets would deduce from a change in our policy along the lines suggested by General Cutler—General Twining pointed out his view that a deterrent would cease to be a deterrent if the enemy came to believe that we had lost our will to use it.

As for the third point—the effect of a change of policy in this matter on the people of the United States—General Twining stated his opinion that no free nation would long survive if its people will not accept grave risks in order to save their freedom. Our nation might perish if we come to believe that general war is a remote possibility and thus lose the will and courage to face the dangers of the actual world in which we live.

For these psychological reasons, if not for any other, General Twining strongly urged the retention of last year's wording, which was the same wording as presently written in the corresponding paragraph of last year's statement of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5707/8, paragraphs 14 and 15).

Going on, General Twining insisted that the United States already possessed strong capabilities for fighting limited war. Indeed, we had not fully used this capability in Korea, against China, in Indochina, and in Indonesia. In other words, political decisions had more bearing on involvement in limited war than does military capability. Moreover, there is a greater degree of flexibility in our present military structure

than many people realize. The bulk of our stockpile of atomic weapons, both in dollar value and in numbers, is in the low-yield variety, and this ratio is moving rapidly even more in the direction of the small weapons.

General Twining stated that he certainly had no closed mind on the subject of the composition of forces. However, he felt that no fire power of any kind is of any use if there is no will to use it. Also, any expansion of our forces designed for limited war would require considerably more of our resources, since it would be fatal to detract from the power of the strategic deterrent in order to provide forces of more limited capability.

General Twining concluded his remarks by stating that in his judgment we should not change the present statement of basic national security policy because of the serious adverse psychological reactions at home, in the minds of our allies, and in the minds of the Soviets. We could expand tactical type military forces within the terms of the present wording of the basic document, if we so desire. Secondly, we must accept the fact that any expansion of tactical type forces at the expense of the strategic deterrent is unacceptable at this time. (A copy of General Twining's statement is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)¹¹

When General Twining had concluded his remarks, General Cutler called on Secretary Dulles. Secretary Dulles stated that the topic on which the Chiefs of Staff had been speaking was one of tremendous importance. Turning to the President, he reminded him that some weeks ago the President had authorized the Secretary to discuss with the Secretary of Defense and others our existing strategic concepts. We have already had such a discussion. It was Secretary Dulles' belief that as matters were now proceeding one could foresee two or three years from the present that our principal allies will either demand that they be provided with a capability for local defense, or else they will disassociate themselves from their alliance with us. We have a certain historical association with some of the Western European governments, but the mass feeling in these Western European countries is such that one can foresee a change of thinking in these governments. In three years or so the peoples of these countries will not go along with the policies of the present governments. When this time approaches, these European countries will conclude that either we do not intend to resort to nuclear war to defend them against the Soviets, or, if they think that we will resort to such warfare, they will disassociate themselves from us. Accordingly, it seemed to Secretary Dulles urgent for us to develop the tactical defensive capabilities inherent in small "clean" nuclear weapons, so that we can devise a new strategic concept which will serve to maintain our allies and our security position in Western Europe.

¹¹Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

Secretary Dulles went on to say that he realized that there was a great deal of truth in what General Twining had stated about the adverse psychological effect of a change in our policy with respect to the nuclear deterrent and limited war. If, as General Twining argued, we could do all that was needed to develop greater capabilities for limited war under the terms of our existing basic policy, that was all well and good. But Secretary Dulles was not sure that this was in fact the case. At any rate, there must be an adequate capability to deal with wars not directly involving the United States and the USSR. The United Kingdom has recently swung over to reliance on an almost 100% nuclear military capability. We can see the unfortunate results of so complete a reliance in British action in various parts of the world, notably in Egypt. While the British had plenty of time to prepare a successful campaign against Egypt, and while the forces Egypt could muster were insignificant, the British did not have the kind of forces and the conventional capability that was required to defeat the Egyptians. Accordingly, while they had two weeks to defeat the Egyptians completely, they failed. Another example is what the tribes in Southern Arabia are able to do to the British. They didn't even have the military means to clean up a little place like Yemen. The United Kingdom does not have this type of force for limited operations because of budgetary reasons. The United States, of course, has budgetary problems too. Whether we are making a wise and proper allocation of resources between the two main elements—viz., the deterrent forces and the forces for limited war—was hard for Secretary Dulles to judge as a layman; but he expressed the hope that our basic security policy, when we finally adopted it, won't compel us to allocate so much of our resources to maintenance of the nuclear deterrent that we will weaken our capability for limited war. As far as the State Department was concerned, mobile elements such as our aircraft carriers have in the past performed very useful services in support of our foreign policy. Perhaps the capability represented by such mobile forces is somewhat weakened now. This was not really necessary.

Secretary Dulles then turned to the other main point as he saw the picture. He did not think we should permit a dangerous gap in or an increasing doubt as to the willingness of the United States to resort to massive nuclear retaliation until such time as we have something to take its place. The massive nuclear deterrent was running its course as the principal element in our military arsenal, and very great emphasis must be placed on the elements which in the next two or three years can replace the massive nuclear retaliatory capability. In short, the United States must be in a position to fight defensive wars which do not involve the total defeat of the enemy. Our own military planning must shape up to meet conditions when governments such as those of Macmillan and Adenauer will have disappeared. If we have to keep our basic policy

paper in the form and language that it presently has in order to avoid showing our hand, this was OK with Secretary Dulles. But we must do everything that is necessary in order to develop the supplementary strategy of which he had spoken.

Secretary Dulles also stated that he realized the budgetary implications of the point of view he was advancing. We have got to do all this in the way of military programs and still remain solvent. More than that, we must protect programs such as the mutual security program with which we wage the cold war. The military were afraid that resources required to enhance our capability for limited warfare would be diverted from the maintenance of our nuclear deterrent capability. This was a legitimate fear, but Secretary Dulles also feared that resources which should be allocated to the mutual security program might be diverted to assisting in the maintenance of our military programs.

In conclusion, Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that, while NSC 5810 was a most interesting and challenging paper, he thought that the problems set forth in it required further study. Consideration of NSC 5810 could well occupy the time of the National Security Council for more than one session. It goes to the very heart of our policy in many more respects than had been discussed thus far. He personally would like to have more time to study the paper, inasmuch as he had only got around to it a day or two ago, and we all around the table had so many things to do. For example, he particularly wanted to talk further about the paper with Secretary McElroy and Secretary Anderson.

When Secretary Dulles had concluded his comments, General Cutler asked if there were others. The President replied that he had a couple of questions. Someone had remarked that mutual deterrence was an umbrella under which small wars could be fought without starting a global war—small wars even in the NATO area. The analogy of the umbrella did not seem appropriate to the President. Actually, the umbrella would be a lightning rod. Each small war makes global war the more likely. For example, the President said he simply could not believe that if the Soviets tried to seize Austria we could fight them in what the President called a nice, sweet, World War II type of war. This seemed very unrealistic to the President, and he felt that the matter must be looked into much more deeply.

The President then posed his second question. We really are faced with two possible courses of action. If we strengthen the mobile and tactical types of forces, either we do so by decreasing the strength of our nuclear deterrent force or else we will have to accept a massive increase in the resources to be devoted to our military defenses. If we accept the latter alternative, we have got to decide promptly by what methods we are going to maintain very much larger military forces than we have previously done. These methods would almost certainly involve what is

euphemistically called a controlled economy, but which in effect would amount to a garrison state. For these reasons the President expressed his satisfaction that we were raising this most serious problem. This on paper, NSC 5810, said the President, was worth all the NSC policy papers which he had read in the last six months.

In his concluding remarks, the President again expressed strong doubts as to whether we could fight a limited war in the NATO area. At any rate, the President said he would not want to be the one to withhold resort to the use of nuclear weapons if the Soviets attacked in the NATO area. However, he said, he did not wish to be prejudiced in his judgments, and he was ready to be convinced of the contrary if this could be done. Obviously the Secretary of State takes the opposite view. The President wanted the case to be argued more fully.

Lastly, said the President, we were in great need of more definite information as to the exact size of the deterrent forces which we need today and which we will need over the next few years. This precise information should be brought out and discussed right here at the Council table.

Secretary Dulles quickly replied that he had never meant to say that we could keep a war in Europe within bounds and prevent its spreading into global war. What he had said was that unless we could satisfy our allies that they possess some kind of local military capability to defend themselves by other means than our resort to massive nuclear retaliation, we would lose our allies. The President replied by asking what else we had been trying to do these last years but try to induce our allies to provide themselves with just such a local defensive capability and, moreover, doing our best to help them achieve such a capability.

Secretary Dulles agreed that the President's observation was right, but expressed doubts as to whether we had been giving them the right kind of military assistance. What was needed was a modernization of the military capabilities of our European allies. These allies must at least have the illusion that they have some kind of defensive capability against the Soviets other than the United States using a pushbutton to start a global nuclear war. The President again expressed bewilderment. What possibility was there, he asked, that facing 175 Soviet divisions, well armed both with conventional and nuclear weapons, that our six divisions together with the NATO divisions could oppose such a vast force in a limited war in Europe with the Soviets?

Secretary Dulles responded by citing the example of Korea. We feel that there is an adequate deterrent to the renewal of Communist aggression against South Korea. This deterrent consists of our nuclear capability based on Okinawa. Nevertheless, we and the South Koreans maintain on South Korean territory 22 divisions, two of which are U.S. Why do we do so? Primarily for political and psychological reasons. The South

Koreans want to see defensive forces on their own soil. The same thing applies in Europe. It may well prove that local wars in Europe will spread into general nuclear war. But even so, we do not want to lose our allies before the war even starts. The President replied that it would be splendid if we could induce our NATO allies to maintain proportionately as many divisions as the South Koreans maintain in South Korea. Secretary Dulles said that we might indeed be able to do so if we were willing to pay out in military assistance to our European allies sums proportionate to the sums we provided to South Korea.

At this point General Cutler suggested what he regarded as a suitable Council action with respect to the military strategy paragraphs of NSC 5810, and suggested that the Council turn its attention to other problems which arose in connection with other portions of NSC 5810.

Mr. Allen Dulles asked to speak before the Council finished its consideration of the military strategy sections of NSC 5810. He pointed out that it was in the newly developing areas of the world that the United States was suffering the hardest blows. We were quite thin in our resources to meet situations such as that in Indonesia at the present time and situations like it which might develop very soon in Laos. We should and can do more to meet such situations as these. In order to do so we need more funds, at least \$50 million additional. The President expressed his agreement with Mr. Dulles' suggestion, and said he was sorry that Mr. Dulles had not asked for more money if he needed it. Mr. Dulles pointed out at once that this was not the fault of the Bureau of the Budget.

Secretary Dulles said that he would presently go to Berlin. When he got there he would repeat what he had said in Berlin four years ago—namely, that an attack on Berlin would be considered by us to be an attack on the United States. Secretary Dulles added that he did not know whether he himself quite believed this or, indeed, whether his audience would believe it. But he was going to perform this ritual act. The President expressed surprise, and said that if we did not respond in this fashion to a Soviet attack on Berlin, we would first lose the city itself and, shortly after, all of Western Europe. If all of Western Europe fell into the hands of the Soviet Union and thus added its great industrial plant to the USSR's already great industrial might, the United States would indeed be reduced to the character of a garrison state if it was to survive at all.

Secretary Dulles, in reply, said that he indeed hoped that the President would order a nuclear war if the Soviets attacked Berlin, but he doubted very much whether the President's successor would issue such an order. Could we not in fact, asked Secretary Dulles, fight our way into Berlin to defend the city against Soviet attacks? The President replied very forcefully that we certainly could not with the U.S. and NATO forces now existing. You might be able to bluff your way into Berlin, but

you would not be able to fight your way. Secretary Dulles commented that our present policy was now to resort to nuclear war at once if there were a Soviet military attack on Berlin. Mr. Allen Dulles commented that he thought the Russians believed this, and that it was extremely important that they continue so to believe.

Secretary Anderson said he wished to comment on General Cutler's proposal with respect to Council action on paragraphs 13 and 14 and the other military strategy paragraphs of NSC 5810. He explained that he hoped that the Council would have the opportunity for a much longer discussion of the subject. He agreed with the President's estimate of the great significance of this paper. However, we were confronted by a differing judgment as to the facts of the situation. General Twining states that we have already achieved an adequate capability for conducting limited war. General Taylor says that we do not have such an adequate capability. General Twining stated his agreement with Secretary Anderson's remark, whereas General Taylor said that this was not a question of black and white but a question of judgment or of degree. General Cutler said that he was by no means suggesting that there be no further discussion of this problem. Secretary McElroy gave his support to the Council action suggested by General Cutler. He said also that he was so impressed with General Twining's comments on the psychological importance of making a basic change in our military strategy, that he believed that if we did change the policy in this respect the new language should be consigned to a limited-distribution annex.

General Cutler then went back to his briefing note in order to deal with the second of the two most significant paragraphs in the new statement—namely paragraph 41, dealing with Communist China. He pointed out that paragraph 41 in NSC 5810 repeated the guidance in last year's basic policy with respect to Communist China. However, this paragraph contained no guidance as to a future attempt by other nations to seat Red China, rather than the Chinese Nationalist Government, in the United Nations. In view of the fact that there were many straws in the wind to indicate that such a move might be made, and that the United States might not be able to block it, he personally believed, along with certain Planning Board members, that the United States should be considering now, while it still enjoys its strong majority in the UN, alternative ways of dealing with such a contingency, and of finding a way to preserve the independence of Taiwan despite the loss of its status as representative in the UN of all China. Upon concluding his remarks, General Cutler asked Secretary Dulles to speak to this problem.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that, in line with General Twining's fears as to the unfortunate psychological impact of a change in basic policy, he believed that the last thing in the world we would want to commit to writing was a proposal of the sort suggested by General Cutler for

paragraph 41. Furthermore, he doubted whether the tide was actually running against the United States in the UN with respect to seating Communist China. On the contrary, there was some evidence that the tide had turned in favor of our position against the admission of Red China. For example, the United Kingdom has committed itself to support the moratorium during the lifetime of the Macmillan government. Secretary Dulles doubted, therefore, whether any change in British policy on this subject was imminent.

General Cutler asked if there would not certainly be a change if Aneurin Bevan¹² were soon to become Foreign Secretary. To this point, Secretary Dulles replied that if we were to review all our policies on such assumptions as this, there were a lot more significant changes to be made than our attitude toward the admission of Red China to the UN. If Bevan became Foreign Secretary, we would presumably be ousted from all our missile bases in the United Kingdom.

The President expressed the belief that if the United States were to recognize Red China and agree to the admission of Red China to the United Nations, there would be a wave of insistence in Congress and among the American people that the United States withdraw completely from the UN.

General Cutler next directed the Council's attention to the first of five splits of view to be resolved by the Council. All these splits dealt with foreign economic matters. The first occurred on page 12, in paragraph 27-d, reading as follows:

"d. Because many less developed nations depend for economic growth on exports of a few basic commodities, their development programs are adversely affected by large fluctuations in prices of such commodities. If necessary for political reasons, the United States should, on occasion, join in a multilateral examination of price, production, and demand trends which might help to promote readjustments between supply and demand and reduce price fluctuations. [But the United States should not discuss the making of, or participate in, any international commodity agreement without the specific approval of the President.]*¹³

"* Treasury-Commerce proposal."

General Cutler pointed out that Mr. Randall had called attention to the fact that the CFEP, on October 11, 1955, generally disapproved of international commodity agreements, and that CFEP policy requires inter-agency policy-level approval before such an agreement may be discussed with a foreign nation. Neither of these points was reflected in paragraph 27-d, and Mr. Randall believed that the whole subparagraph

¹² British Member of Parliament and Labor Party spokesman on foreign affairs as a member of the opposition "Shadow Cabinet."

¹³ All brackets are in the source text.

should be deleted until present policy in this regard is first modified by the CFEP. Accordingly, General Cutler suggested that the subparagraph be deleted and its substance referred to the CFEP for action.

Secretary Dulles said that there was a statement made, he believed, at the 1957 conference at Buenos Aires which was based on the President's approved policy with respect to the problem of international commodity agreements and related matters. He therefore suggested that since this statement had been approved by the President, it should be inserted in NSC 5810 in place of the present subparagraph 27-d.

General Cutler asked Secretary Dulles if it were not possible to send the substance of this subparagraph to CFEP for consideration by that body as having jurisdiction in this field. Secretary Dulles said he could not understand why this was necessary, inasmuch as the policy statement he was referring to had already been made by the President. Secretary Anderson suggested that decision should be delayed so that we could determine whether what was said at Buenos Aires on this matter in 1957 continued to be what we still believed to be wise policy. Secretary Dulles said he had no intention of going beyond what we had said at Buenos Aires, and handed the President a copy of the Buenos Aires statement. The President then suggested that the substance of subparagraph 27-d be transmitted to the CFEP together with Secretary Dulles' statement made at Buenos Aires. Secretary Dulles said he merely wanted to state that any severe inhibition such as proposed by Treasury and Commerce in the bracketed portion of subparagraph 27-d, against even considering or discussing international commodity agreements with our Latin American friends, would have catastrophic repercussions throughout Latin America. The President agreed that this was true, but also warned against the danger of price-fixing as an actual U.S. course of action. Secretary Anderson also expressed great concern about the problem, but likewise agreed that we could not certainly state that we would not even discuss it with our Latin American neighbors. The President added that extreme care must be taken with regard to the wording of the policy guidance on this problem.

General Cutler then invited the Council's attention to the split in paragraph 27-e-(6), reading as follows:

"[(6) Be prepared to consider, on a case-by-case basis, participation with other Free World nations in multilateral development projects or funds.]**

*** Treasury and Commerce propose deletion."

He added that since NSC 5810 had been circulated, State, Treasury and Commerce had agreed to a rewording of this subparagraph. General Cutler read the agreed rewording, and it was accepted by the Council.

General Cutler then moved on to subparagraph 37-c, dealing with Communist China and reading as follows:

"c. The United States should continue its unilateral embargo on trade with [similarly liberalize its trade policies with]* Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam.

"* ODM alternative proposal."

He pointed out his agreement with the position of Mr. Randall that proposals such as this, for changes in our economic defense policy, should be made first in the Council on Foreign Economic Policy. He then called on Mr. Gray to speak to the proposed ODM amendment of subparagraph 37-c.

Mr. Gray stated that he was agreeable to sending the subparagraph to the CFEP for prior consideration, but that he had changed his mind recently with respect to the liberalization of U.S. trade with Communist China, and felt that the ODM proposal had merit substantively. He accordingly said that he wished to make his position clear when this matter was considered subsequent to CFEP consideration.

The next split related to subparagraph 29-a, reading as follows:

"a. The total level of U.S. economic assistance world-wide should be consistent with the objectives we seek to achieve in the world, such as peace, the security and economic vitality of the United States, the independence of the new states, long-range security interests, and the development of future markets. [Increases in economic development assistance should, to the extent politically and militarily feasible, be offset by decreases in other economic or in military assistance programs.]*

"* Treasury and Budget proposal."

General Cutler called on Secretary Anderson to explain why the Treasury Department believed that the bracketed language in this subparagraph should be included in NSC 5810.

Secretary Anderson replied that we simply could not go on compounding all these assistance programs for foreign countries. The matter was as simple as that. In support of this view he noted how paragraph 43 of the paper called for a strong, healthy, expanding U.S. economy, and warned against the dangers of inflation. In turn, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget pointed out that statements such as that proposed by the Treasury and the Budget had been in all our basic policy statements since 1953. Accordingly, its deletion from NSC 5810 would take on greater significance than was usual. Furthermore, he thought that the qualifying language, "to the extent politically and militarily feasible", would provide sufficient opportunity to make exceptions to the general rule that increases should be offset by decreases.

Secretary Dulles expressed a strong distaste for the proposed language. He realized that all such matters as this must come before the

Bureau of the Budget, but if this language were included and you needed to increase economic assistance to some country, you would find that you could not make the increase on the basis of its intrinsic merits. You would have to reduce military assistance first. This procedure would prove to be altogether too mechanistic in operation, so that it might be impossible to increase our economic assistance to a given nation even when it was clearly in the U.S. national interest.

The President inquired of Secretary Dulles whether the inclusion of this language in previous statements of basic national security policy had occasioned difficulties for the State Department in its desire to increase economic assistance. Secretary Dulles replied that, on the contrary, up to now this language had been a dead letter. The President said that he thought so, and that there was a good deal of merit in Mr. Stans' argument.

General Cutler told the President that it was the President himself who had provided this phraseology that was originally adopted. The President said probably so; we are trying to save money. This sentence constitutes a warning, and it would certainly do no harm to include it. General Cutler also pushed for inclusion of the bracketed language, and Secretary Dulles agreed to accept it.

Director Stans then said that he had certain other suggestions to make for changes. He asked the Council to look at subparagraph 43-b, and suggested that the final sentence of this subparagraph be revised to read as follows:

"Constant efforts should be made to eliminate waste, duplication, unnecessary overhead, and unnecessary facilities and activities of the Federal Government."

There was agreement to add the language recommended by Mr. Stans.

Mr. Stans then called the Council's attention to subparagraph 4-d, on page 2, reading as follows:

"d. To engage successfully in a world-wide peaceful contest with the USSR, and thus to achieve its basic objective."

Mr. Stans called for the elimination of all of this phraseology except the final section, "thus to achieve its basic objective." He feared that if all the phraseology in the subparagraph as written were accepted, the United States would be called upon to achieve superiority over the USSR or every single competitive front, and this was simply too much to expect. General Cutler explained the feeling of the Planning Board as to the importance of successful peaceful competition with the Soviet Union, but Mr. Stans said this idea was covered already in paragraph 6; and he repeated his objections to the phraseology. General Cutler said that he did not read this language as Mr. Stans did. He did not believe that the

Planning Board intended that the United States should have to be superior in every single field of competition, but that it must be able to win in the over-all struggle. Secretary Dulles suggested that Mr. Stans' problem could be met by the insertion of the word "over-all". The Council accepted this revision.

The Director of USIA¹⁴ stated that he had a number of reservations with respect to NSC 5810, but he would bring up only one of them at the present time. He asked the Council to look at the first line of paragraph 18, reading as follows:

"18. The United States should continue efforts to persuade its allies to recognize nuclear weapons as an integral part of the arsenal of the Free World and the need for their prompt and selective use when required."

Mr. Allen found the suggestion of pressure on our allies unsuitable. He pointed out that in the forthcoming national elections in Greece the outcome seemed to turn on the question of whether or not the United States was pressing the Greeks to permit the installation of missile bases and nuclear weapons in Greece. Mr. Allen believed that we would obtain better results if we adopted the attitude of waiting to be asked by our allies to install bases and provide nuclear weapons, rather than to press them to accept such weapons.

The President said he did not believe that we had ever intended to press any of our allies to accept missile bases. If we had done so, he agreed with Mr. Allen that these were poor tactics. It was the President's understanding of this sentence that it meant only that our allies agreed to our use of nuclear weapons, and not to the establishment of bases in allied countries from which such weapons could be used. Secretary Dulles resolved the impasse by suggesting the language "to educate our allies" instead of "to persuade" them. The Council agreed to the adoption of this language.

Secretary Dulles then said that he had a question to raise with respect to subparagraph 43-a, reading as follows:

"a. A strong, healthy and expanding economy is essential to U.S. national security and to the security and stability of the rest of the Free World. A prolonged and severe U.S. recession would have very serious effects on the economic growth and political stability of the Free World. . . ."

Secretary Dulles said he took exception to the inclusion of the adjectives "prolonged" and "severe". A U.S. recession could have serious consequences in the Free World even if it were not prolonged and severe. Indeed, the present U.S. recession is already having a serious effect on

¹⁴George V. Allen.

the Free World. Secretary Anderson agreed with the Secretary of State that these adjectives were not suitable, but did not know what adjectives to use to replace them. Secretary Dulles then suggested the language, "A U.S. recession could have serious effects, etc., etc.". This proposal was favorably received by the Council.

General Cutler then said that as the final item of today's meeting he would like to suggest a change in subparagraph 6–e, reading as follows:

"e. To deter Communist limited military aggression or, if necessary, to defeat such aggression in a manner and on a scale best calculated to keep hostilities from broadening into general war."

General Cutler suggested dropping the term "Communist", on the ground that while, of course, we wished to stop Communist aggression, we likewise wanted to deter *any* limited military aggression. Secretary Dulles replied that deleting the term "Communist" would have serious implications and would greatly enlarge our current commitments to deter aggression. We should consider carefully whether or not it was wise so to enlarge our responsibilities. What, for example, would we be expected to do in the event of a war between India and Pakistan? General Cutler immediately suggested that Council action on this item be deferred pending the studies which were to be submitted by the Department of Defense in June with respect to the general problem of revising the military strategy outlined in NSC 5810.

*The National Security Council:*¹⁵

a. Discussed the draft statement of Basic National Security Policy contained in NSC 5810; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon (particularly with reference to paragraphs 13 and 14), as presented orally at the meeting.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5810, subject to:

(1) *Page 2, subparagraph 4–d, next-to-last line:* Changing "a world-wide" to read "an over-all world-wide".

(2) *Page 3, subparagraph 6–e:* Review of the wording of this subparagraph in the light of the recommendations by the Department of Defense pursuant to (3) below.

(3) *Page 5, paragraphs 13 and 14:* The tentative inclusion, as paragraphs 13 and 14 in NSC 5810, of existing basic policy in paragraphs 14 and 15 of NSC 5707/8 without change; pending submission on or before June 16, 1958, by the Department of Defense (perhaps in the form of a limited-distribution supplement) of recommendations for any revision of the military strategy outlined in NSC 5810 as amended, after further consideration in the light of Council discussion at this meeting.

¹⁵The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 1903, approved by the President on May 5. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

(4) *Page 7, paragraph 18, 1st and 2nd lines:* Revision of "to persuade its allies to recognize" to read "to educate its allies as to the importance of".

(5) *Page 12, subparagraph 27-d:* Deletion of this subparagraph, and referral of it and the alternative proposed by the Secretary of State to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy for review of existing policy on international commodity agreements and advice on June 2, 1958, to the National Security Council as to the results of such review.

(6) *Page 12, subparagraph 27-e:* Relettering as subparagraph 27-d, and substitution for the bracketed subparagraph (6) thereof and the footnote thereto, of the following:

"(6) Be prepared to study the acceptability of proposals for the establishment of international institutions for development financing."

(7) *Page 13, subparagraph 29-a:* Inclusion of the bracketed sentence and deletion of the footnote thereto.

(8) *Page 18, subparagraph 37-c:* Deletion of the bracketed words and the footnote thereto.

(9) *Page 21, subparagraph 43-a, 2nd sentence:* Substitution for "A prolonged and severe U.S. recession would" of the words "A U.S. recession could".

(10) *Page 21, subparagraph 43-b, last line:* Insertion, after "unnecessary facilities", of the words "and activities".

Note: NSC 5810, as adopted subject to the amendments and provisos in b above, approved by the President and circulated as NSC 5810/1¹⁶ for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, with the understanding that final determination on budget requests based thereon will be made by the President after normal budgetary review. NSC 5810/1 supersedes NSC 5707/8, and is the basic guide in the implementation of all other national security policies, superseding any provisions in such other policies as may be in conflict with it. Progress reports to the National Security Council on other policies should include specific reference to policies which have been modified by NSC 5810/1.

The action in b-(2) and -(3) above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate action.

The action in b-(5) above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, CFEP, for appropriate action.¹⁷

S. Everett Gleason

¹⁶ Document 24.

¹⁷ A commentary on this action and on the discussion as they affected the Department of Defense are in a May 5 memorandum from Cutler to McElroy. The memorandum was reviewed by the President. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records) See the Supplement.

24. National Security Council Report

NSC 5810/1

Washington, May 5, 1958.

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

REFERENCES

- A. NSC 5707/8
- B. NIE 100-58
- C. NSC 5810
- D. NSC Action No. 1903

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, at the 364th Council meeting on May 1, 1958, discussed the draft statement of Basic National Security Policy contained in NSC 5810, prepared by the NSC Planning Board, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon (particularly with reference to paragraphs 13 and 14), as presented orally at the meeting. The Council adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5810, subject to the amendments and provisos set forth in NSC Action No. 1903-b.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5810 as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5810/1, and directs its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of U.S. Government, with the understanding that final determination on budget requests based thereon will be made by the President after normal budgetary review.

NSC 5810/1 supersedes NSC 5707/8, and is the basic guide in the implementation of all other national security policies, superseding any provisions in such other policies as may be in conflict with it. Progress reports to the National Security Council on other policies should include specific reference to policies which have been modified by NSC 5810/1.

Existing basic policy in paragraphs 14 and 15 of NSC 5707/8, without change, has tentatively been included as paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1, pending submission on or before June 16, 1958, by the Department of Defense (perhaps in the form of a limited-distribution supplement) or recommendations for any revision of the military strategy outlined in NSC 5810/1, after further consideration in the light of Council discussion at the 364th Meeting.

Subparagraph 27-d of NSC 5810 has been deleted, and has been referred, together with the alternative proposed by the Secretary of State, to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy for review of existing policy on international commodity agreements and advice on June 2, 1958, to the Council as to the results of such review.

James S. Lay, Jr.¹

Enclosure

[Here follows a table of contents.]

STATEMENT OF BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Preamble

1. The spiritual, moral, and material posture of the United States rests upon established principles which have been asserted and defended throughout the history of the Republic. The genius, strength, and promise of America are founded in the dedication of its people and government to the dignity, equality, and freedom of the human being under God. These concepts and our institutions which nourish and maintain them with justice are the bulwark of our free society and the basis of the respect and leadership which have been accorded our nation by the peoples of the world.

Our constant aim at home is to preserve the liberties, expand the individual opportunities and enrich the lives of our people. Our goal abroad must be to strive unceasingly, in concert with other nations, for peace and security and to establish our nation firmly as the pioneer in breaking through to new levels of human achievement and well-being.

These principles and fundamental values must continue to inspire and guide our policies and actions at home and abroad. When they are challenged, our response must be resolute and worthy of our heritage. From this premise must derive our national will and the policies which express it. The continuing full exercise of our individual and collective responsibilities is required to realize the basic objective of our national security policy.

¹ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

SECTION A

OUTLINE OF U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY

2. The *basic objective* of U.S. national security policy is to preserve and enhance the security of the United States and its fundamental values and institutions.

3. The *basic threat* to U.S. security is the determination and ability of the hostile Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes effectively to direct the rapidly growing military and economic power under their control toward the objective of world domination; at a time when (a) there are sufficient quantities of nuclear weapons capable of causing immediate and incalculable devastation; (b) uncertainty is growing whether U.S. massive nuclear capabilities would be used to defend Free World interests; (c) weakness or instability in many areas exerts strong pressures for economic or political change and creates vulnerabilities to expanding Sino-Soviet subversion, political action and economic penetration; and (d) the American people have not been brought to appreciate the extent of the crisis facing the United States, or adequately to support certain elements of the U.S. strategy.

4. The *basic problem* for the United States, in order to minimize this basic threat, is to mobilize and effectively employ, over a long period and at an adequate and sustained level, the U.S. and Free World spiritual, political, military, economic, intellectual and scientific resources required (a) to maintain military strength sufficient to deter general war and limited aggression, (b) to maintain economic growth essential to U.S. security, welfare, and world leadership, (c) to provide leadership in maintaining the integrity of the Free World and in fostering an international environment in which the United States can sustain its values and institutions, and (d) to engage successfully in an over-all world-wide peaceful contest with the USSR, and thus to achieve its basic objective.

5. The initiation by the United States of preventive war to reduce Soviet or Chinese Communist military power is not an acceptable course either to the United States or its major allies. Therefore, U.S. policy must be designed (a) to reduce the threat of Soviet or Chinese Communist military power by other means (such as a safeguarded arms control agreement with the USSR), and (b) in a time of relative nuclear parity and increased Sino-Soviet political and economic aggressiveness, to place greater emphasis on non-military measures.

6. U.S. policies, for which the full support of the American people should be enlisted, and U.S. and other Free World resources effectively used to meet the problem stated in paragraph 4 above, must be designed:

a. To take the initiative in promoting sound economic growth and acceptable political development in the Free World, not only to meet the

Communist threat but also to create an international environment in which the values and institutions of freedom can be sustained.

- b. To present the true image of the United States.
- c. To accelerate acceptable changes in the character and policies of the Sino-Soviet Bloc regimes.
- d. To prevent the occurrence of general war, without sacrificing vital U.S. security interests.
- e. To deter Communist limited military aggression or, if necessary, to defeat such aggression in a manner and on a scale best calculated to keep hostilities from broadening into general war.
- f. To prevent Communism from gaining political control of independent nations by subversion or other means short of war.
- g. To destroy or neutralize the international Communist apparatus in the Free World.
- h. To seek safeguarded arms control agreements as a means of reducing the threat of Sino-Soviet military power.

7. This national strategy requires a flexible and coordinated, overt and covert, combination of military, political, and economic actions, consistent with the national posture described in paragraph 1 above, and executed in a manner to achieve the optimum psychological advantage. Carried out with resolution and initiative, this general strategy can enable the United States to achieve its basic objective.

SECTION B

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

I. Military Elements of National Strategy

8. A central aim of U.S. policy must be to deter the Communists from use of their military power, remaining prepared to fight general war should one be forced upon the United States. This stress on deterrence is dictated by the disastrous character of general nuclear war, the danger of local conflicts developing into general war, and the serious effect of further Communist aggression. Hence the Communist rulers must be convinced that aggression will not serve their interests: that it will not pay.

9. If this purpose is to be achieved, the United States and its allies in the aggregate will have to have, for an indefinite period, military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility and mobility to enable them to deal swiftly and severely with Communist overt aggression in its various forms and to prevail in general war should one develop. In addition, the deterrent is much more likely to be effective if the United States and its major allies show that they are united in their determination to use military force against such aggression.

10. a. It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other

weapons in the arsenal of the United States; to consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view; and to use them when required to achieve national objectives. Advance authorization for their use is as determined by the President.

b. The U.S. nuclear stockpile should include, in varying sizes and yields, standard weapons and clean² weapons as feasible, to provide flexible and selective capabilities for general or limited war, as may be required to achieve national objectives.

11. The United States will be prepared to use chemical and biological weapons to the extent that such use will enhance the military effectiveness of the armed forces. The decision as to their use will be made by the President.

12. If time permits and an attack on the United States or U.S. forces is not involved, the United States should consult appropriate allies before any decision to use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is made by the President.

13. In carrying out the central aim of deterring general war, the United States must develop and maintain as part of its military forces its effective nuclear retaliatory power, and must keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knockout blow, even by surprise. The United States must also develop and maintain adequate military and non-military programs for continental defense. So long as the Soviet leaders are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them deliberately to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the USSR.

14. Within the total U.S. military forces there must be included ready forces which, with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (a) to present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression, and (b) to defeat or hold, in conjunction with indigenous forces, any such local aggression, pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to suppress quickly the local aggression. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted.

Local aggression as used in this paragraph refers only to conflicts occurring in less developed areas of the world, in which limited U.S. forces participate because U.S. interests are involved. The prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary to defeat such local

² Nuclear weapons capable of being exploded with greatly reduced radioactive fallout. [Footnote in the source text.]

aggression is considered the best means to keep hostilities from broadening into general war. Therefore, military planning for U.S. forces to oppose local aggression will be based on the development of a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use as authorized by the President. When the use of U.S. forces is required to oppose local aggression, force will be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid hostilities from broadening into general war.

15. In order to maximize the cold war contribution of U.S. military power, the military capabilities of the United States, to the extent consistent with primary missions, should be utilized in appropriate ways to reinforce and support overt and covert political, economic, psychological, technological, and cultural measures in order to achieve national objectives.

16. U.S. security is predicated upon the support and cooperation of appropriate major allies and certain other Free World nations, in providing and using their share of military forces in the common defense and in furnishing bases for U.S. military power. Although developments in weapons technology and other factors over future years will change the need for, and will necessitate periodic review of, the present U.S. overseas base system, a small net expansion of this system may be required, at least initially. The determination as to whether to position IRBM's around the Sino-Soviet periphery outside the NATO area will be made by the President.

17. The United States should strengthen as practicable the collective defense system. The United States should take the necessary steps to convince its NATO and other allies that U.S. strategy and policy serve their security as well as its own, and that, while their full contribution and participation must be forthcoming, the United States is committed to carry out its obligations for their defense and possesses the capability to fulfill its commitments. In particular, to counter existing uncertainty, the United States should reaffirm that its nuclear weapons will be used, as necessary, to defend Free World interests.

18. The United States should continue efforts to educate its allies as to the importance of nuclear weapons as an integral part of the arsenal of the Free World and the need for their prompt and selective use when required. Taking into account the protection of classified data, the essential requirements of U.S. forces, and production capabilities, the United States should continue to provide to selected allies, capable of using them effectively, advanced weapons systems (including nuclear weapons systems with the elements required by law to be under U.S. control, readily available). Special attention should be directed to assisting selected allies rapidly to develop and produce in concert, through NATO, their own advanced weapons systems (less nuclear elements), and to facilitating and increasing the exchange and utilization of Free

World scientific and technological resources. The United States should seek to prevent the development by additional nations of national nuclear weapons capabilities and to prevent or retard the acquisition of national control over nuclear weapons components by nations which do not now possess them. The United States should consider the long-term development of a NATO nuclear weapons authority to determine requirements for, hold custody of, and control the use of nuclear weapons in accordance with NATO policy and plans for defense of NATO areas.

19. The United States should continue to provide military and support assistance to nations whose increased ability to defend themselves and to make their appropriate contributions to collective military power is important to the security of the United States. To the extent possible without sacrifice of U.S. security, the United States should seek to reduce requirements for military assistance by encouraging selected recipient nations (principally non-Europeans) (a) to reduce large indigenous forces maintained to resist external aggression to a size commensurate with both the economic ability of the allied nation to support and with the external threat, placing reliance for additional support on U.S. capabilities, and (b) to emphasize police and constabulary type forces for internal security purposes in lieu of large indigenous military establishments.

20. The United States and its allies must reject the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war. Hence, the United States should attempt to make clear, by word and conduct, that it is not our intention to provoke war. At the same time, the United States and its major allies must make clear their determination to oppose aggression despite risk of general war; and the United States must make clear its determination to prevail if general war occurs. To strengthen the deterrent to limited aggression and to reduce the danger of limited aggression expanding into general war, the United States should, in appropriate cases, make timely communication of its intentions.

21. a. Dynamic research and development for military application are a necessity for the continued maintenance of effective armed forces and an adequate U.S. military posture. The military technology of the United States and its allies required to support these objectives should be superior to the military technology of the Soviet Bloc.

b. The United States must tap the basic and most advanced research of the nation, both private and governmental, so that it can rapidly take advantage of new discoveries, including those related to outer space, which may profoundly influence military technology. Moreover, the United States must speed up by all practicable steps the translation of research and development into an appropriate flow of new weapons and equipment to the armed forces.

c. Measures should be undertaken to increase mutual support between the United States and its allies in selective research and development for military application.

II. Political and Economic Strategy

22. Political and economic progress in the Free World is vitally important (a) to maintain the effectiveness of the military deterrent by preserving the cohesion of our alliances and the political basis for allied facilities and capabilities; (b) as an end in itself, in strengthening the vitality and well-being of the free nations; and (c) to create the conditions which over time will be conducive to acceptable change in the Communist Bloc. Behind the shield of its deterrent system, the United States should place relatively more stress on promoting growth and development in the Free World and constructive evolution in the Communist Bloc.

23. The ability of the Free World, over the long pull, to compete successfully with the Communist World will depend in large measure on demonstrated progress in meeting the basic needs and aspirations of Free World peoples. In helping to remedy conditions throughout the Free World which are readily susceptible to Communist exploitation, the United States should take timely action rather than allow a further deterioration to ensue which may require more costly and less certain measures (including military action).

A. *Strengthening the Free World*

24. Maintaining the vitality of the NATO Alliance is essential to carrying out effectively our national strategy to meet the threat of the Communist Bloc. At the same time, the United States must increase its leadership and influence in strengthening other Free World nations. Accordingly, the United States should act (a) to increase in Free World nations, especially in neutral nations, mutuality of interest and common purpose; confidence in the United States, through better understanding of its national purposes and by reason of its actions; and the will, strength, and stability necessary to retain their independence; (b) to provide, especially to emerging nations, constructive and attractive economic and ideological alternatives to Communism, including the effective promotion of economic development of less developed areas; (c) to neutralize the Communist apparatus in the Free World; and (d) to prevent the political and economic efforts of the Sino-Soviet Bloc from subverting or gaining political control of independent nations.

25. a. In the foreign economic field U.S. objectives include strong, healthy, expanding Free World economies; with emphasis on sound and timely economic progress in less developed areas and on maintenance of high rates of economic activity with relatively stable price levels in industrialized nations.

b. Necessary conditions for strength and growth in both the industrialized and less developed areas include:

- (1) Reasonable political stability and favorable internal policies.
- (2) A high level of international trade and investment within the Free World.
- (3) A strong, healthy and expanding U.S. economy

c. In order to foster a high level of international trade, the United States should (1) continue to press strongly for a general reduction of barriers to such trade; (2) seek to reduce further its own tariffs and other trade restrictions over the next few years on a reciprocal basis, with due regard to national security and total national advantage; and (3) support sound moves to widen the convertibility of currencies.

26. a. The United States should encourage and support movements toward European unity, especially those leading to supra-national institutions, bearing in mind that the basic initiative must come from the Europeans themselves. The United States should continue the policy of providing financial and other assistance to promote such integration. The United States should work, as appropriate with organizations which reflect progress toward such integration or increased cooperation among European nations.

b. The United States should encourage and assist the development of a sounder relationship between Europe and Africa and Europe and the Middle East.

27. a. Dangers to Free World stability are particularly acute in less developed areas (including certain European nations outside the Soviet Bloc), in view of lagging economic growth, rapid population increase, bitter national and colonial disputes, internal political instability, and increasingly vigorous Communist efforts toward political and economic penetration. The United States should support and foster economic progress in these areas in order, and in a manner designed, to increase long-range political stability and Free World cohesion.

b. Primary responsibility for satisfactory economic growth must remain with the less developed nations themselves. U.S. assistance should be extended in a way to promote local self-help, incentives, and initiative in mobilizing local resources and developing sound programs. Bearing in mind the political motivation of some assistance, the United States should seek, where possible, to assure that its assistance will be effectively used and that recipient governments are willing to take the necessary and appropriate measures.

c. The difficult task of speeding up economic growth and promoting political stability in the less developed areas calls for some changes in their traditional habits and attitudes. In order to lift one of the major limitations on the rate of economic growth, (1) less developed nations should be encouraged to expand educational facilities and opportuni-

ties, especially in the administrative and technical fields, and to share their knowledge and techniques with other less developed nations; and (2) the United States should devote, and should encourage other Free World industrialized nations to devote, more effort (by training programs, by strengthening educational institutions, by greatly expanding training in administrative and technical skills, and by providing competent advisers) to the development of local leaders, administrators, and skilled personnel. The United States should offer attractive contact and exchange opportunities to citizens of less developed nations.

d. To provide new capital investment required for economic development in less developed areas at a rate consistent with U.S. objectives, the United States should:

(1) Encourage the governments of underdeveloped nations to mobilize the maximum amount of local capital for domestic economic development, and create a favorable climate for foreign private investment.

(2) Encourage other industrialized Free World nations to facilitate movements of private capital to the less developed areas and to supply governmental capital where their own resources permit.

(3) Support, wherever appropriate, the efforts of the IBRD and the IFC to promote development in less developed nations.

(4) Develop positive programs to foster increased U.S. private investment in less developed nations as well as in industrialized nations.

(5) Be prepared to make appropriately increased economic development financing available in substantial amounts and on a long-term basis.

(6) Be prepared to study the acceptability of proposals for the establishment of international institutions for development financing.

28. a. In order to meet the challenge posed by the Sino-Soviet Bloc economic offensive (both trade and aid), the United States should vigorously press forward its own positive programs to foster a high level of Free World trade and to promote economic development in the less developed areas, rather than react defensively to Sino-Soviet Bloc programs.

b. Recognizing that it is not always feasible or desirable for less developed nations to reject Sino-Soviet Bloc aid or trade, the United States, in cooperation with other Free World nations as appropriate, should (1) insure that nations are aware of the opportunities which expanding trade with the United States and the rest of the Free World, and U.S. aid programs, create for them to achieve economic progress as independent members of the Free World; (2) seek to induce nations not to (a) accept Sino-Soviet Bloc aid in certain sensitive fields which would create damaging dependence on the Bloc, (b) trade with the Bloc on prejudicial terms, or (c) become unduly dependent on trade with the Bloc; and (3) in very exceptional cases, take direct measures to counter Bloc

moves, by Free World actions in aid or trade taken specifically for this purpose.

29. a. The total level of U.S. economic assistance world-wide should be consistent with the objectives we seek to achieve in the world, such as peace, the security and economic vitality of the United States, the independence of the new states, long-range security interests, and the development of future markets. Increases in economic development assistance should, to the extent politically and militarily feasible, be offset by decreases in other economic or in military assistance programs.

b. The Development Loan Fund should be assured of continuity and resources adequate to promote accelerated rates of development in less developed nations.

c. The disposal of U.S. surplus agricultural products to Free World nations should be consistent with our foreign policy objectives and avoid material injury to the trade of friendly nations. In taking actions affecting imports of products of special importance to friendly nations, the United States should consider the impact on our foreign policy objectives.

30. U.S. political policies must be adapted to the conditions prevailing in each less developed area. The United States should not exert pressure to make active allies of nations not so inclined, but should recognize that the independence of such nations from Sino-Soviet control serves U.S. interests even though they are not aligned with the United States. The United States should provide assistance on the basis of the will of such nations to defend and strengthen their independence, and should take other feasible steps which will strengthen their capacity to do so.

31. The United States should seek (a) to work with, rather than against, constructive nationalist and reform movements in colonial areas in Asia and Africa, when convinced of their present or potential power and influence; and (b) to prevent the capture of such movements by Communism. Where disputes or tensions involved the relations of a major U.S. ally with a colonial or dependent area, the United States should use its influence in behalf of an orderly evolution of political arrangements towards self-determination, and should seek to strengthen the forces of moderation in both the colonial and metropolitan areas.

32. The United States should continue its full support of, and active leadership in, the United Nations, and do what it can appropriately to strengthen the organization to meet changing circumstances. It should seek to make maximum effective use of the United Nations to settle international disputes; to promote collective security, including the averting or limiting of local conflicts; to advance dependent peoples and less developed nations through such measures as technical assistance and trusteeships; and to solve international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character. The United Nations can serve

and should be used to mobilize Free World opinion in support of U.S. policies, to expose inimical Communist aims and actions, and to counter Communist propaganda. It should also be used for unobtrusive contacts, for intelligence, and for quiet diplomacy.

33. The United States should actively pursue programs for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Objectives should include advancement of knowledge in this field, strengthening of the U.S. national economy, and furtherance of cooperative efforts with other nations, both through bilateral arrangements and through multilateral agencies such as I.A.E.A. and EURATOM.

34. In nations vulnerable to subversion, the United States should, as one of its objectives, assist in the development of adequate local internal security forces, recognizing that direct action against the Communist apparatus must rest largely with the local government concerned. The United States should:

a. Seek to alert vulnerable nations to the methods and dangers of Communist subversion.

b. Conduct civil police and other overt and covert programs and activities to combat Communist subversive forces and techniques.

[1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]

d. In the event of an imminent or actual Communist seizure of control from within, take all feasible measures to thwart it, including military action if required and appropriate to cope with the situation.

B. Other Means of Influencing the Communist Bloc

35. a. In addition to political, military, and economic programs and actions to prevent further expansion of Communist influence and steadily to improve the relative position of the Free World, the United States, where appropriate in cooperation with other Free World nations, should seek to influence the Communist Bloc by:

(1) Giving to the peoples of Communist nations, as well as those of the rest of the world, a clear conception of the true U.S. and Free World purposes, including uncompromising U.S. determination to resist Sino-Soviet Bloc aggressive moves and uphold freedom; and otherwise to correct the distorted Communist view of the world.

(2) Making clear to the peoples of Communist nations, as well as those of the rest of the world, that the Free World opposes the Sino-Soviet Bloc because of Communist imperialism and continued use of violence and subversion.

(3) Convincing the Communist leaders and their peoples that there are alternatives to their regimes' present policies which would be acceptable to the United States and which they should come to consider compatible with their own security interests.

(4) Encouraging the Communist regimes to take measures which make more difficult the reversal of policies more acceptable to us.

b. Advantage should be taken of every opportunity to accomplish paragraph a above, by such measures as expansion of Free World-Soviet

Bloc exchanges and contacts, appropriate liberalization of trade controls, exploitation of Sino-Soviet Bloc vulnerabilities, the negotiating process, appropriate use of information media, and peaceful cooperation with the USSR in fields not inimical to U.S. security. The United States and the Free World should carry out these measures so as not to affect adversely the Free World's will to resist Communism, taking the initiative whenever possible and with a view to making a favorable impact upon the Free World, including uncommitted peoples.

36. a. The United States should encourage expansion of U.S.-Soviet Bloc exchanges and selective expansion of Free World-Soviet Bloc exchanges, and continue to sponsor specific proposals, which are chosen particularly with the view to:

(1) Sustaining current ferment in the thinking, and fostering evolutionary trends, within the Bloc.

(2) Maintaining Free World initiative and leadership for advantageous reductions of barriers to free communications and peaceful trade.

(3) Increasing the acquisition of useful intelligence concerning the Sino-Soviet Bloc and scientific information.

(4) Avoiding a net disadvantage to the United States from such contacts.

If such proposals are rejected by the Bloc, we should utilize these rejections to expose the reality behind the Soviet facade.

b. In considering proposals for U.S.-Soviet Bloc contacts, the United States should: (1) weigh the potential advantages against the adverse effect of the U.S. example upon other Free World nations more vulnerable to Communist penetration; and (2) discreetly inform Free World nations that expansion of U.S.-Bloc contacts does not signify acceptance of Soviet Bloc attitudes, but rather is a means of influencing such attitudes toward more acceptable conduct.

37. a. The United States should agree to liberalize the multilateral security controls on trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, thereby facilitating accord with our allies and agreement on the maintenance of an effective multilateral security trade control system. Such system should continue controls on munitions and atomic energy items and on other items having a clear military application or involving advanced technology of strategic significance not available to the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

b. The United States should be prepared to conform its unilateral controls on trade with the European Soviet Bloc to those agreed multilaterally, except as to items control of which will clearly advance U.S. policy objectives.

c. The United States should continue its unilateral embargo on trade with Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam.

38. a. In the exploitation of Sino-Soviet Bloc vulnerabilities, the United States should design its policies and programs to (1) accelerate

evolutionary changes in Sino-Soviet policies and conduct which will advance U.S. and Free World security and policy objectives; (2) weaken the ties which link the USSR and Communist China and the controls by which these nations dominate other nations; (3) exploit divisive forces within the Bloc; (4) encourage popular pressures on the Bloc leaders for greater emphasis on the legitimate needs and national aspirations of their peoples, such as greater liberties and improved standards of living; (5) undermine the faith of the Communist ruling classes in their own system and ideology; and (6) develop closer contacts with the peoples of the Eastern European nations in ways calculated to build on traditional feelings of friendship and respect for the United States.

b. In order to foster the development of internal freedom and national independence among the Soviet-dominated nations of Eastern Europe and Poland when judged to be to the net strategic advantage of the Free World, appropriate legislation should be sought, and necessary administrative changes should be made, relaxing present restrictions on the provision of economic aid.

39. The United States should continue its readiness to negotiate with the USSR whenever it appears that U.S. interests will be served thereby. Such negotiations may help to maintain Free World initiative and cohesion, and can be used to probe the intentions and expose the meaning of Soviet policies. The United States and its major allies should be prepared to sponsor mutual concessions between the Free World and the Sino-Soviet Bloc which would leave unimpaired the net security position of the Free World and which would contribute to the ultimate peaceful resolution of the Communist threat. The United States should not, however, make concessions in advance of similar action by the Soviets in the hope of inspiring Soviet concessions. Agreements with the USSR should be dependent upon a balance of advantages, and not upon implied good will or trust in written agreements.

40. Safeguarded arms control should be sought with particular urgency, in an effort to reduce the risk of war attendant on the increased possibility of achieving surprise and on the growth and proliferation of nuclear and strategic missile delivery capabilities. It should therefore be a major objective of the United States, in its own interest and as interrelated parts of its national policy, actively to seek a comprehensive, phased and safeguarded international system for inspection against surprise attack and for the regulation and reduction of conventional and nuclear armed forces and armaments; to make intensive efforts to resolve other major international issues because a comprehensive arms control agreement will depend upon the resolution of some of these issues; and meanwhile to continue the steady development of strength in the United States and in the Free World coalition required for U.S. security. As an initial step in developing this international arms system, the

United States should give priority to early agreement on the implementation of measures designed to reduce the risk of general war. The acceptability and character of any international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments depend primarily on the scope and effectiveness of the safeguards against violations and evasions, and especially the inspection system. Because in the future U.S. security will depend increasingly upon information and intelligence of Soviet military capabilities and intentions, the development of such an inspection system within the Soviet Union assumes, in and of itself, significance to U.S. security.

41. In applying the strategy in paragraphs 35-40 inclusive to Communist China, the United States must take account of non-recognition of the regime, the special hostility of the regime, its aggressive aims, and the undesirability of enhancing the power and influence of Communist China relative to free Asian nations. Moreover, the United States should not overlook any possibility, however remote, of fostering among the Chinese people demands for an alternative to the Communist regime. However, the United States should continue its willingness to participate in talks with, or including, Communist China, on specific subjects on an ad hoc basis where the general objectives of its political strategy against the Communist Bloc would be served thereby.

C. *Psychological Aspects of U.S. Policies*

42. a. The psychological impact abroad of our policies—domestic as well as foreign—plays a crucial part in the over-all advancement of U.S. objectives. It is essential, therefore, that along with the pertinent military, political and economic considerations, the psychological factor be given due weight during the policy-forming process.

b. After specific policies have been determined, implementing actions and statements supporting these policies should be coordinated and presented publicly in a manner that will best advance U.S. objectives.

c. Foreign informational, cultural, educational and other psychological programs are vital elements in the implementation of U.S. policies and should be selectively strengthened.

III. Domestic Strength and Other National Security Measures

43. *Sound U.S. Economy.*

a. A strong, healthy and expanding economy is essential to U.S. national security and to the security and stability of the rest of the Free World. A U.S. recession could have very serious effects on the economic growth and political stability of the Free World. The Federal Government should, therefore, pursue over-all credit and fiscal policies designed to:

(1) Counter the current recession and foster sustainable economic growth with a relatively stable price level.

(2) Maximize the economic potential of private enterprise by minimizing governmental controls and regulations and by encouraging the development, through private effort, of natural and technological resources.

b. Consistent with paragraph a above and with the necessity to undertake all programs which are essential for the national security, the United States should keep all Federal expenditures to a necessary minimum. Expenditure levels must take into full account the danger to the United States and its allies resulting from impairment, through inflation or the undermining of incentives, of the basic soundness of the U.S. economy or of the continuing expansion of the U.S. economy under a free enterprise system. Constant efforts should be made to eliminate waste, duplication, unnecessary overhead, and unnecessary facilities and activities in the Federal Government.

c. Efforts should also be made to keep Federal expenditures at levels which, over a period of time, would permit some reduction in the public debt and reductions in tax rates essential to long-term economic growth.

44. *Internal Security.* Internal security measures should be made adequate, by strengthening them as necessary, to meet the threat to U.S. security of covert attack by the Soviet Bloc on the United States by means of sabotage, subversion, espionage and, particularly, the clandestine introduction and detonation of nuclear weapons.

45. *Civil Defense.*

a. An essential ingredient of our domestic strength is an improved and strengthened civil defense program which seeks, by both preventive and ameliorative measures, to minimize damage from nuclear attack. An effective civil defense program requires an increasing degree of Federal responsibility, support and influence on the civil defense activities of the states.

b. Such a civil defense program should include certain measures, as approved by the President, to carry out the concept of fallout shelter for protection of the population against radiation hazards.

46. *Support by U.S. Citizens.*

a. The support of the American people is essential to the success of a national strategy to meet the threat to our national security.

b. Our nation, our institutions, the principles we hold dear, and our very lives are now in great danger. This great danger to the United States and to all free nations, may persist for a long time. While this threat is taking on new dimensions, the determination of U.S. citizens to face the risks and sacrifices, and their willingness to support the demands on

their spiritual and material resources, necessary to carry out this national strategy will be crucial.

c. Continuing efforts should be made to develop a comprehension among the American people of these needs and of the fact that our national strategy provides the best hope that war can be averted and our national security objectives achieved. Steadfastness, wisdom, courage, and readiness to sacrifice, rather than the complacent pursuit of peacetime living, are required to assure their survival during a period of crisis which may continue for many years.

d. Eternal vigilance to prevent intimidation of free criticism is also necessary in carrying out the national strategy.

47. *Mobilization Base.* The mobilization base (military and non-military) should be designed to meet the requirements of (a) general war, initiated by the enemy with a nuclear onslaught or as a result of hostilities which were not intended to lead to general war, (b) cold war, and (c) military conflict short of general war. Emphasis should be given to those elements that will increase U.S. D-Day readiness and capability. Within the military, first emphasis should be placed on achieving readiness for the forces in being. The base should meet the following objectives:

a. Maintenance of the active forces in a condition of optimum readiness to execute initial wartime missions.

b. Maintenance and support in a high state of readiness of those selected reserve forces specified as being so essential to the execution of initial wartime missions as to require their being given priority treatment.

c. Maintenance and support of phased expansion to M+6 months force levels.

d. The capacity to meet the combat requirements of all forces which would be mobilized by M+6 months.

e. Pre-M-Day positioning of stocks of selected supplies and equipment within the United States to insure M-Day readiness.

f. Pre-M-Day provision and positioning of reasonably protected stocks of selected supplies and equipment outside the United States to insure that U.S. forces surviving the enemy nuclear attack will have a reasonable capability of performing assigned initial tasks effectively without substantial resupply from the United States during the initial phase of war.

g. Maintenance and support of the industrial capability to conserve and replenish stocks that may be used in a local war.

h. Development and maintenance in a high state of readiness of measures essential to survival as a nation, including minimum civilian needs and continuity of government.

Implementation of these objectives should emphasize immediate combat readiness and effectiveness, reflect any planned reductions in the over-all physical size of the military establishment, and provide for increased selectivity aimed at bringing the mobilization base structure,

including equipment and standby facilities, in consonance with strategic concepts.

48. *Stockpiling of Materials for the Strategic Stockpile.*

a. Procurement for additions to the strategic stockpile authorized under P. L. 520, 79th Congress,³ should be limited to meeting shortages for a 3-year period of national emergency under (1) a "basic objective" which only partially discounts sources of supply outside North America and comparably accessible areas and (2) a "maximum objective" which discounts completely sources outside North America and comparably accessible areas.

b. The "basic objective" should be met expeditiously. The "maximum objective" should be reached on a lower priority basis, by such means as (1) deliveries under existing contracts; (2) transfers from other Government programs; (3) purchases with available foreign currencies; and (4) barter of U.S. agricultural surpluses.

c. Stockpile procurement for the purpose of maintaining the mobilization base should be undertaken only within the "maximum objective".⁴

d. Commitments calling for deliveries beyond the "maximum objective" should be cancelled when settlements in the over-all best interests of the Government can be arranged through agreement with the contractor.

49. *Intelligence.* The United States should develop and maintain an intelligence system capable of collecting the requisite data on and accurately evaluating:

a. Indications of hostile intentions that would give maximum prior warning of possible aggression or subversion in any area of the world.

b. The capabilities of foreign nations, friendly and neutral as well as enemy, to undertake military, political, economic and subversive courses of action affecting U.S. security.

c. Potential foreign developments having a bearing on U.S. national security.

50. *Manpower.* The United States should develop and maintain manpower programs designed to:

a. Channel a larger share of our resources to the education and training of rapidly increasing numbers of young men and women, with special emphasis on meeting the needs of science and technology.

³ Approved on July 23, 1946; 60 Stat. 596.

⁴ Through FY 1959 new mobilization base procurement could include battery-grade manganese (synthetic dioxide). New purchases of lead for the strategic stockpile will end on the effective date of any affirmative action on the application for increased tariff, but in no event later than June 30, 1958. [Footnote in the source text.]

b. Develop incentives and public attitudes which will cause a sufficiently larger share of our manpower to enter research and other pursuits required to accomplish national security objectives.

c. Expand the training of U.S. technical, scientific, and management personnel to further U.S. objectives in less developed nations.

d. Provide an effective military training system which recognizes the need for full utilization of skills, both civilian and military, and is, so far as possible, equitable.

e. Maintain the necessary active military forces with an adequate number of career leaders, specialists, and the highly-trained manpower required for modern war.

f. Develop and maintain suitably-screened, organized and trained reserve forces, including ready-reserve forces, of the size necessary for selected missions in the early phases of war, and for the phased expansion to M+6 months force levels.

g. Provide effective manpower mobilization plans (1) to meet military requirements, and (2) to channel manpower into priority tasks under emergency conditions, including the immediate post-attack requirements of civil defense.

51. *Research and Development.* The United States must achieve and maintain a rate of technological advance adequate to serve its over-all national security objectives. To this end there are required:

a. Increased awareness throughout the nation of the importance to national security of science, of technological advance, and of the need for greater motivations for qualified youth to pursue scientific careers and engineering careers.

b. Strong continuing support by the U.S. Government for basic and applied research, in proper balance.

c. Improved methods for the evaluation, collation and dissemination of U.S. and foreign scientific information.

d. The fostering of foreign, or cooperative U.S.-foreign, scientific endeavor in friendly nations.

e. Facilitation of wider application by industry, within the bounds of security, of the results of governmental research and development, including that performed for military purposes.

As research and development results are translated into an operational capability with new weapons, there should be an attendant continuing review of the level and composition of forces and of the industrial base required for adequate defense and for successful prosecution of war.

25. Memorandum of Discussion at the 367th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, May 29, 1958.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Launching of SAC Alert Forces* (NSC Action No. 1891)¹

General Cutler briefed the Council on the procedure formerly known as "Fail Safe" and now christened "Positive Control". He noted that when the Council had been briefed earlier on Fail Safe, the President had asked certain questions which had not been answered at the time. These questions would now be answered, together with any other related questions which might come up. (A copy of General Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)² He then called on Deputy Secretary Quarles.

Secretary Quarles summarized the findings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows: The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with the President's suggestion as to the desirability of working out advance procedures which would permit strike aircraft to receive "GO" instructions at the last possible moment while they still had the capability to proceed to their assigned targets and post-strike bases using program tactics and fuel reserves. The difficulty, however, was that under emergency war plans the maximum range of each aircraft, with minimum fuel reserves over post-strike bases, had been exploited to the fullest extent in order to cover the target system. Therefore, the capability to orbit within a specific delimited area, except under extremely advantageous wind conditions, could only apply to a small percentage of the force.

The Joint Chiefs, according to Secretary Quarles, did not think that there would be any Soviet reaction to the launching of our SAC forces under the Positive Control concept because it will not be detected as such.

With respect to the question of our contemplating reciprocal action by the USSR, Secretary Quarles pointed out that our Positive Control

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason.

¹ See footnote 3, Document 16.

² In his May 27 briefing note, Cutler stated that the President had inquired at the April 3 NSC meeting "as to the desirability of giving additional instructions to SAC Alert Forces which would permit them on reaching their points of return—in the absence of orders to proceed to their targets—to remain in the air for a specified time within a specified area instead of promptly returning to their bases; thus, giving an opportunity to send forth orders to such aircraft without requesting their return to their bases."

operations were carefully planned to avoid alerting or triggering the Soviet early warning system. We expect them to do likewise with respect to our early warning system. Admittedly, we would have some intelligence of Soviet operations of this nature, and they would have some intelligence of our Positive Control operations, before the aircraft of either side reached the early warning network of the other. While this involved a certain risk, Secretary Quarles believed that we could continue these operations without anticipating untoward results.

The President expressed his agreement with these conclusions.

General Cutler asked Mr. Allen Dulles whether he felt that there was any need for a coordinated intelligence estimate as to the probable Soviet reaction to the Positive Control exercises. Mr. Dulles said he did not believe such an intelligence estimate was necessary. (A copy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff report, on the basis of which Secretary Quarles briefed the Council on the above subject, is attached to this memorandum.)³

*The National Security Council.*⁴

Noted and discussed a further oral report on the subject by the Department of Defense, as presented by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

[Here follow Agenda Items 2. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," 3. "Status of Military Mobilization Base Program" (included in the Supplement), 4. "U.S. Policy Toward Spain," and 5. "U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of China."]

S. Everett Gleason

³ Not attached.

⁴ The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1916, approved by the President on June 1. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

26. Editorial Note

On June 25, 1958, President Eisenhower, on the recommendation of the Director of Central Intelligence, approved a directive establishing an interagency Comparative Evaluations Group to assess U.S. and Soviet progress in weapons systems. This action was noted by the National Security Council at its 370th meeting on June 26 in NSC Action No. 1938, approved by the President on July 30. (Department of State, S/S-NSC

(Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) The President subsequently circulated the directive on a Special Limited Distribution basis as NSC 5815, dated June 25. (Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Disaster File)

Also on June 25, the President, on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, approved a revision of that Subcommittee's directive, which he subsequently circulated as NSC 5816, dated July 1. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5816 Series) See the Supplement. NSC 5816 replaced NSC 5728, dated December 24, 1957. Regarding NSC 5728, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, volume XIX, page 676, footnote 6. Regarding the origins and early work of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, see *ibid.*, pages 56-57.

27. Memorandum of Discussion at the 370th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, June 26, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Item 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security" (see Document 160).]

2. *Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military Operations* (NSC Action No. 1814; NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1841, 1842 and 1844; NSC 5810/1; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 7 and June 18, 1958;¹ NSC Actions Nos. 1881,² 1903 and 1908³)

General Cutler briefed the Council on the background of the preparation of the 250-page State-Defense Study on "U.S. and Allied Capabil-

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on June 27.

¹ The March 7 memorandum transmitted a March 5 memorandum from the Secretary of Defense setting forth guidelines for a study of U.S. capabilities for limited war, an undertaking that had been suggested by the Gaither Panel. The June 18 memorandum transmitted a joint memorandum dated June 17 from the Secretaries of State and Defense, which commented on the study cited in footnote 4 below. (Both in Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5724 Series) Both are in the Supplement.

² NSC Action No. 1881 was approved by the President on March 21. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) It was discussed at the NSC meeting on March 20. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) See the Supplement.

³ Regarding NSC Action No. 1903, see footnote 15, Document 23. NSC Action No. 1908 was approved by the President on May 9. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) It was discussed at the NSC meeting on May 8; see vol. IV, pp. 417-418.

ities for Limited Military Operations to July 1, 1961".⁴ He noted that the Study was based on the examination of twelve hypothetical situations in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. His briefing note also contained references to the written memorandum of the Secretaries of State and Defense, submitting the Study to the Council. This written memorandum summarized fourteen Study findings which the Secretaries deemed significant. It also made eight additional observations and stressed five Study limitations.⁵ General Cutler suggested that while Admiral Triebel, the JCS Observer on the NSC Planning Board, summarized the content of the Study, the Council keep in mind the aforementioned five limitations, which he proceeded to state. Finally, he pointed out that the memorandum of the two Secretaries made three recommendations in addition to the recommendations made in the Study itself. He then called upon Admiral Triebel. (A copy of General Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting; another is attached to this memorandum.)⁶

Admiral Triebel proceeded to summarize the findings of the Study in general, and at the end provided a more detailed discussion of two of the hypothetical cases of limited war on which the conclusions and recommendations of the Study had been based. One of these concerned a Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan. The other concerned an attack by the United Arab Republic on the Arab Union. Admiral Triebel concluded with a summary of the recommendations of the group which had formulated the Study, dividing these into action recommendations and recommendations for noting. (A copy of Admiral Triebel's presentation is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)⁷

At the conclusion of the presentation, the President said that he had one or two questions to ask Admiral Triebel. Had he and his associates in the Study gone into the problem of command arrangements in each of the twelve hypothetical cases of limited war? Admiral Triebel replied that this problem had not been gone into in any detail.

⁴ Dated May 29. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5724 Series) This study, without appendices, is in the Supplement. In a June 18 memorandum to Goodpaster, Cutler enclosed what he described as "rough notes" of a meeting among Dulles, McElroy, and others on June 17 to discuss issues raised by the study. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary Records) See the Supplement.

⁵ These limitations were that the study did not examine capability for limited war with the Soviet Union, with any enemy using nuclear weapons, or in covert limited military operations; assumed that the United States could engage in effective military action against Communist China without "undue risk" of general war; and was not a "complete and final analysis" of limited operations. The Secretaries concluded that within the limitations, U.S. capabilities were "adequate to undertake and carry out limited operations of the nature examined," but that in East Asia, there was no capability to "cope satisfactorily" with Communist forces without *[text not declassified]*.

⁶ Dated June 26. For text, see the Supplement.

⁷ Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File)

The President then commented that at the present juncture the necessity for the use of nuclear weapons, even in the limited war, has been widely accepted both by the United States and the other great powers. He wondered, however, whether there would be a similar acceptance by the small countries whom the United States was attempting to defend by recourse to limited war. While he repeated his belief that we have moved a long distance since 1953 in reconciling the world to the necessity of using atomic weapons, he was still worried about what we would do if some small country called on us for assistance against Communist aggression but did not wish us to use nuclear weapons in providing such assistance. Admiral Triebel replied that it was precisely this concern about the attitude the President described that accounted for the recommendation in the Study which called for a public education and information program to show the relative efficiency of nuclear weapons.

Secretary Dulles at this point stated that he had one or two observations to make on the Study. As had been pointed out in the meeting, as well as in the joint memorandum by himself and Secretary McElroy, the United States did not possess a non-nuclear capability for limited military operations in the Far East. All of us must agree that this constitutes a U.S. weakness, because the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the Far East would have most serious political repercussions in such places as Japan and India, especially. Secretary Dulles confessed that he did not know how much it would cost to provide some kind of non-nuclear capability for our forces in the Far East, but he gathered that it would be costly. After citing the requirements as they were set forth in the Study, Secretary Dulles indicated that what he meant was this: If you could create a conventional capability for limited war in the Far East for as little as \$100 million or \$200 million, it would certainly be worth doing. But if the creation of such a non-nuclear capability would cost us \$2 or \$3 billion, that was quite another matter.

General Twining pointed out that the cost of creating such a capability would depend on the kind of limited war that we were compelled to fight in the Far East. To provide a conventional capability for a limited war in Korea would certainly cost in the billions rather than in the millions. Other kinds of Far Eastern limited operations might be less costly if we used conventional rather than nuclear power.

Secretary Dulles then quoted subparagraph 3-a-(3) of the joint memorandum of the Secretaries, reading as follows:

"In the Far East, however, the United States does not now have a ready non-nuclear capability which alone could cope satisfactorily with limited military operations against overtly engaged substantial Communist forces. The selective use of nuclear weapons against such forces and the facilities supporting them would be necessary."

Perhaps, thought Secretary Dulles, in the light of the discussion the above finding of the two Secretaries was inaccurately stated. Secretary McElroy replied that he thought the statement was accurate if all of it were read together.

After a discussion of the precedents in the late war in Indochina, the President expressed the opinion that the aforementioned statement from the memorandum of the two Secretaries was certainly applicable to the Korean and Formosan situations, but perhaps not to others. It might, therefore, be better to specify these two possible areas of limited military operations rather than to blanket in the whole Far East as an area where we had no ready non-nuclear capability for coping with substantial Communist forces.

Secretary Dulles then addressed the President and said that he understood it to be the President's opinion that the United States did possess a sufficient non-nuclear capability to deal effectively with a Viet-Minh invasion of South Vietnam or to deal with the hypothetical situation in Indonesia as it was set forth in the Study. Admiral Triebel explained briefly that a Vietnam invasion might require the use of a few nuclear weapons.

The President then expressed the belief that we could not support a much larger deployment of forces in the Far East without heavily increasing our costs.

At this point General Cutler stated to the Council that he had had in mind a Council action on this agenda item, but he believed that Secretary McElroy had a somewhat different proposal for a Council action, and asked him to explain it.

Secretary McElroy replied that inasmuch as the Defense Department was scheduled to come up before the Council on July 24 with recommendations for a revision of the military paragraphs in our recently-adopted Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1) which would include a discussion of limited military operations, the Defense Department was suggesting as a suitable Council action at this time that the Council simply note the Study and refer it to the Departments of State and Defense for their use in preparation for the July 24 meeting. After that, if the Council thought it desirable, the limited war study could be referred to the Planning Board for further consideration.

General Cutler said that he found Secretary McElroy's proposed action quite acceptable; but wondered whether, if the Planning Board found that it had some useful comments to make on the Study prior to July 24, provision should not be made for sending such comments to the Departments of State and Defense for their use in making their preparations for the July 24 meeting. General Cutler's amendment was agreed on, as was his suggestion for getting started at once on the recommendation of the two Secretaries that a National Intelligence Estimate be

prepared on world reactions and Sino-Soviet military reactions to U.S. use of nuclear weapons in limited military operations against Communist (non-Soviet) forces in the Far East.

This having been agreed, Secretary Dulles said he had a second point to make in connection with this general subject. The Shah of Iran was coming to Washington next week with the primary objective of discussing with the President what would happen in Iran if it were a victim of Communist aggression. As everyone here knew, the Shah imagined himself to be a military genius. Secretary Dulles hoped that, prior to the time of the Shah's arrival, all who were to talk with him could be briefed on what to say with respect to the matter he wished to discuss. In response to Secretary Dulles, it was pointed out that the Joint Chiefs have already made a full report on military potentialities in Iran and what we could do.

The President, believing that the discussion was ended, warmly complimented Admiral Triebel and his associates, both with respect to the Study itself and to Admiral Triebel's presentation.

General Twining, however, reverted to the Council action, and stated his strong doubt as to permitting the NSC Planning Board to deal with the problem of forces for limited military operations. He believed that if the Planning Board did consider this subject, it was likely to come up with a set of requirements for forces to deal with limited military operations. This was dangerous because it put our military people in a straitjacket in the matter of the character and level of our military forces; whereas what we needed in these respects was flexibility. General Twining believed that the problem of limited war could be more effectively dealt with by direct discussion between the authorities of State and Defense than through the medium of the NSC Planning Board.

The President stated that he did not quite grasp why the Planning Board would conduct itself in the manner suggested by General Twining. Neither, said General Cutler, describing himself as a dying gladiator (reference to his approaching return to private life), did he. General Cutler insisted that the Planning Board's concern with the study of limited military operations was largely to raise significant questions for Council consideration.

Mr. Allen Dulles informed the Council that he and his associates were working on a large-scale study of covert support of nations which were victims of aggression which is short of limited war.

*The National Security Council:*⁸

a. Noted and discussed the memorandum by the Secretaries of State and Defense on the subject, transmitted by the reference memorandum dated June 18, 1958, and the Study attached thereto, prepared by the Departments of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with appropriate participation of the Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to the plan concurred in by NSC Action No. 1881; as summarized at the meeting by Admiral Triebel.

b. Agreed that the above-mentioned memorandum by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Study attached thereto should be referred to the Departments of State and Defense:

(1) To be taken into account by them in their consideration of any revisions of NSC 5810/1 submitted pursuant to NSC Action No. 1903-b-(3); and

(2) For such further recommendations to the National Security Council on the subject as they may see fit to make.

c. Agreed that the Chairman of the NSC Planning Board should transmit to the Secretaries of State and Defense, for consideration during the implementation of b above, appropriate comments developed by the Planning Board in its consideration of the memorandum and attached Study mentioned in b above.

d. Requested the Director of Central Intelligence to initiate the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates on (1) world reactions and (2) Sino-Soviet military reactions to U.S. use of nuclear weapons in limited military operations against Communist (non-Soviet) forces in the Far East.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for implementation.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently referred to the NSC Planning Board for implementation, and to the Secretaries of State and Defense for information.

The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for implementation.

[Here follow Agenda Items 3. "Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria," 4. "Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," 5. "Atomic Energy Programs, 1953–1958," and 6. "Comparative Evaluations Group." For Agenda Items 4 and 5, see Document 160.]

S. Everett Gleason

⁸ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 1934, approved by the President on June 30. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

28. Briefing Note

Washington, June 27, 1958.

[Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records. Top Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

29. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, June 27, 1958, 11:05 a.m.

[Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Extract—3 pages of source text not declassified.]

30. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McElroy to the National Security Council

Washington, July 18, 1958.

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy

REFERENCES

- A. NSC 5810/1
- B. NSC Action No. 1903-b-(3)
- C. NSC Action No. 1934

1. Transmitted herewith are Department of Defense comments and recommendations pursuant to NSC Action No. 1903-b-(3). In the for-

Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1. Top Secret. The source text is incorrectly dated June 18. A July 21 memorandum of transmittal from Lay to the Council is in the Supplement. McElroy sent a copy of this memorandum to Dulles under cover of a July 18 letter, in which he stated there was "plenty of flexibility" in NSC 5810/1 to "let us adjust our balance of forces as may be desirable. At the same time, by retaining the present language we do not suggest to any of our allies that there is any retreat in the offing from our past policy of firm resolution to use all required military force for whatever may be the situation that must be met." McElroy concluded by expressing his hope that the Departments of State and Defense would reach a common view by the time of the July 24 NSC meeting on the subject. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351) See the Supplement.

mulation of these views, the conclusions and recommendations of the State–Defense study, “U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961”, the memorandum signed by the Secretaries of State and Defense forwarding that study to the National Security Council, and the comments on that study developed by the Planning Board and forwarded by the Chairman of the Planning Board, have been seriously studied and taken into account.

2. As a result of the review by the Department of Defense of the military aspects of Basic Policy, it is concluded that there have been no recent developments which change fundamentally the major undertakings for which the military should be prepared. The major threat to the security of the United States continues, and will continue in the foreseeable future, to reside in the capability of the Soviet Union to precipitate and wage general nuclear war against the United States. Therefore, the highest priority in our military effort must continue to be given to the deterrent to all-out nuclear war.

3. In this connection, it is the intention of the Department of Defense to insure that this deterrent is adequate for its purpose but not excessive. It is believed that the conclusions of the Department of Defense study on Defensive and Offensive Weapons Systems, which will be presented to the NSC upon completion, will be pertinent in this regard.

4. The Department of Defense fully recognizes the need for flexibility in U.S. forces, to the maximum degree attainable within available resources, in order to deter or meet limited war. Both the limited war study and our recent thorough examination of our force structure have revealed a significant U.S. and allied capability to cope with a wide variety of limited war situations, and efforts are continuing toward the improvement of this capability.

5. Certain problem areas relating to limited military operations are raised by the study on this subject, and others are highlighted in the memorandum from the Chairman of the Planning Board. These problem areas have significant bearing on our capabilities for limited war and must receive continuing attention in our national planning—military, political, and economic—in order to insure the most effective use of available resources. The questions raised will receive continuing attention in our military planning.

6. In earlier NSC discussions a question was raised concerning the implications of increasing doubt on the part of our European allies that the United States would risk its own devastation by “massive retaliation” in response to aggression not directly involving U.S. territory. There was expressed the possible need for a modification of U.S. strategy in order to convince our allies that their security is not subject to an “all-

or-nothing" decision by the United States. The problem raises the issue of whether limited war with the USSR is possible.

7. The Department of Defense has given careful consideration to this question. It is our considered opinion that war with the USSR cannot be held to limited operations and limited objectives. Moreover, to imply that we might seek to hold a war with the USSR to limited operations and limited objectives would involve a dangerous weakening of our deterrent position and certainly have a deleterious effect on the attitude of our allies.

8. Because of the almost certain adverse effect on our over-all deterrent inherent in any modification of strategy,¹ the Department of Defense does not favor any such modification at this time for the purpose of reassuring our allies, nor does it favor any revision of the military paragraphs of NSC 5810/1 which can be interpreted as a departure from current strategy. The Department of Defense does subscribe to any measures designed to allay doubts on the part of our allies as to the firmness of our purpose and intentions and to reinforce their confidence and determination, along the lines contemplated in paragraph 17 of NSC 5810/1, which states in part: "... In particular, to counter existing uncertainty, the United States should reaffirm that its nuclear weapons will be used, as necessary, to defend the Free World interests."

9. In the light of the foregoing, the Department of Defense considers that the military section of NSC 5810/1 adequately sets forth the military role in national strategy and provides the necessary basic guidance for development of the U.S. and Free World force structure in the national security interest.² Accordingly, the Department of Defense recommends no change in the military section of NSC 5810/1 and recom-

¹ According to a memorandum by Elbert G. Mathews of S/P of a conversation held July 18 among himself, Smith, and a Department of Defense group led by Irwin, the "DOD representatives stressed the budgetary difficulties of changing our strategic concept, our manpower deficiencies as compared with the Soviet bloc and the strong possibility of any US-USSR clash, even if we desired and had the capability to deal with it in a limited way, developing into total war." In a July 15 memorandum to Dulles, Smith had recommended deferment of action on NSC 5810/1 while the two departments undertook a joint revision of the strategic concept, to be completed by the end of September. (Both in Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351) Both are in the Supplement.

² In a July 19 letter to McElroy (prepared before but probably sent after receipt of McElroy's letter summarized in the source note above), Dulles stated that "in the light of our two recent conversations" on the strategic concept, much remained to be done and the matter should be deferred for "several months." (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351) See the Supplement. The two mentioned conversations are apparently those of April 7 (see Document 18) and June 17. (Memorandum by Smith; Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy 1958-1959; see the Supplement)

mends adoption of paragraphs 13 and 14 thereof, as already tentatively approved.³

Neil McElroy⁴

³ According to a July 22 memorandum by David E. Boster, Dulles' Staff Assistant, the Secretary suggested on July 21 letting NSC 5810/1 stand unchanged for the record, but having the President privately ask the Secretaries of State and Defense "to continue studying the question until a better recommendation could be made. Secretary McElroy accepted this idea. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351) In a July 23 letter to the President, Dulles outlined this plan. The letter is marked "OK DE." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series) See the Supplement.

⁴ Printed from a copy that indicates that McElroy signed the original.

31. Memorandum of Discussion at the 373d Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, July 24, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Items 1. "Significant Developments Affecting U.S. Security Elsewhere Than in the Near East," and 2. "The Situation in the Near East."]

3. *Basic National Security Policy* (NSC 5810/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1903 and 1934; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 21, 1958)¹

Mr. Gray presented the subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)²

The Director of Central Intelligence summarized the conclusions of SNIE 100–7–58, entitled "Sino-Soviet and Free World Reactions to U.S.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on July 25.

¹ See the source note, Document 30.

² Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File)

Use of Nuclear Weapons in Limited Wars in the Far East",³ prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1934-d (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).

At the conclusion of his summary, Mr. Allen Dulles said that these estimates were necessarily conjectural, and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had certain reservations concerning the one summarized at this meeting. However, Mr. Dulles felt that it was clear that (1) the United States cannot expect to use nuclear weapons in the Far East without provoking enemy retaliation, since the enemy would not be deterred from retaliation by fear of general war; and (2) there would be an adverse world reaction to U.S. use of nuclear weapons in the Far East.

Mr. Gray then asked the Secretary of Defense if he wished to make any explanations with respect to the Defense recommendations on the military section of NSC 5810/1.

Secretary McElroy said his Department had been studying the matter since the NSC meeting on the subject last May. Defense wished to emphasize four points:

(1) Because of the nature of the Soviet threat, the United States must continue to place primary emphasis on an all-out deterrent to war which should be adequate but not excessive.

(2) The United States has a significant limited war capability, and there should be flexibility in the U.S. forces in order to deter or meet limited war.

(3) Hostilities between the United States and Soviet forces could not be confined to limited war.

(4) The policy stated in NSC 5810/1 is adequate to permit an adequate but not excessive capability to deter general war, and adequate and flexible limited war capabilities.

Secretary McElroy said we must make clear to our allies that our position of deterrence has not changed. It was equally important that our principal opponent should have no doubts as to our steadfast adherence to a policy of deterrence.

Mr. Allen asked whether, if the USSR sent Soviet troops into Syria, there was not a possibility of limited hostilities between such Soviet troops and U.S. forces in Lebanon. Or must any clash between Soviet and American troops become general war?

³ Dated July 22; the Special Estimate stated that if the United States used nuclear weapons in East Asia, there was "grave risk that the Communists would retaliate in kind," that it was unlikely that any East Asian Communist state would launch local aggression without previous assurance of Soviet support; that the Soviets would probably estimate that "local Communist use of nuclear weapons" would not necessarily lead to "expansion of hostilities into general war;" and that "US use of nuclear weapons would arouse widespread fear of general war and tend to obscure Communist responsibility for initiating hostilities." (Department of State, INR-NIE Files) See the Supplement.

Secretary McElroy said this situation would have to be met when it arises. However, he thought that in the NATO area a conflict with Soviet forces would not be confined to limited war.

General Twining then read a memorandum to the National Security Council dated July 23, 1958, which stated the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject, originally presented at the 364th NSC meeting on May 1, 1958 (NSC Action No. 1903-a). (A copy of the memorandum read by General Twining is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)⁴ General Twining added that on this question he supported the views of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Gray said there had been some division of opinion in the Planning Board, as well as in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on this subject. He asked if the Secretary of State wished to speak to the question.

Secretary Dulles said he had quite a few thoughts on the subject. He felt that we must recognize that military doctrine is in flux at the present moment and that the military paragraphs which we write into Basic Policy at the moment may not remain valid very long, and certainly will not be fixed for all time. However, budgetary questions are arising, and he was willing for the time being to accept the old language of paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1 as proposed by Defense.

Secretary McElroy said that review of Basic National Security Policy was an annual exercise, and that the problem of the military elements of national strategy would undergo further study in Defense.

The President said he felt that further study and consideration must take place before final action was taken on paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1. He did not want to approve these paragraphs finally without further study; the paper should be kept open. The Department of Defense could proceed if necessary to prepare its budget on the basis of the old language, but further study must be given this question.

*The National Security Council:*⁵

a. Noted an oral summary by the Director of Central Intelligence of Special National Intelligence Estimate 100-7-58 on "Sino-Soviet and Free World Reactions to U.S. Use of Nuclear Weapons in Limited Wars in the Far East", prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1934-d.

b. Noted and discussed the recommendations by the Department of Defense relative to the military elements of national strategy in NSC 5810/1, including paragraphs 13 and 14 thereof (prepared pursuant to

⁴ Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File)

⁵ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 1952, approved by the President on July 28. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

NSC Action No. 1903-b³ and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 21, 1958); in the light of:

- (1) An oral summary by the Secretary of Defense.
- (2) An oral summary by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, originally presented at the 364th NSC meeting on May 1, 1958 (NSC Action No. 1903-a).
- (3) A statement by the Secretary of State that he concurred at this time with the recommendation by the Secretary of Defense that no change be made in the military section of NSC 5810/1, but that U.S. military doctrine should be kept under study and review.

c. Noted a statement by the President that:

(1) Final action on paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1 should be deferred, pending further study and consideration in the light of the views expressed at this meeting.

(2) Meanwhile, the Department of Defense is authorized to continue preparation of its Fiscal Year 1960 budget submission on the basis of the present wording of paragraphs 13 and 14 in NSC 5810/1.

Note: The President, after further study and consideration following this meeting, approved paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1, with the understanding that they would be kept under continuing study pending the next annual review of basic policy.⁶ This decision by the President subsequently circulated to all holders of NSC 5810/1.

[Here follows Agenda Item 4. "U.S. Policy Toward Iceland."]

Marion W. Boggs
Director
NSC Secretariat

⁶ In Gray's memorandum of his meeting with the President held on July 28, the section regarding this action reads as follows: "After some discussion, he [Eisenhower] indicated that he felt that while the policy needed continuing review and should be specifically reviewed in the annual revision of the Basic National Policy, he would like to have the Record of Action note that subject to such review the existing paragraphs 13 and 14 will be considered to be in the National Policy paper. He approved the revision presented by Mr. Lay." (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up)

On August 5, Sprague informed the Department of State that the Department of Defense would prefer to defer State-Defense consultation on the subject of the military paragraphs of basic policy pending Defense decisions on the FY 1960 budget. (Memorandum from Howard Furnas of S/P to Smith, May 6, 1959; Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5904 Series)

32. Memorandum of Discussion at the 375th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, August 7, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Items 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," and 2. "The Situation in the Near East."]

3. *Recent Developments Regarding U.S. Long-Range Ballistic Missiles Programs* (NSC Actions Nos. 1846 and 1941)¹

Mr. Gray said that current discussions in the press had prompted him to ask the Department of Defense to make a report on recent developments in U.S. long-range missile programs.

Mr. Holaday, the Director of Guided Missiles, then reported on the Jupiter, Thor, Titan, Atlas and Polaris programs:

Jupiter: This missile has been tested in five successful and four partly successful flights. A number of technical difficulties, such as turbo-pump problems and the loss of bearings and shafts due to overloading, were being overcome. On July 17 a Jupiter traveled 1250 nautical miles and missed its assigned target by only 1.4 nautical miles. This very successful flight had checked out all components of the missile, including the guidance system. In August a test with complete guidance and solid verniers would be held; in September a fast-fueling system would be tested. By December, five launchers and their missiles would be ready. The first Jupiter squadron would be complete in 1959.

Thor: Twenty tests of Thor had included eight successful flights, eight partly successful flights, and four failures. A new flame deflector had been developed to solve propulsion problems, and a new thrust bearing was overcoming guidance problems. Turbo-pump difficulties similar to those affecting Jupiter were being overcome. Missile 117 had made a completely successful flight on automatic pilot. A guidance test would be conducted in September; final tests of guidance and nose cone separation would be held in September, October and November. The first squadron of Thor would be deployed to the United Kingdom in December 1958, if negotiations with the United Kingdom were successful.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on August 8.

¹ NSC Action No. 1941 was approved by the President on July 3. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) The action noted the priorities for ballistic missile and satellite programs as described in paragraph 5, Annex B, NSC 5814, "Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer Space," dated June 20. (*Ibid.*, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5814 Series) For text of NSC 5814/1, including Annex B (but not A), see vol. II, pp. 845-863.

Atlas: Ten tests had included four successful flights, five partly successful flights, and one failure. Turbo-pump and flame deflector problems had developed, and 800 pounds had been added to the missile in an effort to solve the flame deflector difficulty. The Atlas test last Saturday had been an important milestone, demonstrating that the missile could dump its first two engines and separate the nose cone. An automatic pilot, rather than a complete guidance system, was used on this flight; but guidance components were used to determine the range by cutting off the engines, and the desired range was missed by only five miles. Two more tests of the separation of engines and nose cones were scheduled for this fall; the first Atlas squadron would be ready in July 1959.

Mr. Holaday then said it was important for the Council to realize that Atlas flights scheduled for September and November were intended to test the structure of the missile under maximum acceleration—under conditions more severe than normal operating conditions. As a result, one or two missiles would probably be lost in a rather spectacular way. However, such losses were necessary in order to determine how much stress Atlas can take. In these tests, 6500-mile flights with separation of engines and nose cones would be attempted.

Titan: This missile, a "follow-on ICBM", has developed difficulties in engine control in static tests. Components now under test in Denver and at Cape Canaveral will not be launched in flight; but in late September a launching will test the engines and structural strength of the missile.

Polaris: Trouble has been experienced with the first stage of this missile, but a full-duration run of the second stage was successful, marking an important milestone. However, the first Polaris missiles will have a range of only 1100–1200, instead of 1500, miles. The state of the art is such that the range cannot be extended to 1500 miles until there are breakthroughs in steel and solid-propellant technology. The Polaris "pop-up" (its initial ejection from the submarine before ignition of engines) has been tested nine times, and all nine tests were successful. The keels of three Polaris submarines have been laid, and contracts have been let for two more. Navigation and survey ships are working in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, and communications facilities are under construction in Maine. It is hoped that the first Polaris submarine will be available in April 1960.

The President asked what navigation and survey ships were doing in the Mediterranean in connection with Polaris. Mr. Holaday replied that they were establishing reference points from which a Polaris submarine could locate itself within a few hundred yards. This was part of an effort to solve the difficult navigation problems involved in accurate firing of missiles from submarines.

The President asked whether we would have to establish such navigation points in all the oceans, including the Pacific and the Arctic. Mr. Holaday replied in the affirmative. The President said that a year or so ago the Navy had asserted that it had developed methods of navigation which would solve the problem of firing missiles from submarines. At that time he thought the Navy was talking about a new system of navigation, not a series of hitching posts around the world.

The President, recalling that he had frequently complained about Washington predictions, then referred to publicity from the Pentagon indicating that we would try to send a Thor rocket, with a Vanguard fastened on, to the moon in September. He was unable to understand why we needed to predict that we would hit the moon in September, or why we should say what equipment would be used. We should accomplish these feats first, and then we would have something to talk about. Moreover, he could not understand why, when we announced a test of this kind, we emphasized all the difficulties and possibilities of failure.

Secretary McElroy said the difficulties of a moon-shot were being emphasized to prepare the public for the failure of the initial try—and unless we were quite lucky, the first shot would fail. Information about the moon-shot was being released because there was great public interest in it.

The President inquired why we had to say we were shooting for the moon. Secretary McElroy said Cape Canaveral was open to public view, and that newspaper men assigned there, after having been briefed by scientists, had a rather accurate idea of what the various missiles were intended to do.

The President said that we are struggling for a psychological victory. If we are successful in our moon-shot, we have discounted that success in advance by talking about it too much. The President then asked why we were placing a Titan battery in Denver.

Mr. Holaday said the Titan site would be quite far from the center of the city. The first and second Titan squadrons were being located near Denver because of the availability of Government property and the proximity of manufacturing plants. The third squadron would be in South Dakota and the fourth in Idaho.

The President said that as soon as construction on missile sites begins, Denver becomes even more of a target city than it is already by virtue of its research and ordnance plants and its airfield. Why couldn't Titan have been located elsewhere—say, Pueblo?

Mr. Holaday said the cost of military installations would be greatly increased if they were located at a distance from large cities. The President thought such installations could be located in several small cities instead of being concentrated in one large city.

Mr. Holaday pointed out that Atlas was being widely deployed in order to increase its chances of survival under attack.

The President concluded this discussion with the remark that he was growing tired of our inability to keep anything secret.

*The National Security Council:*²

Noted and discussed an oral report on the subject by the Director of Guided Missiles, with specific reference to the Jupiter, Thor, Atlas, Titan and Polaris programs.

[Here follow Agenda Items 4. "U.S. Policy Toward Korea," 5. "U.S. Policy Toward Africa South of the Sahara Prior to Calendar Year 1960," 6. "Technical Surveillance Countermeasures" (included in the Supplement) and 7, "U.S. Policy on Antarctica."]

Marion W. Boggs

Director

NSC Secretariat

² The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1959, approved by the President on August 11. (*Ibid.*, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

33. Editorial Note

During his briefing on significant world developments affecting U.S. security at the 378th National Security Council meeting on August 27, 1958, Allen Dulles discussed Soviet missiles as follows:

"The Director of Central Intelligence said the intelligence community had just completed a new estimate on Soviet guided missile capabilities (NIE 11-5-58, copy of which is filed in the minutes of the meeting). This estimate, which represented the unanimous view of all intelligence agencies, had been prepared on an all-source basis—that is, it had taken into account every scrap of information available. A considerable body of new information on Soviet guided missile capabilities had become available over the past year, but there were still serious deficiencies in our information.

"Mr. Dulles then summarized certain of the conclusions of NIE 11-5-58. He said we had direct evidence regarding nine of the thirteen

Soviet missile systems. The USSR would probably obtain a first operational capability with ten ICBM prototypes in Calendar Year 1959. The Soviet ICBMs would probably have a maximum range of 5500 nautical miles, a CEP of five nautical miles, and a reliability of 50%. The performance of these ICBMs would probably improve in the early '60s. Of the twelve Soviet launching operations identified, six had probably been unsuccessful ICBM firings, three had been earth satellite firings, and one had been the firing of a space vehicle which failed. Mr. Dulles said he did not exclude the possibility, however, that the Soviets would obtain a first ICBM operational capability this year. One year after obtaining a first operational capability the Soviets could produce and deploy 100 missiles; two or three years later—i.e., 1961 or 1962—they could deploy 500. By the end of 1959 they could probably produce ten to 100 ICBMs. The payload weight of these missiles was estimated to be 2000 pounds, but some were evidently designed to carry 5000 pounds. The heavier weapons might produce a 4-megaton explosion.

"Mr. Dulles said the Soviets were also developing subsonic missiles with an estimated range of 200 miles (not 500 miles, as previously estimated) capable of being fired from a submarine on the surface. By 1961 the Soviets would probably have the prototype of a submarine capable of launching, while submerged, a missile with a 1/3-megaton warhead and a range of 1000 nautical miles. In the light of new evidence on submarine construction and missile development, the 1961 date replaces the previously-estimated date 1964-1966. Mr. Dulles believed the Soviets would elect to develop launching of missiles from submerged submarines rather than pursue development of missiles which could be launched only from a submarine on the surface.

"Turning to shorter-range missiles, Mr. Dulles said that 350 missiles, with ranges of 100, 200, 350 and 750 nautical miles, had been fired by the Soviets since 1953. The USSR would probably achieve an operational capability in 1958 with a missile of 1100 nautical miles maximum range." (Memorandum of discussion by Boggs, August 28; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

NIE 11-5-58, "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles," dated August 19, is in Department of State, INR-NIE Files. The sections entitled "The Problem," "Foreword," and "Summary and Conclusions" and a memorandum from Robert M. Biber to Dr. Killian, October 9, containing a different view of Soviet guided missile capabilities, are in the Supplement.

34. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, August 29, 1958.

OTHERS PRESENT

Senator Symington
General Goodpaster

Senator Symington said he had met with Allen Dulles recently to bring to his attention certain intelligence information on Soviet missile programs which he had received from independent sources. An earlier meeting had disclosed that these estimates were in disagreement with those of Mr. Dulles, and Senator Symington said the subsequent meeting did not resolve the difference. Senator Symington said he took with him Colonel Lanphier,¹ an officer in the Air Force Reserve who is a top executive for Convair, and had formerly been his assistant in the Air Force and in the NSRB. Because he had not resolved with Mr. Dulles the disagreement over the estimates, he had prepared a paper to hand to the President.²

The President said he had knowledge of this matter. He had asked for information as to what the source of the difference might be. He understood Colonel Lanphier's estimate was reportedly based on disclosures made to him by working level officers in the intelligence field. The President said he had been through this matter, with intelligence chiefs of all services present, just a day or two before. He thought our information is quite good as to current Soviet strengths and activities; when it is projected ahead, of course differing interpretations can be reached. He cited the great error that had been made two years ago in estimating Soviet Bear and Bison programs which resulted in mistakes being made in our own programs, inasmuch as the Soviets actually carried out only a small fraction of what certain people estimated at that time. With regard to the ballistic missiles, it is clear that the Soviets started their program as early as 1945. Ours only started in earnest after the President had had two scientific studies made following a basic breakthrough in warhead weight and power resulting from the achievement of the thermonuclear weapon.

The President said he thought it would be out of character for him to be indifferent to valid assessments of Soviet strength. He said he had

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on August 30.

¹ Colonel Thomas G. Lanphier.

² In the form of a letter to the President dated August 29. (Department of State, Whitman File, Administration Series)-See the Supplement.

read Senator Symington's report. He also commented that Colonel Lanphier cannot possibly get information that reflects the full process of the evaluation system. The President said he had no doubt as to the dedication and skill of our intelligence community working as a whole. He asked Senator Symington whether he had discussed this matter with Mr. McElroy, and Senator Symington indicated he had not. The Senator went on to say he was surprised at the things Allen Dulles did not seem to know, which had been reported to him. The President commented that intelligence activity functions very much on a line rather than a staff basis; as a result, individuals at lower levels in the structure do not have an evaluated assessment of bits and pieces of reports, many of dubious reliability, of which they have heard.

The President added a further point relating to decisions as to size and timing of procurement programs for items in development. Sometimes we have a project that looks good in development. If it is put into procurement too soon, there can be a great diversion of development effort to correct mistakes which a little more time on development would have avoided. He cited the M-47 tank as an example. Once we have confidence that our ICBMs will be militarily significant, they will be of great help, for example in reducing our reliance upon bases; he mentioned the extreme difficulty we are having regarding our Moroccan bases at the present time.

Senator Symington reported that an Atlas had been fired the previous night with very successful results. The President said he understood it was making good progress. He also understood the Titan is expected to be a very good weapons system. It will come a year or two later, but this is the cost of our having delayed until 1954 or 1955 in doing what the Soviets started in 1945.

Senator Symington expressed willingness to come in again if he could be of further help in this matter. The President said he did not think it should be kept away from Mr. McElroy. In fact, he thought Mr. McElroy should meet with Senator Symington with the top intelligence people present so that the matter could be very authoritatively dealt with. Senator Symington said that the intelligence estimate of Soviet test firings is much lower than it should be, to be consistent with the estimated growth of their ICBM operational capability. The President thought this too is a matter, that could well be discussed with Mr. McElroy.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

35. Editorial Note

At the 382d (Special) meeting of the National Security Council on October 13, 1958, Allen Dulles briefed the Council on Soviet missile developments and Soviet nuclear testing during discussion of Agenda Item 2. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security." For this portion of the memorandum of discussion, see Document 183.

During discussion of Agenda Item 1. "Evaluation of Offensive and Defensive Weapons Systems," Allen Dulles remarked that the Soviets "were not testing ICBMs to the extent expected." (Memorandum of discussion by Lay; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

The record of the discussion of Agenda Item 1 and NSC Action No. 1994 pertaining to it are in the Supplement. NSC Action No. 1994 was approved by the President on October 16. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

36. Memorandum of Discussion at the 384th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, October 30, 1958.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1958: the Military Program* (NSC 5819;¹ NSC Action No. 1994²)

Mr. Gordon Gray introduced General Twining, who outlined the form of the forthcoming analysis which would be given by a team of offi-

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on October 31.

¹ Entitled "Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1958," dated September 9. Complete copies are *ibid.*, RG 383, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, and in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Policy Paper File. A copy without the sections on "The Military Program" and "The Atomic Energy Program" is in Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5819 Series. The section on "The Military Program" transmitted by Lay to the Council under an October 6 memorandum is *ibid.*, S/S Files: Lot 71 D 171, NSC 5819. Part of that section is in the Supplement.

"The Atomic Energy Program" section was discussed at the NSC meeting on October 16. (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, October 17; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) Other sections that the NSC discussed were "The Internal Security Program," September 18, and "The Mobilization Program and the Civil Defense Program," September 25. (Memoranda of discussion by Gleason; *ibid.*) All the memoranda of discussion are in the Supplement.

² See Document 35. The action includes note of the President's emphasis on the need for the JCS to "identify those weapons systems which may be obsolescent, antithetical or overlapping."

cers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff headed by Col. R.S. Dorsey, USAF. General Twining pointed out that the evaluation of the military capabilities of the United States would be presented in the form of relative U.S. capabilities vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. He also stressed that the status report covered the period only as far as June 30, 1958, and that accordingly the JCS evaluation did not take account of recent developments in Lebanon or in the Taiwan Straits. (Copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note, and of General Twining's introductory remarks, filed in the minutes of the meeting.)³

Colonel Dorsey began his presentation with a summary of the five basic objectives of the U.S. military program as set forth in the statement of basic national security policy (NSC 5810/1).⁴ He thereafter described the capabilities of the U.S. military forces to achieve each of these five objectives in turn. The conclusion of the report consisted, first, of a summary comparison of selected major U.S. forces and, secondly, of a summary JCS evaluation of the ability of the United States to meet the five objectives outlined at the beginning of the presentation.

At the conclusion of the oral presentation, Mr. Gray announced that he had a few points to make which had proved of special interest to the Planning Board when it had discussed the Defense Department status report. He then called attention to a statement, just made in the presentation and contained on page 1 of the status report on the U.S. military program, evaluating the capabilities of our nuclear retaliatory forces for general war and reading as follows:

“... despite continued improvement in the quality and posture of these forces during FY 1958, and notwithstanding the promise of continued improvement in the future, recent Soviet technological advances and the concurrent qualitative reductions in U.S. forces have combined to diminish that margin of U.S. military superiority. If these trends continue, it is estimated that this superiority will be lost in the foreseeable future.”

Mr. Gray pointed out that this view had not appeared in previous Defense Department status reports, and it might possibly be in conflict with a statement that appeared elsewhere (page 155 of the Defense Department report) to the effect that “A gradual reduction in military personnel . . . should be possible without any sacrifice in readiness or over-all combat capability of the forces.” Mr. Gray asked General Twining if he cared to comment on the problem posed by these two views.

General Twining replied that in speaking of U.S. military superiority the Joint Chiefs were speaking of a relative matter; that is, we could lose our superiority as the Soviets increased theirs. By way of illustra-

³ Neither printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File)

⁴ Document 24.

tion, we have a heavy superiority over the Soviet Union at the present time in terms of our bomber forces, but such superiority could be lost if the Soviet Union greatly increased its long-range missile capability.

Secretary Dulles remarked that it seemed to him that the time would soon be coming—if, indeed, it was not already here—when we may have to take another hard look at this question of U.S. military superiority over the Soviet Union. He said he was not sure that such superiority ought to be our goal. If it were, it would put us in an arms race with the USSR which could conceivably endanger our American way of life. Secretary Dulles pointed out how frequently the President had referred to George Washington's statement about the desirability of our country's maintaining a respectable posture of defense. Secretary Dulles said he took this to mean, in modern terms, a U.S. capability of inflicting such heavy damage on the enemy as to deter him from attacking the United States. In Secretary Dulles' opinion, this capability was not the same thing as military superiority over the USSR. From his standpoint, continued Secretary Dulles, the United States did not always need military superiority. The past greatness of the United States had not depended upon the maintenance of military superiority. As long as we have an adequate military capability to deter attack by the Soviet Union, we did not require to be superior to the USSR in every area and at all times.

Mr. Quarles, the Acting Secretary of Defense, pointed out that the term "superiority", as used in the Defense Department report, really meant the same thing as the term "respectable military posture". In short, it meant the military capability to carry out missions and deter the Soviets from attacking. In order to do this reliably, the people in the Pentagon believed that we not only needed to have a capability of inflicting very heavy damage on the Soviet Union in order to deter the Soviet Union, but damage on such a scale as to enable us to emerge successfully in the event of general war with the USSR.

Mr. Gray then referred to another matter which had been of considerable interest to the Planning Board—to wit, the statement made in the presentation and in the Defense Department report that the NATO powers and Spain between them had some 100 divisions of ground forces in Europe. Actually, however, there were currently only 24 divisions in Central and Northern Europe, including the United Kingdom. It was also of great interest that the Defense Department report had suggested the possibility that some reduction in overseas deployment of U.S. forces, including those in NATO, would be required. Mr. Gray reminded the Council that when the subject of possible reduction of U.S. forces in NATO had been discussed earlier in the National Security Council, the Secretary of State had requested that he be given notice in advance of any plans of the Department of Defense for such reduction.

Secretary Dulles asked whether Mr. Gray's remarks were to be taken as constituting advance notice of plans for a reduction of U.S. forces deployed in NATO. If this were the case, he would prefer to have more explicit advance notice. Mr. Gray replied that his remarks were not to be taken as advance notice of such planned reduction.

Secretary Dulles went on to point out that, as the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff knew very well, the reduction of U.S. forces deployed overseas required a considerable amount of advance political preparations to offset adverse reaction. In illustration of this point, Secretary Dulles cited the turmoil which had been created by the British decision to reduce the number of British forces stationed in Germany. Indeed, the turmoil had been so great that the British had found it expedient to reduce the number of their forces to be redeployed from Germany. In short, we certainly did need to have advance notice of proposals to reduce the number of U.S. forces deployed overseas. As another example of the same reasoning, Secretary Dulles cited the case of Iceland, whose importance to our Western defense was constantly being emphasized in the National Intelligence Estimates and accordingly was an area, in the Secretary's opinion, where it was necessary to maintain U.S. force deployments. It would prove very difficult to re-introduce U.S. forces into important overseas areas once they had been redeployed back home, and in general it seemed desirable to keep U.S. forces in important areas overseas where they had already been accepted and admitted.

On the other hand, Secretary Dulles stated that in Europe an increasing share of responsibility for the maintenance of adequate forces should be undertaken by the European countries themselves, and we should therefore be able to cut down the numbers of U.S. forces deployed there, provided the steps to do so were carefully prepared in advance. Thus De Gaulle was now clamoring for a larger voice for France in the conduct of NATO affairs. We were in a position to say "yes, indeed", provided France is willing to accept a greater share of responsibility in the defense of the NATO area.

Secretary Quarles observed that he wanted to be sure that we did not leave this matter of warning of possible future reductions in U.S. forces overseas in mid-air. Perhaps we should call the statement in the defense report a premonition rather than a warning of future reductions. Such reductions, however, would actually be proposed in connection with the development of the Defense Department budget, wherein we would present the planned deployment of U.S. military forces. It certainly, however, was dubious whether we could continue to maintain five U.S. divisions in Europe in FY 1960. As to the problem of Iceland, to which the Secretary of State had referred, the U.S. Army forces now stationed there were rated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as not being militarily effective, and we would therefore like to replace these Army forces with

other kinds of military forces which would prove more effective in the circumstances. Accordingly, the Department of Defense was still urging the desirability of pulling out these Army forces while at the same time it recognized the existence of political pressures to keep these Army forces in Iceland.

Mr. Gray then referred to the Planning Board's concern about the alleged political difficulties the United States was encountering in deploying intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in certain European countries such as France, Italy and Turkey. Was it true that we had abandoned hope of being able to deploy such missiles on bases in France?

Secretary Dulles replied that we had by no means abandoned hope of ultimately deploying IRBMs on French bases. However, General Norstad felt that we should not push the French so hard to accept these missiles as to allow France to bargain with us on other matters and secure a high price for the deployment of these missiles. The State Department agreed with General Norstad that this would be an undesirable posture for the United States to get into. De Gaulle was currently playing "hard to get". Moreover, so far as Secretary Dulles knew, the fact was that the present generation of IRBMs was not as effective as the IRBMs we expect to get with the next generation of such missiles. Accordingly, the United States should not pay too high a price in order to get these first-generation IRBMs deployed in France. We certainly did not propose to get down on our knees and beg the French to accept these missiles. As for Italy, said Secretary Dulles, there had been no objection in principle to basing IRBMs in that country. The only problem in Italy was the matter of how the costs were to be shared. There was no problem whatsoever with respect to Turkey. In fact, the Turks were almost too eager to have these missiles deployed on Turkish territory. Moreover, certain political implications vis-à-vis the USSR are making us a little cautious about introducing IRBMs into Turkey at the present time.

In response to Secretary Dulles' comments, Secretary Quarles said he had nothing to add with respect to what the Secretary of State had said about the deployment of IRBMs in France, Italy and Turkey. But, he added, he was obliged to differ with the Secretary of State as to the military value of the IRBMs of the first generation. In point of fact, these first-generation IRBMs are of the same kind that we worry about because the Soviets have deployed them against us. Furthermore, these IRBMs are the only kind of IRBMs that the United States is likely to have for some five years in the future. So, concluded Secretary Quarles, he thought it important not to write off these liquid propellant IRBMs with the idea of waiting for a second generation of IRBMs which it is probably optimistic to think we could get in five years' time.

Secretary Dulles responded that of course he was in no position to pass a military judgment on the effectiveness of these IRBMs, and that if he had been wrong in his appraisal he stood corrected.

The President stated with great force that he was strongly convinced of certain things. He kept hearing implications that the United States was gradually going down in military capabilities as the Soviet Union was increasing its military capabilities. Nevertheless, in three years our American scientists have done wonders to close the gap in the missile race, in which the Soviet Union had acquired a considerable head start. Continuing his forceful speech, the President insisted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff ought to take a good look at the contents of Admiral Sides' recent presentation on the evaluation of weapons systems.⁵ The Joint Chiefs should take each and every one of these weapons systems, analyze their capabilities, and find out, system by system, where there are duplications and overlap. If the United States does not find some way to keep the military appropriations from growing and growing, we were going to have to adopt a different form of government than we had had in the past. We would not be defending freedom, but only defending lives and territory, which was a vastly different thing. We must find out where we are duplicating weapons systems all along the line, and particularly in these great new weapons systems. A whole problem of analysis faces us with respect to what we now have by way of weapons systems and where we are going with them in the years before us. The main thing is the U.S. deterrent capability. If we can be sure that we have got that taken care of, then sanity must be our guide in dealing with military problems of lesser importance than deterring Soviet attack. Calling again for an urgent JCS appraisal of all these competing weapons systems—their costs, their capabilities, and everything else—the President warmly insisted that we simply could not always balance off military capabilities with the Soviet Union. We must find out where we do stand in the main area of deterrence, and then proceed to take on these lesser problems and try to solve them.

*The National Security Council:*⁶

a. Noted and discussed the report on the status of the military program on June 30, 1958, prepared by the Department of Defense and transmitted as Part 1 of NSC 5819; on the basis of an oral presentation by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Sections I, II and III of that report.

⁵ See footnote 2 above. Vice Admiral John H. Sides, Director of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, also gave an evaluation to the Council on Soviet air defense radar developments and capabilities on November 6. (Memorandum of discussion by Coyne, November 6; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) See the Supplement.

⁶ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2000, approved by the President on November 4. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

b. Noted the President's observation that, as a central aim, U.S. forces must have a known capability adequate to deter Soviet attack on the United States. Beyond that, reason and discrimination should guide the choice and development of and establish priorities for weapons systems for other military tasks. The effort should not be to balance exactly each Soviet capability, but to provide a military posture in which the United States can have confidence and which it can finance indefinitely without seriously weakening the essential strength of our economy.

c. Noted that the President re-emphasized the importance of the additional investigation and report on weapons systems by the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested in NSC Action No. 1994.

Note: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

[Here follow Agenda Items 2. "Report by the Secretary on His Recent Visit to Taiwan," 3. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," and 4. "U.S. Policy Toward the Near East." For a portion of Agenda Item 3, see Document 186.]

S. Everett Gleason

37. Memorandum of Meeting

Washington, November 8, 1958.

Secretary McElroy said that in connection with the preparation of the Defense Budget for FY 1960, he would like to have the Secretary's thoughts regarding the kinds of situations the United States would have to meet in the years to come.¹ There were two aspects of the problem: (1) capability for general war and (2) capability for limited war. He thought that everyone was agreed on the need for an adequate nuclear deterrent in the form of a massive retaliatory force. What was less clear was the

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.00/11-858. Top Secret. Drafted by Reinhardt and cleared by Secretary Dulles. The meeting was held at Dulles' residence.

¹ According to his memorandum of a conversation on November 6, Dulles told Secretary Anderson of his forthcoming meeting with McElroy. "I indicated that I felt we needed at least our present conventional weapons establishment, but I thought we could cut down on the nuclear effort on the theory that all we needed was enough to deter; that we did not need to be superior at every point. I felt that some important cuts could be made and that we could in certain respects get world advantage from doing so. Secretary Anderson indicated his general concurrence." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation) Prior to this meeting, Murphy, Reinhardt, and Smith jointly prepared a briefing memorandum dated November 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.00/11-858) See the Supplement.

scale of the military requirement apart from that. He asked whether the Secretary believed that in the years ahead we would have continued requirement for limited local showing of force in various areas of the world similar to the Lebanese and Formosa operations this year.

The Secretary replied that he agreed with the Army, Navy and Marine Corps comment submitted in connection with NSC 5810.² In an era when both major world powers had the capacity to destroy each other the Sino-Soviet threat to the United States lay in the Sino-Soviet capacity to create crises along the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc in the arch stretched from North Africa and the Mediterranean to the Far East. He thought the Lebanese and Formosan operations were characteristic of the kind of problem we would have continually to face. It seemed to him that both of these operations had gone off exceedingly well, but he had the impression that our capacity had been stretched pretty thin, and the operations had highlighted the many problems involved in operating at such great distances—overflights, operational bases, etc. The Secretary of State wondered whether we might not be putting too much emphasis on the nuclear deterrent. Anything beyond the capacity to destroy the enemy would seem excessive and unnecessary. If an adjustment of emphasis had to be made perhaps it should be at the expense of the nuclear deterrent. During the last century the British with their worldwide system of bases had provided a stabilizing influence which today only we could provide. This would seem to require on our part adequate mobile Naval forces with air and ground force components.

Messrs. McElroy and Quarles were of the opinion that too much emphasis was not being put on the nuclear deterrent.

Mr. McElroy said he agreed, however, that more emphasis should be put on our limited war capabilities. He thought the problem was essentially that of providing the logistic support for operations in remote quarters of the globe. This could not be done by air alone. It was essentially a question of increasing Naval facilities. The Navy had ended World War II with an excess of vessels. But these were becoming superannuated. The Navy probably needed another carrier which could serve as the nucleus of a task force for the area between the Mediterranean and the Far East. It need not be as large as the Forrestal class. Mr. McElroy thought there was no requirement for more ground forces.

The Secretary of State made the point that the ground forces had a role to play in limited operations. Some 14,000 had landed in Lebanon. There was a static requirement in Germany, Korea and Iceland. He did not think the Army should be cut back. The Secretary of State stated that the military requirements of national security could not simply be tailored to an arbitrary budget figure. There was some minimum require-

² See footnote 8, Document 23.

ment for national security. Mr. McElroy agreed and said he would seek a budget which met that requirement. Any reduction beyond that point would be a matter for the President.

Mr. McElroy asked whether the Secretary would be agreeable to providing him with a written statement of the problem from the foreign policy point of view. The Secretary told him he thought it would be more appropriate to formulate these ideas in pursuance of the further study of paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810 which the President had approved. Mr. McElroy agreed, but asked whether he could proceed for the time-being on the basis of the views expressed by the Secretary. The Secretary concurred.

Note: Meeting was attended by:

The Secretary
Secretary McElroy
Mr. Quarles
Mr. Reinhardt

38. Memorandum of Discussion at the 387th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, November 20, 1958.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Report by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee* (NSC Actions Nos. 1260, 1330, 1430, 1463, 1532, 1641 and 1815; NSC 5816)¹

Mr. Gordon Gray introduced General Thomas, the Director of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff,² and explained the general purpose

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason.

¹ NSC Action No 1260, adopted by the Council on November 4, 1954, is not printed, but see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. XIX, p. 1, footnote 3, and pp. 56-57. NSC Action No. 1330, dated February 17, 1955, designated a Director for the Net Evaluation Subcommittee. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Regarding NSC Action No. 1430, approved by the President on August 11, 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. XIX, p. 103, footnote 9. Regarding NSC Action No. 1463, approved November 2, 1955, see *ibid.*, p. 130, footnote 5. NSC Action No. 1532, approved April 7, 1956, noted discussion at the NSC meeting on April 5 of procedural revisions to the then-current directive on net evaluation, NSC 5516 of February 14, 1955. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, and *ibid.*, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5516 Series, respectively) For NSC Action No. 1641, approved December 20, 1956, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. XIX, p. 381, footnote 5. For NSC Action No. 1815, approved November 12, 1957, see *ibid.*, p. 676, footnote 5. Concerning NSC 5816, see Document 26.

² General Gerald C. Thomas.

of the meeting. (A copy of Mr. Gray's remarks are included in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.)³

General Thomas summarized the methodology of the report that was about to be given. He pointed out the change which had been made last year by the President in the directive to the Subcommittee and also referred to the use made by the Subcommittee of the current National Intelligence Estimate of Soviet intentions and capabilities. General Thomas also pointed out the assumptions under which this year's evaluation had been developed and noted the participation in the evaluation of representatives from all four of the military services as well as representatives of each of the other responsible Government agencies.

General Thomas then introduced Brig. General Willard W. Smith, Deputy Director of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff, who discussed the basic assumptions concerning the assumed Soviet attack on the U.S. which was mounted by the Soviets in mid-1961 with strategic surprise. This was followed by General Smith's discussion of the detailed assumptions made by the U.S.S.R. with respect to the nature of the attack which it made on the continental U.S. General Smith followed with a discussion of the detailed assumptions underlying the U.S. retaliatory attack on the Soviet Union.

Upon the conclusion of General Smith's portion of the report, Colonel William R. Calhoun, USA, described the Soviet attack on the continental U.S. Captain Edward L. Dashiell, USN, subsequently described the U.S. retaliatory attack on the Soviet Union as well as the U.S. military posture after the attack on the U.S. by the Soviet Union.

Colonel Calhoun next expounded the estimate of the damage inflicted on the U.S. by the Soviet attack and Captain Dashiell described the damage inflicted on the Soviet Union by the U.S. retaliatory attack. Dr. R.J. Smith of the Central Intelligence Agency, also a member of the Subcommittee Staff, discussed the potentialities of the Soviet clandestine attack on the U.S. which concluded the formal presentation.

In his concluding statement General Thomas emphasized the difficulties involved in attempting to achieve realistic assumptions with regard to the evaluation as a whole. There were obviously many uncertainties with respect to the military capabilities of the U.S. at a period as distant as mid-1961 and of course even more uncertainty as to the military capabilities of the Soviet Union at the same time. Despite these

³ Dated November 20, not attached. In it, Gray stated that pursuant to the President's "direction" of March 24, the 1958 evaluation was based upon a targeting plan that would seek "immediately to paralyze the Russian nation," rather than one limited to military targets, in the belief that it would, in the case of a retaliatory strike, provide fewer but more effective targets, whose destruction might involve a smaller nuclear kilotonnage. The evaluation also for the first time involved substantial use of "long-range ballistic missiles." (Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Disaster File)

uncertainties, General Thomas believed the assumptions were sufficiently realistic to bear out the essential validity of the evaluation.

General Thomas also invited the Council to take a backward look at the previous reports of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee in relation to the findings of the report just rendered.⁴ There was, he pointed out, an essential similarity in the findings of all the reports since the first one was delivered in 1954. These findings were listed in a chart described as "Recurrent Conclusions".⁵

Mr. Gray reminded the President and the Council that this was General Thomas' last appearance as Director of the Subcommittee Staff, and that his successor, Lt. General Thomas F. Hickey, was present this morning. Thereafter, Mr. Gray presented a recommendation in substantially the following language:

"You will recall that the 1957 report involved a retaliatory attack confining itself to a primarily military target system. For 1958, the President directed that the exercise concern itself with the *retaliatory* objective of immediately paralyzing the Russian nation, rather than concentrating on targets of a military character although not entirely ruling out particular military targets which the Subcommittee believed would significantly contribute to paralysis of the Russian nation.

"The presentation you have just heard has concluded that a substantial reduction of the capability of the USSR to recover would be accomplished by the concentration of a U.S. retaliatory effort against a combined military-urban industrial target system as opposed to a strictly military target system. The conclusion also was that such an effort would destroy the Soviet nuclear offensive capability.

"A central aim of our policy is to deter the Communists from use of their military power, remaining prepared to fight general war should one be forced upon the U.S. There has been no suggestion from any quarter as to a change in this basic policy. However, as you know, NSC

⁴ An undated note entitled "Megatonnage Involved in Previous Net Evaluation Studies" describes the 1958 study as follows: "In a surprise attack situation, the USSR delivered 2186 megatons on the U.S. (the U.S. delivered 5810 megatons on the USSR and 705 megatons on China)." The section on the 1957 study reads: "Under conditions of surprise attack, the USSR delivered 3905 megatons on the U.S. (and in retaliation the U.S. delivered 7896 tons [*megatons*] on the Soviet Bloc). In a condition of full alert, the USSR delivered 5173 megatons on the U.S." The note also contains assumptions and megatonnage figures for the 1955 and 1956 studies. (Attachment to memorandum from Twining to Lay, April 22, 1960; *ibid.*) See the Supplement.

⁵ Not found.

5410/1, the so-called 'war objectives' paper is in the process of review.⁶ These matters are inextricably interwoven.

"In the light of these facts, it seems to me that it is important for you, Mr. President, to have before you, for your consideration, an appraisal of the relative merits, from the point of view of effective deterrence, of *retaliatory efforts* directed toward:

- "1. Primarily a military target system; or
- "2. What might be felt to be the optimum mix of a combined military-urban industrial target system.

"Such appraisal should also take into account the requirements of a *counter-force capacity* which might conceivably be called upon in the case of unequivocal strategic warning of impending Soviet attack on the U.S. The question here might be whether the character and composition of such a force would be adequate to the purposes of 1 or 2 above, and vice-versa.

"These matters have been under intensive study in the Department of Defense. If it is agreeable to you I shall be glad to work with Mr. McElroy and General Twining to determine the best way to accomplish such an appraisal, relating it as necessary to the review of the so-called War Objectives paper, bearing in mind that the knowledge and views of the State Department and other Federal agencies would be importantly involved."

When Mr. Gray had concluded his suggested Council action, the President said he was convinced that what Mr. Gray proposed to have done was essential for the obvious reason that in today's presentation of the U.S. retaliatory attack on the Soviet Union, the U.S. had as targets [*1 line of source text not declassified*]. In view of this very large number of urban targets, the President believed that we must get back to the formulation of the series of targets in the Soviet Union destruction of which would most economically paralyze the Russian nation. Turning to General Twining and addressing him and other members of the Joint Chiefs

⁶ NSC 5410/1, "U.S. Objectives in the Event of General War With the Soviet Union," dated March 29, 1954, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. II, pp. 644–646. In a memorandum to Dulles dated September 22, 1958, Smith stated that revision had been "postponed last May when you and Secretary McElroy were discussing alternatives to the present Strategic Concept," and that the paper would be the "logical intermediary between Basic National Security Policy and the Strategic Concept and will, in large measure, determine the Strategic Concept since the latter depends for its characteristics upon the nature of the objectives which the US sets for itself in military situations." (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5410 Series) See the Supplement. In a November 22 memorandum of a conversation with the President held November 19, Gray recounted that he raised revision of NSC 5410/1. "The President expressed his doubt as to our ability to do effective planning against a situation of mutual devastation. However, he approved the notion of bringing a discussion paper to the Council." (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up) See the Supplement. For further information, see Document 47.

of Staff, the President said that he could remember well when the military used to have no more than [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. He accordingly expressed his approval of the suggested action by Mr. Gray.

Secretary McElroy expressed his view that the dispersal of the hardened Soviet ICBM bases introduced a new element in the picture because even if we succeeded in destroying the cities and urban centers of the Soviet Union, these missile sites would still enable the Soviet Union to retain an add-on capability with their long-range missiles.

In response to Secretary McElroy's point, the President commented that in this morning's presentation the Soviets delivered all of their ICBM's in the first two hours of their attack on the U.S. Secretary McElroy agreed that this was the case but said that there was some doubt as to whether this was a sound assumption as to the Soviet use of their ICBM's. The President replied that the presentation assumed that we are trying to destroy the will of the Soviet Union to fight. If in the first thirty hours of the nuclear exchange the U.S. succeeded in accomplishing the degree of devastation in the Soviet Union that had been outlined in this morning's presentation, we would already have accomplished our purpose of destroying the will of the Soviet Union to fight. One could not go on to argue that we must require a 100 per cent pulverization of the Soviet Union. There was obviously a limit—a human limit—to the devastation which human beings could endure.

Secretary McElroy expressed his agreement to the action recommended by Mr. Gray and the President brought the meeting to a conclusion with an expression of warm congratulations to General Thomas and his associates and also a welcome to General Hickey who would be taking over henceforth from General Thomas.

*The National Security Council:*⁷

a. Noted and discussed the Annual Report for 1958 of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, pursuant to NSC 5816, as presented orally by the Director and other members of the Subcommittee Staff.

b. Noted the President's request for an appraisal of the relative merits, from the point of view of effective deterrence, of alternative retaliatory efforts directed toward: (1) Primarily a military target system, or (2) an optimum mix of a combined military-urban industrial target system. Such an appraisal is to take into account the requirements of a counter-force capacity and whether such a counter-force capacity would be adequate for (1) or (2) above and vice versa. The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs are to determine the best means of defining and accomplishing such an appraisal, relating it as necessary to the cur-

⁷ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2009, approved by the President on December 3. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

rent review of NSC 5410/1 and the interests of the Department of State and other Executive agencies.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for appropriate implementation.⁸

S. Everett Gleason

⁸ See Document 90.

39. Memorandum by the Secretary of State's Staff Assistant (Boster)

Washington, November 28, 1958.

The following is an excerpt from a conversation between the Secretary and Secretary McElroy on November 28, at the Pentagon:

"We spoke of the budget. Mr. McElroy said that with the prospective cuts it was almost impossible to preclude some reductions in Germany, Korea and/or Iceland. I said that some reduction could probably be dealt with if we had sufficient time. Mr. McElroy said he thought it important to have a military establishment adequate to do what the State Department felt had to be done to back up our political policies for the peace and security of this country. I asked when this budget matter would come before the NSC. He said it might come up next week, Wednesday or Thursday.¹ I said I would probably not be here. Mr. McElroy asked that I speak to Mr. Herter."²

D.E. Boster³

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5/11-2858. Confidential.

¹ The Defense budget was discussed at the NSC meeting held on Saturday, December 6; see Document 41.

² According to notes by Bernau of the Secretary's telephone conversation with Herter on the morning of December 4, Dulles referred to the impending discussion of the Defense budget at NSC and stated that "what they do to get our support of a big budget is they come up with cuts where it will hurt the most and the Sec told McElroy that. They know we will fight cuts in Germany and Korea—they say that will be where they come and will get us on their side. They don't say cut in duplication of weapons. We would say that is all right. They say they will cut what we will oppose. The Pres indicated how he was strongly against the carriers—the older ones will be all right." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

40. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles

Augusta, Georgia, November 30, 1958, noon.

Continuing the discussion on the budget and its bearing on our Mutual Security Program,¹ I said that I hoped that the burden of a defense cut would not fall entirely upon the conventional forces. I felt that there was certainly considerable overlapping and duplication in the new weapons field. The President agreed. However, he indicated that he did not favor the new atomic power carrier advocated by McElroy. He said he thought that existing carriers were good enough for the kind of task that would be required of it.

JFD

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private.

¹ A memorandum of a conversation beginning at 11:30 a.m. states that Dulles made a strong plea to the President for increased Mutual Security funding, perhaps to be funded by a national sales tax, and that the President in response stressed the need for both foreign aid and a balanced budget and indicated that further exploration of modalities was necessary. (*Ibid.*) Dulles had with him at Augusta a November 29 memorandum from Smith, which argued that both the MSP and limited war capabilities were endangered by current budgetary constraints and suggested a national sales tax as a possible alternative. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5810 Series) Both are in the Supplement.

41. Memorandum of Discussion at the 389th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, December 6, 1958.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *U.S. Military Programs for Fiscal Year 1960* (NSC Actions Nos. 1994 and 2000)

After a brief introduction to the subject by Mr. Gray, Secretary McElroy read a short statement containing the principles which had guided

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on December 8. Another memorandum of this meeting by Admiral Burke, dated December 6, is in the Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originator File.

the Department of Defense in the formulation of the FY 1960 Defense Department budget. The first of these "principles" was for those programs which were considered to be unquestionably essential, the rate of development had been maintained and, where advisable technically, had been advanced. Secondly, in developing the overall military budget the Defense Department had rigorously examined all other programs in order that those programs which in view of current technical information might be considered marginal, could be eliminated or reduced. Thirdly, after careful consideration of the advisability of reducing force levels, it was decided that they could not recommend reductions in Fiscal 1960 from those already reduced levels which will be reached at the end of Fiscal 1959, except for a 5000 man reduction in the Air Force.

After pointing out that General Twining would comment more specifically with respect to force levels, Secretary McElroy went on to say in his statement that Defense had considered its first responsibility to be that of protecting the ability of this country to retaliate with large weapons in the event of general war. As their second responsibility they had considered the provision of capacity to apply military force promptly in various local conflict areas of the Free World. The other major measures provided for in the budget were Continental Air Defense and the maintenance of open sea lanes.

Turning from his prepared statement, Secretary McElroy then stated that it was hardly necessary to say that there had been a very considerable amount of doing and redoing of the FY 1960 Military Program in these last weeks and days.¹ Decisions had been made which would certainly close a number of camps and shore stations, decisions which would cause dislocation of employment and trade as well as exerting a major influence on certain U.S. corporations. One or more aircraft corporations, for example, might have to go out of business. While regrettable, this seemed unimportant in comparison with the overall objective.

¹ A December 9 memorandum by Goodpaster describes a lengthy meeting held at the White House on November 28 on the Defense budget, attended by the President, McElroy, Twining, Gray, Stans, and other officials. A memorandum from Stans to General Persons dated December 10 summarizes a meeting held with the President on the Defense budget on December 3. (Both in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries) Eisenhower met with the JCS on the Defense budget at the White House the evening of December 3. (Memorandum by Burke, December 4; Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originator File) A December 5 memorandum from Captain J.H. Morse, Jr., USN, Special Assistant to Chairman McCone of the AEC, to Gordon Gray also treats this subject. (Attachment to memorandum from Gray to Morse, December 11; Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up) All are in the Supplement. General Taylor's account of Eisenhower's session with the JCS on December 3 is in *The Uncertain Trumpet*, pp. 70-72.

In closing Secretary McElroy asked General Twining to report specifically on the matter of FY 1960 force levels. (A copy of Secretary McElroy's opening remarks is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting.)²

General Twining stated that as a preliminary to the more detailed discussions of the FY 1960 budget (by those who were to follow him), he wanted to discuss briefly the military personnel strengths, our current world-wide deployments in the several military services, and some of the implications inherent in the FY 1960 budget program. General Twining then pointed to a chart entitled *Personnel End Strength—1960*. This chart indicated the following end strengths:

| | |
|----------------------|----------------|
| Army | 870,000 |
| Navy | 630,000 |
| Marine Corps | 175,000 |
| Air Force | <u>850,000</u> |
| Total | 2,525,000 |

General Twining added that the Air Force had voluntarily agreed to reduce by 5000 men in return for other concessions which it had sought.

General Twining then referred to his second chart entitled *Summary of Major Force Deployments—End of FY 1959*. In commenting on this chart General Twining pointed out that the deployments described on it could not be maintained under the proposed FY 1960 budget in view of first, personnel reductions and second, new demands for personnel resulting from such programs as the NATO atomic stockpile and missile weapons systems which as yet have no reliable combat capability. Therefore, General Twining predicted the possibility of a reduction of Army forces deployed in overseas units including those in Europe although he was not sure how large such reductions would be. He pointed out that the most severe problem facing the Navy was the growing obsolescence of its ships. If funds cannot be found for new procurement, the Navy may have to reduce the size of its fleet significantly in the future. The same must be said of the Navy's aircraft. For the Air Force the major problem was also in the area of procurement. Under this FY 1960 budget, it will be necessary for the Air Force to retain weapons systems and aircraft which it considered to be obsolescent. For example, no new fighter interceptors were scheduled to be procured.

General Twining concluded with the comment that after having examined the FY 1960 Program, he was personally of the opinion that no serious gaps existed in the key elements although the Services did have reservations with respect to funds provided for some of the respective Service programs. In short, General Twining added that he believed this

² Not found.

to be a sound program for the defense of the nation in the period under consideration.

General Twining was followed by Mr. Max Lehrer of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) who described in detail the FY 1960 budget. He commenced his presentation with a chart entitled *Defense Program for FY 1960*. This chart compared the FY 1960 budget with the budgets for FY 1958 and FY 1959. The chart was divided into Budget Categories as follows: Operative and Capital Costs. It indicated new Obligational Authority of approximately \$42,120,000,000. It indicated Direct Obligations for FY 1960 of \$42,840,000,000. Actual expenditures for FY 1960 were estimated at \$41,170,000,000.

After thus glancing at this overall chart, Mr. Lehrer referred to a subordinate chart entitled *Aircraft Production*. In discussing this he pointed out that the number of new aircraft to be procured would total less than the number required to replace attrition. A similar chart indicated the FY 1960 shipbuilding program. Here Mr. Lehrer pointed out that the program fell short of the rate of ship construction required to maintain the fleet at its present size.

Mr. Lehrer concluded his detailed presentation with a summary of the Defense Program for FY 1960 by components. He indicated that the actual Congressional appropriation to be sought for FY 1960 would amount to \$40,776,000,000. For FY 1959 the actual Congressional appropriation was \$41,000,000,000.

Mr. Lehrer was followed by Mr. Holaday, Director of Guided Missiles in the Department of Defense. Mr. Holaday indicated that he would describe the missile programs including the major sections in which the Defense Department had made drastic changes or the portions which were of particular interest to the National Security Council. He referred to a chart entitled *Missile Program* and discussed the following figures on the chart in billions of dollars:

| | 1959 | 1960 |
|-------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Army | 1,250 | 1,179 |
| Navy | 1,540 | 1,401 |
| Air Force | <u>3,077</u> | <u>3,060</u> |
| Grand Total .. | 5,867 | 5,640 |

Mr. Holaday said he would discuss the Thor and Jupiter Intermediate Ballistic Missiles together because the Defense Department would suggest that both these be put on a "Buy-out" basis. Thereafter Mr. Holaday dealt with the Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, and Polaris programs.

Mr. Holaday concluded with a statement of recommendations which the Department of Defense was making with respect to the several missile programs. With respect to the Thor and Jupiter programs, it was recommended that they be reduced from twelve to eight squadrons, five

of Thor and three of Jupiter for which production commitments have already been made. If further NATO requests were expressed within the next few months and if military aid funds were available, it was further recommended that authority be granted to increase this program by not more than two additional squadrons.

With respect to the ICBM program (Atlas and Titan), it was recommended that the presently approved thirteen squadron ICBM program should be increased to a total of twenty squadrons of which twenty squadrons nine would be Atlas and eleven would be Titan. Since each Titan and Atlas squadron has ten missiles, there would be a total of ninety Atlas missiles and one hundred ten Titan missiles for a grand total of 200 ICBM's.

With respect to the Polaris missile, Mr. Holaday pointed out that in previous Council actions the construction of five nuclear submarines, equipped with Polaris missiles, had been approved. The Defense Department was now recommending in connection with a Congressional add-on of over 600 million appropriations in FY 1959:

(1) the release of 144 million for an R&D program for conversion of a submarine tender;

(2) to authorize the release of 105 million for the construction of one additional Polaris submarine to make six in all as of January 1, 1959;

(3) authorize the release of 360 million for the construction of three additional Polaris submarines bringing the total authorized as of July 1, 1959 to nine.

Mr. Holaday said that it was recommended that authority likewise be requested to proceed with planning for the construction of three additional Polaris submarines with FY 1961 funds. Such an action would bring the Polaris submarine program to a total of twelve. (A copy of the recommendations of the Department of Defense presented by Mr. Holaday are filed in the Minutes of the Meeting.)³

Mr. Holaday was followed by Deputy Secretary Quarles who went over certain of the highlights of the FY 1960 Research and Development Program of the Department of Defense.

At the conclusion of Secretary Quarles' comments, Secretary McElroy asked if Admiral Burke might be permitted to lay before the Council the proposal of the Navy to build one new aircraft carrier. Admiral Burke noted that in the course of careful examination of this proposal, many questions had come up. One of the most important of these was whether, if permission were granted for a new carrier, the carrier should be propelled by nuclear power or conventional power. After lengthy discussion the Navy had decided on conventional power which would result in a saving of something over \$100 million. The new CVA, if approved,

³ Not found.

would be commissioned in the course of FY 1964. Admiral Burke stressed the value to the national security of aircraft carriers of the Forrestal class, particularly in limited war situations although the value was not confined solely to such situations. He also stressed the obsolescence and inadequacies of the old Essex-class carriers as compared to the newer Forrestal-class. This accounted for the inclusion of the proposal for a new carrier in the FY 1960 budget. The President indicated his approval of the inclusion of the aircraft carrier.

The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission⁴ inquired of Admiral Burke whether in reaching its decision to build a conventionally powered aircraft carrier (CVA) rather than a nuclear powered carrier (CVAN), the Navy Department had considered the savings which would result from the reduction of the auxiliary services required for a CVA but which would not be needed in a CVAN. Admiral Burke replied that every aspect of the problem had been considered and that on all counts the CVA would be cheaper. Mr. McCone, however, insisted that we would get spectacular performance from a CVAN as opposed to a CVA and he also predicted that in due course lower costs would dictate the use of nuclear propulsion in all the major ships of the fleet. He therefore wondered whether in proposing a CVA the Navy Department was not buying a 1945 Cadillac.

At this point Secretary McElroy indicated that the formal presentation of the FY 1960 Military Program had been concluded. He called attention to the presence in the room of all the Chiefs of Staff and all of the Secretaries of the Military Services and invited questions.

The President put the first question. Had there ever, he asked, been a successful test of a Titan ICBM? Mr. Holaday replied in the negative and the President then asked how did the Defense Department justify its recommendation for an increase in the number of Titan squadrons?

In reply Mr. Holaday pointed out that the Titan missile had many technical advantages. It was a full two-stage missile, for example. He added that Dr. Killian also strongly recommended the proposed increase as necessary which statement was confirmed by Dr. Killian. Mr. Holaday also pointed out that the funds requested for increasing this missile program included not only funds for the procurement of the missiles themselves but also the construction of hard bases.

Secretary Douglas of the Air Force stated that the first static test firing of a Titan missile would occur on December 15 and the first flight test might come before the end of that month. Secretary Douglas also defended, in response to some criticisms by the President, the value of the discarded Navajo program which he believed had paid off in value.

⁴ John A. McCone.

The President insisted that what he was trying to find out was what we were buying if we agreed to the increase in Titan squadrons. If we were far enough along in the Titan program so that we really knew what we were doing, the increase would be O.K. Moreover, if the Defense Department was so sure that the Titan would actually fly, why was it also proposing an increase in the Atlas program?

Secretary Douglas replied by stating that if we did not go ahead with our program, we would not have available what was required of the Atlas program in 1962 and Titan in 1963.

Secretary McElroy pointed out that the Atlas program was a year and a half ahead of Titan and supplied the need to have a long range missile capability at a future critical time vis-à-vis the Russians. However, he predicted that in due course the Titan would prove to be the better missile system.

The President said he fully understood the psychological importance of getting an early ICBM operational capability for the U.S. It certainly would be fine if the Atlas missile proved able to fly but was it a smart move to try to procure 200 missiles by the end of 1963? The President believed that the history of military equipment and weapons systems revealed the danger of trying to agree on standardization of a weapon for as short a time as a year and a half. He still believed we were putting too much money on Atlas in terms of 200 missiles for a period of one and a half years.

Secretary Anderson said that he would like to make a statement at this time. He began by stating that he could not disagree in any particular with the principles on which Secretary McElroy had stated at the outset that the 1960 Military Program had been based on for the need for the U.S. to have the military capabilities that Secretary McElroy had outlined. He was, however, troubled about the budget figures because it seemed that for a mere few hundreds of millions of dollars, we were not going to be able to balance the FY 1960 budget. It was depressing that in a period of history in which our people have the highest incomes and in which our Gross National Product was the highest ever, we were, even so, going to be unable to bring our accounts into balance to say nothing about retiring the national debt. If we are going to have to state all this to the world, Secretary Anderson said that he had grave doubts as to the continuing confidence of the people of this country who pay the taxes and provide for capital formation. Similar doubts will be planted among other strong nations of the world when in the light of this news they investigate their own stake in our affairs. If we are really trying to defend the hope of oncoming peoples in the standards of living in the U.S., we must defend the vital element of confidence.

Secretary Anderson stated that he did not know where the "breaking point" was. He knew how difficult it was for a layman to appraise

technical military problems. He professed the highest regard for all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a sympathy for their difficulties but as he tried to evaluate the problem, he could only conclude that if we permit long-range inflation as a result of budget deficits, he could see no way that we could hope to combat the inflationary spiral. All this suggested to Secretary Anderson, he continued, that as a nation, what we must make up our minds to, was to take some calculated risks both in the military and the economic areas. Furthermore, we have to get into the problem of whether this country can invariably afford every right gun and every right target at every right time. He himself doubted this and felt that our security should instead be based upon a combination of capabilities of such a nature that the Russians would not dare to attack us. He added that he did not mean to imply that we have not been doing this nor was he trying to substitute his judgment for the judgment of the competent military authorities.

Secretary Anderson also pointed out that even if we were able to obtain a revision of some of the open-ended civilian programs in the government in FY 1960, there would not be any appreciable saving until a year later in 1961. No doubt a significant cut in military procurement would have an effect upon the vigor of our national economy although it was impossible to say exactly how much. If we were to reduce by perhaps a billion or two, such an effect or impact would not be very great in view of a Gross National Product of \$460 billion. Admittedly, however, cut-backs would also have a psychological impact.

What, therefore, asked Secretary Anderson, were the alternatives which presented themselves? Raising taxes? Secretary Anderson doubted very much whether the American people would stand for a raise in the income tax and moreover, he was not sure that such a raise in taxation would actually be productive. Certainly a great deal of energy would be expended by Americans in trying to evade additional taxes. Indeed as things now were, we almost seemed to be driving our citizens into courses of immorality with respect to their taxes. What about the excise tax? If we were to repeal the existing excise taxes and substitute therefore a single sales tax, we would have to levy a three cent sales tax merely in order to stay where we are. Congress would undoubtedly oppose a sales tax of this magnitude. Personally, however, Secretary Anderson preferred new taxes to continuing deficits.

In conclusion Secretary Anderson expressed uncertainty as to what could be done. Anything less than a balanced budget was unquestionably going to cost [*cause?*] damage to future Defense budgets of the U.S. Moreover, Secretary Anderson said he did not believe that most of the world thought the U.S. and the Soviet Union would ever be foolish enough to get themselves involved in a nuclear war. Most of the people of the world are actually thinking of the betterment of their people. This

hope is largely based on the ability of the U.S. economy to show advances. Accordingly, said Secretary Anderson, it was his plea that when our military people look at all these weapons systems, they must see what other things we are trying to defend and where money is being spent in this country. We must try to protect the American competitive system. This, said Secretary Anderson to the President, was his speech for the day. The President replied that it was a very good one too.

The Director of the Budget asked if he could add a little to the observations that Secretary Anderson had just made. It seemed to Mr. Stans that at the level of \$41,165,000,000 which was being proposed for the Defense Department budget, there was no possibility of balancing the FY 1960 budget unless we could either find new sources of revenue or make cuts in the budgets of other agencies. If, moreover, we fail to reach our objective with respect to the Defense Department budget, we will also fail to do so with respect to the budget of the Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. Stans also pointed out that on the civilian side of the budget, the civilian agencies have come down five and a half billions of dollars by such devices as deferring expenditures wherever possible. Accordingly, the non-Defense agencies have taken very substantial cuts.

In the light of the above facts Mr. Stans then said he was forced to state a couple of things that represented the solid opinion of the Bureau of the Budget. First, to accept the present overall figure of the Defense Department will leave the country in a budget posture which will definitely increase over the next few years. Secondly, in terms of the yardstick applied to other agencies, the Defense Department budget is not as tight as the budget of the others. It did not seem to Mr. Stans that one per cent of the Defense Department figures (all that was needed by way of a cut to insure balancing of the budget) could actually constitute the measure of the difference between national security and national insecurity.

If you ask me, continued Mr. Stans, why it is so significant to have a balanced FY 1960 budget when the expenditure deficit will only come to some \$400,000,000, the answer I give is that it is of prime psychological importance to have the balanced budget and that secondly, whether we have been fair with the other agencies who have made sacrifices if we permit the Defense Department to unbalance the budget even by an amount as small as \$400,000,000. It was, therefore, his recommendation and that of the Bureau of the Budget that this Defense Department budget not be approved in this amount and that the Defense Department budget follow the normal procedures of the budgetary process. We should put before you, Mr. President, a number of specific Defense Department programs and ask whether or not these programs really belonged in the FY 1960 Defense Department budget. In this process Mr. Stans said that we might need the help of the President.

The President replied by asking Mr. Stans whether he, Mr. Stans, thought that he, the President, had been sitting on his hands. The President then went back and asked a question as to the effectiveness of the Polaris missile. How confident were we of the Polaris missile? Were we not going into procurement of the missile before we had proved out the weapon system? Were we not gambling?

Secretary McElroy replied that we have gone ahead to procure long-range missiles on the basis that we were buying time. Admittedly this was chancy and it was expensive. The President replied that the trouble was that we are buying this time all the time and we were taking gambles in every field. Why was the procurement of the Polaris now so very important? You could not win if you persisted in putting your money on all the colors of the wheel. Secretary McElroy responded that we had indeed held back on the procurement on some of the shorter range missiles but in the matter of the Atlas, the Titan, and the Polaris, the attainment of an early operational capability could be a very important factor in maintaining the balance of capabilities between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Secretary McElroy suggested that Admiral Burke would have some pertinent comments with respect to the Polaris procurement program. Admiral Burke admitted that Polaris was chancy at the outset. Now, however, we know that we can get a *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* warhead for the missile. We also know that we have the re-entry problem licked. Moreover, the guidance tests have been satisfactory, and the propellant is all right. Therefore, what we have now in sight and are pretty sure of obtaining is a Polaris missile with a 1200 mile range which can be fired from a submarine while submerged which will carry *[1-1/2 lines of source text not classified]*. What we must try to do in the immediate future is to get a missile with a 1500 mile range, *[1 line of source text not declassified]*. Mr. Holaday in general confirmed Admiral Burke's figures.

In response to Admiral Burke the President said that if what he had stated was correct, then it was toward the Polaris program objectives that we should be building hard but at the same time we are also trying to buy time with our Atlas missile, the Titan missile, and practically everything else. How many times do we have to calculate that we need to destroy the Soviet Union? These Polaris missiles, said the President, ought to have some regulatory effect on the Atlas and Titan procurement programs. The President asked how many missiles there were to each submarine and Mr. Holaday replied that there were 16 missiles to a sub, that we would propose to have 9 submarines at the end of 1963. In all we would have 200 Atlas and Titan missiles; 192 Polaris missiles and 120 IRBM's.

The President said that it seemed to him that somewhere along the line we had got ourselves heavily over-insured. He would agree with the need for a good little fleet of Polaris submarines but do we need such a

hell of a lot of them? Secretary McElroy said that precisely this question was now before the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President went on to say that the basic theory of the Secretary of the Treasury earlier was that the U.S. defense system has got to be one that this country can carry for forty years. If our citizens become pessimistic, we could have a serious drop in our economy. If we cannot balance this budget with the present great strength of our economy, then in the long run our national defense will be weakened. Repeating his view that the U.S. was over-insured, the President went on to say that if we could get these truths of which the Secretary of the Treasury talked clearly fixed in our minds, he really believed that we could find one or two of these military programs which could be eliminated.

Secretary Herter remarked that while most of the problems relating to the Defense Department budget required a technical competence which members of the State Department did not profess to have, there was a certain trend that he found disturbing. While members of the State Department could not be judges of the effectiveness of our deterrent capabilities, the people in State were concerned over the outlook for our capability in limited military operations which seems to be being cut down as, for example, with respect to the deployment of U.S. Forces overseas.

The President replied with some warmth that the Department of State had just as big a stake in this problem as any of the rest of us. Like everything else, foreign policy depended on a sound dollar. Suppose our Allies were to lose confidence in our economic soundness, asked the President. Such a development could be just as serious for the national security in the long run as the lack of a capability for waging limited war. With respect to the problem of a cut in U.S. deployments overseas, the President suggested the possibility at this point of cutting out one of the divisions now stationed in the U.S.

The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission provided certain statistics concerning military and national security expenditures in the last few years and defended the FY 1960 Defense proposal by stating that this proposal had not gone up as high percentage-wise as might normally be expected as a result of the factor of inflation alone. He also pointed to the enormous expenditures of the non-Defense agencies. This fact should be recognized and people should understand it so that our deficit is not always laid at the doorstep of the Defense Department.

Secretary McElroy then asked if General White, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, could speak to the Council for a moment or two. General White said he felt obliged to make the statement he was about to make. In his opinion SAC was now the umbrella under which the Free World lives and breathes. It must remain an effective deterrent but although few people knew it, we had had as many as 47 structural failures with our

B-47 aircraft. These were obviously deteriorating very rapidly and they must be replaced by more modern aircraft if our deterrent was to be maintained.

Secretary McElroy then stated that the matters that Secretary Anderson and Mr. Stans had been talking about to the Council this morning had also been very much on the minds of himself and the Defense Department in developing the FY 1960 budget. He wished to state clearly that the budget did not contain a gun for every need. There *were* calculated risks in this budget. We were *not* moving as fast as we could with proved weapons systems. In the matter of the long-range missiles, it seemed to Secretary McElroy that 20 squadrons of ICBM's, with 200 missiles involved, constituted a relatively conservative program. He went on to say that he and the Defense Department had examined these programs in this spirit. It would perhaps be silly for him to state that every single dollar in this FY 1960 budget was sound but nevertheless many hard long sessions with the best people available to us made this budget the best that the President's Defense team could present. It was for that reason that the budget was here before the National Security Council this morning.

Mr. Gordon Gray referred to the cancellation of the Goose decoy missile which came after the presentation made by Admiral Sides recently on October 13 on the evaluation of offensive and defensive weapons systems.⁵ Mr. Gray, reminding the Council that the President had requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this occasion to conduct additional investigations to identify weapons systems which might be obsolescent or overlapping, asked Secretary McElroy whether such additional investigations had been scrutinized and evaluated during the course of the formulation of the FY 1960 Defense budget. Secretary McElroy replied that this had not happened once but many many times. He cited the conclusions of the Department on the B-58 aircraft as a reflection of this scrutiny.

The President asked when the Defense Department expected to have a wing of B-58 aircraft operational. General White replied that a B-58 wing would be operational late in 1960. We were now producing some three B-58's per month. Secretary Douglas spoke up to point out that we would not be getting more than two B-58 aircraft a month until late in Calendar 1960 and we would not get four a month until the end of Calendar 1960.

The Vice President said he did not believe he could add anything much to the discussion except that he wished to speak further of Secretary Herter's concern that when the FY 1960 Defense budget is finally

⁵ See footnote 5, Document 36.

determined and published, it might appear that we are shifting ever more to reliance on our deterrent capability at the expense of our capability for limited wars. Secretary Herter interjected that we certainly want a deterrent that was a deterrent but that he was worried about the timing of the redeployment of U.S. Forces in Europe. For example, we would certainly not want to redeploy U.S. Forces from Europe if we found ourselves in the midst of a crisis over Berlin.

The Vice President went on to say that he shared somewhat Governor Herter's concern over fears abroad that the primary interest of the U.S. was in the "big war" (nuclear exchange). On this basis, continued the Vice President, it would appear that if we are going to stay within an overall defense spending ceiling, if further adjustments become necessary it will be difficult to make them except in the area of the Atlas, the B-58 or the B-52. We must know that when this budget finally comes out, it will be widely felt to be a budget designed to protect our nuclear retaliatory capability but not our limited war capability. This might not be the fact but it would certainly have that appearance.

Secretary McElroy replied to the Vice President that this was the reason why they had put into the budget the aircraft carrier which had earlier been referred to. The Secretary thought we had done reasonably well in meeting our limited war demands in Lebanon and the Taiwan Strait although he confessed he did not know whether we could effectively handle three limited war situations at one and the same time. Secretary McElroy added his strong opinion that the NATO nations press us to fulfill our defense responsibilities but do not fulfill their own. The U.K., for example, was becoming more or less a third rate military power and we should all remember that there is no one now but the U.S. which can employ significant military power around the world with the hope of helping indigenous forces in the Free World to prevent or resist aggression.

At this point the Vice President thought it would be well for all to realize that when this budget went to the Congress, the Defense Department was going to get from the Congress more than the President was asking from the Congress. Congress would very likely cut appropriations for foreign aid but they would almost certainly add to the military program. Both the President and Secretary McElroy were inclined to agree but pointed out that opinion in this country could change and we might get less.

General Twining asked permission to speak with respect to the capabilities of the U.S. to fight brush fire or limited wars. He pointed out that if the U.S. ever got so involved in a limited military operation that our Army and Navy and Air Force could not handle the situation, we would have to resort to mobilization in any case. General Twining expressed the opinion that we were in pretty good shape in the area of

limited military capabilities. He also pointed out that we were spending large sums of money for the procurement of new weapons systems this year but that maybe in future years, once these weapons systems have been procured, our defense budget levels would begin to go down. General Twining's statement was greeted with mild amusement. The President said he could not agree with General Twining's prediction that within a few years we would see our defense expenditures begin to go down although Secretary McElroy gave some support to the view that there could be reductions once the nation's long-range missile capability had been firmly established. Again disagreeing, the President pointed out that once we had procured an adequate number of missiles, we would find ourselves faced with the continuing problem of the cost of base construction for the missiles.

It was suggested by Mr. Gray that the Council hear briefly from Dr. Killian who stated his belief and that of his associates that there were indeed calculated risks in this Defense Department budget at the present time. There was really no adequate air defense which this budget was slowing down. Furthermore, Dr. Killian said, he could see no way clear to an adequate defense against missiles. It seemed to Dr. Killian that the very complex question of the balance of overall military capabilities must be examined. There was likewise need for a thorough review of our air defense program. Dr. Killian expressed the opinion likewise that our limited war capabilities were tending to be downgraded although General Twining disagreed with him. Finally, said Dr. Killian, as regards this specific Defense Department budget, there were things in it that could be cut out if we decided to do it. There were things in this budget which were of less importance than some of the things which have been cut and are not in it. Can we justify more money, for example, for a nuclear-powered plane which we know will be subsonic? Would it not be better to spend the money allocated to this program on our long-range missile programs instead? We must bank on our Atlas, Polaris and Titan missile programs rather than on Minuteman at this time. Also we have probably been a little too enthusiastic in this budget about certain space activities. There was certainly some "blue sky" stuff in this area.

General Taylor asked permission to clear up certain misunderstandings with respect to the deployment of U.S. Forces in the NATO area. He disclaimed any intention to reduce deployment of tactical units to NATO but we were short of spaces for such new responsibilities as the NATO nuclear stockpile. We will have to reduce somewhere and General Norstad may come back and prefer a reduction in tactical units as opposed to a reduction of the forces allocated for taking care of the NATO stockpile.

At this point Mr. Gray reminded the President of the time and pointed out that he had two recommendations before him, one by Secretary McElroy calling for approval of the proposed FY 1960 budget and

another by Mr. Stans advocating that the budget not be approved pending regular budgetary processes.

The Director of Central Intelligence said that he did not wish to commence his briefing without a comment or two on the direction of the FY 1960 Defense Department budget. He felt he must point out that subversion and other techniques used by the Russians not involving military operations would undoubtedly be stepped up by the Soviets in the coming months and years.

*The National Security Council:*⁶

a. Noted and discussed an oral presentation of the recommendations by the Secretary of Defense as to the U.S. Military Programs for FY 1960, as presented at the meeting by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Max Lehrer of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Director of Guided Missiles, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

b. Noted the President's approval of the inclusion of a new aircraft carrier (CVA) in the FY 1960 Military Program, in the light of an oral statement by the Chief of Naval Operations.

c. Noted the comments by the Secretary of the Treasury on the serious implications for the national security of a failure to balance the FY 1960 budget.

d. Noted the comments by the Director, Bureau of the Budget, that the FY 1960 military budget recommended by the Secretary of Defense would result in a budget posture involving increased budgets over the next few years, and that this military budget did not appear as tight as the budgets of other agencies in terms of the yardsticks applied to them. Mr. Stans recommended that the military budget as presented not be approved at this time, but that it should follow the usual budget procedures.

e. Noted the statement of the Acting Secretary of State that, although the Department of State is not competent to advise on the overall level of the military budget, it is concerned that the contemplated reductions in troop strength, particularly those involving foreign deployments, might adversely affect U.S. limited war capabilities.

f. Noted the statement by the Secretary of Defense that the investigations of weapons systems directed by NSC Action No. 1994 were reflected in the recommendations as to the U.S. Military Programs for FY 1960 presented at this meeting, and that these recommendations repre-

⁶ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2013, approved by the President on December 16. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Further discussion of this action is in Document 42.

sented the best programs that could be developed as a result of careful re-examination by all responsible officials of the Department of Defense.

g. Noted the President's statement that, while he approved in general the recommendations as to the U.S. Military Programs for FY 1960 presented at this meeting, the military budget estimates for FY 1960 should follow the regular budgetary process to make sure that all practicable economies were effected.

Note: The President, in subsequently approving the above actions taken at the meeting, directed that this Record of Action should also show the President's approval of the following recommendations by the Secretary of Defense as presented at the meeting by the Director of Guided Missiles:

(1) The presently approved 13-squadron ICBM Program (9 Atlas and 4 Titan) be increased to a total of 20 squadrons (9 Atlas and 11 Titan).

(2) The production of land-based IRBMs be limited to the 5 squadrons of Thor and 3 squadrons of Jupiter for which production commitments have already been made, with the understanding that this program may be increased by not to exceed 2 additional squadrons if further NATO requirements are expressed within the next few months and military aid funds therefore can be made available.

(3) Authorization of the use of FY 1959 appropriated funds for:

(a) Research and development, and for conversion of a submarine tender.

(b) Construction of 1 additional Polaris submarine beginning in FY 1959, bringing the total authorized to 6 Polaris submarines.

(4) Authorization to construct 3 additional Polaris submarines beginning in FY 1960, bringing the total authorized to 9 Polaris submarines; using in part FY 1959 appropriated funds.

(5) Authorization to proceed with the planning and necessary lead-time procurement actions for construction of 3 additional Polaris submarines with FY 1961 funds, bringing the total authorized to 12 Polaris submarines.

The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, for appropriate implementation.

[Here follows Agenda Item 2. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security."]

S. Everett Gleason

42. Memorandum of Conference Between President Eisenhower and His Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray)

Washington, December 8, 1958, 11:15 a.m.

The following items were discussed with the President:

1. I raised with him the question of a "debriefing" for the Planning Board members with respect to the NSC meeting on December 6 involving the Defense budget. I indicated to the President that I had a feeling that the regular debriefing process should not be followed in this case. He agreed.

2. I then took up with the President the Record of Actions of the meeting of the National Security Council on December 3.¹ He approved it with the amendment suggested by Mr. Dillon and agreed to by Defense and the JCS.

3. I then took up the Record of Actions of the meeting of December 6. The President read it carefully and initialed it. I then pointed out to the President that even the language he had approved would perhaps not be adequate guidance in the premises. I reported to him that there was not a clear and general agreement as a result of the Saturday meeting² and that his statement in the Council perhaps would mean one thing to Defense and another thing to the Bureau of the Budget. I informed him that Defense and the BOB as far as I knew had not gotten together following the meeting on December 6 and that on the basis of a conversation with Mr. McElroy and Mr. Quarles I believed Defense was awaiting a next move from someone else, probably the President himself.

The President then said that he felt there had been some progress and that he was hopeful that Mr. McElroy was finding it possible to make an adjustment in the Defense figures which would meet the budget problem. He based this optimism on a report of a meeting between Mr. Anderson and Mr. McElroy on Sunday. I indicated to the President that I believed his optimism misplaced and that as of the morning of December 8, Mr. McElroy was not prepared to make any meaningful adjustment. I told the President that Mr. McElroy was meeting again with Secretary Anderson at 11 o'clock on the morning of the 8th.

The President then asked me how I felt the Defense Department interpreted the Presidential statement in the NSC on December 6. I told him that Defense felt that the budget had gone through the normal budgetary process; that they had presented it to the President; and that it

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up. Secret. Drafted by Gray on December 9.

¹ The memorandum of discussion at this meeting is printed in vol. IV, pp. 434-443.

² December 6; see Document 41.

should be printed as presented. I told him on the other hand that I felt the Budget interpretation was that the whole budget was subject still to challenge specifically including the programs presented in the meeting.

The President then said that what he had meant by budgetary process was an examination of non-program areas, such as administrative costs, housing, construction, inventories, logistic support, etc., and that there had been no discussion in his presence of these matters.

I then pointed out to the President that time was an important factor inasmuch as Mr. McElroy was departing early on the morning of the 9th for the NATO Ministerial Meeting and that Mr. Stans was insisting that the budget had to go to print before Mr. McElroy's return. The President then expressed his irritation of the frequent absence of Cabinet Ministers.

The President then said that if he were in charge he felt that he could take \$5 billion out of the Defense budget but that Defense seemed not to be yielding at all. I observed to the President that if he were talking large amounts of money there couldn't be any significant reduction by further squeezing and that the only way to accomplish it was by the elimination of programs. He said he fully understood this. He said that if Defense, after all of the meetings and conversations on the subject, still maintained that the programs presented in the NSC meeting were essential to the national security, he had little choice but to approve them.

I repeated to the President that I felt that clarification was needed as to the result of the December 6 meeting.

He then said he thought he would call Secretary McElroy. I suggested that Mr. McElroy would probably still be with Mr. Anderson and the President did indeed reach him in Mr. Anderson's office.

The main points in the conversation between the President and Mr. McElroy were:

1. The President indicated that he had been "dragooned" into approving the Defense programs as presented. He made it clear to Mr. McElroy that his approval was reluctant but was given only because he felt he had no choice. He continued to have, however, reservations about the numbers of Atlas and Titan missiles, wondering if it was necessary to program as many of both. He then said that he wanted Mr. McElroy to get together with Mr. Stans right away and subject to further discussion the non-programmed items which he had mentioned to me earlier.

When he concluded the conversation the President instructed me to communicate the substance of it to General Persons with the request that General Persons reach Mr. Stans immediately and instruct him to get together with the Secretary of Defense.

[Here follows discussion of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee and of underground nuclear testing.]

Immediately upon leaving the President's office at 11:40, I got General Persons out of a meeting in his office and informed him as requested by the President. He immediately got Mr. Stans on the telephone, with me on an extension, and I, at General Persons' direction, reported to Mr. Stans the substance of the President's conversation with Mr. McElroy. General Persons directed Mr. Stans to get in touch with Secretary Anderson to be brought up-to-date on his conversation with the Secretary of Defense and then to get in touch with Secretary McElroy.³

Gordon Gray⁴

³ Further documentation on these proposed discussions has not been found. President Eisenhower approved NSC Action No. 2013 during a conversation with Gray on December 16. Only paragraph e was discussed briefly during this talk. (Memorandum of conversation by Gray, December 18; Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up)

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

43. Editorial Note

On December 18, 1958, the National Security Council discussed as Agenda Item 1 the status of the military mobilization base program. At the close of the discussion, the Council decided to keep under study whether mobilization base planning should continue to assume a mobilization period of 6 months prior to D-day, and continue efforts to find means of taking bomb damage into account in mobilization base planning "while keeping the assumptions as to the extent of damage within limits which provide a basis for feasible planning." As Agenda Item 2, the Council considered fallout shelters in existing federal buildings. (Memorandum of discussion by Boggs, December 18; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) During the discussion of mobilization, the Council heard an oral presentation by Perkins McGuire, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics), of his report of the same date on the subject. (*Ibid.*) Both documents are in the Supplement. Agenda Item 1 and Agenda Item 2 were both approved as NSC Action No. 2019 and 2020, respectively. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Records of Action)

In a memorandum of a conversation held with the President on December 24, Gray wrote in part: "I reminded the President that he had

indicated that he wished the Department of Defense to keep under study the question of whether its mobilization base planning should continue to assume a mobilization period of six months prior to D-day. The President said that he felt that it should be studied but that his guess was that planning had to assume both such a period and no period whatsoever." (Memorandum of conversation by Gray, December 30; Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up) See the Supplement.

44. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, December 19, 1958, 2:30 p.m.

[Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. No classification marking. Extract—4 pages of source text not declassified.]

45. Editorial Note

On January 12, 1959, President Eisenhower discussed with Killian and Kistiakowsky the problem of inspection against surprise attack and Soviet missile capability. The meeting closed with the following exchange:

"Dr. Killian next referred to some of Dr. Kistiakowsky's impressions and observations about the Soviet missile capability, since these impressions ran counter to our best intelligence estimates. Dr. Kistiakowsky said he was very much impressed with the importance that the Soviets attach to long-range ballistic missiles. These are in fact a focal point in their whole defense concept. They referred to it as a special area not subject to discussion at the Geneva meeting. He said it is his opinion that they now have an operational long-range missile force. The President said he could accept this possibility, but still holds a question as to the numbers and accuracy of such weapons. He then asked the question, if the Soviets should fire these weapons at us, where this action would leave them. They would still be exposed to destruction. In his mind there is the question whether this is a feasible means of making war; he granted that it is a feasible way of destroying much of the nation's

strength, but the resulting retaliation would be such that it does not make sense for war. He said he thought it would be at least a few years before the Soviets could conceivably have enough missiles so as not to have grounds to fear retaliation." (Memorandum of meeting by Goodpaster, January 14; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries) The full text is in the Supplement.

46. Editorial Note

On January 16, 1959, Secretary McElroy and General Twining briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in executive session on the state of U.S. military defenses. A 93-page typescript record of this briefing is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 46, Records of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The transcript is printed in *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series)*, 1959, pages 17–53.

47. Memorandum of Discussion at the 394th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, January 22, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Items 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," and 2. "Visit of Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan to the United States."]

3. *Review of NSC 5410/1* (NSC 5410/1; NSC 5810/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1077 and 1102;¹ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 7, 1959²)

In his briefing of the Council Mr. Gray pointed out that there had been a policy paper of one sort or another on "U.S. Objectives in the

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason.

¹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. II, pp. 643–644 and p. 646, footnote 6, respectively.

² This memorandum enclosed a discussion paper prepared by the Planning Board, much of which is quoted and summarized in this memorandum of discussion. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5904 Series) See the Supplement.

Event of General War with the Soviet Bloc" since 1948. The existing policy on this subject, NSC 5410/1, needed to be up-dated since it had been adopted almost five years ago. He continued by pointing out that the lengthy and involved review of the paper in the Planning Board had resulted in wide divergences of view as to what a revised paper should contain. Indeed there was some question as to whether there was any need for a policy on this subject at all. In this situation the Planning Board had finally decided to prepare the discussion paper which was now before the Council in order to solicit guidance from the Council as the basis for either rescinding NSC 5410/1 altogether or as the basis for revising of this policy.

Mr. Gray then read to the Council the first question contained in the discussion paper reading as follows:

"Should a statement of U.S. policy in the event of war be limited to the subject of existing policy (NSC 5410/1), i.e., U.S. objectives in the event of general war with the Soviet Bloc; or should it cover additional contingencies such as (a) major war initiated by Communist China, and (b) other war initiated by a member of the Sino-Soviet Bloc?"

Mr. Gray asked Secretary Dulles for his view on this question. Secretary Dulles replied that while he had a few remarks to make on the general subject of the discussion paper, he would prefer not to answer the specific questions since they were a lot easier to ask than to answer. He then went on to say that the present paper (NSC 5410/1) which had been prepared some years ago was plainly outdated. It would be unfortunate to keep it on the books as an outdated policy document, particularly in view of its practical relationship to U.S. military planning. With respect to the present policy statement (NSC 5410/1), Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that Paragraph 4 which called for efforts to prevent the active participation of Communist China in the war on the side of the U.S.S.R. was unwise. This matter certainly needed to be reviewed. Likewise, the assumption in the paper that you could have a general nuclear war in which a "victory" could be achieved also needed to be reconsidered. There was also an implicit assumption in the present policy statement that the U.S. did not need any policy with respect to a war except a policy which dealt with the problem of general war and not with limited hostilities. This assumption also needed reconsideration. For these reasons and others, Secretary Dulles again said that he thought the present policy statement was obsolete and was indeed actually a liability because it had become a kind of Bible from which status there flowed undesirable practical consequences.

While it was one thing to find fault with the present paper (NSC 5410/1), it was quite another to suggest the form and content of a new paper on this subject. Secretary Dulles said that he would personally hate to have to undertake the new paper himself. He nevertheless felt the

effort should be made. While he would rather have no paper than the present one, he would prefer to see a new policy statement however difficult or almost impossible it might be to write.

Mr. Gray said that he agreed with Secretary Dulles that such a paper was difficult to write and that the effort to write it had been his most difficult task in the six months and one day that he had been in his present job. Nevertheless, he too felt that we should try to write a new paper. For this purpose we needed the guidance of the Council and that is why we had posed the questions set forth in the discussion paper. As a matter of fact, Mr. Gray said that Secretary Dulles had really answered the first question in the discussion paper in the course of his general remarks just completed. Secretary Dulles agreed that this was the case and also called attention to the real possibility in connection with the first question that Communist China could be pushed by the U.S.S.R. into starting a major war against the U.S.

Mr. Gray then inquired whether Secretary McElroy or General Twining had any general comments on the discussion paper that they wished to make. Secretary McElroy replied that he agreed with Secretary Dulles in general and that we should strive to redo or up-date the present policy statement. Such a policy was plainly needed for the purpose of providing basic guidance to the military. Secretary McElroy thought that such a policy statement should be addressed to a situation of general war because the variety of possible limited wars was so great that it would be extremely difficult to provide any concrete policy guidance concerning them. Finally, said Secretary McElroy, changes in the situation in the Sino-Soviet Bloc could be so frequent that he believed that a review of any policy statement respecting our objectives in the event of general war with the Sino-Soviet Bloc should be reviewed much more frequently than NSC 5410/1. Indeed such a review should perhaps be undertaken annually.

Secretary Dulles expressed agreement with Secretary McElroy that you could not cover all the various contingencies of limited war in a single policy statement. He had made his reference to limited war simply to be sure that a new policy statement avoided any implication that the only kind of hostilities we would have to face with the Sino-Soviet Bloc was general war. It was this negative thought that Secretary Dulles wanted to avoid. He did not mean, however, that he would attempt to guess what limited wars might actually occur and what our policies should be with respect to such limited war. The President said he agreed with the thought expressed by Secretary Dulles.

Mr. Gray then requested the guidance of the Council with respect to the second and third questions in the discussion paper which he pointed

out were political as well as military or strategic questions. The second and third questions read as follows:

"2. In the light of the capability of the United States and the U.S.S.R. in the foreseeable future to destroy one another, even after a surprise nuclear attack, should the United States in the event of general war initiated by the U.S.R.R.:

"Despite the loss of U.S. lives and resources which might be involved, endeavor by all necessary means to reduce the capabilities of the U.S.S.R. to the point where it has lost its will or ability to wage war against the U.S. and its allies; and yet be prepared to consider an offer by the U.S.S.R. to cut short the nuclear exchange at a point advantageous to the U.S., even though the U.S.S.R. might retain some will and ability to continue the struggle?"

"3. Should the U.S. accept an otherwise advantageous settlement:

"a. If Communist control were maintained over the satellites?

"b. If a Communist Government retained power in the U.S.S.R.?

"c. Only if all Communist controls were destroyed?"

With respect to these questions the President observed that everyone knew that in such matters we took Clausewitz as our guide. Clausewitz, in his doctrine, put all his emphasis on the destruction of the will of the enemy to wage war rather than the enemy's capabilities to do so. However, said the President, perhaps it was rather futile to try to make a real differentiation between destroying the will or destroying the capability of an enemy to continue war. Look at the example of Fidel Castro. He had started out with a dozen ragged men and had ended by destroying Batista and his large forces. This was an example of the destruction of the will to fight so we are really trying to destroy the enemy's will. War is after all waged for a purpose. Our purpose is to defend ourselves. To defend ourselves means that we must destroy the present threat to ourselves. Accordingly, once we become involved in a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, we could not stop until we had finished off the enemy; that is, forced him to stop fighting. If at any point in the hostilities we agree to make terms with the enemy, we would only make terms which allayed the Communist threat to us.

Secretary Dulles expressed some doubt as to whether one could destroy the Communist threat in the world simply by destroying the Kremlin and the U.S.S.R. The Communist movement in the world was wider than the Soviet Union. Ideologies cannot be destroyed by military forces alone. If you destroy the present Communist center in Moscow, the very suffering and dislocation of so terrible a war would tend to keep the Communist ideology alive. The President agreed with Secretary Dulles and added that never in history had an ideology been destroyed by war.

Secretary McElroy added the comment that what we hoped to do if we ever became involved in a war was not to get everyone to accept our

own ideology but to try to achieve a world in which everybody could live and let live.

General Twining expressed his disagreement with any doctrine which called for the application of degrees of pressure against the Soviet Union in the event that we became involved in general war. On the contrary, said General Twining, it was his view that if we ever got into such a fight, we should use all our powers to win rather than to fight with one hand only. He pointed out that we had war-gamed a general war against the Sino-Soviet Bloc three times and in each case the U.S. had managed to survive despite the fact that so many people nowadays argue that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. each has the power to destroy the other in the event of general war between them.

At this point Mr. Gray expressed the view that the guidance already provided by the Council had been valuable but that he would like to raise one more question for discussion. This was the question contained in Paragraph 6 reading as follows:

"Can and should the United States undertake now to formulate post-war policies and plans, e.g., terms of enemy surrender, border and territorial arrangements, administration of enemy territory, and independence for national minorities?"

As Mr. Gray finished reading this question he observed that Secretary Dulles was smiling and the President was laughing. Accordingly Mr. Gray observed that he guessed that the answer to this question had been provided. The President, however, commented that what we must do in connection with the problem raised by this question was to use our imagination. On the other hand, imagination will not solve non-imaginable problems which by implication the President thought were contained in this question. What were going to be the conditions after a general war between the U.S. and the Sino-Soviet Bloc asked the President. That was precisely what he would like to know. Who was going to re-educate the defeated enemy in a conflict which resulted in such terrible devastation and pulverization of the enemy's territory? If we got hit, what had we better do with Soviet Russia and Communist China? This was the sense of this question and while the President doubted if you could answer the question with any specifics, it might be possible to work out a few reasonable guide lines.

General Twining asked if he might express the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said that the Chiefs believed in the value of this type of policy statement. On the other hand, they wished it to confine itself to the problem of our policy in the event of general rather than on and including limited wars. As a title they preferred "U.S. Objectives in the Event of General War with the Sino-Soviet Bloc". They were anxious that objectives in such a war be included.

The President inquired what could be our objectives in such a general war beyond the objective of hitting the Russians as hard as we could. General Twining responded by stating that we planned in the event of such a war "to shoot the works" and not to apply our military power degree by degree against the enemy. Perhaps in the course of such a conflict we might find it advantageous to negotiate but we should certainly not plan to negotiate in advance. If the Communists want to stop, that would be O.K. We finish the attack and then talk to them but we shoot the works.

At this point Mr. Gray reverted to the second question, posing it in somewhat different terms and stressing the importance of the political questions which underlay it.

The President commented that the only form in which you could expect to get a peace offering would be from that side in the conflict which was putting up the white flag. The U.S. will never do this so we should go ahead and hit the Russians as hard as possible. We could not do anything else. They, the Russians, will have started the war, we will finish it. That is all the policy the President said he had. Secretary Dulles stated that this statement of the President might indeed constitute the statement of policy. Mr. Allen Dulles warned against a repetition of President Roosevelt's call for unconditional surrender which he believed had prolonged the Second World War for perhaps a year's time. The President insisted he was not calling for a revival of the doctrine of unconditional surrender.

General Twining then completed his brief statement of the Joint Chiefs' views which he took from a memorandum submitted to the National Security Council Planning Board by the Defense and JCS members of a drafting committee under the date of November 5, 1958 (a copy of this memorandum is attached to this Memorandum).³ General Twining noted that according to this memorandum the Joint Chiefs wished to include in a new policy statement Paragraph 3 of NSC 5410/1 calling for the reduction of the capabilities of the U.S.S.R. to a point where it had lost its will or ability to wage war against the U.S. and its allies. On the other hand, the Joint Chiefs wished to delete Paragraph 4 of NSC 5410/1 which called for preventing by all means consistent with other U.S. objectives, the active participation of Communist China in the war on the U.S.S.R. side.

After Mr. Gray stated the consensus of the meeting that a new statement of policy should be undertaken by the Planning Board, the President closed the discussion by observing that we ought to be clear among ourselves that if we are going to hit the Soviet Union, we are going in the

³ Not found attached; for text, see the Supplement.

process to remove the threat posed by the Soviet Union. There was, accordingly, no use to talk about negotiating a settlement in the midst of the war. The Soviets would certainly not keep any negotiated settlement to which they agreed. They never had in the past.

In closing Mr. Gray observed that he thought that the suggestions by Secretary McElroy for an annual review of such a policy statement was a good idea but he wanted very much to get a new statement of policy on the subject done first. It would be a considerable task.

*The National Security Council:*⁴

a. Noted and discussed the subject in the light of a discussion paper prepared by the NSC Planning Board transmitted by the reference memorandum, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as presented orally at the meeting by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Directed the NSC Planning Board to prepare for Council consideration a new statement of U.S. policy along the lines discussed in the meeting, to supersede NSC 5410/1.

[Here follow Agenda Items 4. "U.S. Policy Toward Greece," and 5. "U.S. Policy Toward Yugoslavia."]

S. Everett Gleason

⁴ The following paragraphs constitute NSC Action No. 2039, approved by the President on January 23. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

48. Editorial Note

At the National Security Council meeting on January 29, 1959, Allen Dulles discussed significant world developments affecting U.S. security with emphasis on Khrushchev's speech in Moscow on January 27 to the 21st Congress of the Communist Party: "After considerable study, Mr. Dulles said that the most careful translation indicated that Khrushchev had stated that 'serialized production of ICBM's has been organized'. If this were an accurate translation, Mr. Dulles indicated that it fitted well with our U.S. intelligence estimates which have assumed that ICBM's would be coming off the production line in small numbers this Calendar Year. Khrushchev's statement did not indicate that Soviet production of

ICBM's was ahead of our estimates." (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

During his briefing at the NSC meeting on February 26, Dulles considered recent National Intelligence Estimates on Soviet missile capabilities: "By and large he felt that there had not been a significant degree of error in the period covered by the Estimate of December 10, 1957 down to the most recent Estimate of December 23, 1958. He also pointed out that Khrushchev's statement made in January 1959 that series production of ICBMs in the Soviet Union had been organized, fitted very well with our prior intelligence estimates.

"Secretary McElroy expressed the view that the most important matter was the date when the Soviets would have attained an initial operating capability of 500 ICBMs. This date was crucial for Department of Defense planning and on this point our estimates have been changed rather significantly.

"[2 paragraphs (16 lines of source text) not declassified]"

"Secretary McElroy then pointed out that in point of fact the so-called missile gap had recently been narrowed because we were now estimating a longer period before the Soviets obtained a genuine operational capability with ICBMs and also because we ourselves have made more rapid progress in some of our own missile programs, such as the Polaris, than we had originally anticipated." (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason; *ibid.*)

The estimates referred to are NIE 11-4-57, November 12, 1957, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies 1957-1962," and NIE 11-4-58, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1958-1963." (Both in Department of State, INR-NIE Files) A memorandum from John S.D. Eisenhower to Goodpaster, January 27, compares and contrasts the two estimates in some detail, noting that the principal difference was the lowered projection in NIE 11-4-58 for long-range bomber capability, revised to 200 to 300 by 1962 instead of the 400 to 600 expected by that year in NIE 11-4-57. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary Records)

49. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, February 9, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

General Twining
Major Eisenhower

[Here follows discussion, included in the Supplement, of NATO and personnel matters.]

The President now brought up the matter of publicity in connection with our defense posture. Specifically, he has been advised by General Persons that the American public should know more about missiles and armaments. In order to give proper publicity in this matter, General Persons feels that we should do something a little different. Speeches are inadequate. Accordingly, it has been recommended that the President make a trip to a Strategic Air Command base, to Cape Canaveral, and to a Nike site, and at each location, he should make an appearance to the press and attempt to give some understanding of what our defense structure is all about. Accordingly, he requests a restudy of our public information policies on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine what type of facts the President might give out under these circumstances.

General Twining, while he expressed approval of this scheme, pointed out that facts and logic are often wasted when the opposition employs tactics similar to those of Senator Symington on the matter of airborne alert. While testifying before Congress, General Twining had been asked by Senator Symington how many aircraft were on airborne alert that particular day. There had been a recent exercise which involved an airborne alert in SAC, but that exercise having been terminated, General Twining so advised Senator Symington. As a result, Senator Symington had made a great issue of this matter to the effect that it is a shame that none of our aircraft are on airborne alert and blamed the budget for this deplorable fact. Senator Bush had also expressed shock. When General Twining mentioned this later to General Power, he learned that Senator Symington had telephoned General Power that morning and asked how many aircraft were on airborne alert. General Power had given him the facts. As the result, General Twining has received a volume of mail, and in his answers, has cleared the record. In General Twining's view, we have no need for an airborne alert and our capability to respond with SAC on fifteen minutes warning is adequate for our military posture.

General Twining then proceeded to describe the tendency on the part of some people to discount everything but relative ICBM capabilities. He pointed out that our Air Force is four times the size of that of the Soviets and ten times as good. It does execute airborne alert exercises from time to time to keep the Soviets uncertain. General Twining expressed admiration for the performance of the Secretary of Defense in his testimony before Congress.

The President stated that he had spoken before about self-appointed military experts. He is considering another statement about neurotics—either honest or dishonest neurotics—who are so fearful that they advocate taking the entire SAC into the air and keeping it there. He conceded that these people realized the aircraft must come down occasionally to gas up. General Twining expressed the view that the public must realize that the USSR has a capability to hit the U.S. and to live with this realization. It is a hard fact of life. The President agreed except that he pointed out that our estimates for the last four years have included the Soviet capability to destroy the U.S. 100%. This was first based on one-way bomber missions and is now based on the ICBM. He reiterated his stand for a reasonably adequate program.

General Twining continued the discussion on enemy capabilities by stating that in his testimony before Congress he personally admitted that he had previously fought for more bombers. He had been concerned over the Soviet capability to build Bisons and Bears. However, as it had turned out, the Soviets had not built these aircraft and now possess only 100-115 heavy bombers. He had further pointed out to Congress that missiles are only as good as their launching sites. We have not as yet obtained any hard intelligence on any launching sites in the Soviet Union.

The President and General Twining then reviewed the concept of a trip by the President to SAC, to a Nike site, and to Cape Canaveral, and to issue statements at each location. General Twining stated he would open a study on what might be said at these locations. In this connection, he made mention of the successful flight of the Titan on February third, adding that this is the first missile which had been successful on its first launching. The President observed that manufacturers in Denver had predicted this.

General Twining then completed his report on the Congressional hearings by describing the question on the subject of the missile gap. When asked how to remedy the missile gap, he had answered that we should merely produce lots of big Atlas missiles. However, he does not advocate this. The Atlas is not the weapon that we would ultimately like, and, therefore, large quantities of this weapon would be obsolete soon. He does not believe the USSR is in a mood for general war, particularly in view of the pride that they take in having rebuilt their cities from World

War II. He repeated the desires on the part of fearful people, stating that if we bought everything they advocated we would wind up spending \$70 billion for defense alone. Finally, he had suggested to the Congress that they employ the word "operational" when discussing missile sites. He pointed out that there is no glamor to the subject of base building, only to the production of missiles. The President suggested we might mention to the Congress that every missile site near a city makes that city a prime target. General Twining now reiterated his admiration for the performance of the Secretary of Defense before these hearings. In this connection, the President expressed the view that Secretary McElroy, while he should not be made to look too partisan, possesses talents which are such that he should not be lost to Government service when this particular job is terminated.

[Here follows discussion, included in the Supplement, of Congress, command structure, and personnel matters.]

John S.D. Eisenhower

50. Editorial Note

During a discussion on atomic weapons requirements held after the National Security Council meeting on February 12, 1959, with McElroy, Twining, and others, President Eisenhower commented as follows:

"The President understands the need for small weapons in air defense and missile defense, although he pointed out that the three scientists who had visited him the day before (Drs. Land, Purcell and Killian) had shown less enthusiasm than he has heard at other times in this area. The President continued that when we come to supplying small yield weapons for the Infantry and the Marines we are getting into the area of marginal utility. He does not visualize great stockpiles of these weapons around the periphery of the USSR. He pointed out further that our total current megaton capability is estimated so high that if we should employ this quantity of atomic weapons, the fallout from our own weapons could destroy our own country, and indeed the entire Northern Hemisphere. He further expressed the view that we are taking counsel of our fears. He reiterated that we should push atomic weapons

for air defense but be more moderate in development of tactical atomic weapons. He suggested that we indoctrinate ourselves that there is such a thing as common sense. Mr. McElroy agreed and stated that the Department of Defense had fought this line of reasoning when they cut service requests." (Memorandum of Conference with the President by John S.D. Eisenhower; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries) see the Supplement.

51. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, March 4, 1959, 2:30 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Quarles, General Twining, Admiral Sides, Dr. Killian, Dr. Kistiakowsky, Dr. McMillan, Mr. Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster, Major Eisenhower

Dr. Killian said he had asked for this opportunity to present a study by a panel from the Science Advisory Committee,¹ following up on the work of the Technological Capabilities Panel in 1954. He had asked that Defense representatives be present. The purpose of the study was to consider technical aspects of our ballistic missile program, including the warning factor. A first point is that Nike-Zeus cannot become a factor in Defense against missiles before 1964 or 1965. Accordingly, such measures as dispersal, hardening and improved warning and reaction all seem more promising than active defense, at least for the near future. He thought that passive tactics were cheaper than active, and should be a basic element in the protection of our retaliatory force.

He said there is need for greater stability in our missile position and for new principles and concepts to be considered. We need to attain greater assurance of a secure retaliatory capability. Some increase in expenditures may be involved, but the effect of this can be lessened through establishing priorities. Finally, Dr. Killian mentioned that a proposal for hardening, and comment concerning uncertainties, have been in every Science Advisory Committee report.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on March 17.

¹ Killian spoke from "Notes by J.R. Killian, Jr., for Presentation to the President." Macmillan spoke from "An Analysis of Technical Factors in the Strategic Posture of the United States—1956–64," both dated March 4. (Both *ibid.*, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology 1957–1961)

Dr. McMillan then made the presentation of defense of the striking force. A first question is what targets the enemy would have to knock out, and a second, what retaliatory force we could muster if the Soviets were to employ their best capabilities. Analysis shows that our strategic power will be subject to uncertainty in the years ahead, and this fact is likely to lead to instability through proposals for crash changes in the program. He then showed charts on the estimated Soviet missile capability, comparison with U.S. programs, and estimated Soviet strategic needs for missiles (based upon total number of aiming points in the United States). He said he was impressed by the effect of passive measures. For example, hardening to 100 pounds per square inch would require the Soviets to use 200 weapons to destroy one target, as against five weapons against an unprotected target. He then showed what the effect of reasonable hardening would be in multiplying Soviet needs—the effect was to raise them by a factor of 10 to 15.

A second question is what part of our force we could get off the ground under various conditions of warning, it being assumed that the Soviets could deal with our forces overseas. He showed a chart on U.S. retaliatory forces surviving attack in the period 1959–1963.

Dr. McMillan cited uncertainties affecting these estimates. They are greatly dependent upon warning and response readiness. Delay would cost us at the rate of forty aircraft per minute. There is also, however, the problem of Soviet coordination. If they had perfect coordination, they could destroy a large portion of our force; in other words, we offer the Soviets a great premium for good operational coordination. Another uncertainty is as to Soviet air defense—this may be highly effective against our aircraft. All of this emphasizes the importance of reliable warning and quick response time. At the same time we cannot be hasty, because of the consequences, and must reduce the need for extreme haste.

For the protection of U.S. aircraft he proposed: to provide shelter for some of our aircraft; to provide better warning, perhaps including an airborne infra-red system; to provide an automatic bomb alarm system, now planned but not funded; and to increase SAC's ability to take off rapidly. Over the longer term we will be dependent upon protected forces of ICBMs in hardened and dispersed locations; in the present period we should protect our aircraft.

The President commented that we are predicting Soviet missile production for five years. Sometimes he is impelled to look at our difficulties in such production. The Soviets may be having the same. While the presentation gave a range of possible values, still we are assuming that we know what they are going to decide to do. He added that if we ever get to the place where these missiles will rain down out of the skies on the United States, much of what we are planning will be useless anyhow.

