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United States Department of State

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Foreign Relations
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The Conferences
at Cairo and Tehran
1943



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PREFACE

This volume of documents on the Conferences at Cairo and Tehran in 1943 is published in continuation of the special series of *Foreign Relations* volumes on the World War II Conferences attended by President Roosevelt or President Truman, along with Prime Minister Churchill or Marshal Stalin, or both of the latter. The first volume issued in this series dealt with the Conferences at Malta and Yalta; other volumes will deal with the Conferences at Potsdam, Quebec, Casablanca, and Washington.

The substantive editing of the present volume was performed by William M. Franklin, Deputy Director of the Historical Office, assisted by William Gerber. Robert C. Hayes and Donald M. Dozer made the initial compilation of papers on portions of the volume. Eula McDonald and Helene DeLong prepared the list of persons.

The Division of Publishing Services was responsible for the proof-reading and editing of copy. Under the general direction of the Chief of this Division, Norris E. Drew, these editorial functions were performed by the Foreign Relations Editing Branch supervised by Elizabeth A. Vary, Chief, and Ouida J. Ward, Assistant Chief.

In order to make this volume as complete and accurate as possible, the editors supplemented the data available in the Department of State by obtaining source material and information on these Conferences from a number of individuals and agencies outside the Department. The Historical Office would like to express its sincere appreciation for this assistance. Particular acknowledgment is made of the extensive help received from the Historical Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York. Quotations from certain of the books listed in the Introduction to the volume have been made with the kind permission of the respective publishers. The photographs were supplied through the courtesy of the U. S. Army Photographic Agency.

G. BERNARD NOBLE

*Director, Historical Office
Bureau of Public Affairs*

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INTRODUCTION

SCOPE OF COVERAGE

This volume presents documentation on the international Conferences attended by President Franklin D. Roosevelt at Cairo and Tehran in late November and early December 1943. The nomenclature for these Conferences requires a word of explanation. Although the gatherings are often known by the names of the two cities in which they met, or by the corresponding code words of "Sextant" for Cairo and "Eureka" for Tehran, it is necessary to note at the outset that Conferences were held at Cairo both before and after the Conference at Tehran. While no sharp distinction was made in the official terminology of the time between the two gatherings at Cairo, the editors of this volume found it desirable in organizing the material, to distinguish the Cairo meetings by designating them as, respectively, the "First" and the "Second" Cairo Conference.

With regard to subject matter and participants, the three Conferences (First Cairo, Tehran, and Second Cairo) were in part related and in part quite separate. The element of continuity running through all three meetings is to be found in the fact that President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and their top advisers, including the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, attended all three Conferences. The other principal participants, however, were different at each gathering. At the First Cairo Conference (November 22-26) the Anglo-American delegations conferred, in varying combinations, with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China and his top military leaders on problems of the war against Japan. Then they flew to Tehran for four days of consultation (November 28-December 1) with Marshal Stalin, Foreign Commissar Molotov, and Marshal Voroshilov on problems of the war in Europe. Back in Egypt for the Second Cairo Conference (December 2-7), they were joined by President İnönü of Turkey and other top Turkish officials for four days of talks (December 4-7) about Turkey's possible entry into the war against Germany.

The delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom negotiated at Cairo and Tehran not only with the Chinese, the Russians, and the Turks, but also with each other. Indeed a substantial part of the motivation that brought Roosevelt and Churchill together at this time was the need for another top conference of the Combined

Chiefs of Staff to reconsider problems of grand strategy in all theaters of war. Thus the "Sextant" Conference of the Combined Chiefs was a continuation of the series of C. C. S. meetings that had most recently included "Quadrant" (Quebec) and "Trident" (Washington). The Combined Chiefs of Staff brought to Cairo their own agenda and their own numbered series of preparatory papers. All but one of their meetings took place at Cairo, and in several of these meetings they were joined by Roosevelt and Churchill who participated in the formulation of the decisions embodied in the final report. In addition to these discussions within the framework of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, there were private discussions between Roosevelt and Churchill at Cairo (both before and after Tehran) on matters of common concern, political as well as military.

At both Cairo and Tehran President Roosevelt had conversations with a number of other high-ranking leaders, such as the King of Greece and the King of Yugoslavia at Cairo and the Shah of Iran at Tehran. Although such conversations were not considered as parts of the major Cairo and Tehran Conferences as described above, they have been considered as within the purview of the present volume.

In addition to the high-level activities described in the preceding paragraphs there were some negotiations and conversations at lower levels at both Cairo and Tehran, in which Americans participated with various foreign representatives. All such conversations and negotiations have been regarded as within the scope of coverage of this volume.

ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUME

In as much as the annual volumes of *Foreign Relations* for 1943 have not yet been published, the editors considered it essential to include in this volume a considerable quantity of pre-Conference material in order to indicate how these Conferences came to be arranged, what subjects were proposed for consideration, and where these subjects stood on the eve of the Conferences.

Part I of this volume contains pre-Conference papers of this type. The coverage in Part I on "Arrangements for the Conferences" is complete for all conferences up to the time of the President's arrival in Cairo on November 22. Arrangements made subsequently concerning the Tehran and Second Cairo Conferences are included in Parts II and III as appropriate. (See the editorial note, *post*, page 3.) The coverage on "Substantive Preparatory Papers" is, of course, selective since a complete pre-Conference coverage of all subjects that came up for discussion at Cairo and Tehran would fill a number of volumes and, in fact, will constitute large portions of the regular *Foreign Relations* volumes for the year 1943. Compilation on these volumes is now well advanced and it is anticipated that they will be published

in the next several years. Also included in Part I is the Log of the President's trip from Washington, D. C., to Cairo.

Part II contains the President's Log during the First Cairo Conference, the proceedings of that Conference, and the related Conference documents and supplementary papers. The same general arrangement is followed in Part III on the Tehran Conference and in Part IV on the Second Cairo Conference.

Part V contains what are termed "Post-Conference Papers". These are defined as hitherto unpublished papers (or portions thereof) containing factual statements by participants in the Conferences at Cairo and Tehran on what took place at those Conferences. The papers in this chapter, therefore, do not describe the aftermath of the Conferences (which will be in subsequent volumes of *Foreign Relations*), but merely represent a supplement to the contemporary record of the Conferences themselves. Needless to say, the collection of such papers or statements presented in Part V cannot be regarded as exhaustive, since materials of this sort may be filed under any one of scores of subjects for all the years since 1943. There are included in Part V all such papers, or the pertinent portions thereof, that could be located in the most promising files for a few years after the Conferences.

CATEGORIES OF MATERIAL

There were no agreed agenda for the Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, except for the Anglo-American military conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The international discussions engaged in by President Roosevelt and his political advisers at these Conferences ranged widely over a great variety of topics with a large number of foreign representatives. In view of this situation the editors have interpreted the terms "Conference proceedings" and "Conference documents and supplementary papers" in a very broad manner.

"Conference proceedings" have been taken to include all types of records of international discussions in which American representatives participated at Cairo and Tehran from November 22 to December 7, 1943. This includes not only formal minutes but also memoranda and notes on international conversations in which the President or other members of his party participated.

The record of Conference proceedings is far from complete, even for some high-level discussions. There are formal minutes for all meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and for those other international discussions in which the Chiefs of Staff participated. There are minutes for all substantive discussions with the Russians at Tehran and with the Turks at Cairo. There are no American minutes, however, of several important discussions between Roosevelt and Chiang at Cairo, for which Madame Chiang acted as interpreter. There are no American minutes for any of the private conversations held by

Roosevelt and Churchill during the Conferences at Cairo and Tehran. There were no American minutes of a conversation between Churchill and İnönü at Cairo on December 7, after Roosevelt's departure. There are references to a considerable number of international discussions at lower levels at all three Conferences, in which Americans participated but for which there are no official American minutes or notes whatever.

In view of the seriousness of these gaps in the American record of these Conferences, the editors felt it necessary to take unusual measures in order to make the record, as presented in this volume, as complete and coherent as possible. Through the friendly interest of Dr. Hollington K. Tong (who had been on the Chinese delegation to the Cairo Conference) there was obtained a copy in English translation of the Chinese summary of one of the Roosevelt-Chiang discussions at Cairo. It is printed *post*, page 323, with the permission of the National Government of China. With regard to the Churchill-Inönü conversation on December 7, it was decided, in view of the unusual circumstances, to print the British minutes that had been sent to the Department in December 1943. These minutes are published *post*, page 751, with the permission of the British Government. For many of the remaining gaps in the record of these Conferences there will be found editorial notes setting forth what is known about the meeting from available sources, unofficial as well as official.

There were no formal or general meetings of the American delegation at the Cairo or Tehran Conferences. There were, however, conversations on Conference subjects between President Roosevelt and various members of his party during the Conferences, and in so far as official records of these conversations could be found, they have been included as part of the proceedings. Also included are those portions of the minutes of meetings held by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff at Cairo and Tehran that reflect discussions in which the President or other political leaders participated.

Following the proceedings of each of the three Conferences, there appears a chapter entitled "Conference Documents and Supplementary Papers". These chapters include not merely those documents that were under international negotiation (i. e., Conference documents in the usual sense of the word) but also other papers on international political subjects in the form of letters, memoranda, telegrams, despatches, etc., sent to and from the President or his top staff during their sojourn in Cairo and Tehran from November 22 to December 7, 1943. Each of these chapters contains an initial section entitled "Correspondence, Drafts, and Proposals". The documents in these sections are arranged chronologically, since there are very few on any one subject. Other sections in these chapters present the agreed

documents produced by each Conference (i. e., the communiqués, the Declaration on Iran, and the Military Agreement), together with related papers.

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

Since the Conferences at Cairo and Tehran were primarily concerned with the prosecution of the war, and since they were not attended by Secretary of State Hull, it is not surprising that the files of the Department of State were found to be an inadequate source of material for this volume. The editors, therefore, sought and obtained the assistance of several other Government Departments and Agencies in locating necessary source material. In this connection the need was particularly great for Presidential papers from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park and for military papers from the Department of Defense, principally from the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Roosevelt Library provided photocopies of all Presidential papers (including Hopkins papers) that could be found relating to any of the Conferences and discussions at Cairo and Tehran and the preparations therefor. The Department of Defense agreed to provide all papers that could be found, documenting the official position or advice of the War and Navy Departments on politico-military subjects discussed at the international level, as presented by the civilian leaders of those departments and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The papers printed in this volume which came from the indexed Central Files of the Department of State are indicated by means of a file number in the headnote, in the usual style of *Foreign Relations*. A few documents (such as the paper of Chinese origin on page 323) were not originally in the Central Files of the Department but have now been indexed as Central File papers. Other sources from which papers were derived for this volume are as follows:

A. INSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. *Bohlen Collection*—The collection of minutes and documents on the Tehran Conference made by Charles E. Bohlen, who served as President Roosevelt's interpreter with the Russians at Tehran.
2. *L/T Files*—The office files of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs.
3. *FE Files*—The files of the Bureau (Office) of Far Eastern Affairs.
4. *Moscow Embassy Files*—The records of the American Embassy at Moscow, which (for the period of World War II) are now in Washington.
5. *Cairo Legation Files*—The records of the American Legation at Cairo, which (for the period of World War II) are now in Washington.

6. *Tehran Legation Files*—The records of the American Legation at Tehran, which (for the period of World War II) are now in Washington.

B. OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. *Roosevelt Papers*—The papers of President Roosevelt in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York. This large collection was found to be particularly valuable for Heads of Government correspondence.

2. *Hopkins Papers*—The papers of Harry L. Hopkins, located in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Although many of the Hopkins files duplicate material in the Roosevelt papers, a few unique papers were found for publication in this volume.

3. *J. C. S. Files*—The files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These files provided documentation of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff. The approval of the British Chiefs of Staff, along with that of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, was obtained for the declassification of the Combined Chiefs of Staff documentation published in this volume.

4. *Defense Files*—The files of the Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of War and Navy and other relevant top-level files of the military departments for 1943.

5. *Leahy Papers*—A collection of official papers, now in the custody of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the office of the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, the late Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy. Although much of this material duplicates the J. C. S. Files, a few unique papers were found for publication in this volume.

6. *White House Files*—Although the White House does not maintain files of the papers of former Presidents, some portions of the White House files were found to be pertinent. Thus, from the files of the office of the Naval Aide there was obtained a copy of the booklet containing the Log of the President's trip to Cairo and Tehran in 1943.

7. *Censorship Files*—The files of the Office of Censorship, now in the National Archives. These files contained a few papers regarding the release of information to the press from Cairo and Tehran.

8. *Treasury Files*—The files of the Department of the Treasury provided several post-Conference documents.

9. *Hurley Papers*—The private papers of Patrick J. Hurley. General Hurley kindly made his papers available to the editors for the period of the Conferences at Cairo and Tehran. From these papers came the first draft of the Declaration on Iran (*post*, page 623) and considerable data incorporated in footnotes in this volume.

In addition to the collections listed above, the editors also consulted the papers of Cordell Hull and the diary of Fleet Admiral Leahy in the Library of Congress, the files of the Office of War Mobilization in the National Archives, the papers of Harry Dexter White at Princeton University, the diary of Henry L. Stimson at Yale University, the personal notes made by John P. Davies, Jr., on the Conferences at Cairo, and a number of special "lots" or unindexed files within the Department of State. From several of these sources there were derived items of information that have been incorporated in editorial notes where appropriate.

PUBLISHED SOURCES

A. OFFICIAL

In addition to the Department of State *Bulletin*, the official publications listed below were found to be of particular value in the preparation of this volume:

AMERICAN

- Gordon A. Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951) in the series *United States Army in World War II*. Hereafter cited as "Harrison".
- Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1959) in the series *United States Army in World War II*. Hereafter cited as "Matloff".
- Harley A. Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945*, Department of State Publication 3580 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949). Hereafter cited as "Notter".
- Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956) in the series *United States Army in World War II*. Hereafter cited as "*Stilwell's Command Problems*".
- United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents 1941-49*, Senate Document 123, 81st Congress, 1st Session (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950). Hereafter cited as "*Decade*".

BRITISH

- John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), volume 5. Hereafter cited as "Ehrman".

IRANIAN

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Tehran Conference* (Tehran, 1945).

RUSSIAN

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commission for the Publication of Diplomatic Documents, *Stalin's Correspondence With Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941-45* (New York: E. P. Dutton, Inc., 1958). This is a reprint in one volume of the two volumes published by the Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1957, under the title *Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R. and the Presidents of the U. S. A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945*. Hereafter cited as "*Stalin's Correspondence*".

B. UNOFFICIAL

Much authoritative information is to be found in unofficial publications written by those who participated in the Conferences (or in the preparations therefor) or by authors who used the papers of Conference participants. In view of the incompleteness of the official record on some aspects of the Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, the editors have made extensive use of such unofficial publications and have cited them for factual information which was noted as being specifically supplementary to, or at variance with, the official record. The Department of State assumes no responsibility for the accuracy of fact or interpretation in these unofficial publications. The publications of this type which have been consulted in the preparation of this volume are as follows:

- H. H. Arnold, *Global Mission* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949). Hereafter cited as "Arnold".
- Arthur Bryant, *Triumph in the West: A History of the War Years Based on the Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1959). Hereafter cited as "Alanbrooke".
- Winston S. Churchill, *Closing the Ring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959), volume V of the series *The Second World War*. Hereafter cited as "Churchill".
- Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, *A Sailor's Odyssey* (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1951).
- John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Cooperation With Russia* (New York: The Viking Press, 1947). Hereafter cited as "Deane".
- Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1948). Hereafter cited as "Eisenhower".
- Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). Hereafter cited as "Feis".
- General Sir Leslie Hollis, *One Marine's Tale* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1956).
- Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948; 2 volumes). Hereafter cited as "Hull".
- Lord Ismay, *The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay* (London: Heinemann, 1960).
- Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1952). Hereafter cited as "King".
- Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War* (London: John Murray, 1949).
- William D. Leahy, *I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time* (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1950). Hereafter cited as "Leahy".
- James Leasor, *The Clock With Four Hands* (New York: Reynal and Company, 1959).
- Don Lohbeck, *Patrick J. Hurley* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1956). Hereafter cited as "Lohbeck".
- Arthur C. Millspaugh, *Americans in Persia* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1946).

- King Peter of Yugoslavia, *A King's Heritage* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1954).
- Michael F. Reilly, *Reilly of the White House* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1947). Hereafter cited as "Reilly".
- Elliott Roosevelt, *As He Saw It* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946). Hereafter cited as "Elliott Roosevelt".
- Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948). Hereafter cited as "Sherwood".
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- General Albert C. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958).
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A list of post-Conference published statements by participants on the proceedings at the Cairo-Tehran Conferences will be found *post*, page 835.

EDITORIAL TREATMENT

In the preparation of this volume the editors have been guided by the regulations of the Department applicable to the *Foreign Relations* series, viz.:

045 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

045.1 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

045.2 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, shall be edited by the Historical Office of the Department of State. The editing of the record shall be guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There shall be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion was made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing shall be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents or parts of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.

- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department before the decision was made.

In general, the documents in this volume have been reproduced in their original form, retaining all permissible or readable variations in spelling, punctuation, and capitalization. Editorial corrections or insertions are always indicated by being placed in brackets, except in a few instances (particularly in telegrams) in which the editors corrected, without indication, obvious typographic or cryptographic mistakes and supplied necessary punctuation. The data appearing in the headings and subscriptions of the original documents (place, date, addresses, method of transmission, and classification) have been harmonized by the editors into a reasonably standard pattern in the headings as printed herein. Any substantive titles appearing on the original documents have been retained.

The classification of the document (top secret, secret, confidential, or restricted) is included in the printed heading if such information appears on the document itself. It should be noted, however, that in 1943 many documents were not given any formal classification, although they were handled as if classified and were in some instances so marked subsequently. The editors have endeavored to reproduce in this volume the original classification of the document (if any), disregarding subsequent modifications thereof. In instances in which the classification was stamped rather than typed on the text copy, it is possible that this classification was applied subsequently and did not appear on the document as originally prepared.

Most of the minutes presented in this volume contained lists of participants for each meeting reported on. In order to avoid the useless repetition of such lists and to harmonize differences in spelling, the editors have compiled a single list of the names of participants for each meeting of each Conference. A complete list of persons mentioned in the volume will be found beginning on page xxvii.

All telegraphic instructions of the Department of State are issued over the name of the Secretary or Acting Secretary, although in many cases the name of the Secretary or Acting Secretary is actually signed by an official of lower rank who subscribes his own initials. In the telegrams printed in this volume, such initials have been retained as a part of the signature, with a bracketed indication in each case of the identity of the signing officer. Similarly, in the case of those third-person communications which are customarily

initialed rather than signed, the initials have been retained, together with a bracketed indication of the name of the initialing officer.

A consolidated list of abbreviations, symbols, and code names will be found immediately following this introduction. An analytical list of papers will be found beginning on page XLIII.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, SYMBOLS, AND CODE NAMES

EDITOR'S NOTE.—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

- AA**, Anti-aircraft
A. A. F., Army Air Force
A-B, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)
ABDA, American-British-Dutch-Australian, applied to the theater of war from the Bay of Bengal to Australasia
Admiral Q. (or **Admiral Queen**), President Roosevelt
A. E. A. F., Allied Expeditionary Air Force
AFHQ, Allied Force Headquarters
AGC, Amphibious Command Ship
AlSib, Alaska-Siberia transportation route
ALUSNA, United States Naval Attaché
A. M. G., filing symbol signifying American Military Government
ANAKIM, planned operation to retake Burma and open the communications line to China through the port of Rangoon
ANFA, Casablanca
ANVIL, planned amphibious assault on southern France
A/SA/A, anti-submarine auxiliary ship
ATB, Committee for the Administration of Territories-Balkan (British)
A. T. C., Air Transport Command
AVALANCHE, Allied amphibious attack at Salerno, Italy
- B-24**, a type of four-engine long-range bomber
B-29, a type of four-engine heavy bomber
Beaufort, a type of British two-engined medium bomber
- Black**, communications indicator of the White House Map Room
Bns., battalions
BOAC, British Overseas Airways Corporation
BUCCANEER, planned amphibious operation against the Andaman Islands
BULLFROG, planned operation against the Arakan (Burma) coast
- C-46**, a type of twin-engine transport airplane
C-47, a type of twin-engine transport airplane
C-87, a type of four-engine transport airplane
CAIRO 3, Tehran
C. A. S., Chief of the Air Staff (British)
C. B. I., China-Burma-India (Theater of Operations)
CCAC, Combined Civil Affairs Committee
C. C. S., Combined Chiefs of Staff
Celestes, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
C in C, Commander in Chief
CN, Chinese national currency
Colonel Warden, Prime Minister Churchill
C. O. S., Chiefs of Staff
COSSAC, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (designate)
CULVERIN, planned attack on the Netherlands Indies
CVE, Aircraft Carrier Escort
- DD**, Destroyer

- D-day**, the first day of any military operation; specifically the day for launching **OVERLORD**
- DELAM**, communications indicator signifying American Delegation
- Dickie**, Lord Louis Mountbatten
- Divs.**, divisions
- DRAKE**, plan for the bombing of Japan from China
- E. A. C.**, European Advisory Commission
- ELAS**, Greek resistance forces
- ETOUSA**, European Theater of Operations, United States Army
- EUREKA**, the Tehran Conference of 1943
- EW**, filing symbol signifying European War
- EWT**, Eastern War Time
- FAN**, military communications indicator signifying North Africa
- fapi**, Chinese paper currency
- FE**, Far East
- FIRST CULVERIN**, planned operation against northern Sumatra
- Former Naval Person**, Prime Minister Churchill
- FREEDOM**, communications indicator for the Allied radio station at Algiers
- Generalissimo**, Chiang Kai-shek
- GHQ**, General Headquarters
- Gib.**, Gibraltar
- G. M. T.**, Greenwich Mean Time
- G. O. C.**, General Officer Commanding
- GRIPFAST**, planned attack on north and central Burma, a modification of **TARZAN**
- Halifax**, a type of British four-engine heavy bomber
- HERCULES**, planned operation against Rhodes
- H. M. G.**, His Majesty's Government (British)
- H. O.**, Hydrographic Office of the Navy
- Hurricane**, a type of British fighter plane
- HUSKY**, Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943
- Intd.**, initialed
- J. C. S.**, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Joe**, Joseph Stalin
- JU88**, a type of German bomber
- JUPITER**, planned attack on Norway
- Lancaster**, British four-engine heavy bomber
- LCA**, Landing Craft, Assault
- LCC**, Landing Control Craft
- LCI(L)**, Landing Craft, Infantry (Large)
- LCM**, Landing Craft, Mechanized
- LCP**, Landing Craft, Personnel
- LCP(L)**, Landing Craft, Personnel (Large)
- LCS(M)**, Landing Craft, Support (Medium)
- LCS(S)**, Landing Craft, Support (Small)
- LCT**, Landing Craft, Tank
- LCVP**, Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel
- L. of C.**, line of communications
- L. R. P.**, long-range penetration
- LRPG's**, Long-Range Penetration Groups
- LSI(L)**, Landing Ship, Infantry (Large)
- LST**, Landing Ship, Tank
- LVT**, Landing Vehicle, Tracked
- MATTERHORN**, plan for operating long-range bombers (B-29's) from Chungtu against Japan
- M. E.**, Middle East
- M. E. D. C.**, Middle East Defence Committee (British)
- MESC**, Middle East Supply Center
- M. I. M. E.**, Ministry of Information, Middle East (British)
- Mr. Brown**, Foreign Commissar Molotov
- Msg.**, message
- MT**, military transport
- MULBERRIES**, artificial harbors built for use in Operation **OVERLORD**
- NATO**, North African Theater of Operations
- N. E. I.**, Netherlands East Indies

- "O"**, Oran
- OBOE**, Oran
- O. S. S.**, Office of Strategic Services
- OVERLORD**, the Allied invasion of northwest Europe in the spring of 1944
- OWI**, Office of War Information
- PA/M**, Office of the Political Adviser (Murray) in the Department of State
- Panzer**, armor (German)
- P. M.**, Prime Minister (British)
- POINTBLANK**, the Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom against Germany
- P. R.**, Public Relations Office
- PW**, filing symbol signifying Pacific War
- P. W. E.**, Political Warfare Executive (British)
- QUADRANT**, the Quebec Conference of 1943
- R. A. F.**, Royal Air Force (British)
- RANKIN**, plan for the return of Allied forces to Continental Europe in the event of a sudden weakening of German resistance
- RANKIN C**, plan for the return of Allied forces to Continental Europe in the event of a collapse of German resistance
- RCA**, Radio Corporation of America
- R. D. F.**, radio direction finding (an early term for radar)
- R. N.**, Royal Navy (British)
- ROUNDUP**, plan for a major cross-channel operation in 1943
- S. A. C.**, Supreme Allied Commander
- SACSEA**, Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia
- SC**, Submarine Chaser (Patrol Vessel)
- SD**, communications indicator signifying Department of State
- S. E. A.**, Southeast Asia
- S. E. A. C.**, Southeast Asia Command
- SEXTANT**, the Cairo Conferences, November 22-26 and December 2-7, 1943
- S. I. M. E.**, Security Intelligence, Middle East (British)
- S. O. E.**, Secret Operations Executive (British)
- Spitfire**, a type of British fighter plane
- TARZAN**, India-based portion of a general offensive against Burma
- TRIDENT**, the Washington Conference in May 1943
- U**, Office of the Under Secretary of State
- U-boat**, German submarine
- U. E.**, unit equipment (equipment assigned to operational units)
- U. J.** (Uncle Joe), Marshal Stalin
- Uncle J.** (Uncle Joe), Marshal Stalin
- UKCC**, United Kingdom Commercial Corporation
- U. S. A. A. F.**, United States Army Air Forces
- U. S. A. F.**, United States Air Force
- USAFIME**, United States Army Forces in the Middle East
- USNAVCOM**, United States Navy communications indicator
- USSAFE**, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe
- USSS**, United States Secret Service
- V. L. R.**, very long range
- White**, communications indicator of the White House Map Room
- WT**, Wireless Transmitter
- X-force**, the Chinese Army in India
- Y date**, target date for any military operation, specifically with reference to Operation OVERLORD
- Y-force**, a group of American-sponsored Chinese divisions
- Z-force**, a group of about 30 Chinese divisions which were eventually to be reorganized and supplied with American equipment

LIST OF PERSONS MENTIONED

(The identification of the persons in this list is limited to circumstances and positions under reference in this volume. Names of persons who appear only as the authors of books cited in the volume are not included. Enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces are not included unless they are identified in some special capacity. All titles and positions are American unless there is an indication to the contrary.)

ACHESON, Dean G., Assistant Secretary of State.

AÇIKALIN, Cvat M., Turkish Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

ADLER, Solomon, Alternate United States member of the Chinese Stabilization Board.

ALA, Hosein, Minister of the Iranian Imperial Court.

ALEXANDER, BORIS, Second Lieutenant, U. S. A., Censor and Interpreter in the Persian Gulf Service Command, United States Army Forces in the Middle East.

ALEXANDER, Sir Harold, General, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy.

AL-KHOURI, Shaikh Bishara, President of Lebanon.

ALLEN, George V., Assistant Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State; member of the American Delegation to the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, October 19-30, 1943.

ALLING, Paul H., Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

AMBROSIO, Vittorio, Italian General, Chief of Staff of the Army, Inspector General (1943).

ANAMOSA, Harold D., Warrant Officer (jg) U. S. A., Research and Intelligence Section, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ANDERIMAN, Sureyya, Personal and Confidential Secretary to President İnönü of Turkey.

ANDERSON, Howard S., United States Secret Service Agent.

ANDERSON, Sir John, British Chancellor of the Exchequer.

ANTONESCU, Mihai, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Rumania.

ANTONOV, Alexey Innokentyevich, General, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Army.

ARKADIEV, Dmitri Vasilevich, General, Soviet Commissar of State Security.

ARNOLD, Henry H., General, U. S. A., Commanding General, Army Air Forces, and Chief of the Air Staff; member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ASSARSSON, Per Vilhelm Gustaf, Swedish Minister to Russia.

ATCHESON, George, Jr., Counselor of Embassy, Chungking.

AUCHINLECK, Sir Claude, General, Commander-in-Chief of British Forces in India.

BADGER, Oscar C., Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics Plans).

BADOGLIO, Pietro, Marshal, Italian Prime Minister, July 1943-June 1944.

BAKER, John, Air Vice Marshal, R. A. F., Senior Air Staff Officer, Air Command, Supreme Allied Command, Southeast Asia.

BALFOUR, John, Counsellor of the British Embassy at Moscow.

BALLANTINE, Joseph W., Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

- BARNES, Russell W., Chief, Egypt Division, Office of War Information, stationed at Cairo.
- BEARDALL, John R., Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Superintendent, United States Naval Academy.
- BEARY, James M., United States Secret Service Agent.
- BEAVERBROOK, Lord (William Maxwell Aitken), Lord Privy Seal.
- BEHN, Gerald A., United States Secret Service Agent.
- BERARDI, Paolo, Italian General.
- BEREZHKOV, Valentin Mikhailovich, Soviet Interpreter.
- BERGERY, Gaston, French Ambassador in the Soviet Union, April-June 1941.
- BERLE, Adolf A., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.
- BERMAN, Charles E., Captain, U. S. A., Interpreter, Office of Technical Information, Persian Gulf Service Command, United States Army Forces in the Middle East.
- BERRY, Charles N., Lieutenant (jg), U. S. N. R., assigned to the U. S. S. *Iowa*.
- BESSELL, William W., Jr., Colonel, U. S. A., member of the Strategy and Policy Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, and senior Army member of the Joint War Plans Committee.
- BIDDLE, Anthony J. Drexel, Jr., Ambassador to the Belgian Government-in-Exile in England.
- BIERI, Bernhard H., Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans) to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet; member of the Joint Staff Planners and of the Combined Staff Planners.
- BIRSE, Arthur H., Major, Interpreter in the British Embassy at Moscow.
- BISHOP, Max W., Consul at Colombo, Ceylon, April 1944-March 1945.
- BOETTIGER, John, Major, A. U. S., Executive Officer, Allied Military Government Section, Fifth Army, stationed in Italy; son-in-law of President Roosevelt.
- BOGGS, Samuel W., Geographer, Department of State.
- BOGUE, Robert W., Lieutenant (jg), U. S. N. R., Watch Officer, White House Map Room.
- BOHEMAN, Erik, Secretary-General, Swedish Foreign Office.
- BOHLEN, Charles E., Foreign Service Officer, appointed as Assistant Chief, Division of European Affairs, Department of State, August 1943; First Secretary, American Embassy at Moscow, November 1943-January 1944.
- BORIS III, King of Bulgaria, October 3, 1918-August 28, 1943.
- BOWMAN, Isaiah, President of the Johns Hopkins University; Special Adviser to the Secretary of State.
- BRACKEN, Brendan, British Minister of Information.
- BRADLEY, Follet, Major General, U. S. A., Commanding Officer, First Air Force; Representative of the President on a military mission to the Soviet Union in 1942.
- BROOKE, Sir Alan, General, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff; member of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- BROWN, Francis D. W., Assistant Private Secretary to Prime Minister Churchill.
- BROWN, R. F., First Lieutenant, A. U. S., co-pilot of President Roosevelt's plane.
- BROWN, Wilson, Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Naval Aide to the President.
- BRYAN, Otis F., Major, A. U. S., pilot of President Roosevelt's plane.
- BUCKNELL, Howard, Jr., Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom.
- BULLARD, Sir Reader, British Minister in Iran.
- BURNS, James H., Major General, U. S. A., Chief of Army Ordnance.
- BURROUGH, Edmund W., Captain, U. S. N., member of the staff of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and senior Naval member of the Joint War Plans Committee.
- BUTLER, Hugh Alfred, United States Senator from Nebraska.

- BYRNES, James F., Director of War Mobilization; Secretary of State, July 1945-January 1947.
- CADOGAN, Sir Alexander, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- CAFFERY, Jefferson, Ambassador in Brazil, 1937-44.
- ÇAKMAK, Şefik, Lieutenant General, ranking Air Force Officer of the Turkish General Staff.
- CALLAGHAN, Daniel J., Captain, U. S. N., assigned to the U. S. S. *Iowa*.
- CAMPBELL, Cecil James Henry, Major, British Intelligence Corps, Managing Director, Marconi Radio Telegraph Company, Egypt.
- CAMPBELL, Sir Ronald Hugh, British Ambassador in Portugal.
- CAMPBELL, Sir Ronald Ian, Minister, British Embassy at Washington.
- CARROLL, Wallace, Director of the London Bureau of the Office of War Information.
- CARROLL, Monsignor Walter S., Director, Vatican Services, Africa and Southern Italy, 1943-44.
- CARTON DE WIART, Adrian, Lieutenant General, assigned to the Asia Command; Special British Military Representative to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
- CASEY, Richard Gardiner (of Australia), member of the War Cabinet of the United Kingdom; Minister of State Resident in the Middle East.
- CASEY, Thomas J., Commander, U. S. N., Executive Officer of the U. S. S. *Iowa*.
- CATROUX, Georges, French General, with Free French Forces in the Middle East.
- CHANG Chien, Chinese General, Chairman of the Szechwan Provincial Government.
- CHAPMAN, William W., Major, U. S. A., Assistant Deputy Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- CHENNAULT, Claire L., Major General, U. S. A., Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, United States Army Air Forces.
- CHERWELL, Lord, British Paymaster-General, Personal Assistant to Prime Minister Churchill.
- CHEVES, Gilbert X., Brigadier General, U. S. A., Chief of Staff, United States Army Forces in the Middle East.
- CHIANG Kai-shek, Generalissimo, President of the National Government of the Republic of China.
- CHIANG, May-ling (Soong), Madame Chiang Kai-shek.
- CHOU Chih-jou, Lieutenant General, Director, Aeronautic Affairs Commission, National Government of China.
- CHRISTIAN X, King of Denmark.
- CHU Shih-ming, Major General, Military Attaché, Chinese Embassy at Washington.
- CHURCHILL, Clementine (Mrs. Winston S. Churchill).
- CHURCHILL, Randolph F. E. S., Captain, 4th Hussars, son of Prime Minister Churchill.
- CHURCHILL, Winston S., British Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.
- CICOGNANI, Amleto Giovanni, Archbishop, Apostolic Delegate in the United States.
- CIECHANOWSKI, Jan, Polish Ambassador in the United States.
- CLARK, Bennett Champ, United States Senator from Missouri.
- CLARK KEER, Sir Archibald, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
- COBB, E. H. W., Brigadier, British Army; assigned to the General Staff (Plans), General Headquarters, India.
- COLERIDGE, Richard Duke, Commander, R. N., Deputy Secretary, British Joint Staff Mission at Washington, and British Deputy Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff.

- COLLINS, Ogden S., Jr., Lieutenant (jg), U. S. N. R., Watch Officer, White House Map Room.
- CONNOLLY, Donald H., Major General, U. S. A., Commanding General, Persian Gulf Service Command, United States Army Forces in the Middle East.
- CONNOLLY, Tom, United States Senator from Texas; Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
- COOK, E. D. R., Colonel, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff, Commander, Northwest African Air Force.
- COOKE, Charles M., Jr., Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans) to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet; member of the Joint Board.
- CORNELIUS, Albert M., Warrant Officer (jg), U. S. A., assigned to the White House Map Room, member of the President's party to Cairo.
- CORNWALL-JONES, Arthur Thomas, Colonel, Secretary of the British Middle East Defence Committee.
- CUNNINGHAM, Sir Andrew, Admiral of the Fleet, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff; member of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- CUNNINGHAM, Sir John, Admiral, R. N., Commander in Chief, Allied Fleet in the Mediterranean.
- CURZON OF KEDLESTON, George Nathaniel, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1919-24.
- CUSHING, G., First Lieutenant, A. U. S., navigator of President Roosevelt's plane.
- DAMASKINOS, Archbishop of Athens and Primate of Greece.
- DARST, R., Second Lieutenant, A. U. S., flight engineer of President Roosevelt's plane.
- DAVIES, John Paton, Jr., Second Secretary of Embassy at Chungking; Political Adviser to the Commanding General, United States Forces, China-Burma-India Theater (General Stilwell).
- DAVIES, Joseph E., Ambassador in the Soviet Union, 1936-39; Special Representative of the President with the rank of Ambassador, on a mission to the Soviet Union, May-June 1943.
- DAVIS, Elmer, Director of the Office of War Information.
- DEANE, John R., Major General, U. S. A., Chief of the United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union.
- DECKARD, Wilmer K., United States Secret Service Agent.
- DE GAULLE, Charles, General, President of the French Committee of National Liberation.
- DENING, Maberly Esler, British Diplomatic Officer, Chief Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command (Lord Louis Mountbatten).
- DE RHÉ-PHILIPPE, Arthur Terrence, Brigadier, Deputy Quartermaster General, Allied Force Headquarters, Tunis.
- DEVENNEY, John, Warrant Officer (jg), U. S. A.
- DEVERS, Jacob L., Lieutenant General, U. S. A., Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, United States Army.
- DIETHELM, André, Commissioner for Food Supply and Production, French Committee of National Liberation.
- DILL, Sir John, Field Marshal, Head of the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington.
- DIXON, Sir Owen, Australian Minister at Washington.
- DOBSON, W. A. C. H., Lieutenant Colonel, British Army.

- DONOVAN, William J., Brigadier General, U. S. A., Director, Office of Strategic Services.
- DOUGLAS, Lewis W., Deputy Administrator, War Shipping Administration.
- DOUGLAS, Sir Sholto, Air Chief Marshal, Commanding Officer, Royal Air Force in the Middle East.
- DOYLE, Austin K., Captain, U. S. N., member of the Joint Staff Planners and of the Combined Staff Planners.
- DREYFUS, Louis G., Jr., Minister in Iran, July 1939–March 1944.
- DUNN, James Clement, Foreign Service Officer, member of the Interdepartmental Committee on Political Planning, November 1942–January 1944; member, Policy Committee and Coordinating Committee, Commission for Economic Policy in Liberated Areas, 1943.
- DURNO, George H. E., Major, A. U. S., Press Relations Officer of President Roosevelt's party to Cairo and Tehran.
- EAKER, Ira C., Lieutenant General, U. S. A., Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, United States Army Air Forces.
- EARLY, Stephen, Secretary to President Roosevelt.
- EDEN, Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- EDEN, Beatrice (Mrs. Anthony Eden).
- EISENHOWER, Dwight D., General, U. S. A., Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Northwest Africa; designated December 5, 1943, as Commander of OVERLORD, effective as of a later date; designated Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater, December 9, 1943, effective December 10; entered upon the duties of the position of Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces in January 1944.
- ELLIOTT, William, Air Commodore, R. A. F., Director of Plans, British Air Ministry.
- FAIRCHILD, Muir S., Major General, U. S. A., member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee.
- FARISH, Linn M., Major, A. U. S., member of the Allied Military Mission to Yugoslavia, September–October 1943.
- FAROUK I, King of Egypt.
- FERENBAUGH, Claude B., Colonel, U. S. A., Chief, North African Section, Theater Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff.
- FLYTHE, William H., Captain, Medical Corps, U. S. A., assigned to President Roosevelt's plane on the flight from Tehran to Cairo.
- FOCH, Ferdinand, Marshal of France, Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies, 1918.
- Foo Ping-sheung, Chinese Ambassador at Moscow.
- FOX, George A., Lieutenant Commander, Hospital Corps, U. S. N., medical attendant to President Roosevelt.
- FOX, Sanford, Second Lieutenant, A. U. S., steward on President Roosevelt's plane from Oran to Tunis.
- FRANCO Y BAHAMONDE, Francisco, Generalissimo, Chief of State and President of Spain.
- FREDERICKS, Charles W., United States Secret Service Agent.
- FRESEMAN, William L., Captain, U. S. N., Aide to Admiral Leahy.
- GATCH, Nancy, Red Cross worker, daughter of Rear Admiral T. L. Gatch, U. S. N.
- GAUSS, Clarence E., Ambassador in China.
- GEORGE II, King of the Hellenes.
- GEORGE VI, King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

- GEORGE, Robert Allingham, Air Vice Marshal, Air Attaché, British Embassy at Ankara.
- GIBBS, W. Francis, Office of War Mobilization.
- GIRAUD, Henri Honoré, French Civil and Military Commander in Chief, North Africa, 1943; Joint President of the French Committee of National Liberation, 1943-44.
- GLASSFORD, William Alexander, Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Personal Representative of President Roosevelt, with rank of Minister, on special mission to French West Africa (1943).
- GRAY, Cecil W., Foreign Service Officer assigned to the Office of the Secretary of State.
- GREER, De Witt, Major, Signal Corps, U. S. A., in charge of the Signal Corps detachment at the White House.
- GREW, Joseph C., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from September 1942; Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, from May 1944; Under Secretary of State, December 1944-August 1945.
- GRIFFITH, James H., United States Secret Service Agent.
- GROMYKO, Andrey Andreyevich, Soviet Ambassador in the United States, 1943-46.
- GRYZLOV, Anatoly Alexeyevich, Major General, Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Soviet Army.
- GULBENKIAN, G. S., independent oil promoter, holder of a substantial interest in the Iraq Petroleum Company.
- GUSEV, Fedor Tarasovich, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom and Soviet Representative on the European Advisory Commission.
- HACKWORTH, Green H., Legal Adviser, Department of State.
- HALIFAX, Viscount, British Ambassador in the United States.
- HAMAN, Walter A., United States Secret Service Agent.
- HAMILTON, Maxwell M., Minister Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union.
- HAMMOND, Thomas W., Colonel, U. S. A., Secretary, Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff.
- HANDY, Thomas T., Major General, U. S. A., Chief of the Operations Division, War Department General Staff.
- HANNON, J. M., Lieutenant, U. S. N. R.
- HANSELL, Haywood S., Jr., Brigadier General, U. S. A., Chief, Combined and Joint Staff Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans), United States Army Air Forces.
- HARRIMAN, Kathleen, daughter of Ambassador Harriman.
- HARRIMAN, W. Averell, Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
- HARRISON, Geoffrey Wedgwood, First Secretary, British Foreign Office.
- HASSANAYN, Sir Ahmad, Pasha, Chief of the Royal Egyptian Cabinet.
- HASSETT, William D., member of the White House staff.
- HASTINGS, Robert R., United States Secret Service Agent.
- HAYES, Carleton J. H., Ambassador in Spain.
- HAYTER, William, First Secretary of the British Embassy at Washington.
- HEAD, Anton, Brigadier, Staff Assistant to Brigadier Laycock.
- HEARN, Thomas G., Major General, U. S. A., Chief of Staff, United States Army Forces, China-Burma-India.
- HELLEU, Jean, Delegate General to the Levant, French Committee of National Liberation.
- HELM, Alexander Knox, Counsellor of the British Embassy in Turkey.
- HENRY, John, Major, U. S. A., Aide to Brigadier General Patrick J. Hurley, U. S. A.
- HEWITT, Henry K., Vice Admiral, U. S. N., Commander, United States Eighth Fleet; Commander, United States Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters.

- HILLDRING, John H., Major General, U. S. A., Director, Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff.
- HIROHITO, Emperor of Japan.
- HITLER, Adolf, Führer and Chancellor of the German Reich.
- Ho Ying-chin, General, Chinese Minister of War.
- HOLLIS, Leslie Chasemore, Brigadier, Royal Marines, Senior Assistant Secretary, Office of the British War Cabinet; member of the Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- HOLMAN, Adrian, Counsellor of the British Embassy in Iran.
- HOLMES, Robert E., United States Secret Service Agent.
- HOPKINS, Harry L., Special Assistant to the President.
- HOPKINS, Robert, Sergeant, U. S. A., Signal Corps photographer, son of the Special Assistant to the President.
- HORNBECK, Stanley K., Adviser on Political Relations, Department of State.
- HORNE, Frederick J., Vice Admiral, U. S. N., Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
- HOYNINGEN-HÜHNE, Oswald, Baron von, German Minister in Portugal.
- HSU Nien-tseng, appointed Chinese Minister to Egypt; presented his credentials in January 1944.
- HUGHES, Arthur, the Very Reverend, Chargé d'Affaires, Apostolic Delegation at Cairo.
- HULL, Cordell, Secretary of State.
- HUOT, Louis, Major, A. U. S., Office of Strategic Services.
- HURLEY, Patrick J., Brigadier General, U. S. A., Personal Representative of the President on a mission to the Middle East, with the rank of Ambassador; Ambassador in China, November 1944–November 1945.
- ILIFF, William A. B., Major, Financial Counsellor, British Legation in Iran; member of the British Delegation to the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.
- İNÖNÜ, İsmet, President of Turkey.
- ISMAY, Sir Hastings Lionel, Lieutenant General, Deputy Secretary (Military) to the War Cabinet and Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence.
- JEBB, Gladwyn, Counsellor in the British Foreign Office.
- JENKINS, Reuben E., Colonel, U. S. A., Chief of the Plans Section, G-3 Division, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers.
- JERNEGAN, John D., Third Secretary and Vice Consul, Legation in Iran.
- JOHNSON, Herschel, Minister in Sweden.
- JORDAN, Stanley Rupert, British Minister in Saudi Arabia.
- JORDANA, Count Francisco Gómez, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- JOYCE, Kenyon A., Major General, U. S. A., Acting Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission for Italy.
- KAVTARADZE, Sergey Ivanovich, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
- KAVUR, Sadi, *Chef du Cabinet* of the Turkish Foreign Office.
- KELLERMAN, Roy H., United States Secret Service Agent.
- KELLEY, Robert F., Counselor of Embassy in Turkey.
- KENNAN, George F., Counselor of Legation in Portugal from August 1942; Counselor of the American Delegation to the European Advisory Commission from December 1, 1943.
- KEVERS, John H., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N., Commanding Officer, U. S. S. *Potomac*.
- KEYNES, Lord, member of the Consultative Council of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer.

- KILLEARN, Lord (Sir Miles Lampson), British Ambassador to Egypt and High Commissioner for the Sudan.
- KING, Ernest J., Admiral, U. S. N., Commander in Chief of the Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations; member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- KING, William Lyon Mackenzie, Prime Minister of Canada.
- KIRBY, Stanley Woodburn, Major General, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, India, 1942-43; Director of Civil Affairs, British War Office, 1943-44.
- KIRK, Alexander C., Ambassador to the Government of Greece established in Egypt, June 1943; Minister in Egypt, February 1941-March 1944.
- KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN, Sir Hughe, British Ambassador in Turkey.
- KNOX, W. Franklin, Secretary of the Navy, 1940-44.
- KOHLER, Foy D., Foreign Service Officer assigned to the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.
- KOLLONTAY, Madame Aleksandra Mikhailovna, Soviet Ambassador in Sweden.
- KUNG, H. H., Vice President of the Executive Yuan of the National Government of China.
- KUTER, Laurence S., Brigadier General, U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans), United States Army Air Forces.
- LAMBE, Charles Edward, Captain, R. N., Director of Plans, British Admiralty.
- LANDIS, James M., Director of United States Economic Operations in the Middle East and Principal United States Civilian Representative at the Middle East Supply Center, Cairo, with the rank of Minister.
- LARSON, G., Warrant Officer (jg), U. S. A., member of the party of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on board the U. S. S. *Iowa*.
- LASCELLES, J. H., Colonel, British Army.
- LAUREL, José R., President of the puppet government of the Philippines set up by the Japanese.
- LAVAL, Pierre, French Deputy Premier, July-December 1940; also Minister of Foreign Affairs, October-December 1940.
- LAYCOCK, Robert Edward, Major General, Director of British Army, Navy, and Air Force Combined Operations (Commandos).
- LEAHEY, George A., Commander, U. S. N., Damage Control Officer of the U. S. S. *Iowa*.
- LEAHY, William D., Admiral, U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy, member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- LEATHERS, Lord (Frederick James), British Minister of War Transport.
- LEEPER, R. A., British Ambassador to the Government of Greece at Cairo.
- LEWIS, Richard George, Major General, British Army, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers.
- LIN Sen, President of the National Government of China, 1931-43.
- LIN Wei, Lieutenant General, Chief of the Office of Aide-de-Camp to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
- LITVINOV, Maxim Maximovich, Soviet Ambassador in the United States, November 1941-August 1943.
- LIU, John, Colonel, Chinese Army.
- LLEWELLIN, John Jestyn, Colonel, British Minister for Supply in Washington, 1942-43; Minister of Food from November 12, 1943.
- LONG, Victor D., Commander, U. S. N., Aide to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
- LOPEZ, Alfonso, President of Colombia.
- LOUDON, Alexander, Netherlands Ambassador in the United States.

- LOVETT, Robert A., Assistant Secretary of War.
LOWERY, Robert, United States Secret Service Agent.
LUNGH, Hugh A., Captain, British Interpreter.
- MACDONALD, Byron D., Lend-Lease official at Tehran.
MACKENZIE, Donald K., special correspondent of the *New York Daily News*, Cairo.
MACLEAN, Fitzroy H. R., Brigadier, Head of British Military Mission to Yugoslavia.
MACMILLAN, Harold, British member of the Allied Control Commission for Italy.
MACREADY, Gordon Nevil, Chief of the British Army Staff at Washington.
MACVEAGH, Lincoln, Ambassador to the Government of Greece established in Egypt.
MAGLIONE, Luigi Cardinal, Secretary of State, the Vatican.
MALLABY, G., Lieutenant Colonel, British Army.
MANIU, Iuliu, President of the National Peasant Party of Rumania.
MARSHALL, George C., General, U. S. A., Chief of Staff of the Army; member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; Secretary of State, January 1947-January 1949.
MARTEL, Geffard Le Quesne, Lieutenant General, Chief of the British Military Mission to Moscow (1943).
MARTIN, John Miller, Principal Private Secretary to Prime Minister Churchill.
MATHEWSON, Lemuel, Colonel, U. S. A., Assistant Military Aide to the President, in charge of the communications center in the White House Map Room.
MATSUOKA, Yosuke, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1940-41.
MATTHEWS, H. Freeman, Foreign Service Officer; Chief, Division of European Affairs, Department of State; Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs, Department of State, from January 15, 1944.
MAUNSELL, Raymund John, Colonel, serving in the British Office of Security Intelligence, Middle East.
MAXIMOV, Mikhail Alexeyevich, Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Iran.
MCCAIN, John S., Admiral, U. S. N., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air.
MCCARTHY, C. W., Colonel, U. S. A.
MCCARTHY, Frank, Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A., Assistant Secretary of the War Department General Staff.
MCCARTHY, Leighton, Canadian Ambassador in the United States.
MCCLENAHAN, R. W., Lieutenant Colonel, Military Intelligence, United States Army Forces in the Middle East.
MCCLOY, John J., Assistant Secretary of War.
MCCREA, John L., Captain, U. S. N., Commanding Officer, U. S. S. *Iowa*.
MCFARLAND, Andrew J., Colonel, U. S. A., Deputy Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and United States Deputy Secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
MCINTIRE, Ross T., Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Surgeon General, United States Navy.
MCNAIR, John Kirkland, Brigadier, Army Planner, British Joint Staff Mission at Washington.
MCNARNEY, Joseph T., Lieutenant General, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army.
MEIKLEJOHN, Robert P., Lieutenant, U. S. N. R., Assistant Naval Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché for Air, American Embassy at Moscow.
MENEMENÇIOĞLU, Numan, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs.
MENEMENÇIOĞLU, Torgut, *Chef du Cabinet* to the Turkish Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs (Açıklan).

- MERRILL, Frank D., Brigadier General, U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans and Operations), Rear Echelon, United States Army Forces, China-Burma-India.
- MESSE, Giovanni, General of the Army, Italian Chief of Staff, captured May 1943.
- METAXAS, John, General, Prime Minister of Greece, 1936-41.
- MIHAILOVIĆ, Draža, General, leader of the Yugoslav forces operating under the direction of the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile.
- MIKHAILOV, Sergi Sergeyevich, attached to the Soviet Embassy in Turkey.
- MIKOŁAJCZYK, Stanisław, Prime Minister in the Polish Government-in-Exile at London, 1943-44.
- MILLER, C. E., Major, U. S. A., member of the party of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on board the U. S. S. *Iowa*.
- MILLSPAUGH, Arthur C., Administrator General of Finances of Iran.
- MITCHELL, Nicholas Eric, Major, U. S. A., Aide-de-Camp and Liaison Officer for Major General Connolly.
- MOHAMED ALI, Prince, heir presumptive to the throne of Egypt.
- MOLOTOV, Vyacheslov Mikhailovich, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
- MONTGOMERY, Sir Bernard, General, Commanding Officer of the British Eighth Army.
- MOORE, R. Walton, Counselor, Department of State, 1937-40.
- MOOSE, James S., Jr., Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia.
- MORAN, Lord (Charles McMoran Wilson), Personal Physician to Prime Minister Churchill.
- MORGAN, Frederick Edgworth, Lieutenant General, British Army, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (designate) for OVERLORD.
- MORGENTHAU, Henry, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury.
- MORRISON, Chester, representative of the National Broadcasting Company, Cairo.
- MORTON, Desmond John Falkiner, Personal Assistant to Prime Minister Churchill.
- MOUNTBATTEN, Lord Louis, Admiral, R. N., Supreme Allied Commander, South-east Asia Command.
- MRUK, Joseph, Congressman from New York.
- MURPHY, Robert D., American Foreign Service Officer, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater; American member, Allied Control Commission for Italy, with the rank of Ambassador.
- MURRAY, Wallace, Adviser on Political Relations, Department of State.
- MUSSOLINI, Benito, Head of the Italian Government and Prime Minister, October 1922-July 1943.
- NAHAS, Mustafa an-, Pasha, Egyptian Prime Minister.
- NASH, Walter, New Zealand Minister in the United States.
- NELSON, Donald M., Chairman of the War Production Board.
- NORWEB, R. Henry, Minister in Portugal, with the Personal Rank of Ambassador, appointed November 15, 1943.
- O'DONNELL, Emmett, Jr., Colonel, U. S. A., member, Office of the Advisory Council, Headquarters, United States Army Air Forces.
- OLIVER, Sarah (Churchill), Section Officer, Women's Auxiliary Air Force; daughter of Prime Minister Churchill.
- OLSEN, Clarence E., Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Chief of the Naval Division, Military Mission to the Soviet Union.
- O'NEIL, Con Douglas Walter, Adviser on German Affairs, British Foreign Office.
- ORBAY, Kazim, General, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Army.

- ORLANDO, Taddeo, General, Commander of the Italian XX Army Corps.
- OSBORNE, Sir D'Arcy, British Minister to the Vatican.
- OSMAN, Sergio, Vice President of the Philippine Commonwealth.
- PAHLAVI, Mohammad Reza Shah, Shah-in-Shah of Iran.
- PANTUHOFF, Oleg I., Jr., Major, U. S. A., Aide-de-Camp to Major General D. H. Connolly.
- PAPEN, Franz von, German Ambassador in Turkey.
- PARR, Grant, representative of the National Broadcasting Company, Cairo.
- PAUL, Crown Prince of Greece.
- PAVLOV, Vladimir Nikolayevich, Personal Secretary and Interpreter to Marshal Stalin.
- PEAKE, Charles, British Representative to the French National Committee, from February 9, 1942; British Political Liaison Officer with the Supreme Allied Commander, with the personal rank of Minister, from October 1, 1943.
- PEIRSE, Sir Richard Edmund Charles, Air Chief Marshal, Commander, Air Forces, Southeast Asia.
- PÉTAIN, Henri Philippe, Marshal, Chief of State of France.
- PETER II, King of Yugoslavia.
- PHILLIPS, William, United States Political Adviser to the Commanding General, Allied Forces, European Theater of Operations (General Eisenhower).
- PICCARDI, Leopoldo, Italian Minister of Industry and Trade.
- PIUS XII, The Supreme Pontiff, Vatican City.
- PLEVEN, René, Commissioner of Colonies, Free French Committee in Algiers.
- POGUE, A. Welch, Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board.
- PORTAL, Sir Charles, Air Chief Marshal, R. A. F., Chief of the Air Staff, member of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- POWER, M. L., Captain, R. N.
- PRETTYMAN, Arthur S., Chief Steward, U. S. N., President Roosevelt's valet.
- PRICE, Byron, Director, Office of Censorship.
- PURIĆ, Božidar, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile.
- PUTNAM, Russell L., Major, A. U. S.
- QUEZON, Manuel L., President of the Philippine Commonwealth.
- REDMAN, Harold, Brigadier, Secretary, British Joint Staff Mission at Washington; British Secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- REED, Chester J., Lieutenant (jg), U. S. N. R., Commanding Officer of the U. S. S. *SC-664*.
- REILLY, Michael F., Supervising Agent, United States Secret Service.
- REINHARDT, G. Frederick, Foreign Service Officer assigned to the Division of European Affairs, Department of State.
- RIBBENTROP, Joachim von, German Foreign Minister.
- RIDDELL-WEBSTER, Sir Thomas, General, Quartermaster General to the Forces, British War Office.
- RIGDON, William M., Lieutenant (jg), U. S. N., Personal Secretary to the President.
- ROATTA, Mario, General, Chief of the Italian General Staff.
- ROBERTS, Frank N., Brigadier General, U. S. A., Chief, Strategy and Policy Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff; a member of the Joint Staff Planners and of the Combined Staff Planners.
- ROBERTS, Roy Allison, Managing Editor of the *Kansas City Star*; President of the American Society of Newspaper Editors; Chairman of the Newspaper Advisory Committee of the Office of War Information.

- ROCKEFELLER, Nelson A., Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.
- ROGERS, G. E. F., Captain, A. U. S.
- RONALD, Nigel Bruce, Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.
- ROOSEVELT, Elliott, Colonel, U. S. A., Commanding Officer, 90th Photo Reconnaissance Wing, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces; son of President Roosevelt.
- ROOSEVELT, Franklin D., President of the United States, March 4, 1933–April 12, 1945.
- ROOSEVELT, Franklin D., Jr., Lieutenant, U. S. N. R.; Executive Officer of the U. S. S. *Mayrent*; son of President Roosevelt.
- ROWLEY, James J., United States Secret Service Agent.
- ROYAL, Forrest B., Captain, U. S. N., Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and United States Secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- ROYCE, Ralph, Major General, U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Middle East.
- RYAN, Curteis Norwood, Controller, Middle East Services, British Ministry of Information, Cairo.
- RYTI, Risto, President of Finland, 1940–44.
- SA'ED-MARAGHEH'I, Mohammed, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran.
- SAKSIN, Georgy Filippovich, Acting Soviet Representative, European Advisory Commission.
- SALAZAR, Antonio de Oliveira, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of War of Portugal.
- SARACOĞLU, Şükrü, Prime Minister of Turkey.
- SARPER, Selim, Director General of the Press of Turkey.
- SAUD, Ibn ('Abd-al-'Aziz ibn-'Abd-al-Rahman al-Faisal Al-Sa'ud), King of Saudi Arabia.
- SERGEYEV, Vasily Alekseyevich, People's Vice Commissar for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union.
- SFORZA, Count Carlo, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 1920–July 1921.
- SHANG Chen, General, Chief of the General Office and of the Foreign Affairs Bureau, National Military Council of China.
- SHANNON, Neil A., United States Secret Service Agent.
- SHEA, Frank, News Editor, Egypt Division, Office of War Information, stationed at Cairo.
- SHERWOOD, Robert E., Director, Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information.
- SHUSTER, W. Morgan, American Citizen serving as Treasurer-General of Persia (Iran) in 1911.
- SILTON, George B., Captain, A. U. S., assigned to Headquarters, Persian Gulf Service Command, United States Army Forces in the Middle East.
- SINCLAIR, Allan Fergus Wilson, Director, British Information Service, Middle East.
- SLIM, William Joseph, Lieutenant General, Commander-in-Chief, Fourteenth British Army.
- SMIRNOV, Andrei Andreyevich, Soviet Ambassador in Iran.
- SMITH, Joseph, Colonel, U. S. A., member of the Joint War Plans Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- SMITH, M. Frederick, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury.
- SMITH, Walter Bedell, Lieutenant General, U. S. A., Chief of Staff, Allied Forces, Mediterranean.
- SMUTS, Jan Christian, Field Marshal, Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.
- SOHEILI, Ali, Iranian Prime Minister.

- SOMERVELL, Brehon B., Lieutenant General, U. S. A., Commanding General, Army Service Forces.
- SOMERVILLE, Sir James, Admiral, R. N., Commander of the Eastern Fleet.
- SOONG, T. V., Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- SPAATZ, Carl, Lieutenant General, U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Twelfth Air Force; and Commanding General, Northwest African Allied Air Forces.
- SPALDING, Sidney P., Brigadier General, U. S. A., Chief, Supervision Division, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union.
- SPAMAN, Guy H., United States Secret Service Agent.
- SPELLMAN, Francis J., Archbishop of New York.
- SPICER, Vernon D., United States Secret Service Agent.
- STALIN, Iosif Vissarionovich, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.
- STALLINGS, L. T., Lieutenant Commander, United States Coast Guard Reserve.
- STANDLEY, William H., Admiral, U. S. N., retired, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, February 14, 1942–October 1, 1943.
- STANLEY, Oliver Frederick George, British Secretary of State for the Colonies.
- STAYNER, Gerrard Francis Hood, Brigadier, British Army, serving in Malta.
- STEINHARDT, Laurence A., Ambassador in Turkey.
- STETTINIUS, Edward R., Jr., Under Secretary of State; Secretary of State, November 30, 1944–June 27, 1945.
- STEVENS, Harry E., Second Secretary of Embassy in China.
- STEVENSON, Ralph Clarmont Skrine, British Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile.
- STILWELL, Joseph W., Lieutenant General, U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Army Forces, China–Burma–India; Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command; Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander, China Theater (Generalissimo Chiang); Commanding General, Chinese Army in India.
- STIMSON, Henry L., Secretary of War, 1940–45.
- STONE, R. G. W., General, Commander-in-Chief, British Troops in Egypt.
- STOPFORD, Montagu George North, Major General, British Army, Commander of the Thirty-third Indian Corps.
- STRANG, Sir William, British Representative on the European Advisory Commission, with the rank of Ambassador.
- STRATEMEYER, George E., Major General, U. S. A., Commanding General, Army Air Forces, India–Burma Sector, China–Burma–India.
- STUART, J. Leighton, Ambassador in China, 1946–52.
- SUGDEN, Cecil Stanway, Brigadier, Director of Plans, British War Office.
- SUMMERSBY, Kay, Lieutenant, W. A. C., General Eisenhower's chauffeur.
- SURLES, Alexander D., Major General, U. S. A., Director, Bureau of Public Relations, War Department.
- SUTHERLAND, Richard K., Major General, U. S. A., Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area (General MacArthur).
- SWEET, Joseph B., Brigadier General, U. S. A., Director, Motor Transport Services, Persian Gulf Service Command, United States Army Forces in the Middle East.
- T'ANG Wu, Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in Egypt.
- TANSEY, Patrick H., Brigadier General, U. S. A., Chief, Logistics Group, War Department General Staff.
- TAUSSIG, Charles W., Chairman, United States Section of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, and Co-Chairman of the Commission.

- TEDDER, Sir Arthur, Air Chief Marshal, Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Air Command.
- TERRY, Francis J., Lieutenant (jg), U. S. N., assigned to the U. S. S. *Iowa*.
- THOMA, Wilhelm Ritter von, Lieutenant General, Commander, Twentieth Panzer Division, Reichswehr, from October 1941; designated Acting Commander of the German Africa Corps (in the absence of the Commanding General), September 1942; captured by the British at El Alamein in early November 1942.
- THOMPSON, Charles Rolfe, Commander, R. N., Personal Assistant to the Minister of Defence, Winston S. Churchill.
- TIMBERMAN, Thomas S., Colonel, Chief, Asiatic Section, Theater Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff.
- TITO, Josip Broz, Commander of the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation.
- TITTMANN, Harold H., Jr., Assistant to the Personal Representative of the President of the United States to Pope Pius XII.
- TODD, Walter E., Colonel, Deputy Chief (Air), Strategy and Policy Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff.
- TONG, Hollington K., member of the Chinese Delegation at the First Cairo Conference; Director, Information Office, Government of China in 1948; Chinese Ambassador at Washington, 1956-58.
- TRIPPE, Juan, President and General Manager, Pan American Airways System.
- TROUBRIDGE, Thomas Hope, Rear Admiral, R. N., serving in the Mediterranean.
- TROUTBECK, John Munro, Counsellor, British Foreign Office.
- TRUMAN, Harry S., President of the United States, 1945-53.
- TSAI Wen-chih, Major General, member, Chinese Military Mission to the United States.
- TSOUDEROS, Emmanuel, Prime Minister of the Greek Government-in-Exile.
- TULLY, Grace, Secretary to President Roosevelt.
- UNER, Celal, Major, First Aide-de-Camp to the President of Turkey.
- VANDENBERG, Hoyt S., Brigadier General, U. S. A., Chief of the United States Air Mission to the Soviet Union.
- VICTOR EMMANUEL III, King of Italy.
- VINOGRADOV, Sergei Alexandrovich, Soviet Ambassador in Turkey.
- VOROSHILOV, Kliment Efremovich, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Military Adviser to Marshal Stalin; member of the State Defense Committee of the Soviet Union.
- VYSHINSKY, Andrey Yanuaryevich, First Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union; Representative of the Soviet Union on the Allied Advisory Council at Algiers.
- WADSWORTH, George, Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut and Damascus.
- WALLACE, Henry Agard, Vice President of the United States, 1941-45.
- WALLACE, Ilo (Mrs. Henry A.), wife of the Vice President.
- WANG Chung-hui, Secretary General of the Supreme National Defense Council of China.
- WARDLOW, Frank, Second Lieutenant, A. U. S., radio officer on President Roosevelt's plane.
- WARE, Henry H., Captain, U. S. A., Interpreter with the United States Army assigned to the Conference at Tehran.
- WATSON, Edwin M., Major General, U. S. A., Military Aide and Secretary to the President.

- WEDEMMEYER, Albert C., Major General, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff, Southeast Asia Command.
- WEI Tao-ming, Chinese Ambassador in the United States.
- WHEELER, Raymond A., Major General, U. S. A., Principal Administrative Officer (Logistics), Southeast Asia Command.
- WHITE, Harry Dexter, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury.
- WHITELEY, J. F. M., Major General, British Army, Planning and Operations Staff, General Headquarters, Middle East.
- WILHELMINA, Queen of the Netherlands.
- WILLIS, Sir Algernon, Vice Admiral, R. N., Commander-in-Chief, Levant Station.
- WILLSON, Russell, Vice Admiral, U. S. N. (Retired), Navy member, Joint Strategic Survey Committee.
- WILSON, Arthur R., Brigadier General, Commanding General, Mediterranean Base Section, United States Army Forces in the North African Theater of Operations.
- WILSON, Edwin C., Ambassador in Turkey, 1945-48.
- WILSON, Frank J., Chief, United States Secret Service.
- WILSON, Sir Henry Maitland, General, Commander-in-Chief, British Forces in the Middle East; Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theater, from January 8, 1944.
- WINANT, John G., Ambassador in the United Kingdom.
- WINGATE, Orde Charles, Major General, British Army, Commanding Officer of special commando forces in Burma.
- WOOD, Frank B., United States Secret Service Agent.
- WOOD, Sir Kingsley, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, May 1940-September 1943.
- YANG Hsuan-ch'eng, Vice Admiral, Director, Second Department, Military Operations Board, National Military Council of China.
- YATES, Charles M., Commodore, U. S. N., Commandant of the United States Naval Operating Base, Oran, Algeria.
- YOUNG, Owen D., lawyer and industrial executive, Chairman of Commission on German reparations (Young Plan), February 11-June 7, 1929.
- ZERVAS, Napoleon, General, Commanding General of the National Resistance Force in Greece.

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Nov. 30	<i>Memorandum by the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia, Temporarily at Cairo</i> Comment on telegram from British Minister in Saudi Arabia regarding need for Anglo-American cooperation in supplying arms to the Saudis.	447

B. THE COMMUNIQUÉ AND ITS RELEASE

1943 Nov. 26	<i>Final Text of the Communiqué</i> Agreed text as completed on November 26 and released on December 1: territories to be removed from Japanese control; territories to be restored to China; independence of Korea; unconditional surrender of Japan.	448
Nov. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Minister in Egypt</i> Memorandum of conversation with Hopkins regarding release of the communiqué.	449
Nov. 28	<i>The Minister in Egypt to the President's Special Assistant, Temporarily at Tehran</i> Request for detailed instructions regarding release of the communiqué.	449
Nov. 29	<i>The Minister in Egypt to the President's Special Assistant, Temporarily at Tehran</i> Further request for instructions regarding release of the communiqué.	450
Nov. 29	<i>The President's Special Assistant to the Minister in Egypt</i> Instructions regarding release of the communiqué.	450
Nov. 30	<i>The President's Special Assistant to the Minister in Egypt</i> Instructions regarding release of information about the Cairo Conference.	451
Nov. 30	<i>The Director of the Office of War Information to the British Minister of Information</i> Protest against premature release of press report on Cairo Conference.	452
Dec. 2	<i>The President's Secretary to the President's Special Assistant</i> Report of favorable public reaction to Cairo communiqué; suggestion for tightening controls on future releases of this nature.	453
Dec. 2	<i>The President's Special Assistant to the President's Secretary</i> Request for report on any violations of censorship rules in release of Cairo or Tehran communiqués.	453
Dec. 2	<i>The President's Secretary to the President's Special Assistant</i> Report on adverse reaction in American press circles to premature release by Reuters of information on Cairo Conference.	453

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7. THE PRESIDENT'S LOG AT TEHRAN, NOVEMBER 27-DECEMBER 2, 1943

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1943 Nov. 27- Dec. 2	<i>Log of the Trip</i> Observations on flight to Tehran; chronological account of Presidential appointments and activities; notes on Tehran.	459

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1943 Nov. 27	Brown-Maximov Meeting, About 3:30 p. m. <i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to sources of information about the meeting. Principal subject discussed: accommodations for Roosevelt at Tehran.	475
Nov. 27	Roosevelt-Maximov Meeting, 4:30 p. m. <i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to source of information about the meeting; presumably a courtesy call.	475
Nov. 27	Harriman-Clark Kerr-Molotov Meeting, Midnight <i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to source of information about the meeting. Subjects discussed: danger from German agents and accom- modations for Roosevelt in Russian Embassy.	476
Nov. 28	Meeting of the President With the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11:30 a. m. <i>Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Operations in Italy; Mediterranean operations vs. OVER- LORD; possible entry of Turkey into the war; military support for Tito; Churchill's opposition to BUCCANEER; need for unity of command in the Mediterranean; American use of Azores bases.	477
Nov. 28	Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting, 3 p. m. <i>Bohlen Minutes</i> Situation on the Russian front; postwar merchant ship- ping; China; Lebanon; the French Committee of National Liberation; future of France; Indochina; trusteeship for colonies; reform in India.	483
Nov. 28	Roosevelt-Molotov Meeting, About 4 p. m. <i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to sources of information about the meeting; presumably a courtesy call.	486
Nov. 28	First Plenary Meeting, 4 p. m. <i>Bohlen Minutes</i> Survey of the military situation; operations in Italy; pos- sible entry of Turkey into the war; preparation for OVERLORD and supporting operations.	487
	<i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i>	497
Nov. 28	Tripartite Dinner Meeting, 8:30 p. m. <i>Bohlen Minutes</i> Suggestion of Fairbanks as place for next meeting; the future of France; postwar Allied control of strong points; dis- armament and control of Germany; the Oder River as Poland's western boundary.	509

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Nov. 29	Tripartite Military Meeting, 10:30 a. m. <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Review of the military situation; preparations for OVERLORD; air war on Germany; shortage of landing craft; emphasis by Voroshilov on OVERLORD.	515
Nov. 29	Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting, 2:45 p. m. <i>Bohlen Minutes</i> Situation in Yugoslavia; request for air bases in the Soviet Union for shuttle bombing; American proposals regarding air and naval operations against Japan; postwar organization of the United Nations; the "Four Policemen"; international sanctions; postwar control of Germany and Japan.	529
Nov. 29	Second Plenary Meeting, 4 p. m. <i>Bohlen Minutes</i> Reports by the military staff; question of a commander for OVERLORD; possible operations in the Mediterranean; Balkan developments if Turkey should enter the war; timing of OVERLORD; possibilities in the Aegean.	533
Nov. 29	<i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Tripartite Dinner Meeting, 8:30 p. m.	540
	<i>Bohlen Minutes</i> Stalin's raillery of Churchill; improvement of the Soviet Army; liquidation of the German High Command; punishment of war criminals; strong points to be under trusteeship; maintenance of the British Empire; governments in Spain and Portugal.	553
Nov. 30	Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 9:30 a. m. <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Possible Mediterranean operations; timing of OVERLORD and the operation against southern France; deployment of landing craft in the Mediterranean; Operation BUCCANEER in relation to OVERLORD; decisions reached; question of Aegean operations referred to Roosevelt and Churchill.	555
Nov. 30	Meeting of President Roosevelt With the Shah of Iran, Noon <i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to sources of information about the meeting. Principal subject discussed: Iran's economic problems and assistance from the United States.	564
Nov. 30	Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin Luncheon Meeting, 1:30 p. m. <i>Bohlen Minutes</i> Anglo-American decisions regarding the timing of OVERLORD; the command of OVERLORD; Stalin's approval of Cairo communiqué; Russian access to warm-water ports; Russian desire for change in regime of the Dardanelles; free zone in North Germany, including Kiel canal; Dairen as a free port.	565

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8. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE—Continued

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Nov. 30	Third Plenary Meeting, 4 p. m. <i>Bohlen Minutes</i> Anglo-American decisions regarding OVERLORD and the attack on southern France; simultaneous attack by Soviet Army; shortage of landing craft; plans for concluding the Conference.	576
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Dec. 1	Tripartite Luncheon Meeting, 1 p. m. <i>Bohlen Minutes</i> Invitation to President of Turkey; military aid to Turkey; shortage of landing craft for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean; usefulness of Turkish bases; position of Bulgaria if Turkey enters the war; possible change in regime of the Straits; Russian-Finnish peace overtures; Stalin's agreement for use of certain Russian fields for shuttle flights from Italy and England (annex).	586
Dec. 1	<i>Hopkins Notes</i> Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting, 3:20 p. m. <i>Bohlen Minutes</i> Reason for Roosevelt's reluctance to discuss Polish boundaries; the Baltic States; postwar world organization.	593 594
Dec. 1	Tripartite Political Meeting, 6 p. m. <i>Bohlen Minutes</i> Acceptance of Soviet request for certain Italian ships; passage of Turkish Straits by war vessels; Polish-Soviet relations; Polish-Russian boundary; the Curzon Line; dismemberment of Germany; Danubian confederation; Polish-German boundary; partition of East Prussia.	596
Dec. 1	Tripartite Dinner Meeting, 8:30 p. m. <i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to sources of information about the meeting. Subjects discussed: Declaration on Iran; the Conference communiqué.	605

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9. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

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Nov. 28	<i>The President to the Director of War Mobilization</i> Instruction regarding production schedule for landing craft.	617
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Nov. 29	<i>The Minister in Iran to the President's Special Representative</i> Report on Iranian initiative for a joint communiqué on Iran.	619
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A. CORRESPONDENCE, DRAFTS, AND PROPOSALS—continued

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Dec. 2	<i>The President's Special Assistant to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Temporarily at Tehran</i> Request that Molotov be informed of arrangements with İnönü and be asked to have Soviet representatives at Cairo by December 4.	665
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Dec. 3	<i>The Ambassador to the Soviet Union to the President's Special Assistant</i> Report that Vyshinsky was to be designated as Soviet representative for talks with Turkish officials at Cairo.	666
Dec. 4	<i>The Ambassador to the Soviet Union to the President's Special Assistant</i> Confirmation of designation of Vyshinsky as Soviet representative for talks with Turkish officials at Cairo.	667

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12. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE

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Dec. 3	Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p. m. <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Approval of decisions of C. C. S. 131st and 132nd meetings; implications of military conclusions of the Tehran Conference; draft agenda for remainder of SEXTANT Conference; entry of Turkey into the war; action on progress reports; combined bomber offensive.	669
Dec. 3	Roosevelt-Churchill Dinner Meeting, 8:30 p. m. <i>Editorial Note</i> References to sources of information about the meeting. Principal subjects discussed: operation against Andaman Islands or Rhodes; zones of occupation in Germany.	674
Dec. 4	Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff With Roosevelt and Churchill, 11 a. m. <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Significance of Stalin's promise to enter war against Japan; importance of strengthening OVERLORD and ANVIL; shortage of naval resources for amphibious operations; arguments for and against BUCCANEER; possible operations in the Aegean; injunction to Combined Chiefs to reach agreement.	675
Dec. 4	Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p. m. <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Conclusions of C. C. S. 133rd meeting; command of United States strategic air forces in Europe; Mediterranean command arrangements; over-all plan for defeat of Japan; operation RANKIN and zones of occupation in Germany; need for constant review of situation in Europe; occupation in Central Europe; question of resources for OVERLORD, ANVIL, and BUCCANEER.	682
Dec. 4	First Tripartite Meeting of Heads of Government, 5 p. m. <i>United States-United Kingdom Agreed Minutes</i> Arguments for and against Turkey's entry into the war; Turkey's need for war materials; infiltration of British personnel into Turkey.	690
Dec. 4	Quadripartite Dinner Meeting, 8:30 p. m. <i>Editorial Note</i> References to sources of information about the meeting. Principal subject of discussion: Turkey's status in the war.	698
Dec. 4	McCloy-Jebb Meeting, Evening <i>Editorial Note</i> References to sources of information about the meeting. Principal subject discussed: liaison between the European Advisory Commission and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.	699

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12. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE—Continued

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1943 Dec. 5	Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a. m. <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Approval of conclusions of C. C. S. 134th meeting; conflicting views on resources available for BUCCANEER and TARZAN; command of United States strategic air forces in Europe; directive for unification of command in the Mediterranean; ANVIL; directive for intensified support for Partisans in Yugoslavia.	700
Dec. 5	Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff With Roosevelt and Churchill, 11 a. m. <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Arguments for and against BUCCANEER; relationship of BUCCANEER to TARZAN, ANVIL, and OVERLORD; assistance to Turks if they enter the war.	705
Dec. 5	Roosevelt-Inönü Meeting, 2 p. m. <i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to sources of information about the meeting.	711
Dec. 5	Second Tripartite Meeting of Heads of Government, 3 p. m. <i>United States-United Kingdom Agreed Minutes</i> Three stages in Turkey's relationship toward the war; İnönü's concern about the Russians; delivery of war materials to Turkey; danger of German attack on Turkey; designation of committee to consider the problem further.	712
Dec. 5	Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 3 p. m. <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Operations in Southeast Asia; relationship of BUCCANEER to ANVIL; liaison between Combined Chiefs of Staff and shipping authorities; schedule of future work; query to Mountbatten on substitute for BUCCANEER (annex).	719
Dec. 5	Roosevelt Meeting With the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 p. m. <i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to sources of information about the meeting. Principal subject discussed: decision to give up BUCCANEER.	725
Dec. 5	Hopkins-Eden-Menemencioglu Meeting, 6 p. m. <i>United States-United Kingdom Agreed Minutes</i> Explanation of British plan for infiltrating military personnel into Turkey; Turkish concern about German reaction; delivery of war material to Turkey; Turkish promise to enter the war; Turkish concern about the timing of entry; Turkish desire to consider the problem with the Russians.	726
Dec. 5	Quadripartite Dinner Meeting, 8:30 p. m. <i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to sources of information about the meeting. Principal subject discussed: entry of Turkey into the war.	734

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1943 Dec. 6	Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11 a. m. <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Approval of conclusions of C. C. S. 135th and 136th meetings; operations in Southeast Asia Command; over-all plan and specific operations for defeat of Japan; draft report to the President and Prime Minister; reallocation of BUCCANEER resources; draft messages to Stalin and Chiang; future business.	735
Dec. 6	Roosevelt-Churchill Luncheon Meeting, 1:15 p. m. <i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to sources of information about the meeting. Principal subject discussed: the communiqué to be issued on the talks with İnönü.	738
Dec. 6	Quadripartite Meeting, 2:30 p. m. <i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to sources of information about the meeting. Principal subject discussed: the communiqué to be issued on the talks with İnönü.	739
Dec. 6	Roosevelt-Hughes Meeting, 4:45 p. m. <i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to sources of information about the meeting. Principal subject discussed: treatment of Italian priests and nuns in Egypt.	739
Dec. 6	Roosevelt Meeting With the King of Greece, 5 p. m. <i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to sources of information about the meeting. Principal subject discussed: the return of King George to Greece.	740
Dec. 6	Third Tripartite Meeting of Heads of Government, 6 p. m. <i>United States-United Kingdom Agreed Minutes</i> Political guarantees to Turkey; military supplies to Turkey; Turkish fears of German attack; development of airfields in Turkey; continuation of talks between İnönü and Churchill.	740
Dec. 6	Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff With Roosevelt and Churchill, 7:30 p. m. <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Consideration of final report; Chinese request for representation on the C. C. S.; draft communiqué on the U-boat war; draft messages to Stalin and Chiang.	748
Dec. 6	Dinner Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, About 8:30 p. m. <i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to sources of information about the meeting; no official business discussed.	750

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12. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE—Continued

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Dec. 7	Churchill-Inönü Meeting, Morning <i>United Kingdom Minutes</i> Date for entry of British planes into Turkey; supplies for the Turkish Army; Inönü's need for time to consider; British proposal on procedure (annex).	751
Dec. 7	Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11 a. m. <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Approval of conclusions of C. C. S. 137th meeting; integrated command of United States strategic air forces in Europe; alternatives to BUCCANEER; merchant shipping for the war against Japan; availability of resources for operations; development of facilities in the Azores; new command arrangements; operations in Southeast Asia Command; employment of French forces; final remarks.	756
Dec. 7	Churchill-Combined Chiefs of Staff Dinner Meeting, Evening <i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to sources of information about the meeting.	764

13. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

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1943 Dec. 2	<i>Report by the Combined Staff Planners</i> Over-all plan for the defeat of Japan: concepts, operations, forces, bases in India. Preparations for possible Russian entry into war against Japan (annex I); availability and deployment of air forces (annex III).	765
Dec. 2	<i>The Assistant Secretary of War to the Ambassador to the United Kingdom</i> Suggestions for agenda of European Advisory Commission.	773
Dec. 2	<i>The President's Special Assistant to the Soviet Foreign Commissar</i> Expression of satisfaction with the Conference at Tehran.	775
Dec. 2	<i>The Secretary of State to the President</i> Report of possible change in Portuguese attitude toward Japan, with reference to Timor; report of Japanese gains in China.	775
Dec. 2	<i>The Secretary of State to the President</i> Report of, and comment on, British request for Anglo-American discussions on Middle East problems.	776
Dec. 3	<i>The British Ambassador to the Greek Government-in-Exile in Egypt to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i> Transmittal of suggestions for improved Anglo-American coordination of special operations in the Balkan area.	777

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A. CORRESPONDENCE, DRAFTS, AND PROPOSALS—continued

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Dec. 3	<i>President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin</i> Expression of satisfaction with the Conference at Tehran.	785
Dec. 3	<i>President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin</i> Expression of appreciation for the hospitality of the Russian Embassy at Tehran.	785
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Dec. 4	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Proposal that in the event of Operation RANKIN United States forces should occupy the Netherlands and northern Germany.	786
Dec. 4	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Decision in favor of unification of command of United States strategic air forces in Europe; draft directive (attached).	787
Dec. 4	<i>The Assistant Secretary of War to the President's Special Assistant</i> Recommendation to adhere to the Civil Affairs plan worked out by McCloy and Eden.	790
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I. PRE-CONFERENCE PAPERS

1. PAPERS ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCES

Editorial Note

This chapter presents those papers which show the arrangements made prior to Roosevelt's arrival at Cairo for the Conferences to be held at Cairo and Tehran. For correspondence conducted during the First Cairo Conference on arrangements for the Tehran and Second Cairo Conferences, see *post*, pp. 368 ff. For discussions at the Tehran Conference on arrangements for the Second Cairo Conference, see *post*, pp. 586, 589. For correspondence conducted during the early stages of the Second Cairo Conference respecting the meeting with Turkish officials, see *post*, p. 662.

On December 14, 1941, Roosevelt wrote Stalin about his wish that they could meet personally, but he indicated that he realized the impossibility of their doing so then. See *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. IV, p. 752.

In April 1942 Roosevelt corresponded with Stalin inconclusively about the possibility of their getting together during the summer of that year, off Alaska. In November and December 1942 he corresponded with Churchill and Stalin inconclusively about the possibility of their meeting in January 1943 (at or near Khartoum or in southern Algeria) or early in March 1943 (in north Africa). Correspondence relating to these soundings of 1942 is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 662-663, 665-666, 675, 678. See also *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, pp. 22, 42-45.

Roosevelt Papers

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. STALIN: I am sending this personal note to you by the hands of my old friend, Joseph E. Davies. It relates solely to one subject which I think it is easier for us to talk over through a mutual friend. Mr. Litvinov is the only other person with whom I have talked about it.

I want to get away from the difficulties of large Staff conferences or the red tape of diplomatic conversations. Therefore, the simplest and most practical method that I can think of would be an informal and completely simple visit for a few days between you and me.

I fully appreciate the desirability for you to stay in daily touch with your military operations; I also find it inadvisable to be away from Washington more than a short time. There are two sides to the problem. The first relates to timing. There is always the possibility that the historic Russian defense, followed by taking the offensive, may cause a crack-up in Germany next Winter. In such a case we must be prepared for the many next steps. We are none of us prepared today. Therefore, it is my belief that you and I ought to meet this Summer.

The second problem is where to meet. Africa is almost out of the question in Summer and Khartum is British territory. Iceland I do not like because for both you and me it involves rather difficult flights and, in addition, would make it, quite frankly, difficult not to invite Prime Minister Churchill at the same time.

Therefore, I suggest that we could meet either on your side or my side of Bering Straits. Such a point would be about three days from Washington and I think about two days from Moscow if the weather is good. That means that you could always get back to Moscow in two days in an emergency.

It is my thought that neither of us would want to bring any Staff. I would be accompanied by Harry Hopkins, an interpreter and a stenographer—and that you and I would talk very informally and get what we call “a meeting of the minds”. I do not believe that any official agreements or declarations are in the least bit necessary.

You and I would, of course, talk over the military and naval situation, but I think we can both do that without Staffs being present.

Mr. Davies has no knowledge of our military affairs nor of the post-war plans of this Government, and I am sending him to you for the sole purpose of talking over our meeting.

I greatly hope that our forces will be in complete control of Tunisia by the end of May, and Churchill and I next week will be working on the second phase of the offensive.¹

Our estimates of the situation are that Germany will deliver an all-out attack on you this Summer, and my Staff people think it will be directed against the middle of your line.

You are doing a grand job. Good luck!

Always sincerely,

[No signature indicated]

¹ The records of the Third Washington Conference of Roosevelt and Churchill, May 12–25, 1943, are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series. Speaking before the Senate and the House of Representatives on May 19, 1943, Churchill said: “We [the President and I], both of us, earnestly hope that at no distant date we may be able to achieve what we have so long sought—namely, a meeting with Marshal Stalin and if possible with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. But how, when, and where this is to be accomplished is not a matter upon which I am able to shed any clear ray of light at the present time, and if I were I should certainly not shed it.” *Congressional Record*, vol. 89, pt. 4, p. 4621.

121.861/157 : Telegram

*The President's Special Representative (Davies) to the President and the Secretary of State*¹

Moscow, May 21, 1943—4 p. m.

498. Personal and secret for the President and the Secretary only.

Ambassador Standley formally presented me to the Foreign Commissar² at five o'clock yesterday afternoon who immediately arranged for a meeting with Stalin for nine o'clock the same evening. At that time Standley formally presented me to Stalin and then very generously suggested that in view of our old relationship he would leave me with Stalin and Molotov to present the President's letter and for any discussions Stalin might desire. The letter was read to him by the interpreter and seemed to be favorably and cordially received. Stalin said he wished to see me within the next day or so for more definite reply. I spent two hours and a half with Stalin and Molotov in the most friendly atmosphere. Both inquired as to your health and were gratified to hear that you were so fit and strong.

It is gratifying to have been received here in a friendly and cordial way and I feel that my trip has been definitely worth while and successful.

DAVIES

¹ Sent by the Ambassador, Moscow, in the numerical series of the Embassy's telegrams to the Department of State.

² Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov.

740.0011 EW 1939/29606½

*The President's Special Representative (Davies) to the President and the Secretary of State*¹

U. S. URGENT

Moscow, May 27, 1943—noon.

539. Personal and secret for the President and the Secretary only.

Premier Stalin at the Kremlin handed me reply to the President's letter to be delivered personally to the President only. It confirms my telegram No. 498 dated May 24 [21]. There is complete agreement in principle. Some supplementary matters he gave to me to be orally transmitted to the President.² Any further communications on these matters he would arrange to be transmitted to the President exclusively and not through any other channels. I shall return im-

¹ Sent by the Ambassador, Moscow, in the Embassy's numerical series.

² The "supplementary matters" concerned the place of the meeting and the inclusion of Churchill. See *post*, p. 7, footnote 3; the first paragraph of Roosevelt's message to Churchill of June 28, 1943, *post*, p. 11; and the final paragraph of Stalin's message to Roosevelt of August 8, 1943, *post*, p. 18.

mediately by most direct route via Nome. General Burns is returning same time and same route. Expect to be able to report personally to the President in Washington not later than seventh or eighth June. . . .

DAVIES

Roosevelt Papers

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt

Translation ¹

[Moscow, May 26, 1943.] ²

DEAR MR. ROOSEVELT: Mr. Davies has handed me your message.

I agree with you that this summer, possibly as early as June, the beginning of a new large-scale offensive of Hitlerites is to be expected on the Soviet-German front. Hitler has already concentrated against us about 200 German divisions and as many as 30 divisions of his allies. We are preparing to meet the new German offensive and to launch counter attacks but we experience a shortage of airplanes and aircraft fuel. Now it is of course impossible to for[e]see all the military and other steps that we shall have to take. This will depend upon the developments at our front. Much will depend also on how speedy and active will be the anglo-american military operations in Europe.

I have mentioned these important circumstances in order to explain why my present answer to your proposal cannot be quite definite now.

I agree with you that such a meeting is necessary and that it should be not be [*sic*] postponed. But I ask you to appreciate duly the importance of the circumstances set forth just because the summer months will be extremely serious for our Soviet armies. As I do not know how the events will develop at the Soviet-German front in June I shall not be able to leave Moscow during this month. Therefore I would suggest that our meeting should be arranged in July or in August. If you agree to this I undertake to inform you two weeks before the date of the meeting when this meeting could take place in July or August. In case you [sh]ould upon receipt of my communication agree to the time of our meeting suggested by me I would arrive in the place of our meeting at the fixed time.

¹ The Russian words for "Translation (copy)" are written in longhand on the source text. Apparently both the translation and the Russian-language original were delivered to Roosevelt by Davies, who returned to Washington on June 3, 1943.

² The Russian-language original is unlike the translation in that the original bears the place, the month, and the year at the beginning. As printed in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 66, this document is dated May 26, 1943. Verbal variations occur in all three versions.

As to the place of the meeting this will be communicated to you by Mr. Davies personally.³

I agree with you as to the limitation of the number of your and my advisers.

I thank you for sending Mr. Davies to Moscow who has a knowledge of the Soviet-Union and can unbiassedly judge of things.

With sincere respect

J. STALIN

MAY . . . , 1943

³ Stalin apparently indicated that he considered Fairbanks, Alaska, as a possible meeting place. See (1) the penultimate paragraph of Roosevelt's telegram 297, June 28, 1943, to Churchill, *post*, p. 12, and (2) Stalin's message of August 24, 1943, to Roosevelt and Churchill, *post*, p. 22.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 4, 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Personal and secret from the President for Marshal Stalin.

I am very grateful to you for your courtesy extended to my government and me in your cordial reception of Ambassador Davies. He has returned safely, bearing your letter. I am very happy that you and I are in complete agreement in principle on all the matters contained in your letter and I will await your further communication in accordance with your letter and your understanding with Mr. Davies.

My warm personal regards, with my kind remembrances also to Mr. Brown.²

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² "Mr. Brown" was the code name used for Molotov at the time of his visit to Washington in May 1942.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*¹

[Moscow,] June 11, 1943.

Personal and secret message of Premier J. V. Stalin to President Roosevelt

Your message in which you inform me about certain decisions on the questions of strategy made by you and Mr. Churchill I received on June 4.² I thank you for the message.

¹ Apparently received from the Soviet Embassy, Washington. The entire document is printed in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 70.

² Roosevelt's message to Stalin, June 2, 1943; *ibid.*, p. 67.

Is it necessary to say what painful and negative impression will be made in the Soviet Union, upon its people and its Army, by the new postponement of the second front, and by leaving our Army, which has made so many sacrifices, without expected serious support from the British-American Armies?

As to the Soviet Government, it does not find it possible to agree with this decision, made, besides, without its participation and without attempt to discuss jointly this most important question, and which decision may result in grave consequences for the future progress of the war.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 13 June 1943.

Former Naval Person to President most secret and personal. Number 310.

This is what I propose to send to Joe. I should be very glad to know what you think of it before it goes. You will no doubt send your own message, which I should also like to see. Begins:

"I have received a copy of your telegram of about June 11 to the President. . . .

"At the end of your message you complain that Russia has not been consulted in our recent decisions. I fully understand the reasons which prevented you from meeting the President and me at Khartoum, whither we would have gone in January, and I am sure you were right not to relinquish even for a week the direction of your immense and victorious campaign. Nevertheless, the need and advantages of a meeting are very great. I can only say that I will go at any risk to any place that you and the President may agree upon. I personally believe that Scapa Flow, our main naval harbour in the North of Scotland, would be the most convenient, the safest and, if desired, the most secret. I have again suggested this to the President. If you could come there by air at any time in the summer you may be sure that every arrangement would be made to suit your wishes, and you would have a most hearty welcome from your British and American comrades."

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

[HYDE PARK,] June 18, 1943.

To: Marshal Stalin
From: The President

I am a few days late in answering your message as I was away when it came.² I fully subscribe to what Mr. Churchill telegraphed you and I want to assure you that at this time we are really doing everything that is possible. I hope you will understand that the shipping situation is still tight, though we have been greatly encouraged by the better progress of our anti-submarine campaign during the last two months which shows us a good net gain in available ships.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the White House, and forwarded by the White House Map Room, in paraphrase (marked "Secret" and "Operational Priority"), to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² Roosevelt was at Charlottesville, Virginia, June 11-13, 1943.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

[HYDE PARK,] June 18, 1943.

For: The Former Naval Person
From: The President

I did not get the message from Uncle Joe until two days after you got yours. I heartily approve of your message and am sending the following to Uncle Joe:

[Here follows Roosevelt's message of June 18, 1943, to Stalin, *supra*.]

Max² and Averell³ will be with you in a few days and Averell will tell you about the letter Joe Davies brought me from Moscow.⁴

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the White House, and forwarded by the White House Map Room, in paraphrase (marked "Secret", "Operational Priority", and—in the first paragraph—"Personal and secret"), to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Lord Beaverbrook.

³ W. Averell Harriman.

⁴ Letter of May 26, 1943, from Stalin to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 6. For Harriman's report of July 5, 1943, to Roosevelt on his talks with Churchill about this matter, see *post*, p. 13. For Hopkins' reaction to Harriman's mission, see Sherwood, p. 737.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, June 20, 1943.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and most secret No. 322. I send you the telegram to Stalin in the final form in which it went.

[Here follows, with minor changes, the message quoted in Churchill's telegram 310, June 13, 1943. The following changes were made in the portion quoted above: "I and my advisers believe" in place of "I personally believe"; and "if secrecy be desired" in place of "if desired".]

¹ Received via War Department channels. Roosevelt was at Hyde Park, New York, June 17-22, 1943. This message was forwarded to him by the White House on June 21.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 25 June 1943.

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and secret. Number 328.

Averell told me last night of your wish for a meeting with U. J. in Alaska *à deux*.

The whole world is expecting and all our side are desiring a meeting of the three great powers at which, not only the political chiefs, but the military staffs would be present in order to plan the future war moves and, of course, search for the foundations of post war settlement. It would seem a pity to draw U. J. 7000 miles from Moscow for anything less than this.

Should HUSKY prosper and the German offensive not occur[,] the end of July or beginning of August will be the moment to make sure that U. J. attacks himself with full strength in October. We shall probably be able to show that our Mediterranean strategy of which he approved, has, in fact, gained Russia the respite of this summer and has, in fact, achieved all he hoped for from a cross-channel second front. This is, therefore one of the cardinal moments.

I consider that a tripartite meeting at Scapa Flow or anywhere else on the globe that can be agreed not only of us three but also of the staffs, who will come together for the first time, would be one of the milestones of history. If this is lost, much is lost.

You must excuse me expressing myself with all the frankness that our friendship and the gravity of the issue warrant. I do not under-

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.

rate the use that enemy propaganda would make of a meeting between the heads of Soviet Russia and the United States at this juncture with the British Commonwealth and Empire excluded. It would be serious and vexatious, and many would be bewildered and alarmed thereby. My journey to Moscow with Averell in August 1942² was on altogether a lower level, and at a stage in the war when we had only to explain why no second front. Nevertheless, whatever you decide, I shall sustain to the best of my ability here.

² See Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, pp. 472 ff.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 28, 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Personal and secret from the President to the Former Naval Person Number 297.

Your #328. I did not suggest to UJ that we meet alone but he told Davies that he assumed (a) that we would meet alone and (b) that he agreed that we should not bring staffs to what would be a preliminary meeting.

He intimated that he would bring only a total of four or five people and on this assumption I would propose to take only Hopkins and Harriman.

There are certain advantages in such a preliminary meeting which I know you will appreciate. First, that without staffs there will be no military collisions in regard to demands for an immediate roundup.² Second, that he will not think that we are demanding a Russian offensive this summer if the Germans do not attack. Third, that in my opinion he will be more frank in giving his views on the offensive against Japan now and later. Fourth, that he would also be more frank in regard to China. Fifth, that he would be more frank in regard to the Balkan States, Finland and Poland.

I want to explore his thinking as fully as possible concerning Russia's post-war hopes and ambitions. I would want to cover much the same field with him as did Eden for you a year ago.³

What would you think of coming over soon afterwards and that you and I with staffs should meet in the Citadel in Quebec? I am sure the Canadian Government would turn it over to us and it is a thoroughly comfortable spot, with thoroughly adequate accommoda-

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Although the word "roundup" appears in lower-case letters in the source text, it was presumably intended as the code name ROUNDUP.

³ See Feis, pp. 25-28.

tions there and at the Hotel Frontenac. It is far better than Washington at that time of year.

While UJ gave no definite dates he suggested the end of July or early August. This is wholly tentative and I do not expect to hear anything further until about the fifteenth of July.

If he confirms this, I would be back about August fifteenth. I would have to be in Washington for a week but could easily get to some place in eastern Canada by the twenty-fifth of August.⁴

Of course, you and I are completely frank in matters of this kind and I agree with you that later in the autumn we should most definitely have a full dress meeting with the Russians. That is why I think of a visit with Stalin as a preparatory talk on what you rightly call a lower level. Finally I gather from Davies the Kremlin people do not at all like the idea of UJ flying across Finland, Sweden, Norway and the North Sea to Scapa, especially at this time of year when there is practically no darkness.

I have the idea that your conception is the right one from the short point of view, but mine is the right one from the long point of view. I wish there were no distances.

ROOSEVELT

⁴The records of the conversations held by Roosevelt and Churchill in Canada (First Quebec Conference) and in the United States, during August-September 1943, are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 28 June 1943.

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and secret. No. 334.

I send you first of all the very unpleasant reply I have received from U. J. and my rejoinder.² This certainly has its bearing on your proposal to meet him alone and I shall not seek to deter you if you can get him to come.

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.

² Neither printed herein. The exchange concerned the second front.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 29 June 1943.

To President from former Naval person personal and secret. Number 336.

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.

I have now received your 297 and I repeat what I said in my 334 that if you and Uncle J. can fix a meeting together I should no longer deprecate it. On the contrary in view of his attitude I think it important that this contact should be established.

I should be very glad to arrange for a meeting between us and our staffs about the end of August in Quebec which I am sure MacKenzie King would welcome. Later on I will put the point to him.

Many thanks for your very full message.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1943.

Personal and secret to the Generalissimo from the President

I have concluded a series of very satisfactory talks with Mme Chiang Kai-Shek² which she will tell you about.

I have told her of my anxiety to meet you sometime this fall. I think it is very important that we get together. If you agree with this I suggest some place midway between our two capitals. I would appreciate very much hearing from you relative to this proposal.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the American Military Mission to China via Army channels as War Department telegram 2917 to the Mission.

² In February and May 1943.

Hopkins Papers

*The President's Personal Representative (Harriman) to the President*¹

LONDON, July 5, 1943.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In order that you may understand the Prime Minister's reaction to the number one matter you asked me to discuss with him, I think I should explain in more detail his reactions and the circumstances under which I discussed it with him.

Max and I arrived late Wednesday afternoon² after two nights on the plane with little sleep to find an invitation to dine with the Prime Minister that evening. Max was tired and would have preferred to go to bed. He was not, therefore, in too good a mood. The dinner, which included Mrs. Churchill and Kathleen,³ was argumentative and some of the fundamental disagreements between the two men

¹ The source text is the copy sent by Harriman to Hopkins July 5, 1943. The original has not been found in the Roosevelt Papers.

² June 23, 1943. "Max" is Lord Beaverbrook.

³ Miss Kathleen Harriman.

came out. This type of argument with Max always upsets the Prime Minister.

Max left at midnight. I stayed to give the Prime Minister alone your several messages. The talk, which started with the proposed meeting, developed into a two hour discussion on every subject—from de Gaulle to China to India to Poland, etc., coming back throughout the talk to Russia and the question of the meeting.

I have never had a better opportunity to be direct and frank and, as he has since been more friendly than ever, it is obvious that he accepted the sincerity of my statements even though he did not always agree with them.

He firmly believes a three-cornered meeting is in the interests of the war but he admitted that his viewpoint is colored by considerations of the reaction in Great Britain. My main argument was based on the long view as against the immediate—(1) the value of the intimate understanding that in all probability would result from a *tete-à-tete*, impossible with three persons, and (2) the great importance of the favorable reaction of the American people to it and to your participation. I explained the difference in the public reaction in the United States to a personal meeting of two as compared with a three cornered meeting on British soil in which it would appear that he, Churchill, had been the broker in the transaction.

There is no doubt in my mind as to his sincere desire and determination to back you up in anything that you finally decide to do and, although I must emphasize his disappointment if he is not present, I am satisfied he would accept it in good part and that it would in the long run improve rather than adversely affect your relations with him.

If a meeting of three were held reasonably soon after your first meeting alone, he recognizes, I believe, the logic of the historic sequence of the two *tete-à-tete* meetings culminating in the third with three present.

Should Germany not attack this summer, there is much in the Prime Minister's argument of the need for a closer military understanding between the Chiefs of Staff of the three countries. The question is whether much would come of a large meeting of the Staffs now unless you had first created a foundation of understanding which I am satisfied would come from the type of meeting you have in mind. In fact I am not [at?] all sure that you would not be able personally to accomplish more toward an immediate military understanding in the meeting you propose than would be accomplished by the larger meeting he proposes.

I explained to the Prime Minister the first night that there was no need for hurry in his reply, but he prepared a cable to you the next day,⁴

⁴ Presumably Churchill's telegram 328, June 25, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 10.

discussed it with Eden, and called me over to Number 10 (Annex) at one o'clock the following evening. I think he expected another argument from me and he seemed relieved when my only comment was that I thought his cable, although I did not agree with his reasoning, fairly expressed his views. On my way out I had a few words with Eden and got the impression from Eden that he personally was not unsympathetic to your position and was quite satisfied to let the decision rest with you.

.

As you know, I am a confirmed optimist in our relations with Russia because of my conviction that Stalin wants, if obtainable, a firm understanding with you and America more than anything else—after the destruction of Hitler. He sees Russia's reconstruction and security more soundly based on it than on any alternative. He is a man of simple purposes and, although he may use devious means in attempting to accomplish them, he does not deviate from his long run objectives.

The situation is today in the making and we have much at stake. If you don't get a follow up on the Davies letter,⁵ you may want to, consider sending me to Moscow soon (assuming that you think I am the man to go).

I have thought a good deal about it since you talked with me and have some definite views as to how this situation might be handled. If you consider sending me, I would respectfully suggest that you recall me to Washington and give me an opportunity to put my ideas before you. You could then decide whether I should go. Real accomplishment by an Ambassador in Moscow is a gamble with the odds against success but the stakes are great both for the war in Europe and in the Pacific—and after.

I would know within a couple of months in Moscow whether I could be of value and would ask that, if I have not been able to do a job, I could then return or be fired.

I am so keen about the work you have given me in London, which I feel is of increasing value as the time for the offensive approaches, that I would like to go back to it if I cannot do a real job in Moscow. I am sure I can be of more use to you and the war in London than to remain in Moscow as a glorified communications officer.

Respectfully yours,

AVERELL

⁵ Stalin's letter of May 26, 1943, to Roosevelt, delivered by Davies; *ante*, p. 6.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Generalissimo Chiang to President Roosevelt*¹

[CHUNGKING, undated (?).]²

President Roosevelt Washington DC. Your telegram of 4th July³ has been received. And I am in full accord with your suggestions. Madame Chiang has informed me in detail of her conversations with you. I am delighted with the results and that we see eye to eye on many questions. I anticipate with pleasure our meeting in the near future. For many years I have been wishing that we could discuss together in person various problems of mutual interest. I venture to suggest that any time after September [which?] would be most convenient and suitable to you would be possible for me. Should necessity arise, however, for our meeting before then, I should appreciate your letting me know at least a fortnight in advance of my departure.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

¹ Sent by Stilwell, via Army channels, in a secret and urgent message, numbered 630, "for the eyes of Gen Marshall alone".

² Stilwell's message is dated at Chungking, July 9, 1943.

³ Presumably the message of June 30, 1943, *ante*, p. 13.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] July 15, 1943.

Personal and secret from the President to Marshal Stalin.

I am deeply sorry for unfortunate sinking of one of your ships in North Pacific and have directed every possible future precaution.

Although I have no detailed news, I think I can safely congratulate you on the splendid showing your armies are making against the German offensive at Kursk.

I hope to hear from you very soon about the other matter which I still feel to be of great importance to you and me.²

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² A handwritten notation at this point on the source text reads, "In President's letter to Stalin via Amb. Davies." For the President's letter, see *ante*, p. 3.

Hopkins Papers

*The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Soong) to the President's
Special Assistant (Hopkins)*¹

[WASHINGTON,] 21st July, 1943.

DEAR HARRY

My departure has been delayed till tomorrow morning owing to engine trouble.

Generalissimo cabled me that it would be awkward for United Nations' relations, and Sino-Russian relations in particular, if he goes thru Siberia without seeing Stalin. Therefore he prefers the rendez-vous to be somewhere else than Alaska.

If the President desires to advance the date of the meeting to some time in August or September, he would be able to make it, provided he is given two weeks' notice.²

He requests me to proceed to London according to programme, but to be in readiness to return & participate in the Conference whenever the President desires it.

Hoping that you will have a nice little rest in New Hampshire

Sincerely,

T. V. [SOONG]

¹ The source is handwritten.

² No reply to this message has been found, but presumably Chiang was told that it would not be possible to arrange the meeting until autumn.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*¹

[Moscow, August 8, 1943.]

Personal and secret message from Premier I. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

1. Only now, having come back from the front, I can answer your message of July 16th.² I have no doubt that you take into account our military position and will understand the delay of the answer.

Contrary to our expectations, the Germans launched their offensive not in June, but in July, and now the battles are in full swing. As it is known, the Soviet Armies repelled the July offensive, recaptured Orel and Belgorod and now is putting the further pressure upon the enemy.

It is easy to understand that under the present acute situation at the Soviet-German front, a great strain and utmost vigilance against the enemy actions are required from the Command of the Soviet

¹ Apparently sent via the Soviet Embassy, Washington. The entire document is printed in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 78.

² Message sent from Washington, July 15, 1943, *ante*, p. 16.

troops. In connection with the above, I have at the present time to put aside other questions and my other duties, but the primary duty—the direction of action at the front. I have frequently to go to the different parts of the front and to submit all the rest to the interests of the front.

I hope that under such circumstances you will fully understand that at the present time I cannot go on a long journey and shall not be able, unfortunately, during this summer and autumn to keep my promise given to you through Mr. Davi[e]s.

I regret it very much, but, as you know, circumstances are sometimes more powerful than people who are compelled to submit to them.

I consider that a meeting of the responsible representatives of the two countries would positively be expedient. Under the present military situation, it could be arranged either in Astrakhan or in Archangel. Should this proposal be inconvenient for you personally, in that case, you may send to one of the above-mentioned points your responsible and fully trusted person. If this proposal is accepted by you, then we shall have to determine a number of questions which are to be discussed and the drafts of proposals which are to be accepted at the meeting. As I have already told Mr. Davi[e]s, I do not have any objections to the presence of Mr. Churchil[l] at this meeting, in order that the meeting of the representatives of the two countries would become the meeting of the representatives of the three countries. I still follow this point of view on the condition that you will not have any objections to this.

.

AUGUST 8th, 1943.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON,² 11 August 1943.

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and most secret. Number 409.

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I have also received what follows in my next from U. J. You will see I am restored, if not to favour, at any rate to the court. I have sent reply which also follows.

It is quite cool here and very pleasant and everything is ready for you in Citadel which is admirably suited to our needs. It was indeed a happy inspiration which led you to suggest this particular rendezvous at this particular moment in Canadian politics.

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.

² The message originated at Quebec but was apparently transmitted via London.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON,² 11 August 1943.

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and most secret. Message from Stalin delivered by Soviet Chargé d'Affaires for transmission to Prime Minister 10 August. Number 410.

Following is text referred to in Para 3 of my number 409. Begins:

"I have just returned from the front and already had time to become familiar with the message of the British Government dated 7 August.³

"I agree that a meeting of the Heads of three Governments is absolutely desirable. Such a meeting must be realized at the first opportunity having arranged with the President the place and time of this meeting.

"At the same time, I ought to say that in the existing situation on the Soviet German Front, I, to my regret, have no opportunity to absent myself and to leave the front even for one week. Although recently we have had several successes on the front, and [an] extreme strain on the strength and exceptional watchfulness are required in regard to the new possible actions of the enemy from the Soviet Troops and from the Soviet Command just now. In connection with this, I have to visit the troops on that or other parts of our front more often than usual. In the circumstances, at the present time I am not able to visit Scapa Flow or any other distant point for a meeting with you and the President.

"Nevertheless, in order not to postpone an examination of the questions which interest our countries, it would be expedient to organize a meeting of the responsible representatives of our States and we might come to an understanding in the nearest future concerning the place and date of such a meeting.

"Moreover, it is necessary beforehand to agree on the scope of the questions to be discussed and the drafts of the proposals which have to be accepted. The meetings will hardly give any tangible result without that.

"Taking this opportunity I congratulate the British Government and the Anglo American troops on the occasion of their most successful operations in Sicily which have already caused the downfall of Mussolini and the break up of his gang."

For reply see my immediately following telegram.

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.

² The message originated at Quebec but was apparently transmitted via London.

³ An undated memorandum in the Roosevelt Papers, bearing the initials "amc" (Albert M. Cornelius) and attached to a copy of Stalin's message reads, in part, "The 'British Government's message of August 7' referred to herein is not on file." The text is printed in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 387.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON,² 12 August 1943.

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and most secret. Number 411.

Following is reply being sent to message in my number 410 referred to in Para 3 of my number 409. Begins:

"Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. Most secret and personal.

"Your telegram of August 9 gives me the opportunity to offer you my heartfelt congratulations on the recent most important victories gained by the Russian Armies at Orel and Byelgorod opening the way to your further advances towards Bryansk and Kharkov. The defeats of the German Army on this front are milestones to our final victory.

"I have arrived at the Citadel, Quebec, and start this afternoon to meet the President at his private home. Meanwhile, the Staffs will be in conference here and the President and I will join them at the end of the week. I will show the President your telegram about meeting of our responsible representatives in the near future which certainly seems to be most desirable. I quite understand you cannot leave the front at this critical period when you are actually directing the victorious movement of your Armies.

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.

² The message originated at Quebec but was apparently sent via London.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to
Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 18 August 1943.

PRIORITY

Secret and personal to Marshal Stalin from Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt.

We have both arrived here with our staffs and will probably remain in conference for about ten days.² We fully understand the strong reasons which led you to remain on the battlefronts, where your presence has been so fruitful of victory. Nevertheless, we wish to emphasize once more the importance of a meeting between all three of us. We do not feel that either Archangel or Astrakhan are suitable but we are prepared ourselves, accompanied by suitable officers, to proceed

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. The entire document is printed in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 83.

² The records of the First Quebec Conference are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

to Fairbanks in order to survey the whole scene in common with you. The present seems to be a unique opportunity for a rendezvous and also a crucial point in the war. We earnestly hope that you will give this matter once more your consideration. Prime Minister will remain on this side of the Atlantic for as long as may be necessary.

Should it prove impossible to arrange the much needed meeting of the three heads of governments, we agree with you that a meeting of the foreign office level should take place in the near future. This meeting would be exploratory in character as, of course, final decisions must be reserved to our respective governments.³

CHURCHILL—ROOSEVELT

³ The joint statement issued by Roosevelt and Churchill on August 24, 1943, regarding the First Quebec Conference read, in part, as follows: "It was resolved to hold another conference before the end of the year between the British and American authorities, in addition to any tri-partite meeting which it may be possible to arrange with Soviet Russia." *Decade*, p. 8.

Roosevelt Papers

The President's Naval Aide (Brown) to the President's Military Aide and Secretary (Watson) ¹

[QUEBEC,] August 25, 1943.

To General Watson.

You will please send for the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires and give him the following in your capacity as Secretary to the President, which he may feel at liberty to transmit to Marshal Stalin.

"The Marshal's message to the President and the Prime Minister ² has been transmitted to the President, who has left the conference in Quebec and because of absence, will not be available until early next week.

"Any reply by the Marshal to the telegram from the President and the Prime Minister to the Marshal relating to a joint meeting will of course be transmitted to them."

WILSON BROWN

¹ The original of this message, all of it in Roosevelt's handwriting, contained the signature "Roosevelt" and the following concluding sentence: "Do not tell him this is sent by the President." These words were stricken out, and the signature "Wilson Brown" was added by Roosevelt. The copy of the message as received in the White House bears the notation: "acted on by Gen Watson A M 25th. R[obert] W B[ogue]".

² This is the message of August 22, 1943, printed in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 84. According to Churchill (p. 94), Roosevelt was "very much offended at the tone of this message", which concerned the negotiations for the armistice with Italy.

Roosevelt Papers

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

PERSONAL AND SECRET

[Moscow, August 24, 1943.] ¹

From Premier Stalin to Prime Minister Mr. W. Churchill and President Mr. F. D. Roosevelt.

I have received your joint message of August 19th.²

I entirely share your opinion and that of Roosevelt about the importance of a meeting between the three of us. In this connexion I beg you most earnestly to understand my position at this moment, when our armies are carrying on the struggle against the main forces of Hitler with the utmost strain and when Hitler not only does not withdraw a single division from our front but on the contrary has already succeeded in transporting, and continues to transport fresh divisions to Soviet-German front. At such a moment, in the opinion of all my colleagues, I cannot without detriment to our military operations leave the front for so distant a point as Fairbanks although if the situation on our front were different Fairbanks undoubtedly would be very convenient as a place for our meeting as I said before.³

As regards a meeting of representatives of our states and in particular of representatives in charge of Foreign Affairs, I share your opinion about the expediency of such a meeting in the near future. This meeting however ought not to have a purely exploratory character but a practicable and preparatory character in order that after that meeting has taken place our Governments are able to take definite decisions and thus that delay in the taking of decisions on urgent questions can be avoided. Therefore I consider it indispensable to revert to my proposal that it is necessary in advance to define the scope of questions for discussion by representatives of the Three Powers and to draft the proposals which ought to be discussed by them and presented to our Governments for final decision.

¹ As printed in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 85, this document is dated August 24, 1943. The source text is headed "The following message for the Prime Minister and the President, was handed to the Foreign Office by the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires on the night of August 26th, 1943". The channel through which the message was forwarded by the British Foreign Office to the White House at Washington is not indicated. The message was further forwarded by the White House to Roosevelt, who was at Hyde Park August 26-30, 1943.

² Message sent from Quebec on August 18, 1943, *ante*, p. 20.

³ The translation of the final clause of this sentence in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 85, reads "as I indeed thought before." The translation by the American Embassy at Moscow of Molotov's note of August 24, 1943, which transmitted the text of the message for the Embassy's information, employs the phrase, "as I considered it before." There is no written evidence of Stalin's previous mention of Fairbanks, although he appears to have suggested Fairbanks orally to Davies. See *ante*, p. 7, footnote 3.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

[HYDE PARK,] August 26, 1943.

From : The President

To : Colonel Warden, Personal and Secret

Number 347. I hope you have seen Uncle Joe's new message which is greatly improved in its tone. As you and he know, I am lost until Monday² and I would let a few days go by till we answer him.

However, my first feeling is that he has come around to our secondary meeting and that it should be held very soon.

¹ Sent via the White House Map Room and the British Admiralty Delegation at Washington. Churchill was in Canada at this time.

² August 30, 1943.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 4 September 1943.²

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Personal and secret from the President to Marshal Stalin

7. While this coming conference³ is a very good thing, I still hope that you and Mr. Churchill and I can meet as soon as possible. I personally could arrange to meet in a place as far as North Africa between November fifteenth and December fifteenth. I know you will understand that I cannot be away from Washington more than about twenty days because, under our Constitution, no one can sign for me when I am away.

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. The entire document is printed in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 88.

² A notation on the source text indicates that this message was delivered to Stalin on September 6, 1943.

³ Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, held at Moscow, October 18–November 1, 1943.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*¹

Translation

[Moscow, September 8, 1943.]

Personal and secret message from Premier J. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt

¹ Apparently sent via the Soviet Embassy, Washington. The entire document is printed in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 90.

Third. As to our personal meeting with participation of Mr. Churchill I am also interested to have it arranged as soon as possible. Your proposal regarding the time of the meeting seems to me acceptable. I consider that it would be expedient to choose as the place of the meeting the country where there are the representations of all three countries, for instance, Iran. However, I have to say that the exact date of the meeting has to be defined later taking into consideration the situation on the Soviet-German front where more than 500 divisions are engaged in the fighting in all, and where the control on the part of the High Command of the USSR is needed almost daily.

SEPTEMBER 8, 1943.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 9 September 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From the President to Marshal Stalin personal and secret
Thank you for your message received today.

3. I am delighted with your willingness to go along with the third suggestion, and the time about the end of November is all right. I fully understand that military events might alter the situation for you or for Mr. Churchill or myself. Meanwhile, we can go ahead on that basis. Personally, my only hesitation is the place but only because it is a bit further away from Washington than I had counted on. My Congress will be in session at that time and, under our Constitution, I must act on legislation within ten days. In other words, I must receive documents and return them to the Congress within ten days and Teheran makes this rather a grave risk if the flying weather is bad. If the Azores route is not available, it means going by way of Brazil and across the South Atlantic Ocean. For these reasons I hope that you will consider some part of Egypt, which is also a neutral state and where every arrangement can be made for our convenience.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. The entire document is printed in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 92.

740.0011 EW 1939/31080 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 10, 1943.

1638. Today's *Egyptian Mail* carries a summary of interview of Nahas Pasha with London *News Chronicle* reporting *inter alia* he would welcome holding conference between Great Britain, United States and Russia in Cairo and would be pleased to provide facilities.

KIRK

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*¹

Translation

[Moscow, September 12, 1943.]

Personal and secret message from Premier I. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill

I have received your messages of September 10th.²

3. As to the meeting of the heads of the three Governments, I do not have any objections regarding Tegeran [*Tehran*] as the place of the meeting, which (Tegeran) is more appropriate than Egypt where the Soviet Union does not have its representation.

SEPTEMBER 12, 1943.

¹ Apparently sent via the Soviet Embassy, Washington. The entire document is printed in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 93.

² Roosevelt's message referred to here is presumably the one sent from Washington September 9, 1943, *ante*, p. 24. Churchill's is that of September 10, 1943, printed in Churchill, p. 281.

Roosevelt Papers

The British Chargé (Campbell) to President Roosevelt

MOST SECRET & PERSONAL

WASHINGTON, September 17, 1943.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: A telegram just received from Mr. Eden¹ informs me that the Prime Minister before he left² drafted a message to Marshal Stalin; a copy was left with you and it was not to be sent off until your concurrence was received. A further copy is enclosed for your convenience.

¹ Eden had returned to London from the First Quebec Conference.

² Churchill conferred with Roosevelt in Washington during the early part of September 1943. The records of the Roosevelt-Churchill discussions at Quebec and Washington, August-September 1943, are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

Meanwhile a further message has been received from Marshal Stalin addressed apparently both to yourself and to Mr. Churchill. A copy of this is also enclosed.³

Mr. Eden has asked me to find out whether you wish to make any comment on the Prime Minister's draft message to Marshal Stalin, especially in view of Marshal Stalin's message since received.

Believe me, Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

R. I. CAMPBELL

[Enclosure]

Draft Message From Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin

MOST SECRET & PERSONAL

Following is text of draft message from Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin.⁴

Begins.

The President and I were both very glad to get your appreciative message of September 10th.⁵ We have a most intensive desire to help your grand efforts in every possible way.

We are each sending you our proposed agenda separately.⁶ We shall be very glad to have your list of subjects. Nothing should be barred out but some may be more suitable for verbal discussion when the heads of government meet.

The President seems to think that November 15th would be a good date to aim at for our personal meeting and I will of course conform to whatever arrangements are convenient to you two.

There appears to be a very real constitutional difficulty in the President going so far as Tehran and I still hope you will consider Egypt or perhaps a Syrian port like Beirut. One way of holding conference is for us each to have a ship and meet in one of the harbours of Egypt or Levant or possibly at Cyprus. If this idea attracts you we could place a fine ship entirely at your disposal and you could send on ahead all your advance party, cypher staff, etc. so as to be completely independent of us and at the same time in constant contact with your own war front. Wherever we go we think the press should be entirely banished and the whole place sealed off by an armed cordon so that we are not disturbed in any way in these conversations upon which, I repeat, the hope of the future world depends.

³ The message as received by Roosevelt from the Soviet Government is printed *supra*.

⁴ As indicated above, this message was not to be sent until Roosevelt had concurred. Roosevelt concurred, in a message of October 4, 1943, to Churchill, *post*, p. 27; but Churchill replied on October 5, *post*, p. 28, that another message had been sent instead.

⁵ *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 91.

⁶ For the forthcoming Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 4 October 1943.

PRIORITY

Personal and secret to Premier Stalin from the President.

I am sure that we are going to find a meeting of minds for the important decisions which must finally be made by us. This preliminary conference² will clear the ground and if difficulties develop at the meeting of our foreign ministers, I would still have every confidence that they can be reconciled when you and Churchill and I meet.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. A draft of this message, in the Roosevelt Papers, contains the words "Prepared by H. Hopkins" in the lower left corner, in an unidentified handwriting, and some changes in the text, in Roosevelt's handwriting. Roosevelt's changes in the passage printed here were (1) the substitution of "difficulties" for "points of difference", and (2) the substitution of "you and Churchill and I" for "the three of us". The entire document is printed in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 96.

² Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 4 October 1943.

PRIORITY

President to Former Naval Person, No. 374, personal and secret.

I think your idea of enticing Uncle Joe to the Mediterranean with the offer of the use of a ship is excellent, but I am not sure whether or not I have told you this. In any case, I hope that your efforts meet with success for reasons you well know. Please let me know if you have any news on this matter.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 5 October 1943.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret. No. 436.

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.

4. Your number 374. Not hearing from you, I did not persist in the ship enticing idea but I don't think it would have been accepted by Uncle Joe anyhow. On September 25, I sent him the telegram contained in my immediately following and received last night his reply.² I hope you will approve of all this as good and careful arrangements should be made. This plan would be convenient if you still want to invite the Generalissimo to meet you in Cairo on our return from CAIRO 3. I do not think you will find the journey from Cairo to CAIRO 3 a burden. It is only about six hours. It would be a convenience if one of your security authorities came over here to work up the whole cover plan. I expect to start from here about the end of October and will meet you with the greatest pleasure in Cairo or at any other point you fix. May I advise your considering seriously coming across in a fast cruiser and only using the air for the various hops across Africa. I shall be moving about among the armies till you arrive.

PRIME

² Stalin's reply was also quoted in Churchill's immediately following telegram, *infra*.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 5 October 1943.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret. Number 437.

The text of the telegram referred to in my 436 is as follows:

"Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. Personal and most secret. For your eye alone Sept 25, 1943.

"I have been pondering about our meeting of heads of governments at Teheran.² Good arrangements must be made for security in this somewhat loosely controlled area. Accordingly, I suggest for your consideration that I make preparations at Cairo in regard to accommodation, security, etc., which are bound to be noticed in spite of all praiseworthy efforts to keep them secret. Then perhaps only two or three days before our meeting, we should throw a British and a Russian brigade around a suitable area in Teheran including the airfield and keep an absolute cordon till we have finished our talks. We would not tell the Persian Government nor make any arrangements for our accommodation until this moment comes. We should of course have to control absolutely all out-going messages. Thus we shall have an effective blind for the world press and also for any unpleasant people who might not be as fond of us as they ought.

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.

² Agreement had not yet been reached on Tehran as the place of the conference. Presumably Churchill was making plans on the hypothesis that Tehran would be found acceptable to Roosevelt.

"I suggest also that in all future correspondence on this subject we use the expression ("CAIRO 3") instead of Teheran which should be buried and also that the code name for the operation should be (EUREKA) which I believe is Ancient Greek. If you have other ideas let me know and we can then put them to the President. I have not said anything to him about this aspect yet."

"Kremlin Oct 3, 1943. Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill. Personal and secret.

"I received your message of the 27th Sept concerning the forthcoming meeting of the three heads of governments. I have no objection to the diverting preparations which you intend to carry out in Cairo. Regarding your proposal to throw British and Russian brigades into the region of CAIRO 3 several days before our meeting in that city, I find this measure inexpedient as it would cause an unnecessary sensation and would decamouflage the preparations. I suggest that each of us should take with him a sufficient police guard. In my opinion, this would be enough to secure our safety.

"I have no objection to your other proposals relating to the forthcoming meeting and I agree with those conventional denominations which you propose to use in the correspondence concerning this meeting."

PRIME

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*¹

Translation

[Moscow, October 6, 1943.]

Personal and secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

I received your message of October 4th.²

Our representatives³ have to do everything possible to prevent possible difficulties in their responsible work. It is understood that the decisions as such can be made only by our governments and I hope they will be made at my personal meeting with you and Mr. Churchill.

OCTOBER 6, 1943.

¹ Apparently sent via the Soviet Embassy, Washington. The entire document is printed in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 97.

² *Ante*, p. 27.

³ At the forthcoming Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

Roosevelt Papers

*President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang*¹

WASHINGTON, October 13, 1943.

MY DEAR GENERALISSIMO: My special representative, Brigadier General Patrick J. Hurley, is going out on a special mission² and I am hoping very much that you can see him when he gets to China.

With every best wish to you and Madame Chiang Kai-shek,

Always sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

¹ Carried to Chungking by Hurley.

² According to *The Stilwell Papers*, p. 236, the purpose of the mission was "to arrange the final details of the Cairo conference". See also Lohbeck, p. 203.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, [October 14, 1943.]

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and most secret. Number 456.

I have a new idea about "EUREKA" which I have asked Anthony² to try on UJ for subsequent submission to you if UJ agrees. There is a place in the desert which I now call CYPRUS but whose real name is in my immediately following.³ This would be a much easier journey for you from Cairo than "CAIRO THREE" and very little longer for UJ. We could put up three encampments and live comfortably in perfect seclusion and security. I am going into details on the chance of agreement in the Trinity. See also meanwhile St. Mat[t]hew Chapter 17 Verse 4.⁴

¹ Apparently sent via military channels.

² Eden, who arrived at Moscow October 18, 1943, to attend the Conference of Foreign Ministers.

³ The place referred to was Habbaniya, Iraq, about 50 miles west of Baghdad.

⁴ The following footnote was typed on the source text by the White House Map Room: "St. Mat[t]hew Chapter 17 Verse 4.—Then answered Peter, and said unto Jesus, Lord, it is good for us to be here: if thou wilt, let us make here three tabernacles; one for thee, and one for Moses, and one for Elias.[']"

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 14 October 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Personal and secret from President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin.

The Secretary of State and his Staff are well on their way to Moscow but it seems doubtful at this time that they will be able to get there before the seventeenth. I will let you know of their progress.

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

I am much disturbed in regard to the location of the other meeting but I will send you this problem in another message.²

ROOSEVELT

² *Infra.*

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 14 October 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From President Roosevelt personal and secret to Marshal Stalin.

The problem of my going to the place you suggested is becoming so acute that I feel I should tell you frankly that, for constitutional reasons, I cannot take the risk. The Congress will be in session. New laws and resolutions must be acted on by me after their receipt and must be returned to the Congress physically before ten days have elapsed. None of this can be done by radio or cable. The place you mentioned is too far to be sure that the requirements are fulfilled. The possibility of delay in getting over the mountain—first, east bound and then west bound—is insurmountable. We know from experience that planes in either direction are often held up for three or four days.

I do not think that any one of us will need Legation facilities, as each of us can have adequate personal and technical staffs. I venture, therefore, to make some other suggestions and I hope you will consider them or suggest any other place where I can be assured of meeting my constitutional obligations.

In many ways Cairo is attractive, and I understand there is a hotel and some villas out near the pyramids which could be completely segregated.

Asmara, the former Italian Capital of Eritrea, is said to have excellent buildings and a landing field—good at all times.

Then there is the possibility of meeting at some port in the Eastern Mediterranean, each one of us to have a ship. If this idea attracts you we could easily place a fine ship entirely at your disposal for you and your party so that you would be completely independent of us and, at the same time, be in constant contact with your own war front.

Another suggestion is in the neighborhood of Bagdad where we could have three comfortable camps with adequate Russian, British and American guards. This last idea seems worth considering.

In any event, I think the Press should be entirely banished, and the whole place surrounded by a cordon so that we would not be disturbed in any way.

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

What would you think of November twentieth or November twenty-fifth as the date of the meeting?

I am placing a very great importance on the personal and intimate conversations which you and Churchill and I will have, for on them the hope of the future world will greatly depend.

Your continuing initiative along your whole front heartens all of us.

ROOSEVELT

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 14, 1943.

Former Naval Person #388.

I have finally sent the following telegram to U. J. and I think your idea is an excellent one. St. Peter sometimes had real inspirations. I like the idea of three tabernacles. We can add one later for your old friend Chiang.

[Here follows the text of the telegram to Stalin, *supra*.]

ROOSEVELT

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, October 16, 1943.

No. 459. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

3. I entirely agree with the telegram you have sent to Uncle Joe about EUREKA. Let me know what he replies.

4. Please also see Saint Mark 9 verses 5 and 6 especially sixth verse.²

¹ Apparently sent via military channels.

² The following footnote was typed on the source text by the White House Map Room:

"Saint Mark 9

"5. And Peter answered and said to Jesus, Master, it is good for us to be here: and let us make three tabernacles; one for thee, and one for Moses, and one for Elias.

"6. For he wist not what to say; for they were sore afraid."

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*¹

[Moscow, October 17, 1943.]

Personal and secret message from Premier J. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt

I have received both of your messages of October 14.² I thank you for the information about the Secretary of State and his staff, who are on their way now. I hope they will soon arrive safely in Moscow.

I shall send my reply regarding the question raised in your second message, after I have counsel with my colleagues in the Government.

OCTOBER 17, 1943.

¹ Apparently sent via the Soviet Embassy, Washington.

² *Ante*, pp. 30, 31.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*¹

Translation

[Moscow, October 19, 1943.]

Personal and secret message to President Franklin D. Roosevelt from Premier J. V. Stalin

In regard to the place of the forthcoming meeting of the heads of the three Governments, I want to tell you the following.

Unfortunately, not one of the places proposed by you for the meeting; instead of Tegeran [*Tehran*] is acceptable for me.²

In the course of the operations of the Soviet troops during the summer and the fall of this year, it became clear that our troops can continue their offensive operations against the German Army, and summer campaign may overgrow into winter one.

All my colle[a]gues consider that these operations demand daily guidance on the part of the Supreme Command, and my personal contact with the Command. In Tegeran conditions are better, since there are wire telegraph and telephone communications with Moscow, what cannot be said about the other places. That is why my colle[a]gues insist on Tegeran as the place of the meeting.

I agree with you that representatives of press must not be present at the meeting. I also accept your proposal to set November 20th or 25th as possible date of the meeting.

¹ Apparently sent via the Soviet Embassy, Washington.

² The following additional sentence appears at this point in the translation printed in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 101: "It is not a matter of security, for that does not worry me."

Mr. Hull has safely arrived in Moscow, and I hope that his direct participation in the Moscow meeting of the three countries will do a great good.³

OCTOBER 19, 1943.

³ The records of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers are scheduled to be published in *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I. Excerpts relating to arrangements for the Conference of the Heads of Government are printed in this chapter of the present volume; excerpts relating to substantive preparations for the Conference of the Heads of Government are printed in the next chapter.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

[LONDON,] 20 October 1943.

No. 467. Former Naval Person to President personal and most secret.

Para 1. In view of the changes that have taken place since QUADRANT we have had prolonged discussions here about our existing plans for the campaign of 1944. On these the British Chiefs of Staff and War Cabinet are deeply concerned. We ask for a full conference of the Combined Staffs in North Africa in the first or second week of November, that is between the end of the foreign secretaries conference at Moscow and EUREKA. We ask this irrespective of whether EUREKA takes place or not. It would be best however if this took place on our way to EUREKA.

Para 2. We will go wherever you wish, but is there any reason why we should not meet again at ANFA? I recognize that the date should be fixed in relation to EUREKA. We must wait to decide our own movements till we hear from UJ. But the Combined Staffs should begin their discussions not later than about November 10. I beg most earnestly that you will consider this request in a favourable sense.

¹ Sent by the American Embassy, London, apparently via military channels.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram (paraphrase)

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

[Moscow,] 21 October 1943.

URGENT

Urgent and secret for the President from Sec State.

Yesterday was the first opportunity to discuss the meeting place between Heads of Governments. Just as I was starting the discussion with Molotov he spoke of and referred to the correspondence between

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

you and Mr. Stalin within recent days on the subject. He proceeded to repeat Stalin's attitude which seemed nearly adamant with respect to any other place except Teheran. I offered every conceivable reason in support of Beirut in particular.² Unless there are further new developments, I fear that Stalin will continue immovable on the question. Apart from his insistence about the facilities for keeping in close contact with his armies which Teheran will afford, the suggestion is made that all three nations have troops and embassies at Teheran and that the flight from the Mediterranean coast from such point as Alexandria for example would be the same as a flight from Cairo and that this would avoid an ocean voyage by you as far as Beirut or Alexandria or other neighboring point.

I shall continue to press this matter from every possible angle as the conference goes on. If you have any further suggestions they will be welcomed.

² No record has been found of any directive from Roosevelt to Hull to support Beirut as the place of the proposed conference of the Heads of Government. Presumably Hull had been told that Beirut was the "port in the Eastern Mediterranean" to which Roosevelt referred in his telegram of October 14, 1943, to Stalin.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1943.

Personal and secret from the President for the eyes of Secretary Hull only.²

I have received a message from the Marshal³ stating that it is impossible for him to meet Churchill and me anywhere else but Teheran. A careful check-up on time risks and constitutional requirements here makes Teheran impossible for me.

In reply to my several messages the Marshal has shown no realization of my obligations.

Therefore, will you please deliver the following message from me to the Marshal and explain to him orally the definite and clear reasons which are not actuated by personal desires but are fixed by our Constitution. This is not a question of theory; it is a question of fact.

"Personal and Secret for Marshal Stalin.

I am deeply disappointed in your message received today⁴ in regard to our meeting.

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² A notation on the source text indicates that this message was delivered to Hull on October 23 at 8:30 a. m.

³ Telegram of October 19, 1943, *ante*, p. 33.

⁴ The message had been received on October 20, 1943.

Please accept my assurance that I fully appreciate and understand your reason for requiring daily guidance on the part of the Supreme Command and your personal contact with the Command which is bringing such outstanding results. This is of high importance.

And I wish you would realize that there are other vital matters which, in this constitutional American Government, represent fixed obligations on my part which I cannot change. Our Constitution calls for action by the President on legislation within ten days of the passage of such legislation. That means that the President must receive and return to the Congress, with his written approval or his veto, physical documents in that period. I cannot act by cable or radio, as I have told you before.

The trouble with Teheran is the simple fact that the approaches to that city over the mountain often make flying an impossibility for several days at a time. This is a double risk; first, for the plane delivering documents from Washington and, second, for the plane returning these documents to the Congress. I regret to say that as head of the Nation, it is impossible for me to go to a place where I cannot fulfill my constitutional obligations.

I can assume the flying risks for documents up to and including the Low Country as far as the Persian Gulf, through a relay system of planes, but I cannot assume the delays attending flights in both directions into the saucer over the mountains in which Teheran lies. Therefore, with much regret I must tell you that I cannot go to Teheran and in this my Cabinet members and the Legislative Leaders are in complete agreement.

Therefore, I can make one last practical suggestion. That is that all three of us should go to Basra where we shall be perfectly protected in three camps, to be established and guarded by our respective national troops. As you know, you can easily have a special telephone, under your own control, laid from Basra to Teheran where you will reach your own line into Russia. Such a wire service should meet all your needs, and by plane you will only be a little further off from Russia than in Teheran itself.

I am not in any way considering the fact that from United States territory I would have to travel six thousand miles and you would only have to travel six hundred miles from Russian territory.

I would gladly go ten times the distance to meet you were it not for the fact that I must carry on a constitutional government more than one hundred and fifty years old.

You have a great obligation to your people to carry on the defeat of our common enemy, but I am begging you to remember that I also have a great obligation to the American Government and to maintain the full American war effort.

As I have said to you before, I regard the meeting of the three of us as of the greatest possible importance, not only to our peoples as of today, but also to our peoples in relation to a peaceful world for generations to come.

It would be regarded as a tragedy by future generations if you and I and Mr. Churchill failed today because of a few hundred miles.

I repeat that I would gladly go to Teheran were I not prevented from doing so because of limitations over which I have no control.

I am suggesting Basra because of your communications problems.

If you do not like this I deeply hope you will reconsider Bagdad or Asmara or even Ankara in Turkey. The latter place is neutral territory, but I think it is worth considering and that the Turks might welcome the idea of being hosts though, of course, I have not mentioned this to them or anybody else.

Please do not fail me in this crisis. Roosevelt"

ROOSEVELT

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1943.

PRIORITY

Personal and secret, Number 391, from the President to the Former Naval Person.

Last night I received the following from U. J.:

[Here follows the message of October 19, 1943, printed *ante*, p. 33.]

I am asking Hull to deliver the following to U. J. at once:

[Here follows the message printed *supra*.]

The possibility of Teheran is out because I find the time risks are flatly impossible to take. I hope you can find some way of having Eden back this up.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 22 October 1943.

Most secret and personal from Former Naval Person to President. Number 469.

1. Your 391. I am instructing Eden to back you up to the full but I do not think Ankara would be possible; first, because of security, and secondly, because there are the Taurus Mountains to cross.

4. Whatever happens we have got to meet soon.

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET, PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 22 October 1943.

To the Former Naval Person from the President, personal and secret, Number 394.

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

With reference to your Number 467² regarding another full conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff early in November, it appears to me that there are several matters which should first be resolved before we meet.

1. There should be sufficient time allowed to analyze the results of the current Moscow conference and also I think the subsequent conference we have in mind. For us to stage a meeting while the Moscow conference is in progress or at least before its results can be carefully considered, probably would have unfavorable results in Russia.

2. Combined planning teams are now planning an overall plan for the defeat of Japan. It is important that this work be completed and that the respective Chiefs of Staff have an opportunity to study it before a general meeting.

3. Certain outline plans from Eisenhower and commanders in the Pacific covering operations approved at QUADRANT are to be submitted on November 1, and these should receive some consideration before we arrive at the moment for a combined meeting.

It would be advantageous to our advance preparations for the conference to be informed as to the subjects which you think we should discuss.

At the moment it seems to me that consideration of our relations with Russia is of paramount importance and that a meeting after our special conference with U. J. would be in order rather than one in early November. ANFA would be good.

ROOSEVELT

² *Ante*, p. 34.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 23 October 1943.

Personal and most secret. Number 471. Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Your number 394.

1. The Russians ought not to be vexed if the Americans and British closely concert the very great operations they have in hand for 1944 on fronts where no Russian Troops will be present. Nor do I think we ought to meet Stalin, if ever the meeting can be arranged, without being agreed about Anglo-American operations as such.

2. I would be content with Nov 15th if this is the earliest date for your staffs. I thought the staffs would work together for a few days before you and I arrive, say 18th or 19th, and we could then go on together to EUREKA. I do not yet know whether it is to be Nov 20th

¹ Apparently sent via military channels.

or 25th. I had not imagined that EUREKA would take more than 3 or 4 days or that large technical staffs would take part in it.

6. . . . I feel very much in the dark at present, and unable to think or act in the forward manner which is needed. For these reasons I desire an early conference.

7. All that you say about the plans for Eisenhower and the commanders in the Pacific which are due to be submitted on Nov 1st would harmonize with a meeting on Nov 15th at latest. I do not know how long you consider is required for the long term overall plan for the defeat of Japan to be completed by the combined planners and studied by our respective Chiefs of Staff.³ I do not consider that the more urgent decisions to which I have referred above ought to be held up for this long term view of the war against Japan which nevertheless should be pressed forward with all energy.

8. I hope you will consider that these reasons for a meeting are solid. We cannot decide finally until an answer is received from Uncle Joe. Should EUREKA not be possible it makes it all the more necessary that we should meet in the light of the information now being received from the Moscow Conference. I am expecting Anthony⁴ to start home before the end of the month and am ready myself to move any day after the first week in Nov.

² For the portion which is omitted here, see *post*, p. 110.

³ A preliminary version of the Combined Staff Planners' study was completed October 25, 1943; excerpts from it are printed in Ehrman, vol. v, pp. 159-161. The definitive version, circulated December 2, 1943, as C. C. S. 417, is printed *post*, p. 765.

⁴ Eden.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 25 October 1943.

PRIORITY

Number 396, Personal and secret, from the President for the Former Naval Person.

It is a nuisance to have the influenza. McIntire says I need a sea voyage.

No word from U. J. yet.

If he is adamant, what would you think of you and me meeting, with small staffs, in North Africa or even at the Pyramids, and toward the close of our talks get the Generalissimo to join us for two or three

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

days? At the same time, we could ask U. J. to send Molotov to the meeting with you and me. Our people propose November 20.

ROOSEVELT

740.0011 Moscow/345

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Moscow, October 25, 1943—5:00 p. m.

Subject: Turkey and the War; Post-war Planning.

Participants: Mr. V. M. Molotov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

The Secretary.

During the recess this afternoon, Mr. Molotov brought up the question of Turkey's entering the war . . .

I then proceeded to re-emphasize some of the main points I had made to Marshal Stalin earlier today² in support of the proposal of President Roosevelt that the three Heads of Government should meet at Basra. I said the stage in the war situation had been reached where we were strongly on the offensive and that if we should wait until the end of the war to formulate a basic foundation for a post-war international program peoples in all of the democracies would be scattered in every direction under every sort of discordant influence by various elements, groups, societies and individuals with the result that nothing would be more impossible at that belated stage than for a country like mine to pursue a suitable post-war program and rally and unite all of the essential forces in support of it. This made it all-important, therefore, that we should realize the disastrous nature of the opposite course of postponing everything until the military decision has been reached. I said that if an official in my country should announce that he were opposed to formulating the fundamental policies for a post-war world until after the war is over, he would be thrown out of power over night.

¹ For the portion of the memorandum which is omitted here, see *post*, p. 117.

² See Hull's telegram of October 26, 1943, to Roosevelt, *post*, p. 45.

³ For the remainder of the memorandum, see *post*, p. 118. The memorandum is unsigned but bears the typewritten initials "C[ordell] H[ull]" as those of the drafter.

Roosevelt Papers

*The Chief of Staff of the Army (Marshall) to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 25 October 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

The following is a first trial at a draft of a message regarding the subject of Russian participation in the Combined Chiefs of Staff conferences. You will recall that the other day I was opposed to a formal joining up by the Russians with our Chiefs of Staff organization, first, because I felt certain the Russians would feel that we were endeavoring to penetrate their strategical and operational plans, and further, that it would be next to impossible to reach final decisions with such a variegated group. My view is to make a small beginning, and very definitely on the basis that we are not asking for anything from the Russians in the way of information but are offering them virtually a complete insight into all of our strategical and logistical doings.

The following is the proposed message from the President to the Prime Minister:

[The proposed message which follows at this point was sent as Roosevelt's telegram 397, October 26, 1943, to Churchill, printed *post*, p. 42, with the changes indicated in footnotes 2 and 3.]

G C MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

King should have a shot at this before final consideration. G. C. M.²

¹ This memorandum bears in the upper right-hand corner a penciled notation, in Leahy's handwriting, which appears to read: "Tell Marshall (a) if Stalin comes to Basra (b) if he does not come to conf & sends Molotov to a meeting in Cairo msg [message] to be sent immed[iately] after U J. is heard from".

² The postscript was handwritten.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 26 October 1943.

Former Naval Person to President personal and most secret number 475 your number 396.²

1. I shall be delighted to meet you anywhere in North Africa, but I hope we need not wait till the twentieth. Strongly recommend sea voyage to ANFA which we know, moving on to Pyramids if and when convenient. By all means ask Chiang. If UJ refuses, then Molotov

¹ Apparently sent via military channels.

² *Ante*, p. 39.

with a Russian military mission would do. It seems to me fine progress has been made by Hull and Eden at Moscow and still more on the Russian southern front.

PRIME

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 26 October 1943.

PRIORITY

Number 397, personal and secret, from the President for the Former Naval Person.

The present Moscow conference appears to be a genuine beginning of British-Russian-U. S. collaboration which should lead to the early defeat of Hitler. In order to further stimulate this cooperation and particularly to increase the confidence of Stalin in the sincerity of our intentions it is suggested that immediately upon our receipt of information if it turns out that he is unable to meet with us at Basra or other place that is acceptable to both of us,² we jointly transmit some such message as the following to him:

"Heretofore we have informed you of the results of our combined British-American military staff conferences. You may feel that it would be better to have a Russian military representative sit in at such meetings to listen to the discussions regarding British-American operations and take note of the decisions. He would be free to make such comments and proposals as you might desire. This arrangement would afford you and your staff an intimate and prompt report of these meetings.

If you favorably consider such an arrangement we shall advise you of the date and place of the next conference as soon as they have been determined. It would be understood that the procedure outlined carried no implication of discussion of plans for purely Russian operations except as your representative might be instructed to present."

If he does agree to meet us at Basra, we can discuss this matter with him at that time.³

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² In the draft of this message as submitted by Marshall to Leahy (*ante*, p. 41) the words from "immediately upon" to "both of us" (except "if it turns out") were written in by Leahy. The words "if it turns out" may have been added by Roosevelt.

³ In the draft as submitted by Marshall to Leahy, this paragraph was written in by Leahy.

Roosevelt Papers

*President Roosevelt to President İnönü*¹

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1943.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT INONU: I was made very happy when Ambassador Steinhardt brought me the excellent photograph of your good self—and I am happy indeed to have it.

I hope much that the day will come when you and I can meet, for I have long had an admiration for you and all that you are doing.

Our two Nations have, in so many ways, the same ideals of enlightened progress that it is right that we should be found with the same feelings toward this great crisis through which all of the peoples of the world are passing.

I hope, particularly, that when this war is ended, there will be not only an assurance of peace for many generations to come, but that agreements will be reached whereby smaller nations will no longer have to be concerned over the maintenance of their complete independence. In past years, the amount of money that has had to be spent on armaments, great and small, instead of on productive industry and agriculture and the arts, has been a disgrace to all of us in every part of the world.

I think that we are both aware of each other's problems—and again I wish that you and I could have the opportunity of talking over these and many other things.²

With my warm regards and my hope that you will surely let me know if at any time in the future I can be of any service,

Very sincerely yours,

[No signature indicated]

¹ Probably delivered by Steinhardt, who was in the United States in September–October 1943 and who left Washington on October 27, 1943, to return to Ankara.

² For the reply to this expression of Roosevelt's desire to talk over various matters with İnönü, see Steinhardt's telegram 1869, November 14, 1943, *post*, p. 86.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 26 October 1943.

Number: SD 2. Personal secret for the President only from Harriman.

1. After the conference this afternoon, Monday,² I had an opportunity to talk with Molotov privately again about the place of meeting. I asked him bluntly whether communications was the only inhibition to Basra as against Teheran. He assured me that it was and explained that they had direct telegraph and telephone wires to Teheran under

¹ Apparently sent via military channels.

² October 25, 1943. The telegram was sent after midnight.

their complete control policed by Soviet troops, amplifying what Stalin had said.

2. I told him that since this was the case we should make a detailed study of whether similarly satisfactory arrangements could not be made through to Basra, offering the assistance of our military establishment in Iran and assuring him that we could get full cooperation from the British.

3. I am afraid they are worrying that they will not be able to exercise directly the same degree of control and security against Iranians, German spies known to be in the area, and possibly ourselves, as they do in North Persia. I offered to send General Deane down with a Russian officer to investigate the problem on the spot.

4. Molotov did not bring the matter up but they may be concerned over sending too large a force into southern Iran which would be a violation of their treaty. I would appreciate being advised what arrangements, if any, you contemplate should be made with the Iranian and Iraqi governments regarding entry of the substantial number of Soviet guard forces which might be required if the Soviets should wish to police the communications and the camp.

5. I emphasized the importance to the war effort that the discussions would have in establishing closer military collaboration and said that we were so close together on the place of meeting that a way must be found to solve the remaining difficulties.

6. Molotov raised the question if you went to Teheran why the railroad or road could not be used between Basra and Teheran if the air delivery and dispatch of your documents was interfered with by weather. I explained that the ten days available to you were taxed to the utmost by continuous air delivery and that the extra time the seven hundred miles of ground travel would require would make the return of your documents within the legal limit impossible of accomplishment.

7. I asked Molotov to accept your decision that Teheran was impossible but to concentrate with me on finding a way to solve the communication difficulties to Basra. He indicated a willingness to do so but did not show any optimism as to results.

8. I saw Eden this evening regarding this subject. He of course agreed to cooperate fully and volunteered to take the first opportunity to emphasize to Molotov the importance of the meeting to concerting the war effort.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) ¹

[WASHINGTON,] October 26, 1943.

Personal and secret from Harry Hopkins to W. Averell Harriman.

If meeting in Bosra [*Basra*] agreed to President confident that between ourselves and the British we can make proper arrangements with Iran and Iraq relative to Russian troops.

Reports of the Conference are very encouraging although, naturally, everyone here disappointed that personal conference seems difficult.

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President ¹

SECRET

Moscow, 26 October 1943.

Number SD 3. Personal and secret for the President only from the Secretary of State.

In accordance with your instructions contained in your Navy cable,² I called on Marshal Stalin this afternoon, Monday,³ at three o'clock, accompanied by Ambassador Harriman. Mr. Molotov was also present.

After an exchange of amenities, I told the Marshal that my government and people attached the highest importance to the forthcoming meeting between himself, the Prime Minister, and you, and handed to him your communication.⁴ Stalin read our unofficial Russian translation and passed it on to Molotov. He, then, said that he would have to consider the proposal in regard to Basra as a place of meeting and consult with his associates. He made no mention of any of the other places suggested as possible alternatives in your communication.

Mr. Molotov, obviously expressing Mr. Stalin's thoughts, said that the question of any other place except Teheran was a most difficult one. That both civil and military authorities in the Soviet Union were loath to have the Marshal absent himself at all and that he could not go to a place where he could not maintain constant direction of the important military operations now in progress.

Stalin, then, said that he thought it might be possible to postpone the meeting until next spring when military operations would have to be suspended during the thaw, at which time Fairbanks might be an appropriate place.

¹ Apparently sent via military channels.

² Telegram of October 21, 1943, *ante*, p. 35.

³ October 25, 1943. This report was evidently sent shortly after midnight.

⁴ Quoted in the telegram of October 21, 1943.

I, then, endeavored orally to persuade the Marshal of the real importance for our common cause which such a meeting would have both in prosecution of the war and for the post war period. I told him that if, in addition to the announcement of such agreements as we might be able to reach at the present conference our three governments could announce a disposition on the part of the heads of state to meet and confer, the effect would electrify our peoples and Allies and be most disheartening to our enemies.

Stalin replied that he had in progress important military operations with the summer campaign merging into that of the winter; that there was now an opportunity which might only occur once in fifty years in warfare to inflict a decisive defeat on the Germans whose available reserves were very few while the Russians had sufficient reserves for an entire year. He added that he did not feel he could neglect this opportunity. He repeated that he would confer with his colleagues on this latest message from you.

I, then, dwelt on the possibility from a technical point of view [of] establishing equally good communications between Teheran and Basra as exist between Teheran and Moscow, which would permit his constant direction of these operations. I made it clear to him that, while from every point of view we regarded this meeting of the highest importance, both you and I understood that military considerations came first.

Stalin said that his position was not based on stubbornness or on considerations of prestige but entirely on the circumstances which he had mentioned. He said he did not see why a delay of two days in the transmission of any state papers could be so vitally important, whereas a false step in military matters was not a grammatical error which could be subsequently corrected but might cost thousands of lives.

The Ambassador at my request outlined in detail the technical arrangements which we considered could be made to insure absolutely reliable communications between Basra and Moscow and referred to our willingness to do everything we could to assist on this point. The Ambassador mentioned the fact that the three heads of state would be able to stay in three camps in the hills under the protection of troops of their own nationality, to which Stalin replied that he was not a bit concerned about the question of protection but only communication.

Stalin pointed out in this connection that, in regard to the wire and other means of communication between Teheran and Moscow, everything was Russian but the territory which was Iranian.

At the close of the interview Stalin repeated his desire to consult with his colleagues before making an answer.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 27 October 1943.

PRIORITY

Personal and secret to the Generalissimo from the President.

I have been very pleased to hear from you of your satisfaction with your meeting with Mountbatten and Somervell.²

The Conference at Moscow has made splendid progress up to the moment and I am very hopeful that the results will be beneficial all around. I am pressing for the full blown partnership of China, Great Britain, Russia and the United States.

I am not yet sure whether Stalin can meet me but, under any circumstances, I am anxious to meet you with Churchill at a reasonably early date somewhere between the twentieth and the twenty-fifth of November. I think Alexandria would be a good meeting place. There are good accommodations there.

I will bring a small staff with me including our highest ranking Army, Navy and Air officers. I should think the Conference would last about three days. I know you will not want to be away from China long, but it is far better for me to get away now than later.

I am looking forward to seeing you because I am sure there are many things that can only be satisfactorily settled if we can meet face to face. Please keep this very confidential.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the American Military Mission to China, via Army channels, as War Department telegram 3701 to the Mission.

² Madame Chiang had sent Roosevelt, on October 21, 1943, via Stilwell (who had forwarded it via Marshall), a message in which, among other things, she reported (1) that Mountbatten, Somervell, and Stilwell had had several conferences with Chiang and his staff; (2) that, so far as she knew, "everything portends to the fullest cooperation"; and (3) that Chiang was very favorably impressed with Mountbatten and Somervell (Defense Files).

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 27 October 1943.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and most secret No. 476.

Your No. 397.²

1. Like you, I rejoice in the good progress made at Moscow, and I greatly hope we may arrange EUREKA.

¹ Apparently sent via military channels.

² *Ante*, p. 42.

2. I deprecate the idea of inviting a Russian military representative to sit in at the meetings of our joint staffs. Unless he understood and spoke English, the delays would be intolerable. I do not know of any really high officer of the Russian Army who can speak English. Such a representative would have no authority or power to speak except as instructed. He would simply say [*bay*]³ for an earlier second front and block all other discussions. Considering they tell us nothing of their own movements, I do not think we should open this door to them as it would probably mean that they would want to have observers at all future meetings and all discussions between us would be paralyzed. We shall very soon have six or seven hundred thousand British and American troops and airmen in Italy and we are planning the great operation of OVERLORD. There will not be a Russian soldier in any of these. On the other hand, all our fortunes depend upon them. I regard our right to sit together on the movements of our own two forces as fundamental and vital. Hitherto, we have prospered wonderfully, but I now feel that the year 1944 is loaded with danger. Great differences may develop between us and we may take the wrong turning. Or, again, we may make compromises and fall between two stools. The only hope is the intimacy and friendship which has been established between us and between our high staffs. If that were broken, I should despair of the immediate future. A formal triple conference with the Russians is another thing. Then, they have to be represented by plenipotentiaries, or at any rate, persons having wide discretionary powers. I need scarcely say the British Chiefs of Staff fully share these views. I must add that I am more anxious about the campaign of 1944 than about any other with which I have been involved.

PRIME

³ Correction based on the text of the message as printed in Churchill, p. 315.

Roosevelt Papers

The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 28, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Following our conversation at luncheon yesterday, I have given much thought to the end that you will have the most effective State Department personnel available to you in your forthcoming plans. To this end I believe that Mr. Charles Bohlen, head of the Russian desk in the European Division, together with Mr. Frederick Reinhardt, both of whom are now taking part in the discussions in Moscow,

would be of great assistance. I have not only great confidence in the combined judgment of these two officers, but they both are qualified to act as interpreters owing to the length of time they have served and studied in the Soviet Union.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 28 October 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

For the eyes of Secretary Hull only from the President.

I am made very happy by your splendid achievement in putting things through. I know the China part of it² was due to your personal insistence.

Very confidentially I expect to turn up in North Africa shortly and would have to leave here by November ninth at the latest. I understand you are due back November seventh and I hope much that you can keep this schedule. It is imperative that you and I talk before I go. I would want to take Bohlen with me so you can use your judgment as to whether he should return with you and make an immediate turn around or whether you should leave him in North Africa to join me on my arrival there.

If the Marshal finds it impossible to meet me I suggest he fly as far as Basra even for one day. This is of supreme importance. The rest of the time I hope he would let Mr. Molotov sit with Mr. Churchill and me.

The Generalissimo will, I hope, meet us at close of the meetings.

All good luck and congratulations again.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² Inclusion of China as a signatory of the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed two days later at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers and issued November 1, 1943; *Decade*, p. 11.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 29 October 1943.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret. Nr. 477.

1. Earnestly hope you are making good progress.

¹ Apparently sent via military channels.

2. It is very awkward waiting about for an answer from Uncle Joe. It is urgent to get dates settled and preparations made. Anyhow, I hope you and I can meet at ANFA between 15th and 20th November. I have a great wish and need to see you. All our troubles and toils are so much easier to face when we are side by side.

3. Propose code name see my immediately following msg.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 29 October 1943.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret. Nr. 478.

My immediately preceding telegram. SEXTANT.

¹ Apparently sent via military channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 29 October 1943.

PRIORITY

To the Former Naval Person from the President, Number 400. Secret and personal.

Your 477. I must eliminate ANFA because I draw too much water. I want two or three days in North Africa before getting to Cairo or Alexandria on the 20th. I suggest the Combined Staffs meet you and me there at that time. If UJ is willing to come to Basra we can move on there at any date he wants. If he declines Basra I propose we go there with small staffs and meet Molotov and a small Russian Staff and plead with UJ to come there if only for one day. I still think it vital that we see him, but I simply cannot get out of constitutional communication with my Congress. I too am most anxious that you and I get away from this despatch method of talking.

As a corollary of above and in view of overloading transportation facilities, the Combined Staffs could make their headquarters in Algiers or Tunis and you and I could meet them there on the 19th. This is not so good however, because we would want the six top men with us in Egypt or Basra.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 29 October 1943.

PRIORITY

To the Former Naval Person from the President, Number 401.
Secret and personal.

My immediately preceding message. Code word SEXTANT is accepted.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

740.0011 Moscow/345

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Moscow, October 29, 1943—8 p. m.

Subject: Results of the Conference¹

Participants: Mr. V. M. Molotov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
The Secretary.

Mr. Molotov, while attending the reception at the Embassy here this evening, sent word to my apartment that he would be glad to say a few words to me. I cordially invited him to come up. When he came in, without much preliminaries, I expressed my high opinion of the splendid results of the Conference over which Mr. Molotov is presiding. . . .

.

I then said that the second front controversy carried on in public is one of the circumstances that might go far to submerge and divert attention from the monumental accomplishments of the Conference here this week and that another circumstance that may contribute to the same effect is that while some of us know the truth about the military requirements and the emergencies which the Marshal feels thus far have prevented him from going away to meet the other heads of governments in military conference, I said the great public of other countries is steadily getting the impression that the Marshal does not desire to go to meetings away from home but prefers to remain at home as in the past. I added that if the Marshal could see his way clear at the end of this Conference to approve strongly its work and at the same time to say that he is thoroughly agreeable to

¹ Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

meeting Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt at points abroad, and that only compelling military emergencies prevent his making such trips at any time just whenever he might be invited, but that he could only go when in his own judgment military considerations would permit him to leave home, and then proceed to go as in the pending situation in which he has an invitation from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, the effect of this, combined with the Conference, would be world-wide and tremendous.

Mr. Molotov again emphasized the view that most people, including ourselves, did not give the Marshal full credit for the true significance of the military emergencies and their effect on his own movements. I then again reiterated that some of us fully understand. I then said, "Why cannot the Marshal fly down even for one day and meet the President and Mr. Churchill?" He held out a little hope for his doing so and said that if it was so extremely important to have the proposed meeting why was the President not willing to fly just a little further and meet the Marshal in Tehran. I then repeated my inquiry and said "Why could not the Marshal fly down and meet the President and Churchill for even one day and then leave you there as his representative?" Mr. Molotov instantly dissented from this suggestion by saying that he himself was in no sense a military man and would not fit into that sort of a situation. Mr. Molotov requested me the second time to repeat what I said about the Marshal giving public approval to the work of the Conference and indicate his interest in meetings with Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill, and then undertake to carry out the latter.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 29 October 1943.

URGENT

For the President from Hull.

Your Oct 28th² just received. I have been kept here longer than I had expected and will not be able to leave before the 31st. Under most favorable conditions I would not reach Washington prior to the 11th or 12th.

I shall be glad to meet you on this side of the Atlantic at any time or place that will suit your convenience.

I have increasing indications that the Marshal will not go beyond Teheran. I doubt seriously whether Molotov not being a military

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was at Hyde Park October 30–November 3, 1943.

² *Ante*, p. 49.

man would be sent as substitute. Without his knowledge of my purpose I sounded him out indirectly.

I will continue to press the Stalin matter and Harriman will after I leave.

Wire me at Teheran and Cairo as to where you desire me to meet you.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 30 October 1943.

URGENT

(Secret for the President from Hull)

My 292320.² In further appraising the situation in West Africa, where I may find it necessary to spend ten days or two weeks in awaiting your arrival for a conference I find that one is definitely exposed in that area to such diseases as malaria, dysentery, etc and that I can ill afford to contract any of these diseases. I have had no vaccinations or immunizations. For same reasons flight to Dakar and Natal to bring me to Washington earlier seems unwise. Four members crew contracted malignant malaria on way here and will be unable to return. I am wondering whether you could work out your schedule to remain in Washington until about the eleventh on which date I would plan to reach there. Please wire me at Teheran and Cairo. I am assuming too that Harriman, General Deane and Bohlen will join your Conference.

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt at Hyde Park.

² Telegram of October 29, 1943, *supra*.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[HYDE PARK?] 30 October 1943.

URGENT

Personal and secret for the Secretary of State only from the President.

I find I can postpone departure till evening of eleventh or morning of twelfth and I think this is much better than your staying in North Africa all that time. I can probably meet you at your landing port.

I will wire Churchill to postpone everything two days.

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via the White House Map Room and Navy channels.

I will want Harriman and General Deane and Bohlen to join me in North Africa or Cairo.

Your work has been grand.

ROOSEVELT

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 30 October 1943.

Prime Minister to President. Most secret and personal. No. 479.
Your No. 400.²

1. I will meet you in Cairo on the 20th as you suggest and will, if you will allow me, assume responsibility for making all arrangements for your general security and comfort which would fall upon us as the occupying power. Casey has been lent a beautiful villa which I have seen myself and am sure would be in every way suitable for you. It is a mile or two from the Pyramids and surrounded by woods affording complete seclusion. It can be reached from the airfield in twenty minutes without going through any towns. The whole area can be easily cordoned off by British troops. There are some very interesting excursions into the desert which we could make together. I have no doubt Casey would be delighted to place the villa at your disposal. I should probably myself stay at the British Embassy in Cairo, which is perhaps twenty minutes away, but it may be that arrangements could be made for us both to be in the Pyramids area. I believe your Mr. Kirk also has a very fine house. Every facility exists in Cairo for the full staffs to be accommodated and to meet for business, and they can easily come out to your villa whenever desired. If you like this plan, which knowing the layout I consider far the best, I will immediately make all preparations and perhaps you would send an officer to make sure everything is arranged to your liking.

2. Do you propose to go through the Mediterranean in your ship? I should have thought this was more risky than flying on account of the danger of air attack by glider bombs. Our convoys are frequently attacked. I shall myself very possibly go to Gibraltar or Oran by ship and fly on from there by easy hops. I too propose to have a few days in the Mediterranean Theatre before SEXTANT begins, and would probably start from home around the twelfth. I could make preliminary contact with you wherever you first land or alight. It would be good to have a short preliminary meeting of us two and then separate for a few days before SEXTANT.

¹ Apparently sent to Washington via military channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt at Hyde Park.

² *Ante*, p. 50.

3. I am quite game to go on to Basra, but I gather Joe³ will not come beyond Teheran. If it is only Molotov and the Russian generals, I see no reason why they should not come to Cairo. Excellent arrangements can be made for Chiang in Cairo though not at the same moment. Shall we send him a joint invitation or would you prefer to wait till we know about whether we go to Basra? I repeat, I will do whatever you wish.

³ Stalin.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

[HYDE PARK?] 30 October 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Number 404. Personal and secret from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Your 479. Hull's departure from Moscow has meant two-day delay in his getting home. It is essential I see him before I myself leave, as you can readily understand. I had hoped to get three days in North Africa before reaching Cairo. I can, however, do some of the North African and Italian business on the way back. Therefore, I still hope to arrive Cairo by the twentieth by flying there directly I reach the harbor. But, if wind and weather are bad, I might not make Cairo until the twenty-second. I think my ship will take me to Oran.

Ever so many thanks for offering to make arrangements at Cairo, which we accept with pleasure. If any hitch develops there we can, of course, meet in Alexandria, the staff living ashore and we on our respective ships.

I am wiring Generalissimo to prepare to meet us in the general neighborhood of Cairo about November twenty-fifth.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via the White House Map Room and Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang*¹

SECRET

[HYDE PARK?] 30 October 1943.

PRIORITY

From the President to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

I have not heard definitely from Marshal Stalin but there is still a chance of Churchill and me meeting him near Persian Gulf.

¹ Sent to the American Military Mission to China, Chungking, via the White House Map Room and Army channels, as telegram 3734, from the War Department to the Mission.

Very confidentially, I hope you will make arrangements to meet with Churchill and me in general neighborhood of Cairo about November twenty-sixth.

Best regards

ROOSEVELT

Roosevelt Papers

*Memorandum by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces
(Somervell)*¹

[CHUNGKING, 30 October, 1943.]

The Gen asked me to convey the following message.²

Dr. T. V. Soong advised³ that President would like to meet the Generalissimo some time between November 15 and December 15⁴ and that he would see Stalin either before or after he sees the Generalissimo. The Generalissimo says that now the Peoples Political Council is over, if⁵ given reasonable notice he will be glad to meet the President⁶ before his meeting with Stalin. If for whatever reason the President cannot see the Generalissimo before his meeting with Stalin the Generalissimo wishes to postpone the meeting until some other time convenient to both parties. He would like the President to advise as to⁷ whether it would be desirable for him to meet with Mr. Churchill and the President together or whether he should see the President alone whenever the meeting takes place.

¹ Apparently prepared during Somervell's trip to China, and handed by Somervell to Roosevelt, in Washington, November 5, 1943. The source text, on plain paper without any letterhead, is typewritten, with handwritten additions and changes, as indicated in ensuing footnotes. A copy sent by Somervell to Hopkins on November 5, 1943, is typewritten on stationery of Stilwell's headquarters, is dated "30 October, 1943", and is stamped "Secret". The typing of the copy sent to Hopkins conforms to the revised phrasing of the source text (i. e., the introductory paragraph is typewritten, the opening words of the main paragraph are "Dr. T. V. Soong reports that", etc.), except that what appears as "Gen" on the source text appears as "General" on the copy sent to Hopkins, and the letters "issimo" are added, in an unidentified handwriting.

² This sentence is handwritten.

³ The word "advised" is changed to "reports", in handwriting.

⁴ The words "some time between November 15 and December 15" are crossed out, in handwriting.

⁵ Between the words "if" and "given", the word "convenient" is typewritten and is crossed out with typewritten "x's".

⁶ After the word "President", the words "at any time" are inserted, in handwriting.

⁷ The words "as to" are crossed out here and the word "to" is inserted before the word "advise", in handwriting.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 31 October 1943.

Prime Minister to President. Most secret and personal. Number 481.

1. Everything will be ready for operation SEXTANT from 20th onwards and Colonel Warden will await Admiral Q. and also Celestes (see my immediately following) at rendezvous. No difficulty about accommodation for staffs.²

¹ Apparently sent to Washington via military channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt at Hyde Park.

² For paragraph 2 of this message, see *post*, p. 131.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 31 October 1943.

Prime Minister to President. Number 482. Most secret and personal.

My immediately preceding telegram, para 1: Your humble servant, yourself and the Generalissimo respectively.

¹ Apparently sent to Washington via military channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt at Hyde Park.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 31 October 1943.

URGENT

Secret for the President from Hull.

I sat by Marshal Stalin for two hours at his dinner Saturday night.² I presented to him in the strongest way possible all considerations calling for the joining by him of his leadership and cooperation with that of yourself and Mr. Churchill. At one stage he volunteered to bring up the proposed Basra meeting. In so many words he renewed what he and his associates and advisers considered as compelling military reasons for not going beyond Teheran. He said in effect

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt at Hyde Park.

² October 30, 1943.

that we must give him credit for being sincere about this. He then said that he would send the official ranking next to himself in the Soviet Government, namely, Mr. Molotov. He inquired what I thought of him as a substitute. I replied parenthetically that he would do in the sense of understanding the questions that would probably arise, but that was not the point from your and my viewpoints, that the important factor was the broad psychological effect throughout the world of the presence at such a meeting of the Marshal himself. I argued the matter further but got no favorable reaction.

The situation relating to the seeming state of mind of the Marshal is that he talks and acts one hundred percent in favor of our new general forward movement of international cooperation in every way which the Four Nation Declaration³ proclaims, political, economic, military, specially including postwar organization for peace, world order under law, economic benefits etc etc. At the same time he is inflexible at this time about attending a meeting with you and Mr. Churchill at any place beyond Teheran. In the circumstances I think it advisable at present to allow our collaboration and cooperation movement launched here to be cemented by increasing methods of contact from the standpoint of closer military relations in various ways and the same as to the political and peace situation including a definite agreement already entered into⁴ for preliminary or informal conferences from now on between the United States, Great Britain and Russia to formulate a post-war program including perhaps other methods of cooperation during the interim period. In due course unless his entire sincerity including both words and acts here are false, and this is [incredible?], the Marshal will inevitably come to the point of joining you and Mr. Churchill for the purpose of conference.

There is nothing left as to meeting Mr. Stalin at the moment unless you should have a meeting in any event at some place like Basra and decide to fly to Teheran for a day to meet him, since it is evident that he will not at present take even a day off to fly anywhere beyond Teheran. Should you feel that this is not feasible or desirable you will then seem to have the question of where you will meet with Mr. Churchill and later with the Generalissimo. Wherever you meet, at Casablanca or as far west as possible, I think it most important that after inviting Stalin and in event he declines you then invite him to send Molotov and a general of high rank. This matter could become delicate unless even in the face of the Marshal's attitude you invite

³ Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed October 30, 1943, at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers and issued November 1, 1943; *Decade*, p. 11.

⁴ This may refer to the agreement, reached at the Moscow Conference, on future consultations, when necessary, of the representatives of the three countries at their respective capitals. See the communiqué issued by the conferees, November 1, 1943; *ibid.*, p. 10.

Molotov and a military man to your conference. You can cable me both at Teheran and Cairo as to what you may have in mind in the light of the foregoing and other considerations which you already have in mind.

740.0011 Moscow/97 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius)*¹

US URGENT

Moscow, October 31, 1943—9 p. m.

1798. For the Acting Secretary from the Secretary.

At the request of the Ambassador and because of the increase in work here as a result (DELAM 47²) of the Conference, I have decided to leave Bohlen here until the end of year. This would also make him available for the contemplated meeting. I therefore request that the necessary instructions be issued to him for assignment on a temporary basis for two months.³

¹ Sent by the Ambassador, Moscow, in the numerical series of the Embassy's telegrams to the Department of State.

² Numeration of messages sent to the Department of State by the American Delegation to the Moscow Conference.

³ On November 3, 1943, Bohlen was designated First Secretary of the Embassy at Moscow, for temporary duty, effective upon the termination of the Moscow Conference.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Generalissimo Chiang to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

CHUNGKING, 2 November 1943.

For President Roosevelt's eyes only

From the Generalissimo to his Excellency President Roosevelt.

I am in receipt of your telegrams transmitted to me by General Hearn on October 28th² and 29th³ and November 1st.⁴ I am delighted to accept the suggestions contained in your last telegram and am looking forward to meeting you and Mr. Churchill. Everything will be kept strictly secret here. . . .

¹ Apparently sent to Washington via military channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt at Hyde Park.

² Dated October 27, 1943; *ante*, p. 47.

³ Dated October 27, 1943. It concerned the signing of the Four-Nation Declaration on General Security at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

⁴ Dated October 30, 1943; *ante*, p. 55.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 2 November 1943.

Prime Minister to President personal and most secret nr 484.

1. Eden and, I presume, Hull are held up at Moscow by weather and cannot reach Cairo till fourth or fifth. If you wait for Hull to join you at Washington, our meeting at Cairo would be still further delayed beyond twenty-second. Would it not, therefore, be better for you to sail as arranged on ninth, arriving at "O" say sixteenth, and let Hull rest in Egyptian sunshine for a few days and meet you there? In that case, I will ask Anthony² to meet me in Africa instead of coming home.

2. Parliament here rises, eleventh, and I can lie alongside you at "O" or Gib, which last is much the better on fifteenth or sixteenth. We could, then, discuss the general situation and results of Moscow conference on the highest level.

3. Admiral Andrew Cunningham, who knows the Mediterranean back and forth, says that our two staffs might meet in Malta on, say, seventeenth and that in his opinion, voyage thru the Mediterranean could be safely arranged. I shall have an extra cruiser to send staff forward on if convenient. Staffs will want at least four days together, and Malta is by far the best place for the generals to come from the armies. We could join them on the third or fourth day, say, twenty-first, and then proceed to Cairo for the main conference on twenty-third or twenty-fourth. Weather is said to be bad for flying west of Malta at this season but better to eastward.

4. Conference at Cairo will open on twenty-fourth, and here I suggest, notwithstanding what I have previously written, we ask for a triple conference with a proper Russian military delegation beginning, say, twenty-fifth or twenty-sixth. We shall, then, have settled up our own business of the Anglo-American campaign and will open the whole war situation frankly and fully to the Russians. Chiang could arrive twenty-seventh or twenty-eighth, and we could turn homeward about, say thirtieth. There is no need, unless you wish, for you to touch at Malta.

5. Uncle Joe will not come beyond Teheran. I see no advantage in going to Basra, though I would gladly do so if a triple meeting could be arranged. I suggest that, when we are at Cairo, we try to wheedle him to Habbaniya,³ or if the weather is really good, make

¹ Apparently sent to Washington via military channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt at Hyde Park. The text is printed here as corrected by Churchill's telegram 485, November 2, 1943, to Roosevelt; not printed herein.

² Eden.

³ See Churchill's telegram 456, October 14, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 30.

a six hours' hop ourselves to meeting [*meet?*] him in Teheran. Failing this, we should ask for Molotov.

6. The above plan seems to me to meet all the essential needs, namely,

- (A) Our preliminary meeting,
- (B) The preliminary discussions of the Anglo-American staffs in contact with our generals, and
- (C) The triple, and presently, quadruple meeting at Cairo, where final decisions can be taken.

In proposing this programme, I am influenced by the prodigious results of the Moscow conference as exemplified in the paragraphs of the agreed communiqué beginning, "Second only to the importance" and "This conviction is expressed" and especially the sentence "This declaration provides for even closer collaboration in the prosecution of the war and in all matters pertaining to the surrender and disarmament of the enemies with which the four countries are respectively at war".⁴ This seems to me to contemplate an eventual, and possibly near, breach between Russia and Japan with all its consequential reactions.

7. I beg you to let me know how this programme strikes you and what changes in it you propose. Matters are so urgent that we must settle our plans soon.

8. I am sending a copy of this message to Eden who will still be in Moscow tomorrow.

PRIME

⁴ *Decade*, p. 10.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[HYDE PARK?] 2 November 1943.

PRIORITY

Personal and secret from the President to Secretary Hull.

I am sorry that your departure is again delayed but I figure that by going straight through you can get to an Atlantic coast harbor by the 13th. Even though the changes at this end are difficult, I will wait for you until the 14th.

If, however, you get held up by unexpected weather, I think you had better wait for me in Cairo and later join me for a day or two in neighborhood of Algiers.

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via the White House Map Room and Navy channels. About an hour after this telegram had been sent, a paraphrase thereof was also sent, via Army channels, to the Persian Gulf Service Command, Tehran, and to the United States Army Forces in the Middle East, Cairo, for delivery to Hull if he had left Moscow and had reached Tehran or Cairo. The message was delivered to Hull at Tehran on November 3, 1943.

Please let me know as I am keeping Churchill waiting to tell him final plans.

The Generalissimo will be in neighborhood of Cairo by the 25th.

If you have time before leaving Moscow, you might ask the Marshal if he would consider flying from Teheran to Basra for even one day,² and we would hope Molotov and a military group could be with us longer.

All the papers here, with the usual small exceptions, are most enthusiastic about your results.

Warmest regards.

ROOSEVELT

² On November 1, 1943, Roosevelt had written a personal letter to Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada in which, with reference to the forthcoming Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, he said: "I still hope that we can see 'Uncle Joe'. Apparently, however, my constitutional problems weigh lightly with him, though I have tried a dozen times to explain to him that while my Congress is in session I must be in a position to receive bills, act on them, and get them back to the Congress physically within ten days." *F. D. R., His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*, edited by Elliott Roosevelt (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), vol. II, p. 1462. See also *ibid.*, p. 1468, for a letter of November 8, 1943, to Mountbatten concerning the coming Conference.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

[HYDE PARK?] 2 November 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Number 406, personal and secret, for the Former Naval Person from the President.

For many reasons it is advisable that Cordell be back in Washington while I am away and even now he can be home by the 13th.

For escort reasons also it will be much easier to carry through the original plan and a change would interfere with convoys. If I leave by 14th at latest and by going straight through I ought to be able to meet you and staffs in Cairo by the 22nd or 23rd. Perhaps it is just as well to get the main business over first, and you and I can do the inspection work on the way back.

I am wiring Hull to ask U. J. if he could come to Basra for even one day. That would be infinitely better than no meeting with him at all.

I will let you know as soon as I hear.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via the White House Map Room and Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 2 November 1943.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Number 486 personal and most secret.

As I expected, Casey proposes that Admiral Q should use United States Minister's² villa, and Colonel Warden Casey's villa, both handy and in the Pyramid District. There are several additional satisfactory villas for others, and I have got the option on Tutankhamen's tomb for Celestes. Everything can be made thoroughly satisfactory and secure and we shall all be together in the Pyramid District. All arrangements are going forward to be in readiness from the twentieth onwards. Your own Minister is arranging everything for your personal convenience. All will be smooth and easy in Cairo and I doubt not excellent arrangement can be made in Malta where several palaces are undamaged.

¹ Apparently sent to Washington via military channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt at Hyde Park.

² Alexander C. Kirk.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 2 November 1943.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and most secret No. 487.

Further to my No. 484,² Chiefs of Staff think it would be simpler and more secure if we rendezvoused around 17th at Malta. This would avoid our ships touching either at Oran or Gibraltar, both of which are to some extent under observation. Please consider this simplification.

¹ Apparently sent to Washington via military channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt at Hyde Park.

² *Ante*, p. 60.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 2 November 1943.

Personal and secret to the President from Winant.

.

1. If you travel I would like to meet with you. There would be no objection here and my transportation could be easily arranged. Never

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt at Hyde Park.

attending conferences has put me outside the lines of communications and has cut down my usefulness to you.

.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*¹

SECRET

[HYDE PARK?] 2 November 1943.

PRIORITY

Personal and secret from the President to Winant.

You are absolutely right. I will let you know as soon as date can be arranged and you would meet us in North Africa.

It will be good to see you again.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via the White House Map Room and Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 3 November 1943.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and most secret Number 488. Your number 406.²

1. I and the British Staffs will await you in Cairo on 22nd.

2. We think it necessary that the British and United States Staffs should consult together before any triple conference with the Russians take[s] place, and that when it takes place there should be a responsible Russian delegation and not a mere observer. I should be grateful if you would let me know whether you agree with this.

¹ Apparently sent via military channels.

² *Ante*, p. 62.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 4 November 1943.

Personal and secret Winant to The President.

Thanks good message.

Last night I spoke with the Prime Minister. . . .

He told me while we were talking that he had asked you several questions and had only received a reply to a fraction of them. The

¹ Apparently sent via military channels.

issue that deeply disturbed him was your suggestion to introduce a Russian military representative in the projected Anglo-American Staff meetings.² He is absolutely set against it.

² See Roosevelt's telegram 397, October 26, 1943, to Churchill, *ante*, p. 42.

³ For the final paragraph of this telegram, see *post*, p. 152.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 4 November 1943.

URGENT

(Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.)

Now that I have had a chance to take a long breath I thought you would want from me a review of the more important impressions of the Soviet attitude we got in and outside of the conference room. Certain of the doubts which some people have had regarding Soviet intentions are now laid to rest. On the other hand the character of certain real difficulties that exist has been more sharply defined.

(3) The Soviets accepted the explanation of our military plans but our whole permanent relations depend in a large measure on their satisfaction in the future with out [our?] military operations. It is impossible to over-emphasize the importance they place strategically on the initiation of the so-called "Second Front" next spring. An invitation to the next military conference is, I believe, essential if the seeds sown at this conference are to germinate. It is clear they never like to be faced with Anglo-American decisions already taken. If they are asked to the conference they will expect to participate during the consultative stage. It is obvious that this will be to some extent a nuisance and time consuming, but from the long view it will be, in my judgment, well worthwhile. It is important to invite Molotov as well as the military staff. His position as second to Stalin is more apparent than on my previous visits. A subsequent brief meeting with Stalin himself is still of the highest importance, and I feel that every effort should be continued to find a way to bring this about. I expect to cable you further on this subject. It would be helpful in this connection if you could inform me of your decision regarding the invitation to the military conference.

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels, in six sections, beginning on November 4, 1943. The portions printed here were apparently received in Washington by November 6. The source text bears the notation "Sent to State for information".

² For the paragraphs which are omitted here, see *post*, p. 152.

³ For the paragraphs which are omitted here, see *post*, p. 154.

711.00/11-543

*The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 5, 1943.

MR. MURRAY:

Subject: Today's meeting with the President.

The following items from this meeting are sent to you either as of interest or on an action basis.

.

3. *Mr. Jernegan.*

For your secret information. The President will want to see Mr. Jernegan. Will you be good enough at the proper time (date of arrival) to cable Jernegan to be available for such a discussion.²

4. *Arabs.*

The President said he did not think he should see the Arabs this time.

.

6. *Ambassador Steinhardt.*

For your secret information. The President wishes a cable sent to Ambassador Steinhardt ten days after his departure asking him to report to Cairo as of that day. Until then he does not wish any information sent to the Ambassador. Will you be good enough to have an appropriate telegram sent on the proper day.³

.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

¹ For additional excerpts from this memorandum, see *post*, p. 155.

² On November 22, 1943, the Department sent to the Minister at Tehran a telegram (not printed herein), prepared in Stettinius' office, which requested that Jernegan "hold himself available for important consultations" and that "transportation facilities westward" be held available for him.

³ In the margin at this point appears the hand-written notation "W. M. I will handle ES". See *post*, p. 100.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 5 November 1943.

PRIORITY

Number 410 personal and secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. Your number 488.²

I am sorry that the uncertainty of Hull's return and no reply from U. J. have made my plans so uncertain. Hull has now decided to come

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² *Ante*, p. 64.

back by plane and should be here by the 10th.³ Therefore I expect to get away by the 11th and get to O by the 19th or 20th.

I think it best to go straight by air to Cairo with perhaps one short stop. Perhaps you could arrange to meet me in O and we could go on together.

I think it simpler in every way for the Combined Staffs and planners to meet in Cairo just as soon as my people, most of whom will start when I do, can get there. Of course they and we will have many meetings before the Russians or Chinese meet with us.

In regard to Chiang, Somervell who is just back from that very successful meeting in Chungking at which Dickie was present,⁴ thinks you and I should see Chiang before we see U. J. or Molotov.⁵ Therefore I think I should ask Chiang to get to Cairo by the 22nd.

In regard to U. J. I am begging him to meet us for even one day in Basra⁶ or at the point of the railway just south of the mountains.⁷ This would take very little of our time and his, and Molotov could then proceed back to Cairo with us. This jaunt into Persia would be let us say between the 25th and the 28th.

You and I can arrange for Tunis or Italian visits after the Egyptian campaign is over. All goes well.

ROOSEVELT

³ A cable of November 3, 1943, from Hull to Roosevelt, sent from Tehran via military channels, read, in part: "Planning airplane flight straight thru via Dakar and should reach Washington by 9th, even allowing for delays should certainly arrive Washington by 11th." Hull actually arrived at Washington November 10, 1943, was met by Roosevelt at the airport, and went over the highlights of the Moscow Conference with him "on the way to the White House" and in their conversation the following morning; Hull, vol. II, p. 1313.

⁴ Meeting of Somervell, Stilwell, and Mountbatten ("Dickie") with Chiang and other Chinese officials, in the third week of October 1943; see *The Stilwell Papers*, pp. 231-235.

⁵ For Somervell's memorandum of October 30, 1943, conveying a message from Chiang to Roosevelt, see *ante*, p. 56.

⁶ See Roosevelt's telegram of November 2, 1943, to Hull, *ante*, p. 62.

⁷ No record has been found of a Roosevelt message to Stalin suggesting that the Conference be held at the point of the railway just south of the mountains, which would be in Iran.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*¹

Translation

[Moscow, November 5, 1943.]

Personal and confidential from Premier J. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt

¹ Delivered by the Soviet Ambassador, Washington, presumably to the White House, and forwarded telegraphically by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was at his camp in Maryland (informally called "Shangri-la") in the evening of Saturday, November 6, and during the day on Sunday, November 7, 1943.

Mr. Hull has transmitted to me on October 25, your latest message² and I had a chance to talk with him regarding it.³ My reply has been delayed because I was sure that Mr. Hull had transmitted to you the contents of the eventuated talk and my views regarding my meeting with you and Mr. Churchill.

I cannot but give consideration to the arguments you gave regarding the circumstances hindering you from travelling to Teheran. Of course, the decision of w[h]ether you are able to travel to Teheran remains entirely with yourself.

On my part, I have to say that I do not see any other more suitable place for a meeting, than the aforementioned city.

I have been charged with the duties of Supreme Commander of the Soviet troops and this obliges me to carry out daily direction of military operations at our front. This is especially important at the present time, when the uninterrupted four-months summer campaign is overgrowing into a winter campaign and the military operations are continuing to develop on nearly all the fronts, stretching along 2600 kilometers.

Under such conditions for myself as Supreme Commander the possibility of travelling farther than Teheran is excluded. My colleagues in the Government consider, in general, that my travelling beyond the borders of the U. S. S. R. at the present time is impossible due to great complexity of the situation at the front.

That is why an idea occurred to me about which I already talked to Mr. Hull. I could be successfully substituted at this meeting by Mr. V. M. Molotov, my first deputy in the Government, who at negotiations will enjoy, according to our Constitution, all powers of the head of the Soviet Government. In this case the difficulties regarding the choice of the place of meeting would drop off. I hope that this suggestion could be acceptable to us⁴ at the present time.

NOVEMBER 5, 1943.

² See Roosevelt's message of October 21, 1943, to Hull, *ante*, p. 35.

³ See Hull's message of October 26, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 45.

⁴ i. e., mutually agreeable.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 6 November 1943.

Nr. 493. Former Naval Person to President personal and most secret.

¹ Sent by the American Embassy, London, apparently via military channels. For an additional excerpt from this telegram, see *post*, p. 156.

Para 4. Your number 410.² I start 11th or 12th probably in *Renown* which anyhow is carrying my party. I can certainly meet you at "O" on 19th or 20th. I agree with the arrangements you propose that the British and American Combined Staffs and Planners should meet in Cairo and then, after they have had their necessary meetings, meet the Russians and/or Chinese. I also agree that Chiang should be asked to get to Cairo by the 22nd. I shall be obliged if you will send him a joint invitation from us both. I hope indeed you will succeed in persuading U. J. to meet us as you propose between the 25th and 28th, and I think it will be very good if Molotov and some Russian Generals came back to Cairo with us when the triple conference could be held and our Staffs could go into all technical details with them and convince them at once of our resolve to strike with all our strength while reserving the necessary flexibilities inseparable from the ever changing fortunes and hazards of war.

Para 5. I told Ismay to make a thorough examination on the spot of the communications between Cairo and CAIRO 3 and I send his report in my immediately following. I had not realised that the railway journey from Basra to CAIRO 3 was so short. I do not see why we should finally shape our plans until we get to Cairo. You may be sure however that in all this I shall defer to your wishes and act with you.

² *Ante*, p. 66.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 6 November 1943.

No. 494. Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and most secret.

My immediately preceding telegram. Following is report from Ismay referred to in paragraph 5.

Para 1. Begins: "Best information from most experienced and reliable quarters shows that chances of interruption due to weather of communications between Cairo and CAIRO 3 are exaggerated.

Para 2. Last year during the period Mid-November to Mid-December BOAC flight between Cairo and CAIRO 3 was only twice delayed and then for not more than 2 days.

Para 3. Even if flights over the mountains were prevented by the weather journey from Baghdad to CAIRO 3 should not be interrupted and should not exceed 3 days. This could be reduced to 2 days by a properly organized relay system of cars along the route.

¹ Sent by the American Embassy, London, apparently via military channels.

Para 4. A further and quicker alternative would be flight from Cairo to Basra and then by rail (26 hours) Bandashahpur [*Bander Shahpur*] to CAIRO 3. Train travels regularly 5 days a week".

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 7 November 1943.

URGENT

(Personal and secret for the President from Harriman)

Molotov has informed me of U. J.'s cable to you 5 November² regarding the meeting. Although I am not at all sure that you want any suggestions from me on this subject, I cannot help but offer them as I place such supreme importance on this meeting.

(1) The following might appeal to you as a possible plan.

(a) That U. J. be invited to send Molotov and representatives of the Red Army staff to the military conference with you and the Prime Minister and your respective staffs.

(b) That if the place of this meeting is selected, say, in the Cairo area the question of a meeting between the three of you be held open. If at some time during this meeting the weather appears to be propitious, U. J. could fly down from Moscow and you and the Prime Minister could leave your place for Tehran the same morning. The flying time from Cairo to Tehran is about 6 hours. From Moscow to Tehran about 8 hours. You might plan to remain in Tehran 36 hours, which would give reasonable opportunity for two 3-cornered meetings and for you to see U. J. alone as well.

(2) I have checked the weather experience in and out of Teheran and find that during November '41 and '42, regular scheduled flights have been maintained between Cairo and Tehran with only two flights delayed and neither of these more than 24 hours. In our own experience last year with delivery of planes to Russia from Abadan to Tehran, 3 flights weekly were maintained during November last year. Although the weather in December becomes progressively less favorable, January and February are the really bad weather months of the year. It would seem that there was a good chance, at least during the end of November or early December, of making forward predictions of the weather for three days. The risk of delay from weather is greater to U. J.; on the other hand, you would not have to leave until you were sure that he was going to depart and the greater risk of delay on his return journey would be his, not yours.

Generals Deane and Vanderberg [*Vandenberg*] have made the study of past weather experience on which the above is based.

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² *Ante*, p. 67.

(3) I feel satisfied that U. J. would agree to this plan for a meeting. If for any unusual reason, the weather should delay his departure from Moscow beyond your ability to wait, a public statement could subsequently be issued explaining that the weather and not any other reason had prevented your getting together.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, 8 November 1943.]

Number 411, personal and secret, for the Former Naval Person from the President.

Your 479.² I have not received invitation from Kirk and have directed my representative Reilly to make arrangements after consultation with British Minister.³

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² *Ante*, p. 54.

³ Richard Casey, Minister of State Resident in the Middle East (at Cairo).

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 8 November 1943.

PRIORITY

Personal and secret from the President to Marshal Stalin.

Thank you for your message of November fifth² which Mr. Gromyko was good enough to deliver.

I hope to leave here in a few days and to arrive in Cairo by the twenty-second of November.

You will be glad to know that I have worked out a method so that if I get word that a bill requiring my veto has been passed by the Congress and forwarded to me, I will fly to Tunis to meet it and then return to the Conference.

Therefore, I have decided to go to Teheran and this makes me especially happy.

As I have told you, I regard it as of vital importance that you and Mr. Churchill and I should meet. The psychology of the present excellent feeling really demands it even if our meeting last only two

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. A draft of this message, in the Roosevelt Papers, contains the following notation at the top: "Will notify Prime to-morrow W[ilson] B[rown]". For Roosevelt's next message to Churchill on this subject, dated November 11, 1943, see *post*, p. 79.

² *Ante*, p. 67.

days. Therefore, it is my thought that the Staffs begin their work in Cairo on November twenty-second, and I hope Mr. Molotov and your military representative, who I hope can speak English, will come there at that time.

Then we can all go to Teheran on the twenty-sixth and meet with you there on the twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth, twenty-ninth or thirtieth, for as long as you feel you can be away. Then Churchill and I and the top Staff people can return to Cairo to complete the details.

³ The whole world is watching for this meeting of the three of us. And even if we make no announcements as vital as those announced at the recent highly successful meeting in Moscow, the fact that you and Churchill and I have got to know each other personally will have far-reaching effect on the good opinion within our three nations and will assist in the further disturbance of Nazi morale.

I am greatly looking forward to a good talk with you.

ROOSEVELT

³ In the draft Roosevelt struck out the following sentence at this point: "I have asked Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to come to Cairo for a few days."

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 8 November 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From the President to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, personal and secret.

Many thanks for your message.² I am leaving for North Africa in two or three days and I hope to get to Cairo on the twenty-first. Churchill will meet me there. We hope to meet Marshal Stalin in Persia about the 26th or 27th. However I would prefer that you and Churchill and I meet before that. Therefore can you try to reach Cairo by the 22nd of November? We will arrange good accommodations and guard for you and your party in or near Cairo. Please let me know as soon as you can.³

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the American Military Mission to China, Chungking, via Army channels, as War Department telegram 3788 to the Mission. The Roosevelt Papers also contain a draft of this message, in Roosevelt's handwriting, in which an additional sentence appears just before the last sentence. The additional sentence—"How many people are you bringing with you?"—is crossed out.

² Probably the message delivered by Somervell, *ante*, p. 56. The reference may also have been intended as acknowledgment of Chiang's telegram of November 2.

³ The text of this message was repeated by Roosevelt to Churchill in telegram 413, November 8, 1943.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 8 November 1943.

To the President from Winant.

Would you object if I traveled out with our friend? He would like me to go with him.

¹ Apparently sent via military channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 8 November 1943.

PRIORITY

To Ambassador Winant from the President.

Your message of 8 November. I think it would be fine.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels. After receiving this telegram, Winant cabled Hopkins: "Would you be good enough to explain my journey to Ed Stettinius. Telegrams to the Department will continue to carry my name. . . ." Hopkins forwarded the message to Stettinius on November 11, 1943 (123 Winant, John G./250).

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Generalissimo Chiang to President Roosevelt*¹

CHUNGKING, 9 November 1943.

Mme Chiang down with flu and dysentery. Funeral of late President Lin Sen scheduled for 17th. Provided Mme Chiang has recovered I intend to leave here early on the 18th. Otherwise I must delay my departure, in which case your conference with Stalin can take place before ours. I prefer seeing you before you see Stalin and sincerely hope our plans will work out in that way.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

¹ Sent by Stilwell, via Army channels, in telegram 858, November 9, 1943, which was marked as "Secret", "Priority", and "For the eyes of Gen Marshall only for transmission to the President".

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 9 November 1943.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret. No. 496.

¹ Apparently sent via military channels.

Your No. 411.² You may be sure that everything is being arranged. Will telegraph more fully.

² *Ante*, p. 71.

Moscow Embassy Records

Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION AT THE KREMLIN, 11:30 P. M.
NOVEMBER 9, 1943

Present: Ambassador W. A. Harriman
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. V. M. Molotov
Mr. Berezhev

Subject: Meeting of the Heads of State.

After an exchange of amenities the Ambassador handed Mr. Molotov the President's telegram to Marshal Stalin dated November 8,¹ together with a letter of transmittal.² Before having it translated Mr. Molotov said that Marshal Stalin regretted that he was unable to receive the Ambassador but he had a slight attack of grippe and through an excess of caution was staying in for two or three days.

The President's message was then translated very carefully to Molotov by Mr. Berezhev. Mr. Molotov made a note particularly of the fact that the President was expecting to leave Washington within a few days and to arrive in Cairo on November 22.

Mr. Molotov inquired what was to be the nature of the meeting at Cairo. Was it to be of a preliminary character in preparation for the meeting of the heads of government at Tehran? The Ambassador replied that it was his understanding it was of such a nature.

In reply to Mr. Molotov's question as to the exact matters which the Cairo meeting would discuss, the Ambassador stated that he would endeavor to get further details from the President as to the exact character of the meeting, the subjects to be discussed and who would be there. He added that it was his impression this would be one of the more restricted meetings of top staff officers of the three governments and that, while he had no definite information as to the subjects to be discussed, he assumed it was one of the periodic considerations of strategic plans, in this case those adopted at Quebec,³ with a view to such alterations as the developing progress of the war since Quebec might have made necessary. He added that he believed the question

¹ *Ante*, p. 71.

² Not printed herein.

³ For the message from Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin on the military decisions of the First Quebec Conference, see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 150.

of the Dodecanese Islands operation would probably form one of the subjects, and also undoubtedly the question of Turkey's entrance into the war and what effect this might have on the course of the war.

Mr. Molotov replied that since the Soviet military representatives had not participated in the formulation of the Quebec plans they were not of course familiar with their details and would like to have sufficient information to be properly prepared for the meeting. The Ambassador pointed out that for two years the British and American staffs had been working in close intimacy and that now the desire was to include representatives of the Soviet staff in that intimacy. He promised to obtain such information as he could for Mr. Molotov and the Soviet military representative.

Mr. Molotov then inquired whether the Ambassador knew if the President had noticed that in Marshal Stalin's message of November 5⁴ it was stated that his colleagues in the Soviet Government did not consider it advisable for Marshal Stalin in general to leave the Soviet Union at the present time because of the complexity of the operations on the front.

The Ambassador replied that, while he could not say specifically, he thought the President's cable which he was delivering tonight made it quite clear the President considered that Marshal Stalin's offer to go to Tehran still stood. He added that the Marshal's message of November 5 appeared to indicate that he did.

Mr. Molotov replied that he considered the general reluctance to have Marshal Stalin leave the Soviet Union at all had been clearly set forth in that message. He added, however, that he could not undertake to speak for Marshal Stalin and that, since the communication was not addressed to him, Molotov, he could make no more comment on the matter but would immediately transmit it to Marshal Stalin.

