



Position paper on measurement and entitlement of severance damages for Ahtna Inc. Corridor for the Willow-Healy Initiative.

Landmark Research, Inc.

[s.l.]: [s.n.], [s.d.]


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**POSITION PAPER ON
MEASUREMENT AND ENTITLEMENT
OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES FOR
AHTNA INC. CORRIDOR
FOR THE
WILLOW-HEALY INTERTIE**



POSITION PAPER ON
MEASUREMENT AND ENTITLEMENT
OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES FOR
AHTNA INC. CORRIDOR
FOR THE
WILLOW-HEALY INTERTIE

AS OF
JANUARY 1, 1982

PREPARED FOR
ROBERT M. GOLDBERG
ROBERT M. GOLDBERG AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.

PREPARED BY
LANDMARK RESEARCH, INC.



James A. Graaskamp, Ph.D., S.R.E.A., C.R.E.

Jean B. Davis, M.S.

March 12, 1985

Robert M. Goldberg
Robert M. Goldberg and Associates, P.C.
1107 West Seventh Avenue
Anchorage, AK 99501

Dear Mr. Goldberg:

Re: Severance Damages

This letter provides an introduction to the attached position paper on the value of severance damages due AHTNA Inc., in conjunction with the taking of a ten-year lease of an Intertie easement, sometimes called the Willow-Healy Intertie, for which we have provided an appraisal of the real estate interests taken of \$7,570,000 in a report dated March 11, 1985. However, this report concluded that a value for severance damages to the remainder property required further legal direction before the appraisers could confirm their findings.

We believe severance damages have occurred to a degree beyond acceptable social costs and that the condemnor has not met the standard in the statement for a declaration of taking under Section 09.55.430 of the Alaskan Code of Civil Procedure, specifically:

7. A statement that the property is taken by necessity for a project located in a manner which is most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. (State Statute 13.20 ch 101 SLA 1962; am State Statute 1 ch 149 SLA 1976)

Traditionally, it is difficult to set dollar values on visual damages to the landscape, no matter how apparent, or to anticipate present dollar values of progressive deterioration of subsistence food gathering due to disturbance of the environmental integrity. There is also the problem that any conflicts of transmission lines with other future uses presently have unknown costs to cure.

In that light, we believe that a feasible measure of damages would be the cost that might have been incurred by the condemnor to mitigate damages consistent with the intent of Statement 7 above. Such an approach would be consistent with

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the Coase Theorem in contemporary property law economics as well as the opportunity cost approach to appraisal developed in the aforementioned appraisal report. Section II of this position paper carries that approach through to a conclusion that reasonable, appropriate severance damage "most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury" is \$4.68 million.

However, the logic of the Coase Theorem depends on the premise that the owner of the land, AHTNA Inc., had the right to object to the actual placement of the corridor and its construction above or below ground. Conversely, AHTNA Inc., could also agree for consideration to endure the damages incurred by permitting a routing and design that was cheapest to build, cheapest to maintain, and incompatible with public and private concerns for adjacent land. The core of that issue is interpretation of the right-of-entry agreement dated July 1983 between the condemnor and AHTNA Inc. to file a letter of nonobjection with the United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management. Five hundred thousand dollars was paid in advance for this understanding. Moreover, this private agreement bypassed a declaration of taking, in whole or in part, in terms of design, routing, or public policy conflicts. The necessity hearing under the public process precedes the issue of compensation.

The appraisers are unable to agree on the implications of the agreement relative to Ahtna's power to withhold approval because the Ahtnas have filed letters of nonobjection "for all land described." The land described specifically is the strip taken, which might be construed as leaving the remainder lands offended outside the terms of agreement. Power of approval is the fundamental premise for application of the Coase Theorem and on the acceptability of cost to cure as a proxy for minimum damage incurred. These arguments are somewhat expanded in Section II of this position paper.


We believe we have provided an appropriate measure of severance damage. We are doubtful if AHTNA Inc. has any right to modify the project given its private agreement for entry, nonobjection, and cash consideration for same. There is the larger question as to whether the right-to-entry agreement is a


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bonafide agreement since neither party seems to have been aware of the Portland General Electric Case precedent or of the Coase Theorem when discussing appraisal procedures. Recalling business law, if there is no substantial meeting of the minds, there may have been no agreement, but such an annulment is beyond the province of the appraisers. Without instruction on these legal conundrums we cannot provide a final estimate of severance value damages for the first ten years of the Intertie Land lease.

We look forward to a full legal opinion on the status of the AHTNA Inc. right to modify construction or route in a private agreement which has circumvented the mechanisms of a hearing on the necessity of the taking.

FOR LANDMARK RESEARCH, INC.


James A. Graaskamp, Ph.D., SREA, CRE
Urban Land Economist


Michael L. Robbins, Ph.D.

Civil Engineering

Enclosures

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I. INTRODUCTORY COMMENT

The subject of severance damage as a consequence of taking a 170 foot strip of land for a minimum of ten years and for improvement with an overhead Intertie line requires discussion of three major issues:

1. Is there a way of measuring environmental and aesthetic losses, as well as future economic development costs in present dollars for remainder values, such as cost to avoid?
2. If a measurement proxy in dollars can be defined, does it fit the AHTNA Inc. status of rights within the terms of its right-of-entry and valuation agreement with the Alaska Power Authority?
3. If the dollar value measurement is economically reasonable and consistent with the status of AHTNA Inc. rights under the private contract, is it also consistent with Alaskan State Codes defining rights and benefits for severance damage?

This position paper can present a strong case for a methodology of measurement of dollar values lost as severance damage in excess of social and private injury that may be unavoidable. However, the status of the Ahtna in terms of bargaining position under their private agreement to collect severance damages from Alaska Power Authority is cloudy. In the

absence of that agreement, the cost to prevent severance damage would have been added to the opportunity cost base case value of \$7.57 million determined in the appraisal of March 11, 1985. The only severance damage under Alaskan law would be realized when the lease rent was renegotiated in ten years when incremental costs for economic developments built since 1984 attributable to the power line were known and non-speculative. This is an obvious example of the equity inherent in the de novo rule of the Montana State and Portland General Electric cases discussed at length in the appraisal report of March 11, 1985. These statements anticipate the discussion which follows.

II. VALUATION OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES

A. Introductory Argument

In addition to the taking value of \$7.57 million for ten years, economic rent of the Intertie corridor, AHTNA Inc. is entitled to severance damages measurable in dollars in terms of before and after value of the remainder lands adjoining the power corridor.

The overhead power line and the swath cut through native vegetation and ground cover has been an immediate visual encroachment on the naturalness of the area. There will be an irreversible and progressive impact on plant and animal life and the subsistence lifestyle of some native residents. Progressive deterioration will be accelerated with the noise and magnetic fields if and when the line is converted to 345 kV and 200 to 600 megawatts (MW) transmission. There will be incremental costs incurred by other tenants of the corridor, such as a natural gas pipeline, that will reduce rents collected by AHTNA Inc. These observable and predictable losses must fit the Alaskan Code of Civil Procedure on damages to remainder, specifically:

Recoverable damages must be the natural and proximate consequence of the action taken; they must be direct and certain, actual and reasonable, readily ascertainable, and not remote speculative or contingent. *Lewis & Clark County v. Nett*, 263 P. 418 (Mont. 1928); *State v. Bradshaw Land & Livestock Co.*, 43 P. 2d 674 (Mont. 1935).

Not every possible element of depreciation is compensable.--It is not every possible element of depreciation in value for which compensation must be awarded in an eminent domain proceeding. Lewis & Clark County v. Nett, 263 P. 418 (Mont. 1928).

An attempt to enumerate elements of depreciation is futile.--Any attempt to enumerate the various circumstances which may enter into depreciation of the market value of a tract of land would be futile. Lewis & Clark County v. Nett, 263 P. 418 (Mont. 1928).

It is not necessary to measure loss of benefits to the remainder to establish severance damage. The opportunity cost doctrine can redefine the issue to how much would the Alaskan Power Authority be willing to pay AHTNA Inc. for the collective willingness of the Ahntas to endure the environmental and economic damages to the remaining lands. If both parties were knowledgeable and informed as to the alternative opportunity cost of substantially avoiding aesthetic damage to the environment, disturbance of ecological systems, or interference with future economic development (such as a pipeline), in the free market of the fair market value concept the Power Authority and the Ahntas could negotiate for a payment that would settle on the damages at something less than the cost to cure or to avoid. The extension of opportunity cost theory from a determination of rental value to a settlement of liability for land use conflicts is well developed in land law economics in a logical process known as the Coase Theorem.

B. The Coase Theorem

Society cannot grant exclusive rights to a particular land surface to any one owner, and in many cases, two adjacent users of land may need to maintain incompatible uses. There are many classic examples including that of the railroad spewing sparks on the farmer; the damage to the farmer may be less than the cost of preventing the damage if the liability falls entirely on the railroad. To provide a brief treatment of the issue, we have borrowed a few paragraphs (See Appendices A and B for reproduction of the full discussion) from a book on real estate investment by Professors Jaffe and Sirmans: [1]

In 1960, a paper by Ronald Coase greatly affected modern economics. In "The Problem of Social Cost," Coase showed that in those cases in which two adjacent users of land maintain incompatible uses, the classic solutions of Pigou were not necessarily appropriate. (In The Economics of Welfare, A. C. Pigou suggested three ways for society to handle the problem of inharmonious land uses: society could make the user who creates the "external effects" liable for damage by law; society could tax the party "causing" the damage according to the amount of damage suffered by the neighbor; or society could enjoin the inharmonious user from continuing to "create" the problem.) Coase argued that in a world with zero transaction costs, adjacent users of property will be able to negotiate between themselves in cases of inharmonious uses when incentives exist to do so. This is known as the Coase Theorem.

[1] Real Estate Investment Decision Making,
Austin J. Jaffe, and C. F. Sirmans, Introduction
to the Economics of Property Rights, pp. 140-146

As an example, suppose that a bean farmer owns farmland adjacent to land owned by a railroad. Suppose that the railroad has recently laid tracks for its frequent rail service past the farmer's land. Presume that the land near the tracks is valuable to the farmer in terms of expected yield and that, over a short period of time, the train's passage will severely damage (via the sparks emitted) the standing bean crop. Imagine that after some time, the farmer observes the damage and estimates that if the train is not stopped from sparking, the resulting loss will be \$500 per year or \$5,000. On the other hand, the railroad could purchase additional equipment, which when installed, will stop the train from emitting sparks. Suppose that the equipment and its installation cost \$10,000....

Thus, in the absence of transaction costs between the farmer and the railroad, it does not make any difference which party is initially assigned the property rights with respect to the efficient use of society's resources. If incentives exist for negotiation, there is every reason to believe that the party will acquire the rights if it is in the best interest to do so. However, the initial assignment of the right does involve an increase in wealth to the awarded party.

The Question of Liability

A careful reading of the farmer and railroad example shows that the assignment of liability for damage (and, conversely, the right to be free of damage) does not affect the efficient allocation of resources from society's point of view. The optimal use of resources will occur independently of the initial allocation of rights, given that it is costless to transact rights if the parties wish to do so. This is one of the important conclusions of the Coase Theorem....

In the classic case of the farmer suffering crop damage from sparks and the railroad as the cause of the sparks, there were two parameters. To prevent sparks the railroad would have to spend \$10,000; unless the sparks were prevented, the farmer

would lose \$5,000 of land value due to crop damage. Unlike publicly-owned land adjacent to Ahtna land, AHTNA Inc. can be as free of regulation for environmental quality as the Ahtna management may choose in their self-interest so that they can negotiate the sale of freedom from the liability of environmental responsibility. In this case it is possible to measure the opportunity cost differential between the cheapest route available for the Intertie with little environmental sensitivity and the most expensive, feasible route that would be sensitive to Ahtna land vulnerability, and public aesthetic standards.

There is reason to believe that the preferred route selected and constructed for the Intertie was chosen primarily because it was cheapest, both in terms of original cost and annual charges, although it was insensitive to various standards of environmental quality. The value of the land taken for that route has been estimated in Section IV in the appraisal report. However, there was an additional cost avoidance in the preferred route when compared to alternative options that would have eliminated much of the visual and ecological damage of slicing across the countryside. The cost of the cheapest, least sensitive solution to the environment provides a benchmark for comparison to the cost of alternative solutions that would avoid some or much of the adverse effects

which might be recognized as severance payment. A proportion of this cost savings would properly be secured by AHTNA Inc. in negotiation with APA under the doctrine of the Coase Theorem. What is needed is recognition of the types and timing of potential damage, some alternative feasible construction options with appropriate cost estimated, and an equitable basis for a negotiated sharing of cost savings, with possibility of related modification of the base case for the value of land taken.

C. Types and Timing of Severance Damage

The selection of an optimal Intertie route location requires striking a balance between environmental, economic, and political issues, now and in the future. Visual encroachment on the naturalness of the area is immediate and may be softened in time with the return of some vegetative cover. On the other hand, the deleterious effects on subsistence hunting and gleaning may be cumulative over a long term of time. The extra cost of constructing a pipeline grounded and shielded from the ionic corrosion caused by high tension lines cannot be known until the pipeline has fixed the option to use 345 kV, and other levels of power transmission are exercised. Nevertheless, the broad range of potentially adverse consequences of power corridor conflicts with adjacent lands were agreed upon by Commonwealth Associates., Inc., and

the Alaskan Power Authority when specified goals and objectives for the Anchorage-Fairbanks Transmission Intertie Route Selection Report:

Goals:

1. Satisfy regulatory and permit requirements;
2. Respond to concerns expressed through the public Publication Program;
3. Achieve routing objectives;

Objectives:

1. Minimize impact on land use;
2. Minimize conflict with existing life systems;
3. Minimize impact on natural systems;
4. Minimize visual impact;
5. Minimize impact on cultural resources;
6. Maximize sharing of existing rights-of-way;
7. Optimize construction and operation costs.

These considerations certainly played a part in the study of 19 different routes representing different segments of overhead and underground installations and a pattern to the eastern or western edges of the general corridor which are itemized here as Exhibit II-1. Nevertheless, the admirable goals and analysis of environmental issues were essentially ignored in favor of the cheapest route, producing the highest net economic benefit. The selected route was relatively straight providing a less costly and more efficient line. At the same time, the straightness of the route crossed the face of Reindeer Hills, being insensitive to issues of visual quality. Slashing across the Reindeer Hills avoided severance damage to property owners in Cantwell and also avoided costly

EXHIBIT 11-1

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TABLE 9

LIFE-CYCLE COSTS AND BENEFITS (a)
 OF THE ANCHORAGE - FAIRBANKS INTERTIE
 INCLUDING FUTURE NEED FOR 345KV INTERCONNECTION (b)

CONFIG.	INTERTIE VOLTAGE (kV)	LINE CONST. OPTION	CAPITAL INVESTMENT (\$ Millions)	COSTS (\$ Millions)					BENEFITS (\$ Millions)			RATIO OF BENEFITS TO COSTS	
				OPERATION	DESIGN	FIXED CHARGES(c)	RETIREMENT CREDIT(d)	REDEDICATION CREDIT(e)	OPERATION & MAINTENANCE	TOTAL	ECONOMY INTERCHANGE	RESERVE SHARING(f)	
1A	130	130	1	34.3	142.1	-27.8	0.0	5.5	119.8	130.9	11.3	142.2	1.2
			2	112.5	169.2	-30.1	0.0	5.8	141.9	130.9	11.3	142.2	1.0
			3	34.0	141.4	-27.7	0.0	5.5	119.2	130.9	11.3	142.2	1.2
			4	106.2	159.7	-31.3	0.0	5.6	134.1	130.9	11.3	142.2	0.9
			5	125.3	180.3	-36.9	0.0	5.9	157.4	130.9	11.3	142.2	0.9
			6	165.7	199.8	-31.1	0.0	6.6	123.3	130.9	11.3	142.2	1.1
			7	93.6	146.8	-27.6	0.0	5.5	118.7	130.9	11.3	142.2	1.2
			8	111.6	167.9	-32.9	0.0	5.7	146.7	130.9	11.3	142.2	1.0
			9	23.1	146.8	-27.4	0.0	5.5	119.1	130.9	11.3	142.2	1.2
			10	104.5	159.5	-31.9	0.0	5.6	134.1	130.9	11.3	142.2	0.9
			11	124.4	167.1	-35.6	0.0	5.8	156.3	130.9	11.3	142.2	0.9
			12	184.9	157.8	-38.9	0.0	5.6	122.5	130.9	11.3	142.2	1.1
			13	35.9	144.2	-28.2	0.0	5.7	121.7	130.9	11.3	142.2	1.2
			14	101.8	159.7	-32.7	0.0	5.8	135.9	130.9	11.3	142.2	1.0
			15	113.9	171.3	-33.3	0.0	5.8	137.5	130.9	11.3	142.2	1.0
			16	126.7	180.6	-37.3	0.0	6.0	159.3	130.9	11.3	142.2	0.9
			17	167.1	161.1	-31.3	0.0	5.8	135.3	130.9	11.3	142.2	1.1
			18	35.4	143.5	-28.1	0.0	5.7	121.1	130.9	11.3	142.2	1.2
			19	92.8	139.6	-27.3	0.0	5.6	117.8	130.9	11.3	142.2	1.1
1B	130	345	1	134.5	262.3	-6.4	-126.8	5.0	75.6	132.5	11.3	143.8	1.9
			2	162.0	243.7	-6.3	-157.2	6.8	86.1	132.5	11.3	143.8	1.7
			3	125.7	159.6	-6.3	-125.5	5.7	75.5	132.5	11.3	143.8	1.9
			4	124.2	224.4	-6.3	-154.4	6.9	82.4	132.5	11.3	143.8	1.7
			5	188.2	271.8	-6.3	-177.6	6.1	93.2	132.5	11.3	143.8	1.5
			6	150.9	227.0	-6.3	-144.8	5.8	81.7	132.5	11.3	143.8	1.8
			7	122.6	199.4	-6.4	-124.2	5.0	76.7	132.5	11.3	143.8	1.9
			8	168.5	241.4	-6.4	-135.5	6.1	85.7	132.5	11.3	143.8	1.7
			9	131.2	197.3	-6.4	-122.7	5.8	74.1	132.5	11.3	143.8	1.9
			10	150.6	226.8	-6.4	-144.6	5.9	81.8	132.5	11.3	143.8	1.8
			11	178.7	268.0	-6.4	-175.8	6.2	92.8	132.5	11.3	143.8	1.5
			12	149.6	225.0	-6.4	-142.3	5.9	81.3	132.5	11.3	143.8	1.8
			13	136.1	204.7	-6.3	-128.3	5.9	76.0	132.5	11.3	143.8	1.9
			14	154.3	232.1	-6.3	-148.6	6.8	83.1	132.5	11.3	143.8	1.7
			15	164.1	246.8	-6.3	-139.6	6.2	87.1	132.5	11.3	143.8	1.7
			16	162.2	274.0	-6.3	-179.9	6.3	94.2	132.5	11.3	143.8	1.5
			17	153.2	230.4	-6.3	-147.3	6.8	82.6	132.5	11.3	143.8	1.7
			18	125.6	263.1	-6.3	-127.1	5.9	75.5	132.5	11.3	143.8	1.9
			19	136.8	196.7	-6.4	-122.2	6.0	74.0	132.5	11.3	143.8	1.9
2B	220	345	1	145.8	219.3	-5.4	-142.6	5.0	77.2	135.6	11.3	146.9	1.9
			2	173.7	261.3	-5.4	-173.8	6.8	88.5	135.6	11.3	146.9	1.9
			3	144.4	212.2	-5.4	-154.8	5.9	76.7	135.6	11.3	146.9	1.7
			4	164.0	246.7	-5.4	-163.1	6.0	84.3	135.6	11.3	146.9	1.7
			5	191.9	280.6	-5.4	-194.3	6.3	95.3	135.6	11.3	146.9	1.5
			6	162.6	244.6	-5.4	-161.3	6.0	83.7	135.6	11.3	146.9	1.8
			7	144.2	216.9	-5.4	-148.8	6.0	76.7	135.6	11.3	146.9	1.9
			8	172.1	258.9	-5.4	-172.8	6.3	87.7	135.6	11.3	146.9	1.7
			9	142.8	214.8	-5.4	-129.8	6.0	76.1	135.6	11.3	146.9	1.9
			10	162.5	244.4	-5.4	-161.3	6.1	83.0	135.6	11.3	146.9	1.8
			11	150.4	206.4	-5.4	-192.3	6.4	94.9	135.6	11.3	146.9	1.5
			12	161.2	242.5	-5.4	-159.8	6.1	83.3	135.6	11.3	146.9	1.8
			13	147.7	222.2	-5.4	-144.8	6.1	78.0	135.6	11.3	146.9	1.9
			14	156.9	249.7	-5.4	-162.3	6.2	85.3	135.6	11.3	146.9	1.7
			15	175.8	264.4	-5.4	-176.3	6.3	89.1	135.6	11.3	146.9	1.6
			16	193.9	239.6	-5.4	-154.4	6.1	86.3	135.6	11.3	146.9	1.5
			17	142.5	247.6	-5.4	-164.3	6.2	91.3	135.6	11.3	146.9	1.7
			18	146.3	228.8	-5.4	-143.7	6.1	77.1	135.6	11.3	146.9	1.9
			19	142.4	214.2	-5.4	-138.0	6.0	76.0	135.6	11.3	146.9	1.9

(a) Present worth of additional annual expenses and benefits during the period 1994 to 1993, inclusive.

(b) Assuming that in 1994 it will be necessary to raise the intertie voltage to 345kV in order to provide for transmission of power from Bustine or other new generating plants within the Rail belt(s), and/or provide general system growth.

(c) For a 35 - year amortization period.

(d) Deduction for facilities retired in 1994.

(e) Deduction for facilities rededicated to 345kV transmission in 1994.

(f) Including the advantages of load diversity.

Commonwealth Associates Inc.

11/2/91

negotiations and delays related to the western route crossing a corner of Denali Park. Finally, no alternatives were considered that avoided sensitive areas at Windy Pass and Panorama Mountain. Consultant Alvarado suggests other indirect effects in paragraphs 24 through 28, Appendix D of the appraisal report. Since more damage would be associated with a 345 kV line, actual severance damage from physical effects of the power line would be greater ten years in the future.

D. Alternative Opportunity Costs of Environmental Protection and Reduced Severance Damage

There are an unlimited number of construction and route adjustments which could modify economic or environmental interference of the Intertie, but the subject is adequately covered by examining seven alternative scenarios from least opportunity cost avoidance to maximum sensitivity to AHTNA Inc. land and the congested mountain passes. In each case these should be compared to a benchmark, the line actually constructed known as (1B19).

Each of the options described below is analyzed in terms of the opportunity cost avoided and net benefits lost to the Alaskan Power Authority in order to arrive at the resulting land value to Ahtna for the corridor and the Ahtna share of the APA interest in cost avoidance and net benefits which could be negotiated.

Option 1: would compensate the Ahtnas for a reduction in the net present value surplus of the gas pipeline proposed due to the necessity of altering the route or installing special shields and grounds to avoid ionization of the pipe where it came within the corona of the power line. Assuming that the net benefit value would be reduced and that 50 percent of that reduction would have reduced Ahtna land rental to \$7,520,000, reference to Exhibit 2 would indicate that costs would rise to APA by an amount of \$560,000 and benefits to APA would fall by \$280,000, for a net loss of \$840,000. Fifty percent of this net loss would be negotiated for the Ahtnas so that the natives would receive \$7,520,000 for the land and \$420,000 in lieu of severance damage. The right of entry agreement could allocate the \$500,000 to this portion of the settlement.

Option 2: Alvarado suggested that an overhead line could have been built around Windy Pass, the most congested bottleneck of the total corridor and the area suffering the most dramatic visual change. The line would have been six miles longer and cost at least \$3.47 million to build. The benefit to all landowners would have been reduced, but the additional land of the Ahtnas would increase their share to 22.46 percent, giving them a base land value of \$8.19 million. The lost opportunity to APA would be \$5.20 million, 50 percent of which, or \$2.6 million, becoming due and payable to the Ahtnas in lieu of severance pay. This route would avoid jarring the observer with a line across Reindeer Hills and related sensitive areas. By remaining on Ahtna land it avoided conflict with a potential pipeline in the passes and conflict with the National Park Service on the western route alternative. However, construction of six miles of overhead was apparently not considered by Commonwealth as a method for avoiding Windy Pass because of the high construction cost with helicopter assistance and the concern that adverse weather conditions could cause collapse and maintenance problems like those adversely affecting the ill-fated Snettisham line to Juneau, where a tougher overhead route was initially selected to avoid aesthetic damage to an alternative beach route.

Option 3: would be to bury six miles of line underground through Windy Pass. The advantages of an underground installation are described in Appendix U of the appraisal report, taken from the Commonwealth report and in Appendix D, paragraphs 25 through 28 in the memorandum from Alvarado. All underground options would be immediately convertible to 345 kV so that the additional charges could be rededicated to a larger system and benefit product in ten years. This corresponds to configuration 1B12 in the Commonwealth Report. It would avoid both visual and economic conflicts, perhaps enjoy some protection from the climate, but create a potentially high repair charge for seismic disturbance. It does avoid the unknown construction and maintenance disadvantages of circumventing Windy Pass with an overhead line. The total benefit to land is reduced to 35.4, but the amount of the Intertie on Ahtna land would be sharply reduced so that the base rent for land would be reduced to \$3.93 million and the total opportunity cost to the APA would be \$8.48 million, 50 percent of which would go to the Ahtnas or \$4.24 million for a total award of \$8.17 million. The problem with this alternative is that it requires a western route with a suspended crossing of the corner of wilderness parklands, a route which would involve difficult permit applications and environmental impact analysis at best and a reasonable probability of refusal unless the overhead line was also buried on parkland for an additional six miles.

Option 3a: recognizes the probability that any line touching the parkland would need to be underground to minimize aesthetic encroachment and ongoing maintenance problems. The added expense reduced the net benefit to land to the \$32.45 million, and the Ahtna land rental to \$3.6 million. However, the total loss in benefits and additional costs to APA would be \$17.33 million. The allocation problem is more complex because three parties would have a vested interest, the Ahtnas, the Park Service, and the Power Company so that the maximum the Ahtnas might achieve through negotiation would be 33 percent, or \$5.77 million.

Option 4: would be to bury an underground line for six miles on George Park Highway and seven miles along the base of Reindeer Hills, Panorama Mountain, and the narrowest portion of the Windy Pass to avoid the unknowns of dealing with the Park Service. It would accomplish significant reductions of both visual and environmental damage to highly sensitive areas, but might still involve certain conflicts with the future pipeline. Such a solution would have provided an indicated Ahtna land value of \$4.12 million at an additional cost to APA of \$16.25 million. The shared opportunity cost with Ahtna would be \$8,125,000, for a total compensation of \$12,250,000.

Option 5: would place 16 miles underground, including six miles in Windy Pass from the previous scenario and an additional ten miles in the Nenana Gorge so that the imperative for minimizing economic and environmental congestion in the passes would have been applied consistently to the whole system. The added cost would have little affect on the Ahtnas' share since a third party would have reduced the negotiation range to 33 percent for the Ahtnas. Even then the total negotiated payment might reach \$14.12 million with risk of greater negotiation variance.