He asked what the underground protection for missiles would be like. Mr. Quarles said that a protection to twenty-five pounds per square inch would be achieved by putting the missile on its side and raising it to fire. Protection to 100 pounds per square inch would be achieved in a silo-type hole in the ground. It would probably take the Soviets nine missiles to knock out one site protected to twenty-five pounds per square inch, and twenty-seven against one protected to 100 pounds per square inch. He said the Defense people question Soviet ability to make the firing simultaneous. Mr. Quarles added that we expect to obtain fifteen-minute reaction time with the IRBMs, and even to reduce this in vertically hardened facilities. For solid missiles reaction could be almost instantaneous. Mr. Quarles would recognize, however, that if the Soviets maintain a missile force in this status they could thus have all of them arrive on a fixed schedule. The President next asked how the B-52 and B-58 facilities can be hardened, but there was no detailed discussion other than an indication that this could be done. The President commented that once we have proved out Polaris and know that it works, we ought to consider doubling the number of these because of its concealment and mobility. Dr. Killian agreed that, for dispersal, mobility and concealment, it has great advantages.

Mr. Quarles said that the indications from the study are impressive evidence that something could be done. He thought hardening would be particularly significant. He added that Defense has been considering all of these measures intensively and trying to apply resources in what seems to be the best way.

The President commented that the United States, being on the defensive, must achieve stalemate in one mode of possible combat after another. The Soviets then can shift to other forms. The President commented during the discussion that if we really got into a war we should get off our striking power as quickly as possible.

Dr. Killian said that looking ahead there seemed to be grounds for re-examining the B-70 program, the F-108 program and the nuclear-powered aircraft program in order to put resources where they would have better results. The President agreed, and commented that the presentation stresses the need for hardening dispersal and mobility. General Twining, however, said the Chiefs think it is too late to harden our bomber facilities. Also, it seems to take three or four years to build a dispersal base. They all agreed, however, that it is desirable to harden our missile facilities. Dr. Killian thought there would be great gain in hardening a few SAC bombers on each base. General Twining commented that it would take a long time to clean up and repair runways in case of attack. Dr. Killian replied that it takes a much better hit by the enemy to knock out a runway than an airplane.

The President commented again that when we begin talking of weapons up to certain very great figures, the discussion loses all meaning since we would really be destroying civilization.

Dr. Killian next spoke in favor of a bomb alarm system and General Twining said it will be provided in the FY-60 budget. Dr. Killian said we should move as fast as we can on BMEWS and provide a back-up system. The President agreed that we should do what is vitally necessary, but should give less effort to frills. Dr. Killian also asked that the importance of adding to our numbers of missiles not be overlooked. The President asked when Minuteman would be ready, and Mr. Quarles indicated the end of 1963 by our best estimate. The President said it would be unwise to standardize (i.e., procure in large numbers) earlier missile systems.

General Twining stated strongly that missiles are no better than their launchers. He said that he would not buy additional Atlases, because we would simply buy them to put them in warehouses. He said that Congress, which calls for buying more missiles, fights the military to a standstill on sites for launchers.

Dr. Killian recalled that an additional runway—perhaps a special “take off” runway, would help to get added aircraft in the air, and General Twining said this is being studied.

Finally, the President asked that this information be gotten into the planning staffs for a review to see if priorities have been established so that first things come first. Admiral Sides commented that all of this analysis is extremely dependent upon the estimates provided by intelligence. If any answers could be gotten they could be extremely valuable. Dr. Killian commented that data processing techniques may prove to be of help on intelligence indicators and these are now being examined.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

52. Memorandum of Discussion at the 398th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, March 5, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Item 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security."]

2. *Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies 1958–1959 (NIE 11–4–58) and Estimate of the World Situation (NIE 100–59)*¹ and *Present Trends in Communist China (NIE 13–2–59)*²

(Copies of the briefing note used by Mr. Gray are filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and attached to this Memorandum.)³

(The President joined the meeting in the course of Mr. Allen Dulles's briefing on this subject.)

The Director of Central Intelligence reminded the National Security Council that it was customary in the intelligence community at the end of each calendar year to prepare or revise certain basic Intelligence Estimates, particularly the three which he was summarizing this morning. Thereafter Mr. Dulles summarized and commented on the major conclusions reached in the three National Intelligence Estimates in order, as he said, to provide a basis for Council discussion this morning.

In the course of his remarks on the three Estimates, Mr. Allen Dulles stressed the new assertiveness of the Communist Bloc despite the fact that in the last year Communism had met with certain reverses, particularly in Western Europe. He pointed out that the intelligence community felt that the Communist Bloc had suffered a certain loss of influence in the United Arab Republic, in Burma, and in Argentina. Likewise notable in the last year was the new note of confidence in the Soviet Union based on the country's significant economic and industrial growth, a rate of growth twice as much as that of the U.S. in terms of Gross National Product. In this connection Mr. Dulles also pointed out that the extent of the Soviet defense effort was roughly equal to the U.S. in terms of military hardware and in terms of men under arms.

Mr. Dulles also pointed out that the Soviets would obtain their initial capability with ICBM's sometime in the course of the current year. They have already achieved such a capability with respect to the IRBM. At the

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason.

¹ Dated February 17. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files) See the Supplement.

² Dated February 10. For text of the Conclusions section, see *Foreign Relations, 1958–1960*, vol. XIX, pp. 520–523.

³ See the Supplement.

same time the intelligence community believed that the Soviets would be able to maintain and modernize massive conventional military forces.

Continuing, Mr. Dulles stated that the Estimates indicated in the Calendar Year 1958 that the Sino-Soviet Bloc had tripled the amount of its credits to nations outside the Bloc although the total aid to such nations was still far behind that provided to these nations by the U.S. Obviously the Soviets had a great advantage in their freedom to select the means to achieve their objectives in non-Bloc countries.

The Estimates indicated that the achievement of Communist China in the course of the first year of the "Great Leap Forward" had been remarkable. The Chinese Communists confidently expected to maintain a high growth rate for their economy although the commune program was still a great question mark.

While the intelligence community continued to estimate that the Soviet Union would try to avoid the deliberate provocation of general war the community also noted some increased danger of wars in peripheral areas. At this point Mr. Dulles actually quoted from Paragraph 16 of NIE 100-59 which involved a dissent from the majority of the intelligence community by the Joint Staff (JCS) and the Air Force. Mr. Dulles briefly explained the nature of the disagreement but pointed out that by and large it was really not very great.⁴

Noting that the strength of the Atlantic Community had increased in the past year and that the countries which composed it were still committed to NATO, Mr. Dulles did warn that there were certain countervailing tendencies in the Atlantic Community which could be serious. There was also some questioning in Western Europe of the current NATO strategic concept. There was also the problem of De Gaulle's intransigence and his plan for withdrawing the French Mediterranean Fleet from NATO. The Fleet had not yet actually been withdrawn. Finally in this context there were many Europeans still strongly favoring some form of disengagement in Central Europe. Protagonists of this view were strongest in Germany and especially among the German Socialists although supporters of the view could also be found in the opposition ranks in other Western Governments.

In the underdeveloped countries of the world Mr. Dulles said that the intelligence community, while noting improvements in certain underdeveloped countries, estimated that their overall situation had generally become worse. It seemed quite clear that parliamentary

⁴ Paragraph 16 includes language stating that the "increase of Soviet nuclear capabilities has made the Soviet leaders feel freer to adopt an aggressive posture in peripheral areas, and probably somewhat freer to encourage or instigate armed conflict in these areas, although probably not initially with overt Soviet forces." Footnotes indicate that the Joint Staff and the Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence wanted the sentence to end with the first use of the word "areas," on the grounds that there was no evidence that Soviet leaders were as yet either more willing or more able than previously to risk limited war.

democracy was not an exportable commodity to the underdeveloped nations. After citing specific illustrations Mr. Dulles indicated that this could be a very severe problem for the U.S. to which he himself saw no clear answer. He speculated, however, that the U.S. might well have to reconcile itself to the growth of other systems of government such as Sukarno's "Guided Democracy" in Indonesia.

After touching briefly on the rapid acceleration of nationalist sentiment in black Africa, Mr. Dulles undertook to summarize the situation in one sentence. He stated that the outlook over the next few years was for a heightened aggressiveness in the realm of foreign policy by the Bloc leaders which of course entailed a greater risk of war.

When Mr. Dulles had finished his summary and comments Mr. Gray informed the Council that there had been some disagreement in the Planning Board with respect to the measurements used by the intelligence community in reaching their estimates as to the comparative size of the defense effort being made by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. He described the meeting of the Planning Board with experts from the Central Intelligence Agency on this subject and asked the Director of the Bureau of the Budget whether his questions about the accuracy of the intelligence community's methodology had been satisfactorily answered by the CIA experts. Mr. Stans said that he still entertained some doubts about the arithmetic used by the Central Intelligence Agency in this area but he felt that rather than to discuss this complicated matter here he would address his further questions to the Director of Central Intelligence and members of Mr. Dulles's own staff.

Secretary McElroy pointed out that this particular issue was of very considerable importance in view of the estimated greater increase in defense expenditures by the U.S.S.R. by 1963. Pointing out that such expenditures were estimated to be nearly 50 per cent greater in 1963 than in 1958, Secretary McElroy said that the problem was obviously all the more serious if at the present time we agreed that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are spending approximately equal amounts on their national defense.

After a certain exchange of views on this subject between Mr. Stans and Mr. Allen Dulles, the President intervened to suggest that the subject was not precisely suitable for argument at an NSC meeting and that the two protagonists should get together privately and try to resolve their differences. The President said, however, that he did agree with Secretary McElroy that the issue at stake was a highly important.

At this point Mr. Gordon Gray inquired whether there were any further questions which members of the Council wished to address to Mr. Allen Dulles, particularly with respect to the dissent in NIE 100-59 entered by the Joint Staff and the Air Force with regard to the likelihood of increased peripheral wars. There were no further questions but the President said that he went along with the minority (the Joint Staff and

the Air Force) with respect to this issue. Secretary McElroy said he could not believe that this dissent was a matter of very great importance.

*The National Security Council:*⁵

Noted and discussed the subject National Intelligence Estimates, in the light of summaries thereof by the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. NSC 5904⁶ (NSC 5410/1; NSC 5810/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1077, 1102 and 2039; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 7 and March 3, 1959⁷)

(A copy of the briefing note used by Mr. Gordon Gray to describe NSC 5904 to the Council is included in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum.)⁸

In dealing with the paper Mr. Gray pointed out that there had been no disagreement on the first Objective in NSC 5904 with respect to general war with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This Objective read as follows:

"1. To prevail, and survive as a nation capable of controlling its own destiny."

On the other hand he pointed out that the Objective in Paragraph 2 of NSC 5904 was a subject of considerable disagreement. He read Paragraph 2 as follows:

"2. To reduce, by military and other measures, the capabilities of:

"a. The USSR;

"b. And Communist China [if involved in the hostilities]*⁹

"c. And European Bloc countries [if involved in the hostilities]*

"d. And non-European Bloc countries [if involved in the hostilities]*

to the point where they have lost their will or ability to wage war against the United States and its allies."

"*Defense, Treasury, and JCS propose deletion."

After explaining his understanding of the disagreement among the Planning Board members on the appropriate content of Paragraph 2, Mr. Gray invited the comment of the Acting Secretary of State.

⁵ The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2055, approved by the President on March 12. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

⁶ Entitled "U.S. Policy in the Event of War," dated February 19. (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5904 Series)

⁷ Regarding the January 7 memorandum, see footnote 2, Document 47. The March 3 memorandum encloses a memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, dated March 2, giving the Chiefs' views on NSC 5904. (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1) See the Supplement.

⁸ Dated March 4. For text, see the Supplement.

⁹ All brackets are in the source text.

Secretary Herter pointed out initially that the issue in disagreement appeared both in Paragraph 2 of the *Objectives* and in Paragraph 6 of the *Policy Guidance* of NSC 5904. He said that of course there could be no doubt that in the event of general war with the U.S.S.R. it would be our objective to reduce by the means mentioned above the capabilities of the U.S.S.R. The State Department, however, felt that an automatic decision likewise to reduce by military and other measures the capabilities of Communist China and other Bloc countries would tie the hands of the U.S. in advance and would result in war on Communist China and the Bloc countries might actually take the opportunity of general war to rebel against the U.S. on the side of the Soviet Union. In fact some of these Bloc countries might actually take the opportunity of general war to rebel against Soviet domination in the event of a war in which they are not attacked by the U.S. The same reasoning, continued Secretary Herter, applied to the similar statement in Paragraph 6 of the Policy Guidance.¹⁰

The President immediately expressed disagreement with Secretary Herter and invited him once again to consider carefully what Paragraph 2 actually said. Particularly insofar as Communist China is concerned, the President did not think that Secretary Herter's case for including the bracketed language was at all a good case. If the U.S., said the President, got into a disastrous nuclear war with the Soviet Union and in the course of the war simply ignored Communist China, we would end up in a "hell of a fix." The President added that he was inclined to agree with Secretary Herter that we should not attack the European Bloc countries if they were not involved in the hostilities but this proviso should certainly not apply to Communist China. With respect to Secretary Herter's point that Paragraph 2 without the bracketed language would involve automatic attack on Communist China, the President pointed out that the language in Paragraph 2 stated that we should reduce by military and *other* measures. Accordingly, there was no directive in Paragraph 2 which compelled an automatic military attack on Communist China once the U.S. was involved in general war with the U.S.S.R.

¹⁰ Paragraph 6 reads as follows:

"The United States should utilize all requisite force against selected targets in waging war against:

"a. The USSR;

"b. And Communist China [if involved in the hostilities];

"c. And as necessary European Bloc countries [if involved in the hostilities];

"d. And as necessary non-European Bloc countries [if involved in the hostilities];

"to attain the above objectives."

Footnotes to the text state that the Departments of Defense and the Treasury and the JCS wanted the bracketed portions deleted.

In the same connection Mr. Gray pointed out the significance of the phrase "all requisite forces" which occurred in Paragraph 6. According to Mr. Gray's interpretation, he said, this language in Paragraph 6 indicated that U.S. attack on Communist China or other Sino-Soviet Bloc countries would not be an indiscriminate attack. Mr. Gray also reminded the Council of views expressed on the general subject of U.S. Policy in the Event of General War at earlier Council discussions of the problem. At this earlier meeting a clear distinction had been made between the manner in which we would deal with Communist China in the event of general war and the manner in which we would deal with other European or non-European Bloc countries.

The President indicated that he recalled this distinction and still strongly agreed with it. He said he simply could not envisage the U.S. becoming involved in an all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union while at the same time permitting Communist China to stay on the sidelines and develop, after perhaps forty years, into another Soviet Union.

Secretary Herter said he heartily agreed on this last point but that the question which bothered him was whether we wanted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan now to strike Communist China automatically if the U.S. became involved in a general war with the U.S.S.R.

The President said he saw the problem in this fashion. Our real enemy in the world is International Communism. Communist China was certainly a willing partner in this International Communist grouping thus occupying a different position from the European Bloc countries which had been compelled by the U.S.S.R. to join in the International Communist grouping. The President again repeated his view that even a U.S. attack on Communist China need not necessarily be indiscriminate.

Secretary Herter said that it would be helpful if Defense or the Joint Chiefs could speak to this problem but it still seemed to him that if the bracketed language in Paragraphs 2 and 6 were deleted, the U.S. would automatically hit Communist China in the event that the U.S. became involved in general war with the U.S.S.R. The President still insisted that such a course of action was not automatic and that pressure on China could involve other than military measures.

In responding to Secretary Herter's invitation, General Twining stated that targets in Communist China were certainly on our list for attack in the event of general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. but the question whether we would actually attack these targets in Communist China would depend on circumstances existing at the time. Obviously, however, the U.S. must be *prepared* to attack such targets in Communist China. The President commented that in the event of general war the U.S. would obviously attack its worse enemy first; that is, it would put all the weight of its attack on the U.S.S.R. In illustrating his

point he reminded the Council that in the Second World War Germany was the first priority enemy and Japan the second.

General Twining pointed out that one of the difficult aspects of this problem was our ignorance of what the Soviets would do with regard to Communist China in the event that the Soviets became involved in war against the U.S. We simply had to be prepared for all eventualities. Secretary Herter replied that so far as he could see the issue in question here was whether or not Communist China participated in the war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Turning to General Twining he said that General Twining concluded that Chinese participation with the U.S.S.R. was a virtual certainty. To Secretary Herter, however, it was not absolutely certain.

The President suggested that we assume that a general war has occurred and we have succeeded in defeating Soviet Russia. Throughout the war China has, let us assume, remained quiescent. In this [source text illegible—connection?] the President added that we would certainly take political measures to disarm and remove the threat of Communist China. We simply could not just ignore a Communist China which remained untouched and intact after a terrible war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. To do so would be unrealistic in the extreme.

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget suggested that the dilemma might be solved if the phrase "by military *and* other measures" were changed to read "by military *or* other measures." However, Secretary McElroy stated that such a change would gravely weaken the statement of Objectives and that such a change had been considered in the Department of Defense and had been rejected. After the President had again repeated his argument with respect to the inclusion of Communist China, Secretary McElroy went on to say that in his view the U.S. must be prepared to make use of military measures against Communist China. The President commented that it was virtually certain that in general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Communist China would be an ally of the U.S.S.R. The same could not be said for other Bloc countries but it certainly could be said about Communist China. Agreeing with the President, Secretary McElroy said that while he would greatly prefer to drop all the bracketed language in Paragraphs 2 and 6, he would be willing to settle for retaining the bracketed language as it applies to the Bloc countries other than Communist China.

The President then enunciated clearly the distinction between objectives and tactics in the Council discussion and repeated his views on Communist China. He illustrated his point by reference to the role of Italy in World War I, noting that after an interval, Italy joined with Germany's enemies. He also reiterated the necessity that the policy statement now under consideration should see to it that both the U.S.S.R. *and* Communist China are incapable of further harming the U.S. after the end

of hostilities. The Vice President agreed with the President and said that the U.S. should undertake to see to this by all necessary means. The President continued by stating that the point he was making was the objective of the policy and that the objective was very clear.

Turning to General Twining he indicated that our military plans ought not to indicate that we must hit China in the very first hours and days of the war with the Soviet Union. We should concentrate our initial attacks on the U.S.S.R.

General Twining agreed with the President's last point and said that presumably our intelligence information would tell us what the precise situation was between the U.S.S.R. and Communist China and whether the Soviets had deployed weapons for use against the U.S. in Communist China. He insisted that there was no military intention to strike Communist China at once and automatically in the event of general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

At this point Secretary Herter suggested that the problem of Communist China might be settled to everyone's satisfaction if the phrase "as necessary" were inserted before the words "Communist China" in Paragraphs 2 and 6 and the bracketed language removed. The President said he could perceive no objection to this proposal as regards Paragraph 6 and Secretary McElroy likewise found it acceptable.¹¹

The President then suggested that in his view the countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc other than Communist China actually constituted a weakness for the U.S.S.R. They would like nothing better than to have the opportunity to revolt against the U.S.S.R. if an opportunity were provided by the outbreak of general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Secretary McElroy expressed agreement with this point made by the President but warned of the likelihood that the U.S.S.R. would have created missile batteries and sites within the Bloc countries. Secretary Herter agreed with Secretary McElroy that we would have to destroy such targets in the Bloc countries.

The President referred to our experience in World War II with respect to bombing targets in France even though that country was an enemy of the Axis Powers. He would therefore suggest the inclusion of the term "military targets" in Paragraphs 2-c and 2-d. Obviously while we might have to attack military targets in Poland, the U.S. certainly did not want to fight the Poles as a nation.

Mr. Gray then suggested appropriate language for changing Paragraph 6 to which the Council responded favorably. The President said that he would suggest the elimination of subparagraphs 2-c and 2-d

¹¹Subsequent to the meeting a difference of interpretation arose as to whether the President's approval of the insertion of the phrase "as necessary" applied only to Paragraph 6 or to Paragraphs 2 and 6. The issue will be decided at a subsequent NSC meeting. [Footnote in the source text.]

inasmuch as guidance for the European Bloc and the non-European Bloc countries was covered by Paragraph 6 and also because these countries were under the control of the Soviet Union. General Twining stated that he would just as soon see Paragraphs 2-c and 2-d eliminated because he thought the only real problem was presented by the involvement of Communist China. Both Secretary McElroy and the Vice President agreed in turn with the proposal to drop subparagraphs 2-c and 2-d.

Mr. Gray then read Paragraph 3 as follows:

"3. To render ineffective the control structure by which the enemy regimes have been able to exert ideological and disciplinary authority over their own peoples and over individual citizens or groups of citizens in other countries."

He pointed out that the only change in this paragraph from the statement on the same subject in the previous policy paper consisted of the insertion of the phrase "over their own peoples."

Mr. Gray then read Paragraph 5 as follows:

"5. So far as consistent with the above objectives, to avoid unnecessary destruction and casualties in all countries not involved in the war."

The President asked at once why it had been thought desirable to include the term "unnecessary" in Paragraph 5. Obviously we would avoid unnecessary destruction in the countries not involved in the war. The Council agreed with the President that the word should be deleted.

Mr. Gray then invited the Council's attention to Paragraph 7 reading as follows:

"[7. Since ultimate victory in all-out nuclear war will go to the nation which retains the greater residual power and the greater capacity for quick recovery from nuclear assault, the United States should develop and maintain such a capacity.]**

*** State-OCDM proposal."

He pointed out that there was no particular difference of view in the Planning Board as to the actual substance of Paragraph 7. On the other hand, most of the Planning Board had questioned whether such a paragraph belonged in a policy dealing with what the U.S. should do *after* general war broke out. It seemed to them that retaining residual power and capacity for quick recovery belonged in a policy paper, such as our Basic Policy, which concerned itself with what the U.S. should do prior to the outbreak of war.

The President said that wherever it belonged, he was sure that the substance of Paragraph 7 belonged somewhere in our policy. It seemed perfectly clear to him, he said, that the U.S. must have this kind of residual power and capacity for quick recovery. Governor Hoegh then proposed new and simplified language for Paragraph 7 which he said might

appeal to the Council. His language was "the U.S. should maintain a capacity for quick recovery from nuclear assault."

Secretary Herter said that he and his colleagues were perfectly willing to have the substance of Paragraph 7 contained in our Basic National Security Policy paper. Mr. Gray also expressed the opinion that the Basic Policy was the best place for such a statement although he professed no objection to Governor Hoegh's suggested new language. Mr. Stans said that the Bureau of the Budget believed likewise that the question ought to be debated in a different context from a paper such as this dealing with our policy in the event of war. The President again said he rather liked Governor Hoegh's suggestion and thought it made very good sense. Secretary Herter also approved the language suggested by the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization but suggested that it be included in the section of the paper dealing with Objectives rather than as now set forth, in a section dealing with Policy Guidance. Secretary McElroy agreed with this suggestion of Secretary Herter. Mr. Gray then suggested that Governor Hoegh's proposed new language be inserted as a new Paragraph 6 at the end of the present section entitled Objectives. The President gave his consent to this change and insisted that if the U.S. did not have such a capacity for quick recovery from nuclear assault, the U.S. would have lost the war.

Mr. Gray then read Paragraph 8 as follows:

"8. If, in the course of the hostilities, an enemy country asks the United States for peace terms, the United States should not accept any terms unless they remove the threat to U.S. security posed by such country."

He noted that this paragraph was a new paragraph which had no counterpart in the earlier policy paper on "U.S. Objectives in General War." It was put in, he said, to reflect discussion at the prior Council meeting on the subject of our war objectives. The President expressed the view that the new Paragraph 8 was just about as useful as the fifth wheel on a wagon even though the statements it made were perfectly true. On the other hand, he thought that the inclusion of Paragraph 8 would do no harm. To the President it simply meant, he said, if you get into a fight you try to shoot your enemy before he shoots you. At this point the President also repeated his dislike of the formula and concept of unconditional surrender and Mr. Gray pointed out that Paragraph 8 had been included in part to avoid adherence by the U.S. to a concept of unconditional surrender in a future war.

There being no difficulties about the paragraphs on Post-War Objectives,¹² Mr. Gray asked the Council to turn to Section B of NSC 5904 which set forth Objectives and Policy Guidance for limited war as

¹² Paragraphs 9-12 are identical to paragraphs 9-12 of NSC 5904/1, Document 55.

opposed to general war. He pointed out that the first disagreement in this Section applied to the very title of Section B. The majority preferred the title: "U.S. Policy in the Event of War with a Sino-Soviet Bloc State (or States) other than the USSR*". The JCS preferred the following version on the right hand of the page: "U.S. Policy in the Event of a War in which the USSR does not Participate*." ("*Present U.S. policy is based upon the assumption that any war with the USSR would be general war. The validity of the foregoing assumption is not an issue in this paper, but will be susceptible of re-examination in the course of the review of Basic Policy (NSC 5810/1)."

Mr. Gray pointed out in explanation that the Joint Chiefs felt that the title of Section B proposed by the majority was not wholly acceptable because it did not cover limited wars with states which were not in the Sino-Soviet Bloc as for example a war with Egypt. Mr. Gray said he would come back to the problem of the title later.

With respect to Paragraph 13¹³ Mr. Gray pointed out that the Joint Chiefs had agreed to its deletion and also pointed out that there was no problem with respect to the first three sentences of Paragraph 15 since the Joint Chiefs had likewise withdrawn their proposal for the inclusion of the bracketed language in Paragraph 15 which paragraph Mr. Gray proceeded to read.¹⁴ After explaining to the best of his ability the three different versions of the latter portion of Paragraph 15 as set forth on Page 5, Mr. Gray pointed out that we now had in hand a further alternative which had been agreed to between Defense and the Joint Chiefs and copies of which had just been handed to members of the Council.¹⁵ Mr.

¹³This paragraph reads: "Armed force should be used only for the attainment of established national objectives."

¹⁴The first part of paragraph 15 with the bracketed language reads: "Any decision to commit U.S. forces to war [with any state other than the Soviet Union] should be taken only after full consideration of all factors, including probable Soviet reaction and the risk of general war. The United States should be prepared to utilize all requisite force to attain its objectives. Force will be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid hostilities from broadening into general war."

¹⁵The first alternative version, "Majority Proposal," reads: "However, the objectives may not be fully realizable without causing the USSR to initiate general war. Therefore, it may be in the U.S. interest to terminate hostilities before the objectives are fully achieved." The "JCS Alternative" reads: "Once committed, the clear and immediate danger of general war with the USSR must not deter the United States from taking the actions necessary to achieve its objectives." The "Defense Alternative" reads: "The original objectives, however, may not be fully realized without causing the USSR to initiate general war. Therefore, if during the course of hostilities general war becomes a clear probability, the U.S. will have to decide in the light of the circumstances then existing whether it is in the U.S. interest to pursue its original objectives."

Gray expressed the view that the new Defense-JCS alternative had much to recommend it in comparison with the others.¹⁶

The President said that he was frankly very confused by these differing versions. If we think, he said, of some course of action that is necessary to gain our war objectives and take such action, we would certainly in the course of so doing have considered the possibility that the Soviets would come into the war. We have gone into this course of action with our eyes open and we would certainly have to take the consequences. Citing South Korea as a further example, the President insisted that we could not retreat from our objectives in that area once our forces were actually committed.

In response to the President General Twining defended the new Defense-JCS version of the latter portion of Paragraph 15 (a copy of the Defense-JCS version is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum). General Twining suggested that if in the course of limited hostilities general war with the Soviet Union became clearly probable, we might have to decide to change our objectives in the light of the circumstances existing at the time. The President said that this was all right with him if our purpose was to change our objectives but he was strongly opposed to abandoning our objectives under Soviet pressure, a thought which seemed to him to be suggested by the new Defense-JCS proposal for the latter portion of Paragraph 15. General Twining assured the President that such was not the intent of the new version. Secretary Herter on the other hand suggested the willingness of the State Department to buy the original version of the latter part of Paragraph 15 suggested by the Department of Defense and included on Page 5 of NSC 5904.

Certain suggestions for language were next made by the President who explained them by stating that he was afraid of a war in which we would be sticking our toe into the water and if we found the water cold would pull it out again. Secretary McElroy commented that all the difficulties of trying to reach an agreed version of Paragraph 15 both in the Planning Board and at the Council meeting simply illustrated the difficulty of trying to write policy guidance for limited wars. He queried whether we really wanted or needed or indeed could write a reasonable policy paper on limited wars in view of all the possible combinations and permutations of possible limited wars in the future. In response to Secre-

¹⁶This language reads: "Recognizing that the prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary to defeat local aggression is the best means to keep such hostilities from broadening into general war and that any decision to commit U.S. forces to war would be taken only after consideration of all factors, the United States should, with clear determination, utilize all requisite forces to obtain its objectives. If, however, during the course of hostilities general war becomes a clear probability, the U.S. will have to decide in the light of the circumstances then existing whether it is in the U.S. interest to alter its original objectives."

tary McElroy's point, Mr. Gray stressed that certain members of the Planning Board felt that it was not possible or right to confine ourselves in this paper to problem of general war alone.

General Twining then stated that if the Joint Chiefs could have exactly what they wanted, what they really wished was their own original alternative set forth in NSC 5904. At this point Secretary Herter suggested that perhaps the most sensible solution was to strike all of Paragraph 15 which was in dispute and which appeared on Page 5, contenting ourselves with that portion of Paragraph 15 which appeared on Page 4. Mr. Gray suggested that if the portions of Paragraph 15 on Page 5 were left out, the remainder of the paragraph on Page 4 seemed to him pretty well to cover the situation. Secretary McElroy expressed himself as being extremely happy with this proposal as did Secretary Anderson who said that the guidance in the earlier portion of Paragraph 15 was what was going to happen anyway. Secretary Herter, however, expressed some concern as to whether his suggestion would mean that we would pursue our objectives "come hell or high water." Would there be a danger of tying the President's hands? The Vice President did not think so in view of the statement in the earlier part of Paragraph 15 as to the risk of general war. The President finally stated that he was willing to delete that portion of Paragraph 15 which was set forth on Page 5 of NSC 5904. To Secretary Herter's expression of concern about the view which historians might later take if this paper seemed to tie the President's hands, the President said that he was not concerned and again suggested the deletion of the language on Page 5.

Mr. Gray then reverted to the problem of the title of Section B which he had stated earlier he would have to come back to. He again repeated the anxiety of the Joint Chiefs that the majority title was too restricted and deprived the military of policy guidance to be followed in the event of hostilities with countries which were not members of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. After a brief discussion Secretary Herter agreed with the version of the title to Section B which was proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

*The National Security Council:*¹⁷

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject, contained in NSC 5904, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 2039-b and in the light of the discussion at the 394th NSC Meeting; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 3, 1959.

b. Tentatively adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5904, subject to certain amendments.

¹⁷ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2056, approved by the President on March 12. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

Note: Subsequent to this Council meeting, the Departments of State and Defense proposed further revisions in the draft statement of policy in NSC 5904 of a substantive nature which had not been discussed at this meeting. The President, after reviewing these proposals, authorized further consideration at the next Council meeting of NSC 5904 as tentatively adopted in b above, in the light of the State and Defense proposed revisions.

[Here follows a brief note about a special meeting the President held with the NSC about Germany, immediately after this meeting.]

S. Everett Gleason

53. Editorial Note

During a meeting on March 9, 1959, with Secretary McElroy, Under Secretary Murphy, General Twining, General LeMay, and other officials to discuss airborne alert exercises and additional means of securing the SAC from attack, the President commented on proposals for continuous alert:

"The President now turned to a political question which is of some concern to him. In the light of the pressures from Congress to maintain an 'airborne alert,' the President dislikes that name. He is concerned over the possibility that once this exercise is conducted, it will establish a requirement for its continuance; and the implication will be that at the end of the test we will no longer be alert. The President pointed out his mentioning in press conference that a continuous airborne alert may become essential during certain phases of the missile age, but it is *not* essential now. He therefore desires that a training name be placed on this exercise, in order to alleviate the effect of possible leaks. A training name would emphasize that we are only preparing to do what we need to do in the future. Mr. McElroy pointed out that this will go under the code name of Headstart II; but this did not satisfy the President in itself. He desired that we have a name in case we are asked for a description of this exercise. Mr. McElroy voiced his agreement that there is no current military need for an airborne alert." (Memorandum of Conference by Goodpaster; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries) The full text is in the Supplement.

54. Memorandum of Discussion at the 399th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, March 12, 1959.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. NSC 5904 (NSC 5410/1; NSC 5810/1; NSC 5904; NSC Actions Nos. 1077, 1102, 2039 and 2056; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary dated January 7 and March 3, 9 and 10, 1959¹)

Mr. Gray explained that after discussion of the draft report on "U.S. Policy in the Event of War" (NSC 5904) at the Council meeting last week (March 5), the usual Draft Record of Action was circulated to the Planning Board for checking with each of their principals. In commenting upon the Draft Record the State and Defense Departments proposed certain revisions. Because of the importance of the subject, the President had authorized further consideration of these revisions by the Council as a whole at this morning's meeting.

Using the enclosure to the Memorandum of March 9, 1959, a copy of which is attached to this Memorandum, Mr. Gray pointed out that the first proposal for a change in the prior text of NSC 5904 came from the Department of State which desired to omit the phrase "with the Sino-Soviet Bloc" so that the title of Section A would read simply: "U.S. Policy in the Event of General War." Mr. Gray explained that the State position on the title, as he understood it, was that general war with the U.S.S.R. would not necessarily mean general war with Communist China and that the assumption should not be made in the title. On the other hand Mr. Gray pointed out that this involved one of the most fundamental issues in NSC 5904 and that it had been his view that the two previous Council meetings gave clear guidance to the effect that in a general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., Communist China would inevitably be involved.

The President commented that as he understood the previous Council guidance, the U.S. would attack Communist China in the event of general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., only as necessary. The President said he agreed that the U.S. would have to be prepared to attack Communist China in the event of general war with the U.S.S.R. but would not automatically attack Communist China if that country could be isolated from the hostilities. As a historical precedent for this

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason.

¹ The March 9 memorandum enclosed a redraft of NSC 5904. A copy is attached but not printed. The March 10 memorandum has not been found.

position, the President cited the fact of the long delay before the Soviet Union finally declared war and attacked Japan in World War II.

Mr. Gray pointed out his understanding that the language "as necessary" with respect to a U.S. attack on Communist China had been inserted at the Council's direction in the text of Paragraph 7² which provided the Policy Guidance. The words "as necessary" may perhaps also have been suggested for inclusion in Paragraph 2³ of the Objectives although this was another point which was in dispute and where there was a difference of recollection as to whether the Council had agreed on the insertion in Paragraph 2. Indeed this was one of the splits which must be resolved.

The President said that it was his memory of the discussion of the problem of what the U.S. would do in the event of general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. that the Council had decided to put the nations of the European Soviet Bloc in a special category. Selected targets in these European Bloc nations might have to be hit but we hoped to be able to avoid doing any more damage than necessary.

Mr. Gray then stated that it was his understanding that the Department of Defense would go along with the proposal of the State Department to change the title of Section A of NSC 5904 but that the Defense Department could not agree to the insertion of the words "as necessary" in Paragraph 2 of the Objectives. Secretary McElroy confirmed Mr. Gray's understanding and explained the position of the Defense Department that the objectives should be to reduce the capabilities of Communist China to wage war against the U.S. and its allies but that a distinction should be made between the treatment accorded to Communist China and the treatment accorded to the U.S.S.R. in the event of general war.

Secretary Herter said that the State Department was prepared to accept the elimination of the words "as necessary" from Paragraph 2 if it was made crystal clear elsewhere in the paper that in the event of general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the U.S. would not automatically attack Communist China.

The President commented that our overall objective with respect to Communist China in the event of such a general war was to assure ourselves that we would not be in a situation of being attacked afresh by Communist China after we had defeated the Soviet Union in a general war. With respect to targets the President said he assumed that the targets we attacked would always be selected and not indiscriminate.

² Paragraph 7 is quoted in full in the text of this memorandum of discussion.

³ This paragraph reads: "To reduce, by military and other measures, the capabilities of the USSR and *as necessary* Communist China to the point where they have lost their will and ability to wage war against the United States and its allies." A footnote identifies the italicized phrase as "State proposal."

Secretary Herter repeated again his concern that NSC 5904 should not seem to indicate that a U.S. attack on Communist China would be automatic. He said that he was willing to see the words “as necessary” dropped from Paragraph 2 if Paragraph 7, where it had been agreed that these two words should be inserted, also stated that it was to be the controlling Policy Guidance. Mr. Gray suggested the wording of a footnote which would make clear that Paragraph 7 was indeed the controlling Policy Guidance and Secretary McElroy suggested that this language be placed in a footnote to Paragraph 7. The President gave his approval to this solution.

Mr. Gray then invited the attention of the Council to the additional change the State Department was now proposing to Paragraph 7 reading as follows:

“7. The United States should utilize all requisite force against selected targets in the USSR [;]*⁴ and as necessary in Communist China [European Bloc and non-European Bloc countries;]* to attain the above objectives. *Military targets in other Bloc countries will be attacked as necessary. It is assumed that the peoples of these countries are not responsible for the acts of their governments and accordingly so far as consistent with military objectives military action against these countries should avoid non-military destruction and casualties.**

“*State proposals.”

Mr. Gray pointed out that the State Department wished to add the underlined language to Paragraph 7 because it desired to make a distinction between the application of “all requisite force” against targets in the U.S.S.R., Communist China, and other Bloc countries.

With respect to the underlined language the President observed that it contained a view which he had himself stated and which he meant but he was not clear that the statement had to be included in the Policy Guidance.

Mr. Gray pointed out that there was another issue not so apparent to the naked eye which was involved in the bracketed language in Paragraph 7 which the State Department proposed that we should delete. Mr. Gray explained that if the language in brackets was left in the paragraph as the Department of Defense desired, it would provide the basis for action to carry out Paragraph 3 of the Objectives⁵ because it would permit the U.S. to destroy the puppet regimes in the Bloc countries by force if necessary. On the other hand, if the bracketed language was left out as

⁴ All brackets are in the source text.

⁵ This paragraph reads: “To render ineffective the control structure by which the enemy regimes have been able to exert ideological and disciplinary authority over their own peoples and over individual citizens or groups of citizens in other countries.”

the State Department desired, no Policy Guidance would be provided as to the destruction of the puppet regimes in the Bloc states.

Secretary Herter countered with the argument that the guidance which Defense sought, in this context, was actually provided in the next sentence which if the underlined language were accepted would read: "Limited targets in other Bloc countries will be attacked as necessary." The President said that he could not understand why if it was agreed to put in this particular sentence the State Department would also wish to delete the bracketed language. Secretary Herter then agreed to the inclusion of the language in brackets. It was then proposed to change the first of the underlined additional sentences to read as follows: "Military targets in Bloc countries other than the U.S.S.R. and Communist China will be attacked as necessary."

Secretary McElroy thought that the inclusion of this statement was redundant if the bracketed language were included. The President however said that he thought this was not case although perhaps the additional language proposed by the State Department to be added to Paragraph 7 was the result of some excess of caution. The President then suggested that perhaps this cautionary language could be inserted as a footnote or as a parenthetical note in the text. Secretary McElroy thought this to be a distinct improvement because after all what we were dealing with was an assumption and so described in the proposed text. The Council thereupon agreed to this solution.

Mr. Gray then invited the Council's attention to the last split view; namely, Paragraph 14 in Section B.⁶ He recalled that there had been a considerable number of versions proposed for acceptance as the Policy Guidance in Paragraph 14.⁷ Secretary Herter indicated that he had yet another version of Paragraph 14 which he would like the Council to look at and which read as follows:

"14. The United States should be prepared to utilize such force as is requisite to attain its objectives. If during the course of hostilities general war becomes a clear probability, the U.S. will have to decide in the light of the circumstances then existing whether it is in the U.S. interest to alter its original objectives."

After a short conference between Secretary Herter and Secretary McElroy, the latter stated that the language of this version proposed by the State Department appeared quite acceptable both to the Defense

⁶ This paragraph reads: "The United States should be prepared to utilize all requisite force to attain its objectives. Any decision to commit U.S. forces to war should be taken only after full consideration of all factors, including probable Soviet reaction and the risk of general war. [Force will be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid hostilities from broadening into general war.] A footnote states that the Department of Defense and JCS proposed deletion of the bracketed portion.

⁷ Reference is to paragraph 15 in the previous version of NSC 5904; see Document 52.

Department and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President said that the proposed language was also acceptable to him but warned that we could not make too many detailed military plans in advance of a war.

Mr. Gray then stated that he understood that the shorter version for the title of Section A had also been approved. There was no contrary view.

At this point General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were worried about the present title of Section B reading as follows: "U.S. Policy in the Event of War in which the U.S.S.R. does not Participate." In view of the kind of assistance and participation which the U.S.S.R. could actually offer without necessarily participating as a belligerent, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would suggest the desirability of changing the title to read: "U.S. Policy in the Event of a War in which the U.S.S.R. does not Participate as a Belligerent."

Secretary Herter stated that this proposal involved no difficulty for the State Department. The President also agreed to the change in a slightly modified form.

*The National Security Council:*⁸

a. Discussed the statement of policy contained in NSC 5904, as revised in the last Council meeting; in the light of the suggestions proposed subsequently by the Departments of State and Defense as indicated in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of March 9, 1959.

b. Adopted the draft statement of policy in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of March 9, 1959, subject to the following amendments:

(1) *Page 1, title of Section A:* Delete the bracketed words and the footnotes thereto.

(2) *Page 1, paragraph 2:* Delete the underlined words "as necessary" and the footnote thereto.

(3) *Page 2, paragraph 7:* Revise to read as follows:

"*7. The United States should utilize all requisite force against selected targets in the USSR—and as necessary in Communist China, European Bloc and non-European Bloc countries—to attain the above objectives. Military targets in Bloc countries other than the USSR and Communist China will be attacked as necessary. (*Note:* It is assumed that the peoples of the Bloc countries other than the USSR and Communist China are not responsible for the acts of their governments and accordingly so far as consistent with military objectives military action against these countries should avoid non-military destruction and casualties.)

"*Paragraph 7 contains the controlling policy guidance with respect to military action to attain the foregoing objectives."

⁸ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2057, approved by the President on March 12. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

(4) Page 4, title to Section B: Reword as follows: "U.S. Policy in the Event of a War in Which the USSR Is Not a Belligerent*"

(5) Page 4, paragraph 14: Revise to read as follows:

"Policy Guidance

"14. The United States should be prepared to utilize such force as is requisite to attain its objectives. If during the course of hostilities general war becomes a clear probability, the United States will have to decide in the light of the circumstances then existing whether it is in the U.S. interest to alter its original objectives."

Note: The statement of policy, as adopted in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5904/1 as a planning guide for all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, subject to the understanding that it will be reviewed annually.

[Here follow Agenda Items 3. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," and 4. "Problems Illustrated by Recent Developments in the Near East and the Taiwan Strait."]

S. Everett Gleason

55. National Security Council Report

NSC 5904/1

Washington, March 17, 1959.

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY IN THE EVENT OF WAR

REFERENCES

- A. NSC 5410/1
- B. Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject: "Basic Military Planning Concept to Govern Planning and Development of the Mobilization Base", dated March 1, 1957¹
- C. NSC 5810/1
- D. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Review of NSC 5410/1", dated January 7, 1959

Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5904 Series. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. A cover sheet is not printed.

¹ This memorandum enclosed a memorandum dated February 25, 1957, from Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson to Lay. For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. XIX, pp. 419-424.

E. NSC Action No. 2039

F. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "NSC 5904", dated March 3 and 9, 1959

G. NSC Action No. 2056

H. NSC 5904

I. NSC Action No. 2057

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Acting Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, at the 398th and 399th NSC Meetings on March 5 and 12, 1959, adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5904, as amended by NSC Actions Nos. 2056-b and 2057-b.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5904, as adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5904/1; and directed its use as a planning guide by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, subject to the understanding that it will be reviewed annually.

The enclosed statement of policy, as adopted and approved, supercedes NSC 5410/1.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosure, and that access to it be strictly limited on a need-to-know basis.

James S. Lay, Jr.²

Enclosure

STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY IN THE EVENT OF WAR

Section A: U.S. Policy in the Event of General War

Special Note: This section of the policy statement addresses itself only to the contingency of *general war*; it does not apply to situations of local aggression or so-called "limited war".

Objectives

1. To prevail, and survive as a nation capable of controlling its own destiny.
2. To reduce, by military and other measures, the capabilities of the USSR and Communist China to the point where they have lost their will and ability to wage war against the United States and its allies.

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

3. To render ineffective the control structure by which the enemy regimes have been able to exert ideological and disciplinary authority over their own peoples and over individual citizens or groups of citizens in other countries.

4. To preserve and retain as many of our allies as possible.

5. So far as consistent with the above objectives, to avoid destruction and casualties in all countries not involved in war.

6. To retain in the United States a capacity for quick recovery from nuclear assault.

Policy Guidance

7.³ The United States should utilize all requisite force against selected targets in the USSR—and as necessary in Communist China, European Bloc and non-European Bloc countries—to attain the above objectives. Military targets in Bloc countries other than the USSR and Communist China will be attacked as necessary. (*Note: It is assumed that the peoples of the Bloc countries other than the USSR and Communist China are not responsible for the acts of their governments and accordingly so far as consistent with military objectives military action against these countries should avoid non-military destruction and casualties.*)

8. If, in the course of the hostilities, an enemy country asks the United States for peace terms, the United States should not accept any terms unless they remove the threat to U.S. security posed by such country.

Post-War Objectives

9. To prevent, so far as practicable, the formation or retention after the war of military power in potentially hostile states sufficient to threaten the security of the United States.

10. To seek the eventual establishment in nations of the Sino-Soviet Bloc of friendly governments founded upon broad-based, popular support.

11. To maintain after the cessation of hostilities sufficient U.S. and allied military strength to deter aggression and to accomplish other post-war objectives.

12. To establish effective international arrangements for the preservation of peace.

³ Paragraph 7 contains the controlling policy guidance with respect to military action to attain the foregoing objectives. [Footnote in the source text.]

Section B: U.S. Policy in the Event of a War in Which the USSR
is Not a Belligerent⁴

Objectives

13. To reduce, by military and other measures, the capabilities of the enemy to the point where it has lost its will or ability to wage war against the United States and its allies.

Policy Guidance

14. The United States should be prepared to utilize such force as is requisite to attain its objectives. If during the course of hostilities general war becomes a clear probability, the United States will have to decide in the light of the circumstances then existing whether it is in the U.S. interest to alter its original objectives.

⁴ Present U.S. policy is based upon the assumption that any war with the USSR would be general war. The validity of the foregoing assumption is not an issue in this paper, but will be susceptible of re-examination in the course of review of basic policy (NSC 5810/1). [Footnote in the source text. This footnote was later deleted; see Document 95.]

**56. Memorandum of Discussion at the 406th Meeting of the
National Security Council**

Washington, May 13, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Item 1. "Western European Dependence on Middle East Petroleum."]

2. *Priorities for Ballistic Missiles and Space Programs* (NSC Actions Nos. 1846, 1941, 1956 and 2013;¹ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 7, 1959²)

Mr. Gray presented this subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.)³

Secretary Dillon called attention to NSC Action 1956 which requires Presidential approval before the launching of any satellite capable of reconnaissance over the U.S.S.R., and asked whether Action 1956 would be affected by the proposed action on priorities for ballistic missiles and space programs. The President said NSC Action 1956 would not be affected; and Mr. Gray indicated that the Record of Action would make this point clear.

Secretary McElroy said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recently recommended that the Council consider adding other defense programs, notably Minuteman, to the priority list. He had heretofore resisted lengthening the priority list but was now about convinced that Minuteman should be included even though it was not a space program.

The President pointed out that the action the Council was about to adopt included defense programs as well as space programs. He said that the purpose of the action was to determine programs which have equal claims on scarce resources. If a program is being conducted for psychological reasons only, we must look at it with a jaundiced eye. On the other hand, we cannot pretend that we are not going to press forward rapidly on certain programs which have primarily psychological purposes; e.g., "man in space."

In response to a question from Mr. Gray, Secretary McElroy said he thought he would recommend that Minuteman should be an additional priority item, but he was not quite ready to bring the matter before the Council at this meeting.

¹ Regarding NSC Action No. 1846, see footnote 2, Document 5. Regarding NSC Action No. 1941, see footnote 1, Document 32. In NSC Action No. 1956, taken July 31, 1958, and approved by the President on August 4, the NSC noted Presidential approval for planning purposes of the advanced reconnaissance satellite program presented by the Department of Defense. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) The text of NSC Action No. 1956 is included in the memorandum of discussion at the NSC meeting held July 31, 1958. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) For text, see the Supplement. Regarding NSC Action No. 2013, see footnote 6, Document 41.

² Not found.

³ This note states that in March 1959, the Department of Defense had recommended removal of Vanguard-Jupiter C programs from, and addition of the Sentry, Discoverer, and Mercury programs to, the priority list adopted in NSC Action No. 1846, and had also recommended that henceforth changes in priorities for space programs be made by the President on advice of the NASC. According to the note, the President had approved these changes on advice of the NASC on April 27, 1959. See the Supplement.

The President wondered if missile bases could not be simplified when Minuteman became operational. He had been told that Titan bases cost \$80 million each and asked if this figure was correct. Dr. York⁴ replied in the affirmative. The President said that if possible we should save money on the launching bases and put the money thus saved into the missile itself. We must cut the cost of our missile programs or go broke. He wondered whether Minuteman would simplify the base complexes very materially. Secretary McElroy said the hardened Titan launching sites require an incredibly complex construction, particularly for storage of the missile fuel. Minuteman on the other hand has the fuel in the missile at all times. It was the intention of the Defense Department to press forward on the development of Minuteman. He pointed out, however, that any development policy on ICBM's was contingent on the possibility of a rapid development of the second generation missile.

The President felt that the development of storable liquid fuels would be a great advantage. The best scientific brains should be at work on how to handle liquid fuel without building such expensive bases, pending the development of solid fuels.

*The National Security Council:*⁵

a. Noted and discussed the memorandum on the subject by the Acting Secretary, National Aeronautics and Space Council, transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 7, 1959.

b. Noted that the President has established the following programs as having the highest priority above all others for research and development and for achieving operational capability; scope of the operational capability to be approved by the President:

(Order of listing does not indicate priority of one program over another)

- (1) Atlas (ICBM) Weapon System.
- (2) Titan (ICBM) Weapon System.
- (3) Thor–Jupiter (IRBM) Weapon Systems.
- (4) Polaris (FBM) Weapon System.
- (5) Anti-missile missile defense weapon system, including active defense and related early warning for defense of the United States proper.
- (6) Space programs determined by the President on advice of the National Aeronautics and Space Council to have objectives having key political, scientific, psychological or military import.

⁴ Dr. Herbert F. York, Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

⁵ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2081, approved by the President on May 18. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

c. Noted that the President has designated the following projects under the category specified in b-(6) above:

Sentry (Satellite-borne visual and ferret reconnaissance system).
Discoverer (satellite guidance and recovery).
Mercury (manned satellite).

d. Noted that the actions in b and c above did not change the requirement contained in NSC Action No. 1956-b for Presidential authorization with respect to the launching of development satellites capable of reconnaissance over the USSR and the subsequent scope of the operational capability of the advanced reconnaissance satellite program.

e. Noted the statement by the President that all feasible efforts should be made to reduce the costs of the liquid fuel ICBM weapon systems, especially the costs of bases.

Note: The above actions, as approved by the President to supersede NSC Action No. 1846, subsequently circulated for the information of the National Security Council, and referred to the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration for appropriate implementation.

[Here follow Agenda Items 3. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," 4. "U.S. Policy Toward Korea," and 5. "U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of China."]

Marion W. Boggs

57. Editorial Note

During the National Security Council meeting on May 28, 1959, President Eisenhower raised the subjects of air defense and military organization:

"The President before leaving the Council meeting to join with the Foreign Ministers said that he had one important question he wished to put to the 'Defense Department people.' He said that he was increasingly upset by the vehemence of the fight between the advocates of the Nike missile and the advocates of the BOMARC. Why, asked the President, do we have to have two armed services of the U.S. shooting two different ground-to-air missiles? This is not a question which has been neglected in the past. Former Secretary of Defense Wilson had said that we had

gone so far down the road in procurement of these two kinds of missiles that we would have to leave the matter up to the Services. This did not mean to him, said the President, that each of two Services must have its own special ground-to-air missile. Moreover, if the two Services insist on using and firing two different kinds of ground-to-air missiles, it seemed to the President that we were violating all that this Administration had ever said about integrated control in the Armed Services.

"The President added that in any case he would certainly like to see a memorandum of the reasons why we must continue along the line that we seem wedded to. Secretary McElroy replied that he had given much thought to this problem since he had come back from Geneva.

"The President said that he had one other thing which very greatly disturbed him. This, he said, was the obvious lessening of what he called the authority of the corporate conclusions of the Military Services. This tendency seemed to the President very destructive of the respect due to the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary McElroy replied that what we were faced with in this particular matter was how to manage Congressional hearings which played up differences. This problem had to be straightened out if the tendency which disturbed the President so greatly was to be avoided in the future.

"The President replied that he doubted the possibility of getting the committees of Congress to change their ways if they could see a partisan advantage in continuing along the present line. To this Secretary McElroy answered that if the President were right, we could only have recourse to insisting that military people testifying before Congress keep their mouths shut when asked for an expression of their private opinions. We would of course take a heavy rap if we were to undertake to do this.

"The President insisted that in his view every military man should support the final decision of those in positions of authority after he has had the opportunity to state his own personal views. Such a procedure as this was the essential basis on which a military staff successfully operated. Suppose, asked the President, we were actually in a state of war and all these differences of opinion and challenges to authority were being aired?" (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

The President's statement about rejoining the Foreign Ministers refers to meetings he held following funeral services for former Secretary Dulles in Washington on May 27. The Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France convened on May 11, but recessed for 2 days to permit the Ministers to attend the funeral.

58. Editorial Note

During the National Security Council meeting on June 4, 1959, Allen Dulles reported on Soviet weapons developments:

"The Director of Central Intelligence said that he would comment first on certain developments relating to the Soviet guided missiles program. On May 30 the Soviets had launched another vehicle from Tyura Tam. There were several unique features in this launching and it had been difficult to state the precise purpose of it. We think, however, that the launching was of another successful ICBM with a much longer range—perhaps somewhere between 4000 and 5500 nautical miles. If so, this would constitute the first test firing of a Soviet ICBM with a range beyond 3500 nautical miles. Such a development was of course not unanticipated.

"In connection with the Soviet program for outer space exploration, Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that the 8th of June would be the best date for a probe of the Planet Venus for the next two years. The Soviets may try a Venus probe on this date although we have no direct evidence of an intention to do so.

"Mr. Dulles then turned to the current estimate of the intelligence community with respect to Soviet aircraft production. He noted that in the first quarter of 1959 Soviet production of heavy bombers was marked by a very low level of activity. The majority opinion in the intelligence community thinks that the production of Bisons has fallen to about one a month although the Air Force believes that the production was two a month. In any event the total of heavy bombers of the Bison type would be in the range of about 100. It was extremely difficult to state the reasons why production was so low.

"Meanwhile, there was some evidence that certain of the Bison aircraft had lately been improved both as to altitude and range capabilities. It was estimated that there were about twelve of such improved Bisons in operational units. With one refueling such improved Bisons would be able to make two-way flights from the Soviet Union to the U.S. and back.

"With respect to the Bear turbo-prop heavy bomber production had ceased early in 1957. The total production of this bomber was estimated at between 50 and 60 aircraft.

"As for the Badger—the B-47 type—which was the backbone of the Soviet Air Force, such aircraft were capable only of one-way 'suicide' missions to the U.S. Production of the Badger had apparently virtually ceased and it was estimated that the total number of Badgers produced in the U.S.S.R. to date was between 1800 and 1900.

"The only large new bomber under development in the Soviet Union was the so-called Bounder. This was a supersonic bomber. Mr.

Dulles said that we had estimated that this program would be ready for flight test in January 1959. However, we had as yet no evidence of a test flight.

"The President inquired whether the Bounder was an aircraft on the order of our B-58? Mr. Dulles replied in the affirmative and added that there was some disagreement in the intelligence community as to whether this new aircraft would be nuclear-powered or powered by some new chemical.

"In summary Mr. Dulles pointed out that we believed that for the next year or two Soviet-manned bomber capabilities against the U.S. would remain substantially unchanged.

"Turning to developments in the Soviet submarine program, Mr. Dulles reported that on May 29 the U.S. Navy submarines had made sonar contact with a Soviet submarine between Iceland and Scotland. The Soviet submarine [1 line of source text not declassified] when it had surfaced had been photographed from U.S. aircraft. It had been identified as Z-Class Submarine #82. It was thought possible that it was equipped to fire guided missiles." (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) The NSC also discussed "Effects of U.S. Import Trade Policy on National Security;" see the Supplement.

At the NSC meeting on June 18, Dulles reported that the Soviets had launched another ICBM on June 9 and that they were placing more and more emphasis on new types of submarines, one of which was probably nuclear-powered and at least one of which might be equipped to fire missiles. (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason; *ibid.*)

59. Memorandum of Conference

Washington, June 9, 1959, 3 p.m.

1. Present in addition to the President were: the Vice President, Acting Secretary Dillon, Secretary McElroy, Deputy Secretary Gates, Budget Director Stans, General Lemnitzer, Admiral Burke, General White, Mr.

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. The meeting was held in the President's office. A more extensive record of this meeting, prepared by Goodpaster on June 10, and Goodpaster's June 9 record of Killian's briefing of Gray and the President on air defense on June 8, are *ibid.*, Staff Secretary Records. Both are in the Supplement.

Holiday, General Persons, Dr. Killian, Mr. Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster.

2. The following summarizes actions taken, and policy positions indicated by the President:

a. The President indicated broad approval of the following programs and planning proposals:

1. Nike—Continue on a buy-out basis; deploy at sites presently programmed plus certain additional SAC bases.

2. BOMARC—Continue BOMARC A on a buy-out basis; continue BOMARC B on a minimum basis for deployment on the eastern, northern and western segments of the U.S. periphery.

3. SAGE—Strengthen to “high grade” SAGE on the above periphery (cost estimated roughly at \$250 million). Cut back to minimum capability SAGE in interior areas.

4. Nike-Zeus—Acceleration through an additional \$150 million under consideration.

b. The above changes are being made because, beyond the point these programs will reach, additions would not be very useful; the threat from Soviet bombers has changed with the reduced estimates of numbers of bombers, and because Soviet long-range missiles are becoming the dominant threat.

c. While adoption of these changes logically tends to imply a firmer commitment to these programs beyond FY-60, it is to be understood that these programs are not frozen. Beyond FY-60, the programs should not be expressed as specific amounts for specific years, but rather as trends. Decisions on future budgetary authorizations are to be left open, and it is to be pointed out that the Administration will continue to watch developments and adjust accordingly.

d. Present action on these proposals is not to prejudice the full study of air defense now under way at the President’s request pursuant to action by Gordon Gray. Hardening, concealment, and future role of interceptors are to be included. There is question concerning the F-108; the decision is open at the present time.

e. Continental U.S. air defense forces are to be under a single, strong operational command; this unified command is to have full command authority.

f. The Canadians are to be asked (through an approach by Mr. McElroy to the Canadian Defense Minister)—without being pressured—whether they would wish to have the deployment of the northern tier of BOMARC bases moved several hundred miles north, i.e., up into Can-

ada, so as to give them increased air defense protection against aircraft attacks from the north.

A. J. Goodpaster¹
Brigadier General, USA

¹ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

60. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, June 24, 1959.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary McElroy, General Loper, Dr. George E. Pugh, Vice Admiral John H. Sides, Dr. Charles A. Boyd, Col. Charles Stewart, Chairman McCone, General Starbird, Dr. Dunning, Mr. Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster

Mr. Gray said the group had come together to give the President an oral report in response to a question the President had asked some weeks ago—what would be the effects if the United States and the Soviets were to expend their atomic stockpiles on each other. Dr. Pugh¹ began, with a presentation based upon reciprocal attacks aggregating some 10,000 megatons. The immediate effects in the two target countries would be tremendous, generally in accord with the findings of previous presentations on this subject. Losses would be cut in half by making use of the best available shelter existing today, as against being caught wholly unprepared. There would be subsequent effects lasting for varying periods of time up to thirty or forty years in some locations, the total magnitude of which would be of some small fraction (1/10 to 1/4) of the initial losses. In allied territories also attacked the pattern would be similar. In “fringe areas” the initial effects would vary, depending on wind conditions and upon special measures of restraint as to size and number of weapons detonated in target areas nearby; by observance of measures of restraint,

Source: Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Executive Secretary’s Subject File. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.

¹ Of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Department of Defense.

losses of an initial character in these areas could be kept almost negligible in relation to the losses in the target areas. As to long-term effects, world-wide, these would be extremely small in relation to initial losses in the target areas, and in fact would be only a small fraction of natural radiation effects on the human race now being experienced.²

Dr. Dunning of the AEC followed up with a briefing oriented more specifically to the medical aspects. The gist of his presentation was also that effects outside the target areas, even for attacks of these magnitudes, would be extremely small in relation to the losses within the target areas. He pointed out that the long-term effects would be felt to a very large extent within the band of the Northern hemisphere between 30-60° north latitude.

There was brief discussion after the presentation. The President recalled that his request in response to which this study had been made was as a result of last October's tests, which resulted in localized fall-out in the Minnesota area which doubled the expected strontium dose. This raised the question in his mind of what might be the possible consequences of the world-wide fall-out in the case of a full-scale atomic attack.

Dr. Dunning said that no wheat or milk in the area affected had to be destroyed. The localized concentrations occurred when fall-out clouds ran into rain storms which deposited the material. He repeated that, in case of all-out warfare, the world-wide effects of fall-out would be infinitesimal in relation to the losses occasioned in the target areas.

A. J. Goodpaster³
Brigadier General, USA

² A text of Dr. Pugh's briefing, entitled "The Effects of Radioactive Fallout in Nuclear War," dated June 24, is in the Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Executive Secretary's Subject File.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

61. Memorandum of Discussion at the 411th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, June 25, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Items 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," and 2. "U.S. Policy Toward Korea."]

3. *Basic National Security Policy* (NSC 5810/1; NIE 11–4–58; NIE 100–59; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Overseas Internal Security Program", dated April 10, 1959;¹ NSC Action No. 2079;² Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Status of Military Mobilization Base Program", dated April 21, 1959;³ NSC 5906;⁴ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Basic National Security Policy", dated June 19, 1959⁵)

As the Council turned to consideration of the proposed new statement of Basic National Security Policy, Secretary Mueller from the Department of Commerce joined the meeting. Mr. Gray then briefed the Council on the general background of the Planning Board's work on revising the Basic Policy and indicated that on this occasion any discussion in the Council of the military paragraphs (Paragraphs 10 through 28) would be omitted. These paragraphs would be taken up at a subsequent Council meeting on the subject of Basic Policy. (A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.)⁶

Mr. Gray first invited the Council's attention to the Preamble on Page 1 of NSC 5906.⁷ He pointed out that some of the consultants who had given their views to the Planning Board felt that there should be a reference to Justice or to the Rule of Law in the Preamble. The President said that he supposed that all speeches made by the State Department officials or high officials of our Government invariably spoke of the U.S.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason.

¹ Drafted by Charles A. Haskins of the NSC Staff. (*Ibid.*)

² NSC Action No. 2079 was approved by the President on May 18. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) The text is in the memorandum of discussion of the overseas internal security program for the NSC meeting on May 7. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) See the Supplement.

³ A copy is in Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5810 Series. See the Supplement.

⁴ Entitled "Basic National Security Policy," dated June 8, 1959. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5906 Series)

⁵ A copy is *ibid.* See the Supplement.

⁶ For text, see the Supplement.

⁷ It is identical to paragraph 1 of NSC 5810/1, Document 24.

objective of a just peace or peace with justice. He had no objection, however, to adding such a thought to the Preamble.

Mr. Gray then invited the Council's attention to Paragraph 3 a statement of the basic threat to U.S. security, on Pages 3 to 6 of NSC 5906, noting that there was a split with the JCS Adviser proposing one text for Paragraph 3 whereas the Majority favored a different text. The two texts read as follows:⁸

"JCS Proposal [Par. 3 of NSC 5810/1, amended.]

"3. The basic threat to U.S. security is the determination and ability of the hostile Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes effectively to direct their political and ideological influence and their rapidly growing military and economic strength toward the objective of world domination at a time when:

(a) there are sufficient quantities of nuclear weapons capable of causing immediate and incalculable devastation; (b) uncertainty exists and is growing as to whether U.S. massive nuclear capabilities would be used to defend Free World interests; (c) weakness or instability in many areas exerts strong pressures for economic or political change and creates vulnerabilities to expanding Sino-Soviet subversion, political action and economic penetration; and (d) the American people have not been brought to appreciate the extent and long-term nature of the crisis facing the United States, or adequately to support certain elements of the U.S. strategy."

Majority Proposal [Par. 3 of NSC 5810/1, revised.]

"3. The basic threat to U.S. security is the determination and ability of the hostile Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes to direct their political and ideological influence and their rapidly growing military and economic strength toward shifting the power balance away from the West and, ultimately, toward achieving world domination.

"The chief elements of this threat lie in (a) the Soviets' possession of rapidly growing nuclear capabilities (which have made the Soviet leaders feel freer to adopt an aggressive posture in peripheral areas) as well as large conventional forces; (b) the Soviet regime's ability and willingness to identify itself with various forms of political and social discontent and popular opposition to the status quo; to support subversive elements, including legal political parties, within free societies, to apply substantial resources for the purpose of fostering and exploiting various kinds of weakness and instability in all parts of the Free World; and particularly in the neutralist and less developed

⁸ All brackets are in the source text.

"JCS Proposal [Par. 3 of NSC 5810/1, amended.]

Majority Proposal [Par. 3 of NSC 5810/1, revised.]

societies, to take advantage of pressures for economic and social change; (c) the extent to which the totalitarian Communist leadership is able to act ruthlessly and rapidly and to repudiate agreements without being subject to moral restraints.

The danger to U.S. security from the Communist threat lies not only in general war or local aggression but in the possibility of a future shift in the East-West balance of power. Such a shift could be caused by a gradual erosion of Western positions via means short of force, and over time by a continued growth of overall Communist strength at a rate significantly greater than that of the West. The U.S. ability to deal with the Communist threat is complicated by: (a) lack of sufficient Free World awareness of the nature, dimensions, and probable long-term duration of the crisis; (b) the possibility of serious differences in outlook and policy among Free World nations, including questions concerning the use of nuclear weapons."

After himself explaining the difference in the two versions, Mr. Gray noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves had not been able to reach unanimity in support of either of these two versions.⁹ Admiral Burke said essentially what the Joint Chiefs probably wanted was a combination of elements from both the proposed texts.

⁹ The differing views of the JCS on this paragraph are set forth in a memorandum concerning NSC 5906 from Admiral Burke to McElroy, dated June 20. (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5906 Series)

After again trying to illustrate the nature of the difference, Mr. Gray called on Secretary Herter.

Secretary Herter commented that he did not really see much basic essential difference between the two statements on the nature of the basic threat to U.S. security. He did feel, however, that the new proposal by the Majority represented better drafting and a more comprehensive statement of the nature of the threat.

The President said that it appeared to him that the text on the left-hand side, proposed by the JCS Adviser to the Planning Board, addressed itself particularly to the possibility of sudden and catastrophic destruction. The text on the right-hand side addressed itself to a destruction of the U.S. which could come about more gradually through a process of erosion. The President said he liked the new language which clearly recognized the danger of a possible shift of the power balance in favor of the Soviet Union.

Admiral Burke asked the President's permission for General White to speak to this problem since General White's views differed from those of the other Chiefs.

General White said that what he first objected to was the statement in the Majority proposal which stated that the Soviets' possession of rapidly growing nuclear capability had made the Soviet leaders feel freer to follow aggressive policies in peripheral areas. General White said he simply could see no basis for this assertion. The President replied that this seemed odd to him. Khrushchev had made precisely this threat in his conversation with Averell Harriman to which the President had just alluded.¹⁰ Of course, said the President, what Khrushchev may have said to Harriman does not constitute evidence of what Khrushchev really thinks or means to do but it was something that could not be ignored.

General White then went on to say that his other objection to the language in the Majority Proposal arose from the fact that it seemed to him to equate the danger of general war with the danger of local aggression. To General White it seemed obvious that the greatest threat posed by the Soviet Union was the threat of general nuclear war against the U.S. On the other hand, General White thought that the Majority Proposal was quite correct in warning about the danger of a gradual shift of the power balance in favor of the Soviet Union.

In response to these remarks of General White, the President expressed himself as worried that we in the U.S. were not as well prepared to meet the threat of economic and political competition from the

¹⁰ Possible reference to Khrushchev's conversation with W. Averell Harriman on June 23. Harriman, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was then traveling in the Soviet Union as a private citizen.

Russians as we were to meet the military threat. It was harder to get the people of the U.S. to realize the danger which was inherent in the Soviet use of political and economic resources against us. To the President the greater danger lay where the greater risk was—whether you think the Soviets are going to resort to general war or to content themselves with a gradual erosion of our position through economic and political pressures.

After General White had again briefly reviewed his suggested changes in the language of the Majority Proposal, the President commented that obviously the greatest catastrophe which could befall the U.S. would be the sudden initiation of general nuclear war by the Soviet Union. The other grave risk would be posed if we actually witnessed a shift of the balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union. This of course would be a longer-term development if it occurred. At any rate, said the President, he would hate to say that the greatest danger was the danger of general nuclear war.

Secretary McElroy commented that failure to maintain our nuclear deterrent power was the most sure way to invite the shift of the power balance which had been emphasized in the Majority Proposal. The President then suggested language to meet Secretary McElroy's point and the Council all agreed on its insertion in Paragraph 3.

After further changes in Paragraph 3 had been agreed upon, Mr. Gray proceeded to comment on Paragraph 5 reading as follows:⁴

"[Par. 4 of NSC 5810/1, revised.] The basic task for the United States is to minimize the basic threat by mobilizing and effectively employing, [while preserving fundamental American values and institutions.]* U.S. and Free World spiritual and material resources over a long period and at an adequate and sustained level, in order to:" etc., etc.¹¹

Mr. Gray called first on Mr. Stans inasmuch as the parenthetical phraseology had been proposed by the Treasury and the Budget. Mr. Stans said that he did not think the matter was earth-shaking in importance but he felt that the bracketed language proposed by Treasury and Budget belonged at the beginning of the statement of Basic Policy even though it was repeated in greater detail in the later sections. Secretary Scribner also commented that if it was repetitious to include the bracketed language in Paragraph 5, the thought in the language was a very good one to repeat.

¹¹ The remainder of this paragraph reads: "(a) maintain adequate military strength to deter or successfully wage war and survive as a nation capable of controlling its own destiny, and civilian preparedness which will contribute thereto; (b) encourage sound and vigorous domestic economic growth and progress; (c) strengthen the integrity and unity of the Free World; and (d) succeed in the over-all contest with the USSR for world leadership." A footnote identifies the bracketed language as a "Treasury–Budget proposal."

The President said that perhaps this was good language to repeat but he felt that we might well have to preserve some of our fundamental American values and institutions by putting them in cold storage in the event of certain dire contingencies and threats to our nation's actual security.

Secretary McElroy said that the Defense Department saw no reason for including the bracketed language in Paragraph 5 because Defense felt that this was a clear assumption in any case and if the phraseology were included here, it might make for some hesitation or doubt as to the limits to which the U.S. should go in order to meet the basic threat to its security posed by the enemy. Secretary Herter expressed agreement with Secretary McElroy and said that of course it was obvious that our basic task is to protect our country. After further brief discussion, the bracketed language, slightly amended, was included in the agreed version of Paragraph 5.

At this point Mr. Gray turned to Paragraph 6 on Page 7 of NSC 5906 reading in part as follows:

"[Par. 6 of NSC 5810/1, revised.] U.S. policies, for which the full support of the American people should be enlisted, and U.S. and other Free World resources effectively used to carry out the task described in Paragraph 5 above, must be designed:

"a. To take the initiative in promoting sound economic growth and acceptable political development in the Free World, not only to meet the Communist threat but also to create an international environment in which the values and institutions of freedom can be sustained."

Mr. Gray noted that certain of the consultants had disagreed with the idea that the U.S. should take the initiative in promoting sound economic growth as suggested by the phraseology in Paragraph 6-a above. They believed that it would be very costly indeed if the U.S. were to take such initiative everywhere in the world. The Planning Board had not agreed with the views of the consultants and the phraseology about taking the initiative was therefore contained in Paragraph 6-a. The President inquired whether it really means that we take the initiative everywhere in the world, including perhaps even Saudi Arabia?

Secretary Dillon then stood up behind Secretary Herter and explained that the proposal to take the initiative was very basic to our policy of promoting sound economic growth. This phraseology was not meant to apply universally and everywhere. Nevertheless, there were often countries which we needed to help which themselves had no means of taking the initiative.

The President suggested that perhaps it would be better to say "support the promotion of" and added that we ought not to try to impose U.S. plans on other countries in order to persuade their peoples to take the initiative. Let us avoid, said the President the accusation of being economic

imperialists. Secretary Dillon said that the language did not contemplate a U.S. policy of forcing initiatives on unwilling people. The President then suggested substitute language along the lines of "support the desires and efforts of the Free World in promoting sound economic growth", etc. The President's proposal was adopted.

After further discussion certain changes were agreed to in Paragraph 29 and in Paragraph 33. When the Council came to Paragraph 35 on Page 27 dealing with the problem of the U.S. attitude toward neutrals as opposed to allies, Mr. Gray noted that some of the consultants had expressed distaste for any U.S. policy of assisting countries which insisted on maintaining a policy of neutralism. These consultants thought that we should only aid countries who were willing to stand up and be counted on the Free World team. As Paragraph 35 made clear, the Planning Board did not agree with these consultants and had stated in Paragraph 35 that the U.S. should recognize that the independence of such nations from Communist control meets a minimum U.S. objective even if not the maximum objective of having them as friends or allies.

The President said that he disagreed with the views of the consultants for the same reasons that the Planning Board had disagreed. He cited the serious problems, economic and financial that Nehru was facing in India and pointed out that in view of these problems Nehru had no choice but to follow a policy of neutralism as between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World.

Apropos of this discussion of neutralism with particular respect to the underdeveloped countries, Mr. Gray pointed out the view of the consultants.

Not specifically reflected in any portion of NSC 5906, was the view that unless we solve the problem of exploding populations all of our efforts to achieve our objectives in the underdeveloped countries were likely to prove vain in the long run. It was the view of certain of the consultants that the problem of birth control was so crucial that our statement of basic policy should contain some reference to means of controlling the very rapid population growth in certain areas of the world. Mr. Gray thought that perhaps if the Council thought it wise, the Planning Board could submit at next week's meeting language which could be inserted in NSC 5906.

The President immediately replied that he would strongly oppose having a statement of policy by the U.S. Government on the subject of birth control. The objectives, as everyone knew, were of crucial importance but we must depend on education and on the services of foundations and private citizens to try to provide an answer to the truly vital question of exploding populations. However, if we put a statement with respect to birth control in a Government policy statement, we would be accused of all kinds of terrible things.

*The National Security Council:*¹²

a. Discussed the Preamble, Section A, and Paragraphs 29 through 35 of NSC 5906; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Consultants, as reported at the meeting.

(1) *Page 1, paragraph 1, 5th sentence:* Revise "for peace and security" to read "for peace, security and justice".

b. Tentatively adopted the above-mentioned sections of NSC 5906, subject to the following amendments:¹³

(2) *Pages 3-6, paragraph 3:* Include the "Majority Proposal" in the right-hand column, subject to:

(a) The insertion of the following preceding the first sentence in the subparagraph beginning at the top of Page 5: "The first danger to U.S. security lies in any neglect on our part to retain adequate deterrent power. However,".

(b) The insertion, in the last line on Page 5, of a new (b) to read as follows (relettering present (b) to (c)):

"(b) existing and growing uncertainty as to whether U.S. massive nuclear capabilities would be used to defend Free World interests; and"

(3) *Page 6, paragraph 5:* Include the bracketed phrase amended to read as follows: ", while seeking to preserve fundamental American values and institutions,".

(4) *Page 7, paragraph 5:* Delete the word "and" before "(d)", and add at the end of the sentence the following:

"; and (e) engage in continuous diplomatic efforts to remove the causes of world tension through negotiation."

(5) *Page 7, paragraph 6-a:* Revise to read as follows:

"a. To support the desires and efforts of Free World nations to promote sound economic growth and acceptable political development in the Free World, as a means of taking the initiative not only to meet the Communist threat but also to create an international environment in which the values and institutions of freedom can be sustained."

(6) *Page 23, paragraph 29, 5th line:* Insert, after the word "means", the following: "(including the provision of military assistance)".

(7) *Page 26, footnote to paragraph 33:* Insert, in the second line after the words "assistance to", the word "Euratom".

c. Agreed to continue consideration of NSC 5906 at the next Council meeting.

S. Everett Gleason

¹²The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2103. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95 Records of Action by the National Security Council)

¹³All the language adopted here is reflected in NSC 5906/1, Document 70.

62. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, July 2, 1959, 9 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretaries Herter, McElroy, Gates; Assistant Secretary Gerard Smith, Admiral Radford, Mr. Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster

Mr. Gray said the group had come in to discuss the issues involved in certain military paragraphs of our basic security policy paper. He had prepared a statement of these issues, four in number.¹ A prior question is whether there should be any change in the language of the policy at all.

Mr. Herter spoke to the first two issues—what constitutes general war, and our limited war capabilities.² He recalled that Secretary Dulles had agreed to continue the language with respect to limited war capabilities and the use of nuclear weapons for one year during which time State and Defense would try to agree on new language. As for general war, Mr. Herter was concerned that the import of the present language was that any hostilities involving US and USSR forces would automatically be a situation of general war. He also felt that commanders should not be automatically bound to use nuclear weapons in limited situations but that their use should be initiated only when our national objectives were advanced.

The President said that, as he has stated before, he questions the idea of such generalized definitions. He recalled that he had talked with Admiral Radford and General Taylor about this matter three years ago. He adverted to the wide range of possible hostile situations that might occur, citing in particular the undeclared Russo-Japanese war in Manchuria, about which the outside world knew practically nothing, but which involved units of more than division size. In such circumstances today involving nuclear powers he had no doubt that these weapons would be used. At the same time, he said he could imagine a situation, for example intervention in Iran, in which we would not use these weapons.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on July 6. Another memorandum of this conversation by Gerard Smith is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy 1958–1959. See the Supplement.

¹ A copy is enclosed with a covering memorandum from Gray to Haydn Williams, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for NSC Affairs and Plans, International Security Affairs, dated July 8. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up) See the Supplement.

² The other two issues were whether it should be assumed that limited war would occur in developed as well as underdeveloped areas, and whether in cases of local or limited aggression the United States should apply all force necessary to defeat such aggression, or limit operations to the amount of force necessary to limit hostilities and restore the status quo ante.

He really thought that a major war is one where the Russians have shown that they are "going after us" with all-out effort. In his judgment the real question is how far to give junior commanders the authority to initiate the use of these weapons.

Mr. Herter said there is indication that weapons of very large size are becoming tactical in concept—weapons of over one megaton. He did not think our forces should be free to use these, but should be prepared to act wherever necessary around the world, on a conventional basis if this seemed desirable. The President said we cannot deploy our ground troops all around the world. We are obliged to put our main reliance on air, naval and other supporting type forces. Mr. Herter said that the use of these weapons at sea or in the air did not seem to cause so much trouble. The difficult question is their use on the ground. It seemed likely that this would project all-out nuclear war and this is what frightens our allies.

The President recalled the decision in the case of *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* not to use these weapons unless we were attacked so heavily as to endanger our forces. Mr. Herter recalled that our ground forces began to move their supporting weapons, including the atomic-equipped Honest John into *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*, but that these weapons were then pulled back. In his judgment the question is whether we are saying that our main reliance is to be on nuclear weapons. He did not question this for strategic operations. However, for limited operations he thought we should not go this far, since such a commitment creates psychological problems for our allies, who are fearful of our initiating the use of nuclear weapons.

The President recalled that Harriman had reported a comment by Khrushchev that he has rockets (meaning nuclear weapons) ready to destroy Taiwan. He had said that if the Chinese Communists decide to attack Taiwan, he would support them with these weapons. The President said he would find it very difficult to state just when we would refrain from using such weapons as the Honest John, Corporal, Sergeant, etc. It was clear to him that if sizable forces were to come in on us, we would have to defend ourselves. Mr. Herter said he had no disagreement on this. His quarrel was with the assumption that we would use nuclear weapons under any circumstances involving the combat of our armed forces.

Mr. McElroy said the real question from the Defense point of view is whether we are to develop our forces and weapons on the basis that nuclear weapons would be used in a limited war. If we do not, then we simply will not have forces of such strength as to permit us to "sit in on sizable limited warfare." Specifically, if we have to go after enemy air bases, we must use nuclear weapons for that purpose in order to be effective; the amount of conventional bombs we could carry would not be enough.

The President said the basic point in his mind is that we have got to have nuclear weapons available wherever we have sizable American forces.

Mr. McElroy commented that within the Defense Department, the Army, the Navy, and the Marines feel that there should be more reliance on conventional forces for the conduct of limited war. He commented that we are continuing to develop nuclear weapons on the assumption that we will use them, on the President's decision, whenever the national interest requires the commitment of our forces. The President said he sees a difference between operations that amount merely to harassment and those that amount to limited war. The question in his mind is what are the levels of hostility at which we should be ready with nuclear forces. He repeated that if we have sizable American forces in an area, we must have nuclear weapons there too. Then we have the question, in what circumstances would we use them. Mr. McElroy said that if we were attacked in Korea it is quite clear to him that we should use nuclear weapons. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

Admiral Radford said he understood State to want Defense to be able to fight without using atomic weapons until a decision is taken here in Washington to permit their use. Defense takes the stand that when it is to our military advantage or necessity we will use the weapons. He thought we could back up our foreign policy if we have that kind of arrangement; otherwise we cannot provide the forces to do it. Specifically, we cannot make this matter dependent upon the decision of the State Department. He pointed out that we are prepared to put small units very quickly into any of a large number of possible areas. We would not dare to do this and expose these forces except that we have atomic support readily available. He recalled that we built our forces on this basis beginning in 1953. The Chiefs said very clearly that they could handle the military task with smaller forces if, and only if, they could depend on using atomic weapons should hostilities occur.

The President commented that if small units, for example conducting an intervention in Cuba, should be attacked by conventional air forces, it might not be necessary to use atomic weapons against the attackers. The key point to him is that we are fearful of someone doing something foolish far down the chain of command and getting us into major hostilities.

Admiral Radford pointed out that in the last three years we have concentrated on smaller and smaller weapons. What the State Department seems to be concerned about is that the use of atomic weapons would result in the killing of a great number of civilians. The new weapons being developed make this much less likely. He added that he had been surprised to hear General Lemnitzer and Admiral Burke say that they saw no difference between the State and Defense language, but pre-

ferred the State Department version. He thought this might have come about through a blurring of the old language which was very forthright that we would use these weapons when it was to our military advantage to do so; this now reads that we would use these weapons in accordance with our national objectives. The President said that if we had to intervene in Cuba, the last thing we would want to do would be to use atomic weapons. Therefore he said we must realize that there is a whole range of possible situations. He was afraid that we are trying to find generalizations that cover too many possibilities. At the same time he realized that we must have directives which give guidance to our staff officers on how to build up the military programs. He thought that we could be clear as to where we provide atomic support—i.e., wherever we have sizable forces—but that we cannot define generally just when to use it. Mr. Herter said he had no quarrel with having these weapons available. The whole question relates to using them. Admiral Radford said that if there is the possibility that we would have to go to war without using these weapons, our forces would be very different from what they are now.

Mr. McElroy said that the thing that is valuable to our foreign policy in the cold war is to be able to have a show of force wherever we need it. He said we can have a show of force, and do this with security and without exposing ourselves to disaster, if we have the nuclear weapons, but not otherwise. Admiral Radford commented that many people do not realize what a great decision it was to adopt the "new look", i.e., to pattern our forces on the use of atomic weapons. We cannot do the job with conventional weapons alone. We cannot maintain forces of the size that would be required to meet the Soviet threat around the world if these are to be limited to conventional operations.

Mr. Herter said he is not asking this for our armed forces as a whole. Referring to the Cuban example, he said his point is perfectly brought out in that it is clear that we would not want to be in the position of having to use atomic weapons there. The President said that for that kind of pacification we would not need nuclear weapons.

Admiral Radford said that our military men must consider what are the possibilities that could be brought against them. We do not need to use the nuclear weapons in Central America, but we do need to be ready to use them instantly in case we commit forces along the Sino-Soviet periphery where we could otherwise be overwhelmed. Mr. McElroy commented that [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] we had these weapons available immediately on carriers, but not on land. The President, commenting on the operations [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], said that he would of course keep closely informed of the developing situation, and could authorize use on very short notice.

Mr. McElroy next turned to the reason Defense wants to keep the language unchanged. He said it is very difficult to change language

without this action being interpreted as a substantial change in policy. He was afraid we would thereby open the gate to all sorts of changes in our program. He added that our allies would then doubt whether we would meet the situations that might arise resolutely or whether we would be uncertain in our responses. He said Turkey, for example, is wondering whether we would in fact use these weapons.

Mr. Gates said it should be clearly understood that a change of policy is in fact being recommended by some people. They feel that the increase of nuclear capability on the part of both the Soviets and the United States makes conflicts limited to the use of conventional forces more likely, and hence increases the need for conventional forces.

The President said the problem always is how far you can delegate authority—what will be the consequences of the delegation. He said we have come a long way since 1952. At first, none of our atomic weapons were deployed. Finally, this deployment was achieved. Next we took up the question when could we use them. First we said they could be used when our forces are attacked for purposes of defending themselves. However, when we intervene deliberately, for example along the border of Burma, use on our own initiative is a very different thing.

Mr. Gates said that the suggestion that we be able to conduct our military operations with or without the use of atomic weapons implies a duplicate capability. The President came back to his point that if we had to put organized U.S. units into an area, he would insist that we have atomic support available. The question then is when to use them; for example, when is their existence threatened. He cited as a possible example sending our forces into Iran. Admiral Radford added Iraq and Kuwait. The President said that definitely whenever we send in organized units they have to have the capability to defend their own existence. Mr. Herter said he did not quarrel with the idea of this capacity. The question is whether the commander on the spot is to have the authority to use them. This of course also ties into the question of these units being given a non-atomic capability. The President said he would like to find a formula for this and he would suggest that when formed units are in areas exposed to the power of Sino-Soviet forces, they will always be supported by appropriate nuclear defenses. He is thinking of a defensive capability primarily. Mr. McElroy said that to defend our forces we have to be ready to take out air fields which may be 300–500 miles distant. Mr. Gates said that stated the other way around we cannot expect to be able to take them out without atomic weapons. Admiral Radford said that we must have offensive atomic power nearby also if the units are to be able to accomplish their objectives.

Mr. Gray said that as he understood it, State is in fact suggesting that the United States should develop the capability, which it does not now have, to engage in limited operations without the use of atomic weapons.

The President said he does not agree that we do not have that capability now. He said our present division has a power greater than the division had in World War II. Mr. McElroy said this is true regarding the first 2,000 yards or so of the combat zone. The thing that will be lacking is a capacity to be effective at ten to twenty miles. The President asked if we are throwing our artillery away and Mr. McElroy said that we are on the way to doing so. Mr. Gates added that the modern airplane is decreasing in its capability to be effective using conventional weapons only. The President said he is not thinking so much of the use of aircraft in jungle countries. He said he could take one of our present day divisions into the field and defeat anything that could be put against it in such terrain. He recognized that we are at a transitional stage. He thought that if we get atomic weapons down to twenty tons equivalent explosive strength, then they will in fact have become conventional. At that time we can drop conventional artillery. Until then we are in transition.

Mr. Gray said the issue is whether we should have larger conventional forces than we have now. The President said he thought we should develop our organization basically on the theory that advanced weapons as he had just described are bound to come. We can take such units and give them training in conventional operations and give them plenty of fire power, some of which would extend more than 1000-2000 yards, and employ them against small places such as Cuba. Mr. McElroy said that while we are carrying out research and development and modernizing the conventional weapons in the hands of our forces, we are not developing conventional forces for the long-range future. The President said that we cannot base our organization on the distant future. It must be based on the weapons we now have and will have in the three or four years ahead. We should train our forces to use all weapons available. He added that in areas susceptible of overrunning by Sino-Soviet forces we must put atomic capacity.

Mr. Herter then read from a State Department paper containing a summary statement of foreign policy requirements bearing upon U.S. strategy.³ He thought that for deterrent purposes we should not explicitly deny ourselves the use of nuclear weapons. However, we should not tie ourselves necessarily to their use, since in general they are not desirable for use in limited warfare, and should be used only as a last resort. The President thought this expressed too many cautions, and would be too restrictive upon our military preparations. Mr. Herter said he had thought that a change in the policy paper could be avoided through a

³ Apparently a paper dated April 24, a copy of which is enclosed with an April 25 letter from Herter to McElroy. Another paper containing Department of State views, entitled "A Concept of US Military Strategy for the 1960s," dated January 5, is enclosed with a January 24 letter from Dulles to McElroy. (All in Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5906 Series) All are in the Supplement.

supplementary statement of this kind. The President said he does not mind changing the language in the policy paper if it can be improved. He does not put too much weight on the point earlier raised by Mr. McElroy.

Mr. McElroy said that there is some opinion that it would be possible for the United States to be engaged in a limited war involving the USSR in Europe and China. The President said it would have to be awfully limited if it were not to become all-out conflict. Mr. Herter commented that Under Secretary Murphy thinks that we could have limited hostilities, which could be kept limited, over Berlin. He was doubtful of this, however.

Mr. Gates added that some people believe that, in a situation of level expenditures, the high and increasing costs of the big weapons such as ICBMs will squeeze out conventional forces and preclude the modernizing of our armed forces. The President said that, as a matter of fact, he thought that we do have a tougher problem coming up because of this. We never know when we might have to intervene with force anywhere around the world. So far as the situations in NATO and Korea are concerned, however, if a major attack should come our only recourse can be to reply with atomic weapons.

Mr. Herter said the question is how much our forces capable of intervening in limited operations are in fact tied down. He cited the need to replace forces in Europe before they could be used in Lebanon or on the route to Berlin. The question is, are we so short of forces, and are those we have so committed, that we cannot intervene with Army or Marine forces elsewhere in the world in case of necessity.

The President said he thought there was a good measure of agreement on the facts of the matter. The problem is to state the situation in such a way as to give our people a basis for planning and preparation of programs. Governor Herter said he had no desire to get into the specifics of military planning. His thought is as to what, in round terms, is required to put us in the position where we can meet our foreign policy objectives. The President recognized that the world is "scared to death" of atomic bombs, and that we could lose all our allies in one ill-advised act. He thought we should keep ourselves ready to intervene where needed without sprawling our forces all over the world. Admiral Radford stated that while public opinion is terrified by atomic weapons, military and governmental people around the world realize that we do not have enough manpower to meet the Soviet threat without resort to these weapons. He said that Admiral Felt indicated that the military people in Asia are more concerned that we would not use these weapons in case of necessity than that we will.

The President said that we must not, however, use excessive means to meet our tasks. Just as a man cannot use a pistol against another who is simply trying to give him a bloody nose, there is need for judgment and

care in selecting the weapons with which we would respond. He thought we should go carefully and wisely toward the weapons of 1965 in our organization and our military concepts. He thought that State is being a little overcautious in their approach. Our military people should continue the incorporation of atomic weapons into our military structure, but at the same time should make sure that we can use the forces we have in a maximum conventional role and thus avoid unnecessarily causing all-out war to occur. Mr. Herter stressed again that the world is fearful of the use of nuclear power. The President said that people are wrong, and that perhaps the opinion must be changed. He commented as an aside that he does not think that a nuclear weapon of twenty tons power would be worth its cost—he would doubt whether we should go below about 100 tons effect. Mr. Smith said that our planning has been based on the assumption that we would use atomic weapons but that our adversary would not use them since if he did we would no longer have a limited war. There was a considerable exchange over this, with Admiral Radford indicating that we had taken the possibility of their use against us into account in our planning. It turned out that Mr. Smith was referring to a specific set of plans on limited war in which this assumption was included. Admiral Radford did not consider the assumption to be a sound one, nor apparently did the others there.

The President said that we have crossed this bridge. If we were attacked in Korea, for example, we are going to use atomic weapons.

If our opponents came back with atomic weapons, perhaps this would cause all-out war. In any case, we would put all our forces on the most stringent alert possible. He stressed again that we are talking about units committed to areas susceptible to heavy attack from the central Eurasian mass; we are not talking about units committed in the Caribbean, in Africa or in other areas remote from Soviet power. He agreed that if we use these weapons and our adversary has them, we must expect that he would use them against us. Mr. McElroy recalled that he is having a basic restudy of the limited war question made in response to a request from Mr. Gray.

In concluding, the President said that he had a great deal of question in his mind as to the validity of definitions of the type attempted in this paper.

G
Brigadier General, USA

63. Memorandum of Meeting Between President Eisenhower and His Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray)

Washington, July 6, 1959, 11:10 a.m.

1. I indicated to the President that I felt that we needed further to discuss certain military paragraphs in the Basic Policy paper following the meeting in his office on July 2d.

First of all, I reported to him that following the meeting in his office, the same group met for a while in the Conference Room, less Mr. Herter. I reported that Mr. McElroy still insisted that the first question is whether the President wants the policy changed. However, I also reported that Mr. McElroy acknowledged that the President had said that a change in language is not necessarily a change in policy. I also reported that Mr. Gerard Smith had frankly stated that the State Department does indeed want the policy changed.

I then said the question is: How do we now proceed? My first recommendation was with respect to paragraph 10.¹ I recommended that he consider accepting the language as written in the old paper and that the concerns by the State Department be taken care of by the President's approval of the change in language in the strategic concept which the President had approved while Charles E. Wilson was Secretary of Defense. I indicated to the President that Secretary McElroy agrees that such a change of language is appropriate so that it makes clear that general war exists only when sizable or substantial U.S. and USSR forces are engaged and not when just any such forces are engaged. The President seemed to think well of this suggestion although he said that he felt that general war would exist when the Soviets were obviously engaged in an all-out effort against us.

Paragraph 12 a. I presented to the President a draft of paragraph 12 a, attached. I told the President that I proposed to have this draft in his hands at the time of the Council meeting and he could either use it there, or if he decided in the Council not to make final decisions, this could be the basis for the language he would later adopt. We discussed it in con-

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up. Top Secret. Drafted by Gray on July 9.

¹ Paragraph 10 of NSC 5906 was based on paragraph 8 of NSC 5810/1, unchanged except for a suggested AEC-Department of State amendment to the first sentence (in brackets): "A central aim of U.S. policy must be to deter the Communists from use of their military power, remaining prepared to fight general war, [a war in which the survival of the United States is at stake,] should one be forced upon the United States."

siderable detail and as a result of the discussion, I have now redrafted the paragraph as in the attached.²

Paragraph 16.³ I presented a suggested draft of paragraph 16, which is attached.⁴ After some discussion in which I pointed out that two of the four issues discussed in the July 2d meeting were involved in this paragraph, the President made suggestions which are incorporated in a redraft of paragraph 16, 2d paragraph, Page 13, which is also attached.

I pointed out to the President that this paragraph really set the stage for planning in Defense and State Departments and should not be construed to define a situation such as would be involved in hostilities in connection with Berlin. I also had pointed out to him that it seemed impossible to me for a military commander to do other than to seek to defeat local aggression once he became engaged in hostilities.

I then pointed out to the President that there were other split paragraphs in the military section. The first was paragraph 13⁵ relating to CW and BW. I indicated that the Budget Bureau effort was to get us off dead center as a result of a feeling that we were spending too little or too much on these weapons. The President understood the issue.

I also pointed out the split in paragraph 17⁵ relating to the use of the term "cold war" and expressed the view to the President that we could not abandon the use of this phrase any more than people would agree to refer to the White House as the Executive Mansion.

I also referred to paragraph 23⁶ but indicated that as a result of discussion with the consultants, the Planning Board had had some second thoughts and that we hoped to have some new language from the State Department.

[Here follows brief discussion of administrative matters.]

Gordon Gray

² This redraft is quoted in full in Document 64. The modifications mentioned were made in the first sentence of Gray's original draft, which reads: "It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States; and to use them when required to achieve (military) objectives."

³ Paragraph 16 of NSC 5906 is identical to paragraph 14 of NSC 5810/1. The annex to NSC 5906 is a suggested Department of State redraft of paragraph 16, partially quoted in Document 64.

⁴ Not printed. This redraft contains minor revisions of Gray's draft.

⁵ This paragraph is quoted in full in Document 64.

⁶ A revised version of this paragraph was discussed and quoted at the NSC meeting on July 16; see Document 67.

64. Memorandum of Discussion at the 412th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, July 9, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting (34) and Agenda Item 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security."]

2. *Basic National Security Policy* (NSC 5810/1; NIE 11–4–58; NIE 100–59; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Overseas Internal Security Program", dated April 10, 1959; NSC Action No. 2079; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Status of Military Mobilization Base Program", dated April 21, 1959; NSC 5906; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Basic National Security Policy" dated June 19 and July 6¹ and 7,² 1959; NSC Action No. 2103)

Mr. Gray introduced the subject. (A copy of Briefing Note, only portions of which were actually used at the Meeting by Mr. Gray are filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and attached to this Memorandum.)³

Mr. Gray began by presenting the views of General Twining on the military paragraphs of NSC 5906 which views had been sent in a memorandum to Mr. Gray from General Twining.⁴ The general gist of these views was strong opposition by General Twining to any change in our present policy with respect to the use of nuclear and conventional armaments. For obvious reasons, therefore, General Twining also expressed himself as strongly opposed to any change in the present wording of the military paragraphs in our current Basic National Security Policy (NSC

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason.

¹ This memorandum enclosed a July 2 memorandum from Franklyn W. Phillips, Acting Secretary of the NASC, giving NASC views on paragraph 62 of NSC 5906. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5906 Series) See the Supplement. Paragraph 62 was discussed at NSC meetings on July 23 and July 30; see Documents 68 and 69.

² Not further identified.

³ For text, see the Supplement.

⁴ Twining's views are enclosed with a July 8 memorandum from his Special Assistant, Brigadier General James F. Wisenand, to Gray. A note indicates that the views had been provided to McElroy on May 8. Twining wrote that in limited war situations the changes in policy then "being advanced" could result in decisions to use nuclear weapons coming too late; cause unacceptably heavy attrition of limited U.S. forces in conditions which, from a military standpoint, called for early use of nuclear weapons; and, when they became public, weaken U.S. posture for deterrence of Soviet-inspired local aggression. Strategically, assuming no increase in defense budget ceilings, the policy changes would result in reduction of the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent relative to the Soviet Union in order to pay for a conventional force buildup that would still be inadequate to counter Soviet bloc forces. (Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Disaster File) See the Supplement.

5810/1). Mr. Gray added that he understood that this last view of General Twining's was essentially the view of the Secretary of Defense which fact Secretary McElroy then confirmed.

The President commented that General Twining appeared to perceive the possibility of a much more radical change in our military policy, as suggested by various proposals for rewording the military paragraphs, than the President judged to be the case. The President added that he had read very carefully the suggested changes in the wording of the most important military paragraphs.

Secretary McElroy said that he himself could not subscribe to every word in General Twining's memorandum as read by Mr. Gray. Secretary McElroy thought that General Twining was more apprehensive about the dangers of changes in the policy than he was; but Secretary McElroy said he did feel that our basic military policy should not be changed and accordingly the wording of the key paragraphs should likewise remain as written. Basically, he continued, both he and General White were convinced that our capability to deter war derived not only from our great capability for nuclear retaliation but also from our policy of using tactical nuclear weapons whenever the use of such weapons was required to achieve our national objectives. Secretary McElroy felt that any change in our present military policy would constitute an invitation for the outbreak of war. Moreover, the budgetary implications of a change in our military policy were both implicit and clear. He strongly doubted the wisdom of a policy which would tend to reduce our strategic delivery capability in order to provide additional funds for building up our conventional military capabilities. At any rate, complete unanimity existed among the Chiefs of Staff on the vital necessity of maintaining our nuclear deterrent to general war. Secretary McElroy said that it was his own feeling, in talking over these matters with officials of different views, was that the difference was less in some cases than in others. One detected evidence of extremes in some cases and of moderation in others. He felt that the real issue to be discussed was not the wording in the paragraphs describing our military policy but rather the question whether to change our military policy at this time or not.

The President observed that more and more he was receiving recommendations from the Department of Defense that we deploy nuclear weapons of every type and that we increasingly disperse such weapons and that we also provide for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] use nuclear weapons. The President could understand therefore why the Department of State was worried by these developments. The President added that he had no intention at all of closing down production of those weapons on which we depended to deter war. This however did not appear to the President to be a policy issue. We certainly did not intend to

change our fundamental military policy and program which we had been pursuing for the last six years.

Contrary to the President's view, Secretary Herter expressed the opinion that there was indeed a high policy matter involved in the military portions of our Basic National Security Policy. Indeed State and Defense had been considering these policy problems for a considerable period of time. The State Department had one basic fear about our existing policy with respect to the use of nuclear weapons. This fear was that we might find ourselves in a situation where even in waging small limited wars, we would have no choice but to resort to the use of nuclear weapons because we would have no other weapons available to use in such wars.

Secretary Herter then went on to state that he agreed one hundred per cent with the necessity of maintaining intact our nuclear deterrent capability. He likewise agreed that all U.S. Forces should possess nuclear capabilities. However, he emphasized that he did not wish to see the nuclear capability as the inevitable concomitant of every kind of military engagement. There was widespread in the world a genuine fear that the use of nuclear weapons would lead to general war. For certain types of limited military operations the State Department did not think that nuclear weapons need to be used at once or necessarily at all. We may well have to engage in limited wars in the future. If it were necessary in such wars to use nuclear weapons, Secretary Herter said that of course he agreed that we should do so but he insisted that we should also have an alternative to the use of nuclear weapons under certain conditions.

The President reverted to the illustration used last week in the discussion of these problems in his office, namely, Cuba. The President stated that if we were asked by the Organization of American States to intervene in Cuba, it was perfectly obvious to him that we would not have recourse to the use of nuclear weapons in such an intervention.

Secretary McElroy pointed out that in the future we were not going to have long-range non-nuclear artillery, say of a range of fifteen miles. We would, however, continue to have short-range, non-nuclear artillery with a range of say two or three miles. As far as he was concerned, Secretary McElroy argued, a twenty-ton nuclear weapon produced about the same bang as a twenty-ton conventional weapon. In short, we were in a position to carry out police actions with only conventional weapons, but with respect to those of our military missions which were more effectively performed with nuclear weapons, we were proposing to cut out the use of conventional weapons. If for no other than budgetary reasons, we could not afford to have both capabilities for such military missions.

The President inquired of Secretary McElroy whether we had as yet adopted a policy in the Defense Department that our fighter-bombers would not be provided with a conventional capability. Secretary McEl-

roy replied in the negative. The President then went on to say that when you are talking about carrying out operations against all a nation's airfields and military depots, of course you would use nuclear weapons. What was concerning State, however, was the use of these weapons in much more limited actions and the President indicated that this seemed to him justly a matter of concern.

Turning to Secretary McElroy, Secretary Anderson said that it seemed to him that the crux of the issue we were talking about was the economics of warfare. If the State Department could be convinced that we had all the weapons we needed to fight every kind of a war that might confront us, State of course would be very happy. Did it not, however, get down to this, if we were going to have all the military capabilities that Secretary Herter was talking about, we would simply have to spend more money? Can we have both what the State Department says it *wants* and what General Twining and the Chiefs say we *need* for the same number of dollars? Or are we going to be obliged to rearrange our dollars or add to them?

The President was disinclined to believe that Secretary Anderson's point was indeed the crux of the issue. He pointed out that as far back as 1953 we had publicly stated that if the Korean War continued the U.S. would make use of nuclear weapons. This was the kind of a war in which we would obviously use nuclear weapons. Nevertheless the President expressed sympathy with the State Department position that the U.S. must have the reputation of being able to stabilize small situations without being obliged to have recourse to nuclear weapons. The President added that we must try to keep up with all the latest techniques of weaponry.

Mr. Gray stated that he was prepared to suggest possible language to meet this issue posed in Paragraph 12-a but said that perhaps before doing so the Council ought to hear from Admiral Burke as spokesman for the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps.

Admiral Burke explained that the basic area of disagreement among the Chiefs was the use of nuclear weapons in general war and in local wars. He felt that the wording in the crucial paragraphs of our Basic Policy (Paragraphs 10, 13, and 14 of NSC 5810/1 or Paragraphs 12, 15, 16 of NSC 5906) had come to mean something rather different from the thought conveyed originally by these paragraphs. This change was marked by some overemphasis in our reliance on nuclear weapons. What he and his Army and Marine Corps colleagues feared was that the U.S. was getting into a position where it could not use anything but nuclear weapons or else face the serious political liability involved in losing the fight with the enemy. He and his colleagues of course insisted on the absolute necessity of maintaining our nuclear deterrent capability. However, they did not feel that we needed to have more large nuclear

weapons than were necessary to knock out Soviet Russia in the event of war. We should have the kind of nuclear capability we needed to accomplish this mission but not more than this. The resources thus saved by not having more than we needed could be devoted to the development of other capabilities which we needed in view of the possibilities of limited wars.

Admiral Burke also said that there appeared to be a good deal of evidence that Khrushchev was now feeling that it was much safer for the Soviet Union to risk indulging in limited wars than had been the case earlier. To illustrate his argument Admiral Burke asked permission to read from a message from General Norstad⁵ with respect to the size and type of forces which we would have to use in Berlin if we were genuinely to test the intentions of the Soviet Union to bar Allied access to Berlin. General Norstad felt that an effective test of Soviet intentions would require sizable Allied forces and not mere token forces. Inasmuch as these forces did not have nuclear armament, Admiral Burke believed that the situation that might confront us in Berlin illustrated military situations which might well confront us elsewhere all around the world. It was his view and that of the Army and Marine Corps Chiefs of Staff that if we continue to put more and more of our resources into the development of our nuclear capabilities, we will have less and less such resources for maintaining our conventional capabilities. What we really needed were balanced military forces and capabilities.

The President commented that at some future time when our weapons become much more effective, the character of our retaliatory capability would obviously change but this time is not yet. Accordingly, we have no alternative but to calculate what was necessary for our retaliatory forces at the present time on a very generous scale. Later on perhaps we might be able to reduce the size of this retaliatory force.

Mr. Gray then directed the Council's attention to the split wording of Paragraph 12-a in NSC 5906 reading as follows:⁶

⁵ Not further identified.

⁶ All brackets are in the source text.

"Majority Proposal [Par. 10-a of NSC 5810/1, unchanged]

12. a. It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States; to consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view; and to use them when required to achieve national objectives. Advance authorization for their use is as determined by the President."

"State-OCDM Proposal [Par. 10-a of NSC 5810/1, amended]

12. a. It is the policy of the United States to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States; and to place main reliance on nuclear weapons in general war, remaining prepared to fight limited war with or without such weapons. Nuclear weapons will be used when required to achieve national objectives. Advance authorization for their use in either general or limited war is as determined by the President."

Mr. Gray next suggested that he had language available as a possible substitute for the above versions of Paragraph 12-a which might conceivably be satisfactory to all concerned. He gave copies of his text to the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense and to Admiral Burke. He then read his proposed revision of Paragraph 12-a as follows:

"12. a. It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation's war objectives. Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear. All deployed organized units will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President."

When Mr. Gray had finished his proposed redraft of Paragraph 12-a, the President commented that it was what he understood we were really trying to do. Mr. Gray added the comment that he did not think this text represented a major change in our military policy with respect to nuclear and conventional weapons but of course he would have to let the military people pass judgment on this point.

Secretary Herter said that the proposed new text certainly went a considerable way toward meeting the objections which the State Department perceived in the old Paragraph 10-a of NSC 5810/1 or the Majority Proposal for Paragraph 12-a in NSC 5906. Nevertheless, Secretary Herter believed that the new text of the paragraph ought not to be considered in isolation but only in relation to the other relevant military

paragraphs; for example, the paragraph containing the definition of general war,⁷ before the Council made any decision as to the final text of the paragraph.

With respect to Secretary Herter's point about the definition of general war, Mr. Gray briefly discussed prior definitions of general war and called attention to the need now to refine these earlier definitions. The President inquired whether one could not say that when there had been a national decision to go into general mobilization, we could then state that we were going into general war, that is, we would define general war as a war which would compel national decision to proceed to general mobilization. Mr. Gray pointed out to the President that in future general war there might not be time to go into general mobilization. He suggested that the definition of general war which had been accepted in the past, namely, that a general war was a war in which U.S. and Soviet forces were overtly engaged would be more realistic if it were changed to read "where *sizable* U.S. and Soviet forces are overtly engaged."⁸ The President commented that this still left us in the dilemma of trying to determine what was meant by "sizable" forces and returned to his point about general war and general mobilization. He added that he felt that Mr. Gray was in his suggested language actually trying to describe a situation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. which would require a general mobilization.

Secretary Anderson wondered whether we were not all talking about something that, regardless of the words we used, the President himself would have to decide. The President agreed that this was a decision which the President would have to take. Nevertheless, the military staff planners would require guidance with respect to the definition of general war and that is why we needed these words. While the President must make the decision, staff planners must in the meantime make plans. In that case, said Secretary Anderson, should not the words say that for planning purposes a sizable engagement between the U.S. and Soviet forces meant general war.

At this point the President referred back to Admiral Burke's earlier statement on behalf of himself and the Army and Marine Corps Chiefs. He said he felt obliged to disagree with Admiral Burke's estimate that we may in the future be confronted with a lot of little wars all around the globe. On the contrary, the President felt that the real danger derived from Soviet political and economic aggression against us and the Free World.

⁷ Apparent reference to paragraph 10 of NSC 5906; see footnote 1, Document 63.

⁸ See paragraph 1a of Appendix A to the memorandum from Secretary of Defense Wilson to Lay, February 25, 1957, in *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XIX, p. 421.

Attorney General Rogers wondered whether, if the Council were to agree to remove from the Majority text of Paragraph 12—a the clause “to consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view”, we would not have gone a long way to solve our problem and resolve the issue. Secretary McElroy said he did not object to the recommended removal of this clause but the real issue seemed to him to be whether we proposed to fight a vigorous limited military engagement with Soviet Russia or Communist China without having recourse to the use of nuclear weapons.

In replying to Secretary McElroy's point, the President said that if the Chinese Communists simply went after the little Off-Shore Islands, such a military engagement would not involve a nuclear war. On the other hand, if the Chinese Communists launched a major attack on Formosa, the result would be general war. With considerable warmth the President insisted that it was nonsense to imagine that we could invade the vast land mass of China, with a population of 600 million people, without making use of nuclear weapons. If anyone thought differently on this subject, then he, the President, would recommend that such an individual cease to act as one of the President's advisers. It seemed inconceivable to the President that we could engage Communist China in full-scale war without depending on nuclear weapons.

Mr. Gray next suggested that Dr. Killian probably wished to be heard on these issues. Dr. Killian referred to Secretary Herter's earlier comments and misgivings about undue dependence on nuclear weapons. He added that our scientists were likewise troubled by the apparent falling off of interest in the improvement and perfecting of our conventional weapons. He believed that there was in the present wording of the military paragraphs language which seemed to militate against vigorous research and development in the field of our conventional weapons. He believed that much could be done to make our conventional weapons more effective without necessarily involving an increase in our conventional forces.

The President inquired of Secretary McElroy whether Dr. Killian's fears were justified. Secretary McElroy replied that he knew of no policy to reduce conventional weapons. The relation of conventional to nuclear weapons was a budgetary problem rather than a policy problem.

The President went on to say that at least it seemed to him that the language in our policy papers actually does influence planning in the Department of Defense. Obvious fear had been manifest in the discussion that we are putting all our eggs, or nearly all of them, in one basket. We are currently going through a phase, said the President, in the course of which we were not yet ready to put all our eggs in the nuclear basket, that is, a phase where we still needed balanced military forces. He expressed the conviction that what we were doing at the present time

with respect to our military capabilities was “pretty good” but we should certainly clarify our language as to what we were actually doing in this regard.

Secretary McElroy commented that it was for this reason that he was quite prepared to omit the phrase “to consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view.”

The President then asked if Admiral Radford would provide the Council with his views on these questions. Admiral Radford replied that he thought he understood the thinking that lay behind General Twining’s statement which had been read earlier by Mr. Gray. What General Twining feared was a definite change in our current military policy. Admiral Radford added that it was his feeling that this country had not yet reached the point when we could not handle certain military situations without recourse to using nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Admiral Radford believed that whenever the U.S. forces came into contact with the main elements of Communist military power, we would have to use nuclear weapons.

The President at this point expressed the view that the proposed redraft of Paragraph 12–a as read by Mr. Gray and on which he himself had worked, was designed to do what was needed to resolve the issue the Council had been discussing. Admiral Radford added the comment that if the conventional capabilities of the U.S. were not now being maintained, then we were not living up to the military policy which was set forth in our Basic National Security Policy.

The President inquired whether, if agreement could be reached on the wording of Paragraph 12–a, all the other disputed points in the military paragraphs would, so to speak, automatically fall into line. Mr. Gray replied in the negative and pointed out that even if agreement could be reached on Paragraph 12–a, there were two other difficult issues posed in Paragraph 16⁹ as well as the point earlier raised by Secretary Herter with respect to the appropriate definition of general war. Mr. Gray pointed out the two issues raised in Paragraph 16, reading the latter half of the paragraph as follows:

“Local aggression as used in this paragraph refers only to conflicts occurring in less developed areas of the world, in which limited U.S. forces participate because U.S. interests are involved. The prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary to defeat such local aggression is considered the best means to keep hostilities from broadening into general war. Therefore, military planning for U.S. forces to oppose local aggression will be based on the development of a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use as authorized by the President. When the use of U.S. forces is required to oppose

⁹ See footnote 3, Document 63.

local aggression, force will be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid hostilities from broadening into general war."

Mr. Gray explained that the first issue was posed by the belief of many people that local aggression might occur in other parts of the world than in less developed areas, whereas local aggression in Paragraph 16 was defined as referring only to conflicts occurring in less developed areas of the world.

The President wondered whether this issue could not be met by inserting language to the effect that apart from exceptional circumstances, local aggression referred only to conflicts occurring in less developed areas of the world.

Mr. Gray then went on to explain that the second major issue raised in this portion of Paragraph 16 related to the manner in which local aggression was to be met by the U.S. Was it to be our policy that, to quote Paragraph 16, "the prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary to defeat such local aggression is considered the best means to keep hostilities from broadening into general war" or, on the contrary, would we be confronted by certain situations where it would be in the best U.S. interest to apply "only that degree of force necessary to achieve the objectives of limiting the area and scope of the hostilities and restoring the status quo ante . . ." (See Department of State proposal for revision of Paragraph 16 in Annex to NSC 5906.)

The President commented that he thought the idea of trying to say exactly what was going to happen in such circumstances, when no one really knew, was foolish.

Secretary McElroy expressed the view that whether it should be our policy in a given circumstance to defeat local aggression or alternatively simply to limit the area and scope of hostilities and restore the status quo ante, would be a decision which would have to be made by the President with the Secretaries of State and Defense. On the other hand, to plan to organize our military forces other than to win a war seemed wrong to Secretary McElroy, even though we might modify our plans when these plans were put into practice.

The President once again asked if there were any objections in the Council to the redraft of Paragraph 12-a which Mr. Gray had read. Could the Council accept this version? The Chiefs of Staff seemed to be agreeable to it. If so, could we not use this new version of Paragraph 12-a as a guide for the solution of other issues posed in the military paragraphs? Secretary McElroy said that at least he had felt we had achieved a clear understanding that there could be no such thing as a limited war in the NATO area or in Communist China. The President said that Secretary McElroy was right unless the President and his chief advisers made a different decision. He repeated his view that the period or phase in which we now found ourselves was still one which required balanced military

forces and capabilities. The President confessed that he did not know when our new missiles would really prove themselves to be reliable and we could thus place much greater reliance on them.

Secretary Herter returned to a point implied earlier by Secretary McElroy that some of the lower echelons of the State Department had ideas at variance with the ideas at the top level of the State Department. Secretary Herter insisted that there was no division on these matters in the State Department although he admitted that sometimes we overstated the State Department case. Turning his attention to Paragraph 16, Secretary Herter said he very much liked the sentence with respect to military planning for U.S. forces to oppose local aggression which was to be based on development of a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability, for use as authorized by the President. On the other hand, Secretary Herter felt that he detected a contradiction between the sentence in Paragraph 16 which stated "that the prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary to defeat such local aggression is considered the best means to keep hostilities from broadening into general war, and the last sentence of the paragraph which stated that "When the use of U.S. forces is required to oppose local aggression, force will be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid hostilities from broadening into general war."

The President replied that any military commander is naturally inclined to think that the best way to defeat any aggression was the prompt and resolute application of the necessary degree of force. He again wondered whether the objections of Secretary Herter could be met by the insertion in this sentence of phraseology along the lines of "except in unusual circumstances."

Mr. Gray expressed the view that the other disputed paragraphs would manage to fall into place if the Council could agree on the redraft text of Paragraph 12-a. However, Secretary McElroy asked that the Defense Department be allowed more time to look at the new language of Paragraph 12-a even though he thought, off the cuff, that it was O.K.

The Council agreed to Secretary McElroy's request and Mr. Gray suggested that the Council move on to consider other paragraphs in the military section of the paper.

However, the President interposed to explain that many of the people in this room at this time who had been working with him over the years realized that he was occasionally given to the use of strong language and the expression of strong sentiments. The fact that he did so, the President emphasized, was not intended in the slightest to prevent anyone from standing up and making his views known and understood.

(The President's remark seemed to be directed to his rather strongly expressed views about the folly of contemplating a limited war in Communist China.)

Mr. Gray directed the Council's attention to Paragraph 15 of NSC 5906 which was unchanged from Paragraph 13 of NSC 5810/1 and which had not been at issue in the Planning Board. On the other hand, Mr. Gray said that he had been informed that the Chiefs of Staff had a proposal for certain changes in Paragraph 15. He then called on Admiral Burke who said he felt that the issue which had concerned the Chiefs with respect to Paragraph 15 had been adequately covered by the earlier discussion this morning of the varieties of retaliatory capabilities and power.

Mr. Gray then directed the Council's attention to Paragraph 13 reading as follows:

"13. [Par. 11 of NSC 5810/1, amended.] The United States will be prepared to use chemical and biological weapons to the extent that such use will enhance the military effectiveness of the armed forces. The decision as to their [stock piling and]* use will be made by the President.

"*Budget-Treasury proposal"

Mr. Gray explained that he understood that the reason the Budget and Treasury wished to have the decision as to the stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons made by the President as well as the decision as to their use, was that these two departments felt that either too much money was being spent on the development of chemical and biological weapons if we did not actually plan to use them in war, or that too little money was being spent on these weapons if we did plan to use them in war. Mr. Gray then called on Director Stans for further elucidation.

Mr. Stans expressed the view that the whole U.S. policy with respect to chemical and biological weapons should be reconsidered. He repeated that we have spent too much money on these weapons if we do not intend to use them and too little money if we do plan to use them. He thought that there should be in the near future a full-scale presentation by the Department of Defense on chemical and biological weapons.

The President observed that what this government had always done with respect to these weapons was first of all to make sure that we had a good defense against their employment by the enemy and, second, that we had sufficient chemical and biological weapons to retaliate if the enemy used them on us. This was the policy, said the President, that he had lived with ever since 1918. However, he added, he would certainly like to see a study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject.

Dr. Killian asked to be heard on this issue and stated that this was another example where it would be prudent to give more research and development attention to a problem if we could obtain a clear policy directive to do so. There were great possibilities in developing disabling chemical agents which showed great promise of being able temporarily to incapacitate the enemy without actually having lethal effects. For this

reason Dr. Killian expressed opposition to the inclusion of the phrase proposed by the Budget and Treasury because inclusion of the phrase would tend to put a damper on further efforts in research and development on chemical and biological agents. Mr. Stans denied that the phraseology he was proposing was designed to put a damper on further research and development on chemical weapons. What he wanted, said Mr. Stans, was no further procurement of chemical and biological weapons until U.S. policy on their use had been clarified. Dr. Killian answered that he had no objection to the inclusion of the phraseology proposed by Budget and Treasury if this was all the words were intended to convey, but he repeated that he did not wish to retard research and development work on these weapons and would object to the inclusion of the phrase if this was its intention.

Secretary McElroy observed that the problem of chemical and biological weapons had been reviewed with him at a high level in the Department of Defense and he would be glad to present the results to the National Security Council if this were desired. On the other hand, he opposed including the phraseology proposed by the Treasury and Budget because it would add one more burden to the many burdens that the President was already carrying. The President in turn commented that he supposed that the decision on stockpiling these weapons would depend largely on the results of research and development in this field.

Mr. Gray suggested that Paragraph 13 be included without the Budget and Treasury proposal at least until such time as the Defense Department made its presentation to the Council on chemical and biological weapons. Thereafter, he directed the Council's attention to Paragraph 17 reading as follows:

"17. [Par. 15 of NSC 5810/1, amended.] [In order to maximize the cold war contribution of U.S. military power,]* to the extent consistent with primary missions, the capabilities of U.S. military forces should be utilized in appropriate ways to reinforce and support overt and covert political, economic, psychological, technological, and cultural measures in order to achieve national objectives."

He pointed out that the U.S. Information Agency proposed the deletion of the bracketed language at the beginning of the paragraph and called on the Director, U.S.I.A., to explain his objection to this language.

Mr. Allen stated that his desire to remove the bracketed language was not intended in any way to minimize the type of activity called for in the paragraph as a whole, quite the contrary. He would be glad to see such activities increased but . . . The President interrupted to suggest dropping the two words "cold war" and leaving the rest of the paragraph as it was. Mr. Allen went on to explain his objections to the bracketed phrase because it seemed to lump all the humanitarian activities of our military forces under the heading of cold war activities.

Secretary McElroy said that he did not care about the particular words cold war but that the Defense Department did wish the language in Paragraph 17 to emphasize the kind of activity which the paragraph described.

After further discussion agreement followed on wording to take the place of the bracketed language to which Mr. Allen had objected. This read:

"In order to maximize the contribution of U.S. military power to the achievement of over-all national objectives,"

Mr. Gray invited the Council's attention to Paragraph 18 dealing largely with U.S. military bases overseas but also including language with respect to the positioning of IRBMs around the Sino-Soviet periphery. Mr. Gray said that he felt that the U.S. base system was something separate and distinct from the problem of stationing of IRBMs in the territory of our Allies and that he was therefore proposing that the IRBM problem be made the subject of a separate paragraph and handed out copies of a text of a proposed new paragraph dealing with IRBMs and reading as follows:

"Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) will be positioned only in those NATO and other Free World nations which demonstrate a desire to have them, and pressure will not be exerted by the U.S. to persuade reluctant nations to accept them. Proposals for the positioning of IRBMs outside the NATO area will be subject to approval by the President."

When Mr. Gray had finished reading his proposed new paragraph, the President said that it seemed to him rudimentary common sense not to pressure other nations to accept these weapons.

Secretary McElroy said he would be glad to accept Mr. Gray's proposed new paragraph provided the phrase "and pressure will not be exerted by the U.S. to persuade reluctant nations to accept them" was deleted. He explained that while he too disapproved of exerting pressure on reluctant nations to accept these weapons, there was going to be a problem as to what precisely was meant by pressure. He went on further to say that once a nation had willingly accepted these IRBMs, the negotiations for their installation involved lots of problems and difficulties which could conceivably be misinterpreted as pressure by the U.S. although not intended to be such. He cited the negotiations with Italy on the positioning of IRBMs in that country as an example. Thus he said he was fully in accord with the first clause of the first sentence of Mr. Gray's proposed paragraph but not with the second.

After further discussion the President suggested the deletion of the clause to which Secretary McElroy objected and the substitution therefor of the phrase "and officially request them."

It being after eleven o'clock Mr. Gray suggested that the President adjourn the meeting. The President agreed and stated that this had been the most interesting meeting of the National Security Council for some considerable time.

*The National Security Council.*¹⁰

a. Discussed paragraphs 10 through 18 of NSC 5906 in the light of the written views of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the views of the Chiefs of Staff as presented orally at the meeting, and of the State Department "Summary Statement of Foreign Policy Requirements Bearing Upon U.S. Strategy" enclosed with the reference memorandum of July 7, 1959.

b. Considered possible redrafts of paragraph 12–a of NSC 5906, and deferred action thereon pending further study by the Department of Defense.

c. Referred paragraphs 10, 12–a, 15 and 16 to the NSC Planning Board for further study and recommendation in the light of the discussion at this meeting of the results of the study by the Department of Defense referred to in b above, and of further study by other interested departments and agencies.

d. Agreed that paragraph 13 should remain as stated in existing policy (paragraph 11 of NSC 5810/1) pending a presentation to the Council at an early date by the Department of Defense, in collaboration with the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, on the subject of chemical and biological weapons.¹¹

e. Tentatively adopted the following amendments to NSC 5906:

(1) *Paragraph 17, page 14:* Substitute for the bracketed phrase and the footnote thereto the following words: "In order to maximize the contribution of U.S. military power to the achievement of over-all national objectives."

(2) *Paragraph 18, page 14:* Delete the last sentence thereto and insert a new numbered paragraph immediately thereafter, reading as follows:

"Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM's) will be positioned only in those NATO and other Free World nations which demonstrate a desire to have them and officially request them. Proposals for the positioning of IRBM's outside the NATO areas will be subject to approval by the President."

f. Agreed to continue consideration of NSC 5906 at the next Council meeting.

¹⁰The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2105, approved by the President on July 13. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

¹¹The presentation was made to the Council by Dr. York and General Lemnitzer on February 18, 1960. See Document 92.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate study.

The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, for appropriate implementation.

S. Everett Gleason

65. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, July 14, 1959.

OTHERS PRESENT

Admiral Radford
General Goodpaster

Admiral Radford said he would report to the President some impressions he had gained from his period of temporary duty. He expects General Twining to return to duty next week, probably Monday.

Two principal things bothered him during his period in the Pentagon just ended. The first is continental defense. This is taking a large amount of money and is scheduled to take more. He feels that a sizable reduction should be made in the amount of money being given to this. If the present programs are continued, then we should add a fall-out shelter program to them, and this would be very expensive. He really thought we should re-allocate funds from this purpose to other purposes.

He said he had asked both General Lemnitzer and General White to consider trading some responsibilities—for example, giving the whole air defense mission to Air Force units, and tactical air operations to Army units. Air defense is now split, and the Army is in fact initiating many activities with missiles to do a job formerly done only by tactical air. He said both had expressed interest in this, and would talk to each other. He said they are West Point classmates who get along well with each other.

The Nike-Zeus is another element of air defense which causes him concern. The missile will be extremely advanced, complicated and expensive and will require wide dispersion. He thought that the money should be used in other places, for example in modernizing certain equipment of the Army and the Navy. The President said that Dr. Killian had suggested putting some of the air defense money into hardening and fall-out shelters. On this point Admiral Radford recalled that he had in times past questioned putting so many of our big missile bases in the United States, thus making the United States too attractive a target. He thought they might be put on islands in the Pacific, the Atlantic and in the Aleutians area as well as in Alaska. The President said we are getting into insoluble problems in connection with our bases abroad. They are terribly expensive, and are so valuable that, once installed, give foreign countries leverage for blackmail on us. Admiral Radford said his notion was to put them on U.S. soil. He said that the Air Force had stressed the problems of manning and morale. Many of them could be handled just as we handle the DEW line. He spoke of the great advantage of the Polaris, in giving dispersion, mobility and concealment to our missile forces.

Admiral Radford then went on to say that the second problem, and by far the greater one, is the idea generated in the State Department that it is possible to have a conventional force of large size, and to fight a sizable war with it without using atomic weapons. He recalled that the reason we can intervene in many areas quickly with force is that we do this with small forces which, armed with atomic weapons, are not in danger of being wiped out. Assistant Secretary of State Gerard Smith, he said, is attempting to get a change of policy, even though Mr. Herter says that he is seeking nothing so sweeping. The President asked me to put this down for him to talk to Mr. Herter about. He recalled his own view that any formed unit will have to have the capacity to use these weapons; whether they are in fact used or not is a command decision to be made in light of the circumstances.

Admiral Radford said that he believes all this whipped-up concern over use of atomic weapons is unfounded; there is more real concern lest we fail to use them when their use is really needed. He thought that State Department people below top level are generating opposition to the redraft of the national security policy paragraph discussed by the President at the last NSC meeting.¹ The President asked me to call Douglas Dillon and tell him that there had been long talks on this paragraph, that its meaning is now very close to what he intends, that he understood it to be generally in line with Mr. Herter's thinking, and he does not want a great campaign started to generate opposition to it.

¹ Reference is to paragraph 12-a. of NSC 5906.

Admiral Radford said he is going to see Admiral Burke and General Lemnitzer further on this matter. He said that he is counting greatly on General Lemnitzer to pull things together in the Army in a better way than we have seen in many years. He said the real question at the moment is that the Army and the Navy want some of the money that is going to the Air Force. He personally felt that some redistribution would make sense, although he pointed out that many of the expensive projects in the Air Force budget such as the DEW line are simply there for convenience and could have been carried under the Department of Defense. Admiral Radford said that in his opinion the Army and the Navy, if they take a long range view, have less grounds for concern over their combat roles than does the Air Force. This is why the Air Force in his opinion is making such efforts to get into missiles, outer space, etc. The President stressed strongly that he agreed with a point made by Dr. Killian that there must be improved coordination between NASA and ARPA and that ARPA should take control of space research throughout the Department of Defense. There was then discussion of the problems of top level direction in the Department of Defense. The President said he cannot figure out what is causing the trouble in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The organization seems to be failing to do its job. Admiral Radford suggested, and the President agreed, that it would be most helpful for the President to meet with the Chiefs shortly.

G.

Brigadier General, USA

66. Letter From Howard Furnas of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith)

Washington, July 15, 1959.

DEAR GERRY: The Planning Board did take up the military paragraphs yesterday, but the discussion was confusing and in many ways discouraging.

Gray introduced the subject by saying that the President does not believe the change in language represents any change in policy, and that

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy 1958-1959. Top Secret. Smith was in Geneva, where he was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Conference.

it will not allow additional strength for the Army nor a "doubling or tripling" of the Defense budget for additions to the limited war capability. If the Secretary of State believes that a change in policy is involved, or that an increase in our limited war capability will result, says Gray, he is wrong. Gray said there still may be a difference of opinion which is not clearly brought out, namely, on whether the US now has an adequate limited war capability.

I said I didn't think the Secretary of State cares whether the change is regarded as a change in policy or as a clarification of language to make it possible to implement present policy, so long as what comes out of the pipeline is an adequate limited war capability made up of balanced nuclear and non-nuclear forces. In response to Gray's direct question, I said we believe the US does not now have an adequate non-nuclear limited war capability and that we feel we are in good company with the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps who would actually have to fight such actions.

When asked to give examples of where the US might have to respond to local aggression with forces which are not now adequate, I said that we might be called upon to fight in non-nuclear actions, at least initially, in the Off-Shore Islands, Lebanon, Iraq, Berlin, and Yugoslavia. Other Planning Board members added Korea, South Vietnam, and Iran.

Defense proposed to add the word "militarily" before "appropriate" in the second sentence of Gray's redraft paragraph 12-a (attached). I said State could not accept this, and Gray said this was not what the President had in mind in agreeing to the language. Lay suggested the second sentence read simply: "Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where nuclear weapons would not be used, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear." Gray did not seem enthusiastic about this (although I think we can accept it). Triebel did not like it, and Williams said Defense would be glad to study it. In the next sentence Triebel wanted to change "deployed organized units" to "designated commanders." Gray objected to this.

My guess is that para 12-a represents the President's thinking and was perhaps drafted by Gray under instructions; thus he is very reluctant to see changes in it and thus he can be so positive about what it means to the President. It seems clear that Defense now realizes the implications of the new language and McElroy wants to back away from his tentative agreement to it. Williams' tactics yesterday were deliberately stalling.

Later, yesterday afternoon, during the briefing of Dillon for the NSC meeting, he received a call from Goodpaster. Goodpaster told him that Admiral Radford had seen the President and had discussed with him

paragraph 12.¹ Radford apparently told the President that even though the latter might have understood from Secretary Herter and Mr. Dillon that the new language generally met the view of State and that they did not envisage any major change of policy this is not true with respect to some subordinates in State including Policy Planning people. The President asked Goodpaster to call Dillon to say that there had been long talks on paragraph 12, that it was essentially what the President intended, and that he would not want a big campaign of opposition built up against it. Dillon said he had understood and was satisfied that the paragraph was accepted as the basis for change in the language, and that while the Pentagon may be going back on its agreement to the paragraph, there is no question of a change of mind so far as State is concerned. Goodpaster told Dillon that Radford said there is a view within the Planning Staff of State that we should have a force of major size and be able to fight sizable operations. Goodpaster said this is what the President is addressing himself to. Dillon said that unless some change takes place we will wind up three or four years from now with no limited war capability at all. There was some exchange about the memorandum on the talk with Ambassador Caccia.² Goodpaster said Gray feels that the point of difference between State and Defense is on whether the proposed change concerns the need to maintain our present capability through future years or whether there is a need for additional forces at present. He said the President would like to know that the view he understood the Secretary and Dillon to hold would be generally held in State. Dillon promised to check this out and let the President know before the Council meeting on Thursday.

This conversation reveals what must have been in Gray's mind before the Planning Board yesterday. He feels that even though the language may be agreed to, it represents different things to the two opposing sides. Williams has told me that his principals feel that the view of State and the majority of the Chiefs was never clearly put forward and that the President doesn't understand that a change in policy is being proposed. The problem is fuzzed further by the apparent agreement between the two sides on the President's language. In searching for the issue here Gray has come up with his idea that the real difference is on the question of whether (a) our present capability is adequate and we are merely seeking to ensure that it doesn't deteriorate, or (b) we need an additional capability at present and for the future.

In any case, this will go back to the President now. After Dillon sees him tomorrow the President may want a further session.³ I think Dillon understands our view, which I put forward as clearly as I could last eve-

¹ See Document 65.

² Not further identified.

³ Furnas' handwritten postscript states that Dillon and Eisenhower did not discuss this subject at their meeting on July 16. According to the President's Appointment Book, the meeting lasted only 9 minutes. (Eisenhower Library, President's Daily Appointments)

ning, assisted by Graham Martin,⁴ but I can't be sure what position he will take. He seems inclined to feel that State can't judge as to the adequacy of our present capability and must accept the assurance of the people responsible for these matters. Without going into the question of what the responsibility of the Secretary of State is in this matter, both Martin and I pointed out that the views of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps are on record, and that those officers in the Department who were intimately involved in the Off-Shore and Lebanon operations had been able to arrive at some judgments.

I'll let you know of any further developments.⁵

Sincerely,

Howard

Attachment⁶

Washington, July 9, 1959.

REDRAFT OF PARAGRAPH 12–a

It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation's war objectives. Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons

⁴ Dillon's Special Assistant.

⁵ In a conversation with Eisenhower on July 15, Gray stated that the Department of State view was that conventional war capability was inadequate and should be enlarged. Eisenhower was displeased that "clear and decisive" language could not be found to "communicate to everyone concerned his clear intention." Gray replied that it was unlikely the language would be revised again so it should be clear and commonly understood. (Memorandum of conversation, July 17; Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up) See the Supplement.

In Tocah 162 to Herter at Geneva, June 21, Dillon reported that he had agreed to a Defense proposal to accept "Gray's paragraph 12–a" if there was a proviso stating that it was a clarification, not a change, in basic policy. Calling it a clarification was satisfactory if there was an understanding that the new language would be controlling. In Cahto 159 from Geneva, July 21, Herter approved, but asked Dillon at his discretion to state to the NSC an assumption that the new language would permit an ability to engage "to some significant extent in limited hostilities" without use of nuclear weapons. (Both in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy 1958–1959) Both are in the Supplement.

⁶ Top Secret.

would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear. All deployed organized units will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President.

67. Memorandum of Discussion at the 413th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, July 16, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Items 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," and 2. "Berlin."]

3. *Basic National Security Policy* (NSC 5810/1; NIE 11-4-58; NIE 100-59; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Overseas Internal Security Program", dated April 10, 1959; NSC Action No. 2079; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Status of Military Mobilization Base Program", dated April 21, 1959; NSC 5906; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Basic National Security Policy", dated June 19 and July 6 and 7, 1959; NSC Actions Nos. 2103 and 2105)

Mr. Gray indicated that the Council would now proceed to resume consideration of NSC 5906 and called attention to the fact that a four-page Change Sheet had been given to each member of the Council this morning. He also noted that a number of other changes had been agreed upon in the Planning Board as well as in conferences between Secretary Dillon and Secretary Anderson of the Treasury Department. (Copies of Mr. Gray's briefing note and of the Change Sheet are filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and attached to this Memorandum.)¹

Mr. Gray passed over Paragraphs 19 and 20² with a brief comment. When he came to Paragraph 23 he noted that there was a split between

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason.

¹ For text, see the Supplement.

² These paragraphs are identical to paragraphs 20 and 21 of NSC 5906/1.

the Majority Proposal on the one hand and a proposal by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the other. He also pointed out that the Majority Proposal for Paragraph 23 had been revised in the Change Sheet which had been distributed to the members. The revised Majority Proposal read as follows:

“a. The United States should seek:

“(1) To prevent or retard the development by additional nations of national nuclear weapons capabilities.

“(2) To prevent or retard the acquisition of national control over nuclear weapons components by nations which do not now possess them.

“b. If, however, it becomes clear that efforts to achieve agreed international controls affecting nuclear weapons development will not succeed, or if there is substantial evidence that the Soviet Union is permitting or contributing to the development of nuclear weapons capabilities by Bloc countries, the United States should enhance the nuclear weapons capability of selected allies by the exchange with them or provision to them of appropriate information, materials, or nuclear weapons, under arrangements for control of weapons to be determined.

“c. In anticipation of the possible acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by such allies, the United States should now urgently consider within the Executive Branch plans for the development of multi-national (e.g., NATO) arrangements for determining requirements for, holding custody of, and controlling the use of nuclear weapons.

“d. Legislation should be sought when and as necessary for b and c above.”

The Defense–JCS Proposal which was much shorter read as follows:

“23. [Fourth sentence of par. 18 of NSC 5810/1, amended.]³ It should be U.S. policy to exchange with, or provide to, additional selected allies scientific and technical information in order to assist the research and development of nuclear weapons capability among our most reliable allies and to enhance our own knowledge. Seek legislation as necessary to authorize such exchange or provision of information.”

Mr. Gray also pointed out that Paragraph 24 was very closely involved with Paragraph 23 and indeed in the Majority Proposal was incorporated in Paragraph 23 as sub-paragraph c.⁴ After explaining the nature of the difference between the two versions of Paragraph 23 Mr. Gray asked Secretary Dillon to speak to the Majority Proposal.

Secretary Dillon said that it was the basic view of the State Department that the policy that we have hitherto followed, that is, of trying to

³ Brackets in the source text.

⁴ The original Defense–JCS proposal has not been found.

prevent any additional nations from achieving a nuclear capability, was a good policy and should not be abandoned until it has proved to be ineffective. It was quite possible that that time would come. Secretary Dillon also suggested an amendment in the Majority version of Paragraph 23-a(1). He felt that the word "prevent" should be deleted as being so strong that it suggested that we might try to prevent the acquisition of a nuclear capability by other nations through the use of actual force. To Secretary Dillon the word "discourage" seemed a more appropriate word than the word "prevent."

Secretary Dillon went on to say that if the U.S. should in time come to feel that we would have to go further in passing on to other nations nuclear information or even nuclear weapons, we should try to do so within some multi-national framework rather than through bilateral agreements. He added that of course the State Department recognized the danger that the Soviets might pass such information or weapons to their allies and satellites but he was inclined to doubt that the Soviets would do so in the near future.

Secretary McElroy stated that he was obliged to disassociate himself from support of the Defense-JCS version of Paragraph 23. He explained that the proposal that the U.S. exchange with our reliable allies or provide such information to them would raise a lot of problems. Perhaps this was intended to be confined to the French but it could be interpreted to apply to the Germans, the Italians or others. He added that he liked Secretary Dillon's suggestion of dropping the word "prevent". If that term were dropped, the resulting phraseology would go a long way to meet the concerns of the Department of Defense. Secretary McElroy also expressed approval of the Majority version of Paragraph 23-b. With regard to the difference between the content of sub-paragraph 23-c and Paragraph 24, Secretary McElroy did not think it very significant. Accordingly, it would be his suggestion, he said, to refer these paragraphs back to the Planning Board for further consideration in view of the likelihood that an agreed version could easily be reached.

The President said that he certainly hoped that agreement on Paragraph 23 could be reached because he was personally very confused about the issue raised in the paragraph. Perhaps we were sticking our heads in the sand when we talked about continuing to keep our nuclear secrets from falling into the hands of other parties. Certainly the hope of keeping these secrets continually recedes. At some future time a great many nations will have learned how to manufacture nuclear weapons. Accordingly, said the President, it was his own feeling that we are sitting on the beach waiting for the rising tide to stop.

Mr. Gray suggested that the Council might like to hear from Admiral Burke on Paragraph 23. Admiral Burke explained that the JCS felt that in due course the French would eventually by their own efforts, and at

very great expense, succeed in manufacturing nuclear weapons. If this turns out to be the case and the French do succeed independently in achieving this objective, they are bound to be angry at the U.S. for not assisting them in the process. On the other hand, if we now proceed to assist them in achieving a nuclear capability, Franco-American relations would improve.

Turning to sub-paragraph c of the revised Majority Proposal, Admiral Burke indicated that the JCS had a quarrel with the wording. It was the belief of the Chiefs that the development of multi-national arrangements, called for in the paragraph, should begin with NATO. The present wording of the paragraph suggested that NATO was merely one example of the kind of multi-national arrangements we should consider and plan for. Secretary Dillon indicated that he would have no objection to changing the language of sub-paragraph c to meet the point raised by Admiral Burke.

With respect to the development of nuclear weapons, Mr. McCone pointed out that our recent exchange of information with the U.K. has revealed that the British had much more information on this [*4 lines of source text not declassified*].

Mr. McCone went on to say that he was somewhat troubled by the two conditions in sub-paragraph 23-b which would govern a U.S. decision to enhance the nuclear weapons capability of selected allies. According to the sub-paragraph, as now written, the U.S. would enhance the nuclear weapons capability of selected allies if it became apparent that efforts to achieve agreed international controls would not succeed or if it became known that the Soviet Union was contributing to the development of nuclear weapons capabilities by Bloc countries. These conditions seemed wrong to Mr. McCone. He thought that the criterion which should determine U.S. action should be the criterion of whether the security of the U.S. was enhanced.

Mr. Gray said that it seemed to him that there were no basic differences of view on Paragraph 23 and he believed that the Planning Board could come back with agreed language. He added that this paragraph was one notable instance where our use of outside consultants in preparing our revised Basic National Security Policy had contributed greatly.

With respect to Paragraphs 25, 26⁵ and 28 Mr. Gray commented briefly but there was no discussion. When Mr. Gray reached Paragraph 28 dealing with dynamic research and development for military application, he read the last two sentences, which were new, as follows:

"During any nuclear weapons test moratorium, research and development should go forward as rapidly and as far as possible on nuclear

⁵ Paragraphs 25 and 26 of NSC 5906 are identical to paragraphs 25 and 26 of NSC 5906/1.

weapons even though nuclear testing is not permitted. Effort should be directed also to permit early test resumption should the moratorium be terminated."⁶

Mr. McCone immediately questioned whether the last of these two sentences really added anything to the paragraph although the first of the two new sentences seemed to him to cover the matter and was quite satisfactory.

Mr. Gray thought that the last sentence might well be omitted. Secretary McElroy pointed out that if we were literally to follow the directive given by the last sentence in Paragraph 28-a, very large sums of money would be involved. Preparing and organizing for extensive tests, he explained, was a long-term and extremely expensive operation. Mr. Gray said he judged that Mr. McElroy agreed with Mr. McCone in wishing to delete the last sentence of Paragraph 28-a which view Secretary McElroy confirmed.

The President warned that responsible officials ought to keep this problem in mind daily. If there is any possibility of any kind of hopeful political change, it did not seem sensible to the President to have our readiness to start test resumption so far advanced that we could resume tests the very next day after the moratorium was terminated. He added that he thought his Science Advisory Group might well take a look at what is involved in this problem. Perhaps we might be able to put our test resumption capabilities on a lower stand-by basis.

Secretary McElroy said that he would welcome such a move and the President added that he hated to keep putting millions into our test resumption capabilities each month when it was possible that we might never resume testing. Secretary Dillon added that even if the moratorium were to be terminated next October, there was no certainty that some kind of negotiations would not continue after this. The issue certainly had foreign policy implications. The President observed that we certainly have to recognize the fact that we are here speculating about actions that somebody else will take and that the best we could do was to make an educated guess.

Thereupon Mr. Gray ran briefly through Paragraphs 36, where he suggested a minor amendment, Paragraph 37, and Paragraph 38. He pointed out that the original split in Paragraph 38⁷ had now ceased to exist inasmuch as the State Department had later expressed a willingness

⁶ These are the last two sentences of paragraph 28-a. The remainder of the paragraph is identical in NSC 5906 and 5906/1.

⁷ In NSC 5906, the second sentence of the "State Proposal" reads: "To the extent feasible the United States should encourage Western European nations to influence and support their respective dependent or recently dependent areas so long as such encouragement is consistent with U.S. security interests." The matching sentence of the "Majority Proposal" reads: "The United States should encourage and, to the extent feasible, rely on Western European nations to influence and support their respective dependent or recently dependent areas so long as such encouragement and reliance are consistent with U.S. security interests."

to accept the Majority Proposal. Secretary Dillon explained why the State Department had agreed to accept the Majority language since the State Department no longer feared that the Majority language would prevent the U.S. from assisting more recently independent areas if assistance of their metropolises was not forthcoming.

Mr. Gray also pointed out that the Defense Department proposed adding the bracketed language at the end of Paragraph 38 reading as follows:

“[Recognizing, however, that the United States should not allow the attitudes and emotions of the mother country unduly to influence actions essential to attaining or preserving U.S. objectives in emerging or newly independent countries.]”⁸

“* Defense proposal”

Mr. Gray explained that originally this bracketed language had had the support of both the Defense and JCS representatives but that in their formal views the Joint Chiefs had withdrawn support for the proposal so that it was now presumably being proposed by Defense alone. He called on Secretary McElroy to defend the Defense position on this phraseology.

Secretary McElroy pointed out that the advantage in this language, as seen by Defense, was that it would place the U.S. in a position of being more forthright and direct in moving into certain situations, as was not done in the case of Guinea where we had delayed appointing a U.S. Ambassador lest we offend the French.

The President said that he believed that acts taken by the U.S. in this context would have to be taken on a case-by-case basis. It did not seem to him practicable to set down this guidance in a policy paper. The President also expressed concern over the possible repercussions in NATO if we were to follow too literally the guidance suggested in the bracketed language. Mr. McElroy said that inasmuch as earlier phraseology in NSC 5906 seemed to cover the problem adequately, he would not insist on the retention of the bracketed language. Mr. Allen Dulles expressed the hope that dropping this language would not mean that the U.S. would take second place to the metropolises in these countries because many of these new countries will look to us for help and guidance rather than to their metropolises.

In Paragraph 39, dealing with U.S. action with respect to nations vulnerable to Communist subversion, Mr. Gray read subparagraph 39–a(4) as follows:

“(4) In the event of an imminent or actual Communist seizure of control from within, take all feasible measures to thwart it, [including mili-

⁸ Brackets in the source text.

tary action if required and appropriate to cope with the situation.]* [not excluding the possibility of taking military action as a last resort to prevent Communist domination of a vital area.]*⁹

“*State-Defense-JCS proposal

“**Treasury proposal”

After explaining as best he could the nature of the split in this sub-paragraph, Mr. Gray called on Under Secretary of the Treasury Scribner to explain the matter more fully.

Secretary Scribner said that it was certainly not the intention of the Treasury proposal to change our policy. Rather it was a desire to provide more explicit policy guidance to our military planners inasmuch as this was essentially a planning problem. Moreover, in the Planning Board discussions of this problem he had detected no indications that the U.S. would ever move in with military forces except as a last resort and then in only vital areas. Accordingly, it seemed to Secretary Scribner that the Treasury language provided better guidance than the language proposed by State-Defense, and JCS.

Secretary McElroy replied that adoption of the Treasury proposal might well seem to indicate an undue reluctance on the part of the U.S. to use military action if required. The matter hardly got into planning at all although obviously we would not resort to military action if we could achieve our objectives by any other measures.

Secretary Scribner replied by expressing fear that if we adopted the State-Defense-JCS language, our military intervention might come too soon. Secretary Dillon said he failed to perceive any very significant difference between the two conflicting versions. The President expressed agreement with Secretary Dillon. The Attorney General suggested that the whole matter might be solved by placing a period after “thwart it” and deleting all the rest of the language. The President, however, felt that it would be necessary to say something more than this. For example, if Cuba went Communist, nobody doubted that the U.S. would intervene. After further discussion and various suggestions, it was agreed to accept the President’s proposal to accept the State, Defense, JCS proposal providing the term “finally” were inserted between “if” and “required”.

Mr. Gray noted that the next split occurred in Paragraph 42 dealing with the foreign economic policy of the U.S. In sub-paragraph b of Paragraph 42 Budget and Treasury wished to add a final sentence reading:

“Any increases in economic development assistance should to the extent politically and militarily feasible, be offset by decreases in other economic or in military assistance programs.”

⁹ Brackets in the source text.

After explaining the various views about the proposed language, Mr. Gray called on Director Stans. Mr. Stans said he thought that the State Department had agreed to include the language proposed by Budget and Treasury. Mr. Gray replied that this was the case but that the views of other departments had yet to be provided on the wisdom of including or deleting this language. Secretary Dillon said that it was true that the State Department had said it could continue to live with this language although it would prefer to delete it inasmuch as it was pretty meaningless and there were no instances where increases in economic development assistance had been offset by decreases elsewhere in our assistance programs. Mr. Stans admitted that this might well be true but thought that if this language which occurred in our present Basic National Security Policy statement (NSC 5810/1) were deleted in the proposed new policy statement (NSC 5906), the deletion might be thought to have greater significance than was actually the case.

The President thought that we were at present doing something like this now. He often increased our assistance in one area and decreased it in another. Furthermore, he asked whether the inclusion of the language had in the past done us any harm. Mr. Gray replied in the negative and the Council agreed to include the language proposed by Budget and Treasury.

Mr. Gray pointed out that the split which had formerly existed in Paragraph 43–d had been resolved.¹⁰ Apropos of the general subject of U.S. assistance to less-developed areas, covered in Paragraphs 43 and 44, the President said he had a question to put to the Council. Were we studying the feasibility of developing some kind of multinational agreement to see whether it might not be possible to secure a greater degree of coordination of our own efforts and the efforts of other Free World nations and in order to try to develop among other Free World nations a greater sense of responsibility for assisting the less-developed areas of the world? It seemed to the President that the U.S. had taken too much of this burden on its own shoulders. We ought to ask other Free World nations to share this burden with us. A serious study should be made with respect to this possibility.

Secretary Dillon replied that he and his associates had thought a great deal about this problem and had talked it over with the British, with the West Germans, and later with the Italians. All were agreed on the general principle but the problem remained of working out a mechanism by which such multi-national aid to the less-developed areas could be made effective. It was essential to avoid any suggestion that the Western Nations were levying demands on the less-developed nations in the

¹⁰This original split has not been found.

course of providing assistance to them. Secretary Dillon indicated that he had also been talking with officials in the Treasury Department with a view to increasing the role of the World Bank. However, he certainly agreed that more must be done to secure a greater coordination of Free World efforts to help the underdeveloped nations.

The President said he thought we ought to get thoroughly into the business with the representatives of the appropriate Western European countries. After all, he said, these countries have as much to gain or lose in the underdeveloped areas as the U.S. It is for this reason that we have been groping with plans for trying to expand NATO's hitherto largely military mission.

Discussion of this item concluded with Mr. Gray reading the newly agreed wording for Paragraph 43-f which had originally contained two splits.¹¹ He also noted that the split in Paragraph 44-b had been resolved when the State Department had agreed to the inclusion of the bracketed language.¹² Mr. Gray also read the last sentence of Paragraph 44 as follows:

"In its actions the U.S. should seek to avoid giving the impression that the U.S. is guaranteeing or underwriting the achievement of specific rates of economic growth or the fulfillment of overall economic targets in less-developed countries."

Mr. Gray said he read this language in because while there was no controversy at present, the sentence had occasioned much discussion in the Planning Board. The President commented that really the phraseology seemed to him simply a caution for the eager beavers.

Mr. Gray also read Paragraph 48 as follows:

"Interference in the trade between the Free World and the Sino-Soviet Bloc should take place only where a clear advantage to the Free World would accrue from such interference."

Mr. Gray pointed out that while this paragraph was new in our statement of Basic Policy, it had long been part of our statement of policy on Economic Defense. Essentially, therefore, it was not new U.S. policy. The President commented that he was very glad to see this statement in Basic Policy because it comprised his whole theory about trade between the Free World and the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Mr. Clarence Randall also said

¹¹ The previous version of this subparagraph reads: "Make [appropriately increased] U.S. public capital available in substantial amounts on a long-term basis for the purpose of supplementing the capital available from other sources for sound economic development in less developed areas. [The development Loan Fund should be assured of continuity and resources adequate to promote accelerated rates of development in less developed nations.]" The bracketed portions were a "State-Defense proposal." The version Gray read was incorporated in NSC 5906/1.

¹² The bracketed language, included in NSC 5906/1, is "the basic initiative as well as".

that he felt it was very important to have this guidance clearly expressed in our Basic National Security Policy. While it was contained in our Economic Defense Policy paper, the guidance it contained had not been fully implemented in the past.

With respect to Paragraph 51 dealing with negotiations with the U.S.S.R., Mr. Gray read the last sentence as follows:

“Agreements affecting strength and deployment of military forces should include provisions for effective safeguards against violations and evasions.”

While not exactly new Mr. Gray thought that this idea deserved to be stressed. The President commented with respect to the sentence that we should probably never get 100 per cent safeguards and we should not imagine that the term “effective safeguards” would ever be 100 per cent effective. Dr. Kistiakowsky agreed with the President’s remark.

Mr. Gray passed lightly over Paragraphs 52 and 54 but dwelt at greater length on a proposed new paragraph to follow Paragraph 54 dealing with U.S. personnel overseas which paragraph he read. (This paragraph change was subsequently adopted by the Council and is set forth in the Council action following this item.)

The President said he thought the new paragraph was fine. He reminded the Council that back in 1953 and 1954 we had experienced a lot of trouble with our overseas U.S. personnel because so many of them appeared to operate independently of the Chief of Mission. We had insisted at that time that the Chief of Mission should have the ultimate control so that American operations in any given foreign country would be unified. The President said he was not suggesting that the new paragraph be revised to include this thought although he wished that the OCB and the responsible agencies should not lose sight of this significant point.

Mr. Gray explained to the Council that we had now reached the point in NSC 5906 which we had agreed to cover at this meeting and that he would go on with the remaining paragraphs of NSC 5906 at next week’s Council meeting.

*The National Security Council:*¹³

a. Tentatively adopted Paragraphs 19 through 28 and 36 through 54 of NSC 5906, subject to the following:

(1) *Paragraphs 23–24, pages 16–18:* Referred these paragraphs to the NSC Planning Board for revision in the light of a revised Majority Pro-

¹³The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2108, approved by the President on July 20. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

posal circulated at the meeting and of the subsequent Council discussion.

(2) *Paragraph 28-a, page 21*: Delete the last sentence.

(3) *Paragraph 36, page 28*: Insert, in the 3rd line after the word "also", the words "through appropriate channels".

(4) *Paragraph 38, pages 29-30*: Include the "Majority Proposal" and delete the "State Proposal". Also delete the bracketed phrase at the end of the paragraph and the footnote thereto.

(5) *Paragraph 39-a-(4), page 31*: Delete the bracketed phrases and the footnotes thereto, and substitute the following: "including military action if finally required and appropriate to cope with the situation."

(6) *Paragraph 42-b, pages 33-34*: In the 3rd line, substitute "such assistance" for "public capital". Include the bracketed last sentence.

(7) *Paragraph 43-d, page 35*: Revise the first sentence to read as follows, and delete the bracketed sentence which follows it:

"d. Utilize and support the efforts of Free World international financial institutions to the maximum extent possible to promote economic development and to bring about economic reforms in less developed nations."

(8) *Paragraph 43-f, page 36*: In the first sentence, delete the bracketed phrase "appropriately increased" and the footnote; and in the second line substitute the word "adequate" for the word "substantial". Delete the bracketed second sentence and substitute the following: "U.S. lending agencies should be assured of continuity in order to contribute to this purpose."

(9) *Paragraph 44-b, page 37*: Include the bracketed words.

(10) *Page 47*: Insert a new numbered paragraph following Paragraph 54, as follows:

"The acceptance by the people and governments of foreign countries of the presence on their soil of official U.S. personnel* directly affects our capability to achieve our national security objectives. To this end, programs should be developed and improved to encourage and strengthen the natural inclination of the individual American to be a good representative of his country and to promote conduct and attitudes conducive to good will and mutual understanding. Each department and agency and senior representatives overseas should seek (a) to ensure that U.S. official personnel understand the importance to the United States of their role as personal ambassadors (b) to develop programs that promote good personal relations between foreign nationals and U.S. personnel, and (c) to ensure that the total number of U.S. official personnel in each country is held to a strict minimum consistent with sound implementation of essential programs.

"*As of March 31, 1959 there were 1,072,200 military and citizen employees of the United States and their dependents in foreign countries and possessions."

b. Noted the President's request that:

(1) The President's Science Advisory Committee study and report on the appropriate extent and timing of efforts to permit early resumption of nuclear weapons tests should the moratorium of such tests be terminated.

(2) The Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, in consultation with the Department of State, keep the plans and preparation for such test resumption under continuing study, taking into account the study in (1) above, reporting to the President whenever necessary.

c. Noted, in connection with the new numbered paragraph in a-(10) above, the President's reference to his previous instructions regarding relations between Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions and representatives of all United States agencies conducting operations in foreign countries, concurred in by the Council and approved by the President in NSC Action No. 1587. The President reiterated his views concerning the importance of the role of Chiefs of Mission in exercising control over all official U.S. personnel abroad and in coordinating their activities so that a unified U.S. effort is ensured; and his request that the Operations Coordinating Board transmit to the field the substance of the new paragraph in a-(10) and the President's views related thereto.

d. Agreed to continue consideration of NSC 5906 at the next Council meeting.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, AEC, and the President's Science Advisory Committee, for appropriate implementation.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Operations Coordinating Board for appropriate implementation.

[Here follows Agenda Item 4. "Merchant Marine Policy."]

S. Everett Gleason

68. Memorandum of Discussion at the 414th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, July 23, 1959.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Basic National Security Policy* (NSC 5810/1; NIE 11-4-58; NIE 100-59; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Overseas Internal Security Program", dated April 10, 1959; NSC Action No. 2079; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Status of Military Mobilization Base Program", dated April 21, 1959; NSC 5906; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Basic National Security Policy", dated June 19 and July 6 and 7, 1959; NSC Actions Nos. 2103, 2105 and 2108)

Mr. Gray explained that Paragraph 55 which had originally had in it two splits was now an agreed paragraph. He proceeded to read the agreed wording of Paragraph 55-b as set forth in the attached "Change Sheet", Paragraphs 55-c-(3) as set forth in NSC 5906 and Paragraph 55-d as set forth in the attached "Change Sheet."¹ He felt that it was no longer necessary to discuss the differences which had now been resolved in Paragraph 55 but invited comments on the paragraph as a whole from members of the Council. (Copies of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note are filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and attached to this Memorandum.)²

Secretary Dillon said he believed that the new agreed version of Paragraph 55 represented a great improvement, particularly because for the first time in a statement of Basic National Security Policy there was stated that the goal of our domestic economic policy was vigorous, orderly, and sustained economic growth and progress in an appropriate safeguarded context.

Secretary Anderson said that he had no comments to make on Paragraph 55. However, Dr. Saulnier, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, expressed an opinion similar to that of Secretary Dillon that the new agreed version was a distinct improvement. He referred to Paragraph 55-b-(1) which in the newly agreed version read as follows:

"Avoid inflation which could prevent achievement of long-term economic growth, create serious inequities and distortions within the economy and damage our ability to compete in world markets."

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs.

¹ For text, see the Supplement.

² Dated July 22, not printed.

Dr. Saulnier expressed the view that the substitution of the term "could" for "would" in the first line was unwise. He felt that the word "would" expressed more clearly his own view. If we used the term "could" in place of "would", the change would suggest the possibility that we might be able to have simultaneously both substantial growth and inflation. Dr. Saulnier thought that this was not possible.

Acting Secretary of Commerce Mueller suggested that Dr. Saulnier's point might be met if the word "impeded" were substituted for the word "prevent" in the first line. The President added by and large he preferred the term "would" but he was not greatly concerned with either of the two words. The Council agreed to the use of the term "would".

Mr. Gray then called attention to Paragraph 56 on Internal Security. He noted that the paragraph was unchanged from the version which appeared in NSC 5810/1³ but he understood that the Director of the Budget might wish to make some comments on the paragraph. Mr. Stans said that he had no comment to make on this paragraph. Mr. J. Edgar Hoover and Mr. J. Walter Yeagley also said they had no comments to make.

Mr. Gray then turned to Paragraph 57 and said that he would ask Mr. Stans to speak to the deletion proposed by the Bureau of the Budget in Paragraph 57—a reading as follows:

"a. An essential ingredient of our domestic strength is [an improved and strengthened]*⁴ civil defense program which seeks, by both preventive and ameliorative measures, to minimize damage from nuclear attack. An effective civil defense program requires an increasing degree of Federal responsibility, support, and influence on the civil defense activities of the states."

"*Budget proposes deletion."

Mr. Stans said that the proposal by the Budget to delete the bracketed language in Paragraph 57—a was in no sense intended to change our existing policy on civil defense. The reason that Budget wished to delete the bracketed language was to call the matter to the President's attention inasmuch as we generally objected to the inclusion of programmatic words in a policy statement. Mr. Stans thought that the bracketed language was unnecessary in view of the remaining content of the paragraph. Words defining degree, he concluded, were generally undesirable.

The President commented that while this was so, we did not seem to object to using programmatic words or words describing degree when we discussed domestic economic policy in our basic policy statement.

³ Reference is to paragraph 44 of NSC 5810/1.

⁴ All brackets are in the source text.

Nevertheless he thought we were talking about a distinction without a difference.

Asked for his opinion, Governor Hoegh first pointed out that the phrase that the Budget wished to delete had been included in the previous statement of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1). We had been making some modest progress in our civil defense program and if this phrase were now to be deleted, it would suggest that no further progress was to be considered desirable. Governor Hoegh emphasized that we do not wish to hinder further progress in our civil defense program and he therefore believed that it was very important to retain the bracketed language. Mr. Stans replied that having now made his point, he was very glad to withdraw his proposal for a year.

With respect to Paragraph 58⁵ dealing with the Mobilization Base, Mr. Gray pointed out that the Planning Board had not given formal consideration to this paragraph because it was understood that the Department of Defense was in the process of reviewing the statement of policy on the Mobilization Base and would presently bring in a new version which could be considered by the National Security Council. Secretary Gates confirmed Mr. Gray's statement and added that the Secretary of Defense has already sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a new draft statement of policy on the Mobilization Base which the Joint Chiefs were now considering.

Mr. Gray likewise pointed out that the Planning Board had not given consideration to Paragraph 59⁶ on Strategic Stockpiling because the Board understood that this matter was now receiving consideration in the Cabinet. Governor Hoegh confirmed this statement and said that the results of Cabinet consideration of our stockpiling policy should be ready in a matter of two or three weeks.

With respect to Paragraph 61 on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Mr. Gray pointed out that the last two sentences were new.⁷ Mr. McCone said he approved the wording of the new sentences as did Secretary Dillon.

With respect to Paragraph 62,⁸ a new policy statement on Outer Space, Mr. Gray first pointed out that our more detailed policy on Outer Space (NSC 5814/1)⁹ was now undergoing review under the auspices of the Space Council.¹⁰ He understood that at an informal meeting of the Space Council a proposal for modifying Paragraph 62 had been proposed

⁵ Identical to paragraph 47 of NSC 5810/1.

⁶ Identical to paragraph 48 of NSC 5810/1.

⁷ Amended version of paragraph 33 of NSC 5810/1. As discussed at this meeting, identical to paragraph 62 of NSC 5906/1.

⁸ As eventually adopted, paragraph 63 of NSC 5906/1.

⁹ See footnote 1, Document 32.

¹⁰ NSC 5814/1 was superseded by a Report by the National Aeronautics and Space Council, January 26, 1960. For text, see vol. II, pp. 920-936.

and discussed but not agreed upon.¹¹ (The proposed modification of Paragraph 62 is set forth in the "Change Sheet" attached to this Memorandum.)

Dr. T. Keith Glennan, Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, said that Mr. Gray had stated the case very well. If, as in the case of the exploitation of outer space, there were only two horses in the race, the U.S. could not be a leader and run second. He believed that it should be our policy to establish supremacy for the U.S. in outer space activities. The language in Paragraph 62 of NSC 5906 was acceptable provided it was correctly interpreted.

Mr. Stans pointed out to the Council that Dr. Glennan had called for an interpretation of Paragraph 62 which would direct the U.S. to seek supremacy in outer space activities. If Dr. Glennan meant this, it would involve an actual change in U.S. outer space policy which had hitherto directed that the U.S. was to be "a recognized leader in this field" but did not call for U.S. supremacy. In any event, Mr. Stans suggested that inasmuch as the Space Council was engaged in developing a more general U.S. policy statement on outer space, he would suggest that the Council not now adopt Paragraph 62 and instead wait until the new policy statement from the Space Council had been sent to the NSC for consideration.

Dr. Glennan stated that he had no objection to Mr. Stans' proposal. The President said that he personally believed that the U.S. must achieve a position of supremacy in outer space activities with some qualifications. As demonstrated earlier (presumably in the case of the Sputnik) the people of the U.S. tended to get rather hysterical when they thought their country was lagging behind the Soviet Union with respect to scientific progress.

Mr. Stans then said that he would plead surprise over the new proposal with respect to supremacy and would like to consider the matter at greater length before he expressed a final view. Certainly the matter had obvious budgetary implications.

The President agreed to delay Council consideration of the paragraph on outer space activity until the Space Council should send to the National Security Council its new detailed policy statement of U.S. outer space activities. Mr. Gray asked Mr. Stans whether he could be ready to

¹¹The first sentence of paragraph 62 in NSC 5906 reads: "The United States should continue actively to develop and exploit outer space as needed to achieve scientific, military and political purposes and to insure that the United States is a leader in this field." The modification, as quoted in Gray's briefing note, reads: "The U.S. should continue actively and with a sense of urgency to pursue programs to develop and exploit outer space capabilities as needed to insure the attainment of national objectives in scientific, military and political areas. These programs should be designed to secure and maintain for the U.S. a position of supremacy in outer space activities without requiring that the U.S. be the leader in every phase of space exploration."

express his views at the Council meeting next week. Mr. Stans thought he would. The President stressed the psychological importance of the U.S. achieving supremacy in outer space activities. This was, he thought, perhaps the most important aspect of the attempt by the U.S. to achieve supremacy in this field.

Dr. Glennan said he did not believe that this issue would raise budgetary problems as Mr. Stans had feared. The budget for outer space activities which would be submitted would not be based on a proposal that the U.S. should achieve supremacy in outer space activities.

Mr. Gray concluded the discussion by calling attention briefly to the remaining paragraphs of NSC 5906. None of these occasioned any discussion.

At the conclusion of the discussion the President said that quite apart from NSC 5906 as such, he had a question to put to the Chiefs of Staff on the general problem of our Mobilization Base Requirements. He said that he would like very much to have, although not as a matter of urgency, a study made by military officers of middle rank which would sketch a picture of the kind of war the U.S. would face after a real nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. This was a problem, continued the President, that had bothered him terribly in the past. He insisted that we all still tended to talk about a possible future war in World War II terms. Perhaps, speculated the President, the term "Mobilization Base" is an erroneous term. After a tremendous nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., we will be faced with very severe problems even if there is not more actual fighting in the classical sense. The problems that we will face in this country in such an event will be problems that no one can solve except on a disciplined and controlled basis. In short, the President said, he would like to see what the picture is going to look like at that time insofar as we can imagine it. One would have to assume that both countries would be almost stabilized from the military point of view after the nuclear exchange between ourselves and the Soviets.

Admiral Burke stated that some of the information the President was looking for would come out of the current study of our Mobilization Base Requirements but he warned that that study would have to consist of a number of alternative possibilities. The President said he understood this but urged that we ought to have a clearer common view of what we are all talking about in the National Security Council when we use the term "Mobilization Base." It seemed to the President that this term no longer applies very cogently to the beginning of a war but only after the nuclear exchange which we must anticipate. Admiral Burke said he agreed with the President's thought.

*The National Security Council:*¹²

a. Tentatively adopted Paragraphs 55 through 66 of NSC 5906, subject to the following:

(1) *Page 48, paragraph 55–b:*

(a) Delete the first sentence of the paragraph (including the split language) and substitute therefor the following:

“The goal of our economic policy is the achievement, within a framework of free competitive enterprise and reasonable price stability, of vigorous, orderly and sustainable economic growth and progress, including the efficient employment of resources at high levels.”

(b) In the first line of subparagraph b–(1), substitute “impede” for “prevent”.

(2) *Page 49, paragraph 55–c–(2):* Delete the first clause and the footnotes relating thereto, and substitute the following: “Strive for a vigorous, orderly and sustainable economic growth;”

(3) *Page 50, paragraph 55–d, line 6:* Insert “reasonable” before “price”, and “competitive” after “free”.

(4) *Page 50, paragraph 57–a:* Include the bracketed words and delete the footnote thereto.

(5) *Pages 51–53, paragraphs 58 and 59:* Agreed that these paragraphs would be revised in the light of the results of the review thereof now being conducted by the interested departments and agencies and to be reported to the Council at the earliest feasible date.

(6) *Pages 54–55, paragraph 62:* Deferred action on this paragraph until the next Council meeting, to permit further study of the proposals put forward at an informal meeting of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (circulated in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of July 6, 1959) and the discussion at this meeting.

b. Agreed to continue at the next Council meeting further consideration of Paragraphs 10, 12–a, 15, 16, 23, 24 and 62 of NSC 5906.

c. Noted the President’s request that an informal study be made by military staff officers of the Department of Defense, with appropriate staff participation from the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, analyzing the nature of the wartime situation which would probably exist following an exchange between the United States and the USSR of their nuclear stockpiles.

Note: The action in c above, as approved by the President together with his further instructions regarding the study, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, ODCM, by the Spe-

¹²The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2110, approved by the President on July 27. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

cial Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for appropriate implementation.

[Here follow Agenda Items 2. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," 3. "Definition of 'Defectors'," and 4. "U.S. Policy Toward Finland."]

Marion W. Boggs¹³

¹³ Boggs signed over Gleason's typed signature.

69. Memorandum of Discussion at the 415th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, July 30, 1959.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Basic National Security Policy* (NSC 5810/1; NIE 11-4-58; NIE 100-59; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Overseas Internal Security Program", dated April 10, 1959; NSC Action No. 2079; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Status of Military Mobilization Base Program", dated April 21, 1959; NSC 5906; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Basic National Security Policy", dated June 19 and July 6, 7 and 28, 1959; NSC Actions Nos. 2103, 2105, 2108 and 2110)

Mr. Gray said the Council was resuming consideration of Basic National Security Policy by taking up first the paragraph on outer space and then the six unresolved paragraphs in the military section. Agreement as to these paragraphs would complete Council consideration of the subject except for the paragraphs on the mobilization base (paragraph 58) and on strategic stockpiling (paragraph 59), the proposed revisions of which he would like to have it understood would be coming forward from the responsible agencies during August. (A copy of Mr.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs.

¹ This July 28 memorandum transmitted new texts of several military and outer space paragraphs for NSC 5906, some of which had been drafted by the Planning Board in response to NSC Actions No. 2105-c and 2110-a-(6). (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5906 Series) See the Supplement.

Gray's briefing note is attached to this Memorandum and another is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting.)²

Mr. Gray then turned to Paragraph 62 (enclosure to the reference Memorandum of July 28). He said this paragraph contained new general guidance on outer space which was initially discussed at last week's Council meeting. Action on the paragraph had been deferred to permit further study, in the light of the Council discussion, of the suggestions put forward at an informal Space Council meeting. The Planning Board was unable to reconcile the differences and the paragraph contained four splits. Mr. Gray then read the first sentence of Paragraph 62 in which Treasury and Budget proposed deletion of "and with a sense of urgency"³ and the second sentence in which the majority proposed that the U.S. should obtain a position of supremacy in outer space activities, with Treasury and Budget proposing that the U.S. be a recognized leader in this field. He then called on Dr. Dryden⁴ to explain the majority position.

Dr. Dryden said the differences in this paragraph were substantive rather than merely a question of language. Two countries, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., were in the forefront of space developments. He thought it was necessary to decide whether it was the policy of the U.S. to be ahead of the U.S.S.R. or merely equal to the U.S.S.R. in outer space activities. Once this question of policy was decided, the drafting of appropriate language would present no difficulty. The split occurred because the "civilian" members of the Space Council had objected to the phrase "recognized leader" on the ground that they were unable to determine whether it meant we should be first or second.

Mr. Gray asked whether Dr. Dryden was addressing himself to the "sense of urgency" phrase or only to "supremacy" vs. "a recognized leader." Dr. Dryden indicated he was interested primarily in the supremacy split and thought the question was whether the U.S. should be ahead of the Soviet Union, equal to the Soviet Union, or in second place behind the Soviet Union.

The President said that if we stopped everything else, including our missiles program, and put every dollar and every scientist to work on outer space activities, we could forge ahead of the U.S.S.R. Dr. Dryden remarked that in his opinion the U.S. should go ahead of the U.S.S.R. in space programs. The President wondered whether we were in a 100-yard dash or a mile run. He thought we probably should not couch our own

² Not printed.

³ This sentence reads: "The United States should pursue actively [and with a sense of urgency] to pursue programs to develop and exploit outer space as needed to achieve scientific, military and political purposes."

⁴ Hugh Dryden, Acting Administrator of NASA.

policy in terms of what the U.S.S.R. was doing when we did not know exactly what the U.S.S.R. was doing in outer space.

Dr. Dryden agreed that it was not necessary for our policy to be stated in terms of what other countries were doing. The President said that the majority proposal did just that.

Mr. Stans noted that Paragraph 62 had important budgetary implications. He said the proposal that the U.S. should be a "recognized leader" came from the language of the present policy and the language of the Space Act. He then listed five reasons for his objection to the majority proposal for "supremacy":

(1) It would be impossible for the U.S. to meet every shift in communist tactics or to compete with the U.S.S.R. in every field. For example, the U.S.S.R. had built a nuclear ice-breaker, but a bill for a similar ice-breaker for the U.S. had been vetoed.

(2) It was impossible to measure the point at which we became the leader or attained supremacy, which according to the dictionary meant superiority. The U.S. could not attain superiority over the U.S.S.R. when it did not know what the U.S.S.R. was trying to achieve in outer space. The current space policy paper (NSC 5814/1) contained a timetable of Soviet capabilities. Each capability was stated as an individual estimate, and the paper specifically said that the sum of the individual capabilities was not the aggregate Soviet capability in outer space. If the U.S. attempted to compete with the U.S.S.R. in every phase of outer space activity, it would mean writing a blank check, especially if the phrase "a sense of urgency" remained in the paragraph.

(3) We were already spending \$800 million on outer space activities and expected to spend a billion dollars in FY 1960. Future funding to carry out our present policy might require \$1.4 billion in 1961 and two billion in 1963. If we increased our goals, even greater sums would be required in the future.

(4) Outer space activities should be related to other activities, since we had insufficient resources to engage in all activities that might be desirable. If we devoted too many resources to outer space, we would be compelled to cut down in equally important broad scientific areas.

(5) The type of competition which might be characterized as "a stern chase of the Soviets" was inconsistent with the policy of using outer space for peaceful purposes.

Accordingly, for all these reasons Mr. Stans urged that the existing policy language be incorporated in Basic Policy unless the Space Council presents an approved change in policy.

The President felt that the space programs proposed by Dr. Glennan and later approved represented a fine effort by the U.S. in outer space. It appeared to him that we were now trying to state in general language and in terms of the activity of another country the specific space pro-

grams that had already been approved. He was more interested in the programs themselves and in any changes that might be contemplated in those programs than he was in such general language. He felt that if it were considered necessary to have an outer space section in Basic National Security Policy, it might consist of policies approved by the Space Council. However, he felt it would be unwise to spend too much time discussing this split.

Mr. Gray suggested that perhaps it was sufficient to say, as the first sentence stated, that we would pursue programs to develop and exploit outer space as needed to achieve our purposes.

The President asked whether the space program had come before the National Security Council. Mr. Gray said the Council had adopted a policy on outer space (NSC 5814/1) and that this policy was now under review by the Space Council. The President said the space program had been before the Space Council and had been adopted. He recalled that the cost of that program was somewhat less than the cost mentioned by Mr. Stans. Dr. Dryden said that Mr. Stans' figures had included expenditures by the Department of Defense as well as by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Secretary McElroy thought it was time to effect a clear separation between military space projects and other space projects. We were approaching the point of operational capability for such military programs as surveillance satellites, communications satellites, etc. If a surveillance satellite should be considered superior to other means of military reconnaissance, he could see no reason why it should not be used even though there was a total ceiling on expenditures for space activities. The President agreed, adding that in the case mentioned by Secretary McElroy, the Defense Department could stop buying reconnaissance planes and buy reconnaissance satellites instead. Secretary McElroy said he had thought that any restrictions on expenditures for outer space applied only to non-military space activities. He repeated that it was time to consider the military and the non-military space programs separately. The President said that basic research was one type of space activity and the use of outer space for military purposes was another type of activity. We were trying to avoid basic research on outer space being done in N.A.S.A. and in the military departments. He believed that any purely research activity should be conducted by the Space Agency while applied research looking toward a military capability should be conducted by the military.

The Attorney General felt that the effort to find general words to describe specific programs amounted to approaching the problem backwards.

Secretary Dillon said that the present space programs were satisfactory to the Department of State, which was chiefly interested in the psy-

chological impact of these programs throughout the world. The way other countries looked on our space activities was an important element in national security. Accordingly, he dissented from one of Mr. Stans' arguments which contained the implication that the U.S. might have to take a secondary position in outer space activities. If it became our policy to allow ourselves to take a secondary position, and if the world believed we were in second place, the repercussions throughout the world would be most unfortunate.

Mr. Stans suggested that the words "and with a sense of urgency" be deleted from Paragraph 62, that the first sentence without these words be adopted, and that the rest of the discussion be referred to the Space Council. Mr. Gray said that the suggestion of leaving out both the "supremacy" language and the "recognized leader" language would have the virtue of not impairing a review of the space policy paper by the Space Council. If the Space Council recommended enlarged space programs, the matter could properly come back to the National Security Council.

The President asked whether Paragraph 62 covered both ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency) and NASA and Mr. Gray said that it did.

In reply to a question from Mr. Gray, Mr. Stans said he was suggesting that Paragraph 62 consist of the first sentence only. The President said the first sentence of Paragraph 62 seemed satisfactory to him, but asked whether the material beginning with "Objectives should include", should not remain in the paragraph. Mr. Gray said he believed the majority might wish to retain this material, although he understood Mr. Stans was suggesting its deletion.

Secretary McElroy, referring to sub-paragraph (2) under "Objectives"⁵ suggested that the bracketed language proposed by Budget and Treasury could well be omitted. He felt the high officials of the Department of Defense should be relieved of duty if they do not understand that the military space program is restricted to fields showing promise of offering advantages over other means for achieving required military capabilities. Mr. Gray pointed out that the Budget and Treasury proposal in sub-paragraph (2) would require that every military space program be justified as the best way of accomplishing the purposes in view. The President pointed out that the Secretary of Defense had said that the necessity

⁵ This paragraph begins: "Objectives should include: (1) a broad-based scientific and technological program in space flight and planetary-interplanetary exploration which will extend human knowledge and understanding; (2) a military space program designed to extend U.S. military capabilities through application of advancing space technology, [only in fields where such applications show promise of offering advantages over other possible means for achieving required capabilities];". The bracketed language was proposed by Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget.

for such justification was inherent and therefore need not be specifically stated. Mr. Stans said he was urging the inclusion of the Budget-Treasury proposal in sub-paragraph (2) in order to recognize the point the Secretary of Defense had just made. He felt it was necessary to match the advantages of spending money on outer space against the advantages of spending money for other activities. He believed it was desirable to make clear that the activities of the Defense Department in outer space were limited to the military field and that Defense would not engage in research in areas allocated to NASA. Secretary Anderson thought the Budget-Treasury language was appropriate because two agencies were dealing with space. NASA and the Department of Defense should not both engage in the same type of activity. Secretary McElroy said he felt the bracketed language was totally unnecessary and thoroughly undesirable; it implied that Defense might be engaging in non-military space activities and he did not like this implication.

The President noted that one of the purposes of the Space Council was to determine in specific terms where outer space resources were to go. He agreed with the Secretary of Defense that something would be wrong if the Department of Defense were going beyond the military applications of outer space.

Mr. Stans thought the Budget-Treasury proposal was a desirable qualification because documents based on an understanding by the Council might not be clear when read "down the line" in the various departments and agencies. Secretary McElroy observed that he was also concerned with the lower echelons in the various agencies. He feared that if the Budget-Treasury proposal were included in the paragraph, some of the lower echelons in the Bureau of the Budget perhaps would require that every space program proposed by the Defense Department be discussed over and over again. He believed that general responsibility must be placed on someone and that person's general performance be the basis for his retention or dismissal.

Dr. Dryden felt that the lower echelons would benefit by good guidance. NASA and Defense were working closely together on future planning. He believed the language of the Space Act was not very useful here and that the language suggested by the majority would provide desirable guidance. Secretary McElroy agreed with Dr. Dryden that cooperation between NASA and the Department of Defense was close and effective. Dr. Dryden said that few problems of cooperation existed at the top level; problems arose in the lower echelons, which would accordingly benefit from adequate guidance.

The President said the problem was one of finding language to show the difference between Objective (1) and Objective (2). We were trying to eliminate the chance that the scientific program would invade the military field and vice versa. The desire to eliminate duplication was one rea-

son for the Space Council. Each side has to bring its programs before the Space Council or the National Security Council.

Mr. Gray felt that the programs and details should come before the Space Council and that the Basic Policy paper should state a broad general policy. The Space Council was perhaps the proper forum for raising the questions implicit in the Budget-Treasury proposal for Objective (2). Mr. Gray also pointed out that the Budget-Treasury proposal was not included in existing policy.

The President said that in place of the Budget-Treasury proposal, he believed the following language should be added to Objective (2): "without invading the responsibilities of NASA." Mr. Stans wondered whether we could say at the end of Objective (2) "without competing with Objective (1)". The President said he preferred the language he had just suggested.

Mr. Gray then read the two alternative versions of the last sentence of Paragraph 62 dealing with the psychological aspect of space programs. He felt this was a substantive question which should be decided by the Council. Secretary Dillon was at a loss to understand why this split was regarded as deeply substantive. He felt the majority proposal for the last sentence of Paragraph 62 was so general that it contained little guidance and accordingly he wanted to say specifically what the language in the right-hand column said. The President asked whether the word "comparable" in the right-hand column meant "equal". Mr. Gray said the word "comparable" had been used because the drafters of the right-hand column felt that it would be impossible to say that any two projects were ever of equal scientific and technical value. The President asked who would determine which of two projects had the greater psychological value? For example, he wondered whether flying to the moon or visiting Venus had the greater psychological value. He believed the discussion was turning toward hypothetical situations when an effort should be made to be practical.

The Attorney General felt it was unnecessary to incorporate in Paragraph 62 either version of the last sentence because responsible officials in this field should be giving consideration to psychological values now.

The President wondered whether the language on psychological values did not pertain only to NASA, whose whole program was based on psychological values. Dr. Dryden could not agree that NASA's whole program was based on psychological values; on the contrary, he believed NASA rendered very important support to the military. The President said that nevertheless the furor produced by Sputnik⁶ was really the reason for the creation of NASA. Mr. Abbott Washburn⁶ remarked that cer-

⁶ Deputy Director, U.S. Information Agency.

tain outer space projects carried more “world opinion freight” than others. For instance, a soft moon landing had captured people’s imagination. When the Soviets out-distanced us, as they had in putting up the Sputnik, there were important effects on world opinion. The President asked whether anyone could tell him what difference there was in psychological impact between a soft moon landing and a trip to Venus.

Dr. Dryden thought that the question in connection with the last sentence of Paragraph 62 was whether psychological considerations should be made the primary element in determining the value of space programs. The psychological value of a project really depended on whether or not it was successful. What is done must be successful or it will have no psychological or scientific value. The President said in the case of the last sentence of Paragraph 62, he found himself against both the majority and the minority positions and suggested that both versions of the sentence be deleted.

Mr. Gray then briefed the Council on Paragraph 12–a⁷ (enclosure to the reference Memorandum of July 28) which deals with the use or non-use of nuclear weapons. He said that so far as he knew, the only unresolved point concerned the footnote. The Secretary of Defense would like to make it clear by means of a footnote that the revised paragraph is not to be interpreted as a change in policy but rather a clarification of existing policy. He then called on Secretary Dillon to express his view.

Secretary Dillon said he fully agreed with the language of Paragraph 12–a as it was written (in the enclosure to the July 28 Memorandum). He felt that the paragraph should stand as written and that it was not of vital importance whether the language was called a clarification of policy or a change in policy. He assumed the footnote was not intended to bring in the superseded language of the old paragraph (paragraph 10–a of NSC 5810/1) by the backdoor. Referring to the State proposal that the footnote be included in the Record of Action, he said it was a matter of indifference to him whether the footnote appeared as a footnote or in the Record of Action.

Secretary McElroy noted that he had found the interpretation of the language in Paragraph 12–a differing according to who was reading it. Accordingly, he would like to have included in the paper a footnote stating that the language was a clarification rather than a change in policy. The President thought the language of Paragraph 12–a was a clarification rather than a change in existing policy, and that a footnote was preferable to a paragraph in the Record of Action.

⁷ Paragraph 12–a and its footnote as discussed here are identical to the language adopted in NSC 5906/1. Eisenhower and Twining discussed the revised military paragraphs of NSC 5906 in a conversation on July 27. (Memorandum by Goodpaster; Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers, NSC Records) See the Supplement.

General Twining personally thought that Paragraph 10-a of NSC 5810/1 was preferable to Paragraph 12-a of NSC 5906, but he could agree with Paragraph 12-a as long as it was a clarification and not a change in policy. General Lemnitzer believed the language in Paragraph 12-a was clear, but that it would be clouded by the footnote. He feared that as long as the footnote said the policy was not changed, some of the planners would want to continue developing programs which had been started on the basis of the old language.⁸ The President said the revision of the paragraph on the use of nuclear weapons was necessary because there had been a lack of understanding of what was meant by the corresponding paragraph in last year's Basic Policy. He felt that the footnote did not do any harm.

Mr. Gray then suggested that the Council turn to Paragraph 16 (enclosure to the Memorandum of July 28) with the thought that the resolution of the issues there presented might help dispose of any remaining issues in Paragraph 10. Mr. Gray briefed the Council on Paragraph 16.⁹

Secretary McElroy was prepared to accept Mr. Gray's proposal to make the last part of the first sentence read "for use in cases authorized by the President." The President felt this change was desirable because the word "as" might mean that he had already given his authorization. Mr. Gray pointed out that in the first sentence the Department of State wanted to insert the word "balanced". The President said we had spent

⁸ In a conversation with the President on July 27, Gray stated in part that agreement had been reached between the Secretaries of State and Defense on paragraph 12-a, but "there was still some disagreement within the military establishment." (Memorandum of conversation, July 29; Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up) See the Supplement.

⁹ Paragraph 16 reads as follows: "Military planning for U.S. forces to oppose local aggression will be based on a [balanced], flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use [as] [in cases] authorized by the President. Within the total U.S. military forces there must be included ready forces which, in conjunction with indigenous forces and with such help as may be realistically expected from allied forces, are adequate (a) to present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression, and (b) to defeat such aggression, or to hold it pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to defeat it quickly. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. When the use of U.S. forces is required to oppose local aggression, force should be promptly and resolutely applied in a degree necessary to defeat such local aggression. Force should be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent hostilities broadening into general war. Local aggression as the term is used in this paragraph refers to conflicts occurring outside the NATO area in which limited U.S. forces participate because U.S. interests are involved. The possibility of local aggression in the NATO area involving sizable forces of the United States and the USSR is ruled out; incidents such as incursions, infiltrations and hostile local actions, involving the United States and the USSR, are covered by the NATO political directive and strategic concept." The Department of State proposed the first bracketed phrase, Gray the second. The Department of Defense proposed the following footnote: "Paragraph 16 of NSC 5906 was approved by the President with the understanding that it is not to be interpreted as a change in policy but rather as a clarification of existing policy."

lots of money developing forces in every country touching on the communist part of Eurasia. Probably none of these forces were balanced. Balanced forces might lead to an unbalanced expedition. He felt that the word "balanced" did not belong in this sentence. The Air Force and the Navy comprise the bulk of our mobile forces; but in some expeditions the Army would furnish the largest component. Secretary Dillon agreed with the President's remarks and wished to withdraw the word "balanced". He believed his Planning Board Member in suggesting the word had been thinking of the overall balance in the total U.S. armed forces.

In presenting the next to the last sentence of Paragraph 16 Mr. Gray suggested that the word "limited" might be inserted before "U.S. forces". The President concurred in this suggestion, but added that in some respects using the word "limited" was like asking how long is a piece of string. However, he felt the use of the word "limited" did indicate that all our forces could not be involved in local aggression. Mr. Gray said that of course it was impossible to write a policy which would cover every contingency and indicate exactly what the President would do when a crisis arrived. The President agreed.

Secretary McElroy remarked that an aggression could be "local" only if it involved a small engagement. The question arose whether we could have an engagement with Russian armed forces anywhere in the world without having general war. Secretary Dillon said he could conceive of a situation in the Middle East where Russian "volunteers" might be engaged with U.S. forces. Such an engagement would remain local aggression. The President noted that "limited" was a relative term. Did it mean a regiment, a battalion, a division, or what? However, he felt the term was useful, since it injected a note of caution. General White believed the next to the last sentence should say that local aggression refers to conflicts not involving the U.S.S.R. Otherwise we would be implying that we could have a conflict with the U.S.S.R. anywhere but in the NATO area without going to general war. In his view, we could not have a limited war anywhere in which U.S. and Soviet forces were directly and overtly engaged against each other. General White also thought the question of conflict with Communist China should be considered.