The Ambassador, in concluding the subject, added that the President attached the greatest importance to this meeting as a certain method of destroying the last Nazi hope of any division among the Allies, and that he knew the President would like to have a favorable answer before he left Washington. He knew the President fully appreciated the importance of Marshal Stalin's personal direction of the highly skillful operations on the Soviet Union front.

The Ambassador returned to the question of the Cairo meetings at which Mr. Molotov would be present, stating he had been asked to find out whether there was any high ranking Soviet staff officer who spoke English, since the presence of such an officer would greatly facilitate the technical and detailed consideration of military matters. Molotov replied that there should be someone on the staff who had a good knowledge of English and he would endeavor to find out whom.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 68.

The Ambassador informed Molotov that he was under instruction to go to the meeting with the President accompanied by General Deane, and with Mr. Bohlen as interpreter.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 9 November 1943.

URGENT

(Personal and secret for the President from Harriman)

As Stalin is laid up with the grippe for a few days I delivered your message of November 8² to Molotov. He said that he would convey it at once to Stalin. We went over the cable in detail and he asked a number of questions to be sure he understood the suggested arrangements. He was particularly anxious to find out what military subjects would be discussed in Cairo so that the Soviet staff could be adequately prepared, also how large a staff you and the Prime Minister were taking. I hope you will give me some information on these subjects to pass on to Molotov.

He asked me whether I thought you had noticed in Stalin's cable of November 5³ that Stalin had said his colleagues had been resisting his leaving the Soviet Union at this time because of the great complexity of the situation at the front. I told him that you obviously considered Stalin's offer to meet you at Tehran still stood.

Molotov made it clear however that he was not attempting to speak for Stalin. Nevertheless I emphasized to Molotov the urgency of your receiving a favorable reply before you left.

Stalin's illness is genuine but not serious. Molotov assured me that he would be up and about again in two or three days.

I shall certainly insist on seeing him if any difficulty arises.

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² *Ante*, p. 71.

³ *Ante*, p. 68.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 9 November 1943.

No. 497. Prime Minister to President. Personal and most Secret.
Your 411.²

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, apparently via military channels.

² *Ante*, p. 71.

Casey tells me that Kirk did not feel entitled to telegraph to you till he heard from the State Department about SEXTANT. He is proud and delighted to know that you will use his house and all preparations are proceeding actively to that end.

I leave by sea 12th reaching Gibraltar evening 15th, arriving Malta by air dawn 16th. I shall spend two or three days in the field with Alexander, meeting you at OBOE, or if you prefer, and I think it would be better fun, at Malta.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang*¹

[WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1943.

Personal and most secret from the President to the Generalissimo

I am terribly sorry to learn of Madame Chiang's illness² and sincerely hope that she will be fully recovered in time for our conference.

I have had a long talk with General Somervell and appreciate very much your courtesies to him. He has given me your private message³ as I have already indicated to you.⁴

I agree with you fully that we should meet together before I see Stalin. I want so much to have some good talks with you so, naturally, I am eagerly looking forward to seeing you.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.

² See Chiang's telegram of November 9, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 73.

³ See Somervell's memorandum of October 30, 1943, *ante*, p. 56.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 72.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 10 November 1943.

PRIORITY

Personal and secret from the President for the Former Naval Person. Number 416.

Your 497.² As we cannot arrive OBOE before forenoon November 20th it seems to me impracticable to have a meeting at Malta enroute to SEXTANT. It is best to go straight through with one stop at Tunis for the night.

Perhaps we can visit Malta on the return journey.

I am glad you are bringing Winant.³

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² *Ante*, p. 76.

³ See *ante*, p. 73.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 10 November 1943.

URGENT

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret. Number 500.

I think it would be best, irrespective of any arrangements which we may be able to make for our own meeting with U. J., to cable him at once in the following sense:—

"The British and American Chiefs of Staff are meeting in Cairo about the 22nd November to discuss in detail the operations of the Anglo-American Armies and also the war against Japan, for which our long term plans have now been prepared. For the latter subject it is hoped that Chiang Kai Shek himself and a Chinese Military Delegation may be present. After these domestic and Far Eastern discussions have been concluded we have the hope that the meeting of the three heads of Governments may take place. Besides and apart from this it is proposed that there should be a formal triple conference of the Soviet, United States and British Staffs, starting about the 25th or 26th November, to discuss the whole field of the war in all its aspects. It is much hoped, therefore, that you will send a powerful military delegation to this conference, accompanied if possible by M. Molotov. All this is separate from and additional to the meeting which we still hope it may be possible to arrange between the three heads of Governments."

As I feel sure that the above is in accord with your views and wishes, I am sending it off today in order to avoid delay.

I have just received your 416. A meeting at Malta en route to SEXTANT is clearly out of the question. I shall therefore go direct to Cairo.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, apparently via military channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*¹

[Moscow, November 10, 1943.]

Personal and secret message from Premier J. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt

I have received Your message of November 8th.² I thank You for Your answer.

Your plan concerning the organization of our meeting in Iran, I accept. I hope, and [*that*] Mr. Churchill will agree with this proposal.

¹ Apparently sent via the Soviet Embassy, Washington.

² *Ante*, p. 71.

By November 22nd, Mr. V. M. Molotov and our military representative will arrive in Cairo, where together with you they will agree upon everything necessary in connection with our meeting in Iran.

NOVEMBER 10, 1943.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 11 November 1943.

Number 501. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal.

1. There seems to have been a most unfortunate misunderstanding. I thought from your number 410² that the British and American Staffs would have "many meetings" before being joined by the Russians or Chinese. But now I hear from Ambassador Clark Kerr that on the 9th November the United States Ambassador at Moscow delivered a message from you to Stalin inviting Monsieur Molotov to go to Cairo on November 22nd with a Military representative.³ November 22nd is, however, the first day on which the Staffs can meet. I ask therefore that the date of the arrival of Molotov and his Military representative shall be postponed till the 25th November at the earliest.

2. I am very glad to hear also from Ambassador Clark Kerr that you contemplate going on November 26th to Teheran. I rather wish you had been able to let me know direct.

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.

² *Ante*, p. 66.

³ Message of November 8, 1943; *ante*, p. 71.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 11 November 1943.

PRIORITY

Personal and most secret from the President to the Former Naval Person. Number 418. Your 501.

I have just heard that U. J. will come to Teheran.² I received a telegram from him five days ago³ which made me think he would not come even to that place—this because his advisors did not wish him to leave Russian soil.

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels. A notation attached to the source text states that Roosevelt "delayed departure of his party for SEXTANT for sufficient time to dictate 418."

² See Stalin's message of November 10, 1943, *ante*, p. 78.

³ Stalin's message of November 5, 1943, *ante*, p. 67.

I wired him at once⁴ that I had arranged the Constitutional matter here, and therefore that I could go to Teheran for a short meeting with him and told him I was very happy.

Even then I was in doubt as to whether he would go through with his former offer to go to Teheran.

His latest message has clinched the matter, and I think that now there is no question that you and I can meet him there between the twenty-seventh and the thirtieth.

Thus endeth a very difficult situation, and I think we can be happy.

In regard to Cairo, I have held all along—as I know you have, that it would be a terrible mistake if U. J. thought we had ganged up on him on military action. During the preliminary meetings in Cairo the Combined Staffs will, as you know, be in the planning stage. That is all. It will not hurt you or me if Molotov and a Russian military representative are in Cairo too. They will not feel that they are being given the “run around.” They will have no staff and no planners. Let us take them in on the high spots.

It is only five hours ago that I received U. J.’s telegram confirming Teheran. Undoubtedly, Molotov and the military representative will return there with us between the twenty-seventh and the thirtieth and, when and after we have completed our talk with U. J., they will return with us to Cairo, possibly adding other military staff to the one representative accompanying Molotov on the first trip.

I think it essential that this schedule be carried out. I can assure you there will be no difficulties.

I am sending you this at the first opportunity of letting you know about U. J.

I am just off. Happy landing to us both.

ROOSEVELT

⁴ See Roosevelt’s message of November 8, 1943, *ante*, p. 71.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram (paraphrase)

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 12 November 1943.

Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.

Unless you meet [*need?*] us some place earlier, I plan to be in Cairo by the 22nd with Deane, Bohlen, Lt Mei[kl]ejohn and an army interpreter Capt Ware. None of us here have heard of any senior Soviet staff officer who speaks English and Molotov could not think of one when I asked him. It is not clear how many Soviet staff officers you

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

expect in Cairo as your cable² speaks of a military representative in the singular and Churchill's cable to Stalin³ expresses the hope that Molotov will bring a strong staff. It would be helpful if you would cable me urgently so that I can clarify this point to Molotov.⁴

² Roosevelt's message of November 8, 1943, to Stalin, *ante*, p. 71.

³ The cable quoted in Churchill's telegram 500, November 10, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 78.

⁴ On November 14, 1943, Mathewson, of the White House Map Room, sent Harriman a message, in Stettinius' name, to the effect that no reply to this telegram, or to Harriman's telegrams to Hopkins (see *post*, p. 85), was possible for the time being, as the addressees were on a trip. Mathewson sent the three messages to Oran by pouch, for delivery on the arrival of Roosevelt and Hopkins there.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET

[ABOARD THE U. S. S. "Iowa",]

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

12 November 1943.

Personal and secret for Marshal Stalin from the President.

I am of course made very happy by your telegram of ten November² and the definite prospect of our meeting, and I shall be very glad to see Mr. Molotov in Cairo on the twenty-second. I am just leaving for French North Africa. Warm regards.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via the White House Map Room and Navy channels.

² *Ante*, p. 78.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 12 November 1943.

Nr. 502. Prime Minister to President. Personal and most secret. Most immediate. Your number 418.²

Para. 1. I am very pleased that you have managed to arrange the Constitutional matter and that our meeting is now definitely arranged. That is a great step forward.

Para. 2. The Chiefs of the Staff [*Chiefs of Staff*] are however very apprehensive about the arrangements which you have settled for military conversations and I share their misgivings. I thought from your number 410³ that the British and American Staffs would have

¹ Sent by the American Embassy, London, apparently via military channels. A notation on the source text reads: "Sent via pouch 11/15/43". The message was delivered to Roosevelt upon his arrival at Oran on November 20, 1943; see *post*, p. 104.

² *Ante*, p. 79.

³ *Ante*, p. 66.

"Many meetings" before being joined by the Russians or Chinese. I still regard this as absolutely essential in view of the serious questions which have to be settled. There is no objection to you and me seeing Molotov before our meeting with UJ, but the presence of a Soviet military observer so early in the conference may cause grave embarrassment. HMG cannot abandon their rights to full and frank discussions with you and your officers about the vital business of our intermingled armies. A Soviet observer cannot possibly be admitted to the intimate conversations which our own Chiefs of Staff must have and his exclusion may easily cause offense. None of these objections would have applied to the formal triple staff conference which I suggested ⁴ should take place in due course.

⁴ See Churchill's telegram 493, November 6, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 68.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt ¹

[Moscow,] 12 November 1943.

As it appeared, Mr. V. M. Molotov, due to some circumstances, which are of a serious character, cannot come to Cairo by November 22nd. He will come together with me to Iran at the end of November. On the above I inform at the same time Mr. Churchill, and on this matter you will receive the information.

P. S. Sending of the present message, unfortunately, has [been] delayed, because of the fault of some office clerks, but, I hope, it will arrive, nevertheless, in time.²

¹ Channel of transmission to Washington not indicated. On November 14, 1943, the White House Map Room relayed the message to the U. S. S. *Iowa*, for the President, via Naval Radio. The file copy of the message as received on board the U. S. S. *Iowa* contains the following handwritten notation: "Pres wants to answer soon as we arrive." For Roosevelt's reply of November 20, 1943, see *post*, p. 101.

² The postscript was from Stalin; see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 106.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt ¹

[Moscow, November 12, 1943.]

Personal and strictly confidential message from Premier J. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt

¹ Apparently sent via the Soviet Embassy, Washington. No record has been found of the forwarding of this message by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt during his trip. As the Map Room was keeping to a minimum its telegraphic messages to the U. S. S. *Iowa*, those in charge of the Map Room may have felt that it was unnecessary to forward this message, which was largely repetitious.

I consider necessary to inform You that I have sent today a message to Mr. Churchill of the following content:

"Today I have received two messages of Yours.²

Although I had already written to the President,³ that Mr. V. M. Molotov would be in Cairo by November 22, I have, however, to say that due to some reasons, which are of a serious character, Mr. Molotov, unfortunately, cannot come to Cairo. He will be able to be in Teheran at the end of November and will come there together with me. And some military men will come with me.

It goes without saying that in Teheran a meeting of only three heads of the Governments is to take place as it was agreed upon. And the participation of the representatives of any other countries must be absolutely excluded.

I wish success to Your conference with the Chinese on Far Eastern Affairs."

NOVEMBER 12, 1943.

² One of these messages from Churchill to Stalin is the message repeated to Roosevelt in Churchill's telegram 500, November 10, 1943, *ante*, p. 78. The other message (which was of lesser importance) was not repeated to Roosevelt. Both messages are printed in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, pp. 175 and 176.

³ See Stalin's message of November 10, 1943, *ante*, p. 78.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang*¹

[ABOARD THE U. S. S. "IOWA",
November 12, 1943.]

Personal and secret for the Generalissimo from the President

I am just off for French North Africa and our meeting place where I am scheduled to arrive by the twenty-second. I expect to stay there until the twenty-sixth when I will go to see our friend from the north and then return to our conference place in three or four days.

I do hope you can come by the twenty-second and that Madame Chiang is much better. Please give her my warm regards.²

ROOSEVELT

¹ The source text bears the following handwritten notation: "11-12-43 Despatched from USS *Iowa* by officer courier (Lt. Bogue) to Colonel Mathewson in Map Room for transmission." (See also *post*, p. 276.) The message was then sent as a telegram to the American Military Mission to China, Chungking, via military channels.

² The Chiangs arrived in Cairo on the evening of November 21; see the Log, *post*, p. 293. According to Hollington K. Tong, *Chiang Kai-shek*, p. 307, Chiang was accompanied by a party of sixteen.

740.0011 EW 1939/32670 : Telegram

*The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 12 November 1943.

You may recall that in discussing with you certain phases affecting the impending visit here I offered observations, from the American standpoint, in the matter of amenities as regards the local Monarch and government usual on such occasion[s] and I take this opportunity for safe communication to enumerate briefly those observations:

1. In the present instance a special factor is involved insofar as we are concerned owing to the exalted rank of our visitor.
2. The position of the United States vis-à-vis Egypt differs in many ways from that of Great Britain and whereas the British may regard their actions as predicated on the rights of an "Occupying Power", the same considerations [*consideration?*] does not apply to U. S.
3. The United States is held in special regard on the basis of its considerate treatment of small independent nations.

I need not emphasize the fact that I recognize the controlling consideration is the one of security but as I explained to you orally, I assume that the foregoing observations are being borne in mind and I hope that, although arrangements for the visit are in the hands of the British authorities who I understand are to be considered as hosts on the occasion, the American Government will not be placed in a position vis-à-vis the Egyptians of deviating from the amenities prescribed for such a visit any further than the exigencies of security in present conditions may require.

I wish to add that if the present crisis in Lebanon² causes a postponement of plans I may be informed direct.

¹ Sent, via Greer (who was at Oran), to the White House Map Room, which forwarded the message to the Department of State. At Stettinius' request, a copy of Kirk's message was sent back to Oran by pouch for Roosevelt on November 14, 1943. A notation on the forwarded copy reads: "To speak to Kirk about. F. D. R."

² The Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on November 8, 1943, voted for an immediate end of the French mandate and the immediate establishment of the independence of Lebanon. Three days later the French Committee of National Liberation issued decrees suspending the operation of the Lebanese Constitution and Government; this action touched off local riots. The United States Government expressed its objection to the decrees, and they were abrogated. On November 26, 1943, in a press release, the Department of State noted with approval the abrogation of the decrees and indicated that the United States sympathized with "the aspirations of the Syrian and Lebanese peoples for the full enjoyment of sovereign independence." Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, November 27, 1943, p. 381.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 12 November 1943.

ROUTINE

Personal and secret for Hopkins from Harriman.

Since cabling the President last night² about our joining him at Cairo on the 22nd I have been wondering whether it would not be of value for us to make our reports prior to the meeting with Molotov. We have of course considerable information both military and political of reactions to and developments since the Conference broke up which perhaps should be discussed beforehand.³

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² Telegram of November 12, 1943, *ante*, p. 80.

³ See *ante*, p. 81, footnote 4.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram (paraphrase)

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 13 November 1943.

URGENT

(Personal and secret for Hopkins from Harriman)

Have had no reply to those portions of my 092359² and 120001³ regarding Molotov's desire for information about Cairo Conference. I hope this information can be supplied soonest possible even if only in a preliminary way.⁴ . . .

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² Telegram of November 9, 1943, *ante*, p. 76.

³ Telegram of November 12, 1943, *ante*, p. 80.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 81, footnote 4. For the portion of this message omitted at this point, see *post*, p. 189.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

[ABOARD H. M. S. "RENOWN"?,]

14 November 1943.

No. 505. Prime Minister to President. Personal and most secret.

Para 1. I have received the following message from Stalin.

¹ Sent to London via British channels; forwarded to Washington by the American Embassy, London, apparently via military channels; forwarded further by the White House Map Room, via pouch leaving Washington November 15, 1943, and also via Navy radio November 17. The copy sent by pouch was delivered to Roosevelt upon his arrival at Oran on November 20. See *post*, p. 104.

[Here follows a paraphrase of the message quoted in Stalin's second telegram of November 12, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 83.]

Para 2. I have sent the following reply.

Para. 3. "Your message of November 12th received. I entirely understand your position and I am in full accord with your wishes. I am at sea. All congratulations on your continued triumphant advance."

811.001 Roosevelt, F. D./9453½ : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) ¹

ANKARA, November 14, 1943—5 p. m.

1869. Most secret for the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary.

In expressing his keen pleasure with President Roosevelt's letter of October 26 to President Inonu,² the Minister for Foreign Affairs³ remarked to me last night that Inonu would be delighted to meet our President and that if President Roosevelt could not be persuaded to visit Turkey, he would be more than pleased to go to meet him should he visit any other part of the Near East.

STEINHARDT

¹ On November 17, 1943, the White House Map Room telegraphed a paraphrase of this message to Greer, "to be held for delivery to the President upon arrival at Oran."

² *Ante*, p. 43.

³ Numan Menemencioğlu.

J. C. S. Files

Minutes of the President's Meeting With the Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 15, 1943, 2 P. M., President's Cabin, U. S. S. "Iowa" ¹

SECRET

1. U. S. DELEGATION IN MOSCOW TO PROCEED TO "SEXTANT"

THE PRESIDENT said that he desired a dispatch sent to Ambassador Harriman immediately upon arrival in port telling him to come to the place for the SEXTANT Conference, and bring with him General Deane, Mr. Bohlen of the State Department, and General Vandenberg [Vandenberg].

¹ Present were Roosevelt, Hopkins, Leahy, Marshall, King, Arnold, Brown, and Royal. For additional excerpts from the minutes of this meeting, see *post*, p. 194.

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF directed the Secretary² to prepare an appropriate dispatch in compliance with the President's desires.³

THE PRESIDENT then said that the big conference would be held in Tehran. He then read a dispatch regarding the fact that Mr. Molotov cannot come to SEXTANT by 22 November.⁴ However, Mr. Molotov will come to Tehran with Marshal Stalin by the end of November. THE PRESIDENT added that it was vague as to why Mr. Molotov could not come by the 22nd, but he inferred from the message that Molotov was probably ill.⁵

5. TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR WINANT

THE PRESIDENT referred to a recent telegram received from Ambassador Winant in which it was said that the Prime Minister was emphatically against the proposal that any U. S. S. R. officer should be present at the SEXTANT Conference.⁶ It was felt by Mr. Churchill that the difficulty of military planning must be settled between the U. S. and British Governments before any contact on this subject is made with the Soviet Government. . . .

² Captain Forrest B. Royal.

³ Message of November 20, 1943, *post*, p. 102.

⁴ See Stalin's first telegram of November 12, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 82.

⁵ The last two paragraphs of Stalin's second telegram to Roosevelt on November 12, 1943 (*ante*, p. 83), indicate that Stalin was disturbed when he learned from Churchill that Chiang would be in Cairo at the same time as Molotov. It appears, however, that this telegram was not forwarded to Roosevelt aboard the *Iowa*; see footnote 1 to Stalin's second telegram to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 82. See also the remarks on this subject by Harriman and Molotov, *post*, p. 94. Churchill's telegram of November 10, 1943, to Stalin (*ante*, p. 78) had not indicated, however, that Molotov and Chiang were to be included in the same discussions at Cairo. Cf. Lohbeck, p. 203.

⁶ Telegram of November 4, 1943, *ante*, p. 64.

740.0011 EW 1939/31965

The President's Secretary (Early) to the Secretaries of State (Hull), War (Stimson), and the Navy (Know), and to the Chief, United States Secret Service (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, November 15, 1943.

Confidential memorandum for:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of War
The Secretary of the Navy
Chief, United States Secret Service

The attached is strictly personal and confidential. It was received today from Mr. Byron Price, Director, Office of Censorship.

The context, or at least that portion of the memorandum which refers to the radiogram sent to the United Press, New York, from Cairo, via London, undoubtedly is already known to you. However, I consider the question of security to be of such vital importance that I take this means immediately to call it to your attention.

I know of nothing more Mr. Price can do. It does seem to me, however, that those who control the press and radio outside of the United States should be reached by other agencies and officials of this Government than the Office of Censorship. Action by these additional Government authorities should be in strong support of the position taken by Mr. Price.

STEPHEN EARLY

Secretary to the President

P. S. I especially invite your attention to the last paragraph in Mr. Price's memorandum.

[Enclosure]

The Director of the Office of Censorship (Price) to the President's Secretary (Early)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, November 15, 1943.

STRICTLY PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE STEPHEN EARLY.

On November 10 this office asked British Censorship, through their representative at the British Embassy, to take particular pains to suppress any disclosures which might indicate the imminent movement of high officials of the United States Government. The British replied that these steps would be taken at once.

At 6:43 P. M., EWT, on November 13, the following message from the United Press in Cairo, via London, to the United Press in New York was received in New York by commercial cable:

"Possibly foreshadowing international developments Mena House Hotel subshadow pyramids favorite exdiplomaticers ministers will closed publicward soon profumigation quote in anticipating visits conversations great portent to held Cairo unquote"

This dispatch had come from Cairo to London by radio.

I protested immediately to British Censorship through the Embassy here. After investigation, British Censorship replied that there was no point of stopping the dispatch in London since security already had been compromised. This is doubtless true not only because of the radio transmission, but because the Cairo Censorship unquestionably passed the same information (which indicates that a public statement was issued) to other countries. I pointed out, however, that

the British also controlled the censorship in Cairo and asked again that the most vigorous steps be taken at Cairo to prevent further disclosures.

I also telephoned the White House immediately after the above dispatch was received in this country, and reported the circumstances to Mr. Hassett.

I think there can be no question that this much is known in Berlin and I respectfully suggest that steps be taken to amend in the interest of security plans already made.

BYRON PRICE
Director

740.0011 EW 1939/32201

*Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray)*¹

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1943.

Subject: United Press story out of Cairo

Participants: The British Ambassador
Mr. Murray

I spoke to the British Ambassador this evening about the attached United Press story² out of Cairo published in the *Washington Times-Herald* and other papers on November 14 reporting "indications that an international conference of major import will be held in Cairo shortly" and stating that "the famed Mena House Hotel will be closed to the Public in preparation for the arrival of important guests."

I told the Ambassador that in a communication just received from Mr. Byron Price, the Director of Censorship, Mr. Price stated that on November 10 he had consulted with the appropriate censorship authorities of the British Embassy and requested them to see that every precaution was taken in order that no reports be permitted to pass through British censors anywhere regarding the movements of important personages in these times. Mr. Price was informed that appropriate steps would be immediately taken to this end.

I further informed the Ambassador that we were communicating urgently with Mr. Kirk, our Minister in Cairo, requesting him to take this matter up at once with Mr. Casey, the British Minister of State at Cairo, and protest strongly against this failure of the British censorship authorities there to hold up the above-mentioned story radioed out of Cairo to London and repeated from London to this country. I added that we hoped the Ambassador would take simultaneous action.

¹ Noted by the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary.

² Not reprinted herein.

The Ambassador stated that he would be glad to send a strong telegram to Cairo at once and repeat it to London. This will be done this evening.

W[ALLACE] S. M[URRAY]

740.0011 EW 1939/31965 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1943—2 p. m.

US URGENT

1748. On November 10 the Office of Censorship requested the British Censorship representative in Washington to take particular pains to suppress any disclosures which might indicate the movement of high officials of the United States. The British replied that appropriate steps would be taken at once.

Despite this assurance a message from the United Press in Cairo to the United Press in New York via London was passed on November 13. The message in question referred to the closing of Mena House Hotel to the public and states this action possibly foreshadowed international developments and anticipated visits and conversations of great portent.

United States Censorship protested to British Censorship which replied there was no point in stopping message in London since security already compromised. American Censorship pointed out that British controlled censorship in Cairo and asked that vigorous steps be taken at Cairo to prevent further disclosures.

Please take this matter up immediately with Mr. Casey or such other British authorities as you consider proper and reinforce the request that immediate and vigorous steps be taken to prevent such disclosures.

HULL

P[AUL] H. A[LLING]

740.0011 EW 1939/32015

The President's Secretary (Early) to the Secretaries of State (Hull), War (Stimson), and the Navy (Knox), and to the Chief, United States Secret Service (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1943.

Confidential memorandum for:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of War
The Secretary of the Navy
Chief, United States Secret Service

Supplementing my confidential memorandum of yesterday (November 15, 1943),¹ I have now to advise you that I have just received the

¹ *Ante*, p. 87.

following confidential report from Byron Price, Director, Office of Censorship:

"The following messages were sent this morning by RCA from Cairo to New York:

"From Chester Morrison in Cairo to National Broadcasting Company, New York:

'Eyem cleared by public relations as of today. Can leave first available transportation but Parr will have three men on his hands any day. Stop. Under circumstances suggest might be usefuller remain here temporarily.'

"From Grant Parr, Cairo, to National Broadcasting Company, New York:

'Advise heavy scheduling latter half this week.'

"It appears that the Cairo censorship is now disclosing the time, having already disclosed the place."

In bringing the above to your attention, may I urge each of you to render every possible aid, assistance, and cooperation to Mr. Price in the interest of security.

STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President

740.0011 EW 1939/32015

The President's Secretary (Early) to the Secretaries of State (Hull), War (Stimson), and the Navy (Knox), and to the Chief, United States Secret Service (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1943.

Confidential memorandum for:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of War
The Secretary of the Navy
Chief, United States Secret Service

Supplementing my earlier confidential memorandum of this day, I am now informing you that I have just received the following confidential report from Byron Price, Director, Office of Censorship:

"The following supplements my memorandum earlier today and discloses that Cairo is now becoming even more definite.

"At 12: 03 P. M., E. W. T., today this message reached New York by RCA Radio from Cairo, sent by MacKenzie at Cairo to the New York Daily News:

"Can you arrange through open line AdCairo Uncan do anything this end. Stop. Vital get sure quickest link-up Cairo-New York before Thursday.'"¹

¹ November 18, 1943.

In bringing this supplemental memorandum to your attention may I emphasize again the need of rendering every aid and cooperation to Mr. Price in the interest of security.

STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President

740.0011 EW 1939/32015

The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army (McNarney) to the Secretary of State

SECRET—SECURITY

WASHINGTON, 16 November 1943.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am enclosing a copy of the memorandum from the United States Chiefs of Staff which is being presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The United States Chiefs of Staff request that you take up immediately with the British Foreign Office the matter of guarding the security of the forthcoming conference and urge that steps be taken which will insure that there is no further violation thereof.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH T. McNARNEY
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Deputy Chief of Staff

[Enclosure]

*The United States Chiefs of Staff to the British Chiefs of Staff*¹

SECRET—SECURITY

[WASHINGTON, 16 November 1943.]

VIOLATION OF CONFERENCE SECURITY

We have received a reliable report that British censorship authorities in Cairo passed the following news dispatch and that British censorship authorities in London have cleared this dispatch:

“Possibly foreshadowing international developments Mena House Hotel subshadow pyramids favorite exdiplomaticers ministers will closed publicward soon profumigation quote in anticipating visits conversations great portent to held Cairo unquote”

Obviously this action is a flagrant violation of conference security, and the implications and possible repercussions are most grave. We urge that the British Government take extraordinary steps to insure that no further information is released which would tend to jeopardize the security of the conference.

¹ Sent by the United States Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff, in the name of the Joint Chiefs.

We are requesting the State Department to bring this violation of security to the attention of the Foreign Office immediately, and to request that steps be taken to prevent any other occurrences of this kind.²

² The Department promptly called this security violation to the attention of the British authorities by way of the British Embassy at Washington and the American Embassy at London (740.0011 EW 1939/32446a and 841.711/3801a). Winant reported on November 17 that Eden had said that urgent steps had been taken to prevent any further leakage through British censorship (841.711/3801½).

Moscow Embassy Records

*Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen)*¹

CONVERSATION

[Moscow,] November 16, 1943.

[Participants:] The American Ambassador, Mr. Harriman
Mr. Bohlen
The Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Molotov
Mr. Pavlov

After an exchange of congratulations on the Tenth Anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the U. S. S. R., the Ambassador told Mr. Molotov that he expected to leave Moscow on Friday, November 19, to meet the President who would be in Cairo on November 22.

Mr. Molotov thanked the Ambassador for this information and then observed that the American press was commenting rather openly about the forthcoming meeting and that there seemed to be little secrecy observed.

The Ambassador replied that what appeared in the American press was of course nothing but speculation and that the main thing to keep secret was the time and place of the meeting. He had thought, however, that it would be very difficult to keep down speculation in regard to the forthcoming meeting since the whole world had expected it for so long.

The Ambassador then said that, although he had immediately telegraphed to the President to obtain further information in regard to the size of the American military staff and the military subjects to be discussed, the President unfortunately had left before he could reply. The President was now on shipboard and it was impossible to communicate with him since radio silence was being observed. He added, however, that General Deane and he would be prepared to give Mr. Molotov or the Soviet military representatives any opinions or

¹ For the passages which are omitted, see *post*, p. 201.

information they might have as to the probable subjects to be discussed at the meeting. The Ambassador said in regard to the military staff that, while he had no definite information, he believed it would be very restricted.

He then asked Mr. Molotov if there was anything he could tell him as to the size of the Soviet military staff who would go.

Mr. Molotov replied that that question had not yet been definitely decided but he assumed that the military staff would be rather small. The Ambassador repeated his offer to give Mr. Molotov any information that either he or General Deane had in regard to possible subjects to be discussed at the meeting, adding that he would of course be glad to transmit to the President any observations in regard to the meeting which Marshal Stalin or Mr. Molotov might have.

The Ambassador then gave a short description of the general character and atmosphere of previous meetings between the President and Mr. Churchill, which he assumed would be the same at the forthcoming meeting in Tehran. He stressed the informality of the President's talks with Mr. Churchill and his willingness to discuss any subject whatsoever. Therefore it was not expected that any formal agenda would be drawn up.

Mr. Molotov said that when men of the character of the President, Marshal Stalin and Mr. Churchill met it was much better to dispense with formality.

The Ambassador then told Mr. Molotov that he had been somewhat surprised from a message of Mr. Churchill's² to learn for the first time that Chinese military representatives were expected to be at the Cairo conference, and that he was certain from the President's message suggesting that Mr. Molotov come to Cairo,³ that the President likewise had not yet heard that any Chinese would be present.

Mr. Molotov said that the first they had heard of this possibility was also from Mr. Churchill's message but that anyway he could not have left until the end of November since he had had an increased quantity of work because of the slight illness of Marshal Stalin. He added that Marshal Stalin was practically well again but, in order to run no risks which might impede the forthcoming meeting was still staying in his room.

The Ambassador then turned to the question of communications between the President and Stalin while the President was in Cairo

² Churchill's message to Stalin, quoted in Churchill's telegram 500, November 10, 1943, to Roosevelt; *ante*, p. 78.

³ Roosevelt's telegram of November 8, 1943, to Stalin; *ante*, p. 71.

before the Tehran meeting. He suggested that messages be sent from Cairo through the military channels to General Connolly in Tehran who could then turn them over to the Soviet representatives for transmission to Moscow by direct Soviet wire.

Mr. Molotov replied that he thought in matters of that kind it was better to follow the previous practice and have them sent direct from Cairo to the Embassy here and delivered in the usual fashion, since he regarded it as undesirable to have other persons involved in handling these messages.

The Ambassador pointed out that communications between Cairo and Moscow were very slow and that furthermore messages from Stalin to the President might be difficult through this channel since he understood the Soviet Government had not yet established a mission in Cairo. The Ambassador then suggested that possibly, since the British had quicker communications between Cairo and Moscow than we had, and since any messages from the President would in effect be joint messages from himself and Mr. Churchill dealing with the date of arrival in Tehran, etc., it might be possible to use the British channels. Mr. Molotov agreed.

Mr. Molotov then inquired whether any announcement would be made of the arrival of the President and Mr. Churchill in Cairo, to which the Ambassador emphatically replied that there would not.

The Ambassador asked Mr. Molotov if he knew of the date of arrival of Marshal Stalin and himself in Tehran, whether it would be on the 27th, the first date mentioned by the President.⁴ Mr. Molotov replied that this question had not yet been decided but it probably would be some time around the 27th or just after.

The Ambassador informed Mr. Molotov that he was notifying no one of his departure and that technically Mr. Hamilton, who would be in charge of the Embassy in his absence, would not be Charge-de-[*Chargé d'*]Affaires. Mr. Molotov expressed approval of this arrangement since it would lend added security to the whole question of the meeting.

⁴ See Roosevelt's telegram of November 8, 1943, to Stalin, *ante*, p. 72.

740.0011 EW 1939/31966 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

MOST IMMEDIATE

CAIRO, November 17, 1943—1 p. m.

2109. Department's 1748, November 16, 2 p. m.¹ Secret for the Secretary.

As brief notices appeared in the local press regarding the closing of the Mena House I made inquiries on the matter and was assured

¹ *Ante*, p. 90.

that no more such references would appear. Furthermore, I have been given to understand by United States Army Headquarters that censorship stop is now in force. I have this morning told Casey of the conten . . . ² and he states that as he has received word from London in a similar sense he is investigating the question and will inform me of the results.

In this general connection I refer to our conversation while in Cairo and must say that given the original selection of an area of this nature and the preparations which the British have made to meet the requirements, speculation, at least among the local public, could scarcely be avoided. I have expressed my doubts on this score to our special agents who have been here for some days³ but they do not appear to be disturbed.

KIRK

² Garbled code group or groups.

³ See Reilly, p. 164.

Defense Files : Telegram

*The President to the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, North Africa
(Eisenhower)* ¹

ULTRA SECRET

[ABOARD THE U. S. S. "IOWA",]

17 Nov[ember 19]43.

From Com[mander] in Ch[ief] Embarked.

Transmit to Former Naval Person[:] "Official information from Washington to effect that meeting place is known to enemy through press and radio. Propose meeting place be changed to Khartoum[.]" Confirm seriousness of leak. Adjust transit as you deem requisite.

¹ Sent to Malta via Navy channels.

740.0011 EW 1939/31989 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, November 18, 1943—4 p. m.

2122. My 2109, November 17, 1 p. m.¹

Casey has given me the following additional explanations:

(1) In absence of instructions from London and Washington no censorship stop on press speculation was imposed here as releases about prospective conferences of high officials had already appeared from both capitals.

(2) As regards this area press stop which must be communicated to junior Egyptian officials of Anglo-Egyptian censorship would become widely known at once and in view of previous releases from

¹ *Ante*, p. 95.

London and Washington would have indicated Cairo as meeting place of high officials. Reliance was therefore placed upon cover plan which British had agreed to.

(3) As matter stands now censorship stop prevails which was put out from London on November 14th just after transmission from Cairo of the United Press report in question, and in addition cover stories are being circulated indicating Luxor and Jerusalem as possible meeting places.

I need scarcely add that as regards these cover stories both places mentioned are not in my opinion to be regarded as seriously intentioned alternative places as Luxor is out of bounds owing to prevalence of malaria and Jerusalem would raise grave political objections.

KIRK

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 18, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull.

Kirk thinks² it would be appropriate for you to send message to King Farouk to wish him recovery from recent motor accident which resulted in slight injury to pelvis and minor bruises.³

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room to Greer at Oran, apparently via military channels, November 19, 1943.

² Telegram 2116, November 17, 1943, from the Legation at Cairo; not printed herein.

³ For Roosevelt's message of November 20, 1943, to Farouk, based on this suggestion, see *post*, p. 101.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, North Africa (Eisenhower) to the President*¹

SECRET

[MALTA] 18 November 1943.

URGENT

While unquestionably the enemy strongly suspects imminence of Cairo meeting because of elaborate preparations I consider that arrangements there offer best degree of security that can be provided in whole region. If deemed desirable I can lend Mid-East temporarily additional fighters to increase air defence. My first recommendation is therefore that present plan be followed without change. If however the President believes a change should be made I recommend meeting place be Malta for following reasons: (A) Existing facilities plus addition of British ships in harbour insure improvised accommodations on short notice. (B) Malta is a fortress with defences

¹ Sent via Navy channels to the President aboard the U. S. S. *Iowa*.

that provide maximum secrecy and high degree of safety regardless of possible leak. (C) Malta is on route followed by both parties towards Cairo and all preparations at latter place serve as excellent cover for Malta meeting. (D) I can provide at Malta maximum density of air cover.

I have consulted Former Naval Person who is sending you a message of similar import.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

[MALTA,] 18 November, 1943.

URGENT

From Former Naval Person to Admiral Queen.

Immediately on receipt of your ultra 331² I had a conference here with General Eisenhower, First Sea Lord³ and Commander in Chief Mediterranean.⁴ We all agreed that it would be better to go through with the Cairo rendezvous. We had of course always thought that the news was bound to leak directly we got there, and the fact that it has leaked a few days earlier should not therefore very much affect our plans. We would be well dispersed at Cairo. Enemy aircraft have to fly 100 miles over land before reaching us and arrangements have already been made to strengthen the fighter and gun defences of the enclave in which we propose to live. In addition we could, if necessary, have alternative residences. If, however, you remain of the opinion that we should not go through with Cairo, your suggested alternative Khartoum would not I fear be feasible. Apart from the fact that accommodation there is inadequate it is 1000 miles from Cairo and off our route and it would be very difficult to move the necessary staffs.

Paragraph two. The best substitute for Cairo seems to be Malta where I am now and I am having the possibilities examined. C-in-C Mediterranean strongly advises that your ship should not come here since its presence would be sure to be detected by the enemy and this would give away our whereabouts. We are of course nearer the enemy here but the defences are good. Pray let me know your wishes as soon as possible as it will take some time to alter arrangements.

Paragraph three. Please reply saying Cairo or Malta.

¹ Sent by Eisenhower, via Navy channels, to Roosevelt aboard the U. S. S. *Iowa*.

² Reference is to the message for Churchill contained in Roosevelt's telegram of November 17, 1943, to Eisenhower, *ante*, p. 96.

³ Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham.

⁴ Admiral Sir John Cunningham.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

[MALTA] November 19, 1943.

Further examination shows that Malta would be most inconvenient administratively and conditions would harm work of conference.² We are not therefore proceeding with Malta preparation. All authorities here strongly recommend adhering to Pyramid area and that air raid danger is slight. If desired principals could sleep in Cairo at any rate part of the time. Everything is prepared and all precautions are taken in present position and I hope that you will decide to come there. Unless I hear from you to the contrary during the day of 20th I shall proceed to Cairo.

¹ Sent via British and American Navy channels, by way of Washington, and also via the headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, at Algiers, to Roosevelt aboard the U. S. S. *Iowa*.

² For the difficulties at Malta, see Leasor, *The Clock With Four Hands*, pp. 255-257; and Hollis, *One Marine's Tale*, pp. 102-103.

Defense Files : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

MOST IMMEDIATE

[ABOARD THE U. S. S. "IOWA",
November 19, 1943.]

Following for Former Naval Person from Admiral Q begins

I agree with your recommendation. Will proceed to Cairo as planned. Ends.

¹ Sent to Malta via Navy channels, in a telegram which began "Personal for First Sea Lord" (Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham) and ended "Message has been given to General Eisenhower."

Defense Files : Telegram

*The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Chief of Staff of the Army (Marshall)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 20, 1943.

SECURITY CONTROL

Have just returned from a weeks absence and learned of the problem which has arisen concerning the location of future conference owing to leaks in censorship. Unless irrevocable decision of this problem has made it obsolete please give the President this message:²

¹ Sent to McCarthy at Algiers as War Department telegram "Freedom Number 3051 SEXTANT Number 1001", marked "for General Marshall from Stimson".

² Since Roosevelt and Churchill had already decided to proceed to Cairo, this message was "obsolete" by the time it reached Marshall.

"After careful consideration of the publicity which has occurred and the possible dangers involved, I sum up the situation as follows: if I were an Air Force Commander having control of between 90 and 100 JU88 bombers and had received the press reports as to a specifically described target of unique importance within easy range of my advanced airports, (such reports being probably confirmed by knowledge of ship movements) I should stake every plane on the chance of winning such a prize. Under such circumstances I believe that elementary prudence dictates a change of location. While not responsible for my method of expression both Hull and Knox concur in this conclusion."

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

. *The President to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt)*¹

[TUNIS] 20 November 1943.

From the President to Ambassador Steinhardt

Hope you can come to Cairo either immediately or later. I hope to be there until Saturday November 27 and to be back there about six days later.

¹ Sent to the White House, apparently via military channels; forwarded to the Department of State; and forwarded further by the Department, in paraphrase, in telegram 902, November 20, 1943, 4 p. m., to the Legation at Ankara, marked "Most Secret and Personal" and "U. S. Urgent".

123 Steinhardt, Laurence A./576 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt)

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1943—5 p. m.

U. S. URGENT

903. Secret and personal for the Ambassador.

By direction of the President¹ you are requested to report immediately in Cairo and there await further instructions.

HULL

C[ECIL] W. G[RAY]

¹ See *ante*, p. 66.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt)*¹

[TUNIS,] 20 November 1943.

From the President to Ambassador Steinhardt.

Please tell President Inonu I have landed safely in North Africa

¹ Sent to the White House, apparently via military channels; forwarded to the Department of State; and forwarded further by the Department, in telegram 904, November 20, 1943, 7 p. m., to the Legation at Ankara, marked "Secret" and "U. S. Urgent".

and that I would greatly welcome him. I cannot make my plans until Monday morning² but will advise you at that time.³

ROOSEVELT

² November 22, 1943.

³ For Roosevelt's next message to Steinhardt, see *post*, p. 386.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

[TUNIS,] 20 November 1943.

For Marshal Stalin personal and secret from the President.

I have just landed. I am sorry about Mr. Molotov and hope he is all well again.² I will be glad to see him with you in Teheran. Let me know when you expect to get there. I will be in Cairo from tomorrow on and Mr. Churchill will be nearby.

I am sincerely happy about the fine continuance of your gains.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the White House, apparently via military channels; forwarded to the Department of State; and forwarded further by the Department to the Embassy, Moscow, in telegram 1248, November 20, 1943, 7 p. m. Telegram 1248 was marked "US Urgent" and "Secret for the Ambassador or Hamilton", and began "Please have the following message from the President delivered immediately."

² See *ante*, p. 87, footnote 5.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to King Farouk of Egypt*¹

SECRET

[TUNIS,] 20 November 1943.

On landing in French North Africa I have just heard of your motor accident.² I am deeply sorry and hope to see you when I am in Egypt.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent by the Advanced Liaison Group, Allied Force Headquarters, North Africa, to the Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the Middle East, Cairo, as message 952, which was marked as being from Roosevelt, for the eyes of Kirk alone, and began "Please deliver the following to His Majesty the King". Kirk forwarded the message to the King via Hassanayn on November 21, 1943.

² See Hull's telegram of November 18, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 97.

Defense Files : Telegram

*The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*¹

SECRET

[ORAN,] 20 November 1943.

(For Ambassador Harriman)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been directed by the President to inform you² that he desires your presence at Cairo about 22 November (to Chief United States Military Mission to USSR from Joint Chiefs of Staff) accompanied by General Deane, Mister Bohlen, General Vandenberg, and Commodore [Rear Admiral] Olsen.

¹ Sent to the War Department, apparently via Navy channels, as telegram 36, for forwarding to the United States Military Attaché, Moscow.

² See *ante*, p. 87.

Roosevelt Papers

The President's Personal Representative (Hurley) to the President

SECRET

CAIRO, 20 November 1943.

I have inspected the Chinese Theatre of Operations. I spent considerable time with the American Generals, Lieutenant General Stilwell, Major General Chennault, and other Chinese and American Army Officers. I was accompanied into the Chinese Theatre by Major General Stratemeyer who is Commander of the American Air Operations in the India and China Theatres. I had two conferences with the President of China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The Generalissimo expressed his complete confidence in you, in your motives, and in the principles that you have promulgated.

The Generalissimo talked very frankly about the coming conference in Cairo. He questioned whether or not he could meet Marshal Stalin at Teheran on the terms of amity becoming such a meeting. He related to me frankly the causes that impelled him to hesitate to have a personal meeting with Marshal Stalin.¹ He related to me his suspicions concerning Russia's desires to communize China and perhaps for a complete conquest and annexation to Russia of a portion of China.

I recalled to him Marshal Stalin's renunciation of world conquest as a fundamental policy of communism. I told him that in my opinion Marshal Stalin is now committed to the proposition that communism

¹ Regarding the question of a meeting of Chiang with Stalin, see Lohbeck, pp. 203-205.

can succeed in Russia alone without an attempt being made to force it on the rest of the world. I said also that in my opinion Russia is no longer subsidizing or directing communist activities in other nations. I suggested to the Generalissimo that Russia's own experience with communism in Russia is to some extent neutralizing what we considered to be the harsher elements of the communistic ideology. I said that I realized that there are communist political parties in other nations but in my opinion such parties are neither directed nor subsidized from Russia.

In corroboration of these arguments I drew the Generalissimo's attention to the recent Moscow declaration.² Notwithstanding this, the Generalissimo still appeared to entertain grave doubts of the friendly intentions of the Soviet Government toward China.

The Generalissimo stated that he wished to see you first in Cairo and much depended on his conference with you as to whether or not he would subsequently confer with Marshal Stalin.

I hope I may have the opportunity of discussing with you the Chinese-Russian problem before you have a conference with the Generalissimo.

The Generalissimo stated that so far as you and Prime Minister Churchill are concerned he has no doubt of being able to find a basis of complete cooperation.

3

In all of the foregoing it will be apparent to you that I have confined myself to a discussion of the attitude of President-Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek toward a meeting with Marshal Stalin. I have purposely refrained from injecting into this letter any of the reasons why Marshal Stalin might not want a public meeting with Chiang Kai-shek at this moment. For instance, Marshal Stalin might be opposed to taking any action that might cause the closing of the Port of Vladivostok. Moreover, you may find that Marshal Stalin might be convinced that it would be unwise to take any action that might bring an enemy down on his rear in the present posture of the conflict.

Respectfully yours,

PATRICK J. HURLEY,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

² Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, November 1, 1943; *Decade*, p. 11.

³ For the passages which are omitted, see *post*, p. 263.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

[TUNIS,] 21 November 1943.

Personal and Secret for the Prime Minister from the President.

Thank you very much for your messages Numbers 502,² 503,³ 504⁴ and 505⁵ which were delivered to me upon my arrival early yesterday. I expect to reach SEXTANT early morning November twenty-second, and it will be grand to see you again. I hope your cold is better.

ROOSEVELT

¹ The source text bears the following typed notation : "Above message sent by the President from Tunis to the Prime Minister at Cairo thru local channels."

² *Ante*, p. 81.

³ *Post*, p. 188.

⁴ *Post*, p. 189.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 85.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO?] 21 November 1943.²

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and most secret. No. 506.

1. My arrival in Egypt is bound to be known as I shall pass through to see Catroux and others: moreover British Parliament meets on 23rd and my absence must be explained. Unless I hear from you to the contrary I shall allow it to be stated on 22nd that I am in Cairo.

2. This publicity will be unsupported cover for your movement which I think should not be announced for a few days.

3. You will be receiving a telegram about military precautions³ which are excellent.

¹ Sent to London; forwarded to Washington, apparently via United States military channels; and forwarded further by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt in North Africa.

² According to Alanbrooke (p. 74), Churchill arrived at Cairo at 2:30 p. m. by plane from Alexandria.

³ Telegram 508 of November 21, 1943, *post*, p. 105.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO?] 21 November 1943.

Unnumbered (#507)²

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt most immediate personal and most secret.

See St. John, chapter 14, verses 1 to 4.³

¹ Sent to London ; forwarded by the American Embassy, London, apparently via military channels and the White House Map Room, to Roosevelt in North Africa. Regarding Churchill's concern after this message had been sent, lest it give offense, see Churchill, p. 327.

² The parenthetical information is handwritten on the source text.

³ The source text contains, at the bottom of the page, the verses cited, as follows :

"1. Let not your heart be troubled : ye believe in God, believe also in me.

"2. In my Father's house are many mansions ; if it were not so, I would have told you, I go to prepare a place for you.

"3. And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again, and receive you unto myself ; that where I am, there ye may be also.

"4. And whither I go ye know, and the way ye know."

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO?] November 21, 1943.

No. 508. Most immediate. Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and most secret.

1. I asked Commanders-in-Chief Middle East to let me have :

(1) Their estimate of the risk attached to our meeting.

(2) Arrangements already made to deal with air and parachute attacks.

(3) Proposals for reinforcing above.

2. Their reply is as follows.

(A) Appreciation of risk.

Risk small in view of precautions taken. Target is 100 miles inland giving ample warning and good fighter and A. A. defences have been provided. There is a remote possibility that low flying enemy aircraft might reach target, but every possible precaution is being taken against this.

(B) Arrangements made against air and parachute attacks.

(1) Fighters. Five Spitfire Squadrons, three Hurricane Squadrons and one Night Fighter Squadron of which one Spitfire Squadron at Matabeleland West and one at Heliopolis.

¹ Sent to London ; forwarded to Washington, apparently via United States military channels ; and forwarded further by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt in North Africa.

(2) A. A. One Regiment Light AA (54 guns) two Regiments Heavy AA (48 guns) and 18 searchlights deployed in target area. One Balloon Squadron standing by but not deployed. Smoke screen available.

(3) R. D. F. and Warning System. R. D. F. will cover along whole coast and special arrangements have been made for cover inland. Special arrangements have been made also for WT observer posts covering target. Specially organized gun and fighter operation rooms controlling air and AA defence of area. Adequate air raid warnings and shelter arrangements have been made in target area.

(4) Ground. Three Infantry Bns. Plus one Troop of Armoured Cars guarding Mena area which is fully wired. Extent of parachute attacks appreciated by command.

(C) Proposal for increased insurance.

We are taking following steps to increase insurance.

(1) Fighters. We are adding one Spitfire Squadron to air defence scheme.

(2) Ground. We are reinforcing ground defence by equivalent of one Regiment Mixed Armoured Cars and Tanks.

(D) We consider arrangements in (B) and (C) above fully adequate to deal with all foreseeable contingencies.

Cairo Legation Records

*The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Chief of the Egyptian Cabinet
(Hassanayn)*

SECRET¹

CAIRO, November 21, 1943.

MY DEAR PASHA, I venture to solicit your good offices with a view to advising His Majesty the King for his personal information that the President of the United States is expected to arrive in Egypt in the very near future accompanied by several of his advisers.

I need not add that it is a source of regret that owing to the exigencies of travel in time of war it was impossible to establish preliminary contact on this matter with His Majesty and I am certain that His Majesty will understand this necessity for secrecy both prior and subsequent to the arrival of the President in Egypt.

Believe me, my dear Pasha,

Yours very sincerely,

[No signature indicated]

¹ A notation on the source text reads: "(Envelope marked—PERSONAL, SECRET, URGENT)".

Cairo Legation Records

*The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Egyptian Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs (Nahas)*

SECRET¹

CAIRO, November 21, 1943.

MY DEAR PASHA, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency in strictest confidence that the President of the United States is expected to arrive in Egypt in the near future.

Your Excellency will realize that the exigencies of travel in time of war require special safeguards and that the utmost secrecy is prescribed both prior and following the President's arrival in Egypt.

Believe me, my dear Pasha,

Yours faithfully,

[No signature indicated]

¹ A notation on the source text reads: "(Envelope marked—PERSONAL, SECRET, URGENT)".

2. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS

Editorial Note

From the documents in Chapter I it is clear that the principal purpose of the conferences at Cairo and Tehran was to coordinate and strengthen the war effort of the United Nations. During the months of arranging for these conferences it was understood that President Roosevelt would be accompanied by the United States Chiefs of Staff, that his talks with Prime Minister Churchill, Generalissimo Chiang, Marshal Stalin, and President İnönü would center primarily on military problems, and that there would be a conference of the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, regardless of whether it proved possible to arrange meetings with the Chinese, Russians, and Turks.

In view of the military nature of all these proposed discussions President Roosevelt relied primarily on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make the necessary substantive preparations. Acting Secretary of State Stettinius was informed in great confidence of the President's projected trip, and a few memoranda on political subjects were submitted to the President in response to his requests, but the Department of State was not asked to draft any policy recommendations or "position papers" of the type that were prepared and organized into comprehensive "briefing books" for the later conferences at Yalta and Potsdam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared agenda for the military discussions, but there were no agenda for any of the political discussions at Cairo and Tehran.

In this connection it is worth noting that Secretary Hull was at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers during the latter half of October and that this conference itself was regarded as being preparatory to the forthcoming meeting of the Heads of Government. By delimiting major areas of agreement and disagreement, the Foreign Ministers at Moscow did in effect identify certain subjects which would need to be referred to the Heads of Government for further consideration. For this reason Roosevelt postponed his departure for North Africa until after Hull had returned to Washington and had personally briefed him on the highlights of the Moscow Conference (see *ante*, p. 67, footnote 3, and Hull, vol. II, p. 1313).

In the light of these circumstances the following categories of papers have been included as background for the conferences at Cairo and Tehran:

(1) Papers specifically prepared for use or consideration at the forthcoming conferences of the Heads of Government and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Papers that were not originally prepared with these conferences in mind but which were submitted to Roosevelt in connection with preparations for these conferences.

(3) Correspondence relating to the papers in the two above-mentioned categories, plus correspondence between the Heads of Government or their representatives regarding substantive problems to be taken up at the conferences.

(4) Excerpts from the minutes and documents of the Moscow Conference that show the nature and status of the subjects that were referred by the Foreign Ministers to the Heads of Government. This category also includes communications on these subjects to and from Roosevelt up to the time of his arrival in Cairo.

For many of the subjects touched upon at Cairo and Tehran there were no preparatory papers or special negotiations in anticipation of the meeting of the Heads of Government. The background on these subjects, including the complete documentation of the Moscow Conference, is scheduled to be published in other *Foreign Relations* volumes for 1943.

J. C. S. Files

*Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 22 October 1943.

J. C. S. 533/1

PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT UNITED STATES-BRITISH STAFF
CONFERENCE

Reference: J. C. S. 533²

1. It is recommended that a Combined Chiefs of Staff Conference be held in the near future, but not until the results of the current discussions in Moscow are available.³

2. The proposed Conference should retain the continuity of the series of conferences, in that it follow precedent as to organization, procedure and scope.

¹ Approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for planning purposes October 26, 1943.

² Not printed herein.

³ For those aspects of the military discussions of the Moscow Conference which concern subjects referred to the planned Conference of the Heads of Government, see *post*, pp. 121-129, 134-144; for other aspects, see Deane, chapter II.

3. It is considered important that the QUADRANT paper⁴ be made the basis for the discussions and that the paper resulting from the new conference follow the same form, being complete in itself and replacing the QUADRANT document.

4. It is recommended as a general line of action to be followed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they strongly support the Over-all Objective, the Strategic Concept and the Basic Undertakings in support thereof, as stated in Articles I, II and III of the QUADRANT paper.

5. In general, discussion should be preceded by full report [*reports?*] from all theaters and operations and current estimates on enemy capabilities and intentions.

6. It is recognized that the principal discussions will concern Section IV of the QUADRANT paper—Execution of the Over-all Strategic Concept. Under this heading it would seem that the European and South East Asia theaters will require the most attention, and that the war in the Pacific will not require substantial modification at this time.

7. There is attached for approval, as Enclosure "A", the proposed agenda prepared in collaboration with the Joint Staff Planners and the Joint Logistics Committee.⁵ Discussion and recommendations of items on the agenda will be submitted separately.⁶

⁴The records of the First Quebec (QUADRANT) Conference of 1943 are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series. The "QUADRANT paper" referred to is the Final Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Roosevelt and Churchill, August 24, 1943. Extensive extracts from it will be found in Ehrman, vol. v, pp. 1, 8-10, 12-15. A summary of the military decisions of the First Quebec Conference appears in Leahy, pp. 177-178.

⁵Not printed at this point. The proposed agenda was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on November 22, 1943; see *post*, p. 368.

⁶Not printed herein; one of the papers submitted separately was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for discussion with the British and, in final form, became C.C.S. 380/2, November 6, 1943, *post*, p. 157.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 23 October 1943.

Personal and most secret. Number 471. Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Your number 394.²

3. Nov 15 would be 90 days from the beginning of QUADRANT. In these 90 days events of first magnitude have occur[r]ed. Mussolini

¹ Apparently sent via military channels.

² *Ante*, p. 37.

³ For paragraphs 1 and 2, which discuss the idea of holding a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff beginning November 15, 1943, before the Heads of Government should convene, see *ante*, p. 38.

has fallen; Italy has surrendered; its fleet has come over; we have successfully invaded Italy, and are marching on Rome with good prospects of success. The Germans are gathering up to 25 or more div[ision]s in Italy and the Po Valley. All these are new facts.

4. Our present plans for 1944 seem open to very grave defects. We are to put 15 American and 12 British Divs into OVERLORD and will have about 6 American and 16 British or British controlled divs on the Italian front. Unless there is a German collapse Hitler, lying in the center of the best communications in the world, can concentrate at least 40 to 50 divs against either of these forces while holding the other. He could obtain all the necessary forces by cutting his losses in the Balkans and withdrawing to the Sava and the Danube without necessarily weakening his Russian front. The disposition of our forces between the Italian and the Channel theatres has not been settled by strategic needs but by the march of events, by shipping possibilities, and by arbitrary compromises between the British and Americans. The date of OVERLORD itself was fixed by splitting the difference between the American and British view. It is arguable that neither the forces building up in Italy nor those available for a May OVERLORD are strong enough for the tasks set them.

5. The British Staffs and my colleagues and I all think this position requires to be reviewed, and that the commanders for both fronts should be named and should be present. In pursuance of QUADRANT decisions we have already prepared two of our best divs, the 50th and 51st now in Sicily, for transfer to OVERLORD. Thus they can play no part in the Italian battle to which they stood near, but will not come into action again for 7 months and then only if certain hypothetical conditions are fulfilled which may very likely not be fulfilled. Early in Nov a decision must be taken about moving landing craft from the Mediterranean to OVERLORD. This will cripple Mediterranean operations without the said craft influencing events elsewhere for many months. We stand by what was agreed at QUADRANT but we do not feel that such agreements should be interpreted rigidly and without review in the swiftly changing situations of war.

6. Personally I feel that if we make serious mistakes in the campaign of 1944, we might give Hitler the chance of a startling comeback. Prisoner German General Von Thoma was overheard saying "Our only hope is that they come where we can use the army upon them". All this shows the need for the greatest care and foresight in our arrangements, the most accurate timing between the two theatres, and the need to gather the greatest possible forces for both operations, particularly OVERLORD. I do not doubt our ability in the conditions laid down to get ashore and deploy. I am however deeply concerned with the build up and with the situation which may arise

between the 30th and 60th days. I feel sure that the vast movement of American personnel into the United Kingdom and the fighting composition of the units requires to be searchingly examined by the commander who will execute OVERLORD. I wish to have both the high commands settled in a manner agreeable to our two countries, and then the secondary commands which are of very high importance can be decided. I have the greatest confidence in General Marshall and that if he is in charge of OVERLORD we British will aid him with every scrap of life and strength we have. My dear friend, this is much the greatest thing we have ever attempted, and I am not satisfied that we have yet taken the measures necessary to give it the best chance of success. I feel very much in the dark at present, and unable to think or act in the forward manner which is needed. For these reasons I desire an early conference.⁴

⁴ For paragraphs 7 and 8, on arrangements for the Conferences, see *ante*, p. 39.

740.0011 Moscow/51 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President and the Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) ¹

Moscow, October 23, 1943—2 p. m.

1704. DELAM No. 14.

Secret and personal for the President and the Acting Secretary from the Secretary

Following is our translation of the Soviet proposals presented at yesterday's meeting (reference DELAM 13²) in regard to Italy which we have now received in written form.

"Proposal of the USSR in regard to Italy

II. The Soviet Government considers it also necessary in the interest of the intensification of the struggle against Hitlerite Germany to transfer immediately to the Soviet Union from the total number of more than 100 war vessels transferred to the Allies by reason of the capitulation of Italy following war vessels: one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers and four submarines to be dispatched right away to the northern ports of the Soviet Union and also 40,000 displacement tons of merchant ships out of the total of more than 150,000 displacement tons of ships which passed to the control of the Anglo-American armed

¹ Sent by the Ambassador, Moscow, in the numerical series of telegrams from the Embassy to the Department of State. A copy is in the Roosevelt Papers.

² In DELAM 13 (telegram 1693, October 22, 1943, midnight, from the Embassy at Moscow) Hull reported the presentation and discussion of the Soviet paper regarding Italy.

forces as a result of the capitulation of Italy for immediate despatch to the Black Sea.”³

³ In DELAM 13 Hull reported, with regard to this proposal as introduced by Molotov: “He justified this request by explaining that the Italian participation in the war against the Soviet Union had done incalculable damage to the Soviet Union and particularly to the Soviet naval and merchant fleet. Both Eden and I agreed to submit this request immediately to our governments and urge upon them sympathetic consideration on an equitable and fair basis.”

740.0011 Moscow/342

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) to the Secretary of State*¹

Moscow, 23rd October, 1943.

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE: I have the honour to submit to Your Excellency for consideration by the Conference a memorandum by the British Delegation on Persia.

2. I understand that this question, which figures as point 10 on the draft Agenda, may be examined by the Conference at its meeting on October 24th and I trust that your delegation will be in a position to give favourable consideration to the proposal set out in the memorandum when it comes up for consideration.

Yours sincerely

ANTHONY EDEN

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the British Delegation to the Moscow Conference

PERSIA

1. The general policy towards Persia of the Allied Powers (Great Britain and the Soviet Union) for the duration of the war at all events, must stand the test of whether or not it conforms to the engagements which the Allies have entered into in the Tripartite Treaty.²

2. In return for the treaty right to maintain military forces in Persia, and to use Persia's communications (subject to certain conditions of payment) in prosecution of the war against the Axis, the Allied Powers have guaranteed the territorial integrity and the independence of Persia, and have undertaken “to use their best endeavours to safeguard the economic existence of the Persian people against the privations and difficulties arising as a result of the present war.”

¹ According to Hull, vol. II, p. 1506, the three Foreign Ministers, after inconclusive discussion of the declaration regarding Iran proposed in the enclosure to this communication, agreed that it should be considered further at the coming Conference of the Heads of Government.

² Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and Iran, signed January 29, 1942; Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. VI, March 21, 1942, pp. 249-252.

Moreover, it is specifically provided in the Treaty that the presence of Allied military forces in Persia does not constitute a military occupation and "will disturb as little as possible the administration and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations."

3. The Government of the United States are also maintaining considerable military forces in Persian territory. While the Government of the United States are not yet in treaty relations with Persia, it is believed that they will wish to conduct their present relations with Persia in accordance with considerations and obligations similar to those set out in the immediately preceding paragraph.

4. For the period of the war, and particularly so long as the Persian supply route to Russia continues to hold its present importance, the policy of the Allies towards Persia should be directed to securing her co-operation in the United Nations war effort to her fullest capacity. Her military co-operation has not been invited (even since her declaration of war on Germany³) except to the extent that the Allies look to the armed forces of Persia to maintain order and security within the country, and especially on the supply routes. It is in the economic and financial field that Persia can make her most useful contribution.

5. In the Tripartite Treaty, Persia has undertaken to place her system of communications at the Allies' disposal. She has done so. The Allies' next requirement has been an uninterrupted supply of currency to meet local expenditure of the Allied military forces on the development and maintenance of the supply routes to Russia. This has been secured, and the currency issue may be regarded as settled. Of secondary importance is the utilisation of Persia's capacity to supply the Allies from her natural and manufacturing resources with commodities of which the Allies themselves may be in need, for example, foodstuffs, minerals and other raw materials, arms, etc.

6. So long as Persia complies with her own Treaty engagements, and so long as she grants the Allies their desiderata in the financial and economic field, there is a moral obligation on the Allies to do all that they can to ensure that their utilisation of these facilities causes the least hurt to Persian economy, and, in addition, to do all in their power, having regard to the exigencies of their own situation, to safeguard the people of Persia against the privations and difficulties which the war must inevitably bring to them.

7. Benevolent treatment for Persia, to the extent of the Allies' capacity, in exchange for co-operation from Persia herself, sums up what should be Allied policy towards her during the war period.

³ September 9, 1943.

8. It is suggested therefore that the Conference might consider the adoption of a declaration in regard to Persia in the following terms:—

“The Governments of the U. K., the U. S. A., and the U. S. S. R., having in mind the adherence of the Government of Iran to the cause of the United Nations, rely with confidence upon the desire of the Government and people of Iran to make their contribution along the most effective lines in furtherance of the struggle against the common enemy.

The Governments of the U. K., the U. S. A., and the U. S. S. R. undertake for [t]heir part to do all within their power to safeguard the people of Iran from the privations and difficulties which the present war must bring to them, in common with all other peoples engaged in the conflict. They further undertake to collaborate closely with each other on all issues as they arise, and to co-operate with the Government of Iran, with a view to the furtherance of the United Nations’ war effort, and in the best interests of the people of Iran.”⁴

9. It is for consideration also, whether such a declaration, if adopted, should be made public.

⁴ Hull wrote, in his *Memoirs*, vol. II, p. 1505: “During one of my conferences with Eden in Moscow, I suggested on October 24 that the declaration be expanded to include a promise of support for the foreign advisers and domestic agencies working to improve conditions in Iran, and that separate declarations be made stating the intentions of the three Powers to withdraw their armed forces from Iran after the cessation of hostilities.” The expanded declaration is printed *post*, pp. 118–119.

740.0011 Moscow/346

*United States Delegation Minutes of the Sixth Regular Meeting of the
Moscow Conference*

SUMMARY OF THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE
MOSCOW, OCTOBER 24, 1943, 3:00 P. M.

MR. MOLOTOV then took up item 10 on the agenda—common policy towards Iran.

MR. EDEN said he felt we should consider the various practical questions involved in this matter, such as transport, finance, coordination of trade activities, etc.

THE SECRETARY said he thought it would save time to refer this question to a special committee.

MR. MOLOTOV said he had some observations to make on this question, that just before the meeting the Iranian Ambassador had called at the Foreign Office to call attention to the existing Soviet-Anglo-Iranian treaty of 1942, which envisaged the presence of an Iranian representative at all international conferences in which questions relating to Iran would be dealt with.

MR. EDEN replied that it had not been intended to take any decisions in regard to Iran, but merely to discuss among ourselves certain

practical measures which would redound to the benefit of Iran in the exchange of views on the subject.

MR. MOLOTOV said it was his understanding, which the Secretary confirmed, that the United States had no such treaty with Iran, but that one was in process of negotiation and might soon be brought to a successful conclusion.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that a small commission be formed to consider these practical questions without settling in advance any of the questions in principle.

Mr. Allen and Mr. Jernegan were named to this commission for the United States; Mr. Holman and Mr. Iliff for the British and Mr. Kavtaradze and Mr. Smirnov for the Soviet Union.

740.0011 Moscow/346 ¹

Memorandum by the British Delegation to the Moscow Conference

SECRET

[Moscow, October 24 (?), 1943.]

(British Proposal)

DRAFT OF DECLARATION ON JOINT RESPONSIBILITY FOR EUROPE

The three Governments

Fully conscious of their common responsibility as members of the United Nations, aware that once the Nazi and Fascist powers are crushed the welfare of Europe depends on the widest possible cooperation among the nations concerned, disapproving of those separate combinations which have in the past spread jealousy and suspicion and led to economic and armed rivalries, declare:—

1. That they affirm the principle that each people is free to choose for itself its form of government and way of life, provided that it respects equally the rights of other peoples;

2. That all States are accordingly free to associate themselves with other states in order to increase their mutual welfare by the establishment of institutions on a wider scale than each can separately maintain, provided that such associations shall not be directed against the welfare or stability of any other States and are approved by any general international organization that may be set up in accordance with paragraph 4 of the Four Power Declaration adopted at [blank] on [blank.] ²

3. That, subject to the considerations advanced in paragraph 2 above, they regard it as their duty and interest, so far as lies in their power, to assist other European States to form any associations designed to increase mutual welfare and the general prosperity of the Continent;

¹ In the numbered documents of the Moscow Conference, located in this file, the memorandum printed here is document 31.

² Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, issued at Moscow November 1, 1943; *Decade*, p. 11.

4. That for their own part they will not seek to create any separate areas of responsibility in Europe and will not recognize such for others, but rather affirm their common interest in the well-being of Europe as a whole.

(No action was taken on this document.) ³

³ Appears on the source text. See *post*, p. 130.

740.0011 Moscow/345

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State*¹

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Moscow, October 25, 1943—5:00 p. m.

Subject: Turkey and the War: Post-war Planning.

Participants: Mr. V. M. Molotov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
The Secretary.

During the recess this afternoon, Mr. Molotov brought up the question of Turkey's entering the war and made it very clear that Russia's proposal is that she, the United States and Great Britain should "suggest" to Turkey that she come into the war and that by this word "suggest" he meant to suggest peremptorily, which meant in effect a command by the three great Powers.

I again made it clear that whatever the merits of the idea may be this was purely a military matter, which, as I had previously stated, came exclusively within the province of the President and the Chiefs of Staff so far as my Government was concerned, and added that no doubt they would be glad to talk this matter out with the Chiefs of Staff and the Heads of the other two Governments. I said that, of course, the British had taken the lead in dealing with the Turkish situation so far as she and the United States are concerned.

Mr. Molotov added that he saw no reason why the Allies and Great Britain should be furnishing arms to Turkey without getting some fighting out of her. I said that again I would have to refer him to Great Britain and to my own Chief of Staff along with the President. I concluded by saying that when this proposal, along with the Swedish proposal, was first made by Mr. Molotov for his Government, I had stated that I had no authority to deal with those war matters, but as a courtesy had promptly sent the proposals to my Government for any comment it might see fit to give to me.²

¹ The memorandum is unsigned but bears the typewritten initials "C[ordell] H[ull]" as those of the drafter.

² For the Soviet proposal regarding Turkey, Sweden, and other matters, see *post*, p. 135. For Roosevelt's letter of October 26, 1943, to İnönü, which dealt with the matter of their getting together but which also mentioned matters of substance to be talked over, see *ante*, p. 43.

³ For the paragraph omitted here, see *ante*, p. 40.

Mr. Molotov then asked me what different phases of international cooperation I had in mind. I again repeated to him numerous proposals that I had more than once stated to him since coming here. They included cooperation to preserve peace permanently and to provide for the maximum of economic advantages and benefits to each country for the equal enjoyment of their respective peoples, to preserve world order under law so as to avoid international anarchy, to provide for relief against starvation in many nations immediately following as well as during the war, to relieve the post-war German situation, to deal with dependent peoples, to deal with stabilization as a basis for suitable international trade and like relations, etc., etc. He agreed and then inquired if isolation did not hurt the United States. I said the truth is it has almost destroyed the United States and Soviet Russia. He said he agreed that isolation would not do.

740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

*Memorandum by the British Members of the Moscow Conference
Committee on Iran*¹

[Moscow, October 25, 1943.]

DRAFT DECLARATION No. 1

The Governments of the U. S. S. R., the U. S. A. and the United Kingdom having in mind the adherence of the Government of Iran to the cause of the United Nations rely with confidence upon the desire of the Government and people of Iran to make their contribution along the most effective lines in furtherance of the struggle against the common enemy.

2. The Government[s] of the U. S. S. R., the U. S. A., and the United Kingdom undertake for their part to do all within their power to safeguard the people of Iran from the privations and difficulties which the present war must bring to them in common with all other peoples engaged in the conflict. They further undertake to collaborate closely with each other and to co-operate with the Government of Iran on all issues as they arise with a view to the furtherance of the United Nations' war effort. They also undertake to give full moral support in any way acceptable to the Government of Iran to the efforts of the various individuals, groups and agencies, whether Iranian or foreign, which are endeavouring to relieve the existing economic difficulties of the country and to improve security through the strengthening of Iranian Governmental authority.

¹ Submitted by Holman to Jernegan, for consideration by the subcommittee, established the preceding day; see *ante*, p. 116.

3. The three Governments similarly undertake to effect as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities the withdrawal or the reduction to a normal peace time establishment of such non-military Governmental organisations as are now operating in Iran in connection with the United Nations' war effort.

DRAFT DECLARATION No. 2

Under Articles 1 and 5 of the Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and Iran of January 29th, 1942,² the Governments of the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R. undertake to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Iran and to withdraw their forces from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is earlier.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R. now desire to take this opportunity of declaring that the undertakings given to the Government of Iran in the foregoing paragraph still continue to constitute the basis of their policy towards Iran, which has in no way changed since the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty. Furthermore the two Governments affirm their intention of reducing in the meantime their military commitments in Iran as quickly as their general military situation permits.

² Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. vi, March 21, 1942, pp. 249-250.

740.0011 Moscow/346¹

Memorandum by the American Members of the Moscow Conference Committee on Iran

Moscow, October 26, 1943.

In connection with British declaration No. 1, the American members of the sub-committee on policy in Iran suggest that the third sentence of the second paragraph be amended to read as follows:

"As one means of implementing these undertakings, the three Governments will support, in collaboration with the Iranian Government, the efforts of the various foreign advisers, groups and agencies which are working with the Iranian Government to relieve the existing economic difficulties of Iran and to improve security through the strengthening of Iranian governmental authority."

In connection with British draft declaration No. 2, the American members suggest the issuance by the Secretary of State of the United States of a parallel statement as follows:

¹ In the numbered documents of the Moscow Conference, located in this file, the memorandum printed here is document 29.

"American military organizations in Iran consist solely of technical and administrative units, whose only function and purpose is to expedite the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union in furtherance of the war effort of the United Nations, among whom Iran is numbered. The United States has no combat units in Iran; its forces do not in any respect constitute an army of occupation, and they endeavor to interfere as little as possible with the normal life of the Iranian people. They will be withdrawn as soon as the necessity for their presence ceases to exist, and in no case will their withdrawal be later than six months after the cessation of hostilities between the United States and its enemies in the present war."

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 26, 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

For the Secretary from the President.

In regard to turning over naval vessels and merchant ships to the Soviet,² the President desires that Italian shipping, both naval and merchant now in Allied possession, be used wherever it may promise the best service to the common Allied cause (with due reference to the terms of the Admiral Cunningham Agreement³ if and as amended), without any final transfer of title to any Nation at the present time.⁴

The question of permanent title to ships and other material surrendered by Italy while in an enemy status or by other enemy countries hereafter can be determined at a later date without prejudice to the interest of the allied nations, and without adversely affecting the present and prospective Italian war effort against Germany.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² See Hull's telegram 1704 of October 23, 1943, 2 p. m., *ante*, p. 112.

³ "Memorandum of Agreement on Employment and Disposition of Italian Fleet and Mercantile Marine", concluded by Cunningham as Allied Naval Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, and the Italian Minister of Marine, on September 23, 1943; *United States and Italy, 1936-1946; Documentary Record* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 53.

⁴ A draft of this message in the Roosevelt Papers shows that it had been prepared in the Department of State and had been reviewed by Roosevelt. The original draft of the final portion of this sentence read: "without any transfer of title at the present time when Italy is a co-belligerent with us."

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 26 October 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Secret for the Secretary from the President.

The following is the point of view of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff as regards paragraph[s] *b* and *c* of ALUSNA 192114.²

It would not be deemed advisable to push Turkey at this moment into a declaration of war on the side of the Allies since the necessary compensation to the Turks in war material and war supplies including armed forces and ships would divert too much from the Italian front and the proposed OVERLORD operation. However, inquiries could be started on basis of lease by Turkey as a neutral of airbases and transportation facilities.

Sweden should not be asked at this time to make a large system of air bases available to Allied use since the necessary employment of Allied defending forces and Allied war material together with equipment and maintenance supplies and personnel would cause too great a diversion from OVERLORD operations. This would not debar later consideration of seeking lesser air bases from Sweden along the line of those recently obtained in the Azores.³

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² Hull's telegram of October 19. It conveyed the military proposals which had been made by Molotov at the first regular meeting of the Moscow Conference and which are printed *post*, p. 134.

³ For the British-Portuguese agreement of August 17, 1943, on the use of facilities in the Azores, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1946 (vol. 146), p. 447.

740.0011 Moscow/10-2843

United States Delegation Minutes of the Tenth Regular Meeting of the Moscow Conference

SECRET

RECORD OF MEETING OF TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE HELD AT THE GUEST HOUSE OF THE PEOPLES COMMISSARIAT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MOSCOW, ON OCTOBER 28, 1943

The meeting opened at 4 p. m.

MR. MOLOTOV thanked Mr. Hull and Lt.-General Ismay for the above expressed views,¹ in which he himself joins. The meeting, therefore, has a positive value in this respect, and will have its beneficial effect

¹ On the intensity of the planned cross-Channel attack against German forces.

on the populace in the U. S. A., United Kingdom and U. S. S. R. Then Mr. Molotov proposed a decision on the first part of the question put forward by the Soviet delegation, on the shortening of the war against Germany and her allies in Europe. He suggested that a formulation of this decision together with the written reports presented by Lt.-General Ismay and Major-General Deane² be made a part of the protocol of the Conference. The draft decision is to express facts only, to contain nothing not stated at the Conference. There should be a reiteration of statements and a clarification of suggestions which had been brought up. The Soviet delegation expressed the hope that events decided upon for the spring of 1944 will be carried out as planned. Mr. Molotov suggested that the document be drawn up with the British and American views on each point stated on one side of the page, and the Soviet on the other side of the page.

MR. HULL expressed his desire to have this proposal in writing, to avoid misunderstanding and possible suspicion.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that from the beginning he proposed to have these things in writing, and that he sees no grounds either for misunderstanding or suspicion. The Soviet delegation has reason to hope that the measures in draft will be carried out; and would want a generally accepted agreement that we can all count on: Mr. Eden, Mr. Harriman and Mr. Molotov.

MR. EDEN remarked that we have tried to be completely frank, and that after we see the documents, he feels sure a generally acceptable agreement can be worked out. He added that last night when talking with Mr. Molotov and Mr. Stalin, he had told them of the latest developments just as he would have told them to Mr. Churchill.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested passing to the next question.

MR. HULL would want the President and General Staff to look it over first, if anything new was to be inserted into the discussion.

MR. MOLOTOV assured that no new element was contemplated and that it would all be within the limits of the protocol.

MR. HULL remarked that he just didn't want the heads of government and their respective military staffs to think that we at the Conference were trying to take over their functions. Mr. Hull said that he felt that a meeting between the three heads of government would be desirable and that he hoped it was being contemplated.

MR. MOLOTOV remarked that the heads of government and the general staffs have more important business to attend to than what we were considering at the Conference.

MR. HULL said that we came here with the idea of talking about the cross-Channel operation and reiterating our intentions; and that we will continue to inform the Soviet government periodically as to

² *Post*, pp. 137-144.

current developments. In this connection, Mr. Hull said he hoped for mutual understanding.

Mr. Molotov thanked Mr. Hull for this explanation, stating that these were his ideas, too; and that this is the purpose of the Military Mission in Moscow.³

Returning to the question of the formulation of the accomplishments of the Conference, Mr. Molotov reminded us that we all would be asked how the Conference concluded, what answer shall we give? The formulation of the answer should help our common cause. Therefore, a generally accepted statement would be desirable, in a finally agreed form.

Mr. EDEN said we must look it over, and that he thinks we can reach an agreed form. . . .

Intermission

Mr. Molotov then opened for discussion the question of Turkey and Sweden, stating that the communications from Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull had been received.⁴

Mr. EDEN said that he would like very much to see Turkey at war; that on this point his government agrees with the Soviet government. However, the question as to how this could be accomplished remained a question in his mind. A possible method has been suggested. Any other suggestion for any other method would be welcomed, especially if it could bring quicker results than the neutrality to nonbelligerency method.

Mr. Molotov suggested that possibly we should consider Turkey and Sweden separately.

Mr. HULL reiterated the United States suggestion of requesting from Turkey air bases and the use of transportation facilities.

Mr. Molotov observed that so far no agreed opinion has been achieved on this point; that the 3 proposals give the impression of 3 points of view, Mr. Hull suggests that Turkey remain neutral but help the Allies, and that consequently it is not advisable to induce Turkey to enter the war. England's proposal contains many points. To fully consider these would require two more conferences. But there is Mr. Eden's proposal to change Turkey from a neutral to a non-belligerent country. Mr. Eden says it would be useful if Turkey entered the war as soon as possible, but the British government does not think it advisable to suggest to Turkey that she enter the war immediately. Therefore, the Soviet proposal to ask Turkey to enter

³ United States Military Mission, headed by Deane.

⁴ Hull's communication was based on Roosevelt's telegram of October 26, 1943, *supra*; Eden's, on Churchill's telegrams of October 23 and 25, 1943, printed in Churchill, pp. 288 and 289, respectively.

the war immediately does not meet with the support of Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull and their respective governments. The Soviet attitude is that notwithstanding the difficulties indicated by the American and English delegations if Turkey were to enter the war now, nevertheless, the complications facing Hitler would be much greater than any which might develop for the Allies. Time is too short to fully go into the matter. If Turkey's entrance into the war is to be postponed, why should she be receiving shipments of armament? Mr. Molotov suggested that it be announced to Turkey that further shipments of armament will be stopped if she fails to enter the war immediately. Bases, Mr. Molotov contended, would not be enough to request of Turkey at this time. Turkey's participation is needed now; later it will not be so necessary, claimed Mr. Molotov, who concluded that therefore Turkey should be asked to come into the war now. A three-power request to Turkey, Mr. Molotov suggested, would not be disregarded.

MR. EDEN stated that in his opinion the request to Turkey merely on the basis of threatening to stop shipments would not be enough to get the desired result. Mr. Eden expressed a desire to communicate more with his government on this matter; reaffirming his desire to get Turkey into the war now.

MR. HULL pointed out that Turkey has neither the necessary shipping nor supplies that would enable her to proceed efficiently with military movement. Furthermore, there is not enough U. S. shipping available to back up Turkey in a war at this time. He emphasized the already heavy commitments made by U. S. in the Mediterranean and Italy, and in preparation for the coming cross-Channel operations. Mr. Hull suggested that he would be glad to present the whole question for further consideration to the President and the U. S. military authorities.⁵

MR. MOLOTOV reiterated the Soviet position that bases were half-measures not of decisive importance, and that he would rather see Turkey's immediate entry into the war. He added that the Soviet government was particularly interested in results now. The Soviet suggestion, he added, is now in the interest of Turkey as well as of the Soviet Union.

MR. HULL underlined the U. S. opposition to the Soviet proposal, stating that we could not give Turkey the needed support in ships,

⁵ A telegram of October 29, 1943, from Hull to Roosevelt (received at Washington October 31 and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt at Hyde Park) stated, with reference to this discussion of Turkey's role in the war: "I held persistently to the view expressed in your telegram but agreed that the matter might be the subject of further discussions by the Heads of Governments and informed Mr. Molotov that I should be pleased to present the Soviet views to you upon my return. It was agreed that the matter should be dropped during this conference and that the discussions be reported to the Heads of Government with a view to further consideration of the matter at a later date."

armament and supplies because already our operations are very spread out all over the world.

MR. EDEN stated that in regard to Sweden, he had become better informed than previously, and that therefore he had now come to a conclusion counter to his first idea. Swedish airfields could not be used as effectively as existing ones now in the hands of the Allies.

MR. MOLOTOV raised the question of the possible use of Swedish air bases by the Soviet Union air force. The use of Swedish bases he said would be a step ahead compared to the present situation. Perhaps after further consultation with the military authorities, some conclusions may be reached.

Regarding Turkey and Sweden and measures for shortening the war, are there any other proposals? Is there anything else to suggest, if we do not take concrete serious measures concerning the Soviet proposals on this subject? Mr. Molotov emphasised that he still maintains that the matter of shortening the war is in the interest not only of the Soviet government. Admitting that the Soviet proposals may not be sufficiently worked-out or may be considered untimely—are there other proposals?

MR. EDEN stated that air bases in Turkey would be much more valuable than air bases in Sweden. He said he was willing to agree to the American proposal to further consider the question of Swedish air bases; and had nothing further to add to the picture presented by Lt.-General Ismay.

MR. MOLOTOV again stated that bases are too little to require of Turkey. Now that Italy is practically out of the war, Turkey should feel freer to act.

MR. HULL brought up the proposal submitted by Major-General Deane in regard to air bases, meteorological stations, weather information, communications and transport.⁶ Mr. Hull asked if the Russian experts would take up this proposal with Major-General Deane.

MR. MOLOTOV asked if there was any further discussion on proposals for shortening the war. Are there any new proposals?

MR. HULL expressed the belief that if the General Staffs were in closer working relationship and if the heads of our respective governments were in closer cooperation, those questions would come to mind which had to be dealt with, and this would facilitate the conduct of the war more than anything. Mr. Hull said he believed this type of closer cooperation would come about, and that there are gratifying possibilities for the future.

MR. MOLOTOV said that Mr. Hull's considerations are very valuable, but that we do not want to get away from the subject under discussion today. Therefore, let us continue with the question of shortening

⁶ The proposal appears in the most secret protocol, *post*, p. 136.

the war as quickly as possible. Let us confine ourselves to an exchange of views and conclusions which may be drawn. Tomorrow we shall discuss the economic phases of the same general question, at 3 o'clock.⁷

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⁷The economic matters discussed at the meeting of October 29, 1943, concerned Hull's proposals for post-war international economic collaboration, which do not appear to have been referred to the coming Conference of the Heads of Government for consideration. See Hull, vol. II, pp. 1303-1304.

740.0011 Moscow/91 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President and the Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) ¹

SECRET

Moscow, October 29, 1943—midnight.

1784. Secret for the President and the Acting Secretary from the Secretary. DELAM No. 42.

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. . . Molotov . . . turned to the question of the Italian ships. He said that he did not consider that the reply of the United States which I had submitted ² was very satisfactory since to refer this question to a meeting of the three heads of state, which was still very indefinite, would appear to postpone a decision of this matter. I pointed out that in [?] suggesting the reference of the matter to the three heads of state was merely one of the means by which it might be settled and I personally on my return to Washington would be more than glad to take up this question with my government in the event that the meeting of the three heads of state was long delayed.

The Conference then adjourned until tomorrow at four o'clock.

¹ Sent by the Ambassador, Moscow, in the numerical series of telegrams from the Embassy to the Department of State. A copy of the telegram was sent by the Department to the White House and was forwarded by pouch to Roosevelt, who was at Hyde Park October 30-November 3, 1943.

² See Roosevelt's telegram of October 26, 1943, to Hull, *ante*, p. 120. On October 28 Hull informed Molotov of the position set forth in Roosevelt's telegram, and—perhaps in the light of the reference, in the telegram, to the determination of title to the Italian ships “at a later date”—he added, “Further discussion should be held between the staffs of our three Governments, or perhaps by the heads of Governments”; Hull, vol. II, p. 1302. On October 29, 1943, Churchill cabled Eden that “it would be better to put off this question till ‘EUREKA’”; Churchill, p. 295.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 30 October 1943.

URGENT

Personal and secret for the President only from the Secretary of State:

From Molotov's attitude at the Conference and from what he said at a personal visit he paid on me last night I am convinced that the Soviet authorities are bitterly disappointed at our reaction to their request for Italian naval and merchant vessels. My impression is that they desire this shipping as a token to convince their people of our recognition of the part the Soviet forces have played in the collapse of Italy and as an indication that our three countries are collaborating. I believe it is their feeling that they have made every effort to meet us in our proposals in other matters and are at a loss to understand our reluctance to make this, what seems to them, small gesture, particularly as we have not been able to agree to their only two proposals concerning Turkey and Sweden.² I cannot overemphasize the importance they appear to place on the acceptance by us of this request and I believe it would be of great importance in cementing the spirit of cooperation initiated in this conference if an acceptance of their request in principle at least could be given promptly, even though the technical questions would have to be reserved for detailed examination and negotiation.

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt at Hyde Park.

² The two proposals appear in the most secret protocol, *post*, p. 135.

Roosevelt Papers

*Draft Message From the President to the Secretary of State*¹

WASHINGTON, [October 30 (?), 1943.]

TO HULL

Please tell Molotov that my understanding of my [blank] of October 24 [26?] ² relative to disposition of Italian naval ships and merchant ships is as follows quote

One third of naval ships and one third of merchant ships captured from Italy will be turned over to Russia for their use at the earliest possible moment[.] The balance available for British and/or American use.

¹ Written in longhand by Hopkins. For Roosevelt's message of October 30, 1943, to Hull (prepared by Hopkins), which may have been a revision of this draft, see *infra*.

² See *ante*, p. 120.

The final disposition of these ships however will be made by our three countries at the peace conference and meanwhile Russia, Great Britain and ourselves will have the unrestricted right to use this [these] ships as we think best to bring about the defeat of Hitler[.]

I assumed we met the Russian request[.]

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 30 October 1943.

URGENT

Personal and secret for Secretary Hull only from the President.

ALUSNA Moscow 301042.²

I am very much surprised about Molotov's misunderstanding of my message of October 24 [26?]³ relative to disposition of Italian naval ships and merchant ships. I meant to convey that I was in favor of the request of the Russian Government for the use of these ships. The only proviso I made was that the Italian ships which were turned over to our respective countries would be used to prosecute the war against our enemies and that final determination of what would become of these ships would be made at the peace conference.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. A memorandum of October 30, 1943, from the White House Map Room informed Roosevelt, who was at Hyde Park, that this message had been prepared by Hopkins, approved by Leahy, and dispatched.

² Hull's telegram of October 30, 1943, *ante*, p. 127.

³ *Ante*, p. 120.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[HYDE PARK,] 30 October 1943.

URGENT

Personal and secret for the Secretary of State only from the President.

My 302232.²

Final disposition of all Italian ships should apply to those used by British and Americans as well as to those used by Russians.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via the White House Map Room and Navy channels.

² Telegram of October 30, 1943, *supra*.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[HYDE PARK,] 30 October 1943.

URGENT

Personal and secret for the Secretary of State only from the President.

Tell Molotov I am sorry the staff telegram about the Italian ships² was not clear. All I want is that the ships be used for whatever is the most useful war purpose. I hope the Soviet can use their third, and I see no reason why they should not do so. Personally, I think that after the war the Italian tonnage should be distributed equitably for the permanent use of the allies. In the meantime, it ought to be used by the three nations. This is certainly not a time to delay in the use of this tonnage by the three nations. This is what we intended to convey in the staff telegram which I regret was not more clear.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via the White House Map Room and Navy channels.

² Presumably the telegram of October 26, 1943, *ante*, p. 120.

Roosevelt Papers

The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

If your journey should take you to the eastern Mediterranean I believe you may wish to look into the following matters.

1. *The Palestine question.* Kirk and other officers of our Legation at Cairo and at Jerusalem are well informed.

2. *Problems relating to Greece, particularly the Greek King.* Lincoln MacVeagh will have full background on this.

3. *Proposals for Arab Unity.* Kirk will have ample information on that subject.

4. *Continued French Imperialism in Syria and the Lebanon.* The French are showing little disposition to implement their promises of independence. Wadsworth, Diplomatic Agent at Beirut, is well informed on the situation.

5. *Difficulties in Iran.* Dreyfus, our Minister, is coming home on leave within a few days.¹ However, Jernegan, one of the junior secre-

¹ Dreyfus left Tehran with Hull's party (which was returning to Washington from the Moscow Conference) on November 4, 1943. But en route Hull suggested that Dreyfus postpone his leave, and Dreyfus accordingly returned from Marrakech to Tehran, arriving November 12, and resumed charge of the Legation on November 13. (123 D 82/566, 567)

taries at Tehran, is particularly expert and well grounded on the complex Iranian situation. Millspaugh, American Financial Adviser to the Iranian Government could be helpful.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

740.0011 Moscow/346

United States Delegation Minutes of the Final Meeting of the Moscow Conference

SUMMARY OF TWELFTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE TRIPARTITE
CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 30, 4 P. M.

Mr. EDEN stated that he would like to say a few words in regard to points 1 and 4 of the declaration regarding general European responsibility as against spheres of separate responsibility.¹ He said he thought that the principles expressed in points 1 and 4 would be a valuable addition to the work of the Conference if they could be published.

Mr. MOLOTOV said that he had understood that Mr. Eden had withdrawn his proposal on this question, to which Mr. Eden replied that he had in fact withdrawn his suggestion to embody points 1 and 4 in the Four-Nation Declaration² merely to facilitate the final adoption of the latter document.

Mr. LITVINOV then said that in his opinion the principles set forth in points 1 and 4 of the British document in question were already embodied in the Atlantic Charter,³ and since there was no evidence that any of the three powers here was seeking special areas of responsibility or influence he felt that to make a special declaration denying this would give rise to the belief that there had been some such intention on the part of one of the three countries here represented. He also inquired why it was confined only to Europe.

Mr. EDEN answered that he felt that there was greater suspicion in that regard on the part of the small nations of Europe, but added that he did not feel he could press the point if there was any objection.

THE SECRETARY said that he was agreeably disposed toward Mr. Eden's suggestion but he wondered whether there was sufficient time at this closing session of the Conference to consider the question. It was then agreed by the Conference to postpone Mr. Eden's suggestion until the next conference.

¹ *Ante*, p. 116.

² Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, issued at Moscow November 1, 1943; *Decade*, p. 11.

³ August 14, 1941; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1603.

After the signature ⁴ the Conference turned to the question of the report of the Committee on Iran.⁵

MR. EDEN proposed that the Conference refer this question for discussion in Moscow by Mr. Molotov and the British and American Ambassadors on the basis of a resolution on Iran which he presented to the Conference (copy attached).⁶

MR. MOLOTOV said he was agreeable to Mr. Eden's suggestion to refer the question to diplomatic channels but he felt that Tehran might be a more suitable place than Moscow.

THE SECRETARY said that he also felt that Tehran might be more suitable since all materials and data on the subject would be there and the diplomatic representatives of the three countries might be more closely in touch with the local situation. It was agreed that no publicity would be given to the resolution on Iran and that further discussions would take place between the diplomatic representatives of the three powers in Tehran.⁷

⁴ Of the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security.

⁵ For the establishment of this committee, see *ante*, p. 116. For the report of the committee on Iran (quoted, as adopted, in the secret protocol of the Moscow Conference), see *post*, p. 133.

⁶ No copy was attached to the source text. The document under reference was presumably the draft tripartite declaration, *ante*, p. 118.

⁷ According to Hull, vol. II, p. 1506, the three Foreign Ministers agreed at Moscow to recommend that the proposed declaration regarding Iran be considered further at the Conference of the Heads of Government.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt ¹

SECRET

LONDON, 31 October 1943.

Prime Minister to President. Most secret and personal. Number 481.²

2. Your number 403.³ Can you give me a firm date when Marshall will be available, as I see great difficulties in the various stop gap arrangements proposed? The press this morning publishes reports from Washington correspondents that Marshall will be succeeded by Eisenhower and Eisenhower by Alexander. This is of course largely assumed throughout the Mediterranean, but the uncertainty is harm-

¹ Apparently sent to Washington via military channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt at Hyde Park.

² For paragraph 1 of this message, see *ante*, p. 57.

³ In telegram 403, October 30, 1943 (printed in Churchill, p. 304), Roosevelt referred to continuing preparations for the cross-Channel attack, and said, as regards the choice of a commander for the operation, "I cannot make Marshall available immediately". He also suggested the early appointment of a British deputy commander.

ful. If you still hold to your opinion, which I share, about the three chief commands, why cannot we make the announcement jointly and add that the dates of the changes of commands will be fixed in relation to operations? We could then at *SEXTANT* settle together the consequential reactions, which are complicated and important.

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740.0011 Moscow/340

Secret Protocol of the Moscow Conference

[Moscow, November 1, 1943.]

SECRET PROTOCOL

of the Conference attended by the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Anthony Eden, and the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, V. M. Molotov, which was held in Moscow from the 19th to the 30th October, 1943.

The following took part in the Conference:

U. S. A.	Mr. Harriman Major General Deane Mr. Hackworth Mr. Dunn Mr. Bohlen and experts
U. K.	Sir A. Clark Kerr Mr. Strang Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay Mr. Wilson and experts
Soviet Union	Marshal Voroshilov Mr. Vyshinski Mr. Litvinov Mr. Sergeev Major General Gryzlov Mr. Saksin and experts

AGENDA

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Consideration of measures to shorten the duration of the war against Hitlerite Germany and her Allies in Europe. | See the Most Secret Protocol of the Conference. |
|---|---|

(Proposed by U. S. S. R.)

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4. Exchange of views on the situation in Italy and the Balkans.

(Proposed by U. K.)

(c) Proposal of the Soviet Government as regards the transfer to the Soviet Union of part of the Italian Navy (one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers, four submarines) and of the Merchant Fleet (to a total of 40,000 tons) which was at the disposal of the Anglo-American forces as a result of the capitulation of Italy.

10. Common policy in Persia.
(Proposed by U. K.)

(c) Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull did not raise any objection to the proposal of the Soviet Government but reserved their final answer.

The following proposal, which was worked out by a committee appointed by the Conference, was accepted: "(a) After an exchange of views, the Committee detects no fundamental difference in the policy towards Iran of any of the three Governments; (b) the Committee was unable to reach agreement on the expediency of making any immediate declaration or declarations with regard to Iran; and (c) the issue of such a declaration or declarations might be further considered by the representatives of the three Governments in Tehran, with a view to the three Governments coming to a decision about the expediency of issuing such a declaration or declarations after the signature of the proposed Irano-American Agreement and after appropriate consultation with the Government of Iran."

Signed at Moscow, November 1, 1943.

CORDELL HULL
B. МОЛТОВ¹
ANTHONY EDEN

¹ V. Molotov.

740.0011 Moscow/341

Most Secret Protocol of the Moscow Conference

SECRET

[Moscow, November 1, 1943.]

MOST SECRET PROTOCOL

of the Conference between the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. A. Eden, and the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. V. M. Molotov, which took place in Moscow from the 19th through the 30th of October, 1943.

The following took part in the discussions:

For the United States:	Mr. Harriman, Major General Deane, Brigadier General Vandenburg [<i>Vandenberg</i>], Captain Ware.
For the United Kingdom:	Sir A. Clark-Kerr, Lieutenant General Ismay.
For the U. S. S. R.:	Marshal K. E. Voroshilov, A. Ya[.] Vyshinski, Major General Gryzlov.

"THE CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES TO SHORTEN THE DURATION OF THE WAR
AGAINST HITLERITE GERMANY AND HER ALLIES IN EUROPE"

(Proposed by the Soviet Delegation on the 19th October, 1943)

On the question put on the agenda of the Conference of representatives of the Governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov on the 19th October, 1943, made the following proposals which were handed in writing to Mr. Anthony Eden and Mr. Cordell Hull:

"For the purpose of shortening the duration of the war it is proposed:

- (1) To put into effect such urgent measures on the part of the Governments of Great Britain and United States of America in 1943, which will ensure the invasion of Anglo-American armies into Northern France and which, together with the powerful blows of the Soviet forces against the main forces of the German army on the Soviet-German front, must radically undermine the military strategic situation of Germany and lead to a definite shortening of the duration of the war.

In this connection the Soviet Government considers it necessary to determine whether the statement made by Mr.

Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt in the beginning of June, 1943,¹ to the effect that Anglo-American forces will carry out the invasion of Northern France in the spring of 1944, remains in force.

- (2) To propose to the Turkish Government on behalf of the three Powers that Turkey immediately enters the war.
- (3) To propose to Sweden on behalf of the three Powers that she should provide the Allies with air bases for the struggle against Germany."

(a) With regard to point (1) of the proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 19th October 1943, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, Mr. Eden, and the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Hull, on the 20th October 1943, endorsed the statement made by the British Lt-General Ismay and the American Major-General Deane (see appendices: statement of Lt-General Ismay and statement of Major-General Deane) as being an accurate presentation of the most recent decisions of their Governments, taken at the Quebec Conference in August 1943.²

With regard to the question put by the Soviet Delegation: whether the statement made by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt in the beginning of June, 1943, to the effect that Anglo-American troops will carry out the invasion of Northern France in the spring of 1944, remains in force, Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull gave an affirmative reply declaring that the decision to undertake the invasion of Northern France in the

The People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, stated that the Soviet Government take note of Mr. Eden's and Mr. Hull's statements, as well as of the statements of Lt-General Ismay and Major-General Deane, and express the hope that the plan of invasion by Anglo-American troops of Northern France in the spring of 1944, contained in these statements, will be carried out on time.

¹ Roosevelt to Stalin, reporting the strategy decisions agreed upon with Churchill at the Third Washington Conference; *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 67, document 90.

² The records of the First Quebec Conference are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

spring of 1944 had been reaffirmed at the recent conference in Quebec, subject to the conditions quoted by General Ismay in his statement. Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull added that this decision has not been changed and that preparations to carry out the above mentioned operation are being pressed forward as rapidly as possible.

(b) With regard to points (2) and (3) of the proposals of the Soviet Delegation (regarding Turkey and Sweden)

(c) The United States delegates placed the following proposals before the conference.

(1) That, in order to effect shuttle bombing of industrial Germany, bases be made available in the U. S. S. R. on which U. S. aircraft could be refueled, emergency repaired, and re-armed.

(2) That more effective mutual interchange of weather information be implemented. In order to effect this, it is essential that means of communication between the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. be strengthened.

(3) That air communication between these two countries be improved.

Mr. Hull, Mr. Eden, and V. M. Molotov recognize the desirability of the Governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom and Soviet Union continuing to study the question of Turkey and Sweden.

V. M. Molotov said that the U. S. S. R. agrees to the United States proposals in principle and that the appropriate Soviet authorities will be given instructions to meet with Generals Deane and Vandenberg for the consideration of concrete measures which would be necessary to carry out these proposals.

CORDELL HULL
B. МОЛОТОВ³
ANTHONY EDEN

1st Nov 1943

³ Molotov.

[Appendix 1]

Statement Made at the Moscow Conference by the Chief of Staff to the British Minister of Defence (Ismay)

SECRET

STATEMENT MADE BY LT. GEN. ISMAY BEFORE TRI-PARTITE CONFERENCE
ON OCTOBER 20TH, 1943

I am instructed to address myself to the following proposal put forward by the Soviet Delegation:—

“In order to shorten the duration of the war it is being proposed:

That the Governments of Great Britain and the U. S. A. take in 1943 such urgent measures as will ensure the invasion of Northern France by Anglo-American armies and, coupled with powerful blows of Soviet troops on the main German forces on the Soviet-German front, will radically undermine the military-strategical situation of Germany and bring about a decisive shortening of the duration of the war.

In this connection the Soviet Government deems it necessary to ascertain whether the statement made in early June, 1943, by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt to the effect that Anglo-American forces will undertake the invasion of Northern France in the spring of 1944 remains valid.”

The answer to both the points raised by the Soviet Delegation is provided by the decisions taken at the recent Anglo-American Conference at Quebec, which was presided over by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain and attended by the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries. Thus I shall be speaking on behalf of the American Delegation as well as the British Delegation; but my American colleague, General Deane, will, I hope, interrupt if I say anything with which he does not agree, and will in any case amplify and explain those matters which are predominantly American interests.

Let me say at the outset in all truth that at every single Anglo-American Conference since we have been in the war together, the thought uppermost in all our minds has been so to arrange our affairs as to ensure the maximum possible diversion of enemy land and air forces from the Russian front. I do not for a moment suggest that in so doing we have thought only of Soviet interests. On the contrary, it has been unanimously and invariably recognized as the soundest strategy in the interests of the Allies as a whole. Let me also say that the urgency of the business has always been present in our minds. Thus the following resolution was adopted at one of our earliest Conferences and was absolutely confirmed less than two months ago at Quebec:—

The overall objective is—

“In co-operation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date repeat at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis *in Europe*.”

I should not, however, like to be inferred that we can concentrate the whole of our combined resources against the Axis *in Europe*. It is essential for us to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan for the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. If the Conference so desires, further information on this subject will be furnished by General Deane.

I now turn to describe the decisions taken at Quebec as to the operations to be undertaken in 1943–44 for the defeat of the Axis powers in Europe. First, there is the bomber offensive. I mention this first, as not only does it come first in chronological order, but it is an essential prerequisite to the invasion of North West Europe. It was decided that the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital lines of communication and the reduction of German air combat strength by the prosecution on an ever increasing scale of the day and night bomber offensive against Germany and German Occupied Europe from all convenient bases, should continue to have the highest strategic priority.

As is well known, the American Air Force stationed in the United Kingdom carry out precision bombing by day whenever the weather is suitable, while the British Royal Air Force concentrate more particularly on area bombing against German war industry by night. The prodigious scale of the damage which has already been done is not generally recognized. The American Delegation have therefore brought with them an officer who can give as full details as the Conference may desire of the effects of the day bombing, while the British Delegation have similarly brought with them an officer who can unfold the story of the British night bombing offensive. The graph which I now pass round ⁴ shows the steadily mounting weight of bombs that have been cast on German war industry by the Royal Air Force alone during the past few months. In August alone it amounted to over 20,000 tons. The graph also shows by way of contrast, the weight of bombs cast on England when the whole weight of the German Air Force was concentrated on us.

It is also to be noted that this combined bomber offensive is to be prosecuted from all convenient bases. It is hoped that shortly we will be in possession of airfields in the vicinity of Rome, which will enable us to attack important war industries in Southern Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Rumania with almost the same intensity that we

⁴ Not found with the source text.

have been attacking Northern Germany during the past year. These industries have hitherto been out of reach or at extreme range.

I now turn to the cross-Channel operation which it has been decided to undertake in 1944. It has been decided that the invasion of Northern France by Anglo-American forces will be the primary U. S./British ground and air effort against the Axis in Europe in 1944. This invasion is to be launched as soon as practicable after weather conditions in the English Channel become favourable.

The scale of the initial assault is to a large extent dictated by the quantity of special assault shipping and special landing craft which is available when the time comes. Both in the United States and in the United Kingdom the greatest efforts are being made to increase the production of these vital craft. The recent success of the anti-submarine campaign has enabled us to take the risk of turning over a larger part of our shipbuilding capacity to the construction of this type of vessel. It is to be remembered that these special craft are essential not only for the assault itself, but for maintaining and reinforcing the invading armies across open beaches until such time as deep water ports have been captured and put into order. At a conservative estimate, it is calculated that we will have to maintain and reinforce over the beaches for a period of two or three months. It is for this reason, apart from any other, that it is a physical impossibility to undertake the operation in the period of winter storms. Comparatively settled weather is essential.

I cannot yet give details of the scale of the initial assault as this is still under urgent and detailed examination, but our plans and preparations are based on being able to get about 18 divisions ashore after 14 days, together with an appropriate strength of supporting aircraft. After 90 days we hope to have 30 divisions ashore, again with an appropriate strength of supporting air formations. Thereafter three to five divisions per month will be sent from the United States direct to the theatre of operations.

The German strength in France and the Low Countries is estimated at 40 divisions at the present time, including coastal, G. A. F. and training divisions. The beach and coast defences of France and the low Countries have been built up over the long period of German occupation. Our experience at Dieppe⁵ showed without any doubt that, even to gain a footing in North West Europe, is a most formidable operation. Moreover, the enemy disposes of excellent lateral communications across Europe which enable him to move reinforcements to the West by road and rail far quicker than we could reinforce our

⁵ Allied raid on the German-held port of Dieppe, France, on August 19, 1942, in which, as Churchill told the House of Commons on September 30, 1942, Allied losses "went up to nearly half the total force".

initial lodgments by sea. The enemy rate of reinforcement is thus limited by the availability of his forces and not by his communications.

In view of the above, it was agreed at Quebec that certain conditions must be present for the invasion to have a reasonable prospect of success. We are fairly confident that these conditions will be fulfilled.

First, there must be a substantial reduction in the strength of the German fighter force in North West Europe between now and the date of the assault. It is expected that the ever increasing Anglo-American bomber offensive will produce this result.

The second condition is that the German reserves in France and the Low Countries as a whole must not be more on the day of the assault than about 12 full strength, first quality, mobile divisions. This is of course exclusive of coastal, training and German Air Force divisions. Furthermore, it must not be possible for the Germans to transfer from other fronts more than 15 first quality divisions during the first two months of the operations.

It is hoped that these conditions may be rendered possible by the following:—

- (I) The softening effect of the Anglo-American bomber forces.
- (II) The maintenance of unremitting pressure by Anglo-American land and air forces in Italy.
- (III) Allied landings in Southern France—threatened or actual, synchronizing with the invasion of Northern France.
- (IV) Operations in the Balkans by guer[r]illa forces which will be sustained by sea and by air.
- (V) And lastly, but of course by far the most important of all, co-ordinated pressure on the Eastern front by the Soviet forces.

The third condition is that the problem of beach maintenance of large forces in the tidal waters of the English Channel over a prolonged period must be overcome. The success of our plans depends on our ability to construct at least two artificial ports. The experiments which have been pursued for some time hold out good promise.

I now turn to the decisions covering operations in Italy. These were conceived in three phases.

- (I) *First phase:*
The elimination of Italy as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the Rome area and, if feasible, further north;
- (II) *Second phase:*
Seizure of Sardinia and Corsica;
- (III) *Third phase:*
The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in Northern Italy and the creation of the conditions required for the cross-Channel assault and of a situation favorable

for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the re-equipped French Army and Air Force, into Southern France.

It is to be particularly noted that operations in Italy are to be carried out by the forces already in the Mediterranean theatre. Seven U. S. and British battle-tried divisions are to be brought back in the near future from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom in order to form the spearhead for the assault across the Channel. These are divisions which have had experience in amphibious warfare. It has been laid down that, wherever there is a shortage of resources of any kind, the governing principle will be that they will be distributed and employed with the main object of ensuring the success of the invasion of Northern France.

The operations described above will stretch our resources to the limit. It has therefore been decided that Operations in the Balkan area will be limited to the supply of the Patriot Armies by air and sea transport, to minor Commando forces and to the bombing of strategic objectives.

That concludes my survey of the decisions taken at Quebec. It remains to say a few words about the urgent measures which are being taken to give effect to these plans. In the first place, U. S. divisions are being concentrated in the United Kingdom at the greatest rate that shipping resources allow, and their training in amphibious operations pressed forward vigorously. General Deane will elaborate this point. Secondly, United States air forces in the United Kingdom are being reinforced at the greatest possible rate. General Deane will also speak on this point. Thirdly, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the United Kingdom is being turned into one vast airfield. Fourthly, a cross-Channel invasion on the scale contemplated against long prepared defences, manned by German troops, is an operation of a character which has never before been attempted in the history of war. It requires most extensive and elaborate administrative preparations at the ports of embarkation and on the lines of communication leading to the ports. All these measures are being pressed forward with the greatest vigour.

[Appendix 2]

*Statements Made at the Moscow Conference by the United States
Military Observer at the Conference (Deane)*

SECRET

STATEMENTS MADE BY MAJOR GENERAL J. R. DEANE, U. S. A., BEFORE
CONFERENCE 20 OCTOBER 1943.

In the first proposal submitted by the Soviet delegates they recommended that urgent measures be undertaken in 1943 which would

insure an invasion of Northern France. I should like to outline some of the measures that are now under way.

In the first place we consider the combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom as being by far the most positive and important preparation for a cross-channel operation. In this connection we should welcome an opportunity to make a complete presentation to you gentlemen, and to such others as you may wish, which would give a comprehensive picture of what has been accomplished in the bomber offensive and what is planned for the future. As a preview to this presentation I have asked General Vandenberg to present pictures⁶ of our most recent bombing operation against Marienburg. Target in this instance was the Focke-Wulf aircraft factory. It was moved to Marienburg by the Germans for security reasons. Its destruction was almost complete. This particular picture was selected as an illustration because the objective was the most distant from the United Kingdom that has been attacked thus far and also it is the closest to the Soviet front. (At this point General Vandenberg displayed several pictures of bombing operations and explained their significance.)

As I have said, our most urgent preparation for a cross-channel operation is the bomber offensive of the British-American air forces from the United Kingdom and from the Mediterranean. The mission of the offensive is the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic systems, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. It is estimated that the bomber offensive shall be far enough advanced by 1 May 1944 to permit the release of its entire strength to support a cross-channel operation. The build-up of the force necessary for the bomber operations will be, for the most part, accomplished by the addition of United States formations. At the present time the United States has in the neighborhood of 20 Groups of 4-engined heavy bombers in the United Kingdom. It is planned that this force will be expanded to approximately 48 Groups or approximately 2,300 aircraft by 1 April 1944. Planned fighter aircraft expansion will be from approximately 9 Groups at present in the United Kingdom to 31 Groups by 1 April 1944. This should amount to approximately 2,300 fighter aircraft by that date. The R. A. F. strength will be about the same and the existing formations will be maintained and kept at full operation strength.

The expansion indicated above is progressing on schedule, the necessary ground installations are being constructed, the ground crews and the operating personnel are being assembled. In order to furnish fighter support for the cross-channel operation it is necessary that approximately 100 additional airfields be constructed in Southern

⁶ Not found with the source text or in associated files.

England. This construction is underway and will be completed prior to the time the operation is launched.

The cross-channel operation agreed upon calls for a build-up of 30 mobile infantry and armored divisions to be in the United Kingdom by April 1944. This force will include appropriate corps, armies, and service troops and will be utilized for securing the initial bridge-head.

The build-up of the ground and air force in Britain will necessitate transporting more than one million men from the United States to Great Britain in the next seven or eight months. This will require the unloading of 400 personnel ships and over 1,000 cargo vessels in the United Kingdom during that period. To do so will tax the port capacity of Britain to the utmost and require that it be diverted exclusively to this purpose.

Approximately 3,300 assault ships and craft will be necessary for the operation. To obtain these the landing craft program has been expanded 35% in the United States despite resulting dislocation in the over-all production program.

It must be expected that German forces will accomplish almost complete destruction of German port facilities in France prior to their capture. It will therefore be necessary to support the operation initially over the beaches, a condition which will probably exist for the first 90 days of the occupation. In the early stages it is estimated that 15,000 tons of supplies per day will be necessary. This figure will increase as the operation expands.

I have presented but a few of the preparations that are now being made. I have selected them because they are of major importance, but as you know for an operation of the magnitude contemplated there are a great many others. The military mission of the United States in Moscow is authorized to keep the Soviet thoroughly informed as to the progress of our preparations. It is hoped that this mission will be utilized as a medium for closer collaboration between our respective staffs.

With a view to measures which might be adopted for hastening the conclusion of the war against Germany I have been authorized to make certain proposals which I shall read and then distribute the translation of them for your information. The proposals are as follows:

That, in order to effect shuttle bombing of industrial Germany, bases be made available in the U. S. S. R. on which U. S. aircraft could be refueled, emergency repaired, and rearmed.

That more effective mutual interchange of weather information be implemented. In order to effect this, that U. S. A. and U. S. S. R. communications be strengthened.

That improved air transport be effected between the two countries.⁷

Later, in response to a question presented by Mr. Molotov as to the validity of the decision for a cross-channel operation I made the following statement:

The decision to undertake a cross-channel operation in the spring of 1944 was reaffirmed at the last conference in Quebec. Now it must be understood that such decision, as is the case with any military decision made far in advance, is subject to certain conditions existing at the time the operation is to take place. The conditions in this case have been stated to you. We confidently feel that these conditions will exist and are proceeding with full scale preparations to launch the attack. One can only appreciate the firmness of the decision by witnessing the intensive spirit with which preparations are now being carried out. I have spoken previously of the landing craft program which has recently been expanded in the United States. The effects of such a readjustment are felt not only in England but throughout the breadth of the United States including the California coast. Such a change in production effects [*affects*] the shipyards along the coast and the engine manufacturers in the middle west. It is inconceivable that such dislocation of industry would be permitted if the intention to launch the operation was questionable.

⁷ Here ends the basic statement made by Deane at the meeting of October 20, 1943. The next three lines, introducing Deane's further statement made at the same meeting, were presumably written by Deane when the appendices to the most secret protocol were being prepared.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 1 November 1943.

OP[ERATIONAL] PRIORITY

Personal and secret for the President from the Secretary of State.

Mr. Eden sent me today a cable which he had dispatched to the Prime Minister covering the points of his conversation with Molotov on the Turkish question yesterday afternoon 31 Oct. as follows.

From the Secretary of State for the Prime Minister.

1. Molotov and I discussed the Turkish question this afternoon. Ismay and the Ambassador² were with me.

2. Our urgent need for airfields in southwest Anatolia was explained by me and later Ismay developed this point in detail. I explained that I was prepared to see the Turkish Foreign Minister in Cairo on my return journey to the United Kingdom and inform him that we required (a) immediate use of airfields; and (b) authority to pass submarines in company with two or three merchant ships carrying important stores into Black Sea.

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt at Hyde Park.

² Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

I should tell him if he were not to concede these points at once that our supply of arms and equipment would stop forthwith. I said that this would be a first step only and if Turkish acquiescence did not involve her in war with Germany we should be prepared to consider within a month the [idea of?]³ presenting Turkey with a formal demand on part of Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United States to enter war immediately.

3. Molotov disagreed with this sort of approach. Why should time be wasted with relatively trivial matters such as bases when it was our right to insist that Turkey immediately enter war as a full partner and it was her duty to comply.

4. The first two sentences of your paragraph two⁴ were quoted textually to Molotov without moving him. He reiterated again and again that if our three countries were really determined that Turkey should enter the war she would have no choice; and he stressed the fact that while the Conference had for the most part gone exceedingly well, to his military colleagues it had been a bitter disappointment that not one suggestion presented by the Russian Delegation for shortening the war had been approved; and also that alternative proposals to that end had not been put forward by either the Americans or ourselves. Obviously he felt that this was a sore which might fester once the good effects of the Conference had worn off. Why could it not be decided here and at once that it was desirable for Turkey to come into the war now. Once that principle was accepted our tactics could be considered further.

5. I replied that our Government was in complete agreement that before the end of the year Turkey should enter the war, and that I was prepared to sign at once on the dotted line to that effect. Question of tactics was only difference between us. He wanted only one bite on cherry while I wanted two. I [dwelt?]³ further on fact that in southwest Anatolia airfields were urgently needed for our operations, not only to prevent a disaster at Eros [*Leros?*] and Damos [*Samos?*], but also to make it possible for us to capture and support Rhodes which we felt was the key to the Aegean and would lead to substantial results; and I pointed out that if we were to make a formal demand to Turkey to enter the war and she were to refuse there was a danger that we would not only have gained nothing but also would have lost all chance for airfields.

6. Obviously Molotov was pleased by my statement that we shared fully the Russian view that Turkey should be brought into war this year; but he did not agree to my argument that if we attempted to rush things our air bases might be lost. "In any case" he said "let us agree as far as the principle is concerned and later work out the tactics." I agreed to this and stated that I would give much to be able to put the coping stone on the Conference's work by arriving at an agreement on Turkish problem. Tomorrow afternoon I shall see him again.

³ Garbled group or groups.

⁴ Various messages from Churchill to Eden regarding Turkey, dated during the Moscow Conference, are printed in Churchill, pp. 285 ff. It is not clear, however, that any of the messages printed in that source is the one referred to here.

7. During discussion Molotov asked if American Delegation would go with us in this matter. I replied that I could not say for sure. As a matter of fact Hull and I had had a talk before by [my] meeting with Molotov and he indicated that he was in favor of the line I proposed to take with the Russians. End of Eden's message.

I have replied to Mr. Eden as follows

"My Dear Mr. Eden Thank you for your letter of Oct 31st enclosing a memorandum of your conversation with Mr. Molotov on the afternoon of October 31st on subject of Turkey.

I am quote [*quite?*] glad to have benefit of your enclosure. While as I stated to you some days ago I should be glad to see a full examination and if necessary reexamination of the Turkish matter in the direction of Turkey[']s entry into the war, I must repeat what I stated to you and Mr. Molotov during the earlier stages of the discussion of Turkey, that the Government at Washington must make the decision. I shall therefore be glad to acquaint my Government with the scope and nature of your conversation with Mr. Molotov on yesterday in which you propose more advanced and expeditious steps than theretofore. Sincerely yours Cordell Hull" End letter.

Mr. Eden called on me this afternoon to acquaint me with a further conversation he had today with Molotov in which he again urgently asked for agreement that the British bring pressure on the Turks to give them use of air bases. He explained that he had had word from Prime Minister that unless this privilege was forthcoming from the Turks promptly it would be impossible to hold Leros.

Molotov continued to object but after a long discussion they finally came to following agreement.

Soviet Govt would approve the British immediate demands on Turkey for the air bases and Eden agreed that British Govt would join with Russia at a later date to bring pressure on Turkey to come into war before end of year.

Molotov asked whether I would join in this and add it as a part of the Conference understandings. I explained to Mr. Eden that I had no authority to join in such an agreement. Eden has undertaken to explain this to Molotov. If there is time Eden will put his verbal agreement with Molotov into memorandum form.

You may wish to reexamine this question from the standpoint of Turkey's entry into the war. Politically I would favor this. Since the British and Russians are going forward with the matter you may wish to send instructions to Harriman.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 2 November 1943.

URGENT

Most secret for the President only from Hull

A message has been given me from the person highest in authority to be delivered to you personally in extreme secrecy. The message promises to get in and help to defeat the enemy.

Remainder follows in another code.²

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² Hull wrote, in his *Memoirs*, vol. II, p. 1311: "The information Stalin had given me on his decision regarding Japan I regarded as so secret that I sent one-half of it to the President over the Navy code and the other half over the Army code."

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 2 November 1943.

Unnumbered. Most secret for the President only from Hull.

In the far East after German defeat (this ends a message in another code). Please flash acknowledgement to me at Cairo.²

¹ Sent via Army channels.

² A telegram referring to this message, reading "Acknowledged", and bearing the typewritten signature "Roosevelt" is in the Roosevelt Papers, but it does not bear the usual indications of having actually been sent.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*¹

SECRET

Moscow, [2 November 1943.]²

URGENT

Personal and secret for the President from Harriman. Part 1 of 022307.

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. Part 1, received on November 3, 1943, was forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt at Hyde Park. The remainder, headed "Part two and three", was received on November 4, after Roosevelt had returned to Washington.

² This message was apparently written late in the evening on November 2, 1943. It was put on the wires at 11:07 p. m., November 2, Greenwich time (i. e., early on November 3, Moscow time).

Referring to the Secretary's cable to you 012215³ Molotov and Eden initialed last night their agreement regarding Turkey substantially as follows:

"It is agreed between the Foreign Secretaries of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom as follows:⁴

First: In order that Turkey may take her part with the United Nations in hastening the defeat of Hitlerite Germany in which Turkey and other freedom loving states are interested, the two Foreign Secretaries think it most desirable that Turkey should enter the war on the side of the United Nations before the end of 1943.

Second: It is agreed between the two Foreign Secretaries that on behalf of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Governments it should be suggested to Turkey at the earliest possible date, to be agreed upon between them, that before the end of 1943 Turkey should enter the war.

Third: It is further agreed that a request should immediately be made of Turkey to give to the United Nations all possible aid by placing at the disposal of the Allied Forces Turkish air bases and such other facilities as may be agreed upon as desirable by the two Governments."

(Part two and three of ALUSNA Moscow's 022307)

About midnight last night I took the protocol papers of the Conference,⁵ previously signed by Mr. Hull, to Molotov's office where he and Eden then signed. During the discussion that followed Molotov expressed to me his satisfaction with the understanding he had reached with Eden regarding Turkey and hoped that we would agree to make it tripartite. I told him that Mr. Hull had informed you for your consideration of the discussions between himself and Eden. Tonight at the ballet Molotov asked me whether any word had been received from Washington on this subject. I explained of course that there had not yet been time for a reply and, in order to be relieved of daily pressure from Molotov I stated that I did not know whether you would wish to express an opinion until you had had an opportunity to discuss the matter in detail with Mr. Hull. Molotov seemed disappointed that there should be such a long delay and expressed the hope that a reply could be given sooner. There is no doubt they place great importance on Turkey's entry into the war and have been unimpressed by our reasons for not being favorable to it. Eden told me that the Prime Minister had approved the agreement reached with

³ Telegram of November 1, 1943, *ante*, p. 144.

⁴ In the source text, the three paragraphs which follow are given in reverse order and are preceded by a statement to the effect that they are in reverse order. They are, however, given in the correct order in the message as forwarded to Roosevelt by the Map Room, and they are printed in the correct order here.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 132-144.

Molotov and that he expected to see the Turkish Foreign Minister⁶ with a senior staff officer in Cairo on Thursday.⁷ He would insist on immediate use of the air bases and if he found the opportunity was propitious, he might sound him out on the subject of full entry in the war. Eden states they have no intention of giving the Turks any additional assistance beyond the arms now being shipped and the small fighter force they expect to move from the Middle East. If you are not prepared to take a definite position on this matter at the present time, I believe it would be helpful in our relations if you were to instruct me to inform Molotov of this and an indication of the time you wish to take before reaching a decision.

⁶ Numan Menemencioglu.

⁷ November 4, 1943.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 2 November 1943.

URGENT

(Secret for the President from the Secretary of State)

I have advised Molotov that sympathetic consideration is being given in Washington to the request of the Soviet Government for certain Italian naval and merchant vessels² and that as a result I believed the matter could be worked out to their satisfaction. I further indicated that I would recommend the matter be concluded in all of its aspects as early as practicable.³

Mr. Eden had received a cable from the Prime Minister favoring acceptance of the request in principle but raising a number of questions such as reservation of the two *Littorio* class battleships, reconditioning that would be necessary, and the actual use to which the ships would be put.

Considering the above and the fact that Molotov seems satisfied for the present with our general replies I have thought it unwise for me to say more than I have as it will involve me in technical matters with which I am not familiar and in my judgement would complicate rather than help the final amicable settlement of the matter. It seems to me that, since this is a matter of combined British-American interests, joint instructions should be sent to our Ambassadors for transmission to Mr. Molotov.

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² For the request, see *ante*, p. 112. For Roosevelt's three telegrams of October 30, 1943, to Hull, to which the present telegram may be the reply, see *ante*, pp. 128-129.

³ Hull's note to Molotov, summarized here, was dated November 1, 1943 (740.0011 Moscow/342).

The instructions should authorize them to inform Molotov that the Soviet request for the use of Italian merchant and naval vessels has been approved subject to such reservations as may be considered appropriate.

They should also be authorized to suggest at the same time that representatives of the naval staffs of the three countries meet at, say Algiers, to work out the arrangements necessary for completing the transaction.

I feel strongly that any question of one-third of the fleet being given to the Soviets should not be opened at this time but that the discussion be confined to the acceptance of the specific Russian request. Opening up the discussion to a proportionate division of the fleet would, in my view, lead to serious complications. If at a later date we find the Russians can use additional ships, it might then be to our advantage to offer them voluntarily the specific number and types we believe would be useful. This should only be done after careful consideration of the numbers and types that they have the capacity to use and maintain.

It is the opinion of our naval officers here that the Soviet Government have been modest in their request because of their inability to employ additional vessels and that they would feel embarrassed if they were faced with the necessity of admitting that they did not have the ability to utilize at the present time their full one-third share.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

[WASHINGTON,] 3 November 1943.

C. C. S. 387

MEDITERRANEAN COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

1. The British Chiefs of Staff have been considering the present system of command in the Mediterranean under which General Eisenhower is responsible for operations in the Central Mediterranean and the Commander in Chief, Middle East, for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans.

2. They point out that the success or failure in one Mediterranean theater has an immediate effect upon the other theater. The present system whereby all transfers of even small forces have to be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, involves delays which are likely to lead to failure to take advantage of fleeting opportunities as has been illustrated by recent events in the Aegean. The restoration of our control of the Mediterranean has removed the necessity for two naval commands.

3. The British Chiefs of Staff therefore consider that the time has come for one Commander to be made responsible for all operations in the Mediterranean and suggest that the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, should now assume responsibility for operations in the following areas in addition to those already in his command, Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Crete, Aegean Islands and Turkey. The three Commanders in Cairo would be under his orders for these operations, but would remain responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff for operation of the Middle East base and for all matters pertaining to those parts of the present Middle East Commands situated in Africa, Asia and Levant (except Turkey) and should continue to receive political guidance from the Minister of State resident in the Middle East ¹ in respect of these responsibilities.

4. Such reorganization would insure that operations in the Mediterranean are regarded as a whole and would empower the Commander in Chief to transfer forces from one part of the area to another in order to take advantage of fleeting opportunities. The British Chiefs of Staff consider this particularly desirable in view of possible opportunities in the Balkans and the effect that operations in that theater might have on the main operations in Italy.

5. On Air Marshal Tedder's recommendation the British Chiefs of Staff would like to suggest that the Mediterranean Air Command should be renamed Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

6. The views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on these proposals are requested. A diagram of the proposals is attached as an enclosure.²

¹ Richard Casey.

² Not printed herein.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 4, 1943.

#407 President to Prime

This government agrees to join Great Britain and Soviet in making immediate demand on Turkey for use of air bases and later pressing Turkey to enter the war before the end of the year² subject to the following: No British or American resources will be committed to the Eastern Mediterranean area which in the opinion of the commanders responsible are necessary for OVERLORD or for operations in Italy.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated. A paraphrase of this message was sent to Harriman at Moscow on the same date, via Navy channels.

² See Hull's telegram of November 1, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 144.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 4 November 1943.

Personal and secret Winant to The President.

.....²

Last week end Smuts and I were with the Prime Minister at Chequers. The withdrawing of landing craft from the Italian zone of action, the possibility of destruction by the rocket guns, the Greek islands, and the timing of the second front all troubled him. I think you will find that the Staff meetings will develop differences of immediate and future military planning that need to be settled.

¹ Apparently sent via military channels.

² For a further excerpt from this telegram, see *ante*, p. 64.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*¹

SECRET

MOSCOW, 4 November 1943.

URGENT

(Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.)

Now that I have had a chance to take a long breath I thought you would want from me a review of the more important impressions of the Soviet attitude we got in and outside of the conference room. Certain of the doubts which some people have had regarding Soviet intentions are now laid to rest. On the other hand the character of certain real difficulties that exist has been more sharply defined.

(1) The Soviet Government before they agreed to the Conference had evidently decided that they would take a shot at working together with the British and ourselves in dealing with war and postwar problems. On the whole the Soviets are delighted with the way the Conference went and it has strengthened their tentative decision. It was interesting to watch how Molotov expanded as the days passed. As he began to realize more and more that we had not come with a united front against him and were ready to expose frankly our preliminary thoughts, he showed increasing enjoyment in being admitted for the first time into the councils as a full member with the British and ourselves. Before the Conference I doubt if they had any intention of allowing the inclusion of China as an original signatory

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels, in six sections, beginning on November 4, 1943. The entire text, except paragraphs 4 and 5, had been received in Washington by November 6. The section containing those two paragraphs was delayed in transit and was not received in Washington until November 9. The source text bears the notation "Sent to State for information".

of the Four Nation Declaration.² Their acceptance of China is a clear indication that they are genuinely satisfied with the way things went and are ready to make important concessions to further the new intimacy. On the other hand it cannot be assumed that this policy is already so set that we can take liberties with them.

(2) They were unquestionably chagrined by the British and our attitude re Turkey and to a lesser extent regarding Sweden.³ Eden's final understanding with them on Turkey⁴ helped to offset their early disappointment but they are expectantly hopeful that we will join in this agreement at an early date. I am convinced, however, that only Turkey's entry into the war will satisfy them. Without coming to Moscow it is hard to appreciate how differently they view the war from the British and ourselves. The Russians have the primitive view that they have suffered and bled to destroy Hitler and see no reason why the Turks should not do the same if it can help shorten the war. They honestly believe that the entry of Turkey will force the Germans to move a considerable number of divisions from the Eastern front. In posing this demand they are entirely indifferent to any moral or actual obligation to assist the Turks in fighting the Germans. Our attitude in this regard is inexplicable to them. The Russians feel that only if the Turks actively fight against Germany now are they entitled to any consideration in the post-war scheme of things. To a somewhat modified degree they feel the same way about the Swedes. In addition to the military value of the entry of these countries into the war, they believe that closing in on Germany from all sides will hasten the deterioration of enemy morale.

The early misunderstanding about the ships⁵ was a disappointment. They feel all right about it now, provided some definite conclusion is reached in the near future. The above were the only two matters of importance not concluded in principle to their satisfaction. (Your cable⁶ accepting the Soviet proposal regarding Turkey has arrived just as I was dispatching this message to you, and will, I know, be tremendously well received.[])]

(3) The Soviets accepted the explanation of our military plans but our whole permanent relations depend in a large measure on their satisfaction in the future with out [*our*] military operations. It is impossible to over-emphasize the importance they place strategically on the initiation of the so-called "Second Front" next spring . . .⁷

² Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, issued at Moscow November 1, 1943; *Decade*, p. 11.

³ See Roosevelt's telegram of October 26, 1943, to Hull, *ante*, p. 121.

⁴ See Harriman's telegram 022307, November 2, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 147.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 128.

⁶ See Roosevelt's telegram 407, November 4, 1943, to Churchill, *ante*, p. 151, footnote 1.

⁷ For the sentences which are omitted here, see *ante*, p. 65.

(4) Their attitude toward Germany as revealed at the Conference is fundamentally satisfactory. There is of course no doubt that they are bent in [on] the complete destruction of Hitler and Nazism. They are ready to deal with Germany on the basis of a three-way responsibility. Our difficulties with them, if any, will be that their present intent toward Germany is tougher than we have in mind, particularly in regard to the magnitude of reparations. Their measure of Germany's capacity to pay reparations in goods and services appears to be based on the concept that the Germans are not entitled to a postwar standard of living higher than the Russians. They definitely did not exclude the possibility of an enforced dismemberment of Germany and are certainly determined to make sure that there will be no military threat from that quarter in any foreseeable future. They convinced me that any public references coming from Moscow or from the free Germany committee showing friendliness to the German people is just propaganda to weaken German resistance.

(5) Their flirtation with the French committee appears to have cooled off as a result of their satisfaction with their new intimacy with the British and ourselves. It may of course be revived if the development of these new relationships is not to their satisfaction.

(6) Although Soviet territorial questions were never raised at the Conference, it can only be inferred that the Soviet Government expects to stand firmly on the position they have already taken in regard to their 1941 frontiers. I believe they have the impression that this has been tacitly accepted by the British, and the fact that we did not bring up the issue may have given them the impression that we would not raise serious objection in the future.

(7) The problem of Poland is even tougher than we believed. They regard the present Polish Government-in-Exile as hostile, and therefore completely unacceptable to them. They are determined to recognize only a Polish government that will be a whole-heartedly friendly neighbor. On the other hand, Molotov told me definitely that they were willing to have a strong independent Poland, giving expression to whatever social and political system the Polish people wanted. They gave us no indication during the Conference that they were interested in the extension of the Soviet system. I take this with some reservation, particularly if it proves to be the only way they can get the kind of relationships they demand from their western border states.

They are determined to have no semblance of the old "cordon sanitaire" concept in eastern Europe. Molotov told me that the relations they expect to establish with the border countries did not preclude equally friendly relationships with the British and ourselves. In the Conference, however, it was indicated that although they would keep

us informed they would take unilateral action in respect to these countries in the establishment of relations satisfactory to themselves. It is my feeling that this rigid attitude may well be tempered in proportion to their increasing confidence in their relations with the British and ourselves in the establishment of overall world security. Although Finland came up only indirectly in our discussions, we sensed a bitter and uncompromising attitude toward her. As to the states west of the areas bordering on the Soviet Union, they appear fully prepared to cooperate with the British and ourselves in working out problems involved, provided they are given full partnership in the decisions.

(8) The discussions on Iran⁸ were only on a staff level. One never gets very far on this level in dealing with the Soviets. Although they accepted an unpublished resolution reaffirming their fidelity to their treaty obligations toward Iran,⁹ we got no clarification of their real attitude. Because this subject was left to the end, Eden decided not to insist that it be thrashed out in the main conference.

(9) I will leave a report about the Far East till I see you. As far as it went, it was entirely satisfactory.

(10) I cannot leave this review of the Conference without speaking of the Secretary. His dignity and determination and sincerity in presenting our attitude toward the preservation of world peace and world conditions compatible with it profoundly impressed the Soviet officials. I cannot over-emphasize the important contribution his presence made toward the favorable outcome of the Conference.

(11) Anthony¹⁰ did a first class job. He supported the Secretary faithfully whenever occasion required. Ismay and Deane worked as a team and so did the rest of our delegations.

⁸ See *ante*, p. 116.

⁹ See *ante*, pp. 119, 133.

¹⁰ Eden.

711.00/11-543

*The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 5, 1943.

MR. MURRAY:

Subject: Today's meeting with the President.

The following items from this meeting are sent to you either as of interest or on an action basis.

1. *British Oil Discussions.*

The President said he did not understand this problem and would appreciate it if we could prepare for him promptly a two-page memo-

¹ For additional excerpts from this memorandum, see *ante*, p. 66.

random outlining the whole Middle East oil situation so that he could have a complete understanding of it. He talked in terms of possibly creating a trusteeship in that territory with Russian, British and American representation, which could handle the problem. It is very important to get this memorandum ² to him promptly.

2. *Politico-Strategic Pattern for French West Africa.*

The President's thinking on this matter, which he gave to Admiral Glassford before his departure, is along the line that the four powers should set up a commission for that area with representatives there for police purposes. Incidentally, he seems somewhat irritated with the attitude of de Gaulle and feels that we should exert influence to make the French behave.

8. *Turkish matter.*

Secret. I mentioned this to you in conversation.³

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

² *Post*, p. 162.

³ No record has been found of the substance of this conversation.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt ¹

SECRET

LONDON, 6 November 1943.

Nr. 493 Former Naval Person to President personal and most secret.

Para 3. Please also refer to your number 407.² Since I telegraphed thanking you for this³ the British Chiefs of Staff have examined the proviso in the last part of this telegram. They do not think that the Commanders should be responsible for allotting the forces for OVERLORD, operations in Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean, but that this should remain as hitherto the duty of the Combined Chiefs of Staff who would naturally have before them the opinion of the "Commanders responsible". They would therefore like to leave out the words "Commanders responsible" and insert "The Combined Chiefs of Staff". Will you very kindly think over this. I imagine we all mean the same thing.

¹ Sent by the American Embassy, London, presumably via military channels. For further excerpts from this telegram, see *ante*, p. 68.

² *Ante*, p. 151.

³ Churchill's "Thank you" telegram was No. 492, November 5, 1943, to Roosevelt (Roosevelt Papers).

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 6 November 1943.

C. C. S. 380/2

BASIC POLICIES FOR THE NEXT UNITED STATES-BRITISH
STAFF CONFERENCE

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff agree that the following statement of basic strategy and policies will be used as a basis for the next United States-British Staff Conference, it being understood that such agreement does not exclude from consideration courses of action which might appear likely to facilitate or accelerate the attainment of the over-all objectives.

I. Over-all Objective

2. In conjunction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

II. Over-all Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War

3. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

5. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

III. Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-all Strategic Concept

6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.

¹ A note of November 6, 1943, by the Combined Secretariat states that this paper, "approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 126th Meeting, is circulated for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff." The meeting referred to was held at Washington on November 5, 1943. For the acceptance by the Combined Chiefs, on November 22, 1943, of the strategic concept and basic undertakings set forth in this paper, see *post*, p. 307.

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communications, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

d. Continue the disruption of Axis sea communications.

e. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

f. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia.

h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

i. Undertake such action to exploit the entry of Turkey into the war as is considered most likely to facilitate or accelerate the attainment of the over-all objectives.

j. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.

k. Prepare to reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as soon as the German situation allows.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*¹

Moscow, November 6, 1943.

Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.

I delivered personally your message concerning Turkey² to Molotov in the form of a letter. Molotov expressed the highest satisfaction at its contents and offered no objection whatsoever to the proviso which it contained. He proposed that your agreement as expressed in my letter be attached to the protocol concerning Turkey which he and Eden had signed, the text of which I have already cabled you,³ and that these two documents be made a part of the most secret separate military record of the Conference. His anxiety to have this agreement part of the action of the Conference is I believe due to the fact that he is personally under some criticism by the Soviet military authorities for not obtaining action on this matter at the Conference. I see no objection to his proposal and ask that you authorize me to put it into effect. He discussed the above with the British Ambassador who is cabling Eden for similar authorization.

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was at his camp, known as "Shangri-la", in the Catoctin Mountains, Maryland, on November 7, 1943. A copy was sent to the Department of State for its information.

² See Roosevelt's telegram 407, November 4, 1943, to Churchill, *ante*, p. 151, footnote 1.

³ See *ante*, p. 148.

Defense Files ¹

Memorandum by Generalissimo Chiang's Chief of Staff (Stilwell)

SECRET

[CHUNGKING (?), November 1943.²]

MEMORANDUM:

His Excellency, Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek.

Proposals for Coming Conference

The Generalissimo's program is to bring up to effective strength, equip, and train 90 combat divisions, in 3 groups of thirty each, and 1 or 2 armored divisions.

1. The first group consists of the divisions in India, and those assigned to the Y-force ³ in Yunnan province. These divisions should be at full strength by January 1, and by that date satisfactorily equipped with small arms—(rifles, light and heavy machine guns, 60 mm and 82 [81] mm mortars, Boys rifles, Tommy guns, Bazookas, and five battalions of 75 mm howitzers,) ammunition for four months of operations, and radio sets to include battalions. Medical service and truck and animal transport will be sufficient to support the operations contemplated. Training is progressing satisfactorily. About 200 American instructors are with the unit schools, which are set up in all divisions. The courses are for weapons and tactics of small units.

2. The second group of 30 divisions has been designated and a school has been set up which takes in 200 infantry officers a week for a 6-week course. Courses are also run for Medical, Veterinary, Engineer and Signal troops. Upon graduation these officers return to their units and set up unit schools. It is planned to put 6,000 officers through the courses by May of 1944. By that time, this group of divisions should be at full strength, and fairly well trained. With a road to India open, they should be re-equipped and ready for the field in August of 1944.

3. A similar process will be followed with the third group of 30 divisions with target date of January 1, 1945. After the reopening of communications through Burma, 1 or 2 armored divisions will be organized.

4. All resources available in China will be used to produce effective combat units. Trained men of existing units will be made available as fillers.

¹ The Army copy is apparently derived from the Stilwell Papers in the library of the Hoover Institution, Stanford, California. See *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 57.

² This paper was apparently prepared after Chiang had asked Stilwell, at Chungking on November 6, 1943, "to make the report for China at Cairo" (quoted from Chiang's request as given in *The Stilwell Papers*, p. 237).

³ A group of American-sponsored Chinese divisions.

5. China will participat[e] according to the agreed plan in the recapture of Burma by attacks from Ledo with the X-force⁴ and from Paoshan with the Yunnan force. This operation will be supported by naval action in the Bay of Bengal. Before the operation, British naval forces should be concentrated in time and fully prepared for action.

6. The training program will be followed and intensified.

7. Necessary airfields will be built and maintained.

8. In the event that communications are reopened through Burma and necessary equipment is supplied, an operation will be conducted to seize the Canton-Hongkong area and open communication by sea.

The Generalissimo expects that:

1. Before the 1944 rainy season an all-out effort will be made by the Allies to re-open communications through Burma to China, using land, air, and naval forces.

2. The U. S. A. will supply the equipment for the three groups of 30 divisions, and the armored divisions.

3. The Fourteenth U. S. Air Force will be maintained as agreed and supplied sufficiently to allow of sustained operations.

4. The Chinese Air Force will be built up promptly to 2 groups of fighters, 1 group of medium bombers, 1 reconnaissance squadron, and 1 transport squadron, and maintained at that strength. By August of 1944 a third group of fighters, and a group of heavy bombardment will be added and maintained thereafter.

5. Following the seizure of the Canton-Hongkong area, the U. S. will put 10 infantry divisions, 3 armored divisions and appropriate auxiliary units into South China for operations against Central and North China. Contingent upon this allocation of troops, the Generalissimo will appoint American command of those units of the combined U. S. Chinese forces which are designated in the order of battle, under his general direction.

6. The U. S. will, at the earliest practicable time, put long-range bombing units in China to operate against the Japanese mainland.

7. The ferry route will be maintained at a capacity of at least 10,000 tons a month.

8. Training personnel will be supplied as required.

9. Medical personnel will be supplied for the second and third groups of divisions.

For the Generalissimo,
JOSEPH W. STILWELL
*Joint Chief of Staff for
Generalissimo.*

⁴ Chinese Army in India.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) ¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 8 November 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

For Ambassador Harriman from the President.

My 041707,² your 06100.³

You are hereby authorized to attach our agreement regarding Turkey to the protocol with the following change.

Change the words "Commanders responsible" to the words "Combined Chiefs of Staff."⁴

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. A copy was sent to the Department of State for its information.

² Telegram of November 4, 1943; see *ante*, p. 151, footnote 1.

³ Telegram of November 6, 1943, *ante*, p. 158. The date-time group was garbled.

⁴ See Churchill's telegram 493, November 6, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 156.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill ¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 8 November 1943.

PRIORITY

Number 412 from the President to the Former Naval Person secret and personal.

Your 493.²

I accept your suggestion that "Commanders responsible" in Paragraph 3 be changed to "Combined Chiefs of Staff" and have so informed Harriman and have authorized him to attach agreement to the protocol.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² *Ante*, p. 156.

740.0011 EW 1939/31842 : Telegram

The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

US URGENT

ANKARA, November 8, 1943—1 p. m.

1823. Most secret for the President, Secretary and Under-Secretary

I have been authoritatively informed that in the conversations at Cairo between the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and Eden,¹

¹ Regarding Eden's talks with Numan Menemencioglu, see *ante*, p. 149, and *post*, p. 164.

Eden requested that Turkey make available air bases for the Allies. Numan took the position that Turkey could not make available such bases to the Allies because Turkey was not prepared and equipped at the present time to meet successfully the German attack which would undoubtedly follow such action on the part of Turkey. I am informed that the demand for air bases was made by Eden under pressure from Moscow and that at the Moscow Conference, Molotov laid great stress on Turkey's entering the war.² However, from information now available here, it would appear that originally it was not intended to make such a demand of Turkey at least at the present time, because Eden's interview with Numan was arranged, as I have reported,³ at the request of Numan and not of Eden.

KELL[E]Y

² For the discussions at the Moscow Conference regarding Turkey's role in the war, see *ante*, pp. 117, 123, 135.

³ Telegram 1790, November 2, 1943, noon, from Kelley, "Strictly Confidential", stated: "The Minister for Foreign Affairs accompanied by the Secretary General and several other officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is leaving Ankara today with the British Ambassador to meet Eden in Cairo. I understand that the meeting between Numan and Eden has been arranged as the result of an intimation by Numan that he would like to see Eden upon the latter's return from Moscow." (740.0011 EW 1939/31790)

Roosevelt Papers

The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Oil concessions in the Middle East.

As I promised at our meeting Friday,¹ I am pleased to enclose herewith a two-page memorandum summarizing the problem of oil concessions in the Middle East. This is the memorandum you said you wanted to have with you.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Department of State

The situation with respect to oil concessions in the Middle East is as follows:

Iraq Petroleum Company (whose shares are owned 23.75% each by the following four companies:

1. *Anglo-Iranian Oil Company* (owned 56% by British Government)

¹ November 5, 1943.

2. *Shell Oil Company* (believed controlled to some extent by British Government)

3. *Société Française des Pétroles* (owned in large part by French Government. Now controlled by Alien Property Custodian, London)

4. *Near East Development Corporation* (owned in equal part by *Socony-Vacuum Oil Company* and *Standard Oil of New Jersey* [])

The remaining 5% of the shares of the Iraq Petroleum Company are held by Mr. G. S. Gulbenkian.

In its own name, or through subsidiaries, the Iraq Petroleum Company holds concessions in all of Iraq, in all of the Peninsula of Qatar, as well as in certain areas of Syria, Palestine and Trans-Jordan and possibly in other territories along the eastern and southern coasts of the Arabian Peninsula. Production, which is active only in Iraq, is pumped to Haifa, Palestine, where there is a refinery, and to Tripoli, Syria.

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In addition to its holdings in the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Anglo-Iranian holds an important concession in Iran and has a large refinery at Abadan.

Bahrein Petroleum Company is owned in equal shares by Standard Oil Company of California and the Texas Company. It has production and a refinery on Bahrein Island in the Persian Gulf.

California-Arabian Oil Company, also owned by the Standard of California and Texas Company. It has immense holdings in Saudi Arabia, with reserves of possibly fifty billion barrels. Present production, which is small, is refined at Bahrein.

Kuwait Oil Company, owned in equal shares by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Gulf Oil Company of Pennsylvania. This company's concession in Kuwait (or Koweit) at head of Persian Gulf has been proved to the extent of nine or ten billion barrels. Drilling was stopped over a year ago by order of British military authorities.

All of the companies mentioned above have small concessions in Egypt.

In view of military needs, it has been proposed to erect refineries at one of the following places:

1. At Dhahran in Saudi Arabia, opposite northern end of Bahrein Island, under arrangements with California Arabian Standard Oil Company.

2. At Kuwait, under arrangements with the Gulf Oil Company (presumably in agreement with its partner, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company).

3. At Bombay or some other port in India, under arrangements with the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company. Presumably production would come from the Iraq Petroleum Company field in the Qatar Peninsula. The two wells drilled there were blown up over a year ago under orders of the British military authorities.

Whatever course is adopted, the question arises whether it is better for the United States Government to purchase shares in the producing

companies or to make some other arrangement, such as purchasing options on a given quantity of oil in the ground. This question is under review by the Petroleum Reserves Corporation.

In general American companies holding interests in the Middle Eastern area desire to produce. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, on the other hand, with its large field in Iran, is inclined to restrict production in other areas. This and other questions make it desirable that some general understanding be reached between the British and American Governments regarding Middle Eastern petroleum questions. A draft of such an agreement is being considered in the Department and has been furnished informally to other interested departments for their consideration and suggestions.²

(See map attached)³

² The Anglo-American agreement regarding petroleum which was signed on August 8, 1944 (but did not come into force), is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XI, August 13, 1944, p. 154.

³ Not reproduced herein.

741.671/11-943

The Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle), and the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray) ¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 9, 1943.

PA/M—Mr. Murray:

A-B—Mr. Berle:

U—Mr. Stettinius:

Mr. Hayter, First Secretary of the British Embassy, came in yesterday to furnish an account of Mr. Eden's talks with Numan Menemencioglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, in Cairo. The first of these talks was held on November 5, and Mr. Eden reported to the Prime Minister that he had had a long tough day. Mr. Eden first requested Numan to furnish air bases for the use of Allied forces. He also brought up the question of Turkey's full entrance into the war. Numan refused to agree that there would be any difference between these two courses of action, contending that to furnish air bases to the Allies would be tantamount to entering the war. In this connection he said that Germany would not dare not to react if Turkey furnished bases. Mr. Eden argued that Germany was in such a posi-

¹ Stettinius, who was Acting Secretary on this date, sent the following note to Alling on November 12, 1943: "I handed to Mr. Harry Hopkins yesterday at noon the original of your memorandum of the 9th on the Turkish matter, so perhaps you would like to send copies of it to those in the Department whom you feel should be familiar with the matter. ES"

tion that it could attack only by air and apparently argued that the Allied air forces could handle any such attacks.

Mr. Eden reported that although Numan did not refuse to discuss the question of air bases or formal entry into the war, it was obvious that he was deeply suspicious of the Russians and greatly concerned about their possible penetration into the Balkans. Mr. Eden argued that Turkey would be in a much stronger position in the post-war world if it furnished bases now or entered fully into the war. Mr. Eden made it clear, however, that what was really wanted was air bases and that there was no intention to press the Turks to go into the war on an all-out basis. Numan asked what good it would do the Allies if at the end of the war Turkey was militarily exhausted. Mr. Eden contended that it was extravagant to talk of exhaustion.

Mr. Eden said it was interesting to note that the Turks made no request for fulfillment of requests made at the Adana Conference² for supplies. Numan had inquired as to whether the Allies would continue to furnish supplies if Turkey refused to supply bases, and the British Foreign Minister replied that he could give no assurance as to that.

On the following day, the discussions were continued and Mr. Eden strongly restated the case for furnishing air bases and stressed the urgency of the need. He expressed the view that the Germans would not dare to declare war on the Turks if bases were furnished and added that if the bases were refused, the British would have to consider the question of furnishing supplies to the Turks.

Numan said he could give an immediate answer to the question of air bases. The Turks could not accept such a demand and they would be unable to grant the facilities requested. Mr. Eden continued with the same arguments he had used on the previous day, but without success.

The discussions then turned to the broad issue of Turkey's formal entrance into the war. Numan pointed out that at Adana Mr. Churchill had given the Turks the impression that they would be free to make an independent decision as to whether and when they should enter the war. Did the British now feel that the Turks now had enough equipment with which to put up a fight? In any case, if Turkey was to be involved in the war, it would wish to be in active collaboration with its allies and was not content to play a passive role by merely furnishing air bases. If the Turks were to go into the war and take an active part, where would the Allies want them to fight? In the Balkans? If the British really felt the Turks were ready, the Turks would want to know the precise part they were to play. Again and again Numan repeated that Turkey would never agree to play a

² Meeting between Churchill and İnönü at Adana, Turkey, on January 30, 1943; see Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, pp. 704 ff.

passive part. He said that if the British Foreign Minister had brought from Moscow such decisions as the future treatment of Persia, Iraq and the Balkans, it would be much easier for him to meet the British views.

Mr. Eden replied that so far as Persia was concerned, the Russians and the British had a treaty under which they undertook to withdraw from Persia after the war.³ So far as Iraq was concerned, the British had a bilateral treaty which made things perfectly clear.⁴ So far as the Balkans were concerned, it would be obvious to the Turks that they would gain more by cooperating with the Allies than by standing aloof. Numan asked if it were not true that the Russians had withdrawn their demand for a second front in Europe in return for a free hand in Eastern Europe. Mr. Eden denied this and pointed out that the Americans, in particular, both in public and in private, had made it clear that they could not discuss frontiers until the end of the war.

Numan then inquired why the British had not accepted Rumania's peace offer.⁵ What more could the Rumanians do than offer to discuss peace? Mr. Eden retorted that the Allies would discuss peace with the Rumanians only on the basis of unconditional surrender. Numan replied that the Turks would never suggest to the Rumanians that they surrender unconditionally to the Russians.

Summing up, Mr. Eden said that the negative reply that he had received from the Turkish Foreign Minister was bound to have a deplorable effect among the Allies. Numan replied that to the first request for air bases he was bound to give a negative reply, for the reasons he had mentioned. As to the second request for formal Turkish entry into the war, he would have to report to his Government. Mr. Eden reported that he had given Numan a severe warning as to the possible consequences of the Turkish refusal to meet the British request. Mr. Eden also pointed out the unenviable position in which Turkey would find itself vis-à-vis the Russians in the event it declined to meet British wishes. He stressed, on the other hand, the far better position in which Turkey would be placed if it went along with the British request.

Numan answered that he must know more of Russian intentions before he could allow Turkey to play the part requested by the British. Furthermore, he did not believe that Germany was stretched as far

³ Treaty of January 29, 1942; Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. vi, March 21, 1942, pp. 249-252.

⁴ Treaty of Alliance, signed at Baghdad June 30, 1930; League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxxxii, p. 363.

⁵ Public reports of a conditional Rumanian peace feeler had emanated from Ankara in June 1943.

as the British contended. In order to reassure the Turks on this point, Mr. Eden said that he was having General Wilson send one of his military intelligence experts to Ankara in an endeavor to convince the Turks that the Germans were over-extended. Mr. Eden also agreed that he would take up with the Russians and the Americans the precise role that Turkey might be expected to play if it entered the war and that a paper on this point would be passed through military channels.⁶

Mr. Hayter understood that the discussions terminated at this point and that Numan was to return to Ankara. However, this morning he telephoned to me urgently that the discussions had apparently continued and that the Embassy was now beginning to receive further reports which he hoped to furnish to the Department during the course of the day.

P[AUL] H. A[LLING]

⁶ Paper not found in associated files. For a C. C. S. paper of December 3, 1943, however, covering, among other things, Turkey's role in the war, see *post*, p. 782.

Roosevelt Papers

The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your request¹ I attach a memorandum on the question of trusteeship for the disputed islands in the Central Pacific and certain other groups of islands, a memorandum on the geographic factors involved and a chart.²

These memoranda have been very hastily compiled. As you know, comprehensive studies of the problems of international trusteeship are well under way in the Department but not completed. Before discussing this question with the Prime Minister you may wish to obtain the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly with respect to the inclusion in the trusteeship of nearby American islands such as Howland, Baker, Palmyra and others which the British would no doubt suggest be included.

E. R. STETTINIUS JR.

¹ The request may have been made at the White House meeting of November 5, 1943, referred to *ante*, p. 155.

² Chart not reproduced herein.

[Enclosure 1]

*Memorandum by the Department of State*³

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

MEMORANDUM

1. . . . If pressed to a settlement, we could expect little except on political grounds. Nevertheless Australia and New Zealand wish the United States to remain permanently interested in the Southeast Pacific for security reasons and Great Britain's attitude is not unfavorable.

2. It is believed that the best disposition is international trusteeship since the United States, assumably, is less interested in the question of sovereignty over these contested islands than in their adequate administration within a security system, and their usefulness on the basis of equal access in the development of common pacific interests, particularly transportation and communication. Responsibility for trusteeship should be assumed by the United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and China. Administration of the individual islands should be allocated through friendly negotiation. The administrator should be accountable for the progressive attainment of the well-understood objectives of trusteeship.

3. Responsibility for administration of defense should be vested singly in the United States, or jointly in the United States and Great Britain (and/or Australia and New Zealand) on terms to be proposed to the heads of the two Governments by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The inclusion of China as a trustee should not be of a kind devolving far-flung naval commitments upon her.

4. This arrangement while assuring immediate advantages to this country should not in any way prejudice United States claims or future freedom of action with respect to them.

5. Inclusion of the French possessions in the area of trusteeship would involve including France among the trustees. French sovereignty need not be disturbed, but France would be obligated to give to the United States and other participating states rights not heretofore granted. She would receive in return protection and equal access to the other islands under trusteeship.

6. This zone of trusteeship might well be extended to include neighboring islands, such as the French Austral and Society Islands, and the British Henderson, Ducie, Pitcairn, and Oeno Islands.

7. It might be desirable that this trusteeship should be integrated with a broader trusteeship encompassing similar islands in the entire South Pacific and possibly including the Philippines, the Netherlands,

³ Prepared by the Divisions of Political Studies, of European Affairs, and of Far Eastern Affairs, and the Office of the Geographer. See Notter, p. 200.

and Chile among the trustees. It should in any event be integrated with whatever general international trusteeship system may be established.

8. In any consideration of Pacific islands the vital importance to the United States of Clipperton Island (French) should never be overlooked. The same might be said of the Galapagos Islands (Ecuador).

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by the Geographer of the Department of State (Boggs)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] November 9, 1943.

CERTAIN PACIFIC ISLANDS

Information has been requested concerning the following Pacific islands, especially in connection with possible trusteeship over them:

a) Islands claimed by the United States, in a note to Great Britain dated August 16, 1939:⁴ (The population is added, as given in H. O. Pub. 166, 1940 edition.)

1) Claimed also by Great Britain:

Vostok	0	(no date given)
Malden	0	(1936)
Starbuck	0	(1940)
Caroline Island	2	laborers and families (1936)
Flint	0	(no date given)
Christmas	23	native, 3 French (1936)
Ellice Islands (the southern 4 of them—administered as part of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony[])	4	
Nukufetau (De Peyster)	361	(1929)
Funafuti	392	(1929) including 5 Euro- peans
Nurakita (Sophia)	39	(1929)
Nukulailai (Mitchell)	202	(1929)

2) Claimed also by New Zealand:

Penrhyn (Tongareva)	462	(1936)
Manahiki (Humphreys)	486	(1937)
Rakahanga (Rierson)	290	(1936)
Danger Islands	651	(1936)
Union Group (all 3 islands)		
Atafu	380	(1932)
Nukunono	250	(1936)
Fakaofu	431	(1925)

⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. II, p. 317.

- b) Two of the French groups in the South Pacific:
The Marquesas
The Tuamotu Archipelago

The relative geographic positions of these and other islands have been marked and studied on a globe (a globe-mounted "printers' proof" of a special air route globe which has been prepared in this office, 1,000 copies of which have been ordered by the War Department). From the globe, the more important lines have been transferred, approximately, to the accompanying H. O. Chart No. 1500.⁵

The problems relating to the islands listed above can not be adequately assessed, it is submitted, without taking the following steps:

- (1) Evaluating all islands in the Pacific which are pertinent, in view of their geographic position, at least approximately, regarding their use for:
 - (a) Land planes
 - (b) Sea planes
 - (c) Surface ships;
- (2) Studying the geographic relationships of all islands which are important for the possible use of one or more of the above—initially without any reference to sovereignty, but only with reference to the range of airplanes and to desirable routes of both airplanes and surface ships;
- (3) Studying the limitations imposed by political sovereignty and claims, with reference only to significant islands and their geographic relationships with each other and with the continental mainlands.

The present memorandum is restricted in scope by a 24-hour deadline. Further data and maps will be submitted later, if desired.

The assumed range of commercial airplanes is 2,500 statute miles, as represented on accompanying chart by circles and arcs of 1,250 mile radius. The portions of the Pacific are ruled which are, on that hypothesis, outside those limits; commercial operation across those zones seems improbable, at least in the near future.

Separated by vast spaces of free air and high sea, there are in the Pacific several thousand islands, many of them mere pinpoints. Very few of them are adapted, by virtue of size, surface structure, and geographic position, to transportation uses, either for landplanes, seaplanes, or surface ships, and then only at great expense. To be useful for airplanes they must also accommodate surface ships to bring supplies. Except for the airway corridor to the Pacific coast of the United States by way of the Hawaiian Islands there is an extensive zone near the American continents which can scarcely be traversed by airplanes with pay loads.

The Pacific is preeminently the area which seems to call for master-planning of air routes. On the basis of natural geographic factors

⁵ Not reproduced herein.

(adaptability to use, and geographic position) excellent trans-Pacific routes are feasible, including alternate routes for varying weather conditions, emergency landings, and adequate aids to navigation.

The imposition of the limitations of political geography greatly reduces the utility of many of the islands, and renders some desirable routes almost impossible. No nation possesses the stepping-stones for a trans-Pacific route under its own flag.

The political problems, however, are relatively simple, involving only colonial possessions of a very few countries, with small populations, and historical background which is brief in comparison with problems in Europe and Asia.

At the request of the Department of State, initiated by Judge R. Walton Moore, the Navy Department in 1938 made a careful, detailed evaluation of 27 islands possessed or claimed by Great Britain (including the more valuable of those claimed by the United States, listed on page 1 of this memorandum) and more than 25 French islands, including the best in the Marquesas and Society groups. The islands were rated on a score of 1,000. A map showing the ratings of these individual islands, with sovereignty of all Pacific islands, is on file in the Office of the Geographer.⁶ Much better information regarding adaptability to both landplane and seaplane use is now available. No attempt is made, therefore, on such brief notice, to discuss the islands individually.

International action on some principle of "trusteeship" seems essential in planning trans-Pacific air services. The details require much study.

S. W. Boggs

⁶ Not reproduced herein.

740.0011 Moscow/256a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1943.

U. S. URGENT

1180. Secret and personal for the Ambassador from the Acting Secretary.

The President has handed to me your message no. 6100 sent via Navy.¹ You are authorized to comply with Molotov's request that your letter containing the message concerning Turkey be made a part of the secret military record of the Conference.

STETTINIUS
Acting

¹ This is the telegram of November 6, *ante*, p. 158.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 10 November 1943.

PRIORITY

Personal and secret from the President to the Former Naval Person. Number 417.

We have under development a project whereby we can strike a heavy blow at our enemy in the Pacific early next year with our new heavy bombers. Japanese military, naval and shipping strength is dependent upon the steel industry which is strained to the limit. Half of the coke for that steel can be reached and destroyed by long-range bombers operating from bases in the Chengtu area of China. The bombers can supply themselves by air, from bases to be constructed near Calcutta, without disturbing present air lift commitments as agreed at QUADRANT.

In order to expedite this project I ask that you arrange for the Government of India to render every possible assistance in the construction of these four air bases for long-range bombers. American Aviation Engineer forces, under a capable general officer, are being prepared for movement as a matter of first priority, so that we may contribute experienced construction personnel to this enterprise without drawing on similar forces in India which are now engaged in other operations. Mountbatten is familiar with this project.

I am sending a similar message to the Generalissimo asking him to expedite construction of five advanced bases in the Chengtu area, financed by Lend-Lease funds.²

This is a bold but entirely feasible project. Together by this operation, we can partially cripple the Japanese naval and military power and hasten the victory of our forces in Asia.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² *Infra*.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1943.

Personal and secret from the President to the Generalissimo.

We hope to be able to launch heavy bombing attacks upon vital Japanese homeland objectives considerably earlier than previously seemed possible.

¹ Sent to the American Military Mission to China via Army channels, as War Department telegram 3811 to the Mission.

To accomplish this will require five long-range bomber airfields, for the new and very powerful planes, with limited housing facilities, in the general Chengtu area in the construction of which we need your close support to ensure their readiness by the end of March 1944.

We can supply the technical engineering supervision but must rely on you to provide the necessary labor and materials so as not to draw on the air supply line.

I will undertake to make available the necessary funds through Lend-Lease appropriations, if that will expedite and ensure the completion of the work on the desired schedule.

I am personally convinced we can deal the Jap a truly crippling blow, so close to both our hearts, by this sudden, surprise attack.

ROOSEVELT

Leahy Papers

The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the President

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 10 November 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Russian request for delivery of Italian surrendered naval and merchant ships.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the message from the Secretary of State of 3 November 1943¹ relative to the transfer of surrendered Italian naval and merchant ships to the Soviets.

Since the U. S. S. R. has accepted Italy as a co-belligerent, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that no Italian naval and merchant ships should be turned over to the Soviets by a transfer of ownership and registry. They consider, however, that the use of Italian vessels by the Soviets in furtherance of the war effort is acceptable, provided there is no transfer of title.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend, therefore, that those Italian naval and merchant ships requested by the Soviet Government for use in furtherance of the war effort be made available for use by the Soviets without transfer of title.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Chief of Staff to the

Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

¹ Telegram of November 2, 1943, *ante*, p. 149.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, November 10, 1943.

Prime Minister to President—personal.

I am not at all content with the changes in the French National Committee which leave de Gaulle sole President. The body we recognized was of a totally different character, the essence being the co-presidency of Giraud and de Gaulle. I suggest we maintain an attitude of complete reserve until we can discuss the position together.

¹ Sent by the American Embassy, London, apparently via military channels.

740.0011 EW 1939/31917 : Telegram

The Chargé in Ankara (Kelley) to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

U. S. PRIORITY

ANKARA, November 10, 1943—11 p. m.

1844. My 1823, November 8.¹

Most secret. For President, Secretary and Under Secretary.

The British Ambassador² gave me this afternoon, upon his return from Cairo, the following summary account³ of the conversations between Eden and the Turk Minister for Foreign Affairs.⁴ He said that Eden opened the conversations by telling Numan that there were two questions which he desired to discuss with him. The first was that of Turkey making available immediately air bases to the Allies and the second that of Turkey's participation in the war. Numan replied at once that he could not agree that these were separate questions because the granting of air bases involved Turkey's entry into the war. As for making immediately available air bases to the Allies, Numan firmly declined to agree to his proposal. He based his refusal principally on military considerations, namely, that the Germans were still sufficiently powerful and in a position to take retaliatory action which the Turks were not prepared or equipped at the present time to meet, that the Germans were in a position to destroy Turk cities, et cetera. He also maintained that Turk public opinion was not in favor of Turkey taking action which would involve her entry into the war and that in any case the public had not been prepared for such action.

With regard to the question of Turkey's participation in the war, Numan took the position that if Turkey entered the war she would

¹ *Ante*, p. 161.

² Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen.

³ See also *ante*, p. 164, and *post*, p. 190.

⁴ Numan Menemencioğlu.

want to do something which would be of real help to the Allies and not remain on the side line and make faces at the Germans, as Eden had intimated that she might do. However, such action on the part of Turkey involved important political and military questions which would have to be thoroughly examined. Numan was particularly concerned with regard to the possibility of Russian penetration into the Balkans.

He talked at great length on this point and said Turkey would desire to have assurances Soviets did not contemplate acquiring territory [or?] bases in Balkans or establishing its domination over that region. Upshot of discussion of question of Turkey's participation in the war was it was agreed Numan, upon his return to Ankara, would discuss the matter with Turkish leaders and he would take up with British Ambassador political and military considerations which Turk Government desired to have examined in connection with its study of the question.

When informing Soviet Ambassador ⁵ [of the?] discussions at Cairo, British Ambassador took occasion to stress to him Turkey's concern with regard to postwar situation in Balkans and her anxiety lest, even if she entered war, situation in Balkans might be less favorable to Turkey after war than prior to war. He explained to Vinogradov Turks look upon Balkans in somewhat same light as British look upon Low Countries. I gather from my talk with Hugessen British consider that the obtaining from Moscow of assurances relative to Balkans of a nature calculated to satisfy Turks presents a difficult problem unless Russians are readily disposed to offer such assurances.

In response to my question as to why Russians, at a time when Germans appear to be hard pressed, were so insistent upon bringing Turkey into war Hugessen said he was told that although Russians now have upper hand militarily there is such great suffering in Soviet Union they consider it of utmost importance to do everything possible to bring war to a speedy conclusion.

KELLEY

⁵ Sergey Alexandrovich Vinogradov.

Hopkins Papers

*The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President's Special Assistant
(Hopkins)*

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, November 10, 1943.

DEAR HARRY: I have reflected over our talk of yesterday and am putting on paper in this letter to you my reflections on the chance that they may be useful for you or the President.

1. *In re OVERLORD*: My best estimate of the situation is that preparations are going all right. Provided there are no further diversions or delays, we shall be ready on the scheduled time. I have checked this statement up. Postponement to midsummer would be so serious that it ought to be avoided if that is possible. In added difficulties and delays in closing the war, such a postponement would cost many thousands of lives.

The task for our Commander-in-Chief is to hold the situation firmly to the straight road which has been agreed to and which it is now on. He should tolerate no departures from the program. It is sound and there are, certainly as yet, no reasons visible for departures from that program. Once we approach within two or three months of the attack, I anticipate no further efforts to depart and a steady acceleration of British support.

So the one prayer I make for the Commander-in-Chief is steadfastness—a very difficult virtue but one more needed than any other in this particular problem.

2. *The problem of command*. I believe that Marshall's command of OVERLORD is imperative for its success. To make it effective he should be there very soon. The success of OVERLORD is so much the most important thing in the world horizon that Marshall should take up that command in spite of all counter reasons which I can envisage. He should do this even if no joint command with the Italian operation is yet achieved. I anticipate that his European command will be extended in future to all auxiliary movements in western Europe even if that is not now agreed upon.

3. No successor Chief of Staff should be appointed for the present but that post should be carried on by an acting chief. I anticipate that Marshall's presence in London will strongly tend to prevent any interferences with OVERLORD even if they were attempted, and as to other theaters of operation we shall have to take our chances of carrying on along the present plans which have been pretty well laid out. Certainly they are in far better situation than they were two or three months ago.

These are my views. Good luck!

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON
Secretary of War

Roosevelt Papers

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] November 11, 1943.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Aviation Policy

Participants:

The President; the Under Secretary of State;² Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State; Mr. Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air; Mr. L. Welch Pogue, Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board; Mr. Harry Hopkins.

The President requested the five men above-named to meet him at 2:00 o'clock yesterday.

He stated that he had begun to discuss aviation policy with Prime Minister Churchill at Quebec³ and he expected to go on doing so at their coming meeting. He had considered the various problems of policy and wished to state the policy he wanted followed. Reading from a memorandum which he said he had himself prepared, though he took the points out of order, he gave us the following oral directives.

(1) Germany, Italy, and Japan were not to be permitted to have any aviation industry or any aviation lines, internal or external. This involved policing these countries.

Their external traffic would be handled by the lines of the other countries. Internal aviation could be handled by a company or companies to be formed by the United Nations. The participation of former enemy countries (Germany, Italy, and Japan) in aviation was to be limited to the maintenance of airfields, local servicing work, and detail of that kind.

As for flying, the President said that he did not want them to be in a position to "fly anything larger than one of these toy planes that you wind up with an elastic".

(2) As to aviation in other countries: The President felt that each country should have ownership and control of its own internal aviation services. He recognized there might be exceptions in backward countries unable to organize aviation themselves. But Brazil, which he took as an illustration, was quite competent to run its own internal aviation. He did not wish Americans to own or control their internal aviation; nor did he wish them to hire American or other foreign companies

¹ Copies were sent by Berle on November 15, 1943, to Roosevelt, Hopkins, and presumably some or all of the other participants in the conversation. For a part of the background of this paper, see Notter, pp. 130, 179, 243; Churchill, pp. 644, 664; and *post*, p. 802, footnote 1.

² Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

³ The records of the First Quebec Conference, August 1943, are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

as managers of their internal aviation. He had no objection, indeed he hoped that they would hire American individuals, and of course he hoped they would buy American equipment. But he wanted the internal aviation to be the development of the country itself.

(3) Regarding the handling of American aviation, he stated that he had decided that American overseas aviation should not be handled by a single line. The scope of international aviation was too great to be trusted to any one company or pool. He said that certain companies—to speak frankly, Pan American—wanted all of the business, and he disagreed with Trippe. He was willing to agree that on their record, Pan American was entitled to the senior place, and perhaps the cream of the business; but he could not go along with the idea of their, or anyone's, having all of it. This meant a multi-company operation.

He said he still felt—though he was open to argument on the subject—that the plan he had outlined to Mr. Pogue and to myself two years ago, of various companies having “zones”, still appealed to him; thus there might be a company for the western side of South America, another company having the eastern side, one company having the North Atlantic; another, the Mediterranean; and so forth. In answer to a question of Bob Lovett's, he said that there might be a shift of equipment from one group to another as seasons required this. I said I thought that Mr. Pogue's idea of competitive terminals by the competitors draining different fields of traffic probably could be harmonized with this general idea. The President said he agreed that his idea would have to be applied flexibly.

(4) Regarding the possibility of Government participation in the lines, he said there remained open the question of ownership by the Government of an interest in the various lines contemplated under this policy. But he said he thought there was no need of such ownership under the proposed plan, except as the Government might have to own, initially, lines going to places in which the traffic could not support a company. This would be covered by his idea that the Government should run such lines until private enterprise was prepared to take over.

(5) The President then spoke of subsidies. He said in general he thought the traffic could be made to pay its own way except in connection with certain routes on which the traffic was not enough to make the line a paying proposition. Again using the illustration of the United States to South Africa, he said there would have to be a line to South Africa, but it probably would not be a paying proposition. He therefore wished that we would apply the same policy which he had worked out for shipping lines after the last war, namely: to have the United States Government use its planes and its men to run government lines—but always on the understanding that if ever a private line was

prepared to bid for the route, the Government would promptly retire from the business.

(6) As to air and landing rights, the President said that he wanted a very free interchange. That is, he wanted arrangements by which planes of one country could enter any other country for the purpose of discharging traffic of foreign origin, and accepting foreign bound traffic. Thus, if Canada wanted a line from Canada to Jamaica, with stops in the United States at Buffalo and Miami, they should be able to discharge traffic of Canadian origin at Buffalo, and take on traffic at Buffalo for Jamaica; but they should not be allowed to carry from Buffalo to Miami.

He considered that each country would have a number—in the United States a quite large number—of airports available for such foreign traffic.

In addition to that, he thought planes should have general right of free transit and right of technical stop—that is, the right to land at any field and get fuel and service, without, however, taking on or discharging traffic.

This, he pointed out, would dispose of any need for a United Nations authority to manage airfields.

The President said that there might, however, remain airfields in respect of which the traffic itself would not pay the cost of upkeep. Liberia, for instance, might have to maintain a field for the purpose of a line between the United States and South Africa; but there would not be business enough to make it a paying proposition. There, there might have to be United Nations contributions, or arrangements might have to be made for the lines which used the field to pay a part of the cost.

(7) In answer to a question from Lovett, the President said that he thought there should be no general party [*parley?*] or conference about aviation until the time was right to call a United Nations conference. Talks with Britain and other countries could be handled quietly as a part of the preparatory discussion.

(8) The President considered that there would have to be a United Nations conference on aviation and probably a United Nations organization⁴ to handle such matters as safety standards, signals, communication, weather reporting, and the incidental services which went with airports; and also to handle the problem of competitive subsidies or rates.

The impending return of Secretary Hull from the Moscow Conference was then announced, and we broke up.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

⁴Regarding the conference of 1944 which set up the International Civil Aviation Organization, see *Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago, Illinois, November 1–December 7, 1944* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1948), vols. I and II.

741.671/11-1143

*Memorandum by Mr. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 11, 1943.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Conversations Between the British and the Turks at Cairo

Participants: Mr. Hayter, First Secretary, British Embassy

Mr. Alling

Mr. Kohler

Mr. Hayter called this morning and read two further telegrams which the Embassy had received regarding the conversations between the British and the Turks at Cairo.²

The first of these communications reported a conversation between the British Ambassador at Ankara, Knatchbull-Hugesson [*Hugessen*], and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Numan Menemencioglu, on November 7. The Ambassador called on Numan on his own initiative, saying that he had been perturbed by the results of the conversations which appeared to constitute a negative reaction on the part of the Turks both as regards the question of bases and that of the Turkish entry into the war this year. Numan replied that he had also been unhappy about the results of the discussions, but that he reported objectively to his Government, which must of course make the decision. The two then reviewed the conversations at some length. When Numan raised the question of continued supplies, the Ambassador said it would be very difficult for the British to continue to furnish such supplies if the Turks should refuse to enter the war. Plainly, if the Turks did not use the weapons which were being provided to them against the Germans, the Soviets could only believe that they were intended for use against Russia.

On November 8 Numan had a further (and apparently final) conversation with Mr. Eden during which he showed himself considerably more receptive.

Eden said that the Soviet desires and the present discussions seemed to him to offer an opportunity to establish Turkish-Soviet relations on a sound basis for the next twenty-five years. Numan replied that he realized that this was so; that he thought the Soviet question was being well handled and that he had entirely welcomed the Moscow

¹ Alling sent copies of this memorandum to Stettinius, Berle, and Murray with a note of November 11, 1943, reading: "Here is the final installment on the Anglo-Turkish conversations at Cairo. In due course the British expect to hear the decisions of the Turks. It is expected that the Turks will endeavor to delay such a decision by every means. P[aul] H. A[lling]" Berle wrote on his copy, near the last sentence: "They usually succeed A. A. B[erle]." It is not clear whether Kohler's memorandum was brought to the attention of Roosevelt and Hopkins prior to their departure from Washington on November 11.

² See *ante*, p. 164.

decisions, which were much more favorable than could have been expected. However, he said that a decision as regards the demands on Turkey could of course only be taken by the Government. He said that the Turks had been very disturbed by Stalin's references to Moldavia and Transylvania.³ It would be hard to explain to the National Assembly if Turkish assistance aided the establishment of Russia in Rumania and Bulgaria under the claim that such establishment was in the interests of those peoples.

Numan continued that he had been upset by Eden's threatening tone, which had been used for the first time in the long relations between the two countries; and that he had the impression that Eden was acting as spokesman not just for Britain, but for Russia. Eden had asked Turkey to give bases and to come into the war without specifying exactly what would be expected of her, what Allied cooperation could be depended upon, and what assurances there would be as to the political results or implications. He said that today for her own safety Turkey must be as concerned about the situation in the Balkans as she was previously about the freedom of the Straits alone.⁴ Eden replied that they must face the facts; that Britain was an ally of Turkey but she was also an ally of Russia.⁵ He said that if Turkey came into the war she would inevitably become stronger through the supply of Allied arms. Numan recognized that this was so. Eden then drew a balance sheet on the familiar lines of the advantages and disadvantages to Turkey of participation. He suggested that the Turkish Government might wish to consider the matter and that its reply might well pose questions which it wanted cleared up regarding the military and political conditions of its collaboration. He said that a favorable reply would require conversations which could not very well be handled through usual diplomatic channels, and asked if Numan had any views as to where such conversations might be held. Numan said that if the Turkish reply should be favorable, conversa-

³ In a number of his addresses Stalin had indicated his intention to regain Moldavia (Bessarabia) from Rumania. See Andrew Rothstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War* (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1946?), vol. I, pp. 22, 38, 41, 50, 56, 70. No public reference by Stalin to Transylvania prior to the Cairo-Tehran Conferences has been found, but his intent to transfer the area to Rumania had been expressed to Eden privately in January 1942. See Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, p. 629, and Hull, vol. II, p. 1167.

⁴ Correspondence on Turkish policy respecting the Straits, the Montreux Conference of 1936 for Revision of the Regime of the Straits, and related matters is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1936, vol. III, pp. 503 ff. For a brief summary of pertinent developments in the early years of World War II, see *The Problem of the Turkish Straits* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 36.

⁵ For the British-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed at Ankara October 19, 1939, see the League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CC, p. 167; for the British-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, signed at London May 26, 1942, see *ibid.*, vol. CCIV, p. 353.

tions could be held anywhere and that Turkey would be more interested in political than in military talks. He had thought that it was a wise decision to hold the recent Allied conversations at Moscow and he would have no objection to holding the conversations there again. He added that if the Turkish response were negative he could only ask that it be received with the fullest understanding.

F[OY] D. K[OHLER]

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 11 November 1943.

No. SD 1. Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.

A problem which is almost certain to arise at the coming conference is Soviet insistence on the importance of Sweden's cooperation in the war.² Molotov has made their attitude plain on several occasions since the conference³ ended.

Yesterday I had a talk with the Swedish Minister⁴ in which he described his talk with Molotov at the reception,⁵ indicating that although he considered Molotov's attitude toward him friendly he considered very significant Molotov's statement criticizing Sweden's neutrality. He explained further that this subject was intimately connected with Finland's dropping out of the war[;] also he told me of his talk with Secretary Hull in which the Secretary said that the United States had expressed to Finland our views on the advisability of her dropping out of the war and that this was as far as the United States was prepared to go. The Swedish Minister stated that he considered it probable Finland would withdraw from the war promptly if she could be given assurance that Soviet troops would not occupy Finland under the guise of protecting her from the Germans. Finland would prefer to fight it out with the Germans on her own even though it would mean a difficult period of German occupation. In this connection he said that he considered the United States would be the only effective means of preventing Russian occupation of Finland but that this effectiveness would be considerably reduced if not exercised at once.

Explained to him of course that I could add nothing to what the Secretary had told him. As Sweden was so much interested in the Finnish withdrawal from the war before it was too late, I asked

¹ Apparently sent via military channels. The message bears the following handwritten notation: "To take up with Mr. Churchill".

² See *ante*, pp. 135-136.

³ Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

⁴ Per Vilhelm Gustaf Assarsson.

⁵ Reception given by the Soviet Government on November 7, 1943, the anniversary of the revolution of 1917.

whether he considered Sweden could do anything about it on their own. He said the Swedes would be ready to supply Finland with food for the next six months which would be necessary when shipments from Germany stopped, and perhaps take other steps which would risk German retaliation, but he was not optimistic about Sweden being able to influence the Soviet Government's present determination to occupy Finland. He said he considered that the next few weeks was the critical time and that they were certainly ready to advise the Finns, if they had the opportunity, to accept harsh terms from the Soviet Government now rather than very much harsher terms if they continued in the war, but he was not optimistic that this would move the Finnish Government in time.

It was his opinion that the Finnish Government were placing too much reliance upon the goodwill of the United States in its effect on their future status and that they did not realize it was their responsibility to work their problems out with the Soviet Government on their own.

As to Sweden's participation in the War, the Swedish Minister indicated that the Swedes he thought were ready to take certain risks. He himself would be ready to go further than the Swedish Government. He pointed out that it was the ambition of the King to lead his people through the war without the suffering that would come from participation. He talked quite frankly about the difficulties that neutrality to the end would present in their permanent relations with the Soviet Government and indicate[d] that he considered the Swedish Government should weigh this seriously as against the policy pursued up to now by the King and his advisors.

I have the feeling that the Swedish Minister was anxious to get advice from me. As I have no instructions I avoided expressing any opinion.

Roosevelt Papers

*Memorandum by the Department of State*¹

THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY

It is proposed that, in accordance with the declarations of the principal United Nations regarding the unconditional surrender of Germany, the terms of surrender to be accepted unconditionally by

¹ Sent by C. W. Gray to Miss Tully at the White House, under cover of a memorandum of November 11, 1943, which read: "Secretary Hull phoned that the President desired this document this afternoon. We apologize for its appearance but it is the only one we have to send you on this short notice." This paper is a copy of the proposal submitted by Hull at the Moscow Conference on October 23, 1943. See Hull, vol. II, pp. 1284-1287.

Germany shall be previously agreed upon jointly by the Governments of Great Britain, the U. S. S. R. and the United States; and that in coming to this agreement the three Governments be guided by the following principles:

1. That an instrument be signed which contains an admission of the total defeat of Germany.
2. That the instrument be signed both by an authorized agent of whatever German Government may exercise power *de jure* or *de facto* and by an authorized agent of the military authorities.
3. That the instrument empower the United Nations to exercise all the rights of an occupying power throughout Germany.
4. That the instrument bind the German Government to deliver, without reciprocity, all prisoners of war and such other nationals of United Nations states as may be held in detention.
5. That the instrument empower the United Nations to regulate the demobilization of the German armed forces.
6. That the instrument stipulate the release of the political prisoners held by the German Government, the abandonment of the concentration camps and the delivery to agents designated by the United Nations of persons who may subsequently be accused of actions within the United Nations' definition of war crimes.
7. That the instrument bind the German Government to the continued maintenance of all agencies of economic control, together with their staffs, complete records and other equipment, for subsequent disposition by the United Nations authorities.
8. That the instrument empower the United Nations to supervise the economic activities of Germany.
9. That the instrument bind the German Government to deliver, according to the stipulations of the United Nations High Command, all arms and armaments, other military and naval stores, and stocks of raw materials wherever located.

A.—Treatment of Germany During the Armistice Period

Inter-Allied Control. It is proposed that, during the armistice period a strict international control—military, political and economic—be maintained; and that this control be exercised through an inter-Allied Control Commission charged with the carrying out of the terms of surrender and the policies agreed upon by Great Britain, the U. S. S. R. and the United States.

The Occupation of Germany. For the purpose of securing the execution of surrender terms and assuring the creation of conditions for a permanent system of security it is recommended that the occupation of Germany be effected by contingents of British, Soviet and American forces.

Local Government. It is recommended that policy with respect to local government (functions, agencies, personnel) be based upon the principle of minimum interference with established mechanisms and

procedures. All Nazi government officials, in whatever capacity, should be promptly eliminated and every vestige of the Nazi regime should be uprooted.

It is recommended that effective supervision of local government be maintained by the occupation authorities and the Control Commission through the media of:

1. Mandatory and veto power over acts of key administrators.
2. Control of personnel administration.
3. Control over the administrative functions of the governmental authorities.

Treatment of National Socialist Party. The National Socialist Party should be dissolved forthwith. The functions of certain existing structures, such as those dealing with employment and social insurance, might be continued temporarily, subject to a thorough-going elimination of Nazi and other objectionable elements and to effective supervision by the occupation authorities.

Reparations. It is recommended that the principle be recognized that it is the duty of Germany to provide reparations for the physical damages inflicted by its armed forces upon the U. S. S. R. and other Allied and occupied countries; and that the forms, extent, and distribution of such reparations be determined through a Commission on German Reparations, consisting initially of representatives of the Governments of Great Britain, the U. S. S. R. and the United States, with provision for the representation of other directly interested governments.

Disarmament. For the purpose of providing a basis for a general security system, it is proposed that, on the cessation of hostilities:

1. All German armed forces should be disarmed and demobilized;
2. All arms, ammunition and military equipment and facilities wherever located should be surrendered to the United Nations;
3. Captured and surrendered arms should be scrapped;
4. Manufacture of war matériel should cease immediately;
5. For the armistice period at least the control of arms manufacturing facilities, as well as all economic facilities, in Germany should be transferred to the United Nations.

Among measures of permanent control of German military potential, the following are suggested for consideration:

1. Germany should be denied a standing army and military training should be prohibited;
2. The German General Staff should be disbanded and should not be reconstituted in any form;
3. The military caste system in all its phases should be eliminated;
4. Arms manufacturing facilities in Germany should be dismantled;

5. The importation and manufacture in Germany of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, and materials essential to their manufacture, including all types of aircraft, should be prohibited;

6. A permanent audit and inspection system should be established and maintained under supervision of the United Nations.

B.—Permanent Status of Germany

Problem of German Political Unity. At the present time there is no indication whether the effect of defeat will be to strengthen the trend towards political unity within Germany, or whether the reaction against the defeated Hitler regime will lead to emergence of a spontaneous movement for the creation of several separate states out of the territory of the present Reich. Certain vital phases of this question continue under study.

Democratic Government. It is the view of the American Government that, in the long run, the most desirable form of government for Germany would be a broadly based democracy operating under a bill of rights to safeguard the civil and political liberties of the individual. Among the conditions required for the success of a new democratic experiment in Germany would be: a tolerable standard of living; restriction of measures of control to the requirements of general security; harmony of policy and purpose among the British, Soviet and American Governments. Since the administration of Germany will be controlled by the inter-Allied mechanisms during the armistice period, it is during that period that the bases of a democratic regime should be laid. Early steps should be taken to restore freedom of speech, religion, and of the press, freedom to organize political parties other than of Nazi-Fascist doctrine, cultural associations and trade unions. When conditions permit, preparations should be made for the holding of free elections for the creation of a central German Government to which the occupation authorities would gradually transfer their responsibility for the internal administration of the country.

Decentralization. It is the view of the American Government that the potential threat of Germany to general security might be lessened through decentralization of the German political structure, through assigning to the federal units control over a wide range of administrative functions, and through encouraging any movement which may emerge within Germany in favor of the diminution of Prussian domination over the Reich.

Frontiers. This is a matter which should come within the purview of the general settlement.

J. C. S. Files

Report by the Joint Staff Planners¹

SECRET

11 NOVEMBER 1943.

J. C. S. 600

V. L. R. AIRFIELDS (B-29) IN THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA AREA

1. In the final QUADRANT Report,² C. C. S. 319/5, the following decisions were made:

"6. *h.* Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan."

"40. To continue to build up and increase the air routes and air supplies of China, and the development of air facilities, with a view to:

a. Keeping China in the war.

b. Intensifying operations against the Japanese.

c. Maintaining increased U. S. and Chinese Air Forces in China.

d. Equipping Chinese ground forces."

2. It now appears possible that B-29 aircraft will be available early in 1944 and that offensive operations from India and China against Japan might be intensified earlier than contemplated at QUADRANT if suitable airfields could be constructed in India and Chengtu area of China.³

3. Current studies indicate that a minimum of 4 such airfields in the Calcutta area and 5 in the Chengtu area would probably be required for the employment of these aircraft.

4. The airfields in the Calcutta area would be constructed in coordination with British authorities in India.

5. The airfields at Chengtu would be constructed in coordination with the Chinese Government.

6. It is believed that operations against the Japanese from China can be intensified in the spring of 1944 by the use of B-29 bombers if airfields are made available in the Calcutta and Chengtu areas.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended:

a. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff authorize that facilities be made available in the Calcutta area which are necessary for the construction of 4 V. L. R. airfields.

¹ Submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on November 11, 1943; forwarded by them, with minor editorial changes, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff; and circulated on November 18, 1943, as C. C. S. 401. For Roosevelt's telegram of November 10, 1943, to Churchill on this subject, see *ante*, p. 172.

² The records of the First Quebec (QUADRANT) Conference, August 1943, are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

³ See Matloff, pp. 328-330.

b. That the proper U. S. authorities initiate necessary measures to construct 5 V. L. R. airfields in the Chengtu area of China.

c. That these airfields be constructed by May 1944 insofar as practicable consistent with the commitments already placed on the Allied Commanders in those areas.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 12 November 1943.

No. 503. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and most secret.

Para 1. Reference your No. 417 of 11th November.²

Para 2. I have immediately telegraphed to General Auchinleck to render every possible assistance in the constriction [*construction*] of the four air bases.

¹ Sent to Washington by the American Embassy, London, apparently via military channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room by pouch on November 15, 1943; received by Roosevelt November 20 at Oran.

² Message sent from Washington, November 10, 1943; *ante*, p. 172.

740.0011 Moscow/257 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 12, 1943—noon.

1925. Secret and personal for the Secretary from the Ambassador.

Reference your 1180 November 9,¹ as authorized by the Department I have had my letter of Nov. 10 to Molotov containing the President's agreement concerning Turkey attached as an annex to the Soviet-British protocol concerning Turkey signed by Molotov and Eden on November 1 in Moscow.²

Since Molotov finally decided that the above arrangement was preferable I did not insist on the protocol and annex being incorporated in the secret military record of the conference.

HARRIMAN

¹ *Ante*, p. 171.

² See *ante*, p. 148.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 13 November 1943.

URGENT

(Personal and secret for Hopkins from Harriman)

...² No reply has been received to Secretary Hull's November 2 regarding Italian ships.³ Molotov showed interest in knowing what is being done to implement our favorable reaction to their request. Molotov would probably be entirely satisfied if I could tell him that this matter would be discussed at the conference in Cairo but then he might want to bring a naval representative to discuss the matter.⁴

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² For the portion of the telegram which is omitted here, see *ante*, p. 85.

³ *Ante*, p. 149.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 75.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 13 November 1943.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret. Nr. 504.

1. You have, no doubt, been informed of the lamentable outrages committed by the French in Syria.² These completely stultify the agreements we have made with the French and also with the Syrians and Lebanese.³ There is no doubt in my mind that this is a foretaste of what de Gaulle's leadership of France means. It is certainly entirely contrary to the Atlantic Charter⁴ and much else that we have declared. The situation will be most grave throughout the whole of the Middle East and the Arab world and also every where people will say: "What kind of a France is this which, while itself subjugated by the enemy, seeks to subjugate others?"

2. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the British and United States Governments should take this up in the strongest manner together. Already we have seen the character of the body we recognised

¹ Apparently sent to Washington via military channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room, by pouch on November 15, 1943, to Roosevelt; received by Roosevelt November 20 at Oran.

² See *ante*, p. 84, footnote 2.

³ See (1) George Kirk, *The Middle East in the War* (a volume of the *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946*, published by the Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952), pp. 107-109, 124-126; (2) J. C. Hurewitz (editor), *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East; A Documentary Record* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1956), vol. II, pp. 231-232; and (3) the sources cited on those pages.

⁴ August 14, 1941; for text, see *Foreign Relations, 1941*, vol. I, p. 367, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1603.

at QUADRANT⁵ totally altered by de Gaulle's complete assumption of power. The outrages in the Levant are of a different character and afford full justification, with the support of world public opinion, of bringing the issue with de Gaulle to a head.

3. Our position should be that the kidnapped Lebanese President and Ministers should be set at liberty and permitted to resume their full function, and that the assembly should meet again as soon as conditions of law and order can be guaranteed. If he fails to do this at once, we should withdraw our recognition from the French National Committee and stop the process of arming the French troops in North Africa.

4. Meanwhile, I am enquiring carefully into the state of our forces in the Levant. At the same time, should action be taken it would be necessary to take precautions in North Africa, for I assure you there is nothing this man will not do if he has armed forces at his disposal.

⁵ The body referred to is the French Committee of National Liberation. The records of the First Quebec (QUADRANT) Conference, August 1943, are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

740.0011 EW 1939/31932: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*¹

ANKARA, November 14, 1943—1 p.m.

1868. Most secret for the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs² last night gave me a detailed account of his conversations with Eden in Cairo and his subsequent talks with the British Ambassador in Ankara.³ He promised to send me a copy of the minutes of his meeting with the dean [*Eden?*] as soon as they are prepared which I will transmit when received.⁴ The main points he emphasized in his conversations with me were:

(1) The Turkish Government prefers to discuss Turkey's entry into the war rather than the mere granting of air bases as in its opinion the granting of air bases would inevitably involve Turkey's entrance into the war.

(2) Eden, although proposing action by Turkey tantamount to entry into the war, failed to indicate what if any assistance the Turks might expect from the Allies.

¹ A slightly abbreviated paraphrase of this telegram was sent by the White House Map Room to Greer on November 17, 1943, apparently via military channels, "to be held for delivery to the President upon arrival at Oran." Roosevelt arrived at Oran on November 20.

² Numan Menemencioglu.

³ Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen. Regarding these talks, see *ante*, pp. 180 and 174.

⁴ Not found.

(3) The Turkish Army is not equipped for offensive action and in consequence the Turkish Government must anticipate the devastation of Istanbul and Izmir, their only two large cities, with a substantial part of the population of these two cities homeless during the winter, its railroad system paralyzed by the destruction of innumerable bridges and trestles with the resultant demoralization of the transportation system leading to starvation in many areas and a general economic breakdown, unless it is satisfied that adequate aerial protection will be made available by the Allies.

(4) The readiness of the Turks to sanction Turkey's entry into war has been adversely affected by the failure of the British to send adequate forces to take over and hold the islands in the Aegean.

(5) In the absence of strong Allied forces in or immediately available to Turkey, particularly aviation, the Turkish Government must consider the probability of a violent Axis reaction to the granting of air bases or other acts of war which might lead to an invasion of Turkey and the devastation of the country to no advantage, while at the same time the Allies would presumably be obliged to send large forces to stem a German drive into the Near East. Should the Germans desire an easy victory to restore their prestige the foregoing probability would become a certainty.

(6) The request of Eden that Turkey grant air bases or enter the war prior to December 3 affords insufficient time to make the necessary military preparations and to prepare public opinion.

(7) It was unreasonable for Eden [to] ask for air bases or for Turkey's entrance into the war without at least a partial disclosure of Allied military plans in respect of the Near East and the Balkans.

(8) There would not be the slightest hesitation on the part of the Turkish Government to enter the war were Anglo-American forces to land in the Balkans as this would imply the availability of adequate Allied forces to support Turkey.

After summarizing his talks with Eden Numan said that the President and Cabinet had been in virtually continuous session since his return from Cairo and that he was having difficulty with some members of the Cabinet who were opposed to Turkey's abandoning its neutrality. He said he was also being embarrassed by insistent demands from various members of Parliament (which is now in session) for information as to his talks with Eden and the course which the Government proposes to pursue. He said it would be necessary for him, within the next few days, to reply publicly to these questions and that in so doing he intended to refer to Turkey's obligations under the Turkish-British alliance⁵ and would endeavor to make a non-committal statement. He added that to avoid undesirable repercussions in the Turkish or Anglo-American-Soviet press the Turkish newspapers would be severely restricted in what they would be per-

⁵ For the British-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed at Ankara October 19, 1939, see the League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167.

mitted to print and that the Turkish censors would scrutinize the despatches of the foreign correspondents with the utmost care.

Numan then said that a meeting of the President and the Cabinet would be held today at which the Turkish reply to Eden's proposals would be formulated. He observed that although he was not as yet certain of the nature of the reply, if he was successful in overcoming the opposition of some members of the Cabinet, the reply would in substance express Turkey's readiness in principle to enter the war and at same time it would set forth Turkey's military deficiencies and stress the dangers of precipitous action in the absence of military program involving adequate support for Turkey.