Option 6: would have been to build at least 35 miles underground on the Ahtna land or state highway road right-of-way, a design which would have avoided most of the visual damage to the land and virtually all of the intrusion on subsistence land. Potential for noise and other foul weather effects would have been eliminated and conflicts with the pipeline would have been minimal. Certainly there would be some disturbance of the soils and riverbanks and the seismic interruption risk would have been increased. Ideally the entire right-of-way would have been a state-owned highway corridor and would have avoided Ahtna land, eliminated ground rent to the Ahtnas by increasing the total lost opportunity cost of the system by \$76.83 million.

Option 7: corrects the premise of Option 6 to recognize that the underground ethic would probably be extended to Nenana Gorge as well as the Ahtna lands, thus reducing the net value attributable to land in

general and the Ahtna shares specifically. This option is included only to show that even in the extreme case of 45 miles of underground line would have proven feasible assuming tie-in of the line eventually to the Susitna project. If environmental sensitivity had been imposed on the Power Authority, the total lost opportunity cost would have been a significant \$99.89 million, and therefore the opportunity to use Ahtna lands without environmental concerns and delays is of great economic value to the Power Authority.

Each option provides significantly different capital investment, fixed charges, rededication credits, and shifts in the value attributed to all landowners and the Ahtna share in land value. The necessary data from consulting reports and related assumptions and computations are detailed in Exhibit II-2 and then summarized to measure alternative net payments to Ahtna likely to be negotiated for accepting the damages of conflicting land use in II-3.

The benchmark case of Route 1B19 has established as the lowest cost alternative proposed by Commonwealth with little redeeming sensitivity to the physical or aesthetic environment. The payment of \$7,570,000 for Ahtna lands from Part IV of the appraisal report is analogous to the \$5,000 paid to the farmer for loss of land value from the sparks generated by the railroad. Exhibit II-3 is the measurement of the savings in opportunity cost for elimination of significant elements of adverse environmental effects of the Intertie since the Ahtnas, like the farmer in the Coase Theorem case, are in a position to

EXHIBIT II-2

OPPORTUNITY COST BENEFIT MATRIX

CONFIGU- RATION	MILES ON TOTAL MILES	MILES AHTNA LAND	MILES UG	CAPITAL INVESTMENT		FIXED CHARGES		REDEDI- CATION CREDIT		OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE		INCREASE TOTAL COST	COST TO APA	NET BENEFIT	AHTNA LAND VALUE	BENEFIT TO APA	APA LOST TUNITY COST	% ALLOCATION LOST OPPOR- TUNITY TO APA	ALLOCATION TO AHTNA IN LIEU OF SEVERANCE	ALLOCATION TO AHTNA IN LIEU OF SEVERANCE
				[a]	[b]	[c]	[d]	[e]	[f]	[g]	[h]									
Benchmark	175.1	34.68	0	120.86	181.28	- 6.4	- 113.34	5.8	67.34	0.00	76.46	38.23	7.51	38.23	0.00	0.00	99	0.00	0.00	
#1	175.1	34.68	0	121.86	182.78	- 6.4	- 114.28	5.8	67.90	0.56	75.90	37.95	7.52	37.95	0.28	0.84	50	0.42	0.42	
#2	181.1 [d]	40.68	0	126.83 [e]	190.25	- 6.4	- 118.94	5.9	70.81	3.47	72.99	36.50	8.19	36.50	1.73	5.20	50	2.60	2.60	
#3	177.2 [g]	19.60	6	143.25	214.88	- 6.4	- 141.39	5.9	72.99	5.65	70.81	35.40	3.93	35.40	2.83	8.48	50	4.24	4.24	
#3a [f]	177.2 [g]	19.60	12 [h]	154.55	231.83	- 6.4	- 152.54	6.0	78.89	11.55	64.91	32.45	3.60	32.45	5.78	17.33	33	5.77	5.77	
#4	172.0 [g]	21.68	13	152.66	228.99	- 6.4	- 150.68	6.4	78.11	10.77	65.49	32.75	4.12	32.75	5.48	16.25	50	8.13	8.13	
#5	172.2 [g]	28.68	16	167.98	251.97	- 6.4	- 165.79	6.2	65.97	18.63	57.83	28.91	4.81	28.91	9.32	27.95	33	9.31	9.31	
#6	175.1 [g]	34.68	35	228.50	342.75	- 6.4	- 224.20	6.4	118.55	51.21	25.25	12.62	0.00	12.62	25.62	76.83	50	38.42	38.42	
#7	175.1 [g]	34.68	45	259.20	388.80	- 6.4	- 255.80	6.4	133.00	67.06	10.80	5.40	0.00	5.40	32.83	99.89	33	33.30	33.30	

[a] Underground cost per mile \$3,765,000.

Above-ground cost per mile \$690,000.

[b] Reflect Commonwealth factor of 1.5 of capital investment.

[c] Using Alvarado's estimate of 93.87% of capital investment for overhead routes and 98.7% of capital investment for underground routes.

[d] Additional 6 miles on Ahtna land to avoid Windy Pass east.

[e] Costs reflect a 20% increase per mile for an additional 6 miles of helicopter construction.

[f] Configuration 3a recognizes the scenario of having to bury an additional 6 miles of cable in the National Park and Wilderness area by using a Western route.

[g] Assumes underground routes are located in State Highway right-of-way.

[h] Six miles underground in right-of-way and 6 miles underground in Park and wilderness lands.

SUMMARY TABLE/BENEFITS AND OPPORTUNITY COST

CONFIGURATION	BENEFIT TO LAND	AHTNA LAND VALUE	TOTAL APA LOST OPPORTUNITY COST	ALLOCATION TO AHTNA IN LIEU OF SEVERANCE TO AHTNA	TOTAL NEGOTIATED PAYMENT TO AHTNA FOR LAND AND ACCEPTANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE (Col. 5 - 7.57) (Col. 2 & Col. 4)	NET NEGOTIABLE PAYMENT FOR CONFLICTING LAND USE
Benchmark	38.23	7.57	0.00	0.00	7.37	0.00
#1	37.95	7.52	0.84	0.42	7.94	0.37
#2	36.50	8.19	5.20	2.60	10.79	3.22
#3	35.40	3.93	8.48	4.24	8.17	0.60
#3a [e]	32.45	3.60	17.33	5.77	9.37	1.80
#4	32.75	4.12	16.25	8.13	12.23	4.68
#5	28.91	4.81	27.95	9.31	14.12	6.55
#6	12.62	0.00	76.83	38.42	38.42	30.85
#7	5.40	0.00	99.89	33.30	33.30	25.73

license the Power Authority to be an environmental nuisance in lieu of heavy capital costs and administrative delays required of a higher level of environmental sensitivity. The alternative solutions often require less Ahtna land and more investment in underground installation. Options 3 and 3a represent the counterpoint to the Ahtna willingness to negotiate on environmental standards since these options require above ground or below ground right-of-way through national parklands where there is significant administrative and legal resistance to any form of "trammeling" with man-made projects. The attractiveness of negotiating a specific payment to Ahtna to accept a conflicting land use such as the Intertie is clearly a reasonable and expedient solution to the business problems of the Power Authority.

Although eight alternative levels of environmental damage mitigation were evaluated in terms of economic benefit and cost, it will be shown that only Option No. 4 survives the test of reasonableness and the Alaskan test of "a manner which is most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury:"

Option 1 is rejected because shielding a pipeline yet to be built may not be germane for the first ten years of the lease of right-of-way and is only a minor element of the total conflict in land use between overhead wires on the right-of-way and enjoyment of the balance of Ahtna lands.

Option 2 was rejected because the difficulties of construction and maintenance remote from existing roads and of exposure to severe climate stress had apparently led Commonwealth to ignore this alternative when it identified 19 other routes. The ill-fated Snettisham line to Juneau would certainly give APA pause in accepting a six or seven mile detour for the subject case.


Options 3 and 3a along the western route were both rejected because they not only would involve positioning lines where the Cantwell residents had already rejected them, but also protracted any uncertain negotiations with federal park authorities for either an overhead or underground line.

Option 5 was rejected because the total opportunity costs to APA were increased by the assumption that environmental concerns would be extended to Nenana Gorge which is not on Ahtna lands, thus exaggerating the award to the Ahtnas for a secondary effect not directly within the Ahtna sphere of negotiation.

Options 6 and 7 were both rejected because there is no evidence that much of the route was in highly sensitive areas beyond the narrow passes and slopes of the Reindeer Hill or Panorama Mountain. If none of the line were on Ahtna land, it is doubtful that Ahtna would have had standing to negotiate although it does measure the consequences of one possible alternative not on Ahtna land.

Nevertheless, the analysts have determined that Option 4 would have reduced the most significant elements of visual damage and an intrusion on subsistence by burying the six miles of line on George Parks Highway and seven miles on Ahtna lands at the base of Reindeer Hills, Panorama Mountain, and Windy Pass. The underground line could have crossed intervening rivers and streams on the bridge framework already in place for the highway, as reported by Commonwealth in Appendix T of the

appraisal report. The underground in the pass would have reduced possible future conflict with the pipeline, and the seven miles of underground to protect the slopes of the Reindeer Hills could have been required by AHTNA Inc. Indeed, Commonwealth had indicated the preferred line 1B19 as snaking around the base of the mountain as illustrated in Exhibit II-4, but the added cost of several zigs and zags was avoided by APA engineers who took the straight line slash across the shoulder of Reindeer Hills with its irreversible damage to the vegetative cover. Since the Ahntas had required relocation of the line from the western route to the eastern route to avoid the edge of Cantwell, the Ahntas could have insisted on the Commonwealth solution or on placing the cable underground in respect to Reindeer Hills and Panorama Mountain. Reference to Exhibit II-3 will indicate that payments due for the Ahnta share in benefits to land dropped to \$4,120,000, but 50 percent of the cost to cure the cause of environmental degradation of \$16,250,000 would have resulted in a 50 percent share to the Ahntas of \$8,130,000. The sum of the land value contribution and the share of avoided cost to cure was \$12.25 million. That is the total amount the Power Company would be willing to pay Ahnta for the corridor if each party were to take a 50-50 split of avoided cost and known benefits. When the land payment from Part IV of \$7,570,000 is deducted from the total negotiated

COMMONWEALTH'S PREFERRED
ROUTE 1B19 AND ALTERNATIVES

payment for land conflict and land use, the result is \$4,680,000; the reasonable net additional payment for negotiating and permitting the Power Company to avoid the cost of environmental mitigation of the power line. The computer data base provides a conservative estimate of 49,000 acres owned by the Ahtnas in the viewshed of the powerline which suggests severance damages of \$95.51 per acre. The larger parcel representing the total corridor lands in the data base is 84,080 acres, suggesting an average loss per acre of \$55.66 from highway frontage to backlands.

THEREFORE IT IS CONCLUDED THAT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES WHICH ARE NOT REAL, BUT SUBJECTIVE IN TIME AND AMOUNT, WOULD TOTAL \$4,680,000 IN ADDITION TO A PAYMENT OF LAND OCCUPIED BY THE INTERTIE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED IN SECTION IV. THIS AMOUNT WILL PURCHASE THE ACCEPTANCE OF ALL DELETERIOUS EFFECTS OF THE INTERTIE ON THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND QUALITY OF LIFE ON ADJOINING AHTNA LANDS FOR THE TEN YEARS OF THE INITIAL 138 kV INTERTIE LINE.

III. AHTNA STATUS TO NEGOTIATE

A. Is Necessity of Taking Negotiable?

Assuming cost to cure is a reasonable measure of severance damage when the condemnor has failed to balance cheapest possible construction cost with minimum injury to public and private interests, it is still necessary to decide if AHTNA had legal status to negotiate on route and construction. If there was no right-of-entry agreement, the power company might have filed a declaration of taking under 09.55.420 or if that were unavailable due to federal assistance under the Rural Electrification Act, a complaint seeking condemnation and an order for possession. Under a declaration of taking, the owner has the responsibility to show some clear abuse of discretion since necessity is presumed in favor of the condemnor if it has considered alternate routing. In this case, the APA decision to disregard the Commonwealth routing of 1B-19 around the base of Reindeer Hills might be such an abuse. However, the Funny River case does indicate that title vested in a condemnor by declaration of taking may be divested where the court finds that the property was not taken by necessity for a public use or a purpose in a manner compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury (see Appendix C of this position paper). The thought here is that there can be an abuse of trust.

B. Does a Letter of Nonobjection
Constitute Acceptance of Any Route?

The right-of-entry agreement signed by AHTNA Inc. eliminated a necessity of declaration of taking and required AHTNA to file a letter of nonobjection. It appears the result was to provide a floating easement for the power company. However, there was some communication which may have led the power company to avoid Cantwell and certain historical sites by taking the eastern route over the Reindeer Hills. The skeptic might argue the power company was forced to take the eastern route because it would have been denied access across Denali Park required on the western route. It is not clear that AHTNA Inc. was ever provided an explanation of options on the eastern route or for partial underground routing so that the status quo had explicit consent.

C. Is the Agreement for Right-of-Entry
a Bonafide Contract

It is clear that AHTNA Inc. was not familiar with the Coase Theorem or the Federal Energy Resource Commission (FERC) position on right-of-way valuation so that negotiations could not have reflected a trade-off of maximum dollars for the Ahntas versus environmentally responsible design. Thus, it could be argued that the APA has violated the discretionary trust placed in it and damages are negotiable after the fact or

the power company could be divested of its most visible route elements degrading the visible landscape. The degree of consent implied by the right-of-entry and the degree of abuse of discretionary trust need definition before it can be argued that the Ahtnas consented to endure severance damages in exchange for a portion of cost to cure avoided by APA as a result of the consent. Does a private agreement, in lieu of a declaration of taking, have the opportunity to seek divesture of lands from APA if the route chosen exceeds limits of discretionary trust?

IV. ALASKAN STATE CODES DEFINING SEVERANCE DAMAGE

As previously argued, visual damage, progressive deterioration of the environment, and speculative future costs are difficult to convert into dollars consistent with severance damage to the remainder of the total parcel. The Alaskan Code of Civil Procedure states:

Recoverable damages must be the natural and proximate consequence of the action taken; they must be direct and certain, actual and reasonable, readily ascertainable, and not remote speculative or contingent. *Lewis & Clark County v. Nett*, 263 P. 418 (Mont. 1928); *State v. Bradshaw Land & Livestock Co.*, 43 P.2d 674 (Mont. 1935).

Not every possible element of depreciation is compensable.--It is not every possible element of depreciation in value for which compensation must be awarded in an eminent domain proceeding. *Lewis & Clark County v. Nett*, 263 P. 418 (Mont. 1928).

And attempt to enumerate elements of depreciation is futile.--Any attempt to enumerate the various circumstances which may enter into depreciation of the market value of a tract of land would be futile. *Lewis & Clark County v. Nett*, 263 P. 418 (Mont. 1928).

In this case, the only thing that is clear is there are no special benefits. However, it is not clear how the private agreement referred to as the right-of-entry agreement modifies statutory definition and the right of the property owner thereunder.

In the absence of a market comparison before and after, it is not clear if negotiation within the logical framework of the Coase Theorem represents recoverable damages that are actual

and reasonable and "readily ascertainable." Cost to cure to avoid many of the damages by going underground or altering a route does provide an alternative to "enumerating the various circumstances which may enter into depreciation of the market value of a tract of land." So the Coase Theorem does advance the law on that point.

In any event, it would appear that in the absence of a private agreement the condemnor would have made a declaratory taking and would have presumed the absence of a hearing on necessity during which the property owner could argue for modification of the design. Without a hearing on necessity the property owner can only appeal to divest the condemnor of the land. That would bring into play 09.55.460 (See Appendix D) which states:

(b) The plaintiff may not be divested of a title or possession acquired except where the court finds that the property was not taken by necessity for a public use or purpose in a manner compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. In the event of that finding, the court shall enter the judgment necessary to (1) compensate the persons entitled to it for the period during which the property was in the possession of the plaintiff, (2) recover for the plaintiff any award paid to any person, and (3) order the plaintiff to restore the property to the condition in which it existed at the time of the filing of the declaration of taking unless such restoration is impossible, in which case the court shall award damages to the property persons as compensation for any diminution in the value of the property caused by the plaintiff's wrongful possession. (State Statute 13.23 ch 101 SLA 1962; am State Statute 3 ch 149 SLA 1976)

At that point, a jury trial may need to decide if the property was not used in a manner compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury and that AHTNA Inc. could once again negotiate to exchange cost to cure as full compensation for 50 percent of the cost to avoid or mitigate environmental damage. At this point, the AHTNA Inc. award suggested in Part II, Section 3 of this report of \$4.68 million would come back into focus as a severance damage for the subject parcels.

VITA OF JAMES A. GRAASKAMP

Name: JAMES A. GRAASKAMP

Address: 202A Breese Terrace
Madison, Wisconsin 53705

Born: June 17, 1933 Place: Milwaukee

Age: 50 Marital Status: Single

Height: 6'6" Weight: 255 pounds

Physical Disability: Post-polio wheelchair

Secondary Education:

Milwaukee Country Day School, Forms I-XII. Class of 1951;
Honors Student, Class President, Publications Editor,
Football, Basketball, and Track Letters.

Undergraduate College:

Rollins College, Winter Park, Florida; BA (1955) English
major, creative writing. Publications Editor, Chapel Staff
President, Class Officer, Key Society.

Graduate Education:

Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin MBA (1957)
Finance major, security analysis. Dissertation: "Three
Theories of a 'Growth Stock' as Applied to the Light
Aircraft Industry."

University of Wisconsin School of Business, Madison,
Wisconsin Ph.D. (1964) Risk Management and Urban Land
Economics. Ph.D. Dissertation: "Problems of Pension
Termination Due to Business Failure, Liquidation, or
Migration." Ford Foundation grant study.

Academic Honors:

Omicron Delta Kappa, 1955; University of Wisconsin Fellow,
1959-60; Relm Foundation Scholar 1960-61. Selected as
co-faculty advisor to Delta Sigma Pi, the professional
business fraternity, Delta chapter, at Marquette
University; Beta Gamma Sigma, at University of Wisconsin,
1961. William H. Kiekhofer Teaching Award 1966;
Handicapped Man of the Year for State of Wisconsin 1970;
Citation for Meritorious Service for Presidents Committee
on Employment of the Handicapped.

Academic Positions:

1956-57 - Lecturer in insurance, School of Business Administration, Marquette University
1958-61 - Teaching and Research assistant - Insurance, School of Business, University of Wisconsin, Madison
1961-64 - Instructor, Insurance and Real Estate, School of Business Administration, University of Wisconsin Madison
1964-67 - Assistant Professor of Real Estate and Insurance, School of Business Administration, University of Wisconsin
1968-74 - Associate Professor of Real Estate, School of Business Administration, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin
1974-present
Full Professor, and Chairman, R.E. and Urban Land Economics

Professional Memberships & Designations:

Lambda Alpha - Ely Chapter
American Society of Real Estate Counselors, CRE
Chartered Property and Casualty Underwriter, CPU
Senior Real Estate Analyst, SREA
Certified Property Casualty Underwriter, College of Property Underwriters, CPCU
Associate member of International Association of Assessment Officers
American Risk and Insurance Association
American Real Estate & Urban Economics Association (elected director 1973-75)
Madison Industrial Development Commission 1968-71
Wisconsin Housing Finance Authority - Board member 1975-81
First Asset Realty Advisors-Board member 1981 to present

Business Experience:

General Insurance Agency from 1955-1960
Co-founder of Landmark Homes, Inc., a general contracting firm in Madison, Regency Hill, Inc., a land development firm in Madison; and West Pond Farms, Inc., a farm investment corporation; Landmark Research, Inc. specializing in real estate counseling and feasibility analysis. All business interests except Landmark Research have been profitably operated and sold. Landmark Research remains a wholly owned vehicle for professional activities. Projects include valuations, feasibility studies, counseling of major insurance companies in Wisconsin, court testimony for private and government agencies from coast to coast.

Monographs:

1. Industrial Park Development for the Small Town, with research assistant Alexander Anagnost, funded and published by U.S. Department of Commerce, 1973, 100 pages.
2. The Role of Investment Real Estate in Portfolio Management, J.A. Graaskamp, Bryn Mawr, Pa: American College of Life Underwriters, 1972, 35 pages.
3. Second Edition of A Guide to Feasibility Analysis, Chicago: Society of Real Estate Appraisers, 1972, 134 pages.
4. Lily Lake Forest Recreational Development Project, co-author, Prof. Atef Sharkawy, Department of Landscape Architecture, a book published by the University of Wisconsin, Environmental Awareness Center, 1971, 150 pages, external funding by Inland Lakes Renewal and Management.
5. The Appraisal of 25 N. Pinckney, a demonstration and discussion of contemporary appraisal theory and methods for adaptive reuse of old buildings. Published by Landmark Research, Inc., 1978, 120 pages.
6. "Fundamentals of Real Estate Development," ULI Development Component Series, 1980, 31 pages.

Articles:

1. "A Practical Computer Service for the Income Approach," The Appraisal Journal, January 1969 - 8 pages.
2. "Dollars & Cents of Shopping Centers: A Critical Review," Land Economics, Spring 1970, - 4 pages.
3. "Development and Structure of Mortgage Loan Guaranty Insurance in the U.S.", Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol, XXXIV, No. 1, March, 1967, pages 47-67.
4. "Simulation Model for Investment Project Analysis of Income Producing Real Estate", a paper presented for and published as Colloquium on Computer Applications in Real Estate Investment Analysis, University of British Columbia, 29 pages.
5. "Implications of Vested Benefits in Private Pension Plans: Comment", Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, September 1966, 6 pages.
6. "A Rational Approach to Feasibility," The Appraisal Journal, October 1972, (40th anniversary issue) 10 pages.
7. "An Approach to Real Estate Finance Education by Analogy to Risk Management Principles," Real Estate Issues, Summer 1977, pages 53-70.

Articles (Continued):

8. "Strategic Planning Approach to Major Real Estate Decisions," Questor Real Estate Investment Yearbook, Public Syndication, 1981, San Francisco, California, pages 237-244.
9. "Remodeling & Rehabilitation," Chapter 24, Principles of Real Estate Appraisal, 1982, American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers.

Additional academic or professional education projects authored by Professor Graaskamp:

1. Co-author with Prof. Peter Amato of Report to the Statutory Advisory Housing Committee, 1972, published by the Committee, approximately 300 pages.
2. Co-author with H. Robert Knitter, Director of the School of Business Computer Center of a one week training seminar designed to teach real estate professionals the techniques and application of computer time sharing systems to real estate appraisal, market analysis and financial analysis. Involved preparation of manuals, lectures, computer programs and a library of supporting systems on GE Time Sharing for the use of the professional once he has returned to his office. The seminars are offered periodically in various cities in the United States.
3. Co-director with Prof. Dick Smith of Agricultural Engineering of Badger Redevelopment Corporation, a special undergraduate two semester course receiving a University grant for innovative undergraduate programs in 1972. Final report describing and analyzing program, Housing Rehabilitation, An Innovative Undergraduate Teaching Project, jointly authored by faculty and students, published by the School of Agricultural Engineering and School of Business, 1973, 63 pages. (Illustrated)
4. Testimony and report to the Sub-Committee on Real Estate Tax Reform of the Governor's Committee on Use of Land Resources, Chairman, Warren Knowles, "A Pragmatic Approach to Real Estate Tax Assessment Valuation Reform in the State of Wisconsin," 1972.
5. Currently developing and testing an automated market comparison valuation system for tax assessment of single family homes that can be operated by the assessor in his own community. System presently operating in the Village of Maple Bluff, Dane County, Wisconsin.

Additional Academic or professional education projects
(Continued):

6. "Private Mortgage Guaranty Insurance as Distinguished from Banking and Extension of Credit," a 40-page brief prepared for Federal Reserve Bank hearings held on January 28, 1974, into possible powers of one bank holding companies to operate in the area of mortgage guaranty insurance.
7. Chairman, Chancellor's Committee for Disabled Persons on Campus, charged with implementation of University concerns for the disabled and priorities and other policies related to implementation of HEW 504 on the Madison Campus.

Educational Consultant:

Society of Real Estate Appraisers

Mortgage Bankers Association of America

Educational Foundation for Computer Applications to Real Estate (EDUCARE) (a joint venture of the three professional appraisal organizations in the United States charged with development of computer time sharing procedures for appraisers and educational seminars for dissemination of computer techniques. Co-director with H. Robert Knitter of the School of Business Computer Center.)

Continuing Education Institute, Inc. a Wisconsin corporation providing accredited programs to lawyers, accountants, appraisers and other Wisconsin professionals requiring continuing education credits for recertification.

Urban Land Institute Education Committee, a funded division of the Urban Land Institute, Washington, D.C.

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EDUCATION

1. Antigo High School, Antigo, Wisconsin, Graduated 1962.
2. Humboldt Institute, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Graduated 1962.
3. Government Photography Schools, Washington, D.C., 1963-1966.
4. University of Wisconsin
 - a. Bachelor of Science, with honors, 1971
Landscape Architecture - Natural Resources Analyst
 - b. Master of Science, 1973
Landscape Architecture - degree in Resource Evaluation
utilizing computers and remote sensing techniques
 - c. Doctor of Philosophy, 1983
Civil and Environmental Engineering

COMMUNITY SERVICE - Monona, Wisconsin

1. 1978 - 1979 Member, Ad Hoc Master Planning Commission
(wrote most of Master Plan document)
2. 1979 - 1981 Alderperson, City of Monona, Wisconsin
Chairperson, Housing and Social Services
Commission
Chairperson, Utility Commission
3. 1982 Reassessment Review Committee
4. 1982 - 1983 TIF Review Committee
5. 1982 - Present Board of Review
(oversee conversion to computer assessment
using Lincoln Land Institute CAMA system)
6. 1982 - Present Community Development Authority

NONACADEMIC EXPERIENCE

1. 10/22/62 - 5/31/63 U.S. Treasury Department, Washington, D.C.
2. 6/1/63 - 4/30/65 Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.
3. 5/1/65 - 8/22/66 Defence Intelligence Agency, Department of
the Army, Washington, D.C.
4. 9/1/66 - 9/1/68 University of Wisconsin, Wausau, Wisconsin,
Photographer.
5. 9/1/66 - 9/1/68 United Parcel Service, Wausau, Wisconsin
6. 9/1/68 - 8/1/73 University of Wisconsin, School of Business
Data Processing Center, Madison, Wisconsin,
Computer operator, programmer/consultant.

ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE

1. Teaching

- a. Teaching Assistant - Business 550 (The Real Estate Process)
1973: 1 & 2, 1974: 1 & 2, 1975: 1 & 2. (Senior T.A.
1974 & 1975.) Teaching responsibility for cash flow analysis
and real estate feasibility analysis to beginning real estate
students.
- b. Teaching Assistant - Business 554 (Residential Development)
1973: 1, 1974: 1. Responsible for weekly lab sessions
teaching site suitability evaluation and market analysis.
1975: 1. Responsible for teaching site suitability evaluation
to the real estate majors and teaching economic impact
analysis to the combined class of real estate students and
landscape architecture students.
- c. Teaching Assistant - Business 555 (Commerical Development)
1973: 2. Responsible for weekly lab sessions teaching
recreational development and commercial development market
analysis.
1974: 2. Responsible for teaching recreational development
and critical path methods in construction management.
- d. Lecturer, 1976 - Spring 1983. University of Wisconsin,
Department of Real Estate, Madison, Wisconsin.
Responsible for teaching all undergraduate appraisal
and development courses plus the graduate section
of the Real Estate Process course.
- e. Assistant Professor, Fall 1983 - Present. University of
Wisconsin, Department of Real Estate, Madison, Wisconsin.
Responsible for teaching all undergraduate appraisal
and development courses plus new course
in Micro-computer applications to real estate analysis.
- f. Acting Director, Summer 1984 - Present.
Business Computing Services, School of Business, University of
Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.
Responsible for directing computer support to faculty needs
in research and teaching.