The President said suppose we were defending Formosa and the Russians sent a detachment of volunteers against Formosa. We would not necessarily be sure that the Russians were actually fighting against us. For example, we were not sure the Russians were fighting in the Korean War. General White regarded Russian participation in the Korean War as an "incursion".

Mr. Gray said the last sentences of Paragraph 16 meant that a substantial conflict in the NATO area would be general war, but if the engagement was not substantial, NATO planning would govern the sit-

uation. He thought the language should be changed if it could be interpreted to permit a large engagement with Communist China—an engagement absorbing a substantial part of our military establishment—to be characterized as local aggression. Secretary Dillon agreed that if substantial U.S. forces were required, the fighting would not be local aggression. The President felt that it might be difficult to improve on the language of the paragraph, but said that if the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any individual Chief of Staff found in his planning that he was having difficulty because of this language, he should refer the matter back to the Council for further consideration. Admiral Burke said the whole question was one of judgment. If U.S. forces were fighting two Russian squads, this would not be general war; on the other hand, if U.S. forces were engaged with large Russian forces, then we would be in general war. The President said it was impossible to cross every “t” and dot every “i”. He recalled that Russia and Japan for six years before World War II had fought battles which absorbed up to a division on each side, but had not declared war.

Mr. Gray suggested in the last sentence of Paragraph 16 the words “in the NATO area” to be deleted after “aggression” and inserted after “incident”. Secretary Dillon agreed with this suggestion because it left it up to the President to decide what forces were sizable.

Mr. Gray then noted that Defense proposed a footnote to Paragraph 16 indicating that the revised paragraph is a clarification of existing policy rather than a change in policy. Secretary McElroy said that the revisions just made in the paragraph made the footnote less necessary. He was willing to delete the footnote to Paragraph 16. However, he felt that he should point out to the Council that he had been concerned about the sentence in Paragraph 16 which reads: “Force should be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent hostilities broadening into general war.” When he read this sentence he thought about the Korean War and the fact that our military commanders were told they could not do this and could not do that in Korea—in fact that they could not win—because whatever they did might lead to general war. The forthright statement of policy in the preceding sentence, that is, that “Force should be promptly and resolutely applied in a degree necessary to defeat local aggression,” was weakened by saying that we had to apply force in a manner and on a scale calculated to prevent general war. The President recalled a previous and lively discussion of this statement. He felt, however, that the sentence was merely a caution, an admonition not to make the fight any bigger than necessary in the case of local aggression.

When Mr. Gray turned to Paragraph 10 Secretary Dillon and Mr. McCone withdrew the State–AEC proposal.¹⁰

Mr. Gray brought up Paragraph 15, dealing with maintaining an effective nuclear retaliatory power, and said that while it was unchanged from existing policy, he did not wish to preclude discussion if anyone wished to raise a question. There was no discussion.

Mr. Gray then explained Paragraphs 23 and 24 of NSC 5906,¹¹ dealing with the problem of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional nations. He added that late last night he had received the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who preferred the version of these paragraphs which the JCS Adviser had supported in the Planning Board. He read extracts from the Memorandum of the JCS to the Secretary of Defense¹² on the subject of these paragraphs. Secretary Dillon believed the policy of limiting to the extent feasible the spread of nuclear capabilities was still a good policy. If we adopted a definite policy of giving nuclear capabilities to other countries, it would be difficult to know where to stop. The effect on general world opinion would be unfortunate, it would be more difficult to achieve a disarmament agreement, and the U.S.S.R. would be presented with a great propaganda advantage in being able to say that the U.S. was trying to spread its war implements around the world. We must of course recognize that we may not be able to retard the development of nuclear capabilities in additional countries forever, but we should try to prevent the spread of such capabilities as long as possible.

The President said he found himself in a difficult position. In 1945 he had advocated making our nuclear knowledge available to the U.K. because he did not see how two close allies could continue their cooperation unless they had similar forces in the nuclear field. He felt there was a great difference between NATO countries and other countries. He could conceive of nothing worse than permitting Israel and Egypt to have a nuclear capability, as they might easily set out to destroy one another. He could go along with the views of the Secretary of State until NATO countries came into the picture, at which point he found himself agreeing with the JCS. Secretary Dillon said he would be afraid to give nuclear weap-

¹⁰This was the language defining general war as "a war in which the survival of the United States is at stake."

¹¹In his briefing note, Gray stated that the Planning Board had consolidated the two in a new paragraph 23, identical to paragraph 23 of NSC 5906/1 except that subparagraph b read: "If, however, it is in the U.S. security interests to do so (for example, if it becomes clear that efforts to achieve agreed international controls affecting nuclear weapons development will not succeed, or if there is substantial evidence that the Soviet Union is permitting or contributing to the development of nuclear weapons capabilities by bloc countries), the United States should enhance the nuclear weapons capability of selected allies by the exchange with them or provision to them of appropriate information, materials, or nuclear weapons, under arrangements for control of weapons to be determined."

¹²Not found.

ons to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] capable of violent emotional reactions. The President said our policy might be to give nuclear information to allies who can afford to make nuclear weapons, but not give such information to allies who cannot afford to make such weapons.

Mr. Gray felt he should point out that the Joint Chiefs did not propose giving weapons to our allies, but only information. The President agreed with Secretary Dillon that it would probably not be wise to give nuclear information to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Secretary McElroy said the Joint Chiefs were proposing that we make nuclear information available to those countries which had an industrial capability to make effective use of such knowledge. The President said that if we were better protected by making nuclear weapons available to our allies, we should consider making them available. Secretary McElroy said his own views were very close to those of Secretary Dillon. It was difficult to see how once we started on a policy of making nuclear information available, we could stop short of giving information to all allied countries with a capacity to produce weapons. We would probably have to make the information available to Germany, Italy, Japan, and Canada.

The President said we would not necessarily have to make public the policy of giving nuclear information to our allies. We might consider giving Germany nuclear information thus enabling the Germans to develop nuclear capabilities for themselves. Secretary McElroy said that during the 1900's Germany had been rather an unstable member of the international community. The President observed Germany had been his enemy in the past, but on the principle of having only one main enemy at a time, only the U.S.S.R. was now his enemy. The President added that the JCS proposal referred to "selected allies." He was not happy about that phrase and felt it should be more restrictive. Secretary Dillon said that the phrase "in the U.S. security interest" in Paragraph 23 of NSC 5906 was similar to the President's idea. Secretary Anderson said it was inconceivable that language could be written which would determine what countries should receive technical information. He felt the matter was covered by the words "when the President decides that it is in our national security interest."

Mr. Gray suggested that Paragraph 23-a might be left unchanged and that Paragraph 23-b might be revised to read as follows: "Whenever the President determines it is in the U.S. security interest to do so, the U.S. should enhance the nuclear weapons capability of selected allies by the exchange with them . . ." The President suggested that Mr. Gray might go over the specific language with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department.

Mr. Gray said the Council had now completed all of the paragraphs on Basic Policy except Paragraphs 58 and 59. He suggested the Record of

Action show that the responsible agencies would report on these paragraphs by August 31. The President agreed.

Mr. Gray concluded the discussion of Basic National Security Policy by expressing his appreciation for the President's patience.

*The National Security Council:*¹³

a. Discussed Paragraphs 62, 10, 12–a, 15, 16, 23 and 24 of NSC 5906; in the light of the further recommendations thereon by the NSC Planning Board (circulated by the reference memorandum of July 28, 1959, and the revised pages 16, 17 and 18 circulated July 22, 1959), and of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented orally at the meeting.

b. Adopted NSC 5906 subject to the amendments made at previous Council meetings in NSC Actions Nos. 2103, 2105, 2108 and 2110, and the following amendments made at this meeting:

(1) *Page 10, paragraph 10:* Delete the bracketed clause and the footnote thereto.

[Here follow the texts of Paragraphs 12–a, 16, 23, and 62 as they appear in NSC 5906/1.]

c. Noted that the Department of Defense and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization would submit a report on the review of Paragraph 58 of NSC 5906 (Mobilization Base) by August 31, 1959.

d. Noted that the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, in consultation with the Bureau of the Budget, would submit a proposed revision of Paragraph 59 of NSC 5906 (Strategic Stockpiling) by August 31, 1959.

Note: NSC 5906, as amended and adopted and approved by the President, subsequently circulated as NSC 5906/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, with the understanding that final determination on budget requests based thereon will be made by the President after normal budgetary review. NSC 5906/1 supersedes NSC 5810/1, and is the basic guide in the implementation of all other national security policies, superseding any provisions in such other policies as may be in conflict with it. Progress reports to the National Security Council on other policies should include specific reference to policies which have been modified by NSC 5906/1.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, OCDM, for appropriate implementation.

¹³The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2114, approved by the President on August 5. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) In a conversation with the President on August 3, Gray noted a few additional revisions to NSC 5906, included in NSC Action No. 2114 and NSC 5906/1, which had not been discussed at the July 30 meeting. (Memorandum of conversation, August 5; Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up) See the Supplement.

The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, OCDM, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget for appropriate implementation.

2. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*

Mr. Allen Dulles said that Khrushchev had recently made a speech at Dnepropetrovsk which had not been immediately publicly reported. The text had only been received this morning and there was evidence it had been carefully revised. The speech was so long that there had not been time to analyze it thoroughly. However, it contained important announcements concerning the Geneva Conference and contained a note of optimism about the possibility of some agreement on Germany. Mr. Dulles felt that Khrushchev was trying to go far enough at Geneva to ensure that a Summit Meeting would be agreed to.

Secretary Dillon said the news from Geneva was somewhat more optimistic. Secretary Herter had reported that there was an outside chance that some agreement could be concluded before Wednesday.

Mr. Allen Dulles said the Soviets had conducted another ICBM test on the Kamchatka Peninsula range. This was the 13th successful Soviet ICBM test. The count-down had apparently been reduced from the normal eight hours to four hours, possibly because part of the count-down had already been completed in the July 25 and 27 tests, during which it was possible the missile did not get off the pad.

Mr. Dulles then noted that the Russians were devoting great effort to the northern reaches of the U.S.S.R., an area which extended from 60 degrees north to the North Pole and which included two per cent of the population of the Soviet Union (excluding Leningrad), forty per cent of the land mass, and four per cent of the production, principally gold, timber and furs. The Soviets hoped to ship a million tons of equipment into this area during the summer. In some years the area begins to freeze up about this time, but this year it appears the area will be open longer. The Soviets are buying ice-breakers abroad and of course are building a nuclear ice-breaker. The area is well covered by 75 radar stations and eight large Air Force bases, including jet bomber training bases. Mr. Dulles said he was calling attention to this area because of its significance from the point of view of possible attack against the U.S. The distances from various points in the northern reaches of the U.S.S.R. to targets in the U.S. are well within the range of Soviet ICBMs. Admiral Burke said this area had great advantages for the Soviet Union because any retaliatory effort by the U.S. against Soviet installations within this area would hit a region of little industrial or economic value to the U.S.S.R. (with the exception of the Murmansk Peninsula).

[Here follows the remainder of Dulles' briefing on events in Vienna, Laos, and Tibet.]

70. National Security Council Report

NSC 5906/1

Washington, August 5, 1959.

[Here follow a note from Lay to the National Security Council and a table of contents.]

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Preamble

1. The spiritual, moral, and material posture of the United States rests upon established principles which have been asserted and defended throughout the history of the Republic. The genius, strength, and promise of America are founded in the dedication of its people and government to the dignity, equality, and freedom of the human being under God. These concepts and our institutions which nourish and maintain them with justice are the bulwark of our free society and the basis of the respect and leadership which have been accorded our nation by the peoples of the world.

Our constant aim at home is to preserve the liberties, expand the individual opportunities and enrich the lives of our people. Our goal abroad must be to strive unceasingly, in concert with other nations, for peace, security and justice and to establish our nation firmly as the pioneer in breaking through new levels of human achievement and well-being.

These principles and fundamental values must continue to inspire and guide our policies and actions at home and abroad. When they are challenged, our response must be resolute and worthy of our heritage. From this premise must derive our national will and the policies which express it. The continuing full exercise of our individual and collective responsibilities is required to realize the basic objective of our national security policy.

Section A

Outline of U.S. National Strategy

2. The *basic objective* of U.S. national security policy is to preserve and enhance the security of the United States and its fundamental values and institutions.

3. The *basic threat* to U.S. security is the determination and ability of the hostile Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes to direct their politi-

cal and ideological influence and their rapidly growing military and economic strength toward shifting the power balance away from the West and, ultimately, toward achieving world domination.

The chief elements of this threat lie in (a) the Soviets' possession of rapidly growing nuclear capabilities (which have made the Soviet leaders feel freer to adopt an aggressive posture in peripheral areas) as well as large conventional forces; (b) the Soviet regime's ability and willingness to identify itself with various forms of political and social discontent and popular opposition to the status quo; to support subversive elements, including legal political parties, within free societies, to apply substantial resources for the purpose of fostering and exploiting various kinds of weakness and instability in all parts of the Free World; and, particularly in the neutralist and less developed societies, to take advantage of pressures for economic and social change; (c) the extent to which the totalitarian Communist leadership is able to act ruthlessly and rapidly and to repudiate agreements without being subject to moral restraints.

The first danger to U.S. security lies in any neglect on our part to retain adequate deterrent power. However, the danger to U.S. security from the Communist threat lies not only in general war or local aggression but in the possibility of a future shift in the East-West balance of power. Such a shift could be caused by a gradual erosion of Western positions via means short of force, and over time by a continued growth of over-all Communist strength at a rate significantly greater than that of the West. The U.S. ability to deal with the Communist threat is complicated by: (a) lack of sufficient Free World awareness of the nature, dimensions, and probable long-term duration of the crisis; (b) existing and growing uncertainty as to whether U.S. massive nuclear capabilities would be used to defend Free World interests; and (c) the possibility of serious differences in outlook and policy among Free World nations, including questions concerning the use of nuclear weapons.

4. The initiation by the United States of preventive war to reduce Soviet or Chinese Communist military power is not an acceptable course either to the United States or its major allies. Therefore, U.S. policy must be designed: (a) to reduce the threat of Soviet or Chinese Communist military power by other means (such as a safe-guarded arms control agreement with the USSR); and (b) in a time of relative nuclear parity and increased Sino-Soviet political and economic aggressiveness, to place greater emphasis on non-military measures.

5. The *basic task* for the United States is to minimize the basic threat by mobilizing and effectively employing, while seeking to preserve fundamental American values and institutions, U.S. and Free World spiritual and material resources over a long period and at an adequate and sustained level, in order to: (a) maintain adequate military strength to deter or successfully wage war and survive as a nation capable of con-

trolling its own destiny, and civilian preparedness which will contribute thereto; (b) encourage sound and vigorous domestic economic growth and progress; (c) strengthen the integrity and unity of the Free World; (d) succeed in the over-all contest with the USSR for world leadership; and (e) engage in continuous diplomatic efforts to remove the causes of world tension through negotiation.

6. U.S. policies, for which the full support of the American people should be enlisted, and U.S. and other Free World resources effectively used to carry out the task described in paragraph 5 above, must be designed:

a. To support the desires and efforts of Free World nations to promote sound economic growth and acceptable political development in the Free World, as a means of taking the initiative not only to meet the Communist threat but also to create an international environment in which the values and institutions of freedom can be sustained.

b. To accelerate acceptable changes in the character and policies of the Sino-Soviet Bloc regimes.

c. To prevent the occurrence of general war without sacrificing vital U.S. security interests; or if general war occurs to prevail and survive as a nation capable of controlling its own destiny.

d. To deter Communist limited military aggression or, if necessary, to defeat such aggression in a manner and on a scale best calculated to keep hostilities from broadening into general war.

e. To prevent Communism from gaining political control of independent nations by subversion or other means short of war.

f. To destroy or neutralize the international Communist apparatus in the Free World.

g. To seek safeguarded arms control agreements as a means of reducing the threat of Sino-Soviet military power.

h. To preserve, for the people of the United States, the basic human concepts, values and institutions which have been nourished and defended throughout our history.

7. The United States should seek to foster understanding of the principles underlying American institutions and the life and culture of the people of the United States; to prevent distortions; and to correct them when they occur.

8. The United States must take fully into account the fact that the psychological impact abroad of our policies—domestic as well as foreign—plays a crucial part in the over-all advancement of U.S. objectives. It is essential, therefore, that along with the pertinent military, political and economic considerations, the psychological factor be given due weight during the policy-forming process. After specific policies have been determined, implementing actions and statements supporting these policies should be coordinated and presented publicly in a manner that will best advance U.S. objectives.

9. The national strategy outlined above requires a flexible and coordinated, overt and covert, combination of military, political, and eco-

conomic actions, consistent with the national posture described in paragraph 1 above. This strategy is designed to achieve the basic objective of U.S. national security policy by deterring or being prepared successfully to wage general or limited war, and by effectively conducting the cold war with the Sino-Soviet Bloc for whatever period of time the basic threat to U.S. security may continue. The succeeding sections of this document amplify policy guidance as to the elements of this national strategy which are applicable to the various national security efforts. The following elements of national strategy should be applied to each national security effort in a manner which will on balance make the maximum contribution to the achievement of the objectives outlined above. Carried out with imagination, initiative and resolution, and with a proper and sufficient use of resources, this general strategy can enable the United States, as the leader of an interdependent Free World, to achieve its basic objective.

Section B

Elements of U.S. National Strategy

I. Military Elements of National Strategy

10. A central aim of U.S. policy must be to deter the Communists from use of their military power, remaining prepared to fight general war, should one be forced upon the United States. This stress on deterrence is dictated by the disastrous character of general nuclear war, a danger of local conflicts developing into general war, and the serious effect of further Communist aggression. Hence the Communist rulers must be convinced that aggression will not serve their interests: that it will not pay.

11. If this purpose is to be achieved, the United States and its allies in the aggregate will have to have, for an indefinite period, military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility and mobility to enable them to deal swiftly and severely with Communist overt aggression in its various forms and to prevail in general war should one develop. In addition, the deterrent is much more likely to be effective if the United States and its major allies show that they are united in their determination to use military force against such aggression.

12. a. It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation's war objectives. Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear. Designated com-

manders will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President.¹

b. The U.S. nuclear stockpile should include, in varying sizes and yields, standard weapons, and clean² weapons as feasible, to provide flexible and selective capabilities for general or limited war, as may be required to achieve national objectives.

13. The United States will be prepared to use chemical and biological weapons to the extent that such use will enhance the military effectiveness of the armed forces. The decision as to their use will be made by the President.

14. If time permits and an attack on the United States or U.S. forces is not involved, the United States should consult appropriate allies before any decision to use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is made by the President.

15. In carrying out the central aim of deterring general war, the United States must develop and maintain as part of its military forces its effective nuclear retaliatory power, and must keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knockout blow, even by surprise. The United States must also develop and maintain adequate military and non-military programs for continental defense. So long as the Soviet leaders are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them deliberately to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the USSR.

16. Military planning for U.S. forces to oppose local aggression will be based on a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use in cases authorized by the President. Within the total U.S. military forces there must be included ready forces which, in conjunction with indigenous forces and with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (a) to present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression, and (b) to defeat such aggression, or to hold it pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to defeat it quickly. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. When the use of U.S. forces is required to oppose local aggression, force should be

¹ Paragraph 12-a of NSC 5906 was approved by the President with the understanding that it is not to be interpreted as a change in policy but rather as a clarification of existing policy with respect to the use of nuclear weapons and the requirement for maintaining balanced forces. [Footnote in the source text.]

² Nuclear weapons capable of being exploded with greatly reduced radioactive debris. [Footnote in the source text.]

promptly and resolutely applied in a degree necessary to defeat such local aggression. Force should be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent hostilities broadening into general war. Local aggression as the term [is] used in this paragraph refers to conflicts occurring outside the NATO area in which limited U.S. forces participate because U.S. interests are involved. Conflicts occurring in the NATO area or elsewhere involving sizable forces of the United States and the USSR should not be construed as local aggression. Incidents in the NATO area such as incursions, infiltrations and hostile local actions, involving the United States and the USSR, are covered by the NATO political directive and strategic concept.

17. In order to maximize the contribution of U.S. military power to the achievement of over-all national objectives, to the extent consistent with primary missions, the capabilities of U.S. military forces should be utilized in appropriate ways to reinforce and support overt and covert political, economic, psychological, technological, and cultural measures in order to achieve national objectives.

18. U.S. security is predicated upon the support and cooperation of appropriate major allies and certain other Free World nations, in providing and using their share of military forces in the common defense and in furnishing bases for U.S. military power. The entire overseas base system should continue to be reviewed periodically in order to assure that base requirements are adequately met and are related realistically to developments in weapons technology and other factors.

19. Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM's) will be positioned only in those NATO and other Free World nations which demonstrate a desire to have them and officially request them. Proposals for the positioning of IRBM's outside the NATO areas will be subject to approval by the President.

20. The United States should, as practicable, strengthen the collective defense system and induce Western European and other allies with well-developed economies to increase their share in collective defense. The United States should take the necessary steps to convince its NATO and other allies that U.S. strategy and policy serve their security as well as its own, and that, while their full contribution and participation must be forthcoming, the United States is committed to carry out its obligations for their defense and possesses the capability to fulfill its commitments. In particular, to counter existing uncertainty, the United States should reaffirm that its nuclear weapons will be used, as necessary, to defend Free World interests.

21. The United States should continue efforts to educate the Free World as to the importance of nuclear weapons as an integral part of the arsenal of the Free World and the need for their prompt and selective use when required.

22. Taking into account the protection of classified data, the essential requirements of U.S. forces and production capabilities, the United States should continue to provide to selected allies, capable of using them effectively, advanced weapons systems (including nuclear weapons systems with the elements required by law to be under U.S. control, readily available).

23. Special attention should be directed to assisting selected allies rapidly to develop and produce in concert, through NATO, their own advanced weapons systems (less nuclear elements), and to facilitating and increasing the exchange and utilization of Free World scientific and technological resources.

24. a. The United States should discourage:

(1) The development by additional nations of national nuclear weapons production capabilities.

(2) The acquisition of national control over nuclear weapons components by nations which do not now possess them.

b. Whenever the President determines it is in the U.S. security interests to do so, however, the United States should enhance the nuclear weapons capability of selected allies by the exchange with them or provision to them as appropriate of (1) information; (2) materials; or (3) nuclear weapons, under arrangements for control of weapons to be determined.

c. In anticipation of the possible acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by such allies, the United States should now urgently consider within the Executive Branch plans for the development of NATO arrangements for determining requirements for, holding custody of, and controlling the use of nuclear weapons.

d. Legislation should be sought when and as necessary for b and c above.

25. a. The United States should continue to provide military and support assistance to nations whose increased ability to defend themselves and to make their appropriate contributions to collective military power is important to the security of the United States. To the extent possible without sacrifice of U.S. security, the United States should seek to reduce requirements for military assistance by encouraging recipient nations to maintain only those indigenous forces which are of a size and composition commensurate with the external threat and in so far as practicable with their economic ability, taking due account of U.S. capabilities and collective security arrangements. In each instance where an external threat exists, it should be determined whether one or both of the following objectives are appropriate for the armed forces receiving assistance: (1) to enable the recipient to contribute to its own self-defense; (2) to enable the recipient to contribute to collective security efforts. While forces maintained for the foregoing purposes will also help meet internal

security needs, these needs should normally be met by encouraging the maintenance of police and constabulary-type forces.

b. The United States should also be prepared to provide limited military assistance to other selected nations which are demonstrating a willingness to defend and strengthen their independence, in order (1) to influence such nations toward a Free World alignment, or (2) to seek to prevent them from falling within the Communist sphere of influence.

c. Consistent with U.S. security, support of police and constabulary-type forces should be used as a means: (1) of satisfying future requests for military assistance by countries having no existing military establishments or agreed military missions, and (2) of reducing, in other cases, requests for the support of additional military forces, where these requests cannot otherwise be discouraged.

26. In furthering U.S. objectives, the United States should, in appropriate cases, encourage and support the participation of indigenous military and para-military forces in less developed nations in economic, social and psychological programs provided that such participation will not significantly detract from the capability of the forces so engaged to perform military missions which the United States considers essential.

27. The United States and its allies must reject the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war. Hence, the United States should attempt to make clear, by word and conduct, that it is not our intention to provoke war. At the same time the United States and its major allies must remain determined to oppose aggression despite risk of general war and must make this determination clear. The United States must also make clear its determination to prevail if general war occurs. To strengthen the deterrent to limited aggression and to reduce the danger of limited aggression expanding into general war, the United States should, in appropriate cases, make timely communication of its intentions.

28. a. Dynamic research and development for military application are a necessity for the continued maintenance of effective armed forces and an adequate U.S. military posture. The military technology of the United States and its allies required to support these objectives should be superior to the military technology of the Soviet Bloc. During any nuclear weapons test moratorium, research and development should go forward as rapidly and as far as possible on nuclear weapons even though nuclear testing is not permitted.

b. The United States must tap the basic and most advanced research of the nation, both private and governmental, so that it can rapidly take advantage of new discoveries, including those related to outer space, which may profoundly influence military technology. Moreover, the United States must speed up by all practicable steps the translation of

research and development into an appropriate flow of new weapons and equipment to the armed forces.

c. Measures should be undertaken to increase mutual support between the United States and its allies in selective research and development for military application.

II. *International Political and Economic Strategy*

29. So long as the United States and its allies maintain an adequate deterrent posture, the Sino-Soviet Bloc, although not abandoning its use of force, can be expected to place chief reliance on political, economic and subversive means (including the provision of military assistance) to further its objectives, taking advantage of its rapidly growing economic strength and its considerable maneuverability in directing the use of its economic resources. The United States must therefore devote increased attention to the non-military aspects of the world-wide contest with the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

A. Strengthening the Free World.

30. Political and economic progress in the Free World is vitally important: (a) to maintain the effectiveness of the military deterrent by preserving the cohesion of our alliances and the political basis for allied facilities and capabilities; (b) as an end in itself, in strengthening the vitality and well-being of the free nations; and (c) to create the conditions which over time will be conducive to acceptable change in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The ability of the Free World to deal successfully with the competition of the Sino-Soviet Bloc will depend in large measure on demonstrated progress in meeting the political, economic and ideological aspirations of Free World peoples. In the long run, it is in the interest of the United States and of the Free World that this progress be accompanied by the spread of individual freedoms and the growth of democratic institutions and practices. In helping to remedy conditions throughout the Free World which are readily susceptible to Communist exploitation, the United States should take timely action designed to avoid further deterioration which might require more costly and less certain measures (including military action), to reverse.

31. The United States should continue to provide leadership for the Free World, directing both U.S. political and economic policies to this end and implementing them with vigor, initiative and imagination. Accordingly, the United States should act:

a. To increase in all Free World nations: (1) mutuality of interest and common purpose; (2) confidence in the United States through better understanding of its national purposes and as a result of its actions; and (3) the will, strength, and stability necessary to maintain their independence.

b. To convince Free World nations that the political, economic and ideological aspirations of their peoples can be better realized within the

Free World than under the Communist system; and to assist them in their efforts to realize such aspirations.

c. To neutralize the Communist apparatus in the Free World.

d. To prevent the political and economic efforts of the Sino-Soviet Bloc from subverting or gaining political control of independent nations or undermining Free World economic institutions.

e. To obtain a substantial increase in the over-all contribution from the industrialized nations of Western Europe to the security and progress of the Free World, including intensified support and encouragement of sound economic progress in the less developed nations.

32. The United States should continue its full support of, and active leadership in, the United Nations and the related intergovernmental organizations, and do what it can appropriately to strengthen these organizations and to foster responsible and constructive attitudes to meet changing circumstances. It should seek to make effective use of the United Nations to settle international disputes; to promote collective security, through measures to avert or limit local conflicts; to advance dependent peoples and less developed nations through such measures as technical assistance and trusteeships (without, however, the UN's becoming an instrumentality for development financing); and to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character. The United Nations can serve and should be used to the extent possible to mobilize Free World opinion in support of U.S. policies, to expose inimical Communist aims and actions, and to counter Communist propaganda. The United States should continue to utilize the UN mechanism for diplomatic and other contracts, particularly in the realm of quiet diplomacy and for intelligence. In implementing the basic policies stated above, the United States should continue to take into account the implication for the attainment of U.S. objectives of the changing composition of the United Nations, particularly as it may affect the voting situation in the General Assembly and other United Nations bodies.

33. The United States should encourage and support movements toward European unity, especially those leading to supra-national institutions, bearing in mind that the basic initiative must come from the Europeans themselves. The United States should work, as appropriate, with organizations which reflect progress toward such integration or increased cooperation among European nations.³

34. While reserving its right of independent action, the United States must adapt its policies to preserve the alignment of allied and certain

³ Deletion of the second sentence of paragraph 26 of NSC 5810/1 does not indicate that assistance to Euratom, the European Productivity Agency, the NATO Science Program, or the OEEC Scientific and Technical Personnel Program should be discontinued. [Footnote in the source text.]

other friendly nations with the United States in world affairs and to provide clear evidence of the dependability and value of the friendship of the United States. In this connection the United States should make effective and appropriate use, consistent with bilateral and international cooperation, of regional collective security systems, such as NATO, OAS and SEATO, and other regional arrangements. Maintaining the vitality of the NATO Alliance is essential to carrying out effectively our national strategy to meet the threat of the Communist Bloc.

35. With respect to less developed nations electing a neutral foreign policy, the United States should recognize that the independence of such nations from Communist control meets the minimum U.S. objective. While avoiding in so far as possible courses of action which appear to reflect more consideration by the United States for neutrals than for friendly nations, the United States should support such neutral less developed nations if they are demonstrating a willingness to defend and strengthen their independence. The United States, while providing incentives where feasible for the eventual incorporation of less developed nations in effective regional collective defense systems, should avoid exerting pressures to make active allies of nations not so inclined. At the same time, the United States should constantly seek means of encouraging a maximum identification of interests and attitudes between these neutral nations and the United States and its allies, and should promote practical forms of cooperation in non-military fields of activity.

36. While maintaining correct diplomatic and other relations with recognized governments, the United States should also through appropriate channels maintain contact with selected elements of the non-Communist opposition to recognized governments in a manner which: (a) will not seriously impede the achievement of the U.S. objectives through the recognized government; or (b) will not associate the United States with efforts to overthrow recognized governments.

37. The United States should continue its traditional support for ultimate self-determination for dependent territories in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It should seek (a) to work with, rather than against, constructive nationalist and reform movements in these territories when convinced of their present or potential power or influence; and (b) to prevent the capture of such movements by Communism. It should give timely and appropriate political support to newly emergent states, including support for UN membership if qualified. In areas of recent or emerging independence, the United States should, whenever it appears desirable, encourage federation or other appropriate larger political groupings, both among the newly independent states themselves and between them and other Free World states, including the European metropolises, so as to minimize the number of politically weak and eco-

nomically non-viable nations created. Where disputes or tensions involve the relations of a major U.S. ally with a dependent area, the United States should, when in the Free World interest, use its influence in behalf of an orderly evolution of political arrangements toward self-determination, and should seek to strengthen forces of moderation in both the dependent and metropolitan areas.

38. In addition to its own actions outlined above, the United States should, in both dependent and newly independent areas, encourage Western European nations to recognize and work with responsible nationalist forces and to accept such changes in political relationships as may best preserve over the long term a pro-Western, or at least a neutralist, orientation as well as strong economic and cultural ties to the West. The United States should encourage and, to the extent feasible, rely on Western European nations to influence and support their respective dependent or recently dependent areas so long as such encouragement and reliance are consistent with U.S. security interests. If and when such encouragement and reliance are not in the U.S. interest, the United States should determine its own independent course of action in each case by taking into account: (a) the need for establishing friendly working relationships with the newly emerging states; (b) the need to incline these states toward the Free World rather than toward the Communist world; (c) the effect of our policies on Free World states having a colonial heritage; and (d) the need for maintaining Free World harmony, including friendly relationships and consultations as appropriate with the metropolitan powers.

39. a. In nations vulnerable to Communist subversion, the United States should, as one of its objectives, assist in the development of adequate local internal security forces, recognizing that direct action against the Communist apparatus must rest largely with the local government concerned. The United States should:

(1) Seek to alert vulnerable nations to the methods and dangers of Communist subversion.

(2) Conduct civil police and other overt and covert programs and activities to combat Communist subversive forces and techniques.

(3) Encourage and assist friendly nations to develop covert operations coordinated with our own activities.

(4) In the event of an imminent or actual Communist seizure of control from within, take all feasible measures to thwart it, including military action if finally required and appropriate to cope with the situation.

b. The United States should be prepared, if required to protect U.S. interests, to take similar actions against subversion or armed rebellion by non-Communist elements hostile to U.S. interests.

40. Wherever feasible without creating antagonism in Free World nations toward the United States, the United States should encourage those nations which are particularly vulnerable to Communist subver-

sion to minimize their political and cultural contacts with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, to avoid extensive use of Sino-Soviet Bloc technicians, and to limit other Sino-Soviet Bloc economic contacts to those required for the conduct of such trade and economic aid programs as they consider it advisable to accept.

41. Recognizing foreign labor's importance to the fulfillment of U.S. national security objectives, the United States should utilize appropriate means for encouraging democratic labor elements to support and advance U.S. interests and to defeat Communist efforts to infiltrate and control foreign trade union organizations. Whenever desirable, from the standpoint of U.S. national security interests, the U.S. Government should seek coordinated efforts in this field with those of U.S. trade unions and other organizations.

42. The foreign economic policy of the United States should be directed to the promotion of strong, healthy, and expanding Free World economies. To this end, the United States should:

a. Foster a high level of international trade and investment within the Free World by: (1) continuing to press strongly for a general reduction of trade barriers within the Free World; (2) maintaining a liberal import policy, and seeking to reduce further its own tariffs and trade restrictions over the next few years on a reciprocal basis in accordance with established trade agreement principles having due regard for foreign policy objectives, national security and total national advantage; (3) taking into account the impact on our foreign policy objectives (especially the collective security effort) of any proposed actions which would adversely affect imports from friendly countries; (4) encouraging the further extension of convertibility of currencies and the elimination of discriminatory trade and currency restrictions; (5) encouraging the expansion of private enterprise and investment for Free World development, especially in less developed nations; and (6) promoting both governmental and private international economic cooperation.

b. Provide economic assistance at a total level consistent with the objectives we seek to achieve in the world, being prepared to provide such assistance (on a grant or loan basis as appropriate in the particular circumstances) to Free World nations when other means of attaining over-all U.S. objectives are insufficient and when these objectives can be advanced significantly thereby. Any increases in economic development assistance should, to the extent politically and militarily feasible, be offset by decreases in other economic or in military assistance programs.

c. Conduct the disposal of U.S. surplus agricultural products abroad so as to be consistent with and to give support to our foreign policy objectives and to avoid material injury to the trade of friendly nations.

43. Dangers to Free World security arising from economic weaknesses are particularly acute in the less developed areas where they arise

out of the disparity between low levels of economic achievement and the aspirations of peoples for more rapid improvement in living standards, rapid population increases, bitter national and colonial disputes, internal political instability, and increasingly vigorous Communist efforts toward economic penetration. The United States should vigorously support and encourage sound economic growth and development in these areas. To this end, recognizing that major changes in traditional habits and attitudes, greater technical and administrative skills, and more capital will be required, the United States should:

a. Encourage less developed nations to undertake desirable political, economic and social reforms.

b. Encourage governments of individual less developed nations to follow policies and develop institutional arrangements which would facilitate mobilization of local capital for domestic economic development and would promote both domestic and foreign private investment.

c. Press Free World industrialized countries to facilitate movements of private capital abroad and to supply public capital to less developed nations and, where appropriate, to join with the United States in combined efforts to build economic strength in the less developed nations.

d. Utilize and support the efforts of Free World international financial institutions to the maximum extent possible to promote economic development and to bring about economic reforms in less developed nations.

e. Facilitate the movement of U.S. private investment abroad, especially by tax and other incentives applicable to less developed nations.

f. Make U.S. public capital available in adequate amounts on a long-term basis for the purpose of supplementing the capital available from other sources for sound economic development in less developed areas. U.S. lending agencies should be assured of continuity in order to contribute to this purpose.

g. Continue to emphasize its own technical assistance programs and devote more effort, and encourage similar action by other Free World nations, to the development of local leaders, administrators, and skilled personnel, by strengthening educational institutions, by greatly expanding training in administrative and technical skills and by providing competent advisers.

h. Increase its contact and exchange opportunities for citizens of less developed nations.

i. Encourage greater use of scientific and technological developments to overcome obstacles to economic progress.

j. Encourage less developed nations to expand educational facilities and opportunities, especially in administrative and technical fields, and to share their knowledge and techniques with each other.

k. Emphasize the broader objectives of economic development which include the enhancement of the dignity of the individual and the preservation of human freedoms as well as the defeat of poverty, disease, and undernourishment.

l. Continue to the fullest extent practicable, and taking into account all relevant economic and political considerations, to utilize U.S. assistance so as to promote and encourage private enterprise in the less developed countries.

44. a. In implementing the policies in paragraph 43 above, the United States should not encourage aspirations for economic development in excess of economic capabilities, or unrealistic expectations of external economic assistance, and should accordingly seek to support economic actions which are within the limits of practical realization.

b. Without minimizing the need for appropriate initiative on the part of the United States in encouraging sound economic progress in the less developed areas, it should be recognized that the basic initiative as well as the primary responsibility for economic growth, and for providing the bulk of the resources required for development, must remain with the less developed nations themselves. In its actions the United States should seek to avoid giving the impression that the United States is guaranteeing or underwriting the achievement of specific rates of economic growth or the fulfillment of over-all economic targets in less developed countries.

45. In order to meet the challenge posed by the Sino-Soviet Bloc economic offensive, the United States should:

a. Vigorously press forward its own positive programs to promote economic development in less developed areas.

b. Make the less developed nations fully aware of the opportunities open to them to achieve economic progress through expanding trade with the United States and the rest of the Free World, through private capital and through the effective utilization of the economic and technical assistance offered by the United States and other Free World nations.

c. Alert less developed nations to the probability that the Sino-Soviet Bloc will attempt to utilize trade and assistance programs as a technique for political subversion.

d. Nonetheless maintain a flexible posture which seeks to minimize damage to U.S. prestige in the event of acceptance by less developed nations of economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, recognizing that in general less developed nations can be expected to trade with and accept economic assistance from the Bloc whenever it appears to be economically or politically advantageous to them.

e. In general, avoid attempts to counter each and every move in the Sino-Soviet Bloc offensive. However, such measures as may be feasible in particular circumstances (including in very exceptional cases only,

direct actions in aid or trade taken specifically for this purpose) may be taken to discourage less developed nations from: (1) accepting Sino-Soviet Bloc aid in certain particularly sensitive fields of a kind or on terms which would be damaging to their security; and (2) engaging in trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc at levels sufficient to create undue economic dependence on the Bloc, or on terms or under conditions seriously prejudicial to U.S. interests.

B. Influencing the Communist Bloc.

46. a. In addition to political, military, and economic programs and actions to prevent further expansion of Communist influence and steadily to improve the relative position of the Free World, the United States, where appropriate in cooperation with other Free World nations, should seek to influence the Communist Bloc by:

(1) Giving to the peoples of Communist nations, as well as those of the rest of the world, a clear conception of the true U.S. and Free World purposes, including uncompromising U.S. determination to resist Sino-Soviet Bloc aggressive moves and uphold freedom; and otherwise to correct the distorted Communist view of the world.

(2) Making clear to the peoples of Communist nations, as well as those of the rest of the world, that the Free World opposes the Sino-Soviet Bloc because of Communist imperialism, continued use of violence and subversion, and its denial of human liberty and dignity to peoples who have come under its domination.

(3) Convincing the Communist leaders and their peoples that there are alternatives to their regimes' present policies which would be acceptable to the United States and which they should come to consider compatible with their own security interests.

(4) Encouraging the Communist regimes to take measures which make more difficult the reversal of policies more acceptable to us.

b. Advantage should be taken of every suitable opportunity to accomplish paragraph a above by such measures as expansion of Free World-Soviet Bloc exchanges and contacts, appropriate liberalization of restrictions of peaceful trade, exploitation of Sino-Soviet Bloc vulnerabilities, and the negotiating process, appropriate use of information media, and peaceful cooperation with the USSR in fields not inimical to U.S. security. The United States and the Free World should carry out these measures so as not to affect adversely the Free World's will to resist Communism, taking the initiative whenever possible and with a view to making a favorable impact upon the Free World, including uncommitted peoples.

47. a. The United States should encourage expansion of U.S.-Soviet Bloc exchanges and selective expansion of Free World-Soviet Bloc exchanges, and continue to sponsor specific proposals, which are chosen particularly with the view to:

(1) Sustaining current ferment in the thinking, and fostering evolutionary trends within the Bloc.

(2) Maintaining Free World initiative and leadership for advantageous reductions of barriers to free communications and peaceful trade.

(3) Increasing the acquisition of useful intelligence concerning the Sino-Soviet Bloc and scientific information.

(4) Avoiding a net disadvantage to the Free World from such contacts.

If such proposals are rejected by the Bloc, we should utilize these rejections to expose the reality behind the Soviet facade.

b. In considering proposals for U.S.-Soviet Bloc contacts, the United States should: (1) weigh the potential advantages against the adverse effect of the U.S. example upon other Free World nations more vulnerable to Communist penetration; and (2) discreetly inform Free World nations that expansion of U.S.-Bloc contacts does not signify acceptance of Soviet Bloc attitudes, but rather is a means of influencing such attitudes toward more acceptable conduct.

48. Interference in the trade between the Free World and the Sino-Soviet Bloc should take place only where a clear advantage to the Free World would accrue from such interference.

49. a. The United States should continue to participate in the multilateral security controls on trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. These controls should apply against the Bloc such economic defense measures by the United States and by the Free World as will retard the growth of the war potential of the Bloc and reduce its unity. The United States should use its influence to the greatest degree feasible to maximize the effectiveness of such trade controls.

b. The United States should conform its unilateral controls on trade with the European Soviet Bloc to those agreed multilaterally except as to those unilateral controls which will achieve an adverse impact on the war potential of the European Soviet Bloc or which will clearly advance U.S. policy objectives.

c. The United States should continue to apply its financial control against, and its embargo on trade with, Communist China and North Korea, and its embargo on exports to North Vietnam.

50. a. In the exploitation of Sino-Soviet Bloc vulnerabilities, the United States should design its policies and programs to: (1) accelerate evolutionary changes in Sino-Soviet policies and conduct which will advance U.S. and Free World security and policy objectives; (2) weaken the ties which link the USSR and Communist China and the controls by which these nations dominate other nations; (3) exploit divisive forces within the Bloc; (4) encourage popular pressures on the Bloc leaders for greater emphasis on the legitimate needs and national aspirations of their peoples, such as greater liberties and improved standards of living; (5) undermine the faith of the Communist ruling classes in their own system and ideology; and (6) develop closer contacts with the peoples of the

Eastern European nations in ways calculated to build on traditional feelings of friendship and respect for the United States.

b. In order to foster the development of internal freedom and national independence among the Soviet-dominated nations of Eastern Europe and Poland when judged to be to the net strategic advantage of the Free World, appropriate legislation should be sought, and necessary administrative changes should be made, relaxing present restrictions on the provision of economic aid.

51. The United States should continue to conduct negotiations with the USSR, on any issue and through any appropriate channel, whenever it appears that over-all U.S. interests will be served by such negotiations. Negotiations with the USSR should be designed to help maintain Free World initiative and cohesion, to probe the intentions and expose the meaning of Soviet policies, and to resolve specific differences on terms advantageous to the United States. All such negotiations should also be directed, ultimately, toward the peaceful resolution of the basic Communist threat; but the United States should recognize that there is little prospect that the process of negotiation will eliminate this threat during the foreseeable future, and also that useful agreements on specific issues may be possible even in the absence of a general settlement. The United States and its major allies should be prepared to sponsor mutual concessions between the Free World and the Sino-Soviet Bloc which will afford net advantages to the United States and which will leave unimpaired the over-all security position of the Free World. The United States should not, however, make concessions in advance of similar action by the Soviets in the hope of inspiring Soviet concessions. Agreements actually reached with the USSR should be dependent upon a balance of advantages and not upon implied good will or trust in written agreements. Agreements affecting strength and deployment of military forces should include provisions for effective safeguards against violations and evasions.

52. Efforts to develop safeguarded arms control measures should be continued with particular urgency, and agreement thereon sought, in an effort to reduce the risk of war attendant on the increased possibility of achieving surprise and on the growth and proliferation of nuclear and strategic missile delivery capabilities. It should therefore be a major objective of the United States, in its own interest and as interrelated parts of its national policy, actively to seek a comprehensive, phased and safeguarded international system for inspection against surprise attack and for the regulation and reduction of conventional and nuclear armed forces and armaments; to make intensive efforts to resolve other major international issues because a comprehensive arms control agreement will depend upon the resolution of some of these issues; and meanwhile, to continue the steady development of strength in the United States and

in the Free World coalition required for U.S. security. As an initial step in developing this international arms system, the United States should give priority to early agreement on the implementation of measures designed to reduce the risk of general war. The acceptability and character of any international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments depend primarily on the scope and effectiveness of the safeguards against violations and evasions, and especially the inspection system. Because in the future U.S. security will depend increasingly upon information and intelligence of Soviet military capabilities and intentions, the development of such an inspection system within the Soviet Union assumes, in and of itself, significance to U.S. security.

53. In applying the strategy in paragraphs 46–52 inclusive to Communist China, the United States must take account of non-recognition of the regime, the special hostility of the regime, its aggressive aims, and the undesirability of enhancing the power and influence of Communist China relative to free Asian nations. Moreover, the United States should not overlook any possibility, however remote, of fostering among the Chinese people demands for an alternative to the Communist regime. However, the United States should continue its willingness to participate in talks with, or including, Communist China, on specific subjects on an ad hoc basis where the general objectives of its political strategy against the Communist Bloc would be served thereby.

C. Informational, Educational, Cultural and Psychological.

54. Foreign informational, cultural, educational and other psychological programs are vital elements in the implementation of U.S. policies and should be selectively strengthened. In these programs increased efforts should be made to influence civilian and military leaders, especially those visiting or being trained in the United States, toward a better understanding and appreciation of the values, the motives, and the policies of the United States. In addition, the United States should, wherever not counter-productive, coordinate its programs with those of our allies in this field in order to attain maximum impact.

55. The acceptance by the people and governments of foreign countries of the presence on their soil of official U.S. personnel⁴ directly affects our capability to achieve our national security objectives. To this end, programs should be developed and improved to encourage and strengthen the natural inclination of the individual American to be a good representative of his country and to promote conduct and attitudes conducive to good will and mutual understanding. Each department and agency and senior representatives overseas should seek (a) to ensure that U.S. official personnel understand the importance to the United

⁴ As of March 32, 1959 there were 1,072,498 military and citizen employees of the United States and their dependents in foreign countries and possessions. [Footnote in the source text.]

States of their role as personal ambassadors, (b) to develop programs that promote good personal relations between foreign nationals and U.S. personnel, and (c) to ensure that the total number of U.S. official personnel in each country is held to a strict minimum consistent with sound implementation of essential programs.

III. *Other Elements of National Strategy*

56. *Domestic Economic Strength.*

a. A sound and vigorous domestic economy is essential to assure our national security, including the security and stability of the rest of the Free World.

b. The goal of our economic policy is the achievement, within a framework of free competitive enterprise and reasonable price stability, of vigorous, orderly and sustainable economic growth and progress, including the efficient employment of resources at high levels. The United States should promote the continuing expansion of production, employment opportunities and incomes—consistent with the necessity to:

(1) Avoid inflation, which would impede achievement of long-term economic growth, create serious inequities and distortions within the economy, and damage our ability to compete in world markets.

(2) Minimize direct government controls and regulations.

c. Toward the above goal, the Federal Government should:

(1) Seek to maintain confidence both internally and abroad that the value of the dollar will be maintained in the years ahead.

(2) Strive for a vigorous, orderly and sustainable economic growth; promote a climate of confidence in which economic growth will take place by giving the fullest play practicable to private initiative and competition, and maximum free rein to incentives to work, to produce, to save, and to invest; promote efficiency and seek to eliminate impediments to growth whether found in restrictive practices of business or organized labor, in government subsidy programs, in trade barriers or elsewhere in the economy; promote the development of a vigorous and expanding international trade and investment between the United States and other Free World countries.

(3) Make a determined effort to hold Federal expenditures to levels which over time will permit reductions in the public debt and tax changes which will encourage private initiative and long-range economic growth, remaining prepared to increase taxes if necessary to avoid extended budgetary deficits.

d. Nevertheless, expenditure levels must be adequate to provide for all programs essential to U.S. security; in determining the essentiality of expenditure programs the long-range security and social objectives of maintaining orderly economic progress within a framework of reasonable price stability and free competitive enterprise must be taken fully into account.

57. *Internal Security.* Internal security measures should be made adequate, by strengthening them as necessary, to meet the threat to U.S. security of covert attack by the Soviet Bloc on the United States by means of sabotage, subversion, espionage and, particularly, the clandestine introduction and detonation of nuclear weapons.

58. *Civil Defense.*

a. An essential ingredient of our domestic strength is an improved and strengthened civil defense program which seeks, by both preventive and ameliorative measures, to minimize damage from nuclear attack. An effective civil defense program requires an increasing degree of Federal responsibility, support, and influence on the civil defense activities of the states.

b. Such a civil defense program should include certain measures, as approved by the President, to carry out the concept of fallout shelter for protection of the population against radiation hazards.

59.⁵ *Mobilization Base.*⁶ The mobilization base consists of the military logistics base and the civilian readiness base and should emphasize those elements that will increase U.S. D-Day readiness and capability.

a. *Military Logistics Base.*⁷ The military logistics base should be designed to provide for the forces and the logistic requirements of: (a) cold war, (b) opposition to local aggression, and (c) general war. The general objective of the military logistics base is to achieve a degree of war readiness which will provide for meeting foreseeable military contingencies. The highest priority will be placed upon achieving and maintaining optimum readiness for the active forces. To achieve this objective, implementation of the military logistics base planning, in addition to providing for a continuing deterrent (including force and equipment modernization), should be sufficiently flexible to meet the requirements of the following:

⁵ The text of paragraph 59 printed here reflects revisions made on October 14, 1959; see Document 74.

⁶ "For planning purposes, the mobilization base is defined as the total of all resources available, or which can be made available, to meet foreseeable wartime needs.

"Such resources include the manpower and material resources and services required for the support of essential military, civilian, and survival activities as well as the elements affecting their state of readiness, such as (but not limited to) the following: manning levels; state of training; modernization of equipment; mobilization matériel reserves and facilities; continuity of government; civil defense plans and preparedness measures; psychological preparedness of the people; international agreements; planning with industry; dispersion; and stand-by legislation and controls."

(This is the definition of the term "Mobilization Base" adopted by NSC Action No. 1756, subsequently approved by the President.) [Footnote in the source text.]

⁷ The military logistics base is defined as the total of all resources available, or which can be made available, to the military effort in order to meet foreseeable wartime needs. [Footnote in the source text.]

(1) Cold war including periods of heightened tension.

(2) Opposition to local aggression, in accordance with paragraphs 12-a and 16 above, by:

(a) U.S. active forces, supplemented as necessary, without degrading the general war posture to a militarily unacceptable degree.

(b) Allied forces, to the extent it is essential they be provided support for combat operations from U.S. resources.

Planning for cold war and opposition to local aggression will include arrangements for the timely provision of personnel and combat essential matériel to ensure the continued maintenance of an acceptable general war posture.

(3) General War:

(a) The active forces as of D-Day.

(b) The selected reserve forces having an initial general war mission.

(c) Additional forces necessary for continued support and reconstitution of forces required to achieve national objectives.

Planning for general war will include appropriate consideration of nuclear damage.

b. *Civilian Readiness Base.* The general objective of the civilian readiness base is to provide for the mobilization and management, for war and survival purposes, of all resources and productive capacity not under military control which can be made available to meet essential military and civilian requirements in any international emergency affecting U.S. national security interests. In developing this base, emphasis will be placed upon meeting the following goals:

(1) Support of the military logistics base, as set forth in a above.

(2) Implementation of the national policies set forth in paragraphs 58 (Civil Defense), 60 (Strategic Stockpiling) and 64-g (Manpower).

(3) Maximum feasible support from U.S. trade and other economic policies for both the cold war efforts of the United States and the wartime readiness posture of U.S. industry and that of our allies.

(4) Development and maintenance in a high state of readiness of measures essential to survival as a nation, including minimum civilian needs and continuity of government.

(5) Development of plans essential to national recovery in the event of general war.

60.⁸ *Strategic Stockpiling.* A stockpile of strategic and critical materials as authorized under P.L. 520, 79th Congress, should be maintained. Objectives for the strategic stockpile should be determined on the basis of the time required for supplies of materials in a national emergency to match essential needs of the emergency. Pending a determination of the

⁸ The text of paragraph 60 printed here reflects revisions made on December 3, 1959; see Document 80.

essential needs of the nation after a nuclear attack (including reconstruction), the planning period should be limited to a maximum of three years, provided that until such determination is made the "maximum objective" should not be less than six months' usage by the U.S. industry in periods of active demand.

61. *Intelligence.* The United States should develop and maintain an intelligence system capable of collecting the requisite data on and accurately evaluating:

a. Indications of hostile intentions that would give maximum prior warning of possible aggression or subversion in any area of the world.

b. The capabilities of foreign nations, friendly and neutral as well as enemy, to undertake military, political, economic and subversive courses of action affecting U.S. security.

c. Potential foreign developments having a bearing on U.S. national security.

62. *Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.* The United States should actively pursue programs for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Objectives should include advancement of knowledge in this field, strengthening of the U.S. national economy, and furtherance of cooperative efforts with other nations, both through bilateral arrangements and through multilateral agencies such as IAEA and EURATOM. Continue strong U.S. leadership and support of the IAEA and give special attention to exploiting through the IAEA practical peaceful applications of nuclear energy in less developed countries. Attention should also be given to formulation of an IAEA control system of internationally acceptable safeguards against diversion of nuclear materials to non-civilian use.

63. *Outer Space.* The United States should continue actively to pursue programs to develop and exploit outer space as needed to achieve scientific, military and political⁹ purposes. Objective should include: (a) a broad-based scientific and technological program in space flight and planetary-interplanetary exploration which will extend human knowledge and understanding; (b) a military space program designed to extend U.S. military capabilities through application of advancing space technology, without invading the responsibilities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; (c) a civil space program designed to promote the peaceful uses of outer space; and (d) as consistent with U.S. security, achievement of international cooperation in the

⁹ The term "political" includes consideration of psychological factors. [Footnote in the source text.]

uses of and activities related to outer space—for peaceful purposes, and with selected allies for military purposes.¹⁰

64. *Manpower.* The United States should develop and maintain manpower programs designed to:

a. Channel a larger share of our resources to achieving higher standards of education and training for the rapidly increasing numbers of young men and women, with special emphasis on meeting the needs of science, technology, education and government service.

b. Develop incentives and public attitudes which will cause a sufficiently larger share of our manpower to enter research and other pursuits required to accomplish national security objectives.

c. Expand the training of U.S. technical, scientific, and management personnel to further U.S. objectives in less developed nations.

d. Provide an effective military training system which recognizes the need for full utilization of skills, both civilian and military, and is, so far as possible, equitable.

e. Maintain the necessary active military forces with an adequate number of career leaders, specialists, and the highly-trained manpower required for modern war.

f. Develop and maintain suitably screened, organized and trained reserve forces of the size necessary to support the military logistics base (paragraph 59-a).¹¹

g. Provide effective manpower mobilization plans: (1) to meet military requirements; and (2) to channel manpower into priority tasks under emergency conditions, including the immediate post-attack requirements of civil defense.

65. *Research and Development.* The United States must achieve and maintain a rate of technological advance adequate to serve its over-all national security objectives. To this end there are required:

a. Increased awareness throughout the nation of the importance to national security of science, of technological advance, and of the need for greater motivations for qualified youth to pursue scientific careers and engineering careers.

b. Strong continuing support by the U.S. Government for basic and applied research, in proper balance.

c. Improved methods for the evaluation, collation and dissemination of U.S. and foreign scientific information.

¹⁰This paragraph will be subject to reconsideration following the current review of "Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer Space" (NSC 5814/1) by the National Aeronautics and Space Council. [Footnote in the source text.]

¹¹The text of paragraph 64-f printed here reflects revisions made on October 14, 1959; see Document 74.

d. The fostering of foreign, or cooperative U.S.-foreign, scientific endeavor in friendly nations.

e. Facilitation of wider application by industry, within the bounds of security, of the results of governmental research and development, including that performed for military purposes.

As research and development results are translated into an operational capability with new weapons, there should be an attendant continuing review of the level and composition of forces and of the industrial base required for adequate defense and for successful prosecution of war.

66. *Scientific Cooperation.* In view of scientific, political, psychological and intelligence interests, the U.S. Government should encourage and support U.S. participation in selected, unclassified international scientific programs where cooperative international planning and execution are required for optimum scientific progress.

Section C

Essential Support of U.S. National Strategy by U.S. Citizens

67. a. The support of the American people is essential to the success of a national strategy to meet the threat to our national security. Information, simply and fully presented, offers the best means of enlisting this support. To this end every reasonable effort should be made to declassify information bearing on the national security so that it can be given wide public dissemination in clear form.

b. Our nation, our institutions, the principles we hold dear, and our very lives are now in great danger. This great danger to the United States and to all free nations, may persist for a long time. While this threat is taking on new dimensions, the determination of U.S. citizens to face the risks and sacrifices, and their willingness to support the demands on their spiritual and material resources, necessary to carry out this national strategy will be crucial.

c. Continuing efforts should be made to develop a comprehension among the American people of these needs and of the fact that our national strategy provides the best hope that war can be averted and our national security objectives achieved. Steadfastness, wisdom, courage, and readiness to sacrifice, rather than the complacent pursuit of peacetime living, are required to assure their survival during a period of crisis which may continue for many years.

d. Eternal vigilance to prevent intimidation of free criticism is also necessary in carrying out the national strategy.

71. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

Washington, August 18, 1959.

Military Power Gains of the USSR

1. It is not the function of Intelligence alone to make net military estimates, but based on the findings of competent American military authority and on intelligence regarding Soviet military development we conclude that the military position of the USSR relative to that of the US is improving. Given the continuation of present programs by both the US and the USSR, the latter will make further gains in relative military power during the next few years.

2. The ability of the US to damage the USSR has been, and for the next year or so probably will be, greater than that of the USSR to damage the US. The US today has a distinct military advantage in this respect. The acquisition by the USSR of intercontinental and medium-range ballistic missiles, however, is changing the situation. Within a few years—say by 1961 or 1962—the relation between the military strengths of the US and the USSR will probably have reached such a point that military advantage would lie with the side which seized the initiative. Even then the USSR would be unlikely to calculate that it could attack the US without receiving, in return, damage on a scale which would threaten the survival of its society. Nevertheless, the increase in the relative power of the USSR will be of great significance both politically and militarily.

3. During the past few months we have had the following principal evidences of progress in Soviet military programs:

(a) Additional ICBM test shots have brought to 14 the total number of successful tests to a range of 3500 nautical miles or more. In conjunction with this, and as an indication of Soviet reliance on ballistic missiles, we have noted that production of present operational types of Soviet jet medium bombers has virtually stopped, and production of jet heavy bombers continues only on a small scale.

(b) Analysis of Soviet ICBM and space vehicle shots indicates an ICBM payload capacity which may equate to as much as 8 megatons.

(c) A conventional-powered Soviet submarine has been sighted with a greatly modified conning tower, possibly indicating adaptation for launching ballistic missiles. New Soviet submarine construction programs are under way.

(d) There is hard evidence of the widespread preparation of surface-to-air missile sites which when completed will greatly bolster Soviet air defense capabilities against bombers.

4. In conversations with Vice President Nixon and Governor Harri-
man,¹ Khrushchev said that he has embarked on a program for produc-
ing and deploying ICBM's and other ballistic missiles which he claims
will be sufficient to paralyze the vital centers of both the US and Europe.
He cited the example of an ICBM shot to a distance of 7000 kilometers
(about 3800 nautical miles) which deviated only 1.4 kilometers to the
right of the target, and was in error by only 1.7 kilometers in distance.
This statement may or may not be true. If true, it very likely represents
the most accurate shot of the series. However, we do have evidence of
good Soviet missile accuracy at medium ranges, and we have informa-
tion that Soviet ICBM's in test shots are reaching the general target area.
While there is presently some difference of opinion concerning the date
at which the Soviets are likely to achieve a first operational capability
with 10 ICBM's, the consensus is that this will be achieved either in 1959
or 1960.²

5. These conversations with Khrushchev showed that while he recog-
nizes the concept of "mutual deterrence", he is fully cognizant of the
increase which is taking place in Soviet military power, and of its signifi-
cance. He probably thinks that this gives him greater freedom of action,
and that this freedom will increase as current Soviet military programs
come to fruition. He will probably expect that the level of provocation at
which the West would risk general war will be higher in years to come
than it is at present.

6. It is clear to us, however, and is probably also clear to Khrushchev,
that he initiated the Berlin crisis while the military power of the USSR,
relative to that of the US, was considerably below what it would become
in a comparatively few years. This may be the reason why Khrushchev
now appears willing to moderate the immediate tension over Berlin and
postpone the full realization of his aims. He did not find the West to be as
alarmed by his demands as he probably expected it to be. However, he
probably thinks that time is on his side.

¹ See footnote 10, Document 61.

² On September 12, Dulles forwarded to Eisenhower the "Report of the DCI Ad Hoc Panel on Status of the Soviet ICBM Program," dated August 25. Among its conclusions, the Panel stated that a Soviet operational capability with about 10 missiles was "at least imminent," but that a capability sufficient "to assure the application of effective force in the international field (100 missiles)" would not be available until late 1960 or later. The Panel noted that "the evidence is now firm that the Soviets are not engaged in a 'crash' program." (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary Records) See the Supplement. An expanded version of these conclusions is in NIE 11-5-59, Document 75.

7. Considering all the factors involved, we believe that Khrushchev now desires to avoid major international crises while the USSR proceeds with military programs calculated greatly to improve its bargaining position.

A.W.D.

72. Memorandum of Discussion at the 417th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, August 18, 1959.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Priorities for Ballistic Missile and Space Programs* (NSC Actions Nos. 1846, 1941 and 1956; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 7 and 18, 1959;¹ NSC Actions Nos. 2013 and 2081; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 11, 1959²)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense. (A copy of the briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting; another copy is filed with this memorandum.)³

Secretary McElroy pointed out that the Thor-Jupiter (ICBM) programs would be deleted from the highest priority list now that these missiles are in production. The President inquired whether it was still planned to have five Thor and three Jupiter squadrons. Secretary McEl-

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Robert H. Johnson, Director of the Planning Board Secretariat, on August 26.

¹ This May 18 memorandum transmitted to the Council the substance of NSC Action No. 2081, approved by the President that day. (Department of State, S/S-OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Ballistic Missiles) Regarding NSC Action No. 2081, see footnote 5, Document 56.

² This memorandum transmitted to the Council a memorandum from McElroy to Gray dated August 10 in which McElroy recommended that Thor and Jupiter missiles be deleted from the missile priority list; that the "antimissile-missile" defense weapon system be deleted from the list and its two component systems substituted for it, namely Nike-Zeus and BMEWS, Phase I, including Project Dew Drop; and that the Minuteman system be added to the list. (Department of State, S/S-OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Ballistic Missiles) See the Supplement.

³ Not printed.

roy confirmed this understanding and indicated that, when these squadrons were equipped, only enough missiles to continue to supply these squadrons would continue to be produced. The Minuteman was a second-generation ICBM. It was being developed with the highest urgency, and it was hoped that this missile would “stand up” for a decade. Secretary McElroy noted certain of the advantages of the Minuteman—that, for example, it was always loaded and ready to go, and that many missiles can be fired from a single base complex. The chief disadvantage so far had been the problem of thrust from solid fuels. Defense believed, however, that this problem would be overcome. The Defense Department was putting everything back of the Minuteman that it could make any sense of.

The President said that these proposals raised a related question in his mind. He believed that we hadn’t yet organized the Department of Defense in the best manner possible for the production of missiles and for the determination of priorities, because we haven’t yet established a unified missile command. The theory on which the existing air, naval and ground organization was based was as incompatible with intercontinental missiles as was the bow and arrow with modern warfare. He knew that we hadn’t got away from a great feeling of Service interest in individual missiles like Titan, Atlas, or Polaris. There was too much organization to do this one job, and too much competitive thinking. It was true that you would have a difficult problem, if you were going to make use of Polaris, in establishing a unified missile command, because you can’t make the Polaris missile independently of the submarines that carry them. This problem could, he suggested, be overcome, however, by bringing a team of naval designers into the unified missile command organization.

The Council, the President suggested, was a group with great experience in this field. The development of a decent organization to handle the missiles program could be a final service of this group to the Government. The President said that we have been defeated too often because each Service has its separate interests.

The President asked why the Russians had taken such an early interest in ballistic missiles while the United States had not. The excuse that was generally given was that we lacked a thermonuclear bomb which would make such missiles practical. Yet, though we got the bomb, it was not until 1955 that the scientists decided that we had to make intercontinental missiles. The Council ought to look at the costs, what we are doing, how we are doing it, and leave a legacy of thought, if not organization, on this subject. This problem, the President felt, deserved the toughest kind of thinking. His Science Advisory Committee ought to go to work on it.

Secretary McElroy indicated his general agreement with the kind of thing that the President was saying. He thought the best way for the present to get integrated work on missiles was through the new office of Development and Engineering in Defense, which had now been formally authorized by Congress. We should take the basic defense missions—the strategic mission, continental defense, anti-submarine warfare, and maintenance of sea lanes—and back them up with integrated planning. There should be integrated planning of aircraft delivery systems, Polaris, and other delivery systems including, when and if it was developed, a satellite-based launching system. The new office provided centralization of authority at one point, though command authority was still in the Services. There was, however, some thinking within the Department of Defense that there should also be a single command authority over all strategic delivery systems. The Secretary did not believe that such a unified command made sense until Polaris was in being. But it would not surprise him if, after, say, six Polaris submarines were ready for deployment, SAC, missiles, Polaris submarines, and other strategic delivery systems were brought under a single command.

The President pointed out that a related study was now under way on targets—a study of the total number of targets, of what we have to put on them, and of who will do it. What worried him was the responsibility for the design, development and production functions. The time had come to say that these were not simply Air Force, Navy, or Army business.

Secretary McElroy suggested that all these considerations were driving us toward a single service, but that even such a single service would not solve all our problems. Eventually we should set up a single strategic command with a single integrated research backup, and we should do the same on continental air defense. Such action would take much of the fever and blood out of service competition.

The President said he was interested in saving money. Some people say that the country can afford anything. But he had been interested this morning in comparing the cost of U.S. steel with the cost of steel produced by Britain, Germany, and other countries. Generally speaking, our costs were going up, while theirs were going down. He believed that our whole economy was as important as continental defense. The question was, how do you do the job best but cheapest? We have so concentrated upon getting missiles into the air that we haven't given enough thought to organization. Mr. York, the President's Science Advisory Committee, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should get together and tell him what to do and he in turn would try to get Congress to swallow their proposals.

Secretary McElroy said that the President's position on the military budget had been very helpful in the fight in Congress. If it hadn't been for

the President's strong position we would have had first-generation missiles all over the country.

The President returned to the subject of targeting, stating that the people running the strategic air force in Omaha should not have the job of launching an attack against specific targets.

Secretary McElroy responded by stating that he had recently looked into this matter, and believed that coordinated targeting based in Omaha made good sense. One problem with a continuing air alert was that you had to have an adjustable targeting system if key targets are to be covered. This was a job for a computer, and he was thankful we had one for it. The planning of targeting was an extremely technical problem, and has to be in the hands of a single authority. SAC seemed the best choice. The President agreed. Secretary McElroy suggested that the President should keep pressing the Defense Department on the organization question.

Mr. Stans stated that he had recently had a two and a half hour briefing on Polaris, in which he had been informed that the eventual objective of the Polaris program was 45 submarines, with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] deployed at all times. With such a force, he was informed, we could destroy [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] targets, which was sufficient to destroy all of Russia. The total cost of such a program would be 7 to 8 billion dollars, and annual operating costs would be \$350 million. An obvious question was suggested by this briefing—if Polaris could do this job, why did we need other IRBMs or ICBMs, SAC aircraft, and overseas bases? The answer he had received when he asked this question was that that was someone else's problem.

Secretary McElroy responded by suggesting that Mr. Stans should not get the wrong impression from such briefings. This kind of thinking goes on throughout the whole Defense Department. That was why there was a Department of Defense and a single Defense Budget.

*The National Security Council:*⁴

a. Noted and discussed the memorandum on the subject by the Secretary of Defense, transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 11, 1959.

b. Noted that the President has established the following programs as having the highest priority above all others for research and development and for achieving operational capability; scope of the operational capability to be approved by the President: [NSC Action No. 2081]⁵

⁴ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2118, as approved by the President on August 21. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Concerning later revision of this action, see Document 94.

⁵ All brackets designating NSC Action No. 2081 are in the source text.

(Order of listing does not indicate priority of one program over another.) [NSC Action No. 2081]

- (1) Atlas (ICBM) Weapon System. [NSC Action No. 2081]
- (2) Titan (ICBM) Weapon System. [NSC Action No. 2081]
- (3) Polaris (FBM) Weapon System. [NSC Action No. 2081]
- (4) Minuteman (ICBM) Weapon System.⁶
- (5) Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) Phase I, including Project Dew Drop.
- (6) Nike-Zeus Weapon System (research and development *only*).
- (7) Space programs determined by the President on advice of the National Aeronautics and Space Council to have objectives having key political scientific, psychological or military import. [NSC Action No. 2081]

c. Noted that the President has designated the following projects under the category specified in b-(7) above:

- Sentry (satellite-borne visual and ferret reconnaissance system). [NSC Action No. 2081]
- Discoverer (satellite guidance and recovery). [NSC Action No. 2081]
- Mercury (manned satellite). [NSC Action No. 2081]

d. Noted that the actions in b and c above did not change the requirement contained in NSC Action No. 1956-b for Presidential authorization with respect to the launching of development satellites capable of reconnaissance over the USSR and the subsequent scope of the operational capability of the advanced reconnaissance satellite program. [NSC Action No. 2081]

e. Noted the statement by the President that all feasible efforts should be made to reduce the costs of the liquid fuel ICBM weapon systems, especially the costs of bases. [NSC Action No. 2081]

Note: The above actions, as approved by the President to supersede NSC Action No. 2081, subsequently circulated for the information of the NSC, and referred to the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator, NASA, for appropriate implementation.

[Here follow Agenda Items 2. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," 3. "U.S. Policy on France," 4. "U.S. Military Assistance," 5. "Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria," and 6. "U.S. Policy Toward South Asia."]

Robert H. Johnson

Director

Planning Board Secretariat

⁶ In his August 23 memorandum of a meeting with the President on August 21, Gray noted that Eisenhower approved full priority for Minuteman as desired by the Department of Defense and Kistiakowsky, against the Bureau of the Budget recommendation that the priority be restricted to research and development only. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Meetings with the President)

73. Editorial Note

During a conference on September 16, 1959, the President and McElroy discussed Minuteman as follows:

“The President asked how Mr. McElroy now feels about the Minuteman project. Mr. McElroy said that Defense feels very good about it, expecting to have operational missiles delivered in FY–63. He commented that our scientists are now expecting that both we and the Russians will achieve increased accuracy. As a result, we must give more consideration to dispersion and mobility, perhaps putting the Minuteman on railroad firing platforms. The President thought there would be great savings if we can get out of the hardening of missile sites. Mr. McElroy said Defense is going some distance in that direction already, cutting down its hardening to twenty-five pounds to the square inch over-pressure rather than one-hundred pounds. The President added that the Titan may be becoming unnecessary. Mr. McElroy said it provides a better booster for missiles of very long range. If our scientists do not see a way of attaining extremely large thrust with solid fuels, there will remain a need for high-grade liquid rockets—undoubtedly using storable propellants.” (Memorandum by Goodpaster, September 18; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)

The subjects of missile sites, hardening, and reliability also came up at Kistiakowsky’s briefing of the President on August 4. (Memorandum by Goodpaster and briefing paper by Kistiakowsky; both *ibid.*) All these documents are in the Supplement.

74. Editorial Note

On October 14, 1959, President Eisenhower approved NSC Action No. 2131, which provided for a new policy on the U.S. mobilization base. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) This policy is reflected in paragraphs 59 and 64–f of NSC 5906/1 (Document 70). In a September 29 memorandum to Secretary Herter, Bromley Smith recommended approval of Planning Board draft paragraphs circulated to the NSC with a September 21 covering note by Lay. (Both in Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Basic National Security Policy) Smith

stated that the revision, undertaken in accordance with the President's instructions of December 1958, made three basic changes: the abandonment of a mobilization timetable extending 6 months from startup and its replacement by a flexible, shorter time period; the adoption, in planning for general war, of estimates of damage from nuclear attack both on the United States and on U.S. forces abroad; and the adoption of a distinction between mobilization requirements for general war and those for limited war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a September 28 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, which was circulated to the Council by Lay under a September 29 covering note, gave general approval to the revisions but asked that "cold war" as well as limited war be taken into account. (*Ibid.*)

The revision was discussed at the NSC meeting on October 1, and the Council recommended adoption with the modification suggested by the JCS and another having to do with planning for a postwar recovery. (Memorandum of discussion by Boggs, October 2, which incorporates NSC Action No. 2131; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) All these documents are in the Supplement.

Concerning the President's instructions of December 1958, see Document 43.

75. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 11-5-59

Washington, November 3, 1959.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACE VEHICLES

The Problem

To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable programs for the development of guided missiles, and the major performance characteristics and dates of operational availability of such missiles. Further, to estimate the technical capabilities of the Soviets in space including the earliest possible dates of achievement of important space ventures.

Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Top Secret. A dissemination notice, table of contents, and list of tables are not printed. A note on the cover sheet indicates the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Joint Staff; AEC; and NSA participated in its preparation. The U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on November 3. The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

Foreword

This estimate supersedes NIE 11–5–58, "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles," dated 19 August 1958,¹ "Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11–5–58," dated 25 November 1958, and the "Advance Portion of NIE 11–5–59," dated 8 September 1959.² It is made on the basis of our belief that the USSR does not now intend to initiate general war deliberately and is not now preparing for general war as of any particular date. It assumes that there will be no international agreement on the control of armaments or outer space.

In view of the paucity of positive intelligence on Soviet missile and space programs, we have given considerable weight to estimated Soviet military requirements, estimated Soviet capabilities in related fields, and US guided missile experience.

For guided missiles, except where noted otherwise, the initial operational capability dates given are the years during which we estimate one or more series produced missiles could *probably* have been placed in the hands of trained personnel in one operational unit, thus constituting a limited capability for operational employment. For space flight activities the dates given are the earliest *possible* time periods by which we believe each specific objective could be achieved, although we believe it unlikely that all these objectives will be achieved within the specified time periods.

Forthcoming estimates will consider to what extent the USSR has the resources and industrial capacity to produce the missile systems described herein, together with the ancillary equipment necessary to their deployment.

Summary and Conclusions

1. Soviet programs in the development of guided missiles and in space flight have been carried forward on a wide front over the past year. As these Soviet programs and our own intelligence collection and analysis have advanced, we have acquired considerable new information on both specific developments and the extensive scientific and technical capability underlying them. In general, this information has confirmed progress along the lines indicated in previous estimates. Of the 19 Soviet missile systems estimated as probably available for operational use now or within the next two years, we have evidence on the existence of 13. The others are inferred from Soviet requirements and technical capabilities. Evidence on some systems is extensive, but for most there are serious

¹ See Document 33.

² Neither printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files) See footnote 7, Document 82.

deficiencies, not only in the quantity and quality of information but also in its timeliness.

Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles

2. Missiles in this category which we know the USSR has developed or has under development include those with maximum ranges of about 75 nautical miles (n.m.), 200 n.m., 350 n.m., 700 n.m., 1,100 n.m., and an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). These missiles probably meet high standards in reliability, accuracy, and other performance characteristics. We believe that in the development of longer range systems, maximum use has been made of proven components.

3. Mobility appears to be a basic design consideration. Systems with ranges of 700 n.m. and less are probably road mobile. The 1,100 n.m. system is probably road and/or rail mobile. The available evidence suggests that the Soviet ICBM could be rail mobile, but we do not know whether the ICBM system as a whole will consist of rail mobile units, fixed installations, or a combination of the two. In any case, the system will be heavily dependent on the Soviet rail network.

4. *ICBM.* During 1959 the Soviet ICBM test firing program resumed after a period of virtual inactivity in the second half of 1958. Recent firing schedules indicate that the program as a whole is proceeding in an orderly fashion rather than on a "crash" basis. We do not know that series production of ICBMs has actually begun, nor do we have evidence of operational launching facilities. However, there has been ample time for the USSR to begin turning out series produced ICBMs, as implied by Soviet claims. Evidence derived from Soviet ICBM flight tests is considered adequate to gauge the general progress of the program. We cannot state with certainty the precise timing of the initial operational capability (IOC) of a few—say, 10—series produced ICBMs. In light of all the evidence, we believe that for planning purposes it should be considered that the IOC will have occurred by 1 January 1960.

5. On the basis of correlated data from ICBM and space vehicle launchings, we believe the Soviet ICBM to be a one and one-half or parallel staged vehicle, employing liquid oxygen/kerosene propulsion, capable of delivering a 6,000 pound nuclear warhead to a range of 5,500 n.m. if employed with a heat-sink nosecone. A reduction in warhead weight would permit an increase in range; use of an ablative nosecone would permit a heavier warhead or extended range.

6. We estimate Soviet ICBM guidance at IOC date as a combination radar track/radio command/inertial system, although an all-inertial system is possible. Soviet capabilities in related components point to a theoretical accuracy (CEP) of about 3 n.m. The amount of degradation which would be introduced by operational factors is unknown, but we estimate that CEP under operational conditions would be no greater

than 5 n.m. at IOC date and may be better, say between 3 and 5 n.m. In any event, we estimate that under operational conditions a CEP of 3 n.m. in 1963 and 2 n.m. in 1966 will be feasible.

7. *Other Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles.* By late 1958 or early 1959, research and development work on an 1,100 n.m. missile had advanced to the point where this system was probably ready for operational use. Test firings on this and shorter range ballistic missiles have continued during 1959; [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Although no units or installations have yet been identified with these missiles, all systems from 75 n.m. to 1,100 n.m. are probably now in operational use. From launching sites within the USSR, 700 and 1,100 n.m. missiles could deliver 3,000 pound nuclear warheads against a large majority of critical targets in Eurasia and periphery, with CEPs of 1-2 n.m. and about 2 n.m., respectively. All-inertial guidance could probably be available now or by the end of 1960.

Air Defense Missiles

8. In the surface-to-air missile category, a new system is being added to the defenses of Soviet industrial and population centers. It probably became operational in 1957, and has been deployed extensively during at least the past year, including some units in East Germany. In contrast to the massive, immobile system which has been employed at Moscow for the past several years, the new system is flexible and employs small fire units. It can, at relatively low cost, be deployed widely for defense of large areas, smaller fixed points, and forces in the field. Both the old and new systems can effectively deliver high explosive (HE) or nuclear warheads against present Western bomber types, except at very low altitude.

9. In the absence of evidence, but considering Soviet technical capabilities and probable needs, we estimate that within the next year or two the USSR will probably have available two additional surface-to-air missile systems, one designed primarily to engage very low altitude targets, the other for long-range (on the order of 100 n.m.) engagement of targets at altitudes up to 90,000 feet. These systems will have increased kill capabilities against aircraft and cruise-type missiles. We also believe that in 1963-1966 the Soviets will have available an antiballistic missile system with undetermined capability against ICBMs, IRBMs, submarine-launched, and air-launched ballistic missiles.

10. We continue to estimate that the USSR has several types of short-range (up to 6 n.m.) air-to-air missiles with HE warheads, for employment with day and all-weather interceptors. Additional types, with longer ranges and capable of carrying nuclear warheads, will probably become available in 1960 and after.

Air-to-Surface Missiles

11. A subsonic air-launched antiship missile, capable of delivering nuclear or HE warheads from a maximum range of 55 n.m., is now assigned to jet medium bomber units in widely separated coastal areas of the USSR. The Soviets will probably have available in about 1961 a supersonic missile which will provide medium and heavy bombers with a standoff capability of at least 350 n.m., and will be adaptable for use against land targets or ships at sea. They may now have in operation an air-launched decoy to simulate medium or heavy bombers.

Naval-Launched Missiles

12. We estimate that at least one and perhaps two types of submarine-launched missiles with nuclear warheads are operational in small numbers of modified, long-range, conventionally-powered submarines. One is a subsonic cruise-type system with a maximum range of 150–200 n.m., low altitude cruise capability, and CEP of 2–4 n.m. In addition, some submarines may have been modified to launch ballistic missiles of similar range and accuracy. Both these systems would require the submarine to surface before launching a missile. Based chiefly on Soviet requirements and capabilities, we estimate that in 1961–1963 the USSR will probably achieve a system capable of delivering ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads to a maximum range of 500–1,000 n.m. from a submerged submarine.

13. The Soviet Navy's modernization program includes the arming of surface ships with missiles. Some destroyers are being modified and others constructed to launch subsonic cruise-type missiles, probably of 30–40 n.m. range, in lieu of main battery guns and torpedoes. It is logical to suppose that such missiles will be installed on any modified or newly-constructed Soviet cruisers. Ground-launched surface-to-air missiles will probably be adapted for use by surface ships. The USSR will probably also develop missile systems for antisubmarine warfare: surface ship-launched and submarine-launched versions could probably enter service between 1962 and 1966.

Space Program

14. The probable main objectives of the Soviet space program are: to conduct scientific research, to develop military applications, to attain manned space travel, and to support Soviet propaganda and policy. The actual launching program has, like the ICBM test firing program, proceeded at a fairly deliberate pace. Its recent emphasis has been on scientific and propaganda objectives. In addition to high altitude research vehicles, the program since mid-1958 has included three space vehicles which reached the vicinity of the moon. All three lunar probes were major feats of theory and technology.

15. Supported by high thrust propulsion systems and a wealth of scientific and technical know-how, the Soviet space effort will achieve large and increasingly refined satellites and space vehicles with scientific and perhaps military utility. Judging by the USSR's known and estimated capabilities, and in light of the obvious Soviet desire to achieve worldwide propaganda and psychological impact, we believe that during the next 12 months or so the Soviet space program will include one or more of the following:

- a. vertical or downrange flight and recovery of a manned capsule;
- b. unmanned lunar satellite or soft landing on the moon;
- c. probe to the vicinity of Mars or Venus;
- d. orbiting and recovery of capsules containing instruments, an animal, and thereafter perhaps a man.

[Here follow the Discussion section and a series of tables, comprising 36 pages.]

76. Editorial Note

At the National Security Council meeting on November 5, 1959, AEC Chairman McCone briefed the Council on atomic energy programs. After describing materials procurement, McCone turned to certain weapons programs and space vehicles:

"Mr. McCone next turned to naval nuclear propulsion. He indicated that by December 31, 1959 we would have one Polaris and eight other nuclear submarines; by December 31, 1960 we would have five Polaris and thirteen other nuclear submarines. The *George Washington*, the first Polaris submarine, will be undergoing sea trials in the near future. The nuclear-powered cruiser *Long Beach* should be operating by the end of 1960, after launching this spring and sea trials in July. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier *Enterprise* and the nuclear-powered destroyer *Bainbridge* should be operating by the latter part of 1961. The naval nuclear propulsion program was summarized as consisting of six land-based prototype reactors, 37 submarines, and 3 surface vessels. Mr. McCone concluded his remarks on maritime nuclear propulsion by indicating that minor modifications in design were being made in the N.S. (Nuclear Ship) *Savannah*.

"In passing, Mr. McCone remarked that we have eight or nine military package power plants in various sizes and types and indicated that they were particularly important in view of their significant contribution to technology.

"Mr. McCone then briefly described the Pluto, Rover and Snap devices and the air nuclear propulsion program. He recalled to the President the thermo-couple principle which was embodied in one of the Snap devices shown to the President, and indicated we were developing more of this type. All of the Snap devices are being utilized for auxiliary power in space vehicles. A careful review is being made of the Snap program, which will run to \$300-\$400 million from the point of view of cost and effectiveness as compared to other power sources such as solar heat. Pluto involved the development of a ram jet to propel low-level unmanned supersonic missiles. Three to four years would be required for the development of this ram jet, but the program offers good prospects. Rover is a nuclear propulsion system for a space vehicle; again three to four years of development will be required before its full possibilities are known. Mr. McCone recalled to the President a recent review of the aircraft nuclear propulsion program and indicated that the development rather than the hardware stage of the program is being emphasized as a result of such review. He said we had developed a reactor which would fly a plane, but the reactor would not fly the plane very well. By postponing the hardware stage two or three years, we could probably develop a better reactor for aircraft propulsion. Mr. McCone thought that the Russians were probably coming to a similar conclusion. He noted that the Russians were somewhat evasive in this area, but believed they had been unable to solve the ceramics problem and did not consider it likely they would surprise us with a technical break-through in aircraft nuclear propulsion."

The remainder of the briefing concerned Soviet atomic energy programs and peaceful uses of atomic energy. (Memorandum of discussion by Boggs; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) See the Supplement.

77. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, November 5, 1959.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary McElroy, General Goodpaster

The President called Mr. McElroy in following the NSC meeting and told him he is disturbed by some of the implications of cuts that may be

forced by the budget. He commented that he has been fighting hard to get our forces in Europe down to perhaps two divisions. But for us, without warning, to cut our forces for budgetary reasons would be very bad in its impact on forthcoming negotiations. Mr. McElroy agreed. The President said this must therefore be very skillfully done, and that we may have to exceed somewhat the figures he and Mr. McElroy have had in mind. His real aim is to get our programs trimmed down to what we can carry forward, with no more than a slight rise in the future. He commented how very costly these programs are, mentioning particularly the \$2-3/4 billion estimate for AEC, which he strongly questions.

The President said he thought we have gone too far in an atomic powered surface fleet. We are already committed to two cruisers and one aircraft carrier according to Mr. McElroy. The President doubted whether we should go any further.

He said he thought it now requires some very close and searching study, to cut expenses everywhere else in government, in order to provide for a little "bulge" in Defense if it has to come. At this time he felt we could not weaken the Western position when we are going into negotiations. He observed the Chiefs appear to appreciate the need for a sound economy, from reports he is getting.

The President said that some decisions may be needed in early December after he has gone on his trip, and cannot preside over meetings. He thought he would ask the Vice President to preside over Cabinet, NSC and such meetings and would make the Secretary of the Treasury the head of a Committee to screen the budget. There is need for a carefully worked out position which all can support before the Congress.

The President said what he really wanted to tell Mr. McElroy is that there must be some flexibility regarding the budget but it must be exercised by the very top men in Defense. Budget officers operate by guidelines and take a completely rigid stand, such as "no new starts."

Mr. McElroy expressed his appreciation to the President for what the President had told him. He said he would keep this "in his own vest pocket." He assured the President he would not put up a program which he thought to be unwise.

G
Brigadier General, USA

78. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Augusta, Georgia, November 16, 1959, 8:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Sec. McElroy
Mr. Gates
Gen. Twining
Mr. Sprague
Gen. Randall
Gen. Persons
Mr. Gordon Gray
Dr. Kistiakowsky
Gen. Goodpaster

Mr. McElroy said that Dr. York was ill and unable to make the flight and that Dr. Kistiakowsky had agreed to represent his views. He then reviewed for the President summary figures covering the military budget for FY '61. He said there is a "classified item" (CIA) which has gone up \$75 million and has not been reviewed. The President asked who reviewed the CIA item. Mr. Stans said that the Bureau of the Budget had gone through it thoroughly. After further discussion, Mr. Gray agreed to look into the mechanism for review and make sure it is adequate.

Mr. McElroy then said that an additional item of \$53 million in the budget is the result of the new health legislation for civilian employees of the Defense Department. In addition, military retirement pay has increased \$73 million over the past year. The Defense Department strength is going down 35,000 people. At the same time, there is an increase of \$145 million in personnel pay, since the average age of the force is increased, the average grade is going up and number of dependents is increasing.

[Here follows a section on NATO printed in volume VII, Part 1, pages 516-517.]

Mr. McElroy next brought up the question of Army Reserves and National Guard. The question is whether to budget them at 700,000 total or decrease to 630,000—the figure we have used the last two years. Gen. Twining said the Army has just completed a reorganization on the basis of 700,000 strength, and an attempt to go below this figure would wreck the whole national training plan and structure. Mr. McElroy said he has asked the Joint Chiefs to consider all our Reserve forces and report as to

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on December 2. The President was on a working vacation in Augusta, November 12-23. A detailed account of this meeting is in Kistiakowsky, *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 157-163.

what they think the function of the Reserves should be, as well as the total strength. He recognized that the Reserves and the National Guard reorganization has just been completed and said Gen. Lemnitzer feels the right course of action would be to go for a year without further changes. Another reason to doubt going back with a proposal for 630,000 is that we have been beaten twice on this. Militarily, he thought the figure could be as low as 500,000. The President said he would support such a figure. Gen. Persons commented that if the President thinks 630,000 is the right figure, it would be well to take on the Congress even though the Administration is defeated. The President said this is all part of a trend, with both Regular and Reserve forces strengths coming down. He was sure we should not go above 630,000. In fact, he believed the figure ought to be lower. Mr. Gates said Gen. Lemnitzer agreed with these observations concerning the mission of the Reserves, as well as the cuts, but felt it would not be possible to carry this through this year.

Mr. McElroy next raised the question of the Navy. Their program was considerably in excess of their funding, and a considerable sum of money has been put into the budget merely to make them honest. Even so, cuts are required. They will take out either ship or aircraft elements on the DEW-line. He has told them they should keep whichever is operationally the more important element. The President referred to new developments such as the BMEWS, initially estimated to cost \$100 million, and now funded at \$300 million with no end in sight. In addition, ICBMs and submarine launched missiles are coming into the military force. All in all, technology is going so fast as to reduce the reasons for such things as the DEW-line. Mr. McElroy concurred, stating that within a couple of years he felt sure we would abandon at least one of the warning lines. The President commented that there were probably a few things Khrushchev told him in which he was speaking honestly. One of these was that long range aircraft are no longer of much significance in war, nor are surface ships. The importance of submarines, missiles and conventional ground forces is rising. Our problem is that we are not concentrating simply on the things he says he is stressing, but are trying to defend ourselves against every conceivable type of weapon. He said it will be hard to sell cutbacks in air defense since this is so much a psychological question. Mr. McElroy agreed, noting particularly that we must discuss the matter carefully with the Canadians. The President added that it should be discussed also with Sen. Russell and Congressmen Vinson, Mahon and Ford.

Mr. McElroy then said he wanted to take up certain individual items. He stated that Defense has cancelled the F-108 fighter, and that this action has been well accepted. The budget includes a minimum figure for preparation for a B-52 air alert in case the JCS later say such is needed. We are not increasing the number of crews, but will procure long

leadtime items of maintenance, such that we could later keep up to a maximum of 25% of our B-52s in the air at all times should we so decide. In addition, some extra POL will be needed to carry out the training. Mr. Stans asked if these are strictly preparatory expenses. Mr. McElroy said that they are and that he would welcome the Bureau of the Budget going over these figures.

The President said it looks again as though we are trying to protect ourselves in several ways at once. He thought if we are going to do this kind of thing then we should abandon the BMEWs project. Mr. McElroy said we cannot be certain that we will do it. It is important however to take preparatory steps, and to let it be known that we are prepared for an air alert should it be required. Until we get the Polaris and the Minuteman, we are relying upon and extending the capabilities of our bomber force.

Mr. Stans asked for a chance to look at the Defense budget, along with other budgets on an over-all basis and to seek alternatives and ways of cutting items out. The President said this is a laudable purpose but that the Secretary of Defense had already done this, checking one program against another. He thought Mr. McElroy was as competent as anyone else regarding the over-all budget picture. The President said that he himself did not have the time or the skill or the knowledge to set up arbitrary decisions. We would however hammer on the budget if Defense seemed careless in preparing it. Mr. Stans urged again that the Defense budget be dealt with in terms of over-all resources looking to see what items are in competition. Mr. McElroy commented that the Defense people have representatives of the Bureau of the Budget working with them all year. The air alert proposal, for example, started out as a \$1 billion program. It is now being cut to a very hard-core, conservative program.

Mr. McElroy next brought up the matter of ICBM squadrons. The NSC has approved 9 Atlas squadrons and 11 Titan squadrons. He recommended increasing the Atlas to 13 and the Titan to 14 squadrons. There is need to harden more Atlas sites. In addition, the need for liquid missiles extends into the indefinite future. He thought we should accept the delay in readiness dates of Titan in order to shift this to storable propellants. The President said he understood that Titan was not doing at all well. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that the Titan has good design and engineering—a long step in advance of the Atlas—but that it is a management mess. Mr. McElroy said Defense is making a great effort to strengthen the Martin Company's management of Titan. The President said he would approve the additional Atlas missiles, but that he thought we should simply put a certain amount of money into the development of storable fuels. If this process proves out, we would then add the 3 Titan squadrons, leaving the total approved at 11 for the moment. He thought we should say we

have come to the conclusion that the ICBM is doing well, and ask for a general authorization for additional squadrons, not specified as to particular weapon. Mr. McElroy agreed to try to work the matter out that way.

Mr. McElroy next asked if the President would see the Chiefs of Staff. The President said he would and that they could come down to see him at Augusta. Gen. Persons asked whether the Service Secretaries should come down at the same time. Mr. McElroy said he felt it would make it a different kind of meeting.

Mr. McElroy next raised the question of the B-58 program. He said we have already spent \$2 billion on this and would obtain 49 aircraft if we cut it off now. He said the proposal of the Air Force is for a 3-wing force of 30 aircraft to a wing. To obtain this would cost us about \$1 billion more. The Air Force says the B-58 has great operational advantages. It can come in fast and low, flying at Mach 0.9 at low altitudes and Mach 2.0 at high altitudes. It cannot carry missiles, being designed to carry a "pod". The Air Force states that the bomber will remain the principal weapon of SAC for 5 more years. Mr. McElroy commented that the Department of Defense favors cancellation of the B-58. They recognize that there would be a heavy impact on the production area. He asked Gen. Twining to state his views, since he knew Gen. Twining supported the B-58 project. Gen. Twining confirmed that he supports the project, for reasons generally as indicated above. The President said he is not so concerned about the B-58 as the B-70. He thought if we expended effort on the B-70 we would simply be saying that we had lost all faith in missiles. Mr. McElroy said the Air Force believes there will continue to be a requirement for an aircraft, and a requirement for a pilot, for armed reconnaissance if for nothing else. The President was very skeptical. He said if we place ourselves in 1965, then in those 6 years we should know whether missiles are as effective as we now believe. If they are effective, there will be no need for these bombers. He thought the Air Force must make up their minds. He said he was beginning to think that they were not concerned over true economy in defense. Mr. McElroy said he could go for the B-70 only on one basis—that we are programming for a very advanced aircraft, for reconnaissance, weapons system, civilian transport and military transport. The President said sharply that he cannot see us putting military money into a project to develop a civilian transport. He is "allergic" to such an idea. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that Dr. York stresses the importance of research and development on a large supersonic aircraft. Mr. Gates said this would involve \$385 million next year for research and development on engine and air frame. The President said he cannot see this proposal. Dr. Kistiakowsky brought out the technical point that this aircraft will have a very large radar cross-section and will be extremely vulnerable to antiaircraft fire. The President said it is

foolish to put effort into things that are going to be obsolete before they are available. Gen. Twining said the Air Force plans to send these aircraft in over an enemy country to search out and knock out mobile ICBMs on railroads. The President said that, if they think this, he thinks they are crazy!

Mr. McElroy said that if this project is cancelled then the development of any advanced aircraft in this country comes to a halt. The President said he had no quarrel with research on advanced metals, but to spend \$385 million on a vehicle which would never be useful militarily is foolish in his opinion. We are not going to be searching out mobile bases for ICBMs, we are going to be hitting the big industrial and control complexes. Mr. McElroy acknowledged that the B-70 is not needed for a deterrent. In addition, he doubted if it were needed as a military transport. The President said he just doesn't see this kind of a project. He felt the B-58 could be left in the program since it is in production. Gen. Twining repeated that this decision would stop development of anything beyond subsonic transport aircraft.

Mr. McElroy said that military construction expenditures are expected to decrease from \$1.7 billion this year to \$1.5 billion next year, with NOA below \$1 billion. As to the Nike-Zeus, he said he has obtained agreement to keep it in a research and development status. Dr. Kistiakowsky referred to the technical difficulty involved, which is to discriminate between a missile and a decoy coming in. The President said he would be agreeable to continuation as a research and development project. Dr. Kistiakowsky added that it might be possible to reprogram the proposal for the Kwajalein Proving Range.

Mr. McElroy said agreement has been reached on the Polaris program, involving 3 additional submarines, and advanced elements for 3 more, in the FY '61 program. He referred to the study now going on concerning the optimum "mix". The President said he would like to see the Navy give priority in its operations to the destruction of targets that bear on the accomplishment of its traditional mission. He said that he understands the U.S. can block out Soviet submarines, and the Soviets can probably frustrate our submarines. Mr. McElroy said the best current judgment is that neither of us can do this, and that this is a soft spot in our defense. The President commented that he is waiting for the day someone can come and tell him that the Polaris is a successful system. We have a tremendous investment in something not yet proven.

Mr. McElroy next discussed the Navy's proposal to fund the balance of the new aircraft carrier, advanced components of which were included in last year's appropriation. They called for a nuclear carrier, as contrasted with the conventional carrier recommended by the Administration, which we would still prefer. The basic reason is that except for the Forrestal class and the Enterprise, we cannot fly with safety the

advanced aircraft now available. The program envisions 11 carriers, of which 4 will be kept on station constantly. For limited war purposes, he felt we need 1 carrier in the military budget each 2 years. Mr. Stans said he had hoped we could defer going forward with the carrier. The President said he is coming to the opinion that we are keeping too many carriers deployed. We are striving for too high a state of readiness. What we really need in forward areas is ready landing teams, with small ships equipped with missiles. He thought the carrier is coming to the point where it is much like a battleship. Mr. Gates said there would be no chance of getting a conventional carrier from the Congress. Gen. Persons commented that the Congress would not push for a carrier if the President did not recommend it. The President said that if the Congress would not give him a conventional carrier, and the nuclear carrier is blocked, he would shed no tears. He is losing faith in the carrier as in the battleship. Mr. McElroy said he would talk to Congressmen Ford and Mahon about this. The President said that if Defense wants to go back to a conventional carrier, he will approve the carrier proposal. He is really more interested in smaller ships.

The President suggested that Mr. McElroy send the JCS down to Augusta within the next day or two.¹ He said he wanted a stop to the speaking of many voices, each thinking he knows all the answers in the fields of defense, science and economy. An Army man writes a book, the Marines try to cause trouble, etc.

Mr. Stans said the governmental budget is now at \$82.4 billion. Postal rate increases of \$500 million would bring this down to \$81.6 billion, with revenues somewhere between \$81 and \$82. He said that FY '60 is already in the red, and that he had hoped for a level defense budget on the order of \$40–40.5 billion. He has other items to question running from 10–100 million each. The SAGE supercombat centers are questionable. We had better get what we can earlier. The Dyna-soar makes no sense at all. The budget that has been proposed will force increases in FY '62. He hoped that Defense would reconsider items. If they are going to reduce the DEW-line in two years, they should do it now. The President said he thought we should consider knocking out one of the DEW-lines in Canada right now. We must always take security risks, and this adds little.

¹ The JCS met with the President on November 18. During a discussion of various weapons systems, the President reiterated the necessity for a "reasonable" defense budget and spoke against the B-70, although he said he would reconsider it. At a similar discussion on November 21 among the President, Gates, Douglas, Brucker, and Defense officials, the B-70 program was discussed on a stretchout basis, with prototypes to be available in 1962. The President stated that he had not resolved the issue and at a later point remarked that "if we are thinking of something that is not operational for eight years this is not a transitional item but is simply a supplement to the missile force." (Memoranda of conference with the President by Goodpaster, January 20 and January 2, 1960, respectively; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) Both are in the Supplement.

Mr. McElroy said he had worked very closely with Dr. Kistiakowsky on this budget, and Dr. Kistiakowsky confirmed this. He said he would take another crack at the questions raised by Mr. Stans. He said he had cut the Dyna-soar submission from \$150 million to \$25 million.

The President said that within 5 years we must be balancing our budgets, or we will be running our defense by swings of the pendulum upsetting military programs. If our country gets sick of its tax burdens, defense will suffer. He asked Mr. McElroy to go over the budget again minutely to make it a little leaner and tougher.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

79. Memorandum of Discussion at the 425th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, November 25, 1959.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Status of National Security Programs as of June 30, 1959: The Military Program (NSC 5912)*¹

Mr. Gray introduced the subject to the Council (a copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).² After reading the first page of his briefing note, Mr. Gray called on General Twining.

General Twining said the presentation which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been asked to make on this subject would be a review of our military

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs.

¹ Complete copies of NSC 5912 are *ibid.*, White House Office Files, Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, and in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Policy Papers Series. A copy without the sections on "The Military Program" and "The Atomic Energy Program" is in Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5912 Series. The section on "The Military Program" is also *ibid.*, S/S Files: Lot 71 D 171, NSC 5912. Part of that section, attached to an October 30 covering memorandum from Lay to the Council, is in the Supplement. On October 29, the Council had considered the section on "The USIA Program." (Memorandum of discussion by R. H. Johnson, October 29; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) See the Supplement.

² Not printed.

capabilities to support the objectives of national policy. He cautioned that the presentation would indicate where we have been, not where we are going, and would therefore not be a part of the second item on the agenda, "U.S. Military Programs for FY 1961." General Twining then called on Colonel Goodwin who displayed a chart entitled "Basic Objectives of Military Programs" and read a briefing memorandum, a copy of which is attached to this Memorandum.³

At the conclusion of Colonel Goodwin's briefing, the President referred to Objective Number Three on the chart which read as follows: "Highly Mobile and Suitably Deployed Ready Forces with a Capability of Responding Selectively and Flexibly to Local Aggression Using All Weapons (Including Nuclear Weapons) as Required to Achieve National Objectives and to Carry Out General War Tasks." Referring to the words "and to Carry Out General War Tasks", the President asked whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff envisaged the use of our nuclear stockpile in the event of general war. General Twining replied in the affirmative. The President inquired what, then, would be the other general war tasks of the ready forces? As he saw it, general war had become restricted almost entirely to a nuclear battle. General Twining said it was necessary for our military forces to be ready for local aggression or for general war. The President said the important capability of our military forces in general war was their nuclear retaliatory power. He wondered what mobile ready forces would be required to do in general war. Some six years ago the U.S. was committed to reinforce NATO forces in the event of general war to the extent of about twelve divisions; and a great deal of effort had been required to terminate this commitment. He did not wish to discuss the matter further in the Council, but requested that the Department of Defense submit a listing of the missions of the "highly mobile and suitably deployed ready forces" in carrying out general war tasks.

Mr. Gray then read the remainder of his briefing note. In connection with the point made in the Military Status Report that modernization of non-nuclear fire support has not kept pace with the improvement in the overall nuclear posture of the services, Mr. Gray asked whether this evaluation had been made in the light of the statement contained in Paragraph 12-a of the new Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906/1). General Twining answered in the affirmative, and added that at first it was necessary to concentrate on acquiring a nuclear capability throughout the armed forces, with the result that conventional capabilities had lagged behind nuclear capabilities. However, the non-nuclear capabilities would now "pick up".

Secretary McElroy said this point could be developed further in connection with the discussion of the second item on the agenda. In the FY

³ Not found attached. A copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.

1959 and FY 1960 budgets provision had been made for fitting the ground forces with nuclear weapons, so that a certain imbalance between nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities had occurred.

Secretary Herter said it had been his intention also to raise the point mentioned by Mr. Gray. In addition, he wished to call attention to the conclusion in the Military Status Report and in the presentation that those who take the initiative in general war would have a decisive advantage. The President said this proposition had been almost self-evident from the beginning of warfare, but was tending to assume more and more importance in modern times. Secretary Herter observed that it would become increasingly difficult to employ U.S. forces to resist local aggression if the side which takes the initiative thereby secures a decisive advantage. In the event of an aggression in Southeast Asia, for example, the U.S. would be faced with the judgment as to whether or not the employment of nuclear weapons to resist local aggression would unleash a completely nuclear war. Accordingly, the matters which General Twining said were under study, namely, a relative increase in our non-nuclear capabilities, were very important.⁴

Secretary McElroy said the matters mentioned by General Twining were not only under study, but were being acted upon. The Army, after its release from responsibilities for space and for IRBMs, would put its research and development capabilities to work on the problem of local war. Dr. York has a group working with the Army. The Army, as well as the Marine Corps, realizes that improvement of local war weaponry is necessary.

Secretary Herter referred to Objective Number Five on the chart which read as follows: "A Cold War Contribution of U.S. Military Power to Reinforce and Support in Appropriate Ways Overt and Covert Political, Economic, Psychological, Technological, and Cultural Measures." He did not understand this Objective when read in conjunction with the following statement on Page 14 of the Military Status Report: "U.S. Military Forces overseas represent the largest single group of U.S. personnel located in foreign countries and in daily contact with the citizens of those countries. This group by reason of its background and training, and the variety of skills represented, is particularly well fitted to pursue the objectives of the President's People-to-People Program and otherwise contribute to the cold war effort." Secretary Herter was not clear about

⁴ In memoranda to Herter, dated October 29 and November 18, Smith set forth his opinion that furtherance of U.S. foreign policy objectives required the United States to move far more vigorously in augmentation of conventional forces. (November 18 memorandum attached to memorandum dated December 11 from Max V. Krebs, Special Assistant to Herter, to Smith; all in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Planning 1958-1959) See the Supplement.

the relation of the People-to-People Program and Objective Number Five.

The President remarked that the Air Force had been handling certain problems which had arisen in connection with Moroccan bases and the local population with extraordinary beneficial results. He was pleased to see that the armed forces were thinking of their presence abroad as a cold war capability. He believed this was a capability of which notice should be taken. Secretary Herter agreed, but added that the man in uniform on foreign soil is under definite disadvantages, since the local population will be automatically inclined to dislike him. He wondered whether the military services had initiated any programs designed to offset this feeling of antipathy on the part of local populations in countries where U.S. forces are stationed. Secretary McElroy said that every service had a program of the type referred to by Mr. Herter.

Secretary Herter said he hoped the statement on Page 14 of the Military Status Report was not intended as an argument for deploying additional U.S. forces overseas. Secretary McElroy said no arguments were being made in favor of deploying additional U.S. forces overseas. He hoped he had made his position on this matter clear during the NATO discussion at the Council meeting of November 11.

*The National Security Council:*⁵

a. Noted and discussed an oral presentation of the status of the military program as of June 30, 1959, by the Department of Defense, based on Part 1 of NSC 5912.

b. Noted the President's request that the Department of Defense submit a description or listing of the missions of the "highly mobile and suitably deployed ready forces" in carrying out general war tasks, as referred to in the above-mentioned presentation.⁶

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

2. *U.S. Military Programs for FY 1961* (NSC Actions Nos. 1994, 2000 and 2013)⁷

Mr. Gray called on Secretary McElroy to make the presentation on this subject.

⁵ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2150, approved by the President on November 30. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

⁶ See footnote 6, Document 106.

⁷ Regarding NSC Actions No. 1994 and 2000, see footnotes 2 and 6, Document 36. Regarding NSC Action No. 2013, see footnote 6, Document 41.

Secretary McElroy said that all items in the Defense Budget for FY 61 had been discussed thoroughly, but some items had been considered more intensively than others. He wished to make a few remarks about the significant items which had been discussed intensively. Following his remarks, General Twining and Mr. Sprague, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), would continue the presentation.

Secretary McElroy noted that the Defense Budget for FY 61 was based on the assumption that the threat to U.S. security had not appreciably changed since preparation of the FY 60 budget. Some softening was evident in Soviet public attitudes, but Soviet positions on matters in dispute with the U.S. were as firm as ever. Moreover, the Chinese Communists were at least as aggressive as they were when the FY 60 budget was prepared.

Secretary McElroy then gave the following tabular comparison between the FY 60 and FY 61 budget, in millions of dollars:

| | <u>FY 1960</u> (Estimated) | <u>FY 1961</u> |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------|
| Expenditures | \$41,075 | \$41,187 |
| New Obligational Authority | \$40,622 | \$40,747 |

Secretary McElroy said we were in a period of level military expenditure, this being the third year in a row that the military budget had been stabilized at about \$41 billion. It was necessary to point out, however, that \$41 billion would not buy as much defense in FY 61 as it had bought in FY 60, for a number of reasons. In 1959 Congress had enacted new health benefits for the armed services which would cost \$53 million a year. Retirement consumes an increasing amount of money each year and in a few years would require the expenditure of a billion dollars a year. The Department of Defense now had to spend \$73 million plus \$22 million for special additional retirement benefits for general officers who had not previously been given proportionate treatment relative to other ranks in the new pay bill. Even though the number of persons covered by the Defense Budget was reduced by 31,000, the cost of personnel was increased by \$227 million. This increase was due to the Cordiner Report⁸ and to the fact people were staying in the services longer, acquiring more dependents, receiving higher pay as their skills increased and receiving other benefits incidental to the longer term of service. Secretary McElroy felt that some of these factors would lead to improved capabilities, although the cost per capita was increasing.

⁸ In January 1957, the Defense Advisory Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation, chaired by Ralph J. Cordiner, offered a plan to base enlisted men's pay on skill rather than length of service. A later version of the report was made public after the Bureau of the Budget in late April 1957 adopted some, but rejected most, of the Committee's recommendations.

Secretary McElroy noted that the combined personnel, operating and maintenance cost in the Defense Budget was 55 per cent of the total, leaving 45 per cent for capital improvement, research and development (which was costing \$5 billion a year) and military construction. At the present level of expenditure, the upper limit on retaining personnel in the services had probably been reached. In the future, Defense would have to face a reduction in personnel or an increase in its budget estimates. Turning to personnel levels, Secretary McElroy reported that Army personnel was remaining level at 870,000 and he was hopeful of reducing overseas deployments. The Navy was reducing personnel from 630,000 to 619,000, while the Air Force was reducing from 845,000 to 825,000. The Marine Corps was holding the line at 175,000. The personnel strength of the Army Reserve was fixed at 270,000 and the personnel of the National Guard at 360,000, as in the past. These figures were 10,000 less than the figures authorized by Congress.

Secretary McElroy then called attention to a series of other significant budgetary items:

SAC Airborne Alert

Ninety million dollars was included in the FY 61 budget for long-lead time items of maintenance, principally aircraft engines, and for additional crew training in preparation for a possible SAC airborne alert with B-52's in mid-1961, or after 1962, if the JCS recommended such an airborne alert. If we are to be in position to initiate an airborne alert by mid-1961, we must begin to prepare the crews and equipment now. Even if we begin preparations now, we would not be able to put every aircraft in the air at all times, but we could put up a significant force of planes at any one time.

F-108

Even before the final budget discussion, it had been decided to discontinue the F-108, a Mach-3 fighter. Indeed, this program had been cancelled two months ago.

B-70

There had been a great deal of discussion of the rate of advance on the B-70, a Mach-3 bomber. The final decision had been to carry on the B-70 program only as a follow-on development program on a strictly research basis leading to one or two prototypes. Only flying machines, that is, air frames and engines flyable by Calendar Year 1960, would be built, rather than a complete weapons system. This decision would bring the expenditure rate down by \$200 million, to \$74 million a year. Secretary McElroy thought that the B-70 program now makes sense. This program will not now drive hard toward a military capability, but will not cancel out all prospect for future development of the aircraft. A decision can be made later whether to build a weapons system around the B-70.

B-58

Consideration of the Defense Budget had also provoked considerable discussion of the B-58, a Mach-2 bomber, the development of which to date had cost a great deal of money. It had been decided to retain the B-58 on a reduced basis of three wings, some of which would fly operationally as combat units in 1961. This program would cost \$625 million in FY 1961.

ICBM's

Secretary McElroy then turned to a discussion of the ICBM. He said that the Atlas had proven to be a very satisfactory missile. The FY 61 budget increased the number of Atlas squadrons from nine to thirteen, each squadron disposing of ten missiles. Titan squadrons were increased from eleven to fourteen. A major decision had been made to shift to storable liquid propellants for the Titan. This decision should give the Titan simplicity, readiness and reliability. Storable liquid fuel, incidentally, was an important missile development, since it enabled the missile to be stored underground in hardened sites. Any future strategic delivery system would have to be either concealed, or mobile, or both. Needless to say, concealment and mobility were both very expensive. Secretary McElroy indicated his strong belief in the value of the solid-propellant Minuteman, which was being continued as a top priority item and which was expected to have substantial capabilities by FY 1963. The FY 1961 budget contained some \$2 billion for ICBM's.

Nike-Zeus

The Nike-Zeus was the only "near time" active defense possibility against missiles. After careful examination of the Nike-Zeus program by Dr. York and Dr. Kistiakowsky, who had, incidentally, been very helpful in this matter, Secretary McElroy had decided that there were too many uncertainties to proceed to the manufacture of Nike-Zeus. The missile, however, would be retained in a research and development category which would cost \$237 million in FY 61. The probability was that the missile could be created and would operate successfully, but there was nothing to prevent an incoming missile from emitting twenty decoys in such a way as to make it impossible for the Nike-Zeus to discriminate between the decoy and the warhead missile. The Nike-Zeus weapons system, to be successful against a decoy system, would require an enormous number of missiles.

Polaris

Secretary McElroy said that it had been decided to provide for three Polaris submarines in the FY 61 budget and to start building reactors for three more. While the Polaris was still in a research status, Secretary McElroy was optimistic about its future capabilities.

Aircraft Carrier

Secretary McElroy said the budget included \$300 million for a conventional-powered aircraft carrier. Last year Congress had authorized the advance components of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, which would cost \$100 million more than a conventional-powered carrier. The nuclear-powered carrier had some advantages but not enough to justify its additional cost; it also had some disadvantages. The decision this year was to put funds for a conventional-powered carrier in the budget in the hope that Congress could be convinced that a conventional-powered carrier was more desirable than a nuclear-powered one.

Saturn

The Budget contained \$140 million NOA and \$60 million of expenditure for Saturn. At some point these figures might come out of the budget after Congress made a decision as to the facilities at Huntsville.

The President said he did not understand the figure of \$22 million for general and flag officers who had not received the same treatment as other officers. He asked whether the presentation just made covered all officers.

Mr. Stans said that it would require \$24 million to cover all officers. Secretary McElroy said he had not explained the matter very well. The budget covered all officers, but substantial amounts were required for general and flag officers due to their higher pay.

The President referred to the statement that the Cordiner Report had made us spend more for the same people. However, he recalled that the Cordiner Report had been supported by the Services as a means of reducing recruitment and turn-over and obtaining more on-the-job training. This presentation appeared to be different from the arguments used by the Services in connection with the Cordiner Report. The President wondered where efficiency took over from numbers.

Secretary McElroy said that some improvement in efficiency in utilizing personnel had enabled the Army to take on additional missions such as atomic storage overseas.

The President asked whether any Service had abolished a special training school. Admiral Burke said that in the Navy training had been reduced, but because of complex equipment this reduction had not been as great as anticipated. General White reported that a number of training centers had been abolished in the Air Force. General Lemnitzer said the Army had retained its schools because it was required to give six months training for the Reserves. The quality of training had improved.

The President felt it would be desirable to take a look at specialist schools, military training programs, and related facilities. He was often told that a program would cost only \$25 million in a given year. He was rarely told what the follow-on cost would be, that is, that a program

might cost \$380 million three years from now. He was worried about the tendency of expenditure curves to go up. He thought now that there was a reduced turn-over in military personnel, the possibility of combining or closing some training schools should be considered. He felt it might be possible to combine the War Colleges, for example.

The President then referred to the ICBM program (which was costing \$2 billion), the B-52, the B-58 and the B-70 programs. He asked whether the Air Force would not have at some time to reach the hard decision as to whether it wished to concentrate on planes or missiles. He wondered whether we really had any confidence in missiles since we continued to demand planes to back them up. He also wondered whether the B-70 program would not become more expensive in 1962.

Secretary McElroy said the B-70 program would cost more if two prototypes instead of one were built.

The President then inquired about the number of B-58's to be built. Secretary Douglas said the Air Force had accepted deliveries of fifty-one B-58's, five of which had been lost. Two of the planes had been lost on the ground and three in rigorous tests. This was a normal experience. In his opinion the B-58 program was on schedule and was doing well. Forty-nine B-58's would be built by next August. The President asked when three squadrons of B-58s would be operational. Secretary Douglas said the first squadron would be operational next August. One hundred sixteen planes would be produced, ninety-eight of which would be in tactical units. The production line would be continued to 1963, at which time the B-58 program would be completed.

The President felt that the U.S. was paying a lot for insurance against the possibility that the ICBM would not work well. Secretary McElroy said the B-52 was in a somewhat different category from some other planes since it was a missile launcher. As a missile launcher, a capability which it would have by mid-60, it was a more attractive weapon than planes which did not have this capability. The President asked whether Secretary McElroy was speaking of the Hound Dog. Secretary McElroy replied in the affirmative. He added that the B-52 carrying Hound Dog could be recalled from a mission if need be, whereas a decision to launch a missile such as the Atlas was irrevocable. The President then inquired about the capabilities of the B-58. Secretary McElroy said the B-58 was attractive as a low-level, high-speed bomber. He added that we were now in a period between weapons, that is, between the bomber and the missile. During this transition period there would undoubtedly be a high-cost overlap. To date we do not have the necessary capabilities with a weapon successor to the bomber. The ICBM is in a soft configuration and hardening is yet to come. Secretary McElroy felt that the time for substantial reliance on missile capabilities was five years away. General

Twining said bombers were superior weapons against the targets we had in view because of their accuracy and the weight of load they could carry.

The President asked what size bomb the B-58 could carry. General Twining said it could carry a ten-megaton nuclear weapon. Secretary Douglas said the B-58 and the B-52 programs were both extended to deliveries in the highly critical period of 1963 but for budgetary (NOA) purposes both programs ended in 1961. Secretary McElroy said that money would be spent beyond FY 1961 on these programs.

Secretary Anderson asked whether the B-58 could be made a missile carrier. Secretary McElroy believed not, and General White added that the B-58 could not carry missiles without great modifications in its structure. Secretary Anderson asked how much built-in, automatic increase there was in the budget over the next two or three years. Secretary McElroy said the budget was intended to be a level budget. It would not be pushed up in the future. This estimate was brought out by the fact that NOA was slightly below spending. Except for the decreasing value of the dollar and increases in retirement, etc., he believed an increased budget for military purposes would not be forced upon us. Mr. Stans agreed with Secretary McElroy with one reservation, that is, that decisions as to Minuteman and Nike-Zeus might compel an increase in the Defense Budget. Secretary McElroy said that when large expenditures for Minuteman and Nike-Zeus became necessary, some aircraft would be dropped out of the budget.

The Vice President asked how much the budget included for space activities. Dr. York said that by stretching the definition of space a bit, the FY 1961 budget included \$400 million for space activities. The Vice President remarked that "space" was almost indefinitely expansible and that the cost of space activities was high. Secretary McElroy thought this was a good point and remarked that the cost of the reconnaissance satellite, for example, would be very high.

Secretary McElroy then called on General Twining to continue the presentation on the Defense Budget.

General Twining read a presentation, a copy of which is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting.⁹ He also displayed four charts as follows: (1) "Summary of Major Forces—Army" (2) "Summary of Major Forces—Navy" (3) "Summary of Major Forces—Air Force" (4) "Summary of Major Force Deployments as of November 1, 1960."

The President asked for some clarification about the BOMARC figures mentioned in General Twining's presentation. General Twining said sixteen BOMARC squadrons will be deployed, each squadron to

⁹ The minutes of the meeting are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.

have thirty missiles. Four squadrons would be operational in FY 1960, with four additional squadrons operational in FY 1961. The President asked what were the characteristics of the weapon. General White said the BOMARC-A had a range of 200 miles and a speed of Mach-2 plus. The BOMARC-B would have a range of 400 miles with a nuclear warhead and solid propellant. The President asked whether the BOMARC was a completely defensive weapon and General White replied in the affirmative.

Secretary McElroy then called on Mr. Sprague to complete the presentation. Mr. Sprague read a briefing memorandum, a copy of which is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting, and displayed charts showing "The Defense Program for FY 1961", "The Aircraft Procurement Program," "Selected Missile Programs", and "The Defense Program for FY 1961 per Service."

The President inquired about increased per diem for Government employees. Had this resulted from legislation?

Mr. Stans said that the bill to increase the per diem of Government employees had almost passed the last session of Congress and was almost certain to pass the next session. The Bureau of the Budget had testified before Congressional Committees that the per diem should be \$14 a day instead of the present \$12. However, it had been raised to \$15 a day in committee. Budget had also testified that the mileage allowance for Government employees was adequate at the present time, but it had also been raised by the committee.

The President said this was the first time he had heard of Congress raising per diem or mileage allowances for anyone but Congressmen. He thought the Bureau of the Budget ought to repeat its testimony of last year in the new session of Congress. Moreover, he believed current provisions regarding the retirement age of military personnel should be reviewed. The doctors were keeping people alive longer and in better physical shape. There should be room at the top in the military services, but if a military career could last longer, the individual officer would have a longer time in which to reach the top. Perhaps the services should do more toward eliminating the less-fit officers after their first seven years of service. Many officers had been forced to retire at age 60 when they were still very capable officers. The President asked that the Department of Defense prepare a study on the provisions regarding retirement age of military personnel. He also asked Mr. Stans to submit a memorandum on the status of legislative proposals for per diem and mileage allowances for Federal employees.

Secretary Anderson then brought up the subject of cargo airlift. He said he had heard of a plan to subsidize private carriers to develop a cargo plane. He wondered whether the Quesada plan had been coordinated with the Military Air Transport Service (MATS). Mr. Gray said that

this matter was currently under consideration by the Planning Board, which had hoped to submit recommendations to the Council before the President's departure on December 3.¹⁰ The Planning Board had been unable to complete the project, however, because of General Quesada's absence from the country. Secretary Anderson asked whether the FY 1961 budget provided for the subsidization of the development of the cargo plane. Mr. Gray said he understood that the Bureau of the Budget was ready to proceed with a guaranteed loan for the development of a cargo airplane. Mr. Stans said a guaranteed loan was not a budgetary item for the first year. The Budget would include some money for modernization of MATS with the understanding, however, that there would be no apportionment for MATS modernization unless the issues revolving around MATS and the cargo airplane were settled.

Secretary McElroy said that Defense had a study on this subject which would be submitted soon. He felt the Quesada plan needed some review in the light of the proposition advanced by some of the major airlines to develop a cargo airplane without a guarantee, as long as there was some assurance that some of the traffic now carried by MATS would be diverted to these private lines. Secretary McElroy said he was inclined to give these assurances. The President said this sounded like an attractive proposition. Mr. Stans said the basic questions now were: how much business should MATS give to the private airlines, and is there a need for a guarantee?

Secretary Anderson pointed out that while we need not worry about a guaranteed loan for a year, such a guarantee is a contingent liability. Mr. Stans agreed that the guaranteed loan could "come home to roost". For example, the FY 1961 budget might have to include \$50 million for payment of shipbuilding guarantees. The President thought another kind of guarantee would be to guarantee that a certain percentage of military traffic would be given to the private carriers.

Mr. Stans said the Defense Budget had had intensive consideration. Difficult decisions had been faced and made, and the Bureau of the Budget had worked closely with Defense. He was completely satisfied as to some decisions, but not as to others. However, on balance, he felt the proposed Defense Budget for FY 1961 was a very creditable result. He admitted that he had hoped for a smaller budget, but felt that the time had now passed for individual suggestions. However, he hoped the normal budgetary process would be retained.

The President agreed that before he took final action, the military budget estimates for FY 1961 should follow the normal budgetary process. The President then said he wished to make some observations from

¹⁰See Document 86.

instinct, not from logic. In 1957 Sputnik went up and induced a Sputnik psychology in this country. One had only to say "moon" or "missile" and everyone went berserk. Sputnik was followed by a recession resulting in tremendous pressure to spend additional money. The peak of our anxiety is now past and the people are taking things in their stride. He did not wish to inculcate complacency, but he did hope that Defense would be able to find a way to save \$200 million more. He realized that certain factors mentioned by Secretary McElroy had pushed the Defense Budget up and possibly he was too optimistic in hoping for savings. However, if the Defense Budget could be \$200 million below the present figure, he would have a big lever in compelling a reduction in the budgets of other departments and agencies. Indeed he wished to use a reduction in the Defense Budget as a club, not only against other departments and agencies, but against Congress.

Mr. Gray asked whether the record might show that, subject to normal budgetary process and final action by the President, the U.S. military programs for FY 1961 as recommended by Secretary McElroy were generally consistent with national security policy objectives. The President answered in the affirmative.

*The National Security Council:*¹¹

a. Noted and discussed an oral presentation of the recommendations by the Secretary of Defense as to the U.S. Military Programs for FY 1961, as presented at the meeting by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr. John M. Sprague, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

b. Noted the President's request that the Department of Defense study and report to him on the following subjects:

(1) The possibility, in view of the reduced turn-over in military personnel resulting from the Cordiner report, of further reducing or consolidating military training programs, specialist schools, and related facilities.

(2) A review of the structure and functions of the various war colleges.

(3) A review of the current provisions regarding retirement age of military personnel in view of the increased longevity and fitness of the population resulting from medical advances. In this connection, the President also suggested consideration of instituting the selection process at an earlier period of military service.

c. Noted the statement by the Secretary of Defense that the Defense Department's Office of Research and Engineering has a special group working on advancing the art of weaponry for limited war, and the state-

¹¹ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2151, approved by the President on November 30. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

ment by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the procurement of non-nuclear weapons systems would now be given increased attention.

d. Agreed that, subject to the normal budgetary process and final action by the President, the U.S. Military Programs for FY 1961, as recommended by the Secretary of Defense at this meeting, were generally consistent with national security policy objectives.

e. Noted the President's statement that, before he took final action on the military budget estimates for Fiscal Year 1961, the regular budgetary process should be completed to make sure that all practicable economies were effected.

f. Noted that the NSC Planning Board was:

(1) Undertaking a review of current policy on Continental Defense (NSC 5802/1).¹²

(2) Preparing a report for Council consideration on Cargo Airlift.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

The actions in d and e above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, for appropriate action.

Marion W. Boggs

¹²See footnote 10, Document 8.

80. Editorial Note

On December 3, 1959, the President approved revisions in paragraph 60 of NSC 5906/1, which had been concurred in by the National Security Council and other interested agencies in NSC Action No. 2155 that same day. (Memoranda from Lay to the NSC, October 29 and December 3; both in Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1) Paragraph 60 concerned stockpiling policy. The general purpose of the revisions, which reflected decisions taken at a Cabinet meeting on September 11, was to improve management of commodities in the stockpile and encourage timely disposal of excess quantities. (Cabinet Paper CP-59-78/2, "Policies With Respect to Stockpiling," September 10, and minutes by L. Arthur Minnich of Cabinet meeting on September 11; both

in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Series) The four documents are in the Supplement. For NSC 5906/1, see Document 70.

81. Editorial Note

In a conference with the President on December 3, 1959, with Herter present, Goodpaster concluded:

"Finally, I brought up the matter of certain authorizations to senior commanders in the field of special weapons, recommending that these be placed in effect before the President left on his long trip. After discussion, the President gave his approval." (Memorandum of Conference, January 2, 1960; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)

82. Memorandum of Discussion at the 430th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, January 7, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Item 1. "U.S. Policy with Respect to the Development of Cargo Airlift." See the Supplement.]

2. *Scope of Operational Capability of the Atlas and Titan ICBM Programs and Polaris FBM Program* (NSC Actions Nos. 1846, 2013, 2081 and 2118;¹ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 5, 1960²)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on the background of this subject and on the recommendations by the Secretary of Defense contained in the reference memorandum of January 5, 1960. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on January 13.

¹ Regarding NSC Action No. 1846, see footnote 2, Document 5. For NSC Action No. 2013, see footnote 6, Document 41. For NSC Action No. 2081, see footnote 5, Document 56. For NSC Action No. 2118, see footnote 4, Document 72.

² Not found.

Note³ is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.)

The President said he saw no objection to the recommendations by the Secretary of Defense.

*The National Security Council:*⁴

Noted the President's approval of the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, contained in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of January 5, 1960, that:

a. The presently approved 20-squadron ICBM program (9 Atlas and 11 Titan) be increased to 27 squadrons (13 Atlas and 14 Titan).

b. The present authorization to construct 9 Polaris FBM submarines be increased to 12 (3 additional beginning in FY 1961) and authorization be given to proceed with the necessary long leadtime planning and procurement actions permitting construction of 3 additional Polaris FBM submarines.

Note: The above action, as approved by the President to supersede subparagraphs (1), (4) and (5) of the Note following NSC Action No. 2013, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, for appropriate implementation.

3. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*

Mr. Dulles said the Intelligence Community had recently completed work on two of its particularly important year-end Estimates, namely, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies 1959 through 1964" (NIE 11-4-59)⁵ and "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack through Mid-1964" (NIE 11-8-59).⁶ The latter Estimate in particular raised many questions which will be raised in this session of Congress, particularly as concerns the missile issue. Mr. Dulles then presented a brief summary of NIE 11-4-59 as follows:

NIE 11-4-59 indicates that the principal objectives of the USSR vis-à-vis the West remain unchanged. The Soviet leaders currently show

³ The note, dated January 6, states that the previous time the President had approved specific numbers of ICBMs and Polaris submarines was in NSC Action No. 2013, but that the Secretary of Defense had proposed further increases at the NSC meeting on November 25, 1959 (see Document 79). While the Defense recommendations had been considered consistent with policy objectives, the President had deferred action pending completion of the "regular budgetary process," which had since taken place. Gray then summarized the recommendations of the January 5 Defense memorandum, which are embodied in NSC Action No. 2168; see footnote 4 below. See the Supplement.

⁴ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2168, approved by the President on January 13. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

⁵ Dated February 9. (*Ibid.*, INR-NIE Files) The summary of this estimate is in the Supplement.

⁶ Document 88.

great confidence that the trend of world events is in their favor and believe that from the position of strength they have now gained, they can either engage the West vigorously on disputed questions, or can relax tensions without any imputation of weakness. During the next five years, Soviet external policy is likely to be marked by swings between a relaxation of tension and belligerent pressure. These swings, however, are not likely to go as far as deliberate assumption of the use of general war on the one hand, or abandonment of the struggle between the Communist and non-Communist worlds on the other hand. The main influence on Soviet policy will be the sense of an improved power position vis-à-vis the West. In another year or two the Soviet leaders may feel that their long-range missiles give them a political advantage which they may wish to test by attempting to win concessions from the West through negotiations which may contain a great deal of pressure and threat. The Soviet leaders may feel that a condition of mutual deterrence applies to general war only and opens up to them the possibility of advancing Communist power by more provocative means, including perhaps limited military means. While the Soviet leaders would not willingly assume serious risk of general war, the chances of miscalculation will be increased by this situation.

Mr. Dulles then summarized NIE 11-8-59 along the lines of the attached "Advance Conclusions" of NIE 11-8-59.⁷

At the conclusion of Mr. Dulles' presentation, the President referred to the hardening of U.S. missile bases and asked whether hardening could be started at once. Secretary Gates replied in the affirmative. Mr. Douglas said we were well along on the 25 PSI hardening of Atlas bases, although not on the 100 PSI. He pointed out that Titan will ultimately be fired from a hole. The President said that apparently a different type of hardening was necessary as between Atlas and Titan because Titan uses storable fuel. He asked whether Atlas as well as Titan could be fired from a hole. Mr. Douglas said various views had been expressed on this point, but that so far the Department of Defense had developed no plans to fire Atlas from a hole. The President said he assumed we would be constantly improving our missiles and wondered whether some of the hardened sites being made ready for Atlas could later be used for Titan and other improved missiles. If the hardening was to cost ten times as much as the missile, the hardened sites should be adaptable to various missiles. Mr. Douglas said a great deal of modification would probably be required; and Secretary Gates pointed out that the silo for Titan was

⁷ Not printed. The "Advance Conclusions," dated December 3, 1959, differ in certain respects from those of NIE 11-8-59, but not in the projections of Soviet missile forces over the 5-year period or in the judgment that the Soviet Union was not undertaking a "crash program" in ICBMs. See the Supplement.

different from the equipment for firing Atlas. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that in order to adapt a hardened Atlas site for firing Titan, the Government would probably have to spend an additional 40–50 per cent of the original cost of the site. A substitution of Titan for Atlas would require replacement of a great deal of equipment, including ground support equipment. He added that Atlas was a “thin-skinned missile” which would probably preclude firing it from a hole. The President asked whether it was the intention to abandon present hardened missile sites after new-type missiles were developed. Secretary Gates replied that both Atlas and Titan would be kept in the U.S. missile arsenal even after Minuteman and Polaris were developed, so that the development of improved missiles would not result in abandoning present missile bases.

The President then asked why so much emphasis was being placed on the mobility of missiles. Secretary Gates replied that the enemy required more missiles to knock out one of our mobile missiles. Dr. Kistiakowsky added that the enemy could not determine where a mobile missile was at any given time. He also pointed out that when the CEP of a missile is less than one nautical mile, hardening loses much of its advantage because of the statistical probability of a “one-to-one kill”. The President asked whether we know with a high degree of accuracy the location of all the targets at which our missiles might be aimed. He recalled that in the Army the field artillery often discovered that it was using inaccurate maps to control its firing. Dr. Kistiakowsky believed that we had our major targets [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. He pointed out, however, that the Russians are in a better position to locate their targets in the U.S. accurately. The President asked when the last of the thirteen Atlas squadrons would be operational. Mr. Douglas replied at the end of Calendar Year 1962. The President then inquired about the Titan squadrons and was told by Mr. Douglas that two Titan squadrons would be operational by the end of 1962 and that Titan would be fired out of the hole in 1963. Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed out that no missile using storable fuels had actually been fired yet, but that some had been static tested and the results were very encouraging.

Secretary Gates said the Administration was in a difficult position with regard to its testimony before Congress on missiles. Last year Secretary McElroy had admitted to a missile gap on the basis of an intelligence estimate of Soviet capabilities. It now appeared that the intelligence estimate had undergone a considerable change and that it now virtually says there is no missile gap. If this is the case, the U.S. has a very strong deterrent force. The Vice President asked whether mid-1961 would be the point of greatest danger to the U.S. in view of the fact that the Soviets would have from 140–200 missiles ready for launching at that time. The President did not believe the Soviets would consider 140–200 missiles decisive. Secretary Gates said Congress is very much interested in

exploring the so-called "missile gap". Past intelligence estimates which had talked about what the Soviets were capable of doing, rather than estimating what they would probably do, had resulted in a large missile gap. The President felt that in testimony before Congress it should be pointed out, as Mr. Dulles had pointed out, that there was no evidence that the Soviets had launched a "crash" program for the development of missiles. The Vice President said the "missile gap" resulted from an assumption that the Soviets would do all they were capable of doing and would make no mistakes, and from the further assumption that we would not do all we were capable of doing and would make a number of mistakes. The new intelligence estimate is based on what the Soviets will probably do rather than what they are capable of doing.

The President felt the U.S. would be in a good position at the end of 1962, since it would have some 195 big missiles plus Polaris plus the IRBM's and would begin to get Minuteman. General Twining said the low-flying subsonic Snark should not be completely ruled out; this was a very useful missile although it was not ballistic. The Vice President asked how much was in the budget for a SAC airborne alert.⁸ The Vice President asked how many planes could be put into the air on any given day in 1961. Mr. Douglas said that present plans call for putting 90-100 SAC planes in the air for three months if necessary. The Vice President asked whether these planes would be equipped with Hound Dog. General Twining replied in the affirmative, and added that for a brief time all SAC planes could be put in the air. General Twining said that the missile gap which appeared in 1961 would be partly closed in 1962.

The President said he did not believe that when the Soviets got all their missiles ready, they would turn them loose against us. The Vice President asked why we assumed Soviet missile accuracy to be less than ours. Mr. Dulles replied that we had better miniaturization and guidance, but added that intelligence was not firm on the accuracy of Soviet-long-range missiles. Dr. Kistiakowsky felt that the Air Force estimate of the Soviet missile CEP is a reasonable one if it is assumed that the Soviets are preparing for pre-emptive attack. If the Soviets go in the direction of pre-emptive attack, they can use "soft guidance", that is, guidance which would be damaged by our retaliatory attack. He believed they could improve their accuracy to the figure suggested by the Air Force, although he would point out this belief involved a guess as to the intentions of the USSR. The President felt we ought to assume that the Soviets will make the first attack. Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed out that the Soviets had bigger missiles than we have and can afford not to miniaturize. Moreover, the Russians can use the long-base inertial type of guidance.

⁸ Mr. Stans said the budget included \$85 million for preparation for such an alert. [Footnote in the source text.]

The President asked whether there was any question of our capability to detect quickly a Soviet attempt to set off a great number of missiles. Dr. Kistiakowsky thought that the BMEWS system could not miss such an attempt. The President pointed out that we are now able to detect the firing of a single missile at Tyura Tam. Dr. Kistiakowsky thought that technique would not be applicable to the firing of missiles under operational conditions. We must rely on BMEWS, although we did not know how many fake signals would appear on BMEWS. The possibility of fake signals on BMEWS was one reason for developing the infra-red satellite warning system which, combined with BMEWS, would give positive and certain warning, but which was yet several years off.

Mr. Allen was concerned that if mention is made before Congressional Committees of Soviet missile misfirings, Congress will want to know how many of our missiles have misfired. Mr. Dulles said he did not intend to go into the matter of Soviet misfirings in testimony before Congressional Committees. In any case the number of U.S. misfirings was well known.

The President felt it might be a mistake to adopt the Air Force estimate of the number of missiles the Soviets would have, referred to in Mr. Dulles' briefing. Khrushchev had said to him, "We know you won't start a war." Moreover, Khrushchev had been emphatic about stopping Russian plane production. Mr. Dulles reported that the Soviets had reduced production of planes, but that production was still going on. He added that the estimate of Soviet missile capability was guesswork to a certain extent for the period after 1961. In testimony before Congress he could probably give the figures for 1961 and say there were various guesses for the period following that.

General Twining asked whether the figures Mr. Dulles had given for the Soviet missile warhead, that is 6000 pounds and 8 megatons, were based on hard intelligence. Mr. Dulles said he was pretty confident of the intelligence on this point. The President said these figures were an indication that the Soviets have larger propulsive machinery in their missiles than we have. However, he had been told by Defense that our thrust was adequate for our requirements. He wondered whether we were using smaller missile warheads as a result of our lower thrust. Secretary Gates felt that our warheads were adequate for our purposes. Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed out that Atlas would carry a [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] warhead which would produce a [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] blast. Mr. McCone said miniaturization enabled us to live with a lower thrust without reducing the warhead proportionately.

Mr. Stans remarked that as the accuracy of Soviet missiles increases, the value of hardening U.S. bases decreases. This principle raised the question whether it would not be better for us to use money for mobility

of missiles instead of hardening of bases. Secretary Gates said this question had often been considered by the scientists, who always concluded that it was worth spending money for hardening of missile bases. The President felt it was desirable to adhere to a well thought-out war plan. In connection with missile bases, he thought we should try a camouflage program, one which would, for example, conceal missile sites in connection with construction of large dams. Mr. Dulles said we might also build a number of dummy missile bases. The President agreed, and urged that we not put all our eggs in one basket in connection with missile bases. The Vice President wondered whether it was not accurate to say that, assuming the Soviets will start any war which occurs, they will need more missiles than we will need. If they set out to destroy us, they will need sufficient missiles to do the job the first time, for if they do not succeed in their first attack, they will feel the weight of our retaliatory capability. He believed the Soviets did not want to initiate war if thereby they risked destroying themselves. He felt they would not initiate a war unless they calculated that they could deliver a decisive attack against us by surprise. Mr. Allen agreed with the Vice President as to the USSR but was not sure about Communist China if the latter acquired missiles with nuclear warheads.

The President remarked that in a period of strained diplomatic relations we might get information about an impending Russian attack which would cause us to fire our missiles. Missiles once fired, however, could not be recalled if the information about the Russian attack proved to be false. There was no "fail-safe" or positive control over missiles as there was over planes. Secretary Gates concluded the discussion with the remark that all studies made by Defense showed that a greater and greater premium was being placed on taking the initiative by surprise attack.

*The National Security Council:*⁹

a. Noted an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to a summary of NIE 11-4-59 ("Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1959 through 1964") and NIE 11-8-59 ("Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack Through Mid-1964").

b. Discussed relative strategic attack capabilities of the United States and the USSR over the next few years.

[Here follow Agenda Items 4. "U.S. Policy Toward Iran," 5. "U.S. Policy Toward Turkey," and 6. "U.S. Policy on Hong Kong."]

Marion W. Boggs

⁹ The following paragraphs constitute NSC Action No. 2169, approved by the President on January 9. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

83. Briefing Note

Washington, January 14, 1960.

[Here follow sections on oceanography, life sciences, and outer space activities.]

The remaining items in my report, Mr. President, have to do with military matters.

4. One of the panels of the PSAC made this fall a very thorough study of the *Nike-Zeus AICBM problem*. It confirmed the findings of two independent recent technical studies in DOD and extended the conclusions further.¹ Specifically, they are that the presently conceived Nike-Zeus system, even if it performs according to expectations, is not a worthwhile investment. If it is considered as a defense of missile sites, it turns out to be cheaper to increase our deterrent strength by adding more such sites than by buying Nike-Zeus, the cost factor being very substantial in this case, of the order of 10 to 1. On the other hand, if one thinks of Nike-Zeus as a defense of population, it turns out to be useless because the enemy can kill people by exploding warheads upwind of the cities out of the range of Nike-Zeus. Hence, only a comprehensive fallout shelter program in conjunction with the Nike-Zeus could achieve this objective. Because of these very thoroughly documented arguments, our Panel recommended against going into production with Nike-Zeus—a recommendation which was accepted by the Secretary of Defense. We urged further research effort on Nike-Zeus in the hope that this weapons system could be dramatically improved. In the Army there seems to be a sharp split on the issue of our recommendations; people lower in the echelons, who have had an opportunity to look into the technical factors involved, agree with our recommendations, but top echelons are most unhappy about them.

5. I should like to tell you now, Mr. President, about the present status of the so-called *Project Corona*. So far it has not functioned, but every successive launch has resulted in some progress, one difficulty after another being eliminated. All of them are of comparatively trivial engineering nature, and there is a substantial degree of optimism that the next launch, which is scheduled for early February, will see a complete technical success of the entire system.

6. You are already aware in a general way, Mr. President, of the difficulties of the *Titan Project*. I have made a considerable effort to analyze these difficulties and have reached the conclusion that the Air Force is

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. The note was prepared by Kistiakowsky for a conference held on January 14; see footnote 2 below.

¹ None found.

completely correct in its evaluation. This is that the missile is soundly engineered and should show the planned performance. On the other hand, the managerial situation at the Martin Company is very bad and the failures of the last eight months can all be traced to human factors: lack of staff training, low competence, lack of adequate instructions. The Air Force, with a little help from me, has put a heavy pressure on the Martin Company to remedy these weaknesses; changes have been made and we have hopes that the program will shortly get going. If this is the case, Titan could still be operational by mid-'61 as planned, but there is little doubt that in Congress a great deal will be made of the present situation by the critics of the Administration.

7. In this connection, I should like to call to your attention a report by GAO on the supposed failings of the Air Force in the over-all management of the *missile program*. This report appears to be an extreme and unwise invasion of the Executive Branch of the Government. GAO, under the guise of managerial criticism, condemns the Air Force and the Defense Department for failure to take certain technical decisions and for use of inadequate scientific talent on the program. The report contends that objectives of the program have not been met. The Air Force is taking vigorous actions to counter the report, urging its revision and also preparing a rebuttal, but I am very much afraid that when and if this report is made public, it will provide ammunition to those who choose to attack your Administration irresponsibly.²

G.B. Kistiakowsky

² In his memorandum of Kistiakowsky's conference with the President held on January 14, Goodpaster stated that Eisenhower expressed general agreement with Kistiakowsky's views, but that during the discussion of ballistic missiles he "remained of the opinion that careful consideration should be given to putting the Polaris missile on the Navy's ships. If this is not to be done, he has a large question in his mind whether Khrushchev is not right, and whether the day of the surface combatant ship is not, in general, past." Regarding the GAO report, the President stated that it would be important for the Air Force to have its "answers" ready for immediate release when the report became public. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries) See the Supplement. Another account of the conversation is in Kistiakowsky, *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 227-228.

84. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 100-60

Washington, January 19, 1960.

ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION¹

Foreword

Although we have tried in this estimate to take as long a view as possible, we have necessarily left out of account some elements that could drastically alter the course of events. Thus, we have not attempted to assess the likelihood or consequences of revolutionary scientific advances of either military or civilian application. Moreover, we have assessed the East-West struggle on the assumption that no major war takes place, and on the other hand, that there is no agreement for large-scale reduction of military capabilities by the major powers.

Summary of the Estimate

1. Over the next decade, we believe that the stature of the USSR and of Communist China in the world will continue to increase markedly, thus posing increasingly serious challenges and a growing menace to the US and the West.² (Para. 18)

2. In the world in general, recent Soviet behavior contributed to a spreading popular impression that the East-West struggle, or cold war, was entering a period of greater movement and fluidity, and that the direction of this movement was toward a diminution of cold war tensions. Viewed objectively and realistically, however, the East-West rela-

Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following Intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 19 January 1960." The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

¹ While the estimate summarizes our views on the USSR, a fuller treatment of Soviet trends and developments will be contained in NIE 11-4-59, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1959-1964." Soviet strategic capabilities, including ICBM buildup, will be covered in NIE 11-8-59, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack Through Mid-1964." Both these estimates will be published in the near future. [Footnote in the source text. Regarding NIE 11-4-59, see footnote 5, Document 82. For NIE 11-8-59, see Document 88.]

² The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the importance of the ICBM requires that the third sentence of paragraph 2 be inserted in this initial paragraph to read: "In particular, the emerging Soviet ICBM capability, dramatized in the eyes of the world by the Lunik shots, is altering military power relationships." [Footnote in the source text.]

tionship remains fundamentally hostile. The emerging Soviet ICBM capability, dramatized in the eyes of the world by the Lunik shots, is altering military power relationships. Confidence that the trend of events is in their favor remains a keynote of the behavior of the Soviet leaders, and they assert that the overall growth of their relative power position has now reached the point where major consequences will be manifest on the world scene within the foreseeable future. (Paras. 13-14)

3. Our views of Soviet power and policy are fully stated in our forthcoming estimate on this subject. In brief, we believe that:

a. Soviet economic and scientific strength will continue to grow at a rapid rate.

b. The Soviets, despite some force reductions, will maintain a high level of conventional military forces and will greatly increase their long range attack capabilities, above all through a substantial ICBM buildup.

c. In the Soviet view, the emerging standoff of intercontinental striking forces marks a stalemate only of general war capabilities. They consider that this situation of mutual deterrence would open up new opportunities for advancing Communist power by political, economic, and perhaps even limited military means. We believe, however, that even then they would not wittingly assume serious risks of general war. We believe that they would draw back if the Western response were of such vigor that in their view more extensive Soviet involvement would entail either serious risk of general war or net political loss. At the same time, we believe that the chance of their miscalculating risks may increase if they remain convinced that their relative power is growing.

d. Soviet foreign policy will remain devoted to the same objectives as heretofore. At least over a five-year period, elements of both a policy of pressure and one of reducing tensions will probably be adopted at one time or another. The immediate outlook is that the Soviets will continue their present tactics of *détente* at least through the initial phase of the series of high-level negotiations now in view. In another year or two they may feel that their capabilities in long range missiles have brought them into a period when the relations of military power are the most favorable from their point of view. They will still try to win Western concessions basically through negotiation. But the element of pressure and threat will probably become more pronounced, perhaps much more so, than it is at present. (Para. 19)

4. Although the assets of the USSR are formidable, and for the foreseeable future will cause it to gravely threaten US security and that of the Free World generally, some of these assets also contain problems. Chief among these are the Satellite situation, Soviet relations with the underdeveloped areas, and Sino-Soviet relations. In the course of time, it is possible that these problems, coupled with long term evolution within the USSR itself, would limit the effectiveness and even alter the content of

Soviet foreign policy. At present, however, we see no basis for estimating that such problems would either diminish Soviet internal power or change the basic objectives of the Soviet leadership. (Paras. 22–29)

5. On the Communist Chinese front, tensions have increased in the past year. The Chinese Communists will probably seek to achieve their objectives by political and subversive means with a broad range of tactics, but there are likely to be frequent manifestations of truculence and more, rather than less, of the range of pressures recently exemplified in the Indian border dispute, in Laos, and in Indonesia. (Paras. 15, 32)

6. Non-Communist Asia has become somewhat alarmed over Chinese Communist intentions. However, there exists no non-Communist power or grouping of local powers comparable in strength to Communist China. Several individual countries remain particularly vulnerable to Communist influence, and over the next five years there is a fair chance that a Communist regime will come to power in one or another of the countries in the area. US action, however, could in most cases reduce the chance of such a development and in any event could probably prevent any chain reaction if an individual country did go Communist. It is hard to see the situation in the area as a whole improving markedly over this period, and a bellicose Chinese Communist policy could produce widespread turmoil and even major hostilities. (Paras. 34–40)

7. Western Europe's economic growth and internal political stability are likely to continue satisfactory, although France's political future is somewhat uncertain. The movement towards economic integration continues to have great momentum, despite current difficulties. NATO confronts serious problems, notably France's pressure for increased status, French development of an independent nuclear capability, and sentiment among the continental countries for some form of European continental military grouping, possibly related to NATO. Over the next few years, we believe that basic military dependence on the US will keep the alliance together. Nevertheless, its effectiveness will probably be somewhat reduced, and this reduction could attain serious proportions if European confidence in the will and ability of the US to protect Europe from the Communist threat should decline markedly. In any event, unless there is a renewed sense of urgency, Western Europe's increased strength will probably not be applied as fully and cohesively as it might be to the key problems now confronting the West, of maintaining an effective military posture and of providing large-scale aid to the underdeveloped countries. (Paras. 41, 44–45, 49, 54, 59)

8. In countries of the underdeveloped world, the complex force of nationalism and growing desires for a better life will be powerful factors shaping the course of events. These countries will continue to expect help from the richer countries, and they will be inclined to accept such help regardless of whether it comes from the East or the West. Inasmuch

as these countries generally lack the experienced leadership, the stable political and social institutions, and the material resources to cope with their many problems in orderly ways, there will remain the possibility of violent upheavals and local conflicts. While these outbreaks may not stem from the East-West struggle, they can be expected often to involve the interests of the two sides and to afford opportunities for exploitation. Thus, the underdeveloped world will continue to be a principal area of the contest between the Bloc and the West. (Para. 80)

9. The outlook in the various underdeveloped areas (apart from non-Communist Asia, covered in Conclusion 6 above) is mixed. The Middle East will remain very unstable. In South Asia, the future of Afghanistan, in particular, is uncertain. While trade and other economic relations with the Bloc will increase in Africa, and there will be many opportunities for the spread of Communist influence, we do not believe that local Communist-controlled groups will become strongly entrenched in power in any country at least over the next few years, given a reasonable degree of effective attention from the West.³ (Paras. 73-76)

10. In Latin America as a whole, we do look for some expansion in Communist influence over the next few years, although such an expansion will probably not be widespread, especially in view of the possibilities for US action. However, there is a possibility that one or another country, notably Cuba, could fall under Communist control. Moreover, the Communists or other extremists may achieve such influence that they can put through programs seriously threatening US interests or even security. In any event, the US will be under increasing pressure, and Latin American support for the US, for example in the UN, will almost certainly continue to decline. (Para. 79)

11. US policy remains crucial both in itself and for its effect on the rest of the Free World. Indications that the US was not maintaining a firm and effective military and political posture would lead to weakening of the resolve of other free nations. The growth of Soviet ICBM capabilities is creating a serious problem for the US in maintaining among other Free World nations confidence in US willingness to bring its nuclear capabilities to bear as a protection for such nations. A second crucial area affecting US prestige and influence will be that of US economic policy. However much the capacity of other Western nations grows, the Free World will still look to the US for leadership in the problem of channeling Western aid to the "have-not" nations and in the freeing and encourag-

³ The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believe that the prospects for Communist groups should be limited further by substituting after "Communist-controlled groups" in the last sentence the words: "will become a major political force in any country. . . ." [Footnote in the source text.]

ing of international trade, and will be intensely concerned with the economic policies, both domestic and foreign, adopted by the US. (Paras. 82, 84, 86)

[Here follows the 13-page Discussion section, included in the Supplement.]

85. Memorandum of Discussion at the 433d Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, January 21, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Item 1. "The Role of the Military Air Transport Service in Peace and War." See the Supplement.]

2. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*

[Here follows discussion, included in the Supplement, of a Soviet missile tested the previous day.]

Mr. Dulles felt the Soviets would want to make a good deal of the two kilometers CEP¹ which they say they have achieved. He thought it was possible that the Soviets intended to support their position in forthcoming diplomatic negotiations by a dramatic demonstration of the long range of their missiles. General White, on the contrary, believed that when the Soviets want to achieve maximum diplomatic impact, they will name the time and the target which they wish to hit, and will attempt to put the missile on the target. Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed out that the 24 hour postponement in the launching of the Soviet missile suggested that the Soviets had fired something new rather than an old-type missile.

Mr. Dulles said he was about to appear before a Congressional Committee and predicted that he would be asked about the Soviet firing. The President said that Mr. Dulles could tell the Committee that the Soviet missile had fallen in the impact area and that it had been seen by our observers in the area. The Attorney General felt Mr. Dulles should

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs.

¹ The Soviets had announced that the missile had landed within two kilometers of its target.

emphasize that there is no assurance that the Soviet report of the missile CEP is accurate. Mr. Allen said we should perhaps indicate that since our CEP is two miles, we assume Russian accuracy is about the same. The President felt, on the other hand, that we should give no credence to the announced Russian CEP until the Russians predict the exact spot they intend to hit and allow us to observe the firing.

Mr. McCone asked whether there would be other Soviet missile firings in the Pacific. Mr. Dulles said he assumed the firing just described was one in a series of shots.

The President said that in Congressional testimony it could be said by US officials that the Soviet missile had impacted in the impact area, but we ought not to betray the extent of our surveillance of the area.

Mr. Dulles then turned to Khrushchev's recent speech before the Supreme Soviet.² He said this speech was very important and had been the subject of a careful analysis by CIA. He was inclined to accept Khrushchev's statement on manpower strength and on the reductions in certain hardware production. He was willing to accept tentatively Khrushchev's figure of 3.6 million men under arms in all the Soviet forces, although this figure was less than the figure previously carried in intelligence estimates. CIA had already observed the virtual cessation of bomber production in the USSR and cuts in the production of other weapons, e.g. naval vessels. Incidentally, Mr. Dulles noted that the first reports of Khrushchev's speech had lumped submarines and surface ships together as obsolete. This turned out to be an error in translation. Actually Khrushchev had said only that surface ships were obsolete. Mr. Dulles estimated that the reduction in Soviet armed forces proposed by Khrushchev of 1.2 million could probably be effected within two years, by the fall of 1961 according to Malinovsky.³ Mr. Dulles felt it made a good deal of sense for the USSR to reduce its forces in view of the possibility of serious competition in 1960 through 1962 between the military on the one hand and the civilian economy on the other as represented by the Seven Year Plan. The USSR needed more manpower for its industrial program. Reduction in military manpower would also result in the reduction of 16-17 billion rubles in the explicit Soviet military budget. Mr. Dulles pointed out, however, that the real military budget, as opposed to the announced military budget, of the USSR was 160+ billion rubles. Mr. Dulles did not believe that the reductions announced in the Khrushchev speech would affect previous estimates of Soviet ICBM capabilities. Apparently the Soviet forces were about to undergo a thorough reorganization. Khrushchev has become a missile enthusiast and wishes to speed up the rationalization of Soviet forces. He may also wish

² Dulles also reported on Khrushchev's address at the NSC meeting on January 14; see vol. X, Part 1, pp. 498-499.

³ Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky, Soviet Minister of Defense.

to fix our attention on the missile field, where he thinks the Soviets have superiority. He apparently wishes to achieve armed forces which will consist of strategic attack and air defense forces armed with missiles, ground forces also armed with missiles and having great airborne capability, and a navy consisting largely of submarines. Mr. Dulles said that Khrushchev may be considering a percentage withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. The Khrushchev program of reduction is probably not palatable to the Soviet military and Khrushchev may have had some difficulty getting the military to go along. Evidence of this is the fact that the Chief of Staff and other important military figures did not make speeches before the Supreme Soviet. The demotion of Kirichenko⁴ may also have been related to opposition to the Khrushchev military program. Mr. Dulles concluded by reporting that the tone of Khrushchev's speech reflects the belief that the USSR can overcome capitalism without general war, indicates great reliance on missile forces as a shield behind which communism can compete with the West, and seems to exclude general war as a deliberate Soviet policy.

Mr. Gray asked whether Khrushchev did not express regret that the US military budget provided for no reductions. Mr. Dulles replied in the affirmative. In response to questions, Mr. Dulles said the published Soviet military budget provided for the expenditure of 96 billion rubles. The President said Khrushchev had told him that Soviet military costs were about half US costs. The President assumed Khrushchev must have been using a four-to-one exchange rate between the dollar and the ruble, which led him to conclude that the Soviets probably have a military budget equivalent to about \$48 billion. Khrushchev had also told him that the Soviet scale of military effort was very close to our scale of effort. Mr. Dulles agreed that the total Soviet military effort was comparable to ours. The Vice President asked what percentage of the Soviet GNP was devoted to military purposes as opposed to the US GNP. Mr. Dulles said the Soviets devoted about twice as much of their GNP to military purposes as we did. The President pointed out, however, that the GNP of the US contained a number of items not included in the Soviet GNP, e.g. advertising.

[Here follows discussion of Soviet-Cuban relations.]

*The National Security Council.*⁵

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the recent Soviet test

⁴ On January 13, the Soviet newspaper *Pravda* announced that A. I. Kirichenko, a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, had been appointed to a minor provincial post.

⁵ The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2182, approved by the President on January 26. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

of a missile which impacted in the Pacific; further evaluation of the recent speech by Khrushchev before the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; and the planned Soviet exposition in Havana, Cuba.

Marion W. Boggs

86. Editorial Note

On January 26, 1960, President Eisenhower approved recommendations designed to transfer many routine cargo operations from the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) to commercial carriers and to encourage the production of commercial aircraft suitable to non-routine military transportation requirements, while simultaneously assuring preservation of an adequate MATS capacity for unique military requirements in peacetime and expanded military requirements in wartime. The policy was embodied in recommendations by an interagency group which are attached to a memorandum from Lay to the NSC, January 19, as modified by NSC Action No. 2181, approved by the President on January 26. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records, and Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

The President's action obviated the need for a formal policy statement, of which a draft had been prepared in NSC 5519, "U.S. Policy With Respect to the Development of Cargo Air Lift," dated December 28, 1959. (*Ibid.*, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5919 Series) NSC 5519 was summarized in a memorandum from the Bureau of Economic Affairs to Acting Secretary Dillon, January 5. (*Ibid.*) Cargo airlift was discussed twice in the National Security Council at meetings on January 7 and January 21. (Memoranda of discussion by Boggs, January 13 and January 21; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) All these documents are in the Supplement.

87. Memorandum of Discussion at the 434th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, February 4, 1960.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*¹

Mr. Gray said the intelligence briefing would be devoted principally to a presentation of the new "Estimate of the World Situation" (NIE 100–60).² This Estimate, prepared every year at this time by the Intelligence Community, is normally one of the bases for the annual review of Basic National Security Policy. However, the last review of Basic Policy was begun in February of last year and the new paper (NSC 5906/1)³ was approved by the President in August. Indeed, certain portions of the paper, those relating to stockpiling, were adopted as recently as December 3. Accordingly, a complete review of the entire Basic Policy was not planned for this year.

Mr. Dulles said he wished to cover some items of current intelligence before summarizing NIE 100–60. [Here follows discussion of Soviet missile and space activity, included in the Supplement.]

[1 paragraph (10 lines of source text) not declassified]

[Here follows discussion of the Warsaw Pact, Khrushchev's travels, and developments in Syria, India, and Algeria.]

Mr. Dulles then turned to the Estimate of the World Situation (NIE 100–60). After reporting that the Estimate had been agreed on by the Intelligence Community except for two mild dissents, he read the "Summary of the Estimate" (Pages 1–4 of NIE 100–60). The President noted that the Estimate contained no speculation as to the Soviet attitude when the Soviets become richer and more industrialized. The President was inclined to feel that as a nation gets richer, it becomes more conservative. Perhaps as industrialization advances in the Soviet Union and as the Soviets have more to risk by an adventuresome policy, they will become more conservative. At any rate, he felt this possibility should not be overlooked. Another fifty years might bring about quite a change in relations between the US and the USSR. Of course, the Chinese Communists would not become rich and conservative for quite a while yet, and they

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs.

¹ Another account of the discussion of this agenda item is in Kistiakowsky, *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 242–243.

² Document 84.

³ Document 70.

might become irritated at the Soviets if the Soviets become conservative. Mr. Dulles was inclined to agree with the President's remarks. He said he had always believed in the possibility of evolutionary development in the Soviet Union. He then read the following extract from the discussion portion of NIE 100-60:

"Popular hopes for a better life are on the rise in the USSR. Some groups seek a greater degree of personal freedom from restrictions and there is a far more universal desire to enjoy more of the economic fruits of Soviet growth. Khrushchev so far has tended to take these sentiments into account and has thus somewhat strengthened the regime."

The President noted that these desires and sentiments could be governmental as well as individual attitudes. The Vice President thought that one of the greatest subconscious restraints influencing the Soviet government was its immense pride in its achievements. The risks the USSR would take now are far less in magnitude than the risks it would have taken ten years ago. As the USSR has more to risk, it will be more restrained. The President recalled that after World War I a great many publicists had written a great deal about the "have's" and the "have not's". He said he liked Mr. Dulles' summary of the Estimate, which he had read.

Mr. McCone said he was concerned by Mr. Dulles' remarks to the effect that Free World allegiance to the alliance with the US might be weakened if the Free World should come to doubt our military capability or our will. He asked whether the Free World was already doubting our will and ability or whether there was a danger that it might do so in the future. Mr. Dulles reported that most Foreign Offices contained a clique which doubted the will and the ability of the US. Secretary Herter agreed and added that these cliques were especially active whenever there was talk of withdrawing US forces from Europe. However, he felt that many of the doubts which the Free World had about us were laid to rest during the last NATO meeting. Most Free World countries, he continued, cannot feel secure unless they maintain their faith in US retaliatory power. Mr. McCone asked whether the attack in the US on our retaliatory capability was weakening confidence in us abroad. Mr. Herter said it was and indicated that our allies would undoubtedly be worried if they felt we were worried about our retaliatory capacity. This was one of the more troublesome features of the "missile gap" discussion. Mr. McCone said he thought that the position which the President took in commenting on the attacks on our military capabilities was of course the correct one. Nevertheless, he had detected some concern among our own people as well as among our allies lest our retaliatory capability not remain adequate. He thought additional missiles could be produced by the US at slight additional cost and wondered whether such additional production should not be given serious consideration. He felt we could not ignore the undercurrent of concern now evident.

Mr. Allen believed that a Gallup Poll in 1939 would have revealed that most Americans thought Hitler was stronger militarily than the UK, but this did not mean that these Americans were about to desert the UK and join Hitler. Today polls would show that people abroad believe the Soviet Union is militarily stronger than the US, but this does not mean that our allies are about to desert us and join the Soviets.

Mr. McCone felt on the contrary that the Estimate just summarized by Mr. Dulles came close to saying that perhaps some Free World countries would join the USSR if they came to have doubts of our will and ability. He could not agree with Mr. Allen about Hitler because Hitler had not been considered a threat to us in 1939. The President said he disagreed with Mr. McCone; at least in the military services, Hitler was considered a threat to the US in 1939. However, the President felt that unnecessary hysteria had been produced in the US by the launching of Sputnik, which had no military significance. He added that if we want the US to become an armed camp, there are a great many measures we could take to strengthen ourselves militarily, but in a free country we could not impose sufficient taxes to become a much more heavily armed nation and at the same time preserve a viable economy. People were inclined to rebel against high taxes; and if we became a garrison state we would need to impose economic controls. He believed we were doing enough militarily at the present time and thought we had sufficient retaliatory capability. On his recent trip he had detected everywhere a desire on the part of the people for peace and a desire for reassurance that the US would not desert the Free World. Secretary Herter said the significance of Sputnik was that it was evidence of Soviet scientific competence and of what might evolve from such scientific competence. The President agreed, but thought nevertheless that our hysteria was too great at the time Sputnik was launched. He noted that he had made several speeches in an effort to produce a calmer atmosphere.

Mr. McCone said he did not want to transform the US into an armed camp, nor would he wish to produce serious effects on the US economy, but he still believed that for the expenditure of a relatively modest sum we could obtain considerable additional retaliatory capacity. The President said that as soon as our more advanced missiles proved themselves, we must see what we can do to get them into production. However, he did not wish to create a big arsenal of weapons which were not yet fully developed or weapons which would soon be obsolete. Mr. McCone agreed that it was always necessary to maintain a balance between existing operational weapons and weapons which will become operational in the future. However, he feared that Minuteman might be disappointing in that it carried only a small warhead [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. Moreover, making Minuteman operational by 1962 was thus far only a hope. Secretary Douglas said some of those who had had some

doubts about Minuteman's operational capability in 1962 were now confident that this schedule would be met. The President wondered whether the successful tests of the Polaris did not hold out great hope for Minuteman. Secretary Douglas said that while the two missiles were similar, there were enough differences between them so that successful tests of Polaris did not necessarily foreshadow success for Minuteman. He thought the situation as to the development of new missiles was healthy at this time; and Dr. Kistiakowsky agreed. Secretary Herter believed the Hound Dog missile should be emphasized. He understood it would come into production soon. The President said the present budget provided for solid accomplishments with the Hound Dog missile. Secretary Douglas believed we could establish four more Atlas squadrons during the last half of Calendar Year 1962 and this development might be extended into 1963. By mid-1963 it was hoped that 150 Minutemen would be operational. Not much could be done with the big missiles before Minuteman becomes operational. However, Mr. Douglas noted there were divided counsels on this subject. Mr. McCone conceded that a year ago we had feared that Atlas would not be successful. He reported he had worked out figures identical with those of Mr. Douglas as to the possible build-up of Atlas squadrons in 1962. The President calculated that if Atlas squadrons should be increased from 27 to 40, we would incur a cost of \$6 billion for launching sites which could not subsequently be used for Minuteman. Mr. McCone believed we should have an arsenal containing various missile weapons. He felt that additional Atlas squadrons could be produced by greater effort, including overtime, in our present plants, without increasing our production facilities. Secretary Douglas said that counting both ICBMs and Polaris (which has capabilities similar to ICBMs) we would in mid-1963 have about 500 missiles on launchers, which was almost exactly the figure credited to the Soviet Union at that date, on the average. Would it not be possible to say that in our best judgment there will be no missile gap by mid-1963? Until that time we will have manned bombers and Navy carriers in large numbers. The period of the gap can thus be covered by spending relatively little on an airborne alert which can be put into operation whenever a crisis impends. The President said that launching sites alone for the additional ICBM squadrons would cost us \$1 billion in this year's budget. Secretary Douglas said that the cost would be \$3-1/2 billion including Polaris.

The Vice President asked what the proponents of the airborne alert wanted. Secretary Douglas said they wanted an airborne alert established by early 1961. Indeed, some critics of our defense policy wanted the airborne alert established today. He felt there was no justification for a crash program to establish an airborne alert. A year to fifteen months lead time was required for some items crucial to the airborne alert, such as aircraft engines, if we wish to have the capacity to continue such an

alert indefinitely. The Vice President felt that if offered a choice between a great airborne alert program and acquiring additional Atlas and Polaris squadrons, we would undoubtedly not decide on the airborne alert. Secretary Douglas said when he spoke of an airborne alert for an indefinite period, he meant by the latter phrase only that period of time until we had certain early warning. When BMEWS was completed, we will have assurance of obtaining warning of any large-scale attack. Even the proponents of the airborne alert admit that it is only a temporary expedient.

The President, pointing out that when a missile is tested there is a long count-down, asked how much count-down would be required for a surprise attack by missiles. Dr. Kistiakowsky said much of the count-down in missile testing at the present time is devoted to ensuring that the test equipment is operational. This test equipment is ten times as complicated as the missile itself. Consequently, the count-down could be reduced for firing an operational missile. For example, the initial operational launches of Thor took place after a count-down of fifteen minutes. The President said we talked a great deal about the advantages of missiles. He asked how long would be required to get Atlas ready to fire. Secretary Douglas reported that the total reaction time of Atlas was fifteen minutes, during nine minutes of which Atlas would be exposed; that is, would be a "soft weapon". Titan exposure time would be zero. It seemed inconceivable to Dr. Kistiakowsky that in twelve to twenty-four months from now it would be possible to launch hundreds of missiles with split-second timing.

Mr. Scribner said he had found great concern among our allies as to whether we were willing to take the economic measures necessary to maintain the strength of the US economy. The President said he continued to insist that we must keep our economy sound.

The Vice President asked permission to return to the airborne alert for a moment. He said he understood the proponents of such an alert advocated continuing it for a long period of time. Mr. Douglas said they did. He added that we have had as many as fourteen SAC bombers at one time in the air for periods up to 90 days. The budget provides for a capability to be reached a year from now, of from 60-70 B-52's airborne on a round-the-clock basis. The President asked how many Hound Dogs each B-52 carried. Mr. Douglas said that some B-52's carried two Hound Dogs. He added that the proponents of the airborne alert would double the number of aircraft carrying this missile. The Vice President asked whether additional airborne alert capability could be obtained for an expenditure of \$300 million more. Secretary Douglas said this figure was a reasonable one, but that eventually more manpower would be needed and there would also be a maintenance problem. For example, more crews would be necessary if twelve bombers from each wing were placed on airborne alert. Mr. Dulles asked whether the airborne alert was

not supplemented by a fifteen minute alert status for other planes. Secretary Douglas said such was indeed the case for B-47's but not for B-52's.

*The National Security Council.*⁴

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the second Soviet test missile impacted in the Pacific; the detection of an unidentified earth satellite; the current Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow; Khrushchev's projected trips to India, Burma, Indonesia, France, and possibly Communist China; Israeli-Syrian border clashes; the anti-Communist election victory in Kerala, India; the Algerian situation; and NIE 100-60, "Estimate of the World Situation".⁵

[Here follow Agenda Items 2. "U.S. Policy Toward Cyprus," and 3. "U.S. Policy Toward Italy."]

Marion W. Boggs

⁴ The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2183, approved by the President on February 9. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

⁵ According to Kistiakowsky, the debate on air alert continued after the NSC meeting in a discussion among Nixon, Herter, and McCone. (Kistiakowsky, *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 243-244)

88. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 11-8-59

Washington, February 9, 1960.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK THROUGH MID-1964

[Here follow a dissemination notice and a table of contents.]

Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Top Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following Intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, NSA, and the AEC. Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 9 February 1960." The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

The Problem

To estimate probable trends in the strength and deployment of Soviet long-range air and missile weapons systems suitable for strategic attack, through mid-1964.¹

Foreword

The critical feature of this estimate is our judgment with respect to the force goals of the existing Soviet ICBM program. This judgment is based in part on calculations regarding Soviet ICBM requirements for various defined strategic purposes. These calculations are especially sensitive to possible differences between our assumptions and those actually made by Soviet planners with respect to two important factors:

- a. The probable future performance characteristics of the improving Soviet ICBM.
- b. The probable future development of the US nuclear retaliatory force.

We have assumed for the Soviet ICBM the performance characteristics estimated for it at various dates in NIE 11-5-59, "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles," dated 3 November 1959, and in the USIB "Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-5-59" dated 19 January 1960.² Soviet planners may expect a better performance, in which case their estimates of the numbers required would be lower than ours. However, we would expect them to use conservative assumptions in making so vital a calculation.

With respect to Soviet targeting, we have assumed that existing approved US military programs will be carried out. Explicit information on these programs is presumably not available to Soviet planners, but we believe that they have enough general information from open sources to be able to estimate them with fair accuracy. These US programs are, of course, subject to change—as is the Soviet ICBM program also. The present Soviet ICBM program, however, must be based on the present Soviet estimate of the probable future development of the target system.

¹ "Strategic attack" as used herein is defined as nuclear attack against retaliatory forces and key war-making strengths in North America, as well as US and Allied retaliatory forces at sea and in overseas areas. The weapons systems primarily considered are heavy and medium bombers assigned to Long Range Aviation, related air-to-surface missiles, ground-launched missiles with maximum ranges of 700 nautical miles or more, and submarine-launched missiles. It is recognized that other delivery systems are available for use against targets at sea and overseas. [Footnote in the source text.]

² For NIE 11-5-59, see Document 75. The memorandum is not printed. (Department of State, INR-NIE Files)

It is beyond the scope of this estimate to consider what political or military courses of action the USSR might adopt if the development of its strategic attack capabilities were to be as estimated herein. Such matters will be considered in the forthcoming NIE 11-4-59, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1959-1964."³

Conclusions

1. The Soviet rulers probably regard their present strategic attack forces as capable of devastating US and Allied concentrations of population and industry, but incapable of preventing, by military action, the nuclear devastation of the USSR. (Para. 36)

2. The ICBM presents the best prospects of being able to deliver a heavy weight of attack within the least time after a decision to attack, and thereby to prevent the launching or reduce the weight of a US strategic attack on the USSR. Hence, we believe that the future development of Soviet intercontinental attack capabilities will be primarily a function of the development, production, and deployment of ICBMs. Soviet ICBM capabilities will be supplemented by the development of a submarine-launched missile capability and by the maintenance of a substantial long range bomber capability. (Paras. 40-43)

3. Our analysis leads us to believe that, if the US military posture develops as presently planned, the USSR will in 1961 have its most favorable opportunity to gain a decided military, political, and psychological advantage over the US by the rapid deployment of operational ICBMs. Even at that time, however, the proportion of US retaliatory forces which the Soviets could expect to destroy in a missile attack would depend not only on the number of missiles employed and their performance characteristics, but also, and critically, upon the degree of surprise attainable and upon the precision with which the initial salvo could be timed. Even if surprise were complete and timing perfect the USSR would have to expect retaliation from such US bombers as might be on airborne alert at the time of attack, from at least some of the US aircraft carriers and missile-launching submarines then at sea, and from any other US retaliatory forces that survived the initial salvo. After 1961 the numbers of semi-hardened and hardened US ICBM sites programmed to become operational would require a steep increase in the number of Soviet ICBMs to achieve comparable objectives against US retaliatory forces. (Paras. 45-52)

4. From an economic point of view the main determinant of the Soviet ICBM program is not so much the availability of resources, as the physical difficulty of rapidly building up production of missiles and particularly of launching facilities during the first year or two after IOC, and

³ See footnote 5, Document 82.

of training in a comparatively short time the personnel required to maintain and operate a large number of missiles. These difficulties set practical limits to the Soviet ICBM program. (Paras. 56–58)

5. Every present indication suggests that the Soviet ICBM program, while not a crash program, is designed to provide a substantial ICBM capability at an early date. The goal of the program is probably an ICBM force as large as Soviet planners deem necessary to provide a substantial deterrent and preemptive attack capability. In our view, this would be consistent with the present deliberate and orderly tempo of the Soviet ICBM test-firing program, with current Soviet military doctrine, and with the USSR's observed policy of maintaining a balance among military capabilities designed to accomplish various missions.⁴ (Para. 55)

6. We conclude that the probable Soviet ICBM program would provide on the order of 140–200 ICBMs on launcher in mid-1961. Within this range, the Assistant Chief for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, estimate that the Soviet program is likely to be toward the low side. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, and the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believing that Soviet planners would regard the advantages to be gained as justifying additional effort, estimate that the number of Soviet ICBMs on launcher is likely to be towards the high side of the 140–200 range. (Para. 61)

⁴ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in the second sentence of paragraph 5. He does not believe that Soviet behavior, as we have observed it, warrants the judgment that their objectives would be satisfied by attainment of only substantial deterrence and pre-emptive attack capability. Rather, he believes that the Soviet rulers are endeavoring to attain at the earliest practicable date a military superiority over the United States which they would consider to be so decisive as to enable them either to force their will on the United States through threat of destruction, or to launch such devastating attacks against the United States that, at the cost of acceptable levels of damage to themselves, the United States as a world power would cease to exist. He further believes that such an objective could be attained by the development of their overall military capabilities which would include an operational ICBM force of about 250 (185 on launcher) by mid-1961, 500 (385 on launcher) by mid-1962, and 800 (640 on launcher) by mid-1963. It is generally agreed that the Soviets have both the technical and industrial capability to produce such a force; the physical difficulties thereby entailed will almost certainly not be the limiting factor.

It is the view of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, that, while Soviet planners will undoubtedly feel that they will have attained a capacity for substantial deterrence and pre-emptive attack by mid-1962 or earlier, the real objective of the Soviet ICBM program is "decisive military superiority." He believes that the Soviets would not be content with conceptual levels of deterrence; they would realize the possibility of error in their own calculations and acknowledge the possibility of Western preemption of their deterrent capabilities. This latter contingency would weigh the more heavily if the Soviet leaders intended, as he believes likely, to exploit their capabilities in political offensives. In this event, their estimate of the likelihood of Western "desperate" acts would induce them to attempt attainment of total deterrence, i.e., "decisive military superiority." [Footnote in the source text.]

7. The military capabilities which the Soviets would acquire with this missile force would depend to a great degree upon the performance characteristics of the missile. By the end of 1960, however, the estimated Soviet ICBM force will constitute a grave threat to the principal US metropolitan areas, and will thus represent a powerful political and psychological weapon in international relationships. By 1961 it will present an extremely dangerous threat to SAC bomber bases, unhardened ICBM sites and command installations, although the degree of assurance the Soviets would have of being able to destroy US retaliatory forces would vary considerably depending on the performance characteristics of their ICBMs, and in any case would be subject to the qualifications in paragraph 3. (Para. 62)

8. The development of the Soviet ICBM force beyond 1961 would be likely to be affected by such considerations as the actual development of the target system to be attacked, the prospects for a greatly improved Soviet ICBM, and the prospects (on both sides) for an effective anti-ICBM, as well as by the general development of the world situation and of relations between the US and the USSR. Any figures for future years should be reviewed in the light of such considerations and of evidence on the actual progress of the Soviet ICBM program. Projecting our estimates of the present ICBM program (and assuming that if the USSR has approximately 200 ICBMs on launcher in mid-1961 production would substantially level off in the subsequent two years) the most likely number of Soviet ICBMs on launcher in mid-1962 would be 250-350 and in mid-1963 would be 350-450.⁵ (Para. 63)

9. The USSR will have no serious difficulty in meeting its estimated requirements for 700 n.m. and 1,100 n.m. ballistic missiles. (Paras. 64-67)

10. On the basis of the foregoing conclusions, our numerical estimates of Soviet medium and heavy bombers in Long Range Aviation units, long and medium-range ballistic missiles, and missile-launching submarines are as shown in the following table:^{6,7}

⁵ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in this sentence. See his footnote to paragraph 5, above. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁶ [Here follows a footnote in the source text with the dissenting view of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, on the number of heavy bombers and ICBMs estimated. He estimated that the number of bombers and ICBMs would be higher from mid-1962 onward.]

⁷ [Here follows a footnote in the source text with the dissenting view of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, on the number of heavy bombers estimated. He estimated that the number would be lower from mid-1960 onward.]

| | Mid-1960 | Mid-1961 | Mid-1962 | Mid-1963 | Mid-1964 |
|------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------------------|----------|
| <i>Bombers</i> | | | | | |
| Heavy | 135 | 150 | 140 | 130 | 120 |
| Medium | 1,100 | 1,050 | 1,000 | 900 | 800 |
| <i>Missiles</i> | | | | | |
| 700 n.m. | | | | | |
| In Inventory | 250 | 350 | 450 | 450 | 450 |
| On Launcher | 110 | 150 | 150 | 150 | 150 |
| 1,100 n.m. | | | | | |
| In Inventory | 80 | 160 | 240 | 300 | 300 |
| On Launcher | 50 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| ICBM | | | | | |
| In Inventory | 50 | 175-270 | 325-450 | ^a 450-560 | |
| On Launcher | 35 | 140-200 | 250-350 | ^b 350-450 | |
| <i>Submarines</i> | | | | | |
| "Z" class ^c | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| "G" class ^d | 9 | 15 | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| Nuclear ^e | | 2 | 6 | 10 | 14 |

^a Not estimated beyond 1963.

^b Not estimated beyond 1963.

^c Each "Z" class submarine would probably carry two missiles.

^d Each "G" class submarine would probably carry about five missiles.

^e The associated missile may not become available until 1963, in which case the missile used in the "G" class might be used in this submarine. Each submarine would probably carry 6-12.

[Here follow 27 pages of the Discussion section and annexes, as well as several maps.]

89. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Kistiakowsky) to President Eisenhower

Washington, February 12, 1960.

SUBJECT

Problems of the B-70 Project¹

The B-70 is to be the most advanced aircraft, in speed, altitude, and range. It is also to be the most complex one, far more so than a missile, for instance. Its development involves a new fabrication concept in airframe construction—brazed stainless steel. It requires a new engine, now under development, and an unorthodox airframe design. At least the crew and equipment compartment will have to be airconditioned because the aircraft will get nearly red-hot due to its high speed.

An additional problem is posed by the design of an adequate bombing and navigation system that takes into account the very high speed and altitude of the aircraft.

However, the great amount of work already done indicates that, after extensive flight-test experience, these problems will be solved.

In a different category is the development of the defensive ECM equipment which appears to be beyond the present state of the art and has been suspended. Judging by experience with other aircraft, it is not possible to accelerate the development arbitrarily by adding more and more funds—flight testing and aircraft modifications required thereby need time and thus 1965 is about the earliest time that operational B-70 would be developed.

The criticisms of the B-70 project rest not on doubts that eventually it could be developed, but on justification for developing it.

The contractor estimates that the cost of the first hundred aircraft will be \$4.1 billion, and experience with such estimates suggests that the actual cost may be nearly double, i.e. some \$70 million per aircraft.

In flight, the B-70 will be a very visible target for radar and infra-red devices and hence subject to detection at great distances. This will facilitate the problem of interception, despite its high altitude and speed.

The B-70 is not well-suited for air-alert because of high fuel consumption, and is to depend on rapid take-off for its protection against

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. No classification marking.

¹ In a January 11 memorandum to General White, General Power set forth his positive view of the B-70's strategic value. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, White Papers, Box 34, SAC) See the Supplement.

surprise attack, hence an early warning. It is by no means sure that early warning can be made wholly reliable because of spoofing, etc.

Putting it crudely, it is not clear what the B-70 can do that ballistic missiles can't—and cheaper and sooner at that.²

G. B. Kistiakowsky³

² In a memorandum on the Minuteman program, also submitted to the President on February 12, Kistiakowsky concluded that problems in development of the missile itself would be "eventually solved," but expressed some reservations about the cost and complexity of the weapons system as a whole. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, White Papers, Box 34, SAC) See the Supplement.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

90. Editorial Note

On February 12, 1960, General Hickey delivered to a Special Meeting of the National Security Council an oral presentation of a study, dated November 6, 1959, on the "Appraisal of Relative Merits, From the Point of View of Effective Deterrence, of Alternative Retaliatory Efforts." The study has not been found; notes dated November 5–6, 1959, on which Hickey apparently based his presentation, are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File. The study had been prepared in accordance with NSC Action No. 2009 (see footnote 7, Document 38). No memorandum of the discussion at the Special Meeting has been found. Kistiakowsky described the meeting in *A Scientist at the White House*, pages 253–254.

91. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Twining) to President Eisenhower

CM-449-60

Washington, February 12, 1960.

SUBJECT

Appraisal of Relative Merits, from the Point of View of Effective Deterrence, of Alternative Retaliatory Efforts

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the Hickey study¹ and have discussed it with the Secretary of Defense on several occasions.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in agreement that the concept of the "optimum mix" target system is sound, and that the order of magnitude of the target system appears to be reasonable, within the scope and time frame of the study.

3. However, the Service Chiefs have requested that I briefly mention certain observations which they have on the conclusions of the study.

4. General Lemnitzer has made the following major observations:

a. The conclusions of the study are predicated on the assumption that our defenses will be capable of containing a Soviet attack on the Continental United States to the extent that we will survive as a viable nation. An adequate air and missile defense, both active and passive, is therefore absolutely essential in order that we may have the residual relative superiority necessary to prevail if the deterrent fails.

b. The problem of locating and destroying enemy ICBM sites is a major factor bearing on the conclusions. This problem requires further study.

c. The relatively small number of bomb release line high-yield weapons required to attack "optimum mix" target system indicates that we have reached, if not surpassed, the leveling off point for these weapons in our stockpile.

5. Admiral Burke has made the following major observations:

a. The study indicates that our current stockpile of high-yield weapons is adequate or even excessive if less vulnerable delivery systems were to be used.

b. For destruction of the basic target systems by bomber delivery, the percentage of aircraft in the national inventory that arrives on target is apparently only about 15%. This is of such concern as to suggest acceleration of programs for less vulnerable delivery systems.

Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File. Top Secret.

¹ See Document 90.

c. The deterrent effect of forces required only for attack of the urban-industrial system is underrated.

d. The study concerned itself with a mix of targets but did not explore extensively a mix of weapons on targets. This requires further study.

e. With the exception of the Polaris, the nuclear capable theater forces of CINCEUR, CINCPAC and CINCLANT were not employed in the wargaming attack of the "optimum mix" strategic target system. Employment of these forces would change the retaliatory force level required. Further studies on this aspect of the problem are required.

6. General White has made the following major observations:

a. The potential benefits of this valuable appraisal could be forfeited unless the term "optimum mix" is given the same meaning in our planning as it was given in the study. The study developed a target system consisting of a mix of vital military and important urban-industrial targets, including all vital strategic elements of the enemy's known nuclear offensive capability.

b. While General White has also expressed certain reservations regarding the specifics of the study, and does not share the reservations noted by General Lemnitzer and Admiral Burke, he has requested that they not be outlined here, since, in his opinion, none of these reservations has significant effect upon the major conclusions of the report, or upon the agreed Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations with which I shall conclude my remarks.

7. Having summarized the major reservations and observations on this report, I would like to present my own views. It is my opinion that the appraisal is a commendably thorough and objective study. It was prepared by a qualified joint group which expended much time and effort to insure the accuracy or reasonableness of the factors which were used and the methodology which was employed. The study constitutes the best objective joint appraisal of strategic targeting and force requirements available at this time. I am confident that we can make significant progress in our planning if we use General Hickey's study until something better is developed. We have in this study a sound point of departure and we should accept its conclusions as a guide for present planning until it is superseded by an equally thorough and objective effort.

8. The most significant conclusions to be drawn from the study, in my judgment, are as follows:

One: A retaliatory force structure based on the destruction of an urban target system would not provide an adequate military posture.

Two: The strategic force level which we have developed is in the right ball park and does not appear excessive. Naturally, the composition of this force must change as the enemy's military target system changes and as our own technology provides improved methods of delivery. The

appraisal reveals that strategic forces now programmed for 1963 will be more than adequate to attack an "optimum mix" target system of minimum size with a 75% assurance of one weapon arriving at each ground zero, but will be inadequate to provide a 90% assurance of one weapon on each ground zero.

Three: The present and planned composition of the atomic stockpile, particularly with respect to high-yield weapons, is also about right; and

Four: The study was reassuring to me in that this independent analysis generally substantiates current national planning with respect to targeting, the nuclear stockpile composition, and the level of strategic offensive forces required.

9. Taking note of the views of all concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reached agreement on certain recommendations. You will recall, Mr. President, that in NSC Action 2009 you directed Mr. Gray, the Secretary of Defense, and myself to arrange for the conduct of this study. We concur in the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which are as follows:

- a. That the concept of the "optimum mix" target system be approved.
- b. That the study be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a basis for planning.
- c. That they be authorized to release a limited number of copies of the study to the Joint Staff and to the Service Planners.²

N.F. Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

² The President and Twining discussed nuclear targeting on February 12, apparently after the NSC Special Meeting (see Document 90): "General Twining next referred to the targeting study that had been presented to the President in the NSC. He said it constitutes a tremendous step forward, since it puts into our planning for the first time a concept regarding our key element of military force. He wants it to be used as a 'point of departure' for JCS planning. The President agreed. He stressed the importance of keeping this kind of war planning away from the Congress because of their carelessness about secrecy and security." (Memorandum by Goodpaster, February 18; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)

In an unnumbered Record of Action at the Special Meeting, circulated on February 17, the President approved the "optimum mix" targeting strategy, designed to achieve a 75 percent assurance of delivering one weapon at each target. (National Archives and Records Administration, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File) See the Supplement.

92. Editorial Note

At the 435th meeting of the National Security Council on February 18, 1960, the Council took up as the first item a briefing by General Lemnitzer and Dr. York on technological developments in non-lethal weapons and military doctrine for their possible use. Dr. York described several such weapons, including tear gas and agents causing temporary paralysis, discoordination, Q-fever, and encephalitis. General Lemnitzer outlined several possible scenarios for their use in hypothetical wartime situations. Dr. York noted that the U.S. stockpile of chemical and biological agents was one-fourth that of the Soviet Union, and that most of the Soviet agents were lethal. Dr. Kistiakowsky stated that the Science Advisory Committee (SAC) about a year previously "had concluded that research and development in this field should be continued since the prospects were definitely bright."

At the conclusion of the discussion, President Eisenhower said "one great difficulty occurred to him in connection with the use of incapacitating agents. While the use of such agents was a splendid idea, if we tried to use them in a humane manner, our enemy would probably charge us with germ warfare and then would proceed in retaliation to use lethal chemical and biological weapons." The President further pointed out a lack of U.S. defensive equipment for such warfare. "The President said chemical and biological weapons had considerably less discrimination than a bullet." Dr. Kistiakowsky, supported by Allen Dulles, urged that a sharp distinction be made between chemical warfare, such as tear gas, which had been accepted throughout the world in police actions, and biological warfare, which had not. General Twining agreed with the President concerning retaliation, and stated that if the United States intended to use incapacitating agents it should publicize their non-lethal effects to the greatest possible extent. (Memorandum of discussion by Boggs; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) See the Supplement.

93. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, March 18, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Gates, General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of administrative matters.]

Secretary Gates said he is, in his testimony, keeping the door open for possible increases in some of our key military programs if we should get a breakthrough. Mr. Gates said the period over which he feels the greatest concern is at the end of 1960 to the latter part of 1961. At that time, we will be in good shape if the Titan and Minuteman are coming along as planned. Otherwise we may have a problem. He felt there is adequate reason to do some reprogramming, in all likelihood taking a substantial amount of funds from Bomarc and Super-Sage, and increasing the number of Atlas missiles in certain of the later squadrons. The President thought there would be reason to put the Atlas missiles in our mountain areas, camouflaging rather than hardening our sites. An enemy could not hit all of them simultaneously. He thought there should be a mix of missiles of various kinds, in various states of concealment and hardening. Mr. Gates said that the additional programs he had in mind would involve something like \$50 million added expenditures in FY-60 and \$500 million added expenditures in FY-61, with half of these additional expenditures met from reprogramming.