Numan intimated that in drafting the Turkish reply he would endeavor to avoid even the appearance of specifying conditions of Turkey's entry into the war but would seek rather to set forth the circumstances under which Turkey's entry would be effective and produce the desired results without running the risk of disaster for Turkey and the consequent damage to Allied military plans and prestige.

Numan said he would send me a copy of the Turkish Government's reply to Eden's proposals⁶ and as Eden had stated that he also spoke on behalf of the Americans and Russians it was his intention to instruct the Turkish Ambassadors in Washington and Moscow to deliver copies to the American and Russian Foreign Ministers.

Throughout our talk I was forcibly struck by the extreme frankness with which Numan discussed Turkey's probable entry into the war. I gained the distinct impression that the Turkish Government has already decided in principle to enter the war and to cooperate wholeheartedly with the Allies but that it is convinced that certain conditions precedent to its entry are vital not only in its own interests but in those of the Allies as well. These conditions grow out of a sober recognition by the Turkish Government of its military deficiencies and economic weaknesses and the realization that without adequate Allied forces immediately available disaster may result from the country's premature entry into the war. Numan however made it unmistakably clear to me that the Turkish Government is quite prepared and expects to make what he described as its contribution in blood, suffering and devastation of its country to the Allied victory but that such contribution should serve a useful purpose in furthering the Allied cause which Turkey wholeheartedly espouses and not entail needless sacrifices occasioned by precipitous action with inadequate forces which could only result in Turkey becoming a liability rather than an asset to the Allies.

STEINHARDT

⁶ See Hull's telegram of November 22, 1943, to Roosevelt, *post*, p. 374.

740.0011 EW 1939/31933: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*¹

ANKARA, November 14, 1943—6 p. m.

1870. Most secret for the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary.

In conversation with the Foreign Minister last night he told me that in reply to von Papen's questions yesterday as to the nature of his talks with Eden he had told him that Eden had given him an account of the Moscow Conference and has assured him that it had been an outstanding success. In reply to a question by von Papen as to whether Eden had requested that Turkey grant air bases to the Allies or that Turkey enter the war, Numan said he had denied that there had been a request for air bases but had admitted that Eden had sought Turkey's entry into the war. He said he had evaded a direct answer as to the Turk Government's probable reply by emphasizing Turkey's present position, unpreparedness and military weakness.

Numan made it clear that the Turk Government must now take into consideration the possibility of preventive action by the Axis as he deems it unlikely that the nature of the deliberations of the Turk Government can be wholly concealed from the Axis.

As an indication that the Germans are already giving consideration to the possibility of Turkey's entry into the war, was today informed that the German authorities have instructed their commercial representatives in Turkey to cease all purchases of Turk products and to dispatch all goods on hand as quickly as possible. (See also my 1855 November 12, 7 p. m.)²

STEINHARDT

¹ A slightly abbreviated paraphrase of this telegram was sent by the White House Map Room to Greer on November 17, 1943, apparently via military channels, "to be held for delivery to the President upon arrival at Oran." Roosevelt arrived at Oran on November 20.

² Not printed herein.

740.0011 EW 1939/31934: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*¹

ANKARA, November 14, 1943—7 p. m.

1871. Most secret for the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary.

¹ A slightly abbreviated paraphrase of this telegram was sent by the White House Map Room to Greer on November 17, 1943, apparently via military channels, "to be held for delivery to the President upon arrival at Oran." Roosevelt arrived at Oran on November 20.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me last night the Russian Ambassador ² had said that if, as he now understood from the British Ambassador, the Turkish Government's concern about Russia's intentions was prompted only [by] fear of excessive demands in the Balkans and not by a general mistrust or suspicion, he had little doubt a satisfactory solution could be found. Numan remarked that if the Turkish Government could be satisfied that the Russians did not harbor ambitions in the Balkans "we could resume the cordial and intimate friendship between the two countries which existed for so many years."

Repeated to Moscow.

STEINHARDT

² Sergey Alexandrovich Vinogradov.

J. C. S. Files

*Minutes of the President's Meeting With the Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 15, 1943, 2 P. M., President's Cabin, U. S. S. "Iowa"*¹

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3. REARMAMENT OF FRENCH FORCES

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With regard to the matter of rearming of French forces, THE PRESIDENT read a recent telegram from the Prime Minister ² wherein he said he was much disturbed about the fact that De Gaulle had thrown out Giraud.

GENERAL MARSHALL observed that we were committed to equipping the French to the extent of 11 or 12 divisions unless this matter should be stopped soon.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that General Eisenhower be interrogated as to whether he really needed these particular French divisions which were to be equipped.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that while the paper provided for the equipping of 11 French divisions, only about 9 of them would be effective. He felt that we should go ahead with the plans to equip these divisions but not commit ourselves beyond the present commitments.

ADMIRAL LEAHY felt that it might be desirable to delay on equipping the 11 divisions in question in that when they were equipped De Gaulle would undoubtedly use them as a lever with which to enhance his own position. He again suggested that General Eisenhower be questioned as to the need for equipping these divisions.

THE PRESIDENT observed that he understood General Eisenhower wants to use the 11 divisions.

¹ Present were Roosevelt, Hopkins, Leahy, Marshall, King, Arnold, Brown, and Royal. For additional excerpts from the minutes of this meeting, see *ante*, p. 86. See also Matloff, pp. 338-339.

² *Ante*, p. 174.

ADMIRAL KING said he believed that De Gaulle was constantly increasing his prestige and would certainly take advantage of these 11 divisions to further strengthen his position.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that De Gaulle plans to use 9 divisions to solidify his own position in France. If De Gaulle gets into France with say 10 well equipped divisions, he can readily take charge of the Government of France by force.

GEN. MARSHALL agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should not say anything about this matter until after they had had an opportunity to talk with General Eisenhower. This would give General Eisenhower an "easy out", i. e., provide the French with equipment as *we* move out; in other words, not ship in any additional equipment for the French but transfer United States equipment as United States troops go out.

THE PRESIDENT observed that the British wanted to build up France into a first class power, which would be on the British side. He said it was his opinion that France would certainly not again become a first class power for at least 25 years.

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6. UNITED NATIONS STRATEGY IN THE BALKANS-EASTERN
MEDITERRANEAN
(J. C. S. 558 and 558/1)³

THE PRESIDENT then read the proposed policy regarding the United Nations strategy in the Balkans-Eastern Mediterranean area presented to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J. C. S. 558 & 558/1). THE PRESIDENT said as far as he was concerned—Amen. The paper was "okay" and approved by him. He added that he felt we should send the paper to the British and during the first few days of the SEXTANT Conference definitely stand on it.⁴

7. COMMAND

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were now considering the very involved subject of high command in Europe and the Pacific.⁵

THE PRESIDENT said that it was his idea that General Marshall should be the commander in chief against Germany and command all the British, French, Italian and U. S. troops involved in this effort.

8. ROME AN OPEN CITY

ADMIRAL LEAHY brought up the matter of Rome as an open city (J. C. S. 463/2 and 463/3.³)

³ Neither printed herein.

⁴ The paper as presented became C. C. S. 402, *post*, p. 210.

⁵ The J. C. S. proposals on this subject are printed *post*, p. 203.

THE PRESIDENT said he felt that we should leave this matter up to General Eisenhower. General Eisenhower knows that we do not want to burn Rome.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that in General Eisenhower's reply regarding Rome as an open city⁷ he had said that it would be necessary to set up the Italian Government in Rome. He felt that we could be placed in a difficult position in this matter if we moved now to refer it to the Germans. They could delay reply until the time for their withdrawal was imminent and then propose Rome as an open city without any restrictions, which would deny us the vitally necessary communications through the Rome district as well as the freedom to set up the Italian Government headquarters in Rome, which General Eisenhower regarded as an important necessity. It was not likely that with Berlin and London under bombardment the Germans would agree to the Italian Government being protected against such measures. He felt we should do nothing about Rome at this time.

MR. HOPKINS said that from a political point of view it would be worthwhile making Rome an open city. If, on the other hand, the Germans are getting ready to move out, it would probably be better to let the matter ride at this time as the United Nations definitely need the communication and transit facilities of Rome.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he still believed from a domestic, political point of view we should accept the original Italian proposal.⁸ He felt that it should have been accepted two months ago.

THE PRESIDENT observed that we had as yet received no final report about the plane which recently bombed the Vatican. It was his opinion that the question of whether or not Rome should be declared an open city should be delayed for the present and that matters regarding this subject should be decided upon an "episode basis." He pointed out that the Germans might desire to use Rome as a pivot and it would be preferable to do nothing about this matter at this time.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was General Eisenhower's intention to encircle Rome by an amphibious movement of one division, probably reinforced by certain units from a second (airborne) division.

9. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

With regard to the matter of the Italian Government, THE PRESIDENT observed that the British are definitely monarchists and want to keep kings on their thrones. They are monarchist-minded. He then quoted from a message to the Prime Minister from Mr. McMillan

⁷ Eisenhower to the War Department for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 8, 1943 (740.0011 EW 1939/31953a); not printed herein.

⁸ The Italian proposal was set forth in a memorandum of August 26, 1943, from the Apostolic Delegate at Washington to the Department of State, *post*, p. 268.

[*Macmillan*].⁹ He observed that the British are definitely anti-Sforza. He added that the paper before him contained an extensive discussion of background by the British Foreign Office. While we would like to get the King out, at the same time General Eisenhower wants to get to Rome before there is any "bust-up."

THE PRESIDENT said that he felt we should go along with "Ike".

MR. HOPKINS observed that the Prime Minister is again using his old tactics and that he wants to go back to the old system. He evidently really desires a *status quo* as regards monarchies but would possibly be in a position to blame the United States for any overthrow of the King.

ADMIRAL LEAHY questioned whether it would make any difference to the United States whether King Emanuel stays or not.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that we cannot sit tight after we get to Rome because we have promised the Italians a plebiscite.¹⁰

ADMIRAL KING recommended that we let the situation solve itself.

10. TRUSTEESHIP

THE PRESIDENT referred to a recent memorandum from Mr. Stettinius with regard to the matter of "trusteeship", particularly as regards places in the Pacific.¹¹ He felt that we should keep in mind the matter of "trusteeship" and that this form of administration presents itself to [*as?*] a very satisfactory solution of the government of ex-enemy territory.

11. DOCUMENTATION OF THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE

THE PRESIDENT handed the U. S. Secretary ¹² an envelope containing the documentation of the Moscow Conference ¹³ which had been presented to him by Mr. Hull. It was directed that this paper be circulated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their perusal.

12. CIVIL AFFAIRS

THE PRESIDENT said that he had been informed that the British were proposing to acquire a large building in London in which could be

⁹ No pertinent message from Macmillan to Churchill has been found in the Roosevelt Papers. The paper which Roosevelt had before him at this meeting may be a telegram of September 17, 1943, from the British Foreign Office to Macmillan at Algiers, which was made available by the British Government to the Department of State via the British Embassy at Washington and, on September 18, was forwarded by the Department to Roosevelt; not printed herein (Roosevelt Papers). It contained a paragraph on Sforza's role in Italian politics.

¹⁰ In a radio broadcast of July 28, 1943, Roosevelt had said: "Eventually Italy will reconstitute herself. It will be the people of Italy who will do that, choosing their own government in accordance with the basic democratic principles of liberty and equality." Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, July 31, 1943, p. 57.

¹¹ *Ante*, p. 167.

¹² Captain Forrest B. Royal.

¹³ The records of the Moscow Conference are scheduled to be published in *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. i.

set up a United Nations civil affairs administration. He said that it was evident that the British contemplated a very large Secretariat and it was a question as to whether we should match them with a large Secretariat or go into the matter on a smaller scale. He pointed out that regardless of the extent of the Civil Affairs Secretariat, decisions on major matters would have to be made by himself, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin. The Secretariat itself would have no authority to make decisions. He pointed out that if the Secretariat became too large and unwieldy, it might become more than "advisory".

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested the possibility of assigning to this proposed Civil Affairs Secretariat a small, very able planning group.

MR. HOPKINS said that just before the Presidential party left Washington, General Macready informed him that he had gotten a wire that the entire question of Combined Civil Affairs Committee versus the British idea of a large Civil Affairs Secretariat in London would be put on the table by the British at SEXTANT. He pointed out as it now stood the Soviets were not represented on the Combined Civil Affairs Committee. He added that Mr. McCloy had been concerned with the "headache" of printing money for use in France. He said that it has been heard from London that all things of this sort will be settled and take place there.

MR. HOPKINS felt that the matter should be watched with great care lest the military layout be placed in jeopardy. He considered that this matter was a very tricky business and added that he believed the Soviets would not take the Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that General De Gaulle will be right behind the army when there is penetration into France and take over by his faction as rapidly as the army advances.

MR. HOPKINS said that he had talked to several of the State Department people who accompanied Mr. Hull to Moscow. These gentlemen felt that the Soviets were not particularly interested in playing up the proposed large Civil Affairs Secretariat.

THE PRESIDENT observed that Mr. Hull's memorandum on [*in?*] the documentation of the Moscow Conference differed considerably from some of the cables.

MR. HOPKINS said that he bet Mr. Eden would be at SEXTANT.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that any move to remove the center of gravity from Washington to London concerns him extremely.

15. AGENDA FOR COMING CONFERENCE

THE PRESIDENT said he hoped to see Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on 22 November. He said he proposed to assign General Somervell to take care of Madame, if she comes. He said that he desired the meeting with the Generalissimo and himself and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

to be separate from and precede any meeting with the British. He said he would like to see a proposed agenda for his meeting with (1) Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; (2) with Prime Minister Churchill; and (3) with Marshal Stalin.

THE SECRETARY was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to arrange to have the proposed draft agenda drawn up by the Planners.¹⁴

¹⁴ See *post*, p. 245.

740.0011 EW 1939/31968 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*¹

ANKARA, November 16, 1943—6 p. m.

1880. Most secret for the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary.

An American newspaper correspondent informed me this afternoon that the Turk censor had told the foreign correspondents this morning that no further press despatches referring to the battle on the Island of Leros would be passed by the censors.

I interpret the foregoing as indicating a desire by the Turks to conceal the increased assistance which they are rendering to the British on the islands who are being hard-pressed, and who are said to have been out-numbered for several days as the result of the landing of German reinforcements. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the lighthouses on the Turk coast in the vicinity of Leros were extinguished last night to permit the landings on Leros by the British of Greek guerrillas.

STEINHARDT

¹ No record has been found of the forwarding of this message to Roosevelt, who was aboard the U. S. S. *Iowa* en route to Africa at this time.

740.0011 EW 1939/31975 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*¹

ANKARA, November 16, 1943—11 p. m.

1884. Most secret for the President, the Secretary and Under Secretary.

¹ No record has been found of the forwarding of this message to Roosevelt, who was aboard the U. S. S. *Iowa* en route to Africa at this time.

In conversation with the Russian Ambassador² yesterday, after expressing to each other our pleasure at the outcome of the Moscow Conference, the Ambassador said that he had not endeavored to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs³ for some days as he thought it preferable that the British Ambassador⁴ continue his negotiations with Numan for the purpose of establishing whether the Turks were more interested in the military than in the political aspects of their possible entry into the war. In reply to his inquiry as to the impression I had gained on this subject from my talk with the Foreign Minister, I said I was under the impression that since the successful outcome of the Moscow Conference the Turk Government was much more concerned with the military than with the political aspect. Vinogradov said he hoped this would prove to be the case inasmuch as the military aspect was of prime importance to Russia, Great Britain, United States, and Turkey whereas the political aspect if not stressed should not be difficult of solution. He then remarked that Turkey's entry into the war in the near future would be regarded by his Government as a valuable contribution to the Allied victory but that its deferment to a later date would make the contribution of little, if any, value. Although recognizing the vulnerability of Turk cities to aerial attack and Turk military deficiencies in general, he was not clear as to what if any military assistance could or should be rendered the Turks by any of the Allies. He then remarked that if the Turks were still worried about Russian intentions in the Balkans, he failed to understand why Numan had not asked him to call to discuss the matter.

In conclusion Vinogradov said that unless Numan asked him to come to see him, it was his intention to await the progress of the talks between the British and the Turks before calling on the Foreign Minister.

I gained the impression that Vinogradov has been instructed to take no part in the Anglo-Turk talks but to hold himself in readiness, if called upon by Numan, to discuss Turk anxiety with respect to Russian intentions in the Balkans.

Repeated to Moscow.

STEINHARDT

² Sergey Alexandrovich Vinogradov.

³ Numan Menemencioğlu.

⁴ Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen.

Moscow Embassy Records

*Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen)*¹

[Moscow,] November 16, 1943.

CONVERSATION

[Participants:] The American Ambassador, Mr. Harriman
Mr. Bohlen
The Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Molotov
Mr. Pavlov

After an exchange of congratulations on the Tenth Anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the U. S. S. R., the Ambassador told Mr. Molotov that he expected to leave Moscow on Friday, November 19, to meet the President who would be in Cairo on November 22.

The Ambassador then said that, although he had immediately telegraphed to the President to obtain further information in regard to the size of the American military staff and the military subjects to be discussed, the President unfortunately had left before he could reply.² The President was now on shipboard and it was impossible to communicate with him since radio silence was being observed. He added, however, that General Deane and he would be prepared to give Mr. Molotov or the Soviet military representatives any opinions or information they might have as to the probable subjects to be discussed at the meeting. The Ambassador said in regard to the military staff that, while he had no definite information, he believed it would be very restricted.

The Ambassador then, at Mr. Molotov's request, outlined the military subjects which in his opinion would probably come up for discussion. Among these were the coordination of strategy for the opening up of a second front in Europe by the Anglo-American armies this spring, the military aspects of Turkey's participation in the war, the best use which could be made in the Allied cause of the forces in the Mediterranean which would be released when the Allied line was finally stabilized north of Rome, and also the question of the Dodecanese Islands and the opening of the Dardanelles.

Mr. Molotov then inquired whether the Ambassador had received from General Deane the information which General Antonov had given him yesterday, namely that according to Soviet information seven German tank divisions and six infantry divisions had been

¹ For the passages of this memorandum which are omitted, see *ante*, p. 93.

² See *ante*, p. 80.

moved from the West to the Soviet-German front, these divisions coming not from Italy but from Western Europe. Mr. Molotov added that the Germans were pressing the Soviet forces very hard with the help of these new tank divisions in the Fastov sector.

The Ambassador said that General Deane had given him this information and he had, as in the case of previous similar information, cabled immediately to the President, but that, in view of the President's departure, it was obvious no reply could be received.

With reference to the earlier information from the Soviet Government regarding the transfer of German divisions from Italy to the East, the Ambassador said that it was considered more suitable to discuss that and all military questions at the Conference rather than by telegram. He added that General Deane had, however, received information from the United States General Staff to the effect that the plans for the second front which had been outlined at the Conference³ were proceeding satisfactorily and that the schedule as presented would be adhered to.

. . . The Ambassador repeated his offer to give Mr. Molotov any information that either he or General Deane had in regard to possible subjects to be discussed at the meeting, adding that he would of course be glad to transmit to the President any observations in regard to the meeting which Marshal Stalin or Mr. Molotov might have.

Mr. Molotov thanked the Ambassador and then inquired whether the United States Government had anything new on the attitude of the Turkish Government. He said he assumed that the United States Government had been fully informed of Mr. Eden's talks with the Turkish Foreign Minister in Cairo.⁴ The Ambassador replied that he had nothing new but that both the Government and himself had been fully informed of Mr. Eden's talks.

Mr. Molotov then said that the Soviet Government had recent information that the German Ambassador in Ankara, Von Papen, had been given assurances by the Turkish Government that the Turkish attitude toward the war remained unchanged.⁵

The Ambassador then inquired whether Mr. Molotov thought it would be possible for General Deane to discuss with the appropriate Soviet staff officer the American proposal presented at the Conference for air bases⁶ before his departure for the Conference.

³ Moscow Conference; see *ante*, p. 137.

⁴ Numan Menemencioglu. Regarding the talks, see *ante*, pp. 164, 174, 190.

⁵ For Steinhardt's report of a conversation between Menemencioglu and Von Papen on this subject, see *ante*, p. 193.

⁶ Proposal presented at the Moscow Conference; see *ante*, p. 136.

Mr. Molotov replied that he believed the discussion of the American proposals should be arranged before General Deane's departure and agreed with the Ambassador that a preliminary discussion of this question before the meeting at Tehran would be advantageous.

J. C. S. Files

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

SECRET

[ABOARD THE U. S. S. "IOWA",]
17 November 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Command of British and U. S. Forces Operating Against Germany.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff present herewith for your consideration drafts of two proposals, Enclosure "A" and Enclosure "B", relative to the command arrangements for the European Theater.

It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Enclosure "A" is the more sound and from a military point of view is the better plan.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

[Enclosure "A"]¹

Draft Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Command of British and U. S. Forces Operating Against Germany.

1. Current operations in the war against Germany and those approved for the immediate future are grouped geographically and functionally into three categories:

a. Operations in the Mediterranean area involving combined forces with land, sea, and air components.

b. Operations in the northwestern part of Europe, also involving combined forces with land, sea, and air components.

c. Operations against interior Germany involving combined strategic air forces based both in the Mediterranean area and in northwestern Europe.

2. Each of these operations is an entity requiring unity of command over the forces which are engaged.

¹ For subenclosure, entitled "Organization Chart", see p. 207.

3. These operations are all intimately related to each other, with a common, over-all objective—Defeat of Germany. Events in the Mediterranean area attract enemy forces and affect enemy capabilities, which in turn have an important bearing upon our capabilities in northwestern Europe, and vice versa. Strategic air operations against interior Germany strongly affect our capabilities in both areas. Furthermore, the flexibility of the strategic air forces permits their employment in varying degree to assist the Allied forces in either area.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff now consider that the war in Europe has reached a stage where the necessity for command direction over all these forces, in conformity with general directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is clearly indicated. This command should be vested in a single commander, and he should exercise command over the Allied force commanders in the Mediterranean, in northwest Europe, and of the strategic air forces. The immediate appointment of this commander is, in our opinion, most urgently necessary. Even if he is appointed now, it is improbable that he will be able to organize his staff and begin to function before the end of January 1944. The situation which may develop in Europe by that time requires a more positive over-all command arrangement than that now functioning under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Any delay in setting up such a command may lead to confusion and indecision at a critical time, thus delaying the attainment of early victory in Europe.

5. In matters pertaining to strategic bombing, it is imperative that unified Allied command be established. The rapidity with which decisions regarding air operations must be made demands command control, as opposed to general directives or occasional direct action by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We cannot escape the responsibility for adopting every means known to us to save the lives of our men and the planes they fly. The one effective method is to insure the rapid coordinated employment, on a day to day operational basis, of United States air forces in both the U. K. and Mediterranean by day and R. A. F. bomber units by night in order to obtain the maximum dispersion of enemy air and anti-aircraft defense, and to take the greatest possible advantage of weather conditions in both theaters. This unified command must, therefore, be established without delay and must embrace all the strategic air forces engaged against Germany, including the United States Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and the British Bomber Command.

6. The British Chiefs of Staff have proposed the establishment of unified command in the Mediterranean area.² We are in accord with this proposal, with the proviso that the U. S. Fifteenth Air Force should be specifically excepted and commanded as in paragraph 5 above.

² See *ante*, p. 150.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff intend to make the following proposals to the British Chiefs of Staff:

a. That a Supreme Commander be designated at once to command all United Nations operations against Germany from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic under direction from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. That an over-all commander for northwestern European operations be appointed, under the Supreme Commander.

c. That a strategic air force commander be appointed, under the Supreme Commander, to exercise command over the U. S. Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and the British Bomber Command.

d. That the Commander of the Allied Forces in the Mediterranean shall come under the Supreme Commander.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further propose that the Supreme Commander be directed to carry out the agreed European strategy, and

a. Be charged with the location and timing of operations;

b. Be charged with the allocation of the forces and matériel made available to him by the Combined Chiefs of Staff; and

c. That his decisions on the above questions be subject to reversal by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire your approval of these proposals.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY³

Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Chief of Staff to the

Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

[Enclosure "B"]⁴

Draft Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Command of British and U. S. Forces Operating Against Germany.

[Paragraphs 1-3 of this draft are identical with paragraphs 1-3 of enclosure "A", printed *supra*.]

4. The U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff now consider that the war in Europe has reached a stage where the necessity for command direction over all these forces, in conformity with general directives of the Combined Chiefs, is clearly indicated. This command direction should be vested in a single commander, and he should exercise com-

³ As this paper is a draft, the signature is typewritten.

⁴ For subenclosure, entitled "Organization Chart", see p. 208.

mand over the Allied commanders in the Mediterranean, in north-west Europe, and of the strategic air forces. However, we believe that the appointment of an over-all commander would be unacceptable from the British viewpoint at this time. Therefore, we feel that it would be inadvisable to press for such an appointment now. Rather, we suggest that the designation of a Supreme Commander for operations against Germany should be the ultimate goal toward which we aim and that our efforts at this time should be limited to the establishment of an Allied commander over the Mediterranean, as proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, and simultaneously the establishment of an Allied commander over the Strategic Air Forces.

[Paragraph 5 of this draft is identical with paragraph 5 of enclosure "A", printed *supra*.]

6. We are in accord with the British proposal for the establishment of a unified command in the Mediterranean area, but only with the proviso that the U. S. Fifteenth Air Force should be specifically excepted and that its command should be in accordance with paragraph 5 above.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff intend to make the following proposals to the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

a. That the British proposal for unified command in the Mediterranean be accepted, with the proviso that the operational command of the U. S. Fifteenth Air Force be excepted from that command and included in the Allied strategic air force.

b. That a strategic air force commander be appointed to exercise command over the U. S. Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and the British Bomber Command.

8. We intend to advocate 7 *a* and *b* above as initial steps. For the future, the control of the Supreme Commander should be extended first to include coordination of all operations which are in direct support of OVERLORD, and second to include command of all operations (except U. S. S. R.) in the battle against Germany.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY⁵


Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Chief of Staff to the


Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

⁵ As this paper is a draft, the signature is typewritten.

Organization Chart
(Subenclosure to Enclosure "A")



Organization Chart
(Subenclosure to Enclosure "B")



J. C. S. Files

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

SECRET

[ABOARD THE U. S. S. "IOWA",]

17 November 1943.

FOR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Memorandum on Command.

In the event that the proposal for over-all command as shown in Enclosure "A"¹ is turned down by the British Chiefs of Staff, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff recommend that the President proceed directly with the Prime Minister as follows:

Emphasize most strongly that the United States cannot accept the risks and inevitable losses of American lives and resources involved in a committee control of closely related operations. We are willing to take any justifiable risk and accept necessary losses, but it is unthinkable that we should, under any circumstances, countenance avoidable losses.

The necessity for unified command, in our opinion, is so urgent and compelling that, in spite of the fact that the bulk of the forces, both ground and air, will ultimately be American, we are willing to accept a British officer as over-all commander for European operations provided the man named is Sir John Dill. This indicates the weight we give to the matter of undivided command and responsibility. Sir John Dill is well known to our officials and to the American public. He has worked on an intimate personal basis with the U. S. Chiefs of Staff since our entry into the war. We have the highest opinion of his integrity of character and singleness of purpose. He understands our organization, our characteristics, our viewpoint on many subjects, and our way of doing business.

If the proposal outlined above is adopted—and it must be—then Eisenhower should remain in command in the Mediterranean. The question as to what individual should immediately command the cross-Channel phase of OVERLORD is a matter which can be discussed further.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

*Admiral, U. S. Navy,**Chief of Staff to the**Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy*

¹ *Ante*, p. 203.

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*¹

SECRET

[ABOARD THE U. S. S. "IOWA",]

C. C. S. 402

18 November 1943.

STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC POLICY IN THE BALKAN-
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION

The United States Chiefs of Staff note that nowhere among our agreed C. C. S. papers is there a definitive statement of the United Nations strategic policy concerning the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean region. We propose the following, and recommend that it be accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

STATEMENT OF UNITED NATIONS STRATEGIC POLICY IN THE BALKAN-
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION

1. This statement of policy supersedes all prior C. C. S. agreements concerning the entire Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean region.

2. Recognizing that (1) the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean approach to the European Fortress is unsuitable, due to terrain and communication difficulties, for large-scale military operations, (2) the implementation of our agreed strategy for the defeat of Germany will require all available military means, and (3) our experience shows that the acceptance of limited objective operations, however attractive in themselves, invariably requires resources beyond those initially anticipated, we are agreed that our strategy will be best served by causing Germany to dissipate her defensive strength in maintaining her position in the Balkan-Aegean area. So long, therefore, as the present strategic situation in this area remains substantially unchanged, operations in the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean region will be limited to:

- a. The supply of Balkan guerrillas by sea and air transport.
- b. Minor action by Commando forces.
- c. The bombing of vital strategic targets.

3. We agree that it is desirable to bring Turkey into the war at this time but this must be brought about without diversion of resources that would prejudice the success of our commitments elsewhere. To this end, in full collaboration with the U. S. S. R., we should bring pressure to bear on Turkey to enter the war and conduct offensive operations in the Balkans to the extent possible with the resources presently available to her. It must be made clear that military assistance to be furnished Turkey by the United States and Great Britain is limited to such supplies and equipment as can be furnished without prejudice to the successful accomplishment of our commitments elsewhere.

¹ For Roosevelt's approval of the text of this paper prior to its submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see *ante*, p. 195.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

C. C. S. 398

[ABOARD THE U. S. S. "IOWA",]

18 November 1943.

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY AND HER
SATELLITES, 1943-44

The United States Chiefs of Staff propose the following specific operations for the defeat of Germany and her satellites in 1943-44.

1. *Facilities in the Azores Islands.* The facilities of the Azores Islands will be used for (1) intensified sea and air operations against the U-boat, and (2) air ferry operations. The British Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the assurance given by them in QUADRANT¹ that everything will be done by the British as soon as possible to assist in making arrangements for facilities in the Azores for U. S. Naval participation in the anti-U-boat campaign and for the operational and transit use by U. S. aircraft.

2. *The Combined Bomber Offensive.* The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases is a prerequisite to OVERLORD. The Combined Bomber Offensive continues to have highest strategic priority. We have directed that studies be made of the use of bases in the U. S. S. R. for shuttle bombing operations.²

3. *Operation Overlord*

a. This operation will be the primary U. S.-British ground and air effort against Germany. (Target date 1 May 1944.) In the preparatory phase immediately preceding the invasion, the whole of the available air power in the U. K., tactical and strategic, will be employed in a concentrated effort to create the conditions essential to the success of the assault. After adequate channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. Following the establishment of strong Allied Air Forces in France, an intensive air attack on Germany and her military forces, communications and installations will be launched, designed to precipitate the collapse of enemy resistance prior to a general assault on the hostile ground forces in the advance into the heart of Germany.

¹ The records of the First Quebec (QUADRANT) Conference, August 1943, are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

² See *ante*, p. 136.

b. There will be a balanced ground and air force build-up for OVERLORD, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the United Kingdom in readiness to take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic cross-Channel move into France.

c. As between Operation OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of OVERLORD. Operations in the Mediterranean Theater will be carried out with the forces allotted except in so far as these may be varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

d. The Supreme Allied Commander for Operation OVERLORD, when appointed, will establish contact with the Commander in Chief, North African Theater of Operations, and the Commanders in Chief, Middle East, or with the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, if and when appointed, and recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff their general missions and objectives, and the timing of their operations, so as best to support OVERLORD.

4. *Planning for Overlord.* Pending the appointment of the Supreme Allied Commander, COSSAC will continue with the detailed planning and with full preparations for operations OVERLORD and RANKIN.

5. *Operations in Scandinavia*

a. Strong carrier-based raids on German combatant ships in northern Norway should be undertaken in order to relieve naval units from the eastern Atlantic for operations in other theaters.

b. Plans should be developed for operations in the Scandinavian area in the event that circumstances should render the execution of OVERLORD impossible. Such plans should envisage collaboration with the U. S. S. R., with particular reference to opening communications to Sweden and developing a situation favorable for Sweden to enter the war. In the event Sweden enters the war, we should make use of her air bases to establish an air task force of suitable composition to aid in the strategic bombing of Germany.³

6. *Operations in Italy.* The maximum possible pressure will be maintained, with the forces allocated, on German forces in Italy, in order to assist in the creation of the conditions required for OVERLORD, and of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the re-equipped French Army and Air Force into Southern France. The Allied Commander, North Africa, (or the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, if and when appointed)

³ See *ante*, p. 125.

will, in the light of the changing strategic situation, make recommendations from time to time to the Supreme Allied Commander for Operation OVERLORD concerning the operations in the Mediterranean that will, in his judgment, make the greatest contribution towards insuring the success of Operation OVERLORD. Pending the appointment of the Supreme Allied Commander, these recommendations will be made, after coordination with COSSAC, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

7. Operations in the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean Region

[Here follow, as paragraphs *a* and *b*, the paragraphs which are numbered 2 and 3 in the preceding document.]

8. Garrison Requirements and Security of Lines of Communication in the Mediterranean. Defensive garrison commitments in the Mediterranean area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through the Straits of Gibraltar will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in Northwest Africa, so long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans' invading the Iberian Peninsula.

9. Coordinated U. S.-British-U. S. S. R. Operations. We are now examining, and shall continue to seek out, methods and means whereby the defeat of Germany and her satellites can be expedited through maximum coordination of United States, British, and U. S. S. R. operations.

10. Emergency Entry into Europe. We have directed that an extended RANKIN plan be prepared in collaboration with the U. S. S. R., in order that available Allied forces may take prompt action in the event an opportunistic entry into Europe becomes possible. The extended plan will provide for emergency entry into Europe in collaboration with the U. S. S. R. of United Nations forces from the United Kingdom, the North African Theater of Operations, Middle East, and, if required, directly from the United States.

11. German Satellites. We are agreed that, in so far as means can be made available without prejudice to the over-all strategy agreed hereto [*here agreed to?*], effort should be made to separate the satellite powers from Germany.

12. Relations with Patriot Forces in Europe. Within the limits of available means and without prejudice to major operations, patriot forces everywhere within enemy occupied territory in Europe, should be furnished supplies to enable them to conduct sabotage, propaganda, intelligence and guerrilla warfare.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[ABOARD THE U. S. S. "IOWA",]

C. C. S. 300/3

18 November 1943.

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944—EUROPE
(As of 1 November 1943)*The Problem*

1. To prepare an estimate of the enemy situation, 1944—Europe.

Summary of the Existing Situation (1 November 1943)

2. Germany is now under severe strain, and her general situation is deteriorating. Her strength remains formidable, however, and, granted relief from pressure, she still has the power of recuperation.

Germany is now on the defensive on all fronts. She has no decisive offensive capabilities. Her military resources are inadequate to meet all of her defensive requirements. The German Air Force is unable to ward off destructive Allied strategic bombing. Its concentration to resist such bombing leaves Germany's land fronts in the east and south inadequately supported. On both of these fronts the German Army has been compelled to yield considerable ground, at the sacrifice of military, economic, political, and psychological interests, in order to conserve its strength for a final decisive conflict. The German Navy has been unable to prevent the build-up of Allied offensive forces within striking distance of the Continent.

The bomber offensive is increasingly destructive of German air strength, industrial capacity, and morale. Reserves of fit German manpower being now exhausted, continued heavy casualties must cause either a decrease in strength or a decline in quality in the German Army. The prospect is such as to cause her allies to seek means of escape, to encourage renewed resistance in occupied areas, and to impair her own morale. Signs of deterioration in her political structure are beginning to be discernible.

Nevertheless, Germany's armed forces are still strong, experienced, and willing to fight hard. By reason of past conquests, she is still able to fight well in advance of her vital areas (except in the air). Her political structure is designed to withstand internal strain. Given any relief from pressure, she has the power of recovery.

Germany's Most Probable Courses of Action

3. We conclude that Germany's most probable courses of action (*a* and *b* to be followed concurrently) are:

- a.* To stand on the strategic defensive. This includes:

- (1) Continuation of the war against shipping.
- (2) Continued direction of her primary air effort to defense against the bomber offensive.

(3) An intention to counterattack to destroy or expel any hostile force entering her defensive perimeter.

(4) A probable intention to yield outlying occupied territory only under pressure and with maximum practicable delaying action.

b. To seek a negotiated peace by psychological and political means. This includes continuation of her efforts to divide her principal enemies.

c. To sue for peace only after it has been proved impossible to achieve either a negotiated peace or a stalemate.

Forecast for 1944

4. Our forecast for 1944, so far as we are now able to make one, is that:

a. The German war against shipping will continue, but probably with diminishing effect.

b. The bomber offensive against Germany will have cumulative effect destructive of the German fighter force, industrial capacity, and morale. It will create conditions within Germany conducive to complete military defeat.

c. The final German defensive line in the east appears to be marked by the rivers Dniester-(Polish) Bug-Niemen. There they must stand and give decisive battle since further withdrawal would uncover vital areas.

d. Germany will continue to resist as long as hope persists that thereby she may gain a stalemate or negotiated peace. When that hope fails, the High Command may assume control in order to halt destruction prejudicial to Germany's eventual recovery. Unmistakable signs of German collapse will not become apparent until the end of resistance is close at hand; when that point has been reached, disintegration will proceed with startling rapidity.

e. Germany's allies (Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland) will come to terms whenever forced to bear the brunt of direct and sustained attack or whenever relieved of fear of Germany or of the U. S. S. R.

Appendix

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944—EUROPE (As of 1 November 1943)

1. *Basic Factors in the European Situation*

a. *Predominance of Germany.* The enemy situation in Europe must be estimated in terms of the German situation. Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland are merely satellites of Germany and, to a considerable degree, prisoners of circumstance. None of

them could offer prolonged resistance without effective German support; any of them would now disassociate itself from Germany if it could do so without fear of Germany or of the U. S. S. R.

b. *Germany's Basic Task* is now to defend "Festung Europa,"* with such assistance as she can extort from satellite and occupied countries. We believe that her leaders now realize that they cannot win the military victory, but that they still hope that they may be able to avert complete defeat by making the operations of the United Nations to that end so costly as to induce one or more of them to conclude some type of negotiated peace. These hopes provide a basis for continued resistance.

c. "*Festung Europa*."* Germany now controls, directly or indirectly, all of continental Europe west of the Soviet front, except part of Italy and the territories of five neutral states (Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey). This control extends to include the Baltic and Aegean Seas and the Mediterranean islands of Crete and Rhodes. This whole area is encircled by blockade but contains within itself the essentials of a military self-sufficiency.

The western and southern faces of this position are now subject to invasion only by difficult amphibious attack or through mountainous terrain. The eastern face is, however, without clear natural definition. For that reason, and because of the immense forces deployed by the U. S. S. R., the Eastern Front must continue to be Germany's chief preoccupation in land operations.

Despite the best efforts of German propaganda and the employment of large occupational forces, resistance (active or passive) by the subject peoples within "Festung Europa" continues to increase.

2. *The Existing Over-all Situation*

a. *Ground Forces*. European Axis armies now (1 November 1943) comprise 433 combat divisions—315 German, 29 Rumanian, 37 Hungarian, 21 Bulgarian, 15 Finnish, 8 Croat, 6 Slovak, and the equivalent of 2 Italian divisions. Only 258 German divisions and the 7 depleted Rumanian divisions in the Crimea could, however, be counted on for front line service.

The German Army has been brought to such strength only by lowering the physical standards, combing out industrial personnel hitherto deferred, and enlisting considerable numbers of non-Germans. In consequence, the average quality of German divisions has declined. Assuming a continuation of losses at current rates, Germany must either permit the size of her armed forces to decrease or see their quality deteriorate further.

*As herein conceived, "Festung Europa" consists of an essential core (roughly Germany itself, most of Poland, Hungary, and Rumania), surrounded by outer defensive and auxiliary areas. [Footnote in the source text.]

Morale among the German ground forces until lately has been generally excellent, but among the satellite forces it has been only good to fair. Further reverses may produce a lowering of morale during 1944.

b. Air Forces. The total first-line strength of the German Air Force (29 October 1943) is approximately 5,325 U. E. aircraft. The high proportion of fighters (2,550) to bombers (2,300) and other types (475) is indicative of the continued emphasis upon defensive capabilities at the expense of offensive. The rate of production has recently declined as a result principally of bombing attacks, bringing it into approximate balance with the rate of attrition. If the attrition rate can be maintained and further reduction in the rate of production can be effected by increased bombing attacks, a downward trend in over-all strength would promptly result, for no substantial stored reserves of aircraft exist to serve as a cushion.

Owing largely to the shortage of trained crews, the efficiency of the long-range bomber force continues to be low. In equipment, some improvement in present types continues, but no important production of radically new types is expected. In defense against daylight bombing attacks and in offensive operations against shipping, some tactical and technical improvements have been made, particularly in the use of rocket projectiles and radio-controlled bombs, and further improvement may probably be expected. Little, if any, deterioration of air force morale is apparent.

We believe that the remnants of the Italian Air Force in German hands have little, if any, present or potential value. Satellite air strength is negligible except for that of Rumania, which has about 200 aircraft of modern type, half of which are on the southern section of the Eastern Front. Dependent as the satellite air forces are upon German production, they are unlikely to receive any substantial increase in first-line equipment.

c. Naval Forces

(1) *Submarines.* Germany now (1 November 1943) possesses around 400 German-built submarines, of which about 200 are attached to the operating forces. Of the ex-Italian submarines a few in use as supply vessels or blockade runners may be operational but probably no others. None of the ex-French submarines are believed to be operational.

The rate of completion of new submarines (all German-built) may be expected to continue at approximately 20 a month.

Germany is encountering great difficulty in manning submarines. The quality and morale of the personnel have on the average declined and in some instances are very low, but there are no reliable indications that any general breakdown of morale is imminent.

(2) *Surface Vessels (effective combatant types—1 November 1943)*. The major units are 2 battleships, 2 pocket battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, and 4 light cruisers. Of these, the battleships *Tirpitz* (damaged to an unknown extent) and *Scharnhorst* are in northern Norwegian waters; the rest are in the Baltic with their effectiveness probably much reduced by the transfer of experienced personnel to submarines. (The aircraft carrier *Graf Zeppelin* is not operational.) Some 30 destroyers and 40 torpedo boats are in waters from the Bay of Biscay northward (including the Baltic). In service in Mediterranean waters are perhaps 2 destroyers and 3 torpedo boats in the Western Basin and perhaps 5 destroyers and torpedo boats in the Aegean (all ex-French or ex-Italian); as many as 40 more of such light units might be placed in service but no major units.

New construction in progress consists of about 18 destroyers and possibly two ex-Netherlands light cruisers.

We believe that morale is low in the major units but is reasonably high in the light forces.

d. Manpower. German reserves of combat manpower (physically fit German men aged 17-37) are by now exhausted. Future losses in that category can be replaced only from boys attaining age 17 and from recruitment of foreigners and over-age German men.

In contrast to the position in German combat manpower, large reserves of German men in the limited service categories and of foreign manpower still are available.

During the past year the civilian labor force in Germany has actually increased slightly in numbers, mainly as a result of compulsory recruitment of foreigners. It is, however, still 3,000,000 (8%) below the figure for May, 1939. It has been kept up, despite drafts of men for the armed services, by recruitment of foreigners, women, and sub-standard men. This change in composition has caused a decline of about 5 percent in per capita productivity, additional to the numerical decline previously noted.

e. War Economy

(1) *General.* The general level of German industrial production has declined probably 10 percent in recent months, principally because of Allied bombing. Other factors are the blockade, sabotage, and the general strain of war. The deterioration would have been greater had the Germans not achieved improvements in industrial efficiency and obtained additions to the labor force.

(2) *War Production.* Aircraft production and submarine construction facilities have been particular objects of air attack. Single-engine fighter production has been so reduced that it no longer exceeds attrition; submarine construction has fallen below attrition. Motor vehicle production also has failed to equal recent wastage rates. The

production of anti-friction bearings has been so seriously interrupted that it is now believed to be inadequate to sustain the required flow of military equipment. With the exception of fighter aircraft, however, these losses may not be felt immediately on fighting fronts.

With respect to synthetic rubber, aircraft tires, and petroleum products, the protective cushion afforded by excess capacity has already been dangerously thinned or eliminated.

The production of anti-aircraft equipment has probably increased.

The German retreat in the east has brought a saving in rail transport of the order of 3 percent of total ton-miles. This eases the entire German rail situation and permits reallocations of materials and labor as between rail equipment and other products. There is also a saving of the several hundred thousand tons of steel required for repairs of Soviet railroads in 1942.

(3) *Civilian Economy.* Civilian economy in Germany is seriously strained. On top of the pre-war shortage, 15 percent of all dwellings in 43 cities subjected to Allied air attacks have been rendered uninhabitable, and three times that number have suffered damage requiring some emergency repair. Four and one-half million persons have been transferred from danger areas. This, in addition to the social dislocations involved, has placed a heavy burden on transportation. There is a severe shortage of most civilian goods, and services such as electric power and transportation have been greatly curtailed. The food situation is, however, reasonably satisfactory; and, except in heavily bombed areas, civilian living standards have been maintained at a tolerable level.

f. German Civilian Morale and Internal Political Situation. A popular feeling of intense war-weariness and discouragement exists in Germany as a result of the vanishing prospects of victory, the heavy damage and casualties inflicted by the Anglo-American bomber offensive, the heavy casualties on the Eastern Front, the reverses on that front and in North Africa and Italy, the defection of Italy, the comparative failure of the submarine campaign, the feeling that all the victories to date have accomplished nothing decisive while their achievement has drained Germany's strength, the long hours of work, and the uncomfortable, though not generally intolerable, living conditions. But the popular acceptance of the war's continuation is supported by deep fear of the consequences of surrender, which has been zealously fostered by propaganda.

Because of the ruthless and thorough methods employed to prevent the existence in Germany of any free political parties or other voluntary organizations except the churches, almost no opportunities exist for low popular morale to find effective expression in concerted action. The only change of leadership which therefore appears possible at an

early date is one which might be engineered by army officers, supported by big industrialists and landowners. Such a change might, however, lead to a weakening or relaxation of the system of control and thereby make it less difficult for low popular morale to express itself in effective action.

Lacking channels of effective expression, low popular morale appears generally to be taking the form of numbness and apathy. For this reason the internal political situation appears today less precarious than it was, say, in August 1918.

Unmistakable signs of German collapse will probably not become apparent until the end of resistance is close at hand. We believe that the cumulative effect of the factors listed above will then cause disintegration to proceed with startling rapidity.

3. *The Situation by Fronts—1 November 1943*

a. *The War Against Shipping.* Germany's war against ocean shipping has fallen far short of achieving its objective of preventing effective support from overseas of United Nations operations. It has, however, succeeded in delaying such support and limiting its scale, and its effects are still felt in such ways. Moreover, the Germans realize that as long as they continue their submarine attacks, or threaten them, on a serious scale, they will force the United Nations to devote to anti-submarine activities large amounts of manpower, energy, and materials which could advantageously be used for other war purposes and will prevent them from making the most efficient use of available shipping. We believe that the effectiveness of the war against shipping will not increase.

b. *Strategic Air Operations.* The current primary commitment of the German Air Force is defense against Allied strategic bombing. To this end, out of an over-all fighter strength of 2,422 in operational units, 1,686 are concentrated in Germany, the Low Countries, and France. In addition to established dispositions and installations for defense against bombing attacks from Great Britain, it has now become necessary to set up in southern Germany and Austria similar defenses against such attacks from Mediterranean bases. In order to meet these requirements, German air support of the Eastern and Mediterranean land fronts has been seriously curtailed.

Despite these efforts and sacrifices, the Germans have not succeeded in warding off the Allied air offensive, which continues to develop in weight of attack, range of penetration, and technical effectiveness. In addition to general destruction of German industrial capacity and dislocation of civilian life,[†] the German Air Force itself has suffered direct and indirect damage which tends to impair its ability to main-

[†] See paragraphs 2 e and 2 f, Appendix to C. C. S. 300/3. [Footnote in the source text.]

tain the present scale of defense. Heavy combat losses have been inflicted on it, single-engine fighter production has been substantially reduced, the percentage of serviceability has been lowered, and the flow of replacements has been seriously interrupted. The growth of the German fighter force has been checked; attrition and production are now approximately in balance; and, if the attack is pressed, and resisted at current intensity, a decline in strength may be expected, opening the way to further progress in the effectiveness of the attack.

Assuming continued growth in the strength of the Allied air offensive, the results achieved may be expected to increase progressively. The cumulative effects may so weaken Germany's capacity for armed resistance as to accelerate greatly the collapse of her will to continue the conflict.

c. Eastern Front (from Leningrad southward). During 1943 approximately two-thirds of Germany's ground strength has been committed to this front. The proportion of Germany's air strength so committed has been significantly less and has been steadily reduced to meet the increasing requirements of the Western and Mediterranean Fronts, thus facilitating the Soviet advance. German ground strength on the Eastern Front consists of 205 German and 14 satellite divisions of varying strength. Numerically, Soviet ground strength is to the German approximately as 3 to 2. Present air strengths may be compared as follows:

	<i>Fighters</i>	<i>Bombers</i>	<i>Others</i>
Germany	393	1,062‡	237
U. S. S. R.	1,700	2,450	250

During 1943 Germany has surrendered the initiative to the U. S. S. R. and has accepted the necessity of yielding space under pressure in order to minimize losses. The Germans may have hoped that eventually the extension of Red communications and the shortening of their own would bring them to a position which could be held with reduced forces against weakened Red pressure. Thus they might gain greater freedom of action in meeting the requirements of 1944. However, the pressure developed and maintained by the Red Army has exceeded German expectations; and German losses of men, material, and ground have been greater than were anticipated.

At present (1 November 1943) Red penetrations of the Dnieper Bend and the Nogai Steppe have rendered those areas untenable and German withdrawal from them is apparently in progress. The Crimea has been isolated, and may not be tenable for long.§ In the

‡Includes 90 Rumanian. [Footnote in the source text.]

§Axis naval forces in the Black Sea consist principally of 4 Rumanian destroyers, a few submarines, and some motor torpedo boats. [Footnote in the source text.]

Ukraine the Germans may well attempt delay in successive positions (e. g., Kremenchug-Krivoi Rog-lower Dnieper, and Cherkassy-Nikolaev), but no position suitable for a determined stand is apparent east of the general line Dniester River-Zhitomir-Pripet Marshes.

Between the Pripet Marshes and the Dvina River, the Germans will apparently seek to hold on the general line Dnieper River-Orsha-Vitebsk. Further north they may withdraw from the Leningrad-Novgorod area to the general line Vitebsk-Pskov-Narva.

The final German defensive line in the east appears to be marked by the rivers Dniester-(Polish) Bug-Niemen. There they must stand and give decisive battle, since further withdrawal would uncover vital areas.

d. Finland and Adjacent Norway. This front has long been quiet. Finnish strength is equivalent to 15 divisions, with 7 German divisions in northern Finland and adjacent Norway. The Soviet numerical superiority is as 3 to 2. Air strengths in the area may be compared as follows:

	<i>Fighters</i>	<i>Bombers</i>	<i>Others</i>
Germany	66	63	27
U. S. S. R.	100	50	50

A German withdrawal from before Leningrad would have psychological repercussions in Finland, but would not affect basically the military situation so long as the Germans remained in Estonia.

e. Norway and Denmark. In Norway (less the area adjacent to Finland) there are 11 German divisions; in Denmark, 5. Of these 16, only 6, in Norway, are offensive in type. German air strength in the area consists of 126 fighters, 42 bombers, and 45 other types. Two German battleships, one of which is damaged, and their accompanying light forces remain in north Norwegian waters.

f. Western Front. The coast from Brest to Den Helder has been well fortified in depth. Although various interior installations have been locally fortified, it is now believed that no prepared defensive line exists between the coast and the West Wall.

In France and the Low Countries there are 42 German divisions (including 10 training divisions). Seventeen of them are offensive in type, but only 11 of these are now fully effective. German air strength in the same area, less southern France, consists of 796 fighters, 267 bombers, and 30 other types.

g. Italy. We believe that from 22 to 25 German divisions are in Italy, all of them offensive in type. Twenty have been identified, of which 10 are panzer or panzer grenadier. Ten are at Rome or southward (3 panzer, 3 panzer grenadier, 2 infantry, 2 parachute). Five (2 panzer, 3 infantry) are engaged against Partisans in Venezia Julia, and a sixth (panzer grenadier) may be en route thither. The remain-

ing identified divisions (4 infantry) are in the Po Valley and Tuscany and are considered as equivalent to the minimum occupational requirement for that area. In Italy elements of 4 Italian divisions are cooperating with the Germans, of which only one is actively engaged (against the Partisans in Venezia Julia).

German air strength in Italy and southern France consists of 132 fighters, 362 bombers, and 27 other types. It is, for the most part, held back in the north, German air support in central Italy having been relatively slight.

Since the topography in central Italy is well suited to defense against frontal attack, the Germans are now principally concerned lest their flanks be turned by amphibious operations. Their intention appears to be to engage in strong delaying actions in successive positions as long as possible and eventually to hold when equilibrium is established, probably north of Rome but south of the Po watershed. A counter offensive capability exists, however, and may be promptly exploited if a good opportunity is offered. For such a purpose ground strength could be drawn, not only from northern Italy, but also from France. The principal deterrent factor would be Allied air superiority.

h. Adriatic-Aegean Area. Axis ground strength in Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, and the Aegean islands consists of 20 German, 8 Croat, 1 Serb, and 9 Bulgar divisions. Of these, only 14 German divisions are offensive in type. German air strength consists of 65 fighters, 199 bombers, and 63 other types. Naval strength in the Aegean consists only of few ex-Italian destroyers and torpedo boats and some motor torpedo boats.

Germany's vigorous reaction to Italian defection in this area indicates a determination to maintain her position there. The prompt seizure of the Adriatic ports and the islands of Corfu, Cephalonia, Rhodes, and Cos, has practically restored the front. The British still hold Leros and Samos. The Germans are sensitive to this penetration and attacks to recapture these islands are anticipated.

Axis occupational forces are stretched thin to make up for the disappearance of 30 Italian divisions. They are still able to hold important localities and routes of communication, but they are inadequate to suppress guerrilla activity and probably inadequate to hold the interior and resist invasion simultaneously.

i. Strategic Reserves. No strategic reserves exist as such. Relief and reinforcement are accomplished by transfer of units from one front to another according to circumstances. Since air strength is inadequate on all fronts, reinforcement of one is possible only at the sacrifice of less important interests on another. With respect to ground forces, it still remains possible to withdraw one or two divisions from any one front (except the Balkans) without undue risk, and several such withdrawals in combination may constitute an appreciable

reinforcement at the point where they are needed, but it is no longer possible to withdraw any considerable number of divisions from any one front.

In France an apparent surplus of divisions over minimum defensive requirements exists. France is a notable training and reforming area, however, and consequently a number of the divisions there are not fully effective. They could nevertheless be of some use in extreme emergency. France is thus the principal source of possible reinforcements for other fronts.

4. *The Situations in the Satellite Countries*

a. Hungary and Rumania. Because of the vital importance to her of Rumanian oil and of Hungarian lines of communication and oil, Germany will maintain a firm grip on both countries as long as possible. Each wishes to escape that grip but is prevented from surrendering or terminating its resistance principally by fear of German occupation. Each also fears the U. S. S. R. and the other, and Hungary also has reason to fear Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

b. Bulgaria. The death of King Boris¹ has as yet brought no significant political change, though future governments will find it harder to sustain a pro-German policy. The people of Bulgaria look to the U. S. S. R. for support, and the widespread pro-Soviet sentiment forces the government to maintain diplomatic relations with that country. Bulgaria has achieved her territorial aspirations at the expense of Yugoslavia and Greece and might not relinquish them easily.

c. Finland. Overwhelming fear of the U. S. S. R. is by far the greatest factor binding Finland to Germany. Less important factors are Finland's dependence on Germany for essential supplies and the presence of German troops in northern Finland. If a satisfactory territorial adjustment with the U. S. S. R. could be made, the less important factors probably could be overcome and Finland would willingly withdraw from the war.

5. *The Situations in Occupied Countries*

a. Norway. Strong underground resistance continues to increase. Some rifts between the underground and the Government in exile are appearing. There is also some evidence, not yet fully evaluated, of Communist influence in the underground.

b. Denmark. As a result of German demands arising out of increased Danish resistance and sabotage the Danish Government tendered its resignation to the King.² Although their resignations were not formally accepted, Denmark has since been without a Government and is ruled directly by the Germans.

¹ August 28, 1943.

² August 29, 1943.

c. *The Low Countries.* A general increase in sabotage and civilian resistance, somewhat more advanced in the Netherlands than in Belgium, has been accompanied by a disintegration of native pro-Nazi parties in both countries. Both countries are compelled to contribute substantial industrial manpower to Germany. Belgian industry, though below capacity, is important.

d. *France.* Resistance to German control has greatly increased and is seriously affecting production for the Axis. Recruitment of labor for Germany has nearly stopped. The underground movement, increasingly unified and confident, has now reached a stage of considerable political effectiveness. French underground leaders show great irritation over attempts to exclude France from major political decisions. The present Vichy Government is likely to give way soon to a more pro-German regime, and even Laval and Petain are making overtures to the United Nations.

e. *Italy.* The Germans appear to have the situation behind their lines in Italy reasonably well in hand, although some Italian units continue to resist in the Alpine area, particularly on the French and Yugoslav frontiers, and some sabotage continues. The Mussolini Government³ appears to have acquired relatively few supporters.

f. *Yugoslavia.* The surrender of Italy and the disintegration of the Italian forces of occupation touched off more active campaigns by guerrilla forces. In spite of extensive operations by German forces, these activities, strengthened by the adherence of certain Italian units, the acquisition of Italian arms, the increased scale of Allied material support, and the psychological effect of the surrender of Italy,⁴ have now reached considerable proportions, especially in the western half of the country. The internal conflict between the Partisans and the Chetniks has, however, reduced guerrilla effectiveness.

g. *Albania.* There is some guerrilla activity but on a much smaller scale than in Yugoslavia.

h. *Greece (Including Crete).* Despite the exhaustion of the country there is considerable and increasing underground and guerrilla activity, but on a much smaller scale than in Yugoslavia. Greek guerrilla forces are divided politically and have clashed. There is general opposition to a restoration of King George II.

i. *Poland.* Considerable underground activity is carried on, but the situation is complicated by a boundary dispute with the U. S. S. R. and the presence of Soviet guerrillas and various Soviet fostered organizations independent of the Polish Government in London.

³ Regime set up by Mussolini following his resignation and arrest in July 1943 and his rescue by sympathizers in September 1943.

⁴ Armistice signed September 3 and 29, 1943. See *United States and Italy, 1936-1946; Documentary Record* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 51 ff.

Poland contributes manpower, and coal, food, and some oil to Germany.

j. Occupied-U. S. S. R. Considerable guerrilla activity continues behind the German lines. German efforts to organize anti-Communists forces have had virtually no success. The Germans have obtained manpower and some food and raw materials from Occupied U. S. S. R. The food dividend for this crop year is at least partly safe against Soviet recapture.

6. *The Attitudes of European Neutrals*

a. Sweden. Sweden is determined to maintain her neutrality and is now taking a firm attitude in her relations with Germany. Public expression of sympathy with the United Nations and with German occupied countries, especially Norway and Denmark, is greatly increasing. Swedish fear of ultimate Soviet intentions in the Baltic area continues, however, to be a factor in the Swedish attitude toward the developing war situation.

b. Switzerland. Despite their isolation, the Swiss have succeeded in maintaining a firmly neutral attitude. However, Switzerland depends heavily upon trade with Germany and continues to make economic contributions of value to that country.

c. Spain. The Franco regime is apparently torn between the dictates of sympathy and of discretion, with Spain's internal situation unstable but held in delicate balance. Since November 1942 Spanish policy has been progressively readjusted away from non-belligerent adherence to the Axis to one of "vigilant neutrality" in accordance with the increase of United Nations power in the Mediterranean. The fall of Mussolini,⁵ the capitulation of Italy, and its declaration of war against Germany⁶ have made a profound impression on Franco. It is possible that, in order to hold his position, he may seek British and American support and even acquiesce in a return of the monarchy, in which he might retain a favorable post.

d. Portugal. The Government of Portugal desires above all to remain neutral on the Continent. Owing to the need for outside economic aid and to popular sympathy toward the United Nations, Portugal has shown increased leanings towards them by granting to Britain the use of the Azores as bases. Further concessions cannot, however, be expected in the near future.

e. Turkey. Turkey's fear of Soviet domination of the Balkans or Dardanelles will probably lead her to active participation in the war in order to obtain a voice in the peace settlement. But such participation will not take place until it can be done at minimum cost.

⁵ The King of Italy on July 25, 1943, announced the resignation of Mussolini and his Cabinet.

⁶ October 13, 1943; see *United States and Italy*, p. 69.

7. *Summary of the Existing Situation*—See Paragraph 2.

8. *Courses of Action Open to Germany in 1944*

a. *To Stand on the Strategic Defensive.* In view of Germany's lack of decisive offensive capabilities and the prospect of having to meet attack on three fronts, this is the only general course of military action open to her. It is a negative course, which cannot bring victory but which might serve to avert defeat. Although her military resources are inadequate to meet all of her defensive requirements, Germany may yet hope that a prolongation of resistance may lead to a favorable stroke of fortune or at least to a stalemate.

Within this general course are several subordinate courses of action, as follows:

(1) *To Continue the War Against Shipping.* Germany will follow this course to the end in order to impede support of Allied operations in Europe.

(2) *To Continue to Direct Her Air Effort Primarily to Defense Against Strategic Bombing.* Germany is compelled to adopt this course, regardless of its effect upon air support of her land fronts and upon her offensive air capabilities.

(3) *To Counterattack to Destroy or Expel any Hostile Force Entering Her Defensive Perimeter.* Germany's last military hope is by exploiting interior lines to concentrate against her enemies in detail and to inflict on at least one of them a repulse severe enough to induce a willingness to negotiate.

(4) *To Abandon Outlying Territory (e. g., Norway, France, Italy, Greece, Occupied Russia, Finland).* This course is responsive to Germany's need to conserve and concentrate strength. However, the consequent impairment of her military, economic, political, or psychological situations will not permit her to adopt it voluntarily.

b. *Contingent Courses of Action.* Within the concept of the strategic defensive are certain contingent courses of offensive action. Since all involve dispersion of force, she will adopt none of them except under imperative necessity to forestall or counteract certain unfavorable developments.

(1) *To Invade Sweden.* Certain intelligence that United Nations bombers were to be permitted to operate against her from Swedish bases would compel Germany to adopt this course. German forces now surrounding Sweden cannot undertake the operation and at the same time maintain their outward fronts against the United Nations. Their reinforcement would be required.

(2) *To Invade Spain.* In present circumstances this course could be adopted only as a diversion. A counter-offensive in Italy would probably be regarded as more effective for that purpose, at less cost in increased commitments.

(3) *To Invade Turkey.* Germany's present strength in the Balkans-Aegean area is barely adequate to occupy and defend it. She is apparently determined, however, to maintain her position there, and, if compelled by a threat to it from Turkey, could divert sufficient

strength from other fronts to advance at least to the Straits for defensive purposes.

(4) *To Occupy Hungary, Rumania, or Bulgaria.* Germany would occupy any one of them if it were absolutely necessary to prevent or counteract its defection.

c. To Seek a Negotiated Peace. Germany will continue, by means of propaganda warfare, to seek to persuade her principal enemies that her defeat is impossible or is possible only at prohibitive cost, in hope of inducing them to accept a negotiated peace advantageous to her. Included in this will be continued efforts to divide her principal enemies so as at least to impede their operations and at best to secure a negotiated peace with one which would enable her to concentrate against the others.

d. To Surrender. Actual or virtual surrender will remain unacceptable so long as there is hope of achieving a stalemate or a negotiated peace. It will, presumably, never be acceptable to the Nazi leaders. The only possibility of political change presently apparent in Germany is an assumption of control by the High Command. If Germany cannot conduct a successful defense on all fronts and cannot divide her enemies, making peace with one in order to concentrate against the others, the High Command may elect to sue for peace in order to avert further destruction prejudicial to Germany's eventual recovery.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[ABOARD THE U. S. S. "IOWA",]

C. C. S. 400

November 18, 1943.

INTEGRATED COMMAND OF U. S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN THE
EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA

THE PROBLEM

1. The provision of a directive to insure the most effective utilization of the U. S. Army Air Forces strategic bombing capabilities from all available European-Mediterranean bases in the accomplishment of the objectives of POINTBLANK.

DISCUSSION

(See Enclosure)

CONCLUSIONS

2. *a.* That control of all U. S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean area, including the control of movement of forces from one area to another, should be vested in a single command in order

to exploit U. S. heavy bomber aircraft capabilities most effectively; and that these forces should be employed primarily against POINTBLANK objectives, or such other objectives as the Combined Chiefs of Staff may from time to time direct.

b. That such a command should likewise be charged with the coordination of these operations with those of the R. A. F. Bomber Command.

c. That the responsibility for over-all base service and administrative control of these Strategic Air Forces should remain in the appropriate Commanders of U. S. Army forces in the United Kingdom and in the Mediterranean area.

d. That provision should be made to assure the assignment of resources, supplies and other services between tactical and strategic operations so as to bring the required support to POINTBLANK as the air operation of first priority.

e. That the headquarters of such U. S. Strategic Air Forces should be established in the United Kingdom because of the facilities available, the existing weight of the respective bomber forces, and the necessity for continuous integration of operations with the R. A. F.

RECOMMENDATIONS

3. It is recommended that:

a. There be established a U. S. Strategic Air Force Command with Headquarters in the United Kingdom, charged with the direction and coordination of all U. S. Strategic Air Force operations in the European-Mediterranean area.

b. A directive to implement the above, attached as Appendix,¹ be issued to the following:

Supreme Allied Commander,
Commanding General, ETOUSA
Allied Commander in Chief, NATO
Commanding General, U. S. Strategic
Air Forces in Europe.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

DISCUSSION

1. There are at present in the Mediterranean Theater the 12th U. S. Army Air Force (Tactical) and the 15th U. S. Army Air Force (Strategic), as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in a directive issued to General Eisenhower (C. C. S. 217/1, Appendix "C"),² under

¹ Subenclosure to this memorandum.

² Not printed herein.

which directive the Allied Commander in Chief, NATO, is charged with employing the 15th U. S. Air Force primarily against the selected targets of POINTBLANK. It is additionally directed that the operations of the 15th U. S. Air Force will be closely coordinated by direct liaison with the 8th U. S. Air Force.

2. The division of heavy bomber units between the 8th and the 15th U. S. Air Forces is likewise set forth in the above directive, upon a quarterly basis, resulting in the deployment of 41 heavy bomber groups in the U. K., and 21 heavy bomber groups in the Mediterranean, by 30 June 1944. This directive provides that those units of the current 12th U. S. Air Force, assigned to the newly organized 15th U. S. Air Force, may continue to be employed primarily against objectives other than POINTBLANK until such time as the air base objective area, north and east of Rome, is secured, and further that, should a tactical or strategical emergency arise, requiring such action, the U. S. Theater Commander is authorized, at his decision, to employ the 15th U. S. Air Force for purposes other than its primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the action taken.

3. Strategic bombing operations from bases other than the United Kingdom which compel German forces to spread in breadth and depth for the defense of other areas, or cause parallel destruction of selected POINTBLANK objectives, and particularly to [of?] the German fighter aircraft and aircraft industry, will contribute heavily to the success of POINTBLANK, hasten the deterioration of the enemy over-all position and decrease losses.

4. Timing and coordination of the mutually supporting operations of the two Strategic Air Forces from the various bases is essential to achieve the most effective exploitation of U. S. heavy bomber aircraft capabilities. Forces should be moved promptly from one area to another to take immediate advantage of varying weather conditions, dispositions of enemy forces, current tactical operations or other circumstances of opportunity. The present command arrangement with the 8th Air Force under CG, ETOUSA and the 15th Air Force under CG, NATO requires decisions to be reached on a mutually cooperative basis in which both commanders must agree. The integration of timing and services, to capitalize fully upon the mobility of aircraft and the need for prompt command decision not possible under the existing situation require a cohesive over-all control, not existent under present command directives.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the air war in Europe has reached a stage where the necessity for command direction over the components of the Strategic Air Forces is imperative. Unified command is necessary in order to achieve effective results from the concerted efforts of the bomber forces, and to reach the vital targets with minimum losses from the formidable defenses established by

the enemy. Base facilities in the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean provide a potential flexibility which must be exploited to confuse, saturate and disperse the enemy defenses and reduce our losses. We feel that it is most urgent that we adopt every means known to us to save the lives of our men and sustain the impetus of their offensive. The one effective method is to insure the rapid, coordinated employment of the two components of our daylight striking force on a day-to-day basis, in order to obtain the maximum dispersion of enemy defenses and to take advantage of weather conditions in the United Kingdom and in the Mediterranean. Unified command over the Eighth and Fifteenth U. S. Air Forces must, therefore, be established without delay.

[Subenclosure]

*Draft Directive From the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Certain Allied and American Commanders*³

SECRET

DRAFT OF A PROPOSED DIRECTIVE

To: The Supreme Allied Commander
The Commanding General ETOUSA
Allied Commander in Chief NATO
Commanding General U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe

1. Effective 1 January 1944 there will be established an air command designated "The U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe," for the purpose of directing and coordinating the operations of the U. S. Strategic Air Forces in the European and Mediterranean areas. Headquarters for this air command will be established in the United Kingdom.

2. Lieut. General Carl Spaatz is designated "Commanding General, U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe."

3. The U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will come directly under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander at a date to be announced later by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In the interim the commander of the U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will be directly under the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. The U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will consist initially of the Eighth and Fifteenth U. S. Army Air Forces.

5. The U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will be employed initially to achieve the objectives of the Combined Bomber Offensive, as directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Commanding General, USSAFE, will be charged with the strategic direction of the U. S. Strategic Air Forces, and he will assign missions to them,

³ For a revision of this draft, see *post*, p. 788.

keeping the appropriate theater commanders informed. In carrying out his strategic objectives, the Commanding General, U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe is authorized to allocate, reallocate, or move any or all of the air force units placed under his command.

6. The Commanding General, U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, will be charged with the coordination of the operations of the U. S. Strategic Air Forces with those of the R. A. F. Bomber Command, through the Chief of the Air Staff R. A. F.

7. The commanders of the U. S. Army Forces in the United Kingdom and in the Mediterranean area will continue to be responsible for administrative control of the U. S. Army air units in their respective areas, including the provision of base services. They will exercise a judicious allocation of resources and supplies and other services between tactical and strategic air forces in such manner as to provide the necessary support to POINTBLANK as the air operation of first priority.

8. Should a strategical or tactical emergency arise requiring such action, theater commanders may, at their discretion, utilize the strategic air forces, which are based within their respective theaters, for purposes other than their primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding General, USSAFE, of the action taken.

9. The Commanding General, USSAFE, will employ six heavy bombardment groups and two long-range fighter groups of the Fifteenth Air Force to meet the requirements of the Commanding General, NATO, in operations against objectives other than those prescribed for POINTBLANK, until such time as the air base objective area, north and east of Rome, is secured, in accordance with the provision of the directive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 22 October (FAN 254).⁴

⁴ Not printed herein.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[ABOARD THE U. S. S. "IOWA",]

C. C. S. 300/2

18 November 1943.

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944—PACIFIC-FAR EAST
(As of 1 November 1943)

THE PROBLEM

1. To estimate the enemy situation in the Pacific-Far East, 1944, with due regard to Soviet and Chinese capabilities and intentions.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

2. We do not feel it practicable to attempt a summarization of the enemy situation in the Pacific-Far East as projected through 1944. Such a condensation, in our opinion, would inevitably result in incomplete treatment of factors essential to the over-all picture. Our view of the situation, 1944, is therefore attached as Appendix "A," to which reference is hereby made.

3. As of 1 November 1943, we estimate Japanese intentions in the Far East, 1944, as follows:

a. General. Japan will probably remain on the strategic defensive unless convinced that the U. S. S. R. has decided to attack her or to grant to the other United Nations the use of Siberian air bases. In such an event Japan would attack the Soviet Union. It is probable, however, that Japan will assume the tactical offensive whenever she considers it necessary, and it may be expected that Japan will initiate local offensive actions to forestall operations by the United Nations in Burma and to prevent the establishment of air bases by the United Nations in China. Japan will take full advantage of any breathing spell permitted her by Allied inactivity to strengthen her defensive cordon with installations of all types in order to make Allied advance most costly in time and casualties.

b. North Pacific. We believe that Japan will continue to strengthen her defenses in the Kuriles and Hokkaido, but is not likely to depart from the defensive except in case of war with the Soviet Union.

c. Manchuria. We believe that Japan will continue to seek to avoid war with the U. S. S. R. in all circumstances except as already mentioned above. She will continue to balance Soviet strength in Siberia, reducing her forces in Manchuria only in case of necessity.

d. China (including Yunnan). Although Japan will continue to seek a satisfactory solution in China by political means, chances of success have deteriorated since the Moscow conference.¹ We believe that she will undertake decisive military operations only to prevent the United Nations from establishing offensive air bases for action against her vital installations.

e. Burma and Southeast Asia. We believe that Japan will seek to maintain her present position in Burma and Southeast Asia, devoting especial attention to Burma, while extending her efforts when necessary to prevent large scale reinforcements and supplies reaching China.

f. Southwest and Central Pacific. We believe that Japan will remain on the strategic defensive, continuing her efforts to build up her local defensive forces and facilities and her naval striking force.

4. Our estimate of Japanese intentions, as set out in paragraph 3 above, is in part based upon our beliefs as to Soviet and Chinese capabilities and intentions, which are attached as Appendix "B" and Appendix "C."

¹ October 18–November 1, 1943; see *ante*, pp. 112 ff.

[Appendix "A"]

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944—PACIFIC-FAR EAST
(As of 1 November 1943)1. *Basic Factors in the Japanese Situation*

a. *Objectives.* Japan's basic objective is to establish undisputed control of an area in East Asia and the Western Pacific which shall be militarily secure and as nearly self-sufficient economically as possible. The area now occupied by her approximates the territorial requirements of this objective but is deficient in three respects, as follows: (1) the possession of eastern *Siberia* by a latently hostile power; (2) the existence in *China* of unoccupied areas within bombing range of Japan and of important Japanese lines of communication; and (3) the presence of United Nations forces in the Japanese defensive perimeter in the *Melanesia* area. Other territories beyond the limits of present occupation may be objects of ultimate Japanese aspiration, but only those specified are essential to the immediate basic objective.

b. *Relationship to the Axis.* Japan's connection with the Axis is a matter of expediency only. Her action will be coordinated with that of Germany only in so far as she estimates that such coordination will contribute to the realization of her basic objective.

c. *Relations with the U.S.S.R.* There exists between the U.S.S.R. and Japan a basic conflict of interest. Japan cannot enjoy complete strategic security without gaining control of the eastern region of Siberia. The U. S. S. R. is determined to hold that region, the strategic security of which requires the ultimate expulsion of Japan from the mainland of Asia and from southern Sakhalin. For the present, however, both the U. S. S. R. and Japan desire to avoid war with each other in order to be free to direct their efforts against their respective enemies.

d. *Relations with subject peoples.* Wherever circumstances allow, Japan's policy is to establish nominally independent, but actually controlled, national governments. This policy fits in with two powerful propaganda themes: (1) "Asia for the Asiatics"; (2) the "Co-Prosperity Sphere," ostensibly a cooperative project.

Japan has recognized the "independence" of *China*, as represented by the Nanking puppet government, and has sought to enlist Chinese nationalism in support of that regime by surrendering to it various foreign concessions, notably those at Shanghai. She has granted "independence" to *Burma* and the *Philippines*, thereby seeking to

enlist the relatively developed nationalism of those countries in her favor. She has hinted that other occupied areas, e. g., *Java*, may receive similar grants of independence. *Thailand* has been rewarded for cooperation by the cession of bits of neighboring territory to which she had some pretensions. By such policies, Japan hopes to strengthen somewhat her position among the subject peoples.

e. Strategic and economic position. Although the strategic initiative has passed from Japan to the United Nations, a far-flung perimeter of defense positions must be penetrated before areas of great strategic or economic importance to Japan are subject to attack. Within this empire, Japan is practically self-sufficient except for textiles. Furthermore, Japan, by stockpiling materials from the Outer Zone and by pursuing a policy of developing resources within the Inner Zone wherever possible, has obtained within the Inner Zone a high degree of short range self-sufficiency in most of the essential materials of war. However, the loss of Sumatra and Borneo would seriously impair Japan's oil position, and loss of the Philippines would seriously impair her ferro-alloys position. Her manufacturing facilities, located mainly in Japan proper and in Manchuria, are accessible only to air attack. Meanwhile, the expansion of war production capacity undertaken in recent years will bear fruit in growing rates of output. For certain critical items, however, growing output is unlikely to offset attrition (ships) or to do more than keep pace with losses (planes). Japan should expect that ultimately greatly superior forces can be directed against her, but she will continue to hope that the United Nations will hesitate to face the tremendous logistical problems, or pay the price in lives, involved in an invasion of Japan proper.

f. Psychology and morale. The Japanese, traditionally, are a close-knit family whose broad characteristics are a toughness of fibre and a fatalistic singleness of purpose. They have been taught that they are of divine origin and that the Emperor is directly descended from the god-founder of the nation. They are taught that the Japanese are divinely and infallibly guided towards the establishment of a new world order dominated by Japan.

To attain this goal the Japanese soldier is taught to give blind obedience and to regard death in the service of the Emperor as an honor. He is told that he is invincible and that to show weakness or to surrender is to accept disgrace.

As a result of these teachings, the morale of the Japanese populace, and especially of the armed forces, remains high in spite of recent reverses. As much of popular morale is, however, based upon the theory of invincibility, a series of sharp defeats when and if brought home to them will tend to confuse and bewilder the people as a whole.

In contrast with the broad mass of the people, real power in Japan

rests in the hands of small groups of leaders capable of manipulating the symbols of emperor-worship for their own self-interest. An early collapse of Germany would have a tremendously depressing effect upon such leaders. This, combined with ever increasing United Nations pressure and approach to the homeland, might conceivably bring about a re-shuffle of the ruling cliques followed by an attempt to secure a negotiated peace.

g. Propaganda. Official propaganda on the home front has shifted from that of the self-assured offensive to propaganda of the defensive, and determination to fight for existence is replacing exaltation in victory. The potential of the United Nations is admitted to be high, and the government has announced its intention to prepare for the defense of the capital and the production centers of the homeland. The government is also preparing the Japanese people for more serious German reverses in Europe. Japanese withdrawals are admitted, and it is implied that the Japanese have finished winning independence for other Asiatic countries and now must prepare to defend their own islands from frontal attack.

2. *The Existing Over-all Situation*

a. Military strength. We estimate the present strength of her armed forces to be as follows: (1) *Naval*, 11 battleships, 7 aircraft carriers, 5 auxiliary aircraft carriers, 14 heavy cruisers, 18 light cruisers, 78 destroyers, 89 submarines. (2) *Air*, 1,660 fighters, 1,770 bombers, 490 float planes and 300 other types. Of the total, 110 fighters and 130 bombers, and 185 float planes are ship-based. In addition to the above total of 4,220 U. E. combat aircraft there are some 1,375 combat type aircraft engaged in advanced operational training. (3) *Ground*, a total ground strength of 2,500,000 representing approximately 110 equivalent divisions, which include 65 infantry divisions, 18 independent mixed brigades, 1 infantry brigade, 3 cavalry brigades, 20 tank regiments, 13 border garrisons, 17 independent garrisons and other independent units. (4) *Totaling* in round numbers 3,500,000 men (exclusive of Puppet Troops).

Puppet Troops. There are some 330,000 Manchurian troops and more than 420,000 Nanking puppet troops. For the most part, both forces are organized into small garrison units lacking in automatic weapons and artillery. Some Manchurian combat divisions exist, and similar Nanking divisions are said to be forming (strength about 6,000 per division), but it is doubtful whether Japan can provide for them normal equipment in heavier weapons in view of her own shortages in those categories. Japan has found Nanking troops particularly unreliable in the past.

Burmese and other puppet forces are so small as to be inconsequential.

b. Positional strength. Japan is now on the strategic defensive. Her control of Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, Pacific islands and parts of China keeps United Nations forces at a distance too great for delivery of effective blows against Japan itself and prevents effective development and use of the Chinese war potential. Thus Japan's position, facing United Nations forces from the North Pacific around to India, is one of great natural strength. At this time, her position in China is secure because of the present inability of either China or the other United Nations to mount large-scale operations there. Soviet commitments in Europe and Japanese strength in Manchuria insure for the time being the security of Japan's northern flank, Japan is able at present to direct her maximum effort toward building up her economic and military strength.

c. Limitations on Japanese Power

(1) *Shipping.* Japan's defensive position requires secure and adequate ocean transport over long lines of communication. The Japanese shipping situation has become acute, with her total tonnage being further reduced by sinkings in excess of total new construction. We estimate that 50-60% of her total tonnage is committed to maintaining her military forces outside the homeland and that the remainder is used primarily to maintain the essential part of her war economy. From this latter bracket some tonnage might still be found for new operations by diverting it from trade, and, provided such diversions were temporary, this would not necessarily have serious effects on Japan's capacity to wage war. Since, however, Japan's rate of building, though on the increase, cannot keep pace even with the present rate of sinkings, she would be reluctant to risk adding further to her shipping commitments. Although attempts are being made to improve the position by building a large number of small and medium-size wooden ships, the general shipping position is becoming increasingly difficult and may well become precarious in 1944. The situation in regard to tankers is also acute. Japan is attempting to meet a deficiency in this respect by continuing to fit out dry-cargo ships for use as oil carriers.

(2) *Air requirements.* Until recently Japan has not only been able to maintain her over-all air strength at approximately the same total figure but has kept her allocated air strength along the perimeter in reasonable balance with her requirements. At present, however, indications point to such a rapid attrition in the Melanesian area that she is having difficulty in replacing losses. We believe that as United Nations pressure increases along the outer defense frontier, she will be unable to maintain sufficient strength to offer effective resistance at all points under attack. Assuming that the United Nations carry out the agreed program for 1944, we are of the opinion that Japan's

defensive air requirements will preclude the possibility of her engaging in any offensive operation requiring heavy air support.

(3) *Naval requirements.* Japan cannot afford to risk large commitments of naval strength except for the defense of vital areas. Her extended lines of communication already entail a large commitment of naval strength for the protection of essential shipping. Their further extension, or indecisive action entailing heavy attrition, might well be unacceptable.

(4) *Military requirements.* A large proportion of Japanese ground forces is required for occupational duties and for concentration in Manchuria to balance Soviet forces in Siberia. Japan, however, has ample ground forces for any probable combat requirements, inasmuch as the insular character of much of the occupied area and the topography of New Guinea, the Indo-Burmese frontier and China limit the scale of ground operations in those areas. Developments of the last few months indicate the necessity of using her superiority in ground forces to compensate for her relative inferiority in naval and air forces. Her ability to move her strategic reserve is restricted by availability of shipping.

3. *The Existing Local Situation*

a. *North Pacific.* Japan is strengthening the fortifications and garrisons on her "Northern Fortress" (Shimushu [*Shumushu?*] and Paramushiru), and we believe that preparations are being made for a determined defense in the Kuriles.

b. *Manchuria.* Japanese ground forces in Manchuria probably balance the Soviet ground forces in Eastern Siberia-Outer Mongolia, but Japanese air strength is believed to be relatively inferior. Japan has the advantage in strategic position, equipment, and supply but is deterred from aggression by respect for Soviet armed forces and reluctance to commit herself further while her army is actively engaged in other areas. Japan is also apprehensive of vulnerability to bombing and submarine attack and fears the probability that in the event of war between Japan and the U. S. S. R., the United States would utilize air bases in Siberia for direct attacks on Japan.

c. *China (except Yunnan).* The front has been largely stabilized for years, with the Japanese in possession of the country's principal productive areas and communications lines. The Japanese are deterred from further expansion primarily by logistical difficulties and secondarily by Chinese resistance. On occasion the Japanese engage in minor offensive operations to season inexperienced troops and accomplish limited objectives such as the temporary denial of facilities to the Chinese. Although nominally in overwhelming numerical strength, the Chinese forces are at present so poorly equipped, supplied, fed, and trained that they are unable to prevent these forays or

to undertake other than local action. This Chinese military weakness springs in large part from China's generally anemic condition, which has resulted from loss of productive areas, disruption of internal communications, isolation from outside support, and war-weariness.

d. Yunnan. Active operations have recently been launched by the Japanese along the Salween River. We believe these operations are to strengthen the Japanese position along the Burma frontier in anticipation of a United Nations increase in activity in that area.

e. Burma. The wet monsoon very greatly hinders major operations from May to October. Recently the Japanese have been increasing their ground and air forces in Burma. It may be that the supply to these forces overland via Indochina and Thailand may be increased considerably in the near future.

f. Southwest Pacific. The ground and air strength in the Timor-Inner Seas area and New Guinea-Bismarcks area appears to be defensive in character. Because of recent United Nations successes in this area, Japan, in order to maintain her defensive position has been forced to increase her strength by one division over and above replacements for her combat losses. Due to extreme losses in this area, it now appears that she is having difficulty in maintaining the air strength disposed heretofore.

g. Central Pacific. At present Japan bases 50-60% of her naval strength at Truk. The total air strength of this area has been increasing, particularly in the Marshalls and Gilberts.

4. *Strategic Reserves*

a. Air. We believe no strategic reserve exists as such. Although Japan's staging facilities are sufficiently developed to enable her to fly even fighter planes to practically any part of her position, theoretically allowing the quick reinforcement of any threatened front, there are indications that simultaneous pressure on several fronts would prevent substantial reinforcements being sent to more than one area.

b. Naval. Normally Japan maintains her battleship and carrier strength in home waters and at Truk, shifting the center of gravity according to circumstances. A formidable striking force, which can reach any threatened point of the defensive perimeter in from 6-9 days, can be quickly assembled in either of these central areas. However, destroyer shortage is becoming critical.

c. Ground. Surplus ground strength in Central China constitutes Japan's initial reserve. If hard pressed, she can also draw surplus strength from Japan and North China and in extremity from Manchuria.

5. *Prospective Developments Through 1944*

a. Air strength. Although Japanese aircraft production is expected to continue to increase gradually during the remainder of 1943 and during 1944, attrition will probably keep pace with and may even exceed this increased production.

b. Naval strength. Disregarding attrition, we estimate that Japanese naval strength should increase as a result of new construction to the following totals:

	<i>Battle-ships</i>	<i>Aircraft Car.</i>	<i>Aux. Air-craft Car.</i>	<i>Heavy Cruisers</i>	<i>Light Cruisers</i>	<i>Destroy-ers</i>	<i>Subma-rines</i>
1 Nov. 43	11	7	5	14	18	78	89
1 Jan. 44	12	8	5	14	18	85	97
1 June 44	12	10	6	15	19	95	113
1 Jan. 45	13	14	7	16	20	105	130

c. Ground strength. We expect that by the end of 1944 the strength of the Japanese army will have increased to 2,750,000, comprising approximately 120 equivalent divisions (including 73 infantry divisions and 14 independent mixed brigades, 3 cavalry brigades, and 24 tank regiments, 20 independent garrisons, and 13 border garrisons).

d. Shipping. Despite Japan's strenuous shipbuilding efforts, estimates of the rate of loss and rate of construction of steel ships indicate that the Japanese may suffer a net loss of 1,500,000 gross registered tons of steel operating tonnage from 1 November 1943 to the end of 1944. However, construction of wooden vessels and further substitution of land transport may offset a part of the estimated net loss of steel ships.

e. War production. Assuming that Japan retains control of the productive areas now under occupation, that shipments by sea can be maintained, and that there [will?] be no effective bombing of Japanese industry or land transportation, Japan's production of critical *finished war goods* may increase materially in 1944 as compared with 1943. *Heavy industrial production as a whole*, however, is not expected to show great gains in 1944, chiefly because steel output seems unlikely to rise by more than a few percent. The steady development of economically unprofitable but strategically important resources of Japan proper and immediately adjacent areas and the use of stock piles will make it possible for Japan's war industry to continue for about two years at approximately its present rate of consumption of raw materials (except for oil, chromite, and possibly lead and zinc), even if cut off from access to resources south of the Yangtze River.

[Appendix "B"]

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

U. S. S. R. CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN THE FAR EAST

1. *Strength*

We estimate that total Soviet air strength east of Lake Baikal consists of some 2,000 tactical aircraft. Of these, some 1,200 are believed to be organized into operational squadrons. This force is apparently disposed on the southern border of Soviet-controlled territory from Ulan Bator to Vladivostok. Existing airfields are believed adequate for flexible operation.

Naval strength is estimated to consist of one light cruiser, 9 destroyers, 6 torpedo boats, 60 submarines, 60 motor torpedo boats, and a number of assorted small craft of no combatant value. There are believed to be sufficient bases available for this force.

The ground strength east of Lake Baikal is estimated to total some 660,000 men divided into units as follows:

- 20 infantry divisions (15,000 men each)
- 11 cavalry divisions (6,600 men each)
 - 1 mountain division (9,000 men)
- 2 motorized divisions (7,000 men each)
- 13 tank brigades (2,000 men each)
- 5 motorized brigades (4,000 men each)
- 9 infantry brigades (4,000 men each)
- 1 composite brigade (5,000 men)
 - Corps, army, line of communication,
and other troops (180,000 men)

Pending the defeat of Germany, reinforcement is unlikely. Although these forces in the Far East are supposed to be self-sufficient, their local sources of supply are actually both limited and vulnerable. Support, in any case, would have to be delivered via a long, and in part exposed, line of communication.

2. *Capabilities*

Offensively, the U. S. S. R. could scarcely hope for any success until her forces in the west have been released by the defeat of Germany or until after the other United Nations have gained access from the Pacific to the Sea of Okhotsk. Defensively the U. S. S. R. would probably be unable to prevent the isolation of the Maritime Provinces by the cutting of, or at least demolitions on, the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Holding operations, however, should be possible on present stored reserves for at least six months. Subsequent developments in the whole area would depend largely on the effectiveness of the assistance of the other United Nations.

3. *Intentions*

Pending further information as to the results of the Moscow Conference, we estimate Soviet intentions as follows:

The U. S. S. R. is likely to intervene in the war against Japan at some stage, but not before the German menace to her has been removed. After that, she would be likely to intervene only when she reckoned that Japan could be defeated at small cost to her. It is unlikely that any arguments that we might bring forward, except substantial progress in our war against Japan, would greatly affect the timing of Soviet intervention. On the other hand, we believe that large-scale hostilities between the United States and Japan in the Northwest Pacific would make the Soviet Union's present neutrality in the Far East increasingly difficult to maintain.

[Appendix "C"]

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

CHINESE CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS

1. *Strength*

The Chinese active army has a nominal strength of 320 infantry and 16 cavalry divisions, plus 30 independent infantry brigades. Infantry divisions average 7,000 each; cavalry divisions and infantry brigades average 3,000 each. The combat efficiency of the bulk of the force never was very high and it has deteriorated considerably since 1938. At the present time malnutrition and lack of medical attention are prevalent and have reduced the combat potential of many units to a very low point. Armament consists almost wholly of infantry weapons. Such heavy material as is available is inadequate and is largely obsolete. The augmentation of this armament to any appreciable degree by the United Nations will not be possible until capacity of transport into China is greatly increased. We feel that, at most, not more than one-fifth of the Chinese Army is currently capable of sustained defensive operations and then only with effective air support; we believe that with the possible exception of the American-trained Chinese divisions, no large number of troops can be expected to undertake more than very limited objective offensive operations, at the present time.

Chinese guerrillas, whose strength is estimated to be 600,000 part-time troops, have proved of value. In recent months, they have done the bulk of the fighting against the Japanese. They share with the regular divisions credit for retaining substantial Japanese occupational forces in China.

2. *Capabilities*

If given adequate United Nations air support, China might be able to defend her major strategic areas against a Japanese offensive and might be able to execute a very limited objective offensive.

3. *Intentions*

The Chinese probably intend to remain generally on the defensive, pending the re-equipping and training of their army for offensive action at a later date.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[ABOARD THE U. S. S. "IOWA",]

C. C. S. 390/1

18 November 1943.

FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

Reference: CCS 390¹

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff realize that it is undesirable for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to enter into the details of various operations, but do not agree, however, that only matters of grand strategy should be considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. The QUADRANT decisions (C. C. S. 319/5, paragraph 58)² state that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would exercise a general jurisdiction over strategy for the Southeast Asia Theater. This is construed as requiring decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to which of several courses of action are to be undertaken, and their sequence and timing.

3. Since the United States cannot furnish the required assistance for FIRST CULVERIN, it is agreed that Operation BUCCANEER should be mounted as early as practicable. However, we believe it may prove possible to conduct additional land, sea, and air operations in order to pin down Japanese forces in South Burma. We therefore recommend that the CinC, Southeast Asia, be directed to explore this subject, and to submit recommendations thereon to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

¹ Not printed herein.

² Not printed herein. The records of the First Quebec (QUADRANT) Conference, August 1943, are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, November 18, 1943.]

For the President from Secretary Hull

British request our support of following policy which they have instructed Casey to follow in Lebanese situation.²

If Catroux has not released Lebanese political prisoners by tonight Casey is to fly to Beirut tomorrow. He is then to inform Catroux that if by Sunday,³ at 10 a. m., prisoners are not released and Helleu recalled, immediate arrangements will be made for declaration British martial law. Thereafter British G. O. C. or C. in C. would take over, release political prisoners and permit reassembly of Lebanese Parliament as soon as situation permits. Casey to make clear to Catroux martial law declared purely as military necessity and no political implication involved.

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room on November 19, 1943, to Greer at Oran, apparently via military channels.

² See Kirk's telegram of November 12, 1943, to Hull, *ante*, p. 84, footnote 2.

³ November 21, 1943.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull

British inform us, with reference Lebanese situation, the deadline of 10 a. m. Sunday has been postponed to the same hour Monday.

A decision has been made to take no action to force the resignation of Badoglio or the abdication of the King until Rome has been reached. This decision based on possibility that contrary action might cause undesirable reactions in Italian army and create difficulties for United Nations armed forces.

Algiers reports on November 17 that Badoglio, with King's approval, contemplates the following changes:

Marshal Messe replaced Ambrosio; Taddeo Orlando to be appointed Under Secretary of State for War; and Beryrdi [*Berardi*] to be Chief of Staff replacing Roatta. Piccardi has resigned as Minister of Commerce, Industry and Labor.

Algiers reports consideration by Allied military authorities of requisition in Italy of Catholic properties. British hold that military

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room to Greer at Oran, apparently via military channels.

necessity sufficient justification for requisition by Italian Government. Matter being presented to Vatican by British Minister.² Monsignor Carroll suggests Vatican might be prepared issue general directive for cooperation Allied forces.

Algiers reports that Giraud has not yet received the written assurance from the Committee which he made condition for withdrawal his resignation.³ He believes that they will be forthcoming. Giraud hopes eventually transfer his headquarters to London for service on Allied staff that may be established incident to future military operations.

Department has delivered to British and Russian Embassies *aide-mémoire*⁴ regarding approach to Ambassador Madrid⁵ by Rumania for peace conditions. Embassies were informed that Ambassador stressed only conditions were unconditional surrender and suggested that Rumania might wish take appropriate steps in this connection. Ambassador's remarks transmitted to Mihai Antonescu from whom approach came.

² Sir D'Arcy Osborne.

³ It was announced at Algiers on November 9, 1943, that Giraud and a group of his supporters had resigned from the French Committee of National Liberation.

⁴ Not printed herein.

⁵ Carlton J. H. Hayes.

Roosevelt Papers

*Paper Prepared by the Joint Staff Planners*¹

SECRET

[ABOARD THE U. S. S. "IOWA", undated.²]

Enclosure "A"³

PROPOSED AGENDA

For the First Meeting of the President of the United States and
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

1. The U. S. should propose the following items for discussion:
 - a. Generalissimo to Outline the Situation in China
 - b. Chinese Attitude Toward Russian Participation
 - c. Status of Operations Against Japan
 - d. Importance of Chinese Assistance to Operations in North Burma
 - e. Air Bases in China

¹ For Roosevelt's request for a paper of this kind, see *ante*, p. 199. The paper was apparently submitted directly to the President. It was not considered or approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² Prepared between November 15 and 19, 1943.

³ No covering paper has been found.

- f. Supplies to China
- g. Equipment and Training of Chinese Forces
- 2. The U. S. should be prepared to discuss the following items if broached by the Chinese:
 - a. U. S. Forces in China
 - b. Command Arrangements Including Relationship of the Generalissimo to Other Commands
 - c. Post-War Problems
 - (1) What arrangements are going to be made for Chinese participation in the occupation of Japan and the recapture of Chinese territory?
 - (2) What arrangements are to be made with regard to mutual security?
 - (3) What military and naval bases are to be made available to each party for mutual assistance?
 - (4) Does the United States intend to provide adequate American forces and Pacific bases to share in preventing future aggression in the Orient?
 - (5) What continuing assistance does the United States intend to furnish in aid to China for equipment of land, air and sea forces for national defense and for the fulfillment of any duties which China may assume in the way of assistance to the United States?
 - (6) What machinery is to be set up for military consultation with regard to cooperation between the two powers in the event of further aggression in the Orient?

Roosevelt Papers

*Paper Prepared by the Joint Staff Planners*¹

SECRET

[ABOARD THE U. S. S. "IOWA", undated.²]

Enclosure "B"³

PROPOSED AGENDA

For the First Meeting of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain

- 1. Command Arrangements:
 - a. Urgency of Installing Over-All Commander
 - b. Commander for "OVERLORD"

¹ For Roosevelt's request for a paper of this kind, see *ante*, p. 190. The paper apparently was submitted directly to the President. It was not considered or approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² Prepared between November 15 and 19, 1943.

³ No covering paper has been found.

- c. Commander for the Mediterranean
- d. Necessity for Unified Strategic Bomber Command European Theater
- 2. Spheres of Responsibility for "RANKIN"
(North Europe versus Southern Europe)
- 3. U. S. Policy on U. S. Non-Participation in Operations in the Eastern Mediterranean-Balkan Area
- 4. Soviet Collaboration
 - a. Strategic Bombing Including Bases for U. S. Forces
 - b. Coordinating Ground Operations
 - c. Turkey and Sweden
 - d. Against Japan
- 5. U. S. Facilities in the Azores

Roosevelt Papers

*Paper Prepared by the Joint Staff Planners*¹

SECRET

[ABOARD THE U. S. S. "IOWA", undated.²]

Enclosure "C"³

PROPOSED AGENDA

For the First Meeting of the President of the United States and
Marshal Stalin

- 1. The U. S. should propose the following items for discussion:
 - a. Soviet Collaboration in Strategic Bombing Including Use of Soviet Bases by U. S. Forces
 - b. Zones of Military Responsibility for "RANKIN 'C'" (Complete Collapse)
- 2. The U. S. should be prepared to discuss the following items if broached by the Soviets:
 - a. Situation Regarding Turkey and Sweden
(The U. S. should not bring up these subjects but should be prepared to state our stand if the Soviets do)
 - b. Italian Fleet and Italian Shipping
(The U. S. should not bring up these subjects but should be prepared to state our stand if the Soviets do)
 - c. Soviet Collaboration in the War Against Japan

¹ For Roosevelt's request for a paper of this kind, see *ante*, p. 199. The paper apparently was submitted directly to the President. It was not considered or approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² Prepared between November 15 and 19, 1943.

³ No covering paper has been found.

J. C. S. Files

*Minutes of the President's Meeting With the Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 19, 1943, 2 P. M., Admiral's Cabin, U. S. S. "Iowa"*¹

SECRET

2. COMMAND

With regard to the memoranda dated 17 November 1943 submitted to him by Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,² THE PRESIDENT said he liked proposal "A" but did not like proposal "B". On the other hand, he said he may have to compromise. We should, however, definitely go after "A". He said he would take up the matter with the Prime Minister at the earliest time. He felt we should definitely try to go ahead with plan "A", although we may have difficulty.

ADMIRAL KING observed that in his personal opinion, in that OVERLORD is only a part of the whole, the position set forth in memorandum "A" is completely logical and should appeal favorably to the British. He said the logic was as much on our side for memorandum "A" as was the logic on the side of the British for a unified command in the Mediterranean.³

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed that while memorandum "A" may be completely logical, the Prime Minister may feel that under his form of government he could not accept such a proposal.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the principle of unified command already existed in General Eisenhower's theater. He felt that even though the British should point out that they would have difficulty in accepting the proposal in memorandum "A" because of their *defense* point of view, it should be pointed out to them that the "best defense is a vigorous offense." Certainly memorandum "A" made for the best offensive command setup.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the Mediterranean unified command decision be postponed until after the over-all command matter is settled.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he could not entirely agree with Admiral Leahy. He referred to the setup in the Middle East where Mr. Casey of Cairo was supposed to act in the position of an intermediary, between the British and U. S. commanders in that theater, the result of which would leave three commanders trying to get an agreement on a committee basis. He felt that any such arrangement could never prove satisfactory and added that they had failed over a period of a

¹ Present were Roosevelt, Hopkins, Leahy, Marshall, King, Arnold, Brown, and Royal.

² *Ante*, p. 203.

³ See *ante*, p. 150.

year and a half to come to satisfactory agreements. He believed that a committee setup was not a proper form of military command.

ADMIRAL KING commented on the relationship of Mr. Churchill to the British War Cabinet and GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that at times the British Cabinet has overridden Mr. Churchill's decisions.

In reply to a question from the President as to what total forces the U. S. and United Kingdom would have at home and abroad by the first of January 1944, the consensus of opinion seemed to be about as follows:

Total Military Forces

U. S.—11,000,000

U. K.—4,500,000

Overseas

U. S. Army—2,500,000–2,600,000

U. S. Navy—about one million

United Kingdom

Army—About 2,700,000 total fighting men

Navy—About one million

THE PRESIDENT observed that we are definitely ahead of the British as regards the total number of men we have overseas at the present time and that we will soon have as many men in England for OVERLORD as the total British forces now in that place.

GENERAL MARSHALL felt we were already ahead of the British in England. There are only five British operational divisions in England. We have now as many men in England as can be deployed as have the British. The British have the problems of breaking down divisions in order to provide service troops and reorganize new troops.

THE PRESIDENT said that the Prime Minister told him last June that the British had about one million men in the Middle East at that time, including Syria, Egypt, Persia, and so forth. He added that he would like to have the figures on deployment of total of U. S. forces versus British forces, and GENERAL MARSHALL undertook to obtain those figures for the President.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that with regard to the air, we have passed the British rapidly. By 1 January 1944 we will have over 12,000 operational planes, while the British will only have about 8,000.

THE PRESIDENT said he was concerned in the total number of U. S. forces engaged in the war against Germany, and much interested in the total air forces. He said he did not like memorandum "B".

ADMIRAL KING observed that a supplementary memorandum⁴ regarding a particular British officer for command was only proposed in the event that it is indicated that memorandum "B" is the only one that can be accepted.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 209.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that this particular British officer mentioned is well known in the United States. He understands us and is presumably a man of stature in Britain. He sticks to the point and does not permit himself to be pushed around.

THE PRESIDENT referred to the last paragraph of memorandum "A" wherein it was stated that the Combined Chiefs of Staff could override the decisions of the proposed Supreme Allied Commander.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that that paragraph had been put in so that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would have the option of negative action. The idea was to get away from the "committee" command system. The proposed Supreme Allied Commander would have complete command control and make command decisions. Of course, he would submit his plans to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have never taken away from General Eisenhower his military command prerogatives. They do, however, take "means" away from General Eisenhower or add to his "means." Our General Eisenhower makes his own plans and carries out his own operations. He decides where and when to bomb certain points.

GENERAL MARSHALL added that there had originally been another sentence included in this paragraph to the effect that either the U. S. Chiefs of Staff or the British Chiefs of Staff could effect the relief of the Supreme Allied Commander on request. He said that this had been deleted, however, on Admiral Leahy's suggestion, in that it was pointed out that the relief of the Supreme Allied Commander would be a matter for decision by the Chiefs of State.

In reply to a question from the President as to the attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding General Alexander as Commander in Chief for the Mediterranean, Italy and the Balkans, GENERAL MARSHALL said that if the Supreme Allied Commander should be a United States officer, he felt that General Alexander would be satisfactory for Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean. On the other hand, if the Supreme Allied Commander should be a British officer, General Eisenhower should become Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean.

THE PRESIDENT said that he understood at Quebec that it was the opinion that General Eisenhower should stay until his mission was completed, that is, until he reached the Ancona line.⁵

GENERAL MARSHALL said he had not known definitely about this until the last afternoon of QUADRANT but that he understood that General Eisenhower was to remain until he reached a point north of Rome.

ADMIRAL KING recalled that was the agreement at QUADRANT but said he believed that the decision had been taken with the understand-

⁵ For the decision under reference, see Matloff, pp. 224-228.

ing that German resistance would be less than had actually been offered.

GENERAL ARNOLD agreed that the decision at QUADRANT had been for General Eisenhower to remain in command in Italy until north of Rome and in a defensive position.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the name of the particular British officer for Supreme Allied Commander had been suggested in order to throw the British into a position where they could not back out in the acceptance of memorandum "A". He pointed out that the Prime Minister had said to him (General Marshall) that it would be well for him to be the OVERLORD commander in that the Prime Minister was in England from where the operation would be launched whereas the President would be in the United States—in other words, General Marshall would act as the President's direct representative on the spot.

THE PRESIDENT asked for an opinion as follows: if we do not get a Supreme Allied Commander as proposed in memorandum "A", do the Chiefs of Staff believe that the British would accept General Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander for the Mediterranean? The opinion of the Chiefs of Staff to this question was emphatically in the affirmative.

In reply to a question from the President as to whether General Eisenhower in Italy and General Wilson in the Aegean had really ever gotten together, GENERAL MARSHALL said that they had had one meeting, that he knew of, but that they had definitely separate commands.

ADMIRAL KING observed that both memoranda "A" and "B" accepted unified command in the Mediterranean.

THE PRESIDENT agreed that it would be satisfactory if General Eisenhower became commander in chief of the Mediterranean. However, there might be some danger should General Alexander take over the Mediterranean command and then be dominated by the Prime Minister.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had accepted the contingency of General Alexander being dominated by the Prime Minister. On the other hand, the desirable condition of one command in the Mediterranean would exist. Naturally, executive direction would come from the British Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that evidently General Marshall thinks we should accept the British proposal for an Allied Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean and Middle East now. He (Admiral Leahy) did not feel that we should accept this until we have fought out the matter of a Supreme Allied Commander.

GENERAL MARSHALL felt that it would be illogical not to accept a Mediterranean commander in chief as proposed by the British

immediately. He felt that it would be more logical and show good faith to accept the British proposal forthwith.

ADMIRAL KING said he was inclined to agree with General Marshall, and felt that the Mediterranean command should be dealt with on its merits forthwith.

ADMIRAL LEAHY, on the other hand, said that to agree to the over-all Mediterranean command immediately would certainly not help the situation now in the Dodecanese.

THE PRESIDENT felt that the over-all Mediterranean command proposed by the British might have resulted from an idea in the back of their heads to create a situation in which they could push our troops into Turkey and the Balkans.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the Mediterranean commander in chief would be under the Combined Chiefs of Staff and that whoever the Commander in Chief might be he would necessarily have to seek approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for any changes in his over-all strategic plans.

THE PRESIDENT observed that even if General Alexander should become commander in chief and desire to use U. S. troops and landing craft against the Dodecanese, the President could say no.

ADMIRAL KING observed that dispositions, allocations, lines of campaign of the commander in chief, Mediterranean, would be subject to decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of State.

GENERAL MARSHALL felt that the British would point out that they had suffered last week as the result of the lack of unified command in the Mediterranean. He said that a commander, in a position such as General Eisenhower, was always conservative regarding the sending of reinforcements to another command that was not his own responsibility. On the other hand, an over-all commander who had responsibility for an enlarged theater would feel differently toward bolstering up any weakened position in the theater for which he was responsible. He cited a recent command situation in Alaska as an example.

GENERAL MARSHALL said if General Eisenhower had had responsibility for the Middle East, the British doubtless feel, and perhaps rightly so, he would have influenced the attitude of Generals Tedder and Spaatz towards additional air support in the Dodecanese and the situation might have been different.

THE PRESIDENT asked, why Leros, why Cos? He said the Prime Minister had been upset as regards the United States attitude regarding the Dodecanese. He asked whether we knew of the details of the British operations in the Dodecanese initiated by the Middle East command before those operations began? The general consensus of opinion of the Chiefs of Staff was that the United States had not been informed in advance of the proposed operations in the Dodecanese.

However, GENERAL MARSHALL said he believed possibly he had seen a British pink dispatch regarding their movements against these islands. He added that the British always regarded the Dodecanese as of greater importance than have we in the United States.

THE PRESIDENT stated that before any change is made in the principle set forth in the command setup proposed in memorandum "A" there should be another meeting between himself and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He added that we could agree to a unified command in the Mediterranean but not at the same time as we took up the matter of the Supreme Allied Commander.

MR. HOPKINS observed that in discussing the matter of the Supreme Allied Commander in Chief for the Mediterranean, we were discussing a matter of principles rather than of personalities.

In reply to a question from the President as to whether it was felt the British would put General Wilson under General Eisenhower *before* General Eisenhower reached Rome, GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL KING said yes.

3. SPHERES OF RESPONSIBILITY IN GERMANY— EUROPE-WIDE "RANKIN"

THE PRESIDENT observed that in the memorandum he received from Admiral Leahy on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff^a asking for guidance regarding spheres of influence as a result of a European-wide RANKIN, the paper makes certain suppositions without actually saying so. He felt that whatever territorial dispositions were made should conform to geographic subdivisions of Germany. He said that the Soviet Government will offer no objection to breaking up Germany after the war, that practically speaking there should be three German states after the war, possibly five. He said (1) we might take southern Germany, Baden, Wurtenburg [*Württemberg*], Bavaria, everything south of the Rhine [*Main?*]. This area forms a sort of southern state. (2) Take everything north and west of that area, including Hamburg and Hanover, and so forth, up to and including Berlin to form a second state, and the northeastern part, that is, Prussia, Pomerania, and south, to form a third state. He believed these general divisions were a logical basis for splitting up Germany. Especially was this so because the first or southern state was largely Roman Catholic; the northwestern portion is Protestant, while it might be said that the religion of the northeastern part is Prussianism. He felt that Marshal Stalin might "okay" such a division. He believed that the Chiefs of Staff would want to make a European RANKIN conform to such a division. Actually the British wanted the northwestern part of Germany and would like to see the U. S. take France

^a Not printed herein.

and Germany south of the Moselle River. He said he did not like that arrangement. We do not want to be concerned with reconstituting France. France is a British "baby." United States is not popular in France at the present time. The British should have France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Baden, Bavaria, and Wurtenburg. The occupation of these places should be British. The United States should take northwest Germany. We can get our ships into such ports as Bremen and Hamburg, also Norway and Denmark, and we should go as far as Berlin. The Soviets could then take the territory to the east thereof. The United States should have Berlin. The British plan for the United States to have southern Germany, and he (the President) did not like it.⁷

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that the matter should be gone into again. He said the proposals in the paper before the President had devolved from a consideration of the United States concentration on the right of the OVERLORD line from England. The conceptions for occupation were primarily based on military considerations of OVERLORD. He said he saw a frank approach to the matter in the paper from three points of view: (1) a normal OVERLORD; (2) a partial OVERLORD, with some fighting; and (3) RANKIN Case "C" (total collapse of Germany before OVERLORD got underway).

ADMIRAL KING observed that if OVERLORD should be underway when Germany collapsed, we would necessarily have a cross-over of our forces under the President's plan. Particularly would this be so if we should have reached the line of the Seine.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that when OVERLORD was launched we must have U. S. forces on the right from a logistics point of view.

ADMIRAL KING observed that while the President's idea regarding areas of occupation did not present insuperable difficulties, nevertheless there was a problem which would have to be worked out.

GENERAL MARSHALL said if a break comes, we could split our forces into two parts.

THE PRESIDENT observed that there were no ports south of Hamburg and Bremen until the Dutch ports are reached.

ADMIRAL KING felt that the military plans for OVERLORD were so far developed that it would not be practicable to accept any change in OVERLORD deployment.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the whole matter goes back to the question of ports in England. If we stick to OVERLORD we must have a scheme for disengaging OVERLORD at any stage of development in order to comply with the political considerations of occupation outlined by the President.

⁷ For reference to a map on which Roosevelt sketched his idea of these occupation zones, see last paragraph of this document and footnote 14.

THE PRESIDENT said it was his idea we should use as many troops from the United States in the occupation of Germany as possible. These can go around Scotland.

ADMIRAL KING felt that we must have a special occupational army, in a particular command, earmarked for occupation of northwest Germany.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the OVERLORD conception was that the United States forces would be progressing on the right and those should be the divisions first to come home.

THE PRESIDENT said he felt that the divisions now in North Africa, Sicily and Italy should be the divisions first to be sent back to the United States. He said one reason for the political "headache" in France was that De Gaulle hoped to be one mile behind the troops in taking over the government. He felt that we should get out of France and Italy as soon as possible, letting the British and the French handle their own problem together. There would definitely be a race for Berlin. We may have to put the United States divisions into Berlin as soon as possible.

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed it would be easy to go directly into northwest Germany. The problem of occupational troops proceeding to northwest Germany would certainly be less difficult than their fighting their way there across the intervening territory from northwestern France.

GENERAL MARSHALL observed that it was most important to keep commands in homogeneous control.

THE PRESIDENT said he envisaged a railroad invasion of Germany with little or no fighting.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he assumed there would be a difficult lack of rolling stock and the land advance would have to be largely made on a motor truck basis.

MR. HOPKINS suggested that we be ready to put an airborne division into Berlin two hours after the collapse of Germany.

In reply to a question from the President as to Admiral Leahy's opinion of the occupational area divisions, from a State Department point of view, ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he felt we should definitely get out of France as soon as possible. We should accept any difficulties in order to get out of France at the earliest possible time. If we want to let De Gaulle have France, all well and good. However, whatever troops there are in France at the time of German collapse will certainly have to stay in order to supervise any elections. General De Gaulle wants to start the French Government right now. Possibly there will be civil war in France. The British should clear up such a condition. On the other hand, it would be much easier for the United States to handle conditions in Germany. The Germans

are easier to handle than would be the French under the chaotic conditions that could be expected in France.

THE PRESIDENT said he personally envisaged an occupational force of about one million United States troops. He expanded on the policy of "quarantine." He said that the four United Nations by their police power could, if necessary, maintain order in Europe by the "quarantine" method. For instance, we do not want to use our troops in settling local squabbles in such a place as Yugoslavia. We could use the Army and Navy as an economic blockade and preclude ingress or egress to any area where disorder prevailed.

In reply to a question from General Marshall as to how long the President contemplated it would be necessary to maintain one million men in Europe, THE PRESIDENT replied for at least one year, maybe two.

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed that there will certainly be civil wars in many parts of Europe when the Germans let go. If the French divisions could be properly controlled, they could doubtless put down civil war in France. If De Gaulle could control the troops, he could put down the civil war—but what then? France will require food and munitions. THE PRESIDENT said we may definitely have to keep certain divisions in France. He felt that Holland was no problem. The Queen will return there and all will be well. On the other hand, Belgium is a big question—it is a two-language country. Possibly a buffer state between Germany and France will be necessary. This buffer state could run from northern France, say, Calais, Lille, and Ardenne[s], through to Alsace and Lorraine—in other words, from Switzerland to the seacoast. This would be a single buffer state.

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed that this was also at one time a German proposal and called the interdicted zone.

THE PRESIDENT observed that if we take the RANKIN paper proposed by COSSAC,⁸ the British would undercut us in every move we make in the southern occupational area proposed for the United States. He said that it was quite evident that British political considerations were in the back of the proposals in this paper.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the paper in the President's hands as regards occupational zones works out logically. There would be less entanglement in forces, supply lines would be shorter and more direct. The paper was worked out on that basis.

ADMIRAL KING said that it was evident from any stage of OVERLORD it is imperative to plan for what operations should be necessary in order to switch to the occupation areas proposed by the President.

⁸ For a summary, see *post*, p. 786.

5. PROPOSED AGENDA FOR PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCES WITH GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK, PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL AND MARSHAL STALIN

With regard to Item 1 *b* of Enclosure "A", "Chinese attitude towards Russian participation,"⁹ GENERAL MARSHALL questioned whether it would be wise to discuss this matter with the Generalissimo.

THE PRESIDENT said the Chinese desire equal rights with Russia in Outer Mongolia. Chiang Kai-shek wants Manchuria back. Unquestionably a discussion of this subject will cause trouble. The matter might be worked out, however, on the basis of "free zones". The Generalissimo desires a trusteeship over Korea, administered by Russia, China and the United States as trustees.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the Soviets want Kuzan [*Pusan?*] in that it is close to Japan.

ADMIRAL KING said the Soviets want a nice big port and communication to Dairen.

MR. HOPKINS observed that the Generalissimo might ask the President for a discussion of all operations contemplated against Japan.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he will tell the Generalissimo in *general* these operations, but did not propose to be specific or mention dates. THE PRESIDENT said undoubtedly the Generalissimo will inquire about the matter of tonnage over the hump.

In reply to a question from the President as to how Admiral McKean's [*McCain's*] plan for the bombing of Japan was coming along, ADMIRAL KING replied that it was being worked out and they were having rehearsals now from which experience will be gained.

THE PRESIDENT said he will not bring up the question of a Supreme Commander in the Pacific.

With regard to item 1 *b* [*d*] of enclosure "A", "Importance of Chinese assistance to operations in North Burma" THE PRESIDENT said he thought it might be desirable to bring General Somervell into the discussion of this matter.

GENERAL MARSHALL then told about the organization of 3,000 U. S. volunteers, organized as a special brigade for long-range penetration groups to precede the Chinese forces. He said that great efforts had been made to organize this United States unit. They had been provided with special equipment and special planes.

In reply to a question from the President as to what had been heard regarding the training of Chinese troops in Yunnan, GENERAL MARSHALL said that General Stilwell, in a recent dispatch, said that Chinese troops lacked equipment, lacked food, suffered from malnutrition, and that he had only received a very small percentage of the troops that were needed. The Chinese divisions each consist of from

⁹ *Ante*, p. 245.

four to five thousand troops. They are all new men and underfed, and must first be brought into suitable physical condition before their training can commence. He added that the British were despondent regarding the matter of Yunnan forces.

GENERAL MARSHALL added he thought it would be a serious error to clamp down additional United States troops between the Chinese, British and Indian troops. We are already sending 4,000 additional troops to India in order to build airfields. We also have a battalion in this area constructing a railroad.

In reply to a question from the President as to whatever happened about the Generalissimo's request for a regiment of marines near Ichang, which would result in making some 200,000 Chinese really fight, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF and MR. HOPKINS stated that they had never heard of such a request.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that any such proposition as putting a large unit of U. S. troops in the vicinity of Ichang would result in increasing the difficulty of the supply problem over the hump.

In reply to a question from the President as to how the tonnage over the hump was getting along, GENERAL ARNOLD said that by means of night flying and thus avoiding Japanese fighter opposition and other improved methods, he hoped to attain a figure of about 10,000 tons this month. He added that we will step up the tonnage as rapidly as possible. He pointed out, however, that we must have American troops in China in connection with this supply route. As far as he knew the pipeline project was up to schedule.

THE PRESIDENT said if Germany should be cleaned up, we must study how many bombers could be operated from the vicinity of Vladivostok.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that General Bradley's plan had proposed the operation of 100 bombers maximum by supply from Alaska.¹⁰

With regard to item 2 c (1), subject "Post-war Problems—Chinese participation in the occupation of Japan"—THE PRESIDENT said the Chinese will undoubtedly want to take part in the occupation of Japan.

With regard to item 2 c (3), "Military and naval bases for mutual assistance"—THE PRESIDENT said it was contemplated that the Mandated Islands would be under the composite sovereignty of the United Nations. The Chinese want Formosa and the Bonins. The military bases required in the Mandated Islands would be occupied by the United States. There might be an over-all civilian control of the entire group and civilian control of the smaller islands. Certainly we would not want to occupy the smaller islands in the Mandates.

¹⁰ The plan under reference, advanced by Major General Follet Bradley in 1942, concerned the flying of planes to Russia via Alaska and the development of Siberian bases. See Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell: *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953) in the series *United States Army in World War II*, pp. 343-346.

MR. HOPKINS felt that if it was believed that Formosa would be an important place for a base, the Generalissimo would be glad to give base rights to the United States.

THE PRESIDENT agreed but said that these base rights in Formosa should not be given on a permanent basis in that the Generalissimo would not agree to any permanent bases.

With regard to Enclosure "B", "Proposed agenda for the meeting of the President and the Prime Minister"¹¹—THE PRESIDENT said that Mr. Churchill is still interested in working for a European economic federation. He said that we should not get roped into accepting any European sphere of influence. We do not want to be compelled, for instance, to maintain United States troops in Yugoslavia.

In reply to a question from General Marshall as to whether there would be any compromise in the Prime Minister's proposal, he (THE PRESIDENT) said that the United States would not act initially but could send air or naval forces.

In regard to U. S. policy on non-participation in operation of eastern Mediterranean-Balkan area, THE PRESIDENT said we must be concerned with the Soviet attitude in this matter.

GENERAL MARSHALL said we must see the question of this Balkan matter settled. We do not believe that the Balkans are necessary. To undertake operations in this region would result in prolonging the war and also lengthening the war in the Pacific. We have now over a million tons of supplies in England for OVERLORD. It would be going into reverse to undertake the Balkans and prolong the war materially. It would certainly reduce United States potentialities by two-thirds. GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that commitments and preparations for OVERLORD extend as far west as the Rocky Mountains in the United States. The British might like to "ditch" OVERLORD at this time in order to undertake operations in a country with practically no communications. If they insist on any such proposal, we could say that if they propose to do that we will pull out and go into the Pacific with all our forces.

THE PRESIDENT said that we could tell the British that they have lots of troops in the Middle East, close to the Balkans, why not send them to the Far East? He pointed out that the Soviets are now only 60 miles from the Polish border and 40 miles from Bessarabia. If they cross the Bug River, which they might do within the next two weeks, they would be on the point of entering Rumania. The Soviets might say, "If someone would now come up from the Adriatic to the Danube, we could readily defeat Germany forthwith."

¹¹ *Ante*, p. 246.

GENERAL MARSHALL said we will have to be ready to explain to the Soviets the implications of any such move. If the Soviet forces get to the Bug River, we can then throw in our air to assist them. We could force the issue from England. He felt that we should not bring up the matter of asking the Soviets for their plans until we are committed to our own plans. Then we could give them air support.

In this connection GENERAL MARSHALL inquired of the President what sort of an organization he contemplated for doing business with the U. S. S. R. on a military basis. He felt that we should come to the Soviets on specific problems and should definitely have a Soviet officer know what we are doing.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that we should not forget about the control commission in London.¹² This commission will undoubtedly ask for a military committee as a part of that setup.

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed that the control commission in London will mean nothing but trouble for us.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that if Turkey entered the war it would result in drawing away supplies and troops from other operations. He asked whether it would be possible to have another conference like this before meeting with the U. S. S. R.

THE PRESIDENT indicated in the affirmative.

GENERAL ARNOLD said the Soviets should give us advance notice of what air facilities would be available for bases and operations against Japan. It was important to get this information as soon as possible.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that Burma, Sumatra and Akyab were not on the list for the President to discuss with the Prime Minister. He said that the Prime Minister was in favor of operations against Sumatra, or the Andaman Islands.

ADMIRAL LEAHY felt that by now the Prime Minister may be somewhat "fed up" with that idea.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the British say that without more help from us they can only do the Andaman Islands operation, which is certainly a case of marking time.

THE PRESIDENT said he was much annoyed about the Azores matter.

ADMIRAL LEAHY felt that it was perfectly proper to be annoyed and that the British could be of more help regarding the Azores if they wanted to.

ADMIRAL KING observed that recent naval ships and planes which entered the Azores were well treated by the Portuguese and British.

GENERAL ARNOLD said our first transport plane will arrive in the Azores tomorrow.

ADMIRAL KING observed that the airfields in the Azores were much better than had been expected.

¹² Presumably the European Advisory Commission, the establishment of which had been agreed upon at the Moscow Conference.

GENERAL MARSHALL thought that what we really should have had was a "go-getter" in Lisbon. From the attitude of our representative there he felt it was a wonder we have anything.

With regard to Item 1 *a* of Enclosure "C", "Proposed agenda for the President's meeting with Marshal Stalin"¹³ regarding the topic, "Soviet collaboration in Strategic Bombing, including use of Soviet Bases by U. S. Forces"—THE PRESIDENT said that the Soviets would like to have our planes but not our personnel.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he believed the Soviets were softening in their point of view regarding this matter.

With regard to the Italian fleet and Italian shipping, ADMIRAL KING said he did not believe the Soviets were in a position to *demand* Italian ships.

THE PRESIDENT said it would be better to let the U. S. S. R. have one-third of the ships as a token of good-will. No transfer of title was contemplated. He said we should not be concerned about the Italian attitude in this matter. The idea was to retain the Italian ships in the possession of the Allies and allocate them for best use as necessary. We will certainly prevent any future Italian Navy. After using these ships to our heart's content we can talk about the matter of eventual title. Then we could give back a few of the ships to the Italians. He felt that it would be all right for the ships given to the U. S. S. R. to be manned by Soviet personnel if a reasonable proposition for the use of them is made by the Soviets.

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed that the conference had been of great benefit to the Chiefs of Staff.

THE PRESIDENT then reiterated his idea of a U. S. occupational zone for Germany and drew out the proposed line of demarcation on a map. This map had been obtained from Rear Admiral Brown and was handed to General Marshall at the conclusion of the meeting.¹⁴

¹³ *Ante*, p. 247.

¹⁴ The map is printed in Matloff, facing p. 341.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull

Ankara reports on November 18 that Numan obtained approval of Party Leaders to reply to Eden that Turks have now decided in principle to enter the war. Numan agreed that military assistance to Turkey is now the prime consideration and political question of Rus-

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room to Greer at Oran, apparently via military channels.

sian assurances should be postponed. British believe Turkish decision cannot long remain secret and are concerned about possible premature Axis attack. British evacuated about 1,000 troops from Leros to Turkey, but reported to have lost seven destroyers.

Ankara reports on November 17 that Von Papen told Finnish Minister that Turks will not enter War. Minister believes Von Papen intends to reassure Hitler and, while concealing truth from Hitler, hasten his downfall as Von Papen stated peace was not possible unless ² Hitler and the Nazis were removed from power.

² This reads "unless and until" in the file copy in the Hull Papers.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President ¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull

1. Ambassador Ankara ² reports that conversations between British and Turkish military on estimated Axis striking power against Turkey revealed wide divergence opinion. Since estimates both sides based self interest Ambassador expects satisfactory compromise on which may be based military assistance required to withstand Axis attack.

2. Algiers reports that directive has been issued to Fifteenth Army group instructing that German prisoners of war accused of atrocities within the Moscow Declaration,³ should not be tried immediately but should be held in custody for subsequent trial. Article Two of Geneva Conference ⁴ will be observed but accused will be segregated to prevent evasion.

3. Algiers reports that some embarrassment caused by increasing numbers of partisans escaping to Italian mainland. Although it is desired to avoid giving offense to any Yugoslav group it has been found necessary to intern a number of these people.

4. On November 17 the Department requested Murphy to take up urgently with the appropriate military authorities the establishment of some workable and practical plan for communication between the Holy See and its bishops in Allied occupied territories.

5. On November 18 the Ambassador in Madrid ⁵ informed the Foreign Minister of this government's concern over large number German agents operating throughout Spain. Hayes also stated that the U. S.

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, presumably to Oran or Tunis, via military channels.

² Laurence A. Steinhardt.

³ Declaration of German Atrocities, November 1, 1943; *Decade*, p. 13.

⁴ International Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva July 27, 1929; *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. 1, p. 336.

⁵ Carlton J. H. Hayes.

government joined with the British government in requesting prompt suppression of German Consulate General at Tangiers and expulsion of German agents from that place. Foreign minister stated that he would study note.

6. Algiers reports on November 18 that political situation in Rome has further deteriorated. Badoglio has submitted to General Joyce the names of ministers and technicians who will constitute the temporary government until Rome is reached. Badoglio assures Joyce that none of these people are tainted with Fascism.

7. On November 12, 1943, the American Ambassador at Madrid was authorized to inform the foreign minister that the Department is convinced that the explanations given regarding the Laurel incident⁶ have been advanced in good faith and wishes to believe that the Spanish Government did not intend to imply recognition of the Laurel regime or to disturb relations with the U. S. and the Department and for its part is willing to let the matter rest. The Ambassador was requested to inform the foreign minister that the incident had created a very unfavorable impression in this country which could only be cleared by deeds of a nature to restore confidence.

⁶Telegram of congratulation sent by Spanish Foreign Minister Jordana in October 1943 to José P. Laurel, president of the puppet government of the Philippines set up by the Japanese.

Roosevelt Papers

*The President's Personal Representative (Hurley) to the President*¹

CAIRO, 20 November 1943.

I have inspected the Chinese Theatre of Operations. I spent considerable time with the American Generals, Lieutenant General Stilwell, Major General Chennault, and other Chinese and American Army Officers. I was accompanied into the Chinese Theatre by Major General Stratmeyer who is Commander of the American Air Operations in the India and China Theatres. I had two conferences with the President of China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The Generalissimo expressed his complete confidence in you, in your motives, and in the principles that you have promulgated.

As President of China and as Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek will recommend that the coming conference reiterate the Atlantic Charter.² If possible he would like to have your Four Freedoms³ specifically included in the declaration of the Cairo or Teheran conference.

¹ For the passages which are omitted, see *ante*, p. 102.

² August 14, 1941; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1603.

³ Set forth in Roosevelt's annual message to Congress, January 6, 1941; *Decade*, p. 1.

After conferences with the Generalissimo which covered approximately six hours, I have drawn the following conclusions:

(1) The Generalissimo and the Chinese people favor the principles of democracy and liberty.

(2) The Generalissimo and the Chinese people are opposed to the principles of imperialism and communism.

(3) He believes that you, of course, favor democracy and liberty. He understands, however, that you may temporarily have to temporize with imperialism and communism in the interests of the joint war effort.

(4) He is aware that the future co-operation and unity of the United Nations must depend upon your ability to assimilate rather than eliminate divergent ideologies. He is convinced that you must find principles on which the Big Four nations can agree. In seeking these principles he feels that you must have extensive freedom of action.

(5) He wanted me to say to you that he has implicit confidence in your motives and that he is committed to the fundamental principles which you have promulgated.

(6) He will, therefore, follow your leadership on the diplomatic and political questions that will be considered in the impending conference.

On strategy he finds himself unable to accept a subordinate position in the Asiatic area to Lord Mountbatten. He stated that so far as the Chinese Theatre of Operations is concerned he must be supreme. He stated that if he should accept a secondary position in that theatre it would divide his following and eventually so weaken his position that he could no longer maintain himself as the leader of all China. Notwithstanding this attitude he is ready to cooperate fully with Lord Mountbatten and he thinks that in Northern Burma and eventually in Thailand and possibly in Indo-China, there would be circumstances in which he would favor the control of British, American and Chinese troops being placed under one commander. He said that he personally liked Lord Mountbatten and that he could visualize future operations outside of China where he would want his Lordship to be the Supreme Commander of United Nations forces, including Chinese Armies. However, he was steadfast in maintenance of the principle that in the Chinese Theatre it is better for himself and China and the United Nations that he should remain the ultimate authority.

He expressed the opinion that the subjugation of Japan should be sought through an attack on Japan in Japan. Attacks should be made from various sectors of the Pacific Theatre, the India-Burmese and the Chinese Theatres simultaneously. These attacks should be co-ordinated and directed toward the ultimate occupation and conquest of Japan in Japan. Tokio and all Japan is the objective rather than any state, island or citadel outside of Japan. He also spoke

with clarity of the strategy of attacking Tokio and all Japan through China.

In evaluating the Generalissimo's conversations it is advisable to consider with some skepticism the Chinese capacity, or readiness, to contribute materially to offensive warfare. It is advisable likewise to give consideration to the relative importance placed by the Chinese Central Government upon conserving its strength for maintenance of its postwar internal supremacy as against the more immediate objective of defeating Japan. These are questions I should like to discuss with you further.

Respectfully yours,

PATRICK J. HURLEY
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

Defense Files

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy)

SECRET

[CAIRO, November 21 (?), 1943.]

MEMORANDUM OF TALK WITH AVERILL [AVERELL] HARRIMAN
NOVEMBER 21, 1943

On the evening of the twenty-first I had dinner with Mr. Kirk in his town house in which Mr. Harriman was staying. During the course of the evening Mr. Harriman asked that I come into another room with Mr. Douglas as he wanted to tell us something about the Soviet situation. He started out by saying that he was here only as a reporter of what the Soviet attitude was, that he did not wish to express himself as being in favor of any particular line of military policy.

He said the chief impressions he has had during his stay in Moscow had been of the passionate desire of the Soviets to end the war. They were still a mighty force but were growing tired, all their facilities and energies were strained, they felt that a prompt application of all the forces that the United Nations now had available would cause the Germans to crumble quickly and they were desperately anxious to close the war against Germany successfully and immediately. He said they had a very firm belief that it was within our power in some form to take more divisions off their front than we had thus far accomplished. They now took for granted and would insist on the completion of OVERLORD in full vigor but they wanted more activity this winter. The Autumn war had become merged in the Winter war and it looked for the moment as if the chief force of the Soviet attack had been checked; it would require the further weakening of the German front before they could again break through. They were

impressed with the effects of our bombing and did not minimize that contribution but were absolutely convinced that we could substantially add to the German troubles this winter if we went about it. When I pressed Harriman for some indication of what they thought we might do and still prepare ourselves to mount an adequate OVERLORD he said that neither he nor they were in a position to suggest anything to our planners as neither were sufficiently familiar with the facts to say what we could do. On one point, however, he said the Soviets were quite clear, and that was that we should immediately intensify in the most realistic manner our pressure on Turkey. He felt that it was quite possible that if Turkey came into the war this winter the Soviets would be satisfied. Harriman felt that we should apply at least as much pressure as Eden had recently done with some success.¹ He said the Soviet government felt that the entry of Turkey into the war would involve a further number of German divisions as well as give great air and psychological advantages to the United Nations position. He felt quite certain that the President and our staffs would find Stalin and the Soviet delegation united along these lines.

Before leaving he made it quite clear that in spite of some implications in certain of General Deane's cables to the contrary, the Soviets were no less interested in or insistent upon a second front which to them meant a cross-channel operation. They did feel the energies of the U. S. and U. K. could be so organized as to enable a more prompt and greater application of power this winter than was contemplated. Harriman said that perhaps the entry of Turkey into the war was all that would be required and that no very substantial diversions need be made to accomplish it, at any rate none that could not be effected by some economies in Italy and elsewhere.

¹ See Alling's memorandum of November 9, 1943, Kelley's telegram 1844 of November 10, and Kohler's memorandum of November 11, *ante*, pp. 164, 174, and 180, respectively.

740.0011 EW 1939/31953A

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: With reference to Mr. Stettinius' recent conversations with you concerning the open city status of Rome, we have been informed that General Eisenhower has recently submitted his recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.² For important

¹ Apparently sent by pouch; received at Tehran November 28, 1943; and referred by Roosevelt to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² See *ante*, p. 196.

considerations other than military, it is desirable that this Government make a sincere effort to spare Rome to the extent possible the devastation resulting from modern military operations and, in the event an agreement cannot be reached, of placing the burden of refusal upon the Germans.

Consequently, I am submitting a draft letter to the Pope, for your signature if you approve, recognizing the open city status of Rome on the general basis of the conditions outlined by the Italian Government in August last. In considering the communication to the Pope, the War Department suggests that you may wish to consult with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure that the military as well as the political aspects of the problem are fully examined. The draft communication incorporates, in a satisfactory manner we believe, General Eisenhower's reservations.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

[Enclosure]

*Draft Letter From President Roosevelt to the Pope*³

YOUR HOLINESS: I refer to your letter of July 20 and to subsequent communications from His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State, sent through the American Chargé d'Affaires and the Apostolic Delegate concerning the recognition of Rome as an open city. As Your Holiness is aware, I have shared your deep concern for the safety of our common religious and cultural heritage in Rome and have continued to give the problem of its preservation my earnest thought and attention. The unilateral declaration of the Royal Italian Government on August 14⁴ and the subsequent steps taken by it to make the declaration effective⁵ have likewise received the careful consideration of the highest authorities of the United States Government.

I now have pleasure in informing Your Holiness that the decision has been reached to recognize Rome as an open city on the basis of the August declaration of the Royal Italian Government and the subsequent effective conditions, notified through the Holy See, provided the German Government will accord its recognition of Rome as an open city on a similar basis. A copy of the conditions established by the Royal Italian Government, then in Rome, which this

³ The following note in pencil, in an unidentified handwriting, appears on the Department's file copy of the draft letter: "President Roosevelt after discussing with the British advised against sending this". See *post*, p. 820.

⁴ Stefani, the Italian news agency, announced on August 14, 1943, the Italian Government's decision to declare Rome an open city. *New York Times*, August 15, 1943, p. 1, col. 8.

⁵ See the subenclosure, *infra*.

Government has found acceptable, to make the Italian declaration effective, is enclosed for reference.

To avoid possible misinterpretation of these conditions, I should point out that with reference to paragraph 4 [5?] the Allied forces reserve full transit rights through Rome, including railway, highway, and other related facilities required for such transit. Since, at the time of the declaration of Rome as an open city in August, the Royal Italian Government was still established there and the conditions, now accepted by this Government, did not anticipate its removal from the Italian capital, it is, of course, assumed that the Royal Italian Government will wish to reestablish itself in Rome.

I can only hope that the tireless efforts of Your Holiness to spare Rome the devastation of modern warfare will prove as successful with the adversary. I shall await with sympathetic interest any information which Your Holiness may in the future be able to communicate to me concerning the results of your approach to the German Government.

Respectfully yours,

[Subenclosure]

The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON, August 26, 1943.]

MEMORANDUM

The Apostolic Delegate has been informed by the Cardinal Secretary of State^o that the Italian Government has taken the following steps to make effective its declaration of August 14, 1943, on the status of Rome as an open city:

1) The defense installations of the city of Rome have been dismantled.

2) Orders have been issued that anti-aircraft batteries are not to operate, nor are fighter planes to go into action over the city of Rome.

3) The Italian and German High Commands are leaving the city, and their complete removal will be effected within a short time.

4) Active troops are being withdrawn and there will remain in the city only a garrison of Italian troops charged with the maintenance of public order. This garrison of troops will be equipped with arms adequate for the purpose of their presence.

^o Luigi Cardinal Maglione.

5) The railway system of Rome will in the future not be used for purposes of military transportation, for the marshalling of trains, or for loading or unloading troops, etc. The railway system of Rome will be reduced to a mere transit line, and its facilities will not be employed for the making up of or the breaking up of military trains. For all purposes of military transportation, the railway system in and around the zone affected by the declaration of Rome as an open city will be put into the status of a simple line of passage.

6) All necessary steps are being taken to effect the transfer beyond the city limits of all military establishments, and of all factories used for the production of arms and munitions.

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1943.

3. THE PRESIDENT'S LOG EN ROUTE TO CAIRO, NOVEMBER 11-21, 1943

Editorial Note

The document referred to as the President's Log is a booklet entitled "Log of the President's Trip to Africa and the Middle East, November—December 1943" (66 regularly numbered pages of text, 16 pages at the front and the back bearing Roman numerals, and some 50 unnumbered pages containing illustrations and appendices). This booklet, which was prepared by Lieutenant (jg) William M. Rigdon, U. S. N., and approved by Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. N., contains a list of members of the President's party, an itinerary, charts showing sea and air travel, a foreword, the main body of the Log, eleven appendices (a citation for General Eisenhower, the communiqués of the conferences held at Cairo and Tehran, the President's talks at a United States Army camp at Tehran, etc.), and an index.

The itinerary, the foreword, and the portion of the main body of the Log covering November 11-21, 1943, are reproduced below. The portions of the main body of the Log covering the periods of the First Cairo, Tehran, and Second Cairo Conferences are reproduced later in this volume.

White House Files

Log of the Trip

ITINERARY

<i>Arrived</i> <i>Hour Date</i>	<i>1943</i> <i>Place</i>	<i>Departed</i> <i>Hour Date</i>	<i>Distance</i> <i>Traveled</i>
	Washington, D. C.	2130, 11 Nov.	
2238, 11 Nov.	Quantico, Va.	2244, 11 Nov.	35
0336, 12 Nov.	Cherry Point, Va.	0951, 12 Nov.	63
1753, 12 Nov.	Hampton Roads, Va.	0006, 13 Nov.	57
0715, 20 Nov.	Oran, Algeria.	1040, 20 Nov.	3806
1403, 20 Nov.	Tunis, Tunisia.	2240, 21 Nov.	653
0935, 22 Nov.	Cairo, Egypt.	0707, 27 Nov.	1851
1500, 27 Nov.	Teheran, Iran.	0946, 2 Dec.	1310
1435, 2 Dec.	Cairo, Egypt.	0820, 7 Dec.	1290
1540, 7 Dec.	Tunis, Tunisia.	0809, 8 Dec.	1571
0950, 8 Dec.	Malta.	1310, 8 Dec.	310
1402, 8 Dec.	Castelvetro, Sicily.	1535, 8 Dec.	164
1630, 8 Dec.	Tunis, Tunisia.	0635, 9 Dec.	155
1810, 9 Dec.	Dakar, Senegal.	2100, 9 Dec.	2425
1619, 16 Dec.	Cherry Point, Va.	1725, 16 Dec.	3654
0850, 17 Dec.	Washington, D. C.		98
Total distance traveled			17,442 miles.

FOREWORD ¹

In order that the reader may have in mind world conditions at the time of this writing, the following outline of the general war situation in November 1943 is included as a foreword:

(a) Although the surrender of Italy in September had been a severe blow to Axis morale, nevertheless the German army appeared to be almost as strong as ever, as was also the Japanese army. Both Axis powers, however, had lost the superiority in the air and both had suffered heavily in shipping and in transport facilities. Both were short in manpower and in many essential war materials. The Germans were fighting a determined delaying action on the Eastern Front west of the Dnieper and also in Italy south of Rome.

(b) The combined building programs of the United States, Great Britain and Russia had established strong superiority in air and naval power. The submarine menace was under control for at least the time being. Ships were being built and manned at a rate that enabled the United States land and air forces to be delivered in the theatres of war with ever-increasing speed. The air offensive from the United Kingdom and from Italy was pounding German military and industrial centers with ever-growing effectiveness. Russia had held the offensive for over six months and was pursuing the German withdrawal beyond the Dnieper. The Russian people were exultant but their losses were continuing. Supplies from the United States and from the United Kingdom were being delivered in quantities that provided important help; but on every occasion Russian leaders and press demanded a second front on the continent of Europe to relieve the Russians from the full pressure of the German armies. China, with her four hundred million starving people, continued her struggle against Japan only because of the promises held out to her that decisive help would soon be forthcoming. It was generally recognized that China's manpower and air bases must play an important role in the destruction of Japan; but it required the sustained personal attention of President Roosevelt to build up a sufficient air transport system to China to keep her in the war. China demanded a campaign in Burma to reopen the Burma Road. Naval, air and land action on the fringes of the Pacific had whittled away Japanese naval and air strength to the point where she was distinctly on the defensive. Through our submarine and air action we had reduced the Japanese merchant marine so much that an early abandonment of some of her outposts seemed probable. Other Allied nations on the American

¹ By Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. N.

continent were contributing to the total war effort with supplies and facilities according to their means.

(c) A great majority of the rumors and reports from neutral European countries predicted the early defeat of the Axis. Some predictions looked to a defeat of Germany in the spring of 1944, while others, recognizing the basic strength of her army, expected her to resist for several years. Rumors were current of the desire of Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria to seek a separate peace. The partisans of Norway, Holland, France, Yugoslavia and Greece were becoming an ever-increasing problem for the Hun.

(d) The all-important questions of the moment were: "How can the Allies join forces so as to bring about the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan at the earliest possible moment?", and, "What measures shall the Allies plan to take after the war so as to prevent Germany and Japan from ever again plunging the world into chaos?"

(e) Teamwork between Great Britain and the United States had been developed through numerous conferences between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill and their Combined Staffs.² Russia, wishing to avoid entanglements with Japan while still involved in a war with Germany, had avoided any close collaboration with her allies. She had not permitted military observers from either Great Britain or the United States to visit her battle fronts. For more than a year President Roosevelt's efforts to arrange a meeting with Stalin had been unsuccessful because of the Marshal's unwillingness to leave Russia and the personal control of his armies. Axis propaganda had seized on this situation to spread persistent rumors of a separate peace between Russia and Germany. In September Stalin had finally expressed a willingness to meet Roosevelt and Churchill at Teheran, but because of the inaccessibility of that city during bad weather, President Roosevelt had held out for a meeting place in the neighborhood of Basra. The Moscow Conference between Secretaries of State had been held as a preliminary study for a later conference of Heads of State, but when President Roosevelt left Washington for Cairo on November 11th he was still uncertain whether a meeting with Stalin could be arranged. Chiang Kai-shek had expressed his willingness to come to Cairo.³

Those of us who had to do with the planning for this expedition were very conscious that the President was running grave personal risk in such extensive travel by sea and air because we believed that

²The records of the Anglo-American Conferences attended by Roosevelt and Churchill in 1941-43 at Washington, Casablanca, and Quebec are scheduled to be published subsequently in other volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series.

³Regarding the developments referred to here, on arrangements for the conferences with Stalin and Chiang, see *ante*, chapter 1.

if the enemy could learn of his whereabouts they would spare no effort to attack by air, submarine or assassin. Even with the strictest censorship, rumors of his activities and whereabouts were almost certain to leak out. We had the submarine menace in the Atlantic and Mediterranean; the new destructive glider-bomb that was raising havoc against shipping in the Mediterranean; attack by air throughout the Mediterranean while traveling in helpless transports and the ordinary risks of air travel in proceeding anywhere beyond Cairo. Axis agents were known to be numerous in all proposed ports of call. However, the very great value of teamwork for the war and for the postwar period was so evident that no one questioned the need for accepting whatever risks might be involved.

THE LOG OF THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP

Thursday, November 11th.

9:30 p. m. The President, Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Admiral William D. Leahy, Rear Admirals Wilson Brown and Ross T. McIntire, Major General Edwin M. Watson and Lieutenant Commander George A. Fox left the White House at 9:30 p. m., by automobile, for the Marine Base at Quantico, Virginia. The other members of the President's party had proceeded to Quantico earlier in the evening.

The *Potomac*, commanded by Lieutenant Commander John H. Kevers, U. S. N., had departed the Washington Navy Yard at noon and had arrived at Quantico in the early afternoon. The *Potomac* was escorted to Quantico by the U. S. S. SC664, Lieutenant (junior grade) C. J. Reed, U. S. N. R., commanding.

The utmost secrecy concerning the President's proposed movements had been observed, and at Quantico only the Commanding General and the Commanding Officer of the Marine Base had knowledge of the President's impending arrival there.

10:38 p. m. The President and his party arrived at Quantico and went on board the *Potomac*, docked there, at once, for the first sea leg of the long journey incident to the forthcoming meetings of the President, Prime Minister Churchill, Marshal Joseph Stalin, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and President Inonu.

10:44 p. m. The *Potomac* cast off her lines and set course down the Potomac River for a rendezvous with the U. S. S. *Iowa* in the Chesapeake Bay near the confluence of the Bay

and the Potomac River. The *Potomac* was escorted by the SC664.

As an early transfer to the *Iowa* was planned for Friday morning, all members of the party turned in soon after we departed Quantico. Strong winds in this area during the early afternoon had abated in time to permit smooth sailing down the river.

Friday, November 12th.

During the night we passed and exchanged calls with the U. S. S. *Dauntless* and the U. S. S. *Stewart*, bound up-river for Washington. They were returning there after having transported members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff party and their baggage to the *Iowa* on Thursday.

3:36 a. m. The *Potomac* anchored off Cherry Point, Va., near the mouth of the Potomac River, to await the transfer of the President and his party. Some five miles distant, farther out in the Bay, the massive *Iowa* could be seen riding at anchor.

8:30 a. m. The *Potomac* got underway to go alongside the *Iowa*.

8:51 a. m. The *Potomac* went alongside the *Iowa*, to starboard, and the transfer of the party was begun. The bay was very smooth at this point and the transfer was made expeditiously and without incident. The President left the *Potomac* at 9:16 a. m. and went aboard the *Iowa*, using his special brow which was rigged from the after sun deck of the *Potomac* to the main deck of the *Iowa*, just abreast of the *Iowa's* number three turret. This arrangement afforded a safe and comfortable means of transfer for the President. At his request, no honors were rendered as he came on board the *Iowa*. Due to war-time restrictions, his flag was not broken in the *Iowa*.

9:45 a. m. The transfer of the party completed, the *Potomac* shoved off from alongside the *Iowa* at 9:45 a. m., and shortly afterwards left for a secret destination in company with the SC664. They were instructed to proceed in company to a destination to be selected by the senior officer and to remain out of sight and incommunicado with the shore for a period of not less than one week. This was ordered so as to create the impression that the President might be on a cruise in the *Potomac*.

The meticulous care by which Captain John L. McCrea and his officers and crew of the *Iowa* had made preparations for the reception and stay of the President and his party in their ship was most evident from the moment we set foot on the broad decks of that great battlewagon. Everything was in order for immediate use and an officer escort was waiting on deck, at the head of the brow, to take his "opposite number" in hand and acquaint him with the ship.

The President, as well as each other member of his party, found in his quarters a card bearing his name and rank and reading, in part, as follows:

"Welcome

The Captain, officers, and men of the *Iowa* are happy to have you on board.

Your room number is—Captain's Cabin*

You will mess in—Flag Mess*

Your Abandon Ship Station is—Lee Motor Whaleboat*

Your Action Station is—Conning Tower (Flag Level)*

Deck Promenade space has been allocated as follows:

The President's Promenade—Entire First Superstructure Deck, Frames 74-99, port and starboard.

Visiting Officers' Promenade—Starboard side Main Deck, Frames 41-78, and Second Superstructure Deck, Frames 109-117, port and starboard.

Ship's Officers' Promenade—Port side Main Deck, Frames 41-78.

The General Alarm and Gas Attack Alarm will be tested daily at 1200. They are not sounded for drill. When sounded at any other time than 1200, enemy action is expected."

(NOTE: (*) indicates the President's assignments.)

We found already on board the *Iowa*, as fellow passengers to our destination, General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations; General H. H. Arnold, Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces; Lieutenant General B. B. Somervell, Chief of Army Service Forces; and the following aides and members of their party: Major General

T. T. Handy, U. S. A., Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., U. S. N., Rear Admiral B. H. Bieri, U. S. N., Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger, U. S. N., Brigadier General L. S. Kuter, U. S. A., Brigadier General H. S. Hansell, Jr., U. S. A., Brigadier General F. N. Roberts, U. S. A., Colonel E. O'Donnell, U. S. A., Colonel W. W. Bessell, U. S. A., Colonel Joseph Smith, U. S. A., Captain W. L. Freseman, U. S. N., Captain F. B. Royal, U. S. N., Captain A. K. Doyle, U. S. N., Captain E. W. Burrough, U. S. N., Commander V. D. Long, U. S. N., Major W. W. Chapman, U. S. A., Major C. E. Miller, U. S. A., Chief Ship's Clerk R. E. Morgan, U. S. N., Ship's Clerk E. F. Block, U. S. N., Warrant Officer (junior grade) G. Larson, U. S. A., and Warrant Officer (junior grade) H. D. Anamosa, U. S. A.

- 9:51 a. m. The *Iowa* got underway to proceed to Hampton Roads where she was to fuel ship and be joined by her anti-submarine screening destroyers before departing on the main leg of the journey. Because of her deep draft and the resultant restricted waters of the Chesapeake Bay, she had come to the rendezvous very light in the water. Once underway, she proceeded on various courses and
- 5:43 p. m.⁴ at various speeds to Hampton Roads, and, at 5:43 p. m., anchored in berth "B".
- 6:00 p. m. Lieutenant (junior grade) R. W. Bogue, U. S. N. R., and Lieutenant (junior grade) O. S. Collins, Jr., U. S. N. R., (White House Map Room watch officers) came on board with official mail from Washington. This mail, which contained H. R. 3366 and S. J. Resolution 95, was acted on by the President, and Lieutenants Bogue and Collins left the *Iowa* at 6:45 p. m. to return the mail to the White House.
- 6:45 p. m. Bogue and Collins left the *Iowa* at 6:45 p. m. to return the mail to the White House.
- 7:12 p. m. The tanker U. S. S. *Housatonic* came alongside to starboard to fuel the *Iowa*.
- 7:35 p. m. The tanker U. S. S. *Escalante* moored alongside to port to assist in fueling the *Iowa*. Fueling from the
- 9:55 p. m. *Escalante* was completed at 9:55 p. m.; from the
- 10:20 p. m. *Housatonic* at 10:20 p. m. Those vessels departed from alongside immediately their task was completed. As a precaution to safeguard the secrecy of the fact that the President was on board the *Iowa*, Supervising Agent Spaman of the Secret Service Detail requested

⁴For three entries out of chronological order, 1:00 p. m., 6:30 p. m., and 8:30 p. m., see *post*, p. 278.

that Mr. Hopkins, General Marshall, General Arnold, General Watson, Admiral Leahy, Admiral King, Admiral Brown and Admiral McIntire remain "under-cover" while the tankers were alongside lest their presence on board be connected with the President's presence. This "restriction" was carefully observed by all those prominently known personages.

The *Iowa*, in which it was our great fortune to make this voyage, is, except perhaps for her sister-ship, the U. S. S. *New Jersey*, the largest and most powerful man-o'-war afloat today. She is 888 feet in length and has a beam of 108 feet and 3 inches. The area of all her decks and platforms is 418,000 square feet, or about 9½ acres. She was built by the New York Navy Yard; was launched on August 27th, 1942, with Mrs. Henry A. Wallace, wife of the Vice President of the United States, serving as sponsor; and was commissioned and placed in service on February 22nd, 1943. Though known as a "45,000-tonner", she has a displacement of 58,000 tons. Her commanding officer since commissioning has been Captain John L. McCrea, U. S. N., whom the President released from duty as his Naval Aide so that he might take that command. Her executive officer is Commander T. J. Casey, U. S. N. Commander G. A. Leahy, U. S. N., the *Iowa*'s first lieutenant and damage control officer, was at one time the commanding officer of the President's yacht, the *Potomac*. Two other faces familiar to the President amongst the *Iowa* officers were Lieutenants (junior grade) C. N. Berry, U. S. N. R., a former White House Map Room watch officer, and Francis J. Terry, U. S. N., assistant to Captain McCrea, Captain D. J. Callaghan, U. S. N., and Rear Admiral John R. Beardall, U. S. N., while they served as Naval Aide to President Roosevelt. The *Iowa*'s armament consists of 157 guns: a main battery of nine 16-inch 50 caliber guns, in three 3-gun turrets; and a combined secondary and anti-aircraft battery of twenty 5-inch 38 caliber double-purpose guns, in twin mounts, nineteen 40 millimeter quads (total of 76 barrels), and fifty-two 20 millimeter guns. She carries two catapults and three observation scout planes. Her engineering plant is a marvel of the very latest design and can develop 210,000 horsepower, sufficient

power to drive the huge ship along at a maximum speed of 33.5 knots. To operate the *Iowa* and fully man her armament requires the services of 142 officers, 2,394 Navy enlisted men and 98 Marines.

The President occupied the Captain's Quarters while in the *Iowa*. Mr. Hopkins, Admirals Leahy, Brown and McIntire and General Watson were members of his mess. The other general and flag officer passengers were messed in the Cabin mess, which mess had been temporarily moved to the Flag Quarters. Captain McCrea lived in his sea cabin, on the navigating bridge, during the period the President occupied his quarters.

1:00 p. m. The President and members of his mess had lunch at 1:00 p. m., and spent a quiet afternoon.

6:30 p. m. Dinner. Captain McCrea was the only guest.

8:30 p. m. Movies in the President's quarters. Generals Marshall, Arnold and Somervell and Admiral King were guests for the movies that night and every other night of the passage.

Saturday, November 13th. (At sea in "Iowa")

12:06 a. m. The *Iowa*, in company with the destroyers U. S. S. *Cogswell* (DD651) (Commander Destroyer Division One Hundred embarked therein), the U. S. S. *Young* (DD580) and the U. S. S. *William D. Porter* (DD579), as Task Group 27.5 with Captain McCrea as Task Group Commander, departed Hampton Roads for Oran, Algeria (French North Africa). The *Iowa* was piloted out of the Hampton Roads area by Lieutenant Commander L. T. Stallings, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve, proceeding at various speeds and on various courses conforming to the swept channel.

2:08 a. m. The *Iowa* was stopped momentarily and the pilot left the ship.

4:25 a. m. Task Group 27.5 went to standard speed of 25 knots.

5:15 a. m. Task Group 27.5 took departure from Buoy "X-5" and set base course of 105° (true).

5:22 a. m. Task Group 27.5 commenced zig-zagging in accordance with a standard Navy plan. Heavy following seas were running now but the *Iowa* rode them comfortably. The destroyers appeared to be finding it pretty hard going.

The seas continued to increase throughout the afternoon and for a while it was necessary to keep all hands

off the top side. One man, R. Uriate (Seaman second class, U. S. N.) suffered slight bruises and a big scare when a wave coming over the main deck caught him and knocked him against a heavy object.

8:00 a. m. Our 8:00 a. m. position was:

Latitude $36^{\circ}-38'-00''$ N.

Longitude $73^{\circ}-22'-00''$ W.

Course— 105° (true).

Distance made good since departure from Hampton Roads, 65 miles.

Wind from 270° , force 6.

Temperature— 56° (wet bulb).

Sea—heavy swell.

Weather—slightly cloudy.

The *Iowa* steamed in Condition of Readiness Three, which required that one-third of her crew be on watch at battle stations at all times. At night the ship was darkened.

12:00 (noon) The President and his party lunched at 12:00 o'clock noon, and spent a quiet and restful afternoon despite the rough weather that prevailed.

Sunday, November 14th. (At sea in "Iowa")

1:00 a. m. All ship's clocks were set ahead one hour to conform to Zone Plus Three time.

8:00 a. m. Position: Latitude $34^{\circ}-16'00''$ N.

Longitude $62^{\circ}-33'14''$ W.

Course— 105° (true).

Speed—25 knots.

Distance made good since 8:00 a. m., Saturday, 553 miles.

Distance made good since departure, 618 miles.

Wind from 300° , force 6.

Temperature— 70° .

Sea—moderate swell.

Weather—slightly cloudy.

During the afternoon the *Iowa* exercised at air defense drill, simulating the repulse of an air attack from starboard. The President witnessed this exercise from the deck just outside his quarters (first superstructure deck, starboard side). Live ammunition was fired from a number of units of the ship's anti-aircraft battery (5-inch, 40 m. m. and 20 m. m. guns) to demonstrate for the Commander-in-Chief what a veritable curtain

of fire a ship of this type can offer as a "greeting" for enemy planes bent on attacking.

While the *Iowa* was exercising at this anti-aircraft drill, and during the lull after one round of the series of firings, a moment of extreme tension was brought on by an unexpected explosion, of an underwater nature, in the vicinity of the ship. This explosion was followed by the terse announcement, "This is not a drill." All hands wondered, had we been attacked? This doubt was soon cleared when the *William D. Porter*, our anti-submarine screen to starboard, reported by visual dispatch that she had accidentally fired a torpedo in our direction. Fortunately the wake of the torpedo had been detected and reported by the *Iowa's* lookouts in time for the *Iowa* to maneuver and to avoid being hit. During this maneuvering, the *Iowa*, within the period of but a very few minutes, built up her speed to 31 knots. The torpedo passed approximately 1,200 yards astern of the *Iowa*, moving at an estimated speed of 46 knots and at an estimated depth of 16 feet. The *William D. Porter* explained the accidental firing as probably caused by moisture from previous rough seas grounding the electrical circuit from the firing pin through the impulse case and igniting the black powder impulse charge. An investigation of this incident was immediately ordered by Admiral King, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, who was a passenger in the *Iowa* at the time.

Had that torpedo hit the *Iowa* in the right spot with her passenger list of distinguished statesmen, military, naval and aerial strategists and planners, it could have had untold effect on the outcome of the war and the destiny of our country. The *William D. Porter's* ship's company presumably did not know who rode the *Iowa*. During the afternoon Admiral McIntire and Lieutenant Commander Fox inspected the ship's medical department and witnessed several major operations.

Monday, November 15th. (At sea in "Iowa")

8:00 a. m. Position: Latitude 32°-11'-00'' N. Longitude 52°-30'-00'' W.

Course—105° (true).

Speed—25 knots.

Distance made good since 8:00 a. m., Sunday, 546 miles.

Distance made good since departure, 1164 miles.

Wind from 345° , force 5.

Sea—slight sea, moderate swell.

Weather—slightly cloudy.

8:38 a. m. The United States destroyers *Hall* (DD583), with Commander Destroyer Squadron Fifty-One embarked therein, *McComb* [Macomb] (DD458) and *Halligan* (DD584) were sighted standing toward our Task Group from the south.

9:00 a. m. Task Group 27.5 changed base course to the left to 093° (true).

9:05 a. m. The *Hall*, *McComb* and *Halligan* reported for duty with Task Group 27.5.

9:15 a. m. The *Cogswell*, *Young* and *William D. Porter* dropped out of position as anti-submarine screen for the *Iowa*, having been relieved by the *Hall*, *McComb* and *Halligan*. The *Cogswell*, *Young* and *William D. Porter* then left our company to proceed on duty assigned. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and their planners met in the Flag Plot during the forenoon.

2:00 p. m. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King and General Arnold) met with the President in the President's cabin for discussions.⁵ This meeting adjourned at 3:30 p. m.

Except for the meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President spent a quiet day. There were no guests for luncheon or dinner.

Tuesday, November 16th. (At sea in "Iowa")

1:00 a. m. All ship's clocks were set ahead one hour to conform to Zone Plus Two time.

8:00 a. m. Position: Latitude $31^{\circ}-40'-00''$ N. Longitude $42^{\circ}-22'-30''$ W.

• Course— 093° (true)

Speed—25 knots.

Distance made good since 8:00 a. m., Monday, 530 miles.

Distance made good since departure, 1694 miles.

Wind from 315° , force 4.

Temperature— 71° .

Sea—calm.

Weather—slightly cloudy.

⁵ For the minutes of this meeting, see *ante*, pp. 86, 194.

During the afternoon Lieutenants (junior grade) C. N. Berry, U. S. N. R. and F. J. Terry, U. S. N., called on the President to pay their respects.

2:51 p. m. The U. S. S. *Block Island* (escort aircraft carrier) and three screening destroyers were sighted bearing 105° (true), distant 30,000 yards. Planes from the *Block Island* furnished air coverage for Task Group 27.5 during the afternoon.

11:55 p. m. Task Group 27.5 crossed the 35th Meridian, West Longitude, and entered the European-African-Middle East Theatre of War.

Wednesday, November 17th. (At sea in "Iowa")

1:00 a. m. All ship's clocks were set ahead one hour to conform to Zone Plus One time.

8:00 a. m. Position: Latitude, 31°-13'-30'' N.
Longitude, 31°-55'-00'' W.

Course—093° (true).

Speed—25 knots.

Distance made good since 8:00 a. m., Tuesday, 528 miles.

Distance made good since departure, 2202^a miles.

Temperature 70°.

Sea—slight sea, moderate swell.

Weather—cloudy with rain squalls during the afternoon.

During the forenoon Admiral McIntire and Lieutenant Commander Fox attended a conference of the ship's medical and dental officers.

1:47 p. m. The United States destroyers *Ellyson* (DD454, with Commander Destroyer Squadron Ten embarked therein), *Rodman* (DD456) and *Emmons* (DD457) joined Task Group 27.5 as anti-submarine screen for the *Iowa*. On being relieved, the *Hall*, *McComb* [Macomb] and *Halligan* departed our company for duty assigned.

The President spent more than an hour on the flag bridge during the afternoon, seemingly enjoying the squally weather that prevailed during that particular time.

Air coverage during the forenoon and afternoon was furnished by fighter planes from the U. S. S. *Santee* (escort aircraft carrier), which was operating as a part

^a Apparently the mileage at this point should be 2222.

of a task group about 25 miles to the northward of our line of advance.

- 5:31 p. m. The *Ellyson* was called alongside and came under the *Iowa's* port quarter and an important and urgent despatch⁷ was passed to her by hand. She was then directed to leave our company temporarily to effect radio transmission of the message. This procedure was followed so that the use of her radio transmitter would not possibly disclose to the enemy the location of the main body of our task group. On completion of this task, the *Ellyson* rejoined us.

Thursday, November 18th. (At sea in "Iowa")

- 1:00 a. m. Set all ship's clocks ahead one hour to conform to Zone Zero (Greenwich Meridian) time.
- 8:00 a. m. Position: Latitude, $32^{\circ}-52'-14''$ N.
Longitude, $21^{\circ}-41'-30''$ W.
Course— 074° (true).
Speed—24 knots.
Wind from 090° , force 6.
Weather cloudy.
Sea—moderate.
Distance made good since 8:00 a. m., Wednesday, 534 miles.
Distance made good since departure, 2736 miles.
- 12:00 noon. Task Group changed standard speed to $26\frac{1}{2}$ knots.
- 1:59 p. m. Task Group changed base course to 087° (true).

Friday, November 19th. (At sea in "Iowa")

- 3:00 a. m. Task Group changed base course to 095° (true).
- 8:00 a. m. Position: Latitude, $33^{\circ}-58'-00''$ N.
Longitude, $10^{\circ}-06'-00''$ W.
Course— 095° (true).
Speed—25 knots.
Wind from 360° , force 6.
Sea—moderate swells.
Distance made good since 8:00 a. m., Thursday, 579 miles.
Distance made good since departure, 3315 miles.
- 10:24 a. m. Sighted Task Group consisting of the light cruiser U. S. S. *Brooklyn*, U. S. destroyers *Trippe* and *Edison*

⁷ Perhaps Roosevelt's telegram of November 17, 1943, to Churchill, *ante*, p. 96.

and British destroyers *Trowbridge* [Troubridge], *Tyrian* and *Teaser* [Teazer], standing toward our Task Group.

- 10:44 a. m. *Iowa* Task Group changed base course to 090° (true).
 10:52 a. m. *Iowa* Task Group (27.5) joined the *Brooklyn* Task Group, and on orders of Rear Admiral L. A. Davidson, U. S. N., Commander of the Combined Task Group, assumed base course of *Brooklyn* Task Group, 045° (true).
 1:30 p. m. Set all ship's clocks ahead one hour to conform to Zone Minus One time.
 2:00 p. m. The Joint Chiefs of Staff met with the President.⁸ This meeting adjourned at 5:10 p. m.
 6:21 p. m. All ships of the combined Task Group went to "General Quarters" in readiness for possible enemy air or submarine attack.
 7:20 p. m. Combined Task Group increased speed to 27 knots.
 7:49 p. m. Combined Task Group entered swept channel leading through the Straits of Gibraltar.
 9:11 p. m. Combined Task Group entered Straits of Gibraltar. *Ellyson*, *Rodman* and *Emmons* left our company to proceed to Gibraltar.
 9:34 p. m. After passing through Straits of Gibraltar our Task Group cruised at various speeds and on various courses throughout the night, adjusted so as to facilitate our arrival at Oran at daybreak the following day—Saturday, November 20th. *Iowa* now in the Mediterranean Sea.

Saturday, November 20th. (At Oran and Tunis)

- 7:15 a. m. The *Iowa* arrived at Oran, Algeria (on the Barbary Coast of French North Africa). The *Brooklyn* and other escorting ships left our company at the outer harbor to proceed on duty assigned. The *Iowa* proceeded to the naval anchorage at Mers el Kebir (the "Great Harbor"), about six miles to the westward of Oran, and, at 8:09 a. m., anchored there. Distance made good since 8:00 a. m., Friday, 491 miles. Total distance, Hampton Roads, Virginia to Oran, Algeria, via our route, 3806 miles.
 We found it quite cool at Oran (temperature 50°). Snowcaps were in evidence in the nearby ranges of the

⁸ For the minutes of this meeting, see *ante*, p. 248.

Atlases. The weather was clear and bright. This was special "Roosevelt weather", we were told, as for the past few days the weather at Oran had been anything but good.

8:36 a. m. The President entered the *Iowa*'s motor whaleboat which was in the port davits and lowered to main deck level; the boat was then lowered into the water; and the President left the *Iowa* for the shore.

8:55 a. m. The President disembarked from the motor whaleboat at Mers el Kebir landing. He was greeted here by his sons, Colonel Elliot[t] Roosevelt, A. U. S., and Lieutenant Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., U. S. N. R., and General Eisenhower, Admiral Cunningham (British Commander in Chief, Mediterranean), Vice Admiral Hewitt, (Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters), Brigadier General A. R. Wilson (Commanding General Mediterranean Base Section, U. S. Army Forces), and Commodore Yates (Commandant of the U. S. Naval Operating Base, Oran). Major DeWitt Greer, U. S. A. and Mr. Michael F. Reilly, who had preceded us to Africa by air, joined the President's party here.

The President entered a waiting motor car and departed Mers el Kebir immediately for the La Senia airport. Riding in the car with him were General Eisenhower and the President's sons Elliot[t] and Franklin Jr. La Senia airport is about 50 miles distant from Mers el Kebir and the route thereto winds along mostly steep and snake-like roads, passing through a number of native villages and skirting Lake Seb[k]ra D'Oran.

10:25 a. m. The President arrived at La Senia airport, left his automobile and embarked in his plane at once. The plane, a Douglas C-54 transport (#950) was manned by the following pilots and crew, who, with this same plane handled the President on all his air travels about North Africa and the Middle East on this particular expedition:

Pilot—Major Otis F. Bryan, A. U. S.

Co-pilot—First Lieut. R. F. Brown, A. U. S.

Navigator—First Lieut. [J.] G. Cushing, A. U. S.

Flight Engineer—Second Lieut. R. Darst, A. U. S.

Radio Officer—Second Lieut. F. Wardlow, A. U. S.

Steward—Second Lieut. Sanford Fox, A. U. S.

10:40 a. m. The President's plane departed La Senia airport for Tunis. In the President's plane were: The President, Franklin D. Jr., Mr. Hopkins, General Eisenhower, Admiral Leahy, General Watson, Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire, Lieutenant (jg) Rigdon, Secret Service Agents Reilly, Spaman and Fredericks, and Steward Prettyman.

Our route to Tunis followed the North African coast line. We were joined by a fighter-plane escort at Dellys and had such escort from there on to Tunis. Because of the strong headwinds and cross-winds encountered, we found the trip rather bumpy.

2:03 p. m. The President's plane arrived at El Aouina airport, 12 miles northeast of Tunis. Air distance traveled Oran to Tunis, 653 miles.

The very first thing noticed at El Aouina was the vast number of wrecked German aircraft still on the ground in this vicinity.

Colonel Elliot[t] Roosevelt, who had flown in his own plane from Oran, was on hand at El Aouina to meet his father.

2:20 p. m. The President disembarked and left the airport for Guest Villa No. 1 (appropriately called the "White House" by those on duty here) in Carthage. We were told that this villa had been used by the German commander during their occupation of Tunisia. It is now being used by General Eisenhower whenever he visits Tunis, and was turned over to the President by General Eisenhower for his personal use. The President rode in General Eisenhower's official car with the General and his sons, Elliot[t] and Franklin D. Jr. Enroute to his villa the President stopped to view the ruins of Old Carthage (The Lions Den and the Amphitheatre). The "White House" villa is situated right on the shore of the Gulf of Tunis. Cape Bon can be seen in the distance across the Gulf.

Sergeant Robert Hopkins, U. S. A., joined his father and the President's party here. He is on duty at the front in Italy with the Fifth Army, and is a Signal Corps photographer. While he was with the President's party he served as official photographer.

Major George H. [E.] Durno, A. U. S., also joined the President's party here, and served as Press Relations

Officer. Major Durno had come from Washington by air and was on hand when we arrived.

During the afternoon Colonel E. D. [R.] Cook, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff, Commander Northwest African Air Force, presented the President with a piece of metal from the fuselage of a German bomber that had just recently been shot down over Italy.

As soon as he had settled down in his quarters, the President summoned Lieutenant Rigdon and he worked on official mail that had been delivered to us on our arrival at Oran. There were no legislative bills in this particular mail pouch. The President worked for two hours with this mail, clearing it up completely.

5:00 p. m. The President left his villa for La Marsa airfield where, from a jeep, he inspected Colonel Elliot[t] Roosevelt's air squadron (Northwest African Photo Reconnaissance Wing), which is comprised of approximately 6,000 Allied airmen (U. S., British and French). The American component is the 90th Wing Reconnaissance Squadron. Approximately 2,800 of the 6,000 were present for the inspection. The President then returned directly to his villa.

8:00 p. m. Dinner at the President's villa with Miss Kay Somersby [Summersby] (General Eisenhower's chauffeur) and Miss Nancy Gatch (Red Cross worker and daughter of Rear Admiral T. L. Gatch, U. S. N.), who were guests of Franklin, Jr., and Elliot[t], Admiral Leahy, General Eisenhower, General Spaatz, Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, Franklin, Jr., and Robert Hopkins. After dinner the President talked for some time with General Eisenhower.⁹ Before retiring, the President announced that he would delay his scheduled departure from Tunis from 6:00 a. m., Sunday, until 10:30 p. m., Sunday. It had been explained to the President that it was the usual practice hereabouts to depart at that late hour on flights to Cairo. The night flight eliminated the need for fighter escort and was considered safer and more comfortable for the President.

Sunday, November 21st. (At Tunis)

There were no callers during the forenoon.

12:00 noon. The President left his villa, together with General

⁹ For the discussions at Tunis between Eisenhower and Roosevelt, see Eisenhower, pp. 195-197.

Eisenhower, General Watson, Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire, to make an automobile tour of the Medjez el Bab and Tebourba battlefields. Three trucks loaded with armed U. S. A. military policemen were in the convoy, one ahead of the President's car and two astern of his car. Eight MP's mounted on motorcycles led the convoy and cleared our route of all other traffic. We skirted the city of Tunis to the north, passing along in front of the palace of the Bey of Tunis and by some of the ruins of the Roman Aqueduct, and then continued on to the rolling plains of the battlefields areas. General Eisenhower rode with the President and described to him what a bitter fight it had been at Medjez el Bab and at Tebourba and how the Allied break through, first at Medjez el Bab and subsequently at Tebourba, had brought about almost immediate German collapse and had given us complete control of this entire area.

1:25 p. m.

The party stopped near Medjez el Bab for a picnic lunch. Immediately we halted, a cordon of armed MP's was thrown around the party while we lunched. While stopped here Admiral Brown found a native horseshoe on the ground beside the President's car. He, Admiral Brown, and General Eisenhower posed for photographs holding the horseshoe beside the President's car.

After lunch, the party proceeded on through Tebourba and back to Tunis to complete the circuit.

The entire party was very conscious of how recently this world-deciding battle of Tunisia had been fought and were amazed to find how few scars had been left on the countryside. Few buildings showed serious damage. This was due, we were told, to precision bombing. The best example of precision bombing was to be seen in the port area of Tunis. This particular section was almost completely demolished, while buildings outside the port area—in some cases just one block away—were apparently untouched.

Already the people of this area have returned to normal country lives. The farms are very well cared for. Numerous shepherds and their flocks were observed. Presumably these flocks were hidden in the hills and back country during the German occupation.

The roads are generally good. There were some rough spots which had been caused by bombs, land mines and artillery fire.

The many Arabs noted were clothed in their picturesque garb—red turbans and flowing gowns. The French natives were clothed in normal Western dress. Some farmers wore turbans and costumes like the ancient Turks.

It was noted that plowing was being done by various means—by horse, by oxen, and, in one instance, by mechanized equipment.

A number of other things of interest were also noted, such as:

- Burned-out tanks (American and German) and other vehicles, still on battlefield where destroyed.

- Tank traps and tank barriers still on battlefields.
- Operational air fields, from which planes were operating to enemy territory on tactical missions.

- Blown-up German ammunition dumps.

- Uncleared land-mine fields. These had been marked and roped-off.

- Defensive positions still standing. Many fox holes observed.

- French military and French Red Cross convoys on the move eastward. The Red Cross convoy, it was observed, was staffed entirely by French women.

- Hill 609, the scene of perhaps the heaviest concentration of artillery fire in this war to date.

- A flight of 51 medium bombers (United States Army Air Force) returning from a tactical mission over the European Continent. Some of the "V's" were not complete, indicating that this particular flight suffered combat losses.

- Vast supplies of our ammunition and bombs stored along the highways and in the fields. It was widely spread so as to minimize loss and damage in case of an enemy raid.

- A large salvage dump filled with burned-out tanks and other vehicles. This was near Medjez el Bab.

- A number of military cemeteries—one American and several German. All appeared very well kept.

- An Arab tribe on the move with their camel caravan headed for greener lands we were told. We also saw a number of camel herds grazing in the distant fields.

- 3:45 p. m. We arrived back at the President's villa. No mishaps or untoward incidents occasioned [*occurred during?*] the tour.
- 8:00 p. m. Dinner at the President's villa. The President had as his guests: Elliot[t], Franklin, Jr., Admiral Leahy, Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire and General Watson.
- 10:10 p. m. The President and his party left the President's villa, by auto, for El Aouina airport to embark for Cairo.
- 10:40 p. m. The President's plane departed El Aouina airport (Tunis) for Cairo. Passengers in the President's plane were: The President, Mr. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire, General Watson, Lieut-Comdr. Fox, Secret Service Agents Reilly, Spaman and Fredericks and Steward Prettyman. This plane had two sleeping berths, so the President and Mr. Hopkins turned in soon after their departure from Tunis.
- Except for Admiral Leahy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff party had proceeded on to Cairo earlier in the day. Lieutenant Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., U. S. N. R., left his father at the El Aouina airport, to proceed and rejoin his ship at Gibraltar. The *Mayrant* had been damaged by enemy bombers at Palermo and was due to leave Gibraltar soon for a U. S. Navy Yard for repairs.



U.S. Army photograph

PLATE 1

Generalissimo Chiang, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Madame Chiang in the garden of the villa occupied by Roosevelt at Cairo, November 25, 1943. Standing, left to right: Mr. Kirk, Sir A. Cadogan, Mr. Dening, Foreign Secretary Eden, Mr. Steinhardt, Mr. Winant, Mr. Macmillan, Dr. Wang, Mr. Casey, Lord Killearn, Mr. Morton, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Douglas, Lord Leathers, Mr. McCloy, Mr. Hopkins.



U.S. Army photograph

PLATE 2

Generalissimo Chiang, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Madame Chiang in the garden of the villa occupied by Roosevelt at Cairo, November 25, 1943. Standing, left to right: General Shang, Lieutenant General Lin, Lieutenant General Somervell, Lieutenant General Stilwell, General Arnold, Field Marshal Dill, Admiral Mountbatten, Lieutenant General Carton de Wiart.



U.S. Army photograph

PLATE 3

Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Churchill on the portico of the Russian Embassy at Tehran, November 29, 1943. Standing, left to right: Mr. Hopkins, Foreign Commissar Molotov, Mr. Harriman, Sir A. Clark Kerr, Foreign Secretary Eden.



U.S. Army photograph

PLATE 4

The Shah of Iran and President Roosevelt in Roosevelt's quarters in the Russian Embassy, Tehran, November 30, 1943.



U.S. Army photograph

PLATE 5

President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin at dinner
in the British Legation, Tehran, November 30, 1943.



U.S. Army photograph

PLATE 6

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the Mena House, Cairo, December 4, 1943. Seated on left side of table, from front to rear: Commander Coleridge, Lieutenant General Ismay, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, General Brooke, Air Chief Marshal Portal, Field Marshal Dill, Brigadier Redman. Seated on right side of table, from front to rear: Admiral King, Admiral Leahy, Captain Royal, General Marshall, General Arnold.



U.S. Army photograph

PLATE 7

President Roosevelt, President İnönü, and Prime Minister Churchill in the garden of the villa occupied by Roosevelt at Cairo, December 5, 1943. Standing immediately behind the Heads of Government: Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Steinhardt, Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu, Mr. Açikalin, Foreign Secretary Eden, Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Mr. Anderiman, Sir A. Cadogan.



U.S. Army photograph

PLATE 8

President Roosevelt and Field Marshal Smuts, Cairo, December 6, 1943.

II. THE FIRST CAIRO CONFERENCE

4. THE PRESIDENT'S LOG AT CAIRO, NOVEMBER 22-26, 1943

White House Files

Log of the Trip

Monday, November 22nd. (Enroute Tunis to Cairo, and at Cairo)

9:35 a. m. The President's plane landed at Cairo West airport (a Royal Air Force field). This was some two and one-half hours after plane number two of our party had arrived from Tunis, and the late arrival caused some concern at the field as to the President's safety. Two different groups of fighter-planes had been at appointed rendezvous at the scheduled times but each failed to make contact and eventually had to return to their base for refueling. The President's plane, it developed, had detoured southward as far as latitude 28°-00'-00" north and had then turned northward and followed the course of the River Nile up to Cairo. This route took them over the Sphinx and the Pyramids.

The air distance from Tunis to Cairo, over the route flown by the President's plane, was 1851 miles. The President was met at Cairo West airport by Major General Ralph Royce, U. S. A., Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Middle East, and his Chief of Staff, Brigadier General G. X. Cheaves [*Cheves*], U. S. A. The Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek and their party had arrived in Cairo from Chungking the evening before our arrival (on November 21st.). Prime Minister Churchill and his party also arrived in Cairo on November 21st.

10:10 a. m. The President disembarked and proceeded via automobile to Ambassador Alexander C. Kirk's villa in the Mena District of Cairo, which is approximately seven miles west of Cairo and out near the Pyramids of Gizeh.

10:30 a. m. The President arrived at Ambassador Kirk's Mena villa. He made this villa his home, at Ambassador Kirk's invitation, during his entire stay in Cairo. This villa is

of medium size and is beautifully furnished. It also has a lovely flower garden in the rear with an overlooking patio, and it was there that the President spent most of his few leisure moments. The general area surrounding the President's quarters was guarded by American soldiers.

Mr. Hopkins and Admiral Leahy lived in the President's villa. Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire and General Watson and other members of our party lived in nearby villas.

The President brought along his own valet and cooks and stewards and throughout our stay here and at Teheran those cooks and stewards prepared the President's meals.

The SEXTANT Conference was held in the Mena House Hotel, located approximately one mile west of the President's villa and right at the very base of the Pyramids of Gizeh.

The President was met at his villa on his arrival by Ambassadors Kirk and Averell W. [W. Averell] Harriman.

During the afternoon, the Prime Minister, the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek called on the President.¹

8:00 p. m. Dinner at the President's villa for the President, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Mr. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy and Prime Minister Churchill.¹

9:00 p. m. Preliminary meeting of the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek with their respective military and naval staffs and other delegates. A complete list of those present follows:²

11:10 p. m. The preliminary meeting, as described above, adjourned.

Tuesday, November 23rd. (At Cairo)

During the forenoon the following persons called on the President: Mr. A. Y. Vyshinsky, First Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, U. S. S. R. Mr. Vyshinsky was accompanied by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen of our State Department; Admiral Mountbatten; General

¹ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 307.

² For those present, see the editorial note, *post*, p. 308.

Wheeler; General Wedemeyer; The Prime Minister and his daughter, Mrs. Sarah Oliver; the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek; Generals Shang Chen, Ling [*Lin*] Wei and Chu Shih Ming.³

Ambassadors Kirk and Harriman called at the President's villa during the forenoon.⁴

- 11:00 a. m. First plenary meeting of the President, the Prime Minister and the Generalissimo with their respective military and naval staffs and other delegates.⁵ Those present for this meeting were the same as for the preliminary meeting held at 9:00 p. m., Monday, November 22nd.
- 1:30 p. m. The President lunched at his villa with the Prime Minister, Mrs. Oliver, Mr. Hopkins, Commander C. R. Thompson, R. H. [*N.*] (The Prime Minister's Naval Aide), and Mr. J. F. [*M.*] Martin (The Prime Minister's Secretary).⁶
- 3:15 p. m. The President, together with Lieutenant (jg) Rigdon, worked on his mail from 3:15 until 4:10 p. m., signing the following Congressional bills: HR No. 244, 273, 400, 560, 800, 1049, 1144, 1202, 1206, 1435, 1498, 1555, 1622, 1666, 1769, 1887, 1889, 1918, 1920, 2182, 2244, 2600, 2675, 2824, 2905, 2915, and 3331.
- 4:15 p. m. With the Prime Minister acting as host, the President, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Oliver, Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire and General Watson left the President's villa for an automobile trip to the nearby Pyramids of Gizeh and the Sphinx.⁷ At the Pyramids one of the native guides, who was found by chance at that late hour, was called in to give details of the history of the Pyramids that some members of the party were not familiar with. The visit to the Pyramids was made

³ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 310.

⁴ No record has been found of the substance of the conversation between Kirk and the President. Harriman's visit was in conjunction with that of Vyshinsky. See *post*, p. 309.

⁵ For the minutes of this meeting, see *post*, p. 311. The term "First Plenary Meeting" was applied to this meeting, as it was the first of five plenary meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the President and the Prime Minister (and occasionally others) held at Cairo between November 23 and December 6, 1943.

⁶ No record of the substance of this meeting has been found.

⁷ No indications have been found that matters of substance were discussed. Arnold, pp. 462-463, states that he went with the President to see the Sphinx. Arnold does not mention that any other persons were in the party, and the trip to which he alludes presumably took place the following day, November 24. According to his account, he and the President discussed on that occasion the choice of a Supreme Allied Commander for the European Theater and the quantity of tonnage that could be delivered by air to China.

just at sunset, so that the party had the experience of seeing the sun dip behind the Pyramids, the afterglow, and the dust [*dusk?*] succeeding the sun.

5:15 p. m. The President, the Prime Minister and members of their party returned to the President's villa at 5:15 p. m.

Colonel Elliot[t] Roosevelt arrived in Cairo this afternoon from his headquarters at Tunis. He was quartered in the President's villa while in Cairo.

8:00 p. m. Dinner at the President's villa. The dinner list included the President, the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Mr. Hopkins and Colonel Elliot[t] Roosevelt. The Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek remained after dinner until 11:00 p. m. conversing with the President and Mr. Hopkins.⁹

A radiogram was received quite late this evening from Moscow informing the President that Marshal Stalin would be at Teheran on November 28th or the 29th.¹⁰ As this was a bit sooner than had been expected, immediate steps were taken to complete the details of our journey to Teheran.

Wednesday, November 24th. (At Cairo)

Callers at the President's villa during the forenoon included Ambassadors Kirk and Harriman and Major Otis Bryan, A. U. S.¹¹

11:00 a. m. The President held a conference with General Marshall, Admiral Leahy, Admiral King, General Arnold, Lt-General Somervell, Captain Royal, Air Chief Marshal Portal, Admiral Cunningham, the Prime Minister, General Sir Alan Brooke, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Lt-General Ismay, General Laycock, Brigadier Hollis and Mr. Hopkins. This conference adjourned at 12:40 p. m.¹²

Major John Boettiger, A. U. S., joined the President's party this morning. Major Boettiger is on duty with the Fifth Army in Italy (with the Allied Military Government organization.)

p. m. During the afternoon the President kept appointments with the following personages at his villa:

⁹ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 322.

¹⁰ See *post*, p. 385.

¹¹ No record of the substance of these meetings has been found.

¹² For the minutes of this meeting, see *post*, p. 329.

*Sir Ahmed [*Ahmad*] Mohammed Hassenein Pacha, Chief of the Egyptian Royal Cabinet.

*His Excellency Moustafa El-Nahas Pacha, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Royal Egyptian Cabinet.

(NOTE: King Farouk I had recently been injured in an automobile accident and was unable to call on the President during the time he was in Cairo.)

His Majesty King George II of the Hellenes (Greece).

His Excellency Mr. Emmanuel Tsouderos, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs (Greece).

Lord Killearn, British Ambassador to Egypt.

His Majesty King Peter of Yugoslavia.

His Excellency Dr. Boxidar [*Božidar*] Pouritch, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs (Yugoslavia).

His Royal Highness Prince Paul, Crown Prince of Greece.

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Commander in Chief British Forces in the Middle East. General Wilson was accompanied by General Royce.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, Officer Commanding Royal Air Force in the Middle East.

Admiral Sir Algerson [*Algernon*] Willis, Commander in Chief, Levant.

General R. G. W. Stone, Commander in Chief, British troops in Egypt.

(The above are listed in the order in which they called.)¹³

5:15 p. m. Ambassador Steinhardt, accompanied by Mr. George Allen, called on the President.¹⁴ Ambassador Steinhardt and Mr. Allen had just arrived in Cairo from Ankara, Turkey.

8:30 p. m. President had dinner at his villa. His guests included Ambassador Harriman, Mr. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire, and General Watson. The guests remained after dinner until 12:40 a. m., chatting and playing cards.

Thursday, November 25th. (At Cairo).

Forenoon callers at the President's villa included Ambassador Harriman and Sir Alexander Cadogan.¹⁵

* These gentlemen were accompanied by Ambassador Kirk. [Footnote appears in the source text.]

¹³ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 345.

¹⁴ No record of the substance of this meeting has been found.

¹⁵ No record of the substance of these meetings has been found.

- 11:30 a. m. The President signed mail that had arrived earlier today by pouch from Washington. This mail included the Executive Order authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to take possession of and to operate part of the plant and facilities of the Remington Rand, Inc., Southport, County of Chemung, N. Y.; a message vetoing HR 1155; and a message vetoing SJ Resolution 59.
- 12:00 The President, the Prime Minister, Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, members of their respective military and naval staffs and various other delegates met in the garden of the President's villa where they posed for moving pictures and still pictures for military photographers and accredited war correspondents of the three nations concerned.¹⁶
- 1:30 p. m. The President had luncheon at his villa with Lord Leathers, Mr. L. W. Douglas, Ambassador Winant and Assistant Secretary of War John S. [J.] McCloy.¹⁷
- 2:30 p. m. Mr. M. F. Reilly and Major Otis F. Bryan called on the President to report on their trip to Teheran, from which they had just returned. The President shortly afterwards announced his decision to fly to Teheran, instead of flying only to Basra and proceeding on from there by train. It was considered that the travel by train would be too uncertain in view of the urgent necessity that the President be in Teheran by November 28th.
- 5:00 p. m. The Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek had tea with the President at his villa.¹⁸
- 6:15 p. m. Major General Donald H. Connolly, Commanding General of our Persian Gulf Service Command, called on the President to discuss desired arrangements at Teheran.¹⁹
- 8:00 p. m. The President was host at Thanksgiving dinner at his villa.²⁰ He had brought his own turkeys from Washington (they were gifts to him from Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, and Mr. Joe Carter of Burnt Corn, Ala.). The dinner list included: The President, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Oliver, Sir [Mr.] Anthony Eden, Major Boettiger, Mr. John F. [M.] Martin, Commander Thompson, Lord Moran, Admiral

¹⁶ The photographs appear *ante*, following p. 290.

¹⁷ No record of the substance of this meeting has been found. See, however, the editorial note, *post*, p. 346.

¹⁸ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 349.

¹⁹ No record of this conversation has been found.

²⁰ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 350.

Leahy, Ambassador Winant, Ambassador Harriman, Mr. Hopkins, Admiral McIntire, Admiral Brown, Elliot[t], Ambassador Kirk, General Watson, Robert Hopkins, and Ambassador Steinhardt. Music during the dinner was furnished by an orchestra from our Camp Huckstepp. The highlight of the dinner was the President's toast to the Prime Minister. He told briefly the history and origin of the tradition of our annual Thanksgiving Day; of how our American soldiers are now spreading that custom all over the world; and how that he, personally, was delighted to share this one with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister rose to respond at this stage, but the President told him that he had still another toast first. The President then went on to say that large families are usually closer united than are small families; and that, this year, with the United Kingdom in our family, we are a large family and more united than ever before. The Prime Minister responded in his usual masterful and inspiring manner.

10:30 p. m. Lt-General Stilwell called on the President.²¹

Friday, November 26th. (At Cairo)

During the forenoon the President conferred with Mr. James Landis, Ambassador Harriman, Admiral Mountbatten, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Admiral Leahy and Ambassador Winant.²²

2:30 p. m. Generals Marshall and Eisenhower called on the President. The President bestowed the Legion of Merit on General Eisenhower in recognition of his outstanding work in the cause of our country. A copy of the citation is appended, marked "A".²³

4:30 p. m. The Prime Minister, Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Ambassador Harriman, Sir [Mr.] Anthony Eden and Sir Alexander Cadogan conferred with the President. A press communiqué announcing the completion of the first phase of the Cairo Confer-

²¹ No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found. According to Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 160-162, the subjects discussed included Stilwell's difficulties with Chiang and the Chinese Minister of War (General Ho), Lend-Lease to China, the Ledo Road, and the qualities of the Chinese soldier. A brief reference to the meeting may be found in *The Stilwell Papers*, p. 246.

²² No record of the substance of these meetings has been found. See, however, the editorial note, *post*, p. 351.

²³ Not printed herein. The citation was published by the War Department in General Orders No. 6, January 11, 1944.

ence was agreed upon. A copy is appended hereto, marked "B".²⁴ For reasons of security, it was also agreed that this communiqué would not be released to the press until after the completion of the forthcoming conference at Teheran.

6:00 p. m. The President summoned Lieutenant (jg) Rigdon and worked on official mail that had arrived in Cairo today from Washington. There was no Congressional matter contained in this particular pouch. The President worked until 7:00 p. m. with this mail.

7:30 p. m. The President dined at his villa with Admiral Leahy, Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire and General Watson.

10:00 p. m. The President turned in, in anticipation of an early rising and departure (5:00 a. m.) on Saturday for Teheran, Iran.

The weather at Cairo during our first five days there was most pleasant; the days were comparatively warm, but the nights were always cool enough for excellent sleeping.

²⁴ The communiqué is printed *post*, p. 448.

5. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1943

MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 22, 1943,
11 A. M., MENA HOUSE¹

PRESENT

General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Ambassador Winant
Assistant Secretary of War
McCloy
Vice Admiral Willson
Lieutenant General Stilwell
Lieutenant General Somervell
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Bieri
Rear Admiral Badger
Major General Stratemeyer
Major General Wheeler
Major General Handy
Major General Fairchild

Major General Chennault
Major General Wedemeyer
Major General Deane
Brigadier General Kuter
Brigadier General Hansell
Captain Burrough
Captain Doyle
Colonel O'Donnell
Colonel Ferenbaugh
Colonel Timberman
Colonel Smith
Colonel Bessell
Colonel Hammond
Colonel Todd
Commander Long
Major Chapman

Secretariat

Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland

J. C. S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WINANT

GENERAL MARSHALL said there was no formal agenda for the meeting which had been called principally for the purpose of hearing the views of Ambassador Winant, Ambassador Harriman² and the representatives of the various theaters present as to the current situation in their particular areas. He said that the British Chiefs of Staff had proposed a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of [at?] 1500 hours in order to consider the matter of the procedure to be pursued during the conference and inquired if there were any objections on the part of the U. S. Chiefs to this proposal.

¹ J. C. S. 127th meeting.

² For the Harriman report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see *post*, p. 327.

THE U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF agreed to meet the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the hour indicated.

GENERAL MARSHALL then invited Ambassador Winant to express his views as to the state of mind of the British with respect to the current situation.

AMBASSADOR WINANT said that he found it difficult to give an accurate picture of British thinking with reference to a purely military conference, the need of which the British had felt some weeks ago. He pointed out that his statements would not in any way present his personal opinions but would indicate British opinion as he saw it. He said that the British felt the position of the United Nations was not sufficiently fluid to take advantage of the victories gained in Italy. These had resulted in the opening up of Mediterranean areas which offered to the Allies an opportunity for profitable action, if seized promptly, and which might assist in getting Turkey into the war. He said that Mr. Eden had differed with the Russian information [*inclination?*] to bring pressure to bear on Turkey and thought that a slow approach to her entry into the war was much better, and he had been able to persuade Mr. Molotov to accept this view.

AMBASSADOR WINANT said that he had recently had a talk with Admiral Sir Andrew Brown[e] Cunningham, the British First Sea Lord. He had been impressed with Admiral Cunningham's knowledge of the personalities who command Turkish policies and felt strongly that a conference with him would prove fruitful.

MR. WINANT said that in his opinion the British had no intention of diverting the means available for action in Burma. With reference to OVERLORD he thought that the British had no idea of abandoning the operation but that they did oppose a fixed date for it. It is the British view that it was not possible to fix far in advance the psychological moment for launching an attack on the Continent and they feared that through the action of the British and U. S. military staffs they had signed a contract, the terms of which took precedence over subsequent changes in the military situation. He felt that the British were genuine in their desire to build up OVERLORD and that the principal difference in opinion as between them and the U. S. was as to timing. He pointed out that OVERLORD lacks a commander and that this lack was adding to the difficulties of the commander of the American forces in England. He said that the British were very anxious to employ fully the resistance possible to be developed among the unorganized forces in the Balkans. He felt that this was sufficient to warrant the expenditure of some means. With respect to Italy, he felt they do not want to advance as far as the Po Valley but only

to go far enough to take Rome and secure the airfields in that area. They are of the opinion that day and night bombing is having tremendous effect in Germany in the destruction of bottle-neck industry. They feel that this bombing has neutralized 17 cities and they hope that a comparable success will continue.

In answer to a question from Admiral King, MR. WINANT stated that the British feel that Russia wants Turkey in the war now and not later. He had been told by Mr. Eden that it was the Prime Minister's opinion that Marshal Stalin is chiefly interested at the present moment in stretching German resources and that his interest in a second front was not nearly so great as it had been. He was still interested in vigorous action against the Germans but was not so much concerned as to the particular area in which it was brought to bear.

GENERAL ARNOLD inquired as to the British view on the possibility of carrying on operations in the Balkans without interfering with scheduled operations.

MR. WINANT replied that the British feel that it can be done without much cost by the employment of what he termed bush-league tactics in the Eastern Mediterranean. He said that the Prime Minister had been considerably upset by the British defeat in the Dodecanese although British military men thought that the Prime Minister's view was considerably out of perspective.

MR. WINANT said that the British feel that they are supreme on the sea and that the British and the U. S. are supreme in the air but that the German is still superior to both in ground operations. Their ground operations in the Dodecanese had confirmed the Prime Minister's views in this regard.

With reference to cross-channel operations he said that the British were disturbed now not so much by the difficulties of landing as by those to be encountered during the first 60 days. They were impressed with the excellent communications which ran from east to west and doubted that by bombing alone it would be possible to prevent the Germans from bringing up sufficient reinforcements to put the issue gravely in doubt.

MR. WINANT reiterated that the British are still behind the OVERLORD operation but wish to be sure that German resistance is properly softened before undertaking the actual landing operation.

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MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 22, 1943,
3 P. M., MENA HOUSE¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Willson
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Bieri
Rear Admiral Badger
Major General Handy
Major General Fairchild
Brigadier General Hansell
Brigadier General Kuter
Brigadier General Tansey
Captain Doyle
Colonel Roberts

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
General Riddell-Webster
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Sugden
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier McNair

Secretariat

Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland
Commander Coleridge

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested, and the COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF agreed, that General Sir Alan Brooke should take the Chair at the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at SEXTANT.

1. CONDUCT OF CONFERENCE

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed the future work of the Conference, with particular reference to the necessity for considering operations in the Far East as early as possible.

SIR HASTINGS ISMAY said that he understood it was likely that the President and Prime Minister would hold a plenary session with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at 1700 on Tuesday, 23 November, and that it had been suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should meet with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on Wednesday, 24 November.

GENERAL MARSHALL read out to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a brief memorandum prepared by General Stilwell giving the Generalissimo's views of future operations in the Chinese Theater.² He suggested

¹ This was the 127th meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and their first meeting during the First Cairo Conference.