2. Research Projects

- a. Resource Evaluation & Development System (Master's Project). Computerized land evaluation and mapping system designed to assist the land use selection process by allowing for data manipulation in a spatial context.
- b. Research Assistant - Interstate 57 Project. An Application of Computer Technology to Highway Location Dynamics.
- c. Research Assistant - Lowery Creek Project. An Application of Remote Sensing and Computer Technology in the Development of Land Use Policy in a Spatial Context.
- d. Consultant - LUSE Data System. Utilizing the computer system developed in (a), this project has developed a spatial data bank for use in teaching land use policy within the C.E. 431 course context.
- e. Consultant - Fire Station Location Model. Utilizing the computer system developed in (a), this project developed a spatial data base for which a process for fire station location was developed for the City of Madison, Wisconsin.
- f. Verona Golf Course Project. This project resulted in the development of a computer program (designed and written by myself) for predesign evaluation of land development impacts.
- g. Consolidated Paper Project. This project evaluated the land holdings of the Consolidated Paper Company. The data supplied was processed in both a spatial and purely numerical format in an attempt to identify potential development sites and suggest alternative land use options.
- h. Pack River Timber Company Project (Ph.D. Project). This project involved the fair market valuation of 42 separate parcels covering 25,000 acres of wilderness lands for inclusion into a national wilderness preserve.

PROFESSIONAL CONSULTATION

1. Teaching

EDUCARE (Educational Foundation for Computer Applications
in Real Estate)

1972 - 1982 One of three individuals who jointly
taught the course several times each year.

Chemical Bank, New York

1978 - Present. Instructor in Chemical Bank's internal
real estate school.

Professional Seminars

1974 - Present. Instructor in professional programs
intended to enhance the professional's understanding
of the real estate evaluation process.

The School of Business, University of
Wisconsin-Madison, Real Estate Executive
Management Seminar Series, REAL ESTATE
ANALYSIS WITH THE IBM PERSONAL COMPUTER

2. Appraisal and Feasibility Analysis

Provide computational support and evaluation of projects to
professionals in the field. Primarily by assisting in the
use of EDUCARE programs, especially MRCAP.

3. Mass Appraisal

Provide assistance in establishing and maintaining
computerized mass appraisal utilizing the EDUCARE
program MKTCOMP.

APPENDIX A

REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT DECISION MAKING

AUSTIN J. JAFFE AND C. F. SIRMAN
INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS

In practice these terms are often used interchangeably and while it is not always necessary to be a purist in word choice, it is important to understand the conceptual distinctions. In practice, almost all writers use the terms interchangeably.¹

Lawyers have developed an analogy called the "bundle of sticks" analogy to illustrate the nature and complexity of real property ownership rights. Each parcel of realty is viewed as carrying with it a bundle of rights, akin to a bundle of sticks. Some of these rights or "sticks" belong to the government: The state's rights to tax, regulate, and condemn real estate are among the government's rights to property. The number of sticks that the government has can vary with the social and economic traditions in a country and with the type of real estate. In general, the more socialistic a country the larger is the government's share of the bundle and conversely the smaller the individual's share. Likewise, the greater the "collective interest" in the use of the property the more rights the government normally claims. The rights that remain after the government has claimed its share may be vested in a single individual or in a group of individuals. These rights or "sticks" are private ownership interests.

Private property rights are themselves divisible. The fullest form of private property is the fee simple estate, in which the owner has three primary rights: the rights to occupy, use, and dispose of the property. But the owner of property may split the rights in numerous ways. When a property is leased, the person paying the rent buys some rights for a given period of time, yet the owner retains some rights also. The rights to surface use and the rights to extract minerals may be held by different parties for the same land. Ownership of rights can be shared among individuals in numerous ways. Because of the variety of rights associated with real estate and the myriad ways such rights can be divided among individuals, it is not always clear what is meant when someone says, "I own real estate."

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the reasons for, and the consequences of, alternative distributions of real property rights. We start with a perspective that will show why real property rights are important and why they may be vested in different ways — why the "bundle of sticks" needs to be split differently under different circumstances. We then examine specific ways that rights are divided and some of the legal limitations on the division of real property rights.

PRINCIPLES OF REAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Property rights can be thought of most generally as determining which individuals can do what with given resources. Alternative forms of property rights can result in changes in the efficiency of the use of resources and/or in a redistribution of the benefits of real property from one group or individual to another. While most changes in the bundle of rights have elements of both purposes, the former function can result in more utility from a given property.

¹ Even among writers in the field, there is disagreement concerning the definition of "real estate" and "real property." A minority of authors contend the words are synonymous. All agree, however, that there is a conceptual difference between rights to physical objects and the objects themselves.

Externalities

An externality or "spillover effect" exists when one individual's activities impose uncompensated costs on other parties or provide free benefits for them. Activities that impose costs on others are called negative externalities. As an example of a negative externality, suppose the owner of a tract of land decides that the greatest return can be derived by constructing a noisy or polluting foundry on it. Because of the foundry, the residential character of the neighborhood deteriorates, property values of existing homes decline. In terms of property rights we might ask: Should the owner of the foundry have the right to use the property in such a way as to create negative externalities for neighboring properties or should this right be removed from the owner's bundle?


The example of the foundry illustrates an important and general principle of real estate. The use of property for a purpose that will maximize the owner's return may not be desirable from an overall social perspective, because the owner may not consider the externalities imposed upon others. Many of the land use regulations and reforms discussed later in the chapter can be understood as attempts to eliminate negative externalities by limiting an individual's rights to use a property. While the desire to eliminate externalities is a major reason for government limitation on rights to real estate, it would not be feasible to attempt to eliminate all externalities. Particularly in an urban area, properties are so interrelated that almost any change in land use will have repercussions, some of which will be negative, on other properties. Thus, most regulation of use attempts to eliminate blatant negative externalities, not all externalities.

The Coase Theorem. Ronald Coase² argued that if property rights were clearly defined and freely transferable, then property could always be put to the most valued use regardless of which party initially has the right to determine how property should be used. His reasoning was that the market will allocate property rights to the individual who places the highest monetary value upon them.

The previous example of the polluting, noisy foundry can be used to illustrate Coase's point. Assume that Ms. Crane, the owner of the land on which the foundry was proposed, valued the use as a foundry \$1,000 more than the next best, non-polluting alternative. Suppose also that the owner of the adjacent residential property, Mr. Jamic, would receive a negative value of \$5,000 if the foundry were established. Given these assumptions, if the property right to specify whether the foundry could be built were given to the owner of the undeveloped land, the residential owner would be willing to pay up to \$5,000 to prevent the foundry. He might offer to pay, say, \$3,000 to Ms. Crane if she agreed to give up her right to build a foundry on the site. The foundry developer would accept the offer, since she places a value of only \$1,000 on the right to use the land as the site of a foundry. If, on the other hand, laws were such that the consent of neighbors had to be obtained before a property can be put to a polluting use, then Ms. Crane would have to get Mr. Jamic's consent before she could build her foundry. Given the initial value she places upon the right to construct and operate a foundry,

² Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," *Journal of Law and Economics*, 1, No. 1 (1960).

CASE 1: Property Owner has Right to Offend Neighbors



CASE 2: Neighbor has Right to Refuse to be Offended




Figure 9-1. Summary of the Coase Theorem.

Ms. Crane would not be willing to pay Mr. Jamic enough to obtain his consent. Thus, regardless of whether Ms. Crane or Mr. Jamic initially has the right to determine if a foundry could be constructed on Ms. Crane's site, the foundry will not be built if the property right is transferable.

Suppose the monetary values placed upon foundry use had been reversed. Mr. Jamic had a negative \$1,000 value and Ms. Crane placed a positive \$5,000 value on the foundry use. In this case the Coase theorem would also apply. Regardless of who had the initial property right to determine whether the foundry could be constructed, the market would operate. If Ms. Crane had to obtain Jamic's consent in order to construct the foundry, she would be willing to pay him up to \$5,000. Jamic would agree and the foundry would be constructed. If Crane were initially given the right to use the property for whatever purpose she pleased, then Jamic would be unwilling to purchase from her an agreement not to construct a foundry.

The Coase Theorem can be used to imply that public regulation may not be necessary, as long as the offensive property right can be purchased by the affected parties from the owner, since neighbors can then pay the owner not to use the property in a way that adversely affects them. However, there are two additional points that are important for understanding the relationship between the transferability of property rights and the role of government. First, while the ultimate use of property may not depend upon the allocation of rights (the right to determine whether the foundry may be built) the distribution of wealth is affected. Zoning and other land use regulations mean that neighbors do not have to purchase consent from nearby owners to refrain from using the land in a way that would be a nuisance. Second, if a negative externality affects many property owners, then the cost of organizing and bargaining might be extremely, even prohibitively, costly.

It was easy for the two property owners in the foundry example to reach an agreement, but if hundreds of neighbors were included then it is possible that they could not reach an agreement. Possibly no one person would want to take the organizational initiative or bear a disproportionate share of the costs. Thus the government, through regulation of real estate, takes certain rights and acts for citizens in general in order to minimize transactions costs.

Transactions costs also explain the occasional need for government to encourage positive externalities. Spillover effects that are valued positively by recipients might not occur as frequently as desired if real estate developers had to bargain with thousands of individuals. The railroads would never have been built, for example, if the railroad companies had not had the support of government. Thus, because of externalities, the state needs powers to encourage some land uses and to discourage others.

The Problem of the Commons. An example of how inefficient use of realty can result from poorly defined property rights can be seen in the "problem of the commons." England prior to 1700 had a property system whereby pastureland was owned in common. All individuals in a specified area had the right to graze their cattle on the common land. No one was excluded and no one had the right to exclude others. In many ways the distribution of property rights in the commons was similar to an idealized communal or communist system.

The problem with the English common property rights system was that each individual with rights to use the field had no incentive to conserve or use the land economically. Suppose that, for example, a farmer decided to double his herd from six to twelve. One of the most important costs of such a decision is the extra grass that the larger herd will consume. If the land were owned individually, the owner would consider this cost before expansion. But, from the perspective of an individual using commonly owned land, the grazing costs were either not considered or at least not considered as important as they should have been, because the grazing costs were shared with the other users of the commons; if the common land was owned jointly by ten farmers, then the farmer expanding a herd would bear only one-tenth of the increased feeding costs. Yet because the farmer had increased his herd there was less grass left for the cattle of other individuals. The cattle of the rest of the farmers had less grass to eat and thus gave less milk. Consequently, the group paid part of the costs of the expansion. On the other hand, since the cattle were owned individually, not jointly, the farmer who expanded his herd received 100 per cent of the benefits from his increased herd size.

Every farmer viewed the situation in the same way. They realized that it was in their individual self-interest to expand the size of their herds and proceeded to do so. The problem was that when all farmers attempted to increase the number of their cattle, the pasture area was not large enough to support the tenfold larger herds. The cattle ate so much grass that the field could not reproduce itself. The commons was overgrazed.

The solution to the problem of the commons is a redefinition of the property rights to them. For example, rather than saying that anyone may use the commons property as much as they want, the property right might be redefined to give each farmer the right to graze no more than a given number of cattle there. Alternatively, the commons might be subdivided so

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that each farmer has a clearly defined area upon which other farmers may not trespass. After the area had been partitioned, any farmer who wanted to increase his herd could still do so, but the risk of overgrazing would be borne by that individual alone.

The commons problem is a special case of externalities because the division of real property rights among numerous individuals creates a conflict between the individual's welfare and the welfare of the group. The large-group-shared ownership situation is illustrative of a variety of situations that can be found in modern urban society. For example, an urban neighborhood can be viewed as a commons area. The urban property owner who decides to let the exterior maintenance of his building deteriorate may not bear the full costs of his activity. Indeed, if the adjoining properties continue to be maintained at the original level, the owner may notice no adverse effects of his lack of maintenance (just as the individual farmer noticed no adverse effects from increasing the size of his herd). All the property owners in the neighborhood may view the situation the same way; consequently all may let their property deteriorate. If the process continues, the neighborhood will become a slum, just as the commons became an ecological disaster. Even international problems such as those concerning ocean fishing rights can be understood as a variation on the problem of the commons.³

Many recent innovations in the division of property rights are attempts to gain some of the advantages that accrue from group ownership while yet avoiding some of the pitfalls associated with collective ownership. For example, when we discuss condominium ownership it will be pointed out that there are strict rules that limit the owner's rights; these rules are necessary to prevent abuse of the commonly owned areas.

Splitting Ownership Rights

APPENDIX B

THE JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS

R. H. COASE

THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST

The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS

Edited by
AARON DIRECTOR

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VOLUME III

OCTOBER 1960

THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST

R. H. COASE
University of Virginia

I. THE PROBLEM TO BE EXAMINED¹

THIS paper is concerned with those actions of business firms which have harmful effects on others. The standard example is that of a factory the smoke from which has harmful effects on those occupying neighbouring properties. The economic analysis of such a situation has usually proceeded in terms of a divergence between the private and social product of the factory, in which economists have largely followed the treatment of Pigou in *The Economics of Welfare*. The conclusions to which this kind of analysis seems to have led most economists is that it would be desirable to make the owner of the factory liable for the damage caused to those injured by the smoke, or alternatively, to place a tax on the factory owner varying with the amount of smoke produced and equivalent in money terms to the damage it would cause, or finally, to exclude the factory from residential districts (and presumably from other

¹ This article, although concerned with a technical problem of economic analysis, arose out of the study of the Political Economy of Broadcasting which I am now conducting. The argument of the present article was implicit in a previous article dealing with the problem of allocating radio and television frequencies (The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. Law & Econ. [1959]) but comments which I have received seemed to suggest that it would be desirable to deal with the question in a more explicit way and without reference to the original problem for the solution of which the analysis was developed.

areas in which the emission of smoke would have harmful effects on others). It is my contention that the suggested courses of action are inappropriate, in that they lead to results which are not necessarily, or even usually, desirable.

II. THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

The traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that has to be made. The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what has to be decided is: how should we restrain A? But this is wrong. We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A. The real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious harm. I instanced in my previous article² the case of a confectioner the noise and vibrations from whose machinery disturbed a doctor in his work. To avoid harming the doctor would inflict harm on the confectioner. The problem posed by this case was essentially whether it was worth while, as a result of restricting the methods of production which could be used by the confectioner, to secure more doctoring at the cost of a reduced supply of confectionery products. Another example is afforded by the problem of straying cattle which destroy crops on neighbouring land. If it is inevitable that some cattle will stray, an increase in the supply of meat can only be obtained at the expense of a decrease in the supply of crops. The nature of the choice is clear: meat or crops. What answer should be given is, of course, not clear unless we know the value of what is obtained as well as the value of what is sacrificed to obtain it. To give another example, Professor George J. Stigler instances the contamination of a stream.³ If we assume that the harmful effect of the pollution is that it kills the fish, the question to be decided is: is the value of the fish lost greater or less than the value of the product which the contamination of the stream makes possible. It goes almost without saying that this problem has to be looked at in total and at the margin.

III. THE PRICING SYSTEM WITH LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE

I propose to start my analysis by examining a case in which most economists would presumably agree that the problem would be solved in a completely satisfactory manner: when the damaging business has to pay for all damage caused and the pricing system works smoothly (strictly this means that the operation of a pricing system is without cost).

A good example of the problem under discussion is afforded by the case of straying cattle which destroy crops growing on neighbouring land. Let us suppose that a farmer and a cattle-raiser are operating on neighbouring proper-

² Coase, The Federal Communication Commission, 2 J. Law & Econ. 26-27 (1959).

³ G. J. Stigler, The Theory of Price 105 (1952).

ties. Let us further suppose that, without any fencing between the properties, an increase in the size of the cattle-raiser's herd increases the total damage to the farmer's crops. What happens to the marginal damage as the size of the herd increases is another matter. This depends on whether the cattle tend to follow one another or to roam side by side, on whether they tend to be more or less restless as the size of the herd increases and on other similar factors. For my immediate purpose, it is immaterial what assumption is made about marginal damage as the size of the herd increases.

To simplify the argument, I propose to use an arithmetical example. I shall assume that the annual cost of fencing the farmer's property is \$9 and that the price of the crop is \$1 per ton. Also, I assume that the relation between the number of cattle in the herd and the annual crop loss is as follows:

Number in Herd (Steers)	Annual Crop Loss (Tons)	Crop Loss per Additional Steer (Tons)
1	1	1
2	3	2
3	6	3
4	10	4

Given that the cattle-raiser is liable for the damage caused, the additional annual cost imposed on the cattle-raiser if he increased his herd from, say, 2 to 3 steers is \$3 and in deciding on the size of the herd, he will take this into account along with his other costs. That is, he will not increase the size of the herd unless the value of the additional meat produced (assuming that the cattle-raiser slaughters the cattle), is greater than the additional costs that this will entail, including the value of the additional crops destroyed. Of course, if, by the employment of dogs, herdsmen, aeroplanes, mobile radio and other means, the amount of damage can be reduced, these means will be adopted when their cost is less than the value of the crop which they prevent being lost. Given that the annual cost of fencing is \$9, the cattle-raiser who wished to have a herd with 4 steers or more would pay for fencing to be erected and maintained, assuming that other means of attaining the same end would not do so more cheaply. When the fence is erected, the marginal cost due to the liability for damage becomes zero, except to the extent that an increase in the size of the herd necessitates a stronger and therefore more expensive fence because more steers are liable to lean against it at the same time. But, of course, it may be cheaper for the cattle-raiser not to fence and to pay for the damaged crops, as in my arithmetical example, with 3 or fewer steers.

It might be thought that the fact that the cattle-raiser would pay for all crops damaged would lead the farmer to increase his planting if a cattle-raiser came to occupy the neighbouring property. But this is not so. If the crop was previously sold in conditions of perfect competition, marginal cost was equal

to price for the amount of planting undertaken and any expansion would have reduced the profits of the farmer. In the new situation, the existence of crop damage would mean that the farmer would sell less on the open market but his receipts for a given production would remain the same, since the cattle-raiser would pay the market price for any crop damaged. Of course, if cattle-raising commonly involved the destruction of crops, the coming into existence of a cattle-raising industry might raise the price of the crops involved and farmers would then extend their planting. But I wish to confine my attention to the individual farmer.

I have said that the occupation of a neighbouring property by a cattle-raiser would not cause the amount of production, or perhaps more exactly the amount of planting, by the farmer to increase. In fact, if the cattle-raising has any effect, it will be to decrease the amount of planting. The reason for this is that, for any given tract of land, if the value of the crop damaged is so great that the receipts from the sale of the undamaged crop are less than the total costs of cultivating that tract of land, it will be profitable for the farmer and the cattle-raiser to make a bargain whereby that tract of land is left uncultivated. This can be made clear by means of an arithmetical example. Assume initially that the value of the crop obtained from cultivating a given tract of land is \$12 and that the cost incurred in cultivating this tract of land is \$10, the net gain from cultivating the land being \$2. I assume for purposes of simplicity that the farmer owns the land. Now assume that the cattle-raiser starts operations on the neighbouring property and that the value of the crops damaged is \$1. In this case \$11 is obtained by the farmer from sale on the market and \$1 is obtained from the cattle-raiser for damage suffered and the net gain remains \$2. Now suppose that the cattle-raiser finds it profitable to increase the size of his herd, even though the amount of damage rises to \$3; which means that the value of the additional meat production is greater than the additional costs, including the additional \$2 payment for damage. But the total payment for damage is now \$3. The net gain to the farmer from cultivating the land is still \$2. The cattle-raiser would be better off if the farmer would agree not to cultivate his land for any payment less than \$3. The farmer would be agreeable to not cultivating the land for any payment greater than \$2. There is clearly room for a mutually satisfactory bargain which would lead to the abandonment of cultivation.⁴ But the same argument applies not only to the whole tract cultivated by the farmer but also to any

⁴ The argument in the text has proceeded on the assumption that the alternative to cultivation of the crop is abandonment of cultivation altogether. But this need not be so. There may be crops which are less liable to damage by cattle but which would not be as profitable as the crop grown in the absence of damage. Thus, if the cultivation of a new crop would yield a return to the farmer of \$1 instead of \$2, and the size of the herd which would cause \$3 damage with the old crop would cause \$1 damage with the new crop, it would be profitable to the cattle-raiser to pay any sum less than \$2 to induce the farmer

subdivision of it. Suppose, for example, that the cattle have a well-defined route, say, to a brook or to a shady area. In these circumstances, the amount of damage to the crop along the route may well be great and if so, it could be that the farmer and the cattle-raiser would find it profitable to make a bargain whereby the farmer would agree not to cultivate this strip of land.

But this raises a further possibility. Suppose that there is such a well-defined route. Suppose further that the value of the crop that would be obtained by cultivating this strip of land is \$10 but that the cost of cultivation is \$11. In the absence of the cattle-raiser, the land would not be cultivated. However, given the presence of the cattle-raiser, it could well be that if the strip was cultivated, the whole crop would be destroyed by the cattle. In which case, the cattle-raiser would be forced to pay \$10 to the farmer. It is true that the farmer would lose \$1. But the cattle-raiser would lose \$10. Clearly this is a situation which is not likely to last indefinitely since neither party would want this to happen. The aim of the farmer would be to induce the cattle-raiser to make a payment in return for an agreement to leave this land uncultivated. The farmer would not be able to obtain a payment greater than the cost of fencing off this piece of land nor so high as to lead the cattle-raiser to abandon the use of the neighbouring property. What payment would in fact be made would depend on the shrewdness of the farmer and the cattle-raiser as bargainers. But as the payment would not be so high as to cause the cattle-raiser to abandon this location and as it would not vary with the size of the herd, such an agreement would not affect the allocation of resources but would merely alter the distribution of income and wealth as between the cattle-raiser and the farmer.

I think it is clear that if the cattle-raiser is liable for damage caused and the pricing system works smoothly, the reduction in the value of production elsewhere will be taken into account in computing the additional cost involved in increasing the size of the herd. This cost will be weighed against the value of the additional meat production and, given perfect competition in the cattle industry, the allocation of resources in cattle-raising will be optimal. What needs to be emphasized is that the fall in the value of production elsewhere which would be taken into account in the costs of the cattle-raiser may well be less than the damage which the cattle would cause to the crops in the ordinary course of events. This is because it is possible, as a result of market transactions, to discontinue cultivation of the land. This is desirable in all

to change his crop (since this would reduce damage liability from \$3 to \$1) and it would be profitable for the farmer to do so if the amount received was more than \$1 (the reduction in his return caused by switching crops). In fact, there would be room for a mutually satisfactory bargain in all cases in which a change of crop would reduce the amount of damage by more than it reduces the value of the crop (excluding damage)—in all cases, that is, in which a change in the crop cultivated would lead to an increase in the value of production.

cases in which the damage that the cattle would cause, and for which the cattle-raiser would be willing to pay, exceeds the amount which the farmer would pay for use of the land. In conditions of perfect competition, the amount which the farmer would pay for the use of the land is equal to the difference between the value of the total production when the factors are employed on this land and the value of the additional product yielded in their next best use (which would be what the farmer would have to pay for the factors). If damage exceeds the amount the farmer would pay for the use of the land, the value of the additional product of the factors employed elsewhere would exceed the value of the total product in this use after damage is taken into account. It follows that it would be desirable to abandon cultivation of the land and to release the factors employed for production elsewhere. A procedure which merely provided for payment for damage to the crop caused by the cattle but which did not allow for the possibility of cultivation being discontinued would result in too small an employment of factors of production in cattle-raising and too large an employment of factors in cultivation of the crop. But given the possibility of market transactions, a situation in which damage to crops exceeded the rent of the land would not endure. Whether the cattle-raiser pays the farmer to leave the land uncultivated or himself rents the land by paying the land-owner an amount slightly greater than the farmer would pay (if the farmer was himself renting the land), the final result would be the same and would maximise the value of production. Even when the farmer is induced to plant crops which it would not be profitable to cultivate for sale on the market, this will be a purely short-term phenomenon and may be expected to lead to an agreement under which the planting will cease. The cattle-raiser will remain in that location and the marginal cost of meat production will be the same as before, thus having no long-run effect on the allocation of resources.

IV. THE PRICING SYSTEM WITH NO LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE

I now turn to the case in which, although the pricing system is assumed to work smoothly (that is, costlessly), the damaging business is not liable for any of the damage which it causes. This business does not have to make a payment to those damaged by its actions. I propose to show that the allocation of resources will be the same in this case as it was when the damaging business was liable for damage caused. As I showed in the previous case that the allocation of resources was optimal, it will not be necessary to repeat this part of the argument.

I return to the case of the farmer and the cattle-raiser. The farmer would suffer increased damage to his crop as the size of the herd increased. Suppose that the size of the cattle-raiser's herd is 3 steers (and that this is the size of the herd that would be maintained if crop damage was not taken into account). Then the farmer would be willing to pay up to \$3 if the cattle-

raiser would reduce his herd to 2 steers, up to \$5 if the herd were reduced to 1 steer and would pay up to \$6 if cattle-raising was abandoned. The cattle-raiser would therefore receive \$3 from the farmer if he kept 2 steers instead of 3. This \$3 foregone is therefore part of the cost incurred in keeping the third steer. Whether the \$3 is a payment which the cattle-raiser has to make if he adds the third steer to his herd (which it would be if the cattle-raiser was liable to the farmer for damage caused to the crop) or whether it is a sum of money which he would have received if he did not keep a third steer (which it would be if the cattle-raiser was not liable to the farmer for damage caused to the crop) does not affect the final result. In both cases \$3 is part of the cost of adding a third steer, to be included along with the other costs. If the increase in the value of production in cattle-raising through increasing the size of the herd from 2 to 3 is greater than the additional costs that have to be incurred (including the \$3 damage to crops), the size of the herd will be increased. Otherwise, it will not. The size of the herd will be the same whether the cattle-raiser is liable for damage caused to the crop or not.

It may be argued that the assumed starting point—a herd of 3 steers—was arbitrary. And this is true. But the farmer would not wish to pay to avoid crop damage which the cattle-raiser would not be able to cause. For example, the maximum annual payment which the farmer could be induced to pay could not exceed \$9, the annual cost of fencing. And the farmer would only be willing to pay this sum if it did not reduce his earnings to a level that would cause him to abandon cultivation of this particular tract of land. Furthermore, the farmer would only be willing to pay this amount if he believed that, in the absence of any payment by him, the size of the herd maintained by the cattle raiser would be 4 or more steers. Let us assume that this is the case. Then the farmer would be willing to pay up to \$3 if the cattle raiser would reduce his herd to 3 steers, up to \$6 if the herd were reduced to 2 steers, up to \$8 if one steer only were kept and up to \$9 if cattle-raising were abandoned. It will be noticed that the change in the starting point has not altered the amount which would accrue to the cattle-raiser if he reduced the size of his herd by any given amount. It is still true that the cattle-raiser could receive an additional \$3 from the farmer if he agreed to reduce his herd from 3 steers to 2 and that the \$3 represents the value of the crop that would be destroyed by adding the third steer to the herd. Although a different belief on the part of the farmer (whether justified or not) about the size of the herd that the cattle-raiser would maintain in the absence of payments from him may affect the total payment he can be induced to pay, it is not true that this different belief would have any effect on the size of the herd that the cattle-raiser will actually keep. This will be the same as it would be if the cattle-raiser had to pay for damage caused by his cattle, since a receipt foregone of a given amount is the equivalent of a payment of the same amount.