The President said that once we have had a full service test of the Polaris missile from a submerged submarine, he would be willing to go to a higher program if this is completely successful. Mr. Gates said there will not be a submerged firing until August and he would like to take some steps prior to that time. The President said he would like for Congress to give an authorization to contract for the long lead-time items for twelve additional submarines as soon as these have been proved out. We would then get a deficiency appropriation after the Congress comes back next year. The President said he did not want to build so many of these vessels at once as to require the opening of new shipyards.¹

He said we retain one big question regarding the Polaris, and that is how to protect our bases. He noted that we have only two harbors where nuclear submarines can come in.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. No classification marking. Drafted by Goodpaster on March 26.

¹ Information on the Navy's advocacy of the Polaris program is in Admiral Burke's March 12 memorandum to Gates, his March 15 memorandum for the record of a JCS meeting with Gates on March 14, and his March 28 memorandum for the record of a telephone conversation with the President on March 26. (All in Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originator File) All are in the Supplement.

Mr. Gates said there is a project to increase the range of the Polaris from 1500 to 2500 miles. This will require \$75 million additional NOA in the first year. This step would be taken later than the other adjustments being considered. The President thought this is acceptable, but considered it should have a low priority.

On all of these matters Mr. Gates stressed that he is not asking for a decision. They must be discussed with the Bureau of the Budget first. There are, however, major factors, some of these of a political nature, which he would like to ask be considered. The President commented that he is not moved too strongly by political considerations. If a bill came to him with unacceptable provisions in it, he would veto it if necessary. Mr. Gates said there is some indication of uneasiness on the part of our public relating to our defense program—resulting largely from the attacks and demagoguery that have been engaged in lately. The President said he has seen little indication that people are actually unhappy about the program. His mail certainly does not show it. In concluding the discussion, the President asked that Mr. Gates watch particularly the Polaris program and the airborne alert program to see that if there is reason to put more funds into either one, we do so promptly.

G.

Brigadier General, USA

94. **Memorandum of Discussion at the 439th Meeting of the National Security Council**

Washington, April 1, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Items 1. "U.S. Policy Toward Scandinavia," 2. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," and 3. "U.S. Policy Toward Cuba."]

4. *Production of the Minuteman ICBM System and Related Operational Force Objectives* (NSC Action No. 2118;¹ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 30, 1960²)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on this subject. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.)³

Secretary Douglas said the Department of Defense always raised with the President and the Council proposals to establish the highest national priority for weapons, especially missiles. The Department of Defense proposal to commit the Minuteman missile to production and to establish an initial operational force objective for achievement of 150 Minutemen operational missiles by mid-1963 had already been considered in connection with the FY 1961 budget. This proposal would result in the establishment of one production facility for Minuteman. If successful, the program would close the so-called "missile gap".

The President said perhaps we should go ahead with this program if the scientists were convinced that Minuteman is an operational weapon. Secretary Douglas said no serious question had been raised as to the feasibility of the Minuteman system, although the system had not yet been fully tested. The President remarked that in the absence of tests he was slightly skeptical; he hated to buy "a pig in a poke". He asked Dr. Kistiakowsky to comment. Dr. Kistiakowsky said there had been no tests of Minuteman, as Secretary Douglas had said. He had no up-to-date technical information on the progress of the Minuteman program and hence was unable to form an independent judgment as to the feasibility of the system. Secretary Douglas said there had been successful static tests of the first and second stages of Minuteman. There had also been successful launches from the hole of the first stage lightly loaded, so that the missile was lifted only a slight distance above ground. This test, however, indicated the structural characteristics of the missile.

Mr. Stans said he understood that a decision to commit Minuteman to production would not include establishing a date for an initial operational force objective, which he thought should be established after production facilities had been created. Secretary Douglas said it was necessary to proceed along the lines proposed by Defense and to increase expenditures on Minuteman if an operational capability for Minuteman

¹ See footnote 4, Document 72.

² This memorandum transmitted a March 25 memorandum from Douglas to Gray, which proposed committing the Minuteman weapons system to production since "recent test results on the various parts of the weapon system" had been "highly indicative of the probable attainment of the desired objective." Douglas advocated approval of a rate of production that would bring the force to 150 operational missiles by mid-1963. (Department of State, S/S-OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Ballistic Missiles)

³ Not printed.

were to be achieved by the end of 1962. The Department of Defense proposal had been well understood in government since the first of the year, except that the size of the operational capability had only recently been fixed. The President said it had earlier been agreed that the funds to proceed with production of Minuteman would be available as soon as the scientists "gave the green light." Secretary Douglas said Dr. York and his office had no question as to the advisability of proceeding with production of Minuteman.

In response to a question from the President, Secretary Douglas said expenditures on Minuteman in FY 61 would amount to \$300 million. The President asked whether part of this sum had already been spent. Secretary Douglas replied that part of the sum had been committed. He added that some research and development production would be available for operational production in the case of Minuteman.

Mr. Gray asked whether an initial operational capability of 150 Minutemen by mid-1963 meant that an initial annual production capability of 150 missiles was being established. Secretary Douglas said that the Minuteman production facilities would be designed to produce 30 missiles per month, a rate which would be achieved by May 1963. Prior to the achievement of that rate, there would be a gradual build-up in the rate of production from February 1962 when the first production Minuteman missile would come off the assembly line.

The President inquired about the final target of the Minuteman program. Secretary Douglas said there was no target beyond 400 missiles by the end of Calendar Year 1963. There was no authorization for production facilities beyond the creation of this first facility and no firm plans for more than 400 missiles to be produced by 1963. He added that there would have to be substantial funding for the Minuteman program in 1962. The President said we were inclined to say what the final figure for production of a missile would be as soon as we start producing it. Secretary Douglas said he was conservative as to the final figure. He refused to go beyond the figure of 400 missiles at the end of 1963, although the figure of 800 missiles at the end of 1964 had come up for discussion. The President said perhaps we should go crazy and produce 10,000 Minutemen. Secretary Douglas believed the Department of Defense proposals were reasonable if we were to attain a substantial operational capability during the important period of time down to mid-1963. The President pointed out that we would have Atlas, Titan, Polaris, and Minuteman missiles soon. Secretary Douglas said we would have 130 Atlas missiles by the end of 1962 at the rate of ten missiles per squadron, plus some additional missiles for the last six squadrons. We would have 70 Titan missiles at the end of 1962 at the rate of ten per squadron. We would have either 144 or 160 Polaris missiles by mid-1963. Admiral Burke said we would have nine or ten Polaris submarines then, depending upon the FY

1961 budget. The President said he calculated that we would have 750 long-range missiles at the end of 1963, counting Polaris and counting the 400 Minutemen mentioned by Secretary Douglas earlier. Secretary Douglas said that by mid-1963, including the Polaris, we had programmed about 500 missiles. It was estimated that the Russians would have just over 500 missiles at that time. Mr. Dulles pointed out that there was a split in the National Intelligence Estimate as to the number of Soviet missiles.⁴ Mr. Herter inquired about the mobile land-based Polaris missiles in Europe. Secretary Douglas believed we could not count on the deployment of many land-based Polaris missiles in Europe if we had to depend on their production in Europe. The President asked why the European countries should not buy the land-based Polaris from the U.S. Secretary Douglas believed the land-based Polaris should be purchased from us. However, there were difficult questions of deployment regarding the land-based Polaris in Europe, questions as to whether the weapons should be deployed by heavy road machinery, by barges or by trains. The President said there should be no difficulty in transporting the missiles, since he recalled that Navy boats had been hauled across Europe for operations on the Rhine during World War II.

With respect to the proposals of the Department of Defense for commitment of Minuteman to production and for an initial operational force objective, the President said he was willing to give his approval, but he would like to keep in close touch with tests of this missile. Secretary Douglas said there would be a full-scale test firing of Minuteman in September or towards the end of the year. The President said we had gambled so much on our missile program since 1955 that we might as well take another gamble. Mr. Stans felt it would be desirable to total up the procurement and facilities cost of all our missiles in an effort to determine what the cost would be in 1963. The President said he hoped the Department of Defense would be as eloquent in suggesting the abandonment of unnecessary weapons systems as it had been in proposing the commitment of Minuteman to production.

*The National Security Council:*⁵

Noted the President's approval of the recommendations of the Acting Secretary of Defense, contained in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of March 30, 1960, for:

- a. Commitment of the Minuteman program to production.
- b. An initial operational force objective which specifies the achievement of 150 Minuteman operational missiles by mid-calendar year 1963.

⁴ See Document 88.

⁵ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2207, approved by the President on April 6. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

Note: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

5. *Priorities for Ballistic Missile and Space Programs* (NSC Actions Nos. 1846, 2013, 2081 and 2118)

Mr. Gray said that one of the projects which was added to the highest priority list of May 13, 1959 (NSC Action No. 2081)⁶ was Sentry, the satellite-borne visual and ferret reconnaissance system. The Sentry program had been redesignated Samos and the Record should be corrected to reflect this change in designation.

*The National Security Council:*⁷

Amended NSC Action No. 2118–c by substituting the designation “Samos” for “Sentry”, to reflect a redesignation of the satellite-borne visual and ferret reconnaissance system.

Note: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to all holders of NSC Action No. 2118–c.

Marion W. Boggs

⁶ See footnote 5, Document 56.

⁷ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2208, approved by the President on April 6. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

95. **Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to Secretary of State Herter**

Washington, April 5, 1960.

SUBJECT

Review of United States Policy in the Event of War (NSC 5904/1)¹

NSC Action 2057² calls for an annual review of the NSC paper on “United States Policy in the Event of War.” The NSC Planning Board has

Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5904 Series. Top Secret. Drafted by Furnas.

¹ Document 55.

² See footnote 8, Document 54.

reviewed this paper and has agreed to recommend to the Council that the policy not be reviewed at this time except for deletion of a footnote as an editorial change.

The policy paper outlines briefly and in very general terms U.S. policy in the event of (1) general war and (2) war in which the USSR is not a belligerent. The footnote which is to be deleted applies to the second section of the policy and indicates that the paper was prepared upon the assumption that any war in which United States and USSR forces are overtly and directly involved is general war. The present Strategic Concept is based upon this assumption. The footnote also explains that this assumption was not examined in connection with the war objectives paper but might be considered in the course of the annual basic policy review.

The basic policy review did examine this question and the revised version of basic policy, which is now current,³ provides that any war between the U.S. and the USSR *in which sizable forces participate* is a general war. Thus the footnote on page 2 of NSC 5904/1 should now be deleted.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached memorandum for the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, concurring in the Planning Board's recommendation not to revise NSC 5904/1 except for the deletion of the footnote on page 2.⁴

³ NSC 5906/1, Document 70.

⁴ Herter signed the attachment, not printed, on April 7. In two memoranda to Gates dated April 11, Twining reported approval of the change by all the Chiefs but White, described the grounds for White's dissent, and stated his own agreement with the majority. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Twining Papers)

In an April 27 memorandum to the NSC, Lay stated that on April 23 the President had approved NSC Action No. 2221. (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5904 Series) This action concurred "in the recommendation by the NSC Planning Board that NSC 5904/1 not be revised at this time, except for deletion of the footnote on page 2 thereof as an editorial revision not involving a change of policy." (*Ibid.*, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

96. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, April 6, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Gates, Secretary Douglas, General Twining, Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Harlow,
General Goodpaster

Mr. Gates said the group had come in to try to reach decisions with the President on Defense reprogramming. He first said that the Defense Department had been over the Air Force reprogramming proposal, and wished to recommend approval. The President asked if this was the program that was worked out with him some days ago, and on being assured that it was, said it was satisfactory to him.

Mr. Gates then took up the question of increasing the Polaris program. He said that to bring in additional boats in 1963, which he considers desirable, would require the addition of a substantial amount of NOA for FY-61. He does not believe the Navy can find funds to offset this other than through the possible cancellation of the attack submarines. There is a real question in the minds of a number of people, however, as to whether this would be wise to do, since the anti-submarine warfare problem is a severe one. There is also the matter of possible cancellation of the carrier, but he did not feel the Administration should propose this since it is a specific part of the program.

The President said, with regard to the attack submarines, that if we are deciding to go in the direction of Polaris, it is because we think that there is value in diversifying and increasing our deterrent through additions to this force. His doubt with regard to the ASW submarines is simply that the argument in favor of the Polaris is that it cannot be detected or stopped from conducting its attack. But the same thing applies in reverse, and means that our ASW submarines will not be able to stop their Polaris.

Our real defense against their Polaris is our diversified, dependable deterrent. He is inclined to think we should take out two of the attack submarines, keeping one so as to keep the development continuing. Mr. Douglas noted that these could be put back into Fiscal 1962 without too much difficulty since they are planning to put out the contract very late in FY-61 anyhow. The President said he would like also to take \$25 or \$30 million in NOA from the funds made available through Air Force reprogramming. Mr. Gates commented that the Air Force had done a fine job

in reprogramming and eliminating the Bomarc, and he thought it might have a bad effect to reward them by taking the money away from them. The President commented that he is suggesting taking only a minor amount of money, and added that he had proposed eliminating the Bomarc two years ago. The Air Force had resisted him very strongly and had simply wasted several hundred million dollars as a result in the meantime. Mr. Gates and Mr. Douglas thought it would not create a problem to take \$25 to \$30 million from the Air Force funds. Mr. Gates said that through these steps it would appear approximately \$150 million could be brought together to support the new program. He said there would still remain a need for additional NOA if we adopted the program of "five and six," i.e., raising the number of submarines fully funded in FY-61 from three to five and the number for which long lead time items are to be obtained from three to six. The President said the program he is particularly keen on is the so-called three and nine program, in which present action is simply to add the long lead time items for six additional submarines. Mr. Gates said the difficulty with the three and nine program in his mind is that we will not get additional boats in 1963, but will get eight in 1964. There is not much gain from the standpoint of funding, since he thought we would want to say the Administration would come in for a supplemental early next year to cover the ships themselves. The President recalled that he had stated publicly his readiness to come to the Congress for additional funds when the Polaris had further proved itself. General Twining recalled that he and others in Defense had said the same thing. The real question is one of timing. Is now the time to make a commitment to the additional six submarines? The President said that all the tests of the system have been quite good, except for the failure of one recent under-water shot to ignite—and this occurred for trivial reasons—and that he thought we had reached the place where we could validly make some increase in the program. He did not necessarily mean to make a full commitment at this point, however. General Twining commented that we should learn a great deal in the service tests that are to take place this fall, and that modifications may be found desirable as a result of these tests which can be introduced more readily if the ships are not fully funded. Mr. Gates said that he and Mr. Douglas would be inclined to recommend the five by six program although he does not feel terribly strongly on this on the grounds that it adds two fully funded ships which will be available sooner. He would also include funds for increasing the range of the Polaris to 2500 miles. The President said that he regards the extension of range to 2500 miles as something of definitely lower priority. He thought the Navy was already working on this and did not see the need for a big program. Mr. Douglas said he had been advised by the Navy that they are putting no money into this at the present time. Mr. Gates said that the Navy is concentrating on extending the range of the present Polaris to the design range of 1500

miles. He added that Dr. York would like to get a start on the 2500 miles development.

The President said that one thing that troubles him is that he is now told that there will be no change needed in the submarines to fit them for 2500 mile missiles. His fear is that the Navy will come back in three years saying that they need all new boats in order to handle this missile.

All in all, he thought it preferable to avoid a full commitment now. He believed we could give the authority for advance items now and look at the situation again in a few months. Mr. Gates said his thought is simply that the five by six program is a little better than the three by nine. The President asked whether the reactors—which are the chief elements involved in the long lead time procurement—are the same for the Polaris submarines as for the attack submarines, and was assured that they are. He commented that any emphasis on the particular date of 1963 seemed questionable to him, as a reversion to the game of guessing the “year of greatest danger.” He said the notion of putting forward a request for an additional \$150 million or so above the budget does not necessarily stop him, but he would rather go no further than authorizing lead time items for the present, awaiting the actual firings from a submarine in mid-ocean to a point on the test range later in the year. Mr. Douglas commented again that there would be value in getting a couple of additional boats in the program for 1963. The President said he thinks it is more a question of being sure the system is proved and tested out. Mr. Gates said he could do either the three by nine or five by six program. The President said he thought it best to recommend the three by nine program on the theory that the additional procurement will be useful either for Polaris submarines or for attack submarines. In August we will have our service tests. If these prove out satisfactorily, we will probably be coming to the Congress for supplemental NOA early next year on the basis of a tested and proven system. He thought the Navy should try to scratch up a limited amount of money to let Admiral Raborn start the development of a 2500 mile missile. Mr. Douglas commented that the extension to 2500 miles makes a great contribution to the invulnerability of the submarine in future years, since the submarine can lie further off the coast and still reach any important target. The President said he thought that the Navy could get the academic and theoretical research started. He did not think it was necessary to have the full \$87 million requested in order to get work started on this project.

He commented that a plan had been developed after great consideration and discussion last fall, and that he thought we should basically stick to it. He recognized that we have thought of the Polaris as having exceptional value in terms of its mobility and invulnerability and were prepared to see additions to the program for this reason.

The President said he would like to have Defense ask the Navy to lay out exactly what are the problems involved in this range extension, in what order they should be attacked, at what time funds will be needed to support this, etc. He repeated that we should not be into a program involving hundreds of millions of dollars a year until we reach the test phase.

There was agreement to go ahead on a three by nine program, dropping two of the attack submarines, and taking \$25 to \$30 million out of the Air Force reprogramming funds. Mr. Gates said he would communicate this to the Congress. He would also make a very general announcement about this as he left the White House this morning.

Mr. Douglas raised the matter of additional airlift. The President said he does not favor substantial additions of interim aircraft, mentioning particularly the KC-135.

Mr. Douglas said that a few more aircraft should probably be obtained, mentioning the C-130-B as a very good aircraft for the purpose. General Twining said that, at the NATO meeting last week, he and Mr. Gates were pressed a little by the Europeans as to the U.S. sending additional major units into Europe in the early days in the event of an attack. The President said he is not favorably impressed by the emphasis of the Europeans on getting the U.S. to do more. He thought they should be doing more. General Twining said that he and Mr. Gates had both made this point quite clear and plain at the NATO meetings.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

97. **Memorandum of Discussion at the 442d Meeting of the
National Security Council**

Washington, April 28, 1960.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs. On April 29, Admiral Burke prepared a memorandum for the record regarding discussion of this item. (Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originator File) See the Supplement.

1. *Report by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee*¹ (NSC Actions Nos. 1260, 1330, 1430, 1463, 1532, 1641, and 1815;² NSC 5816;³ NSC Action No. 2009⁴)

Mr. Gray said that today the 1959 Report⁵ submitted by the Council's Net Evaluation Subcommittee, pursuant to NSC 5816, would be the subject of an oral presentation by members of the Subcommittee Staff. He recalled that under the terms of the Presidential Directive in NSC 5816, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee was established as part of a permanent procedure "to provide integrated evaluations of the net capabilities of the USSR, in the event of general war, to inflict direct injury on the continental U.S., and to provide a continual watch for changes which would significantly alter these net capabilities."

Mr. Gray said the Subcommittee report for 1959 would ordinarily have been presented toward the close of 1959 but that the presentation was delayed until this spring because of the need for completion of the "targeting" study (*Appraisal of Relative Merits, From the Point of View of Effective Deterrence, of Alternative Retaliatory Efforts*) presented to the Council on February 12, 1960.⁶

Mr. Gray noted that the Net Evaluation Subcommittee was composed of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Chairman of the Subcommittee), the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairmen of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. Lt. General Thomas F. Hickey, USA (Ret.), Director of the Staff of the Subcommittee, was also present for the presentation. Mr. Gray asked General Twining whether he had anything to add to this introduction.

General Twining said that each year the Subcommittee approved the assumptions of the Net Evaluation Study. This year the approved assumptions postulated strategic warning and a full military alert in the U.S. preceding the attack on the continental U.S. He wished to emphasize, however, that while the Study was based on the assumption of stra-

¹ In a memorandum, dated April 27, of his meeting with the President on April 23, Gray stated that he had pointed out that this would be "the last such report made to the President barring some emergency and that it was the first of these reports which fully took into account the missile situation." (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Meetings with the President)

² Concerning these NSC Actions, see footnote 1, Document 38.

³ See Document 26.

⁴ See footnote 7, Document 38.

⁵ The "Annual Report for 1959 of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee" is attached to a memorandum dated April 22, 1960, from Twining to Lay. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File)

⁶ See Document 90.

tegic warning it was also based on the assumption that the exact date and time of the attack were not known.

An oral presentation on the 1959 Report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee was made by the following:

Introduction and Basic Assumptions—Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Hickey
The Soviet Attack—Col. William J. Hovde, USAF
The U.S. Attack—Col. Lloyd D. Chapman, USAF
Damage to USSR—Capt. Eugene B. Fluckey, USN
Damage to U.S.—Col. Yale H. Wolfe, USA
Clandestine Attack—Col. Richard Rothwell, USMC
Conclusions—Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Hickey

(A copy of the 1959 Report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee is maintained in the NSC Files.)

At the close of the presentation Mr. Gray said he wished to refer to a question raised by the Planning Board when it heard this presentation on Tuesday, April 26.⁷ An important assumption of the Net Evaluation Study was that a 48 hour strategic warning would be received but that we would not know the exact time of attack. It was also assumed that the Federal Government would be successfully relocated. These assumptions raised in his mind the incidental query whether the Soviets, in the light of our full alert and governmental relocation, would proceed with the attack. However, the Planning Board wondered what the U.S. would do with the strategic warning as far as the general population was concerned. Relocation of the Government could be carried out quietly for a few hours; but after 48 hours what would we tell the population and what would be the effect of the information released? Would we say that the Government was simply engaging in an exercise? Mr. Gray said he realized the Subcommittee had not been asked to consider this question.

The President asked how certain we would be under conditions of strategic warning that an attack would certainly come. Mr. Gray believed we could not be certain that an attack would come, even though strategic warning were received. The President said that in the event of receipt of strategic warning of an attack, we should prohibit all communication with foreign countries, conduct a search for clandestine nuclear weapons, advise people to evacuate large urban centers which might be targets for enemy nuclear weapons and take all other necessary measures to meet the attack. If our information of an impending attack proved to be false, then we would simply have made a mistake.

Mr. Allen asked what measures would be taken in the assumed conditions with respect to the Voice of America. The President said VOA operations should continue. However, communications between for-

⁷A paper entitled "Planning Board Questions, Net Evaluation Presentation, April 26, 1960," is in the Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Disaster File. See the Supplement.

eign embassies in the U.S. and their home governments should be immediately prohibited. Similar measures were placed in effect in London prior to D-Day; no one could leave the country and no message could be sent out, not even a diplomatic communication. The President believed that if strategic warning were received, the U.S. should do everything possible to prepare for the attack. Mr. Allen asked whether these preparations should be made to appear part of a normal peacetime exercise. The President replied that insofar as possible the preparations might be made to appear part of a four-day exercise. In his view we could not possibly sit still and do nothing about strategic warning, once we had received it.

In Mr. Gray's view it would be impossible to institute a full military alert and undertake relocation of the Government without attracting public notice. The President agreed and added that strategic warning would probably not present a black or white situation. Strategic warning of a future attack would probably be similar to the warning we received on December 7, 1941 when we learned from an intercepted Japanese message that something was about to happen although we did not know what it was.

General Twining felt that decisions as to preparations for meeting an attack for which we had strategic warning would have to be made at the time, in the light of circumstances then existing. The President said he wished to emphasize the point that, if strategic warning is received, we could not sit still and do nothing. Mr. Hoegh believed we were in need of a plan in accordance with which the population of urban centers could be evacuated during a period of impending attack.

The President said it seemed to him the estimate given in the presentation of the final effects of fallout were low. He asked Dr. Kistiakowsky to comment. Dr. Kistiakowsky said it was difficult to make accurate estimates of the long term effects of fallout because so much depended on where and how nuclear explosions took place. The President said we were able to measure fallout which resulted from U.S. and Soviet nuclear testing. The Net Evaluation Study assumed the creation within a few hours of 1000 times the fallout produced by all the nuclear tests that had taken place up to now. Dr. Kistiakowsky believed the calculations presented by the Net Evaluation Study had related mainly to the early effects of fallout rather than to the long-range effects.

The President said he had not heard Minuteman mentioned during the presentation. He asked whether a great deal of machinery was required for launching Minuteman, as is the case with Atlas. Dr. Kistiakowsky said much less machinery was required for launching Minuteman than was necessary to launch Atlas.

The President believed the Net Evaluation Study showed the need for establishing reserves of Polaris missiles in underground hardened

storage depots in coastal areas to which Polaris submarines could return for reloading of their missile tubes after they had expended their first complement of missiles. If such reserves were established, the U.S. would have a residual power and a restrike capability not contemplated in the Net Evaluation Study. Admiral Burke said it was contemplated that one-third of the Polaris submarines would reload after expending their initial stock of missiles. The President thought that, considering what we have invested in Polaris submarines, the concept that only one-third of them would reload was rather conservative. He believed 100 per cent of our Polaris submarines should reload. Admiral Burke thanked the President. Secretary Gates remarked that the reloading to which Admiral Burke referred related to reserves of Polaris missiles in submarine tenders, not to reserves stored in hardened underground storage depots. The President said that providing for reloading of Polaris submarines from tenders only would not achieve the objective he had in mind because the tenders might be destroyed. However, if the Polaris missiles were in hardened storage depots along the coast, they would survive and enable the Polaris submarines to reload. Admiral Burke said the concept had been developed of sending an ammunition ship loaded with Polaris missiles to a remote part of the South Atlantic so that it would survive an attack and be able to return to the Northern Hemisphere to reload the Polaris submarines. The President feared that the ammunition ship might be destroyed on its way back. Admiral Burke said perhaps the Polaris submarines could go to the South Atlantic to reload.

General Twining noted that a substantial stockpile of nuclear weapons was left to the U.S. after the initial nuclear exchange described in the Net Evaluation Study. The President agreed that this was so but noted that the U.S., after the initial nuclear exchange in the Study, had no delivery capabilities.

Secretary Gates asked whether an ability to maintain a restrike after the initial nuclear exchange was an effective deterrent. The President believed the restrike capability was not a deterrent. Nevertheless he thought it would be very desirable for the U.S. to have an effective restrike capability for use after the initial nuclear exchange.

Mr. Henderson asked whether, after strategic warning had been received and relocation had been carried out, the Soviets could call off an impending attack twelve hours before it was due to begin. General Twining believed it would be difficult to cancel an attack only twelve hours before its planned initiation. Secretary Gates, on the other hand, felt that not much time would be needed to call off an attack if it depended largely on missiles. The President said that if the Soviets called off an attack only twelve hours before it was due to begin, thousands of people would know about it and we would finally be able to prove that the Soviets

intended to attack us. General Twining believed that in a case of this kind someone would always fail to get the word; consequently, one or a few missiles would be fired at the U.S. and the war would be triggered just as if the Soviets had carried out their intention to make a full-scale attack.

Mr. McCone noted that in the Net Evaluation Study most of the megatonnage that fell on the USSR was delivered by U.S. aircraft rather than by U.S. missiles. He wondered whether we had made an adequate study of the growing interception capability of the Soviets. This capability, together with the long distance attacking aircraft would have to fly over Soviet territory, might result in heavy losses to our aircraft. He wondered whether possible U.S. losses resulting from Soviet interception capabilities had been analyzed. Secretary Gates said such an analysis was made semi-annually by SAC on the basis of the best intelligence available and SAC plans were readjusted accordingly. Our method of carrying out attack by aircraft had been altered a number of times. The growing interception capability of the Soviets was one of the reasons for the Hound Dog missile.

The President asked when the Hound Dog missile would be operational. Secretary Gates said the missile would be operational this year and would be installed in aircraft in significant numbers next year.

The President asked General LeMay what proportion of SAC would be placed on alert in the event of the U.S. receiving a 48 hour strategic warning. General LeMay said that in these circumstances all of SAC would be on the alert. The President said he wanted to know how much of SAC would be on airborne alert in the event of a strategic warning. General LeMay said no part of SAC would be on airborne alert. When the President asked why, Secretary Gates said an airborne alert would downgrade our forces by exhausting them; a ground alert was more effective. General LeMay added that all SAC forces could become airborne with 15 minutes tactical warning. The President said he would like to play safe by giving SAC an extra 15 minutes warning. In response to a question from General Twining, General Hickey said that the Net Evaluation Study this year assumed that before strategic warning 25% of SAC forces were on airborne alert. After receiving a strategic warning, this figure was increased to 33-1/3%. General LeMay pointed out that the B-52 was the only plane that could go on airborne alert. It would not be profitable to attempt an airborne alert with the B-47.

The President inquired about the program for the dispersal of SAC planes, remarking that he had been told two or three years ago that this was a matter of the highest priority. General Twining said the dispersal program for SAC was proceeding on schedule. General LeMay said that plans call for a greater dispersal for SAC than was assumed in the Net Evaluation Study. He added that under new take-off procedures, SAC planes can now get off the ground three times as fast as formerly. More-

over, B-47's could be dispersed to commercial airports in a period of tension. The President said that if a 48 hour strategic warning were received, a great deal could be done. He recalled that several years ago he had asked why it would not be desirable to build additional runways at SAC bases in order to get the planes into the air more rapidly. General LeMay said building additional runways was not economical. The President said he assumed General LeMay meant it was more economical to have another field than to have additional runways. General LeMay said we already had airfields adequate to take all the planes that could be mounted on an alert status. He added that in view of the new take-off techniques, it was not necessary to disperse SAC planes widely. The Vice President asked when the new take-off techniques had been developed. General LeMay said these techniques had been developed during the past year. On wide runways a SAC plane was able to take off every fifteen seconds with JATO. The President expressed surprise at this development. Secretary Gates said these new developments were revolutionary.

The President said he would like an estimate made of the final result of fallout of the magnitude which would be produced by nuclear explosions of the kind described in the Net Evaluation Study. He felt that a nuclear exchange of the kind envisaged in the Study might put so much fallout in the atmosphere that no one would want to live in the Northern Hemisphere. Dr. Kistiakowsky believed the Northern Hemisphere would not become uninhabitable unless there were more nuclear explosions than those assumed in the Net Evaluation Study. He admitted, however, that the Northern Hemisphere would be a less pleasant place to live after the nuclear exchange described in the Study. The President said he felt sure of that conclusion. He added that the presentation had described the fallout effects which would occur soon after the initial nuclear exchange but had not described the long-term effects. Scientific reports seemed to indicate that long-term fallout effects would be serious. Mr. McCone said information developed by the Atomic Energy Commission showed that, while fallout effects were undoubtedly serious, the situation would not be as bad as that portrayed in Nevil Shute's "On the Beach". He added that after 5000 megatons of nuclear weapons had been exploded, it no longer mattered what target was hit because a lethal blanket of fallout would be produced regardless of the target.

Mr. Gray wondered whether the Council should now consider arrangements to provide continuity of the Subcommittee and the Subcommittee Staff. The President said this question need not be decided at this time.

The Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff then withdrew from the meeting.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed the Annual Report for 1959 of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, pursuant to NSC 5816, as presented orally by the Director and other members of the Subcommittee Staff.

[Here follows Agenda Item 2. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security."]

Marion W. Boggs

98. Editorial Note

NIE 11–5–60, "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles," dated May 3, 1960, superseded the Summary and Conclusions of NIE 11–5–59, Document 75. It generally confirmed the estimate of Soviet "progress along the lines indicated in NIE 11–5–59" though there was in some cases "refinement or modification of our estimates." The paragraph concerning initial operational capability (IOC) of Soviet ICBMs reads as follows:

"Evidence derived from flight tests is considered adequate to gauge the general progress of the program, but we cannot state with certainty the precise timing of the USSR's initial operational capability (IOC); that is, the date at which a few—say 10—series produced ICBMs could have been placed in the hands of one or more trained units at existing launching facilities. We also consider the IOC as marking the beginning of the planned buildup in operational capabilities. [6 lines of source text not declassified] We believe, however, that this does not preclude an earlier Soviet decision that the system was satisfactory for initial deployment. Limited number of operational personnel could have received training in conjunction with test firings. We believe that for planning purposes it should be considered that the IOC had occurred by 1 January 1960."

Naval intelligence dissented from this paragraph, stating that an IOC date of "not earlier than mid-1960 should be used for planning purposes" because there was "insufficient information to judge that the conditions" for IOC had been met.

Concerning Soviet ICBM deployment, the estimate noted: "An exhaustive reexamination has failed to establish Soviet ICBM production rates or to provide positive identification of any operational ICBM

unit or launching facility other than the test range. Our belief that series production of ICBMs is under way is based on the time elapsed since the start of test firings in 1957, the generally successful results of the test program, and particularly the increased rate of firings since early 1959, all of which lend credibility to Khrushchev's claim of early 1959 that series production was then beginning." (Department of State, INR-NIE Files) See the Supplement.

99. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, May 4, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Kistiakowsky, Dr. Long, General Persons, General Goodpaster

Dr. Kistiakowsky said he and Dr. Long had come in to present the results of an inquiry they had made into the Minuteman program in response to a request by the President. Dr. Long gave the presentation, stating that the scheduling is extremely tight with regard to the projected 150 missiles in mid-1963. Dr. Kistiakowsky thought that this objective had been moved up from 1964 quite arbitrarily as an offset to the Polaris, and no one really thought it could be met. Dr. Long said he is not so sure as that, but considers it will be extremely tight. Although major design problems have been solved, there are still significant problem areas. These relate chiefly to the three-stage engines and to guidance and control questions. Although the first and second stages have been fired, there has been no wholly successful test. There have been partial successes. With regard to guidance and control, in order to attain the thirty-second firing time objective, it is necessary to keep the guidance (gyroscopes, etc.) in full operation, turning at full speed for years on end. Dr. Long mentioned that the schedule for attainment of equipment that will measure up to this requirement has already slipped six weeks. The President questioned the thirty-second time objective. He thought it might be best to have a "program" as regards readiness, with some missile instantly ready to fire and others prepared to fire after a longer

period. Dr. Long said that this idea conformed to his own suggestions. In this manner some gyroscopes could be kept up to full speed, with others idling at one-tenth speed, and taking ten minutes or so to come up to full speed.

The President said this goes back to the question of need. There is need for some of these to be ready to get off instantly. He noted that the fixed missiles will be in underground silos highly protected. The big thing is simply to dissuade the Soviets from taking any adventure.

Dr. Long said another problem relates to fire control. The Air Force plan is to provide for volley or ripple only, firing off all fifty of the missiles in a squadron. He thought there should be a means of cutting off the firing after a few had been fired. The President commented on this, adding that if we indoctrinate our people on a 30-second response basis, we allow no margin for error, and raise the chances of starting a war that no one wanted. The President thought it is better to take a few extra minutes, to give someone high up in authority the decision.

Dr. Long then commented that each missile has one target set into its guidance system. He thought there could be extra tapes which would give more flexibility to the use of these weapons. This is a matter that he suggested should be studied. The President agreed.

Dr. Long next raised the topic of priorities. He said there is some question that we may be overloading the Aerojet Company with missile requirements. They are to produce the Skybolt, and he is not yet persuaded that Skybolt should have the same priority as the Minuteman. He would not want it to prejudice the Minuteman, since the latter can do anything Skybolt can do, and more.

The President suggested that Dr. Long and Dr. Kistiakowsky present the results of their study to Mr. Gates, and Dr. Kistiakowsky said he had made arrangements to present it to both Dr. York and Mr. Gates.

Dr. Long suggested it might be best to give top priority to the fixed Minuteman as against the mobile concept. This is true if we aim to have a lot of these—something like half as many as we estimate the Soviets might have. If we have fewer than this, the mobile system may be better, in order to keep up the deterrent. The President said he is inclined, on this question, to be a lot on the side of the fixed system. Dr. Kistiakowsky also added that, now that the Polaris is moving ahead, and since the costs of Polaris and the mobile Minuteman are about the same, with fixed Minuteman much less—something like one-third—he thinks the fixed system is the best. The President said he would probably favor having at least a few of the mobile type, since in these matters it is best to have every kind of string on one's bow.

[Here follows discussion of seismic research.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

100. Editorial Note

At the 443d meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1960, the Council heard and discussed presentations by Drs. York and Scoville on the history of U.S. and Soviet long-range missile development. (Memorandum of discussion by Boggs; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) See the Supplement.

101. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, May 5, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

General Twining, General Goodpaster

General Twining recommended that the staff of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee be held together to make future studies, suggesting as the next one a study on the possible range of damage to the United States in case of nuclear war in 1963.¹ The President agreed to this proposal.

General Twining next told the President that a study group has made an estimate of the situation that would exist after a nuclear attack, and although the findings of the study are rather questionable in some respects, he thought it was a good report generally. He said that it would take about thirty minutes to present, and the President agreed to hear it, sometime next week.

General Twining said that the meetings Secretary Gates is holding with the Joint Chiefs of Staff are proving effective in resolving split papers that have been stalled for a long time. He said that there are two very difficult ones left, the rest having been resolved. The first of these pertains to the question of organization for the control of Polaris forces—specifically whether these should be tied to SAC, conducted like carrier

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on May 7.

¹ This was to be the "1961 Net Evaluation," to be prepared with the following assumption: "A surprise nuclear attack perpetrated by the USSR late in 1963 preceded by a period of heightened world tension." (Memorandum from Twining to the President, April 27; *ibid.*)

operations, or coordinated in some other way.² The second question relates to targeting concepts. The President said that in his judgment, so long as we have our main force of manned bombers, we would send the Polaris in to disrupt and knock out organized defenses. It would be necessary, however, to know wind directions and bomber positions. Therefore, he thought that the Polaris must be drawn in to the over-all plan and tightly coordinated. He thought the coordination could probably be accomplished by assignment of targets and by specifying timing of attack. General Twining thought that some form of coordinating organization, to accomplish what the President had in mind, was the most desirable solution.³

General Twining next said that the Navy is concerned regarding the boycotting of American ships by the Arabs, and specifically as to the possibility of their boycotting our oil ships. However, he added that the Navy had just obtained information that oil shipments are not being boycotted, at least in several of the major areas.

General Twining then said the Chiefs are concerned over the fact that they have never fired a complete ICBM (or IRBM for that matter). He said they would like to fire one. I left the room briefly at this moment. When I returned I asked the President the outcome of this discussion. He said he had expressed agreement. To my further question, he said he understood that General Twining was not of course talking about actually firing the nuclear warhead, but only the high explosive components thereof. I spoke to General Twining a few minutes later. He said the Chiefs actually had in mind to fire the nuclear warhead (as I had understood him earlier). When I told him that the President understood this to go only to the point of firing the high explosive components, he said they would proceed on that basis.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

² In a letter to Twining, dated March 6, 1959, General Power recommended operational assignment of Polaris to SAC. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS 471.94 (6 Mar 59)) Memoranda from Burke to the JCS, April 30, 1959 (included with JCS 1620/254, May 2), and from Secretary of the Navy John Russell to McElroy, dated May 5, set forth the Navy's case for its operational control of Polaris. In Appendix C to SM-469-59, May 5, General White proposed disestablishment of SAC and creation of a "United States Strategic Command," to include subordinate components from the Air Force and Navy. (All *ibid.*, CCS 4720 Intermediate Range (5 Jan 59)) On May 6, 1959, the Chiefs referred their divergent views to McElroy. (Decision memorandum by Brigadier General H. L. Hillyard, Secretary to the JCS; *ibid.*)

³ On August 24, 1959, Twining circulated to the JCS CM-386-59, a memorandum enclosing 18 basic questions regarding targeting policy, including such issues as what agency should formulate targeting, whether there should be a single integrated operational plan (SIOP), whether there should be a unified strategic command, and what should be the targeting role of the regional unified commands. (*Ibid.*, CJCS 381 (1957-1959)) In a May 23 memorandum to Twining, Hillyard indicated that Gates was receiving briefings on divergencies within the JCS "on the 18 questions." (*Ibid.*, CJCS 381 (1960)) CM-386-59 is in the Supplement.

102. Memorandum of Discussion at the 445th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, May 24, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Items 1. "Anniversary of the Death of John Foster Dulles," 2. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," and 3. "Statements Regarding the U-2 Incident and the Recent Military Test Alert."]

4. *Policy Issues in the Post-Summit Environment*¹

[Here follows discussion of East-West issues in the aftermath of the summit; see the Supplement.]

Mr. Staats asked how the Administration should react to moves in Congress designed to increase the defense budget. Secretary Gates said he understood Senator Symington had just attempted to add \$4 billion to the defense budget. Any additions to the defense budget made in Congress would deal with the glamorous programs, the long-lead time items. The armed services, except for the Navy, had completed their testimony before Congress on the defense budget.

Secretary Herter said he hoped we would move ahead fast and not back down with respect to the reconnaissance satellite program. In Paris, Khrushchev's reaction had been extraordinary when De Gaulle chided him about the Soviet "space ship" which was going over Paris sixteen to eighteen times a day. Khrushchev said he did not care how many satellites flew over his territory. Secretary Herter thought it would be very useful for our allies and other friendly nations of the Free World to be reassured that if one kind of reconnaissance against surprise attack had to be suspended, another kind would soon be available. The President agreed and added that in Paris Khrushchev had said that anyone might take all the pictures he wished from satellites over Soviet territory.

Mr. Gray asked what should be the public posture of this government with respect to reconnaissance satellites. Secretary Herter felt we should not adopt a public attitude which would be provocative with respect to our military preparations. Mr. Gray pointed out that his question referred to reconnaissance satellites only, not to military preparations. He added that he understood Senator Jackson had written a letter to the President suggesting that reconnaissance satellites should be

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on May 25. Another account of this meeting is in Kistiakowsky, *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 333-336.

¹ For additional portions of this agenda item, see Document 255 and vol. IX, pp. 505-513.

turned over to the UN. The President wondered who would develop reconnaissance satellites if they were now to be turned over to the UN. With respect to our public posture on reconnaissance satellites, the President thought it might be useful to quote Khrushchev's statement to the effect that he (Khrushchev) did not care how many pictures of Russian territory we made from satellites. Secretary Herter said one problem might arise in connection with quoting Khrushchev; namely, there were no official notes of the meeting in Paris. Each delegation took its own notes. The President said he thought the French preserved a rather complete record of the meeting. In any case, Khrushchev had made the statement in the presence of the President and a number of other people.

The President then said he would be glad to put reconnaissance satellites at the disposal of the UN if every nation would follow suit. Mr. Gray said he was not advocating this policy. With respect to questions that might be asked about reconnaissance satellites, the President thought that Administration officials need not attempt to reply to every question which some idiot was able to ask. He felt it would be enough to quote Khrushchev's statement. If we went too far in describing our reconnaissance satellites, information concerning their infra-red and all their other capabilities would become public. Secretary Gates said it was not possible to lump all satellites together as Senator Jackson's letter had apparently done. Midas, for example, was an early warning satellite for the Strategic Air Command. In reply to questions, General Twining said Midas would be fully operational in about a year. Secretary Gates added that Samos would not be fully operational as a system before three years had elapsed. In reply to a question from the President, Dr. Kistiakowsky said the "1 foot resolution" did not now appear hopeful in reconnaissance satellites; a "20 foot resolution" appeared more likely.

[Here follows discussion of the U-2 incident.]

Mr. Washburn asked whether the Secretary of State, in saying that it would be helpful to speed up the reconnaissance satellite, was referring to actions to be taken internally by this government or to our world-wide information posture. Secretary Herter said he was referring to internal actions by this government. The President believed it would be wrong to give the world the impression that we could get the same information from a reconnaissance satellite that we had been obtaining from the U-2 flights.

[Here follows discussion of world opinion.]

Mr. Gray, reverting to the reconnaissance satellite, noted that Senator Johnson had called for a crash program to develop these systems. He assumed everything was being done that could be done reasonably to attain an operational capability in the reconnaissance satellite systems. Mr. Douglas said there was some disagreement on this point. The military program adopted in April fully financed the Midas and Discoverer

satellites but left Samos in a somewhat controversial position. Mr. Douglas thought the Department of Defense might have to ask for another \$50 million in order to insure progress toward the operational capability of Samos in event rapid scientific progress should be made. The President suggested that Dr. Kistiakowsky should consult with Dr. York on the possibility of expediting a reconnaissance satellite program and should report the results to him.

[Here follows additional discussion of public opinion.]

General Persons said there were enough Presidential candidates in the Senate to add a great deal of money to the defense budget. We should take particular pains to support those Senators who wish to continue the President's defense budget without a great change. Secretary Gates agreed with this view.

*The National Security Council:*²

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of an oral statement by the Secretary of State as to the position which the U.S. should take on various policy issues.

b. Noted the President's approval of the following U.S. positions in the post-Summit environment:

[Here follow paragraphs 1-7 on policy implementation with regard to the Soviet Union and other Communist states, nuclear testing, and disarmament.]

(8) The military program as currently approved by the President continues to provide for an adequate defense posture in the post-Summit environment. However, certain operational steps to improve the state of readiness of U.S. forces should be considered in the ordinary course, but any changes deemed necessary should be undertaken quietly without unnecessary publicity.

(9) The reconnaissance satellite program should be reviewed in connection with expediting achievement of an operational capability as soon as feasible, but no programs are to be undertaken on a crash basis until scientific analysis demonstrates real promise of success. If an issue is raised as to whether development and use of reconnaissance satellites is a provocative act, Khrushchev's statement might be quoted in which he said that he was aware of the U.S. satellite photographing the USSR, that he had not protested and that it could take as many pictures as we wanted.

² The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2238, approved by the President on May 31. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

c. Noted the President's request that the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology consult with the Department of Defense with regard to the feasibility of expediting the reconnaissance satellite program, and report the results to the President.³

[Here follows Agenda Item 5. "U.S. Policy Toward Cuba."]

Marion W. Boggs

³ A note to the action reads in part: "The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Special Assistant for Science and Technology and the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation."

103. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, May 26, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Kistiakowsky
Mr. Gordon Gray
General Goodpaster

Dr. Kistiakowsky said he wanted to talk with the President about intelligence satellites.

[14-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Because the volume of information that would be pouring in from the system is so tremendously great—amounting to a trillion "bits" of information a year—one element in this system is a proposal for an enormous electronic computer to handle and sort out the information mechanically.

The President interrupted to say that he thought Dr. York's office should challenge the feasibility of such a project. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that Dr. York does not control military requirements for intelligence. The President stated that Mr. Gates certainly has responsibility for such military requirements.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on May 31. On February 5, the President discussed military reconnaissance with Herter, Douglas, Twining, Kistiakowsky, and others. (Memorandum of conference with the President by Goodpaster, February 8; *ibid.*) Other accounts of these meetings are in Kistiakowsky, *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 245–246 and 336.

Mr. Gray said that under existing directives each Service Department has authority to set its own intelligence requirements, and that no one is given authority to challenge the requirements as stated by the others. The inevitable result is tremendous log rolling.

The President said that there are certain aspects of this which can be taken up in the NSC: first, what information is really needed in the armed services; and second, what is scientifically feasible. If we were developing a system gradually, to be available in 1970, some of these proposals would make sense, but doing them on such a crash basis does not.

Dr. Kistiakowsky suggested setting up an ad hoc committee to look into this, and mentioned Dr. Killian as the type of individual who might head it up. The discussion brought out that the group, if it is established by the President, should not render a report, but should advise him. There was some discussion as to whether the group should be set up in the Defense Department or directly under the President. The former has the disadvantage of risks of free wheeling.

The President said that his notion of what we need in the intelligence field is fairly limited. We want to know what a possible enemy has in the way of weapons that could be used against us because we know that, should war occur, we would never be able to strike the first blow. The idea of elaborate targeting is rather foolish. We would simply hit his cities. He said he would like to see a committee appointed to go into this, with two or three fine scientists and some government people with good sense as its members. He asked me to develop a directive for such a study, the purpose of which would be to get things out where we can look at them.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said there is one further question of major proportion involved, which is whether analysis of data should be more centralized or whether SAC, for example, should set up its separate data analysis system. The President said he could imagine nothing more absurd than this. He said that there would be no sums in the FY'62 budget for this project until needs had been determined and proven and the scientific feasibility had been evaluated.

The President asked me to tell Secretary Gates that he has heard so much regarding various kinds of intelligence satellites that he wants to see a clear delineation of what they are, and what needs they are supposed to fill, together with an assessment of feasibility.

He then wants this brought before the NSC.

The President asked how a project of this kind can slip out of control. I recalled that I had advised him of this probable outcome a year ago when Mr. McElroy took the action of dispersing operational use of satellites to the Departments, rather than keeping it under centralized direction. While there is centralized supervision by Dr. York during the developmental stage of these items, the sky is the limit so far as the opera-

tional use is concerned. The President said the study may help to get this back under some kind of control.

G.
Brigadier General USA

104. Memorandum of Discussion at the 446th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, May 31, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Items 1. "U.S. Policy Toward Japan," 2. "Consultations With Foreign Governments Concerning U.S. Grant Military Assistance," 3. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," 4. "Certain Aspects of U.S. Politico-Military Relationships with Canada," and 5. "U.S. Policy on Antarctica."]

6. *Review of Outer Space Programs Under the Auspices of the Department of Defense*

The President said he had one more matter to bring up. He felt that at an early date it would be necessary to have a national security examination of our outer space programs, especially those being conducted by the Military Services. Under Secretary McElroy, the particular functions to be performed in outer space by the Military Services were laid out. However, the President had received some indirect indications recently that some of the Services were thinking along extremely advanced lines. The result might be not only inadvertent duplication of outer space programs, but possibly also the initiation of some programs so advanced scientifically as to make a re-appraisal advisable. Such a re-appraisal should take place not only during the period of the formulation of the budget, but also at an earlier date, when a more thorough study could be made. Accordingly, the President suggested that the Council at an early meeting examine outer space programs being carried on under the auspices of the Department of Defense.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on June 1. Another account of this meeting is in Kistiakowsky, *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 338–339.

The President then added, by way of example, that he had heard of one outer space program which involved sending a trillion photographs a year to an IBM machine for processing. He felt some competent scientists should take a look at advance programs of this kind.

Secretary Douglas believed that certain fantastic statements had been made regarding the operational requirements of reconnaissance satellites, but in his opinion such statements had not affected defense expenditures or financial commitments. He said the Department of Defense would be ready at any time to make a presentation to the Council on its outer space programs. He believed such a presentation would show that military efforts in outer space were sensibly integrated with the total military program.

The President said it would not be necessary for the Department of Defense to make its presentation until after completion of a related study which the scientists were undertaking under Dr. Kistiakowsky. The Department of Defense report and Dr. Kistiakowsky's report could come before the Council at the same time.

*The National Security Council:*¹

Noted the President's request that the Department of Defense present to the National Security Council a full report on all of the outer space programs being planned or conducted under the auspices of the Department of Defense. Noted further that this presentation was not to be given until after completion of a related study to be undertaken for the President by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

Note: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Special Assistant for Science and Technology for appropriate implementation.²

Marion W. Boggs

¹The following paragraph and note constitute NSC Action No. 2245, approved by the President on June 11. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

²Kistiakowsky noted that on June 1, he saw Gordon Gray about "NSC actions regarding intelligence satellites, since I was unsure about what I was supposed to do. It finally came out that I am to consult with York about the desirability of putting additional money into Samos to accelerate it and to report on this to the President. Separately I will probably be asked by the President to undertake a broad study of intelligence satellites." (*A Scientist at the White House*, p. 339) For the recommendations of what became the Special Panel on Satellite Reconnaissance, see Documents 115-117.

105. Editorial Note

On June 22, 1960, at its 448th meeting, the National Security Council discussed and noted the adoption of revisions to paragraph 19 concerning port security of NSC 5802/1, "Continental Defense," dated February 19, 1958. (Memorandum of discussion by Boggs, June 23; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) See the Supplement. The memorandum of discussion includes NSC Action No. 2249, approved on June 29. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Regarding NSC 5802/1, see footnote 10, Document 8.

106. Memorandum of Discussion at the 449th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, June 30, 1960.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Military Logistics Planning Base* (NSC Action No. 2019;¹ NSC 5906/1, paragraph 59–a²)

Mr. Gray introduced this subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum.)³ Mr. Gray asked whether Secretary Gates wished to make any introductory remarks before Assistant Secretary of Defense McGuire made the presentation on the subject. Mr. Gates said he had no comments in advance of the presentation, which he believed was explicit and to the point.

Assistant Secretary of Defense Perkins McGuire then made an oral presentation on the subject with the assistance of a series of charts shown on a viewgraph. A copy of Mr. McGuire's presentation, including reproductions of the charts, is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting.⁴

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs.

¹ See Document 43.

² See Document 74.

³ Not printed.

⁴ Not found.

At the conclusion of the presentation, Secretary Gates said that the military logistics planning base was a vast and very complicated subject. Mr. McGuire's presentation had been a condensed and excellent summary of a very complex field. Secretary Gates felt that the new concepts underlying the military logistics planning base represented a significant step forward. In contrast to the old base, which consumed the time of a great many people but which was never fully financed, the new base is quite realistic. Secretary Gates believed that it was possible to take pride in the work which had been done on the military logistics planning base.

The President asked whether General Twining had any comments on this subject. General Twining said he fully agreed with the remarks of the Secretary of Defense. The military mobilization base plans were formerly projected for three or four years in the future but were never funded. If an estimate were made of the cost of funding both the old plans and the new plans, it would be found that the new plans are less expensive. However, since the old plans were never fully implemented, a full implementation of the new plans will cost more than was being spent on the partial implementation of the old plans. With respect to limited war, the criticism had often been advanced that the U.S. has insufficient conventional type bombs, "iron bombs", in its inventory to oppose limited aggression when it is contrary to policy to use nuclear weapons. General Twining believed we had sufficient conventional-type bombs to fight a limited war in the Far East unless the Chinese Communists intervened in such a war in great numbers, in which case our stock of conventional bombs would not be large enough and we would be compelled to use nuclear bombs.

Secretary Gates pointed out that, in general, our military logistics planning base for limited war was based, as indicated in the presentation, on contingency plans for the renewal of hostilities in Korea. This meant that our planning base for limited war was at a high, not a low, level. The President felt it would be difficult to plan a limited war on the scale of the Korean War without making plans for the use of nuclear weapons.

Secretary Gates said that development of the new military logistics planning base had certainly demonstrated the absurdity of the old base. The President believed the great accomplishment of the new base was the emphasis which it placed on D-Day. Mr. McGuire commented that some years ago, the Army had tried to establish a production base sufficient to equip 42 U.S. divisions plus indigenous divisions on the U.S. equipment scale. He had put an end to this kind of planning. Under the new plan, the number of tanks saved, for example, was fantastic. Moreover, the Army now admits that indigenous forces will not be equipped on the same basis as U.S. forces. The new logistics base should save money and allow a reduction in inventories and facilities.

The President said he had thought that the M-48 tanks had diesel engines; in fact, he thought we converted to diesels with the M-47 model. Mr. McGuire said this was not the case. He pointed out, however, that we were modernizing some of our older-model tanks by installing diesel engines, thereby saving money in logistical support. The President recalled that tank crewmen did not like diesel engines in cold weather. Mr. McGuire said a tank with a diesel engine did not burn as fast when it was hit.

Mr. Gray wondered whether Mr. McGuire had not neglected to point out during his presentation that the new military logistics planning base had already been approved. Secretary Gates said the new base had been approved by all Services and by the Department of Defense.

Mr. McGuire said he had recently briefed the Army officers at Carlisle Barracks on the new logistics base. He felt these officers understood and accepted the new base quite thoroughly. The President said the new base was a great improvement over the old. When the mobilization base had been discussed at the Council last year, he had felt that the idea of supporting 42 divisions was ridiculous.

Mr. Gray remarked that we formerly said that readiness for general war included readiness for limited war. The new concept presented by Mr. McGuire took special account of limited war. It was clear that under this plan, U.S. forces would be prepared to use conventional weapons in limited wars, except in areas where main communist power might be brought to bear; in the latter areas, planning contemplates the use of nuclear weapons. Mr. Gray wondered whether the principles he had just stated did not constitute an answer to those critics who say we are neglecting preparations for limited war. General Twining agreed with Mr. Gray's comments.

Mr. McGuire said the Joint Chiefs of Staff had put certain war-support items on a highly selective basis. For example, it had been decided that while ten brands of toothpaste might be used by the armed forces during peacetime, only one brand, if any, would be available during a war.

Secretary Gates said that before the new logistics base had been developed, logistics planning was tending to dictate the roles and missions of the forces. He believed Mr. McGuire deserved commendation for the new logistics planning base. The President said that at last year's meeting on the mobilization base, he had spoken out vigorously because it appeared that we were committed to put twelve additional divisions into Europe. He was satisfied that logistics base planning was now on a realistic basis. He was much more satisfied with the whole situation and wished to thank Mr. McGuire for a splendid job.

*The National Security Council:*⁵

a. Noted and discussed an oral presentation by Perkins McGuire, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics, on the status of planning for the military logistics base, taking into account NSC Action No. 2019-b and paragraph 59-a of NSC 5906/1 ("Basic National Security Policy").

b. Noted the President's approval of the concepts outlined by Mr. McGuire, and the President's commendations to Mr. McGuire and his associates in developing a more realistic base for planning the military logistics base.⁶

Note: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense.

[Here follow Agenda Items 2. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," 3. "U.S. Policy Toward Iran," and 4. "Recent Evidences of Social Unrest and Political Instability in Many Free World Nations."]

Marion W. Boggs

⁵ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2254, approved by the President on July 6. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

⁶ In Gray's July 8 memorandum of a meeting with the President on July 6, a section on a mobilization reads:

"I reminded the President that in November 1959, following a presentation by the Defense Department on the Status of Military Programs, the President had asked for a report by the Defense Department on the requirements for highly mobile and suitably deployed Army forces for use in the event of general war. I expressed the view to the President that at that time he had in mind smoking out the continued insistence of the Army to plan for a mobilization buildup of 44 divisions. I said that in my judgment his recent approval of the mobilization base following the presentation in the Council, had pretty well taken care of the problem which would be further nailed down, I felt, by the presentation on Limited War Capabilities which was due in September. I suggested that no further action was required with respect to his November request and he agreed." (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up)

107. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, July 6, 1960, 12:30 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Gates
Colonel Eisenhower

[Here follows discussion of personnel matters.]

Secretary Gates then mentioned the matter of strategic targets. He said he had already gone through fifteen meetings with JCS on this subject. It is a subject extremely broad in scope, covering basic military policy, listing of targets, strategic planning, and roles and missions of the Services. It is of course a highly emotional subject.

More specifically, the question at issue now involves the Air Force recommendation for unified strategic command (not to be confused with the Strategic Air Command).¹ The staff procedure for targeting is not satisfactory as of today. This is carried out in the Joint Staff where procedures are cumbersome and time lags often result. With some weapons the Navy does not plan to deliver warheads on target for some fifteen days following initiation of hostilities. On the other hand, the Air Force has developed a highly integrated set-up within the Strategic Air Command for targeting. They have spent much time on this subject and have the resources to spend on elaborate computers, etc. The other Chiefs of Staff desire to continue the present system of targeting by unified commanders, the results to be periodically coordinated at the annual Commanders Conference. The basic difficulty with this scheme is that coordination is done without benefit of referee.

Secretary Gates reminded the President of the Hickey Report² which set forth the "optimum mix" of counterforce vs. soft targets. He felt that this report can serve as the basis for an Integrated Operation Plan.

Secretary Gates expressed his own view that we do not need a strategic command as such. The problems of SAC and of Polaris are too different. In addition, the initial command in case of global war would be a simple execution order from the President to the JCS. The JCS actually maintain command in a military sense. It is necessary, however, to develop a single operational plan. The only unit capable is SAC. Conceivably, SAC should operate as an agent of the JCS. The Army and Navy

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Colonel Eisenhower.

¹ See footnote 2, Document 101.

² See Document 90.

are suspicious of this arrangement as a power play on the part of the Air Force, to which Secretary Gates has told them that if SAC takes over the functions of the Joint Chiefs it is the fault of the Chiefs themselves. He added that nuclear retaliation comprises a single mission force, inflexible in nature, and therefore only a specialized portion of the broad responsibilities of the JCS. While there is no question of the JCS retaining command in the event of nuclear war, the issue is whether the Joint Staff will develop the Integrated Operation Plan itself or whether they will employ SAC as the agent. He concluded that unless SAC is employed as an agent of the JCS it will not be possible to achieve a coordination any better than a tidying up of what we now have.

The President said the original mistake in this whole business was our failure to create one single Service in 1947. He discussed certain prejudices on the part of the Navy that makes this entire matter more difficult. He told of his difficulties as a theater commander in inducing any U.S. Navy man to take an order from anyone outside his own Service, until Admiral King,³ in 1942, saw the light and gave the unified commanders full backing. Even today the President said that if he were to appoint an Army or Air Force General to command CINCPAC, Admiral Hopwood⁴ would think we are unfair. The President expressed his disagreement with this Navy point of view. He mentioned another prejudice which involved rivalry between the U.S. Navy and the British Navy and our reluctance to allow the Union Jack to fly in the Pacific.

Secretary Gates stated he is aware of traditional prejudices but reiterated the need for an Integrated Operational Plan since matters as they stand now are cumbersome and expensive in nuclear raw materials. In short, management is bad.

The President said he did not consider a single strategic command feasible at this time. We need an Integrated Operational Plan to include objectives, approaches to attaining objectives, means, and designation of forces. He thought we might put this requirement on the JCS with an admonition that if they fail to come up with an integrated plan within six months they will all be replaced.

Mr. Gates agreed completely and brought up once more the question of the resources available to the JCS to accomplish this. He said the only agency available is SAC. The President said he does not care if the function is performed by SAC as an agency of the Joint Staff. He agreed more heartily when Secretary Gates assured him that the SAC planners would have to be augmented with personnel from the other Services.

³ Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, 1942-1945.

⁴ Admiral Herbert G. Hopwood, then Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT). The Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) in 1960 was Admiral Harry D. Felt.

[Here follows discussion of press leaks.]

John S.D. Eisenhower

108. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Newport, Rhode Island, July 19, 1960, 3:15 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter, Mr. Bohlen,¹ Mr. Kohler,² Mr. Wilcox,³ Mr. Hagerty, General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of the United Nations, Cuba, the Congo, and the Soviet shooting down of a U.S. RB-47.]

Mr. Herter then said that the question should be considered why the Soviets are taking the line that they have been taking. Their action gives real grounds for concern, since they are deliberately engaging in saber-rattling. He said that he and his associates, particularly Mr. Bohlen, have been giving some thought as to how best to handle this situation. One action that they have thought of is to work for something of major psychological effect through bringing our defense forces to a greater state of readiness. He asked Mr. Bohlen to outline this line of thought. Mr. Bohlen said the Soviet actions were now going beyond their usual ugly, angry reaction to every event they dislike. There has been a considerable shift in the Soviet behavior, evidenced by widespread campaign of inciting violence and disorder all around the world. He said that the threat to use force is something new in the Soviet tactics. This has now become something more than just words and needs to be met with more than words, since polemics and arguments are something they love for creating tension and disturbing world affairs. He said he had been casting about for

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. The President was on a working vacation in Newport, July 7–26.

¹ Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

² Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

³ Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

some action that might quiet them down and show the world that the Soviets are not in position to rule the roost.⁴

At this point the President asked in what specific military fields this could be done which would have real significance. He commented that everyone knows that if we added to our ICBM program it would be three years before the additional items were actually off the line. Mr. Bohlen said another possibility is to put SAC on airborne alert. The President said the Air Force itself is opposed to this, adding that SAC did not want it. I commented that the Air Force staff, including General White and General LeMay, have not wanted to do this but that General Power has been pressing for it. The President said he gave no weight to Power's views. Mr. Bohlen said that even if the use of the funds is not spelled out, just requesting them would show that we are not being frightened or cowed. He thought we might consider adding to our airlift. The President said he thought that additional airlift is perhaps the least significant need. What he thought he could do was ask authorization from the Congress to start spending available funds more rapidly because of the RB-47 incident, the Congo, Cuba, etc. Perhaps he could put more Atlases in production, and put more of the Air Force on air alert. Mr. Herter asked whether he might talk to Defense about this. The President went on to say that he did not like too much the idea of adding Atlases because it is practically an obsolete weapon. He would be more interested in the Minuteman, but again it is several years until the first of these will appear. Mr. Bohlen suggested he might simply ask the Congress for added money for defense and economic aid. The President said the crux of the matter is to decide what would carry sufficient credibility to create the psychological effect desired. Mr. Bohlen said he thought the Soviets are well aware the military balance is definitely against them. It is just possible, however, that they think our hands are tied during the pre-election period.

The President said he might ask for up to 100 additional ICBMs or perhaps \$500 million for speed-up of weapons systems already proven and for increasing the degree of alertness. In response to the Secretary's question, he asked that the Secretary meet with the Secretary of Defense, Gordon Gray, Mr. Harr and myself.⁵ He commented that he could state his intention even prior to the reconvening of the Congress, and bring

⁴ The Department of State officials left a 4-page written summary of Department views with the President. This summary explicitly recommended an increase in the Defense budget, but did not specify an amount. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material) See the Supplement.

⁵ In a July 20 memorandum to Gates, Herter suggested that these officials meet after the NSC meeting on July 21. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers) No record of this meeting has been found, nor were Defense program alterations or increases discussed at the NSC meeting. (Memorandum of discussion at the NSC meeting by Robert H. Johnson, July 21; *ibid.*, Whitman File, NSC Records)

out that, because of Soviet truculence and arrogance, he proposes to put a certain increase of funds into defense. These funds would be used to get things we want more quickly or additional things that are useful, and would not go into waste. Mr. Bohlen thought this could be done in a sober and deliberate way without kicking off a war scare. There was question as to whether anything could be done in the field of IRBMs. Mr. Kohler said that the MRBM has some possibility, although we are far from having worked out political arrangements. The President said that the meeting he spoke of should be held soon and asked that the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense not go down in their organization below an echelon they could trust since we do not want this getting to the press in a distorted way.

In further discussion Mr. Bohlen said there are two hypotheses with regard to this change of Soviet line. The first, which he does not believe, is that they might have decided this is the best year for a show-down—that the correlation of forces is in their favor, and that the U.S. is paralyzed because of the forthcoming election. The second, which he is inclined to favor, is that they are having a good deal of trouble with Peiping and are adopting a militant line in order to cut out the Chinese. There was a suggestion that the President make a public statement on this matter, whether by live address or by “tape” within the next few days. I suggested that this should preferably come after the convention, rather than before as some seem to be contemplating, on the ground that the President should not be doing two dissimilar things before the American people at the same time. If he were to speak now he would have to change his approach at the Convention and then revert to this, and this would be confusing. After discussion the President thought that there could be a mention by Mr. Herter of concern over this problem before he left Newport later the same afternoon, that the President might mention it briefly but clearly at the Convention, and then make his speech on it later. The President asked whether it might be a good move to take the U.S. dependents out of Berlin. Mr. Kohler thought that this action would frighten the Berliners and that panic might result which would damage and erode our position. He said that Mr. Merchant has been conducting a study of countermeasures, possible alert steps, and contingency planning. The President confirmed that Mr. Herter should say we are taking a serious look at the Soviet line of action.

[Here follows discussion of Berlin, the RB-47 incident, nuclear testing, Taiwan, and Latin America.]

The President told Mr. Herter that, if we are thinking of a Presidential speech on the foreign situation in about two weeks, we should build up to it by a series of comments and references, beginning with the Secretary's own comment today about the change in the Soviet attitude, and

the fact that this had received extended consideration during his meeting with the President.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

109. Memorandum of Discussion at the 453d Meeting of the National Security Council

Newport, Rhode Island, July 25, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Item 1, "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security."]

2. *Measures To Enhance U.S. Military Readiness*

Secretary Gates said that for the last month he had been collaborating with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in an analysis of the defense program. For the last ten days intensive work had been going on with respect to our military readiness in the light of the international situation. Another factor in the defense program at present was the slippage in Atlas construction. At the end of the year we would have twelve Atlas instead of the planned thirty. It was true that the Atlas in question was a soft Atlas and therefore the slippage was not quite as serious as it might seem at first glance. However, the slippage was a matter to be concerned about in relation to future construction problems for hardened Atlas and Titan squadrons. Research on construction problems was now going on. Mr. Gates said he had also examined the Congressional add-ons to the Defense budget and was prepared to make recommendations to the President that some add-ons be accepted, that others be rejected, and that some of the money provided by Congress should be used for purposes different from the purposes suggested by Congress.

Mr. Gates then summarized his proposed changes in the defense program as follows: the deployment of two more aircraft carriers to the fleet; the retention in operational status of three to five B-47 wings which

were about to be phased out; an increased dispersal of B-47s; increased dollars for airborne alert capabilities; a slightly increased effort in the reconnaissance satellite program; and an increase in army readiness. Mr. Gates said all these items fell in the category of military personnel and M & O (Maintenance and Operation) money. These items could be carried on a temporary basis for a twelve month period if additional personnel and funds were made available. A complicating factor in the funding situation was the \$215 million the Defense Department would have to spend due to the pay increase for government employees. If the whole package he had suggested were adopted, we would be spending \$500 million more this year of which \$215 million would be due to the pay increase for government employees and \$95 million would be attributable to National Guard. Accordingly, our expenditures for military readiness would only amount to \$250 million. In this program we would be committing ourselves to the extent of about a billion dollars. We would be rejecting some of the Congressional add-ons but would be taking about the sum of the Congressional add-ons although for different purposes. Secretary Gates said these suggestions raised a difficult question of political timing. Each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had examined a long list of possible measures and had set up a list of priorities. He felt that in the light of the international situation, an enhancement of our visible readiness, especially in view of the slippage in missiles, was desirable. The President asked whether the strikes which had affected missile construction were settled so that by the expenditure of more money we could make up for lost time. Secretary Gates said the labor problems were practically settled. The slippage, however, had been due partly to jurisdictional labor disputes, partly to the newness of the programs, partly to the speed with which we were attempting to build missiles, and partly to certain features of army and air force organization. Secretary Gates said he was gravely concerned about the possibility of slippage with respect to the hardened missile sites which were due to become operational next year.

The President said the question of military readiness came up because of our desire to display visible, additional strength. He was unable to see how acceleration of the satellite program showed visible, additional strength. He doubted whether satellites gave the Soviet or the American people an impression of military strength. We were talking not about our own confidence in our strength but about taking actions which would promote the confidence of the American people and the Free World in our strength and would warn the Soviet Bloc. If we could accelerate the production of Polaris and do something about our alertness, we might be giving visible evidence of our military readiness. He suggested that we might lay down two additional Polaris submarines a year and added that the Atlas slippage was certainly unfortunate. Secretary Gates

said his recommendations had been perhaps somewhat confusing because he had tried to recommend in one package what to do with Congressional add-ons and what to do from the standpoint of pure readiness actions. The President believed we were trying to take a cold war action which would make our people calmer and the enemy more respectful.

Secretary Gates said the readiness measures he had suggested would require about 45,000 more men in the armed services. He had ordered a five per cent reduction in all headquarters staffs including the Pentagon. The additional personnel would be for the purpose of manning the aircraft carriers to be deployed to the fleet and the B-47s which would be retained in operational status. Enhanced readiness could not be achieved without additional personnel and expenditures. Maintenance and Operations money would be required immediately; the case thus differed from long-lead time items with respect to which expenditures could be adjusted over several years.

The President remarked that in terms of percentages the number of additional men for the armed services referred to by Secretary Gates did not seem very significant. However, it would be significant if we could say that we were laying down four Polaris submarines a year instead of two. He had been told that the final objective of the Polaris program was forty submarines. Admiral Burke said the target was fifty submarines. The President said the number seemed to be going up. Admiral Burke replied that fifty had always been the largest number mentioned. The President said he had been told that we would keep two-thirds of our Polaris submarines on station at all times. As far as he could tell, we had a nearly invulnerable base in our Polaris submarines. He supposed the Polaris program could be speeded up by agreement with Congress.

Secretary Gates said the Polaris program was a long-lead time program. The President said he had been told that the long-lead time item in connection with the Polaris submarines was the reactor. Secretary Gates believed that we had stepped the Polaris program up to the maximum extent last April. The President asked why we could not accelerate the production of Polaris missiles even if they could not be put on submarines immediately. He felt that we could not get 45,000 additional men into action immediately. Secretary Gates said many of the additional men would operate the aircraft carriers to be deployed to the fleet, the planes on these carriers and the B-47s which would be retained in commission. The President said he could appreciate the retention of the B-47s as a visible readiness measure. However, the world today thinks we already have the most powerful navy in the world so that the deployment of two additional aircraft carriers might not impress the world.

Secretary Gates felt he had perhaps introduced an element of confusion by mentioning the pay increase for government employees, but he had thought it necessary to propose a package of recommendations. The

cost of his recommendations would not be very different from the cost of the Congressional program but the money would be spent for different purposes.

The President asked how much slippage in Atlas missile construction there was in terms of time. Secretary Gates replied the slippage amounted to six months. Secretary Douglas said the Atlas squadron which was supposed to become operational at Warren Air Force Base had been delayed while the squadron which should have been operational now at Moffat Air Force Base would not be ready until January. The President inquired again whether this slippage was due to the recent strikes. Secretary Douglas said not entirely. For a year missile construction has been harassed by some labor trouble but the other reasons for slippage previously mentioned by Secretary Gates were also important.

Dr. Kistiakowsky believed that if an immediate and visible gesture were desired, a second Atlas squadron at Warren could be made operational within a month if we were willing to sacrifice the requirement to use the automatic check-out equipment. This check-out equipment was designed to indicate why a missile could not be launched whenever there was a failure to launch it. Without the check-out equipment, the missile is somewhat less reliable but if we were willing to accept less reliability temporarily, an additional Atlas squadron could be made operational within the next few weeks and another one could be made operational at Offutt Base in December. The President asked whether the automatic check-out equipment could be added to the missile complex when it was available or would it have to be integrated with the missile when it was installed. Dr. Kistiakowsky said the automatic check-out equipment could be added later. The President said Dr. Kistiakowsky's suggestion seemed to him a very worthwhile one. He would dispense with the automatic check-out for the present and make the additional Atlas squadrons operational.

Secretary Douglas said fifteen or twenty soft Atlas missiles would not be significant during the next few months. He believed the retention of the B-47s would provide the U.S. with greater striking power. Secretary Gates said political difficulties would be created when it became publicly known that our Atlas program had slipped from thirty to twelve missiles. He did not believe the delay could be compensated for by eliminating the automatic check-out. The President said he had thought the delay was in the check-out equipment. Dr. Kistiakowsky said the delay could be attributed to the check-out equipment only at the Warren Base. We could gain only a month or two by declaring the Atlas operational now without the check-out equipment.

Secretary Herter asked how much the missile construction program had been held up by bidding on contracts. Secretary Gates replied that such bidding had caused considerable delay. The President believed we

should by-pass fly-by-night operators and give contracts for missile construction only to reliable firms.

Admiral Burke said the Joint Chiefs of Staff had assembled a long list of possible measures in order to determine what measures would significantly add to our capabilities. Some of the measures suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were visible. The retention of the B-47s was a visible measure but an acceleration of the Samos program was not. Army modernization, while not a spectacular measure, was an important one. An increase in army manpower was not very visible but it would increase readiness and capabilities. The President said the only hostilities the U.S. was really concerned about was an all-out atomic attack. He believed that we should be taking military actions which would convince the American people and the Soviet Bloc that our retaliatory power has been sharpened and speeded up. He was in favor of army modernization but felt the U.S. need not be afraid of brush-fire wars. We could say that we have fought such wars before and could do it again. We should be more concerned about the possibility of a rain of missiles on the U.S. and about becoming so weak that the enemy can attack us with impunity. Such a situation of weakness would affect the mental attitude of both the U.S. and the USSR. We would not have become so concerned about this matter at the present time except for recent Soviet threats. He had no objection to some modernization in the army but noted that the army has no retaliatory weapon.

Secretary Gates said he had been looking at the situation involving immediate gaps in our defenses, that is, those which would exist during the next twelve months. The situation for the next three or four years looks very promising.

The President said we would have to tell the public that we have miscalculated the rate of production of new weapons and that it would be necessary to continue to rely on some of the older weapons which we had thought we could phase out. Secretary Gates agreed but said he did not know how best to handle this question politically. The President thought we might have to declare that our production schedules had been erroneous all the time. Secretary Gates recalled that we had repeatedly said that we would look at our military readiness situation on a month by month basis. Threats by the USSR have recently been increasing. Secretary Douglas noted that our military forces had already been developed to a high state of readiness. The President said that when the missile slippage becomes known, the Democrats will make quite a point of previous estimates that a number of Atlases would be ready at this time. It would be desirable to inform Congressional Leaders of the slippage in secrecy but unfortunately the secrecy would not be kept. Secretary Douglas said the slippage had already been reported in a rather spectacular fashion but no difficulty had resulted. The President said a

long delay was an entirely different thing from a short delay. Secretary Gates said Congress in its defense program had been concentrating on long-lead time items when it talked in terms of spending an additional \$3 billion. There was a great difference between immediate readiness measures and long-lead time measures. Congress had not been talking about readiness measures.

The President said the only honest course of action was to say that we were wrong about our production estimates, even though we would be taking somewhat the Symington–Rockefeller line in bringing this matter to the public attention during the political campaign. In view of the enormous slippage in missile construction, the first thing to do is to deploy Atlas squadrons whether or not they have the automatic check-out. Secretary Douglas said such deployment would only save a month. He did not believe it was necessary to describe the Atlas slippage as enormous. For the future he could not tell what would happen to the program for hardened missile bases.

Secretary Dillon asked why it was necessary to say that B–47 wings were being retained and carriers deployed because of slippage in missile construction. He felt these military readiness measures were being taken on account of the recent threats made by Khrushchev. The President said we should also say that we are retaining ships and planes because we have arrived at a more realistic time schedule for missile production. He felt that army modernization should not be advertised as a deterrent. The army will be used in some small war, in Cuba or elsewhere. We need not specify the amounts of money necessary for these military readiness measures. We can say that because of Khrushchev's threats, we are keeping certain carriers in commission, obtaining more nuclear-powered submarines, retaining B–47s, and taking various other measures and that the bill will be presented to Congress next spring. Secretary Douglas said this would present no problem except with respect to the pay of personnel. Secretary Gates said the Bureau of the Budget might be asked to make an advance apportionment of money for these military readiness measures but this would mean that the deficit would later have to be replaced. Mr. Staats said this action would require a report to Congress. The President said he would like to ask Congress to authorize expenditures for these military readiness measures within certain broad limits, with a report on specific expenditures to be made to Congress subsequently.

Secretary Herter felt the program summarized by the Secretary of Defense was a good program from the standpoint of visibility. He believed that army modernization would be very useful psychologically in view of the situation in Cuba and the Congo.

Secretary Gates said that if Congress re-opened the whole defense question when it came back to Washington in August, we could say that

in changing the defense program we would give priority to retaliatory readiness but would not be averse to taking a look at other possible measures. The President said he would like to make some new weapons available more rapidly. He wondered whether the Polaris program could be speeded up by spending more money. Secretary Anderson asked whether Secretary Gates was to activate additional carriers or to keep some carriers active. Secretary Gates said the proposal was to deploy an additional carrier to the Sixth Fleet and an additional carrier to the Seventh Fleet.

The President believed the Secretary of Defense should make up a program of readiness measures and have a meeting with Congressional Leaders of both parties from the committees on foreign affairs and defense. Congressional Leaders should be told that in accordance with our continuing review of the military program, we wished to make some changes. For example, we do not wish to make the transition from old weapons to new weapons too fast. Therefore, we will keep two carriers in commission and will retain three wings of B-47s which were being phased out. We will indicate that we want to maintain and improve our military strength and that this will mean more M&O funds and personnel. The President cautioned, however, that the personnel figure should not be made too large lest it become next year's floor. He felt that some day with the use of machinery we ought to be able to cut down on military personnel. The program presented to the Congressional Leaders should be couched in general terms as a continuation of the "new look" of the first years of this Administration. By presenting such a program we would not be surrendering to false programs put forward by political figures for their own purposes.

Mr. Gray said that the Mutual Security Program was an important consideration in any assumption of increased threats and truculence by the USSR. Secretary Gates said the Mutual Security Program as passed by Congress was \$200 million short of the amount requested. The fight for adequate funds would be continued.

The President said that in the talk he would give to the Republican Convention, he would say he was planning to hold a conference with the Congressional Leaders to review the world situation and make such changes in programs as might be appropriate.¹

¹ In the course of his address delivered on July 26 to the Republican National Convention at Chicago, Eisenhower reviewed U.S. defense policy, emphasized the "frequent and erratic" changes in Soviet attitudes, and stated his intention to meet with Congressional leaders. "And depending on developments in the meantime, I shall make such recommendations for changes in our own national programs as may then seem appropriate." The address is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61*, pp. 594-599.

Secretary Gates said it might be prudent to take certain readiness actions immediately without waiting to consult with Congress, provided such consultation could be legally postponed. Admiral Burke believed ships could be deployed immediately and that personnel could be paid immediately but that a deficit at the end of the year would be created. The President said we would have to request additional funds from Congress for such deficiencies as might occur in M&O and personnel costs.

Secretary Douglas said that even though we emphasized our retaliatory capability, it might be well to mention the Congo and similar situations in talking about military readiness. The President agreed that the whole international situation should be emphasized. Secretary Douglas said the Congo airlift and possible action in the Formosa Strait might require additional expenditures. Admiral Burke believed the communists would deploy their strong arm squads throughout Latin America and use them as they had used them in the Congo to weaken governments or even take over governments if opportunity offered. He felt such operations would take place in Africa, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand with increasing rapidity. The President wondered how additional army forces could combat this kind of communist activity. Admiral Burke said we would have to face a series of annoying little actions in many places in the world and would have to be prepared to react rapidly.

Secretary Gates said that in his recommendations he had not priced out air defense. Some visible military readiness could be achieved by measures to create a stronger air defense posture through slowing down or stopping phase-outs. Also he had not discussed the possibility of putting tactical air commands in Europe on the alert. Under the President's idea of visible measures, such an alert might be desirable.

*The National Security Council:*²

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of suggestions presented at the meeting by the Secretary of Defense after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State.

b. Noted the President's authorization to the Secretary of Defense to develop, in the light of the current international situation, a program of measures along the general lines discussed in the meeting which will visibly enhance the military readiness of the United States and provide evidence of U.S. firmness, thereby promoting the confidence of the American people and the Free World and serving as a warning to the Soviet Bloc.

² The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2272, approved by the President on August 3. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.³

[Here follow the remaining agenda items on the Organization of American States, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic.]

Marion W. Boggs

³ In a Special Message to the Congress upon its reconvening on August 8, the President outlined modifications in the Defense program, including both readiness measures and alterations in long-range procurement, and stated that the Department of Defense would carry them out "with its available resources insofar as possible." He noted that a "modest increase in military personnel and in operation and maintenance funds may prove to be necessary to carry out the readiness measures. If such an increase should be required, I shall promptly request the necessary funds." The address is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61*, pp. 613-616.

110. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, July 28, 1960.

SUBJECT

Study of Limited War Capabilities

The attached document "United States and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962" (Tab A)¹ was prepared by an interdepartmental study group made up of representatives from State, Defense (including JCS), and CIA. The study was undertaken largely at the instance of the State Department and was projected in a conversation you had in Geneva in the spring of 1959 with Mr. McElroy. The study supersedes one conducted in 1958² and corrects certain deficiencies noted in the earlier study, particularly the assumption that the US could use nuclear weapons in certain limited war situations while the enemy

Source: Department of State, G/PM Files: Lot 64 D 341. Top Secret. Sent through Under Secretary Dillon.

¹ Not found attached; see Document 121.

² See footnote 4, Document 27.

would not have this capability. More attention has also been given in the present study to the problems of logistics, including sea- and airlift.

The five situations examined (Korea, Offshore Islands/Taiwan, Iran, Berlin, and Laos/Cambodia/Vietnam) were selected as representative of the types of areas and situations where the US might be required to conduct limited military operations. They cover a sufficient range of problems to support certain over-all conclusions on our capabilities.

The principal conclusion reached in the study is that the US and its allies have the capability to handle any one of the operations studied, without the use of nuclear weapons except for air defense purposes in Korea and the Offshore Islands/Taiwan. This conclusion must be viewed, however, in the light of the following:

a) the Berlin case does not involve meeting aggression, but only a brigade-sized probe along the autobahn;

b) in Iran it is assumed that no more than 5,000 Soviet "volunteers" assist the Iranian rebels;

c) in a major insurrection in Laos military action alone would not be sufficient to restore and maintain the RLG's authority; if the insurrection were supported by North Vietnam, the SEATO forces involved would be able to reestablish control only after a period of years; if large-sized DRV forces were to intervene, the allies could meet the situation only by attacking targets in North Vietnam;

d) the effort required in Korea against a combined Chinese Communist-North Korea invasion would be on the same order as that required in 1950–1953, although such an effort would enable the US and its allies to restore pre D-Day positions, thus preserving the territorial integrity of the ROK.

Nuclear Weapons

With respect to the use of nuclear weapons,

—the scale of the Berlin and Iran operations studied did not require US use of such weapons;

—in Laos, during an insurrection, there would be few profitable targets for nuclear attack; use of low yield weapons against targets in North Vietnam would be militarily profitable, but Sino-Soviet retaliation could seriously damage SEATO forces and jeopardize the operation;

—to maintain air control over the Offshore Islands, upon which defense of the islands and Taiwan largely depends, nuclear air-defense weapons were found to be essential;

—in Korea, it was found necessary to use nuclear weapons for air defense in order to protect the population as well as UN forces and logistic facilities including ports; while the US defensive capability would be enhanced by tactical use of nuclear weapons on the ground in addition, it was concluded that *two-way use would probably result in either a military stalemate or an unpredictable expansion of the conflict.*

CW/BW Agents

Only in Laos, was there considered to be a possible military advantage in the initiation by the US or its allies of non-lethal CW/BW agents.

Airlift

An operation in Iran of the kind studied would stretch US airlift capabilities to the utmost and would require such extraordinary measures as use of commercial airlift under contract to the Air Force, activation of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and of Air National Guard Transport Units. An operation in either Laos or Korea would also place great strain upon airlift capabilities, and *no two of these three limited military operations could be supported simultaneously.*

Counter-Guerrilla

The US and its allies *do not have an adequate military capability for operations against guerrillas.*

Overall Conclusions

The conclusions of this study reinforce my conviction that the US does not have an adequate capability to deal with the kind of Sino-Soviet aggression which seems most likely to occur during the next few years. Such a capability, in my judgment, must be different from, and additional to, the deterrent/retaliatory forces which represent our ability to meet general war conditions. Although this concept is gradually gaining acceptance among military policy makers and planners, the slowness with which it is being reflected in actual capabilities is shown by the study.³ The fact that we do not have such a separate capability is shown by the study's conclusion that any substantial limited military operation would detract from our readiness for general war, and any two such operations at once would cause the overall US general war capability to be degraded to an unacceptable degree. This effect would occur because of our present logistics posture, particularly our airlift and sealift capability, and because the small size of the Strategic Army Corps would not permit us to conduct certain limited military operations while maintaining an adequate posture for general war, or retaining a capability to conduct military operations in other areas.

Our inability to deal with limited aggression in the Far East without using nuclear weapons is a matter of great concern. All indications are that the initiation of the use of such weapons in Korea or the Taiwan Strait area (as well as in other areas) would be at prohibitive cost to the US in terms of world public opinion including the support of our allies. This consideration is quite apart from the authoritative estimates that our use of nuclear weapons would provoke counteruse, greatly expanding hostilities and possibly leading to general war.

The evident deficiencies in the mobility, size, and flexibility of US forces for limited military operations shown by the present study indi-

³ You will recall that Secretary Gates at the meeting last Friday morning indicated that there are shortages of conventional ammunition at the present time. [Footnote in the source text. No other record of this meeting on Friday, July 22, has been found.]

cate the importance of your emphasizing whenever possible the foreign policy considerations relating to our defense posture set forth most recently in your letter of July 1 to Secretary Gates (Tab B).⁴ From a foreign policy standpoint, as well as from an over-all national security point of view, the US ought to have an adequate capability to respond effectively to local aggression wherever it occurs by conventional means, if desired. As a start toward such a goal I believe you should press for development of the capability to deal simultaneously with two sizable limited military operations without either degrading unacceptably the US general war posture or necessitating the use of nuclear weapons.

Recommendations:

The attached study will be presented by Defense in September to the National Security Council.⁵ Prior to the NSC meeting Defense intends to present it to a meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council to which you will be invited.⁶ I recommend:

1. That you read the over-all conclusions of the study, pp. 4-8.
2. That you or Mr. Dillon attend the Armed Forces Policy Council meeting to discuss the attached study, and that the foregoing form the basis of the Department's position at that meeting and at the NSC.
3. That you have in mind the points outlined above when you meet with the Armed Forces Policy Council, as suggested by Secretary Gates in response to your July 1 letter, to discuss the relationship of foreign policy considerations to the FY62 Defense budget.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ See Document 125.

⁶ Irwin presented the limited war study to the Armed Forces Policy Council on September 27; see Document 121.

111. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 11-8-60

Washington, August 1, 1960.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR LONG RANGE ATTACK THROUGH MID-1965

The Problem

To estimate probable trends in the strength and deployment of Soviet air and missile weapon systems suitable for long range attack, through mid-1965. The weapon systems considered are heavy and medium bombers, related air-to-surface missiles, ground-launched missiles with ranges of 700 nautical miles or more, and submarine-launched missiles.

Conclusions

1. Since the adoption of NIE 11-8-59, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack Through Mid-1964," dated 9 February 1960,¹ we have made an extensive re-examination of all available evidence bearing on Soviet production and deployment of ICBMs. The conclusions resulting from this re-examination are, in brief (Paras. 13-14):

a. Soviet series production of ICBMs probably began in early 1959, but we have no direct evidence of the present or planned future rate of production.^{2 3}

b. As yet, we can identify no ICBM-related troop training activities, nor can we positively identify any operational launching site, as distinguished from the known test range facilities.

Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Top Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following Intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, and NSA." The U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on August 1 except the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

¹ Document 88.

² Series production means production of missiles of like type in accordance with a planned buildup rate. The date of commencement of series production is defined as the date of completion of the first missile in the series. [Footnote in the source text.]

³ The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that there is no evidence to indicate that ICBMs have been produced in the Soviet Union in numbers larger than are required by the continuing R & D activities. He therefore believes that this conclusion is misleading in that it may be interpreted to imply that ICBMs for operational deployment or inventory started to become available in 1959. See his footnote to paragraph 13 a. [Footnote in the source text.]

c. We still estimate a Soviet initial ICBM operational capability with a few—say 10—series produced missiles as of 1 January 1960.^{4 5}

2. Since there is insufficient direct evidence to establish the scale and pace of the present Soviet ICBM production and deployment program,⁶ we have based our estimate in part on various indirect forms of evidence and on argument and analysis deduced from more general considerations. These latter include such things as the strategic ideas which appear to govern Soviet military policy, our appreciation of the strategic capabilities which Soviet military planners might expect to derive from given numbers of ICBMs, our general knowledge of Soviet military production practices, and our sense of the tempo at which the present program is being conducted. (Para. 15)

3. The Soviets have strong incentives to build a substantial ICBM force. The ICBM provides them for the first time with an efficient means of delivering a heavy weight of attack on the US. What we know of Soviet strategic ideas suggests that the ICBM is thought of primarily in terms of deterrence, and of pre-emptive or retaliatory attack should deterrence fail, rather than primarily in terms of the deliberate initiation of general war. These terms, however, provide no quantitative definition of Soviet ICBM force goals.⁷ (Paras. 16–23, 29)

4. As an approach to an appreciation of Soviet ICBM requirements, we have computed the numbers of Soviet ICBMs on launchers theoretically required for an initial salvo designed to inflict severe damage on SAC bomber bases and other installations directly related to immediate

⁴ The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that as of 1 January 1960 the Soviets had only an emergency capability to launch a few ICBMs against North America. These ICBMs probably would have had to have been launched from R & D facilities. However, he believes that, for planning purposes, it is prudent to assume that the IOC had occurred by 1 January 1960. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁵ The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, believes that there is insufficient information to judge that, as of 1 January 1960, the conditions for IOC (that is, the date at which a few—say 10—series produced ICBMs could have been placed in the hands of one or more trained units at existing launching facilities) had been met. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁶ The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that the direct evidence upon which to base an estimate of present Soviet ICBM strength is of major significance. He believes that much of this evidence constitutes negative indications and, therefore, that its rejection as insufficient leads to unrealistic over-estimation. See his footnote to paragraph 15. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁷ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in Conclusions 3 and 4. He believes that Soviet military doctrine, history, and behavior warrant the judgment that the USSR will strive to achieve a capability for decision which has as its basis the exploitation or application of military force, and he does not believe that the Soviets would be content with conceptual levels of pre-emptive attack and deterrence. Thus, he believes that the Soviet rulers would endeavor to achieve a military superiority over the US and would direct Soviet planners to assess those military requirements which would enable them either to force their will on the US through threat of destruction or to launch such a devastating attack that the US as a world power would cease to exist. [Footnote in the source text.]

US nuclear retaliatory capabilities. Uncertainty regarding the inputs, and the sensitivity of the computations to variations in the assumptions made with respect to them, render the numerical results too various to provide a reliable basis for estimating Soviet ICBM force goals. Moreover, regardless of the results of any corresponding Soviet calculations, there are operational factors (such as Soviet problems in achieving simultaneity of salvo, and the mobility of US retaliatory forces) which would tend to reduce their confidence in their ability, with any given number of ICBMs, to destroy or neutralize US retaliatory forces through attack on fixed installations such as bomber bases.^{7 8} (Paras. 24–29, including footnotes to para. 28b, and Annex A)

5. We have also examined the tasks and problems involved in the production and deployment of ICBMs through the elaboration of three illustrative Soviet programs. They represent the range of judgments, based on the direct and indirect evidence available to us, regarding the scale and tempo of Soviet effort. These illustrative programs are summarized, in the chart below,⁹ in terms of the numbers of operational ICBM launchers¹⁰ which each would provide. (Paras. 30–42, and Annex B)

6. With reference to the illustrative programs presented above, the members of the United States Intelligence Board have concluded as follows (Para. 43):¹¹

a. The Director of Central Intelligence considers that program "A" should be regarded as the nearest approximation of the actual Soviet program.

b. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, *USAF*, believes that program "B" approximates the most likely Soviet program.

c. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, and the Director for Intelligence, *The Joint Staff*, believe that through 1961 the Soviet program is likely to fall towards the high side of the range defined by illustrative programs "A" and "B," and, in the light of factors dis-

⁸ The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that operational considerations which extend beyond the computations of the number of ICBMs required to inflict severe damage on certain static targets would prohibit Soviet military planners from accepting with confidence any calculation that a certain number of ICBMs would be sufficient, in conjunction with the operations of other Soviet forces, to reduce the weight of a US retaliatory attack to an acceptable level. See his footnote to paragraph 29. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁹ Not printed. This chart and the accompanying numbers were also included in Annex A, "Soviet Military Forces and Capabilities," to NIE 11–4–60, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1960–1965," dated December 1, 1960. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files) The number of operational ICBM launchers projected by mid-1963 for Program A was 400, for Program B 700, and for Program C 200.

¹⁰ The number of launchers is a good measure of the amount of activity involved in a given ICBM program, since it includes all of the facilities, in addition to the missiles themselves, which are necessary to the operational weapon system. Included are ground guidance facilities; test, check-out, and maintenance equipment; fueling and storage facilities; and housing and general purpose equipment. [Footnote in the source text.]

¹¹ For a more extended expression of some of these views, see footnotes to paragraph 43. [Footnote in the source text.]

cussed in paragraph 8, they consider that in the 1962–1963 period it will continue to grow within the “A”–“B” range.

d. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the *Army*, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the *Navy*, believe that illustrative program “C” most nearly approximates the actual Soviet program.

7. It is notable that the potential threat posed by programs “A” and “B” is substantially the same through 1960. Before the end of the year, either would provide a capability to inflict massive destruction on the principal US metropolitan areas. At the beginning of 1961, either would provide sufficient ICBMs and launchers to threaten the SAC operational air base system. Thereafter, the threat posed by program “B” would increase more rapidly than that of program “A.” By about mid-1961, program “B” would provide Soviet planners with a high assurance of being able to severely damage most of the SAC air base system in an initial salvo, whereas program “A” would reach this point late in the year. The considerably smaller program “C” would provide a capability to inflict massive destruction on the principal US metropolitan areas sometime in 1961. (Para. 44)

8. The present Soviet ICBM program is, of course, subject to change as the period progresses. Soviet planning for the period beyond 1961 will be substantially affected by the actual development of US retaliatory forces, the prospects for a greatly improved Soviet ICBM, and the prospects, on each side, for an effective defense against ICBMs, as well as the general development of the world situation and of relations between the US and the USSR. Our estimates for future years must be reviewed in the light of such developments and of such additional evidence as we may obtain regarding the actual progress of the Soviet program. They must therefore be regarded as highly tentative. For these reasons, we have not projected even a tentative estimate beyond 1963.¹² (Para. 45)

9. We continue to estimate that with relatively modest programs in 700 and 1,100 n.m. ballistic missiles the Soviets will acquire, by 1960 or 1961, a force of medium range missiles capable of seriously threatening the major Western landbased retaliatory targets within their range. (Para. 46–51)

10. We estimate that the USSR now has a limited capability to launch ballistic missiles from about a dozen long range, conventionally-powered submarines. The Soviets will probably increase this force gradually over the next year or two, and then introduce a weapon system capable of delivering ballistic missiles against land targets from a submerged nuclear-powered submarine. While we believe the Soviets would employ submarine-launched missiles against selected US targets, their

¹²The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that, despite the difficulties engendered by consideration of the factors enumerated, an estimate beyond 1963 can be made. He believes that, lacking contradictory information, the rates of increase shown in program “B” should be continued through 1965. [Footnote in the source text.]

planning does not appear to contemplate delivery of the main weight of an attack by this means. (Paras. 65-70)

11. The announced Soviet force reductions will probably bring some reduction in Long Range Aviation strength, but in 1965 the USSR will probably still retain a substantial bomber force. Even after a formidable ICBM capability has been established, the USSR will require long range bombers for a variety of purposes, including attacks on difficult land targets, reconnaissance, and operations against carrier task forces at sea. Air-to-surface missiles will be available in increasing quantity. The Soviets will probably introduce a new medium bomber capable of supersonic "dash," and we estimate that they are developing a long range, super-sonic cruise-type vehicle, but Bisons and Badgers will remain the most numerous of Soviet long range aerodynamic delivery vehicles. (Paras. 52-64)

12. Our numerical estimates of Soviet heavy and medium bombers in Long Range Aviation, medium range ballistic missiles, and missile-launching submarines are set forth in the following table:

| | Mid-1960 | Mid-1961 | Mid-1962 | Mid-1963 | Mid-1964 | Mid-1965 |
|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Bombers and Tankers¹³ | | | | | | |
| Heavy | 135 | 150 | 140 | 130 | 120 | 100 |
| Medium ^a | 1,100 | 950 | 800 | 800 | 800 | 750 |
| Ballistic Missiles | | | | | | |
| 700 n.m. | | | | | | |
| Operational Inventory | 250 | 350 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 |
| Launchers ¹⁴ | 110 | 150 | 150 | 150 | 150 | 150 |
| 1,100 n.m. | | | | | | |
| Operational Inventory | 80 | 160 | 240 | 300 | 300 | 300 |
| Launchers ¹⁴ | 50 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Missile Submarines | | | | | | |
| "Z" Class ^b | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| "G" Class ^c | 9 | 14 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| Nuclear ^d | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 10 | 14 |

^aProbably including a few new supersonic "dash" bombers in 1961, building up to perhaps 100 by 1963-1964.

^bEach "Z" class submarine would probably carry two missiles.

^cEach "G" class submarine would probably carry about six missiles.

^dEach nuclear-powered submarine would probably carry 6-12 missiles.

¹³ [Here follows a footnote in the source text with the dissenting view of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, on the number of bombers and tankers. He believed that the number of both heavy and medium bombers and tankers would be higher from mid-1962 onward.]

¹⁴ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that each operational missile would be provided with a launcher. [Footnote in the source text.]

[Here follow the Discussion section and three annexes, totaling 28 pages.]

112. Editorial Note

On August 9, 1960, the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in SNIE 100–6–60, “Probable Reactions to U.S. Reconnaissance Satellite Programs.” This Special Estimate concluded that although there was “no doubt” that the Soviet Union did not want the United States to orbit military reconnaissance satellites over it, Soviet leaders might not “choose to react immediately to a US reconnaissance program” and were likely for some time to come to “have only a marginal capability under most favorable conditions for interference with US satellites.” The Soviets might stage a campaign of protest if they thought publicity given to the U.S. program threatened their prestige, but would “in any case, probably exert all efforts to neutralize the transmission of data from vehicles which might be providing useful intelligence.” Most Allied governments would probably support the U.S. program even in the case of negative Soviet reaction to it. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files) For text, see the Supplement.

See also Documents 115 and 117.

113. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, August 11, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretaries Gates, Douglas, General Twining, Admiral Burke, Colonel Eisenhower, General Goodpaster

Secretary Gates said he had asked for the meeting with the President to give him a report concerning targeting and retaliatory strike planning.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on August 13. Another memorandum of this conversation by Admiral Burke, dated August 11, and Burke’s memorandum of conversation with Gates on the SIOP held on August 15, are in the Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, NSTL/SIOP Briefing Folder. Both are in the Supplement.

This is a matter on which there has been a split in the JCS for a long period. Mr. Gates has decided to resolve the matter and has prepared documents giving his solution to the problem. The essential points in his mind are first, that there should not be a single command over the entire strategic effort, both SAC and Polaris and other elements. There should, however, be a national target policy. Further, the Joint Staff is not equipped to develop an integrated targeting plan. Therefore he proposes that a "Director of Strategic Target Planning" be designated who would develop such a plan and submit it to the JCS. He proposes that this designation be given, as an additional duty, to the officer serving as Commander-in-Chief, SAC. He added that he thinks this system will work and that it will put the JCS effectively in supervision over SAC where this has not existed previously. He proposes to have a meeting with unified and specified commanders in Omaha in December at which the initial plan would be very thoroughly weighed and reviewed.

The President asked whether the Commander of SAC is appointed by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force or is subject to Presidential Appointment on recommendation of the JCS and Secretary of Defense. Mr. Gates informed him that the latter is the case. Mr. Gates then said that Admiral Burke was in disagreement with the solution Mr. Gates was putting forward and had asked for the opportunity to be present to make a formal appeal to the President. Admiral Burke then presented his views in the matter, as set forth in the attached paper.

The President said he agreed that we cannot devise a completely rigid plan that excludes our allies. Also, he agreed that if the JCS lack the facilities to develop the plan, they lack some of the power to review it. The essential question seemed to him to be whether the plan should be developed in the Joint Staff or somewhere else. He did not see much merit in the argument that the command authority of the unified commanders will be impaired under the scheme proposed, because this impairment is common to either scheme, if the scheme produces an effective integrated plan. Admiral Burke commented that the nature of the plan would be rather different depending on whether it were done in the Joint Staff or at Omaha. The President said that he did not agree. He said that the matter is one of coordination of forces and timing. He foresaw, for example, the use of attacks against targets in coastal areas in order to facilitate deep penetration by our aircraft. In his opinion, the initial operations of the future impose a requirement for greater rigidity in planning than in past methods. He recalled that he had put forward the idea of a separate missile command a few years ago, and still thought that would have been a preferable system. It was not adopted, but the necessity for rigid control is still there.

The President said there was one feature of Admiral Burke's remarks he was inclined to favor. That is the idea of getting busy and working up a plan on a trial basis during the coming months, and then

meeting to see what it looks like. Admiral Burke pressed this point, saying he had no objection to the preparation of a plan, but thought there should not be a firm decision now that such a unit will be created on a permanent or continuing basis. General Twining spoke strongly against this proposal saying that there are some of the Services who would try to make this trial effort fail—and would succeed, as they have succeeded in obstructing any really effective coordination of target planning over the past ten years.

The President commented to the effect that Admiral Burke seemed to think a great reversal of existing methods is involved here. He recalled that a suggestion had been brought to him some time back that SAC exercise overall command of all retaliatory forces and that he had turned it down—principally for the reason that it is not yet clear what the future composition of our forces will be. Here the question is simply one of effective planning, and the difference is the more limited one of having coordination directly under JCS, or more indirectly through an agent in Omaha.

The President said one thing is very clear in his mind and that is that the strategic and retaliatory effort is different from the others in which unified commanders are engaged. Integration of this effort into a single operation has to be accomplished somewhere. He recognized that SAC has a particular and unique method of strike planning; even so, the difference between putting this function one place and another is that it is going under a man with a somewhat specialized approach.

General Twining repeated that we have tried to coordinate separate activities in this field for ten years, and have failed utterly. The plan must specify which targets are to be hit and when they are to be hit. The Polaris is about to join this effort. It is a purely strategic weapon, and we must do something about it to integrate it with other attack means. He said the crux of the problem is as it has been for nearly twenty years, that the Navy is completely opposed to serving under a single commander. Admiral Burke commented that all Navy combat forces at this time are under unified commanders, and that this is not true of either of the other services. The President commented that of course the Army's Reserve Corps in the U. S. and the Reserve Tactical Air Forces cannot logically be put under unified commanders.

Secretary Douglas said he wanted the President to know of the deep and objective study that had been given to this problem by Secretary Gates. He thought that Mr. Gates had come up with a fine solution that should eliminate the haphazard duplication now existing among target systems. At the present time he thought there are as many as 200–300 targets that are subject to attack by duplicating systems. The central and basic question in his mind is whether we are to have an integrated attack plan. Admiral Burke said that he supports an integrated plan. Mr. Gates said that Admiral Burke really doesn't mean that, because specific detail is the essence of a real and effective integrated plan. Admiral Burke said

that he objects to great detail of the kind that would be set out in a plan prepared by SAC.

The President said that there are certain kinds of strikes that required detailed planning and execution if the whole operation is to succeed. For others, particularly those subsequent to the initial strike, niceties of timing are not so important, and more leeway is allowed. Such leeway could be put into the plan. Admiral Burke said that if a unified commander antes up his forces in order to have them incorporated in the plan, they will then be "frozen" and not available to him. On the other hand, if he does not ante them up he will have no assurance that important targets will be hit early enough to avoid threat to his forces otherwise engaged. On this point General Twining said that the priority listing of targets is the key. The President said that if we put large forces outside of the plan, we defeat the whole concept of our retaliatory effort, which takes priority over everything else.

The President then went on to say that he thought too much emotion was being displayed over this question and in fact in the present discussion. He did not think that this is a good way to respond to serious military problems, nor did it speak too well of the ability of good men to get together and work out solutions in the nation's interest. He thought that dedicated men, casting out any thought but the good of the United States, ought to be able to solve this problem. He thought the question was simply one of method of achieving an integrated, effective plan. The group indicated that there was more to the question than simply method; there was disagreement as to the need for an integrated plan. The President said he was very clear on this question. For the first strike, there must be rigid planning, and it must be obeyed to the letter. After the initial strike, increased flexibility will be needed and should be incorporated in the plan.

The President said he was not persuaded by the statements of several people that an effort to prepare a trial plan will necessarily fail. Mr. Gates said that, to get an effective plan, it is necessary to assign responsibilities, rather than to attempt to do something on a "one time" basis. Admiral Burke said the thing to do is for each commander to send a man out to Omaha, participate in making up a target list, and writing policy, etc., but not to make a firm decision to continue this organization. General Twining said he would have to speak frankly and say that if it were announced that this effort were a trial effort, the Navy would sabotage it. General Twining said the whole question, once it is decided to have an effective plan, is whether to have it in the JCS or in Omaha. The President said he thought it was wrong to say the effort was sabotaged. He said he did not know anyone in the services who would do such a thing. He added that he would like to give further thought to the question of a trial run.

Mr. Gates said he wanted to come back to what was to him the fundamental difference. Admiral Burke did not want a detailed plan. Admi-

ral Burke said he agreed with this statement—that he did not want a lot of detail in the plan. Mr. Gates said the essence of the plan is to specify the necessary detail. Mr. Gates said he would propose to go ahead, and come back in December to the JCS and the President for review of the plan as prepared.

Admiral Burke said he thought the plan could simply be an assignment of tasks, not in specific detail, to each of the unified and specified commanders affected. The President strongly disagreed, saying he did not think it is sufficient to assign retaliatory missions from the JCS to the different commanders. This whole thing has to be on a completely integrated basis. It must be firmly laid on. The initial strike must be simultaneous. Since there is no question in his mind about this principle, the agreement before him must be simply one of method of achieving such a plan. He said that he was inclined to try out the preparation of such a plan. He went on to say that a difference as limited as this could not in his judgment account for the amount of emotion that was manifest and that there must be something still concealed.

Mr. Gates said the point is that Admiral Burke wants a coordinated, not an integrated, plan. He repeated that the essence of an integrated plan is the pinning down of details. The President said he was inclined to agree that you cannot have a plan for the second strike which is completely firm. But you can and must have a firm plan for the first strike. He came back again to his thought that the matter is one of organizational method, on which the key question is where is the best talent to be found without training more people. What gives him more concern in the present situation is the schism over the method of conducting the first two hours or so of war. However, he thought the people he has to appoint to take major responsibilities in this field should be able to find a solution to this problem. Nothing has been brought forward that would indicate a solution to be impossible. He recognized that there seems to be a lot of emotion connected with the question and this means the task is a difficult one for those involved. His idea is to go ahead with an approach along the lines outlined by Mr. Gates, and make a final decision in the matter prior to January twentieth. He is completely ready to take the responsibility for the decision.

The President said that, if Admiral Burke accepts the premise—as he understands he does—that for the first strike no unified commander does other than what he is told to do, the matter is then capable, in his opinion, of resolution. If we move in this way, Admiral Burke can at any time come in to see him and show what in his judgment is wrong with the procedures. The purpose of the plan is to specify force and timing for the first strike. For that strike, it is not possible to equivocate. Admiral Burke said that the JCS would not, in his opinion, be able to review or analyze the plan and the target list in one or two, or even three, days at Omaha. The President said he saw no need to limit their review to such a short time. This is something that has to be done and they should take as much

time as is needed. General Twining spoke strongly again in favor of making a decision to establish these arrangements, let the work go forward under these arrangements, and then if they do not work, or do not work satisfactorily, throw them out. The President said this is one point on which he is uneasy. He does not like the idea of making what seems to be a firm decision, and then a few months later having the matter come to the President to reverse his previous decision.

The President said that everyone owes it to our country to try to make arrangements work. He did not think, however, that a decision should be demanded of the President on establishing the arrangements. He recognized that Admiral Burke thinks that SAC will be too dominating in the process established. The whole question is one of method, however, since there seems to be agreement regarding the needs of the first strike. Mr. Douglas commented that these new arrangements will give more control over SAC than has ever been true before and that the means of preventing SAC from being too dominating are available. The President said he had no objection to it being said that this is the President's plan. He thinks that something must be done before he leaves office, because we do not want to leave his successor with the monstrosity we now see in prospect as Polaris and other new weapons come into operating status. At the same time he wanted to test the idea very thoroughly. He thinks the question is a tremendously important one. He doesn't think that the essential differences—which really relate only to method—are great enough to cause all the furor that they seem to be causing. He therefore thought that the method should be set up, and tested out. It should not be given such categorical approval on his part that a later decision to discontinue it would destroy confidence in the soundness of his judgment and approval in such things. Accordingly he thought the instructions should be issued on the authority of the Secretary of Defense.¹ At the same time it should be understood that the results of the plan would be tested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the

¹ On August 16, Gates authorized establishment of a National Strategic Target Planning Staff (NSTPS), later called the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS). (History and Research Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, *History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff: Background and Preparation of SIOF-62*, undated, released by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April 1980, p. 10) To implement this decision, the JCS on August 19 issued the National Strategic Target Planning and Attack Policy and appointed General Power as Director of Strategic Target Planning. (Memoranda from the JCS to Power, August 19 and 23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 3205 Target Systems (17 Aug 59) Sec. 6) A draft of the National Strategic Planning and Attack Policy is Tab A to an undated draft memorandum from Gates to Twining on target coordination; both are enclosed with a letter from Gates to Goodpaster dated August 10. (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records) See the Supplement.

Further information on establishment and performance of the JSTPS is in the *History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff* and in David A. Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," *International Security* (7:4, Spring 1983), pp. 5-6 and 60-69.

results would be reported to the Secretary of Defense and the President in December. On the matter of having a completely integrated plan for the first strike, there could be no question.

There was then brief discussion on other subjects after General Twining, Admiral Burke and Mr. Douglas left the office. Mr. Gates told the President first that Dr. York has had a heart attack of substantial severity, which will knock him out for four months or so at a minimum. Mr. Gates will study what to do about filling the gap during this period. The President and Mr. Gates agreed that Dr. York should be kept in his job while he is hospitalized. The President asked Mr. Gates to talk to Dr. Kistiakowsky about the problem and see what suggestions he might have.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated personnel matters.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

Attachment²

Draft Letter From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to President Eisenhower

Washington, August 11, 1960.

Mr. President: This is not a compromise. I did not ask to see you lightly, Mr. President. This is a problem of tremendous weight which will have a far-reaching effect on our military forces and the issue is more important than any in which I have been involved before.

I am gravely concerned over this proposal. My chief concern lies in three areas.

First—the authority, responsibilities and functioning of the JCS.

Second—is the effect the proposal will have on the ability of the Unified Commanders to carry out their missions under the situation with which they will be faced at the beginning of hostilities.

Third—the effect on our NATO allies.

This proposal is a radical departure from previous practice. I am fearful that if the responsibility and the authority for making a national

² Top Secret.

target list and for making a single operational plan is delegated to a single commander—for all the commanders' forces, the JCS will have lost control over operations at the beginning of a general war, even though they will be given the opportunity to review and approve the national target list and the operational plan.

I know that is not the intent of this proposal. The intent of the proposal is that the JCS will exercise control, but this will not be the result in fact.

1. JCS have great responsibilities for strategic direction of war. Planning for initial nuclear exchange in a general war is the most important element of general war planning. U.S. force levels, atomic weapon requirements, allocation of atomic weapons, deployments of our own U.S. forces, operation of our allies' forces and U.S. military budgets are all greatly influenced by the National Target List developed and the operational plans to strike the target on that list.

2. I believe that the JCS should retain in their hands, not only basic responsibility for directing effort in general war, but the means for generating the basic plans and for controlling the development of these plans directly—that is—control directly and not through another intermediate agency.

The proposal to place responsibility for the preparation of the National Target List and the Single Integrated Operation Plan, two very important documents, in the hands of SAC, as an agency of the JCS, is made because of the belief that the Joint Staff does not have the capability to prepare either of these documents. If the JCS and the Joint Staff do not have the capability to prepare these documents, their capability to review them adequately and to pass judgment on them is just as questionable.

Should target list and operational plans be prepared by another agency, JCS will not have knowledge of target lists or action being proposed in operational plans until the report is submitted. They will then be faced with checking both, which will require about the same type of work and nearly the same amount as the original preparation—or—the alternative of accepting the lists and plans "as is" along with the generated requirements stemming from these two documents of atomic weapons, delivery vehicles, and force levels and essentially deployments of forces. My next concern is whether a single commander as the agency of the JCS, even though served by his joint staff, can develop and maintain a National Target List and a single integrated operational plan in which there will be a determination for each of the targets to be struck by all committed atomic capable forces of all unified commanders and in which there will be a determination of the amount of effort and weight of attack to be used against each target on the list and which plan will integrate the individual strikes for mutual support through establishment of

details such as attack corridors, timing, ECM etc. and still permit the unified commanders to carry out their missions with their forces.

1. We now have a sound unified command structure. The diverse and multipurpose forces assigned to Unified Commanders are deployed and ready. Threatening targets are nearby—and can be hit quickly and effectively.

2. The missions and forces of each of the Unified Commanders will differ from each other. Their plans must be different. SAC has essentially a single mission and largely single purpose forces. The Unified Commanders have a variety of tasks—and multipurpose forces.

3. In spite of participation by representatives of the Unified Commanders in developing the SIOF, I fear it will result in using the methods and procedures now used by SAC—and which are suitable for SAC—on the multipurpose forces of the Unified Commanders—for which these methods and procedures are not suitable.

4. Our total military posture, together with our unified command structure and operational plans, provide us *now* with capability to destroy USSR in war. We should seek improvement—yes—but this does *not* mean an abrupt departure from a system that has given us superiority—and that with a good margin of safety.

Unified Commanders have great responsibility. Should another agency be assigned a major portion of the nuclear strike planning responsibility of the Unified Commanders, it would cut into the heart of the Unified Commanders' responsibility. It would force them to revise their own plans to conform to a master plan prepared by another Commander. If master strike plans changed frequently, as I fear they will do, the other plans would be in constant state of flux—and no plans would be stable. This is contrary to sound planning and control procedure. Unified Commanders exercising control of forces should retain the responsibility for planning for their employment. I believe the Unified Commanders should be given tasks to accomplish by the JCS and be permitted to accomplish those tasks in best manner with forces which have been assigned to them. Unified Commanders should have prerogative of changing their plans quickly to meet the varying threats and changing circumstances.

This proposal will affect our NATO allies, and I think adversely. NATO nations are exhibiting more and more desire to have nuclear weapons and a nuclear delivery capability and to participate in the planning for their use. As NATO nations create a greater capability for nuclear delivery and if they are to commit these forces to NATO, it is advisable that we do not create a procedure in the United States which might cause them to accelerate their impulse to develop and maintain their own individual national nuclear capability which would not be

committed to NATO and over which the United States would not have any influence.

I believe that the Joint Staff *can* make out a suitable National Target List and *can* make out suitable operational plans and keep them up to date, with the same help from the Unified Commander that will be provided to SAC under this proposal. If the Joint Staff can not do this job—how can they plan for general war at all? In any case, I believe that the Unified and specified commanders should be consulted before the final decision is made to make a radical departure from the present system.

There are differences of opinion as to what the results will be if this proposal is put into effect.

It is a radical departure from the present procedures.

Nobody can know now what the effects of this proposal will be:

- (1) on the way the Joint Chiefs carry out their responsibilities;
- (2) on the operations and effectiveness of fulfilling their missions of the forces assigned to the Unified Commanders—
- (3) and on our NATO allies.

No target list has yet been developed under this procedure.

No single integrated operational plan has ever been developed.

There are different opinions as to how these will look after they are developed by this method.

I would hope that before a final decision is made to go to this completely different system that

SAC, with the help of the Unified Commanders, and with a joint staff, make out a complete National Target List in exactly the way it would be done in the future and submit it to the JCS for complete and thorough review, and that SAC again with help of a joint staff, and the Unified Commanders make out their idea of single integrated operational plan and submit it to the JCS for review in detail by the Joint Staff and the JCS.

If this is done before final decision is made we'll all know more about what the results will look like before we jump off the deep end.

If the results are reasonable, if the results can be checked by the JCS, if the forces of the Unified Commanders can be operated by the Unified Commanders effectively in carrying out all their missions, if it works all right with NATO, then—we can all buy it.

114. Editorial Note

On August 24, 1960, the National Security Council adopted NSC Action No. 2289, in which it:

“a. Concurred in the recommendation of the NSC Planning Board that no change be made in paragraph 13 of NSC 5906/1.

“b. Noted that the ‘preparation’ referred to in paragraph 13 of NSC 5906/1 includes the development of a military capability for the use of non-lethal BW–CW agents.

“c. Noted that existing smoke and incendiary agents and agents of the riot control type may be used by U.S. military forces as appropriate in military operations, including the suppression of civil disturbances, without prior approval of the President.

“d. Requested the Department of Defense to incorporate in its annual status report to the Council and the President the status and implications of current and projected programs and activities being carried out pursuant to the guidance of paragraph 13 of NSC 5906/1.”

The following paragraph is appended to NSC Action No. 2289:

“In concurring with the above action, the Secretary of State commented: ‘My concurrence is subject to this interpretation of sub-paragraph c: Prior approval by the President is not necessary for the use by U.S. military forces of (a) existing smoke and incendiary agents and riot control agents in appropriate military operations and (b) riot control agents in suppressing civil disturbances.’ The Secretary of Defense stated that the Secretary of State’s interpretation is acceptable to the Department of Defense.” (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 C 95, Records of Actions by the National Security Council) For NSC 5906/1, see Document 70.

In a July 13 memorandum to Herter, Smith set forth the background of NSC Action No. 2289. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5906 Series) For text, see the Supplement.

115. Editorial Note

According to a note dated August 25, 1960, the National Security Council held a Special Meeting that day to “discuss the reconnaissance satellite program, with specific reference to Samos, on the basis of a joint presentation by the Secretary of Defense and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. No Memorandum.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

Kistiakowsky's diary entry on the August 25 meeting indicates that the President approved the recommendations of the Special Panel on Satellite Reconnaissance as presented during the meeting. (Kistiakowsky, *A Scientist at the White House*, pages 387-388) For text of the Report of the Special Panel, see Document 116. For text of NSC Executive Secretary Lay's memorandum to Secretary of Defense Gates transmitting the recommendations for implementation, see Document 117. Concerning the origin of the Special Panel, see footnote 2, Document 104.

116. Report by the Special Panel on Satellite Reconnaissance to President Eisenhower

Washington, August 25, 1960.

The concept of an artificial satellite orbiting around the earth has been associated, from the outset, with the thought that such a vehicle could be used to maintain a continuous reconnaissance and surveillance over any desired part of the globe. The original plan was to install a kind of television camera in the satellite and to transmit its images by radio techniques to a ground station where the signals would be reassembled into a photograph. With such equipment, a systematic search was to be made of the Eurasian land mass for airfields and other military installations large enough to be detected with the limited resolving power of such a system. By repeated observations it was hoped that changes would be detected with sufficient reliability to provide warning of imminent attack.

The appeal of this fundamentally straightforward approach lies in its relative political unobtrusiveness; in the apparent power of television techniques for making observations almost instantly available; in the prolonged utilization of satellites in their orbits; and in the freedom from the logistic intricacies of recovery techniques. At first sight, this "electronic readout" appears to be the fully modern approach to reconnaissance. It has deserved, and indeed has had the most careful study. As a result, we have now arrived at a clear understanding of the technological problems which remain to be solved. The initial Samos development project was aimed at the electronic solution of these problems; we shall shortly discuss the difficulties.

Several years ago, it was realized that orbiting satellites might be used for the detection of ballistic missile attack in a much simpler and

more direct method than television or photographic observation. While the hostile missile is being launched, its engine is a very powerful source of infrared radiation, and this radiation can be detected, above the atmosphere, from satellites many hundred miles away. The exploitation of this early-warning scheme is going forward as Project Midas; it has been separated from the reconnaissance project (Samos) and will not be discussed further in this paper. As a consequence of this separate development, the warning function is no longer a primary requirement for Samos.

Meanwhile, a much more urgent reconnaissance need has been pointed out by the U.S. Intelligence Board. The overriding intelligence requirement at the present time is information on the operational status of Soviet missile launch sites. This requires photographs of a very high resolution—high enough to enable a skilled photo-interpreter to recognize and identify the objects of interest in a missile launch site.

The exact resolution performance required for this purpose need not be discussed here. Its technical specification is complicated and often controversial. One must realize, for example, that a system which will *resolve* 20 feet on the ground will not permit a photo-interpreter to *describe* an object 20 feet in length.

Up to now, there has been only one source for high-resolution photographs of the Soviet missile installations, and that source has been eliminated with the grounding of the U-2 aircraft. Can we substitute a satellite as the observing vehicle and obtain comparable results? More specifically, can we look to Samos to yield results of the necessary quality within a short time?

Unfortunately, as far as electronic readout is concerned, the answer is NO.

The essence of the problem is that a photograph which contains the amount of detail that is required to know the state of readiness and kind of activity at a missile site must be made up of a fantastically large number of bits of information—a number so large that there is not time enough to transmit all of these bits of information from satellites to earth while the satellite is over our own or friendly territory. It is to be expected during the next ten years that the elaboration of satellite technology, the ease of keeping many satellites in orbit, and improvements in our electronic arts, will ultimately make it feasible electrically to transmit detailed information about a given point on the earth. But what we must emphasize here today is that it is not feasible now, and it is not likely to be feasible in time to give our country the kind of reconnaissance it needs at once. Therefore, while we recommend continued research on these electronic readout programs, and the occasional orbital flights which are now planned, we must warn that we cannot rely on the electronic readout approach for military purposes and urge that higher operational

priority be given to other Air Force developments which we are about to discuss.

Physical recovery, in the air or in the sea, of a satellite that has completed a number of revolutions in orbit has become feasible. The improvement of recovery techniques is going forward [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. One can therefore consider the possibility of using advanced photographic techniques which are capable of very high resolution, and of recovering the exposed photographic film on or near the surface of the earth. The subsequent processing and evaluation of the film can then be performed under the same favorable conditions that are used in the best aerial photography.

While this approach may superficially appear clumsy and pedestrian when compared with electronic readout, a detailed analysis will show its performance to be distinctly superior in providing the kind of detailed information that is required for the study of operational missile sites. In fact, we are convinced that this primary objective of satellite reconnaissance can be realized most promptly and most effectively by the physical recovery of film exposed in a high-resolution convergent stereo camera system. The principles and techniques of this kind of photography are now well understood. Therefore, if timely action is taken, we can expect to have an adequate photographic payload by the time we have mastered the techniques for recovery.

Time is short. We should acquire information on Soviet missile launch sites while they are under construction, in order to counter the deception and concealment that can be used in a completed site. It will take a year and a half at best to fill the present gap in our reconnaissance ability. And we can expect useful performance in 1962 only if we clearly establish high resolution photography as the first goal of the U.S. satellite reconnaissance program.

We are not unmindful of other objectives associated with Samos. Photographic surveys of broad areas, in which extensive coverage is obtained at the expense of reduced resolving power, have important uses. The detection and recording of electromagnetic transmissions by means of the proposed "F" payloads will provide valuable information, especially in areas of technical intelligence, of new aspects in communication links, in missile defense systems, in navigational aids.

But we do not consider these objectives comparable in importance to the task of getting, at the earliest possible date, high resolution photographs that will provide information about the operational status of missile sites, with detail nearly as good as that from the U-2. We therefore recommend a carefully planned program, with simplified management, and with primary emphasis on:

- (a) High resolution stereo photography
- (b) Recovery techniques

Mindful of the urgency of this need for detailed photography, the Air Force has greatly modified the initial Samos development plan. A number of well conceived photographic recovery systems are now under study and evaluation. These designs fall into two distinct categories:

1. A system to achieve maximum coverage with ground resolution adequate to identify missile sites under construction, and
2. A system capable of photographing a large number of selected installations with the higher resolution required for evaluation of the operational status of a missile site.

We are convinced that with straightforward good management in the utilization of components and technology now potentially available, the first of these systems could be placed in operation by late 1962; the higher resolution system becoming operational about one year later. We therefore urge a resolute concentration of effort on these two systems and a clear decision to assign to this task a higher priority than to all other aspects together of the Samos program.

Since we must now rely upon the physical retrieval of satellite photographs it is necessary that increased efforts be made to improve the reliability of recovery techniques. Recent achievements [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] are most encouraging. An alternative procedure, unproven operationally, but most appealing in concept, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. The applicability of this technique to the Samos recovery operation should receive serious consideration.

Until recently, the operational aspects of recovery have been greatly complicated by the obvious requirement for safety to restrict these activities to the ocean areas. As a result of our increased confidence in the precision of the recovery operation, the Air Force is now studying the feasibility of effecting recovery over land. Since this would significantly increase the probability of success of the recovery operation, we heartily recommend the support of Air Force efforts in this area.

Processing and Evaluation

The reconnaissance "take" of the proposed systems is recovered as a set of latent images on photographic film. The intelligence yield that will be extracted from these latent images is critically dependent on quality factors in the chemical processing of the film and in the subsequent analysis and interpretation of the finished photographs. We cannot emphasize too strongly that much of the detailed information captured in the latent image can be irretrievably lost unless first-rate work is done in the processing laboratory and in the interpretation center.

In the purely technical domain, we must point out that the achievement of optimum image-quality calls for the closest possible interaction between individuals concerned with emulsion design and manufacture

and individuals concerned with processing techniques. If these two activities were to be organized as separate and independent enterprises it is most unlikely, in our view, that the results would be the best obtainable.

A full awareness of these factors led to the special organization of processing and evaluation that was used in the handling [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] films. Our experience with the superior results obtained under that arrangement leads us to recommend firmly that the same pattern be followed in preparing the output of the proposed satellite reconnaissance systems. We further recommend that this output be distributed by a centralized community laboratory.

Weather

In aerial photo-reconnaissance operations, the state of the weather over the target has long been a primary consideration. For satellite reconnaissance operations, the sensitivity to weather is in some respects even worse. If the target is obscured by clouds on the first pass, the satellite may have later opportunities to observe the target. But the times of subsequent passes over the target are fixed by the orbit parameters, and the situation is less flexible than the scheduling of aircraft. Moreover, the weather over the great majority of Soviet targets is very bad indeed, and the opportunities for good photography are scarce.

The program outlined in this discussion can succeed only if it is closely integrated with the weather services that will be associated with the Tiros project, with the Air Force's 433-L system, and with other sources of weather data that may come into existence. Because of the short reaction intervals that are necessary here, these arrangements will be difficult to establish, and we recommend early attention to planning.

Recommendations

Our analysis of the investigations already carried out by the Air Force leads us to the conclusion that from the array of important studies a few can now be extracted and integrated into a single simple and powerful program to give us the reconnaissance we need. Therefore, our recommendation is that the following selected components of the Air Force satellite reconnaissance program be now assembled into a program of very high priority.

1. A recoverable satellite-payload for high resolution convergent stereo photography.
2. To be recovered for the time being at sea.
3. To be recovered as soon as feasible on land.
4. To carry in some of the satellites camera and film competent to *identify* with certainty missile sites both in construction and after completion.
5. To carry in other satellites camera and film competent to study the state of readiness, type of activity and type of missiles.

We recommend emphasis on the development of more advanced recovery techniques, particularly for land recovery.

We recommend that electronic readout techniques be given lower priority but be continued as a research project and that the extensive program for a ground-based electronic readout system be cut back very substantially and promptly.

Also, the so-called "F" payloads [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] should be given lower priority than that assigned to photography.

We further recommend that this program be managed with the directness that the Air Force has used on occasion, with great success, for projects of overriding priority. We suggest that this can best be accomplished by a direct line of command from the Secretary of the Air Force to the general officer in operational charge of the whole program, with appropriate boards of scientific advisers to both the secretarial level and to the operational level. The general officer in command would look to associated military boards for support in the execution of his plans. We recommend this extraordinary type of organization to execute the program because we are convinced that the situation presents an unusual combination of urgency and inherent amenability to a direct approach.

In addition, we recommend that [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] be used for chemical processing of the recovered film and that the output be distributed by a central community facility.

We also recommend that this program be closely integrated with the weather services that will be associated with the Tiros project, with USAF's 433-L system and other sources of weather data.

Panel on Satellite Reconnaissance

Co-Chairmen { **Dr. J. R. Killian, Jr.**
Dr. Edwin H. Land

Dr. William O. Baker
Mr. Richard Bissell
Dr. Carl F. J. Overhage
Dr. Edward M. Purcell¹

¹ Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures. Kistiakowsky had appointed Edwin H. Land, Chairman of the Polaroid Corporation, and Killian co-chairmen of the Special Panel. William O. Baker was Vice President of Bell Laboratories; Richard Bissell was Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Plans; Carl F. J. Overhage was Director of the Lincoln Research Institute of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Edward M. Purcell was Donner Professor of Science at Harvard University and a member of the Science Advisory Committee.

117. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to Secretary of Defense Gates

Washington, September 1, 1960.

SUBJECT

Reconnaissance Satellite Program

1. The National Security Council and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the Special NSC Meeting on August 25, 1960, took the following actions:

a. Noted and discussed a joint presentation by the Department of Defense and the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, prepared pursuant to letters from the President dated June 10, 1960, on the Reconnaissance Satellite Program, with specific reference to Samos, including:

(1) The development plan and experimental launchings.

(2) The proposed streamlined management structure for the Samos program within the Department of Defense.

b. Noted the President's approval of the following recommendations submitted in the joint presentation:

(1) That the following selected components of the Air Force satellite reconnaissance program be now assembled into a program of very high priority:

(a) A recoverable satellite-payload for high resolution convergent stereo photography.

(b) To be recovered for the time being at sea.

(c) To be recovered as soon as feasible on land.

(d) To carry in some of the satellites camera and film competent to *identify* with certainty missile sites both in construction and after completion.

(e) To carry in other satellites camera and film competent to study the state of readiness, type of activity, and type of missiles.

(2) That emphasis be placed on the development of more advanced recovery techniques particularly for land recovery.

(3) That electronic read-out techniques be given lower priority but be continued as a research project, and that the extensive program for ground-based electronic read-out system be cut back very substantially and promptly.

(4) That the so-called F payloads [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] should be given lower priority than that assigned to photography.

(5) That this program be managed with the directness that the Air Force has used on occasion, with great success, for projects of overriding priority. This can best be accomplished by a direct line of command from the Secretary of the Air Force to the general officer in operational charge of the whole program, with appropriate boards of scientific advisers to both the secretarial level and to the operational level. The general officer in command would look to associated military boards for support in the execution of his plans.

(6) [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

(7) That this program be closely integrated with the weather services that will be associated with the Tiros project, with USAF 433-L system and other sources of weather data.

(8) That the first scheduled experimental launching of Samos take place during September 1960.

2. The above actions, as approved this date by the President, are transmitted herewith for appropriate implementation of 1-b thereof.

James S. Lay, Jr.¹

¹ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

118. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 2, 1960.

SUBJECT

Defense Budget for FY 1962

PARTICIPANTS

State

Secretary Herter
 Under Secretary Merchant
 Deputy Assistant Secretary Morgan

Treasury

Secretary Anderson
 Briefing officers representing Army,
 Navy, Air Force and Joint Staff

Defense

The Armed Forces Policy Council:¹
 Secretary Gates
 General Twining
 Secretary Brucker
 General Lemnitzer
 Secretary Sharp
 General White
 Under Secretary Bantz
 Admiral Burke
 General Shoup
 Asst Secy Irwin
 Mr. John B. Macauley

Secretary Gates welcomed the visiting Secretaries and explained that the meeting was part of the FY 1962 budget process, in which it was desirable to bring foreign policy guidance to bear as early as possible.

Mr. Irwin introduced the Service budget presentations by pointing out that they were only preliminary at this stage, would be submitted formally to Secretary Gates about mid-September, and thereafter would be revised and coordinated by him before submission to the NSC, the President and the Bureau of the Budget. The preliminary presentations today assumed an "equal funds budget" (i.e., the same amount of dollars for FY 1962 as for FY 1961) or an "equal resources budget" (i.e., a Defense appropriation for FY 1962 which would purchase the same amount of goods and services as the FY 1961 appropriation, which means "equal funds" plus about 5%) to cover rising material and personnel costs, etc.). In addition, the Services were free to point out items they considered desirable but which required a higher budget level. Mr. Irwin also stressed that today's presentations were arranged to bring out foreign policy implications, although it would not be possible to separate general war and limited war items because most items have some bearing on both.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/9-260. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by George A. Morgan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, and approved in S on September 13.

¹ Those members of the Armed Forces Policy Council not previously identified are: Dudley C. Sharp, Secretary of the Air Force; Fred A. Bantz, Under Secretary of the Navy; John N. Irwin, II, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs; and John B. Macauley, Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

The Army presentation called for continuing roughly the present force levels in order to maintain overseas deployments (41% of Army strength), thus keeping allied confidence in the system of collective security. To do this would require grave lags in research, development and procurement needed to modernize our ground forces. Thus the future is to be mortgaged for the sake of immediate requirements. Even so, manning Hawk missile squadrons and NATO stockpiles will require some reduction in other existing forces; there will be a shortage of lift; and with all of STRAC's three ready divisions due in Europe or Iceland by M+30, any limited war diverting one or more of these divisions would cause a serious degradation of our general war capability. If money were available, the Army would like to increase manpower to 925,000 in order to flesh out understrength forces in Europe and the Far East and form one more STRAC division. It would also go in for extensive and long overdue modernization, including tanks clearly superior to the new Russian tank (11 years away on prescribed budget assumptions) and the Iroquois helicopter (10 years away), and for research and development of an anti-missile missile (Nike Zeus). As is, no substantial research and development will be possible except on the communications satellite. In an FY 1962 equal funds budget, an adequate program of modernization would require force cuts which would require eliminating *all* of our Far Eastern and European deployments.

The Navy presentation called for an increase from 6 to 9 Polaris submarines procured, made possible by a corresponding reduction in other submarines. Otherwise strength in men and ships would remain about the same. All ships would have both general and limited war capabilities, carry conventional as well as nuclear ordnance. Funds above the assumed budget level, however, would be needed for a number of worthy purposes. A strong plea was made for stepping up Polaris procurement to twelve a year and for hastening development of the long-range Polaris missile, neither of which could be done without serious cuts elsewhere in the assumed budget. It was noted that the total cost of an accelerated Polaris submarine program at the buildable rate of twelve a year to reach a total of forty-five would be \$2.5 billion, including missiles, back up and research and development on a longer range Polaris. More and better conventional ammunition is needed too; more amphibious lift; more support for the Marines' limited war capabilities; faster replacement of World War II ships which are wearing out (still 75% of the present Navy), and of obsolescent planes. It would also be highly desirable to form one or more additional task forces to be kept abroad, near the scene of possible troubles in Asia or Africa.

The Air Force presentation showed how the top requirement of maintaining our strategic deterrent, with added costs for such things as dispersal, alerts and modernization, will require a continuation in force

cuts which have been going on for some years (e.g., from 137 wings in FY 1957 to 85 or 90 in 1962). Despite the increase in our absolute capabilities produced by modernization, our capabilities relative to the Soviets' have declined and will probably decline further as projected for 1962. Thus our total deterrent is being eroded and we may reach the point of losing our deterrent as well as war-winning capabilities. Even so, the projection for FY 1962 will require substantial cuts elsewhere, notably several squadrons now assigned to NATO.

The Joint Staff presentation gave comments of General Twining on matters relevant to the points stressed in the paper enclosed with Secretary Herter's letter of July 1 to Secretary Gates. A recent JCS evaluation of our general war capabilities concludes that our relative posture may have been weakened during the past year, and is likely to weaken further in view of the fact that we shall not have an ICBM warning system until FY 1963, but the possibility of ICBM attack will exist much sooner. The increasing boldness of Soviet actions probably reflects the Soviet assessment of relative military capabilities. Present budget levels permit adequate capability to meet one limited war situation, but our general war posture would be seriously strained if we had to meet two or more limited war situations at the same time. Since budgetary restrictions have reduced conventional capabilities, it will probably be necessary to make selective use of nuclear weapons to defeat the enemy in a limited war. For guerrilla or anti-guerrilla war we have to rely mainly on the capabilities of other countries. The State Department paper's² stress on the importance of NATO and of forward deployment is sound. In sum, the effect of a straight line defense budget is to compel a choice between modernization forces at reduced levels and existing force levels with obsolete equipment.

Secretary Gates said he was now working on the Joint Strategic Operations Plan (JSOP) with the JCS, who were so far widely divided. Increasing personnel costs vs. rising costs of advanced projects like Polaris and Samos are a problem every year, and getting worse. Something has to give.

General Lemnitzer said that the Army had deliberately decided to sacrifice modernization to force levels because of the disastrous effect on our allies if we moved toward a Fortress America posture.

Admiral Burke said that in order to meet the current world situation we, in effect, have to sacrifice the future to the present. If the world situation is no better five years from now, we will then face "a hell of a problem."

² Apparent reference to a paper accompanying Herter's July 1 letter to Gates; neither found.

Secretary Brucker pointed out that the Army is doubly hit because it is already behind in modernization. This is a problem now, not one beginning in 1963 or later.

Secretary Sharp said that, although maintaining the strategic deterrent has top priority, the possession of an adequate small war capability comes close to being as important. Even a budget increase of 5% to 7% would make a tremendous difference to all the Services.

Secretary Gates said this was very encouraging; the Chiefs were arguing for a lot more in their discussion of the JSOP.

Mr. Merchant asked if the allocation of the budget between the three Services projected in this presentation was the same as for FY 1961. Secretary Gates said essentially yes, but it may not end that way.

General Twining, commenting on the proposed Air Force NATO cuts, said we continue to want a strong NATO, but the US contribution simply must be reduced. Our allies must do more.

Secretary Herter commended the fine spirit of the presentations, particularly shown in the clear relationship to the missions to be performed. He restated several points in the State Department paper about which he felt strongly. Since we must assume an initial Soviet strike in general war, the best chance of avoiding war is to have it publicly known that our deterrent is invulnerable to surprise attack. With regard to limited war, we are presented with a difficult and wide range of possibilities all over the globe—in Africa, Latin America, perhaps the Near East again. It is impossible to have the perfect answer ready for all situations, hence all the more important to have substantial and mobile forces which can move quickly anywhere. The terrible fear of nuclear weapons felt by most peoples does not distinguish between strategic and tactical uses. Thus the prospect of having to use nuclear weapons in some limited war, as required by present capabilities according to the recent joint State-Defense-CIA study, presents a very serious psychological problem. As for NATO, the only answer is a complete review of MC-70 as soon as possible. There is a very ticklish political situation in NATO, and if we reduce forces unilaterally there will be trouble.

General Twining said MC-70 was now being reviewed and the result would be presented next spring. General Lemnitzer commented that with increasing Soviet capabilities the new review may well call for more forces rather than less. General White said General Norstad must simply be told to put on his American hat and insist on the necessary US reductions.

Secretary Gates expressed irritation with "the numbers racket" which disregarded improvements in capabilities. Secretary Herter said that we never object to changes of numbers where equivalent capabilities are provided.

Secretary Anderson then spoke on economic and fiscal aspects of the budget problem. While all agree that the safety of our country is first priority, it can be endangered by economic as well as by military crisis, and economic crisis may come sooner. In this year's budget, 80% of all tax dollars go for defense-related matters. Anything more for defense would therefore have to be taken out of the remaining 20%, competing with all our domestic programs as well as foreign economic aid like the recent items for Latin America and the Congo. Some advocate an increase in taxes, but Congress has refused even to boost postal rates enough to cover the Post Office deficit. We couldn't get a Congressional hearing on a proposal to tax jet fuels proportionally to the fuels used by piston engines. Since Congress would not increase the gasoline tax, \$800 million excise tax receipts had to be transferred to the Federal road program. If we propose to increase defense expenditures by borrowing money, we must impose wartime controls. Inflation—less during the past eighteen months than any time since the depression—must be kept low because of our balance of payments situation. Many foreign countries use our currency to back theirs to a very substantial extent, and if they began to doubt the stability of the dollar they would start exchanging dollars for our gold. As foreign dollar holdings already exceed the gold we hold in excess of statutory requirements for backing the currency, such a run on the dollar could produce a crisis in 24 hours, any time. We can do various things about the unfavorable balance of payments, such as prohibiting foreign investment, stopping aid, bringing our forces home, but the one thing we cannot do is nothing. The real solution is to increase exports, but this can't be done quickly because our foreign competitors have more modern plants—quite aside from comparative wage scales.

119. Editorial Note

At the 458th meeting of the National Security Council on September 7, 1960, discussion included an item on "Civilian Readiness Base," which was primarily devoted to fallout shelters and stockpiling. (Memorandum of discussion by Johnson, September 12; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) See the Supplement.

120. Memorandum of Discussion at the 459th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, September 15, 1960.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants.]

1. *U.S. Policy on Continental Defense* (NSC Action No. 1842–d; NSC 5802/1; NSC Action No. 2151–f–(1));¹ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Future NSC Agenda Items”, dated April 12, 1960;² NIE 11–8–60;³ NIE 11–60; NIE 11–7–60;⁴ Memos for NSC, subject: “U.S. Policy on Continental Defense”, dated July 14 and August 8, 1960)⁵

Mr. Gray presented this subject to the Council by reading the first two paragraphs of his Briefing Note. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.)⁶ Mr. Gray then called on the Secretary of Defense to introduce the Defense presentation. Secretary Gates said that Mr. John H. Rubel, acting in place of Dr. Herbert York, would make the presentation. (A copy of Mr. Rubel’s presentation is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy has been furnished General Goodpaster for the White House files.)⁷

The President said that for the last twenty minutes he had been making up his mind to go into training as an Indian and live on deer in the Rocky Mountains.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Boggs.

¹ See footnote 4, Document 4; footnote 10, Document 8; and footnote 11, Document 79, respectively.

² Not found.

³ Document 111.

⁴ NIE 11–60, “Trends in Soviet Military Capabilities in the Period 1965–1970,” dated April 12; and NIE 11–7–60, “Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Clandestine Introduction of Weapons of Mass Destruction into the US.” (Both in Department of State, INR–NIE Files)

⁵ The July 14 memorandum enclosed a Discussion Paper on “Continental Defense,” prepared by the Planning Board; the memorandum dated August 8 enclosed a draft record of action on the subject. (*Ibid.*, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5802 Series)

⁶ The briefing note summarized the Discussion Paper. In paragraph 2, it points out that NSC 5802/1 had been adopted when Soviet manned bombers were the principal threat to U.S. retaliatory capability, but that by 1961 Soviet ICBMs would present a dangerous, and in a few years the principal, threat to SAC bases, ICBM sites, and command installations. This change questioned the validity of then-current reliance on the ability of early warning to allow time for launch of SAC planes before destruction on the ground, time for key decisions, and time for civilian relocation. Also, since the Nike–Zeus system would probably not be operational within 10 years, continued emphasis on active defenses was questionable. See the Supplement.

⁷ Not found.

Mr. Gray then resumed his briefing by reading Paragraph 4 of his Briefing Note dealing with Questions 4 and 5, of the reference Discussion Paper on the subject.⁸ Mr. Gray then said that Questions 1 and 2 in the Discussion Paper⁹ had been covered in Mr. Rubel's presentation. In addition, the draft Record of Action before the Council had a bearing on Question 2. Question 3, which had to do with decision-making and response doctrine, was also covered by the draft Record of Action. However, Mr. Gray said he would like to take a moment on behalf of himself to suggest that Item g of the draft Record of Action simply read, "Noted that any test which involves destroying a satellite or space vehicle should not proceed without specific Presidential approval." It seemed to Mr. Gray that the other language in the draft of sub-paragraph g was a directive for research and development. Secretary Gates and General Twining endorsed Mr. Gray's suggestion.

Mr. Gray then said he had been requested to make an observation on behalf of Mr. McCone who was unable to attend the meeting. Over a period or years the Atomic Energy Commission had received many briefings by NORAD which indicated that immense requirements would be levied against our atomic stockpile. These briefings had acknowledged that plans for such requirements did not have the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. McCone was concerned about unilateral service planning in an area affecting the stockpile of atomic weapons. General Twining said unified commanders were authorized to make plans which are later approved by the JCS. There was no reason why the unified commanders' plans should be presented to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. There was also no possibility that an Air Defense Commander could obtain atomic weapons directly without the approval of the JCS. Secretary Gates observed that requirements for weapons stated unilaterally by the Services were many times what the Services would actually get.

The President wondered what right any individual officer had in any military service, which was supposed to be disciplined, to state his own individual feelings publicly. No unified war planning about [would?] be possible if every officer was allowed to tell Congress what forces we should have.

Mr. Dillon said the State Department had a few observations to make on the Continental Defense paper. The first observation was not

⁸ Question 4 asked whether increased emphasis should be given to protecting the population against fallout, and question 5 whether existing policies to provide for the continuity of essential wartime functions of the Federal government were in need of review.

⁹ These questions asked whether increased emphasis should be given to passive as compared to active measures for the protection of U.S. retaliatory capacity and whether the air defense effort should be reoriented so that, following initial missile attack, it would retain capability against follow-on manned bombers and guided missiles.

substantive; it dealt with the title, which might not be appropriate any longer. "Continental defense" had once meant the defense of the population of the U.S. but it now appeared that active defense of the population would not be possible and that it would be necessary to concentrate on defending our retaliatory capability. Mr. Dillon said this policy was merely mentioned in passing, however. He then turned to his main point, namely, the tremendous psychological effects of the ability to shoot down an incoming missile if this ability were developed and demonstrated by the enemy rather than by ourselves. Mr. Dillon recalled a recent briefing by Mr. Dulles on the Soviet A-ICBM effort. If the Soviets demonstrated the ability to destroy an incoming missile and we could not demonstrate a similar ability, the psychological power and prestige of the Soviets would be greatly increased and our attempts to explain away the demonstration would not be convincing. Mr. Dillon felt the U.S. should develop a capability to demonstrate the destruction of an incoming missile at least as early as the USSR. In his view this was a good reason for not reducing our research and development effort on Nike/Zeus. Moreover, he felt it was perhaps worthwhile coordinating what we know about Soviet efforts in this field with information about our own efforts. Perhaps the Comparative Evaluation Group should make a thorough study of the subject. Turning to his final point, Mr. Dillon said that Item-d of the draft Record of Action provided that Mr. Gray and the Secretary of Defense would confer with the President concerning a study of the survival of our decision-making capability. The Discussion Paper points out that the preparation of response doctrine is difficult because of possible unforeseen contingencies. Foreign policy considerations are important elements entering into decisions with respect to response doctrine. Accordingly, Mr. Dillon felt that the Department of State should participate in any study concerned with response doctrine.

Mr. Gray said he could not disagree with Mr. Dillon's last suggestion.

The President felt the discussion was omitting a great many important considerations. The State Department had just mentioned in passing the question of greater emphasis on passive defense of the population. However, the presentation which the Council had just heard clearly indicates that if greater emphasis is not given to passive defense, there will be no U.S. Without passive defense we could retaliate but the people we are supposed to be defending would all be dead and there would be no State Department to worry about foreign affairs. The President said that war was still waged for the purpose of destroying the enemy's will to make war. The classical way of destroying the enemy's will was to destroy his armed forces; now we destroy his will by destroying his cities. We are now in a condition such that, no matter what convictions we have previously held, we have to agree to adopt a much larger program for the

protection of the population. The presentation clearly indicates the urgency of such a program. The President felt we should get busy at once on measures for passive defense of the population. Mr. Dillon said his "passing mention" had not meant to deprecate the points the President had just made.

Mr. Patterson said the presentation seemed to indicate that there was no active defense against ballistic missiles. He wondered what studies by the Department of Defense indicated with respect to the value of fall-out shelters in saving lives compared to active defense measures. Mr. Rubel replied that some data on this subject was contained in the Discussion Paper on Page 16. Studies had been made predicting the effect of fall-out shelters on the situation after an attack. The conclusion of all such studies is that an attack involving more than 2000 megatons would kill more persons from fall-out than from direct effects. In this situation civilian casualties can be reduced by a factor of 2 or even 4 or 5, depending on the character of the attack, by having fall-out shelters available. However, when the attack involves more than 50,000 megatons, then even fall-out shelters will not solve the problem because the fall-out is too great to cope with. In the megaton ranges we now think reasonable, fall-out shelters will result in a reduction in civilian casualties.

Mr. Patterson said that Mr. Gray had pointed out that existing shelter policy is based on the assumption of active defense, an assumption which does not appear to be tenable today. In these circumstances Mr. Patterson felt that responsibility for reviewing current shelter policy devolved upon OCDM.

The President believed that a great deal of attention must be concentrated on deterrence. We must be skillful in letting the enemy know what would happen to him if he launches an attack against us. Referring to one of Mr. Dillon's points, the President said he would favor a demonstration of U.S. ability to shoot down an incoming ICBM. Nevertheless, most of our money should be put on deterrence. There seems to be a great deal of talk about small, limited wars but in the President's view these small, limited wars might readily develop into general war. The President believed that there was a need for social scientists to predict for us what people will do under the circumstances of a rain of nuclear missiles. The President believed that a realistic strengthening of the OCDM shelter program should be undertaken if at all possible. He agreed that there should not be a complete re-orientation of our shelter program at the present time but he felt our thinking had now progressed to a point that he had been stressing for a long time, namely, how can we recover from a massive nuclear attack. Perhaps we should advertise our strengthening of the OCDM shelter program instead of playing it in a low key as provided by present policy. Turning again to deterrence, the President said he would want the enemy to realize that enemy cities can be destroyed by

our retaliatory forces. He believed we should think more in terms of cities and deterrence than we had in the past.

Mr. Gray said a question had been asked about the shelter program in the USSR. He understood that the Soviet shelter program was going forward and that the emergency exits for Soviet fall-out shelters in new multiple family dwellings in the Soviet Union had been visually observed. However, it appeared that there was no "crash" shelter program in the USSR. He believed the observation of the emergency exits he had just referred to constituted the first firm intelligence on an orderly Soviet shelter program.

The President said that in this country we could not persuade Congress to allow us to build shelters in government buildings. He believed one of the urgent things on our agenda was a re-examination of current shelter policy. Indeed, the whole subject of passive defense of the population should be re-examined with particular reference to fall-out shelters.

Mr. Dillon asked whether the President approved the idea of undertaking a study on the possibility of developing a capability to demonstrate the shooting down of an incoming ICBM. The President said he approved such a study, although he felt nothing was quite as important immediately as improving our passive defenses. Mr. Dulles said he wished to endorse Mr. Dillon's idea of studying the demonstration of an ability to shoot down an ICBM. He asked whether the Comparative Evaluation Group should undertake this study. The President thought the study should be undertaken by the Comparative Evaluation Group.

Mr. Rubel reported that the U.S. was engaged in a tremendous effort to install Nike/Zeus missiles in Kwajalein and Roi Namur. When these installations are completed, an Atlas will be fired from Vandenberg and the Nike/Zeus installations in the South Pacific will attempt to shoot it down. Mr. Rubel said that there had been no slowing down in our A-ICBM efforts. In fact, one of the most able scientific and technical teams in the country was engaged in attempting to develop Nike/Zeus. The President said there was another element in Mr. Dillon's suggestion. If we are going to shoot down an ICBM, we ought to invite certain people to witness the event, including newspapermen, TV reporters, and possibly certain foreign officials.

Mr. Douglas said that the Department of Defense has hesitated to regard all passive defense measures as within its province. He wondered whether it was not essential for the Department to review this position at this time and take a positive stand as to what passive defense measures should be under the Department of Defense. The President observed that he could see no need for the National Guard except as it might be important in passive defense measures. He believed that U.S. officials thought too much in terms of sending a great army overseas after a

nuclear attack on the U.S. In his view, if the reserves have any function, they will have to perform that function where they are located at the time of the attack. The idea of a great overseas army is a fantasy but there is a field of operation for federally-trained and disciplined units in the U.S. in case of attack. The President then said that perhaps civil defense should be under the Department of Defense. We had tried to separate civil defense functions from military functions but perhaps this had been a wrong approach.

Mr. Douglas said the military services had taken a negative attitude toward passive defense in the past but he believed this attitude was now changing, even though it was not fully reflected in the present statement of policy on continental defense. Mr. Patterson thought that in the minds of the people there was bound to be a clear distinction between civilian defense and military functions. In this connection he noted that people often ask, what are the military services doing about shelters. Action by the military services with respect to shelters was not within the jurisdiction of OCDM but, from the standpoint of a unified approach to the problem, it was very important to realize that actions taken by the military with respect to shelters had a great effect on the people. Mr. Douglas said that a great problem arose when an attempt was made to apply a voluntary shelter program to military personnel temporarily residing in an area. Mr. Dillon thought that nothing would give more impetus to a civilian voluntary shelter program than a program by the military services to protect their own personnel. The President agreed. He added that in strengthening the shelter program it was necessary to be sensible and not attempt a program of a complete shelter for every person, which would leave everyone broke. He would be glad to hear any words of wisdom from members of the Council on how to carry out a sensible shelter program.

Mr. Gray said he had no words of wisdom on this subject at this time but he did want to indicate that the Council had provided guidance to the Planning Board in the work of revising existing continental defense policy. The President said that OCDM should consult with the Departments of State and Defense and any others that might be necessary in re-examining our shelter policy on a down-to-earth basis. He would like to see all the agencies he had mentioned feeling a sense of responsibility for taking a new look at this question. The President then thanked Mr. Rubel for making an interesting and an alarming presentation.

*The National Security Council:*¹⁰

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of the Discussion Paper prepared by the NSC Planning Board, transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 14, 1960, and a Department of Defense presentation by Mr. John H. Rubel, Acting Director, Defense Research and Engineering, covering certain portions of that Paper.

b. Noted that the Planning Board would proceed in the light of the Council discussion with a review of NSC 5802/1, pursuant to NSC Action No. 2151-f-(1).

c. Noted the Department of Defense view that no overall re-orientation of air defense efforts seems to be indicated at this time, but that a re-examination of present air defense concepts to explore means for improving the U.S. capability to cope with follow-on attacks by manned bombers and non-ballistic missiles, following an initial ballistic missile attack, is being made within the Department of Defense, and the results will be included in the annual report on the status of the military program as of June 30, 1960.

d. Noted that the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs would confer with the President and the Secretary of Defense with regard to the proposal for a study of the capabilities, plans and programs to ensure the survival of the decision-making machinery and of reliable means of communication with the surviving retaliatory forces on land, and sea, and in the air, within the time dimensions of a surprise ballistic missile attack. In this study, attention should be given, with the participation of the Department of State, to the problem of an effective and flexible response that is not dependent upon the survival of the seat of government and other vital links of the planned system for command and control.

e. Noted the President's directive that the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, in collaboration with the Departments of State and Defense and as appropriate with other interested departments and agencies, urgently re-examine, in the light of the presentation and discussion at the meeting, current policies and programs for the passive defense of the population, particularly with regard to fall-out shelters, with a view to making any recommendations as to any realistic measures in this field which will contribute to the basic policy of deterrence of general war.

f. Noted that the Director, OCDM, is making, for use in the review of NSC 5802/1, a re-examination of present planning for the continuity of essential functions of the Government in relation to (1) the reduced

¹⁰The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2300, approved by the President on September 21. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

time available for implementation of such plans; (2) the unlikelihood of the survival of many key Government officials; and (3) the disruption of communications and the widespread destruction immediately following an attack.

g. Noted that any test which involves destroying a satellite or space vehicle should not proceed without specific Presidential approval.¹¹

h. Noted the President's approval that the Comparative Evaluation Group undertake expeditiously a comparative study of U.S. and USSR programs to develop anti-ballistic missiles capabilities, in view of the great psychological effect which would result from a demonstration by either the U.S. or the USSR of such a capability.¹²

Note: The actions in c and g above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Secretaries of State and Defense, for appropriate implementation.

The action in e above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, OCDM, and the Secretaries of State and Defense, for appropriate implementation.

The action in f above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, OCDM, for appropriate implementation.

The action in h above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Comparative Evaluation Group for appropriate implementation.

[Here follows Agenda Item 2, "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security."]

Marion W. Boggs

¹¹ A sixth question in the Discussion Paper reads: "Is there a clear need for vigorous research and development efforts to achieve a capability to destroy orbiting satellites and space vehicles?"

¹² In his September 27 memorandum of a meeting held September 21, Gray states that the President was at first reluctant to assign this task to the Comparative Evaluation Group, preferring that DOD and CIA make presentations for evaluation by NSC. "He pointed out that he had become allergic to committees and groups for a good many reasons including the time they consumed, the paper work involved and the leaks that generally occurred." Gray argued that the CEG was experienced and could do the work expeditiously, and the President agreed to paragraph h. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Meetings with the President)

121. Interagency Study

Washington, September 28, 1960.

UNITED STATES AND ALLIED CAPABILITIES FOR LIMITED MILITARY OPERATIONS TO 1 JULY 1962

[Here follow a table of contents and an introduction, both in the Supplement.]

II—Over-All Conclusions

1. U.S. capabilities in conjunction with those of our allies are generally adequate to conduct any one of the limited military operations studied but these capabilities are dependent on prompt action, as required in each case, to:

- a. Initiate partial mobilization.
- b. Augment existing military lift capabilities.
- c. Expand the war production base.
- d. Waive financial limitations.

2. The U.S. over-all capability for general war would be degraded initially by any one of the five limited military operations studied, except Berlin, although not to an unacceptable degree. The capability of the U.S. nuclear retaliatory forces for general war would in no case studied, be seriously affected.

3. Although U.S. capabilities might, in some circumstances, be adequate to conduct two of these limited military operations simultaneously, the U.S. over-all capability for general war would, in such circumstances, be degraded to an unacceptable degree.

4. On the basis of the assumptions utilized, the five studies did not indicate a need for change in existing deployments of U.S. forces.

5. Substantial conventional forces—ground, sea and air—were required in all cases studied whether or not nuclear weapons were employed.

6. From the U.S. military point of view, the desirability of initiating the use of nuclear weapons varied in the five cases studied. In Berlin, Iran, and Laos, their use would not provide a clear military advantage. However, use of [5 lines of source text not declassified].

Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Top Secret. The study is the enclosure to a memorandum from Lay to the National Security Council and a joint memorandum from Gates, Dulles, and Merchant to Gray, both dated September 28. According to the latter, the study was prepared by representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. Both are in the Supplement.

7. Anticipation of the need to initiate a limited military operation along with the earliest possible decisions on its character and objectives, including possible restrictions on weapons systems to be employed, will substantially enhance U.S. and allied capabilities to respond rapidly to the threat.

8. Limited military operations to achieve national objectives are based on a careful balance of political and military considerations which may require restraints on the use of military force. Such restraints may seriously handicap the conduct of military operations and must be kept under continuous review for the purpose of considering their possible revision, where necessary, to achieve established national objectives. The closest possible coordination of political and military decisions and actions will enhance our capability to conduct limited military operations effectively.

9. From a military point of view, it would not be advantageous for U.S. and allied forces to initiate the use of lethal CW/BW agents, principally because current programs provide only a limited capability and because our allies lack protective equipment and training.

10. U.S. employment of non-lethal CW/BW agents would, under certain circumstances, enhance the capabilities of U.S. and allied forces.

11. The United States and its allies presently do not have an adequate capability for counter-guerrilla type limited military operations.

12. If fully committed and used in optimum fashion, the U.S. military airlift, including reserve and national guard, is adequate when augmented from civilian sources for effective support of the individual operations studied in Iran, Laos or Korea, but is not adequate to support two such operations simultaneously.

13. An augmentation of existing sea-lift capabilities would be required in all cases except Berlin. This would vary from a rather small augmentation of existing cargo lift in the Pacific for the Offshore Islands to an extensive augmentation of cargo and passenger lift for Korea—including a transfer from the Atlantic to the Pacific of passenger transports.

14. World-wide strategic communications are adequate to support all operations studied except in Southeast Asia, where they would require considerable U.S. augmentation.

15. Pre-stockage of supplies in the European and Far East areas substantially enhances our capabilities to respond promptly and effectively. Although present pre-stocks in the Eastern Mediterranean and in Southeast Asia are minimal and add little to our capabilities to respond, programmed pre-stocks will partially correct this deficiency by 1962.

16. Transit rights and bases in Italy and Turkey are essential to U.S. limited military operations in Iran. Additional over flight, staging and

operational rights in advance of U.S. deployment would enhance our ability to deploy forces rapidly.

17. Transit rights and logistic bases are essential in Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines for the timely and sustained support of operations in the Western Pacific. In addition, similar rights are essential in Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam for successful operations in Southeast Asia.

18. Existing logistic support facilities and air bases in Southeast Asia are inadequate to support sustained operations of U.S. and allied forces. The timing and extent of operations in this area are almost entirely dependent upon the effectiveness of corrective measures to rectify deficiencies.

19. In all cases studied, some degree of mobilization was required, ranging from a modest mobilization of selected reserve units in the Berlin case to a total mobilization of the 1,000,000-man Ready Reserve for Korea.

20. An expansion of the war production base would be required in the event of hostilities in Korea, the Offshore Islands or Laos in order to prevent a dangerous degradation of war reserves in PACOM and CONUS. In the case of Korea and Laos, six months would be required to re-establish these reserves to required levels. In the case of Berlin and Iran, it would be desirable to make preparations for the rapid expansion of the war production base.

[Here follow 131 pages of case studies, annexes, and a terms of reference. The latter is in the Supplement.]

122. Memorandum of Discussion at the 461st Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, September 29, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Items 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," 2. "U.S. Policy Toward Cuba," 3. "U.S. Policy Toward Greece," 4. "U.S. Policy Toward Turkey," and 5. "U.S. Policy Toward Spain."]

6. *U.S. Overseas Military Bases* (NSC Actions Nos. 1876, 2034 and 2070;¹ Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 14² and March 17, 1958;³ NSC Actions Nos. 2142 and 2166-c-(3))⁴

The President said one of the major problems which the Departments of State and Defense and perhaps CIA should study was how much dependence we could put on Polaris submarines, heavy bombers, and intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as U.S. bases and bases in the U.K., in lieu of other overseas bases. He thought U.S. bases in Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia would be sources of weakness in the future. The Turkish base would have to be firmly maintained but the U.S. should consider relinquishing some of its other bases, assuming that its intercontinental ballistic missile program progresses satisfactorily. The President added that U.S. overseas military bases did have the virtue of creating a large number of targets which the Soviet Union would have to attempt to neutralize in the event of general war but this was about the only value of many such bases. However, we should not relinquish our base system too rapidly because as long as the USSR is concerned about our ability to strike from these bases, it must make plans for their neutralization in case of war. The President felt, however, that we must make a continuing and serious study of our overseas bases. Secretary Dillon agreed and added that the earlier we attained a reliable intercontinental ballistic missile capability, the happier the State Department would be.

*The National Security Council.*⁵

Noted the President's view that a major question which should be studied by the Departments of State and Defense is how much depend-

¹ Regarding NSC Action No. 1876, see footnote 7, Document 10. NSC Action No. 2034 was taken pursuant to Agenda Item 3, "U.S. Military Bases Overseas," at the NSC meeting on January 15, 1959. (Memorandum of discussion; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) NSC Action No. 2070 was taken pursuant to Agenda Item 2, "U.S. Overseas Military Bases," at the NSC meeting on April 25, 1959. (Memorandum of discussion; *ibid.*) See the Supplement.

² See footnote 1, Document 10.

³ Apparent reference to a memorandum dated March 17, 1959, not found, but summarized at the April 25 NSC meeting; see footnote 1 above.

⁴ NSC Action No. 2142 was taken pursuant to Agenda Item 4, "U.S. Overseas Military Bases," at the NSC meeting on October 29, 1959. The action reflected the President's request, following his remark that "we had our heads in the sand" on the bases question, for designation of a Department of Defense official to re-examine the issue, with a report to be submitted to him within 6 months. (Memorandum of discussion; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) NSC Action No. 2166 was taken pursuant to Agenda Item 4, "Topics for Future Discussion or Consideration by the National Security Council," at the NSC meeting held December 16, 1959. The action incorporated Nixon's suggestion that the forthcoming report on bases should take into account developments in missiles. (Memorandum of discussion; *ibid.*) See the Supplement.

⁵ The following paragraph and note constitute NSC Action No. 2313, approved by the President on October 5. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

ence could be placed upon heavy bombers, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Polaris submarines over the next few years, in lieu of the maintenance of military bases in Morocco, Libya and Saudi Arabia which could become points of weakness in the U.S. security posture. The President, however, expressed the view that any change in policy as to the extent of U.S. reliance on overseas military bases should not be made under conditions prevailing, in view of the value of such bases both for positive action in emergency and in increasing the number of military targets which the USSR would have to attack in the event of general war.

Note: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate implementation.

[Here follows Agenda Item 7. "Retirement of General Twining as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff."]

Marion W. Boggs

123. Editorial Note

On October 5, 1960, the President approved NSC Action No. 2315, in which the NSC concurred in the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense that a total of 14 Polaris submarines be authorized for construction, and that long lead-time planning and procurement actions be authorized to permit construction of 5 additional Polaris submarines. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) NSC Action No. 2315 superseded NSC Action No. 2168–b; see footnote 4, Document 82.

124. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, October 6, 1960.

SUBJECT

Presentation of Limited War Study Before the AFPC

The AFPC met at 0930 on 27 September 1960 in the Secretary of Defense's conference room. In addition to the normal members, the following also attended: Mr. Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Mr. Merchant, Mr. Hare, Mr. Gerry Smith and Mr. Furnas from the Department of State; Mr. Dulles from CIA; Mr. Williams, General Polk and Mr. Stanley in addition to Mr. Irwin from ISA; and Mr. Le Boutillier from S&L.

Mr. Irwin gave the prepared presentation in approximately 25 minutes. The discussion then followed for about one hour and ten minutes. The following comments, while not an exact statement of what was said, express the main ideas put forward by the conferees.

General Twining supported the study strongly and said that the four qualifications on our basic conclusion were not qualifications but "musts."¹ They were actions to be taken automatically and early in any limited war conflict. He stated that we cannot prejudge the use of atomic weapons but must have them ready; that these studies were illustrative and should not be taken as a basis for policy decisions.

Mr. Gates stated that the presentation did not give him a clear feeling of the adequacies or inadequacies of our capabilities. He had been saying before Congress that all of the Army, the Navy except Polaris, the Tactical Air Force and the Marine Corps were all applicable to limited war situations.

Mr. Irwin mentioned that we had considered all these forces; that if we engaged in one sizable limited war conflict such as Laos, we would concentrate a total of 6 divisions and 3 carriers in the Southwest Pacific area and seriously unbalance our world-wide deployments.

General Lemnitzer stated that it takes time to get production going, that a limited war arouses the country and starts mobilization, and that this study pointed up the necessity for well trained reserves; that it would be necessary to call up top priority National Guard and reserve units. He then went on to stress the greatly increased emphasis on anti-guerrilla warfare in the U.S. Army and how our main efforts should be in training other countries' forces for this type of warfare.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170. Top Secret.

¹ See paragraphs 1-a through 1-d of Document 121.

Admiral Burke said that the study made two things evident to him: that early decisions were critical in order to make the task easier, and second, that we must have the will to see a limited warfare operation through, as we could lose the world piecemeal.

General White said the study was useful and pointed up problem areas. He agreed with Admiral Burke about the requirement for early decision and strong will and stated that we must use weapons as necessary to win.

General Shoup said he disliked being forced to plan on weapons of opportunity and that atomic weapons were now in this category. He believed that if we became deeply committed in one limited war, and a second is forced upon us, we must then use atomic weapons to solve one or both. He asked about the use of Allied airlift, saying that the Belgians were very proud of their lifting troops to and from the Congo. (*Note: The study did not use Allied lift except for limited U.K. forces.*)

Mr. Irwin stated that each problem placed heavy reliance on our Allies but was of the opinion that, if we are to move quickly and decisively in a limited war situation, we must place primary reliance on U.S. forces.

General Lemnitzer believed that we cannot determine the employment of atomic weapons ahead of time and stated that it was a tricky problem to maintain a proper balance between conventional forces and atomic weapons. He thinks we must fight limited wars conventionally and be prepared to use atomics if necessary.

Mr. Le Boutillier, S&L, mentioned that we are now short in some items of conventional ammunition and that it will take time to build up our inventory to agreed levels.

Mr. Brucker invited the group to visit the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg and explained special forces deployment world-wide. He then spoke about logistics and was of the opinion it would take at least 9 months to start production rolling off the lines of stand-by plants.

Mr. Merchant stated Mr. Herter regretted missing the meeting as the subject was close to his heart. He stated that foreign policy must be supported by an adequate limited war force, not only for these situations but for smaller conflicts in Latin America and Africa. He thought it was an excellent study, posed the problems properly and was illustrative rather than definitive. He believed that the relative calm for the past two years in the Middle East and the Formosa Straits was due to our fast reactions in those areas. He believes that Khrushchev is seeking to castrate the Secretary General of the U.N. and leave the U.N. incapable of acting positively in a future situation such as the Congo. If he succeeds, this will put a greater dependence on U.S. unilateral intervention in this type situation.

Mr. Merchant further stated that it was not State's job to set forces or allocate money but he believed we must have the capability of dealing with at least two limited wars at one time. We must step up training of our Allies in anti-guerrilla operations. He agreed with Admiral Burke on the necessary will and ability in limited wars but must underline that there are situations where initial use of atomic weapons is politically unacceptable. He was delighted with the study and repeated that we require the ability to fight two limited wars concurrently and should start working toward this capacity.

Mr. Dulles, CIA, said the study was useful and that our chief objective must be to prevent limited wars from starting. Most limited wars will start with unclear situations and force probes in which Communist support is not clear. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] He thinks most local wars are successful because the particular country lacks control and ability to respond quickly.

Mr. Gates stated that we have not devoted much money to our production base in recent years. We now have a new logistic yardstick which includes procurement objectives to support a six months limited war of the Korea type. However, we have failed to finance the approved mobilization base because new weapons, in-being forces and reserves are so expensive. Unless we have a radical change in our financial policy, we will not have the stocks authorized in the logistics planning guidance. Further, Mr. Gates does not think we will fight a six months Korean type war again, so that the paper planned for the logistics base is good but it will not be financed.

Mr. Gordon Gray said he was not competent to comment on the study but was interested in a broader question, namely, "Are we carrying out policies in accordance with Basic National Security Policy?" There have been doubts expressed that basic policy is understood or is being carried out. The President will probably want an answer to this question.

Mr. Gates said that Basic National Security Policy was broad; Defense policy was under constant review within the framework of the broader policy, and he had no desire to rewrite Basic National Security Policy.

Mr. Gray said that this study indicated that nuclear weapons must inevitably be used if we are to hold Korea and the Offshore Islands.

[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] However, he cautioned that this study was not a war game or a JCS presentation but was illustrative only and hence was not applicable to policy decisions.

Mr. Gray said that the President was never very eager to talk about limited war and disliked the subject. He mentioned that Mr. Kistia-kowsky got into trouble recommending a reorganization of the Department of Defense and otherwise got outside his terms of reference in

studying limited war. He believed that this study would not offend the President unduly.

The meeting closed with an observation from Mr. Douglas that, in meeting two limited war situations at one time, we may have to fight each of them in a different way. For instance, we might fight a conventional war in Korea and a limited nuclear war in Laos; that we must take all of these facts into account in determining our level of financing for procurement and provision of active forces.²

James H. Polk
*Brigadier General, USA*³
Director, Office of Planning

² Smith commented on this meeting in a September 28 memorandum to Irwin. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Limited War) Additional comment on the study is in an October 5 memorandum to Kistiakowsky from George W. Rathjens of his staff. (*Ibid.*, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology) Both are in the Supplement.

³ Printed from a copy that indicates Polk signed the original.

125. Memorandum of Discussion at the 462d Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, October 6, 1960.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Strategic Target Planning Staff*

The President said he had received good reports on the Target Center operations in Omaha. The fact that the Strategic Target Planning Staff was set up in Omaha, however, placed an additional burden on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, giving them the responsibility of keeping themselves informed on the operation of the Staff. He believed both technical and military elements should be watched very closely by the JCS in the development of the Omaha Center. The JCS had a special responsibility to inform themselves periodically about this operation.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs. For another account of this meeting, see Kistiakowsky, *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 399–400.

General Lemnitzer said that very able and high-ranking military officers were keeping in touch with the Omaha Staff. He intended to visit the Omaha Center himself very soon. Secretary Gates said he would soon receive a brief on the subject from General Power. The President said the JCS had a great responsibility in this field because a great delegation of authority was involved.

*The National Security Council:*¹

Noted the President's statement that, while he has received encouraging reports on the activities of the Strategic Target Planning Staff in Omaha, he believes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a special responsibility for keeping fully informed technically and militarily on the development of this Strategic Target Planning Staff.

Note: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²

2. *U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to July 1, 1962*³ (Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military Operations," dated June 18, 1958; NSC Action No. 1934;⁴ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 28, 1960⁵)

Mr. Gray introduced this subject to the Council by reading the first three paragraphs of his briefing note, a copy of which is filed in the Minutes of this Meeting and another copy of which is attached to this Memorandum.⁶ Mr. Gray then introduced Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin to make a presentation consisting of a summary of the 135-page report on the subject transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 28, 1960. (A copy of Mr. Irwin's presentation is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum.)⁷

At the close of Mr. Irwin's presentation, the President said he was interested in the difference of judgment as to whether we should use

¹ The following paragraph and note constitute NSC Action No. 2316, approved by the President on October 17. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

² According to Goodpaster's November 9 memorandum of Lemnitzer's conference with the President on November 7, Lemnitzer reported that "requirements for targeting need to be very carefully scrutinized because if they go up, force requirements will also rise. Judgment remains the most important element in the process, despite casual statements that it is a completely objective and mechanical process. He said that the JCS will follow this matter closely." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)

³ General Polk also prepared a memorandum, dated October 10, of the discussion on this item. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170) See the Supplement.

⁴ See footnotes 1 and 8, Document 27.

⁵ See the source note, Document 121.

⁶ See the Supplement.

⁷ Not printed.

nuclear weapons immediately in responding to limited war situations which we could not otherwise handle, or whether we should come to the use of nuclear weapons gradually through a process of moves and counter-moves by our forces and the enemy forces. His own feeling was that if we were dependent on and armed with nuclear weapons, we should use them from the outset in the same manner that we would use any other weapon. If we were uncertain whether an enemy aggression can be stopped without the use of nuclear weapons, then we would need to use such weapons.

Mr. Irwin said there were two views on this subject. One view was that we should use nuclear weapons immediately when limited war hostilities broke out. Another view was that we should not use nuclear weapons because their use would create an impossible political situation with our allies; accordingly, we should wait until events force us to use nuclear weapons. Any study of limited war generally contains a compromise between these two views.

Secretary Anderson said he was impressed by our deficiencies with respect to guerrilla warfare. He felt that a great many situations in this hemisphere, as well as in other parts of the world, would call for U.S. action against guerrilla forces. Secretary Gates said steps were being taken to correct this deficiency, which had been high-lighted by the situation in Vietnam. The Army had recently dispatched training teams to Vietnam with the goal of training 4000 anti-guerrilla fighters who can be instructors for training additional forces. Capable anti-guerrilla teams have also been sent to Laos. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are reviewing their programs to determine whether enough effort is being devoted to counter-guerrilla operations. General Lemnitzer reported that extensive counter-guerrilla training was underway. An Army school at Fort Bragg initiates training and doctrine. Special counter-guerrilla groups are deployed to various areas.

The President said one of the most important and serious problems posed by the limited war study was how to stop limited wars from becoming general wars. Lincoln had said the way to kill a snake was to scotch its head. The President would, in general, be against a decision to attack the USSR in order to stop a limited Soviet aggression. He referred to the assumption in the limited war study that 5,000 Soviet volunteers had appeared in Iran. He thought that in such a situation, the Soviets would probably send an ultimatum referring to "the gravest consequences" if U.S. troops entered the struggle. This would pose a serious problem of decision. Ultimately, some President might have to decide that it was his duty to strike the first blow against the USSR in response to such an ultimatum.

Mr. Dillon felt the limited war study represented a step forward. The study had opened certain doors but also strongly suggested proceeding

further. In his view, the Laos and Iran situations depicted in the study were not realistic. However, he believed the Offshore Islands and Korean situations in the study were realistic. It was clear that the U.S. did not have the [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. With respect to the Offshore Islands, there had been no war-gaming of the proposition that once we use air-to-air nuclear weapons, the enemy might also use them. In such an event, we do not know what would happen. There has been no realistic examination of a two-way limited nuclear war in the Korean and Offshore Island areas. Mr. Dillon believed that such a war should be studied urgently. He felt it was possible to assume now that enemy use of nuclear weapons in either of these areas meant Soviet involvement, because the nuclear weapons used by the enemy would be Soviet weapons. Some years hence, however, the Chinese Communists would have a nuclear capability of their own. They might not be as cautious about a world conflagration as the Soviets are and may be more willing to use nuclear weapons in limited hostilities. In view of the forthcoming nuclear capability of the Chinese Communists, Mr. Dillon felt that a net evaluation study of some kind should be initiated to provide information on whether or not [2 lines of source text not declassified]. If such a study indicated that in a situation of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in these areas we would be placed at a disadvantage, this conclusion would strongly reinforce the grave doubts which the State Department has about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the Far East. We must rely on bases provided by our allies in the Far East; there is a serious question whether we can rely on such bases [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Mr. Dillon felt that it should be very clear that [2 lines of source text not declassified]. If we needed to strengthen our conventional military posture, we could do so by the time the Chinese Communists attain a nuclear capability. Mr. Dillon, in conclusion, said that the study left many questions unanswered and he hoped that some answers could be discovered by a new net evaluation exercise in time to produce a legacy to place before the incoming administration.

The President referred to the idea that both sides might use air-to-air nuclear weapons in the Offshore Islands area. He recalled that in 1953 a decision had been made in this room to use nuclear weapons if the enemy refused an armistice in Korea. Of course, the relative stocks of nuclear weapons made such a decision easier at that time. The President felt that if we became involved in the use of air-to-air nuclear weapons in a limited war, we would need to hit the enemy air bases. The enemy would then retaliate with larger nuclear weapons from farther back, whereupon we would attack these more remote bases. The reciprocal blows would tend to become bigger and bigger.

Mr. Dillon thought that in the event of limited hostilities with the Chinese Communists, their lack of sophisticated weapons might lead

them to drop some crude nuclear bomb on Guam. Secretary Gates wondered how it would be possible to fight the Chinese Communists without nuclear weapons in view of the vast reservoir of manpower in China. Secretary Dillon said we might defend in a limited war by conventional means when we would not be able to take the offensive. In the case of the Offshore Islands, we might have to decide whether we would rather lose the Islands or start a nuclear war. The President said this would be a difficult decision for a President who has to decide under the Congressional Resolution whether an attack on the Offshore Islands is a prelude to an attack on Formosa. In making this decision the President would have to pay a great deal of attention to the past performance of the Chinese Communists. Khrushchev had told him (the President) that Chiang Kai-shek was only a rebellious general, a traitor to the constituted government of China. The President had replied that his views and those of Khrushchev's were so different that there was no need of discussing the subject.

Mr. Dillon believed that hostilities over the Offshore Islands would represent our weakest case before the world. Mr. Gates said that would also be our weakest case domestically. Mr. Dillon noted that one major political party in the U.S. says we should not defend the Offshore Islands. The President said that might be good policy if it were possible to talk Chiang Kai-shek out of defending the Offshore Islands.

Mr. Dillon said the situation posed the problem of using nuclear weapons if such use might lead to a general war over the Offshore Islands. He did not know how long it would take to complete a study based on the assumption that both sides used nuclear weapons over the Offshore Islands. Secretary Gates said such studies usually depended on their basic assumptions, especially when we attributed to the enemy capabilities he does not now have. These matters were difficult to war-game but he believed it would be possible for three or four situations to be studied and analyzed. He wondered, however, if the existing study did not cover the point. Mr. Dillon said the present study did not go into detail in assuming that both sides used nuclear weapons. Mr. Gray said the study assumed we would use nuclear weapons and the enemy would not. The study expresses no opinion on what would happen next. Mr. Gray wondered whether we could maintain control of the air if both sides used nuclear air defense weapons in a limited war. If we could not maintain air superiority under these conditions, then would we have to strike at the source of air power, i.e., bases? Such a strike would raise the ante considerably. Mr. Dillon was suggesting that the JCS further examine the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons by both sides.

General Lemnitzer said this problem had not been war-gamed. The outcome of each step of a war-game would depend on the amount of enemy force assumed and the assumed U.S. reaction. The President said that with respect to the Offshore Islands, the assumption should be made

that Taiwan had been attacked. Mr. Irwin said the existing study had assumed that the attack on the Offshore Islands was within the context of the ultimate Chinese Communist goal of taking Taiwan. The President said that in deciding on U.S. action, a President would have to determine whether an attack on the Offshore Islands was part of a continuing attack leading to an attack on Taiwan.

Mr. Irwin said the existing study assumed an attack on Taiwan. He believed the study suggested by Mr. Dillon would be helpful but would pose a difficult question; that is, if only air-to-air weapons were used and there was no net advantage in their use, should the U.S. use nuclear weapons against bases, should the U.S. use nuclear weapons at all, should the U.S. build up conventional forces in view of the fact that even if the U.S. had very large conventional forces, the enemy could still initiate nuclear war? The study suggested by Mr. Dillon would get into difficult questions of force levels and budgets. Many issues would be raised and none of them would be simple.

Mr. Dillon felt a new study might help clarify the thinking of all concerned. If the study indicated that general war is the only way to defend the Offshore Islands, then we might have to re-examine some of our previous decisions on the subject. Mr. Irwin said that if we did not defend the Offshore Islands, Soviet aggression in Laos, Berlin, and elsewhere in the world would be the inevitable result.

Secretary Anderson agreed with the previous comments that the Offshore Island case was our weakest case. However, he believed it was right to defend the Offshore Islands because such defense shows the world that, regardless of the smallness of the geographic unit, we maintain our principles.

Mr. Dillon said the scenario in the present limited war study indicates that the immediate objective of enemy operations in the Offshore Islands area is to bring about the surrender of Quemoy. The optimum enemy objective is to take Taiwan. Secretary Gates said that the late Secretary Dulles had once described the symbolism of defending the Islands, a point which the public sometimes misses in asking why we are thinking about fighting over these little scraps of real estate. The President recalled that the late Secretary Dulles, Walter Robertson, and Admiral Radford had once gone to Formosa to try to persuade Chiang Kai-shek that it was silly to ask the West to defend the Offshore Islands. Secretary Dulles had reported back, however, that we had to keep Formosa and that Formosa would be lost if the Islands were lost, because the loss of the Islands would undermine the morale of Formosa. Mr. Dillon said the decision made at that time as to the defense of the Offshore Islands would be harder to make now because of the balance of nuclear capabilities in the world. Governor Hoegh believed that opinion in the U.S. was firmly in favor of defending Quemoy and Matsu.

The President said it had not yet been decided whether we would defend the Offshore Islands. The President could not declare war; he did, however, have authority to make decisions under the Congressional Resolution relating to the Offshore Islands. He believed the U.S. public favored any action which shows that we are standing firmly against Khrushchev. Vital U.S. interests would not be lost by losing territory such as the Offshore Islands [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] unless the loss of such territory indicated that we were so weak we would not defend our vital interests. The President then asked whether there had been any conversations with our allies on this subject. The presentation by Mr. Irwin had pointed out that we must have bases in order to engage in limited wars. Secretary Gates said that we have recently had conversations with the British about joint use of such bases as Singapore. The President recalled that a year ago Macmillan had remarked that it would be difficult to get the U.K. to go to war for two million miserable Germans who had been against the U.K. in two wars. Mr. Dillon said the same considerations applied to the Offshore Islands. The U.K. would cheer if the U.S. successfully defended the Islands but would not help.

Mr. Dulles estimated that a capability by the Chinese Communists in air-to-air nuclear weapons was many years in the future, unless the Soviets provide the Chinese with warheads and equipment. The Chinese Communists will have some nuclear capabilities in three to five years but these capabilities will not be sophisticated enough to produce air-to-air weapons. Mr. Dulles observed that at the present time the Soviets would not give the Chinese Communists a plugged nickel.

Mr. Gray called attention to the fact that the importance of prompt action regarding mobilization and an expansion of the war production base had been sharply illustrated by the limited war study. He thought it was necessary that the Council be sure that the U.S. was in a position to fight a limited war. General Lemnitzer thought that mobilization actions would depend on the size of the limited war. Ammunition stocks were a key factor since we had only a modest reserve. In the event of a large limited war, we would have to start production immediately. The President asked whether ammunition was not in production at all times for replacement for the amounts expended in training. General Lemnitzer said this was a stop-and-go operation. We build up our ammunition reserves, use them up, and then replace them. The President said he supposed building up ammunition reserves could be carried too far because of deterioration of stocks and changes in weapons. Secretary Gates noted that a new mobilization base concept had been presented to the NSC last summer. This new base was not financed in any budget, however. Defense had not built up a big stock of matériel along the lines of World War II or Korean War inventories.

Mr. Dillon asked Mr. Gates whether it would not be helpful if three or four limited war situations were studied further. Mr. Gates agreed that such a study might be helpful but added that the results might be controversial because of the assumptions problem. Mr. McCone felt that a great deal depended on whether we assume the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield only or on bases also. He wondered how a limited war in Korea could be conducted under the threat of a surprise enemy use of nuclear weapons against a port such as Pusan, where one nuclear bomb would destroy the whole operation. General Lemnitzer said that in the Korean War we took a calculated risk. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Gray said the Record of Actions would reflect a request by the President that Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should evaluate our capabilities for conducting a limited war in Korea and the Offshore Islands areas on the assumption that both sides used nuclear weapons. Mr. Gray also suggested that the JCS be requested to look at the possible deficiencies in limited war capabilities suggested by the study, with particular reference to Southeast Asia, airlift, and mobilization planning. General Lemnitzer agreed to the studies proposed, provided agreement on the assumptions could be reached.

At this point the President left the meeting.

*The National Security Council:*⁸

a. Noted and discussed the memorandum by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject and the study attached thereto (transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 28, 1960), prepared by representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to agreement between the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; as summarized at the meeting by Mr. John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).

b. Noted the directive by the President that the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff undertake, in consultation as appropriate with other departments and agencies, a study for presentation to the NSC of U.S. and allied military capabilities for conducting limited military operations in Korea and the Taiwan/Offshore Islands area, based on the assumption that both the U.S. and the enemy employ nuclear weapons under varying conditions. The study should be designed to answer the question of whether in these or similar limited military operations, there is more advantage to the U.S. from a military

⁸ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2317, approved by the President on October 17. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

point of view in the use of nuclear weapons by both sides or by neither side.

c. Requested the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a report for early presentation to the NSC commenting on possible deficiencies in the U.S. posture for limited military operations that are indicated by the study attached to the reference memorandum dated September 28, 1960, with particular reference to capabilities in Southeast Asia, air and sea lift capabilities, and mobilization base plans.

d. Noted that the Department of Defense is taking actions to improve the capability for counter-guerrilla type limited military operations, referred to in the study attached to the reference memorandum dated September 28, 1960.

Note: The actions in b, c and d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation, with a target date of December 15, 1960, for completion of the study and report referred to in b and c above.

[Here follows Agenda Item 3. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security."]

Marion W. Boggs

126. Editorial Note

On October 13, 1960, a Special Meeting of the National Security Council heard and discussed a presentation by the Comparative Evaluations Group (CEG) on AICBM (anti-intercontinental ballistic missile systems) pursuant to NSC Action No. 2300–h. (Note dated October 13; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) No memorandum of this meeting has been found. Concerning NSC Action No. 2300, see footnote 10, Document 120.

Kistiakowsky's diary entry on this meeting reads as follows:

"A special NSC meeting on the comparative evaluation of AICBM. The analysis was objective and, while not very conclusive, indicated the situation fairly well. Dillon again argued the danger of the psychological impact if the Soviets develop one ahead of us and so urged a strong program. The President emphasized the importance of a convincing demon-

stration that we have a capability but refused to accept the need of large deployment." (Kistiakowsky, *A Scientist at the White House*, page 404)

The previous day, Kistiakowsky had attended the CEG's preliminary briefing at the Pentagon. In his diary entry, he commented: "Nothing much wrong with the study, but it certainly doesn't come to definite conclusions and probably can't. In subsequent discussion, Dillon emphasized the psychological effect of the announcement that the problem has been solved by one of the opposing parties and urged greater intensification of the Nike-Zeus project. Other comments were of more detailed nature." (*Ibid.*, page 403)

Following discussion of the AICBM item on October 13, the Council met in regular session. (Memorandum of discussion by Johnson, October 18; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) The section of the memorandum of discussion dealing with the status of national security programs is in the Supplement.

127. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Kistiakowsky) to President Eisenhower

Washington, November 25, 1960.

Carrying out your directive to report to you on the methodology used in the preparation of the Optimized Strategic Target List and the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP),¹ my associates (Dr. H. E. Scoville and Dr. George Rathjens) and I studied the relevant aspects of the activities of the Joint Strategic Planning Staff (JSPS), and I have come to the following conclusions:²

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret.

¹ Regarding Eisenhower's directive, see Document 113. Some of the methodological assumptions governing the SIOP are in the Annex to Appendix B of JCS 2056/181, October 12, 1960. This Annex records the decisions taken at a meeting of the JSTPS Policy Committee on September 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 5175 (16 Sep 60) Section 1) See the Supplement.

² Kistiakowsky also reported to the President orally on November 25. According to a transcript of a telephone conversation between Burke and Aurand, the latter stated that, after Kistiakowsky's briefing, Eisenhower expressed dismay over the emerging SIOP's potential for overkill, speculated on possible use of Polaris as a backup force for use after satellite damage assessment of an initial nuclear exchange, and stated that "we've got to get this thing right down to the deterrence." (Transcript, November 25; Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Transcripts and Phone Calls (NSTL)) See the Supplement.

1. The staff is following the directives received from the JCS³ which, in turn, are based on your approval of the NSC action following the presentation of "Study 2009" by General Hickey.⁴ The JSPS is making effective use of available intelligence information. I believe that the presently developed SIOP is the best that could be expected under the circumstances and that it should be put into effect.

2. I recommend that an effort be initiated now to review the directive to, and the procedures used by, the JSPS in anticipation of the preparation of subsequent SIOPs for the following reasons:

(a) To achieve operational simplicity, each weapon carrier is now assigned the same target or targets regardless of whether our strike is preventive or retaliatory. This leads to the result that even a retaliatory strike has largely a "counter force" character. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

(b) The JSPS used blast effect as the only criterion of damage and neglected thermal radiation, fires which will be caused by it, and fallout. The question may be raised as to whether the resultant damage criteria are unnecessarily conservative, whether they result in overkill and will create unjustified additional "force requirements."

[2 paragraphs (20 lines of source text) not declassified]

(c) The staff is making extensive use of computers, but I believe that their programming could be improved and that the most competent people (such as available in WSEG, for instance) should become involved. This refinement, the revision of damage criteria, and possibly a re-evaluation of the importance of "counter force" strikes, will become especially important when operational plans are developed for less than our total alert force (the force that may survive a surprise attack by the enemy).

(d) The present SIOPs which are being developed for situations in which we receive longer strategic warning call for the use not only of the alert, but also for the larger "follow on" forces. The damage which is expected to the Sino-Soviet Bloc from the strike of the alert force alone appears to be so extensive that one may question whether the commitment of "follow on" forces to strategic strike is urgently required. If not, the over-all national planning of strategic forces may need revision, with the highest emphasis being given to the survival of the alert force and low emphasis to the use of "follow on" forces.

³ See footnote 1, Document 113.

⁴ Reference is to the presentation described in Document 90. Lieutenant General Thomas F. Hickey was Chairman of the Staff of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee. "Study 2009" refers to NSC Action No. 2009; see footnote 7, Document 38.

I attach herewith a summary of our detailed observations, made on the basis of briefings from the Joint Strategic Planning Staff.⁵

G.B. Kistiakowsky⁶

⁵ "Comments on Briefings by the Joint Strategic Planning Staff, November 3-5, 1960," apparently drafted by a member of Kistiakowsky's staff. See the Supplement. SIOF-62 was approved by the JCS on December 2 and went into effect on April 15, 1961. Additional information is in Burke, "Special Edition Flag Officers Dope," December 4, 1960. (Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, NSTL/SIOF Messages) See the Supplement.

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

128. Editorial Note

On December 6, 1960, President Eisenhower met with President-elect John F. Kennedy at the White House. Kennedy was interested in the organization and operations of the White House staff, the National Security Council, and the Pentagon, and Eisenhower urged him to avoid any reorganization until "he himself could become well acquainted with the problem." Eisenhower also explained the functions of the White House staff and the relations between the President and Cabinet officers and between the military and civilian staffs within the White House. The two men also discussed Europe, NATO, atomic energy policy, and the balance of payments.

At the end of the meeting, Kennedy asked Eisenhower if he could call on the President "to serve the country in such areas and in such manner as may seem appropriate." Eisenhower agreed but noted that he preferred not to undertake "errands which might necessitate frequent and lengthy travel." Kennedy also said that he wanted to retain General Goodpaster for 2 months in the new administration.

The full text of President Eisenhower's account of the meeting is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. It is printed in *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961*, pages 712-716.

129. Memorandum of Discussion at the 469th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, December 8, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Item 1. "NATO in the 1960s."]

2. *Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1960: The Military Program (NSC 6013)*¹

Mr. Gray called on Secretary Gates for an oral presentation on the annual report by the Department of Defense on the status of U.S. Military Programs as of June 30, 1960. Secretary Gates said the annual status report on the Military Program had been prepared in response to an NSC requirement. Mr. Douglas would present a summary of the report unless the President would prefer to open the discussion with questions instead of hearing the presentation. The President said he would like to hear the presentation.

Secretary Douglas said he hoped he could give in a general summary of a detailed report—a matter which always involved the problem of selection—a general impression of where, in the opinion of the Secretary of Defense, our military programs are at the present time. Mr. Douglas then read a brief summary of our actual and potential capabilities to fulfill current military commitments and basic objectives. (A copy of Mr. Douglas' presentation is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting.)²

The President did not quite share the somber opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the U.S. had to be superior in all phases of preparation for war. His own belief was that it was becoming increasingly dangerous to assume that limited wars could occur without triggering general war. His conviction in this matter was growing stronger all the time as he heard more and more discussion of nuclear capabilities. He was becoming more and more concerned with the problem of deterrence. He believed our principal effort should be devoted to convincing the USSR that no matter what the Soviet Union does, it will receive a rain of

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs.

¹ Complete copies of NSC 6013 are *ibid.*, Records of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, and in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Policy Papers File. A copy without the sections on "The Military Program" and "The Atomic Energy Program" is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6013 Series. "The Military Program" is *ibid.*, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 71 D 171, NSC 6013. Part of the latter section is in the Supplement. Although attached to a December 7 covering memorandum from Lay to the Council, that section contains later modifications that apparently resulted from the discussion above.

² Not found.

destruction if it attacks the U.S. The President believed that all other military matters must remain secondary to the overriding importance of deterrence.

The President then remarked that the President-Elect had expressed the belief that there was no excuse for building so many aircraft carriers in view of the large number of Polaris missiles the U.S. would soon have. The President had indicated to Mr. Kennedy that in his view the aircraft carrier was an ideal limited war weapon; for this reason this Administration had supported the construction of aircraft carriers on the basis that they should be built specifically for limited war rather than for general war. Senator Kennedy had kept his own counsel on what he would do when he became President but it seemed likely that he intended to effect some economies in our aircraft construction schedules. Senator Kennedy had recently been briefed at Omaha and as a result of such briefing was apparently concerned about the possibility that we are overdoing things; that is, that we had an over-kill capability and an over-profusion of targets.

Secretary Douglas pointed out in connection with deterrence that on December 2 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved a national strategic target list and an integrated operations plan effective April 1, 1961.³ This list and this plan had been developed by a unified task force and were consistent with national security policy. Mr. Douglas felt this development was significant since the plan for the first time effectively integrated and provided for mutual support among all U.S. forces for a single initial attack. The President agreed that the developments mentioned by Mr. Douglas were great steps forward even though still more needed to be done. The President believed our guiding principle should be to let the USSR know that we have the power to destroy the Soviet Union if the latter attacks us. The President believed that the Soviet leaders would not dare attack if they knew their country would be destroyed.

Secretary Dillon said he had read the Communist Manifesto produced by the Moscow Conference of World Communist Leaders.⁴ This document contained a section on the horrors of general war and a separate section on local wars. Reading between the lines of the latter section, Mr. Dillon gained the impression that the Communists are not fully aware that it may be impossible to fight a local war without having it develop into a general war.

Secretary Herter noted that the military status reports in 1958 and 1959⁵ contained some rather pessimistic conclusions. In 1958, for exam-

³ See footnote 5, Document 127.

⁴ Reference is to the Declaration published on December 5 by the 81 Communist Parties attending the Moscow Conference of World Communist Leaders.

⁵ See footnote 1, Document 36, and footnote 1, Document 79.

ple, the report stated that if the then existing trends continued, the U.S. military superiority would be lost in the foreseeable future. The 1959 report stated that both the U.S. and the USSR would possess military strength of decisive proportions by 1962. In other words, the curve of military development seemed to be against the U.S. according to the 1958 and 1959 reports. Secretary Herter wondered whether this unfavorable trend had now been arrested. Mr. Douglas said that the statements referred to by Secretary Herter in previous reports were contained in a section prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He pointed out, however, that the statements he had just made in his summary evaluation had been approved by the Secretary of Defense after discussion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose comments were reflected in the statement. Mr. Douglas recalled the statement Secretary Herter referred to, to the effect that both the U.S. and the USSR would have decisive military power in 1962, so that the victor would be the power which took the initiative. This year's status report contained no comment on this subject. Secretary Gates said the JCS had received a copy of the presentation made by Mr. Douglas but had not been asked to approve it. General Lemnitzer said the presentation made by Mr. Douglas had been based on a JCS draft. The various Chiefs of Staff had made suggestions which had been incorporated in the presentation. Secretary Gates felt that a more thorough job had been done this year than in previous years. If the statements in previous status report had been coordinated Department of Defense statements, they might not have been couched in such strong language.

Secretary Herter felt that the current status report should be revised for the sake of the record to include an indication that the statements he had referred to in the 1958 and 1959 status reports were not considered appropriate for the 1960 status report. The President agreed with Secretary Herter. The current status report should say that the statements referred to from the 1958 and 1959 reports had been considered but that we no longer give them the weight we attributed to them in 1958 and 1959. Secretary Douglas said the Department of Defense did not necessarily disagree with the statements made in 1958 and 1959 but did not think they would be appropriate for the 1960 report. The President said the current status report should say something on this subject; the matter could not be left hanging in mid-air. Secretary Gates said that a paragraph would be added to the report which would bring the whole question into focus. The President noted that the Defense Department now had an opinion on this question which was not quite the same as it was in 1958 and 1959.

Secretary Herter then noted that Mr. Douglas in his presentation referred to the fact that our conventional capabilities had not kept pace with our nuclear capabilities. He asked whether this meant that our conventional capabilities had decreased. Secretary Douglas said both our

conventional and our nuclear capabilities had advanced but our nuclear capabilities had advanced at a tremendous rate whereas the improvement in our conventional capabilities had not been as great. Secretary Herter felt this point should be clarified in the status report. He had received the impression that the U.S. was falling behind in conventional capabilities. He agreed with the President that limited wars in large numbers were unlikely. Nevertheless, U.S. conventional capabilities to fight a limited war were of great interest to our allies and to many neutral nations of the world. Mr. Douglas believed the report could be amended to call attention to recent improvements in our limited war capabilities. Both in NATO and in the Far East we have augmented our ground force capabilities by provision of short-range nuclear weapons. Secretary Herter pointed out that Mr. Douglas was referring to nuclear capabilities, not conventional capabilities. Mr. Douglas said there was no indication in national security policy that we do not expect to use our nuclear capabilities in a limited war.

The President then inquired about the project to retrofit M-48 tanks with diesel engines. He was under the impression that several years ago we had said we had exactly the tank we wanted and now we seemed to be retrofitting them. Secretary Brucker said that the tank we wanted was the M-60 with a diesel engine and a big gun. The M-48 was an old tank which was to be modernized with diesel engines. After some further discussion of the characteristics of M-47 [M-60?] and M-48 tanks, the President noted that we had carried forward programs for the improvement of a great deal of military equipment.

Mr. Gray observed that some months ago the Council had been informed that construction of our missile bases had fallen behind schedule. During the Planning Board discussion of the military status report, the Department of Defense had reported that there had been no further slippage in missile base construction schedules, even though the time lost earlier had not been fully made up. Secretary Gates confirmed the report that had been made to the Planning Board. The President felt it might be important to make a statement to this effect in the status report.

Mr. Gray then reported that the President had recently asked about the status of the Hound Dog missile. Mr. Gray's information was that 25 Hound Dogs were operational as of June 30, 1960 and that 242 were projected for June 30, 1961. General White said that some difficulties had developed in the Hound Dog program which would delay operational capabilities. The President inquired as to the nature of the trouble. General White said that the Hound Dog, which was a complex weapon system, had not proven completely reliable. He believed the unreliability thus far revealed could be overcome after further testing. The President inquired about the Skybolt program. General White expressed the belief that Skybolt was an important weapon system for the future. The Sky-

bolt was a ballistic equivalent of the Hound Dog. Secretary Gates reported that the Skybolt program had been cut back in the new budget, an action which might create difficulties with the U.K., which had been emphasizing the Skybolt. Some consideration had been given to canceling the Skybolt program but as an alternative it had been retained in the budget, although at a lower level.

*The National Security Council:*⁶

a. Noted and discussed an oral summary of the status of the military program on June 30, 1960, by the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, based on Part 1 of NSC 6013.

b. Noted the President's statement that he believed there was increasing question as to whether it could be assumed that there would be limited wars which would not lead to general war. He felt that this meant that our first responsibility involves maintaining a deterrent to general war, with all other military missions taking largely a supporting role. Noted the statement by the Secretary of State that, whether limited wars in the future were likely or not, the maintenance of adequate conventional capabilities for limited wars was still considered very important by our allies, and indeed by ourselves.

c. Noted and discussed the view of the Secretary of Defense that some of the statements regarding unfavorable trends in U.S. military capabilities vis-à-vis the USSR, contained in the FY 1958 and 1959 status reports (NSC 5819 and NSC 5912), would not necessarily be appropriate under current conditions; and suggested that further comment on such statements be included in the FY 1960 report.

d. Noted that, while delays were previously reported to the National Security Council in the construction schedule for missile bases at the first five sites, no further delays in those bases becoming operational after March 1, 1961, are presently anticipated.

Note: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense.

3. *U.S. Military Programs for FY 1962* (NSC Action No. 2151)⁷

Secretary Gates said that the initial budget guidance in the Pentagon was that the FY 1961 figures would be used as the basis for the FY 1962 budget. At the Quantico meeting he had asked the Armed Services for four different budgets: a budget incorporating a 5 per cent decrease, a budget holding firm at the FY 1961 level, a budget incorporating a 5 per cent increase, and a so-called "D-budget" incorporating all items which

⁶ The following paragraph and note constitute NSC Action No. 2341, approved by the President on December 17. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

⁷ See footnote 12, Document 79.

the Services considered necessary but which could not be squeezed into the other three budgets. It had also been decided that force levels would not be changed. Moreover, the budget preparations took account of the political guidance of the Secretary of State as to the international situation. The largest budget produced by this method called for \$50.6 billion in New Obligational Authority. In the budget processing the Department of Defense had also reviewed each weapons system and category of forces and had tried to achieve a better balance between general and limited war capabilities. All figures on the budget had been furnished the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that they would have all necessary information for a separate review. Secretary Gates had held many meetings with the Service Secretaries and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who participated in the defense budget process this year to a greater extent than ever before. The budget which the Department of Defense will propose for FY 1962 was derived from the four budgets mentioned previously but does not closely resemble any one of them. He had been compelled to cut back certain military programs. One of the compelling reasons for the cut-back was the \$23 billion in fixed personnel costs and in maintenance and operations costs. The new budget provided for no increase or decrease in personnel overall, although Navy personnel strength has increased by about 6000 and a small personnel reduction had been accepted by the Air Force. The National Guard had been reduced by 10 per cent. Many programs in the Research and Development area had been re-oriented and must be reviewed. With great difficulty intelligence programs had been reviewed and an effort had been made to hold them to the FY 1961 levels. Secretary Gates believed that further progress could be made in the intelligence area after the report of the Joint Survey Group was received. The new budget made no provision for additional costs resulting from balance-of-payments difficulties.

In summary, Mr. Gates said the new budget provided for \$42,930,000,000 in expenditures and for \$41,855,000,000 in New Obligational Authority, an increase of \$1.3 billion in expenditures and \$510 million in NOA. To arrive at these figures a substantial cut-back in direct operations was necessary (\$1 billion in the case of the Air Force). Secretary Gates said the details of this budget were still being changed. Last night he had met with the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had solicited their attitude toward the new budget. He was sure that all military officers and civilian officials would support the budget adopted by the President when the President's decision was made. Some of the Services, however, were unhappy as of now, believing that we were taking a military risk in adopting the new budget. This, he believed, was the Air Force attitude. Moreover, the Navy feels its future is not bright because it needs more ships and therefore more new obligational authority than the new budget permits. The Army feels the total budget

figure is too low and should be increased by \$1 or \$2 billion. The Army feels the budget is a "division of shortages" and is concerned about the rate of modernization of the Army, even though the Army budget has been increased relatively more than the budgets of the other two Services. All the Services would like to have more manpower. Secretary Gates said that General Lemnitzer would now make a brief statement on force levels, after which he recommended that the President hear the views of the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Lemnitzer said his summary presentation was supported by a paper distributed to the Council members showing the changes in force levels.⁸ He reported that Army divisions would now have both nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities and that Army air defense capabilities would be enhanced by the National Guard. The budget provided for an Army personnel strength of 870,000 plus a National Guard of 630,000 (a 10 per cent reduction in the National Guard). The principal change in Army deployments was in the air defense field, resulting from a new low-level air defense missile capability. New deployments were made possible by absorbing personnel from deactivated units. Turning to the Navy, General Lemnitzer reported that by June of 1962 the Navy would have 817 combat ships. The active aircraft inventory of the Navy by that time would be reduced by some 400 planes. The major changes in Navy deployment for the period in question included placing seven Polaris submarines on station and slight reductions in the Mediterranean and Far Eastern fleets. In the Air Force, combat wings would be reduced from 96 to 84 by 1962. Manned aircraft would be reduced from 18,700 to 16,144. The Air Force expected to develop 13 Atlas squadrons, 14 Titan squadrons, and 12 Minuteman squadrons (9 hardened and 3 mobile) by 1962 although all these forces would not enter the inventory by that time. Personnel strength in the Air Force had been reduced from 825,000 to 822,900. Air Force re-deployments consisted principally of the reduction of tactical striking and reconnaissance units in Europe. General Lemnitzer concluded by requesting that the paper on deployments distributed to the Council members be returned.

The President wondered what savings could be effected in the military budget if an attempt were made to survey the National Guard reserve problem intelligently. He asked whether we were not now in a position, despite the political factor in the problem, to recommend one reserve force with a specified necessary mission. He thought we should abandon the idea of carrying 15–20 divisions overseas in general war because we know such an operation will be impossible after a nuclear exchange. He would like to see a start made in attacking this problem of the reserves. Secretary Gates said the savings would be very large if the

⁸ Not found.

National Guard and organized reserve problem could be solved. However, the problem was almost entirely a political one. The President said that the only hope for recovery and rehabilitation after a nuclear attack lay in the presence throughout the country of disciplined armed forces which could bring order out of disaster. Secretary Gates agreed with this concept but noted that the Army did not concur. Moreover, he thought there was little chance of selling the President's concept politically unless it had firm military support. General Lemnitzer reported that National Guard and reserve training was placing increasing emphasis on civil defense responsibilities. Governor Hoegh reported that the National Guard now has a secondary mission of great importance, the support of state and local governments in the emergency and recovery phases following a nuclear attack. The National Guard would respond to the command of the state governors. He understood that training in civil defense measures was being carried forward. Secretary Herter felt that the concept of having the National Guard under the command of state governors was one of the great difficulties in this field. He said that in New England all estimates of fall-out pattern cut across the state lines of a great many states. The only hope for recovery and rehabilitation lay in a unified federal command of the armed forces in the area rather than in state command. General Lemnitzer said arrangements had been made for unified command of all the armed forces in an area.

The President said he failed to see the logic in having two types of reserve forces. Two forces were very expensive but were kept in being partly in response to the lobbies of the National Guard and the Reserve Officers Association. When we propose a 10 per cent reduction in the National Guard, Congress disallows the reduction. He would like a study made to indicate exactly what reserve forces we should have; he would like to recommend such forces and stick to that recommendation. General Lemnitzer said the National Guard formed a replacement pool of trained manpower. The President said that if General Lemnitzer was referring to a replacement pool for major combat operations, he would like to be shown how the replacements could be collected and transported to the battle areas after a nuclear attack. He felt we had not adequately studied the conditions which would prevail after such an attack. The Net Evaluation Subcommittee studies had indicated the large number of casualties that would result, the number of cities that would be destroyed, the fact that there would be no communications, and the problem of getting a government started again. The President feared we were thinking in World War II terms in dealing with the problem of the National Guard and the reserves. General Lemnitzer believed the reserves would play a vital role in recovery and rehabilitation after a nuclear attack. Moreover, the reserves would be extremely useful in limited war operations after the active divisions were deployed.

The President agreed that the reserves would have a certain role in limited war operations. He thought, however, that in general war, time was of the essence. It was, of course, necessary to have a disciplined force in the country for recovery and rehabilitation but he did not understand why both a National Guard and an organized reserve were required. With respect to the political problem, he thought no time was better than the present, when he was about to leave the office of President, to make new proposals. He believed a study should show what should be done from the standpoint of efficiency. The time had come to make recommendations for the kind of system we believe is needed. The President felt he could well afford to make recommendations of this character at the present time. General Lemnitzer pointed out that the paid strength of the reserves had been reduced by over 50 per cent since 1953. Further reductions are being resisted by the reserves. A reorganization of the reserves involving every governor was just being completed after a major effort at coordination. An attempt to achieve further reduction might result in upsetting this reorganization and starting over again.

The President observed that he had had the experience of seeing the National Guard called out to resist federal authority. He did not believe the National Guard as such should be under the control of the states. Thus far we had not faced up to this problem. The President then asked whether the FY 1962 military budget contained any money for Dynasoar.

Secretary Gates said the new budget contained an item of \$70 million for the Dynasoar project. The Air Force believed its requirements were double this figure. Ultimately, the Dynasoar program would cost \$700 million. The question at issue was the rate at which the program would be developed. Dr. York said Dynasoar would cost at least \$700 million and possibly more. The President asked to what use Dynasoar could be put when it was completed. Dr. York replied that completion of the project would result in the U.S. being ready to put a military man in space. Dynasoar was a follow-on to the X-15 and the NASA man-in-space programs. The present Dynasoar program was a research and development effort to effect a controlled and manned re-entry from space. The President felt that Dynasoar would be a desirable project to play around with if unlimited funds were available. However, he was not in the least impressed by the usefulness of Dynasoar as a project which would compete with other defense programs for scarce funds. The President then wondered how many Samos and Midas satellites we would have to put in orbit, assuming that these satellites became operationally feasible, and whether we could stand the cost. The President added that he had thus far been willing to retain the Samos and Midas programs in the budget because of the faith which scientists such as Dr. York had in them. Dr. York believed that Dynasoar was not nearly as important as the Samos and Midas programs.

General White expressed the view that the Dynasoar program was vital in order to keep the U.S. in the technological race. The President said that his comments on Dynasoar had been based on his view of the national security race rather than the technological race. General White said that Dynasoar opened up entirely new concepts of fighting a war. He believed Dynasoar was an essential part of the Air Force program. The President said General White had expressed one view of the matter but his (the President's) view was diametrically opposed. Some of the research and development now going on was beyond imagining. The President felt that insufficient discrimination had been used in establishing priorities. He then asked how much Samos and Midas would cost by 1964.

Dr. York replied that Samos could be bought in either large or small amounts; that is, reconnaissance flights could take place frequently or as infrequently as once a year. The President believed that if Samos proved to be technically feasible, its sponsors would want a reconnaissance flight every day. Dr. York said that in the case of Midas a large number of satellites would be needed because Midas was a warning system and moreover, a warning system which was very expensive to build and operate. The cost of Midas would be in the hundreds of millions of dollars each year. However, a warning system was a very important thing to have. Secretary Douglas said it was impossible to tell at the present time whether Midas would ever become operational. The present level of the Midas program was, however, essential in order to determine whether Midas was operationally feasible. In response to a question from the President, Dr. York said that putting one Samos in orbit three years from now would cost about \$10 million. The President asked how long a single Samos would need to reconnoiter the USSR and Communist China. Dr. York said the vehicle could cover the whole of the Soviet Union in a matter of days; perhaps a dozen flights would be required to cover the USSR. Secretary Douglas said a vehicle might be kept in orbit for as long as ten days; it would attempt reconnaissance only during periods of good weather.

The President believed that Dynasoar as well as a great many research and development projects were useful concepts but he was unable to understand what practical utility a great many of these concepts would have. In his view, the defense of the U.S. depended on a balance of moral, economic, and military factors and would not be achieved by military factors alone. Financial circles abroad know of our dollar problem and were closely scrutinizing our budget. If the new budget provides for a large deficit, the result would be loss of confidence abroad and further gold withdrawals.

General Lemnitzer said the Joint Chiefs of Staff faced the problem of a lack of intelligence from inside the Soviet Union. The Chiefs were

working in a complete intelligence vacuum. Mr. Dulles said he did not think there was a complete intelligence vacuum. For example, we know when the Soviets launch missiles. General Lemnitzer said the Joint Chiefs had less information now about Soviet activities than they had ever had before. Mr. Dulles agreed that we were getting less information now than we were able to obtain at the time U-2 flights were permitted.

Secretary Gates asked whether the President would like to hear the views of the military services. The President said he would but warned that he was difficult to convince.

Secretary Brucker said the Army would accept the final budget and support it. The budget difficulties of the Army began in 1957 with the Deutschmark problem. Until then Army was receiving in excess of \$300 million a year from Germany. The Army's procurement troubles which began in 1957 had resulted from postponing \$200 million in procurement each year. The Army was now languishing from loss of adequate procurement for four years. The Army is now in difficulties because there is inadequate provision in the present budget for modernization which will be needed 18 months from now. The Army has been pressing the balanced forces concept and the idea of dual capability weapons such as Davy Crockett and Pershing. The President asked whether the Army could afford to fire Pershing with an ordinary warhead. Secretary Brucker replied it was possible to fire Pershing with a conventional warhead. Continuing, he said that 162 Army Ordnance items had been improved so markedly that analogous old equipment was completely obsolete. However, the Army could not afford to procure the improved items in adequate numbers. The Army needed "modernization money" in its budget to re-equip itself with the improved items.

The President inquired about the cost of keeping an army division in Europe as compared with the cost of maintaining it in the U.S. Secretary Brucker replied that it cost more to keep an army division in Europe or Korea than in the U.S. Mr. Stans estimated that the difference in cost was about \$50 million per division per year. The President said he had always been annoyed at the idea that we had to keep the equivalent of six army divisions in Europe indefinitely. Every time we broached the idea of redeploying some divisions from Europe, there is talk about the possible break-up of NATO. He believed it was time for us to find out whether NATO was really as fragile as this talk suggested.

Secretary Brucker believed the Army could save millions if it were allowed to modernize its equipment. He referred to the M-113 personnel carrier which weighed half as much as the old personnel carrier and did a more effective job for half the cost. Secretary Douglas said large quantities of M-113's were provided for in the budget. Secretary Brucker gave as a further example the M-60 tank which he said cost less than the M-48 or the M-48 retrofit. Moreover, the M-60 had a better gun, a greater

radius, and was more maneuverable. Secretary Gates said the improved equipment referred to by Secretary Brucker was being budgeted for the Army. The issue was how quickly could the entire Army be re-equipped. Secretary Brucker said that a great deal of army modernization could be effected by a slight increase in the Army budget.

Secretary Herter inquired about airlift capabilities in the new budget. Secretary Gates replied that a substantial number of Lockheed-130 planes were provided for in the budget.

Secretary Franke⁹ said the Navy had two budgetary problems; people in uniform and obsolescence. With respect to the first problem, the complexity of modern weapons and modern ships required more personnel whose training period had to be longer. Moreover, industry had been successful in getting trained personnel away from the Navy. As a result, a big in-put was required for a small output. The Navy had closed a great many installations already and was endeavoring to close additional ones. However, every time a proposal is made to close a Navy installation, opposition develops in Congress. The Navy is now trying to close three shipyards, one of which is in Boston. Secretary Franke doubted that the Navy could continue to do its job with the present personnel ceiling of 625,000 men plus 175,000 marines. The second problem, that of obsolescence, involved the replacement of old equipment with new and more expensive equipment. Adequate replacement was not feasible under present budgetary limitations. It could not be said that the Navy was fully modern at the present time.

Admiral Burke said that in 1964 or 1965 when new ships now being built would enter the fleet, over half of the fleet would still be comprised of World War II vessels. Modern ships needed to have six to seven times the sonar and ASW capabilities of World War II ships. It was possible that the Navy would have World War II equipment in action ten years from now. As a result of delay in ship replacement, the Navy would face serious problems five to ten years in the future. The President noted that the Navy was putting a great many resources into Polaris and attack submarines. He wondered what the face of warfare would be like five to six years from now and what naval measures we should take now to induce the USSR to estimate that it would not be profitable to attack the U.S. He asked whether Admiral Burke was suggesting that all old naval vessels should be replaced.

Admiral Burke said he was not suggesting ship-for-ship replacement. Polaris submarines were causing the Soviet Union a great deal of concern. The Soviets were doing everything possible to develop missile submarines of the Polaris type. The U.S. must maintain a Polaris subma-

⁹ William B. Franke, Secretary of the Navy.

rine capability and at the same time must have an attack submarine capability in order to destroy enemy missile-launching submarines. Moreover, there was always the possibility of a limited war for which we would have to furnish forces. It was essential for the Navy to have the limited war capability of protecting the forces which would be engaged in a limited war overseas. The President believed that limited war capabilities should not have the same priority as general war capabilities. Admiral Burke pointed out that anti-submarine warfare capabilities were needed by the Navy for both limited and general war.

Secretary Sharp said that the Air Force would also support the budget finally decided on by the President. He did not know whether General White would agree but he believed that the present modernization program for the Air Force, although not as large as he would like, was probably adequate. The Air Force would like to construct "building blocks" for future warfare. Dynasoar and Midas were examples of these "building blocks." One solution to the budgetary problem might be a NATO force. If the Air Force could achieve the ability to rotate its forces, it might be able to reduce its overseas commitment. An important Air Force economy policy consisted of closing bases and depots. The Air Force had recently announced the closing of four bases, two in Republican territory and two in Democratic territory. The Air Force would continue an effort to reduce its personnel but it must go on with a development program so that it would have the advanced weapons it needed in the event of war in the future. The difference between a quite adequate budget and one which was slightly marginal was in the order of 1 or 2 per cent.

The President said that anyone who sat in the center of the budgetary pressures as he did was apt to be sensitive. He hesitated to oppose his dedicated old associates in the military services. The only thing he could do was to ask the officers who formed the "hinge" between the people and the armed forces to take into consideration all the problems that impinge on him, e.g. the soundness of the dollar and its relationship to defense problems and to a balanced budget. The President believed that a balanced budget would be a tremendous service in helping to solve the dollar problem. There was, however, very little he could do to effect large savings. Military officers who made decisions could have a real effect on the budget. Even if new taxes are suggested, the point of diminishing returns would soon be reached. The President realized that on a "scare" basis, budgets could be increased for a year or so but he was now talking about the next fifty years. The U.S. had to be strong in all fields. We could not destroy morale by forced measures and economic controls which might destroy the economy. He believed it was the duty of military officers to get along with less if at all possible. He realized it was also the duty of military officers to ensure the military safety of the U.S. but he

believed that no absolute assurance on this point could ever be given. Our principal objective must be to convince the Soviets that they cannot attack us with impunity. The President then said he wanted, with respect to the FY 1961 budget, to make sure that this government could continue to operate until next June without going further into debt.

Mr. Stans said a new budget never pleased everyone. He believed the new military budget was a good budget since it seemed to spread dissatisfactions quite widely. He believed this budget could be lowered somewhat if the proper decisions were possible. However, the Bureau of the Budget had participated closely in the formulation of the military budget this year and he believed the present budget was realistic and that he could not conscientiously press for significantly lower amounts. On the other hand, he would oppose any action looking toward an increase in the new military budget.

The President said he was convinced that everyone would support the new military budget. He wanted the best possible corporate decisions made on these military problems since no one man could be sure that his decisions were correct. He would like to find out what percentage of increased security the U.S. would obtain for each percentage of increased cost. We must avoid authorizing advanced scientific programs now which will saddle us with enormous costs five to ten years from now. He realized that many people were estimating that we would have a greater GNP in the future. He wondered, however, whether any greater economic growth was possible without inflation, in which case our monetary unit would be dollarettes instead of dollars.

Mr. Gray said the Record of Actions would show that subject to the normal budgetary process and final action by the President, U.S. military programs for FY 1962 as recommended by the Secretary of Defense were generally consistent with national security policy objectives. Secretary Herter said he had one reservation to this proposed recommended action. He had not seen the details of the military budget and, therefore, felt it was difficult to go on record as endorsing the budget. He wondered whether it would not be preferable to state in the record that the military budget had been reported to and discussed by the Council but that no formal action had been taken. Mr. Gray felt it would be preferable to indicate in the record that the budget as outlined by the Secretary of Defense at this meeting was generally consistent with current national security objectives. Secretary Gates added that he could not conscientiously put forward a budget which would in his view violate national security policy.

*The National Security Council:*¹⁰

a. Noted and discussed an oral summary by the Secretary of Defense of the general outline of his recommendations as to the U.S. Military Programs for FY 1962, supplemented by an oral statement on the subject by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; in the light of comments thereon by the Service Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff.

b. Noted the President's conviction that the time had arrived to make a realistic analysis of the National Guard and Organized Reserve Programs with a view to determining, in the light of practical judgments as to currently foreseeable wartime conditions, whether the two types of Reserve units are still required and what actual missions they might be expected to perform, the number of personnel required, and the appropriate extent of Federal control and support.

c. Agreed that, subject to the normal budgetary process and final action by the President, the over-all outline of the U.S. Military Programs for FY 1962, as recommended by the Secretary of Defense at this meeting, is generally consistent with national security policy objectives.

Note: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense.

[Here follow Agenda Items 4. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," and 5. "U.S. Policy Toward Korea."]

Marion W. Boggs

¹⁰The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2342, approved by the President on December 17. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

130. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Gates

JCSM-553-60

Washington, December 9, 1960.

SUBJECT

Deficiencies in the U.S. Posture for Limited Military Operations (C)

1. In accordance with your directive concerning "U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962", dated 25

Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Top Secret.

October 1960,¹ the Joint Chiefs of Staff have prepared appropriate comments in response to paragraph 2317-c, NSC Action No. 2317.² The cited action required the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a report for early presentation to the National Security Council (NSC) commenting on possible deficiencies in the U.S. posture for limited military operations that are indicated by the Limited War Study with particular reference to capabilities in Southeast Asia, air and sea lift capabilities, and mobilization base plans.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their views on the Interdepartmental Committee Limited War Study which were forwarded to you on 27 July 1960.³ As the situations envisaged probably will never occur exactly in the manner depicted in the study, decisions must be made in light of the actual conditions existing at the time. Accordingly, the study does not by itself constitute a valid basis for formulating programs or reaching decisions. It is recommended that these views be made available to the NSC as they establish the general basis upon which this report is based.

3. Comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are as indicated in the Appendix hereto.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you endorse this report for forwarding to the NSC.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L. L. Lemnitzer⁴
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix⁵

GENERAL COMMENTS

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, even though the subject study stimulates and provokes thought, and highlights already well-recognized problem areas, it does not by itself constitute a valid basis for formulating programs or reaching decisions. Advance planning and programming must take into account many factors, such as Department of Defense budget, production base planning objectives and full capabil-

¹ Not found.

² See footnote 8, Document 125.

³ Document 121.

⁴ Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.

⁵ Top Secret.

ities of Allies to help themselves, which the study does not consider. It is thusly considered appropriate to comment on known deficiencies which may or may not coincide with the deficiencies in the study.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that one of the fundamental conclusions of the Limited War Study is:

“U.S. capabilities in conjunction with those of our Allies are generally adequate to conduct any one of the limited military operations studies but these capabilities are dependent on prompt action, as required in each case, to

“a. Initiate partial mobilization.

“b. Augment existing military lift capabilities.

“c. Expand the war production base.

“d. Waive financial limitations.”⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with this conclusion. This conclusion clearly indicates that the United States does not have forces in being adequate to cope with all envisaged limited war situations. The requirement for and implications of measures along the lines indicated above must be clearly recognized and considered as normal augmentation steps some or all of which must be taken to some degree in any limited war situation. These actions, if taken promptly, would serve to act as a further deterrent to expansion of hostilities. Additionally, the early implementation of these measures would provide required means to engage successfully in large scale limited military operations. These measures focus attention on the continuing requirement for adequately trained and equipped reserve forces, the requirement for ready availability of additional sea and air lift and the requirement to insure that mobilization base planning and programs adequately support operations which may be required, including the areas considered in the basic study, but recognizing that the actual requirements may vary markedly from those indicated by the hypothetical situations studied.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further note that the second over-all conclusion of the Limited War Study is:

“The U.S. over-all capability for general war would be degraded initially by any one of the five limited military situations studied, except Berlin, although not to an unacceptable degree. The capability of the U.S. nuclear retaliatory forces for general war would, in no case studied, be seriously affected.”

4. General views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with regard to the U.S. posture for limited military operations, have been presented in “The Sta-

⁶ “Waive financial limitations” is taken to mean lifting expenditure limitations, authorizing necessary deficiencies and seeking necessary supplemental appropriation. [Footnote in the source text.]

tus of National Security Programs on 30 June 1960,"⁷ which were forwarded to your office on 18 August 1960.

5. There are recognized deficiencies in the U.S. limited war posture, some of which were indicated in the Limited War Study. In any case, remedial action to correct deficiencies will be taken in the usual manner, i.e., the preparation and review of capabilities and contingency plans, evaluation of and action on requests by commanders of unified and specified commands to correct deficiencies and improve capabilities of their commands, the preparation of the JSOP and other actions relating to the preparation of the budget.

6. The system which determines the composition of U.S. forces is based upon acceptance of many calculated risks pertaining to the balance of forces as well as their supporting elements. Specific deficiencies derived from an analysis of the Limited War Study basically stem from judgments pertaining to the allocation of resources to provide forces and supporting elements primarily designed for use in a direct conflict between the United States and the USSR. Therefore, detailed programs aimed at correcting the deficiencies noted with regard to our capabilities to conduct limited war in any specific area must be weighed against possible higher priority commitments and requirements for operations in other areas and in different types of warfare.

7. Many considerations other than purely military directly affect our capabilities to respond effectively in limited war situations. These additional considerations include:

- a. Timely political decision and prompt application of effective force.
- b. Political restraints on the use of force.
- c. Actions by other elements of the government to insure availability of required facilities in overseas areas.

8. With regard to the points outlined in paragraphs 7a and b above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in commenting on the Limited War Study, stated that:

"a. Delayed actions and decisions could place the United States in a position where the application of force required to accomplish national objectives would have to be on such a scale as to increase the probability of undesirable expansion of the conflict.

"b. By their very nature, limited military operations would be conducted in light of numerous political restraints which would not pertain in case of general war. However, these restraints should be kept under review to insure they do not prevent military actions necessary to achieve national objectives. Limited military operations, once undertaken, should operate under sufficiently flexible direction to enable

⁷ See footnote 1, Document 129.

timely lifting of restraints as required. The alternatives would be stalemate or withdrawal from action and, in either case, a settlement under unfavorable circumstances.

“c. The close inter-relationship of diplomatic and propaganda activities to limited military operations underlines the importance of allowing the communist powers ‘thresholds of decision’ at which to weigh the consequences of further action.

“d. Even though the U.S. capability for either general war or additional contingency operations would be initially degraded, with the implementation of the national measures envisaged our over-all capabilities for general war and limited war would be increased with the passage of time.

“e. Under the conditions outlined in the study, it is noted that the military advantage accruing to U.S. and Allied forces from the use of nuclear weapons varied from no advantage in the Berlin situation to possible decisive advantage in the Korean situation. In the latter case, early employment of atomic weapons by U.S. forces—whether or not the communists retaliate—would be more advantageous than employment later in the conflict. It is believed that the use of nuclear weapons should be considered wherever and whenever U.S. military forces become involved in active conflict and that forces and weapons systems should be used as necessary and in a manner to achieve national objectives.

“f. There is a possibility that restricted and discriminate employment of nuclear weapons against purely military targets early in a conflict could result in rapid termination of hostilities.”

Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that the study failed to indicate the decisive potential of early application of required military capabilities. It is believed that, in many situations, the early use of a relatively small force would be more effective than later use of a larger force.

These judgments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff serve to indicate that considerations other than purely military have a considerable impact on the forces and support required to conduct effectively limited military operations.

9. Furthermore, U.S. capabilities may be seriously degraded by inadequate policy guidance during the period prior to hostilities. In fact, indecision and lack of clear cut policies could contribute to creating a situation or starting a conflict which we would desire to avoid. A pertinent example is the recent conflict of judgment between the Department of Defense and the Department of State concerning the proper implementation of U.S. policy in Laos.

10. Comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which specifically address possible deficiencies in U.S. posture for limited military operations, with

particular reference to capabilities in Southeast Asia, air and sea lift capabilities, and mobilization base plans are as indicated in the Annex hereto.

[Here follows a 16-page Annex, included in the Supplement, entitled "Specific Joint Chiefs of Staff Views on Possible Deficiencies in the U.S. Posture for Limited Military Operations."]

131. Editorial Note

On December 14, 1960, Boggs circulated to the National Security Council NSC 6021, "Missiles and Military Space Programs," a codification of policy on the subject derived from certain actions of the National Security Council for the 1955-1960 period. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6021 Series) In light of discussion at the Council meetings held on January 5 and 12, 1961, the Planning Board revised the paper, which the President approved on January 18 as NSC 6108, "Certain Aspects of Missile and Space Programs." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Policy Papers File)

132. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, December 21, 1960.

SUBJECT

NSC 6022 "Continental Defense"¹

On December 22 the NSC will consider the attached draft policy.

In February the Planning Board began a review of existing policy on Continental Defense (NSC 5802/1).² A discussion paper was prepared which was the subject of Council consideration on September 15, 1960.³ The principal subject of the discussion was the prospects for an effective

Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 6022 Series. Top Secret. Drafted by Furnas.

¹ Dated December 13. (*Ibid.*) See the Supplement.

² See footnote 10, Document 8.

³ See Document 120.

active defense against Soviet ballistic missiles. The Department of Defense report to the Council showed that effective active defense of the continent and especially of our nuclear retaliatory force will not be available to the United States in the foreseeable future. Therefore the President directed urgent re-examination of current policy and programs for *passive* defense, particularly fall-out shelters. A specific report on this subject made by ODCM in consultation with State and Defense⁴ (NSC Action 2300-e)⁵ is a subsequent agenda item for the NSC meeting on December 22.

The existing policy paper on Continental Defense places primary emphasis on active defense measures rather than passive measures. The new draft policy is an attempt to change this emphasis in the light of the earlier NSC discussion and recent studies and reports which do not hold out good prospects for effective active defense against increasing Soviet missile capabilities. The differences of view which exist in the draft policy reflect differing assessments of the need for a shift in emphasis toward passive defense.

A split in the paper is in paragraph 7. The majority of the Planning Board believes that the U.S., while continuing active defense measures against manned aircraft attack should, in view of (1) increasing Soviet reliance on missiles, and (2) present limitations on achieving an effective anti-missile missile, make a particular effort to exploit passive measures for defense of the U.S. in general and the retaliatory force in particular.

The Budget-JCS position reflects little change from existing policy.⁶ The JCS view is probably conditioned by the strong support in the Army for development of Nike-Zeus, the only anti-missile weapon development now having any prospect of success. Budget has joined JCS in this split because of the cost to the Federal Government of the proposed fall-out shelter protection. However, while JCS would be willing to "give increased attention to measures for the passive defense of the population," Budget would want this attention given only to measures "essential to the protection" of the retaliatory capability.

A split in paragraph 4 represents JCS reluctance to include in the paper language which casts doubt upon the probability of development of an adequate AICBM system.⁷

⁴ Enclosed with a December 7 memorandum from Lay to the NSC, not found.

⁵ See footnote 10, Document 120.

⁶ The Budget-JCS version of paragraph 7 reads in part: "The United States should place predominant emphasis on measures to improve our active defenses, as compared with—but not to the exclusion of—passive defense measures."

⁷ Paragraph 4 stated that the changing character of the Soviet threat and an assessment of the relative effectiveness of various active and passive defense measures made it necessary to re-examine U.S. programs for continental defense, and that national planning should recognize that "barring a technological breakthrough, the development and deployment of an adequate AICBM program during the 1960's [was] questionable." JCS reserved its position on the quoted portion.

The split in paragraph 12-b indicates JCS desire to make a somewhat firmer commitment to Nike-Zeus than the majority deem prudent now.⁸ We believe that such a capability would have value for psychological reasons to offset a likely Soviet claim of a similar capability.

The other split in the paper is in paragraph 20 concerning Civil Defense. The *majority* of the Planning Board favors a statement that a program of Civil Defense, in which a key element is fall-out shelters, is an essential part of a continental defense posture and would have the additional value of contributing to the deterrent (JCS again objects, however, to the inclusion of language questioning prospects for effective active defense). *Treasury* favors what is largely a restatement of present policy with emphasis upon Federal Government leadership and example only, so far as fall-out shelters are concerned. *Budget* prefers a short statement and a reference to the existing NSC policy document which deals with shelter policy.

The Budget approach on this split is also reflected in its split on paragraph 23.⁹

(The issue on the question of fall-out shelter will also be raised in connection with the OCDM report called for in NSC action 2300-e which is the next item on the NSC agenda for the December 22 meeting. The pertinent paragraphs of the Continental Defense paper can be amended, if necessary, to incorporate the decisions taken then.)

In paragraphs 24 and 25 Treasury and Budget object to the provision of federal guidance and leadership for other than *initial* recovery from nuclear attack. In paragraph 25 Defense joins Treasury-Budget. Also in paragraph 25 Treasury, Defense and Budget wish to place certain limitations upon measures to be taken with respect to the stockpiling of civilian items for survival and recovery.

In paragraph 28 a footnote implies that the President might be asked to make a decision on putting into *use* of an active device for the detection of fissionable material introduced into the US by clandestine means during the next few months when a prototype is completed and tested.¹⁰ We hope that the Presidential decision to use an active device on accompanied diplomatic baggage would be limited to such periods of internal tension which would warrant acceptance of the serious foreign policy risks involved in such use.

⁸ This paragraph called for continued efforts to develop an effective capability against ballistic missiles "as a matter of highest national priority," but the JCS, unlike the majority, wanted "some operational" capability "by the earliest possible date."

⁹ This paragraph dealt with local input into civil defense preparations.

¹⁰ Paragraph 28 concerned the problem of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the United States.

Recommendation:

That you adopt the majority position on all splits in the paper and that you express, in connection with paragraph 28 of the paper, the view indicated in the last sentence of the paragraph above.

133. Memorandum of Discussion at the 471st Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, December 22, 1960.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *U.S. Policy on Continental Defense* (NSC 5802/1; NSC Action No. 2151-f-(1); Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 14, 1960; NSC Action No. 2300; NIE 11-8-60; NIE 11-5-59; NSC 6022)

AND

2. *Measures for the Passive Defense of the Population With Particular Regard to Fallout Shelter* (NSC 5802/1; NSC 5807; NSC 5807/2; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "U.S. Policy on Continental Defense", dated July 14, 1960; NSC Action No. 2300-e; Memos for NSC from Deputy Executive Secretary, subject: "Measures for the Passive Defense of the Population, with Particular Regard to Fallout Shelter", dated December 7 and 8, 1960¹)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on NSC 6022. (A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)²

In the course of his briefing, Mr. Gray referred to paragraph 4 of the statement of policy,³ where the Joint Chiefs of Staff reserved their position on language which questions the U.S. capability to develop and deploy an adequate anti-ICBM system during the 1960's barring technological breakthrough.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Boggs on December 23.

¹ Neither the December 7 nor 8 memorandum has been found.

² Not printed.

³ See footnote 7, Document 132.

General Lemnitzer said the word "adequate" was the key word in this paragraph. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt the paragraph downgraded the possibility of achieving an anti-ICBM system in the 1960's. A really adequate anti-ICBM defense would probably never be achieved.

Mr. Gray pointed out that current policy on continental defense contemplated an active defense against ICBM's. A part of our old shelter policy and other continental defense policy were predicated on an active defense. We are now less optimistic about the possibility of an active defense against ICBM's than we were in 1958, when current continental defense policy was written. Part of the reason for reviewing the 1958 policy is to take account of the change in our estimated capabilities to employ active defense against ICBM attack.

General Lemnitzer believed there was a possibility of getting an effective anti-ICBM system by 1970, but whether the system would provide complete coverage by then was another question. Mr. Gray wondered how effective the system would be.

Secretary Gates said he disagreed with the Joint Chiefs' view on this point. He had been told that even if we spend \$500 million a year beginning this year, and assuming that all the complicated hardware functioned properly, we would be able to defend only 20% of the population against ICBM's by 1969. Secretary Gates felt the statement in the paper was conservative.

Mr. Stans suggested the paper should make the statement that the time by which an active defense against ICBM's can be developed is uncertain.

The President said the scientists who talked to him had indicated uncertainty about the time at which an anti-ICBM system could be developed.

Mr. Gray suggested that the years immediately ahead constituted a "period of greatest danger", one of several such periods we had lived through. The policy statement is indicating that we have little hope of an effective active defense against ICBM's. At the same time there are those who demand a vastly increased shelter program. Mr. Gray wondered therefore whether some of the difficulties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not stem from the fear that the \$500 million a year now being spent on an active anti-ICBM system would be devoted to shelter construction.

General Lemnitzer agreed that Mr. Gray had correctly identified a part of the JCS concern. People might believe it was useless to spend money on an anti-ICBM system if the possibility of achieving an effective system were downgraded.

The President pointed out that the word "questionable" was used in paragraph 4. He felt this word meant we were in doubt as to whether an anti-ICBM system would be developed in the 1960's.

Secretary Gates felt the word “questionable” was the right word, since there was this doubt. He referred again to the fact that even with a great deal of effort we would be able to cover only 20% of the population with an anti-ICBM system by 1969. Accordingly, he believed the statement in paragraph 4 was correct.

Mr. Scribner⁴ thought the effort now being devoted to developing an anti-ICBM system should not be reduced. The difficulty was that some people, upon seeing statements like that in paragraph 4, would want to divert money from the anti-ICBM missiles to shelters.

The President said the statement in paragraph 4 seemed correct to him, and he believed it should be included in the policy paper. The statement was merely a statement of fact. He asked whether anyone could assure him that we would have an anti-ICBM system in the near future.

General Lemnitzer agreed that in so far as the statement was true there should be no objection to including it in the policy paper. The statement apparently meant that we can't count with certainty on achieving an active anti-ICBM defense in the 1960's. On the understanding that this paragraph would not be the basis for a major shift of funds from active to passive defense measures, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would withdraw their reservation.

Mr. Gray then explained paragraph 7, dealing with the question of relative emphasis.

Secretary Gates said that in terms of such things as airborne alert, enhanced ground alert, BMEW's, dispersal, mobility and hardening, our policy has veered more toward passive defense than toward interceptor planes and anti-missile missiles. We are now spending more on passive defense operations than on active defense; this is Defense Department policy. Accordingly, Secretary Gates thought that language leaning toward passive defense should be incorporated in the policy statement.

Mr. Gray said the issue was how much effort the United States should devote to passive defense of the population.

The President said that paragraph 7 referred to passive defense of our retaliatory capability. Mr. Gray said that part of the paragraph referred to retaliatory capability, while the remainder referred to the defense of the population.

Secretary Gates believed the Majority language in paragraph 7 stated what we were actually doing more accurately than the Budget-JCS language.⁵

The President said he saw no objection to the Majority language.

⁴ Fred C. Scribner, Jr., Under Secretary of the Treasury.

⁵ See footnote 6, Document 132.

Mr. Stans said the language proposed by Budget was the language of the present continental defense policy. He had tried to discover the significance of proposing a change in present policy on relative emphasis. He could see no reason for such change because, as Secretary Gates had said, we have been carrying out passive measures within the scope of the present policy. Secretary Gates believed the language of current policy could be improved because it referred to "predominant emphasis" being placed on active defense. It was not true that predominant emphasis was now being placed on active defense.

The President believed the Majority language in paragraph 7 should be adopted.

Mr. Stans pointed out that the Majority language in paragraph 7-b referred to "increased attention to measures for the passive defense of the U.S. population." In the Budget version this language would be deleted.

The President said he would never agree to delete language of this nature. In his view, we should be doing a lot more than we are doing for passive defense of the population. He believed in doing everything possible to alert people without getting them hysterical.

Mr. Gray suggested that paragraph 7-b might be put aside for the moment, inasmuch as it was related to the divergences of view in connection with paragraphs 20 and 21. The paper contained three versions of paragraphs 20 and 21. One alternative reflected a program which would soon be presented by Governor Hoegh; the other alternatives reflected a different approach. Mr. Gray suggested that Governor Hoegh make his presentation on "Measures for the Passive Defense of the Population, with Particular Regard to Fallout Shelter", after which some of the splits would fall into place.

Governor Hoegh said that the key element in the passive defense of the population was fallout shelter, which would contribute to deterrence of war and, in the event the deterrent failed, would protect the population, enabling the nation to survive and go on to win the war. He said the OCDM goal was fallout shelter for the whole population within five years. This goal was to be achieved by providing encouragement to the people and to industry to provide their own fallout shelter without undue panic or haste. Governor Hoegh then displayed charts showing the cost of currently-approved measures. Measures approved by the NSC would have approved expenditure of \$97 million, 1959 to 1961. Actually because of reduction in appropriation requests, only \$15.65 million were expended. In FY 1962, \$42.9 million is being requested.

Governor Hoegh said 25% of the population had an adequate basis for fallout shelter in existing structures. A recent Gallup poll shows that 71% of the people favor fallout shelter. He pointed out that more than a million people had already built fallout shelters, while 13 million fami-

lies had chosen the safest place in the home in case of attack. OCDM had constructed 400 prototype shelters.

Governor Hoegh then turned to proposed measures, and displayed a chart along the following lines:

| Proposed Measures | | |
|---|------------|---------------------|
| | FY 1962 | <i>5-year Total</i> |
| Federal Buildings | | |
| New military | 10 | 50 |
| Existing military | 20 | 100 |
| Grants in aid | 16 | 90 |
| Tax credits | 800 | 4000 |
| Federal matching grants | 2 | 2 |
| NEAR system | <u>0</u> | <u>50</u> |
| Total | <u>848</u> | <u>4292</u> |
| Total of approved and proposed measures | 890 | 4512 |

Governor Hoegh said that certain proposed measures could be taken without cost—namely, Presidential actions, the inclusion of shelter provisions in Federal loan programs, and State actions. Governor Hoegh emphasized the need for Presidential action. He suggested that the President might make the statement regarding fallout shelter in a press conference, or in the State of the Union Message, or might announce that he was building a fallout shelter at Gettysburg.

In connection with State actions, Governor Hoegh gave as an example the fact that some States and cities do not assess a property higher for tax purposes because it has a shelter. He also noted that many local communities are correcting their building codes to facilitate shelter construction.

In conclusion, Governor Hoegh said that if all the proposed measures except the tax credits were adopted he believed the necessary action by the American people would be stimulated. However, all actions other than the tax credits would be needed to produce this effect.

The President thought it would be illogical to allow tax credits for shelter construction. He said people take a great many actions for their own welfare without claiming tax credits. In response to a question from Mr. Gray, Governor Hoegh said he was not pressing for the adoption of tax credits at the present time.

Mr. Gray said he would like to read the goal stated in the OCDM paper: "The goal of the Federal Government should be that the entire population has fallout shelters within five years with such governmental support and assistance as is required to meet this goal."

The President felt the goal should be stated differently. It should be stated as a goal of fallout shelter within five years with the role of the Federal Government defined more precisely.

Mr. Gray then summarized for the Council the Planning Board comments on the OCDM report on "Measures for the Passive Defense of the Population." (A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)⁶ When Mr. Gray noted that Budget and Treasury would put shelters in only some Federal buildings rather than in all suitable buildings, the President commented that "some" Federal buildings would be his choice too.

General Lemnitzer said he agreed with the argument that fallout shelter in military buildings would be a great stimulus to private construction of shelters.

Before Mr. Gray finished reading the Planning Board comments on the OCDM report, the President said there was no need to read all the comments.

Mr. Gray said that the essential differences of view could be summarized as follows: Some officials think we should adhere to shelter programs already approved, while others believe it is necessary to adopt new measures.

Mr. Stans said that provision in the budget had already been made in the FY 1962 budget for the items shown on page 19 of the OCDM report except for the \$25 million for shelters in existing civilian Federal buildings. \$2 million had been put in the budget for this item, with the understanding that a supplemental would probably be requested by the new Administration if a larger shelter program were approved.

The President felt it would be undesirable to refuse, say, \$10 million for shelter in new civilian Federal buildings. Mr. Stans said this item was in the budget. The President believed he would oppose both extremes. He wished to put the Federal Government out in front so that it could show what can be done in the shelter field. However, a vast program of shelter in old Federal buildings would be difficult.

Governor Hoegh said that for \$100,000 a fallout shelter for 5000 persons could be built under the Treasury Building. The President protested that the Treasury Building would be in a main target area and subject to blast. Governor Hoegh said a calculated risk had to be taken on this point; Washington might not be hit. The President believed that fallout shelter would have to be constructed on a selective basis in old buildings. He believed that the \$2 million mentioned by Mr. Stans was a little low in view of the way we spend money on some other things.

Governor Hoegh asked whether the \$2 million could not be raised to \$10 million or \$15 million for shelter in existing civilian Federal buildings. The President said that in any case the \$2 million should be increased.

⁶ Not printed.

Mr. Stans suggested that the exact amount be left open for decision after a survey of the buildings. The President asked whether there was fallout shelter in the new CIA building. Mr. Dulles said no funds had been permitted for this purpose, but he had managed to have the basement of the new building strengthened so that fallout shelter could be constructed later.

Secretary Herter said that funds for fallout shelter in the new State Department building had not been allowed. The President then said that \$10 million should be put in the budget for fallout shelter in existing civilian Federal buildings. This represented his view, but he doubted that Congress would appropriate the money.

Mr. Stans said he would like to see consideration of a user charge as a means of recovering part of the cost of the NEAR system.

Secretary Gates said he wished to express an unpopular philosophy. He was worried about increasing emphasis on fallout shelter because he feared this would lead to control over our economy. Our people were not accustomed to doing things by halves. He feared that fallout shelter might lead to regimentation, and that controls would change our type of society.

The President said no one had made more speeches than he had favoring private enterprise and a free economy, but he was unable to see how the construction of fallout shelters, as proposed in the OCDM paper, would lead to controls. He recalled that in 1953 or 1954 the Council had discussed a \$40 billion shelter program, and that might have resulted in a different story. But our shelter policy was devoted to Federal Government leadership and stimulation, not to compulsion. He did not want to get the Federal Government too far into the shelter work, but it would be stupid for the Federal Government to be indifferent.

Governor Hoegh said he believed that people would build their own fallout shelters as indicated by the Gallup poll he had previously mentioned.

The President wondered whether a large number of people in the Gallup poll had favored shelters because they thought the Government would pay for them.

Secretary Herter said he believed in the goals stated in the OCDM paper. The question was the means of achieving these goals. He would hesitate to go on record as approving the details of the OCDM program unless he were sure that the proposed measures would be implemented.

The President said that Governor Hoegh had what he needed for implementation in the FY 1962 budget.

Secretary Gates pointed out that the proposed measures shown on Governor Hoegh's chart were not funded in the FY 1962 budget.

The President said that with respect to new Federal buildings additional money could not be put into the budget until the designs were known.

Secretary Herter asked whether the cost of fallout shelter in existing buildings could be absorbed by the Defense budget. Secretary Gates said that Mr. Stans had already absorbed everything that could be absorbed in the Defense budget.

Mr. Stans said that some proposals made in the OCDM report could be handled on the basis of legislative recommendations. The President believed that recommendations on civil defense should be incorporated in the State of the Union Message. Governor Hoegh thought a single piece of legislation should be introduced to carry out the passive defense program contained in the OCDM paper.

Mr. Scribner said people favored fallout shelter, but he wondered whether they favored it enough to build it. He believed that in an emergency people working in the center of Washington would try to get home so that a fallout shelter under the Treasury Building, for example, would not be very useful.

The President said that Treasury employees would need a fallout shelter at home as well as under the Treasury Building. He had often wondered whether officials would be inclined to go to a relocation site or would attempt to reach home.

Mr. Scribner believed people would have to be frightened before they would build large numbers of fallout shelters. He also felt that many shelters probably were used for storage and did not have adequate food or water supplies on hand.

Governor Hoegh pointed out that 6% of the people have a two-weeks supply of food on hand.

The President said we were talking about measures which would awaken the American people without making them hysterical and which would stimulate them to take action by showing that the Government is serious about this problem. He believed we should be fairly conservative in the tone of our legislative recommendations. Mr. Stans said the Budget Message could submit recommendations for fallout shelter. The President suggested that a requirement for the preparation of new legislative recommendation on fallout shelter be incorporated in the NSC Record of Action.

Mr. Gray said OCDM would be requested, in consultation with Defense and Budget, to prepare a revised statement of policy on measures for the passive defense of the population. The revised paper should include a statement of financial implications as guidance for the next Administration. The new paper would be designed to supersede our current policy on "Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Fallout Shelter" (NSC 5807/2). Mr. Gray also suggested that the alternative paragraphs

20 and 21 of NSC 6022 be referred back to the Planning Board for revision in the light of the discussion.

Mr. Gray said that paragraph 23 could also be resolved by the Planning Board. In connection with paragraph 23, the President said he was becoming more and more pessimistic about the possibility of evacuating cities in the event of a nuclear attack.

Mr. Gray then called attention to paragraph 25, which involved the issue of the extent to which civilian items should be stockpiled. Mr. Gray pointed out that originally it had been the policy to stockpile for survival and that this policy had been subsequently extended to stockpiling for recovery. Part of the Planning Board wished to stockpile for initial recovery only, while the remainder of the Planning Board wished to stockpile for recovery, omitting the word "initial."⁷

The President asked where machinery such as bulldozers would be stockpiled. Governor Hoegh said all stockpiles would be located underground. He added that OCDM was encouraging the citizens of local communities to stockpile such things as medical supplies. He thought it was essential to have a stockpile policy because of the deficiency of essential items which would exist after a nuclear attack.

The President wondered how the survival of the stockpiles would be assured. Governor Hoegh said the stockpiles were relatively safe because of their storage underground.

The President wondered whether we could not induce the drug companies to locate their warehouses in safe places. Governor Hoegh said this had been attempted, but the drug companies preferred to keep their supplies stockpiled near the market. The President said that policies such as the one under discussion might work if the people of the United States could be stimulated to believe in the desirability of advance preparations against the possibility of attack.

After Governor Hoegh had made some drafting suggestions for paragraph 25, Mr. Scribner asked how recovery was defined. Did the word mean that we would stockpile enough material to place the country on a pre-attack basis within a short time? In other words, was complete recovery meant, or only the minimum of recovery essential to get the country functioning on an austere basis again?

Secretary Gates thought paragraph 25 was too open-ended. The President wondered why a time limit could not be put on stockpiling. When Governor Hoegh said this was a difficult matter to prejudge, the President replied that OCDM was prejudging the matter when it decided on the amounts to be stockpiled. Governor Hoegh said he inter-

⁷ The Departments of Defense and the Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget wished to include the word "initial;" the majority wished to omit it.

preted the word "recovery" to mean that the nation has survived the attack, restored free government and institutions, and has the necessary items for the people to live and get back to a production basis sufficient to support continued viability of the country. The President said he was not completely convinced that free government could be restored very soon after a nuclear attack. He believed if materials were to be stockpiled, it was necessary to know exactly what the policy was and how much it was necessary to stockpile.

Governor Hoegh said OCDM estimates of stockpile needs were based on the time it would take to restore industry after a nuclear attack. Since industry could not be restored for a year, a year's requirements should be stockpiled, although these requirements were of course based on a smaller population.

Secretary Herter asked whether we were now talking about the stockpiling of food and medical supplies. Mr. Gray said the issue was whether to stockpile such items as food and medical supplies only or whether to stockpile all items essential to recovery.

Mr. Stans said removal of the word "initial" in paragraph 25 would change present policy in a major way. Even under the paragraph as redrafted by Governor Hoegh, almost every element of society would have to be stockpiled. The President believed our policy could not go too far. Mr. Stans thought that any phase of stockpiling could be dealt with separately and specifically. Mr. Gray pointed out that under Governor Hoegh's language structural steel might be stockpiled, since such action would not disrupt the economy at a time when steel production is declining.

The President said the problem had no real solution. No one knows in what condition a nuclear attack will leave the country. He was unable to see how we could stockpile enough supplies to enable us to resume our normal industrial processes immediately. Perhaps after a nuclear attack we would all be nomads.

Governor Hoegh believed it would be necessary to restore our industrial society after an attack in order to enable the people to survive. He thought perhaps our society would be restored on the 1920 basis. Secretary Gates said it perhaps would be cut back to a 1776 basis. The President doubted that the stockpile itself would survive. He said our imagination could not encompass the situation which would result from an attack on this country involving the explosion of 2000 megatons. He concluded that war no longer has any logic whatever. Mr. Gray said the word "initial" would be left in paragraph 25, and the right-hand version of the split was adopted.

As an additional comment on stockpiling, the President said there would be no transportation after a nuclear attack to carry stockpiled items where they were needed. Governor Hoegh felt transportation

would not be completely destroyed. He believed railroad transportation facilities would survive and be restored to normal in about thirty days. The President did not agree, believing that the railway centers in the cities would be completely destroyed. He was willing to go along with the stockpiling of medicine, but he didn't believe that raw materials and semi-manufactured items should be stockpiled.

Mr. Gray then turned back to paragraph 12–b, where there was a split over whether the United States should “attempt to develop” AICBM capability by the earliest possible date, or should “ensure some operational” AICBM capability by the earliest possible date. In response to questions from the President, Mr. Gray said the language of this paragraph would be adjusted to indicate clearly that it referred to an anti-missile missile system. He felt the issue was between the present research and development priority for the AICBM and an operational capability.

General Lemnitzer said the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt operational capability should be the objective. The President said the paragraph should be drafted in such a way as to take out both versions of the split.

Mr. Gray then turned to paragraph 19–a, where Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed deletion of a provision that the Secretary of Defense should consult with the Director, OCDM, with respect to the location of new fixed retaliatory bases and major military administrative headquarters. Secretary Gates wondered whether the provision which Defense objected to would give the Director, OCDM, a veto power. As long as no veto is implied, he was certainly willing to consult with the Director, OCDM.

The President felt the provision for consultation should remain in the paper because various factors in addition to the military factor needed to be considered. The President recalled that he had once raised this question in connection with the location of a Titan base near Denver.

Mr. Gray said that the other divergences of view in NSC 6022 could be settled on the basis of actions the Council had already taken.

The National Security Council:

*Continental Defense:*⁸

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6022; in the light of the presentation referred to in Item 2 below.
- b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 6022, subject to the following amendments:

(1) *Page 2, paragraph 4:* Include the bracketed sentence; deleting the brackets and the footnote thereto.

⁸ The following paragraphs constitute NSC Action No. 2360, approved by the President on December 29. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

(2) *Pages 4 and 5, paragraph 7:* Include the Majority version (deleting the Budget-JCS version), with the following changes:

(a) *Subparagraph 7-a:* Insert the word "military" before "active defenses" and before "passive measures".

(b) *Subparagraph 7-b:* Insert the word "civilian" before "passive defense".

(3) *Pages 9 and 10, paragraph 12-b:* Revise to read as follows:

"b. *Against ballistic missiles:* The United States should continue efforts to develop at the earliest possible date an effective anti-ballistic-missile capability as a matter of highest national priority,* both for its own value and to offset the practical and psychological disadvantages of possible Soviet claims of success in this field."⁹

(4) *Pages 14 and 15, paragraph 19-a:* Include the bracketed words; deleting the brackets and the footnote thereto.

(5) *Page 15, paragraph 19-b:* Include the word "selected"; deleting the brackets and the footnotes thereto.

(6) *Pages 15, 16, 16-A and 17:* Referred the alternative versions of paragraphs 20, 21 and 23 to the NSC Planning Board for revision in the light of the discussion at this meeting.

(7) *Page 17, paragraph 24:* Delete the word "initial", and the brackets and the footnote thereto.

(8) *Pages 17 and 17-A, paragraph 25:* Include the Treasury-Defense-Budget version, deleting the Majority version.¹⁰

*Measures for the Passive Defense of the Population, With Particular Regard to Fallout Shelter*¹¹

a. Noted and discussed a presentation by the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, based on the enclosures to the reference memorandum of December 7, 1960; in the light of the views of the Treasury Department thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 8, 1960, and of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, as referred to at the meeting.

b. Noted the President's approval of the objective of obtaining fallout shelter for the population within five years, principally with local and private effort, and with Federal resources to be confined largely to setting an example and stimulating individual efforts to attain the objective but not to guarantee its attainment.

⁹ The asterisk in this paragraph refers to a definitional footnote in NSC 6022.

¹⁰ These amendments, along with others specified in NSC Action No. 2386, approved by the President on January 18, 1961, were incorporated in NSC 6022/1, "U.S. Policy on Continental Defense," also dated January 18. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, and *ibid.*, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 6022 Series)

¹¹ The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2361, approved by the President on December 29. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

c. Noted the President's directive that suitable language to support the policy in b above be prepared for the State of the Union and Budget messages, and that legislative proposals authorizing appropriate implementing measures be prepared for submission to the Congress in January; subject to the normal Executive clearance process by the Bureau of the Budget.

d. Requested the Director, OCDM, in consultation as appropriate with the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, to prepare, in the light of the discussion at this meeting, a revised statement of policy on the subject, together with an estimate of the financial implications, for consideration by the Council on January 12, 1961, to supersede NSC 5807/2.¹²

Note: The actions in b, c and d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, OCDM, for appropriate implementation, in consultation as appropriate with the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Bureau of the Budget.

[Here follows Agenda Item 3. "NATO in the 1960s."]

Marion W. Boggs

¹²On January 12, 1961, the Council considered NSC 6104/1, "Measures To Provide Shelter From Radioactive Fallout," dated January 10, 1961, and adopted it with modifications as NSC 6104/2, same title, approved by the President on January 18. NSC 6104 is *ibid.*, S/S—NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6104 Series, and NSC 6104/2 is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Policy Papers File.

134. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Douglas) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray)

Washington, December 28, 1960.

SUBJECT

Report on Possible Deficiencies in the U.S. Posture for Limited Military Operations

The attached report,¹ which represents the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is forwarded in response to NSC Action No. 2317-c.²

Your attention is invited to paragraph 1 of their "General Comments" in which it is stated, in part, that the studies do not by themselves constitute a valid basis for formulating programs or reaching decisions. I concur with this statement. With respect to the JCS report, I feel that the following comments should be added to insure understanding and to clarify certain points.

(1) Department of Defense planning for logistics support of limited war is currently based upon the general order of magnitude of effort such as that contained in the Contingency Plan for Resumption of Hostilities in Korea. Planned logistics support capability is, or will be, adequate to meet any one, or combination of contingencies, at one time, provided in sum they do not exceed the general order of magnitude contained in the Korean contingency plan. This basis for limited war support planning was issued on 15 March 1960 to the Military Departments and was included as part of a presentation to the NSC on 30 June 1960 with respect to the Military Logistics Base section of NSC 5906/1. Approval of this concept of our planning base was indicated in NSC Action No. 2254, dated 6 July 1960.³ At the present time, the Military Departments are developing their requirements in accordance with this concept.

(2) Paragraph 2 of the "General Comments" by the JCS refers to certain conclusions contained in the five hypothetical limited war studies which were presented to the NSC on 6 October 1960. Specifically, it was indicated that U.S. capabilities in conjunction with those of our allies are generally adequate to conduct any *one* of the hypothetical military

Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Top Secret. Attached to a December 30 covering memorandum from Lay to the NSC.

¹ Document 130.

² See footnote 8, Document 125.

³ Concerning the NSC meeting held June 30 and NSC Action No. 2254, see Document 106 and footnote 5 thereto. NSC 5906/1 is printed as Document 70.

operations considered, but that our capabilities are dependent on prompt actions being taken as required in each case, including an expansion of the war production base. This general statement on expansion of the production base should be interpreted to mean that prompt action must be taken to increase the deliveries of matériel from the production base in-being, including both active and inactive plants, within the limits of the production base planning concept approved by the NSC on 6 July 1960.

(3) Paragraphs 2 and 3 of that section of the JCS report which is headed "Specific Views" constitute a qualified indication of the status of Service Mobilization base planning, and the general status of war reserves. These comments, as prepared by the JCS, relate to both limited and general war planning and status, and further, are based on a relatively few items reviewed by the Services, rather than a complete study and review concurred in by the JCS or the Secretary of Defense. As previously indicated in comment (1) above, the Department of Defense is still in the process of developing and reviewing its requirements in accordance with the objectives presented to the NSC on 30 June 1960. Pending completion of this effort, any reflection of status must be qualified as preliminary. Further, NSC Action No. 2317 addressed itself to limited war capabilities. The cited parts of the JCS views relate to both limited and general war planning and capabilities. This is called to your attention to preclude a possible misunderstanding. Even the preliminary views stated should not be interpreted as applying to limited war capabilities only.

(4) It is recognized that there are certain deficiencies in our limited war posture, particularly with regard to the logistic stock position and to modernization. Optimum modernization of limited war forces has not been the objective. The objective rather has been to assure an adequate degree of modernization. Our limited war posture is improving and will show a substantial improvement on the basis of the FY 1962 budget as submitted.

(5) With reference to page 15, paragraph 8-i, of the attached JCS report, the data reflected for the MATS Modernization Program were correct at the time the JCS report was prepared. Subsequently, however, the decision was made to revise this program. Currently, \$30 million is programmed in FY 1961 for the development of the so-called Specific Operating Requirement (SOR) aircraft (long-range jet powered cargo aircraft) and an additional \$98 million is being requested in the FY 1962 budget. For interim modernization, an amount of \$175,800,000 has been programmed during FY 1961 for 50 C-130E aircraft.

(6) Steps have been taken since the JCS study to increase the commercial airlift capacity available to support military requirements by increasing the capability of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). To

improve commercial air carrier emergency effectiveness and responsiveness changes in procurement policies have been effected. Only CRAF carriers are being permitted to participate in MATS contracts thus providing the carriers greater experience in military logistic support operations. Contracts with CRAF carriers are being negotiated to provide for an expanded capability to be made available on call of the Secretary of Defense. The objective of this requirement, in addition to improving carrier responsiveness, is to minimize or possibly eliminate the need for call up of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet in situations short of general war.

In my opinion, the following conclusions can be drawn from the JCS report:

(1) *Capabilities in Southeast Asia.* Logistics limitations in Southeast Asia, stemming from the lack of development of communications, port and terminal facilities and transportation means, will severely affect U.S. and friendly indigenous military operations. These limitations will influence the nature of operations and the type of force to be employed and must be considered in all planning. Action is being taken to improve strategic communications into and within the area and to improve capabilities for conducting over-the-beach supply operations. When considered politically feasible, additional transit and base rights in the area would facilitate dispersal, staging and recovery of aircraft and repositioning and prestockage of materials and supplies. While our operational capabilities are improving, this area presents difficult but not impossible problems for limited military operations.

(2) *Air and Sea Lift Capabilities.* Except for some shortages in the first 20 days, the airlift capability for limited war conditions considered by the JCS appears to be adequate if the Civil Reserve Air Fleet is activated and if airlift capabilities in one area are augmented, in the initial phase, by temporary transfer of capability from other areas. (This conclusion is valid only if the Civil Reserve Air Fleet or equivalent commercial airlift augmentation becomes available within the proper time frames and proves effective.) Sea lift capability is generally adequate. Shortages in the first 60 days of limited war could be made up through use of available foreign flag shipping and through "hot bunking" on passenger ships. The FY 1961 and 1962 budgets will provide about \$470 million for improvements in our airlift capabilities.

(3) *Mobilization Base Plans.* At the present time limited war operations could result in some degradation of our general war posture. It is anticipated that upon full implementation by the Military Departments of the 15 March 1960 logistics guidance our capability to support limited

war situations should be improved without degrading our general war readiness posture.

It is requested that this report be given special limited distribution.⁴

James H. Douglas⁵

⁴ The JCS report was discussed at the NSC meeting on January 5, 1961. (Memorandum of discussion by Boggs, January 5; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

⁵ Printed from a copy that indicates Douglas signed the original.

135. Editorial Note

At the 472d National Security Council meeting on December 29, 1960, discussion included the items "Attack Warning Channels and Procedures for Civilians" and "Evacuation and Protection of U.S. Citizens in Danger Areas Abroad." (Memorandum of discussion by Boggs, December 29; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) See the Supplement.

The discussion of the latter item led to the adoption of NSC 6019, "Evacuation and Protection of U.S. Citizens in Danger Areas Abroad," dated November 29, as modified by NSC Action No. 2363, which was approved by the President on January 2, 1961. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6019 Series, and *ibid.*, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, respectively) NSC 6019 is also in the Supplement. On January 2, 1961, NSC 6019 as modified by NSC Action No. 2363 was circulated as NSC 6019/1. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6019 Series)

On December 30, 1960, Lay circulated NSC 6027, "Channels for Transmission of Warning of Attack." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Policy Papers File) See the Supplement.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

136. Memorandum of Discussion at the 350th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, January 6, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Item 1. "Significant World Development Affecting U.S. Security."]

2. *U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments* (NSC Action No. 1419; NSC Action No. 1513 and Annex thereto; NSC Action No. 1553 and Annex thereto; NSC 5707/8; NSC Actions Nos. 1676 and 1722;¹ Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 26, 1957;² and January 3, 1958³)

Mr. Cutler introduced Governor Stassen, and gave a brief background statement on Governor Stassen's "Proposals for the Revision of U.S. Policy on Disarmament". (A copy of Mr. Cutler's comments is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)⁴

Governor Stassen then commented briefly on the substantive recommendation for a revision in the "Proposals for Partial Measures of

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on January 7.

¹ Regarding NSC Action No. 1419, see *Foreign Relations*, 1955-1957, vol. XX, p. 154, footnote 8. For NSC Action No. 1513 and the Annex thereto, see *ibid.*, pp. 329-330. Regarding NSC Action No. 1553 and the Annex thereto, see *ibid.*, p. 399, footnote 5, and pp. 444-446. For NSC 5707/8, "Basic National Security Policy," see *ibid.*, vol. XIX, pp. 507-524. Regarding NSC Actions No. 1676 and 1722, see *ibid.*, vol. XX, p. 462, footnote 6, and p. 538, footnote 8.

² This memorandum transmitted to the NSC Stassen's revised disarmament proposals, which are summarized in this memorandum of discussion. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File, 350th Meeting, Tab A) See the Supplement.

³ This memorandum transmitted to the NSC the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 31, 1957, on Stassen's disarmament proposals (see footnote 2 above). The JCS noted that the major change that Stassen recommended was "abandonment of the provision for inseparability of individual items of the proposals." The JCS believed that from a security point of view there was no justification for such a concession. Abandoning inseparability would present the Soviet Union with the opportunity of accepting only those proposals compatible with their national interests, such as suspension of nuclear testing, to the detriment of U.S. and NATO interests. The JCS also objected to deletion by Stassen of the provision for control of fissionable material for peaceful and weapons purposes and stated that the new inspection zones "are weighted heavily in the favor of the Soviet Union." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File, 350th Meeting, Tab A) See the Supplement.

⁴ Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File)

Disarmament" which had been made by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada in London last August.⁵ Governor Stassen stated his belief that his three specific recommendations for revision of the August proposals would not only have the support of the other NATO governments, but of almost all other Free World countries. He also predicted that his proposed revisions would have the support of more than two-thirds of the members of the United States Senate, as well as the backing of most of the leading American scientists. Furthermore, he believed that his proposed revisions were largely in accord with the views of General Norstad, even though these proposed revisions had not been wholly agreed upon in the NATO Council.

In essence, Governor Stassen said that his three specific recommendations for revision of the August 1957 proposals were designed to move forward certain parts of the agreed U.S. position as of August 1957. He said he believed that these recommendations offered a very good chance of initiating an inspections system within the Soviet Union, and were in the interest of the United States as well as of the Free World generally. Governor Stassen also felt that the USSR itself would find in these recommendations an element which corresponded to their own interest in preventing global nuclear war. At any rate, these were the premises on which Governor Stassen had proceeded in drawing up his recommended revisions, and he warned that the United States would lose the support of world public opinion if we took a negative attitude with respect to any change in the August 1957 position.

Thereafter Governor Stassen dealt briefly with his first recommendation for a revision—namely, for the installation of some eight to twelve test monitoring inspection stations in the USSR and a like number in the United States. On a map he indicated the sites within the Soviet Union at which these test monitoring inspection stations would be located. He pointed out that the choice of sites for these stations in the Soviet Union had been selected on the basis of the opinion of experts in the Department of Defense. He went on to point out that following satisfactory agreement on the inspection stations and on prompt installation of the inspection system, his proposal recommended a 24-month suspension of nuclear testing. He added that he felt that in making this suggestion he was in line with a statement made by the President in June 1957,⁶ and he

⁵ The working paper as submitted to the U.N. Disarmament Committee, August 29, 1957, is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, pp. 868–884. It is also attached as Annex D to the December 26 memorandum cited in footnote 2 above.

⁶ Stassen's reference is apparently to Eisenhower's statements in reply to questions at a press conference on June 19, 1957, when the President stated, "I would be perfectly delighted to make some satisfactory arrangements for a temporary suspension of tests while we could determine whether we couldn't make some agreements that would allow it to be a permanent arrangement." (*American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957*, pp. 1276–1277) For the full transcript of the press conference, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957*, pp. 468–480.

also admitted that there were possibilities of evasion of the test suspension by the USSR, although he thought that successful evasions were not likely.

Governor Stassen then turned to his second recommendation, which he pointed out could be put forward separately or in combination with his first recommendation. Again using a map, he indicated that his second recommendation called for the establishment of an initial inspection zone against surprise attack in the Western USSR and Central Europe. This zone would be from approximately 3° East longitude to 28° East longitude, and from 45° North latitude to the Arctic Circle zone. In describing this inspection zone, Governor Stassen pointed out that it covered a larger territory than General Norstad had described as the essential minimum. It also fitted in with Chancellor Adenauer's statement at Hamburg.⁷ If the Soviet Union could be brought to accept such a zone, Governor Stassen felt that it would be an entering wedge to loosen the Soviet hold on the East European satellites.

Governor Stassen next turned to his third recommendation, calling for the establishment of an inspection zone in Eastern Siberia, the Arctic, the Northwestern United States and Western Canada. This, again, was illustrated on a map. Governor Stassen felt that there was some genuine hope of Soviet acceptance of this proposal.

Governor Stassen reiterated the point that if any one of these three recommendations, or all three together, were accepted by the Soviet Union, such acceptance would be tantamount to beginning to open up the Soviet Union, which had long been an objective of the United States. Of course, he added, in putting forward these three specific recommendations we were leaving a number of very important subjects for follow-up negotiations. The reasons for leaving these subjects for subsequent negotiation was that, for example, our proposal for the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons would require a most long-drawn-out, detailed, and comprehensive inspection system. Furthermore, cessation of nuclear production in the absence of a thoroughgoing inspection system would not be in the interests of the United States. It took only a certain relatively small number of nuclear weapons to provide the means for a surprise attack. It took a much larger number of nuclear weapons to provide an adequate defense against nuclear attack. The field of ballistic missiles, likewise, was an area to be left for follow-up negotiations after the initial step had been taken. Ballistic missiles required an even more complete inspection system than other means of delivery of nuclear warheads. Accordingly, this was not a suitable proposal for an opening step.

⁷ Not further identified.

At this point, Governor Stassen passed around copies of a draft letter of reply by the President to Bulganin⁸ (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting). In this he had suggested ways and means of resuming negotiations with the Soviet Union on disarmament. Simultaneously with this proposal to Bulganin, the United States could also take the initiative toward negotiations in the United Nations as well as through ordinary diplomatic channels. Also, if the National Security Council agreed with these three recommendations, Governor Stassen recommended that consultations be begun promptly with appropriate members of the United States Senate.

Upon the conclusion of Governor Stassen's statement, Mr. Cutler called on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide the Council with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which were in opposition to the recommendations made by Governor Stassen. General Twining read portions of the written views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which had previously been circulated to the members of the National Security Council. Secretary McElroy pointed out that the Department of Defense supported the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in opposition to Governor Stassen's proposals.

Thereafter Mr. Cutler called on Admiral Strauss, who said that he would limit his comments on the Stassen proposals to those aspects which concerned nuclear weapons; he would not speak on inspection zones or force levels, in which fields he was not an expert. Admiral Strauss then proceeded to indicate to the Council what the cessation of nuclear testing would mean to the United States and the USSR nuclear weapons programs. He noted in particular that the proposed 24-month suspension of nuclear testing would have rather severe repercussions on our present programs to achieve small "clean" nuclear weapons. While we would be in a position, even if nuclear testing were suspended for 24 months beginning in September 1958, to stockpile nuclear warheads for our ICBM and our IRBM missiles, such a cessation of testing would very adversely affect our program for developing peaceful uses of hydrogen explosions.

After a similar description of the estimated effects of the test cessation on the Soviet programs, Admiral Strauss went on to comment on the effect of a 24-month suspension on our laboratories. He said that the work in our laboratories would certainly lose momentum as a result of the cessation, but they would not suffer a serious setback if testing were renewed at the end of two years as the result either of a failure of the

⁸ For text of the letter to Bulganin, January 12, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, pp. 932–941. Bulganin's December 10 letter to Eisenhower is *ibid.*, pp. 918–926.

Soviets to follow the rules of the game or as the result of a more comprehensive disarmament agreement.

After reading a message from Ambassador Thompson on the subject of the attitude of the USSR toward disarmament,⁹ Admiral Strauss stated that in his opinion the principal weakness of Governor Stassen's proposal for a revision of our August 1957 disarmament proposal lay in the fact that it constituted a retreat from what the United States had originally regarded as a sound position. Speaking personally, and not presenting the views of the Atomic Energy Commission, Admiral Strauss said he felt that such a retreat was unfortunate. Finally, said Admiral Strauss, both Dr. Teller and Dr. Lawrence felt that several score of inspection stations would be required to monitor testing in the Soviet Union, rather than the eight or twelve which Governor Stassen proposed as requisite to detect clandestine nuclear testing within the Soviet Union.

Mr. Cutler next called on Ambassador Lodge, who had come from New York in order to attend the Council meeting on this subject. Ambassador Lodge pointed out that he was speaking as one who was in daily touch with world trends in the disarmament field, but that he could not be a spokesman for the technical considerations governing this question. He had to assume that our massive retaliatory power existed and was going to be protected. Under this assumption, as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations he felt that the proposals put forward by Governor Stassen would be very advantageous to the United States. The only chance that we would have to achieve disarmament would be to win the great debate on this subject after raising a great hue and cry. The danger in these proposals to the strength of American arms seemed to Ambassador Lodge fairly remote; but the danger to the support we get from our allies would be immediate if we ignored the Stassen proposals. To illustrate his point, Ambassador Lodge analyzed the recent vote in the United Nations,¹⁰ and pointed out that even among our good friends we were getting a good deal of blame for the existing deadlock. Ambassador Lodge felt that Governor Stassen's proposals, if adopted, would get us out of this unfortunate position.

On the other hand, Ambassador Lodge felt that Governor Stassen's proposal for the establishment of an "armaments regulation organization" should be under the aegis of the Disarmament Commission rather than under the aegis of the Security Council of the United Nations, as

⁹ Not further identified.

¹⁰ Apparent reference to the vote on U.N. Resolution 1148 (XII), November 14, 1957, "Regulation, Limitation, and Balanced Reduction of All Armed Forces and All Armaments; Conclusion of an International Convention (Treaty) on the Reduction of Armaments and the Prohibition of Atomic, Hydrogen, and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction." The resolution was approved by a vote of 56 (including the United States) to 9 with 15 abstentions. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, pp. 914-915.

Governor Stassen had proposed, for the reason that in the UN Security Council the Soviet Union would have a veto. Summing up, Ambassador Lodge pointed out his conviction that in the long run the effect of world public opinion is very important, and at the present time the United States is in not a very good posture with respect to world public opinion on disarmament.

Mr. Cutler next called on Secretary Dulles, who reminded the Council that we have a Four-Power position on disarmament which had been put forward in London at the end of August 1957. This position had been reached only with the greatest difficulties, among ourselves as well as with our allies. Secretary Dulles said he wished to address his own remarks to other than technical matters or the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in neither of which fields could he claim any expertise. He preferred to aim his remarks at the effects which the change in the Four-Power August 1957 position, now being proposed by Governor Stassen, would have on our allies and on the world position of the United States.

In this context, Secretary Dulles pointed out that Governor Stassen had claimed that the proposals he was making would be acceptable to our allies. Secretary Dulles said he felt bound to dissent from Governor Stassen's opinion.¹¹ On the contrary, adoption by the United States of Governor Stassen's proposals would cause serious altercations between the United States and its allies, without at the same time providing any assurance that the Soviets would in subsequent negotiations go on to agree with what we regarded as a sound position on disarmament set forth in the Four-Power position at London presented in August 1957. Indeed, continued Secretary Dulles, the United Kingdom was categorically opposed to any proposal for test suspension unless and until there was an amendment to the U.S. atomic energy legislation which would permit the British to secure our technical information if they agreed to

¹¹ At 3 p.m. on January 2, Secretary Dulles and Stassen discussed the proposals Stassen was to make to the NSC. According to the memorandum of conversation of the meeting, Dulles expressed his skepticism about Stassen's recommendations. Dulles thought they "would involve a practical abandonment of our proposals" on the cut-off of fissionable material for weapons, supervision against surprise attack, and the use of space for peaceful purposes. Stassen disagreed and said his proposals would further U.S. objectives. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation) See the Supplement.

At 4 p.m. on January 2, Dulles informed the President that "it was getting increasingly difficult for us [Stassen and himself] to work together because he [Stassen] was not under my authority and yet he conceived of his disarmament task as running into many related problems such as the reunification of Germany, our relations with France as a potential nuclear power, and so forth." Eisenhower was surprised that Stassen was still functioning as an Assistant to the President and agreed "it would probably be wise to effect a change at an early date." (Memorandum of conversation by Dulles; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

stop testing their own weapons. The French, predicted Secretary Dulles, would take very much the same position.

As far as the inspection zones proposed by Governor Stassen were concerned, Secretary Dulles expressed the conviction that these zones went far beyond anything which had been approved by the NATO Council, and he strongly doubted that the NATO Council would approve of them. Secretary Dulles also expressed great doubt that two-thirds of the members of the United States Senate would agree in approving the Stassen proposals. Most Americans don't like gerrymandering, and members of Congress from the West Coast would strongly oppose having their areas opened to Soviet inspection while the rest of the country was free of such inspection. Finally, said Secretary Dulles, on this subject of zones he agreed with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the effect that Governor Stassen's proposed zones were heavily weighted in favor of the Soviet Union in terms of both military and industrial significance.

Secretary Dulles said that he must, however, agree that from the world standpoint the Council must consider the views expressed by Ambassador Lodge, together with other significant views on this subject. Secretary Dulles felt that the ordinary run of people in many countries were going along with the simplified Soviet views on disarmament. This, however, was not true of the governments of these countries, most of whom thought our own position was sound even though they had to make apparent concessions to their public opinion. This ill-informed public opinion was undoubtedly important, but so also was the fact that we had taken a firm position last August on the subject of disarmament, had insisted that this position was sound, and had likewise stressed in public statements the emphasis that we were now giving to the achievement of "clean" tactical weapons. If we retreat from this general position sketched above, Secretary Dulles predicted that we would momentarily appease hostile public opinion, but at the same time we would invite a new Soviet propaganda campaign, the essential keynotes of which would be either that the United States is now thoroughly frightened and willing to make any kind of disarmament agreement, or, alternatively, that the USSR had always been right in its own proposals for disarmament and now at long last the United States was coming to admit it. It seemed to Secretary Dulles that this was a very wrong time to make these concessions. This was a time when everybody was looking for signs of weakness in the United States. It was also a time which would provide the occasion for a fresh Soviet propaganda onslaught on the subject of disarmament.

Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that we should, of course, not be rigid in our views on disarmament and, indeed, we had not been rigid. But to change our position on disarmament at the present time, in

ways that would threaten the strength of the alliance and which would be interpreted as a great Soviet victory, was an error. He did not think this was the time to take such an action and, furthermore, such an action would be incompatible with our basic policy. Indeed, Secretary Dulles said he did not think that he would be able to maintain a belief in the posture of U.S. strength and confidence if these proposals were adopted. Our allies are invariably fearful of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR.

Beyond all these considerations, Secretary Dulles also emphasized the fact that we are now coming face to face with the problems of outer space. We should now strive to do our level best to see that outer space was used for peaceful purposes only. Much of our energy should be directed to this kind of study.

To repeat, said Secretary Dulles, he did not believe it was desirable for the United States to take too rigid a position in the matter of disarmament agreements. He was perfectly willing to take some chances. We could never be one hundred percent sure. Indeed, he might be willing to support Governor Stassen's proposals if they were looked at only under technical and military aspects, but not if looked at on the political and foreign policy side. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles recommended that the United States for the time being stand firm on the August 1957 proposals. We must not panic. We must not give in to the Soviets under present conditions. After all, it took two years of negotiation with the Soviets to achieve the armistice in Korea, and an even longer time to achieve the treaty on Austria. In both instances, however, the Soviets had finally come round to our point of view, and in this connection our disarmament proposal was only four months old. Secretary Dulles repeated that he didn't claim that we shouldn't change our August 1957 proposals; but he did insist that we shouldn't do it now, and especially we shouldn't do it until the requisite changes in the atomic energy legislation had been assured.

Mr. Brundage expressed his view of the desirability of some kind of middle ground. He felt that some kind of U.S. initiative would be very helpful, and believed that we should not stand pat on the August 1957 position.

The President said he had some questions to put to the Council. First of all, we must remember that we do not know what the Congress will do on our recommendations for changes in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The President believed that we could contemplate the break-up of NATO if we ceased nuclear testing in agreement with the USSR before the terms of this Act had been changed.

Now as to his second point, the President said he found himself in agreement with Governor Stassen and Ambassador Lodge with respect to the importance of world public opinion. Much of this public opinion is

very uninformed in the area of disarmament. What the world wants is easy answers to the disarmament dilemma, and we must be clear that this opinion on the necessity for disarmament steps is steadily growing stronger and insisting on results. Even in confidential talks at the NATO meeting, the President said that he encountered very strong insistence that something must be done to advance disarmament.

The President next expressed his great concern about the difference of views of the experts in this field. There was the Teller article in *Foreign Affairs*¹² referred to earlier by Mr. Cutler, which doubted the effectiveness of any inspection system. On the other hand, Dr. Rabi was at the same time urging a cessation of nuclear testing provided there was an adequate inspection system. Apparently Governor Stassen believes in the opinion of one group of scientists and Admiral Strauss follows the views of another group. It was clear to the President, however, that we should never make any inspection proposals which precisely delineate any areas we are going to accept as being open to Soviet inspection, because as soon as you agree on a certain area as subject to inspection, the Soviets will attempt to expand these areas. Accordingly, said the President, he found himself in agreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the matter of Governor Stassen's proposals on zones of inspection.

The President then alluded to the date of September 1958 when, if the Stassen proposals were adopted, nuclear testing would cease for 24 months. This would include the period when the Atomic Energy Act could have been changed and Operation Hardtack¹³ would be concluded. These two matters are at the moment prerequisite to making any new proposals.

The President said that he had yet another point. Secretary Dulles had spoken of the significance of outer space. Was he talking about outer space in connection only with ballistic missiles? Or was he speaking of other matters, such as satellites and the exploitation of outer space for peaceful purposes? Secretary Dulles replied that the proposals which we had put forward at London dealt with outer space above the atmosphere. The President said that such a proposal would include not only ballistic missiles but also vehicles sent into outer space for peaceful purposes. We should clarify this distinction.

¹²The article, entitled "Alternatives for Security," is in the January 1958 issue of *Foreign Affairs*.

¹³Hardtack was the designation given to atmospheric nuclear weapons tests in the Pacific and Nevada in 1958. Hardtack Phase I was a series of tests in which 35 nuclear devices were detonated at the AEC proving grounds at Enewetak (Eniwetok) and Bikini atolls in the Marshall Islands in the Pacific from April 28 to August 18, 1958. Extensive information and technical data on Hardtack I has been published in a report by the Defense Nuclear Agency as Executive Agency for the Department of Defense, *Operation Hardtack I*, 1958, December 1, 1982, report number DNA 6038F.

Finally, said the President, on the supposition that we made the changes that Governor Stassen was suggesting in our August 1957 position on disarmament, through what channels would our proposals for change be put forward? Certainly we could not proceed bilaterally with the Soviets. We would have to coordinate our proposals with our allies. By and large, the President concluded that this was not the time to make any new proposals. We have not concerted either with our allies or even among ourselves. Secretary Dulles commented that the President's position did not preclude proposals for change in the August 1957 position at some future time.

Dr. Killian read from a report of the Science Advisory Committee's Panel on Disarmament,¹⁴ in which the Panel had concluded that the United States should not proceed with additional proposals for nuclear test suspensions without up-to-date technical appraisals made in advance by the most highly-qualified U.S. scientific and technical personnel.

Governor Stassen reverted to the President's question as to the channels through which we would now or at some future time put forward proposals for changes in our position on disarmament. He explained his conviction that if we stood pat on our August 1957 position we would not hold the support of NATO but actually lose it. He also explained what must have appeared to the Soviets as the inequity of the European zone of inspection which we had proposed in August at London. The Soviets had rejected this proposed inspection zone. Nevertheless, our NATO allies clearly do not want us to stand pat on this zone and refuse to consider any modification.

Likewise, continued Governor Stassen, he could not agree with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the inspection zones he was proposing were undoubtedly disadvantageous to the United States or were weighted in favor of the USSR. He defended the proposed new zone, and expressed again the feeling that if the United States did not now take the initiative in proposing other zones of inspection, we could be sure that some other NATO country would do so. Governor Stassen also insisted that his proposals as a whole did not constitute a retreat by the United States, but rather a manifestation of U.S. leadership. It was not only the ill-informed public opinion of the world, but the well-informed people of the world, who are looking to the United States for new leadership. We cannot ignore this opinion, and our national security requires the support of other free nations.

With respect to the question posed by the President as to how we should proceed to advance any new proposals we should decide on,

¹⁴See the Attachment below.

Governor Stassen suggested the following outline: First, we would confer with the appropriate Senate leaders. Then we would take up the matter with the British, the French, and the NATO Council. Governor Stassen said he believed that all of these would support his proposals, and ended with a plea for support in the National Security Council for these proposals.

In reply, Secretary Dulles said he simply could not agree with the accuracy of Governor Stassen's presentation of what had occurred in the presentation of the U.S. position on disarmament at London last August. He did not care to argue this matter, but he was not sure that Governor Stassen qualified as an expert in the knowledge of what our NATO allies will or will not accept, though, he added, he did not question Governor Stassen's sincerity.

Ambassador Lodge said that apropos of the matter of timing, he found himself opposed to any meeting of the Disarmament Commission in January, even though it was chaired by the United States and even if we were to have a new position on disarmament. He would much prefer to have a meeting in some three months' time, during which period the necessary preparations could have been made.

As to inspection, Ambassador Lodge said that he had never visualized spelling out in a UN resolution what the precise inspection system would be. He thought we would only agree in principle to inspection in the resolution. We would have to confer most carefully with our allies on the size and shape of any actual inspection zones.

Secretary Dulles said he felt that the situation was very fluid at the moment, and that we might want to change our position on disarmament later.

The President said he couldn't believe that Governor Stassen's inspection proposal could properly be called a retreat, and Secretary Dulles agreed with him. Again Governor Stassen insisted that his proposal was not a retreat, but merely a new initiative.

The Vice President said he had a question to put to Secretary Dulles. Supposing that an agreement for the cessation of testing occurs and tests thereafter would be frozen. The Vice President assumed that we would be ahead. If this is the case, what is the explanation of the fact that the Soviets are pressing other nations so hard for a cessation of nuclear tests?

Secretary Dulles replied that he supposed that the Soviets feel they have all they need in the way of nuclear weapons for an aggressive attack on the United States. On the other hand, we do not feel that we have enough nuclear weapons for the defense of the United States.

Admiral Strauss added, in explanation to the Vice President, that the Soviets probably believe that we would not conduct clandestine tests if we agreed to a cessation. On the other hand, there was no reason why

they would not conduct clandestine tests and so ultimately they would overtake us.

Governor Stassen added still another point. He felt that the Soviets were very concerned about the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons into other hands. They fear that if this occurs some other nation will trigger a war which would ultimately involve all-out nuclear conflict between the United States and the USSR. Secretary Dulles expressed his agreement with this point, but added that the nuclear cut-off was the surest defense against that kind of situation.

The President expressed the hope that we could advance rapidly in our discovery of detection devices. Dr. Killian indicated that we could not surely detect all nuclear tests. Secretary McElroy pointed out that, as compared to certain other nations, the population of the United States was relatively small. Accordingly, we were compelled to rely on greater fire power. The continued development of small "clean" nuclear weapons, therefore, was of the very greatest importance to the United States. The President commented that certainly we were in the midst of an arms race, and the burdens of armament hung heavy everywhere. We must keep the hope of disarmament before the world.

At the conclusion of the discussion of this subject, Mr. Cutler gave his view as to the consensus, and suggested a possible Council action, which was subsequently modified in part by proposals from the President, Secretary Dulles, and Dr. Killian.

*The National Security Council:*¹⁵

a. Noted and discussed the enclosure to the reference memorandum of December 26, 1957, prepared by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of January 3, 1958.

b. Noted the President's decision that the United States should continue to adhere to the Four-Power proposals of August 29, 1957 (Annex D to the reference memorandum of December 26, 1957) for the time being; having in mind the importance, in any further consideration of this subject, of such matters as determining the Congressional attitude to changes in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

c. Noted the President's approval of the recommendation of the Science Advisory Committee Panel on Disarmament (as summarized by Dr. Killian at the meeting) that the following technical studies be made by representatives of the Science Advisory Committee, the Department

¹⁵The following paragraphs and note, approved by the President on January 9, constitute NSC Action No. 1840. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency:

1. In the area of nuclear testing, the following three studies:

a. A study of the losses to the United States consequent on a total suspension of nuclear tests at specific future dates.

b. A symmetrical study of the losses to the USSR that would accrue from cessation of nuclear testing, using the same hypothetical dates.

c. A study of the technical feasibility of monitoring a test suspension, including the outlines of a surveillance and inspection system.

2. A study to cover the technical factors involved in monitoring a long-range rocket test agreement to assure that it is carried out for peaceful purposes (such as the launching of scientific reconnaissance vehicles).

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to all holders of the reference memoranda, and referred to the Secretary of State for appropriate implementation.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, AEC, and the Director of Central Intelligence, for appropriate implementation.

[Here follows Agenda Item 3; see Document 2.]

S. Everett Gleason

Attachment¹⁶

Report by Caryl P. Haskins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Killian)

Washington, January 5, 1958.

SUBJECT

Report of SAC Panel on Disarmament

The SAC Panel on Disarmament met on January 4, 1958 to review current arms limitation proposals with a view to assisting your partici-

¹⁶Secret.

pation in the NSC meeting on January 6, 1958. In attendance at the Panel meeting were C.P. Haskins, H.A. Bethe, I.I. Rabi, H. Scoville, H. York and G. Kistiakowsky (part time).

The discussion centered principally on two recommendations of Gov. Stassen, (a) that the U.S. propose a two-year nuclear test suspension as of September 1958, and (b) that the U.S. support the creation of a UN technical committee to study ways to monitor the development of outer-space vehicles for peaceful purposes. The Panel also noted that the U.S. has, through the final NATO communiqué, supported the creation of a technical group of NATO to advise on problems of arms control arising out of new technical developments.

It is the conclusion of the Panel that the U.S. should not proceed with additional proposals for a nuclear test suspension or for international studies on ways to limit long-range rocket testing without up-to-date technical appraisals of these two possibilities, made in advance by the most qualified U.S. scientific and technical personnel having access to highly-classified information. It believes that previous scientific studies are no longer current nor were they originally of sufficient technical scope and detail to fully develop potential areas of technical agreement or lack of agreement within the U.S. Government. It recommends that certain studies, to be confined strictly to technical fact-finding and appraisal, be undertaken immediately to assist in national policy determination. They are outlined below.

A. In the area of nuclear testing, there is need for three subsidiary studies:

1. A study of the losses to the U.S. consequent on a total suspension of nuclear tests at specific future dates. This study would include such technical subjects as the effects of suspension on the development of ICBM and Polaris warheads, on development of very small tactical nuclear weapons, on AICBM and anti-aircraft rocket warheads, and on the production of "clean" nuclear weapons. Insofar as possible, it should include an appraisal of the relative importance of such losses to total U.S. military capabilities. These assessments should be based on the assumption that tests are banned (a) before the scheduled summer 1958 Pacific tests, and (b) in September 1958.

2. A symmetrical study on the losses to the USSR that would accrue from cessation of nuclear testing, including effects on long-range missile capabilities, and air defense, using the same hypothetical dates.

3. A study of the technical feasibility of monitoring a test suspension, including the outlines of a surveillance and inspection system. Such a study should carefully consider the possibilities of successfully evading such monitoring and the practicability of clandestine weapon development.

B. A second major study would cover the technical factors involved in monitoring a long-range rocket test agreement to assure that it is carried out for peaceful purposes (such as the launching of scientific

reconnaissance vehicles). It would attempt to broadly outline a surveillance and inspection system. It would assist the possibilities of evasion in terms of the clandestine development of a significant operational capability with long-range missiles.

It is important that these studies be undertaken at the earliest possible time due to (a) the need to assess the disadvantages of instituting a test cessation prior to this summer's Hardtack series, and (b) the probable development by the USSR, within a year's time, of a prototype ICBM. Unless a U.S. proposal for a missile test limitation is made before such developments, it would probably be delayed until after development of an operational missile by both powers.

The Panel recommends that the above studies be made for the President or the National Security Council by a full-time task force of the most qualified individuals, selected with the participation of the AEC, DOD, and the President's Science Advisory Committee. The task force should lean heavily on contributions by research organizations having technical competence in the subject areas.

The President's Science Advisory Committee unanimously supports the Panel's recommendations for factual technical studies on international limitation of nuclear and missile testing (with the exception of four members who were unavailable for comment).

Caryl P. Haskins¹⁷

¹⁷Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

137. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for Disarmament (Stassen) to President Eisenhower

Washington, January 14, 1958.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: May I follow through on my presentation at the NSC¹ with this summary and explanation. I am giving a copy to Foster and to Robert Cutler.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administrative Series, Stassen, Harold E., 1957. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: "Hold/D[wight]."

¹ See Document 136.

First of all my recommendations stem from a deep faith that our system of freedom will prevail if there is not a war. I am confident of the outcome of a long vigorous competition between the free system and the Communist system. It is my basic philosophy that man by nature was meant to be free under God. I do not share Foster's uncertainty about the success of our free way of life in the future economic and idea competition. I am also confident that our nation would come out on top and survive even though there be a nuclear war, but I believe it would be very very difficult to reestablish freedom and to rebuild civilization in the devastated wake of a nuclear war.

With this fundamental approach, it is my view that it is extremely important for the United States to take and maintain a sound, imaginative initiative for peace, and equally important to take and maintain a similar initiative for the wellbeing and freedom of the people of the world.

Such initiatives require concrete and dramatic proposals to hold the attention of the people and develop their understanding and support. We should ever avoid a negative and defensive approach and ever take a counter-proposal and affirmative move. Such an initiative will better establish the necessary sustained defense effort and cohesion and cooperation of other free nations for a widely dispersed and alert deterrent force than will a direct and almost exclusive emphasis on armaments.

Included in such a sustained initiative should be specific United States proposals in the field of disarmament of a type easily understood by the people, reasonable in their balance, and incorporating a favorable chance of starting inspection of the territory of the Soviet Union through a United Nations agency.

The three specific recommendations for spearheading proposals have these characteristics. A United States proposal to the Soviet Union that if a reasonable number of United Nations inspections posts are installed inside their territory and ours, equipped with adequate scientific instruments, the United States will join in stopping nuclear testing for two years, while negotiations are intensified for more far-reaching agreements, would give the United States a firm initiative. If the Soviet Union accepts, there will be an immediate move to open up their territory to international inspection including scientific instrumentation. This would be an historic turning point and have great promise of enlargement and expansion to an inspection system adequate to stop the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and to an inspection system to control the use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes. If the Soviet Union, notwithstanding their agreement to inspection posts in the negotiations in London last June, now refuses the offer, they can be continually pressed on this point. It is a specific and direct issue of a nature that the people of the world will understand. Such

a refusal of the Soviet Union to make it reasonably possible to assure that such a small first agreement to suspend tests is being lived up to would be denounced by the great majority of people.

The second concrete proposal of a reasonable small zone for beginning open skies and ground inspection in Central Europe would attract the attention of the people second only to nuclear testing. General Norstad has been for it. I am confident that the NATO members would approve of it. I urge that their views be solicited. Reciprocal opening of territory is advantageous to the free nations. If the Soviet Union accepts this, it would facilitate prospects for the further successful negotiation of a reunified free Germany combined with a Central European zone without atomic weapons and with limited armed forces.

The third concrete proposal is for an initial zone which would include a part of the United States and a part of Siberia. This offer is important so that both our allies and the Soviet Union note the willingness of the United States to begin open skies and ground inspection on a part of the territory of our own forty-eight states. Furthermore, the joint intelligence studies indicate that any opening of the Soviet territory to the U.S. would give some improved warning protection against surprise attack on our homeland. If the Soviet Union accepts this, the chances of successive expansion to a comprehensive inspection system against surprise attack would be improved.

I do not mean that these disarmament initiatives should be the only ones that the U.S. takes. For example, it would be highly desirable if during this year the President would personally go to a meeting of the heads of governments of the Colombo Plan states to be held in Delhi, India. This Colombo group includes the nations of free Asia from Japan around to Pakistan. They meet exclusively on economic and technical programs. At such a meeting you could offer to establish a Colombo Atoms-For-Peace Center on Ceylon, and win acclaim throughout the area. The engineering and scientific studies for such a Center are well developed. You could also offer a portion of the Development Loan Fund to underwrite a trade and payments union of these Colombo Plan countries to facilitate the flow of private trade between the free nations of Asia. Properly developed, such a program would be of great economic assistance without actually using up the underwriting money. It would assist in confidence of payment between private traders in these states and thus further the development of private enterprise. It is one of the methods we used successfully in Europe. The cooperation and substantial support of the NATO states, acting through the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), could grow out of this initiative. This would help our United States objectives in Asia.

A Presidential offer to assist the United Nations in establishing a police force equipped with tactical atomic weapons would help to take

away the smaller nations' sense of being excluded from our atomic weapons position. Even though it may be many years before such a police force could be worked out, the psychological impact of an offer would be good, and this would be another part of keeping a United States initiative month after month.

After our scientific satellite is successfully orbiting, the President could offer to the United Nations the cooperation of the United States in a United Nations Space Development Project. Such a project could go forward whether or not the Soviet Union agreed. This again would develop a sense of participation by scientists of many nations and could involve financial contributions by all of the others in a manner similar to the infrastructure program of NATO.

The United States could also offer to negotiate a solution of the Hungarian situation along the lines of the Austrian solution and could repeatedly express this willingness. This would make it clear that the United States would not accept a status quo in Eastern Europe.

The United States can propose a competition between systems in the advancement of the standards of living of people, with the results to be observed within each country by a special United Nations Commission in which nations on both sides should participate. This should stimulate the demands of the peoples inside the Communist countries for more results in consumer goods and for more service and freedom. If accepted by the Soviet Union it would further open up Soviet and satellite territory.

Each of such proposals should be made at an appropriate time and in a tone and manner conducive toward a negotiating atmosphere. So far as the free world is concerned this would be the best form of propaganda and at the same time would carry the best chance for agreements which would decrease the danger of war.

In connection with such a program, a meeting at the Summit followed by negotiating groups on individual matters and then followed by another meeting at the Summit with further detailed work is to be commended. With the nature of the world power situation and with an awareness that the form of the Soviet government means that direct talks with the top leaders is the best way to get through to them, even an annual meeting at the Summit would seem to be sensible and logical in world relationships for the sake of peace. The United States meets Prime Ministers of Western countries a number of times each year. Are not meetings with those who hold the power in the Soviet Union in fact even more important. If the people are informed that it is anticipated that there would be repeated meetings, this would prevent either extreme disappointment or undesirable tension in relation to any one summit meeting. The liberation of Austria, the establishment of the atoms-for-peace program, and the easing of the iron curtain for movements of people are

three direct important products of your willingness to meet at the Summit in 1955. The establishment of the United Nations Charter is a direct product of the meeting at Yalta and of the talks of Hopkins with Stalin in Moscow.

Such a first Summit meeting could perhaps best be held in Washington and include the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the U.S., Britain and France, with the Secretary General of the UN participating to represent that organization and to give confidence to all other states that their interests would neither be ignored nor secretly bargained away.

In summary, taking and maintaining the initiative is in my view of the essence. It will be recalled that the initiative that you would go to Korea, the initiative of atoms-for-peace, the initiative of meeting in Geneva, the initiative of the open skies proposal, were the instances in which the greatest support and cohesion for the position of the United States at home and abroad were sustained. During these periods the best cooperation was also obtained on the defense requirements including the great advances in the infrastructure program for airfields throughout NATO, the establishment of the special weapons planning work in NATO, the incorporation of a German defense force, and overall the strong support for your continued leadership of our country.

Measures such as these can be placed in motion through a letter from you to the heads of the NATO governments stating your intention to make certain of the proposals if they do not see an objection, and welcoming their own suggestions and views.

Sincerely,

Harold

138. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, January 22, 1958.

OTHERS PRESENT

General Goodpaster
Admiral Strauss

Admiral Strauss said his first subject was a matter he had discussed with Secretary Dulles, who was greatly interested. It is a proposed initia-

tive in three parts which the United States might take, calling for: 1) Stopping nuclear tests for a period of say three years, 2) Ceasing *all* production of fissionable material (as contrasted to previous proposals to stop production for military purposes), 3) Cannibalizing existing weapons to provide fissionable material for power and other peaceful needs. He said he has studied the matter with General Fields and General Starbird, and they all think the idea is a sound one; he does wish to think about it and check it out a little further, however. He stressed the importance of keeping it secret and the President emphasized this even more strongly.

The President then asked a number of questions—first, as to what would happen to the AEC organization. Admiral Strauss said he would keep the laboratories intact. In the production plants, there would be a saving of power costs now being incurred, but at least the bulk of the labor force would be kept on. The President asked if this arrangement could be reliably supervised, and Admiral Strauss said that it could be—in fact, it could be far more easily inspected than our earlier proposal. He added that, after three years, if the arrangement has worked out, agreement could be reached to resume testing of explosions for peaceful purposes only.

The President said he thought Admiral Strauss had a fine idea, of great promise, and worthy of full-scale further study and evaluation.

Admiral Strauss next raised the matter of the “Hardtack” test series. He said he was concerned about having public attendance during a count down procedure, in light of the experience over the publicity of our satellite attempt. He therefore proposed that there should be no public attendance at these tests, as had been previously contemplated. He added that such attendance might compromise secrecy. The President indicated that if attendance would impair security, he would agree that public attendance should be cancelled.

Admiral Strauss next asked the President if he would be willing to dedicate the Shipping-port reactor, which is now operating successfully. After discussion, the President agreed to do it, from his desk in the White House, making a short statement. Admiral Strauss suggested this be carried over closed circuit TV and said he would consult further with Mr. Hagerty on the matter.

Admiral Strauss next referred to the President’s comment about disagreement among scientific advisers on the matter of certainty that we could pick up Soviet atomic tests. He cited as an example the last Soviet test, which we were able to pick up only by chance—not having detected it by several of the methods we depend on most.

Admiral Strauss next reminded the President that his term as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission expires on June 30th. The President immediately said that he hadn’t realized this and would simply

renominate him. Admiral Strauss said he would like to have the President weigh very carefully the question of his renomination, since he had accumulated a number of liabilities, including most of the columnists in the Washington press. The President said he shared those liabilities with Admiral Strauss.

G
Brigadier General, USA

139. Memorandum of Conversation Between General Alfred M. Gruenther and Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, February 19, 1958, 2 p.m.

We talked about Tunisia, Mutual Security, and so forth. Then I discussed the disarmament situation.¹ I said I felt that it was essential that disarmament work should be an integral part of the State Department activity and not operated independently. Disarmament involved too many political considerations, the future of NATO, the future of Germany, and so forth. Gruenther said he agreed. I further said that I was very skeptical about there being any reduction of armament purely as a matter of agreement. There might be reduction for domestic reasons or because some political issues were settled, but the disarmament problem was so complex, the balance so difficult to find, and enforcement so precarious, that I doubted that there could be reduction of armament purely as a result of reciprocal and balanced agreement. Nevertheless, I felt it was vital to continue to seek limitation of armament. I referred to the German attitude prior to World War I and the disastrous consequences to them of being regarded throughout the world as militaristic. General

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Confidential; Personal and Private.

¹ On February 14, Harold E. Stassen resigned his post as the President's Special Assistant for Disarmament. In his resignation letter to Eisenhower, Stassen stated that the studies and recommendations that he had been asked to make had been made and were either adopted or "are well understood within the Administration." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administrative Series, Stassen, Harold E., 1957) See the Supplement. Eisenhower's February 15 letter accepting Stassen's resignation is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958*, pp. 152-153.

Gruenther indicated his general agreement with this point of view. I then indicated that I was thinking of handling the matter, perhaps through Wadsworth, as far as negotiation was concerned, and through the regular Departmental officers, but I did feel it necessary to have some qualified persons from outside who could serve as kind of an advisory panel to keep us moving and moving in sound directions, taking into account all relevant factors, including public relations. General Gruenther expressed the thought that perhaps some of our allies were making us carry too heavy a public relations burden by getting us to take positions which they wanted but which they were not willing to associate themselves with publicly, e.g. non-suspension of testing. I agreed. I asked General Gruenther whether he would be willing to serve on such a panel and he said that he would if I thought this could be reconciled with his being out of town a good deal of the time. I said I thought it could be. I mentioned General Bedell Smith, and he thought that he would be a good member, subject to the fact that he also was out of town a good deal of the time. General Gruenther suggested Arnold Wolfers as someone here whom he regarded as intelligent and knowledgeable and a student of the subject.

I spoke of Sprague but said I was a little bit concerned because he seemed to be emotional about certain aspects of the matter including shelters. General Gruenther said he had no knowledge of Robert Sprague but did not think we needed to worry much about the shelter program. He said he did not think it would ever take hold or be a popular or political problem. He did express regret that Senator Humphrey had attacked the Administration on the disarmament theme.

I thanked General Gruenther for his willingness to serve and said I would communicate with him later on.²

JFD

² See Document 140.

140. Editorial Note

At 3:33 p.m. on February 19, 1958, Dulles called Governor Sherman Adams, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, to inform him of his discussion with General Gruenther (see Document 139) and suggested that Walter Bedell Smith and Professor Wolfers of Yale University would also be good prospective members of an advisory panel on disarmament. Adams

thought Dulles might as well get "good names." Dulles stated "this is largely scenery" and "a public relations job." Adams suggested that Dulles get "some practical people who can sit around and talk about it." (Memorandum of telephone conversation, February 19; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations) See the Supplement.

On February 20 at 5:09 p.m., Dulles telephoned Robert Lovett and asked him to join the panel on disarmament. Dulles stated that henceforth disarmament would "be part of State," to which Lovett agreed. "One trouble with Stassen," Dulles continued, "was he was only interested in disarmament." Dulles described the panel as two or three people he could talk with in a general way about the lines of U.S. policy. He stated the panel would be made of Gruenther, Smith, and Lovett who would give advice and counsel on an informal basis. When Lovett agreed to serve, Dulles informed him that he felt "the prospects of getting any substantial result are not very good unless and until there are some solutions to political problems. But it is vitally important to keep pressing in this field and it will be disastrous if it is felt we are not interested." (Memorandum of telephone conversation, February 20; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations) See the Supplement.

When Dulles showed President Eisenhower the plan for disarmament reorganization, the President said he also wanted John J. McCloy on the panel. (Memorandum of conversation between Dulles and Eisenhower, February 24, 3 p.m.; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

141. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McElroy

Washington, March 13, 1958.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Testing (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 27 February 1958, subject as above.¹

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology. Top Secret; Restricted Data. An Appendix on estimated spectrum of weapons yields after September 1, 1958, is in the Supplement.

¹ Not found.

2. Under the conditions specified in the referenced memorandum the United States is ahead of the USSR numerically, both in numbers of weapons and amounts of weapons materials. If the moratorium applies only against testing, the United States can hold this position until about 1964. In any analysis of the nuclear capabilities of the two countries, the United States can only evaluate Soviet weapons against our own, since we have no specific intelligence on theirs. With this handicap, we must interject a note of caution into any evaluation, because of the possibility that the USSR may have made alternative effective designs which are unknown to us.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed referenced memorandum in light of the possible position of the USSR with respect to that of the United States, and consider that a complete cessation of nuclear testing after Operation Hardtack would result, at the very least, in a technological parity in nuclear weapons development between the two countries. This apparent parity is reflected in the Appendix hereto. Furthermore, the quantitative advantage which the United States presently enjoys as a result of its greater stockpile may well be equalized by about 1964 by the USSR with its rapidly increasing capacity for producing nuclear materials. These factors, coupled with the ability of the USSR to assume the military initiative, could result in relative supremacy of the USSR over the United States.

4. The tests scheduled for Hardtack will contribute appreciably to an improved United States position, providing the key shots are successful. However, should these key shots prove unsuccessful, there is a possibility that the attainment of a Ballistic Missile warhead greater than [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Fleet Ballistic Missile warhead and an anti-missile missile warhead will be seriously endangered if there is a moratorium on testing. In addition several important developments scheduled for testing subsequent to Operation Hardtack would probably be stopped. These include a family of highly mobile, inexpensive, small-yield weapons for support of battle groups and for air defense, a family of clean tactical weapons, artillery shells, and others. For these reasons, as well as for the technological parity which is now evidenced, and the ability of the USSR to equalize our present quantitative advantage by about 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe strongly that under no circumstances should the United States discuss with the USSR a test moratorium prior to the successful completion of the key shots in Hardtack.

5. Only through continued testing and development can improvements be realized in yield-to-weight ratios for atomic warheads. Further, radical advances in weapon systems are only possible through these improvements. [*3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]² Significant

² [*Text not declassified*] Both tests took place at Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls in the Pacific.

advancements in such weapon systems as the second generation of IRBM's, ICBM's, and FBM's and the anti-missile missile are only possible through continued warhead development and testing. In addition, vital weapon effects information can only be obtained through continued testing.

6. For the reasons above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their opinion of 31 December 1957³ that cessation of tests should be considered only as a part of a larger disarmament proposal which will provide also for complete suspension of the production of weapons and weapons materials keyed to an effective system of inspection verification.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Maxwell D. Taylor⁴
*General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff*

³ See footnote 3, Document 136.

⁴ Printed from a copy that indicates Taylor signed the original.

142. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Disarmament and Atomic Energy (Farley) to Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, March 18, 1958.

SUBJECT

Review of Disarmament Policy

Discussion

1. We have reviewed present U.S. disarmament policy and, in this memorandum, recommend changes in present policy for your consideration.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-1858. Secret. Drafted by Ronald I. Spiers of Farley's office and Henry D. Owen of S/P with the concurrences of Elbrick, Gerard Smith, and Walmsley. According to notes on the source text, the memorandum printed here reflects revisions made on March 21. Tabs A-E, entitled "Nuclear Test Suspension," "Cut-Off of Fissionable Material Production," "Establishment of Surprise Attack Zones," "Preliminary Measures Relating to Missile Controls and Outer Space," and "Reduction of Manpower and Conventional Armaments" are in the Supplement. Tab F (see footnote 2 below) was not attached and has not been found.

2. In preparing recommendations, the following major criteria have been applied:

- a. The national security interests of the United States.
- b. The major points of view and interests of our NATO allies, and particularly the U.K., France, and Germany.
- c. To avoid a sharp break with the August 29 proposals, but to find proposals growing out of this document which demonstrate forward movement, respond to valid criticism directed against our proposals by other governments, and give promise of negotiability vis-à-vis the USSR.
- d. To accord with the principles approved by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution of November 14, 1957,¹ which was adopted upon our initiative.
- e. To set forth a broad and tenable United States position responsive to the “disarmament problem” as it is seen by the majority of governments, and therefore dealing, in some manner, with the following elements:

1. nuclear tests
2. nuclear cut-off
3. surprise attack inspection
4. outer space and missiles controls
5. manpower and conventional arms limitation.

3. The principal elements of the new U.S. disarmament policy which we now propose are the following:

a. *Nuclear testing.* Nuclear tests would be suspended for a period of three years, beginning January 1, 1959, or as soon thereafter as agreement is reached on the nature and location of control posts to monitor the agreement. Testing would be resumed if agreement on an adequately inspected cut-off of production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons had not been reached at the end of three years. The U.S. would announce that, if it thus became necessary to resume testing, the U.S. would henceforth test only underground.²

b. *Cut-off of fissionable materials production.* Production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons would be suspended as soon as an effective inspection system was agreed to and in operation. This proposal could be advanced in two alternative forms: (1) fissionable materials plants would continue to operate, subject to international inspection to insure that the material produced was used only for peace-

¹ See footnote 10, Document 136.

² This is, we believe, a matter of urgency and importance, in view of the telegram from Embassy Moscow reporting that the Soviets may soon announce a unilateral suspension of testing, thus securing a major propaganda victory and depriving us of the principal disarmament benefits (inspection and effect on Nth country programs) which we would expect to result from a ban on tests (Tab F). [Footnote in the source text.]

ful purposes; or (2) plants now producing fissionable materials would be shut down, thereby drastically simplifying the inspection problem initially. In the latter case peaceful uses requirements would be supplied from existing stocks or by dismantling weapons. Transfers of fissionable materials from previous production to non-weapons purposes would be made in agreed equitable ratios.

c. *Surprise attack.* The following measures might be undertaken simultaneously or separately:

1. The broad U.S.–Canada–USSR zone set forth in the August 29 proposals would be reaffirmed.

2. A European zone extending from 5°–35° east, with the smaller central European zone proposed by General Norstad (but expressed in terms of geographic coordinates) as a fall-back position, with or without an arctic zone similar to that proposed on August 29.

3. Ground control posts (à la Bulganin) be established on a reciprocal basis at agreed installations (both within the US and USSR and at their foreign bases—e.g., naval and air) with or without the zones described above.

d. *Preliminary measures relating to strategic missile controls and outer space.* The following measures might be undertaken simultaneously or separately:

1. Immediate initiation of an international working group to plan an inspection system to insure that the sending of objects through outer space is for peaceful purposes only.

2. Joint cooperation in selected outer space projects, such as the development of an outer space platform, and interplanetary rocket and reconnaissance satellites, looking forward to centralization of all outer space activity in an international organization when the program envisioned in (1) goes into effect.

3. Advance notification, and, if possible, inspection of all vehicles, military or otherwise, entering outer space (or, as a fall-back, all objects to be launched into orbit).

e. *Manpower and conventional arms.* If agreement is reached on any two of the three major surprise attack measures proposed in (c) above, we would be willing to agree to reduction of U.S. and Soviet armed forces to the level of 2.2 million men, and U.K. and French forces to corresponding levels, with placement of designated quantities and types of modern conventional arms capable of serving as nuclear delivery systems (submarine, missiles, aircraft, etc.) in international arms depots. If the cut-off of fissionable materials production with a total U.S.–USSR–Canada–European inspection zone is agreed to, we would be willing further to agree to reduction to 1.8 million men for the U.S. and USSR, and comparable levels for other states (with a listing of the overseas bases which the U.S. would give up as a consequence of such reduction), together with placement of such amounts of important conventional armaments in interna-

tional arms depots that the armaments retained will have an agreed relationship to the armed forces remaining.

The reasons for these proposals are discussed in Tabs A–E, along with their relationship to present policy and anticipated reactions by our allies.

4. We have not included in 3(d) above any specific measures relating to cessation of testing, production, or deployment of strategic missiles. A position on these matters is an urgent necessity, particularly in view of the Soviet March 15 proposals on outer space. The present study underway under Dr. Killian's direction is limited to determining the feasibility of controlling an agreement not to test missiles. Before we can spell out the U.S. position on outer space or make specific counterproposals, we should have a broader technical study directed at the following problem:

Is it possible to devise an effective inspection system to police an agreement banning production and/or deployment of strategic missiles, taking into account present and prospective U.S. and USSR progress in developing and testing operational missiles traversing outer space?

Such a broader technical study would provide a basis for reaching conclusions as to *the conditions under which* agreement to use outer space only for peaceful purposes would be acceptable to the U.S. It may be possible in the first instance to reach conclusions regarding the acceptability of a missiles test ban, in time to include a proposal on this aspect during initial renewal of disarmament discussions with the USSR.

The study of the effect of a missile test ban could, if pressed with vigor, be completed in time to include a proposal on the subject in this package, before the package is discussed with the USSR. If undertaken soon enough, a test ban could prevent the development of an operational ICBM, which would threaten the United States, and of improved solid-fuel IRBM's, whose instant reaction time could pose a growing risk of accidental war. These advantages might warrant our accepting, if necessary, limitations on the deployment of existing types of IRBM's in certain areas immediately adjoining the Soviet Bloc in return. This question cannot be decided, however, until a study of the effect of test cessation has been completed.

The study of the inspection requirements for a ban on deployment and/or production will take somewhat longer. It thus seems unlikely that we could include proposals for the total elimination of strategic missiles in this package before it went to the Soviets. If, however, study indicates that elimination is feasible, we should be able to submit proposals soon afterward. Such proposals might combine missile elimination with reduction of conventional forces to 1.8 million men, for much the same reasons that this reduction was proposed under (e) above, in return for a nuclear cut-off. The relation of missile elimination to other elements of

disarmament cannot be judged with confidence, however, until the inspection issue has been appraised.

5. Any of the above measures, except as specified in (e), could be accepted independently by the United States. Linkage between some of the above elements may be desirable for negotiation advantage or to meet Soviet Union positions. To take account of these possibilities, as well as to outline other considerations relating to presentation of a modified U.S. position, a separate paper on tactics is being prepared. It is assumed that U.S. policy proposals would be discussed with the UK, France, Canada and the North Atlantic Council before presentation to the Soviet Union through agreed diplomatic channels.

Recommendations

1. That you approve our submitting the disarmament policy proposals in paragraph 3 above to the panel of disarmament advisers at an early date, to be followed by discussion in the NSC and (in April) with the U.K., France, Canada and the North Atlantic Council.

2. That you ask the NSC to request the Science Advisory Committee, on an urgent basis, to develop answers to the question posed in paragraph 4 above.

143. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the Director of the Office of Civilian and Defense Mobilization (Hoegh)

Washington, March 21, 1958.

I talked with the President last night about Dr. McGrath's excellent presentation to the Council yesterday morning on the hazards of radio-

active fallout and on the relative effectiveness of types of protective measures.¹

The President was interested in the difference, in terms of casualties, between an enemy attack using “dirty” nuclear weapons and an enemy attack using “clean” nuclear weapons. [3 lines of source text not declassified] there is confidence our scientific skill can within some five or more years solve this problem. Obviously a general war fought with “clean” weapons would not have the incalculable consequences to the world of a general war fought with “dirty” weapons, because of the greatly reduced radioactive fallout. Also the use of “clean” weapons in local conflicts (at least in many areas) would lessen the risk of such conflicts spreading into general war.

The presentation given to the Council yesterday included an example of massive nuclear attack on the U.S. with “dirty” weapons (Operation Alert 1957). This example showed the areas affected by radioactive fallout on the basis of two weather patterns on different days.

The President would be interested to see a comparison of estimated casualties resulting from the use of “dirty” nuclear weapons and estimated casualties resulting from the use of “clean” nuclear weapons, based on this attack pattern. While computations of casualties were not given at the presentation, I assume that they are available as to an attack using “dirty” weapons.

In fulfilling the President’s request, the following assumption might be made. The “clean” nuclear weapons to be used in the “clean nuclear weapons exercise” would be [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] “clean” nuclear weapons in all ranges. While at present to “clean” a “dirty” weapon reduces its yield by some [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] it is expected that future testing will greatly minimize such reduction in yield. For the purposes of simplification, your “clean nuclear weapons exercise” could well use “clean” weapons having the same yield as the “dirty” weapons used in the “dirty nuclear weapons

¹ On March 20, Paul McGrath of the Federal Civil Defense Administration briefed the National Security Council with a factual presentation on radioactive fallout and the types of protective measures against it as background to discussion of Agenda Item 1, “Measures To Carry Out the Concept of Shelter.” (Memorandum of discussion at the 359th NSC meeting, March 20; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) See the Supplement, the compilation on National Security.

On March 21, Cutler sent President Eisenhower a memorandum relating to their discussion on March 20. It reads in part:

“In our talk last night relative to the importance to the United States of developing ‘clean’ nuclear weapons, I omitted in my advocacy one very important reason:

“The ability to set off ‘clean’ nuclear detonations without contaminating nuclear radioactive fallout would have tremendous significance in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administrative Series, Cutler, General Robert L., 1958 (3))

exercise". Captain Morse, AEC, will be very useful in assisting in this enterprise because of his intimate knowledge.

While I do not know about these matters myself, I am told that the additional estimates desired by the President would involve mostly machine computations based upon your existing estimates. Do you think it would be possible to have the two exercises and their results completed in time for the next Council meeting on March 27?² This is not a requirement, but if it could be conveniently done it would be helpful.

Robert Cutler³

² On March 27, the NSC again discussed as Agenda Item 1, "Measures To Carry Out the Concept of Shelter." Hoegh informed the Council that in the simulated surprise attack study upon the United States carried out in 1957, estimated U.S. casualties (dead and injured) would have been reduced from 51.3 million to 30.4 million people if only "clean" weapons had been used. (Memorandum of discussion at the 360th NSC meeting, March 27; *ibid.*, Whitman File, NSC Records) See the Supplement, the compilation on National Security.

³ Printed from a copy that indicates Cutler signed the original.

144. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Quarles) to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Cessation (Bethe)

Washington, March 21, 1958.

SUBJECT

The Effects of a Total Suspension or Cessation of Nuclear Testing

Pursuant to NSC Action No. 1840, 6 January 1958,¹ representatives of the Department of Defense have participated in the discussions of your Panel concerning the technical feasibility of monitoring a nuclear weapons tests suspension and the predicted technological status of the United States and the USSR with respect to the development of nuclear weapons, assuming a total suspension of nuclear tests as of 1 September

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Technical Feasibility of Cessation of Testing. Top Secret; Restricted Data.

¹ See footnote 15, Document 136.

1958.² Documents prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Central Intelligence Agency portraying the predicted position of the United States and the USSR, respectively, have been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their views relative to the military impact of cessation of testing are transmitted herewith.³

The reports of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Central Intelligence Agency are accepted as reasonable and satisfactory estimates of the technological positions of the United States and the USSR, with the understanding that events of the near future may necessitate significant revisions of these estimates. Broadly stated, the estimates indicate that at present and also as of the end of 1958, the United States possesses an advantage in yield versus weight ratios, in flexibility of applications, in the economy of use of special nuclear materials and possibly in knowledge of weapons effects of a specialized nature.

It is reasonable to assume that with the continuation of testing the gap will be narrowed and that both nations may be expected to attain the practicable limits of nuclear weapon development as these limits can be foreseen at this time. It is equally reasonable to assume that in the absence of testing the gap will likewise be narrowed but at a slower rate which will be governed by a number of factors over which the United States can exercise little or no control, such as stepped up espionage, ingenuity in devising partial substitutes for testing, and the extent to which the Soviets may be willing to accept the risks of clandestine testing as well as the risks of a lower probability of achieving desired performance characteristics. The achievement of technological parity as regards the practicable limits of nuclear weapons development as now foreseen with and without continuation of testing appears, therefore, to be a matter of time differential only, with the United States holding an advantage for an indeterminate period in either case.

Concerning developments in the nature of "break-throughs," that is, beyond presently foreseen practicable limits, both parties will be inhibited by a test cessation and the advantage will lie with the nation which is able to maintain the higher level of effort and interest in nuclear weapon research and development, the security with which it guards its findings, and the risk it is willing to accept in the conduct of clandestine test operations or its attitude toward the abrogation of treaties.

Relative technological status of nuclear weapons development at the moment and for the foreseeable future is not an adequate index of relative military posture. Consequently, an assumption that the further improvement of weapons designs and the knowledge of weapons effects to be gained from nuclear testing is more important to the Soviets than to

² For the summary of the panel's report, see Document 147.

³ Not attached; printed as Document 141.

the United States is untenable. Within the time available for the submission of the Defense Department's views on the subject matter set forth in NSC 1840, it has not been possible to prepare, on the basis of material submitted by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Central Intelligence Agency a system-by-system comparison which the Panel has indicated to be desirable in order to appraise the relative impact of test cessation on the military postures of the Free World and the Soviet Bloc. With the rapidly changing weapon development scene it is highly questionable whether such an appraisal would be valid even for a brief period.

As pointed out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, cessation of testing as of the date under consideration will find a number of important U.S. research and development programs aborted or drastically limited:

(a) The study of effects at ultra high altitudes essential to the design of effective anti-ICBM and other systems involving outer space, including the warheads, the delivery means, countermeasures and counter-countermeasures;

(b) Second generations of IRBM's, ICBM'S and Fleet Ballistic Missiles designed to drastically reduce overall systems costs and reaction times;

(c) Economical designs of warheads for highly mobile systems for the support of battle groups and for air defense;

(d) Clean weapons in the middle and lower range yields;

(e) Weapons which combine absolute nuclear safety with safety from predetonation.

With respect to Items (a) and (b) above, the facts are:

(a) That the USSR possesses a recognized long range missile capability and that following the conclusion of the Hardtack test program the United States will still not be fully assured of the design of an effective anti-ICBM system [2 lines of source text not declassified].

(b) Since the deterrent capability of U.S. long and medium range missile systems is compromised by the Soviets' ability to adopt the initiative, the retaliatory threat of these systems should be maintained at the highest feasible level through further warhead development, improved readiness and, if necessary, by greater dispersion and larger numbers.

It is the Department's view that until these two requirements are adequately and assuredly met through necessary test programs, the United States should not enter into a test cessation agreement unless it is a part of a broader agreement which offers very large compensating advantages.

In considering the inability of the United States to pursue Items (c), (d) and (e) as listed above, it appears necessary to give adequate weight to political, psychological and economic factors which are certainly not of equal importance to the United States and the USSR. While broadly speaking these factors are outside the area of direct military responsibility, they have a distinct and important bearing on the total Free World

military posture. The problems of world wide dispersion of nuclear weapons for potential use by and support of friendly forces and the occupation of foreign bases by U.S. forces possessing a nuclear weapon capability affect not only quantitative requirements but also design features maximizing safety in handling and simplicity of maintenance. On a broader basis, concepts developed in the interests of political solidarity of the Free World which would place restrictions or restraints on the use of nuclear weapons by reason of geographical, psychological or moral considerations, may require the conduct of nuclear operations under conditions which the Department of Defense could not meet without the further developments indicated above. While the Department of Defense does not necessarily endorse limited war concepts which would place restraints on the types of nuclear weapons which may be used and the targets which may be attacked, it is my view that it would be a serious disadvantage for the United States to enter into a test cessation agreement which would block it from further tactical weapon developments of the type indicated by (c) and (d) above.

As regards the inability or time lag attributed to the Soviets in achieving a position equivalent to or approaching that of the United States, it should be obvious that as long as quantitative aspects of nuclear weapons and both quantitative and qualitative aspects of other weapons and delivery systems remain uncontrolled, efforts will be made by both sides to compensate for failures to attain practicable and desirable objectives in nuclear weapons designs by improving delivery systems, maintaining larger forces or by other means. For example: The Soviets' assumed inability by reason of a test suspension to achieve an ICBM warhead of yield equivalent to ours does not deny them the capability of an equally effective ICBM system through the development of larger payload capacity, improved accuracy of delivery and/or reliance on larger quantities.

It is in the light of the above considerations that I find myself in general agreement with the belief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that in its overall long range effects a test cessation will operate to the distinct disadvantage of the United States. If such a test cessation is a positive and integral part of more comprehensive measures which deal with the stabilization and reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles, the prevention of surprise attack and the regulation of armaments and armed forces, the military disadvantage of test cessation becomes acceptable in the light of these major objectives. In any case, the United States should not become a party to a test cessation agreement which would prohibit the conduct of tests of yields, in environments and under conditions which the agreed and implemented control system would be unable to monitor satisfactorily as to detection, identification and responsibility.

Donald A. Quarles

145. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, March 24, 1958, 4 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dulles
Mr. Allen Dulles
Secretary McElroy
Secretary Quarles
Admiral Strauss
General Twining (joined 15 minutes after conference began)
General Cutler (joined 15 minutes after conference began)
General Goodpaster

Secretary Dulles referred to intelligence reports indicating the possibility that the Soviets might announce unilaterally a suspension of testing at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet, called for Thursday of this week.¹ He referred to the extreme speed at which they have been conducting their tests in the last two or three weeks (some eleven tests in a very short time). If the Soviets do this, we will be placed in an extremely difficult position throughout the world. We start our tests about the seventh of April and they run until September—during all of that time we will be under heavy attack worldwide. The Soviets will cite their test suspension and their call for a Summit meeting while we continue to test. The effect can only be highly adverse on us with regard to enjoying the confidence of the Free World as the champion of peace. We held this confidence through the previous Summit meeting. For the last two and one-half years we have been losing it. There will be very serious losses to us in respect to our allies and the neutrals if this pattern of events occurs.²

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on March 28.

¹ March 27. On March 31, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union issued a decree stating that it would discontinue testing of all types of atomic and hydrogen weapons in the Soviet Union and calling upon the Parliaments of the other nuclear powers to follow the Soviet lead. The Supreme Soviet declared that if the other states possessing nuclear weapons continued to test atomic and hydrogen weapons, the Soviet Union would be free to resume testing in accordance with its security. For text of the declaration, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, pp. 978–980.

² On the previous day, March 23, Dulles telephoned Eisenhower in Augusta, Georgia, to inform him that disarmament was “coming to a crisis.” After making these arguments, Dulles suggested that a U.S. cessation would be “dramatic” and “not cost much.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation, March 23, 1:40 p.m.; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations) See the Supplement.

The Secretary then said that there is still a chance in the next day or two for us to make an announcement which could head off these consequences.³ He suggested an immediate announcement by the President to the effect that following the series of tests now about to begin, the President would not thereafter order new tests during his term in office. The President might go on to say that he hoped this action would afford a basis to push ahead on the whole disarmament effort.

Secretary Dulles said it will undoubtedly be asserted that we are giving up our position on testing without requiring inspection and the stoppage of weapons production. It will be said the Administration is adopting the Stevenson/Stassen position. Mr. Dulles said that we are not doing so, but the reason would be technical and hard to put across—that the United States is taking this action unilaterally, and is announcing an intention, rather than making an agreement. He recognized that there were both advantages and disadvantages to the proposal. The claim will be made that we are giving in to the Soviet line. There will undoubtedly be public and Congressional criticism of the action. However, he said he feels desperately the need for some important gesture in order to gain effect on world opinion.

The Secretary next referred to Admiral Strauss' suggestions to get agreement to stop all production of fissionable materials (rather than weapons production, as our position has previously required). To all but the most sophisticated, the change in our position would not be apparent. Furthermore, we would have to clear this with our allies, and could not hope to accomplish this in the next few days. He concluded by saying that we gravely need something with which to beat the Soviets to the punch.

At Mr. McElroy's request, Mr. Quarles then discussed the Defense aspects. Defense has studied the comparative impact on us and the Soviets of such action. Although we are ahead in our weapons design, considering that the Soviets will always have the initiative as to starting a war, this action will leave us at a substantial net disadvantage. The development of an anti-ICBM depends on tests yet to be conducted (even after the Hardtack series). Polaris and other advanced systems also depend upon development and tests. Small, very light tactical weapons are

³ Dulles attached to his shorter account of this meeting a proposed announcement of a suspension that stressed that the current series of tests were aimed at development of nuclear weapons with greatly reduced radioactive fall-out. The statement also promised that much of any future testing would be conducted underground so that no radiation would enter the atmosphere. The statement also stressed that nuclear weapons stockpiles, not tests, were the greatest peril and controlling them was the objective of U.S. disarmament policy, but expressed U.S. willingness to enter into inspected international agreements on suspension of nuclear testing. (Memorandum of conversation with the President, March 24; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President) See the Supplement.

becoming a possibility which we are just beginning to see in the range of fractional kiloton yield.

Admiral Strauss next spoke on the matter. He recognized that we are at the point where we need a new and more flexible position. He thought the Soviets have succeeded in putting us into a false position regarding testing. Such testing does not result in any significant health hazard—real hazard today is nuclear war, which our weapons development helps to prevent. He said it would be difficult to ascribe any reason for abandoning our tests. In addition, the effect on our laboratories would be severe—they would lose tone, impetus, and personnel. The action would end the development of weapons, including clean weapons, peaceful uses, tactical weapons, and the “Christopholous effect.” He said he thought his proposal was a more dramatic one, and read a possible draft statement in which there would be agreement to stop all production of fissionable materials, together with an agreement to stop testing.⁴ Mr. Dulles repeated that we could not do this without agreement of our allies in advance, whereas we could state unilaterally that we are not intending to test in the next couple of years. If we consulted our allies we could not get agreement in [*the next few days with?*] them.

General Cutler asked if Admiral Strauss’ proposal could be limited to the United States and the USSR without consulting our allies, and Mr. McElroy asked if we could simply discontinue for one year. Secretary Dulles thought this could not be done. He went on to say that Defense was approaching the problem in terms of winning a war. State must, however, think in terms of all means of conducting the international struggle. He said that we are increasingly being given a militaristic and bellicose aspect toward world opinion, and are losing the struggle for world opinion.

Admiral Strauss reiterated that the tests are a trivial threat to the world. Weapons are the real threat. Mr. Dulles recalled that we are open to the charge of not being completely sincere, since we have in fact put impossible conditions on disarmament. We would not, in fact, agree to give up weapons.

The President differed with this judgment, saying that he thought we would do so if we could be sure that all had done so. He said this is the only time in its national history that the United States has been “scared” and this is due simply to these tremendous weapons. Mr. Dulles said that

⁴ Strauss’ draft announcement, also attached to Dulles’ account of this meeting, emphasized the danger of atomic arsenals and their inevitable acquisition by other nations. The draft called for a 2-year cessation on production of U-235 plutonium under U.N. supervision and a gradual transfer of existing nuclear weapons material to peaceful uses. Coincident with these moves, an agreement could be reached on subordinate questions such as concurrent suspension of testing, testing with limited fall-out, or testing for peaceful uses only. See the Supplement.

we couldn't be sure that all weapons had been destroyed—there is no way of turning back history.

General Twining said he didn't see how cutting out tests would really reduce world tension, because everyone knows we already have a stockpile large enough to completely obliterate the Soviet Union. The President said that, as in the case of Sputnik, world opinion, even if not well founded, is a fact; world anxiety exists over tests, and causes tension. The President accepted that the abolition of tests would probably hurt us comparatively in a military sense; on the other hand, we need some basis of hope for our own people and for world opinion. As matters now stand we are bearing the onus of having turned down an agreement calling for inspection. The President also recognized that if we announce we are stopping tests, we put great pressure on our allies to stop theirs. It might be better, as a result, simply to make a factual statement that we are going to complete the present series of tests, and have no more scheduled for the next couple of years.

General Cutler asked if we could announce limiting our tests to underground shots only. Admiral Strauss said it is difficult to learn what we need to know from underground shots.

The President recalled that when the tests were first discussed with him, the schedule was to run from April through July, and now it apparently runs until September. He asked why this was. Admiral Strauss said the reason is safety—delaying until weather conditions are just right. He said it is easily possible that we would complete the tests in July. He went on to say that if there were a stoppage of tests without inspection and someone surreptitiously conducted the test, there would be great recrimination as to which was the guilty party. The President said he did not think the United States would have great difficulty in getting the truth accepted on such a matter as this.

On the broader question, the President said it is simply intolerable to remain in a position wherein the United States, seeking peace, and giving loyal partnership to our allies, is unable to achieve an advantageous impact on world opinion. Meanwhile, the Soviets are putting out just what they want the world to hear and believe. Mr. Dulles added that the image of the United States that is being created in contrast to that of the Soviets, largely through the Soviets controlling what comes out of their country, is very harmful to us.

Admiral Strauss asked why the announcement that we are working on clean weapons could not have a beneficial effect. The President said he recognizes that testing is not evil, but the fact is that people have been brought to believe that it is.

General Twining said that the press will turn this action around on to us to our disadvantage. The President recognized that the irresponsible might charge that this is our Munich. General Cutler asked whether it

would help to couple such an announcement with a statement concerning an open test of a clean weapon. Secretary Dulles suggested that the statement could be couched in the terms that we do not expect to have another series within the next twenty-four months, and that this will give us time to negotiate. In response to a question, Mr. Allen Dulles indicated that there is a better than fair chance that cessation of testing will be announced by the Soviets this week.

The President recalled that it is one problem to work something out between the United States and the USSR, and entirely another one when allies have to be consulted. He thought that, if the decision were made, we could announce as an administrative action that no further tests are planned, and that we will see what we can accomplish during the next year or two. He recalled that we would probably have made an agreement with the Soviets on this matter except that we did not have a law which would permit giving material to the UK so as to avoid the necessity for their testing. Admiral Strauss thought that our unilateral statement would put a great deal of pressure on our allies, and Secretary Quarles said that an administrative statement gives him a great deal of trouble, since it is inconsistent with everything we have said before. He asked if we could not pick up the Khrushchev statement that the Soviets now have enough large weapons and say we are willing to cut off production. The President asked if we could usefully offer to limit our tests to underground bursts. Admiral Strauss suggested that we might say we would stop testing except when they have been approved by the United Nations. The President was not concerned over possible statements that we are doing something new—the fact is that we have been weighing and studying this whole matter for the last five years.

Mr. Dulles thought that in light of the discussion, perhaps the best course of action would simply be to pass up the proposal. He said he wished to tell the group, however, that if we cannot act along lines such as this, “we are going to get licked.”

The President recalled that Mr. Stassen had proposed to wait until the law was passed which would permit transferring material to Great Britain, and then enter into an agreement on testing with the Soviets. Admiral Strauss said that according to the work of the Bethe group, inspection will require 20 seismic, 20 acoustic, and 20 electro-magnetic stations—rather than a dozen or so, as he understood Mr. Stassen had reported.

Mr. Allen Dulles again raised the question whether the proposal to suspend testing could be for a shorter period. The President said he was thinking of a simple announcement that we are having a series of tests this year, several of which will be watched by UN observers. We then plan not to have any tests for the next two years, and to see what we can

accomplish in the field of disarmament in the meantime—specifically to see if production can be stopped.

Mr. McElroy said he thought it would not be possible to hold scientists for two years if no tests were conducted. It might be possible to hold them for one. The President said that he thought scientists, like other people, have a strong interest in avoiding nuclear war. Admiral Strauss, at this point, read a letter from Dr. Teller speaking strongly in behalf of conducting tests, and Mr. Quarles said he supported the same view. He said public opinion would be very adverse in the United States and Congressional problems would be very severe.

Secretary Dulles, at this point, said that if this is the view that is held, we had better forget his proposal.

The President said that if we get the new law, and the Soviets will accept the details of an inspection system, he was inclined to think that we must accept a suspension of testing. Mr. Dulles pointed out that it will be necessary to revise our disarmament position. This must be done in any case to prepare for the Summit meeting, particularly in regard to testing suspension and cut-off of production. The President asked the group, as the meeting came to an end, to think about what could be done to get rid of the terrible impasse in which we now find ourselves with regard to disarmament.⁵

G
Brigadier General, USA

⁵ According to a March 28 memorandum by Goodpaster, Strauss called him on March 25 to say that Secretary Dulles “had swung around to Admiral Strauss’ line of thinking concerning the discontinuance of atomic tests.” Strauss said this change left a vacuum since neither announcement was adopted at the meeting on March 24. Strauss proposed to talk further with Dulles as to how to proceed. If the administration decided to proceed along Strauss’ line, a bipartisan meeting should be held with the Congressional leaders. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary Records, AEC, Vol. II)

146. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to President Eisenhower

Washington, March 24, 1958.

Mr. President:

SUBJECT

Press Statement on Open "Clean" Bomb Test Next Summer

1. The OCB has concurred in the AEC recommendation that you approve an additional test shot (6 MT nuclear detonation) during this summer's Test Series at the Pacific Proving Grounds. To this additional test shot will be invited as observers fifteen qualified international scientists selected by the United Nations and a representative group of international news media.

2. The overriding factor in our consideration was to fulfill the statements made by you in Press Conference¹ and the Defense-AEC commitment September 15, 1958 (see attachment).² Another strong factor was the propaganda advantage, if appropriately handled.

3. These factors overrode doubts arising from these facts: (1) the scientific observers will not be permitted to use their own instruments, although they will fly in our observation planes, receive full instructions, be given atmospheric samples, etc; (2) the proof of reduced radioactive fallout is difficult and may not convince scientific observers desiring not to be convinced; (3) the radioactive fallout from a 6 MT "clean" bomb will equal that from a 300 KT "dirty" bomb detonation (fifteen times Hiroshima). We felt that American scientists had made a significant *first step* towards developing the nuclear explosions safer (i.e., non-radioactive contaminating) for man to use.

4. It has been unanimously recommended by the OCB, with AEC participating, that you make the attached statement³ at your next Press Conference, reading and releasing the text, and that you try to restrict additional comments (leaving them and details to the responsible departments and agencies). A "fact sheet" of significant points is also attached to advise you of difficult areas. Because of the great propaganda

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administrative Series, Cutler, Gen. Robert L, 1958. Top Secret.

¹ See *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957*, pp. 519-520 and 532.

² Not found attached.

³ The attached statement was styled a "semi-draft" and had several differences from the statement as made by the President on March 26. For the draft, see the Supplement. For the statement as made, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, pp. 977-978.

implications in this significant open shot, it was felt that the *first* words should come from the President. The invitation to the United Nations to name scientific observers should go out this month.

5. During Calendar Year 1958, the Soviet Union has exploded eleven nuclear detonations (six in the last two weeks). On March 14, Khrushchev publicly stated: "The level of armaments in certain countries has reached such a state that the time will come, and perhaps it has come already, when these countries themselves, irrespective of whether or not an agreement on the cessation of the production of atomic and hydrogen armaments has been reached, will have to say 'enough' . . . We are apparently, approaching the moment in which governments . . . will no longer be able to turn a deaf ear to this universal demand of the present day [prohibition of nuclear weapons]⁴ and even failing to achieve agreement among themselves, will be forced unilaterally to discontinue manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons." The Intelligence Report of March 24 states that the Soviet Ambassador to Austria recently told the Austrian Chancellor that the USSR will make a unilateral declaration suspending nuclear tests. An obvious occasion for such a dramatic statement by the USSR would be the convening of the new Supreme Soviet which has been hastily called for March 27.⁵

Bobby

⁴ Brackets in the source text.

⁵ See footnote 1, Document 145.

147. Report of the National Security Council Ad Hoc Working Group on the Technical Feasibility of a Cessation of Nuclear Testing

Washington, undated.

SUMMARY

1. The present AFOAT-1 detection system has excellent capabilities to detect and identify surface and air burst nuclear tests up to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] within the USSR and China of 10 KT or more and can detect [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It can detect deep underground disturbances equivalent to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] or over, but [5 lines of source text not declassified].

2. A practical detection system can be designed which can detect and identify nuclear explosions in the USSR and China except for some underground tests of small size [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Such a system, adequate for safeguarding a nuclear test limitation agreement, would require:¹

a. the installation of about 70 observation stations in the territories of the USSR and China;

b. the right of immediate access of mobile teams to any areas suspected of having been the location of a clandestine underground test; and

c. rights to overfly parts of the Soviet Union and China on certain occasions.

An additional system of about 30 stations and extensive air sampling coverage of the entire world would greatly improve the detection capability of the existing Long Range Detection System for test explo-

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament—Bethe Report. Top Secret; Restricted Data. According to a March 28 transmittal memorandum from Lay to the NSC, this report was prepared in accordance with NSC Action No. 1840. It was submitted on March 27 to Killian by the Ad Hoc Working Group, also known as the Bethe Panel after its chairman Hans Bethe of Cornell University. Other members of the group were Harold Brown of the University of California Radiation Laboratory, Major General Richard Coiner and Colonel Lester Woodward of the U.S. Air Force, Herbert Loper of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Mark Carson and Roderick Spence of the Los Alamos Laboratory, Doyle Northrup of AFOAT-1, U.S. Air Force, Herbert Scoville, Jr., of the CIA, and Brigadier General Alfred Starbird of the AEC.

In a March 28 covering letter to Cutler, Killian noted that the Working Group limited itself to the technical feasibility of monitoring nuclear tests and to the technical losses to the United States and the Soviet Union from a cessation of tests. The complete report with covering documents, table of contents, charts, and Appendixes A-E is in the Supplement.

¹ The separate views of the CIA member appear in section B6 of the Conclusions. [Footnote in the source text.]

sions in the remote areas of the world. Such a system is described in Appendix A and its capabilities are discussed in Section B of the Conclusions. With such a system agreed to and implemented, the Working Group feels that the USSR could not utilize testing to improve significantly its nuclear weapon capability, except for small yields without running a great risk of being detected.

3. The Working Group considers a cessation of tests before the end of the Hardtack series as undesirable and practically not feasible.

4. At the end of 1958, the U.S. will have tested designs for warheads of all weight classes from 100 to 20,000 lbs., [3 lines of source text not declassified]. However, the Soviet will probably have warheads by that time that will satisfy most of their major military needs. The U.S. will have usable warheads for missiles planned for early stockpile. For most missiles definitely planned for later stockpile entry, the U.S. will have the capability to design warheads of some yield, but these yields could be very substantially improved in most cases by further testing. The U.S. will need to keep ahead to offset Soviet advantages in missile requirements and surprise capability. Both countries will be able to compensate to some extent for lack of optimal development in warheads by increased capabilities in delivery systems.

5. At the end of 1958 the U.S. will still not have reached ultimate warhead performance as regards economy and weight. The U.S. will be rather close to ultimate performance in heavy warheads and reasonably well advanced in medium weight warheads. On the other hand, further very significant improvements may be required which could be obtained only by further testing in the lightweight, two-stage thermonuclear warheads for application; for example, to the Polaris, the AICBM, and second generation missiles. Areas which will not have been explored sufficiently to permit the development of usable designs are low yield clean weapons and inexpensive small weapons for tactical uses. There will also be lack of information on effects of nuclear weapons exploded at great altitudes and deep underground.

6. The rapidity of deterioration of U.S. weapons laboratories will depend on the duration of a test suspension and the belief of the laboratory staffs as to the permanency of the suspension. During a period of nuclear test cessation, there will be some improvement in Soviet capability through leaks and espionage.

7. The Working Group has discussed the military effects of the deficiencies in nuclear weapons due to a test cessation but has not been able in the time available to assess these defects in detail. Thus it has not come to an agreement as to whether a suspension or cessation of tests would be a net military advantage or disadvantage to the U.S.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON THE TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF A CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING

In response to the action taken by the National Security Council meeting on January 6, 1958, a technical panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency has made a study of the technical factors affecting an international agreement for the cessation of nuclear tests.² The following conclusions have been reached:

A. *Capabilities of the Present U.S. Long Range Detection System*

1. [7-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Underground disturbances equivalent to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] or larger can be detected with a certainty of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] per cent but for about 70 such events per year, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

Underwater explosions of 20 KT or larger conducted in deep ocean areas of the Northern Hemisphere and some parts of the Southern Hemisphere can be detected with 90-100 per cent certainty and probably identified as an explosion rather than an earthquake.

Since the present system was designed to detect tests conducted in the USSR, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Nuclear tests as large as a [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

B. *The Technical Feasibility of Monitoring a Test Suspension, Including the Outlines of a Surveillance and Inspection System*

This involves detection and identification of nuclear explosions carried out in the following physical environments.

1. *At the Earth's Surface and at Low Altitudes within the USSR and China.* It would be feasible to detect and identify explosions at the earth's surface and at low altitudes, having yields down to about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] with the net of seismic, acoustic and electromagnetic stations located within the USSR and China, described in Appendix A. Positive identification requires the [2 lines of source text not declassified].

2. *At Very High Altitudes Over the USSR and China.* Electromagnetic detection techniques, based on theoretical predictions, show great promise of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions created at very high altitudes. This is discussed in detail in Appendix B. A close net of some 40 electromagnetic detection stations would suffice, subject to confirmation

² A complete transcript of the proceedings of the Working Group has been deposited with the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. [Footnote in the source text.]

of actual capabilities. Earth satellites could carry instrumentation for detecting and identifying the nature and location of nuclear detonations both within and outside the earth's atmosphere.

3. *Below the Earth's Surface.* Nuclear explosions conducted well below the earth's surface are most difficult to detect. (See Appendix C) With present seismic techniques it is possible to detect underground disturbances above [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] size with seismic stations located outside the USSR and China [*1 line of source text not declassified*]. With a net of seismic stations inside the USSR and China, it would be possible to detect earth shocks equivalent to [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. But there would be a large number of earthquakes of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] energy and above that could not be distinguished from a nuclear detonation. Of some 2500 earth disturbances in the USSR and China annually of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] and above, about 88 per cent could be positively identified as earthquakes with about 45 seismic stations properly placed within the USSR, leaving about 300 which could not be so identified. Above a [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] however, there would be only about 35 earth disturbances each year that could not clearly be distinguished from a sub-surface nuclear test. (See Appendix A)

It should be noted that the preceding discussion refers to the magnitude of seismic signals, rather than the magnitude of nuclear detonations. It is quite possible that a [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] could look like [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] to a detection seismograph due to the nature of the coupling between the explosion and its surrounding medium. The signal recorded by the seismic stations may not indicate the actual nuclear energy yield because (a) the relationship between the seismic signal and underground weapon yield is not sufficiently known and (b) the coupling between the underground explosion and the seismic disturbances might be poorer than predicted due to the presence of a compressible material and could be substantially lower than the underground test at Rainier. Signal to noise reductions as high as [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] could be experienced especially at the lower yields. On the other hand, it can be expected that further research and development will result in systems permitting improved discrimination between nuclear explosions and natural disturbances. Resolution of uncertainties of shock coupling will require additional nuclear tests conducted for the purpose of exploring this phenomenon. It is important that future U.S. nuclear test programs include such special effects shots. If an international authority is established, it should undertake controlled nuclear testing aimed at improving detection capabilities.

Identification of seismic signals of unknown origin would require an on-the-spot investigation for each of these events. With present techniques the location of the source of the disturbance could be determined [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Positive identification of the nuclear test would require direct access by inspection teams to the suspected location of the test, and the acquisition of radioactive samples by drilling. Even with access of inspection teams to the suspected area, location of the precise spot sufficiently accurate for drilling operations will be difficult. Conventional intelligence will provide an important and possibly essential back-up for physical detection means. Local, low-level overflight for immediate post-test reconnaissance will be required. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

4. *Tests Conducted Outside the USSR and China.* Detection of nuclear tests conducted in the Southern Hemisphere will require a net of about 30 detection stations with components similar to those in the Northern Hemisphere and air sampling coverage extended to both hemispheres. This system will be limited in detection and identification to yields of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and above. A very great difficulty with respect to nuclear tests conducted in the ocean areas would be in proving the nationality of the test, after a nuclear explosion had been identified (e.g. a Soviet nuclear test at Eniwetok). The possibility of a successful clandestine test by the USSR in the Southern Hemisphere would be considerably lessened by conventional intelligence back-up of the detection net.

Detection of nuclear explosions and the identification of surface and air bursts occurring in Red China could be accomplished by means of the proposed net of stations in the USSR and other neighboring countries with some degradation in capabilities. But, identification of sub-surface bursts would not be possible without direct access of inspectors to the sites.

5. *Detection Net.* A net of about 70 detection stations located within the USSR and China, as described in detail in Attachment A, backed up by inspection teams and aerial reconnaissance, would be essential for monitoring possible Soviet tests conducted in all feasible environments within those countries. Full operational status would require approximately two years after an international agreement is reached although a few stations could be installed earlier. Without such a detection system located inside the USSR and China, the detection coverage would be inadequate for safeguarding a nuclear test limitation agreement. Should there be an international agreement to pursue technical studies and design of the detection system of the type described in Appendix A, a substantial amount of information could be disclosed by the U.S. without revealing Atomic Energy Restricted Data although it would be nec-

essary to disclose presently classified detection techniques and capabilities.

6. *Risk of Detection.* The detection system described above has been designed to achieve a high probability of detection and identification of all nuclear shots in the USSR and China which give signals equivalent [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. For the actual enforcement of a moratorium, such a high probability may not be required since it may only be necessary to achieve a situation where the Soviets cannot afford to take the risk of being caught in a clandestine nuclear test. This risk would increase rapidly if several tests were required.

The CIA member of the panel believes that while a much lesser number of observation stations within the USSR, coupled with ground inspection teams, will not guarantee detection and proof of a very low yield, underground Soviet clandestine test, such a reduced system would provide such a high probability of detection as to deter the Soviets from a significant clandestine test program. The CIA member of the panel also believes that aerial overflight of the USSR for purposes of air sampling should not be considered an essential adjunct to an elaborate inspection system within the USSR.

The U.S. has estimated (SNIE 11-7-57)³ that if the Soviets have an over-riding need for the conduct of nuclear tests and if the risk of detection is reasonably high, then they would probably prefer to denounce openly the moratorium and minimize the political disadvantages of such action by false accusations against the West.

7. *Weapons Development Implications of Detection Capabilities.* If, pursuant to a nuclear test limitation by the end of 1958, a detection system were installed sufficient to detect and identify nuclear explosions [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], it would be extremely difficult for the USSR to develop higher yield boosted warheads, assuming no further Soviet advances in this field are tested prior to test cessation. Further Soviet development of megaton weapons would also be seriously impaired except insofar as this can be accomplished by improving the primaries (the lower yield first stage of a two-stage high yield nuclear weapon). On the other hand the aforementioned developments would be possible to a limited extent if the detection capability were limited to yields above [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. In the case of boosted warheads, however, uncertainties in the precision of predicting actual yields of test devices in the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] region would complicate the problem of evasion.

Efficient warheads below 1000 pounds in weight which may be needed for applications such as AICBM and Polaris, will require testing

³ SNIE 11-7-57, "Feasibility and Likelihood of Soviet Evasion of a Nuclear Test Moratorium," December 10, 1957. (Department of State, INR-NIE Files)

at yields considerably higher than [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. In the case of lightweight thermonuclear warheads it is probable that test of a device at a substantial fraction of the actual yield will be required, such as one-fourth. For tests of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] designs, somewhat smaller fractions of the actual yields would be sufficient, such as one-eighth, though substantially more than [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would be required.

C. *The Losses to the U.S. and to the USSR That Would Accrue From Cessation of Nuclear Testing*

1. *U.S. and USSR Nuclear Warhead Capabilities.* Table 1 compares the present and expected position of the U.S. and the USSR nuclear weapons developments according to warhead weight class; it is based on Appendices D and E. The yields of present U.S. warhead developments are measured yields unless otherwise noted. Throughout this report, dates given for U.S. nuclear warhead developments correspond to technical capabilities rather than dates they enter the U.S. stockpile. Present yield capabilities attributed to the Soviets are based on acoustic observations from the tests conducted prior to January 1, 1958. The estimates [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] are uncertain even if deduced from tests, and in addition in several cases the warhead capabilities are extrapolations from test experience. Such a tabulation of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is necessarily speculative and its surety cannot be comparable to the tabulation of U.S. capabilities.

U.S. capabilities indicated as of the end of 1958 reflect the best estimates of the weapons laboratories concerned (see Appendix D). In those weight classes where there is major doubt of results in the forthcoming Hardtack tests, models of different degrees of conservatism will be tested. The estimates given in Table 1 of the USSR position at the end of 1958 are mere extrapolations from the rate at which they have been improving their weapons technology (Appendix E). It is not at all clear that such tests will in fact be made. Unless necessary tests are conducted before the end of 1958 the Soviets will not have a capability in the lower weight classes or at the 20 MT level. For example, unless the Soviets successfully test in 1958 a 1000 pound high yield warhead or if a test suspension is inaugurated prior to such test, we would not credit them at the end of 1958 with the estimated capability which infers a thermonuclear [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] weapon capability at that weight.

2. *Asymmetries in U.S. and USSR Nuclear Warhead Needs.* With respect to the development of ballistic missile warheads, considering warhead alone, [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. However, the U.S. has military requirements not shared by the USSR. For example: (a) the U.S. requires a ballistic missile of 1500 mile range, compared with the apparent Soviet development of a missile with about 1000 mile range.

Thus, for an equivalent propulsion system, a smaller warhead must be developed by the U.S. Similarly, the U.S. requires a submarine launched missile of range twice that needed by the USSR for a comparable geographical coverage. (b) The comparative status of long range missile development gives the USSR the ability to carry a heavier warhead; (c) more compact and ready ICBM's and IRBM's would greatly improve U.S. retaliation capability against surprise attack—the Soviets may not suffer this strategic disadvantage to the same extent; (d) small nuclear weapons are perhaps of greater value to the U.S. than to the USSR, because of our need to offset Soviet bloc superiority in manpower in a limited military operation.

3. *AICBM Warheads.* Neither the U.S. nor apparently the USSR currently possess a satisfactory anti-ballistic missile defense system nor is the U.S. certain as to the character of an effective over-all system. The main problem here is one of detection of an enemy ICBM and discrimination between it and possible decoys, of getting the AICBM to its target in time and of destroying the enemy ICBM without adequate knowledge of its design, rather than of obtaining any specified yield in the AICBM. However, it is likely that a lightweight, high-yield warhead will be needed to improve the effectiveness of the over-all weapon system based on the use of a ready, solid propellant rocket system. [7-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (7-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

4. *Very Small Warheads.* As regards very small weapons, the U.S. has tested but not stockpiled satisfactory warheads of 11 inch diameter. To parallel the U.S. development in this field, the USSR needs to fully exploit the technique of boosting. Smaller diameters than 11 inches or lower weights with substantial yield (kilotons) can be achieved by the U.S. at present with increased expenditure of fissionable material. Relatively cheap weapons of low weight and yield [1 line of source text not declassified] cannot be developed without further testing.

5. *Boosted Warheads.* It is estimated that by the end of 1958 the USSR will have a [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] and can be expected to make considerable progress in a number of directions consequent on these developments.

Boosting is highly important both to the development of cheap, very small warheads and cheap warheads of moderate size. Large numbers of small warheads will be needed for air and missile defense systems and solid propellant long-range missiles. The amounts of fissionable material required to satisfy substantial weapons capabilities in these systems may not be reasonable in terms of the planned U.S. stockpile unless a way can be found further to reduce the amount of fissionable material required for each warhead. To do this will require further nuclear tests beyond those planned for 1958.

6. *Summary of Relative Position.* To summarize the nuclear warhead position as of the end of 1958: the U.S. should be ahead of the USSR in nearly all weight classes but will not have reached ultimate performance, particularly with respect to economy of nuclear materials for the smaller, lighter weight warheads and clean weapons (see paragraph C-7). However, the Soviets will probably have warheads by that time that will satisfy most of their major military needs. The U.S. will need to keep ahead in lightweight, high-yield warheads to offset Soviet advantages in missile requirements (see paragraph C-2) and surprise capability.

Both countries will be able to compensate to some extent for the lack of optimal development in warheads by increased capabilities in delivery systems.

Unless some unforeseen breakthrough occurs indefinite continuation of nuclear testing will result in each country's achieving comparable capability in each weight class approaching the limits of what is practically achievable, differing only in relative time of accomplishment. There is a practical limit to the yield that can be achieved at any given weight. For large weights, the U.S. is now close to that limit; in lower weights there is far to go. The Soviet rate of improvement after 1958 in all weight classes is likely to be greater than the U.S. due to their inferior position as of the end of 1958. However, it may take a longer time for the USSR to achieve a comparable position for such special requirements as economy of design, cleanliness, and special effects. Some of these features, such as cleanliness, may not be of prime interest to the USSR. The limits for improvement in the economy of use of costly materials are set more by ingenuity than by laws of nature.

7. *Clean Weapons.* Clean nuclear weapons are being developed for special military purposes, primarily to reduce the hazard of radioactive fallout to troops and friendly populations when it is necessary to detonate the weapon near the ground. [7 lines of source text not declassified]

As far as reduction of fallout is concerned, clean bombs exploded near the surface may be replaced by standard weapons exploded in the air in such a way that the fireball will not touch the ground. However, certain hard targets require ground bursts, such as airfield runways if it is desired to make a crater, railroad yards if severe destruction of tracks is to be accomplished, or heavily entrenched troops. Where ground bursts are required, clean weapons are needed if reduction of fallout is necessary because of future military operations or other cogent reasons such as protection of non-belligerents.

The use of clean weapons in strategic situations may be indicated in order to protect the local population, especially to protect our European allies from the consequences of attacks on the Western USSR or the satellite countries. In tactical situations, some hard targets may exist close to

our own troops or friendly populations which would then call for the use of clean weapons.

Possession of a clean tactical weapons capability may also contribute to a political climate favorable to the introduction of nuclear weapons in a limited engagement. If both the USSR and the U.S. possessed clean weapons, a convention to use them rather than standard megaton weapons is conceivable.

[4 lines of source text not declassified] Improvements in yield especially for the lower weights referred to above could be obtained by further testing. Still lighter, clean weapons also will have to await further test series. With decreasing weight, the weapons become relatively less clean. Although the degree of cleanliness can generally be expected to improve with further tests, it will be limited by the amount of neutron induced activity in the ground. There was a divergence of view among members of the Working Group as to the military importance of small clean weapons for tactical situations.

8. *Military Effects of a Test Cessation.* The foregoing conclusions have been concerned with current and prospective warhead performance characteristics. The Working Group has not attempted to assess the military effects that would flow from stoppage of further weapons tests. In other words, it has not examined the effects on performance and availability of weapons systems and alternate systems and strategies that might be devised to compensate for warhead performance limitations. It believes that detailed systems evaluation studies should be undertaken by the Department of Defense on a priority basis with the necessary allocation of a number of experienced scientific and military personnel to this task.

9. *Effects of a Cessation on Weapons Laboratories.* The effects of a test suspension on the weapons research laboratories will depend on the terms of the moratorium, its duration and the general political climate and, in particular, on the belief of the laboratory personnel on the permanency of the test suspension. If laboratory personnel believe that the suspension is temporary, which might be the case if the agreement called for the automatic resumption of testing if progress were not achieved on the general problem of disarmament, considerable work might be possible, leading to a backlog of ideas and untested developments to be tested upon resumption of tests. If the laboratory personnel believed that the test cessation would be made permanent, the weapons groups in the laboratories would certainly deteriorate rapidly.

10. *Soviet Gains Through Espionage.* Some improvement in the Soviet position through leaks and espionage carried out over a period of years seems unavoidable. It should be assumed that, in time, USSR capabilities will tend to approach those of the U.S. even without testing.

148. Memorandum of Discussion at the 361st Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, April 3, 1958.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Monitoring a Long-Range Rocket Test Agreement* (NSC) Action No. 1840;¹ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 28, 1958²)

General Cutler explained the nature of this agenda item and noted that this report and the following reports were being presented to the Council for information only. He then called on Dr. Killian, who explained that this report was limited in its coverage to technical factors. All matters of policy, such as whether or not the United States should engage to cease nuclear testing, were excluded. Nor did the report reflect the judgments of the responsible departments of the Government.

Dr. Killian then called on Dr. Kistiakowsky, of Harvard University, who had been Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group of representatives of the President's Science Advisory Committee and of the Central Intelligence Agency, who summarized the conclusion of the Working Group's report on the monitoring of a long-range rocket test agreement.

*The National Security Council.*³

Noted a report on the subject prepared, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1840-c-(2), by an Ad Hoc Working Group of representatives of the President's Science Advisory Committee and the Central Intelligence Agency, and transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 28, 1958.

2. *Technical Feasibility of Cessation of Nuclear Tests* (NSC Action No. 1840; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 28 and April 2, 1958⁴)

At the outset of Council consideration of this item, General Cutler called on General Cabell, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, who

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on April 4.

¹ See footnote 15, Document 136.

² This memorandum transmitted to the NSC the "Report of the NSC Ad Hoc Working Group on the Monitoring of Long-Range Rocket Test Agreement," March 26, also known as the Kistiakowsky Report after the group's chairman. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes Files) See the Supplement.

³ The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1888, approved by the President on April 7. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

⁴ The March 28 memorandum transmitted Document 147 to the NSC. The April 2 memorandum transmitted Documents 141 and 144 to the NSC.

spoke briefly on the recent pattern of Soviet nuclear testing (December 1957 and April 1958). General Cabell emphasized the great acceleration of this Soviet program in this period. There had been 13 distinct tests in a period of slightly more than three months. General Cabell felt that this acceleration indicated that the recent Soviet decision to renounce unilaterally thermonuclear testing had been made as early as mid-1957. This theory explained the large number of tests held in the last few months. General Cabell also expressed his belief that if other nations did not join the Soviet Union in renouncing further thermonuclear tests, there would be strong pressures in the USSR to resume such tests.

General Cabell was followed by Dr. Killian, who explained the background of this agenda item and pointed out that, as in the case of the first item, this report consisted of a technical study rather than a study of policy. It accordingly did not indicate clear conclusions as to the military implications for the United States of a cessation of nuclear testing.

Dr. Killian then called on Dr. Hans Bethe, of Cornell University, who summarized the findings of the Ad Hoc Working Group of which he was the Chairman.

At the end of Dr. Bethe's report, the President referred to his comments on the difficulty of distinguishing between deep underground nuclear explosions and earthquakes. The President wondered if it would be feasible for the Soviets to test a weapon of 10 megatons and make the test appear to have been an earthquake, thus evading detection. Dr. Bethe replied that we really knew too little about this problem to provide the President with a clear and categorical answer.

The President inquired about the duration of the shock produced by such a 10-megaton weapon or by an earthquake. Would the earthquake shock last longer? Dr. Bethe replied in the affirmative in all probability, but he did not feel that duration could be considered a good criterion to determine whether there had been an earthquake or a deep underground nuclear explosion.

Continuing on the same subject, the President noted that in certain areas of the Soviet Union, as many as 140 earthquakes occurred over a period of a year, which amounted to one every few days. Could not the Soviets conduct a secret underground nuclear test in such an area and induce observers to believe that this was simply an earthquake? Dr. Bethe believed that you could probably distinguish the one signal which came from the weapons test from all the other signals which were produced by earthquakes. He felt this could be guaranteed in 90% of the cases.

Secretary Dulles expressed himself as much struck by the fact that Dr. Bethe's discussion of the requirements for detecting evasions of an agreement to cease nuclear testing by the Soviet Union required such a very large number of check-points (over 30) in the Soviet Union and

Communist China. This was a much larger number of stations than had been indicated to the Council as necessary 18 months ago. Secretary Dulles asked if this meant that the longer the United States waited to negotiate an agreement with the USSR for the cessation of nuclear tests, the greater the number of check-points on Sino-Soviet territory we would require to be sure that the Soviets did not undertake to evade the agreement.

Secretary Dulles, in the same vein, inquired if Dr. Bethe and his panel had made any estimate of the number of check-points in the United States and in the Free World that the Soviet Union would insist on manning in order to assure itself that the United States and other Free World countries did not undertake surreptitious nuclear tests. Dr. Bethe replied that the number of check-points depended in general on the geographical size of the area in question. Accordingly, the Soviet Union could reasonably demand only half as many such check-points in the United States as the United States would demand in the Soviet Union. Secretary Dulles, however, pointed out that if the Soviets wanted to be sure to cover not only the United States but the entire Western Hemisphere, they would insist on a very large number of stations on Free World territory. In our concern over what we feel we must require from the Soviet Union in the way of check-points on its territory, we must not overlook the demands that would be made by the USSR for stations in the Free World.

Subsequently, Secretary Dulles likewise commented on Dr. Bethe's finding that a reliable system for detecting evasions of an agreement to cease nuclear testing would under certain circumstances require U.S. overflights of the Soviet Union and Communist China. He felt that this requirement would complicate enormously the effort to obtain an agreement with the Soviet Union to cease nuclear testing under a safeguarded inspection system. It would be much harder to induce the Soviet Union to agree to overflights than it would to induce the Soviets to permit the stationing of trained personnel on the ground at fixed points in the Soviet Union.

Lastly, Secretary Dulles noted a comment by Dr. Bethe to the effect that if the inspection system he had described were actually to be installed in the Soviet Union, the Soviets could not attempt an evasion of the agreement without involving very great risks of detection. It was Secretary Dulles' view that the consequences of the detection of a clandestine nuclear explosion in the Soviet Union were so serious that they themselves constituted a very considerable deterrent. Indeed, he felt that any inspection system which guaranteed as much as a 50-50 chance of the detection of a clandestine test would be sufficient to deter the Soviets from attempting to evade an agreement to cease nuclear testing. Secretary Dulles felt that this judgment was of very great importance because

he felt that the complete detection system, outlined by Dr. Bethe, would never be acceptable to the USSR. The President expressed his agreement with this latter judgment of the Secretary of State.

Dr. Bethe replied that in his opinion the precise number of check-points on Soviet soil was not the decisive factor. The decisive factor was local access by the mobile inspection teams to any suspicious point in the Soviet Union. Any workable agreement with the USSR would have to stipulate this requirement.

General Cutler noted that the report by Dr. Bethe had not dealt with the military effects on the United States of a decision to enter an agreement to cease testing nuclear weapons. He accordingly asked Secretary Quarles to summarize for the Council the views of the Department of Defense and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the effects of a total suspension or cessation of nuclear testing. Secretary Quarles briefly summarized these views, and noted his own agreement with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it would be disadvantageous for the United States to enter into an agreement with the Soviet Union to cease nuclear testing even after the completion of the Hardtack series, which was to begin this month and end in August.

The President said he had one point of significance which he would like to contribute to the discussion. He observed that all of us in the Free World are very much concerned about the psychological effects of continued nuclear tests. We must remember, however, that the Soviet Union rarely if ever informs its own people of the nuclear tests which it conducts. Accordingly, the peoples of the Soviet Union are not as tense as the population of the Free World as a result of these nuclear tests. However, if one lives long enough under the kind of tension which is gripping the Free World, something is bound to happen. The President felt that we were facing a psychological erosion of our position with respect to nuclear testing, and that we must take this fact into account along with the other pro's and con's respecting the cessation of nuclear testing.

Secretary Dulles endorsed the President's statement, and observed that when Secretary Quarles had expressed his judgment against the United States agreeing to cease nuclear testing, his judgment was based on military considerations only. There were other considerations which ought to be taken into account.

*The National Security Council:*⁵

a. Noted an oral briefing by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence on the pattern of recent Soviet nuclear tests.

⁵ The following paragraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1889, approved by the President on April 7. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

b. Noted and discussed a report on the subject prepared, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1840-c-(1), by an Ad Hoc Working Group of representatives of the President's Science Advisory Committee, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency, and transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 28, 1958; and the views of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transmitted by the reference memorandum of April 2, 1958.

[Here follow Agenda Items 3. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," 4. "Launching of SAC Alert Forces ('Fail Safe')" (see Document 16), 5. "U.S. Policy Toward Libya," and 6. "Preparations for a Possible Summit Meeting."]

S. Everett Gleason

149. Editorial Note

On April 4, 1958, Soviet Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev, who succeeded Marshal Nikolai A. Bulganin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, sent President Eisenhower a letter reiterating the Soviet intention to discontinue unilaterally tests of any kind of atomic and hydrogen weapons as of March 31, 1958. Khrushchev called upon the United States and the United Kingdom also to renounce further tests. For text of the letter, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1949*, pages 980-982.

On April 7, President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles discussed the response to Khrushchev. Dulles stated that a draft response had been sent to London where British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had revised it and made minor changes which were incorporated into the draft. Neither draft has been found. Dulles then mentioned a proposal by Press Secretary James Hagerty for a high-level conference at the United Nations to agree on a nuclear testing ban and the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower thought Hagerty "might have something" and that this "new approach" might "make Khrushchev squirm." Nevertheless, Hagerty's proposal was not included in the draft letter to Khrushchev. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, April 7, 8:30 a.m.; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations) Hagerty's proposal, in the form of a draft proposal to the President, is *ibid.* Both documents are in the Supplement.

In his letter to Khrushchev, April 8, President Eisenhower noted that the Soviet Union was calling for a suspension of nuclear testing after just concluding a series of tests "of unprecedented intensity." He cited past U.S. calls for disarmament, which the Soviet Union had failed to heed, and noted that the reduction of nuclear weapons was the real issue. Nevertheless, Eisenhower stated, the United States would be prepared to work with the Soviet Union in anticipation of an agreed disarmament program on technical problems involved in international control for discontinuing atomic testing. For the full text of Eisenhower's letter, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, pages 982-985. According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation on April 8 at 10:48 a.m., Eisenhower and Dulles discussed whether the statement meant that the United States would be willing to have technical studies on inspection for a suspension of testing without also having technical studies on a cut-off of production of atomic weapons. Eisenhower thought the matter was "not an easy one," and he and Dulles agreed that "supervision and control in any field, that is a step forward." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations) See the Supplement.

150. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 8, 1958.

SUBJECT

Meeting with the Disarmament Advisers

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Ambassador Wadsworth
Mr. Farley, S/AE
Mr. Spiers, S/AE
Mr. Weiler, S/AE

The Under Secretary
General Alfred Gruenther
General Walter Bedell Smith
Mr. John McCloy

The Secretary said we were now reaching the point for taking decisions in the current review of disarmament policy, since quite soon we would probably open diplomatic discussions with the Soviets with

respect to a possible Summit meeting. He said we anticipated our re-evaluation of policy would be studied by our NATO allies before any proposals were made to the Russians, and that we hoped to be ready within the next two weeks for discussions with our Allies.

The Secretary said we are confronted by two aspects of the problem that do not necessarily coincide. The first is the expectation and desire of peoples of the world to achieve some progress with respect to arms control. The second is the practical limitations of what can be done in this field. The Secretary said we cannot ignore the aspirations of humanity for some progress in disarmament, in spite of these practical limitations and we must avoid giving the impression that we lack concern for these aspirations. The Secretary referred to the adverse effect upon Germany's moral position before the world that resulted from the position taken by the German representative at the 1907 Hague Conference, to the effect that making war more destructive and disagreeable was more likely to prevent wars than any attempt to limit the horror of war. The Secretary said that if we divorced ourselves from the aspirations of humanity we would run risks, that although imponderable, could have a very real effect upon our security position in the world. Thus we must sometimes appear to strive for those things which may seem to us to be impossible of achievement.

The Secretary said he had grave doubts as to the possibility of achieving any broad agreement on the limitation of armaments with the Russians. He said he did not believe significant reductions would occur until steps were taken to give each side a greater sense of security and thus make it possible to reduce armed forces and armaments. The Secretary said that it might be possible to reach agreement with the Soviets on some zones of inspection, which in turn might make it possible to have some thinning out of military forces within the inspected areas. He said that in addition it might be possible to do something with respect to outer space, although the Killian studies had indicated there were greater problems in this field than we had thought when the idea was first launched.

The Secretary then referred to the probable difficulties which he said we would have with some of our allies in any re-evaluation of disarmament policy. He said that, for example, the British would be opposed to a test cessation unless the Atomic Energy Act¹ were changed and we were willing to give them the benefits of all our testing. The Secretary said that whether the Act would be amended in satisfactory form and whether we would then decide to give the British the information they desired was not certain at this time. He mentioned that in addition Congress was cer-

¹ Public Law 703, August 30, 1954; 68 Stat. 919.

tain to attach some strings to any changes in the Act. The British, the Secretary said, had in the meantime gambled everything on nuclear weapons in order to retain their status as a great power and this had increased their need for nuclear testing information. He said that while it would be technically possible for the British to remain outside a US-USSR agreement to stop testing, public opinion in Great Britain would certainly force the British Government to quickly follow suit in case of a US-USSR agreement.

The Secretary then referred to the French effort to test nuclear weapons as soon as possible in order to get into the nuclear club, and noted that by the time the French have conducted their tests other countries, such as Italy and possibly Germany, may attempt to achieve a nuclear capability.

The Secretary referred next to the reluctance of our European allies to see any agreement concluded in the nuclear field which did not also include some agreements in the conventional field. Nevertheless, he said, if there is one thing that is beyond effective control it is conventional armaments and armed forces. The Secretary said it would be almost impossible to police such an agreement and that in addition the Soviets could increase their forces almost overnight from two to six million men without too much trouble, whereas we would not be able to do this. In addition, each side had its own special armed forces which it wished to exclude: for the United States it was the national guard, for the French it was the reserve. Similar problems applied to most conventional armaments. The Secretary said, however, that he believed some worthwhile controls in the field of conventional armaments could be obtained if we could ever reach an agreement with respect to such major delivery systems as long-range submarines, heavy bombers, and missiles, but that so far no one had been successful in tackling this difficult and complicated problem.

The Secretary said he had made these introductory remarks in order to indicate some of the practical problems we had to face. He next wished to discuss some modifications we are considering in present policy.

The Secretary said the first change under consideration involved a suspension of nuclear tests for two years, with a United States declaration that we would resume testing if an agreement on a cut-off of fissionable materials production had not been reached by the end of the two-year period. He said the British and French would not like this but perhaps it was prudent for the United States to make this shift from the present requirement for prior agreement to a cut-off. He said our present inclination was to agree to a test suspension coming into effect as soon as a more or less pro forma agreement had been reached which would permit us to place a few inspectors on the existing Soviet testing grounds, and that following this we would negotiate to put into effect a more com-

plete inspection system. He said that in this regard the recent study by Dr. Killian's group goes so far with its inspection requirements as to be impractical.² He said this report was quite properly a counsel of perfection but that as a practical matter if you could create a high degree of risk of detection of clandestine testing, that would be sufficient because the disadvantages to the Soviet Union of being caught would be so great as to discourage them from trying. The Secretary said that even if you could create a 50-50 chance of detection that might be enough. He said that he had asked that the Killian group look at what would be required in order to give us such a 50-50 chance of detection. He added that he had doubts that the Soviets would accept even such a modified inspection arrangement but that we should put them to the test. He said that if we got into a period of a twelve months' test suspension without any real inspection, it would not do us any great harm, since it would merely mean extending the present six-month period we have between tests.

The Secretary said that while the British and French would not like a test suspension, they would have to follow us in order for the present governments to remain in power.