² *Post*, p. 370.

that the United States and British Chiefs of Staff should separately study this memorandum on the following morning³ and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff collectively should consider it at 1430 on Tuesday, 23 November.⁴ These proposals were accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It was also agreed that the Generalissimo and his principal advisers should be invited to be present at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting at 1530 on Tuesday, 23 November.⁵

At the suggestion of Admiral Leahy,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that the procedure to be used at **SEXTANT** should follow the lines of that used at the **QUADRANT** Conference, with specific reference to the recording of decisions, the approval of minutes, and the reports to the President and Prime Minister.

2. PROPOSED "SEXTANT" AGENDA
(C. C. S. 404 and 404/1)⁶

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the British proposals set out in C. C. S. 404/1 were designed to enable the Combined Chiefs of Staff to study at the earliest possible opportunity operations affecting the Chinese Theater. They could then turn to operations in Europe in order that if possible they should have fully considered these before meeting the U. S. S. R. representatives.

ADMIRAL KING said he felt that the British agenda was acceptable as an outline into which the details suggested by the United States Chiefs of Staff could be fitted.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the proposals for the main subjects for discussion on the **SEXTANT** agenda as set out in paragraph 2 of C. C. S. 404/1.

3. "EUREKA"

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed the arrangements for **EUREKA**.

4. RELATIONS BETWEEN COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U. S. S. R. AND CHINA

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt the Combined Chiefs of Staff should consider the question of their relationship both during the

³ For a summary of the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff held November 23, 1943, 11 a. m., see *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 61.

⁴ For the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Chinese military officers, November 23, 1943, 2:30 p. m., see *post*, p. 316.

⁵ The meeting with Chiang and his principal advisers was held November 23, 1943, 11 a. m., instead of 3:30 p. m. For the minutes of the meeting, see *post*, p. 311.

⁶ *Post*, pp. 368 and 369.

Conference and in the future, with the military representatives of the U. S. S. R. and China. This seemed particularly important in view of the recent Four-Power agreements concluded in Moscow.⁷ There had already been an intimation from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that he would welcome an invitation for a Chinese military representative to sit with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It might facilitate the development of good faith and mutual understanding with the U. S. S. R. and China if each were invited to have a representative present with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. However, he thought that this should be based on a well thought out scheme, rather than on day-to-day decisions. There might be certain advantages in having the Soviet representatives attend at least some conferences in order that they could appreciate the difficulties of a world-wide war on every front in comparison with their own and China's highly localized operations.

ADMIRAL KING said that the question raised a basic problem in that it might lead to the permanent expansion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff into a Four-Power body. It was pointed out that it would be impossible for the Chinese and the Soviet representatives to sit at the same table since they were not engaging the same enemies, nor could the Soviet representatives attend deliberations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff dealing with the war against Japan.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the Chinese and Soviets should, during the present Conference, be invited to be present only when the Combined Chiefs of Staff were discussing the problems of the particular fronts in which each was interested. With regard to the Soviets, it would of course most certainly be necessary, when a Western Front was opened, that our action should be coordinated with theirs and that the delegates attending meetings for this purpose should be able to speak with full authority.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that this would be equally true if Turkey was brought into the war and operations in that area were undertaken.

SIR HASTINGS ISMAY said that at Moscow it had been clear that the Soviet representatives did not realize that the machinery of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was in continuous operation. They would, he thought, expect to be invited only to Conferences such as QUADRANT or SEXTANT, but not to attend all the meetings at these Conferences. There had been no signs of their suggesting permanent representation with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

⁷ For the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed at Moscow October 30, 1943, by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China, and issued November 1, 1943, see *Decade*, p. 11. The records of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, October 18–November 1, 1943, are scheduled to be published in *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. 1.

There was general agreement that, subject to further consideration, the best procedure would be for the Chinese and Soviet Representatives to be invited to attend only those meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at which matters concerning the fronts in which they were interested were under discussion. At EUREKA, however, it would obviously be necessary for the Soviet representatives to attend all meetings held.⁸

5. REAFFIRMATION OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND BASIC UNDERTAKINGS

Without discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the over-all strategic concept and basic undertakings as set out in C. C. S. 380/2.⁹

⁸ The Combined Chiefs of Staff held one meeting at the Tehran Conference (EUREKA) at which the Soviet military representative (Voroshilov) was not present, namely, the meeting of November 30, 1943, 9:30 a. m., *post*, p. 555.

⁹ *Ante*, p. 157.

MEETINGS OF ROOSEVELT, CHURCHILL, CHIANG, AND MADAME CHIANG, NOVEMBER 22, 1943, AFTERNOON, ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

Editorial Note

The information given above is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 294. No records of these conversations have been found. An entry in the Leahy Diary for the afternoon of November 22, 1943, reads as follows: "Had tea in Kirk Villa with the President, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Madame Chiang, General Marshall and Mr. Hopkins." Presumably the Churchill visit took place separately from that of the Chiangs. There are no indications that substantive problems were discussed during these visits, which appear to have been in the nature of courtesy calls.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, NOVEMBER 22, 1943, 8 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Admiral Mountbatten

Editorial Note

The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 294. No record of the subjects discussed at

this dinner meeting has been found. For post-conference documents indicating that Roosevelt discussed the future status of Hong Kong with Churchill at Cairo, see *post*, pp. 887, 888. There is no indication of the particular meeting at Cairo in which this discussion took place.

**AMERICAN-BRITISH PRELIMINARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 22, 1943,
9 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant-General Stilwell
Lieutenant-General Somervell
Major General Stratemeyer
Major General Wheeler
Major General Chennault
Major General Wedemeyer
Captain Royal

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant-General Ismay
Lieutenant-General Carton
de Wiart
Brigadier Hollis

Editorial Note

No minutes of this meeting have been found and apparently none were taken in view of the informal nature of the gathering. The information given above as to the time of the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log (*ante*, p. 294). Leahy (p. 199) indicates that the Combined Chiefs joined the President's dinner party after the meal and that "Mountbatten outlined his plans and his needs for the Burma campaign which had been assigned to him at the Quebec Conference held in August 1943." Alanbrooke (p. 51) states that the purpose of the meeting was "to discuss Dickie Mountbatten's plans and to prepare for meetings with Chiang Kai-shek." Arnold (p. 461) mentions Chiang as one of the participants, while the Log indicates that Chiang, Madame Chiang, and three Chinese generals were present. It appears doubtful that the Chinese contingent actually attended; see Roosevelt's welcome to the Chinese at the Plenary Meeting on the following morning (*post*, p. 312) and the diary entry for November 23 in Alanbrooke, p. 51.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1943

HARRIMAN-VYSHINSKY CONVERSATION, NOVEMBER 23, 1943,
FORENOON, ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Ambassador Harriman
Mr. Bohlen

SOVIET UNION

Mr. Vyshinsky

Roosevelt Papers

Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SECRET

CAIRO, November 23, 1943.

While waiting to see the President, I followed up Mr. Hopkins' request that I obtain more information about the attitude of the Soviets on some of the Mediterranean problems.

I bluntly told Vyshinski of the serious view we took of the French Committee's actions in Lebanon.¹ I said we could not permit the French Committee to destroy the confidence of the world in the sincerity of American principles on freedom and democracy. I asked him what the Soviet Government's views were in the matter. He said he had not been instructed but he was quite sure there could be no other point of view for his Government.

Next I asked him what he thought about the King of Italy. He said he was going to keep his mind open till he could judge the situation on the ground but he certainly made it clear that he was predisposed not to favor the retention of the King. He said "We have all stated the principles which we are going to apply in Italy as agreed to in the Moscow Conference and these certainly must be put into effect."² He said that any elements or institutions which tend to impede these principles will have to be moved out of the path and anything that assists in the implementation of these principles should be encouraged.

I then asked him whether he had any recent information about Mikhailovic [*Mihailović*]. He said he had none. I said I had none either but I thought it was time to tell Mikhailovic "that he should

¹ The situation in Lebanon, to which reference is made at this point, is described *ante*, p. 84, footnote 2.

² The reference is to the democratic, anti-Fascist principles set forth in the Declaration Regarding Italy, issued on November 1, 1943, at the conclusion of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers. For text of the Declaration, see *Decade*, p. 12.

fish, cut bait, or go ashore." He heartily agreed with this statement and added that, from his point of view, up to the present Mikhailovic had not only not been helpful in the prosecution of the war but had even been harmful.

ROOSEVELT CONVERSATIONS WITH VARIOUS CALLERS, NOVEMBER
23, 1943, FORENOON, ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

Editorial Note

According to the Log (*ante*, pp. 294-295), the following foreign persons called on the President during the forenoon of November 23: Vyshinsky; Mountbatten; Churchill and his daughter, Mrs. Sarah Oliver; Chiang and Madame Chiang; and the Chinese Generals Shang, Lin, and Chu. The calls were apparently of brief duration and were primarily of a courtesy nature. No memoranda of these conversations appear to have been made either by or for the President.

Vyshinsky was accompanied by Harriman and by Bohlen, who acted as interpreter. From correspondence with Harriman and Bohlen (023/5-2554; 023.1/4-1554) the editors obtained the following information concerning this conversation:

Vyshinsky was on his way to Algiers to serve as the Soviet representative on the Tripartite (Anglo-American-Soviet) Advisory Council for Italy set up at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943. He asked to see the President for the purpose of paying his respects. The President expressed to Vyshinsky the need for close cooperation between the three powers represented on the Council for Italy. The President explained the difficulties he was having with de Gaulle, and he touched on the idea of a trusteeship for immature countries, mentioning Morocco in this connection. Vyshinsky expressed general agreement with the views of the President and appeared impressed with the frank manner in which the President spoke.

For a subsequent reference by Roosevelt to his conversation with Vyshinsky, see *post*, p. 439.

Reilly (p. 171) implies that Vyshinsky conveyed an invitation for Roosevelt to stay at the Russian Embassy in Tehran. Hurley's telegram of November 26 (*post*, p. 439) also suggests that Roosevelt had received such an invitation prior to that date. See also the Log, *post*, p. 461. It appears, however, that Roosevelt did not consider this invitation as fully official until it was repeated more formally with Stalin's express approval. In one of the first Churchill-Roosevelt conversations at Cairo the Prime Minister apparently invited the

President to stay at the British Legation at Tehran. The exact time of this invitation is not known, but it preceded the Russian one; see *post*, pp. 397, 461, 476.

**CHIANG-HURLEY CONVERSATION, NOVEMBER 23, 1943,
FORENOON, CHIANG'S VILLA**

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this conversation has been found. The fact that Hurley had an appointment with Chiang on November 23 is indicated in a letter from Hurley's aide (Major John Henry) to Hopkins, dated November 23, 1943 (Hopkins Papers).

In an interview with one of the editors in 1956, Hurley recalled the time and place of the meeting as indicated above. He stated that Madame Chiang was present at the meeting. According to Hurley's recollection, Chiang asked whether Roosevelt and Churchill were to meet with Stalin, to which Hurley replied that such a meeting was scheduled but not for Cairo. Hurley also recalled discussing with Chiang the pending plan for American-British-Chinese military co-operation in Burma. (110.4-HD/12-1756.)

PLENARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 23, 1943, 11 A. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt (in the Chair)
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Stilwell
Lieutenant General Somervell
Major General Stratemeyer
Major General Wheeler
Major General Chennault
Major General Wedemeyer

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant General Carton de Wiart

CHINA

Generalissimo Chiang
Madame Chiang
General Shang
Lieutenant General Lin
Major General Chu

Secretariat

Brigadier Hollis
Captain Royal

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

SOUTHEAST ASIA OPERATIONS

THE PRESIDENT, extending a warm welcome to the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and to the Chinese Delegation, said that this was an historic meeting and a logical consequence to the Four Power Conference recently concluded in Moscow. The effect of this meeting would, he hoped, not only bear fruit today and in the immediate future, but for decades to come. He suggested that Admiral Mountbatten might be asked to give a general survey of intended operations in Southeast Asia. The ground to be covered mainly concerned the land, since seagoing operations were in progress all the time. There was, he felt sure, unanimous agreement that every effort should be made to send more equipment to China, with a view to accelerating the process by which we could launch an air offensive against the heart of Japan itself.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN then outlined the operations he proposed for the coming campaign in Burma. Apart from current air operations by British-U. S. air forces and two Chinese divisions operating from Ledo, the first land movement would take place in mid-January. The 15th British Indian Corps would advance on the Arakan front with a view to taking up an improved line. This Corps would not, however, be restricted to a defensive role, but would exploit success wherever possible. For this purpose a West African brigade would be deployed on an outflanking movement. At the same time the 4th British Indian Corps (Imphal Force) would start operations with the object of capturing Minthami, Mawlaik, and Sittaung and advancing as far as possible to the southeast.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN then explained the natural difficulties with which the Allied Forces had to contend. Our lines of communication ran through one of the most difficult countries in the world, served by a one meter gauge railway which, nevertheless, had been worked up to carry 3,100 tons a day, with the hope that this might be increased by a further 500 tons a day. After leaving the railway and the Brahmaputra River, the communication was by roads now being built. All this was being done in thick jungle and across mountains running north and south across the line of communications. The Japanese in Burma were at the end of an excellent line of communication up the Irrawaddy from Rangoon, with a railway running through Indaw to Myitkyina. They had vast resources and adequate equipment and a force of some five divisions, which was likely to be augmented by a

sixth division. In order to make good the disparity between our extremely difficult and the Japanese relatively good communications, we had adopted the expedient of air supply on a large scale.

In February General Wingate intended to make three thrusts with his Long Range Penetration Groups. One would be from Chittagong; the second would support the 4th Group in the Tamu area; and the third would help the Chinese forces operating from Ledo. It was hoped that the 3rd Group would, by the use of gliders operating ahead of the Yunnan forces, disrupt and muddle the Japanese. Meanwhile, the Ledo forces would move down in the Myitkyina direction to link up at Bhamo with the main operations of the Yunnan forces advancing on Lashio. In mid-March the 5th Indian Parachute Brigade would seize the airfield at Indaw, after which the 26th Indian Division would be flown in to Indaw by transport aircraft and thereafter be maintained by air.

It was hoped in these operations to surprise the Japanese by using novel methods of supply and by the boldness of our advance through what they might consider to be impassable country. Subject to the Generalissimo's permission, General Stilwell had agreed that the Ledo force should come under the 14th Army Commander until it reached Kamaing, after which it would revert to the command of General Stilwell. Admiral Mountbatten enquired whether this arrangement was agreeable to the Generalissimo.

THE GENERALISSIMO said that he would like to see the proposals illustrated on a map before giving his decision.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN then gave certain logistic information for the air route over the "hump." He had promised the Generalissimo to work the supply over this route up to 10,000 tons a month. For November and December the figure would be 9,700 tons. For January and February, however, it would drop to 7,900 tons. In March the figure should rise again to 9,200 tons. Twenty-five additional first-line transport aircraft were required and this demand had been put to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with, he understood, every prospect of the demand being met.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that these were important military operations of a much greater magnitude than ever previously contemplated for this theater. The plans had not yet been examined by the Chiefs of Staff, but this would be done at the earliest opportunity, possibly the same day. In all there was an Allied force of approximately 320,000 men who would apply pressure on the enemy in this theater. They would have a qualitative as well as a quantitative supremacy over the enemy. He had high hopes of these operations, the success of which largely depended on surprise and secrecy and ignorance on the part of the enemy as to the lines of approach and the points of attack.

Owing to the surrender of the Italian Fleet and other naval events of a favorable character, a formidable British Fleet would be established in due course in the Indian Ocean. This would ultimately consist of no less than 5 modernized capital ships, 4 heavy armored carriers, and up to 12 auxiliary carriers, together with cruisers and flotillas. This force would be more powerful than any detachment which it was thought that the Japanese could afford to make from their main fleet in the Pacific, having regard to the U. S. naval strength in the Pacific theater. In addition to all this Admiral Mountbatten would have formed by the spring an amphibious "circus" for use in such amphibious operations as might ultimately be decided upon, but for which preparations were now going ahead with all speed.

THE GENERALISSIMO said that in accordance with the view he had expressed at Chungking, the success of the operations in Burma depended, in his opinion, not only on the strength of the naval forces established in the Indian Ocean, but on the simultaneous coordination of naval action with the land operations.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that naval operations in the Bay of Bengal would not necessarily be coordinated with and linked to the land campaign. Our naval superiority in this area should ensure the security of our communications and a threat to those of the enemy. It should be remembered that the main fleet base would be anywhere from 2,000 to 3,000 miles away from the area in which the armies were operating. Thus, no comparison could be made with these operations and with those carried out in Sicily, where it had been possible for the fleet to work in close support of the Army.

THE GENERALISSIMO considered that the enemy would reinforce Burma and that this could only be stopped by vigorous naval operations.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it would be disastrous if we could do nothing to prevent the Japanese bringing large reinforcements by sea through the Malacca and Sunda Straits. We could not guarantee to cut off reinforcements by sea entirely, but we should do everything to prevent their arrival.

THE GENERALISSIMO said he was not clear as to the timing of the concentration of the naval forces in the Indian Ocean. He was convinced that simultaneous naval and land operations gave the best chance of success for the operations. Burma was the key to the whole campaign in Asia. After he had been cleared out of Burma, the enemy's next stand would be in North China and, finally, in Manchuria. The loss of Burma would be a very serious matter to the Japanese and they would fight stubbornly and tenaciously to retain their hold on the country.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was unable to agree that the success of the land operations entirely hinged on a simultaneous naval concentration. The fleet could not, in any event, be assembled by January, nor, indeed, until some time later. The ships had to be tropicalized and fitted with special equipment. Some would be starting soon, but the build-up to full strength would not be achieved until the late spring or early summer of 1944. It seemed, however, on the whole improbable that in the meanwhile the enemy would send naval forces in any strength to the Bay of Bengal.

THE PRESIDENT enquired about the railway communications between Siam and Burma.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the Japanese had recently completed the railway from Bangkok to Thanbyuzayat, 15 degrees 55 minutes N., 97 degrees 40 minutes E. and this would improve their facilities for maintaining forces in Burma to an appreciable degree.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that the Japanese were mainly relying upon road and rail communications from the Malay Peninsula to maintain their forces in Burma. As we did not possess shore air bases, it was not possible for us to threaten the Japanese communications in the Gulf of Siam. He wished to emphasize the great importance he attached to the operations in Southeast Asia, which would be driven forward with all vigor and dispatch. He hoped to have a further talk with the Generalissimo when some other details of the British naval situation would be communicated.

In conclusion, THE PRESIDENT said that the matter could not be carried any further that morning. He hoped that the Generalissimo would take this opportunity of meeting the Chiefs of the American and British Staffs and to discuss these important problems frankly with them.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, NOVEMBER 23, 1943,
1:30 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Oliver
Commander Thompson
Mr. Martin

Editorial Note

The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 295. No record of the subjects discussed

at this meeting has been found. See, however, the editorial note on the Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, *ante*, p. 307.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 23, 1943,
2:30 P. M., MENA HOUSE¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Stilwell
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Willson
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Bieri
Rear Admiral Badger
Major General Stratemeyer
Major General Wheeler
Major General Handy
Major General Fairchild
Major General Wedemeyer
Brigadier General Kuter
Brigadier General Hansell
Brigadier General Tansey
Captain Doyle
Colonel Roberts
Colonel O'Donnell
Captain Freseman
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
Admiral Mountbatten
General Riddell-Webster
Lieutenant General Carton
de Wiart
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Sugden
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier Cobb
Brigadier Head
Brigadier McNair

PRESENT FOR THE LAST ITEM ONLY

General Shang
Lieutenant General Lin
Vice Admiral Yang
Lieutenant General Chou
Major General Chu
Major General Tsai
Major General Chennault

Secretariat

Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland
Commander Coleridge

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE 127TH MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 127th Meeting. The detailed record of the Meeting was also accepted subject to minor amendments.

¹ C. C. S. 128th meeting.

2. THE ROLE OF CHINA IN THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN (C. C. S. 405)²

GENERAL STILWELL informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he had received a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stating that he did not wish any proposals for Chinese action laid before the Combined Chiefs of Staff until he had had a further consultation with the President and General Marshall.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it appeared that the operations set out in subparagraphs 2 *a*, *b*, *c*, and *d* of C. C. S. 405 were acceptable. The remaining proposals appeared unrealistic, particularly in view of the logistic difficulties which General Marshall had mentioned at a previous meeting. He could not see how Formosa could be attacked from the mainland of China without any landing craft.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he agreed with Sir Alan Brooke's views. Subparagraphs 2 *a*, *b*, *c*, and *d* were acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff; the remaining proposals were matters for the future, requiring detailed examination, particularly in view of the serious logistic implications. He suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should so inform the Chinese representatives.

GENERAL MARSHALL reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that up till now the Generalissimo's sole interest had been in the provision of a large United States Air Force in China and a large number of transport aircraft. He had taken each step in the direction of the formation of ground forces with reluctance. Months had passed before he would agree to the training of the Chinese troops at Ramgarh [*Ramgarh*]. More months had passed before he agreed to an increase in their numbers. Negotiations with the Indian government had necessitated further delay. Yet another period had passed before the Generalissimo would agree to the habilitation of the Yunnan force. Now, for the first time, the Generalissimo had shown an active interest in and an admission of the importance of the formation and employment of Chinese ground forces. He (General Marshall) personally had confidence in the value of Chinese troops provided they were properly led. Their powers of endurance should prove immensely valuable in the type of warfare in which they were to be employed. He considered that the Generalissimo's new proposals should be given the most careful and sympathetic consideration. These factors and the value of China once Germany had collapsed and the flow of supplies to the East had increased, should be borne most carefully in mind when considering the Generalissimo's plan.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the Generalissimo's proposals must be considered in relation to the over-all plan for the defeat of Japan.

² *Post*, p. 370.

He agreed with General Marshall as to the importance of the change of heart shown by the Generalissimo in his latest proposals, and felt that he should not be discouraged if it could possibly be avoided.

GENERAL ARNOLD mentioned the problem of the employment of some two thousand heavy bombers which would be available on the defeat of Germany. Available bases in the Aleutians, Maritime Provinces, and the Islands³ were all of limited capacity.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that this great force might be used against shipping.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that the bases he had mentioned would in fact be used by heavy bombers employed against shipping. His point was that only by using them out of China could the heart of Japan itself be attacked. Attacks on Japanese oil resources and shipping, while valuable, would not produce the final result.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's views with regard to the employment of naval forces in the Bay of Bengal.

GENERAL STILLWELL said he believed that the Generalissimo would be satisfied if we could guarantee naval security in the Bay of Bengal.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that it would be right to say that we should have general control of the Bay of Bengal but he could not absolutely guarantee its complete security. He believed that the Prime Minister intended in due course to inform the Generalissimo of the British naval forces to be employed in the Bay of Bengal but felt that this information should be imparted by the Prime Minister himself and not by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN explained that in discussing amphibious operations with the Generalissimo in Chungking, he had pointed out that it was intended to launch an amphibious operation in the spring, probably to synchronize with the Burma land operations. From the air bases made available by the amphibious operation it was hoped to be able to interfere with seaborne supplies, both through Rangoon and Bangkok. He believed that the Generalissimo was in fact interested in this action rather than in the actual provision of naval forces in the Bay of Bengal.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

a. That the operations proposed in paragraph 2 *a* to *d* inclusive, of C. C. S. 405 are, in general, in consonance with the present concept of operations against Japan as expressed in C. C. S. 397, Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944.⁴

³ Presumably those islands in the Pacific Ocean which were in Allied hands.

⁴ This paper as revised is printed *post*, p. 779.

b. That the operations proposed in paragraphs 2 *e* to *h* inclusive, of C. C. S. 405 go beyond the present concept of operations in China and require detailed examination and study with particular reference to logistic difficulties.

c. That the study indicated in *b* above, together with an examination of the employment for the defeat of Japan of the heavy bombers that would become available when Germany has been eliminated from the war, should be included in the general study of the over-all plan for the defeat of Japan now being conducted by the Combined Staff Planners.

3. ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944—PACIFIC-FAR EAST (C. C. S. 300/2)⁵

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there appeared to be minor discrepancies with regard to the estimate of enemy forces available, which could be discussed by the Combined Intelligence Committee. In other respects the paper could be accepted as an estimate of the situation.

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed with this view.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted and noted for future information the estimate of the enemy situation, 1944—Pacific-Far East, set out in C. C. S. 300/2.

4. FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND (C. C. S. 390/1)⁶

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he noted that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not able to provide the forces necessary for CULVERIN. With regard to BUCCANEER, he would like to defer consideration of this operation until the Conference was further advanced.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the Japanese forces in CULVERIN had increased from one to three divisions. He was, however, prepared to accept a risk and to undertake Operation CULVERIN with smaller forces if this should be considered necessary. His chief concern was to be in a position to cut the Japanese lines of communication into Burma and to obtain an air base from which he could attack the Malacca Straits, Rangoon, and Bangkok. BUCCANEER, though not providing so many airfields, was approximately the same distance from Bangkok as was CULVERIN, and so offered almost equal strategic advantages; it could be undertaken with the forces now available to him. He would propose to launch BUCCANEER probably some two to three days after the launching of the land campaign in North Burma. This would disperse the Japanese air effort. The Burma operations

⁵ *Ante*, p. 232.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 243.

and BUCCANEER each had a considerable effect on the other and had been planned and considered together.

After further discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved C. C. S. 390/1 but agreed to suspend final decision regarding Operation BUCCANEER until later in the SEXTANT Conference in order to allow the operation to be considered in relation to the other operations to be undertaken.

5. COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF—UNITED CHIEFS OF STAFF
(C. C. S. 406)⁷

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he would like further time to consider the proposals put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the United States Chiefs of Staff had given only very brief consideration to this matter but had felt that it would be valuable to outline a possible course of action before pressure was exerted from any quarter to widen the membership of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL KING said that, as he saw it, the United Chiefs of Staff would consist of one representative of the Chiefs of Staff of each nation who would act as spokesman. This proposal would reduce the difficulties to their simplest possible terms if the issue were to be forced upon the United States and British Chiefs of Staff.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer action on this paper.

6. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then entered into a general discussion of the situation in the Southeast Asia Command.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN, in reply to a question, explained that the grounding of a vessel carrying spare aircraft engines would result in a deficit in air lift over the "hump" for December of some 2,100 tons. The backlog thus caused had not been included in his calculations and he suggested that the Combined Planners should look into this question. His plans were not made on wide margins of safety and did not make allowance for acts of God since he realized fully that too heavy demands from his theater would have direct repercussions on the operations in other theaters. In reply to a further question, ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that his Royal Air Force transports were being used to the full. They were not being employed in China since there were insufficient numbers to train his parachute troops and long range penetration groups. It had been necessary for United States aircraft to fly in supplies to the British units in Fort Hertz.

⁷ *Post*, p. 379.

GENERAL STRATEMEYER asked if it was possible for the Royal Air Force to provide old bombers which were not operationally fit, for use as transport aircraft.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he did not feel that worn-out aircraft, even if available, could be used for this task. Manpower also was short and the production of British bombers was a direct measure of the weight of attack on Germany.

In further discussion of the possibility of interrupting Japanese communications, SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that air bombing alone could not completely stop the use of enemy ports.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN agreed with this view but explained that he had great hopes that heavy bombing of Japanese occupied ports would result in strikes of dock labor and a resulting slowing up in the flow of supplies.

GENERAL ARNOLD felt that our present calculations with regard to air transport possibilities had been wrongly based on a 100 percent figure of accomplishment. This figure was never achieved, and it would be safer to "lower our sights" with regard to target figures and accept as a bonus any increase on this lower figure.

In reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal, ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the airport at Blair in BUCCANEER had a 1,650 yard runway and was capable of operating three squadrons.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of the above statements.

(At this point General Shang Chen, Lieutenant General Lin Wei, Vice Admiral Yang Hsuan Ch'eng, Lieutenant General Chou Chih Jou, Lieutenant [*Major*] General Chu Shih Ming, Major General Tsai Wen Chih and Major General Chennault entered the meeting.)

SIR ALAN BROOKE, in welcoming the Chinese Representatives, said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were very pleased to have this opportunity to meet with them and discuss around the table plans for future operations in China. These discussions should lead to definite conclusions. Admiral Mountbatten had that morning put forward his plans and he suggested that the Chinese Representatives should ask any further questions that they might wish and put forward their own suggestions with regard to these plans.

GENERAL CHU, on behalf of General Shang Chen, explained that the Chinese Representatives had not had sufficient time to study these plans and would prefer to discuss them on the following day.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN suggested that the Chinese Representatives should give an outline of the state of readiness of the Yunnan Force and of the detailed plans for its employment. He pointed out that the success of our efforts to open the land route to China was dependent

on the successful operation of the Yunnan Force in coordination with the British attacks.

GENERAL STILWELL then outlined in detail the Chinese Forces available and their state of readiness. There were, at present, certain shortages of personnel which were being rapidly made good. The ten assault divisions would first be brought up to strength and any deficiencies in pack transport would be compensated for by the use of manpower.

With the aid of a map ^s GENERAL STILWELL outlined the three coordinated attacks which would be made by the Yunnan force. He believed that sufficient tactical air forces were available to support these operations.

GENERAL CHENNAULT and GENERAL STRATEMEYER explained the arrangements which had been made for the coordination of the air effort with that of the ground forces.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Took note with interest of the above statements.

b. Agreed to meet again with the Chinese Representatives at 1530 hours on 24 November.

^s Not found with the source text.

ROOSEVELT-CHIANG DINNER MEETING, NOVEMBER 23, 1943, 8 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins

CHINA

Generalissimo Chiang
Madame Chiang
Dr. Wang

Editorial Note

No official American record of the substance of this conversation has been found and apparently none was prepared. In response to an inquiry from the editors in 1956, the Chinese Ambassador at Washington (Dr. Hollington Tong) ascertained that the Chinese Government had in its files a summary record of this conversation in the Chinese language. The Chinese Government kindly prepared an English translation and granted permission for its publication in this volume (023.1/5/21/57). In view of the paucity of authoritative information respecting the Roosevelt-Chiang discussions at Cairo, the Chinese memorandum is reproduced below.

The information set forth above respecting the meeting and the participants is taken from the Chinese record of the conversation.

The Log (*ante*, p. 296) indicates that the Chiangs, together with Hopkins and Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, were dinner guests of the President. Elliott Roosevelt (pp. 142, 164-165) reproduces some of his father's remarks that pertain presumably to this discussion, but there is no indication that Colonel Roosevelt was present at either the dinner or the discussion that followed. The Log does not mention the attendance of Dr. Wang.

According to the account in Elliott Roosevelt, the conversation touched on the following topics that are not mentioned in the Chinese summary record: The formation of a coalition government in China, British rights in Shanghai and Canton, the use of American rather than British warships in future operations based on Chinese ports, and the future status of the Malay States, Burma, and India.

For references to other subjects which were discussed by Roosevelt and Chiang at Cairo and which may have been discussed in whole or in part at this meeting, see the editorial note, *post*, p. 366.

023.1/5-2157

Chinese Summary Record

Translation

(1) *On China's International Position*—President Roosevelt expressed his view that China should take her place as one of the Big Four¹ and participate on an equal footing in the machinery of the Big Four Group and in all its decisions. Generalissimo Chiang responded that China would be glad to take part in all the Big Four machinery and decisions.

(2) *On the Status of Japanese Imperial House*—President Roosevelt enquired of Generalissimo Chiang's views as to whether the institution of the Emperor of Japan should be abolished after the war. The Generalissimo said that this would involve the question of the form of government of Japan and should be left for the Japanese people themselves to decide after the war, so as not to precipitate any error which might perpetuate itself in international relations.

(3) *On Military Occupation of Japan*—President Roosevelt was of the opinion that China should play the leading role in the post-war military occupation of Japan.² Generalissimo Chiang believed, however, that China was not equipped to shoulder this considerable responsibility, that the task should be carried out under the leadership of the United States and that China could participate in the task in

¹ The United States, China, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.

² See *post*, p. 864.

a supporting capacity should it prove necessary by that time. The Generalissimo also took the position that the final decision on the matter could await further development of the actual situation.

(4) *On Reparation in Kind*—Generalissimo Chiang proposed that a part of the reparation Japan was to pay China after the war could be paid in the form of actual properties. Much of Japan's industrial machinery and equipment, war and merchant ships, rolling stock, etc., could be transferred to China. President Roosevelt expressed his concurrence in the proposal.

(5) *On Restoration of Territories*—Generalissimo Chiang and President Roosevelt agreed that the four Northeastern provinces of China, Taiwan and the Penghu Islands [*Pescadores*] which Japan had taken from China by force must be restored to China after the war, it being understood that the Liaotung Peninsula and its two ports, Lushun (Port of Arthur) and Dairen, must be included. The President then referred to the question of the Ryukyu Islands and enquired more than once whether China would want the Ryukyus. The Generalissimo replied that China would be agreeable to joint occupation of the Ryukyus by China and the United States and, eventually, joint administration by the two countries under the trusteeship of an international organization. President Roosevelt also raised the question of Hongkong. The Generalissimo suggested that the President discuss the matter with the British authorities before further deliberation.

(6) *On Matters Concerning Military Cooperation*—President Roosevelt proposed that, after the war, China and the United States should effect certain arrangements under which the two countries could come to each other's assistance in the event of foreign aggression and that the United States should maintain adequate military forces on various bases in the Pacific in order that it could effectively share the responsibility of preventing aggression. Generalissimo Chiang expressed his agreement to both proposals. The Generalissimo expressed his hope that the United States would be in a position to extend necessary aid to China for equipping its land, naval and air forces for the purpose of strengthening its national defense and enabling its performance of international obligations. Generalissimo Chiang also proposed that, to achieve mutual security, the two countries should arrange for army and naval bases of each to be available for use by the other and stated that China would be prepared to place Lushun (Port of Arthur) at the joint disposal of China and the United States. President Roosevelt, on his part, proposed that China and the United States should consult with each other before any decision was to be reached on matters concerning Asia. The Generalissimo indicated agreement.

(7) *On Korea, Indo-China and Thailand*—President Roosevelt advanced the opinion that China and the United States should reach a mutual understanding on the future status of Korea, Indo-China and other colonial areas as well as Thailand. Concurring, Generalissimo Chiang stressed on the necessity of granting independence to Korea. It was also his view that China and the United States should endeavor together to help Indo-China achieve independence after the war and that independent status should be restored to Thailand. The President expressed his agreement.³

(8) *On Economic Aid to China*—Generalissimo Chiang pointed out that China's post-war economic reconstruction would be a tremendously difficult task which would require United States financial aid in the form of loans, etc., and also various types of technical assistance. President Roosevelt indicated that close and practical consideration would be given to the matter.

(9) *On Outer Mongolia and Tannu Tuva*—President Roosevelt enquired especially as to the present status of Tannu Tuva and its historical relations with its neighbors. Generalissimo Chiang pointed out that the area had been an integral part of China's Outer Mongolia until it was forcibly taken and annexed by Russia. He said that the question of Tannu Tuva, together with that of Outer Mongolia, must be settled in time to come through negotiations with Soviet Russia.

(10) *On Unified Command*—Generalissimo Chiang proposed the formation of a China-U. S. Joint Council of Chiefs-of-Staff or, as an alternative, China's participation in the existing Britain-U. S. Council of Chiefs-of-Staff.⁴ President Roosevelt agreed to consult the chiefs of staff of the United States in order to reach a decision on the matter.⁵

³ See *post*, pp. 389, 485, 864, 869; *F. D. R., His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*, edited by Elliott Roosevelt (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950: 2 vols.), vol. II, p. 1489; Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1949), pp. 237-238.

⁴ See *post*, p. 388.

⁵ Roosevelt's answer was negative; see *post*, p. 748. For consideration of this subject by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see also *ante*, pp. 305, 320.

DINNER PARTY OF THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 23, 1943, EVENING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
Admiral King
General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill

Editorial Note

No official record of this informal meeting has been found. The meeting is mentioned in Arnold, p. 462, in Leahy, p. 200, and in Alanbrooke, p. 52, but there are no indications that matters of business were discussed. The meeting took place in the villa occupied by the British Chiefs of Staff.

CHURCHILL-MARSHALL DINNER MEETING, NOVEMBER 23, EVENING
PRESENT

UNITED STATES
General Marshall

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No official record of this informal meeting has been found. At the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the following day Marshall referred to his dinner conversation with Churchill and indicated that the latter had discussed operations in the Dodecanese, the capture of Rhodes, the deployment of landing craft, the progress of the Italian campaign, aid to the guerrillas in the Balkans, the relation of operations in the Mediterranean to the date of OVERLORD, and coordination of the command of strategic air operations. Churchill discussed the same subjects on the following day at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and himself, *post*, p. 331.

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1943
**MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 24, 1943,
9:30 A. M., MENA HOUSE¹**
PRESENT

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Ambassador Harriman
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Willson
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Bieri
Rear Admiral Badger
Major General Handy

¹ J. C. S. 129th meeting.

Major General Fairchild
Major General Deane
Brigadier General Kuter
Brigadier General Hansell
Brigadier General Tansey
Brigadier General Whitten
Captain Burrough
Captain Doyle
Colonel Bessell
Colonel Smith
Colonel Roberts
Captain Freseman
Commander Long
Major Chapman

Secretariat

Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland

J. C. S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

At General Marshall's request, AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN expressed his views of the present attitude of the Soviets and their possible reaction to the proposals recommended by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee. He said there was no indication that the Soviets will advance any specific strategical plan at the coming Conference. This, he thought, was due to their complete absorption in the war. The only proposals that they had put forward in the Moscow Conference were with reference to the entrance of Turkey and Sweden in the war and these had political as well as military implications.

AS AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN saw it, immediate Soviet interest was focused on the reduction of the German forces by whom they were opposed. He did not believe that the Soviet Staff would be agreeable to any discussions until Marshal Stalin had met with the President and Prime Minister and some basic policies had been agreed upon. He thought it would be unfortunate if the Soviet Representatives were given the impression that the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff were arriving at the Conference with anything approximating a cut and dried plan. He felt that the attitude of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be characterized by perfect frankness and a willingness to weigh thoughtfully any proposals made by the Soviets. They do not like *fait[s] accomplis* and will appreciate being consulted in connection with the plans of the U. S. and the British. While the reasons therefor were not clear, he was convinced that the Soviets were under tremendous pressure to end the war quickly. They appeared confident that a second front would be established; Marshal Stalin had

already communicated this to the Russian people and had indicated to them that it would not be long in coming.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN said that our strategy had never before been presented so clearly to the Soviets as it had been by General Deane and General Ismay at the Moscow Conference.² This had had an extremely satisfactory effect. The Soviets had asked many questions but these questions were not critical. He pointed out that no promises had been made to the Soviets but they had been given the outline of the plans for OVERLORD and were being kept informed as to the progress of the buildup. It has been difficult for the Russians to understand why two nations of the strength of the United States and Great Britain have been unable to contain more German forces than they have. He suggested that in the coming Conference, the Chiefs of Staff adopt an attitude of patience and afford the Soviet Representatives ample opportunity to ask questions. Our experience with them has already proved that a frank and sympathetic explanation goes far towards removing suspicion.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN thought that the Soviets had every intention of joining the U. S. and the British in the war against Japan as soon as Germany had capitulated. They fear, however, a premature break with Japan and placed great value on the substantial amount of supplies which they are now receiving through Vladivostok. He reiterated that the pressure on the Soviet Government to end the war could not be over-emphasized.

He thought, that the Chiefs of Staff, in their Conference with the Soviets, should place their sights high and should make unequivocal demands for what they wanted from them. He hoped that the question of Russian participation in the Japanese war would be raised either by the President or by the Chiefs of Staff and indicated that it would be well to point out and to emphasize any advantages which the Soviets would receive from such participation. One difficulty which he foresaw was the Soviet fear that information of the discussions might reach the Japanese and thus provoke a break with them before the Soviets are ready.

GENERAL DEANE stated that his views accorded substantially with those expressed by Ambassador Harriman except perhaps with respect to the degree of emphasis placed on the Russian desire for a second front. He thought that the Soviets viewed the second front more in the nature of desirable insurance than as an immediate necessity. As he saw it, their particular interest at the moment is focused on the assistance necessary to relieve the immediate pressure on them rather than on the opening of a second front.

In reply to a question by General Arnold as to the Soviet attitude

² See *ante*, pp. 137-144.

towards operations in the Aegean Sea, AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN said the Soviets had made no proposals as to what we should do. They stated only the results they desired and left the details to us. They were interested, however, in the reasons underlying our actions. He thought, therefore, that if there was to be an alternative to the cross-Channel operation, that it should be explained to the Soviets very frankly. If OVERLORD were to be abandoned, however, in his opinion, it would have to be replaced by an operation equally offensive in nature.

In reply to a question from Admiral Leahy he said that it was his impression that the Soviets were likely to demand immediate action to relieve the pressure on them.

GENERAL DEANE agreed with this, but said that he did not believe the Russians would propose the specific action to be taken. He said that the Soviets were appreciating for the first time the real effect of the bomber offensive on their operations. Marshal Stalin had mentioned it twice to him and it had been mentioned by several others. The effects had been confirmed by reports from prisoners of war. However, he thought it would not be wise to over-emphasize this as it had been exploited rather fully already.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN said that the Soviet Government was now telling the people that they have strong Allies who are fighting hard. In his opinion they were trying to impress them with the idea that the war has proceeded to a favorable point and progress is being made towards its successful completion. He said that the Soviets are blunt themselves and understand bluntness. He had no fear for any basic misunderstanding or any break with them as a result of the coming Conference. He was sure that we had their confidence.

ADMIRAL LEAHY expressed his appreciation and the appreciation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the very informative summary presented by Ambassador Harriman. . . .

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MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, NOVEMBER 24, 1943, 11 A. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt (in the Chair)
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
Major General Laycock

*Secretariat*Brigadier Hollis
Captain Royal

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SECRET

1. OPERATIONS IN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

THE PRESIDENT said that at this meeting he hoped there would be a preliminary survey of operations in the European Theater, including the Mediterranean. Final decisions would depend on the way things went at the conference shortly to be held with Premier Stalin. There were some reports that Premier Stalin had no thoughts beyond OVERLORD, to which he attached the highest importance as being the only operation worth considering. In other quarters it was held that Premier Stalin was anxious that in addition to OVERLORD in 1944, the Germans should be given no respite throughout the winter, and that there should be no idle hands between now and OVERLORD. The logistic problem was whether we could retain OVERLORD in all its integrity and, at the same time, keep the Mediterranean ablaze. In his view, Premier Stalin would be almost certain to demand both the continuation of action in the Mediterranean, and OVERLORD. As regards the Eastern Mediterranean, the question arose "where will the Germans go from the Dodecanese." The answer seemed to be "nowhere." If the same question was applied to ourselves, the answer seemed to depend on the action of Turkey. The entry of Turkey into the war would put quite a different complexion on the matter. This would be another question for discussion at the meeting with Premier Stalin.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was in accord with the President's views. We had had a year of unbroken success in North Africa and the Mediterranean, in Russia, and in the Pacific. Alamein and TORCH had paved the way for the extermination of large German forces in Tunisia. This was followed by the highly successful Sicily operation, and subsequently by the daring amphibious landing at Salerno and the capture of Naples. Then came Mussolini's fall, the collapse of Italy and the capitulation of the Italian Fleet. In the whole history of warfare there had never been such a long period of joint Allied success, nor such a high degree of cooperation and comradeship extending from the High Command down to the troops in the field between two Allies. We should, however, be unworthy of these accomplishments and of the tasks lying ahead if we did not test our

organization to see whether improvements could be made. That was the purpose of these periodical meetings.

As a contrast to the almost unbroken successes of the past year, the last two months had produced a series of disappointments. In Italy the campaign had flagged. We did not have a sufficient margin of superiority to give us the power to force the enemy back. The weather had been bad. The departure from the Mediterranean of certain units and landing craft had had, it seemed, a rather depressing effect on the soldiers remaining to fight the battle. The build-up of strategic air forces may also have contributed to the slow progress. The main objective was Rome, for "whoever holds Rome holds the title deeds of Italy." With Rome in our possession, the Italian Government would hold up its head. Moreover, we should then be in a position to seize the landing grounds to the northward.

He, THE PRIME MINISTER, had agreed, but with a heavy heart, to the return of seven divisions from the Mediterranean Theater. The 50th and 51st British Divisions, which were first-class troops, had had their equipment removed in preparation for embarkation. In the meanwhile, the 3rd U. S. Division had been no less than 49 days in constant contact with the enemy, and other U. S. and British units had been fighting without rest for long periods.

Passing across the Adriatic to Yugoslavia, more trouble had brewed up. It was a lamentable fact that virtually no supplies had been conveyed by sea to the 222,000 followers of Tito. These stalwarts were holding as many Germans in Yugoslavia as the combined Anglo-American forces were holding in Italy south of Rome. The Germans had been thrown into some confusion after the collapse of Italy and the Patriots had gained control of large stretches of the coast. We had not, however, seized our opportunity. The Germans had recovered and were driving the Partisans out bit by bit. The main reason for this was the artificial line of responsibility which ran through the Balkans. On the one hand, the responsibility for operations here lay with the Middle East Command but they had not the forces. On the other hand, General Eisenhower had the forces but not the responsibility. Considering that the Partisans and Patriots had given us such a generous measure of assistance at almost no cost to ourselves, it was of high importance to insure that their resistance was maintained and not allowed to flag.

Moving further east to the Aegean, the picture was equally black. When Italy fell, cheap prizes were open to us, and General Wilson had been ordered to "improvise and dare." Although we had not been able to seize Rhodes we had occupied Kos, Leros, Samos and others of the smaller islands. It had been hoped to capture Rhodes in October,

but when the time came only one Indian division was available for the task, and this was considered an insufficient force to eject the 8,000 Germans in the island. The enemy had reacted strongly to our initial moves. He had ejected us one by one from the islands, ending up with the recapture of Leros where we had lost 5,000 first-class troops, with four cruisers and seven destroyers either sunk or damaged. Nevertheless, taking into account the German soldiers drowned and those killed by air attack and in the battle, neither side could claim any large superiority in battle casualties. The Germans, however, were now re-established in the Aegean.

As stated by the President, the attitude of Turkey would have a profound effect on future events in this area. With Rhodes once more in our possession and the Turkish airfields at our disposal, the other islands would become untenable for the enemy.

It was to be hoped that the Russians would share our view of the importance of bringing Turkey into the war. They should see that great possibilities would accrue and a chance to join hands with them by means of sending supplies through the Dardanelles. The effect on Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria would be profound. All this might be done at quite a small cost, say, two divisions and a few landing craft. It might well be that a meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister could be arranged on the way back from meeting Premier Stalin.

Passing now to the Southeast Asia Theater, it was now clear that FIRST CULVERIN would require many more ships and craft than the British alone could supply. If it was thought by the United States Chiefs of Staff that CULVERIN was the best contribution to the Pacific war, then our resources would have to be made up by help from America. If, on the other hand, CULVERIN was thought to be too costly, it might be better to bring back from the Southeast Asia Theater to the Mediterranean sufficient landing craft for an attack on Rhodes. Thus the sequence would be, first Rome then Rhodes.¹ He, the Prime Minister, wished to make it clear that the British had no idea of advancing into the Valley of the Po. Their idea was that the campaign in Italy should have the strictly limited objective of the Pisa-Rimini line. No regular formations were to be sent to Yugoslavia. All that was needed there was a generous packet of supplies, air support and, possibly, a few Commandos. This stepping-up of our help to the Patriots would not involve us in a large additional commitment. Finally, when we had reached our objectives in Italy, the time would come to take the decision whether we should move to the left or to the right.

¹ Compare Churchill's memorandum of November 21, 1943, for the British Chiefs of Staff in Churchill, p. 686.

Turning now to the knock-out blow, OVERLORD, THE PRIME MINISTER emphasized that he had in no way relaxed his zeal for this operation. We had profited very considerably in our experiences of amphibious operations and our landing appliances had improved out of all knowledge. There would be an anxious period during the build-up, when the Germans might be able to concentrate more quickly than we could. Nevertheless, the 16 British divisions would be ready when called upon. It seemed to him that the timing of the operation depended more on the state of the enemy than on the set perfection of our preparations. He agreed with the view that if the Germans did not throw in the sponge by February we should have to expect heavy fighting throughout the summer. In this event, it would have to be realized that the 16 British divisions were the limit of our contribution. The British could not meet any further calls on our manpower, which was now fully deployed on war service.

After reviewing all the various theaters of operations the relationships seemed to work out as follows.

OVERLORD remained top of the bill, but this operation should not be such a tyrant as to rule out every other activity in the Mediterranean; for example, a little flexibility in the employment of landing craft ought to be conceded. Seventy additional LCT's had been ordered to be built in British shipyards. We must see if we can do even better than this.

General Alexander had asked that the date of the return of the landing craft for OVERLORD should be deferred from mid-December to mid-January. The resources which were at issue between the American and British Staffs would probably be found to amount to no more than 10 percent of the whole, excluding those in the Pacific. Surely some degree of elasticity could be arranged. Nevertheless, he wished to remove any idea that we had weakened, cooled, or were trying to get out of OVERLORD. We were in it up to the hilt.

To sum up, the program he advocated was Rome in January, Rhodes in February, supplies to the Yugoslavs, a settlement of the Command arrangements and the opening of the Aegean, subject to the outcome of an approach to Turkey; all preparations for OVERLORD to go ahead full steam within the framework of the foregoing policy for the Mediterranean.

THE PRESIDENT said that we could not tell what the state of German military capabilities would be from month to month. The Russian advance, if it continued at its present rate, would bring our ally in a few weeks to the boundaries of Rumania. At the forthcoming conference, the Russians might ask what we intended to do in this event. They might suggest a junction of our right with their left. We should be ready to answer this question.

The Russians might suggest that we stage an operation at the top of the Adriatic with a view to assisting Tito.

Turning to manpower, THE PRESIDENT read out the figures for the U. S. and British air and land forces at present disposed overseas and in the respective home countries.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the staffs had been giving much thought to how we should beat Japan when Hitler was finished. He was determined to solve this problem and the British Fleet would be disposed wherever it could make the best contribution towards this end. The air force build-up would also be studied.

THE PRESIDENT said that he shared the views expressed by Mr. Molotov that the defeat of Japan would follow that of Germany and more rapidly than at present was generally thought possible. It seemed that the Generalissimo had been well satisfied with the discussion held the previous day. There was no doubt that China had wide aspirations which included the re-occupation of Manchuria and Korea.

THE PRESIDENT then referred to the question of Command, remarking that he still received requests for the transfer of shipping and of air forces from one theater to another for a limited period of operations. In his view our strategic air forces from London to Ankara should be under one command. He cited the example of the command which Marshal Foch exercised in 1918.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that once we were across the Channel a united command would be established in the area of operations. He considered that the Combined Chiefs of Staff system had worked reasonably satisfactorily in taking the decision referred to by the President.

THE PRIME MINISTER paid a tribute to the accuracy and effectiveness of the U. S. daylight bombers operating from the United Kingdom.

THE PRESIDENT and PRIME MINISTER invited the staffs to study the problems as to the scope and dates of the operations to be carried out in the European and Mediterranean Theaters in 1944, with a view to arriving at an agreed view, if possible, before the coming meeting with the Russians.

CHIANG-MARSHALL LUNCHEON MEETING, NOVEMBER 24, 1943,
AFTERNOON

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Marshall
Lieutenant General Stilwell

CHINA

Generalissimo Chiang
Madame Chiang

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found. At the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff later the same afternoon Marshall reported on a discussion that he had had with Chiang regarding proposed operations in the Southeast Asia Command; see *post*, p. 338. Presumably the discussion to which Marshall referred had taken place at his luncheon meeting with Chiang. The luncheon meeting is also mentioned in *The Stilwell Papers*, p. 246, from which it appears that Stilwell and Madame Chiang were present. There is no indication of where the luncheon took place.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 24, 1943,
2:30 P. M., MENA HOUSE¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Willson
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Bieri
Rear Admiral Badger
Major General Handy
Major General Fairchild
Brigadier General Kuter
Captain Doyle
Colonel Roberts
Captain Freseman
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
Admiral Mountbatten
General Riddell-Webster
Lieutenant General Carton
de Wiart
Major General Laycock
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Sugden
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier Cobb
Brigadier Head
Brigadier McNair
Lieutenant Colonel Dobson

PRESENT FOR THE LAST ITEM ONLY

General Shang
Lieutenant General Lin
Vice Admiral Yang
Lieutenant General Chou
Major General Chu
Major General Tsai
Lieutenant General Stilwell
Major General Stratemeyer
Major General Chennault
Brigadier General Merrill

Secretariat

Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland
Commander Coleridge

¹ C. C. S. 129th meeting.

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SECRET

1. THANKSGIVING DAY

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that since the following day would be Thanksgiving he had made inquiries into the possibility of holding a service in the cathedral in Cairo and had found that this would be possible at 1800 hours. The British members of the Conference would, if agreeable to their American colleagues, like to join them in attending this service.

ADMIRAL LEAHY thanked Sir Alan Brooke for this gesture. It was very much appreciated by the United States Chiefs of Staff, who would gladly attend.

2. CONCLUSIONS OF THE 128TH MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 128th Meeting. The detailed report of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

3. COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF—UNITED CHIEFS OF STAFF
(C. C. S. 406 and 406/1) ²

SIR ALAN BROOKE said the British Chiefs of Staff had considered the U. S. proposals and saw certain difficulties. The United Chiefs of Staff, if organized to exercise executive functions and take decisions, would in effect be superimposed on the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Only three members of the United Chiefs of Staff would be able to sit together at any one time since Russia and China were not fighting the same enemies, and the organization would be unable to take the wide global outlook which was the function of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Combined Chiefs of Staff now functioned day in and day out and dealt with day-to-day problems of global strategy. He felt it better that Russian and Chinese representatives should be asked to attend all future conferences, such as SEXTANT, to discuss matters in which they were directly concerned.

ADMIRAL KING felt it important to have ready some possible plan to meet future demands for stronger representation.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he felt sure the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be put under pressure to alter their present machinery. He agreed that no other body could be superimposed above the Combined Chiefs of Staff, since such a body could never take major decisions.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he felt that a distinction should be

² Post, pp. 379 and 390.

drawn between the day-to-day work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington and the major decisions which were taken at the special conferences. He felt that if pressure were applied for permanent representation, the demand would be withdrawn if it were suggested that the Chinese or Russian Representatives concerned would have to be able to speak with the full authority of their governments.

SIR JOHN DILL pointed out the special position of the United States and Great Britain in that they only were fighting a global war and were completely integrated and united on all fronts.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should not go further than to agree that, for the present, the Russians and Chinese should be asked to attend those meetings at future special conferences at which their own problems were being discussed.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Took note of C. C. S. 406 and C. C. S. 406/1.

b. Agreed:

(1) That the Combined Chiefs of Staff should not take the initiative in putting forward any proposals for machinery to secure closer military cooperation with the U. S. S. R. and China.

(2) That if the U. S. S. R. and/or the Chinese should raise the question, the difficulties of and objections to any form of standing United Chiefs of Staff Committee should be frankly explained to them. It should be pointed out:

(a) That the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington are responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the Anglo-American forces which are closely integrated in accordance with the broad policy laid down at the formal conferences such as Casablanca, TRIDENT, QUADRANT, and SEXTANT which are convened from time to time; and

(b) That the U. S. S. R. and/or Chinese Governments will be invited to join in any formal conferences which may be convened in the future to take part in the discussion of any military problems with which they are specifically concerned.

4. AGENDA FOR "EUREKA"

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he regarded the EUREKA Conference as primarily a political meeting at which certain points would probably be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their advice. He felt that it would be wise to consider at this conference the best method of coordinating Russian military effort with our own, particularly with regard to Russian action during and prior to the OVERLORD assault. It was essential that this attack should not take place during a lull in the fighting on the Eastern front.

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed with this view and pointed out that there were several other items which might be raised, including the question of the provision of Russian bases for shuttle bombing. He agreed that

it was wise to have in mind certain special points for discussion but that the work of the conference would be inevitably affected by the political discussions.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

a. That no formal agenda need be produced at this stage because the military problems to be considered would arise from the political discussions which would be held at the start of the conference.

b. That the three main military topics for consideration would appear to be:

(1) The coordination of Russian operations with Anglo-American operations in Europe.

(2) Turkish action on entry into the war.

(3) Supplies to Russia.

(At this point Admiral Mountbatten, General Wheeler, General Wedemeyer, Brigadier Cobb, and Lt. Colonel Dobson entered the meeting, and Admiral Leahy withdrew.)

5. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

GENERAL MARSHALL reported that he had discussed the proposed operations in the Southeast Asia Command with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.³ The Generalissimo disapproved of the present plan, which he felt would lead to heavy losses and possibly defeat. The Generalissimo had made the following stipulations: Firstly, that there must be an amphibious operation carried out simultaneously with the land attack in Burma. In this connection the Generalissimo had suggested action against the Andaman Islands. Secondly, that the advances by the columns as now envisaged in the plan should all be aimed at a line running east and west through Mandalay, including the occupation of Mandalay by one of the columns. The Generalissimo was satisfied that the Yunnan force should not advance beyond Lashio, its present objective.⁴

He (GENERAL MARSHALL) had pointed out that the plan as explained to the Generalissimo was only the first stage of the operations to recapture Burma and was a conservative one and much less dangerous than that suggested by the Generalissimo. In view of the Generalissimo's extreme interest in the naval situation in the Bay of Bengal, he suggested he be given, as soon as possible, the build-up of the British naval forces. Admiral Mountbatten should see him and explain his plan, pointing out that it was the first step only of a long

³ Presumably the discussion had taken place at the Chiang-Marshall luncheon earlier in the same afternoon. See *ante*, p. 335.

⁴ See Chiang's telegram 955, December 23, 1943, to Roosevelt, *post*, p. 855.

campaign and that it was in the nature of a safe and conservative first step.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN explained that the plan was based on the principle that the advance should end at the time that the monsoon would break. This would prevent Japanese repercussions. He stressed the point that it would be impossible to remain stationary in the positions captured at the end of the first stage. It would be essential therefore to have collected sufficient resources by October for the next step forward.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that in taking the first step we were committing ourselves to the recapture of all Burma. There could be no question of holding a halfway line and we should probably have finally to undertake an airborne attack on Rangoon and amphibious operations. The alternatives were to continue the Burma land campaign to a finish or to give up the campaign altogether and endeavor to open the Malacca Straits. It was probably now too late to reverse our decision. This decision would, of course, affect the final plan for the defeat of Japan, and this must be realized.

ADMIRAL KING said he felt there was one alternative—to attack Bangkok instead. This would sever the Japanese lines of communication into Burma.

In reply to a question, GENERAL MARSHALL confirmed that the Generalissimo did not feel that the Chinese force from Yunnan should advance further than Lashio. The Generalissimo's fear with regard to the present plan was that it would enable the Japanese to attack and defeat in detail the various columns, particularly the Chinese.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN asked for direction from the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to what he should say to the Generalissimo with regard to future operations after the monsoon. These operations were largely dependent on the amount of air transport he could obtain in order to make his columns fully mobile. It might be possible to launch an amphibious operation in the Prome area and to put in more long range penetration groups. He again emphasized that at the end of the monsoon it would be essential either to advance, in which case sufficient resources would have to be provided, or to retire. To remain stationary was impossible. He would have liked to advance as far as Mandalay in the present dry season if the resources had been available but the lines of communication to Mandalay did not permit this. Further, he had no reserve divisions. He hoped to gain his present objectives by early April when it might be expected that the monsoon would break. During the monsoon, long range penetration groups would operate. He asked that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should consider as early as possible the provision of resources to enable him to renew his advances at the end of the next monsoon.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Chinese fear appeared to be mainly that they might be left to carry out their Yunnan advance unsupported.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of the above statements.

6. BOUNDARIES OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND (C. C. S. 308/7) ⁵

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered a memorandum presented by the United States Chiefs of Staff on the revision of the boundaries of the Southeast Asia Command.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the proposals in the paper dealing with the boundaries themselves were acceptable to him but he did not believe that a committee sitting in Chungking should deal with political matters in Thailand and Siam. He pointed out that the Kra Isthmus was far removed from Chungking with which there was no communication. The Siamese and the French were not suspicious of the United States or Great Britain acting in concert, but rather of the Chinese themselves. His two main considerations were that pre-occupational activity by such agencies as the S. O. E. and O. S. S. into Thailand and Siam must be permitted from his theater and that political questions should not be dealt with in Chungking, but either through the ordinary machinery of Government or perhaps even by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer action on C. C. S. 308/7.

(At this point General Shang Chen, Lieutenant General Lin Wei, Vice Admiral Yang Hsuan Ch'eng, Lieutenant General Chou Chih Jou, Lieutenant [*Major*] General Chu Shih Ming, Major General Tsai Wen Chih, Lieutenant General Stilwell, Major General Chennault, Major General Stratemeyer and Brigadier General Merrill entered the meeting.)

7. DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT ON OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

SIR ALAN BROOKE asked if the Chinese representatives had now had time to consider the plan for operations in the Southeast Asia Command put forward by Admiral Mountbatten.

GENERAL SHANG confirmed that he had had time to study the plan. He had certain questions and comments. Though there might be differences of opinion, these comments were offered in a spirit of helpfulness and he hoped they would be accepted in the same spirit.

With regard to enemy intelligence, there were certain points of difference but he did not propose to raise these at the meeting but

⁵ *Post*, p. 391.

rather to exchange views with the appropriate staff officers. General Shang then put the following questions:

- a. How many purely British units would be used in the area?
- b. Would there be any further British units other than those now in the area?
- c. Were there any armored or special troops?
- d. What was the fighting experience of the formations which would be engaged?

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN and BRIGADIER COBB outlined in considerable detail the nature of the British and Indian formations which would be engaged in the coming operations. Further details which might be required would be available from the staff of the Southeast Asia Command.

GENERAL SHANG then asked for the plan for the employment of the Imphal column. ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN explained that this column would fight its way through as far as possible. Strong resistance was, however, expected in the Kalewa area. He had insufficient air transport to supply this column from the air and, therefore, its rate of advance would be limited by the line of communications which could be built up behind them. All of the columns would advance as far as possible and exploit to the full the success they achieved.

GENERAL SHANG then asked for details with regard to the Indaw column.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that Indaw would be captured by the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade and the 26th Indian Infantry Division would then be flown in to hold it. It was essential to hold Indaw since it would serve as an essential base for the operations of long range penetration groups against the Japanese lines of communication. An airfield was essential for this purpose since insufficient parachutes were available to supply the column by this means. The L. R. P. groups were invaluable, not only for harrying lines of communication but also for killing Japanese.

In reply to a further question, ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN explained the operations which would take place from Fort Hertz. He pointed out that the details of the coordination of these operations with those of General Stilwell's Yunnan force had not yet [been] worked out. Plans with regard to amphibious operations could not yet be disclosed. There would, of course, be a land advance in the direction of Akyab which would be exploited to the full. He hoped to put an L. R. P. group in by gliders west of the Salween River, commanded by an officer well known to the Chins who inhabited this area.

GENERAL SHANG then made certain comments. The Generalissimo had instructed him to emphasize his conviction that the land opera-

tions in Burma must be synchronized with naval action and a naval concentration in the Bay of Bengal. The Generalissimo would be most disappointed if he was not fully apprised, before leaving the Conference, of the intention with regard to the strength and time of the arrival of the naval forces in the Bay of Bengal. The Generalissimo also considered that in the present plan the columns did not advance far enough. He considered that the plan also should cover the recapture of all Burma with Rangoon as an objective and the Mandalay-Lashio line as the first stage. Lastly the Generalissimo was insistent that, whatever the needs of the land campaign, the air lift to China must not drop below 10,000 tons a month. Though this might be thought to hinder the land operations, it must be remembered that operations in China and in Burma were closely related and the pressure exerted from China on Japanese forces must be maintained. The Generalissimo was most insistent with regard to the maintenance of the air lift to China.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that he could state definitely that by the time that the land operation in Burma started, there would be adequate naval forces in the Bay of Bengal. The details of strength and date of this concentration would, he was sure, be communicated by the Prime Minister to the Generalissimo.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the plan for the first stage as outlined by General Shang was very similar to the one he had originally considered but logistic difficulties made it impossible. His staff could explain these difficulties in detail to the Chinese representatives. It was illogical to demand in the same breath that this extensive plan should be carried out and a 10,000 ton air lift to China maintained. He then outlined the relatively small reductions below 10,000 tons which would be necessary over a period to enable his present operations to take place. He pointed out that the 10,000 ton lift had never, in fact, been reached and was no more than a target. In his opinion, the U. S. Air Force had achieved miracles in reaching their present capacity over the "hump." It was essential that the Chinese should make up their minds whether to insist on a 10,000 ton lift to China or whether they wished his present operations carried out. The Generalissimo had told him that he would regard with sympathy any small reductions below 10,000 tons necessary to enable the operations to be undertaken which, in fact, were designed to open the Burma Road to China. He must know where he stood. China could not have both the 10,000 tons and the land operations to open the road.

He would like an explanation with regard to the questions asked as to the numbers of British and Indian troops engaged. Did the Chinese Representatives wish to infer that the fighting qualities of the Indian

troops were bad? This suggestion he most strongly refuted. The Indian divisions had fought magnificently in the North African campaigns. If, on the other hand, the Chinese Representatives wished to imply that British troops were remaining in India without playing an active part in the operations, he wished it to be clearly understood once and for all that this was not the case. There were only two British divisions not engaged; one of those was training for an amphibious role and the other was being broken up to form the long-range penetration groups.

GENERAL SHANG explained that he had asked the questions referred to merely in order to have full details of the position and that, of course, he wished in no way to criticize the fighting qualities of either the Indian or British troops. With regard to tonnage over the "hump," 10,000 tons per month was an absolute minimum, essential to maintain and equip the Chinese Army. Had it been possible to obtain it, they would have asked for ten times this amount.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN pointed out that, in order to make the air-line safe or to open the Burma Road, it was essential to put everything into the present battle. He considered that the Chinese, at this stage, should only equip troops which would actually take part in the present battle and that tonnage designed to equip or maintain the remainder must be foregone until the battle had been won.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the present campaign was designed to open the Burma Road, for which the Chinese had asked, and that the opening of the Road was for the purpose of equipping the Chinese Army. The Chinese must either fight the battle for opening the Road or else call for more American planes to increase the air lift over the "hump." Any further increase in those American planes, at this time, he was opposed to. There must be no misunderstanding about this. The battle was to be fought to open the Burma Road. Unless this road were opened there could be no increase in supplies to China at this time since no further aircraft or equipment could be provided from the United States due to commitments elsewhere to meet serious shortages.

GENERAL SHANG said that all were agreed that the Burma Road should be opened but in spite of that he felt that 10,000 tons per month was necessary for the China area. These supplies would not be hoarded or sold but would be used against the enemy. All the 10,000 tons was required for the Yunnan force and for the Chinese Air Force.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the requirements for the campaign had been calculated in consultation with General Stilwell and General Chennault. These requirements were met by the reduced tonnages he had suggested. The figure of 10,000 tons was a purely arbitrary one whereas his own were based on exact calculations. The Generalissimo

had promised him that he would regard minor reductions sympathetically, and he, Mountbatten, hoped that he would now do so.

GENERAL SHANG said that he was not in a position to give any decision with regard to a reduction in the tonnage over the "hump" but would report the points which had been made.

GENERAL STILWELL said that he had been instructed by the Generalissimo to put forward four points which the Generalissimo considered essential: Firstly, naval and amphibious operations to be synchronized with the land campaign; secondly, that the Indaw and Imphal advances should continue as far as Mandalay; thirdly, that the Yunnan force should advance to Lashio; and lastly, that the needs of the Chinese Air Force should be met.

GENERAL CHENNAULT outlined the present and projected strengths of the 14th Air Force and the Chinese Air Force, together with the additional monthly tonnages required to maintain these forces. The present role of the Chinese Air Force was to defend the Szechwan basin, but the Generalissimo considered it must be equipped and trained to undertake an offensive role. The tonnages required by this plan for the two air forces in China amounted to some 10,000 tons per month.

GENERAL ARNOLD asked how it was proposed to use this 10,000 tons which, if all diverted to the air, would leave no lift for the ground forces.

GENERAL CHENNAULT said that it was proposed to build up the Chinese and United States Air Forces equally. The figures he had given were the requirements to meet the plan. He was not putting forward any recommendations.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that the Chinese Representatives should arrange for Admiral Mountbatten to wait on the Generalissimo to explain his operations and the considerations with regard to the air lift to China.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he had believed that the Generalissimo earnestly desired that the Burma Road should be opened. This could only be done if the air lift to China was reduced.

GENERAL SHANG undertook to arrange a meeting between Admiral Mountbatten and the Generalissimo.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Took note with interest of the discussion between the Chinese military representatives and Admiral Mountbatten on the subject of the operations planned in Burma in the Southeast Asia Command.

b. Noted that the Chinese military representatives undertook to arrange a meeting between Admiral Mountbatten and the Generalissimo at which details of the plan, the reasons underlying it, and the

considerable effort involved, could be explained to the Generalissimo as well as the implications on the air lift to China.

ROOSEVELT CONVERSATIONS WITH VARIOUS CALLERS, NOVEMBER
24, 1943, AFTERNOON, ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

Editorial Note

According to the Log (*ante*, p. 297) the following foreign persons called on the President during the afternoon of November 24:

Egyptian—Cabinet Chief Hassanayn and Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Nahas.

Greek—King George II, Prince Paul, and Prime Minister Tsouderos.

British—Ambassador to Egypt Killearn, Generals Wilson and Stone, Admiral Willis, and Air Chief Marshal Douglas.

Yugoslav—King Peter II and Prime Minister Purić.

According to Leahy, p. 200, the President also had brief talks on the same afternoon with Turkish Prime Minister Saracoğlu, British Ambassador to Turkey Knatchbull-Hugessen, and the Egyptian heir apparent (Mohammad Ali).

The calls were apparently of brief duration and were primarily of a courtesy nature. No memoranda of these conversations appear to have been made either by or for the President. There is some evidence (*post*, p. 864) that Roosevelt discussed a trusteeship for Indochina with the Turks and the Egyptians in the course of this trip. There is no indication, however, of when these conversations took place. His conversation with King Peter is, however, described in the latter's book, *A King's Heritage*, pp. 195–196. According to this account, the subjects discussed included the reconciling of Commander Tito and General Mihailović, the advisability of Allied landings on the Dalmatian or the French coast, and the development of a joint Allied offensive against Germany on a fixed date.

A conversation at Cairo between the President and General Wilson is recounted in Field Marshal Lord Wilson's, *Eight Years Overseas, 1939–1947*, p. 187. It would appear from that source that the conversation took place during the Second Cairo Conference, but the Log for the period December 2–7, 1943 (*post*, p. 655) does not show that Roosevelt conferred with Wilson during the Second Cairo Conference. According to Wilson, the conversation revolved mainly around the resistance movements in Greece and Yugoslavia.

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1943

ROOSEVELT-CADOGAN CONVERSATION, NOVEMBER 25, 1943,
FORENOON, ROOSEVELT'S VILLA*Editorial Note*

No record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 297.

ROOSEVELT-LEATHERS LUNCHEON MEETING, NOVEMBER 25, 1943,
1:30 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Douglas
Ambassador Winant
Assistant Secretary of
War McCloy

UNITED KINGDOM

Lord Leathers

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The information given above with respect to the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 298. See also *post*, p. 415. According to Elliott Roosevelt, p. 157, the principal subject of conversation was supply.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 25, 1943,
2:30 P. M., MENA HOUSE¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Admiral of the Fleet
Cunningham
Admiral Mountbatten
(for item 1 only)

Secretariat

Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal

¹ C. C. S. 130th meeting.

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

At the request of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN gave an account of his meeting with the Generalissimo the day before on the subject of the plan of operations in the Burma campaign.² At this meeting the Generalissimo insisted that the alternative plan of campaign should be carried out, the plan for which, in fact, the resources were not available and which demanded an additional 535 transport aircraft.

When Admiral Mountbatten expressed his opinion that these aircraft could not be found and insisted that in this event it would be necessary for the Generalissimo to give his enthusiastic and personal support to the less extensive plan being put into effect, the Generalissimo acceded but said that first the Combined Chiefs of Staff must be asked formally to provide the aircraft necessary for the more extensive plan.

The Generalissimo also insisted that an amphibious operation should be carried out at the same time as the land operation in North Burma.

The Prime Minister gave the Generalissimo the details of the British Fleet to be available at which the Generalissimo expressed great pleasure.

Also, the Prime Minister informed him that the amphibious operation would not affect the land battle.

The Generalissimo made the point that it would, in that it would draw off part of the enemy air forces available.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then made it clear that this would act both ways and that for an amphibious operation to be carried out at the same time as a land operation would mean that the whole air force would not be made available for the land operation.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that possibly 25 aircraft could be made available but that the figure of 535 might be impossible to find without taking aircraft away from other operations to which they had already been allotted.

In regard to the amphibious operation, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the Generalissimo must be told that he must wait for the answer as it depends upon progress at SEXTANT. The question of air lift to China was then discussed.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the Generalissimo had been told

² The meeting is also described in *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 63.

that the average air lift over the "hump" for a period of six months during the course of the operation would be 8,900 tons per month.

The Generalissimo had demanded that the full 10,000 tons per month should be made available.

Admiral Mountbatten had made it clear that this was only a target figure which, indeed, had not been reached hitherto.

The Generalissimo had then said that he would deal direct with General Somervell in the matter.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he would like the Combined Chiefs of Staff to decide that support should not be given to the Chinese Air Force over and above that which had already been agreed upon.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN asked that it should be accepted as a principle that if there should be an increase in the transport available over the "hump," the right to use that additional transport should be reserved to the Southeast Asia Command.

GENERAL MARSHALL said this acceptance could not be given without reference to the President.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that in view of the important issues involved, it was necessary to get a written agreement from the Generalissimo regarding the Burma campaign to be carried out before the monsoon in 1944. He understood that the Generalissimo would give the campaign his enthusiastic support and had accepted the implication of reduced air lift.

After further discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed that it would not be possible to find the additional 535 aircraft that would be required for the more ambitious plan of campaign in North Burma to be adopted, and for the increased tonnage over the "hump."

b. Took note that Admiral Mountbatten would draw up a paper for submission to the Generalissimo with a view to getting the latter's written agreement to the Burma operations now contemplated; this paper to be submitted for approval to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible in view of the impending departure of the Generalissimo from SEXTANT.³

c. Agreed that it would be very desirable if Admiral Mountbatten would get a clearance to this paper in view of the dealings he had already had with the Generalissimo in the matter.

2. APPROVAL OF DECISIONS OF C. C. S. 129TH MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

³ The paper is printed *post*, p. 430.

Accepted the conclusions of the 129th Meeting. The detailed report of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

3. OVER-ALL PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that instructions should be issued to the Combined Staff Planners to have the Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan, now under study by them, completed prior to the return of the Combined Chiefs of Staff from Jerusalem. This date should be assumed to be about 1 December.⁴

4. "OVERLORD" AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Discussed the subject of "OVERLORD and the Mediterranean" in closed session.

⁴ The plan is printed *post*, p. 765.

ROOSEVELT-CHIANG MEETING, NOVEMBER 25, 1943, 5 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Colonel Roosevelt

CHINA

Generalissimo Chiang
Madame Chiang

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The time and place of the meeting are indicated in the Log, *ante*, p. 298, which indicates that tea was served.

Elliott Roosevelt, p. 158, says that Madame Chiang described her plans for future improvements in China, particularly in the matter of literacy. According to the same source, Roosevelt and Chiang again referred to the question of unity in China, "specifically as regarded the Chinese Communists" (see the editorial note, *ante*, p. 323).

Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 65, indicates that operations in the China-Burma-India theater were also discussed and that Chiang "reversed himself on every point." The points in question were those set forth in C. C. S. 411/2 (*post*, p. 430), to which Chiang apparently had agreed in a meeting with Churchill and Mountbatten earlier the same day. See also *The Stilwell Papers*, p. 246.

In a message to Roosevelt, dated March 27, 1944, Chiang wrote: "In the course of our conversations at Cairo I told you that as soon

as the British began large scale amphibious operations along the Burma coast, our main forces would launch a vigorous attack on Burma with all their might." *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 308. See also *post*, p. 874.

It was probably at this meeting that Roosevelt gave Chiang the promise (referred to in Churchill, p. 328) "of a considerable amphibious operation across the Bay of Bengal within the next few months." According to Ehrman (vol. V, p. 165), this promise was given before November 26. Alanbrooke (p. 63), recollected the promise as having been given "on the first day of our Cairo meetings," but this appears unlikely.

Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 64, gives an account of a meeting of Marshall and Stilwell with Roosevelt immediately preceding Roosevelt's meeting with Chiang. At the earlier meeting Roosevelt had promised to speak to Chiang "at once" about granting Stilwell more power over Chinese troops.

For other subjects which were discussed by Roosevelt and Chiang at Cairo and which may have been discussed in whole or in part at this meeting, see the editorial note, *post*, p. 366.

ROOSEVELT THANKSGIVING DINNER PARTY, NOVEMBER 25, 1943,
8 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
Ambassador Winant
Ambassador Steinhardt
Ambassador Harriman
Minister Kirk
Major General Watson
Rear Admiral Brown
Rear Admiral McIntire
Colonel Roosevelt
Major Boettiger
Mr. Robert Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Lord Moran
Mr. Martin
Commander Thompson
Mrs. Oliver

Editorial Note

Accounts of this dinner party, at which President Roosevelt was host, are given in the Log, *ante*, p. 298; Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 159-160; Sherwood, p. 775; Churchill, pp. 340-341; and Leahy, p. 201. Leahy mentions Lord Leathers rather than Lord Moran as being present. There are no indications that substantive problems were discussed.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF THANKSGIVING DINNER PARTY,
NOVEMBER 25, 1943, EVENING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Air Chief Marshal Tedder

Editorial Note

The only information that has been found about this dinner meeting is given in Arnold, p. 463. Apparently no official record of the meeting was made, and there are no indications that substantive problems were discussed. The place of the meeting is not mentioned.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1943

ROOSEVELT CONVERSATIONS WITH MOUNTBATTEN AND MADAME
CHIANG, NOVEMBER 26, 1943, FORENOON, ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

Editorial Note

The Log, *ante*, p. 299, indicates that Admiral Mountbatten and Madame Chiang called separately on the President during the forenoon of November 26. Apparently no memoranda of these conversations were made either by or for the President. Elliott Roosevelt, p. 166, contains a reference to the calls. Presumably the principal subject of both conversations was the attitude of Chiang toward the proposed operations in the China-Burma-India theater; see *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 65.

AMERICAN-BRITISH CONVERSATIONS ON CIVIL AFFAIRS, NOVEMBER
26, 1943, AFTERNOON AND EVENING, BRITISH EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Winant
Mr. McCloy

UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Secretary Eden
Mr. Jebb
Major Morton

Defense Files

*Memorandum of Conversation*¹

SECRET

Mr. Winant started out by stating our concern, from the point of view of progressing with our planning, over the extent of the jurisdiction of the European Advisory Commission and the early introduction of the political aspect into the cessation of hostility planning. I then outlined to Eden the inadvisability, from the point of view of U. S. participation in the peace and the reconstruction of Europe, of concentrating too much post hostility planning and decision making in London or of removing the military aspect of such planning, at least while the war was going on. Mr. Eden asked whether it was our desire or intention to play down the Moscow Conference agreements in respect to the EAC.² I told him that I thought too much had been referred to it as a practical matter for it to absorb at the start and the result might well be a serious lack of progress.

When I touched on the necessity of avoiding even the suggestion of moving all these decisions to London and spoke of the need for indulging American sensitivities on these matters if the U. S. was to be a real participant in the peace, he rather strongly reacted. It was clear that he considered the setting up of the London Commission as an achievement of some proportions; that it had Mr. Hull's accord and thus the accord of the U. S. government; that whether for better or worse the entire kit and kiboodle *had* been referred and it would not do to indicate to the Soviets that any attempt was being made to derogate from the jurisdiction of the Commission now. I told him that the U. S., of course, intended to go ahead with the decisions made in Moscow and to bring the Soviets into our councils. This was recognized on all sides as desirable and necessary. The question was a matter of getting on with work that must be done. Already due to the attitude of some agencies in London, the British side of the CCAC, who in themselves were able and reasonable men if given some authority, were completely tongue-tied. The thing to do was to avoid playing up the EAC as the great decider of all post hostility questions; to have the EAC prior to submitting their proposed recommendations to the governments, obtain the comments of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. From there on the recommendations of the EAC can be transmitted to the governments for approval and thence to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as a basis for directives to the commanders in the field. Mr. Eden expressed agreement with this procedure

¹ Prepared by McCloy.² *Decade*, p. 10.

and Mr. Jebb, who was with him, also seemed in favor of this arrangement but indicated to Mr. Eden that "London" would be much opposed, i. e., they wanted to shift the CCAC to London. Although no arrangements were confirmed, Mr. Eden indicated he favored this arrangement and would endeavor to carry it into effect. He also said that he thought it wise that no further pressure be exerted toward shifting the functions of the Combined Committee to London.

Winant spoke of the need for a good staff in London to help him out and Mr. Eden said this was most important. He urged that a good military man be sent over immediately (and a good State Department man). He said that if we would agree to treat the EAC seriously he would see that the tongues and minds of the British representatives on the CCAC would be loosened and that he thought that further pressure to set up a CCAC in London would be removed. We touched on many other related things which led up to this tentative conclusion. The discussion was animated at times, but frank.

In the evening Mr. Jebb came to dinner as did Major Morton who briefs the Prime Minister on these matters. Jebb, who was going farther north and east,³ said that after talking with Eden further and consulting Redman and others, the general view among them, again subject to "London" (whatever that means) was that an arrangement would be worked out whereby the tentative recommendations of the EAC would be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their comment and suggestions before being submitted to the governments; that the Combined Chiefs of Staff could refer the matter to the CCAC for advice and the comments could then be returned to the EAC for final submission to the governments which by that time would have been for all practical purposes already in agreement. Thereafter the translation of the policy into the terms of a directive can be made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He urged that when the recommendations were submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that we would not take them apart and start all over again. I assured him that we only wanted to make progress and that I could guarantee we would act expeditiously and reasonably.

I told him that though it might not be advisable to suggest to the Soviet member at the outset that certain matters be carved out of the jurisdiction of the Commission, I did feel as a matter of practice they would find that the Advisory Commission would have enough to do to concentrate on broad matters of policy rather than on details of planning which had better be done at COSSAC Headquarters than either in the EAC or Washington. He agreed. Finally I told Mr. Jebb that I thought that unless we could make such an arrangement

³ i. e., to Tehran.

as that outlined we would reach a further impasse and nothing of any substance would result from the London Commission. I indicated to Mr. Eden that Mr. Hull had suggested a Combined Committee to deal with French matters⁴ and this immediately produced a favorable reaction. He asked that study be given to the question of how and where it should be set up.

The conference ended with the understanding that on the return of Jebb from the East we should work on an agreement on the respective functions of the EAC, the Combined Committee and COSSAC.⁵

⁴ See Hildring's telegram of November 25, 1943, to McCloy, *post*, p. 423.

⁵ The draft agreement is printed *post*, p. 446.

CHIANG MEETING WITH CERTAIN AMERICAN GENERALS, NOVEMBER 26, 1943, 11:30 A. M., CHIANG'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Arnold
Lieutenant General Stilwell
Lieutenant General Somervell
Major General Stratemeyer
Major General Wheeler
Brigadier General Merrill¹

CHINA

Generalissimo Chiang
General Shang
Lieutenant General Lin
Lieutenant General Chou
Major General Chu
Colonel Liu

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum of Conversation

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 26 November 1943.

The Conference began with a demand from the Generalissimo to maintain a fixed tonnage of 10,000 tons per month over the hump regardless of any demands which might be made on the equipment to support necessary operations in the South East Asia Command. It was explained to the Generalissimo (1) that all C-46 airplanes are being assigned to this service, (2) that an increase in the efficiency of the service is expected, (3) that efforts are being made to secure 25 C-47 airplanes for Lord [Louis] Mountbatten, and that with these arrangements, the estimated tonnage over the hump would probably not only reach but exceed in due course the 10,000 tons target figure, (4) that the difference between the figure proposed by Lord Mountbatten for the next 7 months, 8,900 tons, and the figures estimated by the Generalissimo would be only 1,100 tons. It was explained that under these circumstances it was possible, even with the diversions asked by Lord Mountbatten, that there might still be 10,000 tons for delivery in China.

¹ *The Stilwell Papers*, p. 246, gives Chennault rather than Merrill as present.

The Generalissimo stated that he felt that his requirements and those of Lord Mountbatten in the South East Asia Theater should be divorced and that they should be handled as separate items. It was explained that owing to the nature of the operation and the fact that the operations themselves were designed to push the Japanese back and thus provide for greater safety of the air route that this could not be done. It was also explained that all concerned had the increase in tonnage over the hump very much at heart and that though only 8,900 tons could be promised, that every effort would be made to increase this figure not only to 10,000 tons but to exceed 10,000 tons.

The Generalissimo concluded the conference by saying that he hoped that Lord Mountbatten and his demands could be separated but that he would accept the figures given to him with the understanding that the ATC would devote its best endeavors to securing the greatest possible increase in the tonnage.

H. H. ARNOLD
J. STILWELL
BREHON SOMERVELL

MEETING OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH INFORMATION OFFICIALS,
NOVEMBER 26, 1943, 11:30 A. M., MENA HOUSE

Censorship Files

*Memorandum of Conversation*¹

SECRET

Present: Colonel McCarthy	U. S. A.
Colonel McClenahan	"
Major Durno	"
Mr. Ryan	M. I. M. E.
Mr. Shea	O. W. I.
Colonel Maunsell	S. I. M. E.
and for part of the time	
Mr. Sinclair	M. I. M. E.
Mr. Barnes	O. W. I.
Major Putman [<i>Putnam?</i>]	P. R. USAFIME

¹ Prepared by one of the officials of the British Ministry of Information, Middle East (M. I. M. E.).

The following conclusions were reached :

Still Photographs

Each party would process their own material in Cairo under Security conditions, would exchange material and send material to London and Washington under the usual arrangements.

Moving Pictures

The U. S. A. would send their material unprocessed to Washington (Public Relations Bureau, War Dept.). Copies of this material when treated would be sent back to Cairo for M. I. M. E.

British material would be processed under Security conditions in Cairo, and "lavenders"² would be given to the U. S. A. authorities here.

The British material would subsequently be sent to London in the usual way.

Release for Pictures

It was agreed that no pictures of any kind should be released until the time of the final release date.

Credit Line

It was agreed, subject to confirmation on the one hand by Mr. Ryan and on the other by Col. McClenahan, that all pictures moving and still taken in connection with the Conference by any of the various official photographers or cinemen should be pooled for all parties concerned and should carry the credit line "United Nations Photographic Pool".

Transmission by Air of Messages Not Yet Releasable

It was agreed that messages now being written by correspondents could be conveyed periodically by the air courier service to London (for the British correspondents) and Washington (for the American correspondents) subject to

- (1) Censorship here before despatch.
- (2) Consignment to the appropriate official authority in the respective countries for holding until the time of release.
- (3) Recensorship before release in the event of any new stops being imposed after the messages have left this country.

Arrangements for Final Release

Mr. Ryan explained the arrangements under consideration. These were :

- (a) Release for publication to be at 23.30 hours G. M. T. on "X" day. This was the hour adopted as standard for important joint an-

² i.e., lavender-colored copies.

nouncements London and Washington in the past. Mr. Ryan had been assured by the American correspondents that it was a suitable time for American release.

(b) It would be impossible for the cable service to carry a fraction of the correspondents' messages within a reasonable time, (e. g. 24 hours) of the start of transmission. The volume of messages could only be handled within a period of 24 hours by wireless transmission and then only by making very special arrangements and suspending certain other normal transmission.

It was therefore proposed that release for transmission by wireless should be at 23.30 hours G. M. T. on X minus 1 day.

It should be realized that this was the moment at which security stopped. Axis monitoring stations would be able to pick up messages sent by this form of transmission.

The present view was that this interval of 24 hours between release for transmission and release for publication would be long enough to get the correspondents' messages off but short enough to prevent any reproduction in the press or radio of broadcasts sent out by Axis stations based on their pick up of transmissions from Cairo.

(c) It is of the utmost importance that correspondents should have a minimum of 12 hours warning, if at all possible, of the time of release for transmission.

(d) These arrangements to be confirmed by Mr. Ryan (who is in consultation with the Ministry of Information, London) and Col. McClenahan.

Issue of Early Communiqué

If an early communiqué was issued and it was desired that there should be no reference to the location of the Conference, transmission by wireless would be out of the question and the cable service would have to be used.

There would have to be an interval between the release for transmission by cable and release for publication. This would require further investigation and Mr. Ryan undertook to get into touch with the cable company (The Hon. Cecil Campbell.)

Mr. Ryan felt considerable misgivings as to whether it would prove practicable to issue a communiqué on this basis without in fact "breaking" the story.

M. I. M. E.

27th NOVEMBER, 1943.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 26, 1943,
2:30 P. M., MENA HOUSE¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
General Eisenhower
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Willson
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Bieri
Rear Admiral Badger
Major General Sutherland
Major General Stratemeyer
Major General Wheeler
Major General Handy
Major General Fairchild
Major General Wedemeyer
Brigadier General Kuter
Brigadier General Hansell
Brigadier General Tansey
Captain Doyle
Colonel Jenkins
Colonel O'Donnell
Colonel Roberts
Captain Freseman
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
General Riddell-Webster
Admiral Cunningham
Air Chief Marshal Tedder
General Wilson
Air Chief Marshal Douglas
Vice Admiral Willis
Major General Whiteley
Major General Lewis
Brigadier de Rhé-Philipe
Captain Power
Colonel Lascelles
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Sugden
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier Head
Brigadier McNair

Secretariat

Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland
Commander Coleridge

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*²

SECRET

1. OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND
(C. C. S. 411 and 411/1)³

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the amendments to C. C. S. 411 set out in C. C. S. 411/1 and directed that the amended paper, subsequently published as

¹ C. C. S. 131st meeting.

² The source text is evidently a revised version of the minutes, for it incorporates in item 1 a change agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs at their 133d meeting; see *post*, p. 669.

³ Neither printed herein.

C. C. S. 411/2, should be forwarded to the Generalissimo via the Supreme Commander S. E. A. C. without delay.⁴

2. REPORTS FROM COMMANDERS IN CHIEF

a. Report by Commander in Chief, AFHQ

SIR ALAN BROOKE asked General Eisenhower to give his views with particular reference, firstly, to the question of centralization of command in the Mediterranean, and secondly, to the best ways and means of prosecuting the war in the Mediterranean area.

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that with regard to the first question, he regarded centralization of command as being absolutely essential. In practice, the air and naval commands were already centralized and he considered the whole command must similarly be coordinated and controlled from one headquarters. With regard to future operations in the Mediterranean, he considered that these had to be looked at under two different assumptions. Firstly, that there would be a full-out effort in the Mediterranean throughout the winter. On this assumption, taking into consideration the Russian advances and the effect of POINTBLANK, Italy was, in his view, the correct place in which to deploy our main forces and the objective should be the Valley of the Po. In no other area could we so well threaten the whole German structure including France, the Balkans and the Reich itself. Here also our air would be closer to vital objectives in Germany. The seven divisions for OVERLORD had all left his theater so that, to implement his suggested course of action, only additional landing craft were needed. It was necessary to keep all that he now had and certain others would be required for certain phases of his operations. His build-up must go on continuously. In addition, it was essential to have enough landing craft to insure that one amphibious division can be always ready to attack. With regard to the timing of operations, it would be quite impossible to reach the Po by 15 January, a date which he believed had been suggested. The fighting was particularly bitter and it was necessary to keep fresh infantry divisions in the front line. Amphibious operations, it must be remembered, depended on weather conditions and therefore the timing of the advances could not be exactly predicted. The next best method of harrying the enemy was to undertake operations in the Aegean. There are sufficient forces in the Mediterranean to take action in this area provided it is not done until after the Po line has been reached. It could then be undertaken while the forces in Italy were reorganizing for thrusts either to the east or west. When the Aegean operations

⁴ C. C. S. 411/2 is printed *post*, p. 430. It was apparently discussed with Chiang at the meeting of the Heads of Government later the same afternoon; see the editorial note, *post*, p. 366.

were undertaken it would be necessary to bring Turkey into the war. The French High Command were most anxious to undertake operations into the south of France but these were ruled out since all available landing craft were required for the Italian campaign.

Turning to operations in the Mediterranean, based on the assumption that only limited means were available, GENERAL EISENHOWER considered that only the line north of Rome could be achieved and that after that he would have to maintain a strategic defensive with strong local offensive action. Lack of landing craft would prevent him from amphibious turning movements designed to cut off enemy forces. The time to turn to the Aegean would be when the line north of Rome had been achieved. German reactions to our occupation of the islands had clearly proved how strongly they resented action on our part in this area. From here the Balkans could be kept aflame; Ploesti would be threatened and the Dardanelles might be opened. Sufficient forces should be used for operations in the Aegean and no unnecessary risks run. He considered that the earlier British occupation of the islands had been right and justified, but the position was now different and strong German reactions could be expected. In either of the two assumptions it was essential to bring Turkey into the war at the moment that the operations in the Aegean were undertaken.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the date of 15 January had been suggested, not for the capture of the Po line but for that of the Pisa-Rimini line. He asked for General Eisenhower's views with regard to action in Yugoslavia.

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that on the assumption that he would advance to the Po line, he would propose action to establish small garrisons in the islands on the eastern coast of the Adriatic from which thrusts as far north as possible could be made into Yugoslavia and the Patriots furnished with arms and equipment. If only the Rome line was reached, it would not be possible to thrust as far up the Adriatic as he would have liked.

GENERAL EISENHOWER then outlined the program for the build-up of his forces in Italy. He confirmed that the ground forces available to him should be sufficient to reach the Po line. His present strength was the maximum which the poor lines of communication could maintain. It must be remembered that there was no good port north of Naples until Leghorn was reached. With regard to his air force build-up, GENERAL EISENHOWER said he would like it clearly understood that all of this was not for use in POINTBLANK but much of it took an active part in assisting the land battle. This air force, based in Italy, was twice as effective as if it had remained in Tunisia. Only the initial build-up of the air force was a costly business since, once established, six groups could be maintained for the same tonnage as two divisions.

GENERAL EISENHOWER stressed the vital importance of continuing the maximum possible operations in an established theater since much time was invariably lost when the scene of action was changed, necessitating, as it did, the arduous task of building up a fresh base.

With regard to supply of equipment to the Yugoslavian guerrillas, one officer had now been placed in charge of these operations and arms captured in North Africa and Sicily were being sent in. Italian equipment captured in Italy was at present being used to equip one Italian parachute division, which was believed to be of good fighting quality, and a further division would possibly also be equipped. He believed that all possible equipment should be sent to Tito since Mikhailovitch's [*Mikhailović's*] forces were of relatively little value.

SIR JOHN CUNNINGHAM agreed that everything in our power should be done to support Tito, who had some hundred thousand men under his control. The Germans would have great difficulties operating against the guerrillas since their lateral communications were immensely difficult and there was only one poor railway. They would have largely to supply their forces by sea. It would be impossible, therefore, for them to rapidly concentrate against Tito's forces. He believed that by air and naval action, their seaborne lines of communication could be cut, and in fact, he hoped shortly to be operating destroyers in the Venice-Trieste-Pola area. He questioned whether it would be possible or right to continue to supply Italian equipment since this was rapidly running short.

AIR MARSHAL TEDDER said that the present system of air operations into the Balkans worked reasonably well. The tactical commander in Italy was given his targets from the Middle East. He agreed with Sir Charles Portal that when the joint staff under the officer responsible for operations in the Balkans had been set up, coordination of effort would be more satisfactory.

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that he believed that given 50 percent good weather, he would, once his air forces were firmly established in Italy, be able to almost completely cut the seven German lines of communication into Italy and keep them cut.

b. Report by Commanders in Chief, Middle East

GENERAL WILSON, referring to operations in the Aegean, said that it was essential to cut the German iron ring which included Rhodes, Scarpanto, Crete, and Greece. Rhodes was the key to the situation and to capture this, additional equipment would be required from the western Mediterranean. Once Rhodes had fallen, these resources could be returned and the remainder of the operations in the Aegean carried out with the resources available in the Middle East. All of this was based on the assumption that Turkey had entered the war on our side.

For Rhodes, one British division including two assault loaded brigades with previous amphibious experience would be required. These could be withdrawn after the capture of Rhodes. The additional forces required included one armored brigade and one parachute brigade, which were available from the Middle East. He considered that Turkey should be asked to take other islands of the Dodecanese. This he felt should be within their power with the possible exception of Lemnos, which the Germans were using as a base and had reinforced. The commitment to Turkey to protect them against air attack, i. e., Operation **HARDHOOD**, could be met, with the exception of certain administrative units, without affecting Aegean operations.

AIR MARSHAL SIR SHOLTO DOUGLAS said that he would require some 17 to 20 squadrons and these could be provided with certain assistance which Air Marshal Tedder could provide. With this, Smyrna and Constantinople could be protected, Rhodes captured, and convoys to the Dardanelles given adequate cover. He considered that the capture of Rhodes was a prerequisite to running convoys since without it unacceptably heavy losses must be expected.

Most of the airports required in Turkey were already completed with the exception of two in the neighborhood of Rhodes, on which steel mats were now being laid. Negotiations were being undertaken with the Turks to enable us to put into Turkey the necessary equipment to provide R. D. F. cover and operation rooms. Only one of the airfields was situated to the west of the Bosphorus, and he believed the Turkish forces, including the two divisions in the neighborhood of airdromes opposite Rhodes were adequate to protect them even against airborne attack.

GENERAL WILSON stressed the importance of action in support of the guerrillas as far north as possible in Yugoslavia. The islands on the eastern Adriatic would be a valuable stepping stone to the mainland and would assist in the maintenance of guerrillas. Operations in northern Yugoslavia would constitute a serious threat to the Germans' rear.

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, GENERAL WILSON said that the Turks had not got the necessary resources for a full-scale amphibious attack but that he believed that with the assistance of air attack and seaborne bombardment and by using local craft and small landing craft, some of which might have to be provided from the western Mediterranean, the Turks could stage the short shore-to-shore assault required for the capture of certain of the islands.

With regard to Rumania, GENERAL WILSON said that he was in touch with resistance groups and that a wireless station had been established in Bucharest. The resistance groups, however, were fearful of the Germans and were taking little action. His knowledge of resistance

in Bulgaria was small but he believed this resistance to be growing. He had discussed with General Donovan the possibility of further efforts being made to establish contact with this country.

In reply to a question by General Arnold, AIR MARSHAL SIR SHOLTO DOUGLAS said that the airfields in Turkey would be ample for the forces he was able to deploy, and consisted of about eight fighter airdromes and six bomber airdromes. Sites had been selected at a reasonable distance back from the coast and all were equipped with hard surfaces except those in the neighborhood of Rhodes, on which work was now in hand.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note with interest of the statements of the Commanders in Chief, North African and Middle East Theaters, and of the resulting discussion.

(At this point General D. D. Eisenhower, Admiral Sir John Cunningham, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, General Sir H. Maitland Wilson, Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, Vice Admiral Sir A. U. Willis, Major General J. F. M. Whiteley, Major General R. H. [G. ?] Lewis, Brigadier R. [A. T.] de Rhe Phillipe [*de Rhé-Philippe*], Captain M. L. Power, R. N., Colonel J. H. Lascelles and Colonel R. E. Jenkins, U. S. A. withdrew from the meeting.)

3. APPROVAL OF DECISIONS OF C. C. S. 130TH MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 130th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted subject to minor amendments.

4. "OVERLORD" AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

A. Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 1944—Europe (C. C. S. 300/3) ⁵

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the "Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 1944—Europe," presented by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 300/3 (SEXTANT).

B. "OVERLORD" and the Mediterranean (C. C. S. 409, 410 ⁶ and 387 ⁷)

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff tentatively accepted the proposals for action in the Mediterranean contained in paragraph 6 of C. C. S. 409 as a basis for discussion with the Soviet Staff.

It was the understanding of the United States Chiefs of Staff that the British proposals would include the opening of the Dardanelles

⁵ *Ante*, p. 214.

⁶ *Post*, pp. 409 and 411, respectively.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 150.

and the capture of Rhodes for which the retention of landing craft in the Mediterranean was essential but that the retention of these landing craft would in no way interfere with the carrying out of Operation BUCCANEER.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that BUCCANEER would not be interfered with provided the date for OVERLORD was put back. The British Chiefs of Staff had prepared a detailed examination of the relationship of OVERLORD, Mediterranean and Aegean operations, and BUCCANEER.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the United States Chiefs of Staff tentatively accepted the British proposals for negotiations with the Soviets. He understood that these proposals implied the capture of the Rimini-Pisa line, the capture of Rhodes and the retention of the 68 landing craft until its capture. He understood that Operation BUCCANEER would not be interfered with and that further discussion would take place on these proposals when the Combined Chiefs of Staff returned to SEXTANT.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that if the capture of Rhodes and Rome and Operation BUCCANEER were carried out, the date of OVERLORD must go back.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he quite understood this point. He was of the opinion that it was essential to do Operation BUCCANEER, for the reasons that firstly, not only were the forces ready but the operation was acceptable to the Chinese; secondly, it was of vital importance to operations in the Pacific; and, thirdly, for political reasons it could not be interfered with.

In the course of a full discussion the following points were made:

a. SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it might be necessary to consider earnestly the possibility of putting off Operation BUCCANEER since by so doing the full weight of our resources could be brought to bear on Germany, thus bringing the war as a whole to an end at the earliest possible date. The matter should be looked at from a purely strategical aspect.

b. SIR CHARLES PORTAL felt that the Russians might well say that not only did they agree with the proposed course of action outlined by the British Chiefs of Staff and tentatively accepted by the United States Chiefs of Staff but also that they required Operation OVERLORD at the earliest possible date. In this case we must surely consider the possibility of putting off Operation BUCCANEER. He did not believe this operation essential to the land campaign in Burma.

c. ADMIRAL KING considered it unsound to bring back landing craft from BUCCANEER. In his view the land campaign in Burma was not complete without Operation BUCCANEER. Our object was to make use of China and her manpower and the delay of a year in achieving this object must most certainly delay the end of the war as a whole.

d. GENERAL MARSHALL stressed the U. S. contribution to the war in Europe. He believed that the suggestion that putting off the Operation BUCCANEER would shorten the war was an overstatement. The

United States Chiefs of Staff were most anxious that BUCCANEER should be undertaken. They had gone far to meet the British Chiefs of Staff views but the postponement of BUCCANEER they could not accept.

e. ADMIRAL LEAHY said he wished it clearly understood that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not in a position to agree to the abandonment of Operation BUCCANEER. This could only be decided by the President and the Prime Minister.

(At this point the Combined Chiefs of Staff continued the meeting in closed session.)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed to the unification of command in the Mediterranean as outlined in C. C. S. 387, and that this unification of command should be made effective forthwith.

b. Tentatively accepted paragraph 6 *b, c, d, e, and f* (modified) of C. C. S. 409 as a basis for discussion with the Soviets, subject to the following understandings and modifications:

(1) That these proposals necessitate a delay in the target date for OVERLORD.

(2) That paragraph 6 *e* includes the capture of Rhodes and the retention of certain landing craft in the Mediterranean.

(3) That in paragraph 6 *f* the words "do everything possible to" in the second line be deleted.

(4) That the United States Chiefs of Staff could not accept the abandonment of the BUCCANEER operation; also that if further discussion should show the postponement of BUCCANEER to be desirable, this would need to be taken up with the President and the Prime Minister.

c. Took note of the memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff on the effect of weather on Operation OVERLORD. (C. C. S. 410).

5. COLLABORATION WITH THE U. S. S. R. (C. C. S. 407)⁸

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted C. C. S. 407, with certain amendments as a basis for the agenda at the forthcoming conference with the U. S. S. R. [The amended paper, in which are incorporated the conclusions on this subject reached at C. C. S. 129th Meeting,⁹ has been published as C. C. S. 407 (Revised).]¹⁰

⁸ Regarding C. C. S. 407, see *post*, p. 426, footnote 1.

⁹ See paragraph 4 *b* of the minutes of the 129th meeting, *ante*, p. 338.

¹⁰ Bracketed sentence appears in the source text. C. C. S. 407 (Revised) is printed *post*, p. 426.

**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL-CHIANG MEETING, NOVEMBER 26, 1943,
4:30 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	CHINA
President Roosevelt Ambassador Harriman	Prime Minister Churchill Foreign Secretary Eden Sir Alexander Cadogan	Generalissimo Chiang Madame Chiang

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 299. According to all reports, the meeting lasted for at least two hours, and it must have begun earlier than 4:30 if Alanbrooke is correct in indicating (p. 57) that the Chiangs were giving a reception in their own villa as early as 5 p. m. on the same afternoon. The Leahy Diary for November 26 says that Churchill and the Chiangs were with Roosevelt "all the afternoon". Elliott Roosevelt (p. 166) states: "The afternoon was given over to a final political conference. The Chiangs, the Prime Minister, Harriman, Eden, and Cadogan were with the President in the garden for some two hours, framing the language of the communiqué . . ."

The Log entry for November 26 states that "A press communiqué announcing the completion of the first phase of the Cairo Conference was agreed upon. . . . For reasons of security, it was also agreed that this communiqué would not be released to the press until after the completion of the forthcoming conference at Teheran." The release of the communiqué was also postponed until Stalin's approval of the text could be obtained at Tehran; see *post*, pp. 449, 566. For drafts of the communiqué, see *post*, pp. 399-404. For the final text of the communiqué and correspondence concerning its release, see *post*, pp. 448-455.

According to *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 65, the conversation also covered the proposed operations in the China-Burma-India theater, in reference to which Chiang is reported as having agreed to every point that he had rejected the day before; see *ante*, p. 359, and *post*, p. 430.

In addition to the subjects mentioned above and those reported as having been discussed at previous Roosevelt-Chiang meetings (see *ante*, pp. 322, 349), certain other subjects apparently were discussed by Roosevelt and Chiang at Cairo in one or more of their several meetings. These subjects and the sources in which they are mentioned are as follows:

The economic situation in China, including currency stabilization, a billion-dollar loan, and the establishment of a Sino-American

Pro - American Empire

Outer Mongolia

C says -

It protects India
as a buffer - when
Japan no longer a threat.

India a free port

C says - obviously does
not want us to say
anything about
India to Russia

China
afraid of British
China will not give up

economic commission: *post*, pp. 441, 804, 845, 861; *United States Relations With China*, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 488, 491, 557; *The Stilwell Papers*, pp. 251-252.

The cost of maintaining American troops in China: *United States Relations With China*, p. 499.

The disposition of Japanese-held islands in the Pacific: *post*, p. 868.

The maintenance of post-war security in the Western Pacific: *post*, p. 868.

The internationalization of the port of Dairen: *post*, pp. 567, 869, 891; *United States Relations With China*, p. 558.

The results of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers: *post*, p. 784.

The general plan for post-war international organization: *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 1944-45 volume, p. 140.

The payment for the cost of the airfields to be constructed at Chengtu: *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 77.

The providing of Lend-Lease equipment for a total of ninety Chinese divisions: *post*, pp. 484, 889-890; *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 64 and 73.

HOPKINS-CHIANG CONVERSATION, NOVEMBER 26, 1943, EVENING, ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Hopkins

CHINA

Generalissimo Chiang
Madame Chiang

Editorial Note

No official record of this conversation has been found. The only reference to the meeting occurs in the notes by John P. Davies on what Hopkins told Stilwell and Davies on December 6. According to the Davies notes, Hopkins said that he had had a three-hour conversation with the Chiangs on the evening before his departure for Tehran. With respect to subjects discussed, Hopkins mentioned only that the Chiangs had raised the question of the return of Outer Mongolia. This question had been brought up at the dinner meeting on November 23, 1943; see *ante*, p. 325.

The Hopkins notes reproduced on the facing page may pertain to this conversation.

6. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

A. CORRESPONDENCE, DRAFTS, AND PROPOSALS¹

J. C. S. FILES

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*²

SECRET

CAIRO, 22 November 1943.

C. C. S. 404

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR "SEXTANT"

1. Agreement as to conference procedure.
2. Over-All Objective; Over-All Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War; Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-All Strategic Concept.
3. European-Mediterranean
 - a. Estimate of the enemy situation.
 - b. Report on the Combined Bomber Offensive.
 - c. Report on anti-U-boat operations.
 - d. Report on status of development of facilities in the Azores, air and naval.
 - e. Readiness report on OVERLORD, RANKIN, and JUPITER.
 - f. Report on Mediterranean operations, including the Middle East.
 - g. Plans for U. S.-British-U. S. S. R. military collaboration.
 - h. Specific operations for the defeat of Germany and her Satellites, 1943-44.
 - i. Policies with respect to military considerations in dealing with neutral, liberated and occupied countries, including agreement as to division of responsibility between the United Nations.
4. Japan
 - a. Estimate of the enemy situation, 1944, Japan (giving consideration to Russian and Chinese intentions).
 - b. Short Term Plan for the defeat of Japan.

¹ See also Grace Tully, *F. D. R., My Boss* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 270, for a personal letter of November 26, 1943, from Roosevelt to Grace Tully referring briefly to his role ("that of peacemaker") at the Conference.

² Presented for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

- c. Report on the general situation in the Southeast Asia Command.
- d. Report on operations in China.
- e. Report on Pacific operations.
- f. Transfer of United Nations efforts to the defeat of Japan upon the defeat of Germany.
- g. Specific operations for the defeat of Japan, 1944, including amphibious operations in Southeast Asia.
5. Relation of resources to plans.
6. Final report to President and Prime Minister.
7. Preparation and approval of any directives arising from conference decisions and of any reports to other Allies.
8. Discussion as to the next conference.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 22 November 1943.

C. C. S. 404/1

SEXTANT AGENDA

1. We have considered the Agenda for SEXTANT proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 404) and while we have no specific objections to the subjects set out in their memorandum, we suggest that a more simple agenda would meet the case.

2. We, therefore, propose that the main subjects for discussion should be as follows:

- I. Reaffirm Over-All Objective, Over-All Strategic Concept and Basic Undertakings
(C. C. S. 319/5, paragraphs 2-5 and paragraphs [paragraph] 6, as subsequently amended by agreement between Combined Chiefs of Staff (see C. C. S. 380/2))¹
- II. Southeast Asia Operations
- III. "Overlord" and the Mediterranean
- IV. The War Against Japan
- V. Progress Reports

¹ C. C. S. 319/5 was adopted at the First Quebec Conference, August 1943, the documentation of which is scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series. Paragraphs 2-5 of C. C. S. 319/5 are verbally identical with paragraphs 2-5 of C. C. S. 380/2, November 6, 1943, *ante*, p. 157. Paragraph 6 differs in the two papers after subpoint *h*. Extracts from, or the whole of, 39 of the paragraphs of C. C. S. 319/5 are printed in Ehrman, vol. v, pp. 1, 8-10, 12-15.

3. Discussion of the above main subjects would include the introduction of most, if not all, of the points put forward in the American agenda. The arrangements for dealing with the detailed subjects would, however, be made from day to day.

4. It will be noted that Southeast Asia operations have been placed second on the list, in view of the intention to bring the Generalissimo and Admiral Mountbatten into the discussions at the earliest stage.

5. It is thought that the Progress Reports should be left to the end of the Conference when the main items have been disposed of. This procedure will not, of course, preclude points being raised for discussion when the Progress Reports are taken.

A. F. BROOKE

C. A. PORTAL

A. B. CUNNINGHAM

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Generalissimo's Chief of Staff (Stilwell)

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 22 November 1943.

C. C. S. 405

ROLE OF CHINA IN DEFEAT OF JAPAN

1. At QUADRANT an outline plan for operations against Japan was presented in Annex "I" to C. C. S. 319/2.¹ These operations culminated in an invasion of Japan some time after 1947.

2. The question at hand which concerns the China Theater is "what operations can be mounted from China which will have the greatest effect on the course of the war in the Pacific?" This question can be answered as follows:

- a. Assist S. E. A. C. in operations against North Burma—Current.
- b. Develop land route to China and improve internal communications—Current.
- c. Continue to train and improve combat effectiveness of Chinese Army—Current.
- d. Initiate intensive bombing of Japan by V. L. R. bombers—Early 1944.
- e. Recapture Canton and Hongkong—November 1944—May 1945.

¹Not printed herein. The documents of the QUADRANT Conference (Quebec, 1943) are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series. A description of the discussions and decisions of the Quebec Conference of 1943 respecting the war against Japan may be found in Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953), in the series *United States Army in World War II*, pp. 357-360, and in Ehrman, vol. v, pp. 10 ff.

f. Carry out intensive bombing of Formosa and P[hilippine] I[slands], deny use of Straits of Formosa and South China Sea to Japan and furnish land-based air support to any U.S. Navy activities in these areas—October 1944—

g. Attack Formosa if required—May 1945–November 1945.

h. Offensive operations towards Shanghai—November 1945.

The above operations are tactically and logistically feasible. The cost is low. There is no competition with other theaters for specialized equipment and there is no conflict with operations projected by other theaters. These operations will:

- (1) *Provide greatest aid possible to other theaters, and*
- (2) *Cut down "QUADRANT" time table for final defeat of Japan by one to two years.*

3. Requirements

a. One U. S. Infantry Division in India by March 1944. Two additional divisions about a month apart thereafter. (These to be definitely earmarked for China Theater.)

b. Continuation of supply program from U. S. for equipping Chinese troops.

c. Setting up India as a base for both China and Southeast Asia Theaters. All U. S. Troops now in India except those necessary for operation of the Communication Zone to be moved to China after recapture of North Burma.

740.0011 PW 1939/12-3143

*Memorandum by Lieutenant General Stilwell's Political Adviser
(Davies)*¹

[CAIRO, November 22(?), 1943.]

THE CHINA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA THEATERS: SOME POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The mission of the South East Asia Command is to defeat the enemy in and presumably occupy former British and Dutch colonies and Thailand. French Indochina may later be included.

In so far as we participate in SEAC operations, we become involved in the politically explosive colonial problems of the British, Dutch

¹ Apparently prepared for use by Roosevelt. The source text is a copy sent by Davies to Ballantine at Washington and submitted by Ballantine to Hull on December 31, 1943, for his information.

and possibly French. In so doing, we compromise ourselves not only with the colonial peoples of Asia but also the free peoples of Asia, including the Chinese. Domestically, our Government lays itself open to public criticism—"why should American boys die to recreate the colonial empires of the British and their Dutch and French satellites?" Finally, more Anglo-American misunderstanding and friction is likely to arise out of our participation in SEAC than out of any other theater.

By concentrating our Asiatic effort on operations in and from China we keep to the minimum our involvement in colonial imperialism. We engage in a cause which is popular with Asiatics and the American public. We avoid the mutual mistrust and recrimination over the colonial question, potentially so inimical to harmonious Anglo-American relations.

General Stilwell has submitted a plan² for increased American effort in the China theater. It envisages, among other things, the recapture of Canton, Hong Kong and Shanghai and a possible attack on Formosa. He proposes to use American and Chinese forces to accomplish this. The Chinese welcome this plan. It gives them something to fight for. They have slight interest in entering Burma, Thailand and French Indochina for only the territorial benefit of the British and the French. But their own territory and Formosa (which they claim) provide a real incentive.

The Chinese Army is great in size. But it is relatively untrained and generally corrupt. However much of the Generalissimo and his Army may in principle wish to assume the offensive, they cannot effectively do so excepting under firm American guidance. American leadership can concretely be exercised only as General Stilwell is given bargaining power, for the Chinese are sharp, practical traders. All aid and concessions to China must therefore be made in consultation with and through General Stilwell.

It is not proposed that with a concentration of effort on the China theater we should forthwith turn our backs on SEAC. In cooperation with SEAC we need to retake North Burma immediately and so reopen a land route to China. But after the recapture of North Burma there comes a parting of the ways.

The British will wish to throw their main weight southward for the repossession of colonial empire. Our main interest in Asia will lie to the East from whence we can strike directly and in coordination with other American offensives at the center of Japan's new Empire.

² *Supra.*

J. C. S. Files

Note by the Secretaries of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 22 November 1943.

J. C. S. 606

COLLABORATION WITH THE U. S. S. R.

The following paragraph, from a radio from General Deane to General Marshall, is submitted by General Marshall to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration:

"I suggest that the Joint Chiefs of Staff put the Russians on the defensive at once by having some request to make of the Russians. I think it is important that we are not put in a position of doing all the explaining. You might include the following subjects: built [*sic*] bases; improved communications and interchange of weather; shuttle bomber bases, and coordination of timing reference OVERLORD."

F. B. ROYAL

A. J. MCFARLAND

Joint Secretariat

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET

CAIRO, 22 November 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

I have arrived in Cairo this morning and begin [*begun?*] discussions with the Prime Minister. Conferences will follow with the Generalissimo by the end of the week. He will thereupon return to China. The Prime Minister and I with our senior staff officers can then proceed to Teheran to meet you, Mr. Molotov and your staff officers. If it suits your convenience I could arrive the afternoon of November 29. I am prepared to remain for two to four days depending upon how long you can find it possible to be away from your compelling responsibilities. I would be grateful if you would telegraph me what day you wish to set for our meeting and how long you can stay. I realize that bad weather sometimes causes delays in travel from Moscow to Teheran at this time of the year and therefore would appreciate your keeping me advised of your plans.

I am informed that your Embassy and the British Embassy in Teheran are situated close to each other whereas my Legation is some

¹ Sent by Harriman at Cairo to Spalding at Moscow, via Navy channels, for delivery to Stalin, with the suggestion that the reply be sent via Spalding to Harriman. Stalin's reply is printed *post*, p. 415.

distance away. I am advised that all three of us would be taking unnecessary risks by driving to and from our meetings if we were staying so far apart from each other.

Where do you think we should live?

I look forward to our talks with keen anticipation.

ROOSEVELT

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Soviet
Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Molotov)* ¹

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 22 November 1943.

The British and ourselves are sending representatives from Cairo to Teheran tomorrow, November 23, to make the physical arrangements for the Conference including the living quarters and security in all details. It would be helpful if you would advise our Commanding General in Teheran, General Con[n]olly, what representative of the Soviet Government he should get in touch with to coordinate our planning with yours. I would be grateful if you would also cable me in Cairo that this has been arranged.

I had a most hospitable welcome and interesting afternoon during our unexpected stop in Stalingrad ² for which I am very grateful.

I look forward to seeing you. Regards.

¹ Sent to Spalding at Moscow, via Navy channels, for delivery to Molotov, with the suggestion that Molotov's reply be sent via Spalding. Molotov's reply is printed *post*, p. 424.

² The plane carrying Harriman and others from Moscow to Cairo developed engine trouble and made an emergency landing at Stalingrad. See Deane, p. 35.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President ¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 22, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull:

Steinhardt reports Turkish Government has now made official reply to Eden's recent proposals,² summarized as follows:

1) Turkey does not share British opinion that war between Turkey and Germany would not result from Turkey's granting air bases, and Turkey is consequently unwilling to do so.

¹ Presumably sent via military channels.

² See Kelley's telegram 1844 of November 10, 1943, *ante*, p. 174.

2) Turkey believes she should take effective part in war on Allied side.

3) However, the British have not supplied indispensable minimum arms promised by Churchill at Adana, nor has German strength deteriorated to extent contemplated at Adana before Turkey would be asked to come in.

4) Consequently, Turkey's coastal cities, communications, military bases, and industries would be promptly destroyed and Turkey would become liability instead of asset.

5) Moreover, Eden's proposals would leave Turkey as isolated belligerent, since they do not provide for collaboration of Turkey in action undertaken by Great Britain as contemplated in Anglo-Turk Alliance.

6) Thus, demand that Turkey enter war before end of year would entail sacrifices beyond Turkey's material capacity and inconsonant with Turkish Government's elementary duty toward the people.

Steinhardt also reports from reliable Turkish sources that:

1) Von Papen recently informed Turkish Government cession of even one Turkish air base would lead to immediate war declaration by Germany and Bulgaria with disastrous consequences for Turkey.

2) Bulgaria has decided on active and effective cooperation with Germany in event of Turkish concessions to Allies, agreeing to immediate joint attack to occupy Thrace and Straits within three days, meanwhile destroying Istanbul from air and paralyzing Turkish communications in order to make prompt Allied assistance impossible.

Helsinki reports November 19 that it is clear that the Finnish Government as a result of intense German pressure, and despondency following Moscow Declaration ³ has decided to continue in more strict collaboration with Germany.

The Chargé at Lisbon ⁴ has been unable to arrange an interview with the Prime Minister ⁵ before November 22.⁶ The Chargé has learned that the Portuguese apparently do not wish to be consulted or informed regarding the use of facilities at Horta and Teceria [*Terceira?*] by United Nations' forces, since they consider this to be a matter entirely between the British and the Americans.⁷ The Chargé intends to ask Salazar to confirm this position particularly as it applies to the use of American engineering personnel.

I assume that the British are keeping you informed on developments in Lebanese crisis.⁸ We have been supporting the British from

³ The communiqué and declarations issued on November 1, 1943, at the Moscow Conference are printed in *Decade*, pp. 9-14.

⁴ George F. Kennan.

⁵ Antonio de Oliveira Salazar.

⁶ Kennan was to deliver to Salazar Roosevelt's letter of November 4, 1943, printed in *F. D. R., His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*, vol. II, p. 1466.

⁷ See *ante*, p. 260.

⁸ See *ante*, p. 84, footnote 2.

the beginning. Murphy informs us the question of authorizing Catroux to order recall Helleu approved by Committee by vote of 12 to 3. Three dissenting members were de Gaulle, Pleven and Diethelm.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

Hopkins Papers

*United States Delegation Memorandum*¹

CAIRO, November 23, 1943.

COMMENTS ON REPORTS THAT THE GENERALISSIMO IS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD HIS REGIME AND ITS INTENTION TO SUPPORT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

In Moscow there are definite indications that the Soviet Government:

1. In the post war period wants peace within China and a strong central government,
 2. Recognizes that this objective can be obtained only through the Generalissimo,
 3. Will insist on a more liberal policy based on democratic principles and improvement in social conditions,
 4. Desires some solution of the Chinese communist problem either by the Generalissimo's acceptance of them as an independent political² party or by bringing them into the Government in some manner,
 5. Does not have ambitions in respect to Chinese territory in general.
- This view is supported by their recent withdrawal from the Province of Sinkiang. The recognition of Outer Mongolia's independence was for military protection against the Japanese advance. There is no indication yet as to the Soviet Government's attitude regarding the question of a warm water port, although it would be consistent for them to agree to the independence of Korea under some type of trusteeship in which the four great powers would participate.

The Chinese Ambassador in Moscow³ has expressed opinions along these lines.⁴

¹The author of this memorandum was presumably Hopkins. Harriman indicated to the editors in 1956 that Hopkins had handed the paper to him to read; that he had added the sentence at the end; and that he had returned it to Hopkins (023.1/5-256).

²The word "political" is a handwritten interlinear addition.

³Foo Ping-sheung.

⁴The final sentence was added in handwriting by Harriman.

Hopkins Papers

The President to the President's Personal Representative (Hurley)

[CAIRO,] 23 November 1943.

MY DEAR GENERAL HURLEY: You are directed to proceed to Tehran in Iran for the accomplishment of a mission on the conditions outlined in the Secretary of State's message to you dated at Washington, November 5, 1943, as modified by the Secretary of State's message to you dated at Washington November 19, 1943.¹

As my personal representative you are also directed to perform additional duties, the nature and the object of which I have outlined to you personally.²

Yours very sincerely,

[No signature indicated]

¹ The messages under reference authorized Hurley to proceed to Iran for the purpose of coordinating the activities of the several American agencies operating in Iran and of effecting closer cooperation between the American, British, Soviet, and Iranian agencies in that country (123 Hurley, Patrick J./119).

² The additional duties which Hurley was asked to perform apparently related to the selection of the quarters in which Roosevelt would reside while in Tehran; see *post*, pp. 439-440.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 23 November 1943.

C. C. S. 401/1

V. L. R. AIRFIELDS (B-29) IN THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA AREA

1. As the United States Chiefs of Staff will be aware, the President has already telegraphed to the Prime Minister with regard to the provision of suitable airdromes in India and China for the operation of B-29 aircraft against Japan in the spring of 1944.¹ The Prime Minister has instructed the Commander in Chief, India, to render every possible assistance in the construction of the four air bases in India and has so informed the President. An examination of the project has been undertaken and we are satisfied that the difficulties involved, including the movement of the extra tonnage required through the port of Calcutta, can be overcome.

2. We therefore accept the recommendations of the United States Chiefs of Staff contained in paragraph 7 of C. C. S. 401² and are issuing the necessary instructions to the British authorities concerned.

¹ See Roosevelt's telegram to Churchill, November 10, 1943, *ante*, p. 172.

² See *ante*, p. 187.

3. If the necessary work in India is to be completed in time, it is essential that the United States units and equipment required should arrive in Calcutta by 15 January; otherwise the work will not be completed by 1 April and in fact would have to be stopped to allow resources temporarily diverted owing to airfield construction to be sent through to Ledo.

Hopkins Papers

*The Prime Minister's Private Secretary (Martin) to the President's
Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

SECRET

[CAIRO,] November 23, 1943.

MR. HOPKINS. (Private)

Colonel Warden¹ asked me to send you this telegram to see. Could you please let me have it back.²

J. M. MARTIN

[Enclosure]

*The British Minister in Saudi Arabia (Jordan) to the British
Foreign Office*

SECRET

JEDDA, 15 November 1943.

War Cabinet Distribution—Repeated to Minister of State Cairo.³

475. My telegram No. 455.⁴

Ibn Saud has sent me a message from Mecca to the effect that United States representative in Jedda asked him the following questions on November 13th.

1) Has Saudi Arabian Government asked His Majesty's Government for arms?

2) If so when did they make their request to His Majesty's Government?

3) What arms did Saudi Arabian Government ask for?

4) Has anything been promised by His Majesty's Government?

5) What has arrived?

6) Are arms being supplied by His Majesty's Government as a gift or against payment?

¹ Churchill.

² There is no evidence of a written reply from Hopkins to Martin. Hopkins did however, obtain the comments of the American Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) on the enclosed telegram from the British Minister. See *post*, p. 447.

³ Richard Casey.

⁴ Not found in United States files.

7) Did His Majesty's Government offer to supply arms or did the question arise out of a demand from Saudi Arabian Government?

2. Ibn Saud informed my United States colleague that His Majesty's Government had promised to supply 50 light reconnaissance cars but that none had arrived to date. He did not know if payment was expected or whether they were being supplied under Lease Lend in accordance with the list of Saudi Arabian arms requirements submitted to His Majesty's Government by Saudi Arabian representative in London for supply under Lease Lend.

3. I feel my United States colleague's action in putting these questions to Ibn Saud is unfortunate as it would appear to show 1) a lack of collaboration between His Majesty's Government and United States on this question and 2) United States distrust of any information given them by His Majesty's Government.

4. I venture to suggest that we should come to some agreement with United States over the quantities of war material to be supplied to Saudi Arabian Government as soon as possible and inform Ibn Saud accordingly.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 23 November 1943.

C. C. S. 406

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF—UNITED CHIEFS OF STAFF

Reference: CCS 127th Meeting, Item 4¹

1. The discussion in the C. C. S. 127th Meeting concerning the Chinese military representatives meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff was the first of a series of such problems which will arise, particularly as our cooperation with the Soviets and Chinese develops. It would seem highly desirable to find a solution which will permanently (a) maintain the exclusive American-British character of the Combined Chiefs of Staff while avoiding these embarrassing complications and (b) furnish adequate and satisfactory machinery for discussions by the principal Allies at the Chiefs of Staff level, as military problems arise or political considerations make such meetings desirable.

2. As a solution it is suggested:

a. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff be recognized as an exclusive American and British Body, and

¹ See *ante*, p. 305.

b. That a "United Chiefs of Staff" be set up at the Chiefs of Staff level to include the principal Allies—that is, for the present, the four "Moscow" powers.²

3. The United Chiefs of Staff would function only when necessity arose, and would provide for attendance either by all members or by only those concerned in the problems to be discussed. This arrangement would give an "out" to China or Russia as the case might be. The proposed United Chiefs of Staff should consist of a single representative of the Chiefs of Staff of each nation. This representative would not necessarily have to be the same official at all meetings. Our Allies could not complain of being left out of Combined Chiefs of Staff discussion, since in theory, at least, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be the lesser of the two bodies.

4. Such a "United Chiefs of Staff" should be considered as a flexible organization designed to meet situations as they develop, including possible inclusion of other Allies at a later date, on the same basis of participation when concerned.

² Parties to the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed at the Moscow Conference on October 30, 1943, and issued November 1, 1943, i. e., the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China; *Decade*, p. 11.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The President to the Director of War Mobilization (Byrnes) ¹

URGENT

23 NOVEMBER 1943.

Extremely important and urgent that I know at once whether the present schedules for production and completion of landing craft can be increased during January, February, March, April and May. On the assumption that landing craft takes precedence over all other munitions of war will you let me know how many additional landing craft by types can be delivered during the months of January, February, March, April and May? List each month separately. Call conference of all interested departments. Very urgent.²

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to Mathewson at the White House for delivery to Byrnes. Mathewson was instructed to send copies of the message to Horne and to Nelson.

² For an account of Byrnes' action on this matter and for a facsimile of a private letter of November 23, 1943, from Roosevelt to Byrnes, see James F. Byrnes, *All In One Lifetime* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), pp. 202-203.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull:

As the Russian Army approaches the Polish frontier the Polish Government is showing its extreme anxiety over the future of Poland and I believe that I should send you a rather full summary of developments.

The following are the principal points of a confidential memorandum from the Polish Premier to you which has been handed to me by the Polish Ambassador:²

The Prime Minister referred to the Polish Government's memorandum of October 6³ which among other things expressed the hope that normal Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations could be restored in order that the Polish and Soviet Governments could then endeavor to settle their mutual problems and asked for British-American guarantees of the independence and integrity of Polish territory as well as the security of its inhabitants. To assure this the October 6 memorandum made the impractical suggestion that American-British troops should be stationed in Poland to prevent friction and possible reprisals. That memorandum indicated that if the Soviet Government should openly attempt to communize Poland after its armies had occupied Polish territory this might cause the Polish population as an act of desperation to retaliate in self defense.

The latest memorandum dated November 18 appeals to you "to intervene with Marshal Stalin with a view to restoring Polish-Soviet relations, safeguarding the interests of the Polish State and the life and property of its citizens after the Soviet troops have entered Poland."

The memorandum asserts that "the unwillingness of the Polish Government to enter into discussions on frontier questions is based on the following considerations:"

1. Poland has never given up the fight against Germany since 1939 and is fully entitled to emerge from the war without reduction of territory.

2. Soviet claims to Eastern Poland comprises half of total Polish territory and contain important centers of Polish national life.

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.

² The memorandum from the Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) was dated November 18, 1943, and the one from the Polish Premier (Mikołajczyk) was dated November 16, 1943 (760.61/2120). For a similar memorandum dated November 16, 1943, from Mikołajczyk to Churchill, see Stanisław Mikołajczyk, *The Rape of Poland* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1948), p. 267.

³ Not printed herein.

The memorandum continues: "The Polish Government could not see their way to enter into a discussion on the subject of territorial concessions above all for the reason that such a discussion in the absence of effective guarantees of Poland's independence and security on the part of the United States and Great Britain would be sure to lead to ever new demands. The attribution to Poland of East Prussia, Danzig, Opole, Silesia and the straightening and shortening of the Polish Western frontier are in any case dictated by the need to provide for the stability of future peace, the disarmament of Germany and the security of Poland and other countries of Central Europe. The transfer to Poland of these territories cannot therefore be fairly treated as an object of compensation for the cession to the USSR of Eastern Poland which for reasons adduced above does by no means represent to the USSR a value comparable to that which it has for Poland. The attempt made to prejudice the fate of Polish Eastern territories by means of a popular vote organized under Soviet occupation by the occupying authorities is without any value either political or legal. It would be equally impossible to obtain a genuine expression of the will of the population inhabiting these territories in view of the ruthless methods applied there today and those which have been applied in the past by consecutive occupants."

The memorandum then states that "a rising in Poland against Germany is being planned to break out at a moment mutually agreed upon with our Allies either before or at the very moment of the entry of Soviet troops into Poland.

"In accordance with the principles adopted in Quebec,⁴ the Polish Government is entitled to exert sovereign authority over Polish lands as they are liberated from the enemy. Consequently, in case the entry

⁴ The reference here is apparently to a proposed joint statement regarding liberated areas, the text of which was agreed upon by Roosevelt and Churchill at a meeting on August 22, 1943, during the First Quebec Conference. It was decided at that meeting that the statement would first be communicated to the Soviet and Chinese Governments and the refugee governments directly concerned, with a view to its eventual publication on or about September 15. The statement was duly transmitted to the Soviet and Chinese Governments; but on September 11 the Department informed Biddle, in London, that at the request of the British Government the date for communication of the statement to the refugee governments had been postponed. On September 15 the Department instructed the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) and the Chargé in China (Atcheson) to inform the respective Governments that issuance of the statement had been postponed and that it should continue to be regarded as confidential. On September 28 Campbell, of the British Embassy, stated to Dunn, of the Department of State, his Government's view that the time and appropriateness for the issuance of the statement had passed and its desire that the statement as agreed upon at Quebec be "definitely cancelled". Dunn thereupon agreed to the cancellation. The documents available do not indicate from what source the Polish Government learned of the proposed statement. (800.0146/155½, 159a, 160, 160a, 161, 161a, 163a, 164, 165, 170, 171a, 209, 228)

of Soviet troops into Poland takes place after the reestablishment of Polish-Soviet relations, the Polish Government would be anxious, as it has already informed the American Government, to return immediately to Poland together with the Commander-in-Chief, and to co-operate there in the further struggle against Germany.

"The entry of Soviet troops on Polish territory without previous resumption of Polish-Soviet relations would force the Polish Government to undertake political action against the violation of Polish sovereignty while the Polish local administration and army in Poland would have to continue to work underground. In that case the Polish Government foresee the use of measures of self-defence wherever such measures are rendered indispensable by Soviet methods of terror and extermination of Polish citizens."

Asserting that the Moscow Conference did not bring the question of resumption of Polish-Soviet relations nearer to a satisfactory solution, the memorandum states that the Polish Government has reason "to fear that in present conditions the life and property of Polish citizens may be exposed to danger after the entry of Soviet troops into Poland and the imposing on the country of Soviet administration. In that case desperate reaction of the Polish community may be expected following the violation of the principle adopted in Quebec assuring to the United Nations their liberty and their own administration."

The memorandum further indicates that the Polish Government does not believe that the principles applied to Italy as adopted at the Moscow Conference ⁵ would be satisfactory for Poland which is not an enemy country but a member of the United Nations. Moreover, it is stated that the presence of a few American and British liaison officers in Poland would not assure proper safeguards in the administration of the territory occupied by the Red Army.

When the Ambassador handed me the above memorandum he also delivered a personal message to you from the Polish Prime Minister stating that he is anxious to submit to you personally and verbally certain alternatives for the solution of existing difficulties and would be grateful for the opportunity of doing so. He added "I am ready to undertake the necessary journey at any time and in complete secrecy."

In presenting the Polish Prime Minister's request to see you the Ambassador indicated that Mikolajczyk wished to join you and Mr. Churchill to which I replied that I did not believe it would be possible to arrange this since you would be busily engaged in military matters of great urgency.

Subsequent to this Ambassador Biddle telegraphed on November 20 that Mikolajczyk and the Polish Foreign Minister had insisted that

⁵ For the Declaration regarding Italy, November 1, 1943, see *Decade*, p. 12.

they should be consulted in advance concerning any decisions that might be taken involving Polish interests.

The Poles indicated that decisions taken without full consultation with the Polish Government upon which the underground in Poland stakes its hope would undoubtedly lead to a serious crisis in that quarter. Furthermore, it would create a crisis in Polish circles in England, the Middle East, and might have "serious repercussions among Americans of Polish origin." Mikolajczyk interjected that even a man condemned to death was granted a last word before the court.

The Polish Foreign Minister referred to a formula which Mr. Eden, he said, is considering which envisaged dividing Poland into regions in which respectively the military administration of the "liberating forces" and the Polish Government might function. He added that it was logical that whatever formulae were advanced would meet with counter proposals and the Polish Government considered it of the utmost importance that its representatives be on hand during these discussions.

In pressing for arrangements so that he could meet you Mikolajczyk said that there were things he could present orally but could not put in writing at this time.

On the basis of the foregoing and the extremely agitated state of mind of the Polish Ambassador here it is apparent that the Polish Government feels that it is in a desperate position. This may well lead to unfortunate public outbursts. In an effort to calm the Ambassador I made it clear to him that I had emphasized at Moscow my friendly and earnest interest in his country and had urged Molotov to find a basis for reestablishing diplomatic relations with Poland; that once these relations were restored ways and means could be found to work out and adjust their differences. I told the Ambassador that as a friend of Poland I would continue to watch every opportunity to be of service to both Governments.

I also pointed out to the Ambassador that I regretted to find on my return Polish attacks on the Four-Nation Declaration when this Declaration means everything to the future of Poland. I also indicated my regret at shortsighted Polish agitation in this country of a thoroughly unfriendly nature which has manifested itself in other ways than condemning the Four-Nation Declaration.

We are making every effort here and through Biddle in London to convince the Poles, official and unofficial, that they must take a calmer outlook and not prejudice their case by undue public agitation regarding our policies.

With the approach of the Red Army to former Polish territory it would appear that every friendly opportunity should be taken to

bring about a resumption of Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations. If this is not possible at the moment, I believe we should exert all our influence to persuade the Polish Government to give instructions to its underground army to launch at the opportune moment a full-fledged attack on the Germans behind their lines and to assist the Red Army in its battle. The Polish Government should realize that if this is achieved the British and ourselves will be in a better position to convince the Soviet Government of the Polish Government's desire to make a material contribution to the shortening of the war, and to collaborate with the other United Nations after the war in working for the establishment of an organization of peace-loving nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

HULL

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

[WASHINGTON,] November 23, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull

Marshal Stalin, who is at the front, states that he will arrive not later than the 28th or 29th at the appointed place.²

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels. The message from Stalin had been incorporated in a note dated November 22, 1943, from Molotov to Hamilton, who transmitted it the same day to the Department in telegram 2013, signed Harriman (811.001 Roosevelt, F. D./9551½).

² i. e., Tehran.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

[WASHINGTON,] November 23, 1943.

SECRET

For the President from Secretary Hull :

Lisbon reports that an interview with Salazar regarding Azores facilities has been fixed for November 23, 1943, 5:00 p. m. The British Ambassador² has received instructions to support approach to Portuguese. The Chargé³ plans to ask Salazar to confirm that Portuguese

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels. The telegram was actually sent at 2:15 a. m. on November 24, 1943, but retained the date of November 23.

² Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell.

³ George F. Kennan.

Government does not object to use by American forces of Horta and Terceira facilities or to participation by United States engineering units in improvement of these facilities. The Chargé intends at the same interview, informally to sound out Salazar regarding desire United States Army and Navy for the further facilities required.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO,] November 24, 1943.

The Lebanon matter looks better this morning but Prime Minister is being very firm and Eden arrives here tonight Wednesday.

The conferences are going well and we will finish matters with the Generalissimo in two or three days. He will then return home and we start on next leg of our trip.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to Washington via military channels and forwarded by the White House Map Room to the Department of State.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt)*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 24 November 1943.

From the President to Ambassador Steinhardt, Ankara, Turkey. Personal and secret.

Our next plans have been advanced. Hope to see you in Cairo in about a week,² and in regard to your number one³ will advise you in a day or two.

¹ Sent to Washington via military channels, forwarded by the White House Map Room to the Department of State, and relayed by the Department to the Embassy at Ankara (740.0011 EW 1939/32811b).

² Steinhardt arrived in Cairo at 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the same day. See the Log, *ante*, p. 297; see also *ante*, p. 100.

³ President İnönü of Turkey. For subsequent correspondence regarding arrangements for İnönü to come to Cairo, see *post*, pp. 633, 662.

Hopkins Papers

*Memoranda by the Chinese Government*¹

[CAIRO, November 24, 1943.]

ESTABLISHMENT OF A FOUR-POWER COUNCIL OR A COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

I. Pending the formation of a Council of the United Nations, the United States, Great Britain, the U. S. S. R., and China should establish at the earliest practicable date a Four-Power Council for the discussion of questions connected with the Four-Power Declaration.²

II. The Council shall maintain a Permanent Standing Committee in Washington. The Committee may, as occasion arises, hold meetings in London, Chungking, or Moscow.

III. The Council is charged with the duty of organizing a Council of the United Nations.

IV. As regards the organization of the Council of the United Nations, the Chinese Government endorses the proposed scheme of the Government of the United States: viz., Eleven of the United Nations shall form an executive body, with the United States, Great Britain, the U. S. S. R., and China acting as a Presidium.³

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DURING THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION

I. The United States, Great Britain, the U. S. S. R., and China should establish an Inter-Allied Military Technical Commission to consider all military questions concerning the organization and maintenance of international security.

II. For the successful organization and maintenance of international security, a certain number of International Naval and Air Bases will be established. Such Bases should be located at strategic points all over the world, the selection of which should be based upon the opinion of experts and subject to the consent of the States wherein such Bases are to be situated.

¹ Handed by Wang to Hopkins by direction of Chiang, for transmission to Roosevelt—not as formal proposals but as an indication of the problems which, the Chinese felt, might suitably be discussed, and “as reference material for the committee responsible for the drafting of the communiqué”. This footnote is based on, and the quoted words are taken from, a letter of May 21, 1957, from the Chinese Ambassador at Washington (Tong) to the Historical Office, Department of State (023.1/5-2157). It does not appear that any committee was appointed to draft the communiqué; see *post*, pp. 399-404.

² For the text of the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed at the Moscow Conference on October 30, 1943, and issued November 1, 1943, see *Decade*, p. 11.

³ The “proposed scheme” was apparently a reflection of the Draft Constitution of International Organization, dated July 14, 1943; see Notter, p. 473.

EUROPEAN QUESTIONS AND THE SURRENDER OF GERMANY

Any discussion on European questions among the United Nations should be communicated forthwith to the Chinese Government. China should be invited to participate in any decision concerning the surrender of Germany.

QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE FAR EAST

I. *Formation of a Far Eastern Committee.*

China, Great Britain, and the United States should set up a Far Eastern Committee to facilitate joint consultation on political problems arising from the progress of the war in the Far East. The participation of the U. S. S. R. in this Committee is welcomed at any time.

II. *Creation of a Unified Command.*

With a view to unifying the strategy and direction of the war of the United Nations against the enemy in the Far East, the existing Anglo-American Council of Chiefs-of-Staff in Washington should be enlarged to be a tripartite council, that is, a Council of Chiefs-of-Staff of China, the United States, and Great Britain; or in the alternative, a Sino-American Council of Chiefs-of-Staff should be established for the direction of the Chinese and American forces in the Far East.

III. *Administration of Enemy Territory and Enemy-held Territories following Allied Occupation.*

(A) On the occupation of the territory of the enemy, the army of occupation shall exercise the powers of military and civil administration. However, if the army of occupation should be neither Chinese nor British nor American, then all political problems concerning the said territory shall be settled by a specially created Joint Council, wherein China, Great Britain, and the United States, even though without an army in the said territory, shall fully participate for the control of the said territory.

(B) On the liberation of any part of the territory of China, Great Britain, or the United States, the powers of military administration shall be exercised by the army of occupation; and the powers of civil administration, by the State which rightfully has sovereignty over the territory in question. Matters touching on both the military and the civil administration shall be settled by consultation between the army of occupation and the civil administrative organ of the said State.

(C) On the liberation of any part of the territory of other United Nations, the powers of military administration shall be exercised by

the army of occupation; and the powers of civil administration, by the State which rightfully has sovereignty over the territory in question, subject, however, to the control of the army of occupation. (In other words, China endorses the proposed scheme of Great Britain and the United States regarding the administration of liberated territories in Europe.⁴)

IV. *Settlement with Japan upon Her Defeat.*

(A) China, Great Britain, and the United States should agree upon certain guiding principles for the treatment of Japan after her defeat—principles similar to those adopted by the Tripartite Conference in Moscow regarding the treatment of defeated Italy.

(B) China, Great Britain, and the United States should agree upon a program for the punishment of the leaders in Japan responsible for the war and of the officers and men of the Japanese armed forces responsible for the atrocities perpetrated during the war,—a program similar to the one adopted by the Tripartite Conference in Moscow for the punishment of Nazi war criminals.⁵

(C) China, Great Britain, and the United States should agree to recognize the independence of Korea after the war. The adherence of the U. S. S. R. to this agreement for the recognition of Korea's independence is welcomed at any time.

(D) Japan shall restore to China all the territories she has taken from China since September 18, 1931. Japan shall also return Dairen and Port Arthur, and Formosa and the Pescadores Islands to China.

(E) For the settlement of questions relating to territories in the Pacific, China, Great Britain, and the United States should agree upon certain basic principles and also establish a Committee of Experts to make recommendations for the settlement of these questions. If such a Committee is not established, its work shall be undertaken by the projected Far Eastern Committee.

(F) All Japanese property in China, private as well as public, and the Japanese mercantile fleet shall be taken over by the Chinese Government as indemnification in part for the losses sustained by the Chinese Government and people in the war. For the maintenance of peace in the Far East after the war, Japan's ammunition and war materials, her war vessels and her aircraft, which may still remain at the end of hostilities, shall be placed at the disposal of the Joint Council of Chiefs-of-Staff of China, the United States, and Great Britain, or in the alternative, of the projected Far Eastern Committee.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 382, footnote 4.

⁵ Declaration of German Atrocities, November 1, 1943; *Decade*, p. 13.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 24 November 1943.

C. C. S. 406/1

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF—UNITED CHIEFS OF STAFF

We have studied the question of the possible formation of a United Chiefs of Staff organization and, alternatively, of the possible representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff of powers other than the U. S. and the British.¹ We appreciate, moreover, the need for us all to have our minds made up on this subject, in view of the increasing pressure that is likely in the future. Our views are as follows:

a. The chief need is that the best possible coordination of our military effort with that of the Russians and of the Chinese should be ensured. We feel strongly that, whereas the integration of U. S. and British forces is complete and worldwide, this is in no way the case with regard to the Russians or the Chinese, whose outlook, indeed, is largely confined to their own particular main front. We feel, therefore, that no change whatever should be made in the present Combined Chiefs of Staff standing organization, and that it should remain essentially U. S.-British.

b. We have considered whether there should be any other organization, such as a United Chiefs of Staff, and have come to the conclusion that it would not be desirable to establish any form of *standing* machinery. Relations of such a body to the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be very difficult. It might even claim to be the more representative body, and therefore to exercise jurisdiction over the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The representatives of such a body would not have the authority to make big decisions, and in consequence, such an organization could serve no useful purpose, excepting as a means of improving liaison. This could be done better by improving the arrangements already existing in Washington, London, Moscow and Chungking.

c. Our final conclusion, therefore, is that the best way of ensuring inter-Allied coordination and at the same time meeting the Russian and Chinese susceptibilities, is to ensure that whenever the Combined Chiefs of Staff meet for a big conference such as *SEXTANT*, they should be invited to attend to discuss the military problems with which they are concerned, as has been done on the present occasion.

¹ See C. C. S. 406, *ante*, p. 379.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 24 November 1943.

C. C. S. 308/7

BOUNDARIES OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

1. The Generalissimo has indicated his objection to the boundaries of the Southeast Asia Command proposed at QUADRANT¹ and in lieu thereof, after conferences with Admiral Mountbatten and Lieutenant General Somervell, has indicated his views as follows:

The Generalissimo approves wholeheartedly unity of command under Mountbatten for the Burma campaign. Under existing circumstances he feels that the inclusion of Thailand and Indochina in the Southeast Asia Theater would not be practicable and would deter rather than further the success of any project designed to defeat Japan. He cites as his reasons for this belief the effect which a change of boundary would have on the Chinese people, on Chinese troops, on the people of Thailand and Indochina and on the Japanese. The Chinese people and army are aware that those countries were included in the China Theater of War and that now to make the change would strike a blow at their morale which would affect the conduct of the coming operations and attitude of the people and troops towards the war. This is borne out by the effect of the announcement in the British press that such a change was contemplated. This caused repercussions involving necessity for the Chinese news agency to deny the statements. Japanese propaganda has been directed to convincing people of Indochina and Thailand that the British intended to hold those countries after the war. A change in boundaries at this time would tend to convince people that Japanese were correct and thus incur hostility to our cause and lastly the change would permit Japanese propaganda in China to be more successful in creating a breach in present happy British, American, and Chinese relations.

The China Theater comprises Thailand, Indochina, and the whole of China. As the war develops, the scope of operations of the United Nations' Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Theater newly created, besides Burma and Malaya, may involve Thailand and Indochina. In order to enable the two theaters to cooperate closely and

¹ See Ehrman, vol. v, pp. 135 ff., and *post*, pp. 886-887.

satisfactorily, the Generalissimo deems advisable to reach the following arrangements in advance:

a. When the time comes for two theaters to launch assaults upon the enemy in Thailand and Indochina, the Chinese troops will attack from the north, and the troops under the command of the Southeast Asia Theater, Mountbatten, are expected to make full use of facilities afforded by the ports and air bases under its control and attack from the south. If the troops are landed in those countries, the boundaries between the two theaters are to be decided at the time in accordance with the progress of advances the respective forces made.

b. All matters of political nature that arise during operations will be dealt with at a Chinese-British-American committee which is to be located in the headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the China Theater.

2. Admiral Mountbatten has accepted the suggestions of the Generalissimo insofar as the boundaries are concerned but objects to the political commission.

3. The United States Chiefs of Staff and the President have approved the proposal of the Generalissimo as it stands and recommend British acceptance of his proposals.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull

You will recall that just prior to my departure for Moscow you approved a paper entitled "Civil Affairs for France"² which outlined the basic principles under which the Supreme Allied Commander would operate with regard to civil administration of liberated French territory on the mainland during the period of hostilities. This paper had likewise received the approval of our War Department and subsequently was approved by the British Government. It was submitted to the Moscow Conference and by agreement with the British and Russian Delegations was referred to the European Commission. In view of the urgency of the matter and possible delay in setting up the Commission we suggested informally to the British that the For-

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels.

² Not printed herein. Documentation on this subject is scheduled for publication in another volume of *Foreign Relations* pertaining to 1943.

eign Office might wish to take immediate steps to clear it in London through the American and Soviet Embassies.

The British Foreign Office has, however, now come back with suggestions for an entirely different approach communicated in a memorandum left with the Department by the British Embassy.³

The British memorandum sets out that the British Government feels "that in view of recent changes at Algiers and in particular of the fact that the French resistance movements, whose role will be of such importance when Allied landings take place, are now strongly represented on the Committee, the collaboration of the French Committee and of the French military authorities may be impossible to obtain unless the matter is cleared on the *Governmental* level with the French Committee before the Allied military authorities get into touch with the French military authorities in the matter. And French co-operation in the planning, and later in the actual work of civil administration, is essential to its success."

The memorandum also states that the British Government anticipates that since the Russian Delegates raised the matter at Moscow the Russians will again revert to the question of "the status and role of the French Committee" as soon as discussion is resumed with them. Consequently the British feel, the memorandum continues, that "since this question raises an important aspect of a combined Anglo-American operation, it would be desirable that Anglo-American agreement should be reached before discussions are opened with the Soviet Government" and that for these reasons the British Government sees "no practical alternative to an early discussion of the whole problem with the French Committee, and feels ⁴ that this ought to be done very soon if events are not to overtake action."

A similar approach has been made by Peake of the Foreign Office to Phillips in London and COSSAC requests an early reply. Phillips telegraphs in part as follows:

"(3) The proposed basic scheme envisages a French director of civil affairs. Manifestly his authority and responsibility would not extend to appropriate parts of the zone of operations until military conditions therein permit. However, under RANKIN 'c' conditions, which envisage a Nazi collapse and the cessation of organized resistance by the German forces, on or before *d* day, there would arise an almost immediate need for the establishment of a provisional French administration for virtually all France. It would appear that the only available organization capable of handling such a situation in the large areas outside the corridors through which our forces will pass, is the French National Committee which now has the support of the resistance groups. The foregoing refers only to RANKIN 'c'.

³ Not printed herein.

⁴ Reads "feel" in the original British memorandum.

(4) In the case of OVERLORD, this situation would probably not arise until very extensive areas of France have been liberated. Until this situation arises, the French director's responsibility would be necessarily limited to providing civil administration in areas to the rear of the fighting zone and then only as the military situation permits a progressive transfer of civil responsibility to him.

(5) Therefore, the immediate and pressing problem now before us is related [to planning⁵] for the cooperation of RANKIN 'c'."

As you will observe, giving the changes in the French Committee as their reasons, the British have now advanced a basic contention that we should agree to negotiations with the French Committee relative to the basic civil affairs formula on a *governmental* level rather than the previous arrangement of dealing with French military authorities on a combined military operational level.

I should appreciate receiving your instructions as to the nature of the reply you wish made to this British suggestion as well as to the proposal that the French Committee be permitted to assume control of "virtually all France" under RANKIN "c" conditions.

HULL

⁵ These two words in Phillips' telegram of November 19, 1943, were inadvertently omitted in the extract as sent by Hull to Roosevelt.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 24, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull:

Mr. Kennan conversed with Dr. Salazar for two hours yesterday afternoon and presented the President's personal letter.² The letter clearly made a profound impression on the Prime Minister.

The conversation was cordial and friendly throughout. Dr. Salazar said he could not answer authoritatively offhand.

Dr. Salazar had expected us to use naval facilities granted the British as occasion required, without requesting permission.

He was not unsympathetic about facilities in Terceira and was ready to seek a formula to reconcile our use of the airport with the terms of the British agreement.³ He wondered whether we could not

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels.

² The letter under reference, dated November 4, 1943, is printed in *F. D. R., His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*, vol. II, p. 1466.

³ For the text of the agreement of August 17, 1943, between Great Britain and Portugal regarding facilities in the Azores, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1946 (vol. 146), p. 447.

consider aircraft being delivered by ferry command to England as having British status from departure in this country until after passage through Portuguese territory, and said in this case he would not be interested in nationality of crews or ground forces serving such aircraft. Answering a specific question from Kennan he said this would apply to construction and engineering personnel.

As for facilities beyond those granted the British, his primary reaction was that this was tantamount to proposing Portugal's entry into the war. He dwelt at length on his efforts to preserve Portuguese neutrality, and said the British alliance⁴ had afforded the pretext for giving the British their facilities while continuing to claim neutrality. He recognized the need for closer collaboration with Atlantic nations. Should he enter the war he would extend us all facilities, but he questioned the advantage of Portuguese belligerency.

Kennan stressed the importance of obtaining our facilities promptly and asked Dr. Salazar to bear this in mind.

Kennan considers Dr. Salazar's reaction encouraging and hopes indications of British support, which will be conveyed by the British Minister [*Ambassador*]⁵ today, will further improve our position. He is sure that Dr. Salazar, after reading the President's letter and observing recent events, is not unreceptive to our use of the Islands but is seeking a formula to reconcile his action with neutrality.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

⁴ For the texts of the treaties constituting the alliance between Great Britain and Portugal, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1812-1814 (vol. 1, pt. 1,) pp. 462 ff.

⁵ Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Director of War Mobilization (Byrnes) to the President*¹

[WASHINGTON,] November 24, 1943.

Reference yours of 23 November.²

Based on Bureau of Shipping predictions, program "C"³ can be increased in

January	0
February	2 to total of 447,
March	5 to total of 477,
April	15 to total of 517,
May	28 to total of 770;

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via Army channels.

² *Ante*, p. 380.

³ LST's.

LCIL increased in

January	0
February	3 to total of 508,
March	10 to total of 547,
April	20 to total of 597,
May	38 to total of 665;

LCT-7, no increases in months specified;

LCT-5 and 6, increased in

January	0
February	10 to total of 724,
March	21 to total of 785,
April	35 to total of 860,
May	50 to total of 950;

LCM-3 increased in

January	0
February	300 to total of 6,079,
March	300 to total of 6,829,
April	300 to total of 7,629,
May	300 to total of 8,469;

LCVP, increased in

January	0
February	200 to total of 9,646,
March	200 to total of 10,596,
April	200 to total of 11,546,
May ...	200 to total of 12,496;

LCC, increased in

January and February	0
March	15 to total of 69,
April	15 to total of 84,
May	15 to total of 99;

LVT, no increases considered feasible before June; any increases in LCPL and LCSS would be at the expense in equivalent reduction of LCVP. Headquarters ships AGC can be increased

- 1 April delivery
- 2 May.

Above figures result of conference of all interested agencies based on assumption that landing craft takes precedence over all other munitions including Russian protocol. Dates represent delivery tide-water ports United States. Will affect Army truck, Naval construction and to some extent high octane. Deliveries depend upon promptly directing priorities. Shall I proceed? ⁴

⁴ The reply is printed *post*, p. 617.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

The Supervising Agent, United States Secret Service (Reilly) to the Agent at Cairo (Spaman) ¹

TEHRAN, November [24], 1943.

Inform President that the United States Legation is adequate and is located one mile from the British Legation and Russian Embassy, which adjoin each other. The route between presents no security problems. The maximum altitude between Cairo and Teheran direct is no more than eight thousand feet. The railroad reaches an altitude of eight thousand feet. To obtain the train equipment, it will be necessary for us to notify the Shah. Plans are being made for both a direct flight from Cairo to Teheran and also for a flight from Cairo to the field at Abadan and then by rail to Teheran. The railroad terminal is located at Khorram Shahr which is seven miles from Abadan and it will be necessary to cross the Karoon river in a small boat. The railroad presents many dangerous security problems. General Hurley informs me of his conversation with the President.² We have made no commitments as to a residence for the President. He can stay at the United States, the British or at the Russian Embassy if invited. You must leave Cairo at six a. m., Cairo time, on the 26th. Arriving Abadan at 3 p. m. Then depart Khorram Shahr by rail at 4 p. m. Arrive Andimeshk at 9 p. m. Depart Andimeshk at 8 a. m. on 27th and arrive Teheran at 5 a. m. on the 28th. This schedule must be maintained if you expect to see any scenery. Urgently recommend you fly direct to Teheran, in which event you can depart Cairo at

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated. The date "26 Nov." appears in handwriting on the source text, but from internal evidence and from the Log (*ante*, p. 298) it is clear that the telegram was sent on the 24th.

² Hurley's conversations with Roosevelt at Cairo are summarized in Lohbeck, pp. 208-209. See also Hurley's telegram of November 26, 1943, *post*, p. 440.

7:30 a. m., Cairo time, and arrive Teheran at 3:30 p. m., Teheran time the same day. Otis Bryan concurs in all this. Urgently request decision as to whether you will fly direct or proceed by rail be sent to me tonight. Otherwise I will depart Teheran at 7 a. m. on the 25th and will arrive Cairo at 1 p. m. Cairo time the same day. McCarthy says facilities fine for Chiefs of Staff and requests you notify Captain Royal at Mena House that he will be in at 1 p. m. Cairo time tomorrow with full details. Have three cars meet special plane at Payne Field tomorrow at one.

From Reilly to Spaman. Show this message to Admiral McIntire, Mr. Hopkins, General Watson, Admiral Brown, and the President.

*American Draft of the Communiqué With Amendments by
President Roosevelt*¹

DRAFT OF COMMUNIQUE.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK, AND
PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, AND THEIR RESPECTIVE MILITARY LEADERS,
HAVE COMPLETED A CONFERENCE SOMEWHERE IN AFRICA. THE SEVERAL
MILITARY MISSIONS HAVE AGREED UPON FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS
DIRECTED AGAINST JAPAN FROM CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE

PLANS, THE DETAILS OF WHICH CANNOT BE DISCLOSED, PROVIDE FOR
VIGOROUS OFFENSIVES AGAINST THE JAPANESE. WE ARE DETERMINED

TO BRING UNRELENTING PRESSURE AGAINST OUR BRUTAL ENEMY BY
SEA, LAND, AND AIR. THIS PRESSURE IS ALREADY UNDERWAY.

~~TIME, PLACE, AND SCOPE OF OUR JOINT OFFENSIVES IN THIS AREA~~

~~CANNOT NOW BE DISCLOSED, BUT~~ JAPAN WILL KNOW OF ~~THEIR~~ ^{ITS} POWER.

WE ARE DETERMINED THAT THE ISLANDS IN THE PACIFIC WHICH
HAVE BEEN OCCUPIED BY THE JAPANESE, MANY OF THEM MADE POWERFUL
BASES CONTRARY TO JAPAN'S SPECIFIC AND DEFINITE PLEDGE NOT TO
MILITARIZE THEM, WILL BE TAKEN FROM JAPAN FOREVER, AND THE
TERRITORY THEY HAVE SO TREACHEROUSLY STOLEN FROM THE CHINESE,
SUCH AS MANCHURIA AND FORMOSA, WILL OF COURSE BE RETURNED TO THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA. WE ARE MINDFUL OF THE TREACHEROUS ENSLAVEMENT

¹ The text as typed was dictated by Hopkins to Warrant Officer Cornelius in the solarium of the President's villa on the afternoon of November 24, 1943 (letter from Albert M. Cornelius to the Historical Office, 023.1/3-257). The date is confirmed by the fact that one of the carbon copies of this original draft bears the typewritten notation "11/24/43 edition". According to Cornelius, Hopkins dictated without reference to any previously prepared notes or papers. The changes made on this draft are in Roosevelt's handwriting. They were incorporated in the revised version of November 25, 1943 (*post*, p. 402).

OF THE PEOPLE OF KOREA BY JAPAN, AND ARE DETERMINED THAT THAT COUNTRY, AT THE ~~earliest possible~~^{proper} MOMENT AFTER THE DOWNFALL OF JAPAN, SHALL BECOME A FREE AND INDEPENDENT COUNTRY.

WE KNOW FULL WELL THAT THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN IS GOING TO REQUIRE FIERCE AND DETERMINED FIGHTING. OUR ~~own~~ COUNTRIES ARE PLEDGED TO FIGHT TOGETHER UNTIL WE HAVE RECEIVED THE UN-
CONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF JAPAN.

THE GENERALISSIMO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE, MADAM CHIANG KAI-SHEK, WHO TOOK PART WITH THE GENERALISSIMO IN SEVERAL OF THE CONFERENCES WITH OUR MILITARY LEADERS.

Roosevelt Papers

*American Draft of the Communiqué, With Amendments by the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*¹

DRAFT OF COMMUNIQUÉ

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, and their respective military leaders, have completed a conference somewhere in Africa. The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations directed against Japan from China and Southeast Asia. The plans, the details of which cannot be disclosed, provide for vigorous offensives against the Japanese. We are determined to bring unrelenting pressure against our brutal enemy by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already underway. The time, place, and scope of our joint offensives in this area cannot now be disclosed, but Japan will know of their power.

We are determined that the islands in the Pacific which have been occupied by the Japanese, many of them made powerful bases contrary to Japan's specific and definite pledge not to so militarize them, will be taken from Japan forever, and the territory² they have³ so treacherously stolen from the⁴ Chinese, such as Manchuria and Formosa, will of course be returned to the Republic of China. We are mindful of the treacherous enslavement of the people of Korea by Japan, and are determined that that country, at the earliest possible moment after the downfall of Japan, shall become a free and independent country.

We know full well that the defeat of Japan is going to require fierce and determined fighting. Our three countries are pledged to fight together until we have received the unconditional surrender of Japan.

The Generalissimo was accompanied by his wife, Madam Chiang Kai-shek, ~~who took part with the Generalissimo in several of the conferences with our military leaders.~~⁵

¹ The draft as typed is the same as the draft submitted to Roosevelt (*supra*) except for the addition, on a separate sheet, of the last three paragraphs naming the conference participants. The handwritten amendments by Hopkins were made prior to the revised version of November 25, 1943 (*infra*).

² In the margin, near this point and perhaps intended to be associated with the phrase "territory . . . stolen", are the words "all conquered" and the words "violence & greed". Both these groups of words are in Hopkins' handwriting.

³ At this point Hopkins inserted the words: "occupied belonging to the Dutch".

⁴ At this point were inserted the words "Dutch and the", in a handwriting which has not been identified.

⁵ These words were apparently stricken out by Hopkins. Beneath this sentence appear the following words, in Hopkins' handwriting: "We are determined that Japan shall give up all her conquests past & present in addition to mandates."

The conference was attended on behalf of the United States by: Admiral William D. Leahy; General George C. Marshall; Admiral Ernest J. King; General H. H. Arnold; Lt. General B. B. Somervell; Major General Edwin M. Watson; Rear Admiral Wilson Brown; Rear Admiral Ross McIntire; Mr. Harry Hopkins; Ambassador W. Averell Harriman; Ambassador J. G. Winant; ⁶ Mr. L. Douglas; Mr. J. J. McCloy.

British representatives were: General Sir Alan Brooke; Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal; Admiral Sir A. Cunningham; Lord Leathers; Lt. General Sir Hastings Ismay.

The Chinese mission included: ⁷ General Shang Chen; Dr. Wang Chung-hui; Vice Admiral Yang Hsuan-chen [*Hsuan-ch'eng*]; and Lt. General Chow [*Chou*] Chih-jou.

⁶ At this point Hopkins added the name "Steinhardt".

⁷ At this point the words "amongst others" were added in Hopkins' handwriting.

Roosevelt Papers

*Revised American Draft of the Communiqué*¹

DRAFT OF COMMUNIQUÉ.

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, and their respective military leaders, have completed a conference somewhere in Africa. They issued the following joint statement:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations directed against Japan from China and Southeast Asia. The plans, the details of which cannot be disclosed, provide for continuous and increasingly vigorous offensives against the Japanese. We are determined to bring unrelenting pressure against our brutal enemy

¹ This revised draft was dictated by Hopkins to Warrant Officer Cornelius on the morning of November 25, 1943 (letter from Albert M. Cornelius to the Historical Office of the Department of State, 023.1/3-257). A typewritten notation on one of the carbon copies of this draft reads "11/25/43 edition".

by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already underway. Japan will know of its power.

"We are determined that the islands in the Pacific which have been occupied by the Japanese, many of them made powerful bases contrary to Japan's specific and definite pledge not to militarize them, will be taken from Japan forever.

"The territory that Japan has so treacherously stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria and Formosa, will of course be returned to the Republic of China. All of the conquered territory taken by violence and greed by the Japanese will be freed from their clutches.

"We are mindful of the treacherous enslavement of the people of Korea by Japan, and are determined that that country, at the proper moment after the downfall of Japan, shall become a free and independent country.

"We know full well that the defeat of Japan is going to require fierce and determined fighting. Our countries are pledged to fight together until we have received the unconditional surrender of Japan."

The Generalissimo was accompanied by his wife, Madam Chiang Kai-shek.

The conference was attended on behalf of the United States by Admiral William D. Leahy; General George C. Marshall; Admiral Ernest J. King; General H. H. Arnold; Lt. General B. B. Somervell; Major General Edwin M. Watson; Rear Admiral Wilson Brown; Rear Admiral Ross McIntire; Mr. Harry Hopkins; Ambassador W. Averell Harriman; Ambassador J. G. Winant; Ambassador Steinhardt; Mr. L. Douglas; Mr. J. J. McCloy.

British representatives were General Sir Alan Brooke; Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal; Admiral Sir A. Cunningham; Lord Leathers; Lt. General Sir Hastings Ismay.

The Chinese mission included, among others, General Shang Chen; Dr. Wang Chung-hui; Vice Admiral Yang Hsuan-chen [*Hsuan-ch'eng*]; and Lt. General Chow [*Chou*] Chih-jou.

Roosevelt Papers

*British Draft of the Communiqué*¹10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.PRESS COMMUNIQUE

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa. The following general statement was issued:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land and air. This pressure is already rising.

It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, ^{Such as} ~~including particularly~~ ^{and Pescadores,} Manchuria ~~and Formosa,~~ shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

With these objects in view the three Allies, ^{those of} ~~in~~ ^{at war with Japan} ~~the rest of~~ the United Nations, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

¹The handwriting appears to be that of Churchill. Date and authorship not indicated, but the text as amended is very similar to the final version printed post, p. 448.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 25 November 1943.

C. C. S. 408

COMMAND OF BRITISH AND U. S. FORCES OPERATING AGAINST GERMANY

1. Current operations in the war against Germany and those approved for the immediate future are grouped geographically and functionally into three categories:

a. Operations in the Mediterranean area involving combined forces with land, sea, and air components.

b. Operations in the northwestern part of Europe, also involving combined forces with land, sea, and air components.

c. Operations against interior Germany involving combined strategic air forces based both in the Mediterranean area and in northwestern Europe.

2. Each of these operations is an entity requiring unity of command over the forces which are engaged.

3. These operations are all intimately related to each other, with a common, over-all objective—Defeat of Germany. Events in the Mediterranean area attract enemy forces and affect enemy capabilities, which in turn have an important bearing upon our capabilities in northwestern Europe, and vice versa. Strategic air operations against interior Germany strongly affect our capabilities in both areas. Furthermore, the flexibility of the strategic air forces permits their employment in varying degree to assist the Allied forces in either area.

4. The United States Chiefs of Staff now consider that the war in Europe has reached a stage where the necessity for command direction over all these forces, in conformity with general directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is clearly indicated. This command should be vested in a single commander, and he should exercise command over the Allied force commanders in the Mediterranean, in northwest Europe, and of the strategic air forces. The immediate appointment of this commander is, in our opinion, most urgently necessary. Even if he is appointed now, it is improbable that he will be able to organize his staff and begin to function before the end of January 1944. The situation which may develop in Europe by that time requires a more positive over-all command arrangement than that now functioning under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Any delay in setting up such a command may lead to confusion and indecision at a critical time, thus delaying the attainment of early victory in Europe.

5. In matters pertaining to strategic bombing, it is imperative that unified Allied command be established. The rapidity with which decisions regarding air operations must be made demands command control, as opposed to general directives or occasional direct action by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We cannot escape the responsibility for adopting every means known to us to save the lives of our men and the planes they fly. The one effective method is to insure the rapid coordinated employment, on a day-to-day operational basis, of the United States Air Forces in both the U. K. and Mediterranean by day and R. A. F. bomber units by night in order to obtain the maximum dispersion of enemy air and anti-aircraft defense, and to take the greatest possible advantage of weather conditions in both theaters. This unified command must, therefore, be established without delay and must embrace all the strategic air forces engaged against Germany, including the United States Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and the British Bomber Command.

6. The British Chiefs of Staff have proposed the establishment of unified command in the Mediterranean area.¹ We are in accord with this proposal, with the proviso that the U. S. Fifteenth Air Force should be specifically excepted and commanded as in paragraph 5 above.

7. The United States Chiefs of Staff propose to the British Chiefs of Staff:

a. That a Supreme Commander be designated at once to command all United Nations operations against Germany from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic under direction from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. That an over-all commander for northwestern European operations be appointed, under the Supreme Commander.

c. That a strategic air force commander be appointed, under the Supreme Commander, to exercise command over the U. S. Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and the British Bomber Command.

d. That the Commander of the Allied Forces in the Mediterranean shall come under the Supreme Commander.

8. The United States Chiefs of Staff further propose that the Supreme Commander be directed to carry out the agreed European strategy, and

- a.* Be charged with the location and timing of operations;
- b.* Be charged with the allocation of the forces and matériel made available to him by the Combined Chiefs of Staff; and
- c.* That his decisions on the above questions be subject to reversal by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.²

¹ See memorandum dated November 3, 1943, *ante*, p. 150.

² A chart attached to this paper is the same as the one printed *ante*, p. 207.

Roosevelt Papers

*Memorandum by Prime Minister Churchill*¹

MOST SECRET

[CAIRO, 25 November 1943.²]

1. The difficulties and short-comings in our conduct of the war since the Battle of Salerno have arisen from divergencies of view between our two Staffs and Governments. It is not seen how these divergencies would be removed by the appointment of a Supreme Commander working under the Combined Chiefs of the Staff and liable to have his decisions reversed by them. The divergencies, which are political as much as military, would still have to be adjusted by the present methods of consultation between the Combined Staffs and the Heads of the two Governments. Thus the Supreme Commander, after being acclaimed as the world war-winner, would in practice find his functions restricted to the narrow ground between the main decisions of policy and strategy which can only be dealt with by the present methods, and the spheres of the two chief regional Commanders.

2. This would certainly not be sufficient to justify arousing all the expectations and setting up all the apparatus inseparable from the announcement of a "Supreme Commander for the defeat of Germany."

3. On the other hand, if the power of decision is in fact accorded to the Supreme Commander, the work of the Combined Chiefs of the Staff would be virtually superseded and very great stresses would immediately arise between the Governments and the Supreme Commander. Without going into personalities, it is greatly to be doubted whether any single officer exists who would be capable of giving decisions over the vast range of problems now dealt with by the Heads of Government assisted by the Combined Chiefs of the Staff.

4. The principle which should be followed as far as possible between Allies of equal status is that the Command in any theatre should go to the Ally who has the largest forces deployed or about to be deployed there. On this it would be natural that the Command in the Mediterranean should be British and that the Command of OVERLORD should be American. Such Commands would also correspond with the outlook of the two Governments, the Americans regarding OVERLORD of overwhelming importance, while the British

¹ Churchill, p. 340, states that he handed this paper to Roosevelt before they left Cairo for Tehran but that the paper was not discussed by them during the First Cairo Conference.

² The source text is undated and bears no heading, but the text as given in Churchill, p. 338, is dated "25 Nov. 43" and bears the heading "Supreme Commander of All Operations Against Germany" and the subheading "Note by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence". Churchill, p. 338, indicates that this memorandum was written after, and was based upon, the memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff written on November 25 and circulated on November 26, 1943, as C. C. S. 408/1, *post*, p. 424.

believe that the greatest and most immediate results can be obtained in the Mediterranean and that OVERLORD is a knock-out blow, the timing of which must be settled in relation to the condition and dispositions of the enemy.

5. If the two Commands are merged under a Supreme Commander, the British would have available against Germany in May decidedly larger forces than the United States. It would therefore appear that the Supreme Command should go to a British officer. I should be very reluctant, as Head of His Majesty's Government, to place such an invidious responsibility upon a British officer. I have very little doubt that he would concentrate his main effort on the Mediterranean and treat the OVERLORD sphere as a highly important but none the less residuary legatee. This point of view would certainly not be accepted by the Government or Staff of the United States. If, on the other hand, disregarding the preponderance of forces involved, the Supreme Command was given to a United States officer and he pronounced in favour of concentrating on OVERLORD irrespective of the injury done to our affairs in the Mediterranean, His Majesty's Government could not possibly agree. The Supreme Commander, British or American, would therefore be placed in an impossible position. Having assumed before the whole world the responsibility of pronouncing and being overruled by one Government or the other, he would have little choice but to resign. This might bring about a most serious crisis in the harmonious and happy relations hitherto maintained between our two Governments.

6. It is not seen why the present arrangement should not continue, subject to any minor improvements that can be suggested. Under this arrangement, an American Commander would conduct the immense Operation OVERLORD and a British Commander would conduct the war in the Mediterranean, their action being concerted and forces assigned by the Combined Chiefs of the Staff working under the Heads of the two Governments. Regular periodic conferences should be held at Gibraltar between the two Commanders, at which they could adjust minor differences about the movement of units, landing-craft etc., so as to help each other as much as possible, and they should also prepare together the timing and concert of their respective operations. More frequent meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should also be arranged, and possibly visits of one weeks' ³ duration by the Chairman of each Chiefs of Staff Committee alternately to London and Washington.

³ The word "one" is a handwritten substitution for the typewritten word "six". In the text as printed in Churchill, p. 340, the word "monthly" appears before "visits" and "weeks" reads "week's".

J. C. S. Files

Note by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 25 November 1943.

C. C. S. 409

OVERLORD AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

1. For some time past it has been clear to us, and doubtless also to the United States Chiefs of Staff, that disagreement exists between us as to what we should do now in the Mediterranean, with particular reference to the effect of future action on OVERLORD. The point at issue is how far what might be termed the "sanctity of OVERLORD" is to be preserved in its entirety, irrespective of developments in the Mediterranean Theater. This issue is clouding the whole of our future strategic outlook, and must be resolved at SEXTANT.

2. At the outset we must point out that, since the decisions taken at QUADRANT, there have been major developments in the situation. The Russian campaign has succeeded beyond all hope or expectations and their victorious advance continues. Italy has been knocked out of the war; and it is certainly not beyond the bounds of possibility that Turkey will come in on our side before the New Year. In these changed conditions, we feel that consideration of adjustments of, if not actual departures from, the decisions taken at TRIDENT and QUADRANT are not only fully justified but positively essential.

3. Nevertheless, we emphasize that we do not in any way recoil from, or wish to sidetrack, our agreed intention to attack the Germans across the Channel in the late spring or early summer of 1944, or even earlier if RANKIN conditions were to obtain. We must not, however, regard OVERLORD on a fixed date as the pivot of our whole strategy on which all else turns. In actual fact, the German strength in France next spring may, at one end of the scale, be something which makes OVERLORD completely impossible and, at the other end, something which makes RANKIN not only practicable, but essential. Consequently, to assume that the achievement of a certain strength by a certain date will remove all our difficulties and result in shortening the duration of the war is entirely illusory. This policy, if literally interpreted, will inevitably paralyze action in other theaters without any guarantee of action across the Channel.

4. With the Germans in their present plight, the surest way to win the war in the shortest time is to attack them remorselessly and continuously in any and every area where we can do so with superiority. The number of places at which we can thus attack them depends mainly on the extent to which they are stretched. Our policy is

therefore clear; we should stretch the German forces to the utmost by threatening as many of their vital interests and areas as possible and, holding them thus, we should attack wherever we can do so in superior force.

5. If we pursue the above policy we firmly believe that OVERLORD (perhaps in the form of RANKIN) will take place next summer. We do not, however, attach vital importance to any particular date or to any particular number of divisions in the assault and follow-up, though naturally the latter should be made as large as possible consistent with the policy stated above. It is, of course, valuable to have a target date to which all may work, but we are firmly opposed to allowing this date to become our master, and to prevent us from taking full advantage of all opportunities that occur to us to follow what we believe to be the correct strategy.

6. In the light of the above argument, we submit the following proposals for action in the Mediterranean:

a. Unification of Command

Unification of Command in the Mediterranean, as outlined in C. O. S. (W) 919¹ is an essential and urgent measure which should be put into effect irrespective of any other decisions taken about this theater.

b. The Italian Campaign

The Offensive in Italy should be nourished and maintained until we have secured the Pisa-Rimini line.

c. Yugoslavia, Greece, and Albania

Our policy should be to place on a regular military basis and to intensify our measures to nourish the Partisan and irregular forces in these countries.

d. Turkey

We should bring Turkey into the war this year.

e. The Dardanelles

We should aim to open the Dardanelles as soon as possible.

f. The Balkans

We should undermine resistance in the Balkan States and do everything possible to promote a state of chaos and disruption in the satellite Balkan countries.

7. If the above measures necessitate putting back the date upon which the forces agreed to be necessary for OVERLORD will be available in the United Kingdom, this should be accepted since it does not by any means follow that the date of the invasion of France will be put back to the same extent.

8. To sum up, our policy is to fight and bomb the Germans as hard as possible all through the winter and spring; to build up our forces

¹ This document transmitted the text which became C. C. S. 387, November 3, 1943, *ante*, p. 150.

in the United Kingdom as rapidly as possible consistent with this; and finally to invade the Continent as soon as the German strength in France and the general war situation gives us a good prospect of success.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 25 November 1943.

C. C. S. 410

THE EFFECT OF WEATHER ON OPERATION "OVERLORD"

1. The following examination has been made regarding the limitations imposed by weather conditions on the postponement of Operation OVERLORD.

2. Suitable weather conditions are required for two phases of the operation, firstly, the assault for which a four-day fine weather period is required; secondly, the maintenance and build-up period for which suitable weather for a decreasing degree of beach maintenance is required for about three months.

THE ASSAULT

3. In order to launch the assault a quiet spell of four days with winds of force 3 or less is desirable. Over ten consecutive years there were quiet spells for four or more consecutive days on the following number of occasions:

April	18 times
May	21 times
June	19 times
July	16 times
August	23 times
September	17 times
October	14 times

It will be seen that there is no serious deterioration in the chances of launching the assault between the months of May and September with the exception of July, where the incidence of a fine spell is only slightly less than in the month of June. It is therefore considered that, purely from the assault aspect, the operation could be postponed up to the month of September.

4. For tidal reasons the assault is limited in each lunar month to two periods of five or six days, which occur at times of full and new moon. The air lift can only be carried out in the full moon period. It therefore follows that if the full moon period is missed on account of the weather conditions being unsuitable, the assault must be

postponed for 24 days. By sacrificing the air lift this postponement could be reduced to 10 days.

AIR FACTORS AFFECTING THE ASSAULT

5. *a.* For fully effective operation of air forces the following conditions must be satisfied:

	<i>Night</i>	<i>Day</i>
Minimum horizontal visibility	5 miles	5 miles
Minimum cloud base above ground level	3,000 feet	11,500 feet
Maximum cloud	6/10	10/10
Maximum wind at ground level	20 m. p. h.	20 m. p. h. (if airborne forces are used by day)
Minimum moon	5 days each side of full. Moon 20° above horizon.	

b. If high level bombing is abandoned, the cloud conditions by day are then limited by the requirements of the fighter cover over shipping and beaches. These are 10/10 at not less than 5,000 feet.

c. The chances of obtaining these conditions are not yet available, but it is evident that they will lengthen the odds against launching the assault to some extent, although settled summer weather suitable for the landing will most probably be suitable for the air operations.

MAINTENANCE AND BUILD-UP PERIOD

6. COSSAC has stated that, making full use of every captured port, large and small, 18 divisions must be maintained over the beaches during the first month of the operations, 12 divisions during the second month, and a number rapidly diminishing to nil during the third month. It is believed that the use of MULBERRIES will approximately halve this commitment for beach maintenance. Therefore, during this period there will be at first a considerable, and later a gradually dwindling dependence on fine weather conditions. In assessing suitable weather for carrying out beach maintenance any day with wind of not more than Force 3 on shore and not more than Force 4 off shore has been accepted. In the OVERLORD area the average number of suitable days per month is as follows:

April	21
May	23
June	25
July	25
August	24½
September	23½
October	18½
November	20
December	20

It is apparent from the above figures that a marked deterioration does not occur until October. Although the months of October, November, and December appear to provide a reasonable number of quiet days, it is considered that this proportion cannot be fully relied on owing to the severe weather which may occur during unsuitable days, thereby producing conditions of sea or swell which will render beach maintenance impracticable on the subsequent quiet day or days.

7. It is impossible to calculate what loss in expectation of suitable maintenance days can be accepted by COSSAC during the second and third months of the beach maintenance period without a very intimate knowledge of his maintenance and build-up plan; but it would appear that weather should be suitable for sufficient beach maintenance at least up to the end of September and possibly, in view of the dwindling commitment in this respect, up to the middle or end of October.

CONCLUSION

8. It is not possible to submit a firm recommendation on this subject, but from the limited facts available for this brief examination, there does not appear to be any overriding reason why the assault could not be carried out up to about the middle of July.

9. This means that the target date should be in the middle of June to allow for a postponement of 24 days in case weather conditions are unsuitable.

10. Thus if the target date is mid-June and the air lift is not sacrificed, only two periods of four or five days when Moon and Tide conditions are suitable will occur in 1944; and these must coincide with a four day spell of fine weather.

Roosevelt Papers

The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the President

[CAIRO,] 25 November 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

THE EFFECT OF NORTH BURMA OPERATIONS ON CARGO DELIVERY TO CHINA

1. The following data pertains to the current discussion between Lord Mountbatten and the Generalissimo, concerning the conflicting requirements between tonnage over the Hump and projected operations in North Burma.¹

¹ See the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, November 25, 1943, *ante*, p. 348.

2. General Stilwell maintains that the minimum tonnages which must be delivered over the Hump to maintain the Yunnan Force, the 14th Air Force, and the Chinese-American Composite Wing, is as follows:

		Total	For 14th Air Force & China-US Comp Wg	For Yunnan Force
November		9,700	6,500	3,200
December		9,700	6,500	3,200
January	<i>8,050</i> ²	7,900	4,700	3,200
February	<i>8,050</i>	7,900	4,700	3,200
March	<i>9,000</i>	9,200	6,000	3,200
April	<i>9,500</i>	9,200	6,000	3,200
May	<i>9,700</i>	9,200	6,000	3,200
June ²	<i>10,000</i>			

3. Lord Mountbatten considers that these above tonnages should be accepted only as target amounts rather than guaranteed minimums. He must employ portions of the Air Transport planes to support the operation "TARZAN".

4. The Generalissimo demands that 10,000 tons be delivered over the Hump each month, regardless of the logistics requirements of the Burma Campaign.

5. An optimistic estimate of the Air Transport Command's ability to transport supplies over the Hump during the period of the North Burma operations, and with no diversion for these operations, is as follows:

November	9,000
December	9,000
January	9,444
February	11,000
March	12,000
April	12,000
May	12,000

Furthermore Lord Mountbatten has indicated a positive requirement for an additional 25 operating C-46 aircraft to make possible the Burma operations' logistic requirements.

6. There is a project in the China-Burma-India theater to build a 4-inch pipe line from Assam to Kunming. The project has 16 C-47's and 40 C-46's allocated to it. In view of changes in the original plans for the pipe line, it may later be found possible to divert the 16 C-47's to Lord Mountbatten.

7. It is suggested that in your discussions with the Prime Minister and the Generalissimo on this subject, you establish the following;

² The italicized word and figures appear in Roosevelt's handwriting.

a. First priority in the use of U. S. Army transports on the India-China Wing to be assigned to the delivery of the minimum tonnages recommended by General Stilwell for the 14th Air Force, the Yunnan Forces and the composite Chinese-American Wing (Air).

b. All Air Transport Command capacities or facilities in the China-Burma-India Theater, beyond those required to meet the guaranteed minimum tonnages, are to be available to Lord Mountbatten for the support of the Burma Campaign.

c. No additional transports can be promised for over the Hump activities or the Burma Campaign, beyond the 16 additional referred to in paragraph 6 above.

W. D. LEAHY
Admiral, U. S. N.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

Moscow, November 25, 1943.

URGENT

Personal and strictly secret from Premier Stalin to President Roosevelt. Your message from Cairo² received. I will be at your service in Teheran the evening of November twenty-eighth.

¹ Sent by Spalding at Moscow to Harriman at Cairo, via Navy channels.

² Telegram of November 22, 1943, *ante*, p. 373.

Hopkins Papers

The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

[CAIRO,] 25 NOVEMBER 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY HOPKINS :

I did not get a chance to give you all the information I had gathered from the British Joint Secretaries on this matter of Civil Affairs. I did not think that I could or should talk very much at lunch in front of Lord Leathers.

Brigadier Redman told me this morning that the Prime Minister had been "strongly" briefed on the question and was going to take the matter up with the President at an early date and that the matter would not be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff until after the Prime Minister had his talk with the President. He also indicated that the Prime Minister's line would be the foreign office approach, namely the introduction into the occupied area of civilians following

the "forward zone" of military operations and the establishment in London of a Combined Civil Affairs Committee to do the operating from there rather than via the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Washington. The obvious implication was that the President should be briefed to prepare himself for the Prime Minister's presentation.

The British Combined Chiefs of Staff, I find, likewise agree with us and so does Sir John Dill. I had dinner with Cunningham and Brooke last night and they gave every indication of their concurrence. I am seeing Eden in the morning and in the meantime I am giving you herewith two papers which I believe could serve as the basis for the briefing of the President. I have an idea that the Prime Minister is going to bring the matter up on the way north.¹ Don't allow any commitments to be made until the President understands all the implications. I hope that Eden, Winant and I can work out something. In the meantime, I will stick around and await further word from you as to what if any help I can be on this or any other subject.

Sincerely,

JOHN J. McCLOY

[Attachment 1]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy)

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

There has been a very definite and noticeable effort in the past few months on the part of the British government to transfer to London all determinations of our occupational and post-hostility policy. It has been the policy of the American government to base considerations of civil administration in liberated or occupied territory primarily on military policy so long as the war continues. On the American side provision was made for obtaining the views of the political and economic side of the government but the machinery for this was lodged in the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The British were, of course, a part of this machinery and by means of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee a program was carried out with respect to Sicily and Italy, which was mutually satisfactory. As the program developed, however, and issues arose which had to be referred to London, a strong tendency on the part of London developed to limit the activities of the CCAC, ending in what amounted to a complete frustration of the committee. As to Western Europe, London took the position that no matters at all could be discussed, and even in respect to Italy methods

¹ i. e., en route to Tehran.

were employed to avoid consideration of such matters by the Committee. Examples of this circumvention were the Norwegian Agreement² and the comprehensive surrender terms for Italy.³

Today we are at an impasse in getting work done because of this conflict and presumably some attempt will be made at the forthcoming conference to settle it.

There is more involved than the usual conflict of jurisdiction between agencies. It is, or may be a development that may affect the attitude of the U. S. toward all post-hostility policy. The introduction at Moscow of the plan for the Advisory Commission on European Affairs with its site in London⁴ is of large significance and it was particularly so as Eden first proposed the plan. There was no great enthusiasm for it on the part of the Soviet Union and certainly the U. S. representatives there had a very restricted view of its powers. However, as the thing is now developing, and the scope of the matters which appear to be on the verge of consideration by it increases, it seems inevitable that its conclusions will have gathered such momentum that it will be most difficult either to disregard them or to relegate them to minor importance.

It should always be recognized, however, that in the long run the prejudice of the American people to European conferences is profound; that there is a constant fear that the Atlantic theater of war will be weighted against the Pacific, and that the nature and extent of our participation in Europe and world politics have yet to be determined. As the war progresses toward a favorable conclusion two great tendencies will develop. One is the desire, stimulated on the part of our soldiers by their wish to get home, to liquidate the European involvement. The national reaction which followed the last war both in the U. S. and Canada will set in again though presumably with considerably less chance of success. The other great tendency will be the feeling on the part of other countries that now that the war is on its way to being won and the invader is no longer at the door, the dependence on the U. S. should promptly be liquidated except in matters of relief. The development of both tendencies is fatal to both British and American interests. The Prime Minister has written it down as one of the great achievements of his career that his policy was so guided as to make it clear to America that she must enter the war on

² An arrangement of May 19, 1943, between the British Government's Administration of Territories Committee (Europe) and the Norwegian Government in Exile.

³ The text of the "comprehensive surrender terms" for Italy may be found in 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2742-2765.

⁴ The records of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, October 18-November 1, 1943, are scheduled to be published in *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I.

the side of Britain—"But westward lo the sky is bright." It may be more of an achievement and of more importance to Britain, in the long run, to convince America that she must enter the administration of the peace.

Twice within a generation Britain has had to have American aid in order to cope with a European attack. The resources on which she must draw are, in great quantity, located on the American continent and strong as Britain may feel herself to be after each successful war, other wars are coming and there is no certainty of either avoiding or winning them without the fullest communion with America. People on both sides give firm utterance to this sentiment, but it takes *doing*. One of the best ways to do it is to convince the United States, not only its leaders, but its citizens, that the United States has a major part in directing the war.

It is vitally necessary to indoctrinate the American people to a recognition of the national responsibility of the country in world affairs. It is essential that the people of America become used to decisions being made in the United States. On every cracker barrel in every country store in the U. S. there is someone sitting who is convinced that we get hornswoggled every time we attend a European conference. European deliberations must be made in the light of the concepts of the new continent because that continent has now, for better or for worse, become a determining factor in the struggles of the older one. What may be lost through not moving to London in the way of better and more accessible records or a greater familiarity with local conditions, will be made up in a readier assumption of responsibility on the part of the U. S. and perhaps in a greater objectivity of decision.

All this and more can be said against the spirit which motivates the London tendency. One cannot control the shift of power (if that is the heart of the matter) by such artificial devices in any event.

The immediate question, however, is what machinery to erect which will most satisfactorily take into account these imponderables and yet get the necessary work done in time to be of effect.

The British proposal to shift the Combined Committee to London is no solution as it merely accentuates the tendency. The British proposal would leave the American Committee to determine only matters of supply, which is no concession whatever as the U. S. will have to make by far the greater contribution of material in any event. In all other purposes the American Committee would become no more than a sort of amanuensis for the decisions of the London Committee. The proposal is basically objectionable. Moreover, there is no procedural or practical need for it.

The CCAC has operated efficiently. Even the British members have testified to the directness and highly satisfactory character of the decisions and the discussions which it produces. It affords a very simple method by which the attitude of the American Government on all occupational and cessation of hostility questions can be learned. In Mr. Dunn the Committee has a State Department representative very close to Mr. Hull and through the Chairman prompt definitions of American policy where needed can be cleared by the Secretary of War, Mr. Hopkins, or Admiral Leahy. General Hilldring enjoys the confidence and respect of General Marshall and has ready access to him. The Committee's connections with the Treasury are excellent, and Treasury policy is always available.

The Committee is an adjunct of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It is military in its aspect although the Chairman is the Assistant Secretary of War. In his absence General Hilldring or General MacCready [*Macready*] succeeds to the chair. The connection of the Committee with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and its military aspect are consistent with the American point of view that during the progress of the war the introduction to all political decisions should be based on military consideration.

In short, the existing Committee has functioned well in the past, has prompt means of clearing American policy, and is readily available to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as it should be.

It is readily recognized, however, that all decisions cannot be made from Washington and there must be set up in London a machinery whereby detailed plans can be made and on-the-spot questions settled.

It has never been the policy of the Washington Committee to do more than prescribe the bare outline of the policy to be followed in each country. The general directive, e. g., the HUSKY directive,⁵ does not purport to do anything more. For the day-to-day planning for civil affairs the people on the ground must have the responsibility. That planning, to be effectively tied into the operations, must take place in the particular headquarters involved, e. g., for France in COSSAC. It will become the duty of that headquarters to take the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive, put it in force with such additions as local circumstances require. It will thus be made available for use by the commanders of the operation and the chief civil affairs officer of the expedition.

In practice no need has developed for a London Combined Committee except at the detailed planning level. The overall policy will

⁵ Directive of January 23, 1943, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Eisenhower, agreed upon at the Casablanca Conference. The records of the Casablanca Conference are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

be established by the advisory council as it is cleared by the respective governments. That policy is communicable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the CCAC of that body can translate it into military directives as it has in the past. If the Washington Committee had been permitted to function no difficulty would have ensued and none will ensue if London permits the British members of it to operate. On the other hand to center in London the Advisory Council,⁶ the Combined Committee and the detailed planning centralizes too much authority on vital post-war questions in London for the interests of both the U. S. and Britain.

[Attachment 2]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of War. (McCloy) ⁷

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 22 November 1943.

PROBLEM

1. At the Moscow Conference there was established the European Advisory Commission composed of representatives of the U. S., U. K., and Soviet Governments.⁸ The commission will sit in London as soon as possible to make recommendations with respect to matters connected with the cessation of hostilities in occupied and liberated countries. As the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the commission are closely connected with military considerations it becomes necessary to establish a procedure [by?] which the Combined Chiefs of Staff may be advised of and can act upon such policies as are recommended by such Council and are approved by the respective governments.

DISCUSSION

2. *a.* The European Advisory Commission will be called upon for recommendations as to the terms of surrender to be imposed upon each of the European enemy states and as to the machinery required to execute these terms. It will also deal with such policy questions relating to Axis-occupied friendly nations as are referred to it. It is indicated further that the Commission will study [such?] other questions connected with and flowing from the cessation of hostilities in Europe as are referred to it by agreement of the three governments.

⁶ i. e., the European Advisory Commission.

⁷ The source text is headed "Draft". This draft was also sent by McCloy to the Joint Staff Planners, presumably for consideration as a paper to be submitted by the United States Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

⁸ See the communiqué issued by the Moscow Conference, November 1, 1943, in *Decade*, p. 10.

b. With respect to all of its deliberations, the Commission has no executive power and is confined to the position of making recommendations within its field to the respective governments.

3. When the Commission starts operating, it is envisaged that each Government will examine and reconcile the recommendations of the Commission with its own national policies and transmit its views as so reconciled to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. It will become the responsibility of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to resolve these views into military directives for the appropriate Supreme Allied Commander. In conforming to this responsibility it is contemplated that the Combined Civil Affairs Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will combine to perform the function of preparing suggested forms of directives based upon the necessary political and military considerations and conforming to the reconciled views of the respective governments. It will also combine to act in an advisory and planning capacity to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on all matters relative to civil affairs. It has been suggested that the Combined Civil Affairs Committee be transferred to London or that a new committee performing substantially the same functions be set up in London.

This is objectionable from the U. S. point of view for the following reasons:

a. In order to perform its functions adequately and expeditiously it is necessary that the Committee should be near the Combined Chiefs of Staff which must remain in Washington.

b. The military aspect of the initial stages of civil affairs planning should continue to be emphasized as long as either the war against Germany or Japan lasts. To establish a Combined Committee on a ministerial level would be inconsistent with this policy. The existing committee is merely an adjunct of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

c. The existing committee is experienced and well known; it has facilities for promptly clearing U. S. national policy and has operated (until recently when its activities were restricted through the limitations imposed on the British representatives) efficiently and expeditiously.

As it is not the function or intention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to do any more than prescribe to the broadest terms of the policies under which the commanders in the field are to be guided there is no force to the argument that all procedures be transferred to London as greater information and contacts are available there. The methods and details by which the policy is to be carried out and as to which the information contacts and skills will be most useful are matters for the Civil Affairs Division of the appropriate head-

quarters to work out. (In the case of France and the Low Countries, presumably COSSAC).

CONCLUSION

The existing arrangement whereby the Combined Chiefs of Staff operating from Washington and utilizing the services of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee furnish basic directives governing civil affairs and matters relating to the cessation of hostilities to the appropriate combined commanders should be continued.

The U. K. and U. S. Governments should state to the Combined Chiefs of Staff their views in matters relating to civil affairs and the cessation of hostilities; these matters may be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff either on their own initiative or as a result of the action taken of the European Advisory Commission.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in any directives carried to the appropriate commanders shall follow the normal practice of confining such directives to basic matters, leaving to the commanders and their staff the duty of working out the methods and details by which the policies as stated in such directives shall be executed.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the two governments agree to the conclusions set forth above and that for this purpose the Combined Chiefs of Staff transmit to the two governments a letter in substantially the form attached hereto as Enclosure A.⁹

⁹ Not found.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

[WASHINGTON, November 25, 1943.]

For the President from the Secretary of State

Lisbon's cable no. 2835 of November 23, 1943² announces the departure on the preceding day of the group of Army and Navy technicians from Horta for Terceira Island, and adds that the early departure of these American technicians was thanks to British cooperation in Horta.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels.

² Not printed herein.

Defense Files : Telegram

*The Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department
(Hilldring) to the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 25 November 1943.

PRIORITY

(Eyes only, for McCloy from Hilldring signed Marshall¹)

1074. Conference with Secretary Hull and Mr. Dunn indicates State Department view that there is no preference between allocation on [of] northern or southern areas to United States under RANKIN (C). However, the State Department suggests that serious consideration be given organization of a combined U. K.-U. S. commission to deal with French political situation irrespective of allocation of primary obligation under RANKIN (C) for operations in French territory. This commission would have approximately the same representation as the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, but would be responsible to the SAC and its jurisdiction would be confined to civil affairs problems in France. The obvious advantage of such a commission would be to give Anglo-American sanction to all policies followed in French civil affairs, regardless of whether these policies were administered by the U. S. or the U. K. Aside from comments given above, Mr. Hull has no official comments to make with regard to RANKIN (C). However in discussing the RANKIN (C) plan and your radio number 10013² on that subject Mr. Hull expressed some doubt as to the wisdom of allocating separate spheres of responsibility if, from a military point of view, this could be avoided. With respect to the spheres of responsibility, if assigned, it is Mr. Hull's opinion that firm declarations should be made by the governments of the occupying forces to the effect that no advantage shall accrue to the U. S. or to any of our allies in the area in which the armed forces of any united nation are located. Generals McNarney and Hull are acquainted with the contents of this cable.

¹ Certain telegrams sent by the War Department in this period bore the standard notation "signed Marshall", despite the fact that Marshall was at Cairo.

² In telegram 10013, November 22, 1943 (not printed), McCloy had (1) asked Hilldring to consult Dunn and wire the views of the Department of State on the zones of occupation in Europe and (2) observed that he had found Roosevelt opposed to "our occupying France in the event of RANKIN (C) occurring".