It might be thought that it would pay the cattle-raiser to increase his herd

above the size that he would wish to maintain once a bargain had been made, in order to induce the farmer to make a larger total payment. And this may be true. It is similar in nature to the action of the farmer (when the cattle-raiser was liable for damage) in cultivating land on which, as a result of an agreement with the cattle-raiser, planting would subsequently be abandoned (including land which would not be cultivated at all in the absence of cattle-raising). But such manoeuvres are preliminaries to an agreement and do not affect the long-run equilibrium position, which is the same whether or not the cattle-raiser is held responsible for the crop damage brought about by his cattle.

It is necessary to know whether the damaging business is liable or not for damage caused since without the establishment of this initial delimitation of rights there can be no market transactions to transfer and recombine them. But the ultimate result (which maximises the value of production) is independent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work without cost.

V. THE PROBLEM ILLUSTRATED ANEW

The harmful effects of the activities of a business can assume a wide variety of forms. An early English case concerned a building which, by obstructing currents of air, hindered the operation of a windmill.⁵ A recent case in Florida concerned a building which cast a shadow on the cabana, swimming pool and sunbathing areas of a neighbouring hotel.⁶ The problem of straying cattle and the damaging of crops which was the subject of detailed examination in the two preceding sections, although it may have appeared to be rather a special case, is in fact but one example of a problem which arises in many different guises. To clarify the nature of my argument and to demonstrate its general applicability, I propose to illustrate it anew by reference to four actual cases.

Let us first reconsider the case of *Sturges v. Bridgman*⁷ which I used as an illustration of the general problem in my article on "The Federal Communications Commission." In this case, a confectioner (in Wigmore Street) used two mortars and pestles in connection with his business (one had been in operation in the same position for more than 60 years and the other for more than 26 years). A doctor then came to occupy neighbouring premises (in Wimpole Street). The confectioner's machinery caused the doctor no harm until, eight years after he had first occupied the premises, he built a consulting room at the end of his garden right against the confectioner's kitchen. It was then found that the noise and vibration caused by the confectioner's machin-

⁵ See Gale on Easements 237-39 (13th ed. M. Bowles 1959).

⁶ See *Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc.*, 114 So. 2d 357 (1959).

⁷ 11 Ch. D. 852 (1879).

ery made it difficult for the doctor to use his new consulting room. "In particular . . . the noise prevented him from examining his patients by auscultation⁸ for diseases of the chest. He also found it impossible to engage with effect in any occupation which required thought and attention." The doctor therefore brought a legal action to force the confectioner to stop using his machinery. The courts had little difficulty in granting the doctor the injunction he sought. "Individual cases of hardship may occur in the strict carrying out of the principle upon which we found our judgment, but the negation of the principle would lead even more to individual hardship, and would at the same time produce a prejudicial effect upon the development of land for residential purposes."

The court's decision established that the doctor had the right to prevent the confectioner from using his machinery. But, of course, it would have been possible to modify the arrangements envisaged in the legal ruling by means of a bargain between the parties. The doctor would have been willing to waive his right and allow the machinery to continue in operation if the confectioner would have paid him a sum of money which was greater than the loss of income which he would suffer from having to move to a more costly or less convenient location or from having to curtail his activities at this location or, as was suggested as a possibility, from having to build a separate wall which would deaden the noise and vibration. The confectioner would have been willing to do this if the amount he would have to pay the doctor was less than the fall in income he would suffer if he had to change his mode of operation at this location, abandon his operation or move his confectionery business to some other location. The solution of the problem depends essentially on whether the continued use of the machinery adds more to the confectioner's income than it subtracts from the doctor's.⁹ But now consider the situation if the confectioner had won the case. The confectioner would then have had the right to continue operating his noise and vibration-generating machinery without having to pay anything to the doctor. The boot would have been on the other foot: the doctor would have had to pay the confectioner to induce him to stop using the machinery. If the doctor's income would have fallen more through continuance of the use of this machinery than it added to the income of the confectioner, there would clearly be room for a bargain whereby the doctor paid the confectioner to stop using the machinery. That is to say, the circumstances in which it would not pay the confectioner to continue to use the machinery and to compensate the doctor for the losses that this would bring (if the doctor had the right to prevent the confectioner's using his

⁸ Auscultation is the act of listening by ear or stethoscope in order to judge by sound the condition of the body.

⁹ Note that what is taken into account is the change in income after allowing for alterations in methods of production, location, character of product, etc.

machinery) would be those in which it would be in the interest of the doctor to make a payment to the confectioner which would induce him to discontinue the use of the machinery (if the confectioner had the right to operate the machinery). The basic conditions are exactly the same in this case as they were in the example of the cattle which destroyed crops. With costless market transactions, the decision of the courts concerning liability for damage would be without effect on the allocation of resources. It was of course the view of the judges that they were affecting the working of the economic system—and in a desirable direction. Any other decision would have had "a prejudicial effect upon the development of land for residential purposes," an argument which was elaborated by examining the example of a forge operating on a barren moor, which was later developed for residual purposes. The judges' view that they were settling how the land was to be used would be true only in the case in which the costs of carrying out the necessary market transactions exceeded the gain which might be achieved by any rearrangement of rights. And it would be desirable to preserve the areas (Wimpole Street or the moor) for residential or professional use (by giving non-industrial users the right to stop the noise, vibration, smoke, etc., by injunction) only if the value of the additional residential facilities obtained was greater than the value of cakes or iron lost. But of this the judges seem to have been unaware.

Another example of the same problem is furnished by the case of *Cooke v. Forbes*.¹⁰ One process in the weaving of cocoa-nut fibre matting was to immerse it in bleaching liquids after which it was hung out to dry. Fumes from a manufacturer of sulphate of ammonia had the effect of turning the matting from a bright to a dull and blackish colour. The reason for this was that the bleaching liquid contained chloride of tin, which, when affected by sulphuretted hydrogen, is turned to a darker colour. An injunction was sought to stop the manufacturer from emitting the fumes. The lawyers for the defendant argued that if the plaintiff "were not to use . . . a particular bleaching liquid, their fibre would not be affected; that their process is unusual, not according to the custom of the trade, and even damaging to their own fabrics." The judge commented: ". . . it appears to me quite plain that a person has a right to carry on upon his own property a manufacturing process in which he uses chloride of tin, or any sort of metallic dye, and that his neighbour is not at liberty to pour in gas which will interfere with his manufacture. If it can be traced to the neighbour, then, I apprehend, clearly he will have a right to come here and ask for relief." But in view of the fact that the damage was accidental and occasional, that careful precautions were taken and that there was no exceptional risk, an injunction was refused, leaving the plaintiff to bring an action for damages if he wished. What the subsequent developments

¹⁰ L. R. 5 Eq. 166 (1867-1868).

were I do not know. But it is clear that the situation is essentially the same as that found in *Slurges v. Bridgman*, except that the cocoa-nut fibre matting manufacturer could not secure an injunction but would have to seek damages from the sulphate of ammonia manufacturer. The economic analysis of the situation is exactly the same as with the cattle which destroyed crops. To avoid the damage, the sulphate of ammonia manufacturer could increase his precautions or move to another location. Either course would presumably increase his costs. Alternatively he could pay for the damage. This he would do if the payments for damage were less than the additional costs that would have to be incurred to avoid the damage. The payments for damage would then become part of the cost of production of sulphate of ammonia. Of course, if, as was suggested in the legal proceedings, the amount of damage could be eliminated by changing the bleaching agent (which would presumably increase the costs of the matting manufacturer) and if the additional cost was less than the damage that would otherwise occur, it should be possible for the two manufacturers to make a mutually satisfactory bargain whereby the new bleaching agent was used. Had the court decided against the matting manufacturer, as a consequence of which he would have had to suffer the damage without compensation, the allocation of resources would not have been affected. It would pay the matting manufacturer to change his bleaching agent if the additional cost involved was less than the reduction in damage. And since the matting manufacturer would be willing to pay the sulphate of ammonia manufacturer an amount up to his loss of income (the increase in costs or the damage suffered) if he would cease his activities, this loss of income would remain a cost of production for the manufacturer of sulphate of ammonia. This case is indeed analytically exactly the same as the cattle example.

*Bryant v. Lefever*¹¹ raised the problem of the smoke nuisance in a novel form. The plaintiff and the defendants were occupiers of adjoining houses, which were of about the same height.

Before 1876 the plaintiff was able to light a fire in any room of his house without the chimneys smoking; the two houses had remained in the same condition some thirty or forty years. In 1876 the defendants took down their house, and began to rebuild it. They carried up a wall by the side of the plaintiff's chimneys much beyond its original height, and stacked timber on the roof of their house, and thereby caused the plaintiff's chimneys to smoke whenever he lighted fires.

The reason, of course, why the chimneys smoked was that the erection of the wall and the stacking of the timber prevented the free circulation of air. In a trial before a jury, the plaintiff was awarded damages of £40. The case then went to the Court of Appeals where the judgment was reversed. Bramwell, L.J., argued:

¹¹ 4 C.P.D. 172 (1878-1879).

... it is said, and the jury have found, that the defendants have done that which caused a nuisance to the plaintiff's house. We think there is no evidence of this. No doubt there is a nuisance, but it is not of the defendant's causing. They have done nothing in causing the nuisance. Their house and their timber are harmless enough. It is the plaintiff who causes the nuisance by lighting a coal fire in a place the chimney of which is placed so near the defendants' wall, that the smoke does not escape, but comes into the house. Let the plaintiff cease to light his fire, let him move his chimney, let him carry it higher, and there would be no nuisance. Who then, causes it? It would be very clear that the plaintiff did, if he had built his house or chimney after the defendants had put up the timber on theirs, and it is really the same though he did so before the timber was there. But (what is in truth the same answer), if the defendants cause the nuisance, they have a right to do so. If the plaintiff has not the right to the passage of air, except subject to the defendants' right to build or put timber on their house, then his right is subject to their right, and though a nuisance follows from the exercise of their right, they are not liable.

And Cotton, L.J., said:

Here it is found that the erection of the defendants' wall has sensibly and materially interfered with the comfort of human existence in the plaintiff's house, and it is said this is a nuisance for which the defendants are liable. Ordinarily this is so, but the defendants have done so, not by sending on to the plaintiff's property any smoke or noxious vapour, but by interrupting the egress of smoke from the plaintiff's house in a way to which . . . the plaintiff has no legal right. The plaintiff creates the smoke, which interferes with his comfort. Unless he has . . . a right to get rid of this in a particular way which has been interfered with by the defendants, he cannot sue the defendants, because the smoke made by himself, for which he has not provided any effectual means of escape, causes him annoyance. It is as if a man tried to get rid of liquid filth arising on his own land by a drain into his neighbour's land. Until a right had been acquired by user, the neighbour might stop the drain without incurring liability by so doing. No doubt great inconvenience would be caused to the owner of the property on which the liquid filth arises. But the act of his neighbour would be a lawful act, and he would not be liable for the consequences attributable to the fact that the man had accumulated filth without providing any effectual means of getting rid of it.

I do not propose to show that any subsequent modification of the situation, as a result of bargains between the parties (conditioned by the cost of stacking the timber elsewhere, the cost of extending the chimney higher, etc.), would have exactly the same result whatever decision the courts had come to since this point has already been adequately dealt with in the discussion of the cattle example and the two previous cases. What I shall discuss is the argument of the judges in the Court of Appeals that the smoke nuisance was not caused by the man who erected the wall but by the man who lit the fires. The novelty of the situation is that the smoke nuisance was suffered by the man who lit the fires and not by some third person. The question is not a trivial

one since it lies at the heart of the problem under discussion. Who caused the smoke nuisance? The answer seems fairly clear. The smoke nuisance was caused both by the man who built the wall *and* by the man who lit the fires. Given the fires, there would have been no smoke nuisance without the wall; given the wall, there would have been no smoke nuisance without the fires. Eliminate the wall *or* the fires and the smoke nuisance would disappear. On the marginal principle it is clear that *both* were responsible and *both* should be forced to include the loss of amenity due to the smoke as a cost in deciding whether to continue the activity which gives rise to the smoke. And given the possibility of market transactions, this is what would in fact happen. Although the wall-builder was not liable legally for the nuisance, as the man with the smoking chimneys would presumably be willing to pay a sum equal to the monetary worth to him of eliminating the smoke, this sum would therefore become for the wall-builder, a cost of continuing to have the high wall with the timber stacked on the roof.

The judges' contention that it was the man who lit the fires who alone caused the smoke nuisance is true only if we assume that the wall is the given factor. This is what the judges did by deciding that the man who erected the higher wall had a legal right to do so. The case would have been even more interesting if the smoke from the chimneys had injured the timber. Then it would have been the wall-builder who suffered the damage. The case would then have closely paralleled *Sturges v. Bridgman* and there can be little doubt that the man who lit the fires would have been liable for the ensuing damage to the timber, in spite of the fact that no damage had occurred until the high wall was built by the man who owned the timber.

Judges have to decide on legal liability but this should not confuse economists about the nature of the economic problem involved. In the case of the cattle and the crops, it is true that there would be no crop damage without the cattle. It is equally true that there would be no crop damage without the crops. The doctor's work would not have been disturbed if the confectioner had not worked his machinery; but the machinery would have disturbed no one if the doctor had not set up his consulting room in that particular place. The matting was blackened by the fumes from the sulphate of ammonia manufacturer; but no damage would have occurred if the matting manufacturer had not chosen to hang out his matting in a particular place and to use a particular bleaching agent. If we are to discuss the problem in terms of causation, both parties cause the damage. If we are to attain an optimum allocation of resources, it is therefore desirable that both parties should take the harmful effect (the nuisance) into account in deciding on their course of action. It is one of the beauties of a smoothly operating pricing system that, as has already been explained, the fall in the value of production due to the harmful effect would be a cost for both parties.

*Bass v. Gregory*¹² will serve as an excellent final illustration of the problem. The plaintiffs were the owners and tenant of a public house called the Jolly Anglers. The defendant was the owner of some cottages and a yard adjoining the Jolly Anglers. Under the public house was a cellar excavated in the rock. From the cellar, a hole or shaft had been cut into an old well situated in the defendant's yard. The well therefore became the ventilating shaft for the cellar. The cellar "had been used for a particular purpose in the process of brewing, which, without ventilation, could not be carried on." The cause of the action was that the defendant removed a grating from the mouth of the well, "so as to stop or prevent the free passage of air from [the] cellar upwards through the well. . . ." What caused the defendant to take this step is not clear from the report of the case. Perhaps "the air . . . impregnated by the brewing operations" which "passed up the well and out into the open air" was offensive to him. At any rate, he preferred to have the well in his yard stopped up. The court had first to determine whether the owners of the public house could have a legal right to a current of air. If they were to have such a right, this case would have to be distinguished from *Bryant v. Lefever* (already considered). This, however, presented no difficulty. In this case, the current of air was confined to "a strictly defined channel." In the case of *Bryant v. Lefever*, what was involved was "the general current of air common to all mankind." The judge therefore held that the owners of the public house could have the right to a current of air whereas the owner of the private house in *Bryant v. Lefever* could not. An economist might be tempted to add "but the air moved all the same." However, all that had been decided at this stage of the argument was that there could be a legal right, not that the owners of the public house possessed it. But evidence showed that the shaft from the cellar to the well had existed for over forty years and that the use of the well as a ventilating shaft must have been known to the owners of the yard since the air, when it emerged, smelt of the brewing operations. The judge therefore held that the public house had such a right by the "doctrine of lost grant." This doctrine states "that if a legal right is proved to have existed and been exercised for a number of years the law ought to presume that it had a legal origin."¹³ So the owner of the cottages and yard had to unstop the well and endure the smell.

¹² 25 Q.B.D. 481 (1890).

¹³ It may be asked why a lost grant could not also be presumed in the case of the confectioner who had operated one mortar for more than 60 years. The answer is that until the doctor built the consulting room at the end of his garden there was no nuisance. So the nuisance had not continued for many years. It is true that the confectioner in his affidavit referred to "an invalid lady who occupied the house upon one occasion, about thirty years before" who "requested him if possible to discontinue the use of the mortars before eight o'clock in the morning" and that there was some evidence that the garden wall had been subjected to vibration. But the court had little difficulty in disposing of this line of argument: ". . . this vibration, even if it existed at all, was so slight, and the com-

The reasoning employed by the courts in determining legal rights will often seem strange to an economist because many of the factors on which the decision turns are, to an economist, irrelevant. Because of this, situations which are, from an economic point of view, identical will be treated quite differently by the courts. The economic problem in all cases of harmful effects is how to maximise the value of production. In the case of *Bass v. Gregory* fresh air was drawn in through the well which facilitated the production of beer but foul air was expelled through the well which made life in the adjoining houses less pleasant. The economic problem was to decide which to choose: a lower cost of beer and worsened amenities in adjoining houses or a higher cost of beer and improved amenities. In deciding this question, the "doctrine of lost grant" is about as relevant as the colour of the judge's eyes. But it has to be remembered that the immediate question faced by the courts is *not* what shall be done by whom *but* who has the legal right to do what. It is always possible to modify by transactions on the market the initial legal delimitation of rights. And, of course, if such market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights will always take place if it would lead to an increase in the value of production.

VI. THE COST OF MARKET TRANSACTIONS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT

The argument has proceeded up to this point on the assumption (explicit in Sections III and IV and tacit in Section V) that there were no costs involved in carrying out market transactions. This is, of course, a very unrealistic assumption. In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on. These operations are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost.

In earlier sections, when dealing with the problem of the rearrangement of legal rights through the market, it was argued that such a rearrangement would be made through the market whenever this would lead to an increase in the value of production. But this assumed costless market transactions. Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into account it is clear that such a rearrangement of rights will only be undertaken when the increase in the value of production consequent upon the rearrangement

plaint, if it can be called a complaint, of the invalid lady . . . was of so trifling a character, that . . . the Defendant's acts would not have given rise to any proceeding either at law or in equity" (11 Ch.D. 863). That is, the confectioner had not committed a nuisance until the doctor built his consulting room.

is greater than the costs which would be involved in bringing it about. When it is less, the granting of an injunction (or the knowledge that it would be granted) or the liability to pay damages may result in an activity being discontinued (or may prevent its being started) which would be undertaken if market transactions were costless. In these conditions the initial delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system operates. One arrangement of rights may bring about a greater value of production than any other. But unless this is the arrangement of rights established by the legal system, the costs of reaching the same result by altering and combining rights through the market may be so great that this optimal arrangement of rights, and the greater value of production which it would bring, may never be achieved. The part played by economic considerations in the process of delimiting legal rights will be discussed in the next section. In this section, I will take the initial delimitation of rights and the costs of carrying out market transactions as given.

It is clear that an alternative form of economic organisation which could achieve the same result at less cost than would be incurred by using the market would enable the value of production to be raised. As I explained many years ago, the firm represents such an alternative to organising production through market transactions.¹⁴ Within the firm individual bargains between the various cooperating factors of production are eliminated and for a market transaction is substituted an administrative decision. The rearrangement of production then takes place without the need for bargains between the owners of the factors of production. A landowner who has control of a large tract of land may devote his land to various uses taking into account the effect that the interrelations of the various activities will have on the net return of the land, thus rendering unnecessary bargains between those undertaking the various activities. Owners of a large building or of several adjoining properties in a given area may act in much the same way. In effect, using our earlier terminology, the firm would acquire the legal rights of all the parties and the rearrangement of activities would not follow on a rearrangement of rights by contract, but as a result of an administrative decision as to how the rights should be used.

It does not, of course, follow that the administrative costs of organising a transaction through a firm are inevitably less than the costs of the market transactions which are superseded. But where contracts are peculiarly difficult to draw up and an attempt to describe what the parties have agreed to do or not to do (e.g. the amount and kind of a smell or noise that they may make or will not make) would necessitate a lengthy and highly involved document, and, where, as is probable, a long-term contract would be desir-

¹⁴ See Coase, *The Nature of the Firm*. *Economica*, New Series, 386 (1937). Reprinted in *Readings in Price Theory*, 331 (1952).

able;¹⁵ it would be hardly surprising if the emergence of a firm or the extension of the activities of an existing firm was not the solution adopted on many occasions to deal with the problem of harmful effects. This solution would be adopted whenever the administrative costs of the firm were less than the costs of the market transactions that it supersedes and the gains which would result from the rearrangement of activities greater than the firm's costs of organising them. I do not need to examine in great detail the character of this solution since I have explained what is involved in my earlier article.

But the firm is not the only possible answer to this problem. The administrative costs of organising transactions within the firm may also be high, and particularly so when many diverse activities are brought within the control of a single organisation. In the standard case of a smoke nuisance, which may affect a vast number of people engaged in a wide variety of activities, the administrative costs might well be so high as to make any attempt to deal with the problem within the confines of a single firm impossible. An alternative solution is direct Government regulation. Instead of instituting a legal system of rights which can be modified by transactions on the market, the government may impose regulations which state what people must or must not do and which have to be obeyed. Thus, the government (by statute or perhaps more likely through an administrative agency) may, to deal with the problem of smoke nuisance, decree that certain methods of production should or should not be used (e.g. that smoke preventing devices should be installed or that coal or oil should not be burned) or may confine certain types of business to certain districts (zoning regulations).

The government is, in a sense, a super-firm (but of a very special kind) since it is able to influence the use of factors of production by administrative decision. But the ordinary firm is subject to checks in its operations because of the competition of other firms, which might administer the same activities at lower cost and also because there is always the alternative of market transactions as against organisation within the firm if the administrative costs become too great. The government is able, if it wishes, to avoid the market altogether, which a firm can never do. The firm has to make market agreements with the owners of the factors of production that it uses. Just as the government can conscript or seize property, so it can decree that factors of production should only be used in such-and-such a way. Such authoritarian methods save a lot of trouble (for those doing the organising). Furthermore, the government has at its disposal the police and the other law enforcement agencies to make sure that its regulations are carried out.

It is clear that the government has powers which might enable it to get some things done at a lower cost than could a private organisation (or at any

¹⁵ For reasons explained in my earlier article, see *Readings in Price Theory*, n. 14 at 337.

rate one without special governmental powers). But the governmental administrative machine is not itself costless. It can, in fact, on occasion be extremely costly. Furthermore, there is no reason to suppose that the restrictive and zoning regulations, made by a fallible administration subject to political pressures and operating without any competitive check, will necessarily always be those which increase the efficiency with which the economic system operates. Furthermore, such general regulations which must apply to a wide variety of cases will be enforced in some cases in which they are clearly inappropriate. From these considerations it follows that direct governmental regulation will not necessarily give better results than leaving the problem to be solved by the market or the firm. But equally there is no reason why, on occasion, such governmental administrative regulation should not lead to an improvement in economic efficiency. This would seem particularly likely when, as is normally the case with the smoke nuisance, a large number of people are involved and in which therefore the costs of handling the problem through the market or the firm may be high.

There is, of course, a further alternative, which is to do nothing about the problem at all. And given that the costs involved in solving the problem by regulations issued by the governmental administrative machine will often be heavy (particularly if the costs are interpreted to include all the consequences which follow from the Government engaging in this kind of activity), it will no doubt be commonly the case that the gain which would come from regulating the actions which give rise to the harmful effects will be less than the costs involved in Government regulation.

The discussion of the problem of harmful effects in this section (when the costs of market transactions are taken into account) is extremely inadequate. But at least it has made clear that the problem is one of choosing the appropriate social arrangement for dealing with the harmful effects. All solutions have costs and there is no reason to suppose that government regulation is called for simply because the problem is not well handled by the market or the firm. Satisfactory views on policy can only come from a patient study of how, in practice, the market, firms and governments handle the problem of harmful effects. Economists need to study the work of the broker in bringing parties together, the effectiveness of restrictive covenants, the problems of the large-scale real-estate development company, the operation of Government zoning and other regulating activities. It is my belief that economists, and policy-makers generally, have tended to over-estimate the advantages which come from governmental regulation. But this belief, even if justified, does not do more than suggest that government regulation should be curtailed. It does not tell us where the boundary line should be drawn. This, it seems to me, has to come from a detailed investigation of the actual results

of handling the problem in different ways. But it would be unfortunate if this investigation were undertaken with the aid of a faulty economic analysis. The aim of this article is to indicate what the economic approach to the problem should be.

VII. THE LEGAL DELIMITATION OF RIGHTS AND THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM

The discussion in Section V not only served to illustrate the argument but also afforded a glimpse at the legal approach to the problem of harmful effects. The cases considered were all English but a similar selection of American cases could easily be made and the character of the reasoning would have been the same. Of course, if market transactions were costless, all that matters (questions of equity apart) is that the rights of the various parties should be well-defined and the results of legal actions easy to forecast. But as we have seen, the situation is quite different when market transactions are so costly as to make it difficult to change the arrangement of rights established by the law. In such cases, the courts directly influence economic activity. It would therefore seem desirable that the courts should understand the economic consequences of their decisions and should, insofar as this is possible without creating too much uncertainty about the legal position itself, take these consequences into account when making their decisions. Even when it is possible to change the legal delimitation of rights through market transactions, it is obviously desirable to reduce the need for such transactions and thus reduce the employment of resources in carrying them out.

A thorough examination of the presuppositions of the courts in trying such cases would be of great interest but I have not been able to attempt it. Nevertheless it is clear from a cursory study that the courts have often recognized the economic implications of their decisions and are aware (as many economists are not) of the reciprocal nature of the problem. Furthermore, from time to time, they take these economic implications into account, along with other factors, in arriving at their decisions. The American writers on this subject refer to the question in a more explicit fashion than do the British. Thus, to quote Prosser on Torts, a person may

make use of his own property or . . . conduct his own affairs at the expense of some harm to his neighbors. He may operate a factory whose noise and smoke cause some discomfort to others, so long as he keeps within reasonable bounds. It is only when his conduct is unreasonable, *in the light of its utility and the harm which results* [italics added], that it becomes a nuisance. . . . As it was said in an ancient case in regard to candle-making in a town, "Le utility del chose excusera le noisomeness del stink."