The Secretary said that with respect to the production cut-off, we were proposing the alternatives, which each party could choose, of closing down their production of fissionable material or of accepting the more comprehensive inspection that would go along with an arrangement merely not to devote the production of fissionable material to weapons purposes. He said Admiral Strauss had suggested the first alternative but that the British were very upset at the prospect of such an arrangement as this and that this was one issue upon which they would break with the United States if we did not have an alternative, such as the second arrangement. Mr. Farley explained that Admiral Strauss was thinking of a temporary two-year suspension of production while the more comprehensive inspection arrangements were being installed. Mr. Farley also noted that it might be possible to develop an arrangement under which certain plants would be closed down, thus simplifying the inspection problem. The Secretary said that a mere two-year production halt would not be worthwhile, if that was what Admiral Strauss had in mind.

The Secretary then turned to the question of inspection zones. He said we were thinking of the same position as we had advanced before, but were also considering proposing the smaller European zone approved last year by NATO but not submitted in the London negotiations. He said we were also considering an even smaller European zone which General Norstad had been studying. This latter zone would cover

² See Document 147.

Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The Secretary said he had always had reservations about presenting zones in terms of political boundaries and preferred geographical coordinate because it lessened the political implications. He said we had not yet received the views of the Joint Chiefs or of Chancellor Adenauer on this smaller zone. The Chancellor, he said, had not in the past liked the idea of mobile Soviet inspectors in the Federal Republic and we would therefore have some problems with him regarding the extent of mobility to be allowed the ground inspection teams. The Secretary noted that the Joint Chiefs, on the other hand, feel quite strongly about the need for mobility, but that this was a detail we would have to work out.

The Secretary said that along with the European zone would go an Arctic zone, which could be of great importance. He said we had concluded that it was not practical to have zones of inspection for parts of the United States in return for inspection zones in Siberia, as Governor Stassen had suggested, because of the political difficulties that this would raise.

The Secretary then discussed the question of force levels. He said we were thinking of proposing a first step reduction to 2.2 million men, which was about 300,000 less than we had now, and that this would be tied to acceptance of some inspection zones. He noted that General Norstad had indicated that if he obtained an inspection zone in central Europe he would think it advisable to thin out some of his forces there.

The Secretary said we were repeating our proposal for deposition of some post World War II armaments in international depots, but that this would merely mean transferring some obsolete arms from present warehouses to international depots.

The Secretary then referred to our past proposal regarding the use of outer space only for peaceful purposes, noting that while it had originally been put forward as a minor aspect of our proposals it had now become a major item. He said we have some problems with our European allies in this area because they tend to think that we are seeking some arrangements which would protect ourselves but which would bring them little improvement in security; at the same time they believe they need IRBM's to maintain a retaliatory capability. He said he believed this to be a shortsighted view because we would all be safer if we did not have long range missiles coming to the fore. He said if our security, in the form of some measure of immunity for the United States, can be achieved, the fact that we would always be in a position to bring our power to bear in case of aggression would increase all free world security. Aside from our allies' views, however, he said, the problems in dealing with outer space are complex, and it is difficult to separate peaceful activity from military progress. However, while the problem is a complex one it is one worth pursuing.

Mr. McCloy asked if Khrushchev had rejected the outer space item for a summit agenda. The Secretary said the Soviets had tied outer space controls to elimination of Western bases, which was not an acceptable arrangement.

Mr. McCloy asked if disarmament was likely to be the only item discussed at a Summit meeting, to which the Secretary replied that German reunification and other questions would also be discussed. The Secretary commented that if we could obtain German reunification this would permit significant armament reductions. He said we were restudying the proposal for a European security treaty which we had put forward at the 1955 Summit meeting as a means of bringing about German reunification. He said this had been a good plan but was so complicated that it had been a failure from the standpoint of propaganda. The Secretary said that as far as getting German reunification on the agenda, we would probably end up by getting the same agenda headings as were agreed to for the 1955 Summit meeting.

General Gruenther asked if there was strong opposition within the government to the proposal for a separate nuclear test cessation. He said he had talked with some people in AEC who believed they were just beginning to tap possible new developments for testing in higher altitudes. The Secretary said there was opposition within the government, but that he did not believe there was as much glitter in future testing possibilities as some thought. He said much of the talk about exploding materials in outer space as a means of preventing missiles from getting through was not really worth much, and that this was Dr. Killian's view. He said there are great difficulties in connection with any nuclear testing in outer space, and mentioned present difficulties with regard to projected Pacific tests as an example. He said scientists have a tendency to want to go on and on with tests, and that all scientific advances are not necessarily in our interest.

The Secretary commented that we also had to consider the psychological effect of continued testing. He said he had proposed that we deflate the anticipated Soviet announcement on unilateral cessation of testing by announcing that we would stop testing after Hardtack for a period of two years. He said he had acquiesced in the decision not to do this because it would have placed Macmillan and Adenauer in a difficult position. Nevertheless, he said, we must recognize that we can lose the whole struggle with the Soviets if we fail to take into account such imponderables as world opinion, and it is in this area that we have been taking a beating. The Soviet had been trying to advance their cause by achieving their objectives through respectable means and avoiding new Koreas and the like. While this was, in a way, a good development, we must recognize that we also need to consider world opinion.

The Secretary said that if we could get an agreement to suspend tests on January 1, 1959, we could have an agreement to have adequate inspection installed by January 1, 1960 if the test cessation were to continue. He agreed with General Gruenther's observation that, as a practical political matter, it would be difficult to resume testing once we had stopped, particularly if it is over a question of the details of inspection. The Secretary added that while it might be difficult to resume a full scale testing it would be possible to have small tests underground to develop small clean tactical weapons and peaceful applications of nuclear explosives.

Mr. McCloy asked if such things as registration of attempts to launch vehicles to the moon were what we had in mind for measures to regulate outer space. The Secretary said this would be one example.

Mr. McCloy agreed that we faced a serious threat to our moral position in the world. He said people tend to think we are more intransigent than the Soviets. He said that at the same time people also appear to have the view that we are not as strong militarily as the USSR, and are concerned about this. He cited his recent conversation with Nehru in this regard, and noted that Nehru had told him he was convinced that neither Khrushchev nor anyone of importance around him wanted war with the United States.

Mr. McCloy and General Gruenther asked if we will not run a risk of appearing to go to a summit meeting merely to agree to Soviet proposals if, as appears to be the case, the only issue the Soviets will agree to discuss that holds any chance of agreement is a test cessation. The Secretary commented that we had to consider the position of our allies, and that all of them, for domestic political reasons, are determined to have a summit conference this year. He said we had gone along as far as we had on the summit question because of our need to help Mr. Macmillan who had cooperated so well with the United States in the past and who needs a summit meeting to survive politically. The Secretary said he was fearful that a summit meeting will mark a great political defeat for the West, and in this regard he referred to the list he had given in his recent press conference of prices the Soviets wanted us to pay before we even got to the summit.

General Smith said that if the United States went to the summit and came away without an agreement on anything, the Russians would be the only winners. He said failure to reach any agreement might also increase tensions and thereby increase the chances of war. The Secretary noted in this latter connection that twice within recent weeks Khrushchev had told Western diplomats that if the West does not accept the status quo in Eastern Europe it means war. The Secretary said he did not believe Khrushchev meant this in a literal sense but that it does indicate the Soviets are seriously concerned with the situation in Eastern Europe.

General Gruenther said he granted that "the hand was turning" in the direction of a test cessation, and he was aware that we would probably lose the next round in the General Assembly if this question came up, but that he was concerned as to where would we go from a test cessation, and what we would get in return so that it would not appear to be merely a United States acceptance of a Soviet proposal. He said he would like to see a test suspension tied to one of our own proposals, such as inspection zones.

The Secretary said the other proposal in our package besides test cessation that is practical for negotiations and would also be of some value to us is inspection zones in Europe and in the Arctic.

The discussion then turned to the future function of the advisors, and the Secretary said he wanted to be able to talk with them again, in order to get their further views. He mentioned General Gruenther's suggestion of tying a test suspension to inspection zones as an example of useful ideas that could grow out of such discussions. The Secretary said he would try to hold another session with the advisors as soon as possible.

151. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 11, 1958.

SUBJECT

Report on Disarmament and Inspection by President's Science Advisory Committee

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Dulles
Dr. Killian
Dr. James Fisk
Mr. Jerome Wiesner
Mr. Philip J. Farley, S/AE

Dr. Killian said that the Science Advisory Committee had just concluded a meeting in Puerto Rico during which thorough consideration had been given to a number of aspects of disarmament. Because of the

urgency of the Committee's recommendations, he had asked for this opportunity to present the conclusions to the Secretary. The Committee's report was being completed and would be presented to Mr. Farley's disarmament working group at its meeting on Monday, April 14.¹

Dr. Killian said that the main conclusions of the Committee were:

(1) An inspected agreement for suspension of nuclear tests at the conclusion of the forthcoming Pacific series would be greatly to the advantage of the United States.

(2) A suspension of tests of strategic missiles entered into before mid-1959 would be greatly to the disadvantage of the United States.

(3) A proposal for an inspected nuclear test suspension beginning at the conclusion of the Pacific series should be made publicly before the series begins.

Dr. Killian reviewed the analysis and supporting arguments leading to the Committee's conclusions. The Secretary expressed great interest. He doubted that a proposal on nuclear test suspension could be made before April 21 since a number of our allies were concerned in this matter. Dr. Killian explained that the significance of the April 21 date was that the first shot in the Pacific series was scheduled to occur then, and once the U.S. had resumed testing the Soviet Union would under the terms of its announcement be free also to resume testing. Dr. Killian observed that in addition to the technical considerations advanced by his Committee he felt that a test suspension would be advantageous to deal with the Nth country problem and expressed concern particularly over the prospect that France might produce nuclear weapons. The Secretary observed that we were seeking amendment to the Atomic Energy Act to permit us to help our allies in nuclear weapons programs. Mr. Farley pointed out that representatives of the Executive Branch had testified that there were no present plans for nuclear weapons cooperation with any country except the United Kingdom and that great care had been exercised to make clear to the French that they should not expect early assistance from the U.S. if the Act was amended.

The Secretary expressed interest in the conclusion of the Committee as to the difficulties of inspecting the production and use of long-range missiles. Dr. Killian said the problems of inspection of these activities were very difficult and the necessary inspection would go far beyond anything presently contemplated in Western disarmament proposals. He observed that the dimensions of the problem might be illustrated by the statement that any bicycle shop could work on missiles parts and any silo might be a launching pad. The Secretary said that this appeared to complicate the problem of carrying out the President's proposal that

¹ The report has not been found. Regarding the April 14 meeting, see footnote 1, Document 153.

outer space be used only for peaceful scientific purposes. Dr. Killian said that this matter should be approached very cautiously.

The Secretary referred to the study of inspection requirements for a nuclear test suspension.² He recalled that at the NSC he had suggested that further studies be conducted to see what lesser number of inspection installations in the Soviet Union might be sufficient to give an adequate deterrent against attempted Soviet clandestine testing. Dr. Killian said that he would look into this. Mr. Farley said that his personal view was that the number of inspection stations in the Soviet Union was not of great importance since even our existing detection network around the periphery of the Soviet Union picked up virtually all Soviet shots. The difficult problem was the need for mobility of inspectors to ascertain whether detected underground explosions were indeed nuclear in nature.

² Document 147.

152. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, April 15, 1958.

At the dinner given by Sir Leslie Munro I had an extended conversation with Mr. Hammarskjöld, in latter part participated in by Mr. Wilcox with respect to a meeting of the UN Disarmament Commission. I expressed strongly and positively the view that the Commission ought to meet. I said that it would be a very serious blow to the prestige of the United Nations, and certainly to its standing in the United States, if the Commission thus established by the UN, failed to meet merely because the Soviet Union's one member of the Commission did not want it to meet.¹ This would, in effect, be conceding a veto power and power of nul-

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

¹ By the terms of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1150, November 19, 1957, the General Assembly agreed to enlarge the U.N. Disarmament Commission by 14 members. The Representative of the Soviet Union declared that his government would not participate in any future negotiations of the new or old Disarmament Commission or its Subcommittee. For text of Resolution 1150, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, pp. 916-917.

lification to the Soviet Union which would indicate a subservience, even servility, of the Organization and would produce very bad future results. I said that I did not think it necessary for the Commission to do any substantive business. Indeed if the Soviet Union was not there, it could not do very much in the way of disarmament. It might note the absence of the Soviet Union and recess, or it might note that since disarmament was presumably being discussed between the East-West talks at Moscow, it would be better to defer independent action. But it seemed to me that a meeting was imperative and should be held before the end of the month which was a date in the UN Resolution as a date by which at least some action was expected.²

The Secretary-General indicated that he agreed in principle that the Disarmament Commission should meet and that the Assembly action should not be nullified by the Soviet Union. On the other hand he indicated that he was reluctant to see a meeting under conditions which might interfere in some way with the disarmament negotiations which might be conducted at Moscow, or a subsequent meeting of Foreign Ministers, or Heads of Government. He suggested that in some way the Soviets might take umbrage at a meeting of the Commission and use that as an excuse for breaking off disarmament talks elsewhere.

The Secretary-General also said that he did not have any clear responsibility in the matter.

I expressed the view that it was, I thought, unrealistic to think that the Soviet Union would break off disarmament talks on a pretext so slight as that a duly constituted Commission of the United Nations held a meeting at which it transacted no substantive business but merely recessed or adjourned. (There was a curious reluctance on Mr. Hammarskjöld's part, which he was unable to justify rationally, but which made me wonder whether he had not perhaps given some private commitment to the Russians when he was in Moscow recently.)

JFD

² On November 14, 1957, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 1148, which called upon the Disarmament Commission to reconvene its Subcommittee to establish a group of experts to study inspection systems for disarmament measures. The Subcommittee was instructed to report to the Disarmament Commission by April 30, 1958. For text of the resolution, see *ibid.*, pp. 914-915.

153. Interim Report of the Working Group on Disarmament Policy

Washington, undated.

1. The working group on U.S. Disarmament Policy, consisting of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Office of the Special Assistant to the President (Dr. Killian), was established on April 7, 1958, by the Special Cabinet Committee on Summit Preparations. The group was directed to make an initial report on April 15 assessing the adequacy of existing U.S. disarmament policy and the opportunities for new U.S. initiatives in this field.

2. The working group reached no agreement in the course of its three meetings (April 9, April 14 and April 16)¹ on specific new U.S. initiatives on disarmament, but did conclude that:

a) present U.S. policy is adequate in scope and objective, and covers the major substantive areas on which the U.S. should seek agreement.

b) present U.S. policy should be re-examined and modified to increase its effectiveness from the standpoint of U.S. political and military security objectives.

c) the concept of "inseparability" of the various components in present U.S. policy appeared to be a bar to progress in disarmament negotiations and make the West vulnerable before world public opinion.

d) the U.S. position should be so formulated and presented as to remove the basis for criticism of its complexity and rigidity without compromising our basic disarmament objectives.

e) a more specific U.S. position on outer space should be developed.

3. The group recognized that the immediate key issue was U.S. willingness or unwillingness to modify the present position on nuclear testing and its relationship to other elements of disarmament policy. The representatives of the Department of State, CIA and Dr. Killian's office favored a revision of policy to provide for a separate inspected suspension of nuclear tests. The representatives of the AEC did not favor such a change but suggested certain alternative revisions involving limitation of nuclear tests (described in paragraph (d), below) if over-riding political considerations required a change in U.S. policy. The Department of Defense representative is of the opinion that the decision regarding sus-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.0012/4-1758. Secret. Sent under cover of a memorandum from Farley to Reinhardt, April 17. The members of this group from the Department of State were Wadsworth, Farley, Spiers, Baker, Morris, and Owen; from the Department of Defense, General Alonzo Fox and Colonel Fred Rhea; from AEC, Admiral Paul Foster and James Goodby; from CIA, Robert Amory; and from Killian's staff, Spurgeon Keeny.

¹ Memoranda of conversation, April 9, 14, 16, are *ibid*.

pension of nuclear weapons testing will not be taken pending a further assessment of the military and political factors which bear upon this problem. He felt, therefore, that the working group should address itself to the reformulation of the U.S. position under two separate assumptions: (1) that the U.S. decides it is prepared to agree to an immediate test suspension, and (2) that the U.S. decided it is not prepared to agree to an immediate suspension.

More specifically the proposals of the Departments represented were as follows:

a) The Department of State representatives presented a proposal for a two-year inspected test suspension, conditioned for its continuance beyond this period on Soviet agreement to a cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

b) The Department of Defense representative informally presented for discussion purposes a less extensive revision of the U.S. position loosening the link between the nuclear provision and other elements of the August 29 proposals. This was intended to illustrate how the U.S. position might be presented in less complex terms.

c) The CIA representative suggested that the U.S. should announce in the near future a unilateral two-year test suspension to begin September 1, 1958, and the U.S. should simultaneously announce a unilateral suspension of fissionable material production for weapons purposes beginning immediately and invite UN inspection. The suspension would end after one year if the Soviets did not reciprocate.

d) The AEC representative believed that the U.S. should propose a limitation of testing involving unrestricted testing underground and a limit of 20 tests per nation per year above ground, all of the latter to have a yield of no greater than 100 KT each. However, no limitations should be accepted unless it was linked to Soviet acceptance of some other disarmament measures.

4. The group recognized that other areas of U.S. disarmament policy were equally important and should be examined and reformulated. The Department of State representatives presented specific suggestions for reformulation of U.S. proposals covering the nuclear cut-off, surprise attack zones, conventional manpower and arms reductions, and outer space control. These have not yet been discussed due to lack of time.

5. The working group recognizes that the question of separation of the nuclear test issue from other elements of a disarmament agreement must be resolved at a higher level of the U.S. Government. Pending such a decision, the group will continue to review other aspects of the U.S. disarmament position with a view to determining what specific modifications may be recommended.

154. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, April 17, 1958.

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Killian
General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of the missile program.]

Dr. Killian next took up the report of his scientific group on cessation of nuclear testing.¹ He pointed out that this is a controversial subject on which the observations of his group are limited to technical aspects only and must of course be balanced against other considerations. Some of the conclusions reached by his group are: the inspection system for verification of test cessation requires a more extensive system than is now in existence. It is feasible to install a system which would give the required degree of assurance. Such a system could serve as an opening wedge for a system of inspection for disarmament generally. Cessation of testing, in the judgment of the group, would leave the United States in a position of technical advantage for a few years, which will otherwise be lost. The Science Advisory Committee considers that we should stop testing after the Hardtack series. They believe it would be to our over-all advantage to do so. They think, however, that provision should be made for further tests, under international controls for peaceful and scientific purposes.

Dr. Killian next reported that the group had studied the questions that are involved in the possibility of stopping the testing of guided missiles. We believe that the Soviets have fired at least five very long range missiles, of which three had nose cones that returned to the earth. With the background of their proven 700-mile and 1000-mile missiles, the Soviets could complete all the necessary missile firing tests within the next six months. The United States will not have an operational ICBM prior to mid-1959. Within six months we cannot have a reliable IRBM and ICBM.

Accordingly, an advantageous course of action is open to the Soviets to announce unilaterally the cessation of tests in six months or so. They could continue scientific use of rockets and gain from such use all the further information they need. The acceptance of a stoppage of tests before mid-1959 would be highly disadvantageous to the United States. Accordingly, any proposals for limiting the use of outer space should be very carefully studied.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.

¹ See Document 151.

In light of the views of the group on nuclear tests and missiles tests, the committee felt that an early announcement is needed on stoppage of nuclear testing. They consider that major advantages *may* accrue from such a statement and from such action. They added that an early announcement on nuclear testing would reduce the danger of pressures on us for cessation of missile testing.

The President thought that it would be difficult for the Soviets to generate pressure on us for a stoppage of missile testing. Our policy would probably require so many conditions to be met before such a stoppage could be agreed that early agreement would be unlikely. He added that he had never been too much impressed, or completely convinced by the views expressed by Drs. Teller, Lawrence and Mills that we must continue testing of nuclear weapons.

In concluding, Dr. Killian said that while his committee favored stopping of testing, many top officials do not agree, including those of AEC and Defense. The latter are concerned particularly with regard to the warhead for the AICBM. On this point the Science Advisory Committee thinks that the other problems involved in the AICBM are much the greater ones, and that we have warheads which could serve satisfactorily, although perhaps not with the ultimate in efficiency.

G
Brigadier General, USA

155. Memorandum From Secretary of State Dulles to President Eisenhower

Washington, April 30, 1958.

On April 26 I met with the recently appointed group of disarmament advisers: General Gruenther, General Smith, Robert Lovett and John McCloy. Lewis Strauss, Donald Quarles and James Killian were also present to state their views. We had a very thorough discussion of the present situation.¹

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. The source text bears the following notes by Eisenhower: “Foster and I are to talk further reference to final para. D” and “File, D.”

¹ Under his April 30 covering memorandum, Dulles also sent Eisenhower the memorandum of conversation of this meeting, dated April 26, which Eisenhower initialed. (*Ibid.*) See the Supplement.

There was a consensus that steps must be taken to put clearly before the world the U.S. devotion to peace and to reduction of the arms burden. Only by concrete actions can we counteract the false picture, all too prevalent abroad, of the United States as a militaristic nation.

Nuclear testing was recognized to be a key to progress in this direction. So long as we continue to insist upon our freedom to test, the wide opposition to our position shields the Soviet Union from pressure to agree to the positive U.S. proposals for the stopping of bomb production and for "open skies". Continued testing will undoubtedly lead to further refinement of our nuclear arsenal—though Dr. Killian makes a persuasive case that continued testing will help the Soviet weapons program more than it will ours. But the slight military gains appear to be outweighed by the political losses, which may well culminate in the moral isolation of the United States in the coming years.

This analysis was accepted by the four advisers. They cautioned, however, that we should not enhance Soviet prestige by remaining inflexible on the nuclear testing issue until a Summit meeting. U.S. agreement to a test suspension at the Summit, they seemed to feel, would give the Soviet Union a double victory: acceptance of the Soviet thesis on nuclear testing, and confirmation of the Soviet argument that meaningful agreement can only be reached at the Summit. Rather, we should make known our readiness to agree to an inspected test suspension in a manner and at a time of our own choosing. By thus disposing of this issue we might reduce pressures for a Summit meeting or, if it were held, assure that the meeting would deal with broad political issues which, it was felt, would be the proper function of any meeting that you attended.

It was suggested that any announcement we made on the subject of suspension of testing might be formulated as a suspension for six months, for example, on the assumption that an agreement would within that period be reached as to the detailed nature of the inspection required. If this agreement were reached, then there would be a further suspension of say a year on the assumption that during that period the system would be installed. If at the end of the period it actually was installed and functioning, then the suspension would continue on the assumption that progress was being made on other aspects of disarmament. Perhaps we could indicate that any resumption would be limited to confined underground tests or to very high altitude tests, neither of which would pollute the atmosphere.

By coupling our announcement on nuclear testing with a reiteration of our proposals on the nuclear cut-off and inspection against surprise attack, we could put the ball back in the Soviet court on these matters as well as on their willingness to accept inspection of a test suspension.

The nature of our discussion was such that perhaps this summary gives a greater impression of definiteness than was, in fact, the case.

However, I felt that there was a consensus among the four disarmament advisers along these lines. I do not know, however, that Admiral Strauss and Mr. Quarles wholly agreed.

I believe that the time is now ripe for a decision that we will agree to a contingent nuclear test suspension after completion of the testing program now under way, on such conditions as are suggested.

If this decision is taken in the appropriate way, I also recommend that you charge me with the responsibility for developing with AEC, Defense, CIA and USIA, recommendations as to the manner and timing of our announcement of our readiness to agree to an inspected test suspension, in order to obtain maximum benefits in strengthening our hand on the Summit meeting and in regaining the initiative in the disarmament field. The United Kingdom in particular, also France and perhaps NATO would need to be consulted. The attitude of the United Kingdom and France will be much influenced by the prospects of getting the Atomic Energy Act amended.²

JFD

² On May 1, Eisenhower and Dulles discussed the issues raised in this last paragraph. Eisenhower reminded Dulles that unless the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was amended to allow nuclear sharing with the United Kingdom, the British would not agree to a cessation of nuclear testing. They discussed tactics for passing the draft bill, which the Eisenhower administration had submitted on January 27, 1958, to amend the restrictions placed on the release of information to other nations under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, May 1, 11:47 a.m.; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations) See the Supplement.

Eisenhower and Dulles talked again on May 2 and agreed that, in order to be passed, the draft bill would have to grant the Congress the right to veto, within 30 days by concurrent resolution, any atomic exchange agreement negotiated with another nation. (Extract by David E. Boster of memorandum of conversation, May 2; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) See the Supplement.

**156. Memorandum by the Secretary of State's Staff Assistant
(Boster)**

Washington, May 14, 1958.

The following is a summary of a conversation between the Secretary and Dr. Killian on Wednesday evening May 14, regarding the suggested reply to the Khrushchev note of May 9.¹

Mr. Killian suggested that an additional phrase, reading "and a final report not later than 60 days", be added on the last line after "30 days after convening".²

Mr. Killian stressed the importance of getting our own plans and team definitely decided upon as a matter of urgency since quite a lot of preparation would need to be done. The Secretary suggested that there should perhaps be a meeting with Killian, Strauss and McElroy or perhaps others to decide how to proceed.

Mr. Killian said he was prepared to urge that we try to choose three distinguished American scientists, setting the level very high in order to force the Soviets to do the same, and to provide them with a competent staff. Mr. Killian said that these scientists would need to be pried loose from their present positions but was sure that this could be done. The Secretary noted the possibility that we would not know the views of these scientists in advance. Mr. Killian said he thought their views would be known but that there would be a problem of avoiding individuals who had so committed themselves as to indicate that there is no chance to negotiate or be flexible to a particular end.

The Secretary said that he had talked with Selwyn Lloyd in Copenhagen³ about this problem and that Lloyd had indicated that they would like very much to be able to continue testing the smaller [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] weapons for a while longer and wondered whether we could not work out the inspection problem in two phases. The first to be a simple form of inspection sufficient to detect the large explosions and debar those; and in the second phase to install a more elaborate inspection system for the smaller weapons. Mr. Killian said

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret.

¹ For text of the exchange of letters, May 9 and May 24, between Khrushchev and Eisenhower, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, pp. 1036-1041 and 1043-1044. The draft reply has not been identified.

² Killian's suggestion was incorporated into the May 24 letter.

³ On May 6, as reported in memorandum of conversation of that date. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

that this might be feasible but there would be the problem of underground tests and he would have to look at the question with care.

D. E. Boster⁴

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

157. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss)

Washington, May 16, 1958.

Admiral Strauss discussed with me the question of suspension of testing. He indicated that if we thought it politically important it might be possible to announce before the end of the Hardtack series that future testing would only be done under conditions which would assure no fallout. He gave me in this connection the report of his General Advisory Committee, copy attached.¹

I reported on Lloyd's desire to extend the period for the testing of the smaller, e.g., less than one megaton, weapons, and my reply to Lloyd that it might be possible to deal first with detection machinery covering the big explosions with a second phase which would be introduced only later dealing with the smaller tests. Admiral Strauss seemed to think this might be possible.

I spoke of the composition of the experts who might function if this was agreed on with the Soviet Union. He suggested that there should be experts designated as jointly agreed between AEC, Defense, CIA and Dr. Killian. I said I thought we should have a meeting on this subject in the near future and I would try to set it up for next week.

I said we were not clear as to whether the Soviets would accept UK experts or merely wanted U.S. and Soviet experts. Strauss suggested that

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

¹ The AEC Advisory Committee stated in the report, dated May 7, that the United States was approaching a crisis on continuation of testing because of the widespread uneasiness, often based on exaggerated and unsound arguments, over radioactive fallout. Therefore the Committee recommended a Presidential statement before the end of the Hardtack series that the United States was willing to restrict tests so that fallout would be sharply reduced. For text, see the Supplement.

in the latter case we might keep in touch with the UK and perhaps have the meetings in London.

Admiral Strauss spoke very highly of General Norstad's testimony before the Joint Congressional Committee and suggested I should thank him. Admiral Strauss thought that the amendments could be put through, particularly if we would accept the formula for disapproving agreements with other governments by a concurrent resolution. I asked how it would be if we accepted it by a two-third's vote. Admiral Strauss said he thought this might squeeze through and he would talk to Pastore about it if we wished.

I recalled my conversation with the President yesterday, in which the President indicated that there was doubt whether Admiral Strauss would continue to serve beyond his present term. The Admiral expounded on his reasons for this. I said that if he should not continue to serve, I felt that his services should be kept available to the Government and that he might, for example, be a consultant in the State Department with a mention to be a sort of "ambassador-at-large" for atomic peace matters, having in this respect the personal rank of ambassador, if and as he went abroad. Admiral Strauss indicated that something like this would be agreeable to him.

JFD

158. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 19, 1958.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Test Detection—Technical Negotiations with U.S.S.R.

PARTICIPANTS

Department of State
The Secretary
Ambassador James J. Wadsworth
C—Mr. Reinhardt
S/P—Mr. Smith
S/AE—Mr. Farley
EUR—Mr. Kohler
S/AE—Mr. Spiers
S/S—RO—Mr. Miller

Office of the President
Dr. Killian

Department of Defense
General Loper
General Fox

Central Intelligence Agency
Allen Dulles
Herbert Scoville

Atomic Energy Commission
General Starbird

The Secretary advised the group that the British Embassy had just informed us of London's approval of the revised draft reply to Khrushchev's letter of May 9, 1958.¹ He noted also that the Swiss Embassy had agreed to the selection of Geneva as the location of the proposed talks. The Secretary read the draft reply and said that France and Canada would be contacted shortly. He said that the new approach involving a multinational Western delegation would create difficulties in preparation for the talks, and that it was important to get organized quickly. He said that it would be up to the United States to provide the chairman and spokesman for the Western delegation, and that we would choose the representatives from other countries, who would serve as individual experts and not as government representatives. The first problem we faced was who should serve as chairman of the delegation.

Dr. Killian asked whether the first order of business should not be rather settlement, at least in outline, of the terms of reference for the discussion. The Secretary said that the Department had given some preliminary thought to this problem. The Geneva talks should be technical in nature, although the delegation could not be freed from considerable political guidance. As an illustration of some of the problems of a non-technical nature which might arise during the discussions, he alluded to Selwyn Lloyd's idea about installing an inspection system in phases and beginning with a ban on tests of 1 megaton or above. Dr. Killian interjected, with respect to this idea, that, whereas it had not been studied, it would no doubt raise many difficulties in view of the fact that tests of weapons in the smaller yield ranges would provide information of value in the development of larger yield weapons. The Secretary said that he had not meant to go into the question of whether the British idea was a good one or a bad one. Obviously, a United Kingdom objective is not to arrest future weapons development.

¹ Dulles requested British approval of the draft reply during a meeting with Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia on May 18. (Memorandum of conversation, May 18; *ibid.*) See the Supplement. For text of Khrushchev's May 9 letter and the U.S. letter as sent on May 24, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, pp. 1036–1041 and 1043–1044.

Returning to the question of selection of a chairman, The Secretary said that the chairman should be a scientist of considerable prestige, with an ability to handle men and compose differences. This would be a particularly important attribute in view of the fact that members of the delegation will not all be Americans.

The Secretary felt that the delegation chairman, once chosen, should participate in the process of working out terms of reference.

Dr. Killian agreed and said that he hoped the terms of reference would charge the group with designing an "all-out" system and then indicating the capabilities and limitations of various lesser systems. The Secretary said that this was along the lines of our own thinking, and that he, himself, thought that we may decide, as a matter of political judgment, that the U.S.S.R. would not be willing to undertake the risk involved in violating a system with a 50-75% capability of detection. He thought that the technical group should come up with various alternative possibilities from which the responsible political authorities could choose. Dr. Killian inquired as to the number of people the Secretary thought should be on the U.S. delegation. The Secretary said that he did not have any firm view, that he thought the bulk of the members should be from the U.S., that there should be enough to do the job but no more, and that the delegation should have call on an unlimited number of technical people. Perhaps the delegation should consist of 3 U.S. scientists, 2 from the UK, 1 from France and 1 from Canada. At this point the Secretary left the meeting, asking Mr. Farley to determine whether it was possible to get a list of nominees for delegation chairman.

General Starbird presented the following list: E. O. Lawrence, Norris Bradbury, Commissioner Libby, General Fields, or General Nichols.

Dr. Killian inquired as to what attitude the delegation chairman should have on the general proposition of test suspension. Mr. Farley thought that we should avoid selection of any of the "extremists" on this issue, but that we should not necessarily avoid choosing a chairman who has at some point expressed an opinion on the issue, if he is generally known as a man of scientific objectivity. From the political point of view it would be better to select a chairman who is known to be in favor of test suspension in order to avoid the possibility of future Soviet charges, in case of failure of the talks, that we had selected a man whose initial predispositions doomed the technical discussions.

Mr. Scoville suggested James B. Fisk, of the AEC's General Advisory Committee, and Dr. Bethe.

Dr. Killian suggested the following names: Dr. Bacher, General Fields, Dr. Bethe, Dr. Lawrence, Dr. York, Dr. Rabi, and Dr. du Bridge.

Mr. Smith said that he thought from the public relations' point of view, it would be desirable to avoid choosing someone who was known as a "weaponeer." Dr. Killian agreed and said that from the point of view

of experience and ability to get along with foreigners, as well as with the Secretary General of the United Nations, Dr. Rabi would be the ideal choice.

Mr. Farley suggested that representatives of Dr. Killian, the AEC, CIA and the Department of Defense, phone him during the course of the day with an indication of the order of preference, on the basis of the criterion discussed during the meeting, among the names mentioned, in addition to any others which might be thought of in the interim.

159. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, June 18, 1958, 11:45 a.m.

The following members, consultants and staff of the Science Advisory Committee met with the President: Drs. Killian, Bacher, Berkner, Bethe, Bronk, General Doolittle, Drs. Fisk, Haskins, Kistiakowsky, Land, Purcell, Rabi, Robertson, Weiss, Wiesner, Zacharias, Brode, Dryden, Hill, Piore, Scoville, Waterman, Mr. Beckler.

Dr. Killian opened the discussion, reporting on preparations for the technical discussions at Geneva on atomic testing. He said that good progress is being made in developing the views of the United States team. He mentioned that there may be some problems of declassification, i.e., actions may have to be taken to declassify certain material essential to the discussions. The President said he would be prepared to take a liberal stand on this, in view of what we hope to accomplish through the conference. Dr. Killian said the question must also be considered as to how to follow up the report that the group brings in, and as to the kind of support organization that will exist in the United States for the group during their discussions. Some planning and preparations must be made for this. The President said he understood this to be simply a question of what is the next step, and that the idea is to prepare plans on the assumption that United States views are adopted at the conference. Dr. Fisk said that a specific type of question that will arise is as to the measures that will be proposed in the event it is found that explosions below a certain size could not be detected with certainty.

Dr. Killian next asked Dr. Bethe to present some considerations concerning clean weapons. Dr. Bethe said that in the Hardtack series a num-

ber of the clean weapons tests have not been successful, in that the yield has proven to be very much less than that sought. This result occurred, he said, because the laboratories tried to reduce the weight of weapons to certain desirable figures [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. He thought these results may show that we are close to the limit of what we can attain in "cleanness" of weapons. He added that ground bursts of large weapons seem to produce radioactivity equivalent to a fission component of approximately [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] (although this has a short half life—about twenty-four hours). The President asked whether, inasmuch as the Soviets test on land, they are suffering worse effects from fall-out than we are. Dr. Bethe said that the Soviets are using air bursts, probably to minimize this effect, but that even so their fall-out problem is worse than ours. Dr. Bethe concluded by saying that tests of standard weapons in the Hardtack series have been quite successful.

[Here follows discussion of the missile program, the space program, the possibility of establishing a Department of Science during the Eisenhower administration, and the role of the individual in scientific inquiry.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

160. Memorandum of Discussion at the 370th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, June 26, 1958.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*

The Director of Central Intelligence announced that the Soviets had yesterday stated that they would not send their technical experts to Geneva to discuss means of detecting tests of nuclear weapons unless the United States agreed that the goal of the Geneva talks should be the

immediate cessation of such tests.¹ Otherwise, said the Soviets, they would be “deceiving” the peoples of the world. This constituted an extraordinary overnight change since the Soviet note of June 24.²

This change of tactics constituted, in Mr. Dulles’ view, one more manifestation of the increasingly hard policies which the Soviet was following in the field of international relations. We could expect more of the same. Nevertheless, it was difficult to explain this precise change. It was hard to believe that the Soviet note of June 24 on the subject had been written on Gromyko’s sole authority. Perhaps, after sending his note, Gromyko had touched base with Khrushchev, who encountered opposition in the Presidium to the acceptance note of June 24 and had therefore proceeded to make the change announced in the note of June 25.

Secretary Dulles thought he had a possible explanation of the change in tactics. He pointed out that after our Government received the note of June 24 agreeing to the Geneva meeting, we had, at the request of Gromyko, provided the Soviets with the general headings of the topics we wished to have discussed at the Geneva meeting. It had been suggested that provision of these headings may have induced the Soviets to make their final swing away from the Geneva meeting, because the headings would show that the United States intended to be very thorough in its investigation of the means of detecting tests of nuclear weapons. Such thoroughness could have alarmed the Soviets and given them second thoughts about the matter of opening up the Soviet Union to inspection. Thus, if the conference were to have failed because the Soviets had refused to accept an adequate inspection system, this would ruin all the Soviet propaganda in favor of banning atomic tests.

The President still thought it was hard to explain the sudden change from acceptance to rejection. Mr. Allen Dulles thought the change in the Soviet point of view reflected factors more fundamental than those just stated by Secretary Dulles. They were obviously taking a much harder line toward Poland, Yugoslavia, etc. Mr. Allen Dulles said he tended to believe that differences of view existed in the councils of the Kremlin, although we don’t yet know what these differences are. Certainly the recent meeting of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party did something more than agree to a change in the delivery of grain to the state. Poland was clearly not toeing the line with the USSR in the matter of the Hungarian executions. It may be a Soviet objective to force conformity onto the Poles. In any case, Mr. Dulles said he felt that he must warn that the United States faced heavy sledding ahead in its dealings with the USSR.

¹ For text of the June 25 Soviet aide-mémoire announcing this decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, pp. 1080–1082.

² The text of the June 24 Soviet aide-mémoire naming the participants for the conference from Czechoslovakia and Poland is *ibid.*, pp. 1078–1079.

The President looked mildly astonished, and asked Mr. Allen Dulles to be more specific as to what was going to happen. Was he trying to scare the President with some prospect of imminent war? Mr. Dulles replied that this was not his intention, but that he was warning, for example, that the Soviets may force the resignation of the Gomulka regime in Poland.

[Here follow the remainder of Allen Dulles' briefing on Lebanon, Indonesia, Burma, and the Vietnamese-Cambodian border and Agenda Items 2. "Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military Operations" (see Document 27) and 3. "Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria."]

4. *Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy* (NSC 5725/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 19, 1958³)

The National Security Council:

Noted the Semiannual Report by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State on the Implementation of NSC 5725/1, transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 19, 1958; as summarized at the meeting by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

5. *Atomic Energy Program, 1953-1958*

(The text of Admiral Strauss' reports on Items 4 and 5 is filed in the minutes of the meeting. Also note that Admiral Strauss asked for and received permission to make public the unclassified portions of his report.)

[Here follows Agenda Item 6. "Comparative Evaluations Group."]

S. Everett Gleason

³ Neither printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File, 370th Meeting, Tabs)

161. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 100-2-58

Washington, July 1, 1958.

[Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. Extract—3 pages of source text not declassified.]

162. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles

Ottawa, July 10, 1958.

The Secretary and the President discussed the growing pressure from the point of view of foreign relations, on the United States Government to make some move toward cessation of nuclear testing. The President said that he was disposed to tell the Atomic Energy Commission that, in view of the probability that we shall have to take a political decision soon, they should tack on to their present Hardtack Series any additional tests that they and Defense really consider are needed.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Joseph N. Greene, Jr., Dulles' Special Assistant. The meeting was held in the Embassy Residence. Eisenhower and Dulles visited Ottawa July 8–11 for discussions with Canadian leaders. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Diefenbaker discussed disarmament and proposals for safeguards against surprise attack on July 9. (Memorandum of conversation by Merchant, July 9; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series, Canada) For text of the joint statement issued on July 9, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 469–470.

163. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, July 12, 1958.

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Killian
General Goodpaster

Dr. Killian referred to a request he had received from the Secretary of State to make a technical study of measures to detect and discourage surprise attack.¹ He went on to say that the technical aspects of this question are so inextricably involved with military and political factors that he did not think that a meaningful study limited to technical phases alone could be prepared. The President said he was inclined to agree and suggested

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on August 4.

¹ Dulles sent Killian a letter on July 3 requesting that the President's Science Advisory Committee explore the scientific and technical aspects of the surprise attack problem. (*Ibid.*, White House Office Files, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament—Surprise Attack) In a July 10 letter to Dulles, Killian reported that after 2 days of preliminary discussion, the Science Advisory Committee had reached the conclusions as described by Killian. Killian's letter is *ibid.* Both letters are in the Supplement.

that Dr. Killian might advise the Secretary of State that he would be glad to have some of his people look at the problem, together with Defense and State personnel. The effort could be kept small, utilizing an informal working group for the purpose.

Dr. Killian said the question is chiefly related to warning—to find out whether hostilities are being prepared for. We have been talking chiefly about the northern rim. Inspection relating to attacks launched from there, or passing over that area, would seem to have some promise. The President commented that the original idea we had of Open Skies was chiefly related to attack involving aircraft, and that it may not be so effective when projected forward into the missile era. However, for the next several years the greatest threat of destruction continues to be the military aircraft; missiles will not be ready in such quantity. What we are aiming to determine is that bases within such and such a line have not been brought to a state suggesting imminent attack.

After further discussion the President thought that the most effective procedure would be to send a note, signed by himself, asking them jointly to go forward with this study, and making Dr. Killian and his group available to work in coordination with them.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

164. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, August 4, 1958.

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Killian
General Goodpaster

Dr. Killian first reported that the Geneva negotiations on inspection systems for atomic tests have gone quite well—better than expected.¹

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on August 4.

¹ On July 1, experts from Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States conferred with a delegation of experts from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. The conference was to study the possibilities of detecting violations of a potential agreement on suspension of nuclear tests. The discussions lasted until August 21.

The real crux comes this week when an attempt is made to put a full system together and reach agreement on it as to its adequacy. Whether these discussions will end with or without agreement, Dr. Killian suggested we must be prepared to react quickly. The President commented that our position must await NSC consideration of the documents brought back. We should not try to anticipate this, but could be following the matter sufficiently closely that little additional time would be required. Dr. Killian said the question before us will be whether to support a cessation of tests. The President thought that if full technical agreement is reached, the weight of argument for doing so would be very great.

The President asked me to speak to Acting Secretary Herter about this, with a view to getting together representative from Defense, AEC, Dr. Killian's office, and other interested parties. They should then draw up a plan of action which might include a brief but definite statement that the United States, having received the results of the negotiations, is considering as a matter of urgency what can be done through diplomatic processes in relation to this question of test cessation to promote peace and stability. (I later called Governor Herter and found that action is proceeding generally along the lines the President had in mind, and that Governor Herter would take the matter up at the OCB meeting on Wednesday, if not before, to develop a recommended position.)²

Dr. Killian next referred to the Johnson Island test shot last week. It was highly successful, having achieved a very large explosion at a height of fifty miles. The effect on radar seems to have been less than anticipated. The effect on radio was greater than anticipated—and blacked out Pacific communications for about two hours. The glare was greater than expected. This test was correlated with a test planned in late August, which should include an explosion at about 375 miles height.

[Here follows discussion of missile tests and other developments.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

² A memorandum of the telephone conversation, August 4, 3:10 p.m., is *ibid.*, Herter Papers, Telephone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos. See the Supplement.

165. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Herter to the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Killian)

Washington, August 5, 1958.

DEAR JIM: We are giving urgent consideration to the course of action the United States should take following the present Geneva talks.

I am sending you with this note a suggested revision of our policy on nuclear testing, which Mr. Dulles has generally approved. For your personal information, I am enclosing also a copy of the staff paper which summarizes briefly our reasons for favoring this course of action rather than a limited test moratorium which Phil Farley tells me John McCone has discussed with you.

I would welcome a chance to hear your views as to the proper course of action and your comments on our proposal.

Sincerely yours,

Chris

Enclosure 1¹

PROPOSED REVISION OF NSC POLICY PAPER ON
DISARMAMENT²

5a. All parties will agree, independently of agreement on other provisions of section I.

(1) to refrain, as of the effective date of the agreement, from nuclear testing until 36 months thereafter. (The suspension would not continue beyond a 12-month period unless satisfactory progress was being made in the installation of the inspection system in (2) below.)

(2) to cooperate in setting up during the first 24 months, or earlier if mutually agreeable, an effective international inspection arrangement to monitor tests.

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology. Secret. Copies were sent to McCone, Quarles, and Allen Dulles on August 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8-758)

¹ Secret. There is no indication of drafter on the paper, but a note on Farley's memorandum (Enclosure 2 below) indicates that this revised paragraph was prepared by the Working Group on Disarmament Policy on April 28.

² This was a working paper and not a numbered NSC paper. The rest of the paper has not been found.

b. The U.S. will announce that it will resume nuclear tests at the end of 36 months if agreement to an adequately inspected cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes has not been achieved.

c. The U.S. will announce that it will refrain indefinitely from nuclear tests if the monitoring system referred to in paragraph 5a(2) is operating to the satisfaction of each party concerned and if the inspection system for the cut-off has been installed to the satisfaction of each party concerned and if the cut-off has been put into effect.

d. The U.S. will announce that if tests are resumed, it will give notification in advance of dates and approximate yields of such tests; provide reciprocal limited access to tests; and conduct such tests underground.

e. Provisions will be made for the continuation, under international auspices, of any nuclear explosions necessary for the development of peaceful application of such explosions.

Enclosure 2³

Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Disarmament and Atomic Energy (Farley) to Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, August 1, 1958.

SUBJECT

Proposed Policy on Nuclear Tests

Discussion:

1. We believe that with the Geneva talks approaching a conclusion, early policy decisions must be taken on the question of nuclear tests. Dr. Fisk, Ambassador Thompson and Embassy London have also expressed this view within the past week (Denuc 103, Moscow 248, London 661,

³ Secret. Drafted by Vincent Baker with concurrences from Smith of S/P, Kohler and McBride of EUR, Reinhardt, and Walmsley.

attached as Tab C).⁴ In your letter to Prime Minister Macmillan on June 13⁵ you indicated that we hoped to be able to approach the UK shortly on this matter in the light of information developed in the Geneva talks; and the UK reminded the Department last week of its desire to discuss the question with us upon conclusion of those talks. The approach of the United Nations General Assembly, the release of the United Nations Radiation Committee scheduled for early August, and the possibility of the question of tests arising indirectly in connection with the proposed Special Security Council Session are additional factors which demand consideration of this question.

2. On July 30 Chairman McCone handed you a message sent to him by Commissioner Libby and Dr. Edward Teller (Tab B).⁶ The message suggests that to avoid our being forced by public opinion into a complete test cessation we might propose (1) to limit the offsite fission fallout per year to one megaton equivalent each year released by the U.S. and the same amount by the USSR, or alternately (2) to ban completely offsite fallout and permit underground testing by everyone.

3. While any measures which notably reduced fallout would lessen public concern about the health hazards of continued testing, we believe the AEC proposal is insufficient from the political standpoint and that it has the following specific disadvantages:

(a) It would be viewed as a retreat from previous Western proposals which have called for suspension of tests rather than test limitations, and would seem an illogical sequel to the Geneva talks directed toward methods for enforcement of a possible test suspension.

(b) It would not be accepted and hence would enable the USSR to continue to exploit the testing issue and its own unilateral suspension in world-wide propaganda and to avoid the question of a production cut-off by continuing to hide behind the issue of a test suspension.

(c) By the same token, it would be an easy way for the USSR to avoid the inspection to which it has otherwise become largely committed as a result of the Geneva talks.

(d) It would not inhibit the development of nuclear weapons capabilities by fourth countries, a problem which has been of some concern to the U.S. and one which is of apparently increasing concern to the USSR as well.

(e) It would not have the effect of a test suspension in freezing weapons development of the U.S. and USSR at a time when we retain some

⁴ Denuc 103 from Geneva, July 25; telegram 248 from Moscow, July 26; and telegram 661 from London, July 30, are in Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/7-2558, 700.5611/7-2658, and 700.5611/7-3058, respectively. See the Supplement.

⁵ The text of this letter was transmitted in telegram 8917 to London, June 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/6-1358) See the Supplement.

⁶ This message was attached to a memorandum of conversation by Dulles, July 30. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation) See the Supplement.

important advantages in weapons technology (according to technical studies prepared by the Science Advisory Committee).

(f) A limitation of fallout to a fixed amount would, according to past technical consideration of similar limitation proposals, be difficult to enforce by inspection.

4. The policy recommendations which you discussed in general terms with the panel of disarmament advisers and approved for discussion with other agencies in April, we believe, afford the best basis for decisions at this time. In summary, the nuclear test proposal we have discussed with the other agencies and revised in the light of their comments, is the following: The nuclear provisions of our present proposals (test suspension and cut-off) would be made separable from the other elements of the package, but testing would remain linked, as far as the U.S. is concerned, to the cut-off which would become a condition subsequent. Nuclear tests would be suspended for three years beginning as of the effective date of the agreement.⁷ The suspension would not continue beyond twelve months unless satisfactory progress was being made in the installation of the inspection system. The U.S. would declare at the outset that testing would be resumed if agreement on an adequately inspected cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes had not been reached at the end of three years. Conversely, we would announce that the suspension would be extended for an indefinite period if agreement is reached on the installation of a control system to assure that no further fissionable material is produced for weapons purposes. The U.S. would announce that, if it became necessary to resume testing, the U.S. would henceforth test only underground.

5. This proposal would, we believe, turn to our advantage each of the factors mentioned in paragraph 3 above which weigh against the AEC proposal. It would be a logical follow-up to the Geneva talks, deprive the Soviets of the propaganda advantages of the testing issue, enable us to begin arms inspection within the USSR, inhibit fourth country programs, and could freeze our present weapons advantage. It would, by removing the test issue, enable us to place more effective emphasis in the nuclear cut-off as the condition subsequent. Most important, it would be evidence of United States willingness to go the "extra mile" to help achieve more meaningful measures of disarmament and thus go far to counter the image which is all too prevalent abroad of a militaristic United States.

⁷ A three-year period is a minimum for a meaningful inspected agreement since from 18 to 24 months will be required for installing the inspection system. [Footnote in the source text.]

6. Attached as Tab A⁸ is a proposed revision of the paragraph on nuclear tests in present NSC policy which would incorporate the changes recommended above. The other disarmament policy recommendations discussed in the interim report to the Cabinet Committee (Tab D)⁹ need not, in our view, be decided until the studies on surprise attack now underway under the leadership of Dr. Killian have been completed.

*Recommendations:*¹⁰

1. That you meet at an early date with Chairman McCone, Dr. Killian, Secretary McElroy and Mr. Allen Dulles to seek agreement on the nuclear provisions of U.S. disarmament policy along lines suggested in Tab A.¹¹

2. That you then seek a Presidential decision in the proposed revisions in policy as early as feasible.

⁸ See Enclosure 1 above.

⁹ DDS Memo #16, Report of Working Group on Disarmament Policy, April 28, 1958. [Footnote in the source text. The report has not been found.]

¹⁰ There is no indication on the source text whether these recommendations were approved.

¹¹ Killian responded in an August 6 memorandum to Herter pointing out that if the United States wanted to ease international tensions, freeze Soviet nuclear capabilities, or move toward a cessation of production of nuclear materials, the Department of State paper was the course to follow. If, however, the United States wanted to continue research and development in nuclear weapons while partially responding to public concern about fallout, then a test moratorium might take the form suggested by the AEC (see footnote 6 above). In any case, Killian suggested that the decision was one for the NSC and the President to make. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8-658). See the Supplement.

166. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 8, 1958.

SUBJECT

Proposed U.S. Policy on Nuclear Testing

PARTICIPANTS

State

The Secretary

The Under Secretary

Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, S/AE

Mr. Philip J. Farley, S/AE

Mr. Fisher Howe, S/S

Mr. Vincent Baker, S/AE

Defense

Mr. Donald A. Quarles

Lt. General Clovis E. Byers

Captain Clifford S. Foster

AEC

Mr. John A. McCone

General Alfred D. Starbird

White House

Mr. Gordon Gray

Dr. James R. Killian

Dr. Jerome Wiesner

CIA

Mr. Allen Dulles

Secretary Dulles stated that in his view action will be required in a short time to alter our present policy on unrestricted testing of nuclear weapons. The UK is disposed to go along with a change in this policy in view of amendments which have been made in the Atomic Energy Act.¹ There is less certainty that the French will do likewise. In any event, there is much to be done within this government and between governments before a change in policy can be announced. He said that Chairman

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Vincent Baker and approved by Executive Secretary Fisher Howe on August 15.

¹ In accordance with provisions in P.L. 85-479, approved on July 2, 1958 (72 Stat. 276), the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 936) was amended to allow increased exchange of atomic weapons information and material with allies, specifically the United Kingdom. On July 3, Eisenhower sent Congress the text of an agreement with the United Kingdom to exchange classified atomic information for mutual defense purposes so as to permit the British to purchase a U.S.-built nuclear submarine reactor with a 10-year nuclear fuel supply. Under the terms of the new law, Congress had 30 days to veto the agreement, which it did not, and therefore the agreement became effective.

McCone had given him a paper suggesting a course of action whereby tests could be conducted underground without limit, or continued above ground so long as the offsite fission yield was limited to the equivalent of 1 megaton per year for the U.S. and for the USSR.² The conclusion in the Department, he said, is that these measures are not adequate to meet the international situation. We reach this conclusion regretfully for we recognize the importance of testing and would like to see it continued. The Secretary stated he would nevertheless, in the present circumstances, feel that he had to recommend to the President a contingent suspension of all nuclear explosions except those for peaceful uses under international supervision. The contingencies would be: 1) progress in installing a system for monitoring a test agreement; and 2) progress in future disarmament steps, in particular the cut-off. He did not believe retention of underground testing or limitation of testing to an agreed maximum in the yield would be adequate. He did not say this because he liked to; his original reaction had been favorable to this kind of program. However, he did not believe the Soviets would agree to it, and we would be subject to severe psychological reverses if an agreed monitoring system emerged from the Geneva talks and were not put into effect. Suspension of tests, he said, can be looked upon as a first step toward a disarmament agreement. We realize that it is not disarmament but it is part of the disarmament package. If it is made contingent on further steps, we will have shown a desire to progress toward a disarmament agreement. Such a step would also bring a certain degree of penetration of the Iron Curtain in this field which could be useful as a basis for further steps. On the basis of these factors he felt that we should not stand on present policy.

Mr. Quarles said that he shared Secretary Dulles' view of the AEC proposal. He considered it to be a rational proposal if we had a real freedom of choice; but when we embarked on the Geneva exercise we abandoned that course and by implication committed ourselves to embark on test suspension if inspection could be agreed upon. He accepted Secretary Dulles' judgment that politically this is the situation, and that we cannot back out of it. The logic of the Geneva exercise seems to be that a reliable system can be agreed upon for larger above-ground tests, and for some small above-ground tests, and for some underground tests. If we agree on inspection and control, we should limit our political agreement to suspend tests to those greater than the minimal value which can be monitored by the system. Thus we must include not only explosions for peaceful purposes but tests below the minimum yield that can be reliably

² See footnote 6, Document 165.

detected. Also, we should make effective inspection a condition precedent to test suspension.

Dr. Killian said he had at first shared the AEC view but now shared the views that had been expressed in the meeting. The problem was not one of radiation hazard but one of another kind as a result of the Geneva discussions. He agreed with Mr. Quarles that there is no point in trying to eliminate tests below the level that can be enforced.

Dr. Wiesner added that the Soviets can pick the size of tests to be prohibited if we get several alternative monitoring systems agreed at Geneva—if they want maximum elimination of tests, they must accept broad inspection.

Mr. Farley pointed out that several alternative systems had in fact been discussed: 1) a system of 650 stations which, on the basis of the standards adopted by the conference, would detect and identify explosions down to 1 kiloton; and 2) a 170-station system which, it was estimated, would detect and identify with 90% reliability explosions down to 5 kilotons, with a limited capability for smaller shots.

Dr. Wiesner pointed out that there is a level somewhere below the 25 kiloton level where the Soviets could make greater progress than we could by continued testing.

Mr. McCone said that in examining this problem we must also consider current military needs. The emphasis in present tests is on development of defensive systems: warheads for the anti-missile missile, for ground-to-air missiles, and for air-to-air missiles. The enemy has emphasized fallout, but the enemy's purpose is to stop our development of defensive weapons. There are other areas of current military need: for example, light weapons of the explosive power that the Defense Department says it needs. Now we have achieved only part of the yield desired for the Polaris warhead. Our clean bombs are large; they are not field weapons. We need clean bombs for field use. He said that he had submitted the AEC plan for limitation of tests very informally. He recognized that it would be difficult to phase this proposal with the Geneva conclusions. However, although he had not been in the Government at the time the Geneva talks were undertaken, it had been his impression we had not committed ourselves to a change in policy in undertaking the talks. We must weigh such a change, he thought, from the standpoint of the security of this country.

Secretary Dulles said that he was conscious of national security requirements. However, unless we take a radical step now, our failure to do so will in effect be a step to "go it alone" as a militaristic nation in world opinion without friends and allies. This will become apparent in the course of the year. You could count now nations that will turn from us. Many say it is irrational to turn from us; we have a powerful case for continued testing. But the Government of Japan cannot stand with us;

India will not; the Governments likely to come into power in the UK and in Germany will not. Few will want to be our friends and allies, want us to station our facilities on their soil and be willing to stand with us. Stopping tests, of course, exposes us to certain dangers; but the danger of being isolated, encircled and strangled is even greater than the threat of a massive atomic attack so long as we retain our retaliatory power.

Mr. Quarles said we do lose militarily in a test cessation. Consequently, we would hope to associate tests with nuclear cut-off or other measures that are in our interest. But now we are talking of the separation of test cessation from other measures, at least temporarily.

Secretary Dulles stated that we will be separating nuclear tests only temporarily from other measures. In this connection he observed that 36 months seemed longer than necessary, and that a 24-month suspension would be very much better from the standpoint of keeping people in the laboratories. He also mentioned that Section e in the draft before the meeting seemed to be too narrowly drawn and did not make clear that explosions for peaceful purposes would be continued.

General Starbird, connecting on Section e,³ said that Project Plowshare would be slowed up by its provisions. Under it we would either have to reveal advance designs or to employ old designs for peaceful uses. The same sensitive designs are needed for our best weapons as are needed for peaceful uses, namely, clean and small explosive devices.

The Secretary said it was not our intention to give away design data.

General Starbird thought peaceful-uses explosions could be used to conceal weapons tests if there was not very close international supervision.

Mr. Quarles suggested as a matter of procedure that the meeting should develop major points of substance through discussion and refer the proposed policy back to the drafting group for revision in light of the discussion. Secretary Dulles mentioned that we have a time problem in planning our procedures. The report of the UN Radiation Committee would be made public Sunday.⁴ This would lead to distorted but nevertheless unfavorable criticism of the U.S. position on tests. Shortly thereafter the Geneva technical talks were expected to end. Then, in mid-September, the UN General Assembly would begin.

³ Section e of paragraph 5 of Enclosure 1 to Document 165. Subsequent references to subparagraphs of paragraph 5 are also to this document.

⁴ On August 10, the U.N. Secretary-General released the 228-page report of the U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. One of the principal conclusions of the report was that more research was needed to assess the effect of low-level doses of radiation received over long periods of time. The Committee stated that even the smallest amounts of radiation could produce deleterious genetic, and perhaps somatic effects. (U.N. Doc. A/3838 and Corr. 1) For an extract from the report, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, pp. 1056-1074.

Mr. Farley stressed the need to keep the initiative by following up promptly on the Geneva talks. He pointed out that any delay would lead to a Soviet propaganda barrage, which in turn could be used to make any subsequent change in U.S. policy appear to be a result of Soviet pressure.

Mr. Quarles outlined the following points of substance relating to the proposed revisions in the policy. In paragraph 5a (1) and throughout the text he proposed the substitution of 24 months for 36 months as the duration of the suspension. Paragraph 5a (1) also should be amended to reflect the fact that the agreement by which tests would be suspended would include provision for the installation of an effective system of inspection. The paragraph should also be revised to show that testing could be continued below the level of yields reliably detectable above ground and underground.

Secretary Dulles asked if this meant that we would keep our freedom to test below 5 KT if the system presently under discussion in Geneva were agreed, and if Mr. Quarles were satisfied that this would be in our advantage. Mr. Quarles said we should retain such freedom, and that he proceeded on the assumptions: first, that anything we cannot detect the Soviets will do, and secondly, if they are going to do it, there are ways that we also can use experimentation in the lower and fractional KT range to advantage. Referring again to paragraph 5a (1), Mr. Quarles said that we should make as a condition precedent to any test cessation that a method for inspecting that cessation must be agreed.

Dr. Killian pointed out that in incorporating the idea of marginal yield in the policy, and avoiding any obligation to suspend tests below that value, we afforded an opportunity for the laboratories to continue useful work.

Mr. Quarles, referring to paragraph 5a (2), said the draft should clearly indicate that the inspection system referred to was the same as in paragraph 5a (1). He presumed this was the intent of the present draft. In paragraph 5b of the draft Mr. Quarles suggested the substitution of 24 months for 36. In paragraph 5c he felt a revision should make clear that we would refrain indefinitely from nuclear tests under two conditions, both of which must be met: first, that the suspension plan and system of inspection in paragraph 5a (1) was in effect and operating satisfactorily; and secondly, that an agreed plan for the cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes was operating satisfactorily. If there were good faith performance of both agreements, the test suspension would continue.

Secretary Dulles said that if you had a 90% probability of detection in the 5 KT range you would have perhaps 50% probability in certain ranges below that. If tests in these lower ranges were detected, he asked whether you could determine that the test was above or below the allow-

able 5 KT limit. If you detect a test can you prove that the Soviets have violated an agreement, he asked.

Mr. Quarles said it would not be ascertainable with precision; that it would require adjudication; but that you also have an area of uncertainty that would require adjudication in distinguishing earthquakes from nuclear explosions. Mr. Farley mentioned that this would be relatively less difficult since you would, under the system we propose, be able to investigate earthquakes on the spot.

Mr. McCone said that there has to date been only one nuclear explosion underground, namely, the Rainier shot of 1.7 KT. We are, then, designing a system to detect underground explosions on the basis of hypothetical conclusions on which there is little evidence to date.

Secretary Dulles asked whether Defense could carry on necessary testing underground. Mr. Quarles said we also need tests above ground to determine the capabilities of defensive weapons. Underground tests would give some but not all of the information needed.

Mr. McCone said that our experience with the Soviets has been that they won't talk about things in which they are behind and hope to catch up. They will not, for example, talk about cessation of production of fissionable material. Our halting of laboratory work through a test suspension would tend to equalize our position into one of stalemate with the USSR. He wondered if we could have a shorter period for a test suspension in order that the competent organization within our laboratories might not be lost.

Mr. Quarles thought paragraph 5b of the proposed policy meant we would try to negotiate in good faith on implementation of the cut-off during the period of the test suspension. Mr. McCone said this was not his understanding of the proposal. It was our attempt to get Soviet acceptance of the principle of the cut-off, with its implementation to be negotiated during the test suspension, which had failed in London. It was hard to envisage reaching agreement with the Soviets on the cut-off at the outset of the test suspension.

Dr. Killian asked about the duration of the test cycle, whether it was not still two years. General Starbird said the cycle was now almost continuous since the laboratories prepared for two years for tests in the Pacific area and conducted simultaneously a two-year cycle of preparations for tests on alternate years in the United States.

Dr. Killian mentioned that the laboratories under the test suspension as proposed by Defense could concentrate work on excepted tests in the smaller ranges.

Dr. Wiesner referred to the 650-stations system discussed in Geneva which could detect tests down to 1 kiloton, and asked whether the Defense Department would want to conduct tests of, say 50 tons even if

that system were in operation. Mr. Quarles said yes, that all tests below the reliable range of detection should be continued.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that CIA estimates the Soviet would not attempt to violate an agreement not to conduct any tests if there were substantial risk of being caught; instead, it would either conform or find excuse to denounce the agreement.

The meeting adjourned with agreement that the drafting group should prepare a draft reflecting the suggestions that had been made. Secretary Dulles added that the Department of State would reserve on the continuation of tests in the smaller ranges, and noted that AEC also reserved its position on the proposed draft.

167. Editorial Note

On August 12, 1958, at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York, Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower discussed nuclear testing. According to the memorandum of conversation by Dulles, the discussion went as follows:

"I said that another matter that was urgent was the reaching of a policy decision on nuclear testing. It seemed likely that there would be an agreement at Geneva and that coupled with the United Nations Commission Report made it urgent that we arrive at a new policy. I said that State was working actively with Defense and AEC on this subject and that I thought some split would develop which the President would have to resolve. The President said he was thinking in terms of a total suspension except of underground tests. I said I thought that the Defense Department would not like this because in a confined area some characteristics of the explosion could not be accurately estimated. The President said that he did not think that this should be a reason against limiting the test to underground areas.

"I suggested to General Goodpaster that he try to arrange a restricted meeting of those directly interested as soon as I could be back in Washington. The President said he had already asked Goodpaster to plan for this." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President) See the Supplement.

Dulles and Eisenhower were attending the U.N. General Assembly session, which the President addressed on August 13. For text of his address, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958*, pages 606-616.

168. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 13, 1958.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Nuclear Tests

PARTICIPANTS

State

The Under Secretary
Mr. Philip J. Farley, S/AE
Mr. Fisher Howe, S/S
Mr. Vincent Baker, S/AE

Defense

Mr. Donald A. Quarles
Lt. General Clovis E. Byers
Captain Clifford S. Foster

AEC

Mr. John A. McCone
General Alfred D. Starbird

CIA

Mr. Allen Dulles

White House

Mr. Gordon Gray
Dr. James R. Killian, Jr.
Mr. Spurgeon Keeny
Mr. Bromley Smith

Mr. Herter outlined the procedures anticipated in connection with the conclusion of the Geneva technical talks. He said that the conference might agree on a report as early as August 15, and the United States should in any case be prepared no later than August 22 to make an announcement on the change in policy now under consideration. The Secretary, he said, was considering the possibility of a unilateral announcement on nuclear tests in which the UK would join. The Secretary was inclined to feel that the French would not join in the policy announcement.¹

Mr. Quarles asked what areas of agreement had been developed thus far in Geneva. Mr. Keeny said he had just returned from Geneva and there was substantial agreement on the number of posts, the nature of

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8-1358. Secret. Drafted by Vincent Baker.

¹ Herter and Dulles, who was in New York, discussed by telephone at 1:14 p.m. on August 13 the issues raised during this meeting. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations) See the Supplement.

inspection and the technical requirements of an organization to conduct the inspection. As to control posts, he said that agreement seemed likely on 160-170 posts as the total number on a global basis. The conference had defined the kind of equipment they would have, the method of their operation, including their requirements for monitoring aircraft flights under certain conditions. As to inspection, he thought the conference would probably agree on mandatory on-the-spot inspection of unresolved events of either a seismic or acoustic nature. The Soviets were now sticking on the word "suspicion" as a requirement for on-the-spot investigation, and the West was insisting on the right of immediate, unimpeded investigation of any "unresolved" events. As to the control organization, the U.S. draft dealt in simple terms on essential rights of the control organ and provided that a technical organization would decide upon inspection of individual events on the basis of pre-agreed criteria. The Soviets, he said, continued to raise matters that would involve political decisions, i.e., the relationship of the control organ to the UN and whether there should be national or international staffs for observation. The Western delegation believed, however, that the Soviets would withdraw the political parts of their proposals in order to achieve agreement. The conference had agreed on a system which would detect with an 80%-90% level of confidence explosions of 1-2 kilotons in the atmosphere, and, with a similar degree of reliability, underground tests of 5 kilotons. The system would have some capability in the 1-5 kiloton range. The conference had not agreed on a system for detection of high altitude tests, although various possibilities had been discussed.

Mr. Quarles asked for clarification of the 80%-90% probability figure. Mr. Keeny said that it meant two quite different things as applied to above ground and underground explosions respectively. In the case of explosions in the atmosphere, the system provided 80%-90% probability of detection and identification. In the case of underground tests, 90% of events with an energy of 5 kiloton explosions would be identified as earthquakes. 10% would require inspection to be identified, but 100% would be detected. Since identification of 10% of such events would require evidence beyond that of the instrumentation provided in the system, the criterion of "suspicion" might not be adequate as a basis for on-the-spot investigation. It was the unanimous view of the delegation, however, that agreement on these matters will be achieved. The Soviets had made important concessions already and it seemed improbable that they would not go on at this stage to reach agreement.

Mr. Gray said we must also consider the possibility that the Soviets might walk out of the conference, even at this stage. Mr. Dulles agreed, commenting that Khrushchev had been known to change his mind quite suddenly, as in the case of the recent summit negotiations.

Mr. Herter asked whether political or technical matters might serve as the basis for such a break in the conference. Dr. Killian said the Soviets could denounce the whole system as being too complex and say it was designed for espionage. Mr. Quarles said that would be the easiest kind of propaganda for the West to counter. Dr. Killian agreed, saying that the record of the conference would be made public and would support the Western position. Mr. Keeny observed that if the Soviets walked out now the Western case would be well documented. Dr. Killian agreed that this would be true, at least if sophisticated people looked at the report. Mr. Farley added it would be hard for the Soviets, even to an unsophisticated audience, to deny their own acceptance of on-the-spot investigation or to deny the flexibility in the Western position in moving from a 650- to a 170-station system.

Mr. Herter observed that we should begin studying the verbatim records to prepare our defense on points of disagreement in case the Soviets should break up the conference. He asked whether the 170 posts were to be spaced by agreed criteria. Dr. Killian said they were.

Mr. Gray asked whether Communist China would be included in the system. Mr. Keeny said the disposition of posts had been decided merely on a global basis sub-divided by continents and that specific countries in which posts would be placed had not been discussed. It would be possible to avoid putting posts in Communist China if we were willing to degrade the capabilities of the system, but we would have to have inspection rights to investigate unresolved events in China, whether or not there were posts there, if the system was to have any meaning.

Mr. Quarles said he believed the kind of question most likely to cause a break in negotiations would come after the technical phase. Such questions as location of the control posts and the nationality of inspectors could lead to protracted propaganda operations of the kind we witnessed at Panmunjom.

Mr. McCone asked whether we could counter or avoid that kind of situation by a unilateral declaration on test limitation for a period. We could, for example, call off all tests which create off-site effects and say that underground tests, being an internal matter of no direct international concern, would continue. We could point out with satisfaction what the technical people had agreed on certain technical aspects of the system and that accordingly, we would now take this step to further the prospects of agreement. Mr. Quarles said he could not agree that a unilateral declaration of this kind would be in our interest, since it would reduce our bargaining power in negotiation of the political aspects of a control system.

Mr. Herter commented that Dr. Fisk had submitted some comments on the possibility of excepting underground explosions. Mr. Farley read Dr. Fisk's comments as summarized in Denuc 157.²

Mr. Quarles said he thought we would be vulnerable if we put forward an exception for peaceful uses as a part of our proposal, since the whole thing is just a proposal on nuclear weapons tests and has no direct bearing on peaceful uses.

Mr. McCone raised the question of detectability of underground tests, saying that Dr. Teller believes they could be dampened, but added that Dr. Mark does not.

Dr. Killian said that dampening looks increasingly difficult from a technical point of view. Mr. Keeny said the delegation became much less concerned about this problem as it studied the question, and that dampening effects, say on the order of 10, were not a practical possibility in the view of the delegation.

Mr. Herter asked the difference in value from a military standpoint between tests underground and those above ground. General Starbird said that confining tests to underground explosions would rule out systems tests of a kind which are especially important for systems operating at high altitude or under water. We can, however, test individual components of these systems underground, and that is far better than no testing.

Mr. Herter asked if we would want from a military standpoint the unlimited right to a test above ground. Mr. Quarles said if we had an unlimited freedom of choice we would.

Dr. Killian mentioned that there is uncertainty regarding the hazards of such testing but there is no scientific finding of fact of any definite ill effects from such tests.

Mr. McCone said that if tests were continued above ground we would limit such tests to a point that they produced no increase in the level of radioactivity now in the atmosphere. Dr. Killian mentioned that any test limitation of this kind would not follow in logic from the Geneva talks. Mr. Quarles said it was hard to see such a limitation as productive in the cold war as against the Soviet position that there should be no tests at all. He would not think it desirable, even as an internal measure during negotiations, because we would be doing less than the Soviets have done. Mr. Quarles would prefer the posture of favoring further negoti-

² In Denuc 157 from Geneva, August 12, Fisk commented that a commitment to conduct future tests only underground "appears particularly technically unwise," and public announcement of this policy would endorse the Soviet position on the hazard of fallout and increase the problem of continuing tests in the atmosphere and at high altitudes in the event a test agreement was not reached. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8-1258)

ations, this time on the political side of the control problem, but again without commitment as to the relationship of test cessation to other measures of disarmament.

Dr. Killian said he believed we should either do as Mr. Quarles suggested or say that we were willing to proceed with a complete test suspension rather than a limitation of tests.

Mr. Herter commented that underground testing was quite different in its implications from a political standpoint from testing above ground. Mr. Quarles said he believed the logic of the Geneva procedure would be to seek first technical agreement on controls, secondly, agreement on the political phases of controls, and thirdly, agreement to stop tests possibly within the broader context of agreed disarmament steps. He would not favor a unilateral declaration, even of a partial suspension, since this would not show up well against the moves the Soviets have already made. Mr. Herter said that Mr. Quarles' analysis did not deal fully with what we would do if we get agreement on the political phases of control. He asked whether we would still test without limitation up until the time the agreement is ratified.

Mr. McCone said that negotiations would be likely to go on indefinitely, and that we should not stop tests indefinitely while waiting. Dr. Killian commented that the talks at Geneva had accomplished something never achieved before in the way of serious discussions of disarmament controls. Mr. Quarles said he agreed, and welcomed this development, but thought we should not commit ourselves in advance on our position with respect to continuation of testing.

Mr. Gray said the distinction between technical and political aspects of control seemed undesirable from a public relations standpoint. If we planned to discuss the distinction, probably instead of calling it "technical vs. political" we should perhaps call it "technical vs. practical" aspects of control. Mr. Farley stated that in a political negotiation it would be difficult to avoid dealing with the political question of conditions under which we would suspend tests.

Mr. Gray said that the President must decide if we are to break a test suspension away from the cut-off in the present package. Mr. Farley said we would need agreement on conditions under which tests would be suspended in a political negotiation in order both (a) to break the disarmament impasse and (b) to take advantage of the inspection to which the Soviets had agreed at Geneva.

Dr. Killian mentioned some of the policy decisions which would be required if such agreement were to be sought. Should we depart from present NSC policy by separating testing from the cut-off? Should we include Red China? Should we define safeguards as being less than 100% certainty? Should we continue to seek cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes? Is it in the U.S. interest to hold

stocks of fissionable materials at present levels? Is it our policy to seek further refinements in our defensive capabilities? Would we reassure the world about the problem of fallout by our proposal? Would it benefit us from an intelligence and political standpoint to penetrate the Iron Curtain? Do we want to avoid a resumption of tests by the USSR? What would be the relative effects on the US and USSR of test cessation now?

Mr. McCone, referring to the final question, said that we are ahead in nuclear weapons development but since the USSR reserves the privilege of a first strike, they may have what they feel they need for this purpose, while we have a greater need for the more complex defensive weapons.

Mr. Quarles said he believed we were all agreed on the relative capabilities of the two countries; the difference is in our assessment of how much a cessation would hurt each. The USSR has certain geographical advantages. Defense and AEC think that a test cessation would hurt the US more than the USSR. The Bethe Panel, on the other hand, believes a test cessation would be to our advantage, since the problems of defensive weapons at this stage are not so much in the nuclear as in the electronic field. Defense would like to go back to the President recommending continued endorsement of the August 29 disarmament proposals, and supplementing these proposals with a recommendation that we move rapidly toward negotiation of the political aspects of control. The real question is whether we recede from the London package proposal and if so, what kind of suspension would be in our interest.

Dr. Killian asked whether Mr. Quarles still held to the idea of exceptions for underground tests in the lower ranges. Mr. Quarles said that he held the U.S. should have the right to test below the threshold of capability of the inspection system, but that whether or not we exercise that right should be a national policy decision rather than a matter for international agreement.

It was decided that discussions of these matters would be continued at a further meeting on Friday.³

³ August 15; see Document 170.

169. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and the Under Secretary of State (Herter)

August 14, 1958, 12:54 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO MR. HERTER

H said the two pending issues of importance are the Taiwan Straits and cessation of nuclear testing.

[Here follows discussion of Taiwan.]

On the other it is clear with Killian, McCone and Quarles there is basic opposition to doing anything at all. He thinks by tomorrow they will have a pretty clear concept of their own position, so they can have an outline before the Sec and the Pres. Killian says as a scientist he wants to go on. The Sec said he advocated cessation. H said he mentioned that yesterday. It should be complete without exceptions. McCone is for it except underground. Quarles wants to make it inseparable from the first phase of the disarmament package. He is willing to move a little away—but says no offer on cessation until there is a firm agreement on inspection. It looks as if they will close at the end of the week in Geneva. The political questions are still wide open. After H finished on this the Sec responded by saying he said at press conf we would have to insist on observation points and they are waiting for us to ask in Communist China and they will say recognize us first. There is the question of who would supervise the thing—international bodies or neutrals. Quarles thinks the political questions are insuperable and so no offer until they are adjusted—this from Herter. H said it is not in shape yet to put up to the Pres. The Sec asked when and H said there would be another meeting tomorrow by noon. Farley worked all night on papers. The Sec said he probably won't be down until Wednesday.¹

[Here follows discussion of the Middle East.]

Then H said in connection with the preliminary draft statement for the Sec or the Pres to make when Geneva folds up—it will welcome the progress etc. and take the initiative for an early conference re political problems with the same group perhaps. H said the Sec had referred to two stages but the first thing would be where and under whose auspices inspection should be made—back in framework of the UN—there is the question of being prepared for something when it breaks. The Sec thinks we should announce unilaterally suspension provided the Russians con-

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Phyllis D. Bernau. Dulles was in New York and Herter was in Washington.

¹ August 20.

tinue theirs. H thinks McCone would go along with that. Quarles would fight it. The Sec said he would say on the assumption the Russians will continue their business and we will do the same for 12 months except for underground and in the meantime we will develop all political angles to see if there is a basis for continuing it. We have to say something before the GA meets. H said Killian might go all the way for limited period of time. The Sec asked H to have Farley draw up something. H said the Sec may want to consult with the Br and Fr in arriving at a position. The Sec would like something by Monday.² H should push it with the Pres to have something to discuss here. H will try to get something up tonight.

² August 18.

170. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 15, 1958.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Nuclear Tests

PARTICIPANTS

State

The Acting Secretary
Mr. Philip J. Farley, S/AE
Mr. Fisher Howe, S/S
Mr. Vincent Baker, S/AE

Defense

Mr. Donald A. Quarles
Lt. General Clovis E. Byers
Captain Clifford S. Foster

AEC

Mr. John A. McCone
General Alfred Starbird

CIA

Mr. Allen Dulles
Mr. Darcy Brent

White House

Mr. Gordon Gray
Dr. James R. Killian, Jr.
Mr. Spurgeon Keeny
Mr. Bromley Smith

Mr. Herter stated that Mr. Farley had conferred with the Secretary this morning in New York on the proposed policy statement on nuclear tests¹ and would be back in about twenty minutes. In the meantime he wanted to discuss current developments in Geneva. In this connection he read Denuc 163 of August 14² which had just been received.

Following a brief discussion of the status of negotiations in Geneva, Mr. Herter turned to the draft announcement on the proposed test suspension which had been taken to New York as a basis for consultation with the Secretary, and read the draft to the group. He said that an appointment had been made for 2:30 Monday, August 17, with the President to discuss a statement along these lines.³

Mr. Farley arrived and pointed out the changes in the draft under consideration which had been suggested by the Secretary.⁴

The discussion then turned to a definition of issues posed for decision by the draft statement. In this connection Mr. Quarles noted that a suspension of tests as of the date of the beginning of negotiations was proposed in the draft statement, whereas the policy paper under consideration in previous meetings had referred only to a suspension as of the effective date of the agreement. He referred to tests presently scheduled by the United States and the United Kingdom.

Mr. Gray noted that another issue to which the President's attention should be called is the question of Communist China and its relationship to the proposed test suspension agreement. Mr. Herter noted that if Communist China demanded recognition as the price for agreement, this demand—rather than U.S. policy—would be the stumbling block on the road to agreement in the eyes of the world. Mr. McCone said we might let the UK or Scandinavians do any actual negotiating with Communist China, since they have recognized its government.

Dr. Killian said that he had already prepared a paper defining some of the issues which the President would have to be aware of in making a decision, and distributed the paper for information.⁵

¹ Apparent reference to Enclosure 1 to Document 165.

² In this telegram, the Delegation at Geneva reported that "there appeared to be further meetings of the minds on most significant points other than numbers of posts, discussion of which Fedorov obviously postponing to last." (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8-1458)

³ For text of the statement as made on August 22, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, pp. 1111-1112. A draft version of this statement, August 18, with Eisenhower's initials and revisions in his hand, is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series. See the Supplement.

⁴ These changes have not been identified.

⁵ This undated paper, entitled "Policy Questions Raised by the Discussion of Test Cessation or Limitation," was transmitted to Goodpaster by Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of Killian's office on August 15. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary Records, Nuclear Testing) See the Supplement.

Mr. Gray noted two additional issues: one was the separation proposed between the test suspension and other elements of our present disarmament position; another was the redefinition of the term “safeguarded” in our present disarmament policy which would, under the new proposal, in effect mean “largely safeguarded”.

Mr. Herter asked whether the safeguards agreed in Geneva would in fact be adequate. Dr. Killian said we could never have complete certainty, but the Geneva control system would represent the achievable goal in this direction, and it was unlikely that significant testing could go on.

Mr. Quarles asked whether the redefinition of “safeguarded” meant that in the proposed policy statement testing in the lower ranges would be suspended even though the control system was not highly reliable in these ranges. Mr. Gray said this was its meaning. Mr. Quarles indicated agreement and said he thought tests in the lower ranges should continue.

Dr. Killian stated that the system agreed at Geneva, he believed, would pose a risk of detection so great even below the five kiloton range that no country would attempt tests.

Mr. McCone noted that the proposed policy statement involved other issues of NSC policy as well, for example, the policy of reliance on nuclear weapons and the policy of promoting a vigorous program for research and development.

Dr. Killian stated that if disarmament is also a real goal of U.S. policy, the two policies to which Mr. McCone referred would necessarily have to be adjusted in some degree even though we could—and should—of course, continue an active research and development program. Mr. Herter referred to the importance of disarmament as a goal of U.S. policy as reflected most recently in the President’s speech in the special session of the United Nations General Assembly.⁶

Mr. McCone said there was also the issue of a suspension applicable to tests above ground as distinct from underground tests. Dr. Killian mentioned there was the additional problem of the phasing of a suspension in relation to other measures. Mr. Herter asked whether Mr. McCone would accept a phasing which would permit the suspension of tests in the atmosphere first, to be followed at a later time by a suspension of underground tests. Mr. McCone said he would, and that a complete suspension might be justified at a later date if there were sufficient progress in disarmament as a whole. By the time such progress were achieved, however, he thought it would be more generally recognized by public opinion that peaceful uses can be advanced by underground testing. It

⁶ For text of Eisenhower’s address to the Third Special Emergency Session of the U.N. General Assembly, August 13, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958*, pp. 606–616.

might even then be advisable to continue underground tests for this purpose. Dr. Killian observed that a return to underground testing for peaceful purposes after the period of complete test cessation might be psychologically more advantageous than proposing an exception for underground tests in the first instance. Mr. Quarles noted that some testing for peaceful purposes in the small ranges might be continued below the threshold of effective monitoring.

Mr. McCone asked how practical the threshold is from the standpoint of enforceability. Mr. Brent said that we can detect tests in the five-to-ten kiloton range above ground with existing equipment. The practical threshold would be very low indeed if this system were supplemented by that agreed upon in Geneva.

As to phasing possible steps, Mr. McCone suggested we might from September 1 of this year to January of 1960 agree to limit testing to fully contained underground firings and to cooperate in establishment of the system for test detection, while continuing our efforts to reach agreement on conventional reduction, the peaceful uses of outer space, the nuclear cut-off and reduction of stockpiles of fissionable material. We might then say that when a satisfactory monitoring system was in operation and there was sufficient progress on disarmament, we would adopt such further limitations on testing as seemed appropriate in the light of the degree of effectiveness of the monitoring system and the general international situation. The United States should reserve its right to reconsider at a later date what limitations were appropriate. Dr. Killian observed this would mean underground tests would continue until there was a general disarmament agreement. Mr. Quarles said that such a package might look very much like our present first stage disarmament package and thereby lose some of its political appeal. Mr. McCone said that under this proposal the AEC could carry on the program which Defense has indicated that it needs, and that otherwise, AEC would be seriously handicapped in carrying out this program.

Referring to the draft Presidential announcement, Mr. Dulles suggested that a specific date such as September 14 or the first of October might be mentioned. Mr. Herter said that a date could be added along with a statement that the United States hoped that by that date the negotiations would have begun. He asked Dr. Killian's view on the advisability of continued underground testing. Dr. Killian said if we wanted a test suspension agreement, continuation of underground testing might be disadvantageous. The Soviets could use this part of our proposal to charge bad faith on our part, or at least unwillingness to suspend tests completely. Mr. Brent said that from an intelligence standpoint the Soviets do not appear to be testing at all, and that such a proposal would amount to proposing that the Soviets begin testing underground. Mr. Quarles said it might be better to state our proposal for continuation of

underground tests in a different way, perhaps by offering to discontinue any tests which would put radioactive materials into the atmosphere. He said this proposal had an additional logic, namely that we are closer to agreement on the means of detecting earlier tests than on detecting underground tests; accordingly, there would be a plausibility in reserving for a time our position on underground tests.

Mr. Brent noted that in previous discussions our proposals had not called for a unilateral test suspension. Mr. Farley said this was because we had in the past been discussing a policy proposal to be incorporated in a negotiated agreement. The additional unilateral step would have as one purpose that of preventing the Soviets from resuming tests during negotiations on the agreement. Mr. Quarles said that the early unilateral move also had the rationale of a) avoiding contamination of the atmosphere and b) facilitating the political negotiations on the test suspension agreement.

Mr. Gray asked whether Defense still held to the threshold idea. Mr. Quarles said that the Joint Chiefs would not comment upon the distinction between underground tests and those in the atmosphere because they held to the present package policy. They would comment on alternatives only after there had been a decision to change the present policy. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, however, would want to hold to the threshold concept—not necessarily to announce that we would continue tests in the lower ranges but not to give up the idea of our freedom to act at our discretion below the range of enforceable limitations.

Mr. Gray said in defining the issues more clearly it would be helpful to know how long AEC would propose to continue underground tests. Mr. McCone said he favored their continuation only in the first phase. However, he did not consider underground testing any more a matter of international concern than explosions, for example, of dynamite.

While Mr. Herter left the meeting to talk to Secretary Dulles, who was calling from New York, Dr. Killian said that by way of defining the issues, he would be glad to read an unfinished draft now in preparation in his office on the pros and cons of test suspension. He read this paper to the group.⁷

Mr. Herter returned from his conversation with Secretary Dulles, noting that the Secretary believed that once we admit that testing above ground constitutes a real hazard, it would be very difficult to go back to testing above ground. It would be the more difficult after it had been stig-

⁷ The August 15 paper, entitled "Principal Arguments for a Test Cessation," was transmitted to Goodpaster by Keeny, August 15. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary Records, Nuclear Testing) See the Supplement. No specific "con" paper has been found.

matized by a clear distinction drawn between tests above and below the ground.

Mr. Herter said there was the need for scientific decision also on the effects of the two kinds of suspension on our security requirements. Mr. Quarles said he believed we could state the distinction in a way to meet the problem Secretary Dulles had raised, especially as the United States has consistently held that testing in the atmosphere would not constitute a hazard. Dr. Killian believed we would find it more difficult to maintain this position in view of the report of the UN Radiation Committee.⁸ Mr. Quarles said that applying the line of reasoning which the Secretary had suggested, it might be harder to resume any form of testing if once we suspended any form of testing.

Mr. Gray noted there was a consensus in the meeting on much of the draft Presidential statement. He suggested that a redraft should be prepared with brackets indicating the principal issues, such as the proposed exception for underground testing and for tests below the threshold of reliable detection. On the threshold question Mr. Quarles said that this issue would arise only after it had been decided to separate a test suspension from the rest of the package. We might then announce that there would be no tests which would lead to atmospheric contamination. Then, at a still later date, after a system of detection were agreed, say a year from now, we could decide on the threshold problem in the light of the capabilities of the agreed system.

Dr. Killian asked whether the Department of Defense agreed that the purpose of the negotiation was to establish a monitoring system for a complete test cessation. Mr. Quarles said yes, that we should be prepared to accept a complete cessation if the negotiations result in a system which would justify it. Mr. Quarles would like to preface the document with the statement that the first decision by the President would be the issue of separability.

It was agreed that Mr. Farley should prepare a revised draft of the Presidential announcement with brackets indicating the principal issues involved.

⁸ See footnote 4, Document 166.

171. Record of Meeting

Washington, August 18, 1958.

REVISION OF U.S. POSITION ON FIRST PHASE DISARMAMENT

Meeting held August 18 from 12:00 to 2:05 P.M.; chaired by Acting Secretary Herter and attended by Deputy Defense Secretary Quarles, accompanied by Lt. Gen. Byers; Chairman McCone, accompanied by Gen. Starbird; Allen Dulles, Dr. Killian, Gordon Gray, and others.

Secretary Herter introduced a revised draft of a statement to be made by the President at the conclusion of the Geneva Technical Meeting in the event that substantial agreement is reached on feasible methods of monitoring a cessation of nuclear tests. The draft, in its operative paragraphs, presented most of the differences of opinion by means of brackets. A copy of the draft is attached.¹ The positions of the participants appear to be as follows:

a. State favored the unilateral one-year suspension of all nuclear testing, during which time an effort would be made to negotiate with the USSR and the UK, other nations accepting responsibilities under the agreement in which monitoring stations would be established (Communist China, France) participating as appropriate. The agreement to be negotiated would involve the terms of cessation, as well as the practical measures required to install an effective monitoring system. During the course of the meeting, State retreated from its position of desiring to negotiate a 24-month cessation of testing to a position of stating that the U.S. was prepared at the beginning of each year of extension of unilateral test suspension to continue withholding tests for an additional year, depending on whether satisfactory progress was being made in installing an effective monitoring system and satisfactory progress toward other substantial arms control measures. State was flatly opposed to permitting the continuance of underground testing. It also opposed limiting the statement to the mere announcement that we would participate in negotiations to draw up a test monitoring system.

b. The Joint Chiefs, in a formal letter to the President, restated and reaffirmed their opposition to test cessation, as well as separation of a test cessation agreement from other proposals in the London "package". (Apparently the letter to the President is identical with the copy of a JCS letter which Deputy Secretary Quarles gave to Mr. Gray two days ear-

Source: Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Executive Secretary's Subject Files, Policy re Use. Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith on August 20.

¹ See footnote 3, Document 170. The draft was not attached and has not been found.

lier.² There is no copy of the letter sent to the President in our files.) The JCS argument included their belief that if tests ceased they would never be started again, even though a cessation agreement provided the conditions under which testing could legally be resumed.

c. Defense also opposed any change in existing arms control policy, but was prepared to live with a change if the President decided that political considerations were controlling. In the event a change was made, Defense accepted the State position on unilateral cessation, except for its desire to continue underground testing. In any agreement to be negotiated, Defense continues to stand by the "threshold" concept, i.e., that no agreement would require the U.S. to promise to withhold tests which were below the capability of the monitoring system to detect. The Secretary of Defense apparently stated his views in a letter addressed to the President from which Deputy Secretary Quarles read extracts. There is no copy of this letter in our files.

d. AEC opposed any agreement involving cessation of testing. It was prepared to accept an agreement regarding the installation of a monitoring system. AEC also opposed an agreed cessation of testing, but was prepared to accept unilateral limitations on testing. For the first year, the U.S. would limit testing to aboveground explosions. As progress was made toward agreement on a monitoring system and on other disarmament measures, the U.S., again unilaterally, would at appropriate times state its willingness to further limit testing. At no time, however, would it be prepared to agree to promise not to continue tests below the "threshold".

Chairman McCone was very strongly opposed to a cessation of testing. He said the offer suggested by the State Department was not necessary, went far beyond what the situation demanded, and was not in the U.S. national interest. He argued that in our national territory the firing of nuclear weapons underground concerned no one but the U.S. All radiation would be contained in underground tests and no one would be affected other than the citizens of the United States. He did not accept Secretary Dulles' reasoning, as stated by Acting Secretary Herter, that if we agreed to halt aboveground tests and continue underground tests, the resumption of aboveground tests, in the event no agreement was reached with the USSR, would become almost impossible because by implication we have admitted that aboveground tests were harmful. Mr. McCone said that the effect of the State proposal would be to place us at the mercy of the Russians—during the suspension period our laboratories would be disbanded and in the event we wished to resume testing

² Reference is to a memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, August 15, which was then apparently sent as a letter to the President. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Nuclear Testing) See the Supplement.

we would not be in a position to do so for several years. He again recited the cost of a suspension to the U.S., citing the efficient warhead Polaris, the anti-missile missile, small low-range battlefield tactical weapons, etc.

e. Dr. Killian did not state a flat view, but reaffirmed his belief that to be meaningful, cessation of tests must be total. He referred again to the unfortunate effect which a conditional suspension would have on the Russian scientists, and to a lesser extent, on the U.S. scientific community which had been proceeding on the assumption that the monitoring system was being set up to monitor a total cessation. He pointed out that about half of the time of the Geneva meeting had been spent in discussing methods of monitoring underground tests. He said that as regards aboveground tests, our present capability, without stations in the USSR, was substantial and could be greatly improved by additional stations outside the Soviet Union. Hence, a monitoring system for aboveground tests could be set up without an agreement with the USSR. He said the issue involved whether the U.S. was honestly interested in obtaining an agreement for cessation of tests, or whether it was merely adopting a position on testing to meet a public relations problem caused by the agreement reached at Geneva. (In the earlier discussion with Mr. Gray before the State meeting, Dr. Killian referred to a tightly-held report of the Science Advisory Committee³ which concluded that it would be in the over-all U.S. interest, vis-à-vis the USSR, to cease testing. He preferred not to include the scientists' conclusions in any written document.)

Dr. Killian asked whether Congressional consultations would be required. The point he was trying to make he had made earlier to Mr. Gray, i.e., does the President act alone, following a discussion with his advisers, on the question of suspending tests, or should he consult members of the Legislative Branch. Secretary Herter replied that when a treaty was involved, Congressional consultation would be required. He did not respond to the broader issue raised by Dr. Killian. Secretary Herter said Secretary Dulles would confer with the British and French Foreign Ministers in New York prior to any announcement.

³ Not found. See Document 151.

172. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, August 18, 1958.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter, Mr. McCone, Secretary Quarles, Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Gordon Gray, Mr. Wadsworth, Dr. Killian, Mr. Farley, Lt. Gen. Clovis Byers, Mr. Keeny

Secretary Herter showed the President a proposed policy statement regarding possible suspension of atomic testing by the United States if a technical agreement is reached at Geneva.¹ The President stressed that we must make clear that if we do not get agreement on test controls we will resume testing on some certain date. He also asked if high altitude tests are subject to detection. Mr. Keeny said that they are, in that the technical means are known, but Mr. Quarles added that means now existing would not be able to detect a high altitude shot.

Mr. Gray brought out that the paper shown to the President did not carry the agreement of Defense, including the JCS, nor of AEC. Mr. Quarles said the Joint Chiefs consider that the net effect of the proposed test suspension will be disadvantageous militarily. They feel that we should maintain our previous position unless the political advantages of the proposal outweigh the military disadvantage. If such a determination is made then they feel that the memorandum as presented is generally acceptable. The President recalled that Dr. Rabi had come in and said that the United States is technically ahead of the Soviets, who lack one important discovery, and that the United States would gain technically by stopping the tests. I commented that the situation with regard to the balance of advantage in technical terms through cessation is not clear, and that differing views seem to have been presented. Dr. Killian commented that his group felt that technically the U.S. would gain relatively through cessation of tests. Mr. Quarles and Mr. McCone said that their advisors did not agree with this assessment in technical terms, and Mr. Quarles added that militarily the disadvantage to the United States was even greater. The President stated that disagreement as to the balance of advantage is an element in the whole argument.

The President then indicated he saw some reason to make an exception to the general statement so as to permit tests for peaceful purposes. Mr. Wadsworth said he thought that half of the impact would be lost if exceptions were included. The President recalled that Secretary Dulles

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. According to Eisenhower's Appointment Book, this meeting lasted from 2:35 to 3:43 p.m. (*Ibid.*)

¹ See footnote 3, Document 170.

had said that the accepting of underground tests would be a tacit admission that above-ground tests are harmful. He thought the Russians would not accept our proposal. After further discussion he indicated agreement to omitting the exception.

Secretary Herter asked as to consultation with the Congress. The President thought that the top four Congressional leaders, plus perhaps a very few others, might be informed of this action shortly in advance of its being taken. Secretary Quarles suggested omitting certain references to the UK, and Mr. Herter said that there are real problems concerning the UK. Mr. Gray said that the question of our relationship with Communist China is implicitly raised, since no inspection system could be effective without stations in Communist China. The President stressed that he did not accept any implication of recognizing Communist China.

Mr. McCone said that the Commission unanimously opposes the cessation of tests. The President said he recognized that fact, but that the Commission is not concerned with the question of world political position. He felt that our world situation requires that we achieve the political benefits of this action. In a discussion as to whether the atomic laboratories will lose their key personnel the President said he questioned whether they would leave.

In concluding, the President said that, with changes as he had indicated on his draft, he found the statement acceptable. Mr. Herter stated that we are still waiting for word from Geneva of final agreement. Mr. Quarles left with the President a memo by the JCS.²

G.
Brigadier General, USA

² See footnote 2, Document 171.

173. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, August 19, 1958.

OTHERS PRESENT

Chairman McCone
Mr. Gordon Gray
General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of custody of large nuclear weapons by the AEC or Department of Defense.]

Mr. McCone next talked briefly about the proposal to cease the testing of atomic weapons. He said he is sympathetic with the President's desire to find a way to move forward with disarmament after five and one half years of effort. His Commission has strong feelings on this, but will accept the President's decision. Mr. McCone said he would like to ask reconsideration on one point—that of including, as an exception, fully contained underground tests for peaceful purposes. He cited the possible use of atomic explosions to extract oil from the Athabaska sands, and to achieve useful heat power by using the salt domes of the southwest. These uses could be made subject to UN agreement and inspection. The President said he had been searching his mind for some way to allow this exception. Mr. Wadsworth however had thought we would lose the political gains we are seeking if we try to make this exception. The President added that he had agreed with Secretary Dulles that if the Geneva meetings resulted in agreement—no matter what our military might say—then we would make a public statement on this matter. The President said he would be sympathetic, if we would not therefore lose the entire effect of our action, to including the exception to having fully contained underground explosions conducted for peaceful purposes under UN observation. He asked Mr. McCone to take this matter up with Secretary Herter. The President added that Mr. Herter had told him that the protocol is expected to be signed at Geneva on Thursday, and that we hope we can make our announcement immediately thereafter. The British have, however, been showing some opposition to the project. Mr. McCone said he would get in touch with Secretary Herter at once.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

174. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, August 20, 1958, 5:20 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dulles

Under Secretary Herter
Mr. Wadsworth
Allen Dulles
Secretary Quarles
Mr. McCone
Dr. Killian
General Persons
General Goodpaster

By the time of this meeting messages had come in from the British requesting assurance that information on two technical points relating to nuclear weapons would be made available to them in the event of a test suspension.¹ The President asked if we are making that information available to the British in the exchange planned for next week. Mr. Quarles said that we plan for an initial exchange next week not going as far as to provide what the British request. The President stated most strongly that we cannot conduct our operations on such a basis. We have got to be prepared to provide them such information needed for their further weapons development as will be precluded by carrying out such a suspension. Mr. McCone said that the AEC has told the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that we are going quite far toward providing the information the British are seeking. A copy of the President's assurance to Macmillan that we would be generous in furnishing everything permitted by the law had been checked with the other AEC members, and all supported that undertaking.² Mr. Quarles said that we could give Macmillan what he asked within the scope of the law; it is just a question of conducting discussions and finding out what they really need. The President then recalled that he had indicated to Macmillan that there were two areas we would not be ready to talk about immediately.

Mr. Quarles suggested that the President approve the initial list of information to be exchanged and instruct our negotiators to move ahead as the British needs are developed. The President said he wanted to turn this around, and give Macmillan the assurance he seeks.³ Mr. Quarles

¹ These messages were from Macmillan to Eisenhower, August 20. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) See the Supplement. The technical points concerned reduction of weight of large-yield weapons and invulnerability of nuclear weapons to pre-initiation. (Memorandum from Strauss to Eisenhower, August 20; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administrative Series, Strauss, Adm. Lewis) See the Supplement.

² The assurance was in the form of a letter, transmitted in telegram 1969 to London, August 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8–2058) See the Supplement.

³ On the next day, Eisenhower informed Dr. Libby of the AEC of "his philosophy" on exchange of atomic information with the British. The President stated that "such exchange should be full and generous; any attempt to do otherwise with true allies is bound to alienate them." Eisenhower reminded Libby of British assistance to the United States during World War II in intelligence, development of atomic weapons, radar, and jet engines. Libby assured the President that he understood the President's point of view and would seek to carry it out. (Memorandum of conference with the President on August 21 by Goodpaster, August 23; Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary Records, AEC Vol. II) See the Supplement.

then suggested that the President advise Macmillan that we intend to give the information; that we are ready for an initial exchange; and that we are ready to go beyond this as discussions may indicate. The President said this seemed good to him, if we made clear that in successive steps we will tell the British what we know regarding their two questions.

The President asked Mr. McCone to check with Dr. Libby and General Starbird as to the testimony they were giving to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy at the same time of the meeting in order to make sure that there is no difference between their testimony and the position as developed during the discussion.

At this point, all except the State Department representatives left the meeting.

A.J. Goodpaster⁴
Brigadier General. USA

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

175. Editorial Note

On August 20, 1958, in anticipation of the release of the Communiqué and Report of the Geneva meeting on nuclear testing, Secretary Dulles in New York sent Acting Secretary Herter a telegram commenting on the draft Presidential statement to be released at the time of the report. Dulles stated that while he accepted the draft (see footnote 3, Document 170) as a statement of policy, he thought that since its function as a public statement was "to influence world opinion and gain good will," it should be simplified and redrafted to accent the positive. Dulles emphasized that his redraft was not an attempt to retract or modify already agreed language and included in the telegram a suggested text as follows:

"The United States welcomes the successful conclusion of the Geneva discussions on technical requirements for monitoring testing agreements.

"Important questions remain to be resolved before a test monitoring system can be established. These include the organization of the control

system and its relationship to the United Nations and national governments, the implementation of staffing and on-the-spot inspection, and the participation of the authorities on whose territories control posts should be located.

"In an effort to resolve these questions, the United States is prepared to join with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom; the other nations which have tested nuclear weapons, in negotiating an agreement for an effectively inspected suspension of nuclear tests. Representatives of other countries having authority over areas within which control posts should be established would of course be consulted. The progress and results of these negotiations might be duly reported to the United Nations and its organs with disarmament responsibilities, through the intermediary of the Secretary General.

"The United States is also prepared, unless testing is resumed by the Soviet Union, to withhold further testing of atomic and nuclear weapons for a period up to one year beginning October 1, 1958, while agreement is being reached both as to the terms of suspension of testing and the detailed arrangements for inspection. Further, if agreement on the terms of an effectively inspected suspension of nuclear tests can be achieved, the United States is prepared to suspend testing on a year-by-year basis, subject to a determination at the beginning of each year of extension that satisfactory progress is being made (a) in installing and operating the agreed inspection system, and (b) in reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantial arms control measures, such as the United States has long sought.

"As the United States has frequently made clear, it does not consider that suspension of testing of atomic and nuclear weapons is in itself a measure of disarmament or limitation of armament. The significance of an agreement for a monitored mutual suspension of tests is that it may lead to other and more substantial agreements relating to limitation and reduction of such weapons and to other essential phases of disarmament. This is our hope." (Secto 8 from USUN, August 20; Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8-2058) See the Supplement.

At a meeting with Dulles on August 20, British Foreign Secretary Lloyd insisted that a relationship between Western readiness to suspend testing and Soviet willingness to join in negotiations for an agreement to supervise suspension of testing must be established or the West would concede to the Soviet Union a fundamental principle without exacting a price. Dulles therefore agreed to insert at the beginning of the fourth paragraph of the statement the phrase, "If this is accepted principle," so as to establish the link between the two parts of the statement. (Memorandum of conversation between Lloyd and Dulles, August 20; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) See the Supplement.

At 8:50 a.m. on August 21, Secretary Dulles telephoned President Eisenhower in Washington to inform him that he had talked until midnight of August 20 with Lloyd, that the British were satisfied with the draft Presidential statement, and that he was awaiting the French reaction from Foreign Minister Couve de Murville. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations) See the Supplement.

In Secto 13 from USUN, August 21, 4 p.m., Dulles sent Herter his views on the importance of including in the Presidential statement a sentence that reads: "The agreement should also deal with the problem of detonations for peaceful purposes, as distinct from weapons tests." Dulles stated that he did not believe suspension of testing should deny to mankind the "vast new power for human betterment" of atomic energy "as in creating new harbors and waterways, making available underground sources of water, oil, minerals, etc." Dulles stated that once the distinction between nuclear power for peaceful purposes and weapons testing was established, the United States could conduct in good faith explosions for peaceful and economic purposes. Dulles realized that this additional sentence might provide a "possible loophole" for the Soviets during the one-year suspension, but he thought it was worth the risk. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8-2158) See the Supplement.

On August 21, the Conference of Experts To Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on Suspension of Nuclear Tests completed its work and issued a Communiqué and Report. The Western Experts and the Delegations from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania had been meeting at Geneva since July 1. Their conclusions suggested that it would be technically possible to supervise and enforce an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons testing. The Communiqué and Report of the Conference are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, pages 1090-1111; *Department of State Bulletin*, September 22, 1958, pages 452-462; and *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pages 1331-1332 and 1336-1341.

On August 22, President Eisenhower made a statement on the successful conclusion of the Geneva meeting of experts and offered to withhold further testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons, unless testing was resumed by the Soviet Union, for one year from the beginning of the negotiations among nations with nuclear weapons for a test suspension and establishment of an international control system to enforce it. Eisenhower's statement is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, pages 1111-1112; *Department of State Bulletin*, September 8, 1958, pages 378-379; and *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pages 1332-1333. In a note to the Soviet Union, August 22, the United States transmitted Eisenhower's statement and proposed that negotiations

toward the end described by the President begin in New York on October 31, 1958. The text of the note is in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, page 1114.

On August 29, Soviet Chairman Khrushchev gave an interview to *Pravda*, which represented the first official Soviet response to the Western proposals of August 22. On August 30, the Soviet Union sent a formal note to the United States recapitulating Khrushchev's statement. In a memorandum of August 30 to Secretary Dulles, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., analyzed the Khrushchev statement and concluded that the Soviet Union was ready to negotiate with the West, but that it appeared intent, by diplomatic means, popular pressure, and through U.N. action, to put maximum pressure on the West to meet Soviet terms in the negotiations. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/8–3058) See the Supplement. Khrushchev's interview of August 29 and the Soviet note of August 30 are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, pages 1114–1120.

176. Memorandum of Discussion at the 378th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, August 27, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Item 1. "Recommended Revisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directives."]

2. *Geneva Technical Conference on Nuclear Testing*

Dr. James B. Fisk, Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference, said he and his colleagues were grateful for the opportunity afforded them of participating in the Conference, and hoped the results would be useful. His report would cover (1) the substance of the technical agreement, (2) certain aspects of the negotiations, (3) a brief appraisal of certain Western and Soviet strengths in the nuclear weapons field, and (4) some of the problems lying ahead.

Dr. Fisk recalled that the charter of the U.S. Delegation had been to examine methods for the detection and identification of nuclear weap-

ons testing, and to devise a system to monitor test suspension. He wished to emphasize the word "suspension", which had been agreed upon after long argument over "suspension" versus "cessation". The limitations inherent in any system designed to monitor test suspension had always been in the background of the Delegation's thinking. Dr. Fisk said any system for monitoring test suspension has important parameters: (1) the yield of the explosion to be detected, (2) the probability that detection can be achieved, (3) the number of control posts necessary to achieve detection, and (4) the environment of the tests (whether underground, at high altitudes, etc.). Dr. Fisk noted parenthetically that underground tests turned out to be the principal problem.

It was evident at the outset, said Dr. Fisk, that the greater the number of control posts established, the smaller would be the number of inspections required. This presented great difficulty for the Soviets, who wanted relatively few control posts as well as very little inspection. It was clear that detection of high-yield tests would not be difficult, but that detection of low-yield tests would require a large number of control posts and a large number of inspections. The United States started the Conference by suggesting a system which would detect one-KT explosions and would require 650 control posts. In rebuttal the Soviets insisted that they could accept no more than 100 control posts. By hard work and long argument, a technically agreed system was devised without horse-trading.

The system agreed upon will probably detect 5-KT explosions, even under the most difficult circumstances, and will detect one-KT explosions under conditions similar to those which have existed for most nuclear tests in the past. The system involves 180 control posts—110 on the continents, 60 on islands and peninsulas, and 10 on ships. These posts would have the capability of detecting, with a 90% degree of probability, explosions of 5-KT or greater, and a capability, with less than 90% reliability, of detecting lower-yield tests. However, Dr. Fisk warned, the system would also have serious limitations. For example, it might not be able to detect tests in some areas of the ocean and on some seismic islands. There would also be difficulty in detecting shallow underground shots, as well as high-altitude shots.

Dr. Fisk then turned to a description of the negotiations. He said the Conference was a technical conference with heavy political overtones. The Soviet Delegate had once remarked that science must not interfere with the task of the Delegates. At the beginning of the Conference the Soviets brought to bear heavy pressure for a commitment that the United States would suspend nuclear testing. After painful argument, followed by a day's adjournment, the Soviets dropped this pressure, apparently on the basis of fresh instructions from Moscow. One Soviet tactic throughout the Conference was to say the job of the Conference was

easy; the way to stop nuclear testing was just to stop it. At one time the Soviet Delegates attempted to demonstrate the ease of detecting nuclear tests by handing the U.S. Delegation a long list of U.S. tests which the Soviets had detected. However, this list contained a number of non-existent U.S. tests, and this fact was pointed out to the Soviets. Another Soviet tactic was to press for the minimum simplest system and one which would involve the least interference in the territory of the USSR. The Soviet technical arguments were weighted to support these tactics. However, there was also an element of objectivity in the Soviet attitude, so that in the end it was possible to reach agreement on all technical points.

Dr. Fisk emphasized that from the mid-point of the Conference until its adjournment, it was evident that the Soviet Delegation wanted to reach agreement. As a result, the Soviets made what the U.S. Delegates regarded as important concessions—namely, (1) they agreed to overflight of the USSR under certain circumstances; (2) they agreed to inspection; and (3) they accepted the main points of the system proposed by the United States.

Dr. Fisk said he believed the Soviets were anxious for an agreement because of the Fourth Power problem; that is, they may have had in mind the possibility that a fourth country, possibly even including a satellite, would achieve a nuclear weapons capability.

On the last day of the Conference, the Soviets addressed to the U.S. Delegation a plaintive inquiry as to whether the United States was about to announce the suspension of nuclear tests. Apparently, said Dr. Fisk, the Soviets had some prior intimation of the President's announcement on this subject.

Dr. Fisk said the caliber of the Soviet team was high. The Soviet Delegates were technically sound, and were ably led by an outstanding scientist, who was also a Lieutenant General and a Communist Party member.

During the negotiations Dr. Fisk had formed the impression that the Soviets had devoted little attention to tactical nuclear weapons, either because they consider such weapons unimportant or because they know relatively little about them.

Dr. Fisk then reported that the caliber of the Western team was also high. The U.S., U.K., French and Canadian Delegates had worked as a single team. Dr. Fisk felt that the strength of the West in the nuclear field lay in close ties between the United States and the United Kingdom. He said that the Western team had revealed very little sensitive material in the course of the negotiations, and had almost certainly obtained as much information as it gave.

Turning to problems lying ahead, Dr. Fisk warned that the system agreed upon at the Technical Conference was only an outline and that important political and organizational problems, as well as problems of technical implementation, remain to be solved. He thought, however,

that if political negotiations take place they will have a solid foundation in the technical agreement. He suggested that between now and October 31 the United States should give careful consideration to any proposals for nuclear tests before actually carrying out such tests.

The President asked what Dr. Fisk meant by his last observation. Dr. Fisk replied that any decision to conduct additional tests would have an impact on the success or failure of subsequent political negotiations. He was not saying there should be no tests, but was only suggesting that the effect of such tests on the political negotiations should be carefully weighed.

The President asked how the Soviets indicated that they might have had advance information as to his Friday statement. Dr. Fisk said the Soviets had asked him whether the United States was about to make an announcement on suspension of nuclear tests, and the way in which they had put the question led him to the belief that they had some prior knowledge of such an announcement.

The President said he wished to compliment Dr. Fisk on his patience during the Technical Conference.

Secretary McElroy asked Dr. Fisk whether he could say any more about the Soviet attitude toward the small nuclear weapons. Dr. Fisk said the Soviets had indicated no interest in tactical weapons. During the difficult arguments over high-altitude explosions, they had played up the Sputniks and seemed disinterested in some of our technical arguments. When we had pointed out the possibility of shielding tests in order to reduce gamma rays, the Soviets had remarked that thousands of pounds of shielding would be required. Soviet arguments of this nature had led Dr. Fisk to the belief that the Soviets were not sophisticated in the field of tactical nuclear weapons.

Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that the Soviets had exploded a number of low-yield weapons. Dr. Fisk agreed, but said there had been no evidence of Soviet underground shots.

Secretary Herter said the senior U.S. diplomatic official in Geneva had extolled the skill of Dr. Fisk in the technical negotiations. Perhaps Dr. Fisk had missed his vocation in life. The President said Dr. Fisk might look upon this compliment as the kiss of death.

*The National Security Council:*¹

Noted and discussed an oral report on the subject by Dr. James B. Fisk, Chairman of the U.S. Delegation.

¹ The following sentence constitutes NSC Action No. 1979, approved by the President on August 27. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[Here follow Agenda Items 3. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security" (see Document 33), 4. "U.S. Policy Toward the Sudan," and 5. "U.S. Bases in Morocco."]

Marion W. Boggs
Director
NSC Secretariat

177. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (McCone) to President Eisenhower

Washington, August 28, 1958.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On January 29, 1958 the former Chairman of the Commission wrote informing you of our plans for nuclear testing for calendar year 1958 and requested authority to expend the nuclear materials necessary for the test activity.¹ The major effort envisioned at that time was Operation Hardtack to be conducted in the Pacific beginning in April. Hardtack was initiated on April 28 and after a certain number of firings was further extended to include additional shots which were approved by you on June 13, 1958.

In addition to Operation Hardtack, our 1958 plans included a number of safety tests to be conducted as needed throughout the calendar year, and a short series of low yield devices to be fired underground at the Nevada Test Site during October and November 1958. On June 13, 1958 you approved these firings, and preparation for the Fall series is well under way.

In light of the anticipated test suspension, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense have reviewed weapons development requirements. In this review it was determined that certain test shots, which could be fired by October 31, 1958 would be essential to the advancement of our weapons technology. On August 22, I informed you orally of our capabilities in this regard, and on August 27 we discussed the matter further.²

In keeping with these discussions, our present plans include nine nuclear detonations at the Nevada Test Site. Six of the shots proposed

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Presidential Actions—Atomic. Secret; Restricted Data.

¹ Not found.

² No other records of these discussions have been found.

had been previously planned for the Fall 1958 series. The attachment³ indicates the approximate dates of the firings, the conditions under which the shots would be fired, the expected yield and the expected contribution to our weapons program. It should be noted that five of the Nevada shots are sub-kiloton and the largest is 20 kilotons. We shall review further this list during the forthcoming week to see whether certain other small yield detonations at Nevada should be added to, or substituted for, those listed. In addition to these nuclear firings we plan to conduct up to seven "one-point" safety tests underground at Nevada during the same period to establish that no significant nuclear reaction would result if the devices concerned were detonated accidentally.

The attached letter from the Department of Defense to the Atomic Energy Commission outlines the Department of Defense requirement for this series of tests.⁴ As you will recall, in our discussion of August 27, it was determined that the proposed high-yield, follow-on ICBM test at the Eniwetok Proving Ground requested by the DoD should be eliminated and this change has been arranged by us.

We request that you approve the conduct of the tests as outlined above.⁵ We shall consider the Nevada firings as a second phase of Hardtack and make an announcement of the firings at the earliest appropriate time. The special nuclear materials authorized for expenditure by your endorsement of June 13, 1958 to our letter of June 12, 1958 will be sufficient to cover the tests conducted thus far in 1958 together with the other tests herein described.

Respectfully yours,⁶

³ See the Supplement.

⁴ Dated August 23; see the Supplement.

⁵ A note on the source text indicates that Eisenhower approved this recommendation on August 29.

⁶ Printed from an unsigned copy. A note on the source text indicates that the original letter was given to General Starbird of the AEC.

178. Record of Meeting

Washington, September 23, 1958.

PREPARATIONS FOR NUCLEAR TESTING NEGOTIATIONS

Ambassador Wadsworth chaired a meeting in the State Department this morning attended by General Byers for Defense, Mr. Robert Amory for CIA, Mr. Spurgeon Keeny for Dr. Killian's office, Ronald Spiers, the State Department officer in charge of the test suspension negotiations, and representatives from AEC.

Ambassador Wadsworth circulated a State Department draft of a treaty on suspension of nuclear test explosions,¹ and requested that Department comments be available in time for a meeting on September 29.²

Ambassador Wadsworth stated that issues on which the working group could not agree would be referred to the Cabinet-level committee created by the President to prepare for a possible Summit meeting. He assumed that the final position to be taken by the U.S. Delegation would be discussed and approved by the National Security Council. He questioned Mr. Spiers as to whether he agreed. Mr. Spiers said he doubted that the final position would be discussed by the NSC.

Mr. Keeny summarized a paper listing 10 problems which need to be studied prior to the departure of the Delegation for Geneva. They are:

1. *Cost Estimates*—An order of magnitude estimate as to the cost of the entire monitoring system should be made. Funding the U.S. share of the cost is a problem which needs consideration.

2. *Site Selection*—Before the Delegation leaves, the U.S. should know exactly where it wishes to have monitoring stations located in the United States, in the UK and elsewhere abroad. Such a list would be shown to the Soviet Union early in the negotiations in an effort to avoid needless argument on the basis of generalized statements as to the location of monitoring stations.

3. *High Altitude Detection*—The Geneva experts made no recommendations on how to monitor high altitude tests. The U.S. was reluctant to discuss such tests because of the security implications, including such matters as Argus effects, etc. The Russians were hesitant for fear that high altitude test detection methods would make available to us intelli-

Source: Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Executive Secretary's Subject Files, Policy Re Use. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

¹ Not found.

² No record of this meeting has been found.

gence other than that applicable to monitoring test suspension. The method for detection of such tests must be in the treaty. The recent U.S. tests in the Pacific provided us with the information necessary to draw up an acceptable monitoring technique. Satellites may be required to monitor high altitude tests. If so, it is conceivable that the first space activity to be undertaken on an international basis would be the launching of satellites and communications with them as part of a test suspension monitoring system.

4. *Peaceful Purposes*—The treaty must define and seek to limit nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, if the objective of the weapons test suspension is not to be defeated.

5. *Communications Systems*—Language must be included in the treaty to insure satisfactory communications in order to make the test monitoring successful. Technical information as to the kind of a system required is needed on an urgent basis.

6. *Personnel*—Decisions must be made promptly as to the staffing of the test monitoring organization, who is to appoint the officers, how many are required and what competence they should have.

7. *Automation*—The U.S. Air Force operation in data processing should be studied with a view to providing guidance as to what is required for the greatly expanded system requisite to test monitoring.

8. *Phasing of Installation*—The Geneva technicians did not discuss the major problem of phasing of the installation of the monitoring stations. Since all stations cannot be built at once, a choice will have to be made as to whether priority on construction should be given to stations in one area, or whether the first stations to be constructed should be scattered throughout the world resulting in a loose system but a more widespread one. Involved in this problem is the question of stations in Communist China and the political issues arising out of the necessity of establishing monitoring stations in countries not participating in the test suspension treaty.

9. *Organization of the System*—Problems involving the administration of the system should be given urgent study.

10. *Definitions*—Agreed U.S. definitions of the terms used will be necessary. For example, what is a nuclear explosion. Possibly some definitions will have to be included in the treaty itself.

Ambassador Wadsworth indicated that as soon as the technical delegate to the negotiations was named, the Department would consult with him, and immediately thereafter send letters to the appropriate departments and agencies requesting their assistance in preparing information appropriate to their area of competence.

The AEC indicated that, informally, Mr. Northrop was working on the problem of peaceful uses—Plowshare.

General Byers indicated that General Rodenhauer, Commanding General of AFOAT-1, Assistant for Atomic Energy Matters, had already put his staff to work on problems falling in his area of competence.

179. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 30, 1958.

SUBJECT

October 31 US-UK-USSR Negotiations on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests

PARTICIPANTS

State

Ambassador James J. Wadsworth

Mr. Ronald I. Spiers, S/AE

Mr. Vincent Baker, S/AE

Mr. George Spiegel, S/AE

Mr. Donald R. Morris, S/AE

AEC

Commissioner Willard F. Libby

Dr. Edward Teller

Brig. General Alfred D. Starbird

Captain John H. Morse

Dr. Harold Brown

Dr. George Kavanaugh

Dr. Killian's Office

Mr. Spurgeon Keeny

Dr. Libby said he had asked for this opportunity to meet with Ambassador Wadsworth as Chairman of the United States delegation to the October 31 negotiations to discuss with him the importance of Operation Plowshare for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear explosions and some of the aspects of the control system which had been agreed upon at the Geneva Conference of Experts on nuclear test detection.

Dr. Teller said he had noted three things of importance in the Geneva conclusions:

1. The detection of nuclear explosions of less than one kiloton yield had not been discussed.

2. While in its initial evaluation of a detection system for detecting underground nuclear explosions down to one kiloton yield the U.S. delegation had decided 650 detection stations would be required, it subsequently, under Soviet delegation pressure, increased the minimum detectable yield to five kilotons and agreed on a control system with 160-170 stations.

3. No concrete system was proposed for the detection of any nuclear explosion above 30 to 50 kilometers, and for explosions at thousands of miles from the surface of the earth.

These points indicate loopholes in the proposed system. Firstly, it may be impossible with such a system to detect underground explosions of less than five kilotons. Secondly, it may be practically impossible to detect explosions at great altitudes, especially in interplanetary space. Dr. Teller said he felt thought should be given to the wisdom of prohibiting events which cannot be detected by a control system. He therefore would like to speak in terms of whether clandestine tests of small devices or tests in interplanetary states are worth worrying about.

With regard to the first item, Livermore for the past year has devoted about one-third of its efforts on the development of nuclear weapons with yields less than five kilotons. They deem these developments so important for defensive purposes and for tactical weapons that they have telescoped several projects in order to test them during the forthcoming series prior to October 31. For instance, in this series Livermore is testing six weapons of less than five kilotons of which three or four are in the one kiloton range. Dr. Teller suggested that the present evaluation of the relative positions of the US and USSR in nuclear weapons development does not have much validity in the small yield range because, since we cannot detect such explosions at long distances with our present detection system, we do not know what the Soviet Union has done in this yield range.

With regard to high altitude tests, he wished to stress that the United States had performed such experiments for the first time this summer. We observed some very important phenomena from these explosions, notably severe interruption of radio transmissions and electromagnetic disturbances with important implications to our ballistic missile defense efforts. These effects are just now beginning to be analyzed and their full importance will not be known for some time. Tests of nuclear weapons carried out in interplanetary space thousands and thousands of miles from the surface of the earth would be relatively easy to execute and would probably be undetectable. For instance, a payload could be launched into outer space containing a bomb in one-half and measuring instruments in another half. After this payload had travelled for several days or even weeks and reached a considerable distance from the earth, the two halves could be separated by remote control. After they had been separated by about fifteen miles, the bomb could be detonated by remote

control and the phenomena of the explosion measured by the detection instrumentation would be telemetered back to the earth in appropriate coded form. Such test would be quite easy for the Soviet Union to perform at the present time given their missile payload capacity. In a year's time the US could probably perform them also. It should be noted that the launching of such a projectile would not involve the complicated problems of re-entry nor of the guidance required for orbiting a satellite or reaching a specific area, such as the moon, and thus would be relatively simple.

Dr. Teller then described what he feels to be a further loophole in the technical considerations discussed at Geneva. He noted that the only information which exists concerning the coupling of the energy of an underground nuclear explosion to the earth to cause earth motion is that provided by the single underground explosion set off by the United States in 1957, known as Rainier. On the basis of theoretical considerations he and his associates believe it is possible to reduce the coupling of the energy of nuclear explosion by one-third or even one-tenth. This possibility should be explored either by individual nations or by some international organization by conducting experiments to test theoretical techniques. Unless this is done it might be possible to test a weapon of 5 kiloton yield or greater under decoupling conditions underground and evade detection.

Dr. Teller said he felt there were two suggestions as to how the United States might proceed in the October 31 negotiations to meet these points which he had raised. The first would be to support a provision in the treaty that nuclear tests which could not be detected by the system would not be prohibited. For instance, underground tests of less than 5 kiloton yield might be allowed. He wished however to point out two weaknesses to this suggestion. The first is that it would be very difficult to determine whether an explosion had been indeed less than 5 kilotons. While the site of the explosion could be inspected for yield determination with some degree of accuracy this would require advance notice so that the international inspectors could be on hand. A second weakness would be that if decoupling techniques are developed, larger explosions could be made to look like yields of less than 5 kilotons.

A second suggestion would be to limit not the size of nuclear test explosions which would be allowed by the agreement, but rather the size of the effect of these explosions. For instance, it might be agreed that earthquakes with magnitudes less than 4.5 on the Richter scale would not be investigated. This would then mean that underground nuclear explosions giving seismic indications of 4.5 magnitude would be allowable under the agreement.

Dr. Libby noted that the AEC felt quite strongly that the term "nuclear explosion" in any agreement must be defined to allow safety

tests of nuclear weapons which hopefully involve no yield of nuclear energy and developmental explosions at the Laboratories involving yields of nuclear energy of only a few hundred pounds of TNT equivalent.

Turning to the subject of the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, Dr. Libby noted that for two years the AEC has been working on Operation Plowshare. Recently all information, with the exception of the design of the nuclear devices which would be used, about this project has been declassified. This program envisaged the use of nuclear explosions for such projects as: earth moving, which could be accomplished at one-tenth to one-fiftieth of the present cost with conventional techniques; the crushing of rock over-burdens to permit access to mineral deposits; the creation of energy stores in the earth; the creation of useful radioactive isotopes; and similar civil projects. The AEC believes that such a program can be carried out within the context of an agreement to suspend nuclear weapons tests with international inspection of these projects. Dr. Libby said it was their estimate that international inspection would prevent the instrumentation of such explosions that would be necessary in order to gain any information useful in weapons development. He said the AEC presently would not be willing to grant reciprocal access to the device which would be used but would insist on the concept of concealment in a "black box". He added the final thought that these projects hold untold possibilities for the future benefit of mankind and that he personally felt quite strongly that it was wrong to limit or stop any scientific development which might contribute to the benefit of mankind by legislation, treaty or any other means.

Mr. Spiers said that the "black box" concept could create a great psychological barrier to acceptance of the continuation of peaceful uses explosions. He suggested that a comprehensive analysis be made of the loopholes that such an approach would create for the USSR as opposed to the disadvantages from our point of view of managing such a program on the basis of full exchange of information, i.e., opening up the "black box". If the latter approach were found possible, the program would involve substantially fewer political difficulties vis-à-vis both the USSR and world opinion. Dr. Libby agreed this should be explored.

180. Memorandum From Members of the Inter-Agency Group on Surprise Attack (Kistiakowsky and Minshull) to the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Killian)

Washington, September 30, 1958.

SUBJECT

Surprise Attack Policy Considerations

In 1955 the President made the Geneva "Open Skies" proposal.¹ At that time aerial inspection coupled with an "exchange of military blueprints" and the most rudimentary form of ground inspection could have provided an effective safeguard against a surprise attack. Furthermore, if such an inspection system had been implemented, it would have tested inspection techniques that, if successful, could have formed the framework for monitoring future phases of disarmament.

In addition, the proposal was attractive to this country for three quite different secondary reasons. First, by making such a proposal this country was in a position to test Soviet intentions in the disarmament field. Secondly, the proposal provided an excellent propaganda move for this country, indicating our good faith and sincere desire for peace. Finally, it was realized that if an inspection system were implemented, it would provide a means for raising the Iron Curtain and increasing the chances for hard intelligence from USSR.

It should be recognized that if the Soviets had accepted the 1955 proposal, it would have been for one or both of the first two reasons. The final three reasons were important to this country but could not have appealed to the Soviet Union.

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Surprise Attack Policy. Secret. The inter-agency group was formed pursuant to Eisenhower's July 14 request. (Letter from Kistiakowsky to Dulles, August 15; *ibid.*, Surprise Attack Panel)

In an April 28 letter to Khrushchev, President Eisenhower suggested that as a means of moving toward disarmament, the United States and the Soviet Union should instruct their technical experts to study among other things the practical problems and feasibility of inspecting against surprise attack. (*Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, pp. 1006–1007) After a lengthy exchange of correspondence on the subject (letters from Khrushchev to Eisenhower, May 9 and July 2; notes from the U.S. Embassy to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, July 31 and September 8; and a note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the U.S. Embassy, September 15; all *ibid.*, pp. 1036–1041, 1084–1090, 1126, and 1129–1131), the two sides were close to an agreement on a technical conference that would include experts from countries other than the United States and the Soviet Union. On October 10, the United States agreed to a meeting of experts at Geneva, beginning on November 1, 1958. (Note from the U.S. Embassy to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, October 10; *ibid.*, pp. 1145–1146)

¹ The text of the proposal, which Eisenhower made at Geneva on July 21, 1955, is *ibid.*, pp. 486–488.

Advances in weapon technology in the past three years and the advances expected in the next few years will greatly modify the value of an inspection system *as a safeguard against surprise attack*. The advent of the ICBM and the greatly increased readiness capability of manned bombers makes it necessary to go one step beyond inspection and toward limited disarmament before one can obtain a substantial reduction in the danger of surprise attack or accidental war. The Inter-Agency Working Group on Surprise Attack appointed by Secretary Dulles, Secretary McElroy, and Dr. Killian concluded that to obtain an effective safeguard against surprise attack from modern manned bombers would require an inspection system that *monitored* and agreed upon limitation of bomber readiness (for example, an agreed upon maximum number of bombers airborne at any given time). In the case of ICBM's the Working Group felt that an inspection system that *monitored* and agreed upon maximum force level (i.e., total number of missiles) would be required to afford real protection against surprise missile attack. The Inter-Agency Group concluded that the value of an inspection system without such arms controls is limited to the secondary values that existed in 1955.²

In the test cessation technical discussions, Dr. Fisk had an easily definable technical objective. It was to determine the technical feasibility of designing and operating an inspection system to monitor a test cessation agreement. It was only because of this simple, easily definable technical objective that the talks were successful, and that Dr. Fisk was able to keep the meeting from digressing into political areas. If the forthcoming Geneva talks on surprise attack are to be successful, they too must have an equally simple technical objective.

In 1955 such a technical objective would have been easily defined. It would have been to determine the technical feasibility of designing and operating an inspection system to monitor or "to see that there is no dangerous concentration of military land forces or of air or naval forces." The advances in weapons technology have made such an objective obsolete.

² On September 30, at 9:30 a.m., Killian and Eisenhower discussed the work of the Inter-Agency Group as follows:

"Dr. Killian said that the study group is having a very hard time on the Surprise Attack project. It is very difficult to get prepared for the discussions. One key question is as to the scope of the project, i.e., as to what should be monitored, and specifically as to whether limitation of arms and control of size of forces should be among the things being monitored. The President thought the first step is to determine what are the fields or areas wherein by certain actions we could limit or eliminate the danger of surprise attack. Then, what are the means of doing this, i.e., through observation or inspection; then what programs should be carried out to establish these means; then finally in what areas or in what respects could these measures be expected to be effective. Dr. Killian concluded by saying that the President may have to decide, before the matter is resolved, as to whether to include limitation of arms and inspection of such limitation in the Surprise Attack proposal." (Memorandum of conference with the President by Goodpaster, October 2; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries) See the Supplement.

No country needs to mass a "dangerous concentration" of military equipment to launch a surprise attack. Thus, if the forthcoming discussions are to be productive, the technical objective must be modified.

The conclusions of the Inter-Agency Working Group indicate that a reasonable technical objective for the forthcoming meeting would be to *determine the technical-military feasibility of designing and operating an inspection system* to monitor agreements that would result in reducing the danger of surprise attack. If the Geneva discussions parallel the Inter-Agency Group's thinking, some of the "agreements that would result in reducing the danger of surprise attack" might involve limitations on bomber readiness, limitations on total numbers of ballistic missiles, and limitations on the deployment of conventional land forces.

If this country were to go to Geneva to discuss only the technical feasibility of an inspection system as a safeguard against surprise attack in an environment of totally unrestricted military forces, the delegation would find itself in a very difficult position. First of all, as the Inter-Agency Working Group has indicated, an inspection system without force limitation is practically useless as a means of safeguarding against surprise attack. The very attractive secondary effects (for this country) of an inspection system, employed within the Soviet Union, are such that they cannot form the basis of technical discussions. Furthermore, the past Soviet discussions on the matter of inspection and disarmament indicate that Soviets feel that an inspection system by itself provides little protection against surprise attack. Thus, if during the course of the meeting, the Soviets pursue the effect of limited arms control or partial disarmament and we refuse, we would provide the Soviets with an important propaganda wedge.

The actual agreements on limitations of forces are political in nature and therefore *no discussions of them* will be accepted in the forthcoming meeting. By this are meant discussions of force levels of both sides, location or types of air bases or missile sites, etc.

Since, however, it is clear that surveillance of unrestricted forces provides but a small measure of relief from the threat of massive surprise attack, the meetings may, upon a successful completion of discussions of surveillance without limitations, turn to the discussion of techniques of monitoring of hypothetical situations in which limitations on forces are imposed. No discussion of specific limitations, e.g., number of missile sites on both sides will be allowed, but the problem of monitoring an undefined restriction on the number of operational missiles may be proper under conditions defined above.

Unless the delegation has the freedom to actually explore the technical feasibility of such safeguards against surprise attack, they will be [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

G.B. Kistiakowsky
W.H. Minshull, Jr.

181. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray)

Washington, October 8, 1958, 11 a.m.

He talked about the organization of the work on nuclear test suspension and surprise attack, pointing out that on the basis of the record there was a committee of Dulles, McElroy and Anderson on nuclear test suspension, and one of Dulles, McElroy and Killian on surprise attack. He doubted whether Anderson, particularly in view of his present absence, was necessary on either committee, and suggested that the two committees be combined as Dulles, McElroy and Killian. I said this was agreeable to me. He indicated that on nuclear test suspension there was considerable difference of opinion within the Administration on the question of permitting tests below the threshold of detection, permitting peaceful uses, and whether our agreement was contingent upon progress in other disarmament matters. I said I thought all these matters had been settled by the Presidential statement which had been earlier approved. Mr. Gray said this might be so, but many people in the Government did not take it that way and he thought the issue should be resolved.

We spoke of the complications of detection of surprise attack zones as the result of the missile situation. I said I doubted we would really be prepared by the first of November but that probably ways could be found for postponement without a bad public relations reaction. I pointed out that our own position was not yet entirely firm, and much less had we reached agreement with the British and French, and perhaps others who might compose the Western delegation.

[Here follows discussion of the functioning of the NSC.]

JFD

182. Memorandum by the President's Staff Secretary (Goodpaster)

Washington, October 10, 1958.

The following questions would seem to be of basic importance to the next phase of U.S. efforts to arrange a suspension of nuclear weapons testing:

- a. Should the suspension be limited strictly to that which can be verified, with high degree of reliability, by detection, reporting and inspection?
- b. Should nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes be explicitly reserved from the provisions for suspension?
- c. Should provision be included with respect to acceptable "progress on other aspects" of disarmament, and, if so, should it be explicit and detailed?
- d. Should the suspension expire in the absence of positive action, or should positive action be required to terminate it?
- e. On the assumption that no control system will be meaningful without the use of Chinese Communist territory, how should the United States be prepared to proceed if Red China refuses to participate in the system in this way or, if it agrees to participate, sets as the price of its participation worldwide diplomatic recognition and/or admission to the United Nations.
- f. Is the participation of France in the agreement deemed to be essential and if so how is this to be achieved?

A.J. Goodpaster¹
Brigadier General, USA

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary's Records, Nuclear Testing, Secret. Gordon Gray and Goodpaster took part in a visit by NSC-OCB staff to the Nevada test site October 3-5. Goodpaster prepared an October 10 memorandum for the record concerning the trip and an October 9 memorandum of his discussions during the visit with Dr. Edward Teller. (Both *ibid.*) See the Supplement.

¹ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

183. Memorandum of Discussion at the 382d (Special) Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, October 13, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Item 1. "Evaluation of Offensive and Defensive Weapons Systems" (see Document 35).]

2. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*

The Director of Central Intelligence first reported on possible Soviet lunar probe activities. He said that there had been Soviet test missile firing on September 23 which was only picked up by ELINT. The unusual nature of this test activity suggested that it was directed toward three possibilities: (1) a moon probe; (2) some unusual type of satellite; or (3) part of the research and development for substantial space activities. There was no evidence that the missile fired went anywhere, and it is very likely that it was not picked up on our detection systems.

Mr. Dulles then pointed out that the Soviets have made nine nuclear tests since September 30, ranging from 2 megatons to 5 kilotons in yield. One may have been more than 2 megatons, but this would still be less than the highest Soviet test yield. There were two, or possibly three, tests of low kilotonnage that were not announced. Some of these tests were fired within a short time of each other from opposite sides of the island of Novaya Zemlya. We could not tell much about the character of these tests until the debris was fully analyzed. Because of the close proximity of some of the tests, the debris may be mixed up. The purpose of these tests may include a check-out of stock-pile weapons, an attempt to achieve weight reduction, or an over-all technological motivation to improve the Soviets' relative position. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the Soviets would have to make over 80 tests to have as many as we have had from the beginning of our testing.

Secretary Dulles said that he understood that the Soviets had stated that they intended to have only as many as the United States and the United Kingdom since the Soviets had announced the suspension of testing last spring.

In answer to a question by Mr. McCone, as to how long the Soviets had been organizing for these recent tests, Mr. Allen Dulles thought they were probably ready to continue tests when they announced their suspension.

Secretary Dulles expressed the view that the Soviets certainly must not have assumed that we would call our tests off when they announced their suspension. He therefore thought that the Soviet announcement of test suspension was phony in the first place.

The President commented that the speed with which the Soviets had conducted tests indicated they must have a good ground organization. Mr. Allen Dulles said most of the tests were air-bursts.

[Here follows additional discussion of Agenda Item 2, concerning the Taiwan Strait crisis.]

James S. Lay, Jr.

184. Memorandum of Discussion at the 383d Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, October 16, 1958.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Status of National Security Programs: The Atomic Energy Program* (NSC 5819)¹

The Special Assistant to the President, Mr. Gordon Gray, introduced the new Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. McCone, who stated that he would give the first portion of the report on the status of the atomic energy program. In the course of his report, Mr. McCone dealt with the following main subjects: *First*, U.S. commitments for the purchase of uranium ores at home and abroad for the next several years; *second*, availability of fissionable materials—U-235, plutonium, and tritium—in the light of requirements of various kinds; *third*, the aging and deterioration of U.S. reactors and forthcoming problems of replacement; and *fourth*, the program for nuclear power for peaceful purposes. On the latter subject, Mr. McCone indicated that the U.S. goal was to achieve economically competitive nuclear power in the United States in ten years, and in friendly foreign nations in five years.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on October 17.

¹ NSC 5819, "Status of National Security Policy as of June, 1958." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File, 383rd Meeting) The portion of this paper on the atomic energy program is in the Supplement.

Following Mr. McCone, the remainder of the status report was presented by Dr. Willard F. Libby, of the Atomic Energy Commission, who discussed the following subjects: The U.S. basic research program; the program for the study of radioactive fallout; isotopes; the non-military uses of atomic explosions (Project Plowshare); forthcoming Plowshare plans; the U.S. atomic weapons program (Hardtack I); and the Hardtack II series of tests now proceeding in Nevada. (Copies of the reports by Mr. McCone and Dr. Libby are filed in the minutes of the meeting.)²

The President asked a question with respect to the use of atomic explosions to recover oil, and was answered by Dr. Libby. Thereupon Secretary Quarles indicated a desire to comment on the Department of Defense atomic weapons requirements. He pointed out that the Department of Defense had yesterday sent to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission its estimates of its requirements over the next ten years for both plutonium and U-235. Secretary Quarles indicated that the minimum requirements for small tactical nuclear weapons would continue to exceed the plutonium estimated to be available. The President, with a smile, stated that he was at least perfectly certain that Secretary Quarles was not going to reduce the requirements for fissionable materials.

The Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Mr. Roger Jones, asked whether these Defense Department requirements took account of the material discussed by Admiral Sides at the special meeting of the National Security Council on last Monday afternoon. The subject of this meeting was the evaluation of offensive and defensive weapons systems.

Secretary Quarles replied to Mr. Jones by stating that the Defense Department requirements were based on all the latest available information, including that presented at the special Council meeting on Monday.³ [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Jones pointed out that in view of the constant criticism by the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy of the alleged failure of the Department of Defense to indicate its future requirements, which criticism extended also to the Administration as a whole, it would be worth while to advise the Joint Committee that the Defense Department had just sent to the Atomic Energy Commission its requirements over the next ten years.

² Both in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File, 383rd Meeting. See the Supplement.

³ October 13; see Document 183.

*The National Security Council:*⁴

Noted and discussed the report on the status of the atomic energy program on June 30, 1958, prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission and transmitted as Part 3 of NSC 5819; as supplemented by an oral presentation by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and AEC Commissioner Libby, on developments in the program since June 30, 1958.

[Here follow Agenda Item 2. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," 3. "U.S. Policy Toward Iran," and 4. "U.S. Policy Toward the Near East."]

S. Everett Gleason

⁴ The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1996, approved by the President on October 20. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

185. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray) to the President's Staff Secretary (Goodpaster)

Washington, October 22, 1958.

There was another three-hour meeting yesterday on surprise attack and test cessation.¹ I feel now that the whole situation is quite well under control.

There is now agreement on the terms of reference for the surprise attack conference. I have examined very carefully into the question of whether the basic division which existed has been glossed over or resolved. It is my conviction that there is at the moment no division. One could arise during the conference if the negotiators found it desirable to request some broadening of the terms of reference. This would have been dependent upon satisfactory progress in earlier phases of the negotiations. If the negotiators ever get to that point then the President may be called upon to make a decision which, under the circumstances, I now

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary's Records, Nuclear Testing, Secret.

¹ The first meeting was on October 16. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) No record of the October 21 meeting has been found.

feel cannot be made in advance of the conference and may never have to be made.

Also, the test suspension instructions are in much better shape, although there remain some difficulties which could be resolved this week. It is not yet clear to me whether the President will be called upon to express a view with respect to these points.

In any event, however, I will undertake to bring him up-to-date at the earliest opportunity and I would welcome your presence.

GG

186. Editorial Note

At the 384th meeting of the National Security Council on October 30, 1958, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles briefed the Council on Soviet nuclear testing during his report on "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security." According to the memorandum of discussion of the meeting by Gleason, October 31, the report and discussion were as follows:

"Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that the Soviets had conducted eight nuclear tests since he had last briefed the National Security Council on this subject [see Document 183]. Indeed, they had conducted 16 tests since September 30. Two of these tests involved nuclear weapons of eight and ten megatons, roughly twice the size of any previous Soviet nuclear explosion. All of these tests had taken place in the northern proving grounds. The Soviets had gone into this test series with terrific speed and in what appeared to be rather haphazard fashion.

"The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. McCone, said that the AEC shared Mr. Dulles' opinion just expressed. The AEC could not believe that the Soviets had learned very much with the kind of instrumentation they had been using in this recent series of tests.

"Secretary Dulles asked about the wind direction in the northern proving grounds. Mr. Allen Dulles replied that the winds went generally to the east, and that the Japanese had picked up the bulk of the debris from these explosions.

"Mr. Allen Dulles went on to state his belief that the Soviets may be on the point of stopping nuclear testing, at least in this northern area,

though the public and secret evidence on this point differed. Secretary Dulles directly queried Mr. Allen Dulles as to whether the Soviets would stop nuclear testing by the October 31 date. Mr. Allen Dulles replied that CIA people thought this quite possible." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

**187. Memorandum of Conversation Between President
Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles**

Washington, November 3, 1958.

ALSO PRESENT

Allen W. Dulles

Mr. Allen Dulles reported on the information regarding the two presumed nuclear detonations that were indicated as having occurred in the Soviet Union on November 1 and November 3. I said that in view of this we contemplated instructing Wadsworth to talk to the head of the Soviet delegation in Geneva, indicating that we had these indications and asking whether the Soviet Union desired to comment on the matter. I said we did not plan to give any publicity to our information until after the Soviet Union had had a chance to respond and also I thought that in the meantime we should try to get agreement on what our own program should be, if it appeared that the Soviet Union was planning to carry on testing during the Geneva talks.

The President approved of this approach to the Soviet Union. He said that so far as we were concerned, he thought that we might in any event have a respite from testing. He said that Dr. Teller had been talking to him and had indicated that the urgent testing up to October 31 had been so intense that there had been more testing than thinking, and that some period for appraisal and new planning was, in Dr. Teller's opinion, advisable.

I said that we would try to get agreement as between the Department of State, Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commis-

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. According to the President's Daily Appointment Book, this meeting was held from 11:17 to 11:30 a.m. (*Ibid.*)

sion as to what line we would take. I also mentioned that it would be important to coordinate with the British, who seemed to favor the continued suspension of testing by them and ourselves, presumably because they had no plans readied for further testing at this time.

JFD

188. Memorandum of Meeting With President Eisenhower

Washington, November 5, 1958, 11:45 a.m.

Present were members of the U.S. delegation to the surprise attack technical military discussions in Geneva beginning November 10, (Mr. William C. Foster, General Otto P. Weyland, and Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky), and the undersigned.

The President opened the meeting by inquiring about the departure time of the delegation. Mr. Foster responded indicating that they would depart in the early afternoon of November 5 and there ensued a brief exchange about travel conditions and the weather.

Mr. Foster pointed out to the President that the delegation was to meet with the experts of the other four powers on the Western "side" (UK, France, Canada, and Italy) on Friday¹ in Geneva, after having spent a week in consultations with their representatives in Washington. He described the consultations here as quite satisfactory.

The President indicated that he had expected a searching inquiry at his press conference earlier in the morning about the surprise attack conference but it was not forthcoming.² Mr. Foster said to the President that an explanation might lie in the fact that he had had on November 2nd, at the request of the State Department, an off-the-record press conference which was attended by 50 people and lasted 50 minutes; and this may have accounted for the lack of interest in the question at the President's

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. No classification marking. Drafted by Gordon Gray on November 6. Copies were sent to Ann Whitman and Andrew Goodpaster.

¹ November 7.

² For the transcript of the press conference, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958*, pp. 827-838.

press conference. Mr. Foster said that he had emphasized the technical-military nature of the impending discussions and described our approach to the conference as being objective and serious. He then indicated that he would like, following the meeting with the President, to make a statement to the press in the same vein expressing the President's interest in the conference and its purposes.

The President agreed that such a statement³ should be made saying that he felt it was well to publicize this effort.

Mr. Foster then reported to the President that he and his group had had fine support from the scientists in government, the military, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the State Department. He felt that an excellent team had been put together for the assignment. The preparation, he pointed out, had been difficult and massive, inasmuch as the whole spectrum of weapons and detection, inspection, and control techniques had necessarily been examined.

The President said that he understood because the problem was how to establish techniques to eliminate or minimize the chances of surprise attack; and that this is a very difficult task. He observed that following the rejection of his open skies proposal at the Geneva Conference in 1955, he himself would have had great difficulty in knowing how to go about the undertaking.

Mr. Foster said that if now the Soviets were willing to discuss open skies, his delegation was prepared to suggest photographic measures in real technical detail. Indeed, he felt that the delegation was prepared to discuss in detail and with clarity almost any problem which would arise in the discussions at Geneva. He also indicated that if the Soviets were not willing initially or at any point to get down to the business of the conference, the delegation was also prepared to argue questions of agenda, etc.

The President said that in his own experience this kind of discussion requires a great deal of patience. He said that talking with the Russians necessitated on occasions patience to the degree of wearing one's self thin, because there have been occasions when, almost at the last moment, the Soviets have arrived at something acceptable to us. He said that the inherent problem was that of people who are characterized by honesty and good intentions combatting people who are dishonest and whose intentions are not good. Thus we will take and agree only to those things that we can prove.

The President then adverted to his press conference in the earlier morning saying that with respect to such phrases as "spending radicals," he had made it crystal clear that he was not talking about the Democratic

³ Not found.

Party as such, but the "radical free spenders" in the Democratic Party. He emphasized that he said at the press conference that we must find some way to balance the budget and that this means scrutinizing expenditures every place, from Defense on down. He said that the United States is losing gold reserves and that we have a situation which will be intolerable unless we are able to bring expenditures in line with receipts.

Mr. Foster responded that in his opinion, the very thing that he and his delegation were about to engage in was the basis for hope for the future—that successful disarmament would make our budget problems easily manageable.

The President agreed, saying that we should think of all the things we might do if we had a Defense budget of only \$25 billion, for example.

Mr. Foster then said that it should be understood that in the forthcoming conference we can only begin to shape the tools which may be used in the future, but that he was hopeful for progress and success in this effort.

The President then said that he would like to make one particular request of the delegation: he indicated that it is entirely possible that the Russians might become freely talkative, and he would be most eager to have their views toward Communist China. He wondered if the Soviets were not really becoming concerned about Communist China as a possible threat to them in the future.

Mr. Foster indicated that they would actively bear this request in mind. He said that it had occurred to him that there may be some chance that an exchange of views of this sort was one of the things the Soviets had in mind when they agreed to the discussions, expressing his view that if the Soviet Union were not worried, they certainly should be.

The President then said that somehow we must find a mechanism which will disclose and assist in the elimination of duplicating weapons systems and weapons systems of purely an interim nature, and which would identify those areas in which we had too much procurement. He felt, he said, that if we could ever succeed in getting the position of Director of Research and Engineering in the Defense Department filled, this would be a big step toward accomplishment of this requirement.

Mr. Foster recalled that he had said something along this line to the President a year ago.

At this point the President said that he understood that it was desired that pictures be taken of the delegation with him, and asked me to get the photographers in.

189. Memorandum of Discussion at the 392d Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, December 23, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting, Agenda Items 1 and 2 concerning Canada, and Agenda Item 3. "A National Petroleum Program."]

4. *The Geneva Conferences on Nuclear Weapon Tests and on Surprise Attack*

Mr. William C. Foster, U.S. Representative at the Geneva Conference of Experts on Surprise Attack, reported that this Conference accomplished a great deal, despite newspaper stories to the contrary. The Conference, a long step forward, had been useful in three ways: (1) The U.S. and its allies had presented a united front against the Soviets; (2) The U.S. had, as a result of probing at the Conference, learned a great deal about the sensitivities of the Soviet Bloc. For example, it was clear that the Soviets would not permit inspection of missile-firing sites without receiving a great quid pro quo; (3) The complexity of the problem was now clearly apparent; but the resources of skill developed during the meetings will be available for future use in the national interest.

Continuing, Mr. Foster said it was clear the Soviets would permit inspection on their territory only if inspection was associated with some form of armament limitation. A purely technical form of military inspection to insure against surprise attack, therefore, appeared to be ruled out. The Soviets had indicated that their acceptance of inspection would depend on a one-third reduction of armed forces in Europe and the "denuclearization" of Germany. Mr. Foster hoped that the U.S. would seek to find a way of meeting this Soviet position. He would recommend that a high-level U.S. group study the problem and that a task force consult with the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow before another conference was held.

Mr. Quarles said he talked with Mr. Foster yesterday and was in agreement with him. Mr. Quarles believed the Surprise Attack Conference had enabled us to learn a great deal about Soviet attitudes. Mr. Foster said the Conference had unfortunately ended on an intemperate note because the Soviet delegate had been instructed by his government to reverse himself on the communiqué.¹ As a result, the Soviet delegate had made an intemperate attack on the U.S. at the end of the Conference.²

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Boggs.

¹ For the report of the conference as issued, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 1405–1406.

² Apparent reference to the December 18 statement by the Soviet Representative, printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, pp. 1325–1334.

Secretary Herter wondered whether an early report on our future position in this field was not required. The Soviets would probably make propaganda capital out of any reluctance on our part to reconvene the Conference after January 5. Mr. Foster agreed that the need for action was urgent; he hoped personnel would be assigned to study of the subject on a priority basis. The President asked Secretary Herter to initiate the necessary studies on the subject.

Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, U.S. Representative to the Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests, reported that the atmosphere of this Conference was different from that of the meeting described by Mr. Foster. A gathering of experts last summer had cleared away much of the underbrush in the nuclear testing field. Accordingly, the Conference began with five weeks of argument over the agenda, after which substantive matters were discussed. The first four articles of a proposed treaty were agreed on. Three of these agreed articles deal with control, to which the Soviets pay much lip service. The Soviet idea of control involves a veto by each nuclear power on the control commission and the staffing of control posts and inspection teams largely by the host country—e.g. in the USSR control would be exercised by 150 Russians plus 1 or 2 Westerners. In the course of the Conference, however, the Soviets had modified their positions considerably. Ambassador Wadsworth felt that the British would concede a great deal if necessary to avoid a breakdown of the negotiations. He believed the Conference had been a success, though a long road lay ahead. He looked forward to resumption of the negotiations in January.

The President thanked Mr. Foster and Ambassador Wadsworth for their interesting reports.

*The National Security Council:*³

a. Noted and discussed an oral report by Mr. William C. Foster, as U.S. Representative to the Conference of Experts for The Study of Possible Measures Which Might Be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack And For The Preparation of A Report Thereon to Governments.

b. Noted the President's directive that the Department of State should continue to take the lead in developing the United States position for further meetings of the Conference referred to in a above.

c. Noted and discussed an oral report by Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, as U.S. Representative to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests.

³ The following paragraphs and Note constitute NSC Action No. 2028, approved by the President on December 30. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

Note: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate implementation of b above.

[Here follow Agenda Items 5. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," 6. "U.S. Policy Toward Iraq," and 7. "Report by the Director, U.S. Information Agency."]

Marion W. Boggs

190. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, January 5, 1959.

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Killian
Dr. Fisk
General Goodpaster

Dr. Killian referred to the problem which Gordon Gray had discussed with the President on Saturday¹—that new data on underground tests indicates that the threshold of detectability is in the order of 20 KT rather than 5 KT. He thought we should get out a statement, making clear that we are being realistic and responsible in our approach.

The President said he had no objection to giving out the facts, but he would object to tying the release exclusively to the Hardtack II series. The Soviets would instantly say "Haven't you known this all along?" and charge us with bad faith. The President thought we could simply say that we have been refining our findings and conclusions over the years and we find them at variance with earlier data. Dr. Fisk commented that the change is in fact essentially the result of Hardtack II.

The President said he had thought two things would be involved as a result of this finding—a vastly greater number of stations, or exclusion of weapons up to 20 KT from the scope of the treaty. Dr. Killian confirmed

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on January 6.

¹ January 3. No other record of Gray's meeting with the President has been found.

that there will be a need for more stations, or more inspections, or both. He did not think the basic nature of our proposal was invalidated by this data. He did believe we would be subject to criticism if we did not relate our statement to the most recent tests. The President said we must think of our own people and those around the world, and avoid an impact on them which would tend to cause loss of confidence on their part. Referring to the point that the Hardtack II tests were necessary before we could know what the inspection requirements were, the President said that people would ask why we had not made these tests before we had started the negotiations. He referred also to the question why we did not indicate clearly the tentative nature of our findings on which the negotiations were premised. For these reasons he said he had wanted, before making the statements, to see if we couldn't put them on the basis of refinement of analysis. At this point Dr. Killian read a proposed text which the President indicated was agreeable to him.²

Dr. Killian referred to the broad purposes to be served by an agreement on suspension of testing as establishment of the principle of monitored inspection, and breaking through the iron curtain. The President indicated agreement, and commented that he is considering severing test suspension from the requirement for progress on disarmament generally, in order to keep the focus on valid inspection.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

² For text of the January 5 statement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, pp. 1335-1336.

191. Memorandum of Conversation With President Eisenhower

Washington, January 12, 1959, 9 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dulles
Secretary Herter
Secretary McElroy

General Twining
Mr. McCone
Mr. Gordon Gray
Mr. Farley (State)
Mr. Irwin (Defense)
General Loper
General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower

Secretary Dulles opened the meeting by presenting the basic policy program [*problem?*] of whether the United States should change its hitherto held position in the Geneva negotiation with respect to the discontinuance of nuclear testing that such discontinuance of testing should be linked with overall disarmament. Secretary Dulles pointed out that initially the U.S. Government sought an agreement which would be subject to termination on a year-to-year basis if satisfactory progress were not made toward other disarmament measures. Mr. Dulles indicated that the State Department view, which accords with the view of the U.S. Delegation, is that this has been found to be difficult of formulation as a treaty article, and has exposed us to the charge of wishing to connect extraneous matters which conceivably could be under the control of others. He pointed out that the Soviets are pressing us hard on the matter and it appears to the Department of State that they will use it as a breaking point rather than the issue of the control system which we conceive to be the real heart of the matter. The President stated that this had been his opinion for some time.

Secretary McElroy then presented the viewpoint of the Department of Defense. In so doing, he called attention to the fact that Defense had always been reluctant to stop testing. He recognized that there are political reasons for so doing, but prefers that those reasons be evaluated in agencies other than the Department of Defense. The position of the Department is that separation of these issues represents a further chipping away of our military position. The Soviets will continue to chip away and we should receive concurrent gains if we give way on this point. Actually, Secretary McElroy is not so concerned over the issue of separation of testing and disarmament, but he is vitally concerned with the next two steps, which are, (a) the question of periodic inspection of the performance of control arrangements, and (b) the issue of the manning of the control sites.

The President stated that two years ago he had visualized much propaganda mileage to be gained by a positive stand on this question on the part of the U.S. It had been his belief that the Soviets had no intention of allowing a true agreement on nuclear testing and that we would make many gains by pressing the issue. However, he had given way on this position in the light of resistance on the part of Defense and AEC. In the meantime, Dr. Rabi of the Science Advisory Committee had pointed out

the advantage weapons we hold, and we had started negotiations. However, because of the delay (much of it to get the results of Operation Hardtack in the field of anti-ICBM, anti-aircraft, etc.), we now will not, in the President's view, get the propaganda benefits which we would have received two years ago.

The President feels, however, that if we can get an agreement with respect to reciprocal inspection, the establishment of such a mechanism would be a great advance toward reducing the danger of war. He pointed out the further advantage to the Free World of obtaining a set of qualified observers within the USSR; he emphasized that any agreement which we sign must contain within itself a self-enforcing mechanism.

While agreeing with the Defense Department position on periodic inspection of the inspection system and of control post inspection manning, the President stated he visualized two courses which negotiations might run: (a) agreement based on recognizing the limitations of detection equipment, such as allowing explosions up to 20 KT underground, etc., or (b) an agreement going all the way—i.e. no explosions permitted—involving many, many stations. Either system must prove itself every day.

Some discussion on Soviet intentions followed in which the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense all agreed that the U.S. historically labors under the disadvantage in all its treaties of intending to fulfill these agreements, whereas other nations may not. In addition, the Secretary of State observed that the Soviets will probably insist on a veto in the control commission, and in this case, this would be a good issue to break on.

An examination of the draft reply to Macmillan¹ then followed. (The difficulties in wording were later worked out between State and Defense and approved by the President.)²

The discussion then took a somewhat philosophical turn with the President reviewing his theme that we should have pressed this issue some time ago in order to obtain the maximum propaganda value. He reiterated his belief that the Russians have no intention of making this system work. He agreed with Secretary Herter, however, that we would rather break the negotiations on the issues of control mechanism rather than the issue of linking of testing with disarmament.

General Twining then focused on the issue of the timing of evaluation of treaty enforcement. Specifically, he asked whether we are going to

¹ The draft has not been found.

² In the final text of this January 12 letter to Macmillan, Eisenhower agreed to drop U.S. insistence that any agreement on testing cessation have as an explicit requirement that there also be progress on disarmament in general. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower to Macmillan) See the Supplement.

wait for two or three years before we evaluate whether the treaty is working. He expressed the view that we should be able to stop at any time. Mr. McElroy pointed out the possibility open to the Soviets of ambiguous breaches which are not sufficiently clear for us to abrogate a treaty. Mr. Irwin, in this connection, expressed the view that by breaking the link between test suspension and disarmament, the way is clear for more frequent inspection of progress in setting up the inspection posts and conducting inspection operations.

The President recognized that there are plenty of pitfalls in this matter and asserted that we must “read all the fine print” carefully. He visualized that in view of the complicated nature of treaty enforcement, we would probably have to allow two years from date of signing before we expect the control mechanisms to be implemented. Thereafter, its success should be subject to annual review. In addition, he visualized that we would have to allow for limitation in the present state of the testing art and allow testing underground below certain limits. General Loper added a thought that a specific scheduling of the establishment of the inspection system by phases should be spelled out in a treaty annex, a draft of which is already in existence.³

The Secretary of State now called attention to some of the difficulties of carrying out a treaty of this type on the U.S. side. He stated that we tend to focus on the obstructionism of the Soviets, but called attention to the fact that implementing legislation would be difficult to obtain, particularly since it involves State as well as Federal legislation.

In response to a question from the President as to the size of each control post, Mr. McCone and General Loper described a post as comprising approximately 30 people and involving perhaps a square mile of territory. (This does not mean that the government must own the entire square mile, but must have access to certain areas by easement.) Due to our new discoveries, this estimate of the size of control posts is larger than those made initially. In this connection, Mr. McCone pointed out that our techniques of detecting shots are undergoing continual evolution. We have fired only three underground shots. He pointed out that these techniques should be recognized as being in a state of evolution even after the treaty is enforced.

To this the President responded that such an approach would be possible if we were dealing with sensible people, but not when we are dealing with the USSR. We should take a definite standard and adhere to it, making the Soviets live up to that standard. He further pointed out that the world must approve of what we are doing. He agreed with Mr. McCone that the world is most concerned with atmospheric contamina-

³ Not found. For text of the agreed parts of a draft treaty, including annexes, as of December 5, 1960, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pp. 376–387.

tion, for which we have an effective method of detection at this moment. He reiterated that a treaty would probably have to specify a lower limit on the size of explosions that are barred with an added proviso that no contamination be put into the atmosphere.

The Secretary of State pointed up a final diplomatic consideration, which is that our reversal of position as to the size of explosion which may be detected underground (within the current state of the art) will appear to the Soviets as a matter of bad faith. In Geneva the experts came out with unanimous conclusions on this matter and passed the question to the politicians. While the matter is in the hands of the politicians, we have now revised our technical estimates on nuclear detection capabilities. If the Russians did this, we would object strenuously. All present agreed that this fact has put us in a bad spot.

As a final thought, the President stated our treaty should include provision that specific schedules for annual construction, and operations should be reviewed by interested parties for satisfactory progress. He agreed that inspection must visibly indicate reasonable progress at all times. We cannot allow the concept, for example, that a country might *plan* for 2-1/2 years with a view to accomplishing necessary construction in the last 6 months.

John S.D. Eisenhower

192. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, January 12, 1959.

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Killian
Dr. Kistiakowsky
General Goodpaster

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that, as the Geneva meetings on Surprise Attack went along, he became more and more impressed with the haz-

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. According to Eisenhower's Appointment Book, this meeting lasted from 10:35 to 11:15 a.m. (*Ibid.*)

ards to the United States of a system of inspection against surprise attack. While we tabled papers asserting the value of such a system,¹ privately he had growing concern about it. Such a system would reveal detailed information on our deployments, our readiness, and the protective strengths and arrangements for our striking forces. If the system failed to give us warning, it would have given great net advantage to the Soviets. This advantage becomes especially great with ballistic missiles and supersonic aircraft.

The President recalled that he took initiative in 1955 (at Geneva) in proposing aerial inspection against the “means of delivery” of highly destructive weapons; at that time such means of delivery were aircraft. Except for that proposal, he said he had never been wedded to the concept of inspection against surprise attack. In particular, he questioned the significance of the far north, which to him is simply an area of passage.

Dr. Kistiakowsky added that, as against missile launching submarines, no way to monitor was seen. He added that both the scientists and the military men of the group came to feel that the only fruitful approach to this is to couple inspection with arms limitation. Through such a means, a reduction in the threat would be accomplished, without it being dependent for us upon obtaining split-second warning. There would be ample time to observe whether forces had in fact been reduced to and held at agreed levels. Such a limitation, in the case of aircraft, might provide that only so many could be in the air at once. Total numbers of missiles might be limited. As to submarines, not more than a certain number might be allowed to be on station.

The President recognized the difficulties but pointed out that, if we do not follow this line, we must face the question what line do we follow. He did not see much hope for a world engaged in all-out effort on military build-up, military technology, and tremendous attempts at secrecy. One reason for seeking an inspection system in connection with the atomic testing is that if we get one such system we may then be able to go on to another. He recognized that this matter is very difficult, but added that, with aerial inspection, we can find out where great military concentrations are located, and what is their state of readiness. Even if the Soviets should be contemplating a massive surprise attack, if they wish to secure the results of such an attack they must prepare forces to move into the devastated areas, and these we could see. He concluded by saying that, in the long run, no country can advance intellectually and in terms of its culture and well-being if it has to devote everything to military build-up.

¹ For texts of the major papers submitted by the Western Experts at the Geneva Surprise Attack Conference, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, pp. 1223, 1230–1264, 1275–1297, and 1306–1316.

Dr. Killian said that in view of the gravity of this matter there is a need to have a more sustained study under way. He suggested setting up study groups, and a standing group of top governmental officials concerned who would follow the matter. They would go deeply into the problems involved in monitoring surprise attack. Dr. Kistiakowsky commented at this point that the Soviets have had a high-powered group at work since the end of World War II on disarmament. They were very well up on this subject, as evidenced by the fact that when our delegation made proposals at Geneva, the Soviets instantly showed knowledge of the weak points and the implications of such proposals. The President agreed with the suggestion. He thought that someone should draw up a charter for the effort, showing just who would participate—i.e., from what agency, having what qualifications—whose time would be devoted to the effort, and who would comprise the top-standing body.

To indicate the need for a competent body in this area the President cited the importance of a periodic inspection of the inspection system and operations incident to supervision of suspension of atomic weapons tests.

Dr. Kistiakowsky added the point that everything to this point has been done on paper. He thought there was need for a high-level command (actually a task force) under the Joint Chiefs of Staff whose job would be to conduct monitoring and inspection, carry out maneuvers and tests against various combinations of forces and develop the necessary doctrine. The President thoroughly agreed. Dr. Killian recalled that our group at Geneva had proposed that we set up in the United States a small pilot system to see just how the proposals would work.

Dr. Killian next said that there is a group studying ways of improving the inspection system for the supervision of test suspension, thus offsetting the effects of the findings of the Hardtack II series of tests (which indicated that the test system devised last summer at Geneva is less effective than was then thought). The President said he saw possible merit in a scheme which allowed underground tests up to perhaps 10 KT. A corollary would be, however, that we would have to tell if test shots greater than this size were fired.

Dr. Killian next referred to some of Dr. Kistiakowsky's impressions and observations about the Soviet missile capability, since these impressions ran counter to our best intelligence estimates. Dr. Kistiakowsky said he was very much impressed with the importance that the Soviets attach to long-range ballistic missiles. These are in fact a focal point in their whole defense concept. They referred to it as a special area not subject to discussion at the Geneva meeting. He said it is his opinion that they now have an operational long-range missile force. The President said he could accept this possibility, but still holds a question as to the numbers and accuracy of such weapons. He then asked the question, if

the Soviets should fire these weapons at us, where this action would leave them. They would still be exposed to destruction. In his mind there is the question whether this is a feasible means of making war; he granted that it is a feasible way of destroying much of the nation's strength, but the resulting retaliation would be such that it does not make sense for war. He said he thought it would be at least a few years before the Soviets could conceivably have enough missiles so as not to have grounds to fear retaliation.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

**193. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to the President's
Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Killian)**

Washington, January 21, 1959.

DEAR DR. KILLIAN: The recent Geneva Experts Conference on measures to reduce the danger of surprise attack suspended its meetings without setting a date for reconvening, although the participants, in their report to governments, expressed the hope that "discussions on the problem of preventing surprise attacks will be resumed as early as possible".¹ However, it was the view of the Western Experts that we should not resume discussions until the governments had resolved the differences between the two sides regarding the scope and nature of the discussions. Our Delegation reports that the Western Experts also generally held the view that the West should not resume discussions with the Western side's terms of reference limited to studying methods of "inspection and observation" which might be useful in preventing surprise attack. In part because of Soviet unwillingness to engage in discussions within such a limited framework, the West would have been left with little more to say than what was presented during the first four weeks, and at the same time we would not, in fact, have been able to engage in a full military-technical analysis of the problem.

In future discussions of the surprise attack problem, we will probably have to be prepared to engage in an examination of disarmament

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology. Secret.

¹ The quote is from the report of the Conference on Surprise Attack, December 18, 1958, printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 1405–1406.

measures which might affect the surprise attack problem, and it is possible that such discussions may not be limited to the more narrow technical aspects. Whatever the scope and the forum of the next series of meetings dealing with surprise attack, it is inevitable that the United States will have to be prepared in the near future to discuss the surprise attack problem together with, or within the context of, arms control measures. It is necessary, therefore, that we examine the problem of surprise attack in a broader framework than was used for the studies conducted prior to the recent technical conference.

This examination would be facilitated by a high-level study of the surprise attack threat and of the value to the United States of various possible measures to reduce that threat, including arms limitation measures which might be in our interest. Such a study should be directed by a person appointed by the President and having wide experience in this area. I believe Mr. William C. Foster should be asked to assume this responsibility. The study group under his direction would report to the group which the President has asked to coordinate future preparations in the fields of test suspension and surprise attack: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. I would anticipate that such a report could be made within ninety days.

The main burden of the study should be carried by full-time personnel. However, it would be desirable to have a panel of consultants who could at appropriate times during the study contribute their views. Mr. Foster would, of course, be assisted by a full-time staff with appropriate representation from the Departments of State and Defense, Dr. Killian's Office, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Atomic Energy Commission, plus additional personnel of high competence in this field. Mr. Foster should be able to draw upon the services of the staff of the U.S. Delegation to the recent surprise attack discussions; I understand there is general agreement that this group represents an assemblage of experienced talent which would be difficult to duplicate.

Enclosed is a draft memorandum to the President which sets forth the terms of reference for the study.²

Because of the urgency of moving forward with this work, I hope that you will advise me of your views as soon as possible so that the memorandum can go forward to the President.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

² The draft memorandum to the President and attached terms of reference for the study group are in the Supplement.

194. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 26, 1959.

SUBJECT

Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests—Report of Panel on Seismic Improvement

PARTICIPANTS

State

The Under Secretary
Mr. Philip Farley—S/AE
Mr. Charles Sullivan—S/AE
Mr. Ronald Spiers—S/AE
Mr. Donald Morris—S/AE
Mr. Robert Rich—S/S

White House

Dr. James Killian
Mr. Gordon Gray
Mr. Bromley Smith
Mr. Spurgeon Keeny

AEC

Chairman McCone
Admiral Paul Foster

CIA

Mr. Allen Dulles
Dr. Herbert Scoville

DOD

Col. Fred Rhea

At Mr. Herter's request, Dr. Killian explained that the four promising approaches outlined in the first report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement¹ were, of course, based on preliminary considerations and that the members of the Panel were presently formulating recommendations for further studies. In particular, Dr. Street of Livermore Laboratory is preparing an estimate of what further underground nuclear explosions would be needed to provide more data. These recommendations will be reported at the second meeting of the Panel on February 9. He

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/1-2659. Secret. Drafted by Morris and approved by Spiers and Farley. Herter approved the memorandum on January 27.

¹ The Report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement, January 7, concluded that "four promising approaches are within the present limits of technology and should be considered." The four approaches were: 1) analysis of long-period surface waves, 2) a network of unmanned auxiliary seismic stations, 3) larger arrays of seismometers at manned control posts, and 4) detectors in deep holes. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament) The report and appendix are in the Supplement.

noted that the report was in general optimistic and said he felt it was conceivable that within the recommendations set out in the report, significant improvement of the capability of the Geneva System for dealing with the underground problem could be expected. Nonetheless, he felt we should have more data on this question if possible.

Dr. Killian said he felt it important that the U.S. Delegation be informed of the work of the Panel. However, he did not believe the Delegation should be authorized to provide the Soviet Delegation with more than the broad conclusions reached by the Panel and that details of the Panel's recommendations should be withheld until after the February 9th meeting and the techniques have been further evaluated. In this connection he thought it would be useful to have as soon as possible the quantitative analysis by AFOAT-1 of the effects on the capabilities of the Geneva System of the four approaches recommended by the Panel. Colonel Rhea noted that this analysis should be available by January 29.

Mr. Farley recalled that when we tabled the Hardtack II data on January 5, we informed the Soviet Delegation that our scientists were studying the implications of this new data and asked that their scientists join ours in Geneva to consider what the data would mean to the Geneva System. Thus, he felt we should give them as much of the Panel findings as possible, in order to show that we were trying to find solutions. He noted that our public position with regard to this problem will depend largely on what people think were our motives in making this data available to the Russians. He also drew attention to the fact that Senator Humphrey had described the Panel's conclusions in some detail on the Senate floor on January 20 so that the Panel's findings were coming into the public domain.

Mr. McCone said he felt that the longer we pursue our present position in the negotiations, the more difficulties we will encounter. He did not believe that our present position on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests will be accepted in the U.S. and noted that there is a wide school of thought which believes that the inadequacy of the data on seismic detection necessitates more tests to improve our knowledge in this field. He said that the AEC feels two or three years of experimentation will be required to obtain sufficient data to enable us to design a good system for monitoring underground tests.

For this reason the AEC wished to reaffirm its proposal that our position in the negotiations be changed to provide only for a discontinuance of atmospheric testing, with provision for a carefully developed plan of experimentation for the development of a system for monitoring underground tests. Otherwise, he believed that the U.S. would be pursuing a reckless course by relying on techniques which are based on inadequate appraisal and are too new to be fully understood. We would be

running a great risk of finding ourselves committed to an area of agreement which we would ultimately not be able to accept.

Mr. Herter reminded the group that we had proposed the present negotiations on the basis of the conclusions reached last summer by the Conference of Experts who had generally agreed that all nuclear explosions down to 5 kiloton yield could be monitored with 90% reliability. Now, of course, we are faced with the lessened capability of the Geneva System as a result of the new data. However important the resolution of this difficulty may be, he wished to note that Secretary Dulles feels that our tactics in the negotiations should be such that if the Conference fails for any reason, the break should be based on an issue such as control, which would be attributable to the Soviet position, and not on one on which we would bear the blame. Mr. Herter noted that, therefore, we are trying to focus discussion in the negotiations on the most critical matter—the question of adequate organizational arrangements for control. Until we are satisfied with the Soviet position on this matter, we believe it unwise to expose ourselves to the possibility of a break because of disagreement on the new data.

Colonel Rhea said he believed the Department of Defense would support Mr. McCone's position and that they would not support an agreement which would outlaw tests beyond the reach of detection.

Mr. Farley recalled that the Conference has not yet reached the point where the Soviets are faced with agreeing that every unidentified event can be inspected.

Mr. Gray asked Mr. McCone why the Commission thought a proposal seeking agreement on banning atmospheric tests alone would have appeal to the Russians. Mr. McCone replied that the AEC feels it would meet world public opinion because it would eliminate the problem of nuclear fall-out which seemed to be the primary concern. He wished to recommend this position not as a fall-back position, but as one on which we would take the initiative now in the negotiations.

Dr. Killian pointed out that it would be dangerous to propose an agreement to ban atmospheric tests, since that would imply that the fall-out hazard was real. If the Soviets refuse, our only fall-back from the new position suggested by Mr. McCone would be a unilateral cessation of nuclear tests. He felt that such a unilateral deprivation which left the Soviets free to test as they wished while we could test only in outer space and underground would be very dangerous for the U.S. He noted that there was substantial disagreement among scientists as to the value of underground testing.

Mr. McCone agreed that whereas we could expect to make some progress by testing underground, it would be far less than that by testing in the atmosphere. He personally did not feel that outer space testing was feasible in the near future.

Dr. Killian said he wished to make clear that an absolute and perfect control system could never be designed. The important considerations in control were the percentage capability and the deterrent aspects which a system would have. It is very likely, he felt, that the Geneva System as it stood prior to the Hardtack data would have been sufficient as a deterrent to any future testing. He believed that the scientists who are now considering the implications of the Hardtack II data will conclude that the Geneva System can be restored to its former capability. He stressed that the Geneva Experts' report was not "mistaken", but had been overtaken in some respects by new data. It is important to remember that science must always adjust to new data and that we must look to the probabilities and possibilities of improvement. It is, therefore, highly desirable that we pursue agreement on a system in the current negotiations that recognizes these possibilities and that will allow us to conduct such experimentation as may be needed to provide more data.

Mr. Farley said he believed we should make the Panel Report available to our Delegation with full contingent instructions as to what they may transmit to the Soviet Delegation. These instructions should enable them without delay to transmit a version of the Panel Report to the Soviet Delegation in the event of a press leak. He noted that we should also decide whether the information should be transmitted to the United Kingdom and to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Humphrey Disarmament Subcommittee. Moreover, in view of the Humphrey statement on the Senate floor, the public should at least be informed of the existence of the Panel.

It was agreed: (1) that the Delegation be provided with a copy of the first report of the Panel and that the State Department prepare instructions to the Delegation with regard to transmitting the general findings of the Panel to the Soviet Delegation; (2) that the Panel Report be transmitted to the United Kingdom; (3) that the Congressional Committees be informed of the existence and the work of the Panel in non-specific terms, with an explanation that the Panel has not yet finished its work; (4) that the line in any public discussion be similar to that in (3).

Mr. Herter noted that Mr. McCone had recommended an immediate change in our position at the negotiations which would provide for an agreement dealing only with atmospheric tests. He explained that the State Department considers this proposal as a fall-back position and that Secretary Dulles would be very much opposed to any immediate alteration in our present policy. He said he felt we should be sure that those who advocate such a policy change do so from the point of view of our national military security. He asked Mr. McCone if he wished to press for an immediate decision on this matter.

Mr. McCone replied that he had a deep conviction that the United States would be in serious trouble if the Soviets accepted our present

position in the negotiations and that the situation will become increasingly bad unless we revise our approach. He would like, however, to discuss more fully with the full Commission the question of seeking a meeting with the President on the AEC recommendation.

Mr. Gray said he felt that if the AEC and the Defense Department conclude that a change in policy should be undertaken, their recommendation should be taken to the President for discussion.

In response to a suggestion by Dr. Killian that we move ahead to plan for a program of underground tests to gain more data on the question of seismic detection and identification, Mr. Farley suggested that we would want to design a program which would provide an evaluation of any positive approaches such as the four suggested by the Panel. We would be in a far better position in making such a proposal if it could be shown that its purpose was not simply to prove difficulties but to test ways to overcome these difficulties.

Dr. Killian noted that Mr. Herter had asked him to convene a Panel of Experts to review the question of outer space detection and proposed a Panel under the Chairmanship of Dr. Panofsky of Stanford University. The other members of the Panel would be: Dr. Hans Bethe of Cornell University, Dr. Morris Bradbury of Los Alamos Laboratory, Dr. Arthur Donovan of the Space Technology Laboratory, Dr. Richard Latter of Rand Corporation, Dr. Pickering of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Dr. Abe Silverstein of NASA, Dr. Edward Teller of Livermore Laboratory and Dr. Whitson of ARPA. It was agreed that Dr. Killian should convene such a Panel as early as possible.

195. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 30, 1959.

SUBJECT

U.S. Position in Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

S/AE—Mr. Ronald I. Spiers

Mr. John A. McCone, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

Mr. McCone said that he had asked to see the Secretary in order to explain again the position of the AEC with respect to the Geneva nuclear test negotiations and to leave with the Secretary a letter setting out this position.¹ Mr. McCone, referring to the Berkner report,² said that the improvements which might be worked out and incorporated in the Geneva System to compensate for the difficulties disclosed by the new data from Hardtack II were theoretical and must be tested experimentally before they could be relied upon. Mr. McCone noted that the report itself was highly qualified in its conclusions. It pointed out a very important point: That we had no experimental data on the detection of nuclear explosions detonated in geological environments other than that in which the few underground tests to date have been conducted. We were basing our entire approach in the Geneva negotiations on a disturbing paucity of data. The AEC was unanimous in the view that we should change our approach in the negotiations and attempt to secure an agreement banning atmospheric tests with a provision for the ending of underground tests when further experimentation had cast more light on the problem.

Mr. McCone said that the AEC recognized that the responsibility for how the U.S. position was played out in the current negotiations lay with the Department of State. The new Hardtack data placed the U.S. in an awkward position and he could understand the reluctance of the Secretary to consider a shift in our position at this point. He wished to emphasize, however, that there was a deep and serious split among the scientists, who were lining up in a way that they did during the great debate over the development of the H-bomb. If and when agreement was reached with the Soviet Union and it was presented to Congress for consent to its ratification there would be a bitter argument that could be extremely damaging to this country. He added that the AEC was not putting forth its ideas simply with the objective of continuing nuclear testing. They were perfectly ready to end atmospheric tests. This would give us some measure, although modest, of penetration in the Soviet Union. A year or two later, after more experiments had been conducted, it might be possible to agree on a system of detection of underground tests with which everyone would be satisfied. Accordingly it was the strong view of the AEC that if there was an opportunity in the negotiations to change our directions we should take advantage of it.

The Secretary said that he did not doubt that there would be an opportunity to change our direction. He felt that there was not one

¹ The letter, dated February 2, is *ibid.*, Central Files, 700.5611/2-259. See the Supplement.

² Lloyd V. Berkner was the Chairman of the Panel on Seismic Improvement. Concerning its report (also known as the Berkner Report), see footnote 1, Document 194.

chance in a hundred that the Soviets would agree to the controls that we think are necessary to police the agreement we had in mind. He enumerated the problems that related to the veto, to the nationality of staffs and to the problem of mobility of inspection teams. He did not feel that the alternative was either calling off the negotiations or proceeding on a fresh basis. If the 100 to one chance were to come about, and it appeared that the Soviets would accept our control requirements there would still be an opportunity to consider whether our approach should be changed. However, if the chance were so small that we would have to change our position, why do it? Such a change would allow the Russians to break off the negotiations with the United States bearing the entire blame for their failure. It was in some degree for public relations reasons that we had undertaken these negotiations in the first place, since we were losing a great deal throughout the world as a consequence of our position on nuclear testing. We do not want to be back where we started. The Secretary mentioned that he had just had a meeting with his panel of disarmament advisers and that this subject had been discussed. The advisers appeared to agree unanimously that the tactics that we were pursuing were proper. Accordingly, he felt that the State Department needed leeway to work out the best tactics in dealing with the problem. He felt that the press treatment that had been given to the controversy over the course of the negotiations was most regrettable and was quite damaging to our position. The Russians were harping on these articles, claiming that they proved we were looking for a way to break the negotiations off. Mr. McCone agreed that the press treatment was unfortunate and said that he had been advised by one representative of the press that the State Department had been the source of information.

**196. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate
General in Geneva**

Washington, January 30, 1959, 8:21 p.m.

1158. Eyes only Wadsworth from Secretary. Have just completed talk with my disarmament consultants, namely Gruenther, Lovett,

McCloy and Bedell Smith.¹ Also McCone has just presented me with a formal communication from AEC.² Think you should be aware that there is growing apprehension in informed private circles in Defense and AEC, in Congress and in the country as a whole lest these suspension-of-test negotiations involve us in agreements which are far from being "fool proof" so far as inspection and controls are concerned. I consider it of the utmost importance that we concentrate upon forcing the Soviets to show their hand with respect to controls and ascertain whether or not they will demand veto power in Control Commission on substantive matters and whether they will insist that the local control posts in the Soviet Union be manned basically by Soviet nationals. If they demand both, or indeed either of these, then I believe our whole approach must be basically changed. Until we know this I believe it is dangerous to proceed with other aspects of the program. I am confident that you can give the negotiations this direction.

With best personal regards, Foster Dulles.

Dulles

¹ The memorandum of the conversation, January 30, is *ibid.* See the Supplement.

² See footnote 1, Document 195.

197. Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State

London, February 5, 1959, 2 a.m.

Secto 7. Secretary, Macmillan and Lloyd this evening¹ had preliminary discussion of Geneva negotiations on nuclear testing. Secretary urged importance of focusing on controls issue, if necessary breaking off present conference on this issue. Suggested that U.S. and UK could at that point propose to Soviets reciprocal forbearance atmospheric tests, citing their injurious effects and detectibility outside country of origin.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/2-559. Secret. Repeated to Geneva for the U.S. Delegation.

¹ February 4.

He noted there is influential body of opinion in the U.S. holding that we should not agree to any test suspension except within the realm of detectability and expressed certainty U.S. Senate would not ratify a treaty incorporating current Soviet proposals on veto in control system, even if, as he understood British were considering proposing, intention to denounce treaty in event veto used were announced.

Macmillan wanted time for further consideration this matter. Although acknowledging merit of Secretary's proposal in relieving humanity of dangers of atmospheric tests, he felt it left undesirably unsolved larger problem of achieving effective control of armament. He suggested, and Secretary indicated agreement, that Secretary's plan might be modified to provide for continued negotiations on controls after initiation reciprocal forbearance on atmospheric tests.

It was apparent that Macmillan and Lloyd were not fully in accord. Whole subject will be further considered Thursday morning.²

Dulles

² The meeting on the morning of February 5 was reported in Secto 9 from London, February 5. Dulles met again with Macmillan, Lloyd, and Ormsby Gore, and the British acknowledged that the object of the U.S. agreement to break the link between testing and disarmament was to focus on control. Therefore, the U.S. and British officials agreed to do so and give further study to the question of duration of the agreement and the fall back position of reciprocal forbearance of testing with continuing negotiations on control. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/2-559) See the Supplement.

198. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Greene) to the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Disarmament and Atomic Energy (Farley)

Washington, February 12, 1959.

I have told the Secretary on the telephone that you and Mr. Dillon are considering the next moves in the nuclear suspension test talks in Geneva.¹ The Secretary considers that the question of composition of the

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Confidential; Personal and Private.

¹ The transcript of the February 11 telephone conversation between Greene and Dulles is *ibid.* See the Supplement.

control organization is irrelevant as long as the Soviets would have the veto power. The Secretary said he was not sure but what we should call Wadsworth home advertising that he is coming home to consider the grave situation created by Soviet demands for a veto, and indicating it may not be worthwhile to carry on the talks any longer.

The Secretary said if we call the talks off, we would probably have to make a counterproposal—one less far reaching in scope, and along the lines that were discussed with Mr. Macmillan in London (Secto 7),² and that have also been Mr. McCone's idea and also more or less Senator Gore's idea.³

This might be done by a letter to Khrushchev from the President; it should also be considered whether we want to act unilaterally, or together with the British. Macmillan might not want to write Khrushchev in view of his forthcoming trip to Moscow. We should also consider whether parallel letters from the President and Macmillan would tend to put Macmillan in the position of an intermediary or negotiator in our behalf.

The Secretary suggested a formulation along the following lines for a communication to the Soviets:

"Your position on the veto power and all other substantive aspects of control destroys any real control. There is, therefore, no alternative but to devise a course of action which on the one hand will not require controls but which, on the other hand, will spare mankind the growing danger of nuclear contamination. Therefore, we propose for the time being, and until further notice, not to have any more atmospheric explosions and to confine any explosions to underground. We hope you will do the same. If you will do the same, then at least the main concern of mankind will be satisfied. If you don't do it, then we will have to reconsider."

The Secretary thought that in view of Governor Herter's active concern with these matters in the past, he should be consulted about the next moves. If it could not wait until his return, then a telephone call might suffice.

² Document 197.

³ On November 17, 1958, Senator Albert Gore orally proposed to Eisenhower that the United States try a new approach at the Geneva Conference to consist of a Presidential announcement of unconditional and unilateral cessation of all atmospheric tests for 3 years, a call for similar action by other nuclear powers, and concentration by the negotiators on a limited treaty for permanent stoppage of atmospheric tests. Gore followed up this suggestion with a memorandum to the President on November 19, 1958. The Gore memorandum is attached to a memorandum from Gray to Eisenhower, January 8, 1959, which also contains the views of the Department of State and the AEC on the Gore proposal. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Disarmament) See the Supplement.

The Secretary also asked that there be appropriate consultation with Congressional leaders on the matter.

Joseph N. Greene, Jr.⁴

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

199. Memorandum of Meeting

Washington, February 12, 1959.

MEETING ON NUCLEAR TESTING

PARTICIPANTS

Gordon Gray
Dillon—G. Smith—P. Farley
McCone—Starbird
Allen Dulles
G. Allen
Beckler—Keeny
(No Defense representation because Mr. Quarles was called to the President's office)

1. Mr. Gray explained that he had called the meeting of the group, the first in two and one-half weeks, because of the view held by Mr. McCone and Mr. Quarles that the U.S. position on nuclear testing, as well as our present public posture in the Geneva negotiations, needed to be discussed. Mr. Gray made clear that he did not expect any decisions to be made by Mr. Dillon in the absence of Mr. Herter who had been handling the test policy.
2. Mr. Farley, at Mr. Dillon's request, gave a report on the progress of the Geneva negotiations:
 - a. Soviet insistence on the veto and discussion of the Soviet position on controls have been kept as the major issues.
 - b. The Soviet position on controls has shifted from a very hard one to a more reasonable one, including Soviet requests for Western counter-

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up. Confidential. Drafted by Smith on February 13. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. A handwritten note on the memorandum by Gordon Gray reads: "This is in accord with my recollections. GG. 17 Feb. 59."

proposals to their stated views on controls. There is no evidence that the Russians would accept controls satisfactory to us but the negotiations should be continued until Soviet unreasonableness is made more clear publicly and their present posture of appearing willing to negotiate on controls is revealed as being insincere.

c. The Soviet public position on issues other than controls is better than it should be. Therefore, Western efforts must be continued to make clear publicly the unsatisfactory nature of the Soviet final position.

d. The USSR does not now appear on the verge of breaking off the negotiations. Three weeks ago they appeared to be leading up to a break. Now Soviet delegates in Geneva have told U.S. officials there that the Russians are prepared to stay indefinitely and, if there is to be a break, force the U.S. and the UK to make it.