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov) to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman)*¹

URGENT

Moscow, 25 November 1943.

Personal and secret from the Peoples Commissar of Foreign Affairs VM Molotov to the American Ambassador Mr. Harriman.

I thank you for your message from Cairo.² General Connolly may address himself through the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Teheran³ to General Arkadiev with respect to questions which interest him regarding coordination of measures. I hope to meet with you soon. Most cordial greetings.

¹ Delivered to Spalding at Moscow on November 26, 1943, and forwarded by him to Harriman at Cairo via Navy channels. Received at Cairo November 27.

² Telegram of November 22, 1943, *ante*, p. 374.

³ Mikhail Alexeyevich Maximov.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 26 November 1943.

C. C. S. 408/1

COMMAND OF BRITISH AND U.S. FORCES OPERATING AGAINST GERMANY

1. The British Chiefs of Staff have given careful consideration to the proposal put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 408¹ that "a Supreme Commander be designated at once to command all United Nations operations against Germany from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic." This proposal has immense political implications and is clearly a matter for the most earnest consideration of the U. S. and British Governments. Nevertheless, the British Chiefs of Staff must say at once that, from the military point of view, they profoundly disagree with the proposal. Their reasons are set out in the paragraphs that follow.

2. Total war is not an affair of military forces alone, using the word "military" in the widest sense of the term. There are political, economic, industrial, and domestic implications in almost every big war problem. Thus it seems clear that the Supreme Commander for the war against Germany will have to consult both the U. S. and the British Governments on almost every important question. In fact, it boils down to this, that he will only be able to make a decision without reference to high authority on comparatively minor and strictly military questions, such as the transfer of one or two divisions, or a

¹ Memorandum of November 25, 1943, *ante*, p. 405.

few squadrons of aircraft, or a few scores of landing craft, from one of his many fronts to another. He will thus be an extra and unnecessary link in the chain of command.

3. There is no real analogy between the position of Marshal Foch in the last war and the position now contemplated for the Supreme Commander against Germany. Marshal Foch was responsible only for the Western Front and the Italian Front. His authority did not extend to the Salonika Front, the Palestine Front, or the Mesopotamian Front. Under the arrangements now contemplated, the Supreme Commander will have not only OVERLORD and the Italian Front under his authority, but also the Balkan Front and the Turkish Front (if this is opened). There must be some limit to the responsibilities which Allied Governments can delegate to a single soldier and the sphere now proposed seems to exceed these limits considerably.

4. The United States Chiefs of Staff propose (see paragraph 8 *c*) that the decisions of the Supreme Commander should "be subject to reversal by the Combined Chiefs of Staff." If the main object of this new arrangement is to insure rapid decisions, it looks as though the above proviso will lead to deplorable consequences. Instances will occur in which the Supreme Commander has issued orders and the troops have marched in accordance with these orders, only to be followed by a reversal of the order by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and consequent confusion. Again it may happen that the British Chiefs of Staff agree with a decision taken by the Supreme Commander, while the United States Chiefs of Staff totally disagree with it. What happens then? Or again, the Combined Chiefs of Staff may wholeheartedly support on military grounds a decision taken by the Supreme Commander, only to find that one or other of the Governments concerned is not prepared to ratify it. Then what happens?

5. If the Supreme Commander is going to exercise real control, he will need to assemble the whole paraphernalia of Intelligence, Planning and Administration on an unprecedented scale. This staff will merely be a great pad between the theater commanders and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

6. Finally, it is not admitted either that the existing machinery for the higher direction of the war has failed, or that the situation which now confronts us is so inherently different as to demand a revolutionary change.

7. The conclusion to be drawn from the above arguments is that the Supreme Commander of the war against Germany will never have, under the system of government which now obtains in the U. S. A.

and U. K., authority to deal with anything but strictly military, and comparatively minor, problems. He will be boosted by the Press and public opinion as a superman who is going to lead the two nations to victory. This is a mere delusion. His position will be a sham. In important matters, he will not be able to do anything more than is now done by the theater commanders.

8. If the well tried machinery that has led us safely through the last two years has failed in the smaller problems, it would be better to examine that machinery and see how it could be speeded up and adjusted, rather than to embark upon an entirely novel experiment, which merely makes a cumbrous and unnecessary link in the chain of command, and which will surely lead to disillusionment and disappointment.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 26 November 1943.

C. C. S. 407 (Revised)¹

COLLABORATION WITH THE U. S. S. R.

1. During the forthcoming conference with the Soviets it is recommended that the following broad lines of action be adopted:

a. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree upon the U. S.-British strategy in Europe and seek the approval of the President and Prime Minister before meeting the Soviets.

b. That the Soviets be urged to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations offensive by effective coordination with OVERLORD.

c. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree to consult together before making reply to proposals upon which there has been no previous agreement.

d. That, specifically, an agreed answer be obtained to any Soviet proposals which involve the undertaking of major operations through the Balkans or the Aegean.

e. That a common policy be adopted concerning Turkey, to include briefly the support of the Soviet proposal to force Turkey into the war² but to stand firm on the principle that no diversion of forces or supplies for Turkey can be accepted to the prejudice of approved operations elsewhere.

¹ C. C. S. 407, dated November 25, 1943, differed from this document in that, among other things, it did not contain, in the enclosure, the items numbered 3 and 4 in the enclosure to this document, and it contained, as numbered items in the enclosure, the material which was subsequently incorporated in C. C. S. 407/1 (*infra*) under the headings lettered A, B, and C.

² See *ante*, p. 135.

2. Throughout the deliberation with the Soviets it should be made clear that the United States and Great Britain are involved in military operations not only in the European Theater but also in the Pacific-Asiatic Theater, and that their heavy commitments of resources throughout the world compel them to decide on operations only after careful analysis of the over-all situation.

3. At the Moscow Conference, the United States and British representatives were primarily engaged in explaining and defending their own position. In the future, the United States and Great Britain should make specific requests on the Soviets.

4. A proposed agenda is attached as an enclosure.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR U. S.-BRITISH-U. S. S. R. CONFERENCE

1. *Coordination of Military Effort*

The coordination of Soviet operations with Anglo-American operations in Europe.

2. *Italy*

Discuss current and planned military operations in and from Italy.

3. *Turkey*

Turkish action on entry into the war.

4. *Supplies to Russia*

5. *Strategic Bombing*

Discussion of Soviet capabilities to initiate strategic bombing of targets in Germany or her satellites in extension of POINTBLANK. (Current intelligence indicates German fighter strength is extremely weak on the Russian front—130 serviceable fighters.)

6. *Japan*

On the assumption that the U. S. S. R. will bring up for discussion its entry into the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany, the following should be considered:

a. Request Soviets to furnish combat intelligence information concerning Japan; if agreed to we will present specific questions through the military mission at Moscow.

b. Request Soviets to indicate whether they consider it desirable at this time to set in hand arrangements to base Soviet submarine force in U. S. territory.

c. Request Soviets to indicate what direct or indirect assistance they will be able to give, if it is found possible to launch an attack on the Northern Kuriles.

d. Soviets to indicate what ports, if any, they could allow the Allies to use. Request Soviets to furnish data on ports through Military Mission in order that we may determine the size and type of Naval Task Forces we can employ.

e. Soviets to indicate what air bases, if any, they could allow our air forces to use for operations against Japan, and what facilities, including gasoline and bombs, could be supplied. What air routes to these bases could be provided?

J. C. S. Files

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 26 November 1943.

C. C. S. 407/1

COLLABORATION WITH THE U. S. S. R.

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 131st Meeting, Item 5,¹ agreed that the following items, which are currently under discussion as a result of the Moscow Conference, should be discussed between the United States and British Military Missions in Moscow and the Soviet authorities concerned:

A. Shuttle bomber bases

(1) When will the U. S. S. R. be prepared to designate air bases for our use? What are presently available locations, facilities, and capabilities? The United States tentatively desires 10 bases so distributed as to permit shuttle bombing from Italy and United Kingdom.

(2) When may we begin sending the required service personnel into the U. S. S. R. to the designated bases?

(3) What is Soviet proposal for handling the close operational liaison required?

(4) What signal communications with the United Kingdom and Italy can be provided?

B. Air transport routes

Request establishment of U. S. Air Transport Service on a minimum frequency basis of one round trip weekly on three routes in the following order of priority:

¹ See *ante*, p. 365

(1) Alsib

In order that the U. S. may have a direct and independent air line of communications with the U. S. S. R.

In order that the basic machinery may be set up and be in operation to provide a direct U. S.-U. S. S. R. aerial route of supply to support any future U. S. S. R. military air operations.

(2) U. S.-U. K.-Moscow

Primarily to support shuttle bombing operations.

(3) Tehran-Moscow

In order to transport munitions and spare parts required in connection with shuttle bombing operations and to connect Moscow with our Mediterranean and S. E. Asia fronts. This will provide an alternative during the winter months when the northern route (U. S.-U. K.) is not operating regularly.

C. Weather information

(1) Request Soviet basic weather ciphers in order to interpret weather broadcasts. The U. S. will furnish weather ciphers desired by the U. S. S. R.

(2) Alternatively if foregoing is not acceptable to the Soviets, U. S. desires weather data on specific areas, using special ciphers as follows:

(a) Shuttle bombing areas.

(b) Tehran transport route; data west of Long. 75° E.

(c) From 60° E. to 160° E., (for operations in China).

(d) From 90° E. to 180°, (for the Alsib route).

(3) Request U. S. S. R. to indicate the procedure they suggest in the mutual exchange of weather information. We propose exchange of meteorological liaison officers for coordination of technical details and arrangements for distribution of weather codes and ciphers.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff desire their respective missions to make periodic reports to the Combined Chiefs of Staff regarding progress made in the negotiations on the above subjects.

H. REDMAN

F. B. ROYAL

Combined Secretariat

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO, November 26, 1943.]

C. C. S. 411/2

POINTS ON WHICH GENERALISSIMO'S AGREEMENT SHOULD BE OBTAINED

1. Since the Combined Chiefs of Staff are unable to find the 535 additional transport aircraft which are required for the Mandalay plan,² it is agreed that the plan presented by Admiral Mountbatten at the First Plenary Session³ shall be accepted.

2. The stipulation which the Generalissimo has made that an amphibious operation is to be carried out in March⁴ is noted, and will be taken into consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when amphibious operations in all parts of the world are reviewed in about a week's time.⁵ Meanwhile preparations are being pushed forward in the Southeast Asia Theater for an amphibious operation to meet this date, should approval be subsequently given.

3. A fleet of adequate strength to cover such an operation and to obtain command of the Bay of Bengal will be assembled by the beginning of March.

4. The Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command,⁶ will be authorized to divert not more than an average of 1,100 tons per month from tonnage over the "hump" to the requirements of the Burma campaign. Diversions in excess of this figure may be made by him only to meet sudden and critical emergencies of the battle or by permission of the highest authority. The Air Transport Command will use its utmost energy to raise the efficiency of its operation and increase

¹ In response to a suggestion from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Mountbatten prepared on November 25, 1943, a list of the points with regard to operations in the Southeast Asia Command on which Chiang's concurrence should be obtained before his departure from Cairo. The document here printed is Mountbatten's list as amended by the Combined Chiefs and approved by them on November 26; see *ante*, p. 358. The paper is undated but was subsequently circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on December 2, 1943. The substance of this paper was apparently discussed with Chiang at the meeting of the Heads of Government on the afternoon of November 26, 1943, at which time Chiang agreed to all points set forth therein; see *ante*, p. 366. *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 65, states that Chiang reversed himself the following morning (November 27) shortly before leaving Cairo. According to this account Chiang asked Stilwell to remain at Cairo and to insist on the airborne assault on Mandalay and the delivery of 10,000 tons of supplies per month by air to China.

For an amended version of paragraph 4 of this paper, see C. C. S. 411/5, *post*, p. 821.

² Regarding the Mandalay plan, see *ante*, pp. 338, 347.

³ See *ante*, p. 312.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 314; see also p. 347.

⁵ See *post*, pp. 675 ff.

⁶ Admiral Mountbatten.

the "hump" tonnage to a full 10,000 tons per month into China by the late winter and a further increase in the spring.

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is delegating his command over the Chinese-American Task Force starting from Ledo to Lieutenant General Slim commanding the 14th British Army, until the main body reaches Kamaing, when he will place the force under the command of Lieutenant General Stilwell.

6. It is the intention to resume the offensive in October 1944, when the monsoon stops; it is, however, too far ahead to decide the precise resources which will be available.

J. C. S. Files

*The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*¹

SECRET

[ALGIERS,] 26 November 1943.

FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN CAIRO CONFERENCE

An extract of a letter received today by the Commander in Chief Allied Forces, from General Giraud, is quoted for the information of the Allied Chiefs of Staff and such action as they desire to take:

"The conversation which I had with you this morning has confirmed my conviction that the point of view of the French High Command should be explained at the Cairo Conference, before any decision determines definitely the conduct of operations in Western Europe.

"Indeed, if France is to be the theater of new operations, you will understand, I am sure, how anxious I am to contribute to the studying of these operations with all the competence which a thorough knowledge of our territory has given me, and also to take my share of responsibility in the operation where the use of underground forces and resistance groups share[s] the preponderant role.

"If it is not considered necessary that I go personally to this Conference, though I do hold myself at the disposal of President Roosevelt and of the British Prime Minister, I would consider it most useful to have one officer of my staff present to explain my views before the Allied Chiefs of Staff.

"In the event where such a solution would not be possible, I do rely upon you to defend the interests of France and the French Army with the friendship and understanding which you have always shown us."²

¹ Circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as C. C. S. 413.

² The reply of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is printed *post*, p. 786.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 26 November 1943.

C. C. S. 400/1

CONTROL OF STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN NORTHWEST EUROPE AND THE
MEDITERRANEAN

1. In C. C. S. 400¹ the United States Chiefs of Staff have proposed that the U. S. Strategic Air Forces operating from the United Kingdom and from Mediterranean bases, the 8th and 15th Air Forces respectively, should be placed under a single Command—the U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe—with a Headquarters in the United Kingdom. The object of this proposal is to achieve the more effective exploitation of U. S. heavy bomber capabilities which, it is hoped, the new Headquarters will secure in two ways:

a. By organizing mutually supporting operations of the two Strategic Air Forces in order to obtain the maximum dispersal of enemy defenses;

b. By enabling advantage to be taken of changing weather and tactical conditions by switching heavy bomber forces quickly from one theater to another.

2. This proposal affects directly only U. S. heavy bomber forces, and we recognize the ultimate right of the United States Chiefs of Staff to decide the organization of U. S. forces in any theater of operations. We feel bound, however, to record our view that the adoption of this proposal would entail serious disadvantages far outweighing any advantages to be derived from it.

3. To deal first with the advantages which are expected from the present proposal:

a. Great operational benefit would undoubtedly result if an effective combination of operations in the two theaters could be achieved. The operation of a large force of heavy day bombers is however a considerable undertaking and a period of up to 24 hours is required for the preparation and loading of aircraft and the briefing of crews. Unfortunately, the weather in the European theater is so uncertain that the decision to dispatch heavy bomber forces can only be taken a few hours before the time of take-off and it is then too late to make changes in targets and the timing of attacks. The conduct of operations in accordance with a settled policy in either theater is therefore a matter of great difficulty and frequently much effort is wasted, both in abortive operations and in standing by for operations which have to be canceled. A fortiori, the detailed coordination of attacks from two bases so far apart as the U. K. and Italy would be still more difficult and would in fact prove impossible. A commander set up to control

¹ *Ante*, p. 228.

the two forces would find in practice that he could do no more than insure that the subordinate commanders in each theater worked to a general plan and kept him and each other closely informed of the situation on their own front so that the general plan could be altered as necessary. Coordination of this type can be secured with the present organization without the introduction of a new headquarters.

b. The possibility of switching heavy bomber forces from one theater to another is at first sight an attractive one. In order to obtain full benefit from the plan, it would however be necessary to build up a margin of facilities in the two theaters involving the preparation of heavy bomber airfields, runways, and maintenance depots over and above what is required for the forces already based in the theater, and the locking up of additional maintenance personnel. If these additional facilities were not provided, the serviceability and effectiveness of the heavy bombers would fall considerably as soon as they were transferred and the operations carried out would be on a smaller scale and less effective than if the forces had to remain at their normal bases. The Air Ministry have, in the past, given very careful consideration to this plan but they have been forced to the conclusion that, except on rare occasions, the results would not justify the effort involved. Such occasional transfers of forces as are likely to be profitable can be secured by the present machinery.

c. The provision of the necessary margin of facilities which, if a large transfer of force is envisaged, may be considerable, must of necessity conflict in the U. K. with other service and governmental requirements. In Italy or other active theaters of war they can only be provided at the expense of other service requirements.

There is therefore a potential conflict of interest between the commander of the Strategic Air Force on the one hand and the U. K. Government and theater commanders on the other.

4. Our conclusion is that the setting up of a new higher headquarters would not achieve the advantages which are claimed from it and would not in fact be any improvement over the existing machinery. It would, moreover, entail certain disadvantages which we consider to be serious, namely the following:

a. The most serious disadvantage is that it would destroy the present arrangements for the close coordination of the 8th Air Force and the R. A. F. including the 2nd Tactical Air Force. This depends for its effectiveness on the fact that general direction over their operations is exercised by the Chief of the Air Staff, R. A. F. The latter, with his headquarters in London, possesses not only a complete operational staff but is also served by the central Intelligence Staff of the three Services, the Ministry of Economic Warfare, and the Secret Intelligence Service, and is in the closest touch with the Admiralty, Foreign Office, Ministry of Home Security, and other Government departments. The Air Staff is also in constant touch with the Mediterranean Air Command on matters concerned with operations and Intelligence, and very close liaison arrangements have been made between the different commanders in the Mediterranean theater and in the United Kingdom.

The interposition of a new link in the chain of control would, we are convinced, cause a reduction in the efficiency of these arrangements, and the reduction would be even more serious if, as indicated in paragraph 3 of the directive proposed to [in?] C. C. S. 400, the Commanding General of U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe is placed as an interim measure directly under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This latter proposal would mean the termination of the arrangement agreed to at Casablanca² whereby the C. A. S. exercises general direction over the operations of the 8th Air Force in furtherance of the combined bomber offensive and would, in our opinion, be a retrograde step. It would in fact mean that the ultimate control required for the direction of the bomber offensive would have to be effected in Washington rather than as at present in London. Since all the Intelligence and administrative services which are essential for the efficiency of the bomber offensive are centralized in London, there could not fail to be a grave reduction in efficiency from this change.

The final arrangement proposed is that the new Commander should come directly under the Command of the Supreme Allied Commander for Operations in N. W. Europe. In our opinion, it would be fundamentally wrong in principle that the direction of a large part of the strategic bomber offensive which affects operations on all fronts in the European theater should be exercised by the Theater Commander of any single theater.

b. The new Commander would presumably require a large staff of all kinds in order to exercise operational and the necessary administrative control. We cannot help thinking that the provision of the large numbers of specialized and skilled staff officers needed must be a matter of considerable difficulty at the present time and, since the benefits expected from this proposal are in fact attainable under the present organization, that it would be highly wasteful in skilled manpower.

c. The proposal would also cause serious difficulties in the Mediterranean Air Command not only by a division of operational from administrative responsibility but also because it would mean that the night bomber component of the Mediterranean Strategical Air Force would be served by a different chain of information and would be under a different authority from the day bombing component though operated by the same headquarters staff in the Mediterranean theater. This could only make for confusion.

5. To summarize, we consider that the present proposal:

a. Would not secure any advantage over the present system of control;

b. Would mean breaking up the present highly integrated system of control, which has achieved considerable success, and the replacement of it by a less closely integrated and less effective system;

c. Would be wasteful in skilled staff.

² See Matloff, p. 29. The records of the Casablanca Conference of January 1943 are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

We recognize however that there is much to be gained by having a single authority charged with the general direction of the heavy bomber offensive against Germany—someone who can interpret the Combined Chiefs of Staff directives by issuing detailed instructions from time to time according to the changing situation and who can exercise a general supervision over all bomber operations against Germany and the administrative support that they require, and over the provision of Intelligence and Tactical information so as to secure the most effective use of the heavy bomber forces engaged in the Combined Bomber Offensive. We do not see how such an authority can be on a lower level than a Chief of Staff since only on this level can the supervising authority keep in touch with all the strategical political and administrative factors which affect the bombing programme. Our conclusion is that the authority best able to exercise this general control is the Chief of the Air Staff. The latter, acting as the agent of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is already charged with the coordination of the operations of the 8th Air Force and the R. A. F. This coordination has been of the closest and, in our opinion, has enabled the best possible use to be made of the available forces. It would not be difficult to extend this system to the 15th Air Force by giving the C. A. S. authority to regulate, in conformity with the plans of the Commanders of R. A. F. Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force in this country, the priority of objectives to be attacked by the 15th Air Force. The C. A. S. would also be in a position, subject to the Theater Commander's assessment of his administrative capacity, to transfer strategical forces from the United Kingdom to the Mediterranean and back if this seemed profitable.

6. The United States Chiefs of Staff may wish to consider this alternative arrangement to secure the advantages which they have in mind in putting forward their present proposal.³

³ The comments by the United States Chiefs of Staff were set forth in C. C. S. 400/2, *post*, p. 787.

Roosevelt Papers

*The Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East (Landis)
to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

CAIRO, November 26, 1943.

DEAR HARRY: Herewith is a memorandum that Averill¹ asked me to prepare for you this morning.

¹ W. Averell Harriman.

I am grateful to you for your kindnesses to me this morning and for the opportunity that it gave me to put a few of the significant issues that we face in this area.

You know that at any time I am at yours and the Boss's beck and call for anything.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES M. LANDIS

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Director of Economic Operations in the
Middle East (Landis)*

MEMORANDUM ON CONSUMER GOODS IN IRAN

Of course it is impossible to obtain absolutely accurate figures in view of the lack of statistical information in Iran, but these figures I think represent the situation fairly accurately on consumer goods.

As of January 1, 1943, the total quantity of all consumer goods, not including cereals and other bulk foodstuffs, in all Persian warehouses at the beginning of the year was 80,000 tons. Recent information indicates that between 15,000 to 18,000 tons are still at Persian Gulf ports alone. In an attached memorandum, I am breaking down the 80,000 tons of the various different categories. I can give you an even more detailed breakdown but I do not believe that this is necessary for your purposes.

The difficulty in Iran lies in the existence of an adequate distribution system and not in the absence of consumer goods. If you have time, go down to the central bazaars in Tehran and not only look at the goods that are available there in the shops but go in behind to the warehouses that are in the rear of these shops and see the masses of goods that are piled up there. Of course the prices are quite beyond reach. Some economic theorists believe that it might be advisable to throw consumer goods into Iran in order to break these black market prices. But the answer to that is that we have neither the tonnage nor the goods to create surpluses of such a size that black market prices would be permanently broken.

I might add a little about the truck situation. I think it is true that there are perhaps less trucks in Iran than there were in 1938, but not very many less. We are just compiling figures on this now. But the trucks that are in Iran are neither kept at jobs that are essential nor are they kept in repair. Of some 400 Lend-Lease trucks in Tehran I saw 83 of them in one yard alone that were laid up because of lack of repair facilities. Here again the trouble is not spare parts but the want of efficient management.

Attached herewith are data for specific items of consumer goods—the important ones being sugar, tea, drugs and cotton piece goods.²

The following data is given for specific items:

(a) *Sugar* (October 30th)

UKCC Stocks	6500 tons
Government Stocks	24000 tons
Total	30500

MESC has now programmed for Iran during 1944, 5000 tons per month.

(b) *Tea* (October 30th)

Government Stocks 800 tons.

An additional 2,000 tons are to be imported during November and December, with a total 1944 program of 6,800 tons. This latter figure represents 90% of pre-war consumption.

(c) *Coffee*: Stocks unknown, but believed to be extremely small. The 1944 program is set for a total of 300 tons.

(d) *Cocoa*: None heretofore furnished by MESC. 1944 program includes 100 tons which is now available in Palestine for shipment at any time.

(e) *Whiskey and Gin*: Stocks negligible since there was no quota for 1942-43. Present recommendations are for 1944 quota of 6,600 cases subject to approval by London and Washington.

(f) *Drugs and Pharmaceuticals*: Lend-Lease Representative MacDonald estimates sufficient supply for one year, not including items now under procurement. In addition to stocks held by the Government, 85 tons of drugs and instruments have been held in ports for over a year.

(g) *Cigarettes and Tobacco*: There are no imports of cigarettes since Iran is self-sufficient. At present they have on hand a nine months' stock of unmanufactured cigarette tobacco, and a seven months' stock of unmanufactured pipe tobacco.

(h) *Cotton Piecegoods*: Estimated stocks on hand September 7th: 21,263 bales exclusive of very considerable stocks held by private merchants, and the products of Iranian Government textile factories (which have held back from the distribution authorities more than 4,500 bales during the past eight months).

Estimated stocks of cotton piecegoods as at January 1st, 1943 is 5,000 tons, of which 80% is probably Government.

(i) *Woolen Piecegoods*: Iran is self-sufficient generally, but a quota of 80 tons has been assigned for 1944 in order to provide cheap clothing for low-paid Government servants. This, however, is subject to non-interference with minimum demands of other territories.

(j) *Toothbrushes*: Stocks believed to be extremely low.

² This paragraph ends at the bottom of the first page of the memorandum. The next paragraph appears on a separate, unnumbered page.

- (k) *Bicycles*: 500 were recently imported but are believed to have been sold to users, making a total of 22,616 in operation with no unsold stocks.
- (l) *Glassware and Crockery*: Reports indicate that "two warehouses are full" of glassware. Iran is self-sufficient in crockery and in fact has offered to export to other countries at high prices.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Director of War Mobilization (Byrnes) to the President*¹

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1943.

Cablegram for the President:

Increased landing craft program submitted Wednesday² possible only if we immediately issue directive giving priority over all programs any kind. Please wire whether I shall have Nelson issue directive.³

BYRNES

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels.

² November 24, 1943; *ante*, p. 395.

³ For the reply sent by Hopkins, see *post*, p. 617. Byrnes states (*All In One Lifetime*, p. 204) that he sent another telegram to Roosevelt later the same day in which he suggested that the President might count on 15 percent more output than was indicated in the cautious figures in his telegram of November 24, 1943. It has not been possible to find a copy of this additional telegram of November 26 in official files.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 26 November 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Thank you much for your message of November 23rd informing me of your intention to reach Teheran on the 28th or 29th.² I expect to reach there on the 27th. It will be good to see you.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent by Harriman to Spalding at Moscow, via Navy channels, for delivery to Stalin.

² See *ante*, p. 385.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of State*¹

[CAIRO,] 26 November 1943.

In reply to your message transmitted as White 38,² I am convinced that this is not the time to make any final decisions or plans relating to Civil Affairs for France. The whole situation in North Africa is complicated but the general attitude of the Committee and especially De Gaulle is shown in the Lebanon affair. De Gaulle is now claiming the right to speak for all of France and is talking openly about how he intends to set up his government in France as soon as the Allies get in there.

I am increasingly inclined to the thought that the occupation when it takes place should be a wholly military occupation.

I see no need for any further discussion at this time, though I may discuss it informally when I see the Russians.³

I saw Vishinsky four days ago⁴ and I don't believe the Russians will press for any immediate action. I am showing this to Churchill and I hope we can hold up the whole matter until we can see the picture more clearly.

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room, via military channels, and presumably forwarded by the Map Room to the Department of State; Department of State copy not found.

² Telegram of November 24, 1943, *ante*, p. 392.

³ For the discussion of problems concerning France at the Tehran Conference, see *post*, pp. 484, 509, 514.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 310.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President's Personal Representative (Hurley) to the President*¹

[TEHRAN,] November 26, 1943.

This morning I informed Russian Chargé d'Affaires² that you would reside at your own Legation. I told him that this decision in my opinion was final and was made before any invitation had been received by you from Russia.³ All this was satisfactory at that time. At three o'clock this afternoon, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires called on me to say that the Russian Government cordially invites you to be its guest at its Embassy while here. I told him I would convey to you this generous invitation but inasmuch as you had already decided to reside at your own Legation and all preparations had been made

¹ Sent via Army channels.

² Mikhail Alexeyevich Maximov.

³ See the editorial note, *ante*, p. 310, and Lohbeck, p. 210.

accordingly I thought that perhaps it would be too late to make another change, although I knew that you and Stalin would spend a great deal of time together while here. In the meantime DARKY⁴ is inspecting suggested quarters, Russian Embassy, so that if you should decide to accept the invitation, all details regarding quarters will be in hand.

⁴ Code name for James J. Rowley of the United States Secret Service.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President's Personal Representative (Hurley) to the President*¹

[TEHRAN,] November 26, 1943.

Since wiring you I accompanied General Connolly and Rowley together with the Russian Charge d'Affaires and other Russian security officers for an inspection of quarters which the Russians propose to give to you as their guest. For Reilly's information the quarters are in the same building inside the Russian Embassy compound which he inspected and consist of six rooms to the left of the entrance to the building. The suite contains one large reception or assembly room, four smaller rooms that could be used as bedrooms and one large bedroom with adjoining bath. For the other four rooms there is but one bath, making two baths and toilet facilities for the entire suite which is the same number as in the American Legation. In the suite there is also a large dining room and below the main bedroom a kitchen which can be used by your staff for you. The building is steam heated. The suite they are offering you is on the same floor with and adjoins the large conference room. No one else is living in this building but two other rooms are being used as a Russian communications office. There is also a private entrance to the suite. The only work needed to be done on the suite is to re-install bathtubs and toilets which have been removed but can be replaced quickly. List of necessary furnishings being given Russians by DARKY. From the standpoint of your convenience and comfort, from the standpoint of conference communications and security, these quarters are far more desirable than your own Legation. As I told you in my earlier wire, I have advised the Russians that you have definitely decided to use your own Legation. The Russians still most cordially solicit your acceptance of their invitation.

HURLEY

¹ Sent via Army channels.

Roosevelt Papers

The President to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

[CAIRO,] November 26, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: AMBASSADOR KIRK

Please have Wadsworth, Consul General at Beirut, come down here when I get back here—I think about Thursday or Friday.¹

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

¹ December 2 or 3, 1943.

Roosevelt Papers

President Roosevelt to the Chinese Minister of Finance (Kung)

[CAIRO,] November 26, 1943.

MY DEAR DR. KUNG. It was good of you to think of me and I am delighted to have that delicious Chinese tea ¹—especially because I am more and more substituting tea for coffee.

Our visit here in Cairo with the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang has been not only very delightful but it has been a true success. It is the beginning of many such conferences, I hope. They have spoken to me in regard to the inflation problem and when they get back to Chungking they will speak with you in regard to a suggestion which I have made.² I have not, of course, had a chance to talk with the Secretary of the Treasury ³ about it but I will do so just as soon as I get home.

I do hope that I shall have the pleasure of seeing you one of these days very soon. My warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

F[RANKLIN] D R[OOSEVELT]

The Honorable Dr. H. H. Kung,

The Executive Yuan,

Chungking, China

¹ On Madame Chiang's return from the United States to China earlier in the year, Roosevelt had sent with her a letter (not printed herein) and a box of cigars for Kung. Kung replied to Roosevelt in a letter (not printed herein) of November 17, 1943, which was forwarded from Washington to Cairo. A gift of tea accompanied this letter.

² Regarding the suggestion referred to here, see *post*, p. 804, and *The Stilwell Papers*, pp. 251-252.

³ Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

Roosevelt Papers

Madame Chiang to President Roosevelt

CAIRO, 26 November 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You will, I hope, forgive me for this uncertain handwriting, for I am still Cyclops, and the letters all run together very unneatly. But the Generalissimo wishes me to tell you again how much he appreciates what you have done and are doing for China. When we said goodbye to you this afternoon, he could not find words adequately expressive to convey his emotions and feelings, nor to thank you sufficiently for your friendship. He felt too the wistfulness of saying farewell, although he feels that only a short while will elapse before his next meeting with you. Meanwhile he hopes that you will consider him as a friend whom you can trust. He on his part finds joy and comfort in the thought that as time goes on, the bonds of affection and similarity of motives between you and him will be strengthened.

Will you please overlook this very inadequate interpretation of his views, for I have had a full day, and my brain simply cannot encompass what he conveyed to me to pass on to you.

On my own behalf, Mr. President, please remember that as I write this, my heart overflows with affection and gratitude for what you have done, and for what you are.

MAYLING SOONG CHIANG

Defense Files : Telegram*The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Secretary of War (Stimson)*

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 27 November 1943.

PRIORITY

[10064] (To Stimson attention Hilldring and Dunn from McCloy)

Had talk yesterday with Eden.¹ Quite evident he feels European Advisory Commission in London important achievement and does not wish to derogate in any way from the authority which he feels was given it by the terms of reference and documents which were referred to it at Moscow. He wants to dignify it and have us send a small but good staff to London immediately to assist Winant whom the President has advised Prime Minister he intends to appoint to Commission. However, Eden has agreed and I believe favors submission by Advis-

¹ See *ante*, p. 351.

ory Commission of their tentative recommendations to Combined Chiefs of Staff for comment and suggestion by them prior to any final submission of recommendation by commission to Governments. Also has tentatively agreed to remove further pressure for removal of Combined Civil Affairs Committee to London and if we are prepared to take step one above will agree to permit British representatives CCAC to take full part in all discussions relating to U. K. based operations, perhaps sending to Washington a man with substantial authority to augment or replace existing British representation. Under this arrangement very important we should send good military man to act on Winant's staff, and that State Department should nominate their men. Eden pleaded that this staff be sent to London immediately. British want a military man who is familiar with CCAC procedures in London to help Winant. . . . Will have to await return of party from the East ² and further confirmation by British of their agreement as above-outlined. Above entirely satisfactory to me and best arrangement I think we can make under the circumstances but would like to have your views. For information Dunn, Eden seemed much interested in Combined U. K.-U. S. Commission to deal with French political situation suggested in your number 1074.³ Question was raised by British as to where such a Commission could be located most effectively, whether in London, Washington or Algiers. Eden agrees with Hull on political desirability of avoiding separate spheres of responsibility but both military groups here feel this is impractical. Eden also expressed prompt approval of Hull's opinion as to declaration by Governments of occupying forces as expressed in 1074.

² i. e., from Tehran.

³ *Ante*, p. 423.

Defense Files: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Secretary of War (Stimson)

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 27 November 1943.

PRIORITY

10065 (To Stimson from McCloy)

Have had talks with Joint Chiefs and British on civil affairs matters and discussions with others including President, Winant and Eden.¹ Feel that if British confirm agreement outlined in my 10064 we have accomplished all that we have set out to do on civil affairs matter.

¹ See *ante*, pp. 351, 415, and telegram printed *supra*.

Though I have only been on fringe of strategical discussions, it is clear that all decisions of important matters are held up pending results Eastern conference² to which I did not go though I was requested to stay on here pending their return.

² Conference at Tehran.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Director of War Mobilization (Byrnes) to the President*¹

[WASHINGTON,] November 27, 1943.

For the President from Justice Byrnes

Francis Gibbs advises me that if immediately authorized, forty to fifty additional ships nearly identical with LCIL but having speed of twelve knots probably can be delivered within specified time by converting army cargo vessels under contract in Gulf intended for duty in MacArthur theatre. Could probably start deliveries within sixty days. If these ships are held not suitable for all functions of LCIL they can at least be substituted for non-combat duty of LCIL and LST releasing the latter. If you approve please wire me authority to proceed.²

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels. The draft copy of the telegram in the O. W. M. Files is classified as secret.

² No reply specifically to this message has been found. See, however, Hopkins' telegram of November 28, 1943, *post*, p. 617.

Defense Files : Telegram

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy)

[WASHINGTON,] November 28, 1943.

Eyes only to McCloy from Stimson

1124. Hull and I agree with the suggestion that the tentative recommendations of the European Advisory Commission be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for comment and suggestion by them prior to any final submission of recommendations by the commission to Governments. We are pleased to note Eden's tentative agreement to remove further pressure for removal of Combined Civil Affairs Committee to London, and to permit British representatives Combined Civil Affairs Committee to take full part in all discussions relating to operations based on UK. . . . State Department believes that UK-US Commission to deal with French political situation should be located in

London. I congratulate you heartily on having worked out thus far such satisfactory solution of these problems.

Roosevelt Papers

The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

[CAIRO,] 30 November 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS:

We have worked out with the British an arrangement for handling civil affairs, so called, in conjunction with the European Advisory Commission which I think will be satisfactory:

First, we agree to treat the EAC seriously and to put good men who are familiar with what has already been going on, on the staff to help Winant.

Second, they agree to forget their idea of moving the Combined Civil Affairs Committee to London and will empower their representatives in Washington to go ahead and function.

Third, all recommendations made by the EAC will be first submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington for their comments and suggestions before being submitted as final recommendations to the respective governments.

Fourth, the Combined Chiefs of Staff will prepare the final directives for the commanders in the field, based on the determinations of the three governments as thus obtained—the detailed planning to be carried forward by the local command.

This general setup was agreed to in my conference with Eden¹ and later Jebb, his assistant, before leaving for Tehran said he felt "London" (whoever that was) would go along. He asked me to prepare a memo embodying this agreement for final confirmation on his return which I have done.²

This in my judgement is the best that can be done and I have gotten Hull's and Stimson's approval of it.³ If you say O. K. I think it can be put across. My only concern is as to how expeditiously the EAC will function. I do not get the impression that Winant is a fast administrator but we will give him as good a staff as we can collect. If it works at that end it will work at ours.

Will you phone me?

Sincerely,

J. J. [McCLOY]

¹ Regarding the conversations of Winant and McCloy with Eden and Jebb on November 26, 1943, see *ante*, p. 351.

² *Infra*.

³ See *supra*.

Hopkins Papers

*Draft Agreement Prepared by the United States Delegation*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 30 November 1943.

LIAISON BETWEEN EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION AND COMBINED
CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. At the Moscow Conference there was established the European Advisory Commission to which there has been referred civil affairs matters closely connected with military considerations of primary interest to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. It is essential that a liaison procedure be established between the European Advisory Commission and the Combined Chiefs of Staff whereby they can readily exchange views and comments on civil affairs matters.

3. With these considerations in mind the following principles are laid down as satisfactory liaison procedure between the European Advisory Commission and the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

a. Tentative recommendations of the European Advisory Commission will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their comment prior to final submission of recommendations by the Commission to the three governments.

b. The governments will transmit approved recommendations of the Commission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who will prepare and transmit final directives to the appropriate commanders. Detailed planning will be carried forward at the headquarters of the commanders concerned.

c. The British representation on the CCAC will be instructed to participate and empowered to act in all civil affairs matters relating to combined operations, without limitation as to area, that are brought before the committee.

Accepted at SEXTANT Conference
CAIRO, EGYPT

.....
.....

¹ The genesis of this draft agreement is explained in the memorandum from McCloy to Hopkins, *supra*.

Roosevelt Papers

The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

[CAIRO,] 30 November 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY HOPKINS:

In the course of my talk with Eden ¹ I brought up Hull's suggestion ² of a Committee set up somewhat as the Combined Committee to deal with all French questions. All matters relating to our dealings with the French would for the time being be cleared through that committee. Hull's idea was that this would eliminate the irritation and distrust that now arises in connection with our respective French policies. Eden expressed prompt approval of the idea and today Hull cabled through Stimson ³ to the effect that he thought it would be well to set such a group up in London. I gather it would be most informal and could consist of a military man and a foreign affairs man from each of the governments, calling on other agencies for such economic and other help as they need.

Would the President think well of this idea? If so, I can see that it is pushed along.

Sincerely,

J. J. [McCLOY]

¹ See *ante*, p. 351.

² See Hilldring's telegram of November 25, 1943, to McCloy, *ante*, p. 423.

³ *Ante*, p. 444. The telegram in question had been sent on the evening of November 28.

Hopkins Papers

*Memorandum by the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose),
Temporarily at Cairo*

BRIEF COMMENT ON MR. JORDAN'S TELEGRAM OF NOVEMBER 15, 1943,
ABOUT ARMS FOR SAUDIA ARABIA ¹

In the first paragraph the question numbered (6) was not asked, though the answer was supplied by the King's messenger. The remainder of the first paragraph is correct, and the second paragraph, insofar as it goes.

What does not appear from Mr. Jordan's telegram is that King Ibn Saud was informed as a preface to the inquiry that the American and British military authorities in Washington were in consultation on the problem of arms for Saudi Arabia. The King was further

¹ See *ante*, p. 378.

informed that the subject of the inquiry would be discussed with the British Minister in Jidda; and the American Minister Resident did discuss it with the British Minister on a date which cannot be stated exactly without reference to records in Jidda, but which may have been November 16 or November 17, 1943.

A noteworthy feature of Mr. Jordan's telegram is that his concern over apparent lack of collaboration did not lead him to refer to his American colleague to verify the completeness or accuracy of his information before reporting to the Foreign Office, nor did he mention it when discussing arms with the American Minister Resident on or about November 16, 1943. It is also worthwhile to note that the British Foreign Office (or Ministry of State) attributed sufficient importance to this point of procedure to refer it to the highest authority.

CAIRO, November 30, 1943.

J[AMES] S. M[OOSE] JR.

B. THE COMMUNIQUÉ AND ITS RELEASE

Cairo Legation Records

*Final Text of the Communiqué*¹

PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and Prime Minister Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa. The following general statement was issued:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land and air. This pressure is already rising.

"The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other terri-

¹ This is the agreed text as it was given by Hopkins to Kirk on the afternoon of November 26, 1943; see the memorandum by Kirk, *infra*. For earlier drafts of the communiqué, see *ante*, pp. 399-404. The communiqué was released to the press by the White House on December 1, 1943, and was printed, with slight editorial variations, in the Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, December 4, 1943, p. 393.

tories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

"With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

Cairo Legation Records

Memorandum by the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

SECRET

CAIRO, November 26, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

On this afternoon Mr. Harry Hopkins handed me a copy of the communiqué to be issued in regard to the Anglo American Chinese talks in Cairo and asked me to hold it pending the receipt of instructions from Tehran as to its release. Mr. Hopkins said that the matter of the release had not been decided upon and that I would be given 24 hours notice so that the release by the three interested countries might be simultaneous. Mr. Hopkins added that I should notify the Chinese¹ when I got instructions from Tehran. At the conclusion of the conversation I said that it seemed that all I was to do was to see that the U. S. correspondents in Cairo got the communiqué through O. W. I. and Mr. Hopkins replied in the affirmative.

A[LEXANDER] K[IRK]

¹ i. e., the Chinese Legation at Cairo.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins), Temporarily at Tehran*¹

[CAIRO,] 28 November 1943.

Immediate and urgent for Harry Hopkins signed Kirk.

With reference to document which you gave me for safe keeping pending instructions from Tehran I learn from Ryan of Ministry of Information that British have communicated text in code through British Embassy here to Foreign Office in London preparatory to release upon notification flash from your party. Ryan states such

¹ Sent via Army channels.

release will be immediate without twenty-four hour advance notice mentioned and that Cairo handout will be for background only and not for transmission.

In view of this situation I would appreciate immediate detailed instructions as to action to be taken by me so that there may be no slip-up by the Legation and in order that I may notify Chinese as you requested. Russell Barnes of Office of War Information now in Tehran is familiar with set-up here and can furnish you with any additional information in that regard.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

*The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins), Temporarily at Tehran*¹

URGENT

CAIRO, November 29, 1943.

SECRET

With reference to my message of yesterday Chinese Chargé² has just called to say that he has cabled text of document to Chungking with instructions to hold release pending flash from him.

I told him that I had been instructed to notify him when I received word from Tehran of date of release. As matters now stand therefore texts of document in question are in Foreign Offices in London and Chungking, but unless you have sent text direct there is none in Washington. Do you wish me to cable text in advance to State Department to be held pending instructions as to date of release or are you taking action in Tehran?

KIRK

¹ Sent via Army channels.

² T'ang Wu.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)*¹

TEHRAN, 29 November 1943.

Your instructions are as follows: Give text of communiqué to OWI with instructions that it is released for publication at 2330 hours Greenwich Meridian Time Wednesday December 1st under Cairo date line. News services will be given text of communiqué at 1700 hours Cairo time Tuesday November 30 to facilitate transmission.

¹ Sent via Army channels.

Release terms must warn that all material is secret and confidential until the hour for published release and must not be discussed outside newspaper offices or speculated upon in any way. No pre-announcement will be made concerning tendency of important announcement and newspapers and radio stations are directed not to make advance statements of any kind whatsoever until exact hour of release. Background material at Cairo is subject to same release conditions. Stories released must include information all principals have left Cairo for unannounced destinations. Pictures are released same hour or whenever transmission is possible. These instructions are approved by the President. Notify Chinese Minister in detail.² Also send immediately highest priority full copy these instructions with text communiqué to Steve Early, Secretary to the President, Washington, D. C.³

² Chargé T'ang Wu was notified on November 29, 1943. The newly appointed Minister, Hsu Nien-tseng, had apparently not yet arrived at his post. He presented his credentials in January 1944.

³ This message was repeated, with the text of the communiqué, in a telegram of November 29, 1943, from Kirk to Early, sent via Army channels.

Cairo Legation Records: Telegram

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)*¹

SECRET

[TEHRAN, November 30, 1943.]

To Kirk for Frank Shea from Hopkins.

Re Shea's query² instructions are as follows: Eliminate or hold for later release all references to Mena House, villas occupied by any members of party, or Mena itself. It is permissible to release details of trip to Pyramids and Sphinx and other color stories so long as no hint or disclosure of local conference locations is given. Cairo date-line still stands. Text of communiqué unchanged. Repeat this message to Steve Early for reference to Surles.³

¹ Sent via Navy channels.

² Shea at Cairo, in a telegram to Hopkins at Tehran ("for Russell Barnes"), had noted that the communiqué merely gave "in North Africa" as the location of the Conference, and he queried whether specific mention of Mena in the background material was permissible (copy sent to Early; Roosevelt Papers).

³ Sent to Early in paraphrase, via Army channels.

Censorship Files

*The Director of the Office of War Information (Davis) to the British Minister of Information (Bracken)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 30, 1943.

PRIORITY

I must enter the most energetic protest against the Reuter[s] dispatch purporting to come from Lisbon and distributed today.² While I realize that Reuters is a purely private institution on which the British government has not the slightest shadow of influence, this dispatch is reported to have been passed by the British censorship for radio transmission abroad though we understand it was not published in the United Kingdom. I need hardly point out to you the very unfortunate consequences. First is a serious and perhaps perilous violation of security. Second, the political warfare value for both the American and British governments of the meetings and the decisions made thereat will be materially lessened by premature disclosure of the fact which enables the Germans and the Japanese to blanket the world with their version of the story before the actual announcement is on the record. Finally, a consideration not without importance is the universal indignation of the American press at Reuters disclosure here though not in British Isles of facts this morning imparted to American newspapers with instruction to observe extraordinary precautions to preserve secrecy. As you know this is far from the first time that such an incident has occurred though this exceeds all its predecessors in flagrancy. This practice could become one of the most serious obstacles to Anglo-American understanding. In the

¹ Sent to Carroll, Director of the London bureau of the Office of War Information, for transmittal to Bracken.

² The Reuters dispatch, as printed in the *New York Times* of December 1, 1943, p. 1, col. 1, read as follows:

"Lisbon, Portugal, Nov. 30—President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill have completed a long conference in Cairo and are now en route to somewhere in Iran to meet Premier Stalin, it is known here definitely.

"Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek took part in the Cairo conference and will also meet Premier Stalin.

"A communiqué agreed on after the Cairo conference will be published later this week. The three statesmen met on one occasion in a tent in the shadow of the Pyramids.

"During the conference Cairo was cut off from communications with the rest of the world. President Roosevelt and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who was accompanied by Madame Chiang, traveled to Cairo by air, while Prime Minister Churchill traveled by sea."

interest of that understanding, as well as of our coordinated propaganda against the enemy, I most urgently request you to see that censorship holds Reuters in line hereafter.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*The President's Secretary (Early) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*¹

[WASHINGTON,] 2 December 1943.

For Harry Hopkins from Mr. Early

Cairo communiqué enthusiastically received throughout country. Great praise jubilation prevails all quarters. This despite premature release by Reuters in dispatch under Lisbon dateline of virtually complete story of Cairo conferences almost twenty-four hours before official communiqué was released thus most unfortunately discounting communiqué and enabling German Japanese propagandists meanwhile to broadcast to world their versions of conference. Urge reduction of time interval between distribution and publication should other official communiqués be issued. Also suggest strict prohibition against export of contents of future communiqués prior to release date.

¹ Sent via military channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President's Secretary (Early)*¹

[TEHRAN,] 2 December 1943.

For Mr. Early from Mr. Hopkins

Text of Teheran Communiqué² will be released for publication 1300 hours Washington time, 2000 hours Moscow time, December 6th. Details of release will be sent later. Please send report concerning treatment of Chinese communiqué including any violations release date or unauthorized premature publication facts concerning Cairo or Teheran Conferences and your suggestions.

¹ Sent via military channels.

² *Post*, p. 639.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

The President's Secretary (Early) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) ¹

[WASHINGTON,] 2 December 1943.

From Mr. Early to Mr. Hopkins.

Supplementing White 74,² also acknowledging your Black fifty.³ Reuters' treatment Cairo story provoked bitter resentment by American newspapers. Protests have been sent to Bracken and according to press reports today Reuters premature release was subject of heated debate in House of Commons today.⁴ Bracken disclaimed responsibility. However, the Reuters story, circulated generally elsewhere some 33 hours ahead of official release[,] was not permitted by British censors to be published in England.

I am receiving protests, including one from Roy Roberts. Ever since your departure we have pleaded with British censorship and government for greater security. Reuters action seems most reprehensible to us. Their reports gave away practically the entire Cairo story except actual text of communiqué. The text was about all they did not publish in advance of communiqué. Washington correspondents are disposed to place the responsibility for Reuters' actions on the British, not on us. They appreciate we did everything possible to protect story.

They are making on their own responsibility formal protest to Halifax here.

Our press, of course, published Reuters' reports but carefully refrained from publishing anything else although they had received fullest advices from their own correspondents. None of the latter was published until the release hour fixed by Cairo. As Roy Roberts protests "The release by Reuters destroyed much of the effect of what should have been one of the epochal highspots of the war."

Press here received today from London following, "Ankara reported Stalin Roosevelt arrived Teheran." To date except for speculative pieces that Roosevelt moved from Cairo to meet Stalin presumably in Teheran, nothing important has been published yet about Teheran conference.⁵

¹ Sent via military channels.

² Early's previous telegram of December 2, 1943, *ante*, p. 453.

³ Telegram printed *supra*.

⁴ See *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 395, cols. 517-520.

⁵ For premature releases concerning the Tehran Conference, see *post*, pp. 641 ff.

Only suggestions I have to make were included in previous dispatch. However, I urgently repeat that those suggestions be enforced.⁶ I repeat that despite Reuters' actions, the Cairo conference reaction most favorably received by people of this country and the morale effect of the three power pledges is evident everywhere.

Regards to all.

EARLY

⁶ For Roosevelt's decision altering the method of handling press releases, see *post*, p. 848.

III. THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE

7. THE PRESIDENT'S LOG AT TEHRAN, NOVEMBER 27-DECEMBER 2, 1943¹

White House Files

Log of the Trip

Saturday, November 27th. (Cairo; en route Cairo to Teheran; and at Teheran.)

- 5:58 a. m. The President and members of his party left his villa for the airport. All hands were up and ready for a 4:30 a. m. departure for the airport but word had been received that our take-off would have to be delayed temporarily due to fog over the field.
- 6:35 a. m. The President and his party arrived at Cairo West airport. A light fog still persisted over the field so the President and members of his party embarked in their planes to await the lifting of the fog.
- 7:07 a. m. The fog had lifted by now and the President's plane took off for Teheran, Iran, where the President was to confer with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin and their respective military staffs and political delegates. Riding in the President's plane with him were: Mr. Hopkins, Ambassador Harriman, Admiral Leahy, Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire, General Watson, Major Boettiger, Lieut-Commander Fox, Lieutenant (jg) Rigdon, Secret Service Agents Reilly, Fredericks and Kellerman, and Steward Prettyman.²
- 7:40 a. m. Our plane passed over the Suez Canal near the town of Isma[i]lia.

¹ For the portion of the Log preceding November 27, 1943, see *ante*, p. 293.

² In response to a question from the Historical Office of the Department of State, Harriman wrote as follows in a letter of May 25, 1954 (023/5-2554):

"Hopkins and I discussed the question of American aid in repairing economic damage done to the Soviet Union during the war during the flight from Cairo to Tehran on November 27, 1943. I mentioned the matter to President Roosevelt as one of the matters which might be raised by the Russians during the Conference. My recollection, however, is that the subject was never raised or discussed between the President or any of the American delegation with the Russians during the Conference.

"The President authorized me to discuss the matter with Molotov after the Conference was over."

The subject in fact was taken up with Molotov shortly after Harriman's return to Moscow following the Conference at Tehran (861.51/3019, 3022).

8:30 a. m.

Our plane passed over the city of Jerusalem. Major Bryan took us on a wide-circle tour of the city before continuing on, thus affording all passengers an excellent view of this ancient and inspiring city. Our route from Jerusalem took us east over Lake Habbaniya and the Euphrates River; then we turned northeast, passing Baghdad to the south. Just after we crossed the Tigris River we picked up the Abadan-Teheran motor highway and followed its course generally as far as Hamadan. The Iranian railroad, over which much of our lend-lease supplies for Russia travel, could also be seen at times. From the air we sighted train loads and motor convoys loaded with U. S. lend-lease supplies, bound from the Persian Gulf port of Basra to Russia. Our pilot took advantage of the almost perfect visibility prevailing and never flew above 8000 feet altitude, oft[t]imes flying through the mountain passes instead of flying over the mountains. From Hamadan we took a direct air-line route for Teheran. This entire flight offered a real bird's-eye view of the many geological contrasts this generally desolate country has to offer, particularly in the low sandy desert country and in the bleak, nude mountains.

Before landing at Teheran we advanced our clocks and watches one and one-half hours to conform to Teheran local time (Zone Minus 3½ Time).

3:00 p. m.

The President's plane arrived at Teheran at 3:00 p. m., local time, covering the 1,310 miles from Cairo in approximately 6½ hours flying time. Our plane, as well as all other planes bearing members of the American and British delegations, landed at Gale Morghe airport—a Russian Army field—about five miles south of Teheran. This is a modern airfield, and on it were noted a large number of our lend-lease planes now bearing the Red Star of Russia.

The President was met at Gale Morghe airport by Major General D. H. Connolly, Commanding General of our Persian Gulf Service Command. For reasons of security, it had been requested that no other officials meet the President here. There were no honors, which was also by request.

The President left his plane and entered a waiting U. S. Army motor car and proceeded directly to the Ameri-

can Legation where he was greeted by Mr. Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., the United States Minister to Iran, and Brigadier General Patrick Hurley, U. S. A.

The President, Admiral Leahy, Admiral Brown, Major Boettiger and Mr. Hopkins occupied quarters at the American Legation as guests of Minister Dreyfus. The other members of our party were quartered at General Connolly's compound. Before leaving Cairo the President had been urged to make his quarters in Teheran at both the British and Russian Embassies.³ The decision to stay at the American Legation was made because of a wish to be more independent than a guest could hope to be and also as the British had issued their invitation first it was felt that the Russians might be offended if it were accepted. Immediately after our arrival at Teheran, Admiral Brown was sent to call on the Russian Chargé d'Affair[e]s to explain why the President had decided to live at the American Legation and why he could not accept the Russians' invitation.⁴ We learned on our arrival here that Marshal Stalin and his party had arrived in Teheran earlier in the day. The President invited Marshal Stalin to dinner at the American Legation this evening but the Marshal declined because of having had a very strenuous day.⁵

- 4:30 p. m. Mr. Maximoff, Russian Chargé d'Affair[e]s at Teheran, called on the President at the American Legation.⁶
- 4:50 p. m. Ambassadors Harriman and Winant called at the Legation.⁷
- 6:00 p. m. The President retired to his study and wrote a number of personal letters.
- 7:30 p. m. The President dined at the American Legation and had as his guests Admiral Leahy, Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire, General Watson, Ambassador Harriman, Ambassador Winant, and Mr. Hopkins.⁸
- 10:30 p. m. Lt-General Ismay called at the American Legation. He departed at 11:00 p. m.⁹

³ See the editorial note, *ante*, p. 310. The Shah of Iran, when he heard of Roosevelt's impending arrival, offered the use of one of the royal palaces as a residence and as a conference hall, but the invitation was declined; see *post*, p. 631. See also Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 172-173.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 310, and *post*, p. 475.

⁵ No copies of these messages have been found; presumably they were oral.

⁶ See *post*, p. 475.

⁷ No record has been found of the discussion that took place at this meeting.

⁸ No record has been found of the discussion that took place during this dinner meeting.

The following is a complete list of those comprising the American party visiting Teheran for this occasion

The President.	Chief Cook A. Orig, USN.
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins.	Chief Steward I. Esperancilla, USN.
Ambassador Winant.	Chief Steward M. Floresca, USN.
Ambassador Harriman.	Chief Steward F. Calinao, USN.
Admiral William D. Leahy, USN.	Chief Steward P. Estrada, USN.
General G. C. Marshall, USA.	Chief Cook C. Ordon, USN.
Admiral E. J. King, USN.	Mr. Russell W. Barnes (O. W. I.)
General H. H. Arnold, USA.	Corp. W. E. Cru[<i>o</i>]mling, USMC.
Lt-General B. B. Somervell, USA.	Chief Cook A. Javier, USN.
Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, USN.	Chief Cook B. Cabera, USN.
Rear Admiral Ross T. McIntire (MC), USN.	Chief Cook M. Corpus[<i>z</i>], USN.
Rear Admiral C. H. [<i>E.</i>] Olsen, USN.	Sgt. D. P. Flanagan, USMC.
Major General E. M. Watson, USA.	T/3 P. J. Levington, AUS.
Major General J. R. Deane, USA.	S/Sgt. R. Morton, AUS.
Major General T. T. Handy, USA.	[M/]Sgt. E. K. Stott, AUS.
Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, USN.	Sgt. E. E. Bright, AUS.
Brig. General P. J. Hurley, USA.	T/4 H. Gambaccini, AUS.
Captain W. L. Freseman, USN.	Y1c E. J. Maurer, USNR.
Captain F. B. Royal, USN.	Y1c E. G. Peterson, USNR.
Colonel A. J. McFarland, USA.	Y2c L. W. Karr, USNR.
Colonel Elliot[t] Roosevelt, AUS.	Y2c D. C. Flickinger, USNR.
Colonel E. O'Donnell, USA.	T/3 J. J. Lucas, AUS.
Commander V. D. Long, USN.	Mr. Michael F. Reilly (USSS).
Lt-Colonel Frank McCarthy, USA.	Mr. Guy H. Spaman (USSS).
Lt-Comdr. George A. Fox (HC), USN.	Mr. James J. Rowley (USSS).
Major DeWitt Greer, AUS.	Mr. Charles W. Fredericks (USSS).
Major George Durno, AUS.	Mr. Vernon Spicer (USSS).
Major John Henry, AUS.	Mr. Robert Holmes (USSS).
Major John Boettiger, AUS.	Mr. Neil A. Shannon (USSS).
Captain G. E. [<i>F.</i>] Rogers, AUS.	Mr. W. K. Deckard (USSS).
Captain H. H. Ware, AUS.	Mr. Robert Hastings (USSS).
Lieut J. M. Hannon, USNR.	Mr. Walter Haman (USSS).
Lieut (jg) W. M. Rigdon, USN.	Mr. James M. Beary (USSS).
Lieut (jg) R. P. Meikeljohn, USNR.	Mr. Gerald Behn (USSS).
Ship's Clerk E. F. Block, USN.	Mr. Frank B. Wood (USSS).
Warrant Officer (jg) John Devenney, USA.	Mr. Roy Kellerman (USSS).
Mr. Charles Bohlen (State Dept.)	As will be noted, some few members of our party (The President's party) remained at Cairo, viz:
Std 1/c Arthur Prettyman, USN.	Warrant Officer (jg) A. M. Cornelius, USA.
Sgt. Robert Hopkins, AUS.	Mr. H. S. Anderson (USSS).
M/Sgt. Frank Stoner, AUS.	Mr. James Griffith (USSS).
M/Sgt. Horace Caldwell, AUS.	Chief Steward S. Abiba, USN.
	Chief Cook L. Enrico, USN.

Sunday, November 28th. (At Teheran)

During the forenoon Ambassadors Winant and Harriman, Generals Ismay, Connolly and Hurley called at the American Legation.¹⁰

9:30 a. m. Marshal Stalin sent word through Ambassador Harriman that he was concerned about the distance that separated the American Legation from the Russian Embassy compound, because it was well known that the city of Teheran was filled with Axis sympathizers and that an unhappy incident might occur to any of the Heads of State driving through the city to visit each other.¹¹ Ambassador Harriman pointed out that if we persisted in our refusal to accept quarters in the Russian compound we would be responsible for any injury that Marshal Stalin might suffer in driving through the town to consult with President Roosevelt. Mr. Harriman emphasized that the city of Teheran had been under complete German control only a few months before and that the risk of assassination of Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin while coming to visit President Roosevelt was very real. He said that the Russians offered a part of their Embassy that would be under a separate roof and we would have complete independence but that it would bring the three Heads of State so close together that there would be no need for any of them to drive about town. The President accepted the Russian invitation and announced that he would make the move to the Russian Embassy, taking with him his own servants, at 3:00 p. m.

11:20 a. m. The President worked on official mail that had just arrived from Washington. No Congressional matter contained in this mail.

11:30 a. m. The President met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General

¹⁰ No record has been found of what was said, either within the American Delegation or in any talk or talks with Ismay, during these visits.

¹¹ Stalin's invitation had been transmitted to Harriman by Molotov late the preceding evening; see *post*, p. 476. According to Harriman's letter of May 25, 1954, to the Historical Office of the Department of State (023/5-2554), Harriman discussed the question of Roosevelt's moving with Hopkins, Hurley, Watson, and Brown on the morning of November 28, 1943. The letter continues: "All but one favored the move. When we told the President he was pleased. Churchill, when consulted, was much relieved. He and his colleagues explained that they would have been glad to have the President stay in the British Embassy, but if he went there he would only have a bedroom and sitting room and could not have the privacy with visitors which he would wish."

Arnold, Captain Royal and Lieut-Colonel McCarthy). This meeting adjourned at 1:00 p. m.¹²

3:00 p. m. The President, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Hopkins and Major Boettiger left the American Legation by auto for the Russian Embassy to live there as guests of the Russian Government.¹³ While the President and his party occupied the main building of the Embassy, Marshal Stalin and his party lived in one of the smaller houses within the Russian Embassy compound. The British Legation was just one block distant.

After seeing the President comfortably quartered at the Russian Embassy, Admirals Brown and McIntire and General Watson returned to the American Legation so as to continue the impression of occupancy of those quarters by the President and his party.

3:15 p. m. Immediately following the President's arrival at the Russian Embassy, Marshal Stalin, accompanied by Mr. Pavlov (his interpreter), called on the President and they had a long private talk.¹⁴ This was the first meeting of these two distinguished gentlemen. After Marshal Stalin departed, Commissar Molotov called on the President.¹⁵

4:00 p. m. The President, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin, with their respective military staffs and other delegates, met at the Russian Embassy.¹⁶ This was the first joint meeting of these gentlemen.¹⁷

NOTE: Generals Marshall and Arnold were not present due to a misunderstanding as to the time of the meeting. The meeting had been called on very short notice and at the time General Marshall and General Arnold were on an auto tour of the city of Teheran.

7:20 p. m. The meeting of the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin, together with their military staffs and other delegates, adjourned.¹⁸

¹² For the minutes of this meeting, see *post*, p. 476. The minutes do not include McCarthy among those present.

¹³ For the manner in which the move was effected and camouflaged, see Reilly, p. 178.

¹⁴ For the minutes of this conversation, see *post*, p. 482.

¹⁵ See *post*, p. 486.

¹⁶ For the minutes of this meeting, see *post*, p. 487.

¹⁷ At this point the Log contains the list of those present at the meeting; the list appears *post*, p. 487.

¹⁸ According to a press despatch of December 6, 1943, from Cairo, printed in the *New York Times*, December 7, 1943, p. 3, col. 3, Molotov gave a tea attended by the three Heads of Government after the first plenary meeting.

- 7:30 p. m. The President summoned Lieutenant (jg) Rigdon and worked on official mail that had arrived during the day. He signed Congressional bills S321, S364, S1336, S1354 and a proclamation entitled "Capture of Prizes".
- 8:30 p. m. The President was host at dinner in his quarters at the Russian Embassy to the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, Sir [Mr.] Anthony Eden, Ambassador Harri-man, Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Ambassador Clark Kerr, Major Birse, Commissar Molotov and Mr. Pavlov. After dinner, this group discussed conference matters until 11:00 p. m.¹⁹

NORE: Much credit is due the President's Filipino mess boys for the success of the dinner this evening. They prepared the entire meal under a real handicap. They had moved into a virtually empty room at the Russian Embassy at 4:00 p. m. Ranges and much kitchen equipment had first to be installed before they could even begin the preparation of the meal. But with their resourcefulness they saw it done and came through with the meal in their usual fine style.

General Watson spent the day today paying up his many "unfortunate" football bets. The Navy defeated the Army at football yesterday (13 to 0) and permitted practically everyone in the party to fatten his purse at the General's expense.

Monday, November 29th. (At Teheran)

- 10:30 a. m. The United States, British and U. S. S. R. military conferees met in the board room of the Russian Embassy.²⁰ All joint board meetings, as well as all plenary meetings with the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin, were held in this room while we were in Teheran.
- 11:30 a. m. Colonel Elliot[t] Roosevelt arrived in Teheran. He was due to arrive here yesterday morning and his failure to do so caused the President some concern. Colonel Roosevelt's delay in arriving at Teheran was occasioned by motor trouble at Luxor, Egypt, where he visited prior to his departure from Egypt for Teheran. Colonel Roosevelt lived with the President at the Russian Embassy while he was in Teheran.

¹⁹ For the minutes of this discussion, see *post*, p. 509. According to the minutes, Hopkins was also present.

²⁰ For the minutes of this meeting, see *post*, p. 514.

- 11:30 a. m. The President worked on his mail, clearing up all official mail that had arrived yesterday. There were no additional Congressional matters to be acted on.
- 2:00 p. m. Ambassador Harriman called at the Russian Embassy.²¹
- 2:15 p. m. The President met with the American Chiefs of Staff. Those present were: The President, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, Lt-General Somervell, Captain Royal and Lt-Colonel McCarthy.²²
- 2:30 p. m. Major Otis F. Bryan and Mr. M. F. Reilly called on the President.
- 2:45 p. m. Marshal Stalin, accompanied by Commissar Molotov and Mr. Pavlov, called on the President for an informal talk.²³
- 3:30 p. m. Members of the United States, British and U. S. S. R. delegations assembled in the large board room (conference room) at the Russian Embassy for the ceremony at which the Prime Minister presented, in the name of King George VI of Great Britain, the "Sword of Stalingrad" to Marshal Stalin for the people of the City of Stalingrad.²⁴ An honor guard, composed of both Russian and British soldiers and a Russian Army band, participated in the ceremonies. The Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin entered the room simultaneously; then the President. As the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin entered, the band played the Soviet National Anthem and then the British National Anthem. The Prime Minister then read a description of the sword (see Appendix "C")²⁵ and with these remarks:—
- "I have been commanded by His Majesty King George VI to present to you for transmission to the City of Stalingrad, this sword of honor, the design of which His Majesty has chosen and approved. The sword of honor was made by English craftsmen whose ancestors have been employed in swordmaking for generations. The blade of the sword bears the inscription: 'To the steel-hearted citizens of Stalingrad, a gift from King

²¹ No record has been found of the purpose of this call.

²² No minutes of a meeting of this kind at this time have been found in the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or elsewhere.

²³ For the record of this conversation, including a note on the variations in the sources as to who was present, see *post*, p. 529.

²⁴ Accounts of the ceremony may also be found in Arnold, p. 467; Churchill, p. 363; Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Tehran Conference*, p. 172; King, p. 519; Leahy, p. 207; and Elliott Roosevelt, p. 180.

²⁵ Appendix C, an 8-paragraph technical description, is not reproduced herein.

George VI as a token of the homage of the British people.'”

The Prime Minister made the presentation to Marshal Stalin, who accepted the sword and responded as follows:—

“On behalf of the citizens of Stalingrad, I wish to express my deep appreciation of the gift of King George VI. The citizens of Stalingrad will value this gift most highly and I ask you, Mr. Prime Minister, to convey their thanks to His Majesty the King.”

Marshal Stalin then offered the sword to President Roosevelt for his inspection. The President remarked that it was a very fine gift, and added a few words of praise for the people of the City of Stalingrad.

3:45 p. m. The sword presentation ceremony over, the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin, together with members of their respective delegations, moved to the front portico of the Russian Embassy where moving pictures and still pictures were made of them by United States, British and Russian military photographers and accredited war correspondents.

4:00 p. m. Plenary meeting of the United States, British and U. S. S. R. Chiefs of Staff and other delegates with the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin. Those present included all those present at the 4:00 p. m. meeting yesterday and in addition: Ambassador Harriman, General Marshall, General Arnold, Lt-General Somervell and Captain H. H. Ware, A. U. S., for the United States; Ambassador Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Lt-General Martel and Brigadier Hollis for Great Britain. The meeting adjourned at 7:15 p. m.²⁶

8:45 p. m. Marshal Stalin was host at dinner at the Russian Embassy to the President, the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary Eden, Commissar Molotov, Ambassador Harriman, Mr. Hopkins, Ambassador Clark Kerr, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Berezhevsky, and Major Birse. Conference discussions were held by this party from after dinner until midnight.²⁷

NOTE: The numerous Russian guards observed about the Russian Embassy yesterday—the day of our moving

²⁶ For the minutes of this meeting, see *post*, p. 533.

²⁷ For the minutes of this discussion, including a note on the variations in the sources as to who was present, see *post*, p. 552.

there—were not so much in evidence now except when Marshal Stalin came to the Embassy proper. The Russian Embassy guard was comprised entirely of Army officers and civilian secret service men.

Tuesday, November 30th. (At Teheran)

- 10:45 a. m. Ambassador Winant called on the President.²⁸
- 11:30 a. m. The President visited the branch post exchange which had been installed in the Russian Embassy for his convenience through the efforts of Major General Connolly and Captain George B. Sifton, A. U. S., and inspected the articles on display. These articles were principally of Persian manufacture.
- 12:00 (noon) The President received Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlevi, the Shah in Shah of Iran, together with his Prime Minister (Mr. Saheily), his Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Saed), and his Minister of the Imperial Court (Mr. Hossein Ala).²⁹
- While at the Russian Embassy, the Shah and his party also called on Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin, in that order.
- The Shah presented the President with a very beautiful Persian carpet of Isfahan make. The carpet (18' x 30') was designed by the celebrated Iranian artist Imami.
- 1:30 p. m. The President was host at a luncheon at the Russian Embassy to the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Pavlov, Major Birse and Mr. Bohlen.³⁰
- 4:00 p. m. Plenary meeting of American, British and Russian Chiefs of Staff and other delegates with the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin. Those present were the same as at the 4:00 p. m. meeting Monday, November 29th. This meeting adjourned at 6:15 p. m.³¹
- 8:30 p. m. The President attended a dinner at the nearby British Legation given in honor of the Prime Minister on the occasion of his 69th birthday anniversary. Those present: The Prime Minister, the President, Marshal Stalin, Sir [Mr.] Anthony Eden, Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Sergeant Robert Hopkins, Colonel Elliot[t] Roosevelt, Admiral Leahy, Commander Thompson, Mr. Bohlen,

²⁸ No record has been found of what was said during this visit.

²⁹ See *post*, p. 564.

³⁰ For the minutes of the discussion which took place at the luncheon (which mention Berezhkov as present rather than Pavlov), see *post*, p. 565.

³¹ For the minutes of this meeting, see *post*, p. 576.

Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, Mrs. Oliver, Admiral King, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Major Birse, Field Marshal Dill, Ambassador Harriman, Lord Moran, General Arnold, Lt-General Ismay, Major Boettiger, Mr. Holman, Mr. John F. [M.] Martin, Lt-General Somervell, General Brooke, Mr. Berezhevskov, Marshal Voroshilov, Sir Reader Bullard, Commissar Molotov, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Ambassador Winant, Air Chief Marshal Portal, General Marshall and Captain Randolph Churchill.³² Of particular interest are the following remarks made by Marshal Stalin during the Prime Minister's birthday dinner:—

"I want to tell you, from the Russian point of view, what the President and the United States have done to win the war. The most important things in this war are machines. The United States has proven that it can turn out from 8,000 to 10,000 airplanes per month. Russia can only turn out, at most, 3,000 airplanes a month. England turns out 3,000 to 3,500, which are principally heavy bombers. The United States, therefore, is a country of machines. Without the use of those machines, through Lend-Lease, we would lose this war."

President Roosevelt presented the Prime Minister with a Kashan bowl for a birthday gift.

11:45 p. m. The President returned to the Russian Embassy and retired for the evening.

Wednesday, December 1st. (At Teheran)

11:30 a. m. The President signed official mail. There were no Congressional matters included in this mail.

11:40 a. m. The President visited the branch post exchange in the Russian Embassy and made several purchases of souvenirs and articles to be used as gifts.

11:50 a. m. A Dr. Millspaugh, an American and the fiscal manager for the Iranian Government, called on the President.³³ Colonel Elliot[t] Roosevelt left Teheran, in his own

³² For the minutes of the discussion which took place at the dinner, see *post*, p. 582.

³³ Regarding the conversation of Millspaugh with the President, at which Hopkins was apparently also present, and regarding Roosevelt's ideas on postwar American economic assistance to Iran, presumably expressed in this conversation, see T. H. Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952), in the series *United States Army in World War II*, p. 445, footnote 14, and Arthur C. Millspaugh, *Americans in Persia*, pp. 8, 206. See also *post*, p. 629.

plane, for Cairo en route to his post of duty in North-west Africa.

12:00 (noon) The President met with the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, Foreign Minister Eden, Ambassador Harriman, Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Commissar Molotov, Ambassador Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Major Birse, Mr. Berezhevskov and Mr. Bohlen. The meeting was at the Russian Embassy.³⁴

1:00 p. m. The President and all those conferring with him since noon had lunch at the Russian Embassy. The party resumed conference discussions immediately after lunch and remained in session until 4:00 p. m.,³⁵ when they adjourned to meet again at 6:00 p. m.

6:00 p. m. The President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin and those conferring with them earlier during the afternoon met again for further discussions.³⁶ These discussions continued right up until dinner time.

8:30 p. m. The President was host at dinner at the Russian Embassy to all those present at the 6:00 p. m. conference. Conference discussions were resumed after dinner and continued until 10:30 p. m.,³⁷ during which the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin agreed on a communiqué to be issued to the press after the President's subsequent departure from Cairo. A copy of this communiqué is appended, marked Appendix "D".³⁸

10:30 p. m. At 10:30 p. m., the President bade the Marshal and other members of the Soviet Delegation goodbye and was whisked away from the Russian Embassy by auto and driven to the nearby U. S. Army Camp Amirabad where he and his party spent the night. We arrived at the camp (Colonels' quarters D 13-15) at 10:45 p. m. and the President retired shortly thereafter. Camp Amirabad is at the foot of the Elburz Mountains and it was rather cold there. Some of our party required three or more blankets to keep warm that night. The flight to Teheran from Cairo, and return, had been pronounced practical by Major Bryan provided weather conditions were favorable. During unfavorable con-

³⁴ The discussions, which continued through the luncheon, are covered in the minutes of the luncheon meeting, *post*, p. 585.

³⁵ For the record of a Roosevelt-Stalin conversation of 3:20 p. m. on this date, see *post*, p. 594.

³⁶ For the minutes of this meeting, see *post*, p. 596.

³⁷ For the subjects discussed at the dinner meeting, see *post*, p. 605.

³⁸ For the text of the communiqué, see *post*, p. 639.

ditions clouds over the mountain passes would require flying at elevations higher than Admiral McIntire was willing to have the President and some other members of the party go. Weather reports from the westward had, therefore, been watched carefully throughout our stay at Teheran and fortunately conditions had remained ideal. However this (Wednesday) morning information was received of a cold front passing Cairo, which the local aerologists predicted might blank-off the mountain passes on Friday. It was, therefore, decided to make every effort to complete business on Wednesday in order that the President might leave Teheran Thursday morning. Both the Russian and British groups had to readjust their schedule to carry this out and their willingness to do so was another demonstration of the spirit that animated all conferees to work harmoniously together.

During the forenoon the President autographed a photograph of himself for presentation to the Shah of Iran. The photograph, mounted in a silver frame, was handed to Minister Dreyfus who was requested to make the presentation.³⁹

Gifts of American cigarettes and chocolate candy bars were presented to all members of the household staff of the Russian Embassy.

The American and British Chiefs of Staff left Teheran today for return to Cairo, where they were scheduled to resume their conferences. Their party stopped overnight at Jerusalem on the way south.

A "Three Power Agreement" (between the United States, Great Britain and Russia) to guarantee Iran's territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence was signed at Teheran today by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin.⁴⁰

Thursday, December 2nd. (At Teheran; en route Teheran to Cairo; at Cairo.)

8:37 p. m. The President, riding in a jeep, left his quarters at
[a. m.] Camp Amirabad to inspect the camp and its personnel.
In the jeep with the President was Major General

³⁹ For the Shah's acknowledgment, see *post*, p. 806.

⁴⁰ For the text, see *post*, p. 646.

Connolly. The party proceeded to the area in front of the Commanding General's headquarters, where honors were rendered to the President by an honor company and the post band. From here the President was driven about the camp. The President stopped at the post hospital for a few minutes and, remaining in his jeep, made a few impromptu remarks to a group of Army patients and hospital personnel (approximately 75) who were assembled in front of the hospital. His remarks are appended, marked Appendix "E".⁴¹ The party then returned to the area in front of the Commanding General's headquarters, where some 3,000 personnel of Camp Amirabad were drawn up for the President's inspection. The President's jeep was driven onto a low platform and, again from his jeep, the President made an impromptu speech to those assembled. A copy of his remarks is appended, marked "F".⁴²

- 9:10 a. m. On completion of his address, the President departed Camp Amirabad for Gale Morghe airport. Outside Camp Amirabad the President transferred from the jeep to a staff car for the ride to the airport. Our route from Camp Amirabad to Gale Morghe skirted Teheran to the southward. It was over dirt roads mostly and was very dusty.
- 9:30 a. m. Arrived Gale Morghe airport. The President and his party embarked in the planes.
- 9:46 a. m. The President's plane departed Teheran for Cairo. In the President's plane with him were: Mr. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire, General Watson, Major Boettiger, Captain Flythe (Medical Corps, U. S. A.), Lt-Commander Fox, Lieutenant (jg) Rigdon, Secret Service Agents Spaman, Fredericks and Spicer, and Steward Prettyman.
- 12:00 (noon) Our plane passed over Baghdad and circled the city before proceeding on.
- 3:30 p. m. Our plane crossed over the Suez Canal.

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⁴¹ Not printed herein.

⁴² Not printed herein. For a published source containing these informal remarks, see *post*, p. 835.

⁴³ For the continuation of the Log at Cairo, December 2-7, 1943, see *post*, p. 655.

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES ON TEHRAN

Teheran is the terminus of our Persian Gulf supply line for lend-lease material sent to Russia. Actually it is nearby Kazvin where the supplies are turned over to the Soviets. These supplies are shipped by rail and motor convoy from Abadan and Khorro[*a*]mshahr through Teheran to Kazvin. Planes are assembled at Abadan (on the Persian Gulf) and flown here for delivery to the Soviets. Some few planes are flown from Abadan by Soviet pilots. All movements of planes north from Teheran and supplies north from Kazvin are handled by the Soviets. To date they have been very careful not to permit our men beyond those points.

Our forces here bring in all of their foodstuffs. Nothing is bought locally. This is done because of the extreme scarcity of foodstuffs in Iran and consequently, in order not to deprive the Iranians of what little there is. This practice also helps greatly in keeping retail prices down. There is real inflation prevalent here—automobile tires are reported to be selling for \$2,000 each; a “fifth” of whiskey for \$40; a cake of toilet soap for 60¢ (United States currency). Even though there was an absence of fresh vegetables, the diet fed us by the Army while in Teheran was most appetizing.

There are two U. S. Army camps located near Teheran—Camp Amirabad and Camp Atterbury. There are approximately 30,000 officers and enlisted men of our Army stationed in the Persian Gulf Service Command, whose headquarters are at Teheran.

Brigadier General Sweet directs the U. S. Army motor truck transport in Iran and Iraq. He keeps the American supplies rolling through to Russia over the trans-Iranian route.

Major General Connolly and Brigadier General Hurley were both on the job constantly during our visit to personally see that the President and members of his party were well cared for.

The following U. S. Army officers, on duty in Teheran area, served as interpreters for our party while we were in Teheran: Major O. Pantuhoff, Major N. E. Mitchell, Captain Charles Berman, and Second Lieutenant Boris Alexander.

The weather during our entire stay in Teheran was delightful. The days were mild and the nights cold. There was no central heating in Teheran. Most of the buildings are heated by portable oil stoves. The Russian Embassy is the only steam heated building in the city, we were told.

Mount Demavand (Elburz Mountains) near Teheran is 18,456 feet high.

Nice wide streets here. The roadways are paved but most of the sidewalks are not, causing the city to appear very dusty and dirty.

The city's transportation system was apparently most inadequate. It consisted mainly of a very few small buses, which were invariably packed, and horse-drawn "droushkies" [*droshkies*].

While in Teheran the President presented autographed photographs (mounted in silver frames) to Marshal Stalin and to the Shah of Iran.

It was most evident that every individual member of our Army stationed in Teheran was delighted at our visit and for the opportunity to discuss home and home folks.

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8. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1943

BROWN-MAXIMOV MEETING, NOVEMBER 27, 1943, ABOUT 3:30 P. M.
SOVIET EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Brown
Mr. Dreyfus

SOVIET UNION

Mr. Maximov

Editorial Note

The Log, *ante*, p. 461, states that Brown was sent to the Soviet Embassy to explain to Maximov why the President had decided to live at the American Legation and why he could not accept the Russians' invitation.

According to a letter of February 19, 1954, from Dreyfus to the Historical Office of the Department of State (640.0029/2-1954), the circumstances of Brown's visit to the Soviet Embassy were as follows: Roosevelt had indicated a willingness to stay at the Soviet Embassy if invited to do so by Stalin, and Dreyfus had communicated this fact to Maximov, but no indication of Stalin's reaction had been received. Brown went to the Soviet Embassy, accompanied by Dreyfus, to see about a reply. Maximov told Brown and Dreyfus that he himself had not yet received a reply from Stalin, but that inasmuch as Stalin had already arrived at Tehran, the matter would be taken up with him there.

ROOSEVELT-MAXIMOV MEETING, NOVEMBER 27, 1943, 4:30 P. M.,
AMERICAN LEGATION

Editorial Note

This meeting is listed in the Log, *ante*, p. 461, but no record of the conversation has been found. The visit of the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires lasted at most twenty minutes and was presumably in the nature of a courtesy call.

**HARRIMAN-CLARK KERR-MOLOTOV MEETING, NOVEMBER 27, 1943,
MIDNIGHT, SOVIET EMBASSY**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

UNITED KINGDOM

SOVIET UNION

Mr. Harriman

Sir Archibald Clark Kerr

Foreign Commissar
Molotov

Editorial Note

No official record of this conversation has been found. According to a letter of May 25, 1954, from Harriman to the Historical Office of the Department of State (023/5-2554), Molotov asked Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr (British Ambassador to the Soviet Union, who was at Tehran) to call on him. He told Harriman and Clark Kerr, on the basis of information which had reached him, that Roosevelt's presence at Tehran was known to German agents there, that these agents were planning a "demonstration", that this might involve an attempt at assassination, and that Stalin therefore urged Roosevelt to move to either the British Legation or the Soviet Embassy. A house in the Soviet Embassy compound was being made ready for Roosevelt's occupancy. Harriman, on returning to the American Legation, discussed the matter with Connolly and Reilly and the three of them agreed to recommend to Roosevelt that he should move to the proffered residence in the Soviet Embassy compound. Roosevelt agreed, and the move took place on the afternoon of the following day. See the Log, *ante*, p. 463. For a subsequent reference by Roosevelt to his primary motivation in making the move, see *post*, p. 867.

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1943

**MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
NOVEMBER 28, 1943, 11:30 A. M., AMERICAN LEGATION**

PRESENT

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Captain Royal,
Secretary

J. C. S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT said he understood that the British felt our forces in Italy could advance to the Pisa-Rimini line. He believed that as we push north into Italy, the Germans will retire behind the Alps.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said as he saw it we could do either of two things: (1) Undertake OVERLORD, or (2) go after Italy and Rhodes, and then OVERLORD would revert to the status of an operation of opportunity such as RANKIN.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if our forces advance as far as the Ancona line and the Rhodes operation should be undertaken in February, it would mean postponing OVERLORD probably until about 15 June, possibly July. He said the British want to do Rhodes earlier unless the Andaman operation is thrown out. The British propose to undertake Rhodes in lieu of the Andaman operation. The means which would be sucked in for the accomplishment of the Rhodes operation would be considerable. He pointed out that the Soviets probably want a more immediate operation than OVERLORD. He said we could probably increase the pressure in Italy and expedite General Eisenhower's advance. The British are very anxious to bring Turkey into the war and undertake the Rhodes operation. They state that this will result in opening the Straits. General Somervell believes that even should Turkey enter the war, it might be six to eight months thereafter before the Dardanelles could be opened. This consideration is predicated largely on the fact that in order to undertake operations in the Aegean, a change of base will be required, and it always takes considerable time to shift from one base to another.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the British had explained the total number of men they have in the Middle East.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the Prime Minister realizes and desires to deploy these troops. The main problem as regards collaboration with the Soviets is that they desire pressure exerted within the next two months. If, on the other hand, the Soviets decide that they do not really need immediate assisting operations, it might be possible to complete the operation north of Rome, undertake Rhodes, and delay OVERLORD until about 15 June. The British Chiefs of Staff are in an embarrassing position with regards to giving up BUCCANEER. The Prime Minister claims that if Turkey entered the war and we undertake the Dodecanese operation, Bulgaria and Rumania would immediately fall.

THE PRESIDENT inquired, "Suppose we can get the Turks in, what then?"

GENERAL MARSHALL said the requirements will be difficult to provide for Aegean operations. The British idea is to have the Turks hold the Straits.

ADMIRAL KING added that the British furthermore consider that Rhodes and certain other islands in the Aegean must be taken. He pointed out that we can not do Rhodes before sometime in February.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he believed that we should buck up General Eisenhower without effecting any undue delay in OVERLORD.

GENERAL MARSHALL added that the Soviets should know better than anyone else about the situation in Bulgaria, whether or not that country could be expected to fall if Turkey entered the war and the Dardanelles were opened.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that General Wilson had stated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff he did not know very much regarding the conditions in Bulgaria.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Germans already know considerable about the land and air build-up in the U. K. in preparation for OVERLORD—also about the concentration of landing craft in the U. K. and they are conscious of the definite gathering of force in the U. K. He added that it looks as though a delay in OVERLORD would certainly be necessary if we undertake additional commitments in the Mediterranean.

THE PRESIDENT said that he understood there were now some 21 German divisions in the Balkans and the Dodecanese. What should we say if the Soviets inform us that they will be in Rumania soon, and inquire what can the United States and Britain do to help them?

GENERAL MARSHALL said that we could certainly do more along the east coast of the Adriatic by opening up small ports and getting supplies in to the Tito forces. He pointed out that communications inland from the coast are very bad. He believed, however, that it would not be difficult to get in munitions, foodstuffs and other supplies for the guerrilla forces. He said that it had been agreed with the British that the Adriatic should be made a separate command under one officer. He pointed out that the United States Chiefs of Staff had also agreed to a unified command in the Mediterranean, subject to the President's approval. It was believed that we could put ships into the Eastern Adriatic Coast and assist in supporting Tito.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that General Eisenhower feels that if he can get far enough north in Italy he can push into the northeast toward Austria.

GENERAL MARSHALL added that he could also push with a left wing toward Southern France. These two movements, together with the

limited operations on the Adriatic Coast, could hold several German divisions.

THE PRESIDENT made the suggestion that certain special 2,000-ton merchant ships constructed for the U. S. Army be converted to LSI(L)'s.

GENERAL MARSHALL said delays would be caused largely by vehicular transportation facilities. LST's would not be the bottleneck in such a movement. On the other hand, LST's are a bottleneck as regards overseas transportation. One LST is equivalent to about six or seven LCT's. He believed that the Prime Minister would use every wile to cut out BUCCANEER. He pointed out that the United States have constructed suitable landing fields on captured islands in as short a period as twelve days.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that control of the Andaman Islands would make it possible to cut, by air, supply lines from Bangkok. He said we are obligated to the Chinese to carry out the amphibious operation BUCCANEER.

MR. HOPKINS observed that the Prime Minister considers that as between Rhodes and BUCCANEER, the former is the more important.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that as an alternative to withdrawing means for the carrying out of BUCCANEER, withdrawal of certain shipping earmarked for OVERLORD had been suggested.

THE PRESIDENT observed that the Generalissimo had been told that the British would build up their fleet in the Indian Ocean. The question was, of what value would the fleet be there unless some operation were carried out?

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that only a small portion of naval strength would be involved in the Burma operation.

ADMIRAL KING said that the Prime Minister told the Generalissimo orally what ships would be available to support the Burma Command. The only place for the use of landing craft is the Andaman Islands.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the British had observed that they can not decide about BUCCANEER versus Rhodes until after they have talked to the U. S. S. R. They feel they should not be pressed to carry out an operation for political reasons until the military considerations are proven sound. He, GENERAL MARSHALL, considered that BUCCANEER is sound. He said he had talked to Admiral King regarding this matter. As regards the feasibility of constructing only one landing strip in the Andamans, GENERAL MARSHALL said he did not believe it.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the United States would have more experience with opening up and holding occupied territory.

ADMIRAL KING said the British idea is that if they take Rhodes, the Turks will take all other islands. The Allies will have to give material, ships, and supplies for opening up the Dardanelles.

THE PRESIDENT felt that the British would probably say after Rhodes was taken, "Now we will have to take Greece." . . . If we should get the Andaman Islands, where would we go? He felt that small groups of commandos, operating in support of Tito along the Adriatic Coast, had great possibilities. Another suggestion would be for a small force to penetrate northward from Trieste and Fiume. He said he was much more favorably inclined towards operations from the Adriatic rather than from the vicinity of the Dodecanese.

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed that in order to put forces into Trieste and Fiume, we should have to push the German Army further north into Italy; otherwise they would be on the left flank of the penetrations from Trieste.

THE PRESIDENT agreed that the Germans should be pushed on toward the Alps. He thought it would be a good idea to go around the ends into France and Austria. He pointed out that during the last war the Austrians required Germans to help them. He believed that if we push far enough north into Italy, the Germans will retreat behind the mountains.

In reply to a question from the President as to whether or not the Chiefs of Staff were being pressed by the French to go into Southern France, ADMIRAL KING replied in the affirmative. He added that if Turkey comes into the war, we certainly will be involved in the Dodecanese.

In reply to a question from the President as to the value of airfields in the vicinity of Smyrna should Turkey come into the war, GENERAL ARNOLD said we could use certain of these fields for heavy bombers and we would be able to help by using other airfields in Turkey for both heavy and medium bombers.

In reply to a question from the President as to whether or not the British had talked about a landing in the vicinity near Salonika, THE CHIEFS OF STAFF replied in the negative.

ADMIRAL KING observed that neither General Wilson nor General Donovan think the Bulgars will quit.

THE PRESIDENT said he did not have the conscience to urge the Turks to go into the war.

In reply to a question from the President, GENERAL ARNOLD stated that the Germans have now about 700 planes in the Balkans; furthermore, the Turks have no really modern planes, all are obsolete.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the British originally planned to give the Turks 27 fighter squadrons; they finally gave them 17, but more fighter squadrons would have to be given to the Turks.

GENERAL MARSHALL observed that one of the difficulties in the Italian campaign is lack of equipment for troops due to lack of shipping.

There are divisions sitting in North Africa now with insufficient equipment due to lack of shipping. These divisions could be used if the equipment were available. He pointed out that the real issue is, what do the Soviets mean by "immediate help"? The U. S. S. R. evidently wants Turkey into the war as a cold-blooded proposition. The Soviets definitely want something, and we should find out what it is.

THE PRESIDENT thought that by January we could mount commando group operations in the Adriatic and the Aegean.

GENERAL MARSHALL questioned whether it would be feasible to undertake very many commando raids. He questioned whether these operations would conflict with planned operations in Italy.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that his idea was that a commando raid should be on a small scale, say with about 2,000 men to a group. These small groups would not require landing craft on the same scale as larger operations.

In connection with a remark from the President regarding retention of landing craft for OVERLORD, ADMIRAL KING pointed out another factor which should be given consideration with regard to the number of landing craft planned to return to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD. He said we won't get the 67 retained in the Mediterranean into the U. K. due to the fact that they will have been used in action operations and there will certainly be considerable attrition. He added that all landing craft production after March is earmarked for the Pacific. If there is a delay of one month in OVERLORD, the one month's increased production can be diverted to OVERLORD.

THE PRESIDENT observed that we must tell the Soviets that we get just so much production per month. All this production is earmarked for definite planned operations. In order to transfer means such as landing craft, it is necessary to take them away from one place in order to add to the means at another. There is no pool available.

GENERAL MARSHALL observed that when General Eisenhower has one command of the entire Mediterranean, better use of landing craft may be effected.

ADMIRAL KING observed that destroyers and other craft could be utilized for commando raids.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the Prime Minister believes he could control the Mediterranean if he could get his own man, General Alexander, in as Commander in Chief.

THE PRESIDENT observed that we must realize that the British look upon the Mediterranean as an area under British domination.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the British were wedded to committeeism. Unity of command would expedite operations. GENERAL MARSHALL

explained to the President the relationship between General Eisenhower's and General Wilson's command, and the attitude of General Eisenhower's subordinate commanders in chief versus the independent commanders with General Wilson and the effects of this at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting last Friday.¹ He pointed out that while the United States perhaps does not do committee work as well as the British, nevertheless they (the British) have certainly had a very serious time in the Middle East due to the lack of unity of command.

THE PRESIDENT said he was afraid that Marshal Stalin will ask just how many German divisions could be taken off the Soviet Western Front immediately. He said he did not intend to get involved in a discussion as between the relative merits of the Dodecanese and the Andamans.

GENERAL ARNOLD observed that the flow of planes through the Azores has already begun as of yesterday. He said it was planned to pass 147 through in December and as many as 154 in January.

In reply to a question from the President as to how many squadrons of planes were operating in antisubmarine work out of the Azores, ADMIRAL KING replied about three squadrons.

¹ See *ante*, p. 359.

ROOSEVELT-STALIN MEETING, NOVEMBER 28, 1943, 3 P. M.,¹
ROOSEVELT'S QUARTERS, SOVIET EMBASSY

PRESENT ²

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Bohlen

SOVIET UNION

Marshal Stalin
Mr. Pavlov

¹ The Bohlen minutes list the meeting as having begun at 3 p. m. According to the Log, *ante*, p. 464, the meeting began at 3:15 p. m. According to Forrest Davis ("What Really Happened at Teheran," *Saturday Evening Post*, vol. 216, May 13 and May 20, 1944), Roosevelt discussed with Stalin at Tehran two additional subjects besides those covered in the official record as given here, namely, the structure of the federal system in the United States and the "good neighbor" policy of the United States toward Latin America. The Davis article was based on an "off-the-record" conversation with Roosevelt in March 1944. (Roosevelt Papers)

² The listing of those present is based on the Bohlen minutes. Elliott Roosevelt, p. 175, appears to have misunderstood some remarks of his father respecting Bohlen's presence at the meeting.

Bohlen Collection

Bohlen Minutes

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT greeted Marshal Stalin when he entered with "I am glad to see you. I have tried for a long time to bring this about."³

MARSHAL STALIN, after suitable expression of pleasure at meeting the President, said that he was to blame for the delay in this meeting; that he had been very occupied because of military matters.

THE PRESIDENT inquired as to the situation on the Soviet battlefront.

MARSHAL STALIN answered that on part of the front, the situation was not too good; that the Soviets had lost Zhitomir and were about to lose Koresten [*Korosten*]³—the latter an important railroad center for which the capture of Gomel could not compensate. He added that the Germans have brought a new group of divisions to this area and were exercising strong pressure on the Soviet front.

THE PRESIDENT then inquired whether or not the initiative remained with the Soviet forces.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that, with the exception of the sector which he had just referred to, the initiative still remains with the Soviet Armies, but that the situation was so bad that only in the Ukraine was it possible to take offensive operations.

THE PRESIDENT said that he wished that it were within his power to bring about the removal of 30 or 40 German divisions from the Eastern front and that that question, of course, was one of the things he desired to discuss here in Tehran.

MARSHAL STALIN said it would be of great value if such a transfer of German divisions could be brought about.

THE PRESIDENT then said that another subject that he would like to talk over with Marshal Stalin was the possibility that after the war a part of the American-British merchant fleet which, at the end of the war, would be more than either nation could possibly utilize, be made available to the Soviet Union.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that an adequate merchant fleet would be of great value, not only to the Soviet Union, but for the development of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States after the war, which he hoped would be greatly expanded. He said, in reply to the President's question, that if equipment were sent to the Soviet Union from the United States, a plentiful supply of the

³ Regarding Roosevelt's efforts, beginning in 1942, to bring about a meeting with Stalin, see *ante*, pp. 3 ff.

raw materials from that country could be made available to the United States.

The Conference then turned to the Far East.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had had an interesting conversation with Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo, on the general subject of China.⁴

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that the Chinese have fought very badly but, in his opinion, it was the fault of the Chinese leaders.

THE PRESIDENT informed Marshal Stalin that we were now supplying and training 30 Chinese divisions for operations in Southern China and were proposing to continue the same process for 30 additional divisions. He added that there was a new prospect of an offensive operation through North Burma to link up with China in Southern Yun[n]an and that these operations would be under the command of Lord Louis Mountbatten.

MARSHAL STALIN then inquired as to the situation in the Lebanon.

THE PRESIDENT gave a brief description of the background and events leading up to the recent clashes, and in reply to Marshal Stalin's question said that it had been entirely due to the attitude of the French Committee and General De Gaulle.⁵

MARSHAL STALIN said he did not know General De Gaulle personally, but frankly, in his opinion, he was very unreal in his political activities. He explained that General De Gaulle represented the soul of sympathetic⁶ France, whereas, the real physical France engaged under Petain in helping our common enemy Germany, by making available French ports, materials, machines, etc., for the German war effort. He said the trouble with De Gaulle was that this [*his?*] movement had no communication with the physical France, which, in his opinion, should be punished for its attitude during this war. De Gaulle acts as though he were the head of a great state, whereas, in fact, it actually commands little power.

THE PRESIDENT agreed and said that in the future, no Frenchman over 40, and particularly no Frenchman who had ever taken part in the present French Government, should be allowed to return to position in the future. He said that General Giraud was a good old military type, but with no administrative or political sense, whatsoever. He added that there were approximately 11 French divisions, partly composed of Algerians and other North Africans, in training in North Africa.

⁴ Information regarding conversations between Roosevelt and Chiang at the First Cairo Conference may be found *ante*, pp. 322, 349, 366.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 84, footnote 2.

⁶ In a copy of the Bohlen minutes in the Hopkins Papers, the word "symbolic" is written in the margin at this point, and parentheses are inserted around "sympathetic", in a handwriting which has not been identified. See in this connection the use of the word "symbolic" in the section headed "France and the French Empire", *post*, p. 514.

MARSHAL STALIN expatiated at length on the French ruling classes and he said, in his opinion, they should not be entitled to share in any of the benefits of the peace, in view of their past record of collaboration with Germany.

THE PRESIDENT said that Mr. Churchill was of the opinion that France would be very quickly reconstructed as a strong nation, but he did not personally share this view since he felt that many years of honest labor would be necessary before France would be re-established. He said the first necessity for the French, not only for the Government but the people as well, was to become honest citizens.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed and went on to say that he did not propose to have the Allies shed blood to restore Indochina, for example, to the old French colonial rule. He said that the recent events in the Lebanon made public service the first step toward the independence of people who had formerly been colonial subjects. He said that in the war against Japan, in his opinion, that in addition to military missions, it was necessary to fight the Japanese in the political sphere as well, particularly in view of the fact that the Japanese had granted the least nominal independence to certain colonial areas. He repeated that France should not get back Indochina and that the French must pay for their criminal collaboration with Germany. X

THE PRESIDENT said he was 100% in agreement with Marshal Stalin and remarked that after 100 years of French rule in Indochina, the inhabitants were worse off than they had been before. He said that Chiang Kai-shek had told him China had no designs on Indochina but the people of Indochina were not yet ready for independence, to which he had replied that when the United States acquired the Philippines, the inhabitants were not ready for independence which would be granted without qualification upon the end of the war against Japan. He added that he had discussed with Chiang Kai-shek the possibility of a system of trusteeship for Indochina which would have the task of preparing the people for independence within a definite period of time, perhaps 20 to 30 years.

MARSHAL STALIN completely agreed with this view.⁷

⁷ On March 17, 1944, in a conversation with Stettinius, Roosevelt recounted what had been said at Tehran regarding Indochina. Stettinius's notes on the conversation, prepared that night, read as follows: "Then at Teheran the President raised the question with Joseph Stalin, who said that Indo-China should be independent but was not yet ready for self-government. He said that the idea of a trusteeship was excellent. When Churchill objected, the President said, 'Now, look here, Winston, you are outvoted three to one.'" Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians; The Yalta Conference* (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1949), p. 238. The number "three" apparently refers to the concurrence not only of Roosevelt and Stalin, but also, at the First Cairo Conference, of Chiang Kai-shek; see *ante*, p. 325. See also *F. D. R., His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*, vol. II, p. 1489.

THE PRESIDENT went on to say that Mr. Hull had taken to the Moscow Conference a document which he (the President) had drawn up for the purpose of a National [*International?*] Committee to visit, every year, the colonies of all nations and through use of instrumentalities of public opinion to correct any abuse that they find.⁸

MARSHAL STALIN said he saw merit in this idea.

THE PRESIDENT continued on the subject of colonial possessions, but he felt it would be better not to discuss the question of India with Mr. Churchill, since the latter had no solution of that question, and merely proposed to defer the entire question to the end of the war.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed that this was a sore spot with the British.

THE PRESIDENT said that at some future date, he would like to talk with Marshal Stalin on the question of India; that he felt that the best solution would be reform from the bottom, somewhat on the Soviet line.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the India question was a complicated one, with different levels of culture and the absence of relationship in the castes. He added that reform from the bottom would mean revolution.

It was then 4 o'clock and time for the General Meeting.

THE PRESIDENT, in conclusion, stated that an additional reason why he was glad to be in this house was that of affording the opportunity of meeting Marshal Stalin more frequently in completely informal and different [*sic*] circumstances.

⁸ Document 44 of the Moscow Conference. The records of the Moscow Conference are scheduled to be published in *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I. For a substantially identical version of the document referred to here, see Notter, p. 470.

ROOSEVELT-MOLOTOV MEETING, NOVEMBER 28, 1943, ABOUT 4 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S QUARTERS, SOVIET EMBASSY

Editorial Note

According to the Log, *ante*, p. 464, Molotov called on Roosevelt after Stalin had departed. No record has been found of the remarks exchanged by Roosevelt and Molotov during this visit. That the visit was short, and may have been limited to an exchange of courtesies, is suggested by the fact that Roosevelt's conversation with Stalin, which preceded it, is stated in the Bohlen minutes to have ended at 4 o'clock, and the meeting which followed it is stated to have begun at that same time. A brief reference to Molotov's call is in Elliott Roosevelt, p. 176.

FIRST PLENARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 28, 1943, 4 P. M., CONFERENCE
ROOM, SOVIET EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES ¹	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Mr. Hopkins	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar
Admiral Leahy	Field Marshal Dill	Molotov
Admiral King	General Brooke	Marshal Voroshilov
Major General Deane	Admiral of the Fleet	Mr. Pavlov
Captain Royal	Cunningham	Mr. Berezkhov
Mr. Bohlen	Air Chief Marshal Portal	
	Lieutenant General Ismay	
	Major Birse	

Bohlen Collection

Bohlen Minutes

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT said as the youngest of the three present he ventured to welcome his elders.² He said he wished to welcome the new members to the family circle³ and tell them that meetings of this character were conducted as between friends with complete frankness on all sides with nothing that was said to be made public. He added that he was confident that this meeting would be successful and that our three great nations would not only work in close cooperation for the prosecution of the war but would also remain in close touch for generations to come.

THE PRIME MINISTER then pointed out that this was the greatest concentration of power that the world had ever seen. In our hands here is the possible certainty of shortening the war, the much greater certainty of victories, but the absolute certainty that we held the happy future of mankind. He added that he prayed that we might be worthy of this God-given opportunity.

MARSHAL STALIN welcomed the representatives of Great Britain and the United States. He then said that history had given to us here a great opportunity and it was up to the representatives here to use wisely the power which their respective peoples had given to them and to take full advantage of this fraternal meeting.

¹ The Log, *ante*, p. 464, indicates that Marshall and Arnold were not present because of a misunderstanding as to the time of the meeting, which had been called on short notice. A reference to the misunderstanding is also in Elliott Roosevelt, p. 176.

² According to Churchill, p. 347, he (Churchill) and Stalin had agreed beforehand that Roosevelt should preside at this first conference of the three Heads of Government, and Roosevelt consented to do so. See also Sherwood, p. 778. No official record of this agreement has been found.

³ The allusion is to the previous conferences of the President, the Prime Minister, and the Anglo-American Chiefs of Staff.

THE PRESIDENT then gave a general survey of the war as a whole and the needs of the war from the American point of view. Before turning to the war in the Pacific, THE PRESIDENT said he desired to emphasize that the United States shared equally with the Soviet Union and Great Britain the desire to hasten in every way possible the day of victory. He then said that the United States was more directly affected by the war in the Pacific and that the United States forces were bearing the chief burden in that theater with, of course, help from Australian and British forces in that area; the greater part of the U. S. naval establishment was in the Pacific and over a million men were being maintained there. He pointed out as evidence of the immense distances in the Pacific that one supply ship operating from the United States could only make three round trips a year. The allied strategy in the Pacific was based on the doctrine of attrition which was proving successful. We were sinking more Japanese tonnage than the Japanese were able to replace. He said that the allies were moving forward through the southern islands and now through the islands to the east of Japan. On the north little more could be done due to the distance between the Aleutian and Kurile islands. On the west our one great objective was to keep China in the war, and for this purpose an expedition was in preparation to attack through North Burma and from Yun[n]an province. In this operation Anglo-British [*Anglo-American*] forces would operate in North Burma and Chinese forces from Yun[n]an. The entire operation would be under the command of Lord Louis Mountbatten. In addition, amphibious operations were planned south of Burma to attack the important Japanese bases and lines of communication in the vicinity of Bangkok. The President pointed out that although these operations extended over vast expanses of territory the number of ships and men allocated for the purpose were being held down to a minimum. He summed up the aims of these operations as follows: (1) to open the road to China and supply that country in order to keep it in the war, and (2), by opening the road to China and through increased use of transport planes to put ourselves in position to bomb Japan proper.

THE PRESIDENT then said he would turn to the most important theater of the war—Europe. He said he wished to emphasize that for over one year and a half in the last two or three conferences which he had had with the Prime Minister all military plans had revolved around the question of relieving the German pressure on the Soviet front; that largely because of the difficulties of sea transport it had not

been possible until Quebec ⁴ to set a date for the cross-channel operations. He pointed out that the English channel was a disagreeable body of water and it was unsafe for military operations prior to the month of May, and that the plan adopted at Quebec involved an immense expedition and had been set at that time for May 1, 1944.

THE PRIME MINISTER interposed and remarked that the British had every reason to be thankful that the English channel was such a disagreeable body of water.

THE PRESIDENT then said that one of the questions to be considered here was what use could be made of allied forces in the Mediterranean in such a way as to bring the maximum aid to the Soviet armies on the Eastern front. He added that some of these possibilities might involve a delay of one, two or three months in the large cross-channel operation and that before making any decision as to future operations in the Mediterranean he and the Prime Minister had desired to ascertain the views of Marshal Stalin on this point. He pointed out that among the possible points of future operation in the Mediterranean were Italy, the Adriatic and Aegean Seas and Turkey. In conclusion THE PRESIDENT emphasized the fact that in his opinion the large cross-channel operation should not be delayed by secondary operations.

MARSHAL STALIN stated that in regard to the Pacific war the Soviet Government welcomed the successes of the Anglo-American forces against the Japanese; that up to the present to their regret they had not been able to join the effort of the Soviet Union to that of the United States and England against the Japanese because the Soviet armies were too deeply engaged in the west. He added that the Soviet forces in Siberia were sufficient for defensive purposes but would have to be increased three-fold before they would be adequate for offensive operations. Once Germany was finally defeated, it would then be possible to send the necessary reinforcements to Siberia and then we shall be able by our common front to beat Japan. MARSHAL STALIN then gave a brief review of military developments in the Soviet-German front since the German offensive in July. He said that the Soviet High Command had been preparing an offensive of its own but that the Germans had stolen the march on them and attacked first. Following the failure of the German offensive, the Soviet forces had passed over to the attack, and he admitted that the successes which they had achieved this summer and autumn had far exceeded their expectations as they had found the German army much weaker than they had expected. He said that at the present time there were 210 German Divisions

⁴The records of the First Quebec Conference of Roosevelt and Churchill, August 1943, are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series. For the military discussions and decisions at the First Quebec (QUADRANT) Conference, see Matloff, chapter x.

facing the Soviet armies with six more in the process of transfer from the west. To this should be added 50 non-German Divisions (10 Hungarian, 20 Finnish, 16 to 18 Rumanian), making a total of 260 Divisions facing the Soviet armies with six more on the way. In reply to the President's question, MARSHAL STALIN stated that the normal battle strength of a German front line Division was from 8,000 to 9,000 but that if Auxiliary corps, supply, etc. forces were added the total strength of each Division was around 12,000. He said that last year the Soviet armies had faced 240 Axis Divisions of which 179 were German, whereas this year they faced 260 of which 210 were German with six more on the way. He said that the Soviet Union had had 330 Divisions at the start of the summer campaign and that it was this numerical superiority over the Germans which permitted the offensive operations to develop so successively [*successfully?*]. He added, however, that the numerical superiority was gradually being evened up. He said one of the great difficulties encountered by the Soviet armies in advancing was the question of supply since the Germans destroyed literally everything in their retreat. He mentioned that although the initiative on the front as a whole remained in Soviet hands, the offensive because of weather conditions had slowed down in those sectors. In fact, in the sector south and southwest of Kiev the German counteroffensive had recaptured the town of Zhitomir and would probably recapture Korosten in the near future. He said the Germans were using for this counter-attack three old and five new tank Divisions and twenty to twenty-three motorized infantry Divisions in an attempt to retake Kiev.

MARSHAL STALIN then turned to the allied operations in Italy. He said that from their point of view the great value of the Italian campaign was the freeing of the Mediterranean to allied shipping but that they did not consider that Italy was a suitable place from which to attempt to attack Germany proper; that the Alps constituted an almost insuperable barrier as the famous Russian General Suvorov had discovered in his time.⁵ He added that in the opinion of the Soviet military leaders, Hitler was endeavoring to retain as many allied Divisions as possible in Italy where no decision could be reached, and that the best method in the Soviet opinion was getting at the heart of Germany with an attack through northern or northwestern France and even through southern France. He admitted that this would be a very difficult operation since the Germans would fight like devils to prevent it. MARSHAL STALIN went on to say that it would be helpful if Turkey would enter the war and open the way to the Balkans, but

⁵ In the autumn of 1799 a Russian army under Field Marshal Alexander Suvorov suffered a disastrous defeat in attempting to cross the Swiss Alps from south to north.

even so the Balkans were far from the heart of Germany, and while with Turkish participation operations there would be useful, northern France was still the best.⁶

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that the United States and Great Britain had long agreed as to the necessity of the cross-channel operation and that at the present time this operation, which is known as OVERLORD, was absorbing most of our combined resources and efforts. He added that it would take a long statement of facts and figures to explain why, to our disappointment, it would be impossible to undertake this operation in 1943 but that we were determined to carry it out in the late spring or early summer of 1944. He went on to say that the operations in North Africa and Italy had been clearly recognized by both the President and himself as secondary in character but that it was the best that could be done in 1943. He said that the forces which were now in process of execution [*accumulation?*]⁷ for the OVERLORD operation involved an initial assault of 16 British and 19 U. S. Divisions, a total of 35. He pointed out that the strength of the individual British and American Divisions was considerably stronger than a German Division. He said it was contemplated to put one million men on the continent of Europe in May, June and July.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked at this point that he had not meant to convey the impression that he considered the North Africa or Italian operations as secondary or belittle their significance since they were of very real value.

THE PRIME MINISTER thanked the Marshal for his courtesy by repeating that neither he nor the President had ever considered the operations in the Mediterranean [as anything more than a stepping-stone?]⁸ for the main cross-channel operation. He said that when the 16 British Divisions earmarked for OVERLORD had landed in France, they would be maintained by reinforcements, but that no additional British Divisions could be sent to Europe since, taking into consideration the British forces in the Middle East, India and the size of the Royal Air Force which was not idle, this would utilize all British manpower which was based on a population of only 46 million. He added that it was the United States which would send in a steady stream of necessary reinforcements for the development of OVERLORD. He added, however, that the summer of 1944 was a long way off and that following the capture of Rome, which was

⁶ For prognostications that Stalin might stress operations in the Mediterranean rather than OVERLORD, see Harrison, pp. 121-123, where the reaction of the American Delegation at Tehran to Stalin's emphasis on OVERLORD is described thus: "The Americans were pleased, if somewhat surprised."

⁷ Inserted on the basis of Churchill, p. 351.

⁸ Inserted on the basis of the Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes; see *post*, p. 502. See also Churchill, p. 351.

hoped would take place in January, 1944, it would be six months before OVERLORD would begin. He and the President had repeatedly asked themselves what could be done with forces in the Mediterranean area during this period to bring the greatest pressure to bear on the enemy and help relieve the Soviet front. He said he did not wish to have any allied forces to remain idle during this period. He admitted that some of the operations which had been discussed might involve a delay of some two months in OVERLORD. He added, however, that they are all ready to withdraw seven of the best British Divisions from the Italian theater in preparation for OVERLORD, but emphasized that the great difficulty lay in the shortage of landing craft and that this constituted a great bottleneck of all allied operations.

Reverting to the Italian theater, THE PRIME MINISTER said that the weather had been exceptionally bad in Italy and that General Alexander, who under General Eisenhower was in command of the 15th Army Group in Italy, believed that in taking Rome there was an excellent opportunity of destroying or at least mauling 10 to 15 German Divisions. There was no plan for going into the broad part of Italy subsequent to the taking of Rome, and once the great airfields in the vicinity of that city had been captured and the Pisa-Rimini line had been reached, the allied forces would be free for other operations, possibly in southern France, or an enterprise across the Adriatic.

He said that the operations of the Partisans in Yugoslavia, which had been greater and better than those of Mihailovic, opened up the prospects to the allies to send additional help to Yugoslavia, but there was no plan to send a large army to the Balkans, although through commandos and small expeditions something might be done in that area.

THE PRIME MINISTER then said that he had come to one of the largest questions we had before us, namely, the question of Turkey's entrance into the war which we should urge upon that country in the strongest possible terms. If Turkey would enter the war it would open up the Aegean sea and assure an uninterrupted supply route to Russia into the Black Sea. He mentioned that only 4 Arctic convoys to the North Russian Ports could be considered this season because of the need of escort vessels in connection with OVERLORD. He then inquired, how shall we persuade Turkey to enter the war and in what manner? Should she provide the allies with bases or should she attack Bulgaria and declare war on Germany, or should she move forward or stay on the defensive on the fortified lines in Thrace. He added that Bulgaria owed a debt of gratitude to Russia for her liberation from Turkish rule.

MARSHAL STALIN interposed to remark that this liberation had taken place a long time ago.⁹

THE PRIME MINISTER said that Turkey's entrance into the war would undoubtedly have an effect from Rumania from whom peace feelers had already been received, and also from Hungary and might well start a landslide among the satellite States. He added that the Soviet Government had special feelings and special knowledge on these questions and he would welcome their views. THE PRIME MINISTER concluded by inquiring whether any of the possible operations in the Mediterranean were of sufficient interest to the Soviet Union if these operations involved a two or three months delay in OVERLORD. He said that he and the President could not make any decision until they knew the Soviet views on the subject and therefore had drawn up no definite plans.

THE PRESIDENT then said that he had thought of a possible operation at the head of the Adriatic to make a junction with the Partisans under Tito and then to operate northeast into Rumania in conjunction with the Soviet advance from the region of Odessa.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that if we take Rome and smash up the German armies there we will have a choice of moving west or, as the President says, east in the Mediterranean, and suggested that a sub-committee be appointed to work out the details of the various possibilities.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired if the 35 Divisions which he understood were earmarked for OVERLORD would be affected in any way by the continuation of the operations in Italy.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that they would not, since entirely separate Divisions were being used in the Italian Theater. THE PRIME MINISTER, in reply to Marshal Stalin's questions as to the relationship of the operations which he had outlined, explained that after the taking of Rome there would be available some 20 to 23 British, American, French and Polish Divisions which would be available for operations in the Mediterranean without in any way affecting the preparations for OVERLORD. He repeated that this force could either move west, or as the President suggested, to the eastern part of the Mediterranean. He said that since shipping was already allocated, any movements of effectives between OVERLORD and the Mediterranean would be very limited. He added that while the OVERLORD involved an initial assault of 35 Divisions, of which 16 would be British, the development of the operation envisioned by July 50 or 60 Allied Divisions on the continent, but repeated that the additional Divisions would come from the United States and not Great Britain. He added

⁹ The reference is to Russian action in 1877-78.

that the total strength of an American or British Division, including auxiliary forces, amounted to 40,000 men. He also stated that although the British and American air forces were very large and undertaking great operations, it was expected that the United States air force would be doubled or tripled within the next six months. He proposed to make available to Marshal Stalin the exact schedule of movements of supplies from the United States to Great Britain which already involved one million tons of stores.

MARSHAL STALIN then inquired if Turkey entered the war would some Anglo-American forces be allocated to that area.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that two or three Divisions, British or British controlled, were available for the capture of the islands of the Aegean, and that as an immediate aid to Turkey it was proposed to send 20 squadrons of fighters and several anti-aircraft regiments, adding that the preparation[s] to send these forces to Turkey were already far advanced.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that in his opinion he questioned the wisdom of dispersing allied forces of [*for?*] the various operations mentioned such as Turkey, the Adriatic and Southern France since there would be no direct connection between these scattered forces. He said he thought it would be better to take OVERLORD as the basis for all 1944 operations; that after the capture of Rome the troops thus relieved might be sent to Southern France, and in conjunction with forces operating from Corsica might eventually meet in France the main force of OVERLORD from the north. These would be in the nature of diversionary operations to assist OVERLORD. Marshal Stalin said that he favored the operations in Southern France particularly as he thought Turkey would not enter the war. He repeated that he was convinced that Turkey would not enter the war.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that there would be 8 or 9 French Divisions, which included native Divisions, available for an operation against southern France.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that in an operation against southern France the transportation difficulties would be greatly facilitated.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he agreed with Marshal Stalin in regard to the inadvisability of scattering our forces. He pointed out that the squadrons destined for Turkey and the Divisions for the seizure of the Aegean islands were now being used for the defense of Egypt and that their use would not distract in any way from OVERLORD or the operations in Italy.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that these operations would be worthwhile only if Turkey entered the war which he again repeated he did not believe would happen.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he had in mind the six months which would elapse after the expected capture of Rome before the beginning of OVERLORD, and that both he and the President were most anxious that their troops should not remain idle since if they were fighting, the British and American governments would not be exposed to the criticism that they were letting the Soviet Union bear the brunt of the war.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that in his opinion OVERLORD represented a very large operation and that it would be facilitated and, in fact, would be certain of success if the invasion of southern France was undertaken some two months before OVERLORD. This would divert German troops from the northern part of France and assure the success of OVERLORD. He said that as an extreme measure he would be inclined to leave 10 Divisions in Italy and postpone the capture of Rome in order to launch the attack in southern France two months in advance of OVERLORD.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he was sure Marshal Stalin would permit him to develop arguments to demonstrate why it was necessary for the allied forces to capture Rome, otherwise it would have the appearance of a great allied defeat in Italy. He pointed out the allied forces would be no stronger before the capture of Rome than after, and in fact without the fighter cover which would be possible only from the north Italian fields it would be impossible to invade northern France. In reply to Marshal Stalin's questions regarding Corsica, the PRIME MINISTER pointed out that there were no adequate airfields on the island.

THE PRESIDENT said that he thought the question [of] relative timing was very important and that he personally felt that nothing should be done to delay the carrying out of OVERLORD which might be necessary if any operations in the eastern Mediterranean were undertaken. He proposed, therefore, that the staffs work out tomorrow morning a plan of operations for striking at southern France.

MARSHAL STALIN pointed out that the Russian experience had shown that an attack from one direction was not effective and that the Soviet armies now launched an offensive from two sides at once which forced the enemy to move his reserve back and forth. He added that he thought such a two way operation in France would be very successful.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that he personally did not disagree with what the Marshal had said and that he did not think he had said anything here which could possibly affect adversely an operation in southern France, but he added it would be difficult for him to leave idle the British forces in the eastern Mediterranean which numbered

some 20 Divisions, British controlled, which could not be used outside of that area, merely for the purpose of avoiding any insignificant delay in OVERLORD. He said that if such was the decision they would, of course, agree, but they could not wholeheartedly agree to postpone operations in the Mediterranean. He added, of course, that if Turkey does not enter the war that is the end of that, but that he personally favored some flexibility in the exact date of OVERLORD. He proposed that the matter be considered overnight and have the staffs examine the various possibilities in the morning.

MARSHAL STALIN stated that as they had not expected to discuss technical military questions he had no military staff but that Marshal Voroshilov would do his best.¹⁰

THE PRIME MINISTER stated it would not [*now?*] be necessary to consider how far we could meet Turkey's request in the event that she agreed to enter the war.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that Turkey was an ally of Great Britain and at the same time had relations of friendship with the United States and the Soviet Union who as friends could ask Turkey and indeed bring pressure to bear on her to carry out her obligations as an ally of Great Britain. He said that all Neutrals considered Belligerents to be fools and it was up to the countries represented here to show that the Neutrals were the ones that were fools and that we must prove to Turkey that if they stay out of the war on the winning side that they were indeed the fools.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought it would be an act of supreme unwisdom if the Turks were to refuse an invitation from Russia to join the war on the winning side. He added that Christmas in England was a poor season for Turkeys. When the joke had been explained to Marshal Stalin he said he regretted that he was not an Englishman.¹¹

THE PRESIDENT then stated that should he meet the President of Turkey he would, of course, do everything possible to persuade him to enter the war, but that if he were in the Turkish President's place he would demand such a price in planes, tanks and equipment that to grant the request would indefinitely postpone OVERLORD.¹²

MARSHAL STALIN repeated his doubt as to Turkey's intention and said that they had in fact already replied to the suggestion that they enter the war. Although many considered this reply favorable, he personally thought it was negative in character.

¹⁰ For the minutes of the tripartite meeting of the military staffs, see *post*, p. 514.

¹¹ According to the Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes of this meeting, Churchill referred at this point to a document which he intended to submit to the Conference. See *post*, p. 508.

¹² Roosevelt and Churchill did meet with President İnönü of Turkey at the Second Cairo Conference; see *post*, pp. 662 ff.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that in his opinion the Turks were crazy.

MARSHAL STALIN said there were some people who apparently preferred to remain crazy.

The meeting adjourned until 4 P. M., November 29, 1943.

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*¹

U. S. SECRET

THE PRESIDENT said, as the youngest of the three Chiefs of State present, he had the privilege of welcoming Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill to this auspicious conference. We are sitting around this table for the first time as a family, with the one object of winning the war. Regarding the conduct of naval and military meetings, it has been our habit, between the British and the United States, to publish nothing but to speak our minds very freely. In such a large family circle we hope that we will be very successful and achieve constructive accord in order that we may maintain close touch throughout the war and after the war. The General Staffs of the three countries should look after military matters. Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister and I have many things to discuss regarding matters pertaining to conditions after the war. If anyone of us does not want to talk about any particular subject brought up we do not have to. THE PRESIDENT added that before he came to the discussion of military problems he felt that perhaps the Prime Minister would like to say something about matters pertaining to the years to come.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that we represent here a concentration of great worldly power. In our hands we have perhaps the responsibility for the shortening of this war. In our hands we have, too, the future of mankind. I pray that we may be worthy of this God-given opportunity.

THE PRESIDENT then turned to Marshal Stalin and said, "Perhaps our host would like to say a few words."

MARSHAL STALIN said, "I take pleasure in welcoming those present. I think that history will show that this opportunity has been of tremendous import. I think the great opportunity which we have and the power which our people have invested in us can be used to take full advantage within the frame of our potential collaboration. Now let us get down to business."

¹ For editorial annotations, see also the Bohlen minutes of this meeting, *supra*.

THE PRESIDENT said he would like to start with a general survey of the war and of the meaning of the war. This survey will be from the American point of view. We earnestly hope that the completion of the war will come just as soon as possible. Let us begin with a subject that affects the United States more than either Great Britain or the U. S. S. R., the subject of the Pacific. It is most important to us to bring back to the United States those forces which are now in the Pacific. We are bearing a major part of the Pacific war. The United States has the greatest part of its naval power in the Pacific, plus about one million men. We are proceeding on the principle of attrition as regards Japan. At the present that policy is being accepted in our country. We believe we are sinking many Jap ships, both naval and merchant—more than they can possibly replace. We have been moving forward toward Japan from the south and now we are moving toward Japan through the islands from the east. There is very little more that we can do as regards operations from the north. On the west of Japan it is necessary for us to keep China in the war. Hence, we have arranged plans for operations through North Burma and into the Yunnan Province. That operation will advance us far enough so that China herself can strike into the Yunnan Province. In addition, we are still discussing an amphibious operation in order to strike at the supply lines from the Jap base at Bangkok. This base is a veritable storehouse for Japan. The whole operation covers a huge territory, and large numbers of ships and men and planes are necessary to carry it out. We must definitely keep China actively in the war.

THE PRESIDENT said, in the second place, we hope, by opening the Burma Road and increasing the transportation of supplies by plane into China, we will be in a position to attack Tokyo from China by air this summer. All this is regarding the Southeast Asia operations. But we want to express to you the very great importance not only of keeping China in the war but of being able to get at Japan with the greatest possible speed.

Now to come down to the more important operations which are of immediate concern to the U. S. S. R. and Great Britain. In the last two or three conferences at Casablanca, Washington and Quebec,² we have made many plans. As a matter of fact, about a year and a half ago the major part of our plans were involved in consideration of an expedition against the Axis across the English Channel. Largely because of transportation difficulties we were not able to set a definite

² The records of the conferences of Roosevelt and Churchill held at Casablanca, Washington, and Quebec are scheduled to be published subsequently in other volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series. For the military planning at these conferences, see Matloff, chapters I, VI, X.

date. Not only do we want to get across the English Channel but once we are across, we intend to proceed inland into Germany. It would be impossible to launch such an operation before about 1 May 1944—it was decided at Quebec. The Channel is such a disagreeable body of water. No matter how unpleasant that body of water might be, however, we still want to get across it. (MR. CHURCHILL interpolated that we were very glad it was an unpleasant body of water at one time.) We can not do everything we would like to do in the Mediterranean and also from the United Kingdom, as there is a definite “bottleneck” in the matter [*matériel*] of war called landing craft. If we were to conduct any large expedition in the Mediterranean, it would be necessary to give up this important cross-Channel operation, and certain contemplated operations in the Mediterranean might result in a delay in OVERLORD for one month or two or three. Therefore, I pray in this military Conference to have the benefit of the opinion of the two Soviet Marshals and that they will inform us how in their opinion we can be of most help to the U. S. S. R.

THE PRESIDENT said that he felt that even though OVERLORD should be delayed, we can draw more German divisions from the Soviet front by means of that operation than any other. We have the troops in the Mediterranean but there is a shortage of landing craft. We might help the U. S. S. R. by doing certain immediate operations in the Mediterranean, but we must avoid, if possible, delaying OVERLORD beyond May or June. There were several things we could do: (a) increase the drive into Italy; (b) undertake an operation from the Northeast Adriatic; (c) operations in the Aegean; (d) operations from Turkey. That is what this military conference is concerned with and we want to create a withdrawal of German divisions from the Western Front. (THE PRIME MINISTER interpolated “as soon as possible.”)

THE PRIME MINISTER said we would like to know what we can do that would most gratefully [*greatly*] help that which the Soviets are doing on their Western Front. He added that we have tried to outline matters in the simplest terms. There are no differences between Great Britain and the United States in point of view except as regards “ways and means.” We would like to reserve any further comments until after we have heard from Marshal Stalin.

MARSHAL STALIN said, as regards the first part of the President’s remarks, we Soviets welcome your successes in the Pacific. Unfortunately we have not so far been able to help because we require too much of our forces on the Western Front and are unable to launch any operations against Japan at this time. Our forces now in the East are more or less satisfactory for defense. However, they must be

increased about three-fold for purposes of offensive operations. This condition will not take place until Germany has been forced to capitulate. *Then* by our common front we shall win.

Regarding the second part of the President's remarks concerning Europe, MARSHAL STALIN said he had certain comments to make. Firstly, in a few words, he would like to tell how the Soviets are conducting their own operations, especially since they started their advance last July. (Here THE MARSHAL inquired whether he would be taking too much time to discuss the operations on the Soviet front, and THE PRESIDENT and PRIME MINISTER both replied emphatically in the negative and requested him to proceed.)

MARSHAL STALIN said that after the German defense had collapsed, they were prepared to start their offensive, i. e., they had accumulated sufficient munitions, supplies and reserves, etc. They passed easily from the defensive into the offensive. As a matter of fact, they did not expect the successes they achieved in July, August, and September. Contrary to the Soviet expectations, the Germans are considerably weakened. At the present time the Germans have on the Soviet front 210 divisions, plus 6 German divisions that are in the process of being furnished for this front. In addition, there are 50 non-German divisions, which include 10 Bulgarian, 20 Finnish, and 16 to 18 Rumanian.

THE PRESIDENT asked what the present strength of these divisions was.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the Germans considered a normal division to be eight to nine thousand men, not counting the corps troops, antiaircraft artillery, and so forth. Including these special troops, the divisions totaled about twelve thousand. He said that last year the Germans had 240 divisions on the Soviet front, 179 of which were German. However, this year they have 260 divisions on the Soviet front, 210 of which are German, plus the six that are now moving from the West. The Red Army has 330 divisions opposing the Germans. This Soviet excess of 70 divisions is used for offensive operations. If the excess did not exist, no offensive operations would be possible. However, as time goes on the difference between the German and Soviet strength decreases, particularly as to the result of demolitions which the Germans construct during their withdrawals, which makes supply difficult. As a result, the operations have slowed down, but the Red Army still maintains the initiative. In some sectors the operations have come to a standstill.

MARSHAL STALIN said that as to the Ukraine, west and south of Kiev, the Germans have taken the initiative. In this sector they have three old and five new tank divisions, plus 22 or 23 infantry or motorized divisions. These are for the purpose of capturing Kiev. Some diffi-

culties may, therefore, be foreseen. All of these factors make it necessary that the Soviets continue operations in the West and remain silent as far as the Far Eastern front is concerned. The above is a description of the Soviet operations during this past summer.

Now a few words as to how the U. S. S. R. believes the forces of the United States and Great Britain could be best used to help the Soviet front. Possibly this is a mistake, but the U. S. S. R. has considered the operations in Italy as of great value in order to permit ships to pass through the Mediterranean. As to other large operations against Germany from the Italian front, it is not considered that operations in Italy are of great value to further the war against the Axis. Thus, it is believed that the Italian operations were of great importance in order to produce freedom of navigation, but that now they are of no further great importance as regards the defeat of Germany. There was once a time when the Soviets tried to invade the Alps,³ but they found it a very difficult operation.

In the U. S. S. R. it is believed that the most suitable sector for a blow at Germany would be from some place in France—Northwestern France or Southern France. It is thought that Hitler is trying hard now to contain as many Allied divisions in Italy as possible because he knows things cannot be settled here, and Germany is defended by the Alps. It would be a good thing if Turkey could open the way to Germany, and it would then be unnecessary to launch a cross-Channel operation. However, despite the fact that the heart of Germany is far from the Balkans, it would be a better area from which to launch an attack than from Italy. Soviet military authorities believe it would be better to use Northern France for invasion purposes, but it must be expected that the Germans will fight like devils to prevent such an attack.

THE PRIME MINISTER then said that the British had long agreed with the United States that an invasion of North and Northwestern France across the Channel should be undertaken. At the present time preparations for such an operation are absorbing the major part of our energies and resources. He said it would take a long statement to explain why the U. S. and U. K. have not been able to strike against France in 1943, but that they are resolved to do so in 1944. In 1943 operations in Africa and across the Mediterranean were the best that could be accomplished in view of the limitations imposed by the lack of shipping and landing craft. He said that the United States and Great Britain had set before themselves the object of carrying an army into France in the late spring or early summer of 1944. The

³ The reference is to the operations of Russian troops in the Napoleonic Wars: see *ante*, p. 490, footnote 5.

forces set up for this operation amount to 16 British divisions and 19 U. S. divisions, a total of 35. It must be remembered, however, that these divisions are almost twice as strong as the German divisions. The enterprise will involve a force of a million men being placed into France in 1944.

At this point MARSHAL STALIN stated that he had not wished to imply that the Mediterranean operations had been unimportant.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was very grateful for the Marshal's courtesy, but both he and the President had never regarded the Mediterranean operations as more than a stepping stone to the main offensive against Germany. He said that after the British 16 divisions had been committed, there would be no more British divisions available for the operations. The entire British manpower would be necessary to maintain the divisions thus committed in France and elsewhere throughout the world. The remaining build-up for the offensive against Germany would rest with the United States. THE PRIME MINISTER said, however, that the summer of 1944 is far away. This particular operation is six months away. It is asked now what can be done in the meanwhile that will be of more use and take more weight off the U. S. S. R., possibly without delaying OVERLORD more than a month or two. Already seven of the best divisions have been withdrawn from the Mediterranean for OVERLORD and many landing craft have already gone or are being collected together. These withdrawals, plus bad weather, have resulted in our great disappointment at not now being in Rome. However, it is hoped to be there in January. General Alexander, who is commanding these operations under the direction of General Eisenhower, feels that that offensive might result in completely cutting off the 10 or 12 divisions now opposing the Anglo-American forces. This would result from amphibious operations, flanking movements, which would cut off their lines of withdrawal.

The United States and the British have not come to any decision regarding plans for going into the Valley of the Po or for trying to invade Germany from Northern Italy. It was felt that when the Pisa-Rimini line should be reached we could then look toward Southern France or the Adriatic. It would be possible to use sea power in order to open the way.

THE PRIME MINISTER said, however, that the operations referred to above were not enough. Ways of doing much more were now being talked of. Splendid things had been accomplished in Yugoslavia by Tito, who is doing much more than Mihailovich had accomplished. There were no plans to put a large army into Yugoslavia, but a blow could be struck at the Germans by means of assisting the Tito forces through increased supplies.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that one of the greatest things under consideration was the matter of bringing Turkey into the war, persuading her in, and opening the communications into the Dardanelles, Bosphorus and the Black Sea. Such operation would make possible an attack on Rhodes and other islands in the Aegean. The above would have a very important effect in that it would be possible for convoys to supply the U. S. S. R. through that route and these convoys could be maintained continuously. At the present time four convoys are scheduled via the northern routes, but it will not be possible to send more because of the necessity of utilizing the escorts for the OVERLORD build-up.

THE PRIME MINISTER said one of the most important questions is how Turkey can be persuaded to come into the war. What should be done about this matter? If Turkey should enter the war, should she be asked to attack Bulgaria or should her forces stop on the Thrace front? What would be the effect of Turkey's action on Bulgaria? What do the Soviets think Bulgaria would do in the event of Turkey's coming into the war? How would Turkey's entry into the war affect Rumania and Hungary? Would not Turkey's entry into the war and consequent operations in the Aegean bring about a political "turnover" and force a German evacuation of Greece? It would be appreciated if the Soviets would let us know their opinion, political as well as military, on the above questions.

MARSHAL STALIN said with regard to the remark of the Prime Minister as to whether it was thought Bulgaria would remember the Soviet action in freeing her from the Turks⁴—the liberation of Bulgaria has not been forgotten.

THE PRIME MINISTER continued that the objective of operations which were contemplated in the Eastern Mediterranean was to support the Soviets provided the U. S. S. R. considered the matter of sufficient interest for these operations to be undertaken—even if it meant as much as about two months' delay in OVERLORD. Until it is known how the Soviets feel about Turkish and Aegean operations, the matter can not be definitely decided. The U. S. and U. K. can only decide this point after consulting with the U. S. S. R.

THE PRESIDENT said that possibly an entry through the North-eastern Adriatic for offensive operations against Germany in the direction of the Danube would be of value. Such operations were being considered together with a movement into Southern France. Plans for these operations had not been worked out in detail. Such plans would be based, of course, on the assumption that the Red

⁴ The reference is to Russian action in 1877-78. With regard to the Churchill remark referred to by Stalin, see *ante*, p. 492.

Army would at the same time be approaching Odessa. It was thought, however, that it would be desirable to have a subcommittee go into the details of this matter.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if the Anglo-American forces take Rome and break up the German formation south of the Apennines they would then have the choice of proceeding to Southern France or eastward across the Adriatic.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he understood it would require 35 divisions to invade France. Did these include the forces to be used in the Mediterranean?

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated that the Mediterranean forces were entirely separate from those included in the OVERLORD build-up. He added that after the Italians had been defeated in Italy there remained the possibility of an attack against Southern France or across the Adriatic in the direction of Hungary and the Danube. Entirely separate from the OVERLORD build-up there would be 22 divisions available in the Mediterranean; these should all be used. However, it was not possible to move more than seven of them to the OVERLORD build-up because of a lack of shipping. He explained again that the OVERLORD build-up was to include 16 British and 19 American divisions; that once the 16 British divisions had been committed there would be no more British divisions available. However, the United States would continue to pour divisions into France as fast as they could be shipped across the Atlantic until a total force of 50 to 60 divisions had been reached. He pointed out, incidentally, the British and American divisions with their necessary supporting troops could be roughly estimated at 40,000 men each.

THE PRIME MINISTER also spoke of the large air forces being assembled in England. The present R. A. F. has about reached its maximum strength and [will?] be maintained at this strength in the future. However, it is contemplated that the American Air Forces in England will be doubled or tripled in the next six months. The U. S. has already shipped a million tons of stores to the United Kingdom in preparation for the OVERLORD operation. MR. CHURCHILL said that the President and he would be delighted to have the whole schedule of the OVERLORD build-up, both as to personnel and supply, presented to the Soviet authorities and answer any questions which they might have on this subject. He added that the schedule so prepared is being carried out.

MARSHAL STALIN said it seemed to him that in addition to the operations to capture Rome and in addition to those envisaged for the Adriatic, an operation in Southern France was contemplated.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied it was hoped that an operation against

Southern France might be carried out as a diversion for OVERLORD but that detailed plans for such an operation had not been worked out.

MARSHAL STALIN asked if Turkey enters the war will Anglo-American forces be allocated to assist them?

THE PRIME MINISTER said that speaking for himself, two or three divisions would be required to take the islands in the Aegean that control communications to Turkey, that 20 squadrons of fighter aircraft and several regiments of anti-aircraft artillery could also be supplied by the British without seriously affecting other operations in the Mediterranean.

MARSHAL STALIN then said that the Anglo-American presentation was clear to him and indicated that he would like to make some comments. He said that it was not worthwhile to scatter the British and American forces. The plans presented seemed to indicate that part would be sent to Turkey, part to be utilized in Southern France, part in Northern France and part for operations across the Adriatic. He suggested that OVERLORD be accepted as a basis for operations in 1944 and other operations should be considered as diversionary. He thought that after Rome had been captured there might be a chance for an operation against Southern France from Corsica, in which event the OVERLORD forces plus the Southern France invasion force could establish contact in France. This, he thought, would be a much better operation than to scatter forces in several areas distant from each other. He considered that France was the weakest of all German-occupied areas. He added that he had no hopes of Turkey entering the war and in fact was convinced that she would not, in spite of all pressure that might be exerted.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he and the President had understood that the Soviet authorities wanted Turkey to come into the war. They were prepared to make every effort to persuade or force her to do so.

MARSHAL STALIN said the Soviets do want Turkey to enter the war but he felt that she could not be taken in by "the scruff of the neck."⁵

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he agreed that the Anglo-American forces should not be scattered but that the operations he had outlined in the Eastern Mediterranean would require only three or four of a total of 25 divisions that might be available. He thought that this could be accomplished without seriously affecting the main operations

⁵ According to Churchill, p. 355, Stalin replied as follows to Churchill's question whether it was not intended to renew the effort to induce Turkey to enter the war: "I am all in favour of trying again. We ought to take them by the scruff of the neck if necessary."

of OVERLORD. Most of the operations would be done by divisions from the Middle East. The air power necessary to assist Turkey would be taken from that now protecting Egypt and thus they would be brought into a better position to strike at the enemy.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he dreaded the six months' idleness between the capture of Rome and the mounting of OVERLORD. Hence, he believed that secondary operations should be considered in order to deploy forces available.

MARSHAL STALIN said he would like to express another opinion, i. e., that he believed OVERLORD has the greatest possibilities. This would particularly be the case if OVERLORD operations were supported by another offensive movement from Southern France. He believed that the Allies should be prepared to remain on the defensive in Italy and thus release 10 divisions for operations in Southern France. Within two or three months after operations commenced in Southern France and the German forces had thus been diverted, the time would be propitious to start an operation in the North of France such as OVERLORD. Under these conditions the success of OVERLORD would be assured. Rome might then be captured at a later date.

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that we should be no stronger if we did not capture Rome. If the airfields north of Rome are not secured it would be impracticable to place adequate aircraft for an attack on Southern France. He said it would be difficult for him to agree not to take Rome this January. He added that failure to do so would be considered as a crushing defeat, and that the House of Commons would feel that he was failing to use his British forces in full support of the Soviet ally. He said that in this event he felt it would be no longer possible for him to represent his government.

MARSHAL STALIN suggested that an operation against Southern France might be undertaken and given air cover from bases on Corsica.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that it would take considerable time to construct the necessary airfields on the Island of Corsica.

THE PRESIDENT said that Marshal Stalin's proposals concerning Southern France were of considerable interest to him. He would like to have the Planners make a study of the possibilities of this operation. The question of relative timing in the Eastern Mediterranean with reference to these operations posed a very serious question. The point was whether it would be better to go into the Eastern Mediterranean and delay OVERLORD for one or two months or to attack France one or two months before the first of May and then conduct OVERLORD on the original date. He was particularly desirous that this operation not be delayed if it were possible to avoid it.

MARSHAL STALIN said as the result of the Soviet experience in the past two years they have come to the conclusion that a large offensive from one direction is unwise. The Red Army usually attacks from two directions, forcing the enemy to move his reserves from one front to the other. As the two offensives converge the power of the whole offensive increases. Such would be the case in simultaneous operations from Southern and Northern France.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he agreed with the views expressed by Marshal Stalin but did not feel that his proposals concerning Turkey and Yugoslavia were inconsistent with them. He wished to go on record as saying that it would be difficult and impossible to sacrifice all activity in the Mediterranean in order to keep an exact date for OVERLORD. There would be 20 divisions which could not be moved out of the Mediterranean because of a lack of shipping. These should be used to stretch Germany to the utmost. He expressed the hope that careful and earnest consideration should be given to making certain that operations in the Mediterranean were not injured solely for the purpose of keeping the May date for OVERLORD. He added that agreement between the three powers was necessary and would be reached but he hoped that all factors would be given careful and patient consideration before decisions were reached. He suggested meditating on the discussions of the first meeting and reviewing them at the meeting of the next day.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought it would be a good idea for the staff to immediately conduct a study on the operations against Southern France.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that the staff should investigate plans for operations against Southern France but added that they should also work on Turkey.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed that it would be well to continue consideration of these matters the next day. He had not expected that the conference would deal with purely military questions and therefore they had not brought a large military staff. He added, however, that Marshal Voroshiloff was present and would be available for military discussions.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked how the question of Turkish entry into the war should be considered. He asked if she could be brought in, what she should be expected to do in the event that she did come in and what the cost of her entry would be to the three powers concerned.

MARSHAL STALIN said that the entry of Turkey into the war was both a political and a military question. Turkey must take pride in

the policy of entry from the point of view of friendship. The British and the United States should use their influence to persuade Turkey to help. In this way it would be impossible for Turkey to maintain her position as a neutral and continue to play fast and loose between our side and the Axis. It was his opinion that if it were not possible to induce Turkey to enter the war as a matter of friendship, she should not enter. MARSHAL STALIN added that all neutral states, including Turkey, look upon belligerents as fools. We must prove to them that if they do not enter this war they will not reap the benefits of the victory.

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that Christmas time would be a dangerous season for Turkey. He added that he proposed submitting a paper which he would present before the conference, containing six or seven questions which should be answered in order to clarify the Turkish situation.⁶

THE PRESIDENT said that he would do all he could to persuade the President of Turkey to enter the war. However, he felt personally that Turkey would ask such a high price for her entry as a belligerent that OVERLORD would be jeopardized.

MARSHAL STALIN said that the Turks have not yet answered the proposals already made to them but that he expected their reply would be in the negative.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that Turkey would be mad not to accept the Soviet invitation to join the winning side. If she failed to align herself with us she would certainly lose [*lose*] the sympathy of the British people and almost certainly of the American people.

MARSHAL STALIN observed that "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." The Turks are now inactive and they should help us.

THE CONFEREES then agreed that the plenary session should be held at 1600 the following day.

THE PRESIDENT observed that it would be desirable to have a military conference first.

It was agreed that a military conference should be held at 1030 the following day, that Marshal Voroshiloff should represent the U. S. S. R., Admiral Leahy and General Marshall should represent the U. S. A. and General Brooke and Air Marshal Portal should represent Great Britain.

⁶ The paper to which Churchill referred was drawn up by the British Chiefs of Staff at Tehran and dated November 28, 1943. It was not discussed, however, at the Tehran Conference. On December 2, 1943, the paper was circulated as C. C. S. 418 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Cairo. It was discussed at their meeting on December 3, 1943, and was approved with amendments as 418/1. See *post*, pp. 673 and 782, respectively.

TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING, NOVEMBER 28, 1943, 8:30 P. M.,
ROOSEVELT'S QUARTERS, SOVIET EMBASSY¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Roosevelt Mr. Hopkins Mr. Harriman Mr. Bohlen	Prime Minister Churchill Foreign Secretary Eden Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Major Birse	Marshal Stalin Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Pavlov

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SECRET

During the first part of the dinner the conversation between the President and Marshal Stalin was general in character and dealt for the most part with a suitable place for the next meeting. Fairbanks seemed to be considered by both the most suitable spot.

MARSHAL STALIN then raised the question of the future of France. He described in considerable length the reasons why, in his opinion, France deserved no considerate treatment from the Allies and, above all, had no right to retain her former empire. He said that the entire French ruling class was rotten to the core and had delivered over France to the Germans and that, in fact, France was now actively helping our enemies. He therefore felt that it would be not only unjust but dangerous to leave in French hands any important strategic points after the war.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he in part agreed with Marshal Stalin. That was why this afternoon he had said to Marshal Stalin that it was necessary to eliminate in the future government of France anybody over forty years old and particularly anybody who had formed part of the French Government. He mentioned specifically the question of New Caledonia and Dakar, the first of which he said represented a threat to Australia and New Zealand and, therefore, should be placed under the trusteeship of the United Nations. In regard to Dakar, THE PRESIDENT said he was speaking for twenty-one American nations when he said that Dakar in unsure hands was a direct threat to the Americas.

MR. CHURCHILL at this point intervened to say that Great Britain did not desire and did not expect to acquire any additional territory out of this war, but since the 4 great victorious nations—the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China—will be

¹ Roosevelt was the host at this dinner.

responsible for the future peace of the world, it was obviously necessary that certain strategic points throughout the world should be under the [*their?*] control.

MARSHAL STALIN again repeated and emphasized his view that France could not be trusted with any strategic possessions outside her own border in the post-war period. He described the ideology of the Vichy Ambassador to Moscow, Bergery, which he felt was characteristic of the majority of French politicians. This ideology definitely preferred an agreement with France's former enemy, Germany, than with her former allies, Great Britain and the United States.

The conversation then turned to the question of the treatment to be accorded Nazi Germany.

THE PRESIDENT said that, in his opinion, it was very important not to leave in the German mind the concept of the Reich and that the very word should be stricken from the language.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that it was not enough to eliminate the word, but the very Reich itself must be rendered impotent ever again to plunge the world into war. He said that unless the victorious Allies retained in their hands the strategic positions necessary to prevent any recrudescence of German militarism, they would have failed in their duty.

In the detailed discussion between the President, Marshal Stalin and Churchill that followed Marshal Stalin took the lead, constantly emphasizing that the measures for the control of Germany and her disarmament were insufficient to prevent the rebirth of German militarism and appeared to favor even stronger measures. He, however, did not specify what he actually had in mind except that he appeared to favor the dismemberment of Germany.

MARSHAL STALIN particularly mentioned that Poland should extend to the Oder and stated definitely that the Russians would help the Poles to obtain a frontier on the Oder.

THE PRESIDENT then said he would be interested in the question of assuring the approaches to the Baltic Sea and had in mind some form of trusteeship with perhaps an international state in the vicinity of the Kiel Canal to insure free navigation in both directions through the approaches. Due to some error of the Soviet translator Marshal Stalin apparently thought that the President was referring to the question of the Baltic States. On the basis of this understanding, he replied categorically that the Baltic States had by an expression of the will of the people voted to join the Soviet Union and that this question was not therefore one for discussion. Following the clearing up of the misapprehension, he, however, expressed himself favorably in

regard to the question of insuring free navigation to and from the Baltic Sea.

THE PRESIDENT, returning to the question of certain outlying possessions, said he was interested in the possibility of a sovereignty fashioned in a collective body such as the United Nations; a concept which had never been developed in past history.

After dinner when the President had retired, the conversation continued between Marshal Stalin and Mr. Churchill. The subject was still the treatment to be accorded to Germany, and even more than during dinner Marshal Stalin appeared to favor the strongest possible measures against Germany.

MR. CHURCHILL said that he advocated that Germany be permitted no aviation of any character—neither military or civilian—and in addition that the German general staff system should be completely abolished. He proposed a number of other measures of control such as constant supervision over such industries as might be left to Germany and territorial dismemberment of the Reich.

MARSHAL STALIN to all of these considerations expressed doubt as to whether they would be effective. He said that any furniture factories could be transformed into airplane factories and any watch factories could make fuses for shells.² He said, in his opinion, the Germans were very able and talented people and could easily revive within fifteen or twenty years and again become a threat to the world. He said that he had personally questioned German prisoners in the Soviet Union as to why they had burst into Russian homes, killed Russian women, etc., and that the only reply he had received was they had been ordered to do so.

MR. CHURCHILL said that he could not look more than fifty years ahead and that he felt that upon the three nations represented here at Teheran rested the grave responsibility of future measures of assuring in some manner or other that Germany would not again rise to plague the world during the [*that?*] period. He said that he felt it was largely the fault of the German leaders and that, while during war time no distinction could be made between the leaders and the people particularly in regard to Germany, nevertheless, with a generation of self-sacrificing, toil and education, something might be done with the German people.

MARSHAL STALIN expressed dissent with this and did not appear satisfied as to the efficacy of any of the measures proposed by Mr. Churchill.

² For post-Conference references to this matter, see *post*, pp. 847, 880, 884.

MR. CHURCHILL then inquired whether it would be possible this evening to discuss the question of Poland. He said that Great Britain had gone to war with Germany because of the latter's invasion of Poland in 1939 and that the British Government was committed to the reestablishment of a strong and independent Poland but not to any specific Polish frontiers. He added that if Marshal Stalin felt any desire to discuss the question of Poland, that he was prepared to do so and he was sure that the President was similarly disposed.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he had not yet felt the necessity nor the desirability of discussing the Polish question (After an exchange of remarks on this subject from which it developed that the Marshal had in mind that nothing that the Prime Minister had said on the subject of Poland up to the present stimulated him to discuss the question, the conversation returned to the substance of the Polish question).

MR. CHURCHILL said that he personally had no attachment to any specific frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union; that he felt that the consideration of Soviet security on their western frontiers was a governing factor. He repeated, however, that the British Government considered themselves committed to the reestablishment of an independent and strong Poland which he felt a necessary instrument in the European orchestra.

MR. EDEN then inquired if he had understood the Marshal correctly at dinner when the latter said that the Soviet Union favored the Polish western frontier on the Oder.

MARSHAL STALIN replied emphatically that he did favor such a frontier for Poland and repeated that the Russians were prepared to help the Poles achieve it.

MR. CHURCHILL then remarked that it would be very valuable if here in Teheran the representatives of the three governments could work out some agreed understanding on the question of the Polish frontiers which could then be taken up with the Polish Government in London. He said that, as far as he was concerned, he would like to see Poland moved westward in the same manner as soldiers at drill execute the drill "left close" and illustrated his point with three matches representing the Soviet Union, Poland and Germany.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed that it would be a good idea to reach an understanding on this question but said it was necessary to look into the matter further.

The conversation broke up on this note.

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF MARSHAL STALIN'S VIEWS AS EXPRESSED DURING THE
EVENING OF NOVEMBER 28, 1943

During dinner and afterwards Marshal Stalin kept returning to the following subjects:

(1) TREATMENT TO BE ACCORDED GERMANY

In regard to Germany, Marshal Stalin appeared to regard all measures proposed by either the President or Churchill for the subjugation and for the control of Germany as inadequate. He on various occasions sought to induce the President or the Prime Minister to go further in expressing their views as to the stringency of the measures which should be applied to Germany. He appeared to have no faith in the possibility of the reform of the German people and spoke bitterly of the attitude of the German workers in the war against the Soviet Union. As evidence of the fundamental German devotion to legality he cited the occasion in 1907 when he was in Leipzig when 200 German workers failed to appear at an important mass meeting because there was no controller at the station platform to punch their tickets which would permit them to leave the station. He seemed to think that this mentality of discipline and obedience could not be changed.

He said that Hitler was a very able man but not basically intelligent, lacking in culture and with a primitive approach to political and other problems. He did not share the view of the President that Hitler was mentally unbalanced and emphasized that only a very able man could accomplish what Hitler had done in solidifying the German people whatever we thought of the methods. Although he did not specifically say so, it was apparent from his remarks that he considered that Hitler through his stupidity in attacking the Soviet Union had thrown away all the fruits of his previous victories.

As a war-time measure Marshal Stalin questioned the advisability of the unconditional surrender principle with no definition of the exact terms which would be imposed upon Germany. He felt that to leave the principle of unconditional surrender unclarified merely served to unite the German people, whereas to draw up specific terms, no matter how harsh, and tell the German people that this was what they would have to accept, would, in his opinion, hasten the day of German capitulation.

(2) FRANCE AND THE FRENCH EMPIRE

Throughout the evening Marshal Stalin kept reverting to the thesis that the French nation, and in particular its leaders and ruling classes, were rotten and deserved to be punished for their criminal collaboration with Nazi Germany. In particular he reiterated that France should not be given back her Empire. He took issue with the Prime Minister when the latter stated that France had been a defeated nation and had suffered the horrors of occupation, and denied that France had been in effect defeated. On the contrary their leaders had surrendered the country and "opened the front" to the German armies. He cited as characteristic of French political thinking the views of Bergery, former Vichy Ambassador to Moscow. Bergery had felt that the future of France lay in close association with Nazi Germany and not in association with Great Britain and the United States. When the Prime Minister stated that he could not conceive of a civilized world without a flourishing and lively France, Marshal Stalin somewhat contemptuously replied that France could be a charming and pleasant country but could not be allowed to play any important role in the immediate post war world. He characterized De Gaulle as a representative of a symbolic and not a real France but one who nevertheless acted as though he was the head of a great power. He appeared to attach little importance to De Gaulle as a real factor in political or other matters.

Both in regard to German and French questions Stalin was obviously trying to stimulate discussion and to ascertain the exact views of the President and Prime Minister on these questions without, however, stating clearly what solutions he himself proposed. On all questions of future general security which arose in the discussion of the French and German questions he appeared desirous to ascertain exactly what form of security organization would be developed after the war and how far the United States and British governments were prepared to go in implementing the police power of such an organization.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1943

TRIPARTITE MILITARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 29, 1943, 10:30 A. M.,
CONFERENCE ROOM, SOVIET EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
Admiral Leahy	General Brooke	Marshal Voroshilov
General Marshall	Air Chief Marshal Portal	Mr. Pavlov,
Colonel McFarland,	Brigadier Redman,	Interpreter
Secretary	Secretary	
Captain Ware,	Captain Lunghi,	
Interpreter	Interpreter	

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SECRET

GENERAL SIR ALAN BROOKE expressed his pleasure at being able to sit down at a table around which were gathered the military representatives of the U. S., the U. K., and the U. S. S. R. He said that he would run through a brief account of the war as seen by the British representatives at the present moment and then examine the relation of the OVERLORD operation to the other parts of the war effort.

He thought that one of the most important things at the present time was to keep the German divisions actively engaged. For this reason, the British were interested in stopping the movement to the Russian front of all the German divisions which it was possible to hold. OVERLORD would engage a large number of German divisions, but it could not possibly be mounted until 1 May at the very earliest date. Therefore, there would ensue, between the present time and the launching of OVERLORD, a period of some five or six months during which something must be done to keep the German divisions engaged. It was therefore desired to take full advantage of the forces now established in the Mediterranean area.

At this point GENERAL BROOKE expressed the hope that General Marshall would interrupt his statement if anything was said with which General Marshall did not agree or on which he wished to offer any comment.

Continuing his account of the war, GENERAL BROOKE said that for the reasons already stated, all the plans on which we have been working have been designed to deploy the maximum forces on all fronts. Pointing out on a map the present location of the Italian Front, he said that on that line we are assembling the forces in Italy necessary to drive the Germans to the north. There are some 23 German divisions now in Italy, part of them in the south and a part of them in the north. The present conception is to assemble sufficient forces to drive the Germans from their present line to a line north of Rome. To do this it would be necessary to employ amphibious forces around the German flanks (pointing to the west flank), and by these operations it was hoped to engage the 11 or 12 German divisions in the south, render them inoperative, and force the Germans to relieve them. By these means we should be able to contain the German divisions now present in Italy and to reduce their efficiency.

Turning to Yugoslavia, GENERAL BROOKE said that since the withdrawal of Italian forces there, the Germans have found it difficult to maintain their communications in that country. Therefore, full

advantage must be taken of all opportunities to increase the German difficulties in Yugoslavia by assisting the Partisans. It is desired to organize a system by which arms can be supplied to them and air assistance rendered as well.

GENERAL BROOKE said that there were now some 21 German divisions deployed in Yugoslavia as far down as the Grecian border. Replying to an indication from Marshal Voroshiloff that he did not quite agree with these figures, he stated that this was his information and that he would ask the British Intelligence to check the accuracy of his figures. He said that there were also 8 Bulgarian divisions in addition to the German divisions in the Yugoslav area.

With reference to Turkey, GENERAL BROOKE said that, looking at Turkey from a military point of view and omitting all political considerations, we see a great military advantage in getting Turkey into the war. By this we shall have an opportunity of opening the sea communications through the Dardanelles. By doing this, the position of Bulgaria and Rumania will become more difficult and the chances of getting them out of the war will be greatly increased. There will also be opened up the possibility of establishing a supply line to Russia through the Dardanelles.

By establishing airdromes in Turkey, it will be possible to launch bombing attacks on German oil establishments in eastern Europe. The shortening of the sea route to Russia will save shipping and thereby assist greatly in the general shipping shortage. In order to open sea communications through the Dardanelles, it is considered that it will be necessary to capture some of the Dodecanese Islands, beginning with Rhodes. With airdomes established in Turkey and with Turkish help, it was not believed that this would be a difficult task nor that it would detract from other operations.

GENERAL BROOKE said that we have in the Mediterranean now a certain number of landing craft for special operations. These landing craft would be required for the operations he had outlined, and their retention for these operations would require the retarding of the date set for OVERLORD. The landing craft are being used to maintain and build up the forces now in Italy. By the operations he had outlined we should be able to hold and destroy the German forces now in the Mediterranean area while awaiting the date for OVERLORD.

He considered it also of great importance to establish airdromes to the north of Rome in order to bring bombing to bear on German installations. He said that this air operation in conjunction with the operations now being carried on from England would play a great part in the conduct of the whole war.

He pointed out that air attacks were now containing about a million men now held in Germany solely by reason of the bomber offensive.

He said that if we adopt defensive operations in Italy now, as had been suggested at yesterday's conference,¹ we should still have to maintain strong forces in Italy in order to contain the German forces there. Therefore, there would be left over only very limited forces for the operation against the coast of Southern France. In addition, the landing craft available for that operation would be limited to a very small assault force.

GENERAL BROOKE said that he agreed with Marshal Stalin's pincer strategy of two cooperating forces whenever such a strategy was possible but he thought that this strategy was better when based on land instead of on long sea communications. In the latter case, the two forces are not sufficiently self-supporting. It is not easy to reinforce one from the other or to keep a reserve from which to reinforce either from a central point. The building up of land forces by sea is a lengthy business.

GENERAL BROOKE said that if the attack against Southern France were launched two months prior to OVERLORD, that it was certain to be defeated before OVERLORD starts. He said that a more nearly simultaneous execution of these operations would be required and also that large numbers of landing craft would be necessary. However, it had been considered that during OVERLORD a small landing might be made in Southern France to draw German forces away from the larger operation.

He said that the difficulties and dangers for OVERLORD would develop during the building up of the forces. It was possible to assault the French coast only with some three or four divisions and the process of building up to 35 divisions would be long and difficult. During this period it was imperative that the Germans should not be able to concentrate large forces against the operation.

GENERAL BROOKE said that this concluded a rough outline of the projected land operations and that Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal would explain the air aspects of the operations.

AIR MARSHAL PORTAL inquired as to whether he should, in his comments, cover the U. S. air operations or whether General Marshall would do this.

In reply, GENERAL MARSHALL requested Air Marshal Portal to cover the entire operations and said that he would elaborate as necessary.

In response to Marshal Voroshiloff's request that the U. S. representatives give their comments on the land operations before the taking up of the air aspects, ADMIRAL LEAHY requested General Marshall to state the U. S. views.

¹ See *ante*, p. 495.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he should first explain the purely American point of view of this stage of the war. He pointed out that the U. S. now has a going war on two fronts, the Pacific and the Atlantic, and this fact of two major operations at one time presents a dilemma. In contrast to the usual difficulties of war, there is no lack of troops and no lack of supplies. There are now more than fifty divisions in the United States which we wish to deploy as soon as possible in addition to those already overseas. The military problem, therefore, resolves itself almost entirely into a question of shipping and landing craft. While this is, of course, an exaggeration, it might almost be said that we have reached the point of having to ignore strategy in order to advance communications. Our great desire is to bring these troops into action as soon as possible.

When we speak of landing craft we mean, most of all, special craft for the transport of motor vehicles and tanks. As the Chief of the Imperial General Staff has already stated, our problem in the Mediterranean is largely one of landing craft, and of those landing craft, we are particularly concerned with the special craft for transporting motor vehicles.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he wished to repeat and emphasize that there was no lack of troops or of supplies. He said we are deeply interested in the length of voyages, the length of time required in ports, and the over-all time for the turn-around. Our air forces had been sent overseas just as soon as they had been trained and hence, the air battle was far more advanced than the situation on land. One of the delays in the build-up of land forces in Italy had been the getting in of air support and the necessary ground troops to maintain it.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that one reason for favoring OVERLORD from the start is that it is the shortest oversea transport route. After the initial success, transports will be sent directly from the United States to the French ports because there are about sixty divisions in the United States to be put into OVERLORD.

As to the Mediterranean factors in the situation, GENERAL MARSHALL said that no definite conclusions have been reached up to the present as to further operations, pending the results of this conference. The question now before us is: What do we do in the next three months, and then in the next six months? He pointed out that what was done in the second period would necessarily depend on the decisions made in the first period.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he would like to repeat the statement made by General Brooke that it is considered dangerous to launch an operation against the coast of Southern France a long time (that is, what we consider a long time) prior to OVERLORD. On the other hand, action in Southern France has been considered and planned on as very impor-

tant for the support of the operation in Northwestern France. He said that at the present moment he and his U. S. colleagues feel that from two to three weeks should be the maximum limit for launching this operation in advance of OVERLORD.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he wished to point out, in addition to what General Brooke had said, that the destruction of ports imposes an initial and serious delay in getting heavy equipment and ammunition ashore, and it is necessary that we assume in our planning that the ports will be destroyed. Our engineers have accomplished marvels in restoring the damaged ports but despite this, a considerable period of dangerous delay inevitably follows the initial assault. He illustrated this by reference to the U. S. experience in Salerno, a comparatively small landing. In the first 18 days there had been landed over the beaches a total of 108,000 tons of supplies, 30,000 motor vehicles and 189,000 troops. He wished to emphasize that all of this had to be done over the beaches and that none of it came through a port. The U. S. was fortunate, of course, to have had during this period a very slight enemy air reaction.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the difficulty in such an operation is to get sufficient fighter air cover. In almost every case it had been found, therefore, that an additional operation was necessary in order to get the airfields for this fighter cover.

In answer to a question from Marshal Voroshiloff as to how long it had taken to land the men and material just enumerated, GENERAL MARSHALL said it had required 18 days; thereafter a port had been secured. Then, beginning with an initial entry of 2,000 tons of supplies, the intake through the port was increased more and more as the demolished equipment was rehabilitated until it was possible to take care of all requirements in this manner.

In summarizing, GENERAL MARSHALL said that he wished to emphasize that shipping and landing craft, with the provision of fighter air cover, are the problems for which we have to find solutions in order to decide the question of Mediterranean operations. He added that over Salerno fighter aircraft had had only 15 or 20 minutes of actual combat flying time.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF remarked that for OVERLORD this would be a very short time.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that a total combat time of 30 minutes had been planned for OVERLORD.

In reply to Marshal Voroshiloff's statement that he did not think this was sufficient time, AIR MARSHAL PORTAL explained that the 30 minutes was not measured from take-off to landing but was the actual time in which the fighter planes were actually engaged over the battle area.

In reply to Marshal Voroshiloff's question as to what fighters were envisaged as being in this area, AIR MARSHAL PORTAL said that these would be the high-performance fighters, like the British Spitfires and American P-51's and P-38's. He explained that the long-range fighters were not so suitable against the German defenses as the short-range.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in the Mediterranean we face the problem of where to employ our available landing craft. If we undertake certain operations, OVERLORD will inevitably be delayed. If we confine ourselves to reduced operations in the Mediterranean for the next three or four months, this course entails the least interference with OVERLORD. He repeated that the problem is not a lack of troops or of equipment. He would like Marshal Voroshiloff to understand that at the present time the U. S. has landing operations going on at five different places in the Pacific, all of which involve landing craft, and that four more similar operations were due to be launched in January.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he thought the best procedure now would be to have Air Marshal Portal discuss the air aspects of operations and then to ask Marshal Voroshiloff to present any comments or advice he may have.

AIR MARSHAL PORTAL said that he would speak only of the air war in Europe other than on the battle fronts. He said that the air offensive against Germany was being waged on an ever-increasing scale from the U. K.; from the Mediterranean it was just beginning. As to the scale of attack, the British and Americans together were launching from 15,000 to 20,000 tons of bombs per month on German communications, installations, and battle industry. Our immediate objective is the destruction of the plants and factories on which German battle industry depends. If we can do this and inflict heavy casualties on German fighters, we hope to be able to range over all Germany and destroy one by one every important installation on which the German war effort depends.

The battle is heavy, with heavy losses on both sides. The Germans clearly realize their danger if our plans succeed. This is assured by the disposition of their forces in order to counter our attacks. For instance, for the defense of central and southern Germany the Germans now have deployed between 1,650 and 1,700 fighters. On all other fronts together they have only 750 fighters. These figures cover fighters only; bombers are not included. German sensitiveness to the bombing of their industrial area was recently illustrated when, in response to the comparatively light attacks made from the Mediterranean on this area, the Germans immediately transferred 200 fighters to the area.

AIR MARSHAL PORTAL said that it was recognized that the bulk of the Soviet planes were now employed in support of the land battle, but when it became possible to spare air forces from the land battle, this would help enormously on all other fronts by causing the Germans to withdraw forces to protect the area threatened by the Soviets.

In response to a suggestion from Admiral Leahy, it was now agreed that it would be helpful if Marshal Voroshiloff would express his opinion on the matters under discussion.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that before making a statement, he would like to ask some questions. He said that he knew from the statements made by the British and American military representatives in Moscow that OVERLORD is being prepared for next spring, with a target date about 1 May. He had just heard that morning that fifty or sixty divisions would be available from the U. S. for this operation and that the only problem was one of shipping and landing craft. He hoped that it might be possible to have a report on what is being done now to solve the problem of shipping and landing craft and to launch Operation OVERLORD on time. This constituted his first question.

As to his second question, he said that he had attached great importance to the remarks made by General Marshall from which he understood that the U. S. considers Operation OVERLORD of the first importance. He wished to know if General Brooke also considered the operation of the first importance. He wished to ask both Allies whether they think that OVERLORD must be carried out or whether they consider that it may be possible to replace it by some other suitable operation when Turkey has entered the war.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in answer to Marshal Voroshiloff's question as to progress from the U. S. side on the build-up for OVERLORD, all preparations are now under way and have been for some time, for a target date of 1 May 1944, and that the troops are now in motion. As an example he pointed out that we now have in England, well ahead of the troops, a million tons of supplies and equipment, including munitions and heavy supplies of all kinds. It remains now only to bring the troops up to the supplies.

He pointed out that the U. S. had only one division in England in August. There are nine divisions there now with a constant flow of additional troops. There had been a tremendous flow of air personnel for the bomber offensive.

He said that in speaking of divisions, he was including the necessary corps and army troops as well as service troops. He reiterated that the problem is landing craft for OVERLORD. The question now is: Shall we take any landing craft from OVERLORD for other operations and thereby delay OVERLORD? The troops are in motion for

OVERLORD. The air forces are already there and proceeding with their expansion. The problem is landing craft.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that he had an additional question. He said that General Deane and General Ismay, in explaining the OVERLORD build-up at the Moscow Conference,² had said that both in the U. S. and U. K. there were now being built special landing craft and special vessels for the construction of temporary harbors. He would like to know the present status of these construction programs.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he would leave the answer as to the special port construction and as to part of the landing craft construction to General Brooke. He said that in the struggle with the landing craft problem, the object of the U. S. is to get more craft in order to be able to undertake some operations in the Mediterranean that could easily be done if more landing craft were available. He wished to make clear that the landing craft program for OVERLORD is well in hand. GENERAL MARSHALL repeated and emphasized this statement.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that he understood that some ship-building yards both in England and America had been taken over for the building of landing craft. He wished to know whether the construction was actually under way or whether it was still only a program.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that General Brooke could answer for the U. K. There was no secret about the matter. He feared that he himself had misled Marshal Voroshiloff in view of the fact that he was answering the Marshal's question wholly with respect to landing craft for OVERLORD. For example, it had recently been decided to delay the movement from the Mediterranean to OVERLORD of sixty landing craft, capable of carrying 40 tanks each, in order to permit General Eisenhower not only to advance more rapidly in Italy but to force the Germans to reinforce their line from the Po Valley. In other words, the object was to absorb more German divisions in view of the fact that General Eisenhower was unable to conduct a turning movement through the mountains during the winter. For this reason it had been decided to delay the movement of these landing craft from the Mediterranean to the U. K. but it was hoped that it would be possible to complete the operations for which they were being retained in the Mediterranean and still get them through on time for OVERLORD. In the meantime, a tremendous effort was being made both in the U. S. and U. K. to increase the output of landing craft so that OVERLORD might be made more powerful and more certain of success, and so that it might be possible to undertake the operations in the Mediterranean that additional landing craft would permit. He pointed out

² See *ante*, pp. 137 ff.

that the problem in the Mediterranean involves at present more troops than can be put into action.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that this answered his question.

GENERAL BROOKE said, in answer to Marshal Voroshiloff's first question as to the importance in British eyes of operation OVERLORD, that the British had always considered the operation as an essential part of this war. However, they had stipulated that the operation must be mounted at a time when it would have the best chances of success. He pointed out that the fortifications in Northern France are of a very serious character, that the communications are excellent, and therefore the Germans would have an excellent opportunity of holding up the landings until they could bring their reserves into play. This is the reason for the British stipulations as to the conditions prerequisite for launching the operation. They consider that in 1944 these conditions will exist. They have reorganized all their forces for this purpose. These forces were originally organized for the defense of the U. K. but they are now organized as an expeditionary force for employment on the Continent. Amphibious divisions are now undergoing training for Operation OVERLORD. Four battle-trying divisions have been brought back from Italy to the U. K. for the operation and, in addition, there have been brought back some of the landing craft which will be required. All details and plans for the operation have been made as far as it has been possible to do so up to the present moment.

It followed, therefore, that the British attach the greatest importance to the execution of this operation in 1944 but, as General Marshall had said and as he (General Brooke) wished to say again, landing craft constituted our tactical necessity. In order to maintain the 1 May 1944 date for OVERLORD it will be necessary to withdraw landing craft from the Mediterranean *now*. If this were done, it would bring the Italian operations almost to a standstill. The British wished, during the preparations for OVERLORD, to keep fighting the Germans in the Mediterranean to the maximum degree possible. In their view, such operations are necessary not only to hold the Germans in Italy but to create the situation in Northern France which will make OVERLORD possible.

GENERAL BROOKE said that Marshal Voroshiloff had heard correctly as to the construction of landing craft in England at the present time. The Prime Minister has stopped certain ordinary construction in order to make additional landing craft possible. By these means it was hoped to make sixty or seventy more craft available in time for OVERLORD. These are being built now and are in addition to the original program.

With reference to the provision for temporary harbors, he said that the necessary gear was being built for this purpose now. In this connection many experiments have been made, and while some of them had not been as successful as it had been hoped, others had offered considerable promise and it was hoped would give fruitful results. This was a matter of the greatest importance as the success or failure of the operation may depend on these ports. He hoped that these statements would provide a satisfactory answer to Marshal Voroshiloff's question.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said he wished to apologize for his failure to understand clearly but he was interested to know whether General Brooke, as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, considered OVERLORD as important an operation as General Marshall had indicated that he did. He would like General Brooke's personal opinion.

GENERAL BROOKE replied that as Chief of the Imperial General Staff he considered Operation OVERLORD as of vital importance, but there was one stipulation that he should like to make. He knew the defenses of Northern France and did not wish to see the operation fail. In his opinion, under certain circumstances it was bound to fail.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that Marshal Stalin and the Soviet General Staff attach great importance to OVERLORD and felt that the other operations in the Mediterranean can be regarded only as auxiliary operations.

GENERAL BROOKE said that that was exactly the way he looked at the matter but, unless the auxiliary operations are carried out, in his opinion OVERLORD can not be successful.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that he would now express his own point of view. He recalled that Marshal Stalin had said yesterday that he and the Soviet General Staff considered that OVERLORD was a very serious operation and would prove a difficult one.³ He said that the accomplishments of the U. S. and U. K. in the war to date, especially the brilliant operations of their air forces over Germany, served to indicate the might of these two nations and the superiority of the Allies in the Mediterranean area. If there is added to this the firm will and desire of the U. S. and British staffs, he (Marshal Voroshiloff) felt sure that OVERLORD would be successful and that it would go down in history as one of our greatest victories. He repeated that this view was supported by what all have seen in the fighting in North Africa and the operations of the Allied air forces over Germany.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that he had absolutely no doubt that the necessary shipping and landing craft for OVERLORD can be found either by construction of new craft or conversion from merchant craft. He

³ See *ante*, p. 490.

was sure these problems can be solved successfully. He understood from the statements made by General Marshall that the U. S. now has nine divisions in the U. K. He pointed out that there are yet six months to 1 May 1944, the target date for OVERLORD. This will permit the U. S. forces in the U. K. to be doubled or tripled and, in addition, make possible the bringing over of tanks and other supplies.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the nine divisions now in the U. K. consisted of seven infantry divisions and two armored divisions.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that in his opinion this force can be doubled in the next six months, to which GENERAL MARSHALL replied that this is already scheduled.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that he would now discuss the operation itself. He entirely agreed with General Brooke that some small operations in the Mediterranean are necessary as diversions in order to draw German troops away from the Eastern Front and from Northwestern France, but he thought as a military man, and as probably all other military men would think also, that OVERLORD is the most important operation and that all the other auxiliary operations, such as Rome, Rhodes and what not, must be planned to assist OVERLORD and certainly not to hinder it. He pointed out that it was possible now to plan additional operations that may hurt OVERLORD and emphasized that this must not be so. These operations must be planned so as to *secure* OVERLORD, which is the most important operation, and not to hurt it. The suggestion made yesterday by Marshal Stalin that simultaneous operations should be undertaken from Northern France and Southern France⁴ is based on the idea that the Mediterranean operations are secondary to OVERLORD. Germany can not be attacked directly from Italy because of the Alps. However, Italy does offer the possibility of successful defense with a small number of troops. The troops saved by defensive operations in Italy would be available for launching an amphibious operation against Southern France. Marshal Stalin does not insist on this but does insist on the execution of OVERLORD on the date already planned.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said, with respect to the action of the air forces and Air Marshal Portal's suggestion of the bombing of eastern Germany by the Russian Air Force,⁵ that it must be known to the U. S. and the U. K. staffs that the Germans are still strong on the Russian front. He wished to repeat that, as Marshal Stalin had said yesterday, there are now 210 German divisions on this front and 50 satellite divisions, making a total of 260 in all.⁶ The Soviets will, of course, utilize every opportunity of attacking eastern Ger-

⁴ See *ante*, p. 495.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 521.

⁶ See *ante*, p. 490.

many by air, but these opportunities are not very frequent. No such possibility exists at present because all air forces are employed in support of the land battle.

With respect to the difficulties of the cross-Channel operation, he said that it was understood, of course, that crossing the Channel was more difficult than crossing a large river. He pointed out, however, that during the recent Soviet advances to the west they had crossed several large rivers, the most recent of which was the Dnieper. In the latter case the ordinary difficulties of a river crossing were greatly increased by the high, steep western bank and the low eastern bank, but with the help of machine gun, mortar and artillery fire and the employment of mine throwers it had been found possible to lay down a fire so intense that the Germans could not endure it. It was so in the vicinity of Kiev, Gomel, and other points. He believed, therefore, that with similar aids it will be possible for the Allies to land in Northern France.

GENERAL BROOKE said that he would like to point out that the question as to whether or not Operation OVERLORD is to be executed in 1944 has not been under discussion. It has been definitely decided to carry out the operation, and it is recognized that the Mediterranean operations are definitely of a secondary nature. There are certain forces, however, now deployed in the Mediterranean from whose employment a direct benefit can and should be derived. In addition, all operations planned in the Mediterranean area are coordinated in the over-all plan for the war and are projected with a view to their eventual influence on the Eastern Front and on OVERLORD. He said that he had been studying the Soviet river crossings with the greatest of interest. In his opinion the Soviets had been accomplishing technical marvels.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that the crossings were the result of the efforts of all of their people. They had the will to do it.

GENERAL BROOKE said that the Channel crossing was a technical matter, the minutest details of which had been under study for several years. It must not be forgotten that the fire support for the operation must come from the sea. With reference to Marshal Voroshiloff's remarks as to artillery and mortar support, he said that the British have equipped landing craft with mortars and have studied every detail of the fire support of the cross-Channel operation from air and sea. He wished to point out the special difficulties existing in connection with this coast because of the long shelving beaches, where the tide goes out a long way. On many parts of the coast this characteristic makes landing operations very difficult and in some places, as at Calais, where the situation most favors air support, the beaches are the worst. He said the British are still engaged in experi-

ments as to the best means of forcing a landing and are adding to the results of these experiments the best experience of the U. S. and British forces in the war to date.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF referred to newspaper accounts which he had read with reference to large maneuvers held in England and wished to know if these had resulted in any new developments.

GENERAL BROOKE replied that these maneuvers have been carried out mainly for the purpose of bringing about battles in the air. He said that they had carried out all preparations for the cross-Channel operation as a matter of training, and this had proved of great value to the staffs. The landing craft had been launched toward the French coast in the hope that the German air forces would be induced thereby to come out and fight. The German response had not been in keeping with the British hopes. The maneuvers referred to did not include an exercise in the actual landings. These exercises, however, are continually being carried out in certain areas on the English coasts from which the population has been cleared in order to permit the necessary supporting fire.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said he wished to inquire of Air Marshal Portal what his opinion was as to the sufficiency of the air forces available for OVERLORD.

AIR MARSHAL PORTAL replied that there were enough air forces available to insure the success of the landing itself. The Allies would probably be superior to the Germans in the air by five or six to one. It was not, however, in the assault period that the air need would be the greatest, but during the build-up of the invading forces across the beaches. This would constitute the critical period, and it was during this period that the Germans would try to bring to bear their maximum available air power. At the same time a considerable portion of the Allied air forces would have to be used in order to interrupt communications leading from the interior of France to the front.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said he considered an air superiority of five or six to one as satisfactory.

AIR MARSHAL PORTAL pointed out that all these figures must be judged in the light of distance. He said that the Germans have many airfields located close to the front on their side.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that these German airfields must be destroyed before the operation is launched. In his opinion it was impossible to begin it without air superiority.

AIR MARSHAL PORTAL replied that this initial destruction of German airfields was a part of the OVERLORD plan.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he wished to offer one comment. The difference between a river crossing, however wide, and a landing from the ocean is that the failure of a river crossing is a reverse while the

failure of a landing operation from the sea is a catastrophe, because failure in the latter case means the almost utter destruction of the landing craft and personnel involved.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that he appreciated the frankness of these statements.

GENERAL MARSHALL went on to say that his military education had been based on roads, rivers, and railroads and that his war experience in France had been concerned with the same. During the last two years, however, he had been acquiring an education based on oceans and he had had to learn all over again.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that prior to the present war he had never heard of any landing craft except a rubber boat. Now he thinks about little else.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF replied, "If you think about it, you will do it."

To this GENERAL MARSHALL replied, "That is a very good reply. I understand thoroughly."

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that he wished to emphasize that if in Operation OVERLORD our forces were launched against the hostile coast without previously destroying the enemy positions, there could, of course, be no success. He thought that the procedure must be similar to that followed on land. First the enemy positions must be destroyed with artillery fire and bombing from the air; then light forces, including reconnaissance groups, would land and take the first ground; when this had been done, the large forces would come in later. Therefore, if the advance forces were unable to land and were destroyed in the attempt, the larger forces would not be destroyed also. He felt that if the operation were conducted in this way, it would prove to be a brilliant success and not result in catastrophe.

GENERAL MARSHALL emphasized that no catastrophe was expected, but that everyone was planning for success.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested, in view of the lateness of the hour, that the meeting adjourn and reconvene later.

GENERAL BROOKE suggested the possibility of convening again Tuesday morning at 1030. He said that he had some questions he would like to ask Marshal Voroshiloff.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF thought it desirable to reach some conclusions as a result of the discussion.

GENERAL BROOKE suggested that the conclusions would properly follow the second meeting, to which MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF agreed.

The meeting accordingly adjourned, to reconvene at the Russian Legation [*Embassy*], Tehran, Iran, on Tuesday, 30 November at 1030.⁷

⁷ For the decision not to hold this proposed second meeting of the three military staffs, see *post*, p. 539.

ROOSEVELT-STALIN MEETING, NOVEMBER 29, 1943, 2: 45 P. M.,
ROOSEVELT'S QUARTERS, SOVIET EMBASSYPRESENT¹UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. BohlenSOVIET UNION
Marshal Stalin
Mr. Berezhev

Bohlen Collection

Bohlen Minutes

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT opened the conference by saying that he wished to lend to Marshal Stalin a most interesting report² from an American Army officer who had spent six months in Yugoslavia in close contact with Tito. This officer had the highest respect for Tito and the work he was doing in our common cause.

MARSHAL STALIN thanked the President and promised to return the report when he had read it.

THE PRESIDENT then said that during the Moscow Conference, the American Delegation had introduced a proposal to make available to the United States Air Forces, air bases in the USSR for the primary purpose of the shuttle-bombing between Great Britain and the Soviet Union.³ He handed Marshal Stalin a memorandum on the subject⁴ and expressed the personal hope that the Marshal would give this project his support. He then said that this was of great future importance and he wished to tell the Marshal how happy he would be to hear his word in the conference in regard to the defeat of Japanese forces and victory over Germany. He said however, that we must be prepared for that eventuality and do some advance planning, and he therefore was giving the Marshal two papers, one on the air operations against Japan and the other relating to naval operations.⁵ In handing these papers to Marshal Stalin, THE PRESIDENT emphasized that the entire matter would be held in the strictest security and any contacts between Soviet and American officers on the subject would be strictly secret.

MARSHAL STALIN promised to study the documents the President had given him.

¹ The listing of those present is based on the Bohlen minutes. As regards those present for the United States, Elliott Roosevelt (pp. 178-180) mentions his father and himself but not Bohlen. As regards those present for the Soviet Union, Elliott Roosevelt (p. 179) and the Log (*ante*, p. 466) mention Stalin, Molotov, and Pavlov but not Berezhev; and Churchill (p. 363) mentions Stalin and Molotov.

² See *post*, p. 606.

³ See *ante*, p. 136.

⁴ See *post*, p. 617.

⁵ See *post*, pp. 618 and 619, respectively.

THE PRESIDENT then said he had a great many other matters relating to the future of the world which he would like to talk over informally with the Marshal and obtain his view on them. He said that he hoped to discuss some of them before they both left Tehran. He said that he was willing to discuss any subject military or political which the Marshal desired.

MARSHAL STALIN replied there was nothing to prevent them from discussing anything they wished.

THE PRESIDENT then said the question of a post war organization to preserve peace had not been fully explained and dealt with and he would like to discuss with the Marshal the prospect of some organization based on the United Nations.

THE PRESIDENT then outlined the following general plan:

(1) There would be a large organization composed of some 35 members of the United Nations which would meet periodically at different places, discuss and make recommendations to a smaller body.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired whether this organization was to be world wide or European, to which the President replied, world-wide.

THE PRESIDENT continued that there would be set up an executive committee composed of the Soviet Union, the United States, United Kingdom and China, together with two additional European states, one South American, one Near East, one Far Eastern country, and one British Dominion. He mentioned that Mr. Churchill did not like this proposal for the reason that the British Empire only had two votes. This Executive Committee would deal with all non-military questions such as agriculture, food, health, and economic questions, as well as the setting up of an International Committee. This Committee would likewise meet in various places.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired whether this body would have the right to make decisions binding on the nations of the world.

THE PRESIDENT replied, yes and no. It could make recommendations for settling disputes with the hope that the nations concerned would be guided thereby, but that, for example, he did not believe the Congress of the United States would accept as binding a decision of such a body. THE PRESIDENT then turned to the third organization which he termed "The Four Policemen", namely, the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, and China. This organization would have the power to deal immediately with any threat to the peace and any sudden emergency which requires this action. He went on to say that in 1935, when Italy attacked Ethiopia, the only machinery in existence was the League of Nations. He personally had begged France to close the Suez Canal, but they instead referred it to the League which disputed the question and in the end did nothing. The

result was that the Italian Armies went through the Suez Canal and destroyed Ethiopia.⁶ THE PRESIDENT pointed out that had the machinery of the Four Policemen, which he had in mind, been in existence, it would have been possible to close the Suez Canal. THE PRESIDENT then summarized briefly the idea that he had in mind.⁷

MARSHAL STALIN said that he did not think that the small nations of Europe would like the organization composed of the Four Policemen. He said, for example, that a European state would probably resent China having the right to apply certain machinery to it. And in any event, he did not think China would be very powerful at the end of the war. He suggested as a possible alternative, the creation of a European or a Far Eastern Committee and a European or a Worldwide organization. He said that in the European Commission there would be the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and possibly one other European state.

THE PRESIDENT said that the idea just expressed by Marshal Stalin was somewhat similar to Mr. Churchill's idea of a Regional Committee, one for Europe, one for the Far East, and one for the Americas. Mr. Churchill had also suggested that the United States be a member of the European Commission, but he doubted if the United States Congress would agree to the United States' participation in an exclusively European Committee which might be able to force the dispatch of American troops to Europe.

THE PRESIDENT added that it would take a terrible crisis such as at present before Congress would ever agree to that step.

MARSHAL STALIN pointed out that the world organization suggested by the President, and in particular the Four Policemen, might also require the sending of American troops to Europe.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that he had only envisaged the sending of American planes and ships to Europe, and that England and the Soviet Union would have to handle the land armies in the event of any future threat to the peace. He went on to say that if the Japanese had not attacked the United States he doubted very much if it would have been possible to send any American forces to Europe. THE PRESIDENT added that he saw two methods of dealing with possible threats to the peace. In one case if the threat arose from a revolution or developments in a small country, it might be possible to apply the quarantine method, closing the frontiers of the countries in question and imposing embargoes. In the second case, if the

⁶ Regarding the Ethiopian-Italian conflict, see *Foreign Relations*, 1935, vol. 1, pp. 594 ff., including the reference on p. 742 to the question of blocking the Suez Canal.

⁷ For a facsimile reproduction of a sketch made by Roosevelt at Tehran to illustrate his concept of the postwar international organization, see *post*, p. 622.

threat was more serious, the four powers, acting as policemen, would send an ultimatum to the nation in question and if refused, [it] would result in the immediate bombardment and possible invasion of that country.

MARSHAL STALIN said that yesterday he had discussed the question of safeguarding against Germany with Mr. Churchill and found him optimistic on the subject in that Mr. Churchill believed that Germany would not rise again.⁸ He, Stalin, personally thought that unless prevented, Germany would completely recovery [*recover*] within 15 to 20 years, and that therefore we must have something more serious than the type of organization proposed by the President. He pointed out that the first German aggression had occurred in 1870 and then 42 [44] years later in the 1st World War, whereas only 21 years elapsed between the end of the last war and the beginning of the present. He added that he did not believe the period between the revival of German strength would be any longer in the future and therefore he did not consider the organizations outlined by the President were enough.

He went on to say that what was needed was the control of certain strong physical points either within Germany along German borders, or even farther away, to insure that Germany would not embark on another course of aggression. He mentioned specifically Dakar as one of those points. He added that the same method should be applied in the case of Japan and that the islands in the vicinity of Japan should remain under strong control to prevent Japan's embarking on a course of aggression.

He stated that any commission or body which was set up to preserve peace should have the right to not only make decisions but to occupy such strong points against Germany and Japan.

THE PRESIDENT said that he agreed 100% with Marshal Stalin.

MARSHAL STALIN then stated he still was dubious about the question of Chinese participation.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he had insisted on the participation of China in the 4 Power Declaration at Moscow⁹ not because he did not realize the weakness of China at present, but he was thinking farther into the future and that after all China was a nation of 400 million people, and it was better to have them as friends rather than as a potential source of trouble.

THE PRESIDENT, reverting to Marshal Stalin's statements as to the ease of converting factories,⁸ said that a strong and effective world

⁸ See *ante*, p. 511.

⁹ For the text of the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed at Moscow October 30, 1943, and issued November 1, 1943, see *Decade*, p. 11.

organization of the 4 Powers could move swiftly when the first signs arose of the beginning of the conversion of such factories for warlike purposes.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the Germans had shown great ability to conceal such beginnings.

THE PRESIDENT accepted Marshal Stalin's remark. He again expressed his agreement with Marshal Stalin that strategic positions in the world should be at the disposal of some world organization to prevent a revival of German and Japanese aggression.

SECOND PLENARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 29, 1943, 4 P. M., CONFERENCE ROOM, SOVIET EMBASSY

PRESENT ¹

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Mr. Hopkins	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar
Mr. Harriman	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Molotov
Admiral Leahy	Field Marshal Dill	Marshal Voroshilov
General Marshall	General Brooke	Mr. Pavlov
Admiral King	Admiral of the Fleet	Mr. Berezhev
General Arnold	Cunningham	
Major General Deane	Air Chief Marshal Portal	
Captain Royal	Lieutenant General Ismay	
Captain Ware	Lieutenant General	
Mr. Bohlen	Martel	
	Major Birse	

Bohlen Collection

Bohlen Minutes ²

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT said that since there was no agenda for the conference he thought it would be a good idea to have a report from the

¹ The listing of those present is based on the Bohlen minutes. The Log (*ante*, p. 467) and the list that originally accompanied the Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes (*post*, p. 540) also include, in the list of those present, Somervell of the American Delegation and Hollis of the British Delegation.

² Arnold, pp. 466-467, describes a conversation that he had with Stalin (presumably in conjunction with this plenary meeting) in which Arnold offered additional American bombers in return for permission to use Soviet bases for shuttle bombing. Deane, p. 45, recounts a conversation in which Marshall, Voroshilov, and he participated and which may have occurred at the close of this meeting or of the only other meeting at Tehran (third plenary meeting) attended by these three; the conversation related to Deane's authority to speak for the American Chiefs of Staff. Somervell stated, in a letter of November 30, 1943, to the Persian Gulf Command, that Stalin had expressed to him (at a time unspecified, perhaps at this meeting) general satisfaction with the work of the Command in delivering supplies to the Soviet Union; see John D. Millett, *The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1954) in the series *United States Army in World War II*, p. 80, and the file cited *ibid.*, p. 79, footnote 13.

military staffs who had met this morning,³ and if there was no objection they might hear from General Brooke, Marshal Voroshilov and General Marshall.

GENERAL BROOKE said that the committee had not finished its work and had merely made a survey of the various operations mentioned, and had also examined the operation OVERLORD, taking into account the period of time which must elapse before OVERLORD was put into effect. He said that the committee considered the fact that if active operations were not undertaken in the Mediterranean during this period it would provide the Germans with an opportunity to remove their forces from that area either for the Soviet front or for the defense against OVERLORD. The committee also examined the advantages of continuing the operations up the leg of Italy until they had brought the Germans to a decisive battle. The committee briefly reviewed the question of providing the Partisans in Yugoslavia with aid and supplies in order to assist them in containing German forces. The advantages of Turkey's participation in the war from the point of view of opening up the Dardanelles, the supply route to Russia and its effect on the Balkans was [*were*] also considered. The possibility of an operation in southern France in connection with OVERLORD was also briefly discussed. The effect of the air attacks on Germany was outlined to the committee by Air Marshal Portal, and General Marshall provided the figures of the United States build-up in England, and General Brooke himself had described the change-over from the defense to offensive preparations in England. GENERAL BROOKE concluded that Marshal Voroshilov had put forth a number of questions and had received answers.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he had little to add to what General Brooke had said and he did not intend to go into any detail. He said that the chief problems were landing craft and suitable airfields to afford fighter protection for any operation. He emphasized that the question of adequate landing craft came first in importance, and added that by landing craft he meant those capable of carrying 40 tanks. He said that he had endeavored to make clear to the committee the manner in which preparations for OVERLORD were proceeding; that the flow of troops from the United States were [*was*] on schedule and that one million tons of material had already been shipped to England. He repeated that the variable factor was production of landing craft and that the schedule of production had been stepped up. He said that some veteran divisions had already been transferred from the Italian theater to England.

³ See *ante*, p. 514.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOV said that the answers which he had received to his questions at the committee meeting had been confirmed here at the conference by General Brooke and General Marshall. He added that the questions of Yugoslavia and Turkey mentioned by General Brooke had not been considered in detail.

MARSHAL STALIN then inquired who will command OVERLOAD.

THE PRESIDENT replied that it had not yet been decided.

MARSHAL STALIN said that nothing would come out of the operation unless one man was made responsible not only for the preparation but for the execution of the operation.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that General Morgan had been in charge of the preparatory work for some time but that the actual Commander had not yet been appointed. He said the British Government was willing to have a United States General in command in view of the fact that from the United States would come the bulk of the troops, and that possibly the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean would be a British General. He suggested that the question of who should command OVERLORD had best be discussed between the three of them rather than in the large meeting.

THE PRESIDENT said that the decisions taken here will affect the choice of the particular officer to command OVERLORD.

MARSHAL STALIN stated that the Russians do not expect to have a voice in the selection of the Commander-in-Chief; they merely want to know who he is to be and to have him appointed as soon as possible.

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed agreement and said that he thought the appointment could be announced within a fortnight. He then went on to say that he was a little concerned at the number and complexity of the problems which were before the conference. He said many hundreds of millions of people are watching this conference, and he hoped that it would not break up until an agreement had been reached on big military, political and moral questions. He said that the British Staff and himself had given prolonged thought to the Mediterranean theater and that they were most anxious to have the armies there fight against the enemy and not have them stripped of essential elements. He stated that their Soviet allies had now had an opportunity to survey the scene and that he would appreciate learning their views as to the best [use?] which could be made of the British forces in the Mediterranean area. He said the question of what help could be given from the Mediterranean theater to OVERLORD and the scale and timing of such help was of great importance. The operation into southern France from northern Italy had been mentioned but not studied and should, therefore, be explored more fully between the United States and British Staffs. MR. CHURCHILL said that Marshal Stalin had correctly stressed the value of pincers move-

ment but that the time element was important and a premature subsidiary attack might be wiped out. He went on to say that personally all he wanted was landing craft for two divisions in the Mediterranean and that with such a force many operations would be feasible, for example, it could be used to facilitate the operations in Italy or to take the island of Rhodes if Turkey will enter the war, and could be used for these purposes for at least six months and then employed in support of OVERLORD. He pointed out that this force of landing craft could not be supplied for the forces in the Mediterranean without either delaying OVERLORD six to eight weeks or without withdrawing forces from the Indian theater. That is the dilemma. He said he would appreciate the views of Marshal Stalin and his military aides on the general strategy. THE PRIME MINISTER continued that the questions of Yugoslavia and Turkey were more political than military. He said that there are now in the Balkans 21 German Divisions and 21 Bulgarian Divisions, a total of 42. He added that there were 54,000 Germans scattered around the Aegean islands which would be an easy prey. If Turkey came in, the nine Bulgarian Divisions from [*in?*] Yugoslavia and Greece would be withdrawn, thus endangering the remaining German Divisions. No important operations were envisaged for the Balkans but merely supply and commando raids to assist Tito and his forces to contain the German forces there. MR. CHURCHILL added that Great Britain had no ambitious interests in the Balkans but merely wanted to pin down the German Divisions there. With regard to Turkey MR. CHURCHILL said that the British Government as allies of Turkey had accepted the responsibility to persuade or force Turkey to enter the war. He would need, and he hoped to obtain, help from the President and Marshal Stalin in his task in accordance with the agreement reached at Moscow.⁴ He added that the British Government would go far in pointing out to the Turks that their failure to respond to the invitation of our three great powers would have very serious political and territorial consequences for Turkey particularly in regard to the future status of the straits. He said this morning the military committee had discussed briefly the question of aid to Turkey, but it appeared to be more political than military, and there was no thought of using a major army, and that at the most two Divisions apart from the air and anti-aircraft forces would be sent to Turkey. MR. CHURCHILL proposed that the two foreign secretaries and the representative of the President meet to discuss the political aspects of the Turkish question as well as other political questions involving the Balkans area.⁵ MR. CHURCHILL said that he had asked

⁴ See Harriman's telegram of November 2, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 147.