The world must have factories, smelters, oil refineries, noisy machinery and blasting, even at the expense of some inconvenience to those in the vicinity and the

plaintiff may be required to accept some not unreasonable discomfort for the general good.¹⁶

The standard British writers do not state as explicitly as this that a comparison between the utility and harm produced is an element in deciding whether a harmful effect should be considered a nuisance. But similar views, if less strongly expressed, are to be found.¹⁷ The doctrine that the harmful effect must be substantial before the court will act is, no doubt, in part a reflection of the fact that there will almost always be some gain to offset the harm. And in the reports of individual cases, it is clear that the judges have had in mind what would be lost as well as what would be gained in deciding whether to grant an injunction or award damages. Thus, in refusing to prevent the destruction of a prospect by a new building, the judge stated:

I know no general rule of common law, which . . . says, that building so as to stop another's prospect is a nuisance. Was that the case, there could be no great towns; and I must grant injunctions to all the new buildings in this town. . . .¹⁸

In *Webb v. Bird*¹⁹ it was decided that it was not a nuisance to build a schoolhouse so near a windmill as to obstruct currents of air and hinder the working of the mill. An early case seems to have been decided in an opposite direction. Gale commented:

In old maps of London a row of windmills appears on the heights to the north of London. Probably in the time of King James it was thought an alarming circumstance, as affecting the supply of food to the city, that anyone should build so near them as to take the wind out from their sails.²⁰

In one of the cases discussed in section V, *Sturges v. Bridgeman*, it seems clear that the judges were thinking of the economic consequences of alternative decisions. To the argument that if the principle that they seemed to be following

¹⁶ See W. L. Prosser, *The Law of Torts* 358-99, 412 (2d ed. 1955). The quotation about the ancient case concerning candle-making is taken from Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, *A General View of the Criminal Law of England* 106 (1890). Sir James Stephen gives no reference. He perhaps had in mind *Rex v. Ronkett*, included in Seavey, Keeton and Thurston, *Cases on Torts* 604 (1950). A similar view to that expressed by Prosser is to be found in F. V. Harper and F. James, *The Law of Torts* 67-74 (1956); Restatement, *Torts* §§826, 827 and 828.

¹⁷ See Winfield on *Torts* 541-48 (6th ed. T. E. Lewis 1954); Salmond on the *Law of Torts* 181-90 (12th ed. R.F.V. Heuston 1957); H. Street, *The Law of Torts* 221-29 (1959).

¹⁸ *Attorney General v. Doughty*, 2 Ves. Sen. 453, 28 Eng. Rep. 290 (Ch. 1752). Compare in this connection the statement of an American judge, quoted in Prosser, *op. cit. supra* n. 16 at 413 n. 54: "Without smoke, Pittsburgh would have remained a very pretty village." Musmanno, J., in *Versailles Borough v. McKeesport Coal & Coke Co.*, 1935, 83 Pitts. Leg. J. 379, 385.

¹⁹ 10 C.B. (N.S.) 268, 142 Eng. Rep. 445 (1861); 13 C.B. (N.S.) 841, 143 Eng. Rep. 332 (1863).

²⁰ See G. on *Easements* 238, n. 6 (13th ed. M. Bowles 1959).

were carried out to its logical consequences, it would result in the most serious practical inconveniences, for a man might go—say into the midst of the tanneries of *Bermondsey*, or into any other locality devoted to any particular trade or manufacture of a noisy or unsavoury character, and by building a private residence upon a vacant piece of land put a stop to such trade or manufacture altogether,

the judges answered that

whether anything is a nuisance or not is a question to be determined, not merely by an abstract consideration of the thing itself, but in reference to its circumstances; What would be a nuisance in *Belgrave Square* would not necessarily be so in *Bermondsey*; and where a locality is devoted to a particular trade or manufacture carried on by the traders or manufacturers in a particular and established manner not constituting a public nuisance, Judges and juries would be justified in finding, and may be trusted to find, that the trade or manufacture so carried on in that locality is not a private or actionable wrong.²¹

That the character of the neighborhood is relevant in deciding whether something is, or is not, a nuisance, is definitely established.

He who dislikes the noise of traffic must not set up his abode in the heart of a great city. He who loves peace and quiet must not live in a locality devoted to the business of making boilers or steamships.²²

What has emerged has been described as "planning and zoning by the judiciary."²³ Of course there are sometimes considerable difficulties in applying the criteria.²⁴

An interesting example of the problem is found in *Adams v. Ursell*²⁵ in which a fried fish shop in a predominantly working-class district was set up near houses of "a much better character." England without fish-and-chips is a contradiction in terms and the case was clearly one of high importance. The judge commented:

It was urged that an injunction would cause great hardship to the defendant and to the poor people who get food at his shop. The answer to that is that it does not follow that the defendant cannot carry on his business in another more suitable place somewhere in the neighbourhood. It by no means follows that because a fried fish shop is a nuisance in one place it is a nuisance in another.

In fact, the injunction which restrained Mr. Ursell from running his shop did not even extend to the whole street. So he was presumably able to move to other premises near houses of "a much worse character," the inhabitants

²¹ 11 Ch.D. 865 (1879).

²² Salmond on the *Law of Torts* 182 (12th ed. R.F.V. Heuston 1957).

²³ C. M. Haar, *Land-Use Planning, A Casebook on the Use, Misuse, and Re-use of Urban Land* 95 (1959).

²⁴ See, for example, *Rushmer v. Polsue and Allieri, Ltd.* [1906] 1 Ch. 234, which deals with the case of a house in a quiet situation in a noisy district.

²⁵ [1913] 1 Ch. 269.

of which would no doubt consider the availability of fish-and-chips to outweigh the pervading odour and "fog or mist" so graphically described by the plaintiff. Had there been no other "more suitable place in the neighbourhood," the case would have been more difficult and the decision might have been different. What would "the poor people" have had for food? No English judge would have said: "Let them eat cake."

The courts do not always refer very clearly to the economic problem posed by the cases brought before them but it seems probable that in the interpretation of words and phrases like "reasonable" or "common or ordinary use" there is some recognition, perhaps largely unconscious and certainly not very explicit, of the economic aspects of the questions at issue. A good example of this would seem to be the judgment in the Court of Appeals in *Andreæ v. Selfridge and Company Ltd.*²⁰ In this case, a hotel (in Wigmore Street) was situated on part of an island site. The remainder of the site was acquired by Selfridges which demolished the existing buildings in order to erect another in their place. The hotel suffered a loss of custom in consequence of the noise and dust caused by the demolition. The owner of the hotel brought an action against Selfridges for damages. In the lower court, the hotel was awarded £4,500 damages. The case was then taken on appeal.

The judge who had found for the hotel proprietor in the lower court said:

I cannot regard what the defendants did on the site of the first operation as having been commonly done in the ordinary use and occupation of land or houses. It is neither usual nor common, in this country, for people to excavate a site to a depth of 60 feet and then to erect upon that site a steel framework and fasten the steel frames together with rivets. . . . Nor is it, I think, a common or ordinary use of land, in this country, to act as the defendants did when they were dealing with the site of their second operation—namely, to demolish all the houses that they had to demolish, five or six of them I think, if not more, and to use for the purpose of demolishing them pneumatic hammers.

Sir Wilfred Greene, M.R., speaking for the Court of Appeals, first noted that when one is dealing with temporary operations, such as demolition and re-building, everybody has to put up with a certain amount of discomfort, because operations of that kind cannot be carried on at all without a certain amount of noise and a certain amount of dust. Therefore, the rule with regard to interference must be read subject to this qualification. . . .

He then referred to the previous judgment:

With great respect to the learned judge, I take the view that he has not approached this matter from the correct angle. It seems to me that it is not possible to say . . . that the type of demolition, excavation and construction in which the defendant company was engaged in the course of these operations was of such an abnormal and unusual nature as to prevent the qualification to which I have referred coming

²⁰ [1938] 1 Ch. 1.

into operation. It seems to me that, when the rule speaks of the common or ordinary use of land, it does not mean that the methods of using land and building on it are in some way to be stabilised for ever. As time goes on new inventions or new methods enable land to be more profitably used, either by digging down into the earth or by mounting up into the skies. Whether, from other points of view, that is a matter which is desirable for humanity is neither here nor there; but it is part of the normal use of land, to make use upon your land, in the matter of construction, of what particular type and what particular depth of foundations and particular height of building may be reasonable, in the circumstances, and in view of the developments of the day. . . . Guests at hotels are very easily upset. People coming to this hotel, who were accustomed to a quiet outlook at the back, coming back and finding demolition and building going on, may very well have taken the view that the particular merit of this hotel no longer existed. That would be a misfortune for the plaintiff; but assuming that there was nothing wrong in the defendant company's works, assuming the defendant company was carrying on the demolition and its building, productive of noise though it might be, with all reasonable skill, and taking all reasonable precautions not to cause annoyance to its neighbors, then the plaintiff might lose all her clients in the hotel because they have lost the amenities of an open and quiet place behind, but she would have no cause of complaint. . . . [But those] who say that their interference with the comfort of their neighbors is justified because their operations are normal and usual and conducted with proper care and skill are under a specific duty . . . to use that reasonable and proper care and skill. It is not correct attitude to take to say: 'We will go on and do what we like until somebody complains!' . . . Their duty is to take proper precautions and to see that the nuisance is reduced to a minimum. It is no answer for them to say: 'But this would mean that we should have to do the work more slowly than we would like to do it, or it would involve putting us to some extra expense.' All these questions are matters of common sense and degree, and quite clearly it would be unreasonable to expect people to conduct their work so slowly or so expensively, for the purpose of preventing a transient inconvenience, that the cost and trouble would be prohibitive. . . . In this case, the defendant company's attitude seems to have been to go on until somebody complained, and, further, that its desire to hurry its work and conduct it according to its own ideas and its own convenience was to prevail if there was a real conflict between it and the comfort of its neighbors. That . . . is not carrying out the obligation of using reasonable care and skill. . . . The effect comes to this . . . the plaintiff suffered an actionable nuisance; . . . she is entitled, not to a nominal sum, but to a substantial sum, based upon those principles . . . but in arriving at the sum . . . I have discounted any loss of custom . . . which might be due to the general loss of amenities owing to what was going on at the back. . . .

The upshot was that the damages awarded were reduced from £4,500 to £1,000.

The discussion in this section has, up to this point, been concerned with court decisions arising out of the common law relating to nuisance. Delimitation of rights in this area also comes about because of statutory enactments. Most economists would appear to assume that the aim of governmental

action in this field is to extend the scope of the law of nuisance by designating as nuisances activities which would not be recognized as such by the common law. And there can be no doubt that some statutes, for example, the Public Health Acts, have had this effect. But not all Government enactments are of this kind. The effect of much of the legislation in this area is to protect businesses from the claims of those they have harmed by their actions. There is a long list of legalized nuisances.

The position has been summarized in *Halsbury's Laws of England* as follows:

Where the legislature directs that a thing shall in all events be done or authorises certain works at a particular place for specific purposes or grants powers with the intention that they shall be exercised, although leaving some discretion as to the mode of exercise, no action will lie at common law for nuisance or damage which is the inevitable result of carrying out the statutory powers so conferred. This is so whether the act causing the damage is authorised for public purposes or private profit. Acts done under powers granted by persons to whom Parliament has delegated authority to grant such powers, for example, under provisional orders of the Board of Trade, are regarded as having been done under statutory authority. In the absence of negligence it seems that a body exercising statutory powers will not be liable to an action merely because it might, by acting in a different way, have minimised an injury.

Instances are next given of freedom from liability for acts authorized:

An action has been held not to be against a body exercising its statutory powers without negligence in respect of the flooding of land by water escaping from water-courses, from water pipes, from drains, or from a canal; the escape of fumes from sewers; the escape of sewage; the subsidence of a road over a sewer; vibration or noise caused by a railway; fires caused by authorised acts; the pollution of a stream where statutory requirements to use the best known method of purifying before discharging the effluent have been satisfied; interference with a telephone or telegraph system by an electric tramway; the insertion of poles for tramways in the sub-soil; annoyance caused by things reasonably necessary for the excavation of authorised works; accidental damage caused by the placing of a grating in a roadway; the escape of tar acid; or interference with the access of a frontager by a street shelter or safety railings on the edge of a pavement.²⁷

The legal position in the United States would seem to be essentially the same as in England, except that the power of the legislatures to authorize what would otherwise be nuisances under the common law, at least without giving compensation to the person harmed, is somewhat more limited, as it is subject to constitutional restrictions.²⁸ Nonetheless, the power is there and cases more or less identical with the English cases can be found. The

²⁷ See 30 *Halsbury, Law of England* 690-91 (3d ed. 1960), Article on Public Authorities and Public Officers.

²⁸ See Prosser, *op. cit. supra* n. 16 at 421; Harper and James, *op. cit. supra* n. 16 at 86-87.

question has arisen in an acute form in connection with airports and the operation of aeroplanes. The case of *Delta Air Corporation v. Kersey, Kersey v. City of Atlanta*²⁹ is a good example. Mr. Kersey bought land and built a house on it. Some years later the City of Atlanta constructed an airport on land immediately adjoining that of Mr. Kersey. It was explained that his property was "a quiet, peaceful and proper location for a home before the airport was built, but dust, noises and low flying of airplanes caused by the operation of the airport have rendered his property unsuitable as a home," a state of affairs which was described in the report of the case with a wealth of distressing detail. The judge first referred to an earlier case, *Thrasher v. City of Atlanta*³⁰ in which it was noted that the City of Atlanta had been expressly authorized to operate an airport.

By this franchise aviation was recognised as a lawful business and also as an enterprise affected with a public interest . . . all persons using [the airport] in the manner contemplated by law are within the protection and immunity of the franchise granted by the municipality. An airport is not a nuisance per se, although it might become such from the manner of its construction or operation.

Since aviation was a lawful business affected with a public interest and the construction of the airport was authorized by statute, the judge next referred to *Georgia Railroad and Banking Co. v. Maddox*³¹ in which it was said:

Where a railroad terminal yard is located and its construction authorized, under statutory powers, if it be constructed and operated in a proper manner, it cannot be adjudged a nuisance. Accordingly, injuries and inconveniences to persons residing near such a yard, from noises of locomotives, rumbling of cars, vibrations produced thereby, and smoke, cinders, soot and the like, which result from the ordinary and necessary, therefore proper, use and operation of such a yard, are not nuisances, but are the necessary concomitants of the franchise granted.

In view of this, the judge decided that the noise and dust complained of by Mr. Kersey "may be deemed to be incidental to the proper operation of an airport, and as such they cannot be said to constitute a nuisance." But the complaint against low flying was different:

. . . can it be said that flights . . . at such a low height [25 to 50 feet above Mr. Kersey's house] as to be imminently dangerous to . . . life and health . . . are a necessary concomitant of an airport? We do not think this question can be answered in the affirmative. No reason appears why the city could not obtain lands of an area [sufficiently large] . . . as not to require such low flights. . . . For the sake of public convenience adjoining-property owners must suffer such inconvenience from noise and dust as result from the usual and proper operation of an airport, but their private rights are entitled to preference in the eyes of the law where the inconvenience is not one demanded by a properly constructed and operated airport.

²⁹ Supreme Court of Georgia. 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E. 2d 245 (1942).

³⁰ 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934).

³¹ 116 Ga. 64, 42 S.E. 315 (1902).

Of course this assumed that the City of Atlanta could prevent the low flying and continue to operate the airport. The judge therefore added:

From all that appears, the conditions causing the low flying may be remedied; but if on the trial it should appear that it is indispensable to the public interest that the airport should continue to be operated in its present condition, it may be said that the petitioner should be denied injunctive relief.

In the course of another aviation case, *Smith v. New England Aircraft Co.*,³² the court surveyed the law in the United States regarding the legalizing of nuisances and it is apparent that, in the broad, it is very similar to that found in England:

It is the proper function of the legislative department of government in the exercise of the police power to consider the problems and risks that arise from the use of new inventions and endeavor to adjust private rights and harmonize conflicting interests by comprehensive statutes for the public welfare. . . . There are . . . analogies where the invasion of the airspace over underlying land by noise, smoke, vibration, dust and disagreeable odors, having been authorized by the legislative department of government and not being in effect a condemnation of the property although in some measure depreciating its market value, must be borne by the land-owner without compensation or remedy. Legislative sanction makes that lawful which otherwise might be a nuisance. Examples of this are damages to adjacent land arising from smoke, vibration and noise in the operation of a railroad . . . ; the noise of ringing factory bells . . . ; the abatement of nuisances . . . ; the erection of steam engines and furnaces . . . ; unpleasant odors connected with sewers, oil refining and storage of naphtha. . . .

Most economists seem to be unaware of all this. When they are prevented from sleeping at night by the roar of jet planes overhead (publicly authorized and perhaps publicly operated), are unable to think (or rest) in the day because of the noise and vibration from passing trains (publicly authorized and perhaps publicly operated), find it difficult to breathe because of the odour from a local sewage farm (publicly authorized and perhaps publicly operated) and are unable to escape because their driveways are blocked by a road obstruction (without any doubt, publicly devised), their nerves frayed and mental balance disturbed, they proceed to declaim about the disadvantages of private enterprise and the need for Government regulation.

While most economists seem to be under a misapprehension concerning the character of the situation with which they are dealing, it is also the case that the activities which they would like to see stopped or curtailed may well be socially justified. It is all a question of weighing up the gains that would accrue from eliminating these harmful effects against the gains that would result from allowing them to continue. Of course, it is likely that an extension of Government economic activity will often lead to this protection against

³² 270 Mass. 511, 523, 170 N.E. 385, 390 (1930).

action for nuisance being pushed further than is desirable. For one thing, the Government is likely to look with a benevolent eye on enterprises which it is itself promoting. For another, it is possible to describe the committing of a nuisance by public enterprise in a much more pleasant way than when the same thing is done by private enterprise. In the words of Lord Justice Sir Alfred Denning:

. . . the significance of the social revolution of today is that, whereas in the past the balance was much too heavily in favor of the rights of property and freedom of contract, Parliament has repeatedly intervened so as to give the public good its proper place.³³

There can be little doubt that the Welfare State is likely to bring an extension of that immunity from liability for damage, which economists have been in the habit of condemning (although they have tended to assume that this immunity was a sign of too little Government intervention in the economic system). For example, in Britain, the powers of local authorities are regarded as being either absolute or conditional. In the first category, the local authority has no discretion in exercising the power conferred on it. "The absolute power may be said to cover all the necessary consequences of its direct operation even if such consequences amount to nuisance." On the other hand, a conditional power may only be exercised in such a way that the consequences do not constitute a nuisance.

It is the intention of the legislature which determines whether a power is absolute or conditional. . . . [As] there is the possibility that the social policy of the legislature may change from time to time, a power which in one era would be construed as being conditional, might in another era be interpreted as being absolute in order to further the policy of the Welfare State. This point is one which should be borne in mind when considering some of the older cases upon this aspect of the law of nuisance.³⁴

It would seem desirable to summarize the burden of this long section. The problem which we face in dealing with actions which have harmful effects is not simply one of restraining those responsible for them. What has to be decided is whether the gain from preventing the harm is greater than the loss which would be suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the action which produces the harm. In a world in which there are costs of rearranging the rights established by the legal system, the courts, in cases relating to nuisance, are, in effect, making a decision on the economic problem and determining how resources are to be employed. It was argued that the courts are conscious of this and that they often make, although not always in a very explicit fashion, a comparison between what would be gained and what lost by preventing

³³ See Sir Alfred Denning, *Freedom Under the Law* 71 (1949).

³⁴ M. B. Cairns, *The Law of Tort in Local Government* 28-32 (1954).

actions which have harmful effects. But the delimitation of rights is also the result of statutory enactments. Here we also find evidence of an appreciation of the reciprocal nature of the problem. While statutory enactments add to the list of nuisances, action is also taken to legalize what would otherwise be nuisances under the common law. The kind of situation which economists are prone to consider as requiring corrective Government action is, in fact, often the result of Government action. Such action is not necessarily unwise. But there is a real danger that extensive Government intervention in the economic system may lead to the protection of those responsible for harmful effects being carried too far.

VIII. PIGOU'S TREATMENT IN "THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE"

The fountainhead for the modern economic analysis of the problem discussed in this article is Pigou's *Economics of Welfare* and, in particular, that section of Part II which deals with divergences between social and private net products which come about because

one person A, in the course of rendering some service, for which payment is made, to a second person B, incidentally also renders services or disservices to other persons (not producers of like services), of such a sort that payment cannot be exacted from the benefited parties or compensation enforced on behalf of the injured parties.³⁵

Pigou tells us that his aim in Part II of *The Economics of Welfare* is

to ascertain how far the free play of self-interest, acting under the existing legal system, tends to distribute the country's resources in the way most favorable to the production of a large national dividend, and how far it is feasible for State action to improve upon 'natural' tendencies.³⁶

To judge from the first part of this statement, Pigou's purpose is to discover whether any improvements could be made in the existing arrangements which determine the use of resources. Since Pigou's conclusion is that improvements could be made, one might have expected him to continue by saying that he proposed to set out the changes required to bring them about. Instead, Pigou adds a phrase which contrasts "natural" tendencies with State action, which seems in some sense to equate the present arrangements with "natural" tendencies and to imply that what is required to bring about these improvements is State action (if feasible). That this is more or less Pigou's position is evident from Chapter I of Part II.³⁷ Pigou starts by referring to "optimistic

³⁵ A. C. Pigou, *The Economics of Welfare* 183 (4th ed. 1932). My references will all be to the fourth edition but the argument and examples examined in this article remained substantially unchanged from the first edition in 1920 to the fourth in 1932. A large part (but not all) of this analysis had appeared previously in *Wealth and Welfare* (1912).

³⁶ *Id.* at xii.

³⁷ *Id.* at 127-30.

followers of the classical economists"³⁸ who have argued that the value of production would be maximised if the Government refrained from any interference in the economic system and the economic arrangements were those which came about "naturally." Pigou goes on to say that if self-interest does promote economic welfare, it is because human institutions have been devised to make it so. (This part of Pigou's argument, which he develops with the aid of a quotation from Cannan, seems to me to be essentially correct.) Pigou concludes:

But even in the most advanced States there are failures and imperfections. . . . there are many obstacles that prevent a community's resources from being distributed . . . in the most efficient way. The study of these constitutes our present problem. . . . its purposes is essentially practical. It seeks to bring into clearer light some of the ways in which it now is, or eventually may become, feasible for governments to control the play of economic forces in such wise as to promote the economic welfare, and through that, the total welfare, of their citizens as a whole.³⁹

Pigou's underlying thought would appear to be: Some have argued that no State action is needed. But the system has performed as well as it has because of State action. Nonetheless, there are still imperfections. What additional State action is required?

If this is a correct summary of Pigou's position, its inadequacy can be demonstrated by examining the first example he gives of a divergence between private and social products.

It might happen . . . that costs are thrown upon people not directly concerned, through, say, uncompensated damage done to surrounding woods by sparks from railway engines. All such effects must be included—some of them will be positive, others negative elements—in reckoning up the social net product of the marginal increment of any volume of resources turned into any use or place.⁴⁰

The example used by Pigou refers to a real situation. In Britain, a railway does not normally have to compensate those who suffer damage by fire caused by sparks from an engine. Taken in conjunction with what he says in Chapter 9 of Part II, I take Pigou's policy recommendations to be, first, that there should be State action to correct this "natural" situation and, second, that the railways should be forced to compensate those whose woods are burnt. If this is a correct interpretation of Pigou's position, I would argue that the first recommendation is based on a misapprehension of the facts and that the second is not necessarily desirable.

³⁸ In *Wealth and Welfare*, Pigou attributes the "optimism" to Adam Smith himself and not to his followers. He there refers to the "highly optimistic theory of Adam Smith that the national dividend, in given circumstances of demand and supply, tends 'naturally' to a maximum" (p. 104).

³⁹ Pigou, *op. cit. supra* n. 35 at 129-30.

⁴⁰ *Id.* at 134.

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Let us consider the legal position. Under the heading "Sparks from engines," we find the following in Halsbury's Laws of England:

If railway undertakers use steam engines on their railway without express statutory authority to do so, they are liable, irrespective of any negligence on their part, for fires caused by sparks from engines. Railway undertakers are, however, generally given statutory authority to use steam engines on their railway; accordingly, if an engine is constructed with the precautions which science suggests against fire and is used without negligence, they are not responsible at common law for any damage which may be done by sparks. . . . In the construction of an engine the undertaker is bound to use all the discoveries which science has put within its reach in order to avoid doing harm, provided they are such as it is reasonable to require the company to adopt, having proper regard to the likelihood of the damage and to the cost and convenience of the remedy; but it is not negligence on the part of an undertaker if it refuses to use an apparatus the efficiency of which is open to bona fide doubt.

To this general rule, there is a statutory exception arising from the Railway (Fires) Act, 1905, as amended in 1923. This concerns agricultural land or agricultural crops.

In such a case the fact that the engine was used under statutory powers does not affect the liability of the company in an action for the damage. . . . These provisions, however, only apply where the claim for damage . . . does not exceed £ 200, [£ 100 in the 1905 Act] and where written notice of the occurrence of the fire and the intention to claim has been sent to the company within seven days of the occurrence of the damage and particulars of the damage in writing showing the amount of the claim in money not exceeding £ 200 have been sent to the company within twenty-one days.

Agricultural land does not include moorland or buildings and agricultural crops do not include those led away or stacked.⁴¹ I have not made a close study of the parliamentary history of this statutory exception, but to judge from debates in the House of Commons in 1922 and 1923, this exception was probably designed to help the smallholder.⁴²

Let us return to Pigou's example of uncompensated damage to surrounding woods caused by sparks from railway engines. This is presumably intended to show how it is possible "for State action to improve on 'natural' tendencies." If we treat Pigou's example as referring to the position before 1905, or as being an arbitrary example (in that he might just as well have written "surrounding buildings" instead of "surrounding woods"), then it is clear that the reason why compensation was not paid must have been that the railway had statutory authority to run steam engines (which relieved it of liability for fires caused by sparks). That this was the legal position was

⁴¹ See 31 Halsbury, Laws of England 474-75 (3d ed. 1960), Article on Railways and Canals, from which this summary of the legal position, and all quotations, are taken.

⁴² See 152 H.C. Deb. 2622-63 (1922); 161 H.C. Deb. 2935-55 (1923).

established in 1860, in a case, oddly enough, which concerned the burning of surrounding woods by a railway,⁴³ and the law on this point has not been changed (apart from the one exception) by a century of railway legislation, including nationalisation. If we treat Pigou's example of "uncompensated damage done to surrounding woods by sparks from railway engines" literally, and assume that it refers to the period after 1905, then it is clear that the reason why compensation was not paid must have been that the damage was more than £ 100 (in the first edition of *The Economics of Welfare*) or more than £ 200 (in later editions) or that the owner of the wood failed to notify the railway in writing within seven days of the fire or did not send particulars of the damage, in writing, within twenty-one days. In the real world, Pigou's example could only exist as a result of a deliberate choice of the legislature. It is not, of course, easy to imagine the construction of a railway in a state of nature. The nearest one can get to this is presumably a railway which uses steam engines "without express statutory authority." However, in this case the railway would be obliged to compensate those whose woods it burnt down. That is to say, compensation would be paid in the absence of Government action. The only circumstances in which compensation would not be paid would be those in which there had been Government action. It is strange that Pigou, who clearly thought it desirable that compensation should be paid, should have chosen this particular example to demonstrate how it is possible "for State action to improve on 'natural' tendencies."