3. In response to a question by Mr. Allen as to whether our aim in Geneva is a propaganda victory or the achievement of a test suspension agreement, Mr. Dillon replied:

a. At the outset, we wanted an agreement if the Russians would meet us on controls and inspection. We have now come to feel that the Russians will not sign an agreement acceptable to us.

b. Data which we have learned since the Geneva technical negotiations last summer, if known then, might have led us to avoid undertaking the negotiation of a treaty. In addition, the new data has led us to believe that an agreement such as that visualized by the technicians last summer is less desirable now than we thought then.

c. Therefore, propaganda has now moved into the ascendancy and our future tactics will seek to prevent the Russians from putting on us the onus for failure of the treaty negotiations.

d. The tactical problem consists of concentrating the discussions on controls and disengaging at the best possible time. To do so, we will:

(1) Introduce boiler-plate articles to keep the discussions going and to avoid future Soviet accusations that we did not even try to discuss all aspects of the treaty.

(2) Keep the talks on dead center until Prime Minister Macmillan returns from his visit to Moscow. Secretary Dulles discovered that Mr. Macmillan's views on nuclear testing treaty were unsatisfactory when he discussed the issue with him recently in London. The Prime Minister was "soft" on the question of controls and appeared willing to take a test cessation agreement at almost any price. Mr. Dillon said Secretary Dulles had persuaded him differently and helped to bring him back to a stronger position, but that nothing should be done in Geneva or with the British which would prompt the Prime Minister to go back to his earlier position while discussing the issue with the Russians in Moscow.

4. Mr. McCone said he unfortunately had to leave the meeting but urged that another meeting of the group be held promptly to discuss the substantive issues of the U.S. position. He pointed out:

a. If we continue to negotiate with the Russians indefinitely in Geneva, in effect we have accepted a test suspension without an agreement.

b. The second Berkner report may turn out to be more pessimistic about improving the capabilities of an underground test monitoring system than the first. The Berkner reports are based on tests in a single geographic area and in a single geological formation. Further underground tests will be required to obtain authoritative data applicable to underground tests in differing areas and formations. The technology of a deep underground monitoring system requires further development.

c. Increasing concern has been expressed to him by several Congressmen who feel that the U.S. may be led into an area where we almost had to accept an unsatisfactory test suspension agreement.

5. Mr. Dillon said the State Department had no intention of continuing negotiations in Geneva indefinitely, nor did it intend to abandon the present firm position on the detection and control system. He said that the talks would be broken off when it was possible to do so advantageously. In the meantime, in order to keep the discussions going, the U.S. Delegation would introduce only minor matters (details of control, staffing, finance, etc.). In response to a question by Allen Dulles, Mr. Farley said there were plenty of minor matters to discuss for a considerable period of time without tabling additional important substantive articles.

6. Mr. Allen stated his belief that the U.S. should now move to a position of seeking the cessation of atmospheric tests only. He expressed a fear that if eventually we planned to seek an atmospheric only test ban, it would be a mistake to try to put the Russians in a difficult propaganda position now because, if we succeeded, the Russians would be hostile toward an atmospheric test ban.

7. Mr. Beckler, representing Dr. Killian's office, asked whether the State Department's doubts regarding the possibility of negotiating a satisfactory nuclear suspension treaty were based primarily on technical considerations. He pointed out that many technical facts had not yet been determined. Further study by the scientists would be required before they were willing to come to firm conclusions regarding the capabilities of underground test detection. He said that the technical situation was not as bad as Mr. Dillon had made it out to be. He said there was no reason to be pessimistic, and therefore no decision to abandon efforts to obtain a treaty could be based on a statement that technically a satisfactory treaty was impossible. In reply, Mr. Dillon repeated State's belief that the primary reason why the Department doubts that a treaty will result from the Geneva negotiations is Soviet insistence on the veto, and only secondarily on the technical difficulties of monitoring tests.

8. Mr. Gray stated that it appeared that Defense, AEC and Mr. Allen favored giving up the present U.S. position and proceeding to try for an agreement prohibiting only atmospheric tests. He indicated his belief that if the President were asked to decide whether to continue negotiations as we are now doing or to change the U.S. policy as suggested above, he would favor the former position.

Mr. Gray expressed his concern that possible policy differences were being aired in the press, that a Congressional hearing might lead to full public airing of any differences, and that a charge might be made that although there are differing views among Cabinet members, there had been no real opportunity for the proponents of these views to be heard.

Mr. Gray indicated that the group should meet again in the near future for a discussion of the substantive issues, possibly before the completion of the second Berkner report, which will not be ready before March 6.

(Mr. Keeny, who met with the Berkner panel last week, indicated his belief that the second Berkner report would not materially change the conclusions reached in the first report. He said that he felt that the scientists would not be willing to make firmer judgments as to the effectiveness of additional seismic techniques but would recommend further underground tests not limited to one geographic or geological area. He added that the scientists at their next meeting on March 5 would be prepared to add their views on the question of concealing or covering underground tests.)

Bromley Smith¹

¹ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

200. **Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests to the Department of State**

Geneva, February 16, 1959, 11 a.m.

Supnu 283. For Herter from Wadsworth. I have been giving careful thought to the basic question of whether or not it is in our interest to go further with these negotiations. One thing is clear. We have to make up our minds right away. We have been focusing on the central issues of control for just about a month. We have talked at great length about the key issues of veto, staffing, and inspection. I think that as of this moment we are in a good position on all these points and that the differences between us and the Soviets are clearly registered. But we cannot expect to go on talking about these points alone without running real risk that these major issues will get blurred. The Soviets obviously have every interest in trying to make themselves look less bad and they are trying hard to fuzz up the differences between us. The British have acted very well so far but it is evident that because of their domestic public opinion they are itching to start compromising on staff, inspection, and even the veto in a way which could help the Russians to confuse and undermine our public position. I think therefore that we must now decide whether we are going to wind up these negotiations at least temporarily or whether we should start talking about other things, and begin the kind of compromises and negotiations which would be necessary if there were to be any possibility of making an agreement with the Soviets.

Know that this is an important decision and that if we choose to arrange a recess of these talks it must be done in a way which does not seem to close doors upon further negotiations with regard to stopping tests or other fields of disarmament. And of course the U.K. would have to be consulted. I know that there are many important considerations, aside from those involved in these particular negotiations, which you must take into account in reaching a decision. I think though that it will be helpful to you to have my thinking about our position here.

As you know, I have been cautiously optimistic from the start of the negotiations until after the Christmas recess. I have a tremendous emotional desire to make a success of these talks. However, I have reluctantly come to believe that it would be wiser for us to find some way of stopping these negotiations now for some time at least. Two things have led me to this belief.

In the first place it does not seem at all likely that the Soviets are willing or ready to make basic changes in their position and allow the degree

of control that would be necessary for a treaty. If we go on with the negotiations we will get into problems such as threshold and phasing which can involve us in very real difficulties. I am not confident that the possibilities of securing Soviet agreement are sufficient to warrant our moving into these tricky and complicated issues where our position from the point of view of public opinion is bound to be less favorable.

Secondly, although I naturally cannot judge what the thinking is at home I am afraid that the general effect of the new seismic data has been such that any control arrangements that the Soviets might possibly agree to would certainly not be considered "fool-proof" by our own people and might well not be considered even an adequate deterrent by the Senate.

We began these negotiations on the basis of the agreed conclusions of the experts. Our own people had the idea that this system would give adequate protection. But in the middle of the conference we found that the system had been overrated, or is at least suspect. The net result is that even in the unlikely case the Soviets should agree to a treaty, the arrangement, whatever its provisions, would not in many quarters meet the expectations which have been created. We would, I am afraid, have real trouble with our own public opinion and might well fail to get Senate consent to ratification. This, in my opinion, would be far worse for the U.S. than failure to agree here.

Accordingly, I believe that it is the wisest thing now to arrange a recess for these negotiations. I will give you my ideas in later messages on how this might be done with least damage and the things I think should be done by us here before a recess. But I believe you should know that I think it best for us to wind up this phase of the negotiations as soon as possible.

201. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, February 17, 1959.

OTHERS PRESENT

Acting Secretary Herter
General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of Secretary Dulles' illness and the possibility of a Foreign Ministers Conference.]

Mr. Herter next recalled that Mr. Macmillan is going to Moscow in the next few days. Currently the Geneva talks on the suspension of atomic tests are practically stalled. We have concluded the Soviets are not going to give in on the inspection issue. They seek veto power, and we believe we may have to break off the negotiations. The President said that there must be no technical conditions bearing on this. If there is a break, it must be on the refusal of the Soviets to provide for inspection—on their insistence upon a veto.

Mr. Herter said that with Macmillan's trip coming up, he clearly wants to give in on this matter, because of his forthcoming elections. We must have an agreement as to what we are going to do and what procedures we are going to follow. He added that Mr. Wadsworth now believes that it will not be possible to get an agreement that the Senate would or should ratify.

The President said that voluntary disengagement will be extremely difficult to explain. He thought the text of our instructions should have a sentence to the effect that we have come to the conviction that the talks are bound to fail because of the intransigence of the Soviets in insisting on a veto in every phase of inspection; while we cannot foresee the exact conditions on which the break will probably take place, we must make clear that the one thing on which there cannot be retreat is insistence on an effective inspection system. Mr. Herter said he planned to tell Caccia just this today. The President said we should not tell anyone we are preparing to pull out. Instead we should say we believe negotiations are about to break down because of Soviet insistence on the veto.

As to the next step in this case, Mr. Herter referred to Secretary Dulles' ideas about a fall-back position. The President recalled that this related to atmospheric tests. Mr. Herter said that if negotiations break down the plan is then to make an offer regarding atmospheric tests, but not to suggest it to Macmillan now. He repeated that Mr. Wadsworth thinks we should break off negotiations now.¹ The President asked whether recessing would not be a better formula but Mr. Herter said it is not as dramatic as breaking off and shifting the discussion to the Disarmament Committee of the United Nations. The President suggested additional language to the effect that our problem is to be completely prepared for disengagement on terms that would be understood by the whole world regardless of whether the negotiations are broken off by them or by us. The President added that without satisfactory control arrangements he would rather handle the testing problem simply by making a unilateral statement.

¹ See Document 200.

[Here follows discussion of President Eisenhower's upcoming trip to Mexico.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

202. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, February 23, 1959.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter
General Goodpaster

The discussion centered on a draft of a proposed reply, prepared by the State Department, for the President to make to Mr. Macmillan on the subject of the Geneva negotiations for suspension of atomic testing.¹ Mr. Herter said that the British are now advancing the idea of agreeing on a certain number of allowable inspections that can be made each year.

The President indicated he did not see much merit in this proposal. He also commented that a careful reading of Macmillan's letter shows a certain confusion as to what he means by control; his real meaning seems to be "detection." The President recalled that he had agreed with Secretary Dulles that we do not have to have a system better than that agreed upon a year ago. We do, however, have to have the right to go in and inspect any questionable occurrence.

In further discussion, the President extensively modified the State Department proposal, in order to concentrate very directly upon the question of the veto. This is the breaking point in the negotiations, provided always that the system of stations and procedures is reasonable and satisfactory.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on February 24.

¹ The draft reply, attached to a February 22 memorandum from Herter to the President, is in Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/2-2259. See the Supplement. The draft reply was in response to a February 20 letter from Macmillan, in which Macmillan suggested that it would be worth the risk involved in accepting something less than perfect control, "if we can create a control system which involves a sufficient degree of risk to a potential violator that he cannot get away undetected." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Eisenhower) See the Supplement.

Mr. Herter commented that Secretary Dulles thinks there would be considerable merit, because of the complexity of this whole issue, in finding some way to break off the negotiations in Geneva—inasmuch as the Soviets apparently are not going to agree on an effective inspection system—and put the whole matter into the Disarmament Committee of the U.N. At that time we could focus on the question of atmospheric testing, and eliminate other features of the proposals. Mr. Herter said that Lord Hood is coming in to see him today, and planning to talk about the suggestion for agreeing upon a fixed number of inspections per year. He asked if he might take up this reply with Lord Hood, and The President said he could give the message to Hood for delivery.

Mr. Herter told the President that Mr. Macmillan had sent a copy of his note to the President to British negotiators in Geneva. He suggested that the President might send similarly a copy of his own reply. The President objected vehemently and said there was to be no distribution of his private correspondence with Macmillan. He said that Mr. Herter could give the substance of the position approved by the President in a separate wire but that his text must not be disseminated. He added that if ever we know that Macmillan's letters to the President are being distributed, that will finish the use of this method of communication.

[Here follows discussion of leaks of prospective appointments within the Eisenhower administration.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

203. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, February 25, 1959, 3:25 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Killian
General Goodpaster

The President said he had asked Dr. Killian to stop in so that he might discuss one or two matters relating to the progress of the negotiations at Geneva for the suspension of atomic testing. He recalled that we have separated our proposals on suspension of testing from efforts in the

direction of general disarmament in order to improve the possibilities of obtaining an agreement. By eliminating any extraneous features we have centered the negotiation on the crucial point—the right to carry out inspection untrammelled. The President thought that if we have stations such that we can detect if the Russians test a weapon in the air, and can be sure they are not setting off large weapons underground, then the idea of teams to be sent out from place to place seems rather secondary in importance.

Practically, the President said he doubted whether such teams could find the sites of underground explosions of a size say of 20 kilotons. He also commented that he and the Secretary of State were in agreement that the provision of teams is not a feature of too great importance in this scheme.¹ Accordingly, he is wondering whether we could not agree that the system will not apply to tests below say 10 kilotons—what would be prohibited would be tests in the atmosphere and tests underground above a certain size. He thought that if we bar some underground tests, but then cannot be sure they are not occurring, the tendency for suspicions to arise will be very great, and our whole nation will become more and more jittery.

The President said what we are concerned about is that we do not want to be vetoed as regards the reading of instruments in the fixed stations and making the decision to conduct an inspection. Dr. Killian agreed that this is vital. The President said that what is essential is the right to inspect.

Dr. Killian then said that a great deal depends on the size of explosion which is set as the "threshold." There exists a problem of possible concealment of underground tests, the difficulty of which is not yet understood, although we expect to have data and findings in about ten days. There is, at least theoretically, and perhaps practically, the possibility of accomplishing "decoupling" of an explosion from its surrounding environment, and if this can be done the result would be to blur and fuzz the seismographic data, and hence invalidate the threshold concept.

¹ Earlier on February 25, at 9:25 a.m., Eisenhower and Killian briefly discussed the negotiations at Geneva. The memorandum of conversation by Goodpaster reads as follows:

"The President asked Dr. Killian to talk to Mr. Herter concerning our minimum position on inspection in connection with the negotiations on suspension of atomic testing now under way in Geneva. Specifically, he is to examine the limits of the position which might be acceptable to us.

"For example, they should consider the acceptability of a system adequate to give assurance against atmospheric shots and underground shots above a certain size. Under this concept, the suspension of tests would be limited to these particular modes.

"Dr. Killian said he would go into the matter with Mr. Herter." (*Ibid.*)

With regard to Mr. Macmillan's idea of setting an allowable number of test inspections each year, the basic problem is of course the one of discriminating between underground explosions and earthquake shocks. Unless there were authority to visit the site of shocks, there could be no confidence that they were not underground tests. Dr. Killian said that there is good indication that the capability of the Geneva system can be restored by the addition of new methods; although determination is not final, this might include the necessity to add to the number of observing stations.

I suggested that if the problem is in fact as the Russians are indicating a deep concern over the misuse of this system to make it serve simply as an intelligence device, it might be possible to meet this concern through assurances and safeguards against the misuse or promiscuous use of the inspection system. The type of misuse about which they are concerned would be of the form of frequent inspection trips not based upon seismographic events which in fact require investigation. Without obstructing the right to conduct such inspections, means might be found to audit them after they are made to assure that they were not carried out without valid basis. The President thought there might be some merit in such an effort.

G
Brigadier General, USA

204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests

Washington, March 10, 1959, 1:15 p.m.

Nusup 260. Eyes only for Wadsworth from Acting Secretary. British being advised our thinking on Geneva negotiations along following lines.

We are convinced present phase Geneva negotiations should be recessed at early date. If we do, we will be in position state openly to world the principle of effective international control system not subject to veto or obstruction. If we do not recess soon, we will be drawn into prolonged inconclusive discussions confusing and obscuring basic

issues without making real progress. We have now tested possibilities of shift in Soviet position. However, Soviet reception of UK informal suggestions to Khrushchev appears to be that these are signs of Western readiness compromise on veto.

Our purpose in negotiations is to reach agreement on sound principles which will be good precedent for future disarmament agreements. Stopping nuclear tests is of secondary importance. These tests are already temporarily suspended and UK is aware of our tentative thinking that this reciprocal forbearance might be continued indefinitely for atmospheric tests if a test ban agreement proves unobtainable. Continuing present negotiations without pause to highlight principles involved will face us with widespread expectation of compromise on principles of international control just for sake of stopping tests and increasing complexity of debate will make it increasingly difficult to stand on principles.

UK also advised we would welcome pause in order enable us to clarify our thinking on some aspects of control system. High altitude and underground study groups just completing their work. Their conclusions require careful assessment as to implications for control system agreed on by experts.

We further advise UK our view recess well before end of month will not interfere with progress toward negotiations with the Soviets on other outstanding issues and will actually assist in objective of reaching sound test suspension agreement. We do not want sharp or complete break and would handle a recess in such manner as to make this clear. If possible, a recess would be taken by agreement to enable delegates to report back their governments. We would of course continue withhold nuclear testing under terms announced in White House statements August 22 and November 7.¹ We suggest possibility letters from President and Prime Minister to Khrushchev explaining our approach to negotiations and our continuing desire devise effective international control system. We state readiness welcome discussion status negotiations in UN Disarmament Commission since we believe principles we have insisted on would receive general endorsement.

UK views requested prior Macmillan visit Washington.

¹ Regarding the August 22 statement, see Document 175. In the November 7 statement, Eisenhower announced that the Soviet Union was continuing to test nuclear weapons and thus the United States was not obligated to continue its testing suspension begun on October 31, 1958. Nevertheless, Eisenhower stated, the United States and the United Kingdom would continue to suspend testing "for the time being," but "if there was not a corresponding renunciation by the Soviet Union, the United States would be obligated to reconsider its opinion." The full text of the statement is in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, p. 1221.

In view approach to UK summarized above, Department will defer commenting on proposals for temporary recess in Supnu 323 and Supnu 325² at least until initial response received from UK.

Herter

² Dated March 8 and 9, respectively. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-959) Both are in the Supplement.

205. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, March 17, 1959, 9:45 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter
Deputy Under Secretary Murphy
Assistant Secretary Merchant
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Hagerty
General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower

Secretary Herter explained the reason for his requesting this meeting: to summarize for the President matters which Prime Minister Macmillan might bring up on his forthcoming visit.

[Here follows discussion of a possible summit and Berlin.]

The President now turned to the question of our position on nuclear testing. He feels it is no longer quite right for us to be rigid in the details on such matters as inspection merely because we have been rigid in the past. All available evidence indicates that nuclear testing is bad. The allowable dose of strontium 90 is being approached in some foods in some areas of the country. With this development, the President feels that we would no longer test atomic weapons in the atmosphere. There is a requirement now for a system which both sides know would work. He realizes that some small test shots might not be detected, and elaborately

placed underground shots are reported to reduce the shock effect on technical equipment by a factor of 1000 to 1. Therefore, he feels we would be best off by agreeing that small weapons may be tested. We should work on a system which would operate without a veto and still be meaningful. This would comprise a definite promise to the world that we would cease testing in the atmosphere.

The President continued with the thought that the scientists will say that any nuclear war would be disastrous, at least for the Northern Hemisphere. This might point to a suspension of the use of all atomic weapons, around which we have built our forces, and require us to go back to conventional tactics. All this he cited in support of his idea that we should be working toward acceptance of a test ban, which may not be so good as we want, but would test whether both sides are acting in good faith.

Secretary Herter stated that the negotiations are looking toward a three-week recess. Both sides have agreed only that they cannot agree on the veto system. The Soviets primarily fear espionage connected with inspection for underground testing. Secretary Herter believed that we can suspend atmospheric testing, possibly by the device of a renunciation on both sides or possibly by a treaty. Although the matter of the threshold has not yet been approached to the Soviets, it is expected that the Soviets will refuse any such proposal.

The President then referred to Macmillan's idea that inspections might be held to a certain finite "maximum number." This the President regards as infeasible. He feels that Macmillan derives his enthusiasm for this idea from the fact that Khrushchev told him it might offer some hope. Secretary Herter stated that the idea of equality of sides had appealed to Khrushchev. Mr. Merchant added that the whole thing was pretty vague.

The President continued with his idea that one thing we must bring about is a system where each side has reasonable rights, which may not be stopped by veto. If we are unsuccessful in bringing about such an arrangement, we will forego one opportunity to demonstrate that we *can* get one meaningful agreement. Secretary Herter mentioned that we have, in our negotiations, tabled many papers with regard to control terms, geared to prevention of their use as devices for spying. We have not yet approached the threshold question. He added that the Soviets have refused to go beyond scientific agreements of last summer. He and the President agreed that our technical agreements of that time had been a mistake. We had gone too far in basing an international agreement on the data received from one underground test. We are now in an awkward position.

The President turned to the question of negotiations on prevention of surprise attack. Here there has been some divergence of views

between the State Department and the Defense Department in regard to the feasibility of a study to determine what we can concede in this area. The President expressed some annoyance at this and said that the Department of Defense is not a policy-making agency. Defense policy should be confined to determining what should be our defense posture. Accordingly, he directed Secretary Herter to initiate the organization of this study, and to send a memorandum to Secretary McElroy informing him that the President had directed that this study be conducted. The President will mediate any disagreements which come up in formulating the study.

[Here follows discussion of the Near East, the wool tariff, preparations for Macmillan's visit, and European security.]

John S.D. Eisenhower

206. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, March 19, 1959, 9 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter
Deputy Under Secretary Murphy
Assistant Secretary Merchant
Mr. Reinhardt
Ambassador Whitney
General Goodpaster
Mr. Hagerty
Major Eisenhower

This was the second meeting involving informal briefings for the Macmillan talks. [Here follows discussion of possible U.S.-U.K. differences over a summit meeting and the agenda of a Foreign Ministers Conference.]

The President then turned to the subject of nuclear inspection. Here he repeated the thoughts which he had expressed in the meeting of

March 17th on the subject of development of a practical inspection system. The President is of the opinion that we should desert the scientists, and to some extent the Department of Defense in their insistence on obtaining a perfect system. What the President desires is a workable system which will give a true picture to the extent desired. He holds no brief for the number of inspection stations which must be set up in the USSR, be it 2, 15 or 40; he holds no brief for any one particular degree of tolerance so long as the system is adequate to ensure the criterion agreed upon. Here Secretary Herter pointed out the difficulties which might be anticipated from the Senate in securing ratification of any agreement which allows for a threshold. He expressed the view that an agreement which could be restricted to atmospheric tests might be satisfactory. The President agreed emphatically with respect to atmospheric tests. He expressed the opinion that this would, in large measure, reduce the total number of tests conducted by virtue of the costly nature of conducting underground tests. He cited some technical data on the gigantic dimensions of a tunnel which must be created in order to scale down seismic reaction to a nuclear test. Although it is possible to reduce the seismic effect of an exploded bomb by a factor of 1000, such would be highly expensive.¹

Secretary Herter briefly mentioned the fact that the high altitude tests of 1958 had been made public yesterday without approval of the government. This brought a strong reaction from the President, who is of the opinion that some scientist had released the information. General Goodpaster explained the efforts to keep the release in perspective which had been made the day before. Mr. Sullivan, of the *New York Times*, apparently had notified Karl Harr that they were about to release the information which they had been holding back for some time at the remonstrance of Defense. In General Goodpaster's view, the *Times* felt it was about to lose a scoop, since the discussion of this test series was becoming prevalent. The President referred to the publication of this matter in strong terms, and deplored any plans for releasing more information on the basis that some had already leaked. General Goodpaster assured him that we have never authorized further disclosure of information. To set the record straight, General Goodpaster advised the President that part of the information which had been released was already available to the scientists through the IGY, due to the radiation readings which had been transmitted from the satellites. The scientists who had made these readings were not under governmental control.

¹ Eisenhower is referring to the so-called "Latter Hole" theory, named for Dr. Albert Latter of the Rand Corporation. The theory held that if nuclear explosions took place in large spherical caverns deep underground, the air gap between the explosion and the walls of the hole would theoretically "decouple" the explosion so that only a small seismic signal would be emitted. The true size of the test would therefore be masked.

The President then turned away from this subject to continue with his thoughts on a nuclear test ban. For our first step, we should restrict our agreements to refraining from conducting tests in the atmosphere. We should not initially strive for perfection of detection of all shots, including those detonated underground. He recognized that there may be difficulty in securing agreement from the Soviets for any sort of test ban short of complete abolition. He recognized the Soviet position on the veto and their fear of espionage. He stated that he wanted Dr. Killian, Mr. McCone and somebody from Defense available to come to Camp David for these discussions. In view of the fact that only the West will adhere to the agreements, and in view also of the fact that very high altitude shots (he mentioned 300-mile altitude) will send almost negligible radiation to the earth, he desired to follow this approach and discuss the matter with the British.

[Here follows discussion of U.S.–U.K. economic issues, non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic, and administrative procedures for Macmillan's visit.]

The President then mentioned once more the nuclear testing item, in an attempt to place it in the perspective of our overall position in the world. Anything we and the Soviets can do to build confidence in each other's word is a step forward. We of the West are at present in the position of refusing everything brought up. This presents a poor image to the world, regardless of how spurious the Soviet proposals may be.

In passing, the President mentioned Khrushchev's statement to Macmillan, to the effect that the Soviets have no interest in testing small weapons, and that their thinking is based on weapons of large megaton yield. Secretary Herter said this statement is being evaluated at the State Department. The President asked how you evaluate a liar.

[Here follows discussion of access to Berlin and administrative details for the Macmillan talks.]

John S.D. Eisenhower

207. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 20, 1959, 11:20 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Macmillan
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd

President Eisenhower
Secretary Dulles

[Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.]

I [Dulles] referred to Geneva negotiations on nuclear test suspension and said that it now seems evident that there would not emerge from that conference an agreement including control provisions acceptable to us. I said I saw no prospect that the Soviets will abandon their concept of the veto, which has been borne out in the operations of the United Nations Security Council: that is, unless the Great Powers act in accord, they should not act at all.

I said that I thought that since atmospheric tests are increasingly shown to be injurious to life, we should extend indefinitely our suspension of them and hope that the Soviets would reciprocate. But, I said, I was sure that opinion in the United States would have no confidence in the possibility of a reliable control agreement being reached at Geneva. I recalled that Mr. Macmillan had himself suggested to me during my last visit to London the possibility that he and the President might address letters to Khrushchev setting out the proposition on atmospheric testing and the impossibility of an agreement to control specifically underground and high altitude tests unless the Soviets alter their position on the veto in the control system.

Mr. Macmillan said he understood the scientists had changed their view of the dependability of the conclusions on a control system, reached in Geneva in 1958. The President said that it is his understanding that the scientists now find that the originally proposed 180 world-wide stations would be inadequate to detect underground testing of moderate proportions. The President thought, however, that there might be present now elements of an agreement with the Soviets that there would be no atmospheric tests and no underground tests exceeding, say, 100 kilotons. He understood that underground tests larger than this could in any event be detectable. The President emphasized that he would not be willing to enter into an agreement with the Soviets suspending underground tests unless he could be sure that we could detect violations.

I remarked that I did not believe that we could, under any circumstances, get a veto-less control system with Russia.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles and Greene. The conversation, which lasted for 1 hour, was held at Walter Reed Hospital. Macmillan and his party were in Washington March 19-23.

Mr. Macmillan said that he attaches great importance to reaching some kind of an agreement in the Geneva talks.

I said that I thought it is perhaps now time to put Soviet intentions in this matter to the stern test by reacting firmly to their extreme position on the veto and showing some sense of outrage at the Soviet proposals. I thought that unless we reacted vigorously against this now, but went on to discuss other matters, we would have missed the psychological moment. Unless our reaction evoked better evidence than we now have of honorable intentions, we should not go with the present conference or set up a successor to it but could exchange views diplomatically.

208. Memorandum of Conversation

MVW USDel MC 19 Camp David, Maryland, March 21, 1959, 4:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Testing

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President
The Acting Secretary
Mr. Murphy
Ambassador Whitney
Mr. Merchant
General Goodpaster
Dr. Killian
Mr. McCone
Mr. Quarles
General Twining
Mr. Reinhardt
Major Eisenhower
Mr. Farley

United Kingdom

The Prime Minister
Mr. Lloyd
Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar
Sir Patrick Dean
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Ambassador Caccia
Sir Norman Brook
Mr. O'Neill
Mr. Roper
Mr. Bishop

Mr. Herter said that the negotiations in Geneva for a suspension of nuclear weapons tests had recessed until April 13.¹ The principal issues on which there was a sharp difference between the United States and the United Kingdom on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other were

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel on Disarmament Policy. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Farley and cleared by Herter.

¹ The recess began on March 20.

the veto, procedures for on-site inspection, and staffing of control posts. He briefly summarized the opposing positions.

The Prime Minister noted that at the last meeting the Soviet Union had accepted the draft duration article proposed by the United States.² During his recent trip to the Soviet Union Khrushchev had told him that it was clear the proposed U.S.-U.K. control system was designed for espionage purposes. There are some 2,000 earthquakes a year and the U.S. and U.K. propose a scheme which would enable any one of them to be inspected plausibly. There would be plenty of occasions for obtaining military intelligence anywhere the U.S. and U.K. wanted. Mr. Macmillan had replied that the Soviets wanted a double veto on inspection, both over the sending of a team and the reaching of conclusions after its visit. He had protested that there was no intent to carry out 2,000 inspections a year. If this was what was troubling Mr. Khrushchev, the difficulty could be met by setting a ceiling on the number of inspections and allocating to each side a certain share of these. Khrushchev had said this was an interesting idea. Gromyko later asked what number of inspections we had in mind but Mr. Lloyd had left it indefinite.

The Prime Minister said that the real question now was what the technical situation is. Our experts last summer had agreed on a control system with a very high capability even for 5 KT underground shots. We went into the present talks with our eyes open on this basis. But now he understood there were new facts indicating that perhaps a 100 KT shot underground could go undetected. It was important to get clear whether this was indeed the situation before we tried to decide on negotiating tactics.

Dr. Killian said that there have been several developments. The first of these was the new data from the Rainier series. Instead of from 20 to 100 earthquakes needing checking annually there might be about 1,500. Second, a restudy of the possibilities of concealment of underground shots showed the possibility of reducing the signal from an underground shot to one-tenth or less of the actual yield. In theory the reduction in signal size might be even greater. Dr. Killian emphasized that this was only theory and that one could not be sure without experimenting and testing. Such concealment would be very costly and would require a considerable engineering effort. The third development related to testing in outer space. It is apparently technically feasible to test out to 300 million kilometers. It is also technically feasible to design detection systems, using in the first instance earth satellites, and later solar satellites. Here,

² For text of the agreed duration article, which bound the signatories "indefinitely" subject to the "inherent right" to withdraw if the provisions were not fulfilled, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, p. 380.

however, account must be taken in turn of the possibility of shielding outer space tests from such satellite detection systems.

The President observed that he had had some experience with earthquakes in the Far East and that earthquakes were much more diffused events than nuclear explosions, which came from a single point. Dr. Killian said that this was true and that when the signal from an earthquake could be clearly distinguished from the background noise of the earth, it could in many cases be recognized and distinguished from a nuclear explosion.

Dr. Killian continued that the final development was the possibility that (leaving aside concealment) relatively simple ways had been found to restore now the capabilities of the Geneva experts system for 10 KT shots to what it had been thought to be for 5 KT shots. By three years of research, the capability could be fully restored down to 5 KT, and if some provision were made for additions to the system, the original estimated capability could be improved.

Mr. Quarles said that the developments summarized by Dr. Killian meant that the Geneva experts system might not distinguish events which could be tests approaching 50 to 100 KT. If events of this size could go undetected, then most of the additional nuclear weapons development work that the United States might want to do could fall within this range of undetectability. Mr. Herter and Dr. Killian pointed out that this limitation on the detection capability had a direct bearing on the possibility of setting an upper limit on the number of inspections, as suggested by Mr. Macmillan. With such a range of uncertainty it would be very difficult to fix a realistic ceiling.

The President asked whether the idea of a threshold had been suggested to the Soviet Union. Dr. Killian said that it had not.

The President inquired whether fallout appeared to be an increasing problem. Dr. Killian said that our appraisal of the fallout hazard has not changed significantly. However, scientists have always pointed out that this problem must be carefully watched and they are now concerned that new data now coming in may lead to a shift in the evaluation of the degree of hazard. Mr. Quarles observed that there appeared to be a higher rate of settling out of strontium-90 from the upper atmosphere so that more of this radioactive material comes to earth during its half-life.

The Prime Minister said he thought it was important for us to rethink our position in the light of these facts. Our purposes in the testing negotiations were the following: (1) to get rid of fallout; (2) to limit the number of countries learning how to make nuclear weapons; and (3) to make some forward movement in applying the principle of international control. He asked whether an agreement limited at least initially to cessation of atmospheric tests would achieve these purposes. This would appear still to be a deterrent to fourth country nuclear weapons pro-

grams. Presumably the control system would be much simpler. Mr. Herter and Mr. McCone said that mobile inspection teams would not be required for such a ban, but only a relatively few control posts and aircraft flights. The Prime Minister said that the other possibility apparently was to suspend the present negotiations, continue suspension of tests unilaterally, and continue efforts to solve the technical problems which have appeared. The President said that the United States would be prepared in such a situation to say that we would refrain from atmospheric tests if the Russians did. We would want to do some tests underground, particularly some for peaceful purposes.

Mr. Herter said that it must be understood that the new developments on the detection problem raised very grave difficulties for the United States in seeking Senatorial approval of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests. Mr. McCone said that he was convinced that there would have to be a very persuasive case for our ability to detect tests, if a treaty was to be ratified. He remarked also that we would have to realize that there was a school of thought in the Senate which was skeptical of the kind of concealment or decoupling theories described by Dr. Killian and that we would be criticized for letting this possibility stand in the way of agreement. He agreed that it was possible to stop atmospheric tests either unilaterally or by agreement. In the case of such an agreement, it appeared that seven or eight fixed control posts in the Soviet Union and about four in the United States would be adequate. It would be harder to accept a halt in underground tests since there was much useful work to be done in this field.

The Prime Minister referred to the recently accepted duration article and pointed out that it gave a unilateral right to withdraw if we were not satisfied with the installation or operation of the control system. He suggested that with this much of a free hand we might be safe to go into a comprehensive agreement and rely on this right of escape if we felt we were not sure the Soviets were living up to it. The President said he thought this would not be prudent since it would be very difficult in the face of world opinion to exercise such a unilateral right of withdrawal.

The Prime Minister said that he thought the issues relating to the control system which Mr. Herter had summarized at the outset of the session might conceivably be negotiated out and agreed on. Was it wise to press ahead in our efforts to gain a treaty of the kind we were now seeking in Geneva? Mr. Quarles said that he did not think we ought to agree to anything we did not feel confident could be controlled by the proposed detection system. An inadequate control system favored the dishonest. He thought the conference should be steered toward an agreement for cessation of atmospheric tests but not outer space or underground tests. This would take care of the concern with fallout and the health hazard. The President said that while this would take care of the health hazard it

would not take care of the fourth country problem. Mr. Lloyd said that he thought the Soviet answer to a proposal for a limited agreement would be to say they would agree to stop *all* tests or *none*. Mr. Herter agreed that that had been the Soviet line and on this basis they had raised strong objections to our article permitting explosions for peaceful purposes. However, if they turned down an agreement for cessation of atmospheric tests, after having been the obstacle to an agreement on a comprehensive test ban, they would take a licking in the propaganda forum.

Dr. Killian said that he thought it was important to try to make some start on application of international controls by agreement. Mr. Herter said that he thought any proposal for a limited atmospheric test ban should include provision for continued study of control of underground and outer space tests.

Dr. Killian pointed out that there were troublesome problems in defining the atmosphere, and that these problems of definition had real implications for both fallout and detection.

The Prime Minister asked whether we could just decide not to shoot off nuclear weapons in outer space. Mr. Quarles said that we have some things we want to do in outer space, though he then commented that perhaps we did not want to do them badly enough to actually shoot.

The Prime Minister said he considered a decision on this matter of a nuclear testing agreement to be an epochal one. It was of great importance to the survival of humanity to keep nuclear weapons from spreading. Mr. Herter pointed out that an agreement for cessation of nuclear weapons production was even more important in this regard. The President said that he too thought this was a very grave decision but unfortunately we just cannot be sure we could detect clandestine underground explosions.

Mr. Lloyd said he thought we would be on a very bad wicket if we changed our position. We proposed the experts' talks and the present negotiations. If, after starting on October 31 on the basis of the experts' report, and reaching agreement on most points, we now bring up basic new technical conclusions we will be in a very unfavorable position. Mr. Herter pointed out that we had not reached agreement on the veto. The Prime Minister said that clearly our line should be to have any break come on the veto, not on the technical issues. Mr. Herter and Mr. Quarles expressed agreement with this point.

Mr. Macmillan said that the possibility which appeared to be emerging was that we might say that, in the face of the Soviet insistence on the veto, we would go to an atmospheric test ban in order to simplify the control system in a way which would remove the need for mobile inspection. This would avoid having to try to agree on a specific number of inspections and yet remove the point which was of greatest concern to Khrushchev. The President said that, if the Soviets wouldn't buy such a proposal,

it would still be possible for us to go to a unilateral suspension of atmospheric tests.

The Prime Minister said that this matter would require more thought. We had a few weeks during the recess to get our position agreed. Mr. Lloyd said that he would be in touch with Mr. Herter regarding the next steps.

209. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Camp David, Maryland, March 22, 1959, 2:30 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Prime Minister Macmillan, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Ambassador Caccia, Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, Mr. Dean, Sir Norman Brook, Mr. Bishop, Secretary Herter, Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Reinhardt, Ambassador Whitney, General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.]

Mr. Macmillan next brought up the fact that we have only until April 13th to decide on the course we will follow with regard to resumption of negotiations on nuclear test suspension.¹ He thought we had only three choices—to try to force the Soviets to accept an agreement; to break off the negotiations; or to substitute another plan, perhaps the one restricted to banning atmospheric tests.

The President thought the best course would be to break off the negotiations on the issue of the veto. We would then unilaterally renounce the conduct of atmospheric tests unless other nations were to conduct such tests.

Mr. Herter suggested a two-stage procedure in which we offer agreement on the banning of atmospheric tests. If the Soviets refuse, we

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on March 28.

¹ At a meeting at 9 a.m. on March 22, with a similar group, Macmillan raised the issue of negotiations on test suspension. The brief exchange went as follows:

"Mr. Macmillan next referred to the negotiations on test suspension and said he is interested in discussing that question. Mr. Lloyd said we have a tremendous investment in the Geneva Conference in terms of world opinion and must not let it fail. The President suggested that world concern on this matter is heightened by the attention given to scientific developments. He recalled that our people were more upset about Sputnik than were any other people in the world. Our scientists have gotten our people to think that this is a race of some kind." (Memorandum of conversation, March 22; *ibid.*)

would then make our self-denying statement regarding atmospheric tests.

Mr. Macmillan said that the Soviets have agreed on many provisions. He saw no use in pressing them to agree on controls if the controls are in fact going to be ineffective. He said he understood that the experts believe that the detection method will improve. Mr. Herter said he thought they had indicated only that they hoped these measures would improve.

Mr. Macmillan said that what disturbed him most was that if the Soviets test and we do not, they will gain in relation to us militarily. He did not think that the refinements that are in prospect for our weapons are worth too much.

The President said that some of the weapons development is very important, since it reduces the weights of weapons, increases their yield, etc. Also, we have in mind certain peaceful uses of atomic explosions which are very important to us.

Mr. Lloyd thought that the Soviets would make concessions in order to keep the negotiations going. He thought it would be a great mistake to let the conference break down. Failure would have a bad public effect around the world. A better formula would be to recess while reporting to the Heads of Government. Mr. Herter added that if we were to break off entirely, it is likely that the Indians and others would raise the issue for action in the United Nations. The President said he was inclined to agree that it would be better to recess to report back to Governments.

Mr. Lloyd asked whether the U.S. Government would agree on the approach involving an agreed maximum number of inspections per year—which might be not more than once a week or once a fortnight. As a practical matter he thought we would be thus limited by the fact that very senior personnel will be needed to make the inspections. Mr. Herter said that the Soviets have indicated they want to have ad hoc inspection teams, to be organized, subject to the veto, after the fact. Mr. Lloyd thought it would be necessary to have the administrative organization of the teams constantly in existence. The President said that the “numbers” proposal seems to contemplate as few as twenty-five inspections per year as against 2000 earthquakes indistinguishable by seismographic means from atomic weapons tests. He had a great deal of doubt accordingly concerning this approach.

Mr. Macmillan raised for consideration the idea of keeping the negotiations going from April until May. Mr. Herter said we have already strung them out a great deal and have had nothing new from the Soviets in the last month. The significance of the veto is becoming blurred as a result.

Mr. Lloyd said he thought we should keep the negotiations going if we can. He thought there was need for a technical examination of the

new findings on underground tests and concealment to be carried out by U.S. and U.K. scientists and would like to send Mr. Penney over for this purpose. The President said it would be good to have him come over quickly. Mr. Lloyd recalled that the Soviets have refused to examine the technical data which we have submitted.

Mr. Herter said that we have a Congressional problem, since the Congress is unlikely to accept any agreements that are unenforceable and unverifiable.

Mr. Macmillan thought that the Summit may prove to be the only way forward in these negotiations. Mr. Herter commented that with regard to atmospheric tests, if we were to make an offer we could then go forward on that phase. At the same time we could offer to put the question of ground tests before the United Nations Disarmament group for consideration. Mr. Macmillan asked that Sir Patrick Dean and Mr. O'Neill talk this out with U.S. representatives, spelling out the major possibilities that are before us as conceivable lines of action with respect to the Geneva negotiations.

Mr. Allen Dulles commented, with respect to Khrushchev's statement that the Soviets are not interested in small atomic weapons, that the intelligence communities of both the United Kingdom and the United States feel that the Soviets are still very much interested in nuclear weapons for air defense. Sir Patrick Dean added that the intelligence communities do not believe that the Soviets are cutting down on the production of "fissile" material.

Mr. Herter then told the group that three "minutes"² are being prepared on actions that have been agreed upon during the conference. He hoped that they could be ready for a meeting of the President with the Prime Minister in Washington late the following day. The President asked me to review the main features of the discussion and the minutes to see that the United States and the British are fully agreed as to what has been agreed upon during the conference. He asked Mr. Macmillan to meet with him at 4 PM on Monday³ to check these out finally.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

² Not found.

³ March 23.

210. Editorial Note

At a meeting at Secretary Dulles' residence on March 22, 1959, 5:20 to 5:55 p.m., Eisenhower and Macmillan informed the Secretary of the earlier discussion of a test cessation agreement (see Document 209). The relevant portion of Dulles' memorandum of conversation reads as follows:

"On the Geneva test suspension negotiations, the President and the Prime Minister noted that the latter attached importance to finding some way to keep these negotiations going after they resume on April 13. He hoped that they could spin out at least until a Foreign Ministers meeting with the Soviets. The President indicated his readiness to conclude an agreement suspending atmospheric tests; he recounted some of the briefing Dr. Killian had given the group at Camp David. This had led him to conclude that any explosion greater than 10 kilotons could be detected; he thought that it might be possible to get Soviet agreement on unmanned instrument detection stations. The reported Soviet 'agreement' to our Duration Article makes it appear possible that the Soviets might make further concessions.

"I recalled that we have made provision for effective mobile controls the sine qua non of any agreement.

"The Prime Minister noted that our most recent scientific information suggests that there is a risk of disadvantage to us if the Soviets suddenly give in on the veto issue. Nevertheless, he thought that our gain would so outweigh any such disadvantage that we ought to assume the risk. The President said that he thought even an agreement limited to atmospheric tests, and including as few as three or four control posts, would be better than no agreement at all. I said that I thought that while our scientists can advise us on the size, composition and nature of controls, they are not in a position to make the required judgment as to the overall value to us of the establishment of mobile control personnel behind the Iron Curtain." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

211. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower

Washington, March 28, 1959.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: At a meeting yesterday in the Department of State we had a useful discussion of the position that we should take in the Geneva nuclear test negotiations when they reconvene on April 13, 1959.¹ Mr. Quarles, Ambassador Wadsworth, Mr. McCone, Dr. Killian, Mr. Allen Dulles and Mr. Gordon Gray participated in this discussion and there seemed to be agreement on the following points:

1. We should go back to Geneva on April 13 and, in continuing the negotiations, press the Soviets further on their veto demands.

2. We cannot accept any agreement to ban underground tests which permits the Soviets to stop mobile on-site inspection by the veto.

3. If the Soviet position on the veto does not change, Prime Minister Macmillan and you might propose an initial agreement on banning atmospheric testing under necessary controls which would not require any significant measure of mobile inspection, if at all. This would be presented as the first step of a program of continued negotiation toward an agreement for ending all tests as rapidly as the political and technical problems can be resolved. A limited program for underground testing, perhaps under international participation, might be undertaken as part of this effort to see whether the problem of detecting underground tests might be simplified.

4. If the Soviets were to accept our position on the veto we would have to consider whether the control system, although admittedly not 100 per cent foolproof, provided a sufficient measure of deterrence to violation, or whether it would be necessary to press for a threshold on underground tests.

If these decisions have your approval, we will go ahead in the next few days to work out a more detailed plan of action consistent with these principles for early discussion with the United Kingdom in the hope that we will have a common position by April 13, 1959.²

Faithfully yours,

Christian A. Herter

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, March 1959. Secret.

¹ The meeting took place on March 26. A memorandum of conversation of that date is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. See the Supplement.

² The President wrote the following note at the bottom of the page: "O.K., D.E., 3/31/59."

212. Editorial Note

On April 13, 1959, President Eisenhower sent Chairman Khrushchev a letter in which he recommended that in the absence of Soviet agreement to controls that would be effective in environments where all nuclear tests might be conducted, a phased agreement providing for discontinuance of tests in the atmosphere up to 50 kilometers should be agreed upon. This agreement could be expanded as the political and technical problems associated with control of nuclear testing in outer space and underground were resolved at Geneva. For text of the letter, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, pages 1392–1393.

Prime Minister Macmillan, in an April 13 letter to Khrushchev, expressed support for Eisenhower's proposal. (*Ibid.*, page 1398, footnote 2)

213. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests

Washington, April 21, 1959, 7:08 p.m.

Nusup 307. For Wadsworth from Acting Secretary. We have been considering question tactics in period prior to Geneva meeting Foreign Ministers May 11 and request USDel comments following soonest.¹

US is now in excellent position place onus on Soviet Union either accept phased approach suggested by US or to make significant moves toward US position on control issues which must be resolved if complete nuclear weapons test cessation under effective control to be agreed.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/4–2159. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Farley and Baker, cleared by Kohler, and approved by Herter.

¹ In Supnu 382, April 22, Wadsworth responded that the suggestions in this telegram covered "very well what we should do in response to various approaches the Russians might take." Wadsworth believed the Soviet Delegation would not give clear acceptance or rejection of the alternative U.S. suggestions and the conference should be recessed. (*Ibid.*) See the Supplement.

In event of Soviet reply² accepting phased approach believe USDel should table as many as possible of draft treaty provisions applicable to this approach by or during first week May and might look toward recess after a few meetings devoted to clarification and answering questions. Recess would be based on practical difficulties involved continuation during Foreign Ministers' meeting, need for consultations, and desirability USSR opportunity study detailed proposals. Resumption date would be fixed early in June. In this event would see no necessity for any formal discussion in side talks at Foreign Ministers' meeting, though US might indicate Soviets would of course be free raise informally any broad questions relating to test negotiations in side talks with US and UK in course meeting Foreign Ministers and prior to resumption conference.

In event USSR gives no answer or maintains that no answer necessary on phased approach until conference explores further possibilities for progress on issues involved in complete cessation, USDel may continue tactic discussing and agreeing on relatively non-controversial articles that would be part of treaty under either alternative, while making clear these do not constitute significant progress and pressing Soviets for reply on alternative approaches. USDel should indicate that while of course willing hear Soviet suggestions any of outstanding issues USDel will be unable reach decisions or make concrete proposals these issues in absence Soviet answer as to broad course to be pursued. This would of course apply to composition of commission as well as questions of veto and on-site inspection since composition, voting procedures, and functions assigned to Commission re inspection necessarily interrelated. As to the staffing issue, believe as stated Nusup 301³ we should not indicate readiness to shift our basic position unless much more movement is evident on Soviet side. Staffing issue resembles issue of composition of Control Commission. Our posture on the two issues should be the same, i.e. that we are confident they can be resolved and will not be barriers to ultimate agreement if basic elements of effective control are agreed. Purpose authorized Wadsworth's statement of April 13⁴ was to make this point and to lessen possibility Soviet could use movement on staffing issue as evidence of real progress and as excuse to evade answering on alterna-

² To Eisenhower's April 13 letter; see Document 212.

³ Dated April 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/4-1259)

⁴ On April 13, Wadsworth suggested to the Soviet Delegation that if the Soviet Union were prepared to change its position on the veto, on procedures for on-site inspection, and on early discussion of concrete measures for high-altitude detection, the Geneva Conference could proceed with the hope of concluding a comprehensive agreement. If the Soviet Union were unprepared to go this far, then the United States suggested, as a first step, an agreed suspension of nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere up to 50 kilometers. (United Nations, Geneva Conference doc. GEN/DNT/PV.73, pp. 3-8) President Eisenhower also made this suggestion directly in his April 13 letter to Khrushchev; see Document 212.

tive approaches. Purpose was thus not to invite detailed negotiation this issue but to remove it from list of decisive issues.

If Soviet response to US proposal April 13 takes line that phased approach not acceptable, and that all nuclear weapons tests must be banned from time treaty enters into force, USDel should take position that it is up to Soviets to drop demand for comprehensive veto, accept effective arrangements for on-site inspection, and enter into joint consideration of technical problems of outer space and underground detection and identification in order make comprehensive agreement possible.

USDel presentations should carry clear implication that if USSR unwilling accept either (a) limited initial phase or (b) broader agreement based on effective inspection provisions, we see no basis for continuing present conference. In event Soviet rejection phased approach or in absence Soviet answer or major new proposal on basic issues believe USDel should look toward recess during first week May with question reconvening dependent Soviet response at time Foreign Ministers' meeting on basic issues and on course to be pursued. Department would consider it desirable for US and UK in side talks at Foreign Ministers' meeting to emphasize to Soviet Foreign Minister essential requirements for complete cessation, press USSR for answer as to basic approach to be pursued, and to consider in light Soviet attitude whether and when conference should be reconvened and terms of resumption.

Department considering pros and cons of release of slightly modified version Berkner Report on Seismic Improvements next week regardless Soviet response to previous US proposals. Request any comments USDel may have as to desirability, tactics and timing such release.⁵

Herter

⁵ In Supnu 383, April 22, which also commented on the Department's suggested actions, the Delegation opposed release of a modified version of the Berkner report on the grounds that the Soviet Delegation could cite technical difficulties as being the real motivation for the U.S. decision to recess the negotiations. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/4-2259) See the Supplement.

214. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower

Washington, April 23, 1959.

SUBJECT

Voluntary Temporary Moratorium on Underground and High Altitude Tests

On April 11 you directed that the interested agencies give urgent consideration to Prime Minister Macmillan's proposal that we offer to accompany a controlled agreement for suspension of atmospheric tests with a temporary moratorium on other nuclear weapons tests provided the Soviet Union did likewise.¹

This question has been carefully examined with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. We have concluded that proposing an extended uncontrolled moratorium on outer space and underground tests, even if the Soviets agree to negotiate a controlled suspension of atmospheric tests, is an undesirable course of action at the present time. Such a proposal would undercut our basic principle of effective control, and would be unlikely to increase Soviet interest in serious negotiations.

Consideration of this question has served to draw attention to the urgent need for decisions, as soon as possible and well in advance of the expiration of the present one year voluntary withholding of nuclear testing, on United States nuclear testing policy in the event negotiations are unsuccessful or reach agreement only on controlled suspension of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere. We have agreed that studies

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, April 1959. Secret. The source text bears Eisenhower's initials.

¹ At the April 15 meeting of the principals, Farley reported on the British proposal as follows:

"In Mr. Herter's absence Mr. Farley explained that during the course of consultations with the U.K. last week regarding the phased approach to a test cessation agreement presented by Amb. Wadsworth in Geneva on Monday, Prime Minister Macmillan had proposed to President Eisenhower that we supplement our proposal for a first step inspected agreement on the cessation of atmospheric tests by offering a unilateral moratorium on testing underground and in outer space for a finite period while further negotiations on extension of the agreement to these areas are in progress. The State Department felt that such a move at this time would not be wise from a negotiating point of view and Mr. Herter had so recommended to the President. The President accepted Mr. Herter's recommendation but noted agreement with Prime Minister Macmillan that such a course of action might have to be reconsidered at some point. The President had therefore directed that the British proposal receive urgent and objective consideration within the US Government." (Memorandum of conversation by Morris, April 15; Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/4-1559) See the Supplement.

looking toward such decisions should be initiated promptly and should embrace future requirements for nuclear weapons testing, improvement of methods of detection, fall-out considerations, and factors of cost and practicability involved in testing underground and in outer space. Arrangements for these studies are being worked out by the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

I am enclosing for your information a more detailed paper on this subject.²

Christian A. Herter

² The enclosure, dated April 17, is attached to an earlier draft of this memorandum, dated April 20. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament, Nuclear Policy) Both are in the Supplement.

215. Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower

Washington, April 27, 1959.

SUBJECT

Disarmament Policy Review

Our current disarmament policy was formulated in 1957, and it is now urgent that a further study be undertaken to review and make recommendations regarding United States disarmament policy. Terms of reference for the proposed study, which have the concurrence of the Department of Defense, are enclosed. These terms of reference are consistent with current national security policy, pertinent provisions of which are also enclosed.¹

The Departments of State and Defense agree that this study should be undertaken jointly by the two Departments. Because of the wide

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.0012/4-2759. Secret. On April 22, Herter succeeded Dulles who resigned because of illness.

¹ Enclosure 2, not printed, is a copy of paragraphs 3–6 and 40 of NSC 5801/1, “Basic National Security Policy,” May 5, 1958, which is printed as Document 24.

range of interests involved and the need for clear and undivided lines of responsibility, however, I would recommend that the study be conducted by an individual named by me who enjoys your complete confidence, on the analogy of the study of base rights conducted by Frank Nash. The full support and assistance of appropriate departments and agencies, including primarily the Departments of State and Defense, should be provided, including assignment of qualified officers to aid in the study.

If you approve this recommendation I would be glad to have an opportunity to discuss with you the question of persons who might be called upon to conduct such a study.

Christian A. Herter²

Enclosure 1³

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR DISARMAMENT POLICY REVIEW

An urgent study should be undertaken jointly by the Departments of State and Defense to review and make recommendations regarding United States disarmament policy.

The basic question to be considered is whether there are comprehensive or partial measures of arms control and reduction which would contribute to the achievement of our national security objectives.

In considering this question, existing detailed United States disarmament policy and positions should be reviewed. These positions were last systematically formulated in 1957 and only relatively minor modifications have been made since that time. The last proposals for comprehensive disarmament were advanced by the United States in 1955.

In reviewing existing policy and making recommendations, such questions as the following should be considered:

1. The extent to which measures of arms control and reduction might contribute to our national security objectives.
2. The extent to which vigorous and imaginative efforts to achieve arms control and reduction would be to the advantage of the United States from the point of view of gaining the support of our allies and the peoples and governments of uncommitted areas of the world.

² Printed from a copy that indicates Herter signed the original.

³ Secret.

3. The nature of a comprehensive arms reduction arrangement which might be in the interest of the United States and the possibilities (including the technical feasibility) of achieving such a comprehensive arrangement through single or multiphased agreements.

4. The nature of limited or partial arms control or reduction measures (including regional measures) which might be in the interest of the United States, the timing and technical feasibility of such measures, and their inter-relationship with each other with a comprehensive arrangement.

5. The relationship of disarmament agreements to settlement of outstanding political issues and to the development of collective security arrangements.

6. Technical and organizational requirements for enforcement, with particular attention to the role of the United Nations and of appropriate UN organs in enforcement of disarmament agreements (particularly agreements involving radical reduction of national military establishments).

Conclusions and recommendations should be submitted by January 1, 1960.

Negotiations are currently under way with regard to nuclear test suspension, and discussion of aspects of disarmament may be anticipated in the near future in a Foreign Ministers' meeting and a possible subsequent Summit meeting or in competent organs of the United Nations. Advice or special reports on matters of immediate urgency may accordingly have to be requested. In particular, in view of the possibility of resumption of surprise attack discussions recessed in Geneva last December, priority attention should be given, within the framework of the general study, to consideration of various types of international agreements consistent with United States security interests which might reduce the danger of surprise attack or unintentional war.

The full support and assistance of appropriate departments and agencies will be provided, including assignment of qualified officers to aid in this study. All necessary data, including military and technical data, pertinent to the study will be made available.

216. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 5, 1959, 8:35 a.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Position in Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Secretary of State, Mr. Herter

Mr. Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Mr. McCone, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

Mr. Allen Dulles, Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Dr. Killian, Special Assistant to the President on Science and Technology

Mr. Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Gen. Goodpaster

Mr. Farley, S/AE

The Secretary of State read the statement of the issue before the President, as set forth in the attached memorandum (Tab A).

Mr. McCone said that AEC had approached the present negotiations on the premise that the United States was prepared to ban tests under an agreement which provided reasonable safeguards. The experts had agreed at Geneva on a control system which would monitor underground tests of 5 kt with a 90% degree of assurance. Experience at Hardtack as assessed by the Berkner Panel had shown that the system would actually not have this capability, although certain improvements would permit regaining most of the originally estimated capability. Initial results of the studies of Hardtack experience were tabled in Geneva on January 5, but the Soviet Union has so far refused to discuss these data or their implications.

Mr. McCone said further that continued study had identified the possibility of concealing underground explosions through detonation in specially designed chambers or holes which would cause decoupling by a factor of 10 to several hundred times. A report to this effect has been provided to the United Kingdom and to interested Congressional committees but has not been made public. Recent calculations by Dr. Teller indicate that a 1.7 kt explosion could be detonated in a hole of 120 feet diameter with virtually no detectable signal, and a 200 kt explosion might be detonated in a hole of 360 feet diameter with a resultant yield equivalent to a 1 kt explosion. Dr. Killian said that the decoupling report referred to by Mr. McCone was a theoretical study and that the agreed

study itself indicated a requirement for much larger holes than those reported as calculated by Dr. Teller.

Mr. McCone continued that AEC believes a dependable detection system for underground shots cannot be installed without extensive further study and experimentation. Thus AEC believes that the U.S. policy at this time should be to adopt the phased approach which was the second alternative of the President's letter to Khrushchev and Ambassador Wadsworth's statement, both on April 13.¹ The other alternative—a complete monitored cessation of tests—would give the Soviet Union a serious opportunity for clandestine testing in view of the limited capabilities of detecting underground shots.

Mr. Quarles said that he did not disagree with Mr. McCone's point of view. If there were a choice, the Department of Defense would prefer the phased approach. However, in his judgment the United States was now in a position where it was very difficult to back up to this approach. It is in his opinion acceptable for the United States to take the chances involved in pursuing the Macmillan proposal provided that the on-site inspections are unobstructed and are in sufficient number to protect us. Pursuing the present line of negotiation would be likely to cause the Soviet Union to back out on the veto questions or on the question of a proper number of inspections, and thus enable the United States to avoid such a retreat. The President's April 13 letter to Khrushchev and the presently proposed reply to Khrushchev's latest letter² played this tactical game about as well as was possible in present circumstances.

The President referred to recent increases in fall-out levels in the United States, partly due to increased Soviet testing in the past two years. He said that we were going to be forced by public opinion in the United States to stop tests unilaterally. We must find a reasonable and decent way to do this by agreement if possible, even if the arrangement is not necessarily a perfect one.

There was a good deal of discussion of the number of earthquakes of various sizes which might require inspection, of the relationship between a number of earthquakes and the threshold for inspection, and of the advantages of conducting inspections by choice rather than on a random basis.

The President said that an arrangement for a reasonable number of inspections was important, and that otherwise we would be faced either with the need for unilateral stopping of tests or by a renewed testing race in which we might break ourselves by over-insurance. He remarked that,

¹ See footnote 4, Document 213.

² For text of Khrushchev's April 23 letter to Eisenhower, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, pp. 1396–1398. For Eisenhower's reply to Khrushchev as sent on May 5, see *ibid.*, pp. 1403–1405.

if we agreed to a limited rather than unlimited number of inspections, we might then ask that the number of manned or unmanned stations be increased to compensate. Mr. Herter said that he did not think it was desirable to broach discussion of the acceptable number of inspections yet.

Dr. Killian referred to some of the other considerations in deciding whether a test suspension would be desirable. These included piercing the Iron Curtain, both for its revolutionary political significance and for its intelligence advantage to us. No inspection system could be 100% sure, but it might bring with it other advantages in addition to its actual detection capabilities.

In response to a question from the President, the Secretary of State said that the issue was whether we would go ahead probing the Soviets on the veto and on relevant technical questions, prepared to enter into an agreement if they met our demands on those points.

The President said that, if we can break down the veto and get reliable people into the Soviet Union for control posts and inspections, an agreement to this end would be worthwhile. We would be in a terrible position to change now to an agreement limited to atmospheric tests. He agreed with Mr. Quarles that this would be the simplest and most logical approach, but you could not expect to get Soviet agreement to that. Thus we should go ahead on present lines, prepared, if they call our hand, to play as long as there is no veto and a reasonable control system.

Mr. Herter said that, if we probe, they will probably not meet us on the many outstanding issues. We would then be able to come back to the atmospheric ban with a reasonable posture before world opinion. Mr. McCone said that he thought we would not be able to test again in the atmosphere anyway. The President and the Secretary of State, while agreeing with this remark, said that we should not show our hand on this too soon.

Mr. Herter distributed a list of unresolved issues (Tab B). The President observed that the negotiations clearly had a long way to go. It looked as though we would end up with a unilateral declaration that we would no longer conduct tests which pollute the atmosphere. Mr. Quarles said that he hoped this decision would not be taken. If the Soviet Union tests in the atmosphere, we will want to conduct a few tests carefully circumscribed to limit fall-out.

The President said that the implication of this approach was a continued arms development competition. Dr. Killian said that the judgment of many technical experts was that we would gain in relative military posture if the Soviet and U.S. tests could be stopped and the respective weapons development programs of the two countries frozen at their present status.

The President said that we should go ahead with the prepared letter to Khrushchev and the present negotiating course. He referred to the importance of this positive approach for U.S. posture before world opinion and the eyes of our allies.

Mr. McCone referred to the problem of China. The Secretary of State said that we had a provision on extension of the treaty to China and other key areas which would be introduced in due course. It was undesirable to raise this matter prematurely, however. He referred to the duration clause accepted by the Soviet Union as one protection to us. The President said that China was a problem but a second stage and almost separate problem. He repeated that the United States must not show an intransigent attitude in the negotiations. He referred to his interest in data on the effects on life in the northern hemisphere from use of either the U.S. or Soviet nuclear stockpile. Dr. Killian said that he thought this matter deserved careful study. Mr. McCone said that some work had been done on this and referred to the Net Evaluation Subcommittee. The President said that he thought this group had taken too many disqualifying assumptions and that he was not satisfied with the answers he had received so far.

The meeting adjourned at 9:20 a.m.

Tab A³

U.S. POSITION ON CESSATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS

Problem:

The basic policy issue is whether the United States is still prepared, in the light of current technical data including information on possibilities of concealment of underground tests, to enter into an agreement for complete cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The latest Khrushchev letter and the statements of the Soviet representative at Geneva indicate that the Soviet Union may be prepared to shift its position on key issues which have barred agreement. While further U.S.-U.K. probing is necessary to ascertain whether the Soviets will indeed abandon the veto and accept the Geneva control system with a limited number of on-site inspections, if we continue this probing we will become further committed to a complete cessation if the Soviets meet our demands.

The President may wish to hear the views of his advisers as to whether, in the light of current technical data, the detection of under-

³ Secret; Limit Distribution.

ground tests is a manageable problem and a treaty banning underground as well as other tests could be adequately monitored.

Recommended U.S. Position:

Assuming an affirmative answer to the above question, the U.S. position should be:

1. Provided the Soviets will abandon the veto throughout operation of the control system and permit a reasonable number (not "a few") of unhampered inspections, we should be prepared to conclude promptly an agreement for controlled cessation of nuclear weapons tests along lines presently pursued by Ambassador Wadsworth at Geneva.

2. Such an agreement, to be acceptable to the U.S., would have to provide that:

- a. Not only the veto on dispatch of inspection teams, but other vetoes and opportunities for obstruction be abandoned by the Soviets (see list of unresolved issues).

- b. The extent of on-site inspection would have to be consistent with scientific facts regarding possible suspicious events and with the detection capabilities of the control system if there is to be an adequate deterrent.

3. U.S. tactics should be to probe the Soviet position on a and b above before entering into discussion on a possible quota of inspections.

4. The U.S. approach at present should be along lines stated in the proposed reply to Premier Khrushchev and in the draft treaty articles which have been tabled by the Western powers at Geneva.

5. The U.S. should continue to hold in reserve the alternative of an atmospheric ban if the Soviets will not abandon the veto or accept a reasonable level of inspection.

Tab B⁴

SOME UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN NUCLEAR TEST NEGOTIATIONS

Comprehensive Veto: While the Soviets have said that if a quota of inspections were adopted they would drop their veto in the Commission on the dispatch of the inspection teams, they continue to demand a veto on:

⁴ Confidential; Limit Distribution.

- a. All matters relating to violation of the treaty including decisions on the basis of results of on-site investigations;
- b. Recruitment and dismissal of all personnel including those of inspection groups;
- c. Location of control posts, routes of aircraft flights, and new methods of observation and apparatus in the control system;
- d. Budgetary, financial, administrative and economic matters.

On-site Inspection Arrangements: Questions remain as to (a) Approval of routes for inspection groups; (b) Will there be access to the closed areas of the Soviet Union; (c) Composition of inspection teams; and (d) Whether permanent inspection groups could be set up in the USSR.

Criteria for Inspection: The Soviets have not stated on what technical criteria inspection would be based and who would apply these criteria.

Staffing: The Soviets still insist on host country nationals as heads of control posts and on their holding all but 4 or 5 of the 30 technical positions in the post.

High Altitude: The Soviets still refuse to discuss methods of high altitude detection.

New Seismic Data: The Soviets still refuse to discuss the implications of the new seismic data on capabilities of the system or means of improving it.

Experimentation: The Soviets have not responded to our proposals for a joint program of experimentation, including nuclear tests, to improve and check detection capabilities.

Phasing of Control System: Arrangements for bringing other areas of the world into the control system must still be worked out.

217. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, May 20, 1959, 5 p.m.

Secto 81. Department pass Defense. I met May 19 with Lloyd and Gromyko again to seek Soviet agreement for technical discussions on

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/5-2059. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and Moscow. Herter was in Geneva May 11-June 20 to attend the Foreign Ministers Conference. For additional documentation on the conference, May 11-August 15, see volume VIII.

capabilities detection and identification seismic events and technical criteria for inspections. Pointed out if scientists are to meet prior to June 8 resumption nuclear test talks, decision needed as soon as possible. Gromyko was completely intransigent, denied any area of agreement in our discussion of May 14 except high altitude.¹

Gromyko stated he wanted position of Soviet Union made clear, that there is no relationship between the number of "suspicious events" and the number of inspections. He stated number of inspections is a political matter. He repeated this point several times and posed a direct question to both Lloyd and me as to whether we agree there is no connection between "suspicious events" and the number of inspections. Lloyd and I both took the position that Soviet Union can use any basis it wishes for determining number of inspections. I stated that while ultimately a decision on the number of inspections would be made by appropriate policy officials in the U.S. Government and that although the Soviet Union can use any basis it wishes to determine the number of inspections, the U.S. decision on numbers of inspections will be made after considering all factors, particularly the findings and advice of our scientists.

We emphasized to Gromyko that no agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing can possibly be reached until there is agreement on the criteria to be applied to inspection of unidentified events. We spent greater part of meeting trying to explain this point to Gromyko, who expressed view we were only trying to justify more inspections.

Gromyko recited usual Soviet line expressing concern that our proposal for technical talks represents a step backward from agreement already reached and that Soviet Union would oppose any attempt to disavow findings technical experts last summer. We pointed out to Gromyko that we were not trying to disavow findings of experts but to improve the scientific basis upon which an agreement on nuclear test cessation can be reached.

Lloyd suggested that Gromyko give us his views on this matter in writing, particularly after Gromyko seemed to imply that if we accept the Soviet position that there is no relationship between "suspicious events" and the number of inspections we might find some basis for

¹ According to Supnu 433 from Geneva, May 14, U.S. and British officials worked out a memorandum that they believed summarized the agreement of the May 14 Gromyko-Herter-Lloyd meeting. The three Foreign Ministers supposedly agreed, in light of the most recent scientific and technical information, that technical representatives should meet on June 1 to consider recommendations for detecting nuclear explosions above 50 kilometers and in outer space, improvements for distinguishing between underground explosions and earthquakes, and specific technical criteria that had to be satisfied by data from the control system before an inspection could be undertaken. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/5-1459) See the Supplement. A memorandum of the conversation of the Foreign Ministers on May 14 (US/MC/31) is in Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1338.

technical talks. Gromyko at first agreed to submit his views to us in writing, then seemed to back away from this approach as not being particularly productive since he felt that our views on this subject were so far apart.

If Gromyko presents us an unacceptable paper on this subject, it is my intention to inform him that I see no point in further discussions and after registering disappointment at the Russian attitude on this subject, will inform him that we will have to see what progress is made after the testing negotiations resume on June 8.² I shall also point out to Gromyko that if his attitude is an indication of the way the Soviet Union will cooperate in an agreement on the suspension of nuclear testing, the situation does not look promising.

Herter

² The Geneva negotiations on nuclear testing were in recess from May 12 to June 8.

218. Editorial Note

At the 407th meeting of the National Security Council on May 21, 1959, Under Secretary of State Dillon briefed the Council on the results of the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference. Gleason's memorandum of discussion reads as follows:

"Secretary Dillon added the thought that there had been a couple of fairly significant developments at the private dinner meeting of the Foreign Ministers. In the first place, Secretary Herter had informed Gromyko that the U.S. would never consent to a Summit Meeting under threat. Secondly, there had been a flop in the matter of the nuclear test negotiations. The sudden hope of progress in this area had ended abruptly almost as soon as it had been born. If the Soviets do not retreat from the position recently taken by Khrushchev who had stated a willingness to study only high altitude test suspension, the prospects for any real agreement seemed to Secretary Dillon to be very slim.

"The Vice President inquired whether Secretary Dillon meant to convey that the Soviets would not agree to the suggestions on test suspension made in the President's recent letter to Khrushchev. Secretary Dillon said they would not agree to these suggestions." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

President Eisenhower's most recent letter to Khrushchev is that of May 5, the text of which is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, pages 1403-1405. In a May 14 letter to Eisenhower, Khrushchev expressed willingness to discuss at a technical level concrete measures for the detection of explosions conducted at high altitudes for the purpose of including such measures in the system of control. For text of that letter, see *ibid.*, pages 1409-1411.

219. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, June 1, 1959.

SUBJECT

Resumption of General Disarmament Talks

You have asked me to consider ways in which discussions on general disarmament could be carried forward if there is an agreement in Geneva that such discussions should be undertaken. There are three principal possibilities in this regard.

1. *Within the Framework of the Security Council.* Lloyd has suggested the possibility of having the Security Council take up the question of disarmament. While the Council in the past has undertaken such discussions, it is unlikely that a Western initiative in this regard would be acceptable to the Soviet Union since the composition of the Council is unfavorable to it. It is true, of course, that the present Disarmament Commission reports both to the Security Council and the General Assembly. However, a move to the Council, particularly in light of the Assembly resolutions which have been adopted on disarmament in recent years would be interpreted as an attempt on our part to circumvent the broader interests reflected in the 82-Nation Disarmament Commission. It is unlikely that the Soviets would opt for the Security Council as the forum for initiating general disarmament talks and carrying them forward by means of some appropriate sub-group of the Council. Such an

arrangement could be made, however, and would be acceptable to the United States if there was agreement between East and West.

2. *Within the Disarmament Commission.* Under the resolution adopted at the last Assembly the Disarmament Commission was reconstituted on an 82-Member basis and requested to report to the Security Council or the Assembly any "constructive proposals and recommendations".¹ In light of the history of this resolution and the interest manifested at the last session by the overwhelming majority of members in bringing disarmament discussions within this framework, the choice of the Disarmament Commission would be whole-heartedly supported, and we could count on positive cooperation both from our Allies and the uncommitted countries. This would give us a real psychological advantage, and the French desire to bring the Disarmament Commission into the picture perhaps reflects some appreciation of this fact. Moreover, the Soviet Union has accepted this forum. We are confident that if the Disarmament Commission should be called that we can get the necessary support so that it will adopt the Assembly rules of procedure. (You will recall that there was a considerable argument during the last General Assembly on this point.) From the standpoint of procedure it would be possible to have a brief general discussion within the Commission, after which an arrangement providing for various sub-groups on certain aspects of our original package, and in particular surprise attack, could be arranged.

We should anticipate that the Soviet Union will insist upon parity in any sub-group which the Disarmament Commission establishes. We should also anticipate that the Disarmament Commission will be disposed to grant parity or quasi-parity in the sub-groups largely on the ground that if agreement is to be achieved through quiet discussions the two states most directly concerned must be satisfied with the arrangements for representation. We do not believe that agreement to parity or quasi-parity (6–4–4 formula for example) in a sub-group of the Disarmament Commission will necessarily have adverse effects throughout the UN system since we would not be yielding on this principle in the parent body. At the same time it would have to be recognized that there would be a number of UN members who would tend to cite our agreement in this case in other circumstances such as the Outer Space Committee and other Committees of the Assembly. In summary, we believe it would be advantageous psychologically and politically for the West to use the Disarmament Commission as the instrumentality for further general disarmament talks, provided we are willing to take on such liabilities as may be involved in agreeing to a parity-type arrangement in various sub-committees.

¹ Resolution 1252 D, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on November 4, 1958; for text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 1299–1301.

3. *Outside the Framework of the UN.* It would of course be feasible to resume discussions outside the UN along the lines of the present nuclear test negotiations. The problem of parity would be faced outside the UN, as it has been in this instance, and talks on, for example, surprise attack, could be undertaken in a political framework rather than the past technical approach. While such an arrangement would be satisfactory to the world at large if it is agreed to between East and West, the majority of UN members would probably prefer to have these discussions pursued within the UN. They, nevertheless, as a manifestation of their interest in achieving agreement, would go along with such an arrangement. Even in these circumstances, consideration would have to be given to some means for bringing the results of the negotiations into the framework of the UN. At the same time, pressure might develop for convening a meeting of the Disarmament Commission, particularly if an impasse should seem to be developing in the discussions outside the framework of the UN.²

The above possibilities have been set forth without account having been taken as to whether we are prepared to undertake general disarmament discussions in the near future. From our preliminary discussions with S/AE, I have the impression that there may be serious political and technical difficulties in the early undertaking of general disarmament talks.

Historical Footnote

Comment: Thinking through the various alternatives it should be kept in mind that the disarmament problem has been handled in a number of forums. These include:

(a) The U.N. Disarmament Commission—made up of the Security Council plus Canada.

(b) The U.N. Disarmament Commission Sub-Committee—consisting of Canada, France, USSR, UK and US.

(c) The Enlarged UN Disarmament Commission—made up of 25 members. This was enlarged still further to 82 members in 1958.

(d) The Conference of Experts on Nuclear Test Cessation—made up of experts and advisers from Canada, France, UK, US, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and the USSR.

(e) The Technical Conference on Surprise Attack—made up of US, UK, France, Canada, Italy, USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Albania.

² In a June 8 memorandum to Herter, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, John N. Irwin II, opposed Wilcox's idea of separating specific disarmament topics from the general disarmament package of 1957. Irwin also observed that the newly-enlarged Disarmament Commission was "unwieldy" and that if a sub-group were established, the United States should control its composition. (Department of State, IO Files: Lot 61 D 91, Subject Files, Disarmament) See the Supplement.

(f) The Conference on Nuclear Tests Cessation—made up of US, UK and USSR.

220. Notes of Meeting

Washington, June 5, 1959.

Notes by McCone of the Meeting, June 5, 1959 at 7:30 AM attended by:

Acting Secretary of State Dillon
Acting Secretary of Defense Gates
Gordon Gray
Dr. Killian
Allen Dulles
John McCone

The meeting convened at 7:30 AM. At 8:00 AM the group was joined by General Loper, General Starbird, Dr. English, Dr. Killian, Philip Farley and one or two others.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the opening of the Geneva Test Conference on June 8, most particularly the disposition of the Berkner Reports.¹

Secretary Dillon stated the State Department believes the Berkner and Panofsky Reports² should be made public. The security information should be edited out of them. Careful attention should be given to how

Source: Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Chairman's Reading File, 1959. Secret. Prepared by McCone.

¹ Reference is to the Panel on Seismic Improvement, or the Berkner Panel after the panel's chairman Lloyd Berkner; see footnote 1, Document 194. For the Berkner Reports as published, see the summary report of March 31, released on June 12, printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, pp. 1378–1392, and the Department of State summary, June 12, printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pp. 1313–1317. In addition, the Department of State published in July 1959 a detailed technical report by the Berkner Panel entitled *The Need for Further Research in Seismology*.

² The Report of the Working Group of the Panel on High Altitude Detection, chaired by Dr. Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky (Director of the High Energy Physics Laboratory, Stanford University) was not made public. The panel considered the problem of identifying nuclear explosions in the region between 50 and 100,000 kilometers above the earth. The group concluded that detection of nuclear explosions at distances of 100,000 kilometers was possible, but there were problems with so-called "low altitude" (50–200 kilometers) explosions and concealment. (Memorandum from Panofsky to Killian, May 1; Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament, Hi. Alt.—Misc.) See the Supplement.

they are released. All Agencies should agree on the procedure and be of a single mind so that all would answer questions from the press and others in a consistent manner. The President should be informed regarding the implications of the release.

Secretary Gates stated that the Berkner Report should be released and could be released. Dr. Killian asked if he referred to the entire Berkner Report. General Loper said, "Yes." Defense, therefore, went on record as favoring the release of the Berkner Report and indicating they also favored release of the Panofsky High Altitude Report.

Dr. Killian stated that our objectives in the Geneva Conference should govern our strategy and tactics of which the release of the Berkner and Panofsky Reports were a part. He raised the following:

1. Are we endeavoring to reach a comprehensive test suspension on all testing. If this is the case we should go one way.
2. If our objective is to reach the phased approach, that is, atmospheric and then underground and high altitude later, we should consider tabling the reports at once.
3. If our objective is to break off the negotiations this would be aided (perhaps to our embarrassment) by the improper handling of the reports, most particularly the findings and conclusions with reference to concealment.

Therefore, Dr. Killian concluded that the policy with respect to the release of the reports relates to our objectives in the Conference.

Secretary Dillon then suggested we move rapidly, but protect security. He asked whether security was involved. General Starbird replied that there was some restricted data in each of the reports but this could be easily removed. General Loper stated there was some military and intelligence information of a sensitive nature which likewise could be removed. It was, therefore, agreed that the reports must be rewritten if they are to be released.

Mr. Dulles stated that the release of the reports would give some intelligence information. In his opinion they would not oppose their release if they were "sanitized."

McCone then stated AEC's views as follows:

We continue to support the policy of the President that all tests should be suspended by agreement providing, and only providing, that the agreements can be safeguarded. We do not agree to any procedure under which we would suspend testing in any environment if the agreement cannot be safeguarded. It is our opinion, as a result of intensive and careful study of this question that an agreement to suspend underground shots cannot be properly and safely safeguarded by known technology. Therefore, we continue to advocate research, experimentation and testing either by the United States alone or jointly with the

Soviets and British or through the United Nations as a means of developing this technology. We believe means of properly safeguarding can be developed through this experimentation. McCone pointed out that Dr. Northrup had stated that from three to five years would be required for such experimentation and, furthermore, it was possible even then results would not bring forth a satisfactory system. However, in McCone's opinion, and that of the AEC, this was the reasonable course to pursue because of the possibilities of finding a successful solution.

For that reason the AEC advocates the phased approach. With respect to high altitude, McCone suggested we pursue technical discussions with the Soviets but in the June 8 meeting we emphasize that these discussions, while important, should not be exaggerated because in the final analysis it was very questionable in our mind whether this country or the Soviets would ever at any time conduct an extensive program of high altitude testing. The reason is that the cost of the test would be extremely high and in all probability expenditures of lesser proportions would produce propulsion engines for our missiles which would permit utilization of weapons already in being. Therefore, the need for development of light high yield weapons would not be essential.

There seemed to be no disagreement among the group with these points. Dr. Killian agreed particularly with respect to our position on high altitude and its excessive costs.

McCone then went on to suggest that the Berkner Report be tabled and that this report and all prior data which we have submitted be used to force technical discussions on underground detection. McCone recommended that if the Soviets did not agree to such technical discussions we should then withdraw from any further discussion of suspending underground tests and direct the negotiations to suspending atmospheric and high altitude testing.

There was not full acceptance of this proposal, but no real objection was expressed.

It was concluded that:

1. The summary of the Berkner Report should be released and the volume having to do with further research, experimentation and development should be released. Some, including AEC representatives, had not seen the summary and it was agreed that General Starbird and Dr. English would review the summary promptly and give their comments to Phil Farley.

2. Concurrent with this release, which should be made promptly, we should agree to technical discussions on high altitude with the caveat that we didn't think high altitude was very important.

3. The Panofsky Reports should be reviewed and summarized and stripped of sensitive or restricted data and then they should be released at least in summary form.

Attached to this memorandum, and for my files, should be the memorandum prepared by General Starbird and Dr. English.³

John A. McCone⁴

³ Not found.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

221. Memorandum of Meeting

Washington, June 8, 1959.

Memorandum of a Meeting With the President, June 8, 1959, at 9:45 AM, attended by:

Acting Secretary of State Dillon
Acting Secretary of Defense Gates
Allen Dulles
Dr. Killian
Gordon Gray
Philip Farley
General Persons
General Goodpaster
John McCone

Dillon reviewed the meeting of Friday, June 5,¹ stating conclusions to discuss Panofsky High Altitude Report at Geneva after removal of classified information.² This in about a week.

Also, the release of the summary of the Berkner Report together with complete report on necessary further developmental work.³ Dillon finally read teletype from Secretary Herter explaining agreed strategy

Source: Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Testing File No. 1. Secret. Prepared by McCone.

¹ See Document 220.

² See footnote 2, Document 220.

³ See footnote 1, Document 220.

Geneva to proceed slowly but deliberately for three or four weeks and if major unresolved issues not satisfactorily disposed of, delegation will press one last time for phased plan, and if this not acceptable Soviets then delegation will be prepared to end negotiations in manner most advantageous to the United States.

The President agreed with all of the above but spoke at some length that we should not release documents under pressure from the press, the public or the Congress.

McCone stated that I felt information should be released in as complete a form as possible as the Reports contain the type of information the public must have in evaluating our decision to break off or continue discussions. The President expressed doubt as to whether the public would pay much attention to as complicated and involved subject. [sic]

Killian then expressed himself as convinced that we must have technical discussions on underground testing, indicating that the Reports which contained information on both improvements to the detection system and ways of deceiving it were significant. Secretary Dillon agreed and finally the President approved the program as outlined by Secretary Dillon.

It was understood that all Departments would work together in developing the most careful and prudent way of handling the releases, it being pointed out that if these matters were handled carelessly, great harm would result.

McCone then asked if all were of the mind that we must insist upon adequate safeguards for any tests which are suspended by agreement even if the price of such a policy would be no agreement at all. There was no dissent to this expression of policy and all seemed agreed that we must have adequate safeguards.

The President and McCone then discussed the prospect of a unilateral suspension of atmospheric tests if the discussions broke down. The President concurred that we would probably follow this policy but that it would be unwise to make any such indication at this time.

The President then spoke of the importance of underground testing and also of the possibility that further underground testing might open up areas of peaceful uses not heretofore considered feasible. He did not elaborate on just what was in his mind.

The meeting adjourned to an adjoining room and was attended by all except the President. It was agreed that the release of the Panofsky and Berkner Reports required careful handling. A memorandum was distributed by State⁴ and Dillon agreed to convene a meeting early next week to discuss and agree upon this subject.

⁴ Not further identified.

Killian urged a study and a determination of what might be considered a "safe number" of on-site inspections. He stated that a preliminary study had been made by his staff, indicating that it probably involved some theory of mathematical probabilities. McCone agreed that AEC would give thought to this subject.

McCone urged that in considering these matters we evaluate the pluses and the minuses and that we not be carried away by the arguments which merely support our conscious or subconscious desires. On the contrary, we must carefully weigh the rationality of all problems such as the underground decoupling, the feasibility of high altitude testing, etc.

John A. McCone⁵

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

222. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, June 29, 1959.

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Killian
General Goodpaster

Dr. Killian recalled that Secretary Herter had recommended to the President some weeks ago the establishment of a group to conduct a disarmament policy review, and had submitted draft terms of reference which the President had referred to Dr. Killian.¹ Secretary Herter, Secretary McElroy and Mr. Gordon Gray, as well as Dr. Killian, have now reworked and clarified these terms of reference.² Pertinent changes are, first, to eliminate any assignment to this group respecting the short-term

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on July 1.

¹ See Document 215.

² The revised terms of reference are attached to a letter from Herter to General Maxwell D. Taylor, July 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.0012/7-159) See the Supplement.

problem of current negotiations in Geneva, and second, to make clear the authority of the individual to head the group to select personnel acceptable to him. Dr. Killian showed the revised terms of reference to the President, who indicated they were acceptable to him subject to certain comments that he proceeded to make. First, he questioned bringing in organizations such as Rand and ORO with an organizational tie-in to the proposed group. He would have no objection of course to their serving as consultants. He regarded the essence of the current proposal as getting people within government to concentrate their efforts on this subject. He thought the technique should be to call upon Defense and the State Department for certain answers, which they would submit to this group. If outside studies are needed, he was inclined to think that State and Defense should have them made. Dr. Killian indicated that he could and would have this point taken care of through interpretative instructions.

Dr. Killian said that Gordon Gray had asked that the point be raised with the President as to what the relation of this group would be to the NSC. He added that Mr. Gray agreed that the group should report to the Secretary of State. The President thought that, ultimately, something out of this body would probably need to be put before the NSC, that is, certain of their conclusions. The project should not, however, be tied organizationally to the NSC, in his opinion.

Dr. Killian next raised the question as to who should head up the project. He said that Governor Herter had suggested William Foster, John McCloy, Colonel Lincoln, Arthur Dean or Mansfield Sprague. The President recalled that Secretary Dulles had felt that the disarmament effort should be headed up by someone actually in the State Department. Dr. Killian said that Mr. McElroy has submitted as additional names those of General Draper and General Taylor. He understood the former would not be available. The President picked up the suggestion of General Taylor with some enthusiasm and thought that it might be an excellent idea to try to get him for this work. He could be called back to active duty for the purpose. He asked Dr. Killian to pursue this.

[Here follows discussion of the space and missile programs.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

223. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (McCone) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, July 7, 1959.

DEAR CHRIS: In our meeting on July 2,¹ I summarized to you the impressions I had gained during my recent trip to Geneva to observe negotiations underway there. I shall repeat these in this personal note, together with certain suggestions I made to you, so that you may have them readily available for such use as you may care to make of them.

I gained the distinct impression that the US-UK tactics of advancing questions concerning the Soviet position gives to the Soviets the opportunity to answer with very minor concessions (if any at all) and then to advertise the answer to the press as representing a real concession. From my contacts and observance, the press in Geneva appeared willing to repeat such advertisements. For example, I can mention the case occurring while I was there where the Soviets, agreeing to raise the manning from 4-5 to 6-7, and to "a different procedure for the appointment of engineering and technical personnel," were reported by the press as being of importance.

As you know, the British are supporting our position but show great anxiety that an agreement be concluded. Sir Michael Wright stated to me and the other members of our visiting group that the concluding of an agreement was of paramount importance and that, if one is not made now, there will never be another chance. This desire naturally leads to optimistic statements made by the Prime Minister before the British Parliament as to the likelihood of successfully concluding an agreement. As a related matter, Tsarapkin gave us the distinct impression that Mr. Macmillan's discussions with Khrushchev on the quota plan were more than casual.

The Soviets are, of course, insisting that agreement be reached on the principle of a quota approach before discussing numbers, and that the quota need not be related to the technical capability of the system. Though queried by our group they gave little or no indication of the numbers of inspections they were considering, although in one answer Tsarapkin implied their "few" was less than 15. They continue to refuse discussion of the Hardtack II and Berkner Panel data, referring back to the Geneva Conference of Experts' Report as final, developed by eight nations, and approved by the US, UK and USSR. In a private conversation with me, Tsarapkin ridiculed the unmanned seismic instruments as absolutely impractical, extremely costly, and impossible to maintain. He

Source: Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Testing File No. 2. Secret.

¹ No other record of this meeting has been found.

simultaneously ridiculed the removing of the veto control on budgets. I believe it obvious that the Soviet strategy is to force our agreement in principle to a "quota plan" and then to attempt agreement on a very low number using all possible propaganda for the purpose (together with such assistance from the UK as they can secure). It is obvious, too, that they will continue to press for complete suspension under a system which has severe limitations on control of underground firings. The UK, too, appears to consider that we are talking only about complete suspension with no regard to a threshold.

In private talks again, Tsarapkin gave me the impression that his objective is to reach an agreement on testing and then to expand the agreement to a ban on nuclear weapons. This matter disturbed me and the other visitors greatly. It appears we must decide now what the US wants as the next step in disarmament negotiations and to lay the groundwork for that step.

While in Geneva I suggested to both the UK and US delegates that they use the statement from the Khrushchev letters to the effect that the control system should "establish such controls as would guarantee strict observance of the treaty." I do feel, however, that the protracted negotiations have given, and will continue to augment, the impression that we are close to agreement while in truth we have not met the major issues. I suggested to you, therefore, that:

- a. The conference should be recessed, if possible, and at an early date.
- b. The US situations immediately should be carefully reappraised by the senior people in our government to establish our objective (and the limits to which we can go) on each of the important issues unresolved—number of inspections, the underground problem, staffing, freedom of access and veto.
- c. On reconvening, the negotiations should be centered on the more major issues and these should be dealt with completely before going further with the fringe matters.
- d. To place the status of the negotiations and agreement in proper perspective before the world, we should develop and issue as rapidly as possible a "white paper" which describes the major issues, points out those still unresolved, and (while explaining also the matters upon which agreement has been reached) emphasizes how large have been our concessions as contrasted with those of the Soviets.
- e. Decision should be reached as soon as possible as to what the US believes should be the next step to be taken in disarmament negotiations, and that public preparations therefor be initiated.

I feel that our visit to Geneva was most beneficial to us. I hope that these thoughts may be helpful to you. Should there be any way I can be of assistance, please call on me.

Sincerely,

John²

² Printed from a copy that bears this signature in an unidentified hand, indicating McCone signed the original.

224. Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower

Washington, July 9, 1959.

SUBJECT

Summit Meeting and Disarmament

In planning for a possible Summit meeting I believe serious thought should be given to a new start toward general disarmament. Khrushchev has shown interest on several occasions. Last February he told Macmillan that the USSR would be willing to see armed forces abolished and only militia retained for internal security (Enclosure 1).¹ Ambassador Thompson believes there is a genuine possibility that Khrushchev would in fact agree to total disarmament, with full control and inspection (Enclosure 2).

Of course this is still only a possibility, not a probability. But in my judgment the implications of the arms race are so grave as to give both sides powerful inducement to stop it. Indeed there should be more common ground between us and the Russians on this point than any other. The difficulties are enormous, and yet when it comes to disarmament big decisions may be easier than little ones. Even a start in the right direction would be a major turning-point.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, July 1959. Secret (Top Secret Attachment). The source text bears Eisenhower's initials.

¹ All enclosures are in the Supplement.

You could move for such a start at the Summit by frankly outlining the problem as you see it. The arms race is increasingly developing a momentum of its own which could easily, like 1914, bring on the war nobody wanted. A general war would profit no nation. The cost of armaments meanwhile is a world tragedy in the face of the real needs of mankind. Serious difficulties between nations will keep arising as long as history lasts, but the time has come when the world must learn to work them out by means other than war. Thinkers have dreamed about disarmament for centuries. It is time for governments to get on with its accomplishment.

The elements of a general disarmament program are agreed levels of forces and equipment, verification procedures and machinery for keeping the peace between disarmed states. The United Kingdom Defense Minister, Duncan Sandys, prepared an analysis last year which might usefully be drawn on (Enclosure 3).

As a start toward defining limits on internal security forces, the United Nations could be asked to obtain estimates of national requirements from all countries.

A fresh approach to the verification problem might be launched at a Summit by telling Khrushchev you agree that inspection and control of weapons systems should be considered simultaneously with proposals to reduce the danger of surprise attack.

You could point to your recent directive for a new disarmament study in the United States Government as an earnest of your seriousness in this field.

You might propose that the enforcement problem be explored in a general way by high-level representatives of the Heads of Government. Meanwhile at the Summit Khrushchev might be pressed to agree on safeguarded nuclear test suspension, as a means of encouraging movement all along the line.²

² In a meeting with Eisenhower on July 13, Herter briefed the President on the Geneva talks as follows:

"Mr. Herter next referred to the nuclear test talks. These are at a difficult point. The Soviets are insisting upon the acceptance of the principle of quota, leaving the exact number to be haggled over as a political question. It is clear, and becoming clearer, that inspection against underground tests is a very uncertain and expensive operation. Mr. McCone and many others would much rather start with a ban of atmospheric tests only. He added that the inspection systems being discussed would be very costly and of doubtful efficacy. Within the State Department there is division of opinion regarding the continuation of the talks. He thought there was a consensus, however, that they should not be broken off. We then come to the question, 'how long should they be allowed to drag on?' He said the British are so anxious for an agreement that they would sign almost anything." (Memorandum of conference by Goodpaster, April 13; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)

Given the way the Soviets work, it would be a mistake to expect the exploratory talks to produce any agreement. They should rather be looked on as means of clearing away some underbrush and helping the Heads of Government develop their own thinking, looking toward a second Summit at which the main issues would be tackled. If, as seems likely, only limited progress were then made, the process of staff talks and occasional Summits could continue. Even slow progress in this fashion through the years could spell the difference between doom and survival.

Christian A. Herter

225. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, July 23, 1959, 10:15 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dillon, Secretary Gates, Mr. McCone, Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Gordon Gray, Dr. Kistiakowsky, General Loper, General Starbird, Mr. Philip Farley, Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, General Goodpaster, Major Eisenhower

The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the next move with regard to atomic testing in the light of the unfavorable prognosis of the test talks at Geneva. Decision on this matter was considered necessary at this time because of the logistical problems involved in any resumption of tests. The problem that the President put to the Science Advisory Committee is to outline a reasonable program of tests, should there be a resumption of testing. Two different test series are undergoing consideration. One is the series of tests of stockpile atomic weapons in the Pacific next summer, sponsored by the Secretary of Defense; the other, sponsored by the AEC, would be a series of "diagnostic tests" underground in the U.S. to test the design of new devices.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by John Eisenhower. For Kistiakowsky's account of this meeting, see *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 17-18.

Mr. Gates pointed out that the proposed weapon stockpile test series will cost \$125 million. In preparing for next summer's tests, the Department of Defense should spend some \$30 million between now and October if these tests are going to be held. If this were not done, then the earliest feasible time for summer tests would be eighteen months from then. Defense gave some indication that it had been hopeful that some indication would be forthcoming from Geneva as to how things are going—and that decisions could be taken based thereon.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that studies had been made eighteen months ago, before the Hardtack operations, outlining what would be gained through another series of tests. However, this study will not be comprehensive until the military viewpoint is included. He therefore proposed that a joint committee, including representatives from Defense, AEC, and the Science Advisory Committee should attack this problem.

The President said that he assumed that all would participate, but that he wished his Science Advisors to act for him in giving direction to the effort. Mr. McCone and General Starbird said that this coordinated study should be fairly easy since most of the work has been done.

Mr. Gates then pointed out that since Dr. York had ruled out high altitude shots, we are concerned with testing both underground and in the atmosphere. Our timing for next summer's tests in the Pacific is already slipping. The President said that the first matter we should decide, this being the case, is the advisability of conducting tests in the Pacific.

Mr. Dillon then introduced Dr. Kistiakowsky's briefing, and summarized its purpose as being to evaluate the worth of a "quota" system of inspections. Regardless of the way it is arrived at, the *actual number* of inspections permitted vs. the number of seismic accidents of varying intensity per year is the core of the question. (Dr. Kistiakowsky then gave Dr. Bacher's briefing, which is appended hereto.)¹

The President summarized his view of the briefing by saying it appeared impossible to control underground tests. He inquired as to the feasibility of using one underground test site more than once. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that much is unknown in this area, and he thought that the AEC would like to conduct a series of underground tests to learn more about wave propagation through various kinds of soil and rock, the effects of decoupling, etc.

The President said that the cost of concealment of large-size tests would appear to be exorbitant, commenting on the estimate that 15 million tons of earth must be moved in order to accomplish maximum reduction of the seismic signal of a 100 KT test shot. Mr. Dulles agreed,

¹ See the Supplement.

adding that the Soviets would fear the detection of construction necessary for this concealed testing.

The group then addressed the Possible Course of Action, appended hereto. This course of action has been agreed among the various departments and agencies, except that Defense and AEC do not agree with the limitation imposed in the last sentence of the paper, which prohibits atmospheric testing. State feels that for propaganda purposes, this limitation must be included. Mr. McCone said, however, that it is possible to conduct all nuclear weapons diagnostic and safety tests underground. The testing in the atmosphere would be confined to that of weapons systems only.

Mr. Dillon warned of the British attitude in this matter, saying we must expect them to suggest going even further on self-imposed restrictions and to desire to refrain from all testing up to five years. Mr. Gates pointed out that more progress can be made in weapons development without testing than had previously been believed.

Mr. McCone expressed concern over the prospect of imposing a restriction on all tests since it would be impossible for us to detect if the Soviets do the same. The President said that it would be difficult for the Soviets to disagree if this testing is being conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the feasibility of detection system. Mr. Dillon said that the Soviets are capable of disagreeing to nearly anything.

Mr. McCone then referred to the President's letter of April thirteenth to Khrushchev.² The President said this position still makes sense, in view of worldwide opinion. Further, that position avoids hamstringing the French unnecessarily, since they are desirous of embarking on tests of their own.

Mr. McCone then called attention to the next-to-last line of page 2 of the Proposed Course of Action and urged that this thought, the highlighting of unreasonable Soviet positions on the veto, be emphasized. The President reiterated his thought that if we stop atmospheric tests, then the Soviets must take full blame for worldwide fear of fallout.

Mr. McCone then proposed a recess of the Geneva talks until the first of next January, assuming that we go ahead with tests to enlarge our knowledge of underground test signals and establish the feasibility of underground decoupling this fall. Under these circumstances, we could conduct the tests and study the results prior to the reconvening of the Geneva talks.

Mr. Dulles pointed out, with regard to the percentage estimates given for the probability of detection of various sizes of shots, with varying numbers of inspections, that they are based on theoretical consider-

² See Document 212.

ations only, with no regard to the Soviet physical capability of building these underground test sites. The President agreed.

John S. D. Eisenhower

Attachment³

POSSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION

a) The Secretary to inform Lloyd of our present views, and offer an immediate visit by a U.S. technical team headed by Dr. Bacher to the U.K. to satisfy U.K. questions. (We should be prepared for a U.K. conclusion that the political advantages to be gained from agreement outweigh the technical uncertainties involved. In addition the U.K. is likely to resist a change in position while the Foreign Ministers Conference is under way and so long as a Summit Conference is a possibility.)

b) Secretary Herter and Lloyd to advise Gromyko in Geneva that we are seriously concerned about Soviet unwillingness to join in reconsidering the effectiveness of the Geneva system for dealing with underground tests in the low yield ranges and that, in spite of the progress which the negotiators have made, we will be unable to agree to a comprehensive ban until there is a solution of this problem. Gromyko should be made to understand that our public and Congressional opinion will not accept an agreement which is not technically sound, and that we cannot longer defer facing up to this problem. Secretary Herter to offer that Dr. Bacher visit Geneva or Moscow to review the technical considerations with Dr. Fedorov or other Soviet scientists.

c) If, as is to be expected, the Soviet Union refuses to agree to the proposed technical reassessment despite this *démarche*, Wadsworth should be instructed to state in the meeting that the United States, short of finding ways of overcoming the technical uncertainties, no longer believes it possible to agree to a full test ban.

1) This would be preceded by a presentation in the meeting, by Dr. Bacher, of our full analysis of the technical situation.

2) We should introduce a draft treaty for a phased approach similar to that developed subsequent to the April 13 proposal, preserving as many as possible of the now agreed elements of the control system but extending to high altitude tests on the basis of the recent technical agreement in this area.

3) Concurrently, we should propose to develop with them a concrete program of research and experimentation, to be conducted coopera-

³ Secret.

tively over a definite period (2-5 years), designed to answer the present uncertainties about underground detection capabilities. The treaty could include provision for extending the ban to underground tests, perhaps in stages, as soon as effective control is proven possible by further study and experimentation. The initial stage, for example, might be to prohibit underground tests creating a seismic signal larger than 10-25 KT on the Rainier coupling, if this proves feasible.

4) This action might be coordinated with a message from Eisenhower to Khrushchev designed to authenticate this position.

5) If the USSR, under this pressure, agrees to the proposed reassessment, the conclusions of the Bacher Panel and the Latter theory will stand up under Soviet technical criticism, and thus will provide even stronger justification for our action. If the USSR continues to refuse, it will bear the onus of ignoring the difficulties we have described in specific terms.

d) If the USSR does not accept this proposal, the President should issue a statement recalling the U.S. delegation temporarily, announcing the intention to undertake the experimental program unilaterally (or jointly with the U.K.) and proposing resumption of negotiations as soon as the program produces results sufficient to warrant this action. Unreasonable Soviet positions on the veto would also be highlighted. In this event we should refrain from conducting any tests in the atmosphere and limit ourselves to a modest and restricted program of underground weapons tests conducted with a minimum of formal publicity. (We must anticipate Soviet and U.K. declarations of intent not to conduct any testing.)

226. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, August 3, 1959, 7 p.m.

Cahto 202. For the Acting Secretary. Selwyn Lloyd has informed me he thinks we are facing a serious situation in nuclear test talks. If we allow Soviets to break off talks and say that since they had been unable to

get a complete agreement which would include stopping underground tests they would have to continue atmospheric tests, effect on public opinion in UK would be almost catastrophic. Lloyd believes, therefore, that we must develop such a position that the Russians cannot say that they want to continue testing. He believes that this can best be accomplished by agreeing to stop on underground tests for a year or so. Lloyd said that the British were not as patient as we, and felt that in a year some sort of satisfactory control system could be worked out for ground tests. He stressed again that we would be in a very bad position if the Russians continue atmospheric testing and give as the reason fact that we would not agree to discontinuance of underground tests.

I said that while the US position that we are not willing to have a moratorium on underground testing before a suitable control system is developed is not unalterable, we would find it difficult now to offer to stop testing for an indefinite time without an agreed control system. If we do so we are afraid we shall never get a satisfactory control system. I pointed out that underground tests did not present the hazards that atmospheric tests did and that we do not feel that we can offer a moratorium on underground testing until our preoccupations on the scientific aspects are met.

I said that we have a large and vocal public opinion that believes that the USSR will continue underground testing during any moratorium and that this would give them an unfair military advantage. I pointed out that they have not apparently conducted underground tests for some time but without a control system they might resume at any time. In the past they had imposed such a voluntary restriction all atmospheric tests but then suddenly shot off a large number without warning. I pointed out that Congress would have to approve any agreement we might reach on atmospheric tests coupled with underground tests. On this last point Lloyd remarked that the agreement need not be covered in a treaty.

Herter

227. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 13, 1959.

SUBJECT

Meeting of the Principals—Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

State Department

Mr. Dillon

Mr. Sullivan—S/AE

Mr. Morris—S/AE

Mr. Borg—S/S

D.O.D.

Mr. Gates

Gen. Loper

Gen. Fox

White House

Mr. Gordon Gray

Dr. Kistiakowsky

Mr. Keeny

A.E.C.

Mr. McCone

Gen. Starbird

CIA

Mr. Dulles

Mr. Brent

Mr. Dillon stated that he had called the group together to bring them up to date on developments at the nuclear test conference and to present State Department ideas on tactics for the immediate future. He mentioned that we have received word that the Killian technical discussions with the British in London went well and that agreement was reached between our scientists on the technical assessment of the underground problem.¹ Dr. Killian is expected to brief the group in Washington in the very near future. Mr. Farley has gone on to Geneva to inform Amb. Wadsworth and the U.S. Delegation of the result of the discussions.

Mr. Dillon said that we have had the impression from discussions during the last two or three weeks with the British Chargé here that the

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Morris and approved by Dillon on August 24. For Kistiakowsky's account of this meeting, see *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 36-37.

¹ Reference is to the report of the Joint U.S.-U.K. Technical Group To Review Technical Aspects of Nuclear Weapons Test Detection, which met in London August 10-11. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology) See the Supplement.

U.K. was very wary of making any significant move in the Geneva negotiations until after their general elections, which may be held around October 20. More specifically, Secretary Herter last weekend received a letter from Foreign Secretary Lloyd² which contained the following proposals:

1) That the U.S. and U.K. take no action at Geneva until the scientists have had an opportunity to report to their Governments on the result of the London discussions and until the Governments have had time to consider the situation in the light of their reports.

2) That the best course would seem to be to wait until the President and the Prime Minister meet in London, when they can thoroughly review the situation together and decide on the best strategy and tactics.

3) That we should bear in mind the probability that the conference will be discussed by Mr. Khrushchev when he visits Washington.

4) Finally, Lloyd proposed that the conference recess for a "summer holiday" from the last week in August for a period of about 3-4 weeks.³ This would allow the conference to reconvene before the United Nations General Assembly really gets down to work.

Mr. Dillon said that we, for different reasons, had likewise concluded that a recess would be advantageous at this time. Among these was the President's decision to appoint Amb. Lodge to escort Mr. Khrushchev during his visit here. Since Lodge would be absent from the U.N. during the first two weeks of the General Assembly, it will be necessary for Amb. Wadsworth, his Deputy, to return to this country to head the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly. For this reason it would seem wise to extend the recess until October 12, a date which would allow adequate turnover time for Amb. Lodge in New York and allow Amb. Wadsworth to be briefed in Washington prior to returning to Geneva. This date, however, raised a new element in our thinking with regard to our public posture in the test negotiations. The Soviets have of late made much of various statements in the American press that we were preparing to resume testing after October 31. A six-weeks' recess would bring us back to the negotiations close to October 31 and expose us to Soviet charges that the recess was nothing but a delaying tactic, since it would be obvious that no conclusion could be reached in the negotiations prior to the October 31 date which we had previously set for our unilateral moratorium. In view of this situation and since the President will probably not visit Moscow until November or early December, the State Department had come to the conclusion that it might be the best course for the U.S., when requesting the recess, to make a unilateral state-

² Dated August 7. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Lloyd-Herter)

³ The conference was in recess from August 28 to October 27.

ment that because of the length of the recess we intend to continue to refrain from nuclear testing until December 31 of this year.

Mr. Dillon said that when discussing the Wadsworth-Lodge problem, and before the State Department views had been expressed, the President had expressed the strong feeling that we should propose to extend our moratorium until the end of the year. Mr. Dillon had said that he felt likewise but that he would like to discuss such a move with the other principals. The President had replied that this would of course be in order, but reiterated that he felt strongly on the matter.

Mr. Dillon said that there therefore seemed to be two courses open at the moment:

1) To agree to a recess and a suitable announcement concerning the extension of our voluntary moratorium. In any case the U.K. had expressed doubts during the Killian discussions in London as to how we might best present our argument for a more limited agreement to the Soviet Union. They want to consider the problem further. Thus we probably could not get U.K. agreement to raise the Bacher Panel data in Geneva prior to the President's visit to London.

2) If any of the other agencies strongly disagree with this course, then they should reopen the question with the President in Gettysburg.

Mr. Gates said he felt this move constituted a major change in the position agreed upon at the July 23 meeting with the President.⁴ This would mean that the new scientific argument militating against a complete underground test cessation would not be presented before mid-October. He felt that we should at least either inform the Soviet Delegation that we intended to discuss the technical problems of underground detection when the conference reconvenes or alternatively give them a paper setting forth the problem which they could study during the recess. In any event it would be important to get something on our intentions in the record before the recess. He further felt that the decision to extend our voluntary moratorium would have unfortunate consequences on our weapons development program. He would prefer to delay any extension announcement until it became clear that such a move was necessary.

Mr. Dillon said he expected that the President would be under such pressure during the exchange of visits that he will feel it necessary to make some announcement. With regard to the July 23 decision, it had been his understanding that this course of action was subject to working out the arrangements with the U.K. Clearly the U.S. would have extreme difficulties in proceeding without the U.K.

⁴ See Document 225.

Mr. McCone said he felt that we would continue to get a soft line from the U.K. as long as they were worried about their elections. Moreover, if we delay our presentation on the limited agreement we run the risk that our colleague at the conference table will represent a different U.K. Government, should Mr. Macmillan's party be defeated in the election. He believed that the basic U.K. desire was to reach agreement on a total cessation of testing regardless of whether it were completely safeguarded. Mr. Gates said he could not see why the basically sound phased limited cessation agreement we had proposed would be so disastrous to the U.K. elections. Mr. Dillon replied that of course the U.K. was the best judge of that and emphasized that they have been quite emphatic in their desire for no shift in the negotiations before the President's meeting with Macmillan in London.

Mr. Dillon said that some U.S. scientists, Dr. Kistiakowsky in particular, have continued to study the limited agreement and have developed some serious reservations concerning our proposal for a joint developmental or exploration program to improve our knowledge of seismic detection. They feel the best way to approach the new problem is to continue the negotiations in the present pattern but to ask for a high quota of inspections—somewhere around the 375 events which would be outstanding each year in the Soviet Union.

Dr. Kistiakowsky explained that he was very much afraid that from a purely technical point of view the U.S. would be open to a rather devastating attack if we proposed an agreement to ban atmospheric and high altitude tests while exempting underground testing. The experts in Geneva had expressed in their report the possibilities for evading detection in outer space—albeit at very high cost. Thus, while on the one hand we are saying that we cannot agree to ban underground tests because of a theoretical possibility of evasion, on the other we would be agreeing to ban tests in outer space where there was a more certain possibility for evasion. Furthermore, he felt it would be very difficult to present the Bacher report in Geneva, particularly a description of the intelligence factors involved. The sum of these considerations led him to believe that the U.S. would be open to the accusation that we are being inconsistent technically. Another area of concern is that a joint investigation of possible means for evading an underground ban would be very difficult to arrange timewise. Such an investigation would be a continuing type of undertaking rather than simply one or two shots to prove or disprove a theory. The Soviets are unlikely to agree to anything without a definite termination date.

In response to a suggestion by Gen. Loper that perhaps the best course would be to return to our old position that we only ban what can be controlled and thus withdraw from including high altitude tests in the

agreement, Mr. Dillon said that he had understood that the possibility of evasion exists only in far space.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that this was indeed the case. In view of the rather substantial weights which would be carried by the 1-1/2-million-lb.-thrust or the 6-million-lb.-thrust engines under development now in this country, and presumably in the Soviet Union, one will in a very few years be able to carry devices with heavy shields to these far distances.

Mr. McCone said that it would seem to him that if such powerful vehicles would be available they would be able to carry practically any weight bomb we have already, and thus it would not be necessary to test to develop lighter weapons for use with our less powerful missiles.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said he completely agreed with this thought. He believes that nuclear testing in outer space for developmental purposes would be the quickest way of pauperizing oneself he knows. Such tests may cost hundreds of millions of dollars each and, since the amount of information which would be obtained from outer space would be slim, we would require many such tests. Of course, the principle remains that evasion in far space is possible. He is worried as a technical person about the inconsistency of the U.S. position in refusing to deal with the underground situation while at the same time agreeing to an outer space ban where there is a loophole.

Mr. Dillon commented that if indeed the question of evasion of an underground agreement is a never-ending possibility, he believes there is a strong argument in support of returning to our original position of a complete cessation and handling the underground situation by proposing 375 on-site inspections in the Soviet Union each year. Gen. Starbird pointed out that even if the Soviet Union were to agree to such a number of inspections we would still have no guarantee against small underground tests by means of which the Soviet Union could push their weapons development quite far.

Mr. McCone expressed his concern that the proposed extension of our unilateral moratorium would be one more step in the erosion of our position. He felt we have already lost the threshold because we have not squarely proposed it in the negotiations. If we now extend our moratorium to December 31 because of the very real pressures which exist vis-à-vis the U.K., other crises in the future can be expected to militate toward further extensions. He did not believe that the U.S. could afford to take the position, as the U.K. seemed determined to do, that all testing must be stopped, unless we were absolutely sure that the Soviet Union is doing the same.

Mr. Dillon said that we were faced with the necessity of this recess. The question remaining is the tactics to be used.

Mr. Gates again expressed his concern about the extension move. He felt it has considerably more implications than merely an extension until

the end of this year. Mr. McCone said that in the future it would be easy to argue for similar extensions because of our own election year, and then because of our elections, and then because a new President will be assuming office. This continuing uncertainty had considerable impact on our testing program. Eighteen months' lead time is required for a large-scale series of tests in the Pacific, and even for underground tests in Nevada for which we already have tunnels we would need three months' lead time. Gen. Starbird added that no significant preparation in Nevada can be taken without the fact becoming public information.

Mr. Dillon said that in any case he did not believe that the President would be able to reach a decision to resume testing before the end of December. Mr. Sullivan noted that our willingness to extend our voluntary moratorium may very likely be the sine qua non to Soviet agreement to a recess. Mr. Dillon said he thought that if as he believed we would not be in a position because of the Eisenhower-Khrushchev visits to test anyway, it would be best to make an announcement along the lines suggested by the President.

Mr. McCone proposed that perhaps a more satisfactory way to handle an extension, if it is indeed necessary, would be merely to have Amb. Wadsworth, when proposing a recess, say that we recognize that the recess would last so close to the Oct. 31 deadline we could not expect agreement before that time and that the U.S. is therefore willing after October 31 to allow a reasonable period of time for progress in the negotiations before deciding on a resumption of testing.

Gen. Starbird said he wished to bring to the attention of the group the fact that he expects a tremendous letdown on the part of the weapons laboratory scientists who are looking toward Oct. 31 for clarification of our intentions toward further testing. Gen. Loper said he felt it would be unwise for the President to take such a decision without having an evaluation of the decrease in our defensive readiness posture this no-testing situation is causing. The situation should not be passed over lightly. Gen. Starbird explained that even though the laboratories could certify the worth of certain weapons, proof tests were necessary for the Department of Defense to have full confidence in the weapons.

Mr. Dillon said that if Mr. Gates and Mr. McCone feel they must present their opinions to the President, the best course would be to seek an early meeting with the President so that an answer to Mr. Lloyd might be sent by Monday evening, August 17.

Mr. Gates said he wished to discuss the situation further with his staff and with the Joint Chiefs. He was very concerned that what was really being discussed was a complete cessation of testing rather than

merely an extension of the moratorium to December 31.⁵ There will always be a reason why a resumption of tests should be deferred.

Mr. Dillon said he believed that any basic conclusions on the need for resuming testing will be based on the report of the Kistiakowsky Panel, which is expected by August 21. This report will detail the consequences to the United States of delaying testing. He would think in any case that the possibility of a definite decision by the President on the basis of this report would be unrealistic prior to his departure to Europe on August 26. Thus there could be no decisions before sometime in September.

Mr. Brent asked whether the Department of Defense was proposing to resume testing to improve our defense posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Were they assuming that the Soviet Union would not itself resume testing and that we would thus improve our two-year lead time?

Mr. McCone said it was worthwhile to discuss this point. The United States bases its defense policy on nuclear weapons to offset the manpower advantage of the Sino-Soviet bloc. If this policy is good, then we must be in the best possible technological position. This requires continued development and testing. We can reduce the fear of fallout by testing underground and in the upper atmosphere. But to withdraw any further than that would be to allow the basis of our defense policy to erode away. He did not think that the Soviet Union is aiming only toward a cessation of testing. Rather they seek to get a lead on all nuclear weapons, thus leaving the free world to the mercy of their defense superiority. The United States must decide whether it will allow itself to be forced into this course.

Mr. Sullivan pointed out that we were not proposing to shift away from the limited agreement approach, but only revising our timing. Mr. Dillon affirmed this.

General Starbird noted that when nuclear weapons leave development laboratories and are deployed by the armed forces the possibility of espionage is increased. We have indications that the Soviet Union has been able to gain considerable useful information on specific weapons. There are, however, no parallel cases on the part of the United States.

After some discussion of the report expected from the Kistiakowsky Panel, it was agreed that it would be best for the panel to report in writing to Dr. Kistiakowsky, who would then brief the NSC, orally rather than by circulating a written document. This would avoid undue dissemination and the possibility of leaks.

⁵ On July 26, the Department of State announced an extension of the moratorium until December 31. For text of the statement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, pp. 1439-1440.

Mr. Dillon said that if we are to approach the Soviet Union next week concerning a recess we will need to be able to reply to Mr. Lloyd's message by August 17 at the latest. It would thus be necessary to see the President on August 17 at Gettysburg if any of the principals wished to dispute the proposed tactics. The State Department would therefore draft a reply to Lloyd accepting a recess and indicating that we will announce our intention to continue to refrain from testing for a reasonable time after October 31. He would expect this evening or tomorrow morning a clarification of the views of the Department of Defense.

Mr. Gray said he thought we should make an effort to present the Bacher data before the recess, or at least put the Soviets on notice that we consider a discussion of the technical problem essential when we return from the recess.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said he felt that the Berkner report had made our concerns to the Soviets clear. Couldn't we just make clear to them our intention to return to this matter?

Mr. Sullivan pointed out that any advance indication that we intended to press for discussion of the technical problems would probably cause the Soviets to refuse to agree to a recess. Mr. Dillon said that in any case we should plan to raise the matter as soon as the Conference reconvenes.

228. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/11

Chequers, England, August 30, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE August-September 1959

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
The Secretary

U.K.

Prime Minister Macmillan
Foreign Secretary Lloyd

SUBJECT

Private Meeting between the President and Prime Minister Macmillan

The Prime Minister said he would like to talk about the political aspects of the nuclear tests negotiations. He stated that in spite of all the

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068, CF 1449. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Herter and agreed to by Lloyd. Chequers was the official country residence of the British Prime Minister. Eisenhower visited the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and France August 26-September 4.

technical findings he felt that there were real political advantages in trying to find an agreement with the Russians which would be comprehensive and not cover atmospheric testing alone.

The President agreed with the desirability of being able to reach a comprehensive agreement, but expressed real doubts as to whether this could be done. He emphasized that, if it could not, it would still be of real importance to make a beginning with an atmospheric tests ban. There was considerable discussion of the political difficulties which the United States Government would face in trying to get a treaty ratified by the Senate unless the balance of testimony indicated that that agreement could prove an adequate deterrent against Russian cheating.

The Prime Minister pressed the advantages from the point of view of public opinion of accompanying the offer to make an agreement on atmospheric tests with the offer of a longer moratorium on underground testing. The President said the real danger of this was that it would give to the Russians what they wanted without any controls whatever and that there was ground for real suspicion that this time might well be used by the Russians in performing a number of undetectable underground shots.

The whole matter was left in a somewhat inconclusive state with the President having made no commitments with regard to any unilateral declaration on the part of the United States with regard to any type of tests beyond the moratorium already announced until the end of 1959. The Prime Minister said that he might have to make some statement about no further British tests taking place. The necessity for, and form of, such a statement were still under consideration.

229. Editorial Note

At the conclusion of the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva on August 5, 1959, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union issued a communiqué to the U.N. Secretary-General stating that they had "had a useful exchange of views on disarmament" and after further consultations would inform him of their results. (Department of State *Bulletin*, August 24, 1959, page 269)

On September 7, the four Foreign Ministers released another communiqué announcing that they had agreed to form a committee to con-

sider disarmament matters, made up of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, and Romania. The Ministers stressed in the communiqué that their committee in no way diminished or encroached on the U.N. responsibilities for disarmament and that their consultations would provide a basis for consideration by the United Nations, to which the group planned to report periodically. The committee expected to begin its work early in 1960 at Geneva. The text of the September 7 communiqué is in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, pages 1441–1443.

230. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, September 24, 1959.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretaries Herter, Dillon, Murphy, Merchant, Mr. Davis, Mr. Hagerty, General Goodpaster

The group came in to discuss with the President matters expected to come up during his meeting with Mr. Khrushchev.¹ The President commented that it will be very difficult to adhere to an agenda. He added that some say that Khrushchev is a master debater. In fact, he seems to be a skillful evader of tough questions.

[Here follows discussion of Berlin and Germany and whether Eisenhower should make a return trip to the Soviet Union.]

The President asked what State's evaluation was of Khrushchev's disarmament speech.² Mr. Herter said it has obviously had substantial impact around the world. The small nations fear that the big powers might start a war, drawing them in. They were also attracted by his suggestion to use the funds freed from armaments for economic development around the world. He recalled that the President had put for-

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on September 26.

¹ Khrushchev arrived in the United States on September 15 and left on September 27, after discussions with President Eisenhower at Camp David, Maryland, September 25–27. See Document 231.

² For an extract of Khrushchev's speech to the General Assembly, September 18, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, pp. 1452–1460.

ward this suggestion six weeks ago. Mr. Khrushchev called for a step by step approach, extending controls as disarmament is extended.

Mr. Dillon suggested that the President consider making a speech on disarmament in the United Nations within the next few weeks. The President thought this might be a pretty good idea, providing him an opportunity to set out our plan.

The President thought that really the most promising line suggested so far is to try to get Khrushchev committed to negotiation as a principle in the conduct of our relations. If he does this, we should be ready to tell him what we are prepared to do. Secretary Herter brought out that Khrushchev had omitted any consideration of any central or UN military force once national forces were reduced. The President said he has been trying to think of concrete examples for a possible step by step approach. We might for example abolish naval units having more than a certain operating range. Mr. Herter said that the Soviets had offered to reduce their conventional forces initially, cutting down to 1.7 million, but offer no way to verify these reductions. One idea his people have been examining is for the United Nations Disarmament Commission to send out a questionnaire for information to every nation asking what forces they require for their own internal security and what armament. Mr. Murphy commented that the existing forces are testimony to our lack of confidence in Soviet behavior, that we increased our forces greatly as the cold war became more severe. The President asked me to find out what was the strength of our armed forces at the end of December 1949. (I did so. The total was approximately 1.5 million.)

Regarding the exchange of atomic reactor information, the President said he viewed the project favorably so long as the whole thing was done through the IAEA.

The President next asked how the Chinese problem could be taken into consideration. If we are talking about disarmament and such subjects, he wondered how we could negotiate on controls in light of our rigid policy against any recognition of Red China. Mr. Herter said we do not wish to change our stand on Red China. They will not renounce the use of force in Taiwan nor will they release our prisoners. The President said he realized this but wondered how we can talk about general disarmament with them. Mr. Merchant said we have the same problem regarding the Federal Republic of Germany. It is realized, however, that such countries must come under the purview of a disarmament agreement even though they are not UN members. The President repeated that he wished we had a really fine first step in disarmament to offer—one not involving our allies. Mr. Herter said that each type of weapon is so interwoven with others that it is hard to visualize what the President is seeking. Nuclear weapons now are so intimately mixed in with others that they could no longer be banned as a class.

The President said that there were reasons not to single out the nuclear weapon back in 1948, when we had a monopoly, but times have changed and if we could now really eliminate all atomic weapons we would not be too badly off. However, we cannot do this without the most extreme and comprehensive inspection system. There is one possibility, however. Bombers and large missiles are discoverable because they are of substantial size.

The President thought Mr. Herter should talk to our Defense people. Where we once said our great strength advantage is nuclear, this is no longer true. If we could put down the sequence of steps we favor, some pattern might emerge. Mr. Murphy thought we could dust off the main lines of our 1957 proposals.

The President next noted that the Russians seemed to want a non-aggression pact. Mr. Herter referred to this as a political treaty. The President thought it was undesirable since it would cover the same ground as our UN commitment and thus detract from it. Also, it would imply some kind of special relationship between the United States and the USSR, and thus alarm our allies.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

231. Editorial Note

During their meetings at Camp David, Chairman Khrushchev and President Eisenhower discussed arms limitations as follows:

"3. Arms Limitation:

"The problem of arms limitation was touched on only in general terms. Both the President and the Chairman agreed on the extravagant cost of the armaments race and the dangers inherent in it. They also agreed that arms limitation was the 'most important problem' in contemporary international relations. The President cited the establishment of the Coolidge Committee as indicative of the serious interest of the United States in the problem of disarmament.

"Secretary Herter and Foreign Minister Gromyko discussed disarmament in more detail. However, there was nothing tangible in the con-

versations to indicate any greater Soviet willingness to permit adequate inspection and controls.

"When queried regarding the possibility of a United Nations police force after general disarmament, Gromyko protested that it was illogical to disband armed forces and then reorganize them under the auspices of the UN.

"In discussing the suspension of nuclear testing, Gromyko stated that the issues of the number of inspections and the staffing of control posts were the only major considerations and termed other aspects of the test talks unimportant. He firmly reiterated Soviet positions. However, Khrushchev had indicated to Lodge on the trip that the question of staffing could be compromised." (Memorandum by John A. Calhoun, Director of the Executive Secretariat; Department of State, S/AE Files: Lot 68 D 358, 16.10)

Concerning the report of the Coolidge Committee to the National Security Council, see Document 236. The text of the Coolidge Committee Report on Disarmament, January 19, 1960, is in the Supplement.

232. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 6, 1959.

SUBJECT

Meeting of Principals: Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

State

Under Secretary Dillon
Amb. Wadsworth
Mr. Popper, USDel
Mr. Farley, S/AE
Mr. Sullivan, S/AE
Mr. Spiers, S/AE
Mr. Baker, S/AE
Mr. Mark, USDel
Mr. Morris, S/AE

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology; Disarmament, Nuclear Testing Policy, '59. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Morris and approved in U on October 13. For Kistia-kowsky's account of this meeting, see *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 108-109.

Defense

Mr. Gates

Mr. Irwin

Gen. Loper

Gen. Fox

AEC

Mr. McCone

Gen. Starbird

Dr. English

White House

Mr. Gray

Dr. Kistiakowsky

Mr. Keeny

CIA

Dr. Scoville

Col. Smith

Mr. Dillon said he had convened the group in order to discuss the course we would like to pursue upon resumption of negotiations on October 27. Of course, decisions would only be final after consultations with U.K. officials when their new government is formed. The Department of State has given a good deal of thought to this matter. The course of action we have developed is only slightly different than that outlined in the July 23 statement.¹ We have recently received a letter from the Department of Defense noting their continued interest in a phased agreement and their eagerness to proceed with the July 23 course of action.² We in the State Department feel that we would not want to allow the negotiations to proceed past December 31 without some decisive action lest we allow the Soviet Union to have a de facto uncontrolled cessation of nuclear tests. We feel that after resumption of negotiations on October 27, the delegation must, for the next two months, make a major effort to make clear in the minds of impartial observers that the Soviet Union is not prepared to accept what we consider to be adequate control over a cessation of underground tests. How to do this is a problem for the negotiators. Our thinking has been that it will be necessary to re-emphasize the need for a full discussion of the technical data pertinent to the underground problem. If the Soviets refuse to enter into such a discussion, the delegation itself should then proceed to present the technical information. We do not necessarily feel we must present our estimate of a specific number of on-site inspections, but rather, set the pattern as to how a level of inspection must be derived from consideration of the technical facts.

This procedure, coupled with a re-emphasis of our position on the other major issues such as staffing and veto, would, we believe, put us in a position so that after the end of the current United Nations General

¹ See the attachment to Document 225.

² The letter, dated September 29, has not been found.

Assembly and a probable December summit meeting, we would be able by Christmas to move to presentation of a limited treaty on the basis of Soviet refusal to give attention to pertinent technical data or to agree to adequate inspection and control. When presenting the limited treaty we should point out that such an agreement would eliminate the fallout problem.

Mr. Dillon said that he was not clear from Mr. Gates' letter of Sept. 29 exactly what Defense recommended. If it wished to move immediately on October 27 to table a limited treaty, he thought that this would cause considerable difficulty both in world public opinion and in the negotiations. The Soviets would probably be able to shift to the United States the blame for withdrawing from the stated conference objective of a complete cessation of nuclear tests.

Mr. McCone said that when he was in Vienna for the General Conference of the IAEA, the Soviet delegate, Mr. Novikov, had sought him out on several occasions to discuss the negotiations. Mr. McCone gathered that Novikov was deputy director of the international organization section of the Soviet Foreign Office and perhaps had over-all responsibility for the Geneva negotiations. During these discussions Novikov made the following statements:

1. The USSR desires to stop all nuclear testing and to ban the use of nuclear weapons.

2. The Soviet Union has concluded that the United States does not want to stop testing because the latter wishes to continue the development of tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviets felt that they have no practical value, are very expensive and if used, would lead to full-scale nuclear war. Chairman Khrushchev himself had decided not to proceed with developing and manufacturing such weapons.

3. The United States had not presented all the information on the new seismic data in its presentation of January 5.³ Soviet scientists have not been able to check the validity of the new data, working only with the summary report that has been given.

4. The United States over-exaggerates the problem of controlling underground nuclear tests. He pointed to the Soviet detection of 32 U.S. tests during Operation Hardtack. When Mr. McCone pointed out that such detection was very possible from a submarine, Novikov had replied that all detection had been from the Soviet Union. Novikov seemed to think these explosions had included underground tests.

5. He questioned U.S. refusal to discuss the Soviet quota proposal and our insistence that a quota must be firmly related to the technical

³ Reference is to Geneva Conference doc. GEN/DNT/25, January 5, 1959, a report given to the Soviet and British Delegations at Geneva. The report is briefly summarized in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, pp. 1335-1336.

facts of the underground problem. This was hard to understand, since Gromyko, Lloyd and Herter had agreed in Geneva that the quota was indeed a matter for political decision.

Mr. McCone said that Novikov evinced considerable interest in the Berkner reports and asked what they contained. Mr. McCone had replied that they showed that the Geneva system did not have the capability for dealing with the underground problem the experts had originally estimated. This capability could be restored partially but not fully. Novikov had asked whether closer spacing of seismic stations would not increase this capability. Mr. McCone had replied that he thought it would. The possibilities of evasion of detection were referred to, but Mr. McCone did not discuss these in any detail. Novikov asked how many inspections would be required if it turned out that there were 1,000 unidentified events each year. Mr. McCone said that, proceeding from the formula in our tabled draft Annex I to the treaty, this would be about 20 percent of the stated figure, or 200 inspections. Novikov commented that even if the Soviet Union did allow that number of inspections, he thought it would be impossible to organize them.

Mr. McCone said that he had taken the position that the United States was pursuing these negotiations in accordance with the President's May 5 letter to Mr. Khrushchev.⁴ He pointed out that it did not appear that Ambassador Tsarapkin was negotiating in the same spirit that characterized Mr. Khrushchev's letters to the President, especially Khrushchev's pledge of absolutely adequate controls. Novikov seemed disturbed by this. He also seemed impressed with Mr. McCone's assessment that technical discussions of the underground detection problem were the only way to make progress in the negotiations.

When Novikov suggested that the United States really did not want an agreement on underground testing because it wished to be able to continue to develop nuclear weapons, Mr. McCone had replied that this was not the case and that the United States did not have to continue such development since we had enough nuclear weapons. It was rather a question of improving our existing weapons. Mr. McCone had further stated that it appeared that the Soviet Union was trying to establish a position where the United States, an open country, would be constrained from continuing such tests while the USSR could proceed with undetectable tests. Novikov had replied that the Soviet Union did not know as much about the United States as Mr. McCone might think, pointing out that the three Argus high altitude tests had been unknown to the Soviet Union until they were reported several months later in the *New York Times*.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 1403-1405.

After concluding the account of his talk with Novikov, Mr. McCone said that the AEC had been giving some thought to the course of action on resumption of the negotiations. The AEC has not changed in its appraisal of the extreme difficulty of monitoring an underground nuclear test cessation. It thought it important to remember that the United States has already been foreclosed from nuclear testing for a year by a device which is very much to the advantage of the Soviet Union. It believes that, as time goes on, there will be continued and increasing pressure on us to accept a treaty that does not provide safeguards. In this connection, General Gruenther had reported that at the recent International Red Cross Conference several delegates from other countries had strongly indicated their belief that nuclear testing would not be resumed. They, of course, had not differentiated between tests in the atmosphere and underground tests.

The AEC feels that the July 23 course of action is perfectly valid, although it agrees that interim events may require some modification in the tactics. It believes that a comprehensive treaty must be adequately safe-guarded. The decision that underground tests could not be adequately monitored had been arrived at on a sound basis and after the exposure of all pertinent technical data. We must continue to study ways to improve the detection system. Of course, it might be that we will find that a solution of the underground problem is impossible and that the art of deception may advance as rapidly as improvements in seismic detection. The AEC believes that we should avoid a break in the negotiations which, if necessary, should be carried to a point at which the President might address himself to Khrushchev either personally or by letter. Failing agreement with the Soviets on a limited atmospheric treaty, the AEC would propose that we announce a unilateral moratorium on atmospheric tests to continue as long as others do likewise. We should state, however, that due to the lack of adequate control means for monitoring underground tests, the United States reserves the right to take any action with regard to such tests it deems necessary. In view of a possible summit meeting and the President's trip, however, the AEC does not believe that we should state in advance that we are free to resume testing on January 1. However, we should not impede the United States freedom of action to do so.

General Starbird commented that in earlier conversations Mr. McCone had felt that a letter from the President to Khrushchev should be sent before the end of December and that the U.S. Delegation should be instructed on resumption of negotiations that their objective is to point out that the United States cannot accept an agreement banning underground tests.

Mr. Dillon said that the only difference between the July 23 course of action and the one proposed by the State Department is that under the

former, after the Soviets had refused to discuss the technical data, we would immediately introduce the limited treaty while, at the same time, proceeding to present the technical data. The course we now propose would have the U.S. Delegation present the technical data without telling the Soviet Delegation that we cannot accept a comprehensive treaty.

Mr. Gates said that the important thing to the Defense Department is that the group determine U.S. policy on what we wish to be the outcome of the negotiations. Tactics are a State Department matter. Defense is anxious to be able to resume nuclear testing after December 31. If a policy decision is not made, it feels that we will continue to be faced with new reasons for delay, such as the President's trip to the Soviet Union, a summit conference, etc. It will become more and more difficult to resume testing. Defense is anxious to determine a firm U.S. position so that policy will determine tactics, and not vice versa.

Mr. McCone asked whether Mr. Gates meant that Defense wished to abandon the goal of a comprehensive agreed ban even under circumstances where an adequate control system was possible. Mr. Gates said yes, because he has not yet seen a control system which would be adequate. He believed that we should settle the policy issue now rather than spend time on the discussion of tactics and technical data, so that we can avoid a situation where the tactics "tail" wags the policy "dog". Mr. Gates said it seemed to him that a limited phased nuclear test agreement could be proposed as one immediately feasible move towards peace at a time when Chairman Khrushchev has so vocally stated his desire for such movement.

Mr. Irwin said that if agreement can be reached on a policy that the United States intends to resume underground testing because no system exists for the detection and identification of underground tests, and if this is the policy for which we can all work, then the tactics proposed by the State Department could be used, since our position will be clear. In this case, we will be faced with two possible situations: either the Soviets will agree with the technical assessment of the problem, but state that we should proceed with a comprehensive agreement regardless of the difficulties; or the Soviets will not agree with the validity of our technical assessment. In either case, the United States will have to be prepared for disagreement with the Soviet Union and to announce that we will continue to test underground.

Mr. Dillon said that we have not changed the conclusion that, without further seismic experimentation, we cannot be sure of a system which would give reasonable control, and thus we could not agree to a ban on underground tests. There was thus no real change in our view. However, we do not believe that we can separate tactics from our objective, since in the play of world events, especially looking toward a summit conference, tactics are a very real part of what we hope to attain. If we

have a summit conference in December, the underground control issue should be sharpened at the negotiation to a point where a move to the limited approach could be made by the President at the summit meeting, should this seem desirable.

Mr. Gates said that what really worries Defense is that its planning, organization and budgeting in the nuclear field is all held in abeyance by the uncertainty of what our testing policy will be. He believed that we should decide now what we want to do and should work toward this. The tactical approach of playing by ear can only fuzz the matter. Mr. Dillon replied that, as he had said earlier, we do not wish to prolong the uncertain situation beyond December 31, thus giving the Soviets a de facto uncontrolled test ban. Mr. Gates commented that he thought the Soviets had done fairly well in getting by for the past year with an uncontrolled ban.

Mr. McCone commented that he did not think we could blame the Soviet Union for a de facto ban this past year, since we ourselves had volunteered a one-year moratorium. They had, of course, spun out the negotiations, although we had proposed several recesses. He said that he was not clear whether the Defense Department felt that it should be in a position to resume testing in the sensible [*sic*] atmosphere regardless of Soviet action. Mr. Irwin replied that Defense would be willing to accept an agreement banning atmospheric testing even if such an agreement relied only on national detection networks for control.

In response to a query by Mr. Gates as to what technical discussion at the negotiations would reveal, Mr. McCone said that he believed it would prove to any reasonable man the futility of safeguarding an underground cessation.

Mr. Dillon asked Ambassador Wadsworth how long he thought it would take at the negotiations to proceed with the proposed tactics in order to sharpen the issue of underground control to the point where we could propose a limited agreement. Ambassador Wadsworth replied that this would, of course, depend a bit on our objective. If the delegation returned to Geneva with all the material ready for presentation, we could present a rounded picture of why we need technical discussions in a relatively short time. However, it would be very difficult to know by what date we could demonstrate Soviet intransigence. His experience at the negotiations showed clearly that the Soviets might, on that day, make sufficient movement so that we would not be able to shift to a new approach. He would definitely not wish to face the issue until after the conclusion of the present UN General Assembly. He believed that a sufficient case could be built for a shift to a limited treaty by Christmas.

Mr. Gray noted that while it would be relatively easy to arrive at a policy decision on this matter for the U.S. Government, he wondered about UK willingness to support such a position. Mr. Dillon commented

that this would, of course, be a problem and that we would not be able to develop a program with the UK until after their elections on Thursday. Mr. Gates said he was completely convinced that the UK has no intention of changing its national position, which was for a complete test cessation. Mr. Irwin said he believed this is a question of judgment of the importance to the United States of its nuclear capability over the next ten to fifteen years. If this capability is essential to U.S. national security, as he believed, then we shall have to weigh this against the problem of facing up to a difference with the UK.

Mr. McCone said he found it difficult not to be impatient with Macmillan's attitude toward the negotiations since, after all, one of the reasons the UK is in a position to agree to cease British nuclear weapons development activities is that the United Kingdom is now getting weapons information and submarines from the United States under our bilateral agreement with them. He recalled that Macmillan had assured U.S. officials, and him personally—when urging the United States to drop the link to disarmament—that under no circumstances would he go along with an inadequately controlled agreement.

Mr. Dillon said it appeared that Defense wished a basic decision at this time that a comprehensive test cessation agreement is impossible, that the United States proceed with an atmospheric agreement, and plan to continue weapons testing underground for the next ten to fifteen years. The State Department, rather, would say that a controlled and complete cessation does not seem possible now but that we are not willing publicly to abandon this goal at this time. Mr. Gates said he thought we should eliminate underground cessation as a practical possibility at the present time and consider it as the next step in a phased approach. Mr. Irwin added that when we learn how to control underground tests in two or five years, we should then reconsider an extension of the agreement to include an underground ban, provided there is progress in other disarmament issues.

Dr. Kistiakowsky recalled that the original Geneva Experts' control system had not guaranteed certain detection; rather the President had decided to accept a certain probability for such detection. Since that time we have learned of a quantitative change in the capability of the Geneva system. However, this was certainly not a black-and-white shift from capability to no capability. He also recalled that the McRae Report⁵ had indicated no strong technical requirement for a resumption of tests in January. To him the worst thing that could happen would be for the

⁵ Dr. James W. McRae was the chairman of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Requirements. The report of the panel was presented at the August 26 meeting of the principals charged with policy for the Geneva nuclear test negotiations. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Suspension of Nuclear Testing) See the Supplement.

United States to be caught in a no-testing situation without any control system. Thus, he could not subscribe to a unilateral moratorium. He reiterated that no detection system could be perfect. Mr. Irwin commented that he realized that perfect control was impossible but that he believed we must have a "reasonably adequate" control system. He understood that such a system does not exist. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that possibilities for such a system had not been fully explored as, for instance, the possibility of using unmanned seismic stations—as discussed in the Berkner report and the London Killian-Penney meeting—capable of detecting and identifying underground events down to 50-ton size, not just 50 kilotons. This is a perfectly straightforward proposition which has not been considered.

Mr. McCone said that we had, of course, recognized that the original Geneva system was not perfect and for that reason he had thought that a threshold should be proposed for underground explosions. Thus we would ban nuclear tests of 5 kilotons and larger which could be controlled but would exempt from the ban tests smaller than 5 kilotons, which would not be adequately controlled. He noted that in the negotiations we had never had a real opportunity to introduce this concept and, indeed, we seemed to have forgotten it. A technical conference could re-establish the need for a threshold. Of course, this would not dispose of the decoupling problem.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said he had concluded that technical discussions would be advantageous but that he believed we should be very careful in any discussion of the Latter hole decoupling scheme unless we have good and hard facts to support what is now only a theory. To his mind, the Latter hole was a little like seriously proposing nuclear tests on the other side of the sun.

Mr. Dillon said that the group seemed agreed that we should not tie our hands, and pointed out that it would be difficult to reach a final decision at this point in view of differing scientific judgments on the underground problem. However, we could come close to agreement to use every effort to put the facts on the conference record, to clarify the underground detection problem with the Soviet Delegation and to make clear that they are unwilling to accept adequate inspection. He said he felt that if we follow this procedure, we will then be in a position to put forward the limited treaty. He believed the UK would go along with such a course of action as far as the moment when we would shift from a comprehensive approach to a limited phased approach. At that point we may well be faced with a parting of the ways.

Mr. Gray said he thought that sooner or later the United States would have to face up to a difference in approach to these negotiations. He believed that we were moving from a position relying on adequate control to a system described as *deterrence*.

Mr. Gates said he could not understand what was so difficult in arriving today at a decision among the principals. Mr. Dillon said he could not see any difficulty in arriving at a decision but could not say when such a decision could be made, since it would be necessary to take into account subsequent events.

Ambassador Wadsworth said that the words they use in Geneva to describe the kind of control the United States desires are "effective international control". Control is effective if it acts as a deterrent. Thus, in the delegation lexicon, they arrive at the term "adequate deterrent". Effective control means enough deterrent. Mr. Irwin said that in order to have a deterrent one would need a reasonable chance of catching a potential violator. He did not know, but perhaps 200 inspections might be able to do this even if we know that such a number of inspections could not positively identify an underground violation.

Mr. Dillon said that after listening to the discussion, it appeared to him that the basic decisions on this matter had already been taken, and that he could not see what further decision was required. Mr. Irwin replied that Defense would like to see instructions to Ambassador Wadsworth stating that the U.S. Delegation should not agree to a cessation of underground testing at this time, and that the cessation of underground tests should be a goal for a phased agreement to be entered into at the time when underground detection becomes feasible and after progress in other areas of disarmament. The instructions should include a statement that the United States reserves the right to continue nuclear testing underground after January 1. The delegation's tactics should be aimed toward the implementation of this policy.

Mr. McCone said he did not believe such a course of action was different from the May 5 decisions of the President.⁶ The AEC believes that whether or not the Soviets agree to technical talks on underground detection, the President should write Soviet Premier Khrushchev prior to January 1:

(1) making clear that the United States can accept at this time only the limited treaty embracing atmospheric tests and those to altitudes which can be adequately monitored by the system to be agreed;

(2) pointing out that if the Soviets want a first step, the limited treaty can be negotiated immediately;

(3) emphasizing that the United States cannot accept now a treaty prohibiting underground tests in view of the lack of adequate capability for monitoring;

(4) reiterating that the United States is pursuing urgently the problem of improving techniques for detection and identification of underground tests so that agreement on this matter can be attempted subsequently when a technically sound solution is possible;

(5) If the Soviets refuse the limited treaty, the United States will announce that it will withhold unilaterally atmospheric tests while other

⁶ See Document 216.

nations do likewise in view of the possibility of monitoring these relatively effectively with national systems in existence. However, in view of the lack of any system capable of monitoring effectively underground tests, the United States will consider itself free to take any action with regard to such tests it deems necessary.

Mr. Dillon said that the State Department sees our objectives in the negotiations somewhat differently from the Defense Department, which wishes to clear up the underground control problem so that we may be free to resume underground testing on January 1. The State Department does not disagree with the necessity for resolving the underground detection difficulty, but we feel that tactics are an integral part of our objective. We must consider not only our testing positions but also our position vis-à-vis world public opinion. Thus, for us, tactics meld with our objective. Mr. Irwin said he believes that the importance to our national interest of continued underground nuclear testing during the next ten years is such that it should override the imponderable public opinion problem.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said it was his impression that the State Department thought of a nuclear test agreement as a part of an over-all arms limitation program. A nuclear test ban makes no sense to him if it is not a step in the broader area of disarmament. He was afraid that a hard and fast decision to resume nuclear testing would be bad if it disregarded public opinion.

Mr. Gray said he very strongly felt that the principals were not fundamentally in agreement on the course of action to be pursued. The Defense Department clearly desired to instruct the U.S. Delegation to avoid a comprehensive agreement. He did not believe this to be the State Department position. He asked whether the Delegation had been informed of the July 23 decision. Ambassador Wadsworth explained that the July 23 decision had not yet been translated into concrete instructions to the Delegation because of the practical difficulties of implementing it. He was, of course, aware of the proposed plan for proceeding immediately to table a limited treaty. He stated that he was personally definitely opposed to such a course of action. He did not wish to discuss this matter in detail, however, since his responsibility was that of negotiation rather than of policy formulation. Mr. Dillon said he believed the principals were agreed that the underground detection facts do not indicate at this time that an underground nuclear test ban could be fully monitored. Mr. McCone said it was perhaps rather that we now know that we cannot enforce an underground cessation and that we must strive to develop additional technology in this field. Dr. Kistiakowsky said he did not believe he could judge the ability to control underground tests until he had studied the recent work with long-period seismograms being done by Columbia University seismologists in cooperation with the Bell Telephone Laboratory. Some of those working on this possibility believe they

can re-attain the detection and identification capability originally estimated for the Geneva system.

Dr. Scoville said that there was a real difference between what was necessary to deter and what is necessary to control. He did not believe that many of those present were sympathetic with the deterrent approach. However, if a control system does deter a potential violator, it is therefore an *effective* control system. He recalled that the most recent NIE on Soviet testing motivations had concluded that the Soviet Union would not seek to cheat if there was an appreciable chance that they would be caught.

Mr. Gates stated that he did not wish to take the position that the Defense Department is opposed to a comprehensive test agreement. However, it does not see how such an agreement can be controlled now. In the face of this, it wishes to avoid continued delays and to move toward continued underground testing. He could not understand why we could not now proceed with a limited phased agreement. Mr. Dillon said that when we move away from a comprehensive approach, he did not believe we should immediately resume weapons tests underground after January 1. It would be more prudent to conduct seismic improvement and decoupling investigation of nuclear shots first. These would get people accustomed to underground nuclear explosions and help pave the way for resumption of underground development tests later on.

Mr. Dillon said he believed that, on the basis of the discussion, we were in a position now to work out a definite course of action for the delegation which, after coordination with the other agencies, could be presented to the U.K. next week.

Mr. Dillon reminded the group that technical discussion or extensive technical presentation will require a very strong technical contingent on the U.S. Delegation, and he hoped that the other agencies would make such people available as Ambassador Wadsworth may need them.

Mr. Dillon asked for a summary of progress on the various technical investigations under way in Defense and AEC. Mr. McCone explained that the high explosive investigation of the Latter decoupling scheme being done in Operation Cowboy was about two months behind schedule. We could not expect results until sometime in January or March. Several contracts had been let for the engineering studies of the feasibility of constructing, and the costs of, the "Latter" holes required to decouple underground tests, which had been recommended by the Killian/Penney group in London. Early reports seemed encouraging for holes of limited size. For instance, a hole of 110-ft. radius designed to accommodate a 2 KT nuclear explosion could be constructed with reasonable assurance in twelve months at a cost of \$5 million.

Mr. Keeny asked whether anything could be done with the larger holes. General Starbird replied that AEC had been hampered in these

studies because they have had to ask for judgments on this complicated question without being able to explain fully the use to which such holes would be put. There have been some judgments that holes as large as 200 ft., or even greater, could be reliably constructed. However, they have not been able to approach the investigation broadly on an unclassified basis. Mr. McCone said that in planning for nuclear shots for the testing of the decoupling theory, and for seismic improvement shots, surveys and negotiations are required. These are not proceeding because the Defense Department had requested that a public announcement of this program be withheld for the present. Mr. Irwin said that the Defense Department had recommended withholding a public announcement because it was concerned lest publicity have an untoward effect on the negotiations. Mr. Dillon said the Department had approved the text of the announcement some time ago and did not see any problem with going ahead with such a public announcement at a suitable time.

General Loper reported that the Berkner and Panofsky panel recommendations for long-range research and development on seismic and outer space detection had been reviewed by two panels under Dr. York's direction and that while proposals were under consideration, no contracts had been let. \$20 million had been allocated by the Secretary of Defense for this work, but the two panels had indicated a total of \$28 million would be needed for the first year. Defense was somewhat worried about the propriety of allocating funds initially appropriated for other purposes.

233. Memorandum of Discussion

London, October 19, 1959.

Memorandum of Discussion With Prime Minister Macmillan on October 19, 1959

Attendance:

Ambassador Whitney
Lord Plowden
Chairman John A. McCone
One secretary

I called on the Prime Minister at his invitation at 10 Downing Street at 3:30 p.m., October 19, 1959. The meeting lasted one hour and 15 minutes.

The Prime Minister was interested in my visit to the Soviet Union nuclear activities which I reviewed in detail. In summary I stated it seemed to us the Soviets were pursuing their peaceful uses program at a high level, that they were working in parallel areas to the U.S. and U.K. but they obviously had or possessed a high level of technical competence and that their plan of organization of their scientific community permitted accomplishment of specific undertakings in a minimum time. I pointed out that the building of the CTN ALPHA, copy of British ZETA, in four months and the CTN OGRA, equal in size to U.S. Princeton machine, in ten months were examples of their ability to conscript and organize their resources to accomplish special purposes in a minimum time. Plowden said their ZETA required two years or more and our Princeton machine two and one-half years or more. I then discussed the Krivoi Rog mining operations, uranium milling operations and at this point brought to the Prime Minister's attention the fact that the Soviet policy did not permit full disclosure of detailed production figures to the extent published by U.S. and U.K. and that I had taken every opportunity to emphasize this point as essential to any form of cooperation.

We then discussed at length the Geneva test suspension negotiations. I stated that it was abundantly clear to me after visiting their underground mining operations to a depth of 3000 feet that the Soviets could make very significant progress in the development of small tactical weapons without the risk of detection. I explained to the Prime Minister the possibility of developing very exotic small weapons, the characteristics of which I explained indicating that if such developments were made by the Soviets in a clandestine developmental program the possession of such weapons would, in the opinion of our military, be of real significance.

I stated that research, seismological instrument development and testing of detection systems would be necessary to provide means of reasonable safeguarding an underground suspension agreement and until such testing was carried out with successful results (which was by no means certain) we could not ensure compliance with the test suspension in the underground environment.

I did not deal with our own developmental possibilities nor with the decoupling possibilities except to mention decoupling briefly. Plowden readily agreed that testing up to one KT could be carried out without danger of discovery and that the devices I was talking about were far below the 1 KT threshold.

I concluded by outlining my discussions with Professor Emelyanov and with Novikov in Vienna at which time I urged technical discussions at Geneva stating that such discussions would bring out the correctness of our position. I emphasized that a detection system and a quota of on-site inspections must be based on technical and scientific fact and not on

political considerations. The Prime Minister did not object to this position.

The Prime Minister then stated that we might seek an atmospheric ban by agreement and with appropriate safeguarding arrangements which would be relatively simple and then have a gentlemen's agreement for one year not to test in the underground and during this year we could seek appropriate means for safeguarding an underground agreement. I stated our scientists felt two to five years were necessary for research and development. The Prime Minister then suggested a two year gentlemen's agreement pointing out that one year would be consumed in laboratory studies and preparing test devices prior to making tests and therefore a two year suspension would involve only a one year loss of time. I urged no gentlemen's agreement pointing out that developments of the type mentioned could be achieved by the Soviets if they chose within the same period of time as could be required for research in detection methods.

The Prime Minister discussed at length the possibility of using tactical weapons indicating he had challenged the British JCS on this concept stating in his opinion it would lead to "big war". I did not comment on this issue stating it was a military matter.

The Prime Minister then took the position that we must evaluate the hazards of failure at Geneva and the consequences in our relationship with the Soviets and with world opinion as contrasted with the risks of entering into an agreement which might have some loopholes which would give the Soviets advantages, though not crucial advantages. I stated this was the central issue at Geneva and that I was convinced from my ten day trip that the Soviet's friendship, peace drive was a facade and that there was considerable evidence to me of their devious tactics and I therefore felt we have to be extremely guarded in any arrangement we made with them. The Prime Minister readily agreed.

Ambassador Whitney reported that in private conversations following our meeting, the Prime Minister expressed satisfaction over the discussion and pleasure at receiving the information from me. Both Whitney and Plowden felt the information given the Prime Minister was important and useful in molding British policy.

John A. McCone¹

¹ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

234. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 14, 1959.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Testing

PARTICIPANTS

Department of State

Secretary Herter

Mr. Farley—S/AE

Mr. Spiers—S/AE

Department of Defense

Deputy Secretary Gates

Asst. Secretary Irwin

C.I.A.

Mr. Allen Dulles

A.E.C.

Mr. McCone

White House

Dr. Kistiakowsky

The Secretary said that there were several urgent items of business which had necessitated calling the group together at such short notice. He said that first he would like to bring the Department of Defense up to date on a conversation which he and Mr. McCone had had with the President on November 11th. He said that this conversation had arisen in connection with the fact that it was difficult to get any outstanding scientist to head our technical delegation in Geneva because of the feeling that the meeting would be used to serve a previous political decision to disengage from the negotiations. At Mr. Herter's request Mr. McCone read the record of the meeting (Tab A).¹ Dr. Kistiakowsky said that, having read Mr. McCone's memorandum on the conversation with the President which refers to a statement he made to Mr. McCone, he was somewhat concerned that he did not express himself correctly. He said that Dr.

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Assistant for Science and Technology. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Spiers and approved by S on November 23. For Kistiakowsky's account of this meeting, see *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 155–156.

¹ According to McCone's account of the meeting at Tab A, the President "stated he felt that the purpose of the technical conference was to examine the capabilities of detection systems in view of all presently known information, much of which has been developed since the original technical conference in March, 1958. As a result of this examination, to reach agreement both on the capabilities of any detection system and the areas in which the detection system could, and could not, provide safeguards." The full text of Tab A is in the Supplement.

Bacher, in explaining his reasons for refusing to become Chairman of the Delegation of Experts, did not object to a policy aiming at a limited treaty. Rather his strong objection was to his understanding that there was no clear policy and that hence his activities at the experts conference would be a holding operation while the policy was being decided in Washington. His intention in conveying this to Mr. McCone was to emphasize that other scientists would most likely take a similarly negative attitude if approached. He had therefore urged the need to obtain a clear statement of policy before assembling the Delegation unless it were to be formed of men who could be ordered to Geneva.

The Secretary said that Dr. Fisk had conditioned his acceptance of leadership of the delegation on his obtaining a policy statement regarding U.S. intentions in the technical meeting. The Secretary asked Mr. Farley to report on this matter and on the status of the negotiation of terms of reference for the meeting with the Soviet Union. Mr. Farley reviewed recent developments in Geneva in connection with the negotiation of the terms of reference, which he stated were still up in the air. The Soviets are still emphasizing the formulation of technical criteria as the major purpose of the meeting, whereas to us this is only a part of the problem. Our delegation has been instructed to seek terms of reference which will allow assessment of the capabilities and limitations of the control system in the light of the new data. This was the key point for us. So far the texts which the USDel has proposed for terms of reference have been rejected by the Soviets. The major question for us is the extent to which we must insist on terms of reference which explicitly call on the scientists to make the assessment we wish. He distributed for discussion a further version of the terms of reference which amalgamated the first paragraph suggested by the Soviet Union with a second paragraph suggested by the U.S. Delegation. During discussion of this draft minor changes were suggested and agreed. The agreed version of the draft terms of reference are reproduced at Tab B.²

The Secretary then referred to the reports we had received on the Wright-Tsarapkin discussions which indicated that the Soviet Union might be interested in a temporary underground test ban which would be reviewable after a period of three years in the light of further knowledge and experience of the problems and possibilities of detection. This would give the West an interim right of on-site inspection, although the numbers would still have to be negotiated. He felt that this was a very important conversation and that we could not ignore Soviet willingness to install 20 control posts in their territory, the capability of which could be improved with further experience. The Secretary said that a control system based on present technology would probably be better than none

² Tabs B, C, and D are in the Supplement.

at all, particularly as we had repeated extension of our voluntary suspension. Mr. McCone said that we should face up right now to the fact that the Senate would not approve a treaty with large gaps in its capability. Therefore the technical delegation should focus on developing a clear description of the limitations of any presently feasible system.

The Secretary then referred to the policy statement which had been drafted in the Department for the guidance of the technical delegation on the basis of the conversation with the President. After substantial discussion and with changes suggested by Mr. McCone the statement as reproduced at Tab C was agreed.

The Secretary then referred to the problem we faced at the United Nations, where we are confronted with an Indian resolution which "calls upon the states concerned at Geneva to refrain from further tests or preparations for same pending agreement on total cessation".³ The Secretary said that tempers were white hot at the United Nations on the testing issue and felt that the fact that the Afro-Asian resolution directed against the French Sahara tests⁴ had received less than a 2/3 vote was due only to the fact that the sponsors of the resolution had piqued some of the Latin Americans, who then refused to support their draft. Our problem thus is how to avoid adoption of the provision in the Indian resolution. The Secretary observed that last year we had co-sponsored a resolution, which is still in effect, which called upon the states involved in the Geneva negotiations not to undertake further tests of nuclear weapons while these negotiations are in progress.⁵ We had hoped to avoid being confronted with similar language this year, but if we were so confronted it might be difficult to oppose. The Secretary distributed a copy of the statement which he proposed to instruct Ambassador Lodge to make in the United Nations in voting for a provision which would call upon states to continue their present voluntary suspension of nuclear testing, and which we would hope would forestall a vote on the more unfavorable Indian resolution. Mr. McCone said that the Indian language was very bad since it would amount to an indefinite voluntary suspension "pending agreement on total cessation", which might never come, and would also call for shutting down our laboratories. After further discussion the group agreed on the statement for Ambassador Lodge in the revised form enclosed at Tab. D.

³ For text of the resolution sponsored by India and others, as approved, see Part B of Resolution 1402 (XIV), November 21, printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, pp. 396–397.

⁴ Resolution 1379 (XIV), approved November 20, 1959. Before voting on the resolution as a whole, the Assembly voted on two paragraphs of the draft resolution, which failed to receive a two-thirds majority. The approved resolution and the failed paragraphs are *ibid.*, pp. 1546–1547.

⁵ Resolution 1252 (XIII), November 4, 1958, is printed *ibid.*, pp. 1214–1217.

Mr. Gates asked whether the conversation with the President reported earlier meant that we had changed our plans to table a limited treaty. The Secretary answered affirmatively, noting that we would not be in a position to make any political decisions as to the nature of our further steps until the results of the technical conference were available and had been assessed. Mr. Gates said that as far as the Department of Defense was concerned the vital objective was to avoid indefinite continuation of the moratorium. He noted that one-point safety testing was being held up because it was deemed inconsistent with the moratorium. Mr. McCone said that the AEC was proceeding with the one-point safety program. Dr. Kistiakowsky noted that the President had approved the program. Mr. McCone said that the planning was being done with the objective of avoiding any risk of nuclear yield before January 1st. Mr. Gates said that it was his understanding that one-point safety testing would have to be postponed as long as a moratorium were in effect. Dr. Kistiakowsky reported that the President had recently made a definite statement to him that as long as the blasts were produced by a chemical explosion, whether or not a nuclear reaction takes place, it is not in his view a nuclear weapons test. Dr. Kistiakowsky himself strongly agreed with this view. So far as he knew the weapons laboratories felt very confident that they could conduct these experiments within the framework set by the President. Mr. McCone said that if the moratorium on testing were to be extended it would be necessary to clarify that this type of experimentation is not prohibited. In his view, also, safety tests qualified as nuclear experiments and were not weapons tests. The problem was that the press might get wind of these experiments in view of the elaborate precautions that had to be taken and that their nature might be misinterpreted. Dr. Kistiakowsky suggested that the President himself make a plain public statement before any further extension of the moratorium clarifying the fact that these experiments are not weapons tests. The Secretary observed that the difficulty with a Presidential statement would be its effect on public confidence in the safety of our weapons. Mr. Irwin agreed with the serious political consequences of any leaks about our need to conduct safety testing. Accordingly he opposed doing such testing as long as the moratorium was in effect. Mr. Gates said that regardless of all of the considerations the fact is that the moratorium has prevented us from doing safety testing. Mr. Irwin asked what yields might be involved in safety testing. Mr. McCone replied that it would be on the order of tens of pounds. Mr. Gates asked why we could not tell the Soviets the truth and advise them that we do not consider such experiments to fall within the category of weapons tests. It would be better to do this than to be caught in the act without prior explanation. The Secretary said that he would like to see in black and white just what one would say in this connection.

Returning to the problem of extension of the moratorium, Mr. Gates observed that the Soviet Union is getting just what it wants for nothing. With every extension of the moratorium we will encounter greater political difficulties in ever resuming testing. There are always political reasons for extending the moratorium "just a little while". He now considers that extension for a further year is a practical certainty. The Secretary said that he felt we should make no commitment to extend beyond a "few weeks" since this is the time which would probably be required for the technical talks. The fundamental question before us is do we really want an agreement and will we use our best efforts to achieve it. Mr. Irwin said that the historic position of the Department of Defense was to oppose suspension of testing. The Department of Defense now supports the official policy but does not want to be committed to suspend tests which are beyond our ability to control. Mr. McCone said that this represented the AEC position also.

The Secretary said that he was disturbed at the apparent postponement of the urgent safety tests. He had the impression that these had been approved and that everything was going ahead on schedule. Mr. McCone repeated that this was the case although we had scheduled the tests so that there would be no possibility of a nuclear yield until after January 1st. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that this matter should be clarified so that all needed safety tests could be conducted regardless of whether the moratorium were continued. These tests are essentially research experiments for safety purposes. They do not involve useable weapons and should not be construed as weapons testing.

Mr. Gates said that there was one way out of the present dilemma and that was for the AEC to agree with Dr. York that one-point safety tests were not important and to reverse its present policy of cutting back on production until the safety problem was resolved. Dr. York felt that the one-point safety problem was just one minor risk among other larger ones and should not preoccupy us to the extent that it had. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that he agreed entirely with Dr. York. No amount of one-point safety testing will give us 100 per cent assurance of weapons safety, in any case. This is a relative matter and should not be given undue importance.

The Secretary asked again for a draft of a statement of what we might say should any safety testing we do become public knowledge. He suggested that this matter be discussed at the next meeting of principals on Tuesday and that DOD and AEC be prepared to present their suggestions at that time.

235. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 17, 1959, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Test Negotiations: Meeting of the Principals, Room 5100 New State,
2:30 PM

PARTICIPANTS

State

The Secretary

Mr. Farley—S/AE

Mr. Blanchet—S/AE

A.E.C.

Mr. McCone

D.O.D.

Mr. Gates

Mr. Irwin

Gen. Fox

White House

Dr. Kistiakowsky

Mr. Keeny

Dr. Fisk—President, Bell Telephone Laboratories

Mr. Herter said the first matter to be discussed was the disagreement with the USSR over terms of reference for the forthcoming technical talks. He expressed his great appreciation to Dr. Fisk for his willingness to lead our group at these talks. Mr. Farley explained the main difference between the Soviet and the U.S. terms of reference. The issue was whether to state explicitly in the terms of reference that the working group should assess the capabilities and limitations of the control system. It was a major U.S. objective to arrive at such an assessment if possible. Ambassador Wadsworth's explanation of the Soviet rigidity on this question was that they believed that such an explicit statement would prejudice whether or not the Experts Report of 1958 had in fact been overtaken by subsequent scientific research. The Soviets appeared to consider our concern with capabilities and limitations as unacceptable, just as we view the requirement, in the original Soviet terms of reference, that the group define criteria for on-site inspection "within an agreed quota" as unacceptable. Tsarapkin did, however, claim in informal talks that the Soviets were willing to discuss any data which was

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Blanchet and approved by S on November 30. For Kistiakowsky's account of this meeting, see *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 163-164.

relevant and had stated that the Soviet scientists had masses of material which they wanted to bring to the discussions. They would be willing to record, Tsarapkin claimed, any new conclusions. They would not, however, commit themselves in advance to a revision of the conclusions of 1958. The Soviets looked upon our insistence upon an explicit statement that capabilities and limitations should be treated as an effort to prepare the way for disengaging from the conference. Mr. Farley stated that if this was in fact the Soviet position the practical question was whether, in the absence of an explicit call in the terms of reference for review of capabilities and limitations, Dr. Fisk would have a sufficient mandate to draw the Soviet scientists into a discussion of appropriate scope. In viewing this question we had to bear in mind the personality of Federov, who could eventually be brought to yield ground but would in the first instance be rigid and unyielding.

The Secretary said that to him the central question was how fundamental a difference did in fact exist between the Soviet proposal on the one hand and the Department staff proposal, both of which were reproduced in a paper before the meeting (Tab A). Mr. Gates said that it appeared to him that even under the Soviet terms of reference, if the Soviets were to try to dispute the relevance of information which we put forward, we would still be able to table the information and it would become a part of the conference record. Dr. Fisk agreed. The Secretary said he thought that, since it was stated in all current versions of the terms of reference that the group "shall consider all data and studies relevant to the detection and identification of seismic events" (as the Soviets had already agreed to do in the terms of reference), the other side would not be in a position to resist the submission of any relevant data. If they were to attempt to do this we should be in a much stronger position to break off the conference than we were in our present disagreement as to whether the terms of reference should refer to an assessment of capabilities and limitations.

Mr. McCone said that he thought the Department staff proposal did not show our real purpose in going to these discussions, a purpose to which the President had agreed in the conversation of November 11th¹ and which was reflected in the policy statement discussed by the group last Saturday.² He doubted whether, if he were the negotiator, he could meet the requirements of the policy statement within the limits of the terms of reference proposed by the Department.

Dr. Fisk stated that, although the Soviet and State Department staff terms of reference differed from the policy statement, he believed that they established the important point that all data should be discussed

¹ See footnote 1, Document 234.

² November 14; see Document 234.

and could become a part of the permanent record. He did not attach the same importance to the part of the terms of reference concerning capabilities and limitations. The Secretary observed that it was an important point if Dr. Fisk felt the terms of reference would in fact permit a discussion of capabilities and limitations. Mr. McCone said it is also necessary to report upon the capabilities and limitations.

Mr. McCone said that he felt strongly that the proposed terms of reference might carry the negotiations down the road toward a comprehensive test suspension without securing a discussion of capabilities and limitations. He did not feel we should join in technical discussions at all on these terms. The Soviets had been pushing us around on a matter of great importance. The Soviets were conducting worldwide propaganda on the question of suspension of tests. The U.K. was wobbling. Our own position had been continuously eroded over the last year. It would be a mistake and a submerging of principle to go along with these terms of reference.

The Secretary stated that it was his understanding that the Soviet Union objected to the insertion of the words "capabilities and limitations" since this would constitute an admission that the Experts Report of 1958 had in fact been overtaken. He said that he had read the alternative proposed terms of reference carefully and had not reached the conclusion that there would be an essential difference in the group's mandate if all reference to capabilities and limitations were left out. Dr. Kistiakowsky stated that it might well prove necessary to have separate conclusions; it might be impossible to get agreement upon a joint report. This was not, however, the same as having an inadequate discussion on record. He did not, however, share Mr. McCone's concern about the proposed terms of reference. Dr. Fisk pointed out that it would permit the group to put all relevant information on the table and that this in itself might be sufficient. If the terms of reference were to preclude putting forth all relevant data, then he would have reservations. Mr. Farley pointed out that the word study had been used so that the latter hole theory (which was not, strictly speaking, data) could be discussed.

Mr. Irwin asked whether the new data had not invalidated the Experts Report of 1958. Dr. Fisk replied this question had to be answered in two parts. Setting aside for the moment the question of concealment, the Hardtack II data had shown that the conclusions of Experts had been optimistic relative to the capabilities of the instrumentation described. At the same time, however, it was possible to envisage improvements in instrumentation which would restore something like the original capabilities. This judgment did not take into account the effect on the system of the possibility of concealment. If it were in fact possible, taking into account such factors as the expense of constructing large holes, to decouple so that the yield of an explosion would be reduced by a factor of 10 or

as much as 100, then the capabilities and the system would be much less. Its effectiveness would then have to be assessed differently. Mr. Irwin said it was his understanding that, irrespective of the possibility of decoupling, there was a threshold below which small tests could be conducted without risk of detection and with the promise of significant military results. Dr. Kistiakowsky stated that it had been obvious before the Experts Report in 1958 that there was a threshold below which the detection of small tests was uncertain but that nevertheless the President had authorized the negotiations. Mr. McCone said that our basic position provides specifically that the question of threshold would be brought up in the negotiations.

Mr. Dulles said that he did not know what likelihood there was that the Conference might break on the terms of reference. He believed, however, that we would be in a better position if we were to break over a failure to reach conclusions on data which had been put before the conference than if we were to break on the terms of reference. He did not see a clear-cut issue between the two drafts. The Secretary said that there had been a clear-cut issue so long as the Soviets had refused to accept the principle that all relevant data should be discussed. If they were to refuse to consider relevant data on the course of the conference there would again be a clear-cut issue. Dr. Kistiakowsky said he thought a significant issue had been the use of the phrase "suspicious events" in the original Soviet terms of reference. This had suggested a Soviet intention to insist upon positive evidence of a nuclear explosion as part of the criteria for on-site inspection. This phrase had however been abandoned and he did not believe the Soviets could press this approach in the discussion. Dr. Fisk said he wouldn't be surprised if there were trouble with the Soviets at the Conference. It had been possible in 1958 to get Soviet agreement to an identification of the holes in the capability of the system. He was doubtful if it would be possible to get agreement in this same respect this time. Nevertheless he believed it reasonable to expect that it would be possible to consider all relevant data. The Secretary said that there was a practical problem in keeping the scientific group which had been gathered for the discussion together. He was grateful for Dr. Fisk, who had made it possible to assemble these people. In his own opinion he felt the language proposed by the Department was preferable. It was necessary to keep things moving. It was essential to have a scientific appraisal of the feasibility of the detection and identification of underground events.

Mr. McCone said that he felt it was important to continue to follow the policy we have consistently stated in the past. We must only agree to a discontinuance of testing if the agreement is effective and adequately safeguarded. It was essential that we have a clear estimate of the capabilities and limitations of any control system which might be under negotiation. If these principles could be observed and if it was considered that it

would in fact be possible to bring into the technical discussion all relevant information, he was agreeable to accept the terms of reference proposed.

Dr. Fisk stated that he thought that he would prefer the original U.S. terms of reference but that he thought that the versions calling specifically for consideration of all relevant data and studies would permit an adequate frame of reference. He said that he hoped that he would have an opportunity to have a private conversation with Federov comparable to Mr. McCone's conversation with Emelyanov, which had apparently contributed a great deal to the Soviet agreement finally to discuss the new data. He would make clear to Federov as had Mr. McCone that it was essential that these technical matters be fully discussed.

It was agreed that the delegation would be authorized to seek Soviet agreement to the terms of reference proposed by the Department staff with the words "as part of their work" substituted for the words "in the course of their work" at the beginning of the first sentence of the second paragraph. Dr. Fisk then left the meeting.

The Secretary then raised the question of safety tests. Mr. McCone said that he had received a report on recalculation of the chances of one-point detonation. It appears that the original calculations of Los Alamos had been in some respects in error and had exaggerated the probability of a dangerous incident. There is a problem, however, and safety experiments would have to be conducted some time even though less urgent. The AEC was accordingly prepared to do without these tests before January 1 and could face further deferral till about February. It could forego these without failure to meet any DOD weapons production requirements, except in the case of the depth charge. Mr. Gates asked whether this was the only nuclear depth charge. Mr. McCone said he thought so.

Mr. McCone passed out a preliminary draft of a public announcement concerning the tests.³ Dr. Kistiakowsky agreed to attempt revision to place these experiments in the context of normal laboratory activities. It was generally agreed that this was a good approach.

The Secretary said that when the original draft had been refined to the satisfaction of all concerned it would be desirable to give the British and Canadians advance notice.

Mr. McCone said that if our voluntary moratorium were to extend beyond another three months it would probably be essential to do something about one-point safety. The Secretary observed that it was helpful to know that the matter was not as urgent as originally suggested. If there were an extended moratorium we would of course have to go ahead with

³ Not found.

these tests in any case, as the State Department has been consistently willing to do.

Tab A⁴

PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR TECHNICAL TALKS

1. *Original U.S. Proposal* (Nusup 557)

The Technical Working Group shall consider all data and studies relevant to the detection and identification of seismic events; review and assess the capabilities and limitations of the control system for detection and identification; consider possible improvements of techniques and instrumentation and their impact on these capabilities; consider the need for further research and study; and also, on the basis of the above, consider appropriate technical criteria for on-site inspection. The Working Group shall report its conclusions to the Conference.

2. *Latest U.S. Proposal* (Nusup 582)

The Technical Working Group of Experts shall consider the question of the use of objective instrument readings in connection with the selection of an event which cannot be identified by the international control organ and which could be suspected of being a nuclear explosion, in order to determine a basis for initiating on-site inspections. In the course of their work, the experts, proceeding from the discussions and the conclusions of the Geneva Conference of Experts, shall consider all data and studies relevant to the detection and identification of seismic events and shall consider possible improvements of the techniques and instrumentation.

The Technical Working Group shall, taking into account the discussions and conclusions of the Geneva Conference of Experts and the consideration of the above matters, work out criteria for the complex of instrument readings which shall be the basis for initiating on-site inspections, and shall estimate the extent to which the control system using these criteria will result in the detection and identification of natural and nuclear underground events in various yield ranges under various conditions of instrumentation.

The group will meet in Geneva on 25 November and report to the Conference by ____ December 1959.

⁴ Confidential.

3. *Soviet Counter-proposal, acceptable to U.K. (Supnu 700)*

The Technical Working Group of Experts shall consider the question of the use of objective instrument readings in connection with the selection of suspicious events in order to determine a basis for initiating inspections. In the course of their work, the experts, proceeding from the discussions and the conclusions of the Geneva Conference of Experts, shall consider all data and studies relevant to the detection and identification of seismic events and shall consider possible improvements of the techniques and instrumentation.

The Technical Working Group shall on the basis of the discussion and conclusions of the Geneva Conference of Experts and the discussion of the above work out an instruction determining the complex of instrument readings which will be the basis for initiating on-site inspections.

The group will meet in Geneva on 23 November and report to the Conference by ____ December 1959.

4. *Department Staff Proposal*

The Technical Working Group of Experts shall consider the question of the use of objective instrument readings in connection with the selection of an event which cannot be identified by the international control organ and which could be suspected of being a nuclear explosion, in order to determine a basis for initiating on-site inspections. In the course of their work, the experts, proceeding from the discussions and the conclusions of the Geneva Conference of Experts, shall consider all data and studies relevant to the detection and identification of seismic events and shall consider possible improvements of the techniques and instrumentation.

The group will meet in Geneva on 25 November and report to the Conference its conclusions on the above matters by ____ December 1959.

236. Memorandum of Discussion at the 426th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, December 1, 1959.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *U.S. Position With Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments* (NSC 112)¹

Mr. Gray said the first item on the agenda would be a presentation on disarmament by the Director of the Joint Disarmament Study, Mr. Coolidge, who had earlier discussed his preliminary thinking on the subject with the Planning Board.² Mr. Gray asked Secretary Herter if he cared to make any introductory remarks.

Secretary Herter recalled that some months ago the President had approved the assumption by Mr. Coolidge of responsibility for studying, on behalf of the Departments of State and Defense, the disarmament questions which our negotiators will soon have to face. Mr. Coolidge had completed his preliminary studies and was now prepared to make an interim report.

Mr. Coolidge expressed the hope that as a result of his interim report he would be able to obtain the criticism of the Council with respect to his preliminary thinking on disarmament. When he accepted his present assignment, he had not been able to see much light at the end of the tunnel. He had lived in the hope that the light would grow, but he regretted to report that it remained dim. Mr. Coolidge then emphasized the joint nature of the Disarmament Study. He had taken two oaths of office, one as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and one as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. He was grateful to State, Defense, CIA, AEC, and WSEG³ for providing him with a staff, which was selected primarily for the purpose of providing imagination and ideas, rather than on the basis of previous disarmament experience.

Mr. Coolidge reported that the first step in his study of disarmament had been to look at what had been done in the past. He had been led to believe that disarmament had always been considered on a "crash" basis; but he had discovered on the contrary that the entire field of disar-

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on January 26, 1960. For Kistiakowsky's account of this meeting, see *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 180–181.

¹ For text of NSC 112, July 6, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, pp. 477–496.

² A memorandum for the record of Coolidge's meeting with the NSC Planning Board, November 30, is in the Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Disarmament—General. See the Supplement.

³ Weapons Systems Evaluation Group. [Footnote in the source text.]

mament had already been so competently and thoroughly explored in every direction that very little new material remained to be uncovered by his study. However, in the past our disarmament efforts had suffered from an emphasis on "package deals", which were extremely complicated and which involved making vast future commitments at an early stage of negotiation. On the other hand, modest proposals for a few immediate disarmament steps often appeared picayune. His efforts had been directed toward establishing a long-range U.S. disarmament goal comparable in breadth to the Russian goal but not complete as to the detailed steps necessary to achieve the goal.

Mr. Coolidge felt that a long-range U.S. goal which would appeal to world opinion and be in accord with U.S. interests as previously stated by the President would be to build toward world peace under law. He then read the following statement of proposed policy:

"The present policy of the United States on arms control matters should be to favor verifiable arms control measures which tend toward establishing world peace under law; namely, a world in which:

"1. Rules of international law prohibiting armed conflict between nations shall be in effect, backed by adequate jurisdiction in a world court and by an adequate international peace force.

"2. National military establishments shall have been reduced to the point where no single nation or group of nations can effectively oppose the international peace force, and no weapons of mass destruction shall be in the control of any nation."

Mr. Coolidge said this proposed policy, which spelled out the President's statements of world peace under law, called for two actions to be taken in modest steps: reducing national capabilities and building up international capabilities. He thought this proposed policy should be tried out on the Russians in order to determine whether they are serious about disarmament.

Mr. Coolidge said that two-and-a-half measures held some promise for reducing national war-making capabilities. The "half-measure" was a ban on nuclear testing; he called it a "half-measure", not because he considered it inappropriate or inadequate, but because it was already half-way in force. Aside from cessation of nuclear testing, the *first* measure to reduce national capabilities was an agreement on the use of outer space. Mr. Coolidge felt the world had failed in the past to seize two opportunities for dramatic progress in disarmament, once when the Baruch Plan⁴ was proposed and once during Mr. Stassen's term as Disarmament Adviser when agreement was not achieved on limiting ICBM's. It was now too late to limit ICBM's, but great effort, which might lead to

⁴ Reference is to Bernard M. Baruch's plan in 1946 for international control of atomic energy to be enforced by the United Nations. For Baruch's description of the plan, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, pp. 7-16, 44-47.

profitable negotiation, should be devoted to controlling outer space before satellites containing warheads begin to be placed in orbit. The *second* measure to reduce national capabilities was the Norstad Plan for a "freeze" of forces under a bilateral inspection arrangement in an European Zone composed of Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. After such a "freeze", negotiations might turn toward a "thin-out" of forces which would enable the United States to withdraw two divisions from Germany. Mr. Coolidge felt that the Norstad Plan was consistent with the surprise attack negotiations, with efforts to test Russian good faith, and with one of Khrushchev's five disarmament proposals; and that if placed in operation, it should result in considerable development of the inspection technique. In addition, the Norstad Plan had the advantage of enabling the United States to obtain compensation, in the form of Soviet withdrawals, for any redeployment of U.S. divisions from Europe which we might have to make on account of the gold problem.

Turning to means of enhancing international capabilities, Mr. Coolidge expressed the view that there was little chance of achieving significant steps in the direction of creating an international police force. The small nations as well as the U.S.S.R. opposed such a step. However, it might be possible to develop further the concept of a UN "presence" in a troubled area. The establishment of such a UN "presence" might be facilitated by asking each UN member to file with the UN Secretariat a list of persons eligible to serve on a UN team which would be dispatched to trouble spots. This concept did not call for a standing force but for an ad hoc procedure of choosing UN teams from among the countries not involved in a dispute. Ultimately the UN teams might be given the power to mediate. Moreover, Mr. Coolidge continued, the concept of the codification and development of international law could be expanded. Previous efforts in this field had foundered on an attempt to define "aggression". Mr. Coolidge said he was proposing agreement in the UN on additional rules of international law, not the enactment of rules by a world legislature. He also felt the Connally amendment, relating to the extent to which the United States would accept the jurisdiction of the World Court, should be repealed. Mr. Coolidge believed that the Court, which today lacks business and prestige, should at least be charged with the interpretation of treaties.

Mr. Coolidge realized that thus far he had omitted any mention of a limitation of nuclear weapons. This problem had been considered, and the conclusion had been reached that a balance of mutual deterrence was perhaps to be preferred to an attempt to limit nuclear weapons. Mr. Coolidge felt that if the United States had sufficient retaliatory capacity so that from five to twenty enemy missiles were required to destroy each U.S. missile, deterrence of surprise attack and an uneasy peace would

result. Of course hardening the bases for our retaliatory force and making part of that force mobile would require a great deal of money. Moreover, for a time there would be a "missile gap," the only remedy for which would be to keep SAC in the air.

Mr. Coolidge reported that the Disarmament Study had also explored the questions of "nth country" nuclear capabilities. Although there was a clear split of opinion, military vs. diplomatic, on this issue, he was inclined to think that the present system, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] was the best system.

Mr. Coolidge felt that ICBM's could not be controlled because inspection would be unable to discover hidden ICBM's. It had been suggested that ICBM's might be controlled in an indirect way by providing for cessation of nuclear production. In time ICBM's would thereby become useless because of degeneration of the nuclear stockpile after four to five years, especially after seven to eight years. However, the problem of inspecting a cessation of nuclear production would be formidable because plutonium would be produced by reactors under the atoms for peace program. Moreover, the ICBM vehicle would be difficult to limit because of the program for the peaceful exploration of outer space.

Mr. Coolidge said there was little hope of accomplishing U.S. objectives in disarmament unless and until there was a change in Soviet thinking so that the Soviets would pay more attention to world opinion. At the moment he was left with the feeling that proposal of a few limited measures in the field of disarmament would reveal whether Soviet thinking has changed and would provide guidance as to whether it would be worthwhile to propose more comprehensive and complicated measures.

Mr. Coolidge felt it was important that disarmament studies should be continued in order to backstop negotiations and maintain liaison with the scientific community. In this connection he noted with gratification that the JSC had recently established a Disarmament Group under Admiral Dudley.

In conclusion, Mr. Coolidge again solicited the views of the Council members on the general subject of disarmament.

Secretary Herter remarked that, except for the Norstad scheme, which was proposed two years ago and discussed informally with our allies, the interim report did not hold out much prospect of forward movement in the disarmament field. The Norstad Plan perhaps had merit as a means of testing Soviet desire for mutual inspection of ground and air forces. But in the eyes of the Germans, the Norstad Plan would be the beginning of the isolation of Germany from the rest of Europe, a possible development which causes the Germans considerable anxiety. The French believe the disarmament zone proposed by Norstad should extend from the Urals to the Atlantic. Secretary Herter thought the first

step in any disarmament negotiation should be a test of Russian good faith as to inspection. In this connection, the negotiations in progress in Geneva were important, inasmuch as they might result in a precedent-setting opening up of Russian territory to inspection. Secretary Herter then referred briefly to three disarmament plans: a Soviet plan for disarmament by stages with very vague inspection provisions; a British "staged" plan similar to Mr. Stassen's plan of 1957; and a French scheme consisting of a very general declaratory statement with no inspection provisions, but with provisions which concentrated on delivery systems. Secretary Herter said he gathered the Coolidge group was continuing its study. In conclusion, the Secretary added that he had hoped Mr. Coolidge would propose a cessation of nuclear production.

Mr. Coolidge said he would be able to propose a number of disarmament measures which would be useful discussion topics but which in his view would not lead to much accomplishment. A cessation of nuclear production was an unsatisfactory scheme in that it would not produce very far-reaching results, and in addition required a very cumbersome inspection system which virtually required the inspectors to sit down with the manager of an atomic installation and help him run it.

The President said he had been told something he had not known before, i.e., the short life expectancy of nuclear bombs.

Mr. Coolidge explained that this short life expectancy did not apply to all bombs, but only to those containing trinium, which disintegrates and must be replaced after about five years. Trinium need not necessarily be used in bombs, but is generally used because it increases the explosive effect.

The President said that for some time attempts to think though the disarmament problem had foundered on the certainty that some nuclear bombs could be concealed from disarmament inspectors. Now Mr. Coolidge's group had concluded that delivery vehicles could also be concealed. The President believed that delivery vehicles and hardened bases could be discovered by a system of disarmament inspection. He wondered why Mr. Coolidge had expressed such complete pessimism on this point.

Mr. Coolidge said he would like to clarify his position on this matter. He agreed with the President that ICBM's could be discovered by inspection: what he was pessimistic about was the possibility that the Russians would give up ICBM's and go back to reliance on planes short of our giving up our overseas bases.

Secretary Herter thought the military services estimated that the Russians could camouflage or conceal a sufficient number of ICBM's—say 100—to be decisive in the absence of U.S. ICBM's.

The President said that, on the assumption that nuclear disarmament could not be achieved, we should concentrate on conventional dis-

armament. There would then be a situation in which we could destroy the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union could destroy us, i.e., a condition of mutual deterrence. This situation would engender some uneasiness, it is true; but if conventional armaments were eliminated at least we would not be carrying such a heavy arms burden. If a start could be made on conventional disarmament, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. might begin to make sense out of problems that now appear insolvable. Accordingly, he would not abandon the hope of taking definite steps in conventional disarmament while ignoring nuclear capabilities.

Mr. Coolidge observed that the United States had taken in the conventional field unilateral military actions from which it might have derived disarmament advantage. For example, we had reduced our armed forces manpower without securing any Russian concessions in return for such reduction. He would hesitate now to ask the Soviets to reduce from 3.7 million men to 2.5 million men without any U.S. reductions.

The President and Secretary Herter indicated that Russian proposals provided for considerable reduction in military manpower by both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. A manpower ceiling of 1.5 million for each country had even been mentioned.

Mr. Coolidge did not believe it would be safe for the U.S., in the light of unsolved international political problems, to reduce its forces below 2.5 million men, not because these forces were needed for use against the U.S.S.R., but because of the possibility of limited wars or "brush fires".

The President asked whether Mr. Coolidge envisaged fighting two or three limited wars simultaneously. When Mr. Coolidge replied in the affirmative, the President remarked that a situation in which several limited wars were going on simultaneously seemed to him to be getting beyond the "brush fire" stage and tending toward fire in the tall timber.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said he was not as pessimistic as Mr. Coolidge about control of long-range ballistic missiles. Some months ago (April 3, 1958) he had reported to the Council that a study by a technical panel on control of missile testing had concluded that it would be disadvantageous for the U.S. at that time to agree to a cessation of missile testing.⁵ However, the situation may now be different. By the time the disarmament negotiations end, Atlas and Polaris will be tested. A cessation of missile testing at that point might prevent the development of small, mobile missiles similar to Minuteman which, produced in quantity, would make disarmament much more difficult. He agreed with the view that 100 ballistic missiles could be concealed from disarmament inspectors, but doubted that such a number could be concealed in an opera-

⁵ See Document 148.

tional status, particularly if they required liquid fuel, because very complex facilities were required for launching liquid-propellant missiles. Dr. Kistiakowsky did not want to prejudge any fresh study of the subject that might be made, but he felt there was a possibility that the conclusions of the 1958 study had been rendered obsolete by technological progress. However, Dr. Kistiakowsky added, it would not be practicable to limit missiles while allowing unlimited technological developments in outer space; missile control would necessitate international control of space. Nevertheless, the situation was not totally hopeless.

Mr. Dulles agreed with Dr. Kistiakowsky's remarks, and added that the next eighteen months constituted a particularly important period because during this period the Soviets would be completing their deployments to mobile and hardened missile bases.

Secretary Anderson inquired whether it would be possible to combine the President's "open skies" proposal with the Norstad Plan in such a way to guarantee against surprise. Mr. Coolidge replied that the Norstad Plan provided for open skies over the disarmament zone.

Mr. Gray noted that Mr. Coolidge's view as to the undesirability of a "package plan" on disarmament would involve a change in policy. Disarmament had so far been discussed from a political and moral point of view; Mr. Gray felt it was important to discuss the subject also from the point of view of military advantage, and pointed out that Mr. Coolidge would be interested in the Council's reaction to the statement of the long-range goal Mr. Coolidge had read.

General Twining said he understood the Council did not intend to make decisions on disarmament at this meeting. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would like an opportunity to comment on the points made by Mr. Coolidge before any decisions were taken.