⁵ For the minutes of the luncheon meeting of Hopkins, Eden, and Molotov, November 30, 1943, see *post*, p. 568.

some questions yesterday regarding Bulgaria, in particular if Bulgaria attacked Turkey would the Soviet Government consider Bulgaria as a foe.⁶ THE PRIME MINISTER concluded that if Turkey declared war on Germany it would be a terrible blow to German morale, would neutralize Bulgaria and would directly affect Rumania which even now was seeking someone to surrender unconditionally to. Hungary likewise would be immediately affected. He said that now is the time to reap the crop if we will pay the small price of the reaping. He summed up the task before the conference as: (1) to survey the whole field of the Mediterranean, and (2), how to relieve Russia, and (3), how to help OVERLORD.

MARSHAL STALIN said that Mr. Churchill need have no worry about the Soviet attitude toward Bulgaria; that if Turkey entered the war the Soviet Union would go to war with Bulgaria, but even so he did not think Turkey would come in. He continued that there was no difference of opinion as to the importance of helping the Partisans, but that he must say that from the Russian point of view the question of Turkey, the Partisans and even the occupation of Rome were not really important operations. He said that OVERLORD was the most important and nothing should be done to distract attention from that operation. He felt that a directive should be given to the military staffs, and proposed the following one:

(1). In order that Russian help might be given from the east to the execution of OVERLORD, a date should be set and the operation should not be postponed. (2). If possible the attack in southern France should precede OVERLORD by two months, but if that is impossible, then simultaneously or even a little after OVERLORD. An operation in southern France would be a supporting operation as contrasted with diversionary operations in Rome or in the Balkans, and would assure the success of OVERLORD. (3). The appointment of a Commander-in-Chief for OVERLORD as soon as possible. Until that is done the OVERLORD operation cannot be considered as really in progress. MARSHAL STALIN added that the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief was the business of the President and Mr. Churchill but that it would be advantageous to have the appointment made here.

THE PRESIDENT then said he had been most interested in hearing the various angles discussed from OVERLORD to Turkey. He attached great importance to the question of logistics and timing. He said it is clear that we are all agreed as to the importance of OVERLORD and the only question was one of when. He said the question was whether to carry out OVERLORD at the appointed time or possibly postpone it for the sake of other operations in the Mediterranean. He felt that the danger of an expedition in the eastern Mediterranean

⁶ See *ante*, p. 492.

might be that if not immediately successful it might draw away effectives which would delay OVERLORD. He said that in regard to the Balkans, the Partisans and other questions are pinning down some 40 Axis Divisions and it was therefore his thought that supplies and commando raids be increased to that area to insure these Divisions remaining there. THE PRESIDENT then said he was in favor of adhering to the original date for OVERLORD set at Quebec,⁷ namely, the first part of May.

MARSHAL STALIN said he would like to see OVERLORD undertaken during the month of May; that he did not care whether it was the 1st, 15th or 20th, but that a definite date was important.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it did not appear that the points of view were as far apart as it seemed. The British Government was anxious to begin OVERLORD as soon as possible but did not desire to neglect the great possibilities in the Mediterranean merely for the sake of avoiding a delay of a month or two.

MARSHAL STALIN said that the operations in the Mediterranean have a value but they are really only diversions.

THE PRIME MINISTER said in the British view the large British forces in the Mediterranean should not stand idle but should be pressing the enemy with vigor. He added that to break off the campaign in Italy where the allied forces were holding a German army would be impossible.

MARSHAL STALIN said it looked as though Mr. Churchill thought that the Russians were suggesting that the British armies do nothing.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if landing craft is [*are*] taken from the Mediterranean theater there will be no action. He added that at Moscow the conditions under which the British Government considered OVERLORD could be launched had been fully explained,⁸ and these were that there should not be more than 12 mobile German divisions behind the coastal troops and that German reinforcements for sixty days should not exceed 15 Divisions. He added that to fulfill these conditions it was necessary in the intervening period to press the enemy from all directions. He said that the Divisions now facing the allies in Italy had come from the most part in France [*for the most part from France?*], and to break off the action in Italy would only mean that they would return to France to oppose OVERLORD. Turning again to the question of Turkey, THE PRIME MINISTER said that all were agreed on the question of Turkey's entrance into the war. If she refused, then that was the end of it. If she does enter, the military needs will be

⁷ The records of the Roosevelt-Churchill conference held at Quebec in August 1943 are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

⁸ See *ante*, p. 140.

slight, and it will give us the use of Turkish bases in Anatolia, and the taking of the island of Rhodes which he felt could be done with one assault Division. Once Rhodes was taken the other Aegean islands could be starved out and the way opened to the Dardanelles. Mr. CHURCHILL pointed out that the operation against Rhodes was a limited operation and would not absorb more effectives, and that in any case the troops for this purpose would come from those now used for the defense of Egypt. Once Rhodes was taken these forces from Egypt could proceed forward against the enemy. All he wanted was a small quantity of landing craft. He then said that he accepted Marshal Stalin's suggestion that terms of reference be drawn up for the military staffs.

MARSHAL STALIN interposed to ask how many French Divisions were being trained in North Africa.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that for the present there were five Divisions ready and four in training, and that one of these five was in Italy with the American Fifth Army and another was en route. He said that from the battle experience gained it would be possible to decide how best to utilize the other French Divisions.

THE PRESIDENT then proposed that instead of three directives to the three Staffs⁹ that one directive be agreed upon here. He then proposed a joint directive as follows: (1). That the military staffs should assume that OVERLORD is the dominating operation. (2). That the Staffs make recommendations in regard to other operations in the Mediterranean area, having carefully in mind the possibility of causing a delay in OVERLORD.

MARSHAL STALIN said he saw no need for any military committee here, that the questions involved should be decided at the conference. He also saw no need for any political sub-committee. MARSHAL STALIN then said he wished to ask Mr. Churchill an indiscreet question, namely, do the British really believe in OVERLORD or are they only saying so to reassure the Russians.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that if the conditions set forth at Moscow were present it was the duty of the British Government to hurl every scrap of strength across the channel. He then suggested that the British and American Staffs meet tomorrow morning in an endeavor to work out a joint point of view to be submitted to the conference.¹⁰ It was further agreed that the President, Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister would lunch together at 1:30,¹¹ and that Mr.

⁹ This is apparently a reference to Churchill's suggestion on the subject, which is reported in the Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes (see *post*, p. 549) but not in the Bohlen minutes.

¹⁰ For the minutes of the meeting referred to, see *post*, p. 555.

¹¹ For the minutes of the meeting referred to, see *post*, p. 565.

Eden, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Hopkins would likewise lunch together separately.¹²

The meeting adjourned until 4 P. M., November 30, 1943.

¹² For the minutes of the meeting referred to, see *post*, p. 568.

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*¹

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT said he had no formal agenda for today's meeting. He thought it would be a good idea if Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister, and possibly Marshal Voroshiloff, would give the meeting their ideas.

MARSHAL STALIN asked whether the military committee had completed its work.

GENERAL BROOKE gave an outline of the proceedings of the conference this morning. (See Minutes of Military Conference, 29 November 1943 at 1030.)

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that he had little to add to the statement of General Brooke but that the problems concerning the United States are not those of troops nor equipment but rather problems of ships, landing craft and airfields in sufficient proximity to the scene of immediate operations under consideration. Furthermore he said, in speaking of landing craft, he was speaking particularly of a special type which carries about 40 tanks or motor vehicles. He said he desired to make clear, as far as the United States forces for OVERLORD are concerned, that the build-up has proceeded according to schedule. Especially should it be noted that the supplies and equipment have now been assembled to the extent of one million tons in the United Kingdom, in advance of the arrival of the troops anticipated. All supplies and equipment have been set up according to schedule. The variable or questionable factor is the subject of landing craft. He said there was a schedule of landing craft construction which had been accelerated both in the United Kingdom and the United States. The purpose of this acceleration is involved with two considerations, (a) the matter of the initial assault for OVERLORD, and (b) operations in the Mediterranean, which could be done if additional landing craft could be made available. In brief, the OVERLORD build-up is going ahead according to schedule as regards ground troops, air forces and

¹ For editorial annotations, see also the Bohlen minutes of this meeting, *supra*.

equipment. Discussions and problems regarding OVERLORD were related almost entirely to the employment and movement of available landing craft. Transfer of certain United States and British divisions from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom for the OVERLORD build-up had virtually been completed at the present time.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that the information given by General Brooke and General Marshall corresponded to the talks which had been held this morning on the questions concerning OVERLORD—specifically, technical questions. Continuing, MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said as far as the matters discussed by General Brooke concerning [*concerned?*] Italy, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Southern France, it was hoped that these matters would be the subject of the next meeting of the *ad hoc* committee. The committee also had under discussion the date of OVERLORD and the details of that operation, with the thought that they would be able to discuss these matters further at the next meeting.

MARSHAL STALIN asked who will be the commander in this Operation OVERLORD. (THE PRESIDENT and PRIME MINISTER interpolated this was not yet decided.) MARSHAL STALIN continued, "Then nothing will come out of these operations." He further inquired as to who carries the moral and technical responsibility for this operation. He was informed by the President and Prime Minister that the British General Morgan, who is Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate), is charged with the plans and preparations which have been and are continually being made and carried out by a Combined U. S.-British Staff.

In reply to a question from Marshal Stalin as to who has the executive responsibility for OVERLORD preparations, THE PRESIDENT replied that we have already decided the names of all the commanders except that of the Supreme Commander.

MARSHAL STALIN said that it could happen that General Morgan might say that all matters were ready; however, when the Supreme Commander reports, he, the Supreme Commander, might not think that everything necessary had been accomplished by the Chief of Staff. He felt that there must be one person in charge.

THE PRIME MINISTER informed Marshal Stalin that General Morgan had been charged with the preparation and carrying out of plans in the preliminary stages for OVERLORD. His Majesty's Government had expressed willingness to have Operation OVERLORD undertaken under the command of a United States commander. The United States will be concerned with the greatest part of the build-up, and this United States commander will have command in the field.

MR. CHURCHILL added that in the Mediterranean the British have large naval and air forces which are under direct British command

under the Allied Commander in Chief. A decision had not yet been reached between the President and Prime Minister regarding the specific matter of high command. Decisions here at this conference will have a bearing on the choice. Therefore the President can name the Supreme Allied Commander for OVERLORD if he desires to accept the British offers to serve under a United States commander. THE PRIME MINISTER further suggested that Marshal Stalin be given an answer in confidence between the three Chiefs of State regarding who the Supreme Allied Commander would be.

MARSHAL STALIN said he desired it to be understood that he did not presume to take part in the selection of a commander for OVERLORD but merely wanted to know who this officer would be and felt strongly that he should be appointed as soon as possible and be given the responsibility for preparations for OVERLORD as well as the executive command of the operation.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed it was essential that a commander be appointed for the OVERLORD operation without delay and indicated that such an appointment would be made within a fortnight. He hoped that it might be accomplished during his current meeting with the President.

THE PRIME MINISTER then went on to say that he was concerned with the number and complexity of problems which presented themselves before the conference. He said that the meeting was unique in that the thoughts of more than 140,000,000 people were centered upon it. He felt that the principals should not separate until agreements on political, moral, and military problems had been reached. He said that he wished to present a few points which would require study by a subcommittee. Both he and the British Staff had given long study to the Mediterranean position, in which area Great Britain has a large army. He was anxious that the British Mediterranean army should fight throughout 1944 and not be quiescent. From that point of view he asked the Soviets to survey the field and examine the different alternatives put before them and submit their recommendations.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the first point which required study was what assistance could be given to the OVERLORD operation by the large force which will be in the Mediterranean. He asked in particular what the possibilities of this force might be and what should be the scale of an operation that might be launched from Northern Italy into Southern France. He did not feel that such an operation had been studied in sufficient detail but he welcomed the opportunity to give it close examination. He thought it might be well for the U. S. and U. K. staffs to consider this matter together in the light of their special knowledge concerning resources available. He pointed out

that Marshal Stalin had stressed the value of pincer operations. He said that for such operations timing is of great importance. A weak attack several months in advance might result in it[s] being defeated and permit the enemy to turn his whole strength to meet the main attack.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he wanted landing craft to carry at least two divisions. With such an amphibious force it would be possible to do operations seriatim, that is, first, up the leg of Italy by amphibious turning movements, thus offering the possibility of cutting off the enemy's withdrawal and capturing the entire German force now in Central Italy; second, to take Rhodes in conjunction with Turkey's entry into the war; and, third, to use the entire force for operations six months hence against the southern coast of France in order to assist OVERLORD. He said that none of these operations would be excluded but that the timing would require careful study. This force of two divisions cannot be supplied in the Mediterranean without either setting back the date of OVERLORD for six or eight weeks or without drawing back from the Indian Ocean landing craft which were now intended to be used against the Japanese. He said that this is one of the dilemmas which the Anglo-American staffs are balancing in their minds. In reaching their conclusions they would be greatly assisted by the views of Marshal Stalin and his officers. He welcomed these views because of his admiration for the military record of the Red Army. He therefore suggested that the military staffs continue to study these subjects.

THE PRIME MINISTER then said that the second matter which must be settled was political rather than military because of the small military forces involved. He referred to the question of Yugoslavia and the Dalmatian Coast. He said that in the Balkans there were 21 German divisions plus garrison troops, of which 54,000 troops are spread about among the Aegean Islands. There were also about 21 Bulgarian divisions or a total of 42 divisions in all. (THE PRIME MINISTER later corrected these figures to indicate that there were 42 divisions in all, 12 of which were Bulgarian divisions in Bulgaria.) He said that if Turkey came into the war the Bulgarian divisions would be used to face the Turks on the Thrace front. This withdrawal of Bulgarian divisions as garrison troops in the Balkans would endanger the remaining German divisions left on that duty by operations of the guerrillas. He said that he did not suggest that the Anglo-American forces put divisions into the Balkans, but he did propose that there be a continuous flow of supplies, frequent commando raids and air support furnished as and when needed. He felt it was short-sighted to let the Germans crush Yugoslavia without giving those brave people now

fighting under Tito weapons for which they might ask. He emphasized that the Balkan operations would be a great factor in stretching the Germans and thus giving relief to the Russian front. He added that the British had no interests in the Balkans that were exceptional or ambitious in nature and all they wanted to do was to nail the 21 German divisions in that area and destroy them. He suggested that the Foreign Secretaries of the U. K. and the U. S. S. R. and a representative of the United States whom the President might designate should hold discussions to see if the proposed activities in the Balkans presented any political difficulties.

THE PRIME MINISTER then came to his last point, which was in reference to Turkey. He said that the British are allies of Turkey and that the British have accepted the responsibility of endeavoring to persuade or force Turkey into the war before Christmas. He said that if the President would come in with the British or take the lead, it would be agreeable to him, but he should certainly want all possible help from the U. S. and U. S. S. R. in accordance with the agreements made at the Moscow Conference.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the British would go far in warning Turkey that her failure to enter the war would jeopardize her political and territorial aspirations, particularly with reference to the Dardanelles, when these matters were being discussed at the peace table.

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated that the military staffs had already discussed the military aspects of Turkey's entry into the war. He said, however, that the question was largely political since only two or three divisions of soldiers were involved. He again posed the question as to how the U. S. S. R. would feel about Bulgaria. Would they be inclined to tell Bulgaria that if Turkey did enter the war against Germany and Bulgaria helped Germany, the U. S. S. R. would regard Bulgaria as a foe? He felt that such a statement might have a great influence on Bulgaria's attitude because of her relationship with the Soviets. He suggested that the Foreign Secretaries study this matter, also particularly as to the methods to be used and the results which might be expected. He said that he personally felt that the results might well be decisive, particularly in their moral effect. He said that Turkey, being an ally of Germany in the last war and now turning against her, would have a profound effect on the remainder of the Balkans. He pointed to Rumania's desire to present an unconditional surrender at this time and to other indications of unrest in the Balkans, as evidence of the fact that Turkey's entry into the war would have a great effect.

THE PRIME MINISTER concluded by saying he felt that the whole Mediterranean situation should be carefully examined to see what could be done to take weight off the Soviet front.

MARSHAL STALIN said, as far as the question of the U. S. S. R. versus Bulgaria is concerned, as soon as Turkey comes into the war we can consider that the matter is closed. The U. S. S. R. will take care of Bulgaria. If Turkey declares war on Bulgaria, the U. S. S. R. will declare war on Bulgaria. Even under these circumstances Turkey will not enter the war.

As far as military matters are concerned, MARSHAL STALIN said he understood that two or three divisions would be made available to help Turkey should she come into the war or to help in the Partisan movement in Yugoslavia. There is no difference of opinion on this point. We feel it desirable to help in Yugoslavia and to give two or three divisions if it would be necessary to do so. The Soviets do not think, however, that this is an important matter. Even the event of the entry of Turkey into the war or the occupation of Rhodes is not the most important thing. If we are here in order to discuss military questions, among all the military questions for discussion we, the U. S. S. R., find OVERLORD the most important and decisive. MARSHAL STALIN said he would like to call the attention of those present to the importance of not creating diversions from the most important operation in order to carry out secondary operations. He suggested that the *ad hoc* committee, which was created yesterday, should be given a definite task as to what they were to discuss. He said if a committee is created in the U. S. S. R., we always give that committee a specific directive or instructions. MARSHAL STALIN suggested that the military *ad hoc* committee be given a specific directive. He said it was, of course, true that the U. S. S. R. needed help and that is why the representatives of the Soviet are here at this conference. He said the Soviets expect help from those who are willing to fulfill Operation OVERLORD. The question now was what shall be the directive to the *ad hoc* committee? What shall be the instructions that should be given to the committee under the guidance of General Brooke? First of all, this directive must be specific with regard to the fact that OVERLORD should not be postponed and must be carried out by the limiting date. Secondly, the directive to the committee should state that Operation OVERLORD must be reinforced by a landing in the South of France a month or two before undertaking the OVERLORD assault. If not possible two or three months earlier, then the landing in the South of France should be at the same time. If a landing can not be effected in the South of France at the same time as OVERLORD, possibly this operation could be mounted a little later than OVERLORD.

MARSHAL STALIN thought this operation in the South of France would be an auxiliary or supporting operation and would help and be considerably effective in contributing toward OVERLORD. On the

other hand, operations against Rhodes and other operations in the Mediterranean would be diversions. Operations in the South of France would influence and contribute directly to OVERLORD. He said that the directive to the *ad hoc* committee must also state that the appointment of the Supreme Commander for OVERLORD should be made forthwith. The decision regarding the OVERLORD commander should be made here in Tehran. If it can not be done here, it should be done within a week at the latest. The Soviets believe that until such a commander has been appointed, no success from OVERLORD can be expected in the matter of organization for this operation. He added that it is the task of the British and the United States representatives to agree on the commander for OVERLORD. The U. S. S. R. does not enter into the matter of this selection but the Soviets definitely want to know who he will be. The above are the points of the directive which should be given to the *ad hoc* committee, and the work of this committee should be completed immediately.

MARSHAL STALIN asked the conference to seriously consider the points which he had just outlined. He added that he felt if the three points he had made were carried out, they would result in the successful and rapid accomplishment of OVERLORD.

THE PRESIDENT said he was tremendously interested in hearing all angles of the subject from OVERLORD to Turkey. He said that if we are all agreed on OVERLORD, the next question would be regarding the timing of OVERLORD. Therefore, if we come down to a matter of questions, the point is either to carry out OVERLORD at the appointed time or to agree to the postponement of that operation to some time in June or July. There are only one or two other operations in the Mediterranean which might use landing craft and air forces from some other theater. THE PRESIDENT said there are two dangers in creating a delay in OVERLORD. One of them is that the use of two or three divisions in the Eastern Mediterranean would cause a delay to OVERLORD and would necessitate the sending of certain landing craft for those operations which in turn could not be withdrawn from the Eastern Mediterranean in time to return for the OVERLORD date. He said it was believed that once we are committed to specific operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, we would have to make it a supreme operation and we probably could not then pull out of it.

MARSHAL STALIN observed that maybe it would be necessary to utilize some of the means for OVERLORD in order to carry out operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

THE PRESIDENT continued that in the Balkans and Yugoslavia he believed all aid should be given which could be possibly sent to Tito without making any particular commitment which would interfere with OVERLORD. He said he thought that we should consider the value

of the 40 divisions the Germans have in the Balkans and if we can do certain operations with a minimum effort, these divisions might be placed in a position where they could no longer be of any value.

THE PRESIDENT said he felt that commando raids should be undertaken in the Balkans and that we should send all possible supplies to Tito in order to require Germany to keep their [*her?*] divisions there.

MARSHAL STALIN said that in Yugoslavia the Germans have eight divisions; they have five divisions in Greece, and three or four divisions in Bulgaria. He stated that the figures given by the Prime Minister regarding German divisions in the Balkans were wrong.

In reply to a question, MARSHAL STALIN said there were 25 German divisions now in France.

THE PRESIDENT said we should therefore work out plans to contain these German divisions. This should be done on such a scale as not to divert means from doing OVERLORD at the agreed time.

MARSHAL STALIN observed, regarding the President's statement, "You are right"—"You are right."

THE PRESIDENT said we again come back to the problem of the timing for OVERLORD. It was believed that it would be good for OVERLORD to take place about 1 May, or certainly not later than 15 May or 20 May, if possible.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he could not agree to that.

MARSHAL STALIN said he observed at yesterday's conference that nothing will come out of these proposed diversions. In his opinion OVERLORD should be done in May. He added that there would be suitable weather in May.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he did not believe that the attitudes of those present on this matter were very far apart. He said he (the Prime Minister) was going to do everything in the power of His Majesty's Government to begin OVERLORD at the earliest possible moment. However, he did not think that the many great possibilities in the Mediterranean should be ruthlessly cast aside as valueless merely on the question of a month's delay in OVERLORD.

MARSHAL STALIN said all the Mediterranean operations are diversions, aside from that into Southern France, and that he had no interest in any other operations other than those into Southern France. He accepted the importance of these other operations but definitely considered that they are diversions.

THE PRIME MINISTER continued that in the British view their large armies in the Mediterranean should not be idle for some six months but should be, together with the United States Allies, working toward the defeat of Germany in Italy, and at the same time be active elsewhere. He said for the British to be inert for nearly six months would be a wrong use of forces, and in his opinion would lay the British

open to reproach from the Soviets for having the Soviets bear nearly all the burden of land fighting.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he did not wish the British to think that the Soviets wished them to do nothing.

THE PRIME MINISTER said if all the landing craft were taken away from the Mediterranean they will not affect the battle. Marshal Stalin must remember that at Moscow it was stated under what conditions OVERLORD could be mounted and that under those conditions alone could it be launched. Operation OVERLORD was predicated on the assumption that not more than 12 German mobile divisions would be located behind the coastal troops, and furthermore, that not more than 15 reinforcement divisions could enter the fray within 60 days. He said that that was the basis on which he (Mr. Churchill) had stated the British would do OVERLORD. On those conditions, the Allies will have to utilize as many divisions in the Balkans and so forth as are necessary to contain German troops. If Turkey comes into the war, this will be particularly necessary. The German divisions now in Italy have largely come from France. Consequently, if there should be a slackening off in Italy, it would mean that the German divisions would withdraw and appear in the South of France to meet us there. On the other hand, if we do the Eastern Mediterranean, we will contain more German divisions and will create conditions indispensable to the success of OVERLORD.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired, "What if there are 13 divisions, not 12?"

THE PRIME MINISTER replied, "Naturally." He continued by saying there was one more word about Turkey. All are agreed here that she should enter the war. If Turkey does not enter the war, then that ends that. If she does enter, the only necessary thing to do would be to use an air attack from the Turkish bases in Anatolia and an operation to take the Island of Rhodes. For the purpose of the Rhodes operation, one assault division would be ready in the near future and that would be sufficient. Having gotten Rhodes and Turkish air bases, a course could be steered north and operations undertaken to drive and starve all German divisions out of the Aegean and then open the Dardanelles. Essentially, these specific operations were limited operations, and therefore they could not be considered as military commitments of an indefinite character. If Turkey comes into the war and we get the air bases, it would be a simple matter to open the Straits. If Turkey does not come in, we do not pay any further attention to the matter. If Turkey comes into the war and we hold Rhodes and the Aegean, we will be able to use the air squadrons now in Egypt. All could move forward and help the Soviets. They now play no part except in the defense of Egypt. We can use the same troops

which are now guarding Egypt to drive the Germans back. This is a big matter and should not be lightly considered.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he felt that our future will suffer great misfortune if we do not get Turkey into the war, for in such case troops and planes will stand idle.

THE PRIME MINISTER added that he agreed with General Marshall in his statement that the chief problem is one of transportation across the water and that that matter is largely a question of landing craft. He said that the British were prepared to go into the matter in great detail, and a very small number of landing craft could make the subsidiary operations feasible. If these landing craft cannot be kept in the Mediterranean because of OVERLORD or cannot possibly be found from some other arrangement [*area?*] such as the Indian Ocean, then this matter should be resolved by the technical committee. A landing in Southern France will require a great number of landing craft. He begged that this important point should be carefully weighed.

THE PRIME MINISTER said in conclusion that he accepted the proposal that a directive should be drawn up for this technical committee. He further suggested that the Soviet Government draw up terms of reference, that the United States draw up terms of reference, that Great Britain draw up terms of reference and then he felt sure that all three nations would not be far apart.

THE PRESIDENT inquired how long will the conference be in session until the staff comes to a conclusion on these matters.

THE PRIME MINISTER in this connection said he can give his own opinion on behalf of the British Government tonight.

In reply to a question from Marshal Stalin as to how many French divisions were in the Allied Armies and how many troops there were in French divisions, THE PRESIDENT replied he understood there were now five combat divisions and four more will soon be ready, making a total of nine. Some of these divisions are now engaged in Sardinia and Corsica.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the French Corps is to become a part of the U. S. 5th Army in Italy and will occupy the left flank. He said that one division was now en route to the Front and will get a trial of battle. As a result of this it would be possible to judge better regarding the employment of other French divisions. All equipment for the French divisions is now in North Africa. There was some delay in four or five divisions being brought up to strength and completing their training. He said the French divisions were training with United States equipment and under the instruction of United States officers and non-commissioned officers.

In reply to a question from Marshal Stalin as to how many men there were in these French divisions, GENERAL MARSHALL replied, French divisions have the same number of men as the United States—15,000 men per division. The men are mostly native troops with French officers and some noncoms. In the armored command only one quarter are native troops.

MARSHAL STALIN said, with regard to the remarks of the Prime Minister, if Turkey does not enter the war it cannot be helped.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied if Turkey does not come into the war, he had no intention of asking for any troops for operations in Rhodes or Asia Minor.

In reply to a question from Marshal Stalin as to how many more days this conference would continue, THE PRESIDENT said that he was willing to stay here until the conference is finished.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he would stay here forever, if necessary.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that if the three Chiefs of State were in agreement, the committee need not have any written directive because they have been confronted with every suggestion made at this afternoon's meeting. He said if the Chiefs of State could agree on the proceedings of the afternoon conference as a directive, then the staff would definitely have only one directive.

MARSHAL STALIN said he considered that the *ad hoc* committee was unnecessary. It could not raise any new questions for the military conference. He believed that all that was necessary to be solved was the selection of the commander for OVERLORD, the date for OVERLORD and the matter of supporting operations to be undertaken in Southern France in connection with OVERLORD. He furthermore believed that the committee of Foreign Secretaries proposed by the Prime Minister was unnecessary. He considered that all matters could be solved here and that committees were unnecessary. He said he must leave on the first, anyway, but that he might stay over until the second of December if it had to be—then he must go away. He said that he must know when he can get away. There are two days remaining, the 30th of November and the first of December. He said the President would remember that he had said he could come to the conference for three or four days.²

THE PRESIDENT then read a proposed directive for the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Chiefs of Staff:

"1. The Committee of the Chiefs of Staff will assume that OVERLORD is the dominating operation.

² Roosevelt's message to Stalin of November 8, 1943, had proposed three or four days, and Stalin had accepted. See *ante*, pp. 72, 78. See also *ante*, p. 373.

"2. The Committee recommends that subsidiary operation(s) be included in the Mediterranean, taking into consideration that any delay should not affect OVERLORD."

MARSHAL STALIN observed that there was no mention regarding the date of OVERLORD in the proposed directive. He said for the U. S. S. R. it is important to know the date OVERLORD will be mounted in order that the Soviets could prepare the blow on their side. He said he insisted on knowing the date.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that the date for OVERLORD had been fixed at Quebec and that only some much more important matter could possibly affect that date, that is to say, this was the President's view.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he would like to have an opportunity to reply to the President's remarks. He said there was no decisive difference in principle. He would be very glad to stay until the first of December and make a decision. It was not clear to him what the President's plans were, however. He said he was in favor of the continuance of the *ad hoc* committee if that could be done. With regard to the political subcommittee, Marshal Stalin has clarified matters with regard to Bulgaria and help to Yugoslavia. Therefore, the meeting between the two Foreign Secretaries and Mr. Hopkins would be of great advantage. It would throw light on the problems and would be particularly important on the political questions. He would be grateful for Marshal Stalin's prompt answers to his questions. If it were decided to do so, THE PRIME MINISTER thought that on the whole this procedure would be of advantage. He considered that the timing of the supreme Operation OVERLORD as regards any subsidiary operations would be most necessary as a condition for the success of OVERLORD. Furthermore, he believed that the *ad hoc* staff committee should recommend what subsidiary operations should be carried out. THE PRIME MINISTER believed that we should take more time in drawing up a proper directive to the *ad hoc* committee.

THE PRESIDENT said he found that his staff places emphasis on OVERLORD. While on the other hand the Prime Minister and his staff also emphasize OVERLORD, nevertheless the United States does not feel that OVERLORD should be put off.

THE PRESIDENT questioned whether it would not be possible for the *ad hoc* committee to go ahead with their deliberations without any further directive and to produce an answer by tomorrow morning.

MARSHAL STALIN questioned, "What can such a committee do?" He said, "We Chiefs of State have more power and more authority than a committee. General Brooke cannot force our opinions and there are many questions which can be decided only by us." He said he would

like to ask if the British are thinking seriously of OVERLORD only in order to satisfy the U. S. S. R.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that if the conditions specified at Moscow regarding OVERLORD should exist, he firmly believed it would be England's duty to hurl every ounce of strength she had across the Channel at the Germans.

THE PRESIDENT observed that in an hour a very good dinner would be awaiting all and people would be very hungry. He suggested that the staffs should meet tomorrow morning and discuss the matter.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he believed that that was unnecessary. The staffs will not in any way speed our work; they will only delay matters. It is proper to decide matters more quickly.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought the talks of the foreign officers would be most profitable.

THE PRESIDENT observed that a few political problems might be discussed during luncheon together by the Foreign Secretaries and Mr. Hopkins in a *different* place from that where the Chiefs of State had their luncheon.

MARSHAL STALIN commented, "Then at four o'clock tomorrow afternoon we will have our conference again."

THE PRESIDENT suggested that the Chiefs of State have luncheon together tomorrow about one thirty.

**TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING, NOVEMBER 29, 1943, 8:30 P. M.,
SOVIET EMBASSY¹**

PRESENT²

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Mr. Hopkins	Foreign Secretary Eden	Mr. Berezhkov
Mr. Harriman	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	
Mr. Bohlen	Major Birse	

¹ Stalin was the host at this dinner. The Bohlen minutes list the dinner as having begun at 8:30 p. m. According to the Log (*ante*, p. 467), the dinner began at 8:45 p. m.

² The listing of those present is based on the Bohlen minutes. As regards those present for the United States, Churchill, p. 373, and Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 186-191, state that Elliott Roosevelt came in and was seated during the dinner. As regards those present for the Soviet Union, the Log (*ante*, p. 467) and Churchill, p. 373, mention Molotov as among those who attended.

Bohlen Collection

*Bohlen Minutes*³

SECRET

The most notable feature of the dinner was the attitude of Marshal Stalin toward the Prime Minister. Marshal Stalin lost no opportunity to get in a dig at Mr. Churchill. Almost every remark that he addressed to the Prime Minister contained some sharp edge, although the Marshal's manner was entirely friendly. He apparently desired to put and keep the Prime Minister on the defensive. At one occasion he told the Prime Minister that just because Russians are simple people, it was a mistake to believe that they were blind and could not see what was before their eyes.

In the discussion in regard to future treatment of Germans, Marshal Stalin strongly implied on several occasions that Mr. Churchill nursed a secret affection for Germany and desired to see a soft peace.

Marshal Stalin was obviously teasing the Prime Minister for the latter's attitude at the afternoon session of the Conference, he was also making known in a friendly fashion his displeasure at the British attitude on the question of OVERLORD.

Following Mr. Hopkins' toast to the Red Army, MARSHAL STALIN spoke with great frankness in regard to the past and present capacity of the Red Army. He said that in the winter war against Finland, the Soviet Army had shown itself to be very poorly organized and had done very badly; that as a result of the Finnish War, the entire Soviet Army had been re-organized; but even so, when the Germans attacked in 1941, it could not be said that the Red Army was a first class fighting force. That during the war with Germany, the Red Army had become steadily better from [the] point of view of operations, tactics, etc., and now he felt that it was genuinely a good army. He added that the general opinion in regard to the Red Army had been wrong, because it was not believed that the Soviet Army could reorganize and improve itself during time of war.

In regard to the future treatment of Germany, MARSHAL STALIN developed the thesis that he had previously expressed, namely, that really effective measures to control Germany must be evolved, otherwise Germany would rise again within 15 or 20 years to plunge the world into another war. He said that two conditions must be met:

³ See also (1) the Bohlen memorandum summarizing incidental remarks made at various meetings during the course of the Conference, *post*, p. 836, and (2) the indications, *post*, pp. 854-855, 862-863, that the subject of unconditional surrender was discussed at this dinner. For an exchange of remarks between Roosevelt and Stalin, perhaps at this dinner, regarding Russian champagne, see Grace Tully, *F. D. R., My Boss*, p. 271.

(1) At least 50,000 and perhaps 100,000 of the German Commanding Staff must be physically liquidated.

(2) The victorious Allies must retain possession of the important strategic points in the world so that if Germany moved a muscle she could be rapidly stopped.

MARSHAL STALIN added that similar strong points now in the hands of Japan should remain in the hands of the Allies.

THE PRESIDENT jokingly said that he would put the figure of the German Commanding Staff which should be executed at 49,000 or more.

THE PRIME MINISTER took strong exception to what he termed the cold blooded execution of soldiers who had fought for their country. He said that war criminals must pay for their crimes and individuals who had committed barbarous acts, and in accordance with the Moscow Document,⁴ which he himself had written, they must stand trial at the places where the crimes were committed. He objected vigorously, however, to executions for political purposes.

MARSHAL STALIN, during this part of the conversation, continuously referred to Mr. Churchill's secret liking for the Germans.

With reference to the occupation of bases and strong points in the vicinity of Germany and Japan, THE PRESIDENT said those bases must be held under trusteeship.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed with the President.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that as far as Britain was concerned, they do not desire to acquire any new territory or bases, but intended to hold on to what they had. He said that nothing would be taken away from England without a war. He mentioned specifically, Singapore and Hong Kong. He said a portion of the British Empire might eventually be released but that this would be done entirely by Great Britain herself, in accordance with her own moral precepts. He said that Great Britain, if asked to do so, might occupy certain bases under trusteeship, provided others would help pay the cost of such occupation.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that England had fought well in the war and he, personally, favored an increase in the British Empire, particularly the area around Gibraltar. He also suggested that Great Britain and the United States install more suitable government[s] in Spain and Portugal, since he was convinced that Franco was no friend of Great Britain or the United States. In reply to the Prime Minister's inquiry as to what territorial interests the Soviet Union had,

⁴ Declaration of German Atrocities, November 1, 1943; *Decade*, p. 13.

MARSHAL STALIN replied, "there is no need to speak at the present time about any Soviet desires, but when the time comes, we will speak."

Although the discussion between Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister remained friendly, the arguments were lively and Stalin did not let up on the Prime Minister throughout the entire evening.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 30, 1943,
9:30 A. M., BRITISH LEGATION¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Captain Freseman

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay

Secretariat

Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

SIR ALAN BROOKE began by saying that the problem was to arrive at an agreed basis for discussion with the Soviets at this afternoon's Plenary Meeting. He then went on to consider operations in the Mediterranean from west to east. It had always been agreed that some operation should take place against the South of France. In Italy he felt that it was agreed we should not stay in the position now reached and must advance farther. For political and other reasons, it was important to get Rome, and he thought it was probably generally accepted that we should advance as far as the Pisa-Rimini line. For operations in Italy it was clear that landing craft would be wanted. General Eisenhower had asked for the retention of the landing craft due to return to OVERLORD until 15 January.² This would have a repercussion on the OVERLORD date.

¹ This was the 132d meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and their first meeting during the Conference at Tehran.

² See Harrison, p. 118.

In Yugoslavia it was important to give all possible help to the Partisans and there was general agreement regarding this. As regards Turkey and operations in the Aegean, agreement was much more in question. If Turkey were to be brought into the war, it would be desirable to open the Dardanelles and operations in the Aegean would be necessary. If Turkey were not to come into the war, the operations in the Aegean would not be called for.

If examination showed the operation against the South of France to be feasible, sufficient landing craft might be provided for the purpose. The sequence would then be Italian campaign, Rhodes (only if Turkey comes into the war), South of France, landing craft from Rhodes returning in time for the South of France. The date for the South of France operation would therefore be affected by the undertaking of the Rhodes operation.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the problem seemed to be a straightforward one of the date of OVERLORD. The Russians wanted OVERLORD on a fixed date in May. They also wanted an expedition against the South of France at the same time, or perhaps a little earlier or a little later. As far as he could see, the date of OVERLORD was the only point confusing the issue. If this matter was settled, everything would be settled. If OVERLORD was to be done by the date originally fixed, other operations could not be carried out. It was entirely agreed, he felt, that the operations in Italy must be carried on. On the U. S. side it was felt that this could be done without interfering with OVERLORD and, indeed, the U. S. Planners were of the opinion that the operation against the South of France could be undertaken as well, without interfering with OVERLORD. If the landing craft were to be kept in Italy until 15 January, the U. S. calculation was that they could still be back in time for OVERLORD.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this was not thought by the British to be the case. Landing craft would need repair and there were also training demands. According to British calculations, even the date of 15 December for returning landing craft to OVERLORD was rather tight and it would be a great help if U. S. repair facilities could be made available for the British landing craft returning.

GENERAL MARSHALL then said that the paper submitted the day before by the United States Chiefs of Staff on the operation against the South of France³ had been produced at Cairo but was based on logistic and other data prepared in detail before SEXTANT. He said that four questions had been put to the U. S. Planners. Firstly,

³ Not found, but presumably similar to an unnumbered draft dated November 29, 1943, in the J. C. S. Files. For the approved paper on this subject, see C. C. S. 424, December 5, 1943, *post*, p. 797.

assuming that the operations against the South of France, set out in the paper in question, were undertaken, could OVERLORD take place on 15 May? In this connection the answer had been that, with the possible exception of transport aircraft, this date would still be possible for OVERLORD. There was reasonable expectation that the transport aircraft would be available from elsewhere. It was possible, moreover, that an airborne division might be brought from the U. S. by cargo ship infiltration, thus making it unnecessary to bring an airborne division from the United Kingdom.

As regards the timing of the operation against the South of France, he considered that it should not be carried out more than two to three weeks before OVERLORD.

The second question asked the U. S. Planners was how long the 68 LST's could remain in the Mediterranean and still arrive in time for an OVERLORD date of 15 May. The U. S. calculation was that the landing craft must be released $21\frac{1}{2}$ months before OVERLORD in order both that the necessary repair of craft could be effected and that the craft might be available for training purposes. This gave a date of 1 March. The time for training might be reduced by using more fully the craft already in the United Kingdom. It was clear that all U. S. resources must be used to assist in the repair of the landing craft returning late from the Mediterranean.

The U. S. calculation was that, after allowing for losses, the landing craft remaining in the Mediterranean after the departure of the 68 LST's for OVERLORD would be sufficient to lift 27,000 troops and 1,500 vehicles.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that the British felt that 100 days were necessary instead of the $21\frac{1}{2}$ months calculated by the U. S. This put 15 February as the latest date to which the landing craft could be retained.

ADMIRAL KING agreed and said that therefore it should be safe to leave the landing craft in the Mediterranean until 1 February.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that this also might allow for some small refits⁴ to be carried out in the Mediterranean before returning to the United Kingdom.

GENERAL MARSHALL then went on to the third question which had been asked the U. S. Planners, which was that if the Rhodes operation had to be undertaken as well as the operation against the South of France, how would OVERLORD be affected? It was difficult to get an answer to this question. In the first place, the dates were quite uncertain. Rome had not yet been taken and the date of the

⁴ Repairs.

amphibious operation in Italy must be dependent on land operations. Moreover, in an amphibious operation such as might be carried out in the Italian campaign maintenance across the beaches might be necessary, which would delay accordingly the availability of landing craft. It was understood, however, that the amphibious operation contemplated was such that the main forces would join up quickly with it. Assuming that the Rome operation would have been completed by the end of January, the landing craft required for Rhodes could be in the Middle East by 15 February; the Rhodes operation could take place then on 21 March. Allowing a month for the operation, the landing craft could return to Corsica on 21 April, arriving 30 April. A month would probably be necessary for the repair of landing craft before the operation against the South of France which could, therefore, be undertaken at an earlier stage [*at the earliest, say?*]⁵—15 July. Moreover, the total landing craft available would be barely sufficient for operations against the South of France, and this was not allowing for any losses that might occur.

The Planners were also asked how long OVERLORD would be delayed if the 68 LST's were never returned to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD. The answer to this was that these craft represented a three months' production and, in consequence, three months' delay to OVERLORD. As the landing craft could be made available alternatively only by withdrawing them from allocations to the Pacific, operations there would also be put back by three months.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the only landing craft that had not been mentioned were those allocated to Operation BUCCANEER, in which 20 LST's and 12 LSI(L)'s were involved. He then read certain extracts from NAF 492,⁵ giving General Eisenhower's views on operations against the South of France.

GENERAL MARSHALL expressed himself as being opposed to an early date for the attack against the South of France in advance of the OVERLORD date. He was more inclined to a simultaneous operation.

ADMIRAL KING considered that D-day should be the same for both operations and that this would provide a much better basis for planning. This met with general agreement.

SIR ALAN BROOKE then referred to the U. S. paper on the operation against the South of France⁶ and said that the paper would need careful examination as to the number of divisions that were available

⁵ Telegram from Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, October 29, 1943 (J. C. S. Files). The telegram stated, among other things, that an assault on the German forces in northern Italy might prove a more valuable help to OVERLORD than an attack on southern France, and that the making of an assault on southern France should therefore be considered as only one of various alternative methods of assisting OVERLORD. See also Harrison, p. 125.

⁶ See *ante*, p. 556, footnote 3.

from Italy for such an operation, and the number that would need to be retained for the operations in Italy.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the figure of four British divisions represented garrison requirements in Italy outside the immediate zone of operations.⁷

SIR ALAN BROOKE thought the figure of 10 divisions and an amphibious lift of 2 divisions, available from Italy for the South of France operation, to be too high.⁷

ADMIRAL KING stressed the importance of insuring that landing craft were employed for the purposes for which they were designed and not diverted to other uses for convenience. This had happened in the Pacific and no doubt also in the Mediterranean and it was necessary to be firm in view of the importance of the landing craft factor.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM agreed and said that once the assault was over and ports were open, all landing craft should be withdrawn for refit for the next operation. It was true that although in the Mediterranean the Commanders were alive to the situation and had tightened up matters considerably, there was still some misuse of landing craft.

In this connection, SIR CHARLES PORTAL referred to the tendency to be too conservative in the build-up. He referred particularly to the large stocks that had been accumulated in Sicily as an insurance. Probably there was a tendency to over-insure.

There was general agreement on the above considerations and some discussion ensued in which two extremes were quoted, one, in which the 8th Army landing in Sicily had taken a bare minimum of transport and in consequence had been delayed in their subsequent advance; and the other, in the planning for OVERLORD in which so many vehicles had been put down to accompany the leading formations, that the whole operation would tend to be hampered thereby.

As regards relief work, ADMIRAL KING considered that it was necessary to be hard-hearted and to cut out anything that was being taken across beaches which was not absolutely necessary. There was general agreement regarding this.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then referred to the aspect of fighter cover for the operation against the South of France. He said he was not satisfied that the range from the available air bases would allow of adequate air support and thought the matter would need to be examined carefully. In AVALANCHE two alternative plans had been considered and one of these had had to be turned down because fighter cover could not be insured. Salerno had been 180 miles from available fighter strips in North Sicily. Marseilles was 190 miles from the

⁷ These figures refer to estimates in the United States planning paper.

nearest part of Corsica and 225 miles from the eastern side on which the best air bases were sited. We might want to go farther than Marseilles.

ADMIRAL LEAHY questioned as to why we should need to go as far west as Marseilles. There were good beaches at various places along the coast.

GENERAL ARNOLD agreed that the whole question would have to be studied very carefully. He stated that the estimates in the U. S. draft paper on operations against Southern France had been based on the use of long-range fighter aircraft.

ADMIRAL KING then asked whether he was correct in understanding that, should all other operations be dropped, the landing craft would not be available for OVERLORD to take place on 1 May.

SIR ALAN BROOKE replied that this was the case and that if the landing craft due to return to OVERLORD did not leave the Mediterranean until 15 January, 1 June would be the earliest date possible for OVERLORD because of the need for repairing the landing craft and using them for training purposes.

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that the U. S. figures did not agree with this and that if the landing craft were retained until 15 February, OVERLORD would still be possible by 15 May.

ADMIRAL KING said that any U. S. facilities available for the repair of landing craft would be placed at the disposal of the Commander of OVERLORD for this urgent task.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then made the suggestion that [if?] an amphibious lift of one division were left in Italy until the capture of Rome and one division with its amphibious lift were kept mounted in the Middle East until the middle of February, by then it would be known whether Turkey would come in. If Turkey did not come in, the division could be dismounted and the landing craft made available for OVERLORD.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said, in reply to this, that he felt that the landing craft that would be required for this division for the Aegean were already being used for the Italian campaign.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that if the proposed operation were to take place after 15 February, this would surely delay OVERLORD.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL agreed but suggested that we might have two alternative dates for OVERLORD—the one if Turkey were to come into the war, and the other if Turkey were not to come in.

ADMIRAL KING made it clear that whereas the operations against Rhodes and the Dodecanese were contingent upon Turkey entering the war and were not concerned with OVERLORD, the operations against the South of France and in Italy were completely interlocked with

OVERLORD. It should be possible for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to work out roughly on these bases two alternative dates for OVERLORD, as suggested by Sir Charles Portal.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL remarked that while he agreed with Admiral King, he could not accept that the entry of Turkey into the war would have no effect on OVERLORD.

GENERAL MARSHALL then said that disregarding the question of postponing the date for OVERLORD and considering the matter of landing craft only, it seemed to him that the suggestion of Sir Charles Portal would involve the dividing of the resources of landing craft available in the Mediterranean so that no real strength would be left anywhere. This, he thought, was serious as it would be splitting the most potent means of influencing the war. It would reduce correspondingly the effort in Italy and might have serious consequences. General Eisenhower's views were different from those expressed formerly, and he now talked of a two division amphibious lift whereas formerly he had only asked for one.

GENERAL MARSHALL felt, moreover, that there was the chance that the landing craft so withdrawn to the Aegean, to which Sir Charles Portal referred, might never be used. He said that he agreed completely with the Prime Minister as to the importance of keeping a tighter hold on supply. There was general agreement in this connection.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the OVERLORD plan should be coordinated with the plans for a Russian offensive. No Russian offensive had ever started before the end of May. Marshal Stalin clearly, and quite reasonably, would like us to draw the German strength away from the Russian front before the Russian offensive started.

A general discussion then ensued as to the answer that could be given to the Russians regarding the date on which it would be possible to undertake OVERLORD.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that unless we could give the Russians a firm date for OVERLORD, there would be no point in proceeding with the Conference. As far as he could see, we could do OVERLORD in May if we did not undertake other operations. Sir Alan Brooke said that he did not think that 1 May would be possible although 1 June might be. This brought us back to the BUCCANEER operation to which, of course, there was a political background.⁸ He still thought that it would be better to use the landing craft allocated to BUCCANEER for this main effort against the Germans. In response to a question of Admiral Leahy as to whether the BUCCANEER landing craft would help OVERLORD at all, SIR ALAN BROOKE replied that it would, as it could

⁸ See *ante*, p. 365.

be used both in the Aegean and against the South of France. Moreover, the amphibious lift for OVERLORD was itself all too small. It was even smaller than it had been at Salerno.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that this affected the validity of the whole of the OVERLORD plan.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that if OVERLORD were delayed it would make more landing craft available.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL remarked that whatever operations were undertaken in the European theater, the OVERLORD operation would undoubtedly be helped indirectly.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that unless BUCCANEER landing craft were to be used, it would not be possible, except at the expense of OVERLORD, to have more than a one-division lift for the South of France operation, a lift which, in his opinion, was not sufficient.

ADMIRAL KING said that the Prime Minister had laid great stress on the importance of keeping actively employed all forces now in the Mediterranean. He agreed with this in principle but drew attention to the 2½ months' inactivity that would ensue for 35 divisions in the United Kingdom if the OVERLORD date was postponed from 1 May to 15 July. He had always felt that the OVERLORD operation was the way to break the back of Germany.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM questioned the 2½ months referred to by Admiral King, saying that the earliest date possible for OVERLORD would be 1 June. Both ADMIRAL KING and ADMIRAL LEAHY then said that this came to them as a complete surprise as 1 May was the date agreed upon.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked Sir Alan Brooke whether he believed that the conditions laid down for OVERLORD would ever arise unless the Germans had collapsed beforehand.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he firmly believed that they would and that he foresaw the conditions arising in 1944, provided the enemy were engaged on other fronts as well.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it was still in the balance as to whether we would overcome the German increase in fighter production. The success of the combined bomber offensive had not been as complete as had been hoped for. The Germans were making tremendous efforts and were aiming at a production of 1,600 to 1,700 fighters per month. If they succeeded, the OVERLORD operation might be faced by a very strong fighter force acting against it.

GENERAL ARNOLD then said how important it was to examine carefully the whole question of air strengths throughout the world in order to ensure that our great air superiority could be applied to best advantage.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL expressed his opinion that from the air point of view a June or July date for OVERLORD would seem to be better, as regards weather, than one in May.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the Russians would not refuse a 1 June date for OVERLORD but that we would have to be firm about it.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the date would have to be fixed earlier than 1 June because of the need to retain landing craft for Italy until 15 January. It would be possible to fix a RANKIN date for 1 May when probably an attack could be made across the Channel with about two-thirds the strength now envisaged for OVERLORD. It was generally felt that the Russians would not understand the RANKIN operation if it were put to them. He reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that 1 May had been settled at TRIDENT as the date for OVERLORD by splitting the difference between the U. S. suggestion of 1 April and the British suggestion of 1 June. It had not been based on any particular strategic consideration.

GENERAL ISMAY said that at Moscow the Russians had been told that the operation was scheduled for some time in May. They had not been told 1 May.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that we might tell the Russians that OVERLORD could be undertaken not later than 1 June but that we would expect, in that case, the Russian offensive to take place also not later than 1 June.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM agreed that 1 June could be adhered to.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that Marshal Stalin's statement that the Russians would enter the war against Japan when Germany had been defeated, seemed to alter the whole relative importance of the war in Europe and the Pacific, and to shift the emphasis rather towards Europe for the time being.

There was some further discussion in which the dependence of the attack upon moon and tide and weather conditions was considered, and also the desirability of giving a bracket of dates instead of a fixed target date for the operation.

⁹ THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

a. That we should continue to advance in Italy to the Pisa-Rimini line. (This means that the 68 LST's which are due to be sent from

⁹ An undated typewritten page in the Hopkins Papers appears to be a first version of that portion of this minute which begins at this point and runs to the end of the minute, including the two-paragraph "Note" at the very end. The page referred to contains two headings, one reading "Conclusions of the C. C. S. 132d Meeting", and the other reading "(The minutes are being processed and will be distributed later.)". It corresponds to the text printed here, except that (1) in paragraph c, it reads "by 1 June" where this text reads "during May", and (2) there are minor differences in spelling (e. g., "L. S. T." in place of "LST's").

the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD must be kept in the Mediterranean until 15 January.)

b. That an operation shall be mounted against the South of France on as big a scale as landing craft permit. For planning purposes D-day to be the same as OVERLORD D-day.

c. To recommend to the President and Prime Minister respectively that we should inform Marshal Stalin that we will launch OVERLORD during May, in conjunction with a supporting operation against the South of France on the largest scale that is permitted by the landing craft available at that time.¹⁰

NOTE:¹¹ The United States and British Chiefs of Staff agreed to inform each other before the Plenary Meeting this afternoon of the decisions of the President and Prime Minister respectively on the above point.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff were unable to reach agreement on the question of operations in the Aegean until they had received further instructions from the President and Prime Minister respectively.

¹⁰ The Roosevelt Papers contain an undated document, without any descriptive heading, which may be the recommendation (or a draft of the recommendation) referred to here. On it, there are typewritten (1) the word "Agreed:—" and (2) a paragraph reading "To inform Stalin that we will launch OVERLORD by June 1st and will simultaneously make the biggest attack on Southern France that is permitted by the landing craft available at that time." The words "by June 1st" are crossed out, and in their place there is written, in Roosevelt's handwriting, "during the month of May". The words from "and will simultaneously" to the end of the paragraph are also crossed out, and in their place there is written, in an unidentified handwriting, possibly Leahy's, "in conjunction with a supporting operation in Southern France of the largest scale that is permitted by the landing craft available at that time". See also Churchill's telegram 536, January 7, 1944, *post*, p. 865, and Churchill, pp. 448-449.

¹¹ This two-paragraph note appears as part of the Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes.

MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT WITH THE SHAH OF IRAN, NOVEMBER 30, 1943, NOON, ROOSEVELT'S QUARTERS, SOVIET EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
General Hurley
Mr. Dreyfus
Colonel Roosevelt

IRAN

Shah Pahlevi
Prime Minister Soheily
Foreign Minister Sa'ed-
Maragheh'i
Mr. Ala

Editorial Note

No official minutes of this meeting have been found. Apparently the principal subjects discussed were Iran's economic problems and the

desire of the United States to assist in their solution. The list of those present and this reference to the subjects discussed are based on (1) the Log, *ante*, p. 468; (2) a memorandum of January 29, 1954, by a Department of State historian of a conversation with Hurley (023.1/-2954); (3) a letter of February 19, 1954, from Dreyfus (640.0029/2-1954); and (4) Elliott Roosevelt, p. 192.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL-STALIN LUNCHEON MEETING, NOVEMBER
30, 1943, 1:30 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S QUARTERS, SOVIET EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Roosevelt Mr. Bohlen	Prime Minister Churchill Major Birse	Marshal Stalin Mr. Berezhevskiy ¹

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SECRET

Before luncheon, at the Prime Minister's request, THE PRESIDENT read to Marshal Stalin the recommendations of the combined British and American Staffs,² which had been approved by himself and the Prime Minister.

MARSHAL STALIN expressed his great satisfaction with this decision. He added that the Red Army would at the same time undertake offensive operations, and would demonstrate by its actions the value it placed on this decision. He asked when the Commander in Chief would be named.

THE PRESIDENT said he had to consult with his Staff, but that he was sure that the Commander in Chief would be named in three or four days or, in other words, immediately following his return, and that of the Prime Minister, to Cairo. THE PRESIDENT said that there were a number of questions in regard to command which he had had to discuss with Mr. Churchill. He added that the Commander in Chief of OVERLORD would operate from England, and that there would be a Commander in Chief for the Mediterranean area. And one question was, under whose command the operations in Southern France would fall.

¹ According to the Log, *ante*, p. 468, Pavlov rather than Berezhevskiy was present.

² See *ante*, p. 563.

At this point THE PRIME MINISTER interrupted to say that the operations in Southern France should be under the Commander in Chief of OVERLORD, but the operations in Italy, which must be intensified to coordinate with the operations in France, would be under the Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean theater.

MARSHAL STALIN expressed agreement with this idea, and said it was sound military doctrine.

For the next part of the luncheon the conversation was general, until THE PRIME MINISTER asked Marshal Stalin whether he had read the proposed communiqué on the Far East of the Cairo conference.³

MARSHAL STALIN replied that he had and that although he could make no commitments he thoroughly approved the communiqué and all its contents. He said it was right that Korea should be independent, and that Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores Islands should be returned to China. He added, however, that the Chinese must be made to fight, which they had not thus far done.

THE PRIME MINISTER and THE PRESIDENT expressed agreement with Marshal Stalin's views.

After some discussion of the great size of the Soviet Union, during which MARSHAL STALIN admitted frankly that had Russia not had at her disposal such a vast territory the Germans would have probably won the victory, THE PRIME MINISTER said that he felt that such a large land mass as Russia deserved the access to warm water ports. He said that the question would of course form part of the peace settlement, and he observed that it could be settled agreeably and as between friends.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that at the proper time that question could be discussed, but that since Mr. Churchill had raised the question he would like to inquire as to the regime of the Dardanelles.⁴ He said that since England no longer objected, it would be well to relax that regime.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that England had now no objections to Russia's access to warm water ports, although he admitted that in the past she had. He questioned, however, the advisability of doing anything about the Straits at the time, as we were all trying to get Turkey to enter the war.

MARSHAL STALIN said there was no need to hurry about that question, but that he was merely interested in discussing it here in general.

³ *Ante*, p. 448.

⁴ For the text of the Convention of Montreux Regarding the Régime of the Straits, July 20, 1936, see British Cmd. 5249, Turkey No. 1 (1936), or League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, p. 213. Also printed in *The Problem of the Turkish Straits* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 25.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that Great Britain saw no objections to this legitimate question, and that furthermore we all hoped to see Russian fleets, both naval and merchant, on all seas of the world.

MARSHAL STALIN said that Lord Curzon had had other ideas.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that that was true, and that it would be idle to deny that in those days Russia and England did not see eye to eye.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that Russia also was quite different in those days.

THE PRESIDENT reverted to the question of the approaches to the Baltic Sea, which he had previously discussed with Marshal Stalin.⁵ He said he liked the idea of establishing the former Hanseatic cities of Bremen, Hamburg and Lubeck into some form of a free zone, with the Kiel Canal put under international control and guaranty, with freedom of passage for the world's commerce.

MARSHAL STALIN said he thought that that was a good idea, and then asked what could be done for Russia in the Far East.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that it was for this reason that he had been particularly glad to hear the Marshal's views on the Cairo communiqué, since he was interested to find out the views of the Soviet government on the Far East and the question of warm water ports there.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that of course the Russians had their views, but that it would perhaps be better to await the time when the Russians would be taking an active representation in the Far Eastern war.⁶ He added, however, that there was no port in the Far East that was not closed off, since Vladivostok was only partly ice-free, and besides covered by Japanese controlled Straits.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought the idea of a free port might be applied to the Far East besides, and mentioned Dairen as a possibility.

MARSHAL STALIN said he did not think that the Chinese would like such a scheme.

To which THE PRESIDENT replied that he thought they would like the idea of a free port under international guaranty.⁷

MARSHAL STALIN said that that would not be bad, and added that Petropavlovsk or [on?] Kamchatka was an excellent port, and ice-free, but with no rail connections. He pointed out in this general connection that Russia had only one ice-free port, that of Murmansk.⁸

⁵ See *ante*, p. 510.

⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 361-400, 894-897, 984.

⁷ Regarding the discussion of this matter with Chiang at the First Cairo Conference during the preceding week, see *ante*, pp. 324, 367.

⁸ For a reference by Harriman in 1944 to this discussion, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 378.

THE PRIME MINISTER then said that it was important that the nations who would govern the world after the war, and who would be entrusted with the direction of the world after the war, should be satisfied and have no territorial or other ambitions. If that question could be settled in a manner agreeable to the great powers, he felt then that the world might indeed remain at peace. He said that hungry nations and ambitious nations are dangerous, and he would like to see the leading nations of the world in the position of rich, happy men.

THE PRESIDENT and MARSHAL STALIN agreed.

It was then decided that after a short session this afternoon at 4:30⁹ there would be no more full sessions of the conference, but at 4:00 o'clock tomorrow the President, Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister, together with Mr. Eden, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Hopkins, would meet to discuss political matters, and reference was made to Poland, Finland and Sweden as possible subjects of discussion.¹⁰

⁹ For the minutes of the third plenary meeting, which began at 4 p. m., see *post*, p. 576.

¹⁰ For the minutes of the special tripartite political meeting held in the afternoon of December 1, 1943, see *post*, p. 596.

HOPKINS-EDEN-MOLOTOV LUNCHEON MEETING, NOVEMBER 30, 1943,
1:30 P. M., BRITISH LEGATION

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Hopkins
Captain Ware

UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Secretary Eden
Captain Lunghi

SOVIET UNION

Foreign Commissar
Molotov
Mr. Pavlov

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SECRET

MR. HOPKINS brought up the question of the "strong points" to which reference had evidently been made previously in discussions with Mr. Molotov and Marshal Stalin about postwar Europe.¹

MR. MOLOTOV specifically mentioned Bizerte and Dakar and was interested in the question of the sovereignty of Bizerte. He said it would be difficult to realize how the war could not but affect such places, and that this was Marshal Stalin's point of view also.

He added that it would be difficult also to comprehend how France, specifically, could be considered for treatment which would exclude

¹ See *ante*, pp. 532, 554.

punishment for her hostile acts committed in the past—in other words, how France could go unpunished for these acts.

MR. HOPKINS, specifically mentioning Belgium and Holland, brought out the implications of the fact that these countries were in close proximity to Germany and questioned the ability of such countries to defend themselves after this war.

MR. MOLOTOV said it had been shown once more that they are unable to defend themselves. Regarding France, however, he stated that this was a different matter. He said that France did not want to defend herself and in this respect she could be held much more responsible for her hostile acts than could Belgium and Holland.

MR. EDEN very willingly admitted that Great Britain should have given France more help.

MR. MOLOTOV indicated that France was not merely a country overpowered by the Germans but in fact was now with the Germans actively supporting German strategy. He added that France was not weak and that France did not want to join the Allies but wanted to collaborate with Germany. He said that the former French government had collapsed and that France made an alliance with Germany.

MR. EDEN, in reference to possible future attitudes toward France, said that nothing was too bad for the Laval and Petains.

MR. MOLOTOV repeated that they are supporting Hitler now and that regarding France it is not just a matter of weakness.

MR. HOPKINS mentioned as an example the possibility of a strong point and airbase in Belgium and wanted to know what sort of agreement could be worked out in regard to who would operate such a base and under what right or authority.

It was pointed out that it would perhaps be easier just to arrange for the use of such bases for the Allies following the war in countries which had been enemy countries, and that in order to get the use of such bases in friendly countries, certain complications and rights of sovereignty might arise.

MR. EDEN suggested that the leasing of bases in the West Indies to the United States by Great Britain might serve as a rough example of these future arrangements.

Turning to Mr. Hopkins he said that it seemed that this was an exchange of bases for United States ships but really it was because "We like the United States to be there." He asked Mr. Hopkins if he did not think that was really it.

MR. HOPKINS indicated that he would object to any such conclusion.

MR. MOLOTOV indicated that it would be hard to realize how such future arrangements for strong points could not but affect the countries where such bases were located but that at the present time it

seemed uncertain what countries would be so affected. He said that he felt he was expressing the views of Marshal Stalin in stating that after the war in order to assure that there would be no future big war, the States particularly responsible for securing the peace will have to see to it that the main strategic bases will be in their control.

Regarding the strong points which will be taken from Germany or Japan, he remarked that these could be under the control possibly of Great Britain or the United States or both.

Specifically concerning Bizerte and Dakar, he mentioned United States or British control.

It appeared that he assumed there would be United States control in the Atlantic, and he asked if this was the correct understanding.

MR. EDEN said that the Prime Minister had stated that he did not want any more territory and that in regard to strong points taken from Germany and Japan, there might be joint control by the United States and Great Britain or United Nations control.

Regarding French bases, he could not say, since this matter would take great consideration, particularly in view of the fact that for many years England had been very close to France.

It might be supposed that the French could make a contribution by placing their bases under some United Nations control. In this way it would be possible for France to give something, and this should not in any way hurt the pride of France.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed that these sounded like legitimate demands.

MR. HOPKINS indicated that the place and strength of these future strong points would have to be worked out with a view as to who would possibly be a potential future enemy. He said that the President feels it essential to world peace that Russia, Great Britain, and the United States work out this control question in a manner which will not start each of the three powers arming against the others.

He indicated that the people would select as likely future enemies, Germany and Japan.

He said that the question of building up bases in the Pacific would not be a difficult one. Specifically in regard to the Philippines [*Philippines*], he indicated that following their independence we would still consider it advisable to have naval and air bases there. He indicated that we feel such bases in the Philippines would not be under United Nations control but rather United States control.

In the event that Formosa was returned to China, naval and air bases would be desired there also.

The size, character, and duties of occupying forces on such bases would have to be worked out.

MR. EDEN said he agreed also.

MR. HOPKINS said that there are two problems which disturb the President in this connection. We do not want sovereignty over any islands which will be free [*freed?*] from Japanese domination. The United Nations may perhaps exercise some sort of protective influence.

The problem remains as to the type of base and as to who will operate them. The three great powers should decide these basic questions regarding strong points and who will control these. This control will involve air, naval, and ground forces.

MR. HOPKINS pointed out that it is relatively easy for the United States to discuss the question of strong points because the United States is not located under any possible immediate danger from Germany. The difficult problem will be to enforce peace upon Germany. The Russian and British strong points located nearer to Germany would involve more immediate problems in connection with the enforcing of peace on Germany.

The question of the location of strong points should not be too difficult once the most difficult problems in this connection have been basically agreed upon here. This whole question of strong points is one of the most important postwar problems.

MR. HOPKINS mentioned that there had been a brief discussion between the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin on this subject² and that it would be fully worthwhile, he believed, if the President, Prime Minister, and Marshal Stalin could further discuss this problem but that he understood that time was short and that possibly we could go into this matter now.

MR. MOLOTOV indicated that of course the heads of the governments had greater authority and would be more fully competent to talk through the issue but that possibly we could clarify the matter now.

MR. EDEN said he would like to know what Mr. Molotov recommends on the matter. Then he turned to the problem of Turkey.

He said that the Turkey problem had been thought over carefully and that it was his suggestion that we should make a joint summons to Turkey to enter the war. This summons would be made to Turkey, making clear what consequences would follow if Turkey refused, with all three of us backing the demand. He indicated that if it were agreeable to Mr. Molotov, an invitation could be extended to President Inonu of Turkey to come to Cairo where he could meet with the Prime Minister and the President if the President would be willing to stop over for this purpose in Cairo on his way back.

²This may have been a reference to the conversation which took place between Churchill and Stalin at the tripartite dinner meeting of November 28, 1943, after Roosevelt had retired; see *ante*, p. 511.

Mr. EDEN said to Mr. Molotov that he would like to have Russian participation also and that it would be good if they would send someone representing the Soviet Government to the proposed meeting with the Turkish President in Cairo.

Mr. EDEN added that it may be likely that President Inonu would not come; that he might make a constitutional excuse. But in case President Inonu does refuse to come to Cairo, he would suggest that the President or the Prime Minister should not go to Turkey. If President Inonu does not come, perhaps an Ambassador or better yet, some special messenger should be sent to President Inonu in Turkey with our demands.

Mr. EDEN emphasized that he thought there should be a special person sent and asked who this person should be.

Mr. MOLOTOV stated that he was in favor of bringing Turkey into the war not in the distant future, but now, this year.

Mr. EDEN remarked that the problem then is not *what* we want but how. He stated that he understood that Marshal Stalin does not believe that Turkey will go to war, but MR. EDEN added it should be tried.

He said to Mr. Molotov that it was his feeling that the Soviet position was of much greater optimism in regard to the possibility of getting Turkey into the war at the time of the Three Power Conference in Moscow.³

Mr. MOLOTOV indicated that following the Numan request and the negotiations with Turkey conducted by Mr. Eden in the name of the Three Powers,⁴ that the reply which Great Britain had received from Turkey⁵ had caused the Russian loss of optimism.

Mr. HOPKINS said that he understood that the Russians had wanted Turkey to enter the war particularly for immediate military benefit which the Russians had felt they would derive from having this action force more German troops away from the Soviet front.

He understood that the Prime Minister had discussed with Marshal Stalin on several occasions, the Turkey problem and that Marshal Stalin had emphasized his desire to have Turkey in the war now.⁶

He said that the President would want to know more about the present Soviet attitude on this question. He assumed that all of us would want Turkey in the war and wanted to know whether there was actually a change in emphasis in the Soviet analysis of this situation.

³ See *ante*, pp. 117 ff.

⁴ See *ante*, pp. 161, 164, 174, 180, 190.

⁵ See Hull's telegram of November 22, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 374.

⁶ Churchill and Stalin had discussed the entrance of Turkey into the war at the first plenary meeting, November 28, 1943, *ante*, pp. 490 ff., and 503 ff., and at the second plenary meeting, November 29, 1943, *ante*, pp. 536 ff., and 544 ff.

MR. EDEN, in answer to a question put to him, stated that he had spoken in Turkey on behalf of the three countries.

MR. MOLOTOV remarked that under the authority of the protocol of the Three Power Conference,⁷ this was as it should be.

MR. HOPKINS indicated that it was quite all right for Mr. Eden to speak for the United States.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that the reply made by Turkey was very bad and could not but affect the Soviet point of view which he understood had been made clear to Mr. Churchill by Marshal Stalin.

MR. MOLOTOV then added that if Turkey does declare war on Germany and if Bulgaria continues to take a hostile attitude, the Soviet Union will not only break diplomatic relations with Bulgaria but will be at war with Bulgaria. This all goes to show, he indicated, that the Soviet Government does attach importance to the participation of Turkey in the war.

MR. EDEN said that when he first learned of this Soviet analysis in regard to Bulgaria in this connection, and that he had heard about this at the conference yesterday,⁸ that he was frankly surprised.

MR. MOLOTOV said that this was a brief exposition of the Soviet point of view.

He asked Mr. Eden if he could elucidate a statement made at the conference yesterday by Prime Minister Churchill⁹ to the effect that if Turkey refuses the demands, that Turkey's post-war rights in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles would be affected. He asked Mr. Eden what Mr. Churchill meant by this.

MR. EDEN replied "frankly I do not know."

Then he went on to add that he supposed the Prime Minister had meant that the present cordiality and support being offered Turkey would be changed; in fact that the whole basis of relationship with Great Britain would be changed.

He offered to ask Mr. Churchill for further elucidation if Mr. Molotov would so desire.

MR. MOLOTOV indicated that he would like to know.

MR. EDEN then asked Mr. Molotov if specifically his government would agree to the suggestion to try to bring President Inonu of Turkey to Cairo.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he thought it would be a good idea but that he would ask Marshal Stalin.

MR. EDEN thanked Mr. Molotov very much.

MR. HOPKINS, turning to Mr. Eden, stated that he had good reason to believe that a substantial understanding on these points under

⁷ See *ante*, pp. 148, 158, 161.

⁸ See *ante*, pp. 537, 545.

⁹ See *ante*, pp. 536, 544.

discussion would be arrived at between Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister, and the President.

MR. MOLOTOV said he was convinced that the results of this conference would add vigor to the people of our respective countries and that the coming together of the three heads of government would do still more toward improving the morale in our countries.

MR. HOPKINS indicated that if large undertakings were started following Turkey's entry into the war, and if in this connection the island of Rhodes were occupied and attacks were made on the Dodecanese Islands, that such large commitments which would inevitably follow, would possibly cause at least a delay of OVERLORD. However, he stated that aside from the military situation which might be of sufficient importance that also there might be a psychological advantage in developing the war in this area at this time which would justify a delay in OVERLORD. Among other things, this might force Finland to ask for peace from Russia.

MR. MOLOTOV asked if he was to understand that the entry of Turkey into the war at this time was connected with a delay in the timing of OVERLORD in the opinion of Mr. Hopkins.

MR. HOPKINS said that the President was under this impression and so also our Chiefs of Staff.

MR. MOLOTOV said that Marshal Stalin would be against getting Turkey into the war now if this necessarily meant a delay of OVERLORD.

MR. HOPKINS said he hesitated to be too encouraging but that he might be mistaken and that possibly a formula was being worked out whereby this possible action in the Eastern Mediterranean could take place without interfering with OVERLORD.

MR. HOPKINS said that he understands there were three questions of urgent importance to the Russians in regard to OVERLORD as stated at the conference yesterday:

1. The assurance that OVERLORD will take place and on time.
2. The Commander of OVERLORD.
3. The supporting action in Southern France.

MR. EDEN then turned to the question of aid to Tito in Yugoslavia. He made mention of a mission with United States Officers in it and suggested to Mr. Molotov that the Russians might also want to send a mission and that maybe the Russians would want to have an airbase in Northern Africa.

MR. EDEN stated that the British were ready to provide that base.

MR. MOLOTOV said thank you.

MR. EDEN went on to explain that the British airbase for sending

supplies to Tito is located at Cairo and asked Mr. Molotov where he would like to have a base for the Russians.

MR. MOLOTOV answered that he would leave that to the discretion of Mr. Eden and that as Mr. Eden suggested Cairo he thought that would be a good location for the Russians too.

MR. MOLOTOV said that the Soviet General Staff plans to send a mission to Yugoslavia and that on his return to Moscow he will be able to state who is taking part in this mission.

MR. EDEN said that he would try to get preliminary arrangements made and a place ready for an airbase for the Russians at Cairo and assured that such a base would be made available.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether it would not be better to have a mission to Michaelovich [*Mihailović*] rather than to Tito in order to get better information.

MR. EDEN said that he would know better tomorrow but that from reports he had received from British Officers, Michaelovich would not be good to deal with, but he said that maybe it would be good for the Russians to send some of their people to Michaelovich.

Then he brought up the question as to whether the territory occupied by Tito was or was not separated by German forces from the area or areas occupied by Michaelovich.

MR. EDEN then referred to Mr. Molotov, making reference to what he termed an "indiscreet conversation" held between the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin the other day on the subject of Poland.¹⁰

He added that the British have only one desire—to prevent the problem from becoming a source of friction between our countries. He said that if the question of two steps to the left was to be considered for Poland, then he would want to know how large these steps would be. He said that if he knew what was in the minds of the Russians on this question he would then be able to ask them for some sort of an agreement of opinion. Therefore he suggested that this problem should be carefully looked over.

MR. MOLOTOV added that he agreed.

MR. HOPKINS said that he was under the impression that the President had spoken quite openly and frankly with Marshal Stalin and that he had told him or would tell him all that he had on his mind on this subject and that he was sure the President and Prime Minister had talked over the question of Poland.

¹⁰ For an account of Churchill's after-dinner conversation of November 28, 1943, with Stalin regarding Poland, after Roosevelt had retired, see *ante*, p. 512.

THIRD PLENARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 30, 1943, 4 P. M., CONFERENCE
ROOM, SOVIET EMBASSY

PRESENT ¹

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Mr. Hopkins	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar
Mr. Harriman	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Molotov
Admiral Leahy	Field Marshal Dill	Marshal Voroshilov
General Marshall	General Brooke	Mr. Pavlov
Admiral King	Admiral of the Fleet	Mr. Berezhevskov
General Arnold	Cunningham	
Major General Deane	Air Chief Marshal Portal	
Captain Royal	Lieutenant General	
Captain Ware	Ismay	
Mr. Bohlen	Lieutenant General	
	Martel	
	Major Birse	

Bohlen Collection

Bohlen Minutes

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT opened the proceedings by stating that while most of those present were aware of what had occurred this morning at the meeting of the British and American Staffs,² he wished personally to express his happiness at the decision reached which he hoped would be satisfactory to Marshal Stalin. He proposed that Sir Alan Brooke, British Chief of Staff, report for the Combined Chiefs.

GENERAL BROOKE said that sitting in combined session the United States and British Staffs had reached the following agreement, which had been submitted for the approval of the President and the Prime Minister. It was agreed:

- (1). That OVERLORD will be launched during the month of May, 1944.
- (2). That there will be a supporting operation in southern France on as large a scale as possible, depending on the number of landing craft available for this operation.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that it was important that close and intimate contact be maintained with Marshal Stalin and the Soviet General Staff since it was important that in closing on the wild beast all parts of the narrowing circle should be aflame with battle. All operations must be considered, and if Turkey entered the war her

¹ The listing of those present is based on the Bohlen minutes. The Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes also include in the list of those present, Somervell of the American Delegation and Hollis of the British Delegation.

² See *ante*, p. 555.

action as well as the resistance operations in Yugoslavia should also be coordinated with the actions of the allied army.

MARSHAL STALIN said he fully understood the importance of the decision reached and the difficulties which would be encountered in the execution of OVERLORD. He added that the danger in the beginning of the operation was that the Germans might attempt to transfer troops from the eastern front to oppose OVERLORD. In order to deny to the Germans the possibility of maneuvering he pledged that the Red Army would launch simultaneously with OVERLORD large scale offensives in a number of places for the purpose of pinning down German forces and preventing the transfer of German troops to the west. He said that he had already made the foregoing statement to the President, and Mr. Churchill³ but he thought it necessary to repeat it to the conference.

THE PRESIDENT said that we were all aware of the importance of maintaining the closest cooperation between the three Staffs, and now that they had gotten together he hoped they would stay together. He went on to say that he had already told Marshal Stalin that the next step would be the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief for OVERLORD, and that he was confident that this appointment would be made within three or four days or immediately after he and the Prime Minister had returned to Cairo.⁴ He suggested that if Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister had no objection it might be advisable for the British and American military staffs to return to Cairo tomorrow as they had a great deal of detail work to do in working out the decisions reached here. Both MARSHAL STALIN and THE PRIME MINISTER agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that having taken this important decision the main question now was to find enough landing craft for all our needs. He said he could not believe that the great resources of the United States and England could not make available what was needed. He said he had caused an inquiry to be made in regard to the total number of landing craft in the Mediterranean, and that upon their return home his military staff would have this information. MR. CHURCHILL added that he wished to state that now the decision had been taken he felt that OVERLORD should be delivered with smashing force and he hoped that it would be possible to add to the strength

³ See *ante*, p. 565.

⁴ Sherwood, p. 791, states: "It is not a matter of record, but it is the testimony of some who were present at this conference [the Tehran Conference] that Stalin was told, unofficially (and not by Roosevelt) that the President would appoint Marshall to the OVERLORD command and that Stalin made evident his conviction that no wiser or more reassuring choice could be made." On December 6, 1943, Roosevelt informed Stalin that he had decided on Eisenhower as the Commander of OVERLORD. See *post*, p. 819.

of the operation as he wished to place that man in a position where there was no way out for him; if he put force in the west he would be smashed on the Soviet front, and if he attempted to hold firm in the east he would be smashed on the west. He went on to say that the present conclave might now break up as the military questions had been settled. Some political questions remained to be discussed and he hoped it would be possible on December 1st and 2nd to discuss these questions since he felt it would be of great value to be able to tell the world that full agreement had been reached on all questions at this conference. He expressed the hope that the President and Marshal Stalin would be willing to remain in Tehran through December 2nd if necessary. Both THE PRESIDENT and MARSHAL STALIN agreed.⁵

THE PRESIDENT then said it would be necessary to consider the text of the communiqué to be issued and suggested that the military staffs before their departure work out a draft of the military aspects of the conference for their consideration. This was agreed.⁶

THE PRIME MINISTER then said some form of cover plan should be worked out in order to confuse and deceive the enemy as to the real time and place of our joint blows. He said that the vast preparations in England could not be concealed from the enemy, and it was therefore important that every effort be made to confuse and mislead him. He said that "truth deserves a bodyguard of lies".

MARSHAL STALIN then described the methods used on the Soviet front to conceal the location and timing of Soviet offenses. This was done through the use of dummy tanks, aircraft, fake landing fields and false information on the military radio.

The formal conference then closed with the agreement that the President, Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Eden and Mr. Hopkins would meet tomorrow to discuss political questions.

⁵ Regarding the subsequent decision to end the Conference on December 1, 1943, see the Log, *ante*, p. 471.

⁶ For the texts of the communiqué and of the military conclusions, see *post*, pp. 639 and 651, respectively.

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*¹

SECRET

In opening the meeting, THE PRESIDENT said he assumed that most of those present were familiar with what had transpired at the meeting of the British and American staffs earlier in the day, but he

¹ For editorial annotations, see the Bohlen minutes of this meeting, *supra*.

suggested that General Brooke be asked to read the conclusions which were reached at that meeting.

MARSHAL STALIN and THE PRIME MINISTER agreed.

GENERAL BROOKE said that at the meeting of the British and American staffs they had agreed to recommend to the President and Prime Minister that they should inform Marshal Stalin that the Anglo-American forces would launch OVERLORD during the month of May, in conjunction with a supporting operation against the South of France, on the largest scale that would be permitted by the landing craft available at that time.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it is of course understood that we shall keep in close touch with Marshal Stalin and the Soviet military authorities in order that all operations may be coordinated with each other. He said that the Anglo-American-Soviet forces would be closing in on Germany from all parts of a circle and it was essential that the pressure be exerted by all forces at the same moment. For this purpose he proposed to keep the Soviet authorities informed of the Anglo-American plans. He added that it would be possible to hold 8 to 10 German divisions on the Italian front, and he expressed the hope that the Yugoslavs could continue their good work in holding German divisions in that country. He said that if Turkey could be brought into the war, so much the better, and emphasized again the necessity for the three great Powers to work together as one team.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he understood the importance of the decision that had been reached by the Anglo-American staffs. He emphasized that there would be difficulties in the beginning and possibly dangers. The greatest danger would be that at the time of the attack the Germans might endeavor to transfer divisions from the Eastern Front to meet it and attempt to prevent its success. In order to deny the Germans freedom of action and [not to?] permit them to move their forces to the West he stated that the Soviets would undertake to organize a large-scale offensive against the Germans in May in order to contain the maximum number of German divisions on the Eastern Front and thus remove the difficulties for OVERLORD. He added that he had already made such a statement to the President and Prime Minister but felt it necessary to repeat it at the Plenary Session of the conference.

THE PRESIDENT said that the Marshal's statement concerning the timing and coordination of operations was extremely satisfactory and it forestalled a question on that subject he was about to ask. He suggested that now that the staffs of the three nations had gotten together it was essential they should maintain close contact with

each other, with particular emphasis on making certain that all future operations were timed with relation to each other.

THE PRESIDENT then said he had told Marshal Stalin that the next step was the appointment of the Supreme Commander for the OVERLORD operation. He said that he and the Prime Minister would take up this matter with their staffs and make the decision within three or four days, certainly soon after their arrival in Cairo.

THE PRESIDENT said that the only military matters remaining for consideration were details of the OVERLORD operation which would have to be worked out between the combined British and American staffs, and suggested it might be more convenient for them to return to Cairo at once for this purpose.

After ascertaining from Marshal Stalin that he had no more matters which he wished presented to the Combined British and American Staffs, THE PRESIDENT and PRIME MINISTER agreed that the staffs should return to Cairo on the following day.

THE PRIME MINISTER said there are many details about the OVERLORD operation which remain to be settled. He said that the necessary landing craft would have to be found, but he could not believe that the two nations, with their great volume of production, could not make the necessary landing craft available. He said also that he would like to add weight to the operation as it is now planned, especially in the initial assault. In all events, he wished to make sure that the armed forces of the three nations would be in heavy action on the Continent of Europe during the month of June. If this were so, he added, it would make it very difficult for "that man." If Hitler attempts to meet the Soviet attack from the east, the Anglo-American forces will move in on him. On the other hand, if he attempts to stop the Anglo-American forces, the Soviet forces will be able to advance into Germany.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he understood the necessity for the detailed staff planning and concurred that it would be a good idea for the staffs to return to Cairo at once.

THE PRIME MINISTER then indicated that since the military business of the conference was concluded, there were some political matters of extreme importance which remained to be decided. He hoped it would be possible for the three Heads of State to meet on the first and second of December and not to leave Tehran until December 3. He said it would be well if they remained until all questions of importance had been decided. He indicated that he was prepared to delay his departure, and THE PRESIDENT and MARSHAL STALIN agreed to stay the extra day.

THE PRESIDENT brought up the subject of the communiqué, particularly as it referred to the military decisions. He suggested that the military staffs draft something for the President and Prime Minister's approval.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed that this should be done insofar as military matters taken up at the conference were concerned.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought the communiqué should strike the note that all future military operations were to be concerted between the three great Powers.

MARSHAL STALIN added, certainly those in Europe from both the east and west.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the preparations for OVERLORD are bound to be known to the enemy. Numerous depots are being constructed in Southern England, the entire appearance of the coast is changing and photographs indicate these changes in detail.

MARSHAL STALIN said that it was difficult, if not impossible, to hide such a large operation from the enemy.

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked if any arrangements had been made to provide a combined cover plan for the operations in May as between the three great Powers.

MARSHAL STALIN said that on such occasions the Soviets had achieved success by the construction of false tanks, airplanes and airfields. They move these items to sectors in which no operations are planned, and such movements are immediately picked up by the German intelligence. In sectors from which blows are to be launched, all movements are made quietly and mostly under cover of darkness. In this manner they had often succeeded in deceiving the Germans. He noted that at times up to 5,000 false tanks and 2,000 false airplanes had been used, as well as the construction of a number of airfields which were not actually intended to be used. Another method of deception practiced by the Red Army was by the use of radio. Unit commanders communicate freely by radio giving the Germans false information and evoke immediate attacks from the German air forces in areas where such attacks can do no harm.

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that truth deserves a bodyguard of lies.

MARSHAL STALIN said, "This is what we call military cunning."

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he considered it rather military diplomacy. He suggested that arrangements be made for liaison to be established between the three great Powers as regards the deception and propaganda methods to be adopted.

It was agreed that the Chiefs of State and their Foreign Ministers should meet on the following day at 1600.

TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING, NOVEMBER 30, 1943, 8:30 P. M.,
BRITISH LEGATION¹

PRESENT²

Major Boettiger
Lieutenant General Ismay
General Arnold
Lord Moran
Mr. Harriman
Field Marshal Dill
Major Birse
Marshal Stalin
Prime Minister Churchill
President Roosevelt
Mr. Bohlen
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Admiral Leahy
Section Officer Sarah
Churchill Oliver
Admiral King
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sergeant Robert Hopkins

Mr. Holman
Mr. Martin
Lieutenant General Somervell
General Brooke
Mr. Berezhevskoy
Marshal Voroshilov
Sir Reader Bullard
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Eden
Mr. Hopkins
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Winant
Air Chief Marshal Portal
General Marshall
Captain Randolph Churchill
Colonel Elliott Roosevelt
Commander Thompson

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*Boettiger Minutes*³

Thirty-three members of the American, British and Russian representatives [*delegations?*] at the Teheran conference gathered with Mr. Churchill for dinner on the occasion of his 69th birthday. A list of the guests, and the seating arrangement at the dinner-table, is attached.

It was clear that those present had a sense of realization that historic understanding had been reached and this conception was brought out in the statements and speeches. Back of all was the feeling that basic friendships had been established which there was every reason to believe would endure.

This strong feeling of optimism appeared to be based on the realization that if the three nations went forward together, there was real hope for a better world future, and that their own most vital interests dictated such a policy.

President Roosevelt sat on the Prime Minister's right, and Marshal Stalin on his left. All speeches took the form of toasts, following

¹ Churchill was host at this dinner.

² The listing of those present is based on the Boettiger minutes and follows the seating order at table. According to Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Tehran Conference*, p. 176, Hurley was also present. Churchill, pp. 387-388, states: "I had not invited Randolph and Sarah to the dinner, though they came in while my birthday toast was being proposed, but now Stalin singled them out and greeted them most warmly, and of course the President knew them well."

³ See also the Bohlen memorandum summarizing incidental remarks made at various meetings held during the course of the Conference, *post*, p. 837.

the Russian custom and the policy established at the Stalin dinner at the Soviet Embassy on Sunday [*Monday*] night.

THE PRESIDENT opened the proceedings with the first toast, an unusual departure from rote in that he, instead of the host, proposed the traditional toast to the King. THE PRESIDENT said that as an old friend of King George he had requested of Mr. Churchill the privilege of offering the toast.

THE PRIME MINISTER then paid a warm official and personal tribute to the President, whom he characterized as a man who had devoted his entire life to the cause of defending the weak and helpless, and to the promotion of the great principles that underlie our democratic civilization. Following this with a toast to Marshal Stalin, he said the latter was worthy to stand with the great figures of Russian history and merited the title of "Stalin the Great".

THE PRESIDENT spoke of his long admiration for Winston Churchill and his joy in the friendship which had developed between them in the midst of their common efforts in this war.

MARSHAL STALIN said the honors which had been paid to him really belonged to the Russian people; that it was easy to be a hero or a great leader, if one had to do with people such as the Russians. He said that the Red Army had fought heroically, but that the Russian people would have tolerated no other quality from their armed forces. He said that even persons of medium courage and even cowards became heroes in Russia. Those who didn't, he said, were killed.

THE PRIME MINISTER spoke of the great responsibility that rested on the three men who have the power to command some 30 million armed men, as well as the vast number of men and women who stood behind these men in their work in field and factory, which makes possible the activities of the armies. In a personal toast to Franklin Roosevelt, THE PRIME MINISTER expressed his opinion that through the President's courage and foresighted action in 1933, he had indeed prevented a revolution in the United States. He expressed his admiration for the way the President had guided his country along the "tumultuous stream of party friction and internal politics amidst the violent freedoms of democracy".

Among the many toasts of the evening was one by PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT to Sir Alan Brooke, the British Army Chief of Staff. MARSHAL STALIN stood with the others, but he held his glass in his hand, and when the others had drunk he stayed on his feet. He said he wished to join in the toast of General Brooke, but wished to make certain observations.

Acknowledging the General's greatness, MARSHAL STALIN, with a twinkle in his eye, said he regretted that Sir Alan was unfriendly to the Soviet Union, and adopted a grim and distrustful attitude toward

the Russians. He drank the General's health in the hope that Sir Alan "would come to know us better and would find that we are not so bad after all".

Some time later, in reply to Stalin, GENERAL BROOKE rose and with some stiffness of manner declared that the Marshal had made note of the means used by the Russians in deceiving the enemy on the Eastern front. For the greater part of the war, he went on, Great Britain had adopted cover plans to deceive the enemy, and it was possible that Marshal Stalin had mistaken the dummy "tanks and airplanes" for the real operations. "That is possible" interjected STALIN, dryly, bringing chuckles around the table. His real desire, continued BROOKE, was to establish closer collaboration with the Russians. "That is possible", STALIN repeated, "even probable". And there were more chuckles. It was thought that General Brooke would wind up with a toast to Marshal Voroshilov, the Russian chief of staff, but instead he broke away completely from his [*this?*] vein and abruptly proposed the health of Admiral Leahy.

MR. CHURCHILL took indirect note of the incident and seemed inclined to soften the effect of it, and in a subsequent toast he observed that he had heard the suggestions concerning changing political complexions in the world. He said that he could not speak with authority concerning the political view which might be expressed by the American people in the coming year's elections, and that he would not presume to discuss the changing political philosophy of the Russian nation. But, he continued, so far as the British people were concerned, he could say very definitely that their "complexions are becoming a trifle pinker". STALIN spoke up instantly: "That is a sign of good health!"

In what he declared would be the concluding toast of the evening, MR. CHURCHILL referred to the great progress which had been made at Teheran toward solution of world affairs, and proposed a joint toast to the President and Marshal Stalin.

But before the dinner could break up, STALIN requested of his host the privilege of delivering one more toast. MR. CHURCHILL nodded assent and STALIN then said he wished to speak of the importance of "the machine" in the present war, and to express his great admiration for the productive capacity of the United States. He had been advised, he said, that the United States would very soon be producing 10,000 planes every month. This compared, he said, with 2,500 to 3,000 planes which the Soviet Union was able to produce, after making every effort to speed the task, and with a somewhat similar number of planes produced monthly by Great Britain.

Without these planes from America the war would have been lost, said STALIN with emphasis. He expressed his gratitude and that

of the Russian people for the great leadership of President Roosevelt which had developed the great production of war machines and made possible their delivery to Russia. He wound up with a warm toast to the President.⁴

Then THE PRESIDENT sought the privilege of adding a last word, and he said these meetings at Teheran had raised all our hopes that the future would find a better world, an ordered world in which the ordinary citizen would be assured the possibility of peaceful toil and the just enjoyment of the fruits of his labors.

"There has been discussion here tonight of our varying colors of political complexion", he said. "I like to think of this in terms of the rainbow. In our country the rainbow is a symbol of good fortune and of hope. It has many varying colors, each individualistic, but blending into one glorious whole.

"Thus with our nations. We have differing customs and philosophies and ways of life. Each of us works out our scheme of things according to the desires and ideas of our own peoples.

"But we have proved here at Teheran that the varying ideals of our nations can come together in a harmonious whole, moving unitedly for the common good of ourselves and of the world.

"So as we leave this historic gathering, we can see in the sky, for the first time, that traditional symbol of hope, the rainbow".

⁴ See also the quotation from Stalin's remarks which appears in the Log, *ante*, p. 469.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1943 ¹

TRIPARTITE LUNCHEON MEETING, DECEMBER 1, 1943, 1 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S QUARTERS, SOVIET EMBASSY ²

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Mr. Hopkins	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar
Mr. Harriman	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Molotov
Mr. Bohlen	Major Birse	Mr. Pavlov ³

¹ For an account—based on a conversation with Roosevelt—of jocular remarks at Churchill's expense, made by Roosevelt to Churchill and Stalin apparently on December 1, 1943, and not recorded in the minutes, see Frances Perkins, *The Roosevelt I Knew* (New York: Viking Press, 1946), p. 84.

² According to the Log, *ante*, p. 470, this meeting began about noon. Bohlen has stated to the editors that the minutes presented at this point cover the discussions immediately preceding the luncheon as well as those during the luncheon.

³ The listing of those present is based on the Bohlen minutes. According to the Log, *ante*, p. 470, Berezhkov was present rather than Pavlov.

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Bohlen Minutes

SECRET

During the first part of luncheon the text of a telegram to be dispatched to the British and American Ambassadors in Ankara ⁴ to deliver orally an invitation to the President of Turkey to meet the President and Mr. Churchill in Cairo on December 3rd, 4th or 5th, was discussed and was agreed to.⁵

MR. HOPKINS then stated that before any meetings with the Turkish President, it was essential that we were agreed as to exactly what form of military assistance could be rendered to Turkey in the event she agreed to enter the war.

THE PRESIDENT agreed with Mr. Hopkins, and said that the American Staff had not yet worked out anything in detail on that question.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he only intended to offer the Turks 20 squadrons, mostly of fighter aircraft, and some 3 anti-aircraft regiments, but he had no intention of offering any land forces at this time.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that the big problem confronting his Staff was the number of available landing craft in the Mediterranean and how much would be needed for the Italian operations, those in Southern France and in England, as well as for the operations in the Indian Ocean.

MARSHAL STALIN then said that as he understood it, if Turkey entered the war there would only be made available the air force and anti-aircraft force mentioned by the Prime Minister.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed and spoke of the great assistance to the Allied cause that would result from obtaining Turkish air bases, with the possibility of continual bombing of the Ploesti oil fields. He added that he wanted landing craft only for the assault on the Island of Rhodes, which would be a temporary operation in the month of March.

THE PRESIDENT stated that he desired to have military advice on the subject, as he did not know whether it would be possible to sandwich in, between the Italian and OVERLORD operations, for any operation in the Aegean, the landing craft which the Prime Minister desired.

THE PRIME MINISTER repeated that he had made no promises to

⁴ Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen and Laurence A. Steinhardt, respectively.

⁵ For the text of the telegram sent by Roosevelt to Steinhardt, see *post*, p. 633. It would appear from the phrasing of the telegram to Steinhardt that Stalin agreed to send a similar telegram to the Soviet Ambassador at Ankara (Vino-gradov).

Turkey, and would make none beyond the aircraft and anti-aircraft of which he had spoken.

He said if the Turkish President, which is possible, would be unable to come to Cairo, that he proposed himself to go to Ankara subsequently and present to him the ugly case which would result from the failure of Turkey to accept the invitation to join the war, and the unappetizing picture of what help could be afforded her if she did.

MR. HOPKINS again pointed out that the United States Chiefs of Staff had not given consideration to the detailed requirements of the Turkish operation. The whole of the Mediterranean was soon to come under the Combined Chiefs of Staff—hence the resources must be examined in the light of that fact.

It should be clearly understood that the American side believe that there are no landing craft available for an attack on Rhodes—and more important still that even if the landing craft were available, no decision has been reached as to whether or not the landing craft could not be used to better advantage in some other operation.

Under any circumstances it should be clearly understood that no mention can be made to President Inonu, implied or otherwise, that an amphibious landing can be made on Rhodes.⁶

THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought we could have the precise information desired by Mr. Hopkins within three days, and in any event before any meeting with the Turkish President. He went on to say that landing craft was the bottleneck, and it might be possible to divert some from the Pacific theater, but that one thing was certain after yesterday's decision, and that was that OVERLORD not suffer.

THE PRESIDENT said, with reference to the Southwest Pacific, that it was absolutely impossible to withdraw any landing craft from that area. The distance alone from the Mediterranean would make it impossible, and besides all landing craft out there were urgently needed for the operations in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, and for the Burma campaign.

MR. EDEN then explained that in his conversations in November with the Turkish Foreign Minister in Cairo⁷ he had only asked for bases from Turkey, and had made no mention of any assistance other than the air forces mentioned by the Prime Minister, and no reference whatsoever to any other forces. He said that he had expressed the view that Turkey could make available these bases to the Allies without being attacked by Germany, but the Foreign Minister had not agreed with this opinion.

⁶ According to Sherwood, p. 793, this four-sentence summary of what Hopkins said was written out by Hopkins for inclusion in the minutes, in order that the record might be straight. The handwritten summary is in the Hopkins Papers. A facsimile of the summary appears in Sherwood, pp. 794–795.

⁷ See *ante*, pp. 162, 165.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER then repeated what he said about the advantages of acquiring bases in Turkey; that it would permit healthy battles with the German Air Force in that region, and in all probability starve out the German garrisons on the Aegean Islands. It might not even be necessary to take Rhodes by assault.

MARSHAL STALIN expressed agreement with this view, and felt that the German garrisons would be so demoralized following the loss of air superiority that they would be easy prey. He added, however, that he thought some bombers would be necessary for any such operations.

THE PRESIDENT then said he was in favor of meeting the Turkish Prime Minister, but he intended to make no offer of any amphibious operations to Turkey whatsoever, and that any commitments should be confined to the air forces referred to by the Prime Minister.

THE PRIME MINISTER then summed up the advantages to Turkey which would accrue if she accepted the invitation to join the war, and mentioned particularly the possibility of sitting alongside the Soviet Union at the peace table.

In reply to Mr. Eden's question as to the exact attitude of the Soviet Union towards Bulgaria, which Marshal Stalin had referred to at the formal conference,⁸ MARSHAL STALIN replied that if Turkey declares war on Germany and Bulgaria, or if Bulgaria attacks or goes to war with Turkey, the Soviet Union will break relations or declare war on Bulgaria.

He also inquired what other assistance would be required of the Soviet Union in such an event.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that they were seeking nothing more of the Soviet Union, but that it was obvious that if the Soviet Armies approached Bulgaria, the pro-German Bulgarian circles would be in great fear.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired what particularly the Turkish Army lacked in the way of armaments.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that the present Turkish Army would have been a good army at the end of the last war, but that when they had seen the modern Bulgarian equipment received from French arsenals, the Turks realized that their army was not a modern one.

He pointed out that they had brave infantry, but lacked anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft, and airplanes. He mentioned that 25 million pounds worth of military equipment, mostly American, had been sent to Turkey.

MARSHAL STALIN then said it was possible that Turkey would not have to go to war if she granted bases to the Allies; that she need not

⁸ See *ante*, pp. 537, 545.

attack; and that it was possible that neither the Bulgarians nor the Germans would do so.

THE PRESIDENT then mentioned the case of Portugal as an example of the granting of bases without the involvement in war.

With reference to Mr. Eden's remarks that the Turkish Foreign Minister had preferred to go right into war rather than to be dragged in by bases, THE PRIME MINISTER said that was Turkey's usual behaviour. If you suggested a small move they said they preferred the big. And if you suggested the big, they said they were not ready. MR. CHURCHILL said that he personally preferred that we offer something substantial to the Turks, and that if they refused, then they would wash their hands of Turkey, both now and at the peace table.

In reply to Mr. Eden's question, MARSHAL STALIN stated that it was expected that Turkey would declare war only on Germany, and not on Bulgaria. If Bulgaria attacks or declares war on Turkey, the Soviet Union goes to war with Bulgaria.

MARSHAL STALIN mentioned that there was one other possibility, and that was that if Turkey declared war on Germany, and Bulgaria refused to accede to German demands to go to war, the Germans might occupy Bulgaria. In which case Bulgaria might ask help from the Allies, and what then would be our position?

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that in such an event great strain would be put on Germany's strength, and undoubtedly result in the removal of some German divisions from the Eastern front.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he had talked the day before yesterday with the Prime Minister, who had referred to the idea that if Turkey would refuse an invitation to enter the war, Great Britain would tell her that her interests in the Straits and in the Bosphorus would be adversely affected.⁹ He wished to know what this meant.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he was far from his cabinet, but he personally favored a change in the regime of the Straits¹⁰ if Turkey proved obdurate.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he had merely meant to indicate that the Black Sea countries were very much interested in the regime of the Straits.

THE PRESIDENT said he would like to see the Dardanelles made free to the commerce of the world and the fleets of the world, irrespective of whether Turkey entered the war or not.

After agreeing [*after agreement had been reached?*] that the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey¹¹ would come to Cairo and Mr. Bushinsky

⁹ For Churchill's reference to this idea at the plenary meeting of November 29, 1943, see *ante*, pp. 536, 544.

¹⁰ See *ante*, p. 566, footnote 4.

¹¹ Sergei Vinogradov.

[*Vyshinsky*] would come to Cairo from Algiers for the meeting with the Turkish President, if it occurred that the Turkish president was present, THE PRESIDENT then said he would like to take up the question of Finland. He said that he wished to help in every way to get Finland out of the war, and he would like to have the views of Marshal Stalin.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that recently the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Boheman,¹² had inquired of the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm¹³ as to what were the Soviet Union's intentions regarding Finland, saying that the Finns were afraid that the Russians intended to make good the Russian promise and destroy the independence of Finland, and added that the Finns would like an opportunity to talk to the Russians.

The reply from Moscow was to the effect that Russia had no designs on the independence of Finland, if Finland by its behaviour did not force Russia to do so. Also that the Soviet Government had no objection to the Finns coming to Moscow for conversations, but would like to have the conditions in [*on?*] which the Finns would negotiate, in advance.

He added that only today they had had word of a Finnish reply through the Swedish [*Swedes*], but did not yet have the full text. The gist of the reply was, however, to the effect that the Finns desired to take as a basis the 1939 frontier, and made no mention of disassociation from Germany. Stalin said in his opinion that this unacceptable reply indicated that the Finns were not anxious to conduct serious negotiations, since they knew that such conditions would be unacceptable.

THE PRESIDENT said that the Marshal's statement had been most interesting, but also unsatisfactory.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the Finnish ruling groups obviously had hopes still of a German victory.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether Marshal Stalin thought it would be any help if the United States suggested that the Finns send a delegation to Moscow.

MARSHAL STALIN said he personally had no objections.

THE PRIME MINISTER outlined the change in his own and British feeling that had occurred toward Finland from 1939 to the present as a result of the Finnish associations and the German attack on Russia. He said that Great Britain was at war with Finland, and the first consideration was that the city of Leningrad would be secure, and also that the position of the Soviet Union as the leading naval and air power in the Baltic Sea should likewise be secure.

¹² Erik Boheman was Secretary-General of the Swedish Foreign Office.

¹³ Mme. Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontay.

He said, on the other hand, he would greatly regret to see anything done to impair the independence of Finland, and would therefore welcome the Marshal's statement on that point. He went on to say that an indemnity would not be much good from a country as poor as Finland.

MARSHAL STALIN expressed disagreement, and said that payments in kind over a period of from 5 to 8 years, such as timber, paper and other materials, would cover some of the damage done by Finland during the war, and that the Soviet Government intended to demand such reparation.

MR. CHURCHILL developed at some length the reasons why he did not consider reparations, in regard to such a country as Finland, either desirable or feasible. And he said in his ears there was an echo of the slogan "No Annexations and No Indemnities".

MARSHAL STALIN laughed, and replied that he had already told Mr. Churchill that he was becoming a Conservative.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that he attached a great importance to Finland's being out of the war and Sweden's being in, at the moment of the great attack in May.

To which STALIN expressed assent.

THE PRESIDENT then inquired whether Marshal Stalin thought that the Finns could expel the Germans from their country by their own efforts.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that there were 21 Finnish divisions on the Soviet front, and that while they were expressing their desire to negotiate, they had recently increased their divisions to this number from 16.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed on the desirability of getting the Finns out of the war, but not at the expense of the interests of the Soviet Union.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that for 27 months the Finns and the Germans had had Leningrad under artillery fire.

THE PRESIDENT said that according to his information the Finns were willing to remove the frontier a long distance from Leningrad, but hoped to have Vivorg [*Viborg*] (MARSHAL STALIN interrupted to say that this was impossible). THE PRESIDENT went on to say that Hango should be demilitarized and made into a bathing beach.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he did not wish to press his Russian friends, but he would like to know what their conditions were; that the British Government was leaving the initiative entirely in the hands of the Russians.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that in February the Soviet Government had told the United States Government what the conditions were, and the British Government had been likewise informed, and that since the

United States Government did not transmit these terms to the Finns it was obvious that it was not believed that the Finns would accept them.

THE PRESIDENT agreed that at that time it was felt that the Finns would not go along with any proposals.

MARSHAL STALIN said that the Treaty of 1940 ¹⁴ was broken and must be restored, but if Hango were belonging to the Finns he was willing to accept Petsamo instead, which would give them a common boundary with Norway. He added that Petsamo had been in the first instance a gift from Russia to Finland.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the British Government desired first of all to see the Soviet Government satisfied with the border in the west, and secondly would like to see Finland remain independent.

MARSHAL STALIN thought that it was all right to let the Finns live as they wished, but they must pay half of the damages they had caused.

THE PRESIDENT asked if it would be helpful if the Finns would go to Moscow without any reservations or conditions.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that if there was no prospect of success, such a move might play right into the hands of the Germans, since the reactionary group in Finland would exploit such a failure and pretend that it was impossible to talk with the Russians. He added, however, that if the President insisted, let the Finns come to Moscow, but who could they send?

MR. CHURCHILL interjected that the British Government was not insistent on anything regarding the Finns.

MARSHAL STALIN said that allies could occasionally use pressure on one another, and repeated that if the President thought it was worthwhile, an attempt might be made.

THE PRESIDENT said that in his opinion the present Finnish Government was pro-German, and that nothing could be done with them, but that it might be possible to send other Finns.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that of course that would be better, that they had no objection to anyone the Finns wanted to send, even Ruti [*Ryti*], or even, he added, the devil himself. STALIN then outlined the Soviet terms, as follows:

1. The restoration of the Treaty of 1940, with the possible exchange of Petsamo for Hango. However, whereas Hango had been leased, Petsamo would be taken as a permanent possession.

2. Compensation for 50% of the damage done to the Soviet Union by the Finns, the exact amount to be discussed.

3. Break with Germany, and the expulsion of Germans from Finland.

4. Reorganization of the army.

¹⁴ For an English translation of the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Peace, signed at Moscow March 12, 1940, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. II, April 27, 1940, p. 453.

THE PRIME MINISTER and MARSHAL STALIN entered into a friendly discussion as to the advisability of reparations from Finland, and MARSHAL STALIN made clear his determination that Finland should pay.¹⁵

The meeting adjourned until 6 o'clock.

[Annex] ¹⁶

DECEMBER 1, 1943.

At the beginning of luncheon today after the President had mentioned to Marshal Stalin that his son, Colonel Elliot[t] Roosevelt was in charge of 250 observation and scouting planes, Ambassador Harriman told the Marshal that Colonel Roosevelt was very anxious to obtain permission to land in the Soviet Union, thus flying straight through from Italy, photographing the Danube Basin, and landing in Russia.

Marshal Stalin agreed to give this permission, and said that the exact airfields and other details could be discussed with the United States Military Mission in Moscow.

He also agreed to make available for similar purposes fields in the Northern part of Russia, to permit through flying from England over enemy territory to the Soviet Union.¹⁷

¹⁵ For a post-Conference reference to this discussion, see Harriman's telegram 43, January 6, 1944, *post*, p. 865.

¹⁶ This memorandum appears in the Bohlen collection, without any heading, immediately after the minutes of the luncheon meeting.

¹⁷ For Roosevelt's request of November 29, 1943, for agreement on this point, see *post*, p. 617.

Hopkins Papers

Hopkins Notes ¹

1. Turkey should be asked to come into the war & invite President of Turkey to come to Cairo to meet the President of U. S. A. & Prime Minister.

Mr. Eden asked Marshall [*Marshal*] Stalin whether the Soviet Government wished to send a representative—if so he would of course be welcomed.

M. Stalin answered that he would send such a representative.

Proposed telegram to Pres. Inonu was presented and discussed.

¹ These notes, in Hopkins' handwriting, are headed "Mr. Eden[s] report of Foreign Minister Committee". The material reproduced here ends at the middle of a page and appears to be incomplete. No other Hopkins notes of this meeting have been found.

ROOSEVELT-STALIN MEETING, DECEMBER 1, 1943, 3:20 P. M.,
ROOSEVELT'S QUARTERS, SOVIET EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Bohlen

SOVIET UNION

Marshal Stalin
Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Collection

Bohlen Minutes

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT said he had asked Marshal Stalin to come to see him as he wished to discuss a matter briefly and frankly. He said it referred to internal American politics.

He said that we had an election in 1944 and that while personally he did not wish to run again, if the war was still in progress, he might have to.

He added that there were in the United States from six to seven million Americans of Polish extraction, and as a practical man, he did not wish to lose their vote. He said personally he agreed with the views of Marshal Stalin as to the necessity of the restoration of a Polish state but would like to see the Eastern border moved further to the west and the Western border moved even to the River Oder.¹ He hoped, however, that the Marshal would understand that for political reasons outlined above, he could not participate in any decision here in Tehran or even next winter on this subject and that he could not publicly take part in any such arrangement at the present time.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that now the President explained, he had understood.

THE PRESIDENT went on to say that there were a number of persons of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian origin, in that order, in the United States. He said that he fully realized the three Baltic Republics had in history and again more recently been a part of Russia and added jokingly that when the Soviet armies re-occupied these areas, he did not intend to go to war with the Soviet Union on this point.

¹ For post-Conference references to what Roosevelt said at Tehran about Polish boundaries, see Churchill's telegram 799, October 18, 1944, to Roosevelt, *post.* p. 884, and *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 203-205, 667, 677.

He went on to say that the big issue in the United States, insofar as public opinion went, would be the question of referendum and the right of self-determination. He said he thought that world opinion would want some expression of the will of the people, perhaps not immediately after their re-occupation by Soviet forces, but some day, and that he personally was confident that the people would vote to join the Soviet Union.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the three Baltic Republics had no autonomy under the last Czar who had been an ally of Great Britain and the United States, but that no one had raised the question of public opinion, and he did not quite see why it was being raised now.

THE PRESIDENT replied that the truth of the matter was that the public neither knew nor understood.

MARSHAL STALIN answered that they should be informed and some propaganda work should be done.

He added that as to the expression of the will of the people, there would be lots of opportunities for that to be done in accordance with the Soviet constitution but that he could not agree to any form of international control.

THE PRESIDENT replied it would be helpful for him personally if some public declaration in regard to the future elections to which the Marshal had referred, could be made.

MARSHAL STALIN repeated there would be plenty of opportunities for such an expression of the will of the people.

After a brief discussion of the time of the President's departure and that of Marshal Stalin, THE PRESIDENT said there were only two matters which the three of them had not talked over.

He said he had already outlined to the Marshal his ideas on the three world organizations² but he felt that it was premature to consider them here with Mr. Churchill. He referred particularly to his idea of the four great nations, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China, policing the world in the post-war period. He said it was just an idea, and the exact form would require further study.

MR. MOLOTOV said that at the Moscow Conference, in accordance with the Four Power Declaration,³ it had been agreed that the three governments would give further study as to the exact form of world organization and the means of assuring the leading role of the four great powers mentioned.

² See *ante*, p. 530.

³ *Decade*, p. 11.

During the conversation, in reply to the President's question, MARSHAL STALIN said that he had received the three papers which the President had handed him the day before yesterday, one in regard to air bases, and the other two in regard to secret contacts involving the Far East,⁴ but said he had not had time to study the documents carefully, but would take it up in Moscow with Ambassador Harriman.

At this meeting, STALIN, referring to his conversation with the President on November 28 [29] on the world organization,⁵ said that after thinking over the question of the world organization as outlined by the President, he had come to agree with the President that it should be world-wide and not regional.⁶

⁴ See *ante*, p. 529, and *post*, pp. 617-619.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 530.

⁶ It would appear, however, from what Roosevelt told Connally after returning to the United States, that Roosevelt believed that Stalin continued to favor the regional plan. See Senator Tom Connally, *My Name Is Tom Connally* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1954), p. 265, which reads in part: "Stalin, Roosevelt concluded, favored Churchill's regional plan. 'I'll have to work on both of them,' Roosevelt told me."

TRIPARTITE POLITICAL MEETING, DECEMBER 1, 1943, 6 P. M.,
CONFERENCE ROOM, SOVIET EMBASSY¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Mr. Hopkins	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar
Mr. Harriman	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Molotov
Mr. Bohlen	Major Birse	Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Collection

*Bohlen Minutes*²

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT stated he thought that there were two main questions to be discussed—the question of Poland and the treatment of Germany.

¹ The fact that the meeting took place in the conference room of the Soviet Embassy does not appear on the minutes but was indicated to the editors by Bohlen.

² See also the Bohlen memorandum summarizing incidental remarks made at various meetings held during the course of the Conference, *post*, p. 836.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether it would be possible to obtain any answer on the Soviet Union's request for Italian ships.³

THE PRESIDENT replied his position on this question was very clear; that the Allies had received a large number of Italian merchant ships and a lesser number of warships and that he felt they should be used by our three nations in the common cause until the end of the war when the division based on title and possession might be made.

MR. MOLOTOV answered that the Soviet Union would use these ships during the war in the common war effort, and after the war the question of possession could be discussed.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked where the Soviet Union would like to have these ships delivered.

MARSHAL STALIN replied in the Black Sea if Turkey entered the war. If not, to the northern ports.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it was a small thing to ask in the face of the tremendous sacrifices of Russia.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he knew how great the need for war vessels was on the part of England and the United States but that he felt the Soviet request was modest.

Both THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER said they were in favor of acceptance of the Soviet suggestion.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it would require some time to work out the arrangements and that he personally would welcome the sight of these vessels in the Black Sea and hoped some English war vessels could accompany them in action against the enemy in those waters.

He said it would take a couple of months to work out the arrangements with the Italians, since they wish to avoid any possibility of mutiny in the Italian Fleet and the scuttling of the ships.

It was agreed that the ships would pass over to Soviet command sometime around the end of January, 1944.⁴

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that it would be one of the advantages to be attained from Turkey even if she did not enter the war; namely to permit the passage of war vessels through the Dardanelles.

THE PRESIDENT, turning to the subject of Poland, said it was his hope that negotiations could be started for the re-establishment of relations

³ With respect to the Soviet request, see *ante*, pp. 112, 120, 126-129, 133.

⁴ For post-Conference references to this discussion, see *post*, pp. 852, 862, 873, 875-878.

between the Polish and Soviet Governments.⁵ He felt that the re-establishment of relations would facilitate any decisions made in regard to the questions at issue. He said he recognized the difficulties which lay in the way.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the Polish Government in exile were closely connected with the Germans and their agents in Poland were killing partisans. He said it is impossible to imagine what is going on in Poland.

THE PRIME MINISTER said the great question before the English was the fact that they had declared war because of the German invasion of Poland.

He said he personally had been astonished when Chamberlain had given the guarantee in April, 1939 to Poland⁶ when he had refused to fight for the Czechs. He had been astonished and glad.

He said that England and France had gone to war in pursuance of this guarantee and it was not that he regretted it, but still it would be difficult not to take cognizance of the fact that the British people had gone to war because of Poland.

He said he had used the illustration of the three matches the other evening in order to demonstrate one possible solution of the questions.⁷

He said that the British Government was first of all interested in seeing absolute security for the Western frontiers of the Soviet Union against any surprise assault in the future from Germany.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that Russia, probably more than any other country was interested in having friendly relations with Poland, since the security of Soviet frontiers was involved.

He said the Russians were in favor of the reconstitution and expansion of Poland at the expense of Germany and that they make distinction between the Polish Government in exile and Poland.

He added that they broke relations with Poland not because of a whim but because the Polish [*Poles*] had joined in slanderous propaganda with the Nazis.

⁵ The Soviet Union had broken relations with the Polish Government-in-Exile at London on April 26, 1943, following the appeal by the latter to the International Committee of the Red Cross to investigate German charges against the Soviet Union of the wholesale murder of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest.

⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 233, footnote 47.

⁷ See *ante*, p. 512.

He inquired what guarantee could there be that this would not be repeated. He said they would like to have a guarantee that the Polish Government in exile would cease the killing of partisans in Poland and secondly to urge the people to fight against the Germans and not to indulge in intrigues.

The Russians would welcome relations with a Polish Government that led its people in the common struggle but it was not sure that the Polish Government in exile could be such a government. However, he added, if the government in exile would go along with the partisans and sever all connections with the German agents in Poland, then the Russians would be prepared to negotiate with them.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he would like to obtain the views of the Soviet Government in regard to the frontier question, and if some reasonable formula could be devised, he was prepared to take it up with the Polish Government in exile, and without telling them that the Soviet Government would accept such a solution, would offer it to them as probably the best they could obtain. If the Polish Government refused this, then Great Britain would be through with them and certainly would not oppose the Soviet Government under any condition at the peace table.

He said the British Government wished to see a Poland strong and friendly to Russia.

MARSHAL STALIN replied this was desirable, but it was not just for the Poles to try and get back the Ukraine and White Russia; that the frontiers of 1939 had returned the Ukrainian soil to the Ukraine and White Russian soil to White Russia. The Soviet Government adheres to the 1939 line and considers it just and right.

MR. EDEN said that was the line known as the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line.

MARSHAL STALIN said call it what you will, we still consider it just and right.

MR. MOLOTOV interjected to say that the 1939 frontier was the Curzon Line.⁸

⁸ The Curzon Line is described in *Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. XIII, pp. 793-794.

MR. EDEN said there were differences.

MR. MOLOTOV replied in no essential points.

There was then an examination of maps as to the exact location of the Curzon Line, and its location was finally established.⁹

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether in the opinion of Marshal Stalin, East Prussia and the area between the old Polish frontier and the Oder was approximately equal to the former Polish territory acquired by the Soviet Union.

MARSHAL STALIN replied he did not know.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if it was possible to work out some fair solution that it would be up to the Polish [*Poles*] to accept it.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the Soviet Union did not wish to retain any regions primarily occupied by Poles even though they were inside the 1939 Line.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether a voluntary transfer of peoples from the mixed areas was possible.

MARSHAL STALIN said that such a transfer was entirely possible.

Turning to the question of Germany, THE PRESIDENT said that the question was whether or not to split up Germany.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that they preferred the dismemberment of Germany.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was all for it but that he was primarily more interested in seeing Prussia, the evil core of German militarism, separated from the rest of Germany.

THE PRESIDENT said he had a plan that he had thought up some months ago for the division of Germany in five parts. These five parts were:

1. All Prussia to be rendered as small and weak as possible.
2. Hanover and Northwest section.
3. Saxony and Leipzig area.
4. Hesse-Darmstadt
Hesse-Kassel and the area South of the Rhine
5. Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg [*Württemberg*]

He proposed that these five areas should be self-governed and that there should be two regions under United Nations or some form of International control. These were:

⁹ See the map facing page 601. For further details on this discussion, see *post*, p. 837.

POLAND: EASTERN FRONTIER

LEGEND

- National boundaries
- Line of Russian occupation, June 1941
- Boundaries of the Ukraine and White Russia
- Voivodship boundaries
- Curzon Line
- Railroads
- Line "A"
- Line "B"
- Line "C"
- Line "D"
- Line "E"
- Line "F"

Scale 1:3,700,000

0 50 100 150 Kilometers
0 50 100 Miles



EXPLANATORY NOTE REGARDING MAP OF POLAND: EASTERN FRONTIER

This map had been prepared in the Office of the Geographer of the Department of State, working in conjunction with the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy. (See Notter, pp. 150, 173, 178, 492-513.) The significance of the colored lines indicated in the legend is as follows:

- Line A=Polish-Soviet boundary, 1921-1939;
- Lines B, C, and D=Hypothetical Polish-Soviet boundaries;
- Line E=The "Curzon Line";
- Line F=Portion of the German-Polish boundary, 1939-1941.

The map was taken to Tehran for possible reference use, and when the question arose, at the Tripartite Political Meeting on December 1, as to the location of the "Curzon Line," Bohlen put the map on the table for consultation. The note that Bohlen later attached to the map reads as follows:

"The marks in red pencil on the attached map were made by Stalin himself to illustrate the fact that if part of eastern Prussia, including the ports of Königsberg and Tilsit, were given to the Soviet Union he would be prepared to accept the Curzon line (the blue line "E" on the map) as the frontier between the Soviet Union and Poland. The red pencil marks to the east of the 1941 Soviet-Polish frontier [the red line "F" on the map] and to the west of the Curzon line were put on the map by Stalin to show the areas which would go back to Poland. The small area marked in red west of the River Bug northeast of Lublin was put on by Stalin as indicating a place where there would remain in Poland a small area chiefly inhabited by Ukrainians. The Soviet Union, however, would not claim this area but would accept the Curzon line running along the River Bug. Although it was admitted that the city of Lwów was predominantly Polish, it was situated in the heart of an overwhelmingly Ukrainian region and for that reason [according to Stalin] could not be returned to Poland." (Bohlen Collection)

601

1. The area of the Kiel Canal and the City of Hamburg.
2. The Ruhr and the Saar, the latter to be used for the benefit of all Europe.¹⁰

THE PRIME MINISTER said, to use an American expression, "The President had said a mouthful."

He went on to say that in his mind there were two considerations, one destructive and the other constructive.

1. The separation of Prussia from the rest of the Reich.
2. To detach Bavaria, Baden, Wurtemberg [*Württemberg*] and the Palatinate from the rest of Germany and make them part of the Confederation of the Danube.

MARSHAL STALIN said he felt if Germany was to be dismembered, it should really be dismembered, and it was neither a question of the division of Germany in five or six states and two areas as the President suggested. However, he said he preferred the President's plan to the suggestion of Mr. Churchill.

He felt that to include German areas within the framework of large confederations would merely offer an opportunity to the German elements to revive a great State.

He went on to say that he did not believe there was a difference among Germans; that all German soldiers fought like devils and the only exception was the Austrians.

He said that the Prussian Officers and Staffs should be eliminated, but as to the inhabitants, he saw little difference between one part of Germany and another.

He said he was against the idea of confederation as artificial and one that would not last in that area, and in addition would provide opportunity for the German elements to control.

Austria, for example, had existed as an independent state and should again. Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria likewise.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed with the Marshal, particularly in regard to the absence of differences between Germans. He said fifty years ago there had been a difference but since the last war it was no longer so.

He said the only difference was that in Bavaria and the Southern part of Germany there was no officer cast[e] as there had been in Prussia. He agreed with Marshal Stalin that the Austrians were an exception.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he did not wish to be considered as against the dismemberment of Germany—quite the contrary, but he felt to

¹⁰ For Stalin's recollection at the Potsdam Conference in 1945 that control of the Ruhr by the great powers had been discussed at Tehran, see Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs* (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1955; 2 vols.), vol. 1, p. 406.

separate the parts above would merely mean that sooner or later they will reunite into one nation and that the main thing was to keep Germany divided if only for fifty years.

MARSHAL STALIN repeated what he had said as to the danger of the re-unification of Germany. He said no matter what measures were adopted there would always be a strong urge on the part of the Germans to unite.

He said it was a great mistake to unite Hungary with Germans since the Germans would merely control the Hungarians and to create large frameworks within which the Germans could operate would be very dangerous.

He felt the whole purpose of any international organization to preserve peace would be to neutralize this tendency on the part of the Germans and apply against them economic and other measures and if necessary, force, to prevent their unification and revival. He said the victorious nations must have the strength to beat the Germans if they ever start on the path of a new war.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether Marshal Stalin contemplated a Europe composed of little states, disjoined, separated and weak.

MARSHAL STALIN replied not Europe but Germany.

He supposed for example that Poland would be a strong country, and France, and Italy likewise; that Rumania and Bulgaria would remain as they always had; small States.

THE PRESIDENT remarked Germany had been less dangerous to civilization when in 107 provinces.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he hoped for larger units.¹¹

THE PRIME MINISTER then returned to the question of Poland and said he was not asking for any agreement nor was he set on the matter but he had a statement which he would like to have the Marshal examine.

This statement suggested that Poland should obtain equal compensation in the West, including Eastern Prussia and frontiers on the Oder to compensate for the areas which would be in the Soviet Union.¹²

THE PRESIDENT interjected to say that one question in regard to Germany remained to be settled and that was what body should be empowered to study carefully the question of dismemberment of Germany.

¹¹ For post-Conference documents bearing on this discussion, see *post*, pp. 877, 879, 881, 883.

¹² The text of the statement has not been found. It may have been the "formula" quoted in Churchill, p. 403.

It was agreed that the European Advisory Committee [*Commission*] would undertake this task.¹³

THE PRIME MINISTER said in his opinion the Polish question was urgent.

He repeated if it would be possible to work out a formula here, and then [*sic*] he could go back to the Polish Government in London and urge on them the desirability of at least attempting to reach a settlement along those lines, without however indicating any commitment on the part of the Soviet Government.

MARSHAL STALIN said that if the Russians would be given the northern part of East Prussia, running along the left bank of the Niemen and include Tils[i]t and the City of Königsberg, he would be prepared to accept the Curzon Line as the frontier between the Soviet Union and Poland.

He said the acquisition of that part of Eastern Prussia would not only afford the Soviet Union an ice-free port but would also give to Russia a small piece of German territory which he felt was deserved.

Although nothing definitely was stated, it was apparent that the British were going to take this suggestion back to London to the Poles.¹⁴

¹³ For a post-Conference reference to the task assigned to the Commission at this time, see *post*, p. 883.

¹⁴ At the Potsdam Conference in 1945, Stalin referred to the discussion at Tehran of the city of Königsberg and said that Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed to the acquisition of some German territory by the Soviet Union; see Truman's *Memoirs*, vol. I, p. 378.

TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING, DECEMBER 1, 1943, 8:30 P. M.,
CONFERENCE ROOM, SOVIET EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Mr. Hopkins	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar
Mr. Harriman	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Molotov
Mr. Bohlen	Major Birse	Mr. Pavlov

Editorial Note

According to the Log, *ante*, p. 470, this dinner meeting lasted until 10:30 p. m. No official minutes of the conversation appear to have been prepared, but a memorandum prepared by Bohlen a few days later (*post*, p. 838) indicates that the Declaration on Iran and the Conference communiqué were discussed and put into final form.

9. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

A. CORRESPONDENCE, DRAFTS, AND PROPOSALS ¹

023.1/10-2954, 1-28/55

Report From the Office of Strategic Services ²

SECRET

BARI, ITALY, 29 October, 1943.

Subject: Preliminary Report on a visit to The National Army of Liberation, Yugoslavia.

To: Major Louis Huot, OSS Advance Base, Bari

1. The following conclusions were formed as a result of personal observation in the field with the National Army of Liberation during the period from 17 September to 27 October 1943.

2. The Partisan movement is of far greater military and political importance than is commonly realized in the outside world.

3. The Partisans have created solely by their own efforts in the face of the Germans, Italians, Ustasha, and Chetniks a free community of no mean size entirely encircled by enemy forces. Within this area, Mohammedans, Christians, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Communist Party members, any person of any religion or political belief can express an opinion concerning the way in which he believes the affairs of the community should be conducted.

4. The above situation is probably unique in all Occupied Europe. The Partisans are in contact with liberation groups in all the adjoining countries. A considerable number of Italian troops are fighting with them as organized units. It seems quite certain that the manner

¹ Reference may also be made to an exchange of messages between Roosevelt and Churchill, on November 29, 1943, in which Churchill invited Roosevelt to lunch with him, Roosevelt declined, and Churchill then insisted on being the host at a dinner to be held on November 30; see Churchill, p. 363, and Sherwood, p. 784. These latter messages may have been oral. No textual copies of them have been found.

² See *ante*, p. 529. No record has been found of the return by Stalin of the copy lent him by Roosevelt. Copies of the report had been sent in 1943, by the O. S. S., to Roosevelt, Hull, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The office having custody of the report in 1954, in furnishing the Department of State with a copy to replace the missing copy sent to Hull in 1943, stated: "Subsequent reports prepared by Major Farish indicate that the opinions on the Partisan movement expressed by him in his memorandum of 29 October 1943 were considerably modified later". (023.1/10-2954)

in which the movement develops, the way of life which they decide to adopt, will have a great effect upon all the Balkan states and probably upon the greater portion of Europe.

5. The initial resistance against the occupying Axis forces and their native Quislings after the defeat of the regular Yugoslav Army stemmed from the indomitable will of various isolated groups to remain free. Peculiarly favorable geographic conditions aided these bands to persist in the face of utterly overwhelming odds.

6. The Communist Party, especially after the German attack on the Soviet, actively recruited resistance groups, but their principal initial function in the Partisan movement was to supply the underground organization whereby the isolated groups could communicate with each other and weld themselves into a common body.

7. The Communist Party failed in its initial attempt to organize the movement strictly along Party lines and sensibly decided to concentrate every available force of any character against the common enemy. Thus, the Communist Party is in theory only one element within the Partisan movement, but it is a very active one, and there is every evidence that strongly indoctrinated Party members are working hard to shape the structure of this newly born state according to their social, political, and economic beliefs.

8. The average Partisan soldier and civilian was undoubtedly pleased to meet the members of the Allied Mission. As an American, the observer was at times embarrassed by the enthusiastic reception which he received and the implicit faith of the people that the United States would come to their aid. This was especially true in the case of those who had relatives or friends in America, and there was never a village, a unit, or group of any kind visited that there were not people in this category. This is a factually true statement concerning which the observer paid particular attention.

9. In view of the facts stated above, it seems quite evident that, if an atmosphere of free and enlightened discussion can be maintained, there is a wonderful opportunity for the Partisans to select for themselves those portions of all forms of government and way[s] of life which they believe would be suitable to their temperament and environment. In such a case, it seems quite probable that a state will emerge which will be a meeting ground between political beliefs which are now widely separated in their extreme phases. The Partisans are very favorably placed in this regard due to the fact that they can directly incorporate into their way of life those portions of these divergent beliefs which they think would be good for them without going through the slow and cumbersome processes of any existing

legislative system. It was in such an environment and under similar conditions that the beginnings of the United States were established.

10. There can be no question of a doubt that the Partisan forces dedicated themselves to the fight against the Axis from the beginning; that they have always fought them; that they are fighting them at this time, and will fight them to the end. The story of this struggle is at times almost beyond the imagination. It is so immense that only a suggestion of it can be given in this short report. The observer must content himself with the statement that if ever a movement had the background of indomitable will and courage with which to build to great things, it is to be found in Yugoslavia. It may not take place, but, nevertheless, all of the necessary elements are there, and it will be to the eternal discredit of the leaders of the Partisan movement if they do not build wisely and unselfishly upon the solid foundation of this tremendous human effort. We have sent representatives to the Partisans and have been supplying them with weapons and materials. If the Partisan movement should fail, and if such failure could be directly attributed to our improper appraisal of the situation or lack of effective material support, then we, also, must accept our portion of the responsibility.

11. Whereas the Partisans have fought steadfastly against the Axis occupying forces, other Yugoslav groups have not done so. The *Ustasha* are the Himmerlite [*Himmlerite?*] terrorists of the Croatian puppet state and the evidences of their ferocious treatment of Partisan communities can be seen on all sides. The *Domabrandts* are the conscripted soldiers of the puppet state. They have never fought effectively and never attempted to do so. The *Chetniks* under Col. Mihailovitch and other officers of the Yugoslav Army fought for a time against the occupying Axis troops in conjunction with the Partisans. But Mihailovitch made the fatal mistake of allowing his political beliefs and his plans for the future to overcome his better judgment. He feared Communism more than he feared the common enemy. He and his leaders were more concerned with their plans for themselves after the war than with the actual ending of the war by defeating the Axis. Acting upon these misconceptions, Mihailovitch ordered his Chetniks to attack the Partisan forces, and thus commenced the bitter civil war which has become so savage that it is difficult to see how a reasonable understanding can be brought about.

Not all the Chetnik leaders obeyed the order to attack the Partisans and some of them came over to the Partisans. Since then more have come and are coming over every day. The above is the story they tell. Unquestionably it will not be the story of Mihailovitch, but

that the Chetniks are now fighting the Partisans is a fact to which the observer can personally testify. Furthermore, the Allied Mission has numerous captured Chetnik documents including routine correspondence, orders, pay books, pay rolls, etc. which afford ample concrete evidence that the Chetnik forces have been fighting with the Germans and Italians against the Partisans.

12. The presence of this civil war in Yugoslavia is unfortunate. As in any civil war, it is extremely difficult for a foreign observer to understand the no quarter ferocity with which it is being fought. But these facts stand out from a military standpoint:

a. Repeating, the Partisans have always fought the Germans and are doing so now.

b. They are a more potent striking force at this time than they have ever been before. They are better trained and equipped, and there is every evidence that, provided they can obtain the necessary arms and supplies, their army will constantly increase in size and efficiency. Their present strength is given by them as 180,000 men which are included in 18 divisions, garrison troops, and detachments guarding the lines of communication.

c. These forces control one large mountainous area extending from the Montenegro-Serbian border northwest through Herzegovina to Western Bosnia. Other mountainous portions of Croatia, Slovenia, Slavonia, and the Pola Peninsula are also in their hands.

d. All of the Adriatic Coast, with the exception of the principal seaports, such as Zara, Sibenik, Split, Makarska, Dubrovnik, and Kotor, is controlled by the Partisans, as well as the coastal islands, with the possible exception of Peljesac where fighting is now taking place.

e. The Germans and their Ustasha Quislings hold all of the principal cities but outside of few miles radius of these points their control of the country ceases. The observer does not have accurate information at his disposal concerning the strength of the German, Ustasha and Chetnik forces, but he does know from personal experience that it is in no way sufficient to prevent the Partisans from travelling almost at will throughout the length and breadth of the country, from Albania to Austria, from the Dalmatian Coast to Belgrade. The observer states without hesitancy that, provided the Partisans are efficiently and immediately supplied with food, clothing, medical equipment and supplies, transport, weapons, and other materials which are needed to properly equip their present forces and the recruits which are available, Allied personnel can in comparative safety be conducted to any point from the Adriatic Coast to the Danube Basin. A communication system to the outside world can be established, airfields constructed, supply dumps established, and any other projects of military importance accomplished. But in all this it must be remembered that this report could not be written and these plans could not be envisaged if it had not been that a comparative handful of men, betrayed and harassed by a portion of their own countrymen, had the courage and faith to stand up to what was at that time the most powerful military power the world had ever seen.

These few people have made such things possible. Now they compose the backbone of the National Army of Liberation and they are justifiably proud of the fight they have made. It is time they received full credit, and we must work directly through them and with them in this strategically important gateway to the Danube Basin and the Northern Balkans.

13. Their favourable geographical position, knowledge of mountain warfare, and great courage enabled the Partisans to defeat a sustained well planned German offensive against them in Montenegro during the first six months of 1943 in which several divisions of German, Italian, Chetnik and Ustasha troops encircled 8,000 fighting troops of the Partisan Army. Led by Tito himself, this force fought its way out to the north through successive enemy positions, passing within a few miles of Sarajevo. By their tenacity, their resourcefulness, and their ability to withstand extreme hardships, these people discouraged the German High Command. The Partisans broke through and established themselves in the easily defended Vrbas Valley by taking the towns of Mrkonje Grad, Jajce, Donji Vakuf, and Bugojno. We, of course, can feel a certain satisfaction in the thought that perhaps these events were influenced by the offensives which the Allies were conducting against the Germans on several fronts but, nevertheless, a lesser people than the Partisans could not have withstood the hardships and apparently hopeless positions in which they often found themselves.

One extremely important point is that the Partisans had fought themselves clear and had established themselves in the Vrbas Valley before the capitulation of Italy.

Following the Italian surrender, the Partisan First Division occupied the Adriatic seaport of Split, capturing a large amount of Italian equipment and recruiting 9,000 men, a considerable contingent of Italian troops joining them as well. At that time they asked for Allied air support against the garrison towns of Sinj, Knin, Imotski, Zara, and Gospic, signifying their intention of attacking Sinj, Knin and Gospic, with the idea in mind of severing the coastwise communication system of the Germans, isolating the ports of Zara and Sibenik, thus establishing themselves firmly on the Dalmatian coast with free access to the interior mountainous regions of Herzegovina and Bosnia. They also asked for the delivery of essential war materials to Split, the evacuation of Italian prisoners and seriously wounded Partisans.

The Partisans received no response to these requests except that some 3,000 Italian prisoners were evacuated. The Germans attacked Split from Knin, Sinj, and Imotski in such numbers that the Partisans were forced to fight their way out and retreat into the mountains of Bosnia taking with them as much of the Italian equipment as possible.

Merely as a matter of incident, they overran the strongly garrisoned Ustasha towns of Livno and Kupres in order to clear a way for the transport [of] field guns, and tanks which they had been able to bring out of Split. These events took place during the latter part of September and early October. The bulk of the captured equipment arrived at Bugojno during the second week of October. It can never be determined whether the Partisan plans for the occupation of the Dalmatian coast were too ambitious for the resources of the Partisan Army, but two things are important so far as the Allies are concerned, namely (1) the military strategy was sound, and (2) no Allied air assistance was forthcoming.

14. It is hoped that from this brief outline the military position of the Partisan forces can be roughly established. Their potentialities are great, but their position can be improved. The observer believes that two factors are of great importance: (1) immediate delivery of supplies by sea and air, and (2) a limited amount of air support along the Dalmatian Coast in order to protect the supply lines, as well as the German held town of Travnik in Central Bosnia.

Travnik is not a natural German position. This enemy position is only 22 miles airline to southeast of Jajce, the GHQ of the Partisan forces where Tito is in residence. Travnik is well into the mountains and is not an integral portion of any enemy supply line. The observer obtained private information that it is strongly fortified and garrisoned by 2,600 well equipped German troops with tanks. There are Ustasha troops there also. The position was attacked by the Partisans in mid-October, and possibly in the earlier part of the month, but they could not take it.

The importance of Travnik may be summarized as follows:

a. It constitutes a direct threat to the very heart and GHQ of the Partisan positions.

b. At least two of the best Partisan divisions must be held in the mountains to guard against this potential threat. In the Central Bosnian area there cannot be over three Partisan divisions sufficiently well equipped and trained to stand up to the Germans.

c. The observer believes that an attack on the Partisan communications and garrisons on the Dalmatian Coast and islands would be logical German strategy as soon as the snow blocks the mountain passes. If this attack is forthcoming, the Partisans will be faced with the problem of reinforcing the Dalmatian forces, but if they withdraw troops from Bugojno or Donji Vakuf they will expose themselves to the threat from Travnik.

The Partisans have asked for air support for an attack upon Travnik, and the observer believes that this support should be offered to them as soon as it is possible to do so. From a military standpoint it will be nothing more than a bombing and strafing attack in prepara-

tion for a ground operation by Partisan troops. The distance from Bari to Travnik is approximately 300 miles. A courier can proceed to the Partisan GHQ, offer the air support and obtain all the necessary information relative to timing, objectives, enemy positions, A/A defenses, air strength, etc. This journey can be made in something in the order of four days.

The observer cannot express too strongly the great moral effect that such air support would have on the situation in Yugoslavia. The Germans, of course, would not be seriously affected except by the manner in which their military position is weakened. The Ustasha, whose morale is deteriorating rapidly, would be thoroughly shaken. This would be particularly advantageous if the Germans have left them as garrison troops following the repulse of the Partisan attack. The Chetniks would also be shaken, as they have been spreading the rumour, and no doubt believe, that no Allied support will be given to the Partisans. The Partisans themselves will be the most affected. Even if the military operation attains no great success, the effect will be tremendous. They have been subjected to enemy air attacks for over two years without once seeing a friendly aircraft. Anyone who has been in an area of complete enemy air control will know what this means. A great many Partisans have completely lost faith in the possibility of any Allied air support and have asked the observer some rather embarrassing questions about the leaflet load of the Halifax and the Liberator.³

For morale effect the flight in and out should be over as many Partisan headquarters as possible with the aircraft flying low in order that the markings can be clearly seen. These are also the safest routes. These Partisan positions are—the islands of Vis, Brac, and Hvar, and the inland towns of Livno, Kupres, Bugojno, Donji Vakuf, Jajce and Mrknoic Grad. Localities to avoid are Metkovic, Makarska, Split, Sibenik, Zara, Mostar, Imotski, Sinj, Knin, Gospic, Bihac and Banjaluka. Attacks may come from enemy airfields at Mostar, Knin, Gospic, Bihac, and Banjaluka, but it is not believed that they will be heavy. The Partisans should be asked for detailed information concerning the number and types of aircraft at these or any other adjacent enemy airfields.

The observer believes this offer of air assistance to be of prime importance. As to the morale effect, the observer can only state what it would have meant to him to have seen one of his aircraft during his short stay in Yugoslavia. What it would mean to men who have stood two years of defenseless attack can only be conjectured.

15. The one most important factor in regard to the military effectiveness of the Partisans is that of supply. The needed materials

³ Allied aircraft.

may be roughly classified as clothing, food, medical supplies, transport, weapons (rifles, light machine guns, anti-tank rifles, mortars, and ammunition), light tanks, mines and explosives, grenades, signal equipment and other miscellaneous articles. Considering the scale and complicated nature of modern warfare, these supplies are simple in character, small in quantity, and not of any great value.

The primary factor in the matter of supply must be speed. Winter is fast approaching, when the roads through the mountains will be blocked by snow just at the time when the materials will be the most acutely needed. The supply line passes within a few miles of enemy held towns which are peculiarly non-resistant at this time. A portion of the route is actually used by both the Partisans and the enemy. The observer feels that the apparent indifference of the enemy to an obvious situation is due to the fact that he has plans for the future when the snows have blocked the high mountains and he will have an overwhelming advantage on the Dalmatian Coast.

The observer has never believed that supplies can be dropped from the air in quantities proportionate to the needs of the Partisan Army. Airborne supplies are, however, of vital importance in connection with isolated areas or where hard pressed troops are in need of immediate supply. It seems probable that instances falling within these categories will increase during the winter months.

From personal experience, the observer believes that the efficient dispatch of supplies by air depends to a great extent upon a completely adequate communication system. Those who are within the country and aware of the situation must be able to transmit to the supply base the lists of materials needed together with the exact location and time when they can be received. It is then the duty of the base organization to see that these conditions are met precisely as laid down. If there is any discrepancy whatsoever, those who are working internally must be immediately advised in order that they can make their plans accordingly.

This, then, is the observer's conception of the problem of delivery of supplies to the Partisans: (1) bulk supplies landed by sea transport to the Dalmatian coast, and (2) airborne supplies, necessarily in smaller and more exact quantities, to isolated internal areas, or to hard pressed troops. These are actually two separate operations under very divergent conditions and involving correspondingly different transport methods and equipment, personnel and stores. The first involves stores, ships, and personnel for the movement across the Adriatic of large quantities of supplies of general categories. This operation requires a minimum of personnel and communication within Yugoslavia, but necessitates a maximum of bulk stores in Italy. The

second operation is exactly the reverse. It requires a maximum of personnel and communication within Yugoslavia, and a minimum of carefully chosen stores at the operational base. These operations are of equal importance and at the present time the Partisan Army cannot be adequately supplied without the efficient operation of both.

The actual policy of supply to the Partisans has not actually been a matter of debate for some months. When the first airborne supplies were dropped to the Partisans, that policy was established insofar as they were concerned. Our only problem now is whether we supply them adequately, inadequately, or not at all. Thus, by force of circumstance, we are forced to supply them efficiently, rapidly, and in proportion to their needs.

Cold, hungry and inadequately armed men will surely remember from whence aid came when they were fighting for their very existence. The observer feels certain that one modern, efficiently staffed field hospital will be equal to all the most eloquent words which can be written or spoken in a lifetime.

16. A situation such as exists in Yugoslavia is not easy to assess. It is even more difficult to place these assessments on paper in a coherent manner. The following are a few facts which seem to stand out, no matter from what angle the situation is viewed:

a. The Partisan movement is of far greater magnitude and military importance than is commonly known in the world outside.

b. The Partisans are fashioning themselves a way of life which will surely have a great effect upon the Balkans and probably upon all Europe. It can be a meeting place between divergent political beliefs.

c. The Communist Party has played a leading role in the organization of the movement, but has not been able to indoctrinate it along strictly Party lines.

d. The average Partisan is very sympathetic to the USA and the Allied cause. He is steadfast in his belief that we will come to his aid.

e. The Partisans have steadfastly fought the common enemy from the beginning while other factions within Yugoslavia have not.

f. The Partisan forces have control of a militarily strategic area and travel almost at will in a much larger area.

g. Air support should be offered to the Partisans in an effort to eliminate dangerous enemy strongpoints.

h. By dropping supplies from the air to the Partisan forces for some months, we have committed ourselves to the policy of aiding them. We must, therefore, send them the supplies they need, efficiently and promptly, in order that they may continue their fight against the enemy with increasing intensity, and so that they will feel sympathetically inclined toward us.

i. The supply problem consists of two distinct operations: (1) the transport by sea of bulk supplies across the Adriatic from Italy to the Dalmatian Coast, and (2) the delivery of selected supplies by air to isolated positions in the interior.

j. Speed, efficiency, and complete cooperation between all Allied services is essential.

17. The writer served in Yugoslavia in the dual capacity of an American observer and as a member of the staff of the Allied Military Mission headed by Brigadier Maclean. He wishes to thank the other members of the Mission, all British but one, for their comradeship and complete courtesy and consideration. Yugoslavia is obviously a country where it would be most difficult to conduct efficient operations without complete British and American cooperation toward a common end.

18. The issues in Yugoslavia are confusing and the feeling is so intense that it is almost impossible to obtain and get an unbiased opinion. The conclusions set forth in this report are based solely upon the writer's personal observations and such other information as he believed to be authentic.

There are other reports which must be taken into consideration, notably those from our Mission to the GHQ of Mihailovitch. There are also the reports of other members of the Allied Mission, some of whom have been in Yugoslavia much longer than the writer.

19. Personalities are of no importance in a matter of this kind. Our sole object must be to correctly assess the potentialities of the Partisan movement. The observer sincerely believes that the most serious mistake which could be made would be to underestimate it.

LINN M. FARISH
Major, AUS.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Supervising Agent, United States Secret Service (Reilly) to the
White House*

[TEHRAN,] 27 November 1943.

Mike Reilly to Chief Wilson and Agent Lowery

The President arrived Teheran to-day. He is well and we feel confident we have done everything possible to insure his protection. Stalin and Churchill are here also and we are working in close cooperation with their security officers. We are at the American Embassy [*Legation*]. Plans for the return are most indefinite, however we will return to Cairo when this conference is over. I am making every effort to have the party return via Khartoum, Kano and then Dakar where we would meet Capt. McCrea. We will probably arrive in the United States about December 12th.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 27, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull

As you know, the British have named Strang and the Russians Gusev as their principal representatives on the tripartite European Advisory Commission agreed upon at the Moscow Conference. While we of course have no intention of playing up the importance of this body, it would seem advisable to have a representative fully capable of taking care of our interests and feel that it will be a full-time job. I therefore venture to suggest the following names of possible American representative for your consideration: Joseph Grew, Jefferson Caffery, and Herschel Johnson. I have some doubts, however, whether Caffery can be spared from Rio at this time. May I have your instructions?

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels.

Bohlen Collection

Foreign Commissar Molotov to President Roosevelt

TRANSLATION¹ OF COMMUNICATION NOVEMBER 28, 1943, FROM
MR. MOLOTOV AT TEHERAN

Marshal Stalin has acquainted himself with the communiqué concerning the conference of President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, which took place in North Africa in the second half of November this year.²

Marshal Stalin expresses his thanks for the information and states that he has no observation at all to make in regard to the communiqué.³

¹ The translation was made by Bohlen. The Russian text has not been found.

² For the text of the Cairo communiqué, see *ante*, p. 448.

³ For Stalin's oral comments on the communiqué, see *ante* p. 566.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Director of War Mobilization (Byrnes)*¹

[TEHRAN,] November 28, 1943.

Extensive studies of various problems required before decision can be reached.² In meantime you should proceed as before the question of increase in landing craft was raised.

¹ Sent to Washington via military channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Byrnes.

² See Byrnes' telegrams of November 24 and 27, 1943, pp. 395 and 444, respectively.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Director of War Mobilization (Byrnes)*¹

[TEHRAN,] 28 November 1943.

The increase in critical types of Landing Craft proposed in your message (White 37) of 25 November,² coupled with unstated effect on other critical programs, does not become effective soon enough to justify change in present construction programs.³

¹ Sent to Washington via military channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Byrnes.

² Telegram of November 24, 1943, *ante*, p. 395.

³ Despite the negative tenor of this message, Byrnes' exchange of telegrams with Roosevelt resulted in the adoption in Washington of the program described by Byrnes in his telegram of November 24, 1943. See George E. Mowry, *Landing Craft and the War Production Board* (Special Study No. 11 in the series *Historical Reports on War Administration: War Production Board*; published at Washington by the Civilian Production Administration, 1946), p. 31; Civilian Production Administration, *Industrial Mobilization for War: History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, 1940-1945* (General Study No. 1 in the series *Historical Reports on War Administration: War Production Board*; published at Washington by the Government Printing Office, 1947), vol. I, p. 608; James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 20.

Bohlen Collection

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET

PROPOSALS PRESENTED BY UNITED STATES DELEGATION AT MOSCOW
CONFERENCE

During the recent Moscow Conference the United States Delegation proposed that air bases be made available in the U. S. S. R. on which

¹ For references to this document in the Conference discussions, see *ante*, pp. 529, 596.

United States aircraft could be refueled, emergency repaired and rearmed in connection with shuttle bombing from the United Kingdom. It was also proposed that a more effective mutual interchange of weather information be implemented and that both signal and air communication between our two countries be improved.²

It was my understanding that the U. S. S. R. agreed to these proposals in principal [*principle*] and that appropriate Soviet authorities would be given instructions to meet with my Military Mission for the purpose of considering concrete measures which would be necessary to carry out the proposals.

I hope that it will be possible to work out these arrangements promptly.

[TEHRAN,] November 29, 1943.

² See *ante*, p. 136.

Bohlen Collection

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET

ADVANCE PLANNING FOR AIR OPERATIONS IN NORTHWESTERN PACIFIC

With a view of shortening the war, it is our opinion that the bombing of Japan from your Maritime Provinces, immediately following the beginning of hostilities between the U. S. S. R. and Japan, will be of the utmost importance, as it will enable us to destroy Japanese military and industrial centers.

If agreeable, would you arrange for my Military Mission in Moscow to be given the necessary information covering airports, housing, supplies, communications, and weather in the Maritime Provinces and the route thereto from Alaska. Our objective is to base the maximum bomber force possible, anywhere from 100 to 1,000 four-engined bombers, with their maintenance and operating crews in that area; the number to depend upon facilities available.

It is of the utmost importance that planning to this end should be started at once. I realize that the physical surveys by our people should be limited at this time to a very few individuals and accomplished with the utmost secrecy. We would of course meet any conditions you might prescribe in this regard.

If the above arrangements are worked out now, I am convinced that

¹ For references to this document in the Conference discussions, see *ante*, pp. 529, 596.

the time of employment of our bombers against Japan will be materially advanced.

[TEHRAN,] November 29, 1943.

Bohlen Collection

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET

ADVANCE PLANNING FOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN NORTHWESTERN PACIFIC

I would like to arrange with you at this time for the exchange of information and for such preliminary planning as may be appropriate under the present conditions for eventual operations against Japan when Germany has been eliminated from the war. The more of this preliminary planning that can be done, without undue jeopardy to the situation, the sooner the war as a whole can be brought to a conclusion.

Specifically, I have in mind the following items:

a. We would be glad to receive combat intelligence information concerning Japan.

b. Considering that the ports for your Far Eastern submarine and destroyer force might be threatened seriously by land or air attack, do you feel it desirable that the United States should expand base facilities sufficiently to provide for these forces in U. S. bases?

c. What direct or indirect assistance would you be able to give in the event of a U. S. attack against the northern Kuriles?

d. Could you indicate what ports, if any, our forces could use, and could you furnish data on these ports in regard to their naval use as well as port capacities for dispatch of cargo?

These questions can be discussed as you may find appropriate with our Military Mission in Moscow, similar to the procedure suggested for plans regarding air operations.

[TEHRAN,] November 29, 1943.

¹ For references to this document in the Conference discussions, see *ante*, pp. 529, 596.

Tehran Legation Files

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the President's Special Representative (Hurley)

SECRET

TEHRAN, November 29, 1943.

MY DEAR GENERAL HURLEY: This morning the Prime Minister, M. Soheily, told me he had seen Mr. Eden today and had taken up with

him the possibility of the issuance, at the end of the conference, of a joint communiqué along the following lines:

(1) The Allies recognize that Iran has given them every possible help, etc.

(2) The independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran is confirmed, as already set forth in the Tripartite Treaty.

(3) The economic needs of Iran will be considered when the peace treaty is negotiated, etc.

According to M. Soheily, Mr. Eden agreed to this in principle but requested that the Prime Minister approach me and the Soviets to get our agreement to go ahead.

Sincerely yours,

LOUIS G. DREYFUS, JR.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 29, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull:

The Embassy at Chungking reports that, according to a Chinese source who recently saw high Japanese and puppet officials at Nanking, Japan continues to make unsuccessful peace offers to Chungking. According to the same source, Matsuoka, former Foreign Minister, left Japan for the Soviet Union on October 7 to try to arrange peace between Germany and the Soviet Union.

The Consul at Kweilin reports that Changteh, Hunan Province, was reportedly in flames; and that it was believed by observers in Kweilin that Changsha would soon be attacked by the Japanese with little possibility that the defense would be other than perfunctory.

Salazar spoke to the National Assembly on November 26, concerning the Anglo-Portuguese Azores agreement² and the Timor situation. He emphasized the importance of British and American assurances respecting Portuguese sovereignty, and in Portuguese press accounts American participation in these assurances was stressed by italics and subtitles.

Dr. Salazar pointed out that facilities granted the British had resulted from loyalty to an old alliance and were not to be regarded as a business deal.

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels.

² Agreement of August 17, 1943, on British use of facilities in the Azores; *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1946 (vol. 146), p. 447.

Dr. Salazar said relations with Japan were entirely unsatisfactory, and contrasted this with the cordiality of Portuguese relations with the Anglo-Saxon powers.

In the course of the speech Dr. Salazar showed some preoccupation for Portuguese relations with Spain.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

[WASHINGTON,] 29 November 1943.

For the President from the Secretary of State.

There is a danger that unless we move ahead in our study of post-war international civil aviation problems, we may find that the present fluid situation will become jelled in the minds of some of our Allies along lines that may not parallel your own thoughts. I feel therefore that it is urgent and important for us to move ahead in preparing the groundwork which is an essential preliminary to any discussions with other countries. As a practical and feasible way to proceed what would you think of a Committee consisting of Secretary Stimson, Knox and myself meeting to consider the complicated problems involved. Further that we three be authorized to select an able and disinterested man such as Owen D. Young or someone else of equal stature that you may suggest, to give his thought to this question and to draw up a report and recommendations to submit for your consideration.

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels. A copy of this message in the Hull Papers is labeled "Secret".

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of State*¹

[TEHRAN,] 29 November 1943.

Deliver to Secretary Hull from the President. Your message transmitted as White 55,² I think it more advisable to appoint Winant as our representative.³

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels.

² Telegram printed *ante*, p. 616.

³ On November 2, 1943, Winant at London had cabled Roosevelt at Washington that he "would like to have a chance to serve on the European Advisory Commission". (Roosevelt Papers)

Hopkins Papers

*Sketch by Roosevelt To Illustrate His Concept of the United Nations Organization*¹

40 U.N. Executive Com[mittee] 4 Police Tehran

120 - North Africa - Food

By FDR

at Tehran

Nov - 30, 1943

¹ The words in the upper right corner "T[ehran]-misc[ellaneous]" were added subsequently as a file indicator. The writing enclosed in the circles reads: "40 U. N.", "Exec[utive] Com[mittee]", and "4 Police[men]". The words below the left-hand circle are "I[n]ternational L[abor] O[rganization]-Health Agric[ulture]-Food".

Roosevelt Papers

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

SECRET

[TEHRAN,] 30 November 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

From: The United States Chiefs of Staff.

Subject: Allocation of Italian Ships to the U. S. S. R.

The question of the allocation of Italian ships to the U. S. S. R., as requested at the Moscow Conference,¹ may be brought up during the EUREKA proceedings.

The original Russian request was for 1 battleship, 1 cruiser, 8 destroyers, 4 submarines and 40,000 displacement tons of merchant shipping. This request is the subject of the exchange of a number of dispatches between our delegation in Moscow and the President.² During

¹ See Hull's telegram 1704 of October 23, 1943, 2 p. m., *ante*, p. 112.

² See *ante*, pp. 120, 126-129.

these exchanges the allocation, or possible allocation, of one-third of the Italian Fleet for the use of the U. S. S. R. was concurred in by the United States. However, it is understood that the U. S. S. R. would not be prepared at this time to man and employ one-third of the Italian Fleet.

If the allocation of Italian ships to the U. S. S. R. is brought up at this time, the action agreed upon should be solely with regard to its influence on the prosecution of the war. The following factors are to be considered:

a. The turning over of Italian ships to the Russians at this time would have a serious adverse effect on the prosecution of the war in Italy and in such other places as Italian forces are now cooperating. It seems quite possible that the Italian crews, before surrendering the ships to the Russians would scuttle. Italy has been accepted as a co-belligerent. The surrender of Italian ships would provide valuable propaganda for use by the enemy with the Italians in Germany, occupied Italy, even elsewhere.

b. Italian ships would not come provided with spare parts and ammunition. Further, they would probably require some modernization, especially as regards antiaircraft armament, which the U. S. S. R. has no means of effecting.

It is recommended that it continue to be agreed in principle that one-third of the Italian warships that are allocated for transfer to powers other than Italy be allocated for the use of the U. S. S. R. It is further recommended that any question of the allocation of Italian naval ships to other powers be deferred, at least until after the conclusion of Allied offensive operations in Italy.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY³

Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Chief of Staff to the

Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

³ The source text is unsigned, the name being typewritten below the signature space. Attached to the source text is a memorandum of November 30, 1943, from Royal to Leahy, stating that this paper had been "prepared at the instance of Mr. Hopkins, to be available if needed", and had been cleared by Marshall, King, and Arnold.

Draft Declaration on Iran

[EDITORIAL NOTE.—A rough draft of a declaration on Iran was prepared by Jernegan on November 29. At Hurley's request this draft was shortened considerably and was altered in a number of respects, one of which involved the insertion of a reference to the Atlantic Charter. The draft presented here is the draft as shortened and

amended in accordance with Hurley's suggestions. For the preparation and negotiation of this document, see the statement by Jernegan, *post*, p. 648, and the one by Dreyfus, *post*, p. 840. See also Lohbeck, pp. 215-216. The Hurley Papers also contain a draft with additional amendments. This draft as amended is the same as the final text, except that in the second paragraph it reads "primarily" where the final text reads "particularly", in the fourth paragraph it reads "on an equal basis with" instead of "along with", and in the final paragraph it reads "complete independence" instead of "independence".]

[TEHRAN,] November 30, 1943.

SUGGESTED DRAFT DECLARATION

The Governments of Iran, the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom, having consulted together, desire to make plain their common policy with regard to the prosecution of the war and their complete agreement with respect to the special economic questions with which the war has confronted Iran.

By subscribing to the Declaration by United Nations,¹ all four governments have already declared their joint determination to press the war to a victorious conclusion. They are further agreed that Iran can make its most useful contribution to this end by facilitating the movement of essential supplies from overseas to the U. S. S. R. and they recognize the assistance along this line which Iran has already rendered. All four governments intend to continue and intensify the cooperation in this respect which has been established. It is clearly understood that any armed forces of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom which are, or may be, established on Iranian territory are solely for the purpose of furthering the common war effort and will be withdrawn as soon as the needs of that effort permit, in accordance with the published agreements already concluded between Iran and the other three Governments.²

The four Governments are in agreement that the maximum benefit from their combined efforts can be obtained only if the essential economic needs of Iran are met, and they reaffirm their intention to cooperate closely to achieve this objective. The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such financial and material

¹ For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. i, p. 25, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1600.

² The Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Alliance, signed January 29, 1942, is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. vi, March 21, 1942, p. 249. Correspondence on negotiations for a treaty between the United States and Iran, which would govern the stationing of American troops in Iran during the war, is scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption. The four Governments will work together in planning the importation of essential goods into Iran, and, in general, they will act in close consultation with regard to all economic matters which may affect the war effort in Iran.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the conclusion of hostilities should receive full consideration, on an equal basis with those of other members of the United Nations, by any conferences or international agencies which may be set up to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are as one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the complete independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, along with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter,³ to which all four Governments have subscribed.

³ For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1603.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

[WASHINGTON,] November 30, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull

Winant would certainly be a fine choice. Our representative on the Commission will have a full time job and much detailed drafting and discussion will be essential. I don't see, therefore, how one man can combine the exacting duties of American Ambassador to Great Britain with those of our representative on the Commission if these two important jobs are to be effectively done. Have you any further com-

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels.

ment or suggestions in the light of the foregoing, in other words do you still desire him to hold both positions? ²

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

² For Roosevelt's reply, see *post*, p. 784.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President ¹

[WASHINGTON,] 30 November 1943.

From the Secretary of State for the President

Following the sinking by a German submarine of a small Colombian Vessel in the Caribbean (The second such sinking) the Colombian Government with the approval of the Senate proclaimed a state of belligerency with Germany. This will involve the adherence of Colombia to the United Nations declaration.

President Lopez of Colombia is in the United States on leave of absence. The reason for his trip is his wife's need for medical attention. However, the President's political position, while improved, has not entirely recovered from the recent political crisis. It is generally believed that he will return to Colombia to resume his office within a few weeks.

Senator Butler's article in *Readers Digest* and his address and reports to the Senate on his trip to the other American Republics ² have caused a sensation. However, his charges which are as sweeping as they are unfounded have been vigorously challenged by the Vice President and by Nelson Rockefeller. The general effect in the other American Republics cannot be minimized although the majority of those commenting have shown a good understanding of the situation here. Senator Butler's elaborate report will when available be analyzed in detail by the different agencies concerned. ³

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels. A copy of this message in the Hull Papers is labeled "Secret".

² Hugh A. Butler, "Our Deep, Dark Secrets in Latin America", *Reader's Digest*, vol. 43, December 1943, p. 21; address before the Senate, November 26, 1943, *Congressional Record*, vol. 89, pt. 8, pp. 10002-10006; country-by-country report and other material printed as Senate Document No. 132, 78th Congress, 1st session (1943). Butler was critical of United States aid programs in Latin America.

³ For statements on the subject released by the Department of State in December 1943, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, December 18, 1943, pp. 430-431, and December 25, 1943, pp. 443-447.

Tehran Legation Files

*The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Legation in Iran*¹

[TEHRAN, December 1, 1943.]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On this occasion when with the help of God Almighty this happiness and honor have come to this ancient land of Iran, our dear homeland, which is the place of conference of the august leaders of the three big allies of Iran, when one of the important events of history in this era happens in Iran for the solution of international difficulties and the establishment of permanent peace and tranquility and insurance of the future life² of all of the nations of the world on the foundation of justice and equality which are the ideals of the United Nations, and on which the Atlantic Charter is based, it is a most suitable opportunity to bring to your knowledge the longings of the Iranian people.

The present condition of Iran, which has come to exist as a result of the efforts, pains and sacrifices of all the classes of this country for several years and which has been fully utilized by the allies³ for the promotion of the designs and speeding up of victory, necessitates that the Iranian Government and people should be certain that the allies will not refrain from lending Iran any kind of assistance at the present and in the future.

In view of the hearty desires and prominent and effective steps that Iran has taken in helping the allies Iran has shown in practice her desire that the war should come to an end as soon as possible with the victory of the allies.

Iran which by showing cordial and sincere cooperation in conformity with the tri-partite pact⁴ and by full collaboration with the allies shares⁵ in this victory and triumph, is positively certain that

¹ This *aide-mémoire* was sent to Eden and Molotov, as well as to Dreyfus. See Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Tehran Conference*, p. 28, where a somewhat different English version of the *aide-mémoire* (referred to hereafter as the "published version") appears. The American Legation received a Persian-language text of the *aide-mémoire* and possibly also an accompanying English version. It is not clear from the Legation files whether the English version here reproduced is a translation made by the Legation or an English text received with the Persian text. Substantive differences between the English version reproduced here and the published version are indicated in footnotes.

² The phrase in the published version corresponding to "insurance of the future life" is "future security".

³ The phrase in the published version corresponding to "which has been fully utilized by the allies" is "which has been a great source of help to the Allies".

⁴ Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and Iran, signed January 29, 1942; Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. vi, March 21, 1942, p. 249.

⁵ The phrase in the published version corresponding to the word "shares" is "considers herself entitled to a share".

the allies would take into full consideration all the troubles and damages which have been inflicted on Iran through conditions of war.

In view of the tests of cordial cooperation and sincere collaboration shown during this period by the Iranian people and Government in all fields and stages, and in view of her efforts to insure allied victory and to eradicate cruelty and oppression from the world to an extent which has been above Iran's ability and power, supporting as she did innumerable economic difficulties, and consequently by declaring war against Germany having won the full confidence of the allies, Iran expects that the allies would make a special effort in turning over the vital threads of the affairs of the country which are at present in their hands and in leaving to the military and security⁶ forces of Iran herself the maintenance of security in the country and safeguarding all the means of this work in order that existing trust and confidence may assume a practical shape.

The Iranian Government and people confidently hope that the written promises and oral assurances given by the Allies in regard to the integrity and full independence of Iran will be strengthened through moral and material help in all political and economic realms and that Iran may be able in this way to continue to play in the future the honorable role which she had in the past among the civilized countries of the world.

The Iranian Government and people, in consideration of this demonstration of sincerity and unity, give the assurance that in the same way that in the most difficult times of war they did not refrain from lending cordial cooperation and showing sincere friendship for a speedy Allied Victory, hereafter, too, they will continue this traditional policy in respective international questions and will fully cooperate with their Allies.

Now that the august leaders of the three big powers are staying in Iran, the Iranian Government and people expect that a communiqué⁷ will be issued substantiating the foregoing and, in this way, specifying once more the good will that they have repeatedly shown toward Iran orally and in writing.

TEHRAN, Azar 9, 1322 (December 1, 1943).

⁶ The word in the published version corresponding to "security" is "civil".

⁷ The word in the published version corresponding to "communiqué" is "declaration".

Hopkins Papers

*The Administrator General of Finances of Iran (Millspaugh) to
President Roosevelt*¹

[TEHRAN,] December 1, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In our conversation today,² you were good enough to give me permission to write you a personal note about the American effort in Iran.

Iran has on three occasions obtained American administrative assistance:

1. The Shuster Financial Mission in 1911, dismissed the same year following a Russian ultimatum.³

2. The first Millspaugh Financial Mission, 1922-27,⁴ with other missions for agriculture, highways and railway construction.

3. The second Millspaugh Financial Mission, 1943— with other missions in the Ministries of War, Interior (*Gendarmerie* and Police), Agriculture, and Health.

Each of these Missions came at or following a time of political, economic and financial disturbance and danger. Each had, from the Iranian point of view, two main purposes:

1. A political purpose—to hold the balance between British and Russian imperialisms and thus safeguard the independence of the country.

2. A financial and economic purpose—to help Iran to put its own house in order, to conserve its financial and economic resources, and in this way to prevent Britain and Russia from having an excuse to take over the country.

In general, the Americans in Iran are employees of the Iranian Government, with a period of service that will terminate in about four years. But we feel that we are here and that we can and do appropriately act, not only as administrative employees of the Iranian Government, but also as the practical instruments for implementing your international policies.

Iranians welcome American assistance because they know that Americans are neutral, non-imperialistic, honest, and sincere. But I am convinced that, if Americans are to work effectively over a period of years in this country and really implement your policies, the independence of the country must be safeguarded by an understanding among the three powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.

¹ Sent by Millspaugh to Hopkins, with a covering letter of December 1, 1943, for presentation to Roosevelt (Hopkins Papers). Covering letter not printed herein.

² See *ante*, p. 469.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1911, pp. 679 ff.

⁴ See *ibid.*, 1921, vol. II, pp. 633 ff., and 1927, vol. III, pp. 523 ff.

Because of fifteen years of dictatorship, because of the War, and because of the Allied occupation, Iran and the Iranians are at present in a condition of inconceivable disorganization, demoralization and corruption. If American assistance is withdrawn at the end of four years, our effort will be largely wasted. To do a permanent job, fifteen or twenty years will be required.

As I see it, therefore, the suggested understanding should provide:

1. For exclusively American administrative and technical assistance to Iran over a period of fifteen or twenty years;
2. For the divorcement of this American effort from American commercial interests;
3. For the harmonizing of this effort with the political independence of Iran, with Iranian self-government through constitutional democratic forms and procedures, and with some form of protection against the reestablishment of dictatorship; and,
4. For assurances to be given Great Britain and the Soviet Union that Americans in Iran are to be neutral as between these two powers and friendly to both.

The Iranians look to you, Mr. President, to guarantee them freedom from fear. With American administrators to help the Iranians to help themselves, the Iranians can, should and will do the rest. Iran seems to me to be a clinic—a testing ground—for the practical execution of your international policies. Finally, the doing of the job here need not cost the American taxpayers a cent, and need not require any armed intervention.

Permit me to thank you, Mr. President, for seeing me in the midst of your immense responsibilities and let me convey to you on behalf of my Mission our best wishes for your health and continued high accomplishment.

Respectfully yours,

A. C. MILLSPAUGH

Roosevelt Papers

President Roosevelt to the Shah of Iran

TEHRAN, December 1, 1943.

YOUR MAJESTY, I was very much pleased to see you yesterday when you welcomed me to your country in the name of the Iranian people.¹ Your gesture is one that emphasizes again the more than friendly feeling that has always existed between our two nations. I was delighted to have had this chance to make Your Majesty's acquaintance.

I have received the magnificent carpet, the gracious gift of Your Majesty.² This carpet will serve to remind both myself and the

¹ See *ante*, p. 564.

² See *ante*, p. 468.

American people of the generous hospitality of the Iranian nation. I am truly grateful.

Your Majesty's invitation to be a guest at your palace³ as well as your offer to meet me at the airport upon my arrival and to provide a guard of honor have been conveyed to me and I am most appreciative. Much to my regret, the circumstances of my visit, as you are no doubt aware, have made it impossible for me to avail myself of these kind offers, much as I would have liked to have done so.

I cannot emphasize too strongly how much I have been touched by all of these truly friendly gestures on the part of Your Majesty. I shall leave Iran with regret at not having had an opportunity to extend my acquaintance with you and to have seen more of your country and your people. The American people have for many years been cognizant of the friendly sentiments of the Iranian people, and the hospitality shown by Your Majesty in their name will serve to keep this realization alive for many years to come.

Iran has always occupied a warm spot in American hearts, more than ever now that we are brothers in arms. We know the part Iran is playing in the common struggle and our hope is that when peace at last comes, the spirit of working together that now exists between our two peoples will continue unchecked in peaceful labors.

I take this opportunity to thank Your Majesty again for all the gestures of friendliness and hospitality you have shown me and to wish Your Majesty the greatest happiness both for yourself and for the people of your ancient land.

With my sincere regards, I am,

Faithfully yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

I greatly hope that we shall have the pleasure of a visit from you to Washington.⁴

³ See *ante*, p. 461, footnote 3.

⁴ On signing the letter as submitted to him by Dreyfus, Roosevelt penned this additional sentence below his signature and near the left margin.

Roosevelt Papers

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

TEHRAN, 1 December 1943.

MY DEAR FRANKLIN, I was indeed touched by your kind present.¹ It is a beautiful bowl, and I shall always treasure it as a reminder

¹ See *ante*, p. 469. According to Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Tehran Conference*, p. 176, Roosevelt had sent the following signed message to accompany the bowl: "my affection, may we be together for many years".

of our sunlit days in Tehran and of the most memorable of my Birthdays.

I cannot thank you enough for all your friendship and support in the years in which we have worked together, and I am glad of this occasion to send you a message of sincere affection and gratitude.

Yours always,

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) ¹

SECRET

CAIRO, December 1, 1943.

URGENT

For immediate delivery to Harry Hopkins visiting party from Kirk. I have received an urgent but garbled message from Steinhardt at Ankara from which I gather that he wishes me to inform you that neither he nor the British Ambassador at Ankara ² has received any message from your party and that he believes that communications from Tehran may be temporarily suspended.

¹ Sent via Army channels.

² Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen.

740.0011 European War 1939/32357 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State ¹

ANKARA, December 1, 1943—1 p. m.

1958. The following telegram has been sent to Cairo, ² repeated for the Department's information :

Most Immediate December 1, 1 p. m. Most secret for the President.

In a conversation with the Foreign Minister ³ this morning he referred to your presence in Cairo and again expressed the hope that a meeting could be arranged between Inonu and yourself. ⁴ He intimated

¹ For earlier correspondence relating to arrangements for the Second Cairo Conference, see *ante*, pp. 43, 386.

² Not found in the Roosevelt Papers.

³ Numan Menemencioglu.

⁴ For the previous expression of hope for such a meeting, see Steinhardt's telegram 1869 of November 14, 1943, 5 p. m., *ante*, p. 86.

that given sufficient notice Inonu could meet you in Aleppo, just across the Turkish frontier.

For your information Aleppo is about 26 hours by special train from Ankara and would seem satisfactory from a security point of view.

Please instruct the Security Officers to transmit any reply you may send me as quickly as possible.

STEINHARDT

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt)*¹

SECRET

[TEHRAN,] December 1, 1943.

Please pass following message immediately to President Inonu from President Roosevelt:

"Prime Minister Churchill and I, having had our meeting with Marshal Stalin, will be in Cairo next Saturday and Sunday,² accompanied by a representative of the Soviet Government. We should greatly value a meeting with Your Excellency and hope it might be possible for you to join us in Cairo."

You should if possible hand this message in person to the President, and you must of course impress upon him its extreme secrecy.

Your American [*British*]³ and Soviet colleagues are being instructed to convey similar messages to President and you should concert with them simultaneous presentation.

You are authorized to tell President Inonu that we have no objection to his consulting his Parliament in secret session regarding his leaving his country if he finds it necessary to do so.

It would be useful if you could accompany the President.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to Washington via military channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to the Department of State; and forwarded further by the Department to Steinhardt, in paraphrase, as telegram 924, December 1, 1943, 2 p. m. (740.0011 EW 1939/32358a). Regarding the preparation of the message to Steinhardt, see *ante*, pp. 586, 593.

² December 4 and 5, 1943.

³ This inadvertent reference to Steinhardt's "American and Soviet colleagues", instead of his "British and Soviet colleagues", may have resulted from a confusion of *mutatis mutandis* instructions to the typist in connection with the sending of a message on this subject by Churchill to the British Ambassador at Ankara (Knatchbull-Hugessen), which is mentioned in Churchill, p. 415. The error was corrected in the paraphrase sent by the Department to Steinhardt.

Hopkins Papers

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President,
and the President's Reply*¹

[TEHRAN, December 1, 1943.]

MR. PRESIDENT: What do you think of letting the Russians give dinner tonight—your last chance at Russian food

HARRY

OK but I have to leave *early* as we sleep at the camp.

FDR

¹ According to Sherwood, p. 796, these messages were exchanged near the end of the tripartite luncheon meeting of December 1, 1943 (*ante*, p. 585). For a facsimile reproduction of the messages, which were handwritten, see Sherwood, p. 797.

Hopkins Papers

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President*¹

[TEHRAN, December 1, 1943.]

MR. PRESIDENT: *It is 8.10.*

Do you wish at dinner to introduce the method of our occupation of Germany after her collapse.

HARRY

¹ This message, which is handwritten, was presumably passed by Hopkins to Roosevelt near the end of the tripartite political meeting, December 1, 1943, *ante*, p. 596.

Roosevelt Papers

Communiqué: First Draft

[EDITORIAL NOTE.—This draft was apparently an American paper. No evidence has been found of its being considered outside the American Delegation. The purport of the statements that appear in the third paragraph, however, was discussed at the Plenary Meeting on November 30, 1943. See *ante*, p. 581, and Churchill, p. 384.

The draft contains handwritten changes or corrections which, according to an attached note of December 2, 1943, were made by Roosevelt and Hopkins. The changes or corrections are indicated here as follows: words which were crossed out are printed in canceled type; words which were substituted for the crossed-out words, or added, are printed in italics; and other handwritten notations are described in footnotes.

Of the principal changes, the following are in Roosevelt's handwriting: the substitution of "determination", the addition of "greater

part of the", the substitution of "war", and the substitution of "fact". The handwriting of the addition, at the end, of the names of the Heads of Government, and perhaps of the other changes (e. g., the correction of "he" to "we"), is Hopkins'.]

DRAFT

WE—The President of the United States, The Prime Minister of Great Britain, and The Premier of Soviet Russia, Marshal of the Red Army, have met these four days past, in this city of Teheran, and have bent our united efforts toward solutions of our military and political problems.

We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

As to war—our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the final destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations which will be undertaken from the East, West and South, and arrangements were made to ensure intimate and continuous cooperation.

As to peace—the road is still bloody and hard and long. But the common understanding which ~~he~~ *we* have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to post war plans—our mutual understanding¹ gives us courage to hope for an enduring peace. We recognize fully our great responsibilities to help in the ~~writing~~ *determination* of a peace which will meet approval of the *greater part of the* peoples of the world, and ensure a lasting surcease from war.

With our diplomatic advisors we have surveyed the problems of the future,² and we now reiterate our aim to strengthen democratic principles in the world. We shall seek the cooperation and the active participation of all nations, large and small, whose people in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of democratic nations.

We say to the German people:³

"We do not seek to enslave you. We do mean to destroy not only your military forces, but also the false leaders who have led a generation of Germans into bitter excesses against common decencies,

¹ A handwritten question mark was inserted over the word "understanding".

² The remainder of the sentence was bracketed in pencil, as an indication of its suggested deletion.

³ This line and the first of the two quoted paragraphs which follow were bracketed in pencil, as an indication of their suggested deletion.

culminating with your being plunged, by this same leadership, into a useless war which has ~~cost~~ *caused* millions of your sons to die, and may sacrifice millions more.”⁴

“No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their submarines by sea, and their ~~industrial~~ *war* plants from the air. Our attack will be relentless.”⁵

Emerging from these conferences we look with confidence toward the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in ~~actuality~~ *fact*, in spirit as well as in purpose.

And we shall meet again as the war—and the peace—progresses!

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Winston Churchill

Joseph Stalin

⁴ The quotation mark at the end of this paragraph was crossed out, apparently before the bracketed suggestion of deletion was made.

⁵ The quotation marks at the beginning and end of this paragraph were crossed out.

Roosevelt Papers

Communiqué: Second Draft

[EDITORIAL NOTE.—As in the case of the first draft, this was apparently an American paper. No evidence has been found of its being considered outside the American Delegation.

The handwritten changes or corrections (indicated typographically as in the first draft, printed *supra*) appear to be wholly or in part in Roosevelt's handwriting; possibly some are Hopkins'. Some of the changes made on this draft were not incorporated in the typewritten text of the third draft (printed *infra*). From this, it may be surmised that such changes were written in on this draft—possibly by Hopkins—at the same time they were written in on the third draft by Roosevelt.]

SECOND DRAFT¹

WE²—The President of the United States, The Prime Minister of Great Britain, and The Premier of Soviet Russia, Marshal of the Red Army, have met these four days past, in this city of Teheran, ~~and have~~

¹ In the upper left-hand corner of this draft appears the handwritten date “12/2/43”, presumably associated with the procedural note of December 2, 1943, referred to in the editorial note to the first draft, *supra*.

² This word was underlined by hand.

~~best~~ ^{our} ³ ~~united~~ efforts toward solutions of our ⁴ military and political problems.⁵

We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

As to war—our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the ~~final~~ destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations ~~which will to be undertaken from the East, West and South, and arrangements were made to ensure intimate and continuous cooperation.~~

~~The road is still bloody and hard and long. But t~~The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to peace—our ⁶ ~~mutual belief~~ ⁷ *we are confident that it will* our concord ~~gives us courage to hope that we may will~~ make it endure. We recognize fully ~~our great the supreme~~ responsibilities ~~resting upon us & all the United Nations to help in the determination making of~~ make a peace which will meet approval of the greater part command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world, and ⁸ ensure a lasting surcease from war banish the scourge & terror of war for many generations.

With our diplomatic advisors we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the cooperation and the active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of ⁹ democratic nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their submarines *U boats* by sea, and their war plants & armies from the air.

Our attack will be relentless & increasing.

Emerging from these *cordial* conferences we look with confidence toward the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, un-

³ Over the word "our" was written the word "their", which, in turn, was crossed out.

⁴ The word "our" was crossed out, and the word "their" was written above it. The word "their" was then crossed out, and the word "our" was written below the deleted typewritten "our".

⁵ After the word "problems" was written "of the three great allies", and these words were crossed out. In the left-hand margin, apparently as a substitution for the portion of the sentence following the word "Teheran," were written the following words: "& have shaped & ~~formed~~ confirmed our united policy. ~~for the future.~~"

⁶ The word "our" was presumably intended to be crossed out.

⁷ The words "mutual belief" were struck over with typewritten "x's".

⁸ The word "and" was presumably intended to be crossed out.

⁹ After the word "of" appears an undecipherable typewritten word of five letters which was struck over with typewritten "x's".

touched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit ~~as well as~~ *in* purpose.

~~And~~ *And* we shall meet again as the war—and the peace—progresses!

Roosevelt Papers

Communiqué: Third Draft

[EDITORIAL NOTE.—As in the case of the first two drafts, this was apparently an American paper. Presumably this was the draft that was discussed and put in final form at the dinner meeting on December 1, 1943. See *ante*, p. 605, and *post*, p. 842.

The draft contains handwritten changes, additions, and notations which appear to have been made by Roosevelt and Hopkins. They are indicated here as follows: words which were crossed out are printed in canceled type, and words which were substituted for the crossed-out words, or added, or written as procedural notations, are printed in italics.

Three of the handwritten changes or additions—the insertion of the word “Communiqué” (in capital letters) above the typewritten words “Third Draft”; the change from “Soviet Russia” to “the Soviet Union” in the second line of the typewritten text; and the insertion at the end of “Teheran, Iran” and “December 1, 1943”—were apparently made by Hopkins. The other changes, additions, and notations were made by Roosevelt.]

COMMUNIQUE

THIRD DRAFT

WE—The President of the United States, The Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of *the Soviet Russia Union, Marshal of the Red Army*, have met these four days past, in this city of Teheran, *the capital of our ally, Iran*, and have shaped and confirmed our ~~mutual~~ *common* policy.

We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

As to war—our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the ~~final~~ destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations ~~which will~~ *to* be undertaken from

the East, West and South, and ~~arrangements were made to ensure intimate and continuous cooperation.~~

The road is still bloody and hard and long. But ~~the~~ The common understanding which we have reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to peace—we are ~~confident~~ sure that our concord will ~~make~~ ~~it~~ win an enduring peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world, and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.

With our diplomatic advisors we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the cooperation and the active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of democratic nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U-boats by sea, and their war plants ~~and armies~~ from the air.

Our attack will be relentless and increasing.

Emerging from these ~~cordial~~ ^{friendly (in Russian)} ^{cordial (in English)} conferences we look with confidence ~~to toward~~ the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.

~~And we shall meet again as the war and the peace progresses!~~

F. D. R.

S

C

Teheran, Iran

December 1, 1943.

As corrected this becomes the final draft.

B. THE COMMUNIQUÉ AND ITS RELEASE

Roosevelt Papers

The Agreed Text of the Communiqué

[EDITORIAL NOTE.—The copy reproduced here contains the text agreed to by Churchill and Stalin (see Harriman's handwritten note,

printed below). This copy is referred to below as the "agreed text".

Material which was crossed out by hand on this copy—whether before or after it was shown to Churchill and Stalin, is not known—is printed here in canceled type. A handwritten notation by Harri-man, in the lower left corner of the single sheet comprising this copy, is printed here in italics.

A copy of the communiqué in the Bohlen Collection is identical with the agreed text as changed; i. e., the material deleted at the end of this text does not appear in the copy in the Bohlen Collection.

The text as released by the White House in mimeographed form for publication on December 6, 1943 (referred to below as the "release text"), corresponds in some respects to the agreed text and in other respects to the third draft as amended. The release text was based on a cablegram of December 4, 1943, from Hopkins, at Cairo, to Stephen Early, Secretary to the President, at Washington, filed in the Roosevelt Papers.

Differences in phrasing between the agreed text and the release text are indicated in the footnotes below. Differences in capitalization, punctuation, and spelling are not indicated. The insignificant differences between the release text and the text printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. IX, December 11, 1943, p. 409, are also not indicated.]

To be released to the Press,
8:00 p. m. Moscow Time,
December 6, 1943.

DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS

WE—The President of the United States, The Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past in this, the capital of our ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy.

We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

As to war—Our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations which will be undertaken¹ from the East, West and South.

The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

¹ This passage reads, in the release text, "operations to be undertaken".

And as to peace—we are sure that our concord will make it an enduring peace.² We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations, to make a peace which will command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world, and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.

With our diplomatic advisers we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the cooperation and the active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of democratic nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U-boats by sea, and their war plants from the air.

Our attack will be relentless and increasing.

Emerging from these friendly³ conferences we look with confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.

Signed at Teheran, ~~Iran~~, December 1, 1943.⁴

F. D. ROOSEVELT

J. STALIN

W. CHURCHILL⁵

Text agreed to by the P. M. & the Marshall [Marshal] W. A. H.

² This passage reads, in the release text, "our concord will win an enduring peace".

³ The fourth word in the paragraph, in the release text, is "cordial" instead of "friendly".

⁴ The release text gives this line below, rather than above, the names of the Heads of Government.

⁵ The names in the agreed text are typewritten. The three Heads of Government do not appear to have signed any copy of this document, which was intended primarily as a press release. The release text reads as follows, on one line: "Signed: Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin."

last not received in time for editorial comment. Speculative stories during past two days had been largely based on German press and radio campaign to prepare enemy populations for anticipated news of meeting. Senator Connally's speech at Fort Worth was also widely reported.¹

BUCKNELL

¹ In a radio address at Fort Worth, Texas, on December 2, 1943, Connally had said that "another great conference is taking place in the Middle East between President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill" (*New York Times*, December 3, 1943, p. 5, col. 5).

740.0011 EW 1939/32362a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1943—midnight.

(PART RESTRICTED)

1342-1344.² Morning press in the United States headlined stories from London that the Moscow radio had announced in an official Soviet news agency broadcast for provincial Russian papers that:

"A few days ago, in Teheran, a conference took place between the leaders of the three Allied powers, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin. Diplomatic and military representatives took part in the conference.

"At the conference, questions on the conduct of the war against Germany were discussed as well as a number of political questions.

"Corresponding decisions were adopted which will be made public later."

No word having been received in this country of the conclusion of the conference and there being nothing to announce in the United States, the publication in Moscow has created a furor in the press. OWI Director Elmer Davis has requested the Department to ascertain the circumstances of the announcement and particularly whether this was a violation of any release date agreed upon by the conferees. We had all assumed that an arrangement would be made for simultaneous publication in the USSR, Great Britain and the United States but so far have no definite information about such an arrangement. Any information you are able to send us about the Moscow broadcast will assist greatly.

HULL

¹ Harriman did not return to Moscow from Tehran until December 5, 1943. During his absence, however, no officer at the post was designated as Chargé.

² This telegram was sent in three sections.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

The President's Secretary (Early) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) ¹

[WASHINGTON,] 4 December 1943.

For Mr. Hopkins from Mr. Early.

All press and radio here headline today Moscow radio reports received via London that Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin had met in Teheran few days ago and discussed questions related to war against Germany and including political war issues. The reports added that the conferences have been concluded and detailed statement is expected momentarily. This comes from the government controlled Moscow radio and further complicates the situation resulting from the British Reuters premature disclosures concerning Cairo conference.² If mechanically possible and in face of these developments, I urge quickest possible release and publication of Teheran communiqué. Regards.

¹ Presumably sent via military channels.

² See Davis' message of November 30, 1943, to Bracken, *ante*, p. 452.

740.0011 EW 1939/32176 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State ¹

U. S. URGENT

Moscow, December 4, 1943.

2113. The Roosevelt-Stalin-Churchill conference in Tehran is reported in the Moscow newspapers for December 4 in the following Tass dispatch datelined Tehran December 3.

[Here follows, in a slightly different translation, the text quoted in Hull's telegram of December 4, 1943, to Harriman, *ante*, p. 642.]

HARRIMAN

¹ See Hull's telegram 1342-1344, of December 4, 1943, *ante*, p. 642, footnote 1.

Censorship Files : Telegram

The Director of the Office of War Information (Davis) to the Director of the London Bureau of the Office of War Information (Carroll) ¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1943.

RAPID

Please transmit following to Bracken: Now that the Russians have set us both back on our tails perhaps we can get together on some

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.

measures to prevent repetition of these deplorable incidents. I have asked State Department to make inquiries in Moscow as to how this Russian thing happened and whether it broke an agreed release date, on which latter point I am not yet informed. Meanwhile I am meeting with Price and Early and hope we can agree on some ideas for improved arrangements which will be forwarded for your comment. Eventually we may perhaps be able to agree with information agencies of other governments on program which can be made as a united recommendation to our principals. Regarding Connally,² he does not appear to have said anything more than was contained in Reuter[s] Lisbon story³ and other speculations earlier in the week. I share your wish that all rumors and conjectures on such meetings could be silenced but doubt if it could be done by domestic censorship in either country since we cannot control the enemy. All we can hope to do is to refrain from giving his speculations confirmation. Hope that we shall be able to concur in recommendations which will avert these painful episodes in future.⁴ End message to Bracken; remainder for Carroll. Sorry you have had to be in the front line and take the heat in this matter but believe Russian performance will measurably reduce inflammation of Anglo-American relations. Also may have salutary effect of persuading our betters to consult their hired experts on such matters hereafter.

² See *ante*, p. 642.

³ See *ante*, p. 452.

⁴ The recommendation under reference took the form of a letter from Roosevelt to Bracken, *post*, p. 848.

740.0011 EW 1939/32203: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the
Secretary of State*

U. S. URGENT

Moscow, December 6, 1943—7 p. m.

2131. The announcement in Moscow in the newspapers for December 4 of the Conference was a complete surprise to me. There was agreement at the Conference that the two agreed declarations were to be released for publication not before December 6, 8 p. m., Moscow time. Your 1344 December 4, midnight,¹ not urgent, which was received here December 6, 3 p. m. and promptly decoded. Release was to be made simultaneously in London, Moscow and Washington. It was my distinct understanding, and I was present, that it was understood that no mention of the Conference would be made

¹ *Ante*, p. 642.

before that time for security reasons. Since my return last night I have not seen Molotov who, I believe, only arrived back today and I am therefore unable at present to give an explanation of the reason which led the Soviet Government to authorize the announcement. It is not unlikely that the original reference by Reuters in Lisbon to a meeting of The Three and reports that Senator Connally in a broadcast had stated that a meeting was then taking place in the Middle East caused the Soviet Government to make the announcement in question.

I assume you have full information now as to the arrangements for simultaneous publication. I personally gave Major John Boettinger [*Boettiger*], of the President's press staff, authentic copies of the two declarations² in order that he might make the necessary technical arrangements.

I shall take the first suitable opportunity to ascertain from Molotov the reasons which led the Soviet Government to make the announcement.

HARRIMAN

² The communiqué and the Declaration on Iran.

740.0011 EW 1939/32243 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the
Secretary of State*

Moscow, December 8, 1943—9 a. m.

2144. Supplementing my 2131, December 6, 7 p. m.

I had occasion to ask Molotov last night how it had happened that Tass had made a statement regarding the conclusion of the Tehran Conference. He explained that (one) Reuter's [*Reuters*] from Lisbon had predicted the meeting and (two) Senator Connally had announced it was going on. Tass could not ignore these reports and therefore stated the truth to end further rumors which were considered to affect adversely our mutual interests. It is my personal opinion that the British and we have more to explain to the Soviet Government than they have to us. I therefore recommend that we do not pursue the matter further with the Soviets.¹

HARRIMAN

¹ It does not appear that the matter was pursued further in Moscow, but the method of handling releases to the press was altered by decision of Roosevelt; see *post*, p. 848.

C. THE DECLARATION ON IRAN AND ITS RELEASE

L/T Files

The Declaration on Iran

[EDITORIAL NOTE.—As to the preparation and signing of the declaration, see (1) *ante*, pp. 619, 623, and *post*, pp. 648, 838, 840, 885; (2) Leahy, p. 211; (3) Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 192–193; and (4) *Military Situation in the Far East*, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 4, p. 2833. A text described as “cabled from Tehran” is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. IX, December 11, 1943, p. 409; it differs from the signed original in certain details, such as the spelling out of the abbreviated name of the Soviet Union, the addition of “of America” after “United States”, and the omission of the signatures. A Russian-language version, apparently prepared later, is printed in Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Tehran Conference*, p. 68.

The signed original was transmitted to the Department of State by the White House on February 4, 1946, photostat copies having been furnished to the Department previously. White House memorandum of November 18, 1944, to the Secretary of State, 891.00/11–1844; White House memorandum of April 19, 1945, Roosevelt Papers; Leahy’s letter of February 4, 1946, to the Secretary of State, 740.0011 EW 1939/2–446 (none printed).]

To be released to the Press
8:00 p. m. Moscow Time
December 6, 1943

Dec. 1, 1943.¹DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS REGARDING IRAN²

The President of the United States, the Premier of the U. S. S. R., and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran,³ desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

¹ On the signed original, the typewritten date “November 30” is crossed out, and “Dec. 1” is substituted, in a handwriting believed to be Churchill’s. See testimony of Patrick J. Hurley, *Military Situation in the Far East*, part 4, p. 2834. See also Lohbeck, p. 491.

² On the signed original, the typewritten heading is “Suggested Draft Declaration”. The words “Suggested Draft” are crossed out, and the words “of the Three Powers regarding Iran” are added after the word “Declaration”, in a handwriting believed to be Churchill’s.

³ The Shah and the Prime Minister (Ali Soheili) had conferred with the three Heads of Government successively on November 30, 1943. See *ante*, p. 564.

The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences⁴ or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.⁵

The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are at⁶ one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter,⁷ to which all four Governments have subscribed.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

И. СТАЛИН⁸

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

⁴ In the signed original, the word "any", typed between the words "by" and "conferences", is crossed out, presumably by Churchill; see Hurley's testimony, cited on p. 646, footnote 1.

⁵ The following two developments concerning postwar American economic aid to Iran occurred during Roosevelt's stay at Tehran: (1) On December 1, 1943, Roosevelt conferred with Millspaugh and received a letter from him on the subject; see *ante*, pp. 469, 629; (2) On December 2, before leaving Tehran, Roosevelt outlined to Hurley what Hurley described as "a tentative basis for American policy in Iran which might be used as a pattern for our relations with all less favored associate nations"; letter from Hurley to Roosevelt, December 21, 1943 (copies sent to the Department of State by Hurley, December 21, 1943, and by Roosevelt, January 12, 1944), 123 Hurley, Patrick J./126½ and 891.00/3037. The Hurley letter of December 21, which elaborated on the basic idea outlined by Roosevelt, is printed in part in *Military Situation in the Far East*, part 4, p. 2845. For Roosevelt's reply, dated March 25, 1944, see *ibid.*, p. 2846.

⁶ In the signed original, this word is typed as "as", and the "s" is changed to a "t", in a handwriting believed to be Churchill's.

⁷ For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1603.

⁸ I. Stalin.

Tehran Legation Records

The Third Secretary of Embassy in Iran (Jernegan) to Brigadier General Hurley's Aide (Henry)

[TEHRAN,] December 3, 1943.

MAJOR HENRY: So far as my knowledge runs, the following are the main facts in connection with the "Declaration by Three Nations Regarding Iran":

A) Prime Minister Ali Soheily spoke to Mr. Eden and Minister Dreyfus, separately, on the morning of November 29 and requested that the conference issue a joint communiqué regarding Iran, to cover three main points:

1) Allied recognition that Iran had given every possible help in the prosecution of the war.

2) Confirmation of the pledges given in the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of alliance of January 29, 1942 regarding the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.¹

3) Assurance that the economic needs of Iran would be considered when the peace treaty should be negotiated.

According to Soheily, Mr. Eden had indicated his agreement in principle but had asked that he approach the American Minister and the Soviet representatives to determine their attitude.

B) Minister Dreyfus informed General Hurley, who immediately saw the President about it. The President approved the idea and asked General Hurley to see Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov and try to get their agreement.

C) I showed General Hurley a rough draft of a declaration which I had worked up in anticipation that the question might be broached at the conference, and he suggested certain changes. I then prepared a shorter draft, which was submitted to General Hurley and which eventually became the basis for the final declaration.²

D) General Hurley saw Mr. Eden on November 30, and they agreed that a declaration would be desirable, but that the Iranians should be told they must endeavor to get Soviet consent. The same evening, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammed Saed, told Minister Dreyfus that Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov had agreed in principle. (This, however, does not check with Molotov's own non-committal remarks to General Hurley the next day.)

E) On December 1, General Hurley saw the President and told him that British agreement had been obtained but that the Soviets were doubtful. He asked the President to speak to Marshal Stalin. The

¹ Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. vi, March 21, 1942, p. 249.

² This is the draft printed *ante*, pp. 624-625.

President did so and told General Hurley afterwards that he had made a strong personal request and that Stalin had consented.

F) On the afternoon of December 1, the short draft which General Hurley had approved was shown to Ambassador Harriman, who made some slight changes and then got the O. K. of Mr. Hopkins. Copies of the corrected draft were sent to Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov immediately. Just before dinner, the draft was considered by the conference and was accepted with two or three additional minor changes in wording. It was signed by Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt, in that order, at the end of the final session that night.³

G) Minister Dreyfus had informed Saed that the matter was being considered, and had given him a copy of our original draft. As soon as the final session of the conference ended, the Minister and General Hurley went to the Foreign Office and showed the Foreign Minister the text which had been signed. After consulting with the Prime Minister by telephone, Saed said the text was acceptable and initialed a copy.⁴ He agreed not to release it until the general release on the conference should be made.

So far as I know, neither the British nor the Russians took any initiative in the matter at any time, although the British were obviously favorably disposed from the beginning. I am quite sure that neither of them prepared a draft. There is no doubt that it was only General Hurley's interest in the matter, and especially his intervention with the President and the latter's intervention with Stalin, which prevented the proposal from being blocked or ignored by the chiefs of government and their immediate entourages.

Of course, we could not put much of the foregoing into the press release.⁵ One point which might be stressed is that the Iranian Government was kept informed and that the declaration had its full approval. I am not sure that it would be a good idea to say that the Iranian Government made the original suggestion. That might be checked first with the British and Russians and then with the Foreign Minister. If they think it advisable, I see no objection.

I think the Minister should see the press release before it is put into final form.

JOHN D. JERNEGAN

³ Apparently Roosevelt signed before Stalin but left a space for Stalin's signature; see *post*, p. 886.

⁴ A facsimile of the copy bearing Sa'ed's initials was received by the Department of State from Hurley with a letter of June 4, 1954 (023.1/6-454).