Pigou seems to have had a faulty view of the facts of the situation. But it also seems likely that he was mistaken in his economic analysis. It is not necessarily desirable that the railway should be required to compensate those who suffer damage by fires caused by railway engines. I need not show here that, if the railway could make a bargain with everyone having property adjoining the railway line and there were no costs involved in making such bargains, it would not matter whether the railway was liable for damage caused by fires or not. This question has been treated at length in earlier sections. The problem is whether it would be desirable to make the railway liable in conditions in which it is too expensive for such bargains to be made. Pigou clearly thought it was desirable to force the railway to pay compensation and it is easy to see the kind of argument that would have led him to this conclusion. Suppose a railway is considering whether to run an additional train or to increase the speed of an existing train or to install spark-preventing devices on its engines. If the railway were not liable for fire damage, then, when making these decisions, it would not take into account as a cost the increase in damage resulting from the additional train or the faster train or the failure to install spark-preventing devices. This is the source of the di-

⁴³ Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railway Co., 3 H. and N. 743 (Ex. 1858) and 5 H. and N. 679 (Ex. 1860).

vergence between private and social net products. It results in the railway performing acts which will lower the value of total production—and which it would not do if it were liable for the damage. This can be shown by means of an arithmetical example.

Consider a railway, which is *not* liable for damage by fires caused by sparks from its engines, which runs two trains per day on a certain line. Suppose that running one train per day would enable the railway to perform services worth \$150 per annum and running two trains a day would enable the railway to perform services worth \$250 per annum. Suppose further that the cost of running one train is \$50 per annum and two trains \$100 per annum. Assuming perfect competition, the cost equals the fall in the value of production elsewhere due to the employment of additional factors of production by the railway. Clearly the railway would find it profitable to run two trains per day. But suppose that running one train per day would destroy by fire crops worth (on an average over the year) \$60 and two trains a day would result in the destruction of crops worth \$120. In these circumstances running one train per day would raise the value of total production but the running of a second train would reduce the value of total production. The second train would enable additional railway services worth \$100 per annum to be performed. But the fall in the value of production elsewhere would be \$110 per annum; \$50 as a result of the employment of additional factors of production and \$60 as a result of the destruction of crops. Since it would be better if the second train were not run and since it would not run if the railway were liable for damage caused to crops, the conclusion that the railway should be made liable for the damage seems irresistible. Undoubtedly it is this kind of reasoning which underlies the Pigovian position.

The conclusion that it would be better if the second train did not run is correct. The conclusion that it is desirable that the railway should be made liable for the damage it causes is wrong. Let us change our assumption concerning the rule of liability. Suppose that the railway is liable for damage from fires caused by sparks from the engine. A farmer on lands adjoining the railway is then in the position that, if his crop is destroyed by fires caused by the railway, he will receive the market price from the railway; but if his crop is not damaged, he will receive the market price by sale. It therefore becomes a matter of indifference to him whether his crop is damaged by fire or not. The position is very different when the railway is *not* liable. Any crop destruction through railway-caused fires would then reduce the receipts of the farmer. He would therefore take out of cultivation any land for which the damage is likely to be greater than the net return of the land (for reasons explained at length in Section III). A change from a régime in which the railway is *not* liable for damage to one in which it is liable is likely therefore to lead to an increase in the amount of cultivation on lands adjoining the

railway. It will also, of course, lead to an increase in the amount of crop destruction due to railway-caused fires.

Let us return to our arithmetical example. Assume that, with the changed rule of liability, there is a doubling in the amount of crop destruction due to railway-caused fires. With one train per day, crops worth \$120 would be destroyed each year and two trains per day would lead to the destruction of crops worth \$240. We saw previously that it would not be profitable to run the second train if the railway had to pay \$60 per annum as compensation for damage. With damage at \$120 per annum the loss from running the second train would be \$60 greater. But now let us consider the first train. The value of the transport services furnished by the first train is \$150. The cost of running the train is \$50. The amount that the railway would have to pay out as compensation for damage is \$120. It follows that it would not be profitable to run any trains. With the figures in our example we reach the following result: if the railway is not liable for fire-damage, two trains per day would be run; if the railway is liable for fire-damage, it would cease operations altogether. Does this mean that it is better that there should be no railway? This question can be resolved by considering what would happen to the value of total production if it were decided to exempt the railway from liability for fire-damage, thus bringing it into operation (with two trains per day).

The operation of the railway would enable transport services worth \$250 to be performed. It would also mean the employment of factors of production which would reduce the value of production elsewhere by \$100. Furthermore it would mean the destruction of crops worth \$120. The coming of the railway will also have led to the abandonment of cultivation of some land. Since we know that, had this land been cultivated, the value of the crops destroyed by fire would have been \$120, and since it is unlikely that the total crop on this land would have been destroyed, it seems reasonable to suppose that the value of the crop yield on this land would have been higher than this. Assume it would have been \$160. But the abandonment of cultivation would have released factors of production for employment elsewhere. All we know is that the amount by which the value of production elsewhere will increase will be less than \$160. Suppose that it is \$150. Then the gain from operating the railway would be \$250 (the value of the transport services) minus \$100 (the cost of the factors of production) minus \$120 (the value of crops destroyed by fire) minus \$160 (the fall in the value of crop production due to the abandonment of cultivation) plus \$150 (the value of production elsewhere of the released factors of production). Overall, operating the railway will increase the value of total production by \$20. With these figures it is clear that it is better that the railway should not be liable for the damage it causes, thus enabling it to operate profitably. Of course, by altering the

figures, it could be shown that there are other cases in which it would be desirable that the railway should be liable for the damage it causes. It is enough for my purpose to show that, from an economic point of view, a situation in which there is "uncompensated damage done to surrounding woods by sparks from railway engines" is not necessarily undesirable. Whether it is desirable or not depends on the particular circumstances.

How is it that the Pigovian analysis seems to give the wrong answer? The reason is that Pigou does not seem to have noticed that his analysis is dealing with an entirely different question. The analysis as such is correct. But it is quite illegitimate for Pigou to draw the particular conclusion he does. The question at issue is not whether it is desirable to run an additional train or a faster train or to install smoke-preventing devices; the question at issue is whether it is desirable to have a system in which the railway has to compensate those who suffer damage from the fires which it causes or one in which the railway does not have to compensate them. When an economist is comparing alternative social arrangements, the proper procedure is to compare the total social product yielded by these different arrangements. The comparison of private and social products is neither here nor there. A simple example will demonstrate this. Imagine a town in which there are traffic lights. A motorist approaches an intersection and stops because the light is red. There are no cars approaching the intersection on the other street. If the motorist ignored the red signal, no accident would occur and the total product would increase because the motorist would arrive earlier at his destination. Why does he not do this? The reason is that if he ignored the light he would be fined. The private product from crossing the street is less than the social product. Should we conclude from this that the total product would be greater if there were no fines for failing to obey traffic signals? The Pigovian analysis shows us that it is possible to conceive of better worlds than the one in which we live. But the problem is to devise practical arrangements which will correct defects in one part of the system without causing more serious harm in other parts.

I have examined in considerable detail one example of a divergence between private and social products and I do not propose to make any further examination of Pigou's analytical system. But the main discussion of the problem considered in this article is to be found in that part of Chapter 9 in Part II which deals with Pigou's second class of divergence and it is of interest to see how Pigou develops his argument. Pigou's own description of this second class of divergence was quoted at the beginning of this section. Pigou distinguishes between the case in which a person renders services for which he receives no payment and the case in which a person renders disservices and compensation is not given to the injured parties. Our main attention has, of course, centred on this second case. It is therefore rather

astonishing to find, as was pointed out to me by Professor Francesco Forte, that the problem of the smoking chimney—the "stock instance"⁴⁴ or "class-room example"⁴⁵ of the second case—is used by Pigou as an example of the first case (services rendered without payment) and is never mentioned, at any rate explicitly, in connection with the second case.⁴⁶ Pigou points out that factory owners who devote resources to preventing their chimneys from smoking render services for which they receive no payment. The implication, in the light of Pigou's discussion later in the chapter, is that a factory owner with a smokey chimney should be given a bounty to induce him to install smoke-preventing devices. Most modern economists would suggest that the owner of the factory with the smokey chimney should be taxed. It seems a pity that economists (apart from Professor Forte) do not seem to have noticed this feature of Pigou's treatment since a realisation that the problem could be tackled in either of these two ways would probably have led to an explicit recognition of its reciprocal nature.

In discussing the second case (disservices without compensation to those damaged), Pigou says that they are rendered "when the owner of a site in a residential quarter of a city builds a factory there and so destroys a great part of the amenities of neighbouring sites; or, in a less degree, when he uses his site in such a way as to spoil the lighting of the house opposite; or when he invests resources in erecting buildings in a crowded centre, which by contracting the air-space and the playing room of the neighbourhood, tend to injure the health and efficiency of the families living there."⁴⁷ Pigou is, of course, quite right to describe such actions as "uncharged disservices." But he is wrong when he describes these actions as "anti-social."⁴⁸ They may or may not be. It is necessary to weigh the harm against the good that will result. Nothing could be more "anti-social" than to oppose any action which causes any harm to anyone.

The example with which Pigou opens his discussion of "uncharged disservices" is not, as I have indicated, the case of the smokey chimney but the case of the overrunning rabbits: ". . . incidental uncharged disservices are rendered to third parties when the game-preserving activities of one occupier involve the overrunning of a neighbouring occupier's land by rabbits. . . ." This example is of extraordinary interest, not so much because the economic

⁴⁴ Sir Dennis Robertson, *I Lectures on Economic Principles* 162 (1957).

⁴⁵ E. J. Mishan, *The Meaning of Efficiency in Economics*, 189 *The Bankers' Magazine* 482 (June 1960).

⁴⁶ Pigou, *op. cit. supra* n. 35 at 184.

⁴⁷ *Id.* at 185-86.

⁴⁸ *Id.* at 186 n.1. For similar unqualified statements see Pigou's lecture "Some Aspects of the Housing Problem" in B. S. Rowntree and A. C. Pigou, *Lectures on Housing*, in 18 *Manchester Univ. Lectures* (1914).

analysis of the case is essentially any different from that of the other examples, but because of the peculiarities of the legal position and the light it throws on the part which economics can play in what is apparently the purely legal question of the delimitation of rights.

The problem of legal liability for the actions of rabbits is part of the general subject of liability for animals.⁵⁹ I will, although with reluctance, confine my discussion to rabbits. The early cases relating to rabbits concerned the relations between the lord of the manor and commoners, since, from the thirteenth century on, it became usual for the lord of the manor to stock the commons with conies (rabbits), both for the sake of the meat and the fur. But in 1597, in *Boulston's* case, an action was brought by one landowner against a neighbouring landowner, alleging that the defendant had made coney-burrows and that the conies had increased and had destroyed the plaintiff's corn. The action failed for the reason that

... so soon as the coneys come on his neighbor's land he may kill them, for they are ferae naturae, and he who makes the coney-boroughs has no property in them, and he shall not be punished for the damage which the coneys do in which he has no property, and which the other may lawfully kill.⁶⁰

As *Boulston's* case has been treated as binding—Bray, J., in 1919, said that he was not aware that *Boulston's* case has ever been overruled or questioned⁶¹—Pigou's rabbit example undoubtedly represented the legal position at the time *The Economics of Welfare* was written.⁶² And in this case, it is not far from the truth to say that the state of affairs which Pigou describes came about because of an absence of Government action (at any rate in the form of statutory enactments) and was the result of "natural" tendencies.

Nonetheless, *Boulston's* case is something of a legal curiosity and Professor Williams makes no secret of his distaste for this decision:

⁵⁹ See G. L. Williams, *Liability for Animals—An Account of the Development and Present Law of Tortious Liability for Animals, Distress Damage Feasant and the Duty to Fence, in Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Common Law Dominions* (1939). Part Four, "The Action of Nuisance, in Relation to Liability for Animals," 236-62, is especially relevant to our discussion. The problem of liability for rabbits is discussed in this part, 238-47. I do not know how far the common law in the United States regarding liability for animals has diverged from that in Britain. In some Western States of the United States, the English common law regarding the duty to fence has not been followed, in part because "the considerable amount of open, uncleared land made it a matter of public policy to allow cattle to run at large" (Williams, *op. cit. supra* 227). This affords a good example of how a different set of circumstances may make it economically desirable to change the legal rule regarding the delimitation of rights.

⁶⁰ 5 Coke (Vol. 3) 104 b. 77 Eng. Rep., 216, 217.

⁶¹ See *Stearn v. Prentice Bros. Ltd.*, (1919) 1 K.B., 395, 397.

⁶² I have not looked into recent cases. The legal position has also been modified by statutory enactments.

The conception of liability in nuisance as being based upon ownership is the result, apparently, of a confusion with the action of cattle-trespass, and runs counter both to principle and to the medieval authorities on the escape of water, smoke and filth. . . . The prerequisite of any satisfactory treatment of the subject is the final abandonment of the pernicious doctrine in *Boulston's* case. . . . Once *Boulston's* case disappears, the way will be clear for a rational restatement of the whole subject, on lines that will harmonize with the principles prevailing in the rest of the law of nuisance.⁶³

The judges in *Boulston's* case were, of course, aware that their view of the matter depended on distinguishing this case from one involving nuisance:

This cause is not like to the cases put, on the other side, of erecting a lime-kiln, dye-house, or the like; for there the annoyance is by the act of the parties who make them; but it is not so here, for the conies of themselves went into the plaintiff's land, and he might take them when they came upon his land, and make profit of them.⁶⁴

Professor Williams comments:

Once more the atavistic idea is emerging that the animals are guilty and not the landowner. It is not, of course, a satisfactory principle to introduce into a modern law of nuisance. If A. erects a house or plants a tree so that the rain runs or drips from it on to B.'s land, this is A.'s act for which he is liable; but if A. introduces rabbits into his land so that they escape from it into B.'s, this is the act of the rabbits for which A. is not liable—such is the specious distinction resulting from *Boulston's* case.⁶⁵

It has to be admitted that the decision in *Boulston's* case seems a little odd. A man may be liable for damage caused by smoke or unpleasant smells, without it being necessary to determine whether he owns the smoke or the smell. And the rule in *Boulston's* case has not always been followed in cases dealing with other animals. For example, in *Bland v. Yates*,⁶⁶ it was decided that an injunction could be granted to prevent someone from keeping an unusual and excessive collection of manure in which flies bred and which infested a neighbour's house. The question of who owned the flies was not raised. An economist would not wish to object because legal reasoning sometimes appears a little odd. But there is a sound economic reason for supporting Professor Williams' view that the problem of liability for animals (and particularly rabbits) should be brought within the ordinary law of nuisance. The reason is not that the man who harbours rabbits is solely responsible for the damage; the man whose crops are eaten is equally responsible. And given that the costs of market transactions make a rearrange-

⁶³ Williams, *op. cit. supra* n. 49 at 242, 258.

⁶⁴ *Boulston v. Hardy*, Cro. Eliz., 547, 548, 77 Eng. Rep. 216.

⁶⁵ Williams, *op. cit. supra* n. 49 at 243.

⁶⁶ 58 Sol.J. 612 (1913-1914).

ment of rights impossible, unless we know the particular circumstances, we cannot say whether it is desirable or not to make the man who harbours rabbits responsible for the damage committed by the rabbits on neighbouring properties. The objection to the rule in *Boulston's* case is that, under it, the harbourer of rabbits can *never* be liable. It fixes the rule of liability at one pole: and this is as undesirable, from an economic point of view, as fixing the rule at the other pole and making the harbourer of rabbits always liable. But, as we saw in Section VII, the law of nuisance, as it is in fact handled by the courts, is flexible and allows for a comparison of the utility of an act with the harm it produces. As Professor Williams says: "The whole law of nuisance is an attempt to reconcile and compromise between conflicting interests. . . ."⁶⁷ To bring the problem of rabbits within the ordinary law of nuisance would not mean *inevitably* making the harbourer of rabbits liable for damage committed by the rabbits. This is not to say that the sole task of the courts in such cases is to make a comparison between the harm and the utility of an act. Nor is it to be expected that the courts will always decide correctly after making such a comparison. But unless the courts act very foolishly, the ordinary law of nuisance would seem likely to give economically more satisfactory results than adopting a rigid rule. Pigou's case of the overrunning rabbits affords an excellent example of how problems of law and economics are interrelated, even though the correct policy to follow would seem to be different from that envisioned by Pigou.

Pigou allows one exception to his conclusion that there is a divergence between private and social products in the rabbit example. He adds: ". . . unless . . . the two occupiers stand in the relation of landlord and tenant, so that compensation is given in an adjustment of the rent."⁶⁸ This qualification is rather surprising since Pigou's first class of divergence is largely concerned with the difficulties of drawing up satisfactory contracts between landlords and tenants. In fact, all the recent cases on the problem of rabbits cited by Professor Williams involved disputes between landlords and tenants concerning sporting rights.⁶⁹ Pigou seems to make a distinction between the case in which no contract is possible (the second class) and that in which the contract is unsatisfactory (the first class). Thus he says that the second class of divergences between private and social net product

cannot, like divergences due to tenancy laws, be mitigated by a modification of the contractual relation between any two contracting parties, because the divergence arises out of a service or disservice rendered to persons other than the contracting parties.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Williams, *op. cit. supra* n. 49 at 259.

⁶⁸ Pigou, *op. cit. supra* n. 35 at 185.

⁶⁹ Williams, *op. cit. supra* n. 49 at 244-47.

⁷⁰ Pigou, *op. cit. supra* n. 35 at 192.

But the reason why some activities are not the subject of contracts is exactly the same as the reason why some contracts are commonly unsatisfactory—it would cost too much to put the matter right. Indeed, the two cases are really the same since the contracts are unsatisfactory because they do not cover certain activities. The exact bearing of the discussion of the first class of divergence on Pigou's main argument is difficult to discover. He shows that in some circumstances contractual relations between landlord and tenant may result in a divergence between private and social products.⁷¹ But he also goes on to show that Government-enforced compensation schemes and rent-controls will also produce divergences.⁷² Furthermore, he shows that, when the Government is in a similar position to a private landlord, e.g. when granting a franchise to a public utility, exactly the same difficulties arise as when private individuals are involved.⁷³ The discussion is interesting but I have been unable to discover what general conclusions about economic policy, if any, Pigou expects us to draw from it.

Indeed, Pigou's treatment of the problems considered in this article is extremely elusive and the discussion of his views raises almost insuperable difficulties of interpretation. Consequently it is impossible to be sure that one has understood what Pigou really meant. Nevertheless, it is difficult to resist the conclusion, extraordinary though this may be in an economist of Pigou's stature, that the main source of this obscurity is that Pigou had not thought his position through.

IX. THE PIGOVIAN TRADITION

It is strange that a doctrine as faulty as that developed by Pigou should have been so influential, although part of its success has probably been due to the lack of clarity in the exposition. Not being clear, it was never clearly wrong. Curiously enough, this obscurity in the source has not prevented the emergence of a fairly well-defined oral tradition. What economists think they learn from Pigou, and what they tell their students, which I term the Pigovian tradition, is reasonably clear. I propose to show the inadequacy of this Pigovian tradition by demonstrating that both the analysis and the policy conclusions which it supports are incorrect.

I do not propose to justify my view as to the prevailing opinion by copious references to the literature. I do this partly because the treatment in the literature is usually so fragmentary, often involving little more than a reference to Pigou plus some explanatory comment, that detailed examination would be inappropriate. But the main reason for this lack of reference is that the doctrine, although based on Pigou, must have been largely the product of an oral tradition. Certainly economists with whom I have discussed these problems have shown a unanimity of opinion which is quite

⁷¹ *Id.* 174-75.

⁷² *Id.* 177-83.

⁷³ *Id.* 175-77.

remarkable considering the meagre treatment accorded this subject in the literature. No doubt there are some economists who do not share the usual view but they must represent a small minority of the profession.

The approach to the problems under discussion is through an examination of the value of physical production. The private product is the value of the additional product resulting from a particular activity of a business. The social product equals the private product minus the fall in the value of production elsewhere for which no compensation is paid by the business. Thus, if 10 units of a factor (and no other factors) are used by a business to make a certain product with a value of \$105; and the owner of this factor is not compensated for their use, which he is unable to prevent; and these 10 units of the factor would yield products in their best alternative use worth \$100; then, the social product is \$105 minus \$100 or \$5. If the business now pays for one unit of the factor and its price equals the value of its marginal product, then the social product rises to \$15. If two units are paid for, the social product rises to \$25 and so on until it reaches \$105 when all units of the factor are paid for. It is not difficult to see why economists have so readily accepted this rather odd procedure. The analysis focusses on the individual business decision and since the use of certain resources is not allowed for in costs, receipts are reduced by the same amount. But, of course, this means that the value of the social product has no social significance whatsoever. It seems to me preferable to use the opportunity cost concept and to approach these problems by comparing the value of the product yielded by factors in alternative uses or by alternative arrangements. The main advantage of a pricing system is that it leads to the employment of factors in places where the value of the product yielded is greatest and does so at less cost than alternative systems (I leave aside that a pricing system also eases the problem of the redistribution of income). But if through some God-given natural harmony factors flowed to the places where the value of the product yielded was greatest without any use of the pricing system and consequently there was no compensation, I would find it a source of surprise rather than a cause for dismay.

The definition of the social product is queer but this does not mean that the conclusions for policy drawn from the analysis are necessarily wrong. However, there are bound to be dangers in an approach which diverts attention from the basic issues and there can be little doubt that it has been responsible for some of the errors in current doctrine. The belief that it is desirable that the business which causes harmful effects should be forced to compensate those who suffer damage (which was exhaustively discussed in section VIII in connection with Pigou's railway sparks example) is undoubtedly the result of not comparing the total product obtainable with alternative social arrangements.

The same fault is to be found in proposals for solving the problem of harmful effects by the use of taxes or bounties. Pigou lays considerable stress on this solution although he is, as usual, lacking in detail and qualified in his support.⁶⁴ Modern economists tend to think exclusively in terms of taxes and in a very precise way. The tax should be equal to the damage done and should therefore vary with the amount of the harmful effect. As it is not proposed that the proceeds of the tax should be paid to those suffering the damage, this solution is not the same as that which would force a business to pay compensation to those damaged by its actions, although economists generally do not seem to have noticed this and tend to treat the two solutions as being identical.

Assume that a factory which emits smoke is set up in a district previously free from smoke pollution, causing damage valued at \$100 per annum. Assume that the taxation solution is adopted and that the factory owner is taxed \$100 per annum as long as the factory emits the smoke. Assume further that a smoke-preventing device costing \$90 per annum to run is available. In these circumstances, the smoke-preventing device would be installed. Damage of \$100 would have been avoided at an expenditure of \$90 and the factory-owner would be better off by \$10 per annum. Yet the position achieved may not be optimal. Suppose that those who suffer the damage could avoid it by moving to other locations or by taking various precautions which would cost them, or be equivalent to a loss in income of, \$40 per annum. Then there would be a gain in the value of production of \$50 if the factory continued to emit its smoke and those now in the district moved elsewhere or made other adjustments to avoid the damage. If the factory owner is to be made to pay a tax equal to the damage caused, it would clearly be desirable to institute a double tax system and to make residents of the district pay an amount equal to the additional cost incurred by the factory owner (or the consumers of his products) in order to avoid the damage. In these conditions, people would not stay in the district or would take other measures to prevent the damage from occurring, when the costs of doing so were less than the costs that would be incurred by the producer to reduce the damage (the producer's object, of course, being not so much to reduce the damage as to reduce the tax payments). A tax system which was confined to a tax on the producer for damage caused would tend to lead to unduly high costs being incurred for the prevention of damage. Of course this could be avoided if it were possible to base the tax, not on the damage caused, but on the fall in the value of production (in its widest sense) resulting from the emission of smoke. But to do so would require a detailed knowledge of individual preferences and I am unable to imagine how the data needed for such a taxation system could be assembled. Indeed,

⁶⁴ *Id.* 192-4, 381 and *Public Finance* 94-100 (3d ed. 1947).

the proposal to solve the smoke-pollution and similar problems by the use of taxes bristles with difficulties: the problem of calculation, the difference between average and marginal damage, the interrelations between the damage suffered on different properties, etc. But it is unnecessary to examine these problems here. It is enough for my purpose to show that, even if the tax is exactly adjusted to equal the damage that would be done to neighboring properties as a result of the emission of each additional puff of smoke, the tax would not necessarily bring about optimal conditions. An increase in the number of people living or of business operating in the vicinity of the smoke-emitting factory will increase the amount of harm produced by a given emission of smoke. The tax that would be imposed would therefore increase with an increase in the number of those in the vicinity. This will tend to lead to a decrease in the value of production of the factors employed by the factory, either because a reduction in production due to the tax will result in factors being used elsewhere in ways which are less valuable, or because factors will be diverted to produce means for reducing the amount of smoke emitted. But people deciding to establish themselves in the vicinity of the factory will not take into account this fall in the value of production which results from their presence. This failure to take into account costs imposed on others is comparable to the action of a factory-owner in not taking into account the harm resulting from his emission of smoke. Without the tax, there may be too much smoke and too few people in the vicinity of the factory; but with the tax there may be too little smoke and too many people in the vicinity of the factory. There is no reason to suppose that one of these results is necessarily preferable.

I need not devote much space to discussing the similar error involved in the suggestion that smoke producing factories should, by means of zoning regulations, be removed from the districts in which the smoke causes harmful effects. When the change in the location of the factory results in a reduction in production, this obviously needs to be taken into account and weighed against the harm which would result from the factory remaining in that location. The aim of such regulation should not be to eliminate smoke pollution but rather to secure the optimum amount of smoke pollution, this being the amount which will maximise the value of production.

X. A CHANGE OF APPROACH

It is my belief that the failure of economists to reach correct conclusions about the treatment of harmful effects cannot be ascribed simply to a few slips in analysis. It stems from basic defects in the current approach to problems of welfare economics. What is needed is a change of approach.

Analysis in terms of divergencies between private and social products concentrates attention on particular deficiencies in the system and tends to

nourish the belief that any measure which will remove the deficiency is necessarily desirable. It diverts attention from those other changes in the system which are inevitably associated with the corrective measure, changes which may well produce more harm than the original deficiency. In the preceding sections of this article, we have seen many examples of this. But it is not necessary to approach the problem in this way. Economists who study problems of the firm habitually use an opportunity cost approach and compare the receipts obtained from a given combination of factors with alternative business arrangements. It would seem desirable to use a similar approach when dealing with questions of economic policy and to compare the total product yielded by alternative social arrangements. In this article, the analysis has been confined, as is usual in this part of economics, to comparisons of the value of production, as measured by the market. But it is, of course, desirable that the choice between different social arrangements for the solution of economic problems should be carried out in broader terms than this and that the total effect of these arrangements in all spheres of life should be taken into account. As Frank H. Knight has so often emphasized, problems of welfare economics must ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthetics and morals.

A second feature of the usual treatment of the problems discussed in this article is that the analysis proceeds in terms of a comparison between a state of laissez faire and some kind of ideal world. This approach inevitably leads to a looseness of thought since the nature of the alternatives being compared is never clear. In a state of laissez faire, is there a monetary, a legal or a political system and if so, what are they? In an ideal world, would there be a monetary, a legal or a political system and if so, what would they be? The answers to all these questions are shrouded in mystery and every man is free to draw whatever conclusions he likes. Actually very little analysis is required to show that an ideal world is better than a state of laissez faire, unless the definitions of a state of laissez faire and an ideal world happen to be the same. But the whole discussion is largely irrelevant for questions of economic policy since whatever we may have in mind as our ideal world, it is clear that we have not yet discovered how to get to it from where we are. A better approach would seem to be to start our analysis with a situation approximating that which actually exists, to examine the effects of a proposed policy change and to attempt to decide whether the new situation would be, in total, better or worse than the original one. In this way, conclusions for policy would have some relevance to the actual situation.