The President referred to the policy statement read by Mr. Coolidge, particularly to the statement that "no weapons of mass destruction shall be in the control of any nation." He believed we would have to accept this goal, but it was the last step in disarmament and should be so regarded.

Secretary Herter thought the objectives stated by Mr. Coolidge were long-range objectives and that the steps by which we advanced toward our goal would be slow. Mr. Coolidge said a technological break-through of some kind might conceivably speed up the process.

The Vice President assumed that the reference to a world court in Mr. Coolidge's statement meant that the jurisdiction of such a court would be limited to disarmament. This limitation should be made clear in order to avoid arguments over domestic jurisdiction and political questions such as arose in connection with the Permanent Court of International Justice. The President agreed.

*The National Security Council:*⁶

a. Noted and discussed an interim report on the subject by Mr. Charles A. Coolidge, Director, Joint Disarmament Study.

b. Noted that the draft statement of a proposed long-range goal of the United States on arms control matters, presented at the meeting by Mr. Coolidge, would subsequently be circulated to Council members and Advisers so that they might provide the Secretary of State with any comments thereon after further study.

Note: The statement referred to in b above subsequently circulated for study and comment as provided therein.

[Here follow unrelated agenda items.]

Marion W. Boggs

⁶ The following paragraphs and Note constitute NSC Action No. 2152, approved by the President on December 3. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

237. Memorandum of Discussion at the 428th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, December 10, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Items 1 and 2. Vice President Nixon presided at the meeting.]

3. *Major Problems Associated With Control of Long-Range Ballistic Missiles* (NSC Actions Nos. 1840 and 1888; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Monitoring a Long-Range Rocket Test Agreement", dated March 28, 1958)¹

Mr. Charles A. Coolidge joined the meeting at this point.

Mr. Gray introduced the subject. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.)²

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Boggs on December 10. For Kistiakowsky's account of this meeting, see *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 193-194.

¹ See footnote 15, Document 136; and footnotes 2 and 3, Document 148.

² Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File)

Dr. Kistiakowsky said he wished to amplify the "off-the-cuff" remarks he had made at the December 1 Council meeting³ during the discussion of disarmament. He then displayed the following chart:

"Major Problems Associated With Control of Long-Range Ballistic Missiles"

1. Cessation of Flight Tests
 - a. Is it detrimental to U.S. interests?
 - b. Is it feasible?
 - c. What about the exploration of outer space?
2. Control of ICBM Production
 - a. Is it detrimental to U.S. interests?
 - b. Is it feasible?
 - c. What about outer space?
3. Control (limitation) of force size
 - a. Is it detrimental to U.S. interests?
 - b. Is it feasible?
4. Control for Early Warning of Operational Sites
 - a. Is it detrimental to U.S. interests?
 - b. Is it feasible?

Dr. Kistiakowsky recalled that some months ago he had chaired an ad hoc panel, which had looked at the technical question of monitoring agreements to stop missile tests and had reported to the Council (Reference Memorandum of March 28, 1958). The ad hoc group had dealt only with Item 1 of the above chart. Item 4 of the chart had become one of the issues at the Geneva Conference on Surprise Attack. The ad hoc group had concluded that it was feasible to monitor and detect Soviet ballistic missile flight tests in the light of the limited Soviet missile testing organization which had existed at that time. With respect to 1.c on the chart, the ad hoc group had pointed out that operational long-range missile capabilities could be materially assisted by space exploration missiles, and that the achievement of control over outer space might require an international organization. With respect to 1.a on the chart, the ad hoc group had concluded that an asymmetric situation existed; that is, that it would not be to U.S. advantage to agree to a cessation of missile tests because the Soviets at that time were more advanced in missile technology than the U.S. Accordingly, the cessation of flight tests would have left the Soviets with operational missile forces, but would have prevented the U.S. from obtaining an operational missile capability. Dr. Kis-

³ See Document 236.

tiakowsky recalled that when this issue was raised during the disarmament discussion on December 1, he had pointed out that the situation had changed. The U.S. now has an operational ICBM (the Atlas) and in a few months will have a mobile missile which will be nearly invulnerable (the Polaris).

In reply to a question by the Vice President, Secretary Gates reported that the first Polaris submarine with a complete missile capability would be operational in seven months.

Continuing his presentation, Dr. Kistiakowsky said the whole issue was now ripe for reconsideration. However, technical arguments suggested that if the U.S. desired to conclude an international agreement for the control and reduction of missile forces, early steps would be necessary. The Soviet missile forces were now large and cumbersome; Soviet missiles could not be concealed in a haystack and fired with only a little preparation. In four or five years both the U.S. and the USSR would have solid propellant missiles which would be small in size, mobile, automated, difficult to monitor, and more accurate than existing missiles. The certainty that the Soviets could achieve their objectives by surprise attack will be less during the period when missiles are limited in mobility and accuracy than at a later time. Indeed, in four or five years the results of surprise attack can probably be mathematically calculated in advance. For all these reasons, Dr. Kistiakowsky suggested that the Council direct a new study of the subject. On the other hand, he did not wish to minimize the complications of the problem, even as regards Item 1 on the above chart. As far as the other items on the chart were concerned, he pointed out that the staff of the U.S. Delegation to the Geneva Conference on Surprise Attack privately had grave doubts that an international organization to provide early warning against surprise attack could be successful.

Secretary Gates wished to interject a note of caution. He felt that any factor involved in disarmament should be studied quietly, but it was inconceivable to him that the U.S. could ever agree to stop flight tests of missiles in the light of the philosophy that the more we move toward an invulnerable deterrent, the less likelihood there is of war. Studies had a way of leaking out, of getting into politics and service problems, and of being blown up out of all proportion to their importance. Even if a committee studied this problem and decided that missile testing could be controlled, it was inconceivable from the military point of view that we would agree to such control. He was afraid a study of this subject would only cause trouble unless the study were confined to scientific problems and did not extend to controversial questions of policy.

Secretary Herter wished to present a slightly different view. The U.S. would shortly be faced with disarmament negotiations in which negative answers would be as important as positive positions. General de Gaulle thinks control of missile testing is a top priority problem in disarmament. Unless the U.S. can present good reasons for not agreeing to

such control, its disarmament negotiators will be in a very difficult position. He felt it was imperative to give our negotiators the best answers possible in order to avoid imposing severe handicaps upon them. He did not want to prejudice the answer, but did want to obtain the answer. In every case, Secretary Herter felt we must weigh the advantages to the U.S. and to Russia. He asked whether his impression was correct that the previous study mentioned by Dr. Kistiakowsky had indicated that, on the basis of relative advantage, we would be the loser. Dr. Kistiakowsky replied in the affirmative. Secretary Herter agreed with Secretary Gates that a study of this kind should receive no publicity, but he did feel that such a study should be made.

Mr. Gray shared some of the views of the Secretary of Defense on the difficulties which might arise from such a study. He believed if the study were made, it should be presented directly to the Council, and should not go through the Planning Board. Secretary Gates said that sometimes studies result in a split answer rather than a clear answer. He agreed with Secretary Herter that answers needed to be provided, but had reservations on the suggestion that a study was the best way to provide answers. He recalled that the Department of Defense had not participated in the previous study referred to by Dr. Kistiakowsky, and indicated that if a study should be requested, Defense wished to participate. Dr. Kistiakowsky explained that the late Deputy Secretary Quarles had decided that Defense need not participate in the study by the ad hoc group.

The Vice President thought that studies sometimes led to second guessing. Leaks often occur when experts are brought in from outside the Government. He felt there were experts in the Government who could take responsibility for a study by tapping outside resources and making recommendations to the Council under security safeguards which would prevent a leak.

Secretary Gates said that an unidentifiable study undertaken for the purpose of informing the Council would be a different matter. He repeated, however, that in his judgment, flight testing of missiles should not be stopped. The Vice President said he was inclined to share Secretary Gates' view while recognizing that difficult problems of politics would soon arise which might necessitate our changing our views.

Secretary Anderson, noting that changes in policy would have to be made by the President, suggested that Dr. Kistiakowsky assume individual responsibility for making a study. Dr. Kistiakowsky could get judgments from Defense and other interested agencies, and could assemble the pros and cons without a formal study. Any differences which arose could be reconciled by submitting them to the President for decision. Dr. Kistiakowsky said he was not very anxious to offer himself for the study. He thought this was a matter of interdepartmental concern; moreover,

the technical people in the interested departments and agencies were essential to the success of the study.

Secretary Herter said he visualized a study of an advisory nature. He thought it was essential that the Department of Defense, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, participate in the study. His guess would be that the study would conclude that the U.S. could not afford to stop missile testing. However, if this a priori judgment could be substantiated by a study, then we would be in an excellent position to reject proposals for cessation of missile testing during disarmament negotiations.

Admiral Burke said that although he had not consulted with Secretary Gates in advance, he shared the Secretary's views. We needed to study all factors connected with missile testing but the problem was a continuing and a delicate one. A number of strong views were involved, including strong pressures for disarmament. He agreed that State would need support in the disarmament negotiations, but felt that any study must be done carefully, and wondered whether the Secretary of the Treasury's suggestion was not the most feasible line of approach. The Vice President felt that it might not be appropriate to discuss the merits of a cessation of missile testing at this meeting. The question was: should responsibility for concluding a study be placed on Dr. Kistiakowsky?

Mr. Gray noted that a number of studies had been made under Dr. Killian and under Dr. Kistiakowsky which had not become part of the public domain. The study might be less visible if it were organized as a study for the President. Mr. Gray agreed that it would be unfortunate if a study of this problem should be organized along the lines of the Gaither Study. He thought the study might concentrate on the pros and cons rather than on the formulation of policy recommendations.

Mr. Coolidge reported that the Disarmament Study, after considering the problem of controlling missile tests, had reached the tentative conclusion that the U.S. should not seek such control. However, he believed a study should be made because more arguments in support of this tentative conclusion were needed.

The Vice President agreed and asked Secretary Herter why De Gaulle considered this problem one of top priority. Secretary Herter said De Gaulle did not want his conventional forces touched.

Mr. Gray suggested that the Council request Dr. Kistiakowsky, in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense and CIA, to draw up the terms of reference for a study of major problems associated with control of long-range ballistic missiles.

Secretary Herter said he was not sure the Department of State would have anything to contribute. Secretary Gates, referring to Dr. Kistiakowsky's chart, said the question, "Is it detrimental to U.S. interests?" immediately opened up policy problems. The Vice President felt that the Department of State should participate in drawing up the terms of reference. Mr. Gray wondered whether Dr. Kistiakowsky's chart had not

referred to U.S. interests in a technical military sense. Secretary Herter said guidance was needed on the technical balance of advantage and disadvantage. Negative considerations were as important as positive considerations.

*The National Security Council:*⁴

a. Noted and discussed an oral presentation on the subject by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, with particular reference to developments which might affect the conclusions of the report transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 28, 1958.

b. Requested the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, to draw up terms of reference for a study on the monitoring of tests and production of long-range ballistic missiles, and to coordinate the conduct of such a study and the preparation of a report thereon to the President.

Note: The above action subsequently transmitted to and approved by the President, and transmitted to the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate action pursuant to b above.

[Here follow unrelated agenda items.]

Marion W. Boggs

⁴ The following paragraphs and Note constitute NSC Action No. 2161, approved by the President on December 23. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

238. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Augusta, Georgia, December 29, 1959, 8:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter, Secretary Dillon, Ambassador Wadsworth, Mr. Farley, General Twining, Secretary Gates, General Loper, Mr. McCone, General Cabell, Dr. Fisk, Mr. Black, Mr. Gordon Gray, Dr. Kistiakowsky, General Goodpaster

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on December 31. For Kistiakowsky's account of this meeting, see *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 213-214.

Secretary Herter said the group had come down to take up with the President the questions as to the next steps in our suspension of testing and our negotiations for an agreement with the Russians on suspension of testing.¹ He said that the technical discussions at which Dr. Fisk headed the U.S. delegation had not been successful and that the Soviet scientific delegation had released publicly a statement impugning the integrity of our technical negotiators, and insulting their scientific competence.² Dr. Fisk reported on the Geneva meetings and said the Soviets had refused to give serious consideration to anything relating to criteria for inspection. On this matter they and the U.S. delegation were miles apart. On the question of improvements in the inspection system, the Russians were most agreeable. If we were to be guided by their criteria, we would omit most underground events, including all the underground tests the U.S. has conducted. He described the Soviet statement as a severe challenge to the integrity of the U.S. team.

Mr. Herter thought that we should take very seriously the Soviet action impugning the integrity of our scientists. Mr. McCone read examples of the Soviet statements.

The President said he thought the State Department should protest this, indicating that if this is the way factual data is to be treated and talked about, the effect is to throw doubt on the whole process of negotiations. He thought it should be brought out that our people were not instructed, but were asked to bring the best scientific judgment to bear on this problem.

The President asked what was thought to be the reason for the Soviet action, specifically whether it is simply that they are opposed to an elaborate and effective system. Dr. Fisk said that they probably are. He added that the Soviet scientists may be engaged in a face-saving operation, to try to prove that the scientific conclusions reached in mid-1958 are valid. Our scientists recognize that those findings were erroneous.

Ambassador Wadsworth said that the Soviets very much want to achieve an agreement. They are simply objecting to considering this data before the system goes into effect. They have said that they would be willing to "talk about" the data after a treaty is signed. Mr. McCone said he felt they did not want to open up their country to inspection. The President asked why it was thought they would not then accept a ban limited to prohibiting atmospheric tests. Mr. Herter thought that such a ban may

¹ The principals met on December 28 to discuss the issues that would be raised with the President. Accounts of that meeting are *ibid.*, p. 212, and in a memorandum of conversation by Spiers, December 28, in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. See the Supplement.

² See Annex II to the Report of Working Group II to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests: December 18, 1959, printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, pp. 1561-1571.

be all it is possible to obtain—or perhaps a ban based on the “threshold” concept.³

The President said that when Ambassador Wadsworth returns to Geneva he should excoriate the Russians for their statement regarding our scientists. Mr. Herter suggested this might be incorporated in the statement he was proposing to the President regarding the continuation of the suspension of testing.

The President thought it might be best not to make any statement at the present time. There are two essential points involved, the first being the evaluation of the scientific basis for an inspection system prepared in 1958, and the second, the charges that have been made against our scientists’ integrity. After further discussion he said he thought that a comprehensive but succinct statement should be made. Mr. Herter asked if that should be prepared as a letter from the President to Khrushchev. The President thought that would be of little value, since Khrushchev would simply answer with a long tirade. He preferred a public statement. In short, we should say that we will not test in the atmosphere, but that, because of the Soviet political decision regarding a system of underground inspection, it seems rather hopeless to try to go beyond an atmospheric ban. Mr. Herter again suggested that the ban might be extended to some threshold insofar as underground explosions are concerned. The President thought the threshold should be put relatively high. Mr. McCone pointed out that in that case there would be few inspections.

The President said he is rather amazed that the Soviets have used this tactic—of impugning our scientific data. General Cabell said the Soviets have been playing this disagreement in a very low key at home, stating there are some differences but that a very large area of agreement has been achieved.

At this point Mr. Herter showed the President a draft of a proposed release on this subject. The President made a few revisions to strengthen

³ The “threshold” concept was discussed more fully at the December 28 meeting. Herter presented it as a third and better alternative to either giving up any attempt to control underground testing or accepting less than adequate detection and control. As Fisk explained, the threshold concept (above which underground tests would be banned) could be expressed in terms of seismic magnitude rather than kiloton yield. While there was a difference of view between the Soviet Union and the United States on the correlation between yield of explosion and seismic amplitude, there appeared to be general agreement among seismologists on the relationship between signal amplitude and seismic intensity.

Kistiakowsky describes an earlier meeting on December 28 among himself, Herter, Dillon, Farley, and Gerard Smith from 11:45 a.m. to 1 p.m. At this meeting, according to Kistiakowsky, he introduced the threshold plan as it evolved in his thinking and in discussions with McCone. Kistiakowsky observed that the concept could solve the problems of decoupling and the Latter hole, that tests below the threshold could be announced in advance, and that with improvements in seismic detection methods the threshold could be gradually reduced. (*A Scientist at the White House*, p. 211)

the statement, and approved it with these revisions. (Mr. Hagerty released it later in the morning.)⁴

The President asked whether we should not now bring forward a specific proposal at Geneva, recognizing that the Soviets may reject it since they apparently are pressing for "all or nothing." Mr. Herter said that, regarding the threshold approach, we are trying to see whether we can set a level of seismic signal which can be incorporated into our instructions to Wadsworth. The President said that if the Soviets want to consider the problem seriously, this would be quite agreeable to us. If they do not, then we should propose 1) the threshold concept, or 2) an atmospheric ban as a less desirable alternative. We should still put a few inspection stations into Russia. Our real aim is to open that country up to some degree. Mr. Herter said it is also to create a model for disarmament agreements.

The President commented with respect to disarmament agreements that he believes it will be necessary to leave atomic weapons to the last. We can identify and cut down conventional arms and means of delivery. If we cut back our armaments to where only a retaliatory force is left, war becomes completely futile. He thought we should therefore go into inspection and reduction of conventional arms and visible means of delivery of atomic weapons. Mr. Herter said Admiral Strauss had thought there would be advantage to the U.S. in cutting off production of atomic material. It now appears that the "requirements" stated by our military authorities for atomic weapons will not permit this. The President said he is completely unconvinced as to the validity of these so-called requirements.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

⁴ For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, pp. 1590-1591.

239. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 12, 1960.

SUBJECT

Threshold Proposal for Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

State

Acting Secretary Merchant

S/AE—Philip J. Farley

S/AE—Vincent Baker

AEC

Mr. McCone

Dr. English

Gen. Starbird

CIA

Dr. Scoville

White House

Dr. Kistiakowsky

Mr. Keeny

Mr. Gray

DOD

Mr. Gates

Gen. Loper

Gen. Fox

Mr. Knight

Mr. Gates recalled that Defense and AEC had been requested at the last meeting of principals to comment on the threshold proposal that Dr. Kistiakowsky had presented at the meeting of January 8.¹ He said that the Department of Defense had prepared a paper, which he circulated for consideration by the group (attached).² He said his staff questions the

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Baker and approved by M on January 20. For Kistiakowsky's account of this meeting, see *A Scientist at the White House*, p. 226.

¹ At the January 8 meeting, Kistiakowsky explained that it was technically possible to define a threshold in terms of magnitude of seismic events as detected by the control system. With this plan it would be feasible to achieve effective monitoring of underground tests with a strong deterrent against cheating, according to Kistiakowsky, either by insisting on a level of monitoring that ensured inspection of either 10 percent of seismic events over 4.75, or 20 percent of all located seismic events below 5 kilotons (the proposal already submitted by the United States at Geneva), or by setting a quota of 10 inspections per year. Dillon suggested that it might be necessary to accept a higher threshold if the AEC and Defense felt it necessary for the U.S. testing program. (Memorandum of conversation by Baker, January 8; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) See the Supplement. See also Kistiakowsky, *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 222–223.

² See the Supplement.

basic threshold idea and that the proposal had been reviewed by ARPA, Dr. Romney and Mr. Northrup. Defense felt, if advancing the threshold proposal were deemed essential for political reasons a level of magnitude of 5.00 should be proposed. We should not, however, discuss the details of any threshold proposal in our initial presentation. His Defense technical advisers were of the opinion that a large expenditure on research would be necessary before we would know how good seismic capability really is and would be able to devise suitable methods for implementing a threshold proposal.

Mr. McCone after reading the paper which Mr. Gates had circulated, asked for a clarification of the reference in para 6(d) to the effect that all located events should be eligible for inspection in comparison to the reference in para 7(c) saying 50% of detected events shall be subject to inspection. General Loper explained that, while all events should be *eligible* for inspection, only 50% under the Defense proposal would actually be inspected.

Mr. Gray recalled that the President had endorsed a threshold proposal at the time when the Department of Defense was supporting it through Mr. Quarles. Mr. Farley recalled the President at the Augusta meeting³ had not been unsympathetic to the threshold and, in a summary in the course of the meeting, had postulated a 3 stage approach in which we would attempt first a comprehensive treaty, then a threshold proposal and then an atmospheric approach. Mr. Gray agreed but said this group however should not assume anything about the President's attitude, and instead should simply make its own best recommendations.

Mr. Gates asked why we didn't just go ahead and table a phased atmospheric treaty. If our purpose was propaganda this would put the Russians on the spot to demonstrate their willingness to reach agreement. Why should we make it hard for ourselves by devising other complicated steps before tabling the atmospheric treaty. Mr. Farley said that there were at least two arguments for the threshold approach as an intermediate stage. First, it would give us a right of on-site inspection, and second it would make a gesture toward demonstrating U.S. willingness to include as much as possible in the initial test ban treaty. In addition, the Soviets, for different reasons, might conceivably agree to the proposal in the hope of tying our hands on all underground tests. Mr. Gates said if we were looking for alternative proposals perhaps we should propose to announce and inspect each other's tests. Mr. Farley recalled that we had invited observers to one of our Hardtack tests, and that most countries had shown reluctance to attend.

³ See Document 238.

General Fox said that Defense technical experts in AFTAC had carefully considered the threshold proposal and their considerations lead them away from it at the present time. One difficulty was that the proposal, instead of dealing with the decoupling problem, served to put a premium on the use of decoupling. Mr. McCone said he could see that there were technical problems in the proposal. He believed that implementing it would add a strain on the operations of the system, and possibly on relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union because of the complexity of its operations. He was agreeable, though, if the other Departments desired, to proceed to a threshold proposal subject to one strong caveat. The AEC caveat was that, before the time we discussed details of a threshold proposal, we should reaffirm we would agree to a ban only in environments where it can be adequately monitored. He believed that this had been lost sight of in the negotiations, and said that our negotiators had not made this point clear. The UK in particular did not seem to fully understand it. No treaty would be acceptable to AEC or to Congress if it were not adequately safeguarded.

Mr. Merchant asked whether McCone was referring to the China problem. McCone said not necessarily, since a higher number of inspections could compensate for the absence of control posts in China to help identify events in the Soviet Union. If the principle he outlined were stated, AEC would accept the threshold and would pick 4.75 as the best threshold magnitude though it had no strong feelings about the exact level. He stressed that, if the Soviets wanted fewer stations or a lower threshold, they would have to accept more inspections. Mr. McCone pointed out that the threshold approach ignores the decoupling problem. However the zone above the proposed threshold was not an important one from the standpoint of weapons testing, and AEC saw no significant danger from decoupling provided the threshold were set as high as 4.75 or 5.00. We should continue the current moratorium only on a day to day basis and make clear we cannot agree to endless negotiations. If we cannot get the threshold idea adopted, we should go to the phased treaty proposal of April 13,⁴ beginning with atmospheric treaty. If that in turn fails, we should decide what kind of unilateral announcement to make. Mr. McCone circulated to the group the attached memorandum elaborating the AEC views which he had expressed.⁵

Mr. Gates said that if you don't have criteria you have no basis for inspection. General Fox concurred, saying that without agreed criteria the control organization has no basis for a choice of events to be inspected. Mr. Farley pointed out that as long as criteria for locating events are agreed, it is possible to bypass differences with the Soviets on

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 213.

⁵ See the Supplement.

criteria for their identification. Mr. Keeny pointed out that the unilateral choice of 20% of unidentified events to be inspected would afford a more powerful inspection mechanism than the 20% random selection proposed in our treaty draft of Annex I tabled in December 1958.

Dr. Kistiakowsky questioned the statement in the Defense Department paper, paragraph 2, as follows: "if we suggest the percentage of the total events in order to eliminate the criteria problem we will introduce a very undesirable factor, namely, the necessity for the East and West to act unilaterally in selecting events to be inspected in the host countries thus degrading the authority of the International Control Organization". He said the right to apply unilaterally our best scientific judgments and intelligence data appeared to him to be advantageous.

General Loper said that unilateral selection becomes a problem only if the inspection system is expanded beyond the original three parties, for example, to France. We cannot leave to each nation the right to determine what events are to be inspected. Dr. Kistiakowsky agreed that we must not of course allow the country which is being inspected to make the selection. Dr. Scoville noted that a smaller number of inspections would yield the same margin of security as a larger number if we had wide freedom to make our own selection of the events to be inspected. Mr. Gates asked what was the problem of the unilateral inspection as a disarmament precedent, for example, in the Norstad zone. Also he could not see how a control system and threshold proposal could be justified on the basis of existing technical information.

Mr. Gray asked if there was any sense in fiddling around with threshold, was it worth getting the President to consider and make further proposals merely to have something else turned down. If there were political factors that make this desirable, the Department of State might comment upon them. We should not think for a minute the Soviets would accept a threshold proposal. Moreover he did not think the President should be asked to take the moral position that we should stop all tests we can control and then be asked to propose a threshold that permits all the testing we want to do. This might be good Defense policy but was not good policy for the President.

General Loper pointed out that a threshold in the range recommended by the last meeting of principals was chosen on purely technical grounds by Dr. Kistiakowsky's panel. He said that the Department of Defense could probably accept a threshold of 4.75 if the number of inspections bore a reasonable basis in technical fact, and particularly if all unidentified events were eligible for inspection.

Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed out that a threshold in practice is unavoidable. It will in fact always exist even under a comprehensive treaty in the fractional kiloton yield range. Moreover to produce what the Secretary of State had called "an adequate deterrent" it would not be nec-

essary to inspect everything. Under his proposal the rigid criteria of Dr. Fisk and the U.S. Delegation would be applied in determining eligibility. Mr. Merchant asked Mr. McCone specifically whether he favored the threshold proposal. Mr. McCone said yes if the other things he had mentioned were done. He would also accept the 4.75 threshold because of his recognition that the higher you go the more awkward the position the President is placed in.

Mr. Merchant said that Mr. Herter had considered the threshold from the standpoint of getting inspectors into the Soviet Union, from the standpoint of tactics in negotiations and from the standpoint of securing an adequate safeguard. He had tended to favor the proposal, but in the light of the divergence of views between Departments we would need time to check further with Mr. Herter before reaching a final decision. Mr. Gray recalled that Mr. McCone would be away during the next few days. Mr. McCone said any necessary decision could be taken by Commissioner Floberg, Dr. English and General Starbird.

Mr. Gates said that his main concern was that his technical people felt we needed more work on the problem—that much needed to be done on the basis of actual nuclear tests—and that otherwise the threshold proposal and the control system were questionable. It was difficult to proceed if the detectability is in question. Dr. Fisk had mentioned at the Augusta meeting that there were many unknowns and imponderables. He was sympathetic to the objective of getting people into Russia but he believed that this factor had been over-rated. We should not proceed if we have real technical doubts about how to operate the control system.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that a threshold does introduce grave complications both in writing a treaty and in putting it into effect. Mr. Gates said if the system were 3/4 foolproof it would not be so bad, but the question is our basic technical capabilities to execute this proposal. As he understood the position of Defense experts, there are grave doubts as to whether we have the knowledge to establish effective control. General Loper said we are assuming things that are not experimentally confirmed. For example, the 100 instrument array which is postulated has never been tested, and we are coming to very specific conclusions on the number of inspections without a correspondingly specific knowledge of technical facts.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said he was certainly not arguing feverishly for the proposal, but would wish to point out it was based upon the use of the U.S. Delegation's rigorous criteria which, in their judgment, is sufficiently firm to be codified without further experimentation. He said that we wouldn't have to worry about exact numbers of inspections if we used a percentage basis. Mr. Gates could not see how this problem could be avoided if we don't have agreed criteria. Mr. Scoville said on the percentage basis the technical uncertainties were largely overcome and such

a proposal could be applied without agreement on criteria. Mr. McCone asked whether the group was agreed on the caveat contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the AEC paper.⁶ It was generally agreed that, apart from the specific wording which the group had not time to consider fully, the idea expressed in these two paragraphs was consistent with U.S. policy.

⁶ Paragraph 1 of the AEC paper reads: "U.S. confirms its position that it will agree to prohibitions in areas where safeguards have adequate capabilities for monitoring." Paragraph 2 states that the U.S. Delegation at Geneva "must determine at the outset of negotiations and prior to discussion of the threshold concept" the willingness of the Soviet Union and British delegations to negotiate a treaty only in areas where adequate safeguards can be provided.

240. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 19, 1960.

SUBJECT

Threshold Proposal for Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

State

Under Secretary Merchant

S/AE—Mr. Farley

S/AE—Mr. Sullivan

S/AE—Mr. Baker

S/AE—Mr. Gotzlinger

CIA

Mr. Allen Dulles

Dr. Scoville

Col. Smith

AEC

Mr. McCone

Dr. English

Gen. Starbird

DOD

Mr. Knight

Gen. Loper

Gen. Fox

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Gotzlinger and approved in M on January 29. For Kistiakowsky's account of this meeting, see *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 232-233.

White House

Dr. Kistiakowsky

Mr. Gray

Mr. Keeny

Mr. Merchant referred to the draft instruction (Tab B)¹ authorizing the US delegation to propose an approach based upon a signal strength threshold for underground tests. He said that Secretary Herter considers it politically and tactically advisable to make this proposal now. It will demonstrate that the US is prepared to agree to a cessation of underground tests, to the extent that adequate safeguards can be applied. The Secretary foresees some difficulty with the British in regard to a moratorium on cessation of all underground tests. Therefore we do not discuss this matter with the UK until the Secretary sends a reply to Selwyn Lloyd's letter of January 14.² Mr. Merchant then read the agenda (Tab A) for the meeting and invited discussion of the first question, namely, whether we should advance a threshold proposal in the Geneva negotiations at this time.

Mr. McCone commented that he is agreeable to the idea of a threshold proposal. This approach is consistent with our thinking since the beginning of negotiations. The late Secretary Dulles foresaw its presentation but was reluctant to put it forward until differences on the on-site inspection question actually developed in the conference. Mr. Quarles had likewise supported this approach. There are of course some difficulties. As a preface to any detailed discussion about the threshold, the US must make clear that it insists on controls for any environment where tests are to cease. The first paragraph might be improved by referring to Khrushchev's January 14 speech before the Supreme Soviet in which he admits that certain types of underground tests might go undetected. Khrushchev thus admits that in some areas there can be no guarantee of compliance, that the treaty must operate partly on faith.

Mr. Merchant said the second paragraph of the draft instruction under consideration (Tab B) makes clear that there will be cessation in only those environments where adequate controls are now available.

¹ Tabs A and B are in the Supplement.

² In his January 14 letter, Lloyd agreed with the threshold concept at least to the extent that it permitted the negotiations to go beyond an atmospheric treaty, but had serious doubts that the Soviet Union would accept a treaty that did not ban all tests, at least temporarily. The Soviets would charge, according to Lloyd, that the West wanted a costly inspection system for intelligence purposes while still allowing a continuation of weapons development. The result would be a serious propaganda setback for the West. Therefore, Lloyd suggested that in spite of scientific difficulties, it was in the West's interest to come to an arrangement with the Soviet Union in which all tests would cease, even if the moratorium on underground testing would be temporary. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, State Mepco Cables) See the Supplement.

General Starbird stated he could find nothing about an atmospheric ban in the instruction. Should we include some instructions conditioned on the Soviet reply to our general approach? Mr. Farley explained that the intent of this paper is a modification from a comprehensive approach to a limited approach. This proposal is an intermediate step on the way to re-introduction of the atmospheric proposal and is thought to be more advantageous than an immediate proposal to ban atmospheric tests. It is doubtful, however; whether we can, in this same instruction, postulate any specific course of action on the basis of various Soviet responses.

Mr. Knight reiterated that Department of Defense technical people still have reservations on the practicability of the threshold idea, whether it can be adequately controlled. DOD technical people would require three more years to prove it workable; however, DOD will abide by the decision of the group. Mr. McCone commented that the late Under Secretary Quarles had called the threshold idea a logical approach. Perhaps it was not so much a question of logic as one of reluctance to enter into a very complex negotiation. General Loper advanced a nonmilitary consideration, the Soviet reply to this proposal. He thought they would say the threshold plan will enable the US to go on testing and yet spy on the USSR at the same time. Mr. Merchant agreed, and said he was under no illusion that the Soviets would accept this proposal. However, we must balance this against the gain in the US posture; we would show our willingness to accept a controlled ban on underground tests. Secretary Herter believes this is good political tactics, a desirable intermediate step.

Dr. Kistiakowsky was unable to understand the concern of the Department of Defense technicians. Seismologists have long understood the measurement of magnitudes. This is elementary; the margin of error is only Q-1 magnitude units. To distinguish between an earthquake and a nuclear explosion is much more difficult. It will require years of research to perfect the techniques. He feels, however, that under the present proposal this particular distinction need not be made. It is the discovery of events and their measurements that is important. Then the percentage would be applied.

General Loper thought an error factor of 2 has been used in arriving at an estimated total number of events. He then referred to Supnu 825³ in which the UK delegate also emphasizes the importance of agreed criteria. According to the UK statement, if there is no agreement on criteria from the first, there is no guarantee that a single inspection will take place. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that magnitude will be the key criterion. The uncertainty in our estimate as to the number of events which would

³ Dated January 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/1-1560)

occur was an argument against use of a numerical quota, but not an argument against use of a percentage quota.

Mr. McCone noted that, in the course of his speech before the Supreme Soviet Khrushchev criticized Western moves to exclude underground tests; he implied they are simply designed to justify the resumption of testing.⁴ Therefore, to accept the proposal now under discussion, he would have to reverse himself. Is he likely to do so? Perhaps a different approach would be advisable. Mr. Khrushchev has merely said he would not test in the Soviet Union provided the western powers do not resume testing. Perhaps we should go further and say we would not ever test in the atmosphere and attach no conditions. He asked whether the threshold proposal had been re-examined in light of the Khrushchev speech. Mr. Merchant felt that Khrushchev's pronouncements should not cause us to forego a proposal which we believe beneficial. The Russians have reversed themselves before. Mr. Allen Dulles noted that Khrushchev has left himself a way out of an agreement to ban atmospheric tests in case the French start testing. Mr. Farley suggested that we must assess the proposal in the light of whether it would be useful even if it were turned down. Even if there were only a 1% or 5% chance of acceptance such a proposal might improve our public position.

Mr. Merchant thought we should save any proposals as to unilateral renunciation of atmospheric tests until after this proposal is turned down. Mr. Farley believed that the public reaction to the proposal would be favorable in any event. If the Soviets turn it down, world opinion will be likely to consider it in terms of a U.S. proposal and a Russian "no". The onus for the refusal will be on the Russians. Mr. Merchant felt that a posture of willingness to cease all tests that it is technically feasible to control, and of earnest desire to lower the threshold as detection capabilities improve, places us in a particularly good position in the eyes of the public; it will accept the US presentation. Mr. Farley recalled that even a person as critical of our efforts as Senator Humphrey has urged presentation of a threshold proposal calling for a threshold of 5 KT.

Mr. Merchant said that we need to reach a decision in principle to move ahead. If we cannot reach agreement here we should go to the President for a decision. He believed too, in the light of Mr. McCone's emphasis on the need for stressing the principle of ceasing tests only in environments subject to control, we should make that provision in the instruction a separate paragraph and spell it out a little. Mr. Knight reiterated that DOD will leave to the consensus of the meeting the decision whether a threshold proposal should be advanced. Mr. Dulles suggested working the Khrushchev speech into the draft instruction, especially the

⁴ See *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pp. 4-16, for extracts.

part about the necessity for "good faith" in place of adequate safeguards. The people of the United States know all about Soviet "good faith". That's why they will approve the threshold proposal, which makes provision for the necessary controls. Mr. McCone and Mr. Farley suggested effective use could be made of Khrushchev's letter to the President on April 23 in which he said we could guarantee strict observance of the treaty. Mr. Gray said he had no ideas to present at the moment. It seemed to him that the Department of State and Dr. Kistiakowsky favor the threshold proposal strongly, AEC is willing to go along, and DOD is a little reluctant but also willing to go along. Mr. Merchant summarized what he believed to be the unanimous view of the group. First of all, as provided in the first sentence of the proposal, we should consult with the U.K. Second, we should prepare a separate paragraph strengthening the idea expressed in Mr. McCone's memo submitted to the January 12 meeting of principals.⁵ We should also weave the Khrushchev speech into the proposals. After that, we should clear the proposal with the principals. We should plan another meeting only if a dividing issue arises. Mr. Gray asked whether the threshold proposal might be inconsistent with anything the President may have said or written to Khrushchev or Macmillan. Mr. Farley said he know of no such inconsistency. The threshold proposal is an intermediate step between the President's proposals of April 13 and May 5. Mr. Merchant recalled another agreed point: General Loper's point that an inspection request cannot be subject to a veto.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said he had some misgivings, because the threshold proposal is, of course, more complicated by far to negotiate than a comprehensive ban or a ban on atmospheric tests. To reduce any unfavorable political effect, it is advisable to emphasize the phased aspect of this proposal. The recommendations of the panel had been very conservative. Seismologists agree that a lot of progress can be made on the problem of identifying a disturbance, whether it is an earthquake or a nuclear detonation. So, this is just a phased approach toward a more comprehensive ban which will become technically feasible after more study. Now, that a substantial amount of money has been released for research in this field some progress could be expected. Mr. Dulles recalled that Khrushchev himself always talks of disarmament by stages.

Mr. McCone suggested an improvement in paragraph 3 on page 3. Instead of the words "US feels obligated to proceed . . ." in the last sentence, we should reverse the emphasis and state, "the U.S. will proceed to develop an improved detection system." The idea of a joint program should then be mentioned. Mr. Dulles suggested that in the first paragraph the words "adequate safeguards can be applied" might be changed to "effective controls can be applied." Dr. Kistiakowsky ques-

⁵ See footnote 5, Document 239.

tioned whether the words "all events located by the system," last sentence, paragraph 4, does not provide excessive coverage. We should add the idea that only events "above the threshold" would be inspected.

Mr. Knight referring to the second agenda item, initiated a discussion on the magnitude of the threshold by proposing a level of 5. He quoted former Secretary of the Air Force Douglas as having been in favor of this figure. He stated it would be of advantage to set our initial proposal at a figure somewhat higher than the lowest magnitude we could ultimately accept. A magnitude of 5 makes the area in which inspection is required more nearly commensurate with the number of inspections that seem feasible. However, the Department of Defense will in this case too abide by the consensus of opinion at this meeting.

Mr. Farley stated that magnitude 4.75 is just about the maximum size underground test that has ever been conducted. The idea of consolidating existing knowledge and experience is perhaps better served by this threshold, equivalent to 19 kilotons, than by one established at the 43 kiloton level. Mr. Merchant said that State Department holds no particular brief for a 4.75 level. State Department will be guided by DOD and AEC on this matter. The arguments against the 5 level seem to be this: The larger the permissible test, the less effort, it appears, the US has made to cut down on underground testing. Also, it should be recalled, the Soviets argue that a signal magnitude of 4.75 corresponds to only a 1.97 kiloton device. They are hooked with this low estimate. The arguments for a 5 level, on the other hand, include the fact that it's a nice round figure and it is easier to negotiate with a round figure. Mr. Gray expressed opposition to a negotiation about a threshold magnitude number. We should stand on our proposed number. Mr. McCone said the AEC approves a magnitude of 4.75. If the threshold is set at a lower figure, the temptation to decouple increases. Dr. Kistiakowsky called 4.75 an average reasonable figure. He believed a figure of 5 to be hard to justify politically; also it will not provide as many inspections as we want. If the threshold is less than 4.75, more inspections will be required to create an effective deterrent. Mr. Merchant said that 4.75 appeared to be acceptable to the group. General Loper recalled that 4.75 had been discussed with the British, and they seem to like this figure best. DOD believes this figure is acceptable provided that agreement can be reached on a reasonable number of inspections. The level of inspection must bear an appropriate relationship to the number of located events or unidentified events. We must insist on a quota which is a satisfactory percentage of events. The percentages listed in paragraph 6 are too low; we have to try to negotiate for a higher percentage.

Mr. Knight advanced 50% as a realistic proposal, in place of 10%. General Loper pointed to the magnitude tables (Attachment to Memo-

randum of Conversation, January 8, 1960)⁶ which show the average annual number of all located events in the USSR to be 105. That would give us only 10 inspections, on the basis of the proposed percentages. Perhaps there will only be half the average number of events in one year and, therefore, only five inspections. That would be too low to serve as a deterrent. Mr. McCone suggested that 30% of all events above 4.75 magnitude unidentified by US criteria or, alternatively, 20% of all events above 4.75 magnitude located by the system should be subject to inspection. That will provide an annual average of 21 inspections, by either method. Dr. Kistiakowsky stated that the percentages proposed in the instruction supply an effective deterrent. It's always possible that a single explosion might go unobserved, but not a series. However, if these percentages may become subject for negotiation, Mr. McCone's suggested percentages should be used. This is a matter of conference tactics. Mr. Merchant suggested substituting 30% and 20%, as suggested by Mr. McCone. Mr. Farley stressed the importance of a proposal which is not prejudicial in the UK view. Mr. McCone replied that Prime Minister Macmillan had once suggested one inspection every two weeks as an effective deterrent. Thus 21 inspections a year might be suitable for him. Mr. Merchant said it appeared 30% and 20% is the proposal acceptable to the group.

General Starbird said that the decision to advance paragraph 6 in the form of a proposal makes it necessary to give Ambassador Wadsworth some type of instruction as to what to answer when he is asked what we intend to do about a moratorium and about high altitude testing. He suggested that paragraph 7 should be re-worded so that Ambassador Wadsworth would be authorized to explain what our position will be to the Soviets as well as to the UK. General Loper concurred but considered the final two sentences of paragraph 7b too specific for decision now. We might, for example, in connection with high altitude treaty language want to apply the threshold idea. It was agreed these two sentences should be deleted.

Mr. McCone concluded with a recommendation that we remind the UK of a few matters. First, Mr. Macmillan had himself told Mr. McCone that he wouldn't agree to a suspension of tests without absolute safeguards. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

⁶ The memorandum of conversation and its attachment are in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. See the Supplement.

241. Editorial Note

President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter met at the White House, January 23, 1960, at 8:30 a.m., to confer on disarmament matters. Their discussion was recorded by Herter in three separate memoranda of conversation. The first deals with strategy for the upcoming Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament meeting in Geneva, March 15, and reads as follows:

"In a conversation with the President this morning, I discussed with him at some length procedures with respect to instructions for our negotiating group headed by Mr. Eaton, who meet on Monday [January 25] with representatives of the other four nations involved in an effort to reach a common position before the March 15 conference with the Soviet Bloc countries in Geneva. I told him that I felt it would be a long and difficult process to achieve agreement with the Defense Department on a detailed program and that, from the point of view of proceeding, it would be best if Mr. Eaton could isolate in the discussions with our Allies points on which he or a representative of Defense who would be sitting with him, felt there might be real objections on the part of Defense. I added that, of course, when unresolved specific points came up we, together with Defense, would bring them to him for resolution.

"He agreed with this procedure. He likewise agreed that we should try to work out some proposal which we could make to the Russians which would have a good public relations impact but that for the initial stages we should confine ourselves to trying to reach agreement on such matters as might be quickly implemented, and that no commitments should be made in so-called "package" form of specific steps leading from the first initial stages to the final disarmament." (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Meetings with the President) See the Supplement.

The second relates to a draft objectives paper for the Ten-Nation meeting and reads as follows:

"The President this morning approved the draft of a disarmament objectives paper. Although we discussed at some length the question of an international police force, it was finally agreed that it would be best not to try to spell out any details and to leave the language as it stood, subject, of course, to revision in consultation with the Five-Power disarmament group. I likewise told him I would send to General Goodpaster our own communication to the Department of Defense containing some of our ideas, as well as the British specific disarmament proposals which had been made at the meeting held by myself with the ambassadors of the other four nations on Monday, January 18." (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Meetings with the President) See the Supplement.

A subsequent draft of the "objectives paper," February 8, styled "Working Paper" and initialed by Eisenhower, is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. See the Supplement. The meeting with the Ambassadors is described in a memorandum of conversation by Spiers, January 18. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

The final memorandum prepared by Herter deals with the reply to Lloyd's January 14 letter (see footnote 2, Document 240). It reads:

"In a conversation with the President this morning, he approved the draft of the letter to Selwyn Lloyd on the Nuclear Test negotiations with the inclusion of the sentence which stated that he had been consulted and approved of the policy outlined." (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Meetings with the President) See the Supplement.

In the letter to Lloyd as sent on January 23, Herter described the threshold concept and the U.S. proposals not as a limited treaty, but as a phased approach to a comprehensive treaty, and he rejected Lloyd's suggestion for a temporary moratorium on all underground testing. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Dulles/Herter—U.K. Officials) See the Supplement.

242. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, February 2, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter, General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Governor Herter mentioned that there had been a bad leak to the *New York Times* regarding our threshold concept. This seemed to result from a luncheon Mr. McCone had had with Reston of the *Times*. He said the British want to have a moratorium for two or three years on explosions below the agreed threshold—i.e., on explosions against which it is not possible to inspect. We wish to exclude such explosions from any

agreement. Mr. Herter showed the President a draft reply to Selwyn Lloyd which he had prepared. The President thought this was all right but said we should make clear in the message that the leak was ours, since the British resent very strongly any unwarranted imputation of a leak by them of secret material.

Mr. Herter said that the AEC suggests we and the UK should meet to discuss the question of resumption of tests below the threshold. He was opposed to this suggestion because it would dramatize a difference between ourselves and the British.

The President summarized this by saying that the UK has suggested a suspension of tests everywhere. So far as he is concerned, the President said he will not authorize tests, but will not make any statement that we will halt tests in environments wherein inspection cannot be carried out.

Mr. Herter said that Emelyanov had told a representative of the AEC in Vienna that he would like to talk to Mr. McCone about the threshold question. Emelyanov made the point that he reports to Khrushchev where Tsarapkin reports to Gromyko. The President said he would agree to this so long as Mr. McCone is thoroughly indoctrinated and there is no danger of his going off on his own. Mr. Herter said he would ask that the AEC representative give Emelyanov a memorandum concerning the threshold and then that we follow the matter up if Emelyanov accepts. The President approved this.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

On the subject of disarmament, Mr. Herter said there is disagreement concerning the proposal to cut off production of fissionable material, in spite of the fact this has been an element in our proposals for many years. The President said he has always understood that this has been something that we could inspect. Therefore he tends to favor it. He added that there is scarcely any proposal in the field of disarmament equitable to the two sides that he would not accept if it can be inspected. Mr. Herter said he will be talking further with Defense on this matter.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

243. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, February 3, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

Chairman McCone, General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Mr. McCone said he is concerned regarding the question of the threshold concept as it affects any suspension of atomic testing. The President said he has had word that the British take the stand that, if we are not successful in getting an agreement based on the threshold concept, they will settle for less. Mr. McCone said he is inclined to be very critical of the UK in this matter. They were opposed to a suspension of testing until they had completed the tests they were ready to conduct. Since that time, having received design information from us under the new law, they have been "living off of us" and have no need to continue testing themselves. Mr. McCone added that we had learned indirectly of a statement by a senior British official involved in this matter that if the United States were to resume testing, Great Britain would take the matter to the UN and join in condemning U.S. action. Initially the President did not recall having received this information previously. I reminded him that we had received it through very indirect means. The President expressed considerable displeasure at this British stand. He said that if we were able to get an agreement on the basis of the threshold concept we would simply say that below the threshold we will do whatever we decide to do.

Mr. McCone stated that with regard to underground tests he has a problem with his laboratories, the members of which are keen to resume testing. The President said he was aware of this but there are policy questions involved. Mr. McCone said he has given instructions for the digging of tunnels in Nevada as a means of being prepared for tests should they be reinstated. This does not of course prejudice the decision as to resuming them.

Mr. McCone commented on a matter he had discussed with Mr. Herter (and Mr. Herter had mentioned to the President yesterday).¹ This is an apparent divergence between Emelyanov (who works directly under Khrushchev) and the Soviet negotiators in Geneva who are under

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on February 3.

¹ See Document 242. McCone and Herter discussed their respective talks with the President in a telephone conversation, February 3 at 10:40 a.m. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Calls & Miscellaneous Memos) See the Supplement.

Gromyko. Mr. McCone said he is willing to meet with Emelyanov to see if any way out of the impasse over the threshold concept can be found, provided Secretary Herter wants him to do so.

Mr. McCone next said that he is concerned over any thought of suspending the production of fissionable material in our atomic plants. Such a suspension is very hard to police. The President said he thought production, or curtailment of production, is not too difficult to police. Mr. McCone said it is not so difficult at any particular plant, but that it is difficult to be sure the inspection is comprehensive. He then went on to say that we know a great deal more about their atomic plants than they think we do. He suggested that we might offer to close down specific plants in our establishment of the same general power input as some of their plants, and ask them to close down specific plants in reciprocity. The President said he liked the idea suggesting for example that we could designate a plant of theirs in the Urals and say that if they will close that we will close an equivalent plant. Mr. McCone said the same could be done for their production facilities at Tomsk, and that we could shut down some of our facilities at Hanford. If this were done, we could then think of extending the measures to the "open skies" proposal to make the control more comprehensive. The President said the matter would simply be one of padlocking a plant and putting a party of as few as two men at each to see that it remained closed.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

244. Memorandum of Discussion at a Special Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, February 18, 1960.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

Nuclear Elements of the United States Disarmament Policy

After Mr. Gray opened the meeting, Secretary Herter explained that the United States must now prepare its position on disarmament policy

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Lay on February 19. For Kistiakowsky's account of the meeting, see *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 257–258.

for negotiation with our allies, before UN Subcommittee negotiations.¹ The question today was in what category should we place the cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. The State Department recommends that the President approve the initiation of moves to negotiate on this subject at once, while other aspects of disarmament might be negotiated later.

Secretary Herter recalled that the President had recommended in 1953 his "open skies" proposal,² and in 1956 had offered to put open stocks of fissionable material under control of an international agency.³ Secretary Herter said that Allen Dulles was prepared to give an estimate of the reliability of our intelligence on Soviet stockpiles. Secretary Herter said that he understood that our stockpile was ten to one over the Soviets—five to one in uranium and two to one in plutonium. The United States therefore has a marked superiority in this respect. He therefore felt this was a good time to get started in this field. He said he was not optimistic, however, that the Soviets would agree. One other important factor to be considered is the danger of proliferation of nuclear materials in the custody of other nations, especially those in the Far East. As the Soviets continue production, that will put them in a better position to help the Communist Chinese, who have not been helped yet so far as we know. In summary, Secretary Herter said that he felt the cut-off of nuclear production would not hurt U.S. security, but that he believed on balance it would be favorable to us.

Secretary Gates said that the Defense Department agrees that a cut-off of nuclear production should be our ultimate objective. He also was concerned that, if we proceed to negotiate this subject now, the Soviets would separate this out of the disarmament negotiations at a time when they have not yet made any offer of effective inspection in the USSR. Secretary Gates pointed out that we are now in a difficult period of transition from bombers to missiles. This will require more nuclear weapons, although they will have less megatons. If the anti-missile system programs progress, a goodly amount of fissionable material must be used.

¹ The forthcoming Ten-Nation Disarmament Meeting under U.N. auspices was scheduled to start on March 15.

² Reference is apparently to Eisenhower's July 21, 1955, proposal at the Geneva Summit Conference, the text of which is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, pp. 486-488.

³ On December 8, 1953, President Eisenhower addressed the U.N. General Assembly and made his "Atoms for Peace" proposal, which called for the existing nuclear powers to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency. For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 393-400. In a letter to Soviet Chairman Bulganin, March 1, 1956, Eisenhower stated that the United States was prepared to work out suitable and safeguarded arrangements so that further production of fissionable materials would no longer be used to increase weapons stockpiles. The President suggested that this approach might be combined with the "Atoms for Peace" proposal. For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 593-594.

Secretary Gates said that any change in the nuclear production program would drastically affect our future weapons plans. He therefore felt that the Defense Department and JCS should have time to review this probable effect. For example, we might have to reprogram some of our nuclear weapons into conventional weapons. He believed that it would be better to keep this subject in Category 3 of the disarmament negotiations⁴ and allow time for further study of future requirements. He is not sure now that Defense could live with a cut-off of production. He was also fearful that we might arrive at a moratorium in this field as we did in nuclear testing by the pressure of world opinion, even though nobody in the United States wished this result. In summary, Secretary Gates said that Defense would like to be prepared to show the effect on the stockpile of a cut-off in production, before a decision is made.

The President said he thought that the Defense presentation of possibility was very good, but that it did not mention what would happen to the Soviets if they stopped production. It also overlooked the possibility that an agreement might put us in the posture of mutual observations with the Soviets, which would be to our advantage. The President said that he did not know how close we have to search for an atomic plant. The President thought, however, that we should look very seriously at what we would be gaining if we could make a start on disarmament. He pointed out that since his atoms-for-peace talk in 1953, the United States had been standing by its proposals for progress on disarmament.

In answer to Secretary Gates' observations that it would be different if we got inspection, the President said that he did not agree to a disarmament program if it did not involve effective inspection.

Mr. McCone said the studies indicate that the inspection problem will be very difficult. It will require a large number of men closely identified with each plant. If we got into technical negotiations on this subject, it would be more difficult, complicated and confusing in the eyes of the world than has been the nuclear testing negotiations. Mr. McCone agreed that Defense needs mean we must continue production, but he thought we could cut out some U-235 capacity. He thought that the fact that we have greater productive capacity than the USSR is a reflection of

⁴ A February 4 Department of State paper, submitted to the Department of Defense for its comment, proposed a three-stage plan of action for the consideration of the Ten-Nation Meeting on Disarmament at Geneva. The text of the paper is attached as Appendix "B" to a memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, February 12, which took strong objection to the State proposal. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, NSC Special Meetings) See the Supplement. The plan was subsequently discussed with and revised by the Delegations of Canada, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom and submitted on March 16 at Geneva as a Western paper. Phase III measures were described in the Western plan as "additional measures which are regarded as necessary for achieving the ultimate goal." For full text of the March 16 proposal, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pp. 68-71.

the fact that we have different needs for smaller weapons for air defense and anti-missile systems. He is concerned that we not get into the position of separating negotiations for nuclear and conventional disarmament. He said that is just what Khrushchev wants with his "ban the bomb" proposal.⁵ This would put the United States in the worst posture and expose Free World manpower to the superior numbers within the Soviet Bloc. Mr. McCone agreed that it would be an advantage to open up the Soviet Bloc, but indicated that they are not willing to agree to this.

The President said that you can't put the cart before the horse. You must put out some bait to get them to agree.

Mr. McCone suggested that we make it a condition that the Soviets go forward on the "open skies" plan before we agree to a nuclear production cut-off. He said he was afraid that we would get into a long protracted argument as we have done at Geneva and be forced into a moratorium in production. He thought that we should force the issue of "open skies" inspection. Then we could find out whether they have additional plants that we don't know about.

Mr. Dulles thought that we have a good idea where Soviet plants are. There may be some plants we don't know about, but we do know about the major plants. However, in judging the efficiency of these plants there is a great margin of error. Even with the highest figure estimated for their production, their stockpile is much lower than ours.

Secretary Gates said that we have a weapons superiority of about two to one. However, taking into account that they may initiate the attack, we may need as much as two and a half to one. We are now in a position where we are developing new systems but do not yet have them. If nuclear production is separated out from other disarmament measures, per se this will mean that we must change our weapons program.

The President said that we would be in danger anyway even if these new weapons systems come along. As we get into the point that we don't think that we may be attacked by aircraft, we will not need all of our anti-aircraft weapons.

Secretary Gates said that we would still need such systems as Nike-Zeus which will use great amounts of fissionable materials.

General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are fearful of stopping nuclear production. He pointed out that we will have to rework our weapons [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. This requires added amounts of tritium.

⁵ On May 24, 1958, Soviet Chairman Khrushchev addressed the Warsaw Pact and called for a ban of atomic and hydrogen weapons. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, pp. 1043-1044.

Secretary Herter, Secretary Douglas and Mr. McCone all pointed out that tritium is not covered by the definition of fissionable material. General Twining and Secretary Gates both expressed the fear that we could not separate tritium out from the other materials as we wanted.

In answer to a question by the President, Mr. McCone said that we used a lot of tritium, but that it was not defined as fissionable material. However, it does come from reactors instead of producing plutonium.

The President did not think that the Joint Chiefs of Staff or others should fear that we were going to surrender our advantage. We should not say that we do not have the guts to keep making tritium. He believes that if we are way ahead in plutonium and uranium and if we can get a dependable inspection system, he did not see how we would not be better off than we are now. We cannot stay on a dime and be in exactly the same position as they are on Berlin. We should not be in a rigid position, but should find something that we can do in our own advantage. That was the point of the "open skies" proposal. We thought that they would probably not accept it because they have good maps of the United States and we have nothing comparable.

In response to a suggestion by Mr. McCone, the President said that he thought that the idea of stopping production in one plant for a one-plant cut-off on the other side was a good gimmick, but that we should not put it into the international disarmament negotiations. Secretary Herter concurred that such a proposal should be arranged bilaterally.

In answer to Admiral Burke's fear that the rules would get changed on us, the President said that the rules would have to be that any agreement would have no effect and would not be signed unless an inspection system had been agreed upon, set up, and tested. In testing it we might try Mr. McCone's suggestion of a one-plant-for-one-plant idea.

The President said we should not forget, when we talk about the Soviet's conventional power of overrunning us, that we still have navies. We would then restore the ocean's capacity to safeguard us. The President commented that in Congress smart demagogues are distorting Defense testimony because the United States is horrified that nuclear bombs will destroy millions of people. War used to result in the destruction of nations, but it now involves our very survival. The President thought that if we could eliminate nuclear bombs he would not fear that the United States could take care of the weapons that would be left. He thought that if we could get effective inspection we should be willing to pay a lot. That's what we are struggling for. He thought that we should make no offers across the board until we can be sure that we can get into the Soviet Union. He felt that we should look at this problem as getting the better in a horse-trade.

Secretary Gates said that he did not disagree with what the President had said, but felt that before we get into such complicated negotiations, a complete review of our force structure should be required.

The President noted that Khrushchev had said that he thought they would be shutting down some nuclear plants. They did not believe in little weapons, but they will be building atomic submarines and missiles. Khrushchev indicated they might shut up at least two nuclear plants, and that they are getting out of the nuclear power business. The President thought that Khrushchev here and there was telling the truth, but the danger was that there might be one lie out of twelve truths. The President had said to Khrushchev that, if we stopped nuclear weapons production, let's put so much bang under UN control. Khrushchev had just smiled. The President reiterated that we must insist upon an inspection system that the military would trust.

In response to Secretary Gate's comment about the enormous transition that is going on in our weapons systems, the President pointed out that our program is based on our evaluation of what the Soviets will do. If they would stop nuclear weapons production, the situation would be different. The President said that even if we got agreement to inspection, he wouldn't talk about putting it into effect before 1963.

Secretary Herter said that the immediate problem is that Mr. Eaton must meet with our allies tomorrow. So far this one subject of nuclear production has been held out and not discussed even with our allies. The question is whether the State Department proposal on this subject can be put on the table in the first category of negotiations.

The President thought that our allies assumed that we had already offered to negotiate on this subject. Secretary Gates pointed out that our previous offer had made this objective along with other things. It had not been separated out before.

Secretary Herter said that the British had put forth a package proposal which they want to lay out. Our allies are objecting to our statement of an objective because they want to proceed to complete disarmament.

The President said that he did not quite agree that this subject had to be part of the package. We have previously said that there was no sense in agreeing to destroy bombs because they could not be discovered. However, it might be possible to stop nuclear weapons production under proper safeguards. The President therefore thought that this subject could be taken up separately.

Secretary Gates said there was one other point. He thought an agreement on production would tend to leave big bombs in the central storage; [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. The President said he sometimes wondered whether one-megaton weapons were better than 20-megaton.

Secretary Gates agreed, but General White observed that we have to have both.

General Twining repeated his fear that public opinion would force us into a moratorium. He thought it would be different if we could be sure to get inspection.

The President said that as long as he is here there will be no moratorium until we have an inspection system which we know will work. The only reason we agreed to a moratorium on testing was that we had found out the Soviets had stopped testing in the atmosphere.

The President said that he thought Mr. Eaton should say that our purpose is to do anything that will give a good inspection system. We are prepared to go into cessation of production, but we have got to know that we have an inspection system first. Secretary Herter agreed, and noted that all negotiations so far have broken down on the problem of inspection.

The President agreed with the Joint Chiefs that we should not accept any proposal if there is a way to circumvent it before we get inspection. The President said that no one should think that he doesn't share the Joint Chiefs' apprehension. However, the President felt that we have got to make a proposal that would be so fair that any man of good sense would accept it.

When Secretary Herter read A-(1) of the State proposal,⁶ the President said that we must be clear what fissionable material means. He suggested that we say we are talking about the production of uranium and plutonium.

Mr. McCone pointed out that there are two different problems—one is refabricating weapons and the other is replacing the tritium in existing weapons.

Mr. Irwin pointed out that tritium is fusionable material. If we cease production of fissionable material, we could maintain the stockpile with the existing fissionable materials plus new supplies of tritium. He was afraid, however, that it would be hard to distinguish these materials in world opinion. The fusion bomb is considered worse than the fission bomb. What the world would understand is that we were stopping production of fusionable materials. It was this type of concern that caused the Defense staff not to accept the proposed cessation of production but to request that a study be made before the proposition is put forward.

The President felt that Defense still did not see that we were making a horse-trade. We should see what an agreement will do to the other fellow as well as to ourselves. We should look to means for starting to thaw out the rigidity between the two sides or there would be a disaster in the

⁶ See Annex A below.

world. The President thought that State should study its proposal again to see whether it was possible to write language which would better meet the anxieties expressed. He thought that we should see that any inspection system must be mutually agreed and tested. He didn't think this subject would involve the same problems of world opinion as the testing negotiations. Pauling and others had raised the specter of deformed children and other horrors resulting from the tests. The President thought world opinion would understand our insistence that we not stop production until we know we have a safeguarded plan.

Secretary Herter pointed out that the United Nations agreements on disarmament had never omitted provisions for a safeguarded inspection system. He thought we were in a good position in world opinion on that aspect.

The President said that the State proposal should be written so that there is no possibility of misinterpreting what we mean.

Secretary Gates noted that fissionable materials for weapons use might be construed to cover aircraft or missile propulsion. Secretary Herter agreed that the definition should not include such matters.

The President said that State should rewrite their proposal to make clear what we mean as indicated at this meeting. Secretary Herter should then look it over and take it back to Secretary Gates for his agreement.

*The National Security Council:*⁷

1. Discussed Paragraph A(1) of the attached draft proposal on the subject (Annex A) presented by the Secretary of State; in the light of comments thereon by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Noted the President's directive that the Secretary of State prepare a revised draft of Paragraph A(1) of Annex A in the light of the discussion at this meeting, which would:

a. Make very clear that the installation and effective operation of an agreed inspection and control system would have to be a prerequisite to cessation by the United States of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

b. Ensure that the meaning of the term "fissionable materials" excludes tritium and other fusionable materials.

c. Make clear that the term "weapons" as used in this proposal excludes nuclear power reactors and propulsion.

The President emphasized the importance of a thorough and effective inspection and control system. The President further directed that

⁷ The following paragraphs and Note were not given an NSC action number since this was a special and not a numbered NSC meeting.

the Secretary of State coordinate this revised draft proposal with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, prior to making this proposal in current negotiations with Western disarmament representatives.

Note: The following redraft of Paragraph A(1) was prepared by the Departments of State and Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission pursuant to 2 above:

"Agreement on the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons immediately after the installation and effective operation of an agreed control system to verify this measure. (The obligations under this provision will not affect the use after the cut-off date of fissionable materials produced prior to and on hand at that date (a) to complete the fabrication of weapons in course of manufacture and (b) to fabricate and maintain weapons on hand or completed under (a). 'Fissionable materials for use in weapons'* is defined as not including materials for nuclear power or propulsion.)

*** 'Fissionable materials for use in weapons' does not include tritium or other fusionable materials (Noform)."

JSL

Annex A⁸

NUCLEAR ELEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT POLICY

A. The United States would be prepared to reach agreement on the following measures subject only to negotiation of appropriate inspection and control and not dependent on specific political settlements or other disarmament measures:

(1) Cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons immediately after the installation of an agreed control system to verify this measure. (The obligations under this provision will not affect the use, after the cut-off date, of fissionable materials on hand at that date—(a) to complete the fabrication of weapons in course of manufacture, and (b) to refabricate and maintain weapons then on hand or completed under (a).)

(2) Conditional on (1), agreement to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons into the national control of other nations except in defense against armed attack.

⁸ Secret. The source text, which is dated February 17, is labeled "Draft."

(3) Agreed quantities of fissionable material from past production would be transferred in successive increments under international supervision to non-weapons uses including stockpiling. (Amounts transferred under this provision after institution of the cut-off and separately from significant progress in other disarmament areas would not be so great as drastically to reduce U.S. nuclear weapons capability.)

(4) Agreement to place non-military atomic energy installations under IAEA safeguards.

B. Without commitments as to a subsequent course of action the United States would agree to:

(1) A technical conference on the possibility of accounting for past production of nuclear weapons.

(2) A joint study to design an inspection system to police a cut-off of fissionable materials production for weapons purposes.

245. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, February 28, 1960.

Mr. Herter met briefly with the President on February 28th. [Here follows a brief discussion of Panama.]

Mr. Herter next said that he had received a long letter on disarmament from Selwyn Lloyd.¹ The President read through this letter. He stated that he agrees with Lloyd on one point—that if we are to condition everything on elimination of nuclear weapons, we will never make any progress, because they could be hidden so easily as to make policing impossible. The President said he thought we should not take the position that we will not negotiate on “stage three” items until “stage two” items have been completely implemented.² We can say, however, that we will not sign an agreement on stage three items until the earlier stages are completely in effect. Mr. Herter said this is exactly the problem with

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary Records. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on March 8.

¹ Apparent reference to an undated message from Lloyd to Herter, transmitted by British Ambassador Caccia. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter) See the Supplement.

² See footnote 4, Document 244.

Defense. They do not want to discuss or negotiate on stage three items— for example, limitation on missiles, reduction in weapons and forces, etc.—until stage two is in effect. He thought it should be possible to find some kind of language that would accommodate our own and the British positions, on the basis of what the President said. The President said what he had in mind is that implementation should follow a certain order. Study of disarmament measures should desirably follow the same order, but it would be possible to start some of these studies earlier if there is a specific need—even while holding strictly to the sequence of implementation.

The President said he found it difficult to understand the thinking of Defense in this matter. I explained to him as did Secretary Herter that Defense is fearful that we will start talking about stage three items and then, because of the pressure of world opinion, be unwilling to adhere to our requirement that the implementation of these be delayed until after stage two is in effect.

A.J. Goodpaster³
Brigadier General, USA

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

246. Notes for the Files

Washington, March 10, 1960.

This morning Secretary Dillon and I discussed with the President the release of the public announcement on Gnome project construction.¹

Source: Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Sealed File No. 5. No Distribution. Drafted by McCone.

¹ Project Gnome was a scheduled test of a 10-kiloton nuclear device, which was part of Project Plowshare. Goodpaster, in his memorandum of the conversation, March 10, states that Eisenhower felt “the only difficulty was that this [announcing Gnome] almost serves notice to the world that we are giving up obtaining an overall nuclear test ban agreement within the year.” Dillon reminded the President that the principle of peaceful use of atomic weapons had been agreed to by the Soviet Union. McCone stated that “the Soviets have no intention of agreeing with any of our proposals at Geneva” and “no desire to make real progress.” (*Ibid.*, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries) See the Supplement.

The release was authorized by the President subject to the changes which I am to discuss with General Starbird. Also, the President requested that some of our Allies, most particularly the British, be informed and State is undertaking this immediately and expects to finally clear the announcement later today.

The President then reviewed his philosophy concerning the trend of armaments with their enormous destructive capability. He said that we must find a way to arrest the development of weapons of mass destruction and to ultimately do away with them. This objective seemed paramount in his mind and he related it to a real fear of an ultimate catastrophe to civilization. At no time did he mention the United States or Western security as against the Soviet or Communistic aggression.

The President seemed entirely pre-occupied by the horror of nuclear war and the fact that men in this country and in other countries had created this situation with their own hands and had been unable to cope with the problem of adjusting differences between themselves in such a way that building up and maintaining an enormous power of destruction was thought a necessity.

As he discussed his philosophy he mentioned time and again the necessity of bringing this situation under control and urged that everything possible be done to reach agreement in areas of test suspension, material on weapon production, determination of weapons, etc. as a means of freeing the people of the world from the dreadful fear that now hangs over them.

I then said the practice of people creating armaments for the destruction of one another in war was an old business; in fact, the practice had been carried on throughout civilization. The only difference now was that we had discovered new and more terrible means and, therefore, the ability to destroy was more complete now than it had been in the past. The President recognized this, but then said that in his opinion there is a distinct difference now between the present and the past insofar as in past wars there had always been a victor—now there would be none as all parties engaged in the war and a large segment of humanity not engaged would be destroyed.

John A. McCone²

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

247. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, March 23, 1960, 8:45 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter
Secretary Dillon
General Goodpaster

[Here follows Herter's account of a discussion with Senator Albert Gore about the scheduled Eisenhower visit to the Soviet Union.]

With regard to the latest Khrushchev note,¹ Mr. Herter confirmed the correct translation of the provision that, at the conclusion of the moratorium, discussions would continue without resumption of tests. He said the British are pressing very hard to accept the Soviet proposal.² He gave the President a long letter from Selwyn Lloyd,³ which the President read, expressing disagreement with certain of Lloyd's premises (chiefly the one that any resumption of testing, even by the Soviets, will be blamed on the U.S.).

Mr. Herter said he had had a legal analysis made as to whether an executive agreement signed by the President could bind his successor, and the finding is that it cannot. He also said there is strong feeling on Mr. McCone's part against the Russian proposal, and less strong on the part of Defense. They stress that we should not make a permanent ban of testing without having adequate inspection. The President said he agreed. He did not understand that a permanent renunciation was involved. Mr. Dillon commented that the basic question is really the length of period of study on improved inspection methods, which is to be covered by a moratorium. Mr. Herter said that if we do not accept the moratorium idea, our only recourse is to go back to the limited treaty we proposed a year ago.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on March 25.

¹ Dated March 3. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Khrushchev–Eisenhower) See the Supplement.

² On March 19, Soviet Representative Tsarapkin informed the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests that the Soviet Union was prepared to conclude a treaty on cessation of all nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, the oceans, outer space, and of all underground tests that produce seismic oscillations of a magnitude 4.75 conventional units or above. As for unidentified underground events at or below 4.75 conventional units, Tsarapkin stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to institute a program of joint research and experiments with the West on the understanding that all parties to the treaty agreed not to carry out testing at or below 4.75 conventional units during the period of joint research and experimentation. For full text of the statement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pp. 72–75.

³ Dated March 22. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Dulles/Herter–UK Officials) See the Supplement.

The President said he understood the Russian proposal to relate to weapons testing. He asked if there is any way by which agreement to the conduct of explosions for peaceful purposes can be obtained. Mr. Herter recalled that this had been agreed upon in principle. Mr. Herter said both Dr. Kistiakowsky and Mr. McCone stressed the importance of conducting underground explosions, including nuclear explosions, as part of a research program to improve inspection methods.

The President thought that he could agree to a moratorium for a particular period. We would start with a proposal for a one-year moratorium, but could, he thought, safely agree on a two-year moratorium. He does not plan to ban testing simply by pronouncement—at least not permanently or indefinitely. If through the operation of the treaty inspection system we obtain greater confidence that effective observation in Russia can be accomplished, we could then think about extending the moratorium arrangements. He added that he does not want to do anything that would purport to bind his successor, since he feels his successor should be in a position to make his own concessions.

Mr. Herter asked if he might pass the Khrushchev letter to the other principals engaged in this study, as well as to the British. The President declined to give this authority, in light of the leak of his last exchange with Khrushchev. He suggested that Mr. Herter tell Ambassador Caccia that we regard this Soviet proposal as a new idea. It has one principal defect—that they are insisting on stopping testing simply by pronouncement, whereas we wish to couple pronouncement with inspection. The Soviets have, however, agreed that it is difficult to inspect below the threshold, and this agreement gives hope for negotiation. We are not, however, going to accept a long-term ban without inspection.

Mr. Dillon commented that, with regard to the study period, we could have an agreement to a treaty covering explosions above the threshold and rely upon a unilateral statement below. The President said such a statement would still have to be limited to a year or two, and not bind his successor. He said he is inclined to think the Soviets are really ready to stop testing if they make an agreement. There are two hypotheses on which the contrary might be true: they think their propaganda machine is good enough so that they could “lie away” any violation that was discovered, or they plan to continue testing in some place not covered by the agreement, such as China. Mr. Dillon noted that the French have said that they will not be bound by any agreement reached.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

248. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 23, 1960.

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations: Meeting of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

Department of State

Secretary Herter
Under Secretary Dillon
M—Mr. Merchant
EUR—Mr. Kohler
EUR—Mr. Dubs
S/S—Mr. Borg
S/AE—Mr. Farley
S/AE—Mr. Spiers
S/AE—Mr. Baker

Department of Defense

Under Secretary Douglas
Lt. General Fox
Mr. Irwin
Lt. General Dabney

White House

Dr. Kistiakowsky
Mr. Gordon Gray
Mr. Keeny

Atomic Energy Commission

Mr. McCone
General Starbird
Dr. English

Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Dulles
Dr. Scoville

Mr. Dillon distributed for discussion the attached draft policy statement on nuclear testing (Tab A) prepared in the Department of State, and suggested a paragraph by paragraph review of the paper.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Spiers and cleared by U, M, and S. For Kistiakowsky's account of this meeting, see *A Scientist at the White House*, p. 281. On March 24, Herter, Allen Dulles, and Goodpaster met with Eisenhower, and Herter briefed the President on this meeting as follows: "Defense is prepared to go along with a line of action such as the President had discussed with Mr. Herter yesterday. Mr. McCone is violently opposed. He thought perhaps the President should see the principals, or possibly Mr. McCone alone. The President said he is willing to accept the proposal for a moratorium on tests below the threshold, but it must be limited to an agreed period and made subject to the decision of his successor. As regards Mr. McCone's opposition, this is a policy question, and Mr. McCone will have to accept the President's policy determination." (Memorandum of conference with the President by Goodpaster, March 24; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)

Secretary Herter suggested that reference to peaceful uses detonations be included among the unsettled issues in paragraph (1). Mr. Dillon confirmed Mr. Irwin's understanding that the use of the term "quota" did not imply acceptance of the Soviet principle of a politically-determined quota. Mr. Dillon stated that the ultimate decision might be called a political one, but that we would base our decision on our view of the technical needs for proper control. Secretary Herter said that the quota to be applied below the threshold did not need to be included in the treaty, but could be determined by side agreement along with the moratorium.

Turning to the second paragraph, Mr. McCone said it should be clear that we would proceed independently with research if there were delays in a joint program. Mr. Dillon indicated that this program would be part of the "package". If there were delay in reaching agreement on the research program, there would be no agreement on the moratorium. After further discussion, it was agreed to refer to a "coordinated" rather than a "joint" program, and to make clear that nuclear detonations in such a program would be subject to similar safeguards as those envisaged for peaceful uses detonations.

Turning to paragraph (3), Mr. McCone stated that this was in effect complete acceptance of what the Soviets proposed on March 19.¹ As such it would be a sharp departure from the policy we have stated and restated. Secretary Herter pointed out that the moratorium would not be part of the treaty, as the Soviets propose. Mr. McCone continued that it would be illusory to expect that anything can be done to improve seismic capabilities in less than 3-5 years. Even then the results may be questionable. Preparations for "Cowboy"² took ten months. Thus a two year moratorium was not realistic. We would be stepping into a long-term moratorium. This complete reversal of policy was very alarming.

Mr. Douglas stated that if the Soviets accepted our threshold proposal, we would not do any testing at least for a year or two. In practical terms we would not be giving up anything more in proposing a moratorium. The key question in any case was how much we are willing to pay for a treaty which provides for controls for the first time. The coordinated research program would teach us a lot in two years even though it would not be conclusive in that time.

Mr. Dulles suggested that the specific date of January 21, 1961, be put in as the time specification for the moratorium. The President could argue that this was the maximum commitment he had authority to make, and that the extension would be a matter for decision by the next President. Mr. Gray suggested that no specific time period be mentioned, but that the length of the moratorium be made to depend upon the good faith

¹ See footnote 2, Document 247.

² Not further identified.

demonstrated in pursuing the research program. If a fixed period were specified, there would be little incentive for Soviet good faith performance.

Mr. Dillon observed that our practical problem was that we were not likely to test in any event. Mr. Douglas agreed, stating that in his view the price of agreement to a moratorium was not too great. We have an opportunity to take a long step forward toward international controls. Mr. McCone agreed that we would probably not test, but that we are confronted with a matter of principle. The reasons we would not test now were primarily political. The next President may feel differently on this question.

Secretary Herter said that the most the President can do is say that he would recommend extension of the moratorium to his successor. This may have some dangers, but there were pressing political objectives which can be served by agreements, and these should not be overlooked. The Nth country problem and a breakthrough on the arms control front were among these. However, he did not think the Russians would accept the proposal we were considering. Mr. Gray noted that putting a date, January 1961, in the third paragraph would bring the issue immediately into the political campaign. Other candidates would be under great pressure to endorse the moratorium. Mr. Irwin agreed. Mr. Dillon said that a candidate could refuse to commit himself until he was elected.

Mr. Douglas suggested, as an alternative, that a two-year moratorium be written into the treaty. A less-than-10-months moratorium would not be convincing to the Russians or to public opinion.

Mr. Irwin said the moratorium idea concerned him. He wondered what the Russians could accomplish if they cheated and we didn't. In his mind there was no doubt that over a period of time the Russians would cheat if they could. Mr. McCone agreed. Professor Emelyanov had told him of the deep split in the Soviet Government on this issue. The anti-test ban faction could get the upper hand in the future. There are developments of great military significance which could be accomplished by further testing. New types of small tactical weapons were important, although not overly so. More important are the missile warhead improvements which can be made. He reviewed present yield/weight figures and indicated the improvements which could be anticipated with further testing, stating that warhead weight reduction could mean an increased range for a given rocket.

Mr. Douglas said that some of these things would be nice to do, but that Defense has not overemphasized their importance. We do not have to go further than far enough. We could use a slightly higher yield on Polaris, but even slight improvements in guidance accuracy would more than compensate for yield increases of this order. Mr. McCone said that he was only indicating the improvements which could be made, and not

arguing the military necessity of further testing. Mr. Douglas said that we had a military as well as political interest in opening up the USSR. We must look at both sides of the question. Inspection in the USSR would be a real step forward. Mr. McCone said that this may or may not be the case. Many of the control posts would be in isolated areas, although on-site inspection could be of some significance. Dr. Scoville disagreed, stating that even stationary posts could be of great importance.

Mr. Gray said he also believed that at some point we will have enough. He seriously suspected we had reached that point. Dr. Scoville said that the knowledge we could gain from inspection would be more important militarily than the yield increases Mr. McCone had described. Soviet agreements that any seismic event would be eligible for inspection opened up a major opportunity.

Secretary Herter said he was worried about the prospect of no agreement at all, particularly if there were public & political restrictions on our ability to test anyway. It is more to our advantage to accept the imperfect than to have nothing and perhaps leave the field open for the whole world to develop and test nuclear weapons. We cannot toss these considerations aside too lightly. Furthermore, we had made a great deal of progress in ten months of negotiation. Mr. Irwin observed that we were assuming the Soviets would reject the threshold treaty without a moratorium. Perhaps this was wrong.

Dr. Kistiakowsky reviewed the progress which could be expected in 2 years of research. Much could be done on instrumentation and the threshold of the Geneva system could probably be pushed down to 5 KT from the present 20 KT. However, there would still be a detection threshold. Unmanned seismic stations could result in a substantial improvement. General Starbird pointed out that even a 1 KT threshold could allow testing of some military significance through use of presently known extrapolation techniques. Mr. Douglas said this would be tremendously expensive. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that great sophistication would be required for any useful testing at this level. It was not a technique readily available to 3rd countries. Dr. Scoville said that current intelligence indicators could provide good clues of where to look although they could not in and of themselves prove violations.

Secretary Herter recapitulated the views expressed and said that he felt the President should have an opportunity to hear the dissenting views expressed by Mr. McCone. For his part he would be willing to limit the formal moratorium to the President's period of competence. Mr. Douglas reminded the group that a possible alternative would be to put a 2 year period into the treaty itself. Mr. Gray raised again the desirability of avoiding a fixed time period and of tying the moratorium to the research program and installation of the control system provided in the treaty. Mr. Dillon said that it would be asking a lot for the Soviets to agree

to such an open-ended proposal which would leave any state free to resume tests on an essentially subjective basis.

Secretary Herter said he would find out when a meeting with the President could be scheduled.³

Tab A⁴

Draft Policy Statement

The United States should be prepared to accept the following three-point program in the Geneva nuclear test negotiations:

(1) Conclusion of a threshold treaty along lines proposed by the U.S. on February 11,⁵ with satisfactory settlement of the outstanding technical and political issues required for an effective control system, including the level or quota of inspections (to be applied both above and below the threshold), remaining aspects of the staffing and voting problems, composition of the Control Commission, and the phased extension of the controls necessary to assure a world-wide cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

(2) Agreement on a joint research program, to be planned as soon as possible, for the purpose of progressively improving control methods for events below the threshold. Such a research program should explicitly make provision for the conduct of nuclear explosions necessary for improving and testing detection capabilities.

(3) Simultaneous unilateral declarations, or executive agreement, by the three powers at the time of signature of the treaty that they would refrain from conducting nuclear weapons tests explosions not prohibited by the treaty for an agreed period⁶ while (a) the joint research program is being pursued, (b) the initial phase of the agreed control system is being installed, and (c) there are no indications that the other countries are not abiding by the declaration.

³ Not further identified.

⁴ Secret. On March 24, the President received a copy of this draft proposal, dated March 23, with revised language in paragraphs 2 and 3. Eisenhower initialed the draft proposal and made a revision in the footnote. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Disarmament) For text of the draft, see the Supplement.

⁵ For text of the U.S. proposal of February 11, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pp. 31-33.

⁶ The United States will first propose a one-year period, but will be prepared to accept a two-year period if this should prove necessary to reach agreement on the over-all package. It would have to be made clear that either a declaration or an executive agreement would be subject to reconfirmation by the newly elected President. [Footnote in the source text.]

249. Memorandum of Discussion at the 438th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, March 24, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Item 1. "U.S. Strategic Striking Force."]

2. *The Feasibility and National Security Implications of a Monitored Agreement To Stop or Limit Ballistic Missile Testing and/or Production* (NSC Action No. 1840-c;¹ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Monitoring a Long-Range Rocket Test Agreement", dated March 28, 1958;² NSC Action No. 2161-b;³ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 21, 1960⁴)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on the background of this subject. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.)⁵ He then called on Dr. Kistiakowsky.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that three years ago an ad hoc group had reported its findings on this subject to the effect that a moratorium on the flight testing of long-range missiles, while technically possible, would be to our disadvantage because our development of ballistic missiles was at that time not sufficiently far advanced to permit a cessation of our testing. Now another ad hoc group under the chairmanship of Dr. Ling⁶ had made another study of the subject, the results of which would be presented by Dr. Ling. Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed out that this study, as indeed any study of this nature, was limited in scope and based on a number of assumptions.

Dr. Ling reported that the purpose of the study made by the ad hoc group was to determine the feasibility and the national security implications of a monitored multilateral agreement to ban or limit the flight testing or production of long-range ballistic missiles. The dates January 1961

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Restricted Data. Drafted by Boggs on March 24. For Kistiakowsky's account of this meeting, see *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 281-282.

¹ See footnote 15, Document 136.

² See footnote 2, Document 148.

³ See footnote 4, Document 237.

⁴ With this memorandum, the Executive Secretary of the NSC transmitted the conclusions of a study entitled "The Feasibility and National Security Implications of a Monitored Agreement To Stop or Limit Ballistic Missile Testing and/or Production," March 14. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) See the Supplement.

⁵ See the Supplement.

⁶ Donald P. Ling of Bell Laboratories was a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee.

and January 1963, which would figure prominently in the presentation, were arbitrarily singled out. The ad hoc group had examined the question of limiting ballistic missile testing in relation to outer space activities on the assumption that such activities would continue, although possibly under international control. It was not easy to define long-range ballistic missiles. Radar was the only "high confidence" method of detecting missile flights. Dr. Ling then displayed a chart of radar detection indicating that the trajectory of a missile has to rise to a certain height before there is a certainty of detection by radar. The ad hoc group considered that an apogee of 75 nautical miles was a reasonable figure which would enable all full-range ICBM firings to be detected and would also enable many shorter-range firings to be detected. The choice of a 75 nautical mile apogee automatically determined the number of radars required and also made it possible to detect the firing of any missile with a range of more than 300 miles under normal conditions. He pointed out, however, that a nation determined to evade a limitation on missile testing could flatten the trajectory of its missiles, causing them to skim along under the 75 mile apogee and hence under radar coverage. Such an evasion was a marginally feasible operation. In any case, however, Dr. Ling believed that even with a flattened trajectory a missile could not be fired beyond a range of 3000 miles without being detected. Dr. Ling then said the deliberations of the ad hoc group had rested on a body of factual data which he would summarize in three charts:⁷

- (1) U.S. Ballistic Missile Operational Deployment Schedules
- (2) USSR ICBM Operational Deployment Schedules
- (3) U.S. and USSR ICBM Deployments Compared

Dr. Ling characterized the last-named chart as the "jumping off" place for the study. He said the study had particularly emphasized two factors: (1) the preservation of a secure U.S. retaliatory capability; and (2) an adequately stable deterrent, by which he meant a deterrent force capable of inflicting such unavoidable and serious damage to a country making the first strike that no country would think of attacking. He said that hardening and mobility as related to U.S. missile launching sites had played an important role in the study, as had Polaris.

Dr. Ling then listed as follows certain key considerations which had exercised a constant effect on the study.

- (1) The first of these was a basic dissymmetry arising from the fact that our missile sites are well-known to the enemy, while the enemy's missile sites are wholly unknown or only partly known to us. Consequently, the USSR would target our retaliatory capability, while our targets would be industrial and urban complexes.

⁷ Not found.

(2) In the second place, since the USSR must destroy hardened U.S. launching sites, guidance accuracy, i.e., CEP, is a more precious commodity to the Soviet Union than it is to us. In fact, the Soviet CEP turned out to be the most sensitive parameter of the study. CEP is translatable into numbers of missiles by way of the exchange ratio, i.e., the number of Soviet missiles required to destroy one U.S. missile. The exchange rate for hardened sites is sensitive to CEP so that a two to one improvement in the Soviet CEP is equivalent to a four to one augmentation of Soviet missiles targeted for U.S. hardened sites. Dr. Ling added the study group had considered variations of the Soviet CEP from the figures given in NIE 11-8-59.⁸ The group believed that an alternative set of Soviet CEP's would be attainable with radio guidance.

(3) In the third place, Dr. Ling brought up what he called "a clouded crystal ball." He said that developments now completely unforeseen could invalidate the conclusions of the report. For example, the USSR might—although this was unlikely—develop anti-submarine warfare or anti-ballistic missile capabilities within a few years adequate to nullify our Polaris. If such capabilities were developed, they would alter the established balance of forces. As another example, a test ban on ballistic missiles might lead to a resurgence of interest in aero-dynamic missiles, especially low altitude vehicles. It was thus apparent that a test ban on ballistic missiles would have serious side effects.

Dr. Ling then displayed a chart⁹ showing the Soviet missiles required for a surprise attack on the U.S. with a 90 per cent probability of producing a specified over-pressure at each aim point in the U.S. He said this chart had been prepared by the ad hoc group and was not based on a formal intelligence position. The chart indicated that if the Soviet ICBM had the CEP referred to in the NIE, the USSR would require 700 ICBMs for a surprise attack on the U.S. by mid-1962. It also showed that a Soviet CEP equal to the U.S. potential would cause the Soviets to need 700 ICBMs by mid-1963. Finally, the chart indicated that the number of ICBMs required by the USSR would rise steeply from a figure of 200 after mid-1961 as U.S. launching sites were hardened. Dr. Ling then presented an overlay on this chart which indicated that the Soviets would not have sufficient missiles for a surprise attack on the U.S. after U.S. hardening began. He remarked that hardening could affect a qualitative as well as a quantitative change in the situation, but cautioned that the curve on the chart needed to be cautiously interpreted.

Dr. Ling reported that many studies related to the main study prepared by the ad hoc group had remained undone or had been carried

⁸ Document 88.

⁹ Not found.

only as far as necessary to validate some of the conclusions. The following were among the omissions of the report:

- (1) the implications of the abrogation of any missile testing agreements;
- (2) the relationship of arms control measures discussed in the report to others, including general disarmament;
- (3) the implications of inhibiting the attainment of nuclear delivery capabilities by nations other than the U.S., the U.K. and the USSR;
- (4) the detailed inspection requirements and cost of monitoring a production ban; and
- (5) specific controls on space programs, including an international space authority.

Dr. Ling then said he would read and comment on the conclusions of the report. He read Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the enclosure to the reference Memorandum of March 21. (A copy of the Conclusions of the study is attached.) Referring to the alternative flight detection systems mentioned in Paragraph 5, Dr. Ling said he meant acoustic and radio backscatter systems which together constituted a simple and reliable detection system, especially against attempts to launch ICBMs from shipboard on the high seas by a power which might be seeking to evade the test ban.

Dr. Ling read Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the report. In connection with Paragraph 7 he remarked that it was conceivable that a Soviet all-inertial guidance system tested on space vehicles could find its way into the missile stockpile, even though a system tested only in space could not be as confidently used for missile purposes as one tested for such purposes. He read Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the report, remarking that more study of the internationalization of space was required. After reading Paragraph 10 Dr. Ling said it seemed impossible to tell whether a test ban in 1963 would increase or decrease the risks of the U.S. position, since many of these risks were associated with unforeseen contingencies. After reading Paragraph 11 Dr. Ling warned that if a deployment of radars for detecting missile tests was wanted in 1963, the time to begin the engineering study was now.

Dr. Ling then read Paragraphs 12 through 16. He remarked that a more detailed study of requirements for inspection of a ban on missile testing was needed. In connection with Paragraph 16 he believed that a potential violator of a ban on missile testing would have to weigh the risk of detection against the possible advantage he would gain from violation. In the event of a total ban on testing, the advantage of evasion might be great; but a ban on production only might make the advantages of evasion considerably less persuasive. Dr. Ling then read Paragraphs 17 and 18 of the report, and concluded his presentation by declaring that the whole study was complex and difficult. The ad hoc group had tried to be

factual and cautious without carrying caution to such an extreme that nothing at all could be done.

Secretary Douglas believed the study was an interesting and useful one, but cautioned against considering missiles alone without reference to other categories of force. Conclusions as to the wisdom of a ban on missile testing depend not only on the facts brought out by this study, but also, and to the same extent, on the situation with respect to long-range aircraft or short-range missiles at a particular time, because if the effect of long-range missiles were eliminated the short-range missiles and manned bombers would become very important in the military situation. Secretary Douglas felt rational conclusions could not be reached on this subject for any particular time period in the absence of a careful estimate of our delivery capabilities other than our long-range missile capabilities. He added that the chart displayed by Dr. Ling comparing U.S. and USSR ICBMs was precisely the kind of chart that had caused a great deal of trouble on the Hill because it seems to show that our situation is desperate. Dr. Ling said that to some extent the study group had been at the mercy of the terms of reference. The group had taken manned bombers into account, but not short-range missiles. Polaris had been very much on the minds of the group when it arrived at its conclusions.

The President asked what Secretary Douglas meant by his remark about the U.S. being in a desperate condition.

Secretary Douglas said he meant that if we consider nothing but ICBMs and ignore all other elements of strength, then the USSR seems to have an edge on us. He added that the CEP of missiles was a matter of great interest to him. He felt the U.S. would be in a serious situation even if the Soviets had considerably less than a 90 per cent probability of producing a specified over-pressure at each aim point in the U.S. He believed it was important to realize the limitations of the charts Dr. Ling had displayed.

Secretary Herter felt the presentation had demonstrated the immense complexity of the problem. He believed the most important conclusion emerging from the report was that it was not to our advantage to agree to a ban on missile testing at this time. However, some considerations different from those developed in the study made two years ago had appeared, so that in his view study of this subject should be on a continuing basis. The time might come when a limitation on missile testing might be in the interest of the U.S. In any case studies of this kind constituted important guidance in disarmament problems.

Admiral Burke agreed that further study was desirable. He felt we did not yet know whether a ban on missile testing would ever be desirable in the future. Secretary Herter said at some time in the future we might conclude that we had more to gain than to lose from a limitation on missile testing. In reply to a question from Mr. Gray, Secretary Herter said the French were exerting a great deal of pressure now for a ban on missile testing. Such a ban appeared to be a fixed idea of the French

because of their political situation. Secretary Herter believed that the negative information in the report was of great value.

The President pointed out that our ideas might be changed a great deal if our reconnaissance satellites were successful. Secretary Herter wondered whether a ban on missile testing would slow up the development of our reconnaissance satellite program. The President said that in the light of the study just presented, we would not think of agreeing to a ban on missile testing before 1963.

Admiral Burke pointed out that the conclusions of the study were based on many sensitive assumptions, so that a slight change in the assumptions might make a considerable change in the conclusions. He felt the study should be broadened to encompass many of the related matters referred to in the presentation. Dr. Ling said if the study were broadened it would tend to become an overall study of general disarmament. Admiral Burke felt that one related study could be pursued at a time. Mr. Dulles remarked that the U.S. did not have at the present time adequate intelligence on Soviet philosophy and techniques regarding ICBM launching. Intelligence on this matter was, however, a high priority target. The President said he believed a study of this subject was an extraordinarily difficult task. He was worried about the proposal that the subject should be kept under constant study because he shuddered at the amount of talent that would have to be expended in such an operation. Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed out that the study just presented had been prepared on a part-time basis; that is, by persons who had other duties. He felt we must continue to study this subject or we would find ourselves helpless to decide these questions in the future. The President believed it was possible to make periodic studies of the subject; that is, at some time in the future we might make another study in an effort to determine to what extent the conclusions presented today should be modified in the light of later developments. Dr. Kistiakowsky said one of the chief difficulties of the study was its ad hoc nature, which made it possible to study only part of the overall subject at one time. The President said we did not need to make a decision at this time on the nature of the next study.

*The National Security Council:*¹⁰

Discussed the subject in the light of a presentation of a report by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted, on a Special Limited distribution, by the reference memorandum of March 21, 1960).

[Here follow Agenda Items 3-6, unrelated to disarmament.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹⁰The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2198, approved by the President on March 31. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

250. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, March 24, 1960, 10:57 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter
Secretary Dillon
Secretary Douglas
Secretary Irwin
Mr. McCone
Mr. Gordon Gray
Dr. Kistiakowsky
General Goodpaster

The President began by saying that, with regard to his views on the latest Soviet proposal on nuclear test suspension,¹ he is not, of course, going to do anything that would damage vital interests of the U.S. Neither will he do anything that works to the relative disadvantage of the U.S. vis-à-vis the Soviets. He commented that he does not accept the Soviet formulation sent to him by Khrushchev,² which would call for continuation of discussions regarding inspection below the threshold at the end of any moratorium, but without resuming tests. Also he noted that he will not take any action which has the effect of mortgaging his successor—other than a treaty. On the other hand, the President felt he could not stand out against some kind of reasonable solution on this issue if it can be obtained. His idea is to say that he prefers a moratorium of one year, but would accept a two-year moratorium, if necessary. Any such moratorium would have to be qualified to give an incoming President the right to make his own decision in the matter.

Mr. McCone said the principal point in his mind is that we cannot leave ourselves in a position where the Soviets could conduct tests while we could not. Because we cannot inspect successfully against explosions below the threshold, he thought we would be in this situation with a moratorium. He thought a four- or five-year moratorium, as suggested by the Soviets, is much too long. The President said he is in agreement that there should be a relatively short fixed period, and reiterated that his successor should retain an open hand. Mr. McCone suggested that, rather than a moratorium, there be an undertaking to reduce the threshold as rapidly as we can. It will take three to five years to accomplish this; perhaps it could be accomplished in as little as two years.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. The meeting was held after the NSC meeting (see Document 249).

¹ See footnote 2, Document 247.

² See footnote 1, Document 247.

The President said he does not see how the moratorium provision can hurt us. The Soviets might try to evade, but they would be running a great risk of being detected. He noted that, within such quota of inspection as may be agreed upon, there will be no limit as to conducting inspections above or below the threshold signal of 4.75. He added that he did not think this action would hurt our security position. His assessment is that the Soviets may be coming toward our position (although he recognized that perhaps this is just a clever gambit). He added that he felt we have got to try to make some progress somewhere in the disarmament area.

At this point Mr. McCone said he felt that Khrushchev is simply going back to the initial Soviet proposal. The President expressed disagreement, and after a further exchange, stated that the position outlined is the way he is going to proceed. Mr. McCone said he would have to state that he believes this is a mistake. The President commented that the only real hazard is that the Soviets test and we do not. But the fact is that we have been doing some experimenting, not involving weapons tests. We cannot be completely sure that the Soviets will not make some small tests, but the risks are very great to them.

Secretary Douglas said one point of concern to Defense is that the U.S. has stated the principle that we will not agree to any measure of disarmament which cannot be inspected. The President acknowledged this, but stated that by pronouncement we have already stopped tests for a year and a half. He commented that the Soviets would not be able to test weapons above 20 KT. Mr. Irwin said that even though the tests are below 20 KT, the Soviets can extrapolate the results upward, and build larger weapons with less danger of technical fault. The President said he realized this. He added that we are preparing tunnels, and could conduct tests ourselves if the Soviets violate the moratorium. He did not think the U.S. can be hurt if the moratorium is held to a short period rather than an indefinite one, or one of four to five years duration. He added that if we cannot agree after the two years of work and negotiations that have been conducted at Geneva, then he thought we would be going back to something hopeless and dangerous, and that there will be severe cracks and ruptures in the Western position. He could not agree that we should break up our whole effort over this remaining question. The idea is to see if we can improve the inspection scheme in two years, through additional stations, etc.

Mr. Irwin returned to the point that the Soviets could test weapons larger than 20 KT through the use of the "big hole," but that this would be expensive. The alternative scheme is to proceed with smaller shots and then scale those up. This would not be expensive.

The President commented that he recognized the risks in what we are doing, but pointed out that we have great risks now simply because we are in a cold war.

The President then told the group that Prime Minister Macmillan would be coming to Washington at the end of this week for talks with the President on Monday and Tuesday.³ The President intended to tell him just how far we are going. The President said he would, of course, prefer the agreement without the provision relating to the moratorium, but that it is clearly impossible to get an agreement on those terms. He stated he would not go beyond two years, and would try for a one-year term. In any case, the moratorium remains subject to the views of his successor. The President commented that it will take a couple of years to install the inspection system. Mr. Irwin suggested keeping the pressure on the negotiation in the effort to reach a satisfactory inspection system quickly.

The President said he does not like the idea of trying to send a treaty up to the Senate at this time. Mr. Herter stated that we would not be able to get a treaty to the Senate in time for action this year.

The President commented that we can, of course, continue with our experiments. He would not, of course, break an agreement, and there would be no debris that would reach the air.

Mr. Irwin added that it would be helpful to go ahead with joint experiments now incident to the research and development for an improved inspection system. We should not wait for the treaty. Mr. McCone said the Soviets insist that the research must be carried out without nuclear explosions, and that we think it should include nuclear explosions. The President noted that our proposal does call for nuclear explosions.

Mr. Dillon suggested that the moratorium should run from the date on which the offer is made, and Mr. Irwin suggested that the research with nuclear explosions should start then. Mr. Gray proposed that we should make clear that we are not under a test moratorium at the present time. As the group left, the President stated that the period of the moratorium should be not over two years, beginning sixty days after the offer is made.

[Here follows discussion of preparations for Macmillan's visit.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

³ March 27 and 28. For the Eisenhower-Macmillan discussion, see Document 251.

251. Memorandum of Discussion

Camp David, Maryland, March 28, 1960, 2:45–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

British Side

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan

Sir Norman Brooks

Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia

Mr. C. D. W. O'Neill

Mr. Philip F. de Zulueta

U.S. Side

The President

Under Secretary Dillon

Assistant Secretary Kohler

General Goodpaster

The Prime Minister opened this phase of the discussion by commenting on the US paper on nuclear testing. He expressed his appreciation for the paper, which he felt was in general conformity with British ideas.¹ He referred to the morning discussions² and to the fact that the experts were today discussing and clarifying some of the technical questions. As he saw it, the problem for the President and himself would be to consider the political aspects—the question of the tactics and presentation.

The President said that the thing which he always kept in mind was that there should be no agreement with the Soviets so loosely drawn as to put us at their mercy. For example, Khrushchev had earlier proposed simply to keep on talking without testing, which would enable him to engage indefinitely in dilatory tactics. The President did not believe in our being hoodwinked. If a sensible agreement could be reached, he would go as far as anyone. It seemed to him that the gist of our position should be that any agreement must have language in it which would enable us to get out of it if satisfactory progress were not being made. Another point was that the State Department lawyers told him that he could legally make a commitment only to January 20, 1961. However, he thought that this would probably present no real problem since any successor would almost certainly go along. Of course, if it happened to be

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Macmillan, Vol. II. Secret. Drafted by Kohler.

¹ Macmillan was apparently referring to a summary paper entitled "The Need for Nuclear Detonations in a Seismic Research Program," March 28, and an undated talking paper on a "Coordinated Effort in the Seismic Improvement Program." (Both *ibid.*) See the Supplement.

² At the morning meeting, Macmillan and his party met with Herter, Douglas, McCone, and others to discuss the issues raised in the U.S. papers cited in footnote 1 above. (Memorandum of conversation by Farley, March 28; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) See the Supplement.

Humphrey, he would probably give the whole works away.³ However, the important point was that we must determine what would be a reasonable period for a moratorium. In this connection, he said he had some opposition within the US Government to any moratorium at all, but he had simply told them that this was the policy.⁴

The Prime Minister said he thought it was important that our presentation and our public posture should be positive. The most important substantive question remaining to be settled was that of a quota. He felt we should call upon the Soviets to expedite the negotiations and to conclude a treaty within a couple of months. He thought this should be said in a joint declaration.⁵

The President said he accepted this proposal subject to two conditions: First, that the remaining technical questions should be settled and second, that a reasonable time period should be agreed upon.⁶

The Prime Minister indicated his agreement, and then reverted to the question of a joint declaration. He said he had worked on a couple of drafts, and went on to indicate the principal points which would be contained in the declaration, as follows:

(1) Affirmation of desire to achieve ultimate objective of controlled prohibition of all tests.

(2) Reference to technological difficulties emerging since conference began 17 months ago and need for coordinated research program.

(3) Need to expedite negotiations on remaining points in proposed treaty.

(4) Intention to suspend tests below threshold for agreed period.

(5) Reference to constitutional processes involved in treaty ratification.

Later the British delegation provided the text of a declaration, copy of which was forwarded to the Department in Mr. Kohler's memorandum to the Secretary of March 28.⁷

³ The characterization of Democratic candidate Hubert Humphrey was crossed out by Goodpaster when he reviewed the memorandum.

⁴ Goodpaster added the following handwritten addendum at this point: "He would not go to a term of 4 or 5 years, however."

⁵ At this point Goodpaster added the following addition to Macmillan's remarks: "With regard to the moratorium, he thought that, if at the end of the period the technical problem of inspecting for small underground shots had been solved, we should make a treaty; if good progress is being made, we might extend the moratorium; but if it is proved no inspection is possible, we should be released from the moratorium obligation, and face the problem afresh."

⁶ At this point Goodpaster added the following addendum: "He will not go beyond a finite period of 2 years maximum."

⁷ There is a draft of a March 29 joint statement, with minor revisions in Herter's hand, in the Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Miscellaneous 1960. For text of the joint statement as released on March 29, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1960, pp. 77-78.

The President, after indicating his general agreement with the proposed line of the declaration, said he wanted to mention another point. Specifically, he wanted to say that the coordinated research program must include actual nuclear testing if it is to be real and productive. He also wanted to say that the agreement period for the moratorium should be not "a period of years" but "a period of time".

The Prime Minister then started briefly to speculate about what Khrushchev's motives might be with respect to the nuclear test negotiations, remarking that if he were trying to divide the British and the Americans this was something he couldn't do.⁸

Mr. Dillon then drew attention to the very important questions connected with the treaty with which the Conference had not yet come to grips, such as Control Commission membership, and which remained to be negotiated.

The President, commenting on the Prime Minister's speculation, said he was perhaps alone in this feeling but he thought the Soviets would agree to almost anything if in return they got assurances on the East German borders. He felt the Soviets were really scared of a reunited, armed Germany. In fact, they might have some reason for this. When he had made his recent visit to Germany, he was faced on all sides with placards demanding the return of the lost German provinces in the East.

The Prime Minister mentioned that President de Gaulle had already made a statement recognizing the permanence of the post-war German frontiers and suggested that this might be something which could be thought about in connection with the Summit conference.

The Prime Minister said it was his own view that the Russians were not planning to hold any further tests, but did not debate the matter. Reverting to the question of a joint declaration, he repeated that he agreed to this, and proposed that the staff get a draft together.

The Prime Minister said that the British would submit their draft as a starter, and assumed that we would also want to have our staff work out agreed instructions to our delegations in Geneva.

Concluding the immediate discussion on nuclear test questions, the President said he was relieved to find the British and our own views close together. From what he had read and been told, he feared that the Prime Minister was coming over here to try to sell him the full Russian line.⁹

⁸ Goodpaster added an addendum to the paragraph: "The President commented that he might be striving to divide both of us from the French."

⁹ There was another meeting between Eisenhower and Macmillan and their advisers and experts on March 29 to discuss in more detail the technical issues raised at this meeting. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Macmillan, Vol. II) See the Supplement.

252. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/25

Washington, April 13, 1960, 3 p.m.

FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING Washington D.C., April 12-14, 1960¹

SUBJECT

Foreign Ministers' Meeting on Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

Additional Attendees Listed at Tab A²

U.S.

Secretary Herter

Mr. Merchant

Mr. Farley

Canada

Secretary Green

Mr. Robertson

Ambassador Heeney

France

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville

Ambassador Alphand

Mr. Lucet

Italy

Foreign Minister Segni

Ambassador Brosio

Ambassador Straneo

U.K.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd

Ambassador Caccia

Mr. Hainworth

Secretary Herter extended a welcome to the group and expressed the hope that today's discussion would be worthwhile. He said that the agenda for the meeting was a nebulous one. We hoped to discuss the progress made to date at Geneva, to concert our assessment of the existing situation and discuss the moves we might make between now and

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Spiers and approved in M on April 16 and in S on April 21. The meeting was held in the Conference Suite at the U.S. Information Agency.

¹ The Foreign Ministers of the United States, Canada, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom met in Washington April 12-14 to discuss the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament meeting in Geneva and the summit conference scheduled to begin in Paris on May 16.

² Not printed.

the Summit. He assumed that all delegations had available the Five Power report prepared by our Geneva delegations³ and that this would serve as the basis for the discussion. The first point to note was the sharp difference of opinion between the East and West on the manner of proceeding in negotiations. The Soviets were sticking so far on the need to agree on general principles at the outset. The Allies on the other hand consistently stressed the need to agree on first measures which could constitute a real beginning toward the ultimate goal. The Western powers have resisted seeking agreement on general principles which could be differently interpreted by the two sides since this would not represent any meaningful advance. We continue to hold that our plan represented the most practical approach, although we were willing to discuss any proposals presented. The Soviets have recently made a switch in tactics in suggesting adoption of the UN resolution as a basis for discussion:⁴ this is curious in view of the last paragraph of this resolution which speaks of agreement on specific measures toward the goal of complete and general disarmament. He felt that our own approach was precisely in accord with this paragraph. He suggested that we now discuss the position we had reached and any difference of opinion we might have on the assessment.

M. Couve de Murville agreed that our problem was to discuss whether we should seek among ourselves to redefine our general goals or to stick with the position we had taken until now. He had begun to wonder how we should orient the discussion in Geneva in the future. He himself agreed that all we could really hope to do is to define certain concrete practical steps which we can take now. We had not yet succeeded in making clear our own program of action and he hoped that the session today would result in some clarification of our ideas.

Mr. Green said that he was much concerned about the policy that was being followed in Geneva and that he had reservations about the U.S. suggestion that we should maintain our present course of action. He observed that world opinion feels that the negotiations are deadlocked and that the situation was very serious. He thought that there was not much to be gained by spending another two weeks with the present situation in which each side has rejected the other's proposal. Canada felt that an attempt should be made to develop specific agreements on measures on which there is now a degree of unanimity. Such measures appeared in the first stages of both plans. He suggested that consider-

³ Apparent reference to the paper submitted to the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva by the five Western nations on March 16, printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pp. 68-71.

⁴ The Soviet bloc proposal, April 8, is printed *ibid.*, pp. 79-80. The U.N. General Assembly resolution, No. 1378, November 20, 1959, is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, p. 1545.

ation be given to the specific areas which could be dealt with in this manner. Secretary Herter said that he thought we were in complete agreement on this approach which stressed the need to discuss concrete steps and to get away from propagandistic discussion of generalities. We would all like to move in the direction suggested by Canada, but the Soviet position made this difficult. It was quite possible that this situation would change. Khrushchev may have in mind presenting a proposal to break the deadlock at the Summit. Mr. Green said that he favored extending an invitation to the Secretary General of the U.N. to attend the sessions. If this were done world opinion would be focused in a different way. The Secretary General might well have some useful suggestions to present. His attendance would be particularly appropriate since we have proposed an international disarmament organization. An impression has been created that this organization would rival the U.N. and this has caused dissatisfaction among members of the U.N. who are not represented at Geneva. He felt it would be wise to arrange for the Secretary General's appearance before the recess. This move would be a step forward and might help break the deadlock.

Sig. Segni suggested that the Canadian proposal was premature and would cause complications in the negotiations. He thought it more useful to formulate general principles for consideration at the Summit, which would then be in a position to achieve some positive result.

Mr. Lloyd said that four points had arisen in the discussion so far: (1) The wisdom of trying to put forward a Western counter-statement of principles, (2) Whether we should continue to concentrate attention on specific agreements which could be reached, (3) The suggestion that Hammarskjöld be invited to Geneva, and (4) What could the Summit accomplish on disarmament. He said that the British Delegation had prepared a paper relevant to the first two points. He felt strongly that we must not remain at a relative disadvantage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. We needed to introduce a reply to the Soviet paper on general principles. His own inclination was to put forward a statement which would deal both with general objectives and the specific matters on which we proposed immediate discussion. Secretary Herter said that the U.S. had been thinking along similar lines and had sent this morning to Geneva a proposed counter-statement of our own for comment by our delegation. Mr. Lloyd read the U.K. suggestion (Tab B). Secretary Herter said that this statement runs extraordinarily close to the one we ourselves had prepared. Regarding the suggestion of inviting the Secretary General, he agreed with the Italian view. He felt that it would only lead to confusion if the Secretary General addressed the meetings before the recess. He had been in touch with the Secretary General and was aware of his preoccupations. The U.S. side had been doing some work on this question and hoped to have a working paper that could be distributed to the other par-

ticipants before the Istanbul meeting.⁵ He felt it was undesirable, however, to raise this matter in the negotiations at this time since it would make it more difficult for us to focus on the key issues we wished to highlight. He doubted that the Secretary General would be willing to discuss anything other than the general question of relationship between the IDO and the U.N. and it would not be productive to raise this matter in the negotiations now. Mr. Green observed that it would be a good idea to get the discussion off on another course. The presence of the Secretary General could not harm the negotiations and might indeed do a great deal of good. It was only a few months before the General Assembly where the Western powers will have to explain the lack of results so far. What he suggested was a Western initiative to which the Soviets could not very well object. As it is, they have maneuvered themselves into a position where they can take credit for championing the U.N. Accordingly, he did not think that discussion of this question in the conference should be delayed.

M. Couve de Murville said that he felt the U.K. draft was a good one in principle. It placed emphasis on the practical steps on which agreement could now be reached. Although he did not feel that the Soviets were making a great impression on public opinion with their plan, he felt that we ourselves should pay more attention to this aspect. He approved of the first paragraph in the British paper as a simple, straightforward and readily understandable statement of the Western objectives. He did not wish to get into a detailed discussion of the remainder of the paper and suggested that it should be turned over to the delegations in Geneva for study and advice. He felt that it was desirable to aim for a Western proposal which could be put forward at the Summit on certain specific measures which could be carried out immediately. He suggested that we obtain the views of the Geneva delegations on this matter as well. He did not feel capable of engaging in a detailed discussion of this matter and wished only to stress French emphasis on nuclear disarmament. We could not very well omit proposals on control of nuclear weapons from the first steps. He noted that this took a secondary place in the British paper.

Sig. Segni said that he accepted the proposal of Mr. Lloyd that a Western draft be developed. However, its text should be carefully worked out and studied. He also agreed that we should attempt at the Summit to reach some kind of detailed agreement and not just agreement on principles.

Secretary Herter agreed that the U.K. draft should be sent to Geneva for study by the delegations at once. He felt we should make every effort

⁵ The Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council held at Istanbul May 2-4, 1960.

to get an agreed Western counter-statement before the recess.⁶ At the same time, we should press the Soviets on their indications of flexibility so that we could do as Italy suggested at the Summit. He thought that the British draft should be studied together with the U.S. draft which he said he would circulate at the present session. Mr. Green agreed that it would be useful to seek the views of the five delegations on matters which the Heads of Government could press at the Summit. Secretary Herter recalled Khrushchev's statement at the UN about partial measures. He was convinced that the Russians know as well as we do that our approach is the more practical one. He felt that it was still possible that they would change their tactics before the recess. Mr. Lloyd said that he felt there was agreement that we should attempt to develop a Western counter-statement for tabling before the recess and that we should proceed to get the advice of our experts in Geneva on the contents of such a statement as well as on the specifics we might propose at the Summit. M. Couve de Murville said that he had received a proposed text from Moch of a similar statement which they would make available to the others as soon as possible.

Secretary Herter said that we would want to consider at the Istanbul meeting exactly what we should do at the Summit, in the light of whatever progress we are able to make in Geneva between now and then. Sig. Segni said that he would like to have another meeting of the five Foreign Ministers just before the Summit to consider the specific proposals which might be put forward there. If this were discussed at Istanbul, the danger of press leaks would be great. Therefore, he favored postponing final decisions until the last possible moment. Secretary Herter thought that this suggestion had merit but that the matter should be decided at Istanbul rather than now. He agreed that there was a great danger of any decisions worked out so far in advance becoming public property.

Reverting to his earlier suggestion, Mr. Green said that he had not proposed that the Geneva negotiations get into details on the question of the U.N.'s role on disarmament. He proposed only that the Secretary General be invited to give his general views on the question so that the UN will feel that its interests are being kept in mind. Secretary Herter said he continued to doubt that this would serve a useful purpose. He said he wished to digress for a moment on a rather discouraging aspect of the arms control problem which had occurred to him in connection with the French emphasis on control of delivery systems. He said that he had consulted an experienced American Army engineering officer on the possibility of concealing as many as a hundred missiles in violation of an arms agreement. The officer had advised him that he could guarantee

⁶ The Western proposal was submitted to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee on April 26; see *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pp. 81-82.

concealing and that the only risk he would run of detection would be if there were an informer. He felt that problems like this emphasized the need for an international body with sufficient strength of its own to make cheating on the part of a would-be violator unprofitable. Thus he felt that our stress on the need for peacekeeping institutions in the context of total disarmament was sound and must be maintained. Recapitulating the discussion so far, he said that it appeared to be agreed that we would instruct our delegations to develop a paper for tabling before the Summit so that the Russians would not have the last word. In response to Mr. Green's suggestion that we concentrate on working out limited areas of possible agreement, Secretary Herter said that he felt that this had been our approach all along and that it continued to be a sound one.

Referring again to the question of the Secretary General, Mr. Lloyd said that he had discussed the problem in general terms with Hammarskjold last Sunday. The Secretary General was going to Geneva to the Law of the Sea Conference and had said that he would like to sit in on a session of the Ten-Nation Committee. He had made no mention, however, of making a statement. Hammarskjold had said that it would be dangerous if the IDO developed without any connection with the U.N. His own preference was for a close connection. However, all he wanted was assurance that the two bodies would not be completely independent. Lloyd had assured him that we foresaw that the IDO would be established "within the U.N. framework". He had said frankly that he did not feel that we could agree on a specific subordinate relationship to the Security Council in view of the Soviet veto or to the General Assembly as presently constituted, where a two-thirds vote is required. This could be a matter of life and death and we could not submit to the arbitrament of these bodies. It was clear that Hammarskjold had not thought the problem out himself and he had little to say about Lloyd's observation. He felt, however, that Mr. Green had a sound fundamental point—that we must not let the Soviets get away with posing as champions of the U.N.

Secretary Herter asked whether there were any other matters which ought to be discussed. The present group was to meet again Sunday, May 1, in Istanbul, and would have another report from the delegations in Geneva at that time. Mr. Lloyd raised the question of a press line. Secretary Herter read a suggested draft prepared by the Canadians. After an exchange of views, a statement was agreed on the basis of the Canadian draft (Tab C).⁷

⁷ Tab C is in the Supplement; it is also printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, p. 400.

Tab B⁸

DISARMAMENT "PRINCIPLES" TO BE PUT FORWARD BY THE
WESTERN POWERS AT THE SUMMIT

1. The final goal is general and complete international disarmament, covering all States and all types of forces and weapons, to the levels required by internal security and fulfilment of obligations under the United Nations Charter; and the maintenance, by international machinery, of international law and order in a disarmed world.

2. The disarmament process must:

(a) be balanced and comprehensive so that no country or group of countries obtains, at any stage, a significant military advantage;

(b) give equal security to all, so that international confidence is progressively increased;

(c) be effectively controlled throughout, to ensure that disarmament obligations are carried out and that there is no evasion.

For the carrying out of this process thorough preparatory work is required, and international control machinery must be established to function as disarmament measures are put into force.

3. For obvious practical reasons disarmament must take place by stages, each stage to be completed as rapidly as possible; but no fixed timetable for the whole process can be laid down in advance.

4. Immediate detailed consideration should be given to:

(a) reductions of the armed forces and armaments of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and certain other States, together with the associated measures of control, to which the States represented on the 10-Nation Committee might agree at once, pending the negotiation of general disarmament measures affecting other States;

(b) the establishment of a ban, with appropriate controls, on the stationing of weapons in orbit or in outer space.

5. Preparations for the further measures of disarmament should also begin immediately. Special attention should be paid to the particular problems of agreeing upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, to the transfer, under control, of fissionable material from military to peaceful uses, and to the control of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Consideration should be given, in addition, to interim measures to give States better protection against surprise attack and increase international confidence during the early stages of general disarmament.

⁸ Confidential.

6. The disarmament process must be started as soon as possible, in order to build up international confidence, and provide experience of the technical and practical problems of international disarmament and control.

253. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/14

Paris, May 14, 1960, 5 p.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT Paris, May, 1960

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State
Mr. Merchant
Ambassador Wadsworth
Mr. Farley
Mr. Spiers

United Kingdom

Foreign Secretary Lloyd
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
The Hon. C.D.W. O'Neill
Mr. J.A. Thomson
Mr. A.C.I. Samuel

SUBJECT

Nuclear Test Negotiations

The Secretary said he understood that Mr. Lloyd felt that Wednesday¹ would be too early for a meeting with the Soviets on suspension of nuclear tests. He said that the timing of such a meeting was of no great moment to us but that we had to reckon with the fact that even as early as Wednesday or Thursday we may not be on speaking terms with the Soviets. Mr. Lloyd agreed that we should suggest a meeting before the atmosphere clouded further. Gromyko was coming to the British Embassy tomorrow² and he would suggest a meeting either Wednesday

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Farley and Spiers on May 15 and approved by M and S on May 15. The meeting was held at the Embassy. Secretary Herter arrived in Paris on May 13 for discussions preliminary to the summit. For documentation on the summit, see volume IX.

¹ May 18.

² Gromyko came to the British Embassy with Khrushchev at 4:30 p.m. on May 15. Khrushchev attacked the United States, demanded a U.S. apology for the U-2 incident, insisted upon punishment of those U.S. officials responsible for the flight, and demanded an American promise that there would be no future flights. If those conditions were not met, he would not continue the summit. A record of the meeting is in Harold Macmillan, *Pointing the Way*, pp. 202-203. The meetings on nuclear testing were never held.

or Thursday and see how Gromyko reacted. For his part he would like to get on to a subject on which there was a chance of making progress. Therefore, on second thought, he thought that Wednesday would be satisfactory. He would suggest that the meeting take place at the British Embassy. They would arrange for a table which would seat four on each side. The Secretary suggested that two or three more might sit behind. Mr. Merchant suggested that the meeting be held at the Foreign Minister level. Mr. Lloyd felt it would be better to get together immediately with Mr. Khrushchev, and if necessary a further meeting of the Foreign Ministers could be arranged for Thursday. The Secretary agreed, observing that Gromyko would probably have no more leeway than Tsarapkin has had to deal with the issues involved.

The Secretary suggested that there were three major problems: (1) the length of the moratorium, (2) the quota, and (3) the composition of the Control Commission. With respect to the first point, the U.S. position was that the maximum would be two years. Mr. Lloyd suggested that the duration could be related to the length of the research program. The Secretary said that this would be dangerous since there had been a great deal of talk about the research program going on for five years. We felt that two years would suffice for preliminary results from the research program. The moratorium should start with the date of signature, as was contemplated in the March 29 communiqué.³

Mr. Lloyd agreed and asked for the U.S. position on dealing with the quota. Did we want one quota or two? The Secretary said that he saw no sense in insisting on a quota to be applied below the threshold. Perhaps we could seek agreement that there would be a few inspections for experimental purposes. These would not be provided for within the treaty. Mr. Lloyd agreed, saying that these inspections could be represented as part of the research program. He asked for the U.S. position on the number of inspections above the threshold. The Secretary referred to the Rand report⁴ as relevant in this connection stating that it was the first hopeful scientific breakthrough we had had in these negotiations. This was something which would be helpful to us in achieving Senate consent to ratification.

Mr. Lloyd asked how we would propose to handle the negotiations and whether we wished to suggest re-spacing of the control stations to the Soviets. The Secretary reviewed the major conclusions of the Rand

³ See footnote 7, Document 251.

⁴ The Rand study concluded that improvements and revisions of the Geneva system for the 21 proposed seismic installations in the Soviet Union made detection of underground tests (as opposed to earthquakes) more possible. A briefing on the results of the study is in a memorandum of conversation by Gotzlinger, May 10. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) See the Supplement. See also Kistia-kowsky, *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 322-323, 348.

report, citing the reductions in the numbers of unidentified events which might be achieved through rearrangement of the stations and addition of either four or nine new stations to the present twenty-one. Mr. Lloyd said that a quota of four inspections would be justified if we were to add 9 stations. Ambassador Wadsworth noted that we could expect Soviet resistance to the addition of stations, although they may be willing to accept such a departure from the Experts' report if this were the price of a low quota figure.

Mr. O'Neill suggested that it might be wise not to let the Soviets know about the Rand recalculations and that we should not propose a rearrangement or addition of stations until and unless we had reached a final impasse on the quota figure. The first problem was to get the Soviet reaction to our proposal for 20 inspections. Mr. Lloyd disagreed and said that our dealings with Khrushchev would be helped if we gave him all of the facts and figures. Otherwise we would succeed only in feeding his suspicions. Mr. Farley noted that the report was in the public domain and that the Soviets had had an official attending the Joint Committee hearings at which the Rand report was described. Mr. Lloyd said that Khrushchev would probably be prepared to take a practical approach to the matter. Ambassador Wadsworth said that we would have to be prepared to add stations in the U.S. if we were suggesting additions in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Lloyd asked what number of experimental inspections we would seek below the threshold. Ambassador Wadsworth suggested the figure of 10. Mr. Farley said that in view of the fact that there was no real basis for regarding inspections in this area as a deterrent, we should not seek inspections as a matter of right but rather by agreement in the context of a joint study of the possibilities of improving inspection techniques.

The Secretary said that another possibility would be to lower the threshold. There was no reason that we had to stick with the present figure of 4.75. For example, with the addition of some stations and a quota of 10 inspections we might agree to a threshold of 4.4, which would correspond to 5 kilotons.

Mr. Lloyd said that assuming Khrushchev had agreed, say, to 6 inspections and a respacing or addition of stations, would we be prepared to discuss Commission composition. Ambassador Wadsworth said that we had to consider the effect of the composition on voting procedures where a two-thirds majority was provided for in the treaty. Parity in this instance would amount to a veto. Mr. O'Neill said that this was relevant only in connection with voting on the budget, where we were ready to accept a veto. Mr. Lloyd said that he himself favored a veto on the budget total. If there were no budget the treaty would fall. He asked what the U.S. estimates of costs of the system would be. Mr. Farley said

that, disregarding the high altitude system, we have previously envisaged an installation cost of between three and five hundred million dollars with yearly operating costs running at perhaps 10 percent of this figure. Last week we had gotten a new estimate which anticipated a cost of up to five hundred million just for the installation of 22 posts in the Soviet Union. This was probably a highly inflated estimate and we felt that the original figure would be more accurate. Mr. Lloyd said that costs on this order did not alarm him. He asked whether the Russians would be likely to raise the composition question here. Ambassador Wadsworth said that he thought a final decision on this question would have to be reached at a high level, although the details could be worked out in Geneva. Mr. Lloyd said that there were two possibilities: 4-4-3 or 4-4-4. Mr. O'Neill said that he preferred the former and original party unanimity on voting the scale of contributions and total budget. Mr. Lloyd said that he felt if we were to indicate to the Soviets here that we could settle on this basis this would loosen Khrushchev up on the other points. He asked what other problems remained.

Ambassador Wadsworth described the position on staffing which was still a major issue. The Secretary said that we should not get into discussion of this but should limit ourselves here to the fairly simple issues. Mr. Lloyd agreed. He said that we should try initially to get agreement on a quota of 20, on the length of the moratorium, and on a 4-4-3 Control Commission composition. The negotiators at Geneva would be left to work out details. He then asked if there was anything likely to come up in connection with the research program, noting that the President at his last press conference had spoken in terms of jointly conducted nuclear tests. The Secretary explained the proposals that we had sent to our delegation regarding the conduct of experiments in the research program and how the terms of the Atomic Energy Act⁵ required us to resort to the "black box" idea.⁶ This was a dilemma since there was also a problem in connection with yield measurements. Both sides will need to know the yield of a particular device before results of experimentation can be considered valid. If internal examination of the devices used cannot be allowed, instrumentation will be required which would be useful for purposes of weapons development.

⁵ For text of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and its revision of 1958, see 60 Stat. 755 and 72 Stat. 276.

⁶ The "black box" concept was devised to prevent the Soviet Union from using the seismic improvement program for additional weapons development and to prevent non-nuclear nations from obtaining nuclear weapons technology. Under its terms, the U.S. and U.K. Delegations at Geneva would propose that any devices used in the program should be deposited as "black boxes" with certain restrictions. (Tab B to memorandum of conversation by Spiers, May 5; Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament/Nuclear Test Policy, '60) See the Supplement.

Ambassador Wadsworth said that his senior scientific adviser at Geneva felt that the simplest solution to the problem would be for the three parties to sit down and develop a new design, starting from scratch. Mr. Farley noted that this would probably not solve the problems since technically a device became Restricted Data as soon as it was conceived. Furthermore, there was the problem of accurate yield prediction. Mr. O'Neill wondered what the position would be if British devices which did not incorporate information received from the United States were used. The Secretary said that he thought the law would not apply in this case. Mr. O'Neill said that he did not think that the U.K. classification system would require automatic declassification of devices disclosed to the Soviets. The Secretary speculated that this might be the solution to the problem we faced. Mr. Farley said that there were other provisions of the law which might make it difficult to use even these devices within the United States. The Secretary suggested that we both look more closely into the possibilities and problems of this approach.

Ambassador Wadsworth noted that a further unsolved problem related to high altitude tests, recalling the February 11 position⁷ that we would agree to ban tests up to altitudes for which effective controls could be agreed. The Secretary described the practical difficulties and costs of the satellite system which had been outlined by the experts in 1959. His own feeling was that we should establish a control system applicable to about 100,000 kilometers and forget about the rest. Mr. Lloyd asked whether in this case we would make a declaration of intention not to test beyond this altitude. The Secretary thought we might. Ambassador Wadsworth said that he preferred the position we had contemplated last August of incorporating the satellite system into the treaty but leaving to the Control Commission the decisions as to whether or not it should actually be installed. Otherwise we would be accused of retreating again from an agreed technical report. Mr. Lloyd said that he did not think we should get into a discussion of this matter with Khrushchev. He agreed with the Secretary that the best approach would be to forget about high altitude tests beyond 100,000 kilometers, simply saying that we would not test in outer space if others did not.

⁷ See *Documents on Disarmament*, 1960, pp. 33-39.

254. Memorandum for the Files

Paris, May 18, 1960.

This morning I spent about forty-five minutes with the President and General Goodpaster. Thereafter, the President and I joined Secretary Herter for one-half hour.

I stated to the President, and later to both the President and the Secretary of State, my views with respect to continuation of the disarmament and test suspension negotiations. I stated that both negotiations were stalled pending directives from the Summit; obviously, no directives were forthcoming, but that Khrushchev had most emphatically reaffirmed his position that inspection and controls must await disarmament, and after disarmament was completed any type of control could be instituted because countries would be "open."

In view of this position it seems that the Soviet delegates in both conferences could not move to resolve unresolved questions to the satisfaction of the West.

I reiterated that with respect to disarmament, protracting negotiations could harm us because the Soviets would use our refusal to accept their broad proposals (all of which would be based upon faith) as an attempt to paint us as war mongers. Furthermore, there is a psychological complication in attempting to maintain a reasonable security posture and a state of readiness and at the same time pursue protracted disarmament negotiations.

With respect to test suspension, the above considerations apply; but, also it must be recognized that we are suffering a severe restriction in our weapons development program; no progress in new or improved weapons is being made and our vital interests are, therefore, being adversely affected.

In a private conversation with Secretary Herter, en route from the residence to the Chancery, and also in his office, I re-emphasized the very great importance that I attach to the dangers of a further extension of an uninspected test moratorium with no prospect of reaching an agreement on adequate or comprehensive inspection.

The President and Mr. Herter recognize that our policies with respect to the continuation of the Geneva conferences are most serious and should only be re-established after most deliberate and careful consideration and that decisions should not be made in the atmosphere of Paris today.

Later, I discussed the subject with Secretary Gates and Secretary Irwin, stating that I felt the long continuation of the Geneva test suspension negotiation would have very damaging effects on the Commission, the staff, and the Laboratories, and I did not feel that I could be responsible for this deterioration. Secretary Gates, much to my surprise, seemed to question the value of weapon improvement and seemed to be doubtful of the effect on world opinion should the test suspension negotiation break down.

Following a meeting of the Foreign Ministers, I pointed out to Secretary Herter that the recent Rand Report, as presented by Dr. Albert Latter, is not to be considered as an authentic scientific conclusion as it is not based on solid technical information. I pointed out that Dr. Latter had briefed a group in Paris on Sunday, and stated that he could not endorse the Rand conclusions¹ because they were drawn from the most fragmentary technical data and, therefore, could not be considered as solid. Dr. Latter later stated that while he had confidence that the relocation of stations, together with nine additional ones, would give an improved capability, the final degree of the improvement of capability must await further experimentation.

John A. McCone²

¹ See footnote 4, Document 253.

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

255. Editorial Note

At the 445th meeting of the National Security Council on May 24, 1960, the Council reviewed developments since the collapse of the Paris summit. Under Agenda Item 4, Herter discussed "Policy Issues in the Post-Summit Environment," two of which were the nuclear test agreement negotiations and disarmament. According to Marion Boggs' account of the meeting, the discussion of these issues was as follows:

"Secretary Herter said another issue was the question of resumption or continuation of the nuclear test agreement negotiations. The scientists in Geneva were continuing their international discussions without interruption. He believed that we should continue these negotiations.

"Another issue concerned disarmament. The representatives of the Five Western Powers involved in the disarmament negotiations are meeting on May 30 and an East-West disarmament meeting is scheduled for June 7. Secretary Herter believed we should maintain our position with respect to disarmament and continue to participate in the Geneva negotiations, although he believed these negotiations would prove to be sterile and futile, with the USSR stubbornly adhering to its position in preparation for bringing the matter up as a propaganda exercise in the UN General Assembly this fall. The President agreed with the views expressed by Secretary Herter, saying that the Soviets not the U.S. should be the ones to make the nuclear test negotiations or the disarmament negotiations futile.

"Mr. McCone said the nuclear test suspension negotiations differed from the disarmament negotiations in that a mere extension of the nuclear test talks keeps the U.S. in a straitjacket. He felt we ought to press for decisions on nuclear testing. If no agreement is reached, the USSR can keep us at the conference table indefinitely while the moratorium on nuclear testing continues. Secretary Herter agreed that the nuclear test suspension negotiations did bring up the whole question of the moratorium on nuclear testing. He also agreed that the U.S. could not continue the Geneva negotiations indefinitely because such a continuation would mean that the USSR is obtaining a moratorium on nuclear testing without giving up anything in return. The President said we must eventually set a time limit for completion of the nuclear test negotiations." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records; for another portion of the memorandum of discussion, see Document 102)

On May 31, the President gave full approval to the following U.S. positions relating to disarmament in the post-summit environment:

"(4) The United States should maintain its current position on the reduction and control of armaments, and should be prepared to continue participation in the Geneva negotiations on that subject. If the negotiations should prove futile, it should be clearly the responsibility of the Soviets for causing this result.

"(5) The United States should continue to seek completion of the Geneva negotiations on nuclear testing, but should make clear that these negotiations and the U.S. moratorium on nuclear testing cannot go on indefinitely without decision. The United States should determine at what time or at what stage of these negotiations it should seek to place a time limit on their duration." (NSC Action No. 2238; Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

256. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 20, 1960, 10:05 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting of Principals on Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

Department of State:

Secretary Herter

Under Secretary Dillon

Assistant Secretary Smith

Ambassador Eaton

S/AE—Messrs. Sullivan, Spiers, Toon, Baker, Goodby

SOV—Mr. Dubs

S/S—Mr. Mau

Department of Defense:

Secretary Gates, Deputy Secretary Douglas, Assistant Secretary Irwin, General Dabney, General Fox, Col. Fergusson

AEC: Chairman McCone, General Starbird, Dr. English

CIA: Deputy Directors Cabell and Amory, Mr. Comer

President's Advisory Committee: Mr. Keeny

White House: Mr. Gray

Secretary Herter opened the meeting by asking Ambassador Eaton to explain the current situation in the disarmament conference in Geneva. Ambassador Eaton began by describing the French emphasis on control of nuclear delivery systems which, he said, ran like a leitmotif through the history of the present negotiations in Geneva.

Secretary Gates asked whether there were not, in fact, two contradictory French positions—the first being their desire for a national nuclear weapons capability, the second their emphasis on control of nuclear delivery systems. One might ask whether the French would give up their concern with nuclear delivery systems control if they were to be given a national nuclear weapons capability. Secretary Herter thought it was possible the French might change their position on disarmament under these circumstances, since the French position on disarmament, he thought, was in part a pressure operation. Mr. Dillon thought the French position on disarmament was a combination of Moch's desire for bold disarmament measures and de Gaulle's desire for French possession of modern weapons systems. Moch's position fitted into de Gaulle's ambitions.

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament/Nuclear Test Policy, 1960. Secret. Drafted by James E. Goodby of S/AE and approved in S on June 24 and U on June 23.

Ambassador Eaton noted that at Istanbul,¹ Selwyn-Lloyd had also proposed a study of the problem of controlling nuclear delivery systems. Ambassador Eaton went on to say that, from the point of view of our Allies, the minimum move that could be made in our disarmament position was to include an immediate study on the control of nuclear delivery systems. This was because the Allies viewed the Soviet June 2nd plan² as, on its face, being very appealing; the plan would be hard to reject and it would be hard to point out its weaknesses. Furthermore, the Allies felt that the Soviets might break off the negotiations and take their case to the UN. Ambassador Eaton remarked that the Soviets continually speak of their flexibility and refer to their "acceptance" of the French proposals on nuclear delivery systems. Because of this situation, the Allies had become panicky and felt that a move had to be made. There were even rumors that the four Allies might table a plan on their own if the U.S. did not modify its position. As far as the U.S. delegation was concerned, Ambassador Eaton said, the position it had taken with the Allies was that the Allied March 16 plan³ was a good one, that the U.S. was fairly relaxed about the situation, but that the Allied comments would be passed back to Washington.

Ambassador Eaton stated that he saw three possible courses of action which he felt should be considered: (1) the U.S. could stand firm on its present plan; (2) the U.S. could revise the plan, possibly adding new proposals to it; or (3) continue to probe the Soviet plan, anticipating a break in the Conference, and taking our case to the UN with a revised plan. With respect to the first alternative, Ambassador Eaton said that in some manner we would lose the support of our allies if this course were followed. With respect to the second and third alternatives, Ambassador Eaton noted that he had circulated a draft revision of the Allied plan,⁴ adding to the plan the minimum things he felt were needed to gain Allied support.

Chairman McCone remarked the paper that Ambassador Eaton had circulated appeared to be a drastic change in both form and substance. Ambassador Eaton replied that it was intended to change the form but not the substance, except for three additions: (1) a study of control of nuclear delivery systems; (2) world-wide air and missiles bases inspection and (3) a spelling out of the transfer of fissionable material from past production to peaceful uses. There was also added a provision for Security Council review before passing to the second and third stages of the plan.

¹ At the Ministerial Session of North Atlantic Council May 2-4.

² For text of the Soviet proposal, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pp. 100-111.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 68-71.

⁴ For text of this paper as submitted to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee Conference at Geneva on June 27, see *ibid.*, 126-131.

Secretary Gates inquired as to what would be studied in connection with nuclear delivery systems. Secretary Herter replied that clearly the study would be one of control over delivery systems and that it was certain such a study would show that the inspection required would amount to a complete opening-up of the territory of the Soviet Union. Ambassador Eaton added that the Allies wanted some kind of a bow to nuclear delivery systems but just what they meant was not certain.

Secretary Gates said he thought that a constructive adjustment in our position over the next two months might be preferable to coming right out with a complete revision which might result in not satisfying anyone. Secretary Herter recalled that the President had taken the position that the U.S. would be willing to go as far as anybody with disarmament if adequate controls could be worked out. The Soviets say the U.S. is for control but not disarmament and Secretary Herter wondered whether the Allies had, in any way, retreated from insistence on adequate controls because of the Soviet line. Ambassador Eaton replied that the Allies had not retreated in any way nor had the Soviets changed their position. He mentioned, as an example of the Soviet attitude on control, that while the Soviets say reductions in force levels would be subject to verification, neither the levels before or after reductions could be verified. Furthermore, the Soviets say that only after we have agreed in principle to a complete disarmament program can we talk about the specifics of control. Secretary Herter asked how well prepared the delegations in Geneva were to show up the Soviet plan for what it was? Ambassador Eaton responded that quite a lot along this line had already been done and that the Allies had been very helpful in this respect. Another week of pointing out holes in the Soviet position would be very useful.

With respect to holding a revised plan until the UN convened, Secretary Herter thought we might be asked why such a plan was not tabled in the negotiating forum in Geneva. Further, with respect to holding the Allies together, perhaps an approach should be made directly to the French Foreign Office. Ambassador Eaton said he felt there was no difference between the French Foreign Office and Mr. Moch, except that Mr. Moch appeared willing to take greater risks and make more moves on his own than was Couve de Murville.

Mr. Irwin asked what dangers would the U.S. run if we were to stand fast with the present plan. Secretary Herter stated that the problem was the French emphasis on control of nuclear delivery systems had great appeal to everyone. Reduced to its essentials, there was a fear that the U.S. and the USSR would not get together on controlling the nuclear threat. Secretary Herter further asked Ambassador Eaton whether moves, such as those suggested in the draft revised plan, would help the Soviet Union and the U.S. reach agreement. Ambassador Eaton said he felt his paper would not lead to agreements since he feared there was no

likelihood of genuine negotiations in the near future. The paper would, however, solidify the Alliance, give us a better position with respect to world public opinion, and help keep the disarmament debate from being taken to the UN right away. If it were determined that our objectives were the foregoing, then we should move immediately and take the leadership in revising the Allied plan. Mr. Irwin asked why the U.S. could not take up the Spaak proposal regarding assistance to the French vis-à-vis nuclear delivery systems, since cooperation with the French in this field might enable us to get a better position in disarmament later on. Secretary Herter said he felt the French would not be satisfied with assistance only on nuclear delivery systems but, in any case, agreement on cooperation of this kind with the French would take time. Meanwhile, we were faced with an immediate problem in Geneva.

Secretary Gates said he did not think it would take very long to find out whether giving the French a nuclear weapons capability, while retaining legal custody of the weapons in U.S. hands, would remove the problem we have with the French in disarmament. Mr. Smith said that, with respect to this point, he felt giving the French a nuclear weapons capability would mean that the Germans would seek such assistance next and that the whole sequence of events thereafter might even lead to a break-up of the Atlantic Alliance.

Turning to the details of the draft revised plan he had circulated, Ambassador Eaton again said that while the paper had been drawn to make a more saleable document, only the three changes in policy, which he had noted before, had been added to the paper. He noted that Stage I of the plan was a package, which the ten delegations in Geneva would negotiate. In response to a question by Mr. Irwin, Ambassador Eaton said that there had been no change intended with respect to our policy on the relationship, to each other, of measures in Stage I. This position was that for the purpose of the talks in Geneva, the U.S. agreed that the Stage I measures might be presented as a package; the U.S. felt free, however, to negotiate any one of the individual items separately if the Soviets indicated a desire to do so. Ambassador Eaton recalled that it was the Allies who had wished to keep the Stage I measures as a package and that the U.S. had informed the Allies, particularly Moch, that while the U.S. felt free to separate out any measures of Stage I, we would give them warning before doing so.

Secretary Herter asked which alternative course of action Ambassador Eaton preferred, to which Ambassador Eaton replied that he would recommend revising the Allied plan along the lines he had suggested in the paper he had circulated. Mr. Irwin said he thought there was public appeal in the revised plan but that if the paper were tabled right away, it would give the Soviets time to act before the General Assembly to counteract any support the West might win with the revised plan. Ambassa-

dor Eaton said he felt we should move quickly so that the revision would not begin to look like a retreat under pressure. Secretary Herter noted, in this connection, that there had been a move in the UN to postpone the next General Assembly session in view of the forthcoming U.S. elections. The Department of State had made it known that the U.S. opposed postponement and he felt we should counteract any impression that might be abroad that the elections would disrupt our carrying out a foreign policy. This consideration indicated that we should take a position now rather than delay.

With respect to the proposal on the study of nuclear delivery systems, Secretary Gates said he could not quite see what the value of such a study would be since it was obvious that control of nuclear delivery systems required an extremely difficult, extensive, and complicated inspection system over everything from suitcases to missiles. Secretary Herter pointed out that the study, at least, would show the world what we are confronted with in attempting to implement any proposal for control of nuclear delivery systems. Mr. Dillon said that it was not obvious to the people of the world how difficult it was to control nuclear delivery systems, and for this reason the study might be useful.

Chairman McCone stated that he felt that the proposal for cessation of production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons was as complicated to implement as the proposal on control of missiles. For this reason, he felt it might be preferable not to delay completion of the First Stage by including in it the nuclear cut-off in the First Stage, together with a proposal to transfer massive quantities of fissionable materials to international stockpiles for peaceful uses. The cut-off itself might then be placed in the Second Stage. Secondly, Chairman McCone commented that, in spelling out the provision for transfer of fissionable material from past production to peaceful uses, he felt the problem could not be handled by defining quantities of fissionable material in terms of Hiroshima bombs. The way to do it was to agree on a figure in kilograms and, if necessary, explain in general terms the meaning of the quantity in terms of explosive yield.

Ambassador Eaton said the U.S. would be subjected to great pressures if we were to move the cut-off to the Second Stage. We had pushed the Soviets so hard on the cut-off proposals that the Soviets had now placed a provision for a study on cessation of production of nuclear weapons in the First Stage. General Cabell stated that one addition to the paper gave him some concern and he would prefer that it be deleted. This was the provision that countries would give prior notification of the crossing of national boundaries of other states by its military aircraft and naval vessels.

Secretary Gates remarked that the consensus seemed to be that we should attempt to draft a new format for the Western plan. If this were

the case, we should look at the plan in some detail and have a revised copy to study. Secretary Herter stated that he felt the plan Ambassador Eaton had circulated had a good deal of public appeal.

With respect to a study on nuclear delivery systems, Secretary Herter said that the U.S. should get a good deal more out of the study than the Soviet Union would since we know so little of their program. Furthermore, we would be bearing down on control which had always been our position, and the more clever ways we could find to do this, the better.

Mr. Irwin asked Ambassador Eaton for his estimate of whether the Allies would accept the modified plan, to which Ambassador Eaton replied that they would probably want further revisions. However, the pressure for a quick change, which the Allies had been pressing for, would now help us to get the plan through.

Chairman McCone asked for a clarification as to whether the plan was considered a package, whether we were now saying that we wanted to go all the way to general and complete disarmament or whether we would proceed step by step.

Ambassador Eaton replied that the plan was really two packages: the First Stage measures would be negotiated by the Ten Nations in Geneva. Following that the balance of the program would be negotiated with the proviso that the program could be stopped by the Security Council. Chairman McCone reiterated that the cut-off was not something that could be accomplished quickly and for that reason it might be well to break it into the two stages as he had previously described. He also noted that the plan contained a provision for a zone of inspection in the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Did this mean that we had abandoned the idea of the Norstad Zone? Secretary Herter replied that the Norstad Zone appeared to be an impossibility in terms of the political problems that arose. He recalled, in this connection, that Ambassador Eaton had had a suggestion with respect to the Norstad Zone which would have added to it a proposal for world-wide inspection of missiles and air bases. Secretary Herter's view on this had been that we might reserve this idea for the General Assembly.

Secretary Herter asked that Ambassador Eaton's paper be redrafted in line with comments made in the present meeting and that the Principals schedule another meeting towards the end of the week to look at the revised paper. Mr. Dillon suggested that the revised paper bring out any area where there might be a difference of views between Departments so that the Principals could concentrate on these issues.

Secretary Herter asked Chairman McCone whether it would not be possible to get a definition of a kilogram of fissionable material in terms of its explosive force, since he felt that explosive force had more meaning to the public than a quantity expressed as kilograms. Chairman McCone

replied that it was difficult to do this because of classification problems and because of variations in types of weapons. Secretary Herter then asked whether it would not be possible to set the equivalent explosive force as a range of figures and Chairman McCone said that the AEC would continue to look into the problem. General Starbird and Dr. English emphasized that it was essential that the quantity of fissionable material be first specified before attempting any kind of translation into kilotons. Chairman McCone stated he understood the decision of the Principals had been to dress up the Allied plan with a new format in which each stage consisted of inseparable measures and to which there must be agreement on basic principles before anything else, even Stage One, could be agreed to.

Ambassador Eaton reiterated that, while Stage One would be presented as a package, he understood U.S. policy to be that any measure in this stage could be undertaken separately. Since the Allies had asked us not to break out individual measures, we had agreed not to do so. We had told the Allies, however, that we were willing to break out individual measures if the Soviets indicated a willingness to accept any one of them. Chairman McCone said he felt the U.S. would be in a better position if Stage One were in fact a package.

Mr. Irwin asked whether it was understood that no study of Stage Two and Three measures would be made until studies of Stage One had been completed. Mr. Dillon replied that a decision on this could be made at the next meeting. Chairman McCone added that he was somewhat concerned by the late stage in which an international peace force would be established. He felt that establishment of such a force at an early date might help the U.S. with some of its world-wide responsibilities and permit us to reduce force levels. Secretary Gates responded that he could make a good case for reduction of conventional forces, provided China were included, and provided that nuclear weapons were maintained. Mr. Dillon suggested that the provision for the peace force be placed at the end of Stage Two and it was agreed that this would be done.

The meeting adjourned at 12:30 p.m.⁵

⁵ On June 27, the Soviet and Soviet bloc Delegations walked out of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee conference at Geneva. In telephone calls to Herter on June 27, Eaton explained the events of the walkout and reported that rather than waiting a few days as planned, he submitted the revised Western proposal (see footnote 4 above) to the remaining members of the conference. (Memoranda of telephone conversations between Eaton and Herter, June 27, 9:15 a.m. and 3 p.m.; Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Memoranda of Telephone Conversations) See the Supplement. The Department of State's June 27 statement on the Soviet action, Khrushchev's June 27 letter to President Eisenhower explaining the reasons for the walkout, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's June 27 letter to U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld requesting that the General Assembly consider disarmament in light of the breakup of the negotiations, and the July 2 U.S. reply to the June 27 Khrushchev letter to Eisenhower are all printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pp. 131-142.

257. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, July 7, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

Vice President
Secretary Gates
Secretary Dillon
Mr. McCone
Mr. Allen Dulles
Mr. Gordon Gray
General Persons
Dr. Kistiakowsky
Colonel Eisenhower

Mr. Dillon opened by telling the President that we fear the Soviets might terminate the nuclear test talks on the basis that we are not serious in our negotiations and declare a unilateral moratorium. In so doing, they would place us in an uncomfortable position in that they could test at will while we would have to announce if we should resume any activity whatsoever. Actually we are greatly desirous of pushing a research program (Project Vela) to investigate the detectability of underground nuclear shots. This research program would not, in any of our proposals, involve the shooting of devices which have military value any longer.

Our initial proposals for use at Geneva involve the use of outdated U.S. devices which would be available for detailed inspection by the Soviets.¹ The only reservation which we would retain in this matter is that we would not be prepared to provide the Soviets with blueprints of the devices. The test would be conducted in full cooperation with the Soviets. This proposal was presented to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy some time ago and, although they indicated support on a Friday,² they had changed their minds by Monday³ and several people said they could not support it. The reason given was strictly political. Various members of both Parties feared that their constituents would interpret this procedure as giving the Russians something for nothing.

Our next approach was a proposal that the devices used for the research program be outdated devices of all three powers, U.S., British and Soviet. All three powers then would be permitted to inspect the

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by John Eisenhower on July 7. A note on the source text indicates the meeting was held after the NSC meeting. For Kistiakowsky's account of this meeting, see *A Scientist at the White House*, pp. 364-365.

¹ The gun-type bomb design.

² June 24.

³ June 27.

devices of the other countries to insure that nothing of military value is being tested. This idea met with the approval of the Joint Committee. At the time that this was approved, we were not aware that Congress was going to adjourn. Therefore, we drafted instructions with the object of pushing this proposal to a conclusion with the British and the Soviets. In so doing, we added a paragraph which put the Soviets on notice that if they rejected this procedure, we would have to resume the research program on our own. This last paragraph has sometimes been referred to as an ultimatum.

The State Department has always feared this ultimatum as written. Accordingly, the Secretary of State watered it down to use such terms as "feel strong compulsion," to make it sound a little less threatening. At any rate, this reciprocal plan was found to be unsatisfactory to the British. They were afraid that it would place us in a bad position in that the requirement for the Russians to show us their devices would give them an excuse to break off negotiations.

The British therefore suggested two alternative approaches; first, to propose the reciprocal scheme without the "ultimatum" paragraph, and second, if this were not accepted, to make the offer of a unilateral unveiling, coupled with the mild ultimatum paragraph.

A meeting of the principals involved, held at the State Department yesterday at 5:00 PM,⁴ reached the conclusion that there is a small chance that the Russians would ever accept the reciprocal scheme at all. Accordingly, we would be in a bad position if we attempted to go even further and combine the reciprocal scheme with the ultimatum. Therefore, the principals propose to instruct Wadsworth to offer the reciprocal scheme without ultimatum in an effort to find a solution with the Soviets. If this is not acceptable, we should instruct Wadsworth to offer, subject to Congressional action, to go ahead with research on a unilateral basis, opening our devices to the Soviets—this offer to be coupled with the ultimatum. In the event the ultimatum must be carried out, we would conduct the research program unilaterally, inviting all the UN member nations except the Soviets to observe our activities.

The consensus is that making an effort to induce the Soviets to accept the reciprocal scheme reduces to some extent our problems with the Joint Committee. It is considered that even the unilateral research program using open U.S. devices has only a 50/50 chance of acceptance by the Soviets. For some reason the Joint Committee has a phobia against presenting the Soviets with the blueprints. On this basis, we feel there is

⁴ A record of this meeting is in the Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament/Nuclear Test Policy, 1960. See the Supplement.

little problem of difficulty with the Congress since even this conciliatory approach has only a 50/50 chance.

Mr. McCone has proposed checking out this fallback position with members of the Joint Committee. He could proceed on a trip in which half of the Committee members are involved and give them an outline of what we are proposing to do. Theoretically, the presence of the ultimatum with the fallback position should make it palatable to the Joint Committee. State Department, however, feels that it is best not to tell the Joint Committee about the fallback position.

The President said we should reject the idea of the ultimatum if we hope to have any propaganda value in these deliberations. Mr. McCone said it would be satisfactory to him to put out our proposals without a threat provided we were determined to go ahead with our research regardless. The President agreed. Mr. Gates said he had favored the ultimatum since it tended to focus on the cause of the termination of the talks, but he did not feel strongly if he were assured that we have made an internal decision to go ahead if our positions are rejected.

In answering a question by the President, Mr. Dillon said we cannot guarantee the attitude of the British. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. McCone expressed irritation with the position that we have gotten into with the British. Our people figure that the British have enjoyed a five-year advancement on their nuclear program from the information we have given them. Regardless of these benefits, the British still sit by and exact a veto on our further testing. The President pointed out that we expect certain things of the British which can be construed as against their security interests. We utilize the entire island of Britain as one dynamic base despite its vulnerability. Therefore, we cannot be too harsh about this one matter. The President said the difficulty in these decisions is that there are no two-sided problems. He cited Cuba as an example. (Here Mr. Dillon volunteered that Cuba is sending some people to the UN in New York. With Cuba's predilection to attack the U.S. in the UN rather than the OAS, this may have some significance. Unfortunately, since the UN is in New York, we are required to give them a visa.) The President then directed the group to go ahead with the instructions to Wadsworth, based on what Mr. Dillon had outlined, but without the presence of an ultimatum and with the understanding that we will begin the research program unilaterally if the Russians reject both.⁵

⁵ In a July 9 letter to British Prime Minister Macmillan, drafted by Farley and approved by Herter (in draft) and Goodpaster, Eisenhower outlined the proposal in more detail. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/7-960) See the Supplement.

The Vice President then inquired as to the timing of the Geneva proposals. Mr. Dillon said he hoped to introduce the initial proposal in Geneva on Monday,⁶ and if this is rejected, the second proposal would be submitted within a week of the first. The President said that any political difficulties the Joint Committee could always "put on him." Something must be done to get negotiations with Soviets off dead center. He expressed irritation over the crazy law that put so much power in the hands of the Joint Committee. Mr. McCone said initial talks with the Joint Committee had been encouraging, but the subsequent talks had not. He reemphasized the non-partisan nature of the objection to the unilateral opening of the devices. He said that all the members of the Committee would go along with us if they could be locked up in a room safe from public view. However, since a Joint Resolution is necessary and since this will be placed in the world forum, it would be impossible to keep their views secret.

The Vice President then asked as to the timing of the actual nuclear shot and the prognosis of the Soviets' accepting our fallback position. Mr. McCone answered the second question first and said that the chances were only 50/50 that the Soviets would accept even the fallback position. He feels that they will use it as a device by which to throw in more obstacles. He evaluates the Soviet objective in the negotiations as merely to keep us pinned while they proceed unilaterally as they desire in secrecy.

The Vice President said that Governor Rockefeller had said we should resume testing. Lyndon Johnson will do the same. Senator Kennedy, being in the hands of certain liberals, will say we should not resume testing. All this makes the timing important in view of the Democratic Presidential possibilities. In answer to the Vice President's question, Mr. Dillon said we can resume research shots in early August if we desire. The President said, however, that we can drag the announcement out also, if necessary. He admonished the group, however, that no matter what the nature of our test, whether it be with outdated devices or not, the Soviets will tell the world that it is actually military testing. So we must be prepared for the world to take this attitude.

The Vice President then asked whether we would announce the resumption of Plowshare at the same time. Mr. McCone said that Plowshare is an entirely different problem, since some Plowshare activities require advance technology which it will be impossible for us to show to the Soviets. The President said he would like to include in his September

⁶ July 11.

26th speech a promise to dig a canal across Yucatan if negotiations with Mexico can be worked out.⁷

The Vice President said the weakest position which the Republicans could hold in the month of August would be to allow the Soviets to drag us on. This position would allow the Democrats to go either way and criticize us for being either too rigid or too conciliatory. From a political viewpoint, he feels it completely favorable to conduct our research shots in the months of September and October.

At this point Mr. Dulles injected his estimate that there is a 30% chance that the Soviets will break off the conferences very shortly, either when we submit our first proposal or when we announce our intentions to resume research shots. Mr. McCone said that if the Soviets walk out of the conferences, we should feel no restrictions on ourselves whatsoever. The Vice President said that any continuation of the current haggling should not prevent us from moving on Plowshare. He feels this would have great propaganda value if the President, in his last speech to the UN, could tell of accomplishments of Plowshare and Atoms for Peace.

Mr. Dillon then reverted to the matter of advance notification of Congress. He expressed his dislike for this procedure. Mr. Gates agreed, saying the Joint Committee has already refused to support us on the fall-back position. The Vice President said we need not worry about the reaction of Congress. If our proposal is accepted by the Soviets, Congress will feel forced to go along even against their will. Mr. McCone said he would like to advise the members of the Joint Committee informally of the whole program since the Committee contained some vindictive people who would take out their frustration in other areas. Mr. Gates said we have a hostage in the hands of the Congress in the form of the Mutual Security Bill which has not been passed yet.

There was then some discussion on the President's schedule as to whether world developments should keep him from going to Newport. He asked that the Secretary of State return to Washington on Friday⁸ rather than Sunday.

He would like the Secretary of State to come to Newport on Sunday morning. The Vice President pointed out the value of putting out statements on Cuba and the like from Newport. General Persons said we get better press coverage from that location anyway.

John S.D. Eisenhower

⁷ Reference is to Eisenhower's planned speech before the U.N. General Assembly, which he delivered on September 22. For text of the speech, part of which was devoted to disarmament, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61*, pp. 707-720. The mentioned proposal was not included in the speech.

⁸ July 8.

258. Letter From the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee Conference (Eaton) to Secretary of State Herter

Geneva, July 25, 1960.

DEAR CHRIS: I have submitted separately for the record a classified report on the Geneva disarmament talks,¹ but since it runs to some 14 pages, I want to sum up here more briefly comments and recommendations on what strike me as the essential points emerging from the Conference.

1. It's clear that we never got down to the stage of concrete and business-like negotiations on disarmament with the Soviet side. From our own point of view, the Conference was more a matter of continuing, backstage negotiation with our Allies, particularly France, on how far the United States was willing to alter its basic disarmament position to counter Soviet initiatives in this field.

2. We made an honest effort to find some genuine negotiating ground with the Soviets. However, the Soviet break on June 27 confirmed what had become obvious almost from the start, namely—that the Soviets came to Geneva with an all-or-nothing program they knew could not be negotiated with the West. At no time in Geneva was there any indication that the Soviets were prepared to discuss any disarmament matters which had a possible chance of acceptability to us. They knew this, and therefore at no time did they contemplate a serious negotiation.

3. I am not prepared to speculate at length about the conditions under which the Soviets might have been willing to talk seriously in Geneva, or whether they came here in March with the primary intention of using the Conference for Communist propaganda and political warfare against the West. Regardless of their intentions, however, every statement and act in and out of the Conference appeared designed for propaganda and to win world opinion. I am not at all sure they succeeded in this, particularly in view of the poor timing of their break. Nothing short of major substantive concessions from us of a character damaging to Free World security would have been likely to change the Soviets' basic propaganda approach to the Conference.

4. Fruitful discussion of disarmament with the Soviets will only take place in bilateral talks. There must be fullest consultation with our Allies giving consideration to their views, their national interests and

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/7-2560. Secret.

¹ An official report, undated, is *ibid.*, 396.12-GE/7-2660. See the Supplement.

aspirations, but the decision must rest with us. Use might be made of NAC to facilitate this process. While bilateral negotiation will be politically difficult now, it will become far more difficult and perhaps impossible as time goes on.

5. One of the biggest problems facing us on the Allied side is how to resolve our basic differences with the French on disarmament, which ran through the whole Conference. The French position on early control and elimination of delivery vehicles is intended primarily as pressure on us. It counters our proposal to stop fissionable production before the French have really started, and serves notice that we should not expect to retain the bulk of our nuclear weapons and delivery means while the French have none. By appealing to world opinion as a plausible avenue to disarmament, the French delivery vehicle proposal is intended to soften the difficult position in which the French would find themselves if they should refuse to go along with any agreement we might make with the Soviets in the nuclear field. It is probable that the only way out of our difficulty with the French would be to assure them that we will find a way to support their efforts to become a nuclear power. Failing this, French acquiescence to a common Western Plan will be obtained, if at all, only by the prospect of the tabling by the other four powers of a common paper before some public session, as in the UN.

6. A related major problem concerns the position and tactics we should adopt to handle the disarmament issue during the next phase in the UN. I feel strongly that, if any paper is to be tabled in the UN, we should seek flexibility by tabling a US Plan which the NATO governments would welcome and generally endorse without being committed—either our June 27 plan² or better yet its modified version, US/WP/69 (Rev. 5).³ This would give us a better opportunity to move into possible bilateral discussions in the future than if we were committed to either a Five-Power or Four-Power Plan from which we could not vary without the consent of our partners. My guess is that the British, Canadians, and Italians would prefer our tabling a plan unilaterally to isolating the French publicly. Furthermore, if we should do this, the French might not feel impelled to air their differences with us publicly by tabling their own markedly different proposals.

7. As far as the Soviets are concerned, we can expect them to make renewed efforts to get UN approval of their approach to general and complete disarmament in order to set the framework for any new round of negotiations. They will probably seek to enlarge the composition of the Ten-Nation Committee perhaps by the inclusion of Communist China and India. The outcome of maneuvering in the UN during the next

² See footnote 4, Document 256.

³ Not found.

few months will be important, and we certainly must do our best to forestall Soviet moves which could have crippling effects on the future Western negotiating position.

8. If serious negotiation is to be undertaken in the future, it is important that the US not state a public position in detail until after the negotiations have commenced and it becomes apparent that the Communists are prepared for serious talk. The public position we will constantly be called upon to declare must be in general terms, sufficiently specific to be serious but sufficiently flexible and consonant with our basic security needs to permit detailed negotiation when such becomes feasible. Although this is difficult, the latest US proposal, in good measure, meets the requirement.

9. In view of Soviet disarmament initiatives designed for wide mass appeal, there may understandably arise pressures for US response in kind. The US should never design a disarmament proposal or plan with an eye to propaganda. Once the elements of the plan are determined, however, it should be put in clear and forceful language to enhance its public appeal. In the long run we will be best served before world opinion by straightforward espousal of reasonable and practical measures which we ourselves are fully prepared to carry out. Any US proposal must be consonant with US security. This does not mean that US security may not well require important controls, reductions and perhaps eventual elimination of national armaments and forces, but the proposal must require that the first measures to be taken shall be reasonably verified before we are committed to further obligations which, if not honored by other states, would endanger our security.

10. In formulating a disarmament position, there is a natural tendency to focus on our present security and political posture. This is understandable, since we can not predict with assurance what the future will hold. However, we can be sure that during the several years time it would take to work out and put into effect any substantial disarmament measures, there will be important changes in the present situation. For example, our weapons systems may call for a quite different deployment from that of today. It may not be necessary to maintain substantial forces on the European continent or elsewhere abroad. Furthermore, as their own situation changes, our Allies may not welcome our presence to the extent they do today. I do not mean to suggest that this will necessarily be the case, but such considerations should be taken into account in designing the future disarmament proposals.

Sincerely,

Fred Eaton

259. Memorandum of Discussion at the 455th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, August 12, 1960.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Geneva Negotiations on Nuclear Testing* (NSC Action 2238-b-(5))¹

Mr. Gray began by explaining that the first item on the Council agenda had to do with the nuclear testing negotiations at Geneva and called upon the Secretary of State to present the item.

Secretary Herter referred to the Eisenhower-Macmillan proposal of last March² which provided for a moratorium on underground tests, subject to two conditions: (1) that a coordinated research program to perfect seismic instrumentation be agreed upon and (2) that satisfactory agreement be arrived at on the banning of nuclear tests in the atmosphere. The scientists at Geneva had reached agreement in principle in May, and then the Soviets had rejected the proposal for political considerations.³ The Soviets had laid down two conditions: (1) that the Soviets have complete access to the detonator and (2) that they have the right to fix the number of tests and their strength. Subsequently, after Mr. McCone had consulted with the Joint Congressional Committee, the U.S. made a proposal that the Soviets, the British, and the U.S. put up devices which would be subject to manual and visual inspection by all.⁴ The Soviets rejected this proposal.⁵ The President, continued Mr. Herter, had written Prime Minister Macmillan setting forth a fall-back position.⁶ With respect to declassification, Mr. Herter pointed out that the AEC has the right to declassify but that then the information would be available to the whole world. It might be possible to obtain limited declassification authority from the Congress.

Mr. Herter explained that there were two alternatives in the three-page paper which had been distributed at the Council table that morning.⁷ The *first* was to offer the fall-back position. However, this was subject to certain disadvantages: (a) it would be unfavorably received by

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Charles A. Haskins of the NSC Staff on August 16.

¹ See Document 255.

² March 29; printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pp. 77-78. See *ibid.*, pp. 81-86.

³ See Tsarapkin's statement of June 15, *ibid.*, pp. 121-126.

⁴ See the statement by Wadsworth, July 12, *ibid.*, pp. 142-152.

⁵ See Tsarapkin's statement of July 26, *ibid.*, pp. 172-180.

⁶ Apparent reference to a letter from Eisenhower to Macmillan, drafted in the Department of State and approved by Herter; see footnote 5, Document 257.

⁷ A copy of the August 11 paper is in the Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Disaster File, Disarmament. See the Supplement.

the Joint Committee; (b) it is doubtful that authority could be obtained at this brief session of the Congress; and (c) there would be a hazard that, if the Soviets accepted the proposal, we might not be able to go through with it. A *second* alternative would be to stick to the reciprocal offer. If the Soviets refused it, then the U.S. could go ahead with the underground test series on its own. As for the date for beginning the underground test series, Mr. Herter said that to set a definite date might have the appearance of an ultimatum and that perhaps we could say "shortly". He said that a political decision had to be taken, and that meanwhile the Geneva negotiations were dragging along. Mr. Herter referred to the statement made by the President at a press conference that there would be no shots in the atmosphere while he was President.⁸ Mr. Herter concluded by saying that there was talk in Geneva about a recess, and that Wadsworth was on the way home to replace Ambassador Lodge in the UN.

The President observed that advance Congressional authority was not needed if the fall-back position was put forward "subject to Congressional authorization", and inquired whether Secretary Herter had talked to the British. The Secretary said that he had not yet done so. The President said it would alarm the British if we went ahead alone and Mr. Herter said that of course we would consult with the British.

The President suggested that the fall-back position would not hurt us badly and inquired whether we would really be giving anything up if the Soviets accepted. Mr. Herter said we would not.

Mr. McCone said we would not as far as these particular devices are concerned, but expressed concern over setting a precedent which might have great effect in the future, particularly as regards "Plowshare". He said that we could not throw additional tests open to inspection.

The Vice President took up the question of timing. He said that the moment the offer was made, a debate would be on which would become a political issue. He said that Senator Anderson would put the offer into the campaign, as would Senator Lyndon Johnson, probably taking the line that we were being naive with the Soviets. He said that Congressional opposition would indicate that the President did not have support in Congress and that the Joint Committee would never agree in a campaign year. If the issue were debated before November 8, it would be distorted and could not be argued on its merits.

The President observed that if we do not have something to keep the negotiations going along, then we are saying in effect that we give up.

The Vice President voiced support for the President's announced stand on no tests in the atmosphere, adding that we know we can learn all we need from underground tests. He said that another disadvantage

⁸ For the President's statement at his news conference on August 10, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960*, p. 627.

of setting a specific date was the ultimatum aspect. The President wondered if a date could not be set subsequent to the election. The Vice President said that it would be desirable to leave the date in a more indefinite status. The more definite the date, he said, the more susceptible the matter would be to political discussion.

Secretary Herter said that if a mid-November date were selected, the scientists would have to occupy the test site a month ahead and by their presence would reveal the timing. Mr. McCone agreed, and said that extensive preparations for the shot would be necessary, including the moving in of scientists, who would be identified by the press. The President suggested that we would not have to fix an exact date but that we might say "on or after".

Secretary Gates suggested that we might re-affirm our position after talking to Prime Minister Macmillan. We could tell the Soviets that we want them to answer again.

Secretary Herter raised the question of how far off the decision could be put from the point of view of planning. At some time we have got to establish a cut-off date. The President suggested that we might say to the Soviets, "If you do not agree, then we will go ahead by ourselves", but we must have coordination with the British. Mr. Herter said he was seeing Ambassador Caccia at noon and the President suggested that the Secretary ask Caccia to inform Macmillan. Our line could be that before the Geneva negotiations adjourned, we would say that we are going to begin to make our underground nuclear tests—small ones and for the purpose of improving seismic instrumentation. We feel that it has to be done. Every decent proposal we have made, the Soviets have flatly turned down. We should get Macmillan's reaction; he has come a long way on Polaris.

Mr. McCone stated that there had been a considerable deterioration in the negotiations since July 17. Tsarapkin had proposed three site inspections and it was reported that that proposal was not negotiable. It is also reported that Tsarapkin is calling for 15 instead of 21 stations. Tsarapkin has not agreed to a single thing since November except the 4.75 threshold. He is an old-time negotiator, continued Mr. McCone; he negotiated the 38th Parallel in Korea, after exhausting the opposition. The President asked if that was in 1945 and Mr. McCone said that it was.

Secretary Herter gave the evaluation that the Soviets will not agree to any tests until after conclusion of a treaty.

The President suggested that perhaps we ought to send someone to London to talk to the British—either Mr. McCone or someone from the State Department. Then we could get away from the fall-back proposal. The President said he agreed with the Vice President with respect to what the political opposition would do and that they would interpret our

action as being soft on communism. Congress so loves to keep secrets which the enemy has had for so long, mused the President.

Secretary Herter inquired whether he had the President's approval for taking the matter up with Ambassador Caccia. The President said that Mr. Herter could start with the Ambassador.

The Vice President counselled that it was of the utmost importance, in our conversations with the British, that no mention be made of any domestic political considerations which might be involved. The President replied that he himself could "tell Harold".

General Persons commented that the Majority leaders in Congress had made it very clear to him that this was going to be a light session and that Congress would only deal with a limited number of things. Secretary Herter said that the House would only be in session for two weeks. The Vice President stated that there was no chance that anything could be done at this session of Congress.

Mr. Gray observed that whereas the tests as planned were not weapons tests, nevertheless they do have collateral defense aspects. Secretary Gates mentioned base hardening, and Mr. Gray pointed out that it could not be said that there are no defense implications. Mr. Gates said that the implications were defensive.

Mr. McCone spoke of his recent trip to the underground test site. He said there was a 950 foot shaft and that the device would be placed at the bottom. One thousand feet away was a 750 foot shaft. There was a tunnel leading to within 200 feet of the first shaft, and additionally there were three sets of other tunnels, radiating from the second shaft. The structures are of various kinds, including concrete and steel and number eight or ten. Information to be derived from the tests would be valuable for civil defense, base hardening, the mining industry, and for tunnel construction techniques. All the information would be made public. The site had been started by Defense and AEC three or four years ago and had cost \$5 million. Mr. McCone emphasized that no information on weapons of any kind was involved and that it was, in his opinion, a very worthwhile experiment.

Mr. Stans expressed concern about world opinion and wondered whether the underground tests might be regarded as a resumption of nuclear testing. He said we should make it very clear that no new weapons are involved. Secretary Herter said that if the negotiations are broken off, then the AEC would test some devices having weapons implications. Mr. McCone said that the AEC had a list of defense requirements which could only be met by further testing. The President emphasized that no weapons are involved in this specific action and that it was important that we did not get weapons into this. Secretary Herter commented that our public posture would be much better if we could say that the tests were seismic only.

The Vice President expressed concern for the security of the matters which had just been discussed and said he hoped that there would not be debriefings to hundreds of people throughout the departments. The President agreed, and said it was most important to protect the subject from falling into unauthorized hands. Mr. Gray said that, in the light of the sensitivity of the discussion, there would be no debriefing of the Planning Board on this item.

*The National Security Council:*⁹

Discussed the subject on the basis of an oral presentation by the Secretary of State.

[Here follow Agenda Items 2-8, unrelated to disarmament.]

Charles A. Haskins

⁹ The following sentence constitutes NSC Action No. 2278, approved by the President on August 17. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

260. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, August 19, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Merchant, Chairman McCone
General Goodpaster

Mr. McCone said that Prime Minister Macmillan sent his warmest regards to the President. He added that he is following Mr. Nixon's campaign with close interest. Finally, he said he is deeply appreciative of the care we have taken not to bring the British into the Powers trial in any way.¹

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on August 23.

¹ Documentation on the shooting down of a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance plane, piloted by Francis Gary Powers, over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960, and the subsequent trial of Powers in the Soviet Union is in volume X, Part 1.

Mr. McCone said the United States and British representatives from the Geneva negotiations gave a report to the meeting of himself and Mr. Merchant with the Prime Minister.² Mr. McCone explained why it is not feasible for the United States to go to the fall-back position—that the Congress will not accept this. He said the British tried to tie the question to the election in some way, but he resisted this. The British pressed us very hard for a statement of our intentions as to when and whether we planned to initiate unilateral nuclear seismic experimentation. Ormsby-Gore wanted a commitment, which he was not given, that the United States would not do anything until the next Congress and Administration had come in.

Mr. McCone was willing to say that we would take no precipitous action, and that we will resume negotiations at the end of the five weeks' recess. Mr. Merchant commented that the British seemed greatly relieved that this was the purpose of the visit.

Mr. McCone said he cited to the British the President's statement that we would not wait forever to resume testing if no progress is made toward an acceptable agreement.³ He and Mr. Merchant agreed on a proposed date of September 27th for reconvening after the recess. He said he proposed that, in the meantime, the United States and the United Kingdom should summarize very strictly the issues that divide the East and West before the recess began.

Mr. McCone said that the Soviets are pressing hard for a commitment from the United States as to the duration of moratorium we would accept. Mr. McCone thought the moratorium should cover the period of seismic improvement experimentation. The British also want to know our thinking on this matter. Mr. McCone said he and Mr. Merchant finally agreed that the moratorium could be of two years' duration plus three to six months, which is the time it would take to make preparations for testing after a decision to test. He said it was agreed that the Western delegations can announce their thinking on the moratorium.

The President said he is inclined to feel, if we could keep the secret from the press, he would authorize small clandestine shots because the

² McCone and Merchant went to London on August 15 for discussions with Macmillan and other British officials on the future of the Geneva negotiations on nuclear testing. Before leaving for London, McCone discussed his visit with Eisenhower. The President told him that he "should simply tell the British that we have so many political problems in regard to this matter during the next 2-1/2 months that he did not feel it is possible to prepare the way for the proposal now. He did not, however, want to be in the position of breaking up the negotiations." A report of this August 15 meeting is in a memorandum of conference with the President by Goodpaster, August 19; *ibid.* See the Supplement.

³ Reference is apparently to Eisenhower's statement in his August 10 press conference on the lack of progress in the Geneva discussions. The President stated that "when we come to the place that progress is not possible, then we will have to take care of ourselves." See footnote 8, Document 259.

delay has been so long in negotiations, and we cannot be sure whether the Soviets are testing or not. I told the President I hoped he would give no consideration to this, since there is one thing our experience has proven, and that is that this government cannot keep a secret. Mr. McCone said that if he had the authority to do this, he would guarantee to do it secretly insofar as his agency is concerned, but added that scientists would know about this and would talk to each other and to the press. At this point the President adverted to several recent security breaches.

Mr. McCone suggested, and said he had suggested to the British, that in the early days of the recess the US and UK negotiators should report on what the issues are that remain in the negotiations with the Russians, and what the US and UK positions are with respect to these issues—and that thereafter the governments should try to decide what to do about them.

Mr. McCone commented that the proposal for reciprocal inspection of seismic improvement devices involving nuclear explosions was not put forward very strongly or effectively by our negotiating team in Geneva, nor was it supported by the British. He acknowledged that, even had it been, it would not have been accepted by the Soviets. Mr. McCone said that during the meeting with Macmillan, Ormsby-Gore reviewed the issues, and his review disclosed that the British see them just as clearly as we do. The Soviets say that we cannot start the research program until a treaty has been initialled. They also say that the first inspection cannot occur until the whole system has been installed. These may be negotiating positions, but they show the extent of the difficulty.

The President said the fundamental question in his mind is this: is it of primary importance to the Soviets that they want no more nuclear explosions, or is it of primary importance that they do not want to open up their country? While a total number of inspections as low as three would be inadequate to provide effective inspection, even these three would disclose a great deal of their country. Mr. McCone said the British are saying that three inspections are not enough. They seem to be thinking in terms of ten, asserting that we could not do more. He said he told them that there was no practical limit of this order and that the number depends simply on how much effort we are willing to make.

Mr. McCone said that, with respect to the seismic improvement program, he felt that by the meeting he and Mr. Merchant had just completed with the British, we have extracted ourselves from the commitment to put forward the fall-back position. He commented that this leaves us in a vacuum, however, since the Soviets have disagreed with our earlier proposal. The President said that it may be necessary for himself or the new President to go up to the Congress in January to see if we could obtain the fall-back position. He added that in many ways he prefers the fall-back

position. He acknowledged that the present Congress didn't consider the question rationally and that there is no point in advancing it now.

To a question by the President, Mr. McCone indicated that it would be possible to declassify these devices, but in that case we would have to make the information public, according to the terms of the law, and this would be contrary to the policy of not spreading nuclear weapons knowledge among additional countries. He suggested that the best course was probably to wait until after the election and reappraise the situation. The President said this depends upon the outcome of the election. If Kennedy were to win, the President thought he would not wish to engage with the present Administration in any activity on this problem. If Mr. Nixon wins, the President thought Macmillan might then have to be told that an early decision to resume or not to resume testing was mandatory.

The President suggested that, in the meantime, we should carry out some large-scale HE explosions, adding that perhaps it would be possible to introduce a nuclear component clandestinely. Again I urged him not to consider this.

Mr. McCone suggested that it might be possible to build a completely new device, not at all in the form of a weapon, using some new principle to create the critical initiatory conditions, which could be completely declassified. He said he would pursue this.

Mr. McCone said it is his view that we and the British are not on the "same wicket"—that we are trying to suspend what we can control and the British want to suspend everything, including tests below the threshold of inspection. The President said he had seen nothing to warrant this conclusion, and disagreed with this judgment.

Mr. McCone said finally that Prime Minister Macmillan had indicated he would like very much to get together with the President some time in December. The President said he too would like this. London seemed completely out of the question, although Culzean Castle or some similar place might be a possibility.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

261. Editorial Note

On September 9, 1960, the Department of State announced the establishment of the U.S. Disarmament Administration to develop and coordinate U.S. policies and activities in the field of arms limitation and control. (Department of State press release 520, September 9, 1960; *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, page 225) The administration was established as a result of a study initiated in late 1959 at the President's request by the Department of State. The Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology recommended creation of an office responsible for arms control policies, located within the Executive Office of the President, which would work closely with the Department of State. Under Kistiakowsky's plan, the Department of State would have sole responsibility for negotiating arms control agreements. On February 18, 1960, Kistiakowsky had sent a memorandum to the President outlining the rationale for the plan. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology—Panel, Disarmament Organization) See the Supplement.

Secretary of State Herter proposed a disarmament organization on the staff level in the Department of State. Secretary Herter, supported by the Department of Defense, convinced the President that an upgraded disarmament effort should be located in the Department of State and should report directly to the Secretary. The new agency was to be staffed with personnel drawn from the Department of State, other agencies, and from outside the government. It was to be responsible for formulating policy recommendations for consideration within the U.S. Government with respect to the limitation and control by international agreement of armed forces and weapons of all kinds and for the direction and support of international negotiations on these matters. (Memorandum from Herter to the President, August 22; Department of State, Central Files, 600.012/8-2260) See the Supplement.

262. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Twining) to President Eisenhower

Washington, September 15, 1960.

SUBJECT

Arms Control Proposals and Your Speech at the United Nations, 22 September 1960¹

1. I have reviewed an early draft by the State Department Staff² of a speech which you might make to the United Nations General Assembly and consider that certain basic aspects of the approach proposed in the arms control area would have serious implications relative to the security of the United States. The draft I saw probably will be revised. However, I feel that the following comments, which are addressed to the early draft, should be considered in formulating the arms control section of the speech you plan to make:

a. I question the view reflected in the speech that in a time of increasing tensions, as at present, the United States should feel compelled to increase the attractiveness to the Soviets of U.S. disarmament proposals by offering the Soviets one-sided military advantages. To do so, would be dangerously misleading to people throughout the world. The Soviets could only interpret this approach as a sign of weakness on the part of the United States and a sign of U.S. uncertainty about fulfilling its world-wide commitments.

b. I don't mean to imply that we should refuse to entertain new ideas, but it does seem clear that in the arms control field we can't expect to out-match the Soviets in offering fancy gimmicks for their propaganda appeal. Our interests surely lie in sticking to a responsible arms control program based on sound principles and realistic regard for the facts of international life.

c. Rather than the arms control approach taken in the draft speech, I believe that the United States should make clear that the unrenounced

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administrative Series, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secret.

¹ For text of the speech as given, see *Public Papers of the President of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61*, pp. 707–720. Eisenhower's speech was part of the general debate on disarmament at the 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly. On September 23, Soviet Chairman Khrushchev addressed the General Assembly on Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament. Extracts of that speech are printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 715–718. A Soviet declaration submitted to the General Assembly and the Soviet proposals on the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, both September 23, are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pp. 229–248.

² The draft was not found.

and frequently repeated Communist objective of world domination is the prime reason for the present level and deployment of U.S. armed forces and armaments.

d. With respect to arms control proposals, I believe that the United States should reiterate its interest in and willingness to negotiate international arms control agreements, and should demonstrate that the Soviets have consistently sabotaged all efforts in this direction through their repeated threats against and attacks on other peoples, their continued use of negotiations strictly as propaganda exercises and their refusal to negotiate in the 1960 Geneva disarmament conference, highlighted by their walk-out from that conference. In this connection, far greater stress than is now given in the draft should be placed on the Soviet penchant for secrecy as an obstacle to arms controls.

e. The United States should then restate—not renounce, as the draft speech implies—its 27 June 1960 disarmament proposals³ and invite participation in renewed negotiations on these proposals. As you no doubt recall, these proposals received your approval shortly before they were tabled in Geneva. To discard the 27 June 1960 proposals, as would be the case if we were to come forward now with what, in effect are new proposals, would—in addition to being a sign of great weakness—play into Soviet propaganda charges used to justify the Communist walk-out at Geneva in June 1960.

f. The arms control proposals in the draft speech are contrary to U.S. Basic National Security Policy in that they do not provide for balanced and phased disarmament. For example, the arms control proposals contained in the draft advocate the reduction of nuclear military capabilities without requiring substantial conventional disarmament, thus potentially impairing U.S. nuclear capabilities while leaving Sino-Soviet conventional capabilities unimpaired. The following are additional examples of proposals contained in the draft considered undesirable:

(1) One proposal asks the United Nations to “call on nations to engage in no military activities” on celestial bodies. This would be an uncontrolled ban, probably binding on the United States, but not on the USSR. A major principle of U.S. policy is that disarmament measures must be controllable and controls must be operative; this proposal is contrary to this principle and could establish a dangerous precedent. Also, this proposal could and probably would lead to additional U.N. resolutions such as ban the bomb, liquidate overseas bases, and eliminate means for delivering nuclear weapons.

(2) Another proposal asks that an “urgent study be initiated” in connection with control of nuclear delivery systems. This proposal, presented out of the context of the 27 June U.S. program, unduly emphasizes

³ For text of the proposals, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pp. 126–131.

this aspect of the program in keeping with the Soviet desire to place the control of nuclear delivery means in Stage One.

(3) The proposals concerning nuclear weapons, aside from being undesirable because they are not tied to conventional disarmament, invite the ninety-odd nuclear have-nots, who have no capability and no responsibility for preserving the security of the Free World, to negotiate and pass resolutions on arms controls for U.S. nuclear weapons. In addition, the proposal to close nuclear production plants one-by-one is undesirable because it is offered without requiring verification to assure that new plants are not being established on the territory of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

(4) The United States cannot agree to terminate "nuclear" production, as is proposed in the speech. This would encompass tritium without which many of our existing or remaining nuclear weapons would quickly become ineffective. For this reason, the U.S. proposals have only suggested termination of the production of "fissionable" materials.

(5) The speech deals inadequately with Soviet aggression over international waters and with the problem of obtaining the release of the RB-47 crewmen; also, it hands the initiative in this matter to the Soviets. The major points to be stressed are that a continuation of Soviet aggressive acts over international waters is a bar to peaceful negotiations; that the continued illegal imprisonment of the RB-47 crewmen is a constant reminder of the fact of Soviet aggression; and that the RB-47 crewmen must be released immediately to afford any hope that Soviet brigandage over international waters will be stopped and, therefore, any hope that negotiations might be fruitful.

(6) The section on arms control fails to specify that nuclear and non-nuclear arms controls must be balanced and that "general disarmament" must be under effective international control.

2. I believe that specific arms control measures listed in the draft speech should be redrafted to conform to the U.S. proposals of 27 June 1960, which are the latest arms control proposals which have been fully coordinated within the Government and approved by the President. The arms control proposals contained in the draft speech have not been so coordinated. They represent a drastic departure from the concept of balanced and phased arms control measures at all times under effective international verification and inspection, as reflected in the 27 June proposals, and would have serious security implications.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur fully in the views expressed above.

N.F. Twining

263. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, September 19, 1960, 9:45 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter
Colonel EisenhowerPart time:
General Twining
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Gerard Smith
Dr. Moos

[Here follows discussion unrelated to disarmament.]

At this time the group was joined by Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Gerard Smith, and Dr. Moos. Dr. Moos pointed out that the speech had now been reduced to 23 pages.¹ In answer to the President's question regarding the views of the JCS, Mr. Smith said that he had received the gist of the JCS comments on Friday,² had talked it over, and had straightened out most of their objections.

At this time the President instructed me to remind him to insist on procedures in which JCS recommendations on international affairs go through the Secretary of Defense to the Department of State and are channeled by them to the President. He recognizes the JCS are separate from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for military matters. On international matters their views should come to him through State. Mr. Herter assured the President again that the comments of the JCS had been addressed to the first draft of the speech and had subsequently been ironed out. At this time the President sent for General Twining to join the group.

Discussion then ensued regarding the term, "verification of space craft" in the President's speech. The wording which the President visualizes would be "all launchings of space craft should be verified in advance by the UN." Here the difficulty lay in the fear of the JCS that important projects such as Samos would be subject to Soviet inspections. After discussion, it was concluded that Samos activities apply to exploration of our own earth and therefore are not subject to verification and disapproval. This prohibition would apply only to weapons of mass destruction placed in the satellite.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by John Eisenhower.

¹ Reference is to Eisenhower's speech to the U.N. General Assembly; see footnote 1, Document 262.

² See Document 262.

The President then expressed concern over the virtue of the ground inspection portion of the speech. He understood that the idea includes voluntary employment of other nations' representatives to prove that any given nation is not preparing for war. This could be done by showing that cities are not being evacuated, that governmental leaders are remaining in their offices, and the like. The President feels that such measures would apply primarily to a 1942 war. He quoted the expression "the nakedness of the battlefield" and said it would be impossible for observers of this kind to detect the real status of alert posture. He pointed out that our bombers remain always on a 15-minute alert. Mr. Smith pointed out the voluntary nature of this procedure as an advantage to a country to prove its non-alert status. He felt there is nothing to lose by such a proposal. He pointed out further that a strong effort is being made to find something new regarding mutual inspection in accordance with the President's promise made in Paris.

The President suggested an approach which emphasized that in 1955 the Soviet Premier had proposed ground observers. The President had proposed open skies. This had been done on a bilateral basis. The President now proposes that both methods be adopted by the UN so that each nation can prove its peaceful intent and receive assurances of the peaceful intent of the other.

Mr. Smith expressed the view that the aerial inspection idea is now obsolete. It will indicate little regarding war preparations. He quoted Mr. Bohlen agreeing with him; however, Mr. Bohlen said that the issue was a political one rather than a technical one. He felt the President should say it is now feasible technically to detect preparations for war. The question is whether nations will permit it.

Secretary Herter then suggested mentioning the fliers of the RB-47 crew still held in the USSR. The President seemed to agree, and the meeting closed.

John S.D. Eisenhower

264. Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to the President's Assistant (Persons)

Washington, November 16, 1960.

DEAR JERRY: You may recall my telling you that we should reach a decision soon with regard to the continuation of the Nuclear Test Suspension discussions in Geneva. On the basis both of Soviet statements and the current slow pace of their responses in Geneva it seems unlikely that they will be prepared to make any substantial negotiating moves or to seek seriously any resolution of remaining differences until they know whether a new administration is prepared to offer them a better deal on the outstanding issues. If a satisfactory resolution of remaining issues is not now likely, it would not seem to be in the U.S. interest to make concessions or offer compromises at a time when instead of enabling us to determine whether agreement is possible they might serve only to reduce our bargaining position for the final effort to reach agreement. Just as the prospects of agreement seem slight at present, so also do the prospects of breaking off negotiations or proceeding with nuclear research explosions in December on terms favorable to the West. In this connection it would be particularly difficult at this time to secure the assent of Congressional leaders to the fallback position on opening nuclear devices (without which the U.K. would not support us in initiating nuclear research shots).

In light of these factors it would seem advisable to seek a recess in the negotiations in the latter part of this month¹ and to propose that negotiations reconvene in February. Since a firm reconvening date would be set we foresee no likelihood that a recess would have any serious repercussions in the UN. Prior to a recess we should maintain essentially our present positions with such elaborations and developments on relatively minor aspects as can be handled through the normal day to day instructions.

Before consultation with the British and the Soviets on this matter, I think it would be well to advise Clark Clifford of what we propose to do.² My guess would be that he would approve.

C.A.H.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Presidential Transition Series. Confidential.

¹ The Geneva negotiations on nuclear testing recessed on December 5.

² Persons had this memorandum retyped in the White House and removed the last sentences of the first and third paragraphs. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Presidential Transition Series) See the Supplement. He then reported in a telephone conversation with Herter on November 18 at 3:30 p.m., that he had given the retyped paper to Clark Clifford in the absence of an officially designated Department of State liaison from President-elect Kennedy. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Misc. Memos)

265. Editorial Note

The First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly discussed proposals for disarmament from October 13 to December 20, 1960, under four general categories: general and complete disarmament, specific disarmament proposals, prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation, and suspension of nuclear testing. For the major statements and texts of resolutions considered by the First Committee, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pages 297-372. The General Assembly adopted three resolutions as recommended by the First Committee, Resolutions 1576-1578. For texts, see *ibid.*, pages 373-375.

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
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




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