⁵ No press release or draft press release regarding the development of the Declaration on Iran has been found in official files. The Hurley Papers, however, contain copies of (1) a document which was apparently used by the Legation in informing the press regarding various details of the Tehran Conference and (2) the script of a "Radio America" broadcast of December 6, 1943, at Tehran on the subject.

891.00/2070 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 3, 1943—1 p. m.

1086. December 1 a declaration was signed here in which United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Great Britain stated mutual agreement regarding policy toward Iran containing following points.

One. Three powers recognize Iranian contribution to war effort against common enemy.

Two. They realize war has caused special economic difficulties in Iran. Three powers express their intent to continue to provide such economic assistance as they are able.

Three. Three powers agree that Iranian postwar economic problems should receive full consideration by international agencies and conferences which may be created or held to deal with such matters.

Four. They reaffirm their desire for maintenance of sovereign independence and territorial integrity of Iran according to Atlantic Charter. Text has been submitted to Iran Government which has declared it acceptable. It is understood publicity will be withheld until December 6 when full text will be released. Issuance of declaration along these lines was requested by Iranian Prime Minister November 29. The President approved and directed General Hurley to obtain consent of other parties, which he and the Legation working together were able to do. Hurley and I feel that this has strengthened United States position in Iran and should have beneficent effect.

DREYFUS

891.00/2068 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 5, 1943—4 p. m.

1090. Persian language newspaper *Friend of Iran* published by (reference my 1086, December 3) Soviet Embassy press section this morning carried full text of declaration regarding Iran signed here December 1.

So far as I know, no other Tehran morning paper published text of referred to declaration in any way. However, upon learning of its publication in Soviet paper, Prime Minister Soheily this morning released it to Tehran press and it will undoubtedly appear in all afternoon newspapers.

General Hurley and I had understood definitely that no release was to be made by anyone until 8 tomorrow night, Moscow time, and neither the British nor ourselves had released anything regarding

the conference or the declaration on Iran. We shall still delay until tomorrow in accordance with instructions.

Repeated to Moscow and Cairo.

DREYFUS

891.00/2072 : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 8, 1943—5 p. m.

1096. In reply to my inquiry as to reason for premature publication of declaration regarding Iran, my 1090, December 5, Soviet Chargé¹ told me he had heard Iranians were going to release text on morning of December 5 and that his Embassy therefore rushed publication in order not to be left behind.

In a separate conversation with an officer of this Legation and Major Henry, Hurley's aide, Soviet Press Attaché denied all knowledge of any agreement regarding release date for publicity on Tehran conference and further intimated he had not understood declaration on Iran to form part of general release.

It is obvious that these two statements are conflicting and both seem implausible. If Soviet Chargé had heard of Iranian intention to break deadline, he could easily have intervened with the Iranian authorities, at same time notifying his American and British colleagues. Likewise, the Press Attaché's plea of ignorance is vitiated by fact that he was present at meeting with Major Henry and British representatives on December 4 at which release arrangements were discussed. However, I have not pressed the point and shall take no further action unless instructed.²

DREYFUS

¹ Mikhail Alexeyevich Maximov.

² It does not appear that further action was taken on this matter in Tehran or Moscow. For Roosevelt's decision changing the method of handling releases to the press, see *post*, p. 848.

D. THE MILITARY AGREEMENT

L/T Files

The Military Agreement

[EDITORIAL NOTE.—The only reference in the minutes to the drawing up or consideration of this document appears *ante*, pp. 578, 581. According to Churchill, p. 404, it was initialed on the evening of December 1, 1943. The initialed original was received by the Department of

State from the White House February 4, 1946 (Leahy's letter of that date; 740.0011 EW 1939/2-446). The text was released to the press by the Department March 24, 1947 (press release 240 of 1947). For references by Roosevelt in June and July 1944 to his understanding of the military plans agreed upon at Tehran, see Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 66, 721, 723.]

SECRET

MILITARY CONCLUSIONS OF THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE

The Conference:—

(1) Agreed that the Partisans in Yugoslavia should be supported by supplies and equipment to the greatest possible extent, and also by commando operations:

(2) Agreed that, from the military point of view, it was most desirable that Turkey should come into the war on the side of the Allies before the end of the year:

(3) Took note of Marshal Stalin's statement that if Turkey found herself at war with Germany, and as a result Bulgaria declared war on Turkey or attacked her, the Soviet would immediately be at war with Bulgaria.¹ The Conference further took note that this fact could be explicitly stated in the forthcoming negotiations to bring Turkey into the war:

(4) Took note that Operation OVERLORD would be launched during May 1944, in conjunction with an operation against Southern France. The latter operation would be undertaken in as great a strength as availability of landing-craft permitted. The Conference further took note of Marshal Stalin's statement that the Soviet forces would launch an offensive at about the same time with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western Front:²

(5) Agreed that the military staffs of the three Powers should henceforward keep in close touch with each other in regard to the impending operations in Europe. In particular it was agreed that a cover plan to mystify and mislead the enemy as regards these operations should be concerted between the staffs concerned.

F. D. R.
H. C.³
W S C

TEHRAN, December 1, 1943.

¹ See *ante*, pp. 537, 545, 588.

² See *ante*, pp. 565, 577, 579.

³ I. S.

IV. THE SECOND CAIRO CONFERENCE

10. THE PRESIDENT'S LOG AT CAIRO, DECEMBER 2-7, 1943

White House Files

Log of the Trip

Thursday, December 2nd

2:35 p. m. (Cairo time). The President's plane arrived at Cairo West airfield. We changed our clocks and watches (set them back 1½ hours) to conform to Zone Minus Two time. Air distance traveled from Teheran to Cairo (our route), 1,290 miles. The President disembarked and left the airport immediately via auto and proceeded to Ambassador Kirk's villa in the Mena district of Cairo.

3:30 p. m. Ambassador Kirk called on the President.

4:00 p. m. The President summoned Lieutenant (jg) Rigdon and worked on official mail that had been received on our arrival here. There were no Congressional bills or executive orders in this particular pouch.

8:30 p. m. The President had dinner at his villa and had as his guests the Prime Minister, Mrs. Oliver, Admiral Leahy, Major Boettiger, Captain Randolph Churchill and Mr. Hopkins.²

The President received word this evening, from Ambassador Steinhardt at Ankara, that President Inonu would come to Cairo Saturday, December 4th, for a conference with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.³

We left Ambassador Harriman and Mr. Bohlen at Teheran. They were to remain there for a few days longer and then proceed on to Moscow.

The news story concerning the Cairo Conference (Nov. 22-26) broke officially this morning.⁴

¹ For the passage on the earlier hours of this day, see *ante*, p. 471.

² See *post*, p. 668.

³ See *post*, p. 664.

⁴ For the communiqué on the First Cairo Conference, December 1, 1943, see *ante*, p. 448.

⁵ The passage omitted here, entitled "Miscellaneous Notes on Tehran", is printed *ante*, p. 473.

Friday, December 3rd. (At Cairo)

- 10:30 a. m. Mr. John S. [J.] McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, called on Mr. Hopkins at the President's villa.⁶
- 11:00 a. m. The President summoned Lieutenant (jg) Rigdon and worked on official mail that had arrived earlier in the day. He signed Congressional bills S630, S770, S862, S950, S1008, S1246, S1309, S1382, S. J. [Res.] 47; an executive order authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to take possession and operate the shipyard of the Los Angeles Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation at Los Angeles; and a proclamation entitled "Day of Prayer".
- 12:00 (noon) Major Boettiger left Cairo by plane (Major Otis F. Bryan pilot) for Adana, Turkey, to meet and accompany President General Ismet Inonu to Cairo.
- 1:30 p. m. The President had lunch at his villa with General Marshall, Admiral Leahy, Assistant Secretary of War John S. [J.] McCloy, Ambassador Winant and Mr. Hopkins.⁷
- 2:00 p. m. Mr. George Wadsworth, American Consul General at Beirut, Syria [*Lebanon*], called on the President.⁸
- 2:30 p. m. Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh (to governments in exile of Greece and Yugoslavia) called on the President.⁹
- 4:40 p. m. The President worked on his mail. He read the "Fathers' Draft Act" and announced his intention to sign the same at a later date.¹⁰
- 5:10 p. m. The President met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold and Captain Royal).¹¹
- 8:30 p. m. The President dined at his villa with the Prime Minister, Sir [Mr.] Anthony Eden, Admiral Leahy and Mr. Hopkins.¹²

Saturday, December 4th. (At Cairo)

- 7:30 a. m. Lt-General Somervell called on Mr. Hopkins at the President's villa.¹³

⁶ No record of what was said during this call has been found. It presumably related to the draft agreement with which McCloy was particularly concerned at this time. See *ante*, p. 445, and *post*, p. 790.

⁷ No record of the luncheon discussion has been found. See, however, *post*, p. 853, footnote 2.

⁸ See *post*, p. 853.

⁹ See *post*, p. 844.

¹⁰ See the Log item for December 5, 4:30 p. m., *post*, p. 658.

¹¹ No minutes of this meeting have been found.

¹² See the editorial note, *post*, p. 674.

¹³ No record of what was said during this call has been found.

- 9:30 a. m. Mr. Louis [*Lewis*] W. Douglas called on Mr. Hopkins at the President's villa.^{13a}
- 11:00 a. m. Plenary meeting of the President and the Prime Minister with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Present: The President, the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister Eden, Mr. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, General Brooke, Air Chief Marshal Portal, Field Marshal Dill, Lt-General Ismay and Captain Royal.¹⁴
- 12:30 p. m. President Ismet Inonu of Turkey arrived in Cairo by U. S. Army plane. He was accompanied from Adana by Major John Boettiger, A. U. S.
- 5:00 p. m. President Inonu and the Turkish delegation, accompanied by Ambassador Steinhardt, met with the President, the Prime Minister and Mr. Hopkins at the President's villa.¹⁵ The following gentlemen comprised the Turkish delegation:

President General Ismet Inonu.
 Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu.
 Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Cevad Acikalin.
 Mr. Sureyya Anderiman, the President's Personal and Confidential Secretary.
 Mr. Selim Sarper, Director General of the Press.
 Undersecretary['s] Chief of Cabinet Turgot [*Torgut*] Menemencioglu.
 Foreign Minister's Chief of Cabinet Sadi Kavur.
 First Aide-de-Camp to the President Major Celal Uner.
 Sir Hugh[e] Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador to Turkey.
 Hon. Sergei Vinogradov, Soviet Ambassador to Turkey.
 Hon. Laurence S.[A.] Steinhardt, United States Ambassador to Turkey.

- 8:30 p. m. The President was host at dinner at his villa.¹⁶ The dinner list included: The President, President Inonu, the Prime Minister, Sir [*Mr.*] Anthony Eden, Ambassador Vinogradov, Ambassador Sir Knatchbull-Hugessen, Mr. Anderiman, Mr. Mihailov, Mr. Sarper, Mr. Hopkins, Major Boettiger, Mr. Numan Menemencio-

^{13a} No record of what was said during this call has been found.

¹⁴ See *post*, p. 675.

¹⁵ See *post*, p. 690.

¹⁶ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 698.

glu, Ambassador Steinhardt, Mr. Acikalin, Admiral Leahy and Sir Alexander Cadogan.

Sunday, December 5th. (At Cairo)

- 11:30 a. m. Plenary meeting of the President and the Prime Minister with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.¹⁷ Present: The President, the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister Eden, Mr. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, Field Marshal Dill, General Brooke, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, Air Chief Marshal Portal, Lt. Gen. Clemay [*Ismay*], Brigadier Hollis and Captain Royal.
- 2:00 p. m. President Inonu and members of the Turkish delegation called on the President and Mr. Hopkins.¹⁸ (Callers included President Inonu; Hon. Numan Menemencioglu; Hon. Cevad Acikalin; Mr. Sureyya Anderiman; Mr. Selim Sarper; Mr. Sadi Kavur, and Ambassador Steinhardt.)
- 3:00 p. m. The Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary Sir [*Mr.*] Anthony Eden, Air [*Vice*] Marshal George, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Ambassador Sir Hugh[e] Knatchbull-Hugessen and Ambassador Sergei Vinogradov called at the President's villa and joined in the meeting of the President and the Turkish delegation.¹⁹
- 4:00 p. m. The President, the Prime Minister and President Inonu, together with members of their military staffs and other delegates, moved to the garden of the President's villa where they posed for motion pictures and still pictures.
- 4:30 p. m. The President worked on his mail. He signed the "Fathers' Draft Act".
- 5:00 p. m. The President met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold and Captain Royal).²⁰
- 8:30 p. m. The President attended a dinner at Mr. Casey's villa given by the Prime Minister for President Inonu and President Roosevelt.²¹ The dinner list included: The President, the Prime Minister, President Inonu, Mr.

¹⁷ See *post*, p. 705. According to the minutes, the meeting began at 11 o'clock.

¹⁸ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 711.

¹⁹ See *post*, p. 711. According to the minutes, three additional British representatives were present.

²⁰ No minutes of this meeting have been found. See, however, the editorial note, *post*, p. 725.

²¹ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 734.

Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, Ambassador Steinhardt, Sir [Mr.] Anthony Eden, Captain Randolph Churchill, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Ambassador Sir Hugh[e] Knatchbull-Hugessen, Commander Thompson, Ambassador Vinogradov, Hon. Numan Menemencioglu, Mr. Anderiman and Mr. Mihailov.

11:45 p. m. The President returned to his villa and retired. Colonel Elliot[t] Roosevelt arrived in Cairo, from Tunis, this afternoon.

It was hoped that all phases of the conference might be concluded today so that we might depart for home tomorrow, but this was found to be impracticable due to the heavy work load already on the hands of the Combined Staffs.

Monday, December 6th. (At Cairo)

11:00 a. m. The President worked on his mail, cleaning up miscellaneous matters.

12:30 p. m. Ambassador Kirk brought his Legation officer staff to the President's villa and they were presented to the President.

12:45 p. m. Lt-General Stilwell and Mr. John Davies called on the President.²²

1:15 p. m. The President had lunch at his villa with the Prime Minister and Mr. Hopkins.²³

2:30 p. m. President Inonu, the Prime Minister and Ambassador Vinogradov called on the President.²⁴ During their conversation they agreed on a joint communiqué to be issued to the press²⁵ concerning their talks, soon to be concluded.

4:00 p. m. From the rear steps of his villa, overlooking the garden, the President made a brief address to a detachment of U. S. Army military police (approximately 125) chosen from the MP company that had guarded his villa dur-

²² No official record of this conversation has been found. Stilwell's notes on the talk, apparently verbatim, are printed in *The Stilwell Papers*, pp. 251-254. Hopkins was there for a part of the discussion and Elliott Roosevelt seems to have heard most of the conversation. See Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 207-208. *The Stilwell Papers* refer (p. 251) to a "fourth American" who was present. This was John P. Davies, Jr., whose notes on the discussion agree in all essential points with those published in *The Stilwell Papers*. See also *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 71-73.

²³ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 738.

²⁴ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 739.

²⁵ The text of the communiqué is printed *post*, p. 831.

- ing his stay in Cairo. A copy of his talk is appended, marked Appendix "G".²⁶
- 4:30 p. m. Major General R. A. [K.] Sutherland (General MacArthur's Chief of Staff) called on the President.²⁷
- 4:45 p. m. The Very Reverend Arthur Hughes, Chargé d'Affaires, Apostolic Delegation, Cairo, called on the President.²⁸
- 5:00 p. m. His Majesty King George II of the Hellenes (Greece) called on the President.²⁹
- 6:00 p. m. President Inonu and Prime Minister Churchill met with the President.³⁰ At the conclusion of this meeting a communiqué, agreed on at an earlier conference between these three heads of governments, was given to the press for release at a future date. A copy is appended marked Appendix "H".³¹
- 7:15 p. m. Plenary meeting of the President and the Prime Minister with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.³² Present: The President, Mr. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, Captain Royal, the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary Eden, General Brooke, Air Chief Marshal Portal, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, Field Marshal Dill, Field Marshal Jan C. Smuts, Lt-General Ismay, Brigadier H. Redman. All meetings and conferences in which the President took part in Cairo were held at his villa.
- 8:30 p. m. The President had dinner at his villa. His only guest was Field Marshal Jan C. Smuts.³³ Colonel Elliot[t] Roosevelt departed Cairo this afternoon for Tunis.
- The final three days at Cairo were extremely busy ones for the President and for Mr. Hopkins. There were numerous conferences, many without a break between, so that there was no opportunity for a rest. Although today marked the official close of the Cairo Conference, the Combined Chiefs of Staff found it necessary to

²⁶ Not reproduced herein.

²⁷ No record of what was said during this call has been found.

²⁸ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 739.

²⁹ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 740.

³⁰ See *post*, p. 740. According to the minutes, the meeting began at 5 p. m.

³¹ The text of the communiqué is printed *post*, p. 831.

³² See *post*, p. 747. According to the minutes, the meeting began at 7:30 p. m.

³³ No official record of the conversation during this dinner has been found. A very brief account appears in J. C. Smuts, *Jan Christian Smuts* (London: Cassell and Co., 1952), p. 448, and a brief reference appears in F. D. R., *His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*, vol. II, p. 1477. Smuts was at Cairo on his way back to the Union of South Africa from a visit to England.

remain behind for a few days longer in order to complete certain staff work.

All members of our party were extremely tired now and anxious to get started homeward.

During our second visit to Cairo the weather was delightful. The mosquitoes and flies were bothersome, however.

Excellent care was taken of our party while we were in Cairo, for which credit is due Major General Royce and Brigadier General Cheaves [*Cheves*].

Tuesday, December 7th. (At Cairo and en route Tunis)

7:30 a. m. The President and members of his party left his villa for the airport.

8:05 a. m. The President arrived Cairo West airport. He bade goodbye to the Prime Minister, Ambassadors Steinhardt and Kirk, General Royce and a number of other officers from our Middle East Command who had accompanied him to the airport.³⁴

8:20 a. m. The President embarked and his plane departed Cairo for Tunis. In the President's plane were: The President, Mr. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire, General Watson, Major Boettiger, Lt-Commander Fox, Lieutenant (jg) Rigdon, Sergeant Robert Hopkins, Secret Service Agents Spaman, Haman and Fredericks and Steward Prettyman.

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³⁴ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 750.

³⁵ The matter here omitted relates to the return of the President's party after it left Cairo. For a report on the return journey, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, December 11, 1943, pp. 410-412.

11. PAPERS ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE WITH TURKISH OFFICIALS ¹

Hopkins Papers

The Prime Minister's Assistant Private Secretary (Brown) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

MOST SECRET

[CAIRO, December 2, 1943.]

MOST IMMEDIATE

MR. HOPKINS.

The Prime Minister has instructed me to send down to you immediately, for the President's information, the attached copy of telegram No. 365 from Angora to the Minister of State, Cairo, which was repeated to Teheran and which the Prime Minister saw last night, and of telegram No. 394 from Angora to the Embassy at Cairo which has just been received.

F. D. W. BROWN

2.12.43

[Attachment 1]

The British Ambassador in Turkey (Knatchbull-Hugessen) to the British Minister of State Resident in the Middle East (Casey)

MOST IMMEDIATE

ANKARA, December 1, 1943.

Addressed Minister of State telegram 365 and repeated to Tehran and Foreign Office. Most secret.

Minister for Foreign Affairs ² spontaneously mentioned to U. S. Ambassador ³ this morning the possibility of meeting President of the Republic ⁴ with President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister. He said that there would be serious difficulties about Cairo and that in any case the party ⁵ would not agree to the President of the Republic flying. Adana would present security difficulties, but speaking purely personally and without commitment, he suggested Aleppo might be possible.

¹ For earlier papers relating to arrangements for the Second Cairo Conference, see *ante*, pp. 43, 386, 632-633.

² Numan Menemencioğlu.

³ Laurence A. Steinhardt.

⁴ Ismet İnönü.

⁵ Presumably the Republican People's Party.

2. I give this for information only. U. S. Ambassador is repeating it.⁶

[Attachment 2]

The British Ambassador in Turkey (Knatchbull-Hugessen) to the British Embassy in Egypt

MOST IMMEDIATE

ANKARA, December 2, 1943.

Addressed to Cairo Embassy telegram No. 394 repeated to the Foreign Office, Tehran. Most Secret. Foreign Office telegram No. 1644 to me (repeating Tehran telegram No. 33 to me).⁷

Pending the receipt of instructions by my Soviet and United States Colleagues⁸ I have informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs of your proposal⁹ that the President should go to Cairo.

2. Minister for Foreign Affairs has consulted the President and the Prime Minister¹⁰ and informs me as follows.

3. If the object of the visit is discussions on basis of decision[s] already taken in conversations with Stalin in Tehran the President would not be willing to come.

4. If however the object is to afford the opportunity of free equal and unprejudged discussion as to the best method by which Turkey can serve the common cause, the President would be willing to come accompanied by Minister for Foreign Affairs.

5. Minister for Foreign Affairs explained that the President's position [vis-à-vis the?] ¹¹ national party and the country would be rendered impossible if he accepted the invitation on the basis of paragraph 3.

6. If the invitation is on basis of paragraph 4 he would be ready to leave on the morning of December 3rd reaching Adana early December 4th. His party would number 15. There would in addition be my Soviet and United States Colleagues and myself. I should propose to bring Counsellor¹² and Air Attaché.¹³ Including the President's party it would be necessary to count on total of 25 to 30.

7. I have been in touch with my Soviet and United States Colleagues and will inform them of the above as soon as possible.

KNATCHBULL HUGESSEN

⁶ See Steinhardt's telegram 1958 of December 1, 1943, 1 p. m., *ante*, p. 632.

⁷ The British telegram under reference was not attached.

⁸ Respectively Vinogradov and Steinhardt. See *ante*, p. 633, footnote 3.

⁹ See *ante*, p. 633.

¹⁰ Şükrü Saracoğlu.

¹¹ Garbled passage in source text.

¹² Alexander Knox Helm.

¹³ Air Vice Marshal Robert Allingham George.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the President*¹

SECRET

ANKARA, December 2, 1943—2 p. m.

The President of Turkey, Mr. Inonu, has agreed to go with the Foreign Minister to Cairo "On condition that as between equals he is being invited to a free discussion and is not merely to be informed of decisions already arrived at in Tehran concerning Turkey."

The British Ambassador to Turkey, Knatchbull-Hugessen, has telegraphed for authority to give Inonu the assurance he desires. It will be possible if the necessary authority is received before the morning of Friday December 3 for us to arrive in Adana by train on the morning of December 4 and to be in Cairo about 1 p. m. on the same day by special planes sent for us. At the moment, as near as I can estimate, the entire party will consist of about thirty people.

All is going along well.

¹ Sent to Cairo via military channels. The source text is a paraphrase prepared in the American Legation at Cairo. It is apparently the text as delivered to the President. A slightly variant text was repeated by Steinhardt to the Department (740.0011 EW 1939/32358).

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt)*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO,] December 2, 1943.

Will you tell Inonu at once that I am delighted that he can come to see me. Assure him that he is being invited to a "free discussion as between equals". Please tell the President that I am especially happy to have the occasion to talk with him. Will you tell him that transport planes will be available Adana on the morning of December 4th. For your information British are advising their Ambassador in similar sense. Will you be sure to have an adequate American Interpreter with you.

¹ Sent to Washington via military channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to the Department of State; and further forwarded by the Department to Ankara (740.0011 EW 1939/32358b).

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman), Temporarily at Tehran*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO,] December 2, 1943.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

President has wired Steinhardt today to the effect that he is delighted Inonu can come to Cairo and to assure Inonu that he is being invited to a "free discussion as between equals". Steinhardt also directed inform Inonu that President especially happy to have the occasion to talk with him and that transport planes will be available Adana morning December fourth.

Will you see Molotov at once to make certain that Russian representatives are here morning December fourth. We understand that Soviet Ambassador Ankara is coming. Please advise.

HOPKINS

¹ Sent via Army channels "for eyes of General Connolly only".

740.0011 EW 1939/32238 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, December 3, 1943—1 p. m.

1968. The following telegram has been sent to Cairo¹ and is repeated for the Department's information.

Most immediate December 3, 11 a. m. Most secret for the President.

Hugesson [*Hugessen*] received authority last night to give Inonu the desired assurance.² The President contemplates leaving here today Friday at 4:00 p. m. on a special train for Adana. We should arrive there by noon on Saturday and if the planes have arrived from Cairo will depart immediately. The President's party will consist of the following:³ the President, his personal and confidential secretary (a Columbia graduate who is outstandingly pro-American), his personal physician, two aides de camp, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, his *Chef de Cabinet*, his personal physician, the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, his *Chef de Cabinet* (who is a nephew of the Foreign Minister) and four domestic servants, a total of 14 persons. In addition there will be the British Ambassador, Knox Helm, formerly stationed in Washington now Counselor of the

¹ Not found in the Roosevelt Papers.

² See Steinhardt's telegram of December 2, 1943, *ante*, p. 664.

³ The names and titles of those members of the Turkish Delegation who participated in international meetings at the Second Cairo Conference are printed in the Log, *ante*, p. 657.

British Embassy here, Air Vice Marshal George, British Air Attaché in Ankara, the Russian Ambassador and myself.

STEINHARDT

Roosevelt Papers

President Roosevelt to President İnönü

CAIRO, December 3, 1943.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT INONU, I am sending one of my own planes to meet you and your party in Adana, together with my son-in-law, Major John Boettiger, who will hand this to you.

The plane is in command of Major Otis F. Bryan.

I hope you will have a smooth trip and I am looking forward with great pleasure to seeing you on Saturday afternoon.

Very sincerely yours,

F[RANKLIN] D R[OOSEVELT]

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt)*¹

URGENT

[CAIRO,] December 3, 1943.

Major John Boettiger is accompanying President's plane to Adana today for purpose of extending President's greetings to President Inonu on his arrival and accompanying him on trip. Randolph Churchill on similar mission in Prime Minister's plane. The President would be pleased to have Inonu ride in American plane.

HOPKINS

¹ Sent to Washington via military channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to the Department of State; and further forwarded by the Department to Ankara (740.0011 EW 1939/32358c). The text as forwarded to Steinhardt was labeled "personal and secret".

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*¹

SECRET

[TEHRAN,] December 3, 1943.

URGENT

Molotov left here yesterday morning. I am therefore sending him message through Soviet Embassy here containing information in your

¹ Sent to Cairo via Army channels.

cable to me ² but as time is so short believe you should also have appropriate person in Algiers inform Vyshinsky and offer him air transportation to Cairo. Molotov stated in Tehran that he would designate Vyshinsky to represent the Soviet Government at the conference.³ I have advised Molotov of the probability of your placing plane at Vyshinsky disposal in Algiers in the event he still desires him to attend conference.

² Hopkins' telegram of December 2, 1943, *ante*, p. 665.

³ See *ante*, pp. 589-590.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President's
Special Assistant (Hopkins)* ¹

SECRET

[TEHRAN,] December 4, 1943.

Through Russian Embassy Teheran message from Molotov "Vishinsky will represent USSR at Cairo".² I will leave Teheran for Moscow morning fifth current month.

¹ Sent to Cairo via Army channels.

² Vinogradov, not Vyshinsky, represented the Soviet Union at Cairo during the Second Cairo Conference, but he attended none of the formal meetings. See *post*, pp. 839, 858.

12. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1943

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, DECEMBER 2, 1943,
8:30 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
Major Boettiger

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Captain Randolph Churchill
Section Officer Oliver

Editorial Note

No official record of the conversation at this dinner has been found. The list of those present is derived from the Log, *ante*, p. 655. Leahy, p. 212, has the following brief summary: "During the dinner Roosevelt and Churchill compared their reactions to Stalin and reviewed the military and political discussion with our Russian ally that had just ended. The Prime Minister clearly indicated that he was inclined toward the American point of view on matters that up to then had produced much controversy between the U. S. and British staffs, particularly on the timing of the cross-Channel attack on Germany." See also Churchill, p. 408.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, DECEMBER 3, 1943,
2:30 P. M., MENA HOUSE¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Willson

UNITED KINGDOM

Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
General Riddell-Webster
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Sugden
Air Commodore Elliot

¹ This was the 133d meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and their first meeting during the Second Cairo Conference.

UNITED STATES

Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Bieri
Rear Admiral Badger
Major General Sutherland
Major General Handy
Major General Fairchild
Brigadier General Kuter
Brigadier General Roberts
Captain Doyle
Captain Freseman
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet
Cunningham
Brigadier McNair
Colonel Cornwall-Jones

Secretariat

Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland

Brigadier Redman
Commander Coleridge

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF DECISIONS OF C. C. S. 131ST AND 132D MEETINGS

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 131st meeting and the conclusions of the 132d meeting, subject to the insertion of the words "via the Supreme Commander, S. E. A. C." after the word "Generalissimo" in the conclusion of Item 1 of C. C. S. 131st meeting. The detailed reports of the meetings were also accepted, subject to minor amendments.²

2. IMPLICATIONS OF MILITARY CONCLUSIONS OF THE "EUREKA" CONFERENCE

(C. C. S. Memorandum for Information No. 165) ³

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should consider the military conclusions reached at the EUREKA Conference as set out in the enclosure to C. C. S. Memorandum for Information Number 165, and consider the implications of these decisions and the action necessary. The military conclusions were then examined in turn.

(1) *Partisans*

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that a directive should be issued to General Eisenhower on the lines of this conclusion. There were cer-

² See *ante*, pp. 358, 563.

³ This memorandum reproduced the "Military Conclusions of the Tehran Conference", *ante*, p. 652.

tain points which should be covered. He understood that General Eisenhower had set up, or was setting up, a commander with a joint staff to deal with the whole question of supplies to Yugoslavia on a regular basis. There was also the question of the supply of equipment. He understood from General Eisenhower that captured Italian equipment was running short. It might be better to give this equipment to the Partisans who already had weapons and ammunition of Italian make and would use the equipment to good advantage, and to arm Italian troops where necessary with Allied weapons.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that these points might form a part of the general directive to the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean area.⁴

After further discussion, it was agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should, as soon as possible, produce a short directive to the Supreme Commander dealing with the question of supplies to the Partisans.⁵

(2) *Turkey*

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that all the necessary preparations were going forward in anticipation of Turkey entering the war.

ADMIRAL KING said he felt that there were implications in this decision which should be considered. For instance, how many squadrons of aircraft and how many anti-aircraft regiments would be required to support Turkey?

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the details of the commitments were set out in C. C. S. 418.⁶

ADMIRAL KING said that he considered that paper, at least in part, out of date. For instance, a target date of 15 July was regarded as a possibility for OVERLORD.

(C. C. S. 418, "Entry of Turkey into the War" was later considered in closed session.)

(3) *Russian Declaration of War on Bulgaria*

It was generally agreed that there were no particular implications to this conclusion.

(4) *OVERLORD and Operations Against the South of France*

SIR ALAN BROOKE felt the first step in considering the implications of this conclusion should be that the whole landing craft situation must be examined in order to discover from where the necessary landing craft for the South of France assault could be obtained. He

⁴ i. e., to the officer to be appointed to the position, about to be created, of Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater; see *ante*, p. 150, and *post*, pp. 704, 761, 794.

⁵ See *post*, pp. 704, 795.

⁶ Not printed herein. As approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, this paper became 418/1, which is printed *post*, p. 782.

suggested that the Combined Staff Planners should examine this at once on the basis that the OVERLORD operation took place during May and that a two-divisional assault took place against the South of France.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the decision at EUREKA ⁷ was only that the operation against the South of France should be undertaken in as great a strength as the availability of landing craft permitted and that there was no decision as to the strength of the assaulting force.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he regarded a two-divisional assault as the minimum which could be accepted. The attack must be planned with sufficient strength to make it successful.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that the Combined Staff Planners must be given an agreed basis on which to consider the landing craft situation. The British Chiefs of Staff felt and hoped that the United States Chiefs of Staff agreed with them, that an assault with less than two divisions would be asking for failure. He reminded the Committee that the plan which had been considered at EUREKA ⁸ envisaged something in the neighborhood of a two-divisional assault with an advance up the Rhone by some ten divisions. If undertaken with less strength, the operation could only be in the nature of a diversion. It appeared that in order to carry out a successful operation in the South of France, other operations would have to suffer. Unless the Planners were given an indication from the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the strength of the assault, they would probably do no more than report that this operation was impossible of successful accomplishment.

ADMIRAL LEAHY felt that the Planners should be told that this operation should be carried out without interference with Operation OVERLORD.

ADMIRAL KING said that the problem might be approached in two ways: The Planners could be directed to study and report on the lift possible with the landing craft available; the other method was to begin with an arbitrary number of divisions and determine whether resources could be made available for a lift of this size.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that in considering the availability of resources, all other operations must be taken into consideration except OVERLORD. He considered that if no strength was set, the Planners could not examine the availability of resources properly. He suggested that they be told, firstly, to report on the required strength for the assault and, secondly, to put forward proposals from where the landing craft resources to lift this assault force could be made available.

⁷ See *ante*, p. 652.

⁸ See *ante*, pp. 556, footnote 3, and 559.

ADMIRAL KING said that he believed there was no record in the EUREKA discussions with regard to a two-division assault. As far as his recollection went, the paper, which had been hastily prepared, showed that without interfering with other operations, there was an amphibious lift for some 37,000 personnel.⁹

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the conclusion at EUREKA implied a definite limitation of resources. What was required was a report on the landing craft necessary for a successful operation against the South of France without affecting Operation OVERLORD. This operation could not be planned on a lavish scale.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that one hypothesis might be that the necessary resources could be found by giving up the Andaman operations.

It was agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should be directed in collaboration, as necessary, with the Combined Administrative Committee, to examine the agreed operation against the South of France on the following premises:

a. That this operation should be carried out with a minimum of two assault divisions, and;

b. That the necessary resources shall not be found at the expense of OVERLORD.

This report to include a statement showing where the necessary resources particularly in assault shipping and landing craft might be found.

(5) *Coordination with the Russian Staff*

It was generally agreed that coordination of effort with the Russian Staff should be achieved through the U. S. and British Missions in Moscow.

It was suggested that it might be desirable that experts should be sent to Moscow from Washington and London in order to deal with the problem of deception.

3. DRAFT AGENDA FOR THE REMAINDER OF "SEXTANT" CONFERENCE

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the future subjects for discussion might be grouped in blocks under main headings. He presented for consideration, a draft agenda¹⁰ set out on this principle.

ADMIRAL LEAHY then explained that he believed the United States Chiefs of Staff would have to leave Cairo on the morning of Monday, 6 December, or possibly on the morning of Sunday, 5 December.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that it would be a calamity if the

⁹ See *ante*, p. 557.

¹⁰ Not printed herein.

Combined Chiefs of Staff broke up without fully agreeing on all the many points still to be resolved.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he saw no hope of postponing their departure after these dates.

GENERAL MARSHALL then suggested an agenda¹¹ designed to deal only with the essential points before the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

After further discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

a. That all but the most essential items should be excluded from the SEXTANT Agenda.

b. That the following should be the order of priority in which they should be dealt with:

- (1) Entry of Turkey into the war.
- (2) Integration of the U. S. Air Command—directive to Supreme Commander, Mediterranean Theater.
- (3) Over-all Plan for the Defeat of Japan.
- (4) RANKIN—discussion only.
- (5) Operations against the South of France.
- (6) Relation of resources to requirements.
- (7) Final Report.

(At this point the Combined Chiefs of Staff went into closed session.)

4. ENTRY OF TURKEY INTO THE WAR (C. C. S. 418)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved C. C. S. 418 as amended during the course of the discussion. (Subsequently published as C. C. S. 418/1.¹²)

5. PROGRESS REPORTS

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that all progress reports submitted for the SEXTANT Conference should be taken as having been noted by them. This is not to be taken as meaning that any recommendations that there may be in different progress reports have been accepted. Should such acceptance be needed, the recommendations in question must be put forward separately.

6. COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

¹¹ Not found.

¹² *Post*, p. 782.

a. That the present plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive¹³ should remain unchanged.

b. That General Eaker should not be urged to catch up the three months of arrears.¹⁴

c. That General Eaker should be told to expand his operations to the extent possible with the aircraft and crews available.

¹³ See Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948-1955; 7 vols.), vol. II, chapter 11.

¹⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 376.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, DECEMBER 3, 1943,
8: 30 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden

Editorial Note

No official record of the conversation at this meeting has been found. According to Leahy, p. 213, the conversation dealt with (1) the allocation of forces for the operation against the Andaman Islands or alternatively against Rhodes, and (2) the choice of zones of occupation in Germany as between the United States and the United Kingdom. With regard to the first topic, Leahy states that Roosevelt insisted on the Andaman Islands operation and emphasized that promises made to Chiang should be fully carried out. With respect to the second topic, Churchill and Eden argued for British occupation of the northwestern zone in Germany. See also *ante*, p. 253; *post*, p. 688; and Churchill, pp. 408-409.

The list of those present is derived from the Log, *ante*, p. 656. Neither Churchill nor Leahy mentions Hopkins' presence, and Leahy refers to those present at the meeting as a party of four. Roosevelt acted as host.

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT
AND CHURCHILL, DECEMBER 4, 1943, 11 A. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
(in the chair)
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet
Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay

Secretariat

Captain Royal

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT said that he must leave Cairo on Monday morning. It was therefore necessary that all reports of the Conference should be signed by Sunday night. Apart from the question of Turkish participation in the war, which he felt should be brought about at some date between 15 February and 1 April, the only outstanding problem seemed to be the comparatively small one of the provision of about 20 landing craft or their equipment. It was unthinkable to be beaten by a small item like that, and he felt bound to say that it *must* be done.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he did not wish to leave the Conference in any doubt that the British Delegation viewed the early separation of the SEXTANT Conference with great apprehension. There were still many questions of first-class importance to be settled. Two decisive events had taken place in the last few days. In the first place, Marshal Stalin had voluntarily proclaimed that the Soviet would make war on Japan the moment Germany was defeated.¹ This would give us better bases than we could ever find in China, and made it all the more important that we should concentrate on making OVERLORD a success. It would be necessary for the Staffs to examine how this new fact would affect operations in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. The second event of first-class importance was the decision to do OVERLORD during May. He himself would have preferred the July date, but he was determined nevertheless to do all in his power to make the May date a complete success. OVERLORD was a task transcending all others. A million

¹ See *ante*, p. 489.

Americans were to be thrown in, and 500,000–600,000 British. Terrible battles were to be expected on a scale far greater than anything that we had experienced before. In order to give OVERLORD the greatest chance of success, it was necessary that Operation ANVIL should be as strong as possible. The critical time would come at about the thirtieth day, and it was essential that every possible step should be taken by action elsewhere to prevent the Germans from concentrating a superior force against our bridgeheads. As soon as the OVERLORD and ANVIL forces got into the same zone, they would come under the same Commander.

Reverting to ANVIL, THE PRIME MINISTER expressed the view that it should be planned on the basis of an assault force of at least two divisions. This would provide enough landing craft to do the outflanking operations in Italy and also, if Turkey came into the war soon, to capture Rhodes. But he wished to say at once that, in the face of the new situation, Rhodes had no longer the great importance which he had previously attached to it.

ADMIRAL KING intervened to remark that a two-division lift for ANVIL was in sight.

THE PRIME MINISTER, continuing, said that operations in Southeast Asia must be judged in their relation to the predominating importance of OVERLORD. He was astounded at the demands for BUCCANEER which had reached him from the Supreme Commander.² Although there were only 5,000 Japanese in the island, 58,000 men were apparently required to capture it. As he understood it, the Americans had been fighting the Japanese successfully at odds of two and a half to one. In the face of Marshal Stalin's promise that Russia would come into the war, operations in the Southeast Asia Command had lost a good deal of their value; while on the other hand their cost had been put up to a prohibitive extent.

THE PRIME MINISTER concluded by observing that there were still very large differences of opinion between the British and American Delegations, and that it was of the first importance that these differences should be cleared away.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that at all the previous Conferences there had been a number of military meetings, as a result of which reports had been submitted from time to time to the President and Prime Minister. The last stage of the Conference had always been the submission of a final report, followed by an examination of ways and means. SEXTANT had been a very different affair. In the first place there had been meetings with the Generalissimo. Then after a short interval, the principal members of both delegations had gone to Tehran where there had been a number of Plenary Conferences on

² Admiral Mountbatten.

political as well as military matters. Thus the Combined Chiefs of Staff had so far had very few opportunities of discussion at **SEXTANT**. The following matters were still outstanding: First, an examination of the landing craft position, without which it was impossible to say what operations could or could not be undertaken; second, the long term plan for the defeat of Japan, which in its turn was affected by the decisions to undertake operations in Upper Burma next March.³ The plan was also seriously affected by Marshal Stalin's promise to make war on Japan as soon as Germany was finished. It seemed essential that these problems should be resolved before the Combined Chiefs of Staff separated. The Mediterranean was of the greatest importance. It would be fatal to let up in that area. We should go on hitting the Germans as hard as we possibly could, and in every place that we could. Finally, the question of **ANVIL** was still under examination and it was essential to decide how the necessary resources could be provided.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM observed that, on a preliminary examination, our naval resources in cruisers, escort carriers, destroyers, and escorts were not adequate to undertake more than two amphibious operations at the same time, namely **OVERLORD** and **ANVIL**. It might be possible to arrange for some of the naval forces employed in **BUC-CANEER** to get back in time for **ANVIL**, but a large proportion of them would have to remain in the Indian Ocean.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that, according to his information, there was only one good airfield in the Andamans. This was capable of operating squadrons of heavy bombers. There was another site which had been cleared by blasting the top off a hill, and a few strips might be made on the beach. Thus the value of the Andamans as a base for long distance bombing was strictly limited.

GENERAL MARSHALL expressed agreement with General Brooke's observations. There was no question that there were a number of important points to be settled. It was impossible to say how long this settlement would take; and thereafter there would be the business of surveying ways and means.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he himself would at any rate be leaving on Tuesday. Would it not be possible for the Staffs to stay for two or three days and work out their problems together?

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that two or three days would not suffice for what they had to do, since the detailed problems to be worked out would take at least one or two weeks.

ADMIRAL KING remarked that the staffs were unlikely to reach agreement on certain problems which could only be resolved by the President-Prime Minister level.

³ See *ante*, pp. 312, 338, 347, 430, and *post*, p. 765.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Generalissimo had left Cairo under the impression that we were going to do BUCCANEER. The new facts were, firstly, that the Soviet had declared themselves ready to go to war with Japan immediately Germany collapsed; secondly, that it had been decided to do OVERLORD in May; and, thirdly, that ANVIL was also to be undertaken. He added that he was very anxious lest the Russian promise should leak out.

THE PRESIDENT agreed, and added that it was impossible to tell the Chinese. Continuing, he said that 18-20 additional landing craft must be provided by hook or by crook. As for the BUCCANEER assault, he thought that 14,000 instead of 58,000 men would be ample. The Supreme Commander in the Far East should be told that he must do his best with the resources which had already been allocated to him. It should be possible for the staffs to settle their problems in principle, leaving the details to be worked out afterwards. They appeared already to have reached agreement on the objectives.

SIR ALAN BROOKE demurred. Many questions, such as shipping, landing craft, and naval resources would have to be examined in detail, as would the relation between ANVIL and BUCCANEER. The former was being examined on the basis of a two-division assault, whereas it might be found that the proper strategy was to divert landing craft from BUCCANEER to the Mediterranean and to increase this to say a three-division assault.

ADMIRAL KING said that landing craft and assault shipping for a two-division assault was already in sight, subject to certain complications. He added that, so long as the target date for OVERLORD was 1 May, it had been necessary to arrange for landing craft to be in the U. K. by 1 March. Consequently, the intention had been to send all new construction of landing craft after that date to the Pacific. Now that it had been decided to postpone OVERLORD by 2-4 weeks, this new construction would come to the U. K. Nothing would be sent to the Pacific.

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that this was a fruitful contribution.

Some discussion followed on the subject of LSI(L)'s. Would it not be possible, asked THE PRIME MINISTER, to adapt merchant ships for this purpose instead of building special vessels?

ADMIRAL KING said that conversions of this character were in progress. The U. S. Navy used ships of 6,000-10,000 tons for this purpose, the monster liners being reserved for transportation of large bodies of troops across the Atlantic.

Some discussion followed about the increase of Japanese fighter strength in Southeast Asia, and, in connection with this matter, ADMIRAL KING pointed to the interrelation between the attack on

Rabaul and BUCCANEER. The Japanese air force was going to be in difficulties at two widely separated points.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that if it could be decided:

a. that ANVIL should go ahead on the basis of a two-division assault; and,

b. that Admiral Mountbatten should be instructed to do the best he could with the resources already allocated to him;

the picture would begin to be filled in. Of course, if Admiral Mountbatten said that he could do nothing, some of his resources could be taken away from him for other purposes.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that BUCCANEER might be left until after the monsoon; in fact this solution of the problem might be forced upon us by facts and figures.

ADMIRAL KING said that there was a definite commitment to the Generalissimo that there should be an amphibious operation in the spring.

THE PRIME MINISTER recalled that at the Plenary Meeting with the Generalissimo, the latter had said that it was essential that an amphibious operation should be undertaken simultaneously with TARZAN. He (THE PRIME MINISTER) had said quite firmly that he could not agree.⁴ The Generalissimo could be under no illusion about this.

THE PRESIDENT suggested the following plan of action:

a. Accept OVERLORD and ANVIL as the paramount operations of 1944.

b. Make every effort to get the additional 18-20 landing craft for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

c. Let Admiral Mountbatten be told that he could keep what he has got, but is going to get nothing else; and that he must do the best that he can.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL remarked that ANVIL had only come seriously into the picture last week. At the present, nobody knew whether a two-division assault would, or would not, be enough. It was merely a yardstick for the planning staffs to work on. It might well be that the proper strategy would be to get a lift for at least another division out of the Southeast Asia Command.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that for OVERLORD the assault was only 3½ divisions; and for ANVIL only a two-division assault was at present contemplated. Surely it would be better to employ all the BUCCANEER resources to strengthen up the European front.

ADMIRAL LEAHY entirely agreed with the idea of strengthening up the European front, but observed that BUCCANEER had been decided on a higher level than the Chiefs of Staff.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed to the great military advantages that

⁴ See *ante*, p. 315.

were to be gained by operations in the Aegean. If Turkey entered the war, there would be great political reactions. Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary might all fall into our hands. We ought to make these German satellites work for us.

MR. EDEN thought that Russia would probably agree to postponing the date for the Turkish entry into the war from 31 December 1943 to about 15 February 1944. As for Rumania, the Russians had, in the first place, refused to have anything to do with the feelers put out by Maniu, except on the basis of unconditional surrender. Maniu had now said that he was prepared to send a representative to negotiate on that basis. It was true that he did not represent the Government of Rumania, but there was always the possibility of a *coup d'etat*.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed to the great advantages that were to be gained by Rumania's entry into the war. If we could get a grip on the Balkans, there would be a tremendous abridgement of our difficulties. The next Conference might perhaps be held at Budapest! All this would help OVERLORD. He himself was not apprehensive about the landing; but the critical period would be at about the 30th day. It was therefore essential that the Germans should be held at every point, and that the whole ring should close in together.

There followed some discussion of the conduct of the political conversations with President Inonu.

THE PRESIDENT, summing up the discussion, asked whether he was correct in thinking that there was general agreement on the following points:

- a. Nothing should be done to hinder OVERLORD.
- b. Nothing should be done to hinder ANVIL.
- c. By hook or by crook we should scrape up sufficient landing craft to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean if Turkey came into the war.
- d. Admiral Mountbatten should be told to go ahead and do his best with what had already been allocated to him.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that it might be necessary to withdraw resources from BUCCANEER in order to strengthen up OVERLORD and ANVIL.

THE PRESIDENT said that he could not agree with this. We had a moral obligation to do something for China and he would not be prepared to forego the amphibious operation, except for some very great and readily apparent reason.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this "very good reason" might be provided by OVERLORD. At present the assault was only on a 3½ division basis, whereas we had put 9 divisions ashore in Sicily on the first day. The operation was at present on a very narrow margin.

FIELD MARSHAL DILL thought it was impossible for us to be strong at both OVERLORD and ANVIL.

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed that, from the military point of view, there was everything to be said for strengthening up OVERLORD and ANVIL at the expense of other theaters; but there were serious political issues at stake.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed with Field Marshal Dill and Admiral Leahy. He pointed out, however, that the difficulties in abandoning or postponing BUCCANEER were not merely political. If BUCCANEER was cancelled, the Generalissimo would not allow Chinese forces to take part in TARZAN. There would be no campaign in Upper Burma, and this would have its repercussion on the operations in the Pacific. There would be a revulsion of feeling in China; the effect on Japan would be bad, and the line of communication between Indochina [*India and China?*] would be at hazard.

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that he had never committed himself to the scale or timing of the amphibious operation in the South-east Asia Theater. Perhaps it might be advisable to revert to Akyab or Ramree.⁵

THE PRESIDENT said that the Generalissimo was anxious that we should secure a base from which the supply line from Bangkok could be bombed.

ADMIRAL KING, in reply to a question from the Prime Minister, said that he had no fear of the Japanese being able to retake the Andamans once we had occupied them. He added that any increase in the scale of BUCCANEER was out of the question.

The meeting concluded with an injunction from the President and Prime Minister to their respective staffs to meet together and try to reach agreement on the points at issue in the light of the discussion which had taken place.

⁵ For previous plans for limited operations against Akyab and Ramree, see Matloff, pp. 78, 79, 139 ff., and 234 ff.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, DECEMBER 4, 1943,
2:30 P. M., MENA HOUSE¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet
Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay

¹ C. C. S. 134th meeting.

Secretariat

Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland

Brigadier Redman
Commander Coleridge

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. CONCLUSIONS OF C. C. S. 133D MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 133d Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.²

2. INTEGRATED COMMAND OF U. S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN THE
EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA
(C. C. S. 400/1³ and 400/2⁴)

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he had not had time to study the United States Chiefs of Staff paper thoroughly but felt from a brief consideration of it that the points put forth by the British Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum on this subject had not been fully appreciated. He would like to discuss the matter quite frankly. He would like to make three points. Firstly, he fully conceded the right of the United States Chiefs of Staff to organize their own air forces as they saw fit. Secondly, in spite of this he would like to go on record as advising most strongly against the arrangements proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff since, in his view, they would not attain the objects desired, were quite unnecessary, and would prove inefficient. Finally, he would like to make it quite clear that, if in spite of his advice, the United States Chiefs of Staff made the reorganization they proposed, he, for his part, would do his utmost to ensure that it worked as smoothly as possible.

From paragraph 2 of the United States Chiefs of Staff paper, it was clear that the U. S. had sufficient personnel and equipment for each AAF group station to be organized to take care of the needs of two groups for brief periods. He had not appreciated this point.

The points which the U. S. reorganization was aimed to achieve were better coordination of the air operations based on Italy and the United Kingdom, the ability to take advantage of varying weather in the two theaters, and the ability of one man to decide on the movements of groups of aircraft from one theater to another.

² The record of the 133d meeting, as amended, is printed *ante*, pp. 668 ff.

³ *Ante*, p. 432.

⁴ *Post*, p. 787.

He would like to point out that after two or three years of experience in the operation of bombers, he considered that it was impossible to coordinate bomber operations from two theaters or work rigidly to a given program. The technical difficulties of getting some 2,000 aircraft in the air at a time required days of planning done by a committee which brought together all the best available knowledge. The final decision to launch the operation had to be taken within four or five hours of its taking place. No amount of unity of command or drive could overcome the inherent difficulties in the operation of large bomber forces.

In his view the insertion of an over-all air commander for Europe would merely insert another link in the chain of command.

With regard to the moving of groups, a quick decision was not always the right decision, and the views not only of the bomber commander but also of the theater commanders concerned must be considered. To give the power to move groups to one man who could take his decisions without consultation with others concerned might result in faulty decisions being taken and even in the movements of groups having to be countermanded by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The new proposals would, he believed, tend to break up the close integration which had been achieved between the Royal Air Force and the Eighth Bomber Command. The Air Ministry had a large staff fully integrated with all the R. A. F. commands in England, and here the operations of the various U. S. and British commands were coordinated. This was done under his own direction and he exercised his functions under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. To insert another commander over the U. S. Air Forces would rupture the present relations between the 8th Air Force and the Air Ministry.

The U. S. proposals would also result in the elimination of the present system of dual responsibility of the Chief of the Air Staff to the British Government and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It must be remembered that the United Kingdom was in the front line and the operations of the bomber forces from the U. K. were of vital moment to the life and industry of England. When the use of "Window"⁵ had been advocated, it had had to be debated in consultation with the British Government over a long period. If a supreme commander were appointed, he might take action of this nature on his own initiative since he would have no responsibility to the British Government.

From the Naval point of view the Commander of the Strategic Air Force would be divorced from that close contact now existing between the Air Ministry and the Admiralty. If, for example, the

⁵ Radar countermeasure, designed to confuse enemy radar readings.

German Fleet put to sea, the quickest possible action was required and aircraft of many different forces had to be brought to bear. For quick action in a case like this, coordination by the Chief of the Air Staff was, in his view, essential.

The question of additional staffs must also be considered. If the supreme commander for OVERLORD had only one air commander under him to deal with, then he, the supreme commander, did not require an air staff. If, however, there were two air commanders under him, the supreme commander must be provided with such a staff in order to integrate the two air commands. The Commander of the Strategic Air Force would also require a large staff which would be duplicating the staff already in existence in the Air Ministry. He (Sir Charles Portal) could not undertake any commitment to provide additional staffs.

With regard to the power of the Strategic Air Commander to move forces from one theater to another, he considered that no theater commander would advocate a system where he might, without consultation, be bereft of a large part of his air forces. His own proposal to deal with this matter was, briefly, that his (the Chief of the Air Staff's) own operation headquarters should be used by the 15th Air Force as it was used at present by the 8th Air Force, under himself, acting for the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He would then indicate or recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the targets for the 8th and 15th Air Forces and would move these forces as might be necessary after consultation with the theater commanders concerned.

He did not claim that he could vote against the U. S. proposal, but he did feel that he must most strongly advise against it. He would, however, if the United States Chiefs of Staff insisted on adhering to their proposal against his advice, move heaven and earth to make the new organization work.

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he would certainly allow General Eisenhower to use the 15th Air Force in his theater as might be necessary since he conceded the principle that a theater commander had a right in an emergency to use such forces as were in his theater provided that he informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of his action.

With regard to coordination between the Royal Air Force and the U. S. Strategic Air Forces, he felt that only one man must have authority over both or the interest of one must be subordinated to those of the other. For his part, he could not undertake to subordinate the operations of the R. A. F. to those of the 8th Air Force.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, he said the present position with regard to operations of the 8th Air Force was as satis-

factory as was possible without the full resources envisaged in the bomber plan. General Eaker had only some 75 percent of his full resources and was, as he had pointed out in his paper, therefore achieving only some 54 percent of the results expected. The program was, in fact, some three months behind. He realized the reasons which had caused this and would like to say that he felt that the 8th Air Force had done everything that was possible in the circumstances. General Eaker had done his utmost to keep the plan to schedule. In spite of his smaller resources, he had penetrated deep into Germany and had accepted the consequent losses. Air operations in Europe and in the Pacific could not be compared. In no other part of the world were our bomber forces up against some 1,600 German fighters over their own country.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the proposals he had put forward were designed in part to overcome the lack of flexibility in the operations of the U. S. bomber forces in Europe. They had not changed their technique. He had sent a series of inspectors to the United Kingdom to try to probe into the reasons for this. In other theaters 60 or 70 percent of available aircraft were used in operations. In the U. K. only some 50 percent were used. Even on this basis some 1,900 sorties had been launched during the month of September. There were approximately 1,300 bombers supplied to the U. K. This gave 800 with the units and a 50 percent reserve. In addition, two crews were provided. In spite of this, only once in the last month had 600 aircraft taken part in operations on one day.

He could see no reason why at least 70 percent of the planes available should not be regularly employed. The failure to destroy targets was due directly to the failure to employ planes in sufficient numbers. A sufficient weight of bombs was not being dropped on the targets to destroy them, nor was the proper priority of targets being followed.

With regard to the transfer of groups in the U. K., aircraft were flying on an average some five sorties per month whereas in North Africa six sorties per month were being achieved. The question of flexibility between the two theaters was, therefore, of the utmost importance. Transfers of groups must be made as proved necessary and a decision to make the transfer must be taken in 24 to 48 hours. The appointment of a Strategic Air Commander would not break up the close integration between the 8th Air Force and the Royal Air Force. Interchange of ideas must and would continue. The commander to be appointed would be responsible mainly for operations. Administration and supply would be handled by the theater commanders. Training, technique, and operational efficiency must all be improved. Only a new commander divorced from day-to-day routine could achieve this.

At present, the necessary drive and ideas were coming from Washington. He believed that more aircraft were being sent to the U. K. than were being effectively used and that unless better results could be achieved no more planes should be sent.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out the difficulties inherent in the operation of huge numbers of aircraft. The joint U. S. and British staffs had yet to learn fully their lessons on this point. If a commander were appointed who insisted on keeping the bomber force rigidly to the program, it would undoubtedly be found that, in fact, less sorties would be flown, and he, for one, could never permit his own fighters to escort bombers on a mission which he did not believe to be sound. It was not always right nor was it possible to keep rigidly to a plan laid down in advance.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it had always proved the case that a combat commander was loath to release any forces in his possession lest they should not return to him. As far as the air forces were concerned, there was required a commander for the strategic air both in Italy and in Europe who, by reason of his position, was not affected by this very human weakness. He realized that the U. K. was in the front line and that this entailed certain complications. He believed that the technique of precision daylight bombing was not being completely carried out in Europe. The U. S. daylight bombers were being operated from bases all over the world and in some of these places were achieving twice the results obtained in the U. K. Flexibility of thought and imagination were required. A huge force could not be allowed to collect in the U. K. unless it was employed to the maximum possible extent. Whether the 8th and 15th Air Forces were integrated or not, he still believed that a commander in England was required who could give full consideration to the many problems involved and impart the necessary drive. He suggested that action be deferred in order to afford additional time to consider the views put forward by Sir Charles Portal and General Arnold.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer consideration of C. C. S. 400/1 and 400/2.

3. MEDITERRANEAN COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS (C. C. S. 387/1)⁶

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer consideration on [of?] C. C. S. 387/1 pending receipt of a memorandum on the same subject by the British Chiefs of Staff.

⁶ C. C. S. 387/1 and 387/2 circulated drafts of a directive to the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, North Africa (Eisenhower). For C. C. S. 387, see *ante*, p. 150. The approved directive (C. C. S. 387/3) is printed *post*, p. 794.

4. OVER-ALL PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN (C. C. S. 417)⁷

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that C. C. S. 417 would serve as a basis for further work but that it required recasting in certain respects. Paragraph 2 *c* would, for instance, require revision in the light of the statements made by Marshal Stalin at EUREKA.⁸ He (General Brooke) was in agreement with the general concept set out in paragraph 4 that the main effort against Japan should be made in the Pacific. He was frankly disturbed with regard to present ideas on operations in Southeast Asia. The Supreme Allied Commander⁹ had recently put forward his views which he had stressed while present at SEXTANT,¹⁰ that once the operations in North Burma were undertaken, either they would have to be continued to complete the capture of the whole of Burma or, alternatively, our forces would have to withdraw when the monsoon stopped. The Supreme Allied Commander had also put forward his requirements in order to continue the campaign at the end of the monsoon. He feared that Burma might become a huge vacuum and if this were the case, it would not fit in with the strategic concept set out in the plan under consideration, i. e., that the main effort should be made in the Pacific.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he had always regarded operations in Burma as a diversionary effort.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff could not agree to an initial campaign in Burma without considering the implications of a large further effort or a retirement. It was now considered that the major effort must be made in the Pacific and large operations to recapture North Burma would not be in accordance with this concept.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that as he understood the position, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had not yet considered the provision of the additional requirements necessary to continue the campaign.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the paper should be returned to the Combined Staff Planners for further study in the light of a further assumption with regard to the necessity of continuing the reconquest of Burma if once the campaign were launched.

ADMIRAL KING agreed with this suggestion.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that it would obviously help the Combined Staff Planners in their further study if it could be agreed to accept paragraph 4 of the report. There were many logistic implications which would have to be taken into consideration.

⁷ For the text of this paper as amended, see *post*, p. 765.

⁸ See *ante*, p. 489. The proposal to revise paragraph 2 *c* was not put into effect.

⁹ Admiral Mountbatten.

¹⁰ See *ante*, pp. 312, 339, 347.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he felt that paragraph 6 *b*, of Annex III, was politically unacceptable since British heavy bombers must, to a large extent, be employed to fight the enemy rather than being used as transport aircraft.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he quite appreciated this point.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

a. That the following additional subparagraph 2 *d* should be inserted in the enclosure to C. C. S. 417:

“The possibility that a full campaign in Burma may have to be carried out following on the TARZAN operation.”

b. That the Combined Staff Planners should be instructed to re-examine and amend C. C. S. 417 in the light of the above, before re-submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5. OPERATION “RANKIN”

(C. C. S. 320/4)¹¹

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he understood that the proposal in C. C. S. 320/4 had been mentioned by the President to the Prime Minister.¹² He considered that it would have to be examined by the political agencies concerned in both countries.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the proposals would entail a crossing of the lines of communication. This did not appear acceptable from the military point of view.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the logistic implications had been briefly examined and found to be difficult but possible. They were most serious when the forces were most deeply committed, i. e., in RANKIN Case “A” and least serious in RANKIN Case “C.” It had been felt necessary to put forward this paper since at present COSSAC was planning on a different basis and an early decision was required in order to be prepared when the need arose.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that paragraph 3 should be amended to read, “That COSSAC be at once directed to examine and report on the implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of spheres of occupation.”¹³ This amendment was accepted.

After further discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to accept C. C. S. 320/4 as modified (subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 320/4 (Revised)).

¹¹ Not printed herein, but see C. C. S. 320/4 (Revised), *post*, p. 786.

¹² See *ante*, p. 674.

¹³ In the original phrasing, the words “to revise” appeared in place of “to examine and report on the implications of revising”.

6. REVIEW OF CONDITIONS IN EUROPE

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that Sir John Dill had suggested, and he himself fully agreed, that since some six weeks were required to prepare for Operation RANKIN, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should either fix a date for planning for this operation or review at monthly intervals the state of Europe in order that they could decide the date on which the operation might have to be mounted. Plans were kept up to date by COSSAC but six weeks were required to take up the necessary shipping.

After a brief discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to instruct the Combined Intelligence Committee to keep the situation in Europe under constant review in relation to RANKIN and to report on the first of each month regarding this to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

7. OCCUPATION OF EUROPE

The Combined Chiefs of Staff briefly discussed the occupation and administration of Europe after the defeat of Germany.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that each occupying power would be responsible for an area and that broad directives would be given by a centralized body. Occupation forces should be kept to a minimum and the maximum use made of the threat of air power and action by armored and mobile forces.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the administration must, wherever possible, be undertaken by the Germans with the necessary degree of military control by ourselves. A European Advisory Commission had already been set up in London.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that there might be difficulties due to the different methods adopted, for example, by ourselves and the Russians in administering adjacent territories.

8. RESULTS OF THE PLENARY SESSION HELD AT 1100, 3 [4] DECEMBER 1943 ¹⁴

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the conclusions of the plenary session held that morning.

GENERAL ISMAY presented a brief note¹⁵ setting out the general sense of the meeting on the main points considered.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the relationship of BUCCANEER to Operations OVERLORD and ANVIL and the naval, shipping, and landing craft requirements for these operations.

¹⁴ See *ante*, p. 675.

¹⁵ Not printed herein.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that since Operations OVERLORD and BUCCANEER had been planned for some time, the requirements for these were presumably available. The deficiency would lie in the resources necessary for Operation ANVIL. If necessary, he would do his utmost to provide the resources required for this operation, particularly in aircraft carriers.

After further discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, respectively, should draw up a paper setting out a draft of matters of high policy regarding the European Theater and the Southeast Asia Command; these papers to be exchanged this evening and considered at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff tomorrow at 1100.¹⁶

¹⁶ See *post*, p. 700.

**FIRST TRIPARTITE MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT,
DECEMBER 4, 1943, 5 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA ¹**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	TURKEY
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	President İnönü
Mr. Hopkins	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Minister
Mr. Steinhardt	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Menemencioğlu
	Sir Hughe Knatchbull-	Mr. Anderiman ²
	Hugessen	
	Air Vice Marshal George	
	Mr. Helm	

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United States—United Kingdom Agreed Minutes

SECRET

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT welcomed the opportunity of discussion with the Turkish President. It was important that as many Nations as possible should join the United Nations, now numbering about 35, and Turkey's accession to the United Nations would be welcomed. They were concerned not only with winning the war but also with the period

¹ For a statement of January 3, 1944, to the effect that Roosevelt had discussed a trusteeship for Indochina with the Turks, the Egyptians, and perhaps others while on his trip, see *post*, p. 864. As the minutes of the discussions with the Turks do not cover this point, it is not clear whether Roosevelt's discussion of the subject with the Turks took place during the First Cairo Conference (see the reference to his conversation of November 24, 1943, with Saracoglu, *ante*, p. 345), or the Second Cairo Conference.

² Mr. Anderiman acted as interpreter.

after the war, and for both, unity of Nations was necessary to achieve the purpose of them all. At Tehran important decisions had been reached.

(1) *As regards the war itself.* Agreement had been come to for operations in 1944 for Russian, British and American Forces in such a way that an Anglo-American Second Front would be opened on a very large scale. This would be timed with an increase of Russian pressure, so that attacks would be developed against Germany from all sides.

(2) *As regards post-war problems.* It must be seen to that Germany and Japan did not start another war in 20 years' time.

MR. CHURCHILL pointed out that he had assured the Turkish President and Government that the British Government would not invoke the alliance³ or ask them to join the war unless and until such action could be taken without unfair risk for Turkey, for whom he had great regard. He now thought the moment had come when Turkey should very seriously consider associating herself with the great Allies. The dangers which had been present at the time of the Adana Conference⁴ had now very largely passed away. The advantages to Turkey from joining in the war would be permanent and lasting, more particularly from the point of view of Turkish relations with Russia. These were causing Turkey anxiety, but if Turkey accepted the invitation being put to her, Turco-Russian relations would be put on the best possible footing. Turkey would sit on the Bench with Russia, America and the United Kingdom and the other United Nations. Turkey's great friend and Ally felt it would be a pity if she now missed her chance. In a few months, perhaps six, German resistance might be broken, and Turkey, if she did not accept the invitation now, might then find herself alone, not on the Bench, but wandering about in Court. It would be dangerous if Turkey now missed the chance of joining the English speaking peoples numbering, excluding coloured races, some two hundred million souls. There were risks either way. But if Turkey associated herself with the United Nations she would also be associated with Russia, one of the strongest military Powers in the world, if not the strongest, at any rate in Europe and Asia. President Roosevelt and he had been authorized by Marshal Stalin to assure President Inönü that, if Turkey entered the war against Germany or if Germany attacked Turkey, and Bulgaria took action, Russia would at once declare war on Bulgaria.⁵

³ For the British-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed at Ankara, October 19, 1939, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167.

⁴ A conference between United Kingdom and Turkish leaders, including Churchill and İnönü, held at Adana, Turkey, on January 30, 1943; see Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, pp. 704 ff.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 537.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT remarked that Marshal Stalin had been very clear about that. The moment Bulgaria acted, Russia would declare war.

MR. CHURCHILL also asked President Inonu to note that at Tehran the Soviet Union had signed, with Great Britain and the United States, a new undertaking to respect Persia.⁶

MR. CHURCHILL said that these were important declarations. If in the circumstances Turkey should feel inclined, at the request of her ally, Great Britain, who was now invoking the Alliance, and of the two greatest Powers in the world, America and the Soviet Union, to throw in her lot with them *in the near future*, we could then go ahead and consider how best to help Turkey with her preparations, more particularly against the possibility of German and Bulgarian aerial attack. The publicity side was also most important, as the greatest possible time should be gained for preparation before everything became known. Finally it would be necessary to discuss the nature of the campaign to be waged by Turkey, i. e., whether it should take an offensive or defensive form.

MR. CHURCHILL said that the entry of Turkey into the Grand Alliance of 35 nations would bring about great international changes. Roumania was now begging for peace. Hungary wished to get out of the war. Bulgaria was greatly divided. Mr. Churchill's own opinion (and he had been associated with European politics for about 35 years) was that the entry of Turkey into the war, arranged in the right way and at the right time, would bring about a series of land-slides in these countries. It would be most fruitful and welcome.

After a brief interval PRESIDENT INONU said that he attached the greatest importance to this meeting. When he learnt that President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill wished to study and discuss the situation with him in full sympathy and friendship, the possibility of the discussion was envisaged by his country and by the Turkish Assembly with the greatest confidence. He expressed thanks for the invitation and for the offer of study.

THE TURKISH PRESIDENT said that since the beginning his country had taken a clear decision—to stand beside those who were fighting the cause of the United Nations. She had been one of the first so to state her position clearly. The war had shown great fluctuations and difficulties, but throughout Turkey had remained firmly anchored to her Alliance with Great Britain, and to the ideas which she postulated for the future of humanity. In this decision Turkey had not been moved by any egotistical or personal interest.

⁶ The document under reference is the Declaration on Iran, *ante*, p. 646.

In connection with the object in view, it was equitable to think of the method which those who had provoked this war had used to convince their peoples—vengeance, etc. Turkey had been one of the greatest victims of the last war. From the first moment, however, she had decided firmly and seriously to collaborate with those who were fighting for the fraternity of peoples, and she had remained faithful throughout the years. These had not been without risks for Turkey. She had been alone and isolated. Great Britain had gone through a hard time and had fought gallantly. In her own way Turkey had done her best and she had sacrificed none of her principles.

PRESIDENT INONU said that he did not want to go over all the ground, but President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill would remember that the Turkish attitude had been appreciated, and the Turks were very pleased at the repeated assurances of this appreciation. At the moment when Germany was about to declare war on Greece,⁷ she gave as one of the reasons for doing so that the Greeks had sent an officer to Ankara for consultation. (MR. CHURCHILL pointed out that it had only been a pretext.) PRESIDENT INONU said that this was typical, and no doubt had Germany thought it worth while to make Turkey pay for her policy, she would have done so.

Now, however, PRESIDENT INONU continued, the situation had totally changed. Mr. Churchill had outlined the advantages which would accrue to Turkey if she joined in the war. President Inonu must, however, first point out that so long as Turkey was not in the war she was not in danger. He could not accept the thesis that there would be danger for Turkey in staying out. Turkey's attitude was not a matter for discussion. Turkey knew her engagement and she had replied to the invitation. She wished to collaborate with her Allies. She remained faithful to the principles which she had embraced from the first moment.

The points which President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill had disclosed were of great importance. The Soviet engagement about Persia and collaboration in connection with Bulgaria were of appreciable value. The Turkish reply of November 17th⁸ had re-affirmed Turkey's desire to collaborate. Naturally Turkey had to state conditions, political and otherwise. But practical considerations, i. e., military needs etc., came before all others. Turkey was alone. If Germany declared war on her, the situation would be dangerous. Turkey was not prepared. From the beginning of the war there had been talk of preparation, and help had come along, sometimes quickly and sometimes more slowly. To a certain extent this was fair. The Turks had asked for aeroplanes and tanks, but these had often been

⁷ Germany declared war against Greece on April 6, 1941.

⁸ See Hull's telegram of November 22, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 374.

refused. The President had agreed to these not being supplied when he was assured that they were needed for active operations. In face of this assurance he had had nothing to say. If, however, the reason was not active military requirements elsewhere, but because, for one consideration or another, it was not desired to supply them, the position was entirely different.

A general discussion ensued at this point as to what the Turkish President meant by consideration. He said that in spite of events Turkish cordiality had remained steadfast. When the Germans were at Stalingrad and El Alemein [*Alamein*], i. e., at the most dangerous moment of all, the Turks had renewed their assurances. On one occasion a British statement had linked together Turkey and Spain as neutrals and the Turks had at once taken exception to this. The Turks had not changed, and they did not tolerate suspicion. Actually, and although Turkey was feeble, she had done well behind her curtain, and the Turks were happy about what they had done. To the British Ambassador, at the dangerous moment, he had repeated his advice "be strong in Egypt". All this background conscientiously pushed him to a decision. But he was not ready. Supposing Germany collapsed tonight or tomorrow, everybody would be happy, he alone would be anxious, because Turkey had not come in.

MR. CHURCHILL said that he had always realised that Turkey's pre-occupation was Russia. But Turkey's only sure course was with the Allies. As he had said at Adana, if Turkey were to come with the Allies at the chosen moment, it would be in the interest not only of Turkey but of the whole world.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT said there was no implication of a threat. The advantages to Turkey had been explained. The United States was 3,000 miles away, but would always remain Turkey's friend. The United Kingdom would also be the friend of her old Ally. The big question for Turkey was Russia, and if he (President Roosevelt) were President of Turkey, he would consider very seriously the advantages offered by the opportunity of making friends with Russia—MR. CHURCHILL interjected "to bind themselves with Russia".

PRESIDENT INONU said he dealt with the past in order to arrive at one point. He had wanted to explain Turkey's entirely loyal attitude. The war might finish with or without Turkey's collaboration. In neither event would egotistical factors dominate. He had, of course, to pay attention to the interests of his country, but Turkey remained faithful to her original decision of association with the common cause. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had responded to the invitation of a month ago, and the Turkish Government had replied.⁹

⁹ The reference is presumably to the Turkish note of November 17, 1943.

Turkey wished to be with the Allies. But there was the practical side, and the practical difficulties must be resolved. Turkey was not prepared. If the Allies were prepared to meet the minimum essential requirements of Turkey, and if after these had been met Turkey could be useful to the Allies, "we will come with you".

But the Germans would understand. They knew that there was effective collaboration, and that Turkey was doing many things which were incompatible with neutrality. It was for this reason and in order to gain time for preparation that the Germans had been told that the Allies had asked Turkey to come into the war, but that she had refused. It was possible that Germany did not believe this statement. In any case, she would watch every development most carefully. So far Germany had raised no strong objection to Turkey's actions. There had been no serious protests against her unneutral actions. Turkey was not in the war and perhaps Germany still thought that she would not come into it. But if the day came when Germany was persuaded that Turkey was coming into the war, the Germans would react to the utmost of their ability.

MR. CHURCHILL agreed, but said that Germany could not do nearly as much as she could have done previously.

PRESIDENT INONU said that the Turks had considered all these things. It was true that Germany could not execute a campaign from Istanbul to Syria. She could, however, by air action do vast destruction and could seize Istanbul. She had the material readily available to the westward of Turkey, where it had been concentrated for two reasons, as a menace to Turkey and to prevent the Allies getting at her.

PRESIDENT INONU said, however, that for him there was one practical point, i. e., the capacity to defend herself with the minimum indispensable requirements. It was essential that in the period of preparation the Germans should not be provoked. If the Allies have no confidence in Turkey they would not discuss future developments until the period of preparation was over. If they had confidence they could discuss plans now.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT remarked that this was reasonable.

PRESIDENT INONU said that so far preparations and supplies had not been encouraging. If a new decision were taken it would depend on the Allies how long it would be before Turkey was ready. He could not say. But essential things must be provided. Turkey had mobilised everything she had, even material dating from the Middle Ages.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT enquired the position as regards anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, and was told that so far about 800 of the latter had been provided.

MR. CHURCHILL said that this was more than the United Kingdom had at the outbreak of war.

PRESIDENT INONU said that no doubt Turkey's Allies sometimes asked themselves why they should go on sending supplies to Turkey if she was never going to come into the war. The Turks for their part complained that although they were not given supplies, they were still asked to come into the war. It was a vicious circle. But Turkey could be got in for the last stage of the war if there were collaboration. He would be glad if the war were over in two months without Turkey acquiring any glory. He thought, however, that the war would last another year, and there was therefore plenty of time for Turkey to help.

MR. CHURCHILL said it was most important that Turkey should decide to enter the war when her influence would be greatest, and so take her place among the victorious nations. It was essential to shorten as much as possible the conflict, which was costing so much in blood and treasure.

PRESIDENT INONU said he could contemplate two things, (1) a plan of preparation involving supplies to Turkey and (2) a plan of collaboration. It was naturally essential that effective collaboration should be studied by the military experts, and he hoped it would be studied on a big basis. What would suit Turkey best would be that she should fight side by side with British and American contingents in her own part of the world. The President and Mr. Churchill could however say that they had made their plans embracing the whole field of world operations, and that Turkey's role was so and so. That he would understand. What he would not accept was a background of suspicion of Turkey's intentions, and a demand to come into the war blindly, with a statement that when Turkey had entered the war she would be told what her part was to be.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT and MR. CHURCHILL vigorously disclaimed any such intention. Discussions could start now on the two stages indicated, and PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT said that there was no question of Turkey being asked to come in and wait for a month or six weeks without any air protection. They contemplated building up that protection at once. When that had been done by a certain date, Turkey could come in without the risk of having Istanbul bombed to the ground. If President Inonu could accept this in principle, the military authorities could take up the question and get ready.

MR. CHURCHILL pointed out that this work was already in hand, and he hoped that in a few weeks the preparations would be complete so that the air bases could then be used for attacks on the German held islands. A programme could be arranged.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT suggested that nothing should be done to induce German attacks.

MR. CHURCHILL said that there was always a danger of this. The Turks had been asked to allow 7000 personnel to be infiltrated, and that involved some risk.¹⁰

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT suggested that the personnel might enter Turkey in plain clothes.

MR. CHURCHILL said that it would be impossible to avoid dangerous moments. It might be that two-thirds of the preparatory work would be completed when the Germans would become convinced that Turkey was irrevocably committed and would act. This danger could not be eliminated. It should, however, be reduced to a minimum by precautions, camouflage etc.

PRESIDENT INONU said that the period of preparation would be a delicate one in spite of all precautions. These precautions must, however, be taken and preparations made sincerely and seriously. He did not think that four or five or six weeks would be enough for the preparations, but if in that time the anti-aircraft preparations were got ready, that would be something.

MR. CHURCHILL said that in six or seven weeks the anti-aircraft defences could be in a good state. Moreover, in that time the strategic situation might have changed appreciably. There might, for instance, be a considerable change in the strategic situation as a result of the Russian advance towards Roumania.

MR. CHURCHILL then said that he contemplated a programme somewhat on the following lines:

(1) A declaration after the present Conference that Turkish policy had not changed.

(2) A period of approximately six weeks during which material, especially for anti-aircraft defence, would be pushed into Turkey.

(3) Immediately thereafter, the placing of British and American combat squadrons on the prepared air fields.

(4) German protests and Turkey's diplomatic reply, but steady continuation of reinforcement and preparation.

(5) Reactions in the satellite countries—Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary. These reactions would be very important, as they would dominate the attitude of Germany. Throughout this period Turkey would continue to send supplies including chrome (but only a little) to Germany. The Germans would be afraid to push things too far. They would be afraid of the Turkish advance towards belligerency having the effect on Bulgaria of making her change sides.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT confirmed that in this phase American heavy bombers, which had already made two raids on Sofia, would be

¹⁰ The request referred to is apparently one which had been made by the Attachés at Ankara of the British Armed Services, in discussions with the Turkish General Staff; see *post*, p. 718.

attacking Bulgaria on a scale much greater than they had done hitherto.

MR. CHURCHILL added that at the right moment in this stage the Bulgarian Government would learn that a Bulgarian declaration of war on Turkey would automatically mean a Russian declaration of war on Bulgaria.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT again stressed the importance of this Russian assurance, and remarked that he had been surprised when Marshal Stalin had volunteered it.

At this stage (7 p. m.) the meeting was adjourned.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT suggested that President Inonu would no doubt wish to consider what had been said and the conversations would be continued later.

QUADRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING, DECEMBER 4, 1943, 8:30 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
Mr. Steinhardt
Major Boettiger

TURKEY

President İnönü
Foreign Minister Mene-
mencioğlu
Mr. Açıkalın
Mr. Anderiman
Mr. Sarper

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Hughe Knatchbull-
Hugessen

SOVIET UNION

Mr. Vinogradov
Mr. Mikhailov

Editorial Note

No official record of the conversation at this meeting has been found. Leahy, p. 214, writes:

"... President Roosevelt on December 4 gave a dinner in honor of the Turkish President. It was an interesting affair, all the conversation being in French, which the President spoke without hesitation.

"After the dinner, the Prime Minister joined the party and promptly laid siege to President İnönü to induce him to cast the fate of his country with the Allies. Churchill did most of the talking. İnönü just listened. Later, the President told his British colleague that if he, Roosevelt, were a Turk, he would require more assurance of aid than Britain had promised before abandoning neutrality and leading his nation into war."

The list of those present is derived from the *Log, ante*, p. 657, which includes Churchill in the dinner list. The second Russian listed is presumably Sergey Sergeyevich Mikhailov, of the Soviet Embassy at Ankara.

McCLOY-JEBB MEETING, DECEMBER 4, 1943, EVENING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. McCloy

UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. Jebb
Major General Kirby

Editorial Note

No record of the conversation at this meeting has been found. The place and hour of the meeting are not known. The principal topics of discussion were apparently the proposed liaison procedure between the European Advisory Commission and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, British attitudes toward the adoption of this procedure, and the desirability of McCloy's going to London to advocate there its adoption. See *post*, pp. 790, 793, and *ante*, p. 354.

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1943¹

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, DECEMBER 5, 1943,
10:30 A. M., MENA HOUSE²

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet
Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay

Secretariat

Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland

Brigadier Redman
Commander Coleridge

¹ Besides the subjects indicated below as having been discussed by the United States Chiefs of Staff with the British Chiefs of Staff during the meetings held on December 5, 1943, the two groups also discussed on this date the question of making Rome an open city; see *post*, p. 801.

² C. C. S. 135th meeting.

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF CONCLUSIONS OF C. C. S. 134TH MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 134th Meeting. The detailed report of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.³

2. DRAFT AGREEMENT BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
(C. C. S. 423 and 423/1) ⁴

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them draft agreements prepared by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, respectively.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he felt that the United States Chiefs of Staff paper expressed better the views put forward at the Plenary Session of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the President and the Prime Minister.⁵ The United States Chiefs of Staff believed that Operation TARZAN and a simultaneous amphibious operation were essential. The Supreme Commander ⁶ must be told to do his best with the amphibious forces available to him. The British Chiefs of Staff paper, on the other hand, visualized the abandonment of the amphibious operation. If no agreement could be reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff it would be necessary for the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to submit their different views to the President and Prime Minister.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were in agreement militarily and only in disagreement on the political aspects of the operations in Southeast Asia.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he did not think this was the case. The United States Chiefs of Staff believed that the abandonment of the amphibious operation would mean either the failure or the abandonment of TARZAN. In the latter case, there would be serious military repercussions throughout the Pacific. In his opinion, the military implications of the abandonment of the amphibious operation were therefore equally as important as the political implications. He considered that the enemy must be engaged in Burma, since unless this were done, they would be able to stop the supply route to China.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he did not believe this would be the case, since if there was no land battle, the whole Allied air force could be directed against the Japanese air instead of supporting the troops.

³ The minutes as amended are printed *ante*, p. 681.

⁴ Neither printed herein. The agreed memorandum (C. C. S. 423/2) for the President and the Prime Minister is printed *post*, p. 796.

⁵ See *ante*, pp. 675 ff.

⁶ Admiral Mountbatten.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that if there were no land operations the Japanese could put more air forces into their many fields out of range of our fighters.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL reminded General Arnold that the ferry route was now being flown at night. Though our fighters might not be able to reach the Japanese airfields, our bombers could, and this form of attack would prove increasingly effective with the good weather now prevailing. In Sicily it had been possible completely to defeat the German air effort by intensified bombing.

GENERAL ARNOLD said he agreed that more could be done with better weather, but it must be remembered that the Japanese were on interior lines and had a very large number of airfields available.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he considered that it was not only a question of cutting the air line; there was also the Japanese ground effort to be considered. The appointment of Admiral Mountbatten⁷ with its consequent publicity had resulted in large Japanese reinforcements to the area. If Operation TARZAN were not carried out, this large Japanese force would take the initiative and could not be stopped by the use of long range penetration groups only. The Japanese could carry out a ground campaign against our lines of communication to China. The Chinese might well be better in defensive operations than in the offensive, but their task would be a difficult one. We had provoked an increased Japanese garrison, and to take no action against it would have serious results in relation to our supply line to China. Further, extraordinary efforts had been made to increase our forces in the area, and these increased forces would now remain immobile. All this was based on the assumption that if no amphibious operation took place, Operation TARZAN would also not take place. This in turn was based on the assumption that the Chinese would not advance unless the amphibious operation took place. There were therefore strong military reasons why the amphibious operation should take place, and there would be serious military implications if it did not take place, particularly in the Southwest Pacific. If it were possible to abandon the amphibious operation and still to do the North Burma campaign, he personally would not be seriously disturbed. He did not believe, however, that without the amphibious operation, there would be any Burma campaign.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL asked if it was considered that the amphibious operation was essential on purely military grounds.

GENERAL MARSHALL expressed the personal view that it would be of assistance but was not vital.

⁷ In August 1943.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then drew attention to paragraph 7 of the United States Chiefs of Staff paper. Had the implications of the proposal that the Supreme Commander should be told that he must do his best with the resources already allocated to him been fully considered? He had now put forward his requirements, which were in excess of the resources he now had. There seemed two courses open to him; either to carry out the operation with these smaller resources and risk a reverse, or to ask to be relieved of the task.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that there was no insistence on Operation BUCCANEER. He could, for example, undertake the amphibious operation against Ramree instead. He recalled that prior to Guadalcanal, the commanders had felt that the operation was impossible of achievement without additional resources, yet it had been undertaken and had been successful.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that there were admittedly advantages in the taking of the Andaman Islands. They would form a base not only for reconnaissance, but to some extent for bombing Bangkok and the Japanese lines of communication. They would also form a good stepping-off place for a further advance on Sumatra. Their seizure would, however, produce for ourselves a very heavy commitment in maintenance. They were a thousand miles away from our nearest base. They were surrounded by Japanese air and it would be difficult to supply them to an extent which would make their use possible. In his opinion, the capture of the Andamans was not worth the candle, except as a stepping-stone to a southward advance. In this connection, however, it had been agreed that the main effort should be made in the Pacific, and therefore neither amphibious operations against the Andamans nor against Ramree were worthwhile.

ADMIRAL KING said that all were agreed that the capture of Ramree would not give us much. He realized that the abandonment of BUCCANEER might fit in with the British view that it would be best to withdraw the Eastern Fleet to the Mediterranean.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM denied this suggestion.

ADMIRAL KING, continuing, said that he felt that the commander of the Eastern Fleet^s would feel more secure if he had an air base in the Andamans. He (ADMIRAL KING) was much concerned over the success of TARZAN. He had always felt that the Andaman operation was the most useful one with the means available, far better, for instance, than CULVERIN. On purely military grounds he considered that Operation BUCCANEER was as much a part of TARZAN as ANVIL was of OVERLORD.

^s Admiral Sir James Somerville.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he felt that the military implications had been overstated. If Operation BUCCANEER were not undertaken, the Chinese forces might withdraw from TARZAN, but they were, even at present, an unknown factor, and reports suggested that their troops now in action were not too promising. With regard to the security of the air route to China, he did not believe that this would be seriously threatened. The Assam airfields could be protected and Japanese air bases bombed. An offensive-defensive should hold the Japanese forces, coupled as it would be by a serious threat. We had, in fact, by our preparations in the Southeast Asia Command, built up an ideal cover plan which would hold the Japanese forces away from the Pacific front. He did not regard Operation BUCCANEER as a justifiable diversion from our main object.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the 14th Air Force was operating "on a shoestring." They were operating at only 50% of their strength, through lack of supplies. Transport aircraft were being shot down, and for each one of these lost, 3 aircraft must stay on the ground. If our aircraft were grounded, the Japanese could then attack Kunming, and knock out our aircraft on the ground.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that if the Chinese troops refused to advance from Yunnan, then we should be relieved from the need to supply them with 3,000 tons per month by air, and this tonnage could be diverted to the use of the 14th Air Force.

ADMIRAL KING felt that it would, on the other hand, be necessary to give more to the Chinese in order to assist them to defend the Kunming base.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that as he saw it, there were three threats: firstly, the air threat against our bases in Assam; secondly, the air threat to the transport line itself, which was difficult to contend with, since the Japanese airfields were numerous and well scattered, and full use was made of dispersal; thirdly, the threat to Kunming both by ground and more particularly air action.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL asked if it was agreed that if BUCCANEER was abandoned and the amphibious lift of 35,000 men was transferred to Europe, it would be of the greatest assistance to OVERLORD and ANVIL.

ADMIRAL KING said that on this basis it might be suggested that resources should be given up from the Pacific to OVERLORD and ANVIL.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that this consideration too, ought not to be ruled out. The British Chiefs of Staff felt no doubt that the abandonment of BUCCANEER must increase the chances of success of OVERLORD and ANVIL and must therefore be accepted. We could not afford to take chances with either of these two operations. The abandonment of BUCCANEER would give far greater military advantages to

the war as a whole than the disadvantages entailed in its postponement.

After further discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to put forward a memorandum to the President and Prime Minister setting out the various points of agreement and disagreement (subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 423/2).⁹

3. INTEGRATED COMMAND OF U. S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN THE EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA (C. C. S. 400,¹⁰ 400/1¹¹ and 400/2¹²)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Took note of the alterations proposed by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff to the draft directive proposed by them in C. C. S. 400/2.

b. Agreed to defer action on these papers.

4. DIRECTIVE FOR UNIFICATION OF COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (C. C. S. 387/1 and 387/2)¹³

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed the directive for unification of command in the Mediterranean on the basis of C. C. S. 387/2. Certain amendments were suggested and agreed to in this paper.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted C. C. S. 387/2 as amended in the course of the discussion (subsequently circulated as 387/3).

5. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION AGAINST THE SOUTH OF FRANCE (C. C. S. 424)¹⁴

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to consider C. C. S. 424 at their meeting to be held at 1500 that afternoon.¹⁵

6. DIRECTIVE FOR INTENSIFICATION OF SUPPORT OF PARTISAN FORCES IN YUGOSLAVIA (C. C. S. 425)¹⁶

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Approved the draft directive to Commander in Chief, Allied Forces in North Africa¹⁷ with regard to Balkan support, and

⁹ *Post*, p. 796.

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 228.

¹¹ *Ante*, p. 432.

¹² *Post*, p. 787.

¹³ Neither printed herein, but see C. C. S. 387, *ante*, p. 150, and C. C. S. 387/3, *post*, p. 794.

¹⁴ *Post*, p. 797.

¹⁵ See *post*, p. 723.

¹⁶ C. C. S. 425 (not printed herein) was the report by the Combined Staff Planners submitting the text of the draft directive referred to in this paragraph.

¹⁷ General Eisenhower.

b. Instructed the Secretaries to include this directive in the main directive to the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean, now being issued.¹⁸

¹⁸ The directive, as amended, became Appendix B to C. C. S. 387/3, *post*, p. 795.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, DECEMBER 5, 1943, 11 A. M.,¹ ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
(in the chair)
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet
Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay

Secretariat

Captain Royal

Brigadier Hollis

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*²

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT read out to the Conference a report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff³ on operations in the European Theater. The point at issue between the two staffs was Operation BUCCANEER, and on this agreement still remained to be reached. He would like to have had a document to which signatures could be affixed.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the difficulty might be overcome if the date of BUCCANEER could be advanced. Would it be possible to do it, for example, in January?

GENERAL MARSHALL said that this would not be possible.

THE PRESIDENT inquired what date Admiral Mountbatten had given for the operation.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that Southeast Asia Command were working to a date in the middle of March.

¹ According to the Log, *ante*, p. 658, the meeting began at 11:30 a. m.

² For a statement made by King apparently at this meeting, in addition to the statements recorded in these minutes, see *post*, p. 720.

³ *Post*, p. 796.

ADMIRAL LEAHY remarked that if a mid-March date was adopted, the landing craft could not be returned to the European Theater till the beginning of May.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was disturbed at the growth in the forces required for BUCCANEER. If a superiority of 10 to 1 was required, this, in fact, made the conduct of war impossible. Could not BUCCANEER be postponed till after the monsoon and the Generalissimo be informed that, as a result of developments arising from the discussions with the Russians, we could not carry out BUCCANEER as originally contemplated? TARZAN would, of course, be carried out as arranged.

THE PRESIDENT said that the Generalissimo had left Cairo quite clearly under the impression that an amphibious operation would be carried out simultaneously with TARZAN.⁴ He, the President, was a little dubious about putting all our eggs in one basket. Suppose Marshal Stalin was unable to be as good as his word; we might find that we had forfeited Chinese support without obtaining commensurate help from the Russians.

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that BUCCANEER would not really influence Chinese continuation in the war. This would depend much more upon the supplies she received over the "hump."

MR. HOPKINS inquired whether, if BUCCANEER took place on 1 March, landing craft and naval forces could leave the Indian Ocean for ANVIL?

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM did not think this would be possible. A considerable portion of the naval forces would have to remain in the vicinity of BUCCANEER, perhaps up to a month, after the assault.

ADMIRAL KING agreed that the follow-up for BUCCANEER might take up to four weeks before the ships in any numbers could be released. This would leave no margin at all for fitting them in to OVERLORD or ANVIL, even assuming that these operations took place in late May.

MR. HOPKINS inquired whether the Combined Staffs had examined the adequacy of a two-divisional assault for ANVIL.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this question had not yet been examined in detail.

THE PRIME MINISTER, reverting to BUCCANEER, said that there was no question of providing any additional forces. When Admiral Mountbatten was told this, he would be quite likely to say that he could not do BUCCANEER and revert to BULLFROG. This was an operation which found favor with no one. The next step would be to discuss the possibilities of an amphibious operation in the Southeast Asia Theater with the Force Commanders.

⁴ See *ante*, pp. 347, 350.

SIR JOHN DILL inquired as to the earliest date for OVERLORD. It was generally agreed that no specific date had been set.

A discussion followed regarding the phases of the moon in May 1944. It was finally ascertained that the full moon would be on 8 May and the new moon on 22 May.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that ANVIL might take place at the same time as OVERLORD or possibly a week later.

MR. HOPKINS said as far as he could see, the situation was about as follows:

There were probably sufficient landing craft for a two-division lift for ANVIL; there were also landing craft available for BUCCANEER and landing craft provided for OVERLORD on the scale now planned, although possibly inadequate in the latter case for an additional lift which might be hoped for. Unless the Chiefs of Staff have ascertained that there are sufficient landing craft for the *required* assault on Southern France, then there would definitely not be enough landing craft for these operations.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that while it was apparent that there was sufficient lift for two divisions for ANVIL it was unquestionably true that a greater lift would be more likely to insure the success of the operation. He felt that if the Generalissimo could be induced to put his forces into TARZAN without accomplishing BUCCANEER, it might be a good thing.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he felt there were a good many new, revolutionary ideas recently injected as regards the relationship between BUCCANEER and TARZAN.

MR. HOPKINS inquired as to whether it was not a question that OVERLORD and ANVIL are of such great importance that they should be augmented if possible.

MR. ANTHONY EDEN said that it was unfortunate that we cannot separate BUCCANEER and TARZAN and continually have to consider them connected.

ADMIRAL KING said that if the BUCCANEER operation was postponed, he believed there would be no operations in Burma after the monsoon except possibly as a part of other incidental operations.

GENERAL BROOKE said if we do TARZAN and then run on into the monsoon we cannot sit still; we must go on. There are two further steps. The next operation is to go down to Mandalay and the Irrawaddy. The subsequent operation is to continue on to Rangoon.

The PRIME MINISTER observed that operations on land such as TARZAN would not cut into OVERLORD or ANVIL.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL inquired whether it would not be possible to substitute some form of amphibious operations in lieu of BUCCANEER.

The Generalissimo had made a special point of naval operations. It might be possible to organize commando groups and make a descent on some part of the coast. He considered that commando raids supported by naval forces would fulfill the Generalissimo's requirements. He believed that operations of this sort would be suitable without making a definite commitment which we will have to continue further. He also believed that the Generalissimo might be told that amphibious operations on a large scale could be carried out after the monsoon.

ADMIRAL KING said that Sir Charles Portal probably meant some sort of "hit-and-run" operations.

MR. HOPKINS inquired whether or not the Chiefs of Staff would get any further if they sent Admiral Mountbatten a wire. He inquired whether the Chiefs of Staff would recommend against the whole business if Admiral Mountbatten said he could not accomplish BUCCANEER with the means available. Would the Chiefs of Staff still tell Admiral Mountbatten to go ahead and do what he could with what he had?

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that both OVERLORD and ANVIL were known to be of great importance and will be seriously affected by a diversion such as BUCCANEER.

MR. HOPKINS said he understood there was nothing in any C. C. S. paper to the effect that landing craft were not available for either OVERLORD or ANVIL. On the other hand, the Chiefs of Staff had never stipulated that there should be a six-division assault for OVERLORD or a three-division assault for ANVIL.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the Southeast Asia Command had 50,000 men against 5,000 Japs and were now asking for more.

MR. HOPKINS said it made no difference in the number of landing craft whether 30,000 men or 50,000 men were being used for BUCCANEER because the size of the initial assault was gauged by the number of landing craft. He asked if Lord Mountbatten's landing craft were made available in the Mediterranean, how many more men could be lifted?

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM replied that Admiral Mountbatten's lift is about 25,000 men. In other words, these landing craft meant an additional lift of about one division for ANVIL. He also believed that the landing craft from the Indian Ocean could get to OVERLORD in time if necessary.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the difficulty in lifting additional troops in the initial assault for OVERLORD was a function of the ports available. There was already considerable port congestion anticipated in England with a lift of the 4½ divisions contemplated. He further observed that his understanding was that the number of

troops in the initial OVERLORD assault was predicated on what could properly be used on the available landing front in France.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that, in his view, the landing could be extended and use made of other beaches.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that the LSI (L)'s could be more economically employed in the longer Mediterranean hauls than in the short cross-Channel haul.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that while he did not feel committed to an amphibious operation on any specific date in Southeast Asia, he realized the difficulty which faced the President with regard to the Generalissimo. Either Admiral Mountbatten should plan for BUCCANEER with the existing resources or start sending back the forces at once. He favored TARZAN going ahead. He had not realized that the amphibious operation was directly related to and bound up with TARZAN.

Continuing, THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the Generalissimo should be informed that Admiral Mountbatten had now said that he wanted more forces than had been contemplated when he, the Generalissimo, had been in Cairo. It was therefore proposed to postpone BUCCANEER until after the monsoon. Meanwhile, TARZAN would go forward. The postponement of BUCCANEER would not effect [*affect?*] TARZAN. If the Generalissimo expressed surprise and threatened to withhold the Yunnan forces, we should say that we would go on without them. Alternatively, we could say that the inaction of the Yunnan forces would allow more supplies to go over the "hump."

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that if the Yunnan forces were to be withdrawn from TARZAN, the whole plan would need recasting.

ADMIRAL KING said that the two-divisional lift for ANVIL was already in sight and it might even be possible to improve on this. He explained, however, that the two-divisional lift entailed keeping back one month's production of landing craft output from the Pacific. Nothing at all was going to the Pacific now.

THE PRESIDENT said he would like the possibility of a series of "hit-and-run" raids to be examined.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, in reply to a question by the Prime Minister, said that the naval force for BUCCANEER would include battle-ships, cruisers, destroyers and one or two big carriers. No great difficulty should be encountered in doing a raid or raids. He remarked that Admiral King had promised to help by providing American naval forces for ANVIL.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that assuming that the President and United States Chiefs of Staff were willing to extend their time at Cairo for a day or so, it would be necessary for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to get to work on the problems which had emerged from

the discussion. First came ANVIL. A more detailed study was required of the strength to be employed in the assault and in the follow-up. Next, we ought to deal with the Turks. He had in mind a program on the following lines: At the end of January the Turkish airdromes should be fitted out with Radar and anti-aircraft defenses. At the beginning of February the U. S. and British squadrons should be ready to move in to Turkey, and medium bombers should start a softening process from airfields in Cyrenaica. By 15 February the bombing attacks on the islands should be intensified. By this time we should expect some reactions from Germany, but as they grew progressively stronger, the Turks would have to face up to greater risks.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that, as far as the United States Chiefs of Staff were concerned, they were quite right to leave the Turkish program to the British Chiefs of Staff to decide upon.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the adjustment of resources to plans, including particularly shipping, could not yet be worked out. The adjustment of resources depended on the decision about BUCCANEER and ANVIL. As regards the former operation, the right thing seemed to be to take what was required for the European Theater, and then see what could be done with what was left in Southeast Asia.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that Admiral Mountbatten should be asked what he could do as an alternative to BUCCANEER assuming that the bulk of his landing craft and assault shipping was to be withdrawn at once. We could not get away from the fact that we should be doing wrong strategically if we used vital resources such as landing craft on operations of comparatively insignificant importance, instead of using these resources to strengthen up OVERLORD and ANVIL, where it looks like we are working to a dangerously narrow margin.

GENERAL ARNOLD explained the possibilities and capabilities of the very long range aircraft which would operate from the four airfields at Calcutta.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired how the construction of these airfields was progressing. He called for a special report, to be followed by weekly progress reports.

THE CONFERENCE:—

a. Invited the Combined Chiefs of Staff to initiate further studies concerning the scope of OVERLORD and ANVIL with a view to increasing the assaults in each case.

b. Invited the Combined Chiefs of Staff to consult with the Force Commanders of BUCCANEER and thereafter to ask Admiral Mountbatten what amphibious operations he could do on a smaller scale than

BUCCANEER if the bulk of landing craft and assault shipping were withdrawn from Southeast Asia during the next few weeks.

c. Agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff should prepare a statement for presentation to the Turks showing what assistance they would receive if they entered the war.

**ROOSEVELT-INÖNÜ MEETING, DECEMBER 5, 1943, 2 P. M.,
ROOSEVELT'S VILLA**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Steinhardt

TURKEY

President İnönü
Foreign Minister Mene-
mencioğlu
Mr. Açikalin
Mr. Anderiman
Mr. Kavrur
Mr. Sarper

Editorial Note

No minutes of this meeting have been found. The information set forth above is from the Log, *ante*, p. 658. At the beginning of the tripartite meeting, *infra*, Roosevelt summarized what he had said at this meeting with İnönü.

**SECOND TRIPARTITE MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT,
DECEMBER 5, 1943, 3 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA**

PRESENT ¹

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Steinhardt

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill ²
Foreign Secretary Eden ²
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Hughe Knatchbull-
Hugessen
General Wilson
Air Chief Marshal Doug-
las
Air Vice Marshal George
Mr. Helm

TURKEY

President İnönü
Foreign Minister Mene-
mencioğlu ³
Mr. Açikalin
Mr. Anderiman ⁴
Mr. Kavrur
Mr. Torgut Menemen-
cioğlu

¹ According to the Log, *ante*, p. 658, Vinogradov also was present, but the reference to him in the fourth paragraph of these minutes makes this seem unlikely.

² Present during a part of the meeting.

³ Referred to as Mr. Numan in the minutes.

⁴ Anderiman acted as interpreter.

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United States-United Kingdom Agreed Minutes

SECRET

Prior to the full meeting President Roosevelt had been in conference with the Turkish representatives. On the arrival of H. M. Ambassador at Ankara, but before the arrival of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, President Roosevelt had explained what he had been saying to the Turks. Though he did not know what Mr. Churchill might say, it seemed to him that there could be three stages. He saw objection to dates for these stages though there should be a general date. In the first phase he felt that the delivery of the Adana material,⁵ which he understood was considerably behind, should be got on with as quickly as possible. Also in this first phase the airfields and other defences should be completed and mechanics etc. got into place. The aeroplanes themselves would only arrive in the last twenty-four hours of this phase.

President Roosevelt's second phase would overlap the first. It was what he would call the cooperative period, during which he regarded as a real necessity the establishment of a small Anglo-Turkish-American Military Committee of three. General Wilson would be the obvious British representative and with him would be some American general and a high Turkish officer, probably an air officer. This Committee would take care of many military developments for the next three, four or five months. They would know all that was going on as regards military plans and activities, e. g., as regards Crete, Rhodes, etc.

Then, according to President Roosevelt, there was the third phase—political. It was not very necessary to have full conversations with the Americans or the British. But it was very necessary with the Russians. The President thought it would be a mistake to defer the political phase until everything else had been tied up. Now was the time to talk.⁶ President Roosevelt doubted whether dates could be fixed for these stages.

PRESIDENT INONU remarked that the practical side must be envisaged. If the Allies⁷ continued to insist on dates Turkey would be in the war in four or five weeks. It was not practical for Turkey to come into the war and for discussions then to start. He very much

⁵ Presumably the material agreed upon at the Churchill-Inönü conference of January 30, 1943, at Adana, to be furnished to Turkey; see Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, pp. 704 ff. See also *post*, pp. 728-729.

⁶ In a copy of these minutes in the Bohlen Collection, this sentence reads: "The Russians were now in a good mood and now was the time to talk."

⁷ The Bohlen Collection copy reads "If the Russians" instead of "If the Allies".

regretted that the Russians were not at the Conference. The Soviet Ambassador was helpless and it would have been most useful if the Russians could have been there so that they could realise that everybody was trying to help but that the method of fixed dates was impracticable.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT thought there was much in this and summarised the position as being that the Turks did not want to be caught with their pants down.

AIR MARSHAL SIR SHOLTO DOUGLAS said that this would depend on the extent of infiltration in the preparatory period.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT said that the target date was dependent on progress.

GENERAL WILSON said that they did not want a scramble. They wanted to get the equipment and everything in so as to be in a position to operate within 24 hours. If things had to be rushed they would not be used to the best advantage. It would be best if nothing happened before all was ready.

At this stage Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden joined the meeting. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT then briefly summarised the above, remarking that he thought it a mistake to date each stage. The final date might be determined but not the date of the intermediate stages. He understood that there had been a fall-down on Adana promises. As an instance he quoted that 1800 trucks had been promised but only 800 delivered. These past delays today affected Turkey's ability to defend herself.

MR. CHURCHILL said that there was another factor. The Turks had not taken full advantage of the school and tuition opportunities offered to them and this had affected their ability to absorb the available material. In this connection AIR MARSHAL SIR SHOLTO DOUGLAS pointed out that 70 [*sic*] aircraft (54 Hurricanes and 18 Beauforts) had been waiting ready for the Turks to collect for the last three months.

PRESIDENT INONU reminded Mr. Churchill of his remark at Adana when inspecting newly arrived Hurricanes, that we no longer regarded these as the most modern. They were in fact out of date. No doubt imperative considerations had made it impossible to supply better planes.

MR. CHURCHILL said that the situation had greatly changed since Adana. In the interval Italy had fallen and it had been necessary to take military supplies for the battle-fields in the Central Mediterranean. As a result the Eastern Mediterranean had not received full supplies. Even so Turkish sea and railway transport had been fully engaged since Adana and the greater part of the Adana supplies had

been delivered. The result was that today the Turks were much stronger than they had been at Adana.

PRESIDENT INONU said that the position taken up by Mr. Churchill at Adana had been generous and comprehensible. The situation today was not so clear and in fact was not known. Frankly he did not know what was required. Was it not possible to get out of the impasse? If a date was fixed for pushing Turkey into the war in the near future, e. g. in a matter of weeks, there would be an impasse. Was not the decision of Turkey to come into the war of some importance?

MR. CHURCHILL said it was fundamental. It represented a new stage. The principle had been established. It remained to study the method.

PRESIDENT INONU said the question seemed to be when Turkey would enter the war. She had stated her conditions. He had spoken of plans of preparation and collaboration. Her representatives wanted to know how they could render service. They wanted to know the risks they would run and how their forces would be used.

MR. CHURCHILL assented.

PRESIDENT INONU remarked that the question of when Turkey would be ready was a practical one. It depended on preparation. Just before lunch he had received a plan. (MR. EDEN remarked that this plan had been based on a telegram from Tehran).^s PRESIDENT INONU went on to say that since Adana 250 medium anti-aircraft guns had been delivered; of these about half were in use and the other half had arrived in recent months. The Turks were agreeable to giving them to British personnel to handle.

AIR VICE MARSHAL GEORGE remarked that there were 138 of these anti-aircraft guns to be taken over. According to GENERAL WILSON they would be replaced by guns already in the Middle East.

MR. CHURCHILL said that the replacement guns were here but that they must not go into store. They should go straight to the air fields.

PRESIDENT INONU said that this (the Tehran plan), though something by itself, was not a sufficient preparation for an army. He had thought it a complete plan and it seemed to him to be only a semblance of preparation.

MR. CHURCHILL remarked that it was not so bad as that. It seemed to Mr. Churchill that first of all there should be the period of prep-

^s The plan and the telegram, presumably of British origin, have not been found in United States files. The nature of the British plans for the infiltration of military personnel and supplies into Turkey is indicated *post*, pp. 727, 751. See also the strategic plan of the British Chiefs of Staff, *post*, p. 782, and Churchill, p. 415.

aration. He hoped that this could begin at once. Throughout it transport facilities should be utilised to the maximum extent. Perhaps a period of six weeks would be required. Throughout this period everything would be camouflaged though the flow would steadily grow. But Turkish policy outwardly would be unchanged. No doubt the Germans would be suspicious but the development would go steadily on.

PRESIDENT INONU remarked that if the experts studied the necessary measures for two or three days they would no doubt be able to say when everything would be ready.

MR. CHURCHILL replied that within a period of six weeks it ought to be possible to make considerable preparations against air attack.

MR. CHURCHILL said that the second stage would then come, i. e. British and American aircraft would come to the fields prepared for them.

PRESIDENT INONU said that the Turks must regard the day of the arrival of the aircraft as the day of the declaration of war. They must regard the arrival of the Allied aircraft with the utmost seriousness and must count it as the beginning of a state of war with Germany.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT said that it was not desired that war should occur until the fields were ready or indeed until everything was ready. He explained that by everything he meant everything in connection with the preparation and defence of the air fields.

PRESIDENT INONU said that, as he understood the position, the airfields would be prepared in six weeks as one part of a general plan of preparations. After six weeks the Allied planes would arrive. MR. CHURCHILL seemed to think that this did not necessarily mean a declaration of war by either side. In that event preparations would continue to go on, e. g., for two months (Mr. Churchill suggested one month) or two weeks, and that then the Turks should take the initiative in declaring war.

MR. CHURCHILL said preparations would continue so long as they were not interrupted. Effective air protection would be provided when everything was in place. Then would come the third phase when it could be arranged to employ forces against the German-held islands. At the same time American aircraft would bomb Bulgarian air fields and so reduce the possibility of air attack on Turkey. Russia also would warn Bulgaria. This might be somewhere about January 15th or 20th. He did not want to push Turkey into a bad position and perhaps she might be ready for effective action about the end of February.

PRESIDENT INONU said that he could not contemplate the conclusion of the first stage mentioned by Mr. Churchill and the arrival of the

Allied aeroplanes without the expectation or intention of a declaration of war.

MR. CHURCHILL said this was not certain.

PRESIDENT INONU said he must be able to explain the position to his people. He must say that there had been no provocation. Turkey's engagements to Britain were known and it was right that Turkey should be prepared to defend herself. He understood that if Turkey were attacked the aircraft would be there to help her within 24 hours.

MR. CHURCHILL, MR. EDEN and AIR MARSHAL SIR SHOLTO DOUGLAS explained that this would depend on the moment of attack. If Germany were to attack immediately the Turks returned to Angora and before any preparations had been made, air assistance could not arrive for a week. If the attack came 15 days after the beginning of the period of preparation, there would be a delay of 3 or 4 days. If however it were delayed for a month after the beginning of the preparatory period, the planes would be there in 24 hours. Thus, MR. CHURCHILL pointed out, it was very important that the period of infiltration should be as long as possible so that the planes could come effectively into action immediately they arrived.

At the request of President Inonu, MR. NUMAN said that the discussions had perhaps rather wandered and that there might be some misunderstanding. It had not been President Inonu's purpose to ask how soon the Allied squadrons would arrive. His point was the danger of war at the end of the 6 weeks' period of preparation. This danger might be 100%, but even if it were only 30% the Turks must still regard it as 100%, and MR. NUMAN said that Turkey could not envisage being in the war at the end of this period of preparation.

MR. EDEN enquired what therefore was the Turkish proposal.

PRESIDENT INONU said that a general plan of preparation must be agreed among the experts. Both parties must play a part in reaching a decision as to what was a reasonable, practical plan. The British would then be able to estimate the period required for its execution. Within that period the plan of future collaboration could be developed and the contemplated political discussions could be engaged. The Allies must however give up the idea of having Turkey in the war within 6 weeks. Otherwise the discussions had reached an impasse.

MR. NUMAN said that the difference between the two sides seemed to be essentially that, whereas the Allies regarded time as being the determining factor, the Turks regard preparations as being that factor. The Turkish President wanted a plan of preparation. It might be that that could be completed in 5 days. If it could, then the Turks

would come in in five days. If, however, it took 5 months the Allies on their side must accept that period.

MR. CHURCHILL said he was in sympathy with much of what Mr. Numan had said. The preparatory period would however be over when the squadrons could land in force and be in action within 24 hours. The guns would be there to defend the nests but the fighters were the birds which used these nests. MR. CHURCHILL explained that what he asked for was the inception at the earliest possible moment and in full vigour of the preparatory plan. This meant the arrival of supplies and material and of men in mufti against the arrival of the protecting air squadrons. Once this protection was established the situation would become dangerous for the enemy. In the intervening period, i. e. before the arrival of the protecting squadrons, the situation would be dangerous for Turkey. Once the air fields were ready the squadrons could come in within 24 hours. He doubted whether the Germans would then declare war on Turkey. Perhaps they would not attack. The Turkish Government could say that the squadrons were there for Turkish protection. Once there, Turkey would be defended. The personnel would come in advance and the squadrons later. This was what had happened at Lisbon. He knew that the circumstances were not the same. They were however similar.

MR. NUMAN contested this. He pointed out that the Germans could not attack the Azores.

MR. CHURCHILL replied that this was so but that the Germans could have bombed Lisbon. President Roosevelt and he had always thought that the Germans would not bomb Lisbon. They had an interest in not doing so. Portuguese wolfram was important to Germany—it was in fact the chrome of Portugal. The position was much the same as regards Turkey. What point would there be in Germany attacking her?

MR. NUMAN suggested that the question of the Azores be left alone. The Atlantic battle had been decided. The use of Turkish bases was quite a different matter since it would be for direct attack on Germany.

PRESIDENT INONU enquired what differences there were between what the Prime Minister had said and what the British had negotiated with the Turkish General Staff.

AIR MARSHAL SIR SHOLTO DOUGLAS said there was no real difference. The Air Attaché⁹ had merely been discussing the first phase.

MR. NUMAN pointed out that there had been 5 points in the discussions of the Service Attachés. Some of these were practicable.

⁹ Air Vice Marshal George.

Others were not. The Turks could not agree to the infiltration of personnel but they could and did agree to the infiltration of the requisite number of specialists.

SIR H. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN pointed out that the Service Attachés had asked for the infiltration of 7,000 personnel. This figure had now been reduced to 2,000.

At the request of President Inonu MR. NUMAN explained that the question of the preparation of the air fields was not the only question. There must be a general plan of which the question of air fields would form a part, indeed perhaps the principal part and the one requiring the greatest priority. He suggested the despatch of experts to Angora to discuss the general plan and to make any other necessary proposals.

MR. CHURCHILL said that he wanted the preparations to begin at once, i. e. to get supplies, material and personnel introduced into Turkey forthwith and so get the air fields ready. This must be done with the utmost discretion and secrecy. There would be no overt change of Turkish policy. It was however essential that it should begin at once and when the air fields were ready for the planes, we should then want them to come in. The Turkish position would then be completely changed.

MR. NUMAN said there was one small point on which he hoped for agreement, namely that there were two questions: that of the period of preparation and that of the declaration of war. He considered that the entry of personnel would provoke war. The second stage would come with the arrival of the squadrons, for within a few days thereafter Turkey would be at war. It was necessary to separate these two points now. At the same time it was, however, also necessary to begin preparations now.

MR. CHURCHILL remarked that the discussion seemed to have got into a difficult circle. We were satisfied that no preparation could be effective without the introduction of personnel while the Turks refused the introduction of personnel because of the danger of provoking Germany. Thus no preparation could be made against Germany being provoked.

At this stage the meeting was adjourned and on the resumption it was suggested that, before a further plenary meeting was held, a discussion should take place between a small committee headed by Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Numan and Mr. Eden. The meeting of this committee was arranged for 6 p. m.¹⁰

¹⁰ See *post*, p. 726.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, DECEMBER 5, 1943,
3 P. M., MENA HOUSE¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Willson
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Bieri
Rear Admiral Badger
Major General Sutherland
Major General Stratemeyer
Major General Handy
Major General Fairchild
Major General Wedemeyer²
Brigadier General Kuter
Brigadier General Hansell
Brigadier General Roberts
Captain Freseman
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet
Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
General Riddell-Webster
Major General Stopford³
Rear Admiral Troubridge
Air Vice Marshal Baker
Major General Laycock
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Sugden
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier McNair
Colonel Cornwall-Jones

Secretariat

Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland

Brigadier Redman
Commander Coleridge

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed future operations in Southeast Asia with Lt. Gen. [*Major General*] Stopford, Rear Admiral Troubridge and Air Vice Marshal Baker.

GENERAL STOPFORD said that a plan had been made for the capture of the Andamans, based on a troop lift of 58,000. It was now felt that the operation to capture Port Blair could be undertaken with a troop lift of 50,000 men. However, the latest intelligence on Japanese dispositions, particularly their air dispositions, had led to the conclusion that it would be necessary to capture Kar Nicobar and retain it for use by ourselves.

¹ C. C. S. 136th meeting.

² Present during a part of the meeting.

³ Although listed in the C. C. S. minutes as "Lt. Gen. J. Stopford", this officer is now known to have been Major General Montagu George North Stopford, who assumed command in December 1943 of the Thirty-third Indian Corps, which fought in Burma.

In reply to a question by Sir Andrew Cunningham, ADMIRAL TROUBRIDGE said that shipping was available for the required assault lift of 24,700 for Port Blair. The remainder of the shipping required could be procured. The estimate of the potential strength of Japanese air forces in the area had recently risen from some 300 aircraft to 600. It had originally been intended to knock out the air strip on Kar Nicobar with a commando raid, but now it was felt that a brigade was required and the Air Commander in Chief⁴ considered that the 120 carrier-borne aircraft provided in the plan were insufficient and should be raised to 240 carrier-borne aircraft. Virtually all the assault shipping required was now available.

AIR VICE MARSHAL BAKER explained that the estimate of 600 enemy aircraft was the total force the enemy could assemble within striking distance of the Andamans. This would include those based on an arc from South Burma to the north tip of Sumatra. Some 80 to 100 enemy aircraft could be based in the Andamans and Kar Nicobar.

GENERAL STOPFORD said that no plan had yet been completed for the capture of Kar Nicobar. It was estimated that there were 5,000 Japanese troops in the Port Blair area and that they could build up to a total of 3,000 in Kar Nicobar.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that an estimate of 50,000 Allied troops against some 5,000 Japanese appeared excessive.

GENERAL STOPFORD explained that the figure of 50,000 included troops required for the development of facilities in the island, the building of airfields and strips, and for work in the docks. It was estimated that of the total of 50,000 some 34,000 would be fighting troops, including headquarters, engineers, and anti-aircraft units; some 16,000 would be non-fighting troops.

In reply to a question by General Arnold, ADMIRAL TROUBRIDGE explained that the present date fixed for Operation BUCCANEER was 23 March. This date was dependent on tide and moon conditions and could not be advanced since the necessary naval covering force would not be available in the area before 15 March.

SIR ALAN BROOKE then asked what operations of a hit-and-run nature might be undertaken, assuming that the bulk of the BUCCANEER landing craft and shipping was returned to the European Theater. This operation might take place either against the islands or on the mainland.

GENERAL STOPFORD said that he would like to consider this possibility further before giving a definite reply.

ADMIRAL KING said that he would like to repeat a statement he had

⁴ Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse.

made at the Plenary Meeting earlier that day ⁵ to the effect that if additional carriers were found necessary for BUCCANEER, he believed, though he could not guarantee, that he could find some four to six additional CVE's.

(The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered the remainder of the agenda in closed session.)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed the relationship of Operation BUCCANEER to Operation ANVIL.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that as regards ANVIL, the critical part of the operation would be the seizure of a bridgehead, including a port through which the build-up could take place. The assault must be in sufficient strength to tide us over this dangerous period, otherwise we were in danger of being thrown into the sea.

GENERAL MARSHALL, in discussing the timing of Operation ANVIL, said that he felt that it should take place after rather than before OVERLORD and suggested that a period of approximately one week should lapse between the launching of the two operations.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he agreed with this view. COSSAC had been of the same opinion. He did not wish France to rise before the launching of Operation OVERLORD, nor could the timing of Operation OVERLORD itself be exact in view of weather conditions in the Channel.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed the wording of a telegram to Admiral Mountbatten with regard to possible operations in his theater on the assumption that certain of his resources were removed to the European Theater.

(At this point General Wedemeyer entered the meeting.)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that, had he realized General Wedemeyer was still here, he would of course have asked him to be present during the discussion with the Force Commanders.⁶ He asked General Wedemeyer if he would give his views on possible alternative amphibious operations of a hit-and-run nature capable of accomplishment with less forces than BUCCANEER.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER said that he considered that some operation commensurate with these lesser resources could be undertaken. The Supreme Commander⁷ had been given the objective of opening the land route to China through Upper Burma. It was considered that an amphibious operation would contribute in the military sense to the success of this task, and Operation BUCCANEER had been decided on as the operation most likely, with the means available, to assist

⁵ i. e., the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, *ante*, p. 705.

⁶ i. e., the discussion, at the beginning of this meeting, with Stopford, Troubridge, and Baker.

⁷ Admiral Mountbatten.

this task. It would deceive the enemy and split his air forces. Amphibious operations along the coast had also been considered but were rendered difficult by weather, tides, and the lack of ports through which they could be maintained.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER considered that a hit-and-run operation could be undertaken but would not be so effective as BUCCANEER. For BUCCANEER it was now considered that some 120 more carrier-borne aircraft were required. This would mean 4 or 5 additional CVE's or 2 fleet carriers. He considered that both the Andamans and Kar Nicobar could be captured with an amphibious lift of 50,000. It was strongly felt that the first large operation undertaken in the South-east Asia Command must be a success. The morale of certain of the Indian troops was low, and a smashing victory would restore it. Operation ANAKIM might be undertaken with only slightly less resources than those required for the Andamans, but it would be against a strong defensive position and would not, he considered, contain as many Japanese forces as would BUCCANEER. Hit-and-run operations would not, in his opinion, divert strong enemy forces, and their cost might well prove incommensurate with the results achieved.

After further discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Took note:

- (1) That the assault forces for BUCCANEER have not been increased.
- (2) That the resources necessary for the operation were either already available in the theater, or in sight, excepting for an increased demand of some 120 carrier-borne fighter aircraft.
- (3) Of a statement by Admiral King that there was a possibility of making from 4 to 6 CVE's available from U. S. sources for this operation.

b. Agreed:

(1) That the representatives of the Supreme Allied Commanders, S. E. A. C. and the BUCCANEER force Commanders now at SEXTANT, in consultation with the Combined Staff Planners should examine and report on the morning of 6 December 1943 what operations of a hit-and-run nature might be carried out in the S. E. Asia Theater in 1944, assuming that the bulk of landing craft is returned to the European Theater, the report to indicate the scale, nature, and objectives of the operations proposed.^a

(2) To dispatch a signal to Admiral Mountbatten asking for a flash estimate on the above. (Annex)

(At this point General Wedemeyer left the meeting.)

^a See C. C. S. 427, December 5, 1943, *post*, p. 800.

2. OPERATION "ANVIL" (C. C. S. 424)⁹

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered a report by the Combined Staff Planners (C. C. S. 424) on Operation ANVIL.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he considered that forces should be taken from BUCCANEER only if they were essential to the success of ANVIL. They should not be taken for diversionary operations, such as Rhodes.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM pointed out that an early decision would have to be taken with regard to Operation BUCCANEER, since otherwise we were in danger of "falling between two stools" and the necessary time for the training of any craft which might be withdrawn would not be available.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then agreed to amend paragraph 4 C on page 3 of C. C. S. 424 by striking from the first sentence the words "from the United States"¹⁰ and by deleting the second sentence.¹¹

GENERAL ARNOLD discussed the air transport requirements for both ANVIL and operations in the Burma-China area. The additional transport aircraft required for ANVIL could only be found by cutting out the provision of these aircraft to all countries other than the United States, and to the domestic air lines in America. This he was quite prepared to do.

It was also agreed to amend paragraph 4 of Appendix "B" on page 8 by inserting the words "at least" between the words "for" and "two."

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Approved C. C. S. 424 as amended, and directed that the directive contained in Appendix "B" be forwarded to General Eisenhower.

b. Agreed that the detailed planning for this operation should be left entirely to General Eisenhower's planning staff.

3. DIRECTIONS TO COMBINED STAFF PLANNERS AND THE U. S. AND BRITISH SHIPPING AUTHORITIES

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed what instructions or directions could usefully be given to the Combined Staff Planners or to the United States and British shipping authorities.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should be instructed to keep the shipping authorities closely in touch with the progress of

⁹ *Post*, p. 797.

¹⁰ After "will have to be provided".

¹¹ The second sentence stated that aircraft and crews from the United States could not arrive in time to be fully trained.

the discussions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff; and that both the Combined Staff Planners and the shipping authorities should do all possible preliminary work on their estimates of the resources required. This to be undertaken both on the basis of the decisions already taken, and on the basis of the various possible assumptions with regard to operations on which final decisions had not yet been reached.

b. Instructed the Secretaries to inform the Combined Staff Planners and the U. S. and British shipping authorities of the above decision.

4. FUTURE WORK

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF agreed to meet at 1100 on 6 December¹² to consider the draft report to the President and Prime Minister (C. C. S. 426),¹³ the report by the Combined Staff Planners on the over-all plan for the defeat of Japan (C. C. S. 417),¹⁴ and the study of alternative amphibious operations being undertaken by the Force Commanders in consultation with General Wedemeyer and the Combined Staff Planners. THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF further agreed to meet on the following afternoon, if necessary, and on the following evening on receipt of the report called for from the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command.¹⁵

ANNEX

To: SACSEA

From: Mideast

MOST IMMEDIATE

CLEAR THE LINE

Following for Admiral Mountbatten from Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. If, as a result of EUREKA Conference overriding priority were to be given to European operations, this would make it necessary to withdraw bulk of your landing craft and assault shipping during the next few weeks.

2. This would rule out BUCCANEER as at present planned before the monsoon, but the necessity would remain to stage, in conjunction with TARZAN, amphibious operations on a smaller scale, possibly of a hit-and-run nature involving carrier raids and landings of commandos.

¹² For the minutes of this meeting, see *post*, p. 734.

¹³ Not printed herein. For the report as approved, see *post*, p. 810.

¹⁴ *Post*, p. 765.

¹⁵ For the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, December 6, 1943, 7:30 p. m., see *post*, p. 747. The meeting at which Mountbatten's report was considered is that of December 7, 1943, 11 a. m., *post*, p. 756.

3. Do you consider operations of this kind feasible? If so, telegraph urgently flash estimate of resources you would require.

4. Your reply must be received by 1600 G. M. T. 6th December.¹⁶

¹⁶ For Mountbatten's reply, see *post*, p. 815.

ROOSEVELT MEETING WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
DECEMBER 5, 1943, 5 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

President Roosevelt
Admiral Leahy
Admiral King
General Arnold
Captain Royal

Editorial Note

This meeting was called at the request of the President and was not considered a formal meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The meeting was apparently brief and no official minutes were prepared. The information given above regarding the time and place of the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 658. Leahy (p. 213) and King (p. 525) give the date of the meeting as December 6, but the Log entry appears to be accurate. Matloff (p. 372) supports the view that the meeting took place on December 5.

From the accounts in Leahy and King it appears that the President called in the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to inform them of his decision to stop further argumentation in favor of Operation BUCCANEER as scheduled for the spring of 1944. Churchill (pp. 411-412) states that on the afternoon of December 5 "the President, in consultation with his advisers, decided to abandon the Andaman Islands plan" and that the President sent him a laconic private message reading, "‘BUCCANEER’ is off." No copy of this message has been found in United States files.

According to Leahy and King, President Roosevelt expressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff his reluctance in making this decision and indicated his intent to offer a substitute to Chiang Kai-shek. The alternative offer to Chiang was drafted by Roosevelt and Hopkins, presumably at the conclusion of Roosevelt's meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was submitted to Churchill in the form of a memorandum (*post*, p. 803).

In explaining his decision to Stilwell and Davies on the following day Roosevelt is reported by Stilwell to have said: "I've been stubborn as a mule for four days but we can't get anywhere, and it won't do

for a conference to end that way. The British just won't do the operation, and I can't get them to agree to it." (*The Stilwell Papers*, p. 251.) The Davies notes on this conversation indicate that Roosevelt also emphasized in this connection that he had fought at Tehran, with Stalin's support, and that Churchill had finally given in. This was presumably a reference to the argument about fixing the date of OVERLORD; see *ante*, pp. 521, 538, 547, 551, 561-564.

HOPKINS-EDEN-MENEMENCIOĞLU MEETING, DECEMBER 5, 1943,
6 P. M., EDEN'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Steinhardt

UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Hughe Knatchbull-
Hugessen
General Wilson
Air Chief Marshal Douglas
Air Vice Marshal George
Brigadier Stayner
Mr. Helm

TURKEY

Foreign Minister Mene-
mencioğlu¹
Mr. Açikalin
Mr. Anderiman
Mr. Kavur
Mr. Torgut Mene-
mencioğlu²

740.0011 EW 1939/12-2443

United States-United Kingdom Agreed Minutes

MOST SECRET

MR. EDEN opened the meeting by suggesting that Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas should explain what was proposed since he had a feeling that the Turks were under a wrong impression.

MR. NUMAN thanked Mr. Eden. He said he would be glad to listen. He must however make it clear that he could not commit himself on military matters which were the concern of the experts and on which he was not competent.

SIR SHOLTO DOUGLAS said that he was not going to deal with technicalities. He was merely going to make a general *exposé* to show why we wanted advance infiltration. In this there were two main objects: the first to provide adequate defence for the most vulnerable points, and the second to provide a force for offensive operations in the Aegean. As regards the first, the vulnerable points were Istanbul, Izmir and Zonguldak. For these it was proposed to send in 17 squad-

¹ Referred to as Mr. Numan in the minutes.

² Torgut Menemencioğlu acted as interpreter.

rons (12 of them Spitfires) and 5 regiments of light and 5 of heavy anti-aircraft guns. For purposes of defence it was essential to have an adequate warning system and also adequate anti-aircraft defence for the air fields on which would depend the defence of Istanbul and other vulnerable places. Until these essentials had been secured it would not be feasible to introduce the necessary squadrons. This brought the Air Marshal to infiltration and his proposals were:

(1) For radio location and operations room—200–250 specialists and 20–30 vehicles.

(2) Signals personnel for radio location and for linking air fields with operations room—400 persons.

(3) Key specialist personnel of anti-aircraft guns—420 persons.

(4) Additional personnel for radio location, i. e. for extension of system round the coast from Zonguldak to Antalya—300 persons.

(5) Administrative personnel for dumps, etc.—500 persons.

This represented a total of about 2,000 personnel.

The introduction of this personnel was the problem. Until something like this had been introduced Turkey would not be in a position of security when the moment of need came.

MR. EDEN remarked that when all this personnel had been brought in the squadrons could be flown in ³ in 24 hours for the defence of Turkey if Turkey were attacked. The complete effectiveness of defence would of course also be dependent on Turkey doing her share ⁴ as promised with personnel for the anti-aircraft guns. It was as a result of the promise of this personnel that the estimated infiltration needs had been reduced from 7,000 to 2,000. Thus it could be seen what were the indispensable minimum needs to be introduced during the period of preparation.

MR. NUMAN said that he took the infiltration to be part of the general minimum plan. He could not say whether the number of squadrons was adequate, though it sounded good. He obviously must however make a reservation on the question of their utility.

MR. EDEN stressed that in our opinion what Sir Sholto Douglas had explained was the minimum necessary for Turkey's protection. In addition we should of course be ready to specify the material which we should be prepared to supply for use by the Turks themselves.

MR. NUMAN remarked that matters were advancing. There was not an impasse. The arrival of foreigners was very important. Even a civilian arriving in Turkey to serve would be known to Germany and the latter would not be indifferent. He did not want to provoke the Germans before a certain degree of preparation could be achieved.

³ The Bohlen Collection copy reads "could be produced".

⁴ The Bohlen Collection copy reads "her bit".

Mr. Churchill had described this as a vicious circle.⁵ He (Mr. Numan) did not agree but saw the problem from a different point of view. He was ready to accept the requisite number of technicians for the material supplied. How many technicians these might be he did not know. That would be a matter for the Turkish General Staff. He could not however accept personnel additional to the proper complement of technicians.

MR. EDEN remarked that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs must have confidence. There surely could be no question of our wanting to introduce one single specialist more than was necessary. But how could the Turkish General Staff say whether particular personnel was necessary or not? During the preparatory period we did not wish to rush things any more than the Turks did. But we did want to get the preparations completed quickly.

MR. NUMAN said that the Turks had the same object. They did not wish to provoke the Germans. He could not agree to the introduction of personnel but he did agree to the introduction of technicians, though he must make a reserve regarding the number of these. What he had said amounted to an acceptance in principle of technicians for the material promised.

MR. HOPKINS remarked that President Inonu had several times spoken of Turkey's minimum defence requirements. He wondered if he was right in assuming that this did not refer to infiltration and air material but to other needs. He assumed that the British had been discussing such questions with the Turkish General Staff. Had the British any idea of Turkish minimum requirements? Did they, for instance, include anti-aircraft guns and aircraft? This brought up the question of the commitments to be made and he realized that it was necessary to get personnel introduced in advance. But he wished to be clear in his own mind about the details.

MR. EDEN thought this was a good question. It seemed to him that there were two points—the material to be used by us in order to give protection to Turkey, and the material to be given to Turkey for use by the Turks themselves.

MR. HOPKINS mentioned that there was also the Anglo-American force to go into Turkey in the event of war.

MR. EDEN said that in the first instance this was air alone—anti-aircraft.

MR. NUMAN said he wished to make an observation and to compare what Turkey had got with what she had asked for. After the Adana Conference⁶ the Turks had prepared a list of requirements which had

⁵ See *ante*, p. 718.

⁶ Churchill-Inönü conference at Adana, Turkey, January 30, 1943; see Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, pp. 704 ff.

been more or less discussed. Later the British had entered into a definite commitment for delivery on the basis of that list. The Turkish list had remained a dead letter. The British list had not been much better (MR. EDEN said that he could not agree). MR. NUMAN went on to say that only some 4% of the items on the general list had been delivered to Turkey. He did not wish to make reproaches. He would only state facts and mentioned in particular the case of lorries of which 300 a month had been promised. For some time deliveries had been about 160 or 180 a month. In recent months there had been no deliveries at all. Deliveries did in fact represent a very small proportion of promises.

MR. EDEN said that he could not accept Mr. Numan's figures. He must make it plain that the position was not the position as it had been at Adana and he personally would not consider recommending his Government now to supply to Turkey all of the material which had been discussed at Adana.

MR. NUMAN remarked that his had only been an observation.

GENERAL WILSON said that even if it had been possible to supply all the items on the Turkish Adana lists, it would have taken the Turkish railways three years to carry them. As it was, Turkey had since Adana been supplied with 350 tanks, 48 self-propelled guns, nearly 300 anti-aircraft guns (over 100 of them heavy) 300 field and medium guns, 200 mortars, rather less than 500 anti-tank guns, an enormous quantity (about 99,000) of various guns and automatics, 420 mortars, and about one million anti-tank mines for the defence of Turkey. It was unfortunately true that there had been a shortage of delivery on motor transport. This had happened because the transport did not exist in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Turks had however said at Adana that they had enough to defend themselves except for three anti-tank units and aviation support.

MR. HOPKINS expressed surprise at the extent of material assistance already given since Adana. He wished however to clear the position up. As he understood things, the Allies had agreed, in the event of war, to put in air squadrons and anti-aircraft guns and personnel. How far removed were we from President Inonu's minimum requirements in the event of war?

MR. NUMAN said that if it were desired to negotiate on the basis of these past figures, he also could cite figures. At one moment 40 air squadrons had been promised in the event of war. This had been reduced by half. The percentage of deliveries was not impressive. As for circumstances he agreed that they had changed since Adana, but things had turned out exactly as they had been foreseen at Adana.

MR. HOPKINS said it seemed necessary to get to grips with the problem. Was he to understand that the Turkish President considered he

should have twice the air force suggested? Was he to understand that the anti-tank preparation was not enough? Were the Turkish railways a limiting factor, insofar as concerned Turkey coming into the war? He asked because if Turkey was not coming into the war she must understand that these munitions, so vitally required elsewhere, would not come into Turkey at all.

MR. NUMAN remarked that there must be some misunderstanding. The position had been quite clearly stated. The President had announced his intention of coming into the war. The question of material had however always been a serious one. At the time when the Anglo-Turkish Alliance was negotiated⁷ there had at first been a clause which postponed the operation of the Alliance until supplies were provided. He had realized that the supplies could not be provided and the clause had been suppressed. Since then and until now supplies had still not been available. Today Turkey lacked everything. Not only anti-aircraft guns and tanks but every sort of war material. He did not suggest that the Adana lists or any other list or anything like either of them should be supplied. He did however think that there ought to be a list of reasonable requirements. The Turks would not ask the impossible and with a maximum effort a list could readily be drawn up.

MR. EDEN said we had given the list of all that we wished to introduce for the defence of Turkey. If this were agreed we could then fix up what we could provide for use by the Turks. But we did not want the preparation of defence to be delayed during the consideration of the second list.

MR. NUMAN said he agreed but that it must be part of a general plan in which the air preparations would of course take complete precedence. MR. EDEN enquired what general plan? MR. NUMAN answered that it was necessary to decide the minimum requirements of Turkey if she were to enter the war. A list would be necessary.

MR. HOPKINS said he understood that the limiting factor was motor transport. Was it a limiting factor for anti-aircraft personnel? There had been talk of years for the introduction of requirements. We were dealing in weeks.

MR. NUMAN pointed to General Wilson's statement that two or three years would have been necessary to introduce the items on the Adana lists. Had one-third of these been introduced in the year since Adana?

SIR H. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN suggested that we were all wasting our time in discussing the past. It was a wasted effort. In the interval

⁷ The reference is presumably to the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which was signed at Ankara on October 19, 1939 (text in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167).

everything had changed and it would be a waste of transport even to send to Turkey today the material contemplated at Adana. Surely we should look at the future and not at the past.

MR. NUMAN welcomed the Ambassador's interjection and said he quite agreed. He wanted to propose something practical. Could we not at once send to Angora the two Generals (one British and one American) proposed by President Roosevelt^{*} so that they could concert at once with the Turkish General Staff and establish a list of requirements and work out complete collaboration.

MR. EDEN said that this was something apart from the fundamental question. We had this afternoon given to our Turkish friends a list of what we thought necessary for the defence of Turkey against attack. This must be the basis of working. In addition we could discuss further material but he could not accept the delay involved in the addition of other material quite unknown.

MR. NUMAN said that the President had answered Mr. Eden's point. He said that 2,000 men and 600 vehicles were not enough for the defence of Turkey though they were no doubt enough for the defence of British air bases.

MR. EDEN pointed out that they were not for the defence of British air bases but for that of Istanbul, Izmir and Zonguldak.

MR. NUMAN remarked that the Turks could not contemplate Turkish defence being entrusted to the British. What they would and did contemplate was the defence of Turkey by the Turks with British help.

AIR MARSHAL SIR SHOLTO DOUGLAS pointed out that air defence depended essentially on fighters and this must be defended by anti-aircraft guns. The first essential was to get the fighter defence established.

MR. EDEN said that there were two points. The first, what we introduced for the security of Turkey and the second the other things which the Turks must have before Turkey could take action.

GENERAL WILSON explained that what had been mentioned hitherto was for Turkish defence. It was only an advance guard. Actually the total force contemplated would be 32,000 troops (11,600 of them air), and 6,000 guns and vehicles (375 guns representing 5 light and 5 heavy anti-aircraft regiments).

MR. EDEN said the urgent plan was one for immediate defence and the execution of this represented the dangerous period.

MR. NUMAN having remarked that he could not comment on these figures, SIR H. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN pointed out that as men and material were introduced, the danger to Turkey would be

^{*} See *ante*, p. 712.

correspondingly diminished. The first problem was to ensure safety and then to build up.

MR. NUMAN said Turkey was coming into the war. It was necessary to draw up a plan of preparation and a plan of collaboration and at the same time to take up political matters in another direction.

MR. HOPKINS having remarked that reinforcement would be limited by transport facilities and that as regards priority for air we already give the Turks what they can take, said he must come to the main point. The war had reached a critical stage. It was impossible to divert to a neutral country war material which was not to be used against Germany. The British Prime Minister had been authorized to express the hope of the United States and of Russia that Turkey would enter the war at an early date.⁹ We know that when a nation went to war with Germany she might suffer losses—the United Kingdom, Russia and the United States had suffered severe losses. He knew that Turkey wanted to enter the war. In the last analysis a country went to war in its own interests. We wanted Turkey in the war even if she could not have all she wanted. Great Britain, Russia and the United States had not all they wanted when they entered the war. At this critical period in the war the entry of Turkey might save the lives of hundreds of thousands of Allied nationals. January 1st was not a set date but Turkish participation might not be useful after very long after that date. We wanted Turkey to enter the war willingly and whole-heartedly. We should like Turkey to enter the war about February even though we knew that in doing so Turkey might suffer. We hoped Turkey would enter because all Allied military and political opinion considered that her entry would shorten the war. Only the Turks themselves could speak for Turkish self-interest. If however discussions were prolonged about the adequacy of material etc. Turkey's entry would be futile. Turkey could be sure that if she came in we would do everything we could—all possible military and air support would be afforded her. He knew he was correctly interpreting President Roosevelt when he said that he hoped that Turkey would in her own interests come in willingly and whole-heartedly.

MR. EDEN said that he wished to have the Turkish position correctly understood and MR. NUMAN confirmed that it was as follows:

(1) Our proposals for infiltration were accepted in principle but Mr. Numan made a reservation as regards numbers pending consideration by the Turkish General Staff.

(2) If the programme involving infiltration were accepted Turkey will not take action which she considers might lead her into a state

⁹ See *ante*, p. 158.

of war with Germany until material and supplies for her use have been given, and the figures of these yet remain to be determined.

(3) Mr. Eden understood that Turkey had political questions to raise. He did not know what these were.

As regards (3) MR. NUMAN referred to the Russian undertaking regarding Bulgaria.¹⁰ He thought that this was the sort of point which he would like to discuss with the Russians. There were other points which he would also like to discuss. But these discussions could take place during the period of preparation and would in no way delay either preparation or collaboration.

MR. EDEN enquired whether there were any other points to be put down.

MR. NUMAN said that Mr. Hopkins had spoken of willing entry. This was also the desire of the Turks. They must however have a minimum of essential preparations. Moreover this was a commitment to the Turkish people and to the Party.¹¹

MR. EDEN enquired what Turkey wanted under (2). Was it not possible for these requirements to be stated without discussions at Angora?

MR. NUMAN repeated that he was not competent to say what the military needs were. All he asked for was comprehension. It lay in our hands to determine when Turkey could enter the war since this would be determined by the supply of the necessary material.

MR. NUMAN confirmed that, as he had previously said, the infiltration programme under (1) above could go ahead while the discussion of (2) was in progress.

At this stage (8.15 p. m.) the meeting was adjourned.

¹⁰ See *ante*, pp. 588, 698.

¹¹ Presumably the Republican People's Party.

QUADRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING, DECEMBER 5, 8:30 P. M., CHURCHILL'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
Mr. Steinhardt

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Hughe Knatchbull-
Hugessen
Commander Thompson
Captain Churchill

TURKEY

President İnönü
Foreign Minister Mene-
mencioglu
Mr. Anderiman

SOVIET UNION

Mr. Vinogradov
Mr. Mikhailov

Editorial Note

The information set forth above is derived from the Log, *ante*, p. 658. No official record of the conversation at this meeting has been found. Leahy, p. 214, writes:

"The next night, December 5, it was Churchill's turn to entertain at dinner for İnönü. Same scene. Same cast. Almost the same lines except that the Turkish President talked a little more freely and impressed me with his direct approach to the question. He made it clear that before Turkey could come into the war, he would have to have enough planes, tanks, guns, etc., to make a strong resistance against invasion by the Nazis.

"It was most interesting to watch the dinner-table maneuvers of the Prime Minister as he pleaded, cajoled, and almost threatened the soldier President of the once powerful Ottoman Empire in an effort to commit him to taking his people into the war. İnönü was told he would have to come in eventually if he was to have a place at the peace table. The Americans did not urge the Turks as vehemently as did the British."

MONDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1943 ¹

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, DECEMBER 6, 1943,
11 A. M., MENA HOUSE ²

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Willson
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Bieri
Rear Admiral Badger
Major General Sutherland
Major General Handy
Major General Fairchild
Brigadier General Hansell
Brigadier General Roberts
Captain Freseman
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet
Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
General Riddell-Webster
Major General Laycock
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Sugden
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier McNair
Colonel Cornwall-Jones

¹ According to Churchill, p. 418, Roosevelt—"on the day before his departure from Cairo" (i. e., on December 6)—stated, during a ride to the Pyramids, that he had decided to appoint Eisenhower to command OVERLORD. No official record of the conversation has been found.

² C. C. S. 137th meeting.

Secretariat

Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland

Brigadier Redman
Commander Coleridge

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF CONCLUSIONS OF C. C. S. 135TH AND 136TH MEETINGS

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 135th and 136th C. C. S. meetings and also the minutes of the 4th Plenary Session held at the Kirk Villa. The detailed records of the meetings were also accepted, subject to minor amendments.³

2. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

ALTERNATIVE TO "BUCCANEER"

(C. C. S. 427) ⁴

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the report by the Combined Staff Planners (C. C. S. 427) should be noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the Appendix would require revision in the light of the decisions taken.⁵

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed with this view.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Took note of C. C. S. 427.

b. Agreed that the forces to be left in the Indian Ocean or to be withdrawn for the European Theater should be decided later.⁶

3. CONTROL OF STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN N. W. EUROPE AND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

(C. C. S. 400,⁷ 400/1 ⁸ and 400/2 ⁹)

At the request of General Arnold,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer consideration of C. C. S. 400, 400/1 and 400/2 until their meeting on Tuesday, 7 December.¹⁰

³ The minutes of these meetings, as amended, are printed *ante*, pp. 699, 705, 719.

⁴ *Post*, p. 800.

⁵ Reference presumably is to the decision described *ante*, p. 725.

⁶ See also section 6 of these minutes.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 228.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 432.

⁹ *Post*, p. 787.

¹⁰ See *post*, p. 757.

4. OVER-ALL PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN (C. C. S. 417 and 417/1¹¹)

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he felt no final decision could be taken on these papers pending decisions on operations to be undertaken in Burma and the Bay of Bengal.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that it would assist the Combined Staff Planners in their further studies if the over-all plan for the defeat of Japan could be accepted in principle as a basis for further work.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he considered that in their further study, the Combined Staff Planners should be instructed to prepare a plan of campaign for the China Theater proper, together with an estimate of forces required. He did not agree with the amendment suggested in paragraph 4 of the Enclosure to C. C. S. 417/1 and preferred the original wording of paragraph 14 of C. C. S. 417.¹²

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM asked if the Combined Chiefs of Staff were prepared to approve the general concept that the main effort against Japan should be made in the Pacific.

ADMIRAL KING said that he agreed with this concept in principle.

After further discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Approved in principle C. C. S. 417 and 417/1 (less paragraph 4 of the enclosure to 417/1) as a basis for further investigation and preparation, subject to final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. Directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare a plan of campaign for the Chinese Theater proper, together with an estimate of the forces involved.

5. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN, 1944 (C. C. S. 397 (Revised))¹³

ADMIRAL KING said that he considered that this paper should be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff less any references contained therein to Operation BUCCANEER.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the specific operations against Japan, 1944 set out in C. C. S. 397 (Revised) with the exception of the references contained therein to Operation BUCCANEER.

¹¹ C. C. S. 417/1 proposed certain amendments to C. C. S. 417. The latter is printed *post*, p. 765, as amended and approved.

¹² Paragraph 4 of the enclosure to C. C. S. 417/1 suggested a revision of paragraph 14 of C. C. S. 417 which would have presented more explicitly Mountbatten's reservations as to a commitment to recapture the whole of Burma.

¹³ *Post*, p. 779.

6. OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND (C. C. S. 427)¹⁴

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Approved the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff with regard to decisions covering operations in the Southeast Asia Command, as follows:

a. Delay major amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal until after the next monsoon and divert the landing craft now assigned to BUCCANEER to Operations ANVIL and OVERLORD.

b. Make all preparations to conduct TARZAN as planned, less BUC-CANEER, for which will be substituted naval carrier and amphibious raiding operations simultaneous with the launching of TARZAN; and carry out air bombardment of the Bangkok-Burma railroad and the harbor of Bangkok, in the meantime maintaining naval control of the Bay of Bengal, or, alternatively,

c. Postpone TARZAN, increase to a maximum with planes available the air lift to China across the "hump," and intensify the measures which will enable the B-29's to be brought to bear on the enemy.

d. The choice between alternatives *b* and *c* above will be made at a later date by the Combined Chiefs of Staff after obtaining an expression of opinion by the Generalissimo and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command.¹⁵

7. DRAFT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER (C. C. S. 426)¹⁶

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a draft report to the President and Prime Minister (C. C. S. 426). Certain additions and amendments were considered and agreed.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Approved the draft report to the President and the Prime Minister as amended in the course of discussion (amended paper subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 426/1).¹⁷

8. RELATION OF RESOURCES TO PLANS

It was pointed out that though no final decision could be taken on operations in Burma pending replies to the messages sent to the Generalissimo¹⁸ and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia

¹⁴ *Post*, p. 800.

¹⁵ For Chiang's messages of December 9 and 17, 1943, regarding this matter, see *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 74-77. For Mountbatten's message of December 6, 1943, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this matter, see *post*, p. 815. For a summary of the subsequent military developments which, in a sense, superseded both alternatives mentioned here, see *Stilwell's Command Problems*, chapters 3-5.

¹⁶ Not printed herein.

¹⁷ *Post*, p. 810.

¹⁸ See *post*, pp. 803 and 804, footnote 3.

Command,¹⁹ the Combined Staff Planners, in consultation with the shipping authorities, might well proceed with their examination of the extent to which the resources of the United Nations would meet the requirements in the light of decisions already taken. In this examination they should take into account the fact that the amphibious resources previously allocated to BUCCANEER would now be available for operations in Europe.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to instruct the Combined Staff Planners to proceed as proposed above.

9. MESSAGES TO MARSHAL STALIN AND THE GENERALISSIMO

GENERAL MARSHALL read out draft messages which he had prepared which might be sent by the President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin and the Generalissimo.²⁰ General Marshall undertook to circulate copies of these messages to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

10. FUTURE BUSINESS

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to meet on Tuesday, 7 December 1943, and to include on their agenda the discussion of the Control of Strategic Air Forces in North-west Europe and the Mediterranean, and Facilities for U. S. Forces in the Azores.²¹

¹⁹ See *ante*, p. 724, and *post*, p. 815.

²⁰ For the message to Stalin as sent after it had been modified, see *post*, p. 820. It was decided not to send the message to Chiang; see *post*, p. 749.

²¹ See *post*, pp. 757, 760.

**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, DECEMBER 6, 1943,
1:15 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Colonel Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No official record of the conversation during this luncheon meeting has been found. The Log, *ante*, p. 659, does not mention Colonel Roosevelt as a participant, but from Elliott Roosevelt, p. 208, it appears that he was there and that the principal topic of conversation was the language of the proposed communiqué to the press respecting

the conversations with İnönü. For the text of the communiqué, see *post*, p. 831.

QUADRIPARTITE MEETING, DECEMBER 6, 1943, 2:30 P. M.,
ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Colonel Elliott Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

TURKEY

President İnönü

SOVIET UNION

Mr. Vinogradov

Editorial Note

No official record of the conversation at this meeting has been found. The Log, *ante*, p. 659, and Elliott Roosevelt, p. 208, indicate that the meeting discussed and agreed upon the language of the communiqué to be issued to the press respecting the conversations with İnönü. For the text of the communiqué, see *post*, p. 831.

ROOSEVELT-HUGHES MEETING, DECEMBER 6, 1943, 4: 45 P. M.,
ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

Editorial Note

No official record of the conversation at this meeting of Roosevelt with the Chargé of the Apostolic Delegation at Cairo has been found. On December 29, 1943, President Roosevelt wrote a letter to Archbishop Spellman of New York in which the following paragraph occurs:

"When I was in Cairo I had a very nice visit from the Very Reverend Arthur Hughes. We talked about the Italian priests and also the Italian nuns who are interned or detained in Egypt and in Ethiopia, and the day I left I called the whole matter to Churchill's attention and pleaded with him that these perfectly innocent people should be released, or at least allowed to do their work. I have not had any answer from the British as yet."

The letter is published in *F. D. R., His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*, vol. II, pp. 1472-1473. See the Log, *ante*, p. 660.

It appears that Roosevelt also raised this subject with Eden at Cairo; see *post*, p. 871.

**ROOSEVELT MEETING WITH THE KING OF GREECE, DECEMBER 6, 1943,
5 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA**

Editorial Note

The only record that has been found of this meeting, aside from the entry in the Log, *ante*, p. 660, is the reference to it which appears in a telegram of December 12, 1943, from the Ambassador to the Greek Government-in-Exile in Egypt (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State, *post*, p. 844.

**THIRD TRIPARTITE MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, DECEMBER
6, 1943, 6 P. M.,¹ PRESIDENT'S VILLA**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	TURKEY
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	President İnönü
Mr. Hopkins	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Minister
Mr. Steinhardt	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Menemencioğlu ²
	Sir Hughe Knatchbull-	Mr. Açikalin
	Hugessen	Mr. Anderiman ³
	General Wilson	Mr. Kavrur
	Air Chief Marshal Douglas	Mr. Torgut Menemencioğlu
	Vice Admiral Willis	
	Air Vice Marshal George	
	Mr. Helm	

740.0011 EW 1939/12-2443

United States-United Kingdom Agreed Minutes

MOST SECRET

Prior to the meeting President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and the Turkish President had been in private conference.⁴

MR. CHURCHILL said that the Turkish President had decided to postpone his departure until midnight on 7th December. This would provide an opportunity for going over the ground in greater detail. He had submitted to the President⁵ a plan of action⁶ and this would raise the question of how it was to be carried out if Turkey were attacked and drawn into the war. In the interval a plan would be

¹ The minutes give the time of the meeting as 5 p. m. The Log, *ante*, p. 660, indicates that the meeting took place at 6 p. m. and that King George of Greece called on Roosevelt at 5 p. m.

² Referred to as Mr. Numan in the minutes.

³ Anderiman acted as interpreter.

⁴ No record of the conversation referred to has been found.

⁵ Presumably İnönü.

⁶ Presumably the plan given to İnönü on December 5, 1943; see *ante*, p. 714.

drawn up for Turkish action in conjunction with the great Allies.⁷ There was also the question of political guarantees, if Turkey by her actions should be drawn into the conflict. It was right and proper that in this event the Allies should see Turkey through.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT remarked that when it came to the discussion of political guarantees it would be desired to include Soviet representatives.

THE TURKISH PRESIDENT said he had been in contact with Mr. Churchill during the afternoon when the essential points had been made. They would be able to discuss these tomorrow⁸ when the position would be clearer in all directions. He thought however that one feature governed the solution of the whole question, namely the period for material preparation. After that came other phases. As THE PRESIDENT now understood it, however, such a period of preparation was not envisaged, or rather that a mixed method was contemplated. This was a cardinal point.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT thought in the first period Turkey would commit only neutral acts. She would receive equipment and material (MR. CHURCHILL—personnel) and men in mufti. MR. CHURCHILL remarked that in these conditions the Germans would not want to break with Turkey.

THE TURKISH PRESIDENT said that for months Turkey would face the German army alone. He had not contemplated this. He had thought that when the Germans declared war the Turks would be in touch with some Anglo-American forces. But in this period of months the Turks would be alone with the Germans. This was a great question and THE PRESIDENT did not think he could decide upon it.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT remarked that he did not think that the Germans would declare war in the first period.

PRESIDENT INONU said that their record showed that the Germans always attacked for prevention. When they saw after a certain time that Turkey had taken her place openly with the Allies they would use this argument and attack.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT pointed out that the Turks had already been receiving supplies on a considerable scale without the Germans taking exception thereto. Why then should the Turks worry now? In the first period there would be no question of the Turks taking the kind of action which would justify the Germans attacking them. Surely the work on airfields and the introduction of material, flak, etc., i. e. the same sort of thing as had been going on in the past, could continue.

⁷ This may be the paper that Churchill gave İnönü on December 7, 1943; see *post*, p. 754.

⁸ See *post*, p. 751.

This would apply to lend-lease material and the trucks previously promised would be delivered. In fact there would be no change except that there would be an accelerated tempo.

MR. EDEN remarked that the technicians would also have to come in. This was essential.

PRESIDENT INONU said that the Turks had replied to Mr. Eden's request for air bases for the Allies. It has been said that the provision of these would not provoke war. The Turks had replied that they must regard the matter as very serious because they were convinced that it would provoke war. This meant contemplating Turkey's entry into the war. The Turkish army was not ready and the country was exposed to enemy air attack. They must therefore have assistance and there would have to be a period of preparation. According to the plan action would begin at the end of this phase. We were now in the first phase and he understood that it was thought that preparation would take too long at a time when the Allies could not wait. The Allies seemed to think that the Turkish Government should act in spite of risks. This was difficult.

MR. EDEN said that a German land attack was most improbable, especially in view of the warning which Russia had promised to give to Bulgaria.

PRESIDENT INONU said that Turkey would be exposed to air attack and also to land attack by the Bulgarian army fortified by the Germans. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT doubted whether Bulgaria would face a hostile Russia.

PRESIDENT INONU said that perhaps a hostile Russia would induce Bulgaria to hold back, perhaps it would not. The present Bulgarian government was completely committed to Germany.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT did not think that Bulgaria would declare war on Turkey, and he doubted whether the Germans had enough men to stage a German land offensive against Turkey by way of Bulgaria. PRESIDENT INONU thought, however, that the Germans would be able to get to Istanbul.

In reply to a question by President Roosevelt PRESIDENT INONU said that Turkey had about forty divisions scattered about the country. They were not prepared. If the Allies had been able to give the desired material assistance in the past the Turkish Government could have replied affirmatively to any demand. As it was they had put all available material, including some very very old stuff, into service. They had hoped that this entirely out of date material would be replaced by new material. How was it possible to get out of the impasse?

MR. CHURCHILL said that the first thing was to prepare the nests for the birds. This must be done secretly and discreetly in order

not to alarm the Germans. The equipment and personnel agreed upon would be put in. Then would come the second phase when all was ready and when the air squadrons would arrive within twenty-four hours. From that moment Turkey would have much greater security than during the preliminary period.

PRESIDENT INONU said that even if the twenty air squadrons⁹ had arrived or were ready to come in, it would not be possible to say that Turkey was ready. Complete plans for assistance would have to be made and material would have to come in for the fortification of the army. In the event of attack the Allies would have to assist. Only one part of the preparation for this assistance was being discussed. The rest was being left to wait. But during the preparatory period proposed in the discussions, he must prepare his army, mobilize it and concentrate it. Much had been done but it was most inadequate, and a sort of concentration must take place. All this was apparently to be finished by 15th February, and the Turkish army must be put on a war footing for the Germans would strike at the first sign of the entry of the twenty squadrons.

MR. CHURCHILL enquired whether the Turkish army was not already mobilized and was informed that it was half mobilized.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT suggested that if mobilization had first to take place it would take a long time and suggested, as did MR. CHURCHILL, that in any case mobilization would surely be more provocative than work on air fields.

PRESIDENT INONU said that precipitate action without preparation seemed to be contemplated. He did not see any possibility of undertaking this.

MR. CHURCHILL remarked that the Turkish President seemed to think there was a serious danger of invasion. He however thought invasion by Bulgaria was most unlikely.

PRESIDENT INONU said it was a matter of opinion. One could not be sure what the enemy would do. Both the Bulgarians and the Germans had forces on the Turkish frontier, and the Turks must calculate that they would all be used.

MR. CHURCHILL thought that it was impossible to get to a conclusion at this meeting. He would like to go over the ground with the Turkish President on 7th December together with documents. The discussion could not be concluded this evening.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT said that what he envisaged was to talk of the first period and to set an objective date for it. This date would not be a hard and fast one, but it would be something to aim at. During this period, which would be in two parts, the Turks would give the Germans

⁹ See *ante*, pp. 726, 729.

and Bulgarians no excuse whatever for declaring war on Turkey. In the first part of the period work on the air fields would go ahead exactly as had happened before, and supplies and equipment, delivery of which was behindhand, would be sent forward. Neither of these would give any excuse to the Germans.

The delivery by the Americans of the thousand lorries with which they were behind-hand would give the Germans no excuse or provocation. At the same time mechanics, equipment, RADAR and technical equipment would come in as it had done before, and none of this would provide an excuse for Germany.

MR. CHURCHILL interjected that the flow would be on the same lines as before but on a much more intense scale, otherwise Turkey would not be ready.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT said that as regards work on the air fields, the work would go on as before and Turkish labour would be employed. This action would not provoke the Germans.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT went on to say that in the second part of his contemplated first period the Turks would bring more of their troops scattered throughout the country to the European side of the Bosphorus. Turkey had the right to do this without provoking an attack. It was PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT's expectation (not alone his hope) that Turkey could get through the whole of this period without attack or war. At the end of it the tempo would be accelerated but by that time preparations would have got so far that the twenty squadrons could be brought in and be in action within twenty-four hours if Turkey were attacked.

PRESIDENT INONU said it was a question of practical things. He was afraid that hopes could not be realized. The standpoint of the British was that Turkey must come in as soon as possible. If he said yes the plan would be that proposed by Mr. Churchill, then Turkey would begin to mobilize. The first thing would be to facilitate the arrival of the British squadrons. Mr. Churchill's expectation would then be realized. But this would mean Turkey's immediate entry into the war and the only assistance she would receive would be air assistance. The Turks contended that they were not ready for immediate entry. Their view was that a planned preparation must be made before Turkey could enter. It seemed to be thought that in contending thus, the Turks were merely dragging things out and adopting delaying tactics.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT said that the Allies also were not ready, for the twenty squadrons would only be ready on 15th February and MR. CHURCHILL said that he was asking for the squadrons to come in on 15th February.

PRESIDENT INONU said however that other things were necessary, in particular the army had to be strengthened.

MR. CHURCHILL enquired how long this would take. In view of the paucity of Turkish communications it would take months to make the Turkish army completely strong so as to enable Turkey to be safe and by that time there probably would be no desire that Turkey should come in. The war was going on and the moment for Turkey would pass. This was a serious possibility for the Turks.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT remarked that the Turkish army was very good, particularly the infantry. Its artillery was good, especially for ground warfare. It needed improved communications and aviation. He had been wondering whether by February 15th the Turkish army could not be trained and concentrated in the north to an extent adequate to ward off attack with the aid of air support.

PRESIDENT INONU said that if this was a question only of mobilization and concentration it could be done, or at least for the greater part. But at the end of it the Turkish army would only have its present material. Technical points were now being discussed and MR. CHURCHILL said that the strengthening of the Turkish army would take months and months. It was twenty days since the Turkish government had given their reply of November 17th,¹⁰ and nothing had happened in the interval. Turkey's material needs could be studied and ascertained in a week and then the Allies could say, on the basis of supply and transport possibilities, how long it would take before Turkey was ready.

MR. CHURCHILL pointed out that Turkish communications had been fully occupied since the delivery of the Turkish note on November 17th. The Turkish army was good; it had been mobilized for four years. It was a considerable force, much stronger than the Bulgarian army, and it had already received much. It was true that it had not received as much as the Turks would have liked, but he considered that the danger of a Bulgarian land attack was negligible.

MR. CHURCHILL suggested that it would be better to adjourn the discussions. If President Roosevelt would confide the further discussions to him he would continue conversations with President Inonu on December 7th and report to President Roosevelt by telegram.¹¹

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT said that he would have liked to have been here to complete the discussions, but that he must leave on 7th December. He urged very strongly that serious consideration should be given to the question of how much could be done before 15th February without giving offence to Germany and Bulgaria.

¹⁰ See Hull's telegram of November 22, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 374.

¹¹ Telegram of December 9, 1943, *post*, p. 839.

PRESIDENT INONU said the situation seemed to be that Turkey would intervene on 15th February (PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT and MR. CHURCHILL at once contested this). There would be a period of preparation. What could the Allies give Turkey in two months? What could be carried? The Turkish General Staff would study these points. But what would happen after February 15th? That, he presumed, would be the period for action.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT said it would not necessarily be the period of action. But from February 15th the Turks would be expected to do things which were no longer neutral. It meant that there would be two months before Bulgaria or Germany would attack, and MR. CHURCHILL remarked that in that time Bulgaria might well be out of the war.

PRESIDENT INONU wondered at what the level of preparations would be in two months. It could not be determined without study.

MR. CHURCHILL said that this would be gone into in the further conversations. To the Turkish President's remark that he had no military experts with him, MR. CHURCHILL said that the Allies would say what they could put in.

PRESIDENT INONU said he would wait for this information. He could not say whether it would be enough, but he would take the information and return to Ankara. He would however be obliged to reserve his reply. To President Roosevelt's remark that his Chief of Staff (General Somerville)¹² would arrive tomorrow and be here for two days, THE TURKISH PRESIDENT enquired why there should not be staff talks. MR. CHURCHILL pointed out that time was too pressing and that the twenty squadrons had to be got ready.

PRESIDENT INONU said that in three or four days he would be ready to reply. The decision would be taken on all the facts. They found themselves in a situation which was fixed by time, but he would see what could be provided within two months and the Turkish staff would offer their observations, including modifications and additions.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT thought that agreement should be reached on that. It was useless to talk about other matters. This was the core of the whole problem. He would leave General Somerville [*Somervell*], or his assistant, to pursue the discussions which were mainly military. MR. NUMAN again remarked that the Turks had no military experts, but MR. CHURCHILL pointed out that the question should be discussed and the Turks then send their observations.

¹² The reference is apparently to Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces. Somervell, however, was listed as present at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at 11 a. m. that morning; see *ante*, p. 734.

MR. EDEN stressed that not everything should be adjourned for consideration at Ankara. Things must be pushed forward.

MR. CHURCHILL cautioned that at the best not much could be provided for the Turkish army. The Turkish communications would be blocked by the delivery of the air programme. The agreed material and technicians must go forward, and there would not be much room for anything else. The Turks must therefore not put their military material expectations too high as otherwise all hopes would be killed.

PRESIDENT INONU said he was forcing himself to try to find a possible position in the Allied programme. He was doing so with the best will in the world. But he must make the position clear. So far the Turks had no material. A preparatory period of two months was now proposed to him. He had not said that this was enough. The Allies had the material and the transport, but he did not know how much was going to be available. He understood however that the main effort was to be concentrated on aviation material and personnel. (MR. CHURCHILL interjected that air was the only danger). At present, as the THE TURKISH PRESIDENT saw it, it was contemplated that Turkey would enter the war with anti-aircraft preparation alone.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT then suggested the conclusion of the meeting and kept back the Turkish President to whom he wished to bid goodbye.¹³

¹³ For Hopkins' suggestion that Roosevelt include, in his farewell conversation with İnönü, a request that he "be ready to go to war Feb. 15", see *post*, p. 817. No record has been found showing whether Roosevelt did so.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, DECEMBER 6, 1943, 7:30 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
(in the chair)
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Minister Eden
General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet
Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA
Field Marshal Smuts

Secretariat

Captain Royal

Brigadier Redman

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT read out paragraph by paragraph the report of the agreed summary of conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the SEXTANT Conference (C. C. S. 426/1).¹

There was some discussion over the Emergency Return to the Continent (paragraphs 17 to 20). THE PRESIDENT understood that objections had been raised to the United States proposals in paragraph 18 on the grounds that they would involve a move of the United States forces from the right to the left across the British lines of communication. He understood that in practice this objection should not be a serious one, as the change-over would not take place until operations had been concluded.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he could not commit the British Government to these proposals. They would have to be put to the War Cabinet.

With regard to the Higher Direction of Operations in the Southeast Asia Command (paragraph 23), THE PRIME MINISTER said that this did not affect the decision taken at the QUADRANT Conference that the British Chiefs of Staff were to be the channel of communication with the Southeast Asia Command.²

With reference to paragraph 26, THE PRIME MINISTER said that he thought the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command,³ should be sent a copy of the President's recent signal to the Generalissimo on the subject of operations in the Southeast Asia Command.⁴ THE PRESIDENT agreed and THE PRIME MINISTER gave instructions for the signal to be dispatched.

After reading out paragraph 28, THE PRESIDENT said that he had been approached by the Chinese, here at the SEXTANT Conference, with a request for Chinese representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. He had made it clear at once that such representation could not be agreed to. The Chinese had also asked if a U. S.-Chinese Committee could be appointed for the consideration of the military operations with which China was concerned.⁵

¹ *Post*, p. 810.

² The records of the QUADRANT (First Quebec) Conference, August 1943, are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

³ Admiral Mountbatten.

⁴ See Roosevelt's memorandum of December 5, 1943, to Churchill, *post*, p. 803.

⁵ See *ante*, pp. 325, 337.

When THE PRESIDENT came to the end of the report, he commended the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the report that they had produced.

THE PRIME MINISTER classified the report as a masterly survey of the whole military scene. He gave it as his opinion that when military historians came to adjudge the decisions of the SEXTANT Conference, they would find them fully in accordance with the classic articles of war.

THE PRIME MINISTER then expressed his deep sense of gratitude to his United States colleagues. The ANVIL operation had been a great contribution made by them to this Conference. He was convinced that this operation would contribute largely to the success of OVERLORD.

THE PRESIDENT and PRIME MINISTER then initialled the report (C. C. S. 426/1).

In answer to a question from the Prime Minister as to whether the draft communiqué on the U-boat war had been approved, ADMIRAL KING stated that the communiqué had been cleared with the President, that it had been dispatched already to Washington, and that it would be released on the 10th of the month.⁶

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested to the President that the communiqué should be made out in alternate months by the United States and the British respectively, and that as the British had prepared the present communiqué, that for next month should be prepared by the United States. THE PRESIDENT agreed with this proposal.

A draft message to Marshal Stalin was then considered. It was approved with a minor modification and instructions given for it to be sent at once.⁷

A draft telegram to the Generalissimo was then read out.⁸ It was agreed that on grounds of security it would be undesirable to put so much secret information into a dispatch of this nature. It was decided not to dispatch a telegram to the Generalissimo until his reply had been received to the recent telegram sent to him by the President on the subject of operations in the Southeast Asia Command.⁹

⁶ The communiqué summarizing Allied anti-submarine operations during the month of November was published in the press on December 10, 1943. The text may be found in the *New York Times* of that date, p. 1, col. 6.

⁷ For the message as sent, see *post*, p. 820.

⁸ Not printed herein.

⁹ See Roosevelt's message of December 5, 1943, to Churchill, *post*, p. 803. Chiang's reply and subsequent correspondence will be found in *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 74 ff.

DINNER MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF,
DECEMBER 6, 1943, ABOUT 8:30 P. M.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet
Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay

Editorial Note

The only account of this meeting that has been found is in Arnold, p. 473, which indicates that Marshall took a poll of the opinion of officers present as to when each of them thought the war with Germany would be ended. The place of the meeting is not given; the time of the meeting is inferred from Arnold's account and from the Log, *ante*, p. 660.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1943¹

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL CONVERSATION, DECEMBER 7, 1943,
ABOUT 8:05 A. M., CAIRO WEST AIRPORT

Editorial Note

According to the Log, *ante*, p. 661, Roosevelt arrived at the airport at 8:05 a. m. and bade goodbye to Churchill and to certain Americans (Steinhardt, Kirk, Royce, and others), after which he embarked in the plane at 8:20 for the return journey.

Roosevelt discussed certain subjects with Churchill apparently on the last day of Roosevelt's stay at Cairo. These subjects, which may have been discussed at the airport, were:

Italian priests and nuns interned or detained in Egypt and in Ethiopia; see *ante*, p. 739.

The question of seeking bases in Ireland; see *post*, p. 853, footnote 1, and Hull, vol. II, p. 1357.

British gold and dollar balances; see *post*, pp. 822, 878.

¹ For a post-Conference report of a Steinhardt-Vyshinsky conversation and an Eden-Vyshinsky conversation at Cairo after Roosevelt had departed, see *post*, pp. 858-859.

CHURCHILL-INÖNÜ MEETING, DECEMBER 7, 1943, MORNING,
CHURCHILL'S VILLAPRESENT ¹

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen

TURKEY

President İnönü
Foreign Minister Menemencioglu
Mr. Açikalin

740.0011 EW 1939/12-2443

United Kingdom Minutes

MOST SECRET

THE PRIME MINISTER put to President İnönü the proposal that by February 15th all measures should be taken to render possible the fly-in of the 20 Allied squadrons.² The Prime Minister would be ready after February 15th to consult with the Turkish government before the fly-in is carried out. By that time the situation may have evolved. The Balkan satellites may be on the point of falling out of the war. We should expect all measures to have been taken by February 15th to render the fly-in possible. It would not be possible to forecast enemy action between now and February 15th. The President of the United States had said that Germany would be given no excuse to attack Turkey in this interval. Germany would not consider excuses but only whether it was worth her while to attack Turkey. Therefore by February 15th we shall know more about the German reaction. We have agreed on the preliminary steps and the work on the airfields must be finished as quickly as possible. After that on February 15th if the preparations are complete, he will ask whether the squadrons can come in and the matter can be discussed as between friends and allies. If after February 15th Turkey will not receive the allied squadrons and wishes to prolong the discussions of the equipment of the Turkish army, then the Prime Minister will be forced to think of other plans. The allied squadrons cannot be wasted, they would have to be used elsewhere. February 15th will be the critical and serious moment. But if we are forced, after that, to send the squadrons elsewhere, the question cannot be reopened with Turkey. It must be closed. We should have to tell our other allies that our policy with Turkey had failed. If the Turkish answer is favorable we would begin as quickly as possible to send in further

¹ The minutes (see *post*, p. 755) state that the "Chiefs of Staff" joined the meeting before it was concluded. The reference is probably to the British Chiefs of Staff, rather than to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but no record has been found to indicate which officers attended.

² See *ante*, pp. 726, 729, 743.

material. But before February 15th Turkish communications would be blocked with the material for the airfields. It was the Prime Minister's opinion that Bulgaria would not attack and it was even uncertain whether the Germans would push Bulgaria to attack, because if Bulgaria did so she would have to withdraw her nine divisions from Yugoslavia and this would create difficulty for the Germans.

PRESIDENT INONU understood that the Prime Minister had resumed [*résuméed?*] the conversations of the last 2 or 3 days.

M. MENEMENCIOGLU said that the Turks had said all they had to say in the last three days.

PRESIDENT INONU said that he had the impression that on the essential question both sides had reserved their own opinions. The Turks had foreseen two periods (i) preparation and (ii) effective cooperation. This had been accepted by the National Assembly and had formed the subject of the answer of November 17th given by the Turkish Government.³ On the other hand the Prime Minister considered the first period as purely one for preparation especially as regards the airfields.

THE PRIME MINISTER explained that this was because he did not regard invasion as a serious danger.

PRESIDENT INONU asked whether he had rightly understood that the Prime Minister had not excluded the supply of other goods either before or after February 15th.

THE PRIME MINISTER said certainly not. The quicker the supplies were sent the better.

PRESIDENT INONU asked whether the Prime Minister thought that these supplies should be complete before action was taken.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that it was not necessary that the supplies for the army should be complete by February 15th, and for the Turks to insist on this would be the same as saying that they would not come in. To complete supplies for the Turkish army is to adjourn the final Turkish decision indefinitely. On that basis the chance of shortening the war by Turkey's entry would be lost.

PRESIDENT INONU said that he thought the difference between the two sides was in their appreciation of German strength. The Allies thought that in the present situation Germany could not do much harm to Turkey.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this applied only to land attack: air bombardment was very possible.

PRESIDENT INONU said that all war risks were natural and would have to be taken. The Turkish government saw Germany as stretch-

³ See Hull's telegram of November 22, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 374.

ing from the Crimea to Rhodes and with Turkey encircled and they felt that Germans [*Germany?*] had fresh forces with which she could attack. If in these circumstances Turkey was left without a minimum of the essential supplies she would be seriously menaced on land. He explained a weak point in the present Turkish military position. At the beginning of November one class had been released from the colours. A new class of recruits was now being called up. On the basis of a decision by February 15th, Turkey would have to strengthen the army by 2 or 3 classes. Another point was that at the present date, the period of mud in Thrace had not yet begun. THE PRESIDENT went on to say that he had explained the situation as he saw it. His technicians were not with him and he could not go further into detail. It was a serious question for the government to give a positive answer on matters which went against the decision of the Grand National Assembly. As to the political question in the preparatory period, it was necessary to work for a closer definition of the political situation. If he had understood the Prime Minister rightly, Mr. Churchill required his answer now, or soon, so that the situation to be taken up in the future could be defined. He would do all he could to give a clear and accurate answer in 3 or 4 days.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the final answer was not required till February 15th, but that in the interval we must at once begin preparations.

PRESIDENT INONU understood the position. The answer he proposed to give in 3 or 4 days was to the question whether and in what manner he would engage in the preparations. He would tell us the conditions in which Turkey would come in or take the risks likely to bring her in. After having considered the Prime Minister's statement Turkey must give an answer. THE PRESIDENT asked that an expert should be sent to Angora to study the technical questions more closely. The Turkish answer had been given in principle. The Turkish government thought that a general plan was necessary, not for the sake of prolonging the discussions but for practical reasons. It was the Prime Minister's opinion that the preparations proposed up to February 15th were sufficient. In the interval it would be quite possible to form a general plan.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if the President envisaged a long programme of re-equipment taking into account the difficulty of communications and so forth, that was the same as saying that the negotiations were ended. It would be easy for Turkey to make prohibitive conditions and in that case the Allied forces must be sent elsewhere.

PRESIDENT INONU said that this was a serious statement touching a fundamental point. He would define the position as follows:

(a) given that the Turkish answer is a simple acceptance of the Prime Minister's proposal, namely to go on with the preparations till February 15th and taking the final decision then, that would be the best answer that the Prime Minister could require.

(b) alternatively to consider Allied needs and add the Turkish need for a plan which both sides could accept. If Turkey accepted, the preparations could continue; if not, the Prime Minister would have the right to change his plans.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that this would mean a complete change of policy. In that event the war would move westwards and Turkey would lose the chance of coming in and of reaping the advantages which entry into the war would promise her.

M. MENEMENCIOGLU asked whether by change of policy the Prime Minister was referring to the Anglo-Turkish Alliance.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that the Alliance would cease to have any value for war purposes. The moment would have gone when Turkey could render the great service we asked. Turkey would stay where she was. Friendship would remain, but as an effective ally for the war Turkey would count for nothing. We should win, but without Turkey. Turkey's entry into the war was important for us as it gave a chance of including Turkey with the Allies in the future.

PRESIDENT INONU said that for Turkey fidelity to Great Britain was an essential conception both during and after the war. If this was also the British view he thought it was not impossible to find a solution.

THE PRIME MINISTER mentioned the line of procedure as subsequently handed to the President and shown here as Annex A.⁴

MR. EDEN said that as regards the Alliance we were faithful to our engagements and wished to work with our Turkish friends. But if the time for Turkey's entry into the war came and went, it was inevitable that the spirit of the Alliance would be affected.

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed the view that Bulgaria would not attack Turkey when she knew that this would entail a Russian declaration of war on her.

M. MENEMENCIOGLU asked whether the Russian declaration of war would be given equally if Bulgaria allowed Germany all facilities in and through Bulgaria for an attack on Turkey.

MR. EDEN undertook to put this question to the Soviet government.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he could not guarantee that the Germans would not bomb Istanbul and Smyrna. But if our squadrons were there the Germans would have serious losses. He thought it very possible by the end of February that the situation would be reassuring for Turkey. It would be easier to see clearly then than now and in the

⁴ *Infra*, p. 755.

interval the preparations did not commit Turkey to give a favourable answer to our appeal to send air squadrons after February 15th. The President was quite free to say yes or no without reproach. All that would have happened would be that we had sacrificed war material for nothing. If Germany did not attack Turkey but remained in relations with her, we should not ask Turkey to declare war. Time would thus be gained for sending in further supplies. In this way Turkey would be in a very strong position and would emerge unexhausted with the advantage of cooperation with the victorious allies. THE PRIME MINISTER wanted Turkey to be strong after the war and to be friends with Great Britain, the United States and Russia. Turkey and Great Britain had common interests and THE PRIME MINISTER wanted to protect them. THE PRIME MINISTER then handed the annexed paper to President Inonu who read it and said that it was clear and that there was nothing more to say. THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that there were two things to be done. The President would consult the National Assembly and give his answer in 4 or 5 days. Those days could also be employed in pressing on with preparations and sending in specialists. This was agreed to and the number of specialists was limited to 250. At this point the Chiefs of Staff⁵ joined the meeting and handed the Prime Minister a paper⁶ which showed that between now and February 15th, in addition to the supplies required for the A. A. guns and airfields, a total of 58,900 tons could be sent to Turkey by rail for Turkey's own use, given the full cooperation of the Turkish railways and in addition as many more supplies as could be carried by sea.

It was agreed that the next steps should be the following:

1. British experts should go to Angora. This was agreed to by the Turks.

2. General Kiazim Orbay and General Ceffik Cakmak and a naval representative of the Turkish General Staff should come to Cairo. The Turks reserved their final answer to this question till their return to Angora.

3. Matters should then be followed up by the despatch of more British officers to Angora to continue the conversations.

ANNEX A

1. Air preparations and other supplies till 15 February.
2. Discussion of war plans.
3. Programme of munitions import.
4. Discussion of political questions.

⁵ The reference is probably to the British Chiefs of Staff rather than to the Combined Chiefs of Staff but no record has been found indicating which officers attended.

⁶ Not found in United States files.

15th February. Allies ask permission to "fly in".

If reply negative.

Allies direct all resources to another theatre and must abandon hope of wartime cooperation with Turkey.

If reply "Yes".

1. Continuation at fullest speed of programme of import munitions for army and air.
2. Opening of the sea route to Turkey.
3. Reinforcement by British anti-tank and armoured units.
4. Execution of agreed plan with full force of Allies and Turkey.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, DECEMBER 7, 1943,
11 A. M., MENA HOUSE¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Badger
Major General Sutherland
Major General Fairchild
Brigadier General Hansell
Brigadier General Roberts
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet
Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
General Riddell-Webster
Major General Laycock
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Sugden
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier McNair
Brigadier Head
Colonel Cornwall-Jones
Lieutenant Colonel Mallaby

Secretariat

Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland

Brigadier Redman
Commander Coleridge

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF CONCLUSIONS OF C. C. S. 137TH MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 137th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The detailed record of the Meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.²

¹ C. C. S. 138th meeting.

² The minutes, as amended, are printed *ante*, p. 734.

2. INTEGRATED COMMAND OF U. S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN THE
EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA
(C. C. S. 400,³ 400/1⁴ and 400/2⁵)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them C. C. S. 400/2 as amended by the corrigendum issued on 7 December.⁶

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the attitude of the British Chiefs of Staff to the proposals had already been stated and to these views he had nothing to add. He recognized, however, that the new directive proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff was designed to meet some of the objections which had been put forward. The British Chiefs of Staff could not signify their approval of the proposals, but recognized the right of the United States Chiefs of Staff to issue such directives to their own air forces as they might see fit. If the new directive were issued, he, for his part, was prepared to assume the responsibility laid on him by this directive, and to carry it out to the best of his ability. He would suggest, however, that before implementing the new policy, General Arnold should, if possible, hear the views of General Eisenhower, General Wilson, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder.

GENERAL ARNOLD said he was anxious to implement the proposals as soon as possible. He would, however, discuss the matter as suggested by Sir Charles Portal before taking final action.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Accepted C. C. S. 400/2.

b. Took note:

(1) that although the British Chiefs of Staff do not agree in principle with C. C. S. 400/2, the United States Chiefs of Staff have decided to issue the directive giving effect to their proposals;

(2) that before issue of the directive, the Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces would consult General Eisenhower, Air Marshal Tedder and General Wilson;

(3) that the Chief of the Air Staff undertook to carry out the duties laid upon him by the directive contained in C. C. S. 400/2 (as corrected by corrigendum of 7 December).

3. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ALTERNATIVE TO
"BUCCANEER"

(C. C. S. 427 and 427/1)⁷

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a telegram from Admiral Mountbatten (C. C. S. 427/1).

³ *Ante*, p. 228.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 432.

⁵ *Post*, p. 787.

⁶ See *post*, p. 788, footnote 2.

⁷ *Post*, pp. 800 and 815.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that no decisions should be taken until the views of the Generalissimo were known.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had given brief consideration to the subject that morning. In general, their views were that since BUCCANEER had been postponed, the trained forces earmarked for this operation would be available for use elsewhere. Some might be required for commando operations, if these were decided upon. The service troops might be used to assist in overcoming the logistic difficulties in Calcutta and Assam. The combat troops might be used as a reliable reserve in the rear of the Chinese forces operating on the Ledo Road. He was most anxious to ensure that our Assam bases and the pipeline should not be lost. The report received with regard to the bad morale of the Chinese forces^a had, he felt, been given too much weight. It was a report from one officer only, who was not in contact with the troops. The reactions of the Generalissimo could not be foretold, but if Operation TARZAN was called off he felt that the operations outlined by Admiral Mountbatten might well be undertaken with an additional advance by the Chinese forces on the Ledo Road with the United States long range penetration group of 2,500 to 3,000 men operating ahead of them, and with some of the British forces released from BUCCANEER forming a reserve.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he was in general agreement with the views which had been expressed. If the Generalissimo did not agree to the undertaking of Operation TARZAN, but preferred an additional air lift over the "hump," then a new directive might be given to Admiral Mountbatten, giving him as his objective the assurance of the Assam lines of communication and instructing him that the combat forces released from BUCCANEER should be used in active offensive operations to achieve the object while the non-fighting troops released should be used to assist in overcoming logistics difficulties and in the construction of the facilities required for the operations of the B-29's. He suggested that the British Chiefs of Staff should inform General Wedemeyer of these views, telling him that they should form a basis for future planning, but could not be taken as a firm instruction until a reply from the Generalissimo had been received. In the meantime, a draft directive could be prepared for Admiral Mountbatten on the assumption that the Generalissimo would prefer the postponement of TARZAN.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

a. That a new directive along the lines indicated in the above discussion should be issued to the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia

^a This may have been the report summarized in *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 69.

Command regarding the campaign to be carried out in North Burma in 1944; and

b. That this directive should not be dispatched until the receipt of the Generalissimo's reply ⁹ to the President's dispatch of 5 December ¹⁰ on the subject of operations in the Southeast Asia Command.¹¹

4. PROVISION OF MERCHANT SHIPPING TYPES FOR THE WAR AGAINST
JAPAN
(C. C. S. 415/3)¹²

Without discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved that the Ministry of War Transport and the War Shipping Administration should take into consideration the need for Fleet Auxiliaries for the British Fleet for operations in the war against Japan, and that they should take steps to provide the requisite ships after agreement in detail between the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet ¹³ and the First Sea Lord,¹⁴ as set out in C. C. S. 415/3.

5. RELATION OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO THE OPERATIONS DECIDED
UPON
(C. C. S. 428)¹⁵

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the paper under consideration had been prepared in great haste as an interim report, and as such it could be accepted. Further work would have to be done in the light of the final decisions yet to be taken.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed with this view. He suggested certain amendments to the report, which were agreed.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted in principle the relation of available resources to agreed operations outlined in C. C. S. 428 with the modifications approved in the course of discussion. (Amended paper subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 428 (Rev.)¹⁶)

⁹ For Chiang's reply of December 9, 1943, see *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 74.

¹⁰ *Post*, p. 803.

¹¹ For subsequent developments, see *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 73 ff.

¹² *Post*, p. 809.

¹³ Admiral Ernest J. King.

¹⁴ Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham.

¹⁵ Not printed herein.

¹⁶ *Post*, p. 828. The parenthetical reference to C. C. S. 428 (Revised) of December 15, 1943, was presumably added to these minutes of the meeting of December 7, 1943, later in the month, by the military editors of the minutes.

6. DEVELOPMENT OF FACILITIES IN THE AZORES
(C. C. S. 270/13 and 270/14)¹⁷

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that there were two sides to this problem. Firstly, with regard to the political position, the latest information from Lisbon showed that Dr. Salazar was ready to allow the operation of United States anti-submarine forces and the ferrying of United States aircraft through the Azores on condition that acceptable formulae to cover these operations could be found. The British Chiefs of Staff memorandum (C. C. S. 270/14) suggested certain formulae. These were contained in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of the paper. He would like to know if these were acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had already put forward a draft memorandum for the President to send to the State Department with regard to the changing of the insignia on the United States aircraft to be used in the Azores.¹⁸

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he did not believe that this would now be necessary. It seemed to him that provided Dr. Salazar could be satisfied that the United States anti-submarine forces were operating on loan to His Majesty's Government under command of a British officer from a British base, and that the American transit aircraft were controlled by the British Air Transport Command, he, Dr. Salazar, would be satisfied.

With regard to the military aspects, it had been found necessary to obtain additional facilities; for instance, more land was required, and it was desired to run a pipeline to take the place of the long haul for gasoline by road. In this connection, it was proposed that the British Government should make a further approach to the Portuguese Government, asking for these additional facilities, on the ground that these were a natural development on the agreement already in force.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the formulae suggested by Sir Charles Portal were entirely acceptable to him, except for the proposal in the second half of paragraph 4 of C. C. S. 270/14 with regard to the second airfield. He suggested, therefore, that the British proposals with this exception should be accepted and that he and Sir Charles Portal should work out the necessary details.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Approved C. C. S. 270/14 with the elimination of the last sentence of paragraph 4.

¹⁷ *Post*, pp. 807 and 808.

¹⁸ Not printed herein. The draft memorandum was not sent to Roosevelt, on the basis presumably of Portal's thought set forth in the next paragraph of the minutes.

b. Agreed that details regarding the use of the Azores facilities by United States Army air forces should be settled directly between General Arnold and Air Chief Marshal Portal.

7. NEW COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed the date on which the new Mediterranean Command¹⁹ should be set up, and the most suitable time for General Eisenhower to leave this theater and assume command of the Allied Expeditionary Force.²⁰

It was generally agreed that it was undesirable to publish the fact that unification of command in the Mediterranean had been set up, or to announce General Eisenhower's new appointment. In this latter case, however, it was accepted that for political reasons the announcement of this appointment would be necessary.

SIR HASTINGS ISMAY put forward a draft memorandum covering these points.²¹ The Combined Chiefs of Staff accepted this memorandum for submission to the President and Prime Minister.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed that the unification of Command in the Mediterranean shall take effect from 10 December.²² There should be no public announcement of this change of organization.

b. Agreed to recommend that General Eisenhower should hand over Command of the Mediterranean Theater on 1 January, or as soon after that date as General Eisenhower himself thinks desirable, having regard to the progress of the operations to capture Rome.²³

c. Agreed to recommend, that, if there is to be a public announcement of General Eisenhower's move from the Mediterranean to the U. K., his new appointment should be described as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.²⁴

d. Recommend that concurrently with the above, the announcement should be made of the new Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater.²⁵

¹⁹ Agreed to on December 5, 1943; see *ante*, p. 704.

²⁰ See *ante*, p. 734, footnote 1.

²¹ Not found. The memorandum presumably corresponded to some or all of the points contained in the lettered paragraphs which follow.

²² On December 9, 1943, Eisenhower was designated Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater, as of December 10.

²³ Eisenhower departed from the Mediterranean Theater at the end of December 1943, going to Washington first before moving on to London. The Mediterranean Command was transferred to General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson as of January 8, 1944.

²⁴ The public announcement was made on December 24, 1943.

²⁵ Wilson's designation was announced on December 24, 1943.

e. Took note that the approval of the President and Prime Minister would be sought to the above before transmission of the necessary instructions.²⁶

8. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND (C. C. S. 411/5 ²⁷)

The United States Chiefs of Staff presented a memorandum (C. C. S. 411/5) setting out certain proposals with regard to the air lift to China.

After a brief discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved C. C. S. 411/5.

9. EMPLOYMENT OF FRENCH FORCES

SIR ALAN BROOKE reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that General Giraud had put forward a proposal for employing at least one French armored division from the United Kingdom.²⁸ He felt that in view of shipping limitations and the fact that Operation ANVIL had now been decided on, it would be better to maintain the principle that the main French effort should be made in the South of France.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed with this view. The training of a French armored division in the United Kingdom would prove difficult. It would be better that the French armored division and other French forces should if possible be given a period of active service in Italy, and then used for Operation ANVIL. It must be remembered of course that General Giraud did not know that this operation had been decided on. As he saw, it would probably be best for the ANVIL forces to be principally United States and the remainder French. The majority of the forces in Italy would then be British. It was most important that the French forces for ANVIL should have had experience in battle before this operation. There would, of course, have to be a token French force for Operation OVERLORD.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

a. That for shipping and other reasons it was undesirable that a French armored division should be sent to take part in Operation OVERLORD.

²⁶ By December 9, 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill had approved of points *a* and *b*, and Churchill had approved also of points *c* and *d*; message of December 9, 1943, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Eisenhower (FAN 308), not printed herein. Roosevelt presumably approved of points *c* and *d* later.

²⁷ *Post*, p. 821.

²⁸ Not found. See, however, Eisenhower's memorandum of November 26, 1943, *ante*, p. 431.

b. That as a general policy :

(1) A French force should participate in ANVIL and only a token force in OVERLORD.

(2) It will probably be best to undertake the ANVIL operation with U. S. forces with French participation, and to continue the campaign in Italy with British forces.

c. That all French formations should be given battle experience in Italy.

10. FINAL REMARKS

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he would like to express on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff their deep gratitude for the way in which the United States Chiefs had met their views.

There was one other point he would like to mention. The British Chiefs of Staff would like to express their appreciation of the unstinting help given to the British and other Allies from American production. This aspect of United States assistance was not mentioned in the consideration of strategy, but nevertheless had the widest repercussions on all our plans, and was playing a great part in the successful development of the war. The British Chiefs of Staff would like to express their deep admiration of the stupendous efforts which the United States had made in the field of production.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he very much appreciated Sir Alan Brooke's gracious tributes. He felt that it was most important that during the next month or so the British and United States Chiefs of Staff should both study how best the magnitude of future conferences could be reduced. They would undoubtedly in future have to take place at shorter intervals.

ADMIRAL KING, in agreeing with this view, said that every effort should also be made to cut down the number of subjects discussed at these important conferences.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed :

a. That it was desirable to cut down as much as possible the attendance at future U. S.-British Conferences.

b. That a study with this in view should be carried out within the next month.

CHURCHILL-COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF DINNER MEETING,
DECEMBER 7, 1943, EVENING, CHURCHILL'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA
General Marshall	Prime Minister Churchill	Field Marshal Smuts
Admiral King	Foreign Secretary Eden	
General Arnold	Lord Leathers	
	Mr. Casey	
	General Brooke	
	Air Chief Marshal Portal	
	Field Marshal Dill	
	Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham	

Editorial Note

Churchill was the host at this dinner party, accounts of which will be found in Churchill, p. 419, and Arnold, p. 474. The list of those present is a composite list derived from both of these sources. No official record of the conversation at this meeting has been found, but according to the sources mentioned the topics included the estimated date of the end of the war with Germany, unconditional surrender, and Churchill's views on Russia.

13. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

A. CORRESPONDENCE, DRAFTS, AND PROPOSALS ¹

J. C. S. Files

Report by the Combined Staff Planners ²

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 2 December 1943.

C. C. S. 417

OVER-ALL PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

PROBLEM

1. To prepare an over-all plan for the defeat of Japan.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. Our studies of this subject have taken account of:

a. The possibility that invasion of the principal Japanese islands may not be necessary and the defeat of Japan may be accomplished by sea and air blockade and intensive air bombardment from progressively advanced bases. The plan must, however, be capable of expansion to meet the contingency of invasion.

b. The possibility that Germany may be defeated as early as the spring of 1944.

c. The possibility that the U. S. S. R. may enter the war against Japan early after the defeat of Germany, and our plan proposes that all possible preparations should be made to take advantage of such a development. Further progress is dependent upon staff conversations with the Soviets.

d. The possibility that a full campaign in Burma may have to be carried out following on the TARZAN operation.³

¹ In addition to the documents printed here, it appears that a memorandum was prepared by Douglas for Roosevelt and Hopkins near the end of the Second Cairo Conference, which showed that landing craft were in inadequate supply for the carrying out of BUCCANEER. (Douglas to the Historical Office, June 22, 1956; 023.1/6-2256.) No copy of the memorandum has been found. See, however, Sherwood, p. 800.

² Prepared for the Combined Chiefs of Staff pursuant to their request of November 25, 1943; see *ante*, p. 349.

³ This paragraph was added to C. C. S. 417 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting of December 4, 1943, 2:30 p. m.; see *ante*, p. 688.

OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE

3. To obtain objectives from which we can conduct intensive air bombardment and establish a sea and air blockade against Japan, and from which to invade Japan proper if this should prove to be necessary.

GENERAL CONCEPT

4. The main effort against Japan should be made in the Pacific.

CONCEPT WITHIN THE PACIFIC

5. The advance along the New Guinea-N. E. I.-Philippine axis will proceed concurrently with operations for the capture of the Mandated Islands. These two series of operations will be mutually supporting. United Nations naval forces can be deployed to support successive operations along each axis, and to prevent interference by hostile surface units with simultaneous operations in the two areas. Transfer of forces and resources from one area to the other is contemplated. When conflicts in timing and allocation of means exist, due weight should be accorded to the fact that operations in the Central Pacific promise at this time a more rapid advance toward Japan and her vital lines of communication; the earlier acquisition of strategic air bases closer to the Japanese homeland; and, of greatest importance, are more likely to precipitate a decisive engagement with the Japanese Fleet.

The aim should be to advance along the New Guinea-N. E. I.-Philippine axis and to complete the capture of the Mandated Islands in time to launch a major assault in the Formosa-Luzon-China area in the spring of 1945 (i. e., before the onset of the typhoon season), from a distant base.

CONCEPT WITHIN OTHER AREAS

6. Operations in the North Pacific, the South Pacific, China and the Southeast Asia Theater should be conducted in support of the main operations in the Central and Southwest Pacific. In the event of the U. S. S. R. entering the war, operations in the North Pacific may assume far greater importance and may involve a major redeployment of forces.

GENERAL CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

7. The conduct of operations should be designed to:

- a. Destroy the Japanese Fleet at an early date.
- b. Secure the maximum attrition of enemy air forces.
- c. Intensify air, submarine and mining operations against enemy shipping and lines of communication.
- d. Enable us to launch shore-based and carrier-borne air attack on Japan.

- e. Keep China in the war.
- f. Insure that the sequence of operations remains flexible and that preparations are made to take all manner of short cuts made possible by developments in the situation.
- g. Take advantage of the earliest practicable reorientation of forces from the European Theater.

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN 1944

8. For operations planned for 1944, see schedule in C. C. S. 397, Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944 (To be revised).⁴ These operations are in accordance with the over-all concept. In brief they contemplate:

Central Pacific

a. Capture of the Mandated Islands and conduct of V. L. R. strategic bombing of Japan proper from the Marianas (Guam, Tinian and Saipan).

Southwest Pacific

b. Continuing the advance along the New Guinea-N. E. I.-Philippine axis. Intensification of air bombardment of targets in the N. E. I.-Philippine area.

North Pacific

c. Preparations to conduct very long range strategic bombing against the Kuriles and Northern Japan. (Preparations for the possible entry of the U. S. S. R. into the war are discussed in Annex I.)