A final reason for the failure to develop a theory adequate to handle the problem of harmful effects stems from a faulty concept of a factor of production. This is usually thought of as a physical entity which the businessman acquires and uses (an acre of land, a ton of fertiliser) instead of as a

right to perform certain (physical) actions. We may speak of a person owning land and using it as a factor of production but what the land-owner in fact possesses is the right to carry out a circumscribed list of actions. The rights of a land-owner are not unlimited. It is not even always possible for him to remove the land to another place, for instance, by quarrying it. And although it may be possible for him to exclude some people from using "his" land, this may not be true of others. For example, some people may have the right to cross the land. Furthermore, it may or may not be possible to erect certain types of buildings or to grow certain crops or to use particular drainage systems on the land. This does not come about simply because of Government regulation. It would be equally true under the common law. In fact it would be true under any system of law. A system in which the rights of individuals were unlimited would be one in which there were no rights to acquire.

68 If factors of production are thought of as rights, it becomes easier to understand that the right to do something which has a harmful effect (such as the creation of smoke, noise, smells, etc.) is also a factor of production. Just as we may use a piece of land in such a way as to prevent someone else from crossing it, or parking his car, or building his house upon it, so we may use it in such a way as to deny him a view or quiet or unpolluted air. The cost of exercising a right (of using a factor of production) is always the loss which is suffered elsewhere in consequence of the exercise of that right—the inability to cross land, to park a car, to build a house, to enjoy a view, to have peace and quiet or to breathe clean air.

It would clearly be desirable if the only actions performed were those in which what was gained was worth more than what was lost. But in choosing between social arrangements within the context of which individual decisions are made, we have to bear in mind that a change in the existing system which will lead to an improvement in some decisions may well lead to a worsening of others. Furthermore we have to take into account the costs involved in operating the various social arrangements (whether it be the working of a market or of a government department), as well as the costs involved in moving to a new system. In devising and choosing between social arrangements we should have regard for the total effect. This, above all, is the change in approach which I am advocating.

APPENDIX C

STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
AND PUBLIC FACILITIES v. 2.072 ACRES,
SUPREME COURT OF ALASKA
OCTOBER 15, 1982
(aka FUNNY RIVER CASE)

STATE, DEPT. OF TRANSP., ETC. v. 2.072 ACRES Alaska 465
Cite as. Alaska, 652 P.2d 465

STATE of Alaska, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC
FACILITIES. Appellant.

v.

2.072 ACRES, MORE OR LESS: - 5.450
Square Feet, more or less: Troy Hodges,
Sr., a/k/a Troy D. Hodges; Norma
Hodges; Irl Dale Robinson; Doris E.
Robinson; Lowell D. Kellogg; Beverly
Jean Wagner; Bertram C. Kellogg;
George B. Frederickson; Pearl M. Fred-
erickson; Evelyn Huggins d/b/a Hug-
gins Realty; National Bank of Alaska;
Alaska Title Guaranty Co.; Security Ti-
tle & Trust Company; Kenai Peninsula
Borough, Appellees.

No. 6159.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Oct. 15, 1982.

Appeal was taken from a judgment of the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, James A. Hanson, J., in favor of property owners objecting to a taking of a portion of their property for a road improvement project. The Supreme Court held that State failed to consider critical information with regard to alternatives to moving center line of roadway north, and therefore, its action in taking a portion of property owners' land to accomplish moving center line north, allegedly to improve safety, was arbitrary and in violation of statute.

Affirmed.

Rabinowitz, J., dissented and filed opin-

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State failed to consider critical information with regard to alternatives to moving center line of roadway north, and therefore, its action in taking a portion of property owners' land to accomplish moving center line north, allegedly to improve safety, was arbitrary and in violation of statute. **AS 09.55.430(7), 09.55.460(b).**

Bruce Tenant, Asst. Atty. Gen., Anchorage, Wilson L. Condon, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellant.

Edward L. Garnett, Kenai, for appellees Troy D. Hodges, Sr. and Norma Hodges.

Before BURKE, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, CONNOR, MATTHEWS and COMPTON, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

For the purpose of improving Funny River Road, the State determined to take 2.072 acres of land belonging to Troy and Norma Hodges and attempted to do so using the device of a declaration of taking. However, AS 09.55.430(7) provides that a declaration of taking shall contain "a statement that the property is taken by necessity for a project located in a manner which is most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury; AS 09.55.460(b) provides that the title vested in the condemnor in a declaration of taking proceeding may be divested "where the court finds that the property was not taken by necessity for a public use or purpose in a manner compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury." After holding a hearing, the superior court determined that the taking of the 2.072 acres was unnecessary and thus could not be permitted. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This dispute concerns the Funny River Road Project. The purpose of the project is to improve Funny River Road generally, and in particular to make it safer in certain areas. Construction on the project has not yet begun. The federal government will provide ninety-five percent of the funding for construction of the Project. To receive this funding, the federal government requires that the State comply with the road safety standards of the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO).

Troy and Norma Hodges live on an eighty acre parcel (Parcel 21) which they own on the northern side of Funny River Road across the highway from the Soldotna Airport. At Station 62 + 19, which is in front of the Hodges' property, the road curves south away from the Hodges and toward the airport. Also, at this point there is a gradual hill (vertical curve).

As part of the Funny River Road Project, the State plans to take 2.072 acres from the Hodges—a fifty foot wide strip from Station 62 + 19 to Station 65, and a thirty-three foot wide strip from Station 65 to the end of the Project.¹ The taking will not include the Hodges' house. Rather, it will include lawn areas, two flower beds, an abandoned well, an antenna tie-down and part of the driveway. The taking will make it necessary to regrade the Hodges' driveway. The State will pay for the regrading.

The State's overall purpose in taking the 2.072 acres beginning at Station 62 + 19 is to improve safety. To accomplish this purpose it intends: (1) to widen the road from twenty-eight to thirty-four feet; (2) to widen the right of way on each side of the road; and (3) to move the centerline of the road seventeen feet north beginning at Station 62 + 19. The State wants to move the centerline seventeen feet north at Station 62 + 19 so it can eliminate a horizontal curve to the south occurring at that point, and thus improve safety. Due to the combined effect of the horizontal curve, and the gradual hill or vertical curve which also occurs at Station 62 + 19, oncoming cars falsely appear to be on the wrong side of the road to drivers going up the hill. Also, drivers do not see the horizontal curve until they actually reach it. The combined horizontal and vertical curves fail to comply with AASHTO safety standards. The State proposes to bring the road into compliance with AASHTO standards by eliminating the horizontal curve as indicated above and by reducing the height of the vertical curve.

I. The construction project is divided into 100 foot sections for reference and locating purposes. Each 100 feet is a station so that any point on the project may be located by refer-

The superior court held that the Hodges had shown by clear and convincing evidence that the taking of this portion of their land was not necessary. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.

II. NECESSITY

AS 09.55.430(7) provides:

The declaration of taking shall contain (7) a statement that the property is taken by necessity for a project located in a manner which is most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.

AS 09.55.460(b) provides:

The plaintiff may not be divested of a title or possession acquired except where the court finds that the property was not taken by necessity for a public use or purpose in a manner compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.

In construing these provisions we have stated:

"The mandate of AS 09.55.460(b) is that 'private injury' be considered with reference to the particular properties involved. In our view the statute contemplates that the injuries suffered by each individual should be minimized to the extent that it is reasonably possible to do so without impairing the integrity and function of the project and without adding unreasonable costs to the project. [Footnote omitted.]

Striking the ultimate balance is, of course, a decision to be made by the condemnor. A court should not substitute its judgment for that of the condemnor but may set aside the condemnor's decision if it is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.'

State v. 0.644 Acres, 613 P.2d 829, 832-33 (Alaska 1980). We noted in *0.644 Acres* that the State's determination of the least

ring to the station or portion of a station. Thus, a point referred to as Station 62 + 19 would be 6.219 feet from the reference starting point of the stationing.

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private injury and the greatest public good must be a rational one, *ibid.* at 831, and that a decision must be considered arbitrary where the condemnor has failed to consider all important, relevant factors in making its determination. *Ibid.* at 833.

The Hodges note that there are two methods of bringing the curves into compliance with AASHTO standards which would intrude less upon their property rights than does the method the State has selected. The Hodges argue that the State did not consider all important, relevant factors when it rejected these two alternatives. Thus, the Hodges conclude that the condemnor's decision was arbitrary rather than rational.

Under one of the rejected alternatives, the State would move the centerline south instead of seventeen feet north at Station 62 + 19 and would take land from the Soldotna Airport rather than from the Hodges. Adoption of this alternative would cause three problems. First, moving the centerline south rather than seventeen feet north would exacerbate rather than eliminate the present horizontal curve to the south at Station 62 + 19. Second, on the south side of the road beginning at Station 71, the Soldotna Airport has a paved aircraft parking apron coming to within a few feet of the existing road. If the centerline is moved south, it will run through this aircraft parking apron.

The third problem concerns aboveground telephone lines which run on both the north and south sides of the road. The telephone company has scheduled replacement of the line on the north side regardless of the outcome of the Funny River Road Project. Thus, moving the centerline south will also necessitate moving the telephone line. Conversely, moving the centerline to the north would avoid an additional move of the lines.

As to the first problem, the State admits that there is a method whereby it could move the centerline south and still eliminate any safety hazard at Station 62 + 19 and comply with AASHTO standards. This method would entail rebuilding the road so

that the curve begins much sooner than it does and extends over a longer distance. This would lengthen the curve.

The State decided not to lengthen the curve because it believed lengthening the curve would necessitate costly purchases of additional land from Parcels 16, 18 and 20 which are on the south side of the road prior to Station 62 + 19 and the Soldotna Airport. However, in deciding not to lengthen the curve, the State failed to make even a rough quantitative estimate of either how much land it would have to purchase or how much such purchases would cost.

Without these quantitative estimates, we cannot discern whether it was reasonable for the State to conclude that lengthening the curve would require costly land acquisitions from Parcels 16, 18 and 20. We note that the road, even as widened by the Project, is only thirty-four feet wide. The State already owns an eighty-three foot wide right of way in front of Parcels 16, 18 and 20. Further, the State plans to purchase an additional thirty foot wide swath of right of way in front of Parcel 20 even though the State does not plan to lengthen the curve.

On its face, it is arguable that a right of way varying between eighty-three and 113 feet should be sufficient for a thirty-four foot wide road even if the curve is lengthened. Consequently, quantitative estimates of the amount and cost of the land which would have to be taken if the curve is lengthened are important, relevant factors.

As indicated above, the second factor which caused the State to reject the alternative of moving the centerline south is that the road would then go through the Soldotna Airport aircraft parking apron which begins at Station 71. The State, however, could move the centerline south and then curve it back north prior to Station 71 so as to avoid the parking apron. It may be that this alternative would be costly, or that it would be impossible to curve the road north and still comply with AASHTO standards. However, we do not know whether it would be too costly since the

State failed to estimate the cost. We also do not know if it would be possible to comply with AASHTO standards since the State failed to consider whether such compliance would be possible.

As an alternative to curving the centerline back north to avoid the parking apron, the State might instead relocate the parking apron. The State never considered this possibility. The record does not indicate whether there is land available for relocating the parking apron or how much such a relocation would cost. The State should have considered the possibility of relocating the parking apron, whether there is land available for the relocation, and how much the relocation would cost.

The third problem with moving the centerline south is that it would necessitate the relocation of a telephone line. However, the State's witness at the hearing was unable to provide an estimate of the cost of the relocation. The cost estimate is an important, relevant factor.

In summary, the State did not consider the following important, relevant factors when it rejected the idea of moving the centerline south:

- (1) the amount and cost of land acquisition from parcels 16, 18 and 20 which would be required if the curve at Station 62 + 19 were lengthened;
- (2) the cost of curving the centerline back north before Station 71 so as to avoid the aircraft parking apron;
- (3) whether it would be possible to curve the road back north before Station 71 and still comply with AASHTO standards;
- (4) whether there is land available to relocate the aircraft parking apron, and the cost of the relocation; and
- (5) the cost of moving the telephone line.

The State's failure to consider these important, relevant factors makes it impossible to rationally determine whether the intended taking is "compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury."²

2. AS 09.55.460(b).

In deciding to move the centerline seventeen feet north, the State failed to consider a second alternative of keeping the centerline where it is and widening the road by taking land from both sides, i.e. from both the Hodges and the Airport. The State apparently has a general policy of widening roads all on one side rather than some on each side. At the hearing, Guy Green of the State Department of Transportation attempted to explain the reasons for the policy as follows:

A: [O]ur roadway construction is easier accomplished and we get a better product if the widening is all done to one side . . .

Q: Okay. Then the policy of the department take all off of one side—the widening off of one side is a matter of choice, it has absolutely nothing to do with necessity or need, it's just a matter of choice.

A: No, I think that we make some comparisons, there are many factors that we have to consider. We have to consider existing utilities that are in place and we try to look at the overall cost picture of what it's going to cost us. And we try to provide the best and the safest facility that we can.

We do not find Green's explanation satisfactory. He did not explain why a road is better if it is widened all on one side, and thus we cannot discern whether the policy of widening all on one side rather than some on each side has a rational basis. The State should either have sufficiently explained its general policy of not widening on both sides so that we could have discerned that the policy is rational, or the State should have given serious consideration to the possibility of widening on both sides. Again, the State's failure to take either step precluded a rational determination of whether the intended taking is "... compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury."³

3. Indeed, we have serious doubts as to whether any such general policy could meet the requirement of the statute of "individualized consider-

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For the reasons set forth above, the State cannot presently take the Hodges' land. Failing as it did to consider critical information, the State's action is arbitrary.⁴ However, if the State takes into consideration the factors set forth in this opinion and again determines that taking the 2.072 acres from the Hodges is necessary, it may initiate new proceedings to take the land. Under such circumstances, we will uphold the taking against a challenge by the Hodges unless the State's decision is in some other respect arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.⁵

AFFIRMED.

RABINOWITZ, Justice, dissenting.

I am of the view that the court's opinion has placed too high a burden upon the state to establish the validity of its condemnation. On this record I would reverse the superior court's determination that the taking of the Hodges' 2.072 acres is unnecessary and therefore barred.

In *Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC*, 435 U.S. 519, 551, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 1215-1216, 55 L.Ed.2d 460, 484 (1978) the Supreme Court observed:

Common sense also teaches us that the 'detailed statement of alternatives' cannot be found wanting simply because the agency failed to include every alternative device and thought conceivable by the mind of man. Time and resources are

at the private injury to be suffered by each landholder . . ." *State v. 0.644 Acres*, 613 P.2d 829, 832 (Alaska 1980).

4. *State v. 0.644 Acres, More or Less*, 613 P.2d 829, 833 n. 13 (Alaska 1980).

5. The Hodges argue that airport land should be taken rather than their land because the road project mainly benefits the airport and also because the airport is publicly owned whereas their land is private. We reject the Hodges' argument. AS 09.55.460(b) commands that the taking "be by necessity for a public use or purpose in a manner compatible with the greatest public good and least private injury." Whether the road project mainly benefits the airport and whether the land to be taken is public or private are irrelevant to the statutory command.

simply too limited to hold that an impact statement fails because the agency failed to ferret out every possible alternative, regardless of how uncommon or unknown that alternative may have been at the time the project was approved.

Unfortunately, the common sense approach of *Vermont Yankee* appears to have been overlooked by the majority.¹

If the court's approach is carried out fully in future cases, a condemnee will be able to attack a condemnor's determination of necessity simply by pointing out that the condemnor failed to consider some alternative in detail.² Once the condemnee does this, the condemnor will be under a burden to show either that it did consider the alternative or that the alternative did not have to be considered because it was completely infeasible. Regardless of which course of action it chooses to take, the condemnor will have to present substantial evidence in support of its assertions. Exhaustive cost estimates will be required to back up assertions about costs even in situations where common sense indicates that the alternative in question would involve substantial expense. Only after the condemnor has presented detailed evidence that it considered all possible alternatives or had good reasons for not doing so, will the condemnee be required to shoulder the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the condemnor's evaluation of the alternatives and

The Hodges also argue against taking their land on grounds that the road is already safe and thus it is unnecessary to comply with AASHTO safety standards. The Hodges note that there is no evidence that any accidents have ever occurred on the road since it was built in the early 1960's.

We conclude that the State does not have to wait until an accident occurs before it can take the land for the purpose of complying with AASHTO safety standards. Moreover, the State must comply with AASHTO safety standards if it is to receive 95% federal funding.

1. See also, *Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt*, 626 F.2d 1068, 1074 (1st Cir. 1980).
2. The condemnee will not be required to present evidence that the alternative is feasible before making such a challenge.

thus its determination of necessity was arbitrary. In light of the burden that the majority's approach places on the condemnor to establish the *prima facie* validity of its determination of necessity, only a few condemnees may ever be forced to present evidence.³

In my opinion, the court's opinion does not comport with the 1976 amendments to Alaska's statutory provisions relating to declarations of taking.⁴ In amending the declaration of taking laws, the legislature clearly intended to (1) reverse the court's decision in *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less*, 539 P.2d 64 (Alaska 1975),⁵ and (2) require condemnors to consider alternatives to proposed takings so that private harm could be minimized without sacrificing the interest of the public. There is no evidence, however, that the legislature intended its amendments to change the summary nature of a declaration of taking. The amendments do not require the use of any special investigatory procedures. I think it evident that the legislature intended that the condemnor would have primary responsibility for determining how far to go in investigating alternatives to a taking.

Under an approach which I believe to be more in accord with the legislature's intent, I would require that a condemnor, in order to establish the *prima facie* validity of its determination of necessity, must show only that the taking is "reasonably requisite and proper for the accomplishment of the purpose for which it is sought," *City of Fairbanks v. Metro Co.*, 540 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Alaska 1975), and that it made an effort to

3. The majority's approach will have an enormous practical impact. In order to protect themselves from legal challenges, condemnors will probably undertake elaborate pre-taking studies of alternatives. These developments will add greatly to the administrative costs of taking lands and will probably result in significant delays of needed projects.

4. See *State v. 0.644 Acres, More or Less*, 613 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1980).

5. In *Arco Pipeline*, we held that we would not examine the necessity of a taking under a declaration of taking unless the condemnee presented clear and convincing evidence of "fraud, bad faith, or some gross abuse of dis-

investigate alternatives so as to minimize private injury without "impairing the integrity and function of the project and without adding unreasonable costs to the project." *State v. 0.644 Acres, More or Less*, 613 P.2d 829, 832-33 (Alaska 1980). Once the condemnor has made this requisite showing the burden shifts to the condemnee to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the condemnor arbitrarily failed to investigate a promising alternative or that the condemnor's conclusions about a particular alternative were irrational.

Applying this alternative analysis I conclude that the superior court erred in vacating the State's declaration of taking. The State presented substantial evidence that the taking was reasonably requisite and proper for the road project, and the State's witnesses testified that when it was discovered that the current project plan would necessitate the taking of land from the Hodges, the State planners considered the potential injury to the Hodges and ways of reducing it. The State concluded that the costs of acquiring land for lengthening the curve, of curving the relocated centerline so that the road would avoid the Soldotna Airport's aircraft parking apron (or the cost of land for a relocation of the parking apron), and of relocating a half-mile stretch of telephone line were substantial and outweighed the private injury that would result from the taking. This decision was not irrational on its face even if the State did not develop and use detailed cost estimates in making the determination or supporting it in court.⁶

cretion" on the part of the condemnor. 539 P.2d at 72-73.

6. The State did not abuse its discretion by not considering widening the road on both sides. That alternative would have required the State to acquire land on the southern side of the road and relocate the telephone line. The Hodges presented no evidence that the costs of these actions were so low that it was unreasonable for the State not to investigate the alternative.

Moreover, in my opinion, the State has a valid point when it cites in support of its position the general state policy against widening both sides of a road. Unless the legislature provides otherwise, it seems to me that general

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Once the *prima facie* validity of the State's determination of necessity had been established, the burden shifted to the Hodges to present evidence that contradicted either the State's claim that it had considered the potential injury to the Hodges and had investigated all reasonable alternatives, or the State's conclusions concerning the feasibility of various alternatives. The Hodges did not present such evidence.

For these reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion, and would reverse the judgment of the superior court.

conflicted with state statutes and thus was void; and (3) award of full attorney fees of \$4,615.50 was justified.

Affirmed.

1. **Zoning and Planning** \Rightarrow 571 -

Where borough ordinance allowing land to be subdivided into parcels of ten acres or more without presentation of plat to planning commission harmed title insurer's economic interests by substantially increasing its burden in determining titles and its exposure to liability, title insurer had standing to challenge validity of such ordinance.

2. **Zoning and Planning** \Rightarrow 14

Borough ordinance allowing land to be subdivided into parcels of ten acres or more without presentation of plat to planning commission conflicted with state statute requiring that all subdivisions be submitted for approval to platting authority and state statute permitting waiver, on individual basis, of platting requirement when specified findings are made by platting authority, and thus ordinance was void. AS 29.33.170, 40.15.010.

3. **Zoning and Planning** \Rightarrow 729

Trial court was within its discretion in considering litigation challenging validity of borough ordinance governing land subdivision to be within public interest exception to general rule that prevailing party was to be awarded only partial attorney fees, and thus award of full attorney fees of \$4,615.50 was justified.

4. **Appeal and Error** \Rightarrow 170(1)


Where appellant's claim that there was no case or controversy was not raised in trial court, such claim was waived.

Joseph L. Kashi, Asst. Borough Atty., Andrew R. Sarisky, Borough Atty., Kenai, for appellant.

policy was irrational, not on the State to show that it was rational.

In action challenging validity of borough ordinance allowing land to be subdivided into parcels of ten acres or more without presentation of plat to planning commission, the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Kenai, Victor D. Carlson, J., granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment holding ordinance to be inconsistent with state law, and borough appealed. The Supreme Court, Matthews, J., held that: (1) title insurer had standing to challenge validity of ordinance; (2) ordinance

policies formulated by administrative agencies should be presumed to be rational. The burden was on the Hodges to show that the widening



KENAI PENINSULA BOROUGH,
Appellant,

v.

KENAI PENINSULA BOARD OF REAL-
TORS, INC.; Kachemak Board of Realtors, Inc.; Alaska Society of Professional Land Surveyors, Kenai Peninsula Chapter; and Kachemak Bay Title Agency, Inc., Appellees.

No. 6374.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Oct. 15, 1982.

APPENDIX D

**ALASKAN STATE STATUTES AND
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE**

§ 09.55.310

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Cross references. — For appointment of masters, see Civ. R. 53; for hearing before master, see Civ. R. 72(h)(2).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Judicial review inappropriate to proceedings under declaration of taking. — The concept of judicial review embodied in Alaska's general eminent domain statutes is inconsistent with, and inappropriate to, proceedings under a declaration of taking. Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975).

The question of necessity under a declaration of taking is not one for initial judicial consideration as in the case of other condemnation proceedings. Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975).

For distinction between proceedings in condemnation under a declaration of taking and those under a complaint seeking condemnation and an order for possession, see Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975).

Determination of whether parcel is within original scope of public project. — A determination in a particular case of whether a parcel is within the original scope of a public project subsequently enlarged to require the taking of the tract is a question for the trier of fact. State v. Alaska Continental Dev. Corp., Sup. Ct. Op. No. 2254 (File Nos. 4121, 4122), 630 P.2d 977 (1980).

No finding necessary to issuance of order appointing master. — No "finding" seems to be necessary to the issuance of the order appointing commissioners (now master) to appraise damages. *Alaska Gold Recovery Co. v. Northern Mining & Trading Co.*, 7 Alaska 655 (1927).

And such order is not appealable. — The order appointing commissioners (now master) cannot be regarded as appealable. *Alaska Gold Recovery Co. v. Northern Mining & Trading Co.*, 7 Alaska 655 (1927).

Except for abuse of discretion. — An order appointing commissioners (now master) can only be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, if at all. *Alaska Gold Recovery Co. v. Northern Mining & Trading Co.*, 7 Alaska 655 (1927).

"Owner" includes purchaser under contract. — An instruction "that the term 'owner' to whom compensation must be paid, may include a purchaser under contract who has an interest in the land sought to be taken or damaged," is entirely proper. *State v. Bradshaw Land & Livestock Co.*, 43 P.2d 674 (Mont. 1935), construing the Montana statute.

Cited in *State, Dep't of Transp. & Pub. Facilities v. 0.644 Acres, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 2118 (File No. 4861), 613 P.2d 829 (1980)*.

Collateral references. — Propriety of court's consideration of ecological effects of

proposed project in determining right of condemnation, 47 ALR3d 1267.

Sec. 09.55.310. Hearing. (a) The jury or master shall hear the allegations and evidence of persons interested and shall ascertain and assess the following:

(1) the value of the property sought to be condemned, and all improvements on it pertaining to the realty, and of each separate estate or interest in it; if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and each estate or interest in each parcel shall be separately assessed;

(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought

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to be condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvements in the manner proposed by the plaintiff;

(3) separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned and each estate or interest in it will be benefited, if at all, by the construction of the improvements proposed by the plaintiff; and, if the benefit is equal to the damages assessed under (2) of this section, the owner of the parcel shall be allowed no damages except the value of the portion taken; but if the benefits are less than the damages so assessed, the former shall be deducted from the latter and the remainder shall be the only damages allowed in addition to the value;

(4) if the property sought to be condemned is for a railroad, the cost of good and sufficient fences along the line of the railroad, and the cost of cattle guards where fences may cross the line of the railroad.

(b) As far as practicable, compensation shall be assessed for each source of damages separately. (§ 13.08 ch 101 SLA 1962; am § 2 ch 138 SLA 1968)

Cross references. — For related court rules, see Civ. R. 72(e)(4) and (h).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

I. General Consideration.

II. Just Compensation.

A. Generally.

B. Damages to Remainder.

C. Benefits to Remainder.

III. Role of Witnesses.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Editor's notes. — All notes from Montana decisions appearing under this section are constructions of the Montana statute from which the section derives.

Measure of damages. — The measure of damages in a proceeding for the condemnation of land for public highway is the fair market value of the land sought to be condemned with the depreciation of such value of the land from which the strip is to be taken, less allowable deductions for benefits proven which values are to be determined as of the date of the commencement of the proceeding. *Lewis & Clark County v. Nett*, 263 P. 418 (Mont. 1928).

Independent parcels. — When parts of the same establishment are separated by intervening private lands, they are generally considered as independent parcels. *State v. Bradshaw Land & Livestock Co.*, 43 P.2d 674 (Mont. 1935).

Duty of master. — It is the commissioners (master's) duty to examine the lands sought to be condemned, hear the allegations and evidence of all parties interested, and ascertain and assess the damages done to the persons whose lands are sought to be appropriated. *Spratt v. Helena Power Transmission Co.*, 94 P. 631 (Mont. 1908).

Applied in *State v. Hammer*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1268 (File Nos. 2500, 2660), 550 P.2d 820 (1976).

Cited in *Scavenius v. City of Anchorage*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1182 (File No. 2193), 539 P.2d 1161 (1975).

II. JUST COMPENSATION.

A. Generally.

Valuation of property. — See notes under AS 09.55.330, analysis line II, "Just Compensation."

Fair market value is an appropriate measure of the just compensation guaranteed by Alaska Const., art. I, § 18. Dash

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v. State, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 756 (File No. 1405), 491 P.2d 1069 (1971).

One criterion for determining value is what the property is worth on the market—its fair market value, and this is to be determined by a just consideration of all the uses for which a property is suitable. *Dash v. State, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 756 (File No. 1405)*, 491 P.2d 1069 (1971).

The essential difference between market price and market value lies in the premises of intelligence, knowledge and willingness, all of which are contemplated in market value but not in market price. Stated differently, at any given moment of time, market value connotes what a property is actually worth and market price what it may be sold for. *Dash v. State, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 756 (File No. 1405)*, 491 P.2d 1069 (1971).

"Best use" evidence. — See *Dash v. State, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 756 (File No. 1405)*, 491 P.2d 1069 (1971).

In determining just compensation, usually measured by the "market value" of the property, the highest and most profitable use for which the land is adaptable may be considered to the extent that the prospective demand for such use affects the property's present market value. *Dash v. State, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 756 (File No. 1405)*, 491 P.2d 1069 (1971).

A truly speculative or imagined use should not be considered. *Dash v. State, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 756 (File No. 1405)*, 491 P.2d 1069 (1971).

Evidence of use as subdivision. — Many courts, including Alaska's, have allowed evidence of a reasonably probable subdivision to be admitted to prove the adaptability of the land for subdivision use. *Dash v. State, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 756 (File No. 1405)*, 491 P.2d 1069 (1971).

The majority of courts allow evidence of a potential subdivision only for the limited purpose of showing the adaptability of the land for subdivision purposes. *Dash v. State, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 756 (File No. 1405)*, 491 P.2d 1069 (1971).

The courts are much more liberal in admitting evidence of a potential subdivision when some preliminary steps have been taken to develop the land. *Dash v. State, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 756 (File No. 1405)*, 491 P.2d 1069 (1971).

Where there is testimony that the highest and best use of the property is as an industrial subdivision, and evidence that other property in the immediate area was subdivided for industrial purposes, the proposed subdivision is not purely conjectural or speculative. *Dash v. State, Op. No. 756 (File No. 1405)*, 491 P.2d 1069 (1971).

Sup. Ct. Op. No. 756 (File No. 1405), 491 P.2d 1069 (1971).

If the land were adaptable for subdivision purposes, it would seem that the potential income to be derived from sales of the subdivided lots would be highly relevant to a determination of the "market value," especially to the extent that sophisticated investors who make decisions on the basis of income capitalization take part in market transactions. *Dash v. State, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 756 (File No. 1405)*, 491 P.2d 1069 (1971).

Capitalization of income, in contexts other than proposed subdivisions, has been recognized as an accepted method of valuation by a number of jurisdictions. Although capitalization of anticipated proceeds from a proposed subdivision necessarily has a speculative element, it still has a direct impact on the property's market value since it will influence investment decisions and thereby affect supply and demand. *Dash v. State, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 756 (File No. 1405)*, 491 P.2d 1069 (1971).

To the extent that the "just compensation" guarantee in Alaska Const., art. I, § 18, comprises a notion of fair market value rather than merely the price the property will bring in an imperfect market, income capitalization must be considered particularly apposite. *Dash v. State, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 756 (File No. 1405)*, 491 P.2d 1069 (1971).

Even in a market place where a parcel's price is unaffected by its income potential, income capitalization must be considered to have a bearing on "market value." The danger that market price will not closely reflect market value is enhanced when the property is not currently generating income. *Dash v. State, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 756 (File No. 1405)*, 491 P.2d 1069 (1971).

An expert's testimony which capitalized the anticipated rentals from a proposed recreational subdivision to arrive at an estimate of fair market value was properly admitted. *Dash v. State, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 756 (File No. 1405)*, 491 P.2d 1069 (1971).

As to admission of expert testimony on market value based on the development costs and income capitalization of a potential subdivision, see *Dash v. State, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 756 (File No. 1405)*, 491 P.2d 1069 (1971).

Questions relative to revenue produced from the property taken is admissible for the purpose of arriving at the market value of the property. *State v. Peterson*, 328 P.2d 617 (Mont. 1958).

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Value of improvements. — If improvements on the property enhance the market value then the value of those improvements is material; if improvements do not enhance the market value, they are not material. *State v. Peterson*, 328 P.2d 617 (Mont. 1958).

The true rule seems to be for the witness to testify as to the nature of the improvements, their use, and then, probably, state that the improvements enhance the market value of the land. He may then testify as to the consideration of the improvements and their condition and value at the time of the condemnation. *State v. Peterson*, 328 P.2d 617 (Mont. 1958).

Testimony as to amounts invested in the lands and improvements would be incompetent, for it is the value of all such at the time summons is served that counts. *State v. Peterson*, 328 P.2d 617 (Mont. 1958).

Loss of business by relocation of highway. — It is clear that compensation cannot be had for loss of business by relocation of a highway and diversion of traffic. *State v. Peterson*, 328 P.2d 617 (Mont. 1958).

The owner of land abutting on a highway established by the public has no property or other vested right in the continuance of it as a highway at public expense, and, at least in the absence of deprivation of ingress and egress, cannot claim damages for its mere discontinuance, although such discontinuance diverts traffic from his door and diminishes his trade and thus depreciates the value of his land. *State v. Hoblitt*, 288 P. 181 (Mont. 1930).

Sale fifteen months after date of taking. — As to admission into evidence of a sale taking place fifteen months after the date of the taking by the state, see *Dash v. State, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 756 (File No. 1405), 491 P.2d 1069 (1971)*.

B. Damages to Remainder.

Assessment of damages refers to "portion sought to be condemned." — The assessment of damages the award of the commissioners (master) provided for in this section is made with reference to property sought to be appropriated or "portion sought to be condemned," not to property already condemned at the time of the appointment. *Alaska Gold Recovery Co. v. Northern Mining & Trading Co.*, 7 Alaska 655 (1927).

The award of damages is a substantial fact, which fixes the just compensa-

tion to which relator is entitled, until revised on appeal. *State ex rel. Volunteer Mining Co. v. McHatton*, 38 P. 711 (Mont. 1894).

Recoverable damages must be the natural and proximate consequence of the action taken; they must be direct and certain, actual and reasonable, readily ascertainable, and not remote speculative or contingent. *Lewis & Clark County v. Nett*, 263 P. 418 (Mont. 1928); *State v. Bradshaw Land & Livestock Co.*, 43 P.2d 674 (Mont. 1935).

Not every possible element of depreciation is compensable. — It is not every possible element of depreciation in value for which compensation must be awarded in an eminent domain proceeding. *Lewis & Clark County v. Nett*, 263 P. 418 (Mont. 1928).

And attempt to enumerate elements of depreciation is futile. — Any attempt to enumerate the various circumstances which may enter into depreciation of the market value of a tract of land would be futile. *Lewis & Clark County v. Nett*, 263 P. 418 (Mont. 1928).

Highway destroying the close and requiring additional fencing. — One of the circumstances which directly depreciates the market value of land is that the opening of a highway through a fenced tract of land destroys the close and necessitates additional fencing in order to reestablish it. *Lewis & Clark County v. Nett*, 263 P. 418 (Mont. 1928).

An item of damages which would enter into the depreciation of the value of a tract is the cost of constructing a fence along the highway to maintain an enclosure. *State v. Hoblitt*, 288 P. 181 (Mont. 1930).

The damage suffered and the amount of depreciation is readily ascertainable by testimony as to the reasonable cost of construction of fences to maintain enclosure and the consideration of such an item has generally been upheld. *Lewis & Clark County v. Nett*, 263 P. 418 (Mont. 1928).

Fence as fence. — In the absence of statutory justification therefor no allowance can be made for a fence as a fence. *Lewis & Clark County v. Nett*, 263 P. 418 (Mont. 1928).

Necessity of fencing and cost goes only to show depreciation by reason of taking. — Proof of the necessity of such fencing, and its cost, is proper only as a means of showing the depreciation in market value of the land by reason of the taking and use of a part of the land. *Lewis & Clark County v. Nett*, 263 P. 418 (Mont. 1928).

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Maintenance of fences is too remote.

— Maintenance of fences would be a known future burden upon the lands, but the claim should be disregarded as too remote, and as incapable of definite ascertainment or determination at the time the depreciation in value must be determined, i.e., as of the time of the commencement of the proceeding. *Lewis & Clark County v. Nett*, 263 P. 418 (Mont. 1928).

Appraisal of damages prior to construction of improvements. — When damages are appraised prior to the construction of the improvements for which the land is condemned, the estimate should be made on the assumption that the improvements will be properly constructed; and, if they are constructed pending the condemnation proceedings, the rule should be the same. The actual effect of the properly constructed improvements in the manner proposed by plaintiff as to the larger parcels should control the appraisal. If the improvements are improperly or negligently constructed, no additional damage should be given for this reason. *City of Anchorage v. Scavenius*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1183 (File Nos. 2214, 2222), 539 P.2d 1169 (1975).

Depreciation of adjacent tract. — In arriving at a conclusion as to the damages to be awarded, the triers of facts should consider all of the circumstances which immediately and directly depreciate the present market value of the portions of the whole tract adjacent to the strip sought to be taken as a right-of-way. *Lewis & Clark County v. Nett*, 263 P. 418 (Mont. 1928).

Costs and attorney's fees. — City was entitled to award of costs and attorney's fees for successful defense of negligence claim pertaining to pavement damage occurring when water main installed. *City of Anchorage v. Scavenius*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1183 (File Nos. 2214, 2222), 539 P.2d 1169 (1975).

C. Benefits to Remainder.

Effect of special benefits. — The rule in Alaska is that special benefits to the remainder can only be used to offset severance damages to the remainder. In the event that special benefits exceed severance damages, the landowner is still entitled to receive the full market value of the portion actually taken. *Dash v. State*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 756 (File No. 1405), 491 P.2d 1069 (1971).

General enhancement of land values is not a proper element of benefit. — The general enhancement of values in land in the vicinity because of the con-

struction of a road is not a proper element of benefit to be allowed. *Gallatin Valley Elec. Ry. v. Neible*, 186 P. 689 (Mont. 1919).

It may be stated as a general rule that general and neighborhood benefits resulting to the owner in common with others may not be set off against the damages to the owner. *Gallatin Valley Elec. Ry. v. Neible*, 186 P. 689 (Mont. 1919).

The benefits which may be deducted must be special or local, or such as result directly and peculiarly to the particular tract of which a part is taken. *Gallatin Valley Elec. Ry. v. Neible*, 186 P. 689 (Mont. 1919).

III. ROLE OF WITNESSES.

Role of expert witness in eminent domain proceedings. — See *Dash v. State*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 756, (File No. 1405), 491 P.2d 1069 (1971).

Opinions of witnesses. — The opinions of witnesses must be resorted to determine (1) the value of the land taken; (2) the detriment, if any to the portion not taken, or, in other words the value of that not taken; and (3) the benefits, if any, to the portion not taken. *Yellowstone Park R. Co. v. Bridger Coal Co.*, 87 P. 963 (Mont. 1906).

The right mode of proving value is to take the sworn opinions of those who are shown to be competent to give opinions on the subject, and let them be cross-examined as to the foundation of their opinions, their means of knowledge and the motives prompting them. *Yellowstone Park R. Co. v. Bridger Coal Co.*, 87 P. 963 (Mont. 1906).

The question of how the taking of a right-of-way affects the premises in the market should logically be determined by testimony of qualified witnesses as to the cash market value of the premises today and what that value would be today considering the highway as constructed across them and permitting the witnesses, on cross-examination, to state the manner in which they arrived at their conclusion on the subject. *Lewis & Clark County v. Nett*, 263 P. 418 (Mont. 1928).

Competency of witnesses. — One who knows the real property in question and is familiar with the uses to which it may be put, may testify as to its market value. *State v. Peterson*, 328 P.2d 617 (Mont. 1958).

It must appear that the witness has some peculiar means of forming an intelligent and correct judgment as to the value of the property in question beyond what is

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presumed to be possessed by men generally. *State v. Peterson*, 328 P.2d 617 (Mont. 1958).

Value of real estate may be proved by witnesses other than experts. *State v. Peterson*, 328 P.2d 617 (Mont. 1958).

The witness need not know of any sales and he need not be a technical expert. *State v. Peterson*, 328 P.2d 617 (Mont. 1958).

A witness as to value of property need not to have been engaged in buying or selling the same. *State v. Peterson*, 328 P.2d 617 (Mont. 1958).

Who are competent to give opinions on value of property is generally in the discretion of the trial judge. *State v. Peterson*, 328 P.2d 617 (Mont. 1958).

Weight of testimony is jury question. — The question of what weight to give witness testimony is one for the jury to decide upon the evidence produced at the trial and under the court's instructions on the law. *Alaska State Hous. Auth. v. Vincent*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 261 (File No. 458), 396 P.2d 531 (1964).

Collateral references. — Admissibility of evidence of promissory statements of condemner as to character of use or undertakings to be performed by it. 5 ALR2d 381.

Admissibility in condemnation proceedings of opinion evidence as to probable profits derivable from land condemned if devoted to particular agricultural purposes. 16 ALR2d 1113.

Admissibility, in eminent domain proceeding, of evidence as to price paid for condemned real property during pendency of the proceeding. 55 ALR2d 781.

Admissibility of hearsay evidence as to comparable sales of other land as basis for expert's opinion as to land value. 12 ALR3d 1064.

Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of argument or evidence as to landowner's unwillingness to sell property. 17 ALR3d 1449.

Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of argument or evidence as to source of funds to pay for property. 19 ALR3d 694.

Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of instruction to the jury as to landowner's unwillingness to sell property. 20 ALR3d 1081.

Propriety and effect of argument or evidence as to financial status of parties in eminent domain proceeding. 21 ALR3d 936.

Admissibility, on issue of value of condemned real property, of rental value of other real property. 23 ALR2d 724.

Admissibility of photographs or models of property condemned. 23 ALR3d 825.

Admissibility of evidence of proposed or possible subdivision or platting of condemned land on issue of value in eminent domain proceedings. 26 ALR3d 780.

Right in eminent domain proceeding to call as witness expert engaged but not called as witness by opposing party. 71 ALR3d 1119.

Necessity of trial or proceeding, separate from main condemnation trial or proceeding, to determine divided interest in state condemnation award. 94 ALR3d 696.

Sec. 09.55.320. Right to jury trial as to damages and value of property. An interested party may appeal the master's award of damages and valuation of the property, in which case there shall be a trial by jury on the question of the amount of damages and the value of the property, unless the jury is waived by the consent of all parties to the appeal. (§ 13.09 ch 101 SLA 1962)

Cross references. — For related court rules, see Civ. R. 72(h)(4) and (5).

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and the deposit of the estimated compensation. *Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church of N. Am. v. Alaska State Hous. Auth.*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 809 (File No. 1600), 498 P.2d 737 (1972).

It is the objection which calls for the hearing. A motion for hearing with supporting affidavits is not required. *State, Dep't of Transp. & Pub. Facilities v. 0.644 Acres*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 2118 (File No. 4861), 613 P.2d 829 (1980).

As to showings necessary where

owner contests validity of taking, see *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975).

For distinction between proceedings in condemnation under declaration of taking and those under complaint seeking condemnation and order for possession, see *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975).

Collateral references. — Condemnor's acquisition of, or right to, minerals under land taken in eminent domain, 36 ALR2d 1424.

Charging landowner with rent or use value of land where he remains in possession after condemnation, 20 ALR3d 1164.

Sec. 09.55.460. Effect of appeal. (a) No appeal or a bond or undertaking given operates to prevent or delay the vesting of title to real property or the right to possession of it.

(b) The plaintiff may not be divested of a title or possession acquired except where the court finds that the property was not taken by necessity for a public use or purpose in a manner compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. In the event of that finding, the court shall enter the judgment necessary to (1) compensate the persons entitled to it for the period during which the property was in the possession of the plaintiff, (2) recover for the plaintiff any award paid to any person, and (3) order the plaintiff to restore the property to the condition in which it existed at the time of the filing of the declaration of taking unless such restoration is impossible, in which case the court shall award damages to the proper persons as compensation for any diminution in the value of the property caused by the plaintiff's wrongful possession. (§ 13.23 ch 101 SLA 1962; am § 3 ch 149 SLA 1976)

Legislative history reports. — For report on ch. 149, SLA 1976 (HCSSB 546), see 1976 House Journal, p. 945.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Presumption that taking is reasonably requisite to realization of public use. — Once an authorized public use for the taking is established by the condemnor, and statutory and procedural requirements are otherwise satisfied, that the particular taking is reasonably requisite to the realization of that use shall be presumed. *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less*, Sup. Ct. Op. No.

1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975).

The question of necessity under a declaration of taking is not one for initial judicial consideration as in the case of other condemnation proceedings. *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975).

The concept of judicial review embodied in Alaska's general eminent domain stat-

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costs found to be due to the defendant in the action. No costs or attorney fees shall be assessed against the defendant in an action brought under AS 09.55.390. (§ 13.17 ch 101 SLA 1962)

Cross references. — For related court rule, see Civ. R. 72(j).

Collateral references. — Payment or

deposit of award in court as affecting condemnor's right to appeal. 40 ALR3d 203.

Sec. 09.55.410. Withdrawal of funds by party in interest. The money deposited in the court or a part of it may be withdrawn by a party in interest in the manner provided in AS 09.55.440, and the court shall have the power to direct the payment of delinquent taxes and special assessments out of the amount determined to be just compensation and to make orders with respect to encumbrances, liens, rents, insurance, and other charges as are just and equitable. (§ 13.18 ch 101 SLA 1962)

Sec. 09.55.420. Declaration of taking by state or municipality.

(a) Where a proceeding is instituted under AS 09.55.240 — 09.55.460 by the state, it may file a declaration of taking with the complaint or at any time after the filing of the complaint, but before judgment. Where a proceeding is instituted under AS 09.55.240 — 09.55.460 by a municipality in the exercise of eminent domain for street or highway, off-street automobile parking facilities, school, sewer, water, telephone, electric, other utility, and slum clearance purposes or use granted to cities of the first class, the governing body of the municipality may exercise the power through the filing of a declaration of taking with the complaint or at any time after the filing of the complaint, but before judgment. The declaration of taking procedure may not be used with relation to the property of rural electrification or telephone cooperatives or nonprofit associations receiving financial assistance from the federal government under the Rural Electrification Act; provided that no declaration of taking for off-street parking purposes may be used unless there has been public notice by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the area for not less than once a week for four consecutive weeks followed by a full and complete public hearing held before the governing body of the first class city or municipality.

(b) [Repealed, § 15 ch 59 SLA 1982.] (§ 13.19 ch 101 SLA 1962; am § 2 ch 122 SLA 1966; am § 2 ch 62 SLA 1973; am § 15 ch 59 SLA 1982)

Effect of amendments. — The 1982 amendment repealed subsection (b), which concerned the exercise of the power of declaration of taking by certain home rule cities until July 1, 1975.

Legislative history reports. — For report on ch. 122, SLA 1966 (HB 418 am 5), see 1966 House Journal, p. 432.

Opinions of attorney general. — AS 09.55.420 — 09.55.440 were taken almost word for word from 40 USC 258a, except for substitutions of "state, public utility district, or school district" for "United States." 1960 Op. Att'y Gen., No. 15.

A determination to condemn by an agency acting under power to condemn

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delegated to it by the legislature would not become a problem requiring judicial action unless a lack of necessity for a public use could be shown, and if there is no fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion. 1960 Op. Att'y Gen., No. 15.

The question of the necessity of taking land for public use is primarily a "legislative" question rather than a "judicial" question. 1960 Op. Att'y Gen., No. 15.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Legislative history of this section. — See *Greater Anchorage Area Borough v. 10 Acres More or Less*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1417 (File Nos. 2706, 2707), 563 P.2d 269 (1977).

This section specifically authorizes the state to use a declaration of taking. *Babinec v. State*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 908 (File No. 1539), 512 P.2d 563 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1763, 586 P.2d 966 (1978).

AS 09.55.420 — 09.55.440 were taken, etc.

Basis in federal law. — Alaska's declaration of taking statutes were patterned upon the language of 40 U.S.C. § 258(a) which governs "quick take" eminent domain proceedings by the United States. *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975).

The declaration of taking is a power of eminent domain, and not only a manner of exercising a power otherwise conferred. More than procedure is involved; substantive rights are affected. *Bridges v. Alaska Hous. Auth.*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1 (File No. 16), 349 P.2d 149 (1959); *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975).

Power is strictly construed. — A grant of power of eminent domain is to be strictly construed against the condemning party and in favor of the property owner. *Bridges v. Alaska Hous. Auth.*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1 (File No. 16), 349 P.2d 149 (1959).

It is confined within definite limits. — The legislature was particular in selecting those upon whom the power to exercise a declaration of taking would be conferred and particular also in confining this authority within definite limits. *Bridges v. Alaska Hous. Auth.*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1 (File No. 16), 349 P.2d 149 (1959).

And the Alaska Housing Authority may not use a declaration of taking. *Bridges v. Alaska Hous. Auth.*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1 (File No. 16), 349 P.2d 149 (1959); *Bridges v. Alaska Hous. Auth.*,

Sup. Ct. Op. No. 8 (File No. 46), 352 P.2d 1118 (1960).

Borough is "municipal division". — Under this provision, the term "municipal division" clearly encompasses boroughs as well as cities. Therefore, for purposes of the eminent domain statute, a borough is a municipal division and, as a municipality, could take land under this section. *Greater Anchorage Area Borough v. 10 Acres, More or Less*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1417 (File Nos. 2706, 2707), 563 P.2d 269 (1977).

A borough's authority to condemn land for a school can be inferred from the eminent domain statutory scheme. *Greater Anchorage Area Borough v. 10 Acres, More or Less*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1417 (File Nos. 2706, 2707), 563 P.2d 269 (1977).

A declaration of taking enlarges the rights of the condemning authority and reduces those of the landowner. *Bridges v. Alaska Hous. Auth.*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1 (File No. 16), 349 P.2d 149 (1959); *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975).

Summary exercise of power. — AS 09.55.420 — 09.55.450 were clearly intended to authorize a more summary and less judicially dependent exercise of the power of eminent domain. *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975).

The condemnor may take immediate possession of the property upon the filing of a declaration of taking with the complaint. *Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church of N. Am. v. Alaska State Hous. Auth.*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 809 (File No. 1600), 498 P.2d 737 (1972).

Vesting subject only to limited right of owner to contest. — The intent of AS 09.55.420 — 09.55.450 was to bring, in summary fashion, statutory finality to the questions of title and right to possession even though litigation continues with respect to the ultimate amount of compensation to be paid. If such finality is to be given any meaningful effect, such vesting must be subject only to the rather

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limited right of the owner to contest the validity of the taking as not being statutorily authorized or as having been capriciously or arbitrarily exercised. *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975)*.

Owner must show taking results from clear abuse of discretion. — To permit the owner to challenge the necessity of the particular taking without an initial showing on his part that it is the result of some clear abuse of discretion is to give the concept of a declaration of taking no more effect than that of a complaint in any condemnation proceeding; such an interpretation would render the language of AS 09.55.440 essentially meaningless. *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975)*.

And condemnor need not show necessity of taking. — The trial court erred in its determination that, for purposes of the exercise of the power of condemnation by way of a declaration of taking, petitioners have the burden of showing consideration of possible alternate pipeline routes and of providing sufficient proof of the necessity of the particular route selected. *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975)*.

A consideration of the clear legislative intent that the prompt completion of the pipeline be facilitated under the Right-of-Way Leasing Act. (AS 38.35.010 et seq.), the supreme court's reading and analysis of certain critical provisions governing the effect of the use of a declaration of taking and the continued recognition and validation of the approach it adopted in *Bridges v. Alaska Hous. Auth., Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1 (File No. 16), 349 P.2d 149 (1959)*, rev'd on other grounds, *Sup. Ct. Op. Nos. 8, 46, 352 P.2d 1118 (1960)*, lead to the conclusion that the court erred in concluding that in a proceeding for condemnation by way of a declaration of taking the court is empowered to require the condemnor to prove the necessity of a given taking. *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975)*.

Where it is clear that the use intended is public and statutorily authorized, and petitioners have presented unrebutted evidence to the effect that the design and construction criteria for the pipeline are most feasibly satisfied by the route across the

property of respondent, it cannot be said that petitioner is under any duty to initially submit evidence that it has considered such alternate routing; nor can the failure to make such showing under the circumstances justify a finding of arbitrariness or an abuse of discretion. *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975)*.

Presumption that taking is reasonably requisite to realization of public use. — Once an authorized public use for the taking is established by the condemnor, and statutory and procedural requirements are otherwise satisfied, that the particular taking is reasonably requisite to the realization of that use shall be presumed. *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975)*.

The question of necessity under a declaration of taking is not one for initial judicial consideration as in the case of other condemnation proceedings. *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975)*.

The concept of judicial review embodied in Alaska's general eminent domain statutes is inconsistent with, and inappropriate to, proceedings under a declaration of taking. *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975)*.

In proceedings in eminent domain by way of a declaration of taking under AS 09.55.420 through 09.55.450, the court is without authority, either by virtue of the express mandate of AS 09.55.460(b), or by implication from the legislative history and policy evidenced in AS 09.55.440, to review the question of the necessity of a particular taking absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, arbitrariness or an abuse of discretion in exercise of the power of condemnation by the condemning authority. *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975)*.

Notwithstanding such provisions as AS 09.55.270(2), judicial inquiry into such necessity or the condemnor's determinations with respect thereto is not appropriate unless and until the condemnee has presented clear and convincing evidence that the condemnor has acted in bad faith or so capriciously and arbitrarily as to indicate the absence of any reasonable determining principle. *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975)*.

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There exists a clear functional distinction between proceedings in condemnation under a declaration of taking and those under a complaint seeking condemnation and an order for possession. Under the former, title passes immediately upon filing and deposit — at which time, under AS 09.55.440, the property is deemed to be "condemned and taken for the use of the plaintiff." Under the latter no such vesting occurs; title does not vest, nor does "condemnation" actually occur until the final award is determined and an order and judgment of condemnation is entered by the court. *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less.* Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975).

The difference in the nature of proceedings in condemnation under a declaration of taking and those under a complaint seeking condemnation and an order for possession is not merely procedural; the almost summary quality of the former bespeaks the grant of an additional substantive power of condemnation which considerably reduces the rights of the landowner to contest the taking. *Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, More or Less.* Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1177 (File No. 2419), 539 P.2d 64 (1975).

Cited in *State, Dep't of Transp. & Pub. Facilities v. 0.644 Acres*, Sup. Ct. Op. No. 2118 (File No. 4861), 613 P.2d 829 (1980).

Sec. 09.55.430. Contents of declaration of taking. The declaration of taking shall contain

- (1) a statement of the authority under which the property or an interest in it is taken;
- (2) a statement of the public use for which the property or an interest in it is taken;
- (3) a description of the property sufficient for the identification of it;
- (4) a statement of the estate or interest in the property;
- (5) a map or plat showing the location of the property;
- (6) a statement of the amount of money estimated by the plaintiff to be just compensation for the property or the interest in it;
- (7) a statement that the property is taken by necessity for a project located in a manner which is most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. (§ 13.20 ch 101 SLA 1962; am § 1 ch 149 SLA 1976)

Cross references. — For appearance on answer, see Civ. R. 72(e)(3).

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