Southeast Asia Theater

d. Operations for the capture of Upper Burma in the spring of 1944 in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with China, and an amphibious operation at approximately the same time. Continuance of operations during the autumn of 1944 within the limits of the forces available (see paragraph 14) to extend the position held in Upper Burma.

e. Should the means be available, additional ground, sea and air offensive operations, including carrier-borne raids, with the object of maintaining pressure on the enemy, forcing dispersion of his forces, and attaining the maximum attrition practicable on his air and naval forces and shipping.

China Area

f. Conducting V. L. R. air operations from the Chengtu area in China against vital targets in the Japanese inner zone.

g. Building up the U. S. Air Forces in China and the Chinese Army and air force with the object of intensifying land and air operations in and from China.

DISPOSITION OF FORCES

Naval Forces

9. Considering the British Naval forces shown below, we believe the combined naval forces will be adequate to conduct the operations envisaged for the defeat of Japan. We show in Annex II⁵ the esti-

⁴ C. C. S. 397 (Revised) is printed *post*, p. 779.

⁵ Not printed herein.

mated dispositions of British Naval forces in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific after the completion of operation BUCCANEER, and the subsequent build-up of British Naval forces in the Pacific during 1944 and early 1945.

10. This allocation provides for sufficient forces in the Indian Ocean to maintain our communications with the Andamans, to act as a deterrent against any attempt to recapture them by the Japanese and to carry out operations, raids and threats against Japanese possessions in S. E. Asia. All other available units, to the extent that they can be supported and profitably employed, will be concentrated for the main effort in the Pacific.

11. Though full details have not yet been worked out, we consider that the British naval forces shown can be supported logistically and should in general operate from advanced bases in the Bismarck and Solomons area so that they may either cover the operations along the New Guinea-N. E. I.-Philippines axis, or cooperate with the U. S. Fleet in the Central Pacific.

12. Logistic preparations should be made by the British for the increased British naval forces expected to become available for the long distance assault contemplated in the spring of 1945. Manpower limitations will probably prevent any new bases being manned by the British until after the defeat of Germany.

13. Our studies have reemphasized the importance of the provision of aircraft carriers of all sorts for our future operations against Japan.

Land Forces

14. Present plans contemplate the timely deployment in the Pacific of about 40 U. S. divisions and supporting troops. British/Indian land forces, which can be made available to Southeast Asia command up to the end of 1944 are likely to be fully committed in carrying out the operations recommended for the season 1943/44, and subsequently extending the area of occupation in Burma and in carrying out additional operations against the enemy. This concept is subject to alteration in the light of the progress of the 1943/44 operations and of detailed examination of the forces which will be required for 1944/45, but included in the forces retained in the theater there should be at least one amphibious division.

15. After the defeat of Germany the number of additional British divisions from the European Theater and the dates by which they can be made available for the war against Japan cannot yet be assessed, but it is estimated that some nine months will be required for the necessary reorganization, passage and training. Additional British

forces may prove essential for Burma. In the Pacific, the target should be to provide four British divisions based on Australia for service in that theater as early as possible after the defeat of Germany. At least two of these divisions should be amphibiously trained.

16. After providing for paragraph 15 above, additional British forces becoming available will probably be best placed in reserve at the disposal of Southeast Asia, ready for additional offensive operations in that area.

17. Australian and New Zealand forces should continue to be employed in Pacific operations. The employment of Canadian forces should be discussed with the Canadian Government.

18. We believe that the combined land forces to be made available as outlined in paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 17 above will be adequate to conduct the operations envisaged for the defeat of Japan.

Assault Shipping and Landing Craft

19. Present plans contemplate an eventual U. S. assault lift of 12 divisions in the Pacific. The British should maintain in the Southeast Asia Theater an assault lift for at least one division. As soon as the war with Germany is over the British should aim to provide in the Southwest Pacific as large an assault lift as possible (probably between two and three divisions simultaneously).

Air Forces

20. British and U. S. air forces are sufficient for plans at present contemplated although if the U. S. S. R. enters the war the demand on our resources for the establishment of a bomber force in the Maritime Provinces may conflict with the development of our air effort against Japan through China.

The large air forces which will be available when Germany is defeated must be redeployed against Japan as quickly as possible. The general principles which we consider should govern this redeployment are in Annex III. Immediate examinations of the problems involved in this redeployment of British and U. S. air forces should be made. Studies are now under way to determine the best employment of the B-29 aircraft against Japan.

Appendix "A" to Annex III^e shows the U. S. and British air forces which may be available for deployment against Japan after the defeat of Germany.

PREPARATION OF BASES IN INDIA

21. The preparation of the bases in India required for approved operations in the Southeast Asia and China Theater should continue in consonance with provisions of paragraphs 4, 5 and 6.

^e Appendix "A" is not printed herein.

RECOMMENDATIONS

22. It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

a. Approve the over-all plan for the defeat of Japan and direct that the necessary preparations be initiated.⁷

b. Approve the specific operations set out in C. C. S. 397, Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944. (To be revised).⁸

Annex I

NOTE ON PREPARATIONS THAT SHOULD BE MADE FOR POSSIBLE RUSSIAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR

1. We should urge the U. S. S. R. to come in as early as possible; ask them to tell us when they propose to come in; what they propose to do when they come in; and what they want us to do to help.

2. Meanwhile, in so far as they do not conflict with the operations in the Central and Southwest Pacific, preparations should be made by the spring or early summer of 1944 so that we can assist her:—

a. By building up supplies by trans-Pacific shipment, sea and air.

b. By insuring that her defenses and means in Kamchatka are adequate. If she wants our forces there we should be prepared to move them in, especially air.

c. By furnishing aircraft and air units released from the European front, both from the East and the West.

3. If and when conversations with the Soviets can be arranged, plans should also be made for operations:—

a. To enter and develop bases in Kamchatka and the Maritime Provinces.

b. To seize and hold the Northern Kuriles and to open a sea route to the Maritime Provinces.

c. To supply and operate air forces from Siberian bases.

4. We must constantly review the situation so as to be ready to adjust our operations elsewhere when the U. S. S. R. come into the war.

Annex III

AIR FORCES

AVAILABILITY OF AIR FORCES

1. Appendix "A"⁹ shows the British and U. S. air forces that may become available for the war against Japan on the alternative assumptions that Germany is defeated in March or October 1944.

⁷ For the action of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this recommendation, see *ante*, p. 736.

⁸ C. C. S. 397 (Revised) is printed *post*, p. 779. For the action of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with reference to that paper, see *ante*, p. 736.

⁹ Not printed herein.

These large air forces must be deployed against Japan as quickly as possible.

REDEPLOYMENT OF AIR FORCES

Pacific

2. We should speedily increase our air forces in the Central, Southwest and North Pacific. The air forces in the Central Pacific will be U. S.; those in the Southwest and possibly in the North Pacific will be both British and U. S.

Southeast Asia

3. In Southeast Asia we must deploy sufficient air forces to insure the security of the area, protect our sea communications and to meet the requirements of operations. These will be predominantly British.

U. S. S. R. and China

4. A study is now being made to determine the best employment of B-29 aircraft in the war against Japan.

In so far as operations from China are concerned, we have under consideration the **DRAKE** Plan for V. L. R. bombing from the Kweilin area and a plan for V. L. R. bombing from the Chengtu area (plan **MATTERHORN**). We recommend approval of the **MATTERHORN** plan on the understanding that it is not permitted to interfere materially with other approved operations.

The preparations now underway for the Chengtu operations are also preliminary for the **DRAKE** plan.

Further study of the **DRAKE** plan is required, especially with regard to the logistic features.

5. With respect to whether we carry out **DRAKE** operation from China or V. L. R. bombing from the U. S. S. R., we consider that:

a. If the U. S. S. R. enters the war, grants us facilities and we are able to establish and maintain a bomber force in the Maritime Provinces, the establishment and the operation of such force should have priority over the **DRAKE** plan.

b. If the U. S. S. R. enters the war but it does not prove feasible to establish and maintain a bomber force in the Maritime Provinces, we should proceed with the **DRAKE** plan. In this case the requirement in Chinese divisions for the defense of the forward area should be considerably reduced below the figure of 50 stipulated by General Stilwell. If 20 divisions only were required we might start bombing Japan by autumn 1945.

c. If the U. S. S. R. does not enter the war, we should proceed with the **DRAKE** plan. If the full figure of 50 divisions is necessary, bombing could not start before the end of 1946.

EXAMINATIONS REQUIRED

6. We do not consider that at this stage we can go further than the above. We recommend, however, that the following examinations should be carried out as a matter of urgency :

a. A proposed redeployment of the British and the U. S. air forces in the light of the above principles, after the defeat of Germany, setting out the types and strengths required in the various areas.

b. DRAKE Plan

(1) To be examined by S. A. C. S. E. A.¹⁰ and Commander in Chief, India.¹¹

(2) A study as to the extent to which Lancaster/Halifax aircraft could take the place of the B-24 on which our staff study has been based.

c. It is most desirable to examine as early as practicable with the Soviets the problems involved in establishing and maintaining a U. S.-British air force in the Maritime Provinces of the U. S. S. R., leading to conclusions as to the size of force that may be achieved and the effort required to maintain it by sea, land and air routes. This will depend upon staff conversations with the Soviets.

Appendix "B" to Annex III

"DRAKE" PLAN

1. The plan is to bomb Japan with B-29 aircraft supplied through India and operating through forward airfields in the Kweilin area of China. This forward area would be protected by U. S. equipped Chinese divisions and the augmented 14th Air Force.

2. Twenty-seven airfields would be constructed (or converted) in Bengal. These would be supplied with gasoline by pipelines direct from the port. This would necessitate considerable expansion of the port facilities of Calcutta (both for dry stores and for gasoline) and communications in India, including the Bengal/Assam L. of C. In addition, the plan would require the construction of the Ledo-Pao-shan-Kunming road and the projected pipelines from India to China.

3. Simultaneously with the above, fifteen airfields would be constructed in the Kunming area, using Chinese labor and local resources.

4. On the completion of these projects supplies would be moved from India into China by approximately 2,000 transport aircraft (our plan is based on B-24's), the Ledo-Kunming road and the oil pipelines. These supplies would equip and maintain Chinese forces and the augmented 14th Air Force. As soon as sufficient forces have been

¹⁰ Admiral Mountbatten.

¹¹ General Auchinleck.

built up to protect the Kweilin area, airfields would be constructed there for use by the B-29 aircraft.

5. General Stilwell has stipulated that he would require 50 U. S. equipped and trained Chinese divisions before he could secure the Kweilin area sufficiently to allow airfield construction to be started. On this basis bombing could not start before the autumn of 1946. If a lesser force were acceptable, bombing could start correspondingly earlier (e. g., if 20 divisions would suffice, bombing might start in autumn 1945). The above dates assume the defeat of Germany by 1 October 1944.

6. The maximum B-29 force which we could operate would be eight groups (224 aircraft).

7. The plan allows for the Chengtu project, preparations for which have already been ordered.

8. The plan would be dependent upon the following assumptions:

a. That operations in North Burma in 1943/44 enable construction of the Ledo-Paoshan-Kunming Road and pipelines to be completed by 1 January 1945.

b. That sufficient airfield sites (27) in Bengal and port and communication facilities can be made available.

c. That the Bengal/Assam L. of C. is expanded as directed at QUADRANT.¹²

d. That we can construct suitable airfields (15) in China with local labor and materials.

e. That during 1944, 7,000 tons a month (including 5,000 already allotted to the 14th Air Force) are made available from the capacity of the existing A. T. C. route to China.

f. That the necessary U. S. personnel and equipment are made available by the dates required.

¹² The records of the First Quebec (QUADRANT) Conference, August 1943, are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

Defense Files

The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Winant)

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 2 December 1943.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR:

Subject: Agenda For European Advisory Commission.¹

For what they are worth, I am taking the liberty of sending you my thoughts on the matter of priorities for discussion by the Com-

¹ See *ante*, p. 352.

mission. My thought is that, based on the contemplated military operations in Europe, it seems desirable that the European Advisory Commission consider the following recommended Agenda in order of priority:

- (1) Directive for Civil Administration for France.
- (2) Directives for Civil Administration for Belgium, Norway, Holland and Denmark, in the light of the already executed Norwegian Agreement.²
- (3) Military Armistice for Germany.
- (4) Military Government for Germany.
- (5) Comprehensive terms of Surrender for Germany.
- (6) Terms of Surrender for Lesser Enemy States.

Without wishing to circumscribe the Commission in any way, I would imagine that the Commission would make more progress if it agreed to confine its recommendations on the above listed subjects to statements of broad general political, economic and military principles upon which the Combined Chiefs of Staff may base their directive to the appropriate Military Commander.

In (5) above I think the Commission would do well to consider the wisdom of proceeding on the old outline of comprehensive terms of surrender. There is something consensual about them and I have always had the theory that something in the nature of a blank check is more appropriate than one document from which all our rights flow and have to be defined. There has been a great deal of research done on the documents following the last war, but I am not certain that they are worth the research. The comprehensive terms for Italy³ have not been too fortunate though the British are endeared to them.

I have cabled to Washington the substance of our arrangement with Eden.⁴ It has yet to be confirmed but I have little doubt that it will be. They, including Mr. Hull, have approved of it, as you know.⁵ The matter of the selection of a good officer of sufficient weight to serve as your military adviser on the Commission has also been taken up with the War Department and I am also going to get General Marshall's ideas on this. In addition to the military adviser, I have been able to get the release of an officer who has been one of the chief planners in the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department and who has acted as Secretary of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee. I can think of no one more suited than he to keep the two sides of

² An arrangement of May 19, 1943, between the British Government's Administration of Territories Committee (Europe) and the Norwegian Government-in-Exile in London.

³ See *ante*, p. 417, footnote 3.

⁴ See McCloy's telegram 10064 of November 27, 1943, *ante*, p. 442.

⁵ See Stimson's telegram 1124 of November 28, 1943, *ante*, p. 444.

the water in step. He knows all that has gone on in the Washington planning. If, now, the British will send one of their best men to Washington who knows their plans and thinking, at the same time allowing their representation on the Committee some real authority, I am sure we can make the thing work expeditiously.

Sincerely,

J. J. McCLOY

Assistant Secretary of War

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov)*¹

[CAIRO,] 2 December 1943.

I did so much enjoy our conferences together² and only hope that they may be continued. I am sure that the meeting between Marshal Stalin and the President has done infinite good in bringing our two countries closer together in War and in Peace. I do hope you have reached home safely. With my warmest regards.

HARRY HOPKINS

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room, via military channels, and forwarded by the Map Room to the Embassy at Moscow, via Navy channels.

² At Tehran.

Roosevelt Papers.

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 2, 1943.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY HULL:

Cable of November 29 from our Legation in Lisbon again points out Dr. Salazar's proposal to have Portuguese forces take part in liberating Timor.

It will be recalled that in an *aide-mémoire* dated October 13, 1943 the British Embassy in Washington, acting on instructions from the Foreign Office, informed the President (through the State Department) that the British Embassy in Lisbon had received a formal expression of Dr. Salazar's wish in a communication dated October 4, 1943. According to the *aide-mémoire* of October 13, the Portuguese proposal was under consideration by the British military authorities.

In Lisbon's cable above referred to, Ambassador Norweb suggests the interesting possibility that Salazar may have had Japan in mind

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.

when he told Mr. Kennan that should Portugal enter the war on our side he would not hesitate to grant us all facilities.

In his recent speech² Dr. Salazar strongly intimated that a modification in his relations with Japan might be imminent.

American Military Attaché at Chungking reports that Changteh is still in Chinese hands although Japanese forces have passed that city on the east and west; that the alleged use of poison gas and presence of Japanese paratroopers, neither of which is warranted in the present situation, suggest the possibility that Japanese are being trained for objectives more important; that sudden large-scale application of this type of warfare is believed sufficient to overrun Chungking and Kunming; but that there are no present indications of Japanese offensive operations in the China theater on a large scale.

Your statement³ went over fine.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

² See Hull's telegram of November 29, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 620.

³ Presumably the communiqué of the First Cairo Conference, released December 1, 1943; *ante*, p. 448.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 2, 1943.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY HULL:

Lord Halifax has been pressing the Department insistently for the past month to send "one or more high American officials" to London to discuss "current questions in the Middle East and problems that may arise after the war."

After careful consideration of the implications and long-range aspects of this matter, I have come to the conclusion that under the circumstances

One. Since the British have requested such a meeting the conversations should be held in Washington and not in London, and

Two. Such conversations should not be undertaken until the British have advised us of the specific questions they wish to discuss and of their viewpoint with respect to these questions in so far as it may be possible to formulate their attitude at this time.

Lord Halifax has been informed that for various reasons including a suitable British staff now in Washington we consider it preferable to hold the proposed discussions in Washington but has expressed strong reluctance so to inform the Foreign Office.

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels.

I am reporting this to you in the thought that you might wish to have this information in mind in case Churchill should raise the matter with you.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

Roosevelt Papers

*The British Ambassador to the Greek Government-in-Exile in Egypt (Leeper) to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden)*¹

[CAIRO, December 3, 1943.]

SECRETARY OF STATE

I spoke to you yesterday about our desire for a very much closer co-operation with the Americans in the Balkans, both as regards policy and execution of policy. Both Mr. Stevenson² and I are in full agreement on this point, and I cannot do better than attach a copy of a paper he has written on the subject, which is on the Agenda for the Middle East Defence Committee³ this morning.* I understand that most members of the Defence Committee have already signified in advance their warm approval of these proposals.

R. A. LEEPER

CAIRO, 3rd December, 1943.

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the British Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile in Egypt (Stevenson)

CO-ORDINATION OF O. S. S. AND S. O. E.

1. General Donovan has demanded a very largely increased share in special operations in the Balkans. We should welcome this demand, provided that an agreed policy is carried out.

2. At present the O. S. S. organisation as a whole is answerable only to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and is entirely independent of the State Department. On the other hand, S. O. E. carries out a policy agreed between the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office.

3. There is definite danger that General Donovan's organisation will not necessarily pursue the same policy as S. O. E. Such a de-

¹ This document, which is marked "Copy", was presumably passed to Roosevelt during the Second Cairo Conference; when and by whom this was done are not indicated.

² Ralph Clarmont Skrine Stevenson, British Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile in Egypt.

³ A United Kingdom policy-coordinating agency, functioning at Cairo.

*Now approved by M. E. D. C. [Footnote in the source text.]

velopment would obviously lead to incalculable difficulties, and should be avoided if possible.

4. The best, if not indeed the only, way of doing this would be :

(a) to concert our Balkan policy with the United States Government :

(b) to integrate the carrying out of that policy, so far as special operations are concerned, at all executive levels.

5. (a) would presumably be done on the highest political level.

(b) would mean :—

(i) that S. O. E. and O. S. S. should be two separate, but not independent, organisations :

(ii) that by means of working committees the closest possible integration should be achieved in operational policy and control between the two organisations :

(iii) that by some similar means the closest contact should be established between P. W. E. and the moral operations section of O. S. S. :

(iv) that not only O. S. S. but the United States State Department should be represented on the Special Operations Committee at G. H. Q. Middle East, the State Department representative being the United States Ambassador to Greece and Yugoslavia :

(v) that the United States State Department should be represented by the United States Ambassador on the Middle East Defence Committee :

(vi) that operational control of all special operations should remain in the hands of the C. in C. Middle East who would be advised, as now, by the Special Operations Committee and, when necessary, the Middle East Defence Committee.

6. It is suggested that advantage should be taken of the present conference to obtain an agreed decision on the lines of paragraphs 4 and 5 above.⁴

(Intd.) R. C. S. S[TEVENSON]

⁴ It does not appear that this matter was discussed at the Second Cairo Conference ; see *post*, pp. 840, 871–872.

Roosevelt Papers

President Roosevelt to President al-Khourî of Lebanon

CAIRO, December 3, 1943.

GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND, It has afforded me very particular satisfaction and pleasure to receive today in Cairo, from the hand of my representative in Lebanon, Mr. Wadsworth, the letter¹ whereby you

¹ Not printed herein (Roosevelt Papers). The letter (in French) was dated September 21, 1943.

inform me that, called by the suffrage of Parliament, you assumed on September 21, last, the Presidency of the Lebanese Republic.

I should welcome the opportunity to convey in person my congratulations to you and to the Lebanese people; for the events of recent weeks in your country have been followed in mine with very special attention and sympathy.²

The pressure of other events, however, render[s] such visit impractical at this time. I, therefore, with this reply, cordially reciprocate the sentiments of friendship you express, a friendship which unites our two peoples in the great struggle to uphold the principles to which the United Nations are dedicated.

Your good friend,

F[RANKLIN] D R[OOSEVELT]

² See *ante*, p. 84, footnote 2.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 3 December 1943.

C. C. S. 397 (Revised)

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN, 1944

References: *a.* CCS 242/6 ¹

b. CCS 319/5 ²

c. CCS 417 ³

1. We are agreed that every effort should be exerted to bring the U. S. S. R. into the war against Japan at the earliest practicable date, and that plans should be prepared in that event.

2. We are agreed that plans should be prepared for operations in the event that Germany is defeated earlier than the fall of 1944.

3. A schedule of proposed operations and projected target dates for planning purposes is given in the appendix to the enclosure. The operations envisaged are based on a concept of obtaining strategic objectives and bases from which to conduct further operations to force the unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest practicable date. The operations are in consonance with the over-all objective and over-all strategic concept agreed upon at QUADRANT⁴ and

¹ Not printed herein.

² See *ante*, p. 243, and Ehrman, vol. v, pp. 8-15.

³ *Ante*, p. 765.

⁴ The records of the First Quebec Conference (QUADRANT) are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

reaffirmed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 380/2,⁵ and with the provisions of C. C. S. 417 (Over-all Plan for the Defeat of Japan).

4. *General.* In addition to the specific objectives hereinafter indicated, supporting operations should be conducted. Both the specific and supporting operations will be designed to destroy the Japanese Fleet at an early date; to secure maximum attrition of enemy air forces; to intensify air, submarine, and mining operations against enemy shipping and lines of communication; to establish air and sea blockade of the main Japanese islands; to continue efforts to keep China in the war; and to enable us to launch land and carrier-based air operations against Japan.

5. *North Pacific.* Plans for the North Pacific involve the augmentation of base facilities and defensive installations in the Aleutians in preparation for entry into the Kuriles and Soviet territory in the event of Russian collaboration. Naval surface and submarine action, including raids on the Japanese fishing fleet will be carried out. Preparations will be made for executing very long range strategic bombing against the Kuriles and northern Japan.

6. *Central, South and Southwest Pacific.* The advance along the New Guinea-N. E. I.-Philippine axis will proceed concurrently with operations for the capture of the Mandated Islands. A strategic bombing force will be established in Guam, Tinian, and Saipan for strategic bombing of Japan proper. Air bombardment of targets in the N. E. I.-Philippine Area and the aerial neutralization of Rabaul will be intensified.

7. *China.* Our efforts in the China area should have as their objective the intensification of land and air operations in and from China and the build-up of the U. S. A. A. F. and the Chinese army and air forces. It shall include also the establishing, without materially affecting other approved operations, of a very long range strategic bombing force at Calcutta, with advanced bases at Chengtu to attack vital targets in the Japanese "inner zone."*

8. *Southeast Asia.* In the Southeast Asia Area operations should be carried out for the capture of Upper Burma in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with China. Operation BUCCANEER will be conducted. Within the means available additional offensive operations including carrier borne raids, should be conducted by sea, air, and ground forces for the purpose of maintaining pressure on the enemy, inducing dispersion of his forces, and

⁵ *Ante*, p. 157.

*Includes: Japan proper, Manchuria, Korea, North China, Karafuto (Japanese Sakhalin) and Formosa. [Footnote in the source text.]

attaining the maximum attrition practicable on [of?] his air and naval forces and shipping. The preparation of the bases in India required for approved operations in the S. E. A. and China Theaters should continue.⁶

9. As more carriers become available, the operations set forth should be supplemented, between scheduled operational dates as practicable, with massed carrier task force strikes against selected vital targets.

10. The completion of these operations will place the United Nations in positions from which to use most advantageously the great air, ground, and naval resources which will be at our disposal after Germany is defeated.

Enclosure

A schedule of operations for 1944 is set forth in the appendix.⁷ Target dates which have been determined after careful consideration of prospective means and of time and space factors, are presented for planning purposes only. We are convinced that the sequence of operations must be flexible; we must be prepared to take all manner of short cuts made possible by developments in the situation. The four primary developments which may permit short cuts are:

a. Early defeat of the Japanese Fleet.

b. Sudden withdrawal of Japanese forces from areas (as from Kiska).

c. Increase in our means such as by acceleration of the assault ship-building program and by an earlier defeat of Germany than 1 October 1944.

d. The early collaboration of the U. S. S. R. in the war against Japan.

We have directed that further study be conducted and plans made and kept up to date for the conditions assumed in *c* and *d*.

We have directed that special attention be given to the optimum employment of the enormous air forces which will be released upon the defeat of Germany.

We have directed that a study be made for the optimum use, timing, and deployment in the war against Japan of very long range bombers.

⁶ For the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to change this paragraph, see *ante*, p. 736. In a subsequent version of C. C. S. 397 (Revised), section 8 consists—with minor editorial changes—of the two paragraphs which appear under the heading "Southeast Asia Theater" in C. C. S. 417, *ante*, p. 765.

⁷ This schedule is printed in Matloff, p. 377.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 3 December 1943.

C. C. S. 418/1

ENTRY OF TURKEY INTO THE WAR

1. The object of this paper is to discuss the role that Turkey might be called upon to adopt if she agrees to come into the war, and the extent of our commitments likely to be involved.

TURKEY'S ROLE IN THE WAR

2. We consider that our object in the Balkans should be to bring about the surrender of Bulgaria and open a short sea route to Russia.

3. The surrender of Bulgaria is most likely to be achieved by:

- a.* Air action.
- b.* Russian diplomatic and subversive action.
- c.* The psychological effect of Turkey becoming an active ally of the United Nations.

4. We do not propose that Allied forces should be concentrated in Thrace to cooperate with the Turks. In Thrace, therefore, the Turks must be persuaded to stand on the defensive and to concentrate their forces for the protection of the Straits. To assist them we would continue to bomb the Bulgarians.

5. The opening of a short supply route to Russia through the Dardanelles would achieve a considerable economy in shipping, but might also enable us to take the strain off the Persian supply route. The Turks should be called upon to provide us with the bases from which to protect the convoys.

COMMITMENTS INVOLVED

6. The commitments which would be involved in the above policy can be considered under two headings:

a. Minimum air and anti-air assistance to the Turks, who make a great point of the necessity for protecting their main cities, communications and industries from German air attack.

b. Action, within the capacity of the forces that can be made available, for opening the Aegean Sea, the capture of Rhodes and the other Dodecanese Islands.

Assistance to the Turks

7. We can provide a reasonable scale of air defense for Turkish key points.

Opening the Aegean

8. In addition to 6 *a* above, we can find the necessary air forces to provide air cover for convoys in the Aegean and the Marmora, without any serious effect on operations elsewhere.

9. The naval forces required for escorting and minesweeping for a fortnightly convoy cycle would have to be provided from outside the Mediterranean.

10. With the above naval and air forces it should be possible to pass occasional convoys through the Aegean without first capturing Rhodes. In these circumstances, however, the losses in ships might be considerable, and for the passage of regular convoys it would be necessary to capture Rhodes and highly desirable to clean up Kos, Leros, Samos, Khios, Mytilene and Lemnos. From the military point of view it would be an immense advantage if the Turks could cooperate in the assaults on the islands other than Rhodes.

11. The forces required for the capture of Rhodes over and above those *now* in M. E. Command would be:

a. Naval forces for the assault.

b. One British division.

c. The assault shipping and craft for one division, two brigades assaulting.

d. Two parachute battalions and the necessary air lift for them amounting to 90 transport aircraft.

12. As far as can be foreseen at present the land and air forces for this operation could be found from resources in the Mediterranean Theater.

13. There are two possible sources for the necessary assault shipping and craft: the Mediterranean Theater, and the Southeast Asia Theater.

14. The two parachute battalions and the 90 transport aircraft could only come from the Central Mediterranean and their release would depend on the requirements of the situation in Italy, and the preparations for operations against Southern France.

15. From the point of view of the weather it might be possible to stage an assault on Rhodes towards the end of February, but other factors are likely to affect this date.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 3 December 1943.

In reference your message transmitted as White 67,² in view of the fact that the Russians have appointed the Russian Ambassador³ as Soviet Representative on the Advisory Council [*Commission*] in London, I suggest that you announce Winant's appointment.⁴

My conferences with the Generalissimo⁵ were very satisfactory and I liked him. He is delighted with the results of the Moscow Conference.⁶

In Teheran things went on the whole very well and better than I expected. Marshal Stalin⁶ and I worked together toward objectives which turned out to be very similar. I will bring you the minutes of all that was said and done. Molotov sent you his very warm personal regards.

Churchill and I are to see President Inonu here in Cairo and then I will head westward.

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room, via military channels, and forwarded by the Map Room to Hull.

² Telegram of November 30, 1943, *ante*, p. 625.

³ Fedor Tarasovich Gusev, Soviet Ambassador at London.

⁴ This was done in a press release dated December 4, published in the Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, December 4, 1943, p. 393.

⁵ Chiang Kai-shek.

⁶ At this point a notation on the source text indicates a garble in the code groups.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of State*¹

[CAIRO,] 3 December 1943.

Personal and secret from the President.

I think it best not to appoint International Civil Aviation Committee² until I get back because I think you and I should agree on some general principles to lay before them before they meet.

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room, via military channels, and forwarded by the Map Room to Hull in paraphrase.

² See Hull's message of November 29, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 621.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO,] December 3, 1943.

To Marshal Stalin personal and secret from the President.

I have arrived safely at my destination and earnestly hope that by this time you have done the same. I consider that the conference was a great success and I am sure that it was an historic event in the assurance not only of our ability to wage war together but to work in the utmost harmony for the peace to come. I enjoyed very much our personal talks together and particularly the opportunity of meeting you face to face. I look forward to seeing you again. In the meantime I wish you and your Armies the greatest success.²

¹ Sent to Washington, via military channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Moscow, via Navy channels, on December 4, 1943.

² For Stalin's acknowledgment, dated December 6, 1943, see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 112.

Roosevelt Papers

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin[CAIRO,] December 3, 1943.¹

DEAR MARSHAL STALIN, The weather conditions were ideal for crossing the mountains the day of our departure from Teheran so that we had an easy and comfortable flight to Cairo. I hasten to send you my personal thanks for your thoughtfulness and hospitality in providing living quarters for me in your Embassy at Teheran. I was not only extremely comfortable there but I am very conscious of how much more we were able to accomplish in a brief period of time because we were such close neighbors throughout our stay.

I view those momentous days of our meeting with the greatest satisfaction as being an important milestone in the progress of human affairs. I thank you and the members of your staff and household for the many kindnesses to me and to the members of my staff.

I am just starting home and will visit my troops in Italy on the way.

Cordially yours,

F[RANKLIN] D R[OSEVELT]

¹ The letter was not delivered to Stalin until December 18, 1943; see Stalin's reply, *post*, p. 849. The last paragraph of this letter reads as if it were being sent on December 7, the date on which Roosevelt left Cairo.

J. C. S. Files

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)*FAN 282¹

[CAIRO,] 4 December 1943.

SECRET

PRIORITY

With reference to letter from Giraud² suggesting he attend SEXTANT, you should reply on following lines:

General Giraud's offer to come to Cairo very much appreciated by Combined Chiefs of Staff, who feel, however, that it is unnecessary to ask the General to undertake the journey, since discussions on global strategy are of the broadest possible nature and the details of operations in France are not under consideration. Please inform him that the Combined Chiefs of Staff believe that your presentation here included an accurate and sympathetic explanation of his views.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have the interest of France and of the French Armed Forces much at heart.

¹ Circulated as C. C. S. 413/2.

² See Eisenhower's memorandum of November 26, 1943, *ante*, p. 431.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 4 December 1943.

C. C. S. 320/4 (Revised)

OPERATION "RANKIN"

Reference: CCS 320 Series

1. In developing his plans for RANKIN, COSSAC has submitted a recommendation (paragraph 11, C. C. S. 320/2)¹ that under the general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander the territories to be occupied should be divided into two spheres, the British sphere, including northwest Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and Denmark, and the U. S. sphere, generally southern Germany and France, with Austria a U. S. sphere, initially under the Mediterranean command. It is understood that planning by COSSAC is now proceeding on this basis.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff now propose that these spheres be changed as follows:

a. U. S. sphere. The general area Netherlands, Northern Germany as far east as the line Berlin-Stettin, Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

¹ Not printed herein.

The boundary of this area is to be as follows: Southern boundary of the Netherlands; thence to Duesseldorf on the Rhine; down the east bank of the Rhine to Mains [*Mainz*]; thence due east to Beyreuth [*Bayreuth*]; thence north to Leipzig; thence northeast to Cottbus; thence north to Berlin (exclusive); thence to Stettin (inclusive).

b. British sphere. Generally the territory to the west and south of the American western boundary.

3. The United States Chiefs of Staff further propose that COSSAC be directed to examine and report on the implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of spheres of occupation.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 4 December 1943.

C. C. S. 400/2

CONTROL OF STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN NORTHWEST EUROPE AND IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the subject matter presented in the memorandum from the British Chiefs of Staff, C. C. S. 400/1,¹ and concluded that the advantages to be gained by a more effective exploitation of U. S. daylight precision bombing capabilities, through unification of the command of U. S. Strategic Air Forces, outweigh the disadvantages anticipated by the British Chiefs of Staff.

2. We do not consider that the occasional transfer of aircraft from one theater to another will occasion any significant wastage of manpower or facilities, as each A. A. F. group station is organized to take care of the needs of two groups for brief periods.

3. Neither do we consider that there should be any slackening in the existing close coordination of operations between the U. S. Strategic Air Forces and the R. A. F., as the headquarters of the former will remain in the U. K. in unaltered contact with the intelligence and other services provided by the latter. In fact, this coordination should be broadened by drawing the 15th Strategic Air Force into a unified command.

4. The U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, after giving careful consideration to the alternative arrangement suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff, have concluded:

a. That control of all U. S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean area, including the control of movement of forces from

¹ *Ante*, p. 432.

one area to another, should be vested in a single command in order to exploit the flexibility of U. S. heavy bomber capabilities most effectively and that these forces should be employed primarily against POINTBLANK objectives or such other objectives as the Combined Chiefs of Staff may from time to time direct.

b. That such a command should likewise be charged with the co-ordination of these operations with those of the R. A. F. Bomber Command.

c. That the responsibility for over-all base services and administrative control of these Strategic Air Forces should remain with the appropriate commanders of U. S. Army Forces in the United Kingdom and in the Mediterranean area.

d. That provision should be made to assure the assignment of resources, supplies, and other services between tactical and strategic operations so as to bring the required support to POINTBLANK as the air operation of first priority.

e. That the headquarters of such U. S. Strategic Air Forces should be established in the United Kingdom because of the facilities available, the existing weight of the respective bomber forces, and the necessity for continuous integration of operations with the R. A. F.

f. That the Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces, should continue to have direct channels of approach to the U. S. Strategic Air Force Commander in order to provide direct technical control and insure that operational and training technique and uniformity of U. S. tactical doctrine are maintained.

5. A directive to implement the above, attached as Enclosure, is therefore being issued to the following:

Commanding General, USSAFE
Commanding General, ETOUSA
Commanding General, NATO

Enclosure

Draft Directive by the United States Chiefs of Staff²

To: Commanding General, U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe.
The Commanding General, ETOUSA.
The Commanding General, NATO.

1. Effective 1 January 1944 there will be established an air command designated "The U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe," consisting initially of the Eighth and Fifteenth U. S. Army Air Forces. Headquarters for this air command will be established in the United Kingdom. An officer of the U. S. Army Air Forces will be designated Commanding General, U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe.

² Following the discussion of this subject by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on December 4, 1943 (*ante*, p. 682), the United States Chiefs prepared a revised version of this draft directive. The revised version appears in the J. C. S. Files as the enclosure to C. C. S. 400/2 and is the one printed here.

2. The U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will come directly under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander at a date to be announced later by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In the interim the Chief of the Air Staff, R. A. F. will continue to act as the agent of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, pending transfer of the USSAFE to the command of the S. A. C., and will be responsible under the Combined Chiefs of Staff for coordination of all POINTBLANK operations. Under his direction, the Commanding General, U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will be responsible for the determination of priorities of POINTBLANK targets to be attacked by the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and for the technique and tactics employed and is authorized to move the units of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces between theaters within the limits of base area facilities and available [*sic*] for his forces.

3. The Commanding General USSAFE will keep the Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean Theater informed of his general intentions and requirements. As far as possible, consistent with the performance of his primary mission, the Commanding General USSAFE will coordinate his operations with those of the Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean.

4. The Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the European and North African Theaters of operations will continue to be responsible for the administrative control of the U. S. Army air units in their respective area, including the provision of base services. The Commander in Chief, Allied Forces in the Mediterranean will provide the necessary logistical support to the Fifteenth Air Force in performance of operation POINTBLANK as the air operation of first priority.

5. Should a strategical or tactical emergency arise requiring such action, theater commanders may, at their discretion utilize the strategic air forces, which are based within their respective theaters, for purposes other than their primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding General, USSAFE of the action taken.

6. The Commanding General, USSAFE, will employ six heavy bombardment groups and two long-range fighter groups of the Fifteenth Air Force to meet the requirements of the Commanding General, NATO, in operations against objectives other than those prescribed for POINTBLANK, until such time as the air base objective area, north and east of Rome, is secured, in accordance with the provisions of the directive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 22 October (FAN 254).³

³ Not printed herein.

Hopkins Papers

The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

[CAIRO,] 4 December 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY HOPKINS:

There is an increasing indication that the British are not now inclined to go along with the arrangement I made with Eden.¹ They are placing the blame on the War Cabinet.

It is important that the arrangement we agreed to stick, but it will not be done unless we take a strong position. Until they come through as originally outlined, I propose not to send from Washington any military men to operate either on the European Commission² or any transferred Combined Civil Affairs Committee in London. I believe that Winant's appointment should go through,³ but as soon as I indicated that we would strengthen the London Committee with a good staff, they reverted to their former position, and that position is basically wrong. The plan we should adhere to is attached.⁴

Sincerely,

JOHN J. MCCLOY

¹ See McCloy's memorandum of November 30, 1943, to Hopkins, *ante*, p. 447.

² European Advisory Commission.

³ See Roosevelt's telegram of December 3, 1943, to Hull, *ante*, p. 784.

⁴ The attachment is a copy of the draft agreement printed *ante*, p. 446.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

[WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Lisbon's 2906 of December 2 reports that the following developed from a further conversation² between Salazar and Kennan yesterday:

While maintaining neutrality Salazar is unwilling to grant our desires outright.

He is presently unwilling to extend the British further facilities for their or our use but is prepared to do so when he can be shown that the general military situation has changed in a manner to diminish

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels. Attached to the file copy of this message in the Hull Papers is a memorandum by Matthews stating that, although the message as submitted to Hull for approval was long, "the subject is important and something they should clear with the British during these talks."

² Regarding the Salazar-Kennan conversation of November 23, 1943, see Hull's telegram of November 24, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 394.

the German menace to Portugal as compared with last August. He will go the limit to extend us immediate use of existing British facilities if an appearance can be maintained of adherence to the British agreement.

He demonstrated willingness to examine arrangements to allow us forthwith to proceed to constructing an airport on Santa Maria Island for Portugal, with a view to Anglo-American use when completed.

Lisbon's 2911 of December 2 furnishes the following additional comment:

The Prime Minister agrees definitely to our full use of Terceira under a suitable formula reconciling such use with the British agreement,³ but he wishes to know what formula will be used. In his view a nominal marking of the planes as British would suffice.

When Kennan appraised him of our plans for sharing in anti-submarine patrol activity in Terceira, Salazar raised no objection and displayed no surprise but remarked that this must also be under a formula reconciling activities with the British agreement.

Dr. Salazar indicated that he would consider our proposal to construct in Santa Maria a new airport, and Kennan's impression was that he would consider the proposal benevolently. He felt he could not grant us these facilities outright now. His thought evidently is that we should construct the airfield for Portugal and on completion, if it could be demonstrated that we and the British require such facilities beyond those already granted in the British agreement and that to grant them would not augment Portugal's risk, the field would then be made available under the existing agreement and utilized by us as in the case of Lagens and Horta. As long as some formula covered Salazar's position, it would be immaterial that the United States should make ninety-five percent use of the field. This is not a specific proposal, but is the trend of Salazar's thought.

He mentioned an extraordinary display of curiosity by the German Minister⁴ respecting American use of the Azores, which led the Prime Minister to suspect that our use of the Islands might constitute a turning point in German policy vis-à-vis Portugal. He wishes to be able, as in the case of Terceira, officially to deny to the Germans that he has accorded us any special facilities in the Azores.

In wishing to make the new airfield available under section eight of the Anglo-Portuguese agreement, the interpretation of article eight was his own and did not, according to the British Ambassador in Lisbon,⁵ result from any understanding with the British.

³ For the text of the agreement of August 17, 1943, between Great Britain and Portugal regarding facilities in the Azores, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1946 (vol. 146), p. 447.

⁴ Baron Oswald von Hoyningen-Hühne.

⁵ Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell.

Since his last conversation with Kennan, Salazar has ascertained for himself that Flores is unsuitable for aviation, but he admits the advantages of Santa Maria. Should our views concerning Santa Maria undergo any early change, or should we have any specific additional desires along these lines, he wished us to inform him immediately.

As Ponta Delgada remains, according to the Prime Minister, the only insular port the Portuguese Navy can now call its own and is also the seat of Portuguese administration, he wishes to avoid granting facilities at this time in San [São] Miguel Island. Kennan said we needed a port with nearby airfield for the use of carrier-based planes and suggested an informal arrangement for utilizing Ribo [Rabo] de Peixe field. The Prime Minister seemed dubious, and pointed out that under the British agreement that field was to be reserved for the Portuguese fighter forces in the Islands. He thought the British and our naval authorities had underestimated the potentialities of Horta, and felt we could have all facilities we require for such aircraft in Horta. We might station an American tanker and repair ship in Horta, for example, if we wished.

The Prime Minister did not wish to relate these questions to any hypothesis [as] to eventual Portuguese cobelligerency against Japan. He instinctively thought there was agreement concerning Timor between Germany and Japan and feared the Timor question might complicate his relations with Germany. In this regard he is extremely anxious to have an answer to his overtures for Portuguese participation in liberating Timor.⁶ Our Legation in Lisbon thinks it could be useful for us to be helpful in this regard.

The Legation recommends that our military authorities reach agreement with the British as to the formula to be used to cover our activities at Lagens, and that the Legation should communicate this to Dr. Salazar.

The Legation also recommends that we immediately draft a preliminary proposal for the airport construction on Santa Maria, and that this be communicated to the Legation. The proposal should be in broad, concise terms, leaving details for subsequent agreement. It should embody provision for immediate survey by our technicians and should establish most-favored-nation treatment for us respecting later use by commercial aviation. The Legation suggests that this matter be taken care of in a preliminary exchange of notes to permit us to go ahead with technical planning and survey.

With regard to Salazar's anxiety respecting Germany, the Legation points out that the agreement with the British specifically signifies a desire that Portugal remain neutral, and that if this is our at-

⁶ See Hull's message of December 2, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 775.

titude the extent to which Salazar has gone represents real progress of which we should take advantage. The Legation desires to know precisely the extent to which our military and naval authorities desire to make use of the opportunity.

My heartiest congratulations and felicitations on magnificent achievements of yourself, Prime Minister and your other associates.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

Hopkins Papers

The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

[CAIRO,] 5 December 1943.

DEAR HARRY: I had a good talk with Jebb and General Kirby last night. They said finally they were convinced that the arrangement we had was sound but each of them urged me to go to London and put the case to the people there on the ground.¹ Though they were convinced, they felt they could not get anywhere with the War Cabinet by either cabling or putting the case themselves when they got home. This does not make much sense to me, particularly if Winant is on the ground and holds out for what we want, as he says he will.

I feel that this matter is something the President and the Prime Minister are not going to get to and should not get to, for that matter, as it can be settled satisfactorily on a lower level. I have some real work to do in Italy and am anxious to start back. If Winant, after getting back to London, feels that I should go up there he can cable me at Algiers and if Stimson agrees, I'll go up—otherwise I will go on home.

If the Prime Minister should bring it up before the end of the Conference I think the thing to do is to say we are working the thing out, that all that we want is to set up the machinery whereby we have the chance to work out sound decisions on some of the most difficult problems imaginable. That, above all, it is shortsighted to attempt to move all such decisions to London. The arrangement we had *will work* and it is the only one which has the chance of working expeditiously.

I am leaving Colonel T. W. Hammond here until the end of the Conference. He is fully familiar with the whole subject and he will be at your service on call. His telephone number is Conference 83.

I leave early tomorrow (Monday) morning.

Sincerely,

J[OHN] J[. MCCLOY]

¹ On December 6 Eden notified Winant that he could not agree to the plan (see *ante*, p. 446) without consulting his colleagues at London and that the subject would not be discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill at Cairo (Lot 52 M64 Box 1).

J. C. S. Files

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief,
Allied Forces, North Africa (Eisenhower)*

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 5 December 1943.

C. C. S. 387/3

1. We have decided to set up a unified command in the Mediterranean Theater on account of its geographical unity and its dependence on all bases in the area.

2. We have no intention of changing existing organization and arrangements any more than is necessary to give effect to our main intention. You should assume, therefore, that all present arrangements continue with the exceptions outlined below but you should report as necessary whether you consider any further changes are required in the light of experience.

3. To your present responsibilities you will add responsibility for operations in Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Crete and Aegean Islands and Turkey. The British and American forces allocated to you from Middle East will be determined by the British and United States Chiefs of Staff, respectively. You will have full liberty to transfer forces from one part of your Command to another for the purposes of conducting operations which we have agreed. The Commanders in Chief, Middle East, will be under your orders for operations in these areas.

4. You will provide U. S. Strategic Air Forces under separate command, but operating in your area, with the necessary logistical and administrative support in performance of Operation POINTBLANK as the air operation of first priority. Should a strategic or tactical emergency arise, you may, at your discretion, utilize the 15th U. S. Strategic Air Force for purposes other than its primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding General, U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, if and when that command is organized.

5. You will in addition, assume responsibility for the conduct of guerrilla and subversive action in all the territories in your command and for setting up the necessary organization for the dispatch of supplies to resistance groups in occupied territories.

6. The Commanders in Chief, Middle East, will remain directly responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff for all the territories at present in Middle East Command situated in Africa, Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon, and for the operation and security of the Middle

East base with such forces as the British Chiefs of Staff may allot for this purpose from time to time.

7. You will be notified later of any adjustments which are thought necessary to the machinery by which you receive political guidance. In the meantime, in respect of the new territories in your command you should obtain any necessary political advice from C-in-C Middle East¹ through the channels he at present uses.

8. The system of Command is shown on the attached diagram (Appendix "A").² You will note that the Mediterranean Air Command will now be known as Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

Appendix "B"

BALKAN SUPPORT³

It was agreed at the EUREKA Conference that our support of the Patriots in the Balkans, which now falls within the area in which you are responsible for Allied operations, should be intensified in order to increase their effectiveness.

You will be responsible for supporting them to the greatest practicable extent by increasing the supply of arms and equipment, clothing, medical stores, food and such other supplies as they may require. You should also support them by commando operations and by furnishing such air support as you may consider advisable in the light of the general situation.

You should examine the possibility of continuing to supply the Patriots with Italian equipment, in the use of which they are already experienced, making good deficiencies in Italian formations to such extent as may be necessary with available British or American equipment.

We consider that this mission is of such importance that it would best be controlled on a regular basis by a special commander and joint staff.

¹ General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.

² Not printed herein.

³ Pursuant to the Combined Chiefs' decision of December 3, 1943 (see *ante*, p. 669), the Combined Staff Planners on December 4 prepared a draft directive to Eisenhower on supplies for the Partisans. The present appendix incorporates the draft directive except that "Partisans in Yugoslavia" was changed to "Patriots in the Balkans" in the first paragraph, and "Partisans" was changed to "Patriots" in the third paragraph. See *ante*, pp. 704-705.

J. C. S. Files

Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 5 December 1943.

C. C. S. 423/2

OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER

1. OVERLORD and ANVIL are the supreme operations for 1944. They must be carried out during May 1944. Nothing must be undertaken in any other part of the world which hazards the success of these two operations.

2. OVERLORD as at present planned is on a narrow margin. Everything practicable should be done to increase its strength.

3. The examination of ANVIL on the basis of not less than a two-division assault should be pressed forward as fast as possible. If the examination reveals that it requires strengthening, consideration will have to be given to the provision of additional resources.

4. Operations in the Aegean, including in particular the capture of Rhodes, are desirable, provided that they can be fitted in without detriment to OVERLORD and ANVIL.

5. Every effort must be made by accelerated building and conversion, to provide the essential additional landing craft for the European Theater.

6. The decisions made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the QUADRANT Conference covering the bombing of German industrial targets and the destruction of the German air force, as set forth in paragraph 10 of C. C. S. 319/5,¹ are reaffirmed.

OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA THEATER

VIEWS OF U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

VIEWS OF BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

<p>7. Political and military considerations and commitments make it essential that Operation TARZAN and an amphibious operation in conjunction therewith should take place. Apart from political considerations, there will be serious military repercussions if this is</p>	<p>7. We fully realize that there are political and military implications in the postponement of BUCCANEER. As regards the political implications, we must leave these to be taken into consideration by the President and Prime Minister. As regards the military</p>
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¹ C. C. S. 319/5 was the final report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister at the First Quebec Conference (August 1943). Paragraph 10 (printed in Ehrman, vol. v, pp. 8-9) gave the highest strategic priority to the Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany as a prerequisite to the mounting of OVERLORD. The records of the First Quebec Conference are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

VIEWS OF U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

not done, not only in Burma and China, but also in the Southwest Pacific.

8. The Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command, should be told that he must do the best that he can with the resources already allocated to him.

VIEWS OF BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

disadvantages, these are overridden by the far greater advantages to be derived from a successful invasion of the Continent, and the collapse of Germany.

J. C. S. Files

*Report by the Combined Staff Planners*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 5 December 1943.

C. C. S. 424

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION AGAINST THE SOUTH OF FRANCE

Reference: CCS Memo Directive

1 December 1943²

1. In accordance with the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, we have examined the agreed operations against the South of France on the following premises:

a. That this operation should be carried out with a minimum of two assault divisions.

b. That the necessary resources shall not be found at the expense of OVERLORD.

2. We have in addition assumed:

a. That operation ANVIL will approximately coincide with OVERLORD.

b. In Italy we have reached the Pisa-Rimini line and thereafter as strong pressure as possible is maintained consistent with the provision of forces for ANVIL.

c. The Mediterranean forces will not be engaged in offensive operations elsewhere.

3. We have made tentative estimates, in the absence of any detailed operational plan, of the resources which will be required for the operation under two hypotheses where these apply:

a. That the assault is carried out within range of shore-based fighter aircraft.

¹ Prepared with the collaboration of the Combined Administrative Committee. The text printed here incorporates the changes made by direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting of December 5, 1943, 3 p. m. (see *ante*, p. 723).

² Not printed herein.

b. That the assault is carried out beyond the range of shore-based fighter aircraft.

4. It appears that the following cannot be found from the resources which under present agreements will be available to General Eisenhower in the Mediterranean at the time of the operation :

A. *Naval Forces*

On the assumption that adequate shore-based, short-range fighter cover is provided :

- (1) Additional escorts, probably 10 to 20.
- (2) 2 AA fighter direction ships.
- (3) In the event that the build-up exceeds one division before D plus 8, nine A/S A/A escorts will be required for each extra division.

This indicates that if a rapid build-up is necessary, more escorts will be required.

In the event that adequate shore-based short-range air cover can not be provided the following will be needed in addition to those above.

- (1) 9 to 12 escort carriers with fighters.
- (2) 6 AA cruisers.
- (3) 18 screening vessels.

To meet these deficiencies, we must draw on other theaters, most probably from the Atlantic. It might prove possible for four CVE and six escorts which are taking part in *BUCCANEER* to return to the Mediterranean in time. This, however, will be conditioned by the availability of fighters for reequipping these escort carriers. We have assumed that port parties will be provided from within the Mediterranean.

B. *Land Forces*

Certain service forces, the number and type of which cannot be determined without careful study by AFHQ.

On the assumption that French divisions will participate, the requirement will be lessened if, as recommended by General Eisenhower, some of the French divisions scheduled for activation are not formed but are converted to service forces.

C. *Air Forces*

The troop carrier resources in the Mediterranean will only be sufficient to lift one brigade and if the detailed plan requires a second brigade lift, this will have to be provided.

D. *Shipping*

- (1) Personnel Shipping.

The *QUADRANT* allotment of personnel shipping for 80,000 troop lift in the Mediterranean expires on 31 March. Initially, personnel ship-

ping for 32,000 will be required until after the assault, and during the period of buildup, a total personnel lift for 15,000 will be necessary. It is proposed to use cargo ships for personnel lift to the maximum extent possible.

(2) MT/Stores Shipping.

The following sailings within the Mediterranean will be required in addition to those required for the maintenance of the remainder of the theater:

First month	—	128
Second month	—	90
Third month	—	75
Fourth and subsequent months	—	40

This can obviously be provided but until the present shipping examination is completed, we cannot assess the cost.

E. *Assault Shipping and Craft*

Assault lift for two divisions can be provided. Methods of providing this are shown in Appendix "A."³

5. We consider that General Eisenhower should be directed to prepare an outline plan for the agreed operation against the South of France as a matter of urgency. We have accordingly prepared a directive to General Eisenhower, and this is attached at [*as?*] Appendix "B."

RECOMMENDATION

6. That the directive in Appendix "B" be sent to General Eisenhower.

Appendix "B"

*Draft Directive From the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, North Africa (Eisenhower)**

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an operation is to take place in conjunction with OVERLORD, with the object of establishing a bridgehead on the South Coast of France and subsequently to exploit in support of OVERLORD.

2. You will prepare in consultation with COSSAC and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as a matter of urgency, an outline plan for the operation.

³ Not printed herein.

⁴ The Combined Chiefs on December 5, 1943, approved this message and directed that it be sent; see *ante*, p. 723.

3. The exact date for OVERLORD has not yet been decided upon, but it is to take place at the most suitable date during May 1944. You will be informed of the date once this has been decided, and operation ANVIL will be timed approximately to coincide with operation OVERLORD—the exact date to be determined in consultation with COSSAC.

4. You will be given the assault shipping and craft for a lift for at least two divisions (each with two brigades in the assault).

5. You will inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff of your requirements which cannot be met from the resources which will be at your disposal in the Mediterranean on that date. In assessing your resources you should assume that your forces have reached the Pisa-Rimini line and that as strong pressure as possible is maintained, consistent with the forces required for ANVIL; also that Mediterranean forces will not be engaged in offensive operations elsewhere.

J. C. S. Files

Report by the Combined Staff Planners

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 5 December 1943.

C. C. S. 427

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

ALTERNATIVE TO "BUCCANEER"

PROBLEM

1. On the assumption that the amphibious lift available for BUCCANEER is reduced in certain respects, to consider what minor amphibious operations or raids might be carried out in the Southeast Asia Theater, in order to harass Japanese communication, destroy Japanese installations and equipment, or alternatively to support the land advance on the Arakan coast and obtain airfields with which to support further operations in Burma.

RESOURCES AVAILABLE

2. An appendix is attached ¹ showing a list of the resources which we assume will be left in Southeast Asia. This list is based on the assumption that the bulk of LST and LSI (L) will be withdrawn together with a proportion of the naval forces and escort carriers now allotted to BUCCANEER, as these are the resources which are chiefly required in the European Theater.

¹ Not printed herein.

3. With resources remaining in the Southeast Asia Theater it would be possible to land a force of one infantry battalion group up to one brigade group, depending on the scale of transport to be landed.

POSSIBLE OPERATIONS

4. Detailed study by the Force Commanders of intelligence maps and photographs is necessary before any definite opinion can be formed as to the practicability of any operations.

5. From a general survey of the possibilities however we consider that the following merit examination and might assist Operation TARZAN:

a. Amphibious operations along the Arakan coast in conjunction with the land advance of the 15th Army Group on Indin-Rathedaung-Kyauktau, which is timed to start in mid-January and be completed in February.

b. An amphibious operation to capture and secure the northern tip of Ramree Island, prior to the beginning of the 1944 monsoon. This operation might be covered by shore-based aircraft at Maungdaw. Maintenance of a garrison in this area by sea might prove costly as convoys will be subject to air attack. It might be possible to extend air operations against Japanese communications in Burma, and to infiltrate on the Taungup-Sandaway [*Sandoway*] coast. The provision of fighter support to any such operations would have to be carefully balanced against the requirements of TARZAN.

6. Unless a target can be found to justify the landing of a raiding force, we do not believe that any raids should be attempted other than carrier-borne air raids.

Leahy Papers

*The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the President*¹

[CAIRO,] 5 December 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Recognition of Rome as an Open City.

The question of declaring Rome an open city has again been discussed by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff with the British Chiefs of Staff. The British Chiefs of Staff are still of the opinion that, from a military point of view, such action is undesirable.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

Admiral, U. S. Navy

Chief of Staff to the

Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

¹ Hull's letter of November 21, 1943, to Roosevelt (*ante*, p. 266) was referred to Leahy earlier in the day on December 5, 1943, with a memorandum from Brown reading: "The President requests that you discuss this matter with the British."

Hopkins Papers

*Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant
(Hopkins)*

CAIRO, December 5, 1943.

MY DEAR HARRY, I understand that Lord Beaverbrook has not received any favourable reply to his request to you for a conference on Civil Aviation.¹

Our people are anxious to get on with this and I should be grateful if you could let me know if there are any obstacles we could remove, so that progress may be made.²

Yours always

W[INSTON]

¹The request was contained in telegram 7168, October 18, 1943, from the American Embassy at London to the Department of State (800.796/493). Hopkins replied to Beaverbrook on October 27, 1943, that he did not regard the time as "opportune to reach agreement here along broad lines which would relate to civil aviation". On November 3, 1943, Hopkins wrote to Winant, with reference to "difficulties caused you by my cable to Beaverbrook", that there had been a delay in reaching agreed positions in the United States Government on post-war civil aviation (Hopkins Papers). See also *ante*, p. 621. Correspondence on Anglo-American conversations of 1943-44 relating to civil aviation is scheduled to be published subsequently in other volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series.

²No written reply to this communication has been found. Hopkins corresponded with Beaverbrook in January 1944 regarding the conduct of future international discussion of civil aviation (Hopkins Papers); see also Notter, p. 356.

Hopkins Papers

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the British Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden), and Reply*¹

[CAIRO, December 5 (?), 1943.]

ANTHONY Has he² been told squadrons do not go in until Feb 15?
Is there good reason not to tell him

HARRY

Yes; he has been told. Winston gave him a paper this afternoon.³ He understands, but issue is he won't agree to flying in until his *army* is ready. This looks like a long job.

¹This exchange of handwritten notes presumably occurred during the quadripartite dinner meeting of December 5, 1943, *ante*, p. 733.

²Presumably İnönü.

³The paper under reference was presumably the "plan" mentioned in the tripartite meeting that afternoon; see *ante*, p. 714.

Hopkins Papers

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden), and Reply¹

[CAIRO, December 5 (?), 1943.]

ANTHONY:—It looks like BUCCANEER is out & our military plans hence will be agreed to tomorrow

HARRY

If so, you have been very generous, but our chances next year will surely benefit.

President has been grand about it all.

Note reinforcements (Scotch) just came in!

¹ The exchange, which was handwritten on a single sheet of paper, presumably took place during the quadripartite dinner meeting, *ante*, p. 733.

Hopkins Papers

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill¹

CAIRO, December 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRIME MINISTER

I propose to send over my signature the following message to the Generalissimo tonight. Do you concur in this action? ²

"Conference with Stalin involves us in combined grand operations on European continent in late spring giving fair prospect of terminating war with Germany by end of summer of 1944. These operations impose so large a requirement of heavy landing craft as to make it impracticable to devote a sufficient number to the amphibious operation in Bay of Bengal simultaneously with launching of TARZAN to insure success of operation.

"This being the case: Would you be prepared go ahead with TARZAN as now planned, including commitment to maintain naval control of Bay of Bengal coupled with naval carrier and commando amphibious raiding operations simultaneous with launching of TARZAN? Also there is the prospect of B-29 bombing of railroad and port Bangkok.

"If not, would you prefer to have TARZAN delayed until November to include heavy amphibious operation. Meanwhile concentrating all air transport on carrying supplies over the hump to air and ground forces in China.

¹ A facsimile of this document is printed in Sherwood, p. 801, where the first line of the text begins, as typewritten, "The President proposes to send over his signature", and handwritten changes (by Hopkins, according to Sherwood) make the text read as printed here.

² The paper is endorsed at the bottom by Churchill: "I agree. WSC 5.XII".

"I am influenced in this matter by the tremendous advantage to be received by China and the Pacific through the early termination of the war with Germany.["]³

F[RANKLIN] D[ELANO] R[OOSEVELT]

³The telegram to Chiang was sent from Cairo at 11:05 p. m., December 5, 1943, Cairo time. It was sent to Washington and relayed to Chungking via military channels. On December 7, 1943, Stilwell (at Cairo) cabled Hearn (at Chungking) that Hearn should see Chiang and urge him to proceed with China's part in the campaign despite the cancellation of BUCCANEER; see *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 74. Chiang's reply to Roosevelt is printed in the same publication, p. 74.

Roosevelt Papers

Madame Chiang to President Roosevelt

CONFIDENTIAL

CHUNGKING, December 5, 1943.¹

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Generalissimo and I arrived in Chungking on the morning of December 1st. . . .

Immediately upon our return the Generalissimo consulted with Dr. Kung regarding the feasibility of the plan which you suggested in our conference regarding the alleviation of China's urgent economic situation. Dr. Kung has studied its possibilities with great care and he wishes me to tell you that, in his opinion, your suggestion is both generous and kind and he thinks some feasible procedure could be worked out with the aid of Secretary Morgenthau.² He appreciates the interest and concern you have shown in helping us to fight aggression not only with the military machine, but with economic weapons as well. He is impressed with the fact that you see with such clear foresight and vision that, in order to continue resistance, methods and means must be evolved to hold intact China's economic security, a fact which you doubtless will remember that the Generalissimo emphasized was even more critical than the military.

The Generalissimo is now thinking of asking Dr. Kung or his appointee, empowered with full credentials, to go to Washington to discuss the details with the American Government and would like to know whether this is satisfactory to you. It would, of course, be best if Dr. Kung could go himself, but, failing that, he will send one of his trusted men to go in his stead.

¹ Delivered to Roosevelt at the White House on December 22, 1943.

² The plan, as suggested subsequently by Roosevelt to Morgenthau, involved the selling of dollar currency for yuan to be resold to China after the war at no profit to the United States Government. See *United States Relations With China*, p. 488.

I need not tell you how grateful we feel that you have promised to speak to the Treasury about the two hundred million gold bar arrangement.

The Generalissimo wishes me to thank you again for your promise to help stabilize the *fapi*.

MAYLING SOONG CHIANG
(Madame Chiang Kai-shek)

740.0011 EW 1939/32218

The Soviet Ambassador (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honor to ask you to transmit the following communication from Mr. V. M. Molotov to Mr. Harry L. Hopkins in answer to the latter's telegram addressed to Mr. Molotov¹ and handed to him by Mr. Hamilton on December 3, 1943.

"Personal and secret to Mr. Harry L. Hopkins from V. M. Molotov

Just like you I cannot but express my satisfaction regarding our work together at the Teheran Conference and the possibility of continuation of this work in the future.

The meeting of Premier Stalin with President Roosevelt is of the greatest importance for drawing closer together the peoples of our countries in the interests of the cause of speeding up our common victory and post-war collaboration.

Best wishes."²

Accept [etc.]

A. GROMYKO

¹ *Ante*, p. 775.

² The quoted message was transmitted to Hopkins in a letter from Hull, dated December 10, 1943 (Hopkins Papers).

Roosevelt Papers

President Roosevelt to King Farouk of Egypt

CAIRO, December 6, 1943.

MY DEAR KING FAROUK, It is a cause of profound regret to me that owing to Your Majesty's absence from Cairo following your regrettable accident I am forced to leave Egypt without having the pleasure of meeting you.

My visit to your country has been brief, and the exigencies of my duties while here have prevented me from enjoying all that Egypt

holds of interest and beauty. I wish, however, to assure you that I have been happy to be here and that I appreciate deeply the hospitality of this land and the signal courtesies which you have proffered.

I hope that I may visit Egypt again and that then circumstances will permit our meeting. In the meanwhile I extend to you my best wishes for your speedy recovery and for the welfare and happiness of your people.

I very much hope that you will find it possible some day to visit me at the White House. It would give all of us the greatest pleasure to greet you and to give you the opportunity of seeing the United States.

Those most delicious ducks have just arrived. I am having some of them tonight and the rest of them we are taking with us to eat on the return voyage home.

Again with many thanks, I am,

Your sincere friend,

F[RANKLIN] D R[OOSEVELT]

Roosevelt Papers

The Shah of Iran to President Roosevelt

TEHRAN, December 6, 1943.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, Your Minister¹ duly delivered the framed photograph which Your Excellency was good enough to present to me, just before your departure, as a souvenir of your memorable visit to Tehran.²

This handsome gift, a very good likeness, stands in a prominent place in my study and will always remind me of your great personality and the interesting conversation we had together on November 30th.³

Your Excellency's kind letter of December 1st⁴ has also been gratefully received. The cordial sentiments therein expressed are entirely reciprocated, and I look forward to an ever-increasing co-operation between our two countries in the arts of peace to our mutual advantage.

Let me assure Your Excellency that the friendship of the American People is very precious to us; my constant desire will be to foster closer ties between Iran and the United States of America which have already been brought so near to one another in the common struggle for freedom.

¹ Louis G. Dreyfus.

² See *ante*, p. 471.

³ See *ante*, p. 564.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 630.

It is indeed a matter for gratification that the momentous Tehran Conference was a success. We have to be particularly grateful to Your Excellency for your share in obtaining approval of the satisfactory communiqué issued yesterday regarding Iran,⁵ in the drafting of which Mr. Dreyfus, Your able and distinguished representative, has taken an outstanding part.

The kind invitation to visit Washington, extended by Your Excellency, is much appreciated and I hope to be able to avail myself of it and to have the pleasure of seeing You again as soon as circumstances permit.

With the assurance of my friendship and highest consideration, I remain dear Mr. President

Yours sincerely

MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI

⁵ *Ante*, p. 646.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 6 December 1943.

C. C. S. 270/13

USE OF FACILITIES IN THE AZORES BY U. S. AIRCRAFT

1. Although the United States Chiefs of Staff have noted the memorandum from the British Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 270/12), dated 3 December 1943,¹ it is considered necessary to defer its consideration until more detailed reports and recommendations are available from such sources as the U. S. Army-Navy Reconnaissance Party in the Azores, the Air Ministry Officers now at Lagens Field, Terceira, the Air Transport Command, A. A. F., and the Transport Command, R. A. F.

2. Whatever decisions may be reached concerning the future extent, nature, and control of U. S. and British anti-submarine and in transit aircraft operations in the Azores, it is apparent that the expansion, completion, and maximum possible use of Lagens Field are matters of urgency. In order to render all possible assistance in the early completion of Lagens Field and to maintain U. S. anti-submarine, ferried, and transport aircraft operations, it is proposed to send appropriate U. S. construction, communications, meteorological and maintenance material and equipment, supplies, and personnel to Terceira on the first possible convoy. The United States Chiefs of Staff have been advised by representatives of the United States in Lisbon that Dr. Antonio

¹ Not printed herein.

Salazar, Premier of the Portuguese Government, has replied favorably to questions regarding this procedure.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 6 December 1943.

C. C. S. 270/14

DEVELOPMENT OF FACILITIES IN THE AZORES

1. Reports from Lisbon indicate that, provided the U. S. are prepared to work under British cover, they will be able to obtain all the essential facilities in the Azores they require for the prosecution of the war.

2. As regards U. S. operational facilities at Lagens, we would suggest that a formula on the following lines might be acceptable to the Portuguese Government. They might be informed that American operational units in the Azores would be on loan to H. M. G. operating under the command of a British officer from a base under British control.

3. As regards transit facilities, we recommend that we should await the outcome of Dr. Salazar's consideration of the American proposal that the U. S. should construct an aerodrome on Santa Maria on behalf of the Portuguese Government. If this is unfavorable, as it may be in view of Dr. Salazar's insistence on retaining the framework and principles of the British agreement,¹ the British should then ask for authority to construct an aerodrome and should use American material and assistance under British cover.

4. The formula we would suggest for American transit aircraft would be that aircraft in transit through the Azores are controlled by British Air Transport Command. The second airfield, when constructed, would be under British Command, and aircraft using it would fulfill the same conditions as those using Lagens.²

5. In any case the first step would be a survey of Santa Maria which could be done ostensibly by the British, but with the assistance of the four American officers who remained behind in Terceira, pending further instructions, after completion of work by American survey party recently in that island.

¹ See Hull's telegram of November 24, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 394.

² As indicated *ante*, p. 760, this sentence was eliminated when the document was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

6. We do not foresee any requirements for two B-24 squadrons in the Azores, or, in fact, for two American squadrons of any type. Our requirement is a total of three squadrons of which two should be British squadrons, and we prefer to retain the two Fortress squadrons now at Terceira. We recommend that the third squadron should be an American B-24 squadron, which would replace the Hudsons now in the Azores. If this is agreed, we could also make the point to Dr. Salazar that the majority of operational units would be British and all under British command.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (King), and the First Sea Lord (Cunningham)

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 6 December 1943.

C. C. S. 415/3

THE PROVISION OF MERCHANT SHIPPING FOR THE BRITISH FLEET FOR
THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

The Combined Chiefs of Staff are requested to approve that the Ministry of War Transport and the War Shipping Administration should take into consideration the need for Fleet Auxiliaries for the British Fleet for operations in the war against Japan, and that they should take steps to provide the requisite ships after agreement in detail between the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and the First Sea Lord.

J. C. S. Files

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 6 December 1943.

C. C. S. 401/2

V. L. R. AIRFIELDS (B-29) IN THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA AREA

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the following interpretation of paragraph 3 of C. C. S. 401/1:¹

"If the necessary work in India is to be completed by the desired date of April first, it is essential that United States units and equipment required should arrive in Calcutta by the 15th of January and, in addition, that certain resources be diverted from Ledo, which would

¹ *Ante*, p. 377.

result in delaying progress of road construction for a period of six weeks to two months.

"Certain preparatory work in advance of arrival of American units and equipment can be done without interfering with S. E. A. C. projects, which, with arrival of necessary resources from the U. S. by January 15th, will permit completion of the airfields by May 15th."

H. REDMAN

F. B. ROYAL

Combined Secretariat

J. C. S. Files

*Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO,] December 6, 1943.

C. C. S. 426/1

1. The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at SEXTANT Conference is submitted herewith:—

I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE

2. In conjunction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

II. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

3. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unrelenting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

5. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

¹ The source text contains on a cover sheet the subscriptions "OK FDR" and "WSC 6-XII" in the handwriting of the two Heads of Government.

III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

d. Continue the disruption of Axis sea communications.

e. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

f. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia, including the coordinated action of our forces.

h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

i. Undertake such action to exploit the entry of Turkey into the war as is considered most likely to facilitate or accelerate the attainment of the over-all objectives.

j. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.

k. Prepare to reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as soon as the German situation allows.

IV. EXECUTION OF THE OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The U-Boat War

7. We have received from the Chiefs of the two Naval Staffs encouraging reports regarding the U-boat war. (C. C. S. 399 and 399/1) ²

THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE

The Combined Bomber Offensive

8. *a.* We have received a most encouraging report covering the combined bombing operations against Germany. (C. C. S. 403) ³

b. The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital ele-

² Neither printed herein.

³ Not printed herein.

ments of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.

c. We are agreed that the present plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive should remain unchanged except for revision of the bombing objectives which should be made periodically. The intensity of the operations of the 8th Air Force should be limited only by the aircraft and crews available.

“EUREKA” Decisions

9. At the EUREKA Conference, the following military conclusions were approved by the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin. [Here follows the text of the military agreement printed *ante*, p. 652, beginning with the words “The Conference”. The five paragraphs are lettered from *a* to *e* instead of being numbered, and there are no initials at the end.]

10. In the light of the above EUREKA decisions, we have reached agreement as follows regarding operations in the European Theater:

a. OVERLORD and ANVIL are the supreme operations for 1944. They must be carried out during May, 1944. Nothing must be undertaken in any other part of the world which hazards the success of these two operations.

b. OVERLORD as at present planned is on a narrow margin. Everything practicable should be done to increase its strength.

c. The examination of ANVIL on the basis of not less than a two-division assault should be pressed forward as fast as possible. If the examination reveals that it requires strengthening, consideration will have to be given to the provision of additional resources.

d. Operations in the Aegean, including in particular the capture of Rhodes, are desirable, provided that they can be fitted in without detriment to OVERLORD and ANVIL.

e. Every effort must be made, by accelerated building and conversion, to provide the essential additional landing craft for the European Theater.

Operations Against Southern France

11. We have examined the operations to be undertaken against Southern France. We have instructed the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, in consultation with COSSAC, to submit, as a matter of urgency, an outline plan for the operation. He has been informed that it will take place at about the same time as Operation OVERLORD and that he will be given the assault shipping

and craft for a lift of at least two divisions. He has been instructed to inform us of his requirements which cannot be met from the resources he will have at his disposal in the Mediterranean on that date.

Operations in Italy

12. We have agreed that in Italy the advance should be continued to the Pisa-Rimini line. We have informed the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, that he may retain in the Mediterranean until the 15th January 1944 the 68 LST's due for return to the United Kingdom. This will still allow these landing craft to reach the United Kingdom in time for OVERLORD.

Command in the Mediterranean

13. We have agreed to the unification of command in the Mediterranean Theater and have issued the necessary directive to General Eisenhower (C. C. S. 387/3).⁴

Support to the Balkans

14. We have issued special instructions to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, with regard to the assistance he should render to the Partisans (C. C. S. 387/3, Appendix "B").⁵

Turkey

15. We have examined the role that Turkey might be called upon to adopt if she agrees to come into the war* and the extent of our commitments that is likely to be involved. (C. C. S. 418/1).⁶

Coordination With the U. S. S. R.

16. We have agreed that the necessary coordination of effort with the U. S. S. R. should be arranged through the United States and British Military Missions in Moscow. We have agreed that deception experts should proceed to Moscow to coordinate plans with the Soviet Staff.

Emergency Return to the Continent

[Here follow paragraphs 17 and 18 which, with minor editorial changes, are the same as the first two paragraphs of C. C. S. 320/4 (Revised), *ante*, p. 786.]

19. We have agreed that COSSAC be directed to examine and report on the implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of spheres of occupation.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 794.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 795.

* See paragraph 9 *b* above. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁶ *Ante*, p. 782.

20. We have further agreed that the Combined Intelligence Committee be instructed to keep the situation in Europe under constant review in relation to RANKIN and to report on the first of each month regarding this to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Long Term Strategy

21. Active study continues regarding the Over-all Plan for the Defeat of Japan, and we have approved in principle C. C. S. 417⁷ and 417/1⁸ (less paragraph 4 of the enclosure to C. C. S. 417/1 as a basis for further investigation and preparation, subject to final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to plan a campaign for the Chinese Theater proper, together with an estimate of the forces involved.

Specific Operations in 1943-1944

22. We have approved the Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan in 1944 (C. C. S. 397 Revised)⁹ with the exception of the references contained therein to BUCCANEER.

Higher Direction of Operations in Southeast Asia Command

23. We agree that it is undesirable for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to enter into details of various operations in this theater, but consider that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their general jurisdiction over strategy in this theater must reach decisions as to which of several courses of action are to be undertaken and their sequence and timing.

Operations in the S. E. Asia Command

[Here follow (as paragraphs 24, 25 *a* and *b*, and 26) paragraphs *a* to *d* of section 6 of the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held on December 6, 1943, 11 a. m. (*ante*, p. 737), with such changes—required by the context—as the insertion here of the words “We have agreed to” at the beginning of paragraph 24 and of “We have decided:—To” at the beginning of paragraph 25.]

Relation of Available Resources to the Operations Decided Upon

27. We have now in process of examination a study of the available resources of the United Nations with a view to assessing our ability to carry out the operations decided upon.¹⁰

⁷ *Ante*, p. 765.

⁸ Not printed herein, but see *ante*, p. 736.

⁹ *Ante*, p. 779.

¹⁰ See *ante*, p. 737, and *post*, p. 828.

V. CONCLUSIONS ON MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS

United Chiefs of Staff

28. We have studied proposals for the possible formation of a United Chiefs of Staff organization and, alternatively, the possible representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff of powers other than the U. S. and the British. We have agreed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should not take the initiative in putting forward either of the above proposals. We feel that if the U. S. S. R. or China should raise the question, the difficulties of and objections to any form of standing United Chiefs of Staff Committee should be frankly explained to them. It should then be pointed out that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington are responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the Anglo-American forces which are closely integrated in accordance with the broad policy laid down at the formal conferences such as Casablanca, TRIDENT, QUADRANT and SEXTANT, which are convened from time to time; and that the U. S. S. R. and/or the Chinese Governments will be invited to join in any formal conferences which may be convened in the future, to take part in the discussion of any military problems with which they are specifically concerned.

NOTE

The matters still under study and decisions which have yet to be taken, notably in paragraphs 11, 15, 19, 21, 25, and 27, will be duly brought to your attention for approval.

J. C. S. Files : Telegram

*The Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command
(Mountbatten) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

[NEW DELHI?] December 6, 1943.

SEACOS 38¹

Following for COS from Mountbatten

1. Your 051430 Dec.² para 2 we have examined proposal very carefully and consider that no small amphibious operation can be carried out for the following reasons:

a. In view of enemy's powers of concentration our seaborne air requirements will be the same whether the operation is large or small.

b. BUCCANEER was selected as objective for amphibious operation because it was the only worth while operation which could be carried out with the forces allotted.

¹ Circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as C. C. S. 427/1, December 6, 1943.

² Annex printed *ante*, p. 724.

c. There is no other objective which could be seized and held with the landing craft and assault shipping likely to be available under your para 1.

2. I am totally opposed to landing troops and withdrawing them since the psychological effect of such withdrawal is considerable and in this theater I regard this aspect as of the greatest importance.

3. Possibility remains of hit and run operations by carriers with a view to containing enemy air and possibly surface forces. This may reduce pressure on the SW Pacific and is being examined. Least force which would be necessary for operation of this type is Fleet carriers 2, Unicorn ³ 1, Escorts 3.

4. The utility of extending inshore operations on the Arakan coast is being examined but they cannot be represented as amphibious operations or be considered to be of great significance. Such operations in order to be in any degree effective would require 12 LCI (L), 15 LCT (5), 6 LCS (M), 3 LCA Flotillas, 2 LCM Flotillas, 1 LCP Flotilla. Some of these forces might however be more profitably employed in some other theater other than SEAC.

5. Cancellation of BUCCANEER must inevitably lead to collapse of TARZAN since Generalissimo has only agreed to reduction in "hump" tonnage and cooperation on [of] Yunnan force if amphibious operation is staged at the same time. I have carried out a rapid examination of what could be done in the light of these circumstances and assuming that we could get the additional 25 first line transport aircraft promised by General Arnold in China a rough forecast is as follows:

a. That TARZAN in its original form will not be possible. In particular there will not be enough transport aircraft to fly in the 60th Parachute Brigade and the 26th Infantry Division to Indaw or to maintain them by air.

b. It will still be possible to employ all the LRPG's but in conjunction with

c. An advance by 4th Corps down the Kabaw Valley and through the Chin Hills on to the Kalemyo Kalawa [*Kalewa*] area.

d. The Arakan operations would remain as in TARZAN.

e. The Ledo force would still be available to advance if the Generalissimo gave permission and they prove capable of doing so.

7.⁴ It is realized that this new operation the code for which is given in my immediately following telegram ⁵ will not enable me to achieve the QUADRANT Directive of opening up the land route to China ⁶ but it has certain merits.

³ This may refer to H. M. S. *Unicorn*, an aircraft maintenance ship.

⁴ It does not appear that there was any paragraph 6 in this message.

⁵ Not printed herein. The code word was GRIPFAST.

⁶ See Ehrman, vol. v, p. 14.

a. It enables the LRPG's to operate thus confusing the Japanese and helping to inflict casualties.

b. It will still produce a considerable amount of air fighting.

c. The capture of the Kalembo Kalewa area will give us a starting point from which to begin land operations against Mandalay.

d. It does not necessarily commit us to further operations in the center of Burma.

8. The original plan was based on the high fighting qualities believed to be possessed by the Ledo Force. If, however, they fail to advance in accordance with the general program the fly in to Indaw would have to be cancelled even after the starting of TARZAN so as to avoid leaving the 26th Division entirely isolated in Central Burma.

Hopkins Papers

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President*¹

[CAIRO, December 6 (?), 1943.]

Mr. President:-

Couldnt you see the
President alone for five minutes
to say good bye - and ask
him to be ready to go to war
Feb. 15. Too many people here

Harry

¹ This note was probably handed to Roosevelt toward the latter part of the tripartite meeting on December 6, 1943; see *ante*, p. 747.

Hopkins Papers

*The Ambassador to Turkey (Steinhardt), Temporarily at Cairo,
to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

CAIRO, December 6, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HOPKINS.

I had a talk with Helleu today. I have known him for the past six years quite intimately as he was Minister in Riga and Ambassador in Ankara for some time after I arrived there. He gave me the following version of the recent events in Lebanon¹ where he was Governor General at the time they took place.

About three weeks before he left for Algiers the Lebanese authorities began to press him for consent to their proposed independence bill. He gave them every assurance that the matter would receive full and fair consideration. Four days before his departure for Algiers the matter was again urged upon him and he said he would take it up with General De Gaulle in Algiers. He says he was given to understand by the Lebanese authorities that no action would be taken during his absence. In Algiers he discussed the matter with General De Gaulle who instructed him to reiterate on his behalf the assurance already given by Helleu. When Helleu arrived in Cairo on his return from Algiers he heard that the Lebanese authorities intended to pass the bill at once and he telephoned to Beirut "begging that no action be taken pending his return 'in twenty four hours' ". On his arrival there the next day he found the bill had been passed the night before, but he said he regarded this as a "slap in the face to France" and that he thereupon ordered the arrests on his own initiative. He said no Sen[e]galese troops were used and that the arrests had been made by "white French sailors". He also said that no violence or indignities had taken place and that of this he was certain. He said he attributed the false reports to "British intrigue".

Helleu immediately reported the arrests to De Gaulle and received a telegram from him, of which he permitted me to read the original. It is dated November 13th and is De Gaulle's telegram #3279. It is a fairly long telegram. The substance is as follows: De Gaulle stated that he assumed the action taken by Helleu was necessary or it would not have been taken and that he approved of it. The first paragraph is an unequivocal ratification of Helleu's action. The second paragraph indicates De Gaulle anticipated a violent British reaction. The concluding paragraph states that he is sending General Catroux to Beirut,

¹ See *ante*, p. 84, footnote 2.

not for the purpose of disavowing Helleu's action but for the purpose of supporting him in the action taken by him.

Helleu said that thereafter Catroux arrived and, as is known, disavowed his action. He added in the strictest confidence that he was thoroughly convinced of Catroux's disloyalty to De Gaulle and that he was scheming to succeed him. Helleu then showed me a telegram dated November 22 from De Gaulle requesting him to proceed to Algiers immediately and closed with expressions of great friendship and signed himself as "his sincere friend". Helleu is in Cairo today enroute to Algiers in compliance with De Gaulle's request.

I am entirely convinced of the truthfulness of Helleu's statement to me that the arrests were made on his own initiative but that his action was immediately confirmed and ratified by General De Gaulle. Helleu is a man of integrity and has always been entirely truthful and frank in our relations as colleagues. In view of the circumstances and substance of our meeting today it is inconceivable that the two original telegrams which he showed me and which he had carefully folded in his wallet could have been fabricated for the occasion. If the first telegram is genuine, it follows that his statement that he acted on his own in making the arrests and that De Gaulle immediately ratified his action must be true.

L. A. STEINHARDT

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

[CAIRO,] 6 December 1943.

Personal and secret from the President to Marshal Stalin.

The immediate appointment of General Eisenhower to the Command of OVERLORD has been decided upon.²

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room, via military channels, and forwarded by the Map Room to Moscow in paraphrase, via Navy channels. The source text is the message as received at the Map Room. The original, in Marshall's handwriting and with Roosevelt's signature, was later sent to Eisenhower and is reproduced in his *Crusade in Europe* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1948), p. 208. It reads "command of OVERLORD operation" where this text reads "the Command of OVERLORD".

² See *ante*, p. 542. For Stalin's acknowledgment, dated December 10, 1943, see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 114.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 6 December 1943.

Secret and personal from the President and the Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin.

In the Cairo Conference, just concluded, we have arrived at the following decisions as to conduct of war in 1944 against Germany additional to the agreements reached by the three of us at Teheran:

The bomber offensive against Germany, with the objective of destroying the German air combat strength, dislocating the German military, industrial and economic system, and preparing the way for a cross-channel operation, will be given the highest strategic priority.

We have reduced the scale of operation scheduled for March in the Bay of Bengal to permit the reenforcement of amphibious craft for the operation against Southern France.

We have ordered the utmost endeavors to increase the production of landing craft in the United Kingdom and the United States for the reenforcement of OVERLORD, and further orders have been issued to divert certain landing craft from the Pacific for the same purpose.²

ROOSEVELT and CHURCHILL

¹ Regarding the preparation of this message, see *ante*, pp. 738, 749. It was sent to the White House Map Room, via military channels, and forwarded by the Map Room to Moscow, via Navy channels.

² For Stalin's acknowledgment, dated December 10, 1943, see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 113.

Roosevelt Papers

The President to the Secretary of State

[CAIRO?] December 7, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

After discussing this matter¹ with the British military authorities I consider it inadvisable to reopen the matter at this time.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

¹ See Hull's letter of November 21, 1943, to Roosevelt (*ante*, p. 266), on the question of making Rome an open city. See also *ante*, p. 801.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 7 December 1943.

C. C. S. 411/5

OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

1. In order to settle the question of tonnage lift to China versus availability of aircraft from A. T. C. India-China Wing, it is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept the following in lieu of the solution recommended in C. C. S. 411/4, SEXTANT, 5 December 1943:¹

a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff recognize the principle that the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command² must have control over resources allocated to him for the accomplishment of the assigned objectives.

b. The Combined Chiefs of Staff also recognize the necessity of firm commitments of tonnage over the "hump" into China during the next six months. The Combined Chiefs of Staff direct:

(1) That the tonnage over the "hump" be maintained on the following basis of transport plane allotments:

	C-87's	C-46's	Tons Delivered
December	40	97	8,858
January	40	107	9,535
February	48	120	11,066
March	55	25	5,614
April	52	46	6,716
May	50	96	9,686

(2) They further direct that transport plane allotments to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, for TARZAN, be on the following basis:

15 Dec to 31 Jan— 18 C-47's or 12 C-46's
 1 Feb to 28 Feb — 11 C-47's or 8 C-46's
 1 Mar to 31 Mar —188 C-47's or 126 C-46's
 1 Apr to 15 Apr —183 C-47's or 122 C-46's
 16 Apr to 15 May—114 C-47's or 76 C-46's
 16 May to 30 Jun— 43 C-47's or 29 C-46's

NOTE: The above subparagraph is based on the assumption that 35 additional C-47's will be available in the theater by 1 February. (Now allotted to the 10th Air Force)

¹ Not printed herein. This paper, a memorandum by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Southeast Asia Command (Wedemeyer), proposed an amendment to C. C. S. 411/2, which is printed *ante*, p. 430.

² Admiral Mountbatten.

c. The Combined Chiefs of Staff direct that any shortages in delivery of transport aircraft into the theater on present allotment bases be prorated in proportion to the allotments outlined in *b* (1) and (2) above. Excess in numbers of A. T. C. aircraft over the expectations outlined in (1) and (2) above will be allocated by direction of the Commanding General, U. S. A. A. F., India,³ during the above period.

³ Presumably Major General George E. Stratemeyer.

Hopkins Papers

*Composite Memorandum Handed by Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*¹

[CAIRO, December 7(?), 1943.]

[I]

THE QUESTION OF THE BRITISH GOLD AND DOLLAR BALANCES²

1. Some time back,³ in different circumstances from the present, the President approved a line of policy which would permit the British gold and dollar reserves to reach some figure between \$600 million and \$1,000 million. There was no agreement by the British to limit their reserves to this figure.

2. For some little time past the British reserves have exceeded \$1,000 million, and may be increasing at a rate of some \$600 million a year. This includes gold and represents their total resources against growing liabilities in all parts of the world, which amount to six or seven times these reserves.

3. This increase in the British reserves does not reflect an improvement in their financial position. Their quick liabilities, largely caused by heavy cash outgoings in the Middle East, are increasing at four or five times the rate at which the reserves against them have increased. Their *net* overseas position, in fact, is deteriorating at a rate of about \$3 billions a year.

¹ The following three papers, dated respectively October 26, November 11, and November 12, 1943, are believed together to constitute the "memorandum" which Churchill later stated that he had handed to Hopkins at Cairo on December 8 in connection with a discussion of their subject matter by Roosevelt and Churchill. See *post*, p. 878. Since Roosevelt and Hopkins left Cairo on December 7, 1943, after a conversation with Churchill, the editors have supplied the date of December 7 for this composite memorandum. In the Hopkins Papers these three documents form a physical unit, being attached to one another by means of a short blue cord.

² This paper may have been prepared by Keynes; see *post*, p. 827.

³ On January 1, 1943.

4. The increase in their gold holdings is due to certain receipts from South Africa and Russia. The increase in their dollar balances is due to their receiving the dollar equivalent of the local currency provided to meet the pay of American troops within the sterling area. Indeed, if it were not for the pay of the American troops the British dollar balances would be going down.

5. Apart from certain raw materials, the British are already giving reciprocal aid to the fullest extent of American Government requirements. They have now offered raw materials purchased by the U. S. Government in Great Britain and the Colonies on reciprocal aid terms.⁴ This would retard the growth of their balances by about \$100 million a year, and by \$200 million if India and Australia join in.

6. The British argue that some growth of their reserves is indispensable to the delicate system they are operating by which they finance the war on credit throughout a large part of the world, and that the retention of some part of the above receipts, as a support to this credit system and an offset to a much larger increase of liabilities, is not open to legitimate criticism. They point out that the Russians are believed to hold gold reserves nearly double the total reserves of the British and have no significant liabilities against them. But, in the case of Russia, it is not at present proposed to require them to surrender any part of their reserves as a condition of further Lend-Lease assistance.⁵

7. The British feel that they ought not to be asked to agree to a ceiling to their balances, since their reserve position must be their own concern. Nevertheless, if the British argument is accepted as valid, the position could be regularised by a new Directive, which would set up a revised formula for the guidance of American Departments. If the figure given by the new formula was being approached, then the whole question could be re-opened.

8. The new formula might provide that an increase in British reserves is not unreasonable if the increase does not exceed, say, 30 per cent, of the increase of British liabilities.

9. Figures furnished to Congress hitherto have not disclosed the full burden of British overseas liabilities, or their rate of growth. It might be necessary to justify the new arrangement to provide that the information given to Congress in future should be fuller, and

⁴ See (1) *A Report on Mutual Aid, Presented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, November 1943* (British Command Paper 6483), p. 4, and (2) Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease, Weapon for Victory* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1944), p. 284.

⁵ The decision to reduce lend-lease shipments to Great Britain because of the rise in British gold and dollar balances was advocated by some American officials. See H. Duncan Hall, *North American Supply* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955), pp. 280, 284, 438-440.

should show in some fashion, which would not be dangerous to British credit, the growth of liabilities as well as the growth of reserves.

26th OCTOBER, 1943.

[II]

PRIME MINISTER

There is a matter affecting our financial relations with the United States of America which I think I must bring prominently to your notice at this particular juncture. We have reason to believe that the President is about to give a decision which is of absolutely vital importance to our financial capacity to get through the transitional period and, indeed, to our diplomatic independence during that time.

We are all concerned by the mounting accumulations of sterling balances in the hands of other countries. These represent a post-war liability upon us to convert the sterling into gold or other foreign exchange which the holders of the balances may need.

It looks indeed as though we may come to the end of the war with external liabilities of not less than £2,500,000,000 (ten billion dollars).

On the other side, after being almost cleaned out by the middle of 1941, we have been gradually building up a modest reserve. Our free balances of gold and dollars have now reached £300,000,000, and there is a reasonable hope of their reaching £500,000,000 (two billion dollars) by the end of the war, or about one-fifth of our assumed liabilities at the same date. These balances represent our only quick assets against the liabilities and constitute in fact the central reserve of the whole Commonwealth, since they include dollars turned over to us under the sterling area arrangements by the Dominions and other countries in the sterling area.

These balances will be absolutely essential to see us through the difficult transition period after Lend-Lease has ceased, and before the measures we shall have to take to restore the balance of our external trade have had time to bear fruit.

Early in the year we heard, almost accidentally, that the President had authorized a directive to the effect that the British reserves were not to be allowed to rise beyond a billion dollars (£250,000,000). It is not clear that this directive was ever issued in such explicit terms, and we were certainly not consulted about it. But the U. S. Treasury maintain that this alleged directive puts the Departments under orders to cut off Lend-Lease as soon as our total reserves exceed the limit of a billion dollars.

In course of time, this figure has been passed. Our reserves are now more than \$1,200 million. From now on they are likely to increase, owing to our receiving the dollar equivalent of the pay of the American troops in the sterling area. According to present estimates

of the numbers of American troops who will be drawing their pay in those areas, our reserves may increase by as much as \$600 million in the next year.

This does not mean, however, that we are getting richer. Our liabilities are increasing five or six times as rapidly as our reserves, and we are constantly getting deeper into the pit of net indebtedness. Indeed, I doubt if we can maintain our external financial fabric on its present basis, unless some moderate proportion of our increased liabilities is covered by reserves against them.

All this has been explained in great detail to the American Administration. The late Chancellor of the Exchequer⁶ wrote a long letter to Mr. Morgenthau, rather more than two months ago,⁷ which the latter acknowledged and promised to answer.⁸ No reply has been received. When our Delegation was recently in Washington in connection with the currency and commercial talks,⁹ Lord Keynes and his colleagues submitted a memorandum to the State Department, the Lend-Lease Administration and the American Treasury¹⁰ on our balances and on our liabilities, asking the American Government to recognise that, in view of our growing external liabilities which arose directly from the war, the position of our balances should not be regarded as open to criticism. This view received strong support in some of the American Departments, though not in all. Mr. Stettinius and the State Department are wholly convinced that, in the circumstances, there should be no reduction of Lend-Lease, and that this small mitigation of our growing indebtedness should be allowed to accrue to us. The Lend-Lease Administration (at any rate before they were merged in the new body) were of the same opinion. The U. S. Treasury, on the other hand, has been taking up a sticky line, for reasons which have never been explained to us. They have shown a disinclination to discuss the matter with any of our representatives or to give any reasons.

Some elements in the Administration maintain that Congress was given to understand that Lend-Lease was only to apply to the extent to which the recipient countries were utterly unable to pay for im-

⁶ Sir Kingsley Wood.

⁷ Dated September 3, 1943; not printed herein (023.1/8-1858). See Hall, *North American Supply*, pp. 281 ff.

⁸ Acknowledgment sent September 20, 1943; not printed herein (023.1/8-1858). No further reply has been found, but the Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (White) stated, at a meeting held in the Department of State on January 7, 1944, that a reply had been sent to the effect that the United States Treasury would be at all times willing to confer with British officials about the matter.

⁹ See Notter, pp. 191-193.

¹⁰ Reference may be to a memorandum of September 14, 1943, entitled "The Overseas Assets and Liabilities of the United Kingdom", which was enclosed with a further letter signed by Wood and addressed to Morgenthau in September 1943; not printed herein (023.1/8-1858). No copy received in the Department of State in 1943 has been found.

ports, whether of food or military equipment. In other words, however great our liabilities, we are not entitled to Lend-Lease as long as we have a dollar in the till. This view might have been sustainable in some quarters before Pearl Harbour. But it is, of course, utterly contrary to the principle of the pooling of resources between Allies, and also to the principle that the most convenient supplier shall provide the materials, irrespective of financial liability.

Moreover, it is a doctrine apparently to be applied to us only, for no such suggestion has been made to Russia. Nor, of course, do we apply it in giving reciprocal aid to the Americans or to any other country.¹¹

To resolve the difference of opinion between his own advisers, the President set up, several months ago, an interdepartmental, ministerial Committee, to report to him.¹² Owing to the difference of opinion on this Committee, no report emerged, and sundry meetings of the Committee were adjourned when the time came to call them. This position has gradually become intolerable from our point of view. As the U. S. Treasury takes the line that the existing Presidential directive must be followed until it is superseded, the Lend-Lease Administration is reluctantly and half-heartedly falling in with this by proposing to cut off various items of Lend-Lease, though on nothing like a large enough scale to keep our balances down to the prescribed figure. We have been urging, therefore, on the American Departments concerned that the matter should be brought to a head. During Lord Keynes's recent visit,¹³ the State Department and the Lend-Lease Administration both agreed that this was the right course. Colonel Llewellyn and Sir Ronald Campbell urged Mr. Harry Hopkins to bring it to a head. As a result, the President has instructed Mr. Morgenthau to expedite the Committee's report.

It may be that this report is already in the President's hands. In any case, it is absolutely vital to us that he should make the right decision when it reaches him.

There are several reasons for hoping that he will :—

(1) The force of our case, to anyone who takes the trouble to understand it, is overwhelming.

(2) Russia's gold and dollar reserves are nearly twice ours, and they have no liabilities against them. The Americans are not proposing to tackle the Russians with a similar proposal. We, however, are thought to be easier game.

¹¹ In the margin opposite this paragraph is the handwritten notation, "They say they will pay."

¹² Reference presumably is to the Committee on the Dollar Position of Lend-Lease Countries (established late in 1942), which consisted of Vice President Wallace, Secretary of State Hull, Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, Secretary of War Stimson, and Lend-Lease Administrator Stettinius, or their representatives.

¹³ In September–October 1943.

(3) A change of policy sufficient to keep our balances down to one billion dollars would have to be a very drastic one. The Americans will either have to ask us to meet the pay of their troops throughout the world (at a rate approximately double ours) ; or they will have to cut off Lend-Lease from some major item, such as food. At the very same time that the President has been emphasising the importance of our mutual aid, and when we have only just offered them raw materials, it would be a bit stiff to take either of these measures.

A favourable decision could take various forms. In no circumstances, of course, should we agree, on our side, to allow the amount of this country's reserves to be settled by the Congress of the United States. But that is no reason why the President should not give instructions to his own Departments to the effect that they need not begin to worry about our reserves until they exceed a certain figure.

The most satisfactory revised directive would be one that fixes no limits, but asks that we should keep in consultation with the Administration about liabilities and balances. Failing that, if there is to be a ceiling, it should be raised to something not less than \$2,000 million.

Apart from our post-war liabilities, which, as I have said, are likely to approach five times that amount, our adverse balance of trade in the first two or three years after the war will by itself exceed it. It is about the same amount as the Russian reserves, and they, as I have said, have no corresponding liabilities.

I attach a brief version of our case in a form which may have reached the President.¹⁴ This was prepared by Lord Keynes for Mr. Dean Acheson and Mr. Harry Hopkins, so that they could have something brief in their hands for use at an appropriate opportunity.

I again emphasise that an adverse decision would have the gravest consequences to our financial independence; whilst a favourable decision would remove a constant source of anxiety and friction.

J[OHN] A[NDERSON]

11th NOVEMBER, 1943.

[III]

SECRET

GREAT GEORGE STREET, S. W. 1.

PRIME MINISTER

GOLD AND DOLLAR BALANCES

Thanks to gold from South Africa and pay to American troops in the U. K. and the Empire, our gold and dollar balances have increased to \$1200 million and may rise to \$2000 million by the end of the war. Much of the increase is not really ours at all but represents profits of Empire countries who choose to use us as their banker. Actually our

¹⁴ Possibly the memorandum of October 26, 1943, *supra*.

reserves are far outweighed by our liabilities, especially in India and the Middle East, which are rising about five times as fast as our reserves and may amount to \$10,000 million by the end of the war. Thus our net overseas position is deteriorating rapidly and our reserve when the war ends is likely to be only one fifth of our liabilities.

Certain Americans, ignoring these liabilities, claim that supplies on Lend/Lease should now be reduced and that we should be made to pay with our gold and dollars for goods supplied. Why they should pick on us for such treatment is not clear; it is never suggested that Russia and France with their enormous gold balances should pay for goods supplied to them.

The Lend/Lease administration who, with the State Department, are favourable to us, are reluctantly proposing to cut supplies since the United States Treasury maintain that the President issued a directive limiting British reserves to \$1000 million.

The President has appointed a Committee to examine the matter, whose report may be already in his hands. It is vital to us that he should make the right decision. If our Lease/Lend supplies are cut off and our balances reduced to \$1000 million, it will be almost impossible for us to tide over the difficult post-war period while we are building up our export trade.

CHERWELL

12th NOVEMBER, 1943.

J. C. S. Files

*Report by the Combined Administrative Committee to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON?] 15 December 1943.

C. C. S. 428 (Revised)

IMPLEMENTATIONS OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC
OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 1943-1944

AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF CRITICAL
STRATEGY

THE PROBLEM

1. To examine the available means of the United Nations with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the operations and undertakings indicated in C. C. S. 426/1.²

¹ C. C. S. 428 (not printed herein) was considered and amended at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held on December 7, 1943 (see *ante*, p. 759). The revision of C. C. S. 428 which incorporated the amendments of December 7, 1943, was circulated on December 15, 1943, and is reproduced here.

² *Ante*, p. 810.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The basis of investigation is given in Annex I.³

3. We would emphasize that the purpose of this investigation is to examine whether the operations decided on at SEXTANT are within our resources, and not to imply binding commitments or decisions on the part of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. Military operations shall take precedence over civil relief and rehabilitation of occupied territories.

5. The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter of discussion between governments concerned.

CONCLUSIONS

6. *Ground Forces* (Annex II)

The necessary ground forces for approved operations can be made available. Certain types of service units may be a critical factor but in no case should preclude the operations.

7. *Naval Forces* (Annex III)

So far as can be foreseen, British and United States naval forces adequate to accomplish all approved operations for 1944 will be available. The situation will be tight particularly as to destroyers, escorts and escort carriers in the early part of the year but should be considerably eased by new construction as the year progresses. The defeat of Germany will make available an increase in naval forces for the prosecution of the war in the Pacific.

8. *Air Forces* (Annex IV)

The air resources to meet the operations specified in Annex I will be available with the following exceptions:

a. A deficiency in troop carrier squadrons in the Mediterranean if the detailed plan to be made for ANVIL requires more than a one brigade lift.

b. A possible deficiency of land-based aircraft for certain operations in the Pacific if the war with Germany is not concluded in time to release the additional resources required.

c. A possible deficiency of aircraft for the approved lift into China if diversions are made to supply forces operating in North Burma.

Such support can be given to the resistance groups in Europe as will not interfere with the intensification of the bomber offensive.

9. *Assault Shipping and Landing Craft* (Annex V)

Production of combat loaders, LST's and LCT's still continues to be the bottleneck limiting the scope of operations against the enemy and our ability to carry out operations will continue to be limited by

³ The annexes to this report are not reproduced herein.

this fact. In 1944 there should be sufficient landing craft available to carry out approved operations.

The shortage of landing craft impels the earliest practicable release of assault shipping and craft after assaults to permit proper maintenance of material, rest for personnel and reorientation to other assignments.

10. *Supply of Critical Items* (Annex VI)

In the absence of detailed plans for certain of the approved operations it is impossible to determine exact requirements for supplies and equipment. Certain shortages will exist as indicated in Annex VI. In no case, however, is it considered that shortages will be so serious as to preclude the mounting of approved operations.

11. *Shipping* (Annex VII)⁴

Examination of personnel and cargo shipping position indicates our ability to support approved naval and military operations. In addition it will be noted that provision has been made to execute Operation HERCULES in spring 1944. In the event that this operation is not undertaken, this shipping can be made available for approved operations. While the statement of the shipping position covering the first nine months of 1944 does not include presently indefinable demands or relief requirements except for Italy, there is now no reason to expect any interference with approved military and naval operations. This applies both to personnel shipping as well as to dry cargo resources.

12. *Oil* (Annex VIII)

An examination of the oil position has revealed that the most critical petroleum products are 100 octane aviation gasoline and 80 octane motor gasoline. The situation with respect to 100 octane gasoline continues to improve and the gap between production and consumption will be closed during February 1944. It is believed that the indicated

⁴Discussions of shipping, at the Second Cairo Conference, were conducted largely by Douglas and Leathers. In those discussions it was agreed, among other things, (1) that in the first quarter of 1944, subject to further review, coal should be carried from South Africa and India to Italy by United States shipping; (2) that the movement of coal to the Middle East and North Africa should remain a British responsibility; and (3) that a joint study should be made of certain ships moving in ballast, in connection with the question whether the United States should make up an expected deficit in shipping needed for imports to the United Kingdom. Other shipping problems dealt with at the Conference included the transportation of wheat to Italy and of coal to Latin America, and the provision of shipping to meet the import requirements of the British Dominions. On a number of points, a definite resolution of the problems discussed was not achieved until after the close of the Conference. Documentation of these technical discussions, chiefly in the records of the Maritime Administration and the War Department (messages sent via Army channels) is not printed herein. See, however, Catherine B. A. Behrens, *Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War* (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1955), pp. 380-381, 394-395, 400-401.

shortage of 80 octane motor gasoline will be avoided by using gasolines with lower octane numbers and will be further reduced by continued acceleration of the aviation gasoline plant building program.

In all theaters there continues to exist a shortage of small tankers or small ships suitable for use as such. There appear to be sufficient large oceangoing tankers in existence and coming from new construction to meet requirements for bulk movements of petroleum products.

B. THE COMMUNIQUÉ

White House Files

*Text of the Communiqué*¹

[CAIRO, December 6, 1943.]

COMMUNIQUÉ

Mr. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, M. Ismet Inonu, President of the Turkish Republic[,] and Mr. Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, met in Cairo on December 4th, 5th and 6th, 1943. Mr. Anthony Eden, His Britannic [*Britannic*] Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, M. Numan Menemencioglu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, and Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, took part in their deliberations.

The participation in this conference of the Head of the Turkish State, in response to the cordial invitation addressed to him by the United States, British and Soviet Governments,² bears striking testimony to the strength of the alliance which united [*unites?*] Great Britain and Turkey,³ and to the firm friendship existing between the Turkish Republic, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union.

Presidents Roosevelt and Inonu and Prime Minister Churchill reviewed the general political situation and examined at length the

¹ The text here printed is that of the communiqué printed as Appendix "H" to the Log. This copy was made at Cairo on the basis of the text released there. The text as cabled from Cairo is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, December 11, 1943, p. 412. The latter text shows, in addition to minor variations, the following variations of substance: "Turkish people" (instead of "Turkish Republic"), in the second paragraph; "to" (instead of "towards"), in the fourth paragraph; "the four countries concerned" (instead of "the four countries there represented" in the fifth paragraph; the additional words "great", before "American", and "three" before "powers", in the last sentence; "as also the traditional relations" (instead of "and the traditional relations"), and "interests" (instead of "interest"), also in the last sentence.

² See *ante*, p. 633.

³ For the British-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed at Ankara October 19, 1939, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167.

policy to be followed, taking into account the joint and several interests of the three countries.

The study of all problems in a spirit of understanding and loyalty showed that the closest unity existed between the United States of America, Turkey and Great Britain in their attitude towards the world situation.

The conversations in Cairo have consequently been most useful and most fruitful for the future of the relations between the four countries there represented.

The identity of interest and of views of the American and British democracies, with those of the Soviet Union, and the traditional relations of friendship existing between these powers and Turkey, have been reaffirmed throughout the proceedings of the Cairo conference.

V. POST-CONFERENCE PAPERS

14. POST-CONFERENCE PAPERS

Editorial Note

In the course of compiling the present volume a number of hitherto unpublished documents were found in which important participants in the Cairo and Tehran Conferences made factual statements respecting the proceedings, or portions of the proceedings, at the Conferences themselves. Since these statements supplement the contemporary Conference records, it was felt worthwhile to include them in this volume, although a number of them will doubtless be published in subsequent volumes of *Foreign Relations*.

In addition to the memoirs and other authoritative sources listed in the Introduction of this volume, the reader may wish to consult the following publications containing post-Conference statements made by participants in the Cairo and Tehran Conferences:

Radio address by President Roosevelt on December 24, 1943, Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. X, January 1, 1944, pp. 4-5.

Annual message of the President to Congress, January 11, 1944, *ibid.*, January 15, 1944, vol. X, pp. 76-77; H. Doc. 377, 78th Congress.

Press conferences of President Roosevelt, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, edited by Samuel I. Rosenman:

December 17, 1943—1943 volume, pp. 549-553

May 26, 1944 —1944-1945 volume, p. 137

May 30, 1944 —*ibid.*, p. 142

June 6, 1944 —*ibid.*, pp. 155, 157

Informal remarks of President Roosevelt, *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*:

To the personnel at Camp Amirabad, December 2, 1943—1943 volume, p. 538

To a group of military police at Cairo, December 6, 1943—*ibid.*, p. 540

To the officers and men of the U. S. S. *Iowa*, December 16, 1943—*ibid.*, p. 547

To the Advertising War Council Conference, March 8, 1944—1944-1945 volume, p. 99

To the delegates at Dumbarton Oaks, August 23, 1944—*ibid.*, p. 233

Foreign Secretary Eden's speech in the House of Commons, December 14, 1943, *Parliamentary Debates*, 1943-1944, vol. 395, cols. 1424-1435.

Testimony of George C. Marshall, *Military Situation in the Far East*, part 1, pp. 551-552.

Testimony of Patrick J. Hurley, *ibid.*, part 4, pp. 2833-2835.

Testimony of W. Averell Harriman, *ibid.*, part 5, pp. 3329-3334.

Testimony of Charles E. Bohlen, *The Nomination of Charles E. Bohlen To Be United States Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 83d Congress, 1st session, pp. 26-27, 29, 62-63, 65, 125.

Documents printed in *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 202-205, 332-333, 378-379, 768.

Documents printed in *United States Relations With China*, pp. 488, 491, 499, 557, 558.

Bohlen Collection

*Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union
(Bohlen)*¹

SECRET

[Moscow, December 1943.]

There are given below some incidental remarks which occurred during dinners or luncheons of the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin which were not sufficiently important to include in the regular memoranda or minutes of the conference or were merely briefly mentioned. These are set forth here as of possible general interest.

At the dinner given by Marshal Stalin on November 29² at which Stalin was so industrious in his attacks on the Prime Minister, he told Churchill that there was one thing he was glad of and that was that Mr. Churchill had never been a "liberal". This was said with an expression of great contempt for the word "liberal". It is doubtful if the President heard this statement since he remarked that he felt himself somewhat between the two political views as represented by the Marshal and Mr. Churchill.

During this same dinner the Munich agreement³ was discussed, and the Prime Minister remarked that at the time he had held the same

¹ Bohlen prepared this memorandum from his notes shortly after his return from Tehran to Moscow. Besides the incidental remarks made at the Tehran Conference which are recorded here, an exchange of remarks between Roosevelt and Stalin revealing Stalin's attitude toward religion, as related by Roosevelt, may be found in Mikołajczyk, *The Rape of Poland*, pp. 60-61. For references to sources which state that Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin inconclusively discussed the post-war development and distribution of Middle Eastern oil, see George Kirk, *The Middle East in the War* (a volume of the *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946*, published by the Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952), p. 474.

² *Ante*, p. 552.

³ Agreement signed by France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom on September 29, 1938; *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. II, p. 1014.

views as the Soviet Government as to the stupidity and shame of the Munich agreement. Stalin replied that he personally had never believed that the Czechs meant to fight; that he had sent some Soviet aviation experts to look into the question of the use by the Red Air Force of Czech bases in the event of war; and that they had reported that the Czechs would not fight. He said he knew that this was not in accordance with Mr. Churchill's views. Later on in the discussion, in reply to the Prime Minister's statement that he must admit that after the last war he had done everything in his power to prevent the spread of Bolshevism in Europe and the setting up of Communist regimes, Marshal Stalin said ironically that Mr. Churchill need not have worried quite so much, as they (the Russians) had discovered that it was not so easy to set up Communist regimes.

In one of his toasts to the cooperation of the three countries at his birthday dinner at the British Legation on November 30,⁴ the Prime Minister said that the complexion of the world was changing and that a common meeting ground might be found for the different colors. He remarked in this connection that the complexion of Great Britain was becoming "pinker". Stalin interrupted to state, "That is a sign of health." Mr. Churchill agreed provided the process was not carried so far as to induce congestion.

At the dinner in the British Legation, Stalin referred to both the President and Churchill as his "fighting friends" or "comrades-in-arms", but in the case of Churchill he added the observation, "if it is possible for me to consider Mr. Churchill my friend".

At the political meeting on December 1 when the question of the Polish-Soviet frontier was under discussion,⁵ Marshal Stalin evinced great interest in the maps which had been prepared in the Department of State and particularly the one showing the ethnological composition of eastern Poland.⁶ He came around the table to examine these maps personally and asked Mr. Bohlen who had made up these maps and on the basis of what statistics. Mr. Bohlen told him that they had been drawn up in as objective and scientific a manner as possible on the basis of the best available data. Marshal Stalin replied, after the map had been explained to him, that it looked as though Polish

⁴ See *ante*, p. 584.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 600.

⁶ The maps referred to are presumably the relevant maps prepared in the Department of State in connection with its post-war planning work. One such map, showing the distribution of population in eastern Poland according to mother tongue, is printed in Notter, facing p. 512. Others are filed in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, and the Office of the Geographer, Department of State.

statistics had been used. Mr. Bohlen repeated that the best available statistics had been used, but that since the areas in question had been part of Poland from 1920 to 1939, most available data were of course Polish. Marshal Stalin made a somewhat vague reference to some British statistics on the question but did not pursue the matter further.

At the dinner on December 1⁷ when the declaration on Iran was being put into final form and the Russian and British texts were being compared et cetera, a discussion arose between the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin as to the use of the word Persia. The Prime Minister said that he would prefer to have the word Persia rather than Iran used in the declaration and that he had given orders to the British Foreign Office to have the word Persia used in all British public documents in order to avoid confusion between Iraq and Iran. Marshal Stalin brushed this statement aside with the remark that the name of the country they were in was Iran and no other. The President also insisted on the use of Iran in the declaration and the Prime Minister then said he surrendered. When the time came for signature of the declaration, Stalin insisted that Churchill sign first in order, he said, to avoid any further argument as to the designation of the country that they were in.⁸

During the dinner when the President had made a remark in regard to the shrewdness of Yankee traders, Marshal Stalin replied that there was a Russian saying that "no Jew could earn a living in Yaroslavl because of the shrewdness of the merchants of that city".

Towards the end of the dinner when Marshal Stalin, who was obviously exhausted and for that reason not in the best of humor, was with close attention examining the Russian text of the communiqué⁹ with the Soviet interpreter Mr. Pavlov and Mr. Molotov, the President called Mr. Bohlen over to give him a message to translate to the Marshal.¹⁰ Stalin, hearing an interruption in his ear and without turning to see who it was, said over his shoulder, "For God's sake, allow us to finish this work." Then, when he turned and realized that the interruption had come from the President of the United States, for the first and only time during the Conference he showed embarrassment and turned quickly back to the examination of the communiqué. This remark was not translated to the President.

⁷ For an editorial note regarding the dinner, see *ante*, p. 605.

⁸ For the text of the declaration, see *ante*, p. 646. For the order of signature, see *ante*, p. 649 and *post*, p. 885.

⁹ For the text of the communiqué, see *ante*, p. 639.

¹⁰ Bohlen informed the editors that this message concerned the obtaining of Stalin's autograph.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

SECRET

[CAIRO, December 9 (?), 1943.]¹

509. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Most secret and personal.

1. I gave the paper in my immediately following to Inonu.² They have asked for 4 days in which to consult their Parliament but meanwhile will allow build up to begin and 250 specialists are starting forthwith. On the whole I am hopeful. Vyshinsky liked the layout.

2. . . . I am tidying up with the King of Greece and expect a solution and arrangement in harmony with your feelings.³ Every good wish to you and Harry.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, at 9:48 a. m. on December 9, 1943. The time of origination in Cairo does not appear on the source text.

² Annex A to the minutes of the Churchill-Inönü meeting of December 7, 1943, *ante*, p. 755.

³ See *post*, pp. 844, 850.

740.0011 EW 1939/32275 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, December 9, 1943.

1997. Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu made following statement at press conference of Allied and Turkish correspondents last evening:

"The Cairo conference was one of the most important events in this phase of the war. We returned from [talks?] in [Cairo?] extremely pleased and extremely satisfied with our conversations. We talked about everything there. All aspects of international politics and of the war were passed in review.

You doubtless know that the invitation to this conference was addressed to the Turkish Government by England, United States and USSR¹ who was to have been represented by M. Vichinsky [*Vyshinsky*]. But the latter who was at a distant place could not attend our meetings and did not reach Cairo until this morning. But I can tell you that even without M. Vichinsky [*Vyshinsky*] the Soviets were there.

As you have been able to see from the communiqué our alliance with England has been strengthened by this conference. Our conversations were so intimate and searching that we can likewise say that our relations with the United States and Soviet Union are almost as cordial and strong as those with England.

¹ See Roosevelt's telegram of December 1, 1943, to Steinhardt, *ante*, p. 633.

We studied all aspects of the problems with a frankness which was sometimes brutal but with understanding. We learned a great many things which we did not know. Our friends likewise learned many things of which they were ignorant. We drew closer to them and they drew closer to us for a better mutual understanding of our interests and our possibilities. It is because all our conversations were impregnated with this spirit that we could leave Cairo in an atmosphere of complete cordiality.

I can tell you without going into details that during our conversations we remained on the Axis [apparent omission] of the directives of the peoples party and that our foreign policy remains unchanged."

STEINHARDT

870.01 A. M. G./21 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Bucknell)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 9, 1943—5 p. m.

8552. We again took up the subject matter of the Department's 7742, December 7, 8 p. m.,¹ with Nigel Ronald today. He told us that this was one of the matters which had been discussed at the highest level in North Africa but that the Foreign Office had not yet learned of the decision which had been reached. As soon as they did have this information they would be in a position to reply. Ronald stressed the fact that the Foreign Office was as anxious to settle the matter as was the Department.

BUCKNELL

¹ Not printed herein. It concerned a proposal that the United States participate in the work of the British ATB (Administration of Territories—Balkans) Committee, which had its headquarters at Cairo. See *ante*, p. 777, and *post*, p. 871.

891.00/2078

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, December 9, 1943.

No. 750

Subject: Declaration by the United States, the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom regarding Iran.

SIR: I have the honor to report, for the Department's background information, the circumstances of the drawing up of the joint declara-

tion regarding Iran signed at Tehran on December 1, 1943, by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin, and on the same day declared acceptable by the Iranian Government through its Minister of Foreign Affairs.

During a visit by General Hurley and myself to Prime Minister Soheily and Foreign Minister Saed on November 25, 1943, the Iranian officials spoke of the proposed declaration on Iran¹ which was discussed, but not approved, at the Moscow meeting of foreign secretaries October 19 to 30. (See Mr. George V. Allen's despatch of November 4 from this Legation.² I do not know how the Iranian Government learned of this Moscow proposal but assume they were informed by the British.)

General Hurley informed me that on November 28 he discussed with the President the possibility of securing from the conference of the chiefs of governments a declaration pertaining to the status of Iran. The President had authorized him to see Foreign Ministers Eden and Molotov and endeavor to work something out.

On the morning of November 29, when I called at the Foreign Office regarding another matter, Prime Minister Soheily told me [he] had just seen Mr. Eden and had put forward the request that the conference should issue a joint communiqué regarding Iran, to cover the following points:

1) Allied recognition that Iran had given every possible help in the prosecution of the war.

2) Confirmation of the pledges given in the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of alliance³ with respect to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.

3) Assurance that the economic needs of Iran would be considered when the peace treaty should be negotiated.

M. Soheily said that Mr. Eden had agreed in principle but had requested that he approach the Soviet representatives and the American Minister.

General Hurley saw Mr. Eden on November 30 and advised me that he had reached agreement with the British Foreign Secretary on the desirability of a declaration such as that proposed. The Moscow draft declarations⁴ were considered, and General Hurley suggested that, in addition to the points which they covered, there should be a reaffirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Mr. Eden assented.

¹ See *ante*, pp. 131, 133.

² Not printed herein.

³ Treaty of January 29, 1942; Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. vi, March 21, 1942, p. 249.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 118-119.

It was further agreed that the provision of the Moscow draft calling for support for foreign advisers in Iran should be omitted.

General Hurley advised me that, inasmuch as the Moscow draft had not been approved by the Russians, he and Mr. Eden had agreed it would be appropriate to have the Iranian Prime Minister present his request himself to M. Molotov and endeavor to obtain Soviet consent to the new proposal. Later that same day, the Iranian Foreign Minister told me that Premier Stalin and Foreign Commissar Molotov had expressed their willingness to meet the request for a declaration. However, from information reaching General Hurley, it appeared that Soviet concurrence was not certain, and the following day he requested the President to speak to Marshal Stalin on the matter. General Hurley tells me he was afterwards informed that the President had done so.

December 1 was the last day of the meeting at Tehran, and there was no time for joint discussions among the American [,] Soviet and British representatives with respect to the text of the proposed communiqué. In consultation with General Hurley, this Legation had prepared a tentative draft, which was the first draft to include specific affirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. It was approved by the American delegation to the conference and was submitted to Mr. Eden and M. Molotov late in the afternoon of December 1. With a few minor changes in wording, this draft was accepted by the final plenary session of the conference, held that evening. I understand time was so short that it was not practicable to make three original copies, and that only one was signed, this original remaining in possession of the American delegation. A copy of the final text is enclosed herewith.⁵

I had previously given the Iranian Foreign Minister a copy of the Legation's first draft, which he had discussed with the Prime Minister. I had also informed him that the proposal would be discussed by the chiefs of government on December 1. Accordingly, when the conference session ended at about 11 o'clock in the evening, General Hurley and I took a copy of the final draft to the Foreign Ministry and went over it word by word with M. Saed, explaining the slight changes which had been made in the phraseology. The Foreign Minister called the Prime Minister on the telephone and read him the altered phrases. He then informed us that the revised text was acceptable to the Government of Iran. He initialed a copy which we had brought for that purpose.⁶

⁵ The final text is printed *ante*, p. 646.

⁶ A facsimile of the copy initialed by Soheili was obtained by the Department from Hurley (023.1/6-454).

The Foreign Minister agreed to give no publicity to the Declaration until it should have been released by the three signatory governments. It was explained to him that this would probably be delayed for several days.

In the course of our conversation with M. Saed, General Hurley emphasized that the American representatives had given special support to the proposed declaration, that certain objections had been encountered, but that we had, happily, been able to secure the agreement of the British and Soviets. Since the Foreign Minister also could see for himself that the Legation's draft declaration had been adopted almost in toto by the conference, I think there can be little doubt in his mind that the United States played a large part in the issuance of the declaration.

As the Department will recall, the Soviet delegation at the Moscow Conference resolutely opposed the issuance of any statement regarding policy toward Iran. I was, therefore, surprised at the readiness of Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov to agree to a substantially similar proposal when made at Tehran only a few weeks later. It may well be that the President's personal appeal, coming at the end of a successful conference, was the deciding factor, although I am inclined to think that some general shift in Soviet attitude toward Iran may also have taken place in recent weeks. (As I have previously reported, there are indications that Irano-Soviet relations have attained a more friendly basis.) Contributing or alternative reasons for Soviet acquiescence at Tehran may have been:

- 1) The opposition at Moscow may have originated with subordinates, such as former Ambassador Smirnov, who were not present here and so could not bring their views to the attention of the chiefs.

- 2) At Moscow, the proposal was made by the British and supported by the Americans, no Iranian representatives being present. At Tehran, the proposal came from the Iranians themselves, and the Soviets may have felt that they could not well oppose it without placing themselves in an unfavorable light vis-à-vis the Iranian Government, especially after both the American and British representatives had indicated agreement.

- 3) The Soviet leaders may have thought this a more appropriate occasion to make a gesture toward Iran, since the meeting was taking place on Iranian soil.

Respectfully yours,

LOUIS G. DREYFUS, JR.

Moscow Embassy Records : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

ANKARA, [December 10, 1943.]

Personal and strictly confidential for the Ambassador :

The recent meeting at Cairo was most helpful in drawing Turkey much closer to the Allies; although nothing definite was agreed upon for the time being. I hope the foregoing gives you the present picture.

STEINHARDT

868.01/416 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government-in-Exile in Egypt (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, December 12, 1943—10 a. m.

Greek Series 128. I am reliably informed that during a long session on December 8 with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden the King of Greece steadfastly refused to make a declaration proposed by them to the effect that he will not return to Greece unless and until called for by the Constituent Assembly¹ to the formation of which he agreed in his declaration of July 4.

I saw the President on December 3 and advised him regarding this proposal and after he had seen the King² he desired me not to associate myself with any effort to force him to a course of action against his will. This I have been careful not to do both before and since. I understand that the President told the King that there was no necessity for him to make any declaration whatever unless he so desired.

In this connection the British appear to have been influenced in taking the attitude they did chiefly by a change in military plans regarding operations in Greece and by the anti-British and anti-King propaganda being spread there to the benefit of the Communist leadership. They hoped to kill this propaganda and deprive this leadership of many recruits by making clear now that no possibility exists of the King's being forced on the country. Because of the present and probable future Republican make up of the Greek Government the solution arrived at may be regarded as amounting to much the same thing in effect as the original proposal.

MACVEAGH

¹ See *post*, p. 851.

² See the editorial note, *ante*, p. 740.

893.5151/976 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

URGENT

CHUNGKING, December 14, 1943—8 p. m.

2417. To Secretary of Treasury from Adler. . . .

2. I indicated that the price of United States dollars had become an outstanding issue for all United States Government agencies in China relations and that the working out of a satisfactory arrangement was advisable from point of view of Sino-American relations. Kung replied that "the Generalissimo had said no." When I inquired again into the possibility of the sale of gold, Kung informed me that Chinese Government sales had been quite small, its policy being to buy back a substantial part of what it had sold to keep up price which is now around CN 13,000 per Chinese oz. selling in Chungking.

3. Kung intimated that Generalissimo had discussed exchange rate with President in Cairo but did not inform me of content of discussion.

GAUSS

740.0011-EW/12-1543

*Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen)*¹

[Moscow,] December 15, 1943.

The attitude of the Soviet Government toward each one of the questions listed in the attached document of course deserves detailed and special study. There are three, however, which are of particular interest since they form a pattern of Soviet views concerning post-war Europe. These three are: (1) Soviet opposition to federations; (2) Soviet determination to break up Germany; and (3) the harsh attitude toward France. To this should be added the Soviet preference for strong points or bases in Europe to be held by the three victorious powers as trustees. The most important indication of the Soviet concept of political organization after the war is found in the attitude toward France. The reasons advanced by Stalin for this attitude are not in themselves convincing and the facts in the French situation do not support the harshness of the treatment suggested. The real motive very probably lies elsewhere.

¹ The source text bears no signature or indication of addressee. In a memorandum to the Historical Office, dated June 30, 1959, Bohlen stated that he had prepared the memorandum for the consideration of Harriman (FW 740.0011 EW/12-1543).

While this pattern obviously cannot be regarded as conclusive, it is sufficiently clear to afford a glimpse of the Soviet idea of post-war continental Europe. Germany is to be broken up and kept broken up. The states of eastern, southeastern and central Europe will not be permitted to group themselves into any federations or association. France is to be stripped of her colonies and strategic bases beyond her borders and will not be permitted to maintain any appreciable military establishment. Poland and Italy will remain approximately their present territorial size, but it is doubtful if either will be permitted to maintain any appreciable armed force. The result would be that the Soviet Union would be the only important military and political force on the continent of Europe. The rest of Europe would be reduced to military and political impotence.

There is no attempt here to analyze the motive which may lie behind the Soviet concept of post-war organization of Europe but merely to set forth the facts.

[Attachment]

SECRET

ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL QUESTIONS AS EXPRESSED BY MARSHAL STALIN DURING THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE.

These views have all been recorded in the official records of the Conference and of the conversations which took place, but as they occurred at various times and in various circumstances they are summarized here for convenient reference.

1. *International security after the war.*

No form of international organization by itself will be sufficient to restrain Germany or Japan from recovering and reembarking on a course of aggression. Only if the victorious nations acting perhaps as trustees for some such organization retain in their hands bases and other strong points in the vicinity of those countries and in general the important strategic points of the war, will the world be assured against the recrudescence of German or Japanese militarism. These bases will be held as trustees for the international organization, but they should probably be operated in that capacity by individual nations, particularly the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain. The United States might retain in that fashion bases in the Azores and at Dakar; Great Britain might increase her bases in the Iberian Peninsula and North Africa. (No specific mention was made of bases which might be held by the Soviet Union.)

2. *Treatment of Germany.*

The Soviet Government does not consider that any international organization could prevent the revival of Germany within fifteen or twenty years. Any form of production could be transferred into war industry and supervision could not prevent this process being concealed. Germany should be broken up and kept broken up. The various parts of Germany should not be permitted to group themselves together in any federation either among themselves or in association with other central European states. To do so would provide Germany with the framework for developing another great aggressive state. Strong points (see 1. above) should be held in and in the vicinity of Germany to prevent Germany's "moving a muscle".

3. *France.*

The Soviet Government feels that France should be punished for its criminal association with Germany. De Gaulle represents symbolic France, while the physical France with which he has no connection is cooperating with Nazi Germany. France should be stripped of her colonies and not permitted to retain beyond her borders any strategic points. To permit France to be treated as one of the victorious powers and retain such bases would imperil the future peace of the world. Nine-tenths of the French intelligentsia are corrupt and infected with Nazi ideology. The entire French people must bear a measure of responsibility for the actions of their leaders. France should be reduced to an insignificant military power and become a charming but weak country.

4. *Confederations.*

The Soviet Government is violently opposed to the creation of any federations in eastern, southeastern and central Europe for the reasons set forth at the Moscow Conference.

5. *Poland.*

The Soviet Government considers the Polish Government-in-exile to be agents of Hitler and charges its representatives inside Poland of murdering partisans engaged in fighting the Nazis. Before the Soviet Government would consider reestablishment of relations with the Polish Government-in-exile it must order its agents in Poland to cease fighting the partisans and must utilize its troops and call on the Polish people to fight actively against Nazi Germany. The Soviet Government, provided it is given the northern part of east Prussia including Königsberg and Tilsit, is willing to accept the Curzon Line, thereby returning to Poland those areas primarily inhabited by Poles. Although the city of Lwow is admittedly more than half Poles, it is in the center of a definitely Ukrainian area and could not be returned to Poland for that reason. The Soviet Government is

prepared to help Poland achieve a western frontier along the Oder River.

6. *Finland.*

Although dubious of the result, the Soviet Government is willing to have Finnish negotiators come to Moscow to discuss peace. The Soviet conditions are:

(1) The restoration of the treaty of March 1940 and the reestablishment of the frontiers set forth in that treaty.

(a) The Soviet Government would, however, be willing to release the base at Hango in return for Petsamo, the latter town to pass into the permanent possession of the Soviet Union.

(2) The Finnish army to be demobilized to peacetime strength.

(3) Finland to make reparations in kind for fifty percent of the physical damage done to the Soviet Union because of Finnish participation in the war against the Soviet Union; these reparations in kind to be paid over a period of from five to eight years and if Finland should default the Red Army will occupy certain areas of Finland.

(4) Finland to break off all association with Germany and expel the German forces from her territory.

If peace is established on these terms, the Soviet Government has no intention of subjugating all Finland and transforming it into a province of the Soviet Union.

7. *The British Empire.*

Because of British military contribution, the Soviet Government considers that there should be no reduction in the British Empire, but on the contrary it should if necessary be increased by turning over to Great Britain on the basis of trusteeship certain bases and strong points throughout the world.

8. *The Dardanelles.*

The Soviet Government would like to see the Montreux Convention in regard to the straits replaced by a regime affording freer navigation to merchant and naval vessels both in war and in peace. This question was not pursued in any detail.

Roosevelt Papers

President Roosevelt to the British Minister of Information (Bracken)

[WASHINGTON,] December 18, 1943.

DEAR BRENDAN: Since my return to Washington, I have received a more complete report of the confusions over publicity which arose at Cairo and Teheran.

Whatever the causes, I am greatly disturbed at the results. Not only did the newspapers, news services, and broadcasters of the United States suffer a heavy penalty because they kept confidence and observed the designated release dates, but non-observance elsewhere has engendered bitter reproaches and many charges of bad faith. Such a condition is distinctly damaging to that unity of purpose and action which the conferences at Cairo and Teheran were designed to promote.

I am resolved that we will not risk a repetition. Consequently, I have decided that hereafter no news having a security value will be issued by the Government for future release, but that all such news will be given out instead at the earliest moment consistent with safety, for immediate publication and broadcast. I have issued instructions to that effect to the various departments and agencies.¹

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

¹ In his reply, dated March 6, 1944, Bracken did not mention the incidents at Cairo and Tehran, but he expressed his entire agreement with Roosevelt's decision regarding the future handling of press releases (Roosevelt Papers).

Roosevelt Papers

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*¹

Translation

Personal and Secret Message to President Roosevelt From Premier Stalin

I thank you for Your letter which Your Ambassador has extended to me on December 18th.²

I am glad that fate has given me an opportunity to render you a service in Teheran. I also attach important significance to our meeting and to the conversations taken place there which concerned such substantial questions of accelerating of our common victory and establishment of future lasting peace between the peoples.³

DECEMBER 20, 1943.

¹ Sent via the Soviet Embassy, Washington.

² The letter from Roosevelt dated December 3, 1943, *ante*, p. 785.

³ For a further reference, in the post-Conference Roosevelt-Stalin correspondence, to the cooperative spirit which prevailed at Tehran, see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 119.

868.01/427

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1943.

DEAR CORDELL: Here is a memo which Eden handed me in confidence in Cairo, which apparently was prepared for Eden by some of his associates prior to his talk with the King of Greece.

Mr. Eden told me that he followed this line of argument with the King and I gather he made it pretty strong.¹

Cordially yours,

HARRY L. HOPKINS

[Attachment]

The British Embassy Accredited to the Greek Government-in-Exile in Egypt to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden)

[CAIRO, November 25, 1943.]

MAIN TALKING POINTS WITH THE KING OF THE HELLENES

1. Refer again to your previous conversation when you told the King that the strategical situation had changed and that it was most [un]likely that any but quite inconsiderable British forces would be sent to Greece when the Germans evacuate.

2. Point out that at the time when we thought a considerable British army would go to Greece to drive the Germans out, we strongly supported your desire to enter Greece with the British and Greek forces. Under the changed conditions such British forces as might go to Greece would be mainly concerned in ensuring law and order and in assisting in the distribution of relief supplies.

3. It would be essential for the Greek Government to function at the earliest possible date in close association with the British and in an atmosphere as far removed as possible from political controversy. This Government would have to be mainly composed of leading personalities who have lived in Greece during the period of the occupation.

4. During the whole period of the German occupation acute controversy has continued and grown increasingly strong on the subject of the King's return before the will of the people has been expressed. The immediate return of the King in the teeth of this opposition would inevitably raise this controversy to fever point, and it would be impossible for the King himself to remain outside political dissension. He would find himself confronted with a situation even more acute

¹ Regarding a conversation of Churchill and Eden with the King of Greece, see *ante*, pp. 839, 844.

than that which led to the Metaxas Dictatorship, and would therefore start under every disadvantage, which would make it impossible for him to return in the role which he and we desire for him—that of a constitutional monarch.

5. The immediate confusion that will result from the difficult social and economic conditions caused by the occupation will make it essential for the Government [to] be in the hands of a leading personality, who has made his mark through his bold resistance to the Germans within the country. He will have to form an emergency Committee prepared to act firmly and to put down disorder. The first administration to be formed will be of a temporary character to tide over the period until normal conditions can be established and elections held. It would be an undesirable situation for the King, when he first returned to Greece, to be associated directly with an administration bound to become unpopular and unable to accord all those freedoms associated with a constitutional monarchy.

6. In these circumstances, the King should consider the choice of the most suitable personality to head a Regency Committee in Athens the moment the Germans evacuate. Archbishop Damaskinos is prepared to undertake this responsibility, but must know in advance that he can announce to the Greek people, as soon as the Germans quit Athens, that he has the legal authority of the King for so doing.

7. There is therefore every advantage for the King, in his own interests as well as those of his country, to make it clear now to his people that he does not intend to return to Greece until such conditions have been established as will allow him to function as a constitutional monarch. He has no desire to return to Greece unless he can so function, but he also has no desire to return unless he is convinced by a clear expression of the people's will that the system of constitutional monarchy is desired by them.

8. An immediate declaration to this effect would rally moderate opinion against any attempt made by a small section, who seek to impose their will by force as soon as the Germans leave Athens. This section have made capital out of the failure of the King so far to make such a declaration.

9. There is reason to believe that if Zervas knew that such a declaration would be made by the King, he would immediately ask that his irregular forces should be incorporated in the Greek regular Army. If this were immediately granted by the King it would act as a magnet to draw large numbers of the officers and men in the ELAS forces to break away from purely sectional political control and make a similar request for incorporation on the same terms as those accorded to Zervas. This would bring the Greek Government in Cairo into close

association with the resistance movements inside Greece, and would thereby enormously enhance the authority and prestige of the King and his Government, which would then be reformed to include personalities from Greece and would consequently provide a Government of which Archbishop Damaskinos could avail himself when he set up his Regency Committee in Athens.

BRITISH EMBASSY TO GREECE,
CAIRO.

25th November, 1943

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 20 December 1943.

Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.

At the Teheran Conference you and the Prime Minister agreed that the Italian ships requested by the Soviets should be delivered on one February.² Request that I be informed of the action taken to carry out this commitment as I shall undoubtedly be queried by Molotov at a meeting with him scheduled for Friday or Saturday³ to discuss unfinished business of Teheran.

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² See *ante*, p. 597.

³ December 24 or 25.

Roosevelt Papers

*The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 21 December 1943.

PRIORITY

For Ambassador Harriman from the President. Repeated to Prime Minister

Referring to your message [ALUSNA Moscow 201719 December²] it is my intention that Italian surrendered ships to a number of one-third of the total be allocated to the Soviet war effort as rapidly as they can be made available from their present employment in the Allied war effort commencing about February first.

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² *Supra*.

Title of ownership to be decided after the surrender of our common enemies.

I have requested combined Chiefs of Staff to issue necessary orders to General Eisenhower.

ROOSEVELT

841d.01/228 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 22, 1943—4 p. m.

8893. Personal and secret to the Secretary.

Your 8004, December 18, Department's 7184, November 13,¹ was held by the Embassy until my return and because of the absence of both Eden and the Prime Minister. I explained the British position on this issue to the President in Cairo,² having taken the matter up at great length with the Prime Minister on my journey out there with him.³ I understood the President would talk with the Prime Minister on this subject but do not know the results of their discussion.

.

WINANT

¹ Neither printed herein. The subject of these telegrams was the desire of the United States for British concurrence in a proposed request to Ireland for the use of naval and air facilities if needed during the war. According to Hull (vol. II, p. 1357), the British reaction was unfavorable to the American proposal.

² According to the Log, *ante*, pp. 298, 299, 656, Winant conferred with Roosevelt at Cairo on November 25, November 26, and December 3, 1943.

³ See Winant's telegram of November 8, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 73.

890E.00/340

The Diplomatic Agent in Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

241.

BEIRUT, December 22, 1943.

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I should, I believe, add the following report regarding my brief conversation in Cairo with the President:

Summoned by telephone message from Mr. Kirk, I arrived in Cairo the evening of December 2 and was received by the President the following afternoon. In reply to questions, I gave a brief review of the Lebanese crisis; then presented President Khouri's letter.¹

¹ Not printed herein. The letter notified Roosevelt of al-Khouri's election.

I explained that I had brought the letter personally in the thought that, should it be thought appropriate that personal reply be made from Cairo, an expression of satisfaction at the outcome of the crisis might be added to the usual formal acknowledgment and good wishes.

The President appeared to welcome this suggestion and asked that a reply in the suggested sense be drafted for his signature. He asked that it include mention of the fact that, had time and duties permitted, he would have desired personally to visit Lebanon. I was, too, to convey to President Khouri, but not to include in the letter, Mr. Roosevelt's keen personal interest in reforestation, a subject which possesses particular historical as well as current interest to Lebanon.

The latter message has been delivered. It was received with evidently sincere interest and appreciation.

The aspect of the Lebanese crisis in which President Roosevelt seemed to take special interest was as to whether General de Gaulle was personally responsible for the dictatorial action taken by Monsieur Helleu in suspending the Lebanese Constitution, proroguing Parliament and imprisoning President and ministers.

I could only answer that rumour and report in Beirut, which I tended to credit, had it that Helleu had acted under de Gaulle's general instructions and that de Gaulle had later approved Helleu's action in the matter. General Catroux, I added, had been categorical in insisting that, in his opinion, Helleu had misinterpreted and exceeded them.

.
GEORGE WADSWORTH

740.00119 EW 1939/2036

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1943.

AIDE MÉMOIRE

The Tehran Conference considered the question of a joint declaration to the German people on the basis of unconditional surrender. Marshal Stalin informed President Roosevelt on November 29th that he thought this would be bad tactics vis-à-vis of Germany and sug-

¹ The statements made in the first paragraph of this document were communicated by Hull to Roosevelt in a memorandum of December 22, 1943 (not printed herein.).

gested instead that the Allied Governments concerned should work out terms together and make them generally known to the German people.²

Mr. Eden suggests that this matter should be dealt with as soon as possible by the European Advisory Commission. He hopes that, if the United States Government agree, they will send appropriate instructions in this sense to their representative on the Commission.

² According to the Bohlen minutes, the subject of unconditional surrender came up at the dinner meeting of November 28, 1943 (at which Churchill and Stalin continued to discuss Germany after Roosevelt had retired); see *ante*, p. 513. For the British record, indicating that the subject came up on November 29, 1943, see *post*, p. 863.

740.00119 EW 1939/20574

*The President to the Secretary of State*¹

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

This² I think should be taken up by Winant with Prime Minister Churchill as soon as the latter gets back. It was not brought up in any way at Teheran in my presence.

F. D. R.

¹ A paraphrase of this memorandum was cabled by Hull to Winant on December 24, 1943.

² The matter referred to in the preceding document.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Generalissimo Chiang to President Roosevelt*¹

CHUNGKING, 23 December 1943.

SECRET

PRIORITY

955. I have received your telegram of December 21st.² Since our meeting at Cairo, I have been even more keenly aware of your friendly assistance to and deep concern for China, and have therefore accepted your suggestion of delaying our all-out offensive in Burma until we can have a large scale amphibious operation as outlined in your telegram of December 7th.³ As regards the general strategy decided by the British-American council of Chiefs of Staff to use all available resources to defeat Germany first, I was not present during the

¹ Sent via Army channels, "eyes only", from Hearn to Marshall for relay to Roosevelt.

² Summarized in *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 79-80.

³ Sent from Cairo December 5, 1943; *ante*, p. 803.

deliberations and was therefore not in position to express my views. I place the greatest confidence in the soundness of your judgment. I must however say quite frankly that judging by the latest military dispositions and activities the Allied strategy of relegating the China War Theater to the background has given rise to serious misgivings on all sides. The success or failure of the Burma campaign is a matter of life and death for China. You will recall that while at Cairo ⁴ I emphasized the fact that to dispatch our Yunnan troops to begin operations in south Burma to outflank the enemy is to court disaster—a plan of campaign to which I am unable to agree. . . .

⁴ See *ante*, p. 338.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 23 December 1943.

(Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.)

Referring to your cable to me USNAVCOM 211720 of December,² I beg respectfully to mention that the request Stalin made to you and the Prime Minister at Teheran was for the fulfillment of the Soviet request for a specific number of Italian ships, namely one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers and four submarines for dispatch to North Russia and 40,000 tons displacement of mer[chant] shipping for use in the Black Sea.

After some discussion both you and the Prime Minister agreed that the Soviet request should be approved and that the delivery of the ships was to be made by the 1st of February. No mention was made at Moscow or Teheran of their getting additional ships up to one-third of those captured.

I believe Stalin expects all the ships he requested will be turned over to the Soviet Government's control by February first.

If for any reason it is not now advisable to meet this commitment on time I recommend that the facts be given to the British Minister³ and myself in Moscow as promptly as possible with instructions that we go directly to Stalin to explain to him the situation in full. Under this method of handling I have no doubt that Stalin will be reasonable

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. The copy of the message as relayed to Roosevelt at Hyde Park via Army channels bears the handwritten notation "Leahy to prepare reply. FDR"

² Dated December 21, 1943, *ante*, p. 852.

³ Presumably John Balfour, Counsellor of the British Embassy at Moscow with the local rank of Minister.

and cooperative. On the other hand if the commitment cannot be carried out and we wait for him to bring pressure on us to carry out our earliest commitment resulting from Teheran I am afraid that suspicion might be aroused in his mind or in the minds of his associates who were not present as to the firmness of the other commitments taken at Teheran.

I interpret your cable as being for my information and if queried by Molotov will simply advise him that you are giving active consideration to the matter.

Hopkins Papers

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to President Roosevelt*¹

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1943.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, Mr. Eden has asked me to let you know that the question of Italian ships for the Russians, which was dealt with in your telegram No. 422 of December 21st to the Prime Minister,² has been considered in London in the light of the telegram which you sent to Mr. Harriman.

There is a further point on which there appears to be some uncertainty in London. According to our record of what was said at Tehran, it seems to have been agreed there between yourself and the Prime Minister to assign "a battleship and a cruiser" for Soviet use "about the end of January", the title of ownership to be decided upon after the surrender of Germany. The suggestion mentioned in your telegram to Mr. Harriman of handing over to the Russians a third of surrendered Italian ships appears to be a different one. (The request which the Soviet Government made at the Moscow Conference was for one battleship, one cruiser, 8 destroyers, 4 submarines and 40,000 tons of merchant shipping.)

Eden has not specifically asked me to put to you the point contained in this last paragraph, but he has put it to our Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, who may therefore be speaking to Harriman about it.

Believe me, Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

HALIFAX

¹ On January 4, 1944, Roosevelt sent this note to Hopkins with a memorandum reading "Does this need an answer?" An endorsement of February 11, 1944, reads "No ans[wer] necessary—file per HLH".

² No. 422 was the repetition to Churchill of Roosevelt's telegram to Harriman, *ante*, p. 852.

740.0011 EW 1939/12-2443

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Chief, Division of
Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)*

MOST SECRET

ANKARA, December 24, 1943.

DEAR PAUL: The minutes of the various Anglo-American-Turkish meetings in Cairo having now been approved by the British, I enclose a set ¹ for your information and for the records of the Department. In so doing, I should make it clear that these minutes have not been shown to the Turks or the Russians and accordingly are in no sense binding on either of them. They merely reflect the composite belief of the British and ourselves as to what was said. They are, in my opinion, full and complete, subject always to the misunderstandings—great or small—that inevitably arise when the conversations are carried on in three languages, English, French and Turkish, with only two or three individuals present who speak all three languages fluently.

Subject to the foregoing qualification, but taken as a whole, I think they clearly reflect in detail the views expressed at the Conference. One point will puzzle you which George ² has probably already cleared up. That is the status of the Russians at the Conference. Vinogradov's instructions were delayed in transmission and he had not received them at the time we left Ankara. Hugessen and I persuaded him to go along "as President Inonu's guest". On his arrival in Cairo his instructions to go to Cairo caught up with him but they failed to authorize him to participate in the Conference specifically stating that Vishinsky would represent the Russian Government. As George has doubtless explained to you, Vishinsky's arrival in Cairo was delayed until some hours after the Conference had closed and about twelve hours after President Roosevelt and Hopkins had departed. Vishinsky telephoned me at midnight an hour or two after his arrival in Cairo and in the course of our ensuing talk convinced me—beyond a doubt—that his delay had been in no sense intentional but had resulted from his instructions arriving in Algiers a few hours after he had left there for Naples and when they finally caught up with him he left immediately for Cairo but the delay of two days prevented him from arriving there in time.

After I outlined to him what had taken place at the Conference, he seemed quite satisfied with the outcome—and what impressed me more than anything else—clearly indicated that he had not expected any commitment by the Turks to enter the war by December 31st and

¹ These are the minutes printed *ante*, pp. 690, 711, 726, 740, 751.

² George V. Allen.

would not be surprised at their unwillingness to commit themselves irrevocably on February 15th. I gained the impression after my talk with him that the Russians will be satisfied if the Turks enter the war at such time in the spring as may fit in with the overall Allied plans.

As you know, we returned to Ankara the next morning. I understand that Vishinsky had a long talk with Eden after our departure in the course of which Eden outlined the position to him. I have no knowledge as to the outcome of the talk between Vishinsky and Eden after my departure from Cairo³ but Vinogradov tells me that he has received no instructions to make any representations to the Turkish Government and so I am inclined to the view that the Russians are permitting the British to take the lead in dealing with the Turks from now on subject only to the political discussions concerning the Balkans in general and the position to be taken by Russia vis-à-vis Bulgaria should the latter declare war on Turkey, aid the Germans or permit the passage of German troops through Bulgaria.

The enclosed minutes are copy No. 8. By agreement with the British only ten copies exist of which they hold six and we hold four, each of us to assume responsibility for the utmost secrecy in respect of the copies in our possession.

With every good wish [etc.]

LAURENCE A. STEINHARDT

³ Churchill had informed Roosevelt by a telegram of December 9, 1943, that Vyshinsky had approved of the arrangements with the Turks; *ante*, p. 839.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 27 December [1943].

Unnumbered. Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.

At a meeting with Molotov last night he gave me a memorandum in reply to the memorandum you handed Stalin at Teheran² asking for action on the proposals presented by the United States Delegation at the Moscow conference concerning use of air bases for shuttle bombing, communications, etc, paraphrase of which follows:

"There is no objection in principle, as was indicated previously from the Soviet side, to the granting of air bases in the territory of

¹ Sent via Army channels.

² Roosevelt's memorandum of November 29, 1943, *ante*, p. 617.

the USSR for American military airplanes for the purpose of carrying out the shuttle bombing of Germany. The organization of such bases, however, and the use of the appropriate airdromes for this purpose must be coordinated with the plans of the Command of the military Air Force of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Air Force Command will be instructed for this purpose to begin preliminary conversations on the above question with the appropriate military representatives in Moscow with the subsequent consideration of this question by the Soviet High Command. It goes without saying that there will be made available, after a definite decision of the question concerning the organization of air bases from the Russian side, all necessary information concerning weather related to the operation of shuttle bombing.

With regard to the establishment of air communications between the USSR and the United States along the Moscow-Teheran-Washington route, there is no objection from the Soviet side to the renewal of conversations on this question between representatives of the Chief Administration of the Civil Air Fleet of the USSR and the corresponding American representatives at Moscow for the conclusion of an agreement on a reciprocal basis. December 25, 1943".

Molotov also gave me a preliminary reply to the two other memoranda you handed Marshal Stalin at Teheran concerning advance planning in the North West Pacific for Naval operations and for air operations.³ Reading from a paper he made the following statement orally which he preferred not to give me in writing:

"Under point A of the President's memorandum concerning Naval operations in the Pacific the Soviet Government is prepared to utilize existing facilities to obtain intelligence information concerning Japan and to make such information available to the United States authorities through the United States Military Mission in Moscow.

With reference to weather information referred to in the President's memorandum concerning air operations in the Pacific the Soviet Government agrees to furnish the necessary supplementary information concerning the weather in the Far East. Instructions to this effect will be relayed to the Soviet Meteorological Services and information will be exchanged through the United States Military Mission in Moscow or through such other channels as the American Government may prefer. This exchange of information is to be on a reciprocal basis.

[In] Regard to the other questions contained in the President's memoranda, certain of these questions, because of their importance and complexity require more time for study by the Soviet Government. Others for reasons which the American Government will understand it is difficult for the Soviet Government to give affirmative answers to at the present time."

In making this statement Mr. Molotov said he desired to emphasize the words "at the present time".

³ *Ante*, pp. 618-619.

I thereupon said I knew you would be glad to learn that the Soviet Government was ready to begin cooperation in regard to the Pacific war. I pointed out, however, that Marshal Stalin had indicated to you at Teheran that it was of equal importance to the Soviet Union as to the United States to bring the war against Japan to a successful conclusion at the earliest date.⁴ Molotov interrupted me to say that Stalin had made this quite clear.

I explained further in considerable detail the need for immediate planning in order to make possible the achievement of Stalin's objectives.

Molotov appeared to accept the validity of my statement and indicated that the subject was being actively studied.

Marshal Stalin, however, had just gone to the front and I do not expect to get any further reply for some days.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 489.

893.51/7725

*Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State*¹

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1943.

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The indications are that the Chinese Government has applied to this Government for a loan of \$1,000,000,000, and this memorandum will be posited on an assumption that such is the fact.

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There are indications that the subject of this loan was broached by Chiang at the Cairo Conference.² There have been heard rumors to the effect that Chiang was given encouragement to believe that the requests by China for such a loan would meet with favorable response. There are indications, also, that Chiang strongly urged that a campaign for the reopening of the Burma Road be embarked upon at once; and rumors have been heard and have been seen in print to the effect that Chiang was told that this could not be done. Whatever the facts may be so far as the Cairo Conference is concerned, China's desire for a loan has apparently been formally expressed and operations for the reopening of the Burma Road have not been embarked upon.

¹ This memorandum bears no title, addressee, or signature. There are indications that it was prepared in the office of Stanley K. Hornbeck, then Adviser on Political Relations (memorandum of conversation with Hornbeck, 893.10/2-559).

² Roosevelt told Stilwell and Davies at Cairo on December 6, 1943, that Chiang had asked for a loan of one billion dollars; see Stilwell, p. 251. The Davies notes on this conversation contain the same assertion by Roosevelt.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*¹

SECRET

Moscow, 30 December 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Your 291729.² The minutes prepared by Bohlen relating to the question of the Italian ships will be found beginning with the 2nd paragraph of the minutes of the 6 pm meeting 1 December. These minutes are as follows [Here follow paragraphs two through twelve of the Bohlen minutes, *ante*, p. 596.] I have compared Bohlen's notes with those of Major Birse now in Moscow who acted as interpreter for the Prime Minister and they agree on all points of substance. Major Birse has some more detail in regard to the Prime Minister's explanation as to why the delay of a couple of months was necessary and the desire of Great Britain to help in the reconditioning of Soviet ships when the Dardanelles was open. Both Bohlen and Birse recall the Prime Minister asking Eden during the discussion how many war vessels were covered by the Soviet request and Eden replied "1 battleship, 1 cruiser and 8 destroyers and 4 submarines". This is the number which the Soviet Government asked for at the Moscow Conference. My recollection is quite clear[ly] confirmed by both Bohlen and Birse that the number of ships under discussion at the meeting recorded above was that requested at the Moscow Conference and no mention was made of $\frac{1}{3}$ of the Italian Fleet being turned over to the Soviet Union, nor do we know of any discussion about Italian ships at any other time during the Teheran Conference.

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² The telegram of December 29, 1943, under reference (which is in the Roosevelt Papers) asked for the pertinent passages of Bohlen's minutes regarding the Tehran agreement on turning over Italian ships to the Soviet Union.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 2 January 1944.

530. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

Hull tells Eden that you have no recollection of any remarks by UJ about unconditional surrender.² I certainly heard, with great interest,

¹ Presumably sent via military channels.

² See *ante*, p. 855.

him saying something to the effect that he thought it might be well to consider telling the Germans at some stage what unconditional surrender would involve, or perhaps what it would not involve. After that we began talking about the 50,000 and your compromise and my high falutin, and I finished up by no means certain that the Germans would be reassured if they were told what he had in mind.³

Find also Anthony telegraphed to the Foreign Office on November 30 as follows:

"Last night (November 29th) Marshal Stalin spoke to the President about unconditional surrender. Marshal Stalin said he considered this bad tactics vis-à-vis Germany and his suggestion was that we should together work out terms and let them be made known generally to the people of Germany".

Perhaps this may give you a cue to what Anthony and I had in our memories and you may feel inclined to join with us in asking UJ whether he would care to develop his theme to us. If however, you prefer we can of course leave things where they are for the time being.

³ Churchill's reference is to the discussion at the dinner meeting on November 29, 1943; see *ante*, p. 554.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 3 January 1944.

To the President from Winant.

After reading the Prime Minister's number 530 to you, I wanted you to know that a message from Mister Hull instructed me to take up the question of what was said in relation to unconditional surrender at Teheran with the Prime Minister on his return to London². . . I hope the Prime Minister's query to you was in a form acceptable to you. Eden meant it to be so and the Prime Minister followed his suggestion in his cable to you. Eden thought that the subject had come up at a luncheon conversation at the Russian Embassy. There has been no further word from Stalin.

¹ Presumably sent via military channels.

² See *ante*, p. 855.

851g.01/44

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

[WASHINGTON,] January 3, 1944.

Subject: Status of Indochina After the War

Participants: Secretary of State Hull and the British Ambassador,
Lord Halifax

The British Ambassador called at his request and remarked that information had come to him from his Foreign Office that in a conversation with the Turks, Egyptians, and perhaps others, during his recent trip to the Near East, the President spoke rather definitely about what purported to be his views to the effect that Indochina should be taken away from the French and put under an international trusteeship, et cetera. . . .

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

893.00/15257

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Stevens) to the
Ambassador in China (Gauss)*

CONFIDENTIAL

CHENG TU, January 5, 1944.

No. 12

SIR: I have the honor to report that on January 4, 1944 I called by appointment on General Chang Chun, Chairman of the Szechwan Provincial Government, who received me at his private residence south of the West China University campus. . . .

. . . I inquired whether the Chinese Government had any plans for sending Japanese-trained administrators to Japan to assist in restoring order. He assured me that this question had been fully discussed and settled at the Cairo Conference¹ and that the Generalissimo had informed him recently that the conferees had agreed that as soon as Japan's military power had been broken the Japanese in Japan proper would be permitted to work out their own destiny without outside direction. . . .

¹ See *ante*, p. 323.

740.0011 EW 1939/32572: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, January 6, 1944.

43, January 6, 4 p. m. Personal and secret for the President and the Secretary from Harriman:

Molotov¹ continued that Marshal Stalin at Tehran had outlined the terms which the Soviet Government were prepared to accord Finland and, as he recalled it, the President and Mr. Churchill had expressed no objection to these terms.²

HARRIMAN

¹ In the course of a conversation with Harriman on December 31, 1943.

² See *ante*, p. 592.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 7 January 1944.

No. 536. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret.

Bedell Smith and Devers came through here morning of 5th. Bedell told me that he and Montgomery are convinced that it is better to put in a much heavier and broader OVERLORD than to expand ANVIL above our pre-Teheran conception and that he is putting this to Eisenhower and your Chiefs of Staff. . . .

It also seems to me from what I heard very probable that the Y Moon (see my immediately following)² will be at the earliest practicable date. I do not see why we should resist this if the Commanders feel they have a better chance then. At Teheran, however, C. O. S. recommendation was Y1 or one day earlier which you and I agreed to express more agreeably as "During May".³ In conversation with U. J. we never mentioned such a date as May 5th or May 8th but always spoke to him around 20th.⁴ Neither did we at any time dwell upon the exact phase of the operation which should fall on any particular

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² Telegram 537 reads: ". . . Y date is June 2d."

³ See *ante*, p. 564.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 547.

day. If now the Y date is accepted as final I do not feel that we shall in any way have broken faith with him. The operation will anyhow begin in May with feints and softening bombardments and I do not think U. J. is the kind of man to be unreasonable over 48 hours.⁵

⁵ Further references of 1944 by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin to the Tehran agreement on the invasion of Europe will be found in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, pp. 138, 145.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 8 January 1944.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Personal and secret, Number 437. For the Former Naval Person from the President.

As I told you in my 422,² Harriman requested information on the action we were taking to carry out our commitments to turn over Italian ships to the Soviet by 1 February so that he could discuss the matter with Molotov if he were queried. I told him it was my intention to allocate one-third of the captured Italian ships to the Soviet war effort beginning 1 February as rapidly as they could be made available.

Harriman then reminded me that Stalin's request at Teheran was a reiteration of the Soviet request originally made at Moscow in October (namely for one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers and four submarines for North Russia and 40,000 tons displacement of merchant shipping for the Black Sea) and that no mention was made at Moscow or Teheran of the Russians' getting additional ships up to one-third of those captured. Accordingly Harriman regarded my cable of December 21 as being for his information and he has not discussed the question of one-third with Molotov.

Harriman also emphasized the very great importance of fulfilling our pledge to yield these ships. For us to fail or to delay would in his opinion only arouse suspicion in Stalin and in his associates as to the firmness of other commitments made at Teheran.³

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² No. 422 was the repetition to Churchill of Roosevelt's telegram of December 21, 1943, to Harriman, *ante*, p. 852.

³ The remainder of this message dealt with the implementation of the Tehran agreement on the transfer of Italian ships to the Soviet Union.

Roosevelt Papers

*The President to the President's Personal Representative (Hurley),
Temporarily in Iran*

PERSONAL AND SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 10, 1944.

DEAR PAT: I am given to understand by the State Department that the Foreign Minister of Iran is very much perturbed about the stories the American press and radio have carried about a reported plot to assassinate the various Heads of State during the conferences at Teheran in December.¹

I wish you would explain to the Foreign Minister that there was never any question of suspicion about any Iranian, but that the report of threatened violence involved German agents who were believed to have entered Iran without authority. As you know, my move from the American Legation was made primarily in order not to expose any of the conferees to the risk of attack by Axis agents while coming to visit me. I hope that you can put at rest any misunderstanding about the incident. I do not wish to make any further statement to the American press about it as such action would only increase general attention to the matter.

I hope that you may be making fine progress in your work.

With all good wishes [etc.]

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

¹ See *ante*, p. 476. Roosevelt had mentioned the plot at his press conference on December 17, 1943; *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 1943 volume, pp. 551-552.

Roosevelt Papers

The Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

I wish to refer to telegram no. 9050 of December 29 from Ambassador Winant which reads in part as follows:

"The Department will be familiar with the Soviet accusations against the Polish resistance groups in Poland which were lodged at Teheran ¹ to the effect that these resistance groups were actually cooperating with the Germans in that they were fighting the so-called partisans which were really Russians dropped by parachute."

It would be helpful to me and to the senior members of the Department who are handling Soviet-Polish matters if the pertinent sections

¹ See *ante*, p. 599.

of the report on the Tehran Conference with regard to the aforementioned Soviet accusations might be made available to the Department.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

Roosevelt Papers

*Minutes of a Meeting of the Pacific War Council*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 12, 1944.

MEMORANDUM

The thirty-sixth meeting of the Pacific War Council was held in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, the White House, Washington, D. C., at 12:30 p. m., on Wednesday, January 12, 1944.

Present:

The President.

The Netherlands Ambassador, Dr. A. Loudon.

The Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Wei Tao-ming.

The Canadian Ambassador, Hon. Leighton McCarthy.

Vice President Sergio Osmena, representing Hon. Manuel Quezon, President of the Philippine Commonwealth.

The New Zealand Minister, Dr. Walter Nash.

The Australian Minister, Sir Owen Dixon.

Sir Ronald Campbell, E. E. and M. P., representing Viscount Halifax, the British Ambassador.

. . . President Roosevelt informed the Council that his discussions with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and with Marshal Stalin were highly satisfactory—in that both had agreed that Japan should be stripped of her island possessions² and that the civil control of the islands north of the equator should be taken over by the United Nations,³ while the policing of the Western Pacific and, therefore, the necessary air and naval bases should be taken over by those powers

¹ The Pacific War Council consisted of representatives of those signatories of the Declaration by United Nations which were fighting in the Pacific. It met from time to time at Washington under Roosevelt as chairman.

² For the Cairo Declaration, December 1, 1943, in which Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek stated that it was "their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914", see *ante*, p. 448. For Stalin's concurrence in the Cairo Declaration, see *ante*, p. 566.

³ For statements by Stalin indicating agreement with the idea that the islands in the vicinity of Japan should remain under strong control, and that "strong points" then in the hands of Japan should remain in the hands of the Allies, and for Molotov's statement that "strong points" taken from Germany or Japan could be under the control of Great Britain or the United States or both, see *ante*, pp. 532, 554, and 570, respectively.

capable of exercising effective military control.⁴ Marshal Stalin had specifically agreed to the idea that Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores should be returned to China;⁵ that the Koreans are not yet capable of exercising and maintaining independent government and that they should be placed under a 40-year tutelage;⁶ that Russia, having no ice-free port in Siberia, is desirous of getting one and that Marshal Stalin looks with favor upon making Dairen a free port for all the world, with the idea that Siberian exports and imports could be sent through the port of Dairen and carried to Siberian territory over the Manchurian Railroad in bond.⁷ He agrees that the Manchurian Railway should become the property of the Chinese Government.⁸ He wishes all of Sakhalin to be returned to Russia and to have the Kurile Islands turned over to Russia in order that they may exercise control of the straits leading to Siberia.⁹

President Roosevelt stated that it was extremely gratifying to him to find that the Generalissimo and Marshal Stalin saw "eye to eye" with him on all major problems of the Pacific and that he felt that there would be no difficulty in reaching agreements about the control of the Pacific once Japan had been completely conquered.

President Roosevelt stated that he thinks the Pacific War Council is the body that should work out preliminary studies about the final solution of the Pacific problems as all interested powers are represented in the Council except Russia, whose agreement might be expected in view of the discussions the President had already had with Marshal Stalin.

President Roosevelt also recalled that Stalin is familiar with the history of the Liuchiu Islands and that he is in complete agreement that they belong to China and should be returned to her¹⁰ and further

⁴ For discussions of the control of strategic "strong points" by sufficiently powerful countries or by a world organization in the interests of preserving peace, see *ante*, pp. 510-511, 533.

⁵ See the Cairo Declaration and Stalin's concurrence therein.

⁶ In the Cairo Declaration, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek expressed the determination of their three countries that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent". No other record has been found of agreement at Cairo or Tehran that the Koreans should be placed "under a 40-year tutelage".

⁷ See *ante*, p. 567, and *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 378-379, 768.

⁸ No other record has been found of agreement by Stalin at Tehran that the Manchurian Railway should become the property of the Chinese Government. For a reference to the lack of rail connections at Petropavlovsk, see *ante*, p. 567. According to *United States Relations With China*, p. 113, footnote 1, Soviet use of the Manchurian railways was discussed informally during the Tehran Conference. The authority for this statement has not been ascertained.

⁹ No other specific record has been found of the expression of these desires by Stalin at Tehran. For statements by Stalin concerning the control of the islands in the vicinity of Japan and the control of the Straits in the approach to Vladivostok, see *ante*, pp. 532, 567. See also *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 378-379.

¹⁰ No other record has been found of any expression of views by Stalin at Tehran concerning the Ryukyu (Liuchiu) Islands.

that the civil administration of all islands now controlled by Japan should be taken over by the United Nations with, as stated before, military control of specific strong points assigned as necessary to maintain the peace. President Roosevelt stated that he believed that everyone agreed that the civil administration of the Pacific Islands is a responsibility that should be carried out for the benefit of the populations¹¹ and that their administration will always be a source of expense rather than profit.¹²

WILSON BROWN
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.

¹¹ For discussions at Tehran concerning the welfare of dependent peoples, see *ante*, pp. 485, 486, 571.

¹² For a reference to the costs of occupation of bases which might be placed under trusteeship, see *ante*, p. 554.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 14 January 1944.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Number 441, personal and secret, from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Your 536.² It is my understanding that in Teheran U. J. was given a promise that OVERLORD be launched during May and supported by strongest practicable ANVIL at about the same time and that he agreed to plan for simultaneous Russian attack on Eastern front.³

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² *Ante*, p. 865.

³ See *ante*, pp. 576-577.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 14 January 1944.

For the President from Ambassador Winant.

1. I have just received the following confidential communication dated January 13th from Mr. Eden regarding a matter which you discussed with him at your recent meeting in Egypt:

¹ Presumably sent via military channels.

"13th January, 1944. My dear Ambassador,

"1. Before I left Egypt the President mentioned to me that Father Hughes, an English priest who is at present in charge of the Apostolic Delegation in Cairo, had complained to him of the treatment by the authorities concerned of Italian priests and nuns who had been arrested or interned.² I told the President at the time that I was sure that there was another side to this question, and informed Lord Killearn of the conversation. I have now in front of me several reports from Lord Killearn which show that I was right, and that Father Hughes, in making these complaints, had, to say the least, allowed his heart to rule his head.["]

² See *ante*, pp. 739, 750.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 16 January, 1944.

Number 545. Prime Minister to President. Personal and most secret.

I. . . . My recollection is clear that nothing was said at Teheran about "one third" but that promise was made to meet the Russian claim put forward at Moscow to have transferred to them one battle-ship, one cruiser, eight destroyers, four submarines, and forty thousand tons of merchant shipping.

¹ Presumably sent via military channels.

870.01 A. M. G./21

The Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, January 19, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

On September 25 you authorized the Department to propose to the British participation of American political (Lincoln MacVeagh) and economic (James Landis) representatives on the ATB (Administration of Territories—Balkans) Committee in Cairo in order to meet the increasingly urgent need for a direct method of Anglo-American collaboration as regards the Balkans, and with a view to full American participation in the execution of agreed political and economic policies in that area. The ATB was then a British military-civilian committee, after having started out as a purely military body.

Although Ambassador Winant has subsequently pursued this matter, under instructions, he has been unable to get any concrete response from the British. Finally, in December, the British said this question had been "discussed at the highest level in North Africa" and promised a definite reply as soon as they knew the results of these discussions.¹

So far nothing has been received. Before instructing Winant to take the matter up again, I should appreciate being informed whether this question was in fact covered in your recent discussions; and, if so, what decisions were reached.²

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

¹ See Bucknell's telegram of December 9, 1943, to the Secretary of State, *ante*, p. 840.

² The following reply in Roosevelt's handwriting appears on a copy of this memorandum which Roosevelt returned to Hull: "C. H. I don't remember any discussion on this in Cairo or elsewhere[.] FDR" (870.01 A. M. G./21). According to Army files, McCloy raised with Roosevelt at the Second Cairo Conference a related matter, namely, the question of sending a military mission to the Balkans, which had been under discussion between the Department of State and the War Department, and Roosevelt told McCloy that he regarded such a mission as unnecessary, since existing supply personnel could be used until greater needs developed.

851.014/141½

The President to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, January 24, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I saw Halifax last week and told him quite frankly that it was perfectly true that I had, for over a year, expressed the opinion that Indo-China should not go back to France but that it should be administered by an international trusteeship.¹ France has had the country—thirty million inhabitants for nearly one hundred years, and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning.

As a matter of interest, I am wholeheartedly supported in this view by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and by Marshal Stalin.² I see no reason to play in with the British Foreign Office in this matter. The only reason they seem to oppose it is that they fear the effect it would have on their own possessions and those of the Dutch. They have never liked the idea of trusteeship because it is, in some in-

¹ The substance of the remarks made by Halifax to Hull on January 3, 1944 (see *ante*, p. 864), had been conveyed by Hull to Roosevelt in a memorandum of January 14, 1944 (851.014/134a).

² See *ante*, pp. 325, 485.

stances, aimed at future independence. This is true in the case of Indo-China.

F[RANKLIN] D R[OOSEVELT]

Roosevelt Papers

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*¹

Translation

Personal and secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to Presiden[t]
Fr[a]nklin D. Roosevelt and Prime-Minister Winston Churchill

29 JANUARY 1944.

On January 23 I have received your two joint messages, signed by you, Mr. President, and you, Mr. Prime-Minister, on the question of transference for the use of the Soviet Union of Italian vessels.²

I have to say, that after your joint affirmative reply in Teheran to my question regarding the transference to the Soviet Union of Italian vessels before the end of January, 1944, I considere[d] this question as settled and it did not occur to me that there was a possibility of revision of this accepted and agreed upon, among the three of us, decision. So much the more, as we came to an agreement, that in the course of December and January this question should have been settled with the Italians as well. Now I see that this is not so, and that the Italians have not been approached on that question at all.

In order not to delay, however, this matter, which is of vital importance for our common struggle against Germany, the Soviet Government is ready to accept your proposal . . .³

In your reply, however, is no mention made of the transference to the Soviet Union of eight Italian squadron destroyers and four submarines, regarding the transference of which to the Soviet Union still at the end of January, you Mr. President, and you Mr. Prime-Minister, gave your consent in Teheran. Undoubtedly for the Soviet Union primarily is this question, the question regarding destroyers and submarines, without which the transference of a battleship and

¹ Roosevelt's copy was presumably sent via the Soviet Embassy, Washington.

² The joint message of January 23, 1944, printed in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 115, conveyed to Stalin (1) the conclusions set forth in the memorandum of the Combined Chiefs of Staff mentioned in Churchill's telegram of January 16 1944, *ante*, p. 871, and (2) a proposal, which Churchill had made to Roosevelt in the same telegram, for the temporary transfer to the Soviet Union of certain non-Italian ships instead of the surrendered Italian ships.

³ The omitted passage, which does not refer to the Tehran Conference, is printed in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 117.

a cruiser is of no value. You will understand yourself that cruisers and battleships are powerless without destroyers escorting them. Since you have at your disposal the whole Italian naval fleet, fulfillment of the decision agreed upon in Teheran pertaining to the transference for the use of the Soviet Union of eight destroyers and four submarines from this fleet should not be difficult. I agree, that instead of Italian destroyers and submarines the Soviet Union be given to use the same number of American or English destroyers and submarines. Besides, the question of transference of destroyers and submarines cannot be postponed, but must be solved simultaneously with the transference of the battleship and cruiser, as it was agreed upon, among the three of us, in Teheran.⁴

⁴ Churchill, in a telegram to Roosevelt dated February 1, 1944, repeated the text of this message which he had received from Stalin and added the comment: "What can you expect from a bear but a growl?" (Roosevelt Papers). Further passing references to the Tehran agreement on Italian ships, in correspondence of February 1944 with Stalin, will be found in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, pp. 118, 122.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Generalissimo Chiang to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

CHUNGKING, 3 February 1944.

I appreciate your desire to open the Ledo Road, a desire which is also my great concern since it is only thru the opening of this land route that China may quickly obtain the heavy equipment much needed by her Army. You doubtless recall that at Cairo I reiterated and emphasized the fact that I am ready to send the Yunnan troops into Burma at any moment that large scale amphibious landing operations can be effected at strategic points.²

I stand ready to adhere to this decision, and hope that we can carry out operations even before November of this year, which date you mentioned as possible and probable for the diverting of the amphibious equipment to Burma.

¹ Sent via Army channels from Hearn to Marshall, "eyes only", for delivery to Roosevelt.

² See *ante*, pp. 347-350.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 23 February 1944.

PRIORITY

Personal and secret from the President for Marshal Stalin.

It is clear to me that there is a manifest need for United Nations machinery for joint planning of the procedures by which consideration should be given to the various fields of international economic cooperation, the subjects which should be discussed, the order of discussion, and the means of coordinating existing and prospective arrangements and activities. . . . What I am raising here is the question of further steps toward the establishment of United Nations machinery for post-war economic collaboration, which was raised by the Secretary of State at the Moscow meeting² and was discussed by you, Prime Minister Churchill, and myself at Teheran.³

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² See *ante*, p. 118.

³ See *ante*, pp. 530-531.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 3 March 1944.

599. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret.

Reuter[s] announces the message in my immediately following. Can this be true?

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 3 March 1944.

600. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret.

Reference my immediately preceding telegram. Washington Friday from Reuter[s]. Time of receipt 1720 3rd March. Msg begins:

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

President Roosevelt today announced that Italian warships are ready to be sent to the Russian Navy. Discussions for transferring roughly $\frac{1}{3}$ of the Italian Fleet to Russia, the President said, were about half completed.

President Roosevelt said that the U. S. and Britain are already using some Italian tonnage. Efforts are now being made to determine how many of these ships or their equivalent can be turned over to the Russian Navy. Marshal Stalin had raised the question through his Ambassador in Washington.

President Roosevelt stressed that so long as the war lasted the Allies will use everything afloat against the enemy. After the war something more permanent would have to be decided. Asked whether the ships would be manned by Italians, the President replied that some may and some may not. Italian ships which had escaped to the Balearic [*Balearic*] Islands, he said, were a Spanish problem.

President Roosevelt explained that since Italy surrendered to the U. S., Britain and Russia, it was thought advisable to distribute the Italian Fleet roughly on the basis of $\frac{1}{3}$ each. He would not say how much tonnage was involved.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

[WASHINGTON,] 3 March 1944.

486. In reply to insistent questioning at a press conference today I stated that Italian merchant ships and war ships are now being used in our war effort by the Allied Mediterranean command and that some of the Italian ships or substitutes therefor from the British and American tonnage will be allocated to the Soviet Navy to assist in their requirements for their war effort.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Presumably sent via military channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 4 March 1944.

601. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and most secret.

About the Italian ships et cetera. I was much startled by the press accounts of your talk with them. The Russians have never asked for

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

one-third of the Italian ships, but only for the specific vessels mentioned at Moscow and agreed to by us at Teheran. See list which follows. We have never agreed, as you know, to anything beyond this. . . .

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 4 March 1944.

602. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret.

My immediately preceding telegram. The Admiralty state that one third of the Italian ships in our possession would amount to:

1.7 battleships
2 6 inch cruisers
0.7 5.3 inch cruisers
3.3 destroyers
7.7 torpedo boats
6.7 corvettes
7.3 submarines

Whereas what the Russians ask for and what the British agreed to was:

1 battleship
1 cruiser
8 destroyers
4 submarines
40,000 tons of merchant shipping.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

Roosevelt Papers

President Roosevelt to Congressman Mruk

PRIVATE

[WASHINGTON,] March 6, 1944.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN MRUK :—I am afraid I cannot make any further comments except what I have written to you before—there were no secret commitments made by me at Teheran and I am quite sure that other members of my party made none either. This, of course, does not include military plans which, however, had nothing to do with Poland.

Very sincerely yours,

[No signature indicated]

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 7 March 1944.

No. 608. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and most secret. About the Italian ships.

1. I have never agreed nor have you ever asked me to agree to a division of the Italian Fleet into 3 shares. If this claim were to be based on the fact that we 3 Powers signed the Italian Armistice together, what about all the other Powers that fought Italy? Greece for instance would have an irrefutable claim. It was not until after the Cairo conference that I heard you had mentioned about the $\frac{1}{3}$ for Russia. Averell was however able to assure you that nothing of the sort had been said to the Russians. See your number 437.² You are therefore quite uncommitted so far as they are concerned.

2. His Majesty's Government would not be able to agree to a division of the Italian Fleet by $\frac{1}{3}$ or a pro rata division among signatories to the Armistice. . . .

5. At the Moscow conference the Russians asked for certain specified types of Italian ships, namely

- 1 Battleship
- 1 Cruiser
- 8 Destroyers
- 4 Submarines

and 40,000 tons of merchant shipping.

At Teheran we assented to this. . . .

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² *Ante*, p. 866.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 9 March 1944.

613. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and secret. . . .²

1. You will remember that we discussed the dollar balances in Cairo on December 8th and that I gave a memorandum to Harry.³

¹ Presumably sent via military channels.

² For the full text of this telegram, see Churchill, p. 697.

³ Roosevelt left Cairo on the morning of December 7, 1943. For what is believed to be the memorandum given to Harry Hopkins, see *ante*, p. 822.

I certainly understood that you felt we ought not to be treated worse than France or Russia in these matters. . . .

740.00119 Control (Germany)/4-2244

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs
(Matthews), Temporarily at London*

MOST SECRET

LONDON, April 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Partition of Germany

Participants: Sir William Strang

Mr. H. Freeman Matthews

Following our meeting with Dr. Bowman, Troutbeck, O'Neil and Harrison, Strang took me aside and permitted me hastily to read in strictest confidence the British minutes of the Tehran Conference having to do with the ideas of the three leaders as regards the partition of Germany. The minutes were about four pages in length and apparently concerned two conversations, one between Stalin and Churchill alone, and one at which President Roosevelt was present.¹ These minutes revealed several things quite clearly:

1) All three favored some partition.

2) Churchill seemed inclined to a division of Germany into three parts, the first comprised of Prussia to which area he ascribed all the evil that exists in Germany. (Neither Stalin nor the President appeared to concur in this view, both holding that the peoples of other areas of Germany were equally predatory and militaristic.) The second zone was Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden; and the third comprised the rest of Germany. Churchill did say that some of his advisers held different views on partition.

3) The President suggested a five-zone division and spoke strongly in favor of partition as the best means of preventing German rearmament and a resurgence of German nationalism. He made it clear, however, that he had reached no final conclusions.

4) Stalin throughout was most outspoken in his determination to see Germany completely crushed and never again permitted to be a menace to the peace of the world. He said that he preferred the President's five-way partition plan to the Prime Minister's three-way partition and indicated an even greater number of separate states would please him better. When the Prime Minister said that this

¹ This may refer to the discussion of this subject at (1) the tripartite dinner meeting of November 28, 1943, at which the Churchill-Stalin conversation continued after Roosevelt had retired, *ante*, p. 511, and (2) the tripartite political meeting of December 1, 1943, *ante*, p. 600.

might merely give incentive to the states to join together again, Stalin briskly stated that the Allies should see to it that this did not happen and that as long as he lived Russia would prevent any such efforts. He did not want to see Austria reunited to Hungary or any other strong unit formed. When the President spoke of controlling the German armament industries Stalin remarked: "What about the watchmakers and the tablemakers? Experience has shown that such industries can readily be transformed into arms manufacturers." Any reference to the need for German reconstruction to teach them ways of peace or the need of a healthy Germany to have a healthy Europe he dismissed abruptly. He once questioned the depth of Churchill's determination to keep Germany weak. When Churchill asked if Stalin favored having only small states on the continent he replied that France and Poland were large states who might help keep Germany down and that was enough. He emphasized throughout, however, that it was the duty of the three major Allies to keep Germany weak and poor.

H F[REEMAN] M[ATTHEWS]

800.796/6-1044

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] June 10, 1944.

Subject: Aviation Policy

Participants: The President

Senator Bennett Champ Clark

Mr. L. Welch Pogue, Chairman, Civil

Aeronautics Board

Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr.

The President asked Senator Clark, Mr. Pogue, and myself to meet him at the White House at 12:30 on June 9, which we did. After some general conversation largely relating to political conditions, the President raised the question of aviation policy. . . .

The President said that he had discussed this matter a little with Stalin at Tehran in the general sense that Soviet planes desiring to fly over American territory ought to have the right to land and refuel, though not to take on and discharge passengers or cargo; we would want equivalent rights in the Soviet Union. Stalin thought something could be worked out.¹

A. A. B[ERLE, JR.]

¹ There appears to be no direct reference to such a discussion in the available records of the Tehran Conference. For an additional reference, however, see *ante*, p. 860.

Treasury Files

*Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury
(White)*¹

[LONDON, August 13, 1944.]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY'S FILES:

Conference at Sir [Mr.] Anthony Eden's home, Sunday, 3 p. m., August 13, 1944. Participating in the discussion were Sir Anthony Eden, Secretary Morgenthau, Ambassador Winant, H. D. White. Robert Sherwood joined the group later.

(Sitting on the lawn near by were Mrs. Eden, a Major in the United States Army and some young lady relative of the Eden family, all of whom could have overheard parts of the conversation).

Secretary Morgenthau spoke of his concern over the trend in thinking with respect to plans for civil control by military forces of Germany immediately after occupation . . .

Eden replied that he had been waiting for the European Advisory Committee [*Commission*] to prepare, in accordance with the decision made at the Teheran conference, a program for reparations and other controls over postwar Germany. He said time was short and asked Winant when the E. A. C. was coming out with a report.

Ambassador Winant explained that the E. A. C. had worked out what they regarded as the most urgent part of their assignment, namely, to formulate the terms of surrender and the allocation of areas of control by the British, American and Russian military authorities. He added that to his knowledge the final decision had not yet been made with respect to allocation of the area of control as between the British and American military authorities.

With respect to the report of which Eden was inquiring, he said they had not yet begun working on it. He went on to explain that he was waiting to receive from Washington memoranda or decisions of policy with respect to reparations and other postwar measures regarding Germany. . . .

¹ For an account of the discussions covered in this document and in the one immediately following, see the article by Fred Smith, formerly Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, reprinted in *Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments* (The Harry Dexter White Papers), Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 84th Congress, 1st session, part 30, pp. 2640-2641.

Eden said that he was a little surprised that the general policy with respect to the treatment of Germany after victory wasn't known. He said that at the Teheran conference it had been agreed that E. A. C. should be instructed to work out plans for the dismemberment of Germany. Eden said that Russia was determined on one thing above all others, namely, that Germany would not again disturb the peace of Europe; that "Uncle Joe" Stalin was determined to smash Germany so that it would never again be able to make war. At the Teheran conference "Uncle Joe" had insisted that Germany be dismembered to the end that she would be unable to make war again. Eden said Roosevelt had agreed with Stalin, but Churchill was at first reluctant to accede. He (Churchill) was willing to make Austria independent and to take East Prussia away, but was doubtful about going beyond that. After conversing with him, Eden, Churchill decided, in view of the attitude of Roosevelt and Stalin, to go along with them on that program and so it was definitely decided that the E. A. C. was to prepare a program for the dismemberment of Germany. Eden said that he assumed that their people (the British technicians) were working along the lines necessary to carry out the decision at Teheran. He had assumed he said that the E. A. C. was going ahead on that basis.

Eden said that much of that was in the reported minutes of the meeting at Teheran which possibly the Secretary had seen. The Secretary replied that he had not seen them and inquired whether or not it would be possible. Mr. Eden said that of course, that he had them in his office and he would arrange to have the Secretary see them there.

I mentioned that I understood that some of the thinking among the British, particularly among the British Treasury technicians, was that a restoration of the Germany [*German?*] economy was desirable because prior to the war Germany had been the most important customer of Great Britain and that Great Britain could not afford to lose so excellent a market for her goods. Eden appeared shocked that such views should be held in the British Treasury and said that they were not in accord with the decisions arrived at at Teheran.

H. D. WHITE

Treasury Files

Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury
(White)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY'S FILES

[LONDON,] August 15, 1944.

Conference at Sir [*Mr.*] Anthony Eden's Office at 4 P. M.

Present: Sir Anthony Eden

Mr. W. Strange [*Strang*], British member of the EAC
Secretary Morgenthau
Ambassador Winant
Mr. H. D. White

The conference had been arranged by Sir Anthony Eden on previous Sunday,¹ who had suggested that if the Secretary could come to his office he could show him that portion of the Tehran conference dealing with the decision on partition of Germany.

Eden began reading excerpts from a report on the Tehran conference. He said that the report had been prepared by Archibald Kerr and was sort of a telegraphic report and not a verbatim report. The gist of the excerpts which Eden read was as follows: President Roosevelt said that he would like to discuss the question of the partition of Germany. (At this point Eden explained par[en]thetically that Churchill had been pushing the Polish question and that Stalin was trying to get away from it and he feared likewise President Roosevelt, but that Churchill kept trying to bring the Polish matter back into the discussion. President Roosevelt said that Germany could be divided into three or fifteen parts. Stalin indicated smilingly that Churchill wasn't listening because he doubted whether Churchill was in favor of dividing Germany. Churchill replied that he hadn't yet left Lwow (thereby indicating that he still wanted to discuss the Polish question). The President expressed the view that the European Advisory Commission should be instructed to report on the problem of partitioning Germany. Stalin agreed. Since Stalin and Roosevelt felt strongly about the point Churchill said he was willing to agree that the Commission should examine and report on the question of the partition of Germany.

. . . I asked Winant if as a member of the EAC representing the United States he had ever [been?] instructed to go forward on a study based on the assumption tentatively decided upon at Tehran

¹ See *supra*.

that Germany was to be separated into many parts. The Ambassador replied that he had been at Tehran and knew that decision had been made but that he didn't know how much he was supposed to tell to his own Department back home and that he had never received instructions from his own Department to work on such proposal.

H. D. WHITE

Treasury Files

*Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury
(White)*

[WASHINGTON, undated.¹]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY'S FILES

Dinner at the Citadel, Quebec, Wednesday, September 13, 1944,
8:00 p. m.

However, the President came back to the German problem several times very nicely and did not recede from his position. He reminded Churchill that Stalin at Teheran had said: "Are you going to let Germany produce modern metal furniture? The manufacture of metal furniture can be quickly turned into the manufacture of armament."²

H. D. WHITE

¹ The date "9/25/44" which appears at the end of the memorandum is evidently the date of typing.

² See *ante*, p. 511.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 18 October 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and top secret.
Number 799.

3. . . . I have already informed Parliament in open session of our support of Curzon Line as a basis for frontier settlement in the east,²

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² The Curzon Line was mentioned at the tripartite political meeting held at Tehran on December 1, 1943; see *ante*, p. 599. The proposal to move the Soviet-Polish boundary westward was also discussed, without specific reference to its being moved to the Curzon Line, on other occasions at the Tehran Conference; see *ante*, pp. 512, 594.

and our twenty year treaty with Russia³ makes it desirable for us to define our position to a degree not called for from the United States at the present time.

4. I should however mention, though no doubt Averell⁴ will have reported,⁵ that Molotov stated at our opening meeting with the London Poles⁶ that you had expressed agreement with the Curzon Line at Tehran. I informed Stalin afterwards that neither I nor Eden could confirm this statement. Stalin thereupon said that he had had a private conversation with you, not at the table, when you had concurred in the policy of the Curzon Line, though you had expressed a hope about Lwow being retained by the Poles.⁷ I could not, of course, deal with this assertion. Several times in the course of my long talks with him, he emphasized his earnest desire for your return at the election and of the advantage to Russia and to the world which that would be. Therefore, you may be sure that no indiscretion will occur from the Russian side.

³ Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, signed at London May 26, 1942; League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 353.

⁴ W. Averell Harriman.

⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 202-205.

⁶ For the Polish minutes of the meeting, see the Appendix to Special Report No. 1, *Communist Takeover and Occupation of Poland*, of the Select Committee of the House of Representatives on Communist Aggression (House Report No. 2684, 82d Congress, 2d session, part 4; 1955), pp. 115 ff., especially p. 122.

⁷ For the Bohlen minutes of the Roosevelt-Stalin meeting of December 1, 1943, at which Poland was discussed, see *ante*, p. 594. For Roosevelt's reference at the Yalta Conference to his views on the Curzon Line as expressed at the Tehran Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 667. For other post-Conference references to the discussion of Polish boundaries at Tehran, see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, pp. 119, 133.

Hopkins Papers

*Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman)*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

Subject: Teheran Declaration on Iran

On the last night of the Teheran Conference (Dec. 1-2) I was assigned the responsibility of seeing that agreement was finally reached as to the text of the Iran Declaration, which had been previously accepted in principle, and that the President, Marshal Stalin

¹ This memorandum was prepared in connection with a search in the White House Map Room for the signed original of the Declaration on Iran. Shortly thereafter the signed original (printed *ante*, p. 646) was located in the files of the President's Naval Aide (Brown). See also Lohbeck, pp. 491-492.

and the Prime Minister signed the Declaration. I showed the English draft to Marshal Stalin, and asked him whether he wished it translated into Russian in order that there might be both a Russian and an English text to be signed. Stalin asked Pavlov to translate it to him verbally, and in my presence and Mr. Bohlen's said that he approved the Declaration and that, in view of the shortness of time, it was not necessary to have a Russian text. I then asked Stalin to sign the Declaration. He said he would do so after the President. I then took the Declaration to the President, who signed it. Thereupon Stalin signed it forthwith. I do not recall at what moment Mr. Churchill signed it, but I am positive that all three signatures were attached.

W. A. HARRIMAN

NOTE: I confirm completely Ambassador Harriman's recollection that the document was signed in the manner described above. Charles E. Bohlen.

740.0011 PW 1939/1-945

*The Consul at Colombo (Bishop) to the Secretary of State
(Stettinius)*

SECRET
No. 22

COLOMBO, January 9, 1945.

SIR: . . . I have the honor to report that the British Political Adviser¹ to the Supreme Allied Commander² has recently stated that SEAC considers French Indochina to be "open territory" in which SEAC may operate at any time that it is militarily feasible.

This official pointed out that at the Cairo meeting Admiral Mountbatten discussed the question of Thailand and French Indochina as military theatres with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek³ and asked the Generalissimo to agree to the inclusion of French Indochina in the SEAC theatre. The Generalissimo refused to give his agreement, and Admiral Mountbatten then suggested that, although the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the inclusion of Thailand in SEAC, Admiral Mountbatten was willing not to publish this fact provided the Generalissimo agreed to SEAC operations in Indochina if they became militarily feasible. In other words, it was suggested that the two Supreme Allied Commanders agree orally that forces

¹ Maberly Esler Dening.

² Admiral Mountbatten.

³ See *ante*, p. 391.

under either one might operate in either French Indochina or Thailand and that those areas would become a part of the theatre of the commander whose forces reached there first. The Generalissimo is said to have accepted this arrangement. . . .

Respectfully yours,

MAX W. BISHOP

FE Files

Memorandum by the Co-Chairman of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission (Taussig)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 16, 1945.

HONGKONG

The President told Stanley ¹ in detail of his discussions on Hongkong with Churchill at Cairo. Briefly—the British to make a *beau geste*: announce the return of Hongkong to China; Ch[i]ang “or his successor” in three days time to announce that Hongkong is a free port and open to the entire world on equal terms; no one in Hongkong to be deprived of his property as of the period prior to the Japanese invasion. . . .

¹ The reference is to Oliver F. G. Stanley, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, who was in the process of discussing colonial problems with officials of the Department of State; see Notter, p. 389.

740.0011 PW 1939/1–1945

The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the President

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 19, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

INDOCHINA

The Department has received the following estimate of the present British point of view about Indochina, sent from Kandy on January 4, 1945. As the source of this estimate was Mr. Dening, the Foreign Office official who is Chief Political Adviser under SEAC, I feel that it is of sufficient importance to transmit to you for your information.

In this estimate it is stated that:

"As a result of his verbal agreement with the Generalissimo at Cairo the Supreme Commander still considers that the status of Indochina is as it was in the days of the ABCD [*ABDA?*] Agreement, namely that Indochina and Thailand are free-for-all areas open to whichever allied military force gets there first. The reason for this is that when it was proposed to the Generalissimo that French Indochina be included in the SEAC theater he objected because of the loss of face involved and the alternative suggested by SAC, and agreed to by the Generalissimo, was that the decision of the Combined Chiefs that Thailand was in SEAC theater should not be released to the public and that both countries would be considered on a free-for-all basis."

JOSEPH C. GREW

893.00/5-2945

The President's¹ Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the Secretary of State (Stettinius)²

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 29 May 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The following message from Ambassador Hurley to the President, is forwarded requesting the preparation of a reply for the President's consideration:³

The Generalissimo amplified Roosevelt's position by stating to me that Roosevelt said to him at Cairo that he was in favor of the return of Hongkong to China and had so advised the British. He then asked the Generalissimo if on the return of Hongkong the National Government of China would declare Hongkong a free port. The Generalissimo said the Government of China would make Hongkong a free port. I am familiar with the Roosevelt policy in regard to Hongkong but I do not have a written directive on that subject.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

¹ This and subsequent references to the President (except where otherwise indicated) are to Truman, who succeeded Roosevelt upon the death of the latter, on April 12, 1945.

² The source text is a copy typed in the Department of State. The original sent to the Secretary of State has not been found.

³ Grew's telegram of June 10, 1945, to Hurley at Chungking, containing Truman's reply, is scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

740.0019 PW 1939/8-1145: Telegram

*The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State
(Byrnes)*

CONFIDENTIAL

CHUNGKING, August 11, 1945.

1330. . . . The Generalissimo has mentioned to me frequently President Roosevelt's statement at Cairo to the effect that the United States would equip ninety Chinese divisions. Thirty divisions (X force) to be equipped immediately. Thirty divisions (Y force) as soon as first thirty divisions were completed and finally the arming of thirty additional divisions (Z force) making a total of ninety American armed divisions which would constitute the Chinese peacetime army.

Chiang Kai-Shek said Harry Hopkins was present when commitment was made.

.

839.20 Mission/9-245

The Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 3, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Chinese matters arising out of conversations with T. V. Soong.

.

2. *Lend-Lease Military Equipment.*

T. V. Soong inquires whether we are prepared to complete our commitment to equip 100 Chinese divisions? This commitment is said to have been made to Chiang by President Roosevelt at Cairo. The commitment apparently is not in writing. Mr. Hopkins affirms that some such commitment was made at Cairo when action in the Chinese theatre was agreed upon, and apparently after Teheran, Chiang, who was disturbed by the postponement at Teheran of the action planned for the Chinese theatre, was assured that the commitment would be kept. The form of the commitment apparently was vague and loose. While no one anticipated the Japanese war would end so quickly, it is hard to believe that the parties believed the commitment to be wholly independent of the Japanese war. Certainly both Roosevelt and Chiang must have been thinking of Chinese troops to fight the Japs. And it is difficult to treat our Chinese com-

mitments different from other commitments under the Lend-Lease Act.¹

So far as I can ascertain about 30 divisions have already been equipped under our commitment to Chiang. Soong speaks of 60 additional divisions to be equipped.

JAMES F. BYRNES

¹ Act of March 11, 1941 (55 Stat. 31), as extended by the Act of April 16, 1945 (59 Stat. 52).

893.20 Mission/9-745

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson)

WASHINGTON, September 7, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Furnishing to China of military advisory groups; Economic aid for China.

Participants: The President;
Dr. T. V. Soong;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Acheson

At eleven o'clock this morning, at the President's request, I was present when he received Dr. T. V. Soong. The President stated that he had been giving very considerable thought to the communications from the Generalissimo relative to the furnishing of a military advisory group of American military, naval and air personnel and to the arming of additional Chinese divisions. . . . He [the President] said that he could say categorically to Dr. Soong that personnel could and would be furnished to advise on these military matters. He said that a careful search of the records had been made and had not disclosed anything relative to the commitment to which the Generalissimo referred as having been made at the Cairo meeting.

Dr. Soong interrupted the President to ask whether he had consulted Mr. Harry Hopkins. The President said that he had talked with Mr. Hopkins and would talk with him again. The President added that, with the cessation of hostilities, his powers in certain respects had changed and that he had to consider the views of the Congress in this matter.

740.0011 EW 1939/9-2448 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
(Marshall)*

NANKING, September 24, 1948.

1756. At weekly press conference of September 23, 1948, Doctor Hollington K. Tong, Director of Chinese Government Information Office, replied as follows to questions:

Query: "Have you any comment to make on Harry L. Hopkins' article in August 28 *Colliers*, which has been commented on editorially by *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, stating that President Roosevelt discussed disposal of Dairen with Generalissimo at Cairo, long before Yalta agreement?"¹

Answer: "Now it happens that I was present at Cairo on occasion of meeting which Mr. Hopkins cites.

"According to my recollection President Roosevelt, in one of his conversations with President Chiang at Cairo, inquired about possibility of conversion of Dairen into free port at end of war. The reply of President Chiang was that he might give consideration to such a proposal when time came, provided there was no in[fringement?] of the sovereignty of China.

"The nature of the commitment later made by President Roosevelt at Yalta² differed from what President Roosevelt himself had suggested to President Chiang at Cairo. The Yalta commitment was not known to the Government of China at the time it was made."

Dr. Tong was later asked if he was personally present during conversation referred to between President Roosevelt and Generalissimo. He evaded question by replying that Madame Chiang had acted as interpreter for Generalissimo.

Sent Department 1756, repeated Shanghai 845.

STUART

¹ The article under reference was not by Hopkins but was a serialized portion of Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins*. The passage in question appears in the book at the top of p. 792.

² *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984.